IN PLICATVRVM XIII/XX

 

Harrisianism: philosopher of languageclassical. Grice adored him, and he was quite happy that few knew about Harris! Cf. Tooke. Cf. Priestley and Hartleyall pre-Griceian philosohers of language that are somehow outside the canon, when they shouldn’t. They are very Old World, and it’s the influence of the New World that has made them sort of disappear! That’s what Grice said!

 

Hartianism: h. l. a.cited by Grice, “Hare on ‘carefully.’ Philosopher of European ancestry born in Yorkshire, principally responsible for the revival of legal and political philosophy after World War II. After wartime work with military intelligence, Hart gave up a flourishing law practice to join the Oxford faculty, where he was a brilliant lecturer, a sympathetic and insightful critic, and a generous mentor to many scholars. Like the earlier “legal positivists” Bentham and John Austin, Hart accepted the “separation of law and morals”: moral standards can deliberately be incorporated in law, but there is no automatic or necessary connection between law and sound moral principles. In The Concept of Law 1 he critiqued the Bentham-Austin notion that laws are orders backed by threats from a political community’s “sovereign”  some person or persons who enjoy habitual obedience and are habitually obedient to no other human  and developed the more complex idea that law is a “union of primary and secondary rules.” Hart agreed that a legal system must contain some “obligation-imposing” “primary” rules, restricting freedom. But he showed that law also includes independent “power-conferring” rules that facilitate choice, and he demonstrated that a legal system requires “secondary” rules that create public offices and authorize official action, such as legislation and adjudication, as well as “rules of recognition” that determine which other rules are valid in the system. Hart held that rules of law are “open-textured,” with a core of determinate meaning and a fringe of indeterminate meaning, and thus capable of answering some but not all legal questions that can arise. He doubted courts’ claims to discover law’s meaning when reasonable competing interpretations are available, and held that courts decide such “hard cases” by first performing the important “legislative” function of filling gaps in the law. Hart’s first book was an influential study with A. M. Honoré of Causation in the Law 9. His inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence, “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” 3, initiated a career-long study of rights, reflected also in Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 2 and in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 3. He defended liberal public policies. In Law, Liberty and Morality 3 he refuted Lord Devlin’s contention that a society justifiably enforces the code of its moral majority, whatever it might be. In The Morality of the Criminal Law 5 and in Punishment and Responsibility 8, Hart contributed substantially to both analytic and normative theories of crime and punishment.

 

Hartleyianism: British philosopher. Although the notion of association of ideas is ancient, he is generally regarded as the founder of associationism as a self-sufficient psychology. Despite similarities between his association psychology and Hume’s, Hartley developed his system independently, acknowledging only the writings of clergyman John Gay 1699 1745. Hartley was one of many Enlightenment thinkers aspiring to be “Newtons of the mind,” in Peter Gay’s phrase. In Hartley, this took the form of uniting association philosophy with physiology, a project later brought to fruition by Bain. His major work, Observations on Man 1749, pictured mental events and neural events as operating on parallel tracks in which neural events cause mental events. On the mental side, Hartley distinguished like Hume between sensation and idea. On the physiological side, Hartley adopted Newton’s conception of nervous transmission by vibrations of a fine granular substance within nerve-tubes. Vibrations within sensory nerves peripheral to the brain corresponded to the sensations they caused, while small vibrations in the brain, vibratiuncles, corresponded to ideas. Hartley proposed a single law of association, contiguity modified by frequency, which took two forms, one for the mental side and one for the neural: ideas, or vibratiuncles, occurring together regularly become associated. Hartley distinguished between simultaneous association, the link between ideas that occur at the same harmony, preestablished Hartley, David 362    AM  362 moment, and successive association, between ideas that closely succeed one another. Successive associations occur only in a forward direction; there are no backward associations, a thesis generating much controversy in the later experimental study of memory.

 

Hartleyianism: Josephphilosopher. Hartmann: philosopher who sought to synthesize the thought of Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The most important of his essays is “Philosophie des Unbewussten.” For Hartmann both will and idea are interrelated and are expressions of an absolute “thing-in-itself,” the unconscious. The unconscious is the active essence in natural and psychic processes and is the teleological dynamic in organic life. Paradoxically, he claimed that the teleology immanent in the world order and the life process leads to insight into the irrationality of the “will-to-live.” The maturation of rational consciousness would, he held, lead to the negation of the total volitional process and the entire world process would cease. Ideas indicate the “what” of existence and constitute, along with will and the unconscious, the three modes of being. Despite its pessimism, this work enjoyed considerable popularity. Hartmann was an unusual combination of speculative idealist and philosopher of science defending vitalism and attacking mechanistic materialism; his pessimistic ethics was part of a cosmic drama of redemption. Some of his later works dealt with a critical form of Darwinism that led him to adopt a positive evolutionary stance that undermined his earlier pessimism. His general philosophical position was selfdescribed as “transcendental realism.” His Philosophy of the Unconscious was tr. into English by W. C. Coupland in three volumes in 4. There is little doubt that his metaphysics of the unconscious prepared the way for Freud’s later theory of the unconscious mind. 

 

hazzing: under conjunctum, we see that the terminology is varied. There is the copulatum. But Grice prefers to restrict to use of the copulatum to izzing and hazzing. Oddly Grice sees hazzing as a predicate which he formalizes as Hxy. To be read x hazzes y, although sometimes he uses ‘x hazz y.’ Vide ‘accidentia.’ For Grice the role of métier is basic since it shows finality in nature. Homo sapiens, qua pirot, is to be rational.

 

Heno-theism, allegiance to one supreme deity while conceding existence to others; also described as monolatry, incipient monotheism, or practical monotheism. It occupies a middle ground between polytheism and radical monotheism, which denies reality to all gods save one. It has been claimed that early Judaism passed through a henotheistic phase, acknowledging other Middle Eastern deities albeit condemning their worship, en route to exclusive recognition of Yahweh. But the concept of progress from polytheism through henotheism to monotheism is a rationalizing construct, and cannot be supposed to capture the complex development of any historical religion, including that of ancient Israel.

 

Heraclitusianism -- fl. c.500 B.C., Grice on Heraclitus: They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,/They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remembered how often you and I/Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. Grecian philosopher. A transition figure between the Milesian philosophers and the later pluralists, Heraclitus stressed unity in the world of change. He follows the Milesians in positing a series of cyclical transformations of basic stuffs of the world; for instance, he holds that fire changes to water and earth in turn. Moreover, he seems to endorse a single source or arche of natural substances, namely fire. But he also observes that natural transformations necessarily involve contraries such as hot and cold, wet and dry. Indeed, without the one contrary the other would not exist, and without contraries the cosmos would not exist. Hence strife is justice, and war is the father and king of all. In the conflict of opposites there is a hidden harmony that sustains the world, symbolized by the tension of a bow or the attunement of a lyre. Scholars disagree about whether Heraclitus’s chief view is that there is a one in the many or that process is reality. Clearly the underlying unity of phenomena is important for him. But he also stresses the transience of physical substances and the importance of processes and qualities. Moreover, his underlying source of unity seems to be a law of process and opposition; thus he seems to affirm both the unity of phenomena and the reality of process. Criticizing his predecessors such as Pythagoras and Xenophanes for doing research without insight, Heraclitus claims that we should listen to the logos, which teaches that all things are one. The logos, a principle of order and knowledge, is common to all, but the many remain ignorant of it, like sleepwalkers unaware of the reality around them. All things come to pass according to the logos; hence it is the law of change, or at least its expression. Heraclitus wrote a single book, perhaps organized into sections on cosmology, politics and ethics, and theology. Apparently, however, he did not provide a continuous argument but a series of epigrammatic remarks meant to reveal the nature of reality through oracular and riddling language. Although he seems to have been a recluse without immediate disciples, he may have stirred Parmenides to his reaction against contraries. In the late fifth century B.C. Cratylus of Athens preached a radical Heraclitean doctrine according to which everything is in flux and there is accordingly no knowledge of the world. This version of Heracliteanism influenced Plato’s view of the sensible world and caused Plato and Aristotle to attribute a radical doctrine of flux to Heraclitus. Democritus imitated Heraclitus’s ethical sayings, and in Hellenistic times the Stoics appealed to him for their basic principles. 

 

hermetism, also hermeticism, a philosophical theology whose basic impulse was the gnostic conviction that human salvation depends on revealed knowledge gnosis of God and of the human and natural creations. Texts ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus, a Greco-Egyptian version of the Egyptian god Thoth, may have appeared as early as the fourth century B.C., but the surviving Corpus Hermeticum in Grecian and Latin is a product of the second and third centuries A.D. Fragments of the same literature exist in Grecian, Armenian, and Coptic as well; the Coptic versions are part of a discovery made at Nag Hammadi after World War II. All these Hermetica record hermetism as just described. Other Hermetica traceable to the same period but surviving in later Arabic or Latin versions deal with astrology, alchemy, magic, and other kinds of occultism. Lactantius, Augustine, and other early Christians cited Hermes but disagreed on his value; before Iamblichus, pagan philosophers showed little interest. Muslims connected Hermes with a Koranic figure, Idris, and thereby enlarged the medieval hermetic tradition, which had its first large effects in the Latin West among the twelfth-century Platonists of Chartres. The only ancient hermetic text then available in the West was the Latin Asclepius, but in 1463 Ficino interrupted his epochal translation of Plato to Latinize fourteen of the seventeen Grecian discourses in the main body of the Corpus Hermeticum as distinct from the many Grecian fragments preserved by Stobaeus but unknown to Ficino. Ficino was willing to move so quickly to Hermes because he believed that this Egyptian deity stood at the head of the “ancient theology” prisca theologia, a tradition of pagan revelation that ran parallel to Christian scripture, culminated with Plato, and continued through Plotinus and the later Neoplatonists. Ficino’s Hermes translation, which he called the Pimander, shows no interest in the magic and astrology about which he theorized later in his career. Trinitarian theology was his original motivation. The Pimander was enormously influential in the later Renaissance, when Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Lodovico Lazzarelli, Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples, Symphorien Champier, Francesco Giorgi, Agostino Steuco, Francesco Patrizi, and others enriched Western appreciation of Hermes. The first printed Grecian Hermetica was the 1554 edition of Adrien Turnebus. The last before the nineteenth century appeared in 1630, a textual hiatus that reflected a decline in the reputation of Hermes after Isaac Casaubon proved philologically in 1614 that the Grecian Hermetica had to be post-Christian, not the remains of primeval Egyptian wisdom. After Casaubon, hermetic ideas fell out of fashion with most Western philosophers of the current canon, but the historiography of the ancient theology remained influential for Newton and for lesser figures even later. The content of the Hermetica was out of tune with the new science, so Casaubon’s redating left Hermes to the theosophical heirs of Robert Fludd, whose opponents Kepler, Mersenne, Gassendi turned away from the Hermetica and similar fascinations of Renaissance humanist culture. By the nineteenth century, only theosophists took Hermes seriously as a prophet of pagan wisdom, but he was then rediscovered by G. students of Christianity and Hellenistic religions, especially Richard Reitzenstein, who published his Poimandres in 4. The ancient Hermetica are now read in the 654 edition of A. D. Nock and A. J. Festugière. 

 

heuristics, a rule or solution adopted to reduce the complexity of computational tasks, thereby reducing demands on resources such as time, memory, and attention. If an algorithm is a procedure yielding a correct solution to a problem, then a heuristic procedure may not reach a solution even if there is one, or may provide an incorrect answer. The reliability of heuristics varies between domains; the resulting biases are predictable, and provide information about system design. Chess, for example, is a finite game with a finite number of possible positions, but there is no known algorithm for finding the optimal move. Computers and humans both employ heuristics in evaluating intermediate moves, relying on a few significant cues to game quality, such as safety of the king, material balance, and center control. The use of these criteria simplifies the problem, making it computationally tractable. They are heuristic guides, reliable but limited in success. There is no guarantee that the result will be the best move or even good. They are nonetheless satisfactory for competent chess. Work on human judgment indicates a similar moral. Examples of judgmental infelicities support the view that human reasoning systematically violates standards for statistical reasoning, ignoring base rates, sample size, and correlations. Experimental results suggest that humans utilize judgmental heuristics in gauging probabilities, such as representativeness, or the degree to which an individual or event resembles a prototypical member of a category. Such heuristics produce reasonable judgments in many cases, but are of limited validity when measured by a Bayesian standard. Judgmental heuristics are biased and subject to systemic errors. Experimental support for the importance of these heuristics depends on cases in which subjects deviate from the normative standard. 

 

hierarchy, a division of mathematical objects into subclasses in accordance with an ordering that reflects their complexity. Around the turn of the century, analysts interested in the “descriptive set theory” of the real numbers defined and studied two systems of classification for sets of reals, the Borel (due to Emil Borel) and the G hierarchies. In the 1940s, logicians interested in recursion and definability (most importantly, Stephen Kleene) introduced and studied other hierarchies (the arithmetic, the hyperarithmetic, and the analytical hierarchies) of reals (identified with sets of natural numbers) and of sets of reals; the relations between this work and the earlier work were made explicit in the 1950s by J. Addison. Other sorts of hierarchies have been introduced in other corners of logic. All these so-called hierarchies have at least this in common: they divide a class of mathematical objects into subclasses subject to a natural well-founded ordering (e.g., by subsethood) that reflects the complexity (in a sense specific to the hierarchy under consideration) of the objects they contain. What follows describes several hierarchies from the study of definability. (For more historical and mathematical information see Descriptive Set Theory by Y. Moschovakis, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1980.) (1) Hierarchies of formulas. Consider a formal language L with quantifiers ‘E’ and ‘D’. Given a set B of formulas in L, we inductively define a hierarchy that treats the members of B as “basic.” Set P0 % S0 % B. Suppose sets Pn and Sn of formulas have been defined. Let Pn!1 % the set of all formulas of the form Q1u1 . . . Qmumw when u1, . . . , um are distinct variables, Q1, . . . , Qm are all ‘E’, m M 1, and w 1 Sn. Let Sn+1 % the set of all formulas of that form for Q1, . . . , Qm all ‘D’, and w 1 Pn. Here are two such hierarchies for languages of arithmetic. Take the logical constants to be truthfunctions, ‘E’ and ‘D’. (i) Let L0 % the first-order language of arithmetic, based on ‘%’, a two-place predicate-constant ‘‹’, an individual-constant for 0, functionconstants for successor, addition, and multiplication; ‘first-order’ means that bound variables are all first-order (ranging over individuals); we’ll allow free second-order variables (ranging over properties or sets of individuals). Let B % the set of bounded formulas, i.e. those formed from atomic formulas using connectives and bounded quantification: if w is bounded so are Eu(u ‹ t / w) and Du(u ‹ t & w). (ii) Let L1 % the second-order language of arithmetic (formed from L0 by allowing bound second-order variables); let B % the set of formulas in which no second-order variable is bound, and take all u1, . . . , um as above to be second-order variables. (2) Hierarchies of definable sets. (i) The Arithmetic Hierarchy. For a set of natural numbers (call such a thing ‘a real’) A : A 1 P0 n [ or S0 n ] if and only if A is defined over the standard model of arithmetic (i.e., with the constant for 0 assigned to 0, etc., and with the first-order variables ranging over the natural numbers) by a formula of L0 in Pn [respectively Sn] as described in (1.i). Set D0 n % P0 n Thus: In fact, all these inclusions are proper. This hierarchy classifies the reals simple enough to be defined by arithmetic formulas. Example: ‘Dy x % y ! y’ defines the set even of even natural numbers; the formula 1 S1, so even 1 S0 1; even is also defined by a formula in P1; so even 1 P0 1, giving even 1 D0 1. In fact, S0 1 % the class of recursively enumerable reals, and D0 1 % the class of recursive reals. The classification of reals under the arithmetic hierarchy reflects complexity of defining formulas; it differs from classification in terms of a notion of degree of unsolvability, that reflecting a notion of comparative computational complexity; but there are connections between these classifications. The Arithmetic Hierarchy extends to sets of reals (using a free second-order variable in defining sentences). Example: ‘Dx (Xx & Dy y % x ! x)’ 1 S1 and defines the set of those reals with an even number; so that set 1 S0 1.The Analytical Hierarchy. Given a real A : A 1 P1 n [S1 1] if and only if A is defined (over the standard model of arithmetic with second-order variables ranging over all sets of natural numbers) by a formula of L1 in Pn (respectively Sn) as described in (1.ii); D1 n % P1 n 3 S1 n. Similarly for a set of reals. The inclusions pictured above carry over, replacing superscripted 0’s by 1’s. This classifies all reals and sets of reals simple enough to have analytical (i.e., second-order arithmetic) definitions.The subscripted ‘n’ in ‘P0 n’, etc., ranged over natural numbers. But the Arithmetic Hierarchy is extended “upward” into the transfinite by the ramified-analytical hierarchy. Let R0 % the class of all arithmetical reals. For an ordinal a let Ra!1 % the class of all sets of reals definable by formulas of L1 in which second-order variables range only over reals in Rathis constraint imposes ramification. For a limit-ordinal l, let Rl % UaThe above hierarchies arise in arithmetic. Similar hierarchies arise in pure set theory; e.g. by transferring the “process” that produced the ramified analytical hierarchy to pure set theory we obtain the constructible hierarchy, defined by Gödel in his 1939 monograph on the continuum hypothesis.

 

hippocrates, philosopher from Cos. Some sixty treatises survive under his name, but it is doubtful whether he was the author of any of them. The Hippocratic corpus contains material from a wide variety of standpoints, ranging from an extreme empiricism that rejected all grand theory (On Ancient Medicine) to highly speculative theoretical physiology (On the Nature of Man, On Regimen). Many treatises were concerned with the accurate observation and classification of diseases (Epidemics) rather than treatment. Some texts (On the Art) defended the claims of medicine to scientific status against those who pointed to its inaccuracies and conjectural status; others (Oath, On Decorum) sketch a code of professional ethics. Almost all his treatises were notable for their materialism and rejection of supernatural “explanations”; their emphasis on observation; and their concern with the isolation of causal factors. A large number of texts are devoted to gynecology. The Hippocratic corpus became the standard against which later doctors measured themselves; and, via Galen’s rehabilitation and extension of Hippocratic method, it became the basis for Western medicine for two millennia.

 

Historia -- historicism, the doctrine that knowledge of human affairs has an irreducibly historical character and that there can be no ahistorical perspective for an understanding of human nature and society. What is needed instead is a philosophical explication of historical knowledge that will yield the rationale for all sound knowledge of human activities. So construed, historicism is a philosophical doctrine originating in the methodological and epistemological presuppositions of critical historiography. In the mid-nineteenth century certain German thinkers (Dilthey most centrally), reacting against positivist ideals of science and knowledge, rejected scientistic models of knowledge, replacing them with historical ones. They applied this not only to the discipline of history but to economics, law, political theory, and large areas of philosophy. Initially concerned with methodological issues in particular disciplines, historicism, as it developed, sought to work out a common philosophical doctrine that would inform all these disciplines. What is essential to achieve knowledge in the human sciences is to employ the ways of understanding used in historical studies. There should in the human sciences be no search for natural laws; knowledge there will be interpretive and rooted in concrete historical occurrences. As such it will be inescapably perspectival and contextual (contextualism). This raises the issue of whether historicism is a form of historical relativism. Historicism appears to be committed to the thesis that what for a given people is warrantedly assertible is determined by the distinctive historical perspective in which they view life and society. The stress on uniqueness and concrete specificity and the rejection of any appeal to universal laws of human development reinforce that. But the emphasis on cumulative development into larger contexts of our historical knowledge puts in doubt an identification of historicism and historical relativism. The above account of historicism is that of its main proponents: Meinecke, Croce, Collingwood, Ortega y Gasset, and Mannheim. But in the twentieth century, with Popper and Hayek, a very different conception of historicism gained some currency. For them, to be a historicist is to believe that there are “historical laws,” indeed even a “law of historical development,” such that history has a pattern and even an end, that it is the central task of social science to discover it, and that these laws should determine the direction of political action and social policy. They attributed (incorrectly) this doctrine to Marx but rightly denounced it as pseudo-science. However, some later Marxists (Lukács, Korsch, and Gramsci) were historicists in the original nonPopperian sense as was the critical theorist Adorno and hermeneuticists such as Gadamer.

 

heterological: Grice and Thomson go heterological. Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell’s remarks on heterological and its implicate. Grice is particularly interested in Russell’s philosophy because of the usual Oxonian antipathy towards his type of philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found in Russell a good point for dissent! If paradoxes were always sets of propositions or arguments or conclusions, they would always be meaningful. But some paradoxes are semantically flawed and some have answers that are backed by a pseudo-argument employing a defective lemma that lacks a truth-value. Grellings paradox, for instance, opens with a distinction between autological and heterological words. An autological word describes itself, e.g., polysyllabic is polysllabic, English is English, noun is a noun, etc. A heterological word does not describe itself, e.g., monosyllabic is not monosyllabic, Chinese is not Chinese, verb is not a verb, etc. Now for the riddle: Is heterological heterological or autological? If heterological is heterological, since it describes itself, it is autological. But if heterological is autological, since it is a word that does not describe itself, it is heterological. The common solution to this puzzle is that heterological, as defined by Grelling, is not what Grice a genuine predicate  ‒ Gricing is!In other words, Is heterological heterological? is without meaning. That does not mean that an utterer, such as Baron Russell, may implicate that he is being very witty by uttering the Grelling paradox! There can be no predicate that applies to all and only those predicates it does not apply to for the same reason that there can be no barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves. Grice seems to be relying on his friend at Christ Church, Thomson in On Some Paradoxes, in the same volume where Grice published his Remarks about the senses, Analytical Philosophy, Butler (ed.), Blackwell, Oxford, 104–119. Grice thought that Thomson was a genius, if ever there is one! Plus, Grice thought that, after St. Johns, Christ Church was the second most beautiful venue in the city of dreaming spires. On top, it is what makes Oxford a city, and not, as villagers call it, a town. Refs.: the main source is Grice’s essay on ‘heterologicality,’ but the keyword ‘paradox’ is useful, too, especially as applied to Grice’s own paradox and to what, after Moore, Grice refers to as the philosopher’s paradoxes. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

hobbesian implicatura -- hobbes: “Hobbes is a Griceian”Grice. Grice was a member of the Hobbes Society -- Thomas. English philosopher whose writings, especially the English version of Leviathan (1651), strongly influenced all of subsequent English moral and political philosophy. He also wrote a trilogy comprising De Cive (1642; English version, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, 1651), De Corpore (On the Body, 1655), and De Homine (On Man, 1658). Together with Leviathan (the revised Latin version of which was published in 1668), these are his major philosophical works. However, an early draft of his thoughts, The Elements of Law, Natural and Political(also known as Human Nature and De Corpore Politico), was published without permission in 1650. Many of the misinterpretations of Hobbes’s views on human nature come from mistaking this early work as representing his mature views. Hobbes was influential not only in England, but also on the Continent. He is the author of the third set of objections to Descartes’s Meditations. Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-politicus was deeply influenced by Hobbes, not only in its political views but also in the way it dealt with Scripture. Hobbes was not merely a philosopher; he was mathematical tutor to Charles II and also a classical scholar. His first published work was a translation of Thucydides (1628), and among his latest, about a half-century later, were translations of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. Hobbes’s philosophical views have a remarkably contemporary sound. In metaphysics, he holds a strong materialist view, sometimes viewing mental phenomena as epiphenomenal, but later moving toward a reductive or eliminative view. In epistemology he held a sophisticated empiricism, which emphasized the importance of language for knowledge. If not the originator of the contemporary compatibilist view of the relationship between free will and determinism (see The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, 1656), he was one of the primary influences. He also was one of the most important philosophers of language, explicitly noting that language is used not only to describe the world but to express attitudes and, performatively, to make promises and contracts. One of Hobbes’s outstanding characteristics is his intellectual honesty. Though he may have been timid (he himself claims that he was, explaining that his mother gave birth to him because of fright over the coming of the Spanish Armada), his writing shows no trace of it. During more than half his long lifetime he engaged in many philosophical controversies, which required considerably more courage in Hobbes’s day than at present. Both the Roman Catholic church and Oxford University banned the reading of his books and there was talk not only of burning his books but of burning Hobbes himself. An adequate interpretation of Hobbes requires careful attention to his accounts of human nature, reason, morality, and law. Although he was not completely consistent, his moral and political philosophy is remarkably coherent. His political theory is often thought to require an egoistic psychology, whereas it actually requires only that most persons be concerned with their own self-interest, especially their own preservation. It does not require that most not be concerned with other persons as well. All that Hobbes denies is an undifferentiated natural benevolence: “For if by nature one man should love another (that is) as man, there could no reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man, as being equally man.” His argument is that limited benevolence is not an adequate foundation upon which to build a state. Hobbes’s political theory does not require the denial of limited benevolence, he indeed includes benevolence in his list of the passions in Leviathan: “Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.” Psychological egoism not only denies benevolent action, it also denies action done from a moral sense, i.e., action done because one believes it is the morally right thing to do. But Hobbes denies neither kind of action. But when the words [’just’ and ‘unjust’] are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavor in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. Hobbes’s pessimism about the number of just people is primarily due to his awareness of the strength of the passions and his conviction that most people have not been properly educated and disciplined. Hobbes is one of the few philosophers to realize that to talk of that part of human nature which involves the passions is to talk about human populations. He says, “though the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned.” Though we may be aware of small communities in which mutual trust and respect make law enforcement unnecessary, this is never the case when we are dealing with a large group of people. Hobbes’s point is that if a large group of people are to live together, there must be a common power set up to enforce the rules of the society. That there is not now, nor has there ever been, any large group of people living together without such a common power is sufficient to establish his point. Often overlooked is Hobbes’s distinction between people considered as if they were simply animals, not modified in any way by education or discipline, and civilized people. Though obviously an abstraction, people as animals are fairly well exemplified by children. “Unless you give children all they ask for, they are peevish, and cry, aye and strike their parents sometimes; and all this they have from nature.” In the state of nature, people have no education or training, so there is “continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” But real people have been brought up in families; they are, at least to some degree, civilized persons, and how they will behave depends on how they are brought up. Hobbes does not say that society is a collection of misfits and that this is why we have all the trouble that we doa position congenial to the psychological egoist. But he does acknowledge that “many also (perhaps most men) either through defect of mind, or want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human nature; wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education.” Education and training may change people so that they act out of genuine moral motives. That is why it is one of the most important functions of the sovereign to provide for the proper training and education of the citizens. In the current debate between nature and nurture, on the question of behavior Hobbes would come down strongly on the side of nurture. Hobbes’s concept of reason has more in common with the classical philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle, where reason sets the ends of behavior, than with the modern tradition stemming from Hume where the only function of reason is to discover the best means to ends set by the passions. For Hobbes, reason is very complex; it has a goal, lasting selfpreservation, and it seeks the way to this goal. It also discovers the means to ends set by the passions, but it governs the passions, or tries to, so that its own goal is not threatened. Since its goal is the same in all people, it is the source of rules applying to all people. All of this is surprisingly close to the generally accepted account of rationality. We generally agree that those who follow their passions when they threaten their life are acting irrationally. We also believe that everyone always ought to act rationally, though we know that few always do so. Perhaps it was just the closeness of Hobbes’s account of reason to the ordinary view of the matter that has led to its being so completely overlooked. The failure to recognize that the avoidance of violent death is the primary goal of reason has distorted almost all accounts of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy, yet it is a point on which Hobbes is completely clear and consistent. He explicitly says that reason “teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution [mortem violentam] as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature.” He continually points out that it is a dictate of right reason to seek peace when possible because people cannot “expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war.” And he calls temperance and fortitude precepts of reason because they tend to one’s preservation. It has not generally been recognized that Hobbes regarded it as an end of reason to avoid violent death because he often talks of the avoidance of death in a way that makes it seem merely an object of a passion. But it is reason that dictates that one take all those measures necessary for one’s preservation; peace if possible, if not, defense. Reason’s dictates are categorical; it would be a travesty of Hobbes’s view to regard the dictates of reason as hypothetical judgments addressed to those whose desire for their own preservation happens to be greater than any conflicting desire. He explicitly deplores the power of the irrational appetites and expressly declares that it is a dictate of reason that one not scorn others because “most men would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander.” He does not say if you would rather die than suffer slander, it is rational to do so. Hobbes, following Aristotle, regards morality as concerned with character traits or habits. Since morality is objective, it is only those habits that are called good by reason that are moral virtues. “Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and therefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy (which we have demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or habits, that is, virtues.” Moral virtues are those habits of acting that the reason of all people must praise. It is interesting to note that it is only in De Homine that Hobbes explicitly acknowledges that on this account, prudence, temperance, and courage are not moral virtues. In De Cive he distinguishes temperance and fortitude from the other virtues and does not call them moral, but he does not explicitly deny that they are moral virtues. But in De Homine, he explicitly points out that one should not “demand that the courage and prudence of the private man, if useful only to himself, be praised or held as a virtue by states or by any other men whatsoever to whom these same are not useful.” That morality is determined by reason and that reason has as its goal self-preservation seems to lead to the conclusion that morality also has as its goal self-preservation. But it is not the selfpreservation of an individual person that is the goal of morality, but of people as citizens of a state. That is, moral virtues are those habits of persons that make it rational for all other people to praise them. These habits are not those that merely lead to an individual’s own preservation, but to the preservation of all; i.e., to peace and a stable society. Thus, “Good dispositions are those that are suitable for entering into civil society; and good manners (that is, moral virtues) are those whereby what was entered upon can be best preserved.” And in De Cive, when talking of morality, he says, “The goodness of actions consist[s] in this, that it [is] in order to peace, and the evil in this, that it [is] related to discord.” The nature of morality is a complex and vexing question. If, like Hobbes, we regard morality as applying primarily to those manners or habits that lead to peace, then his view seems satisfactory. It yields, as he notes, all of the moral virtues that are ordinarily considered such, and further, it allows one to distinguish courage, prudence, and temperance from the moral virtues. Perhaps most important, it provides, in almost self-evident fashion, the justification of morality. For what is it to justify morality but to show that reason favors it? Reason, seeking self-preservation, must favor morality, which seeks peace and a stable society. For reason knows that peace and a stable society are essential for lasting preservation. This simple and elegant justification of morality does not reduce morality to prudence; rather it is an attempt, in a great philosophical tradition stemming from Plato, to reconcile reason or rational self-interest and morality. In the state of nature every person is and ought to be governed only by their own reason. Reason dictates that they seek peace, which yields the laws of nature, but it also allows them to use any means they believe will best preserve themselves, which is what Hobbes calls The Right of Nature. Hobbes’s insight is to see that, except when one is in clear and present danger, in which case one has an inalienable right to defend oneself, the best way to guarantee one’s longterm preservation is to give up one’s right to act on one’s own decisions about what is the best way to guarantee one’s long-term preservation and agree to act on the decisions of that single person or group who is the sovereign. If all individuals and groups are allowed to act on the decisions they regard as best, not accepting the commands of the sovereign, i.e., the laws, as the overriding guide for their actions, the result is anarchy and civil war. Except in rare and unusual cases, uniformity of action following the decision of the sovereign is more likely to lead to long-term preservation than diverse actions following diverse decisions. And this is true even if each one of the diverse decisions, if accepted by the sovereign as its decision, would have been more likely to lead to long-term preservation than the actual decision that the sovereign made. This argument explains why Hobbes holds that sovereigns cannot commit injustice. Only injustice can properly be punished. Hobbes does not deny that sovereigns can be immoral, but he does deny that the immorality of sovereigns can properly be punished. This is important, for otherwise any immoral act by the sovereign would serve as a pretext for punishing the sovereign, i.e., for civil war. What is just and unjust is determined by the laws of the state, what is moral and immoral is not. Morality is a wider concept than that of justice and is determined by what leads to peace and stability. However, to let justice be determined by what the reason of the people takes to lead to peace and stability, rather than by what the reason of the sovereign decides, would be to invite discord and civil war, which is contrary to the goal of morality: a stable society and peace. One can create an air of paradox by saying that for Hobbes it is immoral to attempt to punish some immoral acts, namely, those of the sovereign. Hobbes is willing to accept this seeming paradox for he never loses sight of the goal of morality, which is peace. To summarize Hobbes’s system: people, insofar as they are rational, want to live out their natural lives in peace and security. To do this, they must come together into cities or states of sufficient size to deter attack by any group. But when people come together in such a large group there will always be some that cannot be trusted, and thus it is necessary to set up a government with the power to make and enforce laws. This government, which gets both its right to govern and its power to do so from the consent of the governed, has as its primary duty the people’s safety. As long as the government provides this safety the citizens are obliged to obey the laws of the state in all things. Thus, the rationality of seeking lasting preservation requires seeking peace; this in turn requires setting up a state with sufficient power to keep the peace. Anything that threatens the stability of the state is to be avoided. As a practical matter, Hobbes took God and religion very seriously, for he thought they provided some of the strongest motives for action. Half of Leviathan is devoted to trying to show that his moral and political views are supported by Scripture, and to discredit those religious views that may lead to civil strife. But accepting the sincerity of Hobbes’s religious views does not require holding that Hobbes regarded God as the foundation of morality. He explicitly denies that atheists and deists are subject to the commands of God, but he never denies that they are subject to the laws of nature or of the civil state. Once one recognizes that, for Hobbes, reason itself provides a guide to conduct to be followed by all people, there is absolutely no need to bring in God. For in his moral and political theory there is nothing that God can do that is not already done by reason. Grice read most of Hobbes, both in Latin (for his Lit. Hum.) and in English. When in “Meaning,” Grice says “this is what people are getting at with their natural versus artificial signs”he means Hobbes.

 

Hobson’s choice:  willkürHobson’s choice. One of Grice’s favourite words from Kant“It’s so Kantish!” I told Pears about this, and having found it’s cognate with English ‘choose,’ he immediately set to write an essay on the topic!” f., ‘option, discretion, caprice,’ from MidHG. willekür, f., ‘free choice, free will’; gee kiesen and Kur-kiesen, verb, ‘to select,’ from Middle High German kiesen, Old High German chiosan, ‘to test, try, taste for the purpose of testing, test by tasting, select after strict examination.’ Gothic kiusan, Anglo-Saxon ceósan, English to choose. Teutonic root kus (with the change of s into r, kur in the participle erkoren, see also Kur, ‘choice’), from pre-Teutonic gus, in Latin gus-tus, gus-tare, Greek γεύω for γεύσω, Indian root juš, ‘to select, be fond of.’ Teutonic kausjun passed as kusiti into Slavonic. There is an oil portrait of Thomas Hobson, in the National Portrait Gallery, London. He looks straight to the artist and is dressed in typical Tudor dress, with a heavy coat, a ruff, and tie tails Thomas Hobson, a portrait in the National Portrait Gallery, London. A Hobson's choice is a free choice in which only one thing is offered. Because a person may refuse to accept what is offered, the two options are taking it or taking nothing. In other words, one may "take it or leave it".  The phrase is said to have originated with Thomas Hobson (1544–1631), a livery stable owner in Cambridge, England, who offered customers the choice of either taking the horse in his stall nearest to the door or taking none at all. According to a plaque underneath a painting of Hobson donated to Cambridge Guildhall, Hobson had an extensive stable of some 40 horses. This gave the appearance to his customers that, upon entry, they would have their choice of mounts, when in fact there was only one: Hobson required his customers to choose the horse in the stall closest to the door. This was to prevent the best horses from always being chosen, which would have caused those horses to become overused. Hobson's stable was located on land that is now owned by St Catharine's College, Cambridge.  Early appearances in writing According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first known written usage of this phrase is in The rustick's alarm to the Rabbies, written by Samuel Fisher in 1660:  If in this Case there be no other (as the Proverb is) then Hobson's choice...which is, chuse whether you will have this or none.  It also appears in Joseph Addison's paper The Spectator (No. 509 of 14 October 1712); and in Thomas Ward's 1688 poem "England's Reformation", not published until after Ward's death. Ward wrote:  Where to elect there is but one, 'Tis Hobson's choice—take that, or none. The term "Hobson's choice" is often used to mean an illusion of choice, but it is not a choice between two equivalent options, which is a Morton's fork, nor is it a choice between two undesirable options, which is a dilemma. Hobson's choice is one between something or nothing.  John Stuart Mill, in his book Considerations on Representative Government, refers to Hobson's choice:  When the individuals composing the majority would no longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either voting for the person brought forward by their local leaders, or not voting at all. In another of his books, The Subjection of Women, Mill discusses marriage:  Those who attempt to force women into marriage by closing all other doors against them, lay themselves open to a similar retort. If they mean what they say, their opinion must evidently be, that men do not render the married condition so desirable to women, as to induce them to accept it for its own recommendations. It is not a sign of one's thinking the boon one offers very attractive, when one allows only Hobson's choice, 'that or none'.... And if men are determined that the law of marriage shall be a law of despotism, they are quite right in point of mere policy, in leaving to women only Hobson's choice. But, in that case, all that has been done in the modern world to relax the chain on the minds of women, has been a mistake. They should have never been allowed to receive a literary education.  A Hobson's choice is different from:  Dilemma: a choice between two or more options, none of which is attractive. False dilemma: only certain choices are considered, when in fact there are others. Catch-22: a logical paradox arising from a situation in which an individual needs something that can only be acquired by not being in that very situation. Morton's fork, and a double bind: choices yield equivalent, and often undesirable, results. Blackmail and extortion: the choice between paying money (or some non-monetary good or deed) or risk suffering an unpleasant action. A common error is to use the phrase "Hobbesian choice" instead of "Hobson's choice", confusing the philosopher Thomas Hobbes with the relatively obscure Thomas Hobson  (It's possible they may be confusing "Hobson's choice" with "Hobbesian trap", which refers to the trap into which a state falls when it attacks another out of fear). Notwithstanding that confused usage, the phrase "Hobbesian choice" is historically incorrect. Common law In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983), Justice Byron White dissented and classified the majority's decision to strike down the "one-house veto" as unconstitutional as leaving Congress with a Hobson's choice. Congress may choose between "refrain[ing] from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking function to the executive branch and independent agency".  In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), the majority opinion ruled that a New Jersey law which prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste from other states into New Jersey was unconstitutional based on the Commerce Clause. The majority reasoned that New Jersey cannot discriminate between the intrastate waste and the interstate waste with out due justification. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated:  [According to the Court,] New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leaving itself to cast about for a presently nonexistent solution to the serious problem of disposing of the waste generated within its own borders, or it must accept waste from every portion of the United States, thereby multiplying the health and safety problems which would result if it dealt only with such wastes generated within the State. Because past precedents establish that the Commerce Clause does not present appellees with such a Hobson's choice, I dissent.  In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) the judgement of the court was that  [T]here was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman Amendment, by putting municipalities to the Hobson's choice of keeping the peace or paying civil damages, attempted to impose obligations to municipalities by indirection that could not be imposed directly, thereby threatening to "destroy the government of the states".  In the South African Constitutional Case MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v Pillay, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) Chief Justice Langa for the majority of the Court (in Paragraph 62 of the judgement) writes that:  The traditional basis for invalidating laws that prohibit the exercise of an obligatory religious practice is that it confronts the adherents with a Hobson's choice between observance of their faith and adherence to the law. There is however more to the protection of religious and cultural practices than saving believers from hard choices. As stated above, religious and cultural practices are protected because they are central to human identity and hence to human dignity which is in turn central to equality. Are voluntary practices any less a part of a person's identity or do they affect human dignity any less seriously because they are not mandatory?  In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and added in one of the footnotes that the petitioners "faced a Hobson’s choice: accept arbitration on their employer’s terms or give up their jobs".  In Trump et al v. Mazars USA, LLP, US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia No. 19-5142, 49 (D.C. Cir. 11 October ) ("[w]orse still, the dissent’s novel approach would now impose upon the courts the job of ordering the cessation of the legislative function and putting Congress to the Hobson’s Choice of impeachment or nothing.").  Popular culture Hobson's Choice is a full-length stage comedy written by Harold Brighouse in 1915. At the end of the play, the central character, Henry Horatio Hobson, formerly a wealthy, self-made businessman but now a sick and broken man, faces the unpalatable prospect of being looked after by his daughter Maggie and her husband Will Mossop, who used to be one of Hobson's underlings. His other daughters have refused to take him in, so he has no choice but to accept Maggie's offer which comes with the condition that he must surrender control of his entire business to her and her husband, Will.  The play was adapted for film several times, including versions from 1920 by Percy Nash, 1931 by Thomas Bentley, 1954 by David Lean and a 1983 TV movie.  Alfred Bester's 1952 short story Hobson's Choice describes a world in which time travel is possible, and the option is to travel or to stay in one's native time.  In the 1951 Robert Heinlein book Between Planets, the main character Don Harvey incorrectly mentions he has a Hobson's choice. While on a space station orbiting Earth, Don needs to get to Mars, where his parents are. The only rockets available are back to Earth (where he is not welcome) or on to Venus.  In The Grim Grotto by Lemony Snicket, the Baudelaire orphans and Fiona are said to be faced with a Hobson's Choice when they are trapped by the Medusoid Mycelium Mushrooms in the Gorgonian Grotto: "We can wait until the mushrooms disappear, or we can find ourselves poisoned".In Bram Stoker's short story "The Burial of Rats", the narrator advises he has a case of Hobson's Choice while being chased by villains. The story was written around 1874.  The Terminal Experiment, a 1995 science fiction novel by Robert J. Sawyer, was originally serialised under the title Hobson's Choice.  Half-Life, a video game created in 1998 by Valve includes a Hobson's Choice in the final chapter. A human-like entity, known only as the 'G-Man', offers the protagonist Gordon Freeman a job, working under his control. If Gordon were to refuse this offer, he would be killed in an unwinnable battle, thus creating the 'illusion of free choice'.  In Early Edition, the lead character Gary Hobson is named after the choices he regularly makes during his adventures.  In an episode of Inspector George Gently, a character claims her resignation was a Hobson's choice, prompting a debate among other police officers as to who Hobson is.  In "Cape May" (The Blacklist season 3, episode 19), Raymond Reddington describes having faced a Hobson's choice in the previous episode where he was faced with the choice of saving Elizabeth Keen's baby and losing Elizabeth Keen or losing them both.  In his 1984 novel Job: A Comedy of Justice, Robert A. Heinlein's protagonist is said to have Hobson's Choice when he has the options of boarding the wrong cruise ship or staying on the island.  Remarking about the 1909 Ford Model T, US industrialist Henry Ford is credited as saying “Any customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black”  In 'The Jolly Boys' Outing', a 1989 Christmas Special episode of Only Fools and Horses, Alan states they are left with Hobson's Choice after their coach has blown up (due to a dodgy radio, supplied by Del). There's a rail strike, the last bus has gone, and their coach is out of action. They can't hitch-hike as there's 27 of them, and the replacement coach doesn't come till the next morning, thus their only choice is to stay in Margate for the night.  See also Buckley's Chance Buridan's ass Boulwarism Death and Taxes Locus of control Morton's fork No-win situation Standard form contract Sophie's Choice Zugzwang References  Barrett, Grant. "Hobson's Choice", A Way with Words  "Thomas Hobson: Hobson's Choice and Hobson's Conduit". Historyworks.  See Samuel Fisher. "Rusticus ad academicos in exercitationibus expostulatoriis, apologeticis quatuor the rustick's alarm to the rabbies or The country correcting the university and clergy, and ... contesting for the truth ... : in four apologeticall and expostulatory exercitations : wherein is contained, as well a general account to all enquirers, as a general answer to all opposers of the most truly catholike and most truly Christ-like Chistians called Quakers, and of the true divinity of their doctrine : by way of entire entercourse held in special with four of the clergies chieftanes, viz, John Owen ... Tho. Danson ... John Tombes ... Rich. Baxter ." Europeana. Retrieved 8 August .  See The Spectator with Notes and General Index, the Twelve Volumes Comprised in Two. Philadelphia: J.J. Woodward. 1832. p. 272. Retrieved 4 August . via Google Books  Ward, Thomas (1853). English Reformation, A Poem. New York: D.& J. Sadlier & Co. p. 373. Retrieved 8 August . via   See Mill, John Stuart (1861). Considerations on Representative Government (1 ed.). London: Parker, Son, & Bourn. p. 145. Retrieved 23 June . via Google Books  Mill, John Stuart (1869). The Subjection of Women (1869 first ed.). London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer.  51–2. Retrieved 28 July .  Hobbes, Thomas (1982) [1651]. Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. New York: Viking Press.  Martinich, A. P. (1999). Hobbes: A Biography. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.  978-0-521-49583-7.  Martin, Gary. "Hobson's Choice". The Phrase Finder. Archived from the original on 6 March 2009. Retrieved 7 August .  "The Hobbesian Trap" . 21 September . Retrieved 8 April .  "Sunday Lexico-Neuroticism". boaltalk.blogspot.com. 27 July 2008. Retrieved 7 August .  Levy, Jacob (10 June 2003). "The Volokh Conspiracy". volokh.com. Retrieved 7 August .  Oxford English Dictionary, Editor: "Amazingly, some writers have confused the obscure Thomas Hobson with his famous contemporary, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The resulting malapropism is beautifully grotesque". Garner, Bryan (1995). A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.  404–405.  supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/437/617/  "Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs.436 U.S. 658 (1978)". justicia.com. US Supreme Court. 6 June 1978. 436 U.S. 658. Retrieved 19 February .  "MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay (CCT 51/06) [2007] ZACC 21; 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC); 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (5 October 2007)". saflii.org.  Snicket, Lemony (2004) The Grim Grotto, New York: HarperCollins Publishers p.145147  Henry Ford in collaboration with Samuel Crowther in My Life and Work. 1922. Page 72 External links Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Hobson's Choice" . Encyclopædia Britannica. 13 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 553. Categories: English-language idiomsFree willMetaphors referring to peopleDilemmas. Refs.: H. P. Grice and D. F. Pears, The philosophy of action, Pears, Choosing and deciding. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

                                                                                                                  

hoc -- hic, the hæc, and the hoc, theGrice: “The proper way to enter this in a philosophical lexicon is via that favourite gender of philosophers: the epicene or neuter!” -- “Scotus was being clever. Since he wanted an abstract noun, and abstract nouns are feminine in both Greek and Latin (‘ippotes, eqquitas’), he chose the feminine ‘haec,’ to turn into a ‘thess.’ But we should expand his rather sexist view to apply to ‘hic’ and ‘hoc,’ too. In Anglo-Saxon, there is only ‘this,’ with ‘thess’ first used by Pope George. The OED first registers ‘thess’ in 1643.”cf. OED: "It is at its such-&-suchness, at its character -- in other words, at the _universal_ in it -- that we have to look. the first cite in the OED for 'thess' also features 'thatness': "thess,” from "this" + "-ness": rendering ‘haecceitas,’ the quality of being 'this' (as distinct from anything else): = haecceity. First cite: "It is evident that [...] THess, and THATness belong[...] not to matter by itself, but onely as [matter] is distinguished & individuated by the form." The two further quotes for 'thess' being: 1837 Whewell Hist Induct Sc 1857 I 244: "Which his school called ‘HAECcceity’from the feminine form of the demonstrative masculine ‘hic,’ in Roman, neutre ‘hoc’ (Scotus uses the femine because ‘-ity- is a feminine ending) -- or ‘thess.’", and 1895 Rashdall Universities II 532: "An individuating form called by the later Scotists its ‘haecceitas’ or its `thess'").  "The investing of the content, which is in Bradleian language a `what', with self-existent reality or ‘that-ness'." Athenaeum 24 Dec. 1904 868/2. -- OED, 'thatness'. Trudgill writes in _The Dialects of England_ (Oxford: Blackwell), that Grice would often consult (he was from Harborne and had a special interest in this“I seem to have lost my dialect when I moved to Corpus.” The 'this'-'that' demonstrative system is a two-way system which distinguishes between things which are distant and things which are near. Interestingly, however, a number of traditional dialects in England (if not Oxford) differ from this system in having what Grice called a Griceian _three_-way distinction. The Yorkshire dialect, for example, has ‘this’ (sing., near), ‘thir’ (pl. near), ‘that’ (sing. Medial) ‘tho’ (plural, medial), thon (sing. distal) and ‘thon’ (pl., distal). The Mercian Anglian dialect has ‘these’ (sing. near), ‘theys’ (plural, near), ‘that’ (sing. medial), ‘they’ (pl., medial), ‘thik’ (sing./pl., distal). “The northern dialect is better in that it distinguishes between the singular and the plural form for the distal, unlike the southern dialect which has ‘thik’ for either.” Grice. Still, Grice likes the sound of ‘thik’ and quotes from his friend M. Wakelin, _The Southwest of England_. "When I awoke one May day morn/I found an urge within me born/To see the beauteous countryside/That's all round wher'I do bide./So I set out wi' dog & stick,/ My head were just a trifle thick./But good ole' fresh air had his say/& blowed thik trouble clean away." -- B. Green, in _The Dorset Year Book_. Dorset: Society of Dorset Men. “Some like Russell, but Bradley’s MY man.”H. P. Grice: Grice: "Russell is pretentious; Bradley, an English angel, is not!" "Bradley can use 'thatness' freely; Russell uses it after Bradley and artificially." all the rest of the watery bulk : but return back those few  drops from whence they were taken, and the glass-full that  even now had an individuation by itself, loseth that, and  groweth one and the same with the other main stock : yet if  you fill your glass again, wheresoever you take it up, so it be  of the same uniform bulk of water you had before, it is the  same glassfuU of water that you had. But as I said before,  this example fitteth entirely no more than the other did. In  such abstracted speculations, where we must consider matter  without form, (which hath no actual being,) we must not expect  adequated examples in nature. But enough is said to make  a speculative man see, that if God should join the soul of a  lately dead man, (even whilst his dead corpse should lie en-  tire in his windingsheet here,) unto a body made of earth,  taken from some mountain in America; it were most true  and certain, that the body he should then live by, were the  same identical body he lived with before his death, and late  resurrection. It is evident, that sameness, thess, and that-  ness, belongeth not to matter by itself, (for a general indiffer-  ence runneth through it all,) but only as it is distinguished and  individuated by the form. Which in our case, whensoever  the same soul doth, it must be understood always to be the  same matter and body.” (Browne, 1643).  Grice. Corbin says that English is such a plastic language, “unlike Roman,” but then there’s haec, and hæcceitas -- Duns Scotus, J., Scottish Franciscan metaphysician and philosophical theologian. He lectured at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, where he died and his remains are still venerated. Modifying Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics as the science of being qua being, but univocally conceived, Duns Scotus showed its goal was to demonstrate God as the Infinite Being revealed to Moses as the “I am who am”, whose creative will is the source of the world’s contingency. Out of love God fashioned each creature with a unique “haecceity” or particularity formally distinct from its individualized nature. Descriptively identical with others of its kind, this nature, conceived in abstraction from haecceity, is both objectively real and potentially universal, and provides the basis for scientific knowledge that Peirce calls “Scotistic realism.” Duns Scotus brought many of Augustine’s insights, treasured by his Franciscan predecessors, into the mainstream of the Aristotelianism of his day. Their notion of the will’s “supersufficient potentiality” for self-determination he showed can be reconciled with Aristotle’s notion of an “active potency,” if one rejects the controDuhem thesis Duns Scotus, John 247   247 versial principle that “whatever is moved is moved by another.” Paradoxically, Aristotle’s criteria for rational and non-rational potencies prove the rationality of the will, not the intellect, for he claimed that only rational faculties are able to act in opposite ways and are thus the source of creativity in the arts. If so, then intellect, with but one mode of acting determined by objective evidence, is non-rational, and so is classed with active potencies called collectively “nature.” Only the will, acting “with reason,” is free to will or nill this or that. Thus “nature” and “will” represent Duns Scotus’s primary division of active potencies, corresponding roughly to Aristotle’s dichotomy of non-rational and rational. Original too is his development of Anselm’s distinction of the will’s twofold inclination or “affection”: one for the advantageous, the other for justice. The first endows the will with an “intellectual appetite” for happiness and actualization of self or species; the second supplies the will’s specific difference from other natural appetites, giving it an innate desire to love goods objectively according to their intrinsic worth. Guided by right reason, this “affection for justice” inclines the will to act ethically, giving it a congenital freedom from the need always to seek the advantageous. Both natural affections can be supernaturalized, the “affection for justice” by charity, inclining us to love God above all and for his own sake; the affection for the advantageous by the virtue of hope, inclining us to love God as our ultimate good and future source of beatitude. Another influential psychological theory is that of intuitive intellectual cognition, or the simple, non-judgmental awareness of a hereand-now existential situation. First developed as a necessary theological condition for the face-toface vision of God in the next life, intellectual intuition is needed to explain our certainty of primary contingent truths, such as “I think,” “I choose,” etc., and our awareness of existence. Unlike Ockham, Duns Scotus never made intellectual intuition the basis for his epistemology, nor believed it puts one in direct contact with any extramental substance material or spiritual, for in this life, at least, our intellect works through the sensory imagination. Intellectual intuition seems to be that indistinct peripheral aura associated with each direct sensory-intellectual cognition. We know of it explicitly only in retrospect when we consider the necessary conditions for intellectual memory. It continued to be a topic of discussion and dispute down to the time of Calvin, who, influenced by the Scotist John Major, used an auditory rather than a visual sense model of intellectual intuition to explain our “experience of God.”  haecceity from Latin haec, ‘this’, 1 loosely, thess; more specifically, an irreducible category of being, the fundamental actuality of an existent entity; or 2 an individual essence, a property an object has necessarily, without which it would not be or would cease to exist as the individual it is, and which, necessarily, no other object has. There are in the history of philosophy two distinct concepts of haecceity. The idea originated with the work of the thirteenthcentury philosopher Duns Scotus, and was discussed in the same period by Aquinas, as a positive perfection that serves as a primitive existence and individuation principle for concrete existents. In the seventeenth century Leibniz transformed the concept of haecceity, which Duns Scotus had explicitly denied to be a form or universal, into the notion of an individual essence, a distinctive nature or set of necessary characteristics uniquely identifying it under the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Duns Scotus’s haecceitas applies only to the being of contingently existent entities in the actual world, but Leibniz extends the principle to individuate particular things not only through the changes they may undergo in the actual world, but in any alternative logically possible world. Leibniz admitted as a consequence the controversial thesis that every object by virtue of its haecceity has each of its properties essentially or necessarily, so that only the counterparts of individuals can inhabit distinct logically possible worlds. A further corollary  since the possession of particular parts in a particular arrangement is also a property and hence involved in the individual essence of any complex object  is the doctrine of mereological essentialism: every composite is necessarily constituted by a particular configuration of particular proper parts, and loses its self-identity if any parts are removed or replaced. Grice was more familiar with the thatness than the thess (“Having had to read Bradley for my metaphysics paper!”).

 

hologram: the image of an object in three dimensions created and reproduced by the use of lasers. Holography is a method for recording and reproducing such images. Holograms are remarkable in that, unlike normal photographs, every part of them contains the complete image but in reduced detail. Thus a small square cut from a hologram can still be laser-illuminated to reveal the whole scene originally holographed, albeit with loss of resolution. This feature made the hologram attractive to proponents of the thesis of distribution of function in the brain, who argued that memories are like holograms, not being located in a single precise engramas claimed by advocates of localization of functionbut distributed across perhaps all of the cortex. Although intriguing, the holographic model of memory storage failed to gain acceptance. Current views favor D. O. Hebb’s “cell assembly” concept, in which memories are stored in the connections between a group of neurons.

 

Hoesle: Vittorio Hösle (Milano), filosofo. Nato da padre tedescoJohannes Hösle, docente di filologia romanzae da madre italiana Carla Gronda –, Vittorio Hösle trascorse la sua prima infanzia a Milano, dove il padre era direttore del Goethe Institut, e compì poi gli studi in Germania, dove la famiglia si era trasferita. Vero «enfant prodige» della filosofia, precoce e profondo conoscitore delle lingue antiche (greco, latino, sanscrito, ma anche pali e avestico) e di numerose lingue occidentali (ne parla sette ed è in grado di leggerne dodici), a ventidue anni si laureò con una tesi sulla filosofia antica (v. infra), a ventisei anni fu chiamato come professore associato alla New School for Social Research di New York e a trentadue anni divenne Professore all'Essen. Attualmente insegna alla Notre Dame University (Indiana) negli Stati Uniti. Il 6 agosto  è stato nominato Accademico ordinario della Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze Sociali da Papa Francesco.  Gli studi sul pensiero antico Alla «scoperta» di Hösle contribuì in modo determinante l'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, che lo chiamò a Napoli come borsista (venticinquenne) dell'Istituto negli anni 1985-1986. Nell'anno precedente l'Istituto aveva accolto nel suo programma editoriale la tesi di laurea di Hösle, un poderoso lavoro sulla filosofia antica di quasi 800 pagine intitolato Wahrheit und Geschichte. Studien zur Struktur der Philosophiegeschichte unter paradigmatischer Analyse der Entwicklung von Parmenides bis Platon (Verità e storia. Studi sulla struttura della storia della filosofia sulla base di un'analisi paradigmatica dell'evoluzione da Parmenide a Platone), promuovendone la pubblicazione per la casa editrice Frommann-Holzboog e successivamente una traduzione italiana per i tipi della Guerini e Associati. In quest'opera l'allora giovanissimo filosofo imposta in maniera originale il problema dei rapporti tra dimensione sistematica e dimensione storica della filosofia, analizzando lo sviluppo del pensiero greco da Parmenide a Platone.  Nel lavoro successivo, Die Vollendung der Tragödie im Spätwerk des Sophokles. Ästhetisch-historische Bemerkungen zur Struktur der attischen Tragödie (Il compimento della tragedia nell'opera tarda di Sofocle. Osservazioni storico-estetiche sulla struttura della tragedia attica)pubblicato nel 1984 dalla Fromann-Holzboog e in traduzione italiana nel 1986 da Bibliopolis –, Hösle, combinando l'approccio estetico con l'approccio filosofico, cerca di individuare una logica di sviluppo nella storia della tragedia greca e, in contrasto con l'approccio consueto, considera Sofocle come il compimento sintetico di questa storia: "il pensiero fondamentale espresso nell'opera tarda di Sofocle è sintesi dei principi che sono alla base dell'arte di Eschilo e di Euripide, principi che vengono fatti valere insieme da Sofocle e così portati alla loro verità".  Negli anni Ottanta Hösle, che a Regensburg era stato allievo del matematico e filosofo Imre Toth, si occupò anche del problema della matematica in Platone, scrivendo nel 1982 e nel 1984 alcuni saggi, che, per interessamento di Giovanni Reale, vengono tradotti in italiano e riuniti in un volume pubblicato nel 1994 dalla casa editrice "Vita e Pensiero" con il titolo I fondamenti dell'aritmetica e della geometria in Platone.  In anni recenti Hösle è tornato ad occuparsi della filosofia e della letteratura antiche. In un lavoro del 2004, Platoninterpretieren (Interpretare Platone), di cui è uscita nel 2007 anche la traduzione italiana, discute il problema delle interpretazioni di Platone enel volume del 2006, Der philosophische Dialog. Poetik eines Genres (Il dialogo filosofico. Poetica di un genere), analizza ilgenere del dialogo mettendo in connessione il punto di vista filosofico con il punto di vista letterario. Al problema della tragedia è poi dedicato il lavoro del 2009 Die Rangordnung der drei griechischen Tragiker (La gerarchia dei tre tragici greci).  Gli studi sull'idealismo tedesco e il problema della fondazione ultima riflessiva Nei suoi anni italiani a Napoli Hösle tenne una serie di seminari e di conferenze sull'idealismo tedesco, in particolare sul sistema di Hegel, e presentò diverse relazioni in convegni internazionali. Va ricordato il convegno sulla filosofia hegeliana del diritto (Napoli, 1984), i cui atti, pubblicati nel 1987 Christoph Jermann, amico e collaboratore del filosofo, col titolo Anspruch und Leistung von Hegels Rechtphilosophie, contengono, ben tre ampi saggi di Hösle, oltre a contributi dello stesso Jermann, di Kurt Seelmann e di Matthias Hartwig. Di uno di essi, Lo Stato in Hegel, esiste una traduzione italiana pubblicata nel 2008 per i tipi de "La città del Sole".  La riflessione hösliana sull'idealimo oggettivo di Hegel si sviluppa in stretta connessione col problema della "fondazione ultima riflessiva" (reflexive Letztbegründung) e con la soluzione fornita a tale problema dalla pragmatica trascendentale di Karl-Otto Apel. L'unica alternativa consistente al relativismo scettico, dominante nel panorama della filosofia contemporanea ed assurto oggi ad una sorta di principio dell'opinione pubblica, consiste, secondo Hösle, nell'impostazione riflessiva presente negli idealisti postkantiani e soprattutto in Hegel, impostazione che è necessario sviluppare con gli strumenti elaborati dalla filosofia contemporanea e in stretta connessione con i più recenti risultati delle scienze. Alla pragmatica trascendentale di Apel va riconosciuto il merito di aver riproposto in maniera originale la nozione di "fondazione ultima riflessiva", ma tale nozione va ripensata nella sua portata ontologica, superando il formalismo apeliano nella direzione di una formulazione profondamente rielaborata dell'idealismo oggettivo di matrice hegeliana.  In questa direzione, che culminerà nel poderoso lavoro del 1987 sul sistema di Hegel (v. infra), vanno le lezioni hegeliane tenute a Napoli da Hösle nel 1986 e parzialmente pubblicate in volume nel 1991 con il titolo Hegel e la fondazione dell'idealismo oggettivo, in cui è compresa anche la traduzione dell'importante saggio Begründungsfragen des objektiven Idealismus (Questioni di fondazione dell'idealismo oggettivo) scritto proprio nel 1987.  Della pragmatica trascendentale, soprattutto in relazione al problema decisivo della fondazione ultima riflessiva, Hösle tornò ad occuparsi alla fine degli anni Ottanta in una vasta monografia, Die Krise der Gegenwart und die Verantwortung der Philosophie (La crisi della contemporaneità e la responsabilità della filosofia), pubblicata nel 1990 (e tradotta in francese nel 2004): la filosofia di Apel viene analizzata all'interno delle più importanti tendenze della filosofia contemporanea, viene esposta in modo dettagliato la "prova" della fondazione ultima riflessiva (la cosiddetta "prova apagogica") e vengono discussi questioni relative al linguaggio privato, alla controversia “spiegare-comprendere (Erklären-Verstehen)” e alla fondazione dell'etica.  Gli studi su Vico e la traduzione in tedesco della Scienza Nuova Sempre in questo periodo Hösle intraprese la traduzione integrale in tedesco (la prima traduzione integrale in questa lingua) della Scienza nuova di Giambattista Vico nella terza edizione del 1744, compito affidatogli dall'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici e che egli, insieme a Christoph Jermann, portò a termine in tempi straordinariamente brevi. Il capolavoro vichiano uscì nel 1990 per i tipi della casa editrice Felix Meiner in due volumi; la traduzione è preceduta da una introduzione filologica e teoretica di quasi 300 pagine, in cui Hösle illustra il significato ancora attuale della concezione vichiana per una teoria delle scienze della cultura filosoficamente fondata. Questa introduzione è stata tradotta in italiano e pubblicata in volume nel 1997 con il titolo Introduzione a Vico. La scienza del mondo intersoggettivo per i tipi della Guerini e Associati.  Critica e riformulazione dell'idealismo oggettivo: Il sistema di Hegel La rilessione teoretica di Hösle culmina, come si è detto, nella riformulazione critica dell'idealismo oggettivo elaborata in un lavoro di vaste proporzioni, nato come scritto di abilitazione all'insegnamento universitario e pubblicato dalla casa editrice Felix Meiner nel 1987 in due volumi col titolo Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität (Il sistema di Hegel. L'idealismo della soggettività e il problema dell'intersoggettività). Sulla base di un'approfondita e articolata analisi, in primo luogo teoretica, del sistema hegeliano, la cui articolazione viene criticamente ripercorsa in modo dettagliato, Hösle vi sostiene la tesi seguente: l'aporia principale della filosofia di Hegel consiste nell'aver trascurato il problema dell'intersoggettività nella scienza della logica ossia nella parte fondativa del sistema; questa lacuna comporta un grave squilibrio nella struttura complessiva del sistema, in particolare, nella filosofia dello spirito oggettivo e dello spirito assoluto, che restano "scoperte" sul piano logico, ossia senza un corrispettivo categoriale in grado di fondare le strutture intersoggettive di cui trattano. Questa aporia fondamentale è alla radice delle altre aporie presenti nel sistema hegeliano, come, ad esempio, l'appiattimento del dover-essere sull'essere con la conseguente visione passatista e la questione della conclusione del sistema. Nel contempo Hösle cerca di mostrare come l'idea fondamentale dell'idealismo oggettivo sia teoreticamente ancora attuale e indispensabile sia per fondare in modo rigoroso la specificità del discorso filosofico sia per superare la scissione tra scienze della natura e scienze dello spirito che caratterizza in modo aporetico il pensiero moderno e contemporaneo.  Quest'opera ha avuto una vasta risonanza internazionale ed è stata tradotta in portoghese e parzialmente in coreano. Nel , promossa dall'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici e per i tipi della casa editrice "La scuola di Pitagora", è uscita la traduzione integrale italiana (comprendente anche la Postfazione scritta dall'Autore per la seconda edizione del 1998) col titolo Il sistema di Hegel. L'idealismo della soggettività e il problema dell'intersoggettività.  La riflessione sulla filosofia pratica A partire dagli anni Novanta del secolo trascorso Hösle spostò la sua riflessione dalla "filosofia prima" alla "filosofia seconda", occupandosi di problemi morali e politici, tra cui ha un posto di rilievo la questione dell'ecologia. Notevole eco hanno suscitato la sua Philosophie der ökologischen Krise (Filosofia della crisi ecologica) del 1991, che è stata tradotta in italiano, in francese, in russo, in croato, in coreano e parzialmente in olandese.  I suoi studi delle moderne scienze sociali, politologia ed economia soprattutto, sono poi confluiti in un poderoso lavoro di filosofia pratica elaborata sul fondamento dell'idealismo oggettivo: Moral und Politik. Grundlagen einer Politischen Ethik für das 21. Jahrhundert (Morale e politica. Fondamenti di un'etica politica per il XXI secolo), pubblicato nel 1997 da Beck e tradotto in inglese nel 2004, che costituisce senz'altro la sua opera più impegnativa dopo Il sistema di Hegel.  Vanno menzionche i saggi, scritti in tempi diversi e poi raccolti nel volume Praktische Philosophie in der modernen Welt del 1992, in cui vengono discussi problemi come quello della tecnica, della valutazione etica del capitalismo, del terzo mondo, della dialettica illuminismo/controilluminismo ecc.  Altri studi e ricerche Dei numerosissimi scritti di Hösle, che riflettono la vastità dei suoi interessi e dei suoi ambiti di ricerca, è impossibile dar conto in modo easustivo. Ne segnaliamo alcuni soltanto, avendo riguardo in particolare alle traduzioni italiane disponibili. Vanno ricordati, innanzi tutto, i lavori sul significato filosofico della teoria dell'evoluzione di Charles Darwin, tra cui il saggio del 1988 Tragweite und Grenzen der evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie, tradotto in italiano col titolo Portata e limiti della teoria evoluzionistica della conoscenza (Napoli 1996, La Città del Sole), e i lavori scritti in collaborazione col biologo Christian Illies, in particolare la monografia Darwin del 1999.  Un affascinante esempio di Kinderphilosophie o Philosophy for children è il best seller scritto da Hösle insieme all'adolescente Nora K.: Das Café der toten Philosophen. Ein philosophischer Briefwechsel für Kinder und Erwachsene uscito per le edizioni Beck nel 1996 e più volte ristampato. Il libro è stato tradotto in italiano nel 1999 col titolo Aristotele e il dinosauro. La filosofia spiegata a una ragazzina, nonché in inglese, olandese, spagnolo, portoghese, portoghese/brasiliano, catalano, persiano, coreano, giapponese, turco, taiwanese, cinese e indonesiano.  Va ricordato infine il saggio su Woody Allen, Woody Allen. Versuch über das Komische (Woody Allen. Sulla comicità), uscito nel 2001 da Beck, e di cui esiste anche la versione inglese (2007), a riprova del costante interesse nutrito da Hösle per le forme d'arte, come il teatro e il cinema, in cui l'intersoggettivitàla categoria centrale della sua riflessione filosoficagioca un ruolo determinante.  Note  Il compimento della tragedia nell'opera tarda di Sofocle. Osservazioni storico-estetiche sulla struttura della tragedia attica, Napoli 1986, Bibliopolis17  Nel 2006 sono state pubblicate anche le lezioni sulla filosofia hegeliana della religione, tenute da Hösle a Napoli nel 1985, col titolo Il concetto di filosofia della religione in Hegel per l'editrice "La Scuola di Pitagora".  Die Krise der Gegenwart und die Verantwortung der Philosophie'. Transzendentalpragmatik, Letztbegründung und Ethik, München 1990, Beck.'  Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker, Tl.1-2, Hamburg 1990, Felix Meiner.  Opere principali di Hösle Platons Grundlegung der Euklidizität der Geometrie, in: "Philologus", 126 (1982); Zu Platons Philosophie der Zahlen und deren mathematischer und philosophischer Bedeutung, in: "Theologie und Philosophie", 59 (1984 [I fondamenti dell'aritmetica e della geometria in Platone (tr. di E. Cattanei, Introduzione di G.Reale), Milano 1994, Vita e pensiero]. Wahrheit und Geschichte. Studien zur Struktur der Philosophiegeschichte unter paradigmatischer Analyse der Entwicklung von Parmenides bis Platon, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1984, Frommann-Holzboog [Verità e storia. Studi sulla struttura della storia della filosofia sulla base di un'analisi paradigmatica dell'evoluzione da Parmenide a Platone (A. Tassi; senza la III parte per volontà dell'Autore), Milano 1998, Guerini e Associati (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi FilosoficiHegeliana 24)]. Die Vollendung der Tragödie im Spätwerk des Sophokles. Ästhetisch-historische Bemerkungen zur Struktur der attischen Tragödie, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1984, Frommann-Holzboog [Il compimento della tragedia nell'opera tarda di Sofocle. Osservazioni storico-estetiche sulla struttura della tragedia attica (A. Gargano), Napoli 1986, Bibliopolis (Memorie dell'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici 16)]. Il concetto di filosofia della religione in Hegel (trascrizione delle lezioni napoletane del 1985 M. Cuccurullo e F. Iannello), Napoli 2006, La Scuola di Pitagora. Begründungsfragen des objektiven Idealismus, in: Philosophie und Begründung (hg. vom Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg), Frankfurt 1987 [tr. it. in Hegel e la fondazione dell'idealismo oggettivo (G. Stelli; insieme alle lezioni napoletane su Hegel del 1986), Milano 1991, Guerini e Associati (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi FilosoficiHegeliana 1)]. Carl Schmitts Kritik an der Selbstaufhebung einer wertneutralen Verfassung in "Legalität und Legitimität", in: "Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift", 61 (1987); Morality and Politics: Reflections on Machiavelli's Prince, in: "International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society", 3/1 (1989) [La legittimità del politico (tr. di S. Calabrò, I. Santa Maria, M. Ivaldo), Milano 1990, Guerini e Associati (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici. Saggi 7)]. Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität, 2 Bde., Hamburg 1987, Studienausgabe 1988, Felix Meiner Verlag [Il sistema di Hegel. L'idealismo della soggettività e il problema dell'intersoggettività (G. Stelli), Napoli , La Scuola di Pitagora]. Tragweite und Grenzen der evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie, in: "Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie", 19 (1988) [Portata e limiti della teoria evoluzionistica della conoscenza (tr. di C. Sessa e G. Stelli), Napoli 1996, La Città del Sole]. Die Krise der Gegenwart und die Verantwortung der Philosophie. Transzendentalpragmatik, Letztbegründung, Ethik, München 1990, C.H.Beck. Vico und die Idee der Kulturwissenschaft, Einleitung zu Giambattista Vico, Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker, übs. von V. Hösle und Ch.Jermann, Hamburg 1990, Felix Meiner [Introduzione a Vico. La scienza del mondo intersoggettivo (tr. di C. e G. Stelli), Milano 1997, Guerini e Associati(Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici. Saggi 28)]. Philosophie der ökologischen Krise. Moskauer Vorträge, München 1991 sgg., C.H.Beck [Filosofia della crisi ecologica (tr. di P. Scibelli), Torino 1992, Einaudi]. Praktische Philosophie in der modernen Welt, München 1992 sgg., C.H.Beck. Philosophiegeschichte und objektiver Idealismus, München 1996 sgg., C.H.Beck. (con Nora K.), Das Café der toten Philosophen. Ein philosophischer Briefwechsel für Kinder und Erwachsene, München 1996 sgg., C.H.Beck [Aristotele e il dinosauro. La filosofia spiegata a una ragazzina (tr. di S. Bortoli), Torino 1999, Einaudi]. Die Philosophie und die Wissenschaften, München 1999 sgg., C.H.Beck. (con Christian Illies), Darwin, Freiburg etc. 1999, Herder. Woody Allen. Versuch über das Komische, München 2001, C.H.Beck. Platon interpretieren, Paderborn etc. 2004, Ferdinand Schöningh [Interpretare Platone (tr. di B. Marte e F. Perelda), Milano 2007, Guerini e Associati (=Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici. Saggi 43)]. Wie sollte eine synthetische Platondarstellung aussehen? Einige Ueberlegungen angesichts von Kutscheras neuer Platonmonographie, in: "Logical Analsis and History of Philosophy", Paderborn 2006, Mentis Verlag,  175-211 [Per una lettura non riduttiva di Platone (G. Longo), Napoli , La scuola di Pitagora] Die Rangordnung der drei griechischen Tragiker, Basel 2009, Schwabe.  Giambattista Vico Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Vittorio Hösle Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Vittorio Hösle Opere di Vittorio Hösle, . Vittorio Hösle, su Goodreads.  Vittorio Hösle sul  RAI Filosofia, su filosofia.rai.it. Vittorio Hösle sul sito della Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze Sociali, su pass.va. F

 

HOMO-CLITIC -- The homoclitical/heteroclitical distinction, the: heteroclitical implicaturum:-- Greek κλιτικός (klitikós, “inflexional”, but transliterated as ‘heterocliticum’) -- signifying a stem which alternates between more than one form when declined for grammatical case. Examples of heteroclitic noun stems in Proto-Indo-European include *wod-r/n- "water" (nominoaccusative *wódr; genitive *udnés; locative *udén) and *yékw-r/n- "liver" (nominoaccusative *yékwr, genitive *ikwnés). In Proto-Indo-European, heteroclitic stems tend to be noun stems with grammatically inanimate gender. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The heteroclitical implicaturum: implicaturum, implicitum, explicatum, explicitum: what I learned at Clifton, and why.”

 

homœmerum: an adjective Grice adored, from Grecian homoiomeres, ‘of like parts’). Aristotle: “A lump of bronze differs from a statue in being homoeo-merous. The lump of bronze is divisible into at least two partial lumps of bronze, whereas the statue is not divisible into statues.” Having parts, no matter how small, that share the constitutive properties of the whole. The derivative abstract noun is ‘homœomeria’. The Grecian forms of the adjective and of its corresponding privative ‘anhomoeomerous’ are used by Aristotle to distinguish between (a) non-uniform parts of living things, e.g., limbs and organs, and (b) biological stuffs, e.g., blood, bone, sap. In spite of being composed of the four elements, each biological stuff, when taken individually and without admixtures, is through-and-through F, where F represents the cluster of the constitutive properties of that stuff. Thus, if a certain physical volume qualifies as blood, all its mathematically possible sub-volumes, regardless of size, also qualify as blood. Blood is thus homoeomerous. By contrast, a face or a stomach or a leaf are an-homoeomerous: the parts of a face are not a face, etc. In Aristotle’s system, the homœomeria of the biological stuff is tied to his doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter. The homœomerum-heterormerum distinction is prefigured in Plato (Protagoras 329d). ‘Homœomerous’ is narrow in its application than ‘homogeneous’ and ‘uniform’. We speak of a homogeneous entity even if the properties at issue are identically present only in samples that fall above a certain size. The colour of the sea can be homogeneously or uniformly blue; but it is heteromerously blue. “homoiomeres” and “homoiomereia” also occur –in the ancient sources for a pre-Aristotelian philosopher, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, with reference to the constituent things (“chremata”) involved in his scheme of universal mixture. Moreover, homœeomeria plays a significant role outside ancient Grecian (or Griceian) philosophy, notably in twentieth-century accounts of the contrast between mass terms and count terms or sortals, and the discussion was introduced by Grice. ANAXAGORAS' THEORY OF MATTER-I. 17 homoeomerous in Anaxagoras' system falls into one of these three class. (I. 834), for example, says: 'When he ... by FM Cornford‎1930. Refs. Grice, “Cornford on Anaxagoras.”

 

homomorphism: cf. isomorphism -- in Grice’s model theory of conversation, a structure-preserving mapping from one structure to another: thus the demonstratum is isomorph with the implicaturum, since every conversational implicaturum can be arrived via an argumentum. A structure consists of a domain of objects together with a function specifying interpretations, with respect to that domain, of the relation symbols, function symbols, and individual symbols of a given calculus. Relations, functions, and individuals in different structures for a system like System GHP correspond to one another if they are interpretations of the same symbol of GHP. To call a mapping “structure-preserving” is to say, first, that if objects in the first structure bear a certain relation to one another, then their images in the second structure (under the mapping) bear the corresponding relation to one another; second, that the value of a function for a given object (or ntuple of objects) in the first structure has as its image under the mapping the value of the corresponding function for the image of the object (or n-tuple of images) in the second structure; and third, that the image in the second structure of an object in the first is the corresponding object. An isomorphism is a homomorphism that is oneto-one and whose inverse is also a homomorphism.

 

homuncularism -- Grice on the ‘fallacia homunculi’ Grice borrows ‘homunculus’ from St. Augustine, for a miniature ‘homo’ held to inhabit the brain (or some other organ) who perceives all the inputs to the sense organs and initiates all the commands to the muscles. Any theory that posits such an internal agent risks an infinite regress (what Grice, after Augustine, calls the ‘fallacia homunculi’) since we can ask whether there is a little man in the little man’s head, responsible for his perception and action, and so on. Many familiar views of the mind and its activities seem to require a homunculus. E. g. models of visual perception that posit an inner picture as its product apparently require a homunculus to look at the picture, and models of action that treat intentions as commands to the muscles apparently require a homunculus to issue the commands. It is never an easy matter to determine whether a theory is committed to the existence of a homunculus that vitiates the theory, and in some circumstances, a homunculus can be legitimately posited at intermediate levels of theory. As Grice says, a homunculus is, shall we say, a bogey-man (to use a New-World expression) only if he duplicates entire the talents he is rung in to explain. If one can get a relatively ignorant, narrow-minded, blind homunculus to produce the intelligent behaviour of the whole, this is progress. Grice calls a theory (in philosophoical psychology) that posit such a homunculus “homuncular functionalism.” Paracelsus is credited with the first mention of the homunculus in De homunculis (c. 1529–1532), and De natura rerum (1537). Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Paracelsus.”

 

HUMAN: Grice uses ‘human,’ technically, as opposed to ‘person.’ A human is a bio-psycho-social thing, a person is schatological. Oddly, Varro spent some time trying to explore the root of human from humus, soil.

 

Iacono: Alfonso Maurizio Iacono (Agrigento), filosofo. Ordinario di Storia della Filosofia all'Pisa, nell'anno accademico è stato Visiting Professor all'Université de Paris 1 (Sorbonne-Panthéon). Fino al  ha ricoperto la carica di Preside della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Pisa. Dal  al  è stato Presidente del Sistema Museale di Ateneo (SMA) dell'Pisa.  Iacono è stato fra gli studiosi italiani che negli anni settanta e ottanta si sono interessati ai rapporti storici e teorici tra filosofia, antropologia e politica. Fin dai primi anni ottanta, si è inoltre occupato di epistemologia della complessità, collaborando con Gianluca Bocchi, Mauro Ceruti, e Francisco Varela, contribuendo all'introduzione dei temi dell'epistemologia della complessità nel dibattito filosofico italiano. In continuità con quell'impegno di ricerca, che trovò prima espressione nella pubblicazione de L'evento e l'osservatore (1987), nel 2005 ha fondato il Laboratorio filosofico sulla complessità Ichnos.  La sua ricerca si è concentrata sui rapporti tra filosofia, politica e antropologia nel pensiero moderno e contemporaneo, in un costante confronto con il pensiero antico: al riguardo, ha dedicato numerosi studi all'analisi storiografica di nozioni quali feticismo, paura e meraviglia, e all'indagine epistemologica sul tema dell'osservatore. Tali ricerche gravitano attorno ad una riflessione sul tema dell'altro nelle relazioni storico-sociali e politiche: da qui i saggi sulle triadi concettuali autonomia, potere, minorità e storia, verità, finzione.  Ne Il borghese e il selvaggio (1982) Iacono ha analizzato l'influenza della figura di Robinson Crusoe nei paradigmi filosofico-economici di Turgot e Adam Smith rilevando gli elementi di antropologia occidentalista là dove la rappresentazione teorica della società e della storia si mostrava nei suoi aspetti apparentemente semplici, ovvi e trasparenti tali da nascondere con l'evidenza i presupposti del punto di vista coloniale.  In Teorie del feticismo (1985), la genealogia del concetto di feticismo dalla sua origine nell'illuminista Charles de Brosses fino a Marx, a Freud e al pensiero contemporaneo, ha contribuito, sul piano metodologico, all'idea di una storia della filosofia interpretata attraverso concetti e, sul piano interpretativo, alla messa in evidenza dei mutamenti semantici del “feticismo”, un concetto di origine coloniale che si è trasformato con Marx e con Freud in due modi di operare, rispettivamente sul mondo storico-sociale e sul mondo della psiche, basati sulla pratica teorica di un'antropologia dall'interno. Le fétichisme. Histoire d'un concept del 1992 è ancora oggi uno dei testi più citati sull'argomento. Nel 1998, in Paura e meraviglia, i temi storiografici dell'illuminismo e del feticismo vengono ripresi e ridiscussi alla luce del pensiero contemporaneo.  Il problema filosofico e politico dell'antropologia dall'interno è stato sviluppato attraverso la questione epistemologica dell'osservatore a cui Iacono ha dedicato alcuni scritti teorici tra i quali L'evento e l'osservatore (1987). Influenzato da Marx, ma anche da Foucault e da Bateson, Iacono ha analizzato le teorie della storia di Bossuet, Vico e Droysen attraverso il tema del ruolo dell'osservatore che interpreta gli eventi sociali e naturali nella loro storicità. Interessato alle teorie contemporanee dell'autorganizzazione biologica (Atlan, Maturana, Varela), Iacono ha cercato di reinterpretare il senso epistemologico della storia, la parzialità dei punti di vista impliciti dell'osservatore e delle sue visioni del mondo, la questione dell'altro, il rapporto tra scienze storico-sociali e scienze naturali, alla luce del concetto di complessità. In questa chiave, in Tra individui e cose del 1995, Iacono raccoglieva i risultati di ricerche che, all'interno dei rapporti fra filosofia, antropologia e politica, si interrogava attraverso Gregory Bateson sull'idea del ‘pensare per storie' come momento metodologico e critico di un'antropologia dall'interno in una società come quella occidentale moderna dove le cose si sostituiscono feticisticamente agli uomini e il conformismo si mostra incessantemente e paradossalmente come l'irrompere del nuovo.  Il problema della critica sociale e dell'autonomia individuale come decisivo in una società occidentale che domina il mondo dichiarandosi libera e democratica è al centro del libro Autonomia, potere, minorità (2000, Premio Speciale Pozzale Luigi Russo 2001). Partendo dallo scritto di Kant Risposta alla domanda: che cos'è l'Illuminismo?, Iacono si chiede perché in una società istituzionalmente ‘libera' e ‘democratica', all'indomani della fine dei regimi socialisti, il desiderio di uscire dallo stato di minorità non riesce a vincere il contrastante desiderio di rimanere nello stato di minorità, perché in sostanza è così forte la paura di essere autonomi.  La questione dell'autonomia ha portato Iacono a interessarsi ai temi della verità, dell'illusione e dell'inganno. Per un'antropologia dall'interno occorre vedere con altri occhi e per vedere con altri occhi è necessario acquisire uno sguardo d'altrove. I temi dell'universalismo e della questione dell'altro sono discussi in quest'ottica in Storia, verità, finzione del 2006.  La meraviglia che connota il tono emotivo della conoscenza filosofica deve passare attraverso lo straniamento: essere straniero a te stesso affinché l'altro non sia straniero a te. L'autonomia può realizzarsi soltanto nella relazione con l'altro e non, come se l'è immaginato il pensiero moderno, recidendo ogni legame per poi andarlo a costituire da padroni. Ma un'antropologia dall'interno è continuamente in tensione con un senso comune che, conservando le verità condivise ovvero i pregiudizi, tende a mostrarle come ovvie, naturali, eterne, uniche, a renderle dunque salde e indiscutibili. Ci si dimentica allora che viviamo in molti mondi, in mondi intermedi (Mondi intermedi e complessità, 2005), e che siamo capaci, con la coda dell'occhio, di percepire sempre un mondo altro da quello in cui siamo immersi. Perdendo questa percezione perdiamo la nostra capacità di uscire da noi stessi e dunque la facoltà di essere autonomi. L'illusione, attraverso cui ci si approssima alla verità, che è consapevolezza critica di un'illusione stessa (Nietzsche, Pirandello), si trasforma in inganno e in autoinganno, sulle cui basi si produce il rischio della costituzione delle regole del consenso, in una società libera ma senza autonomia. Nel  ha pubblicato L'illusione e il sostituto. Riprodurre, imitare, rappresentare.  Un'altra direzione di studi riguarda  le genealogie dell'immagine della finestra e del concetto di illusione nella storia del pensiero occidentale. In quest'ambito di riflessione Iacono ha realizzato con il regista Renzo Boldrini e l'artista Andrea Bastogi (produzione Giallo Mare Minimal Teatro) una conferenza multimediale sullo spettatore e i suoi paradossi, dal titolo Con altri occhi.  Iacono dirige il bimestrale di politica e cultura Il Grandevetro. Ha collaborato per anni al quotidiano il manifesto. Fa parte del Comitato scientifico della Scuola di formazione e ricerca sui conflitti Polemos. Fa parte del comitato scientifico della Fondazione Collegio San Carlo di Modena.  Ha laureato molti studenti al polo universitario universitario penitenziario della casa circondariale Don Bosco di Pisa e tuttora collabora a progetti e iniziative per un'effettiva opera di recupero del detenuto che sconta la pena.  Opere (selezione) Saggi Il borghese e il selvaggio, Pisa 2003 (2nd. ed.) Teorie del feticismo, Milano 1985 L'evento e l'osservatore, Bergamo 1987; trad. fr., L'evenement et l'observateur Paris 1998 Le fétichisme. Histoire d'un concept, Paris 1992 Fetischismus, in H.J. Sandkühler (Hg.), Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften, Bd. 2, Felix, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg The American Indians and the Ancients of Europe, in  The Classical Tradition and the Americans,  I, Berlin-New York 1994 Tra individui e cose, Roma 1995 Paura e meraviglia. Storie filosofiche del XVIII secolo, Catanzaro 1998 Autonomia, potere, minorità, Milano 2000 (Premio Speciale Pozzale Luigi Russo 2001) Caminhos de saida do estado de menoridate, Rio de Janeiro, 2001 (con A. G. Gargani), Mondi intermedi e complessità, Pisa 2005 Storia, verità e finzione, Roma 2006 L'illusione e il sostituto. Riprodurre, imitare, rappresentare, Bruno Mondadori, Milano  The History and Theory of Fetishism (trad. di Teorie del feticismo), Palgrave Macmillan US, New York  Il sogno di una copia. Del doppio, del dubbio, della malinconia, Guerini Scientifica, Milano  Storie di mondi intermedi, Edizioni ETS, Pisa , Studi su Karl Marx. La cooperazione, l'individuo sociale, le merci, Edizioni ETS, Pisa ,  Filosofia alle elementari (con S. Viti), Le domande sono ciliegie, Manifestolibri, Roma 2000 (con S. Viti), Per mari aperti. Viaggi tra filosofia e poesia nelle scuole elementari, Roma 2003 Filosofia alle scuole superiori La giustizia è l'utile del più forte? Incontro con gli studenti del Liceo classico «Empedocle» di Agrigento, Pisa 2000 Ra Racconti L'accelerato, in Favolare Antonia Casini e Giovanni Vannozzi, MdS editore, Pisa,  La scelta, in Gabbie, Michele Bulzomì, Antonia Casini, Giovanni Vannozzi, MdS editore, Pisa  Note  il sito è momentaneamente disattivato  PSYCHOMEDIAJOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PSYCHOANALYSISAlfonso M. IaconoFrancisco Varela and the Concept of Autonomy  Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, su siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo Unificato per le Soprintendenze Archivistiche. 

 

Illuminati -- Augusto Illuminati Da Wikiquote, aforismi e citazioni in libertà. Jump to navigationJump to search Augusto Illuminati (1937vivente), filosofo italiano.  La città e il desiderio  Le trascrizioni sono da controllare e va specificata in  l'edizione di riferimento Le trascrizioni sono da controllare e va specificata in  l'edizione di riferimento  Viene meno un modo di fare in cui la soggettività potente si appropria il mondo subordinando le altre potenze soggettive e realizza la sua essenza destinale mediante adeguati meccanismi di rappresentazione e manipolazione tecnica. ( 108-109) Come utilizzare regole pubblicamente valide senza colpevolizzare e controllare dall'altro le forme di vita degli uomini è precisamente l'antinomia della cittadinanza. (p. 109) La politicizzazione di sfere inabituali va insieme alla diserzione di istituzioni sclerotiche. Una ricaduta pratica ne è l'integrazione delle strutture rappresentative con nuove lobbies o la richiesta di quote per minoranze (p. 115) Nel lasciar-essere che si contrappone alla tracotanza istituzionale convivono cosi l'ancora-non-rappresentato che cerca lobbisticamente rappresentazione, e rifiuto radicare di rappresentazione. (p. 115) Altri progetti Categoria: Filosofi italiani|

 

Incardona, Nunzio Incardona,  filosofo. Professore di filosofia a 'Palermo. Ha studiato nel Liceo classico Ruggero Settimo. È stato direttore, dal 1982, del Giornale di Metafisica, fondato da Michele Federico Sciacca. Tra gli altri ha collaborato con Giuseppe Masi. La tematica fondamentale della filosofia di Nunzio Incardona è la "filosofia del principio", un percorso nella storia della filosofia occidentale e nel pensiero suoi protagonisti volto all'interrogazione riguardo al fondamento e all'archè. Le due categorie concettuali attraverso cui Incardona legge la storia della filosofia sono l'arcaicità, identificata con Aristotele, e l'arcaismo, identificato con Hegel. Aristotele ed Hegel sono infatti nella filosofia del principio incardoniana le due porte, l'inizio e la fine, l'elemento e il compimento della filosofia. Il percorso del pensiero è per Incardona un percorso aporetico, in cui la dialettica assume l'aspetto di un dialogo senza soluzione fra tensione naturale alla conoscenza e fallimento destinale dell'impresa conoscitiva. A Nunzio Incardona è succeduto, nella direzione del Giornale di Metafisica, Giuseppe Nicolaci. Incardona è un'importante figura della filosofia italiana dell'ultimo novecento anche per l'influenza che ha esercitato nel campo dell'ermeneutica e della filosofia continentale. Il suo magistero ha portato alla creazione della scuola di Palermo.  Il pensiero: breve sinossi Il contributo determinante di Nunzio Incardona è stata la sua riflessione non scettica ma aporetica sull'archè. La questione aristotelica dei principi (ontologici ed epistemologici) e del principio (inteso in senso conoscitivo come principio di non contraddizione e in senso teologico come Dio) viene colta da Incardona ed elevata da questione logica a questione esistenziale. Compagni di strada naturali, sebbene fortemente criticati dal filosofo palermitano, sono, in questa sorta di teologia negativa, Jacques Derrida e Martin Heidegger. In essi è infatti rintracciabile la tematica privativa e mistico-antirazionale del rapporto con l'assoluto. L'unica cosa che si può dire dell'assoluto è che esso non è alla nostra portata, esso nasconde al filosofo il volto come all'esule è nascosta la patria. Sebbene Incardona veda nella filosofia post-hegeliana una sorta di "pleonasmo" che non ha più alcuna utilità nella società contemporanea (antifilosofia), sembra che le sue intuizioni più originali e più feconde nascano proprio da una rielaborazione personale delle tematiche ermeneutiche del secondo Heidegger.  Opere principali Idealismo della filosofia ed esperienza storica, L'Epos, Palermo, 1995. Idealismo tedesco e neo-idealismo italiano, L'Epos, Palermo, 1995. Gli inferi del principio. Interrogazione e invocazione, L'Epos, Palermo, 1994. Karpòs, L'Epos, Palermo, 1991. Meditatio in curriculo mortis, L'Epos, Palermo, 1990. Kéntron, L'Epos, Palermo, 1988.  Rosaria Caldarone, "L'inclusione dell’altro. Profilo di Giuseppe Nicolaci", Epekeina. International Journal of Ontology, History and Critics.

 

Infantino: Lorenzo Infantino (Gioia Tauro), filosofo. Pprofessore a Roma. Ha studiato economia, sociologia, politica e teoria della conoscenza. Ha svolto la parte prevalente della sua ricerca presso l’Oxford (Linacre College). Sul “Times Literary Supplement”, Kenneth Minogue lo ha definito uno “studioso di orientamento anglo-austriaco”. La sua attività intellettuale si svolge infatti nel solco tracciato da Friedrich A. von Hayek che, com’è noto, ha coniugato le acquisizioni di Mandeville e dei moralisti scozzesi con quelle della Scuola Austriaca di Economia.  Infantino si è intensamente dedicato alla divulgazione di classiche opere della Scuola Austriaca, curando l’edizione italiana di numerosi testi di Menger, Boehm-Bawerk, Mises e Hayek, apparsi tutti presso la casa editrice Rubbettino, nella collana editoriale “Biblioteca Austriaca”. Ha inoltre pubblicato importanti risultati della sua ricerca, in quattro principali volumi. 1) L’ordine senza piano, apparso originariamente in italiano nel 1995, che ha avuto poi varie riedizioni. Il testo è stato pubblicato in inglese dalla Routledge di Londra nel 1998 e ha ricevuto favorevoli recensioni da parte di Kenneth Minogue e Andrew Cohen; il libro è stato tradotto anche in spagnolo dalla Union Editorial di Madrid. 2) Ignoranza e libertà è apparso nel 1999 ed è stato pubblicato in inglese dalla Routledge (2003) e in spagnolo dalla Union Editorial (2004). 3) Individualismo, mercato e storia delle idee (2008), apparso anche in spagnolo, presso la Union Editorial (). 4) Potere. La dimensione politica dell’azione umana (), la cui versione inglese è stata pubblicata dalla Palgrave Macmillan ().  Lorenzo Infantino vede nelle conseguenze inintenzionali delle azioni umane intenzionali l’oggetto delle scienze sociali, che vengono in tal modo affrancate da qualsiasi psicologismo. È il tema sollevato da Mandeville e dai moralisti scozzesi, ripreso poi con forza da Carl Menger e da Friedrich A. von Hayek. Non sono le intenzioni dei singoli (o quelli che sono stati infelicemente chiamati “spiriti animali”) a spiegare i fenomeni sociali. Occorre piuttosto individuare le condizioni che rendono possibile o impossibile un dato evento. Tale tradizione di ricerca ha come suo presupposto il riconoscimento dell’ignoranza e della fallibilità umane. Da cui discende l’abbattimento del mito del “Grande Legislatore”, il cui posto viene occupato dal processo sociale, cioè dalla cooperazione volontaria. Questa costituisce un procedimento di esplorazione dell’ignoto e di correzione degli errori. Ed è su tale teoria della società che Infantino si muove per spiegare il fenomeno del potere, da lui studiato come potere infrasociale, derivante cioè dall’interazione fra gli uomini, e il potere pubblico, ossia il potere d’intervento dello Stato nella vita sociale. La competizione minimizza il potere infrasociale, perché non c’è un’unica persona che offre o un’unica persona che richiede. Il potere pubblico si minimizza o si limita, attribuendo allo Stato un’esclusiva funzione di servizio nei confronti della cooperazione sociale volontaria.  Lorenzo Infantino ha pubblicato di recente una raccolta di saggi, Cercatori di Libertà (Rubbettino, ), in cui è ospitato un suo scritto che ha fatto da introduzione alla traduzione italiana del volume (A proposito di Rousseau), dedicato da David Hume alla rottura dei suoi rapporti con Jean-Jacques Rousseau; gli altri saggi della raccolta si occupano di Benjamin Constant, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich A. von Hayek, Bruno Leoni, Robert Nozick, José Ortega y Gasset, Luigi Einaudi. Sempre nel , Raimondo Cubeddu e Pietro Reichlin hanno curato un volume (Rubbettino Editore) di scritti in onore di Lorenzo Infantino, a cui hanno contribuito numerosi studiosi di ispirazione liberale.  Nel 2008, Infantino ha partecipato all’Austrian Colloquium della New York University, e ha tenuto la Hayek Memorial Lecture presso il Ludwig von Mises Institute di Auburn (Alabama). È stato per due volte presidente dell’Italian Linacre Society; è presidente della Fondazione HayekItalia.  Pubblicazioni Lorenzo Infantino  , Sociologia dell'imperialismo: interpretazioni liberali, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 1980,  88-204-1796-0. Dall'utopia al totalitarismo: Marx, Dio e l'impossibile, Roma, Borla, 1985,  88-263-0647-8. Ortega y Gasset: una introduzione, Roma, Armando, 1990,  88-7144-193-1. Ludwig von Mises e la societa aperta, Roma, Quaderni del Centro di metodologia delle scienze socialiLUISS Guido Carli, 1992,  . L'ordine senza piano: le ragioni dell'individualismo metodologico, Roma, NIS,  L'ordine senza piano: le ragioni dell'individualismo metodologico, 2ª ed., Roma, Armando, 1998,  88-7144-863-4. L'ordine senza piano: le ragioni dell'individualismo metodologico, 3ª ed., Roma, Armando, 2Individualism in Modern Thought: From Adam Smith to Hayek, Londra-New York, Routledge, 1998,  0-415-18524-6.El orden sin plan: las razones del individualismo metodológico, Madrid, Union Editorial, 2Metodo e mercato, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 1998,  88-7284-699-4. Ignoranza e libertà, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 1999,  88-7284-841-5.Ignorance and Liberty, Londra-New York, Routledge, .Ignorancia y Libertad, Madrid, Union Editorial, 2004,  978-84-7209-405-5. Dario Antiseri e Lorenzo Infantino , Destra e sinistra due parole ormai inutili, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino,  Dario Antiseri e Lorenzo Infantino  Scuola austriaca di economia: album di famiglia , Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 1999,  88-7284-822-9.Ensayos de Teorìa Econòmica, Madrid, Union Editorial, Dario Antiseri e Lorenzo Infantino , Le ragioni degli sconfitti: nella lotta per la scuola libera, Roma, Armando, Lorenzo Infantino e Nicola Iannello  , Ludwig von Mises: le scienze sociali nella grande Vienna, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2004,  88-7284-841-5. Individualismo, mercato e storia delle idee, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, .Individualismo, mercado y historia de las ideas, Madrid, Union Editorial,  Potere. La dimensione politica dell'azione umana, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, ,  978-88-498-3732-2. Nicola Iannello e Lorenzo Infantino , Idee di libertà. Economia, diritto, società, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, Cercatori di libertà, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, . Raimondo Cubeddu e Pietro Reichlin , Individuo, libertà e potere. Studi in onore di Lorenzo Infantino, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, . Infrasocial Power. Political Dimensions of Human Action, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, . trad, inglese di Potere: la dimensione politica dell'azione umana, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, . Note  Opere di Lorenzo Infantino. Registrazioni di Lorenzo Infantino, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale.

 

Iorio:  Paolo D'Iorio (Seravezza), filosofo. Si è laureato in filosofia all'Pisa con Giuliano Campioni perfezionandosi poi alla Scuola Normale Superiore. È stato borsista della Stiftung Weimarer Klassik di Weimar, dell'Pisa (formazione post-dottorale) e della Technische Universität di Berlino. Nel 1998 è stato assunto al Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique di Parigi.  Nel 2001 ha ricevuto il premio Sofja Kovalevskaja della Fondazione von Humboldt e del Ministero della ricerca tedesco e ha diretto per alcuni anni un'équipe di ricerca all'Monaco di iera. Dal 2007 al  ha effettuato un soggiorno di ricerca a Oxford come visiting fellow dell'Oxford Internet Institute e membro della Maison Française d'Oxford e dell'Oxford e-Research Centre.  Attualmente insegna all'École Normale Supérieure di Parigi e dirige l'Institut des Textes et Manuscrits Modernes (ITEM).  Specialista di Nietzsche, si è occupato del rapporto del filosofo con i suoi contemporanei e con la Grecia antica. Si interessa inoltre dell'uso di Internet per l'edizione critica di testi filosofici. È direttore editoriale di Nietzsche Source, un sito web dedicato alla pubblicazione di edizioni e altri contributi riguardanti la vita e l'opera di Friedrich Nietzsche. I contenuti del sito possono essere liberamente utilizzati per la ricerca e l'insegnamento.  Principali pubblicazioni La linea e il circolo. Cosmologia e filosofia dell'eterno ritorno in Nietzsche. Genova, Pantograf, 1995 Le voyage de Nietzsche à Sorrente. Genèse de la philosophie de l'esprit libre, Paris, CNRS Éditions, Juin ,  246; trad. port. Nietzsche na Itália A viagem que mudou os rumos da filosofia, Zahar, Rio de Janeiro, ; traduzione turca Nietzsche’nin Sorrento Yolculuğu, Isbank Culture Publishing, Istanbul, ; traduzione spagnola El viaje de Nietzsche a Sorrento. Una travesía crucial hacia el espíritu libre, Gedisa, Barcelona, ; traduzione americana Nietzsche’s Journey to Sorrento. Genesis of the Philosoophy of the Free Spirit, University of Chicago Press, . 'Friedrich Nietzsche, Les philosophes préplatoniciens. Combas, l'éclat 1994 (prima edizione in traduzione francese del manoscritto delle lezioni di Nietzsche sui filosofi preplatonici, introdotta e commentata assieme a Francesco Fronterotta) Friedrich Nietzsche, "Écrits de jeunesse" P. D'Iorio et F. Fronterotta, in Friedrich Nietzsche, Oeuvres,  I, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, Giuliano Campioni, Paolo D'Iorio, Maria Cristina Fornari, Francesco Fronterotta, Andrea Orsucci, unter Mitwirkung von Renate Müller-Buck, "Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek", De Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 2003, 736 p. Mazzino Montinari, 'La volonté de puissance' n'existe pas, a cura e con una postfazione di P. D'Iorio, Paris, Éditions de l'éclat, 1996. Genesi, critica, edizioneD'Iorio e N. Ferrand, Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore, 1999. "Bibliothèques d'écrivains", sous la direction de Paolo D'Iorio et Daniel Ferrer, Paris, éditions du CNRS, 2001, 214 p. HyperNietzsche. Modèle d'un hypertexte savant sur Internet pour la recherche en sciences humaines. Questions philosophiques, problèmes juridiques, outils informatiques", Paolo D'Iorio. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, Paolo D'Iorio, Michele Barbera, «Scholarsource: A Digital Infrastructure for the Humanities», in Th. Bartscherer and R. Coover (éds.) "Switching Codes. Thinking through New Technology in the Humanities and the Arts", Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ,  61–87. Note  Pagina di Paolo D'Iorio sul sito dell'ITEM/ENS  Nietzsche Source  Friedrich Nietzsche/

 

IN-LATUM: illatum, f. illātĭo (inl- ), ōnis, f. in-fero, a logical inference, conclusion: “vel illativum rogamentum. quod ex acceptionibus colligitur et infertur,” A Dogm. Plat. 3,  34, 15.infero: to conclude, infer, draw an inference, Cic. Inv. 1, 47, 87; Quint. 5, 11, 27. ILLATUM -- inference, the process of drawing a conclusion from premises or assumptions, or, loosely, the conclusion so drawn. An argument can be merely a number of statements of which one is designated the conclusion and the rest are designated premises. Whether the premises imply the conclusion is thus independent of anyone’s actual beliefs in either of them. Belief, however, is essential to inference. Inference occurs only if someone, owing to believing the premises, begins to believe the conclusion or continues to believe the conclusion with greater confidence than before. Because inference requires a subject who has beliefs, some requirements of (an ideally) acceptable inference do not apply to abstract arguments: one must believe the premises; one must believe that the premises support the conclusion; neither of these beliefs induction, eliminative inference 426 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 426 may be based on one’s prior belief in the conclusion. W. E. Johnson called these the epistemic conditions of inference. In a reductio ad absurdum argument that deduces a self-contradiction from certain premises, not all steps of the argument will correspond to steps of inference. No one deliberately infers a contradiction. What one infers, in such an argument, is that certain premises are inconsistent. Acceptable inferences can fall short of being ideally acceptable according to the above requirements. Relevant beliefs are sometimes indefinite. Infants and children infer despite having no grasp of the sophisticated notion of support. One function of idealization is to set standards for that which falls short. It is possible to judge how nearly inexplicit, automatic, unreflective, lessthan-ideal inferences meet ideal requirements. In ordinary speech, ‘infer’ often functions as a synonym of ‘imply’, as in ‘The new tax law infers that we have to calculate the value of our shrubbery’. Careful philosophical writing avoids this usage. Implication is, and inference is not, a relation between statements. Valid deductive inference corresponds to a valid deductive argument: it is logically impossible for all the premises to be true when the conclusion is false. That is, the conjunction of all the premises and the negation of the conclusion is inconsistent. Whenever a conjunction is inconsistent, there is a valid argument for the negation of any conjunct from the other conjuncts. (Relevance logic imposes restrictions on validity to avoid this.) Whenever one argument is deductively valid, so is another argument that goes in a different direction. (1) ‘Stacy left her slippers in the kitchen’ implies (2) ‘Stacy had some slippers’. Should one acquainted with Stacy and the kitchen infer (2) from (1), or infer not-(1) from not-(2), or make neither inference? Formal logic tells us about implication and deductive validity, but it cannot tell us when or what to infer. Reasonable inference depends on comparative degrees of reasonable belief. An inference in which every premise and every step is beyond question is a demonstrative inference. (Similarly, reasoning for which this condition holds is demonstrative reasoning.) Just as what is beyond question can vary from one situation to another, so can what counts as demonstrative. The term presumably derives from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Understanding Aristotle’s views on demonstration requires understanding his general scheme for classifying inferences. Not all inferences are deductive. In an inductive inference, one infers from an observed combination of characteristics to some similar unobserved combination. ‘Reasoning’ like ‘painting’, and ‘frosting’, and many other words, has a process–product ambiguity. Reasoning can be a process that occurs in time or it can be a result or product. A letter to the editor can both contain reasoning and be the result of reasoning. It is often unclear whether a word such as ‘statistical’ that modifies the words ‘inference’ or ‘reasoning’ applies primarily to stages in the process or to the content of the product. One view, attractive for its simplicity, is that the stages of the process of reasoning correspond closely to the parts of the product. Examples that confirm this view are scarce. Testing alternatives, discarding and reviving, revising and transposing, and so on, are as common to the process of reasoning as to other creative activities. A product seldom reflects the exact history of its production. In An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, J. S. Mill says that reasoning is a source from which we derive new truths (Chapter 14). This is a useful saying so long as we remember that not all reasoning is inference. -- inference to the best explanation, an inference by which one concludes that something is the case on the grounds that this best explains something else one believes to be the case. Paradigm examples of this kind of inference are found in the natural sciences, where a hypothesis is accepted on the grounds that it best explains relevant observations. For example, the hypothesis that material substances have atomic structures best explains a range of observations concerning how such substances interact. Inferences to the best explanation occur in everyday life as well. Upon walking into your house you observe that a lamp is lying broken on the floor, and on the basis of this you infer that the cat has knocked it over. This is plausibly analyzed as an inference to the best explanation; you believe that the cat has knocked over the lamp because this is the best explanation for the lamp’s lying broken on the floor. The nature of inference to the best explanation and the extent of its use are both controversial. Positions that have been taken include: (a) that it is a distinctive kind of inductive reasoning; (b) inference rule inference to the best explanation 427 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 427 that all good inductive inferences involve inference to the best explanation; and (c) that it is not a distinctive kind of inference at all, but is rather a special case of enumerative induction. Another controversy concerns the criteria for what makes an explanation best. Simplicity, cognitive fit, and explanatory power have all been suggested as relevant merits, but none of these notions is well understood. Finally, a skeptical problem arises: inference to the best explanation is plausibly involved in both scientific and commonsense knowledge, but it is not clear why the best explanation that occurs to a person is likely to be true. -- inferential knowledge, a kind of “indirect” knowledge, namely, knowledge based on or resulting from inference. Assuming that knowledge is at least true, justified belief, inferential knowledge is constituted by a belief that is justified because it is inferred from certain other beliefs. The knowledge that 7 equals 7 seems non-inferential. We do not infer from anything that 7 equals 7it is obvious and self-evident. The knowledge that 7 is the cube root of 343, in contrast, seems inferential. We cannot know this without inferring it from something else, such as the result obtained when multiplying 7 times 7 times 7. Two sorts of inferential relations may be distinguished. ‘I inferred that someone died because the flag is at half-mast’ may be true because yesterday I acquired the belief about the flag, which caused me to acquire the further belief that someone died. ‘I inferentially believe that someone died because the flag is at halfmast’ may be true now because I retain the belief that someone died and it remains based on my belief about the flag. My belief that someone died is thus either episodically or structurally inferential. The episodic process is an occurrent, causal relation among belief acquisitions. The structural basing relation may involve the retention of beliefs, and need not be occurrent. (Some reserve ‘inference’ for the episodic relation.) An inferential belief acquired on one basis may later be held on a different basis, as when I forget I saw a flag at half-mast but continue to believe someone died because of news reports. That “How do you know?” and “Prove it!” always seem pertinent suggests that all knowledge is inferential, a version of the coherence theory. The well-known regress argument seems to show, however, that not all knowledge can be inferential, which is a version of foundationalism. For if S knows something inferentially, S must infer it correctly from premises S knows to be true. The question whether those premises are also known inferentially begins either an infinite regress of inferences (which is humanly impossible) or a circle of justification (which could not constitute good reasoning). Which sources of knowledge are non-inferential remains an issue even assuming foundationalism. When we see that an apple is red, e.g., our knowledge is based in some manner on the way the apple looks. “How do you know it is red?” can be answered: “By the way it looks.” This answer seems correct, moreover, only if an inference from the way the apple looks to its being red would be warranted. Nevertheless, perceptual beliefs are formed so automatically that talk of inference seems inappropriate. In addition, inference as a process whereby beliefs are acquired as a result of holding other beliefs may be distinguished from inference as a state in which one belief is sustained on the basis of others. Knowledge that is inferential in one way need not be inferential in the other. When it came to rationalityGrice was especially irritated by the adjective ‘theoretical’ as applied to ‘reason’. “Kant was cleverer when he used the metaphorical ‘pure’!” -- theoretical reasonGrice preferred ‘conversational reason.’ “There’s no need to divide reason into pure and impure!’ -- in its traditional sense, a faculty or capacity whose province is theoretical knowledge or inquiry; more broadly, the faculty concerned with ascertaining truth of any kind also sometimes called speculative reason. In Book 6 of his Metaphysics, Aristotle identifies mathematics, physics, and theology as the subject matter of theoretical reason. Theoretical reason is traditionally distinguished from practical reason, a faculty exercised in determining guides to good conduct and in deliberating about proper courses of action. Aristotle contrasts it, as well, with productive reason, which is concerned with “making”: shipbuilding, sculpting, healing, and the like. Kant distinguishes theoretical reason not only from practical reason but also sometimes from the faculty of understanding, in which the categories originate. Theoretical reason, possessed of its own a priori concepts “ideas of reason”, regulates the activities of the understanding. It presupposes a systematic unity in nature, sets the goal for scientific inquiry, and determines the “criterion of empirical truth” Critique of Pure Reason. Theoretical reason, on Kant’s conception, seeks an explanatory “completeness” and an “unconditionedness” of being that transcend what is possible in experience. Reason, as a faculty or capacity, may be regarded as a hybrid composed of theoretical and practical reason broadly construed or as a unity having both theoretical and practical functions. Some commentators take Aristotle to embrace the former conception and Kant the latter. Reason is contrasted sometimes with experience, sometimes with emotion and desire, sometimes with faith. Its presence in human beings has often been regarded as constituting the primary difference between human and non-human animals; and reason is sometimes represented as a divine element in human nature. Socrates, in Plato’s Philebus, portrays reason as “the king of heaven and earth.” Hobbes, in his Leviathan, paints a more sobering picture, contending that reason, “when we reckon it among the faculties of the mind, . . . is nothing but reckoning  that is, adding and subtracting  of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts.” 

 

IN-LUMINATUM: illuminism: d’Alembert, Jean Le Rond, philosopher, and Encyclopedist. According to Grimm, d’Alembert was the prime luminary of the philosophic party. Cf. the French ideologues that influenced Humboldt. An abandoned, illegitimate child, he nonetheless received an outstanding education at the Jansenist Collège des Quatre-Nations in Paris. He read law for a while, tried medicine, and settled on mathematics. In 1743, he published an acclaimed Treatise of Dynamics. Subsequently, he joined the Paris Academy of Sciences and contributed decisive works on mathematics and physics. In 1754, he was elected to the  Academy, of which he later became permanent secretary. In association with Diderot, he launched the Encyclopedia, for which he wrote the epoch-making Discours préliminaire 1751 and numerous entries on science. Unwilling to compromise with the censorship, he resigned as coeditor in 1758. In the Discours préliminaire, d’Alembert specified the divisions of the philosophical discourse on man: pneumatology, logic, and ethics. Contrary to Christian philosophies, he limited pneumatology to the investigation of the human soul. Prefiguring positivism, his Essay on the Elements of Philosophy 1759 defines philosophy as a comparative examination of physical phenomena. Influenced by Bacon, Locke, and Newton, d’Alembert’s epistemology associates Cartesian psychology with the sensory origin of ideas. Though assuming the universe to be rationally ordered, he discarded metaphysical questions as inconclusive. The substance, or the essence, of soul and matter, is unknowable. Agnosticism ineluctably arises from his empirically based naturalism. D’Alembert is prominently featured in D’Alembert’s Dream 1769, Diderot’s dialogical apology for materialism.  Grice’s illuminism“reason enlightens us” Enlightenment, a late eighteenth-century international movement in thought, with important social and political ramifications. The Enlightenment is at once a style, an attitude, a temper  critical, secular, skeptical, empirical, and practical. It is also characterized by core beliefs in human rationality, in what it took to be “nature,” and in the “natural feelings” of mankind. Four of its most prominent exemplars are Hume, Thomas Jefferson, Kant, and Voltaire. The Enlightenment belief in human rationality had several aspects. 1 Human beings are free to the extent that their actions are carried out for a reason. Actions prompted by traditional authority, whether religious or political, are therefore not free; liberation requires weakening if not also overthrow of this authority. 2 Human rationality is universal, requiring only education for its development. In virtue of their common rationality, all human beings have certain rights, among them the right to choose and shape their individual destinies. 3 A final aspect of the belief in human rationality was that the true forms of all things could be discovered, whether of the universe Newton’s laws, of the mind associationist psychology, of good government the U.S. Constitution, of a happy life which, like good government, was “balanced”, or of beautiful architecture Palladio’s principles. The Enlightenment was preeminently a “formalist” age, and prose, not poetry, was its primary means of expression. The Enlightenment thought of itself as a return to the classical ideas of the Grecians and more especially the Romans. But in fact it provided one source of the revolutions that shook Europe and America at the end of the eighteenth century, and it laid the intellectual foundations for both the generally scientific worldview and the liberal democratic society, which, despite the many attacks made on them, continue to function as cultural ideals. 

 

IN-LUSUM: in-nludo -- illusion: Grice: “The etymology of illusion is fascinatinglusion is of course from ludo, game, so ‘inludo’ is the verb we must be look forif you have an illusion, you are ‘playing with yourself’ -- cf. veridical memories, who needs them? hallucination is Grice’s topic.Malcolm argues in Dreaming and Skepticism and in his Dreaming that the notion of a dream qua conscious experience that occurs at a definite time and has definite duration during sleep, is unintelligible. This contradicts the views of philosophers like Descartes (and indeed Moore!), who, Malcolm holds, assume that a human being may have a conscious thought and a conscious experience during sleep. Descartes claims that he had been deceived during sleep. Malcolms point is that ordinary language contrasts consciousness and sleep. The claim that one is conscious while one is sleep-walking is stretching the use of the term. Malcolm rejects the alleged counter-examples based on sleepwalking or sleep-talking, e.g. dreaming that one is climbing stairs while one is actually doing so is not a counter-example because, in such a case, the individual is not sound asleep after all. If a person is in any state of consciousness, it logically follows that he is not sound asleep. The concept of dreaming is based on our descriptions of dreams after we have awakened in telling a dream. Thus, to have dreamt that one has a thought during sleep is not to have a thought any more than to have dreamt that one has climbed Everest is to have climbed Everest. Since one cannot have an experience during sleep, one cannot have a mistaken experience during sleep, thereby undermining the sort of scepticism based on the idea that our experience might be wrong because we might be dreaming. Malcolm further argues that a report of a conscious state during sleep is unverifiable. If Grice claims that he and Strawson saw a big-foot in charge of the reserve desk at the Bodleian library, one can verify that this took place by talking to Strawson and gathering forensic evidence from the library. However, there is no way to verify Grices claim that he dreamed that he and Strawson saw a big-foot working at the Bodleian. Grices only basis for his claim that he dreamt this is that Grice says so after he wakes up. How does one distinguish the case where Grice dreamed that he saw a big-foot working at The Bodleian and the case in which he dreamed that he saw a person in a big-foot suit working at the library but, after awakening, mis-remembered that person in a big-foot suit as a big-foot proper? If Grice should admit that he had earlier mis-reported his dream and that he had actually dreamed he saw a person in a big-foot suit at The Bodleian, there is no more independent verification for this new claim than there was for the original one. Thus, there is, for Malcolm, no sense to the idea of mis-remembering ones dreams. Malcolm here applies one of Witters ideas from his private language argument. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we cannot talk about right. For a similar reason, Malcolm challenges the idea that one can assign a definite duration or time of occurrence to a dream. If Grice claims that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, one could verify this in the usual ways. If, however, Grice says he dreamt that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, how is one to measure the duration of his dreamt run? If Grice says he was wearing a stopwatch in the dream and clocked his run at 3.4 minutes, how can one know that the dreamt stopwatch is not running at half speed (so that he really dreamt that he ran the mile in 6.8 minutes)? Grice might argue that a dream report does not carry such a conversational implicatura. But Malcolm would say that just admits the point. The ordinary criteria one uses for determining temporal duration do not apply to dreamt events. The problem in both these cases (Grice dreaming one saw a bigfoot working at The Bodleian and dreaming that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes) is that there is no way to verify the truth of these dreamt events — no direct way to access that dreamt inner experience, that mysterious glow of consciousness inside the mind of Grice lying comatose on the couch, in order to determine the facts of the matter. This is because, for Malcolm, there are no facts of the matter apart from the report by the dreamer of the dream upon awakening. Malcolm claims that the empirical evidence does not enable one to decide between the view that a dream experience occurs during sleep and the view that they are generated upon the moment of waking up. Dennett agrees with Malcolm that nothing supports the received view that a dream involves a conscious experience while one is asleep but holds that such issues might be settled empirically. Malcolm also argues against the attempt to provide a physiological mark of the duration of a dream, for example, the view that the dream lasted as long as the rapid eye movements. Malcolm replies that there can only be as much precision in that common concept of dreaming as is provided by the common criterion of dreaming. These scientific researchers are misled by the assumption that the provision for the duration of a dream is already there, only somewhat obscured and in need of being made more precise. However, Malcolm claims, it is not already there (in the ordinary concept of dreaming). These scientific views are making radical conceptual changes in the concept of dreaming, not further explaining our ordinary concept of dreaming. Malcolm admits, however, that it might be natural to adopt such scientific views about REM sleep as a convention. Malcolm points out, however, that if REM sleep is adopted as a criterion for the occurrence of a dream, people would have to be informed upon waking up that they had dreamed or not. As Pears observes, Malcolm does not mean to deny that people have dreams in favour of the view that they only have waking dream-behaviour. Of course it is no misuse of language to speak of remembering a dream. His point is that since the concept of dreaming is so closely tied to our concept of waking report of a dreams, one cannot form a coherent concept of this alleged inner (private) something that occurs with a definite duration during sleep. Malcolm rejects a certain philosophical conception of dreaming, not the ordinary concept of dreaming, which, he holds, is neither a hidden private something nor mere outward behaviour.The account of dreaming by Malcolm has come in for considerable criticism. Some argue that Malcolms claim that occurrences in dreams cannot be verified by others does not require the strict criteria that Malcolm proposes but can be justified by appeal to the simplicity, plausibility, and predictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a whole. Some argue that Malcolms account of the sentence I am awake is inconsistent. A comprehensive programme in considerable detail has been offered for an empirical scientific investigation of dreaming of the sort that Malcolm rejects. Others have proposed various counterexamples and counter arguments against dreaming by Malcolm. Grices emphasis is in Malcolms easy way out with statements to the effect that implicatura do or do not operate in dream reports. They do in mine! Grice considers, I may be dreaming in the two essays opening the Part II: Explorations on semantics and metaphysics in WOW. Cf. Urmson on ‘delusion’ in ‘Parentheticals’ as ‘conceptually impossible.’ Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s essay on ‘Dreaming,’ but there are scattered references in his treatment of Descartes, and “The causal theory of perception” (henceforth, “Causal theory”), The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

IMITATVMImago -- imaginatumimagofrom “imago”imago) "copy, imitation, likeness; statue, picture," also "phantom, ghost, apparition," figuratively "idea, appearance," from stem of imitari "to copy, imitate" (from PIE root *aim- "to copy"). The root of ‘imago’ is cognate with that of ‘emulate,’ aemulatumand the verb is under imitor -- Discussed by Grice in “Vacuous Names.” A population may imagine that a certain expeditioner, Marmaduke Bloggs, climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees. He is the imaginatum.  imagination: referred to by Grice in “Prolegomena”the rabbit that looks like a duck -- the mental faculty sometimes thought to encompass all acts of thinking about something novel, contrary to fact, or not currently perceived; thus: “Imagine that Lincoln had not been assassinated,” or “Use your imagination to create a new design for roller skates.” ‘Imagination’ also denotes an important perception-like aspect of some such thoughts, so that to imagine something is to bring to mind what it would be like to perceive it. Philosophical theories of imagination must explain its apparent intentionality: when we imagine, we always imagine something. Imagination is always directed toward an object, even though the object may not exist. Moreover, imagination, like perception, is often seen as involving qualia, or special subjective properties that are sometimes thought to discredit materialist, especially functionalist, theories of mind. The intentionality of imagination and its perceptual character lead some theories to equate imagination with “imaging”: being conscious of or perceiving a mental image. However, because the ontological status of such images and the nature of their properties are obscure, many philosophers have rejected mental images in favor of an adverbial theory on which to imagine something red is best analyzed as imagining “redly.” Such theories avoid the difficulties associated with mental images, but must offer some other way to account for the apparent intentionality of imagination as well as its perceptual character. Imagination, in the hands of Husserl and Sartre, becomes a particularly apt subject for phenomenology. It is also cited as a faculty that idols of the cave imagination 417 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 417 separates human thought from any form of artificial intelligence. Finally, imagination often figures prominently in debates about possibility, in that what is imaginable is often taken to be coextensive with what is possible.

 

IN-MANENS -- anens, a term most often used in contrast to ‘transcendence’ to express the way in which God is thought to be present in the world. The most extreme form of immanence is expressed in pantheism, which identifies God’s substance either partly or wholly with the world. In contrast to pantheism, Judaism and Christianity hold God to be a totally separate substance from the world. In Christianity, the separateness of God’s substance from that of the world is guaranteed by the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Aquinas held that God is in the world as an efficient cause is present to that on which it acts. Thus, God is present in the world by continuously acting on it to preserve it in existence. Perhaps the weakest notion of immanence is expressed in eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury deism, in which God initially creates the world and institutes its universal laws, but is basically an absentee landlord, exercising no providential activity over its continuing history.

 

INTER-PRETATVM -- interpretatum: h “While ‘heremneia’ sounds poetic and sweet, ‘interpretatio’ sounds thomistic and rough!”H. P. Grice. “Plus ‘hermeneia is metaphorical.’ hermeneia: hermeneutics, the art or theory of interpretation, as well as a type of philosophy that starts with questions of interpretation. Originally concerned more narrowly with interpreting sacred texts, the term acquired a much broader significance in its historical development and finally became a philosophical position in twentieth-century G. philosophy. There are two competing positions in hermeneutics: whereas the first follows Dilthey and sees interpretation or Verstehen as a method for the historical and human sciences, the second follows Heidegger and sees it as an “ontological event,” an interaction between interpreter and text that is part of the history of what is understood. Providing rules or criteria for understanding what an author or native “really” meant is a typical problem for the first approach. The interpretation of the law provides an example for the second view, since the process of applying the law inevitably transforms it. In general, hermeneutics is the analysis of this process and its conditions of possibility. It has typically focused on the interpretation of ancient texts and distant peoples, cases where the unproblematic everyday understanding and communication cannot be assumed. Schleiermacher’s analysis of understanding and expression related to texts and speech marks the beginning of hermeneutics in the modern sense of a scientific methodology. This emphasis on methodology continues in nineteenth-century historicism and culminates in Dilthey’s attempt to ground the human sciences in a theory of interpretation, understood as the imaginative but publicly verifiable reenactment of the subjective experiences of others. Such a method of interpretation reveals the possibility of an objective knowledge of human beings not accessible to empiricist inquiry and thus of a distinct methodology for the human sciences. One result of the analysis of interpretation in the nineteenth century was the recognition of “the hermeneutic circle,” first developed by Schleiermacher. The circularity of interpretation concerns the relation of parts to the whole: the interpretation of each part is dependent on the interpretation of the whole. But interpretation is circular in a stronger sense: if every interpretation is itself based on interpretation, then the circle of interpretation, even if it is not vicious, cannot be escaped. Twentieth-century hermeneutics advanced by Heidegger and Gadamer radicalize this notion of the hermeneutic circle, seeing it as a feature of all knowledge and activity. Hermeneutics is then no longer the method of the human sciences but “universal,” and interpretation is part of the finite and situated character of all human knowing. “Philosophical hermeneutics” therefore criticizes Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology and Enlightenment universalism in ethics, seeing science as a cultural practice and prejudices or prejudgments as ineliminable in all judgments. Positively, it emphasizes understanding as continuing a historical tradition, as well as dialogical openness, in which prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened. 

 

IN-PERATVM -- imperatumWhile of course there is a verb in the infinitive for this, Grice prefers the past participle“It’s so diaphanous!” -- This starts with the Greeks, who had the klesis porstktike, modus imperativus. But then, under the modus subjunctives, the Romans added the modus prohibitivus. So this is interesting, because it seems that most of Grice’s maxims are ‘prohibitions’: “Do not say what you believe to be false.” “Do not that for which you lack adequate evidence.” And some while formally in the ‘affirmative,’ look prohibitive with ‘negative-loaded’ verbs like ‘avoid ambiguity,’ etc. hile an imperatus, m. is a command, ‘imperatum’ refers, diaphanously, to what is commanded. “Impero” is actually a derivation from the intensive “in-“ and the “paro,” as in “prepare,” “Paratum” would thus reflect the ssame cognateness with ‘imperatum.”  Modus imperativus -- imperative mode: At one point, Grice loved the “psi,” Actions are alright, but we need to stop at the psi level. The emissor communicates that the addressee thinks that the emissor has propositional attitude psi. No need to get into the logical form of action. One can just do with the logical form of a ‘that’-clause in the ascription of a state of the soul. This should usually INVOLVE an action, as in Hare, “The door is shut, please.” like Hare, Grice loves an imperative. In this essay, Grice attempts an exploration of the logical form of Kant’s concoction. Grice is especially irritated by the ‘the.’ ‘They speak of Kant’s categorical imperative, when he cared to formulate a few versions of it!” Grice lists them all in Abbott’s version. There are nine of them!  Grice is interested in the conceptual connection of the categorical imperative with the hypothetical or suppositional imperative, in terms of the type of connection between the protasis and the apodosis. Grice spends the full second Carus lecture on the conception of value on this. Grice is aware that the topic is central to Oxonian philosophers such as Hare, a member of Austin’s Play Group, too, who regard the universability of an imperative as a mark of its categoricity, and indeed, moral status. Grice chose some of the Kantian terminology on purpose.Grice would refer to this or that ‘conversational maxim.’A ‘conversational maxim’ contributes to what Grice jocularly refers to as the ‘conversational immanuel.’But there is an admission test.The ‘conversational maxim’ has to be shown that, qua items under an overarching principle of conversational helpfulness, the maxim displays a quality associated with conceptual, formal, and applicational generality. Grice never understood what Kant meant by the categoric imperative. But for Grice, from the acceptability of the the immanuel you can deduce the acceptability of this or that maxim, and from the acceptability of the conversational immanuel, be conversationally helpful, you can deduce the acceptability of this or that convesational maxim. Grice hardly considered Kants approach to the categoric imperative other than via the universability of this or that maxim. This or that conversational maxim, provided by Grice, may be said to be universalisable if and only if it displays what Grice sees as these three types of generality: conceptual, formal, and applicational. He does the same for general maxims of conduct. The results are compiled in a manual of universalisable maxims, the conversational immanuel, an appendix to the general immanuel. The other justification by Kant of the categoric imperative involve an approach other than the genitorial justification, and an invocation of autonomy and freedom. It is the use by Plato of imperative as per categoric imperative that has Grice expanding on modes other than the doxastic, to bring in the buletic, where the categoric imperative resides. Note that in the end Kant DOES formulate the categoric imperative, as Grice notes, as a real imperative, rather than a command, etc. Grice loved Kant, but he loved Kantotle best. In the last Kant lecture, he proposes to define the categorical imperative as a counsel of prudence, with a protasis Let Grice be happy. The derivation involves eight stages! Grice found out that out of his play-group activities with this or that linguistic nuance he had arrived at the principle, or imperative of conversational helpfulness, indeed formulated as an imperative: Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of the conversation in which you are engaged. He notes that the rationality behind the idea of conversation as rational co-operation does not preclude seeing rationality in conversation as other than cooperation. The fact that he chooses maxim, and explicitly echoes Kant, indicates where Grice is leading! An exploration on Paton on the categorical imperative. Grice had previously explored the logical form of hypothetical or suppositional imperatives in the Kant (and later Locke) lectures, notably in Lecture IV, Further remarks on practical and alethic reasons. Here he considers topics related to Hares tropic-clistic neustic-phrastic quartet. What does it mean to say that a command is conditional? The two successors of Grices post as Tutorial Fellow at St. Johns, Baker Hacker, will tackle the same issue with humour, in Sense and nonsense, published by Blackwell (too irreverent to be published by the Clarendon). Is the logical form of a maxim, .p⊃!q, or !(.p ⊃.q), etc. Kant thought that there is a special sub-class of hypothetical or suppositional  imperative (which he called a counsels of prudence) which is like his class of technical imperative, except in that the end specified in a full specfication of the imperative is the special end of eudæmonia (the agents eudæmonia). For Grice, understanding Kant’s first version of the categorical imperative involves understanding what a maxim is supposed to be. Grice explores at some length four alternative interpretations of an iffy buletic (as opposed to a non-iffy buletic): three formal, one material. The first interpretation is the horseshoe interpretation. A blind logical nose might lead us or be led to the assumption of a link between a buletically iffy utterance and a doxastically iffy utterance. Such a link no doubt exists, but the most obvious version of it is plainly inadequate. At least one other philosopher besides Grice has noticed that If he torments the cat, have him arrested! is unlikely to express an buletically iffy utterance, and that even if one restricts oneself to this or that case in which the protasis specifies a will, we find pairs of examples like If you will to go to Oxford, travel by AA via Richmond! or If you will to go to Cambridge, see a psychiatrist! where it is plain that one is, and the other is not, the expression of a buletically iffy utterance. For fun, Grice does not tell which! A less easily eliminable suggestion, yet one which would still interprets the notion of a buletically iffy utterance in terms of that particular logical form to which if, hypothetical or suppositional  and conditional attach, would be the following. Let us assume that it is established, or conceded, as legitimate to formulate an if utterance in which not only the apodosis is couched in some mode other than the doxastic, as in this or that conditional command. If you see the whites of their eyes, shoot fire! but also the protasis or some part (clause) of them. In which case all of the following might be admissible conditionals. Thus, we might have a doxastic protasis (If the cat is sick, take it to the vet), or a mixed (buletic-cum-doxastic protasis (If you are to take the cat to the vet and theres no cage available, put it on Marthas lap!), and buletic protasis (If you are to take the cat to the vet, put it in a cage!). If this suggestion seems rebarbative, think of this or that quaint if utterance (when it is quaint) as conditionalised versions of this or that therefore-sequence, such as: buletic-cum-doxastic premises (Take the cat to the vet! There t a cage. Therefore; Put the cat on Marthas lap!), buletic premise (Take the cat to the vet! Put it in a cage!). And then, maybe, the discomfort is reduced. Grice next considers a second formal interpretation or approach to the buletically iffy/non-iffy utterance. Among if utterances with a buletic apodosis some will have, then, a mixed doxastic-cum buletic protasis (partly doxastic, partly buletic), and some will have a purely doxastic protasis (If the cat is sick, take him to the vet!). Grice proposes a definition of the iffy/non-iffy distinction. A buletically iffy utterance is an iffy utterance the apodosis of which is buletic and the protasis of which is buletic or mixed (buletic-cum-dxastic) or it is an elliptical version of such an iffy utterance. A buletically non-iffy utterance is a buletic utterance which is not iffy or else, if it is iffy, has a purely doxastic protasis. Grice makes three quick comments on this second interpretation. First, re: a real imperative. The structures which are being offered as a way of interpreting an iffy and a non-iffy  imperative do not, as they stand, offer any room for the appearance this or that buletic modality like ought and should which are so prominently visible in the standard examples of those kinds of imperatives. The imperatives suggested by Grice are explicit imperatives. An explicit buletic utterance is Do such-and-such! and not You ought to do such and such or, worse, One ought to do such and such. Grice thinks, however, that one can modify this suggestion to meet the demand for the appearance or occurrence of ought (etc) if such occurrence is needed. Second, it would remain to be decided how close the preferred reading of Grices deviant conditional imperatives would be to the accepted interpretation of standard hypothetical or suppositional imperatives. But even if there were some divergence that might be acceptable if the new interpretation turns out to embody a more precise notion than the standard conception. Then theres the neustical versus tropical protases. There are, Grice thinks, serious doubts of the admissibility of conditionals with a NON-doxastic protasis, which are for Grice connected with the very difficult question whether the doxastic and the buletic modes are co-ordinate or whether the doxastic mode is in some crucial fashion (but not in other) prior (to use Suppess qualification) to the buletic. Grice confesses he does not know the answer to that question. A third formal interpretation links the iffy/non-iffy distinction to the absolute-relative value distinction. An iffy imperatives would be end-relative and might be analogous to an evidence-relative probability. A non-iffy imperatives would not be end-relative. Finally, a fourth Interpretation is not formal, but material. This is close to part of what Kant says on the topic. It is a distinction between an imperative being escapable (iffy), through the absence of a particular will and its not being escapable (non-iffy). If we understand the idea of escabability sufficiently widely, the following imperatives are all escapable, even though their logical form is not in every case the same: Give up popcorn!, To get slim, give up popcorn!, If you will to get slim, give up popcorn! Suppose Grice has no will to get slim. One might say that the first imperative (Give up popcorn!) is escaped, provided giving up popcorn has nothing else to recommend it, by falsifying You should give up popcorn. The second and the third imperatives (To get slim, give up pocorn! and If you will to get slim, give up popcorn!) would not, perhaps, involve falsification but they would, in the circumstances, be inapplicable to Griceand inapplicability, too, counts, as escape. A non-iffy imperative however, is in no way escapable. Re: the Dynamics of Imperatives in Discourse, Grice then gives three examples which he had discussed in “Aspects,” which concern arguments (or therefore-chains). This we may see as an elucidation to grasp the logical form of buletically iffy utterance (elided by the therefore, which is an if in the metalanguage) in its dynamics in argumentation. We should, Grice suggests, consider not merely imperatives of each sort, together with the range of possible characterisations, but also the possible forms of argument into which_particular_ hypothetical or suppositional imperatives might enter. Consider: Defend the Philosophy Department! If you are to defend the philosophy department, learn to use bows and arrows! Therefore, learn to use bows and arrows! Grice says he is using the dichotomy of original-derived value. In this example, in the first premise, it is not specified whether the will is original or derived, the second premise specifies conducive to (means), and the conclusion would involve a derived will, provided the second premise is doxastically satisfactory. Another example would be: Fight for your country! If you are to fight for your country, join up one of the services! Therefore, join up! Here, the first premise and the conclusion do not specify the protasis. If the conclusion did, it would repeat the second premise. Then theres Increase your holdings in oil shares! If you visit your father, hell give you some oil shares. Therefore, visit your father! This argument (purportedly) transmits value. Let us explore these characterisations by Grice with the aid of Hares distinctions. For Hare in a hypothetical or suppositional imperative, the protasis contains a neustic-cum-tropic. A distinction may be made between this or that hypothetical or suppositional imperative and a term used by Grice in his first interpretation of the hypothetical or suppositional imperative, that of conditional command (If you see the whites of their eyes, shoot fire!). A hypothetical or suppositional imperative can be distinguished from a conditional imperative (If you want to make bread, use yeast! If you see anything suspicious, telephone the police!) by the fact that modus ponens is not valid for it. One may use hypothetical, suppositional or conditional imperative for a buletic utterance which features if, and reserve conditional command for a command which is expressed by an imperative, and which is conditional on the satisfaction of the protasis. Thus, on this view, treating the major premise of an argument as a hypothetical or suppositional imperative turns the therefore-chain invalid. Consider the sequence with the major premise as a hypothetical or suppositional imperative. If you will to make someone mad, give him drug D! You will to make Peter mad; therefore, give Peter drug D! By uttering this hypothetical or suppositional imperative, the utterer tells his addressee A only what means to adopt to achieve a given end in  a way which does not necessarily endorse the adoption of that end, and hence of the means to it. Someone might similarly say, if you will to make someone mad, give him drug D! But, of course, even if you will to do that, you must not try to do so. On the other hand, the following is arguably valid because the major premise is a conditional imperative and not a mere hypothetical or suppositional one. We have a case of major premise as a conditional imperative: You will to make someone mad, give him drug D! Make Peter mad! Therefore, give Peter drug D!. We can explain this in terms of the presence of the neustic in the antecedent of the imperative working as the major premise. The supposition that the protasis of a hypothetical or suppositional imperative contains a clause in the buletic mode neatly explains why the argument with the major premise as a hypothetical or suppositional imperative is not valid. But the argument with the major premise as a conditional imperative is, as well as helping to differentiate a suppositional or hypothetical or suppositional iffy imperative from a conditional iffy imperative. For, if the protasis of the major premise in the hypothetical or suppositional imperative is volitival, the mere fact that you will to make Peter mad does not license the inference of the imperative to give him the drug; but this _can_ be inferred from the major premise of the hypothetical or suppositional imperative together with an imperative, the minor premise in the conditional imperative, to make Peter mad. Whether the subordinate clause contains a neustic thus does have have a consequence as to the validity of inferences into which the complex sentence enters. Then theres an alleged principle of mode constancy in buletic and and doxastic inference. One may tries to elucidate Grices ideas on the logical form of the hypothetical or suppositional imperative proper. His suggestion is, admittedly, rather tentative. But it might be argued, in the spirit of it, that an iffy imperative is of the form ((!p⊃!q) Λ .p)) ∴ !q But this violates a principle of mode constancy. A phrastic must remain in the same mode (within the scope of the same tropic) throughout an argument. A conditional imperative does not violate the principle of Modal Constancy, since it is of the form ((p⊃!q) Λ !p)) ∴ !q The question of the logical form of the hypothetical or suppositional  imperative is too obscure to base much on arguments concerning it. There is an alternative to Grices account of the validity of an argument featuring a conditional imperative.  This is to treat the major premise of a conditional imperative, as some have urged it should be as a doxastic utterance tantamount to In order to make someone mad, you have to give him drug D.  Then an utterer who explicitly conveys or asserts the major premise of a conditional imperative and commands the second premise is in consistency committed to commanding the conclusion. If does not always connect phrastic with phrastic but sometimes connects two expressions consisting of a phrastic and a tropic. Consider: If you walk past the post office, post the letter! The antecedent of this imperative states, it seems, the condition under which the imperative expressed becomes operative, and so can not be construed buletically, since by uttering a buletic utterance, an utterer cannot explicitly convey or assert that a condition obtains. Hence, the protasis ought not be within the scope of the buletic !, and whatever we take to represent the form of the utterance above we must not take !(if p, q) to do so. One way out. On certain interpretation of the isomorphism or æqui-vocality Thesis between Indicative and Imperative Inference the utterance has to be construed as an imperative (in the generic reading)  to make the doxasatic conditional If you will walk past the post office,  you will post the letter satisfactory. Leaving aside issues of the implicaturum of if, that the utterance can not be so construed  seems to be shown by the fact that the imperative to make the associated doxastically iffy utterance satisfactory is conformed with by one who does not walk past the post office. But it seems strange at best to say that the utterance is conformed with in the same circumstances. This strangeness or bafflingliness, as Grice prefers, is aptly explained away in terms of the implicaturum. At Oxford, Dummett is endorsing this idea that a conditional imperative be construed as an imperative to make an indicative if utterance true. Dummett urges to divide conditional imperatives into those whose antecedent is within the power of the addressee, like the utterance in question, and those in which it is not. Consider: If you go out, wear your coat! One may be not so much concerned with how to escape this, as Grice is, but how to conform it. A child may choose not to go out in order to comply with the imperative. For an imperative whose protasis is_not_ within the power of the addressee (If anyone tries to escape, shoot him!) it is indifferent whether we treat it as a conditional imperative or not, so why bother. A small caveat here. If no one tries to escape, the imperative is *not violated*. One might ask, might there not be an important practical difference bewteen saying that an imperative has not been violated and that it has been complied with? Dummett ignores this distinction. One may feel think there is much of a practical difference there. Is Grice an intuitionist? Suppose that you are a frontier guard and the antecedent has remained unfulfilled. Then, whether we say that you complied with it, or simply did not *violate* it will make a great deal of difference if you appear before a war crimes tribunal.  For Dummett, the fact that in the case of an imperative expressed by a conditional imperative in which the antecedent is not within the agents power, we should *not* say that the agent had obeyed just on the ground that the protassi is false, is no ground for construing an imperative as expressing a conditional command: for there is no question of fixing what shall constitute obedience independently of the determination of what shall constitute disobedience. This complicates the issues. One may with Grice (and Hare, and Edgley) defend imperative inference against other Oxonian philosophers, such as Kenny or Williams. What is questioned by the sceptics about imperative inference is whether if each one of a set of imperatives is used with the force of a command, one can infer a _further_ imperative with that force from them. Cf. Wiggins on Aristotle on the practical syllogism. One may be more conservative than Hare, if not Grice. Consider If you stand by Jane, dont look at her! You stand by Jane; therefore, dont look at her! This is valid. However, the following, obtained by anti-logism, is not: If you stand by Jane, dont look at her! Look at her! Therefore, you dont stand by Jane. It may seem more reasonable to some to deny Kants thesis, and maintain that anti-logism is valid in imperative inference than it is to hold onto Kants thesis and deny that antilogism is valid in the case in question. Then theres the question of the implicatura involved in the ordering of modes. Consider: Varnish every piece of furniture you make! You are going to make a table; therefore, varnish it! This is prima facie valid. The following, however, switching the order of the modes in the premises is not. You are going to varnish every piece of furniture that you make. Make a table! Therefore; varnish it! The connection between the if and the therefore is metalinguistic, obviouslythe validity of the therefore chain is proved by the associated if that takes the premise as, literally, the protasis and the consequence as the apodosis.  Conversational Implicaturum at the Rescue. Problems with or: Consider Rosss infamous example: Post the letter! Therefore, post the letter or burn it! as invalid, Rossand endorsed at Oxford by Williams. To permit to do p or q is to permit to do p and to permit to do q. Similarly, to give permission to do something is to lift a prohibition against doing it. Admittedly, Williams does not need this so we are stating his claim more strongly than he does. One may review Grices way out (defense of the validity of the utterance above in terms of the implicaturum. Grice claims that in Rosss infamous example (valid, for Grice), whilst (to state it roughly) the premises permissive presupposition (to use the rather clumsy term introduced by Williams) is entailed by it, the conclusions is only conversationally implicated. Typically for an isomorphist, Grice says this is something shared by indicative inferences. If, being absent-minded, Grice asks his wife, What have I done with the letter? And she replies, You have posted it or burnt it, she conversationally implicates that she is not in a position to say which Grice has done. She also conversationally implicates that Grice may not have post it, so long as he has burnt it. Similarly, the future tense indicative, You are going to post the letter has the conversational implicaturum You may be not going to post the letter so long as you are going to burn it.  But this surely does not validate the introduction rule for OR, to wit:  p; therefore, p or q. One can similarly, say: Eclipse will win. He may not, of course, if it rains. And I *know* it will *not* rain. Problems with and. Consider: Put on your parachute AND jump out! Therefore, jump out! Someone who _only_ jumps out of an æroplane does not fulfil Put on your parachute and jump out!  He has done only what is necessary, but not sufficient to fulfil it.  Imperatives do not differ from indicatives in this respect, except that fulfilment takes the place of belief or doxa, which is the form of acceptance apprpriate to a doxasatic utterance, as the Names implies.  Someone who is told Smith put on his parachute AND jumped out is entitled to believe that Smith jumped out. But if he believes that this is _all_ Smith did he is in error (Cf. Edgley). One may discuss Grices test of cancellability in the case of the transport officer who says: Go via Coldstream or Berwick! It seems the transport officers way of expressing himself is extremely eccentric, or conversationally baffling, as Grice prefersyet validly. If the transport officer is not sure if a storm may block one of the routes, what he should say is _Prepare_ to go via Coldstream or Berwick! As for the application of Grices test of explicit cancellation here, it yield, in the circumstances, the transport officer uttering Go either via Coldstream or Berwick!  But you may not go via Coldstream if you do not go via Berwick, and you may not go via Berwick if you do not go via Coldstream. Such qualifications  ‒ what Grice calls explicit cancellation of the implicaturum  ‒ seem to the addressee to empty the buletic mode of utterance of all content and is thus reminiscent of Henry Fords utterance to the effect that people can choose what colour car they like provided it is black. But then Grice doesnt think Ford is being illogical, only Griceian and implicatural! Grice was fascinated by “if” clauses in mode other than the indicative: “if the cat is on the mat, she is purring.” “If the cat had been, make her purr!” etc. He spent years at Clifton mastering thisonly to have Ayer telling him at Oxford he didn’t need it! “I won’t take that!” -- Refs.: There is at least one essay just about the categorical imperative, but there are scattered references wherever Grice considers the mood markers, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

IN-PLICATVM. Grice: “It is obvious that the Romans used this creatively, ‘plico in,’ ‘in-plico.’ The assimilation of the ‘n’ into ‘m’ before ‘p’ is only vugar!” -- IN-PLICATVRVM -- implicaturum: Grice, “Fortunately, philosophy’s main verb, “to imply,” ‘implicare,’ is like amare, perfectly regular.. So we have implicans, who is the utterer or his utterance, the implicaturum, which is the utterance that implies in the future, and the impilicatumBy way of nominalization, or what I call subjectification or category shift we do have ‘impliatura,’ qua nounBut surely ‘implicatura’ qua feminine noun should be distinguished from the non-categorially shifted ‘implicatura’ as plural of ‘implicaturum.’ There is no category shift in thinking of an expression as a vehicle of an ‘implicatum’. This vehicle is the implicaturum when seen as the expression itself. The utterer is the implicans. And then there’s the ‘implicandtum.’ Similarly, in definition, we speak of definiens and definiendumdefiniturumThe definies is what defines. This applies strictly to the ‘definer’the human being. The definiturum if in plural applies to the expression that defines, -- when in masculine, definiturus, it applies to the definer. Similarly we may say that he who is implies is an IMPLIER, or an IMPLICATURUS. We do speak of a professor as being ‘a great explicator.’ So we shoud speak of myself as a great implicator. in his Oxford seminars. Grice: “I distinguish between the ‘implicaturum’ and the ‘implicaturum.’” “The ‘implicaturum’ corresponds to Moore’s entailment.” “For the ‘pragmatic-type’ of thing, one should use ‘implicaturum.’” “The –aturum’ form is what at Clifton I learned as the future, and a ‘future’ twist it has, since it refers to the future.” “ ‘Implicaturum esse’ is, strictly, the infinitivum futurum, made out of the ‘esse’ plus the ‘indicaturum.’ We loved these things at Clifton!”  a pragmatic relation different from, but easily confused with, the semantic relation of entailment. This concept was first identified, explained, and used by H. P. Grice (Studies in the Way of Words, 1989). Grice identified two main types of implicaturum, conventional and non-conventional (including conversational). An emisor is said to conversationally implicate that p in uttering x, provided that, although p is NOT logically implied by what the emisor explicitly communicates, the assumption that the emisor is attempting cooperative communication warrants inferring that the emisor is communicating that p. If Grice utters “There is a garage around the corner” in response to Strawson’s saying, “I am out of gas,” Grice conversationally implicates that the garage is open and has gas to sell. Grice identifies several conversational maxims to which cooperative conversationalists may be expected to conform, and which justify inferences about what the emisor implicates. In the above example, the implicaturums are due to the maxim of conversational relevance. Another important maxim is the maxim of conversational fortitude  (“Make your contribution as informatively strong as is required”). Among implicatura due to the Maxim of conversational fortitude is the scalar implicaturum, wherein the utterance contains an element that is part of a quantitative scale. Utterance of such a sentence conversationally implicates that the emisor does not believe related propositions higher on the scale of conversational fortitude or informativeness. E. g. an emisor who says, “Some of the zoo animals escaped,” implies that he does not believe that that most of the zoo animals escaped, or that every animal of the zoo animals escaped. Unlike a conversational implicaturum, a conventional implicaturum is due solely to the semantics of the expression. An emisor is said by Grice to conventionally imply that p, if the semantics of the expression commits the emisor to p, even though what the emisor explicitly communicates does not entail that p. Thus, uttering, as the Tommies did during the Great War, “She was poor but she was honest” a Tommy implicates, but does not explicitly convey, that there is a contrast between her poverty and her honesty.  Grice fought with this. It’s a term of art, and he mainly wants to avoid, fastidiously, equivocation. “I say fastidiously because at Oxford, fewHare is one of themfollowed suit --. Most stuck with ‘implicatio.’  “So, if we stick with Roman, we have ‘implicatio.’ This gives English ‘implication,’ because the Anglo-Norman nominative proceeded via the Roman accusative, i. e. ‘implicationem.’ The use of –ure is also Anglo-Norman, for Roman ‘-ura.’ So we have ‘implicatura,’ and in Anglo-Norman, ‘implicature.’ ‘Implicatio’ is a feminine noun, and so is ‘implicatura.’ ‘Implicatio’ is a ‘active voice’ noun; so is ‘implicatura.’ The Roman allows for a correlative neuter to the past participle, ‘implicatum,’ or ‘implicitum’ (there are vowel alternation here). So, the two neuter correlative active forms for the two neuter passive perfect forms, ‘implicatum’ and ‘implicitum’ are ‘implicaturum’ and ‘impliciturum.’ Kneale has expanded on the use of ‘implicans.’ If ‘implicans’ is the active PRESENT participle for ‘implicare,’ ‘implicaturum’ is the active FUTURE participle. There is no need to specify the vehicle, as per Kneale, ‘propositio implicans,’ ‘propositio implicata’Since ‘implicatura’ is definitely constructed out of the active-voice future participle, we should have in fact a trio, where the two second items get two variants, each: the implicans, the implicaturum/impliciturum, and the implicatum/implicitum. Note that in the present participle, the vowel alternation does not apply: there’s ‘implicans’ (masculine, feminine, and neuter) only, which then yields, in the neuter forms, the future, ‘implicaturum’/’impliciturum,’ and the perfect, ‘implicatum’/’implicitum.’ The same for ‘explicare’: explicatio, explicatura, -- explicans, yielding explicaturum/expliciturm, explicatum/explciitum. Note that when I speak of what is seen, ‘see’ being diaphanous, I refer to ‘visum,’ what is seen.There is no need, and in fact it is best not to, spceficy the vehicle. The Romans used the neuter, singular, for each case --.”  “If I were serious about ‘implicature’ being feminine, I would speak of the ‘implicata’ as a singular form, but I do not. I use ‘implicatum,’ what is impliedand use ‘implicata’ as plural neuter. Since an implicatum is usually indeterminate, it’s best to refer to the plural, ‘implicata’Ditto for the ‘implicaturum,’ which becomes, in the plural, ‘implicatura.’the vehicles are various in that stress, emphasis, context, all change the vehicle, somehow --. Implicatio then is like ‘conceptio,’ it is an abstract form (strictly feminine) that has a process-producti ambiguity that the neuter family: implicans, implicaturum/impliciturm, implicatum/implicitum avoids. Note that while –ure form in Anglo-Norman does not derive from the accusative, as ‘implication,’ does hence no accusative nasal ‘n’ (of ‘implicatioN,’ but not ‘implicatio’) in ‘implicature.’ The fact that the Anglo-Normans confused it all by turning this into ‘employ,’ and ‘imply’ should not deter the Oxonian for his delightful coinages!” Active Nominal Forms Infinitive: implicā́re Present participle: implicāns; implicántis Future participle: implicītúrus; implicātúrus Gerund: implicándum Gerundive: implicándus Passive Nominal Forms Infinitive: implicā́re Perfect participle: implicī́tum; implicā́tum. implicitura (Latin Dictionary)  lemma part voice mood tense gender number case implicare verb active participle future feminine singularnominative ablative vocative lemma part voice mood tense gender number case implicare verb active participle future neuter plural nominative accusative vocative INFLECTION Temporal inflection presentmasculine implicans futuremasculine impliciturus / implicaturus presentfeminine implicans futurefeminine implicitura / implicatura presentneuter implicans futureneuter impliciturum / implicaturum. De camptgii , vel eampacis dicemus inlra in vita Galheni apud TtebeUtum Pollionem, ratdeiorum cajcci ISc imperatotum ita vocabantur , non "gamba," vel  "campa," qua pro crure pofteriores wfuipatunt, quod crure tenus calcea xeniui: id k corrigiarum flexuris, & implicaturis , quibus circumligabantur. lologiae et Mercurii di Marziano Capella (I 68), e avanza una nuova ipotesi di ... naculis implicaturis in retia sua praecipites implagabuntur, syllogismis tuae pro- ... miliae suae longo ordine ac multis stemmatum inligata flexuris in parte prima. It may be argued that when Grice compares ‘impicature’ to “the ‘implying,’ that’s a feminine form, cognate with German/Dutch, -ung. Cf. Grice, “The conception of value”The conceiving of value,” the concept of value, the conceptus of value, the conceptum of value. Active Nominal Forms Present participle: cōncipiēns; cōncipiéntis Future participle: cōnceptúrus Passive Nominal Forms Perfect participle: cōnceptum. Since Grice plays with this in “Conception of value,” let’s compare. “Grice: “It is worth comparing ‘to conceive’ with ‘to employ’.” Active present participle: implicansconcipiens, concipientis --. Active future participle: implicaturum/impliciturm, concepturus --. Passive perfect participle: implicatum/implicitumconceptum. Hardie would ask, “what do you mean ‘of’?”The implication of implication. The conception of value. In an objective (passive) interpretation: it’s the conceptum of ‘value’. In a subjective (active) interpretion, it’s the ‘conceiving’ of ‘value.’ Cfr. “the love of god,” “the fear of the enemy.” “The implication of implication.” For Grice, it’s the SENDER who implicates, a rational agentalthough he may allow for an expression to ‘imply’via connotation --, and provided the sender does, or would occasionally do. In terms of the subjective/active, and objective/passive distinction, we would have, ‘implication,’ as in Strawson’s implication, meaning Strawson’s ‘implying’ (originally a feminine noun), i. e. Strawson’s ‘implicatio’ and Strawson’s ‘implicatura’, and Strawson’s ‘implicature,’ and Strawson’s ‘implicaturum’/’impliciturm.’ In terms of the passive/objective realm, what is implied by Strawsonthe implicatum, and the implicitum. There passive interpretation allows for only one form (with two vowel alternates): implicatum and implicitum. The active forms can be present: ‘implicans’ and ‘implicaturum’. If it’s Strawson the ‘implier’implicans is ‘masculine.’ If it’s Strawson the one about to imply, it’s “Strawson implicaturus” --. By use of the genitive“Ciceronis” we would have, “implicatura Ciceronis”Cicero’s implicature --, Cicero the implier, Cicero implicans --. Surely Cicero did something to imply. This ‘something’ is best conceived in the neuter, ‘implicans,’ as applied, say, to sententia, or propositio‘propositio implicans‘sententia implicans’‘implicatura’ would refer to the act of implyingas the conceiving of value --. Since ‘implicatura’ is formed out of the future participle, its corresponding form in the neuter would be ‘implicaturum.’ By his handwave (implicaturum/implicitumqua vehicle of Cicero’s implicatureor implicaturahis act of implying), Cicero (implicans) implies (implicat) this or that ‘implicatum’ or ‘implicitum.’ Or, Grice’s implication. Grice makes an important distinction which he thinks Austin doesn’t make because what a philosopher EXPLICITLY conveys and what he IMPLICITLY conveys. It was only a few years Grice was interacting philosophically with Austin and was reading some material by Witters, when Grice comes with this criticism and complaint. Austin ignores “all too frequently” a distinction that Witters apparently dnies. This is a distinction between what an emissor communicates (e. g. that p), which can be either explicitly (that p1) or implicitly (that p2) and what, metabolically, and derivatively, the emissum ‘communictates’ (explicitly or implicitly). At the Oxford Philosophical Society, he is considering Moore’s ‘entailment.’ This is not a vernacular expression, but a borrowing from a Romance language. But basically, Moore’s idea is that ‘p’ may be said to ‘entail’ q iff at least two conditions follow. Surely ‘entail’ has only one sense. In this metabolically usage where it is a ‘p’ that ‘entails’ the conditions are that there is a property and that there is a limitation. Now suppose Grice is discussing with Austin or reading Witters. Grice wants to distinguish various things: what the emissor communicates (explicitly or implicitly) and the attending diaphanous but metabolical, what WHAT THE EMSSOR COMMUNICATES (explicitly or implicitly) ENTAILS, AND the purely metabolical what the emissum ‘entails’ (explicitly or implicitly). This is Grice’s wording:“If we can elucidate the meaning of "A meantNN by x that p (on a particular occasion)," this might reasonably be expected to help us with the explication of "entails.”The second important occasion is in the interlude or excursus of his Aristotelian Society talk. How does he introduce the topic of ‘implication’? At that time there was a lot being written about ‘contextual’ or ‘pragmatic’ implicationeven within Grice’s circleas in D. K. Grant’s essay on pragmatic implication for Philosophy, and even earlier Nowell-Smith’s on ‘contextual implication’ in “Ethics,” and even earlier, and this is perhaps Grice’s main triggerF. Strawson’s criticism of Whitehead and Russell, with Strawson having that, by uttering ‘The king of France is not bald,’ the emissor IMPLIES that there is a king of France (Strawson later changes the idiom from ‘imply,’ and the attending ‘implication, to ‘presuppose,’ but he keeps ‘imply’ in all the reprints of his earlier essays).  In “Causal Theory,” Grice surely cannot just ‘break’ the narrative and start with ‘implication’ in an excursus. So the first stage is to explore the use of ‘implication’ or related concepts in the first part of “Causal Theory” LEADING to the excursus for which need he felt. The first use appears in section 2.  The use is the noun, ‘implication.’ And Grice is reporting the view of an objector, so does not care to be to careful himself.“the OBJECTION MIGHT run as follows.” “… When someone makes a remark such as “The pillar box seems red” A CERTAIN IMPLICATION IS CARRIED.” He goes on “This implication is “DISJUNCTIVE IN FORM,” which should not concerns us here. Since we are considering the status of the implication, as seen by the objector as reported by Grice. He does not give a source, so we may assume G. A. Paul reading Witters, and trying to indoctrinate a few Oxonians into Wittgensteinianism (Grice notes that besides the playgroup there was Ryle’s group at Oxford and a THIRD, “perhaps more disciplined” group, that tended towards Witters.Grice goes on:“It IS implied that…” p. Again, he expands it, and obviously shows that he doesn’t care to be careful. And he is being ironic, because the implication is pretty lengthy! Yet he says, typically:“This may not be an absolutely EXACT or complete characterisation of the implication, but it is, perhaps, good ENOUGH to be going with!” Grice goes on to have his objector a Strawsonian, i. e. as REFUSING TO ASSIGN A TRUTH-VALUE to the utterance, while Grice would have that it is ‘uninterestingly true. In view of this it may to explore the affirmative and negative versions. Because the truth-values may change:In Grice’s view: “The pillar box seems red to me” IS “UNINTERESTINGLY TRUE,” in spite of the implication.As for “It is not the case that the pillar box seems red,” this is more of a trick. In “Negation,” Grice has a similar example. “That pillar box is red; therefore, it is not blue.”He is concerned with “The pillar box is not blue,” or “It is not the case that the pillar box is blue.”What about the truth-value now of the utterance in connection with the implication attached to it?Surely, Grice would like, unless accepting ‘illogical’ conversationalists (who want to make that something is UNASSERTIBLE or MISLEADING by adding ‘not’), the utterance ‘It is not the case that the pillar box seems red to me’ is FALSE in the scenario where the emissor would be truthful in uttering ‘The pillar box seems red to me.” Since Grice allows that the affirmative is ‘uninterestingly true,’ he is committed to having ‘It is not the case that the pillar box seems red’ as FALSE.For the Strawsonian Wittgensteinian, or truth-value gap theorist, the situation is easier to characterise. Both ‘The pillar box seems red to me” and its negation, “The pillar box does not seem red to me” lack a truth value, or in Grice’s word, as applied to the affirmative, “far from being uninterestingly true, is neither true nor false,” i. e. ‘neuter.’ It wold not be true but it would not be false eitherbreakdown of bivalence. Grice’s case is a complicated one because he distinguishes between the sub-perceptual “The pillar box seems red” from the perceptual ‘vision’ statement, “Grice sees that the pillar box is red.” So the truth of “The pillar box seems red” is a necessary condition for the statement about ‘seeing.’ This is itself controversial. Some philosophers have claimed that “Grice knows that p” does NOT entail “Grice believes that p,” for example. But for the causal theory Grice is thinking of an analysis of “Grice sees that the pillar box is red” in terms of three conditions: First, the pillar box seems red to Grice. Second, the pillar box is red. And third, it is the pillar box being red that causes it seeming red to Grice. Grice goes to reformulate the idea that “The pillar box seems red” being true. But now not “uninterestingly true,” but “true (under certain conditions),” or as he puts it “(subject to certain qualifications) true.” He may be having in mind a clown in a circus confronted with the blue pillar box and making a joke about it. Those ‘certain qualifications’ would not apply to the circus case. Grice goes on to change the adverb, it’s ‘boringly true,’ or ‘highly boringly true.’ He adds ‘suggestio falsi,’ which seems alright but which would not please the Wittgensteinian who would also reject the ‘false.’ We need a ‘suggestio neutri.’ In this second section, he gives the theoretical explanation. The “implication” arises “in virtue of a GENERAL FEATURE OR PRINCIPLE” of conversation, or pertaining to a system put in ‘communication,’ or a general feature or principle governing an emissor communicating that p. Note that ‘feature’ and ‘principle’ are appropriately ‘vague.’ “Feature” can be descriptive. “Principle” is Aristotelian. Boethius’s translation for Aristotle’s ‘arche.’ It can be descriptive. The first use of ‘principle’ in a ‘moral’ or ‘practical’ context seems to post-date its use in, say, geometryEuclid’s axioms as ‘principia mathematica,’ or Newton’s “Principia.” Grice may be having in mind Moore’s ‘paradox’ (true, surely) when Grice adds ‘it is raining.’Grice’s careful wording is worth exploring. “The mistake [incorrectness, falsehood] of supposing the implication to constitute a "part of the meaning [sense]” of "The Alpha seems Beta" is somewhat similar to, though MORE INSIDUOUS …”[moral implication here: 1540s, from Middle French insidieux "insidious" (15c.) or directly from Latin insidiosus "deceitful, cunning, artful, treacherous," from insidiae (plural) "plot, snare, ambush," from insidere "sit on, occupy," from in- "in" (from PIE root *en "in") + sedere "to sit," from PIE root *sed- (1) "to sit." Figurative, usually with a suggestion of lying in wait and the intent to entrap. Related: Insidiously; insidiousness]“than, the mistake which one IF one supposes that the SO-CALLED [‘pragmatic’ or ‘contextualimplicaturum, “as I would not,” and indeed he does nothe prefers “expresses” here, not the weak ‘imply’] “implication” that one believes it to be raining is "a part of the meaning [or sense]" of the expression [or emissum] "It is raining.”Grice allows that no philosopher may have made this mistake. He will later reject the view that one conversationally implicates that one believes that it is raining by uttering ‘It is raining.’ But again he does not give sources. In these case, while without the paraphernalia about the ‘a part of the ‘sense’” bit, can be ascribed at Oxford to Nowell-Smith and Grant (but not, we hope to Strawson). Nowell-Smith is clear that it is a contextual implication, but one would not think he would make the mistake of bringing in ‘sense’ into the bargain. Grice goes on:“The short and literally inaccurate reply to such a supposition [mistake] might be that the so-called “implication” attaches because the expression (or emissum) is a PROPOSITIONAL one [expressable by a ‘that so-and-so’ clause] not because it is the particular propositional expression which it happens to be.”By ‘long,’ Grice implicates: “And it is part of the function of the informative mode that you utter an utterance in the informative mode if you express your belief in the content of the propositonal expression.”Grice goes on to analyse ‘implication’ in terms of ‘petitio principii.’ This is very interesting and requires exploration. Grice claims that his success the implicaturum in the field of the philosophy of perception led his efforts against Strawson on the syncategoremata.But here we see Grice dealing what will be his success.One might, for example, suggest that it is open to the champion of sense_data to lay down that the sense-datum sentence " I have a pink sense-datum " should express truth if and only if the facts are as they would have to be for it to be true, if it were in order, to say .. Something looks pink to me ", even though it may not actually be in ordei to say this (because the D-or-D condition is unfulfilled). But this attempt to by-pass the objector's position would be met by the reply that it begs the question; for it assumes that there is some way of specifying the facts in isolation from the implication standardly carried by such a specification; and this is precisely what the objector is denying.Rephrasing that:“One might, for example, suggest that it is open to the champion of sense_data to lay down that the sense-datum sentence "The pillar box seems red” is TRUE if and only if the facts are as the facts WOULD HAVE to be for “The pillar box seems red” to be true, IF (or provided that) it were IN ORDER [i. e. conversationally appropriate], to utter or ‘state’ or explicitly convey that the pillar box seems red, even though it may NOT actually be in order [conversationally appropriate] to explicitly convey that the pillar box seems red (because the condition specified in the implication is unfulfilled).”“But this attempt to by-pass the objector's position would be met by a charge of ‘petitio principia,’ i. e. the reply that it begs the question.”“Such a  manoeuvre is invalid in that it assumes that there IS some way of providing a SPECIFICATION of the facts of the matter in isolation from, or without recourse to, the implication that is standardly carried by such a specification.”“This is precisely what the objector is denying, i. e. the objector believes it is NOT the case that there is a way of giving a specification of the scenario without bringing in the implication.”Grice refers to the above as one of the “frustrations,” implicating that the above, the ‘petitio principia,’ is just one of the trials Grice underwent before coming with the explanation in terms of the general feature of communication, or as he will late express, in terms of ‘what the hell’ the ‘communication-function’ of “The pillar seems red to me” might be when the implicaturum is not meantand you have to go on and cancel it (“That pillar box seems red; mind, I’m not suggesting that it’s notI’m practicing my sub-perceptual proficiency.”).Grice goes on to note the generality he saw in the idea of the ‘implication.’ Even if “The pillar box seems red” was his FIRST attack, the reason he was willing to do the attacking was that the neo-Wittgensteinian was saying things that went against THE TENOR OF THE THINGS GRICE would say with regard to other ‘linguistic philosophical’ cases OTHER than in the philosophy of perception, notably his explorations were against Malcolm reading of Moore, about Moore ‘misusing’ “know.”Grice:“I was inclined to rule against my objector, partly because his opponent's position was more in line with the kind of thing I was inclined to say about other linguistic phenomena which are in some degree comparable.”Rephrase:“My natural inclination was to oppose the objector.”“And that was because his opponent's position is more “in line” with the kind of thing Grice is inclined to sayor thesis he is willing to put forward-- about OTHER phenomena involving this or that ‘communication-function’ of this or that philosophical adage, which are in some degree comparable to “The pillar box seems red.””So just before the ‘excursus,’ or ‘discursus,’ as he has itwhich is then not numberedbut subtitlted (‘Implication’), he embark on a discursus about “certain ASPECTS of the concept OR CONCEPTS of implication.”He interestingly adds: “using some more or less well-worn examples.” This is not just a reference to Strawson, Grant, Moore, Hungerland and Nowell-Smith, but to the scholastics and the idea of the ‘suppositio’ as an ‘implicatio,’: “Tu non cessas edere ferrum.” Grice says he will consider only four aspects or FOUR IDEAS (used each as a ‘catalyst’) in particular illustrations.“Smith has not ceased beating his wife.”“Smith’s girlfriend is poor, but honest.”“Smith’s handwriting is beautiful”“Smith’s wife is in the kitchen or in the bathroom.”Each is a case, as Grice puts it, “in which in ordinary parlance, or at least in Oxonian philosophical parlance, something might be said to be ‘implied’ (hopefully by the emissor) -- as distinct from being ‘stated,’ or ‘explicitly put.’One first illustrationEXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “Smith has not ceased beating his wife.” IMPLICITLY CONVEYED, but cancellable: “Smith has been beating his wife.”CANCELLATION: “Smith has not ceased beating his wife; he never started.”APPLY THREE OTHER IDEAS.A second illustrationEXPLICITLY CONVEYED:“Smith’s girlfriend is poor, but honest.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “There is some contrast between Smith’s girlfriend’s honesty and her poverty; and possibly between Smith and the utterer.”CANCELLATION: “I’m sorry, I cannot cancel that.”TRY OTHER THREE IDEAS.A third illustrationEXPLICITLY CONVEYED “Smith’s handwriting is beautiful”“Or “If only his outbursts were more angelic.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “He possibly cannot read Hegel in German.”CANCELLATION: “Smith’s handwriting is beautiful; on top, he reads Hegel in German.”TRY THREEOTHER IDEASA fourth illustration:EXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “Smith’s wife is in the kitchen or in the bathroom.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “It is not the case that I have truth-functional grounds to express disjunct D1, and it is not the case that I have truth-functional grounds to express disjunct D2; therefore, I am introducting the disjunction EITHER than by the way favoured by Gentzen.” (Grice actually focuses on the specific ‘doxastic’ condition: emissor believes …CANCELLATION: “I know perfectly well where she is, but I want you to find out for yourself.”TRY THREE OTHER IDEAS.Within the discursus he gives SIX (a sextet) other examples, of the philosophical type, because he is implicating the above are NOT of the really of philosophical type, hence his reference to ‘ordinary parlance.’ He points out that he has no doubt there are other candidates besides his sextet.FIRST IN THE SEXTETEXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “”AS” REQUIRES A GESTALT.”CANCELLATION: “I see the horse as a horse, because my gestalt is mine.”TRY THREE OTHER IDEASSECOND IN THE SEXTET:EXPLICITLY CONVEYED:“When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word "know".”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “You can only use ‘know’ for ‘difficult cases.’CANCELLATION: “If I know that p iff I believe that p, p, and p causes my belief in p, I know that the objects before me are human hands.”TRY THREE OTHER IDEAS.THIRD IN THE SEXTETEXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “For an occurrence to be properly said to have a ‘cause,’ the occurrence must be something abnormal or unusual.”IMPLICILTY CONVEYED: “Refrain from using ‘cause’ when the thing is normal and usual.”CANCELLATION: “If I see that the pillar box is red iff the pillar box seems red, the pillar box is red, and the pillar box being red causes the pillar box seeming red, the cause of the pillar box seeming red is that the pillar box is red.”TRY OTHER THREE IDEAS.FOURTH IN THE SEXTET:  EXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is responsible, it must be the sort of action for which people are condemned.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “Refrain ascribing ‘responsibility’ to Timmy having cleaned up his bedroom.”CANCELLATION: “Timmy is very responsible. He engages in an action for which people are not condemned.”TRY THREE OTHER IDEAS.FIFTH IN THE SEXTET:EXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “What is actual is not also possible.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “There is a realm of possibilities which does not overlap with the realm of actualities.”CANCELLATION: “If p is actual iff p obtains in world w1, and p is possible iff p obtains in any world wn which includes w1, p is possible.”TRY THREE OTHER IDEAS.SIXTH IN THE SEXTETEXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “To know is magical!”CANCELLATION: “If I know that p iff I believe that p, p, and p causes my believing that p, then what is known by me to be the case is also believed by me to be the case.”TRY THREE OTHER IDEAS.CASE IN QUESTION:EXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “The pillar box seems red.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “One will doubt it is.”CANCELLATION: “The pillar box seems red and I hope no one doubt it is.”TRY THREE OTHER IDEAS. THAT LISTING became commonplace for Grice. In ProlegomenaGROUP A: EXAMPLE I: RYLE on ‘voluntarily’ and “involuntarily” in “The Concept of Mind.” RYLE WAS LISTENING! BUT GRICE WAS without reach! Grice would nothavecriticised Ryle at a shorter distance.EXAMPLE II: MALCOLM IN “Defending common sense” in the Philosophical Review, on Moore’s misuse of ‘know’also in Causal, above, as second in the sextet.EXPLICITLY CONVEYED:“When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word "know".REPHRASE IN “PROLEGOMENA.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “You can only use ‘know’ for ‘difficult cases.’CANCELLATION: “If I know that p iff I believe that p, p, and p causes my belief in p, I know that the objects before me are human hands.”EXAMPLE III: BENJAMIN ON BROAD ON THE “SENSE” OF “REMEMBERING”EXPLICITLY CONVEYED;IMPLICITLY CONVEYEDCANCELLATIONEXAMPLES, GROUP A, CLASS IV: philosophy of perception FIRST EXAMPLE: Witters on ‘seeing as’ in Philosophical InvestigationsEXPLICITLY CONVEYEDIMPLICITLY CONVEYEDCANCELLATION.Previously used in Causal as first in the sextet: FIRST IN THE SEXTETEXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife.”Rephrased in Prolegomena. IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “”AS” REQUIRES A GESTALT.”CANCELLATION: “I see the horse as a horse, because my gestalt is mine.”GROUP ACLASS IVPHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTIONEXAMPLE II“The pillar box seems red to me.”Used in“Causal”EXPLICITLY CONVEYED: “The pillar box seems red.”IMPLICITLY CONVEYED: “One will doubt it is.”CANCELLATION: “The pillar box seems red and I hope no one doubt it is.”GROUP ACLASS VPHILOSOPHY OF ACTIONHere unlike Class IV, he uses (a), etc.EXAMPLE A: WITTERS AND OTHERS on ‘trying’ EXPLICITLY CONVEYEDIMPLICITLY CONVEYED:CANCELLATIONGROUP ACLASS V“ACTION,” not ‘philosophy of action’cf. ‘ordinary parlance.’EXAMPLE B: Hart on ‘carefully.’EXPLICITLY CONVEYEDIMPLICITLY CONVEYEDCANCELLATION GROUP ACLASS VACTIONEXAMPLE C: Austin in “A plea for excuses” on ‘voluntarily’ and ‘involuntarily’a refinement on Ryle aboveusing variable “Mly”Grice would not have criticised Austin in the play group. He rather took it against his tutee, Strawson.EXPLICITLY CONVEYED IMPLICITLY CONVEYEDCANCELLATIONGROUP B: syncategoremanot lettered butFIRST EXAMPLE: “AND” (not ‘not’)SECOND EXAMPLE: “OR”THIRD EXAMPLE: “IF”particularly relevant under ‘implication.’ STRAWSON, Introduction to logical theory.GRICE’S PHRASING: “if p, q” ENTAILS ‘p horseshoe q.’ The reverse does not hold: it is not the case that ‘p horseshoe q’ ENTAILS ‘if p, q’. Odd way of putting it, but it was all from Strawson. It may be argued that ‘entail’ belongs in a system, and ‘p horseshoe q’ and ‘if p, q’ are DISPARATE. Grice quotes verbatim from Strawson:a ‘primary or standard’ use of “if … then …,” or “if,” of which the main characteristics were: that for each hypothetical statement made by this use of “if,” there could be made just one statement which would be the antecedent of the hypothetical and just onestatement which would be its consequent; that the hypothetical statement is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent statement, if made or accepted, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent statement; and that the making of the hypothetical statement carries the implicationeither of uncertainty about, or of disbelief in, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent.Grice rephrases that by stating that for Grice “a primary or standard use of ‘if, then’” is characterised as follows:“for each hypothetical statement made by this use of “if,” there could be made just one statement which would be the antecedent of the hypothetical and just one statement which would be its consequent; that the hypothetical statement is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent statement, if made or accepted, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent statement; and that the making of the hypothetical statement carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or of disbelief in, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent.”Grice rephrases the characterisation as from “each” and eliding a middle part, but Grice does not care to add the fastidious “[…],” or quote, unquote.“each hypothetical ‘statement’ made by this use of “if” is acceptable (TRUE, reasonable) if the antecedent ‘statement,’ IF made or accepted, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent ‘statement;’ and that the making of thehypothetical statement carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or of disbelief in, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent.  “A hypothetical, or conditional ‘statement’ or composite proposition such as “If it is day, I talk”is acceptable (or TRUE, or ‘reasonable’) if (but not only if), first, the antecedent ‘statement,’ ‘It is day,’ IF made on its own, or accepted on its own, i. e. simpliciter, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground or ‘reason’ for accepting the consequent ‘statement,’ to wit: “I talk;” and, second, that the making of the conditional proposition or hypothetical ‘statement’ carries the implication, or rather the emissor of the emissum IMPLIES, either it is not the case that the emissor is CERTAIN about or that it is day and CERTAIN about or that he talks, or BELIEVES that it is day and BELIEVES that he talks.”More or less Grice’s denial or doubt. Or rather ‘doubt’ (Strawson’s ‘uncertainty about’) or denial (‘disbelief in’). But it will do at this point to explore the argument by Strawson to which Grice is responding. First two comments. Strawson has occasion to respond to Grice’s response in more than one opportunity. But Grice never took up the issue again in a detailed fashionafter dedicating a full lecture to it. One occasion was Strawson’s review of the reprint of Grice in 1989. Another is in the BA memorial. The crucial one is repr. by Strawson (in a rather otiose way) in his compilation, straight from PGRICE. This is an essay which Strawson composed soon after the delivery by Grice of the lecture without consulting. Once Stawson is aware of Grice’s terminology, he is ready to frame his view in Grice’s terms: for Strawson, there IS an implicaturum, but it is a conventional one. His analogy is with the ‘asserted’ “therefore” or “so.” Since this for Grice was at least the second exemplar of his manoeuvre, it will do to revise the argument from which Grice extracts the passage in “Prolegomena.” In the body of the full lecture IV, Grice does not care to mention Strawson at all; in fact, he makes rather hasty commentaries generalising on both parties of the debate: the formalists, who are now ‘blue-collared practitioners of the sciences,” i. e. not philosophers like Grice and Strawson; and the informalists or ‘traditionalists’ like Strawson who feel offended by the interlopers to the tranquil Elysium of philosophy. Grice confesses a sympathy for the latter, of course. So here is straight from the tranquil Elysium of philosophy. For Strawson, the relations between “if” and “⊃” have already, but only in part, been discussed (Ch. 2, S. 7).” So one may need to review those passages. But now he has a special section that finishes up the discussion which has been so far only partial. So Strawson resumes the points of the previous partial discussion and comes up with the ‘traditionalist’ tenet.  The sign “⊃” is called the material implication sign. Only by Whitehead and Russell, that is, ‘blue-collared practitioners of the sciences,’ in Grice’s wording. Whitehead and Russell think that ‘material’ is a nice opposite to ‘formal,’ and ‘formal implication’ is something pretty complex that only they know to which it refers! Strawson goes on to explain, and this is a reminder of his “Introduction” to his “Philosophical Logic” where he reprints Grice’s Meaning (for some reason). There Strawson has a footnote quoting from Quine’s “Methods of Logic,” where the phrasing is indeed about the rough phrase, ‘the meaning of ‘if’’cf. Grice’s laughter at philosophers talking of ‘the sense of ‘or’’“Why, one must should as well talk of the ‘sense’ of ‘to,’ or ‘of’!’Grice’s implicaturum is to O. P. Wood, whose claim to fame is for having turned Oxford into the place where ‘the sense of ‘or’’ was the key issue with which philosophers were engaged.  Strawson goes on to say that its meaning is given by the ‘rule’ that any statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ is FALSE in the case in which the first of its constituent statements is true and the second false, and is true in every other case considered in the system; i. e., the falsity of the first constituent statement or the truth of the second are, equally, sufficient conditions of the truth of a statement of material implication. The combination of truth in the first with falsity in the second is the single, NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT, condition of its falsity. The standard or primary -- the importance of this qualifying phrase, ‘primary,’ can scarcely be overemphasizedGrice omits this bracket when he expolates the quote. The bracket continues. The place where Strawson opens the bracket is a curious one: it is obvious he is talking about the primary use of ‘if’. So here he continues the bracket with the observation that there are uses of “if”  which do not answer to the description given here, or to any other descriptions given in this [essay] -- use of “if” sentence, on the other hand [these are Strawson’s two hands], are seen to be in circumstances where, not knowing whether some statement which could be made by the use of a sentence corresponding in a certain way to the sub-ordinated clause of the utterance is true or not, or believing it to be false, the emissor nevertheless considers that a step in reasoning from THAT statement to a statement related in a similar way to the main clause would be a sound or reasonable step [a reasonable reasoning, that is]; this statement related to the main clause also being one of whose truth the emissor is in doubt, or which the emissor believes to be false. Even in such circumstances as these a philosopher may sometimes hesitate to apply ‘true’ to a conditional or hypothetical statement, i.e., a statement which could be made by the use of “if ”(Philo’s ‘ei,’ Cicero’s ‘si’)  in its standard significance, preferring to call a conditional statement reasonable or well-founded. But if the philosopher does apply ‘true’ to an ‘if’ utterance at all, it will be in such circumstances as these. Now one of the sufficient conditions of the truth of a ‘statement’ or formula of material implication may very well be fulfilled without the conditions for the truth, or reasonableness, of the corresponding hypothetical or conditional statement being fulfilled. A statement of the form ‘p ⊃ q’ (where the horseshoe is meant to represent an inverted ‘c’ for ‘contentum’ or ‘consequutum’ -- does not entail the corresponding statement of the ‘form’ “if p, q.” But if the emissor is prepared to accept the hypothetical statement, he must in consistency be prepared to deny the conjunction of the statement corresponding to the sub-ordinated clause of the sentence used to make the hypothetical statement with the negation of the statement corresponding to its main or super-ordinated clause. A statement of the ‘form’ “if p, q” does entail the corresponding statement of the form ‘p ⊃ q.’ The force of “corresponding” may need some elucidation. Consider the following very ‘ordinary’ or ‘natural’ specimens of a hypothetical sentence. Strawson starts with a totally unordinary subjective counterfactual ‘if,’ an abyss with Philo, “If it’s day, I talk.” Strawson surely involves The Hun. ‘If the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they, viz. the Germans, would have won the war.’ Because for the Germans, invading England MEANT winning the war. They never cared much for Wales or Scotland, never mind Northern Ireland. Possibly ‘invaded London’ would suffice. Strawson’s second instantiation again is the odd subjective counter-factual ‘if,’ an abyss or chasm from Philo, ‘If it’s day, I talk.’ “If Smith were in charge, half the staff would have been dismissed.’ Strawson is thinking Noel Coward, who used to make fun of the music-hall artist Wade. “If you WERE the only girl in the world, and I WAS the only boy…’. The use of ‘were’ is Oxonian. A Cockney is forbidden to use it, using ‘was’ instead. The rationale is Philonian. ‘was’ is indicative.  “If Smith were in charge, half the staff would have been dismissed.’ Strawson’s third instantiation is, at last, more or less Philonian, a plain indicative ‘weather’ protasis, etc. “If it rains, the match will be cancelled.” The only reservation Philo would have is ‘will’. Matches do not have ‘will,’ and the sea battle may never take placethe world may be destroyed by then. “If it rains, the match will be cancelled.” Or “If it rains, the match is cancelledbut there is a ‘rain date.’” The sentence which could be used to make a statement corresponding in the required ‘sense’ to the sub-ordinate clause can be ascertained by considering what it is that the emissor of each hypothetical sentence must (in general) be assumed either to be in doubt about or to believe to be not the case. Thus, the corresponding sentences. ‘The Germans invaded England in 1940.’ Or ‘The Germans invade England’historical present -- ‘The Germans won the war.’ Or ‘The Germans win the war’historical present. ‘Smith is in charge.’ ‘Half the staff has been dismissed.’ Or ‘Half the staff is dismissed.’ ‘It will rain.’ Or ‘It rains.’‘The match will be cancelled.’ Or ‘The match is cancelled.’ A sentence could be used to make a statement of material implication corresponding to the hypothetical statement made by the  sentence is framed, in each case, from these pairs of sentences as follows. ‘The Germans invaded England in 1940 ⊃ they won the war.’ Or in the historical present,’The Germans invade London ⊃ The Germans win the war. ‘ ‘Smith is in charge ⊃ half the staff has been, dismissed.’ Or in the present tense, ‘Smith is in charge ⊃ half the staff is dismissed.’ ‘ It will rain ⊃ the match will be cancelled.’ Or in the present ‘It rains ⊃ the match is cancelled.’  The very fact that a few verbal modifications are necessary to please the Oxonian ear, in order to obtain from the clauses of the hypothetical sentence the clauses of the corresponding material implication sentence is itself a symptom of the radical difference between a hypothetical statement and a truth-functional statement. Some detailed differences are also evident from these instantiations. The falsity of a statement made by the use of ‘The Germans invade London in 1940’ or ‘Smith is in charge’ is a sufficient condition of the truth of the corresponding statements made by the use of the ⊃-utterances. But not, of course, of the corresponding statement made by the use of the ‘if’ utterance. Otherwise, there would normally be no point in using an ‘if’ sentence at all.An ‘if’ sentence would normally carrybut not necessarily: one may use the pluperfect or the imperfect subjunctive when one is simply working out the consequences of an hypothesis which one may be prepared eventually to accept -- in the tense or mode of the verb, an implication (or implicaturum) of the emissor’s belief in the FALSITY of the statements corresponding to the clauses of the hypothetical.That it is not the case that it rains is sufficient to verify (or truth-functionally confirm) a statement made by the use of “⊃,” but not a statement made by the use of ‘if.’ That it is not the case that it rains is also sufficient to verify (or truth-functionally confirm) a statement made by the use of ‘It will rain ⊃ the match will not be cancelled.’ Or ‘It rains ⊃ the match is cancelled.’ The formulae ‘p ⊃ q’ and ‘p ⊃ ~ q' are consistent with one another.The joint assertion of corresponding statements of these forms is equivalent to the assertion of the corresponding statement of the form ‘~ p.’ But, and here is one of Philo’s ‘paradoxes’: “If it rains, the match will be cancelled” (or ‘If it rains, the match is cancelled’) seems (or sounds) inconsistent with “If it rains, the match will not be cancelled,’ or ‘If it rains, it is not the case that the match is cancelled.’But here we add ‘not,’ so Philo explains the paradox away by noting that his account is meant for ‘pure’ uses of “ei,” or “si.”Their joint assertion in the same context sounds self-contradictory. But cf. Philo, who wisely said of ‘If it is day, it is night’ “is true only at night.” (Diog. Laert. Repr. in Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers). Suppose we call the statement corresponding to the sub-ordinated clause of a sentence used to make a hypothetical statement the antecedent of the hypothetical statement; and the statement corresponding to the super-ordinated clause, its consequent. It is sometimes fancied that, whereas the futility of identifying a conditional ‘if’ statement with material implication is obvious in those cases where the implication of the falsity of the antecedent is normally carried by the mode or tense of the verbas in “If the Germans invade London in 1940, they, viz. the Germans, win the war’ and ‘If Smith is in charge, half the staff is dismissed’ -- there is something to be said for at least a PARTIAL identification in cases where no such implication is involved, i.e., where the possibility of the truth of both antecedent and consequent is left openas in ‘If it rains, the match is cancelled.’ In cases of the first kind (an ‘unfulfilled,’ counterfactual, or ‘subjunctive’ conditional) the intended addressee’s attention is directed, as Grice taught J. L. Mackie, in terms of the principle of conversational helpfulness, ONLY TO THE LAST TWO ROWS of the truth-tables for ‘ p ⊃ q,’ where the antecedent has the truth-value, falsity. Th suggestion that ‘~p’ ‘entails’ ‘if p, q’ is felt or to be or ‘sounds’if not to Philo’s or Grice’s ears -- obviously wrong.  But in cases of the second kind one inspects also the first two ROWS. The possibility of the antecedent's being fulfilled is left open. It is claimed that it is NOT the case that the suggestion that ‘p ⊃ q’ ‘entails’ ‘if p, q’ is felt to be or sound obviously wrong, to ANYBODY, not just the bodies of Grice and Philo. This Strawson calls, to infuriate Grice, ‘an illusion,’ ‘engendered by a reality.’The fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement does not show that the man who made the hypothetical statement is right. It is not the case that the man would be right, Strawson claims, if the consequent is made true as a result of this or that factor unconnected with, or in spite of, rather than ‘because’ of, the fulfilment of the antecedent.  E. g. if Grice’s unmissable match is missed because the Germans invadeand not because of the ‘weather.’but cf. “The weather in the streets.” Strawson is prepared to say that the man (e. g., Grice, or Philo) who makes the hypothetical statement is right only if Strawson is also prepared to say that the antecedent being true is, at least in part, the ‘explanation’ of the consequent being true. The reality behind the illusion Strawson naturally finds ‘complex,’ for surely there ain’t one! Strawson thinks that this is due to two phenomena. First, Strawson claims, in many cases, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent provides confirmation for the view that the existence of states of affairs like those described by the antecedent IS a good ‘reason’ for expecting (alla Hume, assuming the uniformity of nature, etc.) a states of affair like that described by the consequent. Second, Starwson claims, a man (e. g. Philo, or Grice) who (with a straight Grecian or Griceian face) says, e. g. ‘If it rains, the match is cancelled’ makes a bit of a prediction, assuming the ‘consequent’ to be referring to t2>t1but cf. if he is reporting an event taking place at THE OTHER PLACE. The prediction Strawson takes it to be ‘The match is cancelled.’And the man is making the prediction ONLY under what Strawson aptly calls a “proviso,” or “caveat,”first used by Boethius to translate Aristotle -- “It rains.” Boethius’s terminology later taken up by the lawyers in Genoa. mid-15c., from Medieval Latin proviso (quod) "provided (that)," phrase at the beginning of clauses in legal documents (mid-14c.), from Latin proviso "it being provided," ablative neuter of provisus, past participle of providere (see provide). Related: Provisory. And that the cancellation of the match because of the rain therefore leads us to say, not only that the reasonableness of the prediction was confirmed, but also that the prediction itself was confirmed.  Because it is not the case that a statement of the form ‘ p ⊃ q’ entails the corresponding statement of the form ' if p, q ' (in its standard employment), Strawson thinks he can find a divergence between this or that ‘rule’ for '⊃' and this or that ‘rule’ for '’if ,’ in its standard employment. Because ‘if p, q’ does entail ‘p ⊃ q,’ we shall also expect to find some degree of parallelism between the rules. For whatever is entailed by ‘p ⊃ q’ is entailed by ‘if p, q,’ though not everything which entails ‘p ⊃ q’ does Strawson claims, entail ‘if p, q.’  Indeed, we find further parallels than those which follow simply from the facts that ‘if p, q’ entails ‘p ⊃ q’ and that entailment is transitive.  To some laws for ‘⊃,’ Strawson finds no parallels for ‘if.’ Strawson notes that for at least four laws for ‘⊃,’ we find that parallel laws ‘hold’ good for ‘if. The first law is mentioned by Grice, modus ponendo ponens, as elimination of ‘⊃.’ Strawson does not consider the introduction of the horseshoe, where p an q forms a collection of all active assumptions previously introduced which could have been used in the deduction of  ‘if p, q.’ When inferring ‘if p, q’ one is allowed to discharge assumptions of the form p. The fact that after deduction of ‘if p, q’  this assumption is discharged (not active is pointed out by using [ ] in vertical notation, and by deletion from the set of assumptions in horizontal notation. The latter notation shows better the character of the rule; one deduction is transformed into the other. It shows also that the rule for the introduction of ‘if’ corresponds to an important metatheorem, the Deduction Theorem, which has to be proved in axiomatic formalizations of logic. But back to the elimination of ‘if’. Modus ponendo ponens. ‘‘((p ⊃ q).p) ⊃ q.’ For some reason, Strawson here mixes horseshoes and ifs as if Boethius is alive! Grice calls these “half-natural, half-artificial.’ Chomsky prefers ‘semi-native.’ ‘(If p, q, and p) ⊃q.’ Surely what Strawson wants is a purely ‘if’ one, such as ‘If, if p, q, and p, q.’ Some conversational implicaturum!  As Grice notes: “Strawson thinks that one can converse using his converses, but we hardly.’ The second law. Modus tollendo tollens. ‘((p⊃q). ~ q)) ⊃ (~ p).’ Again, Strawson uses a ‘mixed’ formula: (if p, q, and it is not the case that q) ⊃ it is not the case that p. Purely unartificial: If, if p, q, and it is not the case that q, it is not the case that p. The third law, which Strawson finds problematic, and involves an operator that Grice does not even consider. ‘(p ⊃ q) ≡ (~ q  ⊃ ~ p). Mixed version, Strawson simplifies ‘iff’ to ‘if’ (in any case, as Pears notes, ‘if’ IMPLICATES ‘iff.’). (If p, q) ⊃ if it is not the case that q, it is not the case that p. Unartificial: If, if p, q, it is not the case that if q, it is not the case that p. The fourth law. ((p ⊃ q).(q ⊃ r)) ⊃ (p ⊃ r). Mixed: (if p, q, and if q, r) ⊃ (if p, r). Unartificial: ‘If, if p, q, and if q, r, if p, r.’ Try to say that to Mrs. Grice! (Grice: “It’s VERY SURPRISING that Strawson think we can converse in his lingo!”). Now Strawson displays this or that ‘reservation.’ Mainly it is an appeal to J. Austen and J. Austin. Strawson’s implicaturum is that Philo, in Megara, has hardly a right to unquiet the tranquil Elysium. This or that ‘reservation’ by Strawson takes TWO pages of his essay. Strawson claims that the reservations are important. It is, e. g., often impossible to apply entailment-rule (iii) directly without obtaining incorrect or absurd results. Some modification of the structure of the clauses of the hypothetical is commonly necessary. Alas, Whitehead and Russell give us little guide as to which modifications are required.  If we apply rule (iii) to our specimen hypothetical sentences, without modifying at all the tenses or moods of the individual clauses, we obtain expressions which Austin would not call ‘ordinary language,’ or Austen, for that matter, if not Macaulay.  If we preserve as nearly as possible the tense-mode structure, in the simplest way consistent with grammatical requirements, we obtain this or that sentence. TOLLENDO TOLLENS. ‘If it is not the case that the Germans win the war, it is not the case that they, viz. the Germans, invade England in 1940.’ ‘If it is not the case that half the staff is dismissed, it is not the case that Smith is in charge.’ ‘If it is not the case that the match is cancelled, it is not the case that it rains.’ But, Strawson claims, these sentences, so far from SOUNDING or seeming logically equivalent to the originals, have in each case a quite different ‘sense.’ It is possible, at least in some cases, to frame, via tollendo tollens a target setence of more or less the appropriate pattern for which one can imagine a use and which DOES stand in the required relationship to the source sentence. ‘If it is not the case that the Germans win the war, (trust) it is not the case that they, viz. the Germans, invade England in 1940,’ with the attending imlicatum: “only because they did not invade England in 1940.’ or even, should historical evidence be scanty). ‘If it is not the case that the Germans win the war, it SURELY is not the case that they, viz. the Germans, invade London in 1940.’ ‘If it is not the case that half the staff is dismissed, it surely is not the case that Smith is in charge.’ These changes reflect differences in the circumstances in which one might use these, as opposed to the original, sentences.  The sentence beginning ‘If Smith is in charge …’ is normally, though not necessarily, used by a man who antecedently knows that it is not the case that Smith is in charge. The sentence beginning ‘If it is not the case that half the staff is dismissed …’  is normally, though not necessarily, used by by a man who is, as Cook Wilson would put it, ‘working’ towards the ‘consequent’ conclusion that Smith is not in charge.  To say that the sentences are nevertheless truth-functionally equivalent seems to point to the fact that, given the introduction rule for ‘if,’ the grounds for accepting the original ‘if’-utterance AND the ‘tollendo tollens’ correlatum, would, in two different scenarios, have been grounds for accepting the soundness or validity of the passage or move from a premise ‘Smith is in charge’ to its ‘consequentia’ ‘consequutum,’ or ‘conclusion,’ ‘Half the staff is dismissed.’ One must remember that calling each formula (i)-(iv) a LAW or a THEOREM is the same as saying that, e.g., in the case of (iii), ‘If p, q’ ‘ENTAILS’ ‘If it is not the case that q, it is not the case that p.’ Similarly, Strawson thinks, for some steps which would be invalid for ‘if,’ there are corresponding steps that would be invalid for ‘⊃.’ He gives two example using a symbol Grice does not consider, for ‘therefore,’ or ‘ergo,’ and lists a fallacy. First example. ‘(p ⊃ q).q ∴ p.’ Second example of a fallacy:‘(p ⊃ q). ~p ∴ ~q.’ These are invalid inference-patterns, and so are the correlative patterns with ‘if’: ‘If p, q; and q  ∴ p’ ‘If p, q; and it is not the case that p ∴ it is not the case that q. The formal analogy here may be described by saying that neither ‘p ⊃  q’ nor ‘if p, q’ is a simply convertible (“nor hardly conversable”Grice) formula. Strawson thinks, and we are getting closer to Philo’s paradoxes, revisied, that there may be this or that laws which holds for ‘p ⊃ q’ and not for ‘If p, q.’  As an example of a law which holds for ‘if’ but not for ‘⊃,’ one may give an analytic formula. ~[(if p, q) . (if p, it is not the case that q)]’. The corresponding formula with the horseshoe is not analytic. ‘~[(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ ~q)]’ is not analytic, and is equivalent to the contingent formula ‘~ ~p.’ The rules to the effect that this or that formula is analytic is referred to by Johnson, in the other place, as the ‘paradox of implication.’ This Strawson finds a Cantabrigian momer. If Whitehead’s and Russell’s ‘⊃’ is taken as identical either with Moore’s ‘entails’ or, more widely, with  Aelfric’s‘if’as in his “Poem to the If,” MSS Northumberland“If” meant trouble in Anglo-Saxon -- in its standard use, the rules that yield this or that so-called ‘paradox’ -- are not, for Strawson, “just paradoxical.” With an attitude, he adds. “They are simply incorrect.”This is slightly illogical.“That’s not paradoxical; that’s incorrect.”Cf. Grice, “What is paradoxical is not also incorrect.” And cf. Grice: “Philo defines a ‘paradox’ as something that surprises _his father_.’ He is ‘using’ “father,” metaphorically, to refer to his tutor. His father was unknown (to him). On the other hand (vide Strawson’s Two Hands), with signs you can introduce alla Peirce and Johnson by way of ostensive definition any way you wish! If ‘⊃’ is given the meaning it is given by what Grice calls the ‘truth-table definition,’ or ‘stipulation’ in the system of truth functions, the rules and the statements they represent, may be informally dubbed ‘paradoxical,’ in that they don’t agree with the ‘man in the street,’ or ‘the man on High.’ The so-called ‘paradox’ would be a simple and platitudinous consequence of the meaning given to the symbol. Strawson had expanded on the paradoxes in an essay he compiled while away from Oxford. On his return to Oxford, he submitted it to “Mind,” under the editorship by G. Ryle, where it was published. The essay concerns the ‘paradoxes’ of ‘entailment’ in detail, and mentions Moore and C. I. Lewis. He makes use of modal operators, nec. and poss. to render the ‘necessity’ behind ‘entail.’ He thinks the paradoxes of ‘entailment’ arise from inattention to this modality. At the time, Grice and Strawson were pretty sure that nobody then accepted, if indeed anyone ever did and did make, the identification of the relation symbolised by the horseshoe, ⊃, with the relation which Moore calls ‘entailment,’ p⊃q, i. e. The mere truth-functional ‘if,’ as in ‘p ⊃ q,’ ‘~(pΛ~q)’ is rejected as an analysis of the meta-linguistic ‘p entails q.’ Strawson thinks that the identification is rejected because ‘p ⊃ q’ involves this or that allegedly paradoxical implicaturum.Starwson explicitly mentions ‘ex falso quodlibeet.’ Any FALSE proposition entails any proposition, true or false. And any TRUE proposition is entailed by any proposition, true or falso (consequentia mirabilis). It is a commonplace  that  Lewis, whom Grice calls a ‘blue-collared practioner of the sciences,’ Strawson thinks, hardly solved the thing. The amendment by Lewis, for Strawson, has consequences scarcely less paradoxical in terms of the implicatura. For if p is impossible, i.e. self-contradictory, it is impossible that p and ~q. And if q is necessary, ~q is impossible and it is impossible that p and ~q; i. e., if p entails q means it is impossible that p and ~q any necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition and any self-contradictory proposition entails any proposition. On the other hand, the definition by Lewis of ‘strict’ implication or entailment (i.e. of the relation which holds from p to q whenever q is deducible from p), Strawson thinks, obviously commends itself in some respects. Now, it is clear that the emphasis laid on the expression-mentioning character of the intensional contingent statement by writing ‘ ‘pΛ~q’ is impossible instead’ of ‘It is impossible that p and ~q’ does not avoid the alleged paradoxes of entailment. But, Starwson optimistically thinks, it is equally clear that the addition of some provision does avoid them. Strawson proposes that one should use “p entails q” such that no necessary statement and no negation of a necessary statement can significantly be said to “entail” or be entailed by any statement; i. e. the function “p entails q” cannot take necessary or self-contradictory statements as arguments. The expression “p entails q” is to be used to mean “ ‘p ⊃ q’ is necessary, and neither ‘p’ nor ‘q’ is either necessary or self-contradictory.” Alternatively, “p entails q” should be used only to mean “ ‘pΛ~q’ is impossible and neither ‘p’ nor ‘q,’ nor either of their contradictories, is necessary. In this way, Strawson thinks the paradoxes are avoided. Strawson’s proof. Let us assume that p1 expresses a contingent, and q1 a necessary, proposition. p1 and ~q1 is now impossible because ~q1 is impossible. But q1 is necessary. So, by that provision, p1 does not entail q1. We may avoid the paradoxical assertion “p1 entails q2” as merely falling into the equally paradoxical assertion “ “p1 entails q1” is necessary.” For: If ‘q’ is necessary, ‘q is necessary’ is, though true, not necessary, but a CONTINGENT INTENSIONAL (Latinate)  statement. This becomes part of the philosophers lexicon: intensĭo, f. intendo, which L and S render as a stretching out, straining, effort. E. g. oculorum, Scrib. Comp. 255. Also an intensifying, increase. Calorem suum (sol) intensionibus ac remissionibus temperando fovet,” Sen. Q. N. 7, 1, 3. The tune: “gravis, media, acuta,” Censor. 12.  Hence: ‘~ (‘q’ is necessary)’ is, though false, possible. Hence “p1 Λ ~ (q1 is necessary)” is, though false, possible.  Hence ‘p1’ does NOT entail ‘q1 is necessary.’ Thus, by adopting the view that an entailment statement, and other intensional statements, are contingent, viz. non-necessary, and that no necessary statement or its contradictory can entail or be entailed by any statement, Strawson thinks he can avoid the paradox that a necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition, and indeed all the other associated paradoxes of entailment.  Grice objects that the alleged cure by Strawson is worse than disease of Moore!  The denial that a necessary proposition can entail or be entailed by any proposition, and, therefore, that necessary propositions can be related to each other by the entailment relation, is too high a price to pay for the solution of the paradoxes, which are perfectly true utterances with only this or that attending cancellable implicaturum. Strawson’s introduction of ‘acc.’ makes sense. Which makes sense in that Philo first supplied his truth-functional account of ‘if’ to criticise his tutor Diodorus on modality. Philo reported to Diodorus something he had heard from Neptune. In dreams, Neptune appeared to Philo and told him: “I saw down deep in the waters a wooden trunk of a plant that only grows under weatheralgae -- The trunk can burn!” Neptune said.Awakening, Philo ran to Diodorus: “A wooden trunk deep down in the ocean can burn.”   Throughout this section, Strawson refers to a ‘primary or standard’ use of ‘if,’ of which the main characteristics are various. First, that for each hypothetical statement made by this use of ‘if,’ there could be made just one statement which would be the antecedent of the hypothetical and just one statement which would be its consequent. Second, that the hypothetical statement is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent statement, if made or accepted, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent statement. Third, the making of the hypothetical statement carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or of disbelief in, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent.’ This above is the passage extrapolated by Grice. Grice does not care to report the platitudionous ‘first’ ‘characteristic’ as Strawson rather verbosely puts it. The way Grice reports it, it is not clear Strawson is listing THREE characteristics. Notably, from the extrapolated quote, it would seem as if Grice wishes his addressee to believe that Strawson thinks that characteristic 2 and characteristic 3 mix. On top, Grice omits a caveat immediately after the passage he extrapolates. Strawso notes: “There is much more than this to be said about this way of using ‘if;’ in particular, about the meaning of the question whether the antecedent would be a GOOD ground or reason for accepting the consequent, and about the exact way in which THIS question is related to the question of whether the hypothetical is TRUE {acceptable, reasonable) or not.’ Grice does not care to include a caveat by Strawson: “Not all uses of ‘if ,’ however, exhibit all these three characteristics.” In particular, there is a use which has an equal claim to rank as standard ‘if’ and which is closely connected with the use described, but which does not exhibit the first characteristic and for which the description of the remainder must consequently be modified.  Strawson has in mind what is sometimes called a ‘formal’ (by Whitehead and Russell) or 'variable' or 'general’ or ‘generic’ hypothetical. Strawson gives three examples. The first example is ‘lf ice is left in the sun, it melts.’ This is Kantian. Cf. Grice on indicative conditionals in the last Immanuel Kant Lecture.  Grice: "It should be, given that it is the case that one smears one's skin with peanut butter before retiring and that it is the case that one has a relatively insensitive skin, that it is the case that one preserves a youthful complexion." More generally, there is some plausibility to the idea that an exemplar of the form 'Should (! E, ⊢F; ! G)' is true just in case a corresponding examplar of the form 'Should (⊢ F, ⊢G; ⊢E)' is true. Before proceeding further, I will attempt to deal briefly with a possible objection which might be raised at this point. I can end imagine an ardent descriptivist, who first complains, in the face of someone who wishes to allow a legitimate autonomous status to practical acceptability generalizations, that truth-conditions for such generalizations are not available, and perhaps are in principle not available; so such generalizations are not to be taken seriously. We then point out to him that, at least for a class of such cases, truth-conditions are available, and that they are to be found in related alethic generalizations, a kind of generalization he accepts. He then complains that, if finding truth-conditions involves representing the practical acceptability generalizations as being true just in case related alethic generalizations are true, then practical acceptability generalizations are simply reducible to alethic generalizations, and so are not to be taken seriously for another reason, namely, that they are simply transformations of alethic generalizations, and we could perfectly well get on without them. Maybe some of you have heard some ardent descriptivists arguing in a style not so very different from this. Now a deep reply to such an objection would involve (I think) a display of the need for a system of reasoning in which the value to be transmitted by acceptable inference is not truth but practical value, together with a demonstration of the role of practical acceptability generalizations in such a system. I suspect that such a reply could be constructed, but I do not have it at my fingertips (or tongue-tip), so I shall not try to produce it. An interim reply, however, might take the following form: even though it may be true (which is by no means certain) that certain practical acceptability generalizations have the same truth-conditions as certain corresponding alethic generalizations, it is not to be supposed that the former generalizations are simply reducible to the latter (in some disrespectful sense of 'reducible'). For though both kinds of generalization are defeasible, they are not defeasible in the same way; more exactly, what is a defeating condition for a given practical generalization is not a defeating condition for its alethic counterpart. A generalization of the form 'should (! E, ⊢F; ! G)' may have, as a defeating condition, 'E*'; that is to say, consistently with the truth of this generalization, it may be true that 'should (! E & ! E*, ⊢F; ! G*)' where 'G*' is inconsistent with 'G'. But since, in the alethic counterpart generalization 'should (⊢ F, ⊢G; ⊢E)', 'E' does not occur in the antecedent, 'E*' cannot be a defeating end p.92 condition for this generalization. And, since liability to defeat by a certain range of defeating conditions is essential to the role which acceptability generalizations play in reasoning, this difference between a practical generalization and its alethic counterpart is sufficient to eliminate the reducibility of the former to the latter. To return to the main theme of this section. If, without further ado, we were to accept at this point the suggestion that 'should (! E, ⊢F; ! G)' is true just in case 'should (⊢ F, ⊢G; ⊢E)' is true, we should be accepting it simply on the basis of intuition (including, of course, linguistic or logical intuition under the head of 'intuition'). If the suggestion is correct then we should attain, at the same time, a stronger assurance that it is correct and a better theoretical understanding of the alethic and practical acceptability, if we could show why it is correct by deriving it from some general principle(s). Kant, in fact, for reasons not unlike these, sought to show the validity of a different but fairly closely related Technical Imperative by just such a method. The form which he selects is one which, in my terms, would be represented by "It is fully acceptable, given let it be that B, that let it be that A" or "It is necessary, given let it be that B, that let it be that A". Applying this to the one fully stated technical imperative given in Grundlegung, we get Kant’s hypothetical which is of the type Strawson calls ‘variable,’ formal, ‘generic,’ or ‘generic.’ Kant: “It is necessary, given let it be that one bisect a line on an unerring principle, that let it be that I draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs". Call this statement, (α). Though he does not express himself very clearly, I am certain that his claim is that this imperative is validated in virtue of the fact that it is, analytically, a consequence of an indicative statement which is true and, in the present context, unproblematic, namely, the statement vouched for by geometry, that if one bisects a line on an unerring principle, then one does so only as a result of having drawn from its extremities two intersecting arcs. Call this statement, (β). His argument seems to be expressible as follows. (1) It is analytic that he who wills the end (so far as reason decides his conduct), wills the indispensable means thereto. (2) So it is analytic that (so far as one is rational) if one wills that A, and judges that if A, then A as a result of B, then one wills that B. end p.93 (3) So it is analytic that (so far as one is rational) if one judges that if A, then A as a result of B, then if one wills that A then one wills that B. (4) So it is analytic that, if it is true that if A, then A as a result of B, then if let it be that A, then it must be that let it be that B. From which, by substitution, we derive (5): it is analytic that if β then α. Now it seems to me to be meritorious, on Kant's part, first that he saw a need to justify hypothetical imperatives of this sort, which it is only too easy to take for granted, and second that he invoked the principle that "he who wills the end, wills the means"; intuitively, this invocation seems right. Unfortunately, however, the step from (3) to (4) seems open to dispute on two different counts. (1) It looks as if an unwarranted 'must' has appeared in the consequent of the conditional which is claimed, in (4), as analytic; the most that, to all appearances, could be claimed as being true of the antecedent is that 'if let it be that A then let it be that B'. (2) (Perhaps more serious.) It is by no means clear by what right the psychological verbs 'judge' and 'will', which appear in (3), are omitted in (4); how does an (alleged) analytic connection between (i) judging that if A, A as a result of B and (ii) its being the case that if one wills that A then one wills that B yield an analytic connection between (i) it's being the case that if A, A as a result of B and (ii) the 'proposition' that if let it be that A then let it be that B? Can the presence in (3) of the phrase "in so far as one is rational" legitimize this step? I do not know what remedy to propose for the first of these two difficulties; but I will attempt a reconstruction of Kant's line of argument which might provide relief from the second. It might, indeed, even be an expansion of Kant's actual thinking; but whether or not this is so, I am a very long way from being confident in its adequacy. Back to Strawson. First example:  ‘lf ice is left in the sun, it melts.’Or “If apple goes up, apple goes down.”Newton, “Principia Mathematica.” “If ice is left in the sun, it, viz. ice, melts.” Strawson’s second example of a formal, variable, generic, or general ‘if’ ‘If the side of a triangle is produced, the exterior angle is equal to the sum of the two interior and opposite angles.’ Cf. Kant: “If a line on an unerring principle is bisected, two intersecting arcs are drawn from its extremities.” Synthetical propositions must no doubt be employed in defining the means to a proposed end; but they do not concern the principle, the act of the will, but the object and its realization. E.g., that in order to bisect a line on an unerring principle I must draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs; this no doubt is taught by mathematics only in synthetical propositions; but if I know that it is only by this process that the intended operation can be performed, then to say that, if I fully will the operation, I also will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition; for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect which I can produce in a certain way, and to conceive myself as acting in this way. Strawson’s third example: ‘If a child is very strictly disciplined in the nursery, it, viz. the child, that should be seen but not heard, will develop aggressive tendencies in adult life.’ To a statement made by the use of a sentence such as these there corresponds no single pair of statements which are, respectively, its antecedent and consequent.  On the other hand, for every such statement there is an indefinite number of NON-general, or not generic, hypothetical statements which might be called exemplifications, applications, of the variable hypothetical; e.g., a statement made by the use of the sentence ‘If THIS piece of ice is left in the sun, it, viz. this piece, melts.’Strawson, about to finish his section on “ ‘⊃’ and ‘if’,”the expression, ‘’ ⊃’ and ‘if’” only occurs in the “Table of Contents,” on p. viii, not in the body of the essay, as found redundantit is also the same title Strawson used for his essay which circulated (or ‘made the rounds’) soon after Grice delivered his attack on Strawson, and which Strawson had, first, the cheek to present it to PGRICE, and then, voiding the idea of a festschrift, reprint it in his own compilation of essays. -- from which Grice extracted the quote for “Prolegomena,” notes that there are two ‘relatively uncommon uses of ‘if.’‘If he felt embarrassed, he showed no signs of it.’It is this example that Grice is having in mind in the fourth lecture on ‘indicative conditionals.’ “he didn’t show it.”Grice is giving an instantiation of an IMPLICIT, or as he prefers, ‘contextual,’ cancellation of the implicaturum of ‘if.’  He does this to show that even if the implicaturum of ‘if’ is a ‘generalised,’ not ‘generic,’ or ‘general,’ one, it need not obtain or be present in every PARTICULAR case. “That is why I use the weakened form ‘generalISED, not general. It’s all ceteris paribus always with me).” The example Grice gives corresponds to the one Strawson listed as one of the two ‘relatively uncommon’ uses of ‘if.’ By sticking with the biscuit conditional, Grice is showing Strawson that this use is ‘relatively uncommon’ because it is absolutely otiose!  “If he was surprised, he didn’t show it.”Or cf. AustinIf you are hungry, there are. Variants by Grice on his own example:“If Strawson was surprised, he did not show it.”“If he was surprised, it is not the case that Strawson showed it, viz. that he was surprised.”Grice (on the phone with Strawson’s friend) in front of Strawsonpresent tense version:“If he IS surprised, it is not th case that he, Strawson, is showing it, viz. the clause that he is surprised. Are you implicating he SHOULD?”and a second group:‘If Rembrandt passes the exam at the Koninklijke Academie van Beeldende Kunsten, I am a Dutchman.’‘If the Mad Hatter is not mad, I'll eat my hat.’(as opposed to ‘If the Mad Hatter IS mad, I’ll eat HIS hat.’)Hats were made at Oxford in a previous generation, by mad ‘hatters.’ “To eat one’s hat,” at Oxford, became synonymous with ‘I’ll poison myself and die.’ The reason of the prevalence of Oxonian ‘lunatic’ hatters is chemical. Strawson is referring to what he calls an ‘old wives’ tale’As every grandmother at Oxford knows, the chemicals used in hat-making include mercurious nitrate, which is used in ‘curing’ felt. Now exposure to the mercury vapours cause mercury poisoning. Or, to use an ‘if’: “If Kant is exposed to mercury vapour, Kant gets poisoned. A poisoned victim  develops a severe and uncontrollable muscular tremors and twitching limbs, distorted vision and confused speech, hallucinations and psychosis, if not death. For a time, it was at Oxford believed that a wearer of a hat could similarly die, especially by eating the felt containing the mercurial nitrate. The sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of a statement made by “If he was surprised, it is not the case that Strawson showed it, viz. that he was surprised” is that it is not the case that Strawson showed that he was surprised. The antecedent is otiose. Cf. “If you are hungry, there are biscuits in the cupboard.’ Austin used to expand the otiose antecedent further, ‘If you are hungryAND EVEN IF YOU ARE NOTthere are biscuits in the cupboard,” just in case someone was ignorant of Grice’s principle of conversational helpfulness. Consequently, Strawson claims that such a statement cannot be treated either as a standard hypothetical or as a material implication. This is funny because by the time Grice is criticizing Strawson he does take “If Strawson is surprised, it is not the case that he is showing it, viz. that he is surprised.” But when it comes to “Touch the beast and it will bite you” he is ready to say that here we do not have a case of ‘conjunction.’Why? Stanford.Stanford is the answer.Grice had prepared the text to deliver at Stanford, of all places. Surely, AT STANFORD, you don’t want to treat your addressee idiotically. What Grice means is:“Now let us consider ‘Touch the beast and it will bite you.’ Symbolise it: !p et !q. Turn it into the indicative: You tell your love and love bites you (variant on William Blake).” Grice: “One may object to the  use of ‘p.q’ on Whiteheadian grounds. Blue-collared practitioners of the sciences will usually proclaim that they do not care about the ‘realisability’ of this or that operator. In fact, the very noun, ‘realisability,’ irritated me so that I coined non-detachability as a balance. The blue-collared scientist will say that ‘and’ is really Polish, and should be PRE-FIXED as an “if,” or condition, or proviso. So that the conjunction becomes “Provided you tell your love, love bites you.”Strawson gives his reason about the ‘implicaturum’ of what P. L. Gardiner called the ‘dutchman’ ‘if,’ after G. F. Stout’s “ ‘hat-eating’ if.”  Examples of the second kind are sometimes erroneously treated as evidence that Philo was not crazy, and that ‘if’ does, after all, behave somewhat as ‘⊃’ behaves.  Boethius appropriately comments: “Philo had two drawbacks against his favour. He had no drawing board, and he couldn’t write. Therefore he never symbolized, other than ‘via verba,’  his ‘ei’ utterance, “If it is day, it is night,” which he held to be true “at night only.”” Strawson echoes Grice. The evidence for this conversational explanation of the oddity of the ‘dutcham’ if, as called by Gardiner, and the ‘hat-eating’ if, as called by Stout, is, presumably, the facts, first, that the relation between antecedent and consequent is non-Kantian. Recall that Kant has a ‘Funktion’ which, after Aristotle’s ‘pros ti,’ and Boethius’s ‘relatio,’ he called ‘Relation’ where he considers the HYPOTHETICAL. Kant expands in section 8.5. “In the hypothetical, ‘If God exists, I’ll eat my hat,’ existence is no predicate.”Strawson appeals to a second, “more convincing,” fact, viz. that the consequent is obviously notin the Dutchman ‘if,’ or not to be, in the ‘hat-eating’ if, fulfilled, or true.Grice’s passing for a Dutchman and sitting for an exam at the Koninklijke Academie van Beeldende Kunsten, hardly makes him a Dutchman.Dickens was well aware of the idiocy of people blaming hatters for the increases of deaths at Oxford. He would often expand the consequent in a way that turned it “almost a Wittgensteinian ‘contradiction’” (“The Cricket in the House, vii). “If the Hatter is not mad, I will eat my hat, with my head in it.”Grice comments: “While it is analytic that you see with your eyes, it is not analytic that you eat with your mouth. And one can imagine Dickens’s mouth to be situated in his right hand. Therefore, on realizing that the mad hatter is not mad, Dickens is allowing for it to be the case that he shall eat his hat, with his head in it. Since not everybody may be aware of the position of Dickens’s mouth, I shall not allot this common-ground status.”Strawson gives a third Griciean fact.“The intention of the emissor, by uttering a ‘consequens falsum’ that renders the ‘conditionalis’ ‘verum’ only if the ‘antecedens’ is ‘falsum, is an emphatic, indeed, rude, gesture, with a gratuitious nod to Philo, to the conviction that the antecedens is not fulfilled either. The emissor is further abiding by what Grice calls the ‘principle of truth,’ for the emissor would rather see himself dead than uttering a falsehood, even if he has to fill the conversational space with idiocies like ‘dutchman-being’ and ‘hat-eating.’ The fourth Griceian fact is obviously Modus Tollendo Tollens, viz. that  “(p ⊃ q) . ~q” entails “~p,” or rather, to avoid the metalanguage (Grice’s Bootlace: Don’t use a metalanguage: you can only implicate that your object-language is not objectual.”), “[(p ⊃ q) . ~ q] ⊃ ~ p.”At this point, Strawson reminisces: “I was slightly surprised that on my first tutorial with Grice, he gave me “What the Tortoise Said To Achilles,” with the hint, which I later took as a defeasible implicaturum, “See if you can resolve this!” ACHILLEs had overtaken the Tortoise, and had seated himself comfortably on its back. "So you've got to the end of our race-course?" said the Tortoise. "Even though it does consist of an infinite series of distances ? I thought some wiseacre or other had proved that the thing couldnl't be doiie ? " " It can be done," said Achilles. " It has been done! Solvitur ambulando. You see the distances were constaiitly diminishing; and so-" "But if they had beenl constantly increasing?" the Tortoise interrupted. "How then?" "Then I shouldn't be here," Achilles modestly replied; "and you would have got several times round the world, by this time! " "You flatter me-flatten, I mean," said the Tortoise; "for you are a heavy weight, and no mistake! Well now, would you like to hear of a race-course, that most people fancy they can get to the end of in two or three steps, while it really consists of an infinite number of distances, each one longer than the previous one? " "Very much indeed !" said the Grecian warrior, as he drew from his helmet (few Grecian warriors possessed pockets in those days) an enormous note-book and a pencil. "Proceed! And speak slowly, please! Shorthand 't invented yet !" "That beautiful First Proposition of Euclid! " the Tortoise miurmured dreamily. "You admire Euclid?" "Passionately! So far, at least, as one can admire a treatise that wo'n't be published for some centuries to come ! " "Well, now, let's take a little bit of the argument in that First Proposition-just two steps, and the conclusion drawn from them. Kindly enter them in your note-book. And in order to refer to them conveniently, let's call them A, B, and Z:- (A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other. (B) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same. (Z) The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other. Readers of Euclid will grant, I suppose, that Z follows logically from A and B, so that any one who accepts A and B as true, must accept Z as true?" " Undoubtedly! The youngest child in a High School-as. soon as High Schools are invented, which will not be till some two thousand years later-will grant that." " And if some reader had not yet accepted A and B as true, he might still accept the sequence as a valid one, I suppose?" NOTES. 279 "No doubt such a reader might exist. He might say 'I accept as true the Hypothetical Proposition that, if A and B be true, Z must be true; but, I don't accept A and B as true.' Such a reader would do wisely in abandoning Euclid, and taking to football." " And might there not also be some reader who would say ' I accept A anld B as true, but I don't accept the Hypothetical'?" "Certainly there might. He, also, had better take to football." "And neither of these readers," the Tortoise continued, "is as yet under any logical necessity to accept Z as true?" "Quite so," Achilles assented. "Well, now, I want you to consider me as a reader of the second kind, and to force me, logically, to accept Z as true." " A tortoise playing football would be--" Achilles was beginning " -an anomaly, of course," the Tortoise hastily interrupted. "Don't wander from the point. Let's have Z first, and football afterwards !" " I'm to force you to accept Z, am I?" Achilles said musingly. "And your present position is that you accept A and B, but you don't accept the Hypothetical-" " Let's call it C," said the Tortoise. "-but you don't accept (C) If A and B are true, Z must be true." "That is my present position," said the Tortoise. "Then I must ask you to accept C.""I'll do so," said the Tortoise, "as soon as you've entered it in that note-book of yours. What else have you got in it?" " Only a few memoranda," said Achilles, nervously fluttering the leaves: "a few memoranda of-of the battles in which I have distinguished myself!" "Plenty of blank leaves, I see !" the Tortoise cheerily remarked. "We shall need them all !" (Achilles shuddered.) "Now write as I dictate: (A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other. (B) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same. (C) If A and B are true, Z must be true. (Z) The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other." " You should call it D, not Z," said Achilles. " It comes next to the other three. If you accept A and B and C, you must accept Z." "And why must I?" "Because it follows logically from them. If A and B and C are true, Z must be true. You don't dispute that, I imagine ?" "If A and B and C are true, Z must be true," the Tortoise thoughtfully repeated. " That's another Hypothetical, 't it? And, if I failed to see its truth, I might accept A and B and C, and still not accept Z, mightn't I?" "You might," the candid hero admitted; "though such obtuseness would certainly be phenomenal. Still, the event is possible. So I must ask you to grant one more Hypothetical." " Very good. I'm quite willing to grant it, as soon as you've written it down. We will call it (D) If A and B and C are true, Z must be true. Have you entered that in your note-book ? " " I have! " Achilles joyfully exclaimed, as he ran the pencil into its sheath. "And at last we've got to the end of this ideal race-course! Now that you accept A and B and C and D, of course you accept Z." " Do I ? " said the Tortoise innocently. " Let's make that quite clear. I accept A and B and C and D. Suppose I still refused to accept Z? " 280 NOTES. " Then Logic would take you by the throat, and force you to do it !" Achilles triumphantly replied. "Logic would tell you 'You ca'n't help yourself. Now that you've accepted A and B and C and D, you mvust accept Z!' So you've no choice, you see." "Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down," said the Tortoise. " So enter it in your book, please. We will call it (E) If A and B and C and Dare true, Zmust be true. Until I've granted that, of course I needn't grant Z. So it's quite a necessary step, you see?" "I see," said Achilles; and there was a touch of sadness in his tone. Here the narrator, having pressing business at the Bank, was obliged to leave the happy pair, and did not again pass the spot until some months afterwards. When he did so, Achilles was still seated on the back of the much-enduring Tortoise, and was writing in his note-book, which appeared to be nearly full. The Tortoise was saying " Have you got that last step written down ? Unless I've lost count, that makes a thousand and one. There are several millions more to come. And would you mind, as a personal favour, considering what a lot of instruction this colloquy of ours will provide for the Logicians of the Nineteenth Century-would you mnind adopting a pun that my cousin the Mock-Turtle will then make, and allowing yourself to be re-named Taught- Us ?" "As you please !" replied the weary warrior, in the hollow tones of despair, as he buried his face in his hands. " Provided that you, for your part, will adopt a pun the Mock-Turtle never made, and allow yourself to be re-named A Kill-Ease !"Strawon protests:“But this is a strange piece of logic.”Grice corrects: “Pieceyou mean ‘piece’ simpliciter.”“But what do you protest that much!?”“Well, it seems that, on any possible interpretation, “if p, q” has, in respect of modus tollendo tollens the same powers as ‘p ⊃ q.’“And it is just these  powers that you, and Cook Wilson before you, are jokingly (or fantastically) exploiting!”“Fantastically?” “You call Cook Wilson ‘fantastical’? You can call me exploitative.’Strawson: “It is the absence of Kantian ‘Relation,’ Boethius’s ‘relatio,’ Aristotle’s ‘pros ti,’ referred to in that makes both Stout’s hat-eating if and Gardiner’s dutchman if quirks (as per Sir Randolph Quirk, another Manx, like Quine), a verbal or conversational flourish, an otiosity, alla Albritton, an odd, call it Philonian, use of ‘if.’ If a hypothetical statement IS, as Grice, after Philo, claims, is what Whitehead and Russell have as a ‘material’ implication, the statements would be not a quirkish oddity, but a linguistic sobriety and a simple truth. Or rather they are each, the dutchman  if and the hat-eating if, each a ‘quirkish oddity’ BECAUSE each is a simple, sober, truth. “Recall my adage,” Grice reminded Strawson, “Obscurely baffling, but Hegelianly true!”Strawson notes, as a final commentary on the relevant section, that ‘if’  can be employed PERFORMATORILY, which will have Grice finding his topic for the Kant lectures at Stanford: “must” is univocal in “Apples must fall,” and “You must not lie.”An ‘if’ is used ‘performatorily’ when it is used not simply in making this or that statement, but in, e.g., making a provisional announcement of an intention. Strawson’s example:“If it rains, I shall stay at home.”Grice corrected:“*I* *will* stay at home. *YOU* *shall.*”“His quadruple implicatura never ceased to amaze me.”Grice will take this up later in ‘Ifs and cans.’“If I can, I intend to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees, if I may disimplicate that to Davidson.”This hich, like an unconditional announcement of intention, Strawson “would rather not” call ‘truly true’ or ‘falsely false.’ “I would rather describe it in some other wayGriceian perhaps.” “A quessertion, not to be iterated.”“If the man who utters the quoted sentence leaves home in spite of the rain, we do not say that what he said was false, though we might say that he lied (never really intended to stay in) ; or that he changed his mindwhich, Strawson adds, “is a form of lying to your former self.” “I agreed with you!” Grice screamed from the other side of the Quadrangle!Strawson notes: “There are further uses of ‘if’ which I shall not discuss.”This is a pantomime for Austin (Strawson’s letter to Grice, “Austin wants me to go through the dictionary with ‘if.’ Can you believe it, Grice, that the OED has NINE big pages on it?! And the sad thing is that Austin has already did ‘if’ in “Ifs and cans.” Why is he always telling OTHERS what to do?”Strawson’s Q. E. D.: “The safest way to read the material implication sign is, perhaps, ‘not both … and not …,” and avoid the ‘doubt’ altogether. (NB: “Mr. H. P. Grice, from whom I never ceased to learn about logic since he was my tutor for my Logic paper in my PPE at St. John’s back in the day, illustrates me that ‘if’ in Frisian means ‘doubt.’ And he adds, “Bread, butter, green cheese; very good English, very good Friese!”. GROUP C“Performatory” theoriesdescriptive, quasi-descriptive, prescriptiveexamples not lettered.EXAMPLE I: Strawson on ‘true’ in Analysis.EXAMPLE II: Austin on ‘know’ EXAMPLE III: Hare on ‘good.’EXPLICITLY CONVEYED: if p, qIMPLICITLY CONVEYED: p is the consequensCANCELLATION: “I know perfectly well where your wife is, but all I’ll say is that if she is not in kitchen she is in the bedroom.”Next would be to consider uses of ‘implication’ in the essay on the ‘indicative conditional.’ We should remember that the titling came out in 1987. The lecture circulated without a title for twenty years. And in fact, it is about ‘indicative conditional’ AND MORE BESIDES, including Cook Wilson, if that’s a plus. Grice states the indirectness condition in two terms:One in the obviously false terms “q is INFERRABLE, that’s the word Grice uses, from p”The other one is in terms of truth-value assignment:The emissor has NON-TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL GROUNDS for the emissum, ‘if p, q’. In Grice’s parlance: “Grounds for ACCEPTING “p ⊃ q.”This way Grice chooses is controversial in that usually he holds ‘accept’ as followed by the ‘that’-clause. So ‘accepting ‘p ⊃ q’” is not clear in that respect. A rephrase would be, accepting that the emissor is in a position to emit, ‘if p, q’ provided that what he EXPLICITLY CONVEYS by that is what is explicitly conveyed by the Philonian ‘if,’ in other words, that the emissor is explicitly conveying that it is the case of p or it is not the case of q, or that it is not the case that a situation obtains such that it is the case that p and it is not the case that q.“p ⊃ q” is F only in the third row. It is no wonder that Grice says that the use-mention was only used correctly ONCE.For Grice freely uses ‘the proposition that p ⊃ q.’ But this may be licensed because it was meant as for ‘oral delivery.’ THE FIRST INSTANTIATION GRICE GIVES (WoW:58) is“If Smith is in London, he, viz. Smith, is attending the meeting.”Grice goes on (WoW:59) to give FIVE alternatives to the ‘if’ utterance, NOT using ‘if.’ For the first four, he notes that he fells the ‘implicaturum’ of ‘indirectness’ seems ‘persistent.’On WoW:59, Grice refers to Strawson as a ‘strong theorist,’ and himself as a ‘weak theorist,’ i. e. an Occamist. Grice gives a truth-table or the ‘appropriate truth table,’ and its formulation, and notes that he can still detect the indirectness condition implication. Grice challenges Strawson. How is one to learn that what one conveys by the scenario formulated in the truth-table for the pair “Smith is in London” and “Smith is attending the meeting”without using ‘if’ because this is Grice’s exercise in detachmentis WEAKER than what one would convey by “If Smith is in London, he, viz. Smith, is attending the meeting”?This sort of rhetorical questions“Of course he can’t” are a bit insidious. Grice failed to give Strawson a copy of the thing. And Strawson is then invited to collaborate with P. G. R. I. C. E., so he submits a rather vague “If and ⊃,” getting the rebuke by Grice’s friend Bennett“Strawson could at least say that Grice’s views were published in three different loci.” BUT: Strawson compiled that essay in 1968. And Strawson was NOT relying on a specific essay by Grice, but on his memory of the general manoeuvre. Grice had been lecturing on ‘if’ before at Oxford, in seminars entitled “Logic and Convesation.” But surely at Oxford you are not supposed to ‘air’ your seminar views. Outside Oxford it might be different. It shoud not!And surely knowing Grice, why would *GRICE* provide the input to Strawson. For Grice, philosophy is very personal, and while Grice might have thought that Sir Peter was slightly interested in what his former tutor would say about ‘if,’ it would be inappropriate of the tutor to overwhelm the tutee, or keep informing the tutee how wrong he is. For a tutor, once a tutee, always a tutee. On WoW:59, Grice provides the FIRST CANCELLATION of an ‘if,’ and changes it slightly from the one on p. 58. The ‘if’ now becomesIf Smith is in the library, he, viz. Smith, is working.’In Wiltshire:“If Smith is in the swimming-pool library, he, viz. Smith, is swimming.”THE CANCELLATION GOES by ‘opting out’:“I know just where Smith is and what he, viz. Smith, is doing, but all I will tell you is that if he is in the library he is working.”Grice had to keep adding his ‘vizes’viz. Smithbecause of the insidious contextualistssome of them philosophical!“What do you mean ‘he,’are you sure you are keeping the denotatum constant?”Grice is challenging Strawson’s ‘uncertainty and disbelief.’No one would be surprised if Grice’s basis for his saying “I know just where Smith is and what he, viz. Smith, is doing, but all I will tell you is that if he is in the library, he is working” is that Grice has just looked in the library and found Smith working. So, Grice IS uttering “If Smith is in the library, he is working” WHEN THE INDIRECT (strong) condition ceteris-paribus carried by what Grice ceteris paribus IMPLIES by uttering “If Smith is in the library, Smith is working.”The situation is a bit of the blue, because Grice presents it on purpose as UNVOLUNTEERED. The ‘communication-function’ does the trick. GRICE THEN GIVES (between pages WoW: 59 and 60) TWO IMPLICIT cancellations of an implicaturum, or, to avoid the alliteration, ‘contextual’ cancellation. Note incidentally that Grice is aware of the explicit/implicit when he calls the cancellation, first, EXPLICIT, and then contextual. By ‘explicit,’ he means, ‘conveying explicitly’ in a way that commits you. THE THIRD INSTANTIATION refers to this in what he calls a ‘logical’ puzzle, which may be a bit question-begging, cf. ‘appropriate truth-table.’ For Strawson would say that Grice is using ‘if’ as a conscript, when it’s a civil. “If Smith has black, Mrs. Smith has black.”Grice refers to ‘truth-table definition’ OR STIPULATION. Note that the horseshoe is an inverted “C” for ‘contentum.’F. Cajori, “A history of mathematical notations,” SYMBOLS IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC, §667-on : [§674] “A theory of the ‘meccanisme du raisonnement’ is offered by J. D. Gergonne in his “Essai de dialectique rationnelle.”In Gergonne’s “Essai,” “H” stands for complete logical disjunction, X” for logical product, “I” for "identity," [cf. Grize on izzing] “C” for "contains," and "Ɔ (inverted C)" for "is contained in."  [§685] Gergonne is using the Latinate, contineoIn rhet., the neuter substantive “contĭnens” is rendered as  “that on which something rests or depends, the chief point, hinge: “causae,” Cic. Part. Or. 29, 103; id. Top. 25, 95: “intuendum videtur, quid sit quaestio, ratio, judicatio, continens, vel ut alii vocant, firmamentum,” Quint. 3, 11, 1; cf. id. ib. § 18 sqq.—Adv.: contĭnen-ter . So it is a natural evolution in matters of implication. while Giusberti (“Materiale per studio,” 31) always reads “pro constanti,” the MSS occasionally has the pretty Griciean “precontenti,” from “prae” and “contenti.” Cf. Quine, “If my father was a bachelor, he was male. And I can say that, because ‘male’ is CONTAINED in ‘bachelor.’”E. Schröder, in his “Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik,” [§690]  Leipzig, uses “⊂” for "untergeordnet”, roughly, “is included in,” and the inverted “⊃” for the passive voice, "übergeordnet,” or includes.  Some additional symbols are introduced by Peano into Number 2 of Volume II of his influential “Formulaire.” Thus "ɔ" becomes ⊃. By “p.⊃ x ... z. q” is expressed “from p one DEDUCES, whatever x ... z may be, and q."  In “Il calcolo geometrico,”“according to the Ausdehnungslehre of H. Grassmann, preceded by the operations of deductive logic,” Peano stresses the duality of interpretations of “p.⊃ x ... z. q” in terms of classes and propositions. “We shall indicate [the universal affirmative proposition] by the expression  A < B, or B > A,  which can be read "every A is a B," or "the class B CONTAINS A." [...]  Hence, if a,b,... are CONDITIONAL propositions, we have:  a < b, or b > a, ‘says’ that "the class defined by the condition a is part of that defined by b," or [...] "b is a CONSEQUENCE of a," "if a is true, b is true."  In Peano’s “Arithmetices principia: nova methodo exposita,” we have:  “II. Propositions.” “The sign “C” means is a consequence of [“est consequentia.” Thus b C a is read b is a consequence of the proposition a.” “The sign “Ɔ” means one deduces [DEDUCITUR]; thus “a Ɔ b” ‘means’ the same as b C a. [...]  IV. Classes “The sign Ɔ ‘means’ is contained in. Thus a Ɔ b means class a is contained in class b.  a, b ∈ K Ɔ (a Ɔ b) :=: (x)(x ∈ a Ɔ x ∈ b).  In his “Formulaire,” Peano writes:  “Soient a et b des Cls. a ⊃ b signifie "tout a est b".  Soient p et q des propositions contenant une variable x; p ⊃x q, signifie "de p on déduit, quel que soit x, la q", c'est-à-dire: "les x qui satisfont à la condition p satisferont aussi à la q".  Russell criticizes Peano’s dualism in “The Principles of mathematics,” §13. “The subject of Symbolic Logic consists of three parts, the calculus of propositions, the calculus of classes and the calculus of relations. Between the first two, there is, within limits, a certain parallelism, which arises as follows: In any symbolic expression, the letters may be interpreted as classes or as propositions, and the relation of inclusion in the one case may be replaced by that of formal implication in the other.  A great deal has been made of this duality, and in the later editions of his “Formulaire,” Peano appears to have sacrificed logical precision to its preservation. But, as a matter of fact, there are many ways in which the calculus of propositions differs from that of classes.” Whiehead and Russell borrow the basic logical symbolism from Peano, but they freed it from the "dual" interpretation.  Thus, Whitehead and Russell adopt Schröder's ⊂ for class inclusion:  a ⊂ b :=: (x)(x ∈ a Ɔ x ∈ b) Df.  and restricted the use of the "horseshoe" ⊃ to the connective "if’: “p⊃q.’ Whitehead’s and Russell’s decision isobvious, if we consider the following example from Cesare Burali-Forti, “Logica Matematica,” a Ɔ b . b Ɔ c : Ɔ : a Ɔ c [...]  The first, second and fourth [occurrences] of the sign Ɔ mean is contained, the third one means one deduces.So the horseshoe is actually an inverted “C” meant to read “contentum” or “consequens” (“consequutum”). Active Nominal Forms Infinitive: implicā́re Present participle: implicāns; implicántis Future participle: implicītúrus; implicātúrus Gerund: implicándum Gerundive: implicándus  Passive Nominal Forms Infinitive: implicā́re Perfect participle: implicī́tum; implicā́tumGRICE’s second implicit or contextual cancellation does not involve a ‘logical puzzle’ but bridgeand it’s his fourth instantiation:“If I have a red king, I also have a black king.”to announce to your competititve opponents upon inquiry a bid of five no trumps. Cf. Alice, “The red Queen” which is a chess queen, as opposed to the white queen. After a precis, he gives a FIFTH instantiation to prove that ‘if’ is always EXPLICITLY cancellable.WoW:60“If you put that bit of sugar in water, it will dissolve, though so far as I know there can be no way of knowing in advance that this will happen.”This is complex. The cancellation turns the ‘if p, q’ into a ‘guess,’ in which case it is odd that the emissor would be guessing and yet be being so fortunate as to make such a good guess. At the end of page 60, Grice gives THREE FURTHER instantations which are both of philosophical importance and a pose a problem to such a strong theorist as Strawson.The first of the trio is:“If the Australians win the first Test, they will win the series, you mark my words.”The second of the trio is:“Perhaps if he comes, he will be in a good mood.”The third in the trio is:“See that, if he comes, he gets his money.”Grice’s point is that in the three, the implicaturum is cancelled. So the strong theorist has to modify the thesis ‘a sub-primary case of a sub-primary use of ‘if’ is…” which seems like a heavy penalty for the strong theorist. For Grice, the strong theorist is attaching the implicaturum to the ‘meaning’ of ‘if,’ where, if attached at all, should attach to some mode-marker, such as ‘probably,’ which may be contextual. On p. 61 he is finding play and using ‘logically weaker’ for the first time, i. e. in terms of entailment. If it is logically weaker, it is less informative. “To deny that p, or to assert that q.”Grice notes it’s ceteris paribus.“Provided it would be worth contributing with the ‘more informative’ move (“why deny p? Why assert q?) While the presumption that one is interested in the truth-values of at least p or q, this is ceteris paribus. A philosopher may just be interested in “if p, q” for the sake of exploring the range of the relation between p and q, or the powers of p and q. On p. 62 he uses the phrase “non-truth functional” as applied not to grounds but to ‘evidence’: “non-truth-functional evidence.”Grice wants to say that emissor has implicated, in a cancellable way, that he has non-truth-functional evidence for “if p, q,” i. e. evidence that proceeds by his inability to utter “if p, q” on truth-functional grounds. The emissor is signaling that he is uttering “if p, q” because he cannot deny p, or that he cannot assert q(p ⊃ q) ≡ ((~p) v q)Back to the first instantiation“If Smith is in London, he, viz. Smith is attending the meeting there, viz. in London”I IMPLICATE, in a cancellable way, that I have no evidence for “Smith is not in London”I IMPLICATE, in a cancellable way, that I have no evidence for “Smith is attending the lecture.On p. 61 he gives an example of an contextual cancellation to show that even if the implicaturum is a generalised one, it need not be present in every PARTICULAR case (hence the weakned form ‘generalISED, not general). “If he was surprised, he didn’t show it.”Or cf. AustinIf you are hungry, there are biscuits in the cupboard. Traditionalist Grice on the tranquil Elysium of philosophyĒlysĭum , ii, n., = Ἠλύσιον, the abode of the blest, I.Elysium, Verg. A. 5, 735 Serv.; 6, 542; 744 al.; cf. Heyne Verg. A. 6, 675 sq.; and ejusd. libri Exc. VIII. p. 1019 Wagn.—Hence, II. Ēlysĭus , a, um, adj., Elysian: “campi,” Verg. G. 1, 38; Tib. 1, 3, 58; Ov. Ib. 175; cf. “ager,” Mart. 10, 101: “plagae,” id. 6, 58: “domus,” Ov. M. 14, 111; cf. “sedes,” Luc. 3, 12: “Chaos,” Stat. Th. 4, 520: “rosae,” Prop. 4 (5), 7, 60. “puella,” i. e. Proserpine, Mart. 10, 24.—On p. 63, Grice uses ‘sense’ for the first time to apply to a Philonian ‘if p, q.’He is exploring that what Strawson would have as a ‘natural’ if, not an artificial ‘if’ like Philo’s, may have a sense that descends from the sense of the Philonian ‘if,’ as in Darwin’s descent of man. Grice then explores the ‘then’ in some formulations, ‘if p, then q’, and notes that Philo never used it, “ei” simpliciteror the Romans, “si.”Grice plays with the otiosity of “if p, in that case q.”And then there’s one that Grice dismisses as ultra-otiose:“if p, then, in that case, viz. p., q.”Grice then explores ‘truth-functional’ now applied not to ‘evidence’ but to ‘confirmation.’“p or q” is said to be truth-functionally confirmable.While “p horseshoe q’ is of course truth-functionally confirmable.Grice has doubts that ‘if p, q’ may be regarded by Strawson as NOT being ‘truth-functionally confirmable.’ If would involve what he previously called a ‘metaphysical excrescence.’Grice then reverts to his bridge example“If I have a red king, I have a black king.”And provides three scenarios for a post-mortem truth-functional confirmability.For each of the three rowsNo red, no blackRed, no blackRed, blackWhich goes ditto for  the ‘logical’ puzzleIf Jones has black, Mrs. Jones has black. The next crop of instantiations come from PM, and begins on p. 64.He kept revising these notes. And by the time he was submitting the essay to the publisher, he gives up and kept the last (but not least, never latter) version. Grice uses the second-floor ‘disagree,’ and not an explicit ‘not.’ So is partially agreeing a form of disagreeing? In 1970, Conservative Heath won to Labour Wilson.He uses ‘validate’for ‘confirm’. ‘p v q’ is validated iff proved factually satisfactory.On p. 66 he expands“if p, q”as a triple disjunction of the three rows when ‘if p, q’ is true:“(not-p and not-q) or (not-p and q) or (p and q)”The only left out is “(p and not-q).”Grice gives an instantiation for [p et]q“The innings closed at 3:15, Smith no batting.”as opposed to“The inning close at 3:15, and Smith did not bat.”as displayed byp.qAfter using ‘or’ for elections he gives the first instantation with ‘if’:“If Wilson will not be prime minister, it will be Heath.”“If Wilson loses, he loses to Heath.”‘if’ is noncommutativethe only noncommutative of the three dyadic truth-functors he considers (‘and,’ ‘or’ and ‘if’).This means that there is a ‘semantic’ emphasis here.There is a distinction between ‘p’ and ‘q’. In the case of ‘and’ and ‘or’ there is not, since ‘p and q’ iff ‘q and p’ and ‘p or q’ iff ‘q or p.’The distinction is expressed in terms of truth-sufficiency and false-sufficiency.The antecedent or protasis, ‘p’ is FALSE-SUFFICIENT for the TRUTH of ‘if p, q.’The apodosis is TRUE-sufficient for the truth of ‘if p, q.’On p. 67 he raises three questions.FIRST QUESTIONHe is trying to see ‘if’ as simpler:The three instantiations areIf Smith rings, the butler will let Smith inIt is not the case that Smith rings, or the butler will let Smith in.It is not the case both Smith rings and it is not the the butler will let Smith in. (Grice changes the tense, since the apodosis sometimes requires the future tense) (“Either Smith WILL RING…”)SECOND QUESTIONWhy did the Anglo-Saxons feel the need for ‘if’German ‘ob’? After all, if Whitehead and Russell are right, the Anglo-Saxons could have done with ‘not’ and ‘and,’ or indeed with ‘incompatible.’The reason is that ‘if’ is cognate with ‘doubt,’ but The Anglo-Saxons left the doubt across the North Sea. it originally from an oblique case of the substantive which may be rendered as "doubt,” and cognate with archaic German “iba,” which may be rendered as “condition, stipulation, doubt," Old Norse if "doubt, hesitation," modern Swedish jäf "exception, challenge")It’s all different with ‘ei’ and ‘si.’For sisī (orig. and ante-class. form seī ),I.conj. [from a pronominal stem = Gr. ἑ; Sanscr. sva-, self; cf. Corss. Ausspr. 1, 778; Georg Curtius Gr. Etym. 396], a conditional particle, if.As for “ei”εἰ , Att.-Ion. and Arc. (for εἰκ, v. infr. 11 ad init.), = Dor. and Aeol. αἰ, αἰκ (q. v.), Cypr.A.“ἤ” Inscr.Cypr.135.10 H., both εἰ and αἰ in Ep.:— Particle used interjectionally with imper. and to express a wish, but usu. either in conditions, if, or in indirect questions, whether. In the former use its regular negative is μή; in the latter, οὐ.THIRD QUESTION. Forgetting Grecian neutral apodosis and protasis, why did the Romans think that while ‘antecedens’ is a good Humeian rendition of ‘protasis,’ yet instead they chose for the Grecian Humeian ‘apodosis,’ the not necessarily Humeian ‘con-sequens,’ rather than mere ‘post-sequens’?The Latin terminology is antecedens and consequens, the ancestors and ... tothem the way the Greek grammatical termsή πρότασιs and ήαπόδοσιsBRADWARDINE: Note that a consequence is an argumentation made up of an antecedent and a consequent. He starts with the métiers.For ‘or’ he speaks of ‘semiotic economy’ (p. 69). Grice’s Unitarianismunitary particle.If, like iff, is subordinating, but only if is non-commutative. Gazdar considers how many dyadic particles are possible and why such a small bunch is chosen. Grice did not even care, as Strawson did, to take care of ‘if and only if.’ Grice tells us the history behind the ‘nursery rhyme’ about Cock Robin. He learned it from his mother, Mabel Fenton, at Harborne. Clifton almost made it forget it! But he recovered in the New World, after reading from Colin Sharp that many of those nursery rhymes travelled “with the Mayflower.” "Who Killed Cock Robin" is an English nursery rhyme, which has been much used as a murder archetype[citation needed] in world culture. It has a Roud Folk Song Index number of 494.  Contents 1Lyrics 2Origin and meaning 3Notes 4 External links Lyrics[edit] The earliest record of the rhyme is in Tommy Thumb's Pretty Song Book, published c. 1744, which noted only the first four verses. The extended version given below was not printed until c. 1770.  Who killed Cock Robin? I, said the Sparrow, with my bow and arrow, I killed Cock Robin. Who saw him die? I, said the Fly, with my little eye, I saw him die. Who caught his blood? I, said the Fish, with my little dish, I caught his blood. Who'll make the shroud? I, said the Beetle, with my thread and needle, I'll make the shroud. Who'll dig his grave? I, said the Owl, with my little trowel, I'll dig his grave. Who'll be the parson? I, said the Rook, with my little book, I'll be the parson. Who'll be the clerk? I, said the Lark, if it's not in the dark, I'll be the clerk. Who'll carry the link? I, said the Linnet, I'll fetch it in a minute, I'll carry the link. Who'll be chief mourner? I, said the Dove, I mourn for my love, I'll be chief mourner. Who'll carry the coffin? I, said the Kite, if it's not through the night, I'll carry the coffin. Who'll bear the pall? We, said the Wren, both the cock and the hen, We'll bear the pall. Who'll sing a psalm? I, said the Thrush, as she sat on a bush, I'll sing a psalm. Who'll toll the bell? I, said the Bull, because I can pull, I'll toll the bell. All the birds of the air fell a-sighing and a-sobbing, when they heard the bell toll for poor Cock Robin. The rhyme has often been reprinted with illustrations, as suitable reading material for small children.[citation needed] The rhyme also has an alternative ending, in which the sparrow who killed Cock Robin is hanged for his crime. Several early versions picture a stocky, strong-billed bullfinch tolling the bell, which may have been the original intention of the rhyme.  Origin and meaning[edit] Although the song was not recorded until the mid-eighteenth century, there is some evidence that it is much older. The death of a robin by an arrow is depicted in a 15th-century stained glass window at Buckland Rectory, Gloucestershire, and the rhyme is similar to a story, Phyllyp Sparowe, written by John Skelton about 1508. The use of the rhyme 'owl' with 'shovel', could suggest that it was originally used in older middle English pronunciation. Versions of the story appear to exist in other countries, including Germany.  A number of the stories have been advanced to explain the meaning of the rhyme:  The rhyme records a mythological event, such as the death of the god Balder from Norse mythology, or the ritual sacrifice of a king figure, as proposed by early folklorists as in the 'Cutty Wren' theory of a 'pagan survival'. It is a parody of the death of King William II, who was killed by an arrow while hunting in the New Forest (Hampshire) in 1100, and who was known as William Rufus, meaning "red". The rhyme is connected with the fall of Robert Walpole's government in 1742, since Robin is a diminutive form of Robert and the first printing is close to the time of the events mentioned. All of these theories are based on perceived similarities in the text to legendary or historical events, or on the similarities of names. Peter Opie pointed out that an existing rhyme could have been adapted to fit the circumstances of political events in the eighteenth century.  The theme of Cock Robin's death as well as the poem's distinctive cadence have become archetypes, much used in literary fiction and other works of art, from poems, to murder mysteries, to cartoons.  Notes[edit]  Jump up to:a b c d e f g h I. Opie and P. Opie, The Oxford Dictionary of Nursery Rhymes (Oxford University Press, 1951, 2nd edn., 1997),  130–3.  * Cock Robin at Project Gutenberg  M. C. Maloney, ed., English illustrated books for children: a descriptive companion to a selection from the Osborne Collection (Bodley Head, 1981)31.  Lockwood, W. B. "The Marriage of the Robin and the Wren." Folklore 100.2 (1989): 237–239.  The gentry house that became the old rectory at Buckland has an impressive timbered hall that dates from the fifteenth century with two lights of contemporary stained glass in the west wall with the rebus of William Grafton and arms of Gloucester Abbey in one and the rising sun of Edward IV in the other light; birds in various attitudes hold scrolls "In Nomine Jesu"; none is reported transfixed by an arrow in Anthony Emery, Greater Medieval Houses of England and Wales, 1300–1500: Southern England, s.v. "Buckland Old Rectory, Gloucestershire", (Cambridge University Press, 2006)80.  R. J. Stewart, Where is St. George? Pagan Imagery in English Folksong (1976).  B. Forbes, Make Merry in Step and Song: A Seasonal Treasury of Music, Mummer's Plays & Celebrations in the English Folk Tradition (Llewellyn Worldwide, 2009)5.  J. Harrowven, The origins of rhymes, songs and sayings (Kaye & Ward, 1977)92. External links[edit] Children's literature portal Death and Burial of Poor Cock Robin, by H. L. Stephens, from Project Gutenberg Death and Burial of Poor Cock Robin From the Collections at the Library of Congress Categories: Robert Walpole1744 songsFictional passerine birdsEnglish nursery rhymesSongwriter unknownEnglish folk songsEnglish children's songsTraditional children's songsSongs about birdsSongs about deathMurder balladsThe train from Oakland to Berkeley.Grice's aunt once visited him, and he picked her up at the Oakland Railway Station. On p. 74, Grice in terms of his aunt, mentions for the first time ‘premise’ and ‘conclusion.’On same p. for the record he uses ‘quality’ for affirmative, negative or infinite. On p. 74 he uses for the first time, with a point, the expression ‘conditional’ as attached to ‘if.’Oddly on the first line of p. 75, he uses ‘material conditional,’ which almost nobody doesexcept for a blue-collared practitioner of the sciences. ‘Material’ was first introduced by blue-collared Whitehead and Russell, practictioners of the sciences. They used ‘material’ as applied to ‘implication,’ to distinguish it, oddly, and unclassily, from ‘formal’ implication. It is only then he quotes Wilson verbatim in quotes“The question whether so and so is a case of a question whether such and such” This actually influenced Collingwood, and Grice is trying to tutor Strawson here once more!For the logic of question and answer has roots in the very philosophy that it was ... is John Cook Wilson, whose Statement and Inference can be regarded as the STATEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THINKING AND APREHENSIOTHE DISTINCTION OF SUBJECT AND PREDICATE IN LOGIC AND GRAMMAR The influence of Strawson on Cook Wilson.“The building is the Bodleian.”As answer to“What is that building?”“Which building is the Bodleian”If the proposition is answer to first question, ‘that building’ is the subject, if the proposition is answer to second question, ‘the bodleian’ is the subject. Cf. “The exhibition was not visited by a bald kingof France, as it doesn’t happen.SUBJECT AS TOPICPREDICATE AS COMMENT.Cf. Grice, “The dog is a shaggy thig”What is shaggy?What is the dog?THIS DOGSubjectTopicTHAT SHAGGY THINGSubjectoccasionally, but usually Predicate, Comment.In fact, Wilson bases on StoutI am hungryWho is hungry?: subject IIs there anything amiss with you? ‘hungry’ is the subjectAre you really hungry? ‘am’ is the subject.Grice used to be a neo-Stoutian before he turned a neo-Prichardian so he knew. But perhaps Grice thought better of Cook Wilson. More of a philosopher. Stout seemed to have been seen as a blue-collared practioner of the SCIENCE of psychology, not philosophical psychology! Cf. Leicester-born B. Mayo, e: Magdalen, Lit. Hum. (Philosophy) under? on ‘if’ and Cook Wilson in Analysis.Other example by Wilson:“Glass is elastic.”Grice is motivated to defend Cook Wilson because Chomsky was criticizing him (via a student who had been at Oxford). [S]uppose instruction was being given in the properties of glass, and the instructor said ‘glass is elastic’, it would be natural to say that what was being talkedabout and thought about was ‘glass’, and that what was said of it was that it was elastic. Thus glass would be the subject and that it is elastic would be the predicate. (Cook Wilson 1926/1969,  1:117f.) What Cook Wilson discusses here is a categorical sentence. The next two quotes are concerned with an identificational sentence. [I]n the statement ‘glass is elastic’, if the matter of inquiry was elasticity and the question was what substances possessed the property of elasticity, glass, in accordance with the principle of the definition, would no longer be subject, and the kind of stress which fell upon ‘elastic’ when glass was the subject, would now be transferred to ‘glass’. [. . .] Thus the same form of words should be analyzed differently according as the words are the answer to one question or another. (Cook Wilson 1926/1969,  1:119f.) When the stress falls upon ‘glass’, in ‘glass is elastic’, there is no word in the sentence which denotes the actual subject elasticity; the word ‘elastic’ refers to what is already known of the subject, and glass, which has the stress, is the only word which refers to the supposed new fact in the nature of elasticity, that it is found in glass. Thus, according to the proposed formula, ‘glass’ would have to be the predicate. [. . .] Introduction and overview  But the ordinary analysis would never admit that ‘glass’ was the predicate in the given sentence and elasticity the subject. (Cook Wilson 1926/1969,  1:121)H. P. Grice knew that P. F. Strawson knew of J. C. Wilson  on “That building is the Bodleian” via Sellars’s criticism.There is  a  strong suggestion  in  Sellars' paper  that I would  have done better if I had stuck to Cook Wilson. This suggestion I want equally strongly to  repudiate.  Certainly  Cook  Wilson  draws  attention to  an interesting difference in ways  in which  items may appear in discourse. It may be roughly  expressed  as follows. When we  say Glass is elastic we may be talking  about glass or we may be talking about elasticity (and we may, in the relevant sense of  'about' be doing neither). We are talking about glass if  we are citing elasticity  as one of  the properties  of  glass, we  are talking  about  elasticity if  we  are  citing glass as one of  the substances which  are elastic.  Similarly when we  say Socrates is wise,  we  may be citing Socrates as an instance of  wisdom or wisdom as one of  the proper- ties  of  Socrates. And of  course  we  may be  doing neither  but, e.g., just imparting  miscellaneous  information.  Now  how,  if  at all,  could  this difference help me with my question? Would  it help at all, for example, if  it were plausible (which it is not) to say that we  were inevitably more interested in determining what properties  a given particular had,than in determining what particular had a given property? Wouldn't  this at least suggest that particulars were the natural subjects, in the sense of  subjects of  &amp;erest?  Let me  answer this question  by the reminder  that what I have  to  do  is to establish  a connexion  between some formal  linguistic difference  and a  category  difference;  and  a  formal  linguistic  difference is one which logic can take cognizance of, in abstraction from pragmatic considerations,  like  the direction of  interest. Such  a  formal  ditference exists in the difference between appearing in discourse directly designated and  appearing  in  discourse under  the cloak of  quantification. ““But the difference in the use  of  unquantified  statements to which Cook Wilson draws attention is not a formal difference at all.”Both glass and elasticity, Socrates  and wisdom appear named  in  such  statements, whichever, in Cook  Wilson's  sense,  we  are talking about. An  appeal  to  pragmatic considerations  is,  certainly, an essential  part  of  my  own  account  at  a certain point: but this is the point  at which such considerations are in- voked to explain why  a certain formal difference should  be particularly closely linked, in common speech, with a certain category difference. The difference  of  which Cook  Wilson speaks is, then, though  interesting in itself, irrelevant to my question. Cook Wilson is, and I am not, concerned with  what  Sellars calls  dialectical  distinctions.” On p.76 Grice mentions for the first time the “ROLE” of if in an indefinite series of ‘interrogative subordination.”For Cook Wilson,as Price knew (he quotes him in Belief), the function of ‘if’ is to LINK TWO QUESTIONS. You’re the cream in my coffee as ‘absurd’ if literally (p. 83). STATEMENT In this entry we will explore how Grice sees the ‘implicaturum’ that he regards as ‘conversational’ as applied to the emissor and in reference to the Graeco-Roman classical tradition. Wht is implicated may not be the result of any maxim, and yet not conventionaldepending on a feature of context. But nothing like a maximStrawson Wiggins p. 523. Only a CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURUM is the result of a CONVERSATIONAL MAXIM and the principle of conversational helpfulness. In a ‘one-off’ predicament, there may be an ‘implicaturum’ that springs from the interaction itself. If E draws a skull, he communicates that there is danger. If addressee runs away, this is not part of the implicaturum. This Grice considers in “Meaning.” “What is meant” should cover the immediate effect, and not any effect that transpires out of the addressee’s own will. Cf. Patton on Kripke. One thief to another: “The cops are coming!” The expressiom “IMPLICATION” is figures, qua entry, in a philosophical dictionary that Grice consulted at Oxford. In the vernacular, there are two prominent relata: entailment and implicaturum, the FRENCH have their “implication.” When it comes to the Germans, it’s more of a trick. There’s the “nachsichziehen,” the “zurfolgehaben,” the “Folge(-rung),” the “Schluß,” the “Konsequenz,” and of course the “Implikation” and the “Implikatur,” inter alia.  In Grecian, which Grice learned at Clifton, we have the “sumpeplegmenon,” or “συμπεπλεγμένον,” if you must, i. e. the “sum-peplegmenon,” but there’s also the “sumperasma,” or “συμπέϱασμα,” if you must, “sum-perasma;” and then there’s the “sunêmmenon,” or “συνημμένον,” “sun-emmenon,” not to mention (then why does Grice?) the “akolouthia,” or “ἀϰολουθία,” if you must, “akolouthia,” and the “antakolouthia,” ἀνταϰολουθία,” “ana-kolouthia.” Trust clever Cicero to regard anything ‘Grecian’ as not displaying enough gravitas, and thus rendering everything into Roman. There’s the “illatio,” from ‘in-fero.’ The Romans adopted two different roots for this, and saw them as having the same ‘sense’cf. referro, relatum, proferro, prolatum; and then there’s the “inferentia,”– in-fero; and then there’s the “consequentia,” -- con-sequentia. The seq- root is present in ‘sequitur,’ non sequitur. The ‘con-‘ is transliterating Greek ‘syn-’ in the three expressions with ‘syn’: sympleplegmenon, symperasma, and synemmenon. The Germans, avoiding the Latinate, have a ‘follow’ root: in “Folge,” “Folgerung,” and the verb “zur-folge-haben. And perhaps ‘implicatio,’  which is the root Grice is playing with. In Italian and French it underwent changes, making ‘to imply’ a doublet with Grice’s ‘to implicate’ (the form already present, “She was implicated in the crime.”). The strict opposite is ‘ex-plicatio,’ as in ‘explicate.’ ‘implico’ gives both ‘implicaturum’ and ‘implicitum.’ Consequently, ‘explico’ gives both ‘explicatum’ and ‘explicitum.’ In English Grice often uses ‘impicit,’ and ‘explicit,’ as they relate to communication, as his ‘implicaturum’ does. His ‘implicaturum’ has more to do with the contrast with what is ‘explicit’ than with ‘what follows’ from a premise. Although in his formulation, both readings are valid: “by uttering x, implicitly conveying that q, the emissor CONVERSATIONALY implicates that p’ if he has explicitly conveyed that p, and ‘q’ is what is required to ‘rationalise’ his conversational behavioiur. In terms of the emissor, the distinction is between what the emissor has explicitly conveyed and what he has conversationally implicated. This in turn contrasts what some philosophers refer metabolically as an ‘expression,’ the ‘x’ ‘implying’ that pGrice does not bother with this because, as Strawson and Wiggins point out, while an emissor cannot be true, it’s only what he has either explicitly or implicitly conveyed that can be true. As Austin says, it’s always a FIELD where you do the linguistic botany. So, you’ll have to vide and explore: ANALOGY, PROPOSITION, SENSE, SUPPOSITION, and TRUTH. Implication denotes a relation between propositions and statements such that, from the truth-value of the protasis or antecedent (true or false), one can derive the truth of the apodosis or consequent. More broadly, we can say that one idea ‘implies’ another if the first idea cannot be thought without the second one -- RT: Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie. Common usage makes no strict differentiation between “to imply,” “to infer,” and “to lead to.” Against Dorothy Parker. She noted that those of her friends who used ‘imply’ for ‘infer’ were not invited at the Algonquin. The verb “to infer,” (from Latin, ‘infero,’ that gives both ‘inferentia,’ inference, and ‘illatio,’ ‘illatum’) meaning “to draw a consequence, to deduce” (a use dating to 1372), and the noun “inference,” meaning “consequence” (from 1606), do not on the face of it seem to be manifestly different from “to imply” and “implication.” But in Oxonian usage, Dodgson avoided a confusion. “There are two ways of confusing ‘imply’ with ‘infer’: to use ‘imply’ to mean ‘infer,’ and vice versa. Alice usually does the latter; the Dodo the former.” Indeed, nothing originally distinguishes “implication” as Lalande defines it — “a relation by which one thing ‘implies’ another”— from “inference” as it is defined in Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie (1765): “An operation by which one ACCEPTS (to use a Griceism) a proposition because of its connection to other propositions held to be true.” The same phenomenon can be seen in the German language, in which the terms corresponding to “implication,” “Nach-sich-ziehen,” “Zur-folge-haben,” “inference,” “Schluß”-“Folgerung,” “Schluß,” “to infer,” “schließen,” “consequence,” “Folge” “-rung,” “Schluß,” “Konsequenz,” “reasoning,” “”Schluß-“ “Folgerung,” and “to reason,” “schließen,” “Schluß-folger-ung-en ziehen,” intersect or overlap to a large extent. In the French language, the expression “impliquer” reveals several characteristics that the expression does not seem to share with “to infer” or “to lead to.” First of all, “impliquer” is originally (1663) connected to the notion of contradiction, as shown in the use of impliquer in “impliquer contradiction,” in the sense of “to be contradictory.” The connection between ‘impliquer’ and ‘contradiction’ does not, however, explain how “impliquer” has passed into its most commonly accepted meaning — “implicitly entail” — viz. to lead to a consequence. Indeed, the two usages (“impliquer” connected with contradiction” and otherwise) constantly interfere with one another, which certainly poses a number of difficult problems. An analogous phenomenon can be found in the case of “import,” commonly given used as “MEAN” or “imply,” but often wavering instead, in certain cases, between “ENTAIL” and “imply.” In French, the noun “import” itself is generally left as it I (“import existentiel,” v. SENSE, Box 4, and cf. that’s unimportant, meaningless).  “Importer,” as used by Rabelais, 1536, “to necessitate, to entail,” forms via  It.“importare,” as used by Dante), from the Fr. “emporter,” “to entail, to have as a consequence,” dropped out of usage, and was brought back through Engl. “import.” The nature of the connection between the two primary usages of L. ‘implicare,’ It. ‘implicare,’ and Fr. ‘impliquer,’ “to entail IMPLICITitly” and “to lead to a consequence,” nonetheless remains obscure, but not to a Griceian, or Grecian. Another difficulty is understanding how the transition occurs from Fr. “impliquer,” “to lead to a consequence,” to “implication,” “a logical relation in which one statement necessarily supposes another one,” and how we can determine what in this precise case distinguishes “implication” from “PRAE-suppositio.” We therefore need to be attentive to what is implicit in Fr. “impliquer” and “implication,” to the dimension of Fr. “pli,” a pleat or fold, of Fr. “re-pli,” folding back, and of the Fr. “pliure,” folding, in order to separate out “imply,” “infer,” “lead to,” or “implication,” “inference,” “consequence”—which requires us to go back to Latin, and especially to medieval Latin. Once we clarify the relationship between the usage of “implication” and the medieval usage of “implicatio,” we will be able to examine certain derivations (as in Sidonius’s ‘implicatura,” and H. P. Grice’s “implicaturum,” after ‘temperature,’ from ‘temperare,’) or substitutes (“entailment”) of terms related to the generic field (for linguistic botanising) of “implicatio,” assuming that it is difficulties with the concept of implication (e. g., the ‘paradoxes,’ true but misleading, of material versus formal implication‘paradox of implication’ first used by Johnson 1921) that have given rise to this or that newly coined expression corresponding to this or that original attempt. This whole set of difficulties certainly becomes clearer as we leave Roman and go further upstream to Grecian, using the same vocabulary of implication, through the conflation of several heterogeneous gestures that come from the systematics in Aristotle and the Stoics. The Roman Vocabulary of Implication and the Implicatio has the necessary ‘gravitas,’ but Grice, being a Grecian at heart, found it had ‘too much gravitas,’ hence his ‘implicaturum,’ “which is like the old Roman ‘implicare,’ but for fun!” A number of different expressions in medieval Latin can express in a more or less equivalent manner the relationship between propositions and statements such that, from the truth-value of the antecedent (true or false), one can derive the truth-value of the consequent. There is “illatio,” and of course “illatum,” which Varro thought fell under ‘inferre.’ Then there’s the feminine noun, ‘inferentia,’ from the ‘participium praesens’ of ‘inferre,’ cf. ‘inferens’ and ‘ilatum.’ There is also ‘consequentia,’ which is a complex transliterating the Greek ‘syn-,’ in this case with ‘’sequentia,’ from the deponent verb. “I follow you.” Peter Abelard (Petrus Abelardus, v. Abelardus) makes no distinction in using the expression “consequentia” for the ‘propositio conditionalis,’ hypothetical. Si est homo, est animal. If Grice is a man, Grice is an animal (Dialectica, 473Abelardus uses ‘Greek man,’ not Grice.’ His implicaturum is ‘if a Greek man is a man, he is therefore also some sort of an animal’). But Abelardus also uses the expression “inferentia” for ‘same old same old’ (cf. “Implicaturum happens.”). Si non est iustus homo, est non iustus homo. Grice to Strawson on the examiner having given him a second. “If it is not the case that your examiner was a fair man, it follows thereby that your examiner was not a fair man, if that helps.” (Dialectica., 414).  For some reason, which Grice found obscure, ‘illatio” appears “almost always” in the context of commenting on Aristotle’s “Topics,”“why people found the topic commenting escapes me” -- aand denotes more specifically a reasoning, or “argumentum,” in Boethius, allowing for a “consequentia” to be drawn from a given place. So Abelardus distinguishes: “illatio a causa.” But there is also “illatio a simili.” And there is “iillatio a pari.” And there is “illatio a partibus.” “Con-sequentia” sometimes has a very generic usage, even if not as generic as ‘sequentia.” “Consequentia est quaedam habitudo inter antecedens et consequens,” “Logica modernorum,” 2.1:38Cfr. Grice on Whitehead as a ‘modernist’! Grice draws his ‘habit’ from the scholastic ‘habitudo.’ Noe that ‘antededens’ and ‘consequens.’ The point is a tautological formula, in terms of formation. Surely ‘consequentia’ relates to a ‘consequens,’ where the ‘consequens’ is the ‘participium praesens’ of the verb from which ‘consequentia’ derives. It’s like deving ‘love’ by ‘to have a beloved.’ “Consequentia” is in any case present, in some way, without the intensifier ‘syn,’ which the Roman gravitas added to transliterate the Greek ‘syn,’ i. e. ‘cum.’ -- in the expression “sequitur” and in the expression “con-sequitur,” literally, ‘to follow,’ ‘to ensue,’ ‘to result in’). Keenan told Grice that this irritated him. “If there is an order between a premise and a conclusion, I will stop using ‘follow,’ because that reverts the order. I’ll use ‘… yields …’ and write that ‘p yields q.’” “Inferentia,” which is cognate (in the Roman way of using this expression broadly) with ‘illatio,’ and ‘illatum,’ -- frequently appears, by contrast, and “for another Grecian reason,” as Grice would put it -- in the context of the Aristotle’s “De Interpretatione,” on which Grice lectures only with J. L. Austin (Grice lectured with Strawson on “Categoriae,” onlybut with Austin, from whom Grice learnedGrice lectured on both “Categoriae’ AND “De Interpretatione.” --  whether it is as part of a commentarium on Apuleius’s Isagoge and the Square of Oppositions (‘figura quadrata spectare”), in order to explain this or that “law” underlying any of the four sides of the square. So, between A and E we have ‘propositio opposita.’ Between A and I, and between E and O, we have propositio sub-alterna. Between A and O, and between E and I, we have propositio contradictoria. And between I and O, we have “propositio sub-alterna.” -- Logica modernorum, 2.1:115. This was irritatingly explored by P. F. Strawson and brought to H. P. Grice’s attention, who refused to accept Strawson’s changes and restrictions of the ‘classical’ validities (or “laws”) because Strawson felt that the ‘implication’ violated some ‘pragmatic rule,’ while still yielding a true statement. Then there’s the odd use of “inferentia” to apply to the different ‘laws’ of ‘conversio’ -- from ‘convertire,’ converting one proposition into another (Logica modernorum 131–39). Nevertheless, “inferentia” is used for the dyadic (or triadic, alla Peirce) relationship of ‘implicatio,’ which for some reason, the grave Romans were using for less entertaining things, and not this or that expressions from the “implication” family, or sub-field.  Surprisingly, a philosopher without a classical Graeco-Roman background could well be mislead into thinking that “implicatio” and “implication” are disparate! A number of treatises, usually written by monksSt. John’s, were Grice teaches, is a Cicercian monastery -- explore the “implicits.” Such a “tractatus” is not called ‘logico-philosophicus,’ but a “tractatus implicitarum,” literally a treatise on this or that  ‘semantic’ property of the proposition said to be an ‘implicaturum’ or an ‘implication,’ or ‘propositio re-lativa.’ This is Grice’s reference to the conversational category of ‘re-lation.’ “Re-latio” and “Il-latio” are surely cognate. The ‘referre’ is a bring back; while the ‘inferre’ is the bring in. The propositio is not just ‘brought’ (latum, or lata) it is brought back. Proposition Q is brought back (relata) to Proposition P. P and Q become ‘co-relative.’ This is the terminology behind the idea of a ‘relative clause,’ or ‘oratio relativa.’ E.g. “Si Plato tutee Socrates est, Socratos tutor Platonis est,” translated by Grice, “If Strawson was my tutee, it didn’t show!”. Now, closer to Grice “implicitus,” with an “i” following the ‘implic-‘ rather than the expected ‘a’ (implica), “implicita,” and “implicitum,” is an alternative “participium passatum” from “im-plic-are,” in Roman is used for “to be joined, mixed, enveloped.” implĭco (inpl- ), āvi, ātum, or (twice in Cic., and freq. since the Aug. per.) ŭi, ĭtum (v. Neue, Formenl. 2, 550 sq.), 1, v. a. in-plico, to fold into; hence, I.to infold, involve, entangle, entwine, inwrap, envelop, encircle, embrace, clasp, grasp (freq. and class.; cf.: irretio, impedio). I. Lit.: “involvulus in pampini folio se,” Plaut. Cist. 4, 2, 64: “ut tenax hedera huc et illuc Arborem implicat errans,” Cat. 61, 35; cf. id. ib. 107 sq.: “et nunc huc inde huc incertos implicat orbes,” Verg. A. 12, 743: “dextrae se parvus Iulus Implicuit,” id. ib. 2, 724; cf.: “implicuit materno bracchia collo,” Ov. M. 1, 762: “implicuitque suos circum mea colla lacertos,” id. Am. 2, 18, 9: “implicuitque comam laevā,” grasped, Verg. A. 2, 552: “sertis comas,” Tib. 3, 6, 64: “crinem auro,” Verg. A. 4, 148: “frondenti tempora ramo,” id. ib. 7, 136; cf. Ov. F. 5, 220: in parte inferiore hic implicabatur caput, Afran. ap. Non. 123, 16 (implicare positum pro ornare, Non.): “aquila implicuit pedes atque unguibus haesit,” Verg. A. 11, 752: “effusumque equitem super ipse (equus) secutus Implicat,” id. ib. 10, 894: “congressi in proelia totas Implicuere inter se acies,” id. ib. 11, 632: “implicare ac perturbare aciem,” Sall. J. 59, 3: “(lues) ossibus implicat ignem,” Verg. A. 7, 355.—In part. perf.: “quini erant ordines conjuncti inter se atque implicati,” Caes. B. G. 7, 73, 4: “Canidia brevibus implicatura viperis Crines,” Hor. Epod. 5, 15: “folium implicaturum,” Plin. 21, 17, 65, § 105: “intestinum implicaturum,” id. 11, 4, 3, § 9: “impliciti laqueis,” Ov. A. A. 2, 580: “Cerberos implicitis angue minante comis,” id. H. 9, 94: “implicitamque sinu absstulit,” id. A. A. 1, 561: “impliciti Peleus rapit oscula nati,” held in his arms, Val. Fl. 1, 264. II. Trop. A. In gen., to entangle, implicate, involve, envelop, engage: “di immortales vim suam ... tum terrae cavernis includunt, tum hominum naturis implicant,” Cic. Div. 1, 36, 79: “contrahendis negotiis implicari,” id. Off. 2, 11, 40: “alienis (rebus) nimis implicari molestum esse,” id. Lael. 13, 45: “implicari aliquo certo genere cursuque vivendi,” id. Off. 1, 32, 117: “implicari negotio,” id. Leg. 1, 3: “ipse te impedies, ipse tua defensione implicabere,” Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 18, § 44; cf.: multis implicari erroribus, id. Tusc. 4, 27, 58: “bello,” Verg. A. 11, 109: “eum primo incertis implicantes responsis,” Liv. 27, 43, 3: “nisi forte implacabiles irae vestrae implicaverint animos vestros,” perplexed, confounded, id. 40, 46, 6: “paucitas in partitione servatur, si genera ipsa rerum ponuntur, neque permixte cum partibus implicantur,” are mingled, mixed up, Cic. Inv. 1, 22, 32: ut omnibus copiis conductis te implicet, ne ad me iter tibi expeditum sit, Pompei. ap. Cic. Att. 8, 12, D, 1: “tanti errores implicant temporum, ut nec qui consules nec quid quoque anno actum sit digerere possis,” Liv. 2, 21, 4.—In part. perf.: “dum rei publicae quaedam procuratio multis officiis implicaturum et constrictum tenebat,” Cic. Ac. 1, 3, 11: “Deus nullis occupationibus est implicatus,” id. N. D. 1, 19, 51; cf.: “implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis,” id. ib. 1, 20, 52: “animos dederit suis angoribus et molestiis implicatos,” id. Tusc. 5, 1, 3: “Agrippina morbo corporis implicatura,” Tac. A. 4, 53: “inconstantia tua cum levitate, tum etiam perjurio implicatura,” Cic. Vatin. 1, 3; cf. id. Phil. 2, 32, 81: “intervalla, quibus implicatura atque permixta oratio est,” id. Or. 56, 187: “(voluptas) penitus in omni sensu implicatura insidet,” id. Leg. 1, 17, 47: “quae quatuor inter se colligata atque implicatura,” id. Off. 1, 5, 15: “natura non tam propensus ad misericordiam quam implicatus ad severitatem videbatur,” id. Rosc. Am. 30, 85; “and in the form implicitus, esp. with morbo (in morbum): quies necessaria morbo implicitum exercitum tenuit,” Liv. 3, 2, 1; 7, 23, 2; 23, 40, 1: “ubi se quisque videbat Implicitum morbo,” Lucr. 6, 1232: “graviore morbo implicitus,” Caes. B. C. 3, 18, 1; cf.: “implicitus in morbum,” Nep. Ages. 8, 6; Liv. 23, 34, 11: “implicitus suspicionibus,” Plin. Ep. 3, 9, 19; cf.: “implicitus terrore,” Luc. 3, 432: “litibus implicitus,” Hor. A. P. 424: “implicitam sinu abstulit,” Ov. A. A. 1, 562: “(vinum) jam sanos implicitos facit,” Cael. Aur. Acut. 3, 8, 87.— B. In partic., to attach closely, connect intimately, to unite, join; in pass., to be intimately connected, associated, or related: “(homo) profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde mortalium omnium societate,” Cic. Fin. 2, 14, 45: “omnes qui nostris familiaritatibus implicantur,” id. Balb. 27, 60: “(L. Gellius) ita diu vixit, ut multarum aetatum oratoribus implicaretur,” id. Brut. 47, 174: “quibus applicari expediet, non implicari,” Sen. Ep. 105, 5.— In part. perf.: “aliquos habere implicatos consuetudine et benevolentia,” Cic. Fam. 6, 12, 2: “implicatus amicitiis,” id. Att. 1, 19, 8: “familiaritate,” id. Pis. 29, 70: “implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis,” id. Lael. 22, 85. —Hence, 1. implĭcātus (inpl- ), a, uma., entangled, perplexed, confused, intricate: “nec in Torquati sermone quicquam implicaturum aut tortuosum fuit,” Cic. Fin. 3, 1, 3: “reliquae (partes orationis) sunt magnae, implicaturae, variae, graves, etc.,” id. de Or. 3, 14, 52: vox rauca et implicatura, Sen. Apocol. med. — Comp.: “implicatior ad loquendum,” Amm. 26, 6, 18. — Sup.: “obscurissima et implicatissima quaestio,” Gell. 6, 2, 15: “ista tortuosissima et implicatissima nodositas,” Aug. Conf. 2, 10 init.— 2. im-plĭcĭtē (inpl- ), adv., intricately (rare): “non implicite et abscondite, sed patentius et expeditius,” Cic. Inv. 2, 23, 69. -- “Implicare” adds to these usages the idea of an unforeseen difficulty, i. e. a hint of “impedire,” and even of deceit, i. e. a hint of “fallere.” Why imply what you can exply? Cf. subreptitious. subreption (n.)"act of obtaining a favor by fraudulent suppression of facts," c. 1600, from Latin subreptionem (nominative subreptio), noun of action from past-participle stem of subripere, surripere (see surreptitious). Related: Subreptitious. surreptitious (adj.)mid-15c., from Latin surrepticius "stolen, furtive, clandestine," from surreptus, past participle of surripere "seize secretly, take away, steal, plagiarize," from assimilated form of sub "from under" (hence, "secretly;" see sub-) + rapere "to snatch" (see rapid). Related: Surreptitiously. The source of the philosophers’s usage of ‘implicare’ is a passage from Aristotle’s “De Int.” on the contrariety of proposition A and E (14.23b25–27), in which “implicita” (that sould be ‘com-plicita,’ and ‘the emissor complicates that p”) renders Gk. “sum-pepleg-menê,” “συμ-πεπλεγμένη,” f. “sum-plek-ein,” “συμ-πλέϰein,” “to bind together,” as in ‘com-plicatio,’ complication, and Sidonius’s ‘complicature,’ and Grice’s ‘complicature,’ as in ‘temperature,’ from ‘temperare.’ “One problem with P. F. Strawson’s exegesis of J. L. Austin is the complicature is brings.” This is from the same family or field as “sum-plokê,” “συμ-πλοϰή,” which Plato (Pol. 278b; Soph. 262c) uses for the ‘second articulation,’ the “com-bination” of sounds (phone) that make up a word (logos), and, more philosophically interesting, for ‘praedicatio,’ viz., the interrelation within a ‘logos’ or ‘oratio’ of a noun, or onoma or nomen, as in “the dog,” and a verb, or rhema, or verbum, -- as in ‘shaggisising’ -- that makes up a propositional complex, as “The dog is shaggy,” or “The dog shaggisises.” (H. P. Grice, “Verbing from adjectiving.”). In De Int. 23b25-27, referring to the contrariety of A and O, Aristotle, “let’s grant it”as Grice puts it“is hardly clear.” Aristotle writes: “hê de tou hoti kakon to agathon SUM-PEPLEG-MENÊ estin.” “Kai gar hoti ouk agathon anagkê isôs hupolambanein ton auton.”“ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὅτι ϰαϰὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμπεπλεγμένη ἐστίν.”“ϰαὶ γὰϱ ὅτι οὐϰ ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγϰη ἴσως ὑπολαμϐάνειν τὸν αὐτόν.” Back in Rome, Boethius thought of bring some gravitas to this. “Illa vero quae est,” Boethius goes,” Quoniam malum est quod est bonum, IMPLICATURA est. Et enim: “Quoniam non bonum est.” necesse est idem ipsum opinari (repr. in Aristoteles latinus, 2.1–2.4–6. In a later vulgar Romance, we have J. Tricot). “Quant au jugement, “Le bon est mal” ce n’est en réalité qu’une COMBINAISON de jugements, cars sans doute est-il nécessaire de sous-entendre en même temps “le bon n’est pas le bon.” Cf. Mill on ‘sous-entendu’ of conversation. This was discussed by H. P. Grice in a tutorial with Reading-born English philosopher J. L. Ackrill at St. John’s.  With the help of H. P. Grice, J. L. Ackrill tries to render Boethius into the vernacular (just to please Austin) as follows. “Hê de tou hoti kakon to agathon SUM-PEPLEG-MENÊ estin, kai gar hoti OUK agathon ANAGKê isôs hupo-lambanein ton auton” “Illa vero quae est, ‘Quoniam malum est quod est bonum,’ IMPLICATURA est, et enim, ‘Quoniam non bonum est,’ necesse est idem ipsum OPINARI. In the vernacular: “The belief expressed by the proposition, ‘The good is bad,’ is COM-PLICATED or com-plex, for the same person MUST, perhaps, suppose also the proposition, ‘The good it is not good.’” Aristotle goes on, “For what kind of utterance is “The good is not good,” or as they say in Sparta, “The good is no good”? Surely otiose. “The good” is a Platonic ideal, a universal, separate from this or that good thing. So surely, ‘the good,’ qua idea ain’t good in the sense that playing cricket is good. But playing cricket is NOT “THE” good: philosophising is.” H. P. Grice found Boethius’s commentary “perfectly elucidatory,” but Ackrill was perplexed, and Grice intended Ackrill’s perplexity to go ‘unnoticed’ (“He is trying to communicate his perplexity, but I keep ignoring it.” For Ackrill was surreptitiously trying to ‘correct’ his tutor. Aristotle, Acrkill thought, is wishing to define the ‘contrariety’ between two statements or opinions, or not to use a metalanguage second order, that what is expressed by ‘The good is bad’ is a contrarium of what is expressed by ‘The good is no good.’” Aristotle starts, surely, from a principle. The principle states that a maximally false proposition, set in opposition to a maximally true proposition (such as “The good is good”), deserves the name “contraria”and ‘contrarium’ to what is expressed by it. In a second phase, Aristotle then tries to demonstrate, in a succession of this or that stage, that ‘The good is good’ understood as a propositio universalis dedicativafor all x, if x is (the) good, x is good (To agathon agathon estin,’ “Bonum est bonum”) is a maximally true proposition.” And the reason for this is that “To agathon agathon estin,” or “Bonum bonum est,” applies to the essence (essentia) of “good,” and ‘predicates’ “the same of the same,” tautologically. Now consider Aristotle’s other proposition “The good is the not-bad,” the correlative E form, For all x, if x is good, x is not bad. This does not do. This is not a maximally true proposition. Unlike “The good is good,” The good is not bad” does not apply to the essence of ‘the good,’ and it does not predicate ‘the same of the same’ tautologically. Rather, ‘The good is not bad,’ unless you bring one of those ‘meaning postulates’ that Grice rightly defends against Quine in “In defense of a dogma,”in this case, (x)(Bx iff ~Gx)we stipulate something ‘bad’ if it ain’t good -- is only true notably NOT by virtue of a necessary logical implication, but, to echo my tutor, by implicaturum, viz. by accident, and not by essence (or essential) involved in the ‘sense’ of either ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ or ‘not’ for that matter. Surely Aristotle equivocates slightly when he convinced Grice that an allegedly maximally false proposition (‘the good is bad’) entails or yields the negation of the same attribute, viz., ‘The good is not good,’ or more correctly, ‘It is not the case that the good is good,’ for this is axiomatically contradictory, or tautologically and necessarily false without appeal to any meaning postulate. For any predicate, Fx and ~Fx. The question then is one of knowing whether ‘The good is bad’ deserves to be called the contrary proposition (propositio contraria) of ‘The good is good.’ Aristotle notes that the proposition, ‘The good is bad,’ “To agathon kakon estin,” “Bonum malum est,” is NOT the maximally false proposition opposed to the maximally true, tautological, and empty, proposition, “The good is good,” ‘To agathon agathon estin,’ “Bonum bonum est.” “Indeed, “the good is bad” is sumpeplegmenê, or COMPLICATA. What the emissor means is a complicatum, or as Grice preferred, a ‘complicature. Grice’s complicature (roughly rendered as ‘complification’) condenses all of the moments of the transition from the simple idea of a container (cum-tainer) to the “modern” ideas of implication, Grice’s implicaturum, and prae-suppositio. The ‘propositio complicate,’ is, as Boethius puts it, duplex, or equivocal. The proposition  has a double meaningone explicit, the other implicit. “A ‘propositio complicata’ contains within itself [“continet in se, intra se”]: bonum non est.” Boethius then goes rightly to conclude (or infer), or stipulate, that only a “simplex” proposition, not a propositio complicata, involving some ‘relative clause,’ can be said to be contrary to another -- Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri hermêneais, 219. Boethius’s exegesis thesis is faithful to Aristotle. For Aristotle, nothing like “the good is not bad,” but only the tautologically false “the good is not good,” or it is not the case that the good is good, (to agathon agathon esti, bonum bonum est), a propositio simplex, and not a propositio complicate, is the opposite (oppositum, -- as per the ‘figura quadrata’ of ‘oppoista’ -- of “the good is good,” another propositio simplex. Boethius’s analysis of “the good is bad,” a proposition that Boethius calls ‘propositio complicate or ‘propositio implicita’ are manifestly NOT the same as Aristotle’s. For Aristotle, the “doxa hoti kakon to agathon [δόξα ὅτι ϰαϰὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν],” the opinion according to which the good is bad, is only ‘contrary’ to “the good is good” to the extent that it “con-tains” (in Boethius’s jargon) the tautologically false ‘The good is not good.’ For Boethius, ‘The good is bad’ is contrary to ‘the good is good’ is to the extent that ‘the good is bad’ contains, implicitly, the belief which Boethius expresses as ‘Bonum NON est —“ cf. Grice on ‘love that never told can be”Featuring “it is not the case that,” the proposition ‘bonum non est’ is a remarkably complicated expression in Latin, a proposition complicata indeed. ‘Bonum non est’ can mean, in the vernacular, “the good is not.” “Bonum non est” can only be rendered as “there is nothing good.’ “Bonum non est’ may also be rendered, when expanded with a repeated property, the tautologically false ‘The good is not good” (Bonum non bonum est). Strangely, Abelard goes in the same direction as Aristotle, contra Boethius. “The good is bad” (Bonum malum est)  is “implicit” (propositio implicita or complicate) with respect to the tautologically false ‘Bonum bonum non est’ “the good is not good.”Abelardus, having read Gricevide Strawson, “The influence of Grice on Abelardus” -- explains clearly the meaning of “propositio implicita”: “IMPLYING implicitly ‘bonum non bonum est,’ ‘the good is not good’ within itself, and in a certain wa containing it [“IM-PLICANS eam in se, et quodammodo continens.” Glossa super Periermeneias, 99–100. But Abelard expands on Aristotle. “Whoever thinks ‘bonum malum est,’ ‘the good is bad’ also thinks ‘bonum non bonum est,’ ‘the good is not good,’ whereas the reverse does not hold true, i. e. it is not the case that whoever thinks the tautologically false ‘the good is not good’ (“bonum bonum non est”) also think ‘the good is bad’ (‘bonum malum est’). He may refuse to even ‘pronounce’ ‘malum’ (‘malum malum est’) -- “sed non convertitur.” Abelard’s explanation is decisive for the natural history of Grice’s implication. One can certainly express in terms of “implication” what Abelard expresses when he notes the non-reciprocity or non-convertibility of the two propositions. ‘The good is bad,’ or ‘Bonum malum est’ implies or presupposes the tautologically true “the good is not good;’It is not the case that the tautologically false “the good is not good” (‘Bonum bonum non est’) implies ridiculous “the good is bad.” Followers of Aristotle inherit these difficulties.  Boethius and Abelard bequeath to posterity an interpretation of the passage in Aristotle’s “De Interpretatione” according to which “bonum malum est” “the good is bad” can only be considered the ‘propositio opposita’ of the tautologically true ‘bonum bonum est’ (“the good is good”) insofar as, a ‘propositio implicita’ or ‘relativa’ or ‘complicata,’ it contains the ‘propositio contradictoria, viz. ‘the good is not good,’ the tautologically false ‘Bonum non bonum est,’ of the tautologically true ‘Bonum bonum est’ “the good is good.” It is this meaning of “to contain a contradiction” that, in a still rather obscure way, takes up this analysis by specifying a usage of “impliquer.” The first attested use in French of the verb “impliquer” is in 1377 in Oresme, in the syntagm “impliquer contradiction” (RT: DHLF, 1793). These same texts give rise to another analysis. A propositio implicita or pregnant, or complicate, is a proposition that “implies,” that is, that in fact contains two propositions, one principalis, and the other relative, each a ‘propositio explicita,’ and that are equivalent or equipollent to the ‘propositio complicata’ when paraphrased. Consider. “Homo qui est albus est animal quod currit,” “A man who is white is an animal who runs.” This ‘propositio complicate contains the the propositio implicita, “homo est albus” (“a man is white”) and the propositio implicita, “animal currit” (“an animal  runs.”). Only by “exposing” or “resolving” (via ex-positio, or via re-solutio) such an ‘propositio complicata’ can one assign it a truth-value. “Omnis proposition implicita habet duas propositiones explicitas.” “A proposition implicita “P-im” has (at least) a proposition implicita P-im-1 and a different proposition implicita P-im-2.” “Verbi gratia.” “Socrates est id quod est homo.” “Haec propositio IMplicita aequivalet huic copulativae constanti ex duis propositionis explicitis. Socrates est aliquid est illud est homo. Haec proposition est vera, quare et propositio implicita vera. Every “implicit proposition” has two explicit propositions.” “Socrates is something (aliquid) which is a man.” This implicit proposition, “Socrates is something shich is a man,” is equivalent or equipoent to the following conjunctive proposition made up of two now EXplicit propositions, to wit, “Socrates is something,” and “That something is a man.” This latter conjunctive proposition of the two explicit propositions is true. Therefore, the “implicit” proposition is also true” (Tractatus implicitarum, in GiusbertiMateriale per studum, 43). The two “contained” propositions are usually relative propositions. Each is called an ‘implicatio.’ ‘Implicatio’ (rather than ‘implicitio’) becomes shorthand for “PROPOSITIO implicita.” An ‘implicatio’ becomes one type of  ‘propositio exponibilis,’ i. e. a proposition that is to be “exposed” or paraphrased for its form or structure to be understood.  In the treatises of Terminist logic, one chapter is by custom devoted to the phenomenon of “restrictio,” viz. a restriction in the denotation or the suppositio of the noun (v. SUPPOSITION). A relative expression (an implication), along with others, has a restrictive function (viz., “officium implicandi”), just like a sub-propositional expression like an adjective or a participle. Consider.  “A man, Grice, who argues, runs to the second base.”  “Man,” because of the relative expression or clause “who runs,” is restricted to denoting the present time (it is not Grice, who argues NOW but ran YESTERDAY). Moreover there is an equivalence or equipolence between the relative expression “qui currit” and the present participle “currens.” Running Grice argues. Grice who runs argues. Summe metenses, Logica modernorum, 2.1:464. In the case in which a relative expression is restrictive, its function is to “leave something that is constant,” “aliquid pro constanti relinquere,” viz., to produce a pre-assertion that conditions the truth of the main super-ordinate assertion without being its primary object or topic or signification or intentio. “Implicare est pro constanti et involute aliquid significare.” “Ut cum dicitur homo qui est albus currit.”  “Pro constanti” dico, quia praeter hoc quod assertitur ibi cursus de homine, aliquid datur intelligi, scilicet hominem album; “involute” dico quia praeter hoc quod ibi proprie et principaliter significatur hominem currere, aliquid intus intelligitur, scilicet hominem esse album. Per hoc patet quod implicare est intus plicare. Id enim quod intus “plicamus” sive “ponimus,” pro constanti relinquimus. Unde implicare nil aliud est quam subiectum sub aliqua dispositione pro constanti relinquere et de illo sic disposito aliquid affirmare. Ackrill translates to Grice: “To imply” is to signify something by stating it as constant, and in a pretty ‘hidden’ manner“involute.” When I state that the man <who is white> runs, I state, stating it as constant, because, beyond (“praeter”) the main supra-ordinate assertion or proposition that predicates the running of the man, my addressee is given to understand something else (“aliquid intus intelligitur”), viz. that the man is white; This is communicated in a hidden manner (“involute”) because, beyond (“praeter”) what is communicated (“significatur”) primarily, principally (“principaliter”) properly (“proprie”), literally, and explicitly, viz. that the man is running, we are given to understand something else (“aliquid intus intelligutur”) within (“intus”), viz.  that the man is white.  It follows from this that implicare is nothing other than what the form of the expression literally conveys, intus plicare (“folded within”).  What we fold or state within, we leave as a constant.  It follows from this that “to imply” is nothing other than leaving something as a constant in the subject (‘subjectum’), such that the subject (subjectum, ‘homo qui est albus”) is under a certain disposition, and that it is only under this disposition that something about the subjectum is affirmed” -- De implicationibus, Nota, 100) For the record: while Giusberti (“Materiale per studio,” 31) always reads “pro constanti,” the MSS occasionally has the pretty Griciean “precontenti.” This is a case of what the “Logique du Port-Royal” describes as an “in-cidental” assertion. The situation is even more complex, however, insofar as this operation only relates to one usage of a relative proposition, viz. when the proposition is restrictive. A restriction can sometimes be blocked, or cancelled, and the reinscriptions are then different for a  nonrestrictive and a restrictive relative proposition. One such case of a blockage is that of “false implication” (Johnson’s ‘paradox of ‘implicatio’) as in “a [or the] man who is a donkey runs,” (but cf. the centaur, the man who is a horse, runs) where there is a conflict (“repugnantia”) between what the determinate term itself denotes (homo, man) and the determination (ansinus, donkey). The truth-values of a proposition containing a relative clause or propositio thus varies according to whether it is restrictive, and of composite meaning, as in “homo, qui est albus, currit” (A man, who is white, runs), or non-restrictive, and of divided meaning, as in “Homo currit qui est albus” (Rendered in the vernacular in the same way, the Germanic languages not having the syntactic freedom the classical languages do: A man, who is white, is running. When the relative is restrictive, as in “Homo, qui est albus, curris”, the propositio implicits only produces one single assertion, since the relative corresponds to a pre-assertion. Thus, it is the equivalent, at the level of the underlying form, to a proposition conditionalis or hypothetical. Only in the second case can there be a “resolution” of the proposition implicita into the pair of this and that ‘propositio explicita, to wit, “homo currit,”  “homo est albus.”—and an equipolence between the complex proposition implicita and the conjunction of the first proposition explicita and the second proposition explicitta. Homo currit et ille est albus. So it is only in this second case of proposition irrestrictiva  that one can say that “Homo currit, qui est albus implies “Homo currit,” and “Homo est albus” and therefore, “Homo qui est albus currit.” The poor grave Romans are having trouble with Grecisms. The Grecist vocabulary of implication is both disparate and systematic, in a Griceian oxymoronic way. The grave Latin “implicare” covers and translates an extremely varied Grecian field of expressions ready to be botanized, that bears the mark of heterogeneous rather than systematic operations, whether one is dealing Aristotle or the Stoics. The passage through grave Roman allows us to understand retrospectively the connection in Aristotle’s jargon between the “implicatio” of the “propositio implicita,” sum-pepleg-menê, as an interweaving or interlacing, and conclusive or con-sequential implicatio, sumperasma, “συμπέϱασμα,” or “sumpeperasmenon,” “συμπεπεϱασμένον,” “sumpeperasmenê,” “συμπεπεϱασμένη,” f. perainein, “πεϱαίνein, “to limit,” which is the jargon Aristotle uses in the Organon to denote the conclusion of a syllogism (Pr. Anal. 1.15.34a21–24). If one designates as A the premise, tas protaseis, “τὰς πϱοτάσεις,” and as B the con-clusion, “to sumperasma,” συμπέϱασμα.” Cf. the Germanic puns with ‘closure,’ etc.  When translating Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism at Prior Analytics 1.1.24b18–21, Tricot chooses to render as the “con-sequence” Aristotle’s verb “sum-bainei,” “συμ-ϐαίνει,” that which “goes with” the premise and results from it. A syllogism is a discourse, “logos,” “λόγος,” in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated necessarily results simply from the fact of what is stated. Simply from the fact of what is stated, I mean that it is because of this that the consequence is obtained, “legô de tôi tauta einai to dia tauta sumbainei,” “λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμϐαίνει.” (Pr. Anal. 1.1, 24b18–21). To make the connection with “implication,” though, we also have to take into account, as is most often the case, the Stoics’ own jargon. What the Stoics call “sumpeplegmenon,” “συμπεπλεγμένον,” is a “conjunctive” proposition; e. g. “It is daytime, and it is light” (it is true both that A and that B). The conjunctive is a type of molecular proposition, along with the “conditional” (sunêmmenon [συνημμένον] -- “If it is daytime, it is light”) and the “subconditional” (para-sunêmmenon [παϱασυνημμένον]; “SINCE it is daytime, it is light”), and the “disjunctive” (diezeugmenon [διεζευγμένον] --  “It is daytime, or it is night.” Diog. Laert. 7.71–72; cf. RT: Long and Sedley, A35, 2:209 and 1:208). One can see that there is no ‘implicatio’ in the conjunctive, whereas there is one in the ‘sunêmmenon’ (“if p, q”), which constitutes the Stoic expression par excellence, as distinct from the Aristotelian categoric syllogism.Indeed, it is around the propositio conditionalis that the question and the vocabulary of ‘implicatio’ re-opens. The Aristotelian sumbainein [συμϐαίνειν], which denotes the accidental nature of a result, however clearly it has been demonstrated (and we should not forget that sumbebêkos [συμϐεϐηϰός] denotes accident; see SUBJECT, I), is replaced by “akolouthein” [ἀϰολουθεῖν] (from the copulative a- and keleuthos [ϰέλευθος], “path” [RT: Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, s.v. ἀϰόλουθος]), which denotes instead being accompanied by a consequent conformity. This connector, i. e. the “if” (ei, si) indicates that the second proposition, the con-sequens (“it is light”) follows (akolouthei [ἀϰολουθεῖ]) from the first (“it is daytime”) (Diog. Laert, 7.71). Attempts, beginning with Philo or Diodorus Cronus up to Grice and Strawson to determine the criteria of a “valid” conditional (to hugies sunêmmenon [τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον] offer, among other possibilities, the notion of emphasis [ἔμφασις], which Long and Sedley translate as “G. E. Moore’s entailment” and Brunschwig and Pellegrin as “implication” (Sextus Empiricus, The Skeptic Way, in RT: Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 35B, 2:211 and 1:209), a term that is normally used to refer to a reflected image and to the force, including rhetorical force, of an impression. Elsewhere, this “emphasis” is explained in terms of dunamis [δύναμις], of “virtual” content (“When we have the premise which results in a certain conclusion, we also have this conclusion virtually [dunamei (δυνάμει)] in the premise, even if it is not explicitly indicated [kan kat’ ekphoran mê legetai (ϰἂν ϰατ̕ ἐϰφοϱὰν μὴ λέγεται)], Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians 8.229ff., D. L. Blank, 49 = RT: Long and Sedley, G36 (4), 2:219 and 1:209)—where connecting the different usages of “implication” creates new problems. One has to understand that the type of implicatio represented by the proposition conditionalis implies, in the double usage of “contains implicitly” and “has as its consequence,” the entire Stoic system. It is a matter of to akolouthon en zôêi [τὸ ἀϰόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ], “consequentiality in life,” or ‘rational life, as Grice prefers, as Long and Sedley translate it (Stobeus 2.85.13 = RT: Long and Sedley, 59B, 2:356; Cicero prefers “congruere,” (congruential) De finibus 3.17 = RT: Long and Sedley, 59D, 2:356). It is akolouthia [ἀϰολουθία] that refers to the conduct con-sequent upon itself that is the conduct of the wise man, the chain of causes defining will or fate, and finally the relationship that joins the antecedent to the con-sequent in a true proposition. Goldschmidt, having cited Bréhier (Le système stoïcien), puts the emphasis on antakolouthia [ἀνταϰολουθία], a Stoic neologism that may be translated as “reciprocal” implicatio,” and that refers specifically to the solidarity of virtues (antakolouthia tôn aretôn [ἀνταϰολουθία τῶν ἀϱετῶν], Diog. Laert. 7.125; Goldschmidt, as a group that would be encompassed by dialectical virtue, immobilizing akolouthia in the absolute present of the wise man. “Implicatio” is, in the final analysis, from then on, the most literal name of the Stoic system. Refs.: Aristotle.  Anal. Pr.. ed. H. Tredennick,  in Organon, Harvard; Goldschmidt, Le système stoïcien et l’idée de temps. Paris: Vrin, Sextus Empiricus. Against the Grammarians, ed. D. L. Blank. Oxford: Oxford. END OF INTERLUDE. Now for “Implication”/“Implicaturum.” Implicatura was used by Sidonius in a letter (that Grice found funny) and used by Grice in seminars on conversational helpfulness at Oxford. Grice sets out the basis of a systematic approach to communication, viz, concerning the relation between a proposition p and a proposition q in a conversational context. The need is felt by Sidonius and Grice for ‘implicaturum,’ tdistinct from “implication,” insofar as “implication” is used for a relation between a proposition p and a proposition q, whereas an “implicaturum” is a relation between this or that statement, within a given context, that results from an EMISSOR having utterered an utterance (thereby explicitly conveying that p) and thereby implicitly conveying and implicating that q. Grice thought the distinction was ‘frequently ignored by Austin,’ and Grice thought it solved a few problems, initially in G. A. Paul’s neo-Wttigensteinian objections to Price’s causal theory of perception (“The pillar box seems red to me; which does not surprise me, seeing that it is red”).  An “implication” is a relation bearing on the truth or falsity of this or that proposition (e. g. “The pillar box seems red” and, say, “The pillar box MAY NOT be red”) whereas an “implicaturum” brings an extra meaning to this or that statement it governs (By uttering “The pillar box seems red” thereby explicitly conveying that the pillar box seems red, the emissor implicates in a cancellable way that the pillar box MAY NOT be red.”). Whenever “implicaturum” is determined according to its context (as at Collections, “Strawson has beautiful handwriting; a mark of his character. And he learned quite a bit in spite of the not precisely angelic temperament of his tutor Mabbott”) it enters the field of pragmatics, and therefore has to be distinguished from a presupposition. Implicatio simpliciter is a relation between two propositions, one of which is the consequence of the other (Quine’s example: “My father is a bachelor; therefore, he is male”). An equivalent of “implication” is “entailment,” as used by Moore. Now, Moore was being witty. ‘Entail’ is derived from “tail” (Fr. taille; ME entaill or entailen = en + tail), and prior to its logical use, the meaning of “entailment” is “restriction,” “tail” having the sense of “limitation.” As Moore explains in his lecture: “An entailment is a limitation on the transfer or handing down of a property or an inheritance. *My* use of ‘entailment’ has two features in common with the Legalese that Father used to use; to wit: the handing down of a property; and; the limitation on one of the poles of this transfer. As I stipulate we should use “entailment” (at Cambridge, but also at Oxford), a PROPERTY is transferred from the antecedent to the con-sequent. And also, normally in semantics, some LIMITATION (or restriction, or ‘stricting,’ or ‘relevancing’) on the antecedent is stressed.” The mutation from the legalese to Moore’s usage explicitly occurs by analogy on the basis of these two shared common elements. Now, Whitehead had made a distinction between a material (involving a truth-value) implication and formal (empty) implication. A material implication (“if,” symbolized by the horseshoe “⊃,” because “it resembles an arrow,” Whitehead said“Some arrow!” was Russell’s response) is a Philonian implication as defined semantically in terms of a truth-table by Philo of Megara. “If p, q” is false only when the antecedent is true and the con-sequent false. In terms of a formalization of communication, this has the flaw of bringing with it a counter-intuitive feeling of ‘baffleness’ (cf. “The pillar box seems red, because it is”), since a false proposition implies materially any proposition: If the moon is made of green cheese, 2 + 2 = 4. This “ex falso quodlibet sequitur” has a pedigreed history. For the Stoics and the Megarian philosophers, “ex falso quodlibet sequitur” is what distinguishes Philonian implication and Diodorean implication. It traverses the theory of consequence and is ONE of the paradoxes of material implication that is perfectly summed up in these two rules of Buridan: First, if P is false, Q follows from P; Second, if P is true, P follows from Q (Bochenski, History of Formal Logic). A formal (empty) implication (see Russell, Principles of Mathematics, 36–41) is a universal conditional implication: Ɐx (Ax ⊃ Bx), for any x, if Ax, then Bx. Different means of resolving the paradoxes of implication have been proposed. All failed except Grice’s. An American, C. I. Lewis’s “strict” implication (Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic) is defined as an implication that is ‘reinforced’ such that it is impossible for the antecedent to be true and the con-sequent false. Unfortunately, as Grice tells Lewis in a correspondence, “your strict implication, I regret to prove, has the same alleged flaw as the ‘material’ implication that your strict implication was meant to improve on. (an impossible—viz., necessarily false—proposition strictly implies any proposition). The relation of entailment introduced by Moore in 1923 is a relation that seems to avoid this or that paradox (but cf. Grice, “Paradoxes of entailment, followed by paradoxes of implicationall conversationally resolved”) by requiring a derivation of the antecedent from the con-sequent. In this case, “If 2 + 2 = 5, 2 + 3 = 5” is false, since the con-sequent is stipulated not be derivable from the antecedent. Occasionally, one has to call upon the pair “entailment”/“implication” in order to distinguish between an implication in qua material implication and an implication in Moore’s usage (metalinguisticthe associated material implication is a theorem), which is also sometimes called “relevant” if not strictc implication (Anderson and Belnap, Entailment), to ensure that the entire network of expressions is covered. Along with this first series of expressions in which “entailment” and “implication” alternate with one another, there is a second series of expressions that contrasts two kinds of “implicaturum,” or ‘implicatura.’ “Implicaturum” (Fr. implicaturum, G. Implikatur) is formed from “implicatio” and the suffix –ture, which expresses, as Grice knew since his Clifton days, a ‘resultant aspect,’ ‘aspectum resultativus’ (as in “signature”; cf. L. temperatura, from temperare).  “Implicatio” may be thought as derived from “to imply” (if not ‘employ’) and “implicaturum” may be thought as deriving from “imply”’s doulet, “to implicate” (from L. “in-“ + “plicare,” from plex; cf. the IE. plek), which has the same meaning. Some mistakenly see Grice’s “implicaturum” as an extension and modification of the concept of presupposition, which differs from ‘material’ implication in that the negation of the antecedent implies the consequent (the question “Have you stopped beating your wife?” presupposes the existence of a wife in both cases). An implicaturum escapes the paradoxes of material implication from the outset. In fact, Grice, the ever Oxonian, distinguishes “at least” two kinds of implicaturum, conventional and non-conventional, the latter sub-divided into non-conventional non-converastional, and non-conventional conversational. A non-conventional non-conversational implicaturum may occur in a one-off predicament. A Conventional implicaturum and a conventional implicaturum is practically equivalent, Strawson wrongly thought, to presupposition prae-suppositum, since it refers to the presuppositions attached by linguistic convention to a lexical item or expression.  E. g. “Mary EVEN loves Peter” has a relation of conventional implicaturum to “Mary loves other entities than Peter.” This is equivalent to: “ ‘Mary EVEN loves Peter’ presupposes ‘Mary loves other entities than Peter.’ With this kind of implicaturum, we remain within the expression, and thus the semantic, field. A conventional implicaturum, however, is surely different from a material implicatio. It does not concern the truth-values. With conversational implicaturum, we are no longer dependent on this or that emissum, but move into pragmatics (the area that covers the relation between statements and contexts. Grice gives the following example: If, in answer to A’s question about how C is getting on in his new job at a bank, B utters, “Well, he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to in prison yet,” what B implicates by the proposition that it is not the case that C has been to prison yet depends on the context. It compatible with two very different contexts: one in which C, naïve as he is, is expected to be entrapped by unscrupulous colleagues in some shady deal, or, more likely, C is well-known by A and B to tend towards dishonesty (hence the initial question). References: Abelard, Peter. Dialectica. Edited by L. M. De Rijk. Assen, Neth.: Van Gorcum, 1956. 2nd rev. ed., 1970. Glossae super Periermeneias. Edited by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello. In TwelfthCentury Logic: Texts and Studies,  2, Abelaerdiana inedita. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958. Anderson, Allan Ross, and Nuel Belnap. Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity.  1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. Aristotle. De interpretatione. English translation by J. L. Ackrill: Aristotle’s Categories and De interpretatione. Notes by J. L. Ackrill. Oxford: Clarendon, 1963. French translation by J. Tricot: Organon. Paris: Vrin, 1966. Auroux, Sylvain, and Irène Rosier. “Les sources historiques de la conception des deux types de relatives.” Langages 88 (1987): 9–29. Bochenski, Joseph M. A History of Formal Logic. Translated by Ivo Thomas. New York: Chelsea, 1961. Boethius. Aristoteles latinus. Edited by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello. Paris: Descleé de Brouwer, 1965. Translation by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello: The Latin Aristotle. Toronto: Hakkert, 1972. Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri hermêneias. Edited by K. Meiser. Leipzig: Teubner, 1877. 2nd ed., 1880. De Rijk, Lambertus Marie. Logica modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic. 2 vols. Assen, Neth.: Van Gorcum, 1962–67.  “Some Notes on the Mediaeval Tract De insolubilibus, with the Edition of a Tract Dating from the End of the Twelfth-Century.” Vivarium 4 (1966): 100–103. Giusberti, Franco. Materials for a Study on Twelfth-Century Scholasticism. Naples, It.: Bibliopolis, 1982. Grice, H. P. “Logic and Conversation.” In Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, edited by P. Cole and J. Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press, 1975. (Also in The Logic of Grammar, edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman, 64–74. Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975.) Lewis, Clarence Irving, and Cooper Harold Langford. Symbolic Logic. New York: New York Century, 1932. Meggle, Georg. Grundbegriffe der Kommunikation. 2nd ed. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997. Meggle, Georg, and Christian Plunze, eds. Saying, Meaning, Implicating. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2003. Moore, G. E.. Philosophical Studies. London: Kegan Paul, 1923. Rosier, I. “Relatifs et relatives dans les traits terministes des XIIe et XIIIe siècles: (2) Propositions relatives (implicationes), distinction entre restrictives et non restrictives.” Vivarium 24: 1 (1986): 1–21. Russell, Bertrand. The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903. implication, a relation that holds between two statements when the truth of the first ensures the truth of the second. A number of statements together imply Q if their joint truth ensures the truth of Q. An argument is deductively valid exactly when its premises imply its conclusion. Expressions of the following forms are often interchanged one for the other: ‘P implies Q’, ‘Q follows from P’, and ‘P entails Q’. (‘Entailment’ also has a more restricted meaning.) In ordinary discourse, ‘implication’ has wider meanings that are important for understanding reasoning and communication of all kinds. The sentence ‘Last Tuesday, the editor remained sober throughout lunch’ does not imply that the editor is not always sober. But one who asserted the sentence typically would imply this. The theory of conversational implicaturum explains how speakers often imply more than their sentences imply. The term ‘implication’ also applies to conditional statements. A material implication of the form ‘if P, then Q’ (often symbolized ‘P P Q’ or ‘P / Q’) is true so long as either the if-clause P is false or the main clause Q is true; it is false only if P is true and Q is false. A strict implication of the form ‘if P, then Q’ (often symbolized ‘P Q’) is true exactly when the corresponding material implication is necessarily true; i.e., when it is impossible for P to be true when Q is false. The following valid forms of argument are called paradoxes of material implication: Q. Therefore, P / Q. Not-P. Therefore, P / Q. The appearance of paradox here is due to using ‘implication’ as a name both for a relation between statements and for statements of conditional form. A conditional statement can be true even though there is no relation between its components. Consider the following valid inference: Butter floats in milk. Therefore, fish sleep at night / butter floats in milk. Since the simple premise is true, the conditional conclusion is also true despite the fact that the nocturnal activities of fish and the comparative densities of milk and butter are completely unreimmediate inference implication 419 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 419 lated. The statement ‘Fish sleep at night’ does not imply that butter floats in milk. It is better to call a conditional statement that is true just so long as it does not have a true if-clause and a false main clause a material conditional rather than a material implication. Strict conditional is similarly preferable to ‘strict implication’. Respecting this distinction, however, does not dissolve all the puzzlement of the so-called paradoxes of strict implication: Necessarily Q. Therefore, P Q. Impossible that P. Therefore, P Q. Here is an example of the first pattern: Necessarily, all rectangles are rectangles. Therefore, fish sleep at night all rectangles are rectangles. ‘All rectangles are rectangles’ is an example of a vacuous truth, so called because it is devoid of content. ‘All squares are rectangles’ and ‘5 is greater than 3’ are not so obviously vacuous truths, although they are necessary truths. Vacuity is not a sharply defined notion. Here is an example of the second pattern: It is impossible that butter always floats in milk yet sometimes does not float in milk. Therefore, butter always floats in milk yet sometimes does not float in milk fish sleep at night. Does the if-clause of the conclusion imply (or entail) the main clause? On one hand, what butter does in milk is, as before, irrelevant to whether fish sleep at night. On this ground, relevance logic denies there is a relation of implication or entailment. On the other hand, it is impossible for the if-clause to be true when the main clause is false, because it is impossible for the if-clause to be true in any circumstances whatever. Speranza, Luigi. Join the Grice Club! StrawsonF.. “On Referring.” Mind 59 (1950): 320–44.

 

IN-POSITVMGrice: “Again, the assimilation of the ‘n’ to ‘m’ before ‘p’ is only vulgar!” -- impositum: “An apt term by Boezio,” Grice. There’s preposition, proposition, supposition, and imposition! a property of terms resulting from a convention to designate something. A term is not a mere noise but a significant sound. A term designating extralinguistic entities, such as ‘tree’, ‘stone’, ‘blue’, and the like, are classified by the tradition since Boethius as terms of “prima impositio,” first imposition. A term designating another term or other communicative items, such as ‘noun’, ‘declension’, and the like, is classified as terms of ‘secunda imposition.’ The distinction between a terms of ‘prima impositio’ and ‘secunda impositio’ belongs to the realm of the communicatum, while the parallel distinction between terms of first and second ‘intentio’ belongs to the realm of the animatum A ‘prima intentio’ (intentio re re), frst intention is, broadly, thoughts about trees, stones, colours, etc. A ‘intentio secunda,’ (intention de sensu), second intention, is a thought about a first intention. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “De sensu implicaturum.”

 

IN-DUCTVM -- inductum: in the narrow sense, inference to a generalization from its instances; (2) in the broad sense, any ampliative inferencei.e., any inference where the claim made by the conclusion goes beyond the claim jointly made by the premises. Induction in the broad sense includes, as cases of particular interest: argument by analogy, predictive inference, inference to causes from signs and symptoms, and confirmation of scientific laws and theories. The narrow sense covers one extreme case that is not ampliative. That is the case of mathematical induction, where the premises of the argument necessarily imply the generalization that is its conclusion. Inductive logic can be conceived most generally as the theory of the evaluation of ampliative inference. In this sense, much of probability theory, theoretical statistics, and the theory of computability are parts of inductive logic. In addition, studies of scientific method can be seen as addressing in a less formal way the question of the logic of inductive inference. The name ‘inductive logic’ has also, however, become associated with a specific approach to these issues deriving from the work of Bayes, Laplace, De Morgan, and Carnap. On this approach, one’s prior probabilities in a state of ignorance are determined or constrained by some principle for the quantification of ignorance and one learns by conditioning on the evidence. A recurrent difficulty with this line of attack is that the way in which ignorance is quantified depends on how the problem is described, with different logically equivalent descriptions leading to different prior probabilities. Carnap laid down as a postulate for the application of his inductive logic that one should always condition on one’s total evidence. This rule of total evidence is usually taken for granted, but what justification is there for it? Good pointed out that the standard Bayesian analysis of the expected value of new information provides such a justification. Pure cost-free information always has non-negative expected value, and if there is positive probability that it will affect a decision, its expected value is positive. Ramsey made the same point in an unpublished manuscript. The proof generalizes to various models of learning uncertain evidence. A deductive account is sometimes presented indubitability induction 425 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 425 where induction proceeds by elimination of possibilities that would make the conclusion false. Thus Mill’s methods of experimental inquiry are sometimes analyzed as proceeding by elimination of alternative possibilities. In a more general setting, the hypothetico-deductive account of science holds that theories are confirmed by their observational consequencesi.e., by elimination of the possibilities that this experiment or that observation falsifies the theory. Induction by elimination is sometimes put forth as an alternative to probabilistic accounts of induction, but at least one version of it is consistent withand indeed a consequence ofprobabilistic accounts. It is an elementary fact of probability that if F, the potential falsifier, is inconsistent with T and both have probability strictly between 0 and 1, then the probability of T conditional on not-F is higher than the unconditional probability of T. In a certain sense, inductive support of a universal generalization by its instances may be a special case of the foregoing, but this point must be treated with some care. In the first place, the universal generalization must have positive prior probability. (It is worth noting that Carnap’s systems of inductive logic do not satisfy this condition, although systems of Hintikka and Niiniluoto do.) In the second place, the notion of instance must be construed so the “instances” of a universal generalization are in fact logical consequences of it. Thus ‘If A is a swan then A is white’ is an instance of ‘All swans are white’ in the appropriate sense, but ‘A is a white swan’ is not. The latter statement is logically stronger than ‘If A is a swan then A is white’ and a complete report on species, weight, color, sex, etc., of individual A would be stronger still. Such statements are not logical consequences of the universal generalization, and the theorem does not hold for them. For example, the report of a man 7 feet 11¾ inches tall might actually reduce the probability of the generalization that all men are under 8 feet tall. Residual queasiness about the foregoing may be dispelled by a point made by Carnap apropos of Hempel’s discussion of paradoxes of confirmation. ‘Confirmation’ is ambiguous. ‘E confirms H’ may mean that the probability of H conditional on E is greater than the unconditional probability of H, in which case deductive consequences of H confirm H under the conditions set forth above. Or ‘E confirms H’ may mean that the probability of H conditional on E is high (e.g., greater than .95), in which case if E confirms H, then E confirms every logical consequence of H. Conflation of the two senses can lead one to the paradoxical conclusion that E confirms E & P and thus P for any statement inductum -- inductivism: “A philosophy of science invented by Popper and P. K. Feyerabend as a foil for their own views. Why, I must just have well invented ‘sensism’ as a foil for my theory of implicaturum!” -- According to inductivism, a unique a priori inductive logic enables one to construct an algorithm that will compute from any input of data the best scientific theory accounting for that data.  inductum: Not deductum, -- nor abductum -- epapoge, Grecian term for ‘induction’. Especially in the logic of Aristotle, epagoge is opposed to argument by syllogism. Aristotle describes it as “a move from particulars to the universal.” E.g., premises that the skilled navigator is the best navigator, the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, and the skilled philosopher the best philosopher may support the conclusion by epagoge that those skilled in something are usually the best at it. Aristotle thought it more persuasive and clearer than the syllogistic method, since it relies on the senses and is available to all humans. The term was later applied to dialectical arguments intended to trap opponents. R.C. epicheirema, a polysyllogism in which each premise represents an enthymematic argument; e.g., ‘A lie creates disbelief, because it is an assertion that does not correspond to truth; flattery is a lie, because it is a conscious distortion of truth; therefore, flattery creates disbelief’. Each premise constitutes an enthymematic syllogism. Thus, the first premise could be expanded into the following full-fledged syllogism: ‘Every assertion that does not correspond to truth creates disbelief; a lie is an assertion that does not correspond to truth; therefore a lie creates disbelief’. We could likewise expand the second premise and offer a complete argument for it. Epicheirema can thus be a powerful tool in oral polemics, especially when one argues regressively, first stating the conclusion with a sketch of support in terms of enthymemes, and then  if challenged to do so  expanding any or all of these enthymemes into standard categorical syllogisms.

 

IN-LATUM -- illatum: A form of the conjugation Grice enjoyed was “inferentia,” cf essentia, sententia, prudentia, etc..see illatum -- Cf. illatio. Consequentia. Implicatio. Grice’s implicaturum and what the emissor implicates as a variation on the logical usage.

 

infima species (Latin, ‘lowest species’), a species that is not a genus of any other species. According to the theory of classification, division, and definition that is part of traditional or Aristotelian logic, every individual is a specimen of some infima species. An infima species is a member of a genus that may in turn be a species of a more inclusive genus, and so on, until one reaches a summum genus, a genus that is not a species of a more inclusive genus. Socrates and Plato are specimens of the infima specis human being (mortal rational animal), which is a species of the genus rational animal, which is a species of the genus animal, and so on, up to the summum genus substance. Whereas two specimens of animale.g., an individual human and an individual horsecan differ partly in their essential characteristics, no two specimens of the infima species human being can differ in essence.

infinite-off predicament, or ∞-off predicament.

 

IN-FINITVM -- infinitum: Cantor, G. Grice thought that “I know there are infinitely many stars” is a stupid thing to say -- one of a number of late nineteenthcentury philosophers including Frege, Dedekind, Peano, Russell, and Hilbert who transformed both mathematics and the study of its philosophical foundations. The philosophical import of Cantor’s work is threefold. First, it was primarily Cantor who turned arbitrary collections into objects of mathematical study, sets. Second, he created a coherent mathematical theory of the infinite, in particular a theory of transfinite numbers. Third, linking these, he was the first to indicate that it might be possible to present mathematics as nothing but the theory of sets, thus making set theory foundational for mathematics. This contributed to the Camus, Albert Cantor, Georg 116   116 view that the foundations of mathematics should itself become an object of mathematical study. Cantor also held to a form of principle of plenitude, the belief that all the infinities given in his theory of transfinite numbers are represented not just in mathematical or “immanent” reality, but also in the “transient” reality of God’s created world. Cantor’s main, direct achievement is his theory of transfinite numbers and infinity. He characterized as did Frege sameness of size in terms of one-to-one correspondence, thus accepting the paradoxical results known to Galileo and others, e.g., that the collection of all natural numbers has the same cardinality or size as that of all even numbers. He added to these surprising results by showing 1874 that there is the same number of algebraic and thus rational numbers as there are natural numbers, but that there are more points on a continuous line than there are natural or rational or algebraic numbers, thus revealing that there are at least two different kinds of infinity present in ordinary mathematics, and consequently demonstrating the need for a mathematical treatment of these infinities. This latter result is often expressed by saying that the continuum is uncountable. Cantor’s theorem of 2 is a generalization of part of this, for it says that the set of all subsets the power-set of a given set must be cardinally greater than that set, thus giving rise to the possibility of indefinitely many different infinities. The collection of all real numbers has the same size as the power-set of natural numbers. Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers 0 97 was his developed mathematical theory of infinity, with the infinite cardinal numbers the F-, or aleph-, numbers based on the infinite ordinal numbers that he introduced in 0 and 3. The F-numbers are in effect the cardinalities of infinite well-ordered sets. The theory thus generates two famous questions, whether all sets in particular the continuum can be well ordered, and if so which of the F-numbers represents the cardinality of the continuum. The former question was answered positively by Zermelo in 4, though at the expense of postulating one of the most controversial principles in the history of mathematics, the axiom of choice. The latter question is the celebrated continuum problem. Cantor’s famous continuum hypothesis CH is his conjecture that the cardinality of the continuum is represented by F1, the second aleph. CH was shown to be independent of the usual assumptions of set theory by Gödel 8 and Cohen 3. Extensions of Cohen’s methods show that it is consistent to assume that the cardinality of the continuum is given by almost any of the vast array of F-numbers. The continuum problem is now widely considered insoluble. Cantor’s conception of set is often taken to admit the whole universe of sets as a set, thus engendering contradiction, in particular in the form of Cantor’s paradox. For Cantor’s theorem would say that the power-set of the universe must be bigger than it, while, since this powerset is a set of sets, it must be contained in the universal set, and thus can be no bigger. However, it follows from Cantor’s early 3 considerations of what he called the “absolute infinite” that none of the collections discovered later to be at the base of the paradoxes can be proper sets. Moreover, correspondence with Hilbert in 7 and Dedekind in 9 see Cantor, Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und philosophischen Inhalts, 2 shows clearly that Cantor was well aware that contradictions will arise if such collections are treated as ordinary sets.  “What is not finite.” “I know that there are infinitely many stars”an example of a stupid thing to say by the man in the street. apeiron, Grecian term meaning ‘the boundless’ or ‘the unlimited’, which evolved to signify ‘the infinite’. Anaximander introduced the term to philosophy by saying that the source of all things was apeiron. There is some disagreement about whether he meant by this the spatially antinomy apeiron unbounded, the temporally unbounded, or the qualitatively indeterminate. It seems likely that he intended the term to convey the first meaning, but the other two senses also happen to apply to the spatially unbounded. After Anaximander, Anaximenes declared as his first principle that air is boundless, and Xenophanes made his flat earth extend downward without bounds, and probably outward horizontally without limit as well. Rejecting the tradition of boundless principles, Parmenides argued that “what-is” must be held within determinate boundaries. But his follower Melissus again argued that what-is must be boundless  in both time and space  for it can have no beginning or end. Another follower of Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, argued that if there are many substances, antinomies arise, including the consequences that substances are both limited and unlimited apeira in number, and that they are so small as not to have size and so large as to be unlimited in size. Rejecting monism, Anaxagoras argued for an indefinite number of elements that are each unlimited in size, and the Pythagorean Philolaus made limiters perainonta and unlimiteds apeira the principles from which all things are composed. The atomists Leucippus and Democritus conceived of a boundless universe, partly full of an infinite number of atoms and partly void; and in the universe are countless apeiroi worlds. Finally Aristotle arrived at an abstract understanding of the apeiron as “the infinite,” claiming to settle paradoxes about the boundless by allowing for real quantities to be infinitely divisible potentially, but not actually Physics III.48. The development of the notion of the apeiron shows how Grecian philosophers evolved ever more abstract philosophical ideas from relatively concrete conceptions.  Infinity -- Grice thougth that “There are infinitely many stars” was a stupid thing to say -- diagonal procedure, a method, originated by Cantor, for showing that there are infinite sets that cannot be put in one-to-one correspondence with the set of natural numbers i.e., enumerated. For example, the method can be used to show that the set of real numbers x in the interval 0 ‹ x m 1 is not enumerable. Suppose x0, x1, x2, . . . were such an enumeration x0 is the real correlated with 0; x1, the real correlated with 1; and so on. Then consider the list formed by replacing each real in the enumeration with the unique non-terminating decimal fraction representing it: The first decimal fraction represents x0; the second, x1; and so on. By diagonalization we select the decimal fraction shown by the arrows: and change each digit xnn, taking care to avoid a terminating decimal. This fraction is not on our list. For it differs from the first in the tenths place, from the second in the hundredths place, and from the third in the thousandths place, and so on. Thus the real it represents is not in the supposed enumeration. This contradicts the original assumption. The idea can be put more elegantly. Let f be any function such that, for each natural number n, fn is a set of natural numbers. Then there is a set S of natural numbers such that n 1 S S n 2 fn. It is obvious that, for each n, fn & S.  Infinity -- eternal return, the doctrine that the same events, occurring in the same sequence and involving the same things, have occurred infinitely many times in the past and will occur infinitely many times in the future. Attributed most notably to the Stoics and Nietzsche, the doctrine is antithetical to philosophical and religious viewpoints that claim that the world order is unique, contingent in part, and directed toward some goal. The Stoics interpret eternal return as the consequence of perpetual divine activity imposing exceptionless causal principles on the world in a supremely rational, providential way. The world, being the best possible, can only be repeated endlessly. The Stoics do not explain why the best world cannot be everlasting, making repetition unnecessary. It is not clear whether Nietzsche asserted eternal return as a cosmological doctrine or only as a thought experiment designed to confront one with the authenticity of one’s life: would one affirm that life even if one were consigned to live it over again without end? On either interpretation, Nietzsche’s version, like the Stoic version, stresses the inexorability and necessary interconnectedness of all things and events, although unlike the Stoic version, it rejects divine providence.  infinitary logic, the logic of expressions of infinite length. Quine has advanced the claim that firstorder logic (FOL) is the language of science, a position accepted by many of his followers. Howinferential justification infinitary logic 428 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 428 ever, many important notions of mathematics and science are not expressible in FOL. The notion of finiteness, e.g., is central in mathematics but cannot be expressed within FOL. There is no way to express such a simple, precise claim as ‘There are only finitely many stars’ in FOL. This and related expressive limitations in FOL seriously hamper its applicability to the study of mathematics and have led to the study of stronger logics. There have been various approaches to getting around the limitations by the study of so-called strong logics, including second-order logic (where one quantifies over sets or properties, not just individuals), generalized quantifiers (where one adds quantifiers in addition to the usual ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’), and branching quantifiers (where notions of independence of variables is introduced). One of the most fruitful methods has been the introduction of idealized “infinitely long” statements. For example, the above statement about the stars would be formalized as an infinite disjunction: there is at most one star, or there are at most two stars, or there are at most three stars, etc. Each of these disjuncts is expressible in FOL. The expressive limitations in FOL are closely linked with Gödel’s famous completeness and incompleteness theorems. These results show, among other things, that any attempt to systematize the laws of logic is going to be inadequate, one way or another. Either it will be confined to a language with expressive limitations, so that these notions cannot even be expressed, or else, if they can be expressed, then an attempt at giving an effective listing of axioms and rules of inference for the language will fall short. In infinitary logic, the rules of inference can have infinitely many premises, and so are not effectively presentable. Early work in infinitary logic used cardinality as a guide: whether or not a disjunction, conjunction, or quantifier string was permitted had to do only with the cardinality of the set in question. It turned out that the most fruitful of these logics was the language with countable conjunctions and finite strings of first-order quantifiers. This language had further refinements to socalled admissible languages, where more refined set-theoretic considerations play a role in determining what counts as a formula. Infinitary languages are also connected with strong axioms of infinity, statements that do not follow from the usual axioms of set theory but for which one has other evidence that they might well be true, or at least consistent. In particular, compact cardinals are infinite cardinal numbers where the analogue of the compactness theorem of FOL generalizes to the associated infinitary language. These cardinals have proven to be very important in modern set theory. During the 1990s, some infinitary logics played a surprising role in computer science. By allowing arbitrarily long conjunctions and disjunctions, but only finitely many variables (free or bound) in any formula, languages with attractive closure properties were found that allowed the kinds of inductive procedures of computer science, procedures not expressible in FOL. -- infinite regress argument, a distinctively philosophical kind of argument purporting to show that a thesis is defective because it generates an infinite series when either (form A) no such series exists or (form B) were it to exist, the thesis would lack the role (e.g., of justification) that it is supposed to play. The mere generation of an infinite series is not objectionable. It is misleading therefore to use ‘infinite regress’ (or ‘regress’) and ‘infinite series’ equivalently. For instance, both of the following claims generate an infinite series: (1) every natural number has a successor that itself is a natural number, and (2) every event has a causal predecessor that itself is an event. Yet (1) is true (arguably, necessarily true), and (2) may be true for all that logic can say about the matter. Likewise, there is nothing contrary to logic about any of the infinite series generated by the suppositions that (3) every free act is the consequence of a free act of choice; (4) every intelligent operation is the result of an intelligent mental operation; (5) whenever individuals x and y share a property F there exists a third individual z which paradigmatically has F and to which x and y are somehow related (as copies, by participation, or whatnot); or (6) every generalization from experience is inductively inferable from experience by appeal to some other generalization from experience. What Locke (in the Essay concerning Human Understanding) objects to about the theory of free will embodied in (3) and Ryle (in The Concept of Mind) objects to about the “intellectualist leginfinite, actual infinite regress argument 429 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 429 end” embodied in (4) can therefore be only that it is just plain false as a matter of fact that we perform an infinite number of acts of choice or operations of the requisite kinds. In effect their infinite regress arguments are of form A: they argue that the theories concerned must be rejected because they falsely imply that such infinite series exist. Arguably the infinite regress arguments employed by Plato (in the Parmenides) regarding his own theory of Forms and by Popper (in the Logic of Scientific Discovery) regarding the principle of induction proposed by Mill, are best construed as having form B, their objections being less to (5) or (6) than to their epistemic versions: (5*) that we can understand how x and y can share a property F only if we understand that there exists a third individual (the “Form” z) which paradigmatically has F and to which x and y are related; and (6*) that since the principle of induction must itself be a generalization from experience, we are justified in accepting it only if it can be inferred from experience by appeal to a higherorder, and justified, inductive principle. They are arguing that because the series generated by (5) and (6) are infinite, the epistemic enlightenment promised by (5*) and (6*) will forever elude us. When successful, infinite regress arguments can show us that certain sorts of explanation, understanding, or justification are will-o’-thewisps. As Passmore has observed (in Philosophical Reasoning) there is an important sense of ‘explain’ in which it is impossible to explain predication. We cannot explain x’s and y’s possession of the common property F by saying that they are called by the same name (nominalism) or fall under the same concept (conceptualism) any more than we can by saying that they are related to the same form (Platonic realism), since each of these is itself a property that x and y are supposed to have in common. Likewise, it makes no sense to try to explain why anything at all exists by invoking the existence of something else (such as the theist’s God). The general truths that things exist, and that things may have properties in common, are “brute facts” about the way the world is. Some infinite regress objections fail because they are directed at “straw men.” Bradley’s regress argument against the pluralist’s “arrangement of given facts into relations and qualities,” from which he concludes that monism is true, is a case in point. He correctly argues that if one posits the existence of two or more things, then there must be relations of some sort between them, and then (given his covert assumption that these relations are things) concludes that there must be further relations between these relations ad infinitum. Bradley’s regress misfires because a pluralist would reject his assumption. Again, some regress arguments fail because they presume that any infinite series is vicious. Aquinas’s regress objection to an infinite series of movers, from which he concludes that there must be a prime mover, involves this sort of confusion. -- infinity, in set theory, the property of a set whereby it has a proper subset whose members can be placed in one-to-one correspondence with all the members of the set, as the even integers can be so arranged in respect to the natural numbers by the function f(x) = x/2, namely: Devised by Richard Dedekind in defiance of the age-old intuition that no part of a thing can be as large as the thing, this set-theoretical definition of ‘infinity’, having been much acclaimed by philosophers like Russell as a model of conceptual analysis that philosophers were urged to emulate, can elucidate the putative infinity of space, time, and even God, his power, wisdom, etc. If a set’s being denumerablei.e., capable of having its members placed in one-to-one correspondence with the natural numberscan well appear to define much more simply what the infinity of an infinite set is, Cantor exhibited the real numbers (as expressed by unending decimal expansions) as a counterexample, showing them to be indenumerable by means of his famous diagonal argument. Suppose all the real numbers between 0 and 1 are placed in one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers, thus: Going down the principal diagonal, we can construct a new real number, e.g., .954 . . . , not found in the infinite “square array.” The most important result in set theory, Cantor’s theorem, is denied its full force by the maverick followers infinity infinity 430 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 430 of Skolem, who appeal to the fact that, though the real numbers constructible in any standard axiomatic system will be indenumerable relative to the resources of the system, they can be seen to be denumerable when viewed from outside it. Refusing to accept the absolute indenumerability of any set, the Skolemites, in relativizing the notion to some system, provide one further instance of the allure of relativism. More radical still are the nominalists who, rejecting all abstract entities and sets in particular, might be supposed to have no use for Cantor’s theorem. Not so. Assume with Democritus that there are infinitely many of his atoms, made of adamant. Corresponding to each infinite subset of these atoms will be their mereological sum or “fusion,” namely a certain quantity of adamant. Concrete entities acceptable to the nominalist, these quantities can be readily shown to be indenumerable. Whether Cantor’s still higher infinities beyond F1 admit of any such nominalistic realization remains a largely unexplored area. Aleph-zero or F0 being taken to be the transfinite number of the natural numbers, there are then F1 real numbers (assuming the continuum hypothesis), while the power set of the reals has F2 members, and the power set of that F3 members, etc. In general, K2 will be said to have a greater number (finite or transfinite) of members than K1 provided the members of K1 can be put in one-to-one correspondence with some proper subset of K2 but not vice versa. Skepticism regarding the higher infinities can trickle down even to F0, and if both Aristotle and Kant, the former in his critique of Zeno’s paradoxes, the latter in his treatment of cosmological antinomies, reject any actual, i.e. completed, infinite, in our time Dummett’s return to verificationism, as associated with the mathematical intuitionism of Brouwer, poses the keenest challenge. Recognition-transcendent sentences like ‘The total number of stars is infinite’ are charged with violating the intersubjective conditions required for a speaker of a language to manifest a grasp of their meaning.  Strawson, or Grice’s favourite informalist: THE INFORMALISTSA Group under which Grice situated his post-generational Strawson and his pre-generational Ryle. informal fallacy, an error of reasoning or tactic of argument that can be used to persuade someone with whom you are reasoning that your argument is correct when really it is not. The standard treatment of the informal fallacies in logic textbooks draws heavily on Aristotle’s list, but there are many variants, and new fallacies have often been added, some of which have gained strong footholds in the textbooks. The word ‘informal’ indicates that these fallacies are not simply localized faults or failures in the given propositions (premises and conclusion) of an argument to conform to a standard of semantic correctness (like that of deductive logic), but are misuses of the argument in relation to a context of reasoning or type of dialogue that an arguer is supposed to be engaged in. Informal logic is the subfield of logical inquiry that deals with these fallacies. Typically, informal fallacies have a pragmatic (practical) aspect relating to how an argument is being used, and also a dialectical aspect, pertaining to a context of dialoguenormally an exchange between two participants in a discussion. Both aspects are major concerns of informal logic. Logic textbooks classify informal fallacies in various ways, but no clear and widely accepted system of classification has yet become established. Some textbooks are very inventive and prolific, citing many different fallacies, including novel and exotic ones. Others are more conservative, sticking with the twenty or so mainly featured in or derived from Aristotle’s original treatment, with a few widely accepted additions. The paragraphs below cover most of these “major” or widely featured fallacies, the ones most likely to be encountered by name in the language of everyday educated conversation. The genetic fallacy is the error of drawing an inappropriate conclusion about the goodness or badness of some property of a thing from the goodness or badness of some property of the origin of that thing. For example, ‘This medication was derived from a plant that is poisonous; therefore, even though my physician advises me to take it, I conclude that it would be very bad for me if I took it.’ The error is inappropriately arguing from the origin of the medication to the conclusion that it must be poisonous in any form or situation. The genetic fallacy is often construed very broadly making it coextensive with the personal attack type of argument (see the description of argumentum ad hominem below) that condemns a prior argument by condemning its source or proponent. Argumentum ad populum (argument to the people) is a kind of argument that uses appeal to popular sentiments to support a conclusion. Sometimes called “appeal to the gallery” or “appeal to popular pieties” or even “mob appeal,” this kind of argument has traditionally been portrayed as fallacious. However, there infinity, axiom of informal fallacy 431 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 431 need be nothing wrong with appealing to popular sentiments in argument, so long as their evidential value is not exaggerated. Even so, such a tactic can be fallacious when the attempt to arouse mass enthusiasms is used as a substitute to cover for a failure to bring forward the kind of evidence that is properly required to support one’s conclusion. Argumentum ad misericordiam (argument to pity) is a kind of argument that uses an appeal to pity, sympathy, or compassion to support its conclusion. Such arguments can have a legitimate place in some discussionse.g., in appeals for charitable donations. But they can also put emotional pressure on a respondent in argument to try to cover up a weak case. For example, a student who does not have a legitimate reason for a late assignment might argue that if he doesn’t get a high grade, his disappointed mother might have a heart attack. The fallacy of composition is the error of arguing from a property of parts of a whole to a property of the wholee.g., ‘The important parts of this machine are light; therefore this machine is light.’ But a property of the parts cannot always be transferred to the whole. In some cases, examples of the fallacy of composition are arguments from all the parts to a whole, e.g. ‘Everybody in the country pays her debts. Therefore the country pays its debts.’ The fallacy of division is the converse of that of composition: the error of arguing from a property of the whole to a property of its partse.g., ‘This machine is heavy; therefore all the parts of this machine are heavy.’ The problem is that the property possessed by the whole need not transfer to the parts. The fallacy of false cause, sometimes called post hoc, ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this), is the error of arguing that because two events are correlated with one another, especially when they vary together, the one is the cause of the other. For example, there might be a genuine correlation between the stork population in certain areas of Europe and the human birth rate. But it would be an error to conclude, on that basis alone, that the presence of storks causes babies to be born. In general, however, correlation is good, if sometimes weak, evidence for causation. The problem comes in when the evidential strength of the correlation is exaggerated as causal evidence. The apparent connection could just be coincidence, or due to other factors that have not been taken into account, e.g., some third factor that causes both the events that are correlated with each other. The fallacy of secundum quid (neglecting qualifications) occurs where someone is arguing from a general rule to a particular case, or vice versa. One version of it is arguing from a general rule while overlooking or suppressing legitimate exceptions. This kind of error has also often been called the fallacy of accident. An example would be the argument ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of speech; therefore it is my right to shout “Fire” in this crowded theater if I want to.’ The other version of secundum quid, sometimes also called the fallacy of converse accident, or the fallacy of hasty generalization, is the error of trying to argue from a particular case to a general rule that does not properly fit that case. An example would be the argument ‘Tweetie [an ostrich] is a bird that does not fly; therefore birds do not fly’. The fault is the failure to recognize or acknowledge that Tweetie is not a typical bird with respect to flying. Argumentum consensus gentium (argument from the consensus of the nations) is a kind that appeals to the common consent of mankind to support a conclusion. Numerous philosophers and theologians in the past have appealed to this kind of argument to support conclusions like the existence of God and the binding character of moral principles. For example, ‘Belief in God is practically universal among human beings past and present; therefore there is a practical weight of presumption in favor of the truth of the proposition that God exists’. A version of the consensus gentium argument represented by this example has sometimes been put forward in logic textbooks as an instance of the argumentum ad populum (described above) called the argument from popularity: ‘Everybody believes (accepts) P as true; therefore P is true’. If interpreted as applicable in all cases, the argument from popularity is not generally sound, and may be regarded as a fallacy. However, if regarded as a presumptive inference that only applies in some cases, and as subject to withdrawal where evidence to the contrary exists, it can sometimes be regarded as a weak but plausible argument, useful to serve as a provisional guide to prudent action or reasoned commitment. Argumentum ad hominem (literally, argument against the man) is a kind of argument that uses a personal attack against an arguer to refute her argument. In the abusive or personal variant, the character of the arguer (especially character for veracity) is attacked; e.g., ‘You can’t believe what Smith sayshe is a liar’. In evaluating testimony (e.g., in legal cross-examination), attacking an arguer’s character can be legitimate in some cases. Also in political debate, character can be a legitimate issue. However, ad hominem arguinformal fallacy informal fallacy 432 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 432 ments are commonly used fallaciously in attacking an opponent unfairlye.g., where the attack is not merited, or where it is used to distract an audience from more relevant lines of argument. In the circumstantial variant, an arguer’s personal circumstances are claimed to be in conflict with his argument, implying that the arguer is either confused or insincere; e.g., ‘You don’t practice what you preach’. For example, a politician who has once advocated not raising taxes may be accused of “flip-flopping” if he himself subsequently favors legislation to raise taxes. This type of argument is not inherently fallacious, but it can go badly wrong, or be used in a fallacious way, for example if circumstances changed, or if the alleged conflict was less serious than the attacker claimed. Another variant is the “poisoning the well” type of ad hominem argument, where an arguer is said to have shown no regard for the truth, the implication being that nothing he says henceforth can ever be trusted as reliable. Yet another variant of the ad hominem argument often cited in logic textbooks is the tu quoque (you-too reply), where the arguer attacked by an ad hominem argument turns around and says, “What about you? Haven’t you ever lied before? You’re just as bad.” Still another variant is the bias type of ad hominem argument, where one party in an argument charges the other with not being honest or impartial or with having hidden motivations or personal interests at stake. Argumentum ad baculum (argument to the club) is a kind of argument that appeals to a threat or to fear in order to support a conclusion, or to intimidate a respondent into accepting it. Ad baculum arguments often take an indirect form; e.g., ‘If you don’t do this, harmful consequences to you might follow’. In such cases the utterance can often be taken as a threat. Ad baculum arguments are not inherently fallacious, because appeals to threatening or fearsome sanctionse.g., harsh penalties for drunken drivingare not necessarily failures of critical argumentation. But because ad baculum arguments are powerful in eliciting emotions, they are often used persuasively as sophistical tactics in argumentation to avoid fulfilling the proper requirements of a burden of proof. Argument from authority is a kind of argument that uses expert opinion (de facto authority) or the pronouncement of someone invested with an institutional office or title (de jure authority) to support a conclusion. As a practical but fallible method of steering discussion toward a presumptive conclusion, the argument from authority can be a reasonable way of shifting a burden of proof. However, if pressed too hard in a discussion or portrayed as a better justification for a conclusion than the evidence warrants, it can become a fallacious argumentum ad verecundiam (see below). It should be noted, however, that arguments based on expert opinions are widely accepted both in artificial intelligence and everyday argumentation as legitimate and sound under the right conditions. Although arguments from authority have been strongly condemned during some historical periods as inherently fallacious, the current climate of opinion is to think of them as acceptable in some cases, even if they are fallible arguments that can easily go wrong or be misused by sophistical persuaders. Argumentum ad judicium represents a kind of knowledge-based argumentation that is empirical, as opposed to being based on an arguer’s personal opinion or viewpoint. In modern terminology, it apparently refers to an argument based on objective evidence, as opposed to somebody’s subjective opinion. The term appears to have been invented by Locke to contrast three commonly used kinds of arguments and a fourth special type of argument. The first three types of argument are based on premises that the respondent of the argument is taken to have already accepted. Thus these can all be called “personal” in nature. The fourth kind of argumentargumentum ad judiciumdoes not have to be based on what some person accepts, and so could perhaps be called “impersonal.” Locke writes that the first three kinds of arguments can dispose a person for the reception of truth, but cannot help that person to the truth. Only the argumentum ad judicium can do that. The first three types of arguments come from “my shamefacedness, ignorance or error,” whereas the argumentum ad judicium “comes from proofs and arguments and light arising from the nature of things themselves.” The first three types of arguments have only a preparatory function in finding the truth of a matter, whereas the argumentum ad judicium is more directly instrumental in helping us to find the truth. Argumentum ad verecundiam (argument to reverence or respect) is the fallacious use of expert opinion in argumentation to try to persuade someone to accept a conclusion. In the Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) Locke describes such arguments as tactics of trying to prevail on the assent of someone by portraying him as irreverent or immodest if he does not readily yield to the authority of some learned informal opinion cited. Locke does not claim, however, that all appeals to expert authority in argument are fallacious. They can be reasonable if used judiciously. Argumentum ad ignorantiam (argument to ignorance) takes the following form: a proposition a is not known or proved to be true (false); therefore A is false (true). It is a negative type of knowledge-based or presumptive reasoning, generally not conclusive, but it is nevertheless often non-fallacious in balance-of-consideration cases where the evidence is inconclusive to resolve a disputed question. In such cases it is a kind of presumption-based argumentation used to advocate adopting a conclusion provisionally, in the absence of hard knowledge that would determine whether the conclusion is true or false. An example would be: Smith has not been heard from for over seven years, and there is no evidence that he is alive; therefore it may be presumed (for the purpose of settling Smith’s estate) that he is dead. Arguments from ignorance ought not to be pressed too hard or used with too strong a degree of confidence. An example comes from the U.S. Senate hearings in 1950, in which Senator Joseph McCarthy used case histories to argue that certain persons in the State Department should be considered Communists. Of one case he said, “I do not have much information on this except the general statement of the agency that there is nothing in the files to disprove his Communist connections.” The strength of any argument from ignorance depends on the thoroughness of the search made. The argument from ignorance can be used to shift a burden of proof merely on the basis of rumor, innuendo, or false accusations, instead of real evidence. Ignoratio elenchi (ignorance of refutation) is the traditional name, following Aristotle, for the fault of failing to keep to the point in an argument. The fallacy is also called irrelevant conclusion or missing the point. Such a failure of relevance is essentially a failure to keep closely enough to the issue under discussion. Suppose that during a criminal trial, the prosecutor displays the victim’s bloody shirt and argues at length that murder is a horrible crime. The digression may be ruled irrelevant to the question at issue of whether the defendant is guilty of murder. Alleged failures of this type in argumentation are sometimes quite difficult to judge fairly, and a ruling should depend on the type of discussion the participants are supposed to be engaged in. In some cases, conventions or institutional rules of proceduree.g. in a criminal trialare aids to determining whether a line of argumentation should be judged relevant or not. Petitio principii (asking to be granted the “principle” or issue of the discussion to be proved), also called begging the question, is the fallacy of improperly arguing in a circle. Circular reasoning should not be presumed to be inherently fallacious, but can be fallacious where the circular argument has been used to disguise or cover up a failure to fulfill a burden of proof. The problem arises where the conclusion that was supposed to be proved is presumed within the premises to be granted by the respondent of the argument. Suppose I ask you to prove that this bicycle (the ownership of which is subject to dispute) belongs to Hector, and you reply, “All the bicycles around here belong to Hector.” The problem is that without independent evidence that shows otherwise, the premise that all the bicycles belong to Hector takes for granted that this bicycle belongs to Hector, instead of proving it by properly fulfilling the burden of proof. The fallacy of many questions (also called the fallacy of complex question) is the tactic of packing unwarranted presuppositions into a question so that any direct answer given by the respondent will trap her into conceding these presuppositions. The classical case is the question, “Have you stopped beating your spouse?” No matter how the respondent answers, yes or no, she concedes the presuppositions that (a) she has a spouse, and (b) she has beaten that spouse at some time. Where one or both of these presumptions are unwarranted in the given case, the use of this question is an instance of the fallacy of many questions. The fallacy of equivocation occurs where an ambiguous word has been used more than once in an argument in such a way that it is plausible to interpret it in one way in one instance of its use and in another way in another instance. Such an argument may seem persuasive if the shift in the context of use of the word makes these differing interpretations plausible. Equivocation, however, is generally seriously deceptive only in longer sequences of argument where the meaning of a word or phrase shifts subtly but significantly. A simplistic example will illustrate the gist of the fallacy: ‘The news media should present all the facts on anything that is in the public interest; the public interest in lives of movie stars is intense; therefore the news media should present all the facts on the private lives of movie stars’. This argument goes from plausible premises to an implausible conclusion by trading on the ambiguity of ‘public interest’. In one sense informal fallacy informal fallacy 434 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:40 AM Page 434 it means ‘public benefit’ while in another sense it refers to something more akin to curiosity. Amphiboly (double arrangement) is a type of traditional fallacy (derived from Aristotle’s list of fallacies) that refers to the use of syntactically ambiguous sentences like ‘Save soap and waste paper’. Although the logic textbooks often cite examples of such sentences as fallacies, they have never made clear how they could be used to deceive in a serious discussion. Indeed, the example cited is not even an argument, but simply an ambiguous sentence. In cases of some advertisements like ‘Two pizzas for one special price’, however, one can see how the amphiboly seriously misleads readers into thinking they are being offered two pizzas for the regular price of one. Accent is the use of shifting stress or emphasis in speech as a means of deception. For example, if a speaker puts stress on the word ‘created’ in ‘All men were created equal’ it suggests (by implicaturum) the opposite proposition to ‘All men are equal’, namely ‘Not all men are (now) equal’. The oral stress allows the speaker to covertly suggest an inference the hearer is likely to draw, and to escape commitment to the conclusion suggested by later denying he said it. The slippery slope argument, in one form, counsels against some contemplated action (or inaction) on the ground that, once taken, it will be a first step in a sequence of events that will be difficult to resist and will (or may or must) lead to some dangerous (or undesirable or disastrous) outcome in the end. It is often argued, e.g., that once you allow euthanasia in any form, such as the withdrawal of heroic treatments of dying patients in hospitals, then (through erosion of respect for human life), you will eventually wind up with a totalitarian state where old, feeble, or politically troublesome individuals are routinely eliminated. Some slippery slope arguments can be reasonable, but they should not be put forward in an exaggerated way, supported with insufficient evidence, or used as a scare tactic.

 

informatum“What has ‘forma’ to do with ‘inform’?”Grice. While etymologically it means ‘to mould,’ Lewis and Short render ‘informare’ as “to inform, instruct, educate (syn.: “instruere, instituere): artes quibus aetas puerilis ad humanitatem informari solet,” Cic. Arch. 3, 4: “animus a natura bene informatus,” formed, id. Off. 1, 4, 13. I. e. “the soul is well informed by nature.” Informativusinformational. Grice distinguishes between the indicative and the informational. “Surely it is stupid to inform myself, but not Strawson, that it is raining. Grammarians don’t care, but I do!” information theory, also called communication theory, a primarily mathematical theory of communication. Prime movers in its development include Claude Shannon, H. Nyquist, R. V. L. Hartley, Norbert Wiener, Boltzmann, and Szilard. Original interests in the theory were largely theoretical or applied to telegraphy and telephony, and early development clustered around engineering problems in such domains. Philosophers (Bar-Hillel, Dretske, and Sayre, among others) are mainly interested in information theory as a source for developing a semantic theory of information and meaning. The mathematical theory has been less concerned with the details of how a message acquires meaning and more concerned with what Shannon called the “fundamental problem of communication”reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message (that already has a meaning) selected at another point. Therefore, the two interests in informationthe mathematical and the philosophicalhave remained largely orthogonal. Information is an objective (mind-independent) entity. It can be generated or carried by messages (words, sentences) or other products of cognizers (interpreters). Indeed, communication theory focuses primarily on conditions involved in the generation and transmission of coded (linguistic) messages. However, almost any event can (and usually does) generate information capable of being encoded or transmitted. For example, Colleen’s acquiring red spots can contain information about Colleen’s having the measles and graying hair can carry information about her grandfather’s aging. This information can be encoded into messages about measles or aging (respectively) and transmitted, but the information would exist independently of its encoding or transmission. That is, this information would be generated (under the right conditions) by occurrence of the measles-induced spots and the age-induced graying themselvesregardless of anyone’s actually noticing. This objective feature of information explains its potential for epistemic and semantic development by philosophers and cognitive scientists. For example, in its epistemic dimension, a single (event, message, or Colleen’s spots) that contains informal logic information theory 435 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:40 AM Page 435 (carries) the information that Colleen has the measles is something from which one (mom, doctor) can come to know that Colleen has the measles. Generally, an event (signal) that contains the information that p is something from which one can come to know that p is the caseprovided that one’s knowledge is indeed based on the information that p. Since information is objective, it can generate what we want from knowledgea fix on the way the world objectively is configured. In its semantic dimension, information can have intentionality or aboutness. What is happening at one place (thermometer reading rising in Colleen’s mouth) can carry information about what is happening at another place (Colleen’s body temperature rising). The fact that messages (or mental states, for that matter) can contain information about what is happening elsewhere, suggests an exciting prospect of tracing the meaning of a message (or of a thought) to its informational origins in the environment. To do this in detail is what a semantic theory of information is about. The mathematical theory of information is purely concerned with information in its quantitative dimension. It deals with how to measure and transmit amounts of information and leaves to others the work of saying what (how) meaning or content comes to be associated with a signal or message. In regard to amounts of information, we need a way to measure how much information is generated by an event (or message) and how to represent that amount. Information theory provides the answer. Since information is an objective entity, the amount of information associated with an event is related to the objective probability (likelihood) of the event. Events that are less likely to occur generate more information than those more likely to occur. Thus, to discover that the toss of a fair coin came up heads contains more information than to discover this about the toss of a coin biased (.8) toward heads. Or, to discover that a lie was knowingly broadcast by a censored, state-run radio station, contains less information than that a lie was knowingly broadcast by a non-censored, free radio station (say, the BBC). A (perhaps surprising) consequence of associating amounts of information with objective likelihoods of events is that some events generate no information at all. That is, that 55 % 3125 or that water freezes at 0oC. (on a specific occasion) generates no information at allsince these things cannot be otherwise (their probability of being otherwise is zero). Thus, their occurrence generates zero information. Shannon was seeking to measure the amount of information generated by a message and the amount transmitted by its reception (or about average amounts transmissible over a channel). Since his work, it has become standard to think of the measure of information in terms of reductions of uncertainty. Information is identified with the reduction of uncertainty or elimination of possibilities represented by the occurrence of an event or state of affairs. The amount of information is identified with how many possibilities are eliminated. Although other measures are possible, the most convenient and intuitive way that this quantity is standardly represented is as a logarithm (to the base 2) and measured in bits (short for how many binary digits) needed to represent binary decisions involved in the reduction or elimination of possibilities. If person A chooses a message to send to person B, from among 16 equally likely alternative messages (say, which number came up in a fair drawing from 16 numbers), the choice of one message would represent 4 bits of information (16 % 24 or log2 16 % 4). Thus, to calculate the amount of information generated by a selection from equally likely messages (signals, events), the amount of information I of the message s is calculated I(s) % logn. If there is a range of messages (s1 . . . sN) not all of which are equally likely (letting (p (si) % the probability of any si’s occurrence), the amount of information generated by the selection of any message si is calculated I(si) % log 1/p(si) % –log p(si) [log 1/x % –log x] While each of these formulas says how much information is generated by the selection of a specific message, communication theory is seldom primarily interested in these measures. Philosophers are interested, however. For if knowledge that p requires receiving the information that p occurred, and if p’s occurrence represents 4 bits of information, then S would know that p occurred only if S received information equal to (at least) 4 bits. This may not be sufficient for S to know pfor S must receive the right amount of information in a non-deviant causal way and S must be able to extract the content of the informationbut this seems clearly necessary. Other measures of information of interest in communication theory include the average information, or entropy, of a source, information theory information theory 436 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:40 AM Page 436 I(s) % 9p(si) $ I(si), a measure for noise (the amount of information that person B receives that was not sent by person A), and for equivocation (the amount of information A wanted or tried to send to B that B did not receive). These concepts from information theory and the formulas for measuring these quantities of information (and others) provide a rich source of tools for communication applications as well as philosophical applications. informed consent, voluntary agreement in the light of relevant information, especially by a patient to a medical procedure. An example would be consent to a specific medical procedure by a competent adult patient who has an adequate understanding of all the relevant treatment options and their risks. It is widely held that both morality and law require that no medical procedures be performed on competent adults without their informed consent. This doctrine of informed consent has been featured in case laws since the 1950s, and has been a focus of much discussion in medical ethics. Underwritten by a concern to protect patients’ rights to self-determination and also by a concern with patients’ well-being, the doctrine was introduced in an attempt to delineate physicians’ duties to inform patients of the risks and benefits of medical alternatives and to obtain their consent to a particular course of treatment or diagnosis. Interpretation of the legitimate scope of the doctrine has focused on a variety of issues concerning what range of patients is competent to give consent and hence from which ones informed consent must be required; concerning how much, how detailed, and what sort of information must be given to patients to yield informed consent; and concerning what sorts of conditions are required to ensure both that there is proper understanding of the information and that consent is truly voluntary rather than unduly influenced by the institutional authority of the physician.

 

IN-SCRIPTVM -- inscriptum -- inscriptionalism -- nominalism. While Grice pours scorn on the American School of Latter-Day  Nominalists, nominalism, as used by Grice is possibly a momer. He doesn’t mean Occam, and Occam did not use ‘nominalismus.’ “Terminimus’ at most. So one has to be careful. The implicaturum is that the nominalist calls a ‘name’ what others shouldn’t.  Mind, Grice had two nominalist friends: S. N. Hamphsire (Scepticism and meaning”) and A. M. Quinton, of the play group! In “Properties and classes,” for the Aristotelian Society. And the best Oxford philosophical stylist, Bradley, is also a nominalist. There are other, more specific arguments against universals. One is that postulating such things leads to a vicious infinite regress. For suppose there are universals, both monadic and relational, and that when an entity instantiates a universal, or a group of entities instantiate a relational universal, they are linked by an instantiation relation. Suppose now that a instantiates the universal F. Since there are many things that instantiate many universals, it is plausible to suppose that instantiation is a relational universal. But if instantiation is a relational universal, when a instantiates F, a, F and the instantiation relation are linked by an instantiation relation. Call this instantiation relation i₂ (and suppose it, as is plausible, to be distinct from the instantiation relation (i₁) that links a and F). Then since i₂ is also a universal, it looks as if a, F, i₁ and i₂ will have to be linked by another instantiation relation i₃, and so on ad infinitum. (This argument has its source in Bradley 1893, 27–8.)

 

IN-SINUATUM -- insinuatum: Cf. ‘indirectum’ Oddly, Ryle found an ‘insinuation’ abusive, which Russell found abusive. When McGuinness listed the abusive terms by Gellner, ‘insinuation’ was one of them, so perhaps Grice should take note! insinuation insinuate. The etymology is abscure. Certainly not Ciceronian. A bit of linguistic botany, “E implicates that p”implicate to do duty for, in alphabetic order: mean, suggest, hint, insinuate, indicate, implicitly convey, indirectly convey, imply. Intransitive meaning "hint obliquely" is from 1560s. The problem is that Grice possibly used it transitively, with a ‘that’-clause. “Emissor E communicates that p, via insinuation,” i.e. E insinuates that p.” In fact, there’s nothing odd with the ‘that’-clause following ‘insinuate.’ Obviosuly, Grice will be saying that what is a mere insinuation it is taken by Austin, Strawson, Hart or Hare or Hampshireas he criticizes him in the “Mind” article on intention and certainty -- (to restrict to mistakes by the play group) as part of the ‘analysans.’ `Refs. D. Holdcroft, “Forms of indirect communication,” Journal of Rhetoric, H. P. Grice, “Communicatum: directum-indirectum.”

 

Swinehead: “I like Swineheadit sounds almost like Grice!”Grice. Merton school.

 

solubile -- insolubile: “As opposed to the ‘piece-of-cake’ solubilia”Grice. A solubile is a piece of a cake. An insolubile is a sentences embodying a semantic antinomy such as the liar paradox. The insolubile is used by philosophers to analyze a self-nullifying sentences, the possibility that every sentence implies that they are true, and the relation between a communicatum and an animatum (psi). At first, Grice focuses on nullification to explicate a sentence like ‘I am lying’ (“Mento.” “Mendax”) which, when spoken, entails that the utterer “says nothing.” Grice: “Bradwardine suggests that such a sentence as “Mento” signifies that it is at once true and false, prompting Burleigh to argue that every sentences implies that it is true.” “Swineshead uses the insolubile to distinguish between truth and correspondence to reality.” While ‘This sentence is false’ is itself false, it corresponds to reality, while its contradiction, ‘This sentence is not false,’ does not, although the latter is also false. “Wyclif uses the insolubile to describe the senses (or implicatura) in which a sentence can be true, which led to his belief in the reality of logical beings or entities of reason, a central tenet of his realism.” “d’Ailly uses the insolubile to explain how the animatum (or soul) differs from the communicatum, holding that there is no insoluble in the soul, but that communication lends itself to the phenomenon by admitting a single sentence corresponding to two distinct states of the soul. Grice: “Of course that was Swine’s unEnglish overstatement, ‘unsolvable;’ everything is solvable!” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Liars at Oxford.”

 

IN-STITUTUM -- institutumGrice speaks of the institution of decision as the goal of conversation -- institution. (1) An organization such as a corporation or college. (2) A social practice such as marriage or making promises. (3) A system of rules defining a possible form of social organization, such as capitalist versus Communist principles of economic exchange. In light of the power of institutions to shape societies and individual lives, writers in professional ethics have explored four main issues. First, what political and legal institutions are feasible, just, and otherwise desirable (Plato, Republic; Rawls, A Theory of Justice)? Second, how are values embedded in institutions through the constitutive rules that define them (for example, “To promise is to undertake an obligation”), as well as through regulatory rules imposed on them from outside, such that to participate in institutions is a value-laden activity (Searle, Speech Acts, 1969)? Third, do institutions have collective responsibilities or are the only responsibilities those of individuals, and in general how are the responsibilities of individuals, institutions, and communities related? Fourth, at a more practical level, how can we prevent institutions from becoming corrupted by undue regard for money and power (MacIntyre, After Virtue, 1981) and by patriarchal prejudices (Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, 1989)? -- institutional theory of art, the view that something becomes an artwork by virtue of occupying a certain position within the context of a set of institutions. George Dickie originated this theory of art (Art and the Aesthetic, 1974), which was derived loosely from Arthur Danto’s “The Artworld” (Journal of Philosophy, 1964). In its original form it was the view that a work of art is an artifact that has the status of candidate for appreciation conferred upon it by some person acting on behalf of the art world. That is, there are institutionssuch as museums, galleries, and journals and newspapers that publish reviews and criticismand there are individuals who work within those institutionscurators, directors, dealers, performers, criticswho decide, by accepting objects or events for discussion and display, what is art and what is not. The concept of artifactuality may be extended to include found art, conceptual art, and other works that do not involve altering some preexisting material, by holding that a use, or context for display, is sufficient to make something into an artifact. This definition of art raises certain questions. What determinesindependently of such notions as a concern with artwhether an institution is a member of the art world? That is, is the definition ultimately circular? What is it to accept something as a candidate for appreciation? Might not this concept also threaten circularity, since there could be not only artistic but also other kinds of appreciation?

 

instrumentum: is Grice an instrumentalist? According to C. Lord (“Griceian instrumentalism”) he isbut he is not! Lord takes ‘tool’ literally. In Grice’s analysandum of the act of the communicatum, Lord takes ‘x’ to be a ‘tool’ or instrument for the production of a response in the emisor’s sendee. But is this the original Roman meaning of ‘instrumentum’? Griceian aesthetic instrumetalism according to Catherine Lord. instrumentalism, in its most common meaning, a kind of anti-realistic view of scientific theories wherein theories are construed as calculating devices or instruments for conveniently moving from a given set of observations to a predicted set of observations. As such the theoretical statements are not candidates for truth or reference, and the theories have no ontological import. This view of theories is grounded in a positive distinction between observation statements and theoretical statements, and the according of privileged epistemic status to the former. The view was fashionable during the era of positivism but then faded; it was recently revived, in large measure owing to the genuinely perplexing character of quantum theories in physics. ’Instrumentalism’ has a different and much more general meaning associated with the pragmatic epistemology of Dewey. Deweyan instrumentalism is a general functional account of all concepts (scientific ones included) wherein the epistemic status of concepts and the rationality status of actions are seen as a function of their role in integrating, predicting, and controlling our concrete interactions with our experienced world. There is no positivistic distinction instantiation instrumentalism 438 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:40 AM Page 438 between observation and theory, and truth and reference give way to “warranted assertability.”

 

INTER-LEGO: intellectum: The noun is ‘intellectus.’ But what is understood is ‘the intellectum’cf. ‘implicatum’ -- hile the ‘dianoia’ is the intellectus, the ‘intellectum’ is the Griceian diaphanous ‘what is understood.’ (dianoia): Grice was fascinated by Cicero. “The way he managed to translate the Grecian ‘dia’ by the ‘inter is genial!” As Short and Lewis have it, it’s from “inter-legere,” to see into, perceive, understand. “intelligere,” originally meaning to comprehend, appeared frequently in Cicero, then underwent a slippage in its passive form, “intelligetur,” toward to understand, to communicate, to mean, ‘to give it to be understood.’ What is understoodINTELLECTUM -- by an expression can be not only its obvious sense but also something that is connoted, implied, insinuated, IMPLICATED, as Grice would prefer. Verstand, corresponding to Greek dianoia and Latin intellectio] Kant distinguished understanding from sensibility and reason. While sensibility is receptive, understanding is spontaneous. While understanding is concerned with the range of phenomena and is empty without intuition, reason, which moves from judgment to judgment concerning phenomena, is tempted to extend beyond the limits of experience to generate fallacious inferences. Kant claimed that the main act of understanding is judgment and called it a faculty of judgment. He claimed that there is an a priori concept or category corresponding to each kind of judgment as its logical function and that understanding is constituted by twelve categories. Hence understanding is also a faculty of concepts. Understanding gives the synthetic unity of appearance through the categories. It thus brings together intuitions and concepts and makes experience possible. It is a lawgiver of nature. Herder criticized Kant for separating sensibility and understanding. Fichte and Hegel criticized him for separating understanding and reason. Some neo-Kantians criticized him for deriving the structure of understanding from the act of judgment. “Now we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgements, and the understanding may therefore be represented as a faculty of judgement.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason Intellectus -- dianoia, Grecian term for the faculty of thought, specifically of drawing conclusions from assumptions and of constructing and following arguments. The term may also designate the thought that results from using this faculty. We would use dianoia to construct a mathematical proof; in contrast, a being  if there is such a being it would be a god  that could simply intuit the truth of the theorem would use the faculty of intellectual intuition, noûs. In contrast with noûs, dianoia is the distinctly human faculty of reason. Plato uses noûs and dianoia to designate, respectively, the highest and second levels of the faculties represented on the divided line Republic 511de.  PLATO. E.C.H. dialectical argument dianoia 233   233 dichotomy paradox. Refs: Grice, “The criteria of intelligence.”

 

IN-TENSVMEX-TENSVM -- intensionalism: Grice finds a way to relieve a predicate that is vacuous from the embarrassing consequence of denoting or being satisfied by the empty set. Grice exploits the nonvoidness of a predicate which is part of the definition of the void predicate. Consider the vacuous predicate:‘... is married to a daughter of an English queen and a pope.'The class '... is a daugther of an English queen and a pope.'is co-extensive with the predicate '... stands in relation  to a sequence composed of the class married to, daughters, English queens, and popes.'We correlate the void predicate with the sequence composed of relation R, the set ‘married to,’ the set ‘daughters,’ the set ‘English queens,’ and the set ‘popes.'Grice uses this sequence, rather than the empty set, to determine the explanatory potentiality of a void predicate. The admissibility of a nonvoid predicate in an explanation of a possible phenomenon (why it would happen if it did happen) may depends on the availability of a generalisation whithin which the predicate specifies the antecedent condition. A non-trivial generalisations of this sort is certainly available if derivable from some further generalisation involving a less specific antecedent condition, supported by an antecedent condition that is specified by means a nonvoid predicate. intension, the meaning or connotation of an expression, as opposed to its extension or denotation, which consists of those things signified by the expression. The intension of a declarative sentence is often taken to be a proposition and the intension of a predicate expression (common noun, adjective) is often taken to be a concept. For Frege, a predicate expression refers to a concept and the intension or Sinn (“sense”) of a predicate expression is a mode of presentation distinct from the concept. Objects like propositions or concepts that can be the intension of terms are called intensional objects. (Note that ‘intensional’ is not the same word as ‘intentional’, although the two are related.) The extension of a declarative sentence is often taken to be a state of affairs and that of a predicate expression to be the set of objects that fall under the concept which is the intension of the term. Extension is not the same as reference. For example, the term ‘red’ may be said to refer to the property redness but to have as its extension the set of all red things. Alternatively properties and relations are sometimes taken to be intensional objects, but the property redness is never taken to be part of the extension of the adjective ‘red’. intensionality, failure of extensionality. A linguistic context is extensional if and only if the extension of the expression obtained by placing any subexpression in that context is the same as the extension of the expression obtained by placing in that context any subexpression with the same extension as the first subexpression. Modal, intentional, and direct quotational contexts are main instances of intensional contexts. Take, e.g., sentential contexts. The extension of a sentence is its truth or falsity (truth-value). The extension of a definite description is what it is true of: ‘the husband of Xanthippe’ and ‘the teacher of Plato’ have the same extension, for they are true of the same man, Socrates. Given this, it is easy to see that ‘Necessarily, . . . was married to Xanthippe’ is intensional, for ‘Necessarily, the husband of Xanthippe was married to Xanthippe’ is true, but ‘Necessarily, the teacher of Plato was married to Xanthippe’ is not. Other modal terms that generate intensional contexts include ‘possibly’, ‘impossibly’, ‘essentially’, ‘contingently’, etc. Assume that Smith has heard of Xanthippe but not Plato. ‘Smith believes that . . . was married to Xanthippe’ is intensional, for ‘Smith believes that the husband of Xanthippe was married to Xanthippe’ is true, but ‘Smith believes that the teacher of Plato was married to Xanthippe’ is not. Other intentional verbs that generate intensional contexts include ‘know’, ‘doubt’, ‘wonder’, ‘fear’, ‘intend’, ‘state’, and ‘want’. ‘The fourth word in “. . . “ has nine letters’ is intensional, for ‘The fourth word in “the husband of Xanthippe” has nine letters’ is true but ‘the fourth word in “the teacher of Plato” has nine letters’ is not. intensional logic, that part of deductive logic which treats arguments whose validity or invalidity depends on strict difference, or identity, of meaning. The denotation of a singular term (i.e., a proper name or definite description), the class of things of which a predicate is true, and the truth or falsity (the truth-value) of a sentence may be called the extensions of these respective linguistic expressions. Their intensions are their meanings strictly so called: the (individual) concept conveyed by the singular term, the property expressed by the predicate, and the proposition asserted by the sentence. The most extensively studied part of formal logic deals largely with inferences turning only on extensions. One principle of extensional logic is that if two singular terms have identical denotations, the truth-values of corresponding sentences containing the terms are identical. Thus the inference from ‘Bern is the capital of Switzerland’ to ‘You are in Bern if and only if you are in the capital of Switzerland’ is valid. But this is invalid: ‘Bern is the capital of Switzerland. Therefore, you believe that you are in Bern if and only if you believe that you are in the capital of Switzerland.’ For one may lack the belief instrumental rationality intensional logic 439 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:40 AM Page 439 that Bern is the capital of Switzerland. It seems that we should distinguish between the intensional meanings of ‘Bern’ and of ‘the capital of Switzerland’. One supposes that only a strict identity of intension would license interchange in such a context, in which they are in the scope of a propositional attitude. It has been questioned whether the idea of an intension really applies to proper names, but parallel examples are easily constructed that make similar use of the differences in the meanings of predicates or of whole sentences. Quite generally, then, the principle that expressions with the same extension may be interchanged with preservation of extension of the containing expression, seems to fail for such “intensional contexts.” The range of expressions producing such sensitive contexts includes psychological verbs like ‘know’, ‘believe’, ‘suppose’, ‘assert’, ‘desire’, ‘allege’, ‘wonders whether’; expressions conveying modal ideas such as necessity, possibility, and impossibility; some adverbs, e.g. ‘intentionally’; and a large number of other expressions’prove’, ‘imply’, ‘make probable’, etc. Although reasoning involving some of these is well understood, there is not yet general agreement on the best methods for dealing with arguments involving many of these notions.

 

IN-TENSVUM -- intentionalism: Grice analyses ‘intend’ in two prongs; the first is a willing-clause, and the second is a causal clause about the willing causing the action. It’s a simplified account that he calls Prichardian because he relies on ‘willin that.’ The intender intends that some action takes place. It does not have to be an action by the intender. Cf. Suppes’s specific section. when Anscombe comes out with her “Intention,” Grice’s Play Group does not know what to do. Hampshire is almost finished with his “Thought and action” that came out the following year. Grice is lecturing on how a “dispositional” reductive analysis of ‘intention’ falls short of his favoured instrospectionalism. Had he not fallen for an intention-based semantics (or strictly, an analysis of "U means that p" in terms of U intends that p"), Grice would be obsessed with an analysis of ‘intending that …’ James makes an observation about the that-clause. I will that the distant table slides over the floor toward me. It does not. The Anscombe Society. Irish-born Anscombe’s views are often discussed by Oxonian philosophers. She brings Witters to the Dreaming Spires, as it were. Grice is especially connected with Anscombes reflections on intention. While he favoures an approach such as that of Hampshire in Thought and Action, Grice borrows a few points from Anscombe, notably that of direction of fit, originally Austin’s. Grice explicitly refers to Anscombe in “Uncertainty,” and in his reminiscences he hastens to add that Anscombe would never attend any of the Saturday mornings of the play group, as neither does Dummett. The view of Ryle is standardly characterised as a weaker or softer version of behaviourism According to this standard interpretation, the view by Ryle is that a statements containin this or that term relating to the ‘soul’ can be translated, without loss of meaning, into an ‘if’ utterance about what an agent does. So Ryle, on this account, is to be construed as offering a dispositional analysis of a statement about the soul into a statement about behaviour. It is conceded that Ryle does not confine a description of what the agent does to purely physical behaviour—in terms, e. g. of a skeletal or a muscular description. Ryle is happy to speak of a full-bodied action like scoring a goal or paying a debt. But the soft behaviourism attributed to Ryle still attempts an analysis or translation of statement about the soul into this or that dispositional statement which is itself construed as subjunctive if describing what the agent does. Even this soft behaviourism fails. A description of the soul is not analysable or translatable into a statement about behaviour or praxis even if this is allowed to include a non-physical descriptions of action. The list of conditions and possible behaviour is infinite since any one proffered translation may be ‘defeated,’ as Hart and Hall would say, by a slight alteration of the circumstances. The defeating condition in any particular case may involve a reference to a fact about the agent’s soul, thereby rendering the analysis circular. In sum, the standard interpretation of Ryle construes him as offering a somewhat weakened form of reductive behaviourism whose reductivist ambition, however weakened, is nonetheless futile. This characterisation of Ryle’s programme is wrong. Although it is true that he is keen to point out the disposition behind this or that concept about the soul, it would be wrong to construe Ryle as offering a programme of analysis of a ‘soul’ predicate in terms of an ‘if’ utterance. The relationship between a ‘soul’ predicate and the ‘if’ utterance with which he unpack it is other than that required by this kind of analysis. It is helpful to keep in mind that Ryle’s target is the official doctrine with its eschatological commitment. Ryle’s argument serves to remind one that we have in a large number of cases ways of telling or settling disputes, e. g., about someone’s character or intellect. If A disputes a characterisation of Smith as willing that p, or judging that p, B may point to what Smith says and does in defending the attribution, as well as to features of the circumstances. But the practice of giving a reason of this kind to defend or to challenge an ascription of a ‘soul’ predicates would be put under substantial pressure if the official doctrine is correct. For Ryle to remind us that we do, as a matter of fact, have a way of settling disputes about whether Smith wills that he eat an apple is much weaker than saying that the concept of willing is meaningless unless it is observable or verifiable; or even that the successful application of a soul predicate requires that we have a way of settling a dispute in every case. Showing that a concept is one for which, in a large number of cases, we have an agreement-reaching procedure, even if it do not always guarantee success, captures an important point, however: it counts against any theory of, e. g., willing that would render it unknowable in principle or in practice whether or not the concept is correctly applied in every case. And this is precisely the problem with the official doctrine (and is still a problem, with some of its progeny. Ryle points out that there is a form of dilemma that pits the reductionist against the dualist: those whose battle-cry is ‘nothing but…’ and those who insist on ‘something else as well.’ Ryle attempts a dissolution of the dilemma by rejecting the two horns; not by taking sides with either one, though part of what dissolution requires in this case, as in others, is a description of how each side is to be commended for seeing what the other side does not, and criticised for failing to see what the other side does. The attraction of behaviourism, Ryle reminds us, is simply that it does not insist on an occult happening as the basis upon which a ‘soul’ term is given meaning, and points to a perfectly observable criterion that is by and large employed when we are called upon to defend or correct our employment of a ‘soul’ term. The problem with behaviourism is that it has a too-narrow view both of what counts as behaviour and of what counts as observable. Then comes Grice to play with meaning and intending, and allowing for deeming an avowal of this or that souly state as, in some fashion, incorrigible. For Grice, while U does have, ceteris paribus privileged access to each state of his soul, only his or that avowal of this or that souly state is deemed incorrigible. This concerns communication as involving intending. Grice goes back to this at Brighton. He plays with G judges that it is raining, G judges that G judges that it is raining. Again, Grice uses a subscript: “G judges₂ that it is raining.” If now G expresses that it is raining, G judges₂ that it is raining. A second-order avowal is deemed incorrigible. It is not surprising the the contemporary progeny of the official doctrine sees a behaviourist in Grice. Yet a dualist is badly off the mark in his critique of Grice. While Grice does appeal to a practice and a habif, and even the more technical ‘procedure’ in the ordinary way as ‘procedure’ is used in ordinary discussion. Grice does not make a technical concept out of them as one expect of some behavioural psychologist, which he is not. He is at most a philosophical psychologist, and a functionalist one, rather than a reductionist one. There is nothing in any way that is ‘behaviourist’ or reductionist or physicalist about Grice’s talk. It is just ordinary talk about behaviour. There is nothing exceptional in talking about a practice, a customs, or a habit regarding communication. Grice certainly does not intend that this or that notion, as he uses it, gives anything like a detailed account of the creative open-endedness of a communication-system. What this or that anti-Griceian has to say IS essentially a diatribe first against empiricism (alla Quine), secondarily against a Ryle-type of behaviourism, and in the third place, Grice. In more reasoned and dispassionate terms, one would hardly think of Grice as a behaviourist (he in fact rejects such a label in “Method”), but as an intentionalist. When we call Grice an intentionalist, we are being serious. As a modista, Grice’s keyword is intentionalism, as per the good old scholastic ‘intentio.’ We hope so. This is Aunt Matilda’s conversational knack. Grice keeps a useful correspondence with Suppes which was helpful. Suppes takes Chomsky more seriously than an Oxonian philosopher would. An Oxonian philosopher never takes Chomsky too seriously. Granted, Austin loves to quote “Syntactic Structures” sentence by sentence for fun, knowing that it would never count as tutorial material. Surely “Syntactic Structures” would not be a pamphlet a member of the play group would use to educate his tutee. It is amusing that when he gives the Locke lectures, Chomsky cannot not think of anything better to do but to criticise Grice, and citing him from just one reprint in the collection edited by, of all people, Searle. Some gratitude. The references are very specific to Grice. Grice feels he needs to provide, he thinks, an analysis ‘mean’ as metabolically applied to an expression. Why? Because of the implicaturum. By uttering x (thereby explicitly conveying that p), U implicitly conveys that q iff U relies on some procedure in his and A’s repertoire of procedures of U’s and A’s communication-system. It is this talk of U’s being ‘ready,’ and ‘having a procedure in his repertoire’ that sounds to New-World Chomsky too Morrisian, as it does not to an Oxonian. Suppes, a New-Worlder, puts himself in Old-Worlder Grice’s shoes about this. Chomsky should never mind. When an Oxonian philosopher, not a psychologist, uses ‘procedure’ and ‘readiness,’ and having a procedure in a repertoire, he is being Oxonian and not to be taken seriously, appealing to ordinary language, and so on. Chomsky apparently does get it. Incidentally, Suppess has defended Grice against two other targets, less influential. One is Hungarian-born J. I. Biro, who does not distinguish between reductive analysis and reductionist analysis, as Grice does in his response to Somervillian Rountree-Jack. The other target is perhaps even less influential: P. Yu in a rather simplistic survey of the Griceian programme for a journal that Grice finds too specialized to count, “Linguistics and Philosophy.” Grice is always ashamed and avoided of being described as “our man in the philosophy of language.” Something that could only have happened in the Old World in a red-brick university, as Grice calls it.  Suppes contributes to PGRICE with an excellent ‘The primacy of utterers meaning,’ where he addresses what he rightly sees as an unfair characterisations of Grice as a behaviourist. Suppes’s use of “primacy” is genial, since its metabole which is all about. Biro actually responds to Suppes’s commentary on Grice as proposing a reductive but not reductionist analysis of meaning. Suppes rightly characterises Grice as an Oxonian ‘intentionalist’ (alla Ogden), as one would characterize Hampshire, with philosophical empiricist, and slightly idealist, or better ideationalist, tendencies, rather. Suppes rightly observes that Grice’ use of such jargon is meant to impress. Surely there are more casual ways of referring to this or that utterer having a basic procedure in his repertoire. It is informal and colloquial, enough, though, rather than behaviouristically, as Ryle would have it. Grice is very happy that in the New World Suppes teaches him how to use ‘primacy’ with a straight face! Intentionalism is also all the vogue in Collingwood reading Croce, and Gardiner reading Marty via Ogden, and relates to expression. In his analysis of intending Grice is being very Oxonian, and pre-Austinian: relying, just to tease leader Austin, on Stout, Wilson, Bosanquet, MacMurray, and Pritchard. Refs.: There are two sets of essays. An early one on ‘disposition and intention,’ and the essay for The British Academy (henceforth, BA). Also his reply to Anscombe and his reply to Davidson. There is an essay on the subjective condition on intention. Obviously, his account of communication has been labeled the ‘intention-based semantic’ programme, so references under ‘communication’ above are useful. BANC.Grice's reductIOn, or partial reduction anyway, of meamng to intention places a heavy load on the theory of intentions. But in the articles he has written about these matters he has not been very explicit about the structure of intentIOns. As I understand his position on these matters, it is his view that the defence of the primacy of utterer's meaning does not depend on having worked out any detailed theory of intention. It IS enough to show how the reduction should be thought of in a schematic fashion in order to make a convincing argument. I do think there is a fairly straightforward extenSIOn of Grice's ideas that provides the right way of developing a theory of intentIOns appropnate for Ius theory of utterer's meaning. Slightly changing around some of the words m Grice we have the following The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning 125 example. U utters '''Fido is shaggy", if "U wants A to think that U thinks that Jones's dog is hairy-coated.'" Put another way, U's intention is to want A to think U thinks that Jones's dog is hairy-coated. Such intentions clearly have a generative structure similar but different from the generated syntactic structure we think of verbal utterances' having. But we can even say that the deep structures talked about by grammarians of Chomsky's ilk could best be thought of as intentions. This is not a suggestion I intend to pursue seriously. The important point is that it is a mistake to think about classifications of intentions; rather, we should think in terms of mechanisms for generating intentions. Moreover, it seems to me that such mechanisms in the case of animals are evident enough as expressed in purposeful pursuit of prey or other kinds of food, and yet are not expressed in language. In that sense once again there is an argument in defence of Grice's theory. The primacy of utterer's meaning has primacy because of the primacy of intention. We can have intentions without words, but we cannot have words of any interest without intentions. In this general context, I now turn to Biro's (1979) interesting criticisms of intentionalism in the theory of meaning. Biro deals from his own standpoint with some of the issues I have raised already, but his central thesis about intention I have not previously discussed. It goes to the heart of controversies about the use of the concept of intention to explain the meaning of utterances. Biro puts his point in a general way by insisting that utterance meaning must be separate from and independent of speaker's meaning or, in the terminology used here, utterer's meaning. The central part of his argument is his objection to the possibility of explaining meaning in terms of intentions. Biro's argument goes like this: 1. A central purpose of speech is to enable others to learn about the speaker's intentions. 2. It will be impossible to discover or understand the intentions of the speaker unless there are independent means for understanding what he says, since what he says will be primary evidence about his intentions. 3. Thus the meaning of an utterance must be conceptually independent of the intentions of the speaker. This is an appealing positivistic line. The data relevant to a theory or hypothesis must be known independently of the hypothesis. Biro is quick to state that he is not against theoretical entities, but the way in which he separates theoretical entities and observable facts makes clear the limited role he wants them to play, in this case the theoretical entities being intentions. The central idea is to be found in the following passage: The point I am insisting on here is merely that the ascription of an intention to an agent has the character of an hypothesis, something invoked to explain phenomena which may be described independently of that explanation (though not necessarily independently of the fact that they fall into a class for which the hypothesis in question generally or normally provides an explanation). ( 250-1.) [The italics are Biro's.] Biro's aim is clear from this quotation. The central point is that the data about intentions, namely, the utterance, must be describable independently of hypotheses about the intentions. He says a little later to reinforce this: 'The central pointis this: it is the intention-hypothesis that is revisable, not the act-description' (p. 251). Biro's central mistake, and a large one too, is to think that data can be described independently of hypotheses and that somehow there is a clean and simple version of data that makes such description a natural and inevitable thing to have. It would be easy enough to wander off into a description of such problems in physics, where experiments provide a veritable wonderland of seemingly arbitrary choices about what to include and what to exclude from the experimental experience as 'relevant data', and where the arbitrariness can only be even partly understood on the basis of understanding the theories bemg tested. Real data do not come in simple linear strips like letters on the page. Real experiments are blooming confusions that never get sorted out completely but only partially and schematically, as appropriate to the theory or theories being tested, and in accordance with the traditions and conventions of past similar experiments. makes a point about the importance of convention that I agree but it is irrelevant to my central of controversy with  What I say about experiments is even more true of undisciplined and unregulated human interactiono Experiments, especially in physics, are presumably among the best examples of disciplined and structured action. Most conversations, in contrast, are really examples of situations of confusion that are only straightened out under strong hypotheses of intentions on the of speakers and listeners as well. There is more than one level at which the takes The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning 127 place through the beneficent use of hypotheses about intentions. I shall not try to deal with all of them here but only mention some salient aspects. At an earlier point, Biro says:The main reason for introducing intentions into some of these analyses is precisely that the public (broadly speaking) features of utterances -the sounds made, the circumstances in which they are made and the syntactic and semantic properties of these noises considered as linguistic items-are thought to be insufficient for the specification of that aspect of the utterance which we call its meaning. [po 244.] If we were to take this line of thought seriously and literally, we would begin with the sound pressure waves that reach our ears and that are given the subtle and intricate interpretation required to accept them as speech. There is a great variety of evidence that purely acoustical concepts are inadequate for the analysis of speech. To determine the speech content of a sound pressure wave we need extensive hypotheses about the intentions that speakers have in order to convert the public physical features of utterances into intentional linguistic items. Biro might object at where I am drawing the line between public and intentional, namely, at the difference between physical and linguistic, but it would be part of my thesis that it is just because of perceived and hypothesized intentions that we are mentally able to convert sound pressure waves into meaningful speech. In fact, I can envisage a kind of transcendental argument for the existence of intentions based on the impossibility from the standpoint of physics alone of interpreting sound pressure waves as speech. Biro seems to have in mind the nice printed sentences of science and philosophy that can be found on the printed pages of treatises around the world. But this is not the right place to begin to think about meaning, only the end point. Grice, and everybody else who holds an intentional thesis about meaning, recognizes the requirement to reach an account of such timeless sentence meaning or linguistic meaning.In fact, Grice is perhaps more ready than I am to concede that such a theory can be developed in a relatively straightforward manner. One purpose of my detailed discussion of congruence of meaning in the previous section is to point out some of the difficulties of having an adequate detailed theory of these matters, certainly an adequate detailed theory of the linguistic meaning or the sentence meaning. Even if I were willing to grant the feasibility of such a theory, I would not grant the use of it that Biro has made. For the purposes of this discussion printed text may be accepted as well-defined, theoryindependent data. (There are even issues to be raised about the printed page, but ones that I will set aside in the present context. I have in mind the psychological difference between perception of printed letters, words, phrases, or sentences, and that of related but different nonlinguistic marks on paper.) But no such data assumptions can be made about spoken speech. Still another point of attack on Biro's positivistic line about data concerns the data of stress and prosody and their role in fixing the meaning of an utterance. Stress and prosody are critical to the interpretation of the intentions of speakers, but the data on stress and prosody are fleeting and hard to catch on the fly_ Hypotheses about speakers' intentions are needed even in the most humdrum interpret atins of what a given prosodic contour or a given point of stress has contributed to the meaning of the utterance spoken. The prosodic contour and the points of stress of an utterance are linguistic data, but they do not have the independent physical description Biro vainly hopes for. Let me put my point still another way. I do not deny for a second that conventions and traditions of speech play a role in fixing the meaning of a particular utterance on a particular occasion. It is not a matter of interpretmg afresh, as if the universe had just begun, a particular utterance in terms of particular intentions at that time and place without dependence upon past prior mtentions and the traditions of spoken speech that have evolved in the community of which the speaker and listener are a part. It is rather that hypotheses about intentions are operating continually and centrally in the interpretation of what is said. Loose, live speech depends upon such active 'on-line' interpretation of intention to make sense of what has been said. If there were some absolutely agreed-upon concept of firm and definite linguistlc meaning that Biro and others could appeal to, then it might be harder to make the case I am arguing for. But I have already argued in the discussion of congruence of meaning that this is precisely what is not the case. The absence of any definite and satisfactory theory of linguistic meaning argues also for movmg back to the more concrete and psychologically richer concept of utterer's meaning. This is the place to begin the theory of meaning, and this Itself rests to a very large extent on the concept of intention -- intention, (1) a characteristic of action, as when one acts intentionally or with a certain intention; (2) a feature of one’s mind, as when one intends (has an intention) to act in a certain way now or in the future. Betty, e.g., intentionally walks across the room, does so with the intention of getting a drink, and now intends to leave the party later that night. An important question is: how are (1) and (2) related? (See Anscombe, Intention, 1963, for a groundbreaking treatment of these and other basic problems concerning intention.) Some philosophers see acting with an intention as basic and as subject to a three-part analysis. For Betty to walk across the room with the intention of getting a drink is for Betty’s walking across the room to be explainable (in the appropriate way) by her desire or (as is sometimes said) pro-attitude in favor of getting a drink and her belief that walking across the room is a way of getting one. On this desire-belief model (or wantbelief model) the main elements of acting with an intention are (a) the action, (b) appropriate desires (pro-attitudes) and beliefs, and (c) an appropriate explanatory relation between (a) and (b). (See Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” in Essays on Actions and Events, 1980.) In explaining (a) in terms of (b) we give an explanation of the action in terms of the agent’s purposes or reasons for so acting. This raises the fundamental question of what kind of explanation this is, and how it is related to explanation of Betty’s movements by appeal to their physical causes. What about intentions to act in the future? Consider Betty’s intention to leave the party later. Though the intended action is later, this intention may nevertheless help explain some of Betty’s planning and acting between now and then. Some philosophers try to fit such futuredirected intentions directly into the desire-belief model. John Austin, e.g., would identify Betty’s intention with her belief that she will leave later because of her desire to leave (Lectures on Jurisprudence,  I, 1873). Others see futuredirected intentions as distinctive attitudes, not to be reduced to desires and/or beliefs. How is belief related to intention? One question here is whether an intention to A requires a belief that one will A. A second question is whether a belief that one will A in executing some intention ensures that one intends to A. Suppose that Betty believes that by walking across the room she will interrupt Bob’s conversation. Though she has no desire to interrupt, she still proceeds across the room. Does she intend to interrupt the conversation? Or is there a coherent distinction between what one intends and what one merely expects to bring about as a result of doing what one intends? One way of talking about such cases, due to Bentham (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789), is to say that Betty’s walking across the room is “directly intentional,” whereas her interrupting the conversation is only “obliquely intentional” (or indirectly intentional). -- intentional fallacy, the (purported) fallacy of holding that the meaning of a work of art is fixed by the artist’s intentions. (Wimsatt and Beardsintensive magnitude intentional fallacy 440 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:40 AM Page 440 ley, who introduced the term, also used it to name the [purported] fallacy that the artist’s aims are relevant to determining the success of a work of art; however, this distinct usage has not gained general currency.) Wimsatt and Beardsley were formalists; they held that interpretation should focus purely on the work of art itself and should exclude appeal to biographical information about the artist, other than information concerning the private meanings the artist attached to his words. Whether the intentional fallacy is in fact a fallacy is a much discussed issue within aesthetics. Intentionalists deny that it is: they hold that the meaning of a work of art is fixed by some set of the artist’s intentions. For instance, Richard Wollheim (Painting as an Art) holds that the meaning of a painting is fixed by the artist’s fulfilled intentions in making it. Other intentionalists appeal not to the actual artist’s intentions, but to the intentions of the implied or postulated artist, a construct of criticism, rather than a real person. See also AESTHETIC FORMALISM, AESTHETICS, INTENTION. B.Ga. intentionality, aboutness. Things that are about other things exhibit intentionality. Beliefs and other mental states exhibit intentionality, but so, in a derived way, do sentences and books, maps and pictures, and other representations. The adjective ‘intentional’ in this philosophical sense is a technical term not to be confused with the more familiar sense, characterizing something done on purpose. Hopes and fears, for instance, are not things we do, not intentional acts in the latter, familiar sense, but they are intentional phenomena in the technical sense: hopes and fears are about various things. The term was coined by the Scholastics in the Middle Ages, and derives from the Latin verb intendo, ‘to point (at)’ or ‘aim (at)’ or ‘extend (toward)’. Phenomena with intentionality thus point outside of themselves to something else: whatever they are of or about. The term was revived by the nineteenth-century philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano, who claimed that intentionality defines the distinction between the mental and the physical; all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality. Since intentionality is an irreducible feature of mental phenomena, and since no physical phenomena could exhibit it, mental phenomena could not be a species of physical phenomena. This claim, often called the Brentano thesis or Brentano’s irreducibility thesis, has often been cited to support the view that the mind cannot be the brain, but this is by no means generally accepted today. There was a second revival of the term in the 1960s and 1970s by analytic philosophers, in particular Chisholm, Sellars, and Quine. Chisholm attempted to clarify the concept by shifting to a logical definition of intentional idioms, the terms used to speak of mental states and events, rather than attempting to define the intentionality of the states and events themselves. Intentional idioms include the familiar “mentalistic” terms of folk psychology, but also their technical counterparts in theories and discussions in cognitive science, ‘X believes that p,’ and ‘X desires that q’ are paradigmatic intentional idioms, but according to Chisholm’s logical definition, in terms of referential opacity (the failure of substitutivity of coextensive terms salva veritate), so are such less familiar idioms as ‘X stores the information that p’ and ‘X gives high priority to achieving the state of affairs that q’. Although there continue to be deep divisions among philosophers about the proper definition or treatment of the concept of intentionality, there is fairly widespread agreement that it marks a featureaboutness or contentthat is central to mental phenomena, and hence a central, and difficult, problem that any theory of mind must solve.

 

INTER-SUB-IAECTVM -- intersubjectiveGrice: “Who was the first Grecian philosopher to philosophise on conversational intersubjectivity? Surely Plato! Socrates is just his alter egoand after Aeschylus, there is always a ‘deuterogonist’”! conversational intersubjectivity. Philosophical sociologyWhile Grice saw himself as a philosophical psychologist, he would rather be seen dead than as a philosophical sociologist‘intersubjective at most’! -- Comte: A. philosopher and sociologist, the founder of positivism. He was educated in Paris at l’École Polytechnique, where he briefly taught mathematics. He suffered from a mental illness that occasionally interrupted his work. In conformity with empiricism, Comte held that knowledge of the world arises from observation. He went beyond many empiricists, however, in denying the possibility of knowledge of unobservable physical objects. He conceived of positivism as a method of study based on observation and restricted to the observable. He applied positivism chiefly to science. He claimed that the goal of science is prediction, to be accomplished using laws of succession. Explanation insofar as attainable has the same structure as prediction. It subsumes events under laws of succession; it is not causal. Influenced by Kant, he held that the causes of phenomena and the nature of things-in-themselves are not knowable. He criticized metaphysics for ungrounded speculation about such matters; he accused it of not keeping imagination subordinate to observation. He advanced positivism for all the sciences but held that each science has additional special methods, and has laws not derivable by human intelligence from laws of other sciences. He corresponded extensively with J. S. Mill, who Comte, Auguste Comte, Auguste 168   168 encouraged his work and discussed it in Auguste Comte and Positivism 1865. Twentieth-century logical positivism was inspired by Comte’s ideas. Comte was a founder of sociology, which he also called social physics. He divided the science into two branches  statics and dynamics dealing respectively with social organization and social development. He advocated a historical method of study for both branches. As a law of social development, he proposed that all societies pass through three intellectual stages, first interpreting phenomena theologically, then metaphysically, and finally positivistically. The general idea that societies develop according to laws of nature was adopted by Marx. Comte’s most important work is his six-volume Cours de philosophie positive Course in Positive Philosophy, 183042. It is an encyclopedic treatment of the sciences that expounds positivism and culminates in the introduction of sociology.

 

INTER-VENTUM -- intervention -- intervening variable, in Grice’s philosophical psychology, a state of an organism, person or, as Grice prefers, a ‘pirot,’ (vide his ‘pirotology’) or ‘creature,’ postulated to explain the pirot’s behaviour and defined in ‘functioanlist,’ Aristotelian terms of its cause (perceptual input) and effect (the behavioural output to be explained by attribution of a state of the ‘soul’) rather than its intrinsic properties. A food drive or need for nuts, in a squarrel (as Grice calls his ‘Toby’) conceived as an intervening variable, is defined in terms of the number of hours without food (the cause) and the strength or robustness of efforts to secure it (effect).. The squarrel’s feeling hungry (‘needing a nut), is no longer an intrinsic propertythe theoretical term ‘need’ is introduced in a ramseyified sentence by describingand it need not be co-related to a state in the brainsince there is room for variable realisability. Grice sees at least three reasons for postulating an intervening variable (like the hours without nut-hobbling). First, time lapse between stimulus (perceptual input) and behavioural output may be large, as when an animaleven a squirrel -- eats food found hours earlier. Why did not the animal hobble the nut when it first found it? Perhaps at the time of discovery, the squarrel had already eaten, so food drive (the squarrel’s need) is reduced. Second, Toby may act differently in the same sort of situation, as when Toby hobbles a nut at noon one day but delay until sunset the next. Again, this may be because of variation in food drive or the squarrel’s need. Third, behaviour may occur in the absence of external stimulation or perceptual input, as when Toby forages for nut for the winter. This, too, may be explained by the strength of the food drive or squarrel’s need. An intervening variables has been viewed, as Grice notes reviewing Oxonian philosophical psychology from Stout to Ryle via Prichard) depending on the background theory, as a convenient ‘fiction’ (as Ramsey, qua theoretical construct) or as a psychologically real state, or as a physically real state with multiple realisability conditions. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre,” in “The Conception of value.”

 

IN-TUITUM -- intuitum: Grice: “At Oxford, the tutor teaches to trust your ‘intuition’and will point to the cognateness of ‘tutor’ and ‘in-tuition’!”tŭĕor , tuĭtus, 2 (  I.perf. only post-Aug., Quint. 5, 13, 35; Plin. Ep. 6, 29, 10; collat. form tūtus, in the part., rare, Sall. J. 74, 3; Front. Strat. 2, 12, 13; but constantly in the P. a.; inf. parag. tuerier, Plaut. Rud. 1, 4, 35; collat. form acc. to the 3d conj. tŭor , Cat. 20, 5; Stat. Th. 3, 151: “tuĕris,” Plaut. Trin. 3, 2, 82: “tuimur,” Lucr. 1, 300; 4, 224; 4, 449; “6, 934: tuamur,” id. 4, 361: “tuantur,” id. 4, 1004; imper. tuĕre, id. 5, 318), v. dep. a. [etym. dub.], orig., to see, to look or gaze upon, to watch, view; hence, pregn., to see or look to, to defend, protect, etc.: tueri duo significat; unum ab aspectu, unde est Ennii illud: tueor te senex? pro Juppiter! (Trag. v. 225 Vahl.); “alterum a curando ac tutela, ut cum dicimus bellum tueor et tueri villam,” Varr. L. L. 7, § 12 Müll. sq.—Accordingly, I. To look at, gaze at, behold, watch, view, regard, consider, examine, etc. (only poet.; syn.: specto, adspicio, intueor): quam te post multis tueor tempestatibus, Pac. ap. Non. 407, 32; 414, 3: “e tenebris, quae sunt in luce, tuemur,” Lucr. 4, 312: “ubi nil aliud nisi aquam caelumque tuentur,” id. 4, 434: “caeli templa,” id. 6, 1228 al.: “tuendo Terribiles oculos, vultum, etc.,” Verg. A. 8, 265; cf. id. ib. 1, 713: “talia dicentem jam dudum aversa tuetur,” id. ib. 4, 362: “transversa tuentibus hircis,” id. E. 3, 8: “acerba tuens,” looking fiercely, Lucr. 5, 33; cf. Verg. A. 9, 794: “torva,” id. ib. 6, 467.— (β). With object-clause: “quod multa in terris fieri caeloque tuentur (homines), etc.,” Lucr. 1, 152; 6, 50; 6, 1163.— II. Pregn., to look to, care for, keep up, uphold, maintain, support, guard, preserve, defend, protect, etc. (the predom. class. signif. of the word; cf.: “curo, conservo, tutor, protego, defendo): videte, ne ... vobis turpissimum sit, id, quod accepistis, tueri et conservare non posse,” Cic. Imp. Pomp. 5, 12: “ut quisque eis rebus tuendis conservandisque praefuerat,” Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 63, 140: “omnia,” id. N. D. 2, 23, 60: “mores et instituta vitae resque domesticas ac familiares,” id. Tusc. 1, 1, 2: “societatem conjunctionis humanae munifice et aeque,” id. Fin. 5, 23, 65: “concordiam,” id. Att. 1, 17, 10: rem et gratiam et auctoritatem suam, id. Fam. 13, 49, 1: “dignitatem,” id. Tusc. 2, 21, 48: “L. Paulus personam principis civis facile dicendo tuebatur,” id. Brut. 20, 80: “personam in re publicā,” id. Phil. 8, 10, 29; cf.: tuum munus, Planc. ap. Cic. Fam. 10, 11, 1: “tueri et sustinere simulacrum pristinae dignitatis,” Cic. Rab. Post. 15, 41: “aedem Castoris P. Junius habuit tuendam,” to keep in good order, Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 50, § 130; cf. Plin. Pan. 51, 1: “Bassum ut incustoditum nimis et incautum,” id. Ep. 6, 29, 10: “libertatem,” Tac. A. 3, 27; 14, 60: “se, vitam corpusque tueri,” to keep, preserve, Cic. Off. 1, 4, 11: “antea majores copias alere poterat, nunc exiguas vix tueri potest,” id. Deiot. 8, 22: “se ac suos tueri,” Liv. 5, 4, 5: “sex legiones (re suā),” Cic. Par. 6, 1, 45: “armentum paleis,” Col. 6, 3, 3: “se ceteris armis prudentiae tueri atque defendere,” to guard, protect, Cic. de Or. 1, 38, 172; cf.: “tuemini castra et defendite diligenter,” Caes. B. C. 3, 94: “suos fines,” id. B. G. 4, 8: “portus,” id. ib. 5, 8: “oppidum unius legionis praesidio,” id. B. C. 2, 23: “oram maritimam,” id. ib. 3, 34: “impedimenta,” to cover, protect, Hirt. B. G. 8, 2.—With ab and abl.: “fines suos ab excursionibus et latrociniis,” Cic. Deiot. 8, 22: “domum a furibus,” Phaedr. 3, 7, 10: mare ab hostibus, Auct. B. Afr. 8, 2.—With contra: “quos non parsimoniā tueri potuit contra illius audaciam,” Cic. Prov. Cons. 5, 11: “liberūm nostrorum pueritiam contra inprobitatem magistratuum,” Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 58, § 153; Quint. 5, 13, 35; Plin. 20, 14, 54, § 152; Tac. A. 6, 47 (41).—With adversus: “tueri se adversus Romanos,” Liv. 25, 11, 7: “nostra adversus vim atque injuriam,” id. 7, 31, 3: “adversus Philippum tueri Athenas,” id. 31, 9, 3; 42, 46, 9; 42, 23, 6: “arcem adversus tres cohortes tueri,” Tac. H. 3, 78; Just. 17, 3, 22; 43, 3, 4.—In part. perf.: “Verres fortiter et industrie tuitus contra piratas Siciliam dicitur,” Quint. 5, 13, 35 (al. tutatus): “Numidas in omnibus proeliis magis pedes quam arma tuta sunt,” Sall. J. 74, 3.!*? 1. Act. form tŭĕo , ēre: “censores vectigalia tuento,” Cic. Leg. 3, 3, 7: “ROGO PER SVPEROS, QVI ESTIS, OSSA MEA TVEATIS,” Inscr. Orell. 4788.— 2. tŭĕor , ēri, in pass. signif.: “majores nostri in pace a rusticis Romanis alebantur et in bello ab his tuebantur,” Varr. R. R. 3, 1, 4; Lucr. 4, 361: “consilio et operā curatoris tueri debet non solum patrimonium, sed et corpus et salus furiosi,” Dig. 27, 10, 7: “voluntas testatoris ex bono et aequo tuebitur,” ib. 28, 3, 17.—Hence, tūtus , a, uma. (prop. well seen to or guarded; hence), safe, secure, out of danger (cf. securus, free from fear). A. Lit. (α). Absol.: “nullius res tuta, nullius domus clausa, nullius vita saepta ... contra tuam cupiditatem,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 15, § 39: “cum victis nihil tutum arbitrarentur,” Caes. B. G. 2, 28: “nec se satis tutum fore arbitratur,” Hirt. B. G. 8, 27; cf.: “me biremis praesidio scaphae Tutum per Aegaeos tumultus Aura feret,” Hor. C. 3, 29, 63; Ov. M. 8, 368: “tutus bos rura perambulat,” Hor. C. 4, 5, 17: “quis locus tam firmum habuit praesidium, ut tutus esset?” Cic. Imp. Pomp. 11, 31: “mare tutum praestare,” id. Fl. 13, 31: “sic existimabat tutissimam fore Galliam,” Hirt. B. G. 8, 54: “nemus,” Hor. C. 1, 17, 5: “via fugae,” Cic. Caecin. 15, 44; cf.: “commodior ac tutior receptus,” Caes. B. C. 1, 46: “perfugium,” Cic. Rep. 1, 4, 8: “tutum iter et patens,” Hor. C. 3, 16, 7: “tutissima custodia,” Liv. 31, 23, 9: “praesidio nostro pasci genus esseque tutum,” Lucr. 5, 874: “vitam consistere tutam,” id. 6, 11: “tutiorem et opulentiorem vitam hominum reddere,” Cic. Rep. 1, 2, 3: est et fideli tuta silentio Merces, secure, sure (diff. from certa, definite, certain), Hor. C. 3, 2, 25: “tutior at quanto merx est in classe secundā!” id. S. 1, 2, 47: “non est tua tuta voluntas,” not without danger, Ov. M. 2, 53: “in audaces non est audacia tuta,” id. ib. 10, 544: “externā vi non tutus modo rex, sed invictus,” Curt. 6, 7, 1: “vel tutioris audentiae est,” Quint. 12, prooem. § 4: “ cogitatio tutior,” id. 10, 7, 19: “fuit brevitas illa tutissima,” id. 10, 1, 39: “regnum et diadema tutum Deferens uni,” i. e. that cannot be taken away, Hor. C. 2, 2, 21: male tutae mentis Orestes, i. e. unsound, = male sanae, id. S. 2, 3, 137: quicquid habes, age, Depone tutis auribus, qs. carefully guarded, i. e. safe, faithful, id. C. 1, 27, 18 (cf. the o: auris rimosa, id. S. 2, 6, 46).—Poet., with gen.: “(pars ratium) tuta fugae,” Luc. 9, 346.— (β). With ab and abl.: tutus ab insidiis inimici, Asin. ap. Cic. Fam. 10, 31, 2: “ab insidiis,” Hor. S. 2, 6, 117: “a periculo,” Caes. B. G. 7, 14: “ab hoste,” Ov. H. 11, 44: “ab hospite,” id. M. 1, 144: “a conjuge,” id. ib. 8, 316: “a ferro,” id. ib. 13, 498: “a bello, id. H. (15) 16, 344: ab omni injuriā,” Phaedr. 1, 31, 9.— (γ). With ad and acc.: “turrim tuendam ad omnis repentinos casus tradidit,” Caes. B. C. 3, 39: “ad id, quod ne timeatur fortuna facit, minime tuti sunt homines,” Liv. 25, 38, 14: “testudinem tutam ad omnes ictus video esse,” id. 36, 32, 6.— (δ). With adversus: “adversus venenorum pericula tutum corpus suum reddere,” Cels. 5, 23, 3: “quo tutiores essent adversus ictus sagittarum,” Curt. 7, 9, 2: “loci beneficio adversus intemperiem anni tutus est,” Sen. Ira, 2, 12, 1: “per quem tutior adversus casus steti,” Val. Max. 4, 7, ext. 2: “quorum praesidio tutus adversus hostes esse debuerat,” Just. 10, 1, 7.—（ε) With abl.: incendio fere tuta est Alexandria, Auct. B. Alex. 1, 3.— b. Tutum est, with a subj. -clause, it is prudent or safe, it is the part of a prudent man: “si dicere palam parum tutum est,” Quint. 9, 2, 66; 8, 3, 47; 10, 3, 33: “o nullis tutum credere blanditiis,” Prop. 1, 15, 42: “tutius esse arbitrabantur, obsessis viis, commeatu intercluso sine ullo vulnere victoriā potiri,” Caes. B. G. 3, 24; Quint. 7, 1, 36; 11, 2, 48: “nobis tutissimum est, auctores plurimos sequi,” id. 3, 4, 11; 3, 6, 63.— 2. As subst.: tūtum , i, n., a place of safety, a shelter, safety, security: Tr. Circumspice dum, numquis est, Sermonem nostrum qui aucupet. Th. Tutum probe est, Plaut. Most. 2, 2, 42: “tuta et parvula laudo,” Hor. Ep. 1, 15, 42: “trepidum et tuta petentem Trux aper insequitur,” Ov. M. 10, 714: “in tuto ut collocetur,” Ter. Heaut. 4, 3, 11: “esse in tuto,” id. ib. 4, 3, 30: “ut sitis in tuto,” Cic. Fam. 12, 2, 3: “in tutum eduxi manipulares meos,” Plaut. Most. 5, 1, 7: “in tutum receptus est,” Liv. 2, 19, 6.— B. Transf., watchful, careful, cautious, prudent (rare and not ante-Aug.; “syn.: cautus, prudens): serpit humi tutus nimium timidusque procellae,” Hor. A. P. 28: “tutus et intra Spem veniae cautus,” id. ib. 266: “non nisi vicinas tutus ararit aquas,” Ov. Tr. 3, 12, 36: “id suā sponte, apparebat, tuta celeribus consiliis praepositurum,” Liv. 22, 38, 13: “celeriora quam tutiora consilia magis placuere ducibus,” id. 9, 32, 3.—Hence, adv. in two forms, tūtē and tūtō , safely, securely, in safety, without danger. a. Posit. (α). Form tute (very rare): “crede huic tute,” Plaut. Trin. 1, 2, 102: “eum tute vivere, qui honeste vivat,” Auct. Her. 3, 5, 9: “tute cauteque agere,” id. ib. 3, 7, 13.— (β). Form tuto (class. in prose and poetry): “pervenire,” Plaut. Mil. 2, 2, 70; Lucr. 1, 179: “dimicare,” Caes. B. G. 3, 24: “tuto et libere decernere,” id. B. C. 1, 2: “ut tuto sim,” in security, Cic. Fam. 14, 3, 3: “ut tuto ab repentino hostium incursu etiam singuli commeare possent,” Caes. B. G. 7, 36. — b. Comp.: “ut in vadis consisterent tutius,” Caes. B. G. 3, 13: “tutius et facilius receptus daretur,” id. B. C. 2, 30: “tutius ac facilius id tractatur,” Quint. 5, 5, 1: “usitatis tutius utimur,” id. 1, 5, 71: “ut ubivis tutius quam in meo regno essem,” Sall. J. 14, 11.— c. Sup. (α). Form tutissime: nam te hic tutissime puto fore, Pomp. ap. Cic. Att. 8, 11, A.— (β). Form tutissimo: “quaerere, ubi tutissimo essem,” Cic. Att. 8, 1, 2; cf. Charis. p. 173 P.: “tutissimo infunduntur oboli quattuor,” Plin. 20, 3, 8, § 14. Grice was especially interested in the misuses of intuition. He found that J. L. Austin (born in Lancaster) had “Northern intuitions.” “I myself have proper heart-of-England intuitions.” “Strawson has Cockney intuitions.” “I wonder how we conducted those conversations on Saturday mornings!” “Strictly, an intuition is a non-inferential knowledge or grasp, as of a proposition, concept, or entity, that is not based on perception, memory, or introspection; also, the capacity in virtue of which such cognition is possible. A person might know that 1 ! 1 % 2 intuitively, i.e., not on the basis of inferring it from other propositions. And one might know intuitively what yellow is, i.e., might understand the concept, even though ‘yellow’ is not definable. Or one might have intuitive awareness of God or some other entity. Certain mystics hold that there can be intuitive, or immediate, apprehension of God. Ethical intuitionists hold both that we can have intuitive knowledge of certain moral concepts that are indefinable, and that certain propositions, such as that pleasure is intrinsically good, are knowable through intuition. Self-evident propositions are those that can be seen (non-inferentially) to be true once one fully understands them. It is often held that all and only self-evident propositions are knowable through intuition, which is here identified with a certain kind of intellectual or rational insight. Intuitive knowledge of moral or other philosophical propositions or concepts has been compared to the intuitive knowledge of grammaticality possessed by competent users of a language. Such language users can know immediately whether certain sentences are grammatical or not without recourse to any conscious reasoning. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “My intutions.” BANC.

 

ionian-sea-coast philosophy: Grice, “Or mar ionio, as the Italians have it!” -- the characteristically naturalist and rationalist thought of Grecian philosophers of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. who were active in Ionia, the region of ancient Greek colonies on the coast of Asia Minor and adjacent islands. First of the Ionian philosophers were the three Milesians. Grice: “It always amused me that they called themselves Ionians, but then Williams, who founded Providence in the New World, called himself an Englishman!”. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “The relevance of Ionian philosophy today.”

 

iron-age metaphysics: Euclidean geometry, the version of geometry that includes among its axioms the parallel axiom, which asserts that, given a line L in a plane, there exists just one line in the plane that passes through a point not on L but never meets L. The phrase ‘Euclidean geometry’ refers both to the doctrine of geometry to be found in Euclid’s Elements fourth century B.C. and to the mathematical discipline that was built on this basis afterward. In order to present properties of rectilinear and curvilinear curves in the plane and solids in space, Euclid sought definitions, axioms, ethics, divine command Euclidean geometry 290   290 and postulates to ground the reasoning. Some of his assumptions belonged more to the underlying logic than to the geometry itself. Of the specifically geometrical axioms, the least self-evident stated that only one line passes through a point in a plane parallel to a non-coincident line within it, and many efforts were made to prove it from the other axioms. Notable forays were made by G. Saccheri, J. Playfair, and A. M. Legendre, among others, to put forward results logically contradictory to the parallel axiom e.g., that the sum of the angles between the sides of a triangle is greater than 180° and thus standing as candidates for falsehood; however, none of them led to paradox. Nor did logically equivalent axioms such as that the angle sum equals 180° seem to be more or less evident than the axiom itself. The next stages of this line of reasoning led to non-Euclidean geometry. From the point of view of logic and rigor, Euclid was thought to be an apotheosis of certainty in human knowledge; indeed, ‘Euclidean’ was also used to suggest certainty, without any particular concern with geometry. Ironically, investigations undertaken in the late nineteenth century showed that, quite apart from the question of the parallel axiom, Euclid’s system actually depended on more axioms than he had realized, and that filling all the gaps would be a formidable task. Pioneering work done especially by M. Pasch and G. Peano was brought to a climax in 9 by Hilbert, who produced what was hoped to be a complete axiom system. Even then the axiom of continuity had to wait for the second edition! The endeavor had consequences beyond the Euclidean remit; it was an important example of the growth of axiomatization in mathematics as a whole, and it led Hilbert himself to see that questions like the consistency and completeness of a mathematical theory must be asked at another level, which he called metamathematics. It also gave his work a formalist character; he said that his axiomatic talk of points, lines, and planes could be of other objects. Within the Euclidean realm, attention has fallen in recent decades upon “neo-Euclidean” geometries, in which the parallel axiom is upheld but a different metric is proposed. For example, given a planar triangle ABC, the Euclidean distance between A and B is the hypotenuse AB; but the “rectangular distance” AC ! CB also satisfies the properties of a metric, and a geometry working with it is very useful in, e.g., economic geography, as anyone who drives around a city will readily understand.  Grice: "Much the most significant opposition to my type of philosophising comes from those like Baron Russell who feel that ‘ “ordinary-language” philosophy’ is an affront to science and to intellectual progress, and who regard exponents like me as wantonly dedicating themselves to what the Baron calls 'stone-age metaphysics', "The Baron claims that 'stone-age metaphysics' is the best that can be dredged up from a ‘philosophical’ study of an ‘ordinary’ language, such as Oxonian, as it ain't. "The use made of Russell’s phrase ‘stone-age metaphysics’ has more rhetorical appeal than argumentative force."“Certainly ‘stone-age’ *physics*, if by that we mean a 'primitive' (as the Baron puts it -- in contrast to 'iron-age physics') set of hypotheses about how the world goes which might conceivably be embedded somehow or other in an ‘ordinary’ language such as Oxonian, does not seem to be a proper object for first-order devotion -- I'll grant the Baron that!"“But this fact should *not* prevent something derivable or extractable from ‘stone-age’ (if not 'iron-age') *physics*, perhaps some very general characterization of the nature of reality, from being a proper target for serious research.”"I would not be surprised if an extractable characterization of this may not be the same as that which is extractable from, or that which underlies, the Baron's favoured iron-age physics!" iron-age physics: Grice on Russellian compresence, an unanalyzable relation in terms of which Russell, in his later writings especially in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, 8, took concrete particular objects to be analyzable. Concrete particular objects are analyzable in terms of complexes of qualities all of whose members are compresent. Although this relation can be defined only ostensively, Russell states that it appears in psychology as “simultaneity in one experience” and in physics as “overlapping in space-time.” Complete complexes of compresence are complexes of qualities having the following two properties: 1 all members of the complex are compresent; 2 given anything not a member of the complex, there is at least one member of the complex with which it is not compresent. He argues that there is strong empirical evidence that no two complete complexes have all their qualities in common. Finally, space-time pointinstants are analyzed as complete complexes of compresence. Concrete particulars, on the other hand, are analyzed as series of incomplete complexes of compresence related by certain causal laws. 

 

SEQUITVR/NON-SEQVITVR -- non sequitur --: irrationality, unreasonableness. Whatever it entails, irrationality can characterize belief, desire, intention, and action. intuitions irrationality 443 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:40 AM Page 443 Irrationality is often explained in instrumental, or goal-oriented, terms. You are irrational if you (knowingly) fail to do your best, or at least to do what you appropriately think adequate, to achieve your goals. If ultimate goals are rationally assessable, as Aristotelian and Kantian traditions hold, then rationality and irrationality are not purely instrumental. The latter traditions regard certain specific (kinds of) goals, such as human well-being, as essential to rationality. This substantialist approach lost popularity with the rise of modern decision theory, which implies that, in satisfying certain consistency and completeness requirements, one’s preferences toward the possible outcomes of available actions determine what actions are rational and irrational for one by determining the personal utility of their outcomes. Various theorists have faulted modern decision theory on two grounds: human beings typically lack the consistent preferences and reasoning power required by standard decision theory but are not thereby irrational, and rationality requires goods exceeding maximally efficient goal satisfaction. When relevant goals concern the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of falsehood, epistemic rationality and irrationality are at issue. Otherwise, some species of non-epistemic rationality or irrationality is under consideration. Species of non-epistemic rationality and irrationality correspond to the kind of relevant goal: moral, prudential, political, economic, aesthetic, or some other. A comprehensive account of irrationality will elucidate epistemic and non-epistemic irrationality as well as such sources of irrationality as weakness of will and ungrounded belief.

 

esse:“est” (“Homo animale rationalis est”Aristotle, cited by Grice in “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”)“is” is the third person singular form of the verb ‘be’, with at least three fundamental usages that philosophers distinguish according to the resources required for a proper semantic representation. First, there is the ‘is’ of existence, which Grice finds otiose“Marmaduke Bloggs is a journalist who climbed Mt Everest on hands and kneesa typical invention by journalists”. (There is a unicorn in the garden: Dx (Ux8Gx)) uses the existential quantifier. Bellerophon’s dad: “There is a flying horse in the stable.” “That’s mine, dad.”Then, second, there is the ‘is’ of identity (Hesperus is Phosphorus: j % k) employs the predicate of identity, or dyadic relation of “=,” as per Leibniz’s problem“The king of France”Kx = Ky. Then third there is the ‘is’ of predication, which can be essential (izzing) or accidentail (hazzing). (Samson is strong: Sj) merely juxtaposes predicate symbol and proper name. Some controversy attends the first usage. Some (notably that eccentric philosopher that went by the name of Meinong) maintain that ‘is’ applies more broadly than ‘exists.’ “Is” produces truths when combined with ‘deer’ and ‘unicorn.’ ‘Exists,’ rather than ‘is’, produces a truth when combined with ‘deer’ -- but not ‘unicorn’. Aquinas takes “esse” to denote some special activity that every existing thing necessarily performs, which would seem to imply that with ‘est’ they attribute more to an object than we do with ‘exists’. Other issues arise in connection with the second usage. Does, e.g. “Hesperus is Phosphorus,” attribute anything more to the heavenly body than its identity with itself? Consideration of such a question leads Frege, wrongly to conclude, in what Ryle calls the “Fido”-Fido theory of meaning that names (and other meaningful expressions) of ordinary language have a “sense” or “mode of presenting” the thing to which they refer that representations within our standard, extensional logical systems fail to expose. The distinction between the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication parallels Frege’s distinction between ‘objekt” and concept: words signifying objects stand to the right of the ‘is’ of identity and those signifying concepts stand to the right of the ‘is’ of predication. Although it seems remarkable that so many deep and difficult philosophical concepts should link to a single short and commonplace word, we should perhaps not read too much into that observation. Grecian and Roman indeed divide the various roles played by English’s compact copula among several constructions, but there are dialects, even within Oxford, that use the expression “is” for other purposes. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being.”

 

-ism: used by Grice derogatorily. In his ascent to the City of the Eternal Truth, he meets twelve –isms, which he orders alphabetically. These are: Empiricism. Extensionalism. Functionalism. MaterialismMechanism. Naturalism. Nominalism. Phenomenalism. Positivism. Physicalism. Reductionism. Scepticism. Grice’s implicaturum is that each is a form of, er, minimalism, as opposed to maximalism. He also seems to implicate that, while embracing one of those –isms is a reductionist vice, embracing their opposites is a Christian virtueHe explicitly refers to the name of Bunyan’s protagonist, “Christian”“in a much more publicized journey, I grant.” So let’s see how we can correlate each vicious heathen ism with the Griceian Christian virtuous ism. Empiricism. “Surely not all is experience. My bones are not.” Opposite: Rationalism. Extensionalism. Surely the empty set cannot end up being the fullest! Opposite Intensionalism. Functionalism. What is the function of love? We have to extend functionalism to cover one’s concern for the otherAnd also there’s otiosity. Opposite: Mentalism. MaterialismMy bones are ‘hyle,’ but my eternal soul ’t. Opposite Spiritualism.  MechanismSurely there is finality in nature, and God designed it. Opposite Vitalism. NaturalismSurely Aristotle meant something by ‘ta meta ta physica,’ There is a transnatural realm. Opposite: Transnaturalism.  Nominalism. Occam was good, except with his ‘sermo mentalis.’ Opposite: Realism. PhenomenalismAustin and Grice soon realised that Berlin was wrong. Opposite ‘thing’-language-ism. PositivismAnd then there’s not. Opposite: Negativism.  PhysicalismSurely my soul is not a brain state. Opposite: Transnaturalism, since Physicalismm and Naturalism mean the same thing, ony in Greek, the other in Latin.  ReductionismJulie is wrong when she thinks I’m a reductionist. Opposite: Reductivism.  Scepticism: Surely there’s common sense. Opposite: Common-Sensism. Refs: H. P. Grice, “Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice,” The Grice Papers, BANC.

 

isocratesGrice: “the chief rival of Plato.” A pupil of Socrates and also of Gorgias, Isocrates founds a play group or club in Athensvide H. P. Grice, “Athenian dialectic” -- that attracts many aristocrats. Many of Isocrates’s philosophy touches on ‘dialectic.’ “Against the Sophists and On the Antidosis are most important in this respect. “On the antidosis” stands to Isocrates as the “Apology” of Plato stands to Socrates, a defense of Socrates against an attack not on his life, but on his property. The aim of Isocrates’s philosophy is good judgment in practical affairs, and he believes his contribution to Greece through education more valuable than legislation could possibly be. Isocrates repudiates instruction in theoretical (what he called ‘otiose’) philosophy, and insisted on distinguishing his teaching of rhetoric from the sophistry that gives clever speakers an unfair advantage. In politics Isocrates is a Panhellenic patriot, and urges the warring Greek city-states to unite under strong leadership and take arms against the Persian Empire. His most famous work, and the one in which he took the greatest pride, is the “Panegyricus,” a speech in praise of Athens. In general, Isocrates supports democracy in Athens, but toward the end of his life complained bitterly of abuses of the system.

 

Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici: the title is telling, This is an institute for philosophical studies, aka ‘research.’ Cf. Witters, “Philosophische untersuchungen,” translated as ‘investigations.’ Grice prefers ‘studio,’ as in ‘studi’ (Studies in the way of words).

 

italicus -- italiano: Italian philosophy. Grice loved it and could recite an Italian philosopher for each letter of the alphabet, including the famous Alessandro Speranza, from Milano! Grice: “Of course there is a longtitudinal unity between Graeco-Roman philosophy and Italian philosophy; Italian after all IS Latin. I experienced the ‘inglese italianato, diavolo incarnato’ at Oxfordespecially with the ‘aesthetes.’!” Grice: “Short and Lewis have an entry for “Italicus,” which unhelpfully render as “Italian”!” --. Grice: “In any case, Italians don’t use ‘Italian’ muchthey prefer ‘Roman,’ as in ‘Graeco-Roman.’” an evolution from Roman, or Latin. A topic that fascinated Grice. Grice: “Most of Italian philosophical vocabulary, if not all, is Roman  in origin. There are a few terms from Etrurian, and even fewer from Uscan. This is good, because Anglo-Saxon, like Roman, are Aryan, so the roots have a bite with an Englishman like me.” Grice: “Most Italians regard ‘Italian’ as a universal. There’s Tuscan, and Ligurian, and Venetian. But no Italian!”  Grice: “There is a continuity between Roman and Italian (or vernacular, as the Italians prefer). Some Italian snobs call Italian the ‘volgare,’ but then vulgus is Deutsche, the people!” --.  Italian: Grice: “Latin is a member of the Italic family of the Indo-European Languages. Romantic is another.” --  H. P. Grice: “It’s absurd the little Oxonians know about Italyit’s all about the Grand Tour! The only Oxonian seriously into things Italian, that I know of, are Collingwood, Bosanquet, and the fashionable Hegelians!” “As a response, I propose to lecture on Italian philosophy, with a view to implicature.” Italy over the ages has had a vast influence on Western philosophy, beginning with the Greeks and Romans, and going onto Renaissance humanism, the Age of Enlightenment and modern philosophy. Philosophy is brought to Italy by Pythagoras, founder of the Italian school of philosophy in Crotone. Major Italian philosophers of the Grecian period include: Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles, and, lastly, Gorgias, responsible for bringing philosophy to Athens. There are several formidable Roman philosophers, such as: Cicero, Lucretius, Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Clement of Alexandria, Alcinous, Sextus Empiricus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Themistius, Augustine of Hippo, Proclus, Philoponus of Alexandria, Damascius, Boethius, and Simplicius of Cilicia. Roman philosophy is heavily influenced by that of Greece. Italian mediaeval philosophy is mainly Christian, and includes several important philosophers and theologians such as Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas is a student of Albert the Great, a brilliant Dominican experimentalist, much like the Franciscan Roger Bacon of Oxford. Aquinas reintroduces Aristotelian philosophy to Christianity. Aquinas believes that there is no contradiction between faith and secular reason. Aquinas believes that Aristotle achieves the pinnacle in the human striving for truth, and thus adopts Aristotle's philosophy as a framework in constructing his theological and philosophical outlook. Aquinas is a professor at the prestigious University of Paris. The Renaissance is an essentially Italian (Florentine) movement, and also a great period of the arts and philosophy. Among the distinctive elements of Renaissance philosophy are: — the revival (renaissance means "rebirth") of classical civilisation and learning. — a partial return to the authority of Plato over Aristotle, who had come to dominate later medieval philosophy; and — among some philosophers, enthusiasm for the occult and Hermeticism. As with all periods, there is a wide drift of dates, reasons for categorization and boundaries. In particular, the Renaissance, more than later periods, is thought to begin in Italy with the Italian Renaissance and roll through Europe. Renaissance Humanism was a European intellectual movement that was a crucial component of the Renaissance, beginning in Florence, and affected most of Italy. The humanist movement develops from the rediscovery by European scholars of Latin literary and Greek literary texts. Initially, a humanist was simply a scholar or teacher of Latin literature. Humanism describes a curriculumthe “studia humanitatis”consisting of grammar, rhetoric, moral philosophy, poetry, and history, as studied via Latin and Greek literary authors. Humanism offers the necessary intellectual and philological tools for the first critical analysis of texts. An early triumph of textual criticism by Lorenzo Valla reveals the Donation of Constantine to be an early medieval forgery produced in the Curia. This textual criticism creates sharper controversy when Erasmus follows Valla in criticising the accuracy of the Vulgate translation of the New Testament, and promoting readings from the original Greek manuscripts of the New Testament. Italian Renaissance humanists believe that the liberal arts (art, music, grammar, rhetoric, oratory, history, poetry, using classical texts, and the studies of all of the above) should be practiced by all levels of "richness". Italian humanists also approve of self, human worth and individual dignity. Italian humanists hold the belief that everything in life has a determinate nature, but man's privilege is to be able to choose his own path. Pico della Mirandola writes the following concerning the creation of the universe and man's place in it: “But when the work was finished, the Craftsman kept wishing that there were someone to ponder the plan of so great a work, to love its beauty, and to wonder at its vastness.” “Therefore, when everything was done, He finally took thought concerning the creation of man.” “He therefore took man as a creature of indeterminate nature and, assigning him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus.” “”Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and according to thy judgement thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form and what functions thou thyself shalt desire.”” “”The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of law.”” “”Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish.”” “”Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgement, to be born into the higher forms, which are divine."” Italy is also affected by a movement called Neoplatonism, which is a movement which had a general revival of interest in Classical antiquity. Interest in Platonism is especially strong in Florence under the Medici. During the sessions at Florence of the Council of Ferrara-Florence, during the failed attempts to heal the schism of the Orthodox and Catholic churches, Cosimo de' Medici and his intellectual circle make acquaintance with the Neoplatonic philosopher George Gemistos Plethon. Plethon’s discourses upon Plato and the Alexandrian mystics so fascinate the learned society of Florence that they name him the second Plato. John Argyropoulos is lecturing on Greek language and literature at Florence, and Marsilio Ficino becomes his pupil. When Cosimo de’ Medici decides to refound Plato's Academy at Florence, his choice to head it is Ficino, who makes the classic translation of Plato from Greek to Latin, as well as a translation of a collection of Hellenistic Greek documents of the Hermetic Corpus, and the writings of many of the Neoplatonists, for example Porphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus, et al.. Following suggestions laid out by Gemistos Plethon, Ficino tries to synthesize Christianity and Platonism. Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli is an Italian philosopher, and is considered one of the most influential Italian Renaissance philosophers and one of the main founders of modern political science. Machiavelli’s most famous work is “The Prince.” “The Prince”’s contribution to the history of political thought is the fundamental break between political realism and political idealism. Machiavelli’s best-known essay exposits and describes the arts with which a ruling prince can maintain control of his realm. The essay concentrates on the "new prince", under the presumption that a hereditary prince has an easier task in ruling, since the people are accustomed to him. To retain power, the hereditary prince must carefully maintain the socio-political institutions to which the people are accustomed; whereas a new prince has the more difficult task in ruling, since he must first stabilize his new-found power in order to build an enduring political structure. That requires the prince being a public figure above reproach, whilst privately acting immorally to maintain his state. The examples are those princes who most successfully obtain and maintain power, drawn from Machiavelli’s observations as a Florentine diplomat, and his ancient history readings; thus, the Latin phrases and Classic examples. “The Prince” politically defines “virtu” as any quality that helps a prince rule his state effectively. Machiavelli is aware of the irony of good results coming from evil actions, and because of this, the Catholic Church proscribes “The Prince,” registering it to the “Index Librorum Prohibitorum,” moreover, the Humanists also viewed the essay negatively, among them, Erasmus of Rotterdam. As a treatise, the primary intellectual contribution of Machiavelli’s “Prince” to the history of political thought is the fundamental break between political Realism and political Idealism — thus, “The Prince” is a manual to acquiring and keeping political power. In contrast with Plato and Aristotle, a Classical ideal society is not the aim of the prince’s will to power. As a political philosopher, Machiavelli emphasises necessary, methodical exercise of brute force and deception to preserve the status quo. Between Machiavelli's advice to ruthless and tyrannical princes in “The Prince” and his more republican exhortations in “Discorsi,” some conclude that “The Prince” is actually only a satire. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for instance, admires Machiavelli the republican and, consequently, argues that “The Prince” is an essay for the republicans as it exposes the methods used by princes. If “The Prince” is only intended as a manual for tyrannical rulers, it contains a paradox: It is apparently more effective if the secrets “The Prince” contains would *not* be made publicly available. Also Antonio Gramsci argues that Machiavelli's audience is the common people because the rulers already know these methods through their education. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Machiavelli writes in the vernacular, Italian, not in Latin (which would have been the language of the ruling elite). Although Machiavelli is supposed to be a realist, many of his heroes in “The Prince” are in fact mythical or semi-mythical, and his goal (i.e. the unification of Italy) essentially utopian at the time of writing. Many of Machiavelli’s contemporaries associate him with the political tracts offering the idea of “Reason of State”, an idea proposed most notably in the writings of Jean Bodin and Giovanni Botero. To this day, contemporary usage of “Machiavellian” is an adjective describing someone who is "marked by cunning, duplicty, or bad faith.” “The Prince” is the treatise that is most responsible for the term being brought about. To this day, "Machiavellian" remains a popular term used in casual and political contexts, while in psychology, "Machiavellianism" denotes a personality type. Cesare Beccaria is one of the greatest writers of the Italian Age of Enlightenment. Italy is also affected by the enlightenment, a movement which is a consequence of the Renaissance and changes the road of Italian philosophy. Followers of the group often meet to discuss in private salons and coffeehouses, notably in the cities of Milan, Rome and Venice. Cities with important universities such as Padua, Bologna and Naples, however, also remain great centres of scholarship and the intellect, with several philosophers, such as Giambattista Vico (who is widely regarded as being the founder of modern Italian philosophy) and Antonio Genovesi. Italian society also dramatically changes during the Enlightenment, with rulers such as Leopold II of Tuscany abolishing the death penalty. The church's power is significantly reduced, and it is a period of great thought and invention, with scientists such as Alessandro Volta and Luigi Galvani discovering new things and greatly contributing to Western science. Beccaria is also one of the greatest Italian Enlightenment writers, who is famous for his masterpiece “Of Crimes and Punishments.” Italy also has a renowned philosophical movement with Idealism, Sensism and Empiricism. The main Sensist Italian philosophers are Gioja and Romagnosi. Criticism of the Sensist movement comes from other philosophers such as Pasquale Galluppi, who affirms that a priori relationships are synthetic. Antonio Rosmini, instead, is the founder of Italian Idealism. The most comprehensive view of Rosmini's philosophical standpoint is to be found in his “Sistema filosofico,” in which he sets forth the conception of a complete encyclopaedia of the human knowable, synthetically conjoined, according to the order of ideas, in a perfectly harmonious whole. Contemplating the position of recent philosophy from Locke to Hegel, and having his eye directed to the ancient and fundamental problem of the origin, truth and certainty of our ideas, Rosmini writes: “If philosophy is to be restored to love and respect, I think it will be necessary, in part, to return to the teachings of the ancients, and in part to give those teachings the benefit of modern methods.” — Theodicy, a. 148. Rosmini examines and analyses the fact of human knowledge, and obtains the following results: — the notion or idea of being or existence in general enters into, and is presupposed by, all our acquired cognitions, so that, without it, they would be impossible. — this idea is essentially objective, inasmuch as what is seen in it is as distinct from and opposed to the mind that sees it as the light is from the eye that looks at it. — the idea is essentially true, because being and truth are convertible terms, and because in the vision of it the mind cannot err, since error could only be committed by a judgment, and here there is no judgment, but a pure intuition affirming nothing and denying nothing. — by the application of this essentially objective and true idea the human being intellectually perceives, first, the animal body individually conjoined with him, and then, on occasion of the sensations produced in him not by himself, the causes of those sensations, that is, from the action felt he perceives and affirms an agent, a being, and therefore a true thing, that acts on him, and he thus gets at the external world, these are the true primitive judgments, containing the subsistence of the particular being (subject), and its essence or species as determined by the quality of the action felt from it (predicate) — reflection, by separating the essence or species from the subsistence, obtains the full specific idea (universalization), and then from this, by leaving aside some of its elements, the abstract specific idea (abstraction). — the mind, having reached this stage of development, can proceed to further and further abstracts, including the first principles of reasoning, the principles of the several sciences, complex ideas, groups of ideas, and so on without end, and, finally, — the same most universal idea of being, this generator and formal element of all acquired cognitions, cannot itself be acquired, but must be innate in us, implanted by God in our nature. Being, as naturally shining to our mind, must therefore be what men call the light of reason. Hence the name Rosmini gives it of ideal being; and this he lays down as the fundamental principle of all philosophy and the supreme criterion of truth and certainty. This Rosmini believes to be the teaching of St Augustine, as well as of St Thomas, of whom he was an ardent admirer and defender. In the 19th century, there are also several other movements which gain some form of popularity in Italy, such as Ontologism. The main Italian son of this philosophical movement is Vincenzo Gioberti, a metaphysician. Gioberti's writings are more important than his political career. In the history of Italian philosophy they stand apart. As the speculations of Rosmini-Serbati, against which he wrote, have been called the last link added to medieval thought, so the system of Gioberti, known as Ontologism, more especially in his greater and earlier works, is unrelated to other modern schools of thought. It shows a harmony with the Roman Catholic faith which caused Cousin to declare that Italian philosophy was still in the bonds of theology, and that Gioberti was no philosopher. Method is with Gioberti a synthetic, subjective and psychological instrument. Gioberti reconstructs, as he declares, ontology, and begins with the ideal formula, the "Ens" creates ex nihilo the existent. God is the only being (Ens). All other things are merely existences. God is the origin of all human knowledge (called lidea, thought), which is one and so to say identical with God himself. It is directly beheld (intuited) by reason, but in order to be of use it has to be reflected on, and this by means of language. A knowledge of being and existences (concrete, not abstract) and their mutual relations, is necessary as the beginning of philosophy. Gioberti is in some respects a Platonist. Gioberti identifies religion with civilization, and in his treatise “Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani” he arrives at the conclusion that the church is the axis on which the well-being of human life revolves. In it Gioberti affirms the idea of the supremacy of Italy, brought about by the restoration of the papacy as a moral dominion, founded on religion and public opinion. In his later works, the “Rinnovamento” and the “Protologia,” Gioberti is thought by some to have shifted his ground under the influence of events. Gioberti’s first work had a personal reason for its existence. A fellow-exile and friend, Paolo Pallia, having many doubts and misgivings as to the reality of revelation and a future life, Gioberti at once set to work with “La Teorica del sovrannaturale,” which was his first publication. After this, philosophical treatises follow in rapid succession. The “Teorica” is followed by “Introduzione allo studio della filosofia.” In this work Gioberti states his reasons for requiring a new method and new terminology. Here Gioberti brings out the doctrine that religion is the direct expression of the idea in this life, and is one with true civilization in history. Civilization is a conditioned mediate tendency to perfection, to which religion is the final completion if carried out. It is the end of the second cycle expressed by the second formula, the Ens redeems existences. Essays on the lighter and more popular subjects, “Del bello” and “Del buono,” follow the “Introduzione.” “Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani” and the “Prolegomeni” to the same, and soon afterwards his triumphant exposure of the Jesuits, “Il Gesuita moderno,” no doubt hastens the transfer of rule from clerical to civil hands. It is the popularity of these semi-political works, increased by other occasional political articles, and his “Rinnovamento civile d'Italia,” that causes Gioberti to be welcomed with such enthusiasm on his return to his native country. All these works are perfectly orthodox, and aid in drawing the liberal clergy into the movement which results since his time in the unification of Italy. The Jesuits, however, closed round the pope more firmly after his return to Rome, and in the end Gioberti's writings are placed on the Index. The remainder of his works, especially “La Filosofia della Rivelazione” and the “Prolologia,” give his mature views on many points. Other Ontological philosophers include Terenzio Mamiani, Luigi Ferri, and Ausonio Franchi. Augusto Vera is probably the greatest Italian Hegelianist philosopher. It is during his studies, with his cousin in Paris, that Vera comes to know about philosophy and through them he acquires knowledge of Hegelianism and it culminates during the events of the French Revolution. In England Vera continues his studies of Hegelian philosophy. During his years in Naples, Vera maintains relationships with the Philosophical Society of Berlin, which originally consists of Hegelians, and keeps up to date with both the German and the French Hegelian literature. Vera undertakes a close commentary of Hegel's “Introduzione alla filosofia.” Much of Vera’s work on neo-Hegelian theories are undertaken with Bertrando Spaventa. Some see the Italian Hegelian doctrine as leading to Italian Fascism. Some of the most prominent philosophies and ideologies in Italy also include anarchism, communism, socialism, futurism, fascism, and Christian democracy. Both futurism and fascism (in its original form, now often distinguished as Italian fascism) are developed in Italy at this time. Italian Fascism is the official philosophy and ideology of the Italian government. Giovanni Gentile is one of the greatest Italian Idealist/Fascist philosophers, who greatly supports Benito Mussolini. Gentile has a great number of developments within his thought and career which define his philosophy: — the discovery of Actual Idealism in his work “Theory of the Pure Act” — the political favour he felt for the invasion of Libya and the entry of Italy into The Great War. — the dispute with Benedetto Croce over the historic inevitability of Fascism. — his role as education minister. — Gentile’s belief that Fascism can be made to be subservient to his thought and the gathering of influence through the work of such students as Ugo Spirito. Benedetto Croce writes that Gentile "holds the honour of being the most rigorous neo–Hegelian in the entire history of Western philosophy and the dishonour of being the official philosopher of Fascism in Italy." Gentile’s philosophical basis for fascism is rooted in his understanding of ontology and epistemology, in which he finds vindication for the rejection of individualism, acceptance of collectivism, with the state as the ultimate location of authority and loyalty to which the individual found in the conception of individuality no meaning outside of the state (which in turn justifies totalitarianism). Ultimately, Gentile foresees a social order wherein opposites of all kinds are not to be given sanction as existing independently from each other; that 'publicness' and 'privateness' as broad interpretations were currently false as imposed by all former kinds of Government; capitalism, communism, and that only the reciprocal totalitarian state of Corporative Syndicalism, a Fascist state, could defeat these problems made from reifying as an external that which is in fact to Gentile only a thinking reality. Whereas it was common in the philosophy of the time to see conditional subject as abstract and object as concrete, Gentile postulates the opposite, that subject is the concrete and objectification is abstraction (or rather; that what was conventionally dubbed "subject" is in fact only conditional object, and that true subject is the 'act of' being or essence above any object). Gentile is a notable philosophical theorist of his time throughout Europe, since having developed his 'Actual Idealism' system of Idealism, sometimes called 'Actualism.' It is especially in which his ideas put subject to the position of a transcending truth above positivism that garnered attention; by way that all senses about the world only take the form of ideas within one's mind in any real sense; to Gentile even the analogy between the function and location of the physical brain with the functions of the physical body were a consistent creation of the mind (and not brain; which was a creation of the mind and not the other way around). An example of Actual Idealism in Theology is the idea that although man may have invented the concept of God, it does not make God any less real in any sense possible as far as it is not presupposed to exist as abstraction and except in case qualities about what existence actually entails (i.e. being invented apart from the thinking making it) are presupposed. Benedetto Croce objects that Gentile's "pure act" is nothing other than Schopenhauer's will. Therefore, Gentile proposes a form of what he calls 'absolute Immanentism' in which the divine is the present conception of reality in the totality of one's individual thinking as an evolving, growing and dynamic process. Many times accused of Solipsism, Gentile maintains his philosophy to be a Humanism that senses the possibility of nothing beyond what was contingent; the self's human thinking, in order to communicate as immanence is to be human like oneself, makes a cohesive empathy of the self-same, without an external division, and therefore not modeled as objects to one's own thinking. Meanwhile, anarchism, communism, and socialism, though not originating in Italy, take significant hold in Italy with the country producing numerous significant figures in anarchist, socialist, and communist thought. In addition, anarcho-communism first fully forms into its modern strain within the Italian section of the First International. Italian anarchists often adhere to forms of anarcho-communism, illegalist or insurrectionary anarchism, collectivist anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, and platformism. Some of the most important figures in the anarchist movement include Italians such as: Errico Malatesta, Giuseppe Fanelli, Carlo Cafiero, Alfredo M. Bonanno, Pietro Gori, Luigi Galleani, Severino Di Giovanni, Giuseppe Ciancabilla, Luigi Fabbri, Camillo Berneri, and Sacco and Vanzetti. Other Italian figures, influential in both the anarchist and socialist movements, include Carlo Tresca and Andrea Costa, as well as the author, director, and intellectual Pier Paolo Pasolini. Antonio Gramsci remains an important philosopher within Marxist and communist theory, credited with creating the theory of cultural hegemony. Italian philosophers are also influential in the development of the non-Marxist liberal socialism philosophy, including: Carlo Rosselli, Norberto Bobbio, Piero Gobetti, Aldo Capitini, and Guido Calogero. Many Italian left-wing activists adopt the anti-authoritarian pro-working class leftist theories that become known as autonomism and “operaismo.” Giuseppe Peano is one of the founders of analytic philosophy and contemporary philosophy of mathematics. Recent analytic philosophers include: Mauro Dorato, Carlo Penco, Francesco Berto, Emiliano Boccardi, Alessandro Torza, Matteo Plebiani, Luciano Floridi, Luca Moretti, and, among the Griceians, Anna Maria Ghersi and Luigi Speranza. See also: List of Italian philosophers References: See: Jerry Bentley, “Humanists and holy writ” Princeton University Pico Yates, Frances A. “Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition” University of Chicago Press Moschovitis Group Inc, Christian D. Von Dehsen and Scott L. Harris, “Philosophers and religious leaders,” The Oryx Press, 117. Definition of MACHIAVELLIAN merriam-webster Skinner, Quentin “Machiavelli: A Very Short Introduction.” OUP Oxford. Christie, Richard; Geis, Florence L. “Studies in Machiavellianism.” Academic Press. “The Enlightenment throughout Europe"history-world “History of Philosophy 70". Maritain “Augusto Vera". Facoltà Lettere e Filosofia “La rinascita hegeliana a Napoli" Ex-Regno delle Due Sicilie. “L'ESCATOLOGIA PITAGORICA NELLA TRADIZIONE OCCIDENTALE". RITO SIMBOLICO ITALIANO. “Idealismo. Idealistas" Enciclopedia GER. Benedetto Croce, “Guide to Aesthetics,” Tr. by Patrick Romanell, "Translator's Introduction," The Library of Liberal Arts, The Bobbs–Merrill Co., Inc. Runes, Dagobert, ed., Treasure of Philosophy,” “Gentile, Giovanni" Nunzio Pernicone, "Italian Anarchism", AK Press. RELATED ARTICLES: Giovanni Gentile, Italian neo-Hegelian Idealist philosopher. Bertrando Spaventa, Italian philosopher. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Hegelians and Croceans in the Oxford I knew.” Grice, “Speranza, our man in Itealian philosophy!”“Surely he’ll be offended if you say that!”Anna Maria Ghersi e Luigi Speranza, “IMPLICATVRA.” Luigi Speranza, “IMPLICATVRA,” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia. Luigi Speranza, “Grice, Gentile e la storiografia della filosofia italiana.”

 

ereditàwhen a symposium on Grice was organised at San Marino, this is the word chosenEredità. Oddly, Berkeley preferred ‘legacy,’ as in “Legacy of Grice.” “Heritage” sounds perhaps more pretentious than “l’eredità di Grice,’ where there is a pun on ‘heritage’ and ‘inheritance’! --.

 

DE-SCRIPTVM -- descriptumdefinite (“the”) and “indefinite” (“some at least one”). Analysed by Grice in terms of /\x. “The king of France is bald” There is at least a king of France, there is at most a king of France, and anything that is a king of France is bald. For indefinite descriptum he holds the equivalence with \/x, “some (at least one).Grice follows Peano in finding the ‘iota’ operator a good abbreviatory device to avoid the boring ‘Russellian expansion.” “We should forgive Russellhis background was mathematics not the belles letters as with Bradley and me, and anyone at Oxford, really.”Grice.  iotaiota operator used by Grice. Peano uses iota as short for “isos,” Grecian for ‘Same”. Peano defines “ix” as “the class of whatever is the same as x”. Peano then looked for a symbol for the inverse for this. He first uses a negated iota, and then an inverted iota, so that inverted iota x reads “the sole [unique] member of x” “ι” read as “the” -- s the inverted iota or description operator and is used in expressions for definite descriptions, such as “(ιx)ϕx(ιx)ϕx,” which is read: the x such that ϕxϕx). [(ιx)ϕx(ιx)ϕx] -- a definite description in brackets. This is a scope indicator for definite descriptions. The topic of ‘description’ is crucial for Grice, and he regrets Russell focused on the definite rather than the indefinite descriptor. As a matter of fact, while Grice follows the custom of referring to the “Russellian expansion” of iota, he knows it’s ultimately the “Peanoian” expansion. Indeed, Peano uses the non-inverted iota “i” for the unit class. For the ONLY or UNIQUE member of this class, i. e. the definite article “the,” Peano uses the inverted iota (cf. *THE* Twelve Apostles). (On occasion Peano uses the denied iota for that).  Peano’s approach to ‘the’ evolve in at least three stages towards a greater precision in the treatment of the description, both definite and indefinite. Peano introducesin 1897  the fundamental definition of the unit class as the class such that ALL of its members are IDENTICAL. In Peanoian symbols, ix = ye (y = x). Peano approaches the UNIQUE OR ONLY member of such a class, by way of an indirect definition: “x = ia • = • a = ix.” Regarding the analysis of the definite article “the,” Peano makes the crucial point that every ‘proposition’ or ‘sentence’ containing “the” (“The apostles were twelve”) can be offered a reductive AND REDUCTIONIST analysis, first, to. the for,? ia E b, and, second, to the inclusion of the class in the class (a b), which already supposes the elimination of “i.” Peano notes he can avoid an identity whose first member contains “I” (1897:215). One difference between Peano’s and Russell's treatment of classes in the context of the theory of description is that, while, for Peano, a description combines a class abstract with the inverse of the unit class operator, Russell restricts the free use of a class abstract due the risk of paradox generation. For Peano, it is necessary that there EXIST the class (‘apostle’), and he uses for this the symbol ‘I,’ which indicates that the class is not vacuous, void, or empty, and that it have a unique member, the set of twelve apostles. If either of these two conditionsexistence and uniqueness -- are not met, the symbol is meaningless, or pointless. Peano offers various instances for handling the symbol of the inverted iota, and the way in which -- starting from that ‘indirect’ or implicit definition, it can be eliminated altogether. One example is of particular interest, as it states a link between the reductionist analysis of the inverted iota and the problem of what Peano calls ‘doubtful’ existence (rather than vacuous, void, or empty). Peano starts by defining the superlative ‘THE greatEST number of a class of real numbers’ as ‘THE number n such that there is no number of this class being greater than n.’ Peano warns that one should not infer from this definition the ‘existence’ of the aforementioned greatEST number. Grice does not quite consider this in the ‘definite description’ section of “Vacuous name” but gives a similar example: “The climber on hands and knees of Mt. Everest does not exist. He was invented by the journalists.” And in other cases where there is a NON-IDENTIFICATORY use of ‘the’, which Grice symbolises as ‘the,’ rather than ‘THE’: “The butler certainly made a mess with our hats and coatswhoever he is --.” As it happens Strawson mistook the haberdasher to be the butler. So that Strawson is MIS-IDENTIFYING the denotatum as being ‘the butler’ when it is ‘the haberdasher.’ The butler doesn’t really exist. Smith dressed the haberdasher as a butler and made him act as one just to impress. Similarly, as per Russell’s ‘Prince George soon found out that ‘the author of Waverley’ did not exist,” (variant of his example). Similarly, Peano proves that we can speak legitimately of “THE GREATEST real number” even if we have doubts it ‘exists. He just tweaks the original definition to obtain a different expression where “I” is dropped out. For Peano, then, the reductionist analysis of the definite article “the” is feasible and indeed advisable for a case of ‘doubtful’ existence. Grice does not consider ‘doubtful’ but he may. “The climber on hands and knees of Mt Everest may, but then again may not, attend the party the Merseyside Geographical Society is giving in his honour. He will attend if he exists; he will not attend if he doesn’t.” Initially, Peano thinks “I” need not be equivalent to, in the sense of systematically replaced by, the two clauses (indeed three) in the expansion which are supposed to give the import of ‘the,’ viz. existence and uniqueness (subdivided in ‘at least’ and ‘at most’). His reductionism proves later to be absolute. He starts from the definition in terms of the unit class. He goes on to add a series of "possible" definitions -- allowing for alternative logical orders. One of this alternative definitions is stipulated to be a strict equivalence, about which he had previously been sceptical. Peano asserts that the only unque individual belongs to a unit.  Peano does not put it in so many words that this expression is meaningless. In the French translation, what he said is Gallic: “Nous ne donnons pas de signification a ce symbole si la classe a est nulle, ou si elle contient plusieurs individus.” “We don’t give signification to this symbol IF the class is void, or if the class contains more than one individual.”where we can see that he used ‘iota’ to represent ‘individus,’ from Latin ‘individuum,’ translating Greek ‘a-tomos.’ So it is not meant to stand for Greek ‘idion,’ as in ‘idiosyncratic.’ But why did he choose the iota, which is a Grecian letter. Idion is in the air (if not ‘idiot.’). Thus, one may take the equivalence in practice, given that if the three conditions in the expansion are met, the symbol cannot be used at all. There are other ways of providing a reductionist analysis of the same symbols according to Peano, e. g., laE b. = : a = tx. :Jx • Xc b class (a) such that it belongs to another class (b) is equal to the EXISTENCE of exactly one (at least one and at most one) idiosyncratic individual or element such that this idiosyncratic individual is a member of that class (b), i. e. "the only or unique (the one member) member of a belongs to b" is to be held equivalent to ‘There is at least one x such that, first, the unit class a is equal to the class constituted by x, and, second, x belongs to b.’ Or, ‘The class of x such that a is the class constituted by x, and that x belongs to b, is not an empty class, and that it have a unique member.” This is exactly Russell's tri-partite expansion referred to Russell (‘on whom Grice heaped all the praise,’ to echo Quine). Grice was not interested in history, only in rebutting Strawson. Of course, Peano provides his conceptualisations in terms of ‘class’ rather than, as Russell, Sluga [or ‘Shuga,’ as Cole reprints him] and Grice do, in terms of the ‘propositional function,’ i. e.  Peano reduces ‘the’ in terms of a property or a predicate, which defins a class. Peano reads the membership symbol as "is,” which opens a new can of worms for Grice: “izzing”and flies out of the fly bottle. Peano is well aware of the importance of his device to eliminate the definite article “the” to more ‘primitive’ terms. That is why Peano qualifies his definition as an "expriment la P[proposition] 1 a E b sous une autre forme, OU ne figure plus le signe i; puisque toute P contenant le signe i a est REDUCTIBLE ala forme ia E b, OU best une CIs, on pourra ELIMINER le signe i dans toute P.” The once received view that the symbol "i" is for Peano undefinable and primitive has now been corrected.  Before making more explicit the parallelism with Whitehead’s and Russell's and Grice’s theory of description (vide Quine, “Reply to H. P. Grice”) we may consider a few potential problems. First, while it is true that the symbol ‘i’ has been given a ‘reductionist analysis’, in the definiens we still see the symbol of the unit class, which would refer somehow to the idea that is symbolized by ''ix’. Is this a sign of circularity, and evidence that the descriptor has not been eliminated? For Peano, there are at least two ways of defining a symbol of the unit class without using ‘iota’straight, inverted, or negated. One way is directly replacing ix by its value: y 3(y = x). We have: la E b • =: 3x 3{a =y 3(y =x) • X E b},  which expresses the same idea in a way where a reference to iota has disappeared. We can read now "the only member of a belongs to b" as "there is at least one x such that (i) the unit class a is equal to all the y such that y =x, and (ii) x belongs to b" (or "the class of x such that they constitute the class of y, and that they constitute the class a, and that in addition they belong to the class b, is not an empty class"). The complete elimination underlies the mentioned definition. Peano is just not interested in making the point explicit. A second way is subtler. By pointing out that, in the "hypothesis" preceding the quoted definition, it is clearly stated that the class "a" is defined as the unit class in terms of the existence and identity of all of their members (i.e. uniqueness): a E Cis. 3a: x, yEa. X = y: bE CIs • : This is why "a" is equal to the expression ''tx'' (in the second member). One may still object that since "a" can be read as "the unit class", Peano does not quite provide a ‘reductionist’ analysis as it is shown through the occurrence of these words in some of the readings proposed above. However, the hypothesis preceding the definition only states that the meaning of the symbols which are used in the second member is to be. Thus, "a" is stated as "an existing unit class", which has to be understood in the following way: 'a' stands for a non-empty class that all of its members are identical. We can thus can "a", wherever it occurs, by its meaning, given that this interpretation works as only a purely ‘nominal’ definition, i.e. a convenient abbreviation. However, the actual substitution would lead us to rather complicated prolixic expressions that would infringe Grice’s desideratum of conversational clarity. Peano's usual way of working can be odd. Starting from this idea, we can interpret the definition as stating that "ia Eb" is an abbreviation of the definiens and dispensing with the conditions stating existence and uniqueness in the hypothesis, which have been incorporated to their new place. The hypothesis  contains only the statement of "a" and" b" as being classes, and the definition amounts to: a, bECls.::J :. ME b. =:3XE([{3aE[w, zEa. ::Jw•z' w= z]} ={ye (y= x)}] • XE b). Peano’s way is characterized as the constant search for SHORTER, briefer, and more conveniente expressionswhich is Grice’s solution to Strawson’s misconceptionthere is a principle of conversational tailoring. It is quite understandable that Peano prefers to avoid long expansions. The important thing is not the intuitive and superficial similarity between the symbols "ia" and ''ix'', caused simply by the appearance of the Greek letter iota in both cases, or the intuitive meaning of  "the unit class.” What is key are the conditions under which these expressions have been introduced in Peano’s system, which are completely clear and quite explicit in the first definition. It may still be objected that Peano’s elimination of ‘the’ is a failure in that it derives from Peano's confusion between class membership and class inclusion -- a singleton class would be its sole memberbut these are not clearly distinct notions. It follows that (iii) "a" is both a class and, according to the interpretation of the definition, an individual (iv), as is shown by joining the hypothesis preceding the definition and the definition itself. The objection derives from the received view on Peano, according to which his logic is, compared to Whitehead’s and Russell’s, not strict or formal enough, but also contains some important confusions here and there.  And certainly Russell would be more than happy to correct a minor point. Russell always thinks of Peano and his school as being strangely free of confusions or mistakes. It may be said that Peano indeed ‘confuses’ membership with inclusion (cf. Grice ‘not confused, but mistaken’) given that it was he himself who, predating Frege, introduces the distinction with the symbol "e.” If the objection amounts to Peano admitting that the symbol for membership holds between class A and class B, it is true that this is the case when Peano uses it to indicate the meaning of some symbols, but only through the reading of "is,” which could be" 'a and b being classes, "the only member of a belongs to b,” to be the same as "there is at least one x such that (i) 'there is at least one a such that for ,': and z belonging to a,. w = z' is equal to y such that y =. x' , and (ii) x belongs to b ,where both the iota and the unit class are eliminated in the definiens. There is a similar apparent vicious circularity in Frege's definition of number. "k e K" as "k is a class"; see also the hypothesis from above for another example).  This by no means involves confusion, and is shown by the fact that Peano soon adds four definite properties distinguishing precisely both class inclusion and class membership,, which has Russell himself preserving the useful and convenient reading.  "ia" does not stand for the singleton class. Peano states pretty clearly that" 1" (T)  makes sense only when applied to this or that individual, and ''t'' as applied to this or that class, no matter what symbols is used for these notions. Thus, ''ta'', like "tx" have to be read as "the class constituted by ...", and" la" as "the only member of a". Thus, although Peano never uses "ix" (because he is thinking in terms of this or that class), had he done so its meaning, of course, would have been exactly the same as "la", with no confusion at all. "a" stands for a class because it is so stated in the hypothesis, although it can represent an individual when preceded by the descriptor, and together with it, i.e. when both constitute a new symbol as a. Peano's habit is better understood by interpreting what he is saying it in terms of a propositional function, and then by seeing" la" as being somewhat similar to x, no matter what reasons of convenience led him to prefer symbols generally used for classes ("a" instead of"x"). There is little doubt that this makes the world of a difference for Russell and Sluga (or Shuga) but not Strawson or Grice, or Quine (“I’m sad all the praise was heaped by Grice on Russell, not Peano”). For Peano the inverted iota is the symbol for an operator on a class, it leads us to a different ‘concept’ when it flanks a term, and this is precisely the point Shuga (or Sluga) makes to Grice‘Presupposition and conversational implicaturum”the reference to Shuga was omitted in the reprint in Way of Words). In contrast, for Russell, the iota operator is only a part of what Whitehead and Russell call an ‘incomplete’ symbol. In fact, Grice borrows the complete-incomplete distinction from Whitehead and Russell. For Peano, the descriptor can obviously be given a reductionist eliminationist analysis only in conjunction with the rest of the ‘complete’ symbol, "ia e b.’ Whitehead’s and Russell’s point, again, seems drawn from Peano. And there is no problem when we join the original hypothesis with the definition, “a eCis. 3a: x, yea. -::Jx,y. x =y: be CIs • :. . la e b. =: 3x 3(a =tx. x e b). If it falls within the scope of the quantifier in the hypothesis, “a” is a variable which occurs both free and bound in the formulaAnd it has to be a variable, since qua constant, no quantifier is needed. It is not clear what Peano’s position would have been. Admittedly, Peanoliving always in a rush in Paris -- does not always display the highest standards of Oxonian clarity between the several uses of, say, "existence" involved in his various uses of this or that quantifier. In principle, there would be no problem when a variable appears both bound and free in the same expression. And this is so because the variable appears bound in one occurrence and free in another. And one cannot see how this could affect the main claim. The point Grice is making here (which he owes to ‘Shuga’) is to recognise the fundamental similarities in the reductionist analysis of “the” in Peano and Russell. It is true that Russell objects to an ‘implicit’ or indirect definition under a hypothesis. He would thus have rejected the Peanoian reductionist analysis of “the.” However, Whitehead and Russell rejects an ‘implicit’ definition under a hypothesis in the specific context of the “unrestricted’ variable of “Principia.” Indeed, Russell had been using, before Whitehead’s warning, this type of ‘implicit’ definition under a hypothesis for a long period the minute he mastered Peano's system. It is because Russell interprets a definition under a hypothesis as Peano does, i.e. merely as a device for fixing the denotatum of this or that symbol in an interpreted formula. When one reads after some symbolic definition, things like "'x' being ... " or" 'y' being ... ", this counts as a definition under a hypothesis, if only because the denotatum of the symbol has to be determined. Even if Peano's reductionist analysis of “the” fails because it within the framework of a merely conditional definition, the implicaturum of his original insight (“the” is not primitive) surely influences Whitehead and Russell. Peano is the first who introduces the the distinction between a free (or ‘real’) and a bound (or ‘apparent’) variable, and, predating, Frege -- existential and universal quantification, with an attempt at a substitutional theory based the concept of a ‘proposition,’ without relying on the concepts of ‘class’ or ‘propositional function.’ It may be argued that Peano could hardly may have thought that he eliminated “the.” Peano continues to use “the” and his whole system depends on it. Here, a Griceian practica reason can easily explain Peano’s retaining “the” in a system in cases where the symbol is merely the abbreviation of something that is in principle totally eliminable.In the same vein, Whitehead and Russell do continue to use “the” after the tripartite expansion. Peano, like Whitehead and Russell after him, undoubtedly thinks, and rightly, too, that the descriptor IS eliminable.If he does not flourish this elimination with by full atomistic philosophic paraphernalia which makes Russell's theory of description one of the most important logical successes of Cambridge philosopherthat was admired even at Oxford, if by Grice if not by Strawson, that is another thing. Peano somewhat understated the importance of his reductionist analysis, but then again, his goal is very different from Whitehead’s and Russell's logicism. And different goals for different strokes. In any case, the reductionist analysis of “the” is worked out by Peano with essentially the same symbolic resources that Whitehead and  Russell employ. In a pretty clear fashion, coming from him, Peano states two of the three conditions -- existence and uniquenesssubdivided into ‘at least and at most --, as being what it is explicitly conveyed by “the.” That is why in a negation of a vacuous description, being true, the existence claim, within the scope of the negation, is an annullable implicaturum, while in an affirmation, the existence claim is an entailment rendering the affirmation that predicates a feature of a vacuous definite description is FALSE. Peano has enough symbolic techniques for dispensing with ‘the’, including those required for constructing a definition in use. If he once rather cursorily noted that for Peano, “i” (‘the’) is primitive and indefinable, Quine later recognised Peano’s achievement, and he was “happy to get straight on Peano” on descriptions, having checked all the relevant references and I fully realising that he was wrong when he previously stated that the iota descriptor was for Peano primitive and indefinable. Peano deserves all the credit for the reductionist analysis that has been heaped on Whitehead and Russell, except perhaps for Whitehead’s and Russell’s elaboration on the philosophical lesson of a ‘contextual’ definition.For Peano, “the” cannot be defined in isolation; only in the context of the class (a) from which it is the UNIQUE member , and also in the context of the (b) from which that class is a member, at least to the extent that the class a is included in the class b. This carries no conflation of membership and inclusion. It is just a reasonable reading of " 1a Eb". "Ta" is just meaningless if the conditions of existence and uniqueness (at least and at most) are not fulfilled. Surely it may be argued that Peano’s reductionist analysis of “the” is not exactly the same as Whitehead’s and Russell's. Still, in his own version, it surely influenced Whitehead and Russell. In his "On Fundamentals,” Russell includes a definition in terms analogous to Peano's, and with almost the same symbols. The alleged improvement of Whitehead’s and Russell’s definition is in clarity. The concept of a ‘propositional function’ is indeed preferable to that of class membership. Other than that, the symbolic expression of the the three-prong expansive conditions -- existence and uniqueness (at least and at most) -- is preserved. Russell develops Peano’s claim to the effect that “ia” cannot be defined alone, but always in the context of a class, which Russell translates as ‘the context of a propositional function.’ His version in "On Denoting” is well known. In an earlier  letter to Jourdain, dated, Jan. 3, 1906 we read: “'JI( lX) (x) • =•(:3b) : x. =x. X = b: 'JIb.” (They never corresponded about the things Strawson corresponded with Gricecricket). As G. Landini has pointed out, there is even an earlier occurrence of this definition in Russell’s "On Substitution" with only very slight symbolic differences. We can see the heritage from Peano in a clear way if we compare the definition with the version for classes in the letter to Jourdain: 'JI(t'u) • = : (:3b) : xEU. =x. X = b: 'JIb. Russell can hardly be accused of plagiarizing Peano; yet all the ideas and the formal devices which are important for the reductionist analysis of “the” were developed by in Peano, complete with conceptual and symbolic resources, and which Russell acknowledged that he studied in detail before formulating his own theory in “On denoting.” Regarding Meinong’s ontological jungle, for Russell, the principle of ‘subsistence disappears as a consequence of the reductionist analysis of “the,” which is an outcome of Russell’s semantic monism. Russell's later attitude to Meinong as his main enemy is a comfortable recourse (Griffin I977a).  As for Bocher, Russell himself admits some influence from his nominalism. Bacher describes mathematical objects as "mere symbols"  and advises Russell to follow this line of work in a letter, two months before Russell's key idea. The 'class as one' is merely a symbol or name which we choose at pleasure.” It is important to mention MacColl who he speaks of "symbolic universes", with things like a ‘round square.’MacColl also speaks of "symbolic ‘existence’". Indeed, Russell publishes “On denoting” as a direct response to MacColl. Refs.: P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, “Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd ed.Cambridge.; M. Bocher, 1904a. "The Fundamental Conceptions and Methods of Mathematics", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society; M. A. E. Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy; Duckworth), G. Frege, G., Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau: Koebner), tr. J.  L. Austin, The Foundations of Arithmetic, Blackwell, Partial English trans. (§§55-91, 106-1O7) by M. S. Mahoney in Benacerraf and Putnam; "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung". Trans. as "On Sense and Reference" in Frege 1952a,  56-78. --, I892b. "Uber Begriff und Gegenstand". Trans. as "On Concept and Object" in Frege I952a,  42-55. --, I893a. Grungesetze der Arithmetik,  I Gena: Pohle). Partial English trans. by M. Furth, The Basic Laws ofArithmetic (Berkeley: U. California P., 1964). --, I906a. "Uber die Grundlagen der Geometrie", Jahresbericht der deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung, 15 (1906): 293-309, 377-403, 423-30. English trans. by Eike-Henner WKluge as "On the Foundations of Geometry", in On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic (New Haven and London, Yale U. P., 1971). --, I952a. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, tr. by P. T. Geach and M. Black (Oxford: Blackwell). Grattan-Guinness, L, I977a. Dear Russell-Dear Jourdain (London: Duckworth). Griffin, N., I977a. "Russell's 'Horrible Travesty' of Meinong", Russell, nos. 25- 28: 39-51. E. D. Klemke, ed., I970a. Essays on Bertrand Russell (Urbana: U. Illinois P.). Largeault, ]., I97oa. Logique et philosophie chez Frege (Paris: Nauwelaerts). MacColl, H., I905a. "Symbolic Reasoning". Repr. in Russell I973a,  308-16. Mosterfn, ]., I968a. "Teoria de las descripciones" (unpublished PH.D. thesis, U. of Barcelona). Peano, G., as. Opere Scelte, ed. U. Cassina, 3 vols. (Roma: Cremonese, 1957- 59)--, I897a. "Studii di logica matematica". Repr. in 05,2: 201-17. --, I897b. "Logique mathematique". Repr. in 05,2: 218-81. --, I898a. "Analisi della teoria dei vettori". Repr. in 05,3: 187-2°7. --, I90oa. "Formules de logique mathematique". Repr. in 05,2: 304-61. W. V. O. Quine, 1966a. "Russell's Ontological Development", Journal of Philosophy, 63: 657-67. Repr. in R. Schoenman, ed., Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century (London: Allen and Unwin,1967). Resnik, M., I965a. "Frege's Theory of Incomplete Entities", Philosophy of Science, 32: 329-41. E. A. Rodriguez-Consuegra, 1987a. "Russell's Logicist Definitions of Numbers 1899-1913: Chronology and Significance", History and Philosophy of Logic, 8:141- 69. --, I988a. "Elementos logicistas en la obra de Peano y su escuela", Mathesis, 4: 221-99--, I989a. "Russell's Theory ofTypes, 1901-1910: Its Complex Origins in the Unpublished Manuscripts", History and Philosophy ofLogic, 10: 131-64. --, I990a. "The Origins of Russell's Theory of Descriptions according to the Unpublished Manuscripts", Russell, n.s. 9: 99-132. --, I99Ia. The Mathematical Philosophy of BertrandRussell: Origins and Development (Basel, Boston and Berlin: Birkhauser). --, I992a. "A New Angle on Russell's 'Inextricable Tangle' over Meaning and Denotation", Russell, n.s. 12 (1992): 197-207. Russell, B., I903a. "On the Meaning and Denotation ofPhrases", Papers 4: 283- 96. --, I905a. "The Existential Import of Propositions", Mind, 14: 398-401. Repr. in I973a,  98-103. --, I905b. "On Fundamentals", Papers 4: 359....,.413. --, I905c. "On Denoting", Mind, 14: 479-93. Repr. in LK,  41-56; Papers 4: 415-27. --, I905d "On Substitution". Unpublished ms. (McMaster U., RAl 220.010940b). --, I906a. "On the Substitutional Theory of Classes and Relations". In I973a, PP165-89--, I908a. "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory ofTypes", American Journal of Mathematics, 30: 222-62. Repr. in LK,  59-102. --, I973a. Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin). Skosnik, 1972a. "Russell's Unpublished Writings on Truth and Denoting", Russell, no. 7: 12-13. P. F. Strawson, 1950a. "On Referring". Repr. in Klemke I970a,  147-72. Tichy, P., I988a. The Foundations of Frege's Logic (Berlin: de Gruyter). J. Walker, A Study o fFrege (Blackwell).

 

izzing: Athenian and Oxonian dialectic.As Grice puts it, "Socrates, like us, was really trying to solve linguistic puzzles."This is especially true in the longer dialogues of Plato — the 'Republic' and the Laws'— where we learn quite a lot about Socrates' method and philosophy, filtered, of course, through his devoted pupil's mind.Some of the Pre-Socratics, who provide Plato and his master with many of their problems, were in difficulties about how one thing could be two things at once — say, a white horse. How could you say 'This is a horse and this is white' without saying 'This one thing is two things'? Socrates and Plato together solved this puzzle by saying that what was meant by saying 'The horse is white' is that the horse partakes of the eternal, and perfect, Form horseness, which was invisible but really more horselike than any worldly Dobbin; and ditto about the Form whiteness: it was whiter than any earthly white. The theory of Form covers our whole world of ships and shoes and humpty-dumptys, which, taken all in all, are shadows — approximations of those invisible, perfect Forms. Using the sharp tools in our new linguistic chest, we can whittle Plato down to size and say that he invented his metaphysical world of Forms to solve the problem of different kinds of 'is'es -- what Grice calls the 'izz' proper and the 'izz' improper ('strictly, a 'hazz').You see how Grice, an Oxford counterpart of Plato, uses a very simple grammatical tool in solving problems like this. Instead of conjuring up an imaginary edifice of Forms, he simply says there are two different types of 'is'es — one of predication and one of identity -- 'the izz' and the 'hazz not.' The first, the 'izz' (which is really a 'hazz' -- it is a 'hizz' for Socrates being 'rational') asserts a quality: this is white.' The second 'hazz' points to the object named: 'This is a horse.' By this simple grammatical analysis we clear away the rubble of what were Plato's Forms. That's why an Oxford philosopher loves Aristotle -- and his Athenian dialectic -- (Plato worked in suburbia, The Academy) -- who often, when defining a thing — for example, 'virtue' — asked himself, 'Does the definition square with the ordinary views (ta legomena) of men?' But while Grice does have this or that antecedent, he is surely an innovator in concentrating MOST (if not all) of his attention on what he calls 'the conversational implicaturum.'Grice has little patience with past philosophers.Why bother listening to men whose problems arose from bad grammar? (He excludes Ariskant here). At present, we are mostly preoccupied with language and grammar. Grice would never dream of telling his tutee what he ought to do, the kind of life he ought to lead.That was no longer an aim of philosophy, he explained, but even though philosophy has changed in its aims and methods, people have not, and that was the reason for the complaining tutees -- the few of them -- , for the bitter attacks of Times' correspondents, and even, perhaps, for his turning his back on philosophy. Grice came to feel that Oxford philosophy was a minor revolutionary movement — at least when it is seen through the eyes of past philosophers. I asked him about the fathers of the revolution. Again he was evasive. Strictly speaking, the minor revolution is fatherless, except that Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Vitters — all of them, as it happened, Cambridge University figures — "are responsible for the present state of things at Oxford." under ‘conjunctum,’ we see that there is an alternative vocabulary, of ‘copulatum.’ But Grice prefers to narrow the use of ‘copula’ to izzing’ and ‘hazzing.’ Oddly, Grice sees izzing as a ‘predicate,’ and symbolises it as Ixy. While he prefers ‘x izzes y,’ he also uses ‘x izz y.’ Under izzing comes Grice’s discussion of essential predicate, essence, and substance qua predicabilia (secondary substance). As opposed to ‘hazzing,’ which covers all the ‘ta sumbebeka,’ or ‘accidentia.’ Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Aristotle on the multiplicity of ‘being.’”

 

ius -- jurisprudence: McEvoy. Hart, Grice’s favourite prudens, iurisprudens: jurisprudence, the science or “knowledge” of law; thus, in its widest usage, the study of the legal doctrines, rules, and principles of any legal system, especially that which is valid at Oxford. More commonly, however, ‘prudens,’ or ‘iurisprudens’ designates the study not of the actual laws of particular legal systems, but of the general concepts and principles that underlie a legal system or that are common to every such system (general jurisprudence). Jurisprudence in this usage, sometimes also called the philosophy of lawbut Grice preferred, “philosophical jurisprudence”) may be further subdivided according to the major focus of a particular study. Examples include Roman and English historical jurisprudence (a study of the development of legal principles over time, often emphasizing the origin of law in custom or tradition rather than in enacted rules), sociological jurisprudence (an examination of the relationship between legal rules and the behavior of individuals, groups, or institutions), functional jurisprudence (an inquiry into the relationship between legal norms and underlying social interests or needs), and analytical jurisprudence (an investigation into the connections among legal concepts). Within analytical jurisprudence the most substantial body of thought focuses on the meaning of the concept of law itself (legal theory) and the relationship between that concept and the concept of the moral. Legal positivism, the view that there is no necessary connection between legal (a legal right) and the moral (a moral right), opposes the natural law view that no sharp distinction between these concepts can be drawn. Legal positivism is sometimes thought to be a consequence of positivism’s insistence that legal validity is determined ultimately by reference to certain basic social facts: “the command of the sovereign” (Austin“the other Austin, the benevolent one!” -- Grice), the Grundnorm (Kelsen), or “the rule of re-cognition” (Hart). These different positivist characterizations of the basic, law-determining FACT yield different claims about the normative character of law, with classical positivists (e.g., John Austin) insisting that legal systems are essentially coercive, whereas modern positivists (e.g., Hans Kelsen) maintain that they are normative. Disputes within legal theory often generate or arise out of disputes about theories of adjudication, or how a judge does or should decide a case. Mechanical jurisprudence, or formalism, the theory that all cases can be decided solely by analyzing a legal concept, is thought by many to have characterized judicial decisions and legal reasoning in the nineteenth century; that theory became an easy target in the twentieth century for various forms of legal ‘realism,’ the view (which Grice found pretentious) that law is better determined by observing what a court and a citizen actually does than by analyzing stated legal rules and concepts. Recent developments in the natural law tradition also focus on the process of adjudication and the normative claim that accompany the judicial declaration of legal rights and obligations. These normative claim, the natural law theorist argues, show a legal right is a species of a political right or a moral right. In consequence, one must either revise prevailing theories of adjudication and abandon the social-fact theory of law (New-World Dworkin), or explore the connection between legal theory and the classical question of political theory. Under what condition does a legal obligation, even if determined by an inter-subjetctive fact, create a genuine political obligation (e.g., the meta-obligation to obey the law)? Other jurisprudential notions that overlap topics in political theory include rule of law, legal moralism, and civil disobedience. The disputes within legal theory about the connection between law and morality should not be confused with discussions of “natural law” within moral theory. In Grice’s meta-ethics, so-called “natural law” denotes a particular view about the objective status of a moral norm that has produced a considerable literature, extending from ancient Grecian and Roman thought, through medieval theological writings, to contemporary Oxonian ethical thought. Though the claim that one cannot sharply separate law and morality is often made as part of a general natural law moral theory, the referents of ‘natural law’ in legal and moral theory do not share any obvious logical relationship. A moral theorist may conclude that there is NO necessary connection between law and morality, thus endorsing a positivist view of law, while consistently advocating a natural law view of morality itself. Conversely, as Grice notes, a natural law legal theorist, in accepting the view that there IS a connection (or priority) between law and morality (a moral right being evaluational prior than a legal right, even if not epistemically prior), might nonetheless endorse a substantive moral theory different from that implied by a natural law moral theory. Refs.: G. P. Baker, “Meaning and defeasibility,” in Festschrift for H. L. A. Hart,  G. P. Baker, “Alternative mind styles,” in Festschrift for H. P. Grice, H. L. A. Hart, “Grice” in “The nightmare,” H. P. Grice, “Moral right and legal right: three types of conceptual priority.” Ius -- jury nullification, a jury’s ability, or the exercise of that ability, to acquit a criminal defendant despite finding facts that leave no reasonable doubt about violation of a criminal statute. This ability is not a right, but an artifact of criminal procedure. In the common law, the jury has sole authority to determine the facts, and the judge to determine the law. The jury’s findings of fact cannot be reviewed. The term ‘nullification’ suggests that jury nullification is opposed to the rule of law. This thought would be sound only if an extreme legal positivism were truethat the law is nothing but the written law and the written law covers every possible fact situation. Jury nullification is better conceived as a form of equity, a rectification of the inherent limits of written law. In nullifying, juries make law. To make jury nullification a right, then, raises problems of democratic legitimacy, such as whether a small, randomly chosen group of citizens has authority to make law. Ius -- de jure: Or titular, as opposed to ‘de facto.’ Each getting what he is due. Formal justice is the impartial and consistent application of a Kantian principle, whether or not the principle itself is just. Substantive justice is closely associated with rights, i.e., with what individuals can legitimately demand of one another or what they can legitimately demand of their government (e.g., with respect to the protection of liberty or the promotion of equality). Retributive justice concerns when and why punishment is justified. Debate continues over whether punishment is justified as retribution for past wrongdoing or because it deters future wrongdoing. Those who stress retribution as the justification for punishment usually believe human beings have libertarian free will, while those who stress deterrence usually accept determinism. At least since Aristotle, justice has commonly been identified both with obeying law and with treating everyone with fairness. But if law is, and justice is not, entirely a matter of convention, then justice cannot be identified with obeying law. The literature on legal positivism and natural law theory contains much debate about whether there are moral limits on what conventions could count as law. Corrective justice concerns the fairness of demands for civil damages. Commutative justice concerns the fairness of wages, prices, and exchanges. Distributive justice concerns the fairness of the distribution of resources. Commutative justice and distributive justice are related, since people’s wages influence how much resources they have. But the distinction is important because it may be just to pay A more than B (because A is more productive than B) but just that B is left with more after-tax resources (because B has more children to feed than A does). In modern philosophy, however, the debate about just wages and prices has been overshadowed by the larger question of what constitutes a just distribution of resources. Some (e.g., Marx) have advocated distributing resources in accordance with needs. Others have advocated their distribution in whatever way maximizes utility in the long run. Others have argued that the fair distribution is one that, in some sense, is to everyone’s advantage. Still others have maintained that a just distribution is whatever results from the free market. Some theorists combine these and other approaches. -- iustumiustum-facere -- iustificatum: The ‘ius’ is cognate with ‘junctum,’ so the jus is a bindingfrom ius we derives iustus, the just. “Late Latin; apparently neither the Grecians nor Cicero saw the need for it!”– Grice. justification, a concept of broad scope that spans epistemology and ethics and has as special cases the concepts of apt belief and right action. The concept has, however, highly varied application. Many things, of many different sorts, can be justified. Prominent among them are beliefs and actions. To say that X is justified is to say something positive about X. Other things being equal, it is better that X be justified than otherwise. However, not all good entities are justified. The storm’s abating may be good since it spares some lives, but it is not thereby justified. What we can view as justified or unjustified is what we can relate appropriately to someone’s faculties or choice. (Believers might hence view the storm’s abating as justified after all, if they were inclined to judge divine providence.) Just as in epistemology we need to distinguish justification from truth, since either of these might apply to a belief in the absence of the other, so in ethics we must distinguish justification from utility: an action might be optimific but not justified, and justified but not optimific. What is distinctive of justification is then the implied evaluation of an agent (thus the connection, however remote, with faculties of choice). To say that a belief is (epistemically) justified (apt) or to say that an action is (ethically) justified (“right”in one sense) is to make or imply a judgment on the subject and how he or she has arrived at that action or belief. Often a much narrower concept of justification is used, one according to which X is justified only if X has been or at least can be justified through adducing reasons. Such adducing of reasons can be viewed as the giving of an argument of any of several sorts: e.g., conclusive, prima facie, inductive, or deductive. A conclusive justification or argument adduces conclusive reasons for the possible (object of) action or belief that figures in the conclusion. In turn, such reasons are conclusive if and only if they raise the status of the conclusion action or belief so high that the subject concerned would be well advised to conclude deliberation or inquiry. A prima facie justification or argument adduces a prima facie reason R (or more than one) in favor of the possible (object of) action or belief O that figures in the conclusion. In turn, R is a prima facie reason for O if and only if R specifies an advantage or positive consideration in favor of O, one that puts O in a better light than otherwise. Even if R is a prima facie reason for O, however, R can be outweighed, overridden, or defeated by contrary considerations RH. Thus my returning a knife that I promised to return to its rightful owner has in its favor the prima facie reason that it is my legal obligation and the fulfillment of a promise, but if the owner has gone raving mad, then there may be reasons against returning the knife that override, outweigh, or defeat. (And there may also be reasons that defeat a positive prima facie reason without amounting to reasons for the opposite course. Thus it may emerge that the promise to return the knife was extracted under duress.) A (valid) deductive argument for a certain conclusion C is a sequence of thoughts or statements whose last member is C (not necessarily last temporally, but last in the sequence) and each member of which is either an assumption or premise of the argument or is based on earlier members of the sequence in accordance with a sound principle of necessary inference, such as simplification: from (P & Q) to P; or addition: from P to (P or Q); or modus ponens: from P and (P only if Q) to Q. Whereas the premises of a deductive argument necessarily entail the conclusion, which cannot possibly fail to be true when the justice as fairness justification 457 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:40 AM Page 457 premises are all true, the premises of an inductive argument do not thus entail its conclusion but offer considerations that only make the conclusion in some sense more probable than it would be otherwise. From the premises that it rains and that if it rains the streets are wet, one may deductively derive the conclusion that the streets are wet. However, the premise that I have tried to start my car on many, many winter mornings during the two years since I bought it and that it has always started, right up to and including yesterday, does not deductively imply that it will start when I try today. Here the conclusion does not follow deductively. Though here the reason provided by the premise is only an inductive reason for believing the conclusion, and indeed a prima facie and defeasible reason, nevertheless it might well be in our sense a conclusive reason. For it might enable us rightfully to conclude inquiry and/or deliberation and proceed to (action or, in this case) belief, while turning our attention to other matters (such as driving to our destination). ius ad bellum, jus in bello: a set of conditions justifying the resort to war (jus ad bellum) and prescribing how war may permissibly be conducted (jus in bello). The theory is a Western approach to the moral assessment of war that grew out of the Christian tradition beginning with Augustine, later taking both religious and secular (including legalist) forms. Proposed conditions for a just war vary in both number and interpretation. Accounts of jus ad bellum typically require: (1) just cause: an actual or imminent wrong against the state, usually a violation of rights, but sometimes provided by the need to protect innocents, defend human rights, or safeguard the way of life of one’s own or other peoples; (2) competent authority: limiting the undertaking of war to a state’s legitimate rulers; (3) right intention: aiming only at peace and the ends of the just cause (and not war’s attendant suffering, death, and destruction); (4) proportionality: ensuring that anticipated good not be outweighed by bad; (5) last resort: exhausting peaceful alternatives before going to war; and (6) probability of success: a reasonable prospect that war will succeed. Jus in bellorequires: (7) proportionality: ensuring that the means used in war befit the ends of the just cause and that their resultant good and bad, when individuated, be proportionate in the sense of (4); and (8) discrimination: prohibiting the killing of noncombatants and/or innocents. Sometimes conditions (4), (5), and (6) are included in (1). The conditions are usually considered individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a fully just war. But sometimes strength of just cause is taken to offset some lack of proportion in means, and sometimes absence of right intention is taken to render a war evil though not necessarily unjust. Most just war theorists take jus ad bellum to warrant only defensive wars. But some follow earlier literature and allow for just offensive wars. Early theorists deal primarily with jus ad bellum, later writers with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Recent writers stress jus in bello, with particular attention to deterrence: the attempt, by instilling fear of retaliation, to induce an adversary to refrain from attack. Some believe that even though large-scale use of nuclear weapons would violate requirements of proportionality and discrimination, the threatened use of such weapons can maintain peace, and hence justify a system of nuclear deterrence.

 

jadelli: essential Italian philosopher. jadelli (n.), filosofo.

 

jaja: essential Italian philosopher. jaja (n. ), filosofo -- Donato Jaja (Conversano) filosofo.Professore di filosofia noto soprattutto per essere stato il maestro diGentile Nato a Conversano, vicino Bari, figlio di Florenzo Jaja (a cui è dedicato l'Ospedale Civile di Conversano) iniziò i suoi studi in seminario allo scopo di intraprendere la carriera ecclesiastica, ma nel 1860, dopo l'unificazione, si trasferì a Napoli, dove studiò sotto la guida di Fiorentino. Si spostò a Bologna, dove si laureò, per seguire il suo maestro.  Il suo incontro filosofico principale fu con Spaventa, che conobbe a Bologna, dopo aver insegnato nei licei di Caltanissetta e Chieti. Col trasferimento di Jaja al Liceo Antonio Genovesi di Napoli i rapporti con Spaventa divennero regolari. Conseguì la libera docenza e ottenne la cattedra di filosofia a Pisa.  Jaja non è stato mai considerato un filosofo particolarmente originale, ma ha avuto il merito storico d'introdurre Gentile allo studio di Hegel e Spaventa, merito che l'allievo riconoscerà sempre.  Opere: “Origine storica ed esposizione della Critica della ragion pura di E. Kant,” “Studio critico sulle categorie e forme dell'essere di A. Rosmini,” “Dell'apriori nella formazione dell'anima e della coscienza,” “ L'unità sintetica kantiana e l'esigenza positivista,” “Sentire e pensare,” “La somiglianza nella scuola positivista e l'identità nella metafisica nuova.” “ Ricerca speculativa. Teoria del conoscere,” “ L'intuito nella coscienza.” Cesare Preti, Jaja filosofo europeo oltre Gentile, su ricerca.repubblica.it, .  Biografia di Jaja, su treccani.it. Jaja: neoidealismo italiano, su orthotes.com.  Jaja, su treccani.it.  Giovanni Gentile, Memoria su Donato Jaja, su sba.unipi.it, 1914.  Bertrando Spaventa Giovanni Gentile Idealismo italiano  Donato Jaja, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Donato Jaja, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Donato Jaja, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Opere di Donato Jaja, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Donato Jaja, .  Giovanni Gentile, Memoria su Donato Jaja, su sba.unipi.it.

 

jammelli: essential Italian philosopher. jammelli (n.), filosofo.

 

javèlli: essential Italian philosopher. javelli (n.), filosofo. Javelli, Giovanni Crisostomo Dizionario di eretici, dissidenti e inquisitori nel mondo mediterraneo Edizioni CLORI | Firenze |  Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli , o Iavelli o Giavelli, da Casale (S. Giorgio di Canavese, Casale Monferrato), filosofo.  Entrò nell'ordine domenicano attorno al 1485 e si formò (a partire dal 1495) presso lo Studio generale domenicano di Bologna, dove fu quindi lettore di teologia (a partire probabilmente dal 1499) e magister studentium (nomina nel 1507). Il 18 febbraio 1516 si addottorò in teologia presso l'Bologna. Fu quindi reggente dello Studio generale domenicano dal 1518 al 1521. Nel 1515 era stato nominato Inquisitore di Piacenza e di Cremona. Prese residenza a Piacenza nel 1523. Nel 1532 si trasferì quindi a Cremona, ma fece rientro in seguito a Piacenza, dove presumibilmente morì nel 1542.  Fu fine teologo ed esegeta ed argomentò anche contro Lutero. I suoi scritti, diversi dei quali furono più volte ristampati, furono raccolti in un'Opera omnia, stampata a Lione presso gli eredi di Giacomo Giunta tra 1568 e 1574, e quest'ultima ebbe quattro riedizioni fino al 1580. Nel 1519 partecipò al dibattito sul Tractatus de immortalitate animae (1516) di Pietro Pomponazzi, di cui scrisse, su richiesta di Pomponazzi stesso una confutazione, che apparve nella riedizione dell'opera. Nel 1530 partecipò al dibattito sul divorzio di Enrico VIII, esponendosi a favore della scelta del sovrano inglese, in contrasto con i colleghi domenicani.   Michael Tavuzzi, Chrysostomus Javelli O.P. (ca. 1470-1538)A biobibliographical essay, in "Angelicum", LXVII, 1990,  457-482; LXVIII, 1991,  109-121 Michael Tavuzzi, Renaissance inquisitors : Dominican inquisitors and inquisitorial districts in Northern Italy, 1474-1527, Brill, Leiden 2007,  222-223 Dagmar Von Wille, Javelli, Giovanni Crisostomo, in DBI,  62 (2004)

 

jerocades: essential Italian philosopher. jerocades (n.), filosofo. Antonio Jerocades (Parghelia), filosofo. Destinato dai genitori alla carriera ecclesiastica, studiò nel seminario di Tropea. Si distinse per la sua precoce abilità nel comporre versi ispirati, come ha ricordato Benedetto Croce, all'opera del Metastasio. Nel 1759 aprì una scuola privata nel paese natale. In questo periodo scrisse il Saggio dell'umano sapere, di stampo illuministico, che verrà successivamente pubblicato a Napoli, e un componimento drammatico, La partenza delle Muse, edito nel 1765 a Messina.  Nel 1765 si trasferì a Napoli. Dietro raccomandazione di Antonio Genovesi, col quale era entrato in corrispondenza, venne assunto al "Collegio Tuziano" di Sora come maestro d'ideologia. Qui Jerocades compose anche delle opere teatrali, in cui emergevano le sue idee democratiche, indotte dalla frequentazioni degli ambienti massonici napoletani. Secondo il clero sorano, tuttavia, quelle opere non si attagliavano ai giovani del collegio, tant'è che prima della rappresentazione del dramma Il ritorno di Ulisse (fissata per il Carnevale del 1770), che conteneva alcuni intermezzi ridicoli e di stampo anticlericale, in particolare il Pulcinella da Quacquero, il vescovo di Sora emise un editto di censura: ne seguì un processo per eresia e sedizione, con la reclusione dell'intellettuale nel carcere vescovile. Scarcerato dopo sette mesi, nel 1771 lasciò Sora per tornare a Napoli, dove divenne popolare come poeta improvvisatore. Nel 1775, invece, fu in Calabria: qui si dedicò alla composizione delle raccolte Quaresimale poetico e La lira focense, testimonianza di quello che Piromalli ha definito «illuminismo massonico».  Di nuovo a Napoli, ottenne prima la cattedra di filologia (1791) e poi quella di economia e commercio (1793) all'Napoli. In questo periodo fondò, insieme a Carlo Lauberg, la Società Patriottica Napoletana, coagulo dei principali esponenti del giacobinismo e dell'antigiurisdizionalismo partenopeo (ovvero che miravano a costituire una repubblica e a limitare l'ingerenza della Chiesa nelle questioni politiche), cosa che determinò la sua incarcerazione a Castel dell'Ovo e il processo, nel 1795, per apostasia, ma riebbe presto la libertà, avendo deciso di ritrattare. Anche per il conflitto interiore causato da una siffatta scelta, nel 1799 sostenne attivamente le idee rivoluzionarie, che però, in seguito alla breve esperienza della Repubblica Napoletana (1799), gli costarono nuovamente il carcere, e quindi l'esilio a Marsiglia.  Ritornato a Napoli nel 1801, grazie all'amnistia prevista dalla pace di Firenze, Jerocades compose l'elogio di suo padre Andrea e di suo fratello Vincenzo, motivo che indusse a farlo rinchiudere nel convento dei Liguorini di Tropea, ove morì.  Opere principali Esercizii spirituali in compendio ossia il filosofo in solitudine, Napoli, s. d. (manoscritto contenuto nella Biblioteca della Società napoletana di storia patria di Napoli) Il Paolo, o sia l'umanità liberata poema d'Antonio Jerocades, Napoli: presso Giuseppe Maria Porcelli, 1783 Inni di Orfeo esposti in versi volgari, Napoli, dopo il 1785 La gigantomachia, ovvero La disfatta de' giganti, Napoli: s. n., 1791 La lira focense, Napoli: si vende da Gennaro Fonzo, strada Forcella n. 20, 1784 Olinto e Sofronia, dramma di Antonio Jerocades, s. n., dedic. 1777 Orazione per l'apertura della Scuola di Economia e Commercio, Napoli: s. n., 1793 Orazione recitata ne' funerali solenni di Marcello Accorinti morto in Messina nel terremoto de' 5 febraio (sic) dell'anno 1783, Napoli, 1783 Phaedrus, Esopo alla moda, ovvero delle fauole di Fedro, Parafrasi Italiana di Antonio Jerocades, In Napoli: presso il Porsile, 1779 Quintus Horatius Flaccus, Le odi di Q. Orazio Flacco esposte in versi volgari da Antonio Jerocades, Napoli, [1787] Pindarus, Le odi di Pindaro tradotte ed esposte in versi volgari da Antonio Jerocades, Napoli: presso Nicola Russo, 1790 Note  Biografia degli uomini illustri del regno di Napoli, D. Martuscelli, tomo IV, Gervasi, Napoli 1817  B. Croce, La rivoluzione napoletana del 1799. Biografie, storie, racconti, Laterza, Bari 195315.  L. Alonzi, Antonio Jerocades ed il giacobinismo napoletano, in Idem, Il Vescovo-prefetto. La diocesi di Sora nel periodo napoleonico (1796-1818), Sora 1998,  24-29.  A. Piromalli, Illuminismo massonico di Antonio Jerocades, in Idem, La letteratura calabrese,  I, Pellegrino editore, Cosenza 1996,  230-259.  B. Croce, op. cit.,  201-203.  D. Ambrasi, Il clero a Napoli nel 1799 tra rivoluzione e reazione, in A. CestaroA. Lerra , «Il Mezzogiorno e la Basilicata fra l'età giacobina e il Decennio francese», Atti del Convegno (Maratea, 8-10 giugno 1990),  I, Venosa 1992,  233-235.  B. Croce, La rivoluzione napoletana del 1799. Biografie, Racconti, Ricerche, Bari, Laterza, 1953. A. Jerocades, Saggio dell'umano sapere, D. Scafoglio, Vibo Valentia, Sistema Bibliotecario Vibonese, 2000. A. Jerocades, La lira focenseː Antonio Jerocades, un abate poeta in loggia, A. Piromalli e G. S. Bravetti, Foggia, Bastogi, 1986. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Antonio Jerocades Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Antonio Jerocades  Antonio Jerocades, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.

 

jervolino, essential Italian philosopher. Jervolino (n.), filosofo -- Domenico Jervolino, indicato anche come Iervolino (Sorrento), filosofo.  Docente universitario presso l'Napoli "Federico II" e allievo di Pietro Piovani, fu particolarmente impegnato sul fronte politico: già dirigente delle Acli e della Cisl-Università, negli anni settanta fu tra i fondatori con Livio Labor del MPL (Movimento Politico dei Lavoratori), tra i promotori del Movimento dei Cristiani per il Socialismo, esponente del dissenso cattolico. Ha successivamente aderito a Democrazia Proletaria, di cui è stato a lungo responsabile nazionale cultura e scuola ed è stato fra i promotori del Partito di Unità Proletaria. È stato consigliere regionale in Campania dal 1979 al 1987. Ha poi militato in Rifondazione Comunista, nelle cui file è stato Assessore all'educazione del Comune di Napoli dal marzo 2000 al marzo 2001, oltre che responsabile nazionale università e ricerca per diversi anni. Nel 2001 si candida al Senato per Rifondazione Comunista, senza risultare eletto. È stato direttore della rivista Alternative fino al 2006, dal 2007 vice-direttore di Alternative per il socialismo; ha collaborato con diverse riviste specialistiche di filosofia (Filosofia e Teologia, Studium).  Era cugino dell'ex ministro e sindaco di Napoli Rosa Russo Iervolino.  La ricerca filosofica Nell'ambito degli studi filosofici è tra i principali studiosi in Italia del pensiero del filosofo francese Paul Ricœur (1913-2005), di cui diviene amico personale. La sua ricerca ha esaminato approfonditamente alcuni aspetti riguardanti il pensiero del Ricoeur, tra cui:  la ricerca di un filo conduttore unitario all'interno della sterminata opera dell'autore francese, cui ha dedicato il volume Il cogito e l'ermeneutica. La questione del soggetto in Paul Ricoeur (Procaccini, Napoli, 1984; Marietti, Genova, 1993). la messa in questione del soggetto cartesiano autocentrato e autotrasparente. Il pensiero di Ricoeur appare nei suoi studi come caratterizzato dall'attenzione verso le peripezie del Cogito che, ferito e spezzato nella sua autosufficienza, cerca di ritrovare sé stesso attraverso un lavoro ermeneutico. Nella speculazione dell'ultimo Ricoeur ha individuato come centrale il paradigma della traduzione come modello di pensiero fondato sull'ospitalità linguistica e l'apertura all'altro. È autore, nel campo degli studi filosofici, dei volumi:  “Il cogito e l'ermeneutica. La questione del soggetto in Ricoeur,” Procaccini, Napoli,  Marietti, Genova (tradotto in inglese presso Kluwer, Dordrecht-Boston-London); Pierre Thévenaz e la filosofia senza assoluto, Athena, Napoli 1Studium, Roma, “Logica del concreto ed ermeneutica della vita morale.” Newman, Blondel, Piovani, Morano, Napoli Ricoeur. L'amore difficile, Studium, Roma Le parole della prassi. Saggi di ermeneutica, Città del sole, Napoli, Ricoeur. Une herméneutique de la condition humaine, Ellipses, Paris ed. it. Introduzione a Ricoeur, Morcelliana, Brescia Ricoeur. Herméneutique et traduction, Ellipses, Paris, Per una filosofia della traduzione, Morcelliana, Brescia. Ha curato e introdotto le antologie ricoeuriane:  Filosofia e linguaggio, Guerini, Milano, La traduzione. Una sfida etica, Morcelliana, Brescia 2Etica e morale, Morcelliana, Brescia, Ricoeur e la psicoanalisi, con G. Martini, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2007. Note  Quei ragazzi di nome Fausto Bertinotti Boys Archiviato il 14 marzo  in . ArchivioPanorama.it   Pagina di Jervolino nel sito dell'Napoli, Dipartimento di studi umanistici, su filosofia.unina.it. F

 

jevons: w. s., philosopher of science. In economics, he clarified the idea of value, arguing that it is a function of utility. Later theorists imitated his use of the calculus and other mathematical tools to reach theoretical results. His approach anticipated the idea of marginal utility, a notion basic in modern economics. Jevons regarded J. S. Mill’s logic as inadequate, preferring the new symbolic logic of Boole. One permanent contribution was his introduction of the concept of inclusive ‘or’, with ‘or’ meaning ‘either or, or both’. To aid in teaching the new logic of classes and propositions, Jevons invented his “logical piano.” In opposition to the confidence in induction of Mill and Whewell, both of whom thought, for different reasons, that induction can arrive at exact and necessary truths, Jevons argued that science yields only approximations, and that any perfect fit between theory and observation must be grounds for suspicion that we are wrong, not for confidence that we are right. Jevons introduced probability theory to show how rival hypotheses are evaluated. He was a subjectivist, holding that probability is a measure of what a perfectly rational person would believe given the available evidence. H. P. Grice: “Jevons’s Aristotle.”

 

philoponus: Grecian philosopher and theologian, who worked in Alexandria (“philoponus,” ‘workaholic’, just a nickname). A Christian from birth, he was a pupil of the Platonist Ammonius, and is the first Christian Aristotelian. As such, he challenged Aristotle on many points where he conflicted with Christian doctrine, e.g. the eternity of the world, the need for an infinite force, the definition of place, the impossibility of a vacuum, and the necessity for a fifth element to be the substance of the heavens. Johannes composed commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, Prior and Posterior Analytics, Meteorologics, and On the Soul; and a treatise Against Proclus: On the Eternity of the World. There is dispute as to whether the commentaries exhibit a change of mind (away from orthodox Aristotelianism) on these questions.

 

Damascenus Chrysorrhoas: Greican theologian and Eastern church doctor. Born of a well-to-do family in Damascus, he was educated in Greek. He attained a high position in government but resigned under the antiChristian Caliph Abdul Malek and became a monk about 700, living outside Jerusalem. He left extensive writings, most little more than compilations of older texts. The Iconoclastic Synod of 754 condemned his arguments in support of the veneration of images in the three Discourses against the Iconoclasts (726–30), but his orthodoxy was confirmed in 787 at the Second Council of Nicaea. His Sources of Knowledge consists of a Dialectic, a history of heresies, and an exposition of orthodoxy. Considered a saint from the end of the eighth century, he was much respected in the East and was regarded as an important witness to Eastern Orthodox thought by the West in the Middle Ages.

 

salisbury: Grice: “One should not confuse Salisbury with Salisbury.” English philosopher, tutored by Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers in Paris. It is possible that during this time he also studied grammar, rhetoric, and part of the quadrivium with Conches at Chartres. After 1147 he was for a time a member of the Roman Curia, secretary to Theobald, archbishop of Canterbury, and friend of Thomas Becket. For his role in Becket’s canonization, Louis VII of France rewarded him with the bishopric of Chartres. Salisbury is a dedicated student of philosophy. In his letters, biographies of Anselm and Becket, and Memoirs of the Papal Court, Salisbury provides, in perhaps the best medieval imitation of classical Latin style, an account of some of the most important ideas, events, and personalities of his time. Neither these works nor his Polycraticus and “Metalogicon,” for which he is most celebrated, are systematic philosophical treatises. The “Polycraticus” is, however, considered one of the first medieval treatises to take up political theory in any extended way. Salisbury maintains that if a ruler does not legislate in accordance with natural moral law, legitimate resistance to him can include his assassination. In the “Metalogicon,” on the other hand, Salisbury discusses, in a humanist spirit, the benefits for a civilized world of philosophical training based on Aristotle’s logic. He also presents current views on the nature of the universale and, not surprisingly, endorses an Aristotelian view of them as neither extramental entities nor mere expressum, but a conceptus that nevertheless has a basis in reality insofar as they are the result of the mind’s abstracting from extramental entities what those entities have in common.

 

johnson: Grice, “Not to be confused with Dr. Johnsonthis one was as a philosopher should just be, an MA, like me!” -- w. e., very English philosopher who lectured on psychology and logic at Cambridge University. His Logic was published in three parts: Part I (1921); Part II, Demonstrative Inference: Deductive and Inductive (1922); and Part III, The Logical Foundations of Science (1924). He did not complete Part IV on probability, but in 1932 Mind published three of its intended chapters. Johnson’s other philosophical publications, all in Mind, were not abundant. The discussion note “On Feeling as Indifference” (1888) deals with problems of classification. “The Logical Calculus” (three parts, 1892) anticipates the “Cambridge” style of logic while continuing the tradition of Jevons and Venn; the same is true of treatments of formal logic in Logic. “Analysis of Thinking” (two parts, 1918) advances an adverbial theory of experience. Johnson’s philosophic influence at Cambridge exceeded the influence of these publications, as one can see from the references to him by John Neville Keynes in Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic and by his son John Maynard Keynes in A Treatise on Probability. Logic contains original and distinctive treatments of induction, metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. Johnson’s theory of inference proposes a treatment of implication that is an alternative to the view of Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica. He coined the term ‘ostensive definition’ and introduced the distinction between determinates and determinables.

 

Jones, Roger Bishop: collaborator with Speranza on “Grice stuff.” A formidable philosopher (it’s an alliteration in Italian) who hails from precisely Grice’s country: Staffordshire! Jones has a clarity of mind that it’s only rarely found. He has reviewed Grice’s Way of Words, and engaged in enthusiastic debates on ‘vacuous names,’ and other. In a way, like Grice, he is fascinated by Carnap!and they both agree that Quine did (or ‘done’, as Jones would say) him wrong! The “Bishop” side to Jones is an interesting story, “One of my ancestors was possibly a bishop, or possibly not.” “I like to think that I was christened Roger after Roger Bacon, but only to please Speranza, who has this Oxonian fixation!” “Speranza reminds me that Bishop wrote “Home, sweet home,” and that his ancestor was also a bishop“although perhaps a different one.”” Jones and Speranza have engaged in disbutes with R. Helzerman, S. R. Bayne, Murphy, Tapper, Sharpless, and many many other Griceians. Jones’s and Speranza’s main ‘unpublication’ is “Eternal Truth”after Grice’s pilgrimage to the City of Eternal Truth“We don’t expect he found it, and we don’t expect we will but ‘speranza sorge eterna’!”

 

jori: essential Italia philosopher. Jori (n.), filosofo -- Alberto Jori (Mantova), filosofo. Ha studiato nelle Padova, Milano, Cambridge, Monaco di iera e Tubinga. È considerato uno tra i massimi esperti del pensiero aristotelico: in particolare, con la sua monografia su Aristotele  ha posto in luce la natura di "costruttivismo aperto" della filosofia aristotelica. Di notevole importanza anche i suoi studi su Ippocrate e sulla medicina antica. Ha vinto il premio dell'Académie Internationale d'Histoire des SciencesInternational Academy of the History of Science (Sorbona).  Ha sottolineato la complementarità strutturale tra procedimenti empirici e procedimenti dialettico-deduttivi. Un'analoga complementarità sussiste nel discorso morale (Jori, che è stato discepolo di Otfried Höffe, è un rappresentante della nuova generazione della "Filosofia pratica"), ove la dimensione etica richiama necessariamente quella meta-etica, quale rigorizzazione formale dei termini della prima.  Opere: “Medicina e medici nell'antica Grecia. Saggio sul 'Perì technes' ippocratico, Il Mulino, Bologna-Napoli, Aristotele, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, Identità ebraica e sionismo in Alberto Cantoni, Giuntina, Firenze,  Hermann Conring, Der Begründer der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, MVK, Tübingen. Curatele La responsabilità ecologica Studium, Roma, Aristotele, Il cielo, Rusconi, Santarcangelo di Romagna II ed. Bompiani, Milano. Lessing, Gli ebrei, Bompiani, Milano.

 

julia: essential Italian philosopher. Julia (n.), filosofo -- Vincenzo Julia (Acri), filosofo. Julia nacque da Antonio e da Maria Giuseppa Balsàno. Ricevette la prima educazione da parte del padre, poi fu accolto nel biennio 1848-9 dall'Istituto Molinari di Acri; in seguito si spostò a Roggiano, dove fu allievo dello zio materno che lo seguì nel biennio successivo al seminario di San Marco Argentano, dove Julia concluse gli studi umanistici. Dopo una breve interruzione, lo scrittore proseguì nel 1855 dedicandosi allo studio del diritto, formazione che proseguì a Cosenza sotto la guida di Luigi Focaracci fino a quando interruppe gli studi 1860.  Dopo una breve esperienza come avvocato, si dedicò per dieci anni all'insegnamento affiancando l'attività di docente a quella di poeta e letterato. Nel 1864 sposò Gabriella Fusari, da cui ebbe quattro figli, rimanendo vedovo nel 1872. Dieci anni dopo gli fu assegnata una cattedra per l'insegnamento di Lettere presso un liceo di Cosenza, ma dovette rifiutare la nomina a causa delle responsabilità e della cura nei confronti dei figli. A metà degli anni ottanta Julia fu per due anni direttore del Telesio, periodico culturale sul quale intervennero significativi scritti di intellettuali calabresi fra i quali Francesco Fiorentino.  Strinse grande amicizia con Vincenzo Padula, specialmente nei suoi ultimi anni di vita trascorsi ad Acri e segnati dalla malattia, e dopo la morte dell'amico nel 1893 gli dedicò una Monografia rimasta incompiuta.  Julia morì ad Acri nel 1894.  Le opere La temperie culturale in ambito locale vedeva la difficoltà della Calabria a integrarsi nella nuova entità politica. Area essenzialmente contadina, la regione aveva una classe dirigente che preferiva assoggettarla al clientelismo e alla sua arretratezza piuttosto che metterla al passo con zone del Paese più avanzate e progredite; perciò il mondo intellettuale d'avanguardia, deluso dalle speranze del 1848 e conscio del sottosviluppo, si volse verso il positivismo e il socialismo.  Julia, come i poeti della sua generazione, visse tra il tardo romanticismo e l'affermarsi delle innovative correnti costituite dal naturalismo e dal verismo, nella scia di Giosuè Carducci e Giovanni Verga. Le contraddizioni della sua epoca lo formarono come un intellettuale spiritualista che rifiutava il materialismo e in parte il mondo contemporaneo, e d'altra parte un sostenitore degli ideali socialisti, del riscatto delle masse disagiate e della glorificazione del passato della Calabriaa partire dall'assedio degli Aragonesi nel 1462e dei suoi conterranei coevi illustri, fra i quali Biagio Miraglia, Vincenzo Padula, Sertorio Quattromani, Felice Tocco, oltre a Tommaso Campanella. Accostatosi in un primo tempo al misticismo di Gioberti, a metà degli anni settanta si convertì al verismo, alla ricerca del pragmatismo e di un modello di poesia di alto civismo che lo stesso Julia proclama nei suoi Sonetti e liriche (1884). In quest'opera, il poeta parte dai miti popolari e dalle ballate della tradizione romantica per marcare orgogliosamente la storia della sua terra.  Considerato il padre della letteratura calabrese, si interessò alle origini della cultura letteraria della regione analizzando anche alcune opere a lui precedenti. Il suo impegno regionalistico si concretizzò nel 1888 in uno studio su Vincenzo Selvaggi, nel quale si individuava un collegamento fra le opere del poeta cinquecentesco Galeazzo di Tarsia e le produzioni romantiche dell'Ottocento. Vi fu poi un saggio inedito (e pubblicato solo nel 1981) su Vincenzo Padula e un esame delle liriche riferibili all'Accademia Cosentina.  Lo scrittore calabrese seppe però spaziare oltre i confini delle sue terre, fino a richiamare John Milton nel suo scritto dedicato a Padula. Oltre a uno studio su Vincenzo Monti del 1892, Julia produsse dei lavori anche su Mazzini, Alessandro Poerio, Cesare Correnti, legati dall'attenzione alle tematiche relative al Risorgimento e perciò in convergenza con il proprio pensiero, che dal punto di vista della poetica si richiama ai modelli che il letterato individua in Leopardi, Berchet e Giusti, oltre che in Prati.  Note  Antonio Piromalli, La letteratura calabrese,  I, google books. 9 settembre .  Antonio Piromalli, La letteratura calabrese,  I, Luigi Pellegrini Editore, Cosenza, 1996   Monografia su calabriaonline, su calabriaonline.com. Digital Storytelling su Vincenzo Julia a cura degli studenti del Liceo V. Julia di Acri, CS.

 

juvalta: essential Italian philosopher. Juvalta (n.), filosofo --  «Ogni sforzo di derivare una valutazione morale da qualche cosa di cui non sia già riconosciuto il valore morale è dunque vano e illusorio. O non dà quel che si cerca, o presuppone quel che si pretende di fondare.»  Erminio Volfango Francesco Juvalta (Chiavenna), filosofo. I genitori erano il barone Corrado Juvalta, cancelliere della locale pretura originario di Villa di Tirano, e Teresa Zanetti di Tirano. Dopo gli studi liceali trascorsi tra Como e Sondrio, si iscrisse all'Pavia dove si laureò con una tesi su Spinoza, sotto la guida di Cantoni, eminente rappresentante della corrente del neokantismo italiano. Successivamente Juvalta insegnò per molti anni materie filosofiche in vari licei della penisola, quali Caltanissetta, Potenza, Spoleto, arrivando altresì a svolgere per alcuni anni la carica di provveditore agli studi e ispettore scolastico.  Dopo aver conseguito la libera docenza universitaria, Juvalta vinse il concorso per la cattedra di filosofia a Torino. I suoi corsi furono incentrati prevalentemente su Spencer, Spinoza e Kant. Le tematiche accademiche prevalentemente trattate riguardarono soprattutto i valori di “libertà” e di “giustizia” con ampie riflessioni etiche. Juvalta, convinto della loro generalità e universalità, arrivò ad auspicarne una loro applicazione anche nello studio delle moderne categorie politiche ed economiche.  Juvalta morì  rimanendo sostanzialmente ignorato dai colleghi filosofi suoi contemporanei: solo post mortem, infatti, le sue opere divennero oggetto di studio, grazie anche all'allievo Ludovico Geymonat che curò la pubblicazione degli scritti del suo maestro.  La filosofia di  Juvalta è una profonda riflessione sull'etica filosofica portata avanti con il metodo dell'analisi critica. Anche se, come risulta dalla sua , non troviamo nei suoi scritti importanti contributi sul piano gnoseologico ed epistemologico, dal momento che il suo principale campo d'indagine fu prevalentemente lo studio dei sistemi morali, possiamo affermare senza dubbio che sia il Neokantismo che il Positivismo costituirono il nucleo di fondo della sua posizione teoretica, da cui sviluppò la sua impostazione metodologica e filosofica.  Il positivismo, in particolare, è stato il primo grande sistema filosofico con cui si è misurato nella prima fase della sua elaborazione concettuale, ed ha costituito per molto tempo la sua principale fonte di riflessione. Tuttavia a partire da uno studio critico del pensiero di H. Spencer, molto ammirato dai positivisti dell'epoca per la sua impostazione metodologica, Juvalta sarà costretto a prendere presto le distanze da una siffatta visione della morale. I motivi di questa rottura sono da imputare principalmente al suo fermo rifiuto di accogliere come sostenibile la pretesa positivistica di fondare l'etica su basi e presupposti scientifici, ampiamente auspicata invece da Spencer  negli scritti aventi per argomento l'etica.  “Il giudizio con il quale si afferma il valore di un oggetto è diverso e non deducibile dal giudizio col quale ne afferma l'esistenza o la possibilità o la connessione modale o condizionale con altri soggetti. Apprendere come le cose sono, è tutt'altra cosa dal valutarle”.  Secondo Juvalta, dal momento che la finalità dell'etica si concreta nella costruzione di teorie morali ed in particolare di coerenti sistemi di valori morali, il giudizio che sta alla base di una qualsivoglia teoria etica deve configurarsi come “un giudizio originario” che ha una natura eminentemente etica, quindi non scientifica (come volevano Spencer e i positivisti) né tantomeno metafisica (come volevano la gran parte delle filosofie che si rifacevano ad una tradizione fondazionalista). Se però una etica scientifica appare insostenibile per il motivo dell'indebita derivazione dei giudizi di valore, di natura morale, da giudizi scientifici, di natura fattuale, è indubbio che la costruzione di ogni sistema morale debba essere condotta con criteri di scientificità. Nella misura in cui ogni teoria è basata su criteri logicodeduttivi e viene definita dalle relazioni logiche che intrattengono in essa i propri elementi costitutivi, così anche la costruzione di sistemi etici deve seguire la stessa metodologia e mostrare possibilmente l'identica costruzione formale. Questi sistemi di valori hanno l'obbligo di mantenere al loro interno un imprescindibile grado di coerenza, se vogliono risultare sostenibili ed essere così accettati dalla ragione. Quando Juvalta parla di scienza dell'etica lo fa proprio pensando a questo carattere logicodeduttivo dei valori all'interno di un sistema; in particolare egli vede garantita la scientificità di un sistema morale nella misura in cui un coerente insieme di valori viene rigorosamente derivato da un postulato di valore morale capace di fungere da premessa all'intero sistema.  Avvicinamento al neokantismo Una volta prese le distanze dai positivisti di fine ottocento, Juvalta si avvicinerà successivamente al Kantismo; in particolare accoglierà, anche se con alcune riserve, molte delle posizioni assunte dal cosiddetto Neokantismo, il movimento di pensiero di inizio novecento che aveva come obiettivo la rivalutazione piena del filosofo di Konisberg riadattando i contenuti del suo pensiero ad esigenze e problematiche tipiche della contemporaneità. Juvalta vede in Kant il più grande filosofo della modernità, colui che meglio di qualsiasi altro pensatore ha saputo cogliere il vero senso dell'autonomia della morale, svincolando per sempre l'etica dai saperi di natura conoscitiva, i quali, proprio in quanto si rivolgono all'ambito fenomenico, non riescono a coglier interamente tutto ciò che ha a che fare con la sfera dei valori (come per esempio la scienza e in generale l'ambito teoretico).  “L'indipendenza e l'indeducibilità dei valori morali da qualsiasi speculazione teoretica fu, come tutti sanno, riconosciuta e affermata, nella forma più esplicita e con grandissimo vigore dal Kant.”  L'autonomia dell'etica Kant ha avuto il grande merito, secondo Juvalta, di consegnare alla morale uno speciale statuto di autonomia e di indipendenza. Per Juvalta la morale deve necessariamente esprimere questo suo carattere di autonomia e di “autoassiomaticità” per poter continuare ad essere coerente e allo stesso tempo attendibile sotto il profilo puramente teorico. Abbracciare l'idea di autonomia della morale significa, prima di tutto, accettare una visione antifondazionalista dell'etica. Se volessimo condensare questa idea autonomista in una sintetica enunciazione potremo dire che l'etica non può prendere le mosse che da se stessa. Ogni tentativo di fondare una teoria etica su ambiti del sapere diversi da quello morale, finisce con il configurarsi come un'indebita pretesa di intromissione da parte di chi si illude di derivare un contenuto di valore morale da una premessa fattuale o metafisica o estetica. Alla base di un sistema coerente di valori, cioè un sistema morale costruito deduttivamente, deve esserci un postulato originario di natura etica e non di natura teoretica o peggio ancora metafisica, e questo per questioni eminentemente logicoanalitiche, che impongono ad ogni sistema coerente di evitare la fallacia logica della Petitio principii, cioè l'errore di voler caparbiamente dimostrare ciò che invece abbiamo già implicitamente accettato nelle premesse.  Una volta riconosciuto il contenuto di quel postulato morale e pensato come un valore che può essere vissuto ed accettato da un soggetto agente e concreto, allora si creano i presupposti di base perché una coscienza riconosca in esso un'intrinseca validità, che trova una sua precisa giustificazione solo a partire dalla sua intima natura assiologica. È proprio questo suo riferimento al contenuto di valore morale che costringe Juvalta a rivedere i limiti di una filosofia morale incardinata su binari formalistici e a non accettare tout court la filosofia morale di Kant.  L'ambito della giustificazione e l'ambito esecutivo Assumere come principi della ricerca etica l'autonomia, l'antifondazionalismo, l'antiformalismo porterà Juvalta a distinguere l'ambito della giustificazione, cioè il momento riflessivo che ci vede impegla ricerca di ragioni che possano difendere razionalmente la scelta dei nostri fini e dei nostri valori, dall'ambito esecutivo che invece coinvolge il momento motivazionale dell'azione ed è fortemente condizionato da elementi contingenti legati al momento storico, sociale e culturale nel quale gli uomini si trovano ad agire. Con un atteggiamento tipicamente moderno Juvalta difenderà la possibilità dell'esistenza di una pluralità di fini morali sia sul piano teorico che pratico, e con la stessa energia cercherà di trovare una soluzione per definire le precondizioni teoriche che rendano possibile una compatibilità tra i diversi valori.  Il vecchio e il nuovo problema della morale La modernità ha definito un passaggio epocale e pieno di tensione nel campo della filosofia morale ed ha segnato il tramonto di un'unica, grande e coerente visione dell'etica. Con l'avvento dell'epoca moderna si è fatta strada l'idea del tutto legittima dell'accettazione di differenti sistemi di valori e di diverse visioni del mondo, i quali trovano, da questo momento, una loro precisa dignità e legittimità in virtù delle ragioni che le diverse dottrine filosofiche hanno saputo elaborare in favore della loro sostenibilità. Juvalta invita a prendere coscienza di questo cambiamento di prospettiva e a considerarlo, asetticamente, come un passaggio dal vecchio problema della morale, in cui il fine principale era la ricerca di una fondazione dell'etica e di una giustificazione dell'esigenza del bisogno di moralità all'interno di ogni coscienza, al nuovo problema della morale riassumibile nella domanda; come possiamo decidere i beni e i valori desiderabili in sé una volta che abbiamo accertato l'esistenza di una pluralità dei postulati di valutazione morale?  La scelta del fine supremo e i limiti del razionalismo etico Juvalta vede nel momento della determinazione della scelta del fine supremo, il cui contenuto costituisce la base per il postulato di valore primario, il principale limite del razionalismo etico. La razionalità può solamente giustificare, cioè portare ragionamenti a favore di una tesi, o stabilire relazioni e deduzioni tra elementi di un sistema, in questo caso valori, che sono legati dalla loro stessa natura; ma essa non può imporre i fini. La razionalità accetta, per così dire, il giudizio di valore morale come un dato, ma non lo può stabilire lei in via preliminare perché nel campo etico la razionalità non riesce a cogliere interamente la natura dei nostri giudizi di valore.  “la ragione per quanto si faccia non dà valori; la ragione esige la coerenza; teorica: dei giudizi fra di loro e con i principi e i dati su cui si fondano; pratica: delle valutazioni derivate e mediate con le valutazioni direttamente o postulate, e delle azioni con le valutazioni.”  “…le valutazioni sono, come espressioni di una esperienza interiore sui generis, valide di per sé…”  I valori ultimi di Libertà e Giustizia Tuttavia il messaggio di Juvalta contiene anche un aspetto propositivo, non secondario. Anche se esiste una pluralità di valori che la coscienza può scegliere come fini, i quali si costituiscono come le linee guida della nostra condotta individuale, una volta adottato il criterio razionale di universalizzazione dei valori è possibile intuire che le scelte si riducono rispetto a quelle che la ragione può immaginare come possibili e, soprattutto, viene meno la completa arbitrarietà della scelta originaria. Juvalta è convinto che due valori su tutti debbano essere visti come i fini supremi su cui improntare la nostra vita e organizzare le nostre società, vale a dire i valori di libertà e giustizia. Libertà e giustizia costituiscono le precondizioni della vita morale e gli unici valori, tra quelli possibili, che risultano universalizzabili; essi sono le sole precondizioni che permettono ad ogni essere umano di realizzare il proprio fine e di raggiungere i propri beni (valori), in vista di una totale e piena realizzazione della natura umana, senza limitare la ricerca della moralità degli altri membri della società. Libertà e giustizia rappresentano per così dire i cardini di ogni sistema morale con i quali poter impostare se non un vero e proprio ripensamento di ogni pratica umana almeno una profonda critica ai modelli di società dominanti quali l'individualismo liberale, l'autoritarismo o la proposta socialista.  “La libertà esprime l'esigenza delle condizioni soggettive necessarie a fare dell'uomo una persona padrona di sé di fronte a sé e di fronte ad ogni altra persona; la giustizia esprime l'esigenza delle condizioni obbiettive necessarie all'esercizio universalmente efficace di questa libertà.”  Opere Juvalta non fu un pensatore sistematico e non cercò mai di definire un sistema filosofico che rendesse ragione dell'organicità del suo pensiero. Egli era sostanzialmente contrario a ingabbiare la riflessione filosofica in grandi narrazioni o in arbitrari sistemi, dal momento che era fermamente convinto che il pensiero soprattutto etico sfuggisse per così dire all'idea di sistematicità e organicità che aveva così profondamente caratterizzato la maggior parte del lavoro filosofico ottocentesco. Per questo motivo non troveremo dunque un corpus di studi juvaltiano che si configuri come summa del suo pensiero. D'altra parte questo non significa che non esiste un'evoluzione all'interno della sua riflessione, o che la sua proposta nel campo della filosofia morale non trovi una sua coerenza e una struttura di fondo ben definita. La sua produzione si caratterizza per essere organizzata in una serie di articoli apparsi nelle riviste di filosofia italiane più apprezzabili di inizio novecento. Tutti gli articoli più significativi sono stati poi raccolti nel volume “I limiti del razionalismo etico,” curato da Ludovico Geymonat. Tra saggi contenuti nel volume vale la pena ricordare alcuni importanti lavori che hanno segnato lo sviluppo del pensiero di Juvalta:  E. Juvalta, I limiti del razionalismo etico, L. Geymonat, Einuadi, Torino.  Il volume raccoglie i seguenti saggi: “ Prolegomeni a una morale distinta dalla filosofia,” Tip. Bizzoni, Pavia, “Le dottrine delle due etiche di Spencer, in «Rivista filosofica», VI (1904). Per una scienza normativa morale, in «Rivista filosofica», VII (1905). Il fondamento intrinseco del diritto secondo il Vanni, in E. JUVALTA Su la possibilità e i limiti della morale come scienza, Bocca, Torino, Il metodo dell'economia pura nell'etica, in «Rivista filosofica», IX (1907). Postulati etici e postulati metafisici, in «Rivista di filosofia», “Postulati etici e imperativo categorico,” «Atti IV congresso internazionale di filosofia» (Bologna 1911)  III, Formiggini, Genova. Su la pluralità dei postulati di valutazione morale, in «Atti del IV congresso della società filosofica» (Genova), Formiggini, Genova, Il vecchio e il nuovo problema della morale, Zanichelli, Bologna. In cerca di chiarezza. Questioni di morale. I. I limiti del razionalismo etico, Lattes, Torino, Per uno studio dei conflitti morali, in «Rivista di filosofia», XIX, Osservazioni sulla dottrina morale di Spinoza, in «Rivista di filosofia», XXI, Scritti su Erminio Juvalta D. Basciani, Erminio Juvalta e l'etica della giustizia, Desclèe, Roma, F. Picardi, Morale e filosofia della morale in Erminio Juvalta, (pubblicazioni dell'istituto di filosofia. Facoltà di magistero dell'Genova, 24), Marzorati, Milano Maurizio Viroli, L'etica laica di Erminio Juvalta, FrancoAngeli, Milano. Sul pensiero di Erminio juvalta, fascicolo monografico della «Rivista di storia della filosofia»,  Franco Angeli, Milano, Piergiorgio Donatelli, «JUVALTA, Erminio», in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana Treccani, Guido Scaramellini, Chiavennaschi nella Storia, Chiavenna, Erminio Juvalta, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Opere di Erminio Juvalta, su Liber Liber.  Opere di Erminio Juvalta, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Erminio Juvalta. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Juvalta on the categorical imperative,” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice.

 

kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhn?:  j. w. v. Goethe, a ballad from Mignon that Goethe uses in Book II of his novel, The apprentice. Grice was amused by Searle’s example“even if it misses its point!” An British soldier in the Second World War is captured by Italian troops. The British soldier wishes to get the Italian troops to believe that he is a *German* officer, in order to get them to release him. What he would like to do is to tell them, in German, or Italian, that he is a German officer (“Sono tedesco,” “Ich bin Deutsche”) but he does not know enough German, or Italian, to do such a simple thing as that. So he, as it were, attempts to put on a show of telling them that he is a German officer by reciting the only line of German that he knows, a line he learned at Clifton, to wit: ‘Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?”. The British soldier intends to produce a certain response in his Italian captors, viz. that they should believe him to be a German officer. He intends to produce this response by means of the Italian troops’s recognition of his intention to produce it. Nevertheless, it would seem false that when the British soldier utters, "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?” what he means or communicates is that  he is a German officer. Searle thinks he can support a claim that something is missing from Grice’s account of meaning. This would (Grice think Searle thinks) be improved if it were supplemented as follows (Grice’s conjecture): "U meant that p by x" means " U intended to produce in A a certain effect by means of the recognition of U's intention to produce that effect, and (if the utterance of x is the utterance of a sentence) U intends A's recognition of U's intention (to produce the effect) to be achieved by means of the recognition that the sentence uttered is conventionally used to produce such an effect." Now even if Grice should be faced with a genuine counterexample, he should be very reluctant to take the way out which Grice suspects is being offered him. Grice finds it difficult to tell whether this is what was being offered, since Searle is primarily concerned with the characterization of something different, not with a general discussion of the nature of meaning or communication. On top he is seems mainly concerned to adapt Grice’s account of meaning to a dissimilar purpose, and hardly, as Schiffer at least tried, to amend Grice’s analysis so as to be better suited to its avowed end. Of course Grice would not want to deny that when the vehicle of meaning is a sentence (or the utterance of a sentence, as in “Mary had a little lamb”uttered by a German officer in France to have the French believe that he is an English officer) the utterer’s intentions are to be recognized, in the normal case, by virtue of a knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence (indeed Grice’s account of “conversational” or in general "non-conventional implicaturum" depends, in some cases, on something like this idea). But Grice treats meaning something by the utterance of a sentence as being only a SPECIAL case of meaning or communicating that p by an utterance (in Grice’s extended use of ‘utterance’ to include gestures and stuff), and to treat a ‘conventional’ co-relation between a sentence and a specific response as providing only one of the ways (or modes) in which an utterance may be correlated with a response. Is Searle’s “Kennst du das land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?” however, a genuine counterexample? It seems to Grice that the imaginary situation is under-described, and that there are perhaps three different cases to be considered. First, the situation might be such that the only real chance that the Italian soldiers would, on hearing the British soldier recite the line from Goethe suppose him to be a German officer, would be if the Italians were to, as they should not, argue as follows: "The British soldier has just recited the first line from Goethe’s “Faust,” in a surprisingly authoritative tone); He thinks we are silly enough to think he is, with the British uniform and all, a German soldier.” If the situation was such that the Italian soldier were likely to argue like that, and the British soldier knew that to be so, it would be difficult to avoid attributing to him the intention, when he recited the line from “Fuast”, that they should argue like that. One cannot in general intend that some result should be achieved, if one knows that there is no likelihood that it will be achieved. But if the British soldier’s intention is as just described, he certainly would not, by Grice’s account, be meaning that he is a German soldier. For though he would intend the Italian soldier to believe him to be a German soldier, he would not be intending the Italian soldier to believe this on the basis of the Italian soldier’s recognition of his intention. And it seems to Grice that though this is not how Searle wishes the example to be taken, it would be much the most likely situation to have obtained. Second, Grice thinks that Searle wants us to suppose that the British soldier hopes that the Italian soldier will each a belief that the English soldier is a German soldier via a belief that the line from Goethe which he uttered means other than what it does, for why would they NOT know the land where the lemon trees bloom? They are in it! It s not easy to see how to build up the context of utterance so as to give the English soldier any basis for his hope that the Italian soldier thinks that the English soldier thinks that the Italian soldier knows where the lemon trees bloomhis native land! Now it becomes doubtful whether, after all, it is right to say that the English solidier did not mean (unsuccessfully communicate) that he is a German soldier. Communication is not factive. That Geothe’s line translates as "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom" is totally irrelevant. If the English soldier could be said to have meant or communicated that he was a German soldier, he would have meant that by saying the line, or by saying the line in a particularly authoritative way. It makes a difference whether U merely intends A to think that a particular sentence has a certain meaning which it does not in fact have, or whether he also intends him to think of himself as supposed to make use of his (mistaken) thought that, metabolically, the expression has this ‘meaning’ in reaching a belief about U's intentions. If A is intended to think that U expects A to understand the sentence spoken and is intended to attribute to it, metabolically, a ‘meaning’ which U knows it does not have, he utterer should not be described as meaning, by his utterance, that p. Grice does not see the force of this contention, nor indeed does he find it easy or conceptually clear to apply the distinction which it attempts to make. The general point seems to be as follows. Characteristically, an utterer intends his recipient to recognize (and to think himself intended to recognize) some "crucial" feature F, and to think of F (and to think himself intended to think of F) as co-related in a certain way or mode with some response which the utterer intends the audience to produce. It does not matter so far as the attribution of the utterer’s meaning is concerned, whether F is thought by U to be *really* co-related in that way or mode with the response or not; though of course in the normal case U will think F to be so co-related. Suppose, however, we fill in the detail of the English soldier case, so as to suppose he accompanies "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen" with gesticulations, chest-thumping, and so forth; he might then hope to succeed in conveying to the Italian soldier that he intends them to understand what the line ‘means’, to learn from the particular German sentence that the English soldier intends them to think that he is a German officer (whereas really of course the English soldier does not expect them to learn that way, but only by assuming, on the basis of the situation and the character of the English soldier’s performance, that he must be trying to communicate to them, against all reasonable hopes, that he is a German officer. Perhaps in that case, we should be disinclined to say that the English soldier means or communicates that he is a German officer, and ready to say only that the English soldier means, naturally and metabolically, as it were, the Italian solider to think that he was a German officer. Grice goes on to suggest a revised set of conditions for " U meant something by x" (Redefinition III, Version A): Ranges of variables: A: audiences f: features of utterance r: responses c: modes of correlation (for example, iconic, associative, conventional) I63 H. P. GRICE (HA) (if) (3r) (ic): U uttered x intending (i) A to think x possessesf (2) A to think U intends (i) (3) A to think off as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (4) A to think U intends (3) (5) A to think on the basis of the fulfillment of (i) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (6) A, on the basis of fulfillment of (5), to produce r (7) A to think U intends (6). In the case of the "little girl" there is a single feature f (that of being an utterance of a particular French sentence) with respect to which A has all the first four intentions. (The only thing wrong is that this feature is not in fact correlated conventionally with the intended responses, and this does not disqualify the utterance from being one by which U means something.) In the English soldier case there is no such single feature. The Italian soldier is intended (i) to recognize, and go by, feature f1 (x's being a bit of German and being uttered with certain gesticulations, and so. forth) but (2) to think that he is intended to recognize x as havingf2 (as being a particular German sentence). So intention (2) on our revised list is absent. And so we do not need the condition previously added to eliminate this example. I think, however, that condition (7) (the old condition [i]) is still needed, unless it can be replaced by a general "anti-deception" clause. It may be that such replacement is possible; it may be that the "backward-looking" subclauses (2), (4), and (7) can be omitted, and replaced by the prohibitive clause which figures in Redefinition II, Version B. We have then to consider the merits of Redefinition III, Version B, the definiens of which will run as follows: (3A) (if) (3r) (ic): (a) U uttered x intending (I) A to think x possessesf (2) A to thinkf correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (3) A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (I) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (4) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r, and (b) there is no inference-element E such that U intends both (I') A in his determination of r to rely on E (2') A to think Uto intend (I') to be false. Grice would actually often play and sing the ballad. G. writer often considered the leading cultural figure of his age. He wrote lyric poetry, dramas, and fictional, essayistic, and aphoristic prose as well as works in various natural sciences, including anatomy, botany, and optics. A lawyer by training, for most of his life Goethe was a government official at the provincial court of Saxony-Weimar. In his numerous contributions to world literature, such as the novels The Sorrows of Young Werther, Wilhelm Meister’s Years of Apprenticeship, Elective Affinities, and Wilhelm Meister’s Years of Pilgrimage, and the two-part tragedy Faust, Goethe represented the tensions between individual and society as well as between culture and nature, with increased recognition of their tragic opposition and the need to cultivate a resigned self-discipline in artistic and social matters. In his poetic and scientific treatment of nature he was influenced by Spinoza’s pantheist identification of nature and God and maintained that everything in nature is animate and expressive of divine presence. In his theory and practice of science he opposed the quantitative and experimental method and insisted on a description of the phenomena that was to include the intuitive grasp of the archetypal forms or shapes underlying all development in nature. 

 

kennyism: “His surname means ‘white,’ as in penguin, kennedy.”Grice. Cited by Grice in his British Academy lectureGrice was pleased that Kenny translated Vitters’s “Philosophical Grammar”“He turned it into more of a philosophical thing than I would have thought one could!”

 

keynes, j. Neville“the father of the better known Keynes, but the more interesting of the pair.”Grice. Keynes, j. k., philosopher, author of “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” and “A Treatise on Probability,” cited by Grice for the importance of the ontological status of properties. Keynes was also active in English Oxbridge philosophical life, being well acquainted with such philosophers as G. E. Moore and F. P. Ramsey. In the philosophy of probability, Keynes pioneers the treatment of the proposition as the bearers of a probability assignment. Unlike classical subjectivists, Keynes treats probability as objective evidential relations among at least two proposition in ‘if’ connection. These relations are to be directly epistemically accessible to an intuitive ‘faculty.’ An idiosyncratic feature of Keynes’s system is that different probability assignments cannot always be compared (ordered as equal, less than, or greater than one another). Keynesianism permanently affected philosophy. Keynes’s philosophy has a number of important dimensions. While Keynes’s theorizing is in the capitalistic tradition, he rejects Sctos Smith’s notion of an invisible hand that would optimize the performance of an economy without any intentional direction by an individual or by the government. This involved rejection of the economic policy of “laissez-faire,” according to which government intervention in the economy’s operation is useless, or worse. Keynes argues that the natural force could deflect an economy from a course of optimal growth and keep it permanently out of equilibrium. Keynes proposes a number of mechanisms for adjusting its performance. Keynes advocates programs of government taxation and spending, not primarily as a means of providing public goods, but as a means of increasing prosperity. The philosopher is thereby provided with another means for justifying the existence of a strong government. One of the important ways that Keynes’s philosophy still directs much theorizing is its deep division between microeconomics and macroeconomics. Keynes argues, in effect, that micro-oeconomic analysis with its emphasis on ideal individual rationality and perfect intersubjective game-theoretical two-player competition is inadequate as a tool for understanding a macrophenomenon such as interest, and money. Keynes tries to show how human psychological foibles and market frictions require a qualitatively different kind of analysis at the macro level. Much theorizing is concerned with understanding the connections between micro- and macrophenomena and micro- and macroeconomics in an attempt to dissolve or blur the division. This issue is a philosophically important instance of a potential theoretical reduction. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Keynes’s ontology in the “Treatise on Probability,” H. P. Grice, “Credibility and Probability.”

 

kilvington: Oriel, Oxford. Yorks. Grice, “The English Place Name Society told me.” “I tried to teach Sophismata at Oxford, but my tutees complained that Chillington’s Latin chilled them!”Grice. English philosopher. He was a scholar associated with the household of Richard de Bury and an early member of “The Oxford Calculators,” as Grice calls them, important in the early development of physics. Kilvington’s “Sophismata” is the only work of his studied extensively to date. It is an investigation of puzzles regarding ceasing, doubting, the liar, change, velocity and acceleration, motive power, beginning and ceasing, the continuum, infinity, knowing and doubting, and the liar and related paradoxes. Kilvington’s “Sophismata” is peculiar insofar as all these are treated in a conceptual way, in contrast to the more artificial “calculations” used by Bradwardine, Heytesbury, and other Oxford Calculators to handle this or that problem. Kilvington also wrote a commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences and questions on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption, Physics, and Nicomachean Ethics. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “Chillington chills: “Sophismata”on beginning and ceasing and knowing and doubtingimplicatura.”

 

kilwardby of portosanta rufina, Lazio: English philosopher, he teaches at Paris, joins the Dominicans and teaches at Oxford. Kilwardby becomes archbishop of Canterbury and condemns thirty propositions, among them Aquinas’s position that there is a single substantial form in a human being. Kilwardby resigns his archbishopric and is appointed to the bishopric of Santa Rufina, Italy, where he dies. Kilwardby writes extensively and had considerable medieval influence, especially in philosophy of language; but it is now unusually difficult to determine which works are authentically his. “De Ortu Scientiarum advances a sophisticated account of how a name is imposed and a detailed account of the nature and role of conceptual analysis. In metaphysics Kilwardby of Santa Rufina insisted that things are individual and that universality arises from operations of the soul. He writes extensively on happiness and was concerned to show that some happiness is possible in this life. In psychology he argued that freedom of decision is a disposition arising from the cooperation of the intellect and the will.

 

Scitum-scitum: cognitum: KK-thesis: the thesis that knowing entails knowing that one knows, symbolized in propositional epistemic logic as Kp > KKp, where ‘K’ stands for knowing. According to the KK-thesis, proposed by Grice in “Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre,” the (propositional) logic of knowledge resembles the modal system S4. The KK-thesis was introduced into epistemological discussion by Hintikka in Knowledge and Belief. He calls the KKthesis a “virtual implication,” a conditional whose negation is “indefensible.” A tacit or an explicit acceptance of the thesis has been part of many philosophers’ views about knowledge since Plato and Aristotle. If the thesis is formalized as Kap P KaKap, where ‘Ka’ is read as ‘a knows that’, it holds only if the person a knows that he is referred to by ‘a’; this qualification is automatically satisfied for the first-person case. The validity of the thesis seems sensitive to variations in the sense of ‘know’; it has sometimes been thought to characterize a strong concept of knowledge, e.g., knowledge based on (factually) conclusive reasons, or active as opposed to implicit knowledge. If knowledge is regarded as true belief based on conclusive evidence, the KKthesis entails that a person knows that p only if his evidence for p is also sufficient to justify the claim that he knows that p; the epistemic claim should not require additional evidence. Scitum -- notum -- knowledge by acquaintance: knowledge of objects by means of direct awareness of them. The notion of knowledge by acquaintance is primarily associated with Russell (The Problems of Philosophy). Russell first distinguishes knowledge of truths from knowledge of things. He then distinguishes two kinds of knowledge of things: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Ordinary speech suggests that we are acquainted with the people and the physical objects in our immediate environments. On Russell’s view, however, our contact with these things is indirect, being mediated by our mental representations of them. He holds that the only things we know by acquaintance are the content of our minds, abstract universals, and, perhaps, ourselves. Russell says that knowledge by description is indirect knowledge of objects, our knowledge being mediated by other objects and truths. He suggests that we know external objects, such as tables and other people, only by description (e.g., the cause of my present experience). Russell’s discussion of this topic is quite puzzling. The considerations that lead him to say that we lack acquaintance with external objects also lead him to say that, strictly speaking, we lack knowledge of such things. This seems to amount to the claim that what he has called “knowledge by description” is not, strictly speaking, a kind of knowledge at all. Russell also holds that every proposition that a person understands must be composed entirely of elements with which the person is acquainted. This leads him to propose analyses of familiar propositions in terms of mental objects with which we are acquainted.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre,” in “The Conception of Value.”

 

shaftesbury: “One of my favourite rationalist philosophers”Grice.

 

de re/de sensu:, knowledge de re, with respect to some object, that it has a particular property, or knowledge, of a group of objects, that they stand in some relation. Knowledge de re is typically contrasted with knowledge de dicto, which is knowledge of facts or propositions. If persons A and B know that a winner has been declared in an election, but only B knows which candidate has won, then both have de dicto knowledge that someone has won, but only B has de re knowledge about some candidate that she is the winner. Person B can knowingly attribute the property of being the winner to one of the candidates. It is generally held that to have de re knowledge about an object one must at least be in some sense familiar with or causally connected to the object. A related concept is knowledge de se. This is self-knowledge, of the sort expressed by ‘I am —— ’. Knowledge de se is not simply de re knowledge about oneself. A person might see a group of people in a mirror and notice that one of the people has a red spot on his nose. He then has de dicto knowledge that someone in the group has a red spot on his nose. On most accounts, he also has de re knowledge with respect to that individual that he has a spot. But if he has failed to recognize that he himself is the one with the spot, then he lacks de se knowledge. He doesn’t know (or believe) what he would express by saying “I have a red spot.” So, according to this view, knowledge de se is not merely knowledge de re about oneself.

 

OPERATVMCVM-OPERATVM -- Cooperatum -- Kropotkin: philosopher, best remembered for his anarchism and his defense of mutual aid as a factor of evolution. Traveling extensively in Siberia on scientific expeditions (1862–67), he was stimulated by Darwin’s newly published theory of evolution and sought, in the Siberian landscape, confirmation of Darwin’s Malthusian principle of the struggle for survival. Instead Kropotkin found that underpopulation was the rule, that climate was the main obstacle to survival, and that mutual aid was a far more common phenomenon than Darwin recognized. He soon generalized these findings to social theory, opposing social Darwinism, and also began to espouse anarchist theory.

 

labriola: Essential Italian philosopher -- born in Genova, Liguria, Italia, philosopher who studied Hegel and corresponded with Engels for years (Lettere a Engels, 1949). Labriola’s essays on Marxism appeared first in French in the collection Essais sur la conception matérialiste de l’histoire. Another influential work, Discorrendo di socialismo e di filosofia collects ten letters to Georges Sorel on Marxism. Labriola did not intend to develop an original Marxist theory but only to give an accurate exposition of Marx’s thought. He believed that socialism would inevitably ensue from the inner contradictions of capitalist society and defended Marx’s views as objective scientific truths. He criticized revisionism and defended the need to maintain the orthodoxy of Marxist thought. His views and works were publicized by two of his students, Sorel in France and Croce in Italy. Gramsci brought new attention to Labriola as an example of pure and independent Marxism. Antonio Labriola (Cassino) filosofo. Con particolari interessi nel campo del marxismo. Nacque da Francesco Saverio, insegnante ginnasiale di lettere, e da Francesca Ponari. Il padre, oriundo di Brienza, era nipote diretto di Mario Pagano.  Nel 1861 si iscrisse alla facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell'Napoli, città nella quale la famiglia si era trasferita. Qui studia con gli hegeliani Augusto Vera e Bertrando Spaventa, il cui appoggio gli procura nel gennaio del 1864 un posto di applicato di pubblica sicurezza nella segreteria del prefetto.  Già il 3 maggio 1862 finisce di scrivere Una risposta alla prolusione di Zeller, un'opera in cui osteggia il neokantiano Eduard Zeller, professore dell'Heidelberg, grande storico della filosofia greca; contro ogni ipotesi di un ritorno a Kant, Labriola rivendica l'attualità dell'hegelismo. Tuttavia lo scritto fu pubblicato postumo, nel 1906.  Labriola non concluse gli studi universitari: nel 1865 conseguì il diploma di abilitazione e insegnò nel ginnasio Principe Umberto di Napoli; il 23 aprile 1866 sposa Rosalia Carolina von Sprenger, una palermitana di origini tedesche e di confessione evangelica, maestra nella scuola "Garibaldi" di Napoli, da cui ebbe tre figli: Michelangelo Francesco, Francesco Felice Alberto e Teresa Carolina. Di quest'anno è il saggio, premiato dall'Napoli, sull'Origine e natura delle passioni secondo Spinoza, che mostra già, nell'interesse del filosofo olandese, unito ai contemporanei studi della filosofia di Ludwig Feuerbach, una significativa presa di distanze dall'idealismo in favore del materialismo.  Nel 1869 scrive il saggio La dottrina di Socrate secondo Senofonte, Platone ed Aristotele, premiata nel 1871 dalla Reale Accademia di Scienze morali e politiche di Napoli. Consegue la libera docenza in filosofia della storia e si mette in aspettativa in attesa di ottenere un incarico nell'Università; scrive la dissertazione Esposizione critica della dottrina di G. B. Vico e collabora con il giornale svizzero "Basler Nachrichten", al quale invia corrispondenze politiche, al quotidiano napoletano "Il Piccolo", fondato e diretto da Rocco De Zerbi, futuro deputato e leader dell'Unione liberale, un gruppo politico al quale Labriola aderisce. Entra anche nella redazione della "Gazzetta di Napoli" e, nel febbraio 1872, in quella de L'Unità Nazionale, diretta da Ruggiero Bonghi, al Monitore di Bologna e alla Nazione di Firenze, nella quale escono nell'estate del 1872 le sue dieci Lettere napoletane. Nel 1873 si dichiara herbartiano in psicologia e in morale, pubblicando a Napoli i saggi Della libertà morale, dedicata ad Arturo Graf e Morale e religione.  Trasferitosi nel 1873 a Roma, ove muore di difterite il figlio Michelangelo, supera nel 1874 il concorso alla cattedra di filosofia e pedagogia all'Roma. Nel 1876 pubblicò il saggio Dell'insegnamento della storia e l'anno dopo è direttore del Museo di istruzione e di educazione: sono anni in cui Labriola mostra un particolare impegno verso il miglioramento del livello professionale degli insegnanti e la diffusione dell'istruzione di base della popolazione, inteso come primo passo per una maggiore democrazia del paese. A questo scopo s'informa sugli ordinamenti scolastici dei paesi europei: nel 1880 pubblica gli Appunti sull'insegnamento secondario privato in altri Stati e nel 1881 l'Ordinamento della scuola popolare in diversi paesi. Contemporaneamente Labriola abbandona le convinzioni politiche di moderato liberalismo per approdare a posizioni radicali: oltre alla lotta all'analfabetismo, auspica l'intervento dello Stato nell'economia, una politica sociale di assistenza ai poveri, il suffragio universale che permetta anche a candidati operai l'ingresso al Parlamento.  Nel 1887 ottiene la cattedra di filosofia della storia all'Roma e inizia un corso di storia del socialismo. A seguito di notizie che danno imminente la stipula del Concordato con il Vaticano, Labriola tiene all'Università la conferenza Della Chiesa e dello Stato a proposito della conciliazione, considerando una minaccia per la libertà di pensiero ogni accordo con la Chiesa, temendone l'ingerenza nella vita pubblica italiana; il 18 novembre 1887 il quotidiano romano La Tribuna pubblica una sua lettera in cui, tra l'altro, scrive di essere «teoricamente socialista ed avversario esplicito delle dottrine cattoliche» e il 22 gennaio 1888, nella conferenza Della scuola popolare, auspica l'abolizione dell'insegnamento religioso.  Il 2 marzo 1888, sul giornale Il Messaggero, depreca l'uso della forza pubblica contro le manifestazioni; il 16 dicembre tiene agli operai di Terni un discorso su Le idee della democrazia e le presenti condizioni dell'Italia, in cui afferma di impegnarsi personalmente in politica e dichiara di desiderare un «governo del popolo mediante il popolo stesso» e la formazione di un grande partito popolare. Il 2 maggio 1890 scrive che «I parlamenti, come forma transitoria della vita democratica d'origine borghese, spariranno col trionfo del proletario» e il 20 giugno tiene nel Circolo operaio romano di studi sociali il discorso Del socialismo commemorando la Comune di Parigi.  Nell'ottobre Labriola saluta il congresso della socialdemocrazia tedesca a Halle scrivendo che «Il proletariato militante procederà sicuro sulla via che mena diritto alla socializzazione dei mezzi di produzione ed l'abolizione del presente sistema di salariato, fidando solo nei suoi propri mezzi e nelle sue proprie forze».  Nel 1890 entra in rapporto epistolare con Engels, che conoscerà nel 1893 a Zurigo, e con i maggiori dirigenti socialisti europei, Kautsky, Liebknecht, Bebel, Lafargue, mentre rimprovera a Filippo Turati, il più prestigioso leader socialista italiano e direttore della rivista Critica sociale, superficialità teorica e arrendevolezza nei confronti degli avversari politici. Vuole che il Partito socialista, che deve nascere ufficialmente con il Congresso di Genova del 14 agosto 1892, sia un partito di operai e non di intellettuali positivisti borghesi. Vede nei Fasci siciliani un concreto esempio di socialismo popolare e rivoluzionario e lamenta che il marxismo non riesca a essere compreso in Italia.  Nell'anno accademico 1890-1891 fa lezione sul Manifesto di Marx ed Engels e scrive a quest'ultimo, nel gennaio del 1893, di star facendo un nuovo corso «su la genesi del socialismo moderno» ma di non riuscire a risolversi a scriverne un saggio per l'ignoranza su tanti «fatti, persone, teorie, etc, che sono tante fasi, tanti momenti né sentiti né conosciuti in Italia», come ribadisce il 7 maggio a Victor Adler che «il marxismo non piglia piede in Italia».  Su sollecitazione del Sorel, scrive In memoria del Manifesto dei comunisti, il primo dei suoi saggi sulla concezione materialistica della storia, terminato il 7 aprile 1895, che esce in francese sulla rivista del Sorel, Le Devenir social; lo spedisce a Engels in luglio, ricevendone le lodi. Anche il giovane Croceche ne promuove la stampa in Italiane è influenzato tanto da attraversare il suo pur breve periodo di adesione al marxismo. Nei due anni successivi Labriola scrive altri due saggi, Del materialismo storico, dilucidazione preliminare e Discorrendo di socialismo e di filosofia.  È sepolto presso il cimitero acattolico di Roma. Schematicamente, possiamo suddividere il percorso filosofico e politico di Labriola in tre diversi momenti: innanzitutto fu propugnatore dell'idealismo hegeliano (influenzato da Bertrando Spaventa, del quale fu allievo a Napoli); successivamente, possiamo distinguere una fase contrassegnata dal rifiuto dell'idealismo in nome del realismo herbartiano, ed infine, il momento della maturità, in cui aderisce pienamente al marxismo.  L'approccio di Labriola al marxismo è influenzato da Hegel e Herbart, per cui è più aperto dell'approccio di marxisti ortodossi come Karl Kautsky. Egli vide il marxismo non come una schematizzazione ideologica ed autonoma dalla storia, ma piuttosto come una filosofia autosufficiente per capire la struttura economica della società e le conseguenti relazioni umane. Era necessario aderire alla realtà sociale del proprio tempo storico se il marxismo voleva considerare la complessità dei processi sociali e la varietà di forze operanti nella storia. Il marxismo doveva essere inteso come una teoria ‘critica', nel senso che esso non asserisce verità eterne ed immutabili ed è pronto ad interpretare le contraddizioni sociali secondo le diverse fasi storiche, avendo al centro della sua analisi il lavoro e le condizioni dei lavoratori e dunque la concreta e materiale "prassi" umana. La sua descrizione del marxismo come "filosofia della prassi" verrà ripresa nei Quaderni dal carcere di Gramsci.  In pedagogia Labriola avvertì l'esigenza collettiva dei tempi nuovi, il bisogno di una scuola popolare che servisse da reale tessuto connettivo dell'Italia post-unitaria, una lotta dunque per la civiltà, mezzo e fine dell'evoluzione morale (e complessiva) delle classi subalterne.  Nella monografia Dell'insegnamento della storia, del 1876, dedicata alle più importanti questioni della pedagogia generale, Labriola aveva asserito la centralità dell'educazione alla socialità: il metodo pedagogico doveva essere quello della ricerca critica e di dibattito e di sperimentazione, unica via capace di condurre alla padronanza del pensiero logico-razionale e in grado di formare personalità aperte alla ricerca e al confronto (non a caso i primi studi di Labriola erano stati rivolti a Socrate e al metodo socratico). Traducendo in un linguaggio pedagogico moderno, per Labriola era necessaria un'attenzione maggiore ai prerequisiti logici piuttosto che alla struttura interna disciplinare, che comunque va indagata attraverso quella che egli chiama un'epigenesi analitica.  Celebre fu una sua conferenza tenuta nell'Aula Magna dell'Roma il 22 gennaio 1888, discorso sollecitato dalla stessa Società degli Insegnanti della capitale, che poi ne curò la pubblicazione in opuscolo.  Era necessario dare concretezza a piani di istituzioni scolastiche entro le quali le didattiche si sviluppassero non da una deduzione della teoria, ma come risultato di lotte politiche, di ideali sociali, di tradizioni storiche, di condizioni ambientali. Per Labriola proprio l'azione dell'ambiente storico sociale sugli uomini e la loro reazione ad esso costituiscono il tema dell'educazione. Per cui « le idee non cascano dal cielo ». Il metodo deve partire dalla prassi, dalla pratica e non dalle idee, dai principi astratti.  Il nucleo essenziale della pedagogia della « prassi » sta nella percezione della connessione dell'opera educativa con le condizioni dello sviluppo economico-sociale.  Trockij conobbe «con entusiasmo» l'opera di Labriola nel 1898, quand'era detenuto nel carcere di Odessa. Egli scrive nelle sue memorie che «come pochi scrittori latini, Labriola possedeva la dialettica materialistica, se non nella politica, dov'era impacciato, certo nel campo della filosofia della storia. Sotto quel dilettantismo brillante c'era vera profondità. Labriola liquida egregiamente la teoria dei fattori molteplici che popolano l'olimpo della storia guidando di lassù i nostri destini». Trockij aggiunge che dopo 30 anni continuava a rimanergli in mente «il ritornello Le idee non cascano dal cielo». Opere Una risposta alla prolusione di Zeller, 1862 Origine e natura delle passioni secondo l’Etica di Spinoza, 1866 La dottrina di Socrate secondo Senofonte, Platone ed Aristotele, Napoli, Stamperia della Regia Università, 1871. Della libertà morale, Napoli, Tipografia Ferrante-Strada, 1873. Morale e religione, Napoli, Tipografia Ferrante, 1873. Dell'insegnamento della storia. Studio pedagogico, Roma, Loescher, 1876. L'ordinamento della scuola popolare in diversi paesi. Note, Roma, Tip. eredi Botta, 1881. I problemi della filosofia della storia. Prelezione letta nella Roma il 28 febbraio 1887, Roma, Loescher, 1887. Della scuola popolare. Conferenza tenuta nell'aula magna della Università (domenica 22 gennaio 1888), Roma, Fratelli Centenari, 1888. Al comitato per la commemorazione di G. Bruno in Pisa. Lettera, Roma, Aldina, 1888. Del socialismo. Conferenza, Roma, Perino, 1889. Proletariato e radicali. Lettera ad Ettore Socci a proposito del Congresso democratico, Roma, La cooperativa, 1890. Saggi intorno alla concezione materialistica della storia I, In memoria del manifesto dei comunisti, Roma, Loescher, 1895; 1902. (presente su Wikisource) II, Del materialismo storico. Dilucidazione preliminare, Roma, Loescher, 1896; 1902. III, Discorrendo di socialismo e di filosofia. Lettere a G. Sorel, Roma, Loescher, 1898; 1902; B. Croce, Bari, Laterza, 1939. IV, Da un secolo all'altro. Considerazioni retrospettive e presagi, Bologna, Cappelli, 1925. L'università e la libertà della scienza, Napoli, Tipi Veraldi, 1897. A proposito della crisi del marxismo, in "Rivista italiana di sociologia", a. 3., fasc. 3, maggio 1899. Scritti varii editi e inediti di filosofia e politica, raccolti e pubblicati da Benedetto Croce, Bari, Laterza, 1906. Socrate, Benedetto Croce, Bari, Laterza, 1909. La concezione materialistica della storia, con un'aggiunta di B. Croce sulla critica del marxismo in Italia dal 1895 al 1900, Bari, Laterza, 1938. Tre prelezioni sulla storia e il materialismo storico; In memoria del Manifesto dei comunisti, Brescia, Studio Editoriale Vivi, 1945. Lettere a Engels, Roma, Rinascita, 1949. Democrazia e socialismo in Italia, Milano, Cooperativa del libro popolare, 1954. Opere, Luigi Dal Pane, I, Scritti e appunti su Zeller e su Spinoza (1862-1868), Milano, Feltrinelli, 1959. II, La dottrina di Socrate secondo Senofonte, Platone ed Aristotele (1871), Milano, Feltrinelli, 1961. III, Ricerche sul problema della libertà e altri scritti di filosofia e di pedagogia (1870-1883), Milano, Feltrinelli, 1962. Scritti di pedagogia e di politica scolastica, Dina Bertoni Jovine, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1961. Saggi sul materialismo storico, Valentino Gerratana e Augusto Guerra, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1964; 1977; introduzione e cura di Antonio A. Santucci, 2000.  88-359-4842-8. Il materialismo storico, antologia sistematica Carlo Poni, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1968. Pedagogia e società. Antologia degli scritti educativi, scelta e introduzioni di Demiro Marchi, Firenze, La nuova Italia, 1970. Scritti politici. 1886-1904, Valentino Gerratana, Bari, Laterza, Opere, Franco Sbarberi, Napoli, Rossi, 1972. Scritti filosofici e politici, 2 voll., Franco Sbarberi, Torino, Einaudi, 1973. Lettere a Benedetto Croce. 1885-1904, Napoli, Istituto italiano per gli studi storici, 1975. Dal secolo XIX al secolo XX. Dall'era della concorrenza al monopolio. Nascita e lotte del socialismo. IV saggio, incompiuto, della concezione materialistica della storia, Lecce, Milella, 1977. Scritti liberali, Bari, De Donato, 1981. Scritti pedagogici, Nicola Siciliani De Cumis, Torino, UTET, Epistolario I, 1861-1890, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1983. II, 1890-1895, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1983. III, 1896-1904, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1983. Lettere inedite. Roma, Istituto storico italiano per l'età moderna e contemporanea, 1988. La politica italiana nel 1871-1872. Corrispondenze alle “Basler Nachrichten”, a cura e con introduzione di Stefano Miccolis, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1998.  88-7088-300-0. Del materialismo storico e altri scritti, Milano, M&B Publishing, 2004.  88-7451-059-4. Del socialismo e altri scritti politici, Milano, UNICOPLI, Giordano Bruno. Scritti editi e inediti Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2008.  978-88-7088-569-9. Fra Dolcino, Pisa, Edizioni della Normale, .  Tutti gli scritti filosofici e di teoria dell'educazione, Milano, Bompiani Il pensiero occidentale, . Edizione nazionale La casa editrice Bibliopolis ha in corso di pubblicazione l'edizione nazionale delle opere di Antonio Labriola, istituita con decreto del Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali del 2 agosto 2007. I, Tra Hegel e Spinoza. Scritti, A.Savorelli e A. Zanardo, Bibliopolis, I problemi della filosofia della storia (1887) e recensioni (1871-1896), G. Cacciatore e M. Martirano, Bibliopolis, Da un secolo all'altro. 1897-1903, Stefano Miccolis e Alessandro Savorelli, Bibliopolis, . Copia archiviata , su archividifamiglia-sapienza.beniculturali.it. 3 settembre  21 settembre ).  L. Trotzkij, La mia vita, 1961112.  Carlo Fiorilli, Antonio Labriola. Ricordi di giovinezza, in «Nuova Antologia», 1º marzo 1906. Giuseppe Berti, Per uno studio della vita e del pensiero di Antonio Labriola, Roma, 1954. Ernesto Ragionieri, Socialdemocrazia tedesca e socialisti italiani: 1875-1895, Milano, 1961. Luigi Cortesi, La costituzione del Partito socialista italiano, Milano, 1962. Sergio Neri, Antonio Labriola educatore e pedagogista, Modena, 1968. Luigi Dal Pane, Antonio Labriola, la vita e il pensiero, Bologna, 1968. Demiro Marchi, La pedagogia di Antonio Labriola, Firenze, 1971. Luigi Dal Pane, Antonio Labriola nella politica e nella cultura italiana, Torino, 1975. Stefano Poggi, Antonio Labriola. Herbartismo e scienze dello spirito alle origini del marxismo italiano, Milano, Giuseppe Trebisacce, Marxismo e educazione in Antonio Labriola, Roma, Filippo Turati, Socialismo e riformismo nella storia d'Italia. Scritti politici 1878-1932, Milano, 1979. Nicola Siciliani de Cumis, Scritti liberali, Bari, 1981. Stefano Poggi, Introduzione a Labriola, Roma-Bari, 1982. Beatrice Centi, Antonio Labriola. Dalla filosofia di Herbart al materialismo storico, Bari, 1984. Franco Livorsi, Turati. Cinquant'anni di socialismo italiano, Milano, 1984. Franco Sbarberi, Ordinamento politico e società nel marxismo di Antonio Labriola, Milano, 1986. Antonio Areddu, Sulle lettere di Antonio Labriola a Benedetto Croce (1895-1904), Firenze 1987. Renzo Martinelli, Antonio Labriola, Roma, 1988. Antonio Areddu, A. Labriola e B. Croce nelle vicende del marxismo teorico italiano (1890-1904), (parte prima), in “Behemoth”, X, 1995, fasc. 1-2,  11–25. Antonio Areddu, A. Labriola e B. Croce nelle vicende del marxismo teorico italiano, in “Behemoth”, X, Luca Michelini, "Antonio Labriola e la scienza economica. Marxismo e marginalismo", in "Marginalismo e socialismo nell'Italia liberale  M. Guidi e L. Michelini, Annali della Fondazione Feltrinelli, Milano, 2001,  401–436 Alberto Burgio, Antonio Labriola nella storia e nella cultura della nuova Italia, Macerata, Antonio Areddu, Il pensiero di A. Labriola, "Il Cronista", 25 ottobre 2005, Antonio Labriola e la sua Università. Mostra documentaria per i Settecento anni della “Sapienza” (1303–2003). A cento anni dalla morte di Antonio Labriola (1904–2004), Nicola Siciliani de Cumis, Roma, 2005. Nicola D'Antuono, Saggio introduttivo e commento a A. Labriola, Discorrendo di socialismo e filosofia, Bologna, Nicola Siciliani de Cumis , Antonio Labriola e «La Sapienza». Tra testi, contesti, pretesti 2005–2006, con la collaborazione di A. Sanzo e D. Scalzo, Roma, 2007. Stefano Miccolis, Antonio Labriola. Saggi per una biografia politica, Alessandro Savorelli e Stefania Miccolis, Milano, . Nicola Siciliani de Cumis, Labriola dopo Labriola. Tra nuove carte d'archivio, ricerche, didattica, Postfazione di G. Mastroianni, Pisa, . Alessandro Sanzo, Studi su Antonio Labriola e il Museo d'Istruzione e di educazione, Roma, ,  Alessandro Sanzo, L'opera pedagogico-museale di Antonio Labriola. Carte d'archivio e prospettive euristiche, Roma, Pietro Mandré. Antonio Labriola, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, . Antonio Labriola, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.  Antonio Labriola, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Opere di Antonio Labriola, su Liber Liber.  Opere di Antonio Labriola, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Antonio Labriola, . Opere di Antonio Labriola, su Progetto Gutenberg.  L'Archivio Antonio Labriola, su marxists.org. Alberto Burgio, Antonio Labriola, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, . Roma. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Labriola," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

 

 

Lagalla: Giulio Cesare Lagalla (Padula), filosofo. Ultimo di tre figli, nacque nel 1571 a Padula, in provincia di Salerno, da Roberto, alto funzionario della burocrazia vicereale, e Vittoria Rosa. Studiò medicina e filosofia. Ancora bambino, perdette i genitori e fu affidato con i fratelli alla tutela di uno zio paterno, padre Girolamo Lagalla, che lo avviò agli studi letterari.  Carriera Nel 1582, appena undicenne, volle trasferirsi a Napoli per proseguire nella sua formazione. Si iscrisse ai corsi di filosofia e medicina dello Studio ed ebbe come maestri G. Stillabota, F.A. Vivoli e B. Longo nelle discipline filosofiche, G.A. Pisano, G. Polverino e C. Scannapieco in quelle mediche. Affidato dal Collegio degli archiatri a G. Provenzale e G. Caro per un periodo di tirocinio, sembra vi si fosse condotto con una tale competenza da meritare, nel 1589, i gradi accademici "nulla pecuniarum solutione". Nello stesso anno, grazie a Longo, divenne l'ufficiale sanitario di una squadra navale pontificia di stanza a Napoli, con la quale si diresse verso le coste laziali, per giungere poi, probabilmente nel 1590, a Roma.  A Roma avrebbe conseguito una nuova laurea in medicina, in seguito alla quale entrò al servizio del cardinale Giulio Antonio Santori, per il cui interessamento, nel 1592, ottenne da Clemente VIII l'incarico di lettore di logica presso la Sapienza romana. Per nove anni, tenne questa cattedra, pur continuando a coltivare la medicina. Inoltre, risale probabilmente a questo periodo l'emergere di un interesse per la teologia, che lo portò a comporre almeno tre orazioni sacre, De Trinitate, De Passione Christi Domini e De circuncisione Christi, lette dinanzi a Clemente VIII e al S. Collegio, in occasioni diverse: l'ultima il 1º gennaio 1600 per l'inaugurazione del giubileo.  L'Oratio de Trinitate è conservata manoscritta[1]; le altre due furono pubblicate a Roma per G. Facciotto nel 1600, con il nome di G.C. Galla e sono le prime opere originali date alle stampe da Lagalla. In precedenza aveva curato, sempre per Facciotto, la stampa di un commento ad Aristotele, lasciato manoscritto da G. Pontano, De immortalitate animae ex sententia Aristotelis libri septem (Roma 1597), precoce manifestazione di un interesse verso la questione dell'anima, intorno alla quale Lagalla si interrogò per buona parte della sua vita intellettuale e che contribuì ad attirargli sospetti di eterodossia.  Teorie Al problema dell'anima Lagalla. dedicò almeno tre corsi annuali della lettura ordinaria di filosofia, che tenne alla Sapienza dall'anno accademico 1601 alla morte; queste lezioni furono raccolte in un manoscritto dal titolo De anima commentarii, descritto da Allacci e oggi perduto. Allo stesso argomento è dedicato il penultimo volume dato alle stampe dal L., il De immortalitate animorum ex Aristotelis sententia libri tres (Roma 1621), la cui composizione terminò prima del dicembre 1619, come risulta da una lettera di Lagalla a Galilei.[2]  Lagalla, pur riaffermando le posizioni della tradizione tomistica sulla questione dell'anima umana, secondo le quali l'anima intellettiva è forma informans del corpo ed è molteplice, accetta quelle di Alessandro di Afrodisia a proposito dell'animazione dei cieli, ritenendo che non abbiano l'intelligenza come forma assistente che li muove eternamente, ma piuttosto come forma informante.  Morto Santori nel 1602, sembra che Lagalla si fosse avvicinato alla famiglia Aldobrandini, entrando, qualche anno più tardi, come medico al servizio del cardinale Pietro. Prima del 1610 conobbe Federico Cesi, al quale fu legato da una cordiale amicizia. Se questa non diede luogo a un'ascrizione all'Accademia dei Lincei, malgrado una precisa richiesta da parte di Lagalla., fu solo a causa della sua marcata professione aristotelica[3]. Cesi lo presentò comunque a Galilei quando quest'ultimo, nel 1611, si recò a Roma per sottoporre il suo telescopio e le scoperte con esso realizzate al giudizio degli autorevoli astronomi del Collegio romano, nonché di influenti membri della Curia pontificia e dello stesso Paolo V. Ne derivarono alcuni incontri, durante i quali Lagalla., incuriosito dall' "occhialino" galileiano, lo sperimentò e fu intrattenuto da Galilei con l'esibizione delle "pietre lucifere di Bologna", una specie di barite scoperta nei primi anni del XVII secolo nei dintorni della città emiliana. Da ciò che vide, trasse spunto per due scritti, pubblicati in un unico volume, il De phoenomenis in orbe Lunae novi telescopii usu a d. Gallileo Gallileo nunc iterum suscitatis physica disputatio… nec non de luce et lumine altera disputatio (Venezia 1612).  Atteso con impazienza da Galilei, che fu costantemente informato da Cesi dei progressi nella composizione, il libro deluse l'ambiente linceo.[4] Nel primo dei due scritti, pur difendendo la verità ottica di ciò che mostrava il telescopio, Lagalla cerca di spiegare l'irregolare (la scabrosità della superficie lunare) come prodotto del regolare, attraverso una sorta di estensione del principio di regolarità (invariabilità dei cieli e dei corpi e fenomeni inclusi in essi), cui risponde l'intera fisica celeste aristotelica. Le asperità lunari dovevano dunque consistere in parti più dense di "etere", più opache alla luce, e in parti meno dense, più chiare. Nel secondo scritto Lagala. racconta una discussione sulla natura della luce avuta con Galilei, Cesi, G. De Misiani e G. Clementi: dopo aver ribadito che la luce non è una sostanza, ma un accidente o una qualità reale, tratta delle "pietre lucifere" e, contro l'interpretazione di Galilei, Lagalla osserva che la luminescenza delle pietre non è una proprietà del minerale non trattato, ma una conseguenza del processo di calcificazione, che rende la pietra porosa e in grado di assorbire una certa quantità di fuoco e di luce, poi lentamente rilasciata; con ciò esclude che possa essere il prodotto della riflessione della luce solare sulla Terra da parte della Luna.  A proposito del primo dei due scritti, Galilei meditò di fornire una risposta pubblica, sollecitata dallo stesso Lagalla,[5] di cui le note di lettura al volume in questione, sembrano essere il lavoro preparatorio. Tale risposta non arrivò, ma i rapporti tra i due divennero più stretti, forse per effetto di un lento avvicinamento delle rispettive posizioni scientifiche. In occasione dell'osservazione di una cometa nel novembre 1613, il L. scrisse il Tractatus… de metheoro quod die nona novembris anni presentis 1613 in Urbe apparuit sopra collem Pincium[6] e poiché quest'opera pareva, in alcuni punti, accogliere le posizioni di Galilei, Lagalla fu attaccato di scarso aristotelismo. Si convinse così a chiedere a Galilei e a Cesi il sostegno per una lettura nello Studio pisano. Pur non mancando l'occasione (la morte di Flaminio Papazzoni aveva reso vacante un posto), non se ne fece niente, ma anche in questo caso i rapporti tra i tre uomini rimasero saldi.  Aumentava intanto l'insofferenza di Lagalla verso gli ambienti romani che lo guardavano con crescente sospetto. La sua De coelo animato disputatio fu stampata in Germania, per l'interessamento di Allacci, poco prima della morte dell'autore[7], pur essendo stata completata nel 1614. Lagalla non rinunciò a coltivare la speranza di ottenere un adeguato incarico al di fuori della capitale pontificia, tanto da valutare con attenzione la proposta, fattagli intorno al 1620, di trasferirsi alla corte di Sigismondo III di Polonia come medico personale del sovrano. Le compromesse condizioni di salute (soffriva di una malattia urinaria, forse una ipertrofia prostatica con complicanze) e il timore che l'inclemente clima polacco potesse peggiorarle lo portarono a rifiutare.  Negli ultimi anni, continuò a praticare, oltre alla medicina e alla filosofia, l'astronomia, e seguì il suo protettore, il cardinale Aldobrandini, in diversi viaggi in vari luoghi d'Italia. Durante il suo viaggio a Torino, nell'autunno del 1623, incorse nell'episodio che lo portò alla morte, avvenuta a Roma il 14 febbraio 1624, per un'infezione seguita alla cauterizzazione di una lacerazione dell'uretra, da lui stesso procurata mentre si medicava per lenire il suo male.  Gli è stato dedicato il cratere Lagalla sulla Luna.  Opere De phaenomenis in orbe lunae novi telescopii usu nunc iterum suscitatis (Venezia, 1612) De metheoro quod die nona novembris anni presentis 1613 in Urbe apparuit sopra collem Pincium[6] (1613) De luce et lumine altera disputatio (1614) De Immortalitate animorum ex Aristot. sententia (Roma, 1621) Note ^ (Biblioteca apost. Vaticana, Barb. lat., 323; cfr. Kristeller, II, p. 444) ^ (cfr. Edizione naz. delle opere, XII, p. 389) ^ (Gabrieli, p. 413) ^ (Gabrieli, p. 210) ^ (Gabrieli, p. 212)  (Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale, Galil., parte VI, t. IX, cc. 116-129; Favaro, nell'Ed. naz. delle opere di Galileo Galilei, XII, p. 389, indica una stampa apparentemente irreperibile, Roma 1613) ^ (s.l. [ma Heidelbergae] 1622) Bibliografia Cesare Preti, Giulio Cesare Lagalla, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol. 63, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2004. URL consultato il 14 settembre 2012. Giano Nicio Eritreo [Gian Vittorio Rossi], Pinacotheca imaginum illustrium doctrinae vel ingenii laude virorum, I, Coloniae Agrippinae 1643, pp. 222 s.; Leone Allacci, Iulii Caesaris Lagallae vita, Parisiis 1644; Tommaso Maria Alfani, Istoria degli anni santi, Napoli 1724, pp. 394 s.; Nuovo Dizionario istorico, XV, Napoli 1791, pp. 107-109; Francesco Colangelo, Storia dei filosofi e dei matematici napolitani, III, Napoli 1834, p. 162; Stefano Gradi, Leonis Allatii vita, in Novae patrum bibliothecae, VI, a cura di Angelo Mai, Romae 1853, pp. 17-19; Emil Wohlwill, Galilei und sein Kampf für die copernicanische Lehre, I, Hamburg-Leipzig 1909, pp. 214-218; Vincenzo Spampanato, Vita di Giordano Bruno, Messina 1921, pp. 587 s.; Gennaro De Crescenzo, Dizionario storico-biografico degli illustri e benemeriti salernitani, Salerno 1937, pp. 67, 168; Charles H. Lohr, Latin Aristotle commentaries, II, Firenze 1988, p. 214; I maestri della Sapienza di Roma dal 1514 al 1787, a cura di Emanuele Conte, Roma 1991, ad ind.; Massimo Bucciantini, Contro Galileo, Firenze 1995, pp. 49-51 e passim; Italo Gallo, Figure e momenti della cultura salernitana dall'umanesimo ad oggi, Salerno 1997, pp. 27-71. Paul Oskar Kristeller, Iter Italicum, I, pp. 147, 290, 311; II, pp. 444, 448, 456; V, p. 547; VI, pp. 91, 156, 186, 189. Lettere del Lagalla, o di altri con notizie su di lui, si trovano nell'Edizione nazionale delle opere di Galileo Galilei, a cura di Antonio Favaro, VIII, XI, XII, XIII, XVIII, Firenze 1929-39, ad indices (nel vol. III, pp. 309-399, è pubblicato il De phoenomenis in orbe Lunae con postille di Galilei) Giuseppe Gabrieli, Carteggio linceo, Roma 1996. Collegamenti esterni Opere di Giulio Cesare Lagalla / Giulio Cesare Lagalla (altra versione), su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Giulio Cesare Lagalla, su Open Library, Internet Archive.

 

Lalla: Paolo de Lalla, noto anche con lo pseudonimo di Paolo de Lalla Millul (Trieste), filosofo. La famiglia Paolo de Lalla nasce a Trieste, figlio unico di Achille e Anna Millul.  Il padre, nato a Napoli da famiglia originaria di Tolve, aveva intrapreso la carrriera militare, giungendo a ricoprire il grado di Tenente colonnello dell'esercito e congedandosi con il grado di Generale dell'esercito. Prese parte alla Prima guerra mondiale nonché alla Seconda guerra mondiale, dove rimase ferito alla spalla destra in Russia. Fu in seguito Dirigente dell'IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale). Achille de Lalla era figlio di Ludovico e di Maria Buonomo, figlia a sua volta di Alfonso Buonomo, compositore e musicista napoletano di fama.  La madre Anna (Roma 1902Napoli 1992) era, invece, nata a Roma in una famiglia alto borghese ebrea originaria di Livorno e discendente dal R Isaac Millul. Alla figura della madre, alla cui memoria in seguito avrebbe dedicato Evoluzione 2, de Lalla rimase legatissimo per tutta la vita. Inoltre, proprio in omaggio all'importanza della figura materna nella propria formazione, scelse di firmare tutte le proprie opere, che esulassero dall'ambito giuridico, con il doppio cognome de Lalla Millul.  Gli anni della formazione Giovanissimo si laurea in Giurisprudenza perseguendo la carriera universitaria e, appassionandosi alla Filosofia, fu allievo del filosofo logico-deontico polacco Jerzy Kalinowski di cui tradusse in italiano il saggio "Interpretazione giuridica e logica delle proposizioni normative".  La Contestazione giovanile e il Maggio francese A ventotto anni scappò a Parigi, prendendo parte al Maggio francese assieme a Daniel Cohn-Bendit e Jacques Sauvageot. Tuttavia, fu tra i primi ad intuire che il Partito Comunista francese non aveva alcuna seria intenzione politica di sostenere la Contestazione e, in anticipo sul fallimento dell'iniziativa giovanile, lasciò la Francia rientrando in Italia deluso.  Gli interessi filosofici e musicali Fu anche studioso di Evoluzionismo (scienze etno-antropologiche) e Politologia, e sarà proprio sulle sue teorie sull'Evoluzione umana e sul pensiero di Charles Darwin che scriverà l'opera Evoluzione 2Darwin e la selezione sessuale. Parallelamente agli studi giuridici e filosofico-evolutivi, coltiva la passione per la musica e si Diploma in Composizione presso il Conservatorio di San Pietro a Majella di Napoli, come allievo di Jacopo Napoli. Del de Lalla rimangono, infatti, diverse Sonate per pianoforte nonché composizioni di musica da camera.  Dopo un primo periodo di insegnamento presso l'Siena, ricoprì per quasi un trentennio il ruolo di Docente Ordinario nel Dipartimento di Scienze Penalistiche, Criminologiche e Penitenziarie dell'Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, insegnando Diritto processuale penale sino al  quando si congedò per sopraggiunti limiti d'età. A testimonianza del grande successo che riscuotevano i suoi corsi universitari, rimane la petizione indetta dagli studenti affinché il Senato Accademico li prorogasse per un biennio.  Gli ultimi anni Ritiratosi a vita privata, muore a Napoli nella tarda serata del 25 settembre  d'infarto mentre attendeva alla redazione della sua ultima opera. Questa, rimasta inedita, si sarebbe intitolata Est Deus in nobisContributo alla Nuova Evangelizzazione e, nelle intenzioni dell'autore, avrebbe dovuto costituire il completamento della trilogia iniziata con Evoluzione 2 e proseguita con La Comunità Democratica. Dal 1992, anno della morte della madre, si era riavvicinato alla Chiesa cattolica e, proprio agli studi teologici e al pensiero filosofico di San Tommaso d'Aquino aveva dedicato gli ultimi anni della propria esistenza.  Il pensiero giuridico Convinto assertore della superiorità del Diritto pubblico rispetto a quello privato, si è sempre posto a tutela delle prerogative statuali.  Il pensiero filosofico Sezione vuota Questa sezione sull'argomento filosofia è ancora vuota. Aiutaci a scriverla! Il pensiero musicale Sezione vuota Questa sezione sull'argomento musica è ancora vuota. Aiutaci a scriverla! Il pensiero politico Convinto assertore dei rischi della dilagante esterofilia in campo politico e fondamentalmente euroscettico negli ultimi anni di riavvicinamento al cattolicesimo, ideò un progetto di edificazione di un nuovo partito politico che, nelle sue teorizzazioni avrebbe assunto il nome di PARTITO CRISTIANO COMUNITARIO (DEMOCRATICO) ITALIANO PCC(D)I.  Opere Il concetto legislativo di azione penale, Ed. Jovene, Napoli 1960 La scelta del rito istruttorio, Ed. Jovene, Napoli 1971 Logica delle Prove penali, Ed. Jovene Napoli 1973 Saggio sulla specialità penale militare,Ed. Jovene, Napoli 1990 Topografia politica della seconda repubblica, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane Napoli 1994 Idee per un "completamento istruttorio" del giudice nelle indagini preliminari in "Riv. it. dir. e proc. pen." 1994 Evoluzione 2Darwin e la selezione sessuale, Ed. Salerno, Roma 2001 Evoluzione e selezioneTemi e problemi del darwinismo, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 2003 La Comunità Democraticaidee per una politica nuova, Guida Editori, Napoli 2009 Comunitarismo politico, Guida Editori, Napoli  Filosofia della musica occidentale, Guida Editori, Napoli  Composizioni musicali Per pianoforte Sonata n.° 1 Suite "italiana" Sonata n.° 2 Sonata n.° 3 "napoletana" Musica da camera Sonata per violino e violoncello Sonata per violino e pianoforte Sonata per violini, viola e violoncello Note  de Lalla F., Una famiglia borghese, Ed. Ibiskos   de Lalla F., op. cit.  in "Il foro penale"  XXIII 1968  ilcambiamento.it,//ilcambiamento.it/articoli/evoluzione_2_darwin_de_lalla_millul.  ateneapoli.it,//ateneapoli.it/news/archivio-storico/reintegro-del-prof-de-lalla-il-consiglio-di-facolta--si-esprime-negativamente.  petizioni.com/petizione_pro_prof_paolo_de_lalla

 

Lamanna: Eustachio Paolo Lamanna (Matera), filosofo. Linceo. Nacque in una famiglia molto povera, da Angelo Raffaele Lamanna, calzolaio, e da Maria Bruna Pizzilli, filandaia. Fece i primi studi in seminario e poi nel Liceo classico della sua città. Nel 1904 si trasferì a Firenze, laureandosi in Lettere e poi in Filosofia con Francesco De Sarlo, del quale sposerà la figlia Edvige.  Docente dal 1921 di filosofia morale nell'Messina e dal 1924 al 1955 di Storia della filosofia nell'Firenze, firmò nel 1925 il Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti di Benedetto Croce, ma successivamente appoggiò il regime: nel 1938 pubblicò un commento alla Dottrina del fascismo scritta da Benito Mussolini.  Autore di un fortunato manuale di storia della filosofia per i Licei, fu rettore dell'Università fiorentina dal 1953 al 1961, membro dell'Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Presidente nazionale dei Professori universitari, membro del Consiglio Superiore della Pubblica Istruzione e Medaglia d'oro al merito della scuola, della cultura e dell'arte. Diresse, con Pietro Piovani, la "Collana di Filosofia" delle Edizioni Morano di Napoli.  Pensiero Stabilito, per Lamanna, che la religiosità sia un'esigenza naturale dello spirito umano, egli rileva le contraddizioni percepite dalla coscienza fra l'essere e il dover essere, fra l'esigenza di una realtà concepita come razionalità e ordine, e la percezione di una realtà che appare irrazionale e disordinata, così come fra la concezione dell'assolutezza dello spirito e la concreta limitatezza della realtà umana. Da queste contraddizioni Lamanna deduce la necessità dell'esistenza di Dio.  Analoga antinomia gli sembra esistere tra morale e politica che a suo avviso può essere risolta trasportando nell'attività pratica la riconosciuta razionalità dell'ordine trascendente e divino, che è di per sé bene assoluto. In questo modo l'operare umano si fa etico ossia, secondo Lamanna, realmente politico, realizzandosi concretamente nell'ordinamento giuridico e, così come nell'operare razionale si concreta la vita morale, da questa si raggiunge l'armonia in cui consiste la bellezza. Opere: “La religione nella vita dello spirito, Firenze,  Kant, Milano, Umanesimo e scienza politica, Milano, Storia della filosofia, Firenze, La filosofia del Novecento, Firenze, Il bene per il bene, Firenze, Studi sul pensiero morale e politico di Kant, Firenze, Scritti storici e pensieri sulla storia, Padova, Studi Pietro Piovani, Sulla prospettiva filosofica di Eustachio Paolo Lamanna, Torino,  Pietro Piovani, Eustachio Paolo Lamanna tra etica e storia, Napoli,  Giuseppe Martano, L'esperienza speculativa di Eustachio Paolo Lamanna, in «Filosofia», Giovanni Calò, Il pensiero di Eustachio Paolo Lamanna, Napoli, Giovanni Calò, Eustachio Paolo Lamanna: Studi e testimonianze, D. Carbone, Matera, s. d.  Piergiorgio Donatelli, LAMANNA, Eustachio Paolo, Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana Treccani.

 

Lami: Gian Franco Lami (Roma), filosofo. Lami, laurea in Giurisprudenza e Scienze Politiche, è stato assistente universitario di Augusto Del Noce, collaboratore di Francesco Mercadante per Filosofia del Diritto, nella Facoltà di Scienze Politiche della Sapienza.. Dal 1994 al 1998 ha insegnato presso la Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell'Teramo; dal 1998 Filosofia Politica presso la Pontificia Università Urbaniana di Roma. Dal 2000 al , è stato docente di Filosofia Politica, nella Facoltà di Scienze Politiche della Sapienza di Roma. Ha collaborato e pubblicato numerosi lavori con diversi giornali e riviste specializzate, tra esse Letteratura e Tradizione; ha partecipato e curato costantemente convegni filosofici, politici e culturali: tra questi LUISS-Guido Carli di Roma (1993-1998), incontri sullo stesso Augusto Del Noce, Julius Evola, Eric Voegelin. Ha promosso con Emiliano Di Terlizzi la Scuola Romana di Filosofia Politica.  Opere Saggistica "Introduzione a Eric Voegelin. Dal mito teo-cosmogonico al sensorio della trascendenza: la ragione degli antichi e la ragione dei moderni", Giuffrè, Roma, 1993,  9788814044175 "Socrate Platone Aristotele. Una filosofia della Polis da Politeia a Politika, Rubettino, Cosenza, 2005,  9788849812435 "Tra utopia e utopismo", Il Cerchio, Rimini, 2008,  9788884741905 "Qui ed ora. Per una filosofia dell'eterno presente" con Giuseppe Casale, Il Cerchio, Rimini, ,  9788884742698  "Il libro Manifesto Per una nuova oggettività", Heliopolis, Pesaro, . (Gian Franco Lami), Giovanni Sessa, "Il pensiero di Eric Voegelin a 50 anni dalla pubblicazione di Ordine e Storia”, Franco Angeli, Roma, ,  9788856838619  Filosofia politica Filosofia della storia Nuova Destra Note  Gian Franco Lami//politicamente.net/gian%20franco%20lami.html Archiviato il 9 novembre  in .  Letteratura e Tradizione//mirorenzaglia.org/2009/10/letteratura-tradizione-il-resoconto/  convegni Copia archiviata, su lankelot.eu. 25 febbraio  (archiviato dall'url originale l'8 marzo ).  Scuola Romana di Filosofia Politica//centrostudilaruna.it/per-gian-franco-lami.html 5.//fondazionejuliusevola.it/Ricordo_Lami.htm

 

Lampronti: Isacco Lampronti (Ferrara), filosofo. È vissuto a Ferrara nel periodo del ghetto ed è noto per essere stato l'autore dell'enciclopedia talmudica Paḥad Yiṣḥāq.   Casa di Isacco Lampronti a Ferrara, in via Vignatagliata. Il nonno veniva da Costantinopoli ed il padre Samuele fu un uomo d'affari di successo che purtroppo morì quando Isacco aveva solo sei anni. Ancora bambino iniziò i suoi studi di ebraico e talmud. Il suo primo insegnante fu il rabbino ferrarese Shabbattai Elchanan Recanati. A quattordici anni fu inviato a Lugo poi andò a Padova, dove studiò medicina e in seguito continuò i suoi studi talmudici a Mantova.  A ventidue anni tornò a Ferrara dove insegnò nella Talmud Torah mentre cominciò ad esercitare la professione medica conquistando ammirazione e rispetto sia come medico sia come insegnante. Per il suo incarico come insegnante di ebraico, italiano ed aritmetica ricevette un salario mensile. Fu predicatore nelle sinagoghe sefardita e italiana.   Piazzetta Isacco Lampronti, angolo con via Vignatagliata. Continuò gli studi del Talmud tutta la vita, sostenne con i suoi guadagni la comunità ebraica spesso in difficoltà e fece dono alla sinagoga spagnola, nel 1710, di una preziosa Arca della Legge.  Opere La fama del rabbino Isacco Lampronti è dovuta in particolare al suo maggior lavoro: Pahad Yitzhak (Il timore di Isacco), un'enciclopedia talmudica di grande vastità, in cui tutti i soggetti talmudici sono esposti in ordine alfabetico. Questo testo è anche in tempi moderni un prezioso aiuto per gli studiosi del Talmud, dell'etica e della storia ebraica.  I primi due volumi vennero pubblicati negli ultimi anni di vita dallo stesso autore ma tutto il resto solo molti anni dopo la sua morte. L'opera completa originale si trova a Parigi, presso la Bibliothèque nationale de France, per la quale fu acquistato nel 1840.  Oltre a questo lavoro monumentale scrisse anche molti volumi di sermoni ed altre opere.  Morte Il rabbino Isacco Lampronti morì all'età di settantasette anni ma non fu possibile segnare la sua tomba con una lapide perché poco prima il papa aveva emesso un'ordinanza che proibiva agli ebrei di erigere pietre tombali, imponendo la distruzione di quelle esistenti.  Riconoscimenti  Epigrafe sulla casa di Isacco Lampronti Oltre un secolo dopo la sua morte i ferraresi ebrei e non ebrei lo ricordarono e nel 1872 posero una epigrafe sulla casa in cui aveva vissuto e lavorato. Sul marmo è scritto:  «ABITO' IN QUESTA CASA ISACCO LAMPRONTI NATO NEL MDCLXXIX MORTO NEL MDCCLVI MEDICO-TEOLOGO FRA I DOTTI CELEBRATISSIMO ONORO' LA PATRIA RIVERENTI ALLA SCIENZA ALCUNI CITTADINI POSERO MDCCCLXXII»  Nel quartiere cittadino dove esisteva il ghetto e dove si trova la sua casa a lui è stata dedicata una piccola piazzetta, un tempo chiamata piazzetta della Vittoria, che unisce via Vignatagliata con via Vittoria.  Note  museoferrara.  S.Magrini, p.153.  Chabad.  museoferrara2.  G.Melchiorri, p.212.  Gerolamo Melchiorri, Nomenclatura ed etimologia delle piazze e strade di Ferrara e Ampliamenti, Carlo Bassi, Ferrara, 2G Editrice, 2009,  IT\ICCU\UFE\0950643. Silvio Magrini, Storia degli ebrei di Ferrara, dalle origini al 1943, Andrea Pesaro, Livorno, Belforte, ,  IT\ICCU\TO0\1929824. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Isacco Lampronti  Isacco Lampronti, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Isacco Lampronti, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Isacco Lampronti, .  Isacco Lampronti (Ferrara, 1679-1756), su museoferrara.it, Istituto di Storia Contemporanea di Ferrara. 3 settembre . Il timore di Isacco, su museoferrara.it, Istituto di Storia Contemporanea di Ferrara. 3 settembre .Nissan Mindel, Rabbi Yitzchak Lampronti (5439-5517;1679-1756), su chabad.org, Chabad-Luitch Media Center. 3 settembre . Annie Sacerdoti, Il ghetto , su ferraraterraeacqua.it, Paolo Ravenna (foto), Ufficio Turismo della Provincia di Ferrara. 3 settembre . Ebraismo identita italiana, su meisweb.it, Museo nazionale dell'ebraismo italiano e della Shoah. 3 settembre . «Isacco Lampronti, autore nel Settecento di una antologia talmudica che è ancora oggi punto di riferimento imprescindibile per gli addetti ai lavori».

 

Landi: Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (Milano), filosofo. Studioso di semiotica, filosofia, economia politica, scienze umane e antropologia, ha apportato un notevole contributo agli sviluppi della semiotica e della filosofia del linguaggio in Italia, cercando di unificare la tradizione italiana con quella oxoniense. Diplomato al Regio LiceoGinnasio Alessandro Manzoni,  si laurea in Lettere a Milano e in Filosofia a Pavia. Proseguirà i suoi studi all'Oxford. Professore incaricato di Filosofia a Padova. Trascorre molti anni a Ann Arbor (nel Michigan) e Texas ad Austin.  Viaggia e lavora per conto di varie università. In seguito accetterà la cattedra di Filosofia della storia a Lecce. Riceve l'incarico di insegnare Filosofia a Trieste.  La sua opera si può suddividere in tre fasi. La prima  riguarda studi su Charles Morris, nonché l'analisi dei processi di “significazione” e del parlare comune.  La seconda fase propone una teoria della “produzione segnica” e linguistica, intendendola come teoria del lavoro non-linguistico e linguistico cui fondamento è l'omologia tra semiotica ed economia. (cf. Grice, P. E. R. E.). La terza fase studia l'intricato rapporto tra la semiotica e le ideologie e teorizza il fenomeno dell'”alienazione” semiotica e linguistica.  Opere: Charles Morris, Bocca, Milano, 1953 Charles Morris: lineamenti di una teoria dei segni, Manni, Lecce, 1954, “Significato, comunicazione e parlare comune,” – cfr. Grice, “SignificARE, communicARE, empiegare, implicARE, -- ‘common’ is Landi for Grice’s ‘ordinary.’ Marsilio, Padova. La semiotica e  Il linguaggio come lavoro e come mercato, -- cf. Grice against an utilitarian and pro a Kantian account of the rational effort – but remarks in the “Retrospective Epilogue” about his concern with ‘rationality’ as being co-operative. And Grice’s remarks about the independence of the two thesis: semiosis as rational and semiosis as cooperatively rational. Bompiani, Milano, Semiotica e ideologia, Bompiani, Milano, Dialektik und Entfremdung in der Sprache, Francoforte sul Meno, Ideology of linguistic relativity, L'Aia, Semiotics, Linguistics and economics, L'Aia, 1974 Charles Morris, H. P. Grice, e la semiotica novecentesca, Bompiani, Milano, Ideologia, Mondadori, Milano, Metodica filosofica e semiotica -- scienza dei segni, o teoria? – cf. Grice on philosophical psychology,’ folk science of psychology – ceteris paribus – ‘law’ of the science of psychology --. The laws of psychology – “That’s why we call them ‘psycho-logical’ concepts, or theoretical terms, -- psychological theory --. Theory Th.  Bompiani, Milano, Between signs and non-signs, Amsterdam, (postumo). Cf. Grice on the boundaries of ‘mean,’ and the idea of ‘consequence,’ y is a consequence of x, x means y. Il corpo del testo tra riproduzione sociale ed eccedenza, Scritti su G. Ryle e la filosofia analitica, il Poligrafo, Padova,  Semiotica Filosofia del linguaggio  Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. Bio-bibliographic note, su ferrucciorossilandi.com. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Landi,” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice. Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Rossi-Landi a Oxford.” Luigi Speranza, “Grice’s principle of economy of rational effort and Rossi-Landi’s economical semiotics.” Luigi Speranza, “Grice and Rossi-Landi: over-informativeness and excess: the implicature.”

 

Landino -- Dettaglio della scena dell'Annuncio dell'angelo a Zaccaria, Domenico Ghirlandaio, Cappella Tornabuoni, Santa Maria Novella, Firenze. Cristoforo Landino (Firenze), filosofo. Nacque da una famiglia originaria di Pratovecchio, nel Casentino, e compì gli studi in materie letterarie e giuridiche a Volterra. Nel 1458 gli venne affidata presso lo Studio fiorentino la cattedra di oratoria e poetica che era stata del suo maestro Carlo Marsuppini: Landino, sostenuto dai Medici, era stato avversato da non pochi personaggi in vista, come Alamanno Rinuccini e Donato Acciaiuoli. Tra i suoi allievi ci furono Poliziano e Marsilio Ficino. In quel periodo ricoprì anche incarichi pubblici, facendo parte della segreteria di Parte guelfa (1467) e della prima Cancelleria. Tra i suoi viaggi, spicca quello a Roma nel 1446.  La sua prima attività fu poetica, con la Xandra, una raccolta di componimenti in latino dedicata inizialmente a Leon Battista Alberti e poi a Piero de' Medici: nella redazione definitiva la silloge raccoglie 82 componimenti suddivisi in 3 libri. In campo filosofico scrisse tre dialoghi: il De anima (1471), le Disputationes Camaldulenses (1474) e il De vera nobilitate (dopo il 1487).  La maggiore fama nei secoli di Landino fu però legata alla sua attività di commentatore dei classici. Nel 1481 diede alle stampe il Comento sopra la Comedia di Dante, nel 1482 quello sulle opere di Orazio e nel 1488 quello sulle opere di Virgilio.  Fu anche traduttore dal latino in fiorentino: volgarizzò la Naturalis historia di Plinio il Vecchio (1475) e la Sforziade di Giovanni Simonetta (1485). Il volgarizzamento pliniano fu un vero e proprio evento: per la prima volta anche chi non conosceva il latino poteva leggere la più importante e vasta enciclopedia del mondo antico (tra i suoi lettori Luigi Pulci, Cristoforo Colombo e Leonardo da Vinci).  Per i meriti acquisiti, la Signoria fiorentina gli assegnò una torre nel Casentino e una pensione.  Venne ritratto tra illustri fiorentini a lui contemporanei da Domenico Ghirlandaio nella Cappella Tornabuoni di Santa Maria Novella.  Opere  Orazione alla Signoria fiorentina  Incipit della Historia naturale tradocta di lingua latina in fiorentina per Christophoro Landino fiorentino, nell'edizione del 1489. Xandra De anima Disputationes Camaldulenses De vera nobilitate Comento sopra la Comedia di Dante Commento a Orazio Commento a Virgilio Historia naturale di Caio Plinio Secondo tradocta di lingua latina in fiorentina per Christophoro Landino fiorentino al serenissimo Ferdinando re di Napoli Orazione alla Signoria fiorentina quando presentò il suo Commento di Dante, Firenze, Niccolò di Lorenzo, 1481. 2 marzo . Formulario di epistole, Firenze, Bartolomeo de' Libri, 1490. 2 marzo . Note  Il testo si può leggere in edizione critica: Christophori Landini Carmina omnia ex codicibus manuscriptis primum edidit A. Perosa, Florentiae 1939. Non esiste una traduzione integrale in italiano, ma ne è stata realizzata una in inglese: Cristoforo Landino, Poems, translated by M. P. Chatfield, Cambridge (USA)London 2008.  Cristoforo Landino, Disputationes CamaldulensesLohe, Firenze, Sansoni, 1980.  Cristoforo Landino, De vera nobilitate, M. T. Liaci, Firenze, Olschki, 1970.  R. Cardini, La critica del Landino, Firenze, Sansoni, 1973. Dallo stesso studioso è stata allestita la raccolta: C. Landino, Scritti critici e teorici, I-II, R. Cardini, Roma, Bulzoni, 1974  Cristoforo Landino, Comento sopra la Comedia, I-IVProcaccioli, Roma, Salerno editrice, 2001  Questo commento è stato solo parzialmente edito (la sezione relativa all'Ars poetica): Cristoforo Landino, In Quinti Horatii Flacci Artem poeticam ad Pisones interpretationes, G. Bugada, Firenze, Sismel, .  Per la datazione di quest'opera: R. Fubini, Quattrocento fiorentino. Politica, diplomazia, cultura, Pisa 1996,  303-332.  R. M. Comanducci, Nota sulla versione landiniana della Sforziade di Giovanni Simonetta, «Interpres», 12 (1992),  309-16.  Uno studio complessivo (sia filologico sia storico-culturale) dell'opera in A. Antonazzo, Il volgarizzamento pliniano di Cristoforo Landino, Messina, Centro Internazionale di Studi Umanistici, .  Questo testo proviene in parte dalla relativa voce del progetto Mille anni di scienza in Italia, opera del Museo Galileo. Istituto Museo di Storia della Scienza di Firenze (home page), pubblicata sotto licenza Creative Commons CC-BY-3.0 Cristoforo Landino, In Quinti Horatii Flacci Artem poeticam ad Pisones interpretationes. Gabriele Bugada, Firenze, Sismel-Società internazionale per lo studio del Medioevo latinoEdizioni del Galluzzo,  Carlo Dionisotti, «Landino, Cristoforo», in Enciclopedia Dantesca, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana Treccani, 1970. Simona Foà, «LANDINO (Landini), Cristoforo», in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 63, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2004. Antonino Antonazzo, Il volgarizzamento pliniano di Cristoforo Landino, Messina, Centro Internazionale di Studi Umanistici,  Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Cristoforo Landino Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Cristoforo Landino Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Cristoforo Landino  Cristoforo Landino, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Cristoforo Landino, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Cristoforo Landino, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.  Simona Foà, Cristoforo Landino, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  63, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2004. Cristoforo Landino, su Dictionary of Art Historians, Lee Sorensen.  (DE) Cristoforo Landino / Cristoforo Landino (altra versione), su ALCUIN, Ratisbona. Cristoforo Landino, su Mathematics Genealogy Project, North Dakota State University.  Opere di Cristoforo Landino / Cristoforo Landino (altra versione), su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Cristoforo Landino, .  di Cristoforo Landino, su Internet Speculative Fiction Database, Al von Ruff.

 

Landucci: Sergio Landucci (Sarzana), filosofo. Laureato all'Pisa con Luporini, ha insegnato Firenze. Studioso di Hegel, ha curato per Laterza opere di Descartes, Spinoza e Kant.  Opere principali: “Cultura e ideologia in Francesco De Sanctis,” Milano, Feltrinelli,  I filosofi e i selvaggi,” Bari, Laterza, 1972; riedito con aggiornamenti da Einaudi nel   Montesquieu e l'origine della scienza sociale, Firenze, Sansoni. “Hegel: la coscienza e la storia, Firenze, La nuova Italia, “La contraddizione in Hegel, Firenze, La nuova Italia, La teodicea nell'età cartesiana, Napoli, Bibliopolis, La Critica della ragion pratica di Kant: introduzione alla lettura, Roma, NIS, ristampato da Carocci nel 2001 e  Sull'etica di Kant, Milano, Guerini, La mente in Cartesio, Milano, F. Angeli,  I filosofi e Dio, Roma-Bari, Laterza, La doppia verità: conflitti di ragione e fede tra Medioevo e prima modernità, Milano, Feltrinelli, Antonio Gnoli, Intervista, "Repubblica", Scheda biografica su Einaudi.it

 

Latini:Grice: “People say it all starts with Alighieri; but the real ‘filosofo’ behind Alighieri surely is Burnetto – he has chapters on ‘Platone,’ ‘Aristotele,’ and the rest of them.”  «Poi si rivolse, e parve di coloro che corrono a Verona il drappo verde per la campagna; e parve di costoro quelli che vince, non colui che perde»  (Divina Commedia, Inf. XV, vv. 121-124) Brunetto Latini (Firenze), filosofo. Stemma di Brunetto Latin.  Brunetto (quasi sempre Burnetto nei documenti) era figlio di Buonaccorso e nipote di Latino Latini, appartenente ad una nobile famiglia toscana. La datazione approssimativa della nascita all'inizio degli anni Venti si desume dal fatto che nel 1254 ricoprì l'incarico di scriba degli anziani del comune di Firenze. Le fonti storiche e una serie di documenti autografi testimoniano la sua attiva partecipazione alla vita politica di Firenze. Come egli stesso narra nel Tesoretto, fu inviato dai suoi concittadini alla corte di Alfonso X di Castiglia, per richiedere il suo aiuto in favore dei guelfi. Tuttavia (sempre secondo il poemetto) la notizia della vittoria dei ghibellini a Montaperti (4 settembre 1260) costrinse Brunetto all'esilio in Francia.  Qui dimorò per sette anni tra Montpellier, Arras, Bar-sur-Aube e Parigi, esercitando (come già a Firenze) la professione di notaio, come testimoniano gli atti da lui stesso rogati.  I cambiamenti politici conseguenti alla vittoria di Carlo I d'Angiò a Benevento su Manfredi di Svevia consentirono il ritorno di Brunetto in Italia. Nel 1273 fu risarcito del torto subito, con il titolo di Segretario del Consiglio della repubblica, stimato ed onorato dai suoi concittadini.  La sua influenza divenne tale che a partire dal 1279 si trova a malapena nella storia di Firenze un avvenimento pubblico importante al quale Brunetto non abbia preso parte.  Nel 1280 contribuì notevolmente alla riconciliazione temporanea tra guelfi e ghibellini detta "pace del Cardinal Latino".  Più tardi (1284) presiedette il congresso dei sindaci in cui fu decisa la rovina di Pisa.  Latini fu elevato alla dignità di Priore. Questi magistrati, in numero di dodici, erano stati previsti nella costituzione del 1282. La sua parola si faceva frequentemente sentire nei Consigli generali della repubblica. Era uno degli arringatori, od oratori, più frequentemente designati.  Conservò integre le sue facoltà anche in età avanzata e morì nel 1294 (come scrive il Villani) o nel 1295 (come affermato da altre fonti), lasciando una figlia, Bianca Latini, che nel 1248 aveva sposato Guido Di Filippo De' Castiglionchi.  La tomba di Brunetto Latini è stata ritrovata nella chiesa di Santa Maria Maggiore di Firenze, ed è segnalata da un'antica colonnetta nella cappella a sinistra dell'altare maggiore.   Dante e Virgilio incontrano Brunetto. Illustrazione di Gustave Doré Nel Canto XV dell'Inferno Dante lo incontra tra i sodomiti, violenti contro Dio nella natura. Siamo nel terzo girone del settimo cerchio; Dante e Virgilio camminano su un piano rialzato rispetto alla landa desolata in cui i dannati procedono. Dante, che era stato allievo di Brunetto, è profondamente scosso, e non nasconde verso il maestro una persistente ammirazione. Brunetto è il primo nell'opera a toccare fisicamente il poeta, tirandolo per la veste.  Opere: “Il Tesoretto” Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg Il Tesoretto. Si tratta di un poema (incompiuto o mutilo) scritto in volgare fiorentino, in settenari a rima baciata, narrato in prima persona da Mastro Brunetto. L'autore definisce l'opera Tesoro, ma il nome Tesoretto è presente già nei manoscritti più antichi,  presumibilmente per distinguerla dalle traduzioni italiane del Tresor. Il protagonista, sconfortato dalla notizia della disfatta di Montaperti, si perde in una "selva diversa". Nella sua peregrinazione si imbatte nelle personificazioni della Natura e delle Virtù, che gli illustrano la composizione del Mondo e i modelli di comportamento cortesi. Il poema si interrompe nel momento in cui il protagonista incontra Tolomeo, che sta per spiegargli i fondamenti dell'astronomia.  Influenzato da un lato dal romanzo cortese in lingua d'oïl, dall'altro dai poemi allegorici medio-latini e francesi, Brunetto realizza un'opera che da una parte della critica è ritenuta tra i precursori diretti della Commedia.  Il Tresor  Frontespizio de Il Tesoro. Venezia, Melchiorre Sessa il Vecchio, 1533.  Il Tesoro, libro I. Quest'opera (il cui titolo originale è Li livres dou Tresor), la più celebre di quelle di Brunetto, fu scritta durante l'esilio in Francia, in lingua d'oïl, perché, come spiega il prologo: "la parleure est plus delitable et plus comune a touz languaiges" ("è la parlata più dilettevole e più comune tra tutte le lingue").  L'opera, della quale Alfonso D'Agostino ha segnalato ottantacinque testimoni manoscritti (61 completi, 11 incompleti, 13 frammentari), consta di tre libri e risulta la prima enciclopedia volgare in senso proprio. Altri testimoni sono stati segnalati in seguito da Paolo Squillacioti, Paolo Divizia e Marco Giola.  Il primo libro tratta "de la naissance de toutes choses"; tra gli argomenti affrontati vi sono un'ampia storia universale, dalle vicende dell'Antico e del Nuovo Testamento alla battaglia di Montaperti, elementi di medicina, fisica, astronomia, geografia, e architettura, e un bestiario. Si trova, in questo libro, una delle menzioni più antiche che conosciamo di una bussola e l'indicazione della sfericità della terra.  Nel secondo libro si tratta dei vizi e delle virtù, attingendo sostanzialmente dall'Etica Nicomachea.  Il terzo libro riguarda principalmente la retorica e la politica. Brunetto utilizza come fonti principali Aristotele, Platone, Senofane, Vegezio e Cicerone.  A Bono Giamboni, di poco più giovane di Brunetto, era un tempo attribuita una traduzione dell'opera in volgare italiano che ebbe una vasta diffusione manoscritta, ma Cesare Segre ha smentito la paternità giamboniana della traduzione (Prosa del Duecento).  Altre opere Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg Il Favolello. Brunetto è inoltre autore di un altro breve poemetto, Il Favolello, di una Rettorica, volgarizzamento e commento del De inventione di Cicerone, nonché dei volgarizzamenti di tre orazioni ciceroniane (Pro Ligario, Pro Marcello, Pro rege Deiòtaro). In passato gli si attribuivano, ma senza fondamento, varie opere tra cui il Mare amoroso e i Fiori e vita di filosafi.  Note  H.R. Jauss, Alterità e modernità della letteratura medievale, Bollati Boringhieri 1989. S. Sarteschi, Dal "Tesoretto" alla "Commedia": considerazioni su alcune riprese dantesche dal testo di Brunetto Latini, in "Rassegna europea di letteratura italiana", 19, 2002, 19-44.  B. Latini, TresorG. BeltramiSquillaciotiTorri e S. Vatteroni, Torino, Einaudi, A. D'Agostino, Itinerari e forme della prosa, in Storia della letteratura italiana, Roma, Salerno Editrice, 1995, p.558.  Brunetto Latini, Tresor. Beltrami, Pietro G. • Squillacioti, Paolo • Torri, PlinioTorino (2007)  Aggiunte (e una sottrazione) al censimento dei codici delle versioni italiane del "Tresor" di Brunetto Latini. In: Medioevo romanzo,  La tradizione dei volgarizzamenti toscani del Tresor di Brunetto Latini: con un'edizione critica della redazione alfa (I.1-129). Verona ()   Edizione del volgarizzamento toscano pubblicata nel 1528.  La colonna posta dove è stata riscoperta la tomba di Brunetto Latini, chiesa di Santa Maria Maggiore Brunetto Latini, Livres dou Tresor, Stampato in Vineggia, per Gioan Antonio & fratelli da Sabbio, ad instanza di Nicolo Garanta & Francesco da Salo libbrari & compagni, 1528. Giorgio Inglese, Brunetto Latini, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. 10 luglio . Brunetto Latini, Tesoretto. In Gianfranco Contini , Poeti del Duecento, Ricciardi, Milano e Napoli 1970, tomo 2. Peter Armour, Dante's Brunetto: the paternal paterine?, "Italian Studies", XXXVIII 1983,  1–38. Peter Armour, The love of two Florentines: Brunetto Latini and Bondie Dietaiuti, "Lectura Dantis [virginiana]", IX 1991 (fall),  11–33. Peter Armour, Brunetto, the stoic pessimist, "Dante Studies", CXII 1994,  1–18. A scuola con ser Brunetto. Indagini sulla ricezione di Brunetto Latini dal Medioevo al Rinascimento. Atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Basilea, 8-10 giugno 2006, Irene Maffia Scariati, Firenze, Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008. D'Arco Silvio Avalle, Ai luoghi di delizia pieni, Ricciardi, Milano e Napoli 1977,  87–106 e 191-197. Lillian Bisson, Brunetto Latini as a failed mentor, "Medievalia et Humanistica", Julia Bolton Holloway, Twice-Told Tales: Brunetto Latino and Dante Alighieri, Peter Lang, Berna e New York, 1993. John Boswell, Dante and the sodomites, "Dante Studies", CXII 1994,  63–76. Antonio Carrannante, "Implicazioni dantesche: Brunetto Latini (Inf. XV)", "L'Alighieri", 1995, 1,  79–102. Bianca Ceva, Brunetto Latini. L'uomo e l'opera, Ricciardi, Milano e Napoli, Elio Costa, From locus amoris to infernal Pentecost: the sin of Brunetto Latini, "Quaderni d'italianistica", X 1-2 (Spring-Fall) 1989,  109–132. Charles Davis, Brunetto Latini and Dante, "Studi medievali", II 1967,  421–450. Enciclopedia dantesca, ad vocem, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia ItalianaTreccani, Roma 1976,  5,  285–287. Pasquale Fornari, Dante e Brunetto, Tip. coop. varesina, Varese 1911. Poi in: Pro Dantis virtute et honore, Tip. coop. varesina, Varese 1911. Ludovico Frati, Brunetto Latini speziale, "Il giornale dantesco", John Harris, Three Dante notes (I: Brunetto the sodomite), da: "Lectura Dantis online", 2 1988, spring. Robert Hollander, Dante's harmonious homosexuals (Inferno 16.7-90, "Electronic Bulletin of the Dante Society of America", 1996. Richard Kay, Dante's swift and strong. Essays on "Inferno" XV, The Regents Press of Kansas, Lawrence 1978 (che ingloba: The sin of Brunetto Latini, "Mediaeval Studies",Richard Kay, The sin(s) of Brunetto Latini, "Dante Studies", CXII 1994,  19– 31. Francesco Maggini, La «Rettorica» italiana di Brunetto Latini, Firenze, Galletti e Cocci, 1912. Umberto Marchesini, Due studi biografici su Brunetto Latini. "Atti dell'Istituto Veneto", "La posizione del Latini nel canto XV dell'Inferno dantesco"). Pietro Merlo, E se Dante avesse collocato Brunetto Latini tra gli uomini irreligiosi e non tra i sodomiti?, "La cultura", anno III,  V 1884,  774–784. Poi in: Saggi glottologici e letterari, Hoepli, Milano 1890, II,  111–127. Fausto Montanari, Brunetto Latini, "Cultura e scuola", 13-14, 1965,  471–475. Sally Mussetter, "Ritornare a lo principio": Dante and the sin of Brunetto Latini, in "Philological Quarterly", LXIII 1984,  431–448. Thomas Nervin, Ser Brunetto's immortality: Inferno XV, "Dante studies", Antonio Padula, Brunetto Latini e il Pataffio, Dante Alighieri, Milano, Roma e Napoli 1921,  27–44. Manlio Pastore Stocchi, Delusione e giustizia nel canto XV dell'Inferno, "Lettere italiane", XX 1968,  433–455 (poi in: Letture classensi,  III, Longo, Ravenna Joseph Pequigney, Sodomy in Dante's Inferno and Purgatorio, "Representations", André Pézard, Dante sous la pluie de feu, Librairie philosophique, Paris 1950. Rosanna Santangelo, "Tutti cherci e litterati grandi e di gran fama": Brunetto Latini e l'omosessualità intellettuale, "Il sogno della farfalla. Rivista di psicoanalisi", III 1994,  23–36. Michele Scherillo, Alcuni capitoli della biografia di Dante, Loescher, Torino 1896,  116–221. Thor Sundby, Della vita e delle opere di Brunetto Latini, Le Monnier, Firenze 1884. Jeffrey Turco. "Restaging Sin in Medieval Florence: Augustine, Brunetto Latini, and the Streetscape of Dante's Vita nuova." Italian Studies, Dante Alighieri Storia di Firenze Divina Commedia Il Favolello Il Tesoretto Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Brunetto Latini Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Brunetto Latini Collabora a Wikiversità Wikiversità contiene risorse su Brunetto Latini Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Brunetto Latini  Brunetto Latini, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Federico Millosevich, Brunetto Latini, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Brunetto Latini, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.  Opere di Brunetto Latini, su Liber Liber.  Opere di Brunetto Latini, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Brunetto Latini,  su Brunetto Latini, su Les Archives de littérature du Moyen Âge. Brunetto Latini, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company.   su Brunetto Latinidal repertorio online Regesta Imperii, su opac.regesta-imperii.de. Brunetto Latino Portal, su florin.ms. 29 gennaio 2008 5 novembre 2005). Giovanni Dall'Orto, Brunetto Latini. Tommaso Giartosio, Dante e Brunetto Latini. Tratto da: Perché non possiamo non dirci. Letteratura, omosessualità, mondo, Feltrinelli, Milano, Concordanze del libro del Tesoretto, su classicistranieri.com.  Brunetto Latini, Li livres dou trésor, ed. par Polycarpe Chabaille, Paris 1863. Marco Giacomelli, In difesa di ser Brunetto Latini; in Adolph Caso , Dante in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1 di Dante studies, Branden Books.

 

Lazzarelli: Grice: “I would call Lazzarelli what Italians call ‘un filosofo ermetico.’ He certainly flouts all my desiderata for conversational clarity!” -- Lazzarelli e una musa presentano il manoscritto Fasti christianae religionis a Ferdinando I di Napoli. (Beinecke MS 391, f.6v) Ludovico Lazzarelli (San Severino Marche), filosofo.  Il documento più importante per ricostruire la vita di Lazzarelli è Vita Lodovici Lazzarelli Septempedani poetae laureati per Philippum fratrem ad Angelum Colotium scritto dal fratello Filippo subito dopo la morte di Ludovico, e indirizzato all'umanista Angelo Colocci. Lazzarelli fu educato e visse a Campli, in Abruzzo, dove frequentò la biblioteca del Convento di San Bernardino da Siena, che egli cita nella sua opera i Fasti Christianae Religionis, un lungo poema di ispirazione cristiana. Ricevette da Alessandro Sforza, signore di Pesaro, un premio per un poema da lui scritto sulla battaglia di San Flaviano. Egli ebbe contatti con i più importanti studiosi dell'epoca e fu seguace dell'ermetismo. Lazzarelli raccolse il Pimander di Ficino, l'Asclepio e tre trattati sull'ermetismo realizzando una versione che ampliava il corpus testi ermetici precedentemente tradotti dal Ficino, che poi divenne noto come Corpus Hermeticum.Fu autore di opere a carattere ermetico come il Crater Hermetis, in sintonia con il sincretismo religioso dei suoi tempi e in anticipo sulla filosofia di Pico, con la fusione di Cabala e Cristianesimo, ma anche di poemetti a carattere allegorico come l'Inno a Prometeo o didascalico-allegorici come il Bombyx.  De apparatu Patavini hastiludii (ed. a stampa Padova); De gentilium deorum imaginibus, dedicato prima a Borso d'Este,  poi a Federico da Montefeltro (edito W.J. O'Neal, Lewiston); Fasti Christianae religionis, con mss dedicati al pontefice Sisto IV,  poi al re di Napoli Ferdinando I d'Aragona e infine al re di Francia Carlo VIII (edito M. Bertolini, Napoli); Epistola Enoch (edita M. Brini, in Testi umanistici sull'ermetismo, Roma 1955,  34–50; la traduzione delle Diffinitiones Asclepii; De bombyce (ed. a stampa G.F. Lancellotti, Aesii 1765); Crater Hermetis edito in Pimander Mercurii Trismegisti liber de sapientia et potestate Dei. Asclepius eiusdem Mercurii liber de voluntate divina. Item Crater Hermetis a Lazarelo Septempedano, Parisiis 1505; Vademecum (edito M. Brini, in Testi umanistici sull'ermetismo, Roma. Un carme per la morte della duchessa d'Atri (conservato nel ms. 598 della Biblioteca del Seminario di Padova; Carmen bucolicum (Biblioteca universitaria di Breslavia, Milich Collection, ms. VIII.18); carmi di occasione (tra cui i versi che gli valsero l'incoronazione) (Biblioteca nazionale di Napoli, ms. V. E. 59); epigrammi sullo Pseudo Dionigi l'Areopagita (Walters Art Gallery di Baltimora, ms. W.344). Il testo dell'opera può essere letto in M. Meloni,"Lodovico Lazzarelli umanista settempedano e il De Gentilium deorum imaginibus, in Studia picena. Josef Lössl, Nicholas J. Baker-Brian, A Companion to Religion in Late Antiquity, John Wiley & Sons, .  pubblicato in appendice a C. Vasoli, Temi e fonti della tradizione ermetica in uno scritto di Symphorien Champier, in Umanesimo e esoterismo, E. Castelli, Padova, poi in G. Roellenbleck, Ludovico Lazzarelli Opusculum de Bombyce, in Literatur und Spiritualität. Hans Sckommodau zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, H. Rheinfelder P. ChristophorovE. Müller-Bochat, München, anche in edizione moderna integrale in C. Moreschini, Dall'"Asclepius" al "Crater Hermetis". Studi sull'ermetismo latino tardo-antico e rinascimentale, Pisa, Guido Arbizzoni, «LAZZARELLI, Ludovico», in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani,  Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Filosofia ermetica  Ludovico Lazzarelli, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Ludovico Lazzarelli, .  Ludovico Lazzarelli Ovidio Cristiano, su ludovicolazzarelli.it.  l rivista Campli Nostra Notizie , su camplinostranotizie.it. Life of Ludovico Lazzarelli and works, su trionfi.com.

 

Lecaldano -- Eugenio Lecaldano  (Treviso), filosofo.  Consegue la laurea in Filosofia presso l'Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" e nello stesso ateneo frequenta il corso di perfezionamento nella medesima disciplina, conseguendo il diploma nel 1968. Successivamente è ricercatore per il CNR presso il "Lessico intellettuale europeo" a Roma. Dapprima docente di Storia della filosofia moderna e contemporanea e poi di Filosofia morale a Siena, prosegue la sua attività presso la Sapienza dal 1986, ove insegna anche Bioetica dal 1999 al 2002 ed è Direttore del Master di II livello di Etica pratica e Bioetica dal 2002 al . Dal  è professore emerito di Filosofia morale presso il Dipartimento di Filosofia dell'Università Sapienza di Roma. Dall'aprile  è socio corrispondente della Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologichesezione I Filosofiadell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino.  È membro dei comitati scientifici delle riviste Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. An International Forum (dal 1998), Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica (dal 1987), Ragion Pratica e dei comitati direttivi di Bioetica. Rivista interdisciplinare (dal 1995), Filosofia e questioni pubbliche, Rivista di Filosofia (dal 1998), Hume Studies (2006-). È stato membro del Comitato Nazionale di Bioetica. È stato fra i fondatori della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica, che ha presieduto dal 1992 al 1994; e membro del direttivo della Società Filosofica Italiana sezione di Roma dal 1991 al 1993 e poi dal 2006. Ha diretto la collana Etica Pratica per l'editore Laterza, e la collana Etica pratica e bioetica per l'editore Le Lettere di Firenze. Nel 1997 per il volume Etica (UTET Libreria, 1995) è stato insignito dall'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino del premio "Cesare Gautieri" per la Filosofia del centenario 1896-1996.  Pensiero Le riflessioni di Lecaldano spaziano dalla storia della filosofia morale sino alle discussioni contemporanee sulla bioetica. Avvalendosi anche del rigore concettuale della filosofia analitica, indirizza la sua ricerca alla ricostruzione storiografica della morale anglosassone dal XVII al XIX secolo, con particolare riferimento ai filosofi scozzesi (David Hume, Adam Smith). Ha inoltre indagato criticamente i problemi della metaetica. In bioetica, Lecaldano si prefigge l'obiettivo di una chiarificazione delle implicazioni morali legate alle biotecnologie, che sfocia in una prospettiva laica per la pacifica gestione dei conflitti morali che le "tecnologie della vita" hanno prodotto.  Opere Le analisi del linguaggio morale. "Buono" e "dovere" nella filosofia inglese dal 1903 al 1965, Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1970. Introduzione a Moore, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1972. L'Illuminismo inglese, Torino, Loescher, 1985. Hume e la nascita dell'etica contemporanea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1991. Etica, Torino, UTET Libreria, 1995. Bioetica. Le scelte morali, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1999. Saggi di storia e teoria dell'etica, Gaeta, Bibliotheca, 2000. Dizionario di bioetica, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002. Un'etica senza Dio, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2006. Prima lezione di Filosofia Morale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, . Simpatia, Milano, Raffaello Cortina Editore, . Senza Dio. Storie di atei e ateismo, Bologna, Il Mulino, . Sul senso della vita, Bologna, Il Mulino, . Traduzione e curatela David Hume, Opere filosofiche, insieme a Enrico Mistretta, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1971.  Bioetica Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica Biotecnologie  La bioetica. Il punto di vista morale di E. Lecaldano sulla nascita, la cura e la morte di Luca Corchia. Riflessioni di Eugenio Lecaldano sul Senso della Vita In Riflessioni.it. Eugenio Lecaldano. Pagina docente Dipartimento di filosofia, SapienzaRoma.

 

Livi -- Antonio Livi (Prato), filosofo. Allievo di Gilson, ha collaborato con Cornelio Fabro, Augusto Del Noce ed Evandro Agazzi; è l'iniziatore della scuola filosofica del senso comune, rappresentata dalla ISCA (International Science and Commonsense Association), che ha come organo ufficiale la rivista "Sensus communisInternational Yearbook of Alethic Logic". Tra i suoi numerosi discepoli o estimatori vi sono gli italiani Fabrizio Renzi (autore di importanti saggi di Storia della Metafisica), Gianfranco Bettetini (semiologo), Fortunato Tito Arecchi (fisico), Alberto Spatola (psichiatra), Giovanni Covino (docente di Filosofia), Valentina Pelliccia (studiosa di Storia della Logica) e Francesco Arzillo (esperto di Filosofia del diritto), lo spagnolo José Meseguer (esperto di Logica e Intelligenza artificiale), l'americano Philip Larrey (studioso di filosofia analitica), l'inglese Thomas Rego (specialista di studi su Aristotele), il polacco Ireneusz Wojciech Korzeniowski (studioso di Ermeneutica) e l'irlandese William Slattery (epistemologo).  Fondatore della casa editrice Leonardo da Vinci, fu membro associato della Pontificia Accademia di San Tommaso, decano e professore emerito della Facoltà di Filosofia della Pontificia Università Lateranense. Firmò con Giovanni Paolo II alcune parti dell'enciclica Fides et ratio.  Il senso comune «Senso comune» è il termine utilizzato da Livi in chiave anti-cartesiana per individuare le certezze naturali e incontrovertibili possedute da ogni uomo. Non si tratta di una facoltà o di strutture cognitive a priori, ma di un sistema organico di certezze universali e necessarie che derivano dall'esperienza immediata e sono la condizione di possibilità di ogni ulteriore certezza. Livi ha per primo precisato quali siano queste certezze e ha provato con il metodo della presupposizione che esse sono in effetti il fondamento della conoscenza umana. Il senso comune comprende dunque l'evidenza dell'esistenza del mondo come insieme di enti in movimento; l'evidenza dell'io, come soggetto che si coglie nell'atto di conoscere il mondo; l'evidenza di altri come propri simili; l'evidenza di una legge morale che regola i rapporti di libertà e responsabilità tra i soggetti; l'evidenza di Dio come fondamento razionale della realtà, prima causa e ultimo fine, conosciuto nella sua esistenza indubitabile grazie a una inferenza immediata e spontanea, la quale lascia però inattingibile il mistero della sua essenza, che è la Trascendenza in senso proprio. Queste certezze sono a fondamento di un sistema di logica aletica su base olistica.  Tra gli studi recenti sul sistema della logica aletica elaborato da Antonio Livi vanno ricordati i saggi di Evandro Agazzi ("Valori e limiti del senso comune", Franco Angeli, Milano 2004), Pier Paolo Ottonello ("Livi", in "Profili", Marsilio Editori, Venezia ), di Piero Vassallo ("Antonio Livi, la riabilitazione del senso comune", in "Memoria e progresso", Fede & Cultura, Verona 2009,  135-140), di Francesco Arzillo, Il fondamento del giudizio. Una proposta teoretica a partire dalla filosofia del senso comune di Antonio Livi (Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, Roma ), di Fabrizio Renzi, La logica aletica e la sua funzione critica. Analisi della nuova proposta teoretica di Antonio Livi (Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, Roma ) e di William Slattery, The Logic of Truth. Thomas Aquinas' Epistemology and Antonio Livi's Alethic Logic (Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, Roma ). Hanno scritto su Livi anche Matteo Andolfo (storico della Filosofia antica), Dario Sacchi (filosofo della Università Cattolica di Milano), Georges Cottier (Teologo della Casa pontificia), Rino Fisichella (rettore magnifico dell'Università Lateranense), Eudaldo Forment (filosofo dell'Barcellona), Umberto Galeazzi (docente di Filosofia dell'Chieti), Mario Pangallo (docente di Storia della filosofia nell'Università Gregoriana) e Vittorio Possenti (filosofo morale dell'Venezia).  Influenze e critiche Da Gilson, Fabro ed Agazzi ha appreso ad affrontare i problemi essenziali della speculazione metafisica in dialogo con grandi pensatori dell'antichità (Platone, Aristotele, gli Stoici, Agostino), del Medioevo (Anselmo, Tommaso, Duns Scoto) e dell'età moderna (Vico, Kierkegaard, Rosmini). Convinto assertore del metodo realistico di interpretazione dell'esperienza, Livi ne ha difeso le ragioni utilizzando sistematicamente gli strumenti dialettici offerti dai pensatori della scuola analitica, da Ludwig Wittgenstein a Barry Smith. Suoi critici più intransigenti sono stati, da una parte, il neo-idealista Emanuele Severino, e dall'altra il caposcuola del "pensiero debole", Gianni Vattimo.  Attività Fondatore e Presidente dell'International Science and Commonsense Association (ISCA). Membro dell'"Arcipelago", International Society for the Unity of Sciences (Genova), a partire dalla sua istituzione nel 1990. Fondatore e direttore (dal 1984 al 1999) di "Cultura e libri", mensile di orientamento bibliografico. Fondatore e direttore (dal 1994) della "Grande Enciclopedia Epistemologica", collana di monografie di argomento epistemologico. Fondatore e direttore di "Sensus communis.Internatonal Yearbook for Studies and Research on Alethic Logic" (dal 1999). Docente di Logica e Filosofia della conoscenza nella Pontificia Università Lateranense (1993-1996); professore stabile ordinario della stessa materia dal 1996. Docente di Antropologia alla Libera Università "Campus Bio-medico" (Roma) nell'anno accademico 1993-1994. Visiting professor nell'Navarra (Spagna) e nell'Università Pontificia della Santa Croce (Roma) dal 1996. Decano della Facoltà di Filosofia della Pontificia Università Lateranense dal 2002 al 2008. Direttore della rivista internazionale di filosofia "Aquinas" dal 2002 al 2008. Direttore editoriale della Casa editrice Leonardo da Vinci di Roma. Professore emerito di Filosofia della conoscenza nella Pontificia Università Lateranense dal 2008. Direttore del Consiglio scientifico per la pubblicazione delle Opere complete del cardinale Giuseppe Siri presso l'Editore Fabrizio Serra (Pisa-Roma). Direttore editoriale, dal , della rivista di apologetica teologica "Fides Catholica". Opere Libri Il cristianesimo nella filosofia (Il problema della filosofia cristiana nei suoi sviluppi storici e nelle prospettive attuali), L'Aquila: Ed. Japadre, 1969 Etienne Gilson: filosofia cristiana e idea del limite critico, Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1970 Blondel, Bréhier, Gilson, Maritain: il problema della filosofia cristiana Bologna: Pàtron, 1974 Louis Althusser: "La revolución teórica de Marx" y "Leer el Capital", Madrid: Editorial Magisterio Español, 1976 Cristo non è Marx, Torre del Benaco: Ed. Colibrì, 1979 Etienne Gilson: "El espiritu de la filosofia medieval" Madrid: Editorial Magisterio Español, 1980 Filosofia del senso comune (Logica della scienza e della fede) Milano: Ed. Ares, 1990 Il senso comune tra razionalismo e scetticismo (Vico, Reid, Jacobi, Moore) Milano: Editrice Massimo, 1992 Lessico della filosofia (Etimologia, semantica e storia dei termini filosofici) Milano: Edizioni Ares, 1995 Il principio di coerenza (Senso comune e logica epistemica), Roma: Editore Armando, 1997 Tommaso d'Aquino: il futuro del pensiero cristiano Milano: Mondadori, 1997 La filosofia e la sua storia,  I: La filosofia antica e medioevale;  II: La filosofia moderna;  III: La filosofia contemporanea (tomo 1: L'Ottocento; tomo 2: Il Novecento) Roma: Società editrice Dante Alighieri, 1997-1998 (seconda edizione 2000; terza edizione 2001) Dizionario storico della filosofia, Roma: Società Editrice Dante Alighieri, 2000 (seconda edizione 2001) La ricerca della verità Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2001 Verità del pensiero (Fondamenti di logica aletica) Roma: Lateran University Press, 2002 Razionalità della fede nella Rivelazione (Un'analisi filosofica alla luce della logica aletica) Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2005 La ricerca della verità (Dal senso comune alla dialettica) Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2005 (terza edizione aumentata, 2005) L'epistemologia di Tommaso d'Aquino e le sue fonti Napoli: Editoriale comunicazioni sociali, 2005 Senso comune e logica aletica Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2005 (terza edizione aumentata, 2007). Reasons for Believing. On the Rationality of Christian Faith Aurora (Colorado): The Davies Group Publishers, 2005 Perché interessa la filosofia e perché se ne studia la storia Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2006 Storia sociale della filosofia,  I: La filosofia antica e medioevale;  II: La filosofia moderna;  III: La filosofia contemporanea (tomo 1: L'Ottocento; tomo 2: Il Novecento) Roma: Società Editrice Dante Alighieri, 2005-2007Logica della testimonianza (Quando credere è ragionevole), Roma: Lateran University Press, 2007 Senso comune e metafisica. Sullo statuto epistemologico della filosofia prima Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2007 Nuovo Dizionario storico della filosofia Roma: Società Editrice Dante Alighieri, 2008 (ed.) Premesse razionali della fede. Filosofi e teologi a confronto sui praeambula fidei Roma: Lateran University Press, 2008 Etica dell'imprenditore. Le decisioni aziendali, i criteri di valutazione e la dottirna sociale della Chiesa Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, 2008 Dizionario critico della filosofia, Roma: Società Editrice Dante Alighieri, 2009. Filosofia e teologia, Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2009. Il senso comune al vaglio della critica, Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, . Filosofia del senso comune. Logica della scienza e della fede, nuova edizione interamente rielaborata, Roma: Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, . Vera e falsa teologia. Come distinguere l'autentica "scienza della fede" da un'equivoca "filosofia religiosa", Roma: Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, . L'istanza critica, Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, . La certezza della verità. Il sistema della logica aletica e il procedimento della giustificazione epistemica, Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, . Dogma e pastorale. L'ermeneutica del Magistero, dal Vaticano II al Sinodo sulla famiglia, Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, . Le leggi del pensiero. Come la verità viene al soggetto, Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, . Teologia e Magistero, oggi, Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, . Vera e falsa teologia. Come distinguere l'autentica "scienza della fede" da un'equivoca "filosofia religiosa", quarta edizione, con un'Appendice su Gli equivoci della teologia morale dopo la "Amoris laetitia'" Roma: Leonardo da Vinci, . Saggi "Étienne Gilson: il tomismo come filosofia cristiana", in Antonio Piolanti (ed.), San Tommaso nella storia del pensiero, Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982. "La filosofia di Etienne Gilson", in Antonio Piolanti (ed.), Etienne Gilson, filosofo cristiano, Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1985. Étienne Gilson, in Gran enciclopedia Rialp, IV ed., Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1988,  XXV, coll. 850-857. "La enciclica Aeterni Patris y el movimiento neotomista", in Pedro Rodriguez (ed.), "Tomas de Aquino, también hoy", Pamplona: Ed. Universidad de Navarra, 1990. "L'unità dell'esperienza nella gnoseologia tomista", in Antonio Piolanti (ed.), "Noetica, critica e metafisica in chiave tomistica", Vatican City: Libreria Ed. Vaticana, 1991. "Senso comune e unità delle scienze", in Rafael Martinez (ed.), "Unità e autonomia del sapere: il dibattito del XIII secolo", Rome: Ed. Armando, 1994. Note  Ester Maria Ledda, In memoriam: Mons. Antonio Livi, in Corrispondenza Romana, 1º luglio .  Sito di Antonio Livi [collegamento interrotto], su antoniolivi.com. Casa editrice Leonardo da Vinci, su editriceleonardo.com. 26 settembre  7 gennaio ). ISCA International Science and Commonsense Association, su isca-news.org. Fides et Ratio, su fidesetratio.it. 2 gennaio  21 agosto ). Il Giudizio Cattolico, su ilgiudiziocattolico.com.

 

labours: the twelve labours of Grice. They are twelve. The first is Extensionalism. The second is Nominalism. The third is Positivism. The fourth is Naturalism. The fifth is Mechanism. The sixth is Phenomenalism. The seventh is Reductionism. The eighth is physicalism. The ninth is materialism. The tenth is Empiricism. The eleventh is Scepticism, and the twelfth is functionalism. “As I thread my way unsteadily along the tortuous mountain path which is supposed to lead, in the long distance, to the City of Eternal Truth, I find myself beset by a multitude of demons and perilous places, bearing names like Extensionalism, Nominalism, Positivism, Naturalism, Mechanism, Phenomenalism, Reductionism, Physicalism, Materialism, Empiricism, Scepticism, and Functionalism; menaces which are, indeed, almost as numerous as those encountered by a traveller called Christian on another well-publicized journey.”“The items named in this catalogue are obviously, in many cases, not to be identified with one another; and it is perfectly possible to maintain a friendly attitude towards some of them while viewing others with hostility.” “There are many persons, for example, who view Naturalism with favour while firmly rejecting Nominalism.”“And it is not easy to see how anyone could couple support for Phenomenalism with support for Physicalism.”“After a more tolerant (permissive) middle age, I have come to entertain strong opposition to all of them, perhaps partly as a result of the strong connection between a number of them and the philosophical technologies which used to appeal to me a good deal more than they do now.“But how would I justify the hardening of my heart?” “The first question is, perhaps, what gives the list of items a unity, so that I can think of myself as entertaining one twelve-fold antipathy, rather than twelve discrete antipathies.” “To this question my answer is that all the items are forms of what I shall call Minimalism, a propensity which seeks to keep to a minimum (which may in some cases be zero) the scope allocated to some advertised philosophical commodity, such as abstract entities, knowledge, absolute value, and so forth.”“In weighing the case for and the case against a trend of so high a degree of generality as Minimalism, kinds of consideration may legitimately enter which would be out of place were the issue more specific in character; in particular, appeal may be made to aesthetic considerations.”“In favour of Minimalism, for example, we might hear an appeal, echoing Quine, to the beauty of ‘desert landscapes.’”“But such an appeal I would regard as inappropriate.”“We are not being asked by a Minimalist to give our vote to a special, and no doubt very fine, type of landscape.”“We are being asked to express our preference for an ordinary sort of landscape at a recognizably lean time; to rosebushes and cherry-trees in mid-winter, rather than in spring or summer.”“To change the image somewhat, what bothers me about whatI am being offered is not that it is bare, but that it has been systematically and relentlessly undressed.”“I am also adversely influenced by a different kind of unattractive feature which some, or perhaps even all of these betes noires seem to possess.”“Many of them are guilty of restrictive practices which, perhaps, ought to invite the attention of a Philosophical Trade Commission.”“They limit in advance the range and resources of philosophical explanation.”“They limit its range by limiting the kinds of phenomena whose presence calls for explanation.”“Some prima-facie candidates are watered down, others are washed away.”“And they limit its resources by forbidding the use of initially tempting apparatus, such as the concepts expressed by psychological, or more generally intensional, verbs.”“My own instincts operate in a reverse direction from this.”“I am inclined to look first at how useful such and such explanatory ideas might prove to be if admitted, and to waive or postpone enquiry into their certificates of legitimacy.”“I am conscious that all I have so far said against Minimalsim has been very general in character, and also perhaps a little tinged with rhetoric.”“This is not surprising in view of the generality of the topic.”“But all the same I should like to try to make some provision for those in search of harder tack.”“I can hardly, in the present context, attempt to provide fully elaborated arguments against all, or even against any one, of the diverse items which fall under my label 'Minimalism.’”“The best I can do is to try to give a preliminary sketch of what I would regard as the case against just one of the possible forms of minimalism, choosing one which I should regard it as particularly important to be in a position to reject.”“My selection is Extensionalism, a position imbued with the spirit of Nominalism, and dear both to those who feel that 'Because it is red' is no more informative as an answer to the question 'Why is a pillar-box called ‘red’?' than would be 'Because he is Grice' as an answer to the question 'Why is that distinguished-looking person called "Grice"?', and also to those who are particularly impressed by the power of Set-theory.”“The picture which, I suspect, is liable to go along with Extensionalism is that of the world of particulars as a domain stocked with innumerable tiny pellets, internally indistinguishable from one another, butdistinguished by the groups within which they fall, by the 'clubs' to which they belong; and since the clubs are distinguished only by their memberships, there can only be one club to which nothing belongs.”“As one might have predicted from the outset, this leads to trouble when it comes to the accommodation of explanation within such a system.”“Explanation of the actual presence of a particular feature in a particular subject depends crucially on the possibility of saying what would be the consequence of the presence of such and such features in that subject, regardless of whether the features in question even do appear in that subject, or indeed in any subject.”“On the face of it, if one adopts an extensionalist view-point, the presence of a feature in some particular will have to be re-expressed in terms of that particular's membership of a certain set.”“But if we proceed along those lines, since there is only one empty set, the potential consequences of the possession of in fact unexemplified features would be invariably the same, no matter how different in meaning the expressions used to specify such features would ordinarily be judged to be.”“This is certainly not a conclusion which one would care to accept.”“I can think of two ways of trying to avoid its acceptance, both of which seem to me to suffer from serious drawbacks.” H. P. Grice, “Grice’s seven labours.”

 

IN-PLICATVRVM -- implicaturum: combines for Grice two aspects (a), Future and (b) general duty:  The use of the future active participle “implicaturum,” rather than the present participle, “implicans”, is meant to mark this. The choice of the distinct future-participle form is meant to do general dutyand not necessarily as a distinctive feaeturefor all sorts of verbs which Grice finds have something in common: ‘mean,’ ‘suggest,’ ‘hint,’ ‘suggest,’ ‘imply’when he wants to oppose them to their explicit correlate: ‘to convey explicitly,’ to ‘express explicitly,’ etc. I think it is clear that whatever I imply, suggest, mean, etc., is distinct from what I explicitly convey. I wish to introduce, as terms of art, one verb "implicate" and two related nouns, "implicature" (cf. "implying") and "implicatum" (cf. "what is implied").  The point of my maneuvre is to free you from having to choose (a) between this or that member of the family of verbs (imply, etc.) for which the verb "implicate" is to do general duty. (b) between this or that member of the family of nouns (the implying, etc.) for which the noun "implicature" is to do general duty.(c) between this or that member of the the family of nouns or nominal consstructions ('what is implied,' etc.) for which 'implicatum' is to do general duty. I will add: implicaturumimplicatura. "Implicaturum" (sing.) becomes, of course, "implicatura." So, strictly, while the verb to use do do general duty is 'implicate,' the NOUN is 'implicaturum' (plural: implicatura). I think it is clear that whatever I imply or keep implicit (suggest, mean, etc.)is distinct from what I explicitly convey, or make explicit. I wish to introduce, as a term of art the Latinate verb 'implicate,' from the Latin 'implicare' -- with its derivative, 'implicaturum.' The point of my maneuvre is for my tutee's delight: he won't have to choose between this or that member of the family of verbs ('suggest,' 'mean') for which the Latinate verb 'implicate' (from 'implicaare' with its derivative form, 'implicaturum,') is to do general duty. If we compare it with ‘amare’: Grice: “As Cicero knows, there is a world of difference between ‘amatum’ and ‘amaturum’so with ‘implicatum’ and ‘implicaturum’!”IMPLICATURUM: about to imply, about to be under obligation to imply, about to be obliged to imply. Refs. H. P. Grice, “Implicaturum.”

 

LIGATVM: ligatum -- lex. Grice: ‘ligare’ gives Roman ‘lex,’a bindingas indeed—there are other cases, like ‘denken’ gives ‘ding’ --  law -- H. P. Grice was obsessed with ‘laws’ to introduce ‘psychological concepts.’ covering law model, the view of scientific explanation as a deductive argument which contains non-vacuously at least one universal law among its premises. The names of this view include ‘Hempel’s model’, ‘Hempel-Oppenheim HO model’, ‘Popper-Hempel model’, ‘deductivenomological D-N model’, and the ‘subsumption theory’ of explanation. The term ‘covering law model of explanation’ was proposed by William Dray. The theory of scientific explanation was first developed by Aristotle. He suggested that science proceeds from mere knowing that to deeper knowing why by giving understanding of different things by the four types of causes. Answers to why-questions are given by scientific syllogisms, i.e., by deductive arguments with premises that are necessarily true and causes of their consequences. Typical examples are the “subsumptive” arguments that can be expressed by the Barbara syllogism: All ravens are black. Jack is a raven. Therefore, Jack is black. Plants containing chlorophyll are green. Grass contains chlorophyll. Therefore, grass is green. In modern logical notation, An explanatory argument was later called in Grecian synthesis, in Latin compositio or demonstratio propter quid. After the seventeenth century, the terms ‘explication’ and ‘explanation’ became commonly used. The nineteenth-century empiricists accepted Hume’s criticism of Aristotelian essences and necessities: a law of nature is an extensional statement that expresses a uniformity, i.e., a constant conjunction between properties ‘All swans are white’ or types of events ‘Lightning is always followed by thunder’. Still, they accepted the subsumption theory of explanation: “An individual fact is said to be explained by pointing out its cause, that is, by stating the law or laws of causation, of which its production is an instance,” and “a law or uniformity in nature is said to be explained when another law or laws are pointed out, of which that law itself is but a case, and from which it could be deduced” J. S. Mill. A general model of probabilistic explanation, with deductive explanation as a specific case, was given by Peirce in 3. A modern formulation of the subsumption theory was given by Hempel and Paul Oppenheim in 8 by the following schema of D-N explanation: Explanandum E is here a sentence that describes a known particular event or fact singular explanation or uniformity explanation of laws. Explanation is an argument that answers an explanation-seeking why-question ‘Why E?’ by showing that E is nomically expectable on the basis of general laws r M 1 and antecedent conditions. The relation between the explanans and the explanandum is logical deduction. Explanation is distinguished from other kinds of scientific systematization prediction, postdiction that share its logical characteristics  a view often called the symmetry thesis regarding explanation and prediction  by the presupposition that the phenomenon E is already known. This also separates explanations from reason-seeking arguments that answer questions of the form ‘What reasons are there for believing that E?’ Hempel and Oppenheim required that the explanans have empirical content, i.e., be testable by experiment or observation, and it must be true. If the strong condition of truth is dropped, we speak of potential explanation. Dispositional explanations, for non-probabilistic dispositions, can be formulated in the D-N model. For example, let Hx % ‘x is hit by hammer’, Bx % ‘x breaks’, and Dx % ‘x is fragile’. Then the explanation why a piece of glass was broken may refer to its fragility and its being hit: It is easy to find examples of HO explanations that are not satisfactory: self-explanations ‘Grass is green, because grass is green’, explanations with too weak premises ‘John died, because he had a heart attack or his plane crashed’, and explanations with irrelevant information ‘This stuff dissolves in water, because it is sugar produced in Finland’. Attempts at finding necessary and sufficient conditions in syntactic and semantic terms for acceptable explanations have not led to any agreement. The HO model also needs the additional Aristotelian condition that causal explanation is directed from causes to effects. This is shown by Sylvain Bromberger’s flagpole example: the length of a flagpole explains the length of its shadow, but not vice versa. Michael Scriven has argued against Hempel that eaplanations of particular events should be given by singular causal statements ‘E because C’. However, a regularity theory Humean or stronger than Humean of causality implies that the truth of such a singular causal statement presupposes a universal law of the form ‘Events of type C are universally followed by events of type E’. The HO version of the covering law model can be generalized in several directions. The explanans may contain probabilistic or statistical laws. The explanans-explanandum relation may be inductive in this case the explanation itself is inductive. This gives us four types of explanations: deductive-universal i.e., D-N, deductiveprobabilistic, inductive-universal, and inductiveprobabilistic I-P. Hempel’s 2 model for I-P explanation contains a probabilistic covering law PG/F % r, where r is the statistical probability of G given F, and r in brackets is the inductive probability of the explanandum given the explanans: The explanation-seeking question may be weakened from ‘Why necessarily E?’ to ‘How possibly E?’. In a corrective explanation, the explanatory answer points out that the explanandum sentence E is not strictly true. This is the case in approximate explanation e.g., Newton’s theory entails a corrected form of Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws.  law-like generalisation, also called nomological (or nomic), a generalization that, unlike an accidental generalization, possesses nomic necessity or counterfactual force. Compare (1) ‘All specimens of gold have a melting point of 1,063o C’ with (2) ‘All the rocks in my garden are sedimentary’. (2) may be true, but its generality is restricted to rocks in my garden. Its truth is accidental; it does not state what must be the case. (1) is true without restriction. If we write (1) as the conditional ‘For any x and for any time t, if x is a specimen of gold subjected to a temperature of 1,063o C, then x will melt’, we see that the generalization states what must be the case. (1) supports the hypothetical counterfactual assertion ‘For any specimen of gold x and for any time t, if x were subjected to a temperature of 1,063o C, then x would melt’, which means that we accept (1) as nomically necessary: it remains true even if no further specimens of gold are subjected to the required temperature. This is not true of (2), for we know that at some future time an igneous rock might appear in my garden. Statements like (2) are not lawlike; they do not possess the unrestricted necessity we require of lawlike statements. Ernest Nagel has claimed that a nomological statement must satisfy two other conditions: it must deductively entail or be deductively entailed by other laws, and its scope of prediction must exceed the known evidence for it. Then there is the so-called law of thought, as in the greaet vowel shiftfrom /gris/ to /grais/: a ‘law’? --  a law by which or in accordance with which valid thought proceeds, or that justify valid inference, or to which all valid deduction is reducible. Laws of thought are rules that apply without exception to any subject matter of thought, etc.; sometimes they are said to be the object of logic. The term, rarely used in exactly the same sense by different authors, has long been associated with three equally ambiguous expressions: the law of identity (ID), the law of contradiction (or non-contradiction; NC), and the law of excluded middle (EM). Sometimes these three expressions are taken as propositions of formal ontology having the widest possible subject matter, propositions that apply to entities per se: (ID) every thing is (i.e., is identical to) itself; (NC) no thing having a given quality also has the negative of that quality (e.g., no even number is non-even); (EM) every thing either has a given quality or has the negative of that quality (e.g., every number is either even or non-even). Equally common in older works is use of these expressions for principles of metalogic about propositions: (ID) every proposition implies itself; (NC) no proposition is both true and false; (EM) every proposition is either true or false. Beginning in the middle to late 1800s these expressions have been used to denote propositions of Boolean Algebra about classes: (ID) every class includes itself; (NC) every class is such that its intersection (“product”) with its own complement is the null class; (EM) every class is such that its union (“sum”) with its own complement is the universal class. More recently the last two of the three expressions have been used in connection with the classical propositional logic and with the socalled protothetic or quantified propositional logic; in both cases the law of non-contradiction involves the negation of the conjunction (‘and’) of something with its own negation and the law of excluded middle involves the disjunction (‘or’) of something with its own negation. In the case of propositional logic the “something” is a schematic letter serving as a place-holder, whereas in the case of protothetic logic the “something” is a genuine variable. The expressions ‘law of non-contradiction’ and ‘law of excluded middle’ are also used for semantic principles of model theory concerning sentences and interpretations: (NC) under no interpretation is a given sentence both true and false; (EM) under any interpretation, a given sentence is either true or false. The expressions mentioned above all have been used in many other ways. Many other propositions have also been mentioned as laws of thought, including the dictum de omni et nullo attributed to Aristotle, the substitutivity of identicals (or equals) attributed to Euclid, the socalled identity of indiscernibles attributed to Leibniz, and other “logical truths.” The expression “law of thought” gains added prominence through its use by Boole to denote theorems of his “algebra of logic”; in fact, he named his second logic book An Investigation of the Laws of Thought. Modern logicians, in almost unanimous disagreement with Boole, take this expression to be a momer; none of the above propositions classed under ‘laws of thought’ are explicitly about thought per se, a mental phenomenon studied by psychology, nor do they involve explicit reference to a thinker or knower as would be the case in pragmatics or in epistemology. The distinction between psychology (as a study of mental phenomena) and semantics (as a study of valid inference) is widely accepted. legalese: Grice: “Many things are called ‘legal’ in philosophy. There is legal  moralism, the view (defended in this century by, e.g., Lord Patrick Devlin) that law may properly be used to enforce morality, including notably “sexual morality.” Contemporary critics of the view (e.g., Hart) expand on the argument of Mill that law should only be used to prevent harm to others. There is Hart’s legal positivism, a theory about the nature of law, commonly thought to be characterized by two major tenets: (1) that there is no necessary connection between law and morality; and (2) that legal validity is determined ultimately by reference to certain basic social facts, e.g., the command of the sovereign (John Austin), the Grundnorm (Hans Kelsen), or the rule of recognition (Hart). These different descriptions of the basic law-determining facts lead to different claims about the normative character of law, with classical positivists (e.g., John Austin) insisting that law is essentially coercive, and modern positivists (e.g., Hans Kelsen) maintaining that it is normative. The traditional opponent of the legal positivist is the natural law theorist, who holds that no sharp distinction can be drawn between law and morality, thus challenging positivism’s first tenet. Whether that tenet follows from positivism’s second tenet is a question of current interest and leads inevitably to the classical question of political theory: Under what conditions might legal obligations, even if determined by social facts, create genuine political obligations (e.g., the obligation to obey the law)? There is legal realism, a theory in philosophy of law or jurisprudence broadly characterized by the claim that the nature of law is better understood by observing what courts and citizens actually do than by analyzing stated legal rules and legal concepts. The theory is also associated with the thoughts that legal rules are disguised predictions of what courts will do, and that only the actual decisions of courts constitute law. There are two important traditions of legal realism, in Scandinavia and in the United States. Both began in the early part of the century, and both focus on the reality (hence the name ‘legal realism’) of the actual legal system, rather than on law’s official image of itself. The Scandinavian tradition is more theoretical and presents its views as philosophical accounts of the normativity of law based on skeptical methodologythe normative force of law consists in nothing but the feelings of citizens or officials or both about or their beliefs in that normative force. The older, U.S. tradition is more empirical or sociological or instrumentalist, focusing on how legislation is actually enacted, how rules are actually applied, how courts’ decisions are actually taken, and so forth. U.S. legal realism in its contemporary form is known as critical legal studies. Its argumentation is both empirical (law as experienced to be and as being oppressive by gender) and theoretical (law as essentially indeterminate, or interpretativeproperties that prime law for its role in political manipulation).

 

lekton (Grecian, ‘what can be said’)Grice was fascinated as to how to apply the modified Occam razor to poly-stem classes like ‘legein,’ ‘logos,’ ‘lekton’“Surely a change of vowel cannot mean a change of Fregeian sense.” -- a Stoic term sometimes translated as ‘the meaning of an utterance’. A lekton differs from an utterance in being what the utterance (or its emisor) signifies: A lekton is said to be what the Grecian grasps and the non-Grecian does not when Gricese is spoken. Moreover, a lekton is incorporeal, which for the Stoics means it does not, strictly speaking, exist, but only “sub-sists,” and so cannot act or be acted upon. A lekton constitutes the content of a state of Grice’s soul:. A lekton is what we assent to and endeavor toward and they “correspond” to the presentations given to rational animals. The Stoics acknowledged a lekton for a predicate as well as for a sentence (including questions, oaths, and imperatives). An axioma or a propositions is a lekton that can be assented to and may be true or false (although being essentially tensed, its truth-value may change). The Stoics’ theory of reference suggests that they also acknowledged singular propositions, which “perish” when the referent ceases to exist. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Benson Mates and the stoics.”

Leoni: essential Italian philosopher. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Leoni," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

 

Leon

 

Leoni:  «La situazione paradossale del nostro tempo è che siamo governati da uomini non, come pretenderebbe la classica teoria aristotelica, perché non siamo governati dal diritto, ma esattamente perché lo siamo»  (Freedom and the Law). Bruno Leoni (Ancona), filosofo. Trascorse la sua vita tra Torino (dove visse ed esercitò la professione di avvocato), Pavia (nella cui università insegnò dal 1945 sino alla tragica scomparsa, assassinato da un truffatore nel novembre del 1967) e la Sardegna (regione con cui ebbe profondi legami familiari ed affettivi).  Per le sue idee, il nome di Bruno Leoni viene associato ad un modello liberale e anti-statalista della società.  Era inoltre il padre della giornalista televisiva Didi Leoni.   All'interno della filosofia del diritto del XX secolo, Bruno Leoni si inserisce nella tradizione del liberalismo classico.[senza fonte] Allievo di Gioele Solari, di cui fu pure assistente volontario, e collega di Luigi Firpo, nel 1942 divenne professore straordinario di Dottrina dello Stato presso l'ateneo pavese, ma la guerra per qualche anno lo tenne lontano dagli studi e dall'insegnamento. Nel corso del conflitto, fece parte di A Force, un'organizzazione segreta alleata incaricata di recuperare prigionieri e salvare soldati.  Nel 1945, a guerra finita, Bruno Leoni iniziò la sua attività accademica, insegnando Filosofia del diritto e ricoprendo l'incarico di preside della facoltà di Scienze Politiche (dal 1948 al 1960).  L'omicidio Morì prematuramente (a 54 anni) ad Alpignano (Torino), in circostanze tragiche, ucciso nel 1967: un collaboratore del suo studio legale, Osvaldo Quero, di professione tipografo ma che svolgeva amministrazioni di condomini e palazzi, aveva perpetrato truffe e sottrazioni di denaro; quando Leoni se ne accorse e minacciò di denunciarlo, l'uomo lo assassinò colpendolo ripetutamente alla testa e nascose poi il corpo in un garage, inscenando un sequestro di persona, ma venne subito scoperto. Braccato dalla polizia, si avvelenò ingerendo della candeggina a Roma. Sopravvissuto, venne infine condannato a 24 anni di carcere e morì nel 1997.  Alla commemorazione di Leoni, a Pavia, intervenne anche Friedrich von Hayek.  Pensiero Negli anni della ricostruzione postbellica, mentre in tutti i paesi europei si affermavano politiche economiche di stampo statalista, Leoni andò controcorrente sostenendo il liberalismo, che ormai quasi più nessuno era pronto a difendere.[senza fonte] Leoni criticava la logica dell'intervento pubblico mentre esaltava la superiore razionalità e legittimità degli ordini che emergono dal basso, per effetto del concorso delle volontà dei singoli individui.  Fondatore nel 1950 della rivista Il Politico, Leoni svolse ugualmente un'intensa attività pubblicistica, soprattutto scrivendo corsivi per il quotidiano economico Il Sole 24 ORE. Membro della «Mont Pelerin Society» (di cui fu segretario e poi presidente), lo studioso torinese fu pure molto impegnato nel Centro di Studi Metodologici della città piemontese e, in seguito, nel Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione “Luigi Einaudi”.  Studioso poliedrico (giurista e filosofo, ma anche appassionato cultore della scienza politica e della teoria economica, oltre che della storia delle dottrine politiche), nel corso degli anni cinquanta e sessanta Leoni promosse le idee liberali all'interno della cultura italiana: proponendo temi ed autori del liberalismo contemporaneo, ma soprattutto aprendo prospettive ad una concezione della società centrata sulla proprietà privata e il libero mercato. Per comprendere quanto sia stata importante la sua azione tesa a favorire una migliore conoscenza delle tesi più innovative, è sufficiente scorrere l'indice della rivista da lui diretta per molti anni, Il Politico, in cui diede spazio ad autori spesso a quel tempo poco noti, ma desti segnare le scienze economiche.  Con i suoi studi, inoltre, Leoni ha aperto la strada a molti orientamenti: dalla Teoria della scelta pubblica all'Analisi economica del diritto (filoni di ricerca che esaminano la politica ed il diritto con gli strumenti dell'economia), fino all'indagine interdisciplinare di quelle istituzionitra cui il dirittoche si sviluppano non già sulla base di decisioni imposte dall'alto, ma grazie ad un'intrinseca capacità di autogenerarsi ed evolvere dal basso.  Dopo la morte, per lungo tempo Bruno Leoni è stato quasi dimenticato: soprattutto in Italia. La sua opera più conosciuta, Freedom and the Law (pubblicato in lingua inglese nel 1961, ma frutto di lezioni tenute in California nel 1958), è stato tradotto in lingua italiana con più di trent'anni di ritardo. Per alcuni decenni, d'altra parte, il suo pensiero ha suscitato più attenzioni ed interessi al di là dell'Oceano Atlantico che non nel suo Paese d'origine.  Ciò non sorprende se si considera che l'individualismo integrale di Leoni risulta ben poco in sintonia con la cultura europea del suo tempo, mentre al contrario appare vicino alla tradizione civile degli Stati Uniti e soprattutto delle sue correnti più libertarian. Il liberalismo dell'autore di Freedom and the Law è pervaso da quella cultura anglosassone che egli assimilò in profondità grazie all'intensa frequentazione di alcuni tra i maggiori studiosi di quell'universo intellettuale.  Inoltre, egli seguì sempre con il massimo interesse i protagonisti della Scuola austriaca (Ludwig von Mises e Friedrich von Hayek, soprattutto) cheanche se europeiproprio in America hanno scritto alcuni dei loro maggiori contributi e in quel contesto hanno trovato folte schiere di allievi, tra cui bisogna menzionare Murray Rothbard e Israel Kirzner.  Una filosofia del diritto di taglio individualista In questo senso, bisogna rilevare che il percorso intellettuale di Bruno Leoni sarebbe stato molto differente senza la Mont Pelerin Society, nei cui convegni egli ebbe l'opportunità di entrare in contatto con intellettuali e scuole di pensiero estranei al clima dominante nell'Italia di allora. Per molti decenni, in effetti, l'associazione fondata da Hayek ha rappresentato un'occasione di scambi e approfondimenti per quanti cercavano interlocutori radicati nella cultura del liberalismo classico.  Per alcuni decenni dimenticato o quasi in Italia, il pensiero di Leoni ha continuato a viverefuori dei nostri confinigrazie alle iniziative, ai libri e agli articoli dei suoi amici americani e, oltre a loro, all'interesse che i suoi lavori hanno saputo suscitare nelle nuove generazioni di studiosi liberali.  A partire dalla metà degli anni novanta, però, la situazione è cambiata sotto più punti di vista. Grazie soprattutto alla pubblicazione in lingua italiana de La libertà e la legge, studiosi di vario orientamento sono tor riflettere sulle pagine del giurista torinese, dando vita ad una vera e propria "riscoperta" che sta producendo numerosi frutti e grazie alla quale si va finalmente riconoscendo a tale pensatore la sua giusta posizione tra i maggiori scienziati sociali del XX secolo. Oggi in Italia Bruno Leoni non è più considerato semplicisticamente un epigono di Friedrich von Hayek o un semplice ripetitore delle sue tesi.  In questo senso, è interessante rilevare che perfino intellettuali lontani dalle posizioni liberali e libertarian di Leoni avvertano sempre più il carattere innovativo del suo pensiero, che nell'ambito della filosofia del diritto ha saputo offrire una prospettiva alternativa ai modelli kelseniani del normativismo dominante e all'ispirazione socialdemocratica che ancora prevale all'interno delle scienze sociali.  La critica a Kelsen In particolare, mentre nel corso degli ultimi due secoli il diritto è stato ripetutamente identificato con la semplice volontà degli uomini al potere, uno dei contributi maggiori di Leoni è quello di aver indicato un altro modo di guardare alle norme, sforzandosi di cogliere ciò che vi è oltre la volontà dei politici e ben oltre la stessa legislazione. Per questa ragione, oggi si guarda alla teoria di Leoni come ad una radicale alternativa rispetto al normativismo formulato da Hans Kelsen, più volte criticato dal pensatore torinese.  Quella di Leoni, per giunta, è ancora oggi una proposta teorica talmente liberale da indurre più di uno studioso a parlare di Freedom and the Law come di un classico della tradizione libertarian, al cui interno sono racchiuse idee e intuizioni che restiamo ben lontani dall'aver compreso e sviluppato in tutte le loro potenzialità.  Al fine di tenere viva la lezione dell'autore di Freedom and the Law, nel 2003 è stato fondato l'Istituto Bruno Leoni, con sedi a Torino e a Milano (animato da Carlo Lottieri, Alberto Mingardi e Carlo Stagnaro), che si propone di affermare, all'interno del dibattito politico-economico, i principii liberali difesi da Leoni stesso e di promuovere la conoscenza del pensiero di Leoni e, in generale, delle teorie liberali e libertarian.  Opere Bruno Leoni, Lezioni di dottrina dello Stato, raccolte da F. Boschis e G. Spagna, Pavia, Viscontea, 1957 (nuova edizione, Raffaele De Mucci e Lorenzo Infantino: Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2004). Bruno Leoni, Lezioni di filosofia del diritto, raccolte da M. Bagni, Pavia, Viscontea, 1959 (nuova edizione, Carlo Lottieri: Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2003). Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law, New York, Nostrand, 1961; trad. it. La libertà e la legge, Introduzione di Raimondo Cubeddu, Macerata, Liberilibri, 1995. Bruno Leoni, Scritti di scienza politica e teoria del diritto, Introduzione di M. Stoppino, Milano, Giuffrè, 1980. Bruno Leoni, Le pretese e i poteri: le radici individuali del diritto e della politica, Introduzione di Mario Stoppino, Milano, Società Aperta, 1997. Bruno Leoni, La sovranità del consumatore, Introduzione di Sergio Ricossa, Roma, Ideazione, 1997. Bruno Leoni, La libertà del lavoro, Carlo Lottieri, collana IBL “Diritto, Mercato, Libertà”, TreviglioSoveria Mannelli, Leonardo FaccoRubbettino, 2004. Bruno Leoni, Il diritto come pretesa, Antonio Masala, Introduzione di Mauro Barberis, Macerata, Liberilibri, 2004. Bruno Leoni, Il pensiero politico moderno e contemporaneo, Antonio Masala, Introduzione di Luigi Marco Bassani, Macerata, Liberilibri, 2009 Note  Istituto Bruno LeoniL'incredibile storia di Bruno Leoni raccontata da sua figlia Didi, su brunoleoni.it. 10 giugno  5 settembre ).  L'idea di uno stato privo di coercizioni nella filosofia del diritto di Bruno Leoni  Bruno Leoni, un "austriaco" di adozione  Articolo su l'Unità Archiviato il 4 marzo  in .  Condannato in appello a 24 anni Quero, l'uccisore del professor Leoni  Il Luogo dei Ricordi di Osvaldo Quero, su inmiamemoria.com. 1º dicembre .  Tra i pochissimi, in Italia, che hanno continuato a sviluppare le ricerche di Leoni è da ricordare Mario Stoppino.  Per merito di Raimondo Cubeddu, che ha anche dedicato molti saggi e articoli alla teoria leoniana.  Secondo Carlo Lottieri, al contrario, è "necessario liberare Bruno Leoni dall'ombra di Hayek, rendendo in tal modo possibile una più adeguata valutazione delle sue tesi e del suo originalissimo contributo all'elaborazione di una filosofia del diritto coerente con i principi del liberalismo classico e con i suoi stessi esiti libertari".  Antonio Masala, Il liberalismo di Bruno Leoni, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2003. Quella di Masala è stata la prima monografia italiana che sia stata dedicata allo studioso. Emma Baglioni, L'individuo e lo scambio. Teoria ed etica dell'ordine spontaneo nell'individualismo di Bruno Leoni, ESI 2004. Antonio Masala  La teoria politica di Bruno Leoni, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2005. Carlo Lottieri, «Bruno Leoni e l'ombra di Hayek. Libertà individuale, common law e Stato moderno», in Antonio Masala, a cura di, La teoria politica di Bruno Leoni, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2005158. Carlo Lottieri, Le ragioni del diritto. Libertà individuale e ordine giuridico nel pensiero di Bruno Leoni, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2006. Il saggio approfondisce il tema di un "libertarismo" non ancora compiutamente espresso in Leoni, ma già ampiamente riconoscibile nelle sue tesi fondamentali. Andrea Favaro, Bruno Leoni. Dell'irrazionalità della legge per la spontaneità dell'ordinamento, n. 29 della Collana “L'Ircocervo. Saggi per una storia filosofica del pensiero giuridico e politico italiano contemporaneo”, Napoli, ESI, 2009. Adriano Gianturco Gulisano, Bruno Leoni tra positivismo e giusnaturalismo. Il diritto evolutivo, Foedus, n. 24, 2009,  87–95. Adriano Gianturco Gulisano, La «teoria empirica» di Bruno Leoni. La centralità dell'approccio metodologico, Biblioteca delle libertà, Anno XLVI, gennaioaprile n. 200. Testo on line.  Sito ufficiale, su brunoleoni.it. Opere di Bruno Leoni, .  Opere. Riscoprire Bruno Leoni, su riscoprire.brunoleoni.com.Bruno Leoni, Online Library of Liberty. (nel sito è disponibile Freedom and the Law).

 

Leoni: Pierleone Leoni, conosciuto anche come Piero Leoni (o Lioni) e Pier Leone (o Pierleone) da Spoleto (Spoleto), filosofo. Di famiglia aristocratica spoletina, studiò a Roma, e successivamente, già dottore in arti e medicina, fu chiamato ad insegnare a Padova, dove mantenne la cattedra fino alla morte, e a Pisa.  Fu qui che ebbe modo di entrare in contatto con la cerchia di artisti e filosofi che gravitavano attorno a Lorenzo de Medici, a Firenze. Iniziò ad avere contatti e una fitta corrispondenza con Marsilio Ficino e Pico della Mirandola.  Venne considerato dai suoi contemporanei uno dei più valenti uomini di scienza esistenti all'epoca. I più illustri personaggi e sovrani dell'epoca, come il duca di Calabria, il re di Napoli, Ludovico il Moro, forse anche il papa Innocenzo VIII, richiesero le sue cure, tanto che divenne il medico personale dello stesso Lorenzo de Medici.  All'indomani della morte di Lorenzo de Medici venne ingiustamente sospettato di essere stato il responsabile del suo avvelenamento, e venne quindi strangolato e gettato in un pozzo il giorno seguente. Diverse fonti dell'epoca  sostengono che il mandante dell'uccisione del Pierleoni fosse stato il figlio di Lorenzo, Piero il Fatuo.  Note  F. Bacchelli, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, riferimenti in .  Dagli Annali di Ser Francesco Mugnoni da Trevi, dal 1416 al 1503, trascriz. D.Pietro Pirri (Estratto dall'Archivio per la Storia Ecclesiastica dell'Umbria  V (1921), Fasc. I e II): "Era adpresso del dicto Lorenzo uno excellentissimo et famosissimo medico de grandissima scientia in loica, in filosofia, strologia, nominato magistro Pierleone de leonardo da Spolitj, reputato el più singulare valente homo in dicte scientie che ogie dì viva. Era quisto homo in tanto prezzo adpresso del dicto Lorenzo che, senza quisto clarissimo doctore, non podiva stare. Fo conducto ad Pisa ad legere, ebbe mille ducatj de provisione per anno: poj fo conducto ad Padua, ebbe mille et ducento ducatj per anno. Ad Pisa stecte multi annj ad legere: et similemente ad Padua."  dagli Annali di Ser Francesco Mugnoni da Trevi, dal 1416 al 1503, trascriz. D.Pietro Pirri (Estratto dall'Archivio per la Storia Ecclesiastica dell'Umbria  V (1921), Fasc. I e II): "Lorenzo se amalò, mandò per luj, et andò ad Fiorenza. Era quisto mastro Pierleone de tanta scientia de strologia, che predisse la morte sua essere infra quatro misi in sino ad mezo aprile 1492. Et andò mal voluntierj ad Fiereze del mese de jenaio 1492. Tandem jonto ad Fiorenze trovò Lorenzo stare male: erano lì clarissimj medicj et valentj et excellentj: poj ce venne el medico del duca de Milano: et predisse mastro Perleone la morte de Lorenzo. Ipso non prestò may et non se mestecù in alcuna medicina ne poti(one) sue (Il cronista forse vuol dire che il Leoni non s'ingerì affatto in ciò che riguardava l'assistenza sanitaria dell'infermo, limitando l'opera sua alla pura diagnosi della malattia ed a consultazioni astrologiche. E con ciò vuol, forse, velatamente intendere che niente ebbe a che vedere Pierleone con quelle strane pozioni a base di gemme e perle triturate somministrate da un altro medico, il Piacentino, le quali, attese le lesioni viscerali che tormentavano il paziente, servirono forse ad accelerarne il tracollo) ma solo ipso in consulendo et predicendo. Tandem venendo alla morte Lorenzo, Perino, figliolo del dicto Lorenzo, homo de poca prudentia, reputato homo bestiale et senza prudentia, ordinò che el dicto mastro Perleone fosse morto. Lorenzo era in villa ad uno suo casale, et lì tucto dì stava mastro Perleone. (...) Essendo morto Lorenzo, et lì insino alla sera stando mastro Perleone, volendo tornare luj allu solito loco, fo menato per uno Carlo o vero Alberto martellj ad uno suo casale, et lì fo strangulato dicto mastro Perleone, et buctato in uno pozo. Poj fo retracto et portato in Fierenze, et retenuto el suo corpo con guardia et veneratione assay. Et de tanto tradimento et iniusta morte se ne dolse tucta la ciptà, perché la bona memoria de Lorenzo amava quisto omo più che homo vivesse, et tucti li secretj soj sapiva, savio, sapientissimo et pieno de verità, bontà et integrità."  Nella sua "Storia della Letteratura Italiana" l'abate Girolamo Tiraboschi (Firenze, Molini Landi, 1809) riporta fonti dell'epoca, fra cui Scipione Ammirato: "Cavossi voce che egli vi si fosse gittato da se medesimo ... ma si rinvenne ... esservi gittato da altri, secondo dice il Cambi, da due famigliari di Lorenzo". Lo stesso testo riporta le affermazioni del Sanazzaro, il quale "non nomina l'autore di questo misfatto. Ma è chiaro abbastanza ch'ei parla di Pietro de Medici, figliuol di Lorenzo", e di Allegretto Allegretti, storico senese contemporaneo di Pierleoni, che riporta: "Maestro Pier Leone da Spoleto, che lo medicava (si riferisce a Lorenzo) fu gittato in un pozzo, perché fu detto, che l'haveva avvelenato, nientedimeno si concludeva per molti non esser vero."  Franco Bacchelli, «LEONI (Lioni), Piero (Pier Leone, Pierleone da Spoleto)», in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 64, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2005. Cleugh J.: The Medici: A tale of Fifteen generation. Dorset Press, London, 1990 Corti M.: Sannazaro Iacobo. In.: Branca V: Dizionariocritico della letteratura italiana.UTET, Torino, 1973 Cotta I., Klien F.: I Medici in rete. Olschki, Firenze, 2003 Dionisotti C.: Appunti sulle rime del Sannazaro. In: Giornale storico della Letteratura italiana, 1963 Lerner R.E.: The prophetic manuscripts of the“Renaissance magus” Pierleone of Spoleto. In: Potestà G.L.: Atti del III Congresso internazionale di studi gioachimiti. Marietti Ed., Genova, 1991 Mauro A: Opere volgari. Laterza Ed., Bari, 1961 Montevecchi A.: Storie fiorentine dal 1378 al 1509 di Francesco Guicciardini, Rizzoli Ed., Milano, 1998 Nibby A.: Analisi storico-topografica-antiquaria della carta de' dintorni di Roma.Tipografia della Belle Arti, Roma, 1848 Orio H.: Le iscrittioni poste sotto le vere imagini de gli huomini famosi il lettere. Trad. da Paolo Giovio dal latino in volgare., 69-72, Torrentino, Firenze, 1552 Pesenti T.: Professori e promotori di medicina nello Studio di Padova dal 1405 al 1509. Repertorio bio-bibliografico, 127-130, 1984 Radetti G.: Un'aggiunta alla biblioteca di Pierleone Leoni da Spoleto. In.: Rinascimento: Rivista dell'Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, Firenze, 1965 Ranalli F.: Istorie Fiorentine con l'aggiunte di Scipione Ammirato il giovane (1641) Batelli, Firenze, 1848 Rotzoll M.: Pierleone da Spoleto: vita e opere di un medico del Rinascimento. Olschki, Firenze, 2001 Ruysschaert J.: Nouvelles recherches au sujet de la bibliotèque de Pier Leone, médecin de Laurent le Magnifique. In: Bullettin de la Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques de l'Académie riyale de Belgique, 1960 Achille Sansi: Storia del comune di Spoleto dal secolo XII al XVII: seguita da alcune memorie dei tempi posteriori.