CATTANEO: Mario
Alessandro Cattaneo (Roma ) filosofo. Cattaneo è nato a Roma il 27 marzo
1934. Dopo avere frequentato a Milano le scuole superiori all'Istituto
Gonzaga si è iscritto all'Università statale di Milano dove si è
laureato in giurisprudenza con una tesi discussa dal prof. Renato Treves
nell'Istituto di Filosofia del diritto dell'Università statale di Milano, dove
è diventato assistente ordinario. Su consiglio dei professori Renato Treves e
Norberto Bobbio ha soggiornato al St Antony's College di Oxford seguendo
l'insegnamento del prof. Herbert L. Hart, professore di Giurisprudenza
all'Oxford, di cui su suggerimento dei professori Norberto Bobbio e di
Alessandro Passerin d'Entreves ha tradotto l'opera più famosa, The concept of
Law, scritta nel 1961, un volume di grande importanza nella filosofia giuridica
novecentesca. Cattaneo ha redatto la lunga introduzione sulla filosofia
giuridica del prof. Hart (il volume è ancora adottato da numerose università
italiane). È stato assistente ordinario di filosofia del diritto della cattedra
diretta dal prof. Renato Treves dal 1957 al 1967 con l'incarico di docente di
Storia delle dottrine politiche nell'Università statale di Milano. È diventato
libero docente di filosofia del diritto a 28 anni. Dal 1967 al 1973 è
stato Professore di filosofia del diritto all'Sassari. Dal 1973 al 1987 è stato
docente ordinario della stessa materia all'Ferrara. Dal 1987 al 2002 è stato
docente ordinario di filosofia del diritto all'Università degli studi di
Milano. Dal 2002 al 2006 è stato Professore di filosofia del diritto
all'Treviso (sede distaccata dell'Padova). Nel 1987 gli è stata conferita la
Medaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della scuola della cultura e dell'arte. È stato
Vicepresidente della Società italiana di Filosofia giuridica e politica.
In tutte le università dove ha insegnato è stato relatore di molte tesi di laurea
grazie anche alla collaborazione dei suoi assistenti ricercatori, dottori di
ricerca e cultori della materia. È stato socio in Italia dell'Istituto lombardo
di Scienze e Lettere di Milano, dell'Ateneo Veneto di Venezia, dell'Istituto
veneto di Scienze lettere ed arti di Venezia e dell'Accademia delle Scienze di
Ferrara. In Germania è stato socio della Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft
dell'Francoforte sul Meno. La sua produzione scientifica analizza l'evoluzione
storica delle teorie della pena e le opere dei grandi giuristi italiani,
francesi, tedeschi ed inglesi dell'illuminismo giuridico europeo con
particolare analisi della filosofia giuridica di Kant. Cattaneo ha anche
analizzato il rapporto tra diritto e letteratura esaminando i capolavori di
grandi scrittori europei. Ha organizzato importanti convegni scientifici tra
cui il "II Congresso nazionale della Società Italiana di Filosofia
Giuridica e Politica" il 2-5 ottobre 1978 (Atti : problemi della
sanzione-Società e diritto in Marx, Rinaldo Orecchia), il Colloquio
internazionale "Diritto e Stato nella Rivoluzione francese" tenutosi
a Milano il 1-3 ottobre 1990 (Atti Mario A. Cattaneo, Giuffrè 1992) ed il
"Colloquio internazionale per il bicentenario della morte di Immanuel Kant
(1804-2004)" tenutosi a Treviso il 1º ottobre 2004 (Atti Mario A. Cattaneo
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2005). È stato membro del comitato
scientifico di importanti riviste italiane sulle quali ha scritto numerosi
libri in italiano e tedesco e molti articoli in italiano, inglese, francese e
tedesco; inoltre ha redatto voci per dizionari giuridici. I suoi volumi sono
presenti in numerose biblioteche europee. È stato direttore della collana
"Filosofia del diritto e dignità umana" della casa editrice ESI di
Napoli che comprende 12 volumi redatti da diversi studiosi e della collana
“Studi storia della filosofia del diritto” che comprende 4 volumi scritti dai
suoi assistenti È morto a Venezia il 6 luglio
ed è sepolto nella cappella di famiglia a Piacenza. Opere Il
concetto di rivoluzione nella scienza del diritto, Milano 1960 Il positivismo
giuridico inglese: Hobbes, Bentham, Austin, Milano, 1962 Il partito politico
nel pensiero dell'Illuminismo e della Rivoluzione francese, Milano 1964 Le
dottrine politiche di Montesquieu e Rousseau, Milano 1964 Illuminismo e
legislazione, Milano, 1966 Montesquieu, Rousseau e la Rivoluzione francese,
Milano 1967 Libertà e virtù nel pensiero politico di Robespierre, Milano, 1968
Anselm Feuerbach filosofo e giurista liberale, Milano 1970 Corso di filosofia del
diritto, Ferrara, 1974 La filosofia della pena nei secolo XVII e XVIII, Ferrara
1974 Delitto e pena nel pensiero di Christan Thomasius, Milano, 1976 Il
problema filosofico della pena, Ferrara, 1978 Stato di diritto e stato
totalitario, Ferrara, 1979 Dignità umana e pena nella filosofia di Kant,
Milano, 1981 Metafisica del diritto e ragione pura, studi sul platonismo
giuridico di Kant, Milano, 1984 Carlo Goldoni ed Alessandro Manzoni:
illuminismo e diritto penale, Milano, 1987 Francesco Carrara e la filosofia del
diritto penale, Torino, 1988 Libertà e Virtù nel pensiero politico di
Robespierre, Milano, 1990 Pena, diritto e dignità umana: saggio sulla filosofia
del diritto penale, Torino, 1990 Diritto e Stato nella filosofia della
rivoluzione francese (Atti nel Colloquio internazionale di Milano), Milano,
1992 Suggestioni penalistiche in testi letterari, Milano 1992 Persona e Stato
di diritto Discorsi alla nazione europea, Torino 1994 L'Umanesimo giuridico e
penale di Karl Grolman, Pisa 1996 Critica della giustizia, Pisa 1996
L'umanesimo giuridico penale di Karl Grolman, Pisa 1996 Pena di morte e civiltà
del diritto (scelta di testi ed introduzione M. Cattaneo) Milano 1997
Terrorismo ed arbitrio, Il problema giuridico del totalitarismo, Padova 1998
Karl Grolmans straftrechtlicher Humanismus, Baden Baden, 1998 Naturrecht als
Idee der Menshenwurde, Stuttgart, 1999 Il liberalismo penale di Montesquieu,
Napoli 2000 Dignità umana e pace perpetua, Kant e la critica della politica,
Padova, 2002 Simone Weil e la critica dell'idolatria sociale, Napoli, 2002
Riflessioni sull'umanesimo giuridico, Napoli, 2004 Kant e la filosofia del
diritto, colloquio internazionale per il bicentenario della morte di Immanuel
Kant (1804-2004), Treviso 1 ottobre 2004 (M.A. Cattaneo), Napoli 2005 Diritto e
forza. Un delicato rapporto, Padova, 2005 Giusnaturalismo e dignità umana,
Napoli, 2006 Dotta ignoranza e umanesimo cristiano, Napoli 2007 Le radici
dell'Europa tra fede e ragione, uno studio filosofico-giuridico, Napoli, 2008 Vincenzo Ferrari, Ricordo di Mario A.
Cattaneo (1934-) in Rivista internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, , 471-480
Wolfgang Naucke Mario A. Cattaneo (1934-), Conferenza tenuta nella riunione
della "Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft der Johann Wolfgang Universitaet"
il 4 giugno Vanda Fiorillo Michael
Kahlo "Wege zur Menschenwuerde Ein
deutch-italienischer Dialog in memoriam Mario A Cattaneo in Zusammenarbeit mit
Brigitte Kelker, Paolo Becchi, Giulio M. Chiodi, Christoph Enders" Mentis
Verlag; Muenster, 490 Giuseppe Bardone
"Some considerations concerning the book of Prof. Mario A. Cattaneo
"Le radici dell'Europa tra fede e ragione" ACADEMIA .EDU Giuseppe Bardone "Diritto
e Letteratura nelle opere di Mario A Cattaneo, Paola Belloli, Arianna Sansone e
Sergio Spadoni Premessa del Prof Giorgetto Giorgi" Unitre Casteggio 979-12-200-5781-3 pubblicato anche in
Giuseppe Bardone ACADEMIA EDU/
CATTANI -- Francesco Cattani
da Diacceto From , the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search For
the bishop of Fiesole, see Francesco Cattani da Diacceto (1531–1595). Francesco
Cattani da Diacceto Born16 November 1466 Florence Died10 April 1522 Florence
NationalityFlorentine Other namesFrancesco di Zanobi Cattani da Diacceto
OccupationPhilosopher Francesco Cattani da Diacceto (16 November 146610 April
1522) was a Florentine Neoplatonist philosopher of the Italian Renaissance. Diacceto was born in Florence on 16 November
1466, the son of Zanobi Cattani da Diacceto and Lionarda di Francesco di Iacopo
Venturi. In his nineteenth year he married Lucretia di Cappone di Bartolomeo
Capponi, with whom he had seven sons and six daughters. From 1491 to 1492 he
studied philosophy under Oliviero Arduini at the University of Pisa. When he
returned to Florence he became a disciple of Marsilio Ficino and a member of
the intellectual group known as the Platonic Academy. He is sometimes
considered Ficino's successor. Unlike Ficino, Diacceto tried to reconcile the
philosophies of Aristotle and Plato. Also, he was not concerned with trying to
Christianise Plato or Plotinus, so he provides a much clearer account of
Neoplatonic magic and astrology; however, he appears to have been less
interested in the subject than Ficino.
Diacceto died in Florence on 10 April 1522. Works The works of Diacceto, in the original
Latin, are collected in the 1563 edition, Opera Omnia, edited by Theodor
Zwinger and published in Basel. De
Pulchro, which is based on Plotinus, contains Diacceto's Neoplatonic theory of
magical and astrological effects, in a chapter entitled: "The twofold
soul, first and second, and its cognition likewise twofold, from which derives
the appetite for beauty, and natural Magic: the nature of which he shows and
which he differentiates from superstitious magic." References
Benedetto Varchi (1561). I tre libri d'Amore di M. Francesco Cattani da
Diacceto, filosofo et gentil'hvomo fiorentino, con un Panegerico all'Amore; et
con la Vita del detto autore, fatta da M. Benedetto Varchi (in Italian). In
Vinegia: appresso Gabriel Giolito de' Ferrari.
Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Platonic Academy of Florence",
Renaissance News, 14, No. 3 (Autumn,
1961)151. Paul Oskar Kristeller (1979).
"Cattani da Diacceto, Francesco, detto il Pagonazzo" (in Italian).
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani Volume 22 (online version). Rome: Istituto
della Enciclopedia Italiana. Accessed June .
Luc Deitz, "Francesco Cattani da Diacceto" in Jill Kraye
(ed.), Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, Volume One:
Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1997). Daniel Pickering Walker (1958). Spiritual and
Demonic Magic: From Ficino to Campanella. p. 31. 0-271-02045-8. Further reading Armand L. De
Gaetano, "The Florentine Academy and the Advancement of Learning Through
the Vernacular: The Orti Oricellari and the Sacra Accademia", Bibliothèque
d'Humanisme et Renaissance, T. 30, No. 1 (1968), 19–52 (JSTOR, subscription required)
Authority control Edit this at Wikidata. Categories: 1466 births1522
deaths16th-century philosophersItalian philosophersItalian Renaissance
humanistsNeoplatonists15th-century Latin writersItalian scholars of ancient
Greek philosophyUniversity of Pisa alumni
CATUCCI: Stefano Catucci
(Roma), filosofo. Docente di Estetica all'Roma "La Sapienza" presso
la Facoltà di Architettura.. Autore di
opere sul pensiero tedesco, in particolare sull'eredità della fenomenologia di
Husserl, e francese d'inizio Professoreha scritto fra l'altro una Introduzione
a Foucault (ed. Laterza, 2001) e uno studio sull'immaginario filosofico della
Grande Guerra imperniato attorno alla figura del giovane György Lukács
("Per una filosofia povera", Bollati Boringhieri 2003). Dal lavoro in Facoltà di Architettura,
iniziato alla fine degli anni Novanta presso l'Camerino (sede di Ascoli
Piceno), è derivata l'esigenza di svolgere con gli strumenti classici
dell'estetica filosofica riflessioni sull'attualità e sull'immaginazione del
futuro: questioni affrontate nel volume del
Imparare dalla Luna: «L'esplorazione della Luna raccontata tramite i
linguaggi dell'arte, della filosofia e del gioco a partire dalla proposta della
Nasa di tutelare i siti storici degli allunaggi come tesori dell'umanità: i
primi parchi archeologici della presenza umana fuori dalla Terra. È questa la
sfida di Imparare dalla Luna» Ha
fondato con Felice Cimatti, Massimo De Carolis e Paolo Virno la rivista Forme
di vita. Dal 1989 collabora con Rai
Radio Tre ed è stato, con Michele dall'Ongaro, tra i fondatori dei Concerti del
Quirinale . Collabora con il quotidiano Il manifesto. Opere La filosofia critica di Husserl,
Milano, Guerini & Associati, 1995 Beethoven Opera Omnia. Le Opere. Fabbri
Classica 1996 Bach e la musica barocca, Roma, La Biblioteca, 1997 Introduzione
a Foucault, Bari-Roma, Laterza, 2000 La storia della musica, Roma, La Biblioteca,
2001 Spazi e maschere, Roma, (a cura di, con Umberto Cao), Meltemi Editore,
2001 Per una filosofia povera, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2003 Imparare dalla
Luna, Macerata, Quodlibet, Note Lectio Magistralis di Stefano Catucci I conduttori di Radio 3 Suite Archiviato il 7
novembre in . Stefano Catucci SWIF, "Sito Web Italiano
per la Filosofia". Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1963
RomaProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di Camerino
CAVALCANTI -- Guido
Cavalcanti «[…] come del corpo fu bello
e leggiadro, come di sangue. gentilissimo, così ne' suoi scritti non so che più
degli altri bello, gentile e peregrino rassembra, e nelle invenzioni
acutissimo, magnifico, ammirabile, gravissimo nelle sentenze, copioso e
rilevato nell'ordine, composto, saggio e avveduto, le quali tutte sue beate
virtù d'un vago, dolce e peregrino stile, come di preziosa veste, sono
adorne.» (Lorenzo il Magnifico, Opere) Dante Alighieri e Virgilio
incontrano all'Inferno Cavalcante dei Cavalcanti e Farinata degli Uberti Guido
Cavalcanti (Firenze), filosofo italiano del Duecento. Ritratto di
Cavalcanti, in Rime, 1813 Guido Cavalcanti, figlio di Cavalcante dei
Cavalcanti, nacque a Firenze (tuttavia il luogo di nascita è ipotizzato e non
si sa quale sia quello reale) intorno all'anno 1258 in una nobile famiglia
guelfa di parte bianca, che aveva le sue case vicino a Orsanmichele e che era
tra le più potenti della città. Nel 1260 Cavalcante, padre del poeta, fu
mandato in esilio in seguito alla sconfitta di Montaperti. Sei anni dopo, in
seguito alla disfatta dei ghibellini nella battaglia di Benevento del 1266, i
Cavalcanti riacquistarono la preminente posizione sociale e politica a Firenze.
Nel 1267 a Guido fu promessa in sposa Beatrice, figlia di Farinata degli
Uberti, capo della fazione ghibellina. Da Beatrice, Guido avrà i figli Tancia e
Andrea. Nel 1280 Guido fu tra i firmatari della pace tra guelfi e
ghibellini e quattro anni dopo sedette nel Consiglio generale al Comune di
Firenze insieme a Brunetto Latini e Dino Compagni. Secondo lo storico Dino
Compagni, a questo punto avrebbe intrapreso un pellegrinaggio a Santiago di
Compostela. Pellegrinaggio alquanto misterioso, se si considera la fama di ateo
e miscredente del poeta. Il poeta minore Niccola Muscia, comunque, ne dà
un'importante testimonianza attraverso un sonetto. Il 24 giugno 1300
Dante Alighieri, priore di Firenze, fu costretto a mandare in esilio l'amico,
nonché maestro, Guido con i capi delle fazioni bianca e nera in seguito a nuovi
scontri. Cavalcanti si recò allora a Sarzana; si pensa che la celebre ballata
Perch'i' no spero di tornar giammai sia stata composta durante l'esilio. Il 19
agosto venne revocata la condanna per l'aggravarsi delle sue condizioni di
salute. Il 29 agosto morì, pochi giorni dopo essere tornato a Firenze,
probabilmente a causa della malaria contratta durante l'esilio. È
ricordatooltre che per i suoi componimentiper essere stato citato da Dante (del
quale fu amico assieme a Lapo Gianni) nel celebre nono sonetto delle Rime
Guido, i' vorrei che tu e Lapo ed io (al quale Guido rispose con un altro,
mirabile, ancorché meno conosciuto, sonetto, che ben esprime l'intenso e
difficile rapporto tra i due amici: S'io fosse quelli che d'amor fu degno) .
Dante lo ricorda anche nella Divina Commedia (Inferno, canto X e Purgatorio,
canto XI) e nel De vulgari eloquentia, mentre Boccaccio lo cita nel Commento
alla Divina Commedia e in una novella del Decameron. La personalità La
sua personalità, aristocraticamente sdegnosa, emerge dal ricordo che ne hanno
lasciato gli scrittori contemporanei: dai cronisti Dino Compagni e Giovanni
Villani a novellieri come Giovanni Boccaccio e Franco Sacchetti. Si legga il
ritratto di Dino Compagni: «Un giovane gentile, figlio di messer Cavalcante
Cavalcanti, nobile cavaliere, cortese e ardito ma sdegnoso e solitario e
intento allo studio» La sua personalità è paragonabile a quella di Dante,
con la importante differenza che non diventa profondamente religioso come
l'amico, ma perde la fede. Cavalcanti era noto per il suo ateismo, come
testimoniato da Dante (Inf. X, 63), Boccaccio (Decameron VI, 9: «Si diceva
tralla gente volgare che queste sue speculazioni erano solo in cercare se
trovar si potesse che Iddio non fosse»), Filippo Villani (De civitatis Florentie
famosis civibus). La sua eterodossia è stata tra l'altro rilevata nella grande
canzone dottrinale Donna me prega, certamente il testo più arduo e impegnato,
anche sul piano concettuale, di tutta la poesia stilnovistica, in cui s i
rinvengono caratteri di correnti radicali dell'aristotelismo
averroistico. Famoso e significativo l'episodio narrato dal Boccaccio di
una specie di scherzoso assalto, da parte di una brigata di giovani fiorentini
a cavallo, al "meditativo" Guido, che schivava la loro compagnia. Lo
stesso episodio verrà ripreso da Italo Calvino nelle Lezioni americane, in cui
il poeta duecentesco, con l'agile salto da lui compiuto, diventa emblema della
leggerezza. L'episodio figura anche nell'omonimo testo di Anatole France
ne "Le Puits de Sainte Claire" dove, peraltro, i fatti risalienti
della sua vita vengono riportati sotto una veste quasi mistica. Opere La
sua opera poetica consta di cinquantadue componimenti, di cui due canzoni,
undici ballate, trentasei sonetti, un mottetto e due frammenti composti da una
stanza ciascuno. Le forme maggiormente utilizzate sono la ballata ed il
sonetto, seguite dalla canzone. In particolare, la ballata appare congeniale
alla poetica cavalcantiana, poiché incarna la musicalità sfumata e il lessico delicato,
che si risolvono poi in costruzioni armoniose. Peculiare di Cavalcanti è, nei
sonetti, la presenza di rime retrogradate nelle terzine. Temi
Quadro di Johann Heinrich Füssli del 1783: Teodoro incontra nella foresta lo
spettro del suo antenato Guido Cavalcanti. I temi delle sue opere sono quelli
cari agli stilnovisti; in particolare la sua canzone manifesto Donna me prega è
incentrata sugli effetti prodotti dall'amore. La concezione filosofica su
cui egli si basa è l'aristotelismo radicale promosso dal commentatore arabo
Averroè (il cui vero nome è Ibn Rushd), che sosteneva l'eternità e
l'incorruttibilità dell'intelletto possibile separato dal corpo e l'anima
sensitiva come entelechia o perfezione del corpo. Va da sé che, avendo le
varie parti dell'anima funzioni differenti, solo collaborando esse potevano
raggiungere il sinolo, l'armonia perfetta. Si deduce che, quando l'amore
colpisce l'anima sensitiva, squarciandola e devastandola, si compromette il
sinolo e ne risente molto l'anima vegetativa (come si sa l'innamorato non
mangia o non dorme). Da qui la sofferenza dell'anima intellettiva che,
destatasi per la rottura del sinolo, rimane impotente spettatrice della
devastazione. È così che l'innamorato giunge alla morte spirituale. La donna,
avvolta come da un alone mistico, rimane così irraggiungibile e il dramma si
consuma nell'animo dell'amante. Questa concezione filosofica permea la
poesia senza comprometterne la raffinatezza letteraria. Uno dei temi
fondamentali è l'incontro con l'amore che conduce, al contrario che in
Guinizzelli, al dolore, all'angoscia e al desiderio di morire. La poesia di
Cavalcanti possiede accenti di vivo dolore riferiti spesso al corpo e alla
persona. Cavalcanti, quindi, oltre che poeta, fu anche un fine pensatore
(scrive Boccaccio: «lo miglior loico che il mondo avesse»), ma non ci resta
nulla di sue opere filosofiche, ammesso che ne abbia effettivamente
scritte. Il poetare di Cavalcanti, dal ritmo soave e leggero è di una
grande sapienza retorica. I versi di Cavalcanti possiedono una fluidità
melodica, che nasce dal ritmo degli accenti, dai tratti fonici del lessico
impiegato, dall'assenza di spezzettature, pause, inversioni sintattiche.
Note Guido Cavalcanti: la poetica e lo
Stilnovo, su WeSchool. 18 febbraio .
Bruno Nardi, “Donna me prega: L'averroismo del ‘primo amico' di Dante”
(1940), ripubblicato in: Dante e la cultura medievale, Roma-Bari: Laterza,
1983, 81-107; Maria Corti, La felicità mentale. Nuove prospettive per
Cavalcanti e Dante, Torino: Einaudi, 1983; Antonio Gagliardi, “Species
intelligibilis”, in: R. Arqués , Guido Cavalcanti laico e le origini della
poesia europea, Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2003, 147-161; Zygmunt G. Barański, “Guido
Cavalcanti auctoritas”, in: R. Arqués , Guido Cavalcanti laico, cit., 163-180.
Mario Marti, Guido Cavalcanti, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Maria Corti, La felicità mentale: Nuove prospettive per Cavalcanti e
Dante, Torino, Einaudi, 1983. Gianfranco Contini, Cavalcanti in Dante, Torino,
Einaudi, 1976. Antonio Gagliardi, Guido Cavalcanti: poesia e filosofia,
Alessandria, Edizioni Dell'Orso, 2001. Roberto Rea, Cavalcanti poeta: uno
studio sul lessico lirico, Roma, Nuova Cultura, 2008. Corrado Calenda, Per
altezza d'ingegno: saggio su Guido Cavalcanti, Napoli, Liguori, 1976. Noemi
Ghetti, L'ombra di Cavalcanti e Dante, Roma, L'Asino d'Oro, . Guido Cavalcanti,
Rime, Firenze, presso Niccolò Carli, 1813. Mario Casella, CAVALCANTI, Guido, in
Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1931. Mario Marti,
Cavalcanti, Guido, in Enciclopedia dantesca, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1970. Mario Marti, CAVALCANTI, Guido, in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, 22, Roma, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1979. 6 agosto .
Di Fiore Ciro, «Il controverso pellegrinaggio di Guido Cavalcanti a
Santiago di Compostela», in "Linguistica e letteratura", 35, (). Anna
Maria Chiavacci Leonardi, commento a La Divina Commedia. Inferno, Mondadori,
Milano, 1991, IV ed. 2003, 315-330.
Edoardo Gennarini, La società letteraria italiana. Dalla Magna Curia al primo
Novecento, Ed. Sandron, Firenze, 1971,
31-46. Averroè Ateismo Cavalcante
dei Cavalcanti Dante Alighieri Dolce stil novo Sarzana Firenze Guido Guinizelli
Guido Orlandi Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una
pagina dedicata a Guido Cavalcanti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Guido
Cavalcanti Collabora a Wikiversità Wikiversità contiene risorse su Guido
Cavalcanti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Guido Cavalcanti Guido
Cavalcanti, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Guido Cavalcanti, in
Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Guido Cavalcanti,
su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Opere di Guido Cavalcanti, su Liber
Liber. Opere di Guido Cavalcanti, su
openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Guido Cavalcanti, . su Guido Cavalcanti, su Les Archives de
littérature du Moyen Âge. Il testo delle
"Rime" di Guido Cavalcanti, su xoomer.alice.it. V D M Poesia italiana
del Duecento V D M Dante Alighieri.
CAVALLO: Tiberius Cavallo,
nato Tiberio Cavallo (Napoli), flosofo e fisico di origine napoletana
stabilitosi a Londra. Autore di trattati di elettricità, magnetismo ed
elettricità medicale, compì anche studi relativi ai gas e all'influenza
dell'aria e della luce sulla biologia vegetale. Propose numerosi apparecchi
elettrostatici di misura e di ricerca. Nel 1777 intuì la possibilità di volare
utilizzando palloni aerostatici. Nel 1780 costruì il primo elettroscopio. Opere A Complete Treatise on Electricity
(1777) Treatise on the Nature and Properties of Air and other permanently
Elastic Fluids (1781) History and Practice of Aerostation (1785) Treatise on
Magnetism (1787) Elements of Natural and Experimental Philosophy (1803) Theory
and Practice of Medical Electricity (1780) Medical Properties of Factitious Air
(1798). Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Tiberio Cavallo
Tiberio Cavallo, in Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. 25 agosto . Museo Galileo, su
catalogo.museogalileo.it.
CAZZANIGA: Gian
Mario Cazzaniga (Torino), filosofo. Ha studiato presso il liceo classico
Massimo D'Azeglio di Torino, la Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa e la facoltà
di Lettere di Pisa, laurea in filosofia (1964, relatore Arturo Massolo).
Attualmente è professore di Filosofia Morale all'Pisa. Nel è stato insignito dell'Ordine del Cherubino,
massima onorificenza dell'Pisa. Membro del Consiglio Universitario Nazionale
(1979-1983, 1986-1989). Dirigente della sinistra socialista (PSI e poi PSIUP
(1960-1967). Dirigente UGI: membro di giunta Unuri (1965-1966), estensore delle
Tesi approvate al congresso UGI di Napoli (1965), estensore delle tesi di
minoranza al congresso UGI di Rimini (1967). Fondatore della CGIL Scuola
(1966), poi segretario nazionale, responsabile università (1976-1978).
Cazzaniga è stato molto attivo nella sinistra extraparlamentare: Quaderni Rossi
(1962-1966), Il potere operaio pisano (1967-1968), Centro Karl Marx di Pisa,
poi Organizzazione dei Lavoratori Comunisti (1969-1975). Iscritto al PCI
(1975), responsabile nazionale Università (1979-1980), membro della Direzione
nazionale (1989-1990) e dell'ufficio di Presidenza del Comitato Centrale
(Presidente della Commissione Economica (19901991). Membro della direzione
nazionale del PDS (1991-1997). Direttore di Marxismo Oggi (1987-1989). Nel 1990
fonda con Luciano Barca e altri (Minucci, Novelli, Pollini) Etica ed Economia.
Nel 1997 esce dal PDS e si ritira dall'attività politica. Scrive su Belfagor e
su Menabò di Etica ed Economia. Opere Funzione e conflitto. Forme e
classi nella teoria marxista dello sviluppo, Napoli, Liguori, 1981. 88-207-0919-8. L'individu dans la pensée
moderne. XVI-XVIII siecles. Paris, 16-18 septembre 1993 Institut Culturel
Italien (Hotel de Galiffet). Pisa, 30 settembre-2 ottobre 1993 Pisa, con Yves
Charles Zarka, 2 voll., Pisa, ETS, 1995.
88-7741-879-6. Symboles, signes, langages sacrés. Pour une sémiologie de
la franc-maçonnerie, Pisa, ETS, 1995. La
religione dei moderni, Pisa, ETS, 1999.
88-467-0200-X. Metamorfosi della sovranità: fra stati nazionali e
ordinamenti giuridici mondiali. Società geografica italiana, Roma, 2 ottobre
1998, Pisa, ETS, 1999. 88-467-0210-7. La
democrazia come sistema simbolico "Belfagor" (LV f. V settembre 2000)
Penser la Souveraineté à l'époque moderne et contemporaine, con Yves Charles
Zarka, 2 voll., Pisa-Paris, Edizioni ETS-J. Vrin, 2001. 88-467-0535-1. Le Muse in loggia. Massoneria
e letteratura nel Settecento, con Gerardo Tocchini e Roberta Turchi, Milano,
UNICOPLI, 2002. 88-400-0759-8. Traces de
l'autre. Mythes de l'antiquité et Peuples du Livre dans la construction des
nations méditerranéennes. Bibliotheca Alexandrina, le 19-21 avril 2003, con
Josiane Boulad-Ayoub, Pisa-Paris, Edizioni ETS-J. Vrin, 2004. Storia d'Italia.
Annali 21: La Massoneria, Torino, Einaudi 2006.
88-06-17031-7. Storia d'Italia. Annali 25: Esoterismo, Torino, Einaudi,
. 978-88-06-19035-4. Movimento operaio Partito Comunista
Italiano Gian Mario Cazzaniga, su
siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo Unificato per le
Soprintendenze Archivistiche. Registrazioni
di Gian Mario Cazzaniga / Mario Cazzaniga, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio
Radicale. Piccola parte tratta da La
religione dei moderni, su lgxserver.uniba.it. 26 aprile 2006 10 maggio 2006) Filosofia
Politica Politica Università Università Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi
italiani del XXI secoloPolitici italiani del XX secoloPolitici italiani Professore1942
20 aprile TorinoPolitici del Partito Socialista ItalianoPolitici del Partito
Comunista ItalianoPolitici del Partito Democratico della SinistraProfessori
dell'PisaStudenti dell'Pisa
CECCATO Silvio
Ceccato Silvio Ceccato, Lucio Fontana e Pino Parini a Milano nel 1964. Silvio
Ceccato (Montecchio Maggiore), filosofo. Filosofo irregolare, dopo aver
proposto una definizione del termine "filosofia" e un'analisi dello
sviluppo storico di questa disciplina, a partire dalla fine degli anni '40 ha
preferito prenderne le distanze e perseguire la costruzione di un'opzione
alternativa, denominata inizialmente "metodologia operativa" e in
seguito "cibernetica della mente". Saggi sta prolifico, ha
scritto numerosi libri, saggi, e articoli, rendendosi noto in particolare nel
campo della cibernetica. Pur ottenendo notevole successo di pubblico con i suoi
libri, riscosse scarso successo negli ambienti scientifici e filosofici
accademici. Fu tra i primi in Italia ad interessarsi alla traduzione automatica
di testi, settore in cui ha fornito importanti contributi scientifici. Negli
anni sessanta sperimentò anche la relazione tra cibernetica e arte in
collaborazione con il Gruppo V di Rimini. Studioso della mente, intesa
come l'insieme delle attività che l'uomo svolge per costituire i significati,
memorizzarli ed esprimerli, ne propose un modello in termini di organofunzione,
scomponendo quest'ultima in fasi provvisoriamente elementari di un ipotetico
organo, e nelle loro combinazioni in sequenze operazionali, in parte poi
designate dalle parole e dalle frasi, o da altri codici utilizzati nei rapporti
sociali. Su questi argomenti pubblicò 21 volumi e centinaia di saggi.
Insieme a Vittorio Somenzi (scomparso nel dicembre 2003) e Giuseppe Vaccarino,
fondò ed animò la "Scuola Operativa Italiana", il cui patrimonio di
pensiero è tuttora oggetto di studio e ricerca, sia in Italia che
all'estero. Studiò Giurisprudenza, violoncello e composizione
musicale. Nel 1949 fondò (insieme a Vittorio Somenzi e Giuseppe Vaccarino) la
rivista internazionale Methodos, che proseguì le pubblicazioni fino al
1964. Nel 1956 progettò e costruì Adamo II, un prototipo illustrativo
della successione di attività proposte come costitutive dei costrutti mentali
da lui chiamati "categorie mentali" per analogia e in omaggio a Kant.
Fu libero docente di Fillosofia della scienza a Milano. Diresse il Centro di
Cibernetica e di Attività Linguistiche dell'Università degli Studi di Milano
dalla sua fondazione, nel 1957, fino al suo passaggio allo IULM. Nel 1987
incontró, durante una cena di gala, il Professore di Sistemi di controllo,
presso l’Pavia, Piero, detto Pierino dai suoi familiari, Mella. Successivamente
a questo incontro ispiratore decise, nel 1988 di partecipare come attore nel
film "32 dicembre" di Luciano De Crescenzo, interpretandovi il ruolo
del folle Cavalier Sanfilippo che si crede Socrate. Pensiero Un tecnico
tra i filosofi, così intitolò i due volumi apparsi nelle Edizioni Marsilio di
Padova, rispettivamente nel 1964 e nel 1966 con i rispettivi sottotitoli:
"Come filosofare" ( I ) e "Come non filosofare" (
II). Opere Il linguaggio con la Tabella di Ceccatieff, Actualités
Scientifiques et Industrielles, Éditions Hermann, Paris, 1951 Adamo II,
Congresso Internazionale dell'Automatismo, Milano, 8-13 aprile 1956, 1–8 Linguistic analysis and programming for
mechanical translation, Gordon & Breach, New York, 1961 Un tecnico fra i
filosofi, Marsilio, Padova, 1962/1964 Cibernetica per tutti, Feltrinelli,
Milano, 1968 Corso di linguistica operativa, Longanesi, Milano, 1969 Il gioco
del Teocono, All'Insegna del Pesce d'Oro, Milano, 1971 La mente vista da un
cibernetico, ERI, Torino, 1972 (testo online) La terza cibernetica. Per una
mente creativa e responsabile, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1974 Monografia Valerio
Miroglio, Ed. Priuli&Verlucca, Ivrea, 1979 Ingegneria della felicità,
Rizzoli, Milano, 1985 (insieme a Carlo Oliva) Il linguista inverosimile, Mursia,
Milano, 1988 Contentezza e intelligenza, Rizzoli, (forse 1989) Mille tipi di
bello, Stampa alternativa, Viterbo, 1995 C'era una volta la filosofia, Spirali,
Milano 1996 Il maestro inverosimile, Bompiani, Milano, II edizione 1972 (CL
04-0355-5) Note In Italia la Società di
Cultura Metodologica Operativa a Milano, il Centro Internazionale di Didattica
Operativa Archiviato il 3 febbraio in .
e il Gruppo Operazionista di Ricerca Logonica Archiviato l'8 aprile in . a Rimini. Felice Accame, CECCATO, Silvio, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, . Francesco Forleo, La cibernetica italiana
della mente nella civiltà delle macchine. Origini e attualità della logonica
attenzionale a partire da Silvio Ceccato, Mantova, Universitas Studiorum,
, 978-88-99459-60-4. Altri progetti
Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Silvio Ceccato
Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Silvio Ceccato Collabora a Wikimedia
Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Silvio Ceccato completa di Silvio Ceccato, su
methodologia.it. Filosofia Linguistica
Linguistica Filosofo del XX secoloLinguisti italianiAccademici italiani Professore1914
1997 25 gennaio 2 dicembre Montecchio Maggiore MilanoCostruttivistiDirettori di
periodici italianiFondatori di riviste italianeProfessori della Libera lingue e
comunicazione IULMProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di MilanoStudenti
dell'Università degli Studi di Milano
CELLUCCI: Carlo Cellucci
(Santa Maria Capua Vetere), filosofo. Professore emerito di filosofia all'Università
degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza", si è laureato all'Università
Statale di Milano nel 1964. Prima di essere chiamato nel 1979 alla Sapienza ha
insegnato nelle università del Sussex, di Siena e della Calabria. Si è occupato
soprattutto di logica e teoria della dimostrazione, filosofia della matematica,
filosofia della logica, ed epistemologia.
Libri Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View, Springer, Dordrecht .
(con Mirella Capozzi) Breve storia della logica: Dall'Umanesimo al primo
Novecento, Lulu, Morrisville . Rethinking Logic: Logic in Relation to
Mathematics, Evolution, and Method, Springer, Dordrecht . Perché ancora la
filosofia, Laterza, Roma 2008. La filosofia della matematica del Novecento,
Laterza, Roma 2007. Filosofia e matematica, Laterza, Roma 2002. Le ragioni
della logica, Laterza, Roma 1998. Teoria della dimostrazione, Boringhieri,
Torino 1978. Articoli più recenti The Role of Notations in Mathematics,
Philosophia 48(4) ()m 1397-1412. Alcuni momenti salienti della storia del
metodo, La Cultura 57(3) (), 353-378. Diagrams in Mathematics, Foundations of
Science 24 (), 583-604. The Most Urgent Task of Philosophy Today, Borderless
Philosophy 2 (), 47-75. cckp.space/single-post//06/01/BP2--The-Most-Urgent-Task-of-Philosophy-Today-pp-47-75
I limiti dello scetticismo, Syzetesis 6(1) (),
31-50. Philosophy at a Crossroads: Escaping from Irrelevance, Syzetesis
5(1) (), 13-53. Also
againstprofphil.org//09/10/philosophy-at-a-crossroads-escaping-from-irrelevance/.
Definition in Mathematics, European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8
(), 605-629. Reconnecting Logic with
Discovery, Topoi doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9523-3. Theory Building as Problem
Solving. In Building Theories, eds. D. Danks & E. Ippoliti, Springer, Cham
, 63-79. Varieties of Maverick
Philosophy of Mathematics. In Humanizing Mathematics and its Philosophy, Essays
Celebrating the 90th Birthday of Reuben Hersh, ed. B. Sriraman. Springer, Cham
, 223–251. La logica della scoperta,
Scienza & Società 31/32 () Creatività,
21-30. Is There a Scientific Method? The Analytic Model of Science. In
Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological and
Cognitive Issues (Proceedings of MBR), eds. L. Magnani & C. Casadio.
Springer, Cham , 489–505. Is Mathematics
Problem Solving or Theorem Proving? Foundations of Science 22 (), 183–199. Models of Science and Models in
Science. In Models and Inferences in Science, eds. E. Ippoliti, F. Sterpetti
& T. Nickles, Springer, Cham ,
95–122. Review of P. Garavaso & N. Vassallo, Frege on Thinking and
Its Epistemic Significance, History and Philosophy of Logic, DOI:
10.1080/01445340..1146202. Conoscenza scientifica e senso comune. In La guerra
dei mondi. Scienza e senso comune, ed. A. Lavazza & M. Marraffa. Codice
Edizioni, Torino , 85–97. Razionalità
scientifica e plausibilità. In I modi della razionalità, eds. M. Dell'Utri
& A. Rainone. Mimesis, Milano ,
47–63 Mathematical Beauty, Understanding, and Discovery. Foundations of Science
20 (), 339–355. Ristampato in The Best
Writing on Mathematics , ed. M. Pitici, Princeton University Press, Princeton
, 241–264. Rethinking Knowledge.
Metaphilosophy 46 (), 213–234. Is
Philosophy a Humanistic Discipline? Philosophia 43 (), 259–269. Explanatory and Non-Explanatory
Demonstrations. In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of scienceProceedings of
the 14th International Congress (Nancy), eds. P. Schroeder-Heister, G.
Heinzmann, W. Hodges & P.-E. Bour. College Publications, London , 201–218. Knowledge, Truth, and Plausibility.
Axiomates 24 (), 517–532. Rethinking
Philosophy. Philosophia 42 (), 271–288.
Does Logic Slowly Pass Away, or Has It a Future? In Second Pisa Colloquium in
Logic, Language and Epistemology, eds. E. Moriconi & L. Tescari, ETA, Pisa
, 122–137. Why Should the Logic of
Discovery be revived? In Heuristic Reasoning, ed. E. Ippoliti, Springer, Cham
, 11–27. Philosophy of Mathematics:
Making a Fresh Start. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (), 32–42. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Philosophy of
Mathematics. Foundations of Science 18 (), No. 1, 93–106. Reason and Logic, in Reason and
Rationality, eds, C. Amoretti & N. Vassallo (eds.), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt
am Main , 199–216. Classifying and
Justifying Inference Rules, in Logic and Knowledge, eds. C. Cellucci, E.
Grosholz & E. Ippoliti, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle Upon Tyne
, 123–142. Indiscrete Variations on
Gian-Carlo Rota's Themes, in From Combinatorics to Philosophy. The Legacy of
G.-C. Rota, eds. E. Damiani, O. D'Antona, V. Marra, & F. Palombi, Springer,
Dordrecht 2009, 211-228. Reprinted in
The Best Writing on Mathematics , ed. M. Pitici, Princeton University Press,
Princeton , 311-329. The Universal
Generalization Problem. Logique & Analyse 52 (2009), 3–20. Curatele (with E. Grosholz & E.
Ippoliti) Logic and Knowledge, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle Upon
Tyne . Filosofia della matematica, Paradigmi,
29 (), N. 3. (with P. Pecere) Demonstrative and Non-Demonstrative
Reasoning in Mathematics and Natural Science, Edizioni dell'Università, Cassino
2006. (with D. Gillies) Mathematical Reasoning and Heuristics, College
Publications, London 2005. Il paradiso di Cantor, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1979. La
filosofia della matematica, Laterza, Roma 1967. Opere di Carlo Cellucci, . uniroma1.academia.edu/CarloCellucci Filosofia
Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1940 9 aprile Santa Maria
Capua Vetere
CENTI -- Tito Centi. Tito
Sante Centi, O.P. (Segni), presbitero e filosofo italiano, uno dei massimi
esperti della filosofia di Tommaso d'Aquino.
Tito Sante Centi nacque a Segni il 30 ottobre 1915. Entrato giovanissimo
nell'Ordine Domenicano, emise la professione solenne il 6 ottobre 1933 e venne
ordinato sacerdote il 16 giugno 1940. Nel 1943 si addottorò in Teologia presso
l'Angelicum di Roma con padre Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Professore emerito
presso la Pontificia accademia di San Tommaso d'Aquino, il 31 ottobre 2003 fu
nominato Maestro in Sacra Teologia dal maestro generale dell'Ordine domenicano
Carlos Azpiroz Costa. Tito Centi ha
collaborato con numerose testate cattoliche, tra le quali Il Timone. Opere Tito Centi è noto soprattutto per le
sue traduzioni in lingua italiana delle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino. Tra il 1950
e il 1974 ha curato per i tipi di Adriano Salani la prima traduzione integrale
in italiano della Somma Teologica in 35 volumi. Ha tradotto e commentato anche
la Summa contra Gentiles, il Commento al Vangelo di san Giovanni (in tre
volumi, Città Nuova, Roma, 1992), il Compendio di Teologia, diversi opuscoli
(Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, De perfectione spiritualis vitae
etc.) e varie Questiones Disputatae.
Oltre alla traduzione e al commento delle opere dell'Aquinate, Tito
Centi si è occupato anche di altre importanti figure storiche appartenenti
all'Ordine Domenicano, come Girolamo Savonarola e Beato Angelico. È stato
membro della commissione storico-teologica incaricata di revisionare gli
scritti di Savonarola e ne ha difeso l'ortodossia, dimostrando la falsità delle
Lettere ai Principi a lui attribuite che avrebbero rivelato le sue intenzioni
scismatiche e sostenendo che la scomunica inflittagli fosse illegittima e che
la vera ragione della sua condanna fosse la sua opposizione alle politiche
espansionistiche di papa Alessandro VI.
Opere (selezione) Tommaso d'Aquino, La somma teologica, testo latino
dell'edizione leonina, trad. e commento a cura dei Domenicani italiani, T.S.
Centi, 35 voll., Salani, Firenze, 1949-1972, poi ESD, Bologna, 1984-85; San
Tommaso d'Aquino, Somma contro i Gentili, UTET, Torino, 1975, Tito S.
Centi, 8802026815; Catechismo
Tridentino. Catechismo ad Uso dei Parroci Pubblicato dal Papa Pio V per Decreto
del Concilio di Trento. Traduzione italiana a cura del P. Tito S. Centi,
Edizioni Cantagalli, Siena, 1981,
88-8272-148-5; Frère Jérôme Savonarole, traduit de l'italien par
Michel-Paul Monredon, introduction de Guy Bedouelle, CLD, Chambray, 1986, 2854431170; Girolamo Savonarola. Il frate che
sconvolse Firenze, Città Nuova, Roma, 1988,
8831153110; La scomunica di Girolamo Savonarola. Santo e ribelle? Fatti
e documenti per un giudizio, Ares, Milano, 1996, 8881551187; San Tommaso d'Aquino Compendio di
Teologia e altri scritti, Tito S. Centi, Agostino Selva, UTET, Torino, 1997
(riedito nel 2001 e nel ,
978-88-511-4167-7); Il Beato Angelico. Fra Giovanni da Fiesole.
Biografia critica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 2003, 9788870944181; Inos Biffi, Tito S. Centi, Le
altre due «Somme teologiche» di S. Tommaso d'Aquino, Edizioni Studio
Domenicano, 2001, 887094428X; Le
bienheureux Fra Angelico: Giovanni da Fiesole, Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2005,
traduzione di Jacques Mignon,
2204078468; Nel segno del sole. San Tommaso d'Aquino, Ares, Milano,
2008, 9788881554256. Note Roberto Allegri, La "Somma
Teologica" di San Tommaso d’Aquino a portata di click da ZENIT.org, 18
dicembre 2009 Massimo Introvigne, San
Tommaso d'Aquino visto (davvero) da vicino. Una recensione di Nel segno del
sole di Tito Sante Centi O.P. Tito Sante
Centi, O.P. Il Timone, Firme, Centi O.P.
P. Tito Sante Armando Torno, Summa di
teologica chiarezza , Il Sole 24 ORE, 12 gennaio Savonarola: è scontro tra Domenicani e
Gesuiti su beatificazione, su www1.adnkronos.com.. Savonarola: Apocrife le Lettere con accuse a
Papa Borgia, su www1.adnkronos.com..
Somma Teologica, Nuova Edizione Italiana P. Tito S. Centi e P. Angelo Z.
Belloni , su documentacatholicaomnia.eu. V D M Famiglia domenicana 21778217 Filosofia
Categorie: Presbiteri italianiFilosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1915 30 ottobre 18 maggio SegniTraduttori dal
latinoDomenicani italiani
CENTOFANTI: Silvestro
Centofanti Silvestro centofanti.jpg Senatore del Regno d'Italia Durata mandato23/3/18606
gennaio 1880 Dati generali Titolo di studioLaurea in Giurisprudenza ProfessioneDocente
universitario Silvestro Centofanti (Calci, 8 dicembre 1794Pisa, 6 gennaio 1880)
politico e letterato italiano. Insigne
filosofo e letterato, Silvestro Centofanti nacque a Rezzano di Calci, presso
Pisa, l'8 dicembre 1794 da Giuseppe e Rosalia Zucchini e morì a Pisa il 6
gennaio 1880. Si laureò in
Giurisprudenza all'Pisa e ben presto divenne titolare della cattedra di Storia
della filosofia nello stesso Ateneo dal 1841 al 1849 dove tenne un importante
corso di Storia dei sistemi della filosofia.
Ebbe una nota relazione epistolare con la poetessa teramana Giannina
Milli. Opere 1836Della prova filosofica
della realtà esteriore secondo il signor Mamiani e della verità obiettiva delle
cognizioni umane. Considerazioni, «Progr.», V, 1836, XV,
174–194. 1838Un preludio al corso
di lezioni su Dante Alighieri. Seguono: Stanze su Dante e un'ode a Vittore Hugo,
Tip. Galileiana, Firenze 1838, LXX-51
1840Pitagora, in Monumenti del giardino Puccini, Pistoia. 1841Sull'indole e le vicende della
letteratura greca. Discorso, Società editrice fiorentina, Firenze, CLVIII 1842Prolusione alle lezioni di Storia della
filosofia, Prosperi, Pisa. 1842Prolusione
letta il di 26 febbraio 1842, M. Wagner, Pisa, 30 1844Del platonismo in Italia. Lezioni due,
Prosperi, Pisa, 36 1844Notizia intorno
alla cospirazione e al processo di T. Campanella, «Giornale euganeo», I, n. 7,
51–52. Estr.: [s.n.t.], 1844
1845Sulla Vita nuova di Dante. Lezione ultima, Tip. Crescini, Padova,
20 1846Prelezione alla storia della
filosofia italiana dai principi del secolo XVIII fino ai tempi presenti,
Prosperi, Pisa, 31 1846Sulla verità
delle cognizioni umane. Ricerche filosofiche, «Annali delle Univ. Toscane», parte
I: Scienze noologiche, tomo I, 45–90.
Pubblicato in estratto insieme a Una formula logica della filosofia della
storia, Nistri, [Pisa] 1846, 204
1846Una formula logica della filosofia della storia, «Annali delle Univ.
Toscane», parte I: Scienze noologiche, tomo I,
257–410. Pubblicato in estratto insieme a Sulla verità delle cognizioni
umane, Nistri, [Pisa] 1846, 204 1847Del
diritto di nazionalità in universale e di quello della nazionalità italiana in
particolare, Nistri, Pisa, 32 1848Sul
risorgimento italiano. Lezione detta da Silvestro Centofanti, professore di
storia della filosofia nell'aula dell'Pisa il dì 15 marzo 1848, Tip. Vannucchi,
Pisa, 23 1850Saggio sulla vita e sulle
opere di Plutarco, Le Monnier, Firenze, CXC
1853Averroès et l'averroïsme, di Ernesto Renan, appendice all'ASI,
1853, IX, 539–556.
1853I poeti greci nelle loro più celebri traduzioni italiane, Preceduti
da un discorso storico sulla letteratura greca di Silvestro Centofanti, nuova
edizione diligentemente corretta, Mazzajoli, Livorno 1853, 886 1855Saggio sulle opere e sulla vita di
Plutarco, R. Migliaccio, Salerno 1855, 212
1855Sant'Anselmo d'Aosta e il suo storico francese sig. Remusat, ASI,
n.s., 1855, II, parte II, 119–146.
1856Sopra un luogo diversamente letto nella Divina Commedia. Lettera, F.
Bencini, Firenze, 52 1858Al commento di
Francesco da Buti sopra la Divina Commedia. Introduzione, Nistri, Pisa, 20 ;
nuova ed.: 1862. 1862Del diritto di
nazionalità in universale e di quella della nazionalità italiana in
particolare, Nistri, Pisa, 14. 1864Discorso letto nell'aula magna della R.
Pisa nel III centenario della nascita di Galileo Galilei, Nistri, Pisa
1864. 1866T. Campanella e alcune sue
lettere inedite, ASI, s. III, IV,
1866, 3–40 e 58-103. 1870La letteratura greca dalle sue origini
sino alla caduta di Costantinopoli e studio sopra Pitagora, Le Monnier,
Firenze, 425 Carriera Professore di
Storia della filosofia all'Pisa dall'8 novembre 1841 al 1849 Professore emerito
dell'Pisa Professore di Storia della filosofia all'Istituto di studi superiori
pratici e di perfezionamento di Firenze dal 1859 Provveditore dell'Pisa dal 7
novembre 1860 Rettore dell'Pisa dal 1861 al 1865 Professore emerito dell'Torino
dal 30 novembre 1862 Cariche politico-amministrative e titoli Deputato alla
Costituente (Toscana) nel 1849 Membro del Senato (Toscana) dal 17 maggio 1848
Segretario del Senato (Toscana) dal 1848 al 1849 Membro della Consulta di Stato
(Toscana) nel 1859 Cofondatore del giornale "L'Italia" (giugno 1847)
Consigliere di Stato straordinario (Toscana) dal 1849 Socio corrispondente
dell'Accademia della Crusca di Firenze dal 13 settembre 1859 Socio
dell'Accademia delle scienze, lettere ed arti di Modena dal 1860 Membro
corrispondente della Società reale di Napoli dall'8 novembre 1863 Onorificenze
Commendatore dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaronastrino per uniforme
ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaro Ufficiale
dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italianastrino per uniforme ordinariaUfficiale
dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italia Piero
Treves, CENTOFANTI, Silvestro, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, 23, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1979. 27 marzo . Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource
contiene una pagina dedicata a Silvestro Centofanti Collabora a Wikimedia
Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Silvestro
Centofanti Silvestro Centofanti, su
Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Silvestro Centofanti, in Enciclopedia
Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Silvestro Centofanti, su accademicidellacrusca.org, Accademia della
Crusca. Opere di Silvestro Centofanti,
su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Silvestro Centofanti, . Silvestro Centofanti, su Senatori d'Italia,
Senato della Repubblica. Scritti inediti
del Prof. Centofanti su Dante Alighieri, su books.google.com. Un preludio al
corso di lezioni su Dante Alighieri, su books.google.com. PredecessoreRettore
dell'PisaSuccessoreUnipi logo.jpg -18611865Fausto Mazzuoli Biografie
Biografie Letteratura Letteratura
Politica Politica Categorie: Politici
italiani del XX secoloLetterati italiani 1794 1880Nati l'8 dicembre 6 gennaio
Calci PisaRettori dell'PisaSenatori della VII legislatura del Regno di
SardegnaUfficiali dell'Ordine della Corona d'ItaliaCommendatori dell'Ordine dei
Santi Maurizio e Lazzaro
CEREBOTANI: Luigi
Cerebotani (Lonato) presbitero, fisico, teologo e filosofo italiano. Nel
1889 fu delegato papale a Monaco di iera. Cerebotani viene descritto come un
'sacerdote di viva pietà', e non fu mai interessato allo sfruttamento economico
delle sue invenzioni. In iera, anche durante il Kulturkampf, si occupò degli
emigrati italiani, sia sotto il profilo dell'assistenza spirituale e cristiana,
sia mantenendo alto fra loro il sentimento nazionale. Per le sue
invenzioni nel campo delle telecomunicazioni, l'ammiragliato britannico lo
invitò a Londra e fu presentato ai dirigente delle comunicazioni pοstali
britanniche da Guglielmo Marconi. Nel 1895, Giuseppe De-Botazzi così lo
descriveva: «L’abate L. Cerebotani, dottore in scienze e membro
dell’Accademia dei nuovi Lincei, è di vasto sapere, di amabile carattere e di
svegliato ingegno. Questo ecclesiastico, letterato e scienziato, che viaggiò
quasi tutta l’Europa e che conosce a fondo più lingue, è appassionato cultore
delle scienze fisiche. Divenne noto nel mondo scientifico per l’invenzione di
strumenti di geodesia, che ebbero anche il plauso in tutta la Germania. È anche
filologo, dappoiché scrisse il pregevole libro Der Organismus und die Aesthetik
der klassisch-italienischen Sprache (L’organismo e l’estetica della lingua
italiana classica), opera di parecchi volumi in ottavo, stampata in tedesco a
Monaco iera l’anno 1891. Il Cerebotani è nativo di Lonato (Lombardia) ed
è in età d’anni 48. Fu prima cappellano a S. Pietro in Vaticano, poi segretario
del Cardinale Hohenlohe e direttore di un istituto a Schillingfürst, in iera.
Indi passò a Sayn, presso Coblenz sul Reno, Informator appo i Principi
Sayn-Wittgenstein, la cui famiglia si disperse. Allora il Cerebotani si
consacrò alla cura d’anime prima al Reno, poi a Berlinosempre sotto l’egida dei
principi e del Governo. Spese le ore libere in scandagli
tecnico-scientifici. Inventò il Teletopometro, l’Autolemeteorometro, il
Telespiralografo, ecc. Di più il Pantelegrafo-Cerobotani o Telegrafo
fac-simile, cioè apparecchio a comunicare immediatamente e per via elettrica il
movimento di una penna scrivente o disegnante ad altre comunque distanti.
Per ciò che riguarda l’Autolemeteorometro, si legga quanto scrisse il prof. G.
Grassi in Milano. Il cardinale Canossa, arcivescovo di Verona, scongiurò
il Cerebotani ad assumere per 4 anni una cattedra nel suo seminario, cattedra
che egli declinò. Finalmente ottenne un buon beneficio alla Metropolitana di
Monaco di iera. In aprile 1895 il Cerebotani emise idee nuovissime sulla
telegrafia multipla, e il 3 maggio tenne a quest’oggetto una conferenza al Club
elettrotecnico di Monaco di iera, coll’intervento della regia Legazione
italiana; egli vi fu applauditissimo. La lealtà del suo cuore, la
modestia, l’ingegno brillano siffattamente in tutte le sue azioni, da farlo
amare e stimare da tutti coloro che hanno la fortuna di avvicinarlo. Il suo
disinteressamento poi lo rese caro non solo a tutti, ma gli procacciò fama
altissima. Misericordioso pei poveri, la sua mano benefica sa provvidamente
venire in aiuto della vera indigenza.» (Giuseppe De-Botazzi, Italiani in
Germania-Als Italiener im Deutschland der Jahrhundertwende) Biografia
cronologica 11 gennaio 1847 Data di nascita 1860 Entra in seminario a Verona.
1869 Ordinato sacerdote. 1870 Laurea in teologia all'università La Sapienza di
Roma. 1873 Nominato segretario del card. Hohenlohe a Monaco di iera, dove
conobbe i principali scienziati del luogo. 1882 Torna a Verona, diventa
insegnante di Scienze fisiche nel liceo del seminario. 1884 Inventa il
teletopometro, uno strumento che serve misurare la distanza tra due punti. 1884
Stampa l'opuscolo 'Il teletopometro'. 1886 Stampa l'opuscolo 'La tachimetria
senza stadia'. 1890 Fa costruire una stazione meteorologica in Germania. 1900
Incontra a Londra il fisico e inventore Guglielmo Marconi. 1913 Riesce a
trasmettere alcuni versi della Divina Commedia ed un ritratto di Dante
Alighieri a 600 km di distanza. 19 ottobre 1928 Data di morte. Cariche Canonico
della cattedrale di Monaco di iera; Cameriere Segreto di Sua Santità Pio XI;
Membro dell'Accademia delle scienze dei nuovi Lincei e altre accademie
scientifiche; Membro del Consiglio di Presidenza del museo scientifico di
Berlino; Presidente a vita del museo della scienza e delle tecnica di Monaco di
iera. Attività scientifica Geodesia Nel settore della geodesia, Cerebotani ha
inventato: il teletopometro nel 1888, un apparecchio che serve a misurare
le distanze fra due punti. Nel 1903 l'imperatore Guglielmo II di Germania fece
sperimentare il telepometro sulla marina da guerra. il nefometro, per misurare
le nubi. Nel 1900 collaborò alla costruzione di una stazione meteorologica
automatizzata nelle montagne del Caucaso; questa stazione era dotata di
strumentazione in grado di comunicare le variazioni atmosferiche direttamente a
Berlino attraverso segnali a radiofrequenza, ed era alimentata elettricamente
con delle batterie che si dovevano ricare ogni due o tre anni. Il
teletopometro Il teletopometro serve a misurare la distanza tra un punto mobile
ed un punto fisso. Venne presentato ufficialmente nel 1903 alla
presenza dell'Imperatore Guglielmo II di Germania; nel 1925 alla presenza del
Santo Padre, eseguendo la misura della distanza tra la cupola della basilica di
San Pietro e le stanze papali. Il teletopometro fu usato a inizio secolo per
eseguire i primi rilievi topografici in Cina, ed è stato soppiantato poi dal
telemetro monostatico. Telegrafia Cerebotani è l'inventore di: un
telegrafo a caratteri, che fu sperimentato con successo tra Milano e Como nel
1900; un ricevitore a caratteri senza filo, che «rende più docile il Coherer»;
una serie di strumenti per le miscurazioni, come il autotelemetereografo e il
telecurvografo. Inoltre, ha anche costruito un pantelegrafo, ed è stato il
primo a tentare una trasmissione radio intercontinentale, esperimento che
riuscì a Guglielmo Marconi il 12 dicembre 1901. Il teleautografo
Uno dei primi teleautografi. Il teleautografo è uno strumento che serviva a
trasmettere disegni e scritti a distanza, inventato da Elisha Gray nel 1888, e
presentato nel 1891 a Chicago, ma era molto complicato. Quasi
contemporaneamente a Richtie, che ottenne interessanti risultati trasmettendo
tra Londra e Parigi, Cerebotani costruì un teleautografo che, con un penna,
permetteva di comandare il moto di una penna ricevente, comandata
elettricamente. Grazie al suo apparecchio, riuscì nel 1913 a trasmettere
scritti e disegni tra Berlino e Monaco di iera, cioè a circa 600 chilometri di
distanza. Il sistema di rilevazione della posizione del pennino, e di comando,
è completamente diverso da quello del pantelegrafo Caselli, e fu brevettato a
Monaco di iera nel 1900. Telefonia Nel settore della telefonia, Cerebotani
ha inventato: un selettore per chiamate individuali, per centralini
telefonici e telegrafici inseriti in un circuito; il 'Qui-Quo-Libet', oggi
chiamato telegrafo stampante. il teletipografo, o telefono scrivente, o
telegrafo stampante. Il teletipografo Il teletipografo, costruito nel 1900, è
una macchina da scrivere collegata ad un telegrafo, il quale a sua volta viene
collegato ad una ruota, il 'tipo', sul quale sono impresse le lettere
dell'alfabeto. In trasmissione, l'operatore scrive sulla macchina da
scrivere, e il telegrafo invia una serie di impulsi elettrici che codificano il
carattere inviato, come nel codice morse; in ricezione, il telegrafo riceve gli
impulsi, e in base al segnale comanda il 'tipo', con il quale vengono stampati
su carta i caratteri ricevuti. Lo stesso apparecchio è utilizzabile sia in
ricezione che in trasmissione, e sfrutta la normale linea telefonica.
Questo strumento permette di trasmettere caratteri alfanumerici ad una velocità
di circa 450 lettere al minuto (più di 90 parole, come una normale macchina da
scrivere dell'epoca), e quindi tre volte superiore rispetto al codice
morse. Il cardinale Merry del Val, quand'era segretario di Stato del papa
Pio X, fu il primo a servirsi del teletipografo per le comunicazioni tra la
Segreteria di Stato e gli uffici vaticani. Il teletipografo si diffure in
tutta l'Europa e fuori, anche il Negus d'Etiopia ne fece acquistare uno, che fu
messo ad Addis Abeba. Altri interessi scientifici Tra le altre cose,
Cerebotani ha inventato un orologio elettrico senza fili, capace di regolare il
movimento di altri orologi collegati con la stessa fonte d'energia. Alla
fine della sua vita, stava studiando la luce fredda: le normali lampadine ad
incandescenza sfruttano l'energia della corrente elettrica per effetto Joule,
mentre la luce fredda è luce generata sfruttando la corrente con dei
condensatori, in modo tale da eliminare il calore. Questo tipo di illuminazione
ha trovato impiego nelle lampade al neon soltanto dopo la seconda guerra mondiale.
Lo stesso principio della luce fredda è anche alla base della
televisione. Pubblicazioni Vorwort zu dem 6-8 Ottav-Bände starken
druckfertigen WerkeDer Organismus und die Aesthetik der klassisch-italienischen
Sprache nebst einem reichhaltigen Sprachpromptuarium für jedes Concept nach den
besten Klassikern elukubrirt, 1891; Aesthetisches und Mystisches im
italienischen Worte um die Zeit Dantes, 1921; Soliloquien; Direttorio e
Prontuario della Lingua Italiana; Wissenschaft und Mystik, 1922. Riconoscimenti
Nel 1947 gli sono stati intitolati una strada e una piazza a Monaco di iera,
nel 1988 una strada a Lonato e nel 1994 una scuola, sempre a Lonato. Karl Bosl: Bosls Bayerische Biographie.
Pustet, Regensburg 1983 Sito della scuola ITIS Cerebotani, su itislonato.it.
3 settembre 2009 14 settembre 2009). Pagina del gruppo La Polada, su
geocities.com (archiviato dall'url originale; seconda copia archiviata). Pagina
sul sito lombardinelmondo.org [collegamento interrotto], su
portal.lombardinelmondo.org. Scienza e fede, su internetsv.info. Il
Qui-Quo-Libet [collegamento interrotto], su suedkurier.de. Luigi Cerebotani, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie
on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Luigi Cerebotani, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Luigi Cerebotani, in Dizionario biografico
degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Luigi Cerebotani,
.Filosofia Fisica Fisica Categorie:
Presbiteri italianiFisici italiani del XIX secoloFisici italiani del XX
secoloTeologi italiani 1847 1928Nati l'11 gennaio 19 ottobre Lonato del Garda
VeronaScrittori in lingua tedescaFilosofi italiani del XIX secoloFilosofi
italiani del XX secolo
CERETTI -- Pietro Ceretti Monumento a Pietro Ceretti, Intra Pietro
Ceretti, noto anche con lo pseudonimo di Alessandro Goreni (Intra), filosofo. L'abitazione di Pietro Ceretti a Intra I suoi
genitori, Pietro e da Caterina Rabbaglietti, di condizioni agiate, lo
affidarono all'insegnamento privato di ecclesiastici e successivamente ai
docenti del seminario di Arona dove Pietro si distinse per il suo carattere
refrattario ai vecchi metodi didattici e ribelle alle rigide regole di
disciplina. Quasi al termine degli studi si appassionò all'approfondimento
della lingua latina e alla composizione di poesie che lo fecero conoscere come
poeta a braccio. Frequentò come alunno esterno un collegio di gesuiti a Novara
dove alla fine del 1840 risultava primo in retorica tanto che il suo maestro lo
spinse a comporre la tragedia Il duca di Guisa scritta sulla base della Storia
delle guerre civili di Francia di Arrigo Caterino Davila (1576-1631). Soggiornò
successivamente a Firenze dove ebbe modo di frequentare i membri del gabinetto
Vieusseux. Dedicatosi agli studi
scientifici e storico-filologici e soprattutto a quelli filosofici, nel 1843
scrisse il poemetto incompiuto Eleonora da Toledo dove l'autore dà prova di
penetrazione psicologica dei personaggi e di abile descrizione ambientale.
Nello stesso periodo compose poesie, dette poi "giovanili", a contenuto
filosofico, il romanzo, pubblicato postumo, Ultime lettere di un profugo
(1847), sul modello foscoliano, e infine le riflessioni Pellegrinaggio in
Italia (1858), nate a seguito di numerosi viaggi avventurosi per l'Europa in
compagnia di zingari e vagabondi, che gli permisero di apprendere diverse
lingue straniere. Opere queste che mostrano la singolarità del mondo spirituale
di Ceretti profondamente diverso e in contrasto con quello degli altri. Sposò la pavese Amalia Valvassori, che gli
venne a mancare il 15 marzo del 1858, lasciandogli una figlia, Argia, ancora in
tenera età. Nell'estate del 1858 soggiornò nella villetta "La
Chaumière", presso Chambéry, dove lavorò alla seconda edizione del
Pellegrinaggio in Italia dato alla stampe a Intra con lo pseudonimo di
Alessandro Goreni. Successivamente nel 1860, trasferitosi alle Cascine a
Firenze, pubblicò la Idea circa la genesi e la natura della Forza. Aderì all'hegelismo, di cui tentò una
revisione in senso soggettivistico in una grande opera in latino, Pasaelogices
Specimen (1864-1871), che non riscosse alcun successo di pubblico. Decise
quindi non pubblicare più nulla: tuttavia continuò a comporre una grande
varietà di testi filosofici, molti dei quali dettati alla figlia Argia, a causa
di una malattia che lo aveva debilitato completamente. Nell'ultimo periodo
della sua vita fino alla morte Ceretti si dedicò esclusivamente alle
meditazioni filosofiche espresse in numerose opere tra le quali i Sogni e
favole (Torino 1886), le Grullerie poetiche (Torino 1890) e le Massime e
dialoghi (Torino 1886). La sua opera è
stata pressoché sconosciuta, solo Giovanni Gentile gli ha assegnato un ruolo di
rilievo nella sua opera Le origini della filosofia contemporanea in Italia nel
capitolo Pietro Ceretti e la corruzione dell'hegelismo. A Pietro Cerretti oggi
viene riconosciuta una certa influenza sul pensiero filosofico della scuola
torinese. e sulla formazione del pensiero di Piero Martinetti Intitolazioni A Ceretti è dedicata la Biblioteca
Civica "Pietro Ceretti" di Verbania Note Dati biografici desunti da fonte principale:
Roberto Grita, Dizionario Biografico degli ItalianiVolume 23 (1979) ed.
Treccani alla voce corrispondente. Piero
Martinetti Pietro Ceretti p.199 L'opera
è tradotta in italiano con il titolo Saggio circa la natura logica di tutte le
cose (1888-1905) e pubblicata presso la UTET di Torino G.Gentile, Op. cit. III, parte II, 1-22;
261-273 Cfr. G. Colombo, La filosofia
come soteriologia, Milano 2005 (79-95)
Vigorelli47-53. Roberto Grita,
Pietro Ceretti, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, 23, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1979. 26 novembre . Pietro Ceretti, Opera OmniaD'Ercole, 15 voll.,
Torino 1885-1905 Vittore Alemanni, Pietro Ceretti. L'uomo, il poeta, il
filosofo, Hoepli 1904 Pasquale D'Ercole, La filosofia della natura di Pietro
Ceretti, UTET 1904 Giuseppe Colombo, La filosofia come soteriologia, Vita e
Pensiero 2005 ( 79-95) Fiorenzo Ferrari, Il filosofo di Intra. L'idealismo di
Pietro Ceretti, in Verbanus, , 63-107.
Amedeo Vigorelli, Piero Martinetti. La metafisica civile di un filosofo
dimenticato, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 1998,
88-424-9455-0. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene
una pagina dedicata a Pietro Ceretti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia
Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Pietro Ceretti Opere di Pietro Ceretti, su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Filosofia Filosofo
del XIX secoloLetterati italiani 1823 1884 24 agosto 28 luglio Intra Intra
CERONETTI -- Guido
Ceronetti «Per essere io morto
all'Assoluto / Vivo come un innato parricida / Tra gente già di padre nata
priva; (...) / Per aver detto all'Inaccessibile / Addio da un cortiletto senza
luce / Vergogna vorrei gridarmi ma resto muto.» (Guido Ceronetti, da
Poesie per vivere e non vivere, 1979) Guido Ceronetti (Torino), filosofo.
«Tutto è dispersione, lacerazione, separazione, rotolare di ruota senza
carro, e questo ha nome esilio, o anche mondo» (Guido Ceronetti, Tra
pensieri) Guido Ceronetti nacque a Torino, anche se talvolta viene indicato
erroneamente Andezeno (paese di origine della famiglia Ceronetti) come luogo di
nascita. Uomo di vasta erudizione e di sensibilità umanistica, cominciò a
collaborare nel 1945 con vari giornali; la sua presenza sul quotidiano La
Stampa ebbe inizio nel 1972. Tra le sue opere più significative vanno
ricordate le prose di Un viaggio in Italia e Albergo Italia ("due moderne
descrizioni, moderne e direi dantesche, da cui vien fuori tutto l'orrore del
disastro italiano", secondo Raffaele La Capria), e le raccolte di aforismi
e riflessioni Il silenzio del corpo e Pensieri del tè. Di rilievo la sua
attività di traduttore, sia dal latino (Marziale, Catullo, Giovenale, Orazio)
sia dall'antico ebraico (Salmi, Qohèlet, Cantico dei Cantici, Libro di Giobbe e
Libro di Isaia), nonché di poesia moderna (in particolare Konstantinos
Kavafis). Nel 1968 sposò Erica Tedeschi, figlia di Giuliana Fiorentino
Tedeschi (scrittrice e superstite ebrea dell'Olocausto); si separarono nel
1982, pur non divorziando mai. Insieme alla moglie nel 1970 diede vita al
Teatro dei Sensibili, allestendo in casa spettacoli di marionette. "Le sue
marionette esordivano su un piccolo palcoscenico, nel tinello di casa
Ceronetti, ad Albano Laziale. Si consumavano tè, biscottini (i crumiri di
Casale) e mele cotte." Nel corso degli anni vi assisterono personalità
quali Eugenio Montale, Guido Piovene, Natalia Ginzburg, Luis Buñuel e Federico
Fellini. A partire dal 1985, con la rappresentazione de La iena di San Giorgio,
il Teatro dei Sensibili divenne pubblico e itinerante. In Difesa della
Luna, e altri argomenti di miseria terrestre (1971), suo saggio d'esordio con
la Rusconi, criticò il programma spaziale americano da prospettive originali e
poetiche (nel analogamente fece con
l'astronauta Samantha Cristoforetti, in un breve e controverso articolo).
Nel 1981 Ceronetti introdusse in Italia le opere di E.M. Cioran, definendo lo
scrittore "squartatore misericordioso"; a sua volta Cioran dedicò a
Ceronetti uno dei suoi Esercizi di ammirazione. Nel 1994 venne aperto,
nell'Archivio Prezzolini della Biblioteca cantonale di Lugano, il fondo Guido
Ceronetti, da lui scherzosamente definito "il fondo senza fondo".
Esso raccoglie infatti un materiale ricchissimo e vario: opere edite e inedite,
manoscritti, quaderni di poesie e traduzioni, lettere, appunti su svariate
discipline, soggetti cinematografici e radiofonici. Vi si trovano, inoltre,
numerosi disegni di artisti (anche per il Teatro dei Sensibili), opere grafiche
dello stesso Ceronetti, collage e cartoline. Con queste ultime fu allestita,
nel 2000, la mostra intitolata Dalla buca del tempo: la cartolina
racconta. Nel 2008 prese posizione a favore dell'eutanasia nel caso di
Eluana Englaro, con la poesia La ballata dell'angelo ferito, definendo gli anni
di coma della donna "17 anni di stupro". Dal 2009 fu
beneficiario della legge Bacchelli, in quanto cittadino che ha «illustrato la
Patria» e «versante in condizioni di necessità economica» Jolanda
Insana, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Alberto Moravia e Guido Ceronetti all'8º Premio
letterario internazionale Mondello. Palermo 1982 Proposto dal controverso
critico e politico Vittorio Sgarbi come senatore a vita a Giorgio Napolitano,
declina subito l'invito. Attento alle tematiche ambientali, era noto per
essere un acceso sostenitore del vegetarismo e per una pratica di
vita estremamente frugale, quasi da moderno anacoreta. «Solo un vero
vegetariano è capace di vedere le sardine come cadaveri e la loro scatola come
una «bara di latta»; un mangiatore di carne (non mi sento di scrivere «un
carnivoro» perché l'uomo non è un carnivoro) neanche se lo chiudono nel
frigorifero di una macelleria avrà la sensazione di coabitare con dei cadaveri
squartati. C'è come un velo sulla retina dei non vegetariani, quasi un materializzarsi
di un velo sull'anima, che gli impedisce di vedere il cadavere, il pezzo di
cadavere cotto, nel piatto di carne o di pesce.» (da Il silenzio del
corpo) Dagli anni '90 alcuni suoi articoli sull'immigrazione (disse che ha
"un carattere preciso di invasione territoriale, premessa sicura di guerra
sociale e religiosa") e il Meridione, pubblicati sui quotidiani La Stampa
e Il Foglio, furono tacciati di razzismo, così come scalpore fecero alcune
posizioni da lui espresse sull'omosessualità maschile, accusate di
omofobia.[25] In precedenza sull'argomento si era attirato gli strali dei
cattolici per aver descritto don Bosco come un omosessuale represso.[26]
Guido Ceronetti intervistato nel
per Radio Radicale Come articolista, principalmente su La Stampa e il
Corriere della Sera, si occupava spesso di letteratura, arte, filosofia,
costume e cronaca nera (ad esempio scrivendo sul caso del delitto di Novi
Ligure o o su Marta Russo), analizzando il problema del male nel mondo odierno
in una prospettiva gnostica; al contrario giudicava "noiosi" i
processi di mafia.[27] Notevoli discussioni suscitò, altresì, un suo
intervento giornalistico a difesa del capitano delle SS Erich Priebke (che
visitò in carcere e con cui ebbe uno scambio epistolare), condannato all'ergastolo
per la strage delle Fosse Ardeatine ma che secondo Ceronetti fu soltanto un
mero funzionario esecutore, colpevole della "miseria di non essere un
santo" (parafrasi del saggio di Léon Bloy La tristezza di non essere
santi), e «creato Mostro delle Ardeatine, vittima di una giustizia
dell'odio».[28][29] Allo stesso modo, pur esprimendo sempre la sua simpatia per
gli ebrei e per Israele, per convinzioni personali e la sua parentela acquisita
con Giuliana Tedeschi, definì l'ergastolo inflitto a Rudolf Hess, al processo
di Norimberga, come un «crimine politico».[25] La sua posizione anticonformista
pro-Priebke e pro-Hess fece scandalo essendo l'autore un noto filosemita, con
moglie e suocera (superstite di Auschwitz) ebree nonché convinto filoisraeliano
(scrisse articoli di fuoco contro Khomeini e il terrorismo palestinese).
Nel fu insignito del premio
"Inquieto dell'anno" a Finale Ligure. Ostile al fascismo nella
seconda guerra mondiale e al comunismo poi[30], ma anche diffidente delle forme
della democrazia[31], non prese mai parte politica attiva, a parte un
brevissimo periodo in cui ebbe la tessera del Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori
Italiani[32] fino al , quando intervenne al congresso dei Radicali
Italiani[33], movimento liberale e libertario, e altre volte ai microfoni di
Radio Radicale (era amico di Marco Pannella[34]), anche se si considerava un
"conservatore"[25] e patriota del Risorgimento[35]
(descrisse l'Italia come «una democrazia strangolata sul nascere da tre poteri
con il verme totalitario, democristiano, comunista e sindacale»). Talvolta fu
definito come un "reazionario postmoderno".[36][37] «Sono
sempre stato anticomunista... [Il Mullah Omar e Osama Bin Laden sono] modi
dell'antiumano (...) Dietro di loro... l'ombra di Lenin, inviato della Tenebra,
fondatore imitabile dell'universo concentrazionario, capostipite novecentesco
di malvagie entità che non finiscono di manifestarsi.» (Ti saluto mio
secolo crudele, [25]) Nel propose in un
articolo su la Repubblica, ispirandosi al fenomeno delle assistenti sessuali
per disabili, l'istituzione di un "servizio erotico volontario"
rivolto agli anziani senza che dovessero rivolgersi a prostitute, per evitare
"la barbarie di una vecchiaia senza sesso".[38] Guido Ceronetti
fece uso di vari pseudonimi, tra i quali Mehmet Gayuk, Il Filosofo ignoto
(riferimento a Louis Claude de Saint-Martin, filosofo così chiamato), Ugone di
Certoit (quasi l'anagramma di Guido Ceronetti) e Geremia Cassandri[39].
Morì nella sua casa di Cetona (SI) a 91 anni, dopo un breve ricovero a causa di
broncopolmonite. Come da disposizione testamentaria, dopo tre giorni e una
cerimonia religiosa a Cetona, fu sepolto sulle colline tra Torino e il
Monferrato, in una tomba a terra situata nel cimitero di Andezeno (Torino), il paese
di origine dei genitori. «Disposizione da prendere: «Non voglio donne in
calzoni ai miei funerali. Cacciatele via. Almeno in questa pur insignificante
occasione, ma per amore, siano insottanate come le ho sognate sempre, nella
vita.» (da Per le strade della Vergine, ) Opere Saggistica e narrativa
Difesa della luna e altri argomenti di miseria terrestre, Rusconi, Milano, 1971
Aquilegia, illustrazioni di Erica Tedeschi, Rusconi, Milano, 1973; con il
titolo Aquilegia. Favola sommersa, Einaudi, Torino, 1988 La carta è stanca,
Adelphi, Milano, 1976; II ed., Adelphi, 2000, La musa ulcerosa: scritti vari e
inediti, Rusconi, Milano, 1978 Il silenzio del corpo. Materiali per studio di
medicina, Adelphi, Milano, 1979 La vita apparente, Adelphi, Milano, 1982 Un
viaggio in Italia, 1981-1983, Einaudi, Torino, 1983; nuova ed. con supplementi,
Einaudi, 2004; con appendice di testi inediti e una nuova Prefazione
dell'Autore, Einaudi, , Albergo Italia, Einaudi, Torino, 1985, Briciole di
colonna. 1975-1987, La Stampa, Torino, 1987, Pensieri del tè, Adelphi, Milano,
1987, L'occhiale malinconico, Adelphi, Milano, 1988, La pazienza
dell'arrostito. Giornali e ricordi 1983-1987, Adelphi, Milano, 1990, D.D.
Deliri Disarmati, Einaudi, Torino, 1993, Tra pensieri, Adelphi, Milano, 1994,
Cara incertezza, Adelphi, Milano, 1997, Lo scrittore inesistente, La Stampa,
Torino, 1999, Briciole di colonna. Inutilità di scrivere, La Stampa, Torino,
1999, La fragilità del pensare. Antologia filosofica personale Emanuela
Muratori, BUR, Milano, 2000, La vera storia di Rosa Vercesi e della sua amica
Vittoria, Einaudi, Torino, 2000, N.U.E.D.D. Nuovi Ultimi Esasperati Deliri
Disarmati, Einaudi, Torino, 2001, Piccolo inferno torinese, Einaudi, Torino,
2003, Oltre Chiasso. Collaborazioni ai giornali della Svizzera italiana
1988-2001, Libreria dell'Orso, Pistoia, 2004, La lanterna del filosofo,
Adelphi, Milano, 2005, Centoventuno pensieri del Filosofo Ignoto, La Finestra
editrice, Lavis, 2006, Insetti senza frontiere, Adelphi, Milano, 2009, In un amore
felice. Romanzo in lingua italiana, Adelphi, Milano, , Ti saluto mio secolo
crudele. Mistero e sopravvivenza del XX secolo, illustrazioni Guido Ceronetti e
Laura Fatini, Einaudi, Torino, , L'occhio del barbagianni, Adelphi, Milano, ,
Tragico tascabile, Adelphi, Milano, , Per le strade della Vergine, Adelphi,
Milano, , Per non dimenticare la memoria, Adelphi, Milano, , Regie immaginarie,
Einaudi, Torino, Guido Ceronetti nel 1974 Poesia Nuovi salmi. Psalterium
primum, Pacini Mariotti, Pisa, 1955, 1957 La ballata dell'infermiere, Alberto
Tallone Editore, Alpignano, 1965 Poesie, frammenti, poesie separate, Einaudi,
Torino, 1968 Premio Viareggio 1969 Opera Prima[40] Poesie: 1968-1977, Corbo e
Fiore, Venezia, 1978 Poesie per vivere e per non vivere, Einaudi, Torino, 1979
Storia d'amore del 1812 ritrovata nella memoria e altri versi, illustrazioni di
Mimmo Paladino, Castiglioni & Corubolo, Verona, 1987 Compassioni e
disperazioni. Tutte le poesie 1946-1986, Einaudi, Torino, 1987, Disegnare
poesia (con Carlo Cattaneo), San Marco dei Giustiniani, Genova, 1991, Scavi e
segnali. Poesie inedite 1986-1992, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 1992 Andezeno,
Alberto Tallone Editore, Alpignano, 1994 La distanza. Poesie 1946-1996,
Edizione riveduta e aggiornata dall'Autore, BUR, Milano, 1996, Preghiera degli
inclusi, Alberto Tallone Editore, Alpignano, senza data Francobollo, Alberto
Tallone Editore, Alpignano, 1997 (sotto lo pseudonimo Mehmet Gayuk), Il
gineceo, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, febbraio 1998; Adelphi, Milano, 1998 In memoriam
di Emanuela Muratori, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 2001 Messia, Tallone,
Alpignano, 2002; Adelphi, Milano, , [nella prima parte del libro] Tre ballate
recuperate dalle carte di Lugano: 1965, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 2003 Tre
ballate popolari per il Teatro dei Sensibili, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 2005;
Pensieri di calma a bordo di un aereo che sta precipitando, Alberto Tallone,
Alpignano, 2007; A Roma davanti al TullianoNotte del 3 dicembre 63 a. C.,
Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 2007; Con l'armata dell'Ebro morire oggi (25 luglio
1938), Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 2008; Invocazione al Dottor Buddha perché
venga e ci salvi, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 2008; Le ballate dell'angelo
ferito, Il Notes magico, Padova, 2009, Poemi del Gineceo, Adelphi, Milano, ,
[riedizione de Il gineceo del 1998 con inediti e nuova prefazione] Sono fragile
sparo poesia, Einaudi, Torino, , Drammaturgia Furori e poesia della Rivoluzione
francese. 8-18 giugno 1989, Carte Segrete, Roma, 1984 Alcuni
esperimenti di circo e varietà. Teatro Stabile-Teatro dei Sensibili,
Alberto Tallone Editore, Alpignano, 1988 Mystic Luna Park. Teatro
Stabile-Teatro dei Sensibili, Alberto Tallone Editore, Alpignano, 1988 Mystic
Luna Park. Spettacolo per marionette ideofore, ricordi figurativi di Giosetta
Fioroni, Becco Giallo, Oderzo, 1988 Viaggia viaggia, Rimbaud!, Il melangolo,
Genova, 1992 La iena di San Giorgio. Tragedia per marionette, Alberto Tallone,
1985, 1986; Einaudi, Torino, 1994 Il volto (Ansiktet), Teatro dei Sensibili,
Alberto Tallone Editore, Alpignano, 1998 Le marionette del Teatro dei
Sensibili, Aragno, Torino, 2004, [contiene: I Misteri di Londra e Mystic Luna
Park] Rosa Vercesi, un delitto a Torino negli anni Trenta, Teatro
Strehler-Teatro dei Sensibili, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 2004; Rosa Vercesi,
illustrazioni di Federico Maggioni, Edizioni Corraini, Mantova, 2005;
Traduzioni e curatele Marziale, Epigrammi, introduzione di Concetto Marchesi,
Einaudi, Torino, 1964; II ed. riveduta, Einaudi, Torino, 1966; nuova edizione
con un saggio di G. Ceronetti, Einaudi, Torino, 1979; nuova ed. riveduta e
nuova prefazione di G. Ceronetti, La Finestra Editrice, Lavis, 2007. I Salmi,
Einaudi, Torino, 1967; nuova ed. riveduta, Einaudi, Torino, 1994; col titolo Il
Libro dei Salmi, Adelphi, Milano, 1985, 2006 Catullo, Le poesie, Einaudi,
Torino, 1969; Adelphi, Milano, . Maurice Blanchot, Il libro a venire (Le Livre
à venir, 1959), trad. G. Ceronetti e Guido Neri, Einaudi, Torino, 1969; Il
Saggiatore, Milano, . Qohelet o l'Ecclesiaste, Einaudi, Torino, 1970, 1988,
1997, 2008; Alberto Tallone Editore, Alpignano, 1984, nuova traduzione ;
Qohelet. Colui che prende la parola, Adelphi, Milano, 2002. Decimo Giunio
Giovenale, Le Satire, Einaudi, Torino, 1971; La Finestra Editrice, Trento,
2008. Il Libro di Giobbe, Adelphi, Milano, 1972; Premio Monselice di
traduzione[41] nuova ed. riveduta, Adelphi, Milano, 1997. Cantico dei cantici,
Adelphi, Milano, 1975; Alberto Tallone Editore, Alpignano, 1981, 1987, 1996;
nuova versione riveduta, . Il Libro del Profeta Isaia, Adelphi, Milano, 1981;
nuova ed. riveduta e ampliata, Adelphi, Milano, 1992. Come un talismano. Libro
di traduzioni, Adelphi, Milano, 1986. Konstantinos Kavafis, Nel mese di Athir,
Edizioni dell'elefante, Roma, 1986. Konstantinos Kavafis, Tombe, Edizioni
dell'Elefante, Roma, 1986. Giovenale, Le donne. Satira sesta, Alberto Tallone
Editore, Alpignano, 1987. Nostradamus: annunciatore nel secolo 16. della
Rivoluzione che durerà dal 1789 al 1999 / profezie estratte dalle Centurie di
Michel de Nostredame, Alpignano, Alberto Tallone Editore, 1989. Tango delle
capinere, Castiglioni & Corubolo, Verona, 1989. Due versioni inedite da
Shakespeare e da Céline, Cursi, Pisa, 1989. Teatro dei sensibili, La
rivoluzione sconosciuta. Pensieri in libertà per ricordare 1789. Una scelta di
testi Guido Ceronetti, Tallone, Alpignano, 1989; col titolo La rivoluzione
sconosciuta, Adelphi, Milano, . [raccolta di 44 locandine teatrali a fogli
sciolti dalla mostra-spettacolo di Dogliani] Henry d'Ideville, Oggi, Alberto
Tallone, Alpignano, senza data. Constantinos Kavafis, Poesia, Alberto Tallone,
Alpignano, senza data Georges Séféris, Poesia, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano,
senza data. Sofocle, Edipo Tyrannos. Coro 1186-1222, Edizioni dell'Elefante,
Roma, 1990. (con Cristina Chaumont) Sura 99. Al Zalzala (Il tremito della
terra) dal Corano, calligrafia di Mauro Zennaro, Edizioni dell'Elefante, Roma,
1990. Il Pater noster. Matteo 6, 9-13, calligrafia di Mauro Zennaro, Edizioni
dell'Elefante, Roma, 1990. Léon Bloy, Dagli ebrei la salvezza, con un saggio di
G. Ceronetti, traduzione di Ottavio Fatica e Eva Czerkl, Piccola Biblioteca n.
330, Adelphi, Milano, 1994. Giorni di Kavafis. 1899-1928. Poesie di
Constantinos Kavafis, Officina Chimerea, Verona, 1995 Messia, Alberto Tallone
Editore, Alpignano, 2002; Adelphi, Milano, . [nella seconda parte del libro]
Siamo fragili, Spariamo poesia. i poeti delle letture pubbliche del Teatro dei
Sensibili , Qiqajon, Magnano, 2003 Tito Lucrezio Caro, I terremoti. De Rerum
Natura. VI 535-569, Alberto Tallone, Alpignano, 2003. Constantinos Kavafis,
Un'ombra fuggitiva di piacere, Adelphi, Milano, 2004. Trafitture di tenerezza.
Poesia tradotta 1963-2008, Einaudi, Torino, 2008. François Villon, I rimpianti
della bella Elmiera, Alberto Tallone Editore, Alpignano, . Orazio, Odi. Scelte
e tradotte da Guido Ceronetti, Adelphi, Milano, . Epistolari Guido Ceronetti e
Giosetta Fioroni, Amor di busta, Milano, Archinto, 1991. Due cuori una vigna.
Lettere ad Arturo Bersano, Prefazione di Ernesto Ferrero, Padova, Il Notes Magico,
2007. Guido Ceronetti e Sergio Quinzio, Un tentativo di colmare l'abisso.
Lettere 1968-1996, Milano, Adelphi, . Spettacoli del Teatro dei Sensibili La
Iena di San Giorgio. Tragedia per marionette (anni '70, allestito in
appartamento); 1985-87, prodotto dal Teatro Stabile di Torino, con Ariella
Beddini, Simonetta Benozzo, Paola Roman e Manuela Tamietti, regia di
Egon Paszfory (Guido Ceronetti), scene e costumi di Carlo Cattaneo Macbeth
(anni '70, spettacolo per marionette allestito in appartamento) Lo Smemorato di
Collegno (anni '70, spettacolo per marionette allestito in appartamento)
Diaboliche imprese, trionfi e cadute dell'ultimo Faust (anni '70, spettacolo
per marionette allestito in appartamento); nel 1979 fu interpretato al Festival
di Spoleto da Piera degli Esposti, Paolo Graziosi e Roberto Herlitzka, con la
regia, scene e costumi di Enrico Job I misteri di Londra (1978-81, allestito in
appartamento); 2009-, prodotto dal Teatro Stabile di Torino, regia di Manuela
Tamietti, con Patrizia Da Rold (Artemisia), Luca Mauceri (Baruk), Valeria Sacco
(Egeria), Erika Borroz (Remedios) e le marionette del Teatro dei Sensibili.
Furori e poesia della rivoluzione francese. Tragedia per marionette (1978-81,
allestito in appartamento); nel 1983 al Teatro Flaiano di Roma con i burattini
di Maria Signorelli Omaggio a Luis Buñuel (1987, prodotto dal Teatro Stabile di
Torino) Mystic Luna Park (1988, prodotto dal Teatro Stabile di Torino),
spettacolo per marionette ideofore con Armida (Nicoletta Bertorelli), Demetrio
(Guido Ceronetti), Irina (Laura Bottacci), Norma (Paola Roman), Yorick (Ciro
Buttari) La rivoluzione sconosciuta (1989), mostra-spettacolo
all'ex-convento dei carmelitani a Dogliani Viaggia viaggia, Rimbaud!
