IN PLICATVRVM VII/XX

CVM-NOTATVM: connotatum –a variation on notatum, cf. denotatum --  adnotatum, annotate -- intension -- connotation. 1 The ideas and associations brought to mind by an expression used in contrast with ‘denotation’ and ‘meaning’. 2 In a technical use, the properties jointly necessary and sufficient for the correct application of the expression in question. 

SE-QUENS: Grice: “The ‘se-‘ prefix the “Dizionario etimologico” has as ‘barbaro.’ sequentia: consequentia“In ‘consequentia,’ the ‘con’ is possibly otiose, as cons usually are.” -- consequentialism, the doctrine that the moral rightness of an act is determined solely by the goodness of the act’s consequences. Prominent consequentialists include J. S. Mill, Moore, and Sidgwick. Maximizing versions of consequentialism  the most common sort  hold that an act is morally right if and only if it produces the best consequences of those acts available to the agent. Satisficing consequentialism holds that an act is morally right if and only if it produces enough good consequences on balance. Consequentialist theories are often contrasted with deontological ones, such as Kant’s, which hold that the rightness of an act is determined at least in part by something other than the goodness of the act’s consequences. A few versions of consequentialism are agentrelative: that is, they give each agent different aims, so that different agents’ aims may conflict. For instance, egoistic consequentialism holds that the moral rightness of an act for an agent depends solely on the goodness of its consequences for him or her. However, the vast majority of consequentialist theories have been agent-neutral and consequentialism is often defined in a more restrictive way so that agentrelative versions do not count as consequentialist. A doctrine is agent-neutral when it gives to each agent the same ultimate aims, so that different agents’ aims cannot conflict. For instance, utilitarianism holds that an act is morally right if and only if it produces more happiness for the sentient beings it affects than any other act available to the agent. This gives each agent the same ultimate aim, and so is agent-neutral. Consequentialist theories differ over what features of acts they hold to determine their goodness. Utilitarian versions hold that the only consequences of an act relevant to its goodness are its effects on the happiness of sentient beings. But some consequentialists hold that the promotion of other things matters too  achievement, autonomy, knowledge, or fairness, for instance. Thus utilitarianism, as a maximizing, agent-neutral, happiness-based view is only one of a broad range of consequentialist theories.  consequentia mirabilis, the logical principle that if a statement follows from its own negation it must be true. Strict consequentia mirabilis is the principle that if a statement follows logically from its own negation it is logically true. The principle is often connected with the paradoxes of strict implication, according to which any statement follows from a contradiction. Since the negation of a tautology is a contradiction, every tautology follows from its own negation. However, if every expression of the form ‘if p then q’ implies ‘not-p or q’ they need not be equivalent, then from ‘if not-p then p’ we can derive ‘not-not-p or p’ and by the principles of double negation and repetition derive p. Since all of these rules are unexceptionable the principle of consequentia mirabilis is also unexceptionable. It is, however, somewhat counterintuitive, hence the name ‘the astonishing implication’, which goes back to its medieval discoverers or rediscoverers. 

 

CVM-SISTENS -- consistens: in traditional Aristotelian logic, a semantic notion: two or more statements are called consistent if they are simultaneously true under some interpretation cf., e.g., W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, 1870. In modern logic there is a syntactic definition that also fits complex e.g., mathematical theories developed since Frege’s Begriffsschrift 1879: a set of statements is called consistent with respect to a certain logical calculus, if no formula ‘P & P’ is derivable from those statements by the rules of the calculus; i.e., the theory is free from contradictions. If these definitions are equivalent for a logic, we have a significant fact, as the equivalence amounts to the completeness of its system of rules. The first such completeness theorem was obtained for sentential or propositional logic by Paul Bernays in 8 in his Habilitationsschrift that was partially published as Axiomatische Untersuchung des Aussagen-Kalküls der “Principia Mathematica,” 6 and, independently, by Emil Post in Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions, 1; the completeness of predicate logic was proved by Gödel in Die Vollständigkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, 0. The crucial step in such proofs shows that syntactic consistency implies semantic consistency. Cantor applied the notion of consistency to sets. In a well-known letter to Dedekind 9 he distinguished between an inconsistent and a consistent multiplicity; the former is such “that the assumption that all of its elements ‘are together’ leads to a contradiction,” whereas the elements of the latter “can be thought of without contradiction as ‘being together.’ “ Cantor had conveyed these distinctions and their motivation by letter to Hilbert in 7 see W. Purkert and H. J. Ilgauds, Georg Cantor, 7. Hilbert pointed out explicitly in 4 that Cantor had not given a rigorous criterion for distinguishing between consistent and inconsistent multiplicities. Already in his Über den Zahlbegriff 9 Hilbert had suggested a remedy by giving consistency proofs for suitable axiomatic systems; e.g., to give the proof of the “existence of the totality of real numbers or  in the terminology of G. Cantor  the proof of the fact that the system of real numbers is a consistent complete set” by establishing the consistency of an axiomatic characterization of the reals  in modern terminology, of the theory of complete, ordered fields. And he claimed, somewhat indeterminately, that this could be done “by a suitable modification of familiar methods.” After 4, Hilbert pursued a new way of giving consistency proofs. This novel way of proceeding, still aiming for the same goal, was to make use of the formalization of the theory at hand. However, in the formulation of Hilbert’s Program during the 0s the point of consistency proofs was no longer to guarantee the existence of suitable sets, but rather to establish the instrumental usefulness of strong mathematical theories T, like axiomatic set theory, relative to finitist mathematics. That focus rested on the observation that the statement formulating the syntactic consistency of T is equivalent to the reflection principle Pra, ‘s’ P s; here Pr is the finitist proof predicate for T, s is a finitistically meaningful statement, and ‘s’ its translation into the language of T. If one could establish finitistically the consistency of T, one could be sure  on finitist grounds  that T is a reliable instrument for the proof of finitist statements. There are many examples of significant relative consistency proofs: i non-Euclidean geometry relative to Euclidean, Euclidean geometry relative to analysis; ii set theory with the axiom of choice relative to set theory without the axiom of choice, set theory with the negation of the axiom of choice relative to set theory; iii classical arithmetic relative to intuitionistic arithmetic, subsystems of classical analysis relative to intuitionistic theories of constructive ordinals. The mathematical significance of relative consistency proofs is often brought out by sharpening them to establish conservative extension results; the latter may then ensure, e.g., that the theories have the same class of provably total functions. The initial motivation for such arguments is, however, frequently philosophical: one wants to guarantee the coherence of the original theory on an epistemologically distinguished basis. 

 

CVM-STITVM -- the english constitution:  an example Grice gives of a ‘vacuous name’ -- constitution, a relation between concrete particulars including objects and events and their parts, according to which at some time t, a concrete particular is said to be constituted by the sum of its parts without necessarily being identical with that sum. For instance, at some specific time t, Mt. Everest is constituted by the various chunks of rock and other matter that form Everest at t, though at t Everest would still have been Everest even if, contrary to fact, some particular rock that is part of the sum had been absent. Hence, although Mt. Everest is not identical to the sum of its material parts at t, it is constituted by them. The relation of constitution figures importantly in recent attempts to articulate and defend metaphysical physicalism naturalism. To capture the idea that all that exists is ultimately physical, we may say that at the lowest level of reality, there are only microphysical phenomena, governed by the laws of microphysics, and that all other objects and events are ultimately constituted by objects and events at the microphysical level. 

 

CVM-TACTVM -- contactum -- syntactics: cf. para-tactuma paratactic construction the Romans called a co-ordinatum, a sub-ordinatum would be hypotaxis. (From syn- and tassein, from PIE, cognate with ‘tact,’ to touch) --  Being the gentleman he was, Grice takes a cavlier attitude to ‘syntax’ as something that someone else must give to him, and right he is. The philosopher should concern with more important issues. Usually Grice uses ‘unstructured’ to mean ‘syntactically unstructured,’ such as a  handwave. With a handwave, an emissor can rationally explicate and implicate. vide compositumStrictly, compositum translates Grecian synthesis, rather than syntaxwhich is better phrased as Latin ‘contactum. Or better combinatumsyntaxis , is, f., = σύνταξις, I.the connection of words, Prisc. 17, 1, 1. When Grice uses ‘unsructured’ he sometimes expands this into ‘syntactically unstructured.’ Since syntax need not be linguistic, this is an interesting semiotic perspective by Grice. He is allowing for compositionality in a semotic system with a comibinatory other than the first, second, and third articulation. The Latinate is ‘contactum.’ Morris thought he was being bright when he proposed ‘syntactics,’ “long for syntax,” he wrote.  syntax, περὶ τῆς ς. τῶν λεγομένων, title of work by Chrysi, Stoic.2.6, cf. Plu.2.731f (pl.); “τὴν ς. τῶν ὀνομάτων” Gal.16.736, cf. 720; περὶ συντάξεως, title of work by A.D.; but also, compound forms, Id.Conj.214.7; ποιεῖσθαι μετά τινος τὴν ς. ib.221.19; also, rule for combination of sounds or letters, τὸ χ (in δέγμενος）“ εἰς γ μετεβλήθη, τῆς ς. οὕτως ἀπαιτούσης” EM252.45, cf. Luc.Jud. Voc.3; also, connected speech, ἐν τῇ ς. ἐγκλιτέον Sch.Il.16.85.Grice’s presupposition is that a ‘syntactics’ is not enough for a system to be a ‘communication-system’. Nothing is communicated. With the syntagma, there is no communicatum. Grice loved two devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the assignment of common-ground status).  Grice is a conservative (dissenting rationalist) when it comes to syntax and semantics. He hardly uses pragmatics albeit in a loose way (pragmatic import, pragmatic inference), but was aware of Morriss triangle. Syntax is presented along the lines of Gentzen, i.e. a system of natural deduction in terms of inference rules of introduction and elimination for each formal device. Semantics pertains rather to Witterss truth-values, i.e. the assignment of a satisfactory-valuation: the true and the good. A syntactic approach to Grice’s System does not require value-assignment. The system is constructed alla Gentzen with introduction and elimination rules which are regarded as syntactic in nature.  One can easily check that the rules statedabove adequately characterise the meaning of classical conjunction which is true iff both conjuncts are true. Hence the syntactic deducibility relation coincides with the semantic relation of /= or logical consequence (or entailment).  Refs.: The most direct source is “Vacuous names,” but the keyword ‘syntax’ is helpful. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

CVM-TEXTVS: context: ‘text’ provides a few nice RomanismsGrice: text, pre-text, con-text, sub-text --. while Grice jocularly echoes Firth with his ‘context of utterance,’ he thought the theory of context was ‘totally lacking in context.’ H. P. Grice, “The general theory of context,” -- contextualism, the view that inferential justification always takes place against a background of beliefs that are themselves in no way evidentially supported. The view has not often been defended by name, but Dewey, Popper, Austin, and Vitters are arguably among its notable exponents. As this list perhaps suggests, contextualism is closely related to the “relevant alternatives” conception of justification, according to which claims to knowledge are justified not by ruling out any and every logically possible way in which what is asserted might be false or inadequately grounded, but by excluding certain especially relevant alternatives or epistemic shortcomings, these varying from one context of inquiry to another. Formally, contextualism resembles foundationalism. But it differs from traditional, or substantive, foundationalism in two crucial respects. First, foundationalism insists that basic beliefs be self-justifying or intrinsically credible. True, for contemporary foundationalists, this intrinsic credibility need not amount to incorrigibility, as earlier theorists tended to suppose: but some degree of intrinsic credibility is indispensable for basic beliefs. Second, substantive foundational theories confine intrinsic credibility, hence the status of being epistemologically basic, to beliefs of some fairly narrowly specified kinds. By contrast, contextualists reject all forms of the doctrine of intrinsic credibility, and in consequence place no restrictions on the kinds of beliefs that can, in appropriate circumstances, function as contextually basic. They regard this as a strength of their position, since explaining and defending attributions of intrinsic credibility has always been the foundationalist’s main problem. Contextualism is also distinct from the coherence theory of justification, foundationalism’s traditional rival. Coherence theorists are as suspicious as contextualists of the foundationalist’s specified kinds of basic beliefs. But coherentists react by proposing a radically holistic model of inferential justification, according to which a belief becomes justified through incorporation into a suitably coherent overall system of beliefs or “total view.” There are many well-known problems with this approach: the criteria of coherence have never been very clearly articulated; it is not clear what satisfying such criteria has to do with making our beliefs likely to be true; and since it is doubtful whether anyone has a very clear picture of his system of beliefs as a whole, to insist that justification involves comparing the merits of competing total views seems to subject ordinary justificatory practices to severe idealization. Contextualism, in virtue of its formal affinity with foundationalism, claims to avoid all such problems. Foundationalists and coherentists are apt to respond that contextualism reaps these benefits by failing to show how genuinely epistemic justification is possible. Contextualism, they charge, is finally indistinguishable from the skeptical view that “justification” depends on unwarranted assumptions. Even if, in context, these are pragmatically acceptable, epistemically speaking they are still just assumptions. This objection raises the question whether contextualists mean to answer the same questions as more traditional theorists, or answer them in the same way. Traditional theories of justification are framed so as to respond to highly general skeptical questions  e.g., are we justified in any of our beliefs about the external world? It may be that contextualist theories are or should be advanced, not as direct answers to skepticism, but in conjunction with attempts to diagnose or dissolve traditional skeptical problems. Contextualists need to show how and why traditional demands for “global” justification misfire, if they do. If traditional skeptical problems are taken at face value, it is doubtful whether contextualism can answer them.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The general theory of context;” Speranza, “Context, pretext, subtext, and text,” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice.

 

CVM-TINENS -- Continens -- temperans -- TEMPERANTIA, CONTINENTIAINCONTINENTIA -- -- egcrateia: or temperantia. This is a universal. Strictly, it’s the agent who has the powerOr part of his soulthe rational soul has the powerhence Grice’s metaphor of the ‘power structure of the soul.’ Grice is interested in the linguistic side to it. What’s the use of “Don’t p!” if ‘p’ is out of the emissee’s rational control? Cf. Pears on egcreateia as ‘irrationality,’ if motivated. Cfr mesotes. the geniality of Grice was to explore theoretical akrasia. Grice’s genius shows in seeing egcrateia and lack thereof as marks of virtue. “C hasn’t been to prison yet” He is potentially dishonest. But you cannot be HONEST if you are NOT potentially DISHONEST. Of course, it does not paint a good picture of the philosopher why he should be obsessed with ‘akrasia,’ when Aristotle actually opposed the notion to that of ‘enkrateia,’ or ‘continence.’ Surely a philosopher needs to provide a reductive analysis of ‘continence,’ first; and the reductive analysis of ‘incontinence’ will follow. Aristotle, as Grice well knew, is being a Platonist here, so by ‘continence,’ he meant a power structure of the soul, with the ‘rational’ soul containing the pre-rational or non-rational soul (animal soul, and vegetal soul). And right he was, too! So, Grice's twist is Έγκράτεια, sic in capitals! Liddell and Scott has it as ‘ἐγκράτεια’ [ρα], which they render as “mastery over,” as used by Plato in The Republic: “ἐ. ἑαυτοῦ,” meaning ‘self-control’ (Pl. R.390b; ἐ. ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν control over them, ib.430e, cf. X.Mem.2.1.1, Isoc.1.21; “περί τι” Arist.EN1149a21, al. Liddell and Scott go on to give a reference to Grice’s beloved “Eth. Nich.” (1145b8) II. abs., self-control, X. Mem.1.5.1, Isoc.3.44, Arist. EN. 1145b8, al., LXX Si.18.30, Act.Ap. 24.25, etc. Richards, an emotivist, as well as Collingwood (in “Language”) had made a stereotype of the physicist drawing a formula on the blackboard. “Full of emotion.” So the idea that there is an UN-emotional life is a fallacy. Emotion pervades the rational life, as does akrasia. Grice was particularly irritated by the fact that Davidson, who lacked a background in the humanities and the classics, could think of akrasia as “impossible”! Grice was never too interested in emotion (or feeling) because while we do say I feel that the cat is hungry, we also say, Im feeling byzantine. The concept of emotion needs a philosophical elucidation. Grice was curious about a linguistic botany for that! Akrasia for Grice covers both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic versions. The buletic-boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion. Grice quotes from Kennys essay on emotion. But Grice is looking for more of a linguistic botany. As it happens, Kennys essay has Griceian implicatura. One problem Grice finds with emotion is that feel that  sometimes behaves like thinks that  Another is that there is no good Grecian word for emotio.  Kenny, of St. Benets, completed his essay on emotion under Quinton (who would occasionally give seminars with Grice), and examined by two members of Grices Play Group: Pears and Gardiner. Kenny connects an emotion to a feeling, which brings us to Grice on feeling boringly byzantine! Grice proposes a derivation of akrasia in conditional steps for both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic akrasia.  Liddell and Scott have “ἐπιθυμία,” which they render as desire, yearning, “ἐ. ἐκτελέσαι” Hdt.1.32; ἐπιθυμίᾳ by passion, oπρονοίᾳ, generally, appetite, αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐ. esp. sexual desire, lust, αἱ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας ἐ.; longing after a thing, desire of or for it, ὕδατος, τοῦ πιεῖν;” “τοῦ πλέονος;” “τῆς τιμωρίας;” “τῆς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτείας;’ “τῆς παρθενίας;’ “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς ἐλθεῖν;’ ἐν ἐ. “τινὸς εἶναι;’ “γεγονέναι;” “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς “ἀφικέσθαι θεάσασθαι;” “ἐ. τινὸς ἐμβαλεῖν τινί;” “ἐ. ἐμποιεῖν ἔς τινα an inclination towards;” =ἐπιθύμημα, object of desire, ἐπιθυμίας τυχεῖν;” “ἀνδρὸς ἐ., of woman, “πενήτων ἐ., of sleep. There must be more to emotion, such as philia, than epithumia! cf. Grice on Aristotle on philos. What is an emotion? Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1; Konstan “Pathos and Passion” R. Roberts, “Emotion”; W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Aristotle, Rhet. II.2-12; De An., Eth.N., and Top.; Emotions in Plato and Aristotle; Philosophy of Emotion; Aristotle and the Emotions, De An. II.12 and III 1-3; De Mem. 1; Rhet. II.5; Scheiter, “Images, Imagination, and Appearances, V. Caston, Why Aristotle Needs Imagination” M. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion, J. Cooper, “An Aristotelian Theory of Emotion, G. Striker, Emotions in Context: Aristotles Treatment of the Passions in the Rhetoric and his Moral Psychology." Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric (J. Dow, Aristotles Theory of the Emotions, Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle PLATO. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.10-11; Plato Philebus 31b-50e and Republic IV, D. Frede, Mixed feelings in Aristotles Rhetoric." Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric, J. Moss, “Pictures and Passions in Plato”; Protagoras 352b-c, Phaedo 83b-84a, Timaeus 69c STOICS The Hellenistic philosophers; “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotion” The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, eEmotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Sorabji, Chrysippus Posidonius Seneca: A High-Level Debate on Emotion. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics M. Graver, Preface and Introduction to Cicero on Emotion: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 M. Graver, Stoicism and emotion. Tusculan Disputations 3 Recommended: Graver, Margaret. "Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι." Phronesis. Tusculan Disputations; "The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul; The Stoic life: Emotions, duties, and fate”; Emotion and decision in stoic psychology, The stoics, individual emotions: anger, friendly feeling, and hatred.  Aristotle Rhetoric II.2-3; Nicomachean Ethics IV.5; Topics 2.7 and 4.5; Konstan, Anger, Pearson, Aristotle on Desire; Scheiter, Review of Pearsons Aristotle on Desire; S. Leighton, Aristotles Account of Anger: Narcissism and Illusions of Self‐Sufficiency: The Complex Evaluative World of Aristotles Angry Man,” Valuing emotions. Aristotle Rhetoric II. 4; Konstan, “Hatred”  Konstan "Aristotle on Anger and the Emotions: the Strategies of Status." Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, C. Rapp, The emotional dimension of friendship: notes on Aristotles account of philia in Rhetoric II 4” Grice endeavours to give an answer to the question whether and to what extent philia (friendship), as it is treated by Aristotle in Rhet. II.4, can be considered a genuine emotion as, for example, fear and anger are. Three anomalies are identified in the definition and the account of philia (and of the associated verb philein), which suggest a negative response to the question. However, these anomalies are analysed and explained in terms of the specific notes of philia in order to show that Rhetoric II4 does allow for a consideration of friendship as a genuine emotion. Seneca, On Anger (De Ira) Seneca, On Anger Seneca, On Anger (62-96); K. Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice, and Future Revenge in Senecas De Ira” FEAR Aristotle, Rhet. II.5; Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9  Aristotles Courageous Passions, Platos Laws; “Pleasure, Pain, and Anticipation in Platos Laws, Book I” Konstan, “Fear”  PITY Aristotle, Rhetoric II. 8-9; Poetics, chs. 6, 9-19 ; Konstan, “Pity”  E. Belfiore, Tragic pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion, Konstan, Aristotle on the Tragic Emotions, The Soul of Tragedy: Essays on Athenian Drama  SHAME Aristotle, Rhet. II.6; Nicomachean Ethics IV.9 Konstan, Shame J. Moss, Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul, B. Williams, Shame and Necessity. Aristotle investigates two character traits, continence and incontinence, that are not as blameworthy as the vices but not as praiseworthy as the virtues. The Grecian expressions are’enkrateia,’ continence, literally mastery, and krasia (“incontinence”; literally, lack of mastery. An akratic person goes against reason as a result of some pathos (emotion, feeling”). Like the akratic, an enkratic person experiences a feeling that is contrary to reason; but unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance with reason. His defect consists solely in the fact that, more than most people, he experiences passions that conflict with his rational choice. The akratic person has not only this defect, but has the further flaw that he gives in to feeling rather than reason more often than the average person.  Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: “propeteia,” or impetuosity and “astheneia, or weakness. The person who is weak goes through a process of deliberation and makes a choice; but rather than act in accordance with his reasoned choice, he acts under the influence of a passion. By contrast, the impetuous person does not go through a process of deliberation and does not make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the influence of a passion. At the time of action, the impetuous person experiences no internal conflict. But once his act has been completed, he regrets what he has done. One could say that he deliberates, if deliberation were something that post-dated rather than preceded action; but the thought process he goes through after he acts comes too late to save him from error.  It is important to bear in mind that when Aristotle talks about impetuosity and weakness, he is discussing chronic conditions. The impetuous person is someone who acts emotionally and fails to deliberate not just once or twice but with some frequency; he makes this error more than most people do. Because of this pattern in his actions, we would be justified in saying of the impetuous person that had his passions not prevented him from doing so, he would have deliberated and chosen an action different from the one he did perform.  The two kinds of passions that Aristotle focuses on, in his treatment of akrasia, are the appetite for pleasure and anger. Either can lead to impetuosity and weakness. But Aristotle gives pride of place to the appetite for pleasure as the passion that undermines reason. He calls the kind of akrasia caused by an appetite for pleasure (hedone) “unqualified akrasia”—or, as we might say, akrasia simpliciter, “full stop.’ Akrasia caused by anger he considers a qualified form of akrasia and calls it akrasia ‘with respect to anger.’ We thus have these four forms of akrasia: impetuosity caused by pleasure, impetuosity caused by anger, weakness caused by pleasure, weakness caused by anger. It should be noticed that Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is heavily influenced by Plato’s tripartite division of the soul. Plato holds that either the spirited part (which houses anger, as well as other emotions) or the appetitive part (which houses the desire for physical pleasures) can disrupt the dictates of reason and result in action contrary to reason. The same threefold division of the soul can be seen in Aristotles approach to this topic. Although Aristotle characterizes akrasia and enkrateia in terms of a conflict between reason and feeling, his detailed analysis of these states of mind shows that what takes place is best described in a more complicated way. For the feeling that undermines reason contains some thought, which may be implicitly general. As Aristotle says, anger “reasoning as it were that one must fight against such a thing, is immediately provoked. And although in the next sentence he denies that our appetite for pleasure works in this way, he earlier had said that there can be a syllogism that favors pursuing enjoyment: “Everything sweet is pleasant, and this is sweet” leads to the pursuit of a particular pleasure. Perhaps what he has in mind is that pleasure can operate in either way: it can prompt action unmediated by a general premise, or it can prompt us to act on such a syllogism. By contrast, anger always moves us by presenting itself as a bit of general, although hasty, reasoning.  But of course Aristotle does not mean that a conflicted person has more than one faculty of reason. Rather his idea seems to be that in addition to our full-fledged reasoning capacity, we also have psychological mechanisms that are capable of a limited range of reasoning. When feeling conflicts with reason, what occurs is better described as a fight between feeling-allied-with-limited-reasoning and full-fledged reason. Part of us—reason—can remove itself from the distorting influence of feeling and consider all relevant factors, positive and negative. But another part of us—feeling or emotion—has a more limited field of reasoning—and sometimes it does not even make use of it.  Although “passion” is sometimes used as a translation of Aristotles word pathos (other alternatives are emotion” and feeling), it is important to bear in mind that his term does not necessarily designate a strong psychological force. Anger is a pathos whether it is weak or strong; so too is the appetite for bodily pleasures. And he clearly indicates that it is possible for an akratic person to be defeated by a weak pathos—the kind that most people would easily be able to control. So the general explanation for the occurrence of akrasia cannot be that the strength of a passion overwhelms reason. Aristotle should therefore be acquitted of an accusation made against him by Austin in a well-known footnote to ‘A Plea For Excuses.’ Plato and Aristotle, Austin says, collapsed all succumbing to temptation into losing control of ourselves — a mistake illustrated by this example. I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into segments corresponding one to one with the persons at High Table. I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse. With this, Aristotle can agree. The pathos for the bombe can be a weak one, and in some people that will be enough to get them to act in a way that is disapproved by their reason at the very time of action.  What is most remarkable about Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia is that he defends a position close to that of Socrates. When he first introduces the topic of akrasia, and surveys some of the problems involved in understanding this phenomenon, he says that Socrates held that there is no akrasia, and he describes this as a thesis that clearly conflicts with the appearances (phainomena). Since he says that his goal is to preserve as many of the appearances as possible, it may come as a surprise that when he analyzes the conflict between reason and feeling, he arrives at the conclusion that in a way Socrates was right after all. For, he says, the person who acts against reason does not have what is thought to be unqualified knowledge; in a way he has knowledge, but in a way does not.  Aristotle explains what he has in mind by comparing akrasia to the condition of other people who might be described as knowing in a way, but not in an unqualified way. His examples are people who are asleep, mad, or drunk; he also compares the akratic to a student who has just begun to learn a Subjects, or an actor on the stage. All of these people, he says, can utter the very words used by those who have knowledge; but their talk does not prove that they really have knowledge, strictly speaking.  These analogies can be taken to mean that the form of akrasia that Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity always results from some diminution of cognitive or intellectual acuity at the moment of action. The akratic says, at the time of action, that he ought not to indulge in this particular pleasure at this time. But does he know or even believe that he should refrain? Aristotle might be taken to reply: yes and no. He has some degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition. His feeling, even if it is weak, has to some degree prevented him from completely grasping or affirming the point that he should not do this. And so in a way Socrates was right. When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its dictates will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to act.  But Aristotles agreement with Socrates is only partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to rival, weaken or bypass reason. Emotion challenges reason in all three of these ways. In both the akratic and the enkratic, it competes with reason for control over action; even when reason wins, it faces the difficult task of having to struggle with an internal rival. Second, in the akratic, it temporarily robs reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a competitor. It is not merely a rival force, in these cases; it is a force that keeps reason from fully exercising its power. And third, passion can make someone impetuous; here its victory over reason is so powerful that the latter does not even enter into the arena of conscious reflection until it is too late to influence action. That, at any rate, is one way of interpreting Aristotle’s statements. But it must be admitted that his remarks are obscure and leave room for alternative readings. It is possible that when he denies that the akratic has knowledge in the strict sense, he is simply insisting on the point that no one should be classified as having practical knowledge unless he actually acts in accordance with it. A practical knower is not someone who merely has knowledge of general premises; he must also have knowledge of particulars, and he must actually draw the conclusion of the syllogism. Perhaps drawing such a conclusion consists in nothing less than performing the action called for by the major and minor premises. Since this is something the akratic does not do, he lacks knowledge; his ignorance is constituted by his error in action. On this reading, there is no basis for attributing to Aristotle the thesis that the kind of akrasia he calls weakness is caused by a diminution of intellectual acuity. His explanation of akrasia is simply that pathos is sometimes a stronger motivational force than full-fledged reason.  This is a difficult reading to defend, however, for Aristotle says that after someone experiences a bout of akrasia his ignorance is dissolved and he becomes a knower again. In context, that appears to be a remark about the form of akrasia Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity. If so, he is saying that when an akratic person is Subjects to two conflicting influences—full-fledged reason versus the minimal rationality of emotion—his state of knowledge is somehow temporarily undone but is later restored. Here, knowledge cannot be constituted by the performance of an act, because that is not the sort of thing that can be restored at a later time. What can be restored is ones full recognition or affirmation of the fact that this act has a certain undesirable feature, or that it should not be performed. Aristotle’s analysis seems to be that both forms of akrasia — weakness and impetuosity —share a common structure: in each case, ones full affirmation or grasp of what one should do comes too late. The difference is that in the case of weakness but not impetuosity, the akratic act is preceded by a full-fledged rational cognition of what one should do right now. That recognition is briefly and temporarily diminished by the onset of a less than fully rational affect.  There is one other way in which Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is close to the Socratic thesis that what people call akrasia is really ignorance. Aristotle holds that if one is in the special mental condition that he calls practical wisdom, then one cannot be, nor will one ever become, an akratic person. For practical wisdom is present only in those who also possess the ethical virtues, and these qualities require complete emotional mastery. Anger and appetite are fully in harmony with reason, if one is practically wise, and so this intellectual virtue is incompatible with the sort of inner conflict experienced by the akratic person. Furthermore, one is called practically wise not merely on the basis of what one believes or knows, but also on the basis of what one does. Therefore, the sort of knowledge that is lost and regained during a bout of akrasia cannot be called practical wisdom. It is knowledge only in a loose sense. The low-level grasp of the ordinary person of what to do is precisely the sort of thing that can lose its acuity and motivating power, because it was never much of an intellectual accomplishment to begin with. That is what Aristotle is getting at when he compares it with the utterances of actors, students, sleepers, drunks, and madmen. Grice had witnessed how Hare had suffere to try and deal with how to combine the geniality that “The language of morals” is with his account of akrasia. Most Oxonians were unhappy with Hares account of akrasia. Its like, in deontic logic, you cannot actually deal with akrasia. You need buletics. You need the desiderative, so that you can oppose what is desired with the duty, even if both concepts are related. “Akrasia” has a nice Grecian touch about it, and Grice and Hare, as Lit. Hum., rejoiced in being able to explore what Aristotle had to say about it. They wouldnt go far beyond Aristotle. Plato and Aristotle were the only Greek philosophers studied for the Lit. Hum. To venture with the pre-socratics or the hellenistics (even if Aristotle is one) was not classy enough! Like Pears in Motivated irrationality, Grice allows that benevolentia may be deemed beneficentia. If Smith has the good will to give Jones a job, he may be deemed to have given Jones the job, even if Jones never get it. In buletic akrasia we must consider the conclusion to be desiring what is not best for the agents own good, never mind if he refrains from doing what is not best for his own good. Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor. We shouldnt be saying this, but we are saying it! Grice prefers akrasia, but he is happy to use the translation by Cicero, also negative, of this: incontinentia, as if continentia were a virtue! For Grice, the alleged paradox of akrasia, both alethic and practical, has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start, and not be deemed a stumbling block. Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden buletic-boulomaic version of akrasia, involving the volitive soul ‒ in term of desirability  ‒ and doxastic akrasia, involing the judicative soul proper  ‒ in terms of probability. Grice considers buletic akrasia and doxastic akrasia ‒ the latter yet distinct from Moores paradox, p but I dont want to believe that p, in symbols p and ~ψb-dp. Akarsia, see egcrateia. egcrateia: also spelled acrasia, or akrasia, Grecian term for weakness of will. Akrasia is a character flaw, also called incontinence, exhibited primarily in intentional behavior that conflicts with the agent’s own values or principles. Its contrary is enkrateia strength of will, continence, self-control. Both akrasia and enkrateia, Aristotle says, “are concerned with what is in excess of the state characteristic of most people; for the continent abide by their resolutions more, and the incontinent less, than most people can” Nicomachean Ethics 1152a2527. These resolutions may be viewed as judgments that it would be best to perform an action of a certain sort, or better to do one thing than another. Enkrateia, on that view, is the power kratos to act as one judges best in the face of competing motivation. Akrasia is a want or deficiency of such power. Aristotle himself limited the sphere of both states more strictly than is now done, regarding both as concerned specifically with “pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions arising through touch and taste” [1150a910]. Philosophers are generally more interested in incontinent and continent actions than in the corresponding states of character. Various species of incontinent or akratic behavior may be distinguished, including incontinent reasoning and akratic belief formation. The species of akratic behavior that has attracted most attention is uncompelled, intentional action that conflicts with a better or best judgment consciously held by the agent at the time of action. If, e.g., while judging it best not to eat a second piece of pie, you intentionally eat another piece, you act incontinently  provided that your so acting is uncompelled e.g., your desire for the pie is not irresistible. Socrates denied that such action is possible, thereby creating one of the Socratic paradoxes. In “unorthodox” instances of akratic action, a deed manifests weakness of will even though it accords with the agent’s better judgment. A boy who decides, against his better judgment, to participate in a certain dangerous prank, might  owing to an avoidable failure of nerve  fail to execute his decision. In such a case, some would claim, his failure to act on his decision manifests weakness of will or akrasia. If, instead, he masters his fear, his participating in the prank might manifest strength of will, even though his so acting conflicts with his better judgment. The occurrence of akratic actions seems to be a fact of life. Unlike many such apparent facts, this one has received considerable philosophical scrutiny for nearly two and a half millennia. A major source of the interest is clear: akratic action raises difficult questions about the connection between thought and action, a connection of paramount importance for most philosophical theories of the explanation of intentional behavior. Insofar as moral theory does not float free of evidence about the etiology of human behavior, the tough questions arise there as well. Ostensible akratic action, then, occupies a philosophical space in the intersection of the philosophy of mind and moral theory.  Refs.: The main references here are in three folders in two different series. H. P. Grice, “Akrasia,” The H. P. Grice Papers, S. II, c. 2-ff. 22-23 and S. V, c. 6-f. 32, BANC.

 

continental breakfast: Grice enjoyed a continental breakfast at Oxford, and an English breakfast in RomeAs for ‘continental’ “philosophy,” Grice applied it to the gradually changing spectrum of philosophical views that in the twentieth century developed in Continental Europe and that are notably different from the various forms of analytic philosophy that during the same period flourished at Oxford. Immediately after World War II the expression “philosophie continentale” was more or less synonymous with ‘phenomenology’. The latter term, already used earlier in G. idealism, received a completely new meaning in the work of Husserl. Later on “phainomenologie” was also applied, often with substantial changes in meaning, to the thought of a great number of other Continental philosophers such as Scheler, Alexander Pfander, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Nicolai Hartmann. For Husserl the aim of philosophy is to prepare humankind for a genuinely philosophical form of life, in and through which each human being gives him- or herself a rule through reason. Since the Renaissance, many philosophers have tried in vain to materialize this aim. In Husserl’s view, the reason was that philosophers failed to use the proper philosophical method. Husserl’s phenomenology was meant to provide philosophy with the method needed. Among those deeply influenced by Husserl’s ideas the so-called existentialists must be mentioned first. If ‘existentialism’ is construed strictly, it refers mainly to the philosophy of Sartre and Beauvoir. In a very broad sense ‘existentialism’ refers to the ideas of an entire group of thinkers influenced methodologically by Husserl and in content by Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre, or Merleau-Ponty, and one may go and include S. N. Hampshire into the bargain. In this case one often speaks of existential phenomenology. When Heidegger’s philosophy became better known at Oxford, ‘continental philosophy’ received again a new meaning. From Heidegger’s first publication, Being and Time 7, it was clear that his conception of phenomenology differs from that of Husserl in several important respects. That is why he qualified the term and spoke of hermeneutic phenomenology and clarified the expression by examining the “original” meaning of the Grecian words from which the term was formed. In his view phenomenology must try “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” Heidegger applied the method first to the mode of being of man with the aim of approaching the question concerning the meaning of being itself through this phenomenological interpretation. Of those who took their point of departure from Heidegger, but also tried to go beyond him, Gadamer and Ricoeur must be mentioned. The structuralist movement in France added another connotation to ‘Continental philosophy’. The term structuralism above all refers to an activity, a way of knowing, speaking, and acting that extends over a number of distinguished domains of human activity: linguistics, aesthetics, anthropology, psychology, psychoanalysis, mathematics, philosophy of science, and philosophy itself. Structuralism, which became a fashion in Paris and later in Western Europe generally, reached its high point on the Continent between 0 and 0. It was inspired by ideas first formulated by Russian formalism 626 and Czech structuralism 640, but also by ideas derived from the works of Marx and Freud. In France Foucault, Barthes, Althusser, and Derrida were the leading figures. Structuralism is not a new philosophical movement; it must be characterized by structuralist activity, which is meant to evoke ever new objects. This can be done in a constructive and a reconstructive manner, but these two ways of evoking objects can never be separated. One finds the constructive aspect primarily in structuralist aesthetics and linguistics, whereas the reconstructive aspect is more apparent in philosophical reflections upon the structuralist activity. Influenced by Nietzschean ideas, structuralism later developed in a number of directions, including poststructuralism; in this context the works of Gilles Deleuze, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Kristeva must be mentioned. After 0 ‘Continental philosophy’ received again a new connotation: deconstruction. At first deconstruction presented itself as a reaction against philosophical hermeneutics, even though both deconstruction and hermeneutics claim their origin in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. The leading philosopher of the movement is Derrida, who at first tried to think along phenomenological and structuralist lines. Derrida formulated his “final” view in a linguistic form that is both complex and suggestive. It is not easy in a few sentences to state what deconstruction is. Generally speaking one can say that what is being deconstructed is texts; they are deconstructed to show that there are conflicting conceptions of meaning and implication in every text so that it is never possible definitively to show what a text really means. Derrida’s own deconstructive work is concerned mainly with philosophical texts, whereas others apply the “method” predominantly to literary texts. What according to Derrida distinguished philosophy is its reluctance to face the fact that it, too, is a product of linguistic and rhetorical figures. Deconstruction is here that process of close reading that focuses on those elements where philosophers in their work try to erase all knowledge of its own linguistic and rhetorical dimensions. It has been said that if construction typifies modern thinking, then deconstruction is the mode of thinking that radically tries to overcome modernity. Yet this view is simplistic, since one also deconstructs Plato and many other thinkers and philosophers of the premodern age. People concerned with social and political philosophy who have sought affiliation with Continental philosophy often appeal to the so-called critical theory of the Frankfurt School in general, and to Habermas’s theory of communicative action in particular. Habermas’s view, like the position of the Frankfurt School in general, is philosophically eclectic. It tries to bring into harmony ideas derived from Kant, G. idealism, and Marx, as well as ideas from the sociology of knowledge and the social sciences. Habermas believes that his theory makes it possible to develop a communication community without alienation that is guided by reason in such a way that the community can stand freely in regard to the objectively given reality. Critics have pointed out that in order to make this theory work Habermas must substantiate a number of assumptions that until now he has not been able to justify. 

 

CVM-TINGENS -- Grice’s contingency planning‘contingens.’ “What is actual is not also possible” “What is necessary is not also contingent” -- contingent, neither impossible nor necessary; i.e., both possible and non-necessary. The modal property of being contingent is attributable to a proposition, state of affairs, event, or  more debatably  an object. Muddles about the relationship between this and other modal properties have abounded ever since Aristotle, who initially conflated contingency with possibility but later realized that something that is possible may also be necessary, whereas something that is contingent cannot be necessary. Even today many philosophers are not clear about the “opposition” between contingency and necessity, mistakenly supposing them to be contradictory notions probably because within the domain of true propositions the contingent and the necessary are indeed both exclusive and exhaustive of one another. But the contradictory of ‘necessary’ is ‘non-necessary’; that of ‘contingent’ is ‘non-contingent’, as the following extended modal square of opposition shows: These logico-syntactical relationships are preserved through various semantical interpretations, such as those involving: a the logical modalities proposition P is logically contingent just when P is neither a logical truth nor a logical falsehood; b the causal or physical modalities state of affairs or event E is physically contingent just when E is neither physically necessary nor physically impossible; and c the deontic modalities act A is morally indeterminate just when A is neither morally obligatory nor morally forbidden. In none of these cases does ‘contingent’ mean ‘dependent,’ as in the phrase ‘is contingent upon’. Yet just such a notion of contingency seems to feature prominently in certain formulations of the cosmological argument, all created objects being said to be contingent beings and God alone to be a necessary or non-contingent being. Conceptual clarity is not furthered by assimilating this sense of ‘contingent’ to the others. 

 

CONTRA-POSITVUM -- contrapositum: -- in Grecian, ‘antithesis’cfr. Hegel’s triad: thesis/antithesis,/synthesis. --  the immediate logical operation on any categorical proposition that is accomplished by first forming the complements of both the subject term and the predicate term of that proposition and then interchanging these complemented terms. Thus, contraposition applied to the categorical proposition ‘All cats are felines’ yields ‘All non-felines are non-cats’, where ‘nonfeline’ and ‘non-cat’ are, respectively, the complements or complementary terms of ‘feline’ and ‘cat’. The result of applying contraposition to a categorical proposition is said to be the contrapositive of that proposition.  contraries, any pair of propositions that cannot both be true but can both be false; derivatively, any pair of properties that cannot both apply to a thing but that can both fail to apply to a thing. Thus the propositions ‘This object is red all over’ and ‘This object is green all over’ are contraries, as are the properties of being red all over and being green all over. Traditionally, it was considered that the categorical A-proposition ‘All S’s are P’s’ and the categorical E-proposition ‘No S’s are P’s’ were contraries; but according to De Morgan and most subsequent logicians, these two propositions are both true when there are no S’s at all, so that modern logicians do not usually regard the categorical A- and E-propositions as being true contraries.  contravalid, designating a proposition P in a logical system such that every proposition in the system is a consequence of P. In most of the typical and familiar logical systems, contravalidity coincides with self-contradictoriness. 

 

CONTRA-RUOLO -- CONTROLLO – Grice: “A ‘bruto francecismo, da lasciare!” – the “Dizionario etimologico” has it!” – Grice: “The etymology is fascinating: counter-role – cfr. Italian ruolo, rullo. voluntary and rational control: the power structure of the soul -- Grice’s intersubjective conversational control, -- for Grice only what is under one’s control is communicatedspots mean measles only metaphorically, the spots don’t communicate measles. An involuntary cry does not ‘mean.’ Only a simulated cry of pain is a vehicle by which an emissor may mean that he is in pain. an apparently causal phenomenon closely akin to power and important for such topics as intentional action, freedom, and moral responsibility. Depending upon the control you had over the event, your finding a friend’s stolen car may or may not be an intentional action, a free action, or an action for which you deserve moral credit. Control seems to be a causal phenomenon. Try to imagine controlling a car, say, without causing anything. If you cause nothing, you have no effect on the car, and one does not control a thing on which one has no effect. But control need not be causally deterministic. Even if a genuine randomizer in your car’s steering mechanism gives you only a 99 percent chance of making turns you try to make, you still have considerable control in that sphere. Some philosophers claim that we have no control over anything if causal determinism is true. That claim is false. When you drive your car, you normally are in control of its speed and direction, even if our world happens to be deterministic. 

 

CONVERSAZIONE -- conversational avowal:  The phrase is a Ryleism, but Grice liked it. Grice’s point is with corrigibility or lack thereof. He recalls his tutorials with Strawson. “I want you to bring me a paper on Friday.” “You mean The Telegraph?” “You know what I mean.”  “But perhaps you don’t.”  Grice’s favourite conversational avowal, mentioned by Grice, is a declaration of an intention.. Grice starts using the phrase ‘conversational avowal’ after exploring Ryle’s rather cursory exploration of them in The Concept of Mind. This is interesting because in general Grice is an anti-ryleist. The verb is of course ‘to avow,’ which is ultimately a Latinate from ‘advocare.’ A processes or event of the soul is, on the official view, supposed to be played out in a private theatre. Such an event is known directly by the man who has them either through the faculty of introspection or the ‘phosphorescence’ of consciousness. The subject is, on this view, incorrigible—his avowals of the state of his soul cannot be corrected by others—and he is infallible—he cannot be wrong about which states he is in. The official doctrine mistakenly construes an avowals or a report of such an episode as issuing from a special sort of observation or perception of shadowy existents. We should consider some differences between two sorts of 'conversational' avowals: (i) I feel a tickle and (ii) I feel ill. If a man feels a tickle, he has a tickle, and if he has a tickle, he feels it. But if he feels ill, he may not be ill, and if he is ill, he may not feel ill. Doubtless a man’s feeling ill is some evidence for his being ill. But feeling a tickle is not evidence for his having a tickle, any more than striking a blow is evidence for the occurrence of a blow. In ‘feel a tickle’ and ‘strike a blow’, ‘tickle’ and ‘blow’ are cognate accusatives to the verbs ‘feel’ and ‘strike’. The verb and its accusative are two expressions for the same thing, as are the verbs and their accusatives in ‘I dreamt a dream’ and ‘I asked a question’. But ‘ill’ and ‘capable of climbing the tree’ are not cognate accusatives to the verb ‘to feel.' So they are not in grammar bound to signify feelings, as ‘tickle’ is in grammar bound to signify a feeling. Another purely grammatical point shows the same thing. It is indifferent whether I say ‘I feel a tickle’ or ‘I have a tickle’; but ‘I have . . .’ cannot be completed by ‘. . . ill’, (cf. ‘I have an illness’), ‘. . . capable of climbing the tree’, (cf. I have a capability to climb that tree’) ‘. . . happy’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of happiness’ or ‘I have happiness in my life’) or ‘. . . discontented’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of strong discontent towards behaviourism’). If we try to restore the verbal parallel by bringing in the appropriate abstract nouns, we find a further incongruity; ‘I feel happiness’(I feel as though I am experiencing happiness), ‘I feel illness’ (I feel as though I do have an illness’) or ‘I feel ability to climb the tree’ (I feel that I am endowed with the capability to climb that tree), if they mean anything, they do not mean at all what a man means by uttering ‘I feel happy,’ or ‘I feel ill,’ or ‘I feel capable of climbing the tree’. On the other hand, besides these differences between the different uses of ‘I feel . . .’ there are important CONVERSATIONAL analogies as well. If a man says that he has a tickle, his co-conversationalist does not ask for his evidence, or requires him to make quite sure. Announcing a tickle is not proclaiming the results of an investigation. A tickle is not something established by careful witnessing, or something inferred from a clue, nor do we praise for his powers of observation or reasoning a man who let us know that he feels tickles, tweaks and flutters. Just the same is true of avowals of moods. If a man makes a conversational contribution, such as‘I feel bored’, or ‘I feel depressed’, his co-conversationalist does not usually ask him for his evidence, or request him to make sure. The co-conversationalist may accuse the man of shamming to him or to himself, but the co-conversationalist does not accuse him of having been careless in his observations or rash in his inferences, since a co-conversationalist would not usually think that his conversational avowal is a report of an observation or a conclusion.  He has not been a good or a bad detective; he has not been a detective at all. Nothing would surprise us more than to hear him say ‘I feel depressed’ in the alert and judicious tone of voice of a detective, a microscopist, or a diagnostician, though this tone of voice is perfectly congruous with the NON-AVOWAL past-tense ‘I WAS feeling depressed’ or the NON-AVOWAL third-person report, ‘HE feels depressed’. If the avowal is to do its conversational job, it must be said in a depressed tone of voice. The conversational avowal must be blurted out to a sympathizer, not reported to an investigator. Avowing ‘I feel depressed’ is doing one of the things, viz. one CONVERSATIONAL thing, that depression is the mood to do. It is not a piece of scientific premiss-providing, but a piece of ‘conversational moping.’That is why, if the co-conversationalist is suspicious, he does not ask ‘Fact or fiction?’, ‘True or false?’, ‘Reliable or unreliable?’, but ‘Sincere or shammed?’ The CONVERSATIONAL avowal of moods requires not acumen, but openness. It comes from the heart, not from the head. It is not discovery, but voluntary non-concealment. Of course people have to learn how to use avowal expressions appropriately and they may not learn these lessons very well. They learn them from ordinary discussions of the moods of others and from such more fruitful sources as novels and the theatre. They learn from the same sources how to cheat both other people and themselves by making a sham conversational avowal in the proper tone of voice and with the other proper histrionic accompaniments. If we now raise the question ‘How does a man find out what mood he is in?’ one can answer that if, as may not be the case, he finds it out at all, he finds it out very much as we find it out. As we have seen, he does not groan ‘I feel bored’ because he has found out that he is bored, any more than the sleepy man yawns because he has found out that he is sleepy. Rather, somewhat as the sleepy man finds out that he is sleepy by finding, among other things, that he keeps on yawning, so the bored man finds out that he is bored, if he does find this out, by finding that among other things he glumly says to others and to himself ‘I feel bored’ and ‘How bored I feel’. Such a blurted avowal is not merely one fairly reliable index among others. It is the first and the best index, since being worded and voluntarily uttered, it is meant to be heard and it is meant to be understood. It calls for no sleuth-work.In some respects a conversational avowal of a moods, like ‘I feel cheerful,’ more closely resemble announcements of sensations like ‘I feel a tickle’ than they resemble utterances like ‘I feel better’ or ‘I feel capable of climbing the tree’. Just as it would be absurd to say ‘I feel a tickle but maybe I haven’t one’, so, in ordinary cases, it would be absurd to say ‘I feel cheerful but maybe I am not’. But there would be no absurdity in saying ‘I FEEL better but, to judge by the doctor’s attitude, perhaps I am WORSE’, or ‘I do FEEL as if I am capable of climbing the tree but maybe I cannot climb it.’This difference can be brought out in another way. Sometimes it is natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I could eat a horse’, or ‘I feel AS IF my temperature has returned to normal’. But, more more immediate conversational avowals, it would seldom if ever be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I were in the dumps’, or ‘I feel AS IF I were bored’, any more than it would be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I had a pain’. Not much would be gained by discussing at length why we use ‘feel’ in these different ways. There are hosts of other ways in which it is also used. I can say ‘I felt a lump in the mattress’, ‘I felt cold’, ‘I felt queer’, ‘I felt my jaw-muscles stiffen’, ‘I felt my gorge rise’, ‘I felt my chin with my thumb’, ‘I felt in vain for the lever’, ‘I felt as if something important was about to happen’, ‘I felt that there was a flaw somewhere in the argument’, ‘I felt quite at home’, ‘I felt that he was angry’. A feature common to most of these uses of ‘feel’ is that the utterer does not want further questions to be put. They would be either unanswerable questions, or unaskable questions. That he felt it is enough to settle some debates.That he merely felt it is enough to show that debates should not even begin. Names of moods, then, are not the names of feelings. But to be in a particular mood is to be in the mood, among other things, to feel certain sorts of feelings in certain sorts of situations. To be in a lazy mood, is, among other things, to tend to have sensations of lassitude in the limbs when jobs have to be done, to have cosy feelings of relaxation when the deck-chair is resumed, not to have electricity feelings when the game begins, and so forth. But we are not thinking primarily of these feelings when we say that we feel lazy; in fact, we seldom pay much heed to sensations of these kinds, save when they are abnormally acute. Is a  name of a mood a name of an emotion? The only tolerable reply is that of course they are, in that some people some of the time use ‘emotion’. But then we must add that in this usage an emotion is not something that can be segregated from thinking, daydreaming, voluntarily doing things, grimacing or feeling pangs and itches. To have the emotion, in this usage, which we ordinarily refer to as ‘being bored’, is to be in the mood to think certain sorts of thoughts, and not to think other sorts, to yawn and not to chuckle, to converse with stilted politeness, and not to talk with animation, to feel flaccid and not to feel resilient. Boredom is not some unique distinguishable ingredient, scene or feature of all that its victim is doing and undergoing. Rather it is the temporary complexion of that totality. It is not like a gust, a sunbeam, a shower or the temperature; it is like the morning’s weather.  An unstudied conversational utterance may embody an explicit interest phrase, or a conversational avowal, such as ‘I want it’, ‘I hope so’, ‘That’s what I intend’, ‘I quite dislike it’, ‘Surely I am depressed’, ‘I do wonder, too’, ‘I guess so’ and ‘I am feeling hungry.’The surface grammar (if not logical form) makes it tempting to misconstrue all the utterances as a description. But in its primary employment such a conversational avowal as ‘I want it’ is not used to convey information.‘I want it’ is used to make a request or demand. ‘I want it’ is no more meant as a contribution to general knowledge than ‘please’. For a co-conversationalist to respond with the tag ‘Do you?’ or worse, as Grice’s tutee, with ‘*how* do you *know* that you want it?’ is glaringly inappropriate. Nor, in their primary employment, are conversational avowals such as ‘I hate it’ or ‘That’s what I I intend’ used for the purpose of telling one’s addressee facts about the utterer; or else we should not be surprised to hear them uttered in the cool, informative tones of voice in which one says ‘HE hates it’ and ‘That’s what he intends’. We expect a conversational avowal, on the contrary, to be spoken in a revolted and a resolute tone of voice respectively. It is an utterances of a man in a revolted and resolute frame of mind. A conversational avowal is a thing said in detestation and resolution and not a thing said in order to advance biographical knowledge about detestations and resolutions. A man who notices the unstudied utterances of the utterer, who may or may not be himself, is, if his interest in the utterer has the appropriate direction, especially well situated to pass comments upon the qualities and frames of mind of its author.‘avowal’ as a philosophical lexeme may not invite an immediate correlate in the Graeco-Roman, ultimately Grecian, tradition. ‘Confessio’ springs to mind, but this is not what Grice is thinking about. He is more concerned with issues of privileged access and incorrigibility, or corrigibility, rather, as per the alleged immediacy of a first-person report of the form, “I feel that …” . Grice does use ‘avowal’ often especially in the early stages, when the logical scepticism about incorrigibility comes under attack. Just to be different, Grice is interested in the corrigibility of the avowal. The issue is of some importance in his account of the act of communication, and how one can disimplicate what one means. Grice loves to play with his tutee doubting as to whether he means that p or q. Except at Oxford, the whole thing has a ridiculous ring to it. I want you to bring me a paper by Friday. You mean the newspaper? You very well know what I mean. But perhaps you do not. Are you sure you mean a philosophy paper when you utter, ‘I want you to bring a paper by Friday’? As Grice notes, in case of self-deception and egcrateia, it may well be that the utterer does not know what he desires, if not what he intends, if anything. Freud and Foucault run galore. The topic will interest a collaborator of Grice’s, Pears, with his concept of ‘motivated irrationality.’ Grice likes to discuss a category mistake. I may be categorically mistaken but I am not categorically confused. Now when it comes to avowal-avowal, it is only natural that if he is interested in Aristotle on ‘hedone,’ Grice would be interested in Aristotle on ‘lupe.’ This is very philosophical, as Urmson agrees. Can one ‘fake’ pain? Why would one fake pain? Oddly, this is for Grice the origin of language. Is pleasure just the absence of pain? Liddell and Soctt have “λύπη” and render it as pain of body, oἡδον; also, sad plight or condition, but also pain of mind, grief; “ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται; τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; ἐρωτικὴ λ.’ λύπας προσβάλλειν;” “λ. φέρειν τινί; oχαρά.” Oddly, Grice goes back to pain in Princeton, since it is explored by Smart in his identity thesis. Take pain. Surely, Grice tells the Princetonians, it sounds harsh, to echo Berkeley, to say that it is the brain of Smith being in this or that a state which is justified by insufficient evidence; whereas it surely sounds less harsh that it is the C-fibres that constitute his ‘pain,’ which he can thereby fake. Grice distinguishes between a complete unstructured utterance token“Ouch”versus a complete syntactically structured erotetic utterance of the type, “Are you in pain?”. At the Jowett, Corpus Barnes has read Ogden and says ‘Ouch’ (‘Oh’) bears an ‘emotional’ or ‘emotive’ communicatum provided there is an intention there somewhere. Otherwise, no communicatum occurs. But if there is an intention, the ‘Oh’ can always be a fake. Grice distinguishes between a ‘fake’ and a ‘sneak.’ If U intends A to perceive ‘Oh’ as a fake, U means that he is in pain. If there is a sneaky intention behind the utterance, which U does NOT intend his A to recognise, there is no communicatum. Grice criticises emotivism as rushing ahead to analyse a nuance before exploring what sort of a nuance it is. Surely there is more to the allegedly ‘pseudo-descriptive’ ‘x is good,’ than U meaning that U emotionally approves of x. In his ‘myth,’ Grice uses pain magisterially as an excellent example for a privileged-access allegedly incorrigible avowal, and stage 0 in his creature progression. By uttering ‘Oh!,’ under voluntary control, Barnes means, iconically, that he is in pain. Pain fall under the broader keyword: emotion, as anger does. Cf. Aristotle on the emotion in De An., Rhet., and Eth. Nich. Knowing that at Oxford, if you are a classicist, you are not a philosopher, Grice never explores the Stoic, say, approach to pain, or lack thereof (“Which is good, since Walter Pater did it for me!”). Refs.: “Can I have a pain in my tail?” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

 

CONVERSAZIONE -- conversational game theory: Grice: “It was Austin who made me see the philosophy of football!” -- Grice for ‘homo ludens’. In “Logic and conversation,” Grice uses the phrases, “the game of conversation,” “conversational game,” “conversational move,” “the conversational rules,”so he knew he was echoing Neumann and Morgenstern. J. Hintikka, “Grice and game theory.” the theory of the structure of, and the rational procedures (or strategies) for performing in, games or game-like human interactions. Although there are forerunners, game theory is virtually invented by Neumann and Morgenstern. Its most striking feature is its compact representation of interactions of at least two players; e. g. two players may face two choices each, and in combination these choices produce four possible outcomes. Actual choices are of strategies, not of outcomes, although it is assessments of outcomes that recommend this or that procedure, maxim, imperative, or strategy. To do well in a game, even for each player to do well, as is often possible, generally requires taking the other player’s position, interest, and goal, into account. Hence, to evaluate an imperative or rule or strategiy directly, without reference to the outcomes they might produce in interaction with others, is conspicuously perverse. It is not surprising, therefore, that in meta-ethics, game theory has been preeminently applied to utilitarianianism. As the numbers of players and rational procedure, guideline or strategies rise, the complexity of the game of conversation increases geometrically. If players have *2* strategies each and each ranks the four possible outcomes without ties, there are already *78* strategically distinct conversations. Even minor real-life interactions may have astronomically greater complexity. Grice once complained to Hintikka that this makes game theory ‘useless,’ or ‘otiose.’ Alternatively, one can note that this makes it realistic and helps us understand why real-life choices are at least as complex as they sometimes seem. To complicate matters further, conversationalists can choose over probabilistic combinations of their pure rational guidelines or strategies. Hence, the original 4 outcomes in a simple 2 $ 2 game define a continuum of potential outcomes. After noting the structure of the game of conversation, one might then be struck by an immediate implication of this mere description. A rational agent may be supposed to attempt to maximize his potential or expected outcome in the game of conversation. But as there are at least two players in the game of conversation, in general conversationalists cannot all maximize simultaneously over their expected outcomes while assuming that all others are doing likewise. This is an analytical principle. In general, we cannot maximize over two functions simultaneously. The general notion of the greatest good of the greatest number, e. g., is incoherent. Hence, in inter-active choice contexts, the simple notion of economic rationality is incoherent. Virtually all of early game theory was dedicated to finding an alternative principle for resolving conversational game interactions. There are now many of what Grice calls a “solution theory,” most of which are about this or that outcome rather than this or that rational guideline or strategy they stipulate which outcomes or range of outcomes is game-theoretically “rational.” There is little consensus on how to generalize from the ordinary rationality of merely choosing more rather than less and of displaying consistent preferences to the general choice of strategies in games. A pay-off in early game theory is almost always represented in a cardinal, transferable utility. A transferable utility is an odd notion that is evidently introduced to avoid the disdain with which philosophers then treated interpersonal comparisons of utility. It seems to be analogous to money. One could say that the theory is one of wealth maximization. In the early theory, the “rationality” conditions are as follows.In general, if the sums of the pay-offs to each players in various outcomes differ, it is assumed that a rational player will manage to divide the largest possible payoff with the other player. 2 No rational agent will accept a payoff below the “security level” obtainable even if all the other player or players really form a coalition against the individual. Sometimes it is also assumed that no group of players will rationally accept less than it could get as its group security level  but in some games, no outcome can meet this condition. This is an odd combination of elements. The collective elements are plausibly thought of as merely predictive. If we individually wish to do well, we should combine efforts to help us do best AS A CONVERSATIONAL DYAD. But what we want is a theory that converts two individual preferences into one collective resultGrice’s conversational shared goal of influencing and being influenced by others. Unfortunately, to put a move doing just this in the foundations of the theory is question-begging. Our fundamental burden is to determine whether a theory of subjective rationality MAY produce an inter-subjectively good result, not to stipulate that it must. In the theory with cardinal, additive payoffs, we can divide games. There is the constant-sum game, in which the sum of all players’ payoffs in each outcome is a constant, and variable sum games. A zero-sum games is a special case of a constant sum game. Two-player constant sum games are games of pure conversational ‘conflict.’ Each player’s gain is the other’s loss. In constant sum games with more than two players and in all variable sum games, there is generally reason for coalition formation to improve payoffs to members of the coalition. A game without transferable utility, such as a games in which players have only ordinal preferences, may be characterized as a game of pure conflict or of pure co-ordination (or co-operation) when players’ preference orderings over outcomes are, respectively, opposite or identical, or as games of mixed motive when their orderings are partly the same and partly reversed. Grice’s nalysis of such games is evidently less tractable than that of games with cardinal, additive utility, and their theory is only beginning to be extensively developed by Griceians. Despite the apparent circularity of the rationality assumptions of early game theory, it is the game theorists’ prisoner’s dilemma that makes clear that compelling subjectivistic principles of choice can produce an inter-subjective deficient outcome. This game given its catchy but inapt name. If they play it in isolation from any other interaction between them, two players in this game can each do what seems individually best and reach an outcome that both consider inferior to the outcome that results from making opposite strategy choices. Even with the knowledge that this is the problem they face, the players still have incentive to choose the strategies that jointly produce the inferior outcome. The prisoner’s dilemma involves both coordination (or co-operation) and conflict. It has played a central role in discussions of Griceian conversational pragmatics. Games that predominantly involve coordination (or cooperation), such as when we coordinate in all driving on the right or all on the left, have a similarly central role. The understanding of both classes of games has been read into the philosophy of Hobbes and Hume and into “mutual advantage” theories of justice. 

 

CONVERSAZIONE – BENEVOLENZA CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational benevolence: benevolentia, beneficentia, malevolentia, maleficentia -- . In Grice it’s not benevolence per se but as a force in a two-force model, with self-love on the other side. The fact that he later subsumed everything under ONE concept: that of co-operation (first helpfulness) testifies that he is placing more conceptual strength on ‘benevolence’ than ‘self love.’ But the self-love’ remains in all the caveats and provisos that Grice keeps guarding his claims with: ‘ceteris paribus,’ ‘provided there’s not much effort involved,’ ‘if no unnecessary trouble arises,’ and so on. It’s never benevolence simpliciter or tout court. When it comes to co-operation, the self-love remains: the mutual goal of that co-operation is in the active and the passive voiceYou expect me to be helpful as much as I expect you to be helpful. We are in this together. The active/passive voice formulation is emphatic in Grice: informing AND BEING INFORMED; influencing AND BEING INFLUENCED. The self-love goes: I won’t inform you unless you’ll inform me. I won’t influence you unless you influence me. The ‘influence’ bit does not seem to cooperative. But the ‘inform’ side does. By ‘inform,’ the idea is that the psi-transmission concerns a true belief. “I’ll be truthful if you will.” This is the sort of thing that Nietzsche found repugnant and identified with the golden rule was totally immoral.It was felt by Russell to be immoral enough that he cared to mention in a letter to The Times about how abusive Nietzsche can beyet what a gem “Beyond good and evil” still is! In the hypocritical milieu that Grice expects his tuttees know they are engaged in, Grice does not find Nietzsche pointing to a repugnant fact, but a practical, even jocular way of taking meta-ethics in a light way. There is nothing other-oriented about benevolence. What Grice needs is conversational ALTRUISM, or helpfulness‘cooperation’ has the advantage, with the ‘co-’, of avoiding the ‘mutuality’ aspect, which is crucial (“What’s the good of helping youI’m not your servant!if thou art not going to help me!” It may be said that when Butler uses ‘benevolentia’ he means others. “It is usually understood that one is benevolent towards oneself, if that makes sense.” Grice writes. Then there’s Smith promising Jones a joband the problem that comes with it. For Grice, if Smith promised a job to Jones, and Jones never gets it“that’s Jones’s problem.” So we need to distinguish beneficentia and benevolentia. The opposite is malevolentia and maleficientia. Usually Grice states his maxims as PROHIBITIONS: “Do not say what you believe to be false” being the wittiest! So, he might just as well have appealed to or invoked a principle of absence of conversational ill-will. Grice uses ‘conversational benevolence’ narrowly, to refer to the assumption that conversationalists will agree to make a contribution appropriate to the shared purposes of the exhcnage. It contrasts with the limiting conversational self-love, which is again taken narrowly to indicate that conversationalists are assumed to be conversationally ‘benevolent,’ in the interpretation above, provided doing that does not get them into unnecessary trouble. The type of rationality that Grice sees in conversational is one that sees conversation as ‘rational co-operation.’ So it is obvious that he has to invoke some level of benevolence. When tutoring his rather egoistic tutees he had to be careful, so he hastened to add a principle of conversational self-love. It was different when lecturing outside a tutorial! In fact ‘benevolence’ here is best understood as ‘altruism’. So, if there is a principle of conversational egoism, there is a correlative principle of conversational altruism. If Grice uses ‘self-love,’ there is nothing about ‘love,’ in ‘benevolence.’ Butler may have used ‘other-love’! Even if of course we must start with the Grecians! We must not forget that Plato and Aristotle despised "autophilia", the complacency and self-satisfaction making it into the opposite of "epimeleia heautou” in Plato’s Alcibiades. Similarly, to criticize Socratic ethics as a form of egoism in opposition to a selfless care of others is inappropriate. Neither a self-interested seeker of wisdom nor a dangerous teacher of self-love, Socrates, as the master of epimeleia heautou, is the hinge between the care of self and others. One has to be careful here. A folk-etymological connection between ‘foam’ may not be neededwhen the Romans had to deal with Grecian ‘aphrodite.’ This requires that we look for another linguistic botany for Grecian ‘self-love’ that Grice opposes to ‘benevolentia.’ Hesiod derives Aphrodite from “ἀφρός,” ‘sea-foam,’ interpreting the name as "risen from the foam", but most modern scholars regard this as a spurious folk etymology. Early modern scholars of classical mythology attempted to argue that Aphrodite's name was of Griceain or Indo-European origin, but these efforts have now been mostly abandoned. Aphrodite's name is generally accepted to be of non-Greek, probably Semitic, origin, but its exact derivation cannot be determined. Scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, accepting Hesiod's "foam" etymology as genuine, analyzed the second part of Aphrodite's name as -odítē "wanderer" or -dítē "bright". Janda, also accepting Hesiod's etymology, has argued in favor of the latter of these interpretations and claims the story of a birth from the foam as an Indo-European mytheme. Similarly, an Indo-European compound abʰor-, very" and dʰei- "to shine" have been proposed, also referring to Eos. Other have argued that these hypotheses are unlikely since Aphrodite's attributes are entirely different from those of both Eos and the Vedic deity Ushas.A number of improbable non-Greek etymologies have also been suggested. One Semitic etymology compares Aphrodite to the Assyrian ‘barīrītu,’ the name of a female demon that appears in Middle Babylonian and Late Babylonian texts. Hammarström looks to Etruscan, comparing eprϑni "lord", an Etruscan honorific loaned into Greek as πρύτανις.This would make the theonym in origin an honorific, "the lady".Most scholars reject this etymology as implausible, especially since Aphrodite actually appears in Etruscan in the borrowed form Apru (from Greek Aphrō, clipped form of Aphrodite). The medieval Etymologicum Magnum offers a highly contrived etymology, deriving Aphrodite from the compound habrodíaitos (ἁβροδίαιτος), "she who lives delicately", from habrós and díaita. The alteration from b to ph is explained as a "familiar" characteristic of Greek "obvious from the Macedonians". It is much easier with the Romans.  Lewis and Short have ‘ămor,’ old form “ămŏs,” “like honos, labos, colos, etc.’ obviously from ‘amare,’ and which they render as ‘love,’ as in Grice’s “conversational self-love.” Your tutor will reprimand you if you spend too much linguistic botany on ‘eros.’ “Go straight to ‘philos.’” But no. There are philosophical usages of ‘eros,’ especially when it comes to the Grecian philosophers Grice is interested in: Aristotle reading Plato, which becomes Ariskant reading Plathegel. So, Liddell and Scott have “ἔρως” which of course is from a verb, or two: “ἕραμαι,” “ἐράω,” and which they render as “love, mostly of the sexual passion, ““θηλυκρατὴς ἔ.,” “ἐρῶσ᾽ ἔρωτ᾽ ἔκδημον,” “ἔ. τινός love for one, S.Tr.433, “παίδων” E. Ion67, and “generally, love of a thing, desire for it,” ““πατρῴας γῆς” “δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔ.” “ἔχειν ἔμφυτον ἔρωτα περί τι” Plato, Lg. 782e ; “πρὸς τοὺς λόγους” (love of law), “ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος γενέσθαι” Hdt.5.32 ; ἔ. ἔχει με c. inf., A.Su521 ; “θανόντι κείνῳ συνθανεῖν ἔρως μ᾽ ἔχει” S.Fr.953 ; “αὐτοῖς ἦν ἔρως θρόνους ἐᾶσθαι” Id.OC367 ; ἔ. ἐμπίπτει μοι c. inf., A.Ag.341, cf. Th.6.24 ; εἰς ἔρωτά τινος ἀφικέσθαι, ἐλθεῖν, Antiph.212.3,Anaxil.21.5 : pl., loves, amours, “ἀλλοτρίων” Pi.N.3.30 ; “οὐχ ὅσιοι ἔ.” E.Hi765 (lyr.) ; “ἔρωτες ἐμᾶς πόλεως” Ar.Av.1316 (lyr.), etc. ; of dolphins, “πρὸς παῖδας” Arist.HA631a10 : generally, desires, S.Ant.617 (lyr.). 2. object of love or desire, “ἀπρόσικτοι ἔρωτες” Pi.N.11.48, cf. Luc.Tim.14. 3. passionate joy, S.Aj.693 (lyr.); the god of love, Anacr.65, Parm.13, E.Hi525 (lyr.), etc.“Έ. ἀνίκατε μάχαν” S.Ant.781 (lyr.) : in pl., Simon.184.3, etc. III. at Nicaea, a funeral wreath, EM379.54. IV. name of the κλῆρος Ἀφροδίτης, Cat.Cod.Astr.1.168 ; = third κλῆρος, Paul.Al.K.3; one of the τόποι, Vett.Val.69.16. And they’ll point to you that the Romans had ‘amor’ AND ‘cupidus’ (which they meant as a transliteration of epithumia). If for Kant and Grice it is the intention that matters, ill-will counts. If Smith does not want Jones have a job, Smith has ill-will towards Jones. This is all Kant and Grice need to call Smith a bad person. It means it is the ill-will that causes Joness not having a job. A conceptual elucidation. Interesting from a historical point of view seeing that Grice had introduced a principle of conversational benevolence (i.e. conversational goodwill) pretty early. Malevolentia was over-used by Cicero, translating the Grecian. Grice judges that if Jones fails to get the job that benevolent Smith promised, Smith may still be deemed, for Kant, if not Aristotle, to have given him the job. A similar elucidation was carried by Urmson with his idea of supererogation (heroism and sainthood). For a hero or saint, someones goodwill but not be good enough! Which does not mean it is ill, either! Conversational benevolence -- Self-love Philosophical theology -- Edwards, J., philosopher and theologian. He was educated at Yale, preached in New York City, and in 1729 assumed a Congregational pastorate in Northampton, Massachusetts, where he became a leader in the Great Awakening. Because of a dispute with his parishioners over qualifications for communion, he was forced to leave in 1750. In 1751, he took charge of congregations in Stockbridge, a frontier town sixty miles to the west. He was elected third president of Princeton in 1757 but died shortly after inauguration. Edwards deeply influenced Congregational and Presbyterian theology in America for over a century, but had little impact on philosophy. Interest in him revived in the middle of the twentieth century, first among literary scholars and theologians and later among philosophers. While most of Edwards’s published work defends the Puritan version of Calvinist orthodoxy, his notebooks reveal an interest in philosophical problems for their own sake. Although he was indebted to Continental rationalists like Malebranche, to the Cambridge Platonists, and especially to Locke, his own contributions are sophisticated and original. The doctrine of God’s absolute sovereignty is explicated by occasionalism, a subjective idealism similar to Berkeley’s, and phenomenalism. According to Edwards, what are “vulgarly” called causal relations are mere constant conjunctions. True causes necessitate their effects. Since God’s will alone meets this condition, God is the only true cause. He is also the only true substance. Physical objects are collections of ideas of color, shape, and other “corporeal” qualities. Finite minds are series of “thoughts” or “perceptions.” Any substance underlying perceptions, thoughts, and “corporeal ideas” must be something that “subsists by itself, stands underneath, and keeps up” physical and mental qualities. As the only thing that does so, God is the only real substance. As the only true cause and the only real substance, God is “in effect being in general.” God creates to communicate his glory. Since God’s internal glory is constituted by his infinite knowledge of, love of, and delight in himself as the highest good, his “communication ad extra” consists in the knowledge of, love of, and joy in himself which he bestows upon creatures. The essence of God’s internal and external glory is “holiness” or “true benevolence,” a disinterested love of being in general i.e., of God and the beings dependent on him. Holiness constitutes “true beauty,” a divine splendor or radiance of which “secondary” ordinary beauty is an imperfect image. God is thus supremely beautiful and the world is suffused with his loveliness. Vindications of Calvinist conceptions of sin and grace are found in Freedom of the Will 1754 and Original Sin 1758. The former includes sophisticated defenses of theological determinism and compatibilism. The latter contains arguments for occasionalism and interesting discussions of identity. Edwards thinks that natural laws determine kinds or species, and kinds or species determine criteria of identity. Since the laws of nature depend on God’s “arbitrary” decision, God establishes criteria of identity. He can thus, e.g., constitute Adam and his posterity as “one thing.” Edwards’s religious epistemology is developed in A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections 1746 and On the Nature of True Virtue 1765. The conversion experience involves the acquisition of a “new sense of the heart.” Its core is the mind’s apprehension of a “new simple idea,” the idea of “true beauty.” This idea is needed to properly understand theological truths. True Virtue also provides the fullest account of Edwards’s ethics  a moral sense theory that identifies virtue with benevolence. Although indebted to contemporaries like Hutcheson, Edwards criticizes their attempts to construct ethics on secular foundations. True benevolence embraces being in general. Since God is, in effect, being in general, its essence is the love of God. A love restricted to family, nation, humanity, or other “private systems” is a form of self-love.  Refs.: The source is Grice’s seminar in the first set on ‘Logic and conversation.’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

CONVERSAZIONE -- CATEGORIA – CATEGORIA CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational category: -- Greek ‘categoria,’ Cicero couldn’t translate it and kept it as ‘categoria,’. Cf  Kant ‘categoric versus hypotheticum or conditionale -- used jocularly by Grice. But can it be used non-jocularly? How can the concept of ‘category,’ literally, apply to what Grice says it applies, so that we have, assuming Kant is using ‘quantity,’ ‘quality,’ ‘relation’ and ‘mode,’ as SUPRA-categories (functions, strictly) for his twelve categories? Let’s revise, the quantity applies to the quantification (in Frege’s terms) or what Boethius applied to Aristotle’s posotesand there are three categories involved, but the three deal with the ‘quantum: ‘every,’ ‘some,’ and ‘one.’ ‘some’ Russell would call an indefinite. Strictly, if Grice wants to have a category of conversational quantityit should relate to the ‘form’ of the ‘conversational move.’ “Every nice girl loves a sailor” would be the one with most ‘quantity.’ Grice sees a problem there, and would have that rather translated as ‘The altogether nice girl loves the one-at-a-time sailor.’ But that would be the most conversational move displaying ‘most quantity.’ (It can be argued it ’t). When it comes to the category of conversational quality, the three categories by Kant under the ‘function’ of qualitas involves the well known trio, the affirmative, the negative, and the infinite. In terms of the ‘quality’ of a conversational move, it may be argued that a move in negative form (as in Grice, “I’m not hearing any noise,” “That pillar box is not blue” seem to provide ‘less’ quality than the affirmative counterparts. But as in quantity, it is not sure Kant has some ordering in mind. It seems he does. It seems he ascribes more value to the first category in each of the four functions. When it comes to the category of conversational relation, the connection with Kant could be done. Since this involves the categoric, the hypothetic, and the disjunctive. So here we may think that a conversational move will be either a categoric responseA: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B: The weather has been delightful. Or a hypothetical. A: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B: If that’s what you think. Or a dijunctive: Mrs. Smith is a wind bag. B: Or she is not. When it comes, lastly, to the category of conversational mode, we have just three strict categories under this ‘function’ in Kant, which relate to the strength of the copula: ‘must be,’ must not be’ and ‘may.’ A conversational move that states a necessity would be the expected move. “You must do it.” Impossibility involves negation, so it is more problematic. And ‘may be’ is an open conversational move. So there IS a way to justify the use of ‘conversational category’ to apply to the four functions that Kant decides the Aristotelian categories may subsumed into. He knows that Kant has TWELVE categories, but he keeps lecturing the Harvardites about Kant having FOUR categories. On top, he finds ‘modus’ boring, and, turned a manierist, changes the idiom. This is what Austin called a ‘philosophical hack’ searching for some para-philosophy! One has to be careful here. Grice does speak of this or that ‘conversational category.’ Seeing that he is ‘echoing,’ as he puts it, Ariskant, we migt just as well have an entry for each of the four. These would be the category of conversational quantity, the category of conversational quality, the category of conversational relation, and the category of conversational modality. Note that in this rephrasing Grice applies ‘conversational’ directly to the category. As Boethius pointed out (and Grice loved to read Minio-Paullelo’s edition of Boethus’s commentary on the Categories), the motivation by Aristotle to posit this or that category was expository. A mind cannot know a multitude of things, so we have to ‘reduce’ things. It is important to note that while ‘quantitas,’ ‘qualitas’ ‘relatio’ and ‘modus’ are used by Kant, he actually augments the number of categories. These four would be supra-categories. The sub-categories, or categories themselves turn out to be twelve. Kant proposed 12 categories: unity, plurality, and totality for concept of quantity; reality, negation, and limitation, for the concept of quality; inherence and subsistence, cause and effect, and community for the concept of relation; and possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity and contingency. Kategorien sind nach Kant apriorisch und unmittelbar gegeben. Sie sind Werkzeuge des Urteilens und Werkzeuge des Denkens. Als solche dienen sie nur der Anwendung und haben keine Existenz. Sie bestehen somit nur im menschlichen Verstand. Sie sind nicht an Erfahrung gebunden. Durch ihre Unmittelbarkeit sind sie auch nicht an Zeichen gebunden. Kants erkenntnistheoretisches Ziel ist es, über die Bedingungen der Geltungskraft von Urteilen Auskunft zu geben. Ohne diese Auskunft können zwar vielerlei Urteile gefällt werden, sie müssen dann allerdings als „systematische Doktrin“ bezeichnet werden. Kant kritisiert damit das rein analytische Denken der Wissenschaft als falsch und stellt ihm die Notwendigkeit des synthetisierenden Denkens gegenüber. Kant begründet die Geltungskraft mit dem Transzendentalen Subjekt. Das Transzendentalsubjekt ist dabei ein reiner Reflexionsbegriff, welcher das synthetisierende Dritte darstellt (wie in späteren Philosophien Geist (Hegel), Wille, Macht, Sprache und Wert (Marx)), das nicht durch die Sinne wahrnehmbar ist. Kant sucht hier die Antwort auf die Frage, wie der Mensch als vernunftbegabtes Wesen konstituiert werden kann, nicht in der Analyse, sondern in einer Synthesis.Bei Immanuel Kant, der somit als bedeutender Erneuerer der bis dahin „vorkritischen“ Kategorienlehre gilt, finden sich zwölf „Kategorien der reinen Vernunft“. Für Kant sind diese Kategorien Verstandesbegriffe, nicht aber Ausdruck des tatsächlichen Seins der Dinge an sich. Damit wandelt sich die ontologische Sichtweise der Tradition in eine erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtung, weshalb Kants „kritische“ Philosophie (seit der Kritik der reinen Vernunft) oft auch als „Kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie“ bezeichnet wird.Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität sind die vier grundlegenden Urteilsfunktionen des Verstandes, nach denen die Kategorien gebildet werden. Demnach sind z. B. der Urteilsfunktion „Quantität“ die Kategorien bzw. Urteile „Einheit“, „Vielheit“ und „Allheit“ untergeordnet, und der Urteilsfunktion „Relation“ die Urteile der „Ursache“ und der „Wirkung“.Siehe auch: Kritik der reinen Vernunft und Transzendentale AnalytikBereits bei Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg findet man den Hinweis auf die verbreitete Kritik, dass Kant die den Kategorien zugrunde liegenden Urteilsformen nicht systematisch hergeleitet und damit als notwendig begründet hat. Einer der Kritikpunkte ist dabei, dass die Kategorien sich teilweise auf Anschauungen (Einzelheit, Realität, Dasein), teilweise auf Abstraktionen wie Zusammenfassen, Begrenzen oder Begründen (Vielheit, Allheit, Negation, Limitation, Möglichkeit, Notwendigkeit) beziehen.

 

CVM-PACTUM -- CONVERSAZIONE – IL PATTO CONVERSAZIONALE – patto, compatto. conversational compact: conversational pact in Grice’s conversational quasi-contractualism, contractarianism, a family of moral and political theories that make use of the idea of a social contract. Traditionally English philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke used the social contract idea to justify certain conceptions of the state. In the twentieth century philosophers such as G. R. Grice, H. P. Grice, and John Rawls have used the social contract notion (‘quasi-contractualism’ in Grice’s sense) to define and defend moral conceptions both conceptions of political justice and individual morality, often but not always doing so in addition to developing social contract theories of the state. The term ‘contractarian’ most often applies to this second type of theory. There are two kinds of moral argument that the contract image has spawned, the first rooted in Hobbes and the second rooted in Kant. Hobbesians start by insisting that what is valuable is what a person desires or prefers, not what he ought to desire or prefer for no such prescriptively powerful object exists; and rational action is action that achieves or maximizes the satisfaction of desires or preferences. They go on to insist that moral action is rational for a person to perform if and only if such action advances the satisfaction of his desires or preferences. And they argue that because moral action leads to peaceful and harmonious living conducive to the satisfaction of almost everyone’s desires or preferences, moral actions are rational for almost everyone and thus “mutually agreeable.” But Hobbesians believe that, to ensure that no cooperative person becomes the prey of immoral aggressors, moral actions must be the conventional norms in a community, so that each person can expect that if she behaves cooperatively, others will do so too. These conventions constitute the institution of morality in a society. So the Hobbesian moral theory is committed to the idea that morality is a human-made institution, which is justified only to the extent that it effectively furthers human interests. Hobbesians explain the existence of morality in society by appealing to the convention-creating activities of human beings, while arguing that the justification of morality in any human society depends upon how well its moral conventions serve individuals’ desires or preferences. By considering “what we could agree to” if we reappraised and redid the cooperative conventions in our society, we can determine the extent to which our present conventions are “mutually agreeable” and so rational for us to accept and act on. Thus, Hobbesians invoke both actual agreements or rather, conventions and hypothetical agreements which involve considering what conventions would be “mutually agreeable” at different points in their theory; the former are what they believe our moral life consists in; the latter are what they believe our moral life should consist in  i.e., what our actual moral life should model. So the notion of the contract does not do justificational work by itself in the Hobbesian moral theory: this term is used only metaphorically. What we “could agree to” has moral force for the Hobbesians not because make-believe promises in hypothetical worlds have any binding force but because this sort of agreement is a device that merely reveals how the agreed-upon outcome is rational for all of us. In particular, thinking about “what we could all agree to” allows us to construct a deduction of practical reason to determine what policies are mutually advantageous. The second kind of contractarian theory is derived from the moral theorizing of Kant. In his later writings Kant proposed that the “idea” of the “Original Contract” could be used to determine what policies for a society would be just. When Kant asks “What could people agree to?,” he is not trying to justify actions or policies by invoking, in any literal sense, the consent of the people. Only the consent of real people can be legitimating, and Kant talks about hypothetical agreements made by hypothetical people. But he does believe these make-believe agreements have moral force for us because the process by which these people reach agreement is morally revealing. Kant’s contracting process has been further developed by subsequent philosophers, such as Rawls, who concentrates on defining the hypothetical people who are supposed to make this agreement so that their reasoning will not be tarnished by immorality, injustice, or prejudice, thus ensuring that the outcome of their joint deliberations will be morally sound. Those contractarians who disagree with Rawls define the contracting parties in different ways, thereby getting different results. The Kantians’ social contract is therefore a device used in their theorizing to reveal what is just or what is moral. So like Hobbesians, their contract talk is really just a way of reasoning that allows us to work out conceptual answers to moral problems. But whereas the Hobbesians’ use of contract language expresses the fact that, on their view, morality is a human invention which if it is well invented ought to be mutually advantageous, the Kantians’ use of the contract language is meant to show that moral principles and conceptions are provable theorems derived from a morally revealing and authoritative reasoning process or “moral proof procedure” that makes use of the social contract idea. Both kinds of contractarian theory are individualistic, in the sense that they assume that moral and political policies must be justified with respect to, and answer the needs of, individuals. Accordingly, these theories have been criticized by communitarian philosophers, who argue that moral and political policies can and should be decided on the basis of what is best for a community. They are also attacked by utilitarian theorists, whose criterion of morality is the maximization of the utility of the community, and not the mutual satisfaction of the needs or preferences of individuals. Contractarians respond that whereas utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons, contractarian theories make moral and political policies answerable to the legitimate interests and needs of individuals, which, contra the communitarians, they take to be the starting point of moral theorizing.

 

CONVERSAZIONE – COOPERAZIONE CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational co-öperation: Grice is perfectly right that ‘helpfulness’ does not ‘equate’ cooperation. His earlier principle of conversational helpfulness becomes the principle of conversational co-operation.Tthere is a distinction between mutual help and cooperation. First, the Romans never knew. Their ‘servants’ were ‘help’and this remains in the British usage of ‘civil servant,’ one who helps. Some philosophical tutees by Hare were often reminded, in the midst of their presenting their essays, “Excuse me for interrupting, Smith, but have you considered a career in the civil service?” Then some Romans found Christianism fashionable, and they were set to translate the Bible. So when this Hebrew concept appeared, they turned it into ad-judicatum, which was translated by Wycliff as ‘help.’ Now ‘operatio’ is quite a different animal. It’s the ‘opus’ of the Romans, who also had ‘labor.’ Surely to ‘co-laborate’ is to ‘co-operate.’ There is an idea that ‘operate,’ can be more otiose, in the view of Rogers Albritton. “He is operating the violin,” was his favourite utterance. “Possibly his opus 5.” The fact that English needs a hyphen and an umlaut does not make it very ‘ordinary’ in Austin’s description. Grice is more interested in the conceptualization of this, notably as it relates to rationality. Can cooperation NOT be rational? For most libertarians, cooperation IS “irrational,” rather. But Grice points is subtler. He is concerned with an emissor communicating that p. The least thing he deserves is a rational recipient. “Otherwise I might just as well scream to the walls!” Used by Grice WOW:368previously, ‘rational cooperation’what cooperation is not rational? Grice says that if Smith promised Jones a job; Jones doesn’t get it. Smith must be DEEMED to have given the job to Jones. It’s the intention, as Kant shows, the pure motive, that matters. Ditto for communication. If Blackburn draws a skull, he communicates that there is danger. If his addressee fails to recognise the emissor’s intention the emissor will still be deemed to have communicated that there is danger. So communication does NOT require co-operation. His analysis of “emissor communicates that p” is not one of “emissor successfully communicates that p,” because “communicates” reduces to “intends” not to ‘fulfilled intention.’ Cooperation enters when we go beyond ONE act of communication. To communicate is to give information and to influence another, and it is also to receive information and to be influenced by another. When these communicative objectives are made explicit, helpfulness or cooperation becomes essential. He uses ‘converational cooperation” and “supreme principle of conversational cooperation” (369). He uses ‘supreme conversational principle” of “cooperativeness” (369), to avoid seeing the conversational imperatives as an unorganized heap of conversational obligations. Another variant is Grice’s use of “principle of conversational co-operation.” He also uses “principle of conversational rational co-operation.” Note that irrational or non-rational co-operation is not an oxymoron. Another expression is conversational cooperative rationality. So Grice was amused that you can just as well refer to ‘cooperative rationality” or “rational cooperation,” “a category shift if ever there was one.”

 

EX PLICATUM -- CONVERSAZIONE – SPIEGATO CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational explicaturum – explicitirum -- cf. the implicaturum and the impliciturmimplicatura/implicituraimplicaturm-impliciturm --  To be explicit is bad manners at Oxford if not in Paris or MIT. The thing is to imply! Englishmen are best at implyingtheir love for understatement is unequalled in the world. Grice needs the explicatio, or explicit. Because the mistake the philosopher makes is at the level of the implicatio, as Nowell-Smith, and C. K. Grant had noted. It is not OBVIOUSLY at the explicit level. Grice was never interested in the explicit level, and takes a very cavalier attitude to it. “This brief indication of my use of say leaves it open whether a man who says (today) Harold Wilson is a great man and another who says (also today) The British Prime Minister is a great man would, if each knew that the two singular terms had the same reference, have said the same thing. But whatever decision is made about this question, the apparatus that I am about to provide will be capable of accounting for any implicaturums that might depend on the presence of one rather than another of these singular terms in the sentence uttered. Such implicaturums would merely be related to different maxims.”Rephrase: “A brief indication of my use of ‘the explicit’ leaves it open whether a man who states (today), ‘Harold Wilson is a great man’ thereby stating that Wilson is a great man, and another who states (also today),‘The British Prime Minister is a great man,’ viz. that the Prime Minister is a great mand, would, if each singular term, ‘the Prime Minister’ and ‘Wilson’ has the same denotatum (co-relata) have put forward in an explicit fashion the same propositional complex, and have stated the same thing. On the face of it, it would seem they have not. But cf. ‘Wilson will be the prime minister’ versus ‘Wilson shall be the prime minister.’ Again, a subtler question arises as to whether the first emissor who has stated that Wilson will be the next prime minster and the other one who has stated that Wilson *shall* be the next prime minster, have both but forward the same proposition. If the futurm indicatum is ENTAILED by the futurum intentionale, the question is easy to settle. Whatever methodological decision or stipulation I end up making about the ‘explicitum,’ the apparatus that I rely on is capable of accounting for any implicaturum that might depend on the presence of this or that singular term in the utterance. Such an implicaturum would merely be related to a different conversational maxims. Urmson has elaborated on this, “Mrs. Smith’s husband just passed by.” “You mean the postman! Why did you use such contrived ‘signular term’?” If the emissor draws a skull what he explicitly conveys is that this is a skull. This is the EPLICITUM. If he communicates that there is danger, that’s via some further reasoning. That associates a skull with death. Grice’s example is Grice displaying his bandaged leg. Strictly, he communicates that he has a bandaged leg. Second, that his leg is bandaged (the bandage may be fake). And third, that he cannot play cricket. It all started in Oxford when they started to use ‘imply’ in a sense other than the ‘logical’ one. This got Grice immersed in a deep exploration of types of ‘implication.’ There is the implicaturum, and the implicitum, both from ‘implico.’ As correlative there is the explicatio, which yields both the explicatum and the explicitum. Grice has under the desideratum of conversational clarity that a conversationalist is assumed to make the point of his conversational contribution ‘explicit.’ So in his polemic with G. A. Paul, Grice knows that the ‘doubt-or-denial’ condition will be at the level NOT of the explicitum or explicatum. Surely an implicaturum can be CANCELLED explicitly. Grice uses ‘contextual’ or ‘explicit,’ here but grants that the ‘contextual’ may be subsumed under the ‘explicit.’  It is when the sub-perceptual utterance is copulated with the formulation of the explicatum of the implicaturum that Grice shows G. A. Paul that the statement is still ‘true,’ and which Grice sees as a reivindication of the causal theory of perception. In the twenty or so examples of philosophical mistakes, both in “Causal” and “Prolegomena,” all the mistakes can be rendered back to the ‘explicatum’ versus ‘implicaturum’ distinction. Unfortunately, each requires a philosophical background to draw all the ‘implications,’ and Grice has been read by people without a philosophical background who go on to criticise him for ignoring things where he never had focused his attention on. His priority is to deal with these philosophical mistakes. He also expects the philosopher to come up with a general methodological statement. Grice distinguishes between the conversational explicitum and the conversational explicatum. Grice plays with ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ at various places. He often uses ‘explicit’and ‘implicit’ adverbially: the utterer explicitly conveys that p versus the utterer implicitly conveys that p (hints that p, suggests that p, indicates that p, implicates that p, implies that p). Grice regards that both dimensions form part of the total act of signification, accepting as a neutral variant, that the utterer has signified that p.

 

CONVERSAZIONE – GIOCCO -- conversational game: In a conversational game, you don’t say “The pillar box seems red” if you know it IS red. So, philosophers at Oxford (like Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hampshire, and Hart) are all victims of ignoring the rules of the game, and just not understanding that a game is being played.  the expression is used by Grice systematically. He speaks of players making the conversational move in the conversational game following the conversational rule, v. rational choice

 

CONVERSAZIONE – NEGOZIAZIONE -- conversational haggle -- bargaining theory, the branch of game theory that treats agreements, e.g., wage agreements between labor and management. In the simplest bargaining problems there are two bargainers. They can jointly realize various outcomes, including the outcome that occurs if they fail to reach an agreement, i.e. if they fail to help each other or co-operate. Each bargainer assigns a certain amount of utility to each outcome. The question is, what outcome will they realise if each conversationalist is rational? Methods of solving bargaining problems are controversial. The best-known proposals are Grice’s and Nash’s and Kalai and Smorodinsky’s. Grice proposes that if you want to get a true answer to your question, you should give a true answer to you co-conversationalist’s question (“ceteris paribus”). Nash proposes maximizing the product of utility gains with respect to the disagreement point. Kalai and Smorodinsky propose maximsiing utility gains with respect to the disagreement point, subject to the constraint that the ratio of utility gains equals the ratio of greatest possible gains. These three methods of selecting an outcome have been axiomatically characterized. For each method, there are certain axioms of outcome selection such that that method alone satisfies the axioms. The axioms incorporate principles of rationality from cooperative game theory. They focus on features of outcomes rather than bargaining strategies. For example, one axiom requires that the outcome selected be Pareto-optimal, i.e., be an outcome such that no alternative is better for one of the bargainers and not worse for the other. A bargaining problem may become more complicated in several ways. First, there may be more than two bargainers (“Suppose Austin joins in.”). If unanimity is not required for beneficial agreements, splinter groups or co-alitions may form. Second, the protocol for offers, counte-roffers (“Where does C live?” “Why do you want to know?”) etc., may be relevant. Then principles of *non-cooperative* but competitive game theory concerning war strategies (“l’art de la guerre”) are needed to justify this or that solution. Third, the context of a bargaining problem may be relevant. For instance, opportunities for side payments, differences in bargaining power, and interpersonal comparisons of utility may influence the solution. Fourth, simplifying assumptions, such as the assumption that bargainers have complete information about their bargaining situation, may be discarded. Bargaining theory is part of the philosophical study of rationality. It is also important in ethics as a foundation for contractarian theories of morality and for certain theories of distributive justice. 

 

CONVERSAZIONE – AIUTO CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational helpfulness. It’s not clear if ‘helpfulness’ has a Graeco-Roman counterpart! The Grecians and the Romans could be VERY individualistic!adiuvare, (adiuare, old for adiūverare), iūtus, āre,” which Lewis and Short render as “to help, assist, aid, support, further, sustain. “fortīs fortuna adiuvat, T.: maerorem orationis meae lacrimis suis: suā sponte eos, N.: pennis adiutus amoris, O.: in his causis: alqm ad percipiendam virtutem: si quid te adiuero, poet ap. C.: ut alqd consequamur, adiuvisti: multum eorum opinionem adiuvabat, quod, etc., Cs.—With ellips. of obj, to be of assistance, help: ad verum probandum: non multum, Cs.: quam ad rem humilitas adiuvat, is convenient, Cs.—Supin. acc.: Nectanebin adiutum profectus, N.—P. pass.: adiutus a Demosthene, N.—Fig.: clamore militem, cheer, L.: adiuvat hoc quoque, this too is useful, H.: curā adiuvat illam (formam), sets off his beauty, O. Grice is right that ‘cooperation’ does NOT equate ‘helpfulness’ and he appropriately changes  his earlier principle of conversational helpfulness to a principle of conversational co-operation. Was there a Graeco-Roman equivalent for Anglo-Saxon ‘help’? helpmeet (n.) a ghost word from the 1611 translation of the Bible, where it originally was a two-word noun-adjective phrase translating Latin adjutorium simile sibi [Genesis ii.18] as "an help meet for him," and meaning literally "a helper like himself." See help (n.) + meet (adj.). By 1670s it was hyphenated help-meet and mistaken as a modified noun. Compare helpmate. The original Hebrew is 'ezer keneghdo. Related entries & more   aid (v.) "to assist, help," c. 1400, from Old French aidier "help, assist" (Modern French aider), from Latin adiutare, frequentative of adiuvare (past participle adiutus) "to give help to," from ad "to" (see ad-) + iuvare "to help, assist, give strength, support, sustain," which is from a PIE source perhaps related to the root of iuvenis "young person" (see young (adj.)). Related: Aided; aiding. Related entries & more   succor (n.) c. 1200, socour, earlier socours "aid, help," from Anglo-French succors "help, aid," Old French socors, sucurres "aid, help, assistance" (Modern French secours), from Medieval Latin succursus "help, assistance," from past participle of Latin succurrere "run to help, hasten to the aid of," from assimilated form of sub "up to" (see sub-) + currere "to run" (from PIE root *kers- "to run"). Final -s mistaken in English as a plural inflection and dropped late 13c. Meaning "one who aids or helps" is from c. 1300. There is a fashion in which to help is to cooperate, but co-operate, strictly, requires operation by A and operation by B. We do use cooperate loosely. “She is very cooperative.” “Help” seems less formal. One can help without ever engaging or honouring the other’s goal. I can help you buy a house, say. So the principle of conversational cooperation is stricter and narrower than the principle of conversational helpfulness. Cooperation involves reciprocity and mutuality in a way that helpfulness does not. That’s why Grice needs to emphasise that there is an expectation of MUTUAL helpfulness. One is expected to be helpful, and one expects the other to be helpful. Grice was doubtful about the implicaturum of ‘co-operative,’after all, who at Oxford wants a ‘co-operative.’ It sounds anti-Oxonian. So Grice elaborates on ‘helping others’ and ‘assuming others will help you’ in the event that we ‘are doing something together.’ Does this equate cooperation, he wonders. Just in case, he uses ‘helpfulness’ as a variant. There are other concepts he plays with, notably ‘altruism,’ and ‘benevolence,’ or other-love.’Helpfulness is Grice’s favourite virtue. Grice is clear that reciprocity is essential here. One exhibits helpfulness and expects helpfulness from his conversational partner. He dedicates a set of seven lectures to it, entitled as follows. Lecture 1, Prolegomena; Lecture 2: Logic and Conversation; Lecture 3: Further notes on logic and conversation; Lecture 4: Indicative conditionals; Lecture 5: Us meaning and intentions; Lecture 6: Us meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning; and Lecture 7: Some models for implicaturum. I hope they dont expect me to lecture on James! Grice admired James, but not vice versa. Grice entitled the set as being Logic and Conversation. That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, The Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is indicated below. In the first, Grice manages to quote from Witters. In the last, he didnt!  The original set consisted of seven lectures. To wit: Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation, Indicative Conditionals, Us meaning and intentions, Us meaning, sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicaturum. They were pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an implicaturum had been introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information, influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a conversation that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted along the lines set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In Prolegomena he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a disregard for the implicaturum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor, Senses are not to be muliplied beyond necessity. In Indicative conditionals he tackles Strawson on if as not representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell. The next two lectures on the meaning by the utterer and intentions, and meaning by the utterer, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning refine his earlier, more austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the lectures with an exploration on the relevance of the implicaturum to philosophical psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had become enamoured with the s. and would love to give it a continuous perusal. The set is indeed grandiose. It starts with a Prolegomena to set the scene: He notably quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of justifies the general title. In the second lecture, Logic and Conversation, he expands on the principle of conversational helpfulness and the explicitum/implicaturum distinctionall very rationalist! The third lecture is otiose in that he makes fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The fourth lecture, on Indicative conditionals, is indeed on MOST of the formal devices he had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather than the quantifiers and the iota operator, with which he deals in Presupposition and conversational implicaturum, since, as he notes, they refer to reference). This lecture is the centrepiece of the set. In the fifth lecture, he plays with mean, and discovers that it is attached to the implicaturum or the implicitum. In the sixth lecture, he becomes a nominalist, to use Bennetts phrase, as he deals with dog and shaggy in terms of this or that resultant procedure. Dont ask me what they are! Finally, in “Some models for implicaturum,” he attacks the charge of circularity, and refers to nineteenth-century explorations on the idea of thought without language alla Wundt. I dont think a set of James lectures had even been so comprehensive! Conversational helpfulness. This is Grice at his methodological best. He was aware that the type of philosophying he was about to criticise wass a bit dated, but whats wrong with being old-fashioned? While this may be seen as a development of his views on implicaturum at that seminal Oxford seminar, it may also be seen as Grice popularising the views for a New-World, non-Oxonian audience. A discussion of Oxonian philosophers of the play group of Grice, notably Austin, Hare, Hart, and Strawson. He adds himself for good measure (“Causal theory”). Philosophers, even at Oxford, have to be careful with the attention that is due to general principles of discourse. Grice quotes philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle, and some interpreters or practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin and Searle. He even manages to quote from Witterss Philosophical investigations, on seeing a banana as a banana. There are further items in the Grice collection that address Austins manoeuvre, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs and cans, : conditional, power.  Two of Grices favourites. He opposed Strawsons view on if. Grice thought that if was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we add an implicaturum to an entailment. The can is merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice! Ifs and cans, intention, disposition. Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of free will. Pears had noted that conversational implicaturum may account for the conditional perfection (if yields iff). Cf. Ayers on Austin on if and can. Recall that for Grice the most idiomatic way to express a disposition is with the Subjectsive mode, the if, and the can ‒ The ice can break. Cf. the mistake: It is not the case that what you must do, you can do. The can-may distinction is one Grice played with too. As with will and shall, the attachment of one mode to one of the lexemes is pretty arbitrary and not etymologically justified ‒ pace Fowler on it being a privilege of this or that Southern Englishman as Fowler is. If he calls it Prolegomena, he is being jocular. Philosophers Mistakes would have been too provocative. Benjamin, or rather Broad, erred, and so did Ryle, and Ludwig Witters, and my friends, Austin (the mater that wobbled), and in order of seniority, Hart (I heard him defend this about carefullystopping at every door in case a dog comes out at breakneck speed), Hare (To say good is to approve), and Strawson (“Logical theory”: To utter if p, q is to implicate some inferrability, To say true! is to endorseAnalysis). If he ends with Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes Searle from an essay in British philosophy in Lecture I, and from an essay in Philosophy in America in Lecture V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas oilmens club example! We may think of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a meta-linguistic botanizer: his hobby was to collect philosophers mistakes, and he catalogued them. In Causal theory he produces his first list of seven. The pillar box seems red to me. One cannot see a dagger as a dagger. Moore didnt know that the objects before him were his own hands. What is actual is not also possible. For someone to be called responsible, his action should be condemnable. A cause must be given only of something abnormal or unusual (cf. ætiology). If you know it, you dont believe it. In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated. Examples A (the use of an expression, by Austin, Benjamin, Grice, Hart, Ryle, Wittgenstein), Examples B (Strawson on and, or, and especially if), and Examples C (Strawson on true and Hare on goodthe performative theories). But even if his taxonomy is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving other examples as he goes on to discuss how to assess the philosophical mistake. Cf. his elaboration on trying, I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque, Trying to cash a cheque, you mean. Or cf. his remarks on remember, and There is an analogy here with a case by Wittgenstein. In summary, he wants to say. Its the philosopher who makes his big mistake. He has detected, as Grice has it, some conversational nuance. Now he wants to exploit it. But before rushing ahead to exploit the conversational nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected in his exercise of linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know with clarity what type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that the nuance depends on a general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general, and most likely rational) governing discoursethat participants in a conversation should be aware of, and not on some minutiæ that has been identified by the philosopher making the mistake, unsystematically, and merely descriptively, and taxonomically, but without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy. The fact that he directs this to his junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest are all Grices seniors! The point is of philosophical interest, rather than other. And he keeps citing philosophers, Tarski or Ramsey, in the third James leture, to elaborate the point about true in Prolegomena. He never seems interested in anything but an item being of philosophical interest, even if that means HIS and MINE! On top, he is being Oxonian: Only at Oxford my colleagues were so obsessed, as it has never been seen anywhere else, about the nuances of conversation. Only they were all making a big mistake in having no clue as to what the underlying theory of conversation as rational co-operation would simplify things for themand how! If I introduce the explicatum as a concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned! Is Grices intention epagogic, or diagogic in Prolegomena? Is he trying to educate Strawson, or just delighting in proving Strawson wrong? We think the former. The fact that he quotes himself shows that Grice is concerned with something he still sees, and for the rest of his life will see, as a valid philosophical problem. If philosophy generated no problems it would be dead. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Whence I took helpfulness,’; the main sources are the two sets on ‘logic and conversation.’ There are good paraphrases in other essays when he summarises his own views, as he did at Urbana. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

CONVERSAZIONE – IMPERATIVO CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational imperative: Grice is loose in the use of ‘imperative.’ It obviously has to do with the will in command mode! -- The problem with ‘command’ is that for Habermas, it springs from ‘power,’ and we need to have it sprung from ‘auctoritas,’ ratherthe voice of reason, that is“Impero” gives also pre-pare. “Imperare, prepare, etc. What was the Greek for ‘imperative mode’? προστακτική prostaktike. προσ-τακτικός , ή, όν, A.of or for commanding, imperative, imperious, τὸ π. [ἡ ψυχή], o τὸ ὑπηρετικόν (of the body), Arist.Top.128b19; “π. τινῶν” Corn.ND16; “λόγος” Plu.2.1037f; Προστακτικός (sc. λόγος), title of work by Protagoras, D.L.9.55; “βραχυλογία” Plu.Phoc.5; also of persons, “ἄρχων” Max.Tyr.13.2 (Sup.). II. Gramm., ἡ -κὴ ἔγκλισις the imperative mood, D.T.638.7, A.D.Synt.31.20; π. ἐκφορὰ τῶν ῥημάτων ib.69.20; “τὸ π. σχῆμα” Anon.Fig.24; also “τὸ -κόν” D.L. 7.66,67, Ps.-Plu.Vit.Hom.53. Adv. “-κῶς” in the imperative mood, D.H.4.18, Sch.Ar.Av.1163.Grice became famous for his ‘maxims,’ which in Nowell-Smith’s view they are more like rules of etiquette for sylish conversation. As such, many had been proposed. But Grice proposes them AS A PHILOSOPHER would, and ONLY TO REBUFF the mistake made by this or that philosopher who would rather EXPLAIN the phenomenon in terms OTHER than involving as PART OF THE DATA, i. e. as a datum (as he says) or assumption, that there are these ‘assumptions,’ which guide behaviour. Grice is having in mind Kant’s “Imperativ.” He also uses ‘conversational objective.” In most versions that Grice provides of the ‘general expectations’ of rational discourse, he chooses the obvious imperative form. On occasion he does use ‘imperative.’ Grice is vague as to the term of choice for this or that ‘expectation.’ According to Strawson, Grice even once used ‘conversational rule,’ and he does use ‘conversational rule of the conversational game of making this or that conversational move.’ Notably, he also uses ‘conversational principle,’ and ‘conversational desideratum.’ And ‘maxim’! And ‘conversational directive (371), and ‘conversational obligation’ (369). By ‘conversational maxim,’ he means ‘conversational maxim.’ He uses ‘conversational sub-maxim’ very occasionally. He rather uses ‘conversational super-maxim.’ He uses ‘immanuel,’ and he uses ‘conversational immanuel.’ It is worth noting that the choice of word influences the exegesis. Loar takes these things to be ‘empirical generalisations over functional states’! And Grice agrees that there is a dull, empiricist way, in which these things can be seen as things people conform to. There is a quasi-contractualist approach to: things people convene on. And there is an Ariskantian approach: things people SHOULD abide by. Surely Grice is not requiring that the conversationalists ARE explicitly or consciously AWARE of these things. There is a principle of effort of economical reason to cope with that!

 

CONVERSAZIONE -- ENTROPIA -- Conversational entropia -- Entropia -- conversational entropy. -- Principle of Conversational entropy, a measure of disorder or “information.” The number of states accessible to the various elements of a large system of particles such as a cabbage or the air in a room is represented as “W.” Accessible microstates might be, e. g., energy levels the various particles can reach. One can greatly simplify the statement of certain laws of nature by introducing a logarithmic measure of these accessible microstates. This measure, called “entropy” by H. P. Grice is defined by the formula: SEntropy % df. klnW, where “k” is Grice’’s constant. When the conversational entropy of a conversational system increases, the system becomes more random and disordered (“less dove-tailed,” in Grice’s parlance) in that a larger number of microstates become available for the system’s particles to enter. If a large system within which exchanges of energy occur is isolated, exchanging no energy with its environment, the entropy of the system tends to increase and never decreases. This result is part of the second law of thermodynamics. In real, evolving physical systems effectively isolated from their environments, entropy increases and thus aspects of the system’s organization that depend upon there being only a limited range of accessible microstates are altered. A cabbage totally isolated in a container e. g. would decay as complicated organic molecules eventually became unstructured in the course of ongoing exchanges of energy and attendant entropy increases. In Grice’s information theory, a state or event (or conversational move) is said to contain more information than a second state or event if the former state is less probable and thus in a sense more surprising (or “baffling,” in Grice’s term) than the latter. Other plausible constraints suggest a logarithmic measure of information content. Suppose X is a set of alternative possible states, xi , and pxi  is the probability of each xi 1 X. If state xi has occurred the information content of that occurrence is taken to be -log2pxi . This function increases as the probability of xi decreases. If it is unknown which xi will occur, it is reasonable to represent the expected information content of X as the sum of the information contents of the alternative states xi weighted in each case by the probability of the state, giving: This is called the Shannon’s or Grice’s entropy. Both Shannon’s and Grice’s entropy and physical entropy can be thought of as logarithmic measures of disarray. But this statement trades on a broad understanding of ‘disarray’. A close relationship between the two concepts of entropy should not be assumed, not even by Grice, less so by Shannon. 

 

CONVERSAZIONE – IMPIEGATO CONVERSAZIONALE – IN PLICATVM -- conversational implicaturum. Grice plays with the ambiguity of ‘implication’ as a logical term, and ‘implicitness’ as a rhetorical one. He wants to make a distinction between ‘dicere,’ to convey explicitly that p, and to convey implicitly, or ‘imply’ (always applied to the emissor) that q. A joke. Surely if he is going to use ‘implicaturum’ in Roman, this would be ‘implicaturum conversationale,’ if there were such thing. And there were! The Roman is formed from cum- plus ‘verso.’ So there’s Roman ‘conversatio.’ And –alis, ale is a productive suffix.  Or implicitum. Grice is being philosophical and sticking with ‘implicatio’ as used by logicians. Implicitum does not have much of a philosophical pedigree. But even ‘implicatio’ was not THAT used, ‘consequentia’ was preferred, as in ‘non sequitur, and seguitur, quod demonstrandumm erat. Strawson criticism of ‘the,’ only tentative by Grice, unlike ‘if,’ so forgivable! See common-ground status. Grice loved an implicaturum. The use of ‘conversational’ by Grice is NEVER emphatic. In his detailed, even fastidious, taxonomy of ‘implication,’ he decisively does not want to have a mere conventional implicaturum (as in “She was poor but she was honest”) as conversational. Not even a “Thank you”, generated by the maxim “be polite.” That would be an implicaturum which is nonconventional and yet NOT conversational, because ‘be polite’ is NOT a conversational maxim (moral, aesthetic, and social maxims are not). And an implicaturum. An elaboration of his Oxonian seminar on Logic and conversation. Theres a principle of conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational candour and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis for a conversational implicaturum, as his term of art goes. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of conversational helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an implicaturum is conversational in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicaturum is rationally calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or stance that the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part of the sense and never an entailment of this or that piece of philosophical vocabulary, in Davidson and Harman, the logic of Grammar, also in Cole and Morgan, repr. in a revised form in Grice, logic and conversation, the second James lecture, : principle of conversational helpfulness, implicaturum, cancellability. While the essay was also repr. by Cole and Morgan. Grice always cites it from the two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar, ed. by Davidson and Harman. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter Grice through this essay. A philosopher usually gets first acquainted with his In defence of a dogma, or Meaning. In Logic and Conversation, Grice re-utilises the notion of an implicaturum and the principle of conversational helpfulness that he introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. The idea Grice is that the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information, to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helfpulness. Grices point is methodological. He is not at all interested in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts in media res, and skips Grices careful list of Oxonian examples of disregard for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum (roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent, conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by a few philosophers leaving them confused. I do not know what Davidson and Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in The logic of grammar. I mean: it is obviously in media res. Grice starts with the logical devices, and never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought The logic of grammar must be left puzzled. He has to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion. Oxonian philosophers would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from unpublished material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and thats why he got all his Grice wrong! And so did Strawson in If and the horseshoe. Even Walker responding to Cohen is relying on memory. Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar. At Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking implicaturum in Mind, and Pears was talking conversational implicaturum in Ifs and cans. And Platts was dedicating a full chapter to “Causal Theory”. It seems the Oxonian etiquette was to quote from Causal Theory. It was obvious that Grices implication excursus had to read implicaturum! In a few dictionaries of philosophy, such as Hamlyns, under implication, a reference to Grices locus classicus Causal theory is madePassmore quotes from Causal theory in Hundred years of philosophy. Very few Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted The logic of grammar, though. At Oxford, Grices implicatura remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a few. And philosophers would not cite a cajoled essay in the references. The implicaturum allows a display of truth-functional Grice. For substitutional-quantificational Grice we have to wait for his treatment of the. In Prolegomena, Grice had quoted verbatim from Strawsons infamous idea that there is a sense of inferrability with if. While the lecture covers much more than if (He only said if; Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that! the title was never meant to be original. Grice in fact provides a rational justification for the three connectives (and, or, and if) and before that, the unary functor not. Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, not and If, Sinton on Grice on denials of indicative conditionals, not, if. Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whiteheads and Russells horseshoe, and if. Grice thought Strawsons observations could be understood in terms of entailment + implicaturum (Robbing Peter to Pay Paul). But problems, as first noted to Grice, by Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicaturum within the operation of, say, negation. Analogous problems arise with implicatura for the other earlier dyadic functors, and and or, and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon.  The qualification indicative is modal. Ordinary language allows for if utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. Counter-factual, if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, Subjectsive is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a cavalier to the problem: Surely it wont do to say You couldnt have done that, since you were in Seattle, to someone who figuratively tells you hes spend the full summer cleaning the Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the centerpiece of the lectures. Grice takes good care of not, and, or, and concludes with the if of the title. For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook Wilson in Statement and Inference. And they all connect with rationality. So he is using material from his Oxford seminars on the principle of conversational helpfulness. Plus Cook Wilson makes more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The last bit, citing Kripke and Dummett, is meant as jocular. What is important is the teleological approach to the operators, where a note should be made about dyadicity. In Prolegomena, when he introduces the topic, he omits not (about which he was almost obsessed!). He just gives an example for and (He went to bed and took off his dirty boots), one for or (the garden becomes Oxford and the kitchen becomes London, and the implicaturum is in terms, oddly, of ignorance: My wife is either in town or country,making fun of Town and Country), and if. His favourite illustration for if is Cock Robin: If the Sparrow did not kill him, the Lark did! This is because Grice is serious about the erotetic, i.e. question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to things, but he manages to bring Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just to impress! Most importantly, he introduces the square brackets! Hell use them again in Presupposition and Conversational Implicaturum and turns them into subscripts in Vacuous Namess. This is central. For he wants to impoverish the idea of the implicaturum. The explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is syntactic-cum-pragmatic import. The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable, and as he knows: what the eye no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for!  The modal implicaturum. Since Grice uses indicative, for the title of his third James lecture (Indicative Conditionals) surely he implicates subjunctive  ‒ i.e. that someone might be thinking that he should give an account of indicative-cum-subjective. This relates to an example Grice gives in Causal theory, that he does not reproduce in Prolegomena. Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows. What is actual is not also possible. Grice seems to be suggesting that a subjective conditional would involve one or other of the modalities, he is not interested in exploring. On the other hand, Mackie has noted that Grices conversationalist hypothesis (Mackie quotes verbatim from Grices principle of conversational helpfulness) allows for an explanation of the Subjectsive if that does not involve Kripke-type paradoxes involving possible worlds, or other. In Causal Theory, Grice notes that the issue with which he has been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would he thinks need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An examples which occurs to me is the following. What is actual is not also possible. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by Grices objector seems to Grice to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. He is not condemning that kind of manoeuvre. He is merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. If was also of special interest to Grice for many other reasons. He defends a dispositional account of intending that in terms of ifs and cans. He considers akrasia conditionally. He explored the hypothetical-categorical distinction in the buletic mode. He was concerned with therefore as involved with the associated if of entailment. Refs.: “Implicaturum” is introduced in Essay 2 in WoWbut there are scattered references elsewhere. He often uses the plural ‘implicatura’ too, as in “Retrospective Epilogue,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. An implicaturum requires a complexum. Frege was the topic of the explorations by Dummett. A tutee of Grices once brought Dummetts Frege to a tutorial and told Grice that he intended to explore this. Have you read it? No I havent, Grice answered. And after a pause, he went on: And I hope I will not. Hardly promising, the tutee thought. Some authors, including Grice, but alas, not Frege, have noted some similarities between Grices notion of a conventional implicaturum and Freges schematic and genial rambles on colouring. Aber Farbung, as Frege would state! Grice was more interested in the idea of a Fregeian sense, but he felt that if he had to play with Freges aber he should! One of Grices metaphysical construction-routines, the Humeian projection, is aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases the rational reconstruction of an intuitive concept displayed in ordinary discourse. We arrive at something like a Fregeian sense. Grice exclaimed, with an intonation of Eureka, almost. And then he went back to Frege. Grices German was good, so he could read Frege, in the vernacular. For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grices, not Freges): In einem obliquen Kontext, Frege says, Grice says, kann ja z. B. die Ersetzung eines „aber durch ein „und, die in einem direkten Kontext keinen Unterschied des Wahrheitswerts ergibt, einen solchen Unterschied bewirken. Ill make that easy for you, darlings: und is and, and aber is but. But surely, Papa, aber is not cognate with but! Its not. That is Anglo-Saxon, for you. But is strictly Anglo-Saxon short for by-out; we lost aber when we sailed the North Sea. Grice went on: Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn und Färbung (oder Konnotationen) eines Satzes fragwürdig. I. e. he is saying that She was poor but she was honest only conventionally implicates that there is a contrast between her poverty and her honesty. I guess he heard the ditty during the War? Grice ignored that remark, and went on: Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von Sinn und Färbung genauer zu unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante Bedeutungs Komponenten hin, bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu differenzieren, da er letztlich nur betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der Logik keine Rolle spielen. They play a role in the lingo, that is! What do? Stuff like but. But surely they are not rational conversational implicatura!? No, dear, just conventional tricks you can ignore on a nice summer day! Grice however was never interested in what he dismissively labels the conventional implicaturum. He identifies it because he felt he must! Surely, the way some Oxonian philosophers learn to use stuff like, on the one hand, and on the other, (or how Grice learned how to use men and de in Grecian), or so, or therefore, or but versus and, is just to allow that he would still use imply in such cases. But surely he wants conversational to stick with rationality: conversational maxim and converational implicaturum only apply to things which can be justified transcendentally, and not idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice follows Church in noting that Russell misreads Frege as being guilty of ignoring the use-mention distinction, when he doesnt. One thing that Grice minimises is that Freges assertion sign is composite. Tha is why Baker prefers to use the dot “.” as the doxastic correlative for the buletic sign ! which is NOT composite. The sign „├‟ is composite. Frege explains his Urteilstrich, the vertical component of his sign ├ as conveying assertoric force. The principal role of the horizontal component as such is to prevent the appearance of assertoric force belonging to a token of what does not express a thought (e.g. the expression 22). ─p expresses a thought even if p does not.) cf. Hares four sub-atomic particles: phrastic (dictum), neustic (dictor), tropic, and clistic. Cf. Grice on the radix controversy: We do not want the “.” in p to become a vanishing sign. Grices Frege, Frege, Words, and Sentences, Frege, Farbung, aber. Frege was one of Grices obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum, a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicatura, that can only mean progress for philosophy! Fregeian senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The employment of the routine of Humeian projection may be expected to deliver for us, as its result, a conceptthe concept(ion) of value, say, in something like a Fregeian sense, rather than an object. There is also a strong affinity between Freges treatment of colouring (of the German particle aber, say) and Grices idea of a convetional implicaturum (She was poor, but she was honest,/and her parents were the same,/till she met a city feller,/and she lost her honest Names, as the vulgar Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem interested in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicatura, and there is a reason for this. Conventional implicatura are not essentially connected, as conversational implicatura are, with rationality. Conventional implicatura cannot be calculable. They have less of a philosophical interest, too, in that they are not cancellable. Grice sees cancellability as a way to prove some (contemporary to him, if dated) ordinary-language philosophers who analyse an expression in terms of sense and entailment, where a cancellable conversational implicaturum is all there is (to it).  He mentions Benjamin in Prolegomena, and is very careful in noting how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian sense. In his Causal theory, Grice lists another mistake: What is known to be the case is not believed to be the case. Grice gives pretty few example of a conventional implicaturum: therefore, as in the utterance by Jill: Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. This is interesting because therefore compares to so which Strawson, in PGRICE, claims is the asserted counterpart to if. But Strawson is never associated with the type of linguistic botany that Grice is. Grice also mentions the idiom, on the one hand/on the other hand, in some detail in “Epilogue”: My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my sister, on the other hand, lives on a peak at Darien. Grice thinks that Frege misuses the use-mention distinction but Russell corrects that. Grice bases this on Church. And of course he is obsessed with the assertion sign by Frege, which Grice thinks has one stroke tooo many. The main reference is give above for ‘complexum.’ Those without a philosophical background tend to ignore a joke by Grice. His echoing Kant in the James is a joke, in the sense that he is using Katns well-known to be pretty artificial quartet of ontological caegories to apply to a totally different phenomenon: the taxonomy of the maxims! In his earlier non-jocular attempts, he applied more philosophical concepts with a more serious rationale. His key concept, conversation as rational co-operation, underlies all his attempts. A pretty worked-out model is in terms then of this central, or overarching principle of conversational helpfulness (where conversation as cooperation need not be qualified as conversation as rational co-operation) and being structured by two contrasting sub-principles: the principle of conversational benevolence (which almost overlaps with the principle of conversational helpfulness) and the slightly more jocular principle of conversational self-love. There is something oxymoronic about self-love being conversational, and this is what leads to replace the two subprinciples by a principle of conversational helfpulness (as used in WoW:IV) simpliciter. His desideratum of conversational candour is key. The clash between the desideratum of conversational candour and the desideratum of conversational clarity (call them supermaxims) explains why I believe that p (less clear than p) shows the primacy of candour over clarity. The idea remains of an overarching principle and a set of more specific guidelines. Non-Oxonian philosophers would see Grices appeal to this or that guideline as ad hoc, but not his tutees! Grice finds inspiration in Joseph Butler’s sermon on benevolence and self-love, in his sermon 9, upon the love of our neighbour, preached on advent Sunday. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, Namesly, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, Romans xiii. 9. It is commonly observed, that there is a disposition in men to complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they live, as greater than that of former ones: which is usually followed with this further observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all times. Now, to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts of history: thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages than in others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the distinction of the present, to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all other principles; "or whether the contracted affection may not possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own end, private good?" Repr. in revised form as WOW, I. Grice felt the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, Never contradict. Never explain) of the nuances about seem and cause (“Causal theory”.). Grice uses ‘My wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom,’ by Smith, as relying on a requirement of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice. Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. Variations on a theme by Grice. I wish to represent a certain subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants, as in a casual conversation. But at each stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to observe, viz.: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the co-operative principle. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to observe, viz.:  Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative Principle. Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants are. Less literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why logic and conversation? Logica had been part of the trivium for ages ‒ Although they called it dialectica, then. Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by Strawsons treatment of the formal devices in “Introduction to logical theory” (henceforth, “Logical theory”), Grice targets these, in their ordinary-discourse counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his logic tutorStrawson was following a PPE., and his approach to logic is practical. His philosophy tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit. Hum. the situation is different. Grice knows that the Categoriae and De Int. of his beloved Aristotle are part of the Logical Organon which had been so influential in the history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile Strawsons observations with the idea that the formal devices reproduce some sort of explicatum, or explicitum, as identified by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica. In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The alleged divergence between the ordinary-language operators and their formal counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicatura, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged ordinary-language counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation  ‒ the exchange of information and the institution of decisions  ‒ and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of conversational helpfulness. The observation of a principle of  conversational helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness. In titling his seminar Logic and conversation, Grice is thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal “Logical theory,” that every Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he acknwoledges Grices difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the strength or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses an adjective that Grice will seldom do, pragmatic. On top, Strawson attributes the adjective to rule. For Grice, in Strawsons wording, there is this or that pragmatic rule to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a weaker conversational move. Strawsons Introduction was published before Grice aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it is Grices occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as generating implicatura under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes it obvious that Grices interest is methodological, and not philological. He is not interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicaturum, which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his expression does, a distinction apparently denied by Witters and all too frequently ignored by Austin. Logic and conversation, an Oxford seminar, implicaturum, principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational implicaturum, conversational implicaturum. Conversational Implicaturum Grices main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his expression does. A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin. Grice is implicating that Austins sympathies were for the Subjectsification of Linguistic Nature. Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicaturum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering It is raining.Grice notes that since the object of the present exercise, is to provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of cases, why is it that a particular implicaturum is present, I would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this model should be: can it be used to construct an explanation of the presence of such an implicaturum, and is it more comprehensive and more economical than any rival? is the no doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give of such an implicaturum consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise: whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics, Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery questions in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever physician, who, when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for poison even from a serpent.qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti machinamentis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio compellit et de serpente conficivnt. If he lectured on Logic and Conversation on implicaturum, Grice must have thought that Strawsons area was central. Yet, as he had done in Causal theory and as he will at Harvard, Grice kept collecting philosophers mistakes. So its best to see Grice as a methodologist, and as using logic and conversation as an illustration of his favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a balance: surely logic and conversation is a topic of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all philosophersunless they are Griceiansto keep a broad unitarian view of philosophy as  a virtuous whole. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. Destructive implicaturum to it: Mr. Puddle is our man in æsthetics implicates that he is not good at it. What is important to Grice is that the mistakes of these philosophers (notably Strawson!) arise from some linguistic phenomena, or, since we must use singular expressions this or that linguistic phenomenon. Or as Grice puts it, it is this or that linguistic phenomenon which provides the material for the philosopher to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory of conversation as rational co-operation is positedtechnically, as a way to explain (never merely describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf. never explain, never apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: Never contradict. Never explain.) these phenomenahis principle of conversational helpfulness and the idea of a conversational implicaturum. The latter is based not so much on rationality per se, but on the implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly plays with, since his earlier semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But back to this or that linguistic phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle for providing this or that linguistic phenomenon that no philosopher would ever feel excited about, Grice himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a philosophical point with this or that linguistic phenomenon that would not be necessarily connected with philosophy. Grice rarely quotes authors, but surely the section in “Causal theory,” where he lists seven philosophical theses (which are ripe for an implicaturum treatment) would be familiar enough for anybody to be able to drop a names to attach to each. At Harvard, almost every example Grice gives of this or that linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and sometimes he expands on his own view of them, just to amuse his audienceand show how committed to this or that thesis he was), but some are not unauthored. And they all belong to the linguistic turn: In his three groups of examples, Grice quotes from Ryle (who thinks he knows about ordinary language), Witters, Austin (he quotes him in great detail, from Pretending, Plea of excuses, and No modification without aberration,), Strawson (in “Logical theory” and on Truth for Analysis), Hart (as I have heard him expand on this), Grice, Searle, and Benjamin. Grice implicates Hare on ‘good,’ etc. When we mention the explicit/implicit distinction as source for the implicaturum, we are referring to Grices own wording in Retrospective epilogue where he mentions an utterer as conveying in some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a gentler, more (midland or southern) English, way, via implicaturum, or implIciture, if you mustnt. Cf. Fowler: As a southern Englishman, Ive stopped trying teaching a northern Englishman the distinction between ought and shall. He seems to get it always wrong. It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His point would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of conversational helpfulness is in order allows P-1 not just to convey in a direct explicit fashion that p, but in an implicit fashion that q, where q is the implicaturum. The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of this or that implicatura, to use Grices word (generate). Surely, He took off his boots and went to bed; I wont say in which order sounds hardly in the vein of conversational helpfulnessbut provided Grice does not see it as logically incoherent, it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The point may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying, Viva Boole. Grices point about rationality is mentioned in his later Prolegomena, on at least two occasions. Rational behaviour is the phrase he uses (as applied first to communication and then to discourse) and in stark opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin. Grice is here less interested here as he will be on rationality, but coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a mutual one between decent chaps, as he puts it. His charming decent chap is so Oxonian. His tutee would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more! A rather obscure exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice is aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible vicious circle in trying to define category of expression in terms of a category of representation. He does not provide a solution to the problem which hell take up in his Method in philosophical psychology, in his role of President of the APA. It is the implicaturum behind the lecture that matters, since Grice will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, its all rational enough. Theres a P, in a situation, say of dangera bull ‒. He perceives the bull. The bulls attack causes this perception. Bull! the P₁ G1 screams, and causes in P₂ G2 a rearguard movement. So where is the circularity? Some pedants would have it that Bull cannot be understood in a belief about a bull which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he brought back implicaturum, which had become obliterated in the lectures, back to title position! But it is also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly rationalist models for implicaturum. He had played with a model, and an explanatory one at that, for implicaturum, in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness, a desideratum of conversational clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour, and two sub-principles: a principle of conversational benevolence, and a principle of conversational self-interest! Surely Harvard could be spared of the details! Implicaturum. Grice disliked a presupposition. BANC also contains a folder for Odd ends: Urbana and non-Urbana. Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it System Q in honour of Quine. At a later stage, Myro will re-Names it System G, in a special version, System GHP, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G, in gratitude to Grice. Odd Ends: Urbana and Not Urbana, Odds and ends: Urbana and not Urbana, or not-Urbana, or Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents, urbane and not urbane, semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures are on language and reality. Grice keeps revising them, as these items show. Language and reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The Urbana Lectures, Language and reference, language and reality, The Urbana lectures, University of Illinois at Urbana, language, reference, reality. Grice favours a transcendental approach to communication. A beliefs by a communicator worth communicating has to be true. An order by a communicator worth communicating has to be satisfactory. The fourth lecture is the one Grice dates in WOW . Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, presupposition and conversational implicaturum, in Radical pragmatics, ed. by R. Cole, repr. in a revised form in Grice, WOW, II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, essay, presupposition and implicaturum, presupposition, conversational implicaturum, implicaturum, Strawson. Grice: The loyalty examiner will not summon you, do not worry. The cancellation by Grice could be pretty subtle. Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate. Grice goes back to the issue of negation and not. If, Grice notes, is is a matter of dispute whether the government has a very undercover person who interrogates those whose loyalty is suspect and who, if he existed, could be legitimately referred to as the loyalty examiner; and if, further, I am known to be very sceptical about the existence of such a person, I could perfectly well say to a plainly loyal person, Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate, without, Grice  would think, being taken to imply that such a person exists. Further, if the utterer U is well known to disbelieve in the existence of such a person, though others are inclined to believe in him, when U finds a man who is apprised of Us position, but who is worried in case he is summoned, U may try to reassure him by uttering, The loyalty examiner will not summon you, do not worry. Then it would be clear that U uttered this because U is sure there is no such person. The lecture was variously reprinted, but the Urbana should remain the preferred citation. There are divergences in the various drafts, though. The original source of this exploration was a seminar. Grice is interested in re-conceptualising Strawsons manoeuvre regarding presupposition as involving what Grice disregards as a metaphysical concoction: the truth-value gap. In Grices view, based on a principle of conversational tailoring that falls under his principle of conversational helpfulness  ‒ indeed under the desideratum of conversational clarity (be perspicuous [sic]). The king of France is bald entails there is a king of France; while The king of France aint bald merely implicates it. Grice much preferred Collingwoods to Strawsons presuppositions! Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicaturum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawsons idea of the præ-suppositum.  Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quines idea of a truth-value gap. Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the præ-suppositum is needed. The king of France is bald entails that there is a king of France. It is part of what U is logically committed to by what he explicitly conveys. By uttering, The king of France is not bald on the other hand, U merely implicitly conveys or implicates that there is a king of France. A perfectly adequate, or impeccable, as Grice prefers, cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness is in the offing. The king of France ain’t bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain’t real! Grice credits Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with the definite descriptor or definite article or the iota quantifier the formally. One thing Russell discovered is that the variable denoting function is to be deduced from the variable propositional function, and is not to be taken as an indefinable. Russell tries to do without the iota i as an indefinable, but fails. The success by Russell later, in On denoting, is the source of all his subsequent progress. The iota quantifier consists of an inverted iota to be read the individuum x, as in (℩x).F(x). Grice opts for the Whiteheadian-Russellian standard rendition, in terms of the iota operator. Grices take on Strawson is a strong one. The king of France is bald; entails there is a king of France, and what the utterer explicitly conveys is doxastically unsatisfactory. The king of France aint bald does not. By uttering The king of France aint bald U only implicates that there is a king of France, and what he explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Grice knew he was not exactly robbing Peter to pay Paul, or did he? It is worth placing the lecture in context. Soon after delivering in the New World his exploration on the implicaturum, Grice has no better idea than to promote Strawsons philosophy in the New World. Strawson will later reflect on the colder shores of the Old World, so we know what Grice had in mind! Strawsons main claim to fame in the New World (and at least Oxford in the Old World) was his On referring, where he had had the cheek to say that by uttering, The king of France is not bald, the utterer implies that there is a king of France (if not that, as Grice has it, that what U explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Strawson later changed that to the utterer presupposes that there is a king of France. So Grice knows what and who he was dealing with. Grice and Strawson had entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson was particularly keen on that turn of phrase he learned from Quine, the truth-value gap. Grice, rather, found it pretty repulsive: Tertium exclusum! So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering The king of France is bald, one entailment of what U explicitly conveys is indeed There is a king of France. However, in its negative co-relate, things change. By uttering The king of France aint bald, the utterer merely implicitly conveys or implicates (in a pretty cancellable format) that there is a king of France. The king of France aint bald: theres no king of France! The loyalty examiner is like the King of France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grices re-introduction of the square-bracket device: [The king of France] is bald; [The king of France] aint bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square brackets is to be read as having attained common-ground status and therefore, out of the question, to use Collingwoods jargon! Grice was very familiar with Collingwood on presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwoods reflections on presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie behind Grices metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest exploration by Grice on this is his infamous, Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, discussed by Ewing in Meaninglessness for Mind. Grice goes back to the example in the excursus on implying that in Causal Theory, and it is best to revisit this source. Note that in the reprint in WOW Grice does NOT go, one example of presupposition, which eventually is a type of conversational implicaturum. Grices antipathy to Strawsons presupposition is metaphysical: he dislikes the idea of a satisfactory-value-gap, as he notes in the second paragraph to Logic and conversation. And his antipathy crossed the buletic-doxastic divide! Using φ to represent a sentence in either mode, he stipulate that ~φ is satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A crunch, as he puts it, becomes obvious:  ~ ⊢The king of France is bald may perhaps be treated as equivalent to ⊢~(The king of France is bald). But what about ~!Arrest the intruder? What do we say in cases like, perhaps, Let it be that I now put my hand on my head or Let it be that my bicycle faces north, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that neither !p nor !~p is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory? If !p is neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesnt to me), does the philosopher assign a third buletically satisfactory value (0.5) to !p (buletically neuter, or indifferent). Or does the philosopher say that we have a buletically satisfactory value gap, as Strawson, following Quine, might prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see that the problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem connected with Strawsons doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present themselves. The main reference is Essay 2 in WoW, but there are scattered references elsewhere. Refs.: The main sources are the two sets of ‘logic and conversation,’ in BANC, but there are scattered essays on ‘implicaturum’ simpliciter, too --  “Presupposition and conversational implicaturum,” c. 2-f. 25; and “Convesational implicaturum,” c. 4-f. 9, “Happiness, discipline, and implicaturums,” c. 7-f. 6; “Presupposition and implicaturum,” c. 9-f. 3, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

 

CONVERSAZIONE -- MANUALE CONVERSAZIONALE – L’IMMANUEL CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational manual: -- Grice was fascinated by the etymology of ‘etiquette’from Frankish *stikkan, cognate with Old English stician "to pierce," from Proto-Germanic *stikken "to be stuck," stative form from PIE *steig- "to stick; pointed" (It. etichetta) -- of conversational rational etiquette -- conversational iimmanuel, cnversational manual. Before playing with ‘immanuel,’ Grice does use ‘manual’ more technically. A know-how. “Surely, I can have a manual, but don’t know how to play bridge.” “That’s not how I’m using ‘manual.’” It should be pointed out that it’s the visual thing that influenced. When people (especially non-philosophers) saw the list of maxims, they thought: “Washington!” “A manual!”. In the Oxford seminrs, Grice was never so ‘additive.’ His desideratum of conversational clarity, his desideratum of conversational candour, his principle of conversational self-love and his principle of conversational benevolence, plus his principle of conversational helpfulness, were meant as ‘philosophical’ leads to explain this or that philosophical mistake. The seminars were given for philosophy tutees. And Grice is playing on the ‘manuals of etiquette’conversational etiquette. If you do not BELONG to this targeted audience, it is likely that you’ll misconstrue Grice’s point, and you will! Especially R. T. L.!The Gentlemen's Book of Etiquette and Manual of Politeness Being a Complete Guide for a Gentleman's Conduct in All His Relations Towards Society by Cecil B. Hartley. Wit and vivacity are two highly important ingredients in the conversation of a man in polite society, yet a straining for effect, or forced wit, is in excessively bad taste. There is no one more insupportable in society than the everlasting talkers who scatter puns, witticisms, and jokes with so profuse a hand that they become as tiresome as a comic newspaper, and whose loud laugh at their own wit drowns other voices which might speak matter more interesting. The really witty man does not shower forth his wit so indiscriminately; his charm consists in wielding his powerful weapon delicately and easily, and making each highly polished witticism come in the right place and moment to be effectual. While real wit is a most delightful gift, and its use a most charming accomplishment, it is, like many other bright weapons, dangerous to use too often. You may wound where you meant only to amuse, and remarks which you mean only in for general applications, may be construed into personal affronts, so, if you have the gift, use it wisely, and not too freely. The most important requisite for a good conversational power is education, and, by this is meant, not merely the matter you may store in your memory from observation or books, though this is of vast importance, but it also includes the developing of the mental powers, and, above all, the comprehension. An English writer says, “A man should be able, in order to enter into conversation, to catch rapidly the meaning of anything that is advanced; for instance, though you know nothing of science, you should not be obliged to stare and be silent, when a man who does understand it is explaining a new discovery or a new theory; though you have not read a word of Blackstone, your comprehensive powers should be sufficiently acute to enable you to take in the statement that may be made of a recent cause; though you may not have read some particular book, you should be capable of appreciating the criticism which you hear of it. Without such power—simple enough, and easily attained by attention and practice, yet too seldom met with in general society—a conversation which departs from the most ordinary topics cannot be maintained without the risk of lapsing into a lecture; with such power, society becomes instructive as well as amusing, and you have no remorse at an evening’s end at having wasted three or four hours in profitless banter, or simpering platitudes. This facility of comprehension often startles us in some women, whose education we know to have been poor, and whose reading is limited. If they did not rapidly receive your ideas, they could not, therefore, be fit companions for intellectual men, and it is, perhaps, their consciousness of a deficiency which leads them to pay the more attention to what you say. It is this which makes married women so much more agreeable to men of thought than young ladies, as a rule, can be, for they are accustomed to the society of a husband, and the effort to be a companion to his mind has engrafted the habit of attention and ready reply.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Paget’s conversational manual.”

 

CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational maxim. The idea of a maxim implies freewill and freedom in general. A beautiful thing about Grice’s conversational maxims is that surely they do not ‘need to be necessarily’ independent, as Strawson and Wiggins emphatically put it (p.520). The important thing is other. A conversational maxim is UNIVERSALISABLE (v. universalierung) into a ‘manual,’ the “Immanuel,” strictly, the “Conversational Immanuel.” Grice is making fun of those ‘conversational manuals’ for the learning of some European language in the Grand Tour (as in “Learn Swiss in five easy lessons”). Grice is echoing Kant. Maximen (subjektive Grundsätze): selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen ausdrücken, vs. Imperative (objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft bestimmt; Ratschläge, moralisch relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das objektive Prinzip, gültig für jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach dem es handeln soll, d. i. ein Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die Subjektivität der Maxime. When considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational maxim,’ one has to be careful. First, he hesitated as to the choice of the label. He used ‘objective’ and ‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this, in WoW:PandCI he adds oneleading the number of maxims to ten, what he called the ‘conversational catalogue.’ So when exploring the maxims, it is not necessary to see their dependence on the four functions that Kant tabulated: quantitas, qualitas, relatio, and modus, or quantity, quality, relation, and mode (Grice follows Meiklejohn’s translation), but in terms of their own formulation, one by one. Grice formulates the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”He then goes on to introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’“On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall certain more specific MAXIMS maxims and submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle.” Note that in his comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in terms of the force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicaturum, he could have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.” He is comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’He is having in mind something like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the introductory passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is very interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he is calling the submaxim.Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim. Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”Grice: “Echoing Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!“The category of QUANTITY”i. e. either the conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category of conversational quantity“relates to the quantity of information to be provided,”So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have itjust QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the quantity of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re: the pillar box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used ‘strength,’ even ‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailmentand here, neither the phenomenalist nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.“and under it fall the following maxims:”That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational maxim.’ He will provide supermaxim for the other three conversational categories.Why is the category of conversational quantity lacking a supermaxim?The reason is that it would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be appropriately informative.’ By having TWO maxims, he is playing with a weighing in, or balance between one maxim and the other. Cf.To say the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth.No more no less.One maximm states the ‘at most,’ the other maxim states the ‘at least.’One maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the other maxim states the ‘min.’ Together they state the ‘maximin.’First, “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).”It’s the contribution which is informative, not the utterer. Cf. “Be as informative as is required.” Grice implicates that if you make your contribution as informative as is required YOU are being as informative as is required. But there is a category-shift here. Grice means, ‘required BY the goal of the exchange). e.g.How are youFine thanksthe ‘and you’ depends on whether you are willing to ‘keep the conversation going’ or your general mood. Second, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.”“ (The second maxim is disputable;”He goes on to give a different reason. But the primary reason is that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” is ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)”vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative inferences” IN a diagram:Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)Therefore, do not make your contribution more informative than is required (by the current purposes of the exchange).Grice gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the maxim is ‘disputable.’“it might be said that to be overinformative is not a transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time.”For both conversationalists, who are thereby abiding by Ferraro’s law of the least conversational effort.”“A waste of time” relates to Grice’s previous elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and ‘unnecessary trouble.’He is proposing a conversational maximin.When he formulates his principle of economy of rational effort, it is a waste of ‘time and energy.’Here it is just ‘time.’ “Energy” is a more generic concept.“However, it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side issues;”Methinks the lady doth protest too much.His example, “He was in a blacked out city.”It does not seem to relate to the pillar boxA: What color is the pillar boxB: It seems red.Such a ‘confusion’ and ‘side issue,’ if so designed, is part of the implicaturum.“and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information.”Cf. Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”More boringly, it is part of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of information.”This may be counterproductive, or not.“Meet Mr. Puddle”“Meet Mr. Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”The introducer point: to keep the conversation going.Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless at nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED). One has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice cares for. Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!”Malcolm implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’If knowledge is justified true belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE CONDITIONS for it. Cf.I didn’t know you were pregnant.You still do not. (Here the cancellation is to the third clause). Grice: “However this may be, there is perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which concems relevance.)”He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:“there is another reason to doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”No “later” about it!Grice:“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim”he forgets to add, as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf. Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS the case. Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he means “more specific supermaxims and maxims”He is following Porophyry in being confusing! Cf. supramaxim. Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one that is true' –“This surely requires generalityand Grice spent the next two decades about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’ “Try to make your contribution one that is acceptable”“True for your statements; good for your desiderative-mode utterances.”“and two more specific maxims:”“1. Do not say what you believe to be false.”There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!” “Say the true!” “MAKEdon’t just TRYto make your contribution one that is true.”“I was only trying.”Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill” “Thou shalt trye not to kylle.”Grice:“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”This is involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?The qualification, “adequate,” turns the maxim slightly otiose. Do not say that for you lack evidence which would make your contribution not a true one.However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.If we are talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on ‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential justification.’“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz., 'Be relevant.'”The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman ‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or ‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place predicate. What about X = xIs identity a relation, in the case of x = x?Can a thing relate to itself?In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim states that one brings y back to x.“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”“The weather has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”If INTENDED to mean, “You ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.To utter an utterly irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.“Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in a later work.”He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette becomes logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the north, to settle in the very fashionable Kent. Grice is also having in mind Urmson’s appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your painting “Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!”and Grice is also having in mind P. F. Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance vis-à-vis the principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.So it was in the Oxonian air.“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE EXPLICITUM, THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said is to be said,”Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p reduces to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares with ‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what is seen.’He is having the form-content distinction.If that is a distinction. This multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or posited.    The Role of the Form/Content Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com › /01 › formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results    The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Researchkarger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction is a potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain characteristics of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG Levine‎1979‎Cited by 25‎Related articles    The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research ...karger.com › Article › Abstract Dec 23, 2009The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research. Levine C.G.. Author affiliations. University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. by CG Levine‎1979‎Cited by 25‎Related articles    Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in ...ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pubmed Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in communicative tasks. Hedelin L(1), Hjelmquist E. Author information: (1)Department of Psychology, ... by L Hedelin‎1998‎Cited by 10‎Related articles    Form and Content: An Introduction to Formal LogicDigital ...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi › viewcontentPDF terminology has to do with anything. In this context, 'material' means having to do with content. This is our old friend, the form/content distinction again. Consider. by DD Turner‎    Simmel's Dialectic of Form and Content in Recent Work in ...tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1, This suggests that for Simmel, the form/content distinction was not a dualism; instead, it was a duality.11 Ronald L. Breiger, “The Duality of ...    Are these distinctions between “form” and “content” intentionally ...reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments › are_th... The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction between form and matter (say, in Aristotle), although Hegel develops the distinction between form ...    Preschool Children's Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com › article Preschoolers' mastery of the form/content distinction in language and communication, along its contingency on the characteristics of p. by L Hedelin‎1998‎Cited by 10‎Related articles    Verbal Art: A Philosophy of Literature and Literary Experiencebooks.google.com › books Even if form and content were in fact inseparable in the sense indicated, that would not make the form/content distinction unjustified. Form and matter are clearly ... Anders Pettersson2001‎Literary Criticism    One Century of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathologybooks.google.com › books He then outlines the most important implications of the form–content distinction in a statement which is identical in the first three editions, with only minor ... Giovanni Stanghellini, ‎Thomas Fuchs‎Medical“I include the supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –” Or supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and submaxims” becomes the clumsier “supermaxims and maxims”Note that in under the first category it is about making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer himself who has to be ‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be relevant. It’s not the weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or “Make your contribution a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”Knowing that most confound ‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but forgot to pronounce it, in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’ under the prolixity maxim.“and various maxims such as: The “such as” is a colloquialism.Surely it was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it becomes viz. The fact that the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicaturable. “1. Avoid obscurity of expression.”Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead, /They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd how often you and I/Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. In a way this is entailed by “Be perspicuous,” if that means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.Be clearTherefore, or what is the same thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.2. Avoid ambiguity.”Except as a trope, or ‘figure, (schema, figura). “Aequi-vocate, if that will please your clever addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma: “My apartment was so small, that I've barely enough room to lay a hat and a few friends“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”Here he added a ‘sic’ that he failed to pronounce in case it may felt as insulting. But the idea of a self-refuting conversational maxim is surely Griceian, in a quessertive way. Since this concerns FORM rather than CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with ‘informativeness.’So given that p and q are equally informative, if q is less brief (longerars longa, vita brevis), utter p. This has nothing to do with logical strength. It is just to be assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.Vide “Syntactics in Semiotics”“4. Be orderly.”This involves two moves in the contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’ if one just utters ‘p.’ So this involves a molecular proposition. The ‘order’ can be of various types. Indeed, one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between Smith and Williams”order of merit or size?‘Between’ is not ambiguous!There is LOGICAL order, which is prior.But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’ ‘keep your room tidy.’orderly (adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning "observant of rule or discipline, not unruly" is from 1590s. Related: Orderliness.He does not in the lecture give a philosophical example, but later will in revisiting the Urmson example and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson, “He went to bed and took off his boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and took arsenic.”“And one might need others.”Regarding ‘mode,’ that is. “It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others;”Not as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say these are not MORAL.“a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false.”Except in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were obsessed with commenting on prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the prisoner?” “He left [while he is hiding in the attic].”That’s why Grice has the ‘in general.’“Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;”But since ‘should’ is weak, I will. “other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.”So the keyword is co-ordination.“While this may be correct, so far as the generation of implicaturums is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a member of the list of maxims.”He is having weighing, and clashing in mind. And he wants a conversationalist to honour truth over informativeness, which begs the question that as he puts it, ‘false’ “information” is no information.In the earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a university lecturer, he was sure that his tutee will know that he was introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO MORALISE, but as GENERATORS of implicaturain philosophers’s mistakes.But this manoeuver is only NOW disclosed. Those without a philosophical background may not realise about this. “There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicaturums.”He is obviously aware that Émile DurkheimWill  Know that ‘conversational’ is subsumed under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps). keyword: ‘norm.’ Grice excludes ‘moral’ because while a moral maxim makes a man ‘good,’ a conversational maxim makes a man a ‘good’ conversationalist. Not because there is a distinction in principle!“The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicaturums connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with”He had this way with idioms.Cf. Einstein,“E =, I hope, mc2.”“the particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange)”He is playing Dutch.The English lost the Anglo-Saxon for ‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has ‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch have ‘taal.’So he is distinguishing between the TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.“is adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to serve.”The ‘adapted’ is mechanistic talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’ elsewhere. He means ‘the particular goal language evolved to serve, viz.’ groom.Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, in which the author argues that language evolved from social grooming. He further suggests that a stage of this evolution was the telling of gossip, an argument supported by the observation that language is adapted for storytelling.  The book has been criticised on the grounds that since words are so cheap, Dunbar's "vocal grooming" would fall short in amounting to an honest signal. Further, the book provides no compelling story[citation needed] for how meaningless vocal grooming sounds might become syntactical speech.  Thesis Dunbar argues that gossip does for group-living humans what manual grooming does for other primates—it allows individuals to service their relationships and thus maintain their alliances on the basis of the principle: if you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours. Dunbar argues that as humans began living in increasingly larger social groups, the task of manually grooming all one's friends and acquaintances became so time-consuming as to be unaffordable. In response to this problem, Dunbar argues that humans invented 'a cheap and ultra-efficient form of grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now needs only to 'groom' them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple allies simultaneously while keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal grooming then evolved gradually into vocal language—initially in the form of 'gossip'. Dunbar's hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that the structure of language shows adaptations to the function of narration in general.  Criticism Critics of Dunbar's theory point out that the very efficiency of "vocal grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would have undermined its capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed by time-consuming and costly manual grooming. A further criticism is that the theory does nothing to explain the crucial transition from vocal grooming—the production of pleasing but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive complexities of syntactical speech.[citation needed]  References  Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. London: Faber and Faber.  9780571173969.  34546743.  von Heiseler, Till Nikolaus () Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast evolution. In: R. L. C. Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World Scientific,  114-121. academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION  Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds), Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  111 29. Categories: 1996 non-fiction booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin DunbarEnglish-language booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press booksPopular science booksGrice: “I have stated my maxims”the maxims“as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information;”“MAXIMALLY EFFECTIVE”“this specification is, of course, too narrow,”But who cares?This is slightly sad in that he is thinking Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own controversy with G. A. Paul on the sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’ and ‘the pillar box is red,’ involving an intensional context, are less amenable to fall under the maxims.“and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others.”He has a more obvious way below:Giving and receving informationInfluencing and being influenced by others.He never sees the purpose as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but maximally effective EXCHANGE of informationdoes he mean merely ‘transmission.’ It may well be.If I say, “I rain,” I have ex-changed information.I don’t need anything in return.If so, it makes sense that he is equating INFORMING With  INFLUENCING or better DIRECTION your addresse’s talk.Note that, for all he loved introspection and conversational avowals, and self-commands, these do not count.It’s informing your addressee about some state of affairs, and directing his action. Grice is always clear that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s ACTION.“As one of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges.”Transaction is a good one.TRANS-ACTIO“I list briefly one such analog for each conversational category.”While he uses ‘conversational category,’ he also applies it to the second bit: ‘category of conversational quantity,’ ‘category of conversational quality,’ ‘category of conversational relation,’ and ‘category of conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that justifies the sub-specifications.They are not categories of thought or ontological or ‘expression’.His focus is on the category as conversation.His focus is on the ‘conversational category.’“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required; if, e. g., at a particular stage I need fourscrews, I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six. He always passed six, since two will drop.“Make your contribution neither more nor less informative than is required (for the purposes of the exchange).”This would have covered the maxi and the min.“NEITHER MORE NOR LESS” is the formula of effectiveness, and economy, and minimization of expenditure.“2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious.”Here again he gives an expansion of the conversational category, which is more general than ‘try to make your contribution one that is true,’ and the point about the ‘quality of information,’ which he did not make.Perhaps because it would have led him to realise that ‘false’ information, i.e. ‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious, is not ‘information.’But “Make your contribution one that is genuine and not spurious.”Be candid.Does not need a generalization as it covers both informational and directive utterances.“If I need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt;”Or you won’t eat the cake.“if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”Spurious and genuine are different.In the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just not being SERIOUS.But surely a maxim, “Be serious” is too serious.Seriously!“3. Relation. I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of the transaction;”Odd that he would use ‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of the “Prolegomena,” and what he was supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the explanation.For each of the philosophers making a mistake are giving a judgment of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational appropriateness. Here it is good that he relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO the ‘need’.Grice is not quite sticking to the etymology of ‘relatio’ and ‘refer,’ bring y back to x. Or he is. Bring y (your contribution) back to the need x.Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on relation, when he did a good bit!“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate contribution at a later stage).”“I just expect you to be silent.”“4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.” For Lewis, clarity is not enough!The ‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’ seems quite different from “Be perspicuous.”“Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch”Is more like“Execute your performance”And not just STAND there!A: What time is it B just stands there“These analogies are relevant to what I regard as a fundamental question about the principle of conversational helpfulness and its attendant conversational maxims,”For Boethius, it is a PRINCIPLE because it does not need an answer!“viz., what the basis is for the assumption which we seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a great range of implicaturums depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the rather otiose maxims], that talkers will ingeneral (ceteris paribus and in the absence of indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these principles prescribe.”Grice really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of the maxim, as in his response to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:“Paul, I surely do not mean to imply that you may end up believing that I have a doubt about the pillar box being red: it seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum of ‘redness’ which attaches to me as I am standing in front of the pillar box in clear daylight.”Grice is EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING SOMETHING TRUE, so at least he is not VIOLATING the principle of conversational helpfulness, or the category of conversational quality, or the desideratum of conversational candour.And that is what he is concerned with.  “A dull but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that *people* (not pirots, although perhaps Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in these ways;”Elinor Ochs was terrified Grice’s maxims are violatednever exploited, she thoughtin Madagascar.“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed, it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”Effort again; least effort. And ease. Great Griceian guidelines!“I am, however, enough of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,”OR EXPLAIN.“undeniable though they may be;”BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORYnot the theory for the generation of implicate, but for the theory of conversation.He is less interested in this than the other. “I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea that observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions:”So how is this not quasi-contractual?  He is listing THIS OR THAT FEATURE that jointly distinguishes a cooperative transactionall grand great words.But he wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!He is playing, as a philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from what.A1. Conversasation is purposiveA2. Conversation is rationalA3. Conversation is cooperativeA4. There is such a thing as non-rational cooperation (is there?)So he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice surely does not wish THAT to demolish his model. If he bases it in general constraints of rationality, the better.“1. The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one,”Is he being logical?“second-order predicate calculus”“meta-language”He means higher or supervenientOr ‘operative’“, that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of the other.”By identify he means assume.YOU HAVE TO DESIRE what your partner desires.The intersection between your desirability and your addressee’s desirability is not NULL.And the way to do this is conditionalIF: You perceive B has Goal G, you assume Goal G. “2. The contributions of the participants .should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. Unless it’s one of those seminars by Grice and J. F. Thomson!“3. There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit)”i.e. implicated rather than explicatedpart of the implicaturum, or implicitum, rather than the explicatum or explicitum.“that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.”This is especially tricky over the phone (“He never ends!” Or in psychiatric interviews!)Note that ‘starting doing something else’ may work. E. g. watch your watch!“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”TWO OPPOSITE EXAMPLES.Fighting is arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not conversation, cooperation,  friendly, collaborative venture, and diagoge.Letter writing is usually otiose“what, with the tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.“In any case, one feels that the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience but himself.”And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant down!”“So I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle of conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the following lines”That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.“: that any one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”Where the keyword is: profit, effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble. That conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable. That a conversational exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.“Whether any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”It’s not clear what the premises are!Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached? Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.It seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.“in any case, I am fairly sure that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”For perhaps “I don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”IS irrelevant, yet true!“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and conversational implicaturum on the other.”This is clearer in the seminars. The whole thing was a preamble “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly and unostentatiously VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead.”And be blamed by Kant.Mislead should not worry Grice, cf. “Misleading, but true.”The violate (or fail to observe) shows that (1) covers two specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim as to ‘be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew obfuscation!”This is Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is KNOWLEDGE of the maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to observe them “2. He may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the principle of conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, e. g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.” Where is the criminal?I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.I shall unseal them. What do you mean ‘cannot.’ You don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?I think Grice means ‘may not.’Is the universe finite? Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed. “3. He may be faced by a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than oneor at least two specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).” Odd that he doesn’t think this generates implicaturum: He has obviously studied the sub-perceptualities here.For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus, thinks that by utteringThe pillar box seems red to methat is all I have adequate evidence forHe is conveying that he is unable to answer the question (“What colour is the pillar box?”) And being as ‘informative’ as is requiredWithout saying something for which it is not the case that he has or will ever have adequate evidence.Cf.Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the noumenon?Kant: My lips are sealed.It may require some research to list ALL CLASHES.Because each clash shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be all VERY CETERIS PARIBUS.Cf.Where is the criminal?My lips are sealed.The utterer has NOT opted out. He has answered, via implicaturum, that he is not telling. He is being relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to DISCLOSE the whereabouts of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a conversation! Odd that Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a clash with ‘Be truthful!’“4. He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill (or observe) it.Mock? Taunt?The magic flute. Grice’s magic flute.flout (v.) "treat with disdain or contempt" (transitive), 1550s, intransitive sense "mock, jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of uncertain origin; perhaps a special use of Middle English “flowten,”"to play the flute" (compare Middle Dutch “fluyten,” "to play the flute," also "to jeer"). Related: Flouted; flouting.Grice: “One thing we do not know is if the flute came to England via Holland.”“Or he may, as we may say, ‘play the flute’ with a maxim, expecting others to be agreeable.”“Or he may, as we might say, ‘play the flute’ with the conversational maxim, expecting others to join with some other musical instrumentor somethingoccasionally the same.”“On the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim (because oi a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead,”This is interesting. It’s the TRYING to mislead.Grice and G. A. Paul:Grice cannot be claimed to have TRIED to mislead, and thus deemed to have misled G. A. Paul, even if he had, when he said, “I hardly think there is any doubt about it, but that pillar box seems red to me.”“the hearer is faced with a minor problem:”Implicaturum: This reasoning is all abductiveto the ‘best’ explanation“How can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall principle of conversational helfpulness?”This was one of Grice’s conversations with G. A. Paul:Paul (to Grice): This is what I do not understand, Grice. How can your saying what you did say be reconciled with the supposition that you are not going to mislead me?”Unfortunately, on that Saturday, Paul went to the Irish Sea. Grice “This situation is one that characteristically”There are othersvide clash, abovebut not marked by Grice as one such situation“gives rise to a conversational implicaturum; and when a conversational implicaturum is generated”Chomskyan jargon borrowed from Austin (“I don’t see why Austin admired Chomsky so!”)“in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being EXPLOITED.”Why not ‘flouted’? Some liked the idea of playing the flute.EXPLOIT is figurative.Grice exploits a Griceian maxim.exploit (v.) c. 1400, espleiten, esploiten "to accomplish, achieve, fulfill," from Old French esploitier, espleiter "carry out, perform, accomplish," from esploit (see exploit (n.)). The sense of "use selfishly" first recorded 1838, from a sense development in French perhaps from use of the word with reference to mines, etc. (compare exploitation). Related: Exploited; exploiting.exploit (n.) late 14c., "outcome of an action," from Old French esploit "a carrying out; achievement, result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern French exploit), a very common word, used in senses of "action, deed, profit, achievement," from Latin explicitum "a thing settled, ended, or displayed," noun use of neuter of explicitus, past participle of explicare "unfold, unroll, disentangle," from ex "out" (see ex-) + plicare "to fold" (from PIE root *plek- "to plait").  Meaning "feat, achievement" is c. 1400. Sense evolution is from "unfolding" to "bringing out" to "having advantage" to "achievement." Related: Exploits. exploitative (adj.) "serving for or used in exploitation," 1882, from French exploitatif, from exploit (see exploit (n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859) appears to be a native formation from exploit + -ive.exploitation (n.) 1803, "productive working" of something, a positive word among those who used it first, though regarded as a Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun of action from exploiter (see exploit (v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in part from influence of French socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also perhaps influenced by use of the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and exploitation was hurled in insult at activities it once had crowned as praise.  It follows from this science [conceived by Saint Simon] that the tendency of the human race is from a state of antagonism to that of an universal peaceful association -- from the dominating influence of the military spirit to that of the industriel one; from what they call l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme to the exploitation of the globe by industry. ["Quarterly Review," April & July 1831] Grice: “I am now in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicaturum.”Not to provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it with one of my metaphysical routines.”“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p”That seems good for the analysandumGrice loves the “by (in, when)” “(or making as if to). Note the oratio obliqua.Or ‘that’-clause. So this is not ‘uttering’As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’“By uttering ‘x’ U means that p.’The “by” already involves a clause with a ‘that’-clause.So this is not a report of a physical event.It is a report embued already with intentionality.The utterer is not just ‘uttering’The utterer is EXPLICITLY conveying that p.We cannot say MEANING that p.Because Grice uses “mean” as opposed to “explicitly convey”His borderline scenarios are such,“Keep me company, dear”“If we are to say that when he uttererd that he means that his wife was to keep him company or not is all that will count for me to change my definition of ‘mean’ or not.”Also irony.But here it is more complicated. A man utters, “Grice defeated Strawson”If he means it ironically, to mean that Strawson defeated Grice, it is not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite. He explicitly conveyed that.Grice considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’“If I am dead, I shall have no time for reading.”He is careful here that the utterer does not explicitly conveys that he will have no time for readingbecause it’s conditioned on he being dead.“has implicated that q,” “may be said to have conversationally implicated that q,”So this is a specification alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly conveying that p, U implicitly conveys that q.’Where he is adding the second-order adverb, ‘conversationally.’By explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL FASHION” iff or if“PROVIDED THAT”“(1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helfpulness;”Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that an implicaturum is ‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when  AT LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.“(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE terms) consistent with this presumption;”THIS IS THE CRUCIAL CLAUSEand the one that not only requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the expectation that one’s addressee, BEING RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE RATIONAL.This is the ‘rationalisation’ he refers to in “Retrospective Epilogue.”Note that ‘q’ is obviously now the content of a state in the utterer’s soula desideratum or a creditum --, at least a CREDITUM, in view of Grice’s view of everything at least exhibitive and perhaps protreptic --“and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) IS required.”All that jargon about mutuality is a result of Strawson tutoring Schiffer!“Apply this to my initial example, to B's remark that C has not yet been to prison.”What made Grice think of such a convoluted example?He was laughing at Searle for providing non-philosophical examples, and there he is!“In a suitable setting A might reason as follows:”“(1) B has APPARENTLY violatedindeed he has played the flute with -- the maxim 'Be relevant' and so may be regarded as [ALSO] having flouted one of the maxims conjoining perspicuity,”In previous versions, under the desideratum of conversational clarity Grice had it that the desideratum included the expectation of this ‘relatedness’ AND that of ‘perspicuity’ (sic). In the above, Grice is stating that if you are irrelevant (or provide an unrelated contribution) you are not being perspicuous.But “He hasn’t been to prison” is perspicuous enough.And so is the link to the question --.Plus, wasn’t perspicuity only to apply to the ‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather than the content.Here it is surely the CONTENTthat it is not the case that C is a criminalthat triggers it all.So, since there is a “not,” here this is parallel to the example examined by Strawson in the footnote to “Logical Theory.”The utterer is saying that it is not the case that C has been in prison yet.The ‘yet’ makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian colouring ‘convention’!“It is not the case that C has been in prison” Is, admittedly, not very perspicuous.“So what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”So there is an equivocation here as to the utterance perhaps not being perspicuous, while the utterer IS perspicuous.“yet I have no reason to suppose that he is opting out from the operation of the CP;”Or playing the flute with my beloved principle of conversational helpfulness.“(2) given the circumstances, I can regard his irrelevance as only apparentas when we say that a plastic flower is not a flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy duck is surely not a duck! That trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only if, I suppose him to think that C is potentially dishonest;”As many are!The potentially is the trick.Recall Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially dishonest?! Not me! PLATO was! Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”“(3) B knows that I am capable of working out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially dishonest.'”Unless he goes on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not mean of course to mean that I mean that he is potentially dishonest, because although he is, he shouldn’t, or rather, I don’t think you are expecting me to convey explicitly that he shouln’t or should for that matter.”“The presence of a conversational implicaturum must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicaturum (if present at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”This is the Humpty Dumpty in Grice.Cf. Provide the sixteen derivational steps in Jane Austen’s Novel remark, “I sense and sensibilia”This is what happens sometimes when people who are not philosophers engage with Grice!For a philosopher, it is clear Grice is not being serious there. He is mocking an ‘ideal’-language philosopher (as Waissmann called them). Let’s revise the word:By “counting” he means “DEEM.” He has said that “She is poor, but she is honest,” is NOT CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not produced, this may not be a matter of argument.Philosophers are OBSESSED, and this is Grice’s trick, with ARGUMENT. Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my father, who was rather blunt, Hardie taught me to ARGUE for this or that reason.”His mention of “INTUITION” is not perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree that meaning is a matter of INTUITION, not a theoretical concept within a theory.So it’s not like Grice does not trust the intuition. So the point is TERMINOLOGICAL and methodological. Terminological, in that this is a specfification of ‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases like “How rude!” (he just flouted the maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not a CONVERSATIONAL maxim. Is Grice implicating that nonconversational nonconventional implicate are not calculable? We don’t think so.But he might.I think he will. Because in the case of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and ‘social maxim’such as “be polite,”the calculation may involve such degree of gradation that you better not get Grice started!“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum.”OKSo perhaps he does allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate ARE calculable.But he may add:“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, it will not be a conversational implicaturum; it will be a conventional implicaturum.”Strawson: “And what nonconventional nonconversational implicate?Grice: You are right, Strawon. Let me modify and refine the point: “It will be a dull, boring, undetachable, conventional implicaturumOR any of those dull implicate that follow from (or resultI won’t use ‘generate’) one of those maxims that I have explicitly said they were NOT conversational maxims.“For surely, there is something very ‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicaturum is involved with the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and yet that the maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”“Therefore, I restrict calculability to CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURUM, because it involves the conversational maxims that contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas you’ll agree that Queen Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as she frequently did not“We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and Sullivan amuse me!””“To work out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind nonconversational nonconventional] implicaturum is present, the hearer will reply on the following data:”As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’Perhaps assumption, alla Gettier, is better:“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved;”WoW Quite a Bit. This is the reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.In he hasn’t been to ‘prison’ we are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my prison”).Strawson: But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?He hasn't been to prisonprison (n.) early 12c., from Old French prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive" (11c., Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;" see prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative *prehensio) "a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of prehendere "to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, + -hendere, from PIE root *ghend- "to seize, take"). "Captivity," hence by extension "a place for captives," the MAIN modern sense.” (There are 34 other unmain ones). He hasn't been to a place for captives yet.You mean he is one.Cf. He hasn't been to asylum.You mean Foucault?(2) the principle of conversational helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”This is more crucial seeing that the utterer may utter something which has no conventional meaning?Cf. Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so for the ‘conventional’ one!”What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have the ‘spirit’ as the implicaturum. Or he needs the lines, so he can have the implicaturum as a reading ‘between the lines.’If the utterance is a gesture, like showing a bandaged leg, or a Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to distinguish or to identify what is EXPLICITLY conveyed.By showing his bandaged leg, U EXPLICITLY conveys that he has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys that he cannot really play cricket.The requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even tricker, “Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational? Substitutional?In any case, Grice is not being circular in requiring that the addressee should use as an assumption or datum that U thinks that the expression E is generally uttered by utterers when they m-intend that p.But there are tricks here.“(3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”Cf. Grice, “Is there a general context for a general theory of context?”“(4) other items of background knowledge;”So you don’t get:How is C getting on at the bank? My lips are sealed Why do you care Mind your own business. Note that “he hasn’t been to prison yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’) is the sort of tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS that he’ll get that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does. “and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.”This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.“A general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicaturum might be given as follows:”Again the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might expect 'He has said that p;”Ie explicitly conveys that p.Note the essential oratio obliqua, or that-clause.“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness”That is, he is not a prisoner of war, or anything.“He could not be doing this unless he thought that q;”Or rather, even if more tautologically still, he could not be doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’ For if the utterer is IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do it!“he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q IS required;”Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY, which Grice fails to have added as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent logics“he is using ‘and’ and ‘or’ in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,”He is an intuitionist, his name is Dummett.“he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.'”The ‘or’ is delightful, for m-intention requires ‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous positions, so ‘willingess to allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE! Especially at Oxford where we are ever so subtle!

 

CONVERSAZIONE – COMPASSIONE CONVERSAZIONALE -- Conversational compassion -- conversational empathy: sympathyempathycompassion -- principle of conversational empathy -- Principle of Conversational Empathya term devised by Grice for the expectation a conversationalist has that his co-partner will honour his conversational goal, however transitory. imaginative projection into another person’s situation, especially for vicarious capture of its emotional and motivational qualities. The term is an English rendering by the Anglo psychologist E. G. Titchener, 1867 7 of the G. Einfühlung, made popular by Theodore Lipps 18514, which also covered imaginative identification with inanimate objects of aesthetic contemplation. Under ‘sympathy’, many aspects were earlier discussed by Hume, Adam Smith, and other Scottish philosophers. Empathy has been considered a precondition of ethical thinking and a major contributor to social bonding and altruism, mental state attribution, language use, and translation. The relevant spectrum of phenomena includes automatic and often subliminal motor mimicry of the expressions or manifestations of another’s real or feigned emotion, pain, or pleasure; emotional contagion, by which one “catches” another’s apparent emotion, often unconsciously and without reference to its cause or “object”; conscious and unconscious mimicry of direction of gaze, with consequent transfer of attention from the other’s response to its cause; and conscious or unconscious role-taking, which reconstructs in imagination with or without imagery aspects of the other’s situation as the other “perceives” it.

 

CONVERSAZIONE – UNIGUITA -- AMBIGUITA – MASSIMA CONVERSAZIONALE EVITAZIONE DELL’AMBIGUITA --  conversational maxim of ambiguity avoidance, the: Grice thought that there should be a way to characterise each maxim other than by its formulation. “It’s a good exercise to grasp the concept behind the maxim.” Quality relates to Strength or Fortitutde, the first  to “at least,” the second to “at most.” For Quality, he has a supra-maxim, “of trust”the two maxims are “maxim of candour” and “maxim of evidence”. Under relation, “maxim of relevance.” Under manner, suprapaxim “maxim of perspicuity” and four maxims, the first is exactly the same as the supramaxim, “maxim of percpicuity” now becomes “maxim of obscurity avoidance”or “maxim of clarity”obscure and clear are exact oppositesperspicuous [sic] is more of a trick. The second maxin under mode is this one of ambiguity avoidanceperhaps there should be a positive way to express this: be univocal. Do not be equivocal. Do not equivocate, univocate! The next two, plus the extra one that makes this a cataloguethe next is ‘maxim of brevity’ or “conversational maxim of unnecessary prolixity avoidance,” here we see the ‘sic’: “Grice’s maxim of conversational brevity, or of avoidance of conversationally unnecessary prolixity.” The next is “maxim of order”and the one that makes this a decalogue: “maxim of conversational tailoring” --. a phonological or orthographic form having multiple meanings senses, characters, semantic representations assigned by the language system. A lexical ambiguity occurs when a lexical item word is assigned multiple meanings by the language. It includes a homonymy, i.e., distinct lexical items having the same sound or form but different senses  ‘knight’/’night’, ‘lead’ n./‘lead’ v., ‘bear’ n./‘bear’ v.; and b polysemy, i.e., a single lexical item having multiple senses  ‘lamb’ the animal/‘lamb’ the flesh, ‘window’ glass/‘window’ opening. The distinction between homonymy and polysemy is problematic. A structural ambiguity occurs when a phrase or sentence is correlated by the grammar of the language with distinct constituent structures phrase markers or sequences of phrase markers. Example: ‘Competent women and men should apply’  ‘[NP[NPCompetent women] and men] . . .’ vs. ‘[NPCompetent[NPwomen and men]] . . .’, where ‘NP’ stands for ‘noun phrase’. A scope ambiguity is a structural ambiguity deriving from alternative interpretations of scopes of operators see below. Examples: ‘Walt will diet and exercise only if his doctor approves’  sentence operator scope: doctor’s approval is a necessary condition for both diet and exercise wide scope ‘only if’ vs. approval necessary for exercise but not for dieting wide scope ‘and’; ‘Bertie has a theory about every occurrence’  quantifier scope: one grand theory explaining all occurrences ‘a theory’ having wide scope over ‘every occurrence’ vs. all occurrences explained by several theories together ‘every occurrence’ having wide scope. The scope of an operator is the shortest full subformula to which the operator is attached. Thus, in `A & B C’, the scope of ‘&’ is ‘A & B’. For natural languages, the scope of an operator is what it C-commands. X C-commands Y in a tree diagram provided the first branching node that dominates X also dominates Y. An occurrence of an operator has wide scope relative to that of another operator provided the scope of the former properly includes scope of the latter. Examples: in ‘~A & B’, ’-’ has wide scope over ‘&’; in ‘Dx Ey Fxy’, the existential quantifier has wide scope over the universal quantifier. A pragmatic ambiguity is duality of use resting on pragmatic principles such as those which underlie reference and conversational implicaturum; e.g., depending on contextual variables, ‘I don’t know that he’s right’ can express doubt or merely the denial of genuine knowledge. 

 

CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA DELL’INFORMAZIONE MAXIMIN: maxim of conversational maximin informativeness: a maxim combining the maximum and the minimum.

 

CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELL’ INFORMATIVITA CONVERSAZIONALE MASSIMA: maxim of maximal conversational informativeness: a maxim only dealing with the ‘maximum,’ not the ‘minimum,’ which is a problem for Grice. “Why regulate volunteerness?”

 

CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELL’INFORMATIVITA CONVERSAZIONALE MINIMA: maxim of minimal conversational informativeness: maxim dealing with the minimum, not the maximum.

 

CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLA CONFIDENZA CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational trust: Grice preferred ‘trust’ to ‘truth.’ Grice: “One of the few useful items in the English philosophical vocabulary: a word that encompasses the volitional and the non-volitional. Of course, the same could be said of ‘verum,’ cognate with German ‘wahr.’

 

CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLA VERICITA CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational veracity: Grice: “When I’m feeling Latinate, you’ll hear me refer to this as the maxim of conversational veracityThe Romans distinguished the verax and the mendax. I don’t.”

 

CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLL’ADEQUAZIONE EVIDENZIALE CONVERSAZIONALE: maxim of conversational evidential adequacy: Grice: “We need a maxim to ensure adequate evidencethis would be otiose in the volitionalbut then we can always generalise the ‘evidence’ to ‘ground,’ or reason, which is what my American tutee, R. J. Fogelin, did.

 

CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLA RELAZIONE CONVERSAZIONE -- maxim of conversational relevance: Grice: “Personally, I prefer ‘relation,’ but Strawson doesn’t. But then Strawson thinks this is ‘unimportant.’ Not to me, ‘relevant,’ like ‘important,’ are the most unrelevant and unimportant pieces, especially as abused by an Oxford philosopher who should know better!”

 

CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA DEL MODO CONVERSAZIONALE – MASSIMA DELLA “PERSPICUITA” [sic] CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational perspicuity: Grice: “D. H. Lewis made me ‘hate’ clarity“clarity is not enoughplus, it’s metaphorical? How can I render clear what is essentially obscure? In fact, I would go on to say that the task of the philosopher is to dramatise the mundane, to render obscure what seems clear. Perspicuity is unclear enough and will do fine.”

 

CONVERSAZIONE: MASSIMA DELLA CLARITA CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational clarity, or maxim of conversational obscurity avoidance: Grice: “It might be said that ‘be perspicuous’ YIELDS ‘avoid obscurity,’ alla ‘be clear, don’t be obscure.’ But I prefer to be repetitive, if not AS repetitive as the Jewish Godthe Jews have more than ten commandments!”

 

CONVERSAZIONE: maxim of conversational ambiguity avoidance, maxim of conversational equivocation avoidance, maxim of conversational univocity: Grice: “This is a teaser, as how ‘ambiguous’ can ‘ambiguous’ be? And why should I dumb down my wit to help my addressee? Dorothy Parker never did!”

 

CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA DELL’EVITAZIONE D’EFFORZO --  maxim of conversational brevity or maxim of conversationally unnecessary prolixity avoidance: Grice: “I would call it maxim of redundancy.” “Or maxim of redundancy avoidance,” or maxim of conversational entropy.” A: Did you watch the programme?Grice: A friend suggested this to me. B: No, I was in a blacked-out city. Versus “No, I was in New York, which was blacked-out.  Grice: "In response to my exploration on conversation, I was given an example by a fellow playgroup member which seems to me, as far as it goes, to provide a welcome kind of support for the picture I am putting forward in that it appears to exhibit a kind of interaction between the members of my list of conversational maxims to which I had not really paid due attention — perhaps for the matter not really concerning directly philosophical methodology.” Suppose that it is generally known that Oxford and London were blacked out the day prior. The following conversation takes place: A: Did Smith see the show on the bobby box last night? Grice: “It will be CONVERSATIONALLY unobjectionable for B, who knows that Smith was in London, to reply, B: No, he was in a blacked-out city. "B could have said that Smith was in *London*, thereby providing a further piece of information.” “However, I should like to be able to argue that, in preferring the conversational move featuring the indefinite descriptor, ‘a blacked-out city' B implicates (or communicates the implicaturum) (by the maxims prescribing relation and redundancy avoidance) a more appropriate piece of information, viz., why_ Smith was prevented from seeing the ‘show’ on the bobby box.” "B could have provided BOTH pieces of information, in an over-prolixic version of the above: ‘Smith was in London , which, as every schoolboy knows, was blacked-out yesterday.” — thereby insulting A. But THE ***GAIN****, as Bentham would put it, would have been **INSUFFICIENT** to **JUSTIFY** the additional conversational **COST**.” “Or so I think.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bobby-box implicatura.”

CONVERSAZIONE – MASSIMA DELL’ORDINE CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational order: Grice: “Order is vague: first is the generalised, then the particularized.” By “the very particularized,” Grice means ‘temporal ordered sequence.” E. g. “Were I to say, Lady Ogilvy fainted and took arsenic, Strawson would get a different feeling if I were to utter instead, ‘Lady Ogilvy took arsenic and fainted.’”

 

CONVERSAZIONE -- MASSIMA DEL CORTE CONVERSAZIONALE -- maxim of conversational tailoring: ‘The king of France is not baldFrance is a monarchy.”

 

CONVERSAZIONE – PUNTO CONVERSAZIONALE – “PUNTO, NON VERITA” -- conversational point: Grice distinguishes between ‘point’ and ‘conversational point.’ “What’s the good of being quoted by another philosopher on the point of ‘point.’?” But that is what Winch does. So, as a revenge, Grice elaborated on the point. P. London-born philosopher. He quotes  Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of one’s remarksGrice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t hesitate to say that it seems red to me”Surely pointless, but an incredible truth meant to refute G. A. Paul

 

CONVERSAZIONE: POSTULATO CONVERSAZIONALE -- “conversational postulate”an otiosity deviced by Lakoff and Gordon (or Gordon and Lakoff) after Carnap’s infamous meaning postulate, a sentence that specifies part or all of the meaning of a predicate. Meaning postulates would thus include explicit, contextual, and recursive definitions, reduction sentences for dispositional predicates, and, more generally, any sentences stating how the extensions of predicates are interrelated by virtue of the meanings of those predicates. For example, any reduction sentence of the form (x) (x has f / (x is malleable S x has y)) could be a meaning postulate for the predicate ‘is malleable’. The notion of a meaning postulate was introduced by Carnap, whose original interest stemmed from a desire to explicate sentences that are analytic (“true by virtue of meaning”) but not logically true. Where G is a set of such postulates, one could say that A is analytic with respect to G if and only if A is a logical consequence of G. On this account, e.g., the sentence ‘Jake is not a married bachelor’ is analytic with respect to {’All bachelors are unmarried’}.

 

CONVERSAZIONE – RAGIONE CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational reason, or ‘dialogical reason.’ With ‘reason,’ Grice is following Ariskant. There’s the ‘ratio’ and there’s the “Vernunft.” “To converse” can mean to have sex (cf. know) so one has to be careful. Grice is using ‘conversational’ casually. First, he was aware of the different qualifications for ‘implication’. There is Nowell-Smith’s contextual implication and C. K. Grant’s ‘pragmatic implication.’ So he chose ‘conversational implication’ himself. Later, when narrowing down the notion, he distinguished between ‘conversational implication’ and ‘non-conversational implication’: “Thank you. B: You’re welcome.” If B is following the maxim, ‘be polite,’ the implication that he is pleased he was able to assist his emissor is IMPLICATED but not conversationally so. It is not a ‘conversational implication.’ Grice needs to restrict the notion for philosophical purposes. Both for the framework of his theory (it is easier to justify transcendentally conversational implication than it is non-conversational implication). Note that ‘I am pleased I was able to assist’ is CANCELLABLE or defeatible, so that’s not the issue. In any case, both ‘conversational impication’ and these type of calculable ‘non-conversational’ implication still yielding from some ‘maxim’ (such as ‘be polite’) Grice covers under the generic “non-conventional” precisely because they can be defeated. When it comes to NON-DEFEASIBLE implicatura, Grice uses ‘conventional implication’ (as in “She was poor but she was honest.”). Grice did not find these fun. And it shows. Strawson stuck with them, but his philosophising about them ain’t precisely ‘fun.’ Used in Retrospective369. Also: conversational rationality. Surely, “principle of conversational rationality” sounds otiose. Expectation of mutual rationality sounds better. Critique of conversational reason sounds best! Grice is careful here. When he provides a reductive analysis of ‘reasoning,’ this goes as follows: the reasoner reasons from premise to conclusion. That’s the analysandum. What’s the analysans? At least it involves TWO clauses: If the reasoner reasons from premise to conclusion, it is assumed that he BELIEVES that the premise obtains; and he believes that the conclusion obtains. This has to be generalised to cover the desiderative, using ‘accept.’ He accepts that the premise obtains, and he accepts that the conclusion obtains. But there is obviously a SECOND condition: that the conclusion follows from the premise! He uses ‘demonstrably’ for that, or the demonstratum.’ He is open as to what kind of yielding is involved because he wants to allow for inductive reasoning and abductive reasoning, not just deductive reasoning. AND THERE IS A TYPICALLY GRICEIAN third condition, involving CAUSATION. He had used ‘cause’ in reductive analyses beforeif not so much in ‘meaning,’ due to Urmson’s counterexample involving ‘bribery,’ where ‘cause’ does not seem to dobut in his analysis of ‘intending’ for the British Academy. So at Oxford he promotes this THIRD causal condition as involving that, naturally enough, it is the rasoner’s BELIEF that demonstrably q follows from p, which CAUSES the reasoner TO BELIEVE (or more generally, accept) that the conclusion obtains. Grice is happy with that belief in the validity of the demonstration ‘populates’ the world of alethic beliefs, and does not concern with generalising that into a generic ‘acceptance.’ The word ‘rationalist’ is anathema at Oxford, because tutor after tutor has brainwashed their tutees that the distinction is ‘empiricst-rationalist’ and that at Oxford we are ‘empiricists.’ So Grice is really being ‘heretic’ here in the words of G. P. Baker. demonstratum: The Eng. word “reason” and the Fr.  word “raison” are both formed on the basis of Roman “reor,” to count or calculate, whence think, believe. The Roman verb translates the Grecian “λέγειν,” two of whose principal meanings it retains, but only two: count and think. The third principal meaning of the Grecian term, speak, discourse, which designates a third type of putting into relation and proportion, is rendered by other Roman series: “dicere” (originally cognate with ‘deixis,’ and so not necessarily ‘verbal’), “loquor,” “orationem habere” (the most ‘vocal’ one, as it relates to the ‘mouth,’ cf. ‘orality’) or “sermonem habere,” so that ultimately the Grecian λόγος is approached by Roman philosophers by means of a syntagm, “ratio et oratio,” reason and discourse. Each vernacular fragments the meaning of logos into a greater or lesser. Cf. ‘principium reddendae rationis.’ Rationality functions as a principle of the intelligibility of the world and history, particularly in Hegel. Then there’s The Partitions of Reason and Semantic diffractions. Although there is no language that retains under a single word all the meanings of logos except by bringing logos into the language in question, the distribution of these meanings is more or less close to Roman. For the classical Fr.  word “raison,” which maintains almost all the Roman meanings including the mathematical sense of proportion, as in “raison d’une série,” or “raison inverse,” a contemporary Fr. -G.  dictionary proposes the following terms: Vernunft, Verstand rational faculty. This example shows that the whole of the vocabulary is thus mobilized. Reason and faculties We can distinguish between two interfering systems. The first designates reason, identified with thought in general, in its relationship to a bodily and/or mental instance. The second situates reason in a hierarchy of faculties whose organization it determines. Regarding the first system, as it is expressed in various languages, where one will find studies of the main distortions, especially around the expressions of the Roman ‘anima.’ Philosophers especially emphasize the ways of designating reason and mind that appear to be the most irreducible from one language to another. Regarding the second system, and the partitions that do not coincide. For Grice, ‘to understand’ presupposes ‘rationalitynot for Kant, who sticks with Verstand/Vernunft distinction. Ratio speculatum, praticatum. From Aristotle to Kant, two great domains of rationality have been distinguished: theory, or speculative reason, and practice. The lurality of meanings, each represented by one or more specific words. The first question, from the point of view of the difference of languages, is thus that of the breadth of the meaning of “reason” or its equivalents, and of the systems diffracting the meanings of logos and then of ratio. But another complex of problems immediately arises. The Roman “ratio” absorbs the meanings of other Grecian terms, such as νοῦς and διάνοια, which are also translated in other, more technical ways, such as intellectus; so that reason, in the sense of rationality, is a comprehensive term, whereas ‘reason’ in the sense of intellect or understanding is a singular and differentiated faculty. However, none of the comprehensive terms or systems of opposition coincides with those of another language, which are moreover changing. Then there’s Reason and Rationality: man, animal, god. Since Aristotle’s definition of man as an animal endowed with logos, which Roman writers rendered by “animal rationale” — omitting the discursive dimension—reason, or the logos, is a specific difference that defines man by his difference from other living beings and/or his participation in a divine or cosmic nature. Reason is opposed to madness understood as de-mentia. More broadly, reason is conceived in terms of difference from what does not belong to its domain and falls outside its immediate law, but which man may, in certain ways, share with other animals, such as sensation, passion, imagination, and possibly memory. Rationality and the principle of intelligibility. Rationality, defined by the logos, is connected with logic as the art of speaking and thinking, and with its founding principles. Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept. Ed.  by M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans. Louvain, Belg.: Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 191 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Phil.  of Right. Tr.  H. Nisbet and ed.  by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Science of LogiTr.  V. Miller. London: Allen and Unwin, . . Werke. Ed.  by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. 20 vols. FrankfuSuhrkamp, . Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Tr.  Albert Hofstadter Bloomington: Indiana , . . Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Tr.  Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana , . Hume, D. . A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed.  by D.  Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford , . Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated and ed.  by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. Tr.  N. Kemp-Smith. : Macmillan, 193 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz. Extraits des manuscrits. Ed.  by Louis Couturat. : Presses Universitaires de France, 190 Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . . Philosophical Essays. Translated and ed.  by Roger Ariew and Dan Garber. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . . Philosophical Papers and Letters. 2nd ed. Ed.  and Tr.  Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht, Neth.: D. Reidel, . . Die philosophischen Schriften. Ed.  by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 187590. Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . . Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. Ed.  by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 18496 . Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre. Ed.  by Gaston Gru2 vols. : Presses Universitaires de France, 194 Locke, J.. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed.  by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon, . Micraelius, J. . Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum. 2nd ed. Stettin, 166 Paulus, J.. Henri de Gand: Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique. : Vrin, 193 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Ed.  by Jörg Jantzen, T.  Buchheim, Jochem Hennigfeld, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Siegbert Peetz. 40 vols. StuttgaFrommann-Holzboog, . . Of the I as the Principle of Phil. , or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge. In The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays 17949 Translated with commentary by F. Marti. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell , . Spinoza, Baruch. Complete Works. With tr.s by Samuel Shirley. Ed.  by Michael L. Morgan. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . . Oper2nd ed. Ed.  by Gebhardt. 5 vols. Heidelberg: Carl Winters.

 

CONVERSAZIONE – LA CONFIDENZA CONVERSAZIONALE – PRINZIPIO DELLA CONFIDENZA CONVERSAZIONALE -- conversational trustworthinessor just trust. Principle of Conversational trustworthiness -- Conversational desideratum of maximal evidence, information bearing on the truth or falsity of a proposition. In philosophical discussions, a person’s evidence is generally taken to be all the information a person has, positive or negative, relevant to a proposition. The notion of evidence used in philosophy thus differs from the ordinary notion according to which physical objects, such as a strand of hair or a drop of blood, counts as evidence. One’s information about such objects could be evidence in the philosophical sense. The concept of evidence plays a central role in our understanding of knowledge and rationality. According to a traditional and widely held view, one has knowledge only when one has a true belief based on very strong evidence. Rational belief is belief based on adequate evidence, even if that evidence falls short of what is needed for knowledge. Many traditional philosophical debates, such as those about our knowledge of the external world, the rationality of religious belief, and the rational basis for moral judgments, are largely about whether the evidence we have in these areas is sufficient to yield knowledge or rational belief. The senses are a primary source of evidence. Thus, for most, if not all, of our beliefs, ultimately our evidence traces back to sensory experience. Other sources of evidence include memory and the testimony of others. Of course, both of these sources rely on the senses in one way or another. According to rationalist views, we can also get evidence for some propositions through mere reason or reflection, and so reason is an additional source of evidence. The evidence one has for a belief may be conclusive or inconclusive. Conclusive evidence is so strong as to rule out all possibility of error. The discussions of skepticism show clearly that we lack conclusive evidence for our beliefs about the external world, about the past, about other minds, and about nearly any other topic. Thus, an individual’s perceptual experiences provide only inconclusive evidence for beliefs about the external world since such experiences can be deceptive or hallucinatory. Inconclusive, or prima facie, evidence can always be defeated or overridden by subsequently acquired evidence, as, e.g., when testimonial evidence in favor of a proposition is overridden by the evidence provided by subsequent experiences.  evidentialism, in the philosophy of religion, the view that religious beliefs can be rationally accepted only if they are supported by one’s “total evidence,” understood to mean all the other propositions one knows or justifiably believes to be true. Evidentialists typically add that, in order to be rational, one’s degree of belief should be proportioned to the strength of the evidential support. Evidentialism was formulated by Locke as a weapon against the sectarians of his day and has since been used by Clifford among many others to attack religious belief in general. A milder form of evidentialism is found in Aquinas, who, unlike Clifford, thinks religion can meet the evidentialist challenge. A contrasting view is fideism, best understood as the claim that one’s fundamental religious convictions are not subject to independent rational assessment. A reason often given for this is that devotion to God should be one’s “ultimate concern,” and to subject faith to the judgment of reason is to place reason above God and make of it an idol. Proponents of fideism include Tertullian, Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, and some Vittersians. A third view, which as yet lacks a generally accepted label, may be termed experientialism; it asserts that some religious beliefs are directly justified by religious experience. Experientialism differs from evidentialism in holding that religious beliefs can be rational without being supported by inferences from other beliefs one holds; thus theistic arguments are superfluous, whether or not there are any sound ones available. But experientialism is not fideism; it holds that religious beliefs may be directly grounded in religious experience wtihout the mediation of other beliefs, and may be rationally warranted on that account, just as perceptual beliefs are directly grounded in perceptual experience. Recent examples of experientialism are found in Plantinga’s “Reformed Epistemology,” which asserts that religious beliefs grounded in experience can be “properly basic,” and in the contention of Alston that in religious experience the subject may be “perceiving God.”

 

converse. 1 Narrowly, the result of the immediate logical operation called conversion on any categorical proposition, accomplished by interchanging the subject term and the predicate term of that proposition. Thus, the converse of the categorical proposition ‘All cats are felines’ is ‘All felines are cats’. 2 More broadly, the proposition obtained from a given ‘if . . . then . . .’ conditional proposition by interchanging the antecedent and the consequent clauses, i.e., the propositions following the ‘if’ and the ‘then’, respectively; also, the argument obtained from an argument of the form ‘P; therefore Q’ by interchanging the premise and the conclusion.  converse, outer and inner, respectively, the result of “converting” the two “terms” or the relation verb of a relational sentence. The outer converse of ‘Abe helps Ben’ is ‘Ben helps Abe’ and the inner converse is ‘Abe is helped by Ben’. In simple, or atomic, sentences the outer and inner converses express logically equivalent propositions, and thus in these cases no informational ambiguity arises from the adjunction of ‘and conversely’ or ‘but not conversely’, despite the fact that such adjunction does not indicate which, if either, of the two converses intended is meant. However, in complex, or quantified, relational sentences such as ‘Every integer precedes some integer’ genuine informational ambiguity is produced. Under normal interpretations of the respective sentences, the outer converse expresses the false proposition that some integer precedes every integer, the inner converse expresses the true proposition that every integer is preceded by some integer. More complicated considerations apply in cases of quantified doubly relational sentences such as ‘Every integer precedes every integer exceeding it’. The concept of scope explains such structural ambiguity: in the sentence ‘Every integer precedes some integer and conversely’, ‘conversely’ taken in the outer sense has wide scope, whereas taken in the inner sense it has narrow scope. 

 

convey: used in index to WoW. Etymology is funny. From con-viacum-via, go on the road with.

 

coonway: a., english philosopher whose Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae 1690; English translation, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 1692 proposes a monistic ontology in which all created things are modes of one spiritual substance emanating from God. This substance is made up of an infinite number of hierarchically arranged spirits, which she calls monads. Matter is congealed spirit. Motion is conceived not dynamically but vitally. Lady Conway’s scheme entails a moral explanation of pain and the possibility of universal salvation. She repudiates the dualism of both Descartes and her teacher, Henry More, as well as the materialism of Hobbes and Spinoza. The work shows the influence of cabalism and affinities with the thought of the mentor of her last years, Francis Mercurius van Helmont, through whom her philosophy became known to Leibniz.

 

CVM-AD-IUTUM – coadiuvare -- co-operatum: Grice previously used ‘help’which has a Graeco-Roman counterpart -- Grice is very right in noting that ‘helpfulness’ does not ‘equate’ cooperation. Correspondingly he changed the principle of conversational helpfulness into the principle of conversational co-operation. He also points that one has to distinguish between the general theisis that conversation is rational from the thesis that the particular form of rationality that conversation takes is cooperative rationality, which most libertarians take as ‘irrationality’ personified, almost! Grice is obsessed with this idea that ‘co-operation’ need not just be ‘conversational.’ Indeed, his way to justify a ‘rationalist’ approach is through analogy. If he can find ‘co-operative’ traits in behaviour other than ‘conversational,’ the greater the chance to generalise, and thus justify. The co-operation would be self-justifying. co-operation. The hyphen in Strawson and Wiggins (p. 520). Grice found ‘co-operative’ too Marxist, and would prefer ‘help,’ as in ‘mutual help.’ This element of ‘mutuality’ is necessary. And it is marked grammatical, with the FIRST person and the SECOND person. The third need NOT be a personcan be a dog (as in “Fido is shaggy”). The mututality is necessary in that the emissor’s intention involves the belief that his recipient is rational. You cannot co-operate with a rock. You cannot co-operate with a vegetal. You cannot cooperate with a non-rational animal. You can ONLY cooperate with a co-rational agent. Animal co-operation poses a nice side to the Griceian idea. Surely the stereotype is a member of species S cooperating with another specimen of the same species. But then there are great examples of ‘sym-biosis’: the crane that gets rid off the hippopotamus’s ticks. Is this cooperation? Is this intentional? If Grice thinks that there is a ‘mechanistically derivable’ explanation,, it ’t. He did not necessarily buy ‘bio-sociological’ approaches. Which was a problem, because we don’t have much philosophical seriouis discourse on ‘cooperation’ at the general level Grice is aiming at. Except in ethics, which is biased. So it is no wonder that Grice had to rely on ‘meta-ethics’ to even conceptualise the field of cooperation: the maximin becomes a balance between a principle of conversational egoism and a principle of conversational altruism. He later found the egoism-tag as ‘understood.’ And his ‘altruism’ became ‘helpfulness,’ became ‘benevolence,’ and became ‘co-operation.’

 

CVM-AG -- copulatum: It was an Oxonian exercise to trace the ‘copula.’ “I’ve been working like a dog, should be sleeping like a log.” Where is the copula: Lennon is a dog-like workerLennon is a potential log-like sleeper.” Grice uses ‘copula’ in PPQ.  The term is sometimes used ambiguously, for ‘conjunctum.’ A conjunctive is called a copulative. But Grice obviously narrows down the use of copulatum to izz and hazz. He is having in mind Strawson.The formula does not allow for differences in tense and grammatical number; nor for the enormous class of * all '-sentences which do not contain, as their main verb, the verb * to be '. We might try to recast the sentences so that they at least fitted into one of the two patterns * All x is y ' or ' All x are y ' ; but the results would be, as English, often clumsy andt sometimes absurd. for Aristotle, 'Socrates is a man' is true "in virtue of his being that thing which constitutes existing for him (being which constitutes his mode of existence)," Hermann Weidemann, "In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication," p. 84— only so long as that "being" be taken as an assertion of being per se. But Weidemann wants to take it merely copulatively. In "Prädikation," p. 1196, he says that when 'is' is used as tertium adiacens it has no meaning by itself, but merely signifies the connection of subject and predicate. Cf. his "Aristoteles über das isolierte Aussagenwort," p. 154. H. P. Grice, "Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being," also rejects an existential reading of tertium adiacens and pushes for a copulative one. Cf. Alan Code, "Aristotle: Essence and Accident,"  414-7. Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation between predicates of one subject, but with variation between essential (per se)predications upon different (indeed categorially different) subjects (such ...eads me to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula exhibits semantic ...An extended treatment of my views about izzing and hazzing can be found in Alan.  A crucial ... on occasion admit catégorial variation in the sense of the copulative 'is', evidently is ... Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation ...with the copulative 'is'; so he rather strangely interprets the last remark. (1017a27-30) as alluding to semantic multiplicity in the copula as being. (supposedly) a consequence of semantic multiplicity in the existential 'is'. This interpretation seems difficult to defend. When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be saying that if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow, these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation"H. P. Grice brings the question he had considered with J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson at Oxford about Aristotle’s categories.In “Categoriae,” Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of case of the application of word or phrase to a range of situations. In one sort of case, both the word and a single definition (account, “logos”) apply throughout that range. In the other sort of case, the word but no single definition applies through the range.These two sorts of case have a different nature. In the first case, the word is applied synonymously (of better as “sunonuma”literally “sun-onuma”, cognomen). In the second case the word is applied homonymously (or better “homonuma”, or aequi-vocally, literally “homo-numa.”)Grice notes that a homonymous application has some sort of sub-division which Aristotle calls "paronymy" (“paronuma”), literally ‘para onuma.’To put it roughly, homonyms have multiple meaningswhat Grice has as “semantic multiplicity.”Synonyms have one meaning or ONE SENSE, but apply to different kinds of thing.A paronym, such as ‘be,’ derives from other things of a different kind. Paronyms display a ‘UNIFIED semantic multiplicity,’ if that’s not too oxymoronic: how can the multiplicity be unified while remaining a multiplicity? Aristotle states, confusingly, that "being is said in many ways". As Grice notes, ‘good’ (agathon) also is a paronym that displays unified semantic multiplicity.In Nichomachean Ethics, even more confusingly, Aristotle says that "good is said in as many ways as being". He doesn’t number the ways.So the main goal for Grice is to answer the question: If, as Aristotle suggests, at least some expressions connected with the notion of "being" exhibit semantic multiplicity, of which expressions is the suggestion true? Grice faces the question of existential being and Semantic Multiplicity. Grice stresses that Semantic Multiplicity of  "be" is not only the case of it interpretation. Other words he wants to know in what way of interpretation of this word the philosophers can detect the SM. Generally speaking there are four possible interpretations of "being": First, "be" is taken to mean "exist.”Second, "be" is taken as a copula in a predication statement.Third, "be" is taken for expressing the identity.Fourth, "Being" is considered to be a noun (equivalent to ‘object' or ‘entity')subjectification, category shift: “Smith’s being tall suggests he is an athlete.” (cfr. A. G. N. Flew on the ‘rubbish’ that adding ‘the’ to ‘self’ results incontra J. R. Jones). Philosophers have some problems for this kind of theory with separating interpretations from each other. It is natural for thinkers to unite the first and the fourth. The object or entity should be the things which already exist. So the SM would attach to such a noun as "entity" if, and only if, it also attaches to the word "exist". Furthermore, it seems to be a good idea to unite the first and the third. In some ways theorist can paraphrase the word "exist" in the terms of self-identity. Grice gives an example: “Julius Caesar exists if and only if Julius Caesar is identical for Julius Caesar.” Cf. Grice on ‘relative identity.’So the philosophers should investigate SM in two possible interpretationswhen "be" is understood as "exist" and when "be" is understood as copula. From Aristotle's point of view ‘being’ is predicated of everything. From this statement, Grice draws the conclusion that "exist" can apply to every thing, even a square circle.This word should signify a plurality of universals and exhibits semantic multiplicity. But Grice continue his analyses and tries to show, that "exist" has not merely SM, but UNIFIED semantic multiplicity. God forbid that he breaks M. O. R., Modifed Occam’s RazorSemantic multiplicies are not to be multiplied unificatory necessity.”In “Metaphysics,” Aristotle says that whatever things are signified by the "forms of predication". Philosophers understood the forms of predication (praedicabilium, praedicamentum) as a category. So in this way "being" has as many significations as there are forms of predication. "Be" in this case indicates what a thing is, what is like or how much it is and ctr. And no reasons to make a difference between two utterances like "man walks (flourishes)" and "the man is walking (flourishing)"cfr. Strawson on no need to have ‘be’ explicitly in the surface form, which render some utterances absurd. Grice says that it is not a problem with interpretation of verb-forms like ‘walks' and ‘flourishes' while we can replace them by expression in a canonical form like ‘is walking' and ‘is flourishing'. Aristotle names them as canonical in form within the multiplicity of use of "be" because ‘is’ is not existential, but copulative.Cf. Descartes, I think therefore I amI am a res cogitans, ergo I am a res. "When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow, these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation" It means that, from Aristotle's point of view, "Socrates is F" is not an essential predication, where "F" shows the item in the category C. So the logical form of the proposition “Socrates is F” is understood as "Socrates has something which is (C) F" where is (C) represent essential connection to category C. In conclusion it can be said that the copula is a matter of the logical nature of constant connection expressed by "has" and a categorical variant relation expressed by essential "is". So we have both types of interpretation: as existence and as a copula. (Our gratitude to P. A.  Sobolevsky). ases of ''Unified Semantic Multiplicity'' (USM). Prominent among examples of USM is the application of the word 'be'; according to. Aristotle, “being is said in ... Aristotle and the alleged multiplicity of being (or something). Grice is  all for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic multiplicity  (homonymy), it is in the end UNIFIED semantic multiplicity (paronymy). Or  something. CopulaH. P. Grice on Aristotle on the copula (“Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”) -- copula, in logic, a form of the verb ‘to be’ that joins subject and predicate in singular and categorical propositions. In ‘George is wealthy’ and ‘Swans are beautiful’, e.g., ‘is’ and ‘are’, respectively, are copulas. Not all occurrences of forms of ‘be’ count as copulas. In sentences such as ‘There are 51 states’, ‘are’ is not a copula, since it does not join a subject and a predicate, but occurs simply as a part of the quantifier term ‘there are’. 

 

corpus: -- Grice’s alma mater; he later became a Hamsworth scholar at Merton and finally fellow of St. John’s.. Grice would not have gone to Oxford had his talent not been in the classics, Greek and Latin. As a Midlander, he was sent to Corpus. At the time, most of Oxford was oriented towards the classics, or Lit. Hum. (Philosophia). At some point, each college attained some stereotypical fame, which Grice detested (“Corpus is for classicists”). By this time, Grice, after a short stay at Merton, accepted the fellowship at St. John’s, which was “a different animal.” In them days, there were only two tutorial fellows in philosophy, Scots Mabbott, and English Grice. But Grice also was “University Lecturer in Philosophy,” which meant he delivered seminars for tutees all over Oxford. St. John’s keeps a record of all the tutees by Grice. They include, alphabetically, a few good names. Why is Corpus so special? Find out! History of “Corpus Christi.” Cf. St. John’s. Cf. Merton. Each should have an entry. Corpus is Grice’s alma materso crucial. Hardieian: you only have one tutor in your life, and Grice’s was Hardie. So an exploration on Hardie may be in order. Grice hastens to add that he only learned ‘form,’ not matter, from Hardie, but the ethical and Aristotelian approach he also admitted. Corpus -- Grice, “Personal identity”soul and body -- disembodiment, the immaterial state of existence of a person who previously had a body. Disembodiment is thus to be distinguished from nonembodiment or immateriality. God and angels, if they exist, are non-embodied, or immaterial. By contrast, if human beings continue to exist after their bodies die, then they are disembodied. As this example suggests, disembodiment is typically discussed in the context of immortality or survival of death. It presupposes a view according to which persons are souls or some sort of immaterial entity that is capable of existing apart from a body. Whether it is possible for a person to become disembodied is a matter of controversy. Most philosophers who believe that this is possible assume that a disembodied person is conscious, but it is not obvious that this should be the case.  Corpus -- Grice’s body -- embodiment, the bodily aspects of human subjectivity. Embodiment is the central theme in European phenomenology, with its most extensive treatment in the works of Maurice MerleauPonty. Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment distinguishes between “the objective body,” which is the body regarded as a physiological entity, and “the phenomenal body,” which is not just some body, some particular physiological entity, but my or your body as I or you experience it. Of course, it is possible to experience one’s own body as a physiological entity. But this is not typically the case. Typically, I experience my body tacitly as a unified potential or capacity for doing this and that  typing this sentence, scratching that itch, etc. Moreover, this sense that I have of my own motor capacities expressed, say, as a kind of bodily confidence does not depend on an understanding of the physiological processes involved in performing the action in question. The distinction between the objective and phenomenal body is central to understanding the phenomenological treatment of embodiment. Embodiment is not a concept that pertains to the body grasped as a physiological entity. Rather it pertains to the phenomenal body and to the role it plays in our object-directed experiences. 

 

COSMOS – COSMOLOGICIA -- cosmologicum. Grice systematized metaphysics quite carefully. He distinguished between eschatology (or the theory of categories) and ontology proper. Within ontology, there is ‘ontologia generalis’ and ‘ontologia specialis.’ There are at least two branches of ‘ontologia specialis’: ‘cosmologia’ and ‘anthropologia.’ Grice would often refer to the ‘world’ in toto. For example, in “Meaning revisited,” when he speaks of the ‘triangle’: world-denotatum; signum-emissor, and soul. Grice was never a solipsist, and most of his theories are ‘causal’ in nature, including that of meaning and perception. As such, he was constantly fighting against acosmism. While not one of his twelve labours, he took a liking for the coinage. ‘Acosmism’ is formed in analogy to ‘atheism,’ meaning the denial of the ultimate reality of the world. Ernst Platner used it in 1776 to describe Spinoza’s philosophy, arguing that Spinoza did not intend to deny “the existence of the Godhead, but the existence of the world.” Maimon, Fichte, Hegel, and others make the same claim. By the time of Feuerbach it was also used to characterize a basic feature of Christianity: the denial of the world or worldliness.   Cosmologicum -- emanationism, a doctrine about the origin and ontological structure of the world, most frequently associated with Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, according to which everything else that exists is an emanation from a primordial unity, called by Plotinus “the One.” The first product of emanation from the One is Intelligence noûs, a realm resembling Plato’s world of Forms. From Intelligence emanates Soul psuche, conceived as an active principle that imposes, insofar as that is possible, the rational structure of Intelligence on the matter that emanates from Soul. The process of emanation is typically conceived to be necessary and timeless: although Soul, for instance, proceeds from Intelligence, the notion of procession is one of logical dependence rather than temporal sequence. The One remains unaffected and undiminished by emanation: Plotinus likens the One to the sun, which necessarily emits light from its naturally infinite abundance without suffering change or loss of its own substance. Although emanationism influenced some Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thinkers, it was incompatible with those theistic doctrines of divine activity that maintained that God’s creative choice and the world thus created were contingent, and that God can, if he chooses, interact directly with individual creatures. 

 

CILIBERTO: Michele Ciliberto (Napoli), filosofo. Uno dei massimi esperti del pensiero di Giordano Bruno. Nato a Napoli nel 1945, si è formato alla Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Firenze ed è stato allievo di Eugenio Garin, con cui si è laureato nel 1968 discutendo una tesi sulla fortuna di Niccolò Machiavelli. Dopo la laurea ha lavorato per alcuni anni come borsista presso il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, diretto da Tullio Gregory, per il quale ha preparato il Lessico di Giordano Bruno edito nel 1979. Nominato nel 1971 assistente alla cattedra di Storia della filosofia della Facoltà di Lettere dell'Firenze tenuta da Eugenio Garin e da Paolo Rossi, ha insegnato a vario titolo prima nella stessa Università, poi in quelle di Trieste e di Pisa, dove ha diretto, dal 1996 al 2002, il Dipartimento di Filosofia. Dal 2002 insegna Storia della filosofia moderna e contemporanea alla Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Nella Scuola Normale ha ricoperto vari incarichi tra cui la presidenza della Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, la direzione del Centro di Filosofia, la presidenza delle Edizioni della Normale. Dal 1996 è Presidente dell'Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento di Firenze. Dal 1998 è presidente di IRISAssociazione di Biblioteche Storico-Artistiche e Umanistiche di Firenze. È stato presidente dei Comitati nazionali per le celebrazioni di Giordano Bruno, Marsilio Ficino, Benedetto Varchi, Giovanni Della Casa e Lodovico Castelvetro.  Ha fatto parte del Consiglio Nazionale per i Beni culturali, fa parte del comitato direttivo del Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani e del consiglio scientifico dell’Istituto dell’Enciclopedia italiana; è membro dell’Advisory Committee della Tatti Renaissance Library della Harvard University e del comitato dei garanti della Fondazione Gramsci. È direttore scientifico dell’edizione delle opere latine di Giordano Bruno per la casa editrice Adelphi e ha coordinato l’enciclopedia Giordano Bruno. Parole, concetti, immagini e i volumi Il contributo italiano alla storia del pensiero. Filosofia e Croce e Gentile. La cultura italiana e l’Europa per l’Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana. Dirige la rivista Rinascimento, oltre a far parte del comitato scientifico della Rivista di storia della filosofia, del Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, degli Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di Lettere, di Dianoia, di Philosophia e di Studi storici. È socio nazionale dell’Accademia dei Lincei.  Pensiero Al centro dell’attività scientifica di Michele Ciliberto sono tre problemi: 1. la filosofia del Rinascimento con speciale attenzione all’opera e alle figure di Giordano Brunoal quale ha dedicato molti lavorie di Niccolò Machiavelli; 2. la filosofia contemporanea, in modo particolare la ‘tradizione’ italiana (Gramsci, Croce, Gentile, Cantimori, Garin). 3. la filosofia politica e in maniera specifica la crisi della democrazia rappresentativa.  Opere Il Rinascimento. Storia di un dibattito, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1975.  8822104749 Intellettuali e fascismo. Saggio su Delio Cantimori, Bari, De Donato, 1977. Lessico di Giordano Bruno, Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo & Bizzarri, 1979, 2 voll.  9788822228468 Come lavorava Gramsci. Varianti vichiane, Livorno, 1980. Filosofia e politica nel Novecento italiano. Da Labriola a «Società», Bari, De Donato, 1982. La ruota del tempo. Interpretazione di Giordano Bruno, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1986, 2000. Giordano Bruno, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1990, 2000. Introduzione a Bruno, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1996, 2000. Umbra profunda. Studi su Giordano Bruno, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1999.  978-88-8711-443-0 Figure in chiaroscuro. Filosofia e storiografia nel Novecento, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2001.  88-2225-129-6 Il dialogo recitato. Preliminari a una nuova edizione del Bruno volgare, Firenze, Olschki, 2002 (con N. Tirinnanzi). L'occhio di Atteone. Nuovi studi su Giordano Bruno, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2002, 2004.  88--8498-039-9 Pensare per contrari. Disincanto e utopia nel Rinascimento, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2005.  978-88-8498-264-3 Giordano Bruno. Il teatro della vita, Milano, Mondadori, 2007, 2008.  978-88-4207-337-6 Biblioteca laica. Il pensiero libero dell'Italia moderna, Roma-Bari, Laterza 2008.  978-88-4209-982-6 La democrazia dispotica, Roma-Bari, Laterza .  978-88-4209-464-7 Eugenio Garin. Un intellettuale nel Novecento, Roma-Bari, Laterza .  978-88-4209-709-9 Giordano Bruno. Parole concetti immagini, M. Ciliberto, 3 voll., Edizioni della Normale, Pisa .  978-88-7642-479-3 Croce e Gentile. La cultura italiana e l'Europa, (direzione) Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana Treccani, . Rinascimento, Pisa, Edizioni della Normale .  978-88-7642-563-9 Il nuovo Umanesimo, Roma-Bari, Laterza, .  978-88-5812-738-4 Niccolò Machiavelli. Ragione e pazzia, Roma-Bari, Laterza, .  978-88-5813-417-7 Il sapiente furore. Vita di Giordano Bruno, Collana gli Adelphi n.589, Milano, Adelphi, ,  978-88-459-3483-4. Note  Ciliberto, Michele, su treccani.it.  Michele Ciliberto, Lessico di Giordano Bruno, in Lessico intellettuale europeo, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1979,  9788822228468.  Scuola Normale Superiore, su sns.it.  Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, su insr.it.  IRIS Associazione di biblioteche, su iris-firenze.org.  Mibac, su librari.beniculturali.it.  Mibac, su librari.beniculturali.it.  Mibac, su librari.beniculturali.it.  Mibac, su librari.beniculturali.it.  Mibac, su librari.beniculturali.it.  Biografico, su treccani.it.  Chi siamo, su treccani.it.  Fondazione Gramsci, su fondazionegramsci.org.  INSR, su insr.it.  Edizioni della Normale, su edizioni.sns.it.  Enciclopedia italiana , su iris.unica.it.  Croce e Gentile. La cultura italiana e l'Europa, su radioradicale.it.  Olschki, su olschki.it.  Franco Angeli, su ojs.francoangeli.it.  Comitato Editoriale degli Annali Lettere SNS, su annalilettere.sns.it.  Comitato scientifico Dianoia, su dianoia.it.  Comitato scientifico Studi storici, su fondazionegramsci.org.  Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, su lincei.it.  Giordano Bruno Rinascimento Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Michele Ciliberto Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Michele Ciliberto  Michele Ciliberto, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Registrazioni di Michele Ciliberto, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale.  Pagina di Michele Ciliberto sul sito della Sns, su sns.it. 24 ottobre  5 novembre ). Il sito dell'Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, su insr.it. Filosofia Rinascimento  Rinascimento Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloStorici italiani del XX secoloStorici italiani Professore1945 16 luglio NapoliAccademici dei LinceiStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di FirenzeProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di FirenzeProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di TriesteProfessori dell'PisaProfessori della Scuola Normale SuperioreSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti italiani del XXI secoloStorici della filosofia italiani

 

CIMATTI not Cinatti: Felice Cimatti (Roma), filosofo. Laureato in filosofia alla Sapienza, con una tesi sui linguaggi animali, relatore Tullio De Mauro, correlatore Alberto Oliverio, insegna Filosofia del Linguaggio e Filosofia italiana contemporanea all'Università della Calabria ad Arcavacata di Rende.  Ha condotto e conduce, per Rai Radio 3, i programmi radiofonici Fahrenheit, dedicato ai libri e alle idee, e Uomini e Profeti, programma di approfondimento di temi religiosi e filosofici. Il 26 maggio  ha ricevuto il Premio Musatti conferito dalla Società Psicoanalitica Italiana. Dal  partecipa al programma televisivo Zettel, per Rai Cultura.  È condirettore, assieme a Francesca Piazza e Alfredo Paternoster, della Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio.  È figlio del poeta Pietro Cimatti e della pittrice Laura Giometti.  Opere Linguaggio ed esperienza visiva, 1997, Rende, Centro Editoriale e Librario. La scimmia che si parla. Linguaggio, autocoscienza e libertà nell'animale umano, 2000, Bollati Boringhieri Nel segno del cerchio. L'ontologia semiotica di Giorgio Prodi, 2000, Manifestolibri La mente silenziosa. Come pensano gli animali non umani, 2000, Editori Riuniti)  88-359-5160-7 Mente e linguaggio negli animali. Introduzione alla zoosemiotica cognitiva, 2002, Carocci editore,  88-430-2343-8 Il senso della mente. Per una critica del cognitivismo 2004, Bollati Boringhieri Mente, segno e vita. Elementi di filosofia per Scienze della comunicazione, 2004, Carocci editore Il volto e la parola. Per una psicologia dell'apparenza, 2007, Quodlibet,  Il possibile ed il reale. Il sacro dopo la morte di Dio, 2009, Codice Edizioni,  978-88-7578-122-4. Bollettino Filosofico. Linguaggio ed emozioni, 2009, Aracne  978-88-548-2417-1 con Marco Tullio Liuzza e Anna Maria Borghi, Lingue, corpo, pensiero: le ricerche contemporanee, Carocci,. Naturalmente comunisti. Politica, linguaggio ed economia , Bruno Mondadori.  978-88-6159-521-7. La vita che verrà. Biopolitica per Homo sapiens, , ombre corte, Filosofia della psicoanalisi. Un'introduzione in ventuno passi, Silvia Vizzardelli e Felice Cimatti, , Quodlibet,  978-88-7462-472-0 Filosofia dell'animalità, Laterza, ,  978-88-581-0941-0 Corpo, linguaggio e psicoanalisi, Felice Cimatti e Alberto Luchetti, , Quodlibet,  con Leonardo Caffo, A come Animale: voci per un bestiario dei sentimenti, Bompiani, ,  Il taglio. Linguaggio e pulsione di morte, Quodlibet, ,  978-88-7462-731-8. Filosofie del linguaggio. Storie, autori, concetti, Felice Cimatti e Francesca Piazza, Carocci, ,   Psicoanimot, La psicoanalisi e l'animalità, Felice Cimatti, Graphe.it, ,  978-88-9372-007-6 Sguardi animali, Mimesis ,  978-88-575-4506-6 Per una filosofia del reale, Bollati Boringhieri, ,  La vita estrinseca. Dopo il linguaggio, Orthotes, Salerno, , A Biosemiotic Ontology. The Philosophy of Giorgio Prodi, Springer, Berlin, ,  978-3-319-97903-8 Abbecedario del reale, Felice Cimatti e Alex Pagliardini, Quodlibet, Macerata ,  La fabbrica del ricordo, Il Mulino ,  978-88-15-28658-1 Unbecoming Human. Philosophy of Animality after Deleuze, Edinburgh University Press ,  978-1-4744-4339-5 Narrativa Senza colpa , , Marcos y Marcos) 37ª giornata in C'è un grande prato verde. 38 scrittori raccontano il campionato di calcio /13, Carlo D'Amicis, , Manni Editori “Dopo la natura”, not.neroeditions.com/i-bambini-del-compost/ Attività artistica Bestie 13 febbraio , Bestie, presso la Galleria M.A.D., via Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina, 62-64-66 Roma. Partecipazione alla mostra Il mondoinfine, presso la Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Moderna e Contemporanea di Roma dal 13/12/ al 23/1/. Note  Dipartimento di filosofia, su dipfilosofia.unical.it. 29 settembre  4 giugno ).  Radio Tre Archiviato il 30 agosto  in .  Premio Cesare Musatti a Felice Cimatti, su spiweb.it. 29 settembre .  Zettel  Direzione, su rifl.unical.it. 29 settembre .  Storni / Starlings   Semiotica Animalità Filosofia del linguaggio Psicoanalisi Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Felice Cimatti  Opere di Felice Cimatti, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.  Filosofia Letteratura  Letteratura Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1959 20 settembre RomaSemiologi italiani

 

CIONE -- Domenico Edmondo Cione (Napoli), filosofio. Di tendenze socialiste, e in un primo momento antifasciste, è stato allievo di studi di Benedetto Croce. Perseguitato della prima ora dal Fascismo, viene rinchiuso nel campo di Colfiorito di Foligno e poi mandato al confino a Montemurro.  Adesione alla Repubblica Sociale Italiana Attratto dal nuovo indirizzo espresso dal Manifesto di Verona, aderisce alla Repubblica Sociale Italiana. Chiede e ottiene il consenso di Benito Mussolini (il quale si rende esplicitamente concorde) per la costituzione di una formazione politica indipendente dal Partito Fascista Repubblicano, denominata in un primo momento Raggruppamento Nazionale Repubblicano Socialista e, in seguito, Partito Repubblicano Socialista Italiano.  A tale formazione politica, su suggerimento dello stesso Mussolini, sarà concessa anche la pubblicazione di un quotidiano L'Italia del Popolo. Il Duce però non aveva nessuna fiducia né nell'uomo, né nell'impresa, tanto che durante una conversazione con l'ambasciatore Rudolf Rahnpreoccupato per una possibile apertura "a sinistra" del capo del fascismoebbe a dichiarare:  «Per ingannare i nostri avversari ho lasciato, non appena ho pensato che il nuovo fascismo in Italia fosse abbastanza forte, che alcune controcorrenti dicessero la loro, tra l’altro ho permesso che si formasse un gruppo di opposizione sotto la guida del professor Cione. Il professor Cione non ha una gran testa, e non avrà successo. Ma la gente che ora sta cercando di crearsi un alibi si raccoglierà intorno a lui e quindi sarà perduta per il Comitato di liberazione che è molto più pericoloso.»  () Attività politica nel dopoguerra Salvatosi dalle epurazioni partigiane nel dopoguerra, si costruirà una carriera politica nell'Italia repubblicana. Dal 1946 al 1949 militò nel Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque; successivamente, quando il partito di Guglielmo Giannini si sciolse, entrò nel Movimento Sociale Italiano e nel 1952 venne eletto consigliere e poi assessore della giunta di Achille Lauro. Nel 1953 si candidò al Senato con la lista della fiamma nel colleggio di Afragola ma ottenne il 7.8% dei voti e non fueletto. Deluso dai missini, aderì alla Democrazia Cristiana, senza però svolgere una militanza attiva nel partito. Negli ultimi anni di vita cercò di conciliare il messaggio di papa Giovanni XXIII con le aperture di Nikita Kruscev oltre la "cortina di ferro".  Opere Juan de Valdés: la sua vita e il suo pensiero religioso con una completa  delle opere del Valdés e degli scritti intorno a lui, Laterza editore, 1938 (2ª ed. Fiorentino, 1963) Francesco de Sanctis, Ed. Giuseppe Principato, 1938 L'opera filosofica, coautore Franco Laterza, Laterza editore, 1942 Napoli romantica, 1830-1848, Gruppo Editoriale Domus, 1944 L'estetica di Francesco De Sanctis, Pennetti Casoni Editore, 1945 Dal de Sanctis al novecento, Garzanti, 1941 (2ª ed. Pennetti Casoni Editore, 1945) Nazionalismo sociale: l'idea corporativa come interpretazione della storia, Achille Celli Editore, 1950 Napoli e Malaparte, Editore Pellerano-Del Gaudio, 1950 Storia della repubblica sociale italiana, Ed. Latinità, 1951 Benedetto Croce, coll. "I Marmi", Longanesi, 1953  crociana, Fratelli Bocca, 1956 Francesco de Sanctis ed i suoi tempi, Montanino, 1960 Questa Europa, M. Mele, 1962 Fascino del mondo arabo: dal Marocco alla Persia, Cappelli Editore, 1962 Benedetto Croce ed il pensiero contemporaneo, Loganesi editore, 1963 Fede e ragione nella storia: filosofia della religione e storia degli ideali religiosi dell'Occidente, Cappelli Editore, 1963 La Cina d'oggi, Filippine, Formosa, Giappone, Editore Ceschina, 1965 Leibniz, Libreria scientifica editrice, 1964 Narrativa del Novecento, Istituto editoriale del Mezzogiorno, 1965 Curatele Francesco De Sanctis, Un viaggio elettorale, Bompiani, 1943 Note //treccani.it/enciclopedia/domenico-edmondo-cione_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/  A. Spinosa, Mussolini. Il fascino di un dittatore, Mondadori, Milano, 1989, pag. 293  Senato 07/06/1953 Area ITALIA Regione CAMPANIA Collegio AFRAGOLA, elezionistorico.interno.gov.it.  Manifesto di Verona Raggruppamento Nazionale Repubblicano Socialista Repubblica Sociale Italiana Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Edmondo Cione  Opere di Edmondo Cione sul web (da Google book search) Gennaro Incarnato, «CIONE, Domenico Edmondo» in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 25, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1981. Repubblichini d'opposizione. Storia. Un ex allievo di Croce negli ultimi mesi di Salò crea un "partito contro" su suggerimento del ministro dell'Educazione Biggini di Silvio Bertoldi, Corriere della Sera, 30 gennaio 199530, Archivio storico.  Biografie  Biografie Fascismo  Fascismo Politica  Politica Categorie: Storici della filosofia italianiStorici italiani del XX secoloCritici letterari italiani Professore1908 1965 9 giugno 19 giugno Napoli NapoliAccademici italiani del XX secoloPersonalità della Repubblica Sociale ItalianaPolitici della Democrazia CristianaPolitici del Partito Nazionale FascistaPolitici italiani del XX secoloProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II

 

COCO: Nicola Coco Presidente della prima sezione civile della Corte Suprema di Cassazione Durata mandato19381948 Presidente aggiunto del Tribunale Supremo delle Acque Durata mandato19371938 Consigliere della Corte di Cassazione Durata mandato19301937 Segretario generale dell'Associazione Generale fra i Magistrati d'Italia Nicola Coco (Umbriatico), filosofo.  Dal punto di vista sistematico fu molto vicino alla visione del grundnorm, teoria elaborata in passato dal filosofo e giurista austriaco Hans Kelsen.   Figlio di Luigi, di professione farmacista, e di Teresina Morelli, napoletana e insegnante di pianoforte diplomatasi al conservatorio di San Pietro a Majella a Napoli, si laureò in Giurisprudenza ed iniziò la carriera giudiziaria nel 1906, a soli 24 anni, con la nomina a Pretore di Lagonegro.  Nel 1910 fu Pretore di Moliterno, per poi essere nominato Sostituto procuratore del Re a Cassino.  Nel 1917 venne trasferito alla Regia Procura di Roma, ove vi rimarrà fino al 1923, anno della sua nomina a sostituto Procuratore Generale presso la Corte d'appello di Roma. In quello stesso anno sarà, insieme a Gaetano Azzariti, tra i principali fondatori e promotori dell'Ufficio del Massimario.  Nel 1924 ottenne la cattedra di Filosofia del diritto penale all'Università degli Studi "La Sapienza" di Roma.  Consigliere della Corte di Cassazione dal 1930 al 1937, venne poi nominato Procuratore generale del Re presso la Corte d'appello di Cagliari, senza però esercitare mai quella funzione; fu invece presidente aggiunto del Tribunale Supremo delle Acque fino al 1938, quando ricevette la nomina a Presidente della prima sezione civile della Corte Suprema di Cassazione.  Fu noto soprattutto per aver partecipato ai lavori di stesura del nuovo codice civile italiano nonché del codice di procedura civile, entrambi entrati in vigore nel 1942. Si occupò prevalentemente della stesura di leggi in materia di contratti, obbligazioni, diritto del lavoro, ecc.  Nicola Coco si spense a Roma il 3 maggio 1948.  Opere Gli eclettismi contemporanei e le lezioni di filosofia del diritto, Lagonegro, M. Tancredi & Figli, 1909; Una quistione di diritto transitorio in tema di farmacie, Milano, Società Editrice Libraria, 1914; Sull'ultimo capoverso dell'art. 375 del codice penale, Milano, Società Editrice Libraria, 1916; Luce di pensiero italico nelle tenebre della guerra, Cassino, Soc. Tip. Ed. Meridionale, 1917; Per la tradizione giuridica italiana, Milano, Società Editrice Libraria, 1918; Saggio filosofico sulla corporazione fascista, Roma, Edizioni del diritto del lavoro, 1927; Sulla costituzione di parte civile delle associazioni sindacali, Roma, Edizioni del diritto del lavoro, 1928; Corso di diritto internazionale (recensita da Santi Romano, seconda edizione riveduta ed ampliata), Padova, CEDAM, 1929; Intorno alla pregiudiziale penale nel giudizio del lavoro, Roma, U.S.I.L.A., 1932; Raffaele Garofalo, Napoli, SIEM, 1934; Il contratto collettivo di lavoro e le imprese cooperative, Roma, s.n., 1935; Una inchiesta sulla criminalità in Francia, Napoli, SIEM, 1936. Onorificenze Commendatore dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaronastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaro «Su iniziativa del Re d'Italia Vittorio Emanuele III» — Roma, 6 gennaio 1940 Grande ufficiale dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italianastrino per uniforme ordinariaGrande ufficiale dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italia «Su iniziativa del Re d'Italia Vittorio Emanuele III» — Roma, 28 settembre 1938 Note  AnnuarioCamera dei fasci e delle corporazioni, 1941409  Rivista penale. Rassegna di dottrina, legislazione, giurisprudenza, Roma, Libreria del Littorio, 1938,  345 e 773   Rivista di diritto pubblico. La giustizia amministrativa,  40, Roma, Società per la Rivista di diritto pubblico e la Giustizia amministrativa, 1948327  Una vita per il Diritto Giusto, su sentieridigitali.it. 27 gennaio .  La giustizia penale. Rivista critica settimanale di giurisprudenza, dottrina e legislazione, Società editoriale del periodico La giustizia penale, 191431  Tale trasferimento avvenne per via di un suggerimento pervenutogli al Re dagli allora procuratori presso la Corte d'appello di Napoli Salvatore Pagliano e Giacomo Calabria.  La giustizia tributaria. Dottrina, giurisprudenza, legislazione, Città di Castello, Società tipografica Leonardo da Vinci, 194689  Cfr. Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia n°. 219 del 18 settembre 1940  Cfr. Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia n°. 140 del 16 giugno 1939   La scuola positiva. Rivista di diritto e procedura penale, Milano, Vallardi, 1931.  Corte suprema di cassazione Codice civile italiano Codice di procedura civile italiano  Nicola Coco, insigne magistrato e giurista della nobile Terra di Calabria, su attualita.it. 26 gennaio . ilosofia Storia  Storia Università  Università Categorie: Magistrati italianiGiuristi italiani del XX secoloInsegnanti italiani Professore1882 1948 2 ottobre 3 maggio Umbriatico RomaFilosofi italiani del XX secoloStorici italiani del XX secoloProfessori della SapienzaRomaGrandi ufficiali dell'Ordine della Corona d'ItaliaCommendatori dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e LazzaroGiudici della Corte suprema di cassazione

 

CODRONCHI - Nicola Codronchi (Imola) filosofo. Saggio filosofico, 1783 (Milano, Fondazione Mansutti). Appartenente alla nobiltà, dopo la laurea in giurisprudenza prosegue gli studi approfondendo la matematica spinto dal padre Innocenzo Codronchi. In seguito entra alla corte del regno di Napoli, prima con Ferdinando I e poi con Giuseppe Bonaparte, da cui ottiene la nomina a consigliere di Stato. Le sue opere più celebri sono un trattato sull'etica e il Saggio filosofico su i contratti e giochi d'azzardo (1783), in cui affronta con semplicità l'argomento del calcolo delle probabilità. Codronchi distingue in tre classi di contratti aleatori: quelli in cui è noto il rapporto tra eventi favorevoli contrari, quelli in cui questo rapporto è fondato sull'esperienza, quelli in cui il rapporto si basa su leggi sicure e in parte sull'esperienza.  Il 9 maggio 1784 divenne socio dell'Accademia delle scienze di Torino.  Fondazione Mansutti, Quaderni di sicurtà. Documenti di storia dell'assicurazione, M. Bonomelli, schede bibliografiche di C. Di Battista, note critiche di F. Mansutti. Milano: Electa, ,  110–111 Note  Nicola CODRONCHI, su accademiadellescienze.it. 28 agosto . Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Nicola Codronchi  Opere di Nicola Codronchi, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.   Biografie  Biografie Storia  Storia Filosofo del XVIII secoloFilosofi italiani del XIX secoloEconomisti italiani 1751 1818 Imola Napoli

 

COLAZZA: Giovanni Colazza, noto anche con lo pseudonimo di Leo (Roma3), filosofo.   Nato in una famiglia dell'alta borghesia romana, da cui ricevette un'educazione cattolica, fu istruito agli studi umanistici e si laureò nel 1902 in medicina e chirurgia all'università La Sapienza.  Cultore dell'esoterismo e delle dottrine massoniche e teosofiche, verso le quali nutriva interessi che condivideva col suo compagno di studi Giovanni Amendola, come lui membro della sezione italiana della Società teosofica, fondata nel 1902, diretta da Isabel Cooper-Oackley. Negli ambienti teosofici ebbe modo di conoscere il fondatore dell'antroposofia Rudolf Steiner tramite la sua amicizia con la moglie di questi, Marie von Sivers, che glielo presentò personalmente a Roma in piazza di Spagna nel 1911. In occasione di quell'incontro, Steiner gli consegnò il libro sull'Iniziazione da lui scritto, tradotto in francese. Secondo la testimonianza della baronessa Olga de Grünewald, Steiner sarebbe venuto in Italia «a conoscere il dottor Colazza perché questi gli era stato indicato dal Mondo Spirituale» con l'intento di affidargli la guida del movimento antroposofico in Italia.  In quegli anni Colazza fondò così uno dei primi Gruppi di Studi antroposofici in Italia, che chiamò «Novalis», tenuto a battesimo dallo stesso Steiner, con il quale continuò a restare in contatto recandosi annualmente a Dornach, sede principale del movimento. Sempre secondo la testimonianza della de Grünewald, Colazza «non solo era il discepolo più caro a Rudolf Steiner, ma la figura più elevata dopo di lui». Dall'incontro con l'antroposofia Colazza apprese l'esigenza di seguire pratiche spirituali di concentrazione adatte al contesto occidentale ed all'epoca attuale, molto diverse dai metodi orientali ritenuti ormai anacronistici, coltivando in particolare la «via del pensiero cosciente».  Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svgEsercizi di Rudolf Steiner per lo sviluppo spirituale. Colazza prese parte come volontario alla prima guerra mondiale, dove fu in trincea come medico ufficiale di campo.  Continuò in seguito la sua attività di medico, anche presso ambasciate straniere, dedicandosi in particolare alla cura dei bambini poveri, che secondo la testimonianza di un suo discepolo, Enrico Pappacena, accoglieva gratuitamente nella sua abitazione romana.  Dal 1927 al 1929 fu membro del gruppo di Ur, diretto da Julius Evola, presso il quale scrisse diversi articoli sulla rivista Ur, pubblicandoli con lo pseudonimo di Leo, rivista i cui contenuti appariranno in seguito in forma di libro intitolato Introduzione alla Magia come scienza dell'Io, edito da Mediterranee.  Dagli anni quaranta tenne inoltre numerose conferenze, tra cui un ciclo sul saggio di Steiner L'Iniziazione, che fu raccolto e pubblicato postumo dalla casa editrice Tilopa nel 1992, col titolo Dell'iniziazione.  Fra i suoi più illustri discepoli vi fu Massimo Scaligero.  Opere Dell'Iniziazione, Tilopa, 1992 Introduzione alla magia, in collaborazione col gruppo di Ur (1ª 1955), 3 voll., Edizioni Mediterranee, 1987 Note  Nel 1905 sarebbe stato iniziato alla massoneria nella loggia Roma del Grande Oriente d'Italia, all'interno della quale sarebbe divenuto compagno, e quindi maestro nel 1907, per poi presumibilmente uscirne nel 1908.  Giovanni Colazza, articolo di Piero Cammerinesi.  Massimo Scaligero, Dallo Yoga alla Rosacroce,  86-87, Roma, Perseo, 1972.  Massimo Scaligero, Dallo Yoga alla Rosacroce,  85-86, Roma, Perseo, 1972.  Giovanni Colazza l'asceta adamantino, articolo dal sito di Econatroposophia.  Enrico Pappacena, Di alcuni cultori della scienza dello spirito, Bari, 1971.  Julius Evola e l'esperienza del Gruppo di Ur. La storia "occulta" dell'Italia del Novecento, articolo di Stefano Arcella su "Hera", settembre .  Presumibilmente in omaggio al suo segno zodiacale, il Leone.  Antroposofia Gruppo di Ur  Conferenza inedita di Giovanni Colazza Piero Cammerinesi, "Giovanni Colazza" su liberopensare.com V D M Antroposofia Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloEsoteristi italiani 1877 1953 9 agosto 16 febbraio RomaTeosofi italianiAntroposofi italianiErmetisti italianiMassoni

 

COLECCHI -- Ottavio Colecchi   Pescocostanzo: targa commemorativa Ottavio Colecchi (Pescocostanzo) filosofo.  Casa natale di Ottavio Colecchi, sulla via omonima Nacque a Pescocostanzo nel 1773. Si dedicò dapprima alla teologia e divenne frate domenicano presso il convento di Ortona, dove subì diverse perquisizioni da parte dell'Inquisizione per la sua tacita simpatia verso gli ideali rivoluzionari. Nel 1809, a causa della soppressione degli ordini religiosi, fu costretto ad abbandonare l'abito religioso. Insegnante di matematica presso la Reale Accademia Militare della Nunziatella intorno al 1812, dopo la caduta di Murat, venne mandato in missione in Russia, dove si dedicò all'insegnamento della Filosofia e della Matematica. Al ritorno, nel 1817, soggiornò a Königsberg, in Germania, dove ebbe modo di conoscere l'opera di Immanuel Kant. Fu uno dei primi filosofi italiani a studiare Kant in lingua originale.  Rientrato in Italia, fondò a Napoli una scuola privata di filosofia ed ebbe tra i suoi allievi i fratelli Spaventa, Bertrando e Silvio, Francesco De Sanctis, Luigi Settembrini e Camillo Caracciolo. Il suo merito principale fu quello di essere, insieme a Pasquale Galluppi, il primo assertore del criticismo kantiano nell'Italia meridionale.  Oggi una targa è posta sulla sua casa natale in via del Convento (oggi via Colecchi); a lui è dedicata la biblioteca pubblica e un busto nella piazzetta tra via Colecchi e via Mastri Lombardi.  Opere Se la sola analisi sia un mezzo d'invenzione, o s'inventi colla sintesi ancora? Memoria di Ottavio Colecchi, «Progresso», V, 1836,  XIV,  213-228. Saggio sulle leggi del pensiere, «Progresso», VI, 1837,  XVI,  161-192. Sulla analisi e sulla sintesi. Teorica di V. Cousin. Suo esame, «Progresso», VI, 1837,  XVII,  189-216. Sulla legge morale, «Progresso», VIII, 1838,  XX,  145-159;  XXI,  5-33; VIII, 1839,  XXII,  161-175;  XXIII,  5-26;  XXIV,  5-27, 225-240. Sulle leggi della ragione, «Progresso», IX, 1840,  XXV,  169-186. Ora in Quistioni filosofiche,  325-346. Se il raziocinio sia essenzialmente diverso dalla intuizione, «Ore solitarie», ottobre 1840, f. 10,  289-299; e «Giornale abruzzese», VI, ottobre 1841,  XX, n. 57,  15-36. Se nell'invenzione eserciti maggior influenza la sintesi o l'analisi, «Giornale abruzzese», VI, marzo 1841,  XVII, n. 51,  143-154. Se li giudizi necessari sieno solamente gli analitici, «Giornale abruzzese», VI, aprile 1841,  XVIII, n. 52,  26-33. Se quella, che un moderno scrittore di logica appella identità formale del raziocinio, sia valevole a convertire il raziocinio empirico in raziocinio misto?, «Giornale abruzzese», VI, maggio 1841,  XVIII, n. 53,  65-74. Principii sui quali poggia il raziocinio quando classifica e quando istruisce, secondo un moderno scrittore di logica, «Giornale abruzzese», VI, giugno 1841,  XIX, n. 56,  24-29. Quistioni ideologiche, «Giornale abruzzese», VI, novembre 1841,  XX, n. 59,  100-114. Se diasi una logica pura, ed una logica mista, «Lucifero», IV, 1841, n. 8,  63-64. Se le idee soggettive non altro sieno che idee di rapporti, «Museo», II, 1842,  IV,  3-8. Sulle idee dello spazio e del tempo, «Museo», II, 1842,  IV,  97-109. Quistione relativa al primo problema di filosofiaSe le nostre sensazioni sieno esterne di lor natura, o tali diventino in forza de' giudizi abituali?,«Progr.», n.s., 1843,  I,  43-58. Sopra alcune quistioni le più importanti della filosofia. Osservazioni critiche, «Giambattista Vico», 1857,  I, fasc. 3,  335-397;  II, fasc. I,  123-136;  III, fasc. I,  68-96. Ora in Quistioni filosofiche,  771-874. Scritti inediti (Psicologia, Logica applicata, Ideologia, Frammento apologetico), in G. Gentile, Dal Genovesi al Galluppi. Ricerche storiche, Edizioni della Critica, Napoli 1903,  [345]-374; e in Storia della filosofia italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi,  II, Firenze 19372,  211-249. Sopra alcune quistioni le più importanti della filosofia. Osservazioni critiche di Ottavio Colecchi, 2 voll., Tip. «All'insegna di Aldo Manuzio», Napoli 1843. Rist. anastatica: Quistioni filosofiche, a cura dell'Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici, con introd. di F. Tessitore, Procaccini, Napoli 1980, 892   E. Pessina, Quadro storico dei sistemi filosofici, Milano 1845,  259-261. P. G. Falcocchio, Necrologia di Ottavio Colecchi, in «Poliorama pittoresco», XII (1848),  357-358. N. M. Zappi, Elogio funebre di Ottavio Colecchi, Chieti 1848. B. Spaventa, Studi sopra la filosofia di Hegel, Torino 1850. L. Settembrini, Lezioni di letteratura italiana, III, Napoli 1876419. F. Fiorentino, Scritti vari di letteratura, filosofia e critica, Napoli 1877,  474-475. A. De Nino, Briciole letterarie, I, Lanciano 1884,  57-61. F. De Sanctis, La lettereratura italiana nel secolo XIX, Napoli 1897,  185, 230. S. Marchi, Il sistema filosofico di Ottavio Colecchi (filosofo abruzzese), Tip. Sociale di A. Eliseo, L'Aquila 190055. F. Amodeo, Ottavio Colecchi, in «Atti della Accademia Pontaniana», XLVII (1917), memoria n. 3. C. Imperatore, Ottavio Colecchi, filosofo e matematico abruzzese, I, Discussioni biografiche e documenti inediti, Ravenna 1920. A. Zazo, L'istruzione pubblica e privata nel Napoletano (1760-1860), Città di Castello 1927,  234-235. G. Sabatini, Ottavio Colecchi filosofo e matematico: nuove notizie e nuovi documenti, in «Rassegna abruzzese di storia e d'arte», IV (1928),  19-94. G. Gentile, Storia della filosofia italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi,  II, Milano 1930,  138-249. E. Codignola, Pedagogisti ed educatori, Milano 1939,  141-142. A. Capograssi, Nuovi documenti sull'accusa di ateismo ad Ottavio Colecchi, in «Samnium», XIII (1940),  73-89. P. Romano, Un antagonista del Galluppi: Ottavio Colecchi, in «Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania», XIII (1944),  157-170. A. Cristallini, Ottavio Colecchi, un filosofo da riscoprire, Padova 1968. G. Oldrini, La cultura filosofica napoletana dell'Ottocento, Bari 1973,  158-163. E. Garin, Storia della filosofia italiana,  III, Torino 1978,  1091-1093. F. Tessitore, Colecchi e gli scettici, in Introduzione a Quistioni filosofiche, Napoli 1980. G. Cacciatore, Vico e Kant nella filosofia di Ottavio Colecchi, in «Bollettino del Centro di studi vichiani», XII-XIII, 1982-1983,  63-99. G. Sabatini, Io e Ottavio Colecchi. Narrazione biografica in forma di anamnesi, Japadre Editore, L'Aquila-Roma 2008.  Roberto Grita, «COLECCHI, Ottavio» in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 26, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1982. Filosofia Matematica  Matematica Filosofo del XIX secoloMatematici italiani Professore1773 1848 18 settembre 28 agosto Pescocostanzo NapoliDomenicani italianiEx domenicani

 

COLLETTI: Lucio Colletti.jpg Deputato della Repubblica Italiana Durata mandato9 maggio 19963 novembre 2001 LegislatureXIII, XIV Gruppo parlamentareForza Italia CircoscrizioneLombardia 1 e Veneto 2 Incarichi parlamentari Componente del Comitato di vigilanza sull'attività di documentazione (XIII legislatura) Componente della III Commissione permanente Esteri (XIII legislatura) Componente della IV Commissione permanente Difesa (XIV legislatura) Sito istituzionale Dati generali Partito politicoPdA (1943-1947) PCI (1947-1964) Indipendente (1964-1994) FI (1994-2001) Titolo di studiolaurea in lettere e filosofia UniversitàUniversità degli Studi di Messina e Università “La Sapienza” Professionedocente universitario Lucio Colletti (Roma) filosofo. Partigiano, aderente prima al Partito d'Azione e poi al Partito Comunista Italiano, dopo la laurea in filosofia insegnò Storia della filosofia e Filosofia teoretica all'Università La Sapienza di Roma. Allievo di Galvano Della Volpe, militò nel PCI fino al 1964, anno in cui uscì dal partito su posizioni di sinistra radicale. Quindi fondò e diresse il periodico La Sinistra (1966-1967).  Pubblicò nel 1969 il volume Il marxismo e Hegel che rinnovò in profondità gli studi marxisti occidentali. La sua crisi teorica, a lungo maturata, fu testimoniata dalla celebre Intervista politico-filosofica del (1974), apparsa dapprima sulla rivista inglese New Left Review e poi in volume presso i tipi della Casa editrice Laterza, volume con cui l'allora direttore editoriale Enrico Mistretta iniziò l'innovativa serie dei libri-intervista. Laterza fu per Lucio Colletti l'editore di riferimento, e per molti anni ne fu anche consulente. Nel 1971 era stato tra i firmatari della lettera aperta pubblicata sul settimanale L'Espresso sul caso Pinelli e di un'altra pubblicata ad ottobre su Lotta Continua in cui esprimeva solidarietà verso alcuni militanti e direttori responsabili del giornale, inquisiti per istigazione a delinquere per il contenuto di alcuni articoli.  Intellettuale molto apprezzato dalla sinistra italiana, dal 1974 al 1978 pensò di lasciare l'Italia e di trasferirsi in Svizzera, rivolgendo sempre più le sue letture filosofiche al mondo anglosassone del neoempirismo, anche su sollecitazione di quel suo amico e sodale che da allora fu Marcello Pera. Negli anni ottanta portò alle estreme conclusioni il processo di revisione della sua ideologia, che lo condusse dapprima a collaborare con Mondoperaio (rivista ufficiale del Partito Socialista Italiano) e, in seguito, ad aderire alla recente formazione politica di Silvio Berlusconi, Forza Italia, nelle cui liste fu eletto deputato nelle elezioni politiche del 1996 e del 2001.  Morì per un malore durante un bagno alle Terme di Calidario a Venturina, venendo poi sepolto nel cimitero del Verano di Roma.  Opere Il marxismo e Hegel, in Lenin, Quaderni filosofici, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1958. Ideologia e società, Bari, Laterza, 1969. Il marxismo e Hegel, Bari, Laterza, 1969. Il futuro del capitalismo. Crollo o sviluppo?, e con Claudio Napoleoni, Bari, Laterza, 1970. Intervista politico-filosofica, con un saggio su Marxismo e dialettica, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1974. Il marxismo e il "crollo" del capitalismo, a cura di, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1975. Tra marxismo e no, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1979. Tramonto dell'ideologia. [Le ideologie dal '68 a oggi; Dialettica e non-contraddizione; Kelsen e il marxismo], Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1980. Crisi delle ideologie. Intervista politico-filosofica, Il marxismo del XX secolo, Le ideologie dal '68 a oggi, Milano, Club degli editori, 1981. Pagine di filosofia e politica, Milano, Rizzoli, 1989.  88-17-85214-7. La logica di Benedetto Croce, Lungro di Cosenza, Marco, 1992.  88-85350-25-9. Fine della filosofia e altri saggi, Roma, Ideazione, 1996.  88-86812-14-0. Lezioni tedesche. Con Kant, alla ricerca di un'etica laica, Roma, Liberal, 2008.  88-88835-26-1. Note  È morto Lucio Colletti voce "contro" di Forza Italia, su repubblica.it, 3 novembre 2001.  Camera dei Deputati, Gruppo Parlamentare di Forza Italia, Ricordo di Lucio Colletti, Roma, Stampa e servizi, 2001 Orlando Tambosi, Perché il marxismo ha fallito Lucio Colletti e la storia di una grande illusione, Milano, Mondadori, 2001.  88-04-48844-1 Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali, Lucio Colletti: il cammino di un filosofo contemporaneo (1924-2001), Roma, Essetre, 2003 Pino Bongiorno, Aldo G. Ricci, Lucio Colletti scienza e libertà, Roma, Ideazione, 2004.  88-88800-17-4. Cristina Corradi, Storia dei marxismi in Italia, Roma, Manifestolibri, 2005,  124–138.  88-7285-386-9. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Lucio Colletti  Collétti, Lucio la voce nella Treccani.it L'Enciclopedia Italiana. il 20/07/ Lucio Colletti, su Camera.itXIII legislatura, Parlamento italiano. Lucio Colletti, su Camera.itXIV legislatura, Parlamento italiano. La storia di Lucio Colletti di Costanzo Preve, nel sito Kelebek Filosofia Politica  Politica Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloPolitici italiani del XX secoloPolitici italiani Professore1924 2001Nati l'8 dicembre 3 novembre Roma Venturina TermePolitici del Partito d'AzionePolitici del Partito Comunista ItalianoPolitici di Forza Italia (1994)Deputati della XIII legislatura della Repubblica ItalianaDeputati della XIV legislatura della Repubblica ItalianaSepolti nel cimitero del VeranoStudenti della SapienzaRomaProfessori della SapienzaRomaFondatori di riviste italianeDirettori di periodici italiani

 

COLLI: Giorgio Colli (Torino) filosofo. Ha insegnato per trent'anni Storia della filosofia antica all'Pisa. Giorgio Colli discendeva da una facoltosa famiglia torinese. Il padre, Giuseppe, amministrò il quotidiano La Stampa ai tempi di Alfredo Frassati, incarico dal quale fu poi estromesso all'indomani della marcia su Roma, su ordine di Benito Mussolini, per mettere alla direzione del quotidiano lo scrittore Curzio Malaparte. Dopo la Liberazione fu nominato amministratore del Corriere della Sera, dove restò per sedici anni.  Colli frequentò in giovane età l'Istituto Principessa Clotilde di Savoia, e successivamente concluse gli studi presso l'Torino, laureandosi in giurisprudenza l'11 luglio 1939, relatore Gioele Solari, discutendo una tesi in filosofia del diritto e filosofia politica dal titolo Politicità ellenica e Platone, sullo sviluppo storico del pensiero politico di Platone, ampie parti della quale furono pubblicate a cura dello stesso Gioele Solari.  Studioso schivo e appartato, lontano da correnti di pensiero "in voga", fedele a Nietzsche e Schopenhauer, scorse nell'antica sapienza presocratica l'autentico "logos" a cui ritornare.  Lo stile di scrittura, profondo e costellato di aforismi taglienti, era caratterizzato da un'attenzione maniacale alla musicalità del testo e della parola. Questa dote musicale emerge con chiarezza dalle letture di alcuni passi di Colli recitati da Carmelo Bene.  Filosofia dell'espressione Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svgFilosofia dell'espressione. La sua opera principale è Filosofia dell'espressione (1969), che fornisce, mediante una complessa teoria delle categorie e della deduzione, un'interpretazione della totalità della manifestazione come "espressione" di qualcosa (l'immediatezza) che sfugge alla presa della conoscenza. Comunque, Colli ritiene che sia possibile riguadagnare il fondamento metafisico del mondo portando il discorso filosofico ai suoi estremi limiti e "(di)mostrando" la natura derivata del logos. Bisogna quindi fare i conti con Filosofia dell'espressione se non si vuole scambiare Colli solo per un geniale interprete di Schopenhauer e di Nietzsche.  Contributi alla storia della filosofia Colli, oltre che filosofo, fu anche apprezzato traduttore dell'Organon di Aristotele e della Critica della ragion pura di Kant nonché docente di Storia della filosofia antica all'Pisa e direttore di collana per diverse case editrici (Einaudi, Boringhieri, Adelphi). Come storico della filosofia, è stato particolarmente importante il suo contributo storico, filologico e critico esercitato su autori come Aristotele, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche.  Sapienza greca Tra i contributi alla storia della filosofia antica vanno ricordati i tre volumi sulla Sapienza greca, opera rimasta incompiuta a causa della sua morte. In essa sono raccolti i frammenti dei presocratici e vengono analizzati l'orfismo, i misteri eleusini e i culti delle divinità greche, in particolare Dioniso e Apollo, come forme alogiche di sapienza. Al tentativo di interpretare gli enigmi di questi culti, fra i quali quelli oracolari, viene fatta risalire l'origine remota della dialettica e della filosofia, di cui Colli si occupa anche in altri libri.  Edizione critica delle opere di Nietzsche A lui si deve anche la prima e fondamentale edizione critica delle opere e degli epistolari di Friedrich Nietzsche, condotta insieme al suo principale allievo Mazzino Montinari. Questa ultima operazione rappresenta senza dubbio uno dei più grandi meriti della coppia Colli-Montinari. In particolare la pubblicazione in edizione critica della "Volontà di potenza" evidenziò come la versione pubblicata nel 1906 da Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche (sorella del celebre filosofo tedesco) presentava numerose e discutibili manipolazioni in chiave razzista e xenofoba totalmente assenti nell'originale e introdotte volutamente dalla Förster. L'edizione critica delle opere nietzschiane diede avvio ad una profonda revisione degli studi su questo filosofo e in particolare mise in discussione molte interpretazioni che, proprio partendo dalla lettura "falsata" della Volontà di Potenza del 1906, sostenevano la vicinanza di questo autore a quelle correnti di “destra” che sarebbero poi sfociate successivamente nella esperienza del nazismo. Tuttavia questo progetto editoriale fu connotato da molteplici difficoltà. In primo luogo Colli, non avendo alcun contatto con gli ambienti politici, difficilmente sarebbe riuscito ad accedere all'archivio Nietzsche di Weimar, dove erano conservati la gran parte dei manoscritti originali del filosofo tedesco. Negli anni Sessanta infatti, quando il progetto fu concepito, Weimar apparteneva alla Repubblica Democratica Tedesca la quale attraverso numerosi "escamotage" burocratici di fatto impediva agli studiosi occidentali di accedere in qualsiasi modo alle Istituzione della DDR. Questo problema fu risolto dal fatto che Montinari, a differenza del suo maestro, era iscritto al PCI e anzi proprio attraverso di esso riuscì ad ottenere dai responsabili culturali del partito comunista della Germania orientale i permessi necessari per studiare nell'archivio Nietzsche. Un'ulteriore difficoltà fu determinata dal fatto che la casa editrice Einaudi, con la quale Colli e Montinari iniziarono a definire la pubblicazione delle opere nietzschiane decise all'improvviso, probabilmente per ragioni politiche, di non dare alle stampe le opere del "nazista" Nietzsche che invece furono poi accolte dalla casa editrice Adelphi, fondata alla fine degli anni Cinquanta da un ex einaudiano come Luciano Foà.[senza fonte]  Note  Valerio Meattini, Colli Giorgio, in Annuario dell'Università degli studi di Pisa per l'anno accademico 1978-1979 on line sul Sistema bibliotecario di ateneo  Modi di vivereGiorgio Colli. Una conoscenza per cambiare la vita, su youtube.com.  Vedi Luigi Anzalone, Giuliano Minichiello, Lo Specchio di Dioniso. Saggi su Giorgio Colli, Edizioni Dedalo, Bari, 1984, pag. 22.  Per Boringhieri diresse l'Enciclopedia di autori classici, con la collaborazione, tra gli altri, di Mazzino Montinari, Sossio Giametta, Gigliola Pasquinelli, Giuliana Lanata; a quest'ultima si deve traduzione e commento di opere del medico greco Ippocrate di Coo, Boringhieri, Torino, 1961  Giorgio Colli, La sapienza greca IDioniso, Apollo, Eleusi, Orfeo, Museo, Iperborei, Enigma. Adelphi, Milano,  Giorgio Colli, Dopo Nietzsche. Adelphi, Milano, Giorgio Colli, La nascita della filosofia. Adelphi, Milano, Opere principali Filosofia dell'espressione. Adelphi, Milano, Dopo Nietzsche. Adelphi, Milano,La nascita della filosofia. Adelphi, Milano, La sapienza greca IDioniso, Apollo, Eleusi, Orfeo, Museo, Iperborei, Enigma. Adelphi, Milano, La sapienza greca IIEpimenide, Ferecide, Talete, Anassimandro, Anassimene, Onomacrito. Adelphi, Milano, La sapienza greca IIIEraclito. Adelphi, Milano, Scritti su Nietzsche. Adelphi, Milano, La ragione errabonda. Quaderni postumi. Adelphi, Milano Per una enciclopedia di autori classici. Adelphi, Milano, La Natura ama nascondersiPhysis kryptesthai philei. Adelphi, Milano, Zenone di Elea. Lezioni 1964-1965. Adelphi, Milano, Gorgia e Parmenide. Lezioni 1965-1967. Adelphi, Milano, Introduzione a Osservazioni su Diofanto di Pierre de Fermat. Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1 Platone politico. Adelphi, Milano, Filosofi sovrumani. Adelphi, Milano, Apollineo e dionisiaco. Adelphi, Milano, Empedocle. Adelphi, Milano, Traduzioni Kurt Hildebrandt, Platone: la lotta dello spirito per la potenza, Einaudi, Torino 1947 Karl Löwith, Da Hegel a Nietzsche, Einaudi, Torino 1949 Aristotele, Organon, Einaudi, Torino 1955 Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion pura, a cura e tr. di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, Torino,  Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion pura, a cura e tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1976 Platone, Simposio, Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1979 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga e paralipomena I, Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1981 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga e paralipomena II, Giorgio Colli e Mario Carpitella, tr. di Mazzino Montinari ed Eva Amendola Kühn, Adelphi, Milano 1983 Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion pura, a cura e tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1995 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga e paralipomena, Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1998 Aristotele, Organon, Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano, Opere complete di Friedrich Nietzsche (Classici Adelphi)  I, tomo 1: Scritti giovanili 1856-1864, Giuliano Campioni e Mario Carpitella, tr. di Mario Carpitella, Adelphi, Milano 1998  I, tomo 2: Scritti giovanili 1865-1869, Giuliano Campioni e Mario Carpitella, Adelphi, Milano 2001  III, tomo 1: La nascita della tragediaConsiderazioni inattuali, I-III, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1972  III, tomo 2: La filosofia nell'epoca tragica dei Greci e Scritti dal 1870 al 1873, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano Frammenti postumi 1869-1874, Mario Carpitella, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 1989  III, tomo 3, parte 2°: Frammenti postumi 1869-1874, Mario Carpitella, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 1992  IV, tomo 1: Richard Wagner a BayreuthConsiderazioni inattuali, IVFrammenti postumi (1875-1876), Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1967  IV, tomo 2: Umano, troppo umano, I e Frammenti postumi, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano, Umano, troppo umano, IIFrammenti postumi, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1967  V, tomo 1: Aurora e Frammenti postumi (1879-1881), Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano  Idilli di MessinaLa gaia scienzaFrammenti postumi (1881-1882), Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1965  VI, tomo 1: Così parlò Zarathustra, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari, Adelphi, Milano 1968  VI, tomo 2: Al di là del bene e del male e Genealogia della morale, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1968  VI, tomo 3: Il caso WagnerCrepuscolo degli idoliL'anticristoEcce homoNietzsche contra Wagner, Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Roberto Calasso e Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1970  VI, tomo 4: Ditirambi di Dioniso e Poesie postume (1882-1888), Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1982  VII, tomo 1, parte 1°: Frammenti postumi, Mazzino Montinari e Mario Carpitella, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Leonardo Amoroso, Adelphi, Milano 1982  VII, tomo 1, parte 2°: Frammenti postumi 1882-1884, Mazzino Montinari e Mario Carpitella, tr. di Mazzino Montinari e Leonardo Amoroso, Adelphi, Milano 1986  VII, tomo 2: Frammenti postumi 1884, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Mazzino Montinari, Adelphi, Milano 1976  VII, tomo 3: Frammenti postumi, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1975  VIII, tomo 1: Frammenti postumi 1885-1887, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1975  VIII, tomo 2: Frammenti postumi 1887-1888, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1971  VIII, tomo 3: Frammenti postumi 1888-1889, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1974 Epistolario di Friedrich Nietzsche (Classici Adelphi)  I: Epistolario 1850-1869, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Maria Ludovica Pampaloni Fama, Adelphi, Milano 1977  II: Epistolario 1869-1874, Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, tr. di Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 1981  III: Epistolario 1875-1879, Giuliano Campioni e Federico Gerratana, tr. di Maria Ludovica Pampaloni Fama, Adelphi, Milano 1995  IV: Epistolario 1880-1884, Giuliano Campioni, tr. di Mario Carpitella e Maria Ludovica Pampaloni Fama, Adelphi, Milano 2004 Opere di Friedrich Nietzsche (Piccola Biblioteca Adelphi) Sull'utilità e il danno della storia per la vita, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1974 Sull'avvenire delle nostre scuole, tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1975 Così parlò Zarathustra, tr. di Mazzino Montinari, Adelphi, Milano Al di là del bene e del male, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1977 L'anticristo, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano La gaia scienza e Idilli di Messina, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano  La mia vita, tr. Mario Carpitella, Adelphi, Milano 1977 La nascita della tragedia, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano Aurora, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1978 Scritti su Wagner, traduzione di Ferruccio Masini e Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1979 Umano, troppo umano, I, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano Umano, troppo umano, II, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano Ditirambi di Dioniso e Poesie postume, tr. di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Milano 1982 Crepuscolo degli idoli, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano 1983 David Strauss, l'uomo di fede e lo scrittore, tr. di Sossio Giametta, Adelphi, Milano 1983 Genealogia della morale, tr. di Ferruccio Masini, Adelphi, Milano Schopenhauer come educatore, tr. di Mazzino Montinari, Adelphi, Milano 1985 Ecce homo, Roberto Calasso, Adelphi, Milano 1991  88-459-0861-5 La filosofia nell'epoca tragica dei Greci e Scritti tr. di Giorgio Colli, Milano Adelphi Frammenti postumi I, Giuliano Campioni, Mario Carpitella e Federico Gerratana, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 2004 Frammenti postumi II, Giuliano Campioni, Mario Carpitella e Federico Gerratana, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano, Frammenti postumi III, Giuliano Campioni, Mario Carpitella e Federico Gerratana, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 2005 Frammenti postumi IV, Giuliano Campioni, Mario Carpitella e Federico Gerratana, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano 2005 Lettere da Torino, Giuliano Campioni, tr. di Vivetta Vivarelli, Adelphi, Milano 2008 Frammenti postumi V, Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari, Giuliano Campioni e Maria Cristina Fornari, tr. di Giorgio Colli e Chiara Colli Staude, Adelphi, Milano, Il servizio divino dei greci, Manfred Posani Löwenstein, Adelphi, Milano   critica Luigi Anzalone, Giuliano Minichiello, Lo Specchio di Dioniso. Saggi su Giorgio Colli, Edizioni Dedalo, Bari, 1984,  978-88-220-6040-2 Maurizio Rossi, Colli come educatore, Cartostampa, Castelfranco Veneto, Luigi Cimmino, COLLI, Giorgio, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  34, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988. 5 novembre .  Giuliana Lanata, articolo in Esercizi di memoria, Levante Editori, Bari, 1989, più il piano di Colli per l'Enciclopedia da lui curata per Boringhieri, Torino. Fausto Moriani, Invito alla lettura di... Giorgio Colli, in « Abstracta » Fausto Moriani, Implicazioni estetiche nell'opera di Giorgio Colli, in Le grandi correnti dell'estetica novecentesca, G. Marchianò, Guerini, Milano, Andrea Pistoia, Misura e dismisura. Per una rappresentazione di Giorgio Colli, ERGA, Genova, Giuseppe Auteri, Giorgio Colli e l'enigma greco, CUECM, Catania 2000. Federica Montevecchi, Giorgio Colli. Biografia intellettuale, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, Lexicon.org (Voce Giorgio Colli di Federica Montevecchilessico danese per il XXI secolo) Enrico Colli, I termini di apollineo e dionisiaco nello sviluppo del pensiero di Giorgio Colli, in Clemente Tafuri e David Beronio, Teatro Akropolis. Testimonianze ricerca azioni, vol II, AkropolisLibri, Genova, . Marco de Paoli,Giorgio Colli e i Greci: annotazioni su alcune traduzioni, in "Episteme", Mimesis Edizioni, Milano, , n. 5,  85–105. Federica Montevecchi, Sull'Empedocle di Giorgio Colli, Luca Sossella Editore, Roma,  Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Giorgio Colli  Giorgio Colli, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Giorgio Colli, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Opere di Giorgio Colli, . Giorgio Colli, su Goodreads.  Archivio Giorgio Colli, su giorgiocolli.it. Centro interdipartimentale Colli-Montinari, su centronietzsche.net. Lexicon.org (Voce Giorgio Colli di Federica Montevecchilessico danese per il XXI secolo) Un ricordo di Valerio Meattini, su biblio.adm.unipi.it:8081 16 settembre 2007). Filosofia Letteratura  Letteratura Filosofo del XX secoloStorici della filosofia italianiAccademici italiani Professore gennaio 6 gennaio Torino FiesoleGrecisti italianiTraduttori italianiTraduttori dal greco all'italianoTraduttori dal tedesco all'italianoStorici della filosofia anticaTraduttori all'italianoStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di TorinoProfessori dell'PisaFriedrich Nietzsche

 

COLLINI -- Cosimo Alessandro Collini (Firenze), filosofo.  Lo Pterodactylus descritto da Collini. Collini era discendente di una nobile famiglia fiorentina. Abbandonò gli studi di giurisprudenza all'Pisa, e dopo la morte del padre si trasferì prima a Coira e poi a Berlino, dove conobbe Voltaire e divenne suo segretario. Dopo la rottura tra Voltaire e Federico il Grande, Collini si trasferì a Francoforte sul Meno  e qui fu invitato dal Principe elettore Carlo Teodoro di iera per rispondere agli eventuali scontri visti tra il Voltaire e il Principe. Collini venne descritto come un uomo scontroso, spesso in litigio con la nipote del filosofo, Madame Denis. Dopo la rottura con Voltaire, Collini venne accusato di furto di un manoscritto del filosofo francese dopo una perquisizione della stanza privata; si trattava di un libro (intitolato "Mon séjour auprès de Voltaire"), che raccontava della vita di Voltaire trascorsa con Collini, il quale venne poi pubblicato . I rapporti tra i Voltaire migliorarono, dopo il licenziamento.  In seguito, Collini venne nominato direttore del Gabinetto di storia naturale di Mannheim ("Naturalienkabinetts") . A Collini si deve la descrizione iniziale dello Pterodactylus, un rettile volante, o pterosauro, vissuto nel Giurassico superiore, circa 145 milioni di anni fa, il cui fossile fu rinvenuto ad Eichstätt. La descrizione del rettile fu poi completata con maggiore accuratezza da Georges Cuvier.  Negli ultimi anni, Collini denunciò ampiamente il fanatismo durante le Guerre rivoluzionarie francesi in Europa e difese tutti i reperti del Gabinetto dalle distruzioni, reperti che furono poi trasferiti, quattro anni dopo, a Monaco di iera. Fonte: F.R. De Angelis, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, riferimenti in .  Vedi .  Francesca Romana De Angelis, COLLINI, Cosimo Alessandro, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  27, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1982. 24 giugno . Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Cosimo Alessandro Collini Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Cosimo Alessandro Collini  Mon séjour auprès de Voltaire et lettres inedites que m'écrivit cet homme célèbre jusqu'à la dernière année de sa vie, 1807. Testo digitalizzato in , sito "archive.org".

 

COLOMBE: Ludovico delle Colombe o Colombo (Firenze), filosofo> Noto per essere stato uno strenuo avversario di Galilei.  Non sappiamo quasi nulla della sua vita, ma restano diverse sue opere, nelle quali difende le dottrine aristoteliche con un particolare disinteresse sia verso le nuove osservazioni sia verso la coerenza logica.  Scrisse un discorso sulla nuova stella apparsasostenendo che si trattava di una stella non nuova, ma esistente da sempre. Scrisse un discorso Contro il moto della Terra.  Per conciliare le osservazioni di Galileo sulle irregolarità della superficie lunare con la concezione aristotelica della perfetta sfericità dei corpi celesti sostenne che le valli e gli spazi tra i monti della Luna fossero colmati da un materiale perfetto e invisibile. Contrario all'idrostatica archimedea recuperata da Galileo, nel suo Discorso apologetico, sostenne che il galleggiare o l'affondare dei corpi dipendesse dalla loro forma. Nella conclusione del discorso usò anche una metafora di questa teoria, affermando che le ragioni dell'avversario per essere troppo argute e sottili vanno a fondo senza speranza di ritornare a galla, mentre quelle di Aristotele, per essere di forma larga e quadrata, non possono affondare in nessun modo. Sono rimaste anche lettere tra il Delle Colombe e Galileo, che stimava pochissimo il suo avversario, che aveva soprannominato Pippione. Vari accenni a questo personaggio sono nella corrispondenza tra Galileo e i suoi amici. M. Muccillo in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, riferimenti in .  Giorgio Abetti, Amici e nemici di Galileo, Milano, Bompiani. Aristotelismo Galileo Galilei. M. Muccillo, «DELLE COLOMBE (Colombo), Ludovico», in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.

 

COLOMBO -- Giuseppe Colombo (filosofo)  Abbozzo Questa voce sull'argomento filosofi italiani è solo un abbozzo. Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di . Giuseppe Colombo (Milano, 1950) è un filosofo e accademico italiano. Docente presso l'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano, è autore di studi sulla storia della filosofia italiana (si è occupato di Antonio Rosmini, Piero Martinetti e Galvano Della Volpe) e sulla filosofia cristiana (Anselmo d'Aosta e Rosmini stesso), oltre che di contributi nei campi della metafisica e dell'antropologia.  Opere Della Volpe premarxista. L'attualismo e l'estetica, Studium, Roma 1979. Scienza e morale nel marxismo di Galvano Della Volpe, CUSL, Milano 1983. Pietra angolare. Introduzione all'insegnamento sociale della Chiesa, CUSL-Centro Toniolo, Milano-Verona 1983. Conoscenza di Dio e antropologia, Massimo, Milano 1988. Ontologismo e trascendenza di Dio. Note a proposito di una recente teoria, in "Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica", anno LXXXI, luglio-settembre 1989,  478-491. Introduzione al pensiero di sant'Anselmo d'Aosta, Mursia, Milano 1990. Piero Martinetti. I maestri in persona, "Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica" anno LXXXVIII, gennaio-marzo 1996, n. 1,  35-94. Il cristianesimo di Kierkegaard e la modernità, in "Per la filosofia", anno XIII, n. 38, settembre-dicembre 1996,  50-57. La svolta antropologica in Antonio Rosmini: il Cristo centro di convergenza totale, in "Per la filosofia", anno XIV, n.41, settembre-dicembre 1997,  17-25. La correttezza dei nomi nel Cratilo di Platone, in  Le origini del linguaggio (Celestian Milani), Demetra, Verona 1999  61-78. Il riordino dei cicli scolastici, in "Quaderno di Iter", supplemento al n. 6 di "Iter Scuola cultura società", settembre-dicembre 1999,  35-38. La filosofia come soteriologia: L'avventura spirituale e intellettuale di Piero Martinetti, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2005. Il giusto prezzo della felicità, Edizioni ISU-Università Cattolica, Milano 2005. Antropologia ed etica, EDUCatt, Milano .  Anselmo d'Aosta Galvano Della Volpe Piero Martinetti Antonio Rosmini Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani Professore1950 Milano

 

COLONNA: Egidio Romano, O.E.S.A. arcivescovo della Chiesa cattolica Filip4 Gilles de Rome.jpg Egidio Romano e Filippo il Bello (miniatura di un codice medievale). Template-Archbishop.svg   Incarichi ricopertiArcivescovo di Bourges   Natotra il 1243 e il 1247, Roma Nominato arcivescovo25 aprile 1295 Deceduto22 dicembre 1316, Roma   Manuale Egidio Romano, latinizzato come Ægidius Romanus, indicato anche come Egidio Colonna (Roma), filosofo. Dopo la sua morte, gli furono tributati i titoli onorifici di Doctor fundatissimus e Theologorum princeps.   Fu discepolo d'Aquino. Insegnò filosofia prima di diventare generale degli agostiniani e arcivescovo di Bourges. Fu inoltre il precettore di Filippo il Bello per il quale scrisse il trattato De regimine principum, sostenendo l'efficacia della monarchia come forma di governo.Colonna è considerato tra i più autorevoli teologi di ispirazione agostiniana, attivo anche nella vita intellettuale e politica in un contesto culturale ed istituzionale travagliato da frequenti ed aspre polemiche sul problema del rapporto tra potere temporale e potere spirituale. Questo filosofo è generalmente ricordato, insieme al prediletto allievo Giacomo da Viterbo, per il contributo nella redazione della celebre bolla Unam Sanctam del 1302 di Papa Bonifacio VIII e per il ruolo significativo che assunse il Maestro degli Eremitani di Sant'Agostino quale autore del De Ecclesiastica potestate e, dunque, quale teorico famoso e autorevole della plenitudo potestatis pontificia. In Egidio Romano rileviamo subito una compresenza del duplice atteggiamento dottrinale e politico; infatti è possibile rintracciare, fra le opere giovanili, il De regimine principum, opera scritta per Filippo il Bello e di ispirazione aristotelico-tomista inerente alla naturalità dello Stato, erigendola a difensore della potestas regale. Nel De Ecclesiastica potestate, invece, Colonna afferma la superiorità del sacerdotium rispetto al regnum, distinguendosi quale rappresentante della teocrazia papale.  La riscoperta di Aristotele e l'agostinismo politico In seguito alle condanne di Étienne Tempier del 1277, Egidio difende la tesi di Tommaso, per la sua qualifica di Baccalaureus formatus, ma, proprio a causa delle condanne stesse, viene sospeso dall'insegnamento. In quegli anni, gli avversari del papato trovano nel pensiero di Aristotele gli strumenti per svolgere un'analisi politica che metta in discussione la sacralità del potere. Dall'altra parte troviamo l'influenza della corrente speculativa dell'agostinismo politico (ossia quel fenomeno, tipicamente medioevale, di compenetrazione fra Stato e Chiesa, all'interno del quale Agostino viene a giocare un ruolo fondamentale dal momento che l'apporto teorico del suo De Civitate Dei conduce a confusioni inevitabili fra il piano spirituale della Civitas Dei Caelestis e il piano temporale della vita terrena che è Civitas Peregrina), che ripropone la teoria delle “due città” e riafferma la superiorità del sacerdotium rispetto al regnum, costituendo un vero e proprio “partito del Papa”.  Egidio rivendica la Plenitudo potestatis come proprietà costitutiva dell'auctoritas del Papa in quanto homo spiritualis. Egidio sostituisce al concetto agostiniano di ecclesia, quello di regnum al fine di estendere gli ambiti del potere del sovrano ecclesiastico. Il sovrano ecclesiastico (il Papa) dovrebbe esercitare la sua sovranità anche sul potere temporale al fine di garantire l'ordine mediante una forma di dominium che coincida con la sua stessa missione spirituale.  Opere  Frontespizio delle In secundum librum sententiarum quaestiones L'edizione critica dell'opera omnia è stata intrapresa, per Leo S. Olschki, (Aegidii Romani opera omnia, collana Corpus Philosophorum Medii AeviTesti e Studi), dal gruppo di ricerca di Francesco Del Punta.   Quaestio de gradibus formarum, Ottaviano Scoto (eredi), Boneto Locatello, 1502.  In secundum librum sententiarum quaestiones,  1, Francesco Ziletti, 1581.  In secundum librum sententiarum quaestiones,  2, Francesco Ziletti, 1581.  Opere, Antonio Blado, 1555.  In libros De physico auditu Aristotelis commentaria, Ottaviano Scoto (eredi), Boneto Locatello, De materia coeli, Girolamo Duranti, 1493.  Quodlibeta, Domenico de Lapi. Colonna, in Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Roberto Lambertini, Giles of Rome, in Edward N. Zalta , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford, .  Charles F. Briggs e Peter S. Eardley , A Companion to Giles of Rome, Leiden, Brill, . Silvia Donati, Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano: I. Le opere prima del 1285: I commenti aristotelici. "Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale", I/1, 1990, pagg. 1-112. Gian Carlo Garfagnini, Egidio Romano, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, . Francesco Del Punta-S. Donati-C. Luna, Egidio Romano, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Filippo Cancelli, Egidio Romano, in Enciclopedia dantesca, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970.  Papa Bonifacio VIII Teocrazia Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Egidio Romano Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Egidio Romano Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Egidio Romano  Egidio Romano, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Ugo Mariani, Egidio Romano, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Egidio Romano, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.  (DE) Egidio Romano, su ALCUIN, Ratisbona.  Opere di Egidio Romano, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.    su Egidio Romano, su Les Archives de littérature du Moyen Âge. Egidio Romano, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. David M. Cheney, Egidio Romano, in Catholic Hierarchy. Roberto Lambertini, Giles of Rome, in Edward N. Zalta , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford. Biografia a cura dell'associazione storico-culturale S. Agostino, su cassiciaco.it. PredecessoreArcivescovo metropolita di BourgesSuccessoreArchbishopPallium PioM.svg Simone di Beaulieu25 aprile 129522 dicembre 1316Raynaud de La Porte Filosofia Medioevo  Medioevo Categorie: Arcivescovi cattolici italiani del XIII secoloArcivescovi cattolici italiani del XIV secoloTeologi italianiFilosofi italiani del XIII secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1316 22 dicembre Romad AvignoneScolasticiFilosofi cattoliciScrittori medievali in lingua latina

 

COLONNELLO: Pio Colonnello (Benevento), filosofo. Ha conseguito la laurea in Filosofia, in Giurisprudenza e in Lettere. