IN PLICATVRVM IX/XX

non-detachability: rather abstract notion. One thinks of ‘detach’ in physical terms (‘semi-detached house’). Grice means it in an abstract way. To detachwhat is it that we detach? We detach an implicaturum. Grice is not so much concerned with how to DETACH an implicaturum, but how sometimes you cannot. It’s NON-detachability that is the criterion. And this should be a matter of a prioricity. However, since style gets in the picture, he has to allow for exceptions to this criterion. A conversational, even philosophically interesting one, generated by the conversational category of modus (as the maxim of orderliness: “he went to bed and took off his boots”) is detachable. How to interpret this in an one-off predicament. Cf. non-detachability. And the other features or tests or catalysts that Grice uses. In Causal Theory of Perception, the ideas are FOUR, which he nicely summarises in WoW on the occasion of eliminating the excursus. And then he expands on Essay II, as an update. His tutees at Oxford are aware of the changes. Few care, though. Even his colleagues don’t, they are into their own things. So let’s compare the two versions of the catalysts in Causal and Essay II. Version of the four catalysts up to the first two examples in “Causal”: The first cxample is a stock case of what is sometimes called " prcsupposition " and it is often held that here 1he truth of what is irnplicd is a necessary condition of the original statement's beirrg cither true or false. This might be disputed, but it is at lcast arguable that it is so, and its being arguable might be enough to distinguish-this type of case from others. I shall however for convenience assume that the common view mentioned is correct. This consideration clearly distinguishes (1) from (2); even if the implied proposition were false, i.e. if there were no reason in the world to contrast poverty with honesty either in general or in her case, the original statement could still be false; it would be false if for example she were rich and dishonest. One might perhaps be less comfortable about assenting to its truth if the implied contrast did not in fact obtain; but the possibility of falsity is enough for the immediate purpose. My next experiment on these examples is to ask what it is in each case which could properly be said to be the vehicle of implication (to do the implying). There are at least four candidates, not necessarily mutually exclusive. Supposing someone to have uttered one or other of my sample sentences, we may ask whether the vehicle of implication would be (a) what the speaker said (or asserted), or (b) the speaker (" did he imply that . . . .':) or (c) the words the speaker used, or (d) his saying that (or again his saying that in that way); or possibly some plurality of these items. As regards (a) I think (1) and (2) differ; I think it would be correct to say in the case of (l) that what he speaker said (or asserted) implied that Smith had been beating this wife, and incorrect to say in the case of (2) that what te said (or asserted) implied that there was a contrast between e.g., honesty and poverty. A test on which I would rely is the following : if accepting that the implication holds involves one in r27 128 H. P. GRICE accepting an hypothetical' if p then q ' where 'p ' represents the original statement and ' q' represents what is implied, then what the speaker said (or asserted) is a vehicle of implication, otherwise not. To apply this rule to the given examples, if I accepted the implication alleged to hold in the case of (1), I should feel compelled to accept the hypothetical " If Smith has left off beating his wife, then he has been beating her "; whereas if I accepted the alleged implication in the case of (2), I should not feel compelled to accept the hypothetical " If she was poor but honest, then there is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty." The other candidates can be dealt with more cursorily; I should be inclined to say with regard to both (l) and (2) that the speaker could be said to have implied whatever it is that is irnplied; that in the case of (2) it seems fairly clear that the speaker's words could be said to imply a contrast, whereas it is much less clear whether in the case of (1) the speaker's words could be said to imply that Smith had been beating his wife; and that in neither case would it be evidently appropriate to speak of his saying that, or of his saying that in that way, as implying what is implied. The third idea with which I wish to assail my two examples is really a twin idea, that of the detachability or cancellability of the implication. (These terms will be explained.) Consider example (1): one cannot fi.nd a form of words which could be used to state or assert just what the sentence " Smith has left off beating his wife " might be used to assert such that when it is used the implication that Smith has been beating his wife is just absent. Any way of asserting what is asserted in (1) involves the irnplication in question. I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (l) the implication is not detqchable from what is asserted (or simpliciter, is not detachable). Furthermore, one cannot take a form of words for which both what is asserted and what is implied is the same as for (l), and then add a further clause withholding commitment from what would otherwise be implied, with the idea of annulling the implication without annulling the assertion. One cannot intelligibly say " Smith has left off beating his wife but I do not mean to imply that he has been beating her." I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (1) the implication is not cancellable (without THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION r29 cancelling the assertion). If we turn to (2) we find, I think, that there is quite a strong case for saying that here the implication ls detachable. Thcrc sccms quitc a good case for maintaining that if, instead of sayirrg " She is poor but shc is honcst " I were to say " She is poor and slre is honcst", I would assert just what I would havc asscrtcct ii I had used thc original senterrce; but there would now be no irnplication of a contrast between e.g', povery and honesty. But the question whether, in tl-re case of (2), thc inrplication is cancellable, is slightly more cornplex. Thcrc is a sonse in which we may say that it is non-cancellable; if sorncone were to say " She is poor but she is honest, though of course I do not mean to imply that there is any contrast between poverty and honesty ", this would seem a puzzling and eccentric thing to have said; but though we should wish to quarrel with the speaker, I do not think we should go so far as to say that his utterance was unintelligible; we should suppose that he had adopted a most peculiar way of conveying the the news that she was poor and honesl. The fourth and last test that I wish to impose on my exarnples is to ask whether we would be inclined to regard the fact that the appropriate implication is present as being a matter of the meaning of some particular word or phrase occurring in the sentences in question. I am aware that this may not be always a very clear or easy question to answer; nevertheless Iwill risk the assertion that we would be fairly happy to say that, as regards (2), the factthat the implication obtains is a matter of the meaning of the word ' but '; whereas so far as (l) is concerned we should have at least some inclination to say that the presence of the implication was a matter of the meaning of some of the words in the sentence, but we should be in some difficulty when it came to specifying precisely which this word, or words are, of which this is true. After third example introduced:It is plain that there is no case at all for regarding the truth of what is implied here as a pre-condition of the truth or falsity cf 130 H. P. GRICB what I have asserted; a denial of the truth of what is implied would have no bearing at all on whether what I have asserted is true or false. So (3) is much closer to (2) than (1) in this respect. Next, I (the speaker) could certainly be said to have implied that Jones is hopeless (provided that this is what I intended to get across) and my saying that (at any rate my saying /s/ that and no more) is also certainly a vehicle of implication. On the other hand my words and what I say (assert) are, I think, not here vehicles of implication. (3) thus differs from both (1) and (2). The implication is cancellable but not detachable; if I add o'I do not of course mean to imply that he is no good at philosophy " my whole utterance is intelligible and linguistically impeccable, even though it may be extraordinary tutorial behaviour; and I can no longer be said to have implied that he was no good, even though perhaps that is what my colleagues might conclude to be the case if I had nothing else to say. The implication is not however, detachable; any other way of making, in the same context of utterance, just the assertion I have made would involve the same implication. Finally, the fact that the implication holds is not a matter of any particular word or phrase within the sentence which I have uttered; so in this respect (3) is certainly different from (2) and, possibly different from (1). One obvious fact should be mentioned before I pass to the last example. This case of implication is unlike the others in that the utterance of the sentence " Jones has beautiful handwriting etc." does not standardly involve the implication here attributed to it; it requires a special context (that it should be uttered at Collections) to attach the implication to its uttgrance. After fourth and last example is introduced: in the case of (a) I can produce a strong argument in favour of holding that the fulfllment of the THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION implication of the speaker's ignorance is not a precaution of the truth or falsity of the disjunctive statement. Suppose (c) that the speaker knows that his wife is in the kitchen, (b) that the house has only two rooms (and no passages etc.) Even though (a) is the casc, thc spcaker can certainly say truly " My wife is in the housc "; he is merely not being as informative as he could bc if nccd arose. But the true proposition that his wife is in thc housc together with the true proposition that the house consists entirely of a kitchen and a bedroom, entail the proposition that his wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom. But il to cxpress the proposition p in certain circumstances would bc to spcak truly, and p, togelher with another true proposition, crrtails q, then surely to express 4 in the same circvmstances must be to speak truly. So I shall take it that the disjunctive statement in (4) does not fail to be true or false if the implied ignorance is in fact not realized. Secondly, I think it is fairly clear that in this case, as in the case of (3), we could say that the speaker had irnplied that he did not know, and also that his saying that (or his saying that rather than something else, v2., in which room she was) implied that he did not know. Thirdly, the irnplication is in a sense non-detachable, in that if in a given context the utterance of the disjunctive sentence would involve the implication that the speaker did not know in which room his his wife was, this implication would also be involved in the utterance of any other form of words which would make the same assertion(e.g., "The alternatives are (1) .(2) " or " One of the following things is the case: (a) (r) "). ln another possible sense, however, the implication could perhaps bc said to be detachable: for there will be some contexls of ruttcrance in Which the normal implication will not hold; e.g., thc spokesman who announces, " The next conference will be cither in Geneva or in New York " perhaps does not imply that lrc does not know which; for he may well be just not saying which. This points to the fact that the implication is cancellablg; :r nrarl could say, " My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bctlroorn " in circumstances in which the implication would rrornrally be present, and then go on, " Mind you, I'm not saying tlrrrt I don't know which"; this might be unfriendly (and grcr'lrrps ungrammatical) but would be perfectly intelligible, I2 131 132 H. P. GRICB Finally, the fact that the utterance of the disjunctive sentence normally involves the implication of the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts is, I should like to say, to be explained by reference to a general principle governing the use of language. Exactly what this principle is I am uncertain, but L first sftol would be the following: "One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing." This is certainly not an adequate formulation but will perhaps be good enough for my present purpose. On the assumption that such a principle as this is of general application, one can draw the conclusion that the utterance of a disjunctive sentence would imply the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts, given that (a) the obvious reason for not making a statemcnt which there is some call on one to make is that one is not in a position to make it, and given (6) the logical fact that each disjunct entails the disjunctive, but not vice versa; which being so, the disjuncts are stronger than the disjunctive. lf the outline just given js on the right lines, then I would wish to say, we have a reason for refusing in the case of (4) to regard the implication of the speaker's ignorance as being part of the meaning of the word'or'; someone who knows about the logical relation between a disjunction and its disjuncts, and who also knew about the alleged general principle governing discourse, could work out for hirnself that disjunctive utterances would involve the implication which they do in fact involve. I must insist, however, that my aim in discussing this last point has been merelyto indicate the position I would wish to take up, and not to argue scriously in favour of it. My main purpose in this sub-section has been to introduce four ideas of which l intend to make some use; and to provide some conception of tlre ways in which they apply or fail to apply to various types of implication. By the numbering of it, it seems he has added an extra. It’s FIVE catalysts now. He’ll go back to them in Essay IV, and in Presupposition and Conversational Impicature. He needs those catalysts. Why? It seems like he is always thinking that someone will challenge him! This is Grice: “We can now show that, it having been stipulated as being what it is, a conversational implicaturum must possess certain features. Or rather here are some catalyst ideas which will help us to determine or individuate. Four tests for implicaturum as it were. First, CANCELLABILITYas noted in “Causal Theory”for two of the examples (‘beautiful handwriting’ and ‘kitchen or bedroom’ and NEGATIVE version of “You don’t cease to eat iron”) and the one of the pillar box -- Since, to assume the presence of a conversational implicum, we have to assume that the principle of conversational co-operation is being observed, and since it is possible to opt out of the observation of this principle, it follows that an implicaturum can be canceled in a particular case. It may be explicitly canceled, if need there be, by the addition of a clause by which the utterer states or implies that he  has opted out (e. g. “The pillar box seems red but it is.”). Then again it may be contextually (or implicitly) canceled (e. g. to a very honest person, who knows I disbelieve the examiner exists, “The loyalty examiner won’t be summoning you at any rate”). The utterance that usually would carry an implicaturum is used on an occasion that makes it clear or obvious that the utterer IS opting out without having to bore his addressee by making this obviousness explicit. There is a second litmus test or catalyst idea. nsofar as the calculation that a implicaturum is present requires, besides contextual and background information only a knowledge or understanding or processing of what has been said or explicitly conveyed (‘are you playing squash? B shows bandaged leg) (or the ‘conventional’ ‘commitment’ of the utterance), and insofar as the manner or style, of FORM, rather than MATTER, of expression plays no role in the calculation, it will NOT be possible to find another way of explicitly conveying or putting forward the same thing, the same so-and-so (say that q follows from p) which simply ‘lacks’ the unnecessary implicaturum in question -- except [will his excluders never end?] where some special feature of the substituted version [this other way which he says is not conceivable] is itself relevant to the determination of the implicaturum (in virtue of this or that conversational maxims pertaining to the category of conversational mode. If we call this feature, as Grice does in “Causal Theory,” ‘non-detachability’in that the implicaturum cannot be detached from any alternative expression that makes the same point -- one may expect the implicaturum carried by this or that locution to have a high degree of non-detachability. ALTERNATIVES FOR “NOT” Not, it is not the case, it is false that. There’s nothing unique about ‘not’.ALTERNATIVES FOR “AND” and, nothing, furthermore, but. There othing unique about ‘and’ALTERNATIVES FOR “OR”: One of the following is true. There is nothing unique about ‘or’ALTERNATIVES FOR “IF” Provided. ‘There is nothing unique about ‘if’ALTERNATIVES FOR “THE”There is at least one and at most one. And it exists. (existence and uniqueness). There is nothing unique about ‘the’.THIS COVERS STRAWSON’S first problem.What about the other English philosophers?AUSTINon ‘voluntarily’ ALTERNATIVES to ‘voluntarily,’ with the will, willingly, intentionally. Nothing unique about ‘voluntarily.’STRAWSON on ‘true’it is the case, redundance theory, nothing. Nothing unique about ‘true’HART ON good. To say that ‘x is commendable’ is to recommend x. Nothing unique about ‘good.’HART on ‘carefully.’ Da Vinci painted Mona Lisa carefully, with caution, with precaution. Nothing unique about ‘carefully.’THIRD LITMUS TEST or idea. To speak approximately, since the calculation of the presence of an implicaturum presupposes an initial knowledge, or grasping, or understanding, or taking into account of the ‘conventional’ force (not in Austin’s sense, but translating Latin ‘vis’) of the expression the utterance of which carries the implicaturum, a conversational implicaturum will be a condition that is NOT, be definition, on risk of circularity of otiosity, included in the original specification of the expression's conventional force. If I’m saying that ‘seems’ INVOLVES, as per conventional force, ‘doubt or denial,’what’s my point? If Strawson is right that ‘if’ has the conventional force of conventionally committing the utterer with the belief that q follows from p, why bother? And if that were so, how come the implicaturum is still cancellable?Though it may not be impossible for what starts life, so to speak, as a conversational implicaturum to become conventionalized, to suppose that this is so in a given case would require special justification. (Asking Lewis). So, initially at least, a conversational implicaturum is, by definition and stipulation, not part of the sense, truth-condition, conventional force, or part of what is explicitly conveyed or put forward, or ‘meaning’ of the expression to the employment of which the impicatum attaches. FOURTH LITMUS TEST or catalyst idea.Mentioned in “Causal theory” The alethic valueconjoined with the test about the VEHICLE --. He has these as two different tests in “Causal”. Since the truth of a conversational implicaturum is not required by (is not a condition for) the truth of what is said or explicitly conveyed (what is said or explicatedthe explicatum or explcitum, or what is explicitly conveyed or communicated) may be true -- what is implicated may be falsethat he has beautiful handwriting, that q follows from p, that the utterer is ENDORSING what someone else said, that the utterer is recommending x, that the person who is said to act carefully has taken precaution), the implicaturum is NOT carried by what is said or the EXPLICATUM or EXPLICITUM, or is explicitly conveyed, but only by the ‘saying’ or EXPLICATING or EXPLICITING of what is said or of the explicatum or explicitum, or by 'putting it that way.’.The fifth and last litmus test or catalyst idea. Since, to calculate a conversational implicaturum is to calculate what has to be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the utterer is a rational, benevolent, altruist agent, and that the principle of conversational cooperation is being observed, and since there may be various possible specific explanations or alternatives that fill the gap hereas to what is the content of the psychological attitude to be ascribed to the utterer, a list of which may be open, or open-ended, the conversational implicaturum in such cases will technically be an open-ended disjunction of all such specific explanations, which may well be infinitely non-numerable. Since the list of these IS open, the implicaturum will have just the kind of INDETERMINACY or lack of determinacy that an implicaturum appears in most cases to possess.

 

determinatum: determinable, a general characteristic or property analogous to a genus except that while a property independent of a genus differentiates a species that falls under the genus, no such independent property differentiates a determinate that falls under the determinable. The color blue, e.g., is a determinate with respect of the determinable color: there is no property F independent of color such that a color is blue if and only if it is F. In contrast, there is a property, having equal sides, such that a rectangle is a square if and only if it has this property. Square is a properly differentiated species of the genus rectangle. W. E. Johnson introduces the terms ‘determinate’ and ‘determinable’ in his Logic, Part I, Chapter 11. His account of this distinction does not closely resemble the current understanding sketched above. Johnson wants to explain the differences between the superficially similar ‘Red is a color’ and ‘Plato is a man’. He concludes that the latter really predicates something, humanity, of Plato; while the former does not really predicate anything of red. Color is not really a property or adjective, as Johnson puts it. The determinates red, blue, and yellow are grouped together not because of a property they have in common but because of the ways they differ from each other. Determinates under the same determinable are related to each other and are thus comparable in ways in which they are not related to determinates under other determinables. Determinates belonging to different determinables, such as color and shape, are incomparable. ’More determinate’ is often used interchangeably with ‘more specific’. Many philosophers, including Johnson, hold that the characters of things are absolutely determinate or specific. Spelling out what this claim means leads to another problem in analyzing the relation between determinate and determinable. By what principle can we exclude red and round as a determinate of red and red as a determinate of red or round?  determinism, the view that every event or state of affairs is brought about by antecedent events or states of affairs in accordance with universal causal laws that govern the world. Thus, the state of the world at any instant determines a unique future, and that knowledge of all the positions of things and the prevailing natural forces would permit an intelligence to predict the future state of the world with absolute precision. This view was advanced by Laplace in the early nineteenth century; he was inspired by Newton’s success at integrating our physical knowledge of the world. Contemporary determinists do not believe that Newtonian physics is the supreme theory. Some do not even believe that all theories will someday be integrated into a unified theory. They do believe that, for each event, no matter how precisely described, there is some theory or system of laws such that the occurrence of that event under that description is derivable from those laws together with information about the prior state of the system. Some determinists formulate the doctrine somewhat differently: a every event has a sufficient cause; b at any given time, given the past, only one future is possible; c given knowledge of all antecedent conditions and all laws of nature, an agent could predict at any given time the precise subsequent history of the universe. Thus, determinists deny the existence of chance, although they concede that our ignorance of the laws or all relevant antecedent conditions makes certain events unexpected and, therefore, apparently happen “by chance.” The term ‘determinism’ is also used in a more general way as the name for any metaphysical doctrine implying that there is only one possible history of the world. The doctrine described above is really scientific or causal determinism, for it grounds this implication on a general fact about the natural order, namely, its governance by universal causal law. But there is also theological determinism, which holds that God determines everything that happens or that, since God has perfect knowledge about the universe, only the course of events that he knows will happen can happen. And there is logical determinism, which grounds the necessity of the historical order on the logical truth that all propositions, including ones about the future, are either true or false. Fatalism, the view that there are forces e.g., the stars or the fates that determine all outcomes independently of human efforts or wishes, is claimed by some to be a version of determinism. But others deny this on the ground that determinists do not reject the efficacy of human effort or desire; they simply believe that efforts and desires, which are sometimes effective, are themselves determined by antecedent factors as in a causal chain of events. Since determinism is a universal doctrine, it embraces human actions and choices. But if actions and choices are determined, then some conclude that free will is an illusion. For the action or choice is an inevitable product of antecedent factors that rendered alternatives impossible, even if the agent had deliberated about options. An omniscient agent could have predicted the action or choice beforehand. This conflict generates the problem of free will and determinism. 

 

deutero-esperanto: Also GricesePirotese. “Gricese” is best. Arbitrariness need not be a two-party thing. E communicates to himself that there is danger by drawing a skull. Grice genially opposed to the idea of a convention. He hated a convention. A language is not conventional. Meaning is not conventional. Communication is not conventional. He was even unhappy with the account of convention by Lewis in terms of an arbitrary co-ordination. While the co-ordination bit passes rational muster, the arbitrary element is deemed a necessary condition, and Grice hated that. For Grice there is natural, and iconic. When a representation ceases to be iconic and becomes, for lack of a better expression, non-iconic, things get, we may assume conventional. One form of correlation in his last definition of meaing allows for a conventional correlation. “Pain!,” the P cries. There is nothing in /pein/ that minimally resembles the pain the P is suffering. So from his involuntary “Ouch” to his simulated “Ouch,” he thinks he can say “Pain.” Bennett explored the stages after that. The dog is shaggy is Grices example. All sorts of resultant procedures are needed for reference and predication, which may be deemed conventional. One may refer nonconventionally, by ostension. It seems more difficult to predicate non-conventionally. But there may be iconic predication. Urquhart promises twelve parts of speech: each declinable in eleven cases, four numbers, eleven genders (including god, goddess, man, woman, animal, etc.); and conjugable in eleven tenses, seven moods, and four voices. The language will translate any idiom in any other language, without any alteration of the literal sense, but fully representing the intention. Later, one day, while lying in his bath, Grice designed deutero-esperanto. The obble is fang may be current only for Griceian members of the class of utterers. It is only this or that philosophers practice to utter The obble is fang in such-and-such circumstances. In this case, the utterer U does have a readiness to utter The obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances. There is also the scenario in which The obble is fang is may be conceived by the philosopher not to be deemed current at all, but the utterance of The obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances is part of some system of communication which the utterer U (Lockwith,, Urquart, Wilkins, Edmonds, Grice) has devised but which has never been put into operation, like the highway code which Grice invent another day again while lying in his bath. In that case, U does this or that basic or resultant procedure for the obble is feng in an attenuated but philosophically legitimate fashion. U has envisaged a possible system of practices which involve a readiness to utter Example by Grice that does NOT involve a convention in this usage. Surely Grice can as he indeed did, invent a language, call it Deutero-Esperanto, Griceish, or Pirotese, which nobody at Oxford ever uses to communicat. That makes Grice the authoritycf. arkhe, authority, government (in plural), "authorities"and Grice can lay down, while lying in the tub, no doubtwhat is proper. A P can be said to potch of some obble o as fang or as feng. Also to cotch of some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o as being fid to one another.” In symbols: (Ex)(Ey).Px  Oy  potch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px  Oy  potch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px  Oy  cotch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px  Ox  cotch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px  Oz  Oy  cotch(x, fid(y,z)). Let’s say that Ps (as Russell and Carnap conceived them) inhabit a world of obbles, material objects, or things. To potch is something like to perceive; to cotch something like to think. Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives. Fid is a possible relation between obbles. Grice provides a symbolisation for content internalisation.  The perceiver or cognitive Subjects perceives or cognises two objects, x, y, as holding a relation of some type.  There is a higher level that Ps can reach when the object of their potchings and cotchings is not so much objects but states of affairs.  Its then that the truth-functional operators will be brought to existence “”: cotch(p  q) “V”:  cotch(p v q) “)”: )-cotch(p ) q)  A P will be able to reject a content, refuse-thinking: ~. Cotch(~p). When P1 perceives P2, the reciprocals get more complicated.  P2 cotches that P1!-judges that p.  Grice uses ψ1 for potching and ψ2 for cotching. If P2 is co-operative, and abides by "The Ps Immanuel," P2 will honour, in a Kantian benevolent way, his partners goal by adopting temporarily his partners goal potch(x (portch(y, !p)) ⊃ potch(x, !p). But by then, its hardly simpler ways. Especially when the Ps outdo their progenitor Carnap as metaphysicians. The details are under “eschatology,” but the expressions are here “α izzes α.” This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. P1 applies it war, and utters War is war which yields a most peculiar implicaturum. “if α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ, α izz γ.” This is transitivity, which is crucial for Ps to overcome Berkeley’s counterexample to Locke, and define their identity over time. “if α hazzes β, α izzes β.” Or, what is accidental is not essential. A P may allow that what is essential is accidental while misleading, is boringly true. “α hazzes β iff α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β.” “If β is a katholou or universalium, β is an eidos or forma.” For surely Ps need not be stupid to fail to see squarrelhood. “if α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular, γ≠α ∧ α izz β.” “α izzes predicable of β iff ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). “α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α  α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). α = β iff α izzes β ∧ β izzes α. “α izzes an atomon, or individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β). “α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)). α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α). α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum. α izzes an eidos or forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium); α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). “ α izzes essentially predicable of α  α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β.  ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β. α izzes an kathekaston or particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum; α izz a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α). ~(∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma)  ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α). x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izzes β); α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazzes α);  α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazzes A); (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α). (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing).  (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing). α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α). (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β.   Grice is following a Leibnizian tradition. A philosophical language is any constructed language that is constructed from first principles or certain ideologies.  It is considered a type of engineered language.  Philosophical languages were popular in Early Modern times, partly motivated by the goal of recovering the lost Adamic or Divine language.  The term “ideal language” is sometimes used near-synonymously, though more modern philosophical languages such as “Toki Pona” are less likely to involve such an exalted claim of perfection.  It may be known as a language of pure ideology.  The axioms and grammars of the languages together differ from commonly spoken languages today.  In most older philosophical languages, and some newer ones, words are constructed from a limited set of morphemes that are treated as "elemental" or fundamental. "Philosophical language" is sometimes used synonymously with "taxonomic language", though more recently there have been several conlangs constructed on philosophical principles which are not taxonomic. Vocabularies of oligo-synthetic communication-systems are made of compound expressions, which are coined from a small (theoretically minimal) set of morphemes; oligo-isolating communication-systems, such as Toki Pona, similarly use a limited set of root words but produce phrases which remain s. of distinct words.  Toki Pona is based on minimalistic simplicity, incorporating elements of Taoism. Láadan is designed to lexicalize and grammaticalise the concepts and distinctions important to women, based on muted group theory.  A priori languages are constructed languages where the vocabulary is invented directly, rather than being derived from other existing languages (as with Esperanto, or Grices Deutero-Esperanto, or Pirotese or Ido). It all starts when Carnap claims to know that pritos karulise elatically. Grice as engineer.  Pirotese is the philosophers engaging in Pology. Actually, Pirotese is the lingo the Ps parrot. Ps karulise elatically. But not all of them. Grice finds that the Pological talk allows to start from zero.  He is constructing a language, (basic) Pirotese, and the philosophical psychology and world that that language is supposed to represent or denote.  An obble is a Ps object. Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch, in Pirotese, is what a P does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is Pirotese for what a P can further do with an obble: know or cognise it. Cotching, unlike potching, is factive.  Pirotese would not be the first language invented by a philosopher. Deutero-Esperanto -- Couturat, L., philosopher and logician who wrote on the history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of mathematics, and the possibility of a universal language. Couturat refuted Renouvier’s finitism and advocated an actual infinite in The Mathematical Infinite 6. He argued that the assumption of infinite numbers was indispensable to maintain the continuity of magnitudes. He saw a precursor of modern logistic in Leibniz, basing his interpretation of Leibniz on the Discourse on Metaphysics and Leibniz’s correspondence with Arnauld. His epoch-making Leibniz’s Logic 1 describes Leibniz’s metaphysics as panlogism. Couturat published a study on Kant’s mathematical philosophy Revue de Métaphysique, 4, and defended Peano’s logic, Whitehead’s algebra, and Russell’s logistic in The Algebra of Logic 5. He also contributed to André Lalande’s Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie 6. Refs.: While the reference to “Deutero-Esperanto’ comes from “Meaning revisited,” other keywords are useful, notably “Pirotese” and “Symbolo.” Also keywords like “obble,” and “pirot.” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

diagoge: Grice makes a triad here: apagoge, diagoge, and epagoge. Cf. Grice’s emphasis on the ‘argument’ involved in the conversational implciatum, though. To work out an impilcatum is to reach it ‘by argument.’ No argument, no conversational implicaturum. But cf. argument in Emissor draws skull and communicates that there is danger. ARGUMENT involved in that Emissor intends his addressee WILL REASON. Can the lady communicate to the pigeons that she is selling ‘twopence a bag’ for their pleasure? Grice contrasted epagoge with diagoge. Cooperation with competition. Cooperative game with competitive game. But epagoge is induction, so here we’ll consider his views on probability and how it contrastds with diagoge. The diagoge is easy to identity: Grice is a social animal, with the BA, Philosophy, conferences, discussion, The American Philosophical Association, transcripts by Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes contained in c. 10 within the same s. IV miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts and audio-cassettes, s. IV, c. 6-f. 8, and f. 10, and s. V, c. 8-f.  4-8 Unfortunately, Parker typed carulise for karulise, or not. Re: probability, Grice loves to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mills principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play, Grice would speak of not bringing more Grice to your Mill. Mills System of Logic was part of the reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his Life and opinions he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was interested in Kneales secondary induction, since Grice saw this as an application of a construction routine. He was also interested in Keyness notion of a generator property, which he found metaphysically intriguing. Induction. Induction ‒ Mill’s Induction, induction, deduction, abduction, Mill. More Grice to the Mill. Grice loved Hardies playing with Mill’s method of difference with an Oxford copper. He also quotes Kneale and Keynes on induction. Note that his seven-step derivation of akrasia relies on an inductive step! Grice was fortunate to associate with Davidson, whose initial work is on porbability. Grice borrows from Davidson the idea that inductive probability, or probable, attaches to the doxastic, while prima facie attaches to desirably, or desirability.  Jeffreys notion of desirability is partition-invariant in that if a proposition, A, can be expressed as the disjoint disjunction of both {B1, B2, B3} and {C1, C2, C3}, ∑ Bi ∈ AProb (Bi ∣∣ A). Des (Bi) = ∑Ci ∈ A Prob (Ci ∣∣ A). Des (Ci). It follows that applying the rule of desirability maximization will always lead to the same recommendation, irrespective of how the decision problem is framed, while an alternative theory may recommend different courses of action, depending on how the decision problem is formulated.  Here, then, is the analogue of Jeffreys desirability axiom (D), applied to sentences rather than propositions: (D) (prob(s and t) = 0 and prob(s or t) "# 0, ⊃ d ( ) prob(s)des(s)+ prob(t)des(t) es s or t =-"---- prob( s) + prob(t ) (Grice writes prob(s) for the Subjectsive probability of sand des(s) for the desirability or utility of s.) B. Jeffrey admits that "desirability" (his terms for evidential value) does not directly correspond to any single pre-theoretical notion of desire. Instead, it provides the best systematic explication of the decision theoretic idea, which is itself our best effort to make precise the intuitive idea of weighing options. As Jeffrey remarks, it is entirely possibly to desire someone’s love when you already have it. Therefore, as Grice would follow, Jeffrey has the desirability operator fall under the scope of the probability operator. The agents desire that p provided he judges that p does not obtain. Diagoge/epagoge, Grices audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various lectures and conferences, some seminars with Warner and J. Baker, audio files of various lectures and conferences. Subjects: epagoge, diagoge. A previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts. These are the audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folder. The kind of metaphysical argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to exemplify a dia-gogic or trans-ductive as opposed to epa-gogic or in-ductive approach to philosophical argumentation. Hence Short and Lewis have, for ‘diagoge,’ the cognates of ‘trādūco,’ f. transduco. Now, the more emphasis is placed on justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to refutation, whether of theses or of people. And perhaps a greater emphasis on a diagogic procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable, would have an eirenic effect. Cf. Aristotle on diagoge, schole, otium. Liddell and Scott have “διαγωγή,” which they render as “literally carrying across,” -- “τριήρων” Polyaen.5.2.6, also as “carrying through,” and “hence fig.” “ἡ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν δ., “taking a person through a subject by instruction, Pl. Ep.343; so, course of instruction, lectures, ἐν τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ δ. prob. in Phld. Piet.25; also passing of life, way or course of life, “δ. βίου” Pl. R.344e: abs., Id. Tht.177a, etc., way of passing time, amusement, “δ. μετὰ παιδιᾶς” Arist. EN 1127b34, cf. 1177a27; “δ. ἐλευθέριος” Id. Pol.1339b5; διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν public pastimes, ib.1280b37, cf. Plu.126b (pl.). also delay, D.C. 57.3. management, τῶν πραγμάτων δ. dispatch of business, Id.48.5. IV. station for ships, f. l. in Hdn.4.2.8. And there are other entries to consider: διαγωγάν: διαίρεσιν, διανομήν, διέλευσιν. Grice knew what he was talking about! Refs.: The main sources listed under ‘desirability,’ above. There is a specific essay on ‘probability and life.’ Good keywords, too, are epagoge and induction The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

dialogosthe ‘dia’ means ‘trans-‘, not ‘two.’ Deuterologos δευτερο-λόγος , ὁ, A.second speaker (though, not really conversationalistcf. conversari) Teles p.5 H. -- is the exact opposite of monologos, cf. Aeschylus when he called on an Athenian to play the second ‘fighter’ “deuteron-agonistes.” -- dialogical implicaturumGrice seldom uses ‘dialogue.’ It’s always conversational with him. He must have thought that ‘dialogue’ was too Buberian. In Roman, ‘she had a conversation with him’ means ‘she had sex with him.’ “She had a dialogue with him” does not. Classicists are obsessed with the beginning of Greek theatre: it all started with ‘dialogue.’ It wasn’t like Aeschylus needed a partner. He wrote the parts for BOTH. Was he reconstructing naturally-occurring Athenian dialogue? Who knows! The *two*-actor rule, which was indeed preceded by a convention in which only a single actor would appear on stage, along with the chorus. It was in 471 B. C. that Aeschylus introduces a second actor, called Cleander. You see, Aeschylus always cast himself as protagonist in his own plays. For the season of 471 B. C., the Athenians were surprised when Aeschylus introduced Cleander as his deuteragonist. “I can now conversationally implicate!” he said to a cheering crowd! Dialogism -- Bakhtin: m. m., philosopher of dialogism -- and cultural theorist whose influence is pervasive in a wide range of academic disciplines  from literary hermeneutics to the epistemology of the human sciences, and cultural theory. He may legitimately be called a philosophical anthropologist in the venerable Continental tradition. Because of his seminal work on Rabelais and Dostoevsky’s poetics, Baden School Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich 70   70 his influence has been greatest in literary hermeneutics. Without question dialogism, or the construal of dialogue, is the hallmark of Bakhtin’s thought. Dialogue marks the existential condition of humanity in which the self and the other are asymmetrical but double-binding. In his words, to exist means to communicate dialogically, and when the dialogue ends, everything else ends. Unlike Hegelian and Marxian dialectics but like the Chin. correlative logic of yin and yang, Bakhtin’s dialogism is infinitely polyphonic, open-ended, and indeterminate, i.e., “unfinalizable”  to use his term. Dialogue means that there are neither first nor last words. The past and the future are interlocked and revolve around the axis of the present. Bakhtin’s dialogism is paradigmatic in a threefold sense. First, dialogue is never abstract but embodied. The lived body is the material condition of social existence as ongoing dialogue. Not only does the word become enfleshed, but dialogue is also the incorporation of the self and the other. Appropriately, therefore, Bakhtin’s body politics may be called a Slavic version of Tantrism. Second, the Rabelaisian carnivalesque that Bakhtin’s dialogism incorporates points to the “jesterly” politics of resistance and protest against the “priestly” establishment of officialdom. Third, the most distinguishing characteristic of Bakhtin’s dialogism is the primacy of the other over the self, with a twofold consequence: one concerns ethics and the other epistemology. In modern philosophy, the discovery of “Thou” or the primacy of the other over the self in asymmetrical reciprocity is credited to Feuerbach. It is hailed as the “Copernican revolution” of mind, ethics, and social thought. Ethically, Bakhtin’s dialogism, based on heteronomy, signals the birth of a new philosophy of responsibility that challenges and transgresses the Anglo- tradition of “rights talk.” Epistemologically, it lends our welcoming ears to the credence that the other may be right  the attitude that Gadamer calls the soul of dialogical hermeneutics. 

 

diaphaneity: Grice unique in his subtlety. Strawson and Wiggins. 'the quality of being freely pervious to light; transparency', OED. This is a crucial concept for Grice. He applies it ‘see,’ which which, after joint endeavours with G. J. Warnock, he was obsessed! Grice considers the ascription, “Warnock sees that it is raining.” And then he adds, “And it is true, I see that it is raining, too.” What’s the diference. Then comes Strawson. “Strawson, you see that it is raining, right?” So we have an ascription in the first, second, and third persons. When it comes to the identification of a sense (like vision) via experience or qualia, we are at a problem, because ‘see,’ allowing for what Ryle calls a ‘conversational avowal,’ that nobody has an authority to distrust, is what Grice calls a ‘diaphanous’ predicate. More formally. That means that “Grice sees that it is raining,” in terms of experience, cannot really be expanded except by expanding into WHAT IS that Grice sees, viz. that it is raining. The same with “communicating that p,” and “meaning that p.”

 

dictum: Grice was fascinated with these multiple vowel roots: dictum, deictis. Cf. dictor, and dictivenss. Not necessarily involved with ‘say,’ but with ‘deixis,’ So a dictum is involved in Emissor E drawing a skull, communicating that there is danger. It is Hare who introduced ‘dictum’ in the Oxonian philosophical literature in his T. H. Green Essay. Hare distinguishes between the ‘dictum,’ that the cat is on the mat, from the ‘dictor,’ ‘I state that the cat is on the mat, yes.’ ‘Cat, on the mat, please.’ Grice often refers to Hare’s play with words, which he obviously enjoys. In “Epilogue,” Grice elaborates on the ‘dictum,’ and turns it into ‘dictivitas.’ How does he coin that word? He starts with Cicero, who has ‘dictivm,’ and creates an abstract noun to match. Grice needs a concept of a ‘dictum’ ambiguous as it is. Grice distinguishes between what an Utterer explicitly conveys, e. g. that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Then there’s what Grice implicitly conveys, to wit: that Strawson took off his boots and went to bedin that order. Surely Grice has STATED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Grice has ASSERTED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. But if Grice were to order Strawson: “Put on your parachute and jump!” the implicatura may differ. By uttering that utterance, Grice has not asserted or stated anything. So Grice needs a dummy that will do for indicatives and imperatives. ‘Convey’ usually doesespecially in the modality ‘explicitly’ convey. Because by uttering that utterance Grice has explicitly conveyed that Strawson is to put on his parachute and jump. Grice has implicitly conveyd that Strawson is to put on his parachute and THEN jump, surely.

 

Griceian dignitas: a moral worth or status usually attributed to human persons. Persons are said to have dignity as well as to express it. Persons are typically thought to have 1 “human dignity” an dichotomy paradox dignity 234   234 intrinsic moral worth, a basic moral status, or both, which is had equally by all persons; and 2 a “sense of dignity” an awareness of one’s dignity inclining toward the expression of one’s dignity and the avoidance of humiliation. Persons can lack a sense of dignity without consequent loss of their human dignity. In Kant’s influential account of the equal dignity of all persons, human dignity is grounded in the capacity for practical rationality, especially the capacity for autonomous self-legislation under the categorical imperative. Kant holds that dignity contrasts with price and that there is nothing  not pleasure nor communal welfare nor other good consequences  for which it is morally acceptable to sacrifice human dignity. Kant’s categorical rejection of the use of persons as mere means suggests a now-common link between the possession of human dignity and human rights see, e.g., the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One now widespread discussion of dignity concerns “dying with dignity” and the right to conditions conducive thereto.

 

Griceian dilemma, a trilemma, tetralemma, monolemma, lemma Grice thought that Ryle’s dilemmas were overrated. Strictly, a ‘dilemma’ is a piece of reasoning or argument or argument form in which one of the premises is a disjunction, featuring “or.” Constructive dilemmas take the form ‘If A and B, if C, D, A or C; therefore, B or D’ and are instances of modus ponendo ponens in the special case where A is C and B is D; A so-called ‘destructive’ dilemma is of the form ‘If A, B, if C, D, not-B or not-D; therefore, not-A or not-C’ and it is  likewise an instance of modus tollendo tollens in that special case. A dilemma in which the disjunctive premise is false is commonly known as a “false” dilemma, which is one of Ryle’s dilemmas: “a category mistake!”

 

diminutive: diminished capacity: explored by Grice in his analysis of legal versus moral right -- a legal defense to criminal liability that exists in two distinct forms: 1 the mens rea variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to cast doubt on the prosecution’s assertion that, at the time of the crime, the defendant possessed the mental state criteria, the mens rea, required by the legal definition of the offense charged; and 2 the partial responsibility variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to support a claim that, even if the defendant’s mental state satisfied the mens rea criteria for the offense, the defendant’s responsibility for the crime is diminished and thus the defendant should be convicted of a lesser crime and/or a lesser sentence should be imposed. The mental abnormality may be produced by mental disorder, intoxication, trauma, or other causes. The mens rea variant is not a distinct excuse: a defendant is simply arguing that the prosecution cannot prove the definitional, mental state criteria for the crime. Partial responsibility is an excuse, but unlike the similar, complete excuse of legal insanity, partial responsibility does not produce total acquittal; rather, a defendant’s claim is for reduced punishment. A defendant may raise either or both variants of diminished capacity and the insanity defense in the same case. For example, a common definition of firstdegree murder requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant intended to kill and did so after premeditation. A defendant charged with this crime might raise both variants as follows. To deny the allegation of premeditation, a defendant might claim that the killing occurred instantaneously in response to a “command hallucination.” If believed, a defendant cannot be convicted of premeditated homicide, but can be convicted of the lesser crime of second-degree murder, which typically requires only intent. And even a defendant who killed intentionally and premeditatedly might claim partial responsibility because the psychotic mental state rendered the agent’s reasons for action nonculpably irrational. In this case, either the degree of crime might be reduced by operation of the partial excuse, rather than by negation of definitional mens rea, or a defendant might be convicted of first-degree murder but given a lesser penalty. In the United States the mens rea variant exists in about half the jurisdictions, although its scope is usually limited in various ways, primarily to avoid a defendant’s being acquitted and freed if mental abnormality negated all the definitional mental state criteria of the crime charged. In English law, the mens rea variant exists but is limited by the type of evidence usable to support it. No  jurisdiction has adopted a distinct, straightforward partial responsibility variant, but various analogous doctrines and procedures are widely accepted. For example, partial responsibility grounds both the doctrine that intentional killing should be reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter if a defendant acted “in the heat of passion” upon legally adequate provocation, and the sentencing judge’s discretion to award a decreased sentence based on a defendant’s mental abnormality. In addition to such partial responsibility analogues, England, Wales, and Scotland have directly adopted the partial responsibility variant, termed “diminished responsibility,” but it applies only to prosecutions for murder. “Diminished responsibility” reduces a conviction to a lesser crime, such as manslaughter or culpable homicide, for behavior that would otherwise constitute murder. 

 

direction of fit: referred to by Grice in “Intention and uncertainty,” and symbolized by an upward arrow and a downward arrowthere are only TWO directions (or senses) of fit: expressum to ‘re’ and ‘re’ to expressum. The first is indicativus modus; the second is imperativus modus -- according to his thesis of aequivocalitythe direction of fit is overrated -- a metaphor that derives from a story in Anscombe’s Intention 7 about a detective who follows a shopper around town making a list of the things that the shopper buys. As Anscombe notes, whereas the detective’s list has to match the way the world is each of the things the shopper buys must be on the detective’s list, the shopper’s list is such that the world has to fit with it each of the things on the list are things that he must buy. The metaphor is now standardly used to describe the difference between kinds of speech act assertions versus commands and mental states beliefs versus desires. For example, beliefs are said to have the world-to-mind direction of fit because it is in the nature of beliefs that their contents are supposed to match the world: false beliefs are to be abandoned. Desires are said to have the opposite mind-to-world direction of fit because it is in the nature of desires that the world is supposed to match their contents. This is so at least to the extent that the role of an unsatisfied desire that the world be a certain way is to prompt behavior aimed at making the world that way. 