(1991, prodotto dal Teatro Araldo di Torino, in occasione del centenario della
morte di Arthur Rimbaud), regia di Jeremy Cassandri (Guido Ceronetti) con
Melissa (Manuela Tamietti), Norma (Paola Roman), Francisco (Gian Ruggero
Manzoni), Yorik (Ciro Bùttari) e Zelda (Roberta Fornier) Per un pugno di yogurt
(1996), collage di poesie Les papillons névrotiques (1997, al Cafè Procope di
Torino) con la partecipazione di Corallina De Maria La carcassa circense
(1997), spettacolo per marionette, azioni mimiche, cartelli, organo di Barberia
con Rosanna Gentili e Bartolo Incoronato Il volto (1998), dedicato a Ingmar
Bergman in occasione dei suoi ottant'anni Ceronetti Circus ovvero Casse da vivo
in esposizione pubblica (2001), letture di poesia, azioni sceniche mimiche e
intermezzi musicali con Elena Ubertalli e Giorgia Senesi M'illumino di tragico
(2002), collage di testi e pantomime liriche; in tournée anche con il titolo I
colori del tragico Rosa Vercesi (2003, prodotto dal Piccolo Teatro di Milano),
con Paola Roman, Simonetta Benozzo e Luca Mauceri Una mendicante cieca cantava
l'amore (2006, prodotto dal Piccolo Teatro di Milano) con Cecilia Broggini,
Luca Maceri, Elena Ubertali e Filippo Usellini Siamo fragili, spariamo poesia
(2008-), collage di testi poetici, ballate e canzoni Strada Nostro Santuario
(2009, prodotto dal Piccolo Teatro di Milano) filastrocche, canzoni, ballate,
azioni mimiche, happening e numeri di repertorio popolare La pedana impaziente
(), repertorio di marionette e azioni sceniche mimiche Finale di teatro (, al
Teatro Gobetti di Torino) con Fabio Banfo, Luca Mauceri, Valeria Sacco, Eleni
Molos, Filippo Usellini Pesciolini fuor d'acqua (), con Luca Mauceri e Eleni
Molos Quando il tiro si alzaIl sangue d'Europa 1914-1918 (, prodotto dal
Piccolo Teatro di Milano, in occasione del centenario della prima guerra
mondiale) con Eleni Molos, Elisa Bartoli, Filippo Usellini, Luca Mauceri e
Valeria Sacco Non solo Otello (, al Teatro della Caduta di Torino) Novant'anni
di solitudine (, a Cetona in occasione dei novant'anni dell'autore), con Luca
Mauceri, Filippo Usellini, Eleni Molos, Valeria Sacco, Fabio Banfo, Salvatore
Ragusa e Elisa Bartoli Ceronettiade. Deliri e visioni di Guido Ceronetti (, a
Cetona in occasione dell'anniversario della nascita dell'autore), con Luca
Mauceri, Eleni Molos, Valeria Sacco, Filippo Usellini Cataloghi di mostre
L'Atelier dei Sensibili a Dogliani, Michela Pasquali, Dogliani, Biblioteca
civica Einaudi, 1988 (catalogo della mostra nell'ex Convento dei Carmelitani a
Dogliani). Dalla buca del tempo: la cartolina racconta. I collages di cartoline
d'epoca del Fondo Guido Ceronetti, cura di Diana Rüesch e Marco Franciolli,
Archivi di cultura contemporanea, Museo Cantonale d'Arte Lugano, 2000. Poesia
marionette e viaggi di Guido Ceronetti nelle visioni di Carlo Cattaneo, Paolo
Tesi e Maurizio Vivarelli, Comune di Pistoia, 2001. Dare gioia è un mestiere
duro: trent'anni più due di Teatro dei Sensibili di Guido Ceronetti, Andrea
Busto e Paola Roman, fotografie di Mario Monge, Marcovaldo 2002. Nella gola
dell'Eone. Ti saluto mio secolo crudele. Immagini del XX secolo. Tutti i
collages di immagini dedicati al ventesimo dell'era da Guido Ceronetti, Il
melangolo, Genova, 2006. "Per le strade" di Guido Ceronetti, Omaggio
allo scrittore per i suoi 90 anni (24 agosto ), Diana Rüesch e Karin Stefanski,
Cartevive, Anno XXVIII, n. 56, Biblioteca cantonale, Archivio Prezzolini-Fondo
Ceronetti, Lugano, [37]. Opere audiovisive su Guido Ceronetti I Misteri di
Londra. Tragedia per marionette e attori, regia di Manuela Tamietti, Teatro
Stabile di Torino (riprese videografiche dello spettacolo, Torino 2009). Sulle
rotte del sogno. Parole musiche storie, di Luca Mauceri (cd e vinile EMA
Records, Firenze ). Guido Ceronetti. Il Filosofo Ignoto, film documentario di
Francesco Fogliotti e Enrico Pertichini (Italia , 52'), prodotto con la
collaborazione del Teatro dei Sensibili di Guido Ceronetti e dei Cinecircoli
giovanili socioculturali. Guido Ceronetti nei mass-media Tra il 1973 e il 1975
Guido Ceronetti curò cinque Interviste Impossibili per la seconda rete radiofonica
rai, in cui "intervistò" Attila (Carmelo Bene), Auguste e Louis
Lumière (Alfredo Bianchini e Mario Scaccia), George Stephenson (Mario Scaccia),
Jack Lo Squartatore (Carmelo Bene) e Pellegrino Artusi (Mario Scaccia). Il
cantautore Vinicio Capossela, nella raccolta di brani dal vivo Nel niente sotto
il soleGrand tour 2006, ha inseritocome incipit della seconda traccia (Non
trattare)una registrazione di Guido Ceronetti che declama i primi versetti del
Qoelet. Note Ha usato per molti anni un
sigillo con scritto "In esilio dal 1927" : Capossela intervista
Ceronetti. 6 febbraio . Morto lo scrittore Guido Ceronetti, in Corriere
fiorentino, 13 settembre . 13 settembre
(archiviato il 13 settembre ). G.
Ceronetti, Tra pensieri, Adelphi, Milano, p.11
Paolo Di Stefano, In morte di Guido Ceronetti Raffaele La Capria, Ultimi viaggi nell'Italia
perduta, Mondadori, Milano, . Guido
Ceronetti morto, ripubblichiamo la sua ultima intervista al Fatto: “Sono un
patriota orfano di patria. Italia, regno della menzogna” Nello Ajello, Ceronetti. Poesia in forma di
marionette, La Repubblica, 14 luglio
1996//ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1996/07/14/ceronetti-poesia-in-forma-di-marionette.html Samantha, lo spazio e il signor Freud "Guido Ceronetti. L'inferno del
corpo", in E.M.Cioran, Esercizi di ammirazione, Adelphi, Milano,
1988, 199-205 "Oggi 24 giugno 1994 una quantità delle
mie carte è partita per Lugano dove tutto entrerà a far partedegli archivi
della Biblioteca Cantonale." Guido Ceronetti, Per le strade della Vergine,
Adelphi, Milano, 214. «Urlate urlate
urlate urlate. / Non voglio lacrime. Urlate. / Idolo e vittima di opachi riti /
Nutrita a forza in corpo che giace / Io Eluana grido per non darvi pace /
Diciassette di coma che m'impietra / Gli anni di stupro mio che non ha
fine». Con Decreto del Presidente della
Repubblica del 30 dicembre 2008 (pubblicato nella G.U. n. 54 del 6 marzo 2009)
gli è stato infatti attribuito un assegno straordinario vitalizio ai sensi
della legge 8 agosto 1985, n. 440. A
Guido Ceronetti l'aiuto della legge Bacchellila Repubblica.it, in Archiviola
Repubblica.it. 13 febbraio .
(peacelink.it/ecologia/a/3267.html)
Edizione , 98-99 "Il nostro meridionale è attaccato alla
propria famiglia e nient'altro, qualsiasi abbominio, qualsiasi sfacelo pubblico
non arrivino a toccargli la Famiglia non gli faranno il minimo solletico. Sono
popoli incapaci di amare disinteressatamente qualcosa perché bello, al di sopra
dell'utile. La loro vera patria la loro nostalgia prenoachide è il deserto e
faticano da ubriachi a ritrovarlo". La pazienza dell'arrostito, Adelphi,
Milano, 1990
(comedonchisciotte.org/forum/index.php?p=/discussion/32946/ceronetti-dal-mare-il-pericolo-senza-nome) (http://lessiconaturale.it/migranti-e-prediche/)
(ilfoglio.it/preservativi//04/25/news/il-grande-pan-e-vivo-83260/)
(ilfoglio.it/cultura//05/23/news/far-torto-o-patirlo-84132/) (ilfoglio.it/preservativi//10/03/news/deutschland-pressappoco-uber-alles-88169/) «Sugli sbarchi in Sicilia l'europeista Ceronetti
dice, come altri non oserebbero, che “hanno ormai un carattere preciso di
invasione territoriale, premessa sicura di guerra sociale e religiosa"»
(Ceronetti, nel dolore si nasconde una luce)
Mario Andrea Rigoni, Ma non bisogna confondere il nichilismo con il
razzismo, Corriere della Sera, 31 gennaio 1999
Guido Almansi, Le leggende di Ceronetti, la Repubblica, 29 novembre
1992 L'innocente Priebke L'invasione africana Il male omosessuale
(Ceronetti dixit...) Guido Ceronetti,
Albergo Italia (Einaudi, Torino 1985), capitolo "Elementi per una
anti-agiografia", 122-133 Uno, cento, mille Ceronetti… Guido Ceronetti, Priebke. Alcune domande
intorno a un ergastolo, la Stampa
Pietrangelo Buttafuoco, La pietas di Ceronetti per Priebke, il Foglio,
27 febbraio 1999 «Sono sempre stato
anticomunista, sempre... Forse, subito dopo la guerra ho avuto una certa
simpatia, però non mi sono iscritto al partito il giorno dopo aver visto La
corazzata Potëmkin, come innumerevoli giovani. Antifascista non è neanche da
dire, da quando ci si è risvegliati, l'8 settembre. Di quel periodo non ho
voglia di parlarne, ero tra i soliti ragazzini stupidoni che andavano alle
adunate, ma non c'è storia di anima o di pensiero o di famiglia che riguardi il
fascismo. I miei non erano fascisti né antifascisti, erano bravi cittadini come
tanti.» (Corriere della sera, 9.5.) «Si
dice il responso delle urne. Come se un popolo di cretini potesse fornire
oracoli» (Per le strade della Vergine, )
Guido Ceronetti, la mia America: “Un baluardo contro l’ideologia
comunista” Guido CeronettiXIII Congresso
Radicali Italiani
ilfoglio.it/preservativi//06/14/news/prttttt-in-una-sigla-tutto-pannella-impenitente-ottimista-e-visionario-97254/
(corriere.it/cultura/libri/11_maggio_09/guido-ceronetti-in-un-amore-felice_d04f8b36-7a35-11e0-a5b9-91021abd11c5.shtml#sect_diz7) Chi era Guido Ceronetti, fustigatore dei vizi
degli italiani Riviste/ Su “Cartevive” omaggio a Ceronetti, reazionario
postmoderno CERONETTI: ‘METTIAMO FINE
ALLA BARBARIE DELLA VECCHIAIA SENZA SESSO: PER DISABILI E CARCERATI QUALCOSA SI
È MOSSO MA PER I VECCHI-MASCHI SI MUOVERÀ MAI QUALCUNO? LA PROPOSTA: UN
SERVIZIO EROTICO VOLONTARIO PER GLI OVER 70!
"Abiterò per tre mesi al N. 4 di via Giolitti a Torino, per mettere
in scena col Teatro dei Sensibili La Iena di San Giorgio. Sulla porta metto
quest'altro mio nome: Geremia Cassandri." Guido Ceronetti, La pazienza
dell'arrostito. Giornale e ricordi (1983-1987), Milano, Adelphi, 1990239. Premio letterario Viareggio-Rèpaci, su
premioletterarioviareggiorepaci.it. 9 agosto .
I VINCITORI DEL PREMIO “MONSELICE” PER LA TRADUZIONE ,
su bibliotecamonselice.it. 5 novembre .
Alberto Roncaccia, Guido Ceronetti. Critica e poetica (Bulzoni, Roma,
1993) Emil Cioran, Esercizi di ammirazione ( Adelphi, Milano, 1988, 199–205,, "Guido Ceronetti. L'inferno
del corpo") Giosetta Fioroni, Marionettista. Guido Ceronetti e il Teatro
dei Sensibili secondo l'alchimia figurativa (Corraini, Mantova, 1993) Giovanni
Marinangeli, Guido Ceronetti. Il veggente di Cetona (Fondazione Alce Nero,
Isola del Piano 1997) Fabrizio Ceccardi, Il Teatro dei Sensibili di Guido
Ceronetti (Corraini, Mantova, 2003) Andrea De Alberti, Il Teatro dei Sensibili
di Guido Ceronetti (Junior, Bergamo, 2003) Marco Albertazzi, Fiorenza Lipparini,
La luce nella carne. La poesia di Guido Ceronetti (La Finestra Editrice, Lavis,
2008) P. Masetti, A. Scarsella, M. Vercesi , Pareti di carta. Scritti su Guido
Ceronetti (Tre Lune, Mantova, ) Anna Maria Ortese, Le piccole persone (Adelphi,
Milano, , 119–121, 210-213). Alessandro
Lattuada, Frammenti di una luce incontaminata in Guido Ceronetti, La Finestra
Editrice, Lavis, Emil Cioran
Gnosticismo moderno Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Guido
Ceronetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Guido Ceronetti Guido
Ceronetti, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Opere di Guido Ceronetti, .
Registrazioni di Guido Ceronetti, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale.
Guido Ceronetti, su Discogs, Zink Media. Guido Ceronetti, su Internet Movie
Database, IMDb.com. Ma io diffido
dell'amore universale Guido Ceronetti, la Repubblica, 18 settembre , Archivio.
Guido Ceronetti, l’ultimo bardo gnostico che cantava il dolore per la bellezza
perduta. Morto a 91 anni il più irregolare degli scrittori italiani. Ernesto
Ferrero, La Stampa, 14. 9. . V D M Vincitori del Premio Grinzane Cavour per la
narrativa italiana V D M Vincitori del Premio "Città di Monselice"
per la traduzione letteraria V D M Vincitori del Premio Flaiano per la
narrativa Filosofia Letteratura
Letteratura Teatro Teatro
Categorie: Scrittori italiani del XX secoloScrittori italiani del XXI
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italiani
CERRONI: Umberto
Cerroni (Lodi) giurista italiano. Ha studiato a Roma con Pilo
Albertelli e si è laureato nel 1947 in Filosofia del diritto. Ottenne nel
1964 la libera docenza in Filosofia del diritto e l'incarico di Storia delle
dottrine economiche e di Storia delle dottrine politiche all'Lecce. Nel
1971divenne professore di ruolo di Filosofia della politica e ha insegnato a
Salerno e all'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli. Dal 1976 ha insegnato
per piùdi venti anni Scienza della politica nella Facoltà di Sociologia
dell'Università "La Sapienza" di Roma. Dal 2000, sempre
all'Università "La Sapienza" di Roma, era stato nominato professore
emerito. Il 23 maggio 2001 l'Macerata gli conferisce la laurea honoris
causa in Scienze politiche. Opere Problemi attuali di storia
dell'agricoltura dell'U.R.S.S. / traduzione [dal russo] di Umberto
Cerroni.Milano : Ed. Centro Per La Storia Del Movimento Contadino, S. T., 1953
Il sistema elettorale sovietico / Umberto Cerroni.[Roma] : Italia-URSS
editrice, stampa 1953 (Roma : Tip. dell'Orso) Legge sull'ordinamento
giudiziario dell'U.R.S.S : (Zakon o sudostroistve SSSR, souznykh i autononmik
respublik) / traduzione dal russo di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Ed. Associazione
Italia-U.R.S.S, sezione giuridica, 1954 (Tip. Sagra, Soc. arti grafiche
riproduzioni artistiche) Recenti studi sovietici su problemi di teoria del
diritto / Umberto Cerroni.[Bologna : s.n., 1954?] Sul carattere dei movimenti
contadini in Russia nei secoli 17. e 18. / V. I. Lebedev ; [traduzione di U.
Cerroni].Milano : Movimento Operaio, 1954 Studi sovietici di diritto
Internazionale : A cura della sezione giuridica della associazione Italia-urss.
[presentazione di Umberto Cerroni].Roma : Tip. Martore e Rotolo, 1954 La
dottrina sovietica e il nuovo codice penale dell'URSS / Umberto Cerroni.S.l. :
s.n., stampa 1955 (Bologna : STEB) Poeti sovietici d'oggi / [traduzioni dal
russo di Umberto Cerroni , Eridano Bazzarelli, Vittorio Strada, Angelo Maria
Ripellino].Roma : Tip. Studio Tipografico, [1957] Per lo sviluppo degli studi
storici sulla Russia / Umberto Cerroni.Bologna : STEB, 1958 Diritto ed economia
: rilevanza del concetto marxiano di lavoro per una teoria positiva del diritto
/ Umberto Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1958 Idealismo e statalismo nella moderna
filosofia tedesca / Umberto Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1959 Individuo e persona
nella democrazia / Umberto Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1959 Il problema politico
nello Stato moderno / Umberto Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1959 Diritto e sociologia
/ Umberto Cerroni.[S.l. : s.n., 1960?] Kelsen e Marx / Umberto Cerroni.Milano :
Giuffrè, 1960 L'etica dei solitari / Umberto Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1960
Lenin e il problema della democrazia moderna : saggi e studi / Umberto
Cerroni.[S.l. : s.n.], 1960 (Roma : NAVA) Parlamento e società / Umberto
Cerroni.[S.l.] : Edizioni giuridiche del lavoro, 1960 La prospettiva del
comunismo / K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori
Riuniti, 1960 Ritorno di Jhering / Umberto Cerroni.[S.l.] : Edizioni giuridiche
del lavoro, 1960 (Città di Castello : Unione arti grafiche) Sulla storicità
della distinzione tra diritto privato e diritto pubblico / Umberto
Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1960 La critica di Marx alla filosofia hegeliana del
diritto pubblico / Umberto Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1961 La filosofia politica
di Giovanni Gentile / Umberto Cerroni.[S.l. : s.n.], 1961 (Novara : Tip. Stella
Alpina) La nuova codificazione penale sovietica / Umberto Cerroni.[S.l.] :
Edizioni giuridiche del lavoro, 1961 Concezione normativa e concezione
sociologica del diritto moderno / Umberto Cerroni.S.l. : Edizioni giuridiche
del lavoro, 1962 Diritto e rapporto economico / Umberto Cerroni.Milano :
Giuffrè, 1962 Kant e la fondazione della categoria giuridica / Umberto Cerroni.Milano
: Giuffrè, 1962 Marx e il diritto moderno / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori
Riuniti, 1962 Teorie sovietiche del diritto / Stucka ...(et al.) ; Umberto
Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1964 Saggi / Benjamin Constant ; introduzione di
Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Samonà e Savelli, 1965 Il diritto e la storia / Umberto
Cerroni.S.l. : s.n., [1965] Le origini del socialismo in Russia / Umberto
Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1965 Il pensiero politico dalle origini ai
nostri giorni / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1966 Un ouvrage recent
sur Marx et le droit : Umberto Cerroni , Marx e il diritto moderno, Rome 1962 /
par Michel Villey.[Paris] : Sirey, 1966 Che cos'è la proprietà ?, o, Ricerche
sul principio del diritto e del governo : prima memoria, 1840 / Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon ; prefazione, cronologia,
Umberto Cerroni.Bari : Laterza, 1967 Considerazioni sullo stato delle
scienze sociali : relazioni sugli aspetti generali / Umberto Cerroni.[Milano :
Centro nazionale di prevenzione e difesa sociale, 1967?] , (Milano : Tipografia
Ferrari) La funzione rivoluzionaria del diritto e dello stato e altri scritti /
Peter I. Stucka ; introduzione e traduzione di Umberto Cerroni.2. ed.- Torino :
Einaudi, 1967 Italian contributions to marxian research: materialism and dialectic
: the international scene: currente trends in the social sciences / by Umberto
Cerroni.- [New York] : Social Research, 1967 Il pensiero politico dalle origini
ai nostri giorni / Umberto Cerroni.2. ed.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1967 La
rivoluzione giacobina / Maximilien Robespierre ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori
Riuniti, 1967 [2. ed. 1984] Discorso sull'economia politica e frammenti
politici / Rousseau ; traduzione di Celestino E. Spada ; prefazione di Umberto
Cerroni.Bari : Laterza, 1968 La libertà dei moderni / Umberto Cerroni.Bari : De
Donato, c 1968 Le national, l'international, l'universel / Umberto
Cerroni.Zagreb : s.n., 1968 Metodologia e scienza sociale / Umberto
Cerroni.Lecce : Milella, stampa 1968 Problemi della legalità socialista nelle recenti
discussioni sovietiche / Umberto Cerroni.Milano : A. Giuffrè, 1968 Sulla natura
della politica : utopia e compromesso / Umberto Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1968
Considerazioni sullo stato delle scienze sociali / Umberto Cerroni.[S.l. :
s.n., 1969?] Il metodo dell'analisi sociale di Lenin / Umberto Cerroni.Bari :
Adriatica editrice, 1969 Il pensiero giuridico sovietico / Umberto Cerroni;
Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1969 Marx, el derecho y el estado / Umberto Cerroni ,
Ralph Miliband, Nicos Poulantzas, Ljubomir Tadic.Barcelona : Oikos-tau, s .
a.ediciones, c1969 La questione ebraica e altri scritti giovanili / Karl Marx ;
introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1969 La società
industriale e la condizione dell'uomo / Umberto Cerroni.Lecce : ITES, 1969 Sul
metodo delle scienze sociali: una risposta / U. Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1969
Principi di politica / Benjamin Constant ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori
Riuniti, c 1970 Strade per la libertà / Bertrand Russell ; introduzione di
Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton, c1970 Tecnica e libertà : conferenza
tenuta al Lions club di Bari il 24 novembre 1969 / Umberto Cerroni.[S.l. :
s.n.], 1970 (Padova : Grafiche Erredici) Tecnica e libertà / Umberto
Cerroni.Bari : De Donato, [1970] Lavoro salariato e capitale / Appunti sul
salario e appendice di F. Engels ; Introduzione, cura e note filologiche di
Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton italiana, 1971 La societa industriale e
le trasformazioni della famiglia / U. Cerroni.Milano : Giuffrè, 1971 Salario, prezzo
e profitto / Karl Marx ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton,
1971 Stato e rivoluzione / Vladimir I. Lenin ; introduzione di Umberto
Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton italiana, 1971 Teoria della crisi sociale in Marx
: Una reinterpretazione / Umberto Cerroni.Bari : De Donato, 1971 Strade per la
libertà / Bertrand Russell ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton
compton italiana, 1971 Discorso sull'economia politica e frammenti politici /
Rousseau ; traduzione di Celestino E. Spada ; prefazione di Umberto
Cerroni.Bari : Laterza, 1971 [2. ed. 1972] Caratteristiche del romanticismo
economico / V. I. Lenin ; prefazione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti,
1972 Kant e la fondazione della categoria giuridica / Umberto Cerroni.Milano :
Giuffrè, 1972 La libertà dei moderni / Umberto Cerroni.Bari : De Donato, 1972
Marx e il diritto moderno / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1972 Il
pensiero di Marx / Antologia Umberto Cerroni , con la collaborazione di Oreste
Massari e Anna Maria Nassisi.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1972 Il pensiero politico
dalle origini ai nostri giorni / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1972
Saggio sui privilegi : che cosa e il Terzo stato? / Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes ;
introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1972 Lo sviluppo del
capitalismo in Russia / V. I. Lenin ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma :
Editori Riuniti, 1972 In memoria del manifesto dei comunisti / Antonio Labriola
; Manifesto del partito comunista / Marx-Engels ; introduzione di Umberto
Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton, 1973 La libertà dei moderni / Umberto Cerroni.2.
ed.Bari : De Donato, 1973 Teoria politica e socialismo; Roma, 1973; Il pensiero
di Marx / antologia Umberto Cerroni ; con la collaborazione di Oreste e Anna
Maria Nassisi. 2. ed.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1973 Teoria della crisi sociale in
Marx : una reinterpretazione / Umberto Cerroni.2. ed.Bari : De Donato, 1973
Teoria politica e socialismo / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Ed.Riuniti, 1973 Lavoro
salariato e capitale / Karl Marx ; con appunti sul salario e appendice di F.
Engels ; introduzione, cura e note filologiche di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton
Compton, 1974 Marx e il diritto moderno / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori
Riuniti, 1974 Il marxismo e l'analisi del presente / Umberto Cerroni.[S.l.] :
Politica ed economia, 1974 Societa civile e stato politico in Hegel / Umberto
Cerroni.Bari : De Donato, 1974 Salario, prezzo e profitto / Karl Marx ;
introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton italiana, 1974 Il lavoro
di un anno : almanacco 1974 / Umberto Cerroni.Bari : De Donato, 1975 Il
pensiero di Marx / Karl Marx ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1975 Il
pensiero politico : dalle origini ai nostri giorni / Umberto Cerroni.Roma :
Editori Riuniti, 1975 Il rapporto uomo-donna nella civiltà borghese / Umberto
Cerroni.1. ed.Roma : Ed. Riuniti, 1975 Scienza e potere / scritti di U. Cerroni
... <et al.>.Milano : Feltrinelli, 1975 Stato e rivoluzione / Vladimir I.
Lenin ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton, 1975 Lo sviluppo
del capitalismo in Russia / V. I. Lenin ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma
: Editori Riuniti, stampa 1975 La teoria generale del diritto e il marxismo /
Evgenij Bronislavovic Pasukanis ; con un saggio introduttivo di Umberto Cerroni.Bari
: De Donato, 1975 Introduzione alla scienza sociale / Umberto Cerroni.Roma :
Editori Riuniti, 1976 Lavoro salariato e capitale / Karl Marx ; con appunti sul
salario e appendice di F. Engels ; introduzione, cura e note filologiche di
Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton, 1976 Materialismo storico e scienza /
Umberto Cerroni.Lecce : Milella, 1976 Il rapporto uomo-donna nella civilta
borghese / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1976 Salario, prezzo e
profitto / Karl Marx ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton,
1976 Sulla storicità dell'eros : note metodologiche / Umberto Cerroni, Annarita
Buttafuoco.[S.l. : s.n.], stampa 1976 Crisi ideale e transizione al socialismo
/ Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1977 Scritti economici / V. I. Lenin
; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1977 Stato e rivoluzione / Vladimir
I. Lenin ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.- Roma : Newton Compton, 1977 Carte
della crisi : taccuino politico-filosofico / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori
Riuniti, 1978 Crisi del marxismo? / Umberto Cerroni ; intervista di Roberto
Romani.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1978 Critica al programma di Gotha e testi sulla
tradizione democratica al socialismo / Karl Marx ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma :
Editori Riuniti, 1978 Due tattiche della socialdemocrazia nella rivoluzione
democratica / V. I. Lenin ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1978 In
memoria del manifesto / Antonio Labriola ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.2.
ed.Roma : Newton Compton Editori, 1978 Che cos'è la proprietà ? : o ricerche
sul principio del diritto e del governo : prima memoria (1840) / Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon ; prefazione, cronologia, biografia Umberto Cerroni. 3. ed.Roma ; Bari
: Laterza, 1978 Lavoro salariato e capitale / Karl Marx ; con appunti sul salario
e appendice di F. Engels ; introduzione ... di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton
Compton, 1978 Lessico gramsciano / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1978
La prospettiva del comunismo / K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin ; Umberto
Cerroni.Roma : Editori riuniti, 1978 La questione ebraica e altri scritti
giovanili / Karl Marx ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori riuniti,
1978 Saggio sui privilegi : che cosa e il terzo stato? / Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes
; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni : traduzione di Roberto Giannotti.Roma :
Editori Riuniti, 1978 Strade per la liberta / Bertrand Russell ; introduzione
di Umberto Cerroni ; traduzione di Pietro Stampa.Roma : Newton Compton, 1978
Teoria del partito politico / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1978 [2.
ed. 1979] I giovani e il socialismo / K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, A.
Gramsci ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1979 Introduzione alla
scienza sociale, Roma 1979; Storia del marxismo / Predrag Vranicki ;
introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1979 Quasi una vita...
e anche meno : 1956-1976 / poesie di Italo Evangelisti ; prefazione di Umberto
Cerroni ; con 9 disegni di Luigi Ferranti.Milano ; Roma, [1980?] Che cosa fanno
oggi i filosofi? / N.Bobbio ; U. Cerroni, U. Eco.Milano, 1982 Logica e società
: pensare dopo Marx / Umberto Cerroni.Milano : Bompiani, 1982 La democrazia
come problema della società di massa / Umberto Cerroni.[S.l. : s.n., 1982]
Principi di politica / Benjamin Constant ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti,
1982 Teoria do partido politico / Umberto Cerroni ; traducao de Marco Aurelio
Nogueira e Silvia Anette Kneip.Sao Paulo : Livraria editora ciencias humanas,
1982 Critica della filosofia hegeliana del diritto pubblico / Karl Marx ;
introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1983 Il pensiero di
Marx : antologia / Umberto Cerroni ; con la collaborazione di Oreste Massari e
Anna Maria Nassisi.III. ed. Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1983 Scritti economici / V.
I. Lenin ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1983 Tehnika in svoboda :
zbirka 2. : 1. knjiga / Umberto Cerroni.Ljubljana : Komunist, 1983 Teoria della
società di massa / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1983 La rivoluzione
giacobina / Maximilien Robespierre ; Umberto Cerroni ; [traduzione di Fabrizio
Fabbrini].Roma : Editori riuniti, 1984 Politica : metodo, teorie, processi,
soggetti, istituzioni e categorie / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : NIS, 1986 La
politica post-classica : studi sulle teorie contemporanee / Michele Prospero ;
prefazione di Umberto Cerroni.[S. l. : s. n.], stampa 1987 (Taviano : Lit.
Graphosette) Urss e Cina : le riforme economiche / Umberto Cerroni ... \et al.!
; a cura del Cespi e del Centro studi paesi socialisti della Fondazione
Gramsci.Milano : F. Angeli, stampa 1987 Che cosa è il terzo stato con il Saggio
sui privilegi / Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori
Riuniti, 1989 Democrazia e riforma della politica : Lo Statuto del nuovo PCI /
Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Partito Comunista Italiano, 1989 Regole e valori nella
democrazia : stato di diritto, stato sociale, stato di cultura / Umberto
Cerroni.1. ed.Roma : Ed. Riuniti, 1989 La cultura della democrazia / Umberto
Cerroni.Chieti : Metis, 1991 Che cosa e il Terzo Stato? / Emmanuel-Joseph
Sieyes ; Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1992 La rivoluzione giacobina
/ Maximilien Robespierre ; Umberto Cerroni ; traduzione di Fabrizio Fabbrini;
apparati biobibliografici di Grazia Farina.Pordenone : Studio Tesi, 1992
Manifesto del partito comunista / Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels ; nella
traduzione di Antonio Labriola ; seguito da In memoria del manifesto dei
comunisti di Antonio Labriola ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma :
TEN, 1994 Nazione/regione : i contributi regionali alla costruzione
dell'identità nazionale / Andrea Battistini, Umberto Cerroni , Michele
Prospero.Cesena : Il ponte vecchio, [1994] L'ambiente fra cultura tecnica e
cultura umanistica : seminario svoltosi presso l'ANPA il 18 ottobre 1994 /
Umberto Cerroni ; A. Albanesi, M. Maggi e L. Sisti.Roma : Anpa, [1995]
Novecento : almanacco del ventesimo secolo / Andrea, Monica e Umberto
Cerroni.Cesena : Il ponte vecchio, 1995 Il pensiero politico italiano / Umberto
Cerroni.Roma : Newton Compton, 1995 Il pensiero politico del Novecento /
Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Tascabili economici Newton, 1995 Sociologia de la
cultura / Aquiles Chihu (coordinador) ; Umberto Cerroni ... [et al.].Mexico,
D.F. : Universidad autonoma metropolitana, Unidad iztapalapa, Division de
ciencias sociales y humanidades, Departamento de sociologia, c1995 Le regole
del metodo sociologico / Emile Durkheim ; introduzione di Umberto Cerroni.Roma
: Editori Riuniti, 1996 Regole e valori nella democrazia : Stato di diritto,
Stato sociale, Stato di cultura / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Editori Riuniti, 1996
L'identità civile degli italiani / Umberto Cerroni.Lecce : Manni , c1996
L'ulivo al governo : come cambia l'Italia / interventi di U. Cerroni ... [et
al.] ; Paola Piciacchia.Roma : Philos, stampa 1996 Politica / Umberto
Cerroni.Roma : Seam, 1996 Confronto italiano : atti degli incontri di Cetona,
1994-1995 / Giovanni Bechelloni, Umberto Cerroni.Firenze : Ed. Regione Toscana,
stampa 1997 (Firenze : Centro Stampa Giunta regionale) L'identità civile degli
italiani / Umberto Cerroni.2. ed., ampliata.Lecce : Manni, 1997 Lo Stato
democratico di diritto : modernità e politica / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Philos,
stampa 1998 Habeas mentem : Scuola e vita civile : 1990-1998 / Umberto
Cerroni.Rionero in Vulture (Pz) : Calice, 1998 Conoscenza e societa complessa :
per una teoria generale del sensibile / Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Philos, 1998
Ricordo di Marisa De Luca Cerroni / scritti di Umberto Cerroni ... et al.Lecce
: [s.n.], stampa 1999 Confronto italiano : atti degli incontri di Cetona,
1996-1997-1998 / Giovanni Bechelloni e Umberto Cerroni (1996-1997) ; Umberto
Cerroni e Marisa De Luca (1998).Firenze : Ed. Regione Toscana, stampa 2000
(Centro Stampa Giunta Regionale) Taccuino politico-filosofico / Umberto
Cerroni.Roma : Philos, 2000 Precocità e ritardo nell'identità italiana, Roma,
2000; Precocità e ritardo nell'identità italiana / Umberto Cerroni.Roma :
Meltemi, c2000 Taccuino politico-filosofico 2000 / Umberto Cerroni.Lecce :
Manni, c2001 Le radici culturali dell'Europa / Umberto Cerroni.Lecce : P.
Manni, 2001 Radici della civiltà europea / Umberto Cerroni.Lecce : Manni, 2001
Globalizzazione e democrazia / Umberto Cerroni.Lecce : Manni, [2002] Taccuino
politico-filosofico 2001, Lecce, 2002; Taccuino politico-filosofico 2002 /
Umberto Cerroni.San Cesario di Lecce : Manni, [2003] L'eretico della sinistra :
Bruno Rizzi elitista democratico / Alessandro Orsini; introduzione di Umberto
Cerroni.Milano : F. Angeli, [2004] Taccuino politico-filosofico 2003, Lecce,
2004; La scienza e una curiosita : scritti in onore di Umberto Cerroni / Cosimo
Perrotta ; con la collaborazione di Mariarosa Greco ; postfazione di Umberto
Cerroni.San Cesario di Lecce : Manni, 2004 Manifesto del partito comunista /
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels ; nella traduzione di Antonio Labriola ; seguito da
In memoria del Manifesto dei comunisti di Antonio Labriola ; introduzione di
Umberto Cerroni.Roma : Newton & Compton, 2005 [2. ed. 2008] Dialettica dei
sentimenti : dialoghi di psicosociologia / Umberto Cerroni , Alberta
Rinaldi.San Cesario di Lecce : Manni, [2004] Taccuino politico-filosofico :
2004 / Umberto Cerroni.[San Cesario di Lecce] : Manni, [2005] Ricordi e
riflessioni : un dialogo con Giuseppe Vagaggini / Umberto Cerroni.Montepulciano
: Le Balze, 2006. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Umberto
Cerroni Il blog dell'Associazione
Machiavelli di cui Umberto Cerroni era presidente. Biografia e documenti di
Umberto Cerroni dall'Enciclopedia Multimediale delle Scienze Filosofiche. 93171982
I0000 0000 8400 8974 IT\ICCU\CFIV\003222
79029788 107964384 cb12677983m
NDL (EN, JA) 00464393
Identitieslccn-n79029788 Biografie
Biografie Diritto Diritto
Politica Politica Università Università Categorie: Giuristi italiani del
XX secoloGiuristi italiani Professore1926 2007 5 aprile 27 aprile Lodi
RomaProfessori della SapienzaRomaLaureati honoris causa dell'Università degli
Studi di Macerata
CERTANI: Giacomo Certani
(Bologna), filosofo. Noto anche come
Jacopo Certani, ovvero Giacomo Cerretani), fu canonico, teologo Collegiato
Filosofo, e nell'Bologna pubblico Professore di filosofia morale. Biografia Cittadino Nobile di Bologna e
fratello di Don Filippo Maria, fu Canonico Regolare di San Giovanni in Monte
dove tenne per due volte pubbliche Conclusioni di filosofia e di teologia,
arciprete di Monteveglio ed abate della sua religione[non chiaro]. Fu lettore di filosofia a Cesena per tre anni
e maestro di teologia a Brescia, Milano e Bologna per 5 anni. Predicò nei
principali pulpiti italiani ed in particolare nel 1650 nella Basilica di San
Petronio a Bologna. Il 12 novembre del
1649 si laureò a Bologna, aggregato al Collegio dei Teologi e nominato Lettore
Pubblico di Morale nell'Bologna. Nel 1653 divenne arciprete di Santo Stefano di
Sinigallia. Il 17 giugno del 1655 fu nominato canonico di San Petronio e nel
1665 rinunciò, divenendo Arciprete di San Pietro di Anzola e successivamente
ottenne anche il canonicato della Pieve di Budrio. Opere principali Pubblicò le seguenti Opere: La vita d'Abramo. Venezia 1636 in 4° per il
Sarcina; e Bologna 1639 per il Ferrosi; e 1640 per lo stesso in 12. L'Apostolo
dell'Indie. Vita di S. Francesco Saverio della Compagnia di Gesù. Bologna per
Giambattista Ferrosi 1648 in 4°. La Verità vendicata, cioè Bologna difesa dalle
Calunnie di Francesco Guicciardini. Osservazioni Istoriche dell'Abate Giacomo
Certani Canonico Dott. Teologo Colleg. Filosofo, e nell'Bologna pubblico
Professore di Filosofia morale. In Bologna per gli Eredi del Dozza 1659 in 4°.
Maria Vergine Coronata. Descrizione, e dichiarazione della divota Solennità
fatta in Reggio per Prospero Vedrotti 1675 in fol. Ristampata nel 1974 da
Arnaldo Forni. La Chiave del Paradiso. Cioè invito alla Penitenza alle Dame, e
Cavalieri, e ad ogni altra condizione di Persone. In Bologna per Giacomo Monti
1678 in 4°. Il Gerione Politico, Riflessioni profittevoli alla vita civile,
alle Repubbliche, e alle Monarchie. In Milano 1680 per il Compagnini in fol. Il
Mosè dell'Ibernia. Vita del Glorioso S. Patrizio Canonico Regolare Lateranense
Apostolo, e Primate dell'Ibernia; descritta dall'Abate D. Giacomo Certani ec.
In Bologna nella Stamperia Camerale 1686 in 4° L'Isacco ed il Giacobbe. Bologna
1642 per il Monti in 12. La Santità Prodigiosa, Vita di S. Brigida Ibernese
Canonichessa Regolare di S.Agostino Scritta dall'Ab. D. Giacomo Certani
Canonico Regolare Lateranense Dott. Filosofo e Teologo Collegiato ec. 1695 per
gli eredi di Antonio Pisarri in 4° e più volte ristampata. La Susanna in versi,
notata da Lorenzo Legati: nel suo museo Cospiano al fol.117 e la nota ancora
Gregorio Leti nell'Italia Regnante parte III lib. II, pag. 118 ove parla di
Questo soggetto. Note Oltre i
sopraccennati ne parla ancora l'Orlandini negli Scrittori Bolognesi ec. Filosofia
Categorie: Teologi italianiFilosofi italiani ProfessoreXVII secolo Bologna
CERUTI Mauro
Ceruti Ceruti2.JPG Senatore della Repubblica Italiana LegislatureXVI Gruppo
parlamentarePartito Democratico CircoscrizioneLombardia Incarichi parlamentari
Membro della 7ª Commissione permanente (Istruzione pubblica, beni culturali)
Membro della Commissione parlamentare per l'infanzia Dati generali Partito
politicoPartito Democratico UniversitàUniversità degli Studi di Milano Mauro
Ceruti (Cremona) è un filosofo e politico italiano. Tra i filosofi protagonisti
dell'elaborazione del pensiero complesso, è uno dei pionieri della ricerca
contemporanea inter- e trans-disciplinare sui sistemi complessi. La
riflessione filosofica di Ceruti si produce all'intersezione di una pluralità
di domini di ricerca: epistemologia (filosofia e storia della scienza, storia
delle idee, noologia…), scienze della natura (fisica, biologia, cosmologia…),
scienze dell'uomo (antropologia, sociologia, psicologia, storia…), scienze
dell'organizzazione e del management. I suoi scritti sono pubblicati in
italiano, inglese, francese, tedesco, portoghese, rumeno, spagnolo e
turco. Si laurea in filosofia della scienza con Ludovico Geymonat
nel 1977 con una tesi dal titolo L'epistemologia genetica di Jean Piaget, nella
quale, attraverso l'analisi dell'opera epistemologica di Jean Piaget, viene
posto il problema del ruolo della biologia e delle scienze del vivente, nelle
varie articolazioni disciplinari, come decisiva interfaccia fra le scienze
fisico-chimiche e le scienze umane, in grado di favorire processi di
circolazione concettuale e di traduzione reciproca fra vari e multiformi campi
del sapere. Nei suoi studi ha affrontato le questioni del significato
filosofico ed epistemologico delle maggiori rivoluzioni scientifiche del
ventesimo secolo (teoria dei quanti, relatività, teoria dei sistemi, biologia
molecolare) focalizzando le sue ricerche sui temi del cambiamento stilistico e
delle relazioni fra stile e contenuto nella storia delle idee, nonché dello
statuto conoscitivo dei risultati innovativi connessi alle rivoluzioni scientifiche.
Una sintesi di queste ricerche è contenuta nell'opera Disordine e costruzione.
Un'interpretazione epistemologica dell'opera di Jean Piaget (1981).
Attività accademiche Dal 1981 al 1986 è assunto dall'Ginevra, presso la Facoltà
di Psicologia e scienze dell'educazione fondata da Jean Piaget, in qualità di
assistant, svolgendo ricerche nel gruppo di lavoro coordinato da Alberto
Munari. In questo periodo approfondisce le relazioni che connettono l'opera di
Piaget a vari modelli e approcci del contesto scientifico a lui contemporaneo:
alla termodinamica di non equilibrio di Ilya Prigogine, alle ricerche sul
concetto e sui processi di auto-organizzazione e autopoiesi, all'embriologia di
Conrad Waddington, ai nascenti dibattiti sul significato delle ricerche della
biologia molecolare. Il tema chiave di queste convergenze disciplinari è la
possibile delineazione di modelli generali del cambiamento, nonché del ruolo
della discontinuità in questi modelli. L'approfondimento dei singoli filoni
disciplinari gli consente di interrogarsi più estensivamente sul significato
profondo e complessivo dei cambiamenti paradigmatici delle scienze alla fine
del ventesimo secolo: dalla convergenza di varie discipline emerge la
prospettiva di una scienza nuova, caratterizzata da precise assunzioni
relativamente alla natura del cambiamento, alla relazione fra soggetto e mondo,
al ruolo del tempo, della storia e della narrazione negli approcci scientifici.
La nozione di complessità costituisce un'utile maniera sintetica di rapportarsi
con tali assunzioni. Per ricostruire queste novità del contesto scientifico,
imposta un programma di ricerca attorno al tema della epistemologia della
complessità, parte integrante del quale è stataa partire dal
1984l'organizzazione di convegni internazionali e di seminari, e la
pubblicazione del volume La sfida della complessità (con Gianluca Bocchi,
1984). Dal 1986 al 1993 è ricercatore associato presso il CETSAP (Centre
d'Etudes Transdisciplinaires, Sociolgie, Anthropologie, Politique) diretto da
Edgar Morin, centro di ricerca associato al CNRS e all’Ecole des Hautes Etudes
en Sciences Sociales di Parigi, presso il quale dirige l'unità di ricerca di
filosofia della scienza. In quegli anni approfondisce le problematiche
dell'epistemologia genetica e della cibernetica, pubblicando Il vincolo e la
possibilità (1986) e La danza che crea (1989). Svolge inoltre ricerche sul
ruolo giocato dalle scienze evolutive e dalla teoria dell'evoluzione di
tradizione darwiniana nel più generale mutamento di prospettiva delle valenze
cognitive e stilistiche del contesto scientifico, focalizzandosi sulle
conseguenze epistemologiche e filosofiche dei modelli di cambiamento e delle
relazioni fra continuità e discontinuità conseguenti alla teoria degli
equilibri punteggiati di Stephen Jay Gould e di Niles Eldredge, ai dibattiti
sulle estinzioni di massa e sulle testimonianze paleontologiche, alle nuove
forme di collaborazione fra evoluzionismo e genetica, alle relazioni fra
approcci storici e approcci nomotetici nelle scienze del vivente. Ne deriva una
serie di ricerche compendiate nel volume Origini di storie (conG. Bocchi,
1993), in cui il tema del cambiamento discontinuo, e i connessi temi
dell'evento, della contingenza e della sensibilità alle condizioni iniziali, vengono
discussi all'interno di un ampio spettro disciplinare, che connette bio G.
Bocchi, 1993), in cui il tema del cambiamento discontinuo, e i connessi temi
dell'evento, della contingenza e della sensibilità alle condizioni
iniziali, vengono discussi all'interno di un ampio spettro disciplinare, che
connette bioogia evolutiva, cosmologia, fisica del caos, antropologia e storia
delle idee. Gli interrogativi sul modo in cui dallo studio del radicamento
naturale delle società umane possano scaturire nuovi strumenti di comprensione
dei fenomeni sociali e culturali della nostra specie lo portano a entrare in
contatto con le ricerche condotte in questi stessi anni dal Santa Fe Institute,
volte all'individuazione di leggi generali della complessità e di modelli generali
sul comportamento dei sistemi complessi. Una nuova linea di ricerca di
filosofia della scienza, che approfondisce a partire dalla metà degli anni
novanta, è lo studio dei modelli di cambiamento dell'evoluzione umana, in
relazione alla teoria degli equilibri punteggiati, alla visione discontinuista
della storia naturale, alle dinamiche ecologiche e ambientali. Una seconda
linea di ricerca epistemologica, strettamente interrelata alla prima, è lo
studio dell'importanza delle analisi genetiche per la ricostruzione
dell'evoluzione e della storia umane, sia dei tempi lunghi della storia delle
varie specie ominidi sia dei tempi medi della storia della nostra specie Homo
sapiens. A partire da Solidarietà o barbarie. L'Europa delle diversità contro
la pulizia etnica (con G. Bocchi, 1994), imposta una serie di seminari e di
ricerche di filosofia delle scienze biologiche, evoluzionistiche e storiche sul
tema dei confini e sulle identità nazionali e culturali. Nel far ciò
approfondisce una concezione evolutiva di tali identità, consonante con la
prospettiva epistemologica costruttivistica, e convergente con i presupposti
epistemologici, costruttivisti e antiessenzialisti propri della tradizione
evoluzionistica darwiniana. In queste ricerche, viene affrontata anche la
questione del significato della rivoluzione darwiniana nell'intera storia della
tradizione scientifica occidentale. Un ulteriore studio dedicato a tali
problematiche è il volume Educazione e globalizzazione (con G. Bocchi, 2004),
che traccia un bilancio epistemologico degli intrecci disciplinari fra storia,
geografia, antropologia, scienze evolutive e naturali per comprendere il ruolo
della diversità culturale nella storia della specie umana e le radici profonde
degli attuali processi di globalizzazione. Mauro Ceruti è stato Professore
di Epistemologia genetica e di Filosofia della Scienza presso le Università
degli Studi di Palermo, di Milano Bicocca, di Bergamo e alla IULM di Milano,
dove attualmente insegna e ricopre la carica di direttore del Dipartimento di
Studi classici, umanistici e geografici. Dal 2008 al è stato Presidente della SILFSSocietà
Italiana di Logica e Filosofia delle Scienze. Negli anni accademici 1999-2000 e
2000-2001 è stato Preside della Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione dell'Università
degli studi di Milano Bicocca. Dall'anno accademico 2001-2002 al 2008 è stato
Preside della Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione dell'Bergamo. Dal 2001 al
2008 è stato Direttore del CE.R.CO. (Centro di Ricerca sull'Antropologia e
l'Epistemologia della Complessità) che comprendeva la Scuola di dottorato in
Antropologia ed Epistemologia della Complessità, presso l'Università degli
Studi di Bergamo. Principali tematiche presenti negli studi di
Ceruti: Antropologia Bioetica costruttivismo (filosofia) Epistemologia
Epistemologia della complessità Epistemologia genetica Evoluzionismo
Globalizzazione Scienze cognitive Scienze della formazione Teoria dei sistemi
Incarichi istituzionali È membro della Commissione Nazionale di Bioetica della
Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri. Nel 2006 è stato nominato, dal Ministro
della Pubblica Istruzione Giuseppe Fioroni, Presidente della Commissione
incaricata di scrivere le nuove Indicazione per il Curricolo per la Scuola
dell'Infanzia e per il Primo Ciclo di Istruzione. Nel 2007 ha partecipato
alla fase di fondazione del Partito Democratico, venendo eletto all'Assemblea
costituente del partito e assumendo l'incarico di relatore della Commissione
incaricata di redigerne il Manifesto dei Valori. Alle elezioni politiche
italiane del 2008 (XVI Legislatura) Mauro Ceruti è stato eletto al Senato della
Repubblica nelle liste del Partito Democratico. È stato membro della 7ª
Commissione permanente (Istruzione pubblica, beni culturali), della Commissione
parlamentare per l'indirizzo generale e la vigilanza dei servizi
radiotelevisivi e della Commissione parlamentare per l'infanzia e
l'adolescenza. Non si è ripresentato alle elezioni della XVII
legislatura. Pubblicazioni Ceruti M. (), Il tempo della complessità,
Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano. Ceruti M. (), La fine
dell'onniscienza, Studium, Roma, Prefazione di Giulio Giorello Morin E.,
Ceruti M. (), La nostra Europa, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano (tr. in
francese: Notre Europe, Fayard, Paris, ; tr. in spagnolo: Nuestra Europa,
Paidós Ibérica, Barcelona, ; tr. in turco: Bizim Avrupamiz, İletişim Yayinlari,
İstambul, ; tr. in tedesco: Unser Europa, Turia + Kant, Berlin ) Ceruti
M., Treu (), Organizzare l'altruismo, Laterza, Roma-Bari Bocchi G, Ceruti
M (2009). Una e moltepliceRipensare l'Europa, Tropea, Milano (tr. in rumeno:
Una şi multiplăSă regândim Europa, Curtea Veche, Bucarest ) Ceruti M.
(1986; 2nd ed. 2009) Il vincolo e la possibilità, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1986,
Prefazione di Heinz von FoersterSeconda edizione Raffaello Cortina Editore,
Milano, 2009 (tr. in inglese: English: Constraints and possibilities, Gordon
and Breach, New York, NY, USA, 1996; tr. in portoghese: Vìnculo e a
Possibilidade, Instituto Piaget, Lisbona, 1995; tr. in spagnolo: Hombre.
Conocimiento y pedagogía, Trillas, Mexico City, 1994) Bocchi G., Ceruti
M. (1986; 2nd ed. 2009) Origini di storie, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1993; Seconda
edizione: 2009, Prefazione di Jerome Bruner (tr. in inglese: The Narrative
Universe, Hampton Press, Cresskill 2002; tr. in spagnolo: El Sentido de la
Historia, Editorial Débate, Madrid 1994,; tr. in portoghese: Histórias e
origens, Instituto Piaget, Lisbona 1997) Bocchi G., Ceruti M., Eds (1985;
2nd ed. 2007), La sfida della complessità, Feltrinelli, Milano 1985; Seconda
Edizione: Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2007 Ceruti M., Fornari G. (2005), Le
due paci. Cristianesimo e morte di Dio nel mondo globalizzato, Raffaello
Cortina Editore, Milano Bocchi G., Ceruti M. (2004), Educazione e
globalizzazione, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano, Prefazione di Edgar
Morin Callari Galli M., Cambi F., Ceruti M. (2003), Formare alla
complessità, Carocci, Roma Bocchi G., Ceruti M., (2002), Le origini della
scrittura. Genealogie di un'invenzione, Bruno Mondadori Editore, Milano
2002 Bocchi G., Ceruti M., (2001), Le radici prime dell'Europa. Gli
intrecci genetici, linguistici, storici, Bruno Mondadori Editore, Milano
Ceruti M., Lo Verso G., (1998), Epistemologia e psicoterapia, Raffaello Cortina
Editore, Milano Callari Galli M., Ceruti M., Pievani T. (1998) Pensare la
diversità. Per un'educazione alla complessità umana, Meltemi, Roma Ceruti
M (1995), Evoluzione senza fondamenti, Laterza, Roma-Bari (tr. in inglese:
Evolution without Foundations, Hampton Press, Crosskill 2008) Bocchi G., Ceruti
M. (1994), Solidarietà o barbarie. L'Europa delle diversità contro la pulizia
etnica, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano, Prefazione di Edgar Morin (tr. in
inglese: Solidarity or Barbarism, Peter Lang, S. Francisco 1997) Fabbri
P, Ceruti M., Giorello G., Preta L., (1994), Il caso e la libertà, Laterza,
Roma-Bari Ceruti M., (1992), Evoluzione e conoscenza, Lubrina,
Bergamo Bocchi G., Ceruti M., Morin E. (1991), L'Europa nell'era
planetaria, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano (tr. in francese: Un nouveau commencement,
Seuil, Paris 1991; tr. in portoghes: Os problemas do fim de século, , Editorial
Notícias, Lisbona 1991; tr. in tedesco: Einen neuen Anfang wagen: Überlegungen
für das 21, Jahrhundert Junius, Hamburg 1992) Morin E., Ceruti M., Bocchi
G (1990), Turbare il futuro. Un nuovo inizio per la civiltà planetaria, Moretti
& Vitali, Bergamo Ceruti M., Preta L., (1990), Che cos'è la
conoscenza, Roma-Bari Ceruti M. (1989), La danza che crea. Evoluzione e
cognizione nell'epistemologia genetica, Feltrinelli, Milano, Prefazione di
Francisco Varela (tr. in spagnolo: A Dança que Cria, Instituto Piaget, Lisbona,
1995) Ceruti M., Lazlo E., (1988), Physis: abitare la terra, Feltrinelli,
Milano Morin E., Ceruti M., (1988), Simplicité et complexité, Mondadori,
Milano Mounoud P., Fabbri Montesano D., Ceruti M., Munari A., Inhelder B.
(1985), Dopo Piaget. Aspetti teorici e prospettive per l'educazione, Edizioni
Lavoro, Roma Bocchi G., Ceruti M. (1984), Modi di pensare postdarwiniani.
Saggio sul pluralismo evolutivo, Dedalo, Bari 1984 Bocchi G., Ceruti M.,
Fabbri Montesano D., Munari A., (1983), L'altro Piaget. Strategie delle genesi,
Emme Edizioni, Milano Bocchi G., Ceruti M. (1981), Disordine e
costruzione. Un'interpretazione epistemologica dell'opera di Jean Piaget,
Feltrinelli, Milano 1981 Mauro Ceruti è stato direttore delle riviste
scientifiche: La Casa di Dedalo (Casa Editrice Maccari, Parma); Oikos
(Pierluigi Lubrina Editore, Bergamo); Pluriverso (Rcs, Milano). Sito ufficiale, su mauroceruti.it. Pagina nel
sito del Senato, su senato.it. Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione, Nuove
Indicazioni Nazionali per il Curricolo, su pubblica.istruzione.it. 19 novembre
2007 9 aprile 2008). Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri, Comitato Nazionale
di Bioetica, su governo.it. Filosofia Politica
Politica Filosofo del XXI secoloPolitici italiani Professore1953 16
luglio CremonaSenatori della XVI legislatura della Repubblica ItalianaPolitici
del Partito Democratico (Italia)Professori della Libera lingue e comunicazione
IULM
CERUTTI: «La globalizzazione
dei diritti umani dovrebbe avere il suo culmine con il riconoscimento del
diritto che ha il Genere Umano alla sopravvivenza» (F. Cerutti) Furio Cerutti (Genova), filosofo.
Cerutti è professore di Filosofia politica nella Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia
e membro del Dipartimento di Filosofia di Firenze. Negli scorsi anni Cerutti ha
svolto attività d'insegnamento e di ricerca nelle Heidelberg, Francoforte sul
Meno, Manchester, all'Université libre de Bruxelles, alla Harvard Law School,
Center for International Affairs della Harvard University, alla Université de
Paris 8 ed alla Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. I primi lavori di Cerutti
vertono principalmente sul marxismo occidentale e la "teoria critica"
propria della Scuola di Francoforte da cui, tra l'altro proviene. Cerutti ha poi lavorato e sta tuttora
lavorando sulla filosofia politica delle relazioni internazionali ed affari
globali, seguendo due diverse tematiche:
La teoria delle sfide globali (armi nucleari e riscaldamento globale);
La questione dell'identità politica (non sociale o culturale) degli europei in
relazione con la legittimazione dell'Unione Europea. Da ricordare la sua
amicizia con Norberto Bobbio del quale Cerutti stesso si ritiene allievo. Opere Storia e coscienza di classe oggi, con
scritti inediti di Lukács, Milano, 1977. Totalità, bisogni e organizzazione,
Firenze, 1980. Marxismo e politica. Saggi e interventi, Napoli, 1981. Gli occhi
sul mondo. Le relazioni internazionali in prospettiva interdisciplinare, a cura
di, Roma, 2000. Global Challenge for Leviathan. A Political Philosophy of
Nuclear Weapon and Global Warming, Lanham, Md., Rowman&Littlefield, 2007.
Edizione italiana: Sfide globali per il Leviatano. Una filosofia politica delle
armi nucleari e del riscaldamento globale, Milano, Vita e pensiero, . FurioCerutti scheda presso il Dipartimento di
Filosofia dell'Firenze. Furio Cerutti, La filosofia politica e il mondo lezione
tenuta all'Firenze il 27 ottobre Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi
italiani Professore1938 Genova
CERVI
CESA
CESARINI. Grice: There are
many philosophers with the name Sforza Cesarini -- Francesco Sforza
Cesarini Abbozzo politici italiani
Questa voce sull'argomento politici italiani è solo un abbozzo. Contribuisci a
migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di . Segui i suggerimenti del progetto di
riferimento. Francesco Sforza Cesarini Francesco II Sforza Cesarini.jpg
Senatore del Regno d'Italia LegislatureXV Dati generali ProfessionePossidente
Crown of italian duke (corona normale).svg Francesco Sforza Cesarini, IV duca
Sforza Cesarini Francesco II Sforza Cesarini.jpg Francesco II Sforza Cesarini
in costume secentesco per l'occasione delle nozze del duca Tommaso di
Savoia-Genova con Isabella di iera nel 1883. Duca Sforza Cesarini Stemma In
carica18671899 PredecessoreLorenzo Sforza Cesarini, III duca Sforza Cesarini
SuccessoreLorenzo Sforza Cesarini, V duca Sforza Cesarini TrattamentoSua Grazia
NascitaGenzano di Roma, 16 novembre 1840 MorteRoma, 13 giugno 1899 DinastiaSforza
Cesarini PadreLorenzo Sforza Cesarini, III duca Sforza Cesarini MadreDuchessa
Caroline Shirley ConsortePrincipessa Vittoria Colonna Religionecattolicesimo
Francesco Sforza Cesarini (Genzano di Roma, 16 novembre 1840Roma, 13 giugno
1899) politico, patriota e militare italiano. Fu senatore del Regno d'Italia
nella XV legislatura. Francesco Sforza
Cesarini era il figlio maggiore del senatore Lorenzo Sforza Cesarini
(1807-1866) e della nobildonna inglese Caroline Shirley (1818-1897), sposata
nel 1837. Il fratello minore Bosio sposò la nobildonna Vincenza Santa Croce da
cui ebbe Carolina, Sforza e Guido.
Francesco e il fratello Bosio, così come i loro genitori, erano convinti
sostenitori del nuovo Regno d'Italia tanto da nascondere le armi degli insorti
nei loro palazzi romani dopo la morte del padre Lorenzo nel 1867. Per questo
motivo il Governo pontificio confiscò tutte le loro proprietà che vennero loro
restituite da Vittorio Emanuele II dopo il suo ingresso a Roma nel 1871, reso
possibile dalla presa di Porta Pia il 20 settembre 1870, accompagnato dallo
stesso duca Francesco in veste di consigliere del re. Matrimonio e figli Francesco sposò la
nobildonna romana Principessa Vittoria Colonna Doria Pricipessa di Paliano da
cui ebbe due figli maschi: Lorenzo, che
sposò Principessa Maria Torlonia Umberto. Onorificenze Commendatore dell'Ordine
dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaronastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore
dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaro Commendatore dell'Ordine della Corona
d'Italianastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine della Corona
d'Italia Medaglia d'argento al valor militarenastrino per uniforme ordinariaMedaglia
d'argento al valor militare Médaille commémorative de la campagne d'Italienastrino
per uniforme ordinariaMédaille commémorative de la campagne d'Italie Medaglia
commemorativa delle campagne delle Guerre d'Indipendenza (2 barrette)nastrino
per uniforme ordinariaMedaglia commemorativa delle campagne delle Guerre
d'Indipendenza (2 barrette) Medaglia a ricordo dell'Unità d'Italianastrino per
uniforme ordinariaMedaglia a ricordo dell'Unità d'Italia Albero
genealogico Lorenzo Sforza Cesarini
Palazzo Sforza-Cesarini (Genzano di Roma)
Francesco Sforza Cesarini, su storia.camera.it, Camera dei
deputati. Francesco Sforza Cesarini, su
Senatori d'Italia, Senato della Repubblica.
Biografie Biografie:
di biografie Categorie: Politici
italiani del XIX secoloPatrioti italiani del XIX secoloMilitari italiani 1840
1899 16 novembre 13 giugno Genzano di Roma RomaMilitari sabaudiUfficiali del
Regio EsercitoMedaglie d'argento al valor militareSenatori della XV legislatura
del Regno d'ItaliaDecorati con l'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e LazzaroSforza
Cesarini
CHERCHI --Placido Cherchi
(Oschiri), filosofo. Andò a scuola al
liceo Siotto Pintor a Cagliari. Placido Cherchi studiò a Cagliari con Ernesto
De Martino e Corrado Maltese, interessandosi contemporaneamente di studi e
problemi etno-antropologici e storico artistici. Come autore di importanti
lavori sul pensiero di Ernesto De Martino e sui problemi dell'identità e della
cultura sarda, fu un membro attivo della Scuola antropologica di Cagliari,
dovuta alla presenza all'Cagliari di maestri come Ernesto de Martino e Alberto
Mario Cirese, come pure di loro allievi quali Clara Gallini, Giulio Angioni e
lo stesso Cherchi. Morì nel all'età di 74 anni a causa di un'emorragia
cerebrale. Opere Paul Klee teorico, De
Donato, Bari 1978 Sciola, percorsi materici, Stef, Cagliari 1982. Pittura e
mito in Giovanni Nonnis, Alfa, Quartu S.E. 1990. Nivola, Ilisso, Nuoro 1990.
Placido Cherci-Maria Cherchi, Ernesto De Martino: dalla crisi della presenza
alla comunità umana, Liguori, Napoli 1987. Il signore del limite: tre
variazioni critiche su Ernesto De Martino, Liguori, Napoli 1994. Il peso
dell'ombra: l'etnocentrismo critico di Ernesto De Martino e il problema
dell'autocoscienza culturale, Liguori, Napoli 1996. Etnos e apocalisse:
mutamento e crisi nella cultura sarda e in altre culture periferiche, Zonza,
Sestu 1999 . Manifesto della gioventù eretica del comunitarismo e della
Confederazione politica dei circoli, organizzazione non-partitica dei sardi ,
coautori Francesco Masala ed Eliseo Spiga, Zonza , Sestu 2000. Il recupero del
significato: dall'utopia all'identità nella cultura figurativa sarda, Zonza, Sestu
2001. Crais: su alcune pieghe profonde dell'identità, Zonza, Sestu 2005. Il
cerchio e l’ellisse. Etnopsichiatria e antropologia religiosa in Ernesto De
Martino: le dialettiche risolventi dell’autocritica, Aìsara, . La riscrittura
oltrepassante, Calimera, Curumuny . Per un’identità critica. Alcune incursioni
autoanalitiche nel mondo identitario dei sardi, Arkadia, . Note Silvano Tagliagambe: Giulio Angioni, Una scuola sarda di
antropologia?, in (Luciano Marrocu,
Francesco Bachis, Valeria Deplano), La Sardegna contemporanea. Idee, luoghi,
processi culturali, Roma, Donzelli, , 649-663
Addio a Placido Cherchi, il ricordo di Giulio Angioni: "Fu ideologo
del neo sardismo" Archiviato il 2 ottobre
in . Notizie.tiscali.it È morto
Placido Cherchi, vicepresidente della Fondazione Sardinia
Fondazionesardinia.eu Scuola
antropologica di Cagliari Ernesto de Martino
Giulio Angioni, In morte di Placido Cherchi, sito "il manifesto sardo".il
6 ottobre . Roberto Carta, Che cosa è Placido Cherchi? Due o tre cose, per decidere
di essere sardi Po arregordai a Placido CherchiEnrico Lobina, su
enricolobina.org. Silvano Tagliagambe, L'eredità preziosa di Placido Cherchi.
CHIAPPELLI -- Alessandro
Chiappelli.jpg Senatore del Regno d'Italia Durata mandato22 marzo 19154 novembre
1931 LegislatureXXIV Gruppo parlamentareliberale democratico, poi Unione
democratica Dati generali Titolo di studioLaurea in lettere e filosofia
UniversitàUniversità degli Studi di Firenze ProfessioneDocente Alessandro Carlo
Francesco Roberto Bruno Chiappelli (Pistoia), filosofo. Figlio del fisiologo Francesco Chiappelli,
zio del pittore omonimo, si laurea in lettere e filosofia all'istituto
superiore di Firenze ed inizia la carriera universitaria a Napoli, dove è stato
titolare della cattedra di storia della filosofia e incaricato
dell'insegnamento di pedagogia e direttore dell'annesso museo. Ha inoltre
insegnato storia delle chiese a Pisa, Bologna e Firenze. È stato membro della
Società reale di Napoli, delle accademie dei Lincei di Roma, delle scienze di
Torino, pontaniana di Napoli e della Crusca di Firenze. Consigliere comunale a
Firenze è stato incaricato di una missione di ricerche e studi negli archivi e
biblioteche di Firenze sull'arte fiorentina del Rinascimento e membro della
commissione provinciale di Firenze per la conservazione dei monumenti e delle
opere d'arte. Opere Della
interpretazione panteistica di Platone, Firenze : Succ. Le Monnier, 1881. La
dottrina della realtà del mondo esterno nella filosofia moderna prima di Kant,
Firenze, Tip. dell'arte della stampa, 1886. Studi di antica letteratura
cristiana, Torino, Loescher, 1887. Darwinismo e socialismo, Roma, Forzani e C.
Tipografi del Senato, 1895. Saggi e note critiche, Bologna, Ditta Nicola
Zanichelli, 1895. Il socialismo e il pensiero moderno, Firenze, Succ. Le
Monnier, 1897. Giacomo Leopardi e la poesia della natura, Roma, Società
editrice Dante Alighieri,, 1898. Leggendo e meditando. Pagine critiche di arte,
letteratura e scienza sociale, Roma, Società editrice Dante Alighieri, 1900.
Nuove pagine sul cristianesimo antico, Firenze : succ. Le Monnier, 1902. Pagine
d'antica arte fiorentina, Firenze, Lumachi, 1905. Dalla critica al nuovo
idealismo, Torino, Bocca, 1910. Pagine di critica letteraria, Firenze, Le
Monnier, 1911. Idee e figure moderne, 2 voll., Ancona, G. Puccini e figli,
1912-1913. Onorificenze Cavaliere dell'Ordine di San Maurizio e Lazzaronastrino
per uniforme ordinariaCavaliere dell'Ordine di San Maurizio e Lazzaro Ufficiale
dell'Ordine di San Maurizio e Lazzaronastrino per uniforme ordinariaUfficiale
dell'Ordine di San Maurizio e Lazzaro Commendatore dell'Ordine di San Maurizio
e Lazzaronastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine di San
Maurizio e Lazzaro Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene
una pagina dedicata a Alessandro Chiappelli Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su
Alessandro Chiappelli Alessandro
Chiappelli, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Alessandro Chiappelli, su
siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo Unificato per le
Soprintendenze Archivistiche. Alessandro
Chiappelli, su accademicidellacrusca.org, Accademia della Crusca. Opere di Alessandro Chiappelli, su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Alessandro Chiappelli, . Alessandro Chiappelli, su Senatori d'Italia,
Senato della Repubblica. Cavalieri dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e
LazzaroUfficiali dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e LazzaroCommendatori
dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaro
CHIAROMONTE -- Nicola
Chiaromonte Da sinistra, Ignazio Silone, Giuseppe Saragat e Nicola
Chiaromonte Nicola Chiaromonte (Rapolla), filosofo. Esponente
antifascista, appassionato di filosofia (fu discepolo di Andrea Caffi) e di
teatro, fondò con Ignazio Silone la rivista culturale indipendente "Tempo
Presente". Nacque a Rapolla, in Basilicata, il 12 luglio 1905
da Rocco e Anna Catarinella. Il padre, medico, si trasferì con la famiglia a
Roma, Sin dall'età di vent'anni si votò all'antifascismo, dopo una breve
parentesi fra le file fasciste, entrando a far parte della formazione Giustizia
e libertà e finendo nel 1935 esule a Parigi per evitare l'arresto della
polizia. Nel 1936 fu in Spagna, combattente repubblicano nella guerra
civile spagnola contro le armate franchiste nella pattuglia aerea di André
Malraux (la figura di Chiaromonte è adombrata in quella del personaggio
dell'intellettuale Giovanni Scali, del romanzo L'Espoir), poi abbandonò il
fronte per contrasto con i comunisti. Allo scoppio del secondo conflitto
mondiale, in seguito all'invasione tedesca della Francia, riparò a New York,
facendosi notare nel gruppo dei cosiddetti New York Intellectuals. Fu
propugnatore del socialismo libertario che contrappose alle spinte trotzkiste
della rivista politics di Dwight Macdonald, a cui pure si legò in un sodalizio
di amicizia e di frequentazione intellettuale. Ebbe legami d'amicizia con
filosofi come Hannah Arendt e Albert Camus, e scrittori come George Orwell, e
collaborò con Gaetano Salvemini al settimanale italiano a New York, Italia
libera. Tornato in Italia nel 1947 una prima volta e nel 1951 una
seconda, si sentì esule in patria, anche per il suo rifiuto a sottostare ai
compromessi che volevano la cultura strettamente legata ai partiti politici;
per un periodo tenne una rubrica di critica teatrale sulla rivista Il Mondo
fondata da Mario Pannunzio. Nel 1956, assieme allo scrittore Ignazio
Silone, fondò "Tempo presente", rivista culturale indipendente,
esperienza innovativa nell'Italia dell'epoca che portò avanti, nonostante qualche
dissapore con Silone, con grande attenzione agli autori di notevole spessore
che riempivano le pagine del mensile. Le sue posizioni furono improntate
all'anticomunismo ma, a differenza di Silone, fu senz'altro più utopico; vicino
alle posizioni di Albert Camus, teorizzò «la normalità dell'esistenza umana
contro l'automatismo catastrofico della Storia». Nel testo La guerra
fredda culturale. La Cia e il mondo delle lettere e delle arti (Fazi editore,
2002) della storica e giornalista inglese Frances Stonor Saunders, si sostiene
che la rivista Tempo presente sia stata finanziata dalla CIA: la Saunders ne
individua i fondatori come personaggi di punta del Congress for Cultural
Freedom e principali destinatari dei finanziamenti della CIA per attività culturali
in Italia. Dal gennaio 1967 e fino alla morte, intrattiene una fitta
corrispondenza con Melanie von Nagel Mussayassul, amichevolmente chiamata
Muska, una monaca benedettina, sul tema della verità. Opere La situazione
drammatica, Milano, Bompiani, 1960. The Paradox of History, Londra, 1970. Le
Paradoxe de l'Histoire, prefazione di Adam Michnik, introduzione di Marco
Bresciani, Cahiers de l'Hôtel de Galliffet,
Credere e non credere, Milano, Bompiani, 1971; Collana Intersezioni,
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993,
978-88-150-3685-8. Scritti sul teatro, Introduzione di Mary McCarthy,
Miriam Chiaromonte, Collana Saggi n.561, Torino, Einaudi, 1976, 978-88-064-4875-2. Scritti politici e civili,
Miriam Chiaromonte, Introduzione di Leo Valiani, con una testimonianza di
Ignazio Silone, Milano, Bompiani, 1976. Il tarlo della coscienza (The Worm of
Consciousness and Other Essays, Prefazione di Mary McCarthy, 1976), Miriam
Chiaromonte, Collana Le occasioni, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1992, 978-88-150-3432-8. Silenzio e parole: scritti
filosofici e letterari, Milano, Rizzoli, 1978. Che cosa rimane, Taccuini
(1955-1971), Collana Saggi n.434, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1995, 978-88-150-4593-5. Lettere agli amici di
Bari, Schena, 1995, 978-88-751-4773-0.
Le verità inutili, S. Fedele, L'ancora del Mediterraneo, 2001, 978-88-832-5029-3. La rivolta conformista.
Scritti sui giovani e il 68, Una città, Forlì, 2009, 978-88-959-1903-4. Fra me e te la verità.
Lettere a Muska, W. Karpinski e C. Panizza, Una città, Forlì, , 978-88-959-1909-6. Il tempo della malafede e
altri scritti, Vittorio Giacopini, Edizioni dell'Asino, , 978-88-635-7093-9. Albert Camus-Nicola
Chiaromonte, Correspondance 1945-1959, Édition établie, présentée et annotée
par Samantha Novello, Collection Blanche, Paris, Gallimard, , 978-2-07-274664-2. Note Piero Craveri, «CHIAROMONTE, Nicola». In:
Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani,
XXIV, 1980. Simone Turchetti,
Libri: "Le attività culturali della Cia" Archiviato il 24
settembre in ., Galileo, anno VII, n. 2,
19 gennaio 2002 Cesare Panizza, Nicola
Chiaromonte. Una biografia. Presentazione di Paolo Marzotto, prefazione di
Paolo Soddu, Roma, Donzelli, .
978-88-6843-662-9 Piero Craveri, «CHIAROMONTE, Nicola». In: Dizionario
Biografico degli Italiani, XXIV, Roma,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani, 1980 (on line) Filippo La Porta,
Maestri irregolari, Bollati Boringhieri, 2007 Gino Bianco, Nicola Chiaromonte e
il tempo della malafede, Lacaita, Manduria-Roma-Bari 1999. 88-87280-18-5 Michele Strazza, Contro ogni
conformismo. Nicola Chiaromonte, in "Storia e Futuro", n.32/ Filippo
La Porta, Eretico controvoglia. Nicola Chiaromonte, una vita tra giustizia e
libertà, Bompiani, . 9788830100756 Bocca di Magra Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikiquote Citazionio su Nicola Chiaromonte
Nicola Chiaromonte, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Nicola
Chiaromonte, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Opere di Nicola Chiaromonte, .
Fotografie e documenti di Nicola Chiaromonte La cultura politica
azionista. Nicola Chiaromonte ampia biografia nel sito del "Nuovo Partito
d'Azione". Il fondo librario Chiaromonte presso la Biblioteca Gino Bianco,
su bibliotecaginobianco.it. Scritti di e su Nicola Chiaromonte e altri
materiali su di lui nel sito della Biblioteca Gino Bianco Filosofia
Politica Politica Categorie: Politici
italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1905 1972 12 luglio 18
gennaio Rapolla RomaAntifascisti italianiPolitici del Partito d'Azione
CHIAVACCI: Gaetano
Chiavacci (Foiano della Chiana) filosofo. Partecipe della stagione neoidealista
italiana, fu tra i più innovativi interpreti ed eredi dell'attualismo
gentiliano. Nato a Foiano in provincia di Arezzo da Enrico
Chiavacci e Annunziata Doni, ricevette l'istruzione primaria a Cortona, e
quella secondaria nel liceo di Iesi. Dal 1904 Gaetano Chiavacci frequentò
la facoltà di lettere del Regio Istituto di Studi Superiori a Firenze, dove fu
allievo di Guido Mazzoni, e conobbe tra gli altri il poeta filosofo Carlo
Michelstaedter, di cui divenne grande amico, insieme ad Arangio-Ruiz, Cecchi,
De Robertis, Lamanna, Facibeni. Nel 1911 si laureò con una tesi sul Decameron
di Boccaccio, e l'anno seguente ottenne una cattedra di insegnamento per il ginnasio
inferiore. Con l'entrata dell'Italia nella prima guerra mondiale,
Chiavacci combatté al fronte come capitano di artiglieria. Tornato
all'insegnamento, nell'immediato dopoguerra vinse una cattedra per il ginnasio
superiore, e iniziò nel contempo a frequentare la facoltà di filosofia a Roma,
dove incontrò Giovanni Gentile, col quale si laureò nel 1921 con una tesi su
Antonio Rosmini. Dal 1924 cominciò a insegnare filosofia nei licei, e due
anni dopo fu promosso a preside di varie scuole, tra cui Siena dove nacque suo
figlio Enrico. Nel 1932 Chiavacci divenne professore universitario di pedagogia
alla Scuola normale di Pisa, e dal 1938 insegnò filosofia teoretica a Firenze,
ottenendo nel 1949 anche la cattedra di estetica. Dal 1º gennaio 1957
Chiavacci entrò a far parte dell'Accademia Roveretana degli Agiati. Gli
verranno quindi elargiti diversi altri titoli accademici e riconoscimenti, come
la medaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della scuola, della cultura e dell'arte il 2
giugno 1964. Morì nel 1969. È sepolto nel Cimitero delle Porte Sante a
Firenze. L'idealismo: tra Gentile e Michelstädter «Se mi domando [...]
che cosa debba al pensiero filosofico di Gentile, quale mi sembri essere il
nucleo più vitale della sua dottrina, non trovo, a voler tutto restringere in
una parola, risposta più esatta di questa: la dottrina dell'atto puro.»
(Gaetano Chiavacci, L'eredità di Gentile, in «Giornale di metafisica», n.
10, 35-45, 1955) Il pensiero filosofico
di Gaetano Chiavacci si muove tra l'idealismo attuale di Gentile da un lato, e
l'anti-dialettica esistenziale di Carlo Michelstaedter dall'altro, conciliati
in un'ottica spiritualista cristiana. Dell'attualismo gentiliano egli
intende rivalutare la portata atemporale dell'atto puro dello Spirito, a cui
riconosce piena realtà, a differenza dell'attualità concepita come un presente
situato storicamente tra un passato e un futuro illusori.
Riappropriandosi al contempo del criterio della persuasione di Michelstädter,
Chiavacci ritiene che non si debba a sua volta fare dell'atto una teoria, una
filosofia panlogista staccata dalla vita e dal suo stesso attuarsi, «perché
deve essere essa la vita». Gentile ha avuto il merito di elaborare una
filosofia anti-intellettualistica che non si esaurisce nel concetto, ma è autoconcetto,
mostrando come il mondo consista nell'autocoscienza dell'atto pensante, in cui
vi è «assoluto possesso, realtà attuale immanente al suo farsi». Egli tuttavia
non avrebbe compreso appieno le conseguenze di questo attuarsi dell'atto, e
sarebbe rimasto a sua volta dentro un "concetto" dell'autoconcetto,
cioè in una forma di mediazione logica, di costruzione intellettuale, in un
logo astratto che supera e smarrisce la «fonte della verità». L'atto
invece, per Chiavacci, proprio perché non può essere ridotto a fatto, cioè ad
oggetto, è un atto «che sfugge ad ogni metro di criterio preconcetto, e che,
per comprenderlo, bisogna rivivere dal di dentro». Tale consapevolezza
interiore che «il soggetto ha di sè senza oggettivarsi», è per Chiavacci
fondamentalmente un'intuizione, un sentimento, che permea la dialettica
dell'atto pensante articolata nel soggetto e nell'oggetto. Essa bensì è anche
un processo mediato, da cui risulta un logo "pensato" senza cui non
si avrebbe coscienza formante della sua stessa origine intuitiva, ma un pensato
che resterebbe vuota astrazione, «caput mortuum, se si distacca dalla sintesi
di cui vuol rendere conto, da quella sintesi che gli dà un contenuto vivo e
sempre nuovo, e che è l'intuizione costitutiva dell'attualità dell'io e che forse
meglio si potrebbe dire sensus sui». Essa è infine, negli esiti religiosi
dell'ultimo Chiavacci, essenzialmente fede. Opere Tesi di laurea: La
Commedia nel Decamerone (Iesi, tipografia Fiori, 1912) Il valore morale nel
Rosmini (Firenze, Vallecchi, 1921) Illusione e realtà. Saggio di filosofia come
educazione (Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1932), concepita come una traduzione in
forma propositiva del tema della «persuasione» che era stata esposta nell'opera
di Michelstaedter in maniera indiretta e non sistematica come contrapposizione
alla «rettorica». Saggio sulla natura dell'uomo (Firenze, Sansoni, 1936), dove
il conflitto michelstädteriano tra illusione e realtà diventa quello tra natura
e ragione umana, superato dalla dialettica dell'atto spirituale. La ragione
poetica (Firenze, Sansoni, 1947), divisa in due parti: Il momento
dell'Indifferenza, che affronta il problema della discordanza tra natura e
intelletto, ovvero tra fatti e concetti, e tra questi e valori; e Il momento
della libertà, che assegna alla libera creatività di una ragione non logica ma
poetica il fondamento di quei valori, attraverso le dimensioni dell'arte e
della religione. Chiavacci ha inoltre curato l'edizione delle Opere di
Michelstaedter (Firenze, Sansoni, 1958), oltre a redigere, su richiesta di
Gentile, la voce "Michelstaedter" per l'Enciclopedia Italiana.
A lui si devono poi altri due saggi sul Rosmini: Filosofia e religione
nella vita spirituale di A. Rosmini (Milano, Bocca, 1943), e La filosofia
politica di A. Rosmini (Milano, Bocca, 1955). Postume Quid est veritas? Saggi
filosofici (1947-1965), A.M. Chiavacci Leonardi, introduzione di Eugenio Garin,
Firenze, Olschki, 1986 GentileChiavacci. Carteggio (1914-1944), Paolo
Simoncelli, Firenze, Le Lettere, 1996 Note Roberto Grita, Gaetano
Chiavacci, su treccani.it, 1980. Antonio Russo, Gaetano Chiavacci
(1886-1969) interprete di Michelstaedter,
22-23, Trieste, . Così Chiavacci
ricorderà il suo primo incontro con la figura di Gentile: «Leggendo per la
prima volta la Teoria generale dello spirito, ebbi un lampo di luce, pel quale
intravidi la possibilità di comprender la vita, di potervi trovare quel valore
senza del quale ogni altra cosa non ha pregio» (da una lettera di Chiavacci a
Gentile dell'8 agosto 1943, cit. in Gentile-Chiavacci: CarteggioSimoncelli,
pag. 383, Firenze 1996). Scheda su Gaetano Chiavacci [collegamento
interrotto], su agiati.org. Cit. anche
in G. Chiavacci, Quid est veritas? Saggi filosofici (1947-1965), A.M. Chiavacci
Leonardi, pag. 283, Olschki, 1986. Gaetano
Chiavacci, Il pensiero di Carlo Michelstaedter, articolo sul «Giornale critico
della filosofia italiana», n. 2, pag. 161, 1924. Gaetano Chiavacci, Il centro della
speculazione gentiliana: l'attualità dell'atto, in «Giornale critico della
filosofia italiana», pag. 75, 1947.
Gaetano Chiavacci, Il centro della speculazione gentiliana: l'attualità
dell'atto, op. cit., pag. 78. Gaetano
Chiavacci, Quid est veritas? Saggi filosofici (1947-1965), A.M. Chiavacci
Leonardi, pag. 287, Olschki, 1986.
Gaetano Chiavacci, Quid est veritas? Saggi filosofici, op. cit., pag.
389. Antonio Russo, Gaetano Chiavacci
(1886-1969) interprete di Michelstaedter, op.cit., pag. 21. Eugenio Garin, Introduzione a G. Chiavacci,
Quid est veritas? Saggi filosofici, op. cit.,
XVI-XVII. Antonio Russo, Gaetano
Chiavacci (1886-1969) interprete di Michelstaedter, op.cit., 11-12.
Gaetano Chiavacci, su sapere.it.
Gaetano Chiavacci, Michelstaedter Carlo, in «Enciclopedia
Italiana», XXIII, 201-202, Roma 1934. Gustavo Bontadini, Dall'attualismo al
problematicismo, Brescia, La Scuola, 1945 Augusto Guzzo, Gaetano Chiavacci: la
"Ragione poetica", in «Giornale di metafisica», V, n. 1, 110–113 (1950) Francesco Valentini, Recenti
studi sull'attualismo, in «Rassegna di filosofia», n. 4, 301–330 (1952) Antonio Testa, Michelstaedter
e i suoi critici, in «Rassegna di Filosofia», II, n. 4, 350–367 (1953) Gianfranco Morra, La scuola
gentiliana e l'eredità dell'attualismo, in «Teoresi», XVIII, n. 1-2, 86–95 (1963) Vito A. Bellezza, Gentile e l'attualismo
nell'ultimo ventennio, in «Cultura e Scuola», n. 24, 95–110 (1967) Dario Faucci, L'«attualismo» di
Gaetano Chiavacci, in «Filosofia», n. 21,
49–72, gennaio 1970 Antimo Negri, Giovanni Gentile: sviluppi e incidenza
dell'attualismo, 2, Firenze, La Nuova
Italia, 1975 Antonio Russo, Gaetano Chiavacci (1886-1969) interprete di
Michelstaedter, Sergio Campailla, in La
via della persuasione. Carlo Michelstaedter un secolo dopo, Venezia, Marsilio,
, 111-131. Attualismo (filosofia) Giovanni Gentile Idealismo
italiano Carlo Michelstaedter La Persuasione e la Rettorica Enrico
Chiavacci Gaetano Chiavacci, in
Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Opere di Gaetano Chiavacci, . Antonio
Russo, Gaetano Chiavacci (1886-1969) interprete di Michelstaedter, Trieste, .
Gaetano Chiavacci, su sapere.it. V D M Idealismo V D M Giovanni Gentile Filosofia
Filosofo del XX secoloPedagogisti italianiAccademici italiani Professore1886
1969 19 giugno 1º febbraio Foiano della Chiana FirenzeFilosofi
cattoliciIdealistiSepolti nel cimitero delle Porte Sante
CHIOCCHETTI: Emilio Chiocchetti
(Moena) filosofo. Nato a Moena, in Val di Fassa, vestì l'abito francescano nel
1896 e l'anno successivo concluse gli studi secondari a Rovereto. Durante il corso
di teologia si appassionò agli studi biblici, anche se non gli venne concessa
la possibilità di approfondirli presso l'Istituto biblico francescano di
Gerusalemme e la Facoltà teologica di Vienna. Nel 1903 venne ordinato
sacerdote. Fino al 1908 studiò filosofia
a Roma presso il Collegio internazionale di San Antonio. Tornò quindi a
Rovereto per insegnare filosofia presso il liceo interno all'Ordine dei Minori
e iniziò un'assidua collaborazione, su invito del padre Agostino Gemelli, alla
Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica fin dalla sua fondazione (1909). Tra il 1908 e il 1909 progettò uno studio
sistematico sulla filosofia di Henri Bergson, interrompendolo definitivamente
nel 1910 per approfondire ulteriormente la sua preparazione filosofica a
Lovanio, centro degli studi neoscolastici. Subito dopo si recò in Germania, a
Fulda, per ascoltare Konstantin Gutberlet, e successivamente a Vienna, dove
frequentò come uditore le lezioni di psicologia di Wilhelm Wundt. Tornato
all'insegnamento a Rovereto nel 1912, assunse la direzione della Rivista
tridentina. Note Chiocchetti, Emilio, su
siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it. 20 marzo .
G. Faustini, , Emilio Chiocchetti, Antonio Rosmini e la cultura
trentina: un filosofo ladino tra Trentino ed Europa, Trento, Pancheri, 2008 G.
Faustini, , Emilio Chiocchetti: un filosofo francescano di fronte alle sfide
del Novecento: antologia, scritti di filosofia e cultura, Trento, Pancheri,
2006 Padre Emilio Chiocchetti un filosofo francescano tra il Trentino e
l'Europa: atti del seminario di studio promosso dal Museo storico in Trento,
svoltosi a Trento il 3 dicembre 2004, "Archivio Trentino", 1,
2005, 101–215 S. Pietroforte, Storia di
un'amicizia filosofica tra neoscolastica, idealismo e modernismo: il carteggio
Nardi-Chiocchetti (1911-1949), Firenze, Sismel Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2004 R.
Centi, Un filosofo francescanoEmilio Chiocchetti, Trento, Gruppo culturale
Civis, 1989 C. Coen, Chiocchetti Emilio, in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, 25, Roma, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1981 (Dizionario biografico degli italiani) G.
Consolati, , di p. Emilio Chiocchetti
filosofo trentino (Moena 1880-1951) rettore generale francescano e professore
di storia della filosofia moderna alla Università cattolica del S. Cuore,
Trento, Saturnia, 1968 Emilio
Chiocchetti, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Emilio
Chiocchetti, su siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo Unificato
per le Soprintendenze Archivistiche. Opere di Emilio Chiocchetti, . Pubblicazioni di Emilio Chiocchetti, su
Persée, Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de
l'Innovation.
CHIODI: Pietro Chiodi
(Corteno Golgi) filosofo. Figlio di
Annibale e Maria Romelli, frequentò le scuole elementari al paese natio e le
medie inferiori e superiori a Sondrio sotto la guida del prof. Credaro, che lo
avviò allo studio della filosofia. Dopo aver conseguito nel 1934 l'abilitazione
magistrale si trasferì a Torino, dove si laureò il 27 giugno 1938 in pedagogia sotto
la guida di Nicola Abbagnano. Nell'anno successivo ottenne la cattedra di
storia e filosofia del liceo classico Giuseppe Govone di Alba, dove insegnò per
18 anni. Qui entrò in contatto col professore di lettere Leonardo Cocito, del
quale divenne intimo amico, ed ebbe tra i suoi allievi lo scrittore Beppe
Fenoglio. Questi ricorderà più volte nei suoi scritti i due insegnanti, con i
loro nomi o con pseudonimi; Chiodi diventerà così, nel romanzo Il partigiano
Johnny, il personaggio di Monti. Grazie
ai suoi contatti con Cocito, fervente comunista e antifascista, Chiodi entrò,
Il 2 luglio 1944, a far parte di una formazione partigiana Giustizia e Libertà
col nome di battaglia di “Piero”. Il 18
agosto di quello stesso anno Chiodi venne catturato dalle SS italiane, assieme
ai suoi compagni, e deportato in un campo di prigionia a Bolzano, quindi a
Innsbruck. Aiutato dal comandante del lager e da un medico, ottenne il visto di
rimpatrio. Il 30 settembre alle ore 07:30 era alla stazione di Innsbruck
diretto a Verona. Il 3 ottobre, verso sera, giunse nell'albese. Qui riprese la
sua attività di partigiano, ora sotto il nome di battaglia di Valerio,
mettendosi a capo, nelle Langhe, di un battaglione della CIII Brigate Garibaldi
intitolato al suo collega Cocito, impiccato dai tedeschi a Carignano (località
pilone Virle) il 7 settembre 1944, insieme ad altri patrioti. Nel 1946 narrò la propria esperienza di
lotta, di prigionia e di guerra civile nel libro scritto in forma diaristica e
pubblicato dall'ANPI, Banditi, uno dei primi memoriali di deportati politici
italiani. Dopo la liberazione di Torino
nel 1945, Chiodi era tornato all'insegnamento ad Alba. Nel 1957 si trasferì
come insegnante al Liceo di Chieri e poi al Liceo Vittorio Alfieri del
capoluogo piemontese. Nel 1955 ottenne la libera docenza e dal 1963 fu
incaricato e poi titolare della cattedra di Filosofia della storia alla Facoltà
di Lettere e filosofia a Torino, insegnamento che ricoprì fino alla sua
prematura morte nel 1970, affiancandolo all'incarico di Pedagogia. Nel 1961,
l'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei gli assegnò il premio del Ministero della
Pubblica Istruzione per la filosofia e nel 1964 gli fu conferito il Premio
Bologna. Alla ristampa del 1961 di
Banditi Chiodi premise questa avvertenza, poi conservata nelle edizioni
successive: «La presente ristampa si rivolge particolarmente ai giovani, non
già per far rivivere nel loro animo gli odi del passato, ma affinché, guardando
consapevolmente ad esso, vengano in chiaro senza illusioni del futuro che li
attende se per qualunque ragione permetteranno che alcuni valoricome la libertà
nei rapporti politici, la giustizia nei rapporti economici e la tolleranza in
tutti i rapportisiano ancora una volta manomessi subdolamente o violentemente
da chicchessia». Raccolse grande stima
ed affetto tra suoi allievi, che ne conservano tuttora il ricordo di un grande
Maestro, limpido esempio di tolleranza e serenità di giudizio. Attività filosofica L'attività filosofica di
Pietro Chiodi si concentrò specialmente sull'Esistenzialismo, riletto in chiave
positiva. La maggior parte delle sue opere è dedicata a Martin Heidegger. Egli fu il primo traduttore in Italiano di
Essere e tempo, nel 1953, e il terzo in assoluto a realizzarne una versione in
un'altra lingua, dopo il giapponese e lo spagnolo. Proprio a Chiodi si deve la
definizione della terminologia heideggeriana in Italiano, divenuta poi abituale
tra gli studiosi. Valga un caso per tutti: la traduzione del tedesco Dasein con
l'italiano Esserci, capolavoro di sintesi ed efficacia, spesso e volentieri non
ancora raggiuntain questo specifico casoin altre lingue. Al filosofo tedesco
dedicò anche, ovviamente, diversi saggi: L'esistenzialismo di Heidegger (1947),
L'ultimo Heidegger (1952), Esistenzialismo e fenomenologia (1963). Fu, inoltre,
traduttore di L'essenza del fondamento (1952) e Sentieri interrotti (1968). A
Immanuel Kant dedicò, invece, La deduzione nell'opera di Kant (1961) e ne
tradusse nel 1967 la Critica della ragion pura e gli Scritti morali, usciti
nella sua versione nel 1970. È infine da ricordare il suo interesse per
Jean-Paul Sartre, del quale si occupò nel 1965 nell'opera Sartre e il
marxismo. L'esperienza partigiana rimase
sempre una pagina fondamentale nella vita di Pietro Chiodi, per cui il valore
della libertà occupò sempre il primo posto. Non è un caso che Fenoglio faccia
rivolgere da parte di Monti, nel Partigiano Johnny, proprio questo ammonimento
ai giovani partigiani di Alba: «Ragazziteniamo di vista la libertà». La sua
breve e unica opera narrativa, Banditi, ricca di valore non solo storico e
morale ma anche letterario, è stata definita da Davide Lajolo «Il libro più
vivo, più semplice, più reale di tutta la letteratura partigiana» (L'Unità, 10
ottobre 1946) e da Franco Fortini «quasi un capolavoro [...]. Ci sono dei
tratti straordinari, nel tragico come nel comico». Opere Chiodi Pietro, Banditi, con
introduzione di Gian Luigi Beccaria, Torino, Einaudi, 2002 [1961], 978-88-06-16322-8. Chiodi Pietro,
Esistenzialismo e filosofia contemporanea, Giuseppe Cambiano, Pisa, Edizioni
della Normale, 2007, 88-7642-194-7.
Note Deportati Politici Italiani, su
restellistoria.altervista.org. P.
Chiodi, Banditi, Torino, Einaudi, 1975V.
, Conoscere la Resistenza, Milano, Unicopli, 1994132. Resistenza italiana Deportati politici
italiani Esistenzialismo Martin Heidegger Opere di Pietro Chiodi, . Biografia di Chiodi nel sito
dell'Associazione nazionale partigiani d'Italia, su anpi.it. Centro Studi
'Beppe Fenoglio'CHIODI Pietro, su centrostudibeppefenoglio.it. V D M
Antifascismo (1919-1943) Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloPartigiani italiani
1915 1970 2 luglio 22 settembre Corteno Golgi TorinoBrigate Giustizia e
LibertàDeportati politici italiani
CHITTI -- «Fervore di
gioventù in età matura, temperato da canuto senno, e un ingegno finissimo,
fanno di Luigi Chitti uno di quegli uomini che sono atti egualmente al pensiero
ed all'azione...» (Vincenzo Gioberti,
Primato morale e civile degli Italiani, 1844)
Luigi Chitti Luigi Chitti (Cittanova, 17 aprile 1784New York, 2
settembre 1853) economista e filosofo italiano. Figlio di Giuseppe Chitti, avvocato e giudice
alla Gran Corte Criminale di Reggio e di Saveria Barbaro, nativa di
Napoli. Partecipò a Napoli, col padre ed
i fratelli, alla rivoluzione del 1799. In seguito alla capitolazione del Forte
Castel Nuovo, riparò in Francia. A Parigi, terminò gli studi giuridici e
strinse amicizia con molti patrioti del tempo.
Ferdinando I delle Due Sicilie Tornato a Napoli, esercitò in città la
professione di avvocato e nel 1808 difese Casalnuovo (l'odierna Cittanova)
contro la feudataria del luogo, Maria Grimaldi-Serra, ultima principessa di
Gerace, davanti alla regia commissione feudale. Fattosi un nome come avvocato,
dopo la restaurazione ebbe la nomina di segretario generale al Ministero di
Grazia e Giustizia del Regno. A Napoli
sposò, il 14 settembre 1822, Maria Amalia Hipman, nata a Napoli il 17 gennaio
1802 e figlia di Emanuele, un capo dipartimento di uno dei Ministeri del Regno,
e di Giulia Rossi. La coppia ebbe due
figli, Roberto (1823-1832) e Maria Malvina (1824-1826), morti entrambi
giovanissimi. Nel 1820, Luigi Chitti fu
coinvolto nella rivolta contro Ferdinando I organizzata dai sottotenenti
Morelli e Silvati, fu quindi privato della carica ed esiliato. Vincenzo Gioberti Passò un periodo a Londra,
e nel 1826 tentò di ritornare a Napoli, ma ebbe l'inibizione ufficiale a
rientrare nella capitale. Andò a Firenze e di lì a poco, chiamato da amici, si
recò a Bruxelles. In Belgio diede
lezioni di diritto pubblico e di economia sociale, ottenne la carica di
segretario della Banca Fondiaria e si fece un nome. Nel 1833, il governo belga
gli conferì la licenza di professare Economia Sociale, e tenne quattro letture
pubbliche nel Museo di Bruxelles. Le sue quattro letture furono intitolate da
lui stesso «Corso di Economia sociale», compendio delle sue vaste vedute e
della sua non comune cultura sull'argomento. Nel corso dello stesso anno,
pubblicò altre opere ed in seguito alla fama acquisita, il governo belga,
nell'ottobre del 1834, gli conferì la carica di Professore alla facoltà di
diritto dell'Bruxelles. In Belgio, Chitti pubblicò la maggior parte dei suoi
lavori e strinse amicizia con Vincenzo Gioberti, che lo definirà valente
economico. Nonostante la revoca dell'esilio, l'economista non tornò a Napoli ma
rimase in Belgio ancora per parecchi anni fino a quando partì per gli Stati
Uniti nel 1844. In America, Luigi
(Louis) Chitti tentò varie imprese commerciali, ma difficoltà sopravvenute gli
fecero abbandonare presto i suoi progetti e nel 1847 si stabilì a New York dove
morì per un colpo apoplettico la notte di venerdì 2 settembre 1853.. Opere Principali Trattato di economia
politica o semplice esposizione del modo col quale si formano, si
distribuiscono e si consumano le ricchezze; seguito da un'epitome dei principi
fondamentali dell'economia politica di Giovanni Battista Say...tradotto dal
francese 3 voll., Napoli, Stamperia del Ministero della Segreteria di Stato,
1817 Cours d'économie politique Bruxelles, 1833 Cours d'économie sociale
(Discours d'ouverture prononcé le 14 décembre 1833, Bruxelles, Jobert, 1834; 2e
Lecture, 21 décembre 1833, Bruxelles, Ode et Wodon, 1834; 3e et 4e Lecture, 4
et 11 janvier 1834) Bruxelles, Ode, 1834 Des crises financières et de la réforme
du système monétaire Bruxelles, Meline, 1839 Note Giovanni Ermenegildo Schiavo, Four centuries
of Italian-American history, Vigo Press, 1952.
The New York Heraldmorning editionmercoledì, 7 settembre 1853 New York Daily TimesSeptember 7, 1853 pag. 4 Daily Free DemocratSeptember 12, 1853pag.
3 The American almanac and repository of
useful knowledge, 1855. 30 settembre .
Center for Migration StudiesSpecial Issue: Four Centuries of Italian
American HistoryVolume 16, Issue 4, page 310, July 2000Wiley Online
Library Vincenzo De Cristo, Prime
notizie sulla vita e sulle opere di Luigi Chitti Economista, Prem. Tip. e Lib.
Claudiana, Firenze, 1902. Giuliano Crifò, CHITTI, Luigi, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, 25, Roma,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Cicerone -- Ciceronian
implicaturum: Marcus Tullius, Roman
statesman, orator, essayist, and letter writer. He was important not so much
for formulating individual philosophical arguments as for expositions of the
doctrines of the major schools of Hellenistic philosophy, and for, as he put
it, “teaching philosophy to speak Latin.” The significance of the latter can
hardly be overestimated. Cicero’s coinages helped shape the philosophical
vocabulary of the Latin-speaking West well into the early modern period. The
most characteristic feature of Cicero’s thought is his attempt to unify
philosophy and rhetoric. His first major trilogy, On the Orator, On the
Republic, and On the Laws, presents a vision of wise statesmen-philosophers
whose greatest achievement is guiding political affairs through rhetorical
persuasion rather than violence. Philosophy, Cicero argues, needs rhetoric to
effect its most important practical goals, while rhetoric is useless without
the psychological, moral, and logical justification provided by philosophy.
This combination of eloquence and philosophy constitutes what he calls
humanitas a coinage whose enduring
influence is attested in later revivals of humanism and it alone provides the foundation for
constitutional governments; it is acquired, moreover, only through broad
training in those subjects worthy of free citizens artes liberales. In
philosophy of education, this Ciceronian conception of a humane education
encompassing poetry, rhetoric, history, morals, and politics endured as an
ideal, especially for those convinced that instruction in the liberal
disciplines is essential for citizens if their rational autonomy is to be
expressed in ways that are culturally and politically beneficial. A major aim
of Cicero’s earlier works is to appropriate for Roman high culture one of
Greece’s most distinctive products, philosophical theory, and to demonstrate
Roman superiority. He thus insists that Rome’s laws and political institutions
successfully embody the best in Grecian political theory, whereas the Grecians
themselves were inadequate to the crucial task of putting their theories into
practice. Taking over the Stoic conception of the universe as a rational whole,
governed by divine reason, he argues that human societies must be grounded in
natural law. For Cicero, nature’s law possesses the characteristics of a legal
code; in particular, it is formulable in a comparatively extended set of rules
against which existing societal institutions can be measured. Indeed, since
they so closely mirror the requirements of nature, Roman laws and institutions
furnish a nearly perfect paradigm for human societies. Cicero’s overall theory,
if not its particular details, established a lasting framework for
anti-positivist theories of law and morality, including those of Aquinas,
Grotius, Suárez, and Locke. The final two years of his life saw the creation of
a series of dialogue-treatises that provide an encyclopedic survey of
Hellenistic philosophy. Cicero himself follows the moderate fallibilism of
Philo of Larissa and the New Academy. Holding that philosophy is a method and
not a set of dogmas, he endorses an attitude of systematic doubt. However,
unlike Cartesian doubt, Cicero’s does not extend to the real world behind
phenomena, since he does not envision the possibility of strict phenomenalism.
Nor does he believe that systematic doubt leads to radical skepticism about
knowledge. Although no infallible criterion for distinguishing true from false
impressions is available, some impressions, he argues, are more “persuasive”
probabile and can be relied on to guide action. In Academics he offers detailed
accounts of Hellenistic epistemological debates, steering a middle course
between dogmatism and radical skepticism. A similar strategy governs the rest
of his later writings. Cicero presents the views of the major schools, submits
them to criticism, and tentatively supports any positions he finds
“persuasive.” Three connected works, On Divination, On Fate, and On the Nature
of the Gods, survey Epicurean, Stoic, and Academic arguments about theology and
natural philosophy. Much of the treatment of religious thought and practice is
cool, witty, and skeptically detached
much in the manner of eighteenth-century philosophes who, along with
Hume, found much in Cicero to emulate. However, he concedes that Stoic
arguments for providence are “persuasive.” So too in ethics, he criticizes
Epicurean, Stoic, and Peripatetic doctrines in On Ends 45 and their views on
death, pain, irrational emotions, and happiChurch-Turing thesis Cicero, Marcus
Tullius 143 143 ness in Tusculan
Disputations 45. Yet, a final work, On Duties, offers a practical ethical
system based on Stoic principles. Although sometimes dismissed as the eclecticism
of an amateur, Cicero’s method of selectively choosing from what had become
authoritative professional systems often displays considerable reflectiveness
and originality.
Circulus: Grice: “I prefer ‘kreis,’ which I learned from Ayerits
etymology is so obscure!” -- Grice’s circle -- Grice’s circle -- circular
reasoning, reasoning that, when traced backward from its conclusion, returns to
that starting point, as one returns to a starting point when tracing a circle.
The discussion of this topic by Richard Whatley in his Logic sets a high standard
of clarity and penetration. Logic textbooks often quote the following example
from Whatley: To allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be,
on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it is highly conducive to the
interests of the Community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty
perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments. This passage illustrates how
circular reasoning is less obvious in a language, such as English, that, in
Whatley’s words, is “abounding in synonymous expressions, which have no
resemblance in sound, and no connection in etymology.” The premise and
conclusion do not consist of just the same words in the same order, nor can
logical or grammatical principles transform one into the other. Rather, they have
the same propositional content: they say the same thing in different words.
That is why appealing to one of them to provide reason for believing the other
amounts to giving something as a reason for itself. Circular reasoning is often
said to beg the question. ‘Begging the question’ and petitio principii are
translations of a phrase in Aristotle connected with a game of formal
disputation played in antiquity but not in recent times. The meanings of
‘question’ and ‘begging’ do not in any clear way determine the meaning of
‘question begging’. There is no simple argument form that all and only circular
arguments have. It is not logic, in Whatley’s example above, that determines
the identity of content between the premise and the conclusion. Some theorists
propose rather more complicated formal or syntactic accounts of circularity.
Others believe that any account of circular reasoning must refer to the beliefs
of those who reason. Whether or not the following argument about articles in
this dictionary is circular depends on why the first premise should be
accepted: 1 The article on inference contains no split infinitives. 2 The other
articles contain no split infinitives. Therefore, 3 No article contains split
infinitives. Consider two cases. Case I: Although 2 supports 1 inductively,
both 1 and 2 have solid outside support independent of any prior acceptance of
3. This reasoning is not circular. Case II: Someone who advances the argument
accepts 1 or 2 or both, only because he believes 3. Such reasoning is circular,
even though neither premise expresses just the same proposition as the
conclusion. The question remains controversial whether, in explaining
circularity, we should refer to the beliefs of individual reasoners or only to
the surrounding circumstances. One purpose of reasoning is to increase the
degree of reasonable confidence that one has in the truth of a conclusion.
Presuming the truth of a conclusion in support of a premise thwarts this
purpose, because the initial degree of reasonable confidence in the premise
cannot then exceed the initial degree of reasonable confidence in the
conclusion. Circulus -- diallelon from ancient Grecian di allelon, ‘through one
another’, a circular definition. A definition is circular provided either the
definiendum occurs in the definiens, as in ‘Law is a lawful command’, or a
first term is defined by means of a second term, which in turn is defined by
the first term, as in ‘Law is the expressed wish of a ruler, and a ruler is one
who establishes laws.’ A diallelus is a circular argument: an attempt to
establish a conclusion by a premise that cannot be known unless the conclusion
is known in the first place. Descartes, e.g., argued: I clearly and distinctly
perceive that God exists, and what I clearly and distinctly perceive is true.
Therefore, God exists. To justify the premise that clear and distinct
perceptions are true, however, he appealed to his knowledge of God’s existence.
civil
disobedience: explored by H. P. Grice
in his analysis of moral vs. legal right -- a deliberate violation of the law,
committed in order to draw attention to or rectify perceived injustices in the
law or policies of a state. Illustrative questions raised by the topic include:
how are such acts justified, how should the legal system respond to such acts
when justified, and must such acts be done publicly, nonviolently, and/or with
a willingness to accept attendant legal sanctions?
clarke: s. Grice
analyses Clark’s proof of the existence of God in “Aspects of reasoning” --
English philosopher, preacher, and theologian. Born in Norwich, he was educated
at Cambridge, where he came under the influence of Newton. Upon graduation
Clarke entered the established church, serving for a time as chaplain to Queen
Anne. He spent the last twenty years of his life as rector of St. James,
Westminster. Clarke wrote extensively on controversial theological and
philosophical issues the nature of space
and time, proofs of the existence of God, the doctrine of the Trinity, the
incorporeality and natural immortality of the soul, freedom of the will, the
nature of morality, etc. His most philosophical works are his Boyle lectures of
1704 and 1705, in which he developed a forceful version of the cosmological
argument for the existence and nature of God and attacked the views of Hobbes,
Spinoza, and some proponents of deism; his correspondence with Leibniz 171516,
in which he defended Newton’s views of space and time and charged Leibniz with
holding views inconsistent with free will; and his writings against Anthony
Collins, in which he defended a libertarian view of the agent as the
undetermined cause of free actions and attacked Collins’s arguments for a
materialistic view of the mind. In these works Clarke maintains a position of
extreme rationalism, contending that the existence and nature of God can be
conclusively demonstrated, that the basic principles of morality are
necessarily true and immediately knowable, and that the existence of a future
state of rewards and punishments is assured by our knowledge that God will
reward the morally just and punish the morally wicked.
class: the class for those philosophers whose class have no
members -- a term sometimes used as a synonym for ‘set’. When the two are
distinguished, a class is understood as a collection in the logical sense,
i.e., as the extension of a concept e.g. the class of red objects. By contrast,
sets, i.e., collections in the mathematical sense, are understood as occurring
in stages, where each stage consists of the sets that can be formed from the non-sets
and the sets already formed at previous stages. When a set is formed at a given
stage, only the non-sets and the previously formed sets are even candidates for
membership, but absolutely anything can gain membership in a class simply by
falling under the appropriate concept. Thus, it is classes, not sets, that
figure in the inconsistent principle of unlimited comprehension. In set theory,
proper classes are collections of sets that are never formed at any stage,
e.g., the class of all sets since new sets are formed at each stage, there is
no stage at which all sets are available to be collected into a set.
clemens: formative teacher in the early Christian church who,
as a “Christian gnostic,” combined enthusiasm for Grecian philosophy with a
defense of the church’s faith. He espoused spiritual and intellectual ascent
toward that complete but hidden knowledge or gnosis reserved for the truly
enlightened. Clement’s school did not practice strict fidelity to the
authorities, and possibly the teachings, of the institutional church, drawing
upon the Hellenistic traditions of Alexandria, including Philo and Middle
Platonism. As with the law among the Jews, so, for Clement, philosophy among
the pagans was a pedagogical preparation for Christ, in whom logos, reason, had
become enfleshed. Philosophers now should rise above their inferior
understanding to the perfect knowledge revealed in Christ. Though hostile to
gnosticism and its speculations, Clement was thoroughly Hellenized in outlook
and sometimes guilty of Docetism, not least in his reluctance to concede the
utter humanness of Jesus.
Clifford: Grice was attracted to Clifford’s idea of the ‘ethics
of belief,’ -- philosopher. Educated at King’s , London, and Trinity ,
Cambridge, he began giving public lectures in 1868, when he was appointed a
fellow of Trinity, and in 1870 became professor of applied mathematics at , London. His academic career ended
prematurely when he died of tuberculosis. Clifford is best known for his
rigorous view on the relation between belief and evidence, which, in “The
Ethics of Belief,” he summarized thus: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for
anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence.” He gives this example.
Imagine a shipowner who sends to sea an emigrant ship, although the evidence
raises strong suspicions as to the vessel’s seaworthiness. Ignoring this
evidence, he convinces himself that the ship’s condition is good enough and,
after it sinks and all the passengers die, collects his insurance money without
a trace of guilt. Clifford maintains that the owner had no right to believe in
the soundness of the ship. “He had acquired his belief not by honestly earning
it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts.” The right Clifford is
alluding to is moral, for what one believes is not a private but a public
affair and may have grave consequences for others. He regards us as morally
obliged to investigate the evidence thoroughly on any occasion, and to withhold
belief if evidential support is lacking. This obligation must be fulfilled
however trivial and insignificant a belief may seem, for a violation of it may
“leave its stamp upon our character forever.” Clifford thus rejected
Catholicism, to which he had subscribed originally, and became an agnostic. James’s
famous essay “The Will to Believe” criticizes Clifford’s view. According to
James, insufficient evidence need not stand in the way of religious belief, for
we have a right to hold beliefs that go beyond the evidence provided they serve
the pursuit of a legitimate goal.
Closure: Grice:
The etymology is convoluted: claudere --- cfr. clausura. Griceian anti-sneak
closure: a set of objects, O, is said
to exhibit closure or to be closed under a given operation, R, provided that
for every object, x, if x is a member of O and x is R-related to any object, y,
then y is a member of O. For example, the set of propositions is closed under
deduction, for if p is a proposition and p entails q, i.e., q is deducible from
p, then q is a proposition simply because only propositions can be entailed by
propositions. In addition, many subsets of the set of propositions are also
closed under deduction. For example, the set of true propositions is closed
under deduction or entailment. Others are not. Under most accounts of belief,
we may fail to believe what is entailed by what we do, in fact, believe. Thus,
if knowledge is some form of true, justified belief, knowledge is not closed
under deduction, for we may fail to believe a proposition entailed by a known
proposition. Nevertheless, there is a related issue that has been the subject
of much debate, namely: Is the set of justified propositions closed under
deduction? Aside from the obvious importance of the answer to that question in
developing an account of justification, there are two important issues in
epistemology that also depend on the answer. Subtleties aside, the so-called
Gettier problem depends in large part upon an affirmative answer to that
question. For, assuming that a proposition can be justified and false, it is
possible to construct cases in which a proposition, say p, is justified, false,
but believed. Now, consider a true proposition, q, which is believed and
entailed by p. If justification is closed under deduction, then q is justified,
true, and believed. But if the only basis for believing q is p, it is clear
that q is not known. Thus, true, justified belief is not sufficient for
knowledge. What response is appropriate to this problem has been a central
issue in epistemology since E. Gettier’s publication of “Is Justified True
Belief Knowledge?” Analysis, 3. Whether justification is closed under deduction
is also crucial when evaluating a common, traditional argument for skepticism.
Consider any person, S, and let p be any proposition ordinarily thought to be
knowable, e.g., that there is a table before S. The argument for skepticism
goes like this: 1 If p is justified for S, then, since p entails q, where q is
‘there is no evil genius making S falsely believe that p’, q is justified for
S. 2 S is not justified in believing q. Therefore, S is not justified in
believing p. The first premise depends upon justification being closed under
deduction.
cockburn: c. English philosopher and playwright who made a
significant contribution to the debates on ethical rationalism sparked by Clarke’s
Boyle lectures. The major theme of her writings is the nature of moral
obligation. Cockburn displays a consistent, non-doctrinaire philosophical
position, arguing that moral duty is to be rationally deduced from the “nature and
fitness of things” Remarks, 1747 and is not founded primarily in externally
imposed sanctions. Her writings, published anonymously, take the form of
philosophical debates with others, including Samuel Rutherforth, William
Warburton, Isaac Watts, Francis Hutcheson, and Lord Shaftesbury. Her best-known
intervention in contemporary philosophical debate was her able defense of
Locke’s Essay in 1702.
cogitatum -- cogito
ergo sumExample given by Grice of
Descartes’s conventional implicaturum. “What Descartes said was, “je pense;
donc, j’existe.” The ‘donc’ implicaturum is an interesting one to analyse. cited
by Grice in “Descartes on clear and distinct perception.” ‘I think, therefore I
am’, the starting point of Descartes’s system of knowledge. In his Discourse on
the Method 1637, he observes that the proposition ‘I am thinking, therefore I
exist’ je pense, donc je suis is “so firm and sure that the most extravagant
suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it.” The celebrated
phrase, in its better-known Latin version, also occurs in the Principles of
Philosophy 1644, but is not to be found in the Meditations 1641, though the
latter contains the fullest statement of the reasoning behind Descartes’s
certainty of his own existence.
cognitumincognitum
--
cohaesum- cohaerence:
Grice: “All Roman words starting with
co- are a trick. haerĕo , haesi, haesum, 2, v. n.
etym. dub., I.to hang or hold fast, to hang, stick, cleave, cling, adhere, be
fixed, sit fast, remain close to any thing or in any manner (class. and very
freq., esp. in the trop. sense; cf. pendeo); usually constr. with in, the
simple abl. or absol., less freq. with dat., with ad, sub, ex, etc. since
H. P. Grice was a correspondentist, he hated Bradley. -- theory of truth, the view that either the
nature of truth or the sole criterion for determining truth is constituted by a
relation of coherence between the belief or judgment being assessed and other
beliefs or judgments. As a view of the nature of truth, the coherence theory
represents an alternative to the correspondence theory of truth. Whereas the
correspondence theory holds that a belief is true provided it corresponds to
independent reality, the coherence theory holds that it is true provided it
stands in a suitably strong relation of coherence to other beliefs, so that the
believer’s total system of beliefs forms a highly or perhaps perfectly coherent
system. Since, on such a characterization, truth depends entirely on the
internal relations within the system of beliefs, such a conception of truth
seems to lead at once to idealism as regards the nature of reality, and its
main advocates have been proponents of absolute idealism mainly Bradley,
Bosanquet, and Brand Blanshard. A less explicitly metaphysical version of the
coherence theory was also held by certain members of the school of logical
positivism mainly Otto Neurath and Carl Hempel. The nature of the intended
relation of coherence, often characterized metaphorically in terms of the
beliefs in question fitting together or dovetailing with each other, has been
and continues to be a matter of uncertainty and controversy. Despite occasional
misconceptions to the contrary, it is clear that coherence is intended to be a
substantially more demanding relation than mere consistency, involving such
things as inferential and explanatory relations within the system of beliefs.
Perfect or ideal coherence is sometimes described as requiring that every
belief in the system of beliefs entails all the others though it must be
remembered that those offering such a characterization do not restrict
entailments to those that are formal or analytic in character. Since actual
human systems of belief seem inevitably to fall short of perfect coherence,
however that is understood, their truth is usually held to be only approximate
at best, thus leading to the absolute idealist view that truth admits of
degrees. As a view of the criterion of truth, the coherence theory of truth
holds that the sole criterion or standard for determining whether a belief is true
is its coherence with other beliefs or judgments, with the degree of
justification varying with the degree of coherence. Such a view amounts to a
coherence theory of epistemic justification. It was held by most of the
proponents of the coherence theory of the nature of truth, though usually
without distinguishing the two views very clearly. For philosophers who hold
both of these views, the thesis that coherence is the sole criterion of truth
is usually logically prior, and the coherence theory of the nature of truth is
adopted as a consequence, the clearest argument being that only the view that
perfect or ideal coherence is the nature of truth can make sense of the appeal
to degrees of coherence as a criterion of truth. -- coherentism, in epistemology, a theory of
the structure of knowledge or justified beliefs according to which all beliefs
representing knowledge are known or justified in virtue of their relations to
other beliefs, specifically, in virtue of belonging to a coherent system of
beliefs. Assuming that the orthodox account of knowledge is correct at least in
maintaining that justified true belief is necessary for knowledge, we can
identify two kinds of coherence theories of knowledge: those that are
coherentist merely in virtue of incorporating a coherence theory of
justification, and those that are doubly coherentist because they account for
both justification and truth in terms of coherence. What follows will focus on
coherence theories of justification. Historically, coherentism is the most
significant alternative to foundationalism. The latter holds that some beliefs,
basic or foundational beliefs, are justified apart from their relations to
other beliefs, while all other beliefs derive their justification from that of
foundational beliefs. Foundationalism portrays justification as having a
structure like that of a building, with certain beliefs serving as the
foundations and all other beliefs supported by them. Coherentism rejects this
image and pictures justification as having the structure of a raft. Justified
beliefs, like the planks that make up a raft, mutually support one another.
This picture of the coherence theory is due to the positivist Otto Neurath.
Among the positivists, Hempel shared Neurath’s sympathy for coherentism. Other
defenders of coherentism from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were idealists, e.g., Bradley, Bosanquet, and Brand Blanshard. Idealists often
held the sort of double coherence theory mentioned above. The contrast between
foundationalism and coherentism is commonly developed in terms of the regress
argument. If we are asked what justifies one of our beliefs, we
characteristically answer by citing some other belief that supports it, e.g.,
logically or probabilistically. If we are asked about this second belief, we
are likely to cite a third belief, and so on. There are three shapes such an
evidential chain might have: it could go on forever, if could eventually end in
some belief, or it could loop back upon itself, i.e., eventually contain again
a belief that had occurred “higher up” on the chain. Assuming that infinite
chains are not really possible, we are left with a choice between chains that
end and circular chains. According to foundationalists, evidential chains must
eventually end with a foundational belief that is justified, if the belief at
the beginning of the chain is to be justified. Coherentists are then portrayed
as holding that circular chains can yield justified beliefs. This portrayal is,
in a way, correct. But it is also misleading since it suggests that the
disagreement between coherentism and foundationalism is best understood as
concerning only the structure of evidential chains. Talk of evidential chains
in which beliefs that are further down on the chain are responsible for beliefs
that are higher up naturally suggests the idea that just as real chains
transfer forces, evidential chains transfer justification. Foundationalism then
sounds like a real possibility. Foundational beliefs already have
justification, and evidential chains serve to pass the justification along to
other beliefs. But coherentism seems to be a nonstarter, for if no belief in
the chain is justified to begin with, there is nothing to pass along. Altering
the metaphor, we might say that coherentism seems about as likely to succeed as
a bucket brigade that does not end at a well, but simply moves around in a
circle. The coherentist seeks to dispel this appearance by pointing out that
the primary function of evidential chains is not to transfer epistemic status,
such as justification, from belief to belief. Indeed, beliefs are not the
primary locus of justification. Rather, it is whole systems of belief that are
justified or not in the primary sense; individual beliefs are justified in
virtue of their membership in an appropriately structured system of beliefs.
Accordingly, what the coherentist claims is that the appropriate sorts of
evidential chains, which will be circular
indeed, will likely contain numerous circles constitute justified systems of belief. The
individual beliefs within such a system are themselves justified in virtue of
their place in the entire system and not because this status is passed on to
them from beliefs further down some evidential chain in which they figure. One
can, therefore, view coherentism with considerable accuracy as a version of
foundationalism that holds all beliefs to be foundational. From this
perspective, the difference between coherentism and traditional foundationalism
has to do with what accounts for the epistemic status of foundational beliefs,
with traditional foundationalism holding that such beliefs can be justified in
various ways, e.g., by perception or reason, while coherentism insists that the
only way such beliefs can be justified is by being a member of an appropriately
structured system of beliefs. One outstanding problem the coherentist faces is
to specify exactly what constitutes a coherent system of beliefs. Coherence
clearly must involve much more than mere absence of mutually contradictory
beliefs. One way in which beliefs can be logically consistent is by concerning
completely unrelated matters, but such a consistent system of beliefs would not
embody the sort of mutual support that constitutes the core idea of
coherentism. Moreover, one might question whether logical consistency is even
necessary for coherence, e.g., on the basis of the preface paradox. Similar
points can be made regarding efforts to begin an account of coherence with the
idea that beliefs and degrees of belief must correspond to the probability
calculus. So although it is difficult to avoid thinking that such formal
features as logical and probabilistic consistency are significantly involved in
coherence, it is not clear exactly how they are involved. An account of
coherence can be drawn more directly from the following intuitive idea: a
coherent system of belief is one in which each belief is epistemically
supported by the others, where various types of epistemic support are
recognized, e.g., deductive or inductive arguments, or inferences to the best
explanation. There are, however, at least two problems this suggestion does not
address. First, since very small sets of beliefs can be mutually supporting,
the coherentist needs to say something about the scope a system of beliefs must
have to exhibit the sort of coherence required for justification. Second, given
the possibility of small sets of mutually supportive beliefs, it is apparently
possible to build a system of very broad scope out of such small sets of
mutually supportive beliefs by mere conjunction, i.e., without forging any
significant support relations among them. Yet, since the interrelatedness of
all truths does not seem discoverable by analyzing the concept of
justification, the coherentist cannot rule out epistemically isolated
subsystems of belief entirely. So the coherentist must say what sorts of
isolated subsystems of belief are compatible with coherence. The difficulties
involved in specifying a more precise concept of coherence should not be
pressed too vigorously against the coherentist. For one thing, most
foundationalists have been forced to grant coherence a significant role within
their accounts of justification, so no dialectical advantage can be gained by
pressing them. Moreover, only a little reflection is needed to see that nearly
all the difficulties involved in specifying coherence are manifestations within
a specific context of quite general philosophical problems concerning such
matters as induction, explanation, theory choice, the nature of epistemic support,
etc. They are, then, problems that are faced by logicians, philosophers of
science, and epistemologists quite generally, regardless of whether they are
sympathetic to coherentism. Coherentism faces a number of serious objections.
Since according to coherentism justification is determined solely by the
relations among beliefs, it does not seem to be capable of taking us outside
the circle of our beliefs. This fact gives rise to complaints that coherentism
cannot allow for any input from external reality, e.g., via perception, and
that it can neither guarantee nor even claim that it is likely that coherent
systems of belief will make contact with such reality or contain true beliefs.
And while it is widely granted that justified false beliefs are possible, it is
just as widely accepted that there is an important connection between
justification and truth, a connection that rules out accounts according to
which justification is not truth-conducive. These abstractly formulated
complaints can be made more vivid, in the case of the former, by imagining a
person with a coherent system of beliefs that becomes frozen, and fails to
change in the face of ongoing sensory experience; and in the case of the
latter, by pointing out that, barring an unexpected account of coherence, it
seems that a wide variety of coherent systems of belief are possible, systems
that are largely disjoint or even incompatible.
collier: Grice found the Clavis Universalis quite fun (“to
read”). -- English philosopher, a Wiltshire parish priest whose Clavis
Universalis defends a version of immaterialism closely akin to Berkeley’s.
Matter, Collier contends, “exists in, or in dependence on mind.” He
emphatically affirms the existence of bodies, and, like Berkeley, defends
immaterialCoimbra commentaries Collier, Arthur 155 155 ism as the only alternative to
skepticism. Collier grants that bodies seem to be external, but their
“quasi-externeity” is only the effect of God’s will. In Part I of the Clavis Collier
argues as Berkeley had in his New Theory of Vision, 1709 that the visible world
is not external. In Part II he argues as Berkeley had in the Principles, 1710,
and Three Dialogues, 1713 that the external world “is a being utterly
impossible.” Two of Collier’s arguments for the “intrinsic repugnancy” of the
external world resemble Kant’s first and second antinomies. Collier argues,
e.g., that the material world is both finite and infinite; the contradiction
can be avoided, he suggests, only by denying its external existence. Some
scholars suspect that Collier deliberately concealed his debt to Berkeley; most
accept his report that he arrived at his views ten years before he published
them. Collier first refers to Berkeley in letters written in 171415. In A
Specimen of True Philosophy 1730, where he offers an immaterialist
interpretation of the opening verse of Genesis, Collier writes that “except a
single passage or two” in Berkeley’s Dialogues, there is no other book “which I
ever heard of” on the same subject as the Clavis. This is a puzzling remark on
several counts, one being that in the Preface to the Dialogues, Berkeley
describes his earlier books. Collier’s biographer reports seeing among his
papers now lost an outline, dated 1708, on “the question of the visible world
being without us or not,” but he says no more about it. The biographer
concludes that Collier’s independence cannot reasonably be doubted; perhaps the
outline would, if unearthed, establish this.
collingwood: r. g.— Grice: “The most Italian of English Oxonians!
He loved Gentile, Croce, and de Ruggiero!”Grice: “I would not count Collingwood
as a philosopher, really, since his tutor was Carritt!” -- cited by H. P. Grice
in “Metaphysics,” in D. F. Pears, “The nature of metaphysics.”Like Grice,
Collingwood was influenced by J. C. Wilson’s subordinate interrogation. English
philosopher and historian. His father, W. G. Collingwood, John Ruskin’s friend,
secretary, and biographer, at first educated him at home in Coniston and later
sent him to Rugby School and then Oxford. Immediately upon graduating in 2, he
was elected to a fellowship at Pembroke ; except for service with admiralty
intelligence during World War I, he remained at Oxford until 1, when illness
compelled him to retire. Although his Autobiography expresses strong disapproval
of the lines on which, during his lifetime, philosophy at Oxford developed, he
was a varsity “insider.” He was elected to the Waynflete Professorship, the
first to become vacant after he had done enough work to be a serious candidate.
He was also a leading archaeologist of Roman Britain. Although as a student
Collingwood was deeply influenced by the “realist” teaching of John Cook
Wilson, he studied not only the British idealists, but also Hegel and the
contemporary post-Hegelians. At
twenty-three, he published a translation of Croce’s book on Vico’s philosophy.
Religion and Philosophy 6, the first of his attempts to present orthodox
Christianity as philosophically acceptable, has both idealist and Cook
Wilsonian elements. Thereafter the Cook Wilsonian element steadily diminished.
In Speculum Mentis4, he investigated the nature and ultimate unity of the four
special ‘forms of experience’ art,
religion, natural science, and history
and their relation to a fifth comprehensive form philosophy. While all four, he contended, are
necessary to a full human life now, each is a form of error that is corrected
by its less erroneous successor. Philosophy is error-free but has no content of
its own: “The truth is not some perfect system of philosophy: it is simply the
way in which all systems, however perfect, collapse into nothingness on the
discovery that they are only systems.” Some critics dismissed this enterprise
as idealist a description Collingwood accepted when he wrote, but even those
who favored it were disturbed by the apparent skepticism of its result. A year
later, he amplified his views about art in Outlines of a Philosophy of Art.
Since much of what Collingwood went on to write about philosophy has never been
published, and some of it has been negligently destroyed, his thought after
Speculum Mentis is hard to trace. It will not be definitively established until
the more than 3,000 s of his surviving unpublished manuscripts deposited in the
Bodleian Library in 8 have been thoroughly studied. They were not available to
the scholars who published studies of his philosophy as a whole up to 0. Three
trends in how his philosophy developed, however, are discernible. The first is
that as he continued to investigate the four special forms of experience, he
came to consider each valid in its own right, and not a form of error. As early
as 8, he abandoned the conception of the historical past in Speculum Mentis as
simply a spectacle, alien to the historian’s mind; he now proposed a theory of
it as thoughts explaining past actions that, although occurring in the past,
can be rethought in the present. Not only can the identical thought “enacted”
at a definite time in the past be “reenacted” any number of times after, but it
can be known to be so reenacted if colligation physical evidence survives that
can be shown to be incompatible with other proposed reenactments. In 334 he
wrote a series of lectures posthumously published as The Idea of Nature in
which he renounced his skepticism about whether the quantitative material world
can be known, and inquired why the three constructive periods he recognized in
European scientific thought, the Grecian, the Renaissance, and the modern,
could each advance our knowledge of it as they did. Finally, in 7, returning to
the philosophy of art and taking full account of Croce’s later work, he showed
that imagination expresses emotion and becomes false when it counterfeits
emotion that is not felt; thus he transformed his earlier theory of art as
purely imaginative. His later theories of art and of history remain alive; and
his theory of nature, although corrected by research since his death, was an
advance when published. The second trend was that his conception of philosophy
changed as his treatment of the special forms of experience became less
skeptical. In his beautifully written Essay on Philosophical Method 3, he
argued that philosophy has an object the
ens realissimum as the one, the true, and the good of which the objects of the special forms of
experience are appearances; but that implies what he had ceased to believe,
that the special forms of experience are forms of error. In his Principles of
Art 8 and New Leviathan 2 he denounced the idealist principle of Speculum
Mentis that to abstract is to falsify. Then, in his Essay on Metaphysics 0, he
denied that metaphysics is the science of being qua being, and identified it
with the investigation of the “absolute presuppositions” of the special forms
of experience at definite historical periods. A third trend, which came to dominate
his thought as World War II approached, was to see serious philosophy as
practical, and so as having political implications. He had been, like Ruskin, a
radical Tory, opposed less to liberal or even some socialist measures than to
the bourgeois ethos from which they sprang. Recognizing European fascism as the
barbarism it was, and detesting anti-Semitism, he advocated an antifascist
foreign policy and intervention in the
civil war in support of the republic. His last major publication, The
New Leviathan, impressively defends what he called civilization against what he
called barbarism; and although it was neglected by political theorists after
the war was won, the collapse of Communism and the rise of Islamic states are
winning it new readers. Grice: “Collingwood
thought of language importantly enough to dedicate a full seminar at Oxford to
it. He entitled it “Language.” The first section is on “symbol and expression.”
Language comes into existence with imagination, as a feature of experience at
the conscious level. . . ‘. . . It is an imaginative activity whose function is
to express emotion. Intel- lectual language is this same thing
intellectualized, or modified so as to express thought.’ A symbol is
established by agreement; but this agreement is established in a language that
already exists. In this way, intellectualized language ‘presupposes imaginative
language or language proper. . . in the traditional theory of language these
relations are reversed, with disastrous results.’ Children do not learn to
speak by being shown things while their names are uttered; or if they do, it is
because (unlike, say, cats) they already understand the language of pointing
and naming. The child may be accustomed to hearing ‘Hatty off!’ when its bonnet
is removed; then the child may exclaim ‘Hattiaw!’ when it removes its own
bonnet and throws it out of the perambulator. The exclamation is not a symbol,
but an expression of satisfaction at removing the bonnet. The second section is
on “Psychical Expression.” More primitive than linguistic expression is
psychical expression: ‘the doing of involuntary and perhaps even wholly
unconscious bodily acts [such as grimac- ing], related in a peculiar way to the
emotions [such as pain] they are said to express.’ A single experience can be
analyzed: -- sensum (as an abdominal gripe), or the field of sensation
containing this; ) the emotional charge on the sensum (as visceral pain); -- the
psychical expression (as the grimace). We can observe and interpret psychical
expressions intellectually. But there is the possibility of emotional
contagion, or sympathy, whereby expressions can also be sensa for others, with
their own emotional charges. Examples are the spread of panic through a crowd,
or a dog’s urge to attack the person who is afraid of it (or the cat that runs
from it). Psychical emotions can be expressed only psychically. But there are
emotions of consciousness (as hatred, love, anger, shame): these are the
emotional charges, not on sensa, but on modes of consciousness, which can be
expressed in language or psychically. Expressed psychically, they have the same
analysis as psychical emotions; for example, -- ‘consciousness of our own inferiority, )
‘shame -- ) ‘blushing.’ Shame is not the emotional charge on the sensa associated
with blushing. ‘The common-sense view [that we blush because we are ashamed] is
right, and the James–Lange theory is wrong.’ Emotions of consciousness can be
expressed in two different ways because, more generally, a ‘higher level [of
experience] differs from the lower in having a new principle of organization;
this does not supersede the old, it is superimposed on it. The lower type of
experience is perpetuated in the higher type’ somewhat as matter is perpetuated,
even with a new form. ‘A mode of consciousness like shame is thus, formally, a
mode of consciousness and nothing else; materially, it is a constellation or
synthesis of psychical expe- riences.’ But consciousness is ‘an activity by
which those elements are combined in this particular way.’ It is not just a new
arrangement of those elements— otherwise the sensa of which shame is the
emotional charge would have been obvious, and the James–Lange theory would not
have needed to arise. ‘[E]ach new level [of experience] must organize itself
according to its own principles before a transition can be made to the next’.
Therefore, to move beyond consciousness to intellect, ‘emotions of
consciousness must be formally or linguistically expressed, not only materially
or psychically expressed’. The third section is on “Imaginative Expression.” Psychical
expression is uncontrollable. At the level of awareness, expressions are
experienced ‘as activities belonging to ourselves and controlled in the same
sense as the emotions they express. ‘Bodily actions expressing certain
emotions, insofar as they come under our control and are conceived by us in our
awareness of controlling them, as our way of expressing these emotions, are
language.’ ‘[A]ny theory of language must begin here.’ The controlled
act of expression is materially the same as psychical expression; the
difference is just that it is done ‘on purpose’. ‘[T]he conversion of
impression into idea by the work of consciousness im- mensely multiplies the
emotions that demand expression.’ ‘There are no unexpressed emotions.’ What are
so called are emotions, already expressed at one level, of which somebody is
trying to become conscious. 5From http://en..org/wiki/James-Lange_theory,
The theory states that within human beings, as a response to experiences in the
world, the autonomic nervous system creates physiological events such as
muscular tension, a rise in heart rate, perspiration, and dryness of the mouth.
Emotions, then, are feelings which come about as a result of these
physiological changes, rather than being their cause. Corresponding to the
series of sensum, emotional charge, psychical expression (as in red color,
fear, start), we have, say, -- ) bonnet removal, ) feeling of triumph, -- cry
of ‘Hattiaw!’ The child imitates the speech of others only when it realizes
that they are speaking. The fourth section is on “Language and Languages.” Language
need not be spoken by the tongue. ‘[T]here is no way of expressing the same
feeling in two different media.’ However, ‘each one of us, whenever he
expresses himself, is doing so with his whole body’, in the ‘original language
of total bodily gesture’—this is the ‘motor side’ of the ‘total imaginative
experience’ identified as art proper in Book I. The sixth section is on “Speaker
and Hearer.” A child’s first utterances are not addressed to anybody. But a
speaker is always -- ness does not begin as a mere self-consciousness. . . the
consciousness of our own existence is also consciousness of the existence of’
other persons. These persons could be cats or trees or shadows: as a form of
thought, consciousness can make mistakes [§ .]. In speaking, we do not
exactly communicate an emotion to a listener. To do this would be to cause the
listener to have a similar emotion; but to compare the emotions, we would need
language. The single experience of expressing emotion has two parts: the
emotion, and the controlled bodily action expressing it. This union of idea
with expression can be considered from two points of view: -- ) we can express
what we feel only because we know it; -- ) we know what we feel because we can
express it. ‘The person to whom speech is addressed is already familiar with
this double situation’. He ‘takes what he hears exactly as if it were speech of
his own. . . and this constructs in himself the idea which those words
express.’ But he attributes the idea to the speaker. This does not presuppose
community of language; it is community of language. If the hearer is to
understand the speaker though, he must have enough expe- rience to have the
impressions from which the ideas of the speaker are derived. (Collingwood’s
footnote to the section title is ‘In this section, whatever is said of speech
is meant of language in general.’) conscious of himself as speaking, so he is a
also a listener. The origin of self-consciousness will not be discussed.
However, ‘Conscious- However, misunderstanding may be the fault of the speaker,
if his consciousness is corrupt. The seventh section is on Language and Thought:
Language is an activity of thought; but if thought is taken in the narrower
sense of intellect, then language expresses not thought, but emotions. However,
these may be the emotions of a thinker. ‘Everything which imagination presents
to itself is a here, a now’. This might be the song of a thrush in May. One may
imagine, alongside this, the January song of the thrush; but at the level of
imagination, the two songs coalesce into one. By thinking, one may analyze the
song into parts—notes; or one may relate it to things not imagined, such as the
January thrush song that one remembers having heard four months ago at dawn
(though one may not remember the song -- to express any kind of thought (again,
in the narrower sense), language must be adapted. The eighth section is on “The
Grammatical Analysis of Language.” This adaptation of language to the
expression of thought is the function or business of the grammarian. ‘I do not
call it purpose, because he does not propose it to himself as a conscious aim’.
The grammarian analyzes, not the activity of language, but ‘speech’ or
‘discourse’, the supposed product of speech. But this product ‘is a
metaphysical fiction. It is supposed to exist only because the theory of
language is approached from the standpoint of the philosophy of craft. . . what
the grammarian is really doing is to think, not about a product of the activity
of speaking, but about the activity itself, distorted in his thoughts about it
by the assumption that it is not an activity, but a product or “thing”. ‘Next,
this “thing” must be scientifically studied; and this involves a double
process. The first stage of this process is to cut the “thing” up into parts.
Some readers will object to this phrase on the ground that I have used a verb
of acting when I ought to have used a verb of thinking. . . [but] philosophical
controversies are not to be settled by a sort of police-regulation governing
people’s choice of words. . . I meant cut. . àBird songs are wonderful to hear;
but I am not sufficiently familiar with them, or I live in the wrong place, to
be able to recognize seasonal variations in them. Looking for my own examples,
I can remember that, last summer, I became drenched in sweat from walking at
midday in the hills above the Aegean coast, before giving a mathematics
lecture; but I need not remember the feeling of the heat.) itself ). Analyzing
and relating are not the only kinds of thought. The point is that. -- ‘The
final process is to devise a scheme of relations between the parts thus
divided. . . a) ‘Lexicography. Every word, as it actually occurs in discourse,
occurs once and once only. . . Thus we get a new fiction: the recurring word’.
‘Meanings’ of words are established in words, so we get another fiction:
synonymity. b) Accidence. The rules whereby a single word is modified into
dominus, domine, dominum are also ‘palpable fictions; for it is notorious that
excep- tions to them occur’. c) Syntax. ‘A grammarian is not a kind of
scientist studying the actual structure of lan- guage; he is a kind of butcher’.
Idioms are another example of how language resists the grammarian’s efforts.
The ninth section is on The Logical Analysis of Language. Logical technique
aims ‘to make language into a perfect vehicle for the expression of thought.’
It asssumes ‘that the grammatical transformation of language has been
successfully accomplished.’ It makes three further assumptions:) the
propositional assumption that some ‘sentences’ make statements; ) the
principle of homolingual translation whereby one sentence can mean exactly the
same as another (or group of others) in the same language;) logical
preferability: one sentence may be preferred to another that has the same
meaning. The criterion is not ease of understanding (this is the stylist’s
concern), but ease of manipulation by the logician’s technique to suit his
aims. The logician’s modification of language can to some extent be carried
out; but it tries to pull language apart into two things: language proper, and
symbolism. ‘No serious writer or speaker ever utters a thought unless he thinks
it worth uttering...Nor does he ever utter it except with a choice of words,
and in a tone of voice, that express his sense of this importance.’ The problem
is that written words do not show tone of voice. One is tempted to believe that
scientific discourse is what is written; what is spoken is this and something
else, emotional expression. Good logic would show that the logical structure of
a proposition is not clear from its written form. Good literature is written so
(8Collingwood imaginatively describes Dr. Richards, who writes of Tolstoy’s
view of art, ‘This is plainly untrue’, as if he were a cat shaking a drop of
water from its paw. Dr. Richards is Ivor Armstrong Richards, to whose
Principles of Literary Criticism Collingwood refers; ac- cording to http://en..org/wiki/I._A._Richards (accessed
December , ), ‘Richards is regularly considered one of the founders of the
contemporary study of literature in English’.) (In a footnote, Collingwood
mentions an example of Cook Wilson: ‘That building is the Bodleian’ could mean
‘That building is the Bodleian’ or ‘That building is the Bodleian.’ that the
reader cannot help but read it with the right tempo and tone. The proposition,
as a form of words expressing thought and not emotion, is a fictitious entity.
But ‘a second and more difficult thesis’ is that words do not express thought
at all directly; they express the emotional charge on a thought, allowing the
hearer to rediscover the thought ‘whose peculiar emotional tone the speaker has
expressed.’The tenth section is on “Language and Symbolism.” Symbols and
technical terms are invented for unemotional scientific purposes, but they
always acquire emotional expressiveness. ‘Every mathematician knows this.’
Intellectualized language, • as language, expresses emotion, • as symbolism,
has meaning; it points beyond emotion to a thought. ‘The progressive
intellectualization of language, its progressive conversion by the work of
grammar and logic into a scientific symbolism, thus represents not a
progressive drying-up of emotion, but its progressive articulation
and specializa- tion. We are not getting away from an emotional atmosphere into
a dry, rational atmosphere; we are acquiring new emotions and new means of
expressing them.’ Grice: “Collingwood improves on Crocefor one, he makes Croce
understandable at Oxford. Collingwood wants to distinguish between emotion and
expression of emotion. He also speaks of communication of emotion. The keyword
is ‘expression.’ Collingwood distinguishes between uncontrolled manifestation
and controlled manifestation. It is the latter that he dignifies with the term
‘expression.’ He makes an interesting point about the recipient. The recipient
must be in some degree of familiarty with the emotion expressed by the utterer
that the utterer is ‘communicating.’ To communicate is not really like
‘transfer.’ It is not THE SAME EMOTION that gets transferred. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Collingwood,” in
“Metaphysics,” in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics. Luigi Speranza, “A
commentary on the language and conversation section of Collingwood’s “The idea
of language.”
colonnae. giles di roma,
Rome, original name, a member of the order of the Hermits of St. Augustine, he
studied arts at Augustinian house and theology at the varsity in Paris but was
censured by the theology faculty and denied a license to teach as tutor. Owing
to the intervention of Pope Honorius IV, he later returned from Italy to Paris
to teach theology, was appointed general of his order, and became archbishop of
Bourges. Colonna both defends and criticizes views of Aquinas. He held that
essence and existence are really distinct in creatures, but described them as
“things”; that prime matter cannot exist without some substantial form; and,
early in his career, that an eternally created world is possible. He defended
only one substantial form in composites, including man. Grice adds: “Colonna
supported Pope Boniface VIII in his quarrel with Philip IV of Franceand that
was a bad choice.”
commitment: Grice’s commitment to the 39 Articles. An utterer is committed to those and only those
entities to which the bound variables of his utterance must be capable of
referring in order that the utterance made be true.” Cf. Grice on
substitutional quantification for his feeling Byzantine, and ‘gap’ sign in the
analysis.
common-ground status assignment: While Grice was invited to a symposium on ‘mutual
knowledge,’ he never was for ‘regressive accounts’ of ‘know,’ perhaps because
he had to be different, and the idea of the mutual or common knowledge was the
obvious way to deal with his account of communication. He rejects it and opts
for an anti-sneak clause. In the common-ground he uses the phrase, “What the
eye no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for.” What does he mean? He
means that in the case of some recognizable divergence between the function of
a communication device in a rational calculus and in the vernacular, one may
have to assign ‘common ground status’ to certain features, e. g. [The king of
France is] bald. By using the square brackets, or subscripts, in “Vacuous names
and descriptions,” the material within their scope is ‘immune’ to refutation.
It has some sort of conversational ‘inertia.’ So the divergence, for which
Grice’s heart grieved, is no more to be seen by Grice’s eye. Strwson and
Wiggins view that this is only tentative for Grice. the regulations for
common-ground assignment have to do with general rational constraints on
conversation. Grice is clear in “Causal,” and as Strawson lets us know, he was
already clear in “Introduction” when talking of a ‘pragmatic rule.’ Strawson
states the rule in terms of making your conversational contribution the
logically strongest possible. If we abide
by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally giving
and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by others
in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the effect,
‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou canst
truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’“Causal” provides a more difficult version, because it
deals with non-extensional contexts where ‘strong’ need not be interpreted as
‘logical strength’ in terms of entailment. Common ground status assignment
springs from the principle of conversational helpfulness or conversational
benevolence. What would be the benevolent point of ‘informing’ your addressee
what you KNOW your addressee already knows? It is not even CONCEPTUALLY possible.
You are not ‘informing’ him if you are aware that he knows it. So, what
Strawson later calls the principle of presumption of ignorance and the
principle of the presumption of knowledge are relevant. There is a balance
between the two. If Strawson asks Grice, “Is the king of France bald?” Grice is
entitled to assume that Strawson thinks two things Grice will perceive as
having been assigned a ‘common-ground’ status as uncontroversial topic not
worth conversing about. First, Strawson thinks that there is one king. (∃x)Fx. Second, Strawson thinks that there is
at most one king. (x)(y)((Fx.Fy)⊃ x=y). That the king is bald is NOT assigned common-ground
status, because Grice cannot expect that Strawson thinks that Grice KNOWS that.
Grice symbolises the common-ground status by means of subscripts. He also uses
square-bracekts, so that anything within the scope of the square brackets is
immune to controversy, or as Grice also puts it, conversationally _inert_:
things we don’t talk about.
communication device: Grice: “I shall frequently speak of a ‘device,’ because its etymology
is fascinating.” divisare,
frequentative of Latin dividereGrice:
“So, ultimately, it’s a Platonic notion, since he was into division. The Romans
did not quite need a frequentative for ‘dividere,’ but the Italians did, and
this was passed to the Gallics, and then to the Brits.”Grice always has ‘or
communication devices’ at the tip of his tongue. “Language or communication
devices” (WoW: 284). A device is produced. A device can be misunderstood.
communicatum: With the linguistic turn, as Grice notes, it was all
about ‘language.’ But at Oxford they took a cavalier attitude to language, that
Grice felt like slightly rectifying, while keeping it cavalier as we like it at
Oxford. The colloquialism of ‘mean’ does not translate well in the Graeco-Roman
tradition Grice was educated via his Lit. Hum. (Philos.) and at Clifton.
‘Communicate’ might do. On top, Grice does use ‘communicate’ on various
occasions in WoW. By psi-transmission,
something that belonged in the emissor becomes ‘common property,’ ‘communion’
has been achived. Now the recipient KNOWS that it is raining (shares the belief
with the emissor) and IS GOING to bring that umbrella (has formed a desire). “Communication”
is cognate with ‘communion,’ while conversation is cognate with ‘sex’! When
Grice hightlights the ‘common ground’ in ‘communication’ he is being slightly
rhetorical, so it is good when he weakens the claim from ‘common ground’ to
‘non-trivial.’ A: I’m going to the concert. My uncle’s brother went to that
concert. The emissor cannot presume that his addressee KNEW that he had an
unlce let alone that his uncle had a brother (the emissor’s father). But any
expansion would trigger the wrong implicaturum. One who likes ‘communication’
is refined Strawson (I’m using refined as J. Barnes does it, “turn Plato into
refined Strawson”). Both in his rat-infested example and at the inaugural
lecture at Oxford. Grice, for one, has given us reason to think that, with
sufficient care, and far greater refinement than I have indicated, it is
possible to expound such a concept of communication-intention or, as he calls
it, utterer's meaning, which is proof against objection. it is a commonplace that Grice belongs, as
most philosophers of the twentieth century, to the movement of the linguistic
turn. Short and Lewis have “commūnĭcare,” earlier “conmunicare,” f. communis,
and thus sharing the prefix with “conversare.” Now “communis” is an interesting
lexeme that Grice uses quite centrally in his idea of the ‘common ground’when a
feature of discourse is deemed to have been assigned ‘common-ground status.’
“Communis” features the “cum-” prefix, commūnis (comoinis); f. “con” and root “mu-,”
to bind; Sanscr. mav-; cf.: immunis, munus, moenia. The ‘communicatum’ (as used
by Tammelo in social philosophy) may
well cover what Grice would call the total ‘significatio,’ or ‘significatum.’ Grice
takes this seriously. Let us start then by examining what we mean by ‘linguistic,’
or ‘communication.’ It is curious that while most Griceians overuse
‘communicative’ as applied to ‘intention,’ Grice does not. Communicator’s
intention, at most. This is the Peirce in Grice’s soul. Meaning provides an
excellent springboard for Grice to centre his analysis on psychological or
soul-y verbs as involving the agent and the first person: smoke only
figuratively means fire, and the expression smoke only figuratively (or
metabolically) means that there is fire. It is this or that utterer (say,
Grice) who means, say, by uttering Where theres smoke theres fire, or ubi
fumus, ibi ignis, that where theres smoke theres fire. A means something
by uttering x, an utterance-token is roughly equivalent to utterer U intends
the utterance of x to produce some effect in his addressee A by means of the recognition
of this intention; and we may add that to ask what U means is to ask for a
specification of the intended effectthough, of course, it may not always be
possible to get a straight answer involving a that-clause, for example, a
belief that He does provide a more
specific example involving the that-clause at a later stage. By uttering x, U
means that-ψb-dp ≡ (Ǝφ)(Ǝf)(Ǝc) U utters
x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ think
that x has f, f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, and (Ǝφ') U intends x to be such
that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has
f and that f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that
p, and in view of (Ǝφ') U intending x to be such
that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has
f, and f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that
p, U ψ-s that p, and, for some
substituends of ψb-d, U utters x
intending that, should there actually be anyone who
has φ, he will, via thinking in view of (Ǝφ') U
intending x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via
thinking that x has f, and f is correlated in way c
with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, U ψ-s that
p himself ψ that p, and it is not
the case that, for some inference element E, U intends x to be such
that anyone who has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be
such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that
p without relying on E. Besides St. John The Baptist, and Salome, Grice
cites few Namess in Meaning. But he makes a point about Stevenson! For
Stevenson, smoke means fire. Meaning develops out of an interest by Grice on
the philosophy of Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other
authors, including, besides Peirce himself (!), Ogden, Richards, and Ewing, or
A. C. Virtue is not a fire-shovel Ewing, as Grice calls him, and this or that
cricketer. In the characteristic Oxonian fashion of a Lit. Hum., Grice has no
intention to submit Meaning to publication. Publishing is vulgar. Bennett,
however, guesses that Grice decides to publish it just a year after his Defence
of a dogma. Bennett’s argument is that Defence of a dogma pre-supposes some
notion of meaning. However, a different story may be told, not necessarily
contradicting Bennetts. It is Strawson who submits the essay by Grice to The
Philosophical Review (henceforth, PR) Strawson attends Grices talk on Meaning
for The Oxford Philosophical Society, and likes it. Since In defence of a dogma
was co-written with Strawson, the intention Bennett ascribes to Grice is
Strawsons. Oddly, Strawson later provides a famous alleged counter-example to
Grice on meaning in Intention and convention in speech acts, following J. O.
Urmson’s earlier attack to the sufficiency of Grices analysans -- which has
Grice dedicating a full James lecture (No. 5) to it. there is Strawsons
rat-infested house for which it is insufficient. An interesting fact,
that confused a few, is that Hart quotes from Grices Meaning in his critical
review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly. Hart quotes Grice
pre-dating the publication of Meaning. Harts point is that Holloway should have
gone to Oxford! In Meaning, Grice may be seen as a practitioner of
ordinary-language philosophy: witness his explorations of the factivity (alla
know, remember, or see) or lack thereof of various uses of to mean. The second
part of the essay, for which he became philosophically especially popular,
takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The only authority
Grice cites, in typical Oxonian fashion, is, via Ogden and Barnes, Stevenson,
who, from The New World (and via Yale, too!) defends an emotivist theory of
ethics, and making a few remarks on how to mean is used, with scare quotes, in
something like a causal account (Smoke means fire.). After its publication
Grices account received almost as many alleged counterexamples as rule-utilitarianism
(Harrison), but mostly outside Oxford, and in The New World. New-World
philosophers seem to have seen Grices attempt as reductionist and as
oversimplifying. At Oxford, the sort of counterexample Grice received, before
Strawson, was of the Urmson-type: refined, and subtle. I think your account
leaves bribery behind. On the other hand, in the New World ‒ in what Grice
calls the Latter-Day School of Nominalism, Quine is having troubles with
empiricism. Meaning was repr. in various collections, notably in Philosophical
Logic, ed. by Strawson. It should be remembered that it is Strawson who has the
thing typed and submitted for publication. Why Meaning should be repr. in a
collection on Philosophical Logic only Strawson knows. But Grice does say that
his account may help clarify the meaning of entails! It may be Strawsons implicaturum
that Parkinson should have repr. (and not merely credited) Meaning by Grice in
his series for Oxford on The theory of meaning. The preferred quotation for Griceians
is of course The Oxford Philosophical Society quote, seeing that Grice recalled
the exact year when he gave the talk for the Philosophical Society at Oxford!
It is however, the publication in The Philosophi, rather than the quieter
evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, that occasioned a tirade of
alleged counter-examples by New-World philosophers. Granted, one or two
Oxonians ‒ Urmson and Strawson ‒ fell in! Urmson criticises the sufficiency of
Grices account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving bribery.
Grice will consider a way out of Urmsons alleged counter-example in his fifth
Wiliam James Lecture, rightly crediting and thanking Urmson for this! Strawsons
alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if regressive. It also
involves the sufficiency of Grices analysis. Strawsons rat-infested house
alleged counter-example started a chain which required Grice to avoid,
ultimately, any sneaky intention by way of a recursive clause to the effect
that, for utterer U to have meant that p, all meaning-constitutive intentions
should be above board. But why this obsession by Grice with mean? He is being
funny. Spots surely dont mean, only mean.They dont have a mind. Yet Grice opens
with a specific sample. Those spots mean, to the doctor, that you, dear, have
measles. Mean? Yes, dear, mean, doctors orders. Those spots mean measles. But
how does the doctor know? Cannot he be in the wrong? Not really, mean is
factive, dear! Or so Peirce thought. Grice is amazed that Peirce thought that some
meaning is factive. The hole in this piece of cloth means that a bullet went
through is is one of Peirce’s examples. Surely, as Grice notes, this is an
unhappy example. The hole in the cloth may well have caused by something else,
or fabricated. (Or the postmark means that the letter went through the post.)
Yet, Grice was having Oxonian tutees aware that Peirce was krypto-technical.
Grice chose for one of his pre-Meaning seminars on Peirce’s general theory of
signs, with emphasis on general, and the correspondence of Peirce and Welby.
Peirce, rather than the Vienna circle, becomes, in vein with Grices dissenting
irreverent rationalism, important as a source for Grices attempt to English
Peirce. Grices implicaturum seems to be that Peirce, rather than Ayer, cared
for the subtleties of meaning and sign, never mind a verificationist theory
about them! Peirce ultra-Latinate-cum-Greek taxonomies have Grice very nervous,
though. He knew that his students were proficient in the classics, but still. Grice
thus proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions and sub-divisions (one
sub-division too many) to mean. In the proceedings, he quotes from Ogden,
Richards, and Ewing. In particular, Grice was fascinated by the correspondence of
Peirce with Lady Viola Welby, as repr. by Ogden/Richards in, well, their study
on the meaning of meaning. Grice thought the science of symbolism pretentious,
but then he almost thought Lady Viola Welby slightly pretentious, too, if youve
seen her; beautiful lady. It is via Peirce that Grice explores examples such as
those spots meaning measles. Peirce’s obsession is with weathercocks almost as
Ockham was with circles on wine-barrels. Old-World Grices use of New-World
Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian linguistic turn focused on ordinary
language. While Peirce’s background was not philosophical, Grice thought it
comical enough. He would say that Peirce is an amateur, but then he said the
same thing about Mill, whom Grice had to study by heart to get his B. A. Lit.
Hum.! Plus, as Watson commented, what is wrong with amateur? Give me an amateur
philosopher ANY day, if I have to choose from professional Hegel! In finding
Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that his tutees, and indeed any
Oxonian philosophy student (he was university lecturer) be aware that to mean
should be more of a priority than this or that jargon by this or that (New
World?) philosopher!? Partly! Grice wanted his students to think on their own,
and draw their own conclusions! Grice cites Ewing, Ogden/Richards, and many
others. Ewing, while Oxford-educated, had ended up at Cambridge (Scruton almost
had him as his tutor) and written some points on Meaninglessness! Those spots
mean measles. Grice finds Peirce krypto-technical and proposes to English him
into an ordinary-language philosopher. Surely it is not important whether we
consider a measles spot a sign, a symbol, or an icon. One might just as well
find a doctor in London who thinks those spots symbolic. If Grice feels like
Englishing Peirce, he does not altogether fail! meaning, reprints, of
Meaning and other essays, a collection of reprints and offprints of Grices
essays. Meaning becomes a central topic of at least two strands in
Retrospective epilogue. The first strand concerns the idea of the centrality of
the utterer. What Grice there calls meaning BY (versus meaning TO), i.e. as he
also puts it, active or agents meaning. Surely he is right in defending an
agent-based account to meaning. Peirce need not, but Grice must, because he is
working with an English root, mean, that is only figurative applicable to
non-agentive items (Smoke means rain). On top, Grice wants to conclude that
only a rational creature (a person) can meanNN properly. Non-human animals may
have a correlate. This is a truly important point for Grice since he surely is
seen as promoting a NON-convention-based approach to meaning, and also
defending from the charge of circularity in the non-semantic account of
propositional attitudes. His final picture is a rationalist one. P1 G
wants to communicate about a danger to P2. This presupposes there IS
a danger (item of reality). Then P1 G believes there is a
danger, and communicates to P2 G2 that there is a danger. This
simple view of conversation as rational co-operation underlies Grices account
of meaning too, now seen as an offshoot of philosophical psychology, and indeed
biology, as he puts it. Meaning as yet another survival mechanism. While he
would never use a cognate like significance in his Oxford Philosophical Society
talk, Grice eventually starts to use such Latinate cognates at a later stage of
his development. In Meaning, Grice does not explain his goal. By sticking with
a root that the Oxford curriculum did not necessarily recognised as
philosophical (amateur Peirce did!), Grice is implicating that he is starting
an ordinary-language botanising on his own repertoire! Grice was amused by the
reliance by Ewing on very Oxonian examples contra Ayer: Surely Virtue aint a
fire-shovel is perfectly meaningful, and if fact true, if, Ill admit, somewhat
misleading and practically purposeless at Cambridge. Again, the dismissal by
Grice of natural meaning is due to the fact that natural meaning prohibits its
use in the first person and followed by a that-clause. ‘I mean-n that p’ sounds
absurd, no communication-function seems in the offing, there is no ‘sign for,’
as Woozley would have it. Grice found, with Suppes, all types of primacy
(ontological, axiological, psychological) in utterers meaning. In Retrospective
epilogue, he goes back to the topic, as he reminisces that it is his
suggestion that there are two allegedly distinguishable meaning concepts, even
if one is meta-bolical, which may be called natural meaning and non-natural
meaning. There is this or that test (notably factivity-entailment vs. cancelation,
but also scare quotes) which may be brought to bear to distinguish one concept
from the other. We may, for example, inquire whether a particular occurrence of
the predicate mean is factive or non-factive, i. e., whether for it to be true
that [so and so] means that p, it does or does not have to be the case that it
is true that p. Again, one may ask whether the use of quotation marks to
enclose the specification of what is meant would be inappropriate or
appropriate. If factivity, as in know, remember, and see, is present and
quotation marks, oratio recta, are be inappropriate, we have a case of natural
meaning. Otherwise the meaning involved is non-natural meaning. We may now ask
whether there is a single overarching idea which lies behind both members of
this dichotomy of uses to which the predicate meaning that seems to be
Subjects. If there is such a central idea it might help to indicate to us which
of the two concepts is in greater need of further analysis and elucidation and
in what direction such elucidation should proceed. Grice confesses that he has
only fairly recently come to believe that there is such an overarching idea and
that it is indeed of some service in the proposed inquiry. The idea behind both
uses of mean is that of consequence, or consequentia, as Hobbes has it. If x
means that p, something which includes p or the idea of p, is a consequence of
x. In the metabolic natural use of meaning that p, p, this or that consequence,
is this or that state of affairs. In the literal, non-metabolic, basic,
non-natural use of meaning that p, (as in Smith means that his neighbour’s
three-year child is an adult), p, this or that consequence is this or that
conception or complexus which involves some other conception. This perhaps
suggests that of the two concepts it is, as it should, non-natural meaning
which is more in need of further elucidation. It seems to be the more
specialised of the pair, and it also seems to be the less determinate. We may,
e. g., ask how this or that conception enters the picture. Or we may ask
whether what enters the picture is the conception itself or its justifiability.
On these counts Grice should look favorably on the idea that, if further
analysis should be required for one of the pair, the notion of non-natural
meaning would be first in line. There are factors which support the suitability
of further analysis for the concept of non-natural meaning. MeaningNN that
p (non-natural meaning) does not look as if it Namess an original feature of
items in the world, for two reasons which are possibly not mutually
independent. One reason is that, given suitable background conditions, meaning,
can be changed by fiat. The second reason is that the presence of meaningNN is
dependent on a framework provided by communication, if that is not too
circular. Communication is in the philosophical lexicon. Lewis and
Short have “commūnĭcātĭo,” f. communicare,"(several times in Cicero,
elsewhere rare), and as they did with negatio and they will with significatio,
Short and Lewis render, unhelpfully, as a making common, imparting,
communicating. largitio et communicatio civitatis;” “quaedam societas et
communicatio utilitatum,” “consilii communicatio, “communicatio sermonis,” criminis
cum pluribus; “communicatio nominum, i. e. the like appellation of several objects;
“juris; “damni; In rhetorics, communicatio, trading on the communis, a figure,
translating Grecian ἀνακοίνωσις, in accordance with which the utterer turns to
his addressee, and, as it were, allows him to take part in the inquiry. It
seems to Grice, then, at least reasonable and possibly even emphatically
mandatory, to treat the claim that a communication vehicle, such as this and
that expression means that p, in this transferred, metaphoric, or meta-bolic
use of means that as being reductively analysable in terms of this or that
feature of this or that utterer, communicator, or user of this or that expression.
The use of meaning that as applied to this or that expression is posterior
to and explicable through the utterer-oriented, or utterer-relativised use,
i.e. involving a reference to this or that communicator or user of this or that
expression. More specifically, one should license a metaphorical use of mean,
where one allows the claim that this or that expression means that p, provided
that this or that utterer, in this or that standard fashion, means that p, i.e.
in terms of this or that souly statee toward this or that propositional
complexus this or that utterer ntends, in a standardly fashion, to produce by
his uttering this or that utterance. That this or that expression means (in
this metaphorical use) that p is thus explicable either in terms of this
or that souly state which is standardly intended to produce in this or that
addressee A by this or that utterer of this or that expression, or in this or
that souly staken up by this or that utterer toward this or that activity or
action of this or that utterer of this or that expression. Meaning was in
the air in Oxfords linguistic turn. Everybody was talking meaning. Grice
manages to quote from Hares early “Mind” essay on the difference between
imperatives and indicatives, also Duncan-Jones on the fugitive
proposition, and of course his beloved Strawson. Grice was also concerned
by the fact that in the manoeuvre of the typical ordinary-language philosopher,
there is a constant abuse of mean. Surely Grice wants to stick with the
utterers meaning as the primary use. Expressions mean only derivatively. To do
that, he chose Peirce to see if he could clarify it with meaning that. Grice
knew that the polemic was even stronger in London, with Ogden and Lady Viola
Welby. In the more academic Oxford milieu, Grice knew that a proper examination
of meaning, would lead him, via Kneale and his researches on the history of
semantics, to the topic of signification that obsessed the modistae (and their
modus significandi). For what does L and S say about about this? This is
Grice’s reply to popular Ogden. They want to know what the meaning of meaning
is? Here is the Oxononian response by Grice, with a vengeance. Grice is not an
animist nor a mentalist, even modest. While he allows for natural
phenomena to mean (smoke means fire), meaning is best ascribed to some utterer,
where this meaning is nothing but the intentions behind his
utterance. This is the fifth James lecture. Grice was careful enough to
submit it to PR, since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views
expressed in Meaning which Strawson had submitted on Grice’s behalf to the same
Review and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers. Among
these philosophers is Strawson himself in Intention and convention in the the
theory of speech acts, also in PR. Grice quotes from very many other
philosophers in this essay, including: Urmson, Stampe,
Strawson, Schiffer, and Searle. Strawson is especially relevant since
he started a series of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of
the rat-infested house. Grice particularly treasured Stampes alleged
counter-example involving his beloved bridge! Avramides earns a D. Phil Oxon.
on that, under Strawson! This is Grices occasion to address some of the
criticisms ‒ in the form of alleged counter-examples, typically, as his
later reflections on epagoge versus diagoge note ‒ by Urmson,
Strawson, and other philosophers associated with Oxford, such as Searle,
Stampe, and Schiffer. The final analysandum is pretty complex (of the type that
he did find his analysis of I am hearing a sound complex in Personal
identity ‒ hardly an obstacle for adopting it), it became yet
another target of attack by especially New-World philosophers in the pages of
Mind, Nous, and other journals, This is officially the fifth James lecture.
Grice takes up the analysis of meaning he had presented way back at the Oxford
Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by the attack by Urmson and by Strawson
in Intention and convention in speech acts, that offered an alleged
counter-example to the sufficiency of Grices analysis, Grice ends up
introducing so many intention that he almost trembled. He ends up seeing
meaning as a value-paradeigmatic concept, perhaps never realisable in a
sublunary way. But it is the analysis in this particular essay where he is at
his formal best. He distinguishes between protreptic and exhibitive utterances,
and also modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He symbolises the utterer
and the addressee, and generalises over the type of psychological state,
attitude, or stance, meaning seems to range (notably indicative vs.
imperative). He formalises the reflexive intention, and more importantly, the
overtness of communication in terms of a self-referential recursive intention
that disallows any sneaky intention to be brought into the picture of
meaning-constitutive intentions. Grice thought he had dealt with Logic and
conversation enough! So he feels of revising his Meaning. After all, Strawson
had had the cheek to publish Meaning by Grice and then go on to criticize it in
Intention and convention in speech acts. So this is Grices revenge, and he
wins! He ends with the most elaborate theory of mean that an Oxonian could ever
hope for. And to provoke the informalists such as Strawson (and his disciples
at Oxfordled by Strawson) he pours existential quantifiers like the plague! He
manages to quote from Urmson, whom he loved! No word on Peirce, though, who had
originated all this! His implicaturum: Im not going to be reprimanted in
informal discussion about my misreading Peirce at Harvard! The concluding note
is about artificial substitutes for iconic representation, and meaning as a
human institution. Very grand. This is Grices metabolical projection of
utterers meaning to apply to anything OTHER than utterers meaning, notably a
token of the utterers expression and a TYPE of the utterers expression, wholly
or in part. Its not like he WANTS to do it, he NEEDS it to give an account of implicaturum.
The phrase utterer is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that speaker is too
narrow. Surely you can mean by just uttering stuff! This is the sixth James
lecture, as published in “Foundations of Language” (henceforth, “FL”), or “The
foundations of language,” as he preferred. As it happens, it became a popular
lecture, seeing that Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford
reading in philosophy on the philosophy of language. It is also the essay cited
by Chomsky in his influential Locke lectures. Chomsky takes Grice to be a
behaviourist, even along Skinners lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, repr.
in PGRICE. In The New World, the H. P. is often given in a more simplified
form. Grice wants to keep on playing. In Meaning, he had said x means that p is
surely reducible to utterer U means that p. In this lecture, he lectures us as
to how to proceed. In so doing he invents this or that procedure: some basic,
some resultant. When Chomsky reads the reprint in Searles Philosophy of
Language, he cries: Behaviourist! Skinnerian! It was Suppes who comes to Grices
defence. Surely the way Grice uses expressions like resultant procedure are
never meant in the strict behaviourist way. Suppes concludes that it is much
fairer to characterise Grice as an intentionalist. Published in FL, ed. by
Staal, Repr.in Searle, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford, the sixth James
Lecture, FL, resultant procedure, basic procedure. Staal asked Grice to
publish the sixth James lecture for a newish periodical publication of whose
editorial board he was a member. The fun thing is Grice complied! This is
Grices shaggy-dog story. He does not seem too concerned about resultant
procedures. As he will ll later say, surely I can create Deutero-Esperanto and
become its master! For Grice, the primacy is the idiosyncratic, particularized
utterer in this or that occasion. He knows a philosopher craves for generality,
so he provokes the generality-searcher with divisions and sub-divisions of
mean. But his heart does not seem to be there, and he is just being
overformalistic and technical for the sake of it. I am glad that Putnam, of all
people, told me in an aside, you are being too formal, Grice. I stopped with
symbolism since! Communication. This is Grice’s clearest anti-animist attack by
Grice. He had joins Hume in mocking causing and willing: The decapitation of
Charles I as willing Charles Is death. Language semantics alla Tarski. Grice
know sees his former self. If he was obsessed, after Ayer, with mean, he now wants
to see if his explanation of it (then based on his pre-theoretic intuition) is
theoretically advisable in terms other than dealing with those pre-theoretical
facts, i.e. how he deals with a lexeme like mean. This is a bit like Grice: implicaturum,
revisited. An axiological approach to meaning. Strictly a reprint of Grice, which
should be the preferred citation. The date is given by Grice himself, and he
knew! Grice also composed some notes on Remnants on meaning, by Schiffer. This
is a bit like Grices meaning re-revisited. Schiffer had been Strawsons tutee at
Oxford as a Rhode Scholar in the completion of his D. Phil. on Meaning,
Clarendon. Eventually, Schiffer grew sceptic, and let Grice know about it!
Grice did not find Schiffers arguments totally destructive, but saw the
positive side to them. Schiffers arguments should remind any philosopher that
the issues he is dealing are profound and bound to involve much elucidation
before they are solved. This is a bit like Grice: implicaturum, revisited.
Meaning revisited (an ovious nod to Evelyn Waughs Yorkshire-set novel) is the
title Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by
Smith. Meaning revisited (although Grice has earlier drafts entitled Meaning
and philosophical psychology) comprises three sections. In the first section,
Grice is concerned with the application of his modified Occam’s razor now to
the very lexeme, mean. Cf. How many senses does sense have? Cohen: The Senses
of Senses. In the second part, Grice explores an evolutionary model of creature
construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation. Finally, in the
third section, motivated to solve what he calls a major problem ‒ versus
the minor problem concerning the transition from the meaning by the
utterer to the meaning by the expression. Grice attempts to construct meaning
as a value-paradeigmatic notion. A version was indeed published in the
proceedings of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London. Grice has a
couple of other drafts with variants on this title: philosophical psychology
and meaning, psychology and meaning. He keeps, meaningfully, changing the order.
It is not arbitrary that the fascinating exploration by Grice is in three
parts. In the first, where he applies his Modified Occams razor to mean, he is
revisiting Stevenson. Smoke means fire and I mean love, dont need different senses
of mean. Stevenson is right when using scare quotes for smoke ‘meaning’ fire
utterance. Grice is very much aware that that, the rather obtuse terminology of
senses, was exactly the terminology he had adopted in both Meaning and the
relevant James lectures (V and VI) at Harvard! Now, its time to revisit and to
echo Graves, say, goodbye to all that! In the second part he applies Pology.
While he knows his audience is not philosophical ‒ it is not Oxford ‒ he
thinks they still may get some entertainment! We have a P feeling pain,
simulating it, and finally uttering, I am in pain. In the concluding section,
Grice becomes Plato. He sees meaning as an optimum, i.e. a value-paradeigmatic
notion introducing value in its guise of optimality. Much like Plato thought
circle works in his idiolect. Grice played with various titles, in the Grice
Collection. Theres philosophical psychology and meaning. The reason is obvious.
The lecture is strictly divided in sections, and it is only natural that Grice
kept drafts of this or that section in his collection. In WOW Grice notes that
he re-visited his Meaning re-visited at a later stage, too! And he meant it!
Surely, there is no way to understand the stages of Grice’s development of his
ideas about meaning without Peirce! It is obvious here that Grice thought that
mean two figurative or metabolical extensions of use. Smoke means fire and Smoke
means smoke. The latter is a transferred use in that impenetrability means lets
change the topic if Humpty-Dumpty m-intends that it and Alice are to change the
topic. Why did Grice feel the need to add a retrospective epilogue? He loved to
say that what the “way of words” contains is neither his first, nor his last
word. So trust him to have some intermediate words to drop. He is at his most
casual in the very last section of the epilogue. The first section is more of a
very systematic justification for any mistake the reader may identify in the
offer. The words in the epilogue are thus very guarded and qualificatory. Just
one example about our focus: conversational implicate and conversation as
rational co-operation. He goes back to Essay 2, but as he notes, this was
hardly the first word on the principle of conversational helpfulness, nor
indeed the first occasion where he actually used implicaturum. As regards
co-operation, the retrospective epilogue allows him to expand on a causal
phrasing in Essay 2, “purposive, indeed rational.” Seeing in retrospect how the
idea of rationality was the one that appealed philosophers mostsince it
provides a rationale and justification for what is otherwise an arbitrary
semantic proliferation. Grice then distinguishes between the thesis that
conversation is purposive, and the thesis that conversation is rational. And,
whats more, and in excellent Griceian phrasing, there are two theses here, too.
One thing is to see conversation as rational, and another, to use his very
phrasing, as rational co-operation! Therefore, when one discusses the secondary
literature, one should be attentive to whether the author is referring to
Grices qualifications in the Retrospective epilogue. Grice is careful to date
some items. However, since he kept rewriting, one has to be careful. These seven
folder contain the material for the compilation. Grice takes the opportunity of
the compilation by Harvard of his WOW, representative of the mid-60s, i. e.
past the heyday of ordinary-language philosophy, to review the idea of
philosophical progress in terms of eight different strands which display,
however, a consistent and distinctive unity. Grice keeps playing with
valediction, valedictory, prospective and retrospective, and the different
drafts are all kept in The Grice Papers. The Retrospective epilogue, is divided
into two sections. In the first section, he provides input for his eight
strands, which cover not just meaning, and the assertion-implication
distinction to which he alludes to in the preface, but for more substantial
philosophical issues like the philosophy of perception, and the defense of
common sense realism versus the sceptial idealist. The concluding section
tackles more directly a second theme he had idenfitied in the preface, which is
a methodological one, and his long-standing defence of ordinary-language
philosophy. The section involves a fine distinction between the Athenian
dialectic and the Oxonian dialectic, and tells the tale about his fairy
godmother, G*. As he notes, Grice had dropped a few words in the preface
explaining the ordering of essays in the compilation. He mentions that he
hesitated to follow a suggestion by Bennett that the ordering of the essays be
thematic and chronological. Rather, Grice chooses to publish the whole set
of seven James lectures, what he calls the centerpiece, as part I. II, the
explorations in semantics and metaphysics, is organised more or less
thematically, though. In the Retrospective epilogue, Grice takes up this
observation in the preface that two ideas or themes underlie his Studies: that
of meaning, and assertion vs. implication, and philosophical methodology. The
Retrospective epilogue is thus an exploration on eight strands he identifies in
his own philosophy. Grices choice of strand is careful. For Grice, philosophy,
like virtue, is entire. All the strands belong to the same knit, and therefore
display some latitudinal, and, he hopes, longitudinal unity, the latter made
evidence by his drawing on the Athenian dialectic as a foreshadow of the
Oxonian dialectic to come, in the heyday of the Oxford school of analysis, when
an interest in the serious study of ordinary language had never been since and
will never be seen again. By these two types of unity, Grice means the obvious
fact that all branches of philosophy (philosophy of language, or semantics,
philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, metaphysics, axiology,
etc.) interact and overlap, and that a historical regard for ones philosophical
predecessors is a must, especially at Oxford. Why is Grice obsessed with
asserting? He is more interested, technically, in the phrastic, or dictor.
Grice sees a unity, indeed, equi-vocality, in the buletic-doxastic continuum.
Asserting is usually associated with the doxastic. Since Grice is always ready
to generalise his points to cover the buletic (recall his Meaning, “theres by
now no reason to stick to informative cases,”), it is best to re-define his
asserting in terms of the phrastic. This is enough of a strong point. As Hare
would agree, for emotivists like Barnes, say, an utterance of buletic force may
not have any content whatsoever. For Grice, there is always a content, the
proposition which becomes true when the action is done and the desire is
fulfilled or satisfied. Grice quotes from Bennett. Importantly, Grice focuses
on the assertion/non-assertion distinction. He overlooks the fact that for this
or that of his beloved imperative utterance, asserting is out of the question,
but explicitly conveying that p is not. He needs a dummy to stand for a
psychological or souly state, stance, or attitude of either boule or doxa, to
cover the field of the utterer mode-neutrally conveying explicitly that his
addressee A is to entertain that p. The explicatum or explicitum sometimes does
the trick, but sometimes it does not. It is interesting to review the Names
index to the volume, as well as the Subjects index. This is a huge collection,
comprising 14 folders. By contract, Grice was engaged with Harvard, since it is
the President of the College that holds the copyrights for the James lectures. The
title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays, which goes far
beyond the James, although keeping them as the centerpiece, is a tribute to
Locke, who, although obsessed with his idealist and empiricist new way of
ideas, leaves room for both the laymans and scientists realist way of things,
and, more to the point, for this or that philosophical semiotician to offer
this or that study in the way of words. Early in the linguistic turn minor
revolution, the expression the new way of words, had been used derogatorily.
WOW is organised in two parts: Logic and conversation and the somewhat
pretentiously titled Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, which offers
commentary around the centerpiece. It also includes a Preface and a very rich
and inspired Retrospective epilogue. From part I, the James lectures, only
three had not been previously published. The first unpublished lecture is
Prolegomena, which really sets the scene, and makes one wonder what the few
philosophers who quote from The logic of grammar could have made from the
second James lecture taken in isolation. Grice explores Aristotle’s “to
alethes”: “For the true and the false exist with respect to synthesis and
division (peri gar synthesin kai diaireisin esti to pseudos kai to alethes).”
Aristotle insists upon the com-positional form of truth in several texts: cf.
De anima, 430b3 ff.: “in truth and falsity, there is a certain composition (en
hois de kai to pseudos kai to alethes, synthesis tis)”; cf. also Met. 1027b19
ff.: the true and the false are with respect to (peri) composition and
decomposition (synthesis kai diaresis).” It also shows that Grices style is
meant for public delivery, rather than reading. The second unpublished lecture
is Indicative conditionals. This had been used by a few philosophers, such as
Gazdar, noting that there were many mistakes in the typescript, for which Grice
is not to be blamed. The third is on some models for implicaturum. Since this
Grice acknowledges is revised, a comparison with the original handwritten
version of the final James lecture retrieves a few differences From Part II, a
few essays had not been published before, but Grice, nodding to the
longitudinal unity of philosophy, is very careful and proud to date
them. Commentary on the individual essays is made under the appropriate
dates. Philosophical correspondence is quite a genre. Hare would express in a
letter to the Librarian for the Oxford Union, “Wiggins does not want to be
understood,” or in a letter to Bennett that Williams is the worse offender of
Kantianism! It was different with Grice. He did not type. And he wrote only
very occasionally! These are four folders with general correspondence, mainly
of the academic kind. At Oxford, Grice would hardly keep a correspondence, but
it was different with the New World, where academia turns towards the
bureaucracy. Grice is not precisely a good, or reliable, as The BA puts it,
correspondent. In the Oxford manner, Grice prefers a face-to-face interaction,
any day. He treasures his Saturday mornings under Austins guidance, and he
himself leads the Play Group after Austins demise, which, as Owen reminisced,
attained a kind of cult status. Oxford is different. As a tutorial fellow in
philosophy, Grice was meant to tutor his students; as a University Lecturer he
was supposed to lecture sometimes other fellowss tutees! Nothing about this
reads: publish or perish! This is just one f. containing Grices own favourite
Griceian references. To the historian of analytic philosophy, it is of
particular interest. It shows which philosophers Grice respected the most, and
which ones the least. As one might expect, even on the cold shores of Oxford,
as one of Grices tutees put it, Grice is cited by various Oxford philosophers.
Perhaps the first to cite Grice in print is his tutee Strawson, in “Logical
Theory.” Early on, Hart quotes Grice on meaning in his review in The
Philosophical Quarterly of Holloways Language and Intelligence before Meaning
had been published. Obviously, once Grice and Strawson, In defense of a dogma
and Grice, Meaning are published by The Philosophical Review, Grice is
discussed profusely. References to the implicaturum start to appear in the
literature at Oxford in the mid-1960s, within the playgroup, as in Hare and
Pears. It is particularly intriguing to explore those philosophers Grice picks
up for dialogue, too, and perhaps arrange them alphabetically, from Austin to
Warnock, say. And Griceian philosophical references, Oxonian or other, as they
should, keep counting! The way to search the Grice Papers here is using
alternate keywords, notably “meaning.” “Meaning” s. II, “Utterer’s meaning and
intentions,” s. II, “Utterer’s meaning, sentence-meaning, and word meaning,” s.
II, “Meaning revisited,” s. II.but also “Meaning and psychology,” s. V,
c.7-ff. 24-25. While Grice uses
“signification,” and lectured on Peirce’s “signs,” “Peirce’s general theory of
signs,” (s. V, c. 8-f. 29), he would avoid such pretentiously sounding
expressions. Searching under ‘semantic’ and ‘semantics’ (“Grammar and semantics,”
c. 7-f. 5; “Language semantics,” c. 7-f.20, “Basic Pirotese, sentence semantics
and syntax,” c. 8-f. 30, “Semantics of children’s language,” c. 9-f. 10,
“Sentence semantics” (c. 9-f. 11); “Sentence semantics and propositional
complexes,” c. 9-f.12, “Syntax and semantics,” c. 9-ff. 17-18) may help, too. Folder
on Schiffer (“Schiffer,” c. 9-f. 9), too.
compactum: Grice: “One should distinguish between Grice’s
compact and the compact.” G. R. Grice, the Welsh philosopher, speaks of a
contract as a compact. Grice on the compactness theorem, a theorem for
first-order logic: if every finite subset of a given infinite theory T is
consistent, then the whole theory is consistent. The result is an immediate
consequence of the completeness theorem, for if the theory were not consistent,
a contradiction, say ‘P and not-P’, would be provable from it. But the proof,
being a finitary object, would use only finitely many axioms from T, so this
finite subset of T would be inconsistent. This proof of the compactness theorem
is very general, showing that any language that has a sound and complete system
of inference, where each rule allows only finitely many premises, satisfies the
theorem. This is important because the theorem immediately implies that many
familiar mathematical notions are not expressible in the language in question,
notions like those of a finite set or a well-ordering relation. The compactness
theorem is important for other reasons as well. It is the most frequently
applied result in the study of first-order model theory and has inspired
interesting developments within set theory and its foundations by generating a
search for infinitary languages that obey some analog of the theorem.
completum: incompletum: Grice on completeness, a property that something typically, a set of axioms, a logic, a
theory, a set of well-formed formulas, a language, or a set of connectives has when it is strong enough in some
desirable respect. 1 A set of axioms is complete for the logic L if every
theorem of L is provable using those axioms. 2 A logic L has weak semantical
completeness if every valid sentence of the language of L is a theorem of L. L
has strong semantical completeness or is deductively complete if for every set
G of sentences, every logical consequence of G is deducible from G using L. A
propositional logic L is Halldén-complete if whenever A 7 B is a theorem of L,
where A and B share no variables, either A or B is a theorem of L. And L is
Post-complete if L is consistent but no stronger logic for the same language is
consistent. Reference to the “completeness” of a logic, without further
qualification, is almost invariably to either weak or strong semantical
completeness. One curious exception: second-order logic is often said to be
“incomplete,” where what is meant is that it is not axiomatizable. 3 A theory T
is negation-complete often simply complete if for every sentence A of the
lancommon notions completeness 162 162
guage of T, either A or its negation is provable in T. And T is omega-complete
if whenever it is provable in T that a property f / holds of each natural
number 0, 1, . . . , it is also provable that every number has f. Generalizing
on this, any set G of well-formed formulas might be called omega complete if
vA[v] is deducible from G whenever A[t] is deducible from G for all terms t,
where A[t] is the result of replacing all free occurrences of v in A[v] by t. 4
A language L is expressively complete if each of a given class of items is
expressible in L. Usually, the class in question is the class of twovalued
truth-functions. The propositional language whose sole connectives areand 7 is
thus said to be expressively or functionally complete, while that built up
using 7 alone is not, since classical negation is not expressible therein. Here
one might also say that the set {-,7} is expressively or functionally complete,
while {7} is not. completum“The idea of the completum is transformational; i. e. that
there are components in a meaningful stringThe unstructured utterance is
completeTo speak of an incomplete segment is quite a step in compositionality.”
Grice: “All Roman words starting with con- are a trick, since they mean
togetherness. In this case, plere is to fill.
plĕo ,
ēre, v. n., I.to fill, to fulfil, the root of plenus,
q. v., compleo, expleo, suppleo: “plentur antiqui etiam sine praepositionibus dicebant,” Fest. p. 230 Müll. And then there’s completion. Grice
speaks of ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete. Consider “Fido is shaggy.” That’s
complete. “Fido” is incompletelike pig. “is shaggy” is incomplete. This is
Grice’s Platonism, hardly the nominalism that Bennett abuses Grice with! For
the rational pirot (not the parrot) has access to a theory of complete --. When
lecturing on Peirce, Grice referred to Russell’s excellent idea of improving on
Peirce. “Don’t ask for the meaning of ‘red,’ ask for the meaning of ‘x is red.”
Cf. Plato, “Don’t try to see horseness, try to see ‘x is a horse. Don’t be
stupid.” Now “x is red” is a bit incomplete. Surely it can be rendered by the
complete, “Something, je-ne-sais-quoi, to use Hume’s vulgarism, is red.” So, to
have an act of referring without an act of predicating is incomplete. But still
useful for philosophical analysis.
complexum: Grive: “All Roman words starting with con- are a
trick, since they mean an agreement, in this case, the plexum. -- versus the
‘simplex.’ Grice starts with the simplex. All he needs is a handwave to ascribe
‘the emissor communicates that he knows the route.’ The proposition which is
being transmitted HAS to be complex: Subject, “The emissor”, copula, “is,”
‘predicate: “a knower of the route.”Grice allows for the syntactically
unstructured handwave to be ‘ambiguous’ so that the intention on the emissor’s
part involves his belief that the emissee will take this rather than that
proposition as being transmitted: Second complex: “Subject: Emissor, copula:
is, predicate: about to leave the emissee.”Vide the altogether nice girl, and
the one-at-a-time sailor. The topic is essential in seeing Grice within the British
empiricist tradition. Empiricists always loved a simplex, like ‘red.’ In his
notes on ‘Meaning’ and “Peirce,’ Grice notes that for a ‘simplex’ like “red,”
the best way to deal with it is via a Russellian function, ‘x is red.’ The
opposite of ‘simplex’ is of course a ‘complexum.’ hile Grice does have an essay
on the ‘complexum,’ he is mostly being jocular. His dissection of the
proposition proceds by considering ‘the a,’ and its denotatum, or reference,
and ‘is the b,’ which involves then the predication. This is Grice’s shaggy-dog
story. Once we have ‘the dog is shaggy,’ we have a ‘complexum,’ and we can say
that the utterer means, by uttering ‘Fido is shaggy,’ that the dog is
hairy-coated. Simple, right? It’s the jocular in Grice. He is joking on philosophers
who look at those representative of the linguistic turn, and ask, “So what do
you have to say about reference and predication,’ and Grice comes up with an
extra-ordinary analysis of what is to believe that the dog is hairy-coat, and
communicating it. In fact, the ‘communicating’ is secondary. Once Grice has
gone to metabolitical extension of ‘mean’ to apply to the expression,
communication becomes secondary in that it has to be understood in what Grice
calls the ‘atenuated’ usage involving this or that ‘readiness’ to have this or
that procedure, basic or resultant, in one’s repertoire! Bealer is one of
Grices most brilliant tutees in the New World. The Grice collection contains a
full f. of correspondence with Bealer. Bealer refers to Grice in his
influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how pragmatic
inference may intrude in the ascription of a psychological, or souly, state,
attitude, or stance. Bealer loves to quote from Grice on definite descriptions
in Russell and in the vernacular, the implicaturum being that Russell is
impenetrable! Bealers mentor is Grices close collaborator Myro, so he knows
what he is talking about. Grice explored the matter of subperception at Oxford
only with G. J. Warnock.
conceptus: Grice: “The etymology of ‘conceptus’ is a fascinating one.
For one, all Roman words staring with ‘cum-‘ mean a sort of agreementIn this
case it’s cum- plus capio, as in captus,
capture. Grice obviously uses Frege’s notion of a ‘concept.’ One of Grice’s
metaphysical routines is meant to produce a logical construction of a concept
or generate a new concept. Aware of the act/product distinction, Grice
distinguishes between the conceptum, or concept, and the conception, or
conceptio. Grice allows that ‘not’ may be a ‘concept,’ so he is not tied to the
‘equine’ idea by Frege of the ‘horse.’ Since an agent can fail to conceive that
his neighbour’s three-year old is an adult, Grice accepts that ‘conceives’ may
take a ‘that’-clause. In ‘ordinary’ language, one does not seem to refer, say,
to the concept that e = mc2, but that may be a failure or ‘ordinary’ language.
In the canonical cat-on-the-mat, we have Grice conceiving that the cat is on
the mat, and also having at least four concepts: the concept of ‘cat,’ the
concept of ‘mat,’ the concept of ‘being on,’ and the concept of the cat being
on the mat. Griceian
Meinongianism -- conceivability, capability of being conceived or imagined.
Thus, golden mountains are conceivable; round squares, inconceivable. As
Descartes pointed out, the sort of imaginability required is not the ability to
form mental images. Chiliagons, Cartesian minds, and God are all conceivable,
though none of these can be pictured “in the mind’s eye.” Historical references
include Anselm’s definition of God as “a being than which none greater can be
conceived” and Descartes’s argument for dualism from the conceivability of
disembodied existence. Several of Hume’s arguments rest upon the maxim that
whatever is conceivable is possible. He argued, e.g., that an event can occur
without a cause, since this is conceivable, and his critique of induction
relies on the inference from the conceivability of a change in the course of
nature to its possibility. In response, Reid maintained that to conceive is
merely to understand the meaning of a proposition. Reid argued that
impossibilities are conceivable, since we must be able to understand
falsehoods. Many simply equate conceivability with possibility, so that to say
something is conceivable or inconceivable just is to say that it is possible or
impossible. Such usage is controversial, since conceivability is broadly an
epistemological notion concerning what can be thought, whereas possibility is a
metaphysical notion concerning how things can be. The same controversy can
arise regarding the compossible, or co-possible, where two states of affairs
are compossible provided it is possible that they both obtain, and two
propositions are compossible provided their conjunction is possible.
Alternatively, two things are compossible if and only if there is a possible
world containing both. Leibniz held that two things are compossible provided
they can be ascribed to the same possible world without contradiction. “There
are many possible universes, each collection of compossibles making one of
them.” Others have argued that non-contradiction is sufficient for neither
possibility nor compossibility. The claim that something is inconceivable is
usually meant to suggest more than merely an inability to conceive. It is to
say that trying to conceive results in a phenomenally distinctive mental
repugnance, e.g. when one attempts to conceive of an object that is red and
green all over at once. On this usage the inconceivable might be equated with
what one can “just see” to be impossible. There are two related usages of
‘conceivable’: 1 not inconceivable in the sense just described; and 2 such that
one can “just see” that the thing in question is possible. Goldbach’s
conjecture would seem a clear example of something conceivable in the first
sense, but not the second. Grice was also interested in conceptualism as an
answer to the problem of the universale. conceptualism, the view that there are
no universals and that the supposed classificatory function of universals is
actually served by particular concepts in the mind. A universal is a property
that can be instantiated by more than one individual thing or particular at the
same time; e.g., the shape of this , if identical with the shape of the next ,
will be one property instantiated by two distinct individual things at the same
time. If viewed as located where the s are, then it would be immanent. If
viewed as not having spatiotemporal location itself, but only bearing a
connection, usually called instantiation or exemplification, to things that
have such location, then the shape of this
would be transcendent and presumably would exist even if exemplified by
nothing, as Plato seems to have held. The conceptualist rejects both views by
holding that universals are merely concepts. Most generally, a concept may be
understood as a principle of classification, something that can guide us in
determining whether an entity belongs in a given class or does not. Of course,
properties understood as universals satisfy, trivially, this definition and thus
may be called concepts, as indeed they were by Frege. But the conceptualistic
substantive views of concepts are that concepts are 1 mental representations,
often called ideas, serving their classificatory function presumably by
resembling the entities to be classified; or 2 brain states that serve the same
function but presumably not by resemblance; or 3 general words adjectives,
common nouns, verbs or uses of such words, an entity’s belonging to a certain
class being determined by the applicability to the entity of the appropriate
word; or 4 abilities to classify correctly, whether or not with the aid of an
item belonging under 1, 2, or 3. The traditional conceptualist holds 1.
Defenders of 3 would be more properly called nominalists. In whichever way concepts
are understood, and regardless of whether conceptualism is true, they are
obviously essential to our understanding and knowledge of anything, even at the
most basic level of cognition, namely, recognition. The classic work on the
topic is Thinking and Experience 4 by H. H. Price, who held 4.
conditionalis: Grice: “The etymology of ‘conditionale’ is fascinating. I
wish I knew it.”It is strictly from conditio "a
making," from conditus, past
participle of condere "to put
together,” i.e. cum- plus dare. dāre (do I.obsol., found only in the
compounds, abdo, “condo,”which gives ‘conditio,” confused with ‘con-dicio,” a
putting together taken as a ‘speaking-together,” abscondo, indo, etc.), 1, v.
a. Sanscr. root dhā-, da-dhāmi, set, put, place; Gr. θε-, τίθημι; Ger. thun, thue, that; indeed cognate
with English “do,” “deed,” etc.. The root “dare” in “conditio” is distinct from
1. do, Sanscr. dā, in most of the Arian langg.; cf. Pott. Etym. Forsch. 2, 484;
Corss. Ausspr. 2, 410, “but in Italy the two *seem* to have been confoundedor lumped -- at least in compounds,” Georg Curtius Gr. Etym. p. 254 sq.; cf. Max Müller,
Science of Lang. Ser. 2220, N. Y. ed.; Fick, Vergl. Wört. p. 100. The conditional is of special interest to Grice because his
‘impilcature’ has a conditional form. In other words, ‘implicaturum’ is a
variant on ‘implication,’ and the conditionalis has been called ‘implication’‘even
a material one, versus a formal one by Whitehead and Russell. So it is of
special philosophical interest. Since Grice’s overarching interest is
rationality, ‘conditionalis’ features in the passage from premise to
conclusion, deemed tautological: the ‘associated conditional” of a valid piece
of reasoning. “This is an interesting Latinism,” as Grice puts it. For those in
the know, it’s supposed to translate ‘hypothetical,’ that Grice also uses. But
literally, the transliteration of ‘hypothetica’ is ‘sub-positio,’ i.e.
‘suppositio,’ so infamous in the Dark Ages! So one has to be careful. For some
reason, Boethius disliked ‘suppositio,’ and preferred to add to the Latinate
philosophical vocabulary, with ‘conditionalis,’ the hypothetical, versus the
categoric, become the ‘conditionale.’ And the standard was not the Diodoran,
but the Philonian, also known, after Whitehead, as the ‘implicatio materialis.’
While this sounds scholastic, it ’t. Cicero may have used ‘implicatio
materialis.’ But Whitehead’s and Russell’s motivation is a different one. They
start with the ‘material’, by which they mean a proposition WITH A TRUTH VALUE.
For implication that does not have this restriction, they introduce ‘implicatio
formalis,’ or ‘formal implication.’ In their adverbial ways, it goes p formally
implies q. trictly, propositio conditionalis:
vel substitutive, versus propositio praedicativa in Apuleius. Classical Latin condicio was
confused in Late Latin with conditio "a making," from conditus,
past participle of condere "to put together." The sense
evolution in Latin apparently was from "stipulation" to
"situation, mode of being."
Grice lists ‘if’ as the third binary functor in his response to Strawson. The
relations between “if” and “⊃” have already, but only in part,
been discussed. 1 The sign “⊃” is called the Material Implication
sign a name I shall consider later. Its meaning is given by the rule that any
statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ is false in the case in which the first of its constituent
statements is true and the second false, and is true in every other case
considered in the system; i. e., the falsity of the first constituent statement
or the truth of the second are, equally, sufficient conditions of the truth of
a statement of material implication ; the combination of truth in the first
with falsity in the second is the single, necessary and sufficient, condition
(1 Ch. 2, S. 7) of its falsity. The standard or primary -- the importance of
this qualifying phrase can scarcely be overemphasized. There are uses of “if …
then … ” which do not answer to the
description given here,, or to any other descriptions given in this chapter
-- use of an “if … then …” sentence,
on the other hand, we saw to be in circumstances where, not knowing whether
some statement which could be made by the use of a sentence corresponding in a
certain way to the first clause of the hypothetical is true or not, or
believing it to be false, we nevertheless consider that a step in reasoning
from that statement to a statement related in a similar way to the second
clause would be a sound or reasonable step ; the second statement also being
one of whose truth we are in doubt, or which we believe to be false. Even in
such circumstances as these we may sometimes hesitate to apply the word ‘true’
to hypothetical statements (i.e., statements which could be made by the use of
“if ... then …,” in its standard significance), preferring to call them
reasonable or well-founded ; but if we apply ‘true’ to them at all, it will be
in such circumstances as these. Now one of the sufficient conditions of the
truth of a statement of material implication may very well be fulfilled without
the conditions for the truth, or reasonableness, of the corresponding
hypothetical statement being fulfilled ; i.e., a statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ does not entail the corresponding statement of the form
“if p then q.” But if we are prepared to accept the hypothetical statement, we
must in consistency be prepared to deny the conjunction of the statement
corresponding to the first clause of the sentence used to make the hypothetical
statement with the negation of the statement corresponding to its second clause
; i.e., a statement of the form “if p then q” does entail the corresponding statement
of the form ‘p⊃q.’ The force of “corresponding” needs elucidation. Consider
the three following very ordinary specimens of hypothetical sentences. If the
Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war. If Jones were
in charge, half the staff would have been dismissed. If it rains, the match will
be cancelled. The sentences which could be used to make statements
corresponding in the required sense to the subordinate clauses can be
ascertained by considering what it is that the speaker of each hypothetical
sentence must (in general) be assumed either to be in doubt about or to believe
to be not the case. Thus, for (1) to (8), the corresponding pairs of sentences
are as follows. The Germans invaded England in 1940; they won the war. Jones is
in charge; half the staff has been dismissed. It will rain; the match will be
cancelled. Sentences which could be used to make the statements of material
implication corresponding to the hypothetical statements made by these
sentences can now be framed from these pairs of sentences as follows. The Germans
invaded England in 1940 ⊃ they won the war. Jones is in charge ⊃ half the staff has been, dismissed. It will rain ⊃ the match will be cancelled. The very fact that these
verbal modifications are necessary, in order to obtain from the clauses of the
hypothetical sentence the clauses of the corresponding material implication
sentence is itself a symptom of the radical difference between hypothetical
statements and truth-functional statements. Some detailed differences are also
evident from these examples. The falsity of a statement made by the use of ‘The
Germans invaded England in 1940’ or ‘Jones is in charge’ is a sufficient
condition of the truth of the corresponding statements made by the use of (Ml)
and (M2) ; but not, of course, of the corresponding statements made by the use
of (1) and (2). Otherwise, there would normally be no point in using sentences
like (1) and (2) at all; for these sentences would normally carrybut not
necessarily: one may use the pluperfect or the imperfect subjunctive when one
is simply working out the consequences of an hypothesis which one may be
prepared eventually to accept -- in the tense or mood of the verb, an
implication of the utterer's belief in the falsity of the statements
corresponding to the clauses of the hypothetical. It is not raining is
sufficient to verify a statement made by the use of (MS), but not a
statementmade by the use of (3). Its not raining Is also sufficient to verify a
statement made by the use of “It will rain ⊃
the match will not be cancelled.” The formulae ‘p revise ⊃q’ and ‘q revise⊃
q' are consistent with one another, and the joint assertion of corresponding
statements of these forms is equivalent to the assertion of the corresponding
statement of the form * *-~p. But “If it rains, the match will be cancelled” is
inconsistent with “If it rains, the match will not be cancelled,” and their
joint assertion in the same context is self-contradictory. Suppose we call the
statement corresponding to the first clause of a sentence used to make a
hypothetical statement the antecedent of the hypothetical statement; and the
statement corresponding to the second clause, its consequent. It is sometimes
fancied that whereas the futility of identifying conditional statements with
material implications is obvious in those cases where the implication of the
falsity of the antecedent is normally carried by the mood or tense of the verb
(e.g., (I) or (2)), there is something to be said for at least a partial
identification in cases where no such implication is involved, i.e., where the
possibility of the truth of both antecedent and consequent is left open (e.g.,
(3). In cases of the first kind (‘unfulfilled’ or ‘subjunctive’ conditionals)
our attention is directed only to the last two lines of the truth-tables for *
p ⊃ q ', where the antecedent has the truth-value, falsity; and
the suggestion that ‘~p’ entails ‘if p, then q’ is felt to be obviously wrong.
But in cases of the second kind we may inspect also the first two lines, for
the possibility of the antecedent's being fulfilled is left open; and the
suggestion that ‘p . q’ entails ‘if p, then q’ is not felt to be obviously
wrong. This is an illusion, though engendered by a reality. The fulfilment of
both antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement does not show that
the man who made the hypothetical statement was right; for the consequent might
be fulfilled as a result of factors unconnected with, or in spite of, rather
than because of, the fulfilment of the antecedent. We should be prepared to say
that the man who made the hypothetical statement was right only if we were also
prepared to say that the fulfilment of the antecedent was, at least in part,
the explanation of the fulfilment of the consequent. The reality behind the
illusion is complex : en. 3 it is, partly, the fact that, in many cases, the
fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent may provide confirmation for the
view that the existence of states of affairs like those described by the
antecedent is a good reason for expecting states of affairs like those
described by the consequent ; and it is, partly, the fact that a man whosays,
for example, 4 If it rains, the match will be cancelled * makes a prediction
(viz.. that the match will be cancelled) under a proviso (viz., that it rains),
and that the cancellation of the match because of the rain therefore leads us
to say, not only that the reasonableness of the prediction was confirmed, but
also that the prediction itself was confirmed. Because a statement of the form
“p⊃q” does not entail the corresponding statement of the form '
if p, then q ' (in its standard employment), we shall expect to find, and have
found, a divergence between the rules for '⊃'
and the rules for ' if J (in its standard employment). Because ‘if p, then q’
does entail ‘p⊃q,’ we shall also expect to find some degree of parallelism
between the rules; for whatever is entailed by ‘p "3 q’ will be entailed
by ‘if p, then q,’ though not everything which entails ‘p⊃q’ will entail ‘if p, then q.’ Indeed, we find further
parallels than those which follow simply from the facts that ‘if p, then q’
entails ‘p⊃q’ and that entailment is transitive. To laws (19)-(23)
inclusive we find no parallels for ‘if.’ But for (15) (p⊃j).JJ⊃? (16) (P ⊃q).~qZ)~p (17) p'⊃q s ~q1)~p (18) (?⊃j).(?
⊃r) ⊃ (p⊃r) we find that, with certain reservations, 1 the following
parallel laws hold good : (1 The reservations are important. It is, e. g.,
often impossible to apply entailment-rule (iii) directly without obtaining
incorrect or absurd results. Some modification of the structure of the clauses
of the hypothetical is commonly necessary. But formal logic gives us no guide
as to which modifications are required. If we apply rule (iii) to our specimen
hypothetical sentences, without modifying at all the tenses or moods of the
individual clauses, we obtain expressions which are scarcely English. If we
preserve as nearly as possible the tense-mood structure, in the simplest way
consistent with grammatical requirements, we obtain the sentences : If the
Germans had not won the war, they would not have invaded England in
1940.) If half the staff had not been dismissed, Jones would not be in
charge. If the match is not cancelled, it will not rain. But these sentences,
so far from being logically equivalent to the originals, have in each case a
quite different sense. It is possible, at least in some such cases, to frame
sentences of more or less the appropriate pattern for which one can imagine a
use and which do stand in the required logical relationship to the original
sentences (e.g., ‘If it is not the case that half the staff has been dismissed,
then Jones can't be in charge;’ or ‘If the Germans did not win the war, it's
only because they did not invade England in 1940;’ or even (should historical
evidence become improbably scanty), ‘If the Germans did not win the war, it
can't be true that they invaded England in 1940’). These changes reflect
differences in the circumstances in which one might use these, as opposed to
the original, sentences. Thus the sentence beginning ‘If Jones were in charge
…’ would normally, though not necessarily, be used by a man who antecedently
knows that Jones is not in charge : the sentence beginning ‘If it's not the
case that half the staff has been dismissed …’ by a man who is working towards
the conclusion that Jones is not in charge. To say that the sentences are
nevertheless logically equivalent is to point to the fact that the grounds for
accepting either, would, in different circumstances, have been grounds for accepting
the soundness of the move from ‘Jones is in charge’ to ‘Half the staff has been
dismissed.’) (i) (if p, then q; and p)q
(ii) (if p, then qt and not-g) Dnot-j? (iii) (if p, then f) ⊃ (if not-0, then not-j?) (iv) (if p, then f ; and iff, then
r) ⊃(if j>, then r) (One must remember that calling the
formulae (i)-(iv) is the same as saying that, e.g., in the case of (iii), c if
p, then q ' entails 4 if not-g, then not-j> '.) And similarly we find that,
for some steps which would be invalid for 4 if ', there are corresponding steps
that would be invalid for “⊃,” e. g. (pq).q :. p are invalid inference-patterns,
and so are if p, then q ; and q /. p if p, then ; and not-j? /. not-f .The
formal analogy here may be described by saying that neither * p 13 q ' nor * if
j?, then q * is a simply convertible formula. We have found many laws (e.g.,
(19)-(23)) which hold for “⊃” and not for “if.” As an example of
a law which holds for “if,” but not for
“⊃,” we may give the analytic formula “ ~[(if p, then q) * (if
p, then not-g)]’. The corresponding formula 4 ~[(P 3 ?) * (j? 3 ~?}]’ is not
analytic, but (el (28)) is equivalent to the contingent formula ‘~~p.’ The
rules to the effect that formulae such as (19)-{23) are analytic are sometimes
referred to as ‘paradoxes of implication.’ This is a momer. If ‘⊃’ is taken as identical either with ‘entails’ or, more
widely, with ‘if ... then …’ in its
standard use, the rules are not paradoxical, but simply incorrect. If ‘⊃’ is given the meaning it has in the system of truth functions,
the rules are not paradoxical, but simple and platitudinous consequences of the
meaning given to the symbol. Throughout this section, I have spoken of a
‘primary or standard’ use of “if … then …,” or “if,” of which the main
characteristics were: that for each hypothetical statement made by this use of
“if,” there could be made just one statement which would be the antecedent of
the hypothetical and just one statement which would be its consequent; that the
hypothetical statement is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent
statement, if made or accepted, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground
or reason for accepting the consequent statement; and that the making of the
hypothetical statement carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or
of disbelief in, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent. (1 Not all
uses of * if ', however, exhibit all these characteristics. In particular,
there is a use which has an equal claim to rank as standard and which is
closely connected with the use described, but which does not exhibit the first
characteristic and for which the description of the remainder must consequently
be modified. I have in mind what are sometimes called 'variable' or 'general’
hypothetical : e.g., ‘lf ice is left in the sun, it melts,’ ‘If the side of a
triangle is produced, the exterior angle is equal to the sum of the two
interior and opposite angles ' ; ' If a child is very strictly disciplined in
the nursery, it will develop aggressive tendencies in adult life,’ and so on.
To a statement made by the use of a sentence such as these there corresponds no
single pair of statements which are, respectively, its antecedent and
consequent. On the other 1 There is much more than this to be said about this
way of using ‘if;’ in particular, about the meaning of the question whether the
antecedent would be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent and
about the exact way in which this question is related to the question of
whether the hypothetical is true {acceptable, reasonable) or not hand, for
every such statement there is an indefinite number of non-general hypothetical
statements which might be called exemplifications, applications, of the
variable hypothetical; e.g., a statement made by the use of the sentence ‘If
this piece of ice is left in the sun, it will melt.’ To the subject of variable
hypothetical I may return later. 1 Two relatively uncommon uses of ‘if’ may be
illustrated respectively by the sentences ‘If he felt embarrassed, he showed no
signs of it’ and ‘If he has passed his exam, I’m a Dutchman (I'll eat my hat,
&c.)’ The sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of a statement
made by the first is that the man referred to showed no sign of embarrassment.
Consequently, such a statement cannot be treated either as a standard
hypothetical or as a material implication. Examples of the second kind are
sometimes erroneously treated as evidence that ‘if’ does, after all, behave
somewhat as ‘⊃’ behaves. The evidence for this is, presumably, the facts
(i) that there is no connexion between antecedent and consequent; (ii) that the
consequent is obviously not (or not to be) fulfilled ; (iii) that the intention
of the speaker is plainly to give emphatic expression to the conviction that
the antecedent is not fulfilled either ; and (iv) the fact that “(p ⊃ q) . ~q” entails “~p.” But this is a strange piece of
logic. For, on any possible interpretation, “if p then q” has, in respect of
(iv), the same logical powers as ‘p⊃q;’
and it is just these logical powers that we are jokingly (or fantastically)
exploiting. It is the absence of connexion referred to in (i) that makes it a
quirk, a verbal flourish, an odd use of ‘if.’ If hypothetical statements were
material implications, the statements would be not a quirkish oddity, but a
linguistic sobriety and a simple truth. Finally, we may note that ‘if’ can be employed not simply in making
statements, but in, e.g., making provisional announcements of intention (e.g.,
‘If it rains, I shall stay at home’) which, like unconditional announcements of
intention, we do not call true or false but describe in some other way. If the
man who utters the quoted sentence leaves home in spite of the rain, we do not
say that what he said was false, though we might say that he lied (never really
intended to stay in) ; or that he changed his mind. There are further uses of
‘if’ which I shall not discuss. 1 v. ch. 7, I. The safest way to read the
material implication sign is, perhaps, ‘not both … and not …’ The material
equivalence sign ‘≡’ has the meaning given by the
following definition : p q =df=⊃/'(p⊃ff).(sOj)'
and the phrase with which it is sometimes identified, viz., ‘if and only if,’
has the meaning given by the following definition: ‘p if and only if q’ =df ‘if
p then g, and if q then p.’ Consequently, the objections which hold against the
identification of ‘p⊃q” with ‘if p then q’ hold with double force against the
identification of “p≡q’ with ‘p if and only if q.’ ‘If’
is of particular interest to Grice. The interest in the ‘if’ is double in
Grice. In doxastic contexts, he needs it for his analysis of ‘intending’
against an ‘if’-based dispositional (i.e. subjective-conditional) analysis. He
is of course, later interested in how Strawson misinterpreted the ‘indicative’
conditional! It is later when he starts to focus on the ‘buletic’ mode marker,
that he wants to reach to Paton’s categorical (i.e. non-hypothetical)
imperative. And in so doing, he has to face the criticism of those Oxonian
philosophers who were sceptical about the very idea of a conditional buletic
(‘conditional commandwhat kind of a command is that?’. Grice would refere to
the protasis, or antecedent, as a relativiserwhere we go again to the
‘absolutum’-‘relativum’ distinction. The conditional is also paramount in Grice’s
criticism of Ryle, where the keyword would rather be ‘disposition.’ Then ther
eis the conditional and disposition. Grice is a philosophical psychologist.
Does that make sense? So are Austin (Other Minds), Hampshire (Dispositions),
Pears (Problems in philosophical psychology) and Urmson (Parentheticals). They
are ALL against Ryle’s silly analysis in terms of single-track
disposition" vs. "many-track disposition," and
"semi-disposition." If I hum and walk, I can either hum or walk. But
if I heed mindfully, while an IN-direct sensing may guide me to YOUR soul, a
DIRECT sensing guides me to MY soul. When Ogden consider attacks to meaning,
theres what he calls the psychological, which he ascribes to Locke Grices
attitude towards Ryle is difficult to assess. His most favourable assessment
comes from Retrospective epilogue, but then he is referring to Ryle’s fairy
godmother. Initially, he mentions Ryle as a philosopher engaged in, and
possibly dedicated to the practice of the prevailing Oxonian methodology, i.e.
ordinary-language philosophy. Initially, then, Grice enlists Ryle in
the regiment of ordinary-language philosophers. After introducing Athenian
dialectic and Oxonian dialectic, Grice traces some parallelisms, which should
not surprise. It is tempting to suppose that Oxonian dialectic reproduces some
ideas of Athenian dialectic. It would actually be surprising if there
were no parallels. Ryle was, after all, a skilled and enthusiastic student of
Grecian philosophy. Interestingly, Grice then has Ryles fairy godmother as
proposing the idea that, far from being a basis for rejecting the
analytic-synthetic distinction, opposition that there are initially two
distinct bundles of statements, bearing the labels analytic and synthetic,
lying around in the world of thought waiting to be noticed, provides us with
the key to making the analytic-synthetic distinction acceptable. The
essay has a verificationist ring to it. Recall Ayer and the
verificationists trying to hold water with concepts like fragile and the
problem of counterfactual conditionals vis-a-vis observational and
theoretical concepts. Grices essay has two parts: one on disposition as
such, and the second, the application to a type of psychological
disposition, which would be phenomenalist in a way, or verificationist, in
that it derives from introspection of, shall we say, empirical
phenomena. Grice is going to analyse, I want a sandwich. One person
wrote in his manuscript, there is something with the way Grice goes to work.
Still. Grice says that I want a sandwich (or I will that I eat a sandwich)
is problematic, for analysis, in that it seems to refer to experience that is
essentially private and unverifiable. An analysis of intending that p in terms
of being disposed that p is satisfied solves this. Smith wants a sandwich, or
he wills that he eats a sandwich, much as Toby needs nuts, if Smith opens the
fridge and gets one. Smith is disposed to act such that p is satisfied.
This Grice opposes to the ‘special-episode’ analysis of intending that p. An
utterance like I want a sandwich iff by uttering the utterance, the utterer is
describing this or that private experience, this or that private
sensation. This or that sensation may take the form of a highly specific
souly sate, like what Grice calls a sandwich-wanting-feeling. But then, if
he is not happy with the privacy special-episode analysis, Grice is also
dismissive of Ryles behaviourism in The concept of mind, fresh from
the press, which would describe the utterance in terms purely of this or
that observable response, or behavioural output, provided this or that
sensory input. Grice became friendlier with functionalism after Lewis taught
him how. The problem or crunch is with the first person. Surely, Grice
claims, one does not need to wait to observe oneself heading for the fridge
before one is in a position to know that he is hungry. Grice poses a
problem for the protocol-reporter. You see or observe someone else, Smith, that
Smith wants a sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich. You ask for evidence.
But when it is the agent himself who wants the sandwich, or wills that he eats
a sandwich, Grice melodramatically puts it, I am not in the
audience, not even in the front row of the stalls; I am on the
stage. Genial, as you will agree. Grice then goes on to offer an
analysis of intend, his basic and target attitude, which he has just used to
analyse and rephrase Peirces mean and which does relies on this or that piece
of dispositional evidence, without divorcing itself completely from the
privileged status or access of first-person introspective knowledge. In
“Uncertainty,” Grice weakens his reductive analysis of intending that, from
neo-Stoutian, based on certainty, or assurance, to neo-Prichardian, based on
predicting. All very Oxonian: Stout was the sometime Wilde reader in mental
philosophy (a post usually held by a psychologist, rather than a philosopher ‒
Stouts favourite philosopher is psychologist James! ‒ and Prichard was
Cliftonian and the proper White chair of moral philosophy. And while in “Uncertainty”
he allows that willing that may receive a physicalist treatment, qua state,
hell later turn a functionalist, discussed under ‘soul, below, in
his “Method in philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre”
(henceforth, “Method”), in the Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, repr. in “Conception.” Grice can easily relate to
Hamsphires "Thought and Action," a most influential essay in the
Oxonian scene. Rather than Ryle! And Grice actually addresses further topics on
intention drawing on Hampshire, Hart, and his joint collaboration with
Pears. Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s early essay on disposition and
intention, The H. P. Grice. Refs.: The main published source is Essay 4 in WOW,
but there are essays on ‘ifs and cans,’ so ‘if’ is a good keyword, on
‘entailment,’ and for the connection with ‘intending,’ ‘disposition and
intention,’ BANC.
CVM-FIRMATUM:
Confirmatum: cf.
infirmatum, firmatum -- disconfirmatum -- confirmation, an evidential relation
between evidence and any statement especially a scientific hypothesis that this
evidence supports. It is essential to distinguish two distinct, and
fundamentally different, meanings of the term: 1 the incremental sense, in
which a piece of evidence contributes at least some degree of support to the
hypothesis in question e.g., finding a
fingerprint of the suspect at the scene of the crime lends some weight to the
hypothesis that the suspect is guilty; and 2 the absolute sense, in which a
body of evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis in question e.g., a case presented by a prosecutor making
it practically certain that the suspect is guilty. If one thinks of
confirmation in terms of probability, then evidence that increases the
probability of a hypothesis confirms it incrementally, whereas evidence that
renders a hypothesis highly probable confirms it absolutely. In each of the two
foregoing senses one can distinguish three types of confirmation: i
qualitative, ii quantitative, and iii comparative. i Both examples in the
preceding paragraph illustrate qualitative confirmation, for no numerical
values of the degree of confirmation were mentioned. ii If a gambler, upon
learning that an opponent holds a certain card, asserts that her chance of
winning has increased from 2 /3 to ¾, the claim is an instance of quantitative
incremental confirmation. If a physician states that, on the basis of an X-ray,
the probability that the patient has tuberculosis is .95, that claim
exemplifies quantitative absolute confirmation. In the incremental sense, any
case of quantitative confirmation involves a difference between two probability
values; in the absolute sense, any case of quantitative confirmation involves
only one probability value. iii Comparative confirmation in the incremental
sense would be illustrated if an investigator said that possession of the
murder weapon weighs more heavily against the suspect than does the fingerprint
found at the scene of the crime. Comparative confirmation in the absolute sense
would occur if a prosecutor claimed to have strong cases against two suspects
thought to be involved in a crime, but that the case against one is stronger
than that against the other. Even given recognition of the foregoing six
varieties of confirmation, there is still considerable controversy regarding
its analysis. Some authors claim that quantitative confirmation does not exist;
only qualitative and/or comparative confirmation are possible. Some authors
maintain that confirmation has nothing to do with probability, whereas
others known as Bayesians analyze confirmation explicitly in terms of
Bayes’s theorem in the mathematical calculus of probability. Among those who
offer probabilistic analyses there are differences as to which interpretation
of probability is suitable in this context. Popper advocates a concept of
corroboration that differs fundamentally from confirmation. Many real or
apparent paradoxes of confirmation have been posed; the most famous is the
paradox of the ravens. It is plausible to suppose that ‘All ravens are black’
can be incrementally confirmed by the observation of one of its instances,
namely, a black crow. However, ‘All ravens are black’ is logically equivalent
to ‘All non-black things are non-ravens.’ By parity of reasoning, an instance
of this statement, namely, any nonblack non-raven e.g., a white shoe, should
incrementally confirm it. Moreover, the equivalence condition whatever confirms a hypothesis must equally
confirm any statement logically equivalent to it seems eminently reasonable. The result
appears to facilitate indoor ornithology, for the observation of a white shoe
would seem to confirm incrementally the hypothesis that all ravens are black.
Many attempted resolutions of this paradox can be found in the literature.
CVM-IUNCTVM: conjunctum: There is the conjunctum, Grice notes, and the disjunctum,
and the adjunctum, as Myro was (adjunct professor). One has to be careful
because the scholastic vocabulary also misleadingly has ‘copulatum’ for this.
The ‘copulatum’ should be restricted to other usages, which Grice elaborates on
‘izzing’ and hazing. traditional parlance, one ‘pars orationis.’ Aulus Gellius writes; “What the Greeks call
“sympleplegmenon” we call conjunctum or copulatum, copulative sentence. For
example. The Stoic copulative sentence — sumpleplegmenon axioma — is translated
by “conjunctum” or “copulatum,” for example: „P. Scipio, son of Paulus, was a
consul twice and was given the honour of triumph and also performed the
function of censor and was the colleague of L. Mummius during his censorship”.
Here, Aulus Gellius made a noteworthy remark, referring to the value of truth
of the composing propositions ■ (a Stoic problem). In keeping with the Stoics,
he wrote: “If one element of the copulative sentence is false, even if all the
other elements are true, the copulative sentence is false” (“in omni aiitem
conjuncto si unum est mendacium etiamsi, caetera vera sunt, totum esse
mendacium dicitur”). In the identification of ‘and’ with ‘Λ’
there is already a considerable
distortion of the facts. ‘And’ can perform many jobs which ‘Λ’ cannot perform. It can, for instance, be used to couple
nouns (“Tom and William arrived”), or adjectives (“He was hungry and thirsty”),
or adverbs (“He walked slowly and painfully”); while ' . ' can be used only to
couple expressions which could appear as separate sentences. One might be
tempted to say that sentences in which “and” coupled words or phrases, were
short for sentences in which “and” couples clauses; e.g., that “He was hungry and
thirsty” was short for “He was hungry and he was thirsty.” But this is simply
false. We do not say, of anyone who uses sentences like “Tom and William
arrived,” that he is speaking elliptically, or using abbreviations. On the
contrary, it is one of the functions of “and,” to which there is no counterpart
In the case of “.,” to form plural subjects or compound predicates. Of course
it is true of many statements of the forms “x and y” are/* or ' x is /and g \
that they are logically equivalent to corresponding statements of the"
form * x Is /and yisf'oTx is /and x is g \ But, first, this is a fact about the
use, in certain contexts, of “and,” to
which there corresponds no rule for the use of * . '. And, second, there are
countless contexts for which such an equivalence does not hold; e.g. “Tom and
Mary made friends” is not equivalent to “Tom made friends and Mary made
friends.” They mean, usually, quite different things. But notice that one could
say “Tom and Mary made friends; but not with one another.” The implication of
mutuality in the first phrase is not so strong but that it can be rejected
without self-contradiction; but it is strong enough to make the rejection a
slight shock, a literary effect. Nor does such an equivalence hold if we
replace “made friends” by “met yesterday,” “were conversing,” “got married,” or
“were playing chess.” Even “Tom and William arrived” does not mean the same as
“Tom arrived and William arrived;” for the first suggests “together” and the
second an order of arrival. It might be conceded that “and” has functions which
“ .” has not (e.g., may carry in certain contexts an implication of mutuality
which ‘.’ does not), and yet claimed
that the rules which hold for “and,” where it is used to couple clauses, are
the same as the rules which hold for “.” Even this is not true. By law (11),
" p , q ' is logically equivalent to * q . p ' ; but “They got married and
had a child” or “He set to work and found a job” are by no means logically
equivalent to “They had a child and got married” or “He found a job and set to
work.” One might try to avoid these difficulties by regarding ‘.’ as having the
function, not of ' and ', but of what it looks like, namely a full stop. We
should then have to desist from talking of statements of the forms ' p .q\ * p
. J . r * &CM and talk of sets-of-statements of these forms instead.
But this would not avoid all, though it would avoid some, of the difficulties.
Even in a passage of prose consisting of several indicative sentences, the
order of the sentences may be in general vital to the sense, and in particular,
relevant (in a way ruled out by law (II)) to the truth-conditions of a
set-of-statements made by such a passage. The fact is that, in general, in
ordinary speech and writing, clauses and sentences do not contribute to the
truthconditions of things said by the use of sentences and paragraphs in which
they occur, in any such simple way as that pictured by the truth-tables for the
binary connectives (' D ' * . ', 4 v ', 35 ') of the system, but in far more
subtle, various, and complex ways. But it is precisely the simplicity of the
way in which, by the definition of a truth-function, clauses joined by these
connectives contribute to the truth-conditions of sentences resulting from the
junctions, which makes possible the stylized, mechanical neatness of the
logical system. It will not do to reproach the logician for his divorce from
linguistic realities, any more than it will do to reproach the abstract painter
for not being a representational artist; but one may justly reproach him if he
claims to be a representational artist. An abstract painting may be,
recognizably, a painting of something. And the identification of “.” with
‘and,’ or with a full stop, is not a simple mistake. There is a great deal of point
in comparing them. The interpretation of, and rules for, “.”define a minimal
linguistic operation, which we might call ‘simple conjunction’ and roughly
describe as the joining together of two (or more) statements in the process of
asserting them both (or all). And this is a part of what we often do with ' and
', and with the full stop. But we do not string together at random any
assertions we consider true; we bring them together, in spoken or written
sentences or paragraphs, only when there is some further reason for the
rapprochement, e.g., when they record successive episodes in a single
narrative. And that for the sake of which we conjoin may confer upon the
sentences embodying the conjunction logical features at variance with the rules
for “.” Thus we have seen that a statement of the form “p and q” may carry an
implication of temporal order incompatible with that carried by the
corresponding statement of the form “q and p.” This is not to deny that
statements corresponding to these, but of the forms ‘pΛq’ and ‘qΛp’would
be, if made, logically equivalent; for such statements would carry no
implications, and therefore no incompatible implications, of temporal order.
Nor is it to deny the point, and merit, of the comparison; the statement of the
form ‘pΛq’ means at least a part of what is
meant by the corresponding statement of the form ‘p and q.’ We might say: the form ‘p q’ is an abstraction from the
different uses of the form ‘p and q.’ Simple conjunction is a minimal element in
colloquial conjunction. We may speak of ‘. ‘ as the conjunctive sign; and read
it, for simplicity's sake, as “and” or “both … and … “I have already remarked
that the divergence between the meanings given to the truth-functional
constants and the meanings of the ordinary conjunctions with which they are
commonly identified is at a minimum in the cases of ' ~ ' and ‘.’ We have seen,
as well, that the remaining constants of the system can be defined in terms of
these two. Other interdefinitions are equally possible. But since ’ and ‘.’ are more nearly identifiable with ‘not’ and
‘and’ than any other constant with any other English word, I prefer to
emphasize the definability of the remaining constants in terms of ‘ .’ and ‘~.’
It is useful to remember that every rule or law of the system can be expressed
in terms of negation and simple conjunction. The system might, indeed, be
called the System of Negation and Conjunction. Grice lists ‘and’ as the first
binary functor in his response to Strawson. Grice’s conversationalist hypothesis
applies to this central ‘connective.’ Interestingly, in his essay on Aristotle,
and discussing, “French poet,” Grice distinguishes between conjunction and
adjunction. “French” is adjuncted to ‘poet,’ unlike ‘fat’ in ‘fat philosopher.’ And Grice:substructural logics,
metainference, implicaturum. Grice explores some of the issues regarding
pragmatic enrichment and substructural logics with a special focus on the first
dyadic truth-functor, ‘and.’ In particular, attention is given to a
sub-structural “rule” pertaining to the commutativeness of conjunction,
applying a framework that sees Grice as clarifying the extra material that must
be taken into account, and which will referred to as the ‘implicaturum.’ Grice
is thus presented as defending a “classical-logical” rule that assigns
commutativeness to conjunction while accounting for Strawson-type alleged
counterexamples to the effect that some utterances of the schema “p and q”
hardly allow for a ‘commutative’ “inference” (“Therefore, q and p”). How to proceed
conservatively while allowing room for pluralism? Embracing the
“classical-logical” syntactic introduction-cum-elimination and semantic
interpretation of “and,” the approach by Cook Wilson in “Statement and
inference” to the inferential métier of “and” is assessed. If Grice grants that
there is some degree of artificiality in speaking of the meaning or sense of
“and,” the polemic brings us to the realm of ‘pragmatic inference,’ now
contrasted to a ‘logical inference.’ The endorsement by Grice of an ‘impoverished’
reading of conjunction appears conservative vis-à-vis not just Strawson’s
‘informalist’ picture but indeed the formalist frameworks of relevant, linear,
and ordered logic. An external practical decision à la Carnap is in order, that
allows for an enriched, stronger, reading, if not in terms of a conventional implicaturum,
as Strawson suggests. A ‘classical-logic’ reading in terms of a conversational implicaturum
agrees with Grice’s ‘Bootstrap,’ a methodological principle constraining the
meta-language/object-language divide. Keywords:
conjunction, pragmatic enrichment, H. Paul Grice, Bootstrap. “[I]n recent
years, my disposition to resort to formalism has markedly diminished. This
retreat may well have been accelerated when, of all people, Hilary Putnam
remarked to me that I was too formal!”H.P. Grice, ‘Prejudices and
predilections; which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice,’ in Grandy
& Warner, 1986:61 Keywords: metainference, substructural logics, classical
logic, conjunction, H. Paul Grice, pragmatic inference; Rudolf Carnap,
bootstrap, modernism, formalism, neotraditionalism, informalism, pragmatics,
inference, implicaturum, extensional conjunction, intensional conjunction,
multiplicative conjunction, additive conjunction. Grice’s approach consistent
with Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism that allows room for the account put
forward by H. Paul Grice in connection with a specific meta-inference (or
second-order “… yields …”) as it may help us take an ‘external’ practical
decision as to how to recapture a structural ‘rule’ of classical logic. The
attempt involves a reconsideration, with a special focus on the sub-structural
classical logic rules for conjunction of Grice’s ultimately metaphilosophical
motivation in the opening paragraphs to “Logic and Conversation.” Grice
explores stick the first dyadic
truth-functor Grice lists. In fact, it’s the first alleged divergence, between
“p and q” and “p. . q” that Grice had quotes in “Prolegomena” to motivate his
audience, and the example he brings up vis-à-vis an ‘alleged’ “linguistic
offence” (a paradox?) that an utterer may incur by uttering “He got into bed
and took his clothes off, but I don’t mean to suggest he did it in that order”
(Grice 1981:186). Implicatura
are cancellable. In the present scheme, which justifies substructural logics,
this amounts to any ‘intensional’ reading of a connective (e. g. ‘and’) being
susceptible of being turned or ‘trans-formed’
into
the correlative extensional one in light of the cancelling clause, which brings
new information to the addressee A. This is hardly problematic if we consider
that sub-structural logics do not aim to capture the ‘semantics’ of a
logical constant, and that the sub-structural logical ‘enrichment’ is relevant,
rather, for the constant’s ‘inferential role.’Neither is it problematic that
the fact that the ‘inferential role’ of a logical constant (such as ‘and’) may
change (allowing this ‘trans-formation’ from classical-logical extensional to
sub-structural logical intension, given new information which will be used by
the addressee A to ‘work out’ the utterer U’s meaning. The obvious, but worthemphasizing, entailment in Grice’s
assertion about the “mistake” shared by Formalism and Informalism is that
FORMALISM (as per the standard presentations of ‘classical logic’) does commit
a mistake! Re-capturing the FORMALISM of classical logic is hardly as direct in
the Griceian programme as one would assume. Grice’s ultimate meta-philosophical
motivation, though, seems to be more in agreement with FORMALISM. Formalism can
repair the mistake, Grice thinks, not by allowing a change in the assigning of
an ‘interpretation’ rule of an empoverished “and” (““p and q” is 1 iff both p
and q are 1, 0 otherwise.” (Cfr. Pap: “Obviously, I cannot prove that
“(p and q) ≡ (q and p)” is tautologous (and that
therefore “He got into bed and took off his clothes’ iff ‘he took of his
clothes and got into bed,’) unless I first
construct an adequate truth-table defining the use of “and.”
But surely one of the points of constructing such a table is to ‘reproduce’ or
capture’ the meaning of ‘and’ in a natural language! The proposal seems
circular!) and a deductive ‘syntactics’ rule,
involving the Gentzen-type elimination of ‘and’ (“ “p and q” yields “p”; and
its reciprocal, “ “p and q” yields “q”.” To avoid commiting the mistake,
formalism must recognise the conversational implicaturum ceteris paribus
derived from some constraint of rational co-operation (in particular, the
desideratum or conversational maxim, “be orderly!”) and allow for some
syntactical scope device to make the implicaturum obvious, an ‘explicatum,’
almost (without the need to reinforce “and” into “and then”). In Grice’s
examples, it may not even be a VIOLATION, but a FLOUT, of a conversational
maxim or desideratum, within the observance of an overarching co-operation
principle (A violation goes unnoticed; a flout is a rhetorical device. Cfr.
Quintilian’s observation that Homer would often use “p & q” with the implicaturum
“but not in that order” left to the bard’s audience to work out). Grice’s attempt
is to recapture “classical-logic” “and,” however pragmatically ‘enriched,’
shares some features with other sub-structural logics, since we have allowed
for a syntactical tweak of the ‘inference’ rules; which we do via the
pragmatist (rather than pragmatic) ‘implicatural’ approach to logic,
highlighting one pragmatic aspect of a logic without CUT. Grice grants that “p and q” should read “p .
q” “when [“p . q” is] interpreted in the classical two-valued way.” His wording
is thus consistent with OTHER ways (notably relevant logic, linear and ordered
logic). Grice seems to have as one of his ‘unspeakable truths’ things like “He
got into bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a man who proceeds otherwise.”
After mentioning “and” “interpreted in the classical
two-valued way,” Grice dedicates a full
paragraph to explore the classical logic’s manifesto. The idea is to
provide a SYSTEM that will give us an algorithm to decide which formulae are
theorems. The ‘logical consequence’ (or “… yields …”) relation is given a
precise definition.Grice
notes that “some logicians [whom he does not mention] may at some time have
wanted to claim that there are in fact no such divergences [between “p and q”
and “p . q”]; but such claims, if made at all, have been somewhat rashly made,
and those suspected of making them have been subjected to some pretty rough
handling.” “Those who concede that such
divergences [do] exist” are the formalists. “An outline of a not
uncharacteristic FORMALIST position may be given as follows,” Grice notes. We
proceed to number the thesis since it sheds light on what makes a
sub-structural logic sub-structural“Insofar as logicians are concerned with the
formulation of very general patterns of VALID INFERENCE (“… yields…”) the
formal device (“p . q”) possesses a decisive advantage over their natural
counterpart (“p and q.”) For it will be possible to construct in terms of the
formal device (“p . q”) a system of very general formulas, a considerable
number of which can be regarded as, or are closely related to, a pattern of
inferences the expression of which involves the device.”“Such a system may
consist of a certain set of simple formulas that MUST BE ACCEPTABLE if the
device has the MEANING (or sense) that has been ASSIGNED to it, and an
indefinite number of further formulas, many of them less obviously acceptable
(“q . p”), each of which can be shown to be acceptable if the members of the
original set are acceptable.”“We have, thus, a way of handling dubiously acceptable
patterns of inference (“q. p,” therefore, “p. q”) and if, as is sometimes
possible, we can apply A DECISION PROCEDURE, we have an even better
way.”“Furthermore, from a PHILOSOPHICAL point of view, the possession by the
natural counterpart (“p and q”) of that element in their meaning (or sense),
which they do NOT share with the corresponding formal device, is to be regarded
as an IMPERFECTION; the element in question is an undesirable excrescence. For
the presence of this element has the result that the CONCEPT within which it
appears cannot be precisely/clearly defined, and that at least SOME statements
involving it cannot, in some circumstances, be assigned a definite TRUTH VALUE;
and the indefiniteness of this concept is not only objectionable in itself but
leaves open the way to METAPHYSICS: we cannot be certain that the
natural-language expression (“p and q”) is METAPHYSICALLY ‘LOADED.’”“For these
reasons, the expression, as used in natural speech (“p and q”), CANNOT be
regarded as finally acceptable, and may tum out to be, finally, not fully
intelligible.” “The proper course is to conceive and begin to construct an
IDEAL language, incorporating the formal device (“p . q”), the sentences of
which will be clear, determinate in TRUTH-VALUE, and certifiably FREE FROM
METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS.”“The foundations of SCIENCE will now be
PHILOSOPHICALLY SECURE, since the statements of the scientist will be
EXPRESSIBLE (though not necessarily actually expressed) within this ideal
language.”What kind of enrichment are we talking
about? It may be understood as a third conjunct ptn-l & qtn
& (tn > tn-l) FIRST
CONJUNCT + SECOND CONJUNCT + “TEMPORAL SUCCESSION” p AND THEN q To
buttress the buttressing of ‘and,’ Grice uses ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ for other
operators like ‘disjunctionand his rationale for the Modified Occam’s razor
would be: “A STRONGER SENSE for a truth-functional dyadic operator SHOULD NOT
BE POSTULATED when A WEAK (or minimal) SENSE does, provided we add the
CANCELLABLE IMPLICATURUM.” Grice SIMPLIFIES semantics, but there’s no free
lunch, since he now has to explain how the IMPLICATURUM arises. Let’s revise the way “and,” the first ‘dyadic’ device in
“Logic and Conversation,” is invoked by Grice in “Prolegomena.” “He got into
bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a someone who took his clothes off and
got into bed.” Cfr. theorems ∧I
= ` ∀ φ ψ• [φ; ψ] |= φ ∧
ψ ∧E = ` ∀
φ ψ• ([φ ∧ ψ] |= φ) ∧ ([φ ∧
ψ] |= ψ)We have: He got into bed and took his clothes off (Grice, 1989:9). He took his clothes off and got into bed (Grice, 1989:9). He got into bed and took his clothes off but I don’t want to
suggest that he did those things in that order (Grice, 1981:186). He first took his clothes off and then got into bed (Grice
1989:9). In invoking Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory, is Grice being
fair? Strawson had noted, provocatively: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
logically equivalent to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a
child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means logically equivalent
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’”How
easier things would have gone should Strawson have used the adjective
‘pragmatic’ that he mentions later in his treatise in connection with Grice. Strawson
is sticking with the truth-functionality and thinking of ‘equivalence’ in terms
of ‘iff’but his remark may be rephrased as involving a notion of ‘inference.’ In
terms of LOGICAL INFERENCE, the premise “He got into bed and took his clothes
off” YIELDS “He took off his clothes and got into bed,” even if that does NOT
‘yield’ in terms of ceteris paribus PRAGMATIC inference. It would have pleased Grice to read the above as: “[The formula] “p . q’ is equivalentL to ‘q .
p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a child’ or ‘He set to work and
found a job’ are by no means equivalentP to ‘They had a child and
got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’” By appealing to a desideratum of rational co-operative
discourse, “be orderly,” Grice thinks he can restore “and” to its
truth-functional sense, while granting that the re-inforced “then” (or an alleged
extra sense of “temporal succession,” as he has it in “Prolegomena”) is merely
and naturally (if cancellable on occasion) conversationally implicated (even if
under a generalised way) under the assumption that the addressee A will
recognise that the utterer U is observing the desideratum, and is being
orderly. But witness variants to the cancellation (3) above. There is an indifferent,
indeterminate form: He got into bed and took off his clothes, though I don’t
mean to imply that he did that in that order.versus the less indeterminate He
got into bed and took his clothes off, but not in that order. +> i.e. in the
reverse one.Postulating a pragmatic desideratum allows Grice to keep any
standard sub-structural classical rule for “and” and “&” (as s he does when
he goes more formalist in “Vacuous Names,” his tribute to Quine).How are to
interpret the Grice/Strawson ‘rivalry’ in meta-inference? Using Frege’s
assertion “⊦LK” as our operator to read “… yields…” we have:p & q ⊦LK q & p and q & p ⊦LK p & q. In
“Prolegomena,” then, Grice introduces:“B. Examples involve an area of special
interest to me [since he was appointed logic tutor at St. John’s], namely
that of expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical
constants and which may, or may not, ‘diverge’ in meaning [not use] from the
related constants (considered as elements in a classical logic, standardly
interpreted). It has, for example, been suggested that because it would be
incorrect or inappropriate [or misleading, even false?] to say “He got into bed
and took off his clothes” of [someone] who first took off his clothes and then
got into bed, it is part of the meaning [or sense] or part of one meaning
[sub-sense] of “and” to convey temporal succession” (Grice 1989:8). The
explanation in terms of a reference to “be orderly” is mentioned in
“Presupposition and conversational implicaturum” (Grice 1981:186). Grice notes: “It
has been suggested by [an informalist like] Strawson, in [An] Introduction to
Logical Theory [by changing the title of Strawson’s essay, Grice seems to be
implicating that Strawson need not sound pretentious] that there is a
divergence between the ordinary use or meaning of ‘and’ and the conjunction
sign [“.”] of propositional or predicate calculus because “He took off his
clothes and got into to bed” does not seem to have the same meaning as “He got
into bed and took off his clothes.”” Grice goes on: “[Strawson’s] suggestion here is, of course, that, in order properly
to represent the ordinary use of [the
word] “and,” one would have to allow a special sense (or sub-sense) for [the word] “and” which contained
some reference to the idea that what was
mentioned before [the word] “and” was temporally prior to what was mentioned
after it, and that, on that supposition,
one could deal with this case.”Grice goes on: “[Contra Strawson,] I want to
suggest in reply that it is not necessary
[call him an Occamist, minimalist] if one operates on some general principle
[such as M. O. R., or Modified Occam’s Razor] of keeping down, as far as possible, the number of special sense
[sic] of words that one has to invoke, to give countenance to the
alleged divergence of meaning.” The
constraint is not an arbitrary assignation of sense, but a rational one derived
from the nature of conversation:“It is just that there is a general supposition
[which would be sub-sidiary to the general maxim of Manner or ‘Modus’ (‘be
perspicuous! [sic]’) that one presents one's material in an orderly manner and, if what one is engaged upon is a narration (if
one is talking about events), then the
most orderly manner for a narration of events is an order that corresponds to the order in which they took
place.”Grice concludes: “So, the meaning of the expression ‘He took off his
clothes and he got into bed” and the
corresponding expression with a [classical] logician's constant
"&" [when given a standard two-valued interpretation] (i.e. “He took his clothes off & he got into
bed") would be exactly the same.”Grice’s
indifference with what type of formalism to adopt is obvious: “And, indeed, if
anybody actually used in ordinary speech the "&" as a piece of vocabulary instead of as a formal(ist)
device, and used it to connect together sentences of this type, they would collect just the same
[generalised conversational] implicatura as the ordinary English sentences have without any extra explanation
of the meaning of the word ‘and’.” It is
then that Grice goes on to test the ‘cancellability,’ producing the
typical Gricean idiom, above:He took his
clothes off and got into bed but I don't mean to suggest that he did those
things in that order. Grice goes on: “I
should say that I did suggest, in [my essay] on implicaturum, two sorts of tests by which one might hope to identify a conversational implicaturum.
[...] I did not mean to suggest that these tests were final, only that they
were useful. One test was the possibility of cancellation; that is to say,
could one without [classical] logical absurdity [when we have a standard
two-valued interpretation], attach a cancellation clause. For instance, could I
say (9)?” Grice: “If that is not a linguistic offense [and ‘false’], or does
not seem to be, then, so far as it goes, it is an indication that what one has
here is a conversational implicaturum, and that the original [alleged meaning,
sense, or] suggestion of temporal succession [is] not part of the conventional
meaning of the sentence.” Grice (1981186). Formalising the temporal succession is
never enough but it may help, and (9) becomes (10):p & q and ptn-l &
qtn where “tn-l” is a temporal index
for a time prior to “tn”. It is interesting to note that Chomsky, of all
people, in 1966, a year before Grice’s William James lectures, in Aspects of
the theory of syntax refers to “A [sic] P. Grice” as propounding that temporal
succession be considered implicaturum (Since this pre-dates the William James
lectures by a year, it was via the seminars at Oxford that reached Chomsky at
MIT via some of Grice’s tutees).Let us revise Urmson’s wording in his treatment
of the ‘clothes’ example, to check if Grice is being influenced by Urmson’s
presentation of the problem to attack Strawson. Urmson notes: “In
formal[ist] logic, the connective[…] ‘and’ [is] always given a minimum
[empoverished] meaning, as [I] have done above, such that any complex
[molecular sentence] formed by the use of [it] alone is [always] a
truth-function of its constituents.”Urmson goes on to sound almost like
Strawson, whose Introduction to Logical Theory he credits. Urmson notes: “In
ordinary discourse the connective[… ‘and]] often [has] a *richer* meaning.”Urmson
must be credited, with this use of ‘richer’ as the father of pragmatic
enRICHment!Urmson goes on: “Thus ‘He took his clothes off and got into bed’
implies temporal succession and has a different meaning from [the impoverished,
unreinforced] ‘He got into bed and took off his clothes.’” Urmson does not play
with Grice’s reinforcement: “He first got into bed and then took his clothes
off.’ Urmson goes on, however, in his concluding remark, to side with Grice
versus Strawson, as he should! Urmson notes: “[Formal(ist) l]ogicians would
justify their use of the minimum [impoverished, unreinforced, weak] meaning by
pointing out that it is the common element in all our uses [or every use] of
‘and.’” (Urmson, 1956:9-10). The
commutativeness of ‘and’ in the examples he gives is rejected by Strawson. How
does Strawson reflect this in his sub-structural rule for ‘and’?
As Humberstone puts it, “It
is possible to define a version of the calculus, which defines most of the
syntax of the logical operators by means of axioms, and which uses only one
inference rule.”Axioms: Let φ, χ and ψ stand for
well-formed formulae. The wff's themselves would not contain any Greek letters,
but only capital Roman letters, connective operators, and parentheses. The
axioms include:ANDFIRST-CONJUNCT: φ ∧ χ → φ and ANDSECOND-CONJUNCT:
φ ∧ χ → χ. Our (13) and correspond to Gentzen’s “conjunction
elimination” (or (& -), as Grice has it in “Vacuous Names.”). The relation between (13) and reflects the commutativity of the conjunction
operator. Cfr. Cohen 1971: “Another
conversational maxim of Grice's, “be
orderly”, is intended to govern such matters as the formalist can
show that it was not appropriate to postulate a special non-commutative temporal
conjunction.”“The locus classicus for complaints of this nature being Strawson (1952).”
Note that the commutative “and” is derived from Grice’s elimination of
conjunction, “p & q ⊦
p” and “p & q ⊦ q
-- as used by Grice in his system Q.Also note that the truth-evaluation would
be for Grice ‘semantic,’ rather than ‘syntactic’ as the commutative (understood
as part of elimination). Grice has it as: If phi and psi are formulae, “φ and ”
is 1 iff both φ and ψ are true, 0 otherwise. Grice grants
that however “baffling” (or misleading) would be to utter or assert (7)
if no one has doubts about the
temporal order of the reported the events, due to the expectation that the
utterer is observing the conversational maxim “be orderly” subsumed under the
conversational category of ‘Modus’ (‘be perspicuous! [sic]”cfr. his earlier
desideratum of conversational clarity). Relevant logic (which was emerging by
the time Grice was delivering his William James lectures) introduces two
different formal signs for ‘conjunction’: the truth-functional conjunction
relevant logicians call ‘extensional’ conjunction, and they represent by (13).
Non-truth-functional conjunction is represented by ‘X’ and termed fusion or
‘intensional’ conjunction:
p q versus p X q.
The truth-table for Strawson’s enriched uses of
“and” is not the standard one, since we require the additional condition that
“p predates q,” or that one conjunct predates the other. Playing with structural and substructural logical rules is
something Carnap would love perhaps more than Grice, and why not, Strawson?
They liked to play with ‘deviant’ logics. For Carnap, the choice of a logic is
a pragmatic ‘external’ decisionvide his principle of tolerance and the rather
extensive bibliography on Carnap as a logic pluralist. For Grice, classical
logic is a choice guided by his respect for ordinary language, WHILE attempting
to PROVOKE the Oxonian establishment by rallying to the defense of an
under-dogma and play the ‘skilful heretic’ (turning a heterodoxy into dogma).
Strawson is usually more difficult to classify! In his contribution to Grandy
& Warner (1986), he grants that Grice’s theory may be ‘more beautiful,’ and
more importantly, seems to suggest that his view be seen as endorsing Grice’s
account of a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum (For Strawson, ‘if’ (used for unasserted
antecedent and consequence) conventionally implicates the same inferrability
condition that ‘so’ does for asserted equivalents. The
aim is to allow for a logically pluralist thesis, almost alla Carnap about the
‘inferential role’ of a logical constant such as ‘and’, which embraces
‘classical,’ (or ‘formalist,’ or ‘modernist’), relevant, linear and ordered
logic. PLURALISM (versus MONISM) has it that, for any logical constant c (such as “and”), “c” has more
than one *correct* inferential “role.” The pluralist thesis depends on a
specific interpretation of the vocabulary of sub-structural logics. According
to this specific interpretation, a classical logic captures the literal, or
EXPLICIT, explicatum, or truth-functional or truth-conditonal meaning, or what
Grice would have as ‘dictiveness’ of a logical constant. A sub-structural logic
(relevant logic, linear and ordered logic), on the other hand, encodes a
pragmatically,” i.e. not SEMANTICALLY, “-enriched sense” of a logical constant
such as “and.” Is this against the spirit of Grice’s overall thesis as
formulated in his “M. O. R.,” Modified Occam’s Razor, “Senses [of ‘and’] are
not to be multiplied beyond necessity”? But it’s precisely Grice’s Occamism (as
Neale calls it) that is being put into question. At Oxford, at the time, EVERYBODY (except
Grice!) was an informalist. He is coming to the defense of Russell, Oxford’s
underdog! (underdogma!). Plus, it’s important to understand the INFORMALISM
that Grice is attackingOxford’s ORTHO-doxyseriously. Grice is being the
‘skilful HERETIC,’ in the words of his successor as Tutorial Fellow at Oxford,
G. P. Baker. We may proceed by four stages.
First, introduce the philosophical motivation for the pluralist thesis.
It sounds good to be a PLURALIST. Strawson was not. He was an informalist.
Grice was not, he was a post-modernist. But surely we not assuming that one
would want to eat the cake and have it! Second, introduce the calculus for the
different (or ‘deviant,’ as Haack prefers) logics endorsed in the pluralist
thesisclassical itself, relevant, linear and ordered logic. Third, shows how
the different “behaviours” of an item of logical vocabulary (such as “and”) of
each of these logics (and they all have variants for ‘conjunction.’ In the case
of ‘relevant’ logic, beyond Grice’s “&,” or classical conjunction, there is
“extensional conjunction,” FORMALISED as “p X q”, or fusion, and “INTENSIONAL
conjunction,” formalized by “p O q”. These can be, not semantically
(truth-functionally, or truth-conditional, or at the level of the EXPLICATUM),
but pragmatically interpreted (at the level of the IMPLICATURUM). Fourth, shows
how the *different* (or ‘deviant,’ or pluralist), or alternative inferential
“roles” (that justifies PLURALISM) that *two* sub-structural logics (say,
Grice’s classical “&” the Strawson’s informalist “and”) attribute to a
logical constant “c” can co-existhence pluralism. A particular version of
logical “pluralism” can be argued from the plurality of at least *two*
alterative equally legitimate formalisations of the logical vocabulary, such as
the first dyadic truth-functor, or connective, “and,” which is symbolized by
Grice as “&,” NOT formalized by Strawson (he sticks with “and”) and
FORMALISED by relevant logicians as ‘extensional’ truth-functional conjunction
(fision, p X a) and intentional non-truth-functional conjunction (p O q). In particular, it can be argued that the
apparent “rivalry” between classical logic (what Grice has as Modernism, but he
himself is a post-modernist) and relevant logic (but consider Grice on
Strawson’s “Neo-Traditionalism,” first called INFORMALISM by Grice) can be
resolved, given that both logics capture and formalise normative and legitimate
alternative senses of ‘logical consequence.’ A revision of
the second paragraph to “Logic and Conversation” should do here. We can
distinguish between two operators for “… yields …”: ├ and ├: “A1, A2, … An├MODERNISM/FORMALISM-PAUL B” and “A1, A2, … An├NEO-TRADITIONALISM/INFORMALISM-PETER
B. As Paoli has it: “[U]pholding weakening amounts to failing to
take at face value the [slightly Griceian] expression ‘assertable on the basis
of’.’”Paoli goes on:“If I am in a
position to assert [the conclusion q, “He took his clothes off and got into
bed”] on the basis of the information provided by [the premise p, “He got into
bed and took his clothes off”], I need NOT be in a position to assert the
conclusion P [“He took his clothes off and got into bed”] on the basis of both
p (“He got into bed and took off his clothes” and an extra premise Cwhere C is
just an idle assumption (“The events took place in the order reported”) ,
irrelevant to my conclusion.”Can we regard Strawson as holding that
UNFORMALISED “and” is an INTENSIONAL CONJUNCTION? Another option is to see
Strawson as holding that the UNFORMALISED “and” can be BOTH truth-functional and
NON-truth-functional (for which case, the use of a different expression, “and
THEN,” is preferred). The Gricean theory of implicaturum is capable of
explaining this mismatch (bewtween “and” and “&”).Grice argues that the
[truth-conditional, truth-functional] semantics [DICTUM or EXPLICATUM, not IMPLICATURUMcfr.
his retrospective epilogue for his view on DICTIVENESS] of “and” corresponds
[or is identical, hence the name of ‘identity’ thesis versus ‘divergence’
thesis] to the classical “∧,” & of Russell/Whitehead, and Quine,
and Suppes, and that the [truth-functional semantics of “if [p,] [q]”
corresponds to the classical p ⊃ q.” There is scope
for any theory capable of resolving or [as Grice would have it] denying the
apparent disagreement [or ‘rivalry’] among two or more logics.” What Grice does
is DENY THE APPARENT DISAGREEMENT. It’s
best to keep ‘rivalry’ for the fight of two ‘warring camps’ like FORMALISM and
INFORMALISM, and stick with ‘disagreement’ or ‘divergence’ with reference to
specific constants. For Strawson, being a thorough-bred Oxonian, who perhaps
never read the Iliad in Greekhe was Grice’s PPE studentthe RIVALRY is not
between TWO different formalisations, but between the ‘brusque’ formalisation
of the FORMALISTS (that murder his English!) and NO FORMALISATION at all. Grice
calls this ‘neo-traditionalist,’ perhaps implicating that the
‘neo-traditionalists’ WOULD accept some level of formalisation (Aristotle did!)
ONLY ONE FORMALISATION, the Modernism. INFORMALISM or Neo-Traditionalism aims to
do WITHOUT formalisation, if that means using anything, but, say, “and” and “and
then”. Talk of SENSES helps. Strawson may say that “and” has a SENSE which
differs from “&,” seeing that he would find “He drank the poison and died,
though I do not mean to imply in that order” is a CONTRADICTION. That is why
Strawson is an ‘ordinary-LANGUAGE philosopher,” and not a logician! (Or should
we say, an ‘ordinary-language logician’? His “Introduction to Logical Theory”
was the mandatory reading vademecum for GENERATIONS of Oxonians that had to
undergo a logic course to get their M. A. Lit. Hum.Then there’s what we can
call “the Gricean picture,” only it’s not too clear who painted it!We may agree
that there is an apparent “mismatch,” as opposed to a perfect “match” that
Grice would love! Grice thought with Russell that grammar is a pretty good
guide to logical form. If the utterer says “and” and NOT “and then,” there is
no need to postulate a further SENSE to ‘and.’Russell would criticize
Strawson’s attempt to reject modernist “&” as a surrogate for “and” as
Strawson’s attempt to regress to a stone-age metaphysics. Grice actually at
this point, defended Strawson: “stone-age PHYSICS!” And this relates to “…
yields…” and Frege’s assertion “/-“ as ‘Conclusion follows from Premise’ where
‘Premise yields Conclusion’ seems more natural in that we preserve the order
from premise to conclusion. We shouldn’t underestimate one crucial feature of
an implicaturum: its cancellability, on which Grice expands quite a bit in
1981: “He got into bed and took his clothes off, although I don’t intend to
suggest, in any shape or form, that he proceed to do those things in the order
I’ve just reported!”The lack of any [fixed, rigid, intolerant] structural rule
implies that AN INSTANCE I1 of the a logical constant (such as “and”) that
*violate* any of Grice’s conversational maxim (here “be orderly!”) associated
with the relevant structural rule [here we may think of ADDITION AND
SIMPLIFICATION as two axioms derived from the Gentzen-type elimination of
“and”, or the ‘interpretation’ of ‘p & q’ as 1 iff both p and q are 1, but
0 otherwise] and for which the derived conversational implicaturum is false
[“He went to bed and took his clothes off, but not in that order!”] should be
distinguished from ANY INSTANCE I2 that does NOT violate the relevant maxim (“be
orderly”) and for which the conversational IMPLICATURUM (“tn > tn-l”) is
true.” We may nitpick here.Grice would rather prefer, ‘when the IMPLICATURUM
applies.” An implicaturum is by definition cancellable (This is clear when
Grice expands in the excursus “A causal theory of perception.” “I would hardly
be said to have IMPLIED that Smith is hopeless in philosophy should I utter,
“He has beautiful handwriting; I don’t mean to imply he is hopeless in
philosophy,” “even if that is precisely what my addressee ends up thinking!”When
it comes to “and,” we are on clearer ground. The kinds of “and”-implicaturums
may be captured by a distinction of two ‘uses’ of conjunctions in a single
substructural system S that does WITHOUT a ‘structural rule’ such as exchange,
contraction or both. Read, relies, very UNLIKE Strawson, on wo FORMALISATIONS
besides “and” (for surely English “and” does have a ‘form,’ too, pace Strawson)
in Relevant Logic: “p q” and “p X q.” “p q”
and “p X q” have each a different inferential role. If the reason the UTTERER
has to assert itvia the DICTUM or EXPLICATUM [we avoid ‘assert’ seeing that we
want logical constants to trade on ‘imperative contexts,’ tooGrice, “touch the
beast and it will bite you!” -- is the utterer’s belief that Smith took his
clothes AND THEN got into bed, it would be illegitimate, unwarranted, stupid,
otiose, incorrect, inappropriate, to infer that Smith did not do these two
things in that order upon discovering that he in fact DID those things in the
order reported. The very discovery that
Smith did the things in the order reported would “just spoil” or unwarrant the
derivation that would justify our use of “… yields …” (¬A ¬(A u B) A ¬B”). As Read notes, we have ADJUNCTION ‘p and q’
follows from p and qor p and q yields ‘p and q.’ And we have SIMPLIFICATION: p and q
follow from ‘p and q,’ or ‘p and q’ yields p, and ‘p and q’ yields q.” Stephen
Read: “From adjunction and simplification we can infer, by transitivity, that q
follows from p and q, and so by the Deduction Equivalence, ‘if p, q’ follows
from q.’” “However, […] this has the unacceptable consequence that ‘if’ is
truth-functional.” “How can this
consequence be avoided?” “Many options are open.” “We can reject the
transitivity of entailment, the deduction equivalence, adjunction, or
simplification. Each has been tried; and each seems contrary to intuition.” “We
are again in the paradoxical situation that each of these conceptions seems
intuitively soundly based; yet their combination appears to lead to something
unacceptable.” “Are we nonetheless forced to reject one of these plausible
principles?” “Fortunately, there is a fifth option.” Read: “There is a familiar
truth-functional conjunction, expressed by ‘p and q’, which entails each of p
and q, and so for the falsity (Grice’s 0) of which the falsity of either
conjunct suffices, and the truth of both for the truth of the whole.” “But
there is also a NON-truth-functional conjunction, a SENSE of ‘p and q’ whose
falsity supports the inference from p to ‘~q’.” “These two SENSES of
‘conjunction’ cannot be the same, for, if the ground for asserting ‘not-(p and
q)’ (e.g. “It is not the case that he got into bed and took off his clothes”)
is simply that ‘p’ is false, to learn that p is true, far from enabling one to
proceed to ‘~q’, undercuts the warrant for asserting ‘~(p & q)’ in the
first place.” “In this sense, ‘~(p & q)’ is weaker than both ‘~p’ and ‘~q’,
and does not, even with the addition of p, entail ‘~q’, even though one
possible ground for asserting ‘~(p & q))’, viz ‘~q’, clearly does.” Stephen
Read: “The intensional sense of ‘and’ is often referred to as fusion; I will
use the symbol ‘×’ for it. Others write ‘◦.’”We add some relevant observations
by a palaeo-Griceian: Ryle. Ryle often felt
himself to be an outsider. His remarks on “and” are however illuminating in the
context of our discussion of meta-inference in substructural logic.Ryle writes:
“I have spoken as if our ordinary ‘and’ […] [is] identical with the logical
constant with which the formal logician operates.”“But this is not true.”“The
logician’s ‘and’ […] [is] not our familiar civilian term[…].”“It is [a]
conscript term, in uniform and under military discipline, with memories,
indeed, of [its] previous more free and easy civilian life, though it is not
leaving that life now.”“If you hear on good authority that she took arsenic and
fell ill you will reject the rumour that she fell ill and took arsenic.”“This
familiar use of ‘and’ carries with it the temporal notion expressed by ‘and
subsequently’ and even the causal notion expressed by ‘and in
consequence.’”“The logician’s conscript ‘and’ does only its appointed dutya
duty in which ‘she took arsenic and fell ill’ is an absolute paraphrase of ‘she
fell ill and took arsenic.’ This might be call the minimal force of ‘and.’”
(Ryle,, 1954:118). When we speaks of PRAGMATIC enrichment, we obviously
don’t mean SEMANTIC enrichment. There is a distinction, obviously, between the
‘pragmatic enrichment’ dimension, as to whether the ‘enriched’ content is
IMPLICATED or, to use a neologism, ‘EX-plicated.’ Or cf. as Kent Bach would
prefer, “IMPLICITATED” (vide his “Implciture.”) Commutative
law: p & q iff q & p. “Axiom AND-1” and “Axiom AND-2” correspond
to "conjunction elimination". The relation between “AND-1” and
“AND-2” reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. A VERY IMPORTANT POINT to consider is Grice’s
distinction between ‘logical inference’ and ‘pragmatic inference.’ He does so
in “Retrospective Epilogue” in 1987. “A few years after the appearance of […]
Introduction to Logical Theory, I was devoting much attention to what might be
loosely called the distinction between logical and pragmatic inferences. …
represented as being a matter not of logical but of pragmatic import.” (Grice
1987:374).Could he be jocular? He is emphasizing the historical role of his
research. He mentions FORMALISM and INFORMALISM and notes that his own interest
in maxims or desiderata of rational discourse arose from his interest to
distinguish between matters of “logical inference” from those of “pragmatic
inference.” Is Grice multiplying ‘inference’ beyond necessity? It would seem
so. So it’s best to try to reformulate his proposal, in agreement with logical
pluralism.By ‘logical inference’ Grice must mean ‘practical/alethic
satisfactoriness-based inference,’ notably the syntactics and semantics
(‘interpretative’) modules of his own System Q. By ‘pragmatic inference’ he
must mean a third module, the pragmatic module, with his desiderata. We may say
that for Grice ‘logical inference’ is deductive (and inductive), while
‘pragmatic inference’ is abductive. Let us apply this to the ‘clothes off’
exampleThe Utterer said: “Smith got into bed and took his clothes off, but I’m reporting
the events in no particular order.” The ‘logical inference’ allows to treat
‘and’ as “&.” The ‘pragmatic inference’ allows the addressee to wonder what
the utterer is meaning! Cf. Terres on “⊢k” for “logical inference” and “⊢r,” “⊢l,” and “⊢o,” for
pragmatic inference, and where the subscripts “k,” “r,” “l” and “o” stand for
‘classical,’ ‘relevant,’ ‘linear’ and ‘ordered’ logic respectively, with each of the
three sub-structural notions of “follows from” or “… yields …” require the pragmatic enrichment of a logical constant, that ‘classical logical’
inference may retain the ‘impoverished’ version (Terres,
, Inquiry13). Grice
himself mentions this normative dimension: “I would
like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely
as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE
for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon.”Grice, 1989a, p.48]However, the
fact that we should observe the conversational maxims may not yet be a reason for endorsing
the allegedly ‘deviant’ inferential role of a logical constant in the three
sub-structural logics under examination.The legitimacy of the ‘deviant’
‘inferential role’ of each constant in each sub-structural logic emerges, rather
from at least two sources.A first source is a requirement for logic (or
reasoning) to be normative: that its truth-bearers [or
satisfactoriness-bearers, to allow for ‘imperative’-mode inferences) are
related to what Grice calls ‘psychological attitudes’ of ‘belief’ (indicative-mode
inference) and ‘desire’ (imperative-mode inference) (Grice, 1975, cfr. Terres,
Inquiry, 13). As Steinberg puts it:“Presumably, if logic is normative for
thinking or reasoning, its normative force will stem, at least in part, from
the fact that truth bearers which act as the relata of our consequence relation
and the bearers of other logical properties are identical to (or at least are
very closely related in some other way) to the objects of thinking or
reasoning: the contents of one’s mental states or acts such as the content of
one’s beliefs or inferences, for example.”[Steinberger, aand cf. Loar’s similar
approach when construing Grice’s maxims as ‘empirical generalisations’ of
‘functional states’ for a less committed view of the embedding of logical and
pragmatic inference within the scope of psychological-attitude ascriptions). A
second source for the legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ inferential role is the fact
that the pragmatic enrichment of the logical vocabulary (both a constant and ‘…
yields …) is part, or a ‘rational-construction,’ of our psychological
representation of certain utterances involving the natural counterparts of
those constants. This may NOT involve a new sense of ‘and’ which is with what Grice is
fighting. While the relevant literature emphasizes “reasons to assert”
(vide Table on p. 9, Terres, ), it is worth pointing out that the model should
be applicable to what we might broadly construe as ‘deontic’ reasoning (e.g.
Grice on “Arrest the intruder!” in Grice 1989, and more generally his practical
syllogisms in Grice 2001). We seem to associate “assert” with ‘indicative-mode’
versions only of premise and conclusion. “Reasons to express” or “reasons to
make it explicit” may serve as a generalization to cover both “indicative-mode”
and “imperative-mode” versions of the inferences to hand. When Grice says that,
contra Strawson, he wants to see things in terms of ‘pragmatic inference,’ not
‘logical inference,’ is he pulling himself up by his own bootstraps? Let us
clarify.When thinking of what META-language
need be used to formulate both Grice’s final account vis-à-vis Strawson’s, it
is relevant to mention that Grice once invoked what he called the “Bootstrap”
principle. In the course of considering a ‘fine distinction’ in various levels
of conceptual priority, slightly out of the blue, he addsthis is from
“Prejudices and predilections, which become, the life and opinions of Paul
Grice,” so expect some informality, and willingness to amuse: “It is perhaps
reasonable to regard such fine distinctions as indispensable if we are to
succeed in the business of pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps,” Grice
writes. And then trust him to add: “In this connection, it will be relevant for
me to say that I once invented (though I did not establish its validity) a
principle which I labelled as ‘Bootstrap.’” Trust him to call with a good
title. “The principle,” Grice goes on, “laid down that, when one is introducing
some primitive concept [such as conjunction] of a theory [or calculus or system]
formulated in an object-language [G1], one has freedom to use any
concept from a battery of concepts expressible in the meta-language [System G2],
subject to the condition that a *counterpart* of such a concept [say,
‘conjunction’] is sub-sequently definable, or otherwise derivable, in the
object-language [System G1].”Grice concludes by emphasizing the
point of the manoeuvre: “So, the more
economically one introduces a primitive object-language concept, the less of a
task one leaves oneself for the morrow.” [Grice 1986]. With
uncharacteristic humbleness, Grice notes that while he was able to formulate
and label “Bootstrap,” he never cared to establish its ‘validity.’ We hope we
have! “Q. E. D.,” as they say! Cf. Terres, , Inquiry17: In conclusion, the pragmatic
interpretation of substructural logics may be a new and interesting research
field for the logical pluralist who wishes to endorse classical and/or
substructural logics, but also for the logical monist who aims to interpret
their divergence with a pluralist logician. The possibility is also open of an
interesting dialogue between philosophical logicians and philosophers of
language as they explore the pragmatic contributions of a logical constant to
the meaning of a complete utterance, given that a substructural logic encodes
what has been discussed by philosophers of language, the enriched ‘explicatum’
of the logical constant. And Grice. References: Werner
Abraham, ‘A linguistic approach to metaphor.’ in Abraham, Ut videam:
contributions to an understanding of linguistics. Jeffrey C. Beall
and Greg Restall. ‘Logical consequence,’ in Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2009 edition, 2009. Rudolf Carnap, 1942. Introduction to Semantics.
L.J. Cohen, 1971. Grice on the logical particles
of natural language, in Bar-Hillel, Pragmatics of Natural language, repr. in
Cohen, Language and knowledge.L.J. Cohen, 1977. ‘Can the conversationalist
hypothesis be defended?’ Philosophical Studies, repr. in Cohen, Logic and
knowledge. Davidson, Donald and J. Hintikka (1969). Words and objections:
essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Bart Geurts, Quantity implicaturums.Bart
Geurts and Nausicaa Pouscoulous. Embedded implicaturums?!? Semantics and
pragmatics, 2:4–1, 2009.Jean-Yves Girard. Linear logic: its syntax and
semantics. London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series, 1–42, 1995.H.P. Grice. 1967a. ‘Prolegomena,’
in Studies in the Way of Words.H.P. Grice. 1967b. Logic and conversation.
Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pages
22–40, 1989.H.P. Grice. 1967c. ‘Indicative conditionals. Studies in the Way of
Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pages 58–85, 1989.H.P. Grice. 1969. ‘Vacuous Names,’ in Words and
objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine, edited by Donald Davidson and
Jaako Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel. H.P. Grice, 1981. ‘Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum,’ in Paul Cole, Radical Pragmatics, New York,
Academic Press. H.P. Grice, 1986. ‘Reply to Richards,’
in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, ed. by
Richard Grandy and Richard Warner, Oxford: The Clarendon Press.H.P. Grice.
2001. Aspects of reason, being the John Locke Lectures delivered at Oxford,
Oxford: Clarendon. H.P. Grice, n.d. ‘Entailment,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Loar, B. F. Meaning and mind. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Mates, Benson, Elementary Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.George
Myro, 1986. ‘Time and identity,’ in Richard Grandy and Richard Warner,
Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Francesco Paoli, Substructural logic. Arthur Pap. 1949. ‘Are
all necessary propositions analytic?’, repr. in The limits of logical
empiricism.Peacocke, Christopher A. B. (1976), What is a logical constant? The
Journal of Philosophy.Quine, W. V. O. 1969. ‘Reply to H. P. Grice,’ in Davidson
and Hintikka, Words and objections: esssays on the work of W. V. Quine.
Dordrecht: Reidel. Stephen Read, A philosophical approach to inference. A.Rieger, A simple
theory of conditionals. Analysis, 2006.Robert
van Rooij. . ‘Conversational implicaturums,’Gilbert Ryle. 1954. ‘Formal and
Informal logic,’ in Dilemmas, The Tarner Lectures 1953. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, Chapter 8. Florian
Steinberger. The normative status of logic. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, spring edition, .P. F. Strawson (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory.
London: Methuen.P. F. Strawson (1986). ‘‘If’ and ‘⊃’’
R. Grandy and R. O. Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Intentions,
Categories, Ends, repr. in his “Entity and Identity, and Other Essays. Oxford:
Clarendon PressJ.O. Urmson. Philosophical analysis: its development between the
two world wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. R. C. S. Walker. “Conversational
implicaturum,”
in S. W. Blackburn, Meaning, reference, and necessity. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1975, 133-81A. N.
Whitehead and B. A. W. Russell, 1913. Principia Mathematica. Cambridge
University Press. Conjunctum --
conjunction, the logical operation on a pair of propositions that is typically
indicated by the coordinating conjunction ‘and’. The truth table for
conjunction is Besides ‘and’, other coordinating conjunctions, including ‘but’,
‘however’, ‘moreover’, and ‘although’, can indicate logical conjunction, as can
the semicolon ‘;’ and the comma ‘,’.
conjunction elimination. 1 The argument form ‘A and B; therefore, A or
B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to
infer either conjunct from a conjunction. This is also known as the rule of
simplification or 8-elimination.
conjunction introduction. 1 The argument form ‘A, B; therefore, A and B’
and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer a
conjunction from its two conjuncts. This is also known as the rule of
conjunction introduction, 8-introduction, or adjunction. Conjunctum -- Why
Grice used inverse V as symbol for “and” Conjunctum -- De Morgan, A. prolific
British mathematician, logician, and philosopher of mathematics and logic. He
is remembered chiefly for several lasting contributions to logic and philosophy
of logic, including discovery and deployment of the concept of universe of
discourse, the cofounding of relational logic, adaptation of what are now known
as De Morgan’s laws, and several terminological innovations including the
expression ‘mathematical induction’. His main logical works, the monograph
Formal Logic 1847 and the series of articles “On the Syllogism” 184662,
demonstrate wide historical and philosophical learning, synoptic vision,
penetrating originality, and disarming objectivity. His relational logic
treated a wide variety of inferences involving propositions whose logical forms
were significantly more complex than those treated in the traditional framework
stemming from Aristotle, e.g. ‘If every doctor is a teacher, then every
ancestor of a doctor is an ancestor of a teacher’. De Morgan’s conception of
the infinite variety of logical forms of propositions vastly widens that of his
predecessors and even that of his able contemporaries such as Boole, Hamilton,
Mill, and Whately. De Morgan did as much as any of his contemporaries toward
the creation of modern mathematical logic.
-- De Morgan’s laws, the logical principlesA 8 B SA 7B,A 7 B SA 8B,-A 8B
S A 7 B, and- A 7B S A 8 B, though the term is occasionally used to cover only
the first two. Refs.The main published source is
“Studies in the Way of Words” (henceforth, “WOW”), I (especially Essays 1 and
4), “Presupposition and conversational implicaturum,” in P. Cole, and the two
sets on ‘Logic and conversation,’ in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
CVM-NECTUM: Connectum: from con-nexusnexus is the
keyconnectionsyntagma –syncategorematacategoremata -- connected, said of a
relation R where, for any two distinct elements x and y of the domain, either
xRy or yRx. R is said to be strongly connected if, for any two elements x and
y, either xRy or yRx, even if x and y are identical. Given the domain of positive
integers, for instance, the relation ‹ is connected, since for any two distinct
numbers a and b, either a ‹ b or b ‹ a. ‹ is not strongly connected, however,
since if a % b we do not have either a ‹ b or b ‹ a. The relation o, however,
is Confucius connected 174 174 strongly
connected, since either a o b or b o a for any two numbers, including the case
where a % b. An example of a relation that is not connected is the subset
relation 0, since it is not true that for any two sets A and B, either A 0 B or
B 0 A. connectionism, an approach to
modeling cognitive systems which utilizes networks of simple processing units
that are inspired by the basic structure of the nervous system. Other names for
this approach are neural network modeling and parallel distributed processing.
Connectionism was pioneered in the period 065 by researchers such as Frank
Rosenblatt and Oliver Selfridge. Interest in using such networks diminished
during the 0s because of limitations encountered by existing networks and the
growing attractiveness of the computer model of the mind according to which the
mind stores symbols in memory and registers and performs computations upon
them. Connectionist models enjoyed a renaissance in the 0s, partly as the
result of the discovery of means of overcoming earlier limitations e.g.,
development of the back-propagation learning algorithm by David Rumelhart,
Geoffrey Hinton, and Ronald Williams, and of the Boltzmann-machine learning
algorithm by David Ackley, Geoffrey Hinton, and Terrence Sejnowski, and partly
as limitations encountered with the computer model rekindled interest in
alternatives. Researchers employing connectionist-type nets are found in a
variety of disciplines including psychology, artificial intelligence,
neuroscience, and physics. There are often major differences in the endeavors
of these researchers: psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers are
interested in using these nets to model cognitive behavior, whereas
neuroscientists often use them to model processing in particular neural
systems. A connectionist system consists of a set of processing units that can
take on activation values. These units are connected so that particular units
can excite or inhibit others. The activation of any particular unit will be determined
by one or more of the following: inputs from outside the system, the
excitations or inhibitions supplied by other units, and the previous activation
of the unit. There are a variety of different architectures invoked in
connectionist systems. In feedforward nets units are clustered into layers and
connections pass activations in a unidirectional manner from a layer of input
units to a layer of output units, possibly passing through one or more layers
of hidden units along the way. In these systems processing requires one pass of
processing through the network. Interactive nets exhibit no directionality of
processing: a given unit may excite or inhibit another unit, and it, or another
unit influenced by it, might excite or inhibit the first unit. A number of
processing cycles will ensue after an input has been given to some or all of
the units until eventually the network settles into one state, or cycles
through a small set of such states. One of the most attractive features of
connectionist networks is their ability to learn. This is accomplished by
adjusting the weights connecting the various units of the system, thereby
altering the manner in which the network responds to inputs. To illustrate the
basic process of connectionist learning, consider a feedforward network with
just two layers of units and one layer of connections. One learning procedure
commonly referred to as the delta rule first requires the network to respond,
using current weights, to an input. The activations on the units of the second
layer are then compared to a set of target activations, and detected
differences are used to adjust the weights coming from active input units. Such
a procedure gradually reduces the difference between the actual response and
the target response. In order to construe such networks as cognitive models it
is necessary to interpret the input and output units. Localist interpretations
treat individual input and output units as representing concepts such as those
found in natural language. Distributed interpretations correlate only patterns
of activation of a number of units with ordinary language concepts. Sometimes
but not always distributed models will interpret individual units as
corresponding to microfeatures. In one interesting variation on distributed representation,
known as coarse coding, each symbol will be assigned to a different subset of
the units of the system, and the symbol will be viewed as active only if a
predefined number of the assigned units are active. A number of features of
connectionist nets make them particularly attractive for modeling cognitive
phenomena in addition to their ability to learn from experience. They are
extremely efficient at pattern-recognition tasks and often generalize very well
from training inputs to similar test inputs. They can often recover complete
patterns from partial inputs, making them good models for content-addressable
memory. Interactive networks are particularly useful in modeling cognitive
tasks in which multiple constraints must be satisfied simultaneously, or in
which the goal is to satisfy competing constraints as well as possible. In a
natural manner they can override some constraints on a problem when it is not
possible to satisfy all, thus treating the constraints as soft. While the
cognitive connectionist models are not intended to model actual neural
processing, they suggest how cognitive processes can be realized in neural
hardware. They also exhibit a feature demonstrated by the brain but difficult
to achieve in symbolic systems: their performance degrades gracefully as units
or connections are disabled or the capacity of the network is exceeded, rather
than crashing. Serious challenges have been raised to the usefulness of
connectionism as a tool for modeling cognition. Many of these challenges have
come from theorists who have focused on the complexities of language,
especially the systematicity exhibited in language. Jerry Fodor and Zenon
Pylyshyn, for example, have emphasized the manner in which the meaning of
complex sentences is built up compositionally from the meaning of components,
and argue both that compositionality applies to thought generally and that it
requires a symbolic system. Therefore, they maintain, while cognitive systems
might be implemented in connectionist nets, these nets do not characterize the
architecture of the cognitive system itself, which must have capacities for
symbol storage and manipulation. Connectionists have developed a variety of
responses to these objections, including emphasizing the importance of cognitive
functions such as pattern recognition, which have not been as successfully
modeled by symbolic systems; challenging the need for symbol processing in
accounting for linguistic behavior; and designing more complex connectionist
architectures, such as recurrent networks, capable of responding to or
producing systematic structures.
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