 

disgrice: In PGRICE, Kemmerling speaks of disgricing as the opposite of gricing. The first way to disgrice Kemmerling calls ‘strawsonising.’For Strawson, even the resemblance (for Grice, equivalence in terms of 'iff' -- cf. his account of what an syntactically structured non-complete expression) between (G) There is not a single volume in my uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’and the negatively existential form (LFG) ~ (Ex)(Ax . ~ Bx)’ is deceptive, ‘It is not the case that there exists an x  such that x is a book in Grice’s uncle’s library and x is written by an Englishman. FIRST, 'There is not a single volume in uncle’s library which is not by an English author' -- as normally used, carries the presupposition -- or entails, for Grice --  (G2) Some (at least one) book is in Grice’s uncle’s library. SECOND, 'There is not a single volume in Grice’s uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’ is far from being 'entailed' by (G3e) It is not the case that there is some (at least one) book in my room. If we give ‘There not a single book in my room which is not by an English author’ the modernist logical form ‘~ (Ex)(Ax .~ Bx),’ we see that this is ENTAILED by the briefer, and indeed logicall stronger (in terms of entailments) ~ (Ex)Ax. So when Grice, with a solemn face, utters, ‘There is not a single foreign volume in my uncle’s library, to reveal later that the library is empty, Grice should expect his addressee to get some odd feeling. Surely not the feeling of having been lied to -- or been confronted with an initial false utterance --, because we have not. Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage." "What you say is outrageous!" This sounds stronger than it is. An outrage is believed to be an evil deed, offense, crime; affront, indignity, act not within established or reasonable limits," of food, drink, dress, speech, etc., from Old French outrage "harm, damage; insult; criminal behavior; presumption, insolence, overweening" (12c.), earlier oltrage (11c.), From Vulgar Latin ‘ultraticum,’ excess," from Latin ultra, beyond" (from suffixed form of PIE root *al- "beyond"). Etymologically, "the passing beyond reasonable bounds" in any sense. The meaning narrowed in English toward violent excesses because of folk etymology from out + rage. Of injuries to feelings, principles, etc., from outrage, v. outragen, "to go to excess, act immoderately," from outrage (n.) or from Old French oultrager. From 1580s with meaning "do violence to, attack, maltreat." Related: Outraged; outraging. But Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage.” When Grice was only trying to tutor him in The Organon. Of course it is not the case that Grice is explicitly conveying or expressing that there there is some (at least one) book in his uncle's room. Grice has not said anything false. Or rather, it is not the case that Grice utters an utterance which is not alethically or doxastically satisfactory. Yet what Grice gives Strawson the defeasible, cancellable, license to to assume that Grice thinks there is at least one book. Unless he goes on to cancel the implicaturum, Grice may be deemed to be misleading Strawson. What Grice explicitly conveys to be true (or false) it is necessary (though not sufficient) that there should at least one volume in his uncle’s library -- It is not the case that my uncle has a library and in that library all the books are autochthonous to England, i.e. it is not the case that Grice’s uncle has a library; for starters, it is not the case that Grice has a literate uncle. Of this SUBTLE, nuantic, or cloudy or foggy, "slight or delicate degree of difference in expression, feeling, opinion, etc.," from Fr. nuance "slight difference, shade of colour,” from nuer "to shade," from nue "cloud," from Gallo-Roman nuba, from Latin nubes "a cloud, mist, vapour," sneudh- "fog," source also of Avestan snaoda "clouds,"  Latin obnubere "to veil," Welsh nudd "fog," Greek nython, in Hesychius "dark, dusky") According to Klein, the French usage is a reference to "the different colours of the clouds,” in reference to color or tone, "a slight variation in shade; of music, as a French term in English --  'sort' is the relation between ‘There is not a volume in my uncle's library which is not by an English author,’ and ‘My uncle's library is not empty. RE-ENTER GRICE. Grice suggested that Strawson see such a fine point such as that, which Grice had the kindness to call an 'implicaturum', the result of an act of an ‘implicatura’ (they were both attending Kneale’s seminar on the growth and ungrowth of logic) is irrelevant to the issue of ‘entailment’. It is a 'merely pragmatic’ implicaturum, Grice would say, bringing forward a couple of distinctions: logical/pragmatic point; logical/pragmatic inference; entailment/implicaturum; conveying explicitly/conveying implicitly; stating/implicating; asserting/implying; what an utterer means/what the expression 'means' -- but cf. Nowell-Smith, who left Oxford after being overwhelmed by Grice, "this is how the rules of etiquette inform the rules of logic -- on the 'rule' of relevance in "Ethics," 1955. If to call such a point, as Grice does, as "irrelevant to logic" is vacuous in that it may be interpreted as saying that that such a fine foggy point is not considered in a modernist formal system of first-order predicate calculus with identity, this Strawson wishes not to dispute, but to emphasise. Call it his battle cry! But to 'logic' as concerned with this or that relation between this or that general class of statement occurring in ordinary use, and the attending general condition under which this or that statement is correctly called 'true' or 'false,' this fine foggy nice point would hardly be irrelevant. GRICE'S FORMALIST (MODERNIST) INTERPRETATION. Some 'pragmatic' consideration, or assumption, or expectation, a desideratum of conversational conduct obviously underlies and in fact 'explains' the implicaturum, without having to change the ‘sense’ of Aristotle’s syllogistics in terms of the logical forms of A, E, I, and O. If we abide by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally giving and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by others in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the effect, ‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou canst truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’ Assume the form ‘There is not a single … which is not . . .,’ or ‘It is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that ... is not ... is introduced in ‘ordinary’ language with the same SENSE as the expression in the ‘ideal’ language, ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx). Then prohibition inhibits the utterance of the form where the utterer can truly and truthfully simply convey explicitly ‘There is not a single ..., i. e. ~(Ex)(Fx). It is defeasible prohibition which tends to confer on the overprolixic form ('it is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that is not ...')  just that kind of an implicaturum which Strawson identifies.  But having detected a nuance in a conversational phenomenon is not the same thing as rushing ahead to try to explain it BEFORE exploring in some detail what kind of a nuance it is. The mistake is often commited by Austin, too (in "Other Minds," and "A Plea for Excuses"), and by Hart (on 'carefully'), and by Hare (on "good"), and by Strawson on 'true,' (Analysis), ‘the,’ and 'if -- just to restrict to the play group. Grice tries to respond to anti-sense-datum in "That pillar box seems red to me,” but Strawson was not listening.  The overprolixic form in the ‘ordinary’ language, ‘It is not the case that there is some (at least one x) such that ... x is not ...’ would tend, if it does not remain otiose, to develop or generate just that baffling effect in one's addressee ('outrage!') that Strawson identifies, as opposed to the formal-device in the ‘ideal’ language with which the the ‘ordinary’ language counterpart is co-related. What weakens our resistance to the negatively existential analysis in this case more than in the case of the corresponding "All '-sentence is the powerful attraction of the negative opening phrase There is not …'.  To avoid misunderstanding one may add a point about the neo-traditionalist interpretation of the forms of the traditional Aristotelian system. Strawson is not claiming that it faithfully represents this or that intention of the principal exponent of the Square of Opposition. Appuleius, who knows, was perhaps, more interested in formulating this or that theorem governing this or that logical relation of this or that more imposing general statement than this or that everyday general statement that Strawson considers. Appuleius, who knows, might have been interested, e. g., in the logical powers of this or that generalisation, or this or that sentence which approximates more closely to the desired conditions that if its utterance by anyone, at any time, at any place, results in a true statement, so does its utterance by anyone else, at any other time, at any other place.  How far the account by the neo-traditionalist of this or that general sentence of 'ordinary' langauge is adequate for every generalization may well be under debate. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “In defence of Appuleius,” BANC.

 

The explicaturum/implicaturum/disimplicaturum triad: Grice: “Strictly, it’s a dyad, since disimplicatum is a derivative of one member of the dyad, the implicatumso that the opposition is binary (ex/in) with ‘dis-‘ as applied to the im-, cf. disexplicaturum(the annulation of an explicaturum). “We should not conclude from this that an implication of the existence of thing said to be seen is NOT part of the conventional meaning of ‘see’ nor even (as some philosophers have done) that there is one sense of ‘see’ which lacks this implication!” (WoW:44). If Oxonians are obsessed with ‘implication,’ do they NEED ‘disimplicaturum’? Grice doesn’t think so! But sometimes you have to use it to correct a mistake. Grice does not give names, but he says he has heard a philosopher claim that there are two SENSES of ‘see,’ one which what one sees exists, and one in which it doesn’t! It would be good to trace that! It relates, in any case to ‘remembers,’but not quite, and to ‘know.’ But not quite. The issue of ‘see’ is not that central, since Grice realizes that it is just a modality of perception, even if crucial. He coined ‘visum’ with Warnock to play with the idea of ‘what is seen’ NOT being existent.  On another occasion, when he cannot name a ridiculous philosopher, he invents him: “A philosopher will not be given much credit if he comes with an account of the indefinite ‘one’ as having three senses: one proximate to the emissor (“I broke a finger”), one distant (“He’s meeting a woman”) and one where the link is not specified (“A flower”). he target is of course Davidson having the cheek to quote Grice’s Henriette Herz Trust lecture for the BA! Lewis and Short have ‘intendere’ under ‘in-tendo,’ which they render as ‘to stretch out or forth, extend, also to turn ones attention to, exert one’s self for, to purpose, endeavour,” and finaly as “intend”! “pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4, 27 Grices tends towards claiming that you cannot extend what you dont intend. In the James lectures, Grice mentions the use of is to mean seem (The tie is red in this light), and see to mean hallucinate. Denying Existence: The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of ...books.google.com › books ... then it seems unidiomatic if not ungrammatical to speak of hallucinations as ... that fighting people and 156 APPEARING UNREALS 4 Two Senses of "See"? A. Chakrabarti1997‎Language Arts & Disciplines    The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and ...books.google.com › books sight, say sense-data; others will then say that there are two senses of 'see'. ... wrong because I am dreaming or hallucinating them, which of course could ... Stanley Cavell1999‎Philosophy    Wittgenstein and PerceptionPage 37Google Books Resultbooks.google.com › books For example, Gilbert Harman characterises the two senses of see as follows: see† = 'the ... which is common to genuine cases of seeing and to hallucinations. Michael Campbell, ‎Michael O'Sullivan‎Philosophy    The Alleged Ambiguity of'See'jstor.org › stable including dreams, hallucinations and the perception of physical objects. ... existence of at least two senses of ' see' were his adherence to the doctrine that 'see' ... by AR White‎1963‎Cited by 3‎Related articles    Seeing and Namingjstorjstor.org › stable there are or aren't two senses of 'see'. If there are, I'm speaking of ... The third kind of case is illustrated by Macbeth's dagger hallucination, at least if we assume ... by RJ Hall‎1977‎Cited by 3‎Related articles    Philosophy at LaGuardia Community Collegelaguardia.edu › Philosophy › GADFLY- PDF Lastly, I will critically discuss Ayer's two senses of 'see', ... (e.g., hallucinations); it thus seems correct to say that ... Hallucinations are hallucinations. There are.    Talking about seeing: An examination of some aspects of the ...etd.ohiolink.edu › ... I propose a distinction between delusions and hallucinations,'and argue ... say that there are two senses of .'see* in ordinary language or not, he does, as I will ... by KA Emmett‎1974‎Related articles    Wittgenstein and Perceptionciteseerx.ist.psu.edu › viewdoc › download PDF 2 Two senses of 'see'. 33 ... may see things that are not there, for example in hallucinations. ... And so, hallucinations are not genuine perceptual experiences. by Y Arahata‎Related articles    Allen BlurUniversity of Yorkwww-users.york.ac.uk › Publications_files PDF of subjectively indistinguishable hallucination (e.g. Crane 2006). ... and material objects of sight, and correlatively for a distinction between two senses of 'see',. by K Allen‎Related articles    Austin and sense-dataUBC Library Open Collectionsopen.library.ubc.ca › ... › UBC Theses and Dissertations Sep 15, (5) Illusions and Hallucinations It is not enough to reject Austin's way of ... I will not deal with Austin and Ayer on "two senses of 'see'" because I ... by DD Todd‎1967‎Cited by 1‎Related articles. Godfrey Vesey (196573) deposes, "if a person sees something at all it must look like something to him, even if it only looks like 'somebody doing something.' With Davidson, Grice was more cavalier, because he could blame it on a different ‘New-World’ dialect or idiolect, about ‘intend.’ When Grice uses ‘disimplicaturum’ to apply to ‘cream in coffee’ that is a bit tangentialand refers more generally to his theory of communication. What would the rationale of disimplicaturum be? In this case, if the emissee realizes the obvious category mistake (“She’s not the cream in your coffee”) there may be a need to disimplicate explicitly. To consider. There is an example that he gives that compares with ‘see’ and it is even more philosophical but he doesn’t give examples: to use ‘is’ when one means ‘seem’ (the tie example).  The reductive analyses of being and seeing hold. We have here two cases of loose use (or disimplicaturum). Same now with his example in “Intention and Uncertainty” (henceforth, “Uncertainty”): Smith intends to climb Mt. Everest + [common-ground status: this is difficult]. Grices response to Davidsons pretty unfair use of Grices notion of conversational implicaturum in Davidsons analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. Pears loved Grices reply. Implicaturum here is out of the question ‒ disimplicaturum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is too social to be true when applied to intending. The doxastic condition is one of the entailments in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicaturum can. If it can be cancelled, it is best seen as a disimplicaturum, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants. Grice and Davidson were members of The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society. Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grices polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears hold a minimalist approach to intending. On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as the same mistake again of building certainty into the concept. Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational implicaturum at this point is too social to be true. Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational disimplicaturum: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a loose use of intends. The certainty on the agents part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt. Davidson was claiming that the agents belief in the probability of the object of the agents intention was a mere conversational implicaturum on the utterers part. Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an entailment of a strict use of intend, even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational disimplicaturum, it can be dropped.  The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending, disimplicaturum, disimplicaturum. Strictly, a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grices claim to fame is implicaturum, he finds disimplicaturum an intriguing notion to capture those occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of intending (without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of see in Shakespeareian contexts (Macbeth saw Banquo, Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore) and the use of is to mean seems (That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise, when both conversants know that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with Youre the cream in my coffee being an utterance where the disimplicaturum (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. Disimplicaturum does not appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes, an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as the wanting family. This wanting family includes expressions like want, desire, would like to, is eager to, is anxious to, would mind not…, the idea of  appeals to me, is thinking of, etc. As Grice remarks, The likeness and differences within this wanting family demand careful attention. In commenting on Davidsons treatment of wanting in Intending, Grice notes: It seems to Grice that the picture of the soul suggested by Davidsons treatment of wanting is remarkably tranquil and, one might almost say, computerized. It is the picture of an ideally decorous board meeting, at which the various heads of sections advance, from the standpoint of their particular provinces, the case for or against some proposed course of action. In the end the chairman passes judgement, effective for action; normally judiciously, though sometimes he is for one reason or another over-impressed with the presentation made by some particular member. Grices soul doesnt seem to him, a lot of the time, to be like that at all. It is more like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in which some members shout, wont listen, and suborn other members to lie on their behalf; while the chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of cheating, endeavours to impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect, since sometimes the meeting breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears to end comfortably, in reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and sometimes, whatever the outcome of the meeting, individual members go off and do things unilaterally. Could it be that Davidson, of the New World, and Grice, of the Old World, have different idiolects regarding intend? Could well be! It is said that the New World is prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in Grices more cautious use, intend is restricted to the conditions HE wants it to restrict it too! Odd that for all the generosity he displays in Post-war Oxford philosophy (Surely I can help you analyse you concept of this or that, even if my use of the corresponding expression does not agree with yours), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for trying to be nice and apply the conversational implicaturum to intend! Genial Grice! It is natural Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to see intending as merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong psychological state as belief. And its natural that Grice hated that! Refs.: The source is Grice’s comment on Davidson on intending. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

disjunctum: Strangely enough Ariskant thought disjunctum, but not conjunctum a categorial related to the category of ‘community’!Aulus Gellius (The Attic Nights, XVI, 8) tells us about this disjunction: “There also is ■ another type of atwpa which the Greeks call and we call disjunctum, disjunctive sentence. Gellius notes that ‘or’ is by default ‘inclusive’: where one or several propositions may be simultaneously true, without ex- cluding one another, although they may also all be false. Gellius expands on the non-default reading of exclusive disjunction: pleasure is either good or bad or it is neither good nor bad (“Aut malum est voluplas, aut bonum, aul neque bonum, neque malum est”). All the elements of the exclusive disjunctive exclude one another, and their contradictory elements, Gr. avTtxs'-p.sva, are incompatible with one another”. “Ex omnibus quae disjunguntiir, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera.”Grice lists ‘or’ as the second binary functor in his response to Strawson. But both Grice and Strawson agreed that the Oxonian expert on ‘or’ is Wood. Mitchell is good, too, though. The relations between “v” and “or” (or “either ... or …”) are, on the whole, less intimate than those between “.” and “and,” but less distant than those between “D” and “if.” Let us speak of a statement made by coupling two clauses by “or” as an alternative statement ; and let us speak of the first and second alternatesof such a statement, on analogy with our talk of the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement. At a bus-stop, someone might say: “Either we catch this bus or we shall have to walk all the way home.” He might equally well have said “If we don't catch this bus, we shall have to walk all the way home.” It will be seen that the antecedent of the hypothetical statement he might have made is the negation of the first alternate of the alternative statement he did make. Obviously, we should not regard our catching the bus as a sufficient condition of the 'truth' of either statement; if it turns out that the bus we caught was not the last one, we should say that the man who had made the statement had been wrong. The truth of one of the alternates is no more a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement than the falsity of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of the truth of the hypothetical statement. And since 'p"Dpyq' (and, equally, * q"3p v q ') is a law of the truth-functional system, this fact sufficiently shows a difference between at least one standard use of “or” and the meaning given to “v.” Now in all, or almost all, the cases where we are prepared to say something of the form “p or q,” we are also prepared to say something of the form 4 if not-p, then q \ And this fact may us to exaggerate the difference between “v” and “or” to think that, since in some cases, the fulfilment of one alternate is not a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement of which It is an alternate, the fulfilment of one alternate is a sufficient condition of the truth of an alternative statement. And this is certainly an exaggeration. If someone says ; “Either it was John or it was Robert but I couldn't tell which,” we are satisfied of the truth of the alternative statement if either of the alternates turns out to be true; and we say that the speaker was wrong only if neither turns out to be true. Here we seem to have a puzzle ; for we seem to be saying that * Either it was John or it was Robert ' entails 4 If it wasn't John, it was Robert * and, at the same time, that ‘It was John’ entails the former, but not the latter. What we are suffering from here is perhaps a crudity in our notion of entailraent, a difficulty In applying this too undifferentiated concept to the facts of speech ; or, if we prefer it, an ambiguity in the notion of a sufficient condition. The statement that it was John entails the statement that it was either John or Robert in the sense thai it confirms it; when It turns out to have been John, the man who said that either It was John or it was Robert is shown to have been right. But the first statement does not entail the second in the sense that the step ‘It was John, so it was either John or Robert’ is a logically proper step, unless the person saying this means by it simply that the alternative statement made previously was correct, i.e., 'it was one of the two '. For the alternative statement carries the implication of the speaker's uncertainty as to which of the two it was, and this implication is inconsistent with the assertion that it was John. So in this sense of * sufficient condition ', the statement that it was John is no more a sufficient condition of (no more entails) the statement that it was either John or Robert than it is a sufficient condition of (entails) the statement that if it wasn't John, it was Robert. The further resemblance, which we have already noticed, between the alternative statement and the hypothetical statement, is that whatever knowledge or experience renders it reasonable to assert the alternative statement, also renders it reasonable to make the statement that (under the condition that it wasn't John) it was Robert. But we are less happy about saying that the hypothetical statement is confirmed by the discovery that it was John, than we are about saying that the alternative statement is confirmed by this discovery. For we are inclined to say that the question of confirmation of the hypothetical statement (as opposed to the question of its reasonableness or acceptability) arises only if the condition (that it wasn't John) turns out to be fulfilled. This shows an asymmetry, as regards confirmation, though not as regards acceptability, between 4 if not p, then q ' and * if not qy then p ' which is not mirrored in the forms ‘either p or q’ and ‘either q or p.’ This asymmetry is ignored in the rule that * if not p, then q ' and ‘if not q, then p’ are logically equivalent, for this rule regards acceptability rather than confirmation. And rightly. For we may often discuss the l truth ' of a subjunctive conditional, where the possibility of confirmation is suggested by the form of words employed to be not envisaged. It is a not unrelated difference between * if ' sentences and ‘or’ sentences that whereas, whenever we use one of the latter, we should also be prepared to use one of the former, the converse does not hold. The cases in which it does not generally hold are those of subjunctive conditionals. There is no ‘or’ sentence which would serve as a paraphrase of ‘If the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war’ as this sentence would most commonly be used. And this is connected with the fact that c either . . . or . . .' is associated with situations involving choice or decision. 4 Either of these roads leads to Oxford ' does not mean the same as ' Either this road leads to Oxford or that road does’ ; but both confront us with the necessity of making a choice. This brings us to a feature of * or ' which, unlike those so far discussed, is commonly mentioned in discussion of its relation to * v ' ; the fact, namely, that in certain verbal contexts, ‘either … or …’ plainly carries the implication ‘and not both . . . and . . .', whereas in other contexts, it does not. These are sometimes spoken of as, respectively, the exclusive and inclusive senses of ‘or;’ and, plainly, if we are to identify 4 v’ with either, it must be the latter. The reason why, unlike others, this feature of the ordinary use of “or” is commonly mentioned, is that the difference can readily be accommodated (1 Cf. footnote to p. 86.In the symbolism of the truth-functional system: It is the difference between “(p y q) .~ (p . q)” (exclusive sense) and “p v q” (inclusive sense). “Or,” like “and,” is commonly used to join words and phrases as well as clauses. The 4 mutuality difficulties attending the general expansion of 4 x and y are/ 5 into * x is /and y is/' do not attend the expansion of 4 x or y isf into c r Is/or y is/ ? (This is not to say that the expansion can always correctly be made. We may call “v” the disjunctive sign and, being warned against taking the reading too seriously, may read it as ‘or.' While he never approached the topic separately, it’s easy to find remarks about disjunction in his oeuvre. A veritable genealogy of disjunction can be traced along Griceian lines. DISJUNCTUM -- disjunction elimination. 1 The argument form ‘A or B, if A then C, if B then C; therefore, C’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer C from a disjunction together with derivations of C from each of the disjuncts separately. This is also known as the rule of disjunctive elimination or V-elimination.  disjunction introduction. 1 The argument form ‘A or B; therefore, A or B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer a disjunction from either of its disjuncts. This is also known as the rule of addition or Vintroduction.  . disjunctive proposition, a proposition whose main propositional operator main connective is the disjunction operator, i.e., the logical operator that represents ‘and/or’. Thus, ‘P-and/orQ-and-R’ is not a disjunctive proposition because its main connective is the conjunction operation, but ‘P-and/or-Q-and-R’ is disjunctive. Refs.: Grice uses an illustration involving ‘or’ in the ‘implication’ excursus in “Causal Theory.” But the systematic account comes from WoW, especially essay 4.

 

dispositum. Grice: “The –positum is a very formative Roman expression: there’s the suppositum, the praepositum, and the dispositum. All very apposite!” -- H. P. Grice, “Disposition and intention”Grice inspired D. F. Pears on this, as they tried to refute Austin’s rather dogmatic views in ‘ifs’ and ‘cans’where the ‘can’ relates to the disposition, and the ‘if’ to the conditional analysis for it. Grice’s phrase is “if I can”. “I intend to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees,” Marmaduke Bloggs says, “if a can.” A disposition, more generally is, any tendency of an object or system to act or react in characteristic ways in certain situations. Fragility, solubility, and radioactivity, and intentionality, are typical dispositions. And so are generosity and irritability. For Ryle’s brand of analytic behaviorism, functionalism, and some forms of materialism, an event of the soul, such as the occurrence of an idea, and states such as a belief, a will, or an intention, is  also a disposition. A hypothetical or conditional statement is alleged to be ‘implicated’ by dispositional claims. What’s worse, this conditional is alleged to capture the basic meaning of the ascription of a state of the soul. The glass would shatter if suitably struck. Left undisturbed, a radium atom will probably decay in a certain time. An ascription of a disposition is taken as subjunctive rather than material conditionals to avoid problems like having to count as soluble anything not immersed in water. The characteristic mode of action or reaction  shattering, decaying, etc.  is termed the disposition’s manifestation or display. But it need not be observable. Fragility is a regular or universal disposition. A suitably struck glass invariably shatters. Radio-activity on the other hand is alleged to be a variable or probabilistic disposition. Radium may (but then again may not) decay in a certain situation. A dispositions may be what Grice calls “multi-track,” i. e.  multiply manifested, rather than “single-track,” or singly manifested. Hardness or elasticity may have different manifestations in different situations. In his very controversial (and only famous essay), “The Concept of Mind,” Ryle, who held, no less, the chair of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, arguesjust to provoke -- that there is nothing more to a dispositional claim than its associated conditional. A dispositional property is not an occurrent property. To possess a dispositional property is not to undergo any episode or occurrence, or to be in a particular state. Grice surely refuted this when he claims that the soul is in this or that a state. Consider reasoning. The soul is in state premise; then the soul is in state conclusion. The episode or occurrence is an event, when the state of the premise causes the state of the conclusion. Coupled with a ‘positivist’ (or ultra-physicalist, ultra-empiricist, and ultra-naturalist) rejection of any unobservable, and a conception of an alleged episode or state of the soul as a dispositios, this supports the view of behaviorism that such alleged episode or state is nothing but a disposition TO observable behaviourif Grice intends to climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees if he can, there is no ascription without the behaviour that manifests itthe ascription is meant to EXPLAIN (or explicate, or provide the cause) for the behaviour. Grice reached this ‘functionalist’ approach later in his career, and presented it with full fanfare in “Method in philosophoical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.” By contrast, realism holds that dispositional talk is also about an actual or occurrent property or a state, possibly unknown or unobservablethe ‘black box’ of the functionalist, a function from sensory input to behavioural output. In particular, it is about the bases of dispositions in intrinsic properties or states. Thus, fragility is based in molecular structure, radioactivity in nuclear structure. A disposition’s basis is viewed as at least partly the cause of its manifestation in behaviour. Some philosophers, for fear of an infinite regress, hold that the basis is categorical, not dispositional D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, 8. Others, notably Popper, Madden, and Harre (Causal powers) hold that every property is dispositional. Grice’s essay has now historical interestbut showed the relevance of these topics among two tightly closed groups in post-war Oxford: the dispositionalists led by Ryle, and the anti-dispositionalists, a one-member group led by Grice. Refs.: Grice, “Intention and dispositions.”

 

distributum: distributio -- undistributed middle: a logical fallacy in traditional syllogistic logic, resulting from the violation of the rule that the middle term (the term that appears twice in premises) must be distributed at least once in the premises. Any syllogism that commits this error is invalid. Consider “All philosophers are persons,” and “Some persons are bad.” No conclusion follows from these two premises because “persons” in the first premise is the predicate of an affirmative proposition, and in the second is the subject of a particular proposition. Neither of them is distributed. “If in a syllogism the middle term is distributed in neither premise, we are said to have a fallacy of undistributed middle.” Keynes, Formal Logic. DISTRIBUTUM -- distribution, the property of standing for every individual designated by a term. The Latin term distributio originated in the twelfth century; it was applied to terms as part of a theory of reference, and it may have simply indicated the property of a term prefixed by a universal quantifier. The term ‘dog’ in ‘Every dog has his day’ is distributed, because it supposedly refers to every dog. In contrast, the same term in ‘A dog bit the mailman’ is not distributed because it refers to only one dog. In time, the idea of distribution came to be used only as a heuristic device for determining the validity of categorical syllogisms: 1 every term that is distributed in a premise must be distributed in the conclusion; 2 the middle term must be distributed at least once. Most explanations of distribution in logic textbooks are perfunctory; and it is stipulated that the subject terms of universal propositions and the predicate terms of negative propositions are distributed. This is intuitive for A-propositions, e.g., ‘All humans are mortal’; the property of being mortal is distributed over each human. The idea of distribution is not intuitive for, say, the predicate term of O-propositions. According to the doctrine, the sentence ‘Some humans are not selfish’ says in effect that if all the selfish things are compared with some select human one that is not selfish, the relation of identity does not hold between that human and any of the selfish things. Notice that the idea of distribution is not mentioned in this explanation. The idea of distribution is currently disreputable, mostly because of the criticisms of Geach in Reference and Generality 8 and its irrelevance to standard semantic theories. The related term ‘distributively’ means ‘in a manner designating every item in a group individually’, and is used in contrast with ‘collectively’. The sentence ‘The rocks weighed 100 pounds’ is ambiguous. If ‘rocks’ is taken distributively, then the sentence means that each rock weighed 100 pounds. If ‘rocks’ is taken collectively, then the sentence means that the total weight of the rocks was 100 pounds.  distributive laws, the logical principles A 8 B 7 C S A 8 B 7 A 7 C and A 7 B 8 C S A 7 B 8 A 7 C. Conjunction is thus said to distribute over disjunction and disjunction over conjunction. 

 

ditto: Or Strawson’s big mistake. Strawson quite didn’t understand what “Analysis” was for, and submits this essay on the perlocutionary effects of ‘true.’ Grice comes to the resuce of veritable analysis. cf. verum. Grice disliked Strawson’s ditto theory in Analysis of ‘true’ as admittive performatory. 1620s, "in the month of the same name," Tuscan dialectal ditto "(in) the said (month or year)," literary Italian detto, past participle of dire "to say," from Latin dicere "speak, tell, say" (from PIE root *deik- "to show," also "pronounce solemnly").  Italian used the word to avoid repetition of month names in a series of dates, and in this sense it was picked up in English. Its generalized meaning of "the aforesaid, the same thing, same as above" is attested in English by 1670s. In early 19c. a suit of men's clothes of the same color and material through was ditto or dittoes (1755). Dittohead, self-description of followers of U.S. radio personality Rush Limbaugh, attested by 1995. dittoship is from 1869.

 

Dodaro: «Ho bruciato il dizionario.  Duemila pagine.  Ottantamila voci.  Una sola parola, tutto il resto una metafora»  Francesco S. Dòdaro, Joe Cocker, Pieghe narrative, Lecce, Conte editore, 2001. Francesco Saverio Dòdaro (Bari), filosofo. Trascorse l'infanzia e l'adolescenza a Bari e, nel pieno della seconda guerra mondiale, fu costretto a riparare a Turi per sfuggire ai bombardamenti sulla città pugliese. A Bari si legò a Milvia Maglione, Mimmo Castellano, Gennaro Piccinni (futuri artisti) e, assieme allo zio Silvio Dòdaro, prendeva parte, da giovanissimo, agli incontri artistici e letterari del caffè-pasticceria Il Sottano (in quegli anni frequentato da Aldo Moro, Albertazzi, Rocco Scotellaro, Vittorio Bodini, Aldo Calò ecc.), fondato a Bari da Armando Scaturchio, e agli incontri di Laterza e del circolo La Scaletta di Matera. Nello stesso periodo conobbe a Bari il poeta armeno Hrand Nazariantz, il quale rappresentò per il giovane Dòdaro una sorta di guida, fu lui, infatti, a introdurlo per la prima volta agli incontri del Sottano dove ebbe modo di stringere amicizia con Vittorio Bodini, Aldo Calò, Rocco Scotellaro. Abbandonò presto Bari, tentando una prima fuga a Parigi, città in cui sarebbe tornato a vivere altre volte, prima di tornare a Bari per poi trasferirsi definitivamente a Lecce intorno al 1953. Altre tappe, prima del trasferimento a Lecce, furono Milano e Bologna. Nella città emiliana divenne allievo di Giorgio Morandi, presso l'accademia, infatti, prime espressioni della sua attività artistica furono la pittura, praticata per una manciata di anni giovanili, e il teatro, poi diluito nelle successive esperienze poetiche e narrative. Come pittore produsse alcuni quadri in cui all'informale materico univa le combustioni, applicate, di fatto, nel 1954: il poeta Antonio Verri riportava in suo intervento: arriva nel '53 F.S. Dodaro, arriva con la novità dei colori "bruciati". Di questo ciclo di opere faceva parte il quadro "Svergognato incantesimo di barca", dipinto nel 1954, che gli valse, successivamente, la segnalazione presso il premio "Il maggio di Bari". Prima del trasferimento a Lecce, lavorò a Bari presso l'ufficio stampa della Fiera del Levante, a stretto contatto con Vittore Fiore, figlio di Tommaso Fiore, venendo influenzato dal meridionalismo. Sempre nel clima della Fiera del levante, strinse un ottimo legame con l'artista Amerigo Tot. Al suo arrivo a Lecce riallacciò i rapporti con Vittorio Bodini e Aldo Calò, oltre che con il pittore Lino Suppressa, conosciuto in occasione del premio Il Maggio di Bari, entrò, inoltre, in contatto con quelli che sarebbero stati poi suoi amici e compagni artistici: Rina Durante, Antonio Massari, Edoardo De Candia, Vittorio Pagano. Ebbe frequentazioni con Carmelo Bene e strinse importanti sodalizi amicali e letterari con il poeta-editore Antonio Leonardo Verri, con l'artista Franco Gelli, con il poeta napoletano Luciano Caruso, il quale, in corrispondenze private, ebbe modo di rinominare la loro amicizia e collaborazione come il "sodalizio Caruso-Dòdaro". A Lecce, nel 1954, si rese protagonista, con il pittore Edoardo De Candia, di un grande falò in cui i due bruciarono tutti i quadri realizzati fino a quel momento. Per quanto riguarda l'opera pittorica di Dòdaro, il quadro "Svergognato incantesimo di barca", insieme a pochi altri, si salvò dal falò perché all'epoca custodito presso la casa dello zio paterno Silvio Dòdaro, a Bari. Dopo questo iniziale periodo di ricerca e sperimentazione, Dòdaro abbandonò la scena artistica per circa vent'anni, anni in cui si dedicò allo studio intenso nel tentativo di scoprire il perché dell'arte e del linguaggio, rompendo il silenzio nel 1976 con la fondazione del Movimento di Arte Genetica con sede a Lecce, Genova e Toronto. Con tale movimento, Dòdaro rintracciava:  l’origine dei linguaggi umani nel battito materno ascoltato in età fetale, teorizzando il linguaggio come una congiunzione volta a rifondare la dualità dell’essere umanonon un regressus ad uterum, bensì la “coppia”, la dualità, ovvero la dimensione originaria del linguaggio, la comunione con l’altroe l’arte come linguaggio del lutto, annodandola alla mancanza lacaniana; il movimento si doterà di due riviste: “Ghen”, giornale modulare ideato da Dòdaro con sede a Lecce, e “Ghen Res Extensa Ligu” con sede a Genova e diretta da Rolando Mignani. L’idea di Dòdaro del “modulo come unità di misura del pensiero” sarà alla base della struttura modulare di “Ghen” oltre che della concezione dello spazio, mutuata sempre dagli studi sulla dimensione prenatale, fino a sfociare nel manifesto "Incliniamo l’orizzonte" firmato nel 1979 con Fernando Miglietta. Il linguaggio, per Dòdaro, diventava una congiunzione, una dichiarazione onomatopeica in cui, con l’abbandono della pittura, si alimentava il trionfo della poesia e dell’analisi letteraria. L’orizzonte letterario, poetico, diventava orizzonte mediale: poesie per i treni, per gli altoparlanti e più in là romanzi in tre cartelle, romanzi su cartolina, collane spaginate, poesie e poesie visive da proiettare per le strade, poesie per internet, net.poetry, narrazioni su leaflet, romanzi da muronarrativa concreta, romanzi di cento parole da pubblicare in store, nelle vetrine dei negozi. Al Movimento di Arte Genetica aderirono, o ruotarono attorno alle sue riviste e attività, un numero considerevole di autori, italiani e non, provenienti dalle sperimentazioni poetiche e poetico-visive, performative, sonore, plastiche: Eugenio Miccini, Amerigo Marras, Rolando Mignani, Giovanni Fontana, Bruno Munari, Vittore Fiore, Aldo Dramis, Michele Perfetti, Vittorio Pagano, Franco Gelli, Guido Le Noci, Sandro Greco, Corrado Lorenzo, Armando Marocco, Antonio Massari, Enzo Miglietta, Center of Art and Communication (Toronto), CAYC Group (Rio De Janeiro), Giorgio Barberi Squarotti, Toshiaki Minemura, William Xerra, Tonino Sicoli, Ernesto de Souza, Alternativa Zero, Experimental Art Foundation (South Australia), Block Cor (Amsterdam), Nicole Genetet-Morel, Jaques Lepage, Stelio M. Martini, Giovanni Valentini, Pierre Restany, Amelia Etlinger, Luciano Caruso, Antonio Verri, Fernando Miglietta, Raffaele Nigro ecc.  Con la nascita del movimento di Arte Genetica, Dòdaro avviava una personale riflessione sull'oggetto-libro e le sue modalità fruitive, avviava il progetto "Archivio degli operatori pugliesi", per una catalogazione degli operatori estetici e culturali. Fra il 1977 e il 1978, ha creato e animato «il centro di ricerca 1.4.7.8. (strutturato, nel nome, sulle coordinate della Classificazione Decimale Dewey, ad indicare i percorsi di ricerca: filosofia, linguistica, arte, letteratura), ospitato dalla Libreria Adriatica di Lecce, e con il quale coinvolgerà numerosi operatori del territorio (docenti universitari, il gruppo Gramma, il Centro ricerche estetiche fondato a Novoli da Sandro Greco e Corrado Lorenzo, il gruppo Oistros di Rina Durante e Gino Santoro, gli autori del gruppo di Arte Genetica da lui fondato ecc)». Ha diretto per alcuni anni la casa editrice Conte di Lecce, ha fondato, nel 2009 a Lecce, il movimento letterario New PageNarrativa in store. Nel corso degli anni, la sua attività letteraria ed editoriale è sempre stata caratterizzata da uno spiccato senso per la formazione di gruppi e la ricerca di giovani autori da lanciare, rappresentando sul territorio pugliese un autentico volano per operazioni di ampio respiro che andavano spesso a coinvolgere autori del panorama letterario internazionale.  Attività editoriale Ha ideato e diretto una mole notevole di collane editoriali volte al rinnovamento dell’oggetto-libro, fra queste: «Scritture» (Parabita, Il Laboratorio, 1989), «Spagine. Scritture infinite» (Caprarica di Lecce, Pensionante de' Saraceni, 1989) scritture di ricerca formato poster, spaginate, «Compact Type. Nuova narrativa» (Caprarica di Lecce, Pensionante de' Saraceni, 1990) ovvero romanzi in tre cartelle, «Diapoesitive. Scritture per gli schermi» (Caprarica di Lecce, Pensionante de' Saraceni, 1990) scritture di ricerca da proiettare, «Mail Fiction» (Caprarica di Lecce, Pensionante de' Saraceni, 1991) romanzi su cartolina, «Wall Word» (Lecce, Conte Editore, 1992)tradotta in giapponese ed esposta all’Hokkaido Museum of Literature di Sappororomanzi da muro, ovvero collana di narrativa concreta, «International Mail Stories» (Lecce, Conte Editore, 1993), «Internet Poetry» (Lecce, Conte Editore, 1995) una delle primissime esperienze italiane di net poetry, «Walkman Fiction. Romanzi da ascoltare» (Lecce, Argo, 1996), «E 800 European Literature», in 5 lingue (Lecce, Conte Editore, 2000), «Pieghe narrative» (Lecce, Conte Editore, 2001), «Pieghe poetiche» (Lecce, Conte Editore, 2001), «Pieghe della memoria» (Lecce, Conte Editore, 2001), «Foglie nude» (Doria di Cassano Jonio, 2003), «Locandine letterarie» (Lecce, Il Raggio Verde, 2005), «Romanzi nudi» (Lecce, 2006-07) in unico esemplare, «Carte letterarie» (Lecce, Astragali, 2009), «792 Mail Theatre» (Lecce, Astragali, 2009), «New Page. Narrativa in store», (Lecce, 2009) narrativa breve, poi anche poesia e teatro, in cento parole, collana che guarda alla comunicazione pubblicitaria con i testi applicati su crowner, pannelli cartonati in uso nella comunicazione pubblicitaria, ed esposti in store, nelle vetrine dei negozi.  Attività espositiva Nell'ambito della poesia verbo-visiva e del libro-oggetto, è presente in numerose manifestazioni di «Nuova scrittura»: Ma il vero scandalo è la poesia. Un salto di codice, Ferrara, Ipermedia, 1980; Attorno a noi poeti in gruppo, Strudà (Lecce), Ospedale psichiatrico, 1980; Dentro fuori luogo, Casarano, Palazzo D'Elia, 1980; Centro internazionale Brera, Documenti di gestione alternativa. Appunti sulla Puglia, Milano, Chiesa San Corpoforo, 1980; Artigianare '81, Lecce,1981; Cercare Bodini, Bari / Lecce, 1982; Ab origine, Martina Franca, 1983; Parola fra spazio e suono. Situazione italiana 1984, Viareggio, 1984; Le brache di Gutenberg, Luciano Caruso, Bruna e Franco Visco, Livorno, 1985; Far libro. Libri e pagine d' artsta in Italia, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, 1989; Il segno della parola e la parola del segno, Milano, Mercato del sale, 1989; Breton et le poeme-objet, Ugo Carrega, Milano, Mercato del sale, 1990; Le porte di Sibari, Sibari, 1990; Visibile Language. Numero speciale sulla poesia visuale. Sezione Italia, E. Minarelli, USA,1990; Cartoline d'artista, Livorno, Belforte, 1990, 1991, 1992; Terra del fuoco. Intersezioni per Adriano Spatola, QuartoNapoli, 1991; La parola dipinta. Rassegna di poesia visuale, Belluno 1991; Comune di GallarateCivica galleria d'arte moderna. Casa d'EuropaSede di Gallarate, Pagine e dintorni, Libri d' artis ta, Gallarate, 1991; L. Pignotti, “La poesia visiva”, L'immaginazione (Lecce), 1991; S-covando l'uovo, Firenze, 1991; Terra del fuoco, QuartoNapoli, 1991; Musei Civici di Mantova, Poesia totale. 1887-1997. Dal colpo di dadi alla Poesia visuale. Mantova, Sarenco, Palazzo della Ragione, 1998; Archivio libri d' artis ta. Laboratorio 66, G. Gini e F. Fedi, Milano, 2007.  È presente in Musei, Biblioteche, Archivi. Tra i più importanti: Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze“Libri e pagine d'artis ta”con l’opera Mar/e amniotico, 1983; Galleria d’arte moderna di Gallarate, con le opere Mourning Processes. The word, 1991 e Processi di lutto. Notizen: dis, 1991; Museo S. Castromediano di Lecce, con l'opera Matram psicofisica, 1987; Archivio Sackner, Miami Beach, e Archivio Della Grazia di nuova scrittura, Milano, con varie opere; Hokkaido Museum of Literature, con la collane “Wall Word”, 1992, interamente tradotta in giapponese; Imago mundi-Visual poetry in Europe (Fondazione Benetton, ) ecc.  Pubblicazioni Opere letterarie Dichiarazione onomatopeica (Lecce, 1979); Progetto negativo (Lecce, 1982); Disianza Congiuntiva (Livorno, 1985); Disperate Professore(Parabita, 1989); dis/adriatico (Caprarica di Lecce, 1989); Tracce di un discorso amoroso (Caprarica di Lecce, 1990); Compact Type. Nuova narrativaCon A. Verri, (Caprarica di Lecce, 1990); Sconcetti di luna (Caprarica di Lecce 1990); Mail Fiction. Free LancesCon A. Verri(Caprarica di Lecce, 1991); Navigli (Caprarica di Lecce 1991); Void Fiction (Sibari, 1992); Street Stories (Lecce, 1992)tradotto in giapponese(SapporoJapan, 2000); Parole morte. Dead Words (Lecce, 1993); L’addio alle scene (Lecce, 1996); Antonio Verri. Schegge del contestocon M. Nocera(Lecce, 2000); 18 i titoli pubblicati su leaflets (Lecce 2001), 16 «Pieghe narrative» e 2 «Pieghe poetiche»: “Pieghe narrative”: Vento, vento, I colombi della clausura, Il figlio dell'anima, La Balilla , Graziato, Il monumento, Dove volano i gabbiani, La mimosa, Ricordanze zigane, Franco, Joe Cocker, All'ombra del grande vecchio, Reparto «P», Il tradimento, 27 marzo, L'esame. “Pieghe poetiche”: Rosa virginale, Il solista; Dichiarazione d'innocenza (Lecce, 2005); 7 i «Romanzi nudi», titoli in unico esemplare (Lecce 2006-2007)Dis (2006), Era d’autunno (2006), Il falò (2006), L’Objet trouvé (2006), Silenzi (2006), Why (2006), Ballata migrante (2007); Uscita in marasma (Lecce, 2009); Di viole. D’incanti. Astragali teatrocon F. Tolledi(Lecce 2009); New Page: In un bosco di frammenti (Lecce, 2009), La parola tramava (Lecce, ); Le prime notti stellate (Lecce, ) interrogatorio violento (Lecce, ) I suoi ramaggi (Lecce, ). Grigiori dell’anima (lecce, ), Di un solstizio d’amore (Lecce, ), Maria la magliaia (Lecce, ), Teresa. L’Altrove, (Lecce, ), La mer. Ma mère (Lecce, ), Una notte senza stelle (Lecce, ). Le distese di grano, (Lecce, ), Gastronomia da asporto (Lecce, ), Una sua lettera (Lecce, ), Trincee matricali (Lecce, ), Compagno d’accademia (Lecce, ). Tra i gabbiani (Lecce, ), Cioccolatini di Chicago (Lecce, ), Cantata duale (Lecce, ). La tromba dell’altrove (Lecce, ), Il nipote violoncellista (Lecce, ). Saggistica Operatori culturali contemporanei in Puglia. Archivio storico divulgativo, Lecce, 1976; “Ambivalenze genetiche”, Ghen (Lecce), 1977 ( ora in “Genetic Ambivalencie”, Art Communication Edition, Toronto-Canada, 1977) “Links”, Ghen (Lecce), 1978; “Il complesso di Edipo e quello di Caino”, Quotidiano (Lecce), 1980; “I processi di lutto. La Weltanschauung ghenica” in , La parola tra spazio e suono. Situazione italiana, Viareggio, 1984; “Codice yem. Le origini del linguaggio, ovvero la rifondazione della coppia”, Ghen (Lecce), 1979 (ora in Regione Puglia, Creatività e linguaggio. Atti del Convegno, Maglie, 1986); “Dis-astro”, in A. Massari, Dis-astro. Loos, Lecce, 1981; “L’area intermedia”, in F. Gelli, Transitional Objects. Mutter Fixerung, Lecce, 1981; “Ipotesi interpretativa del fenomeno droga, formulata da una coscienza che opera nella poetica. Della scissione. Della prevenzione” in Tossicodipendenza: progetto di lotta per gli anni ’80Centro studi giuridici M. Di Pietro. Convegno. Lecce, 1981; “Mater externata”, in L. Caruso, Mater: poesia. Madre e signora dell’acqua, Lecce, 1982; “Lontananze genetiche. Ad cantus enclitico”, in Manifesto mostra gruppo Ghen, Milano, 1983; Progetto negativo, Galatina, 1982 (ora in Ab origine. Presenze pugliesi nell’arte contemporanea, Roma-Bari, 1983); “La letterarietà di Luciano Caruso”, in E. Giannì, Poiesis: Ricerca poetica in Italia, Arezzo, 1986; “La poesia totale di Adriano Spatola. Il convegno di Celle Ligure”, On Board, Lecce, 1990; “Wall Word: parole da muro, romanzo da muro”, in F.S. Dòdaro, Street stories, Lecce, 1992; “Dodici haiku. Dodici punti di rilevamento”, in E. Coriano, A tre deserti dall’ultimo sorriso meccanico. Three deserts from the shadow of the last mechanical smile, Lecce, 1995; “Una pagina diversa, up to date”, in Pieghe narrative, Lecce, 2001; Schede d'arte contemporanea. Mappatura schedografica degli Autori contemporanei, Lecce, 2002; “L’ampliamento della flessione”, in Archivio libri d’artista. Laboratorio 66, Milano, 2007; “Le anime narranti di Alberto Tallone”, in Alberto Tallone. Manuale tipografico, Alpigiano (Torino), 2008; New Page (Lecce, 2009); L'ortografia è morta. L'apparato pausativo, in New Page (Lecce, ). Note  Francesco Aprile, Già così tenera di folla (per F. S. Dòdaro), in Intrecci, Napoli, Oèdipus, .  III 1988: Edoardo, un cavaliere senza terra, su bit. 20 marzo .  Antonio Verri, Edoardo, Un cavaliere senza terra, su bit.  Francesco Aprile, Poesia qualepoesia/06: Un’altra pagina. Le ricerche intermediali a Lecce, su puglialibre.it.  Dòdaro: Testi di teoria letteraria/editoriale, su utsanga.it.  Archivio di nuova scrittura, su verbovisualevirtuale.org.  Dòdaro: Cantata duale, Imago mundi-Visual poetry in Europe, su imagomundiart.com.  Antonio Verri, Una stupenda generazione, SudPuglia, dicembre 1988 Antonio Verri, Edoardo, un cavaliere senza terra, SudPuglia, settembre 1988 Francesco Aprile, Già così tenera di folla (per F. S. Dòdaro), Napoli, Oèdipus,  Francesco Aprile, La parola intermediale: lineamenti di un itinerario pugliese, in Aprile F.-Caggiula C. , La parola intermediale: un itinerario pugliese (atti del convegno), Cavallino, Biblioteca Gino Rizzo,  Francesco Aprile, L'opera di Dòdaro fra parola e new media, in Aprile F.-Caggiula C. , La parola intermediale: un itinerario pugliese (atti del convegno), Cavallino, Biblioteca Gino Rizzo,  Cristo Caggiula, Intersezioni asemiche nel movimento di Arte Genetica, in Aprile F.-Caggiula C. , La parola intermediale: un itinerario pugliese (atti del convegno), Cavallino, Biblioteca Gino Rizzo,  Francesco S. Dòdaro, Visual poetry: A short anthology, in utsanga.it Francesco S. Dòdaro, L'ortografia è morta. L'apparato pausativo, in utsanga.it Francesco S. Dòdaro, Testi di teoria letteraria/editoriale, in utsanga.it Francesco S. Dòdaro, Codice Yem, le origini del linguaggio: ovvero la rifondazione della coppia, in utsanga.it Francesco S. Dòdaro, Letterarietà di Luciano Caruso, in utsanga.it Francesco S. Dòdaro, La poesia totale di Adriano Spatola/Il convegno di Celle Ligure, in utsanga.it Francesco Aprile, Il rapporto Dòdaro-Verri attraverso la critica, in utsanga.it Francesco Aprile, Dal modulo all'internet poetry, in utsanga.it Francesco Aprile, Marzo 1976-Marzo : i quarant'anni dell'Arte Genetica, in utsanga.it Francesco Aprile, New Page: Narrativa, Poesia, Teatro, Scavi in store, in utsanga.it Francesco Aprile, New Page: la poiesi come approccio etnografico-pedagogico, Cavallino, Biblioteca Gino Rizzo,  Francesco Aprile, New Page, collana di critica letteraria, Sondrio, Edizioni CFR,  Intervista a Vincenzo Lagalla, Francesco Aprile, in utsanga.it Lamberto Pignotti, Introduzione a Dòdaro F. S., L'addio alle scene, Lecce, Argo, 1996, ora in utsanga.it Lamberto Pignotti, Rebus, iper-rebus. Parole da vedere, immagini da leggere, in utsanga.it Luciano Caruso, Frammento per F. S. Dòdaro, in utsanga.it Julien Blaine, Omaggio alla "O" in Francesco Saverio Dòdaro, in utsanga.it Ruggero Maggi, Dedica a Francesco Saverio Dòdaro, in utsanga.it Alessandro Laporta, F. S. Dòdaro: cercarlo dove non appare, in utsanga.it Rolando Mignani, Ghen against again. Risarcimento dei supporti o della signatura dei segni, in utsanga.it Egidio Marullo, F. S. Dòdaro. L'ultimo mentore, in utsanga.it  Omaggio a F. S. Dòdaro, in utsanga.it  Cantata plurale per F. S. Dòdaro, materiali 01, Caprarica di Lecce, Utsanga.

 

dodgson: c. l.Grice quotes Carroll often. Cabbages and kingsAchilles and the TortoiseHumpty Dumpty and his Deutero-Esperanto -- Carroll, Lewis, pen name of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson 183298, English writer and mathematician. The eldest son of a large clerical family, he was educated at Rugby and Christ Church, Oxford, where he remained for the rest of his uneventful life, as mathematical lecturer until 1 and curator of the senior commonroom. His mathematical writings under his own name are more numerous than important. He was, however, the only Oxonian of his day to contribute to symbolic logic, and is remembered for his syllogistic diagrams, for his methods for constructing and solving elaborate sorites problems, for his early interest in logical paradoxes, and for the many amusing examples that continue to reappear in modern textbooks. Fame descended upon him almost by accident, as the author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 1865, Through the Looking Glass 1872, The Hunting of the Snark 1876, and Sylvie and Bruno 9 93; saving the last, the only children’s books to bring no blush of embarrassment to an adult reader’s cheek. Dodgson took deacon’s orders in 1861, and though pastorally inactive, was in many ways an archetype of the prim Victorian clergyman. His religious opinions were carefully thought out, but not of great philosophic interest. The Oxford movement passed him by; he worried about sin though rejecting the doctrine of eternal punishment, abhorred profanity, and fussed over Sunday observance, but was oddly tolerant of theatergoing, a lifelong habit of his own. Apart from the sentimental messages later inserted in them, the Alice books and Snark are blessedly devoid of religious or moral concern. Full of rudeness, aggression, and quarrelsome, if fallacious, argument, they have, on the other hand, a natural attraction for philosophers, who pillage Carneades Carroll, Lewis 119   119 them freely for illustrations. Humpty-Dumpty, the various Kings and Queens, the Mad Hatter, the Caterpillar, the White Rabbit, the Cheshire Cat, the Unicorn, the Tweedle brothers, the Bellman, the Baker, and the Snark make fleeting appearances in the s of Russell, Moore, Broad, Quine, Nagel, Austin, Ayer, Ryle, Blanshard, and even Vitters an unlikely admirer of the Mock Turtle. The first such allusion to the March Hare is in Venn’s Symbolic Logic 1. The usual reasons for quotation are to make some point about meaning, stipulative definition, the logic of negation, time reversal, dream consciousness, the reification of fictions and nonentities, or the absurdities that arise from taking “ordinary language” too literally. For exponents of word processing, the effect of running Jabberwocky through a spell-checker is to extinguish all hope for the future of Artificial Intelligence. Though himself no philosopher, Carroll’s unique sense of philosophic humor keeps him and his illustrator, Sir John Tenniel effortlessly alive in the modern age. Alice has been tr. into seventy-five languages; new editions and critical studies appear every year; imitations, parodies, cartoons, quotations, and ephemera proliferate beyond number; and Carroll societies flourish in several countries, notably Britain and the United States. Refs.: Sutherland, “Grice, Dodgson, and Carroll. The Carrolian, the journal of the Lewis Carroll SocietyJabberwocky: the newsletter of the Lewis Carroll Society. A. M. Ghersi, “Turtles and mock-turtles,” from “Correspondence with Derek Foster.” Alice’s adventures in Griceland.

 

Domarinto find.

 

dominium -- domainused by Grice in his treatment of Extensionalism -- of a science, the class of individuals that constitute its subject matter. Zoology, number theory, and plane geometry have as their respective domains the class of animals, the class of natural numbers, and the class of plane figures. In Posterior Analytics 76b10, Aristotle observes that each science presupposes its domain, its basic concepts, and its basic principles. In modern formalizations of a science using a standard firstorder formal language, the domain of the science is often, but not always, taken as the universe of the intended interpretation or intended model, i.e. as the range of values of the individual variables. 

 

donkeyquantificationconsidered by Grice -- sentences, sentences exemplified by ‘Every man who owns a donkey beats it’, ‘If a man owns a donkey, he beats it’, and similar forms (“Every nice girl loves a sailor”), which have posed logical puzzles since medieval times but were noted more recently by Geach. At issue is the logical form of such sentences  specifically, the correct construal of the pronoun ‘it’ and the indefinite noun phrase ‘a donkey’. Translations into predicate logic by the usual strategy of rendering the indefinite as existential quantification and the pronoun as a bound variable cf. ‘John owns a donkey and beats it’ P Dx x is a donkey & John owns x & John beats x are either ill-formed or have the wrong truth conditions. With a universal quantifier, the logical form carries the controversial implication that every donkey-owning man beats every donkey he owns. Efforts to resolve these issues have spawned much significant research in logic and linguistic semantics. 

 

Donà: Massimo Donà (Venezia), filosofo e musicista italiano. In concerto. Dopo essersi laureato con Emanuele Severino, presso la Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Venezia, iniziai a pubblicare diversi saggi per riviste e volumi collettanei, partecipando, lungo il corso degli anni ottanta, a diversi convegni e seminari in varie città italiane. A partire dalla fine degli anni ottanta, collabora con Massimo Cacciari presso la cattedra di Estetica dello IUAV (Venezia) e coordina per alcuni anni i seminari dell'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici di Venezia. Sempre a partire dalla fine degli anni ottanta, inizia la sua collaborazione con la rivista di architettura Anfione-Zeto, della quale dirige ancora oggi la rubrica Theorein. In quegli stessi anni, fonda, con Massimo Cacciari e Romano Gasparotti, la rivista Paradosso. Negli anni novanta, invece, ha insegnato Estetica presso l'Accademia di Belle Arti di Venezia. Attualmente insegna Metafisica e Ontologia dell'arte presso la Facoltà di Filosofia dell'Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele di Milano. È inoltre curatore, sempre con Romano Gasparotti e Massimo Cacciari, dell'opera postuma del filosofo Andrea Emo. Dirige per la casa editrice AlboVersorio le collane "Libri da Ascoltare" e "Anime in dettaglio" ed è membro del comitato scientifico del festival La Festa della Filosofia. Ha scritto diversi saggi e articoli per riviste, settimanali e quotidiani di vario genere. Collabora con il settimanale "L'Espresso".  Attività musicale In qualità di musicista, dopo aver esordito, ancor giovane, con Giorgio Gaslini e con Enrico Rava, forma un suo gruppo: i Jazz Forms (di cui è leader insieme a Maurizio Caldura). In seguito sviluppa il suo linguaggio trasformando l'idioma ancora bop dei primi anni in una scrittura più articolata in cui entrano in gioco elementi tratti dalla musica rock e da molte esperienze etniche maturate nel frattempo con diversi gruppi musicali. Si esibisce in diverse città italiane con un sestetto, in cui ad accompagnarlo sono una chitarra, una batteria, un basso, delle percussioni e una tastiera. Nasce così il Massimo Donà Sextet. Suona con musicisti che sarebbero diventati protagonisti della scena musicale italiana. Suona in jam session anche con alcuni padri storici del jazz, come Dizzy Gillespie, Marion Brown, Dexter Gordon e Kenny Drew. Dal 2001 riprende a suonare professionalmente e forma un nuovo gruppo: il Massimo Donà Quintet, con il quale si esibisce in Italia e all'estero. Il quintetto diventa quindi un quartetto; che è la formazione con cui Donà suona da almeno tre anni. A tutt'oggi il nostro ha all'attivo ben sette CD incisi con suoi gruppi. La sua etichetta di riferimento è sempre la "Caligola Records", il cui responsabile artistico è Claudio Donà, fratello di Massimo e importante critico musicale jazz.  Pubblicazioni In italiano 1983Il 'bello'... o di un accadimento. Il destino dell'opera d'arte, Helvetia, Venezia 1983 1987Le forme del fare, con Massimo Cacciari e Romano Gasparotti, Liguori, Napoli 1987; 1992Sull'assoluto (Per una reinterpretazione dell'idealismo Hegeliano), Einaudi, Torino 1992; 2000Aporia del fondamento, La Città del Sole, Napoli 2000; 2000Fenomenologia del negativo, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 2000; 2000Arte, tragedia, tecnica, con Massimo Cacciari, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano 2000; 2001L' Uno, i molti : Rosmini-Hegel un dialogo filosofico, Città Nuova, Roma 2001; 2003Aporie platoniche. Saggio sul ‘Parmenide’, Città Nuova, Roma 2003; 2003Filosofia del vino, Bompiani, Milano 2003; 2004Magia e filosofia, Bompiani, Milano 2004; 2004Joseph Beuys. La vera mimesi, Silvana Editoriale, Cinisello Balsamo (Milano) 2004; 2004Sulla negazione, Bompiani, Milano 2004; 2005Serenità. Una passione che libera, Bompiani, Milano 2005; 2006La libertà oltre il male. Discussione con Piero Coda ed Emanuele Severino, Città Nuova, Roma 2006; 2006Il volto di Dio, la carne dell'uomo, con Piero Coda, AlboVerosio, Milano 2006; 2006Dell'arte in una certa direzione : appunti su Guido Sartorelli, Supernova, Venezia 2006; 2006Filosofia della musica, Bompiani 2006; 2006Il mistero dell'esistere. Arte, verità e insignificanza nella riflessione teorica di René Magritte. Mimesis, Milano 2006; 2007L'essere di Dio. Trascendenza e temporalità, AlboVersorio, Milano 2007; 2007Dio-Trinità. Tra filosofi e teologi, con Piero Coda, Bompiani, Milano 2007; 2007Arte e filosofia, Bompiani, Milano 2007; 2008L'anima del vino. Ahmbè (cofanettolibro + cd), Bompiani, Milano 2008; 2008Non uccidere, con Enrico Ghezzi, AlboVersorio, Milano 2008 (con un CD audio); 2008L'aporia del fondamento, Mimesis, Milano 2008; 2009I ritmi della creazione. Big Bum (cofanettolibro + cd), Bompiani, Milano 2009; 2009La "Resurrezione" di Piero della Francesca, Mimesis, Milano 2009; Il tempo della verità, Mimesis, Milano ; Non avrai altro Dio al di fuori di me, con Khaled Fouad Allam, AlboVersorio, Milano  (con un CD audio); L'inconciliabile. Restauro Casa D'Arte Futurista Depero, con Renato Rizzi e Raffaella Toffolo, Mimesis, Milano-Udine  PANTA decalogo (Massimo Donà e Raffaella Toffolo), Bompiani, Milano  Filosofia. Un'avventura senza fine, Bompiani, Milano  Comandamenti. Santificare la festa, con Stefano Levi Della Torre, il Mulino, Bologna  Abitare la soglia. Cinema e filosofia, Mimesis, Milano-Udine  Eros e tragedia, AlboVersorio, Milano ; Il vino e il mondo intorno. Dialoghi all'ombra della vite (con Luca Maroni), Aliberti Editore, Reggio Emilia  Figure d'Occidente. Platone, Nietzsche e Heidegger (con Salvatore Natoli e Carlo Sini, introduzione di Ersamo Silvio Storace), AlboVersorio, Milano ; Le verità della natura, AlboVersorio, Milano ; Filosofia dell'errore. Le forme dell'inciampo, Bompiani, Milano  Parmenide. Dell'essere e del nulla (Massimo Donà), AlboVersorio, Milano  Eroticamente. Per una filosofia della sessualità, il prato, Saonara (Padova)  Misterio grande. Filosofia di Giacomo Leopardi, Bompiani, Milano  Pensare la Trinità. Filosofia europea e orizzonte trinitario (con Piero Coda), Città Nuova, Roma  Erranze (Alfredo Gatto), AlboVersorio, Milano  L'angelo musicante. Caravaggio e la musica, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano-Udine  Parole sonanti. Filosofia e forme dell'immaginazione, Moretti & Vitali, Bergamo  J. Wolfgang Goethe, Urpflanze. La pianta originaria (Massimo Donà), Albo Versorio, Milano  La terra e il sacro. Il tempo della verità (libro + DVD), Luca Taddio, Mimesis, Milano  Teomorfica. Sistema di estetica, Bompiani, Milano  Sovranità del bene. Dalla fiducia alla fede, tra misura e dismisura, Orthotes, Salerno  Senso e origine della domanda filosofica, Mimesis, Milano-Udine  La filosofia di Miles Davis. Inno all'irrisolutezza, Mimesis, Milano-Udine  Dire l'anima. Sulla natura della conoscenza, Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino  Tutto per nulla. La filosofia di William Shakespeare, Bompiani, Milano  Pensieri bacchici. Vino tra filosofia, letteratura, arte e politica, Edizioni Saletta dell'Uva, Caserta  In Principio. Philosophia sive Theologia. Meditazioni teologiche e trinitarie, Mimesis, Milano-Udine  Di un'ingannevole bellezza. Le "cose" dell'arte, Bompiani-Giunti, Milano  La filosofia dei Beatles, Mimesis, Milano-Udine  Un pensiero sublime. Saggi su Giovanni Gentile, Inschibboleth, Roma  Dell'acqua, La nave di Teseo, Milano  Essere e divenire. Riflessioni sull'incontraddittorietà a partire da Fichte, con Gaetano Rametta, Mimesis, Milano-Udine  Di qua, di là. Ariosto e la filosofia dell'Orlando Furioso, La nave di Teseo, Milano  Miracolo naturale. Leonardo e la Vergine delle rocce, Mimesis, Milano  In altre lingue Epifanías admirables. Apogeo y consumación de la Antigüedad, Akal, Madrid, Spagna 1996; IMMUNITY AND NEGATION. On possibile developments of the theses outlined in ROBERTO ESPOSITO'S IMMUNITAS, in “Diacritics. A review of contemporary criticism. Bios, Immunity, Life. The thought of Roberto Esposito”, volume 36, number 2, The Johns Hopkins University Press (New York, Summer 2006 Filozofija muzike, Geopetika, Beograd, Serbia 2008; Filosofía de la música, Global Rhythm Press, Barcelona, Spagna 2008 Arte, tragedia, tecnica, (con Massimo Cacciari), Prometeo Libros, Buenos Aires, Argentina 2009 Filosofia del vino, Sigma Books, through Enterskorea, Seoul, Corea  L'anima del vino, Sigma Books, through Enterskorea, Seoul, Corea  Filozofia vinului, Editura ART, Bucuresti, Romania  The Original Betrayal: Nihilism and Nullification of the Negative, in “Annali d'Italianistica”Italian Critical Theory,  29Edited by Alessandro Carrera, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapell Hill, NC 27599-3170,  The Singing of the Sirens, in "Between Urban Topographies and Political Spaces", Threshold Experiences (edited by Alexis Nuselovici, Mauro Ponzi, and Fabio Vighi), Lexington Books, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK,  Der Gesang der Sirenen, in “Schwellen. Ansätze für eine neue Theorie des Raums” (Herausgegeben von Sieglinde Borvitz und Mauro Ponzi), d/u/p, Düsseldorf  Habiter le seuil. Cinéma et philosophie, Editions Mimesis, Paris  Saggi e articoli "Arte e Accademia", in Agalma, no. 9, marzo 2005: 24-30. Discografia New Rhapsody in blue, Caligola Records 2002; For miles and miles, Caligola Records 2003; Spritz, Caligola Records 2004; Cose dell'altro mondo. Bi Sol Mi Fa Re, Caligola Records 2006; Ahmbè, Caligola Records 2008; Big Bum, Caligola Records 2009; Il santo che vola. San Giuseppe da Copertino come un aerostato nelle mani di Dio, Caligola Records  Iperboliche distanze. Le parole di Andrea Emo, Caligola Records  Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Massimo Donà  Il mistero della bellezza svelato da Massimo Donà. Intervista Alberto Nutricati, in L'Anima Fa Arte Blog e Rivista di Psicologia Video-intervista sul mistero dell'esistenza, su asia.it. "Arte e Accademia", in Agalma no. 9, testo completo: web.archive.org/web/011555/http://agalmaweb.org/articoli.php?rivistaID=9 Sito ufficiale di Massimo Donà, su massimodona.com. Filosofia Musica  Musica Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloMusicisti italiani del XX secoloMusicisti italiani Professore1957 29 ottobre Venezia

 

Donatelli: Piergiorgio Donatelli, filosofo. Professore di Filosofia morale alla Sapienza Roma. L’etica, la sua storia e le problematiche contemporanee sono al centro dei suoi interessi.  Ha studiato presso la Sapienza Roma, dove ha conseguito la laurea e il dottorato, per poi perfezionarsi all'University of Pittsburgh. Ha insegnato alla Luiss Guido Carli, ed è stato professore visitatore alla University of Chicago e alla Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.  Temi di ricerca La sua ricerca spazia dalla ricognizione dei classici dell’etica alla filosofia morale contemporanea. Si è occupato della riflessione sulla vita umana, in bioetica e nel pensiero teoretico e politico, e del pensiero ambientale. Nel dibattito bioetico ha difeso una concezione laica delle istituzioni. La sua proposta si situa nella filosofia di ispirazione wittgensteiniana (Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, Iris Murdoch) che fa incontrare con i temi del pensiero democratico e perfezionista nella scia della filosofia di John Stuart Mill.  Riviste Dal  dirige la rivista Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica (il Mulino). È membro di numerosi comitati, tra cui del comitato scientifico di Bioetica. Rivista Interdiscliplinare ed Etica & Politica e dell’Advisory Board della Nordic Wittgenstein Review.  Pubblicazioni Filosofia morale. Fondamenti, metodi, sfide pratiche (con Gabriele De Anna e Roberto Mordacci), Milano, Le Monnier,  Il lato ordinario della vita. Filosofia ed esperienza comune, Bologna, il Mulino,  Etica. I classici, le teorie e le linee evolutive, Torino, Einaudi,  Manières d’être humain. Une autre philosophie morale, Paris, Vrin,  Quando giudichiamo morale un’azione?, Roma-Bari, Laterza,  (ed. digitale) Decidere della propria vita, Roma-Bari, Laterza,  (ed. digitale) La vita umana in prima persona, Roma-Bari, Laterza,  Manuale di etica ambientale , Firenze, Le Lettere,  James Conant e Cora Diamond, Rileggere Wittgenstein , Roma, Carocci,  Introduzione a Mill, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2007 Il senso della virtù (cura con Emidio Spinelli), Roma, Carocci, 2009 Cora Diamond, L’immaginazione e la vita morale , Roma, Carocci, 2006 La filosofia morale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001; 3 Wittgenstein e l’etica, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1998 Etica analitica. Analisi, teorie, applicazioni (con Eugenio Lecaldano), Milano, LED, 1996; 2 Note  I destini dell'etica  Bioetica e progresso morale dell'Italia  Il lato ordinario della vita. Filosofia ed esperienza comune, su ilrasoiodioccam-micromega.blogautore.espresso.repubblica.it.  Bioetica Consulta di bioetica  Registrazioni di Piergiorgio Donatelli, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale.  Pagina personale, Sapienza Roma Academia.edu.

 

Donati: Pierpaolo Donati (Budrio), filosofo. Nei suoi scritti occupano una posizione centrale le tematiche epistemologiche inerenti alla rifondazione delle scienze sociali reinterpretate alla luce della "svolta relazionale" della filosofia e sociologia moderna. Su tali basi, vengono svolte l'analisi delle forme di cittadinanza, dei fenomeni associativi di società civile e delle politiche di welfare state nelle società altamente differenziate; l'analisi del ruolo delle istituzioni sociali che emergono dai processi di morfogenesi sociale, in particolare nelle sfere di terzo settore; l'apertura di una nuova prospettiva negli studi sul capitale sociale e sui processi di riflessività in rapporto alla legittimazione di nuove forme di democrazia deliberativa.  L'elaborazione di una ‘sociologia relazionale' è andata di pari passo con la fondazione filosofica di un nuovo e più generale ‘paradigma relazionale' nelle scienze sociali, che si pone come superamento della contrapposizione fra realismo e costruttivismo, fra individualismo metodologico e olismo metodologico. Questa prospettiva ha portato alla elaborazione di nuovi concetti come quelli di ragione relazionale e beni relazionali, come soluzioni rispettivamente dei problemi inerenti al multiculturalismo e alla mercificazione del welfare nelle società tardo-moderne.  L'etichetta "sociologia relazionale" viene usata, oltre che da Donati, da vari studiosi. Per esempio, Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) ha scritto un ‘Manifesto di sociologia relazionale' elaborato in maniera del tutto indipendente rispetto al lavoro del sociologo italiano. Anche il sociologo inglese Nick Crossley () ha usato la medesima etichetta. Alcuni studiosi assimilano la sociologia relazionale alla network analysis (Crossley , Mische ), altri tracciano delle differenze fra questi due modi di intendere l'analisi della società (Donati ; Terenzi ; Tronca ). Indipendentemente dal lavoro di Donati, esistono gruppi e reti di sociologia relazionale in vari Paesi, tra cui il Canada (si veda il sito della Canadian Sociological Association,, l'Australia (si veda il sito della Australian Sociological Association,). In Italia gli studiosi vicini a Donati si riconoscono nel network Relational Studies in Sociology,).   Pierpaolo Donati è un sociologo italiano che ha prodotto numerose opere di carattere teorico ed empirico. Ha proposto una teoria generale per l'analisi della società chiamata sociologia relazionale. Un capitolo autobiografico di Donati è stato inserito nel volume dedicato ad alcuni dei più importanti sociologi viventi (si veda Building a Relational Theory of Society: A Sociological Journey in Sociologists in a Global Age. Biographical Perspectives,ed. Matthew Deflem, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007,  159–174). Dal 1981 al  è stato Professore di Sociologia presso la Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell'Bologna. È stato direttore del CEPOSS (Centro Studi di Politica Sociale e Sociologia Sanitaria), Presidente del Corso di laurea in Sociologia, e Coordinatore del Ph.D. in Sociologia presso il Dipartimento di Sociologia dell'Bologna.  Ha avuto intensi scambi scientifici personali con vari sociologi di fama internazionale, tra cui Jeffrey C. Alexander, Niklas Luhmann, Margaret Archer. È stato Presidente dell'AIS Associazione Italiana di Sociologia negli anni 1995-1998 e membro del Board dell'International Institute of Sociology (IIS)negli anni 2001-2005. Dal 22 dicembre 1997 è membro della Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze Sociali. È Direttore dell'Osservatorio Nazionale sulla Famiglia. Ha fatto parte del comitato scientifico di Biennale Democrazia. Fondatore e Direttore della Rivista “Sociologia e politiche sociali”, editore FrancoAngeli. Inoltre è stato e/o è: Editorial Adviser della Rivista "International Sociology" Archiviato il 30 novembre 2009 in ., ISA Journal, 1985-1996; Membro dell'International Advisory Board della Rivista "Innovation", Vienna, 1988-1996; Membro del Comitato Scientifico della Rivista "Sociologia", Istituto Luigi Sturzo, Roma (dal 1995-); a partire dal 1998; membro del Comitato Scientifico della Rivista “International Review of Sociology-Revue Internationale de Sociologie” (IIS), Roma La Sapienza (dal 2003-); membro del Comitato Scientifico della Rivista “Familia”, Instituto Superior de Ciencias de la Familia, Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Spagna (dal 2005).  Ha ricevuto il riconoscimento dell'ONU come membro esperto distinto nel corso dell'Anno Internazionale della Famiglia (1994). Premio Capri San Michele per il libro "Pensiero sociale cristiano e società post-moderna" (Ave, Roma, 1997) (settembre 1997). Premio San Benedetto per la promozione della Vita e della Famiglia in Europa, IX edizione (Subiaco, 9 maggio 2009). Dottorato honoris causa del Pontificio istituto Giovanni Paolo II per studi su matrimonio e famiglia, Pontificia Università Lateranense (Roma, 13 maggio 2009). Premio Mario Macchi 2009 conferito dalla Associazione nazionale genitori scuole cattoliche (AGESC) per attività sociali e culturali di rilevante interesse innovativo. Il 15 novembre  Donati ha ricevuto il suo secondo dottorato Honoris Causa dalla Università Internazionale di Catalogna (UIC Barcelona). Con questo riconoscimento Pierpaolo Donati entra a far parte dell'elenco dei dottori onorari dell'UIC Barcelona che comprende anche il dott. Joaquín Navarro-Valls.  Attraverso le sue ricerche, Donati mostra con specifiche indagini empiriche in che modo la società possa essere conosciuta e interpretata come relazione sociale, e non come un semplice prodotto culturale, oppure una mera comunicazione, o ancora una semplice influenza della struttura sociale sull'agire umano (Structure and agency).  La teoria relazionale della società La sociologia relazionale (o teoria relazionale della società) viene per la prima volta esplicitata con il volume “Introduzione alla sociologia relazionale” (Franco Angeli, Milano, 1983, seconda edizione 1986). Questa “Introduzione” è nata come una sorta di “Manifesto della sociologia relazionale”, anche se da allora pochi se ne sono accorti.  I punti essenziali di quel Manifesto sono i seguenti:  La sociologia relazionale consiste nell'osservare che la società, ovvero qualsiasi fenomeno o formazione sociale (la famiglia, una impresa o società commerciale, una associazione, una società nazionale), la società globale, non è né una idea (o una rappresentazione o una realtà mentale) né una cosa materiale (o biologica o fisica in senso lato), ma è una relazione sociale. Non è né un “sistema”, più o meno preordinato o sovrastante i singoli fatti o fenomeni, né un prodotto di azioni individuali, ma un altro ordine di realtà: la società è relazione, ossia la società è fatta di relazioni, e precisamente di relazioni sociali, che distinguono la forma e i contenuti di ogni concreta e specifica “società”. La relazione sociale deve essere concepita non come una realtà accidentale, secondaria o derivata da altre entità (individui o sistemi), bensì come realtà sui generis. Affermare che “la società è relazione” può sembrare quasi ovvio, ma non lo è affatto ove l'affermazione sia intesa come presupposizione epistemologica generale e quindi si abbia coscienza delle enormi implicazioni che da essa derivano. Tutti i sociologi parlano di relazioni sociali (Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann), ma quasi nessuno ha compiuto l'operazione che viene proposta dalla sociologia relazionale: partire dal presupposto che “all'inizio c'è la relazione”, ossia che ogni realtà sociale emerge da un contesto di relazioni e genera un contesto di relazioni essendo essa stessa ‘relazione sociale'. Ciò non significa in alcun modo aderire ad un punto di vista di relativismo culturale, anzi si tratta esattamente del contrario: la sociologia relazionale si fonda su una metafisica relazionale, e dunque su una ontologia delle relazioni che vede nelle relazioni il costitutivo di ogni realtà sociale seconda la loro propria natura (la sociologia relazionale non ha nulla a che fare con il relazionismo filosofico. Il concetto di relazione sociale In via generale, per relazione sociale Donati intende la realtà immateriale (che sta nello spazio-tempo) dell'inter-umano, ossia ciò che sta fra i soggetti agenti, e checome tale«costituisce» il loro orientarsi e agire reciproco per distinzione da ciò che sta nei singoli attoriindividuali o collettiviconsiderati come poli o termini della relazione. Questa «realtà fra», fatta insieme di elementi «oggettivi» e «soggettivi», è la sfera in cui vengono definite sia la distanza sia l'integrazione degli individui che stanno in società: dipende da questa realtà (la relazione sociale in cui il soggetto si trova) se, in che forma, misura e qualità l'individuo può distaccarsi o coinvolgersi rispetto agli altri soggetti più o meno prossimi, alle istituzioni e in generale rispetto alle dinamiche della vita sociale.  Verifiche e applicazioni teoriche La teoria relazionale della società ha elaborato nuovi concetti che sono stati utilizzati non solo da sociologi, ma anche in altri campi, come il diritto, la legislazione sociale, l'economia. Tra i principali concetti originali elaborati da Donati vi sono i seguenti:  Il concetto di ‘privato sociale’ (1978), che è stato poi applicato in molte leggi dello Stato italiano; Il concetto di ‘cittadinanza societaria (1993), che è stato utilizzato dal Consiglio di Stato (Sezione consultiva per gli atti normativi, Adunanza del 25 agosto 2003, N. della Sezione: 1440/2003) in importanti deliberazioni; Il concetto di ‘beni relazionali’ (1991, 1993) che è stato poi ripreso in campo economico da vari autori come Stefano Zamagni e Luigino Bruni; Il concetto di ‘servizi relazionali’ (2001), che è stato ripreso nella legislazione regionale e nazionale in Italia, anche in relazione alle buone pratiche nelle politiche familiari analizzate con le ricerche svolte per l'Osservatorio nazionale sulla famiglia; Il concetto di ‘lavoro relazionale’ e di ‘contratti relazionali’ (2001); Il concetto di ‘welfare relazionale’ (2004) e buone pratiche nei servizi alle famiglie (utilizzato dal Centro studi Erickson); Il concetto di ‘differenziazione relazionale’ (2005) applicato in particolare alla problematica della conciliazione fra lavoro e famiglia Il concetto di ‘ragione relazionale’ (2008) come possibile soluzione ai problemi dei conflitti multiculturali; Il concetto di capitale sociale come relazione sociale (2003, 2006, 2008) con una ridefinizione degli studi sociologici sul tema del capitale sociale; Il concetto di "riflessività relazionale" () per superare il concetto puramente soggettivo di riflessività come mera riflessione interiore. (termine elaborato nel 2009, approfondito nel volume, citato in nota) Il concetto di "genoma sociale della famiglia"(). Ulteriori sviluppi Donati ha affrontato una serie di tematiche di ricerca il cui sviluppo è ancora in corso. Tra queste tematiche si ricordano:  (a) La prima e più estesa riguarda la tematica della sociologia della famiglia: si vedano i volumi P. DonatiDi Nicola, Lineamenti di sociologia della famiglia. Un approccio relazionale all'indagine sociologica, Carocci, Roma, 2002; P. Donati, Manuale di sociologia della famiglia, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1998 (traduzione spagnola: Manual de Sociología de la Familia, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2003) che ha avuto una nuova edizione nel 2006; si vedano anche i Rapporti Cisf sulla famiglia in Italia (dal 1989 al ); per gli aspetti applicativi: Sociologia delle politiche familiari, Carocci, Roma, 2003; è il più recente P. Donati "La famiglia. Il genoma che fa vivere la società", Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, .  (b) Un'altra tematica è quella della salute: si veda P. Donati  Manuale di sociologia sanitaria, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, Roma, 1987 (traduzione spagnola: (a cargo de), Manual de sociologia de la salud, Ediciones Diaz de Santos, Madrid, 1994).  (c) Sui giovani e le generazioni nella società dell'indifferenza etica: Giovani e generazioni. Quando si cresce in una società eticamente neutra, il Mulino, Bologna, 1997;  (d) Sul cittadinanza e welfare: La cittadinanza societaria, Laterza, Roma- Bari, 2000;  (e) Sul welfare state e le politiche sociali: Risposte alla crisi dello Stato sociale, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1985; Lo Stato sociale in Italia: bilanci e prospettive, Mondadori, Milano, 1999;  (f) Sul privato sociale o terzo settore e la società civile: Sociologia del terzo settore, Carocci, Roma, 1996; sulla società civile: La società civile in Italia, Mondadori, Milano; 1997; Generare “il civile”: nuove esperienze nella società italiana, il Mulino, Bologna, 2001; Il privato sociale che emerge: realtà e dilemmi, il Mulino, Bologna, 2004;  (g) Sul lavoro: Il lavoro che emerge, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2000;  (h) I rapporti fra sociologia relazionale e pensiero sociale cristiano: Pensiero sociale cristiano e società post-moderna, Editrice Ave, Roma, 1997; La matrice teologica della società, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, .  (i) Sul capitale sociale: P. Donati, I. Colozzi , Terzo settore e valorizzazione del capitale sociale in Italia: luoghi e attori, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2006; P. Donati, I. Colozzi , Capitale sociale delle famiglie e processi di socializzazione. Un confronto fra scuole statali e di privato sociale, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2006.  Attraverso queste opere (e molte altre: si veda i capitoli Opere e libri in Italiano e Opere in lingue straniere), la sociologia relazionale ha sviluppato un nuovo quadro teorico e ne ha dimostrato la validità sia sul piano della ricerca empirica, sia sul piano delle applicazioni concrete (in termini di legislazione e di programmi di intervento sociale). La conoscenza sociologica che la sociologia relazionale intende perseguire non rifiuta a priori nessuna teoria, né vuole “unificare” tutte le teorie sotto un'unica bandiera, ma tutte le prende in considerazione e le valuta per mettere in evidenza quelle verità, anche parziali, che ciascuna di esse contiene. Tuttavia, perché di solito una teoria offre una visione limitata, se non riduttiva della realtà, la sociologia relazionale è in grado di inserire ogni teoria in un quadro concettuale più ampio, nel quale ritrovare le verità parziali ad un livello più elevato, coerente e consistente di conoscenza della realtà sociale.  Note  Mustafa Emirbayer, Manifesto for a relational sociology, in "American Journal of Sociology",  103, n. 2, September 1997,  281-317.  Nick Crossley, Towards Relational Sociology, Routledge, London and New York, .  Ann Mische, Relational sociology, culture and agency, in J. Scott and P. Carrington (eds.), Sage Handbook of Social Network Analysis, Sage, London, .  Paolo Terenzi, Percorsi di sociologia relazionale, FrancoAngeli, Milano, .  Luigi Tronca, Sociologia relazionale e social networks analysis. Analisi delle strutture sociali, FrancoAngeli, Milano, . UICUniversitat Internacional de Catalunya, Rivka Oxman and Pierpaolo Donati, new doctor honoris causas at UIC Barcelona, in UIC, 15 novembre . 16 novembre .  Enzo Paci, Dall'esistenzialismo al relazionismo, D'Anna, Messina-Firenze, 1957  Pubblico e privato: fine di una alternativa?, Cappelli, Bologna, 1978pg 114.  La cittadinanza societaria, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1993cap. 2 e 5.  I beni relazionali. Che cosa sono e quali effetti producono, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, Pierpaolo Donati e Riccardo Solci.Teoria relazionale della società, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1991cap. 3 e La cittadinanza societaria, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1993cap. 2  Il lavoro che emerge. Prospettive del lavoro come relazione sociale in una economia dopo-moderna, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2001pg 105/108  Il lavoro che emerge. Prospettive del lavoro come relazione sociale in una economia dopo-moderna, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2001cap. 5  Il lavoro che emerge. Prospettive del lavoro come relazione sociale in una economia dopo-moderna, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2001cap.6  Per un nuovo welfare locale “family friendly”: la sfida delle politiche relazionali, in Osservatorio nazionale sulla famiglia, Famiglie e politiche di welfare in Italia: interventi e pratiche.  I, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005,  169-197 e Politiche sociali e servizi sociali di fronte al modello sociale europeo: lo scenario del “welfare relazionale”, in C. Corposanto, L. Fazzi , Il servizio sociale in un'epoca di cambiamento: scenari, nodi e prospettive, Edizioni Eiss, Roma, 2005,  57-112  Quale conciliazione tra famiglia e lavoro? La prospettiva relazionale, in P. Donati , Famiglia e lavoro: dal conflitto a nuove sinergie, Edizioni San Paolo, Cinisello Balsamo, 200,  31-84  Oltre il multiculturalismo. La ragione relazionale per un mondo comune, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2008cap. 6  La valorizzazione del capitale sociale in Italia: luoghi e attoriDonati, I. Colozzi , FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2006 e Il capitale sociale degli italiani. Le radici familiari, comunitarie e associative del civismo (con L. Tronca), FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2008.  Relational Sociology. A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences, Routledge, London,   Margaret Archer, Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003  La famiglia. Il genoma che fa vivere la società, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, . Opere principali in lingua italiana L'enigma della relazione, Mimesis, Milano,  La famiglia. Il genoma che fa vivere la società, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli,  Sociologia della riflessività. Come si entra nel dopo-moderno, il Mulino, Bologna,  I beni relazionali. Che cosa sono e quali effetti producono (P.Donati e R. Solci), Bollati Boringhieri, Torino,  La matrice teologica della società, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli,  Teoria relazionale della società: i concetti di base, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2009 La società dell'umano, Marietti, Genova-Milano, 2009 Il capitale sociale degli italiani. Le radici familiari, comunitarie e associative del civismo (P. Donati e L. Tronca), FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2008 Oltre il multiculturalismo. La ragione relazionale per un mondo comune, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2008 Manuale di sociologia della famiglia, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2006 Sociologia delle politiche familiari, Carocci, Roma, 2003 Il lavoro che emerge. Prospettive del lavoro come relazione sociale in una economia dopo-moderna, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2001 La cittadinanza societaria, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2000 Teoria relazionale della società, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1991 La famiglia come relazione sociale, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1989 La famiglia nella società relazionale. Nuove reti e nuove regole, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1986 Introduzione alla sociologia relazionale, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1986 Risposte alla crisi dello Stato sociale. Le nuove politiche sociali in prospettiva sociologica, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1984 Famiglia e politiche sociali. La morfogenesi familiare in prospettiva sociologica, Angeli, Milano, 1981 Pubblico e privato: fine di una alternativa ?, Cappelli, Bologna, 1978 Opere principali in lingua straniera The Relational SubjectP. Donati, M.S. Archer, Cambridge University Press,  Relational Sociology. A New Paradigm for the Social SciencesRoutledge, London,  Pursuing the Common Good: How Solidarity and Subsidiarity Can Work Together, M.S. Archer and P. Donati (eds.), Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Vatican Press, Rome, 2008 Família no século XXI: abordagem relacional, trad. e cura di Giancarlo Petrini, Paulinas, Sao Paulo, Brasil, 2008 Repensar la sociedad. El enfoque relacional, traduzione e introduzione di Pablo Garcia Ruiz, Ediciones Internacionales Universitarias, Madrid, 2006 Manual de Sociología de la Familia, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2003 La ciudadanía societaria, Editorial Universidad de Granada, Granada, 1999 Manual de sociologia de la salud, Ediciones Diaz de Santos, Madrid, 1994 Principali articoli e capitoli di libri in lingua straniera Inglese  The New Citizenship of the Family, in K. Matthijs (ed.), The Family. Contemporary Perspectives and Challenges, Leuven University Press, Leuven, The Challenge of Universalism in a Multicultural Postmodern Society: A Relational Approach, in E. Halas (ed.), Florian Znaniecki's Sociological Theory and the Challenges of 21st Century, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., 2000,  31–47. Freedom contro Control in Post-Modern Society: A Relational Approach, in E.K. Scheuch, D. Sciulli (eds.), Societies, Corporations and the Nation State, Brill, Leiden, "The Annals of the International Institute of Sociology",  Religion and Democracy: The Challenge of a “Religiously Qualified” Public Sphere, in “Polish Sociological Review”,Giving and Social Relations: The Culture of Free Giving and its Differentiation Today, in “International Review of Sociology”,  13, n. 2, 2003,  243–272. The end of classical liberalism in the lib/lab interplay: what after ?, in E. Banús, A. Llano (eds.), Present and Future of Liberalism, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2004,  169–212. Understanding the human person as a relational subject: an ‘after'-modern paradigm for the social sciences (or: the ‘economy' of the human person lies on her ultimate concerns), in M.A. Glendon (ed.), Conceptualization of the Human Person in Social Sciences, The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Vatican City Press, 2006. Building a relational theory of society: a sociological journey, in Mathieu Deflem (ed.), Lessons From Sociology. Global Perspectives on Sociological Careers, De Sitter Publications, Oshawa, Canada, 2006 The Emergent Third Sector in Europe: Actors, Relations and Social Capital, in H. K. Anheier, G. Rossi, L. Boccacin (eds.), The Social Generative Action of the Third Sector. Comparing International Experiences, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2008,  13–47. Beyond the dilemmas of multiculturalism: recognition through ‘relational reason', in “International Review of Sociology”,   Beyond Multiculturalism: Recognition Through the Relational Reason, in “Polish Sociological Review”,  166, n. 2, 2009,  147–177. Modernization and relational reflexivity, in “International Review of Sociology/Revue Internationale de Sociologie”,  21, No. 1, March , 21-39. Francese  La prospective relationelle dans l'intervention de réseau: fondements théoriques, in L. Sanicola (ed.), L'intervention de réseaux, Bayard Editions, Paris, 1994,  61–108. Family Associations in Europe: A General Outlook and Typology, in "Associations. Journal for Social and Legal Theory",  1, n. 2, 1997,  235–255. La relation comme objet spécifique de la sociologie, in “Revue du Mauss”, La Découvert, n. 24, second semestre 2004,  233–254. Spagnolo  Cultura y comunicacion. Una perspectiva relacional, in "Comunicacion y sociedad",  VIII, n. 1, 1995,  61–75. El desarrollo de las organizaciones del tercer sector en el proceso de modernización y más allá, in "Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociólogicas", El desafío del universalismo en una sociedad multicultural, in "Revista Internacional de Sociologia", Csis,  La crisis del Estado y el surgimiento del tercer sector. Hacia una nueva configuración de relaciones, in "Revista Mexicana de Sociologia",  El desafío del universalismo en una sociedad multicultural postmoderna: un planteamiento relacional, in E. Banús, A. Llano (eds.), Razón práctica y multiculturalismo, Newbook Ediciones, Mutilva Baja (Navarra), 1999,  1–34. Ciudadanía lib/lab (‘tercera vía') versus ciudadanía societaria (civilización): Panópticon estatal versus sociedad de redes, in José Pérez Adán (ed.), Las terceras vías, Ediciones Internacionales Universitarias, Madrid, 2001,  49–82. Tedesco  Konzepte und Strategien einer integrierten und synergetischen Sozialpolitik, in A. Evers, Th. Olk (Hrsg.), Wohlfahrtspluralismus, Westdeutcher Verlag, Opladen, 1996,  126–141. Welche soziale Inklusion? «Lib/lab'sches Neo-Panopticon» und sozietale Staatsbürgerschaft: zwei verschiedene sozialpolitische Strategien, in "Soziologisches Jahrbuch“,  16, 2002/2003,  392–426. Polacco  Praca w epoce globalizacji, in “Spoteczenstwo”, Warszawa, a. XII, n. 47, 2002,  59–92.  Sociologia relazionale Associazione Italiana di Sociologia Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Pierpaolo Donati  Pagina personale del Prof. Pierpaolo DonatiAlma Mater Studiorum, Bologna, su unibo.it. Pagina personale del Prof. Pierpaolo DonatiPontificia Accademia delle Scienze Sociali, su pass.va. Recensione di Reza Azarian su Relational Sociology. A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences. Sociologica, 1, , su sociologica.mulino.it. 31 agosto  5 marzo ). Recensione di Neil Gross su P. Donati e M. Archer, The Relational Subject. American Journal of Sociology, 123(1),

 

Dondi: Giovanni Dondi dall'Orologio (Chioggia), filosofo. Nato da Jacopo Dondi, col quale è stato spesso confuso, studiò medicina, astronomia, filosofia e logica presso l'Padova, dove divenne professore. Nel 1362 si trasferì a Pavia; dopo un periodo a Firenze, vi ritornò dal 1379 come medico e astrologo di corte dei Visconti e insegnò presso l'Pavia.  Scrittore di rime, amico e corrispondente di Francesco Petrarca, fu anche tra i pionieri dell'archeologia: nel 1375, in occasione di un viaggio a Roma, descrisse e misurò monumenti classici, copiò iscrizioni e trascrisse i dati rilevati nel suo ‘'Iter Romanorum'’.  Ritenuto a lungo morto nel 1389, è invece stato accertato essere morto nel 1388 ad Abbiategrasso e solo nel 1389 trasferito e sepolto a Padova.  La sua fama è legata soprattutto all'astrario da lui progettato a Padova e costruito a Pavia, dove, ancora alla fine del Quattrocento era conservato, nel castello di Pavia, presso la biblioteca Visconteo-Sforzesca.  L'astrario Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svgAstrario di Giovanni Dondi.  L'astrario di Giovanni Dondi è un orologio astronomico che mostra l'ora, il calendario annuale, il movimento dei pianeti, del Sole e della Luna. Per ogni giorno sono indicati l'ora dell'alba e del tramonto (alla latitudine di Padova), la "lettera domenicale" che determina la successione dei giorni della settimana e il nome dei santi e la data delle feste fisse della Chiesa. Ricostruzione, Museo nazionale della scienza e della tecnologia Leonardo da Vinci, Milano. L'orologio astronomico (o astrario) di Dondi è andato distrutto, ma è ben conosciuto perché il suo ideatore ne dette una particolareggiata descrizione nell'opera Astrarium, trasmessa da due manoscritti. Si trattava di un congegno mosso da pesi, di piccole dimensioni (alto circa 85 cm, largo circa 70), racchiuso in un involucro a base eptagonale. Grazie ad una serie di ingranaggi l'astrario riproduceva i moti del Sole, della Luna e dei cinque pianeti. Esso indicava anche la durata delle ore di luce alla latitudine di Padova. Come misuratore del tempo esso, oltre all'ora, indicava (forse per la prima volta tra gli orologi meccanici) anche i minuti, a gruppi di dieci. La presenza di opere arabe nella biblioteca di Dondi ha fatto sospettare che la progettazione sia stata influenzata da autori arabi.  Una ricostruzione dell'astrario di Dondi realizzata nel 1963 è esposta nella sezione orologeria del Museo nazionale della scienza e della tecnologia Leonardo da Vinci di Milano.  L'orologio astronomico che si può tuttora ammirare sulla Torre dell'Orologio (Padova) (in Piazza dei Signori) è una copia non dell'astrario di Giovanni Dondi, ma dell'orologio costruito nel 1344 dal padre Jacopo Dondi.  Curiosità Secondo la tradizione sarebbe stato Giovanni Dondi ad introdurre a Padova dalla Polonia la gallina col ciuffo, oggi nota come gallina padovana. In realtà, il giornalista padovano Franco Holzer in una sua ricerca ha potuto stabilire che non vi è documentazione alcuna che attesti che Giovanni Dondi dall'Orologio abbia mai avuto contatti con la Polonia o che l'abbia mai visitata. A lui è dedicata una delle statue che adornano il Prato della Valle, a Padova. Nel 1989, in occasione del 600 anniversario della morte, il Circolo Numismatico Patavino gli ha dedicato una medaglia commemorativa opera dello scultore bellunese Massimo Facchin. A Giovanni De'Dondi è dedicata la ballata iniziale di Mausoleum. Siebenunddreißig Balladen aus der Geschichte des Fortschritts (1975) del poeta tedesco Hans Magnus Enzensberger.  Edizioni delle opere Giovanni Dondi dall'Orologio, Rime, Antonio Daniele, Neri Pozza, Vicenza, 1990. Giovanni Dondi dall'Orologio, Astrarium, E. Poulle, CISST, 1988. Baillie G.H. e altri, The Planetarium of Giovanni De Dondi, The Antiquarian Horological Society, London, 1974. (Contiene la traduzione inglese dell'Astrarium). Opera omnia Jacobi et Johannis de Dondis, corpus pubblicato sotto la direzione di Emmanuel Poulle. Padova: 1, 1987. Note  Andrea Albini, Op. cit., 62-63.  La Biblioteca Visconteo Sforzesca, su collezioni.museicivici.pavia.it. 7 marzo .  Andrea Albini, Op. cit., cap.2.  Andrea Albini, Op. cit., cap.4.  L'astrario di Giovanni Dondi, su Museoscienza.org. 1º aprile .  Ricerche d'Archivio riguardanti la famiglia Dondi dall'Orologio. Di Franco Holzer.  Andrea Albini, Machina Mundi. L'orologio astronomico di Giovanni Dondi, CreateSpace, , cap.3.  Astrario di Giovanni Dondi Jacopo Dondi dall'Orologio Gabriele Dondi dall'Orologio Università degli studi di Padova. Giovanni Dondi dell'Orologio, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Giovanni Dondi dell'Orologio, .  Replica in scala 1/2 dell'Astrario di Giovanni de Dondi, su clockmaker.it. Replica in scala 1/4 dell'Astrario di Giovanni de Dondi, su pendoleria.com.

 

Dorfles: Gillo Dorfles, all'anagrafe Angelo Eugenio Dorfles (Trieste), filosofo. Nato a Trieste nell'allora Austria-Ungheria da padre goriziano di origine ebraica e madre genovese, si laureò in Medicina, con specializzazione in psichiatria. Parallelamente agli studi in ambito medico, sin dai primi anni trenta si dedicò allo studio della pittura, dell'estetica e in generale delle arti. La conoscenza dell'antroposofia di Rudolf Steiner, acquisita a partire dal 1934 grazie alla partecipazione a un ciclo di conferenze a Dornach, orienta la sua arte pittorica verso il misticismo, denotando una vicinanza più ai temi dominanti dell'area mitteleuropea che a quelli propri della pittura italiana coeva.  Professore di Estetica presso le Milano, di Cagliari e di Trieste, nel 1948 fondò, insieme ad Atanasio Soldati, Galliano Mazzon, Gianni Monnet e Bruno Munari, il Movimento per l'arte concreta, del quale contribuì a precisare le posizioni attraverso una prolifica produzione di articoli, saggi e manifesti artistici. Per tutti gli anni cinquanta prende parte a numerose mostre del MAC, in Italia e all'estero: espone i suoi dipinti alla Libreria Salto di Milano nel 1949 e nel 1950 e in numerose collettive, tra le quali la mostra del 1951 alla Galleria Bompiani di Milano, l'esposizione itinerante in Cile e Argentina nel 1952, e la grande mostra "Esperimenti di sintesi delle arti", svoltasi nel 1955 nella Galleria del Fiore di Milano.  Nel 1954 risulta componente di una sezione italiana del gruppo ESPACE. Nel 1956 diede il suo contributo alla realizzazione dell'Associazione per il disegno industriale. Si dedicò quindi in maniera pressoché esclusiva all'attività critica sino a metà degli anni ottanta. Solo nel 1986, con la personale presso lo Studio Marconi di Milano, tornò a rendere pubblica la propria produzione pittorica, che ha coltivato anche negli anni successivi.  Contributi e opere «L'arte non prescinde dal tempo per esprimere semplicemente lo spirito della Storia universale, bensì è connessa al ruolo delle mode e a tutti gli ambiti del gusto.»  Considerevole è stato il suo contributo allo sviluppo dell'estetica italiana del dopoguerra, a partire dal Discorso tecnico delle arti (1952), cui hanno fatto seguito tra gli altri Il divenire delle arti (1959) e Nuovi riti, nuovi miti (1965). Nelle sue indagini critiche sull'arte contemporanea Dorfles si è sovente soffermato ad analizzare l'aspetto socio-antropologico dei fenomeni estetici e culturali, facendo ricorso anche agli strumenti della linguistica. È autore di numerose monografie su artisti di varie epoche (Bosch, Dürer, Feininger, Wols, Scialoja); ha inoltre pubblicato due volumi dedicati all'architettura (Barocco nell'architettura moderna, L'architettura moderna) e un famoso saggio sul disegno industriale (Il disegno industriale e la sua estetica, 1963).  Dorfles è il primo, già nel 1951, a vedere tendenze barocche nell'arte moderna (il concetto di neobarocco sarà poi concettualizzato nel 1987 da Omar Calabrese) riferendole all'architettura moderna in: Barocco nell'architettura moderna. Nel 1995 contribuisce al Manifesto dell'antilibro, presentato ad Acquasanta in provincia di Genova, in cui esprime la valenza artistica e comunicativa dell'editoria di qualità e il ruolo del lettore come artista. A Genova si occupa anche del lavoro del pittore Claudio Costa.  Il 20 settembre 2003 partecipa alla presentazione del libro Materia Immateriale, biografia di Claudio Costa, Miriam Cristaldi, di cui Dorfles ha scritto la prefazione. L'editore Castelvecchi ha pubblicato Horror Pleni. La (in)civiltà del rumore (2008), in cui analizza come la «scoria massmediatica» dei nostri tempi abbia soppiantato le attività culturali; Conformisti (2009) e Fatti e Fattoidi (2009). Nel 2009 pubblica un inedito d'eccezione: Arte e comunicazione, in cui mette la teoria alla prova con alcune applicazioni concrete particolarmente rilevanti e problematiche come il cinema, la fotografia, l'architettura.  Il 24 marzo  è uscito IrritazioniUn'analisi del costume contemporaneo, uscito nella collana Le navi dell'editore Castelvecchi. Con la sua ironia Dorfles ha raccolto le prove della sua inconciliabilità con i tempi che corrono. Nel libro c'è una critica sarcastica e corrosiva all'attuale iperconsumismo. Nel settembre , Comunicarte Edizioni, pubblica 99+1 risposte di Gillo Dorfles nella collana Carte Comuni. Un'intervista "lunga un secolo" con la quale il critico ripercorre la sua vita e alcuni incontri d'eccezione: da Italo Svevo a Andy Warhol, da Leo Castelli a Leonor Fini.  Il 13 gennaio  la Triennale di Milano ospita la mostra "Vitriol, disegni di Gillo Dorfles " Aldo Colonetti e Luigi Sansone; Vitriol è un simbolo alchemico, acronimo del motto rosacrociano “Visita Interiora Terrae Rectificando Invenies Occultum Lapidem”.  Nel , assieme ad artisti e autori comeGiovanni Anceschi, Enrico Baj, Gualtiero Marchesi, Maria Mulas e Giulia Niccolai, ha partecipato al numero quattordici di BAU..  Muor e a Milano, nella sua casa di piazzale Lavater, il 2 marzo , poco più di un mese prima di poter compiere 108 anni.  Gillo era zio di Piero Dorfles, critico letterario della trasmissione televisiva Per un pugno di libri (il padre di Piero, Giorgio, era fratello di Gillo).  Premi e riconoscimenti  Gillo Dorfles (2008) Tra i riconoscimenti ricevuti: Compasso d'oro dell'associazione per il design industriale (ADI), Medaglia d'oro della Triennale, Premio della critica internazionale di Girona, Franklin J. Matchette Prize for Aesthetics. È stato insignito dell'Ambrogino d'oro dalla città di Milano, del Grifo d'Oro di Genova e del San Giusto d'Oro di Trieste.  È stato Accademico onorario di Brera e Albertina di Torino, membro dell'Accademia del Disegno di Città del Messico, Fellow della World Academy of Art and Science, dottore honoris causa del Politecnico di Milano e dell'Università Autonoma di Città del Messico.  Nell'aprile 2007, l'Palermo gli conferì la laurea honoris causa in Architettura. Il 13 novembre , ricevette dall'Cagliari la laurea honoris causa in Lingue moderne.  Onorificenze Cavaliere di gran croce dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiananastrino per uniforme ordinariaCavaliere di gran croce dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiana «Di iniziativa del Presidente della Repubblica» — 23 dicembre  Medaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della cultura e dell'artenastrino per uniforme ordinariaMedaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della cultura e dell'arte — 20 aprile 2006 Opere Barocco nell'architettura moderna, Collana studi monografici d'architettura n.2, Libreria Editrice Politecnica Tamburini, 1951,  96, 66 illustrazioni. Discorso tecnico delle arti, Collana Saggi di varia umanità, Pisa, Nistri-Lischi, 1952.Collana Il pensiero dell'arte, Milano, Marinotti, 2004,  978-88-827-3050-5. L'architettura moderna, Collana serie sapere tutto, Milano, Garzanti, 1954. Le oscillazioni del gusto e l'arte moderna, Collana Forma e vita, Milano, Lerici, 1958. Il divenire delle arti, Collana Saggi n.243, Torino, Einaudi, 1959.IV ed. accresciuta, Torino, Einaudi, 1967; Collana Reprints n.63, Einaudi, 1975; Bompiani, 1996. Ultime tendenze nell'arte d'oggi, Collana UEF n.356, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1961.edizioni rivedute e ampliate apparse nei decenni successivi; XXVII ed., UEF, Milano, Feltrinelli, . Simbolo, comunicazione, consumo, Collana Saggi, Torino, Einaudi, 1962. Il disegno industriale e la sua estetica, Bologna, Cappelli, 1963. Kitsch e cultura, in Aut Aut, 1,1, 1963. Nuovi riti, nuovi miti, Collana Saggi n.357, Torino, Einaudi, 1965.Collana paperbacks, Milano, Skira, L'estetica del mito (da Vico a Wittgenstein), Milano, Mursia, 1967. Kitsch: antologia del cattivo gusto, Milano, Gabriele Mazzotta Editore, 1968. Artificio e natura, Collana Saggi n.426, Torino, Einaudi, 1968.Milano, Skira, Le oscillazioni del gusto. L'arte d'oggi tra tecnocrazia e consumismo, Collana Piccola Biblioteca n.137, Torino, Einaudi, 1970.Milano, Skira, Senso e insensatezza nell'arte d'oggi, ellegi edizioni, 1971. L'architettura moderna. Le origini dell'architettura contemporanea • I quattro grandi: Wright, Le Corbusier, Gropius, Mies van der Rohe • Dall'espressionismo all'organicismo «razionalizzato», dall'«ornamented modern» al brutalismo, ai più avveniristici tentativi attuali, Collana I Garzanti, Milano, Garzanti, 1972. Dal significato alle scelte, Collana Saggi n.517, Torino, Einaudi, 1973.Massimo Carboni, Collana I Timoni, Roma, Castelvecchi, ,  978-88-761-5508-6. Il divenire della critica, Collana Saggi n.563, Torino, Einaudi, 1976. Le buone maniere, Milano, Mondadori, 1978. Mode & Modi, Collana Antologie e saggi n.10, Milano, Mazzotta, 1979.II ed. riveduta, Mazzotta, 1990. Introduzione al disegno industriale. Linguaggio e storia della produzione di serie, Collana Piccola Biblioteca n.181, Torino, Einaudi, 1980. L'intervallo perduto, Collana Saggi, Torino, Einaudi, 1980.Collana paperbacks, Milano, Skira, ,  978-88-572-1600-3. I fatti loro. Dal costume alle arti e viceversa, Collana Saggi, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1983. Architettura ambigue. Dal Neobarocco al Postmoderno, Bari, Dedalo, 1984. La moda della moda, Collana I turbamenti dell'arte n.8, Genova, Edizioni Costa & Nolan, 1984.La (nuova) moda della moda), Costa & Nolan, ,  978-88-743-7080-1. Elogio della disarmonia. Arte e vita tra logico e mitico, Collana Saggi blu, Milano, Garzanti, 1986,  978-88-11-59934-0.Milano, Skira, 2009,  978-88-572-0135-1. Itinerario estetico, Collezione Biblioteca n.52, Milano, Studio Tesi, 1987.Itinerario estetico. Simbolo mito metafora, Luca Cesari, Bologna, Editrice Compositori,  Il feticcio quotidiano, Collana Campi del sapere, Milano, Feltrinelli, Massimo Carboni, Collana I Timoni, Roma, Castelvecchi, Intervista come autopresentazione, con VII tavole di Giulio Paolini, Collana Scritti dall'arte, Tema Celeste Edizioni, 1992. Preferenze critiche. Uno sguardo sull'arte visiva contemporanea, Nuova Biblioteca, Bari, Dedalo, Design: percorsi e trascorsi, Collana Design e comunicazione, Bologna, Lupetti, Nuova ed. aggiornata, Fulvio Carmagnola, Lupetti, . Conformisti, Collana Saggine, Roma, Donzelli, 1997,  978-88-7989-327-5. Fatti e fattoidi. Gli pseudoeventi nell'arte e nella società, Vicenza, Neri Pozza, 1997.Massimo Carboni, Roma, Castelvecchi, Irritazioni. Un'analisi del costume contemporaneo, Collana Attraverso lo specchio, Luni, 1997,  978-88-7984-046-0.Massimo Carboni, Collana I Timoni, Roma, Castelvecchi, ,  978-88-761-5383-9. Scritti di Architettura (1930-1998), L. Tedeschi, Milano, Mendrisio Academy Press, Gillo Dorfles-Flavia Puppo, Dorfles e dintorni, Collana Le vele, Milano, Archinto, 2005,  978-88-7768-429-5. Lacerti della memoria. Taccuini intermittenti, Collana Quadrifogli, Bologna, Editrice Compositori, 2007,  978-88-7794-567-9. L'artista e il fotografo, Verso l'Arte, 2008,  978-88-95894-16-4. Conformisti. La morte dell'autenticità, Massimo Carboni, Roma, Castelvecchi, 2008,  978-88-7615-260-3. Horror Pleni. La (in)civiltà del rumore, Collana I Timoni, Roma, Castelvecchi, Arte e comunicazione. Comunicazione e struttura nell'analisi di alcuni linguaggi artistici, Collana Saggi, Milano, Mondadori Education, Inviato alla Biennale, A. De Simone, Milano, Scheiwiller, ,  978-88-7644-632-0. 99+1 risposte, Lorenzo Michelli, Trieste, Comunicarte Edizioni, Movimento Arte Concreta (1948-1958), Luigi Sansone e N. Ossanna Cavadini, Milano, Mazzotta, Poesie, Campanotto Editore, ,  978-88-456-1347-0. L'ascensore senza specchio, Quaderni di prosa e di invenzione n.9, Milano, Edizioni Henry Beyle, . Kitsch: oggi il kitsch, Aldo Colonetti et al., Bologna, Editrice Compositori, Arte con sentimento. Conversazione con Gillo Dorfles, Marco Meneguzzo, Collana Polaroid, Milano, Medusa Edizioni, ,  978-88-7698-300-9. Essere nel tempo, Achille Bonito Oliva, Milano, Skira, ,   Gli artisti che ho incontrato, Luigi Sansone, Milano, Skira, , La logica dell'approssimazione, nell'arte e nella vita, Aldo Colonnetti, Silvana, Estetica senza dialettica. Scritti dal 1933 al , Luca Cesari, Collana Il pensiero occidentale, Milano, Bompiani, ,  978-88-452-8095-5. Paesaggi e personaggi, Enrico Rotelli, Milano, Bompiani, ,  88-452-9407-2. La mia America, Luigi Sansone, Milano, Skira, ,  978-88-572-3807-4. Saggi e articoli "Interviene Gillo Dorfles", in alterlinus, gennaio/febbraio 1985. "Calligaro: parole e immagini", in Preferenze critiche, Dedalo, 1993. "Né moduli, né rimedi", in Agalma, no. 3, giugno 2002,  27–31. "Disarmonia, asimmetria, wabi, sabi", in Agalma, no. 6, settembre 2003,  55–58. "Feticcio", in Agalma, no. 16, settembre 2008,  16–17. "Paolo Barozzi", in Da Duchamp agli Happening. Articoli pubblicati su Il Mondo di Pannunzio e altri scritti, Campanotto Editore, . Traduzioni Rudolf Arnheim, Arte e percezione visiva, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1962. Rudolf Arnheim, Guernica. Genesi di un dipinto, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1964. Note  Addio a Gillo Dorfles: «La mia vita infinita da Francesco Giuseppe agli smartphone», su corriere.it. 2 marzo  (archiviato il 3 marzo ).  Gruber, Ruth Ellen. Jewish Heritage Travel: A Guide to East-Central Europe. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1992, su iajgsjewishcemeteryproject.org. 2 marzo  3 marzo ).  Aldo Cazzullo, Gillo Dorfles: la mia vita infinita da Francesco Giuseppe agli smartphone, Corriere della sera, 10 febbraio  Archiviato il 12 febbraio  in ..  Redazione, Novità formali e riesumazioni di precedenti esempi, il contemporaneo è un linguaggio nuovo di un sapere condiviso | QM, su quidmagazine.com. 2 marzo  (archiviato il 3 marzo ).  Biografia di Gillo Dorfles, sul sito delle Edizioni Il Bulino, su ilbulinoeditore.it. 23 febbraio  28 febbraio ).  Galliano Mazzon, Mostra antologia (1926-1969) di Galliano Mazzon : Civico Padiglione d'Arte Moderna, Milano, 3-28 ottobre 1969, Milano, Civico Padiglione d'Arte Moderna, 1969,  843294483.  Visualizzazione limitata su Google Libri: Mostra antologia (1926-1969) di Galliano Mazzon : Civico Padiglione d'Arte Moderna, Milano, 3-28 ottobre 1969, su books.google.it. 2 marzo  (archiviato il 3 marzo ).  Luciano Caramel, Arte in Italia, 1945-1960, su books.google.it. 19 marzo  (archiviato il 19 marzo ).  Dioguardi Gianfranco, Processo edilizio e progetto: vecchi attori alla ricerca di nuovi ruoli, Milano : Franco Angeli, Studi organizzativi. Fascicolo 2, 2005  Corriere della Sera, 16 gennaio 2009  Cfr. la raccolta degli scritti di Dorfles raccolti in Architetture Ambigue: Dal Neobarocco al Postmoderno, Dedalo, Bari 1984.  Di Giovanni Marilisa, Il corpo, nuova forma: la body art, Cheiron : materiali e strumenti di aggiornamento storiografico. A.24, 2007.  electaweb.it, su Gillo Dorfles: arte e comunicazione. 21 maggio 2009 12 marzo ).  VitriolTriennale [collegamento interrotto], su triennale.org.  Sussidiaria: GPS / GaPSle Forbici di Manitù (BAU14). 2 marzo  27 dicembre ).  Celeste Prize BAU 14Container of Contemporary Culture[collegamento interrotto].  Antonio Gnoli, E' morto Gillo Dorfles, scompare a 107 anni il rivoluzionario critico d'arte, La Repubblica, 2 marzo . 4 marzo  (archiviato il 4 marzo ).  Stefano Bucci, Morto Gillo Dorfles, critico poliedrico. Aveva 107 anni, Corriere della Sera, 2 marzo . 4 marzo  (archiviato il 4 marzo ).  Addio ad Alma Dorfles, signora di cultura, Il Piccolo, 4 aprile . 5 marzo  5 marzo ).  Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato., su quirinale.it. 16 febbraio  (archiviato il 18 gennaio ).  Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato., su quirinale.it. 16 febbraio  (archiviato il 6 ottobre ).  Intervista a Gillo Dorfles, su conoscenza.rai.it. Sergio Mandelli, Capire l'arte contemporaneaGillo Dorfles, su youtube.com Gillo Dorfles , 106 anni (normali) «Mi sveglio, lavoro. Amo il vino», in Corriere della Sera. 15 gennaio . Aldo Cazzullo, Gillo Dorfles: la mia vita infinita da Francesco Giuseppe agli smartphone, in Corriere della Sera.  l'11 febbraio . V D M Vincitori Premio Feronia-Città di Fiano.

 

Doria: Paolo Mattia Doria (Genova), filosofo. Discorso apologetico, 1735 Nato da Giacomo Doria e Maria Cecilia Spinola, appartenente alla nobile casata dei Doria Lamba dalla quale provennero ben quattro Dogi della Repubblica di Genova, ebbe un'infanzia travagliata segnata a cinque anni dalla morte del padre. L'uscita dalla famiglia delle tre sorelle lo fecero rimanere all'età di 13 anni solo con la madre che influenzò negativamente il suo carattere «melanconico ma vivace», il suo desiderio di «virtù e gloria». La madre, che egli accusava esser stata «de' miei errori ... la prima e principal cagione», si era disinteressata del figlio limitandosi ad affidarne l'educazione a medici e pedagoghi bigotti che lo fecero crescere con la paura delle malattie e della morte, che gli veniva indicata dai suoi educatori gesuiti come «un positivo castigo agli uomini rei».  Il giovane Paolo divenne quindi un giovane «vivace e grazioso nelle conversazioni ... affabile con tutti, facile e condiscendente con gli amici» e allo stesso tempo pieno di sé e fatuo divenendo «uno di quei Petits Maitres disinvolti e alla moda, ... li quali prendono per idea di virtù vere ed esistenti tutte le vanità ... e molte volte prendono con idee di virtù li vizj ancora.  Pieno di sé e fatuo. Compì con la madre il classico viaggio (Grand Tour) in Italia dei giovani ben nati dal quale ne uscì libero dalle inibizioni religiose ma con «nuovi abiti di mente viziosi, ... li quali mi facevano mirare come idee di virtù la rilassatezza ne' sensi, la prepotenza con i deboli e la vendetta»  Tornato a Genova trovò la sua città bombardata dal mare dalle navi di Luigi XIV che voleva punirla per la sua politica filospagnola. In quell'occasione conobbe Tomás Enriquez de Cabrera conte di Melgar che era stato chiamato a difendere la città. Il conte avviò il giovane nelle arti militari e lo introdusse nel giro del patriziato mondano.  Innamoratosi fortemente di una «meritevole donna» che morì poco tempo dopo, cadde in depressione e per distrarsi dal dolore riprese i suoi dispendiosi viaggi in Italia. Ridotto in ristrettezze economiche si recò a Napoli per recuperare certi suoi crediti ma dovette lottare per oltre vent'anni per districarsi dalla palude di leggi e cavillose procedure al punto che si mise egli stesso a studiare legge con un certo profitto per ottenere dai tribunali quanto gli spettava.  La sua fama di spadaccino gli fece guadagnare le simpatie del patriziato napoletano che riteneva «massime di cavagliero ... che fusse atto di disonore e di vergogna il non punire un uomo a sé inferiore quando si haveva da quello qualche offesa ricevuto, e che il perdonare generosamente fusse vergogna; ... ma poscia ... era massima d'estrema vergogna il non chiamare a duello un nobile a sé uguale quando da quello si era qualche offesa ricevuta».  Si diede quindi a duellare per qualsiasi puntiglio cavalleresco tanto da essere messo in prigione aumentando così la sua fama di «duellista e vendicativo» presso la nobiltà locale.  Da duellista a metafisico Dal 1694 Paolo Mattia cominciò a disgustarsi di questa sua vita fatua e falsa trasformandosi in «filosofo metafisico» ed entrando nella cerchia degli intellettuali cartesiani e gassendisti che caddero sotto l'attacco della Chiesa preoccupata che il loro sensismo approdasse a un conclamato materialismo. La posizione della Chiesa fu esplicitata dal grande processo del 1694 contro gli "ateisti", quegli intellettuali che si erano illusi di poter modernizzare la dottrina cattolica.  Paolo Mattia si schierò con questi frequentando il salotto letterario di Nicolò Caravita che si era già battuto contro l'Inquisizione e che era divenuto il centro di diffusione della filosofia cartesiana. Qui il Doria ebbe modo di conoscere il protetto di Caravita, quel Giambattista Vico che scriverà del genovese che «fu il primo con cui poté cominciare a ragionar di metafisica» nella quale si intravedevano «lumi sfolgoranti di platonica divinità».  Gli scritti La politica  Vita civile, 1753 Per organizzarsi contro le polemiche dei tradizionalisti, sostenuti dalla Chiesa cattolica, il Caravita pensò di fondare un'associazione di intellettuali modernisti che, dopo diverse difficoltà, finalmente vide la luce nel 1698 col nome di Accademia Palatina e che annoverava fra i 18 soci fondatori anche Paolo Mattia Doria che pronunziò in quella sede lezioni concernenti la teoria politica (Sopra la vita di Claudio imperadore) dove sosteneva la superiorità della nobiltà per virtù e non per nascita, e dove contestava la base valoriale dell'aristocrazia fondata sull'uso delle armi (Dell'arte militare, Del conduttor degl'eserciti, Del governatore di piazza, Della scherma). La guerra, scriveva Doria, non era un privilegio della "nobiltà di spada" ma un'attività che richiedeva l'applicazione di tecniche scientifiche e il comando affidato a ufficiali competenti nel dirigere l'animo umano (Il capitano filosofoNapoli, 1739)  Nel 1709 Doria pubblica la Vita civile e l'educazione del principe, criticata da alcuni per alcuni fraintendimenti sul pensiero di Cartesio («non ha inteso il Cartesio, o ... ad arte ne tronca o perverte il senso»). Nell'opera si criticava la politica di Tacito e Machiavelli sostenendo che questa va basata non «sopra l'idea degli uomini quali sono» ma sulla «virtù, il giusto e l'onesto». Secondo Doria perciò lo Stato andava guidato, come dettava l'insegnamento platonico, dai filosofi facendosi così sostenitore, secondo le nuove idee riformatrici che cominciavano a circolare in Europa, di un assolutismo moderato nel Regno di Napoli.  La "mattematica" e le donne Nel 1711 Doria cominciò ad interessarsi a temi scientifici mandando alle stampe le sue Considerazioni sopra il moto e la meccanica de' corpi sensibili e de' corpi insensibili (Augusta 1711) e una Giunta di P. M. Doria al suo libro del Moto e della Meccanica (ibid. 1712). Opere queste, dove si criticava il metodo galileiano e si metteva in discussione la distinzione cartesiana fra res extensa e res cogitans in nome del principio neoplatonico dell'Uno immateriale, che non ebbero il successo sperato e vennero anzi aspramente criticate da più parti.  Doria divenne un personaggio ambito da nobili e femmes savantes che lo invitavano nei loro circoli culturali dove riceveva numerosi attestati di stima. Per ricambiare le nobili dame, sue discepole, Doria pubblicò nel 1716 i Ragionamenti ne' quali si dimostra la donna, in quasi tutte le virtù più grandi, non essere all'uomo inferiore .  Le donne, sosteneva Doria, hanno gli stessi diritti naturali degli uomini e possono governare e fondare grandi imperi ma non sono adatte fisiologicamente a formulare leggi per le quali occorre una sapienza storica e filosofica. Cartesio infatti aveva errato nel credere che Dio avesse dato a tutti «eguale abilità per intender le scienze», mentre «Iddio non ha ugualmente a tutti gli uomini distribuito e perciò vediamo che molti non son capaci nelle scienze». Quindi le donne che egli ammirava moltissimo e che lo ricambiavano con tante lodi, devono tuttavia accontentarsi di poter dirigere lo Stato ma non possono essere legislatrici. Un rapporto questo con l'altro sesso che rimase problematico per Doria che non volle mai sposarsi ritenendo il matrimonio una «legge dura» che non trovava precisa corrispondenza nella teologia..  Verso il 1718 Doria si considerava ormai un "filosofo metafisico e mattematico" che adottando il platonismo aveva pressoché «distrutto li saggi di filosofia del signor Giovanni Locke ed in parte ancora la filosofia di Renato Des-Cartes».  Un capovolgimento di fronte Doria compiva un capovolgimento delle sue convinzioni moderniste passando nel campo degli "antichi" quando il suo Nuovo metodo geometrico (Augusta 1714) e i Dialoghi ... ne' quali ... s'insegna l'arte di esaminare una dimostrazione geometrica, e di dedurre dalla geometria sintetica la conoscenza del vero e del falso (Amsterdam 1718), furono aspramente criticati da parte della rivista Acta eruditorum di Lipsia. Ancora più aspre le contestazioni ricevute a Napoli che gli costarono un sonetto denigratorio che così recitava: «Di rispondere a te nessun si sogna / de' nostri, e strano è assai che Lipsia mandi / risposta a un uom che 'l matto ognun lo noma»   Illustrazione alla recensione pubblicata sugli Acta Eruditorum del 1743 al Capitano filosofo Nel 1733, fu rifondata l'Accademia degli Oziosi, dove Doria profuse tutte le sue energie nel criticare i "moderni", seguaci del pensiero filosofico di John Locke, dell'Accademia delle scienze di Celestino Galiani che aveva detto di lui «il Doria ha ristampato tutte in un corpo le sue coglionerie».  Con l'avvento del re riformista Carlo III di Borbone nel Regno di Napoli, Doria si trovò completamente isolato col suo «platonismo pratticabile» che continuava a difendere scrivendo nel 1739 il Politico alla moda.  Doria si rendeva ormai conto di come fosse irrealizzabile il suo ideale di un governo ad opera di sovrani virtuosi e filosofi legislatori: «li magistrati, li capitani, li sacerdoti, e tutti gli ordini che governano hanno diviso la filosofia dalla politica per unire alla politica la sola prattica»; ormai «i principiscrivevavogliono governare lo stato colla politica de mercadanti, e non con quella de filosofi». Egli constatava come vi fosse ormai una generale crisi dei valori «perché in questo nostro tempo si corre dietro solamente alla perniciosa filosofia di Locke e di Newton e si pratica solamente la politica mercantile»  Completamente ignorato dall'ambiente intellettuale, Doria malato e in difficoltà economiche moriva nel 1746 indicando nel suo testamento la volontà che fosse pubblicata a spese di un suo cugino, a saldo di un debito da questi contratto, l'opera Idea di una perfetta repubblica.  Quando lo scritto fu infine edito nel 1753 fu condannato dai revisori ad essere bruciato per il suo contenuto contro «Dio, la religione e la monarchia». In realtà l'autore contestava il celibato ecclesiastico, l'indissolubilità del matrimonio, la castita, l'eternità delle pene inflitte ai dannati e l'ideologia etico-politica dei gesuiti.  Il governo perfetto, ribadiva Doria nell'opera postuma, doveva essere a imitazione di quello di Sparta e della Roma repubblicana, «perché posto il governo in mano agli uomini, è forza che sia moderato da un magistrato ordinato alla difesa del popolo contro la tirannia»  Gli unici a esecrare il rogo dell'opera furono proprio i giuristi napoletani difendendo «i libri di quel savio e cordato vecchio di Doria, di cui s'infama la venerata memoria».  Lo smantellamento delle reti fiduciarie nel Regno di Napoli L'opera  di Paolo Mattia Doria è al centro del saggio di Anthony Pagden dal titolo La distruzione della fiducia e le sue conseguenze economiche a Napoli nel secolo XVIII. In estrema sintesi il Pagden argomenta, poggiando la propria analisi sugli scritti di Doria, che nel corso del secolo XVII, il governo spagnolo, nell'azione di depredazione del Regno di Napoli aveva «spogliato i loro sudditi della virtù e della ricchezza, introducendo al posto loro ignoranza, infamia, divisione e infelicità».  Altra azione, che si rivelerà in seguito disastrosa per la società napoletana e in genere per il Mezzogiorno, fu lo smantellamento dei rapporti interpersonali di fiducia tra le diverse classi, necessari per lo sviluppo dei commerci e dell'iniziativa privata e l'introduzione della cultura dell'onore attraverso l'infoltimento dei ranghi nobiliari, il rafforzamento dell'Inquisizione, l'inasprimento della segretezza dell'attività di governo, l'incremento delle cerimonie religiose e di devozione ritualizzata, l'aumento della diseguaglianza davanti alla legge e infine l'indebolimento apertamente perseguito del rapporto armonioso che si era creato in passato tra i diversi ordini del Regno: tutto ciò al fine di scoraggiare, minando la fede pubblica, l'ascesa di una classe imprenditoriale-commerciale che avanzasse i propri diritti e rompesse l'equilibrio dei poteri tra la corte e il patriziato locale che gli spagnoli intendevano mantenere. Tutti questi fattori, lesivi di quel rapporto di fiducia tra le classi necessario per l'avvio e il consolidamento dell'attività di cooperazione e di intrapresa economica, non tarderanno a produrre effetti duraturi sulla società meridionale, non solo a livello mentale-culturale, e di converso a livello economico, costituendo uno dei fattori prodromici dell'arretratezza socio-economico-culturale del Mezzogiorno d'Italia.  Opere: Paolo Mattia Doria, Considerazioni sopra il moto e la meccanica de' corpi sensibili, e de' corpi insensibili, In Augusta [i.e. Napoli?, Daniello Hopper. Considerazioni sopra il moto e la meccanica de' corpi sensibili, e de' corpi insensibili. Giunta, In Augusta [i.e. Napoli?, Daniello Hopper; Dialoghi, Amsterdam, sn, 1718. 13 giugno . Esercitazioni geometriche, In Pariggi, Duplicationis cubi demonstratio, Venetiis, Discorso apologetico, In Venezia, Soluzione del problema della trisezione dell'angolo, In Venezia; Vita civile, In Napoli, Angelo Vocola. Pierluigi Rovito, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani.  Doria, L’arte di conoscer se stesso, in P. De Fabrizio , Manoscritti napoletani, Paolo Mattia Doria, L'arte di conoscer se stesso, Doria, L'arte di conoscer se stesso414.  Paolo Mattia Doria, L'arte di conoscer se stesso416.  Paolo Mattia Doria, L'arte di conoscere se stesso421.  Paolo Mattia Doria, Autobiografia, in P. Cristofolini , Opere filosofiche, 197120.  R. Ajello, Diritto ed economia in P. M. D.104  Vita civile6, ed. Augusta, 1710  Ibid.,  344 s.  S. Rotta in Politici ed economisti del primo Settecento. Dal Muratori al Cesarotti, V, Milano-Napoli 1978937  Paolo Mattia Doria, L'arte di conoscere se stesso423.  Eugenio Di Rienzo, «GALIANI, Celestino» in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 51, 1998.  Cit. in V. Ferrone, Scienza natura religione. Mondo newtoniano e cultura italiana nel primo Settecento, Napoli 1982533  Manoscritti, V,  26-131  La Politica mercantile (1742), Manoscritti, IV360  Ibid.306  Idea di una perfetta repubblica939  "accorato"  Ajello124  Segnatamente: Del commercio del Regno di Napoli (1740), in E. Vidal, Il pensiero civile di Paolo Mattia Doria negli scritti inediti, Istituto di Filosofia del diritto dell'Roma 1953; Della vita civile, Torino; Massime del governo spagnolo di Napoli, V. Conti, Guida, Napoli 1973.  Contenuto nel volume miscellaneo Diego Gambetta, Le strategie della fiducia, Einaudi, Torino 1989 alle 165-181 .  D. Gambetta, ibidem170  Pierluigi Rovito, «DORIA, Paolo Mattia», in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 41, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1992. Roberto Scazzieri, «Doria, Paolo Mattia», in Il Contributo italiano alla storia del PensieroEconomia, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, . Giulia Belgioioso, «Doria, Paolo Mattia», in Il Contributo italiano alla storia del PensieroFilosofia, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, . E. Vidal, Il pensiero civile di Paolo Mattia Doria negli scritti inediti, Istituto di Filosofia del diritto dell'Roma 1953 Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Paolo Mattia Doria Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Paolo Mattia Doria Encyclopædia Britannica, su britannica.com.

 

dossier: Grice is not clear about the status of thisbut some philosophers have been too mentalistic. How would a genitorial programme proceed. Is there a dossier in a handwave by which the emissor communicates that he knows the route or that he is about to leave his emissee. It does not seem so, because the handwave is unstructured. Unlike “Fido is shaggy.” In the case of “Fido is shaggy,” there must be some OVERLAP between the emissor’s soul and the emissee’s soulin terms of dossier. So perhaps there is overlap in the handwave. There must be an overlap as to WHICH route he means. By making the handwave the emissor communicates that HE, the emissor, subject IS (copula) followed by predicate “knower of the route.” So here we have a definite ‘the route.’ Which route? To heaven, to hell. Cf. The scots ‘high road,’ ‘low road.’ To Loch Lomond. If there is not this minimal common ground nothing can be communicated. In the alternative meaning, “I (subject) am (copula) about to leave youwhere again there must be an overlap in the identification of the denotata of the pronouns. In the case of Blackburn’s skull or the arrow at the fork of a road, the common ground is instituted in situu in the one-off predicament, and there still must be some overlap of dossier. In its most technical usage, Grice wants to demystify Donnellan’s identificatory versus non-identificatory uses of ‘the,’ as unnecessary implications to Russell’s otherwise neat account. The topic interested Strawson (“Principle of assumption of ignorance, knowledge and relevance”) and Urmson’s principle of aptitude. Grice’s favourite vacuous name is ‘Bellerophon.’ ‘Vacuous names’ is an essay commissioned by Davison and Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine (henceforth, W and O) for Reidel, Dordrecht. “W and O” had appeared (without Grices contribution) as a special issue of Synthese. Grices contribution, along with Quines Reply to Grice, appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians ‒ this was the time when logic was starting to be taught outside philosophy departments, or sub-faculties), such as Mitchell, Myro, Mates, Donnellan, Strawson, Grice was particularly proud to be able to quote Mates by mouth or book. Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicatura to be given maximal scope. The device in Vacuous Namess is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation. Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special existential kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer. Someone t attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society. That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees. But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside Newsletter, “W and O,” vacuous name, identificatory use, non-identificatory use, subscript device. Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the New-World impact of the Old-World ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grices and Strawsons sophisticated version of the paradigm-case argument in Word and Object.  Davidson and Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to which Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue into a separate volume, that they would approach the other infamous member of the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Davidson and Hintikka for “W and O.” Grice introduces a subscript device to account for implicatura of utterances like Marmaduke Bloggs won’t be attending the party; he was invented by the journalists. In the later section, he explores identificatory and non identificatory uses of the without involving himself in the problems Donnellan did! Some philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section on Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. The essay is structured very systematically with an initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen, followed by implicatura of vacuous Namess such as Marmaduke Bloggs, to end with definite descriptions, repr. in Ostertag, and psychological predicates. It is best to focus on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on Marmaduke Bloggs, brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his Presupposition and conversational implicaturum. There is a quantifier phrase, the, and two uses of it: one is an identificatory use (the haberdasher is clumsy, or THE haberdasher is clumsy, as Grice prefers) and then theres a derived, non-identificatory use: the haberdasher (whoever she was! to use Grices and Mitchells addendum) shows her clumsiness. The use of the numeric subscripts were complicated enough to delay the publication of this. The whole thing was a special issue of a journal. Grices contribution came when Reidel turned that into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric subscript device by square brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle enough, though. Grices contribution, Vacuous Namess, later repr. in part “Definite descriptions,” ed. Ostertag, concludes with an exploration of the phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude.  Grices choice of an ascription now notably involves an opaque (rather than factive, like know) psychological state or attitude: wanting, which he symbolizes as W.  At least Grice does not write, really, for he knew that Austin detested a trouser word! Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) will be derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will be derivable only from (ix).Grice had been Strawsons logic tutor at St. Johns (Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!) and it shows! One topic that especially concerned Grice relates to the introduction and elimination rules, as he later searches for generic satisfactoriness. Grice wonders [W]hat should be said of Takeutis conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in Xs personalized system that φ, then it is necessary with respect to X that φ is true (establishable). The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary with respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ will be a volitive expression such as let it be that X eats his hat; and my commitment to the idea that Xs system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting (buletically) let X eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. A very interesting concept Grice introduces in the definite-descriptor section of Vacuous Namess is that of a conversational dossier, for which he uses δ for a definite descriptor. The key concept is that of conversational dossier overlap, common ground, or conversational pool. Let us say that an utterer U has a dossier for a definite description δ if there is a set of definite descriptions which include δ, all the members of which the utterer supposes to be satisfied by one and the same item and the utterer U intends his addressee A to think (via the recognition that A is so intended) that the utterer U has a dossier for the definite description δ which the utterer uses, and that the utterer U has specifically selected (or chosen, or picked) this specific δ from this dossier at least partly in the hope that his addressee A has his own dossier for δ which overlaps the utterers dossier for δ, viz. shares a substantial, or in some way specially favoured, su-bset with the utterers dossier. Its unfortunate that the idea of a dossier is not better known amog Oxonian philosophers. Unlike approaches to the phenomenon by other Oxonian philosophers like Grices tutee Strawson and his three principles (conversational relevance, presumption of conversational knowledge, and presumption of conversational ignorance) or Urmson and his, apter than Strawsons, principle of conversational appositeness (Mrs.Smiths husband just delivered a letter, You mean the postman!?), only Grice took to task the idea of formalising this in terms of set-theory and philosophical psychology  ‒ note his charming reference to the utterers hope (never mind intention) that his choice of d from his dossier will overlap with some d in the dossier of his his addressee. The point of adding whoever he may be for the non-identificatory is made by Mitchell, of Worcester, in his Griceian textbook for Hutchinson. Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s “Vacuous names,” in “W and O” and its attending notes, BANC.

 

Dottarelli: Luciano Dottarelli (Bolsena), filosofo. Si è formato alla Facoltà di Filosofia dell'Perugia, dove ha studiato con Cornelio Fabro e si è laureato con una tesi sul dibattito epistemologico del Novecento (K. PopperFeyerabend, I. Lakatos, T. Kuhn) sotto la guida di Massimo Baldini. Si è poi specializzato in Filosofia all'Urbino, dove ha avuto come maestri Italo Mancini e Pasquale Salvucci, con cui ha discusso una tesi sulle implicazioni epistemologiche della filosofia di Immanuel Kant. Ha insegnato nei Licei ed è stato docente a contratto di Filosofia della scienza, Filosofia morale, Bioetica nelle Università della Tuscia, di Macerata e Firenze.  Ha sempre coniugato il lavoro didattico e di ricerca con l'impegno civile. Per 13 anni consecutivi è stato Sindaco della città di Bolsena (VT). Eletto la prima volta nel 1986, con una lista civica di sinistra, è stato successivamente confermato nel 1990 e nel 1995. Dal 2005 al  ha ricoperto il ruolo di Direttore generale della Provincia di Viterbo e in tale veste, oltre al coordinamento e alla sovrintendenza della gestione complessiva dell’Ente, ha avuto la responsabilità diretta della formazione e organizzazione delle risorse umane, del percorso di certificazione EMAS, del processo Agenda 21 locale e del progetto Arco Latino, strumento per la definizione di una strategia integrata di sviluppo dell’area del Mediterraneo. Con Pasquale Picone, filosofo e psicoanalista junghiano, nel 2004 è stato cofondatore della Società Filosofica Italianasezione di Viterbo, di cui è attualmente vicepresidente. Nel  ha costituito il Club per l’UNESCO Viterbo Tuscia, di cui è presidente.  I suoi interessi teorici si sono rivolti all'epistemologia, all'etica, alla filosofia politica e alla pratica filosofica. In Popper e il gioco della scienza ha svolto un'analisi critica dell'epistemologia falsificazionista, mostrando come l'ultimo Popper, pur rendendosi conto della coerenza dello sviluppo evoluzionistico della propria epistemologia, arretrasse e resistesse dal trarne le estreme conseguenze, restando fedele al paradigma del razionalismo critico, difendendolo sino in fondo, ma con ragioni sempre più deboli. Nei suoi lavori su Immanuel Kant (Kant e la metafisica come scienza, Abitare un mondo comune. Follia e metafisica nel pensiero di Kant) ha evidenziato sia il proposito kantiano di fondare come una scienza rigorosa la metaphysica generalis, prima parte della metafisica come era intesa nella tradizione razionalistica tedesca, sia il carattere che viene ad assumere la metaphysica specialis, dopo la critica: un pensare congetturale e analogico che è anche prassi, vita. In questa prospettiva la filosofia kantiana viene valorizzata per la sua peculiare dimensione "cosmica", come «scienza della relazione di ogni conoscenza e di ogni uso della ragione umana con lo scopo essenziale di essa», e viene ricollegata alla filosofia come era praticata soprattutto nell'antichità: arte di vivere, esercizio spirituale. Il filosofo pratico, il maestro di saggezza tramite l’insegnamento e l’esempio, è così «l’autentico filosofo», che, nel quadro della complessiva ed originale riorganizzazione kantiana dell’orizzonte utopico di derivazione platonica e rousseauiana, diventa esso stesso un ideale regolativo, al quale colui che più si è avvicinato è stato Socrate, per via della sua esemplare coerenza di vita. In Freud. Un filosofo dietro al divano, il lavoro del fondatore della psicoanalisi viene letto come un episodio della lunga tradizione che ha interpretato la filosofia come "medicina per l'anima". Il rapporto di Freud con la filosofia si nutre di una profonda ambivalenza: da un lato un'irresistibile attrazione; dall'altro quasi la necessità di rassicurare se stesso e gli altri su una propria «incapacità costituzionale» (Autobiografia, 1924) alla pura speculazione e sulla sua ferma volontà di sottrarsiproprio lui, formidabile affabulatoreal fascino delle narrazioni filosofiche. La riflessione di Freud non trascura nessuna delle dimensioni fondamentali della ricerca filosofica. Neanche quella teoretica, volta a costruire visioni complessive dell’uomo e del mondo; quella che gli appare la più rischiosa, perché la più astratta, la più esposta alla frequentazione della metafisica e della religione, sempre in procinto di cadere nella trappola della verità assoluta. Più a suo agio Freud si sente invece nel lavorare lungo un'altra linea d’impegno tradizionale della filosofia: la riflessione critica sui saperi e sulle pratiche umane. Nell'opera di smascheramento dei meccanismi con cui le ideologie e le prassi individuali e sociali ammantano la loro miseria “umana, troppo umana”, le potenzialità della psicoanalisi si esprimono al meglio. Masecondo l'interpretazione di Luciano Dottarellila fatica intellettuale di Freud trova la propria collocazione più appropriata nella dimensione della ricerca filosofica che interpreta se stessa come un’attività in cui l’uomo si dedica alla cura e alla fioritura di sé, alla coltivazione della propria umanità. Questa dimensione della filosofia come arte di vivere è stata approfondita da Luciano Dottarelli attraverso la ricostruzione della vita e del pensiero del filosofo stoico Musonio Rufo nella monografia su Musonio l'Etrusco. La filosofia come scienza di vita. Testimonianza della vitalità della tradizione culturale etrusca in epoca romana, la filosofia di Musonio è espressione significativa di quel crogiolo di idee ed esperienze di ricerca della felicità che è l'ellenismo della tarda antichità, in cui si rispecchierà poi la civiltà medievale e soprattutto quella umanistico-rinascimentale. Musonio ha dato il tono di fondo all'impegno prevalente nella tradizione filosofica della Tuscia: ricerca di una scienza di vita, studio di perfezione, imitazione di Dio, àskesis, esercizio per sviluppare la conoscenza e la coltivazione di sé, finalizzata alla fioritura dell’autentica esistenza umana. L’adesione del filosofo di Volsinii allo stoicismo è decisamente sotto il segno di Socrate: la filosofia può proporsi come arte regia in quanto, in primo luogo, è arte di governare se stessi. L’ideale dell’autosufficienza del saggio si traduce nella predilezione per l’agricoltura, come attività più appropriata per il filosofo. «La terra in effettiaffermava Musonioricambia con i frutti più belli e più giusti coloro che si prendono cura di essa, dando molte volte tanto quel che riceve ed offrendo grande abbondanza di tutto quanto è necessario per vivere a chi ha la volontà di faticare: e tutto questo con decenza, nulla di ciò con vergogna». Ad un analogo sentimento di appartenenza al cosmo e ad un profondo rispetto per gli altri esseri umani e per tutti i viventi, sono ispirate anche le sue riflessioni sui rapporti sociali, sulla schiavitù, sulle donne, sulla nonviolenza, sull'alimentazione, sul vestire e sull'abitare. Riflessioni che Musoniosecondo la concorde testimonianza dei contemporaneiseppe tradurre con coerenza esemplare in una efficace pratica di elevazione spirituale, diretta a coinvolgere, insieme, il corpo e l’anima. Sobrietà, rispetto, universalità e condivisione sono le parole di riferimento di una visione etica che anticipa in modo sorprendente istanze fondamentali della moderna sensibilità ecologista. La visione della filosofia come arte di maneggiare gli assoluti è approfondita nel libro Maneggiare assoluti. Immanuel Kant, Primo Levi e altri maestri. «La filosofiasostiene Luciano Dottarellianche quella più incline a farsi coinvolgere nell'impresa di estinguere la sete dell’assoluto, contiene in sé, nella propria vocazione alla ricerca di una comune verità mediante il dialogo, un antidoto indispensabile al rischio distruttivo che può annidarsi in ogni tentativo umano, tanto umano di cogliere la totalità, l’infinito, Dio. Anche le grandi tradizioni religiose, quelle che da secoli sono impegnate a tracciare sentieri, trovare parole, celebrare liturgie per saziare la fame di assoluto che agita il cuore e la mente degli uomini non possono fare a meno di intessere un intenso dialogo con questa tradizione di ricerca, soprattutto nei momenti cruciali, quando diventa urgente addomesticare i dèmoni che una frequentazione inadeguata del sacro può evocare. Dèmoni che portano il nome di fanatismo, intolleranza, totalitarismo e di cui la storia degli uomini alla ricerca della verità assoluta, della totalità autentica ed incondizionata, dell’esperienza integrale è purtroppo costellata. La consapevolezza che anche la filosofia non possa dichiararsi storicamente innocente, non cancella ma spinge a ritrovare sempre di nuovo la vocazione più profonda di quest’originale forma di esercizio spirituale: una ricerca appassionata del bene e della verità, capace di resistere alla suggestione del possesso compiuto e di mantenersi in quella apertura alla possibilità dell’errore che è presidio di autentica libertà per sé e per gli altri».  Opere Popper e il "gioco della scienza", Massari, 1992 Kant e la metafisica come scienza, Massari, 1995 Abitare un mondo comune. Follia e metafisica nel pensiero di Kant (Introduzione al Saggio sulle malattie della mente di I.Kant, Massari, 2001 Utopia e ragione come luoghi di incontro con l’altro, in  Le ragioni della speranza, La Piccola Editrice, 2003 Maneggiare assoluti. Immanuel Kant, Primo Levi e altri maestri, Il Prato,  Musonio l’Etrusco. La filosofia come scienza di vita, Annulli Editori,  Freud. Un filosofo dietro al divano, Annulli Editori,  Riverberi. Di Tuscia e d’altro, Annulli Editori,  La farfalla dell’anima e la libertà , Armando Editore,  Note  Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali  amministratori.interno.gov.it/amministratori/ServletVisualxCom3  Club per l'UNESCOViterbo TUSCIA  http://treccani.it/magazine/webtv/videos/Conv_Musonio.html.

 

Doxastic:: discussed by J. L. Austin in the myth of the cave. Plato is doing some form of linguistic botany when he distinguishes between the doxa and the epistemeStich made it worse with his ‘sub-doxastic’! from Grecian doxa, ‘belief’, of or pertaining to belief. A doxastic mental state, for instance, is or incorporates a belief. Doxastic states of mind are to be distinguished, on the one hand, from such non-doxastic states as desires, sensations, and emotions, and, on the other hand, from subdoxastic states. By extension, a doxastic principle is a principle governing belief. A doxastic principle might set out conditions under which an agent’s forming or abandoning a belief is justified epistemically or otherwise. 

 

doxographia griceiana -- Griceian doxographers. A Griceian doxographer is a a compiler of andcommentators on the opinions of Grice. “I am my first doxographer,” Grice said. Grice enjoyed the term coined by H. Diels for the title of his work “Doxographi Graeci,” which Grice typed “Doxographi Gricei”. In his “Doxographi,” Diels assembles a series of Grecian texts in which the views of Grecian philosophers from the archaic to the Hellenistic era are set out in a relatively schematic way. In the introduction, Diels reconstructs the history of the writing of these opinions, viz. the doxography strictlythe ‘writing’ (graphein) of the ‘opinion’ (“doxa”)cfr. the unwritten opinions; Diels’s ‘Doxographi’ is now a standard part of the historiography of philosophy. Doxography is important both as a source of information about a philosopher, and also because a later philosopher (later than Grice, that is), ancient, medieval, and modern, should rely on it besides what Diels calls the ‘primary’ material“what Grice actually philosophised on.” The crucial text for Diels’s reconstruction is the book Physical Opinions of the Philosophers Placita Philosophorum, traditionally ascribed to Plutarch but no longer thought to be by him. “Placita philosophorum” lists the views of various philosophers and schools under subject headings such as “What Is Nature?” and “On the Rainbow.” Out of this oeuvre and others Diels reconstructs a Collection of Opinions that he ascribes to Aetius, a philosopher mentioned by Theodoret as its author. Diels takes Aetius’s ultimate source to be Theophrastus, who wrote a more discursive Physical Opinions. Because Aetius mentions the views of Hellenistic philosophers writing after Theophrastus, Diels postulates an intermediate source, which he calls the “Vetusta Placita.” The most accessible doxographical material for Grice is in “The Life of Opinions of the Eminent Philosopher H. P. Grice,” “Vita et sententiae H. P. Griceiani quo in philosophia probatus fuit.” by H. P. Grice, après “Vitae et sententiae eorum qui in philosophia probati fuerunt,” by Diogenes Laertius, who is, however, mainly interested in gossip. Laertius arranges philosophers by schools and treats each school chronologically.

 

Dummett:: Dummett on ‘implicaturum’ in “Truth and other enigmas”Note the animosity by Dummett against Grice’s playgroup for Grice never inviting him to a Saturday morning! “I will say this: conversational implicaturum, or as he fastidiously would prefer, the ‘implicaturum,’ was, yes, ‘invented,’ by H. P. Grice, of St. John’s, but University Lecturer, to boot, to replace an abstract semantic concept such as Frege’s ‘Sinn,’ expelled in Grice’s original Playgroup’s determination to pay attention, in the typical Oxonian manner, to nothing but what an *emisor* (never mind his emission!) ‘communicates’ in a ‘particularised’ context — so that was a good thing -- for Grice!” “Truth and other enigmas.” Cited by Grice in Way of Words -- dummett, m. a. e.cited by H. P. Grice. philosopher of language, logic, and mathematics, noted for his sympathy for metaphysical antirealism and for his exposition of the philosophy of Frege. Dummett regards allegiance to the principle of bivalence as the hallmark of a realist attitude toward any field of discourse. This is the principle that any meaningful assertoric sentence must be determinately either true or else false, independently of anyone’s ability to ascertain its truth-value by recourse to appropriate empirical evidence or methods of proof. According to Dummett, the sentences of any learnable language cannot have verification-transcendent truth conditions and consequently we should query the intelligibility of certain statements that realists regard as meaningful. On these grounds, he calls into question realism about the past and realism in the philosophy of mathematics in several of the papers in two collections of his essays, Truth and Other Enigmas 8 and The Seas of Language 3. In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics 1, Dummett makes clear his view that the fundamental questions of metaphysics have to be approached through the philosophy of language, and more specifically through the theory of meaning. Here his philosophical debts to Frege and Vitters are manifest. Dummett has been the world’s foremost expositor and champion of Frege’s philosophy, above all in two highly influential books, Frege: Philosophy of Language 3 and Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics 1. This is despite the fact that Frege himself advocated a form of Platonism in semantics and the philosophy of mathematics that is quite at odds with Dummett’s own anti-realist inclinations. It would appear, however, from what Dummett says in Origins of Analytical Philosophy 3, that he regards Frege’s great achievement as that of having presaged the “linguistic turn” in philosophy that was to see its most valuable fruit in the later work of Vitters. Vitters’s principle that grasp of the meaning of a linguistic expression must be exhaustively manifested by the use of that expression is one that underlies Dummett’s own approach to meaning and his anti-realist leanings. In logic and the philosophy of mathematics this is shown in Dummett’s sympathy for the intuitionistic approach of Brouwer and Heyting, which involves a repudiation of the law of excluded middle, as set forth in Dummett’s own book on the subject, Elements of Intuitionism 7. 

 

Duni: Emanuele Duni (Matera), filosofo.  Figlio di Francesco, maestro di cappella della cattedrale di Matera, e fratello dei compositori Egidio Romualdo ed Antonio, nell'ambiente familiare imparò la musica scrivendo anche alcune composizioni da gravicembalo, pur se non seguì le orme dei fratelli maggiori in campo musicale, e fu avviato agli studi religiosi nel Seminario della città di Matera. Laureatosi in giurisprudenza presso l'Napoli nel 1742, tornò a Matera dove aveva già intrapreso la pratica di avvocato presso la Regia Udienza e dove, chiamato dall'arcivescovo Vincenzo Lanfranchi, fu insegnante presso il Seminario; lo stesso Palazzo del Seminario divenne in seguito sede del Liceo Classico di Matera, che fu a lui intitolato. Dopo la morte del padre, lasciò la sua città natale trasferendosi dapprima a Napoli e successivamente a Roma.  Presso l'Università degli Studi La Sapienza fu docente di diritto canonico e di diritto civile, e nel 1752 pubblicò la sua prima opera, un Commentarius in cui esponeva la dottrina giuridica del codicillo, con una dedica a Papa Benedetto XIV che in seguito lo sostenne nella sua nomina alla cattedra universitaria; a Roma entrò in contatto con le opere di Giambattista Vico, del quale divenne un convinto sostenitore.  Eleggendo il Vico a suo maestro, il Duni si propose di realizzare un programma di diritto universale come fonte di tutte le leggi e costumi umani; partendo dalla sua formazione cattolica, il Duni credeva in Dio creatore del mondo e suo legislatore, e non distinse l'etica e la giurisprudenza considerandole integrative in quanto tendenti allo stesso fine, cioè a dare il senso della vita, e quindi facenti parte entrambe della filosofia. Nacque così nel 1760 il Saggio sulla giurisprudenza universale, sua opera fondamentale, dedicato al promotore della politica riformatrice del Regno meridionale, il ministro Bernardo Tanucci; il Saggio indicava esclusivamente nel vero il principio unitario delle conoscenze umane, a cui ricondurre anche la fondazione delle scienze morali. Il bene o vero morale, che differisce dal vero metafisico perché comporta anche l'elezione volontaria del vero conosciuto, si esprime come onestà e come giustizia; la morale propone l'honestum, cioè il bene secondo coscienza, e opera dall'interno, invece il diritto indica la via per andare al giusto, regolando i rapporti tra gli individui e quindi la vita sociale.  Successivamente al Saggio, il Duni scrisse nel 1763 un'opera sul rapporto tra filosofia e filologia nell'ambito della storia di Roma, ed in seguito una Risposta ai dubbi proposti dal signor Gianfrancesco Finetti in cui polemizzava contro il Finetti difendendo la memoria del Vico. Nel 1775 pubblicò a Napoli la Scienza del costume o Sia sistema del diritto universale dedicata al cardinale Leonardo Antonelli, in cui proseguiva l'opera iniziata con il Saggio del 1760; proprio a Napoli morì nel 1781, durante un breve soggiorno, e fu sepolto nella chiesa di San Marco, dove suo fratello Saverio fece incidere un epitaffio.  Opere De veteri ac novo iure codicillorum commentarius (1752) Saggio sulla giurisprudenza universale (1760) Origine e progressi del cittadino e del governo civile di Roma (1763) Scienza del costume o sia sistema del diritto universale (1775) Note  Famiglia Duni Archiviato il 31 dicembre  in . Sassiweb.it Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Emanuele Duni  Mauro Di Lisa, Emanuele Duni, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  42, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1993.  Profilo su Aptbasilicata.it, su aptbasilicata.it. Profilo su Basilicata.cc, su basilicata.cc.

 

Duso: Giuseppe (Bepi) Duso (Treviso), filosofo> Professore di filosofia politica all'Università degli studi di Padova.  Studioso dei concetti della politica moderna e riconosciuto per i suoi interventi su Althusius, sul giusnaturalismo moderno, sulla filosofia classica tedesca e sulla filosofia politica del Novecento. Giuseppe Duso ha studiato all'Padova e di Würzburg e si è laureato nel 1966 con una tesi su Hegel interprete di Platone. Nel 1971 è diventato assistente di Storia della filosofia e nel 1972 Professore di Storia della logica. Dal 1983 insegna presso l'Padova Storia della filosofia politica. Dal  in pensione, continua a lavorare in ambito internazionale. Dirige dal 1977 un Gruppo di ricerca sui concetti politici, collegato ad esperienze di ricerca in Europa e in America. È stato membro della redazione delle riviste "Il Centauro" e Laboratorio politico. Membro della Direzione della rivista "Filosofia politica" dal 1987, anno della sua fondazione, è stato membro fondatore dell'associazione "Centro di ricerca sul lessico politico europeo" (http://cirlpge.it), insieme a Roberto Esposito, Alessandro Biral, Adone Brandalise, Nicola Matteucci e altri. Nel 1999 ha fondato con alcuni colleghi il Centro Interuniversitario di Ricerca sul Lessico Politico e Giuridico Europeo (CIRLPGE), con sede presso l'Istituto suor Orsola Benincasa a Napoli, di cui è attualmente Direttore. Ha tenuto corsi di Storia della Filosofia politica, di Filosofia politica e di Analisi dei Linguaggi e dei Concetti Politici presso l'Padova fino al 12 giugno . In occasione della sua ultima lezione "ufficiale", gli allievi del gruppo di ricerca padovano sui concetti politici hanno edito in suo onore il volume "Concordia discors. Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Duso" (Padova University Press). Il 27 maggio  l'Universidad Nacional de San Martín gli conferisce la laurea honoris causa per il suo lavoro accademico in quanto "costituisce un fondamento teorico indispensabile per comprendere l'attualità".  Contributo teorico Giuseppe Duso è tra i principali fautori italiani di una riflessione sui concetti del politico, che si inserisce nel solco della Begriffsgeschichte tedesca di Brunner, Conze, Koselleck. Nei confronti di quest'ultima il gruppo padovano coordinato da Duso ha elaborato una originale linea di ricerca caratterizzata in modo duplice dalla filosofia: in primo luogo in quanto i concetti che si affermano e si diffondono con la Rivoluzione francese sono esamila loro genesi, che avviene nell'ambito delle dottrine del contratto sociale e dei sistemi di diritto naturale; ma soprattutto perché filosofico è il movimento di pensiero di chi pratica una storia concettuale consistente nell'interrogare e mettere in questione (nel senso dell'elenchos socratico) concetti (diritti, uguaglianza, libertà, potere, democrazia) che sono in genere ritenuti ovvii sia nel dibattito intellettuale, sia nella lotta politica. La storia concettuale consiste in questo modo nel comprendere la genesi, la logica e le aporie dei fondamentali concetti politici moderni. Come spiega Sandro Chignola, «il termine "storia dei concetti" (Begriffsgeschichte) compare per la prima volta nelle Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte di G. W. F. Hegel. Stanti le caratteristiche di quel testo, non si sa se il termine sia di conio hegeliano, o non piuttosto frutto di interpolazione. Esso allude ad una delle tre modalità storiografiche discusse da Hegel, ed in particolare alla "storia interpretativa" (reflektierte Geschichte), che indirizza la storia generale (Weltgeschichte) alla filosofia, da un punto di vista universale. Quest'uso linguistico della BsG. resta senza seguito. La tradizione storico-concettuale evolve invece, tra il XVIII secolo ed il XIX, nell'alveo della lessicografia filosofica tedesca.   Nella riflessione di Duso, la filosofia politica da una parte coincide con il lavoro critico della storia concettuale, e dall'altra tende, sulla base delle aporie emerse, a trovare linee di orientamento per un nuovo pensiero della politica. In tal modo viene messa in questione la modalità generalmente accettata di pensare la politica, che ha la sua radice nello sviluppo teorico che va dalla nascita della sovranità moderna sulla base del concetto di libertà ai concetti fondamentali delle nostre costituzioni democratiche, in particolare sovranità del popolo e rappresentanza politica. Il lavoro critico sui concetti moderni ha perciò una sua ricaduta nella messa in questione del dispositivo formale sia della democrazia rappresentativa che della democrazia diretta, e nel tentativo di pensare la politica mediante nuove categorie.  Pubblicazioni principali: Hegel e Platone, Padova; Contraddizione e dialettica nella formazione del pensiero fichtiano, Argalìa, Urbino; Weber: razionalità e politica (ed.), Arsenale, Venezia; La politica oltre lo Stato: Carl Schmitt (ed.), Arsenale, Venezia; Il contratto sociale nella filosofia politica moderna (ed.), Il Mulino, Bologna; Filosofia politica e pratica del pensiero: Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss e Hannah Arendt (ed.), FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1988 Il potere. Per la storia della filosofia politica moderna (ed.), Carocci, Roma, 1999 (disponibile su cirlpge.it: Parte I; Parte II; Parte III; Parte IV; Parte V) La logica del potere. Storia concettuale come filosofia politica, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1999, (Polimetrica, Monza 2007 (disponibile su cirlpge.it) La libertà nella filosofia classica tedesca. Politica e filosofia tra Kant, Fichte, Schelling e Hegel (ed. con Gaetano Rametta), Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2000 La rappresentanza politica: genesi e crisi del concetto, Franco Angeli Milano, 2003 (disponibile su cirlpge.it)(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2006 (disponibile su cirlpge.it); Buenos Aires, ) Oltre la democrazia. Un itinerario attraverso i classici (ed.), Carocci, Roma; Sui concetti giuridici e politici della costituzione dell'Europa (ed. con Sandro Chignola), FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2005 Crise de la démocratie et gouvernement de la vie, (ed. con Jean François Kervégan), Polimetrica, Monza;  Ripensare la costituzione. La questione della pluralità, (ed. con Mario Bertolissi e Antonino Scalone), Polimetrica, Monza, 2008 (disponibile su cirlpge.it) Storia dei concetti e filosofia politica, (con Sandro Chignola), FrancoAngeli, Milano; Come pensare il federalismo? Nuove categorie e trasformazioni costituzionali (ed. con A. Scalone), Polimetrica, Monza  (disponibile su cirlpge.it) Thinking about Politics beyond Modern Concepts, in New Paths in Political Philosophy, «The New Centennial Rewiew»,Begriffsgeschichte and the Modern Concept of Power, in Political Concepts and Time. New Approaches to Conceptual History I, ed. J. F. Sebastián, Cantabria University Press, Santander ,  275-304 Idea di libertà e costituzione repubblicana nella filosofia politica di Kant, Polimetrica, Monza,  (disponibile su cirlpge.it) Ripensare la rappresentanza alla luce della teologia politica, in «Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno», XLI (),  9-47 (disponibile su centropgm.unifi.it) Libertà e costituzione in Hegel, FrancoAngeli, Milano,  Parti o partiti? Sul partito politico nella democrazia rappresentativa, in «Filosofia politica», 1/,  11-38 (disponibile su cirlpge.it) Buon governo e agire politico dei governati: un nuovo modo di pensare la democrazia? (A proposito di P. Rosanvallon, Le bon gouvernement), in «Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno», XLV (),  619-650 (disponibile su centropgm.unifi.it) Onorificenze Laurea honoris causa in Filosofia Universidad Nacional de San Martin, Buenos Aires, Argentina, . Note  Giuseppe Duso | Historia Conceptual, su historiaconceptual.com. 31 maggio .  Giuseppe Duso recibió el Honoris Causa de UNSAM.. 16 giugno .  .  libri scaricabili gratuitamente in formato dal sito del CIRLPGE (Centro Interuniversitario di Ricerca sul Lessico Politico e Giuridico Europeo)//cirlpge.it/. Nello stesso sito sono disponibili inoltre altri saggi dello stesso autore.  Carl Schmitt Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Johann Gottlieb Fichte Roberto Esposito Alessandro Biral Adone Brandalise Gianfranco Miglio  New Paths in Political Philosophy: Intervento alla conferenza "New Paths in Political Philosophy" alla University of Buffalo, 28/29 marzo 2008. CIRLPGE: Sito Ufficiale.

 

dyad -- co-agency: social action: Grice: “My principle of co-operation you can call the ‘conversational contract.’ In this respect, I agree with Grice: Grice: “When I speak of conversation, I mean of a social actionwhere one agent’s expectations influence his co-agent’s” -- a subclass of human action involving the interaction among agents and their mutual orientation, or the action of groups. While all intelligible actions are in some sense social, social actions must be directed to others. Talcott Parsons 279 captured what is distinctive about social action in his concept of “double contingency,” and similar concepts have been developed by other philosophers and sociologists, including Weber, Mead, and Vitters. Whereas in monological action the agents’ fulfilling their purposes depends only on contingent facts about the world, the success of social action is also contingent on how other agents react to what the agent does and how that agent reacts to other agents, and so on. An agent successfully communicates, e.g., not merely by finding some appropriate expression in an existing symbol system, but also by understanding how other agents will understand him. Game theory describes and explains another type of double contingency in its analysis of the interdependency of choices and strategies among rational agents. Games are also significant in two other respects. First, they exemplify the cognitive requirements for social interaction, as in Mead’s analysis of agents’ perspective taking: as a subject “I”, I am an object for others “me”, and can take a third-person perspective along with others on the interaction itself “the generalized other”. Second, games are regulated by shared rules and mediated through symbolic meanings; Vitters’s private language argument establishes that rules cannot be followed “privately.” Some philosophers, such as Peter Winch, conclude from this argument that rule-following is a basic feature of distinctively social action. Some actions are social in the sense that they can only be done in groups. Individualists such as Weber, Jon Elster, and Raimo Tuomela believe that these can be analyzed as the sum of the actions of each individual. But holists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Margaret Gilbert reject this reduction and argue that in social actions agents must see themselves as members of a collective agent. Holism has stronger or weaker versions: strong holists, such as Durkheim and Hegel, see the collective subject as singular, the collective consciousness of a society. Weak holists, such as Gilbert and Habermas, believe that social actions have plural, rather than singular, collective subjects. Holists generally establish the plausibility of their view by referring to larger contexts and sequences of action, such as shared symbol systems or social institutions. Explanations of social actions thus refer not only to the mutual expectations of agents, but also to these larger causal contexts, shared meanings, and mechanisms of coordination. Theories of social action must then explain the emergence of social order, and proposals range from Hobbes’s coercive authority to Talcott Parsons’s value consensus about shared goals among the members of groups.  -- social biology, the understanding of social behavior, especially human social behavior, from a biological perspective; often connected with the political philosophy of social Darwinism. Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species highlighted the significance of social behavior in organic evolution, and in the Descent of Man, he showed how significant such behavior is for humans. He argued that it is a product of natural selection; but it was not until 4 that the English biologist William Hamilton showed precisely how such behavior could evolve, namely through “kin selection” as an aid to the biological wellbeing of close relatives. Since then, other models of explanation have been proposed, extending the theory to non-relatives. Best known is the self-describing “reciprocal altruism.” Social biology became notorious in 5 when Edward O. Wilson published a major treatise on the subject: Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Accusations of sexism and racism were leveled because Wilson suggested that Western social systems are biologically innate, and that in some respects males are stronger, more aggressive, more naturally promiscuous than females. Critics argued that all social biology is in fact a manifestation of social Darwinism, a nineteenthcentury philosophy owing more to Herbert Spencer than to Charles Darwin, supposedly legitimating extreme laissez-faire economics and an unbridled societal struggle for existence. Such a charge is extremely serious, for as Moore pointed out in his Principia Ethica 3, Spencer surely commits the naturalistic fallacy, inasmuch as he is attempting to derive the way that the world ought to be from the way that it is. Naturally enough, defenders of social biology, or “sociobiology” as it is now better known, denied vehemently that their science is mere right-wing ideology by another name. They pointed to many who have drawn very different social conclusions on the basis of biology. Best known is the Russian anarchist Kropotkin, who argued that societies are properly based on a biological propensity to mutual aid. With respect to contemporary debate, it is perhaps fairest to say that sociobiology, particularly that pertaining to humans, did not always show sufficient sensitivity toward all societal groups  although certainly there was never the crude racism of the fascist regimes of the 0s. However, recent work is far more careful in these respects. Now, indeed, the study of social behavior from a biological perspective is one of the most exciting and forward-moving branches of the life sciences.  -- social choice theory, the theory of the rational action of a group of agents. Important social choices are typically made over alternative means of collectively providing goods. These might be goods for individual members of the group, or more characteristically, public goods, goods such that no one can be excluded from enjoying their benefits once they are available. Perhaps the most central aspect of social choice theory concerns rational individual choice in a social context. Since what is rational for one agent to do will often depend on what is rational for another to do and vice versa, these choices take on a strategic dimension. The prisoner’s dilemma illustrates how it can be very difficult to reconcile individual and collectively rational decisions, especially in non-dynamic contexts. There are many situations, particularly in the provision of public goods, however, where simple prisoner’s dilemmas can be avoided and more manageable coordination problems remain. In these cases, individuals may find it rational to contractually or conventionally bind themselves to courses of action that lead to the greater good of all even though they are not straightforwardly utility-maximizing for particular individuals. Establishing the rationality of these contracts or conventions is one of the leading problems of social choice theory, because coordination can collapse if a rational agent first agrees to cooperate and then reneges and becomes a free rider on the collective efforts of others. Other forms of uncooperative behaviors such as violating rules established by society or being deceptive about one’s preferences pose similar difficulties. Hobbes attempted to solve these problems by proposing that people would agree to submit to the authority of a sovereign whose punitive powers would make uncooperative behavior an unattractive option. It has also been argued that cooperation is rational if the concept of rationality is extended beyond utility-maximizing in the right way. Other arguments stress benefits beyond selfinterest that accrue to cooperators. Another major aspect of social choice theory concerns the rational action of a powerful central authority, or social planner, whose mission is to optimize the social good. Although the central planner may be instituted by rational individual choice, this part of the theory simply assumes the institution. The planner’s task of making a onetime allocation of resources to the production of various commodities is tractable if social good or social utility is known as a function of various commodities. When the planner must take into account dynamical considerations, the technical problems are more difficult. This economic growth theory raises important ethical questions about intergenerational conflict. The assumption of a social analogue of the individual utility functions is particularly worrisome. It can be shown formally that taking the results of majority votes can lead to intransitive social orderings of possible choices and it is, therefore, a generally unsuitable procedure for the planner to follow. Moreover, under very general conditions there is no way of aggregating individual preferences into a consistent social choice function of the kind needed by the planner.  -- social constructivism, also called social constructionism, any of a variety of views which claim that knowledge in some area is the product of our social practices and institutions, or of the interactions and negotiations between relevant social groups. Mild versions hold that social factors shape interpretations of the world. Stronger versions maintain that the world, or some significant portion of it, is somehow constituted by theories, practices, and institutions. Defenders often move from mild to stronger versions by insisting that the world is accessible to us only through our interpretations, and that the idea of an independent reality is at best an irrelevant abstraction and at worst incoherent. This philosophical position is distinct from, though distantly related to, a view of the same name in social and developmental psychology, associated with such figures as Piaget and Lev Vygotsky, which sees learning as a process in which subjects actively construct knowledge. Social constructivism has roots in Kant’s idealism, which claims that we cannot know things in themselves and that knowledge of the world is possible only by imposing pre-given categories of thought on otherwise inchoate experience. But where Kant believed that the categories with which we interpret and thus construct the world are given a priori, contemporary constructivists believe that the relevant concepts and associated practices vary from one group or historical period to another. Since there are no independent standards for evaluating conceptual schemes, social constructivism leads naturally to relativism. These views are generally thought to be present in Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which argues that observation and methods in science are deeply theory-dependent and that scientists with fundamentally different assumptions or paradigms effectively live in different worlds. Kuhn thus offers a view of science in opposition to both scientific realism which holds that theory-dependent methods can give us knowledge of a theory-independent world and empiricism which draws a sharp line between theory and observation. Kuhn was reluctant to accept the apparently radical consequences of his views, but his work has influenced recent social studies of science, whose proponents frequently embrace both relativism and strong constructivism. Another influence is the principle of symmetry advocated by David Bloor and Barry Barnes, which holds that sociologists should explain the acceptance of scientific views in the same way whether they believe those views to be true or to be false. This approach is elaborated in the work of Harry Collins, Steve Woolgar, and others. Constructivist themes are also prominent in the work of feminist critics of science such as Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway, and in the complex views of Bruno Latour. Critics, such as Richard Boyd and Philip Kitcher, while applauding the detailed case studies produced by constructivists, claim that the positive arguments for constructivism are fallacious, that it fails to account satisfactorily for actual scientific practice, and that like other versions of idealism and relativism it is only dubiously coherent.  Then there’s the idea of a ‘contract,’ or social contract, an agreement either between the people and their ruler, or among the people in a community. The idea of a social contract has been used in arguments that differ in what they aim to justify or explain e.g., the state, conceptions of justice, morality, what they take the problem of justification to be, and whether or not they presuppose a moral theory or purport to be a moral theory. Traditionally the term has been used in arguments that attempt to explain the nature of political obligation and/or the kind of responsibility that rulers have to their subjects. Philosophers such as Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant argue that human beings would find life in a prepolitical “state of nature” a state that some argue is also presocietal so difficult that they would agree  either with one another or with a prospective ruler  to the creation of political institutions that each believes would improve his or her lot. Note that because the argument explains political or social cohesion as the product of an agreement among individuals, it makes these individuals conceptually prior to political or social units. Marx and other socialist and communitarian thinkers have argued against conceptualizing an individual’s relationship to her political and social community in this way. Have social contracts in political societies actually taken place? Hume ridicules the idea that they are real, and questions what value makebelieve agreements can have as explanations of actual political obligations. Although many social contract theorists admit that there is almost never an explicit act of agreement in a community, nonetheless they maintain that such an agreement is implicitly made when members of the society engage in certain acts through which they give their tacit consent to the ruling regime. It is controversial what actions constitute giving tacit consent: Plato and Locke maintain that the acceptance of benefits is sufficient to give such consent, but some have argued that it is wrong to feel obliged to those who foist upon us benefits for which we have not asked. It is also unclear how much of an obligation a person can be under if he gives only tacit consent to a regime. How are we to understand the terms of a social contract establishing a state? When the people agree to obey the ruler, do they surrender their own power to him, as Hobbes tried to argue? Or do they merely lend him that power, reserving the right to take it from him if and when they see fit, as Locke maintained? If power is merely on loan to the ruler, rebellion against him could be condoned if he violates the conditions of that loan. But if the people’s grant of power is a surrender, there are no such conditions, and the people could never be justified in taking back that power via revolution. Despite controversies surrounding their interpretation, social contract arguments have been important to the development of modern democratic states: the idea of the government as the creation of the people, which they can and should judge and which they have the right to overthrow if they find it wanting, contributed to the development of democratic forms of polity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  and  revolutionaries explicitly acknowledged their debts to social contract theorists such as Locke and Rousseau. In the twentieth century, the social contract idea has been used as a device for defining various moral conceptions e.g. theories of justice by those who find its focus on individuals useful in the development of theories that argue against views e.g. utilitarianism that allow individuals to be sacrificed for the benefit of the group -- social epistemology, the study of the social dimensions or determinants of knowledge, or the ways in which social factors promote or perturb the quest for knowledge. Some writers use the term ‘knowledge’ loosely, as designating mere belief. On their view social epistemology should simply describe how social factors influence beliefs, without concern for the rationality or truth of these beliefs. Many historians and sociologists of science, e.g., study scientific practices in the same spirit that anthropologists study native cultures, remaining neutral about the referential status of scientists’ constructs or the truth-values of their beliefs. Others try to show that social factors like political or professional interests are causally operative, and take such findings to debunk any objectivist pretensions of science. Still other writers retain a normative, critical dimension in social epistemology, but do not presume that social practices necessarily undermine objectivity. Even if knowledge is construed as true or rational belief, social practices might enhance knowledge acquisition. One social practice is trusting the opinions of authorities, a practice that can produce truth if the trusted authorities are genuinely authoritative. Such trust may also be perfectly rational in a complex world, where division of epistemic labor is required. Even a scientist’s pursuit of extra-epistemic interests such as professional rewards may not be antithetical to truth in favorable circumstances. Institutional provisions, e.g., judicial rules of evidence, provide another example of social factors. Exclusionary rules might actually serve the cause of truth or accuracy in judgment if the excluded evidence would tend to mislead or prejudice jurors.  -- social philosophy, broadly the philosophy of socisocial Darwinism social philosophy 856   856 ety, including the philosophy of social science and many of its components, e.g., economics and history, political philosophy, most of what we now think of as ethics, and philosophy of law. But we may distinguish two narrower senses. In one, it is the conceptual theory of society, including the theory of the study of society  the common part of all the philosophical studies mentioned. In the other, it is a normative study, the part of moral philosophy that concerns social action and individual involvement with society in general. The central job of social philosophy in the first of these narrower senses is to articulate the correct notion or concept of society. This would include formulating a suitable definition of ‘society’; the question is then which concepts are better for which purposes, and how they are related. Thus we may distinguish “thin” and “thick” conceptions of society. The former would identify the least that can be said before we cease talking about society at all  say, a number of people who interact, whose actions affect the behavior of their fellows. Thicker conceptions would then add such things as community rules, goals, customs, and ideals. An important empirical question is whether any interacting groups ever do lack such things and what if anything is common to the rules, etc., that actual societies have. Descriptive social philosophy will obviously border on, if not merge into, social science itself, e.g. into sociology, social psychology, or economics. And some outlooks in social philosophy will tend to ally with one social science as more distinctively typical than others  e.g., the individualist view looks to economics, the holist to sociology. A major methodological controversy concerns holism versus individualism. Holism maintains that at least some social groups must be studied as units, irreducible to their members: we cannot understand a society merely by understanding the actions and motivations of its members. Individualism denies that societies are “organisms,” and holds that we can understand society only in that way. Classic G. sociologists e.g., Weber distinguished between Gesellschaft, whose paradigm is the voluntary association, such as a chess club, whose activities are the coordinated actions of a number of people who intentionally join that group in order to pursue the purposes that identify it; and Gemeinschaft, whose members find their identities in that group. Thus, the  are not a group whose members teamed up with like-minded people to form  society. They were  before they had separate individual purposes. The holist views society as essentially a Gemeinschaft. Individualists agree that there are such groupings but deny that they require a separate kind of irreducibly collective explanation: to understand the  we must understand how typical  individuals behave  compared, say, with the G.s, and so on. The methods of Western economics typify the analytical tendencies of methodological individualism, showing how we can understand large-scale economic phenomena in terms of the rational actions of particular economic agents. Cf. Adam Smith’s invisible hand thesis: each economic agent seeks only his own good, yet the result is the macrophenomenal good of the whole. Another pervasive issue concerns the role of intentional characterizations and explanations in these fields. Ordinary people explain behavior by reference to its purposes, and they formulate these in terms that rely on public rules of language and doubtless many other rules. To understand society, we must hook onto the selfunderstanding of the people in that society this view is termed Verstehen. Recent work in philosophy of science raises the question whether intentional concepts can really be fundamental in explaining anything, and whether we must ultimately conceive people as in some sense material systems, e.g. as computer-like. Major questions for the program of replicating human intelligence in data-processing terms cf. artificial intelligence are raised by the symbolic aspects of interaction. Additionally, we should note the emergence of sociobiology as a potent source of explanations of social phenomena. Normative social philosophy, in turn, tends inevitably to merge into either politics or ethics, especially the part of ethics dealing with how people ought to treat others, especially in large groups, in relation to social institutions or social structures. This contrasts with ethics in the sense concerned with how individual people may attain the good life for themselves. All such theories allot major importance to social relations; but if one’s theory leaves the individual wide freedom of choice, then a theory of individually chosen goods will still have a distinctive subject matter. The normative involvements of social philosophy have paralleled the foregoing in important ways. Individualists have held that the good of a society must be analyzed in terms of the goods of its individual members. Of special importance has been the view that society must respect indisocial philosophy social philosophy 857   857 vidual rights, blocking certain actions alleged to promote social good as a whole. Organicist philosophers such as Hegel hold that it is the other way around: the state or nation is higher than the individual, who is rightly subordinated to it, and individuals have fundamental duties toward the groups of which they are members. Outrightly fascist versions of such views are unpopular today, but more benign versions continue in modified form, notably by communitarians. Socialism and especially communism, though focused originally on economic aspects of society, have characteristically been identified with the organicist outlook. Their extreme opposite is to be found in the libertarians, who hold that the right to individual liberty is fundamental in society, and that no institutions may override that right. Libertarians hold that society ought to be treated strictly as an association, a Gesellschaft, even though they might not deny that it is ontogenetically Gemeinschaft. They might agree that religious groups, e.g., cannot be wholly understood as separate individuals. Nevertheless, the libertarian holds that religious and cultural practices may not be interfered with or even supported by society. Libertarians are strong supporters of free-market economic methods, and opponents of any sort of state intervention into the affairs of individuals. Social Darwinism, advocating the “survival of the socially fittest,” has sometimes been associated with the libertarian view. Insofar as there is any kind of standard view on these matters, it combines elements of both individualism and holism. Typical social philosophers today accept that society has duties, not voluntary for individual members, to support education, health, and some degree of welfare for all. But they also agree that individual rights are to be respected, especially civil rights, such as freedom of speech and religion. How to combine these two apparently disparate sets of ideas into a coherent whole is the problem. John Rawls’s celebrated Theory of Justice, 1, is a contemporary classic that attempts to do just that. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Grice and Grice on the conversational contract.”

 

e: the ‘universalis abdicative.’ Cf. Grice on the Square of Opposition, or figura quadrata -- Grice, “Circling the square of Opposition.” Grice: “There is an asymmetry here. It’s supposed to be from Affirmo/Nego, but Affirmo has THREE vowels, and Nego, two; therefore, the o in affirmo is otiose.”

 

Ǝ: Ǝx. From EX-SISTENS -- Grice: “The inverted E is supposed to stand for ‘exist,’ which is a CiceronianismI mean, The Romans thought that you could sist, insist, or exist!” -- The existential quantifier. When Gentzen used /\ and \/ for ‘all’ and ‘some’ he is being logical, since ‘all’ and ‘some’ behave like ‘and’ and ‘or.’ This is not transparently shown at all by the use of the inverted A and the inverted E. This Grice called Grice’s Proportion: “and:or::every:some”. Grice: “Surely there is a relation of ‘every’ to ‘and’ and ‘some’ to ‘or.’” “Given a finite domain of discourse D = {a1, ... an} “every” is equivalent to an “and” propositions “Pai /\, … Pan.””“Analogously, “some (at least one”) is equivalent to an “or” proposition having the same structure as before:“Pai V, … Pan.”“For an infinite domain of discourse the equivalences are pretty similar, and I shouldn’t bother you with it for two long. But consider the statement, “1 + 1, and 2 + 2, 3 + 3, ..., and 100 + 100, and ..., etc.” This is an infinite  “and” proposition.  From the point of view of a system like System G, this may seem a  problem. Syntax rules are expected to generate finite formulae. But my example above is fortunate in that there is a procedure to generate every conjunct. Now, as Austin once suggested to me, having translated Frege, an assertion were to be made about every *irrational* number, it would seem that is no (Fregeian) way to enumerate every conjunct, since irrational numbers cannot be enumerated. However, a succinct equivalent formulation which avoids this problem with the ‘irrational’ number uses “every” quantification. For each natural number n, n 2 = n + n.  An analogous analysis applies to the “or” proposition: “1 is equal to 5 + 5,  2\/  is equal to 5 + 5, \/ 3 is equal to 5 + 5, ... , \/ 100 is equal to 5 + 5, or ..., etc.” This is easily rephrasable using “some (at least one)” quantification:  “For SOME natural number n, n is equal to 5+5. Aristotelian predicate calculus rescued from undue existential import As ... universal quantifier and conjunction and, on the other, between the existential quantifier and disjunction. This analogy has not passed unnoticed in logical circles. ... existential quantifiers correspond to the conjunction and disjunction operators, ...analogous analysis applies to propositional logic. ... symbol 'V' for the existential quantifier in the 'Californian' notation’ (so-called by H. P. Grice when briefly visiting Berkeley) which was ... In Grice’s system G, the quantifiers are symbolized with larger versions of the symbols used for conjunction and disjunction. Although quantified expressions cannot be translated into expressions without quantifiers, there is a conceptual connection between the universal quantifier and conjunction and between the existential quantifier and disjunction. Consider the sentence ∃xPxxPx, for example. It means that either the first member of the UD is a PP, or the second one is, or the third one is, . . . . Such a system uses the symbol ‘⋁’ instead of ‘∃.’ Grice’s manoeuver to think of the quantifier versions of De Morgan's laws is an interesting one. The statement ∀xP(x)∀xP(x) is very much like a big conjunction. If the universe of discourse is the positive integers, for example, then it is equivalent to the statement that “P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯” or, more concisely, we might write “⋀x∈UP(x),⋀x∈UP(x),” using notation similar to "sigma notation'' for sums. Of course, this is not really a "statement'' in our official mathematical logic, because we don't allow infinitely long formulas. In the same way, ∃xP(x)∃xP(x) can be thought of as “⋁x∈UP(x).⋁x∈UP(x). Now the first quantifier law can be written “¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),” which looks very much like the law “¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),” but with an infinite conjunction and disjunction. Note that we can also rewrite De Morgan's laws for ∧∧ and ∨∨ as “¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).” As Grice says, “this may look initially cumbersome, but it reflects the close relationship with the quantifier forms of De Morgan's laws.” Cited by Grice as translatable by “some (at least one)”. Noting the divergence that Strawson identified but fails to identify as a conversational implicaturum. It relates in the case of the square of opposition to the ‘particularis’ but taking into account or NOT taking into account the ‘unnecessary implication,’ as Russell calls it. “Take ‘every man is mortal.’ Surely we don’t need the unnecessary implication that there is a man!”

 

eco: Eco philosophised at the oldest varsity, BolognaGrice: “Of course, ‘varsity’ is over-rated, as I’m sure Cicero would agree!” -- Grice: “I would not call Eco a philosopher, since his dissertation is on aesthetics in Aquinas! Plus, he wrote a novel!” -- scuola bolognese-- possibly, after Speranza, one of the most Griceian of Italian philosophers (Only Speranza calls himself an Oxonian, rather!“Surely alma mater trumps all!”). Umberto Eco (Alessandria, 5 gennaio 1932Milano, 19 febbraio ) semiologo, filosofo, scrittore, traduttore, accademico, bibliofilo e medievista italiano.   Autografo di Eco apposto all'edizione tedesca di Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale. Saggista e intellettuale di fama mondiale, ha scritto numerosi saggi di semiotica, estetica medievale, linguistica e filosofia, oltre a romanzi di successo. Nel 1971 è stato tra gli ispiratori del primo corso del DAMS all'Bologna. Sempre nello stesso ateneo, negli anni Ottanta ha promosso l'attivazione del corso di laurea in Scienze della comunicazione, già attivo in altre sedi. Nel 1988 ha fondato il Dipartimento della Comunicazione dell'San Marino. Dal 2008 era professore emerito e presidente della Scuola Superiore di Studi Umanistici dell'Bologna. Dal 12 novembre  Umberto Eco era socio dell'Accademia dei Lincei, per la classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filosofiche. Tra i suoi romanzi più famosi figura Il nome della rosa, tradotto in più di 40 lingue, che è divenuto un bestseller internazionale avendo venduto oltre 50 milioni di copie in tutto il mondo; da quest'opera sono stati tratti un film ed una serie televisiva. Figlio di Rita Bisio e di Giulio Eco, un impiegato nelle Ferrovie, conseguì la maturità al liceo classico Giovanni Plana di Alessandria, sua città natale. Tra i suoi compagni di classe, vi era il fisarmonicista Gianni Coscia, con il quale scrisse spettacoli di rivista. In gioventù fu impegnato nella GIAC (l'allora ramo giovanile dell'Azione Cattolica) e nei primi anni cinquanta fu chiamato tra i responsabili nazionali del movimento studentesco dell'AC (progenitore dell'attuale MSAC). Nel 1954 abbandonò l'incarico (così come avevano fatto Carlo Carretto e Mario Rossi) in polemica con Luigi Gedda. Durante i suoi studi universitari su Tommaso d'Aquino, smise di credere in Dio e lasciò definitivamente la Chiesa cattolica; in una nota ironica, in seguito commentò: «si può dire che lui Tommaso d'Aquino mi abbia miracolosamente curato dalla fede».  Laureatosi in filosofia nel 1954 all'Torino (agli esami riportò sempre 30/30, anche con lode, tranne quattro casi: filosofia teoretica e letteratura latina, in cui ottenne 29/30, e storia della letteratura italiana e pedagogia, entrambi superati con 27/30)  con relatore Luigi Pareyson e tesi sull'estetica di San Tommaso d'Aquino (controrelatore Augusto Guzzo), cominciò a interessarsi di filosofia e cultura medievale, campo d'indagine mai più abbandonato (vedi il volume Dall'albero al labirinto), anche se successivamente si dedicò allo studio semiotico della cultura popolare contemporanea e all'indagine critica sullo sperimentalismo letterario e artistico.  Nel 1956 pubblicò il suo primo libro, un'estensione della sua tesi di laurea dal titolo Il problema estetico in San Tommaso. Nel 1954 partecipò e vinse un concorso della Rai per l'assunzione di telecronisti e nuovi funzionari; con Eco vi entrarono anche Furio Colombo e Gianni Vattimo. Tutti e tre abbandonarono l'ente televisivo entro la fine degli anni cinquanta. Nel concorso successivo entrarono Emmanuele Milano, Fabiano Fabiani, Angelo Guglielmi, e molti altri. I vincitori dei primi concorsi furono in seguito etichettati come i "corsari" perché seguirono un corso di formazione diretto da Pier Emilio Gennarini e avrebbero dovuto, secondo le intenzioni del dirigente Filiberto Guala, "svecchiare" i programmi. Con altri ingressi successivi, come quelli di Gianni Serra, Emilio Garroni e Luigi Silori, questi giovani intellettuali innovarono davvero l'ambiente culturale della televisione, ancora molto legato a personalità provenienti dall'EIAR, venendo in seguito considerati come i veri promotori della centralità della RAI nel sistema culturale italiano.  Dall'esperienza lavorativa in RAI, incluse amicizie con membri del Gruppo 63, Eco trasse spunto per molti scritti, tra cui il celebre articolo del 1961 Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno. Dal 1959 al 1975 fu codirettore editoriale della casa editrice Bompiani. Nel 1962 pubblicò il saggio Opera aperta che, con sorpresa dello stesso autore, ebbe notevole risonanza a livello internazionale e diede le basi teoriche al Gruppo 63, movimento d'avanguardia letterario e artistico italiano che suscitò interesse negli ambienti critico-letterari anche per le polemiche che destò criticando fortemente autori all'epoca già "consacrati" dalla fama come Carlo Cassola, Giorgio Bassani e Vasco Pratolini, ironicamente definiti "Liale", con riferimento a Liala, autrice di romanzi rosa. Nel 1961 ebbe inizio anche la sua carriera universitaria che lo portò a tenere corsi, in qualità di professore incaricato, in diverse università italiane: Torino, Milano, Firenze e, infine, Bologna dove ha ottenuto la cattedra di Semiotica nel 1975, diventando Professore. All'Bologna è stato fra i fondatori del primo corso di laurea in DAMS (era il 1971), poi è stato direttore dell'Istituto di Comunicazione e spettacolo del DAMS, e in seguito ha dato inizio al corso di laurea in Scienze della comunicazione. Infine è divenuto Presidente della Scuola Superiore di Studi Umanistici, fondata nel 2000, che coordina l'attività dei dottorati bolognesi del settore umanistico, e dove nel 2001 ha ideato il Master in Editoria Cartacea e Digitale.  Nel corso degli anni ha insegnato come professore invitato alla New York University, Northwestern University, Columbia University, Yale University, Harvard University, University of California-San Diego, Cambridge University, Oxford University, São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro, La Plata e Buenos Aires, Collège de France, École normale supérieure (Parigi). Nell'ottobre 2007 si è ritirato dall'insegnamento per limiti di età. Dalla fine degli anni cinquanta, Eco cominciò a interessarsi all'influenza dei mass media nella cultura di massa, su cui pubblicò articoli in diversi giornali e riviste, poi in gran parte confluiti in Diario minimo (1963) e Apocalittici e integrati (1964). Apocalittici e integrati (che ebbe una nuova edizione nel 1977) analizzò con taglio sociologico le comunicazioni di massa. Il tema era già stato affrontato in Diario minimo, che includeva tra gli altri il breve articolo del 1961 Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno.  Sullo stesso tema, nel 1967 svolse a New York il seminario Per una guerriglia semiologica, in seguito pubblicato ne Il costume di casa (1973) e frequentemente citato nelle discussioni sulla controcultura e la resistenza al potere dei mass media.  Significativa fu anche la sua attenzione per le correlazioni tra dittatura e cultura di massa ne Il fascismo eterno, capitolo del saggio Cinque scritti morali, dove individuava le caratteristiche, ricorrenti nel tempo, del cosiddetto "fascismo eterno", o "Ur-fascismo": il culto della tradizione, il rifiuto del modernismo, il culto dell'azione per l'azione, il disaccordo come tradimento, la paura delle differenze, l'appello alle classi medie frustrate, l'ossessione del complotto, il machismo, il "populismo qualitativo Tv e Internet" e altre ancora; da esse e dalle loro combinazioni, secondo Eco, è possibile anche "smascherare" le forme di fascismo che si riproducono da sempre "in ogni parte del mondo".  In un'intervista del 24 aprile  mise in evidenza la sua visione rispetto a , della quale Eco si definiva un "utente compulsivo", e al mondo dell'open source. Nel 1968 pubblicò il suo primo libro di teoria semiotica, La struttura assente, cui seguirono il fondamentale Trattato di semiotica generale (1975) e gli articoli per l'Enciclopedia Einaudi poi riuniti in Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio (1984).  Nel 1971 fondò VersusQuaderni di studi semiotici, una delle maggiori riviste internazionali di semiotica, rimanendone direttore responsabile e membro del comitato scientifico fino alla morte. È anche stato segretario, vicepresidente e dal 1994 presidente onorario della IASS/AIS ("International Association for Semiotic Studies"). È stato invitato a tenere le prestigiose conferenze Tanner (Cambridge, 1990), Norton (Harvard, 1993), Goggio (Toronto, 1998), Weidenfeld (Oxford, 2002) e Richard Ellmann (Università Emory, 2008). Collaborò sin dalla sua fondazione, nel 1955, al settimanale L'Espresso, sul quale dal 1985 al  tenne in ultima pagina la rubrica La bustina di minerva (nella quale, tra l'altro, dichiarò di aver contribuito personalmente alla propria voce su ), ai giornali Il Giorno, La Stampa, Corriere della Sera, la Repubblica, il manifesto e a innumerevoli riviste internazionali specializzate, tra cui Semiotica (fondata nel 1969 da Thomas Albert Sebeok), Poetics Today, Degrès, Structuralist Review, Text, Communications (rivista parigina del EHESS), Problemi dell'informazione, Word & Images, o riviste letterarie e di dibattito culturale quali Quindici, Il Verri (fondata da Luciano Anceschi), Alfabeta, Il cavallo di Troia, ecc.  Collaborò alla collana "Fare l'Europa" diretta da Jacques Le Goff con lo studio La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea (1993), in cui si espresse a favore dell'utilizzo dell'esperanto. Tradusse gli Esercizi di stile di Raymond Queneau (nel 1983) e Sylvie di Gérard de Nerval (nel 1999 entrambi presso Einaudi) e introdusse opere di numerosi scrittori e di artisti. Ha anche collaborato con i musicisti Luciano Berio e Sylvano Bussotti.  I suoi dibattiti, spesso dal tono divertito, con Luciano Nanni, Omar Calabrese, Paolo Fabbri, Ugo Volli, Francesco Leonetti, Nanni Balestrini, Guido Almansi, Achille Bonito Oliva o Maria Corti, tanto per nominarne alcuni, hanno aggiunto contributi non scritti alla storia degli intellettuali italiani, soprattutto quando sfioravano argomenti non consueti (o almeno non ritenuti tali prima dell'intervento di Eco), come la figura di James Bond, l'enigmistica, la fisiognomica, la serialità televisiva, il romanzo d'appendice, il fumetto, il labirinto, la menzogna, le società segrete o più seriamente gli annosi concetti di abduzione, di canone e di classico.[senza fonte]  Grande appassionato del fumetto Dylan Dog, a Eco è stato fatto tributo sul numero 136 attraverso il personaggio Humbert Coe, che ha affiancato l'indagatore dell'incubo in un'indagine sull'origine delle lingue del mondo. È stato inoltre amico del pittore e autore di fumetti Andrea Pazienza[25] che fu suo allievo al DAMS di Bologna, e ha scritto la prefazione a libri di Hugo Pratt, Charles Monroe Schulz, Jules Feiffer e Raymond Peynet. Scrisse la presentazione di "Cuore" a fumetti, di F. Bonzi e Alain Denis, pubblicata su "Linus" nel 1975. Nel 1980 Eco esordì nella narrativa. Il suo primo romanzo, Il nome della rosa, riscontrò un grande successo sia presso la critica sia presso il pubblico, tanto da divenire un best seller internazionale tradotto in 47 lingue e venduto in trenta milioni di copie. Il nome della rosa è stato anche tra i finalisti del prestigioso Edgar Award nel 1984 e ha vinto il Premio Strega.[26] Dal lavoro fu tratto anche un celebre film con Sean Connery.  Nel 1988 pubblicò il suo secondo romanzo, Il pendolo di Foucault, satira dell'interpretazione paranoica dei fatti veri o leggendari della storia e delle sindromi del complotto. Questa critica dell'interpretazione incontrollata viene ripresa in opere teoriche sulla ricezione (cfr. I limiti dell'interpretazione). Romanzi successivi sono L'isola del giorno prima (1994), Baudolino (2000), La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana (2004), Il cimitero di Praga () e Numero zero (), tutti editi in italiano da Bompiani.  Nel  è stata pubblicata una versione "riveduta e corretta" del suo primo romanzo Il nome della rosa, con una nota finale dello stesso Eco che, mantenendo stile e struttura narrativa, è intervenuto a eliminare ripetizioni ed errori, a modificare l'impianto delle citazioni latine e la descrizione della faccia del bibliotecario per togliere un riferimento neogotico. Molte opere furono dedicate alle teorie della narrazione e della letteratura: Il superuomo di massa (1976), Lector in fabula (1979), Sei passeggiate nei boschi narrativi (1994), Sulla letteratura (2002), Dire quasi la stessa cosa (2003, sulla traduzione). È stato inoltre precursore e divulgatore dell'applicazione della tecnologia alla scrittura.  In contemporanea alla nomina di "guest curator" (curatore ospite) del Louvre, dove nel mese di novembre 2009 organizzò una serie di eventi e manifestazioni culturali[27], uscì per Bompiani Vertigine della lista, pubblicato in quattordici paesi del mondo.  Nel  Bompiani pubblicò una raccolta dal titolo Costruire il nemico e altri scritti occasionali, che raccoglie saggi occasionali che spaziano nei vari interessi dell'autore, come quello per la narratologia e il feuilleton ottocentesco. Il primo saggio riprende temi già presenti ne Il cimitero di Praga. Muore nella sua casa di Milano il 19 febbraio  alle ore 22:30, a causa di un tumore del pancreas che lo aveva colpito due anni prima.[28] I funerali laici si sono svolti il 23 febbraio  nel Castello Sforzesco di Milano, dove migliaia di persone si sono recate per l'ultimo saluto.[29] Sono state eseguite due composizioni alla viola da gamba e al clavicembalo: Couplets de folies (Les folies d'Espagne) dalla Suite n. 1 in re maggiore dai Pièces de viole, Livre II (1701) di Marin Marais e La Folia dalla Sonata per violino e basso continuo in re minore, op. 5 n. 12 (1700) di Arcangelo Corelli.[30]  Nel proprio testamento Eco ha chiesto ai suoi familiari di non autorizzare né promuovere, per i dieci anni successivi alla sua morte (quindi sino al 2026), alcun seminario o conferenza su di lui.[31]  Il corpo di Eco è stato infine cremato. La moglie, Renate Eco-Ramge, rifiutando la proposta di tumularne le ceneri nel Civico Mausoleo Garbin, ex edicola privata del Cimitero Monumentale di Milano ora provvista di piccole cellette destinate a ceneri o resti ossei di personalità artistiche illustri, ne ha preferito la conservazione privata, con il progetto di costruire un'edicola di famiglia nel medesimo cimitero.[32] Nei suoi romanzi, Eco racconta storie realmente accadute o leggende che hanno come protagonisti personaggi storici o inventati. Inserisce nelle sue opere accesi dibattiti filosofici sull'esistenza del vuoto, di Dio o sulla natura dell'universo.  Attratto da temi piuttosto misteriosi e oscuri (i cavalieri Templari, il sacro Graal, la sacra Sindone ecc.), nei suoi romanzi gli scienziati e gli uomini che hanno fatto la storia sono spesso trattati con indifferenza dai contemporanei.  L'umorismo è l'arma letteraria preferita dallo scrittore di Alessandria, che inserisce innumerevoli citazioni e collegamenti a opere di vario genere, conosciute quasi esclusivamente da filologi e bibliofili. Ciò rende romanzi come Il nome della rosa o L'isola del giorno prima un turbinio variopinto di nozioni di carattere storico, filosofico, artistico e matematico.  Centrale ne Il nome della rosa è la questione del riso, post-modernisticamente declinata.  Ne Il pendolo di Foucault Eco affronta temi come la ricerca del sacro Graal e la storia dei cavalieri Templari, facendo numerosi cenni ai misteri dell'età antica e moderna, rivisitati in chiave parodistica.  Ne L'isola del giorno prima l'umanità intera è simboleggiata dal naufrago Roberto de la Grive, che cerca un'isola al di fuori del tempo e dello spazio.  In Baudolino dà vita ad un picaresco personaggio medioevale tutto dedito alla ricerca di un paradiso terrestre (il regno leggendario di Prete Giovanni).  Ne La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana riflette sulla forza e sull'essenza stessa del ricordo, rivolto, in questo caso, ad episodi del XX secolo.  Il cimitero di Praga è incentrato sulla natura del complotto e, in particolar modo, sulla storia 'europea' del popolo ebraico.  Il suo ultimo romanzo, Numero zero, riprendendo temi da sempre cari all'autore (il falso, la costruzione del complotto e delle notizie) si sofferma sulla storia italiana recente, narrando fatti realmente accaduti, ma riletti attraverso una chiave complottistica. Nel 1971 fu tra i 757 firmatari della lettera aperta a L'Espresso sul caso Pinelli e successivamente della autodenuncia di solidarietà a Lotta Continua, in cui una cinquantina di firmatari esprimevano solidarietà verso alcuni militanti e direttori responsabili del giornale, inquisiti per istigazione a delinquere.[33]  I firmatari si autodenunciavano alla magistratura dicendo di condividere il contenuto dell'articolo. Peraltro le severe critiche di Eco al terrorismo e ai vari progetti di lotta armata[34] sono contenute in una serie di articoli scritti sul settimanale L'Espresso e su Repubblica, specie ai tempi del caso Moro (articoli poi ripubblicati nel volume Sette anni di desiderio). In effetti l'arma che ha caratterizzato l'impegno politico di Eco è diventata l'analisi critica dei discorsi politici e delle comunicazioni di massa.  Questo impegno è sintetizzato nella metafora della guerriglia semiologica dove si sostiene che non è tanto importante cambiare il contenuto dei messaggi alla fonte ma cercare di animare la loro analisi là dove essi arrivano (la formula era: non serve occupare la televisione, bisogna occupare una sedia davanti a ogni televisore). In questo senso la guerriglia semiologica è una forma di critica sociale attraverso l'educazione alla ricezione.[35] Dal 2002 partecipa alle attività dell'associazione Libertà e Giustizia, di cui è uno dei fondatori e garanti più noti, partecipando attivamente tramite le sue iniziative al dibattito politico-culturale italiano.  Il suo libro A passo di gambero (2006) contiene le critiche a quello che lui definisce populismo berlusconiano, alla politica di Bush, al cosiddetto scontro tra etnie e religioni. Nel , nelle settimane delle rivolte arabe, durante una conferenza stampa registrata alla Fiera del libro di Gerusalemme, scatena una polemica politica la sua risposta a un giornalista italiano che gli domanda se condivida il paragone fra Berlusconi e Mubarak, avanzato da alcuni: "Il paragone potrebbe essere fatto con Hitler: anche lui giunse al potere con libere elezioni";[36] lo stesso Eco, dalle colonne de l'Espresso, smentirà tale dichiarazione chiarendo le circostanze della sua risposta.[37]  Eco faceva parte dell'associazione Aspen Institute Italia.[38] Onorificenze italiane Cavaliere di gran croce dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiananastrino per uniforme ordinariaCavaliere di gran croce dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiana — Roma, 9 gennaio 1996[39] Medaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della cultura e dell'artenastrino per uniforme ordinariaMedaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della cultura e dell'arte — Roma, 13 gennaio 1997[40] Onorificenze straniere Commendatore dell'Ordine delle Arti e delle Lettere (Francia)nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine delle Arti e delle Lettere (Francia) — 1985 Cavaliere dell'Ordine pour le Mérite für Wissenschaften und Künste (Repubblica Federale di Germania)nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCavaliere dell'Ordine pour le Mérite für Wissenschaften und Künste (Repubblica Federale di Germania) — 1998 Premio Principe delle Asturie per la comunicazione e l'umanistica (Spagna)nastrino per uniforme ordinariaPremio Principe delle Asturie per la comunicazione e l'umanistica (Spagna) — 2000 Ufficiale dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia)nastrino per uniforme ordinariaUfficiale dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) — 2003 Gran croce al merito con placca dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica Federale di Germanianastrino per uniforme ordinariaGran croce al merito con placca dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica Federale di Germania — 2009 Commendatore dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia)nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) — Parigi, 13 gennaio [41] Cittadinanze onorarie Monte Cerignone, 1981. Nizza Monferrato, 6 novembre . San Leo, 11 giugno . Torre Pellice, . Lauree Eco ha ricevuto 40 lauree honoris causa da prestigiose università europee e americane,[42] come quella del , che gli è stata conferita dall'Università federale del Rio Grande do Sul, di Porto Alegre, in Brasile.[43] Nel giugno  in occasione della laurea in comunicazione conferita dall'Torino, Umberto Eco ha rilasciato severi giudizi sui social del Web che, a suo dire, possono essere utilizzati da «legioni di imbecilli» per porsi sullo stesso piano di un vincitore di un Premio Nobel.[44] Le affermazioni di Eco hanno suscitato approvazioni ma anche vivaci discussioni.[45][46]  Affiliazioni e sodalizi accademici Umberto Eco è stato membro onorario (Honorary Trustee) della James Joyce Association, dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Bologna, dell'Academia Europea de Yuste, dell'American Academy of Arts and Letters, dell'Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, della Polska Akademia Umiejętności ("Accademia polacca della Arti"), "Fellow" del St Anne's College di Oxford e socio dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei.[47] Eco è stato inoltre membro onorario del CICAP.  Altro Gli è stato dedicato l'asteroide 13069 Umbertoeco, scoperto nel 1991 dall'astronomo belga Eric Walter Elst.  Il 12 aprile 2008 è stato nominato Duca dell'Isola del Giorno Prima del regno di Redonda dal re Xavier.  Nel  il comune di Milano ha deciso che il suo nome venga iscritto nel Pantheon di Milano, all'interno del cimitero monumentale.[48] Saggistica Eco ha anche scritto numerosi saggi di filosofia, semiotica, linguistica, estetica:  Il problema estetico in San Tommaso, Torino, Edizioni di Filosofia, 1956; poi Il problema estetico in Tommaso d'Aquino, 2ª ed., Milano, Bompiani, 1970. Filosofi in libertà, come Dedalus, Torino, Taylor, 1958, poi in Il secondo diario minimo. Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale, in Momenti e problemi di storia dell'estetica, I, Dall'antichità classica al Barocco, Milano, Marzorati, 1959. Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale, Milano, Bompiani, 1987. Storia figurata delle invenzioni. Dalla selce scheggiata al volo spaziale, e con G. B. Zorzoli, Milano, Bompiani, 1961. Opera aperta. Forma e indeterminazione nelle poetiche contemporanee, Milano, Bompiani, 1962; 1967 sulla base dell'ed. francese 1965; 1971; 1976. Diario minimo, Milano, A. Mondadori, 1963; 1975. (include i saggi Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno e Elogio di Franti) Apocalittici e integrati, Milano, Bompiani, 1964; 1977. Il caso Bond. [Le origini, la natura, gli effetti del fenomeno 007], e con Oreste del Buono, Milano, Bompiani, 1965. Le poetiche di Joyce. Dalla "Summa" al "Finnegans Wake", Milano, Bompiani, 1966. (ed. modificata sulla base della seconda parte di Opera aperta, 1962) Appunti per una semiologia delle comunicazioni visive, Milano, Bompiani, 1967. (poi in La struttura assente) L'Italie par elle-meme. A portrait of Italy. Autoritratto dell'Italia, e con Giulio Carlo Argan, Guido Piovene, Luigi Chiarini, Vittorio Gregotti e altri, Milano, Bompiani, 1967. La struttura assente, Milano, Bompiani, 1968; 1980. La definizione dell'arte, Milano, Mursia, 1968. L'arte come mestiere, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. I sistemi di segni e lo strutturalismo sovietico, e con Remo Faccani, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. L'industria della cultura, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. Le forme del contenuto, Milano, Bompiani, 1971. I fumetti di Mao, e con Jean Chesneaux e Gino Nebiolo, Bari, Laterza, 1971. Cent'anni dopo. Il ritorno dell'intreccio, e con Cesare Sughi, Milano, Bompiani, 1971. Documenti su il nuovo Medioevo, con Francesco Alberoni, Furio Colombo e Giuseppe Sacco, Milano, Bompiani, 1972. Estetica e teoria dell'informazione, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1972. I pampini bugiardi. Indagine sui libri al di sopra di ogni sospetto: i testi delle scuole elementari, e con Marisa Bonazzi, Rimini, Guaraldi, 1972. Il segno, Milano, Isedi, 1973; Milano, A. Mondadori, 1980. Il costume di casa. Evidenze e misteri dell'ideologia italiana, Milano, Bompiani, 1973. Beato di Liébana. Miniature del Beato de Fernando I y Sancha. Codice B.N. Madrid Vit. 14-2, testo e commenti alle tavole di, Milano, Franco Maria Ricci, 1973. Eugenio Carmi. Una pittura di paesaggio?, Milano, Prearo, 1973. Trattato di semiotica generale, Milano, Bompiani, 1975.A Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1976. (e London, Macmillan, 1977) [versione inglese originale del Trattato di semiotica generale] Il superuomo di massa. Studi sul romanzo popolare, Roma, Cooperativa Scrittori, 1976; Milano, Bompiani, 1978. Stelle & stellette. La via lattea mormorò, illustrazioni di Philippe Druillet, Conegliano Treviso, Quadragono Libri, 1976. Storia di una rivoluzione mai esistita. L'esperimento Vaduz. Appunti del Servizio opinioni, n.292, settembre 1976, Roma, Rai, Servizio Opinioni, 1976. Dalla periferia dell'impero, Milano, Bompiani, 1977. Come si fa una tesi di laurea, Milano, Bompiani, 1977. Carolina Invernizio, Matilde Serao, Liala, con altri, Firenze, La nuova Italia, 1979.The Role of the Reader, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979. (contiene saggi tratti da Opera aperta, Apocalittici e integrati, Forme del contenuto, Lector in Fabula e Il superuomo di massa) (EN, FR) A semiotic Landscape. Panorama sémiotique. Proceedings of the Ist Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Den Haag, Paris, New York, Mouton (Approaches to Semiotics, 29) (a cura di, con Seymour Chatman e Jean-Marie Klinkenberg). Lector in fabula, Milano, Bompiani, 1979.Function and sign, the semiotics of architecture; A componential analysis of the architectural sign /column/, in Geoffrey Broadbent, Richard Bunt, Charles Jencks , Signs, symbols and architecture, Chichester-New York, Wiley, 1980. (EL) E semeiologia sten kathemerine zoe, Thessaloniki, Malliares, 1980. (antologia di saggi). De bibliotheca, Milano, Comune di Milano, 1981. Postille al nome della rosa, Milano, Bompiani, 1983. The Sign of Three. Peirce, Holmes, Dupin (a cura di, con Thomas A. Sebeok), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983 (trad. Il segno dei tre, Milano, Bompiani) Sette anni di desiderio. [Cronache, 1977-1983], Milano, Bompiani, 1983. Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, Torino, Einaudi, 1984,  88-06-05690-5. (PT) Conceito de texto, São Paulo, Queiroz, 1984. Sugli specchi e altri saggi, Milano, Bompiani, 1985. (DE) Streit der Interpretationen, Konstanz, Universitätverlag Konstanz GMBH, 1987.  Notes sur la sémiotique de la réception, in "Actes sémiotiques. Documents", IX, 81, 1987. (ZH) Jie gou zhu yi he fu hao xue. Dian ying wen ji, San lien shu dian chu ban fa xing, Np, 1987. (edizione cinese di articoli vari originariamente pubblicati in inglese e francese)Meaning and mental representations (a cura di, con M. Santambrogio e Patrizia Violi), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988. (DE) Im Labyrinth der Vernunft. Texte über Kunst und Zeichen, Leipzig, Reclam, 1989. (antologia di saggi) Lo strano caso della Hanau 1609, Milano, Bompiani, 1989. Saggio in Leggere i Promessi sposi. Analisi semiotiche, Giovanni Manetti, Milano, Gruppo editoriale Fabbri-Bompiani-Sonzogno-ETAS, 1989,  88-452-1466-4. (DE) Auf dem Wege zu einem Neuen Mittelalter, München, DTV Grossdruck, 1990. (antologia di saggi). I limiti dell'interpretazione, Milano, Bompiani, 1990,  88-452-1657-8. Vocali, con Soluzioni felici di Paolo Domenico Malvinni, Napoli, Collana "Clessidra" di Alfredo Guida Ed., 1991,  88-7188-024-2. Il secondo diario minimo, Milano, Bompiani, 1992,  88-452-1833-3.Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. La memoria vegetale, Milano, Rovello, 1992. La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1993,  88-420-4287-0. (EL) Ton augousto den Uparchoun eideseis, Thessaloniki, Parateretés, 1993. (antologia di saggi).Apocalypse Postponed, Bloomington, Indiana U.P, 1994. (saggi tratti da Apocalittici e integrati scelti e curati da Robert Lumley)Six Walks in the Fictional Woods, Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1994. (tradotto come Sei passeggiate nei boschi narrativi, Milano, Bompiani) Povero Pinocchio. Giochi linguistici di studenti del Corso di Comunicazione, a cura di, Modena, Comix, 1995,  88-7686-601-9. In cosa crede chi non crede?, con Carlo Maria Martini, Roma, Liberal, 1996,  88-86838-03-4. (DE) Neue Streichholzbriefe, München, DTV, 1997. Kant e l'ornitorinco, Milano, Bompiani, 1997,  88-452-2868-1. Cinque scritti morali, Milano, Bompiani, 1997,  88-452-3124-0.Talking of Joyce, con Liberato Santoro-Brienza, Dublin, University College Dublin Press, 1998. (DE) Gesammelte Streichholzbriefe, München, Hanser, 1998.Serendipities. Language and Lunacy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. Tra menzogna e ironia, Milano, Bompiani, 1998,  88-452-3829-6. La bustina di minerva, Milano, Bompiani, 1999,  88-452-4383-4. (NO) Den nye Middelalderen og andre essays, Oslo, Tiden Norske, 2000. (antologia di saggi) (DE) Mein verrücktes Italien, Berlin, Wagenbach, 2000. (antologia di saggi) (CS) Mysl a smysl, Praha, Moravia press, 2000. (antologia di saggi)Experiences in translation, Toronto, Toronto U.P., 2000. Riflessioni sulla bibliofilia, Milano, Rovello, 2001. (DE) Sämtliche Glossen und Parodien, München, Hanser, 2001. (raccolta completa da Diario minimo, Secondo diario minimo, Bustina di minerva e altre  parodie da raccolte in tedesco) Sulla letteratura, Milano, Bompiani, 2002,  88-452-5069-5. Guerre sante, passione e ragione. Pensieri sparsi sulla superiorità culturale; Scenari di una guerra globale, in Islam e Occidente. Riflessioni per la convivenza, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002,  88-420-6784-9. Bellezza. Storia di un'idea dell'Occidente, CD-ROM a cura di, Milano, Motta On Line, 2002. Dire quasi la stessa cosa. Esperienze di traduzione, Milano, Bompiani, 2003,  88-452-5397-X.Mouse or Rat?, Translation as Negociation, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003. (Experiences in translation e saggi selezionati da Dire quasi la stessa cosa) Storia della bellezza, a cura di, testi di Umberto Eco e Girolamo de Michele, Milano, Bompiani, 2004,  88-452-3249-2. Il linguaggio della Terra Australe, Milano, Bompiani, 2004. (non in commercio) Il codice Temesvar, Milano, Rovello, 2005. Nel segno della parola, con Daniele Del Giudice e Gianfranco Ravasi, a cura e con un saggio di Ivano Dionigi, Milano, BUR, 2005,  88-17-00632-7. A passo di gambero. Guerre calde e populismo mediatico, Collana Overlook, Milano, Bompiani, 2006,  88-452-5620-0. La memoria vegetale e altri scritti di bibliofilia, Milano, Rovello, 2006,  88-452-5785-1. Sator Arepo eccetera, Roma, Nottetempo, 2006,  88-7452-085-9. Storia della bruttezza, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 2007,  978-88-452-5965-4. 11/9 La cospirazione impossibile, con Piergiorgio Odifreddi, Michael Shermer, James Randi, Paolo Attivissimo, Lorenzo Montali, Francesco Grassi, Andrea Ferrero e Stefano Bagnasco, Massimo Polidoro, Casale Monferrato, Piemme, 2007,  978-88-384-6847-6. Dall'albero al labirinto. Studi storici sul segno e l'interpretazione, Milano, Bompiani, 2007,  978-88-452-5902-9. Historia. La grande storia della civiltà europea, e con altri, 9 voll., Milano, Motta, 2007. Storia della civiltà europea, e con altri, 18 voll., Milano, Corriere della Sera, 2007-2008. Nebbia, e con Remo Ceserani, con la collaborazione di Francesco Ghelli e un saggio di Antonio Costa, Torino, Einaudi, 2009.  978-88-06-18724-8. (antologia letteraria di racconti a tema) Non sperate di liberarvi dei libri, con Jean-Claude Carrière, Milano, Bompiani, 2009.  978-88-452-6215-9. Vertigine della lista, Milano, Bompiani, 2009.  978-88-452-6345-3. Il Medioevo, a cura di, 4 voll., Milano, Encyclomedia, -.  978-88-905082-0-2,  978-88-905082-1-9,  978-88-905082-5-7,  978-88-905082-9-5. La grande Storia, a cura di, 28 voll., Milano, Corriere della Sera, . Costruire il nemico e altri scritti occasionali, Milano, Bompiani, .  978-88-452-6585-3. Scritti sul pensiero medievale, Collana Il pensiero occidentale, Milano, Bompiani, ,  978-88-452-7156-4. L'età moderna e contemporanea, a cura di, 22 voll., Roma, Gruppo editoriale L'Espresso, -. Storia delle terre e dei luoghi leggendari, Milano, Bompiani, .  978-88-452-7392-6. Da dove si comincia?, con Stefano Bartezzaghi, Roma, La Repubblica, . Riflessioni sul dolore, Bologna, ASMEPA, .  978-88-97620-73-0. La filosofia e le sue storie, e con Riccardo Fedriga, 3 voll., Roma-Bari, Laterza, -.  978-88-581-1406-3,  978-88-581-1742-2,  978-88-581-1741-5. Pape Satàn Aleppe. Cronache di una società liquida, Milano, La nave di Teseo, ,  978-88-9344-021-9. Come viaggiare con un salmone, Milano, La nave di Teseo, ,  978-88-9344-023-3. Sulle spalle dei giganti, Collana I fari, Milano, La nave di Teseo, ,  978-88-934-4271-8. Il fascismo eterno, Collana Le onde, Milano, La nave di Teseo, ,  978-88-934-4241-1. [già pubblicato in Cinque scritti morali, Bompiani, 1997] Sulla televisione. Scritti 1956-, Gianfranco Marrone, Collana I fari, Milano, La Nave di Teseo, ,  978-88-934-4456-9. Narrativa Il nome della rosa, Milano, Bompiani, 1980. Il pendolo di Foucault, Milano, Bompiani, 1988,  88-452-0408-1 L'isola del giorno prima, Milano, Bompiani, 1994,  88-452-2318-3 Baudolino, Milano, Bompiani, 2000,  88-452-4736-8 La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana. Romanzo illustrato, Milano, Bompiani, 2004,  88-452-1425-7 Il cimitero di Praga, Milano, Bompiani, ,  978-88-452-6622-5 Numero zero, Milano, Bompiani, ,  978-88-452-7851-8 Narrativa per l'infanzia La bomba e il generale, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1966. I tre cosmonauti, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1966. Ammazza l'uccellino, come Dedalus, illustrazioni di Monica Sangberg, Milano, Bompiani, 1973. Gli gnomi di Gnu, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1992,  88-452-1885-6. Tre racconti, Milano, Fabbri, 2004,  88-451-0300-5. (raccolta dei tre precedenti) La storia de "I promessi sposi", raccontata da, Torino-Roma, Scuola Holden-La biblioteca di Repubblica-L'Espresso, ,  978-88-8371-311-8. Traduzioni Raymond Queneau, Esercizi di stile, Torino, Einaudi, 1983. Note  Claudio Gerino, Morto lo scrittore Umberto Eco. Ci mancherà il suo sguardo nel mondo, in la Repubblica, 20 febbraio . 22 febbraio .  Massimo Delfino e Emma Camagna, Alessandria piange Umberto Eco, in La Stampa, 20 febbraio . 22 febbraio .    Cosimo Di Bari, "A passo di critica: il modello di media education nell'opera di Umberto Eco", Firenze University Press 2009    Èco, Umberto, in Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  LINCEI, ENRICO MENESTO' E UMBERTO ECO NUOVI SOCI DELL'ACCADEMIA, su tuttoggi.info. 30 ottobre .  'Il nome della rosa' debutta su Rai1 e conquista gli ascolti della prima serata, su la Repubblica, 5 marzo . 30 gennaio .  quotidiano la Stampa; Gianni Coscia: «quando suono col mio amico Umberto Eco», su genova.mentelocale.it. 20 febbraio  12 ottobre ).  «È il lato dolente e angoscioso di un uomo che è cresciuto nell'Azione Cattolica, che l'ha lasciata in polemica con il grande Gedda; un uomo, Eco, che ha studiatodiconoTommaso d'Aquino, e che un giorno se n'è uscito dalla Chiesa proclamandosi orgogliosamente ateo, o se si preferisce, agnostico.» (In Rassegna stampa cattolica: Mario Palmaro, Eco è solo un refuso, 21 settembre  «His new book touches on politics, but also on faith. Raised Catholic, Eco has long since left the church. "Even though I'm still in love with that world, I stopped believing in God in my 20s after my doctoral studies on St. Thomas Aquinas. You could say he miraculously cured me of my faith..."» «Il suo nuovo libro tratta di politica, ma anche di fede. Cresciuto nel cattolicesimo, Eco ha lasciato da tempo la Chiesa. "Anche se io sono ancora innamorato di quel mondo, ho smesso di credere in Dio durante i miei anni 20, dopo i miei studi universitari su Tommaso d'Aquino. Potete dire che egli mi ha miracolosamente curato dalla mia fede..."»  (Articolo in Time, 13 giugno 2005)  Liukkonen, Petri (2003) Umberto Eco (1932–)Pseudonym: Dedalus Archiviato il 4 agosto 2006 in .  Eco, quando l'Torino gli consegnò il libretto con 27 in letteratura italiana, su la Repubblica, 20 febbraio . 17 febbraio .  Antonio Galdo, Saranno potenti? Storia, declino e nuovi protagonisti della classe dirigente italiana, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano  Giuseppe Antonio Camerino, ECO, Umberto, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  "Riparte il Master in Editoria, ideato da Umberto Eco"  Capozzi (2008)  Bondanella (2005) 53  Umberto Eco, Cinque scritti morali, Bompiani Intervista a Umberto EcoWikinotizie, su it.wikinews.org.  Umberto Eco, Ho sposato ?, «l'Espresso», 4 settembre 2009.  Con lo pseudonimo di Dedalus: Dedalus e il manifesto, su ilmanifesto.it, 20 Febbraio . 13 febbraio  (archiviato il 13 febbraio ).  Ostini (1998)  Sclavi (1998) p. 94, citazione: "Sto leggendo un libro [In cosa crede chi non crede, N.d.R.] di Umberto Eco che mi è arrivato dall'Italia. Curioso no? Ha il mio stesso nome e il cognome è l'anagramma del mio..."  1981, Umberto Eco, su premiostrega.it. 16 aprile .  Italian Writer Umberto Eco is the Louvre's New Guest Curator  Emma Camagna, La morte di Eco, il ricordo di Gianni Coscia, in La Stampa, 20 febbraio . 22 febbraio .  L'ultimo saluto a Umberto Eco: "Grazie maestro", in La Stampa, 23 febbraio . 23 febbraio .  Marco Del Corona, «Follie di Spagna»: ecco che cos'è la musica suonata per Umberto Eco, su Corriere della Sera. 23 febbraio .  Umberto Eco, la richiesta nel testamento: "Non autorizzate convegni su di me per i prossimi 10 anni", su Il Fatto Quotidiano. 23 marzo .  La lettera della vedova Eco al Comune, in Corriere della Sera. 30 marzo .  Pinelli, Calabresi e l'eskimo in redazione Archiviato il 19 gennaio  in ., opinione.it, 30 gennaio 1997  Bruno Pischedda, Come leggere Il nome della rosa di Umberto Eco, Mursia, 1994 p.99  La struttura assente,  "Eco a Gerusalemme attacca il Cavaliere. È polemica", di Francesco Battistini (dal Corriere della Sera, 24 febbraio ) Corriere della Sera  Berlusconi, Hitler e io, su l'Espresso. 20 febbraio .  Comitato Esecutivo | Aspen Institute Italia, su aspeninstitute.it. 20 febbraio .  Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato.  Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato.  Umberto Eco all'Eliseo onorato da Sarkozy con Legion D'Honneur, su liberoquotidiano.it. 14 gennaio  29 ottobre ).  Curriculum Vitae, su umbertoeco.it. 20 febbraio .  Unibo e Brasile: Laurea ad honorem a Umberto Eco, su magazine.unibo.it. 20 febbraio .  Umberto Eco contro i social: "Hanno dato diritto di parola a legioni di imbecilli", su Il Fatto Quotidiano. 20 febbraio .  Il problema di Umberto Eco con internet, su Il Post. 20 febbraio .  Imbecilli e non, tutto il mondo è social, su LaStampa.it. 20 febbraio .  Serena Vitale e Umberto Eco entrano nell'Accademia dei Lincei, 12 novembre , Il Giornale.  Decise all'unanimità le 15 personalità illustri da iscrivere nel Pantheon di Milano, su comune.milano.it, Opere:  Bondanella, Peter,  Umberto Eco and the Open Text: Semiotics, Fiction, Popular Culture Capozzi, Rocco (2008) Eco's Prophetic Vision of Mass Culture in McLuhan Studies: Premier Issue, Antonio Galdo, Saranno potenti? Storia, declino e nuovi protagonisti della classe dirigente italiana, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano  88-200-3501-4 Alberto Ostini , Umberto Eco e Tiziano Sclavi. Un dialogo, in Dylan Dog, indocili sentimenti, arcane paure, Milano, Euresis, 1998. Tiziano Sclavi, Bruno Brindisi, Lassù qualcuno ci chiama, Dylan Dog n. 136, Milano, Sergio Bonelli Editore, gennaio 199894. Film  Walt Dey e l'ItaliaUna storia d'amore (): viene mostrata un'intervista durante lo "speciale Walt Dey" (1965) con Ettore Della Giovanna e Gianni Rodari  Luigi Bauco, Francesco Millocca, Dizionario del «Pendolo di Foucault», Milano, Corbo, 1989. Manlio Talamo, I segreti del Pendolo, Napoli, Simone, 1989. Francesco Pansa, Anna Vinci, Effetto Eco, Roma, Nuova Edizione del Gallo; Marco Testi, "Il romanzo al passato": medioevo e invenzione in tre autori contemporanei in Analisi letteraria, 27, Roma, Bulzoni, 1992. Walter Pedullà, «L'utilitaria di Eco» in Le caramelle di Musil, Milano, Rizzoli, 1992,  236-243. Salman Rushdie, «Umberto Eco» in Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991, Londra, Penguin, 1992. Bruno Pischedda, Come leggere «Il nome della rosa» di Umberto Eco, Milano, Mursia, 1994. Jean Petitot, Paolo Fabbri , Nel nome del senso. Intorno all'opera di Umberto Eco, Milano, Sansoni, 2001. Antonio Sorella , Umberto Eco. Sponde remote e nuovi orizzonti, Pescara, Tracce, 2002. Roberto Rampi, L'ornitorinco. Umberto Eco, Peirce e la conoscenza congetturale, M & B Publishing, Milano; Marco Sonzogni, Echi di Eco, Balerna, Edizione Ulivo, 2007. Cinzia Bianchi, Clare Vassallo, “Umberto Eco's interpretative semiotics: Interpretation, encyclopedia, translation”, in Semiotica. Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter), Peter Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the open text. Semiotics, fiction, popular culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Peter Bondanella , New Essays on Umberto Eco, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. Jean-Jacques Brochier , Umberto Eco. Du semiologue au romancier, in Le Nouveau Magazine Littéraire [inserto speciale], n. 262, febbraio 1989. Michael Caesar, Umberto Eco. Philosophy, Semiotics and the Work of Fiction, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999. Rocco Capozzi , Reading Eco. An Anthology, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997. Michele Castelnovi, La mappa della biblioteca: geografia reale ed immaginaria secondo Umberto Eco, in Miscellanea di Storia delle esplorazioni n. LX, Genova, ,  195-253. Remo Ceserani, Eco e il postmoderno consapevole in Raccontare il postmoderno, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri,  180-200. Michele Cogo, Fenomenologia di Umberto Eco. Indagine sulle origini di un mito intellettuale contemporaneo. Introduzione di Paolo Fabbri. Bologna, Baskerville, Furio Colombo, «L'isola del giorno prima», in La rivista dei libri;  Roberto Cotroneo, La diffidenza come sistema. Saggio sulla narrativa di Umberto Eco, Milano, Anabasi, 1995. Roberto Cotroneo, Eco: due o tre cose che so di lui, Milano, Bompiani,  Teresa de Lauretis, Umberto Eco, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, Nunzio Dell'Erba, Alla ricerca delle fonti del romanzo "Il Cimitero di Praga" , in Id., L'eco della storia. Saggi di critica storica: massoneria, anarchia, fascismo e comunismo, Universitas Studiorum, Mantova ,  978-88-97683-30-8 Cosimo Di Bari, A passo di critica. Il modello di Media Education nell'opera di Umberto Eco, Firenze, Firenze University Press, Richard Ellmann, Murder in the Monastery?, in The New York Review of Books, n. 12, luglio 1983. Lorenzo Flabbi, La disposizione del sapere di Umberto Eco, in Atlante dei movimenti culturali. 1968-2007, C. Cretella e P. Pieri, Clueb, Bologna, Cristina Farronato, Eco's Chaosmos, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003. Franco Forchetti, Il segno e la rosa. I segreti della narrativa di Umberto Eco, Roma, Castelvecchi, 2005. Grit Fröhlich, Umberto Eco. PhilosophieÄsthetikSemiotik, Paderborn, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, Margherita Ganeri, Il «caso» Eco, Palermo, Palumbo, 1991. Alfredo Giuliani, «Scherzare col fuoco» in Autunno del novecento, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1984. Renato Giovannoli , Saggi su «Il Nome della Rosa», Milano, Bompiani, 1985. Fabio Izzo, Eco a perdere, Associazione Culturale Il Foglio, 2005. Paolo Jachia, Umberto Eco. Arte semiotica letteratura, San Cesario, Manni, 2006. Anna Maria Lorusso, Umberto Eco. Temi, problemi e percorsi semiotici, Roma, Carocci, 2008. Patrizia Magli et. al. , Semiotica: Storia Teoria Interpretazione. Saggi intorno a Umberto Eco, Milano, Bompiani; Sandro Montalto , Umberto Eco: l'uomo che sapeva troppo, Pisa, ETS; Franco Musarra et al., Eco in fabula. Umberto Eco in the Humanities. Umberto Eco dans les sciences humaines. Umberto Eco nelle scienze umane, Proceedings of the International Conference, Leuven, 24-27 febbraio 1999, Leuven, Leuven U.P. e Firenze, Franco Cesati Editore, 2002. Claudio Paolucci, Umberto Eco. Tra ordine e avventura, Milano, Feltrinelli, .  Semiotica Monte Cerignone, luogo di residenza Struttura (semiotica) Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Umberto Eco Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Umberto Eco Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Umberto Eco  Sito ufficiale, su umbertoeco.it.  Umberto Eco, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Umberto Eco, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Umberto Eco, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Umberto Eco, su The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction.  Umberto Eco, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana.  Opere di Umberto Eco, su Liber Liber.  Opere di Umberto Eco, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Umberto Eco, .   Pubblicazioni di Umberto Eco, su Persée, Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation.  di Umberto Eco, su Internet Speculative Fiction Database, Al von Ruff. Umberto Eco (autore), su Goodreads. Umberto Eco (personaggio), su Goodreads.   italiana di Umberto Eco, su Catalogo Vegetti della letteratura fantastica, Fantascienza.com.  Registrazioni di Umberto Eco, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale. Umberto Eco, su Internet Movie Database, IMDb.com. Umberto Eco, su AllMovie, All Media Network; Umberto Eco, su filmportal.de.  Eco, Umberto, in Lessico del XXI secolo, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, -. "La bustina di minerva": la rubrica periodica di Eco su L'Espresso, L'Espresso. 10 gennaio . signosemio.comSignoBiografia di Umberto Eco e la presentazione della sua teoria semiotica, su signosemio.com. 19 giugno 2009 4 giugno 2009). Approfondimento, su italialibri.net. Curiosità (anche la "cacopedia"in PDF) , su bibliotecheoggi.it. Opere in TecaLibri/1, su tecalibri.info. Opere in TecaLibri/2, su tecalibri.info. Considerazioni su: "Non sperate di liberarvi dei libri", su antonietta.philo.unibo.it 18 gennaio ). Golem L'indispensabile (il sito della rivista)rivista online diretta da Umberto Eco, Renato Mannheimer, Carlo Bertelli, Danco Singer Un articolo di Eco su , su espresso.repubblica.it. encyclomedia.it, su encyclomedia.it. Il «questionario Proust» a Umberto Eco, su elapsus.it. 22 maggio . (DE) Umberto Eco, in Perlentaucher, Perlentaucher Medien GmbH. Opere di Umberto Eco V D M Vincitori del Premio Strega V D M Vincitori internazionali del Prix Médicis V D M Vincitori del Premio Bancarella V D M Vincitori del Premio Cesare Pavese V D M Vincitori del Premio di Stato austriaco per la letteratura europea V D M Vincitori del Premio Mediterraneo per stranieri, Europeana agent/base/ Filosofia Giallo  Giallo Letteratura  Letteratura Categorie: Semiologi italianiFilosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloScrittori italiani del XX secoloScrittori italiani Professore1932  5 gennaio 19 febbraiod Alessandria MilanoUmberto EcoScrittori per ragazziFondatori di riviste italianeVincitori del Premio BancarellaVincitori del Premio StregaCavalieri di gran croce OMRIBenemeriti della cultura e dell'arteDecorati con la Legion d'onoreAutori del Gruppo 63Accademici dei LinceiPersone legate all'HarvardProfessori dell'BolognaProfessori della Columbia UniversityPatafisicaTraduttori italianiAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti italiani del XXI secoloUomini universaliStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di TorinoTraduttori dal franceseTraduttori all'italianoMedievisti italianiBibliofiliDirettori di periodici italianiCritici e teorici dei nuovi media. Econ provides a bridge between Graeco-Roman philosophy and Grice! Eco is one of the few philosophers who considers the very origins of philosophy in Bolognaand straight from RomeOn top, Eco is one of the first to generalise most of Grice’s topics under ‘communication,’ rather than using the Anglo-Saxon ‘mean’ that does not really belong in the Graeco-Roman tradition. Eco cites H. P. Grice in “Cognitive constraints of communication.” Umberto b.2,  philosopher, intellectual historian, and novelist. A leading figure in the field of semiotics, the general theory of signs. Eco has devoted most of his vast production to the notion of interpretation and its role in communication. In the 0s, building on the idea that an active process of interpretation is required to take any sign as a sign, he pioneered reader-oriented criticism The Open Work, 2, 6; The Role of the Reader, 9 and championed a holistic view of meaning, holding that all of the interpreter’s beliefs, i.e., his encyclopedia, are potentially relevant to word meaning. In the 0s, equally influenced by Peirce and the  structuralists, he offered a unified theory of signs A Theory of Semiotics, 6, aiming at grounding the study of communication in general. He opposed the idea of communication as a natural process, steering a middle way between realism and idealism, particularly of the Sapir-Whorf variety. The issue of realism looms large also in his recent work. In The Limits of Interpretation 0 and Interpretation and Overinterpretation 2, he attacks deconstructionism. Kant and the Platypus 7 defends a “contractarian” form of realism, holding that the reader’s interpretation, driven by the Peircean regulative idea of objectivity and collaborating with the speaker’s underdetermined intentions, is needed to fix reference. In his historical essays, ranging from medieval aesthetics The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, 6 to the attempts at constructing artificial and “perfect” languages The Search for the Perfect Language, 3 to medieval semiotics, he traces the origins of some central notions in contemporary philosophy of language e.g., meaning, symbol, denotation and such recent concerns as the language of mind and translation, to larger issues in the history of philosophy. All his novels are pervaded by philosophical queries, such as Is the world an ordered whole? The Name of the Rose, 0, and How much interpretation can one tolerate without falling prey to some conspiracy syndrome? Foucault’s Pendulum, 8. Everywhere, he engages the reader in the game of controlled interpretations. “Il nome della rosa” is about the dark ages in Northern Italy, where the monks were the only to find a slight interest in philosophy, unlike the barbaric Lombards!” --  Refs.: Umberto Econ on H. P. Grice in “Cognitive constraints on communication,” Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Eco: semantica filosofica," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia. 

 

eddington: “Some like Einstein, but Eddington’s MY man.”H. P. Grice. Einsteindiscussed by Grice in “Eddington’s Two Tables” -- Albert 18795, G.-born  physicist, founder of the special and general theories of relativity and a fundamental contributor to several branches of physics and to the philosophical analysis and critique of modern physics, notably of relativity and the quantum theory. Einstein was awarded the Nobel Prize for physics in 2, “especially for his discovery of the law of the photoelectric effect.” Born in Ulm in the G. state of Württemberg, Einstein studied physics at the Polytechnic in Zürich, Switzerland. He was called to Berlin as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics 4 at the peak of the G. ultranationalism that surrounded World War I. His reaction was to circulate an internationalist “Manifesto to Europeans” and to pursue Zionist and pacifist programs. Following the dramatic confirmation of the general theory of relativity 9 Einstein became an international celebrity. This fame also made him the frequent target of G. anti-Semites, who, during one notable episode, described the theory of relativity as “a Jewish fraud.” In 3 Einstein left G.y for the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Although his life was always centered on science, he was also engaged in the politics and culture of his times. He carried on an extensive correspondence whose publication will run to over forty volumes with both famous and ordinary people, including significant philosophical correspondence with Cassirer, Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, and others. Despite reservations over logical positivism, he was something of a patron of the movement, helping to secure academic positions for several of its leading figures. In 9 Einstein signed a letter drafted by the nuclear physicist Leo Szilard informing President Roosevelt about the prospects for harnessing atomic energy and warning of the G. efforts to make a bomb. Einstein did not further participate in the development of atomic weapons, and later was influential in the movement against them. In 2 he was offered, and declined, the presidency of Israel. He died still working on a unified field theory, and just as the founders of the Pugwash movement for nuclear disarmament adopted a manifesto he had cosigned with Russell. Einstein’s philosophical thinking was influenced by early exposure to Kant and later study of Hume and Mach, whose impact shows in the operationalism used to treat time in his famous 5 paper on special relativity. That work also displays a passion for unity in science characteristic of nearly all his physical thinking, and that may relate to the monism of Spinoza, a philosopher whom he read and reread. Einstein’s own understanding of relativity stressed the invariance of the space-time interval and promoted realism with regard to the structure of spacetime. Realism also shows up in Einstein’s work on Brownian motion 5, which was explicitly motivated by his long-standing interest in demonstrating the reality of molecules and atoms, and in the realist treatment of light quanta in his analysis 5 of the photoelectric effect. While he pioneered the development of statistical physics, especially in his seminal investigations of quantum phenomena 525, he never broke with his belief in determinism as the only truly fundamental approach to physical processes. Here again one sees an affinity with Spinoza. Realism and determinism brought Einstein into conflict with the new quantum theory 526, whose observer dependence and “flight into statistics” convinced him that it could not constitute genuinely fundamental physics. Although influential in its development, he became the theory’s foremost critic, never contributing to its refinement but turning instead to the program of unifying the electromagnetic and gravitational fields into one grand, deterministic synthesis that would somehow make room for quantum effects as limiting or singular cases. It is generally agreed that his unified field program was not successful, although his vision continues to inspire other unification programs, and his critical assessments of quantum mechanics still challenge the instrumentalism associated with the theory. Einstein’s philosophical reflections constitute an important chapter in twentieth-century thought. He understood realism as less a metaphysical doctrine than a motivational program, and he argued that determinism was a feature of theories rather than an aspect of the world Einstein, Albert Einstein, Albert 256   256 directly. Along with the unity of science, other central themes in his thinking include his rejection of inductivism and his espousal of holism and constructivism or conventionalism, emphasizing that meanings, concepts, and theories are free creations, not logically derivable from experience but subject rather to overall criteria of comprehensibility, empirical adequacy, and logical simplicity. Holism is also apparent in his acute analysis of the testability of geometry and his rejection of Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism. 

 

Einheit: Grice: “I will use the Germanism for two reasons: it’s pompous, and no Englishman would use ‘unity’ (literally ‘onehood’) like that!” --  H. P. Grice, “Unity of science and teleology.” unity of science, a situation in which all branches of empirical science form a coherent system called unified science. Unified science is sometimes extended to include formal sciences e.g., branches of logic and mathematics. ‘Unity of science’ is also used to refer to a research program aimed at unified science. Interest in the unity of science has a long history with many roots, including ancient atomism and the work of the  Encyclopedists. In the twentieth century this interest was prominent in logical empiricism see Otto Neurath et al., International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,  I, 8. Logical empiricists originally conceived of unified science in terms of a unified language of science, in particular, a universal observation language. All laws and theoretical statements in any branch of science were to be translatable into such an observation language, or else be appropriately related to sentences of this language. In unified science unity of science 939   939 addition to encountering technical difficulties with the observationaltheoretical distinction, this conception of unified science also leaves open the possibility that phenomena of one branch may require special concepts and hypotheses that are explanatorily independent of other branches. Another concept of unity of science requires that all branches of science be combined by the intertheoretic reduction of the theories of all non-basic branches to one basic theory usually assumed to be some future physics. These reductions may proceed stepwise; an oversimplified example would be reduction of psychology to biology, together with reductions of biology to chemistry and chemistry to physics. The conditions for reducing theory T2 to theory T1 are complex, but include identification of the ontology of T2 with that of T1, along with explanation of the laws of T2 by laws of T1 together with appropriate connecting sentences. These conditions for reduction can be supplemented with conditions for the unity of the basic theory, to produce a general research program for the unification of science see Robert L. Causey, Unity of Science, 7. Adopting this research program does not commit one to the proposition that complete unification will ever be achieved; the latter is primarily an empirical proposition. This program has been criticized, and some have argued that reductions are impossible for particular pairs of theories, or that some branches of science are autonomous. For example, some writers have defended a view of autonomous biology, according to which biological science is not reducible to the physical sciences. Vitalism postulated non-physical attributes or vital forces that were supposed to be present in living organisms. More recent neovitalistic positions avoid these postulates, but attempt to give empirical reasons against the feasibility of reducing biology. Other, sometimes a priori, arguments have been given against the reducibility of psychology to physiology and of the social sciences to psychology. These disputes indicate the continuing intellectual significance of the idea of unity of science and the broad range of issues it encompasses.  Einheitswissenschaft:  Used by Grice ironically. While he was totally ANTI-Einheitwisseschaft, he was ALL for einheitsphilosophie!  The phrase is used by Grice in a more causal way. He uses the expression ‘unity of science’ vis-à-vis the topic of teleology. Note that ‘einheitswissenschaft,’ literally translates as unity-sciencethere is nothing about ‘making’ if one, which is what –fied implies. The reason why ‘einheitswissenschaft’ was transliterated as ‘unified science’ was that Neurath thought that ‘unity-science’ would be a yes-yes in New England, most New Englanders being Unitarians, but they would like to include Theology there, ‘into the bargain.’  “Die Einheit von Wissenschaft.” Die Einheit der Wissenschaft und die neopositivistische Theorie der „Einheitswissenschaft”. O. Neurath, „Einheit der Wissenschaft als Aufgabe“,Einheitswissenschaft oder Einheit der Wissenschaft? | Frank F Vierter Internationaler Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft, Cambridge 1938 ... Einheitswissenschaft als Basis der Wissenschaftsgeschichte ( positivists held that no essential differences in aim and method exist between the various branches of science. The scientists of all disciplines should collaborate closely with each other and should unify the vocabulary of sciences by logical analysis. According to this view, there is no sharp demarcation between natural sciences and social sciences. In particular, to establish universal laws in the social sciences may be difficult in practice, but it is not impossible in principle. Through Otto Neurath, this ideal of scientific unity became a program for logical positivists, who published a series of books in Vienna under the heading Unified Science. After the dissolution of the Vienna Circle, Neurath renamed the official journal Erkenntnis as The Journal of Unified Science, and planned to continue publication of a series of works in the United States under the general title The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. He thought that the work would be similar in historical importance to the eighteenth-century French Encyclopédie under the direction of Diderot. Unfortunately, this work was never completed, although Carnap and Morris published some volumes originally prepared for it under the title Foundations of the Unity of Science. “We have repeatedly pointed out that the formation of the constructional system as a whole is the task of unified science.” Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World.

 

enantiamorphs: “When Moore said that he knew he had two hands, he implicated, ‘I have two enantiamorphic hands,’ before they were able to cancel his talk and his implicaturum.” from Grecian enantios, ‘opposite’, and morphe, ‘form’, objects whose shapes differ as do those of a right and left hand. One of a pair of enantiamorphs can be made to look identical in shape to the other by viewing it in a mirror but not merely by changing its spatial orientation. Enantiamorphs figure prominently in the work of Kant, who argued that the existence of enantiamorphic pairs entailed that Leibnizian relational theories of space were to be rejected in favor of Newtonian absolutist theories, that some facts about space could be apprehended empiricism, constructive enantiamorphs 263   263 only by “pure intuition,” and that space was mind-dependent. 

 

ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA: he way Grice is known in Italy, due to the efforts of Luigi Speranza, of the Grice Club. Speranza saw that Grice connected, somehow, with philosophy in general, and tried to pursue a way to make him accessible to anti-Oxonians. The encyclopædia Griceiana. Grice went to Paris and became enamoured with encyclopedia, or “encyclopédie,” “or a Descriptive Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Trades,” launched by the Parisian publisher Le Breton, who had secured d’Alembert’s and Diderot’s editorship, the Encyclopedia was gradually released despite a temporary revocation of its royal privilege. Comprising seventeen folio volumes of 17,818 articles and eleven folio volumes of 2,885 plates, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA required a staff of 272 Griceian engravers. “But the good thing,” Grice says, “is that it incorporates the accumulated knowledge and rationalist, secularist views of the  Enlightenment and prescribed economic, social, and political reforms.” Strawson adds: “Enormously successful at Oxford, ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA was reprinted with revisions five times before Grice died.” “Contributions were made by anyone we could bribe!”As in the old encycloopaedia, the philosophes Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, d’Holbach, Naigeon, and Saint-Lambert; the writers Duclos and Marmontel; the theologians Morellet and Malet; enlightened clerics, e.g. Raynal; explorers, e.g. La Condamine; natural scientists, e.g. Daubenton; physicians, e.g. Bouillet; the economists Turgot and Quesnay; engineers, e.g. Perronet; horologists, e.g. Berthoud; and scores of other experts. “The purpose of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA,” writes Grice in the “Foreword”, “is to collect this or that bit of Griceian knowledge dispersed on the surface of the earth, and to unfold its general system.” “The Encyclopedia,” Strawson adds, “offers the educated Oxonian a comprehensive, systematic, and descriptive repository of contemporary liberal and mechanical arts, with an appendix on implicaturum by Grice hisself.” D’Alembert and Diderot developed a sensationalist epistemology, “but I don’t.” “Preliminary Discourse” under the influence of Locke and Condillac. Grice and Strawson (with the occasional help from Austin, Warnock, Pears and Thomson) compiled and rationally classified existing knowledge according to the noetic process memory, imagination, and reason. Based on the assumption of the unity of theory and praxis, the approach of the ENCYCLOOPÆDIA GRICEIANA is positivistic and ‘futilitarian.’ The ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA vindicates experimental reason and the rule of nature, fostered the practice of criticism, and stimulated the development of both old and new sciences. In religious matters, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA cultivates ambiguity and implicaturum to escape censorship by Queen Elizabeth II, an avid reader of the supplements. Whereas most contributors held either conciliatory or orthodox positions, J. F. Thomson barely concealed his naturalistic and atheistic opinions. Thomson’s radicalism was pervasive. Supernaturalism, obscurantism, and fanaticism, and Heideggerianism are among the Encyclopedists’ favorite targets. The Griceian Encyclopaedists identify Roman Catholicism (of the type Dummett practiced) with superstition and theology with occult magic; assert the superiority of natural morality over theological ethics; demand religious toleration; and champion human rights and conventional implicaturum alike. They innovatively retrace the historical conditions of the development of Oxford (“and a little Cambridge”) philosophy. They furthermore pioneer ideas on trade and industry and anticipate the relevance of historiography, sociology, economics, and ‘conversational pragmatics.’ As the most ambitious and expansive reference work Oxford ever saw, the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA crystallizes the confidence of England’s midlands bourgeoisie in the capacity of reason to dispel the shadows of ignorance and improve society“at least Oxonian society, if I can.”

 

enesidemo: or ‘aenesidemus,’ as Strawson would prefer. Although Grecian, he is listed in the name glossay to the essay on “Roman philosophers,” and that is because he influenced some Roman-born philosophers and nnobles. “Nothing beats a Grecian don,” as Cicero remarked. Academic philosopher, founder of a Pyrrhonist revival in Rome. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Scetticismo romano.”

 

Eiconicum -- Would Ciero prefer the spelling ‘eiconicus’ or ‘iconicus’? We know Pliny preferred ‘icon.’īcon , ŏnis, f., = εἰκών,I.an image, figure: “fictae ceră icones,” Plin. 8, 54, 80, § 215.Iconicity -- depiction, pictorial representation, also sometimes called “iconic representation.” Linguistic representation is conventional: it is only by virtue of a convention that the word ‘cats’ refers to cats. A picture of a cat, however, seems to refer to cats by other than conventional means; for viewers can correctly interpret pictures without special training, whereas people need special training to learn languages. Though some philosophers, such as Goodman Languages of Art, deny that depiction involves a non-conventional element, most are concerned to give an account of what this non-conventional element consists in. Some hold that it consists in resemblance: pictures refer to their objects partly by resembling them. Objections to this are that anything resembles anything else to some degree; and that resemblance is a symmetric and reflexive relation, whereas depiction is not. Other philosophers avoid direct appeal to resemblance: Richard Wollheim Painting as an Art argues that depiction holds by virtue of the intentional deployment of the natural human capacity to see objects in marked surfaces; and dependence, causal depiction Kendall Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe argues that depiction holds by virtue of objects serving as props in reasonably rich and vivid visual games of make-believe. 

                                                                                                                                                                                                          

Emiliani: Alessandro Emiliani, filosofo.  Dio è la mia speranza Anch'io vivo nella speranza di avere amici in cielo che pregano per me e che attendono di unirsi a me nella nostra comune patria. Dobbiamo sempre ricordare che questa vita terrena è soltanto un passaggio verso la nostra vera patria che è quella celeste. La Madonna è apparsa e ha parlato a moltissimi veggenti di molti popoli e nelle più svariate circostanze, come una persona viva, che promette, annunzia, loda, esorta, profetizza, prega, guida e protegge dai pericoli, risana i malati, opera i miracoli, piange, invita alla conversione ed alla penitenza, aiuta ad avvicinarsi a Cristo, suo Figlio. La mia sicura bussola è camminare sulla strada della carità in ogni circostanza della vita. La presenza in noi dello Spirito Santo è la caparra della nostra vita eterna futura. Solo Dio resta. Egli è l'unica roccia a cui mi posso aggrappare per non essere travolto dai flutti tempestosi in mezzo ai quali galleggio.  Alessandro Emiliani, Dio è la mia speranza, Edizioni Studio Domenicano.

 

English futilitarians, The: Bergmann’s pun on H. P. Grice and J. L. Austin. from futile. Cf. conversational futilitarianism. Can there be a futilitarian theory of communication? Grice’s! The issue is a complex one. Some may interpret Grice’s theory as resting “on Kantian grounds.” Not everybody was present at Grice’s seminars at Oxford on helpfulness, where he discusses the kind of reasoning that a participant to a conversation will display in assuming that his co-conversationalist is being conversationally helpful, conversationally benevolent, conversationally ‘altruist,’ almost, and conversationally, well, co-operative. So, as to the basis for this. We can simplify the scenario by using the plural. A conversationalist assumes that his co-conversationalist is being co-operative on Kantian grounds. What are the alternatives, if any? One can re-describe “Kantian grounds” as “moral grounds.” Conversationalists abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness on Kantian, moral grounds. Kant wrote the “Critique of practical reason,” so Kant would allow for a rephrase of this as follows. Conversationalists abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness on practical, indeed moral, groundswhich is the topic of Grice’s last Kant lecture at Stanford. How to turn a ‘counsel of prudence,’ which is ‘practical’ into something that covers Kant’s “Kategorische Imperativ.” And then there’s the utilitarian. Utilitarianism IS a moral theory, or a meta-ethical theory. So one would have to allow for the possibility that conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on “utilitarian grounds,” which would be “practical grounds,” AND “moral grounds,” if not Kantian grounds. In any case, the topic WAS raised, and indeed, for someone like Grice who wrote on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘happiness,’ it does not seem futilitarian to see him as a futilitarian. Unfortunately, you need a serious philosophical background to appreciate all this, since it touches on the very serious, or ‘deep,’ as Grice would say, “and fascinating,” suburbia or practicality. But surely the keyword ‘utilitarian’ as per “conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on utilitarian grounds” is a possibility. Cf. Grice’s reference to the ‘least effort,’ and in the Oxford lectures on helpfulness to a conversationalist not getting involved in “undue effort,” or getting into “unnecessary trouble.” “Undue effort” is ‘forbidden’ by the desideratum of conversational candour; the ‘unnecessary trouble’ is balanced by the ‘principle of conversational self-love.’ And I don’t think Kant would ever considered loving himself! Grice being keen on neuter adjectives, he saw the ‘utile’ at the root of utilitarianism. There is much ‘of value’ in the old Roman concept of ‘utile.’ Lewis and Short have it as Neutr. absol.: ūtĭle , is, n., what is useful, the useful: omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci, Hor. A. P. 343: “bonus atque fidus Judex honestum praetulit utili,” id. C. 4, 9, 41: “utilium tardus provisor,” id. A. P. 164: “sententiae de utilibus honestisque,” Quint. 3, 8, 13; cf. id. 1, 2, 29. —Ultimately, Grice’s meta-ethics, like Hare’s, Nowell-Smith’s, Austin’s, Hampshire’s, and Warnock’s derives into a qualified utilitarianism, with notions of agreeableness and eudaemonia being crucial. Grice well knows that for Aristotle pleasure is just one out of the three sources for phulia; the others being profit, and virtue. As an English utilitarian, or English futilitarian, Grice plays with Griceian pleasures. Democritus, as Grice remarks, seems to be the earliest philosopher to have categorically embraced a hedonistic philosophy. Democritus claims that the supreme goal of life is contentment or cheerfulness, stating that joy and sorrow are the distinguishing mark of things beneficial and harmful. The Cyrenaics are an ultra-hedonist Grecoam school of philosophy founded by Aristippus. Many of the principles of the school were set by his grandson, Aristippus the Younger, and Theodorus. The Cyrenaic school is one of the earliest Socratic schools. The Cyrenaics teach that the only intrinsic ‘agathon’ is pleasure ‘hedone,’ which means not just the absence of pain, but a positively enjoyable momentary sensation. A physical pleasure is stronger than a pleasure of anticipation or memory. The Cyrenaics do, however, recognize the value of social obligation, and that pleasure may be gained from altruism. The Cyrenaic school dies out within a century, and is replaced by Epicureanism.  The Cyrenaics are known for their sceptical epistemology. The Cyrenaics reduce logic to a basic doctrine concerning the criterion of truth. The Cyrenaics think that one can only know with certainty his immediate sense-experience, e. g., that he is having a sweet sensation. But one can know nothing about the nature of the object that causes this sensation, e.g., that honey is sweet. The Cyrenaics also deny that we can have knowledge of what the experience of others are like. All knowledge is immediate sensation. Sensation is a motion which is purely subjective, and is painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as it is violent, tranquil or gentle. Further, sensation is entirely individual and can in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only possible criterion of knowledge and of conduct. The way of being affected is alone knowable. Thus the sole aim for everyone should be pleasure. Cyrenaicism deduces a single, universal aim for all which is pleasure. Furthermore, feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows that past and future pleasure have no real existence for us, and that in present pleasure there is no distinction of kind. Socrates speaks of the higher pleasure of the intellect. The Cyrenaics denies the validity of this distinction and say that bodily pleasure (hedone somatike), being more simple and more intense, is preferable. Momentary pleasure, preferably of a physical kind, is the only good for a human. However, an action which gives immediate pleasure can create more than their equivalent of pain. The wise person should be in control (egcrateia) of pleasure rather than be enslaved to it, otherwise pain results, and this requires judgement to evaluate this or that pleasure of life. Regard should be paid to law and custom, because even though neither law nor custom have an intrinsic value on its own, violating law or custom leads to an unpleasant penalty being imposed by others. Likewise, friendship and justice are useful because of the pleasure they provide. Thus the Cyrenaics believe in the hedonistic value of social obligation and altruistic behaviour.  Epicureanism is a system of philosophy based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an atomic materialist, following in the steps of Democritus and Leucippus. Epicurus’s materialism leads him to a general stance against superstition or the idea of divine intervention. Following Aristippus, Epicurus believes that the greatest good is to seek modest, sustainable pleasure in the form of a state of tranquility and freedom from fear (ataraxia) and absence of bodily pain (aponia) through knowledge of the workings of the world and the limits of desire. The combination of these two states, ataraxia and aponia, is supposed to constitute happiness in its highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism, insofar as it declares pleasure as the sole intrinsic good, its conception of absence of pain as the greatest pleasure and its advocacy of a simple life make it different from hedonism as it is commonly understood. In the Epicurean view, the highest pleasure (tranquility and freedom from fear) is obtained by knowledge, friendship and living a virtuous and temperate life. Epicurus lauds the enjoyment of a simple pleasure, by which he means abstaining from the bodily desire, such as sex and the appetite, verging on asceticism. Epicurus argues that when eating, one should not eat too richly, for it could lead to dissatisfaction later, such as the grim realization that one could not afford such delicacies in the future. Likewise, sex could lead to increased lust and dissatisfaction with the sexual partner. Epicurus does not articulate a broad system of social ethics that has survived but had a unique version of the golden rule.  It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, agreeing neither to harm nor be harmed, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life. Epicureanism is originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the main opponent of Stoicism. Epicurus and his followers shun politics. After the death of Epicurus, his school is headed by Hermarchus. Later many Epicurean societies flourish in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era, such as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes and Ercolano. The poet Lucretius is its most known Roman proponent. By the end of the Roman Empire, having undergone attack and repression, Epicureanism has all but died out, and would be resurrected in the seventeenth century by the atomist Pierre Gassendi. Some writings by Epicurus have survived. Some scholars consider the epic poem “De natura rerum” by Lucretius to present in one unified work the core arguments and theories of Epicureanism. Many of the papyrus scrolls unearthed at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum are Epicurean texts. At least some are thought to have belonged to the Epicurean Philodemus. Cf. Barnes on epicures and connoiseurs. Many a controversy arising out of this or that value judgement is settled by saying, ‘I like it and you don’t, and that s the end of the matter.’ I am content to adopt this solution of the difficulty on matters such as food and drink. Even here, though, we admit the existence of epicures and connoisseurs.Why are we not content to accept the same solution on every matter where value is concerned? The reason I am not so content lies in the fact that the action of one man dictated by his approval of something is frequently incompatible with the action of another man dictated by his approval of something. This is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian hedonistic Epicureians made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Oxford. L and S have "ἡδονή,” also “ἁδονά,” or in a chorus in tragedy, “ἡδονά,” ultimately from "ἥδομαι,” which they render it as “enjoyment, pleasure,” “prop. of sensual pleasure.” αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡ. Plato, Republic, 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Plato, Republic, 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R. 582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ.; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to pleasure; Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or so as to humour you? εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ, “one feels pleasure at the thought that …” ; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied with; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple; δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν;  ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ.; πρὸς ἡ. Λέγειν, “to speak so as to please another”; δημηγορεῖν; οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα; πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας; later πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι; καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν κλύειν; καθ᾽ ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν; καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, it is a pleasure or delight to another; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς, to take pleasure in them; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, oοἱ λυπηροί; μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ; ἡδονᾷ with pleasure; a pleasure; ἡδοναὶ τραγημάτων sweetmeats; plural., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts. In Ionic philosophers, taste, flavour, usually joined with χροιή. Note that Aristotle uses somatike hedone. As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of hedone in Aristotles system. Pleasure is sometimes rendered “placitum,” as in “ad placitum,” in scholastic philosophy, but that is because scholastic philosophy is not as Hellenic as it should be. Actually, Grice prefers “agreeable.” One of Grices requisites for an ascription of eudaemonia (to have a fairy godmother) precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an agreeable one. One form or mode of agreeableness, Grice notes, is, unless counteracted, automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of ends to another. However, some other mode of agreeableness, such as e. g. being a source of delight, which is not routinely associated with the fulfilment of this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of other features relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and another. Further, a system of ends the operation of which is especially agreeable is stable not only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the somewhat weakening effect of ‘egcrateia,’ incontinence, or akrasia, if you mustn’t. A disturbing influence, as Aristotle knows from experience, is more surely met by a principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the principle alone. Grices favourite hedonistic implicaturum was “please,” as in “please, please me,” by The Beatles. While Grice claims to love Kantotle, he cannot hide his greater reverence for Aristotle, instilled early on at Corpus. An Oxonian need not recite Kant in what during the Second World War was referred to as the Hun, and while Aristotle was a no-no at Clifton (koine!), Hardie makes Grice love him. With eudaemonia, Grice finds a perfect synthetic futilitarian concept to balance his innate analytic tendencies. There is Grecian eudaemonism and there is Griceian eudaemonism. L and S are not too helpful. They have “εὐδαιμονία” (Ion. –ιη), which they render not as happiness, but as “prosperity, good fortune, opulence;” “χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐ.;” of countries; “μοῖρ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας.” In a second use, the expression is indeed rendered as “true, full happiness;” “εὐ. οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐν χρυσῷ; εὐ. ψυχῆς, oκακοδαιμονίη, cf. Pl. Def. 412d, Arist. EN 1095a18, sometimes personified as a divinity. There is eudaemonia and there is kakodaemonia. Of course, Grice’s locus classicus is EN 1095a18, which is Grice’s fairy godmother, almost. Cf. Austin on agathon and eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics, unearthed by Urmson and Warnock, a response to an essay by Prichard in “Philosophy” on the meaning of agathon in Aristotle’s ethics. Pritchard argues that Aristotle regards “agathon” to mean conducive to “eudaemonia,” and, consequently, that Aristotle maintains that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire for eudaemonia. Austin finds fault with this. First, agathon in Aristotle does not have a single usage, and a fortiori not the one Pritchard suggests. Second, if one has to summarise the usage of “agathon” in one phrase, “being desired” cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides “τό άγαθόν,” even if Davidson would disagree. Prichard endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, “agathon” seems to mean simply that being desired or an ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim of a person. In other contexts, “αγαθον” takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as “a good.” Prichard argues that by "αγαθον" Aristotle actually means, except in the Nicomachean Ethics, conducive to eudaemonia, and holds that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to attain eudaemonia. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of man’s ultimate aim. Grice takes life seriously: philosophical biology. He even writes an essay entitled “Philosophy of life,” listed is in PGRICE. Grice bases his thought on his tutee Ackrill’s Dawes Hicks essay for the BA, who quotes extensively from Hardie. Grice also reviews that “serious student of Greek philosophy,” Austin, in his response to Prichard, Grice’s fairy godmother. Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Grecian eudaimonia means is that eudaemonia is to be understood as the name for that state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for one. One’s good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to one, solely by concern for one’s eudaemonia, well-being or happiness. To change the idiom, eudæmonia is the general characterisation of what a full-time and unhampered fairy godmother would secure for one. Grice is concerned with the specific system of ends that eudaemonia consists for Ariskant. Grice borrows, but never returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. Johns, Ackrill. Ackrills point is about the etymological basis for eudaemonia, from eudaemon, the good dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken literally. Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of eudaemonia to the agent. For Grice, as for Kantotle, telos and eudaemonia are related in subtle ways. For eudaemonia we cannot deal with just one end, but a system of ends, although such a system may be a singleton. Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising end so that a particular ascription of an end may entail an ascription of eudaemonia. Grice follows the textual criticism of his tutee Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that eudaemonia is literally related to the eudaemon. In PGRICE Warner explores Grice’s concept of eudaemonia. Warner is especially helpful with the third difficult Carus lecture by Grice, a metaphysical defence of absolute value. Warner connects with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception seen in an evolutionary light and the Kantotelian idea of eudaemonia. In response to Warner’s overview of the oeuvre of Grice for the festschrift that Warner co-edited with Grandy, Grice refers to the editors collectively as Richards. While he feels he has to use “happiness,” Grice is always having Aristotle’s eudaemonia in mind. The implicaturum of Smith is ‘happy’ is more complex than Kantotle thinks. Austen knew. For Emma, you decide if youre happy. Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life. Grice took life seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes essay in WOW, where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is no Cartesian scholarwhat Oxonian would? It concerns certainty. And certainty is originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer says that to know is to assure that one is certain or sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is authoritative. And Grice plays with meaning, too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know? Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian and otiose. Tutees. Grice loved to place himself in the role of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutees inabilities, a whole week longuntil he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning. Now, the logical form of certain is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as numbering of operators. If G ψs p, G ψs ψs p, and G ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesnt think so. Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver his BA lecture he chooses ‘intention and uncertainty’ as its topic, just to provoke. Not surprisingly, the “Uncertainty” piece opens with the sceptics challenge. And he will not conclude that the intender is certain. Only that theres some good chance (p ˃0.5) that what he intends will get through! When there is a will, there is a way, when there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing! Perhaps by know Moore means certain. Grice was amused by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasnt. He uses Moores misuse of knowaccording to Malcolmboth in Causal theory and Prolegomena. And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptics implicaturum, above, with the two essays Scepticism and Common sense and Moore and Philosophers Paradoxes repr. partially in WOW. With regard to certainty, it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still, may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and desires are incorrigible? One of Grices problems is, as he puts it, how to accommodate privileged access and, maybe, incorrigibility. This or that a second-order state may be, in some fashion, incorrigible. On the contrary, for Grice, this or that lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged access. Note that while he is happy to allow privileged access to lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or second-order may, in some fashion, be said to count as an incorrigible avowal. It rains. P judges it rains (privileged access). P judges that P judges that it rains (incorrigible). The justification is conversational. It rains says the P, or expresses the P. Grice wants to be able to say that if a P expresses that p, the P judges₂ that p. If the P expresses that it rains, the P judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order, higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick with judging here. Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones. If P expresses !p, P ψ-s₂ that !p. His second-order, higher-order buletic state is incorrigible (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a matter only of privileged access. For a study of conversation as rational co-operation this utilitarian revival modifies the standard exegesis of Grice as purely Kantian, and has him more in agreement with the general Oxonian meta-ethical scene. Refs.: Under ‘futilitarianism,’ we cover Grice’s views on ‘pleasure’ (he has an essay on “Pleasure,”) and “eudaemonia” (He has an essay on ‘happiness’); other leads are given under ‘grecianism,’ since this is the Grecian side to Grice’s Ariskant; for specific essays on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘eudaimonia,’ the keywords ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ are useful. A good source is the essay on happiness in “Aspects,” which combines ‘eudaemonia’ and ‘agreebleness,’ his futilitarianism turned Kantotelian. BANC. English futilitarians: utilitarianism, the moral theory that an action is morally right if and only if it produces at least as much good utility for all people affected by the action as any alternative action the person could do instead. Its best-known proponent is J. S. Mill, who formulated the greatest happiness principle also called the principle of utility: always act so as to produce the greatest happiness. Two kinds of issues have been central in debates about whether utilitarianism is an adequate or true moral theory: first, whether and how utilitarianism can be clearly and precisely formulated and applied; second, whether the moral implications of utilitarianism in particular cases are acceptable, or instead constitute objections to it. Issues of formulation. A central issue of formulation is how utility is to be defined and whether it can be measured in the way utilitarianism requires. Early utilitarians often held some form of hedonism, according to which only pleasure and the absence of pain have utility or intrinsic value. For something to have intrinsic value is for it to be valuable for its own sake and apart from its consequences or its relations to other things. Something has instrumental value, on the other hand, provided it brings about what has intrinsic value. Most utilitarians have held that hedonism is too narrow an account of utility because there are many things that people value intrinsically besides pleasure. Some nonhedonists define utility as happiness, and among them there is considerable debate about the proper account of happiness. Happiness has also been criticized as too narrow to exhaust utility or intrinsic value; e.g., many people value accomplishments, not just the happiness that may accompany them. Sometimes utilitarianism is understood as the view that either pleasure or happiness has utility, while consequentialism is understood as the broader view that morally right action is action that maximizes the good, however the good is understood. Here, we take utilitarianism in this broader interpretation that some philosophers reserve for consequentialism. Most utilitarians who believe hedonism gives too narrow an account of utility have held that utility is the satisfaction of people’s informed preferences or desires. This view is neutral about what people desire, and so can account for the full variety of things and experiences that different people in fact desire or value. Finally, ideal utilitarians have held that some things or experiences, e.g. knowledge or being autonomous, are intrinsically valuable or good whether or not people value or prefer them or are happier with them. Whatever account of utility a utilitarian adopts, it must be possible to quantify or measure the good effects or consequences of actions in order to apply the utilitarian standard of moral rightness. Happiness utilitarianism, e.g., must calculate whether a particular action, or instead some possible alternative, would produce more happiness for a given person; this is called the intrapersonal utility comparison. The method of measurement may allow cardinal utility measurements, in which numerical units of happiness may be assigned to different actions e.g., 30 units for Jones expected from action a, 25 units for Jones from alternative action b, or only ordinal utility measurements may be possible, in which actions are ranked only as producing more or less happiness than alternative actions. Since nearly all interesting and difficult moral problems involve the happiness of more than one person, utilitarianism requires calculating which among alternative actions produces the greatest happiness for all people affected; this is called the interpersonal utility comparison. Many ordinary judgments about personal action or public policy implicitly rely on interpersonal utility comparisons; e.g., would a family whose members disagree be happiest overall taking its vacation at the seashore or in the mountains? Some critics of utilitarianism doubt that it is possible to make interpersonal utility comparisons. Another issue of formulation is whether the utilitarian principle should be applied to individual actions or to some form of moral rule. According to act utilitarianism, each action’s rightness or wrongness depends on the utility it produces in comparison with possible alternatives. Even act utilitarians agree, however, that rules of thumb like ‘keep your promises’ can be used for the most part in practice because following them tends to maximize utility. According to rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, individual actions are evaluated, in theory not just in practice, by whether they conform to a justified moral rule, and the utilitarian standard is applied only to general rules. Some rule utilitarians hold that actions are right provided they are permitted by rules the general acceptance of which would maximize utility in the agent’s society, and wrong only if they would be prohibited by such rules. There are a number of forms of rule utilitarianism, and utilitarians disagree about whether act or rule utilitarianism is correct. Moral implications. Most debate about utilitarianism has focused on its moral implications. Critics have argued that its implications sharply conflict with most people’s considered moral judgments, and that this is a strong reason to reject utilitarianism. Proponents have argued both that many of these conflicts disappear on a proper understanding of utilitarianism and that the remaining conflicts should throw the particular judgments, not utilitarianism, into doubt. One important controversy concerns utilitarianism’s implications for distributive justice. Utilitarianism requires, in individual actions and in public policy, maximizing utility without regard to its distribution between different persons. Thus, it seems to ignore individual rights, whether specific individuals morally deserve particular benefits or burdens, and potentially to endorse great inequalities between persons; e.g., some critics have charged that according to utilitarianism slavery would be morally justified if its benefits to the slaveowners sufficiently outweighed the burdens to the slaves and if it produced more overall utility than alternative practices possible in that society. Defenders of utilitarianism typically argue that in the real world there is virtually always a better alternative than the action or practice that the critic charges utilitarianism wrongly supports; e.g., no system of slavery that has ever existed is plausibly thought to have maximized utility for the society in question. Defenders of utilitarianism also typically try to show that it does take account of the moral consideration the critic claims it wrongly ignores; for instance, utilitarians commonly appeal to the declining marginal utility of money  equal marginal increments of money tend to produce less utility e.g. happiness for persons, the more money they already utilitarianism utilitarianism have  as giving some support to equality in income distribution. Another source of controversy concerns whether moral principles should be agent-neutral or, in at least some cases, agent-relative. Utilitarianism is agent-neutral in that it gives all people the same moral aim  act so as to maximize utility for everyone  whereas agent-relative principles give different moral aims to different individuals. Defenders of agent-relative principles note that a commonly accepted moral rule like the prohibition of killing the innocent is understood as telling each agent that he or she must not kill, even if doing so is the only way to prevent a still greater number of killings by others. In this way, a non-utilitarian, agent-relative prohibition reflects the common moral view that each person bears special moral responsibility for what he or she does, which is greater than his or her responsibility to prevent similar wrong actions by others. Common moral beliefs also permit people to give special weight to their own projects and commitments and, e.g., to favor to some extent their own children at the expense of other children in greater need; agent-relative responsibilities to one’s own family reflect these moral views in a way that agent-neutral utilitarian responsibilities apparently do not. The debate over neutrality and relativity is related to a final area of controversy about utilitarianism. Critics charge that utilitarianism makes morality far too demanding by requiring that one always act to maximize utility. If, e.g., one reads a book or goes to a movie, one could nearly always be using one’s time and resources to do more good by aiding famine relief. The critics believe that this wrongly makes morally required what should be only supererogatory  action that is good, but goes beyond “the call of duty” and is not morally required. Here, utilitarians have often argued that ordinary moral views are seriously mistaken and that morality can demand greater sacrifices of one’s own interests for the benefit of others than is commonly believed. There is little doubt that here, and in many other cases, utilitarianism’s moral implications significantly conflict with commonsense moral beliefs  the dispute is whether this should count against commonsense moral beliefs or against utilitarianism. Refs.:  H. P. Grice, “Bergmann on Stephen and the English utilitarians.”

 

entelecheia --  used by Grice in his philosophical psychology -- from Grecian entelecheia, energeia, actuality. Aristotle, who coins both terms, entelecheia and energeia, treats entelecheia as a near synonym of Energeia (“which makes me often wonder why he felt the need to coin TWICE”H. P. Grice.). Entelecheia figures in Aristotle’s definition of the soul (psyche) as the first actuality of the natural body (De Anima, II.1). This is explained by analogy with knowledge: first actuality is to knowledge as second actuality is to the active use of knowledge. ’Entelechia’ is also a technical term, but in German, in Leibniz for the primitive active force in every monad, which is combined with primary matter, and from which the active force, vis viva, is somehow derived (“But I rather use ‘entelecheia’ in the original Grecian.”Grice). “The vitalist philosopher Hans Driesch used the Aristotelian term in his account of biology, and I feel vitalistic on occasion.” “Life, Driesch holds, is not a bowl of cherries, but an entelechy; and an entelechy is a substantial entity, rather like a mind, that controls organic processes.” “To me, life is rather a bowl of cherries, don’t make it serious! It’s just mysterious!”

 

enthymeme: an incompletely stated syllogism, with one premise, or even the conclusion, omitted. The term sometimes designates incompletely stated arguments of other kinds. We are expected to supply the missing premise or draw the conclusion if it is not stated. The result is supposed to be a syllogistic inference. For example: ‘He will eventually get caught, for he is a thief’; or ‘He will eventually be caught, for all habitual thieves get caught’. This notion of enthymeme as an incompletely stated syllogism has a long tradition and does not seem inconsistent with Aristotle’s own characterization of it. Thus, Peter of Spain openly declares that an enthymeme is an argument with a single premise that needs to be reduced to syllogism. But Peter also points out that Aristotle spoke of enthymeme as “being of ycos and signum,” and he explains that ycos here means ‘probable proposition’ while signum expresses the necessity of inference. ‘P, therefore Q’ is an ycos in the sense of a proposition that appears to be true to all or to many; but insofar as P has virtually a double power, that of itself and of the proposition understood along with it, it is both probable and demonstrative, albeit from a different point of view. 

 

EPI-STEMIC: Grice: “Philosophers hardly realise how artificial the idea of a Grecian epi-steme is! from epi "over, near" (see epi-) + histasthai "to stand," from PIE root *sta- "to stand, make or be firm." epistemic deontologism, a duty-based view of the nature of epistemic justification. A central concern of epistemology is to account for the distinction between justified and unjustified beliefs. According to epistemic deontologism, the concept of justification may be analyzed by using, in a specific sense relevant to the pursuit of knowledge, terms such as ‘ought’, ‘obligatory’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’. A subject S is justified in believing that p provided S does not violate any epistemic obligations  those that arise from the goal of believing what is true and not believing what is false. Equivalently, S is justified in believing that p provided believing p is  from the point of view taken in the pursuit of truth  permissible for S. Among contemporary epistemologists, this view is held by Chisholm, Laurence BonJour, and Carl Ginet. Its significance is twofold. If justification is a function of meeting obligations, then it is, contrary to some versions of naturalistic epistemology, normative. Second, if the normativity of justification is deontological, the factors that determine whether a belief is justified must be internal to the subject’s mind. Critics of epistemic deontologism, most conspicuously Alston, contend that belief is involuntary and thus cannot be a proper object of obligations. If, e.g., one is looking out the window and notices that it is raining, one is psychologically forced to believe that it is raining. Deontologists can reply to this objection by rejecting its underlying premise: epistemic obligations require that belief be voluntary. Alternatively, they may insist that belief is voluntary after all, and thus subject to epistemic obligations, for there is a means by which one can avoid believing what one ought not to believe: weighing the evidence, or deliberation.  -- epistemic logic, the logical investigation of epistemic concepts and statements. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, evidence, certainty, and related notions. Epistemic logic is usually taken to include the logic of belief or doxastic logic. Much of the recent work on epistemic logic is based on the view that it is a branch of modal logic. In the early 0s von Wright observed that the epistemic notions verified known to be true, undecided, and falsified are related to each other in the same way as the alethic modalities necessary, contingent, and impossible, and behave logically in analogous ways. This analogy is not surprising in view of the fact that the meaning of modal concepts is often explained epistemically. For example, in the 0s Peirce defined informational possibility as that “which in a given state of information is not perfectly known not to be true,” and called informationally necessary “that which is perfectly known to be true.” The modal logic of epistemic and doxastic concepts was studied systematically by Hintikka in his pioneering Knowledge and Belief2, which applied to the concepts of knowledge and belief the semantical method the method of modal sets that he had used earlier for the investigation of modal logic. In this approach, the truth of the proposition that a knows that p briefly Kap in a possible world or situation u is taken to mean that p holds in all epistemic alternatives of u; these are understood as worlds compatible with what a knows at u. If the relation of epistemic alternativeness is reflexive, the principle ‘KapPp’ only what is the case can be known is valid, and the assumption that the alternativeness relation is transitive validates the so-called KK-thesis, ‘Kap P Ka Ka p’ if a knows that p, a knows that a knows that p; these two assumptions together make the logic of knowledge similar to an S4-type modal logic. If the knowledge operator Ka and the corresponding epistemic possibility operator Pa are added to quantification theory with identity, it becomes possible to study the interplay between quantifiers and epistemic operators and the behavior of individual terms in epistemic contexts, and analyze such locutions as ‘a knows who what b some F is’. The problems of epistemic logic in this area are part of the general problem of giving a coherent semantical account of propositional attitudes. If a proposition p is true in all epistemic alternatives of a given world, so are all logical consequences of p; thus the possible-worlds semantics of epistemic concepts outlined above leads to the result that a person knows all logical consequences of what he knows. This is a paradoxical conclusion; it is called the problem of logical omniscience. The solution of this problem requires a distinction between different levels of knowledge  for example, between tacit and explicit knowledge. A more realistic model of knowledge can be obtained by supplementing the basic possible-worlds account by an analysis of the processes by which the implicit knowledge can be activated and made explicit. Modal epistemic logics have found fruitful applications in the recent work on knowledge representation and in the logic and semantics of questions and answers in which questions are interpreted as requests for knowledge or “epistemic imperatives.”  -- epistemic principle, a principle of rationality applicable to such concepts as knowledge, justification, and reasonable belief. Epistemic principles include the principles of epistemic logic and principles that relate different epistemic concepts to one another, or epistemic concepts to nonepistemic ones e.g., semantic concepts. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, epistemic probability, and other concepts that are used for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of beliefs and knowledge claims. Epistemic principles can be formulated as principles concerning belief systems or information systems, i.e., systems that characterize a person’s possible doxastic state at a given time; a belief system may be construed as a set of accepted propositions or as a system of degrees of belief. It is possible to distinguish two kinds of epistemic principles: a principles concerning the rationality of a single belief system, and b principles concerning the rational changes of belief. The former include the requirements of coherence and consistency for beliefs and for probabilities; such principles may be said to concern the statics of belief systems. The latter principles include various principles of belief revision and adjustment, i.e., principles concerning the dynamics of belief systems.  -- epistemic privacy, the relation a person has to a proposition when only that person can have direct or non-inferential knowledge of the proposition. It is widely thought that people have epistemic privacy with respect to propositions about certain of their own mental states. According to this view, a person can know directly that he has certain thoughts or feelings or sensory experiences. Perhaps others can also know that the person has these thoughts, feelings, or experiences, but if they can it is only as a result of inference from propositions about the person’s behavior or physical condition.  -- epistemic regress argument, an argument, originating in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, aiming to show that knowledge and epistemic justification have a two-tier structure as described by epistemic foundationalism. It lends itself to the following outline regarding justification. If you have any justified belief, this belief occurs in an evidential chain including at least two links: the supporting link i.e., the evidence and the supported link i.e., the justified belief. This does not mean, however, that all evidence consists of beliefs. Evidential chains might come in any of four kinds: circular chains, endless chains, chains ending in unjustified beliefs, and chains anchored in foundational beliefs that do not derive their justification from other beliefs. Only the fourth, foundationalist kind is defensible as grounding knowledge and epistemic justification. Could all justification be inferential? A belief, B1, is inferentially justified when it owes its justification, at least in part, to some other belief, B2. Whence the justification for B2? If B2 owes its justification to B1, we have a troublesome circle. How can B2 yield justification or evidence for B1, if B2 owes its evidential status to B1? On the other hand, if B2 owes its justification to another belief, B3, and B3 owes its justification to yet another belief, B4, and so on ad infinitum, we have a troublesome endless regress of justification. Such a regress seems to deliver not actual justification, but at best merely potential justification, for the belief at its head. Actual finite humans, furthermore, seem not to be able to comprehend, or to possess, all the steps of an infinite regress of justification. Finally, if B2 is itself unjustified, it evidently will be unable to provide justification for B1. It seems, then, that the structure of inferential justification does not consist of either circular justification, endless regresses of justification, or unjustified starter-beliefs. We have foundationalism, then, as the most viable account of evidential chains, so long as we understand it as the structural view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially i.e., without deriving justification from other beliefs, but can nonetheless provide justification for other beliefs. More precisely, if we have any justified beliefs, we have some foundational, non-inferentially justified beliefs. This regress argument needs some refinement before its full force can be appreciated. With suitable refinement, however, it can seriously challenge such alternatives to foundationalism as coherentism and contextualism. The regress argument has been a key motivation for foundationalism in the history of epistemology.  -- epistemology from Grecian episteme, ‘knowledge’, and logos, ‘explanation’, the study of the nature of knowledge and justification; specifically, the study of a the defining features, b the substantive conditions or sources, and c the limits of knowledge and justification. The latter three categories are represented by traditional philosophical controversy over the analysis of knowledge and justification, the sources of knowledge and justification e.g., rationalism versus empiricism, and the viability of skepticism about knowledge and justification. Kinds of knowledge. Knowledge can be either explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge is self-conscious in that the knower is aware of the relevant state of knowledge, whereas tacit knowledge is implicit, hidden from self-consciousness. Much of our knowledge is tacit: it is genuine but we are unaware of the relevant states of knowledge, even if we can achieve awareness upon suitable reflection. In this regard, knowledge resembles many of our psychological states. The existence of a psychological state in a person does not require the person’s awareness of that state, although it may require the person’s awareness of an object of that state such as what is sensed or perceived. Philosophers have identified various species of knowledge: for example, propositional knowledge that something is so, non-propositional knowledge of something e.g., knowledge by acquaintance, or by direct awareness, empirical a posteriori propositional knowledge, nonempirical a priori propositional knowledge, and knowledge of how to do something. Philosophical controversy has arisen over distinctions between such species, for example, over i the relations between some of these species e.g., does knowing-how reduce to knowledge-that?, and ii the viability of some of these species e.g., is there really such a thing as, or even a coherent notion of, a priori knowledge?. A primary concern of classical modern philosophy, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the extent of our a priori knowledge relative to the extent of our a posteriori knowledge. Such rationalists as Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza contended that all genuine knowledge of the real world is a priori, whereas such empiricists as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume argued that all such knowledge is a posteriori. In his Critique of Pure Reason 1781, Kant sought a grand reconciliation, aiming to preserve the key lessons of both rationalism and empiricism. Since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a posteriori knowledge has been widely regarded as knowledge that depends for its supporting ground on some specific sensory or perceptual experience; and a priori knowledge has been widely regarded as knowledge that does not depend for its supporting ground on such experience. Kant and others have held that the supporting ground for a priori knowledge comes solely from purely intellectual processes called “pure reason” or “pure understanding.” Knowledge of logical and mathematical truths typically serves as a standard case of a priori knowledge, whereas knowledge of the existence or presence of physical objects typically serves as a standard case of a posteriori knowledge. A major task for an account of a priori knowledge is the explanation of what the relevant purely intellectual processes are, and of how they contribute to non-empirical knowledge. An analogous task for an account of a posteriori knowledge is the explanation of what sensory or perceptual experience is and how it contributes to empirical knowledge. More fundamentally, epistemologists have sought an account of propositional knowledge in general, i.e., an account of what is common to a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Ever since Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus c.400 B.C., epistemologists have tried to identify the essential, defining components of knowledge. Identifying these components will yield an analysis of knowledge. A prominent traditional view, suggested by Plato and Kant among others, is that propositional knowledge that something is so has three individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This is the tripartite definition that has come to be called the standard analysis. We can clarify it by attending briefly to each of its three conditions. The belief condition. This requires that anyone who knows that p where ‘p’ stands for any proposition or statement must believe that p. If, therefore, you do not believe that minds are brains say, because you have not considered the matter at all, then you do not know that minds are brains. A knower must be psychologically related somehow to a proposition that is an object of knowledge for that knower. Proponents of the standard analysis hold that only belief can provide the needed psychological relation. Philosophers do not share a uniform account of belief, but some considerations supply common ground. Beliefs are not actions of assenting to a proposition; they rather are dispositional psychological states that can exist even when unmanifested. You do not cease believing that 2 ! 2 % 4, for example, whenever your attention leaves arithmetic. Our believing that p seems to require that we have a tendency to assent to p in certain situations, but it seems also to be more than just such a tendency. What else believing requires remains highly controversial among philosophers. Some philosophers have opposed the belief condition of the standard analysis on the ground that we can accept, or assent to, a known proposition without actually believing it. They contend that we can accept a proposition even if we fail to acquire a tendency, required by believing, to accept that proposition in certain situations. On this view, acceptance is a psychological act that does not entail any dispositional psychological state, and such acceptance is sufficient to relate a knower psychologically to a known proposition. However this view fares, one underlying assumption of the standard analysis seems correct: our concept of knowledge requires that a knower be psychologically related somehow to a known proposition. Barring that requirement, we shall be hard put to explain how knowers psychologically possess their knowledge of known propositions. Even if knowledge requires belief, belief that p does not require knowledge that p, since belief can typically be false. This observation, familiar from Plato’s Theaetetus, assumes that knowledge has a truth condition. On the standard analysis, if you know that p, then it is true that p. If, therefore, it is false that minds are brains, then you do not know that minds are brains. It is thus misleading to say, e.g., that astronomers before Copernicus knew that the earth is flat; at best, they justifiably believed that they knew this. The truth condition. This condition of the standard analysis has not attracted any serious challenge. Controversy over it has focused instead on Pilate’s vexing question: What is truth? This question concerns what truth consists in, not our ways of finding out what is true. Influential answers come from at least three approaches: truth as correspondence i.e., agreement, of some specified sort, between a proposition and an actual situation; truth as coherence i.e., interconnectedness of a proposition with a specified system of propositions; and truth as pragmatic cognitive value i.e., usefulness of a proposition in achieving certain intellectual goals. Without assessing these prominent approaches, we should recognize, in accord with the standard analysis, that our concept of knowledge seems to have a factual requirement: we epistemology epistemology 274   274 genuinely know that p only if it is the case that p. The pertinent notion of “its being the case” seems equivalent to the notion of “how reality is” or “how things really are.” The latter notion seems essential to our notion of knowledge, but is open to controversy over its explication. The justification condition. Knowledge is not simply true belief. Some true beliefs are supported only by lucky guesswork and hence do not qualify as knowledge. Knowledge requires that the satisfaction of its belief condition be “appropriately related” to the satisfaction of its truth condition. This is one broad way of understanding the justification condition of the standard analysis. More specifically, we might say that a knower must have adequate indication that a known proposition is true. If we understand such adequate indication as a sort of evidence indicating that a proposition is true, we have reached the traditional general view of the justification condition: justification as evidence. Questions about justification attract the lion’s share of attention in contemporary epistemology. Controversy focuses on the meaning of ‘justification’ as well as on the substantive conditions for a belief’s being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge. Current debates about the meaning of ‘justification’ revolve around the question whether, and if so how, the concept of epistemic knowledge-relevant justification is normative. Since the 0s Chisholm has defended the following deontological obligation-oriented notion of justification: the claim that a proposition, p, is epistemically justified for you means that it is false that you ought to refrain from accepting p. In other terms, to say that p is epistemically justified is to say that accepting p is epistemically permissible  at least in the sense that accepting p is consistent with a certain set of epistemic rules. This deontological construal enjoys wide representation in contemporary epistemology. A normative construal of justification need not be deontological; it need not use the notions of obligation and permission. Alston, for instance, has introduced a non-deontological normative concept of justification that relies mainly on the notion of what is epistemically good from the viewpoint of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity. Alston links epistemic goodness to a belief’s being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reasons to the contrary. Some epistemologists shun normative construals of justification as superfluous. One noteworthy view is that ‘epistemic justification’ means simply ‘evidential support’ of a certain sort. To say that p is epistemically justifiable to some extent for you is, on this view, just to say that p is supportable to some extent by your overall evidential reasons. This construal will be non-normative so long as the notions of supportability and an evidential reason are nonnormative. Some philosophers have tried to explicate the latter notions without relying on talk of epistemic permissibility or epistemic goodness. We can understand the relevant notion of “support” in terms of non-normative notions of entailment and explanation or, answering why-questions. We can understand the notion of an “evidential reason” via the notion of a psychological state that can stand in a certain truth-indicating support relation to propositions. For instance, we might regard nondoxastic states of “seeming to perceive” something e.g., seeming to see a dictionary here as foundational truth indicators for certain physical-object propositions e.g., the proposition that there is a dictionary here, in virtue of those states being best explained by those propositions. If anything resembling this approach succeeds, we can get by without the aforementioned normative notions of epistemic justification. Foundationalism versus coherentism. Talk of foundational truth indicators brings us to a key controversy over justification: Does epistemic justification, and thus knowledge, have foundations, and if so, in what sense? This question can be clarified as the issue whether some beliefs can not only a have their epistemic justification non-inferentially i.e., apart from evidential support from any other beliefs, but also b provide epistemic justification for all justified beliefs that lack such non-inferential justification. Foundationalism gives an affirmative answer to this issue, and is represented in varying ways by, e.g., Aristotle, Descartes, Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Chisholm. Foundationalists do not share a uniform account of non-inferential justification. Some construe non-inferential justification as self-justification. Others reject literal self-justification for beliefs, and argue that foundational beliefs have their non-inferential justification in virtue of evidential support from the deliverances of non-belief psychological states, e.g., perception “seem-ing-to-perceive” states, sensation “seeming-to-sense” states, or memory “seeming-toremember” states. Still others understand noninferential justification in terms of a belief’s being “reliably produced,” i.e., caused and sustained by some non-belief belief-producing process or source e.g., perception, memory, introspection that tends to produce true rather than false beliefs. This last view takes the causal source of a belief to be crucial to its justification. Unlike Descartes, contemporary foundationalists clearly separate claims to non-inferential, foundational justification from claims to certainty. They typically settle for a modest foundationalism implying that foundational beliefs need not be indubitable or infallible. This contrasts with the radical foundationalism of Descartes. The traditional competitor to foundationalism is the coherence theory of justification, i.e., epistemic coherentism. This is not the coherence definition of truth; it rather is the view that the justification of any belief depends on that belief’s having evidential support from some other belief via coherence relations such as entailment or explanatory relations. Notable proponents include Hegel, Bosanquet, and Sellars. A prominent contemporary version of epistemic coherentism states that evidential coherence relations among beliefs are typically explanatory relations. The rough idea is that a belief is justified for you so long as it either best explains, or is best explained by, some member of the system of beliefs that has maximal explanatory power for you. Contemporary coherentism is uniformly systemic or holistic; it finds the ultimate source of justification in a system of interconnected beliefs or potential beliefs. One problem has troubled all versions of coherentism that aim to explain empirical justification: the isolation argument. According to this argument, coherentism entails that you can be epistemically justified in accepting an empirical proposition that is incompatible with, or at least improbable given, your total empirical evidence. The key assumption of this argument is that your total empirical evidence includes non-belief sensory and perceptual awareness-states, such as your feeling pain or your seeming to see something. These are not belief-states. Epistemic coherentism, by definition, makes justification a function solely of coherence relations between propositions, such as propositions one believes or accepts. Thus, such coherentism seems to isolate justification from the evidential import of non-belief awareness-states. Coherentists have tried to handle this problem, but no resolution enjoys wide acceptance. Causal and contextualist theories. Some contemporary epistemologists endorse contextualism regarding epistemic justification, a view suggested by Dewey, Vitters, and Kuhn, among others. On this view, all justified beliefs depend for their evidential support on some unjustified beliefs that need no justification. In any context of inquiry, people simply assume the acceptability of some propositions as starting points for inquiry, and these “contextually basic” propositions, though lacking evidential support, can serve as evidential support for other propositions. Contextualists stress that contextually basic propositions can vary from context to context e.g., from theological inquiry to biological inquiry and from social group to social group. The main problem for contextualists comes from their view that unjustified assumptions can provide epistemic justification for other propositions. We need a precise explanation of how an unjustified assumption can yield evidential support, how a non-probable belief can make another belief probable. Contextualists have not given a uniform explanation here. Recently some epistemologists have recommended that we give up the traditional evidence condition for knowledge. They recommend that we construe the justification condition as a causal condition. Roughly, the idea is that you know that p if and only if a you believe that p, b p is true, and c your believing that p is causally produced and sustained by the fact that makes p true. This is the basis of the causal theory of knowing, which comes with varying details. Any such causal theory faces serious problems from our knowledge of universal propositions. Evidently, we know, for instance, that all dictionaries are produced by people, but our believing that this is so seems not to be causally supported by the fact that all dictionaries are humanly produced. It is not clear that the latter fact causally produces any beliefs. Another problem is that causal theories typically neglect what seems to be crucial to any account of the justification condition: the requirement that justificational support for a belief be accessible, in some sense, to the believer. The rough idea is that one must be able to access, or bring to awareness, the justification underlying one’s beliefs. The causal origins of a belief are, of course, often very complex and inaccessible to a believer. Causal theories thus face problems from an accessibility requirement on justification. Internalism regarding justification preserves an accessibility requirement on what confers justification, whereas epistemic externalism rejects this requirement. Debates over internalism and externalism abound in current epistemology, but internalists do not yet share a uniform detailed account of accessibility. The Gettier problem. The standard analysis of knowledge, however elaborated, faces a devastating challenge that initially gave rise to causal theories of knowledge: the Gettier problem. In 3 Edmund Gettier published a highly influential challenge to the view that if you have a justified true belief that p, then you know that p. Here is one of Gettier’s counterexamples to this view: Smith is justified in believing the false proposition that i Jones owns a Ford. On the basis of i, Smith infers, and thus is justified in believing, that ii either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. As it happens, Brown is in Barcelona, and so ii is true. So, although Smith is justified in believing the true proposition ii, Smith does not know ii. Gettier-style counterexamples are cases where a person has justified true belief that p but lacks knowledge that p. The Gettier problem is the problem of finding a modification of, or an alternative to, the standard analysis that avoids difficulties from Gettier-style counterexamples. The controversy over the Gettier problem is highly complex and still unsettled. Many epistemologists take the lesson of Gettier-style counterexamples to be that propositional knowledge requires a fourth condition, beyond the justification, truth, and belief conditions. No specific fourth condition has received overwhelming acceptance, but some proposals have become prominent. The so-called defeasibility condition, e.g., requires that the justification appropriate to knowledge be “undefeated” in the general sense that some appropriate subjunctive conditional concerning defeaters of justification be true of that justification. For instance, one simple defeasibility fourth condition requires of Smith’s knowing that p that there be no true proposition, q, such that if q became justified for Smith, p would no longer be justified for Smith. So if Smith knows, on the basis of his visual perception, that Mary removed books from the library, then Smith’s coming to believe the true proposition that Mary’s identical twin removed books from the library would not undermine the justification for Smith’s belief concerning Mary herself. A different approach shuns subjunctive conditionals of that sort, and contends that propositional knowledge requires justified true belief that is sustained by the collective totality of actual truths. This approach requires a detailed account of when justification is undermined and restored. The Gettier problem is epistemologically important. One branch of epistemology seeks a precise understanding of the nature e.g., the essential components of propositional knowledge. Our having a precise understanding of propositional knowledge requires our having a Gettier-proof analysis of such knowledge. Epistemologists thus need a defensible solution to the Gettier problem, however complex that solution is. Skepticism. Epistemologists debate the limits, or scope, of knowledge. The more restricted we take the limits of knowledge to be, the more skeptical we are. Two influential types of skepticism are knowledge skepticism and justification skepticism. Unrestricted knowledge skepticism implies that no one knows anything, whereas unrestricted justification skepticism implies the more extreme view that no one is even justified in believing anything. Some forms of skepticism are stronger than others. Knowledge skepticism in its strongest form implies that it is impossible for anyone to know anything. A weaker form would deny the actuality of our having knowledge, but leave open its possibility. Many skeptics have restricted their skepticism to a particular domain of supposed knowledge: e.g., knowledge of the external world, knowledge of other minds, knowledge of the past or the future, or knowledge of unperceived items. Such limited skepticism is more common than unrestricted skepticism in the history of epistemology. Arguments supporting skepticism come in many forms. One of the most difficult is the problem of the criterion, a version of which has been stated by the sixteenth-century skeptic Montaigne: “To adjudicate [between the true and the false] among the appearances of things, we need to have a distinguishing method; to validate this method, we need to have a justifying argument; but to validate this justifying argument, we need the very method at issue. And there we are, going round on the wheel.” This line of skeptical argument originated in ancient Greece, with epistemology itself. It forces us to face this question: How can we specify what we know without having specified how we know, and how can we specify how we know without having specified what we know? Is there any reasonable way out of this threatening circle? This is one of the most difficult epistemological problems, and a cogent epistemology must offer a defensible solution to epistemology epistemology 277   277 it. Contemporary epistemology still lacks a widely accepted reply to this urgent problem

 

erfahrung: Grice used the German, ‘since I find it difficult to translate.” G. term tr. into English, especially since Kant, as ‘experience’. Kant does not use it as a technical term; rather, it indicates that which requires explanation through more precisely drawn technical distinctions such as those among ‘sensibility’, ‘understanding’, and ‘reason’. In the early twentieth century, Husserl sometimes distinguishes between Erfahrung and Erlebnis, the former indicating experience as capable of being thematized and methodically described or analyzed, the latter experience as “lived through” and never fully available to analysis. Such a distinction occasionally reappears in later texts of phenomenology and existentialism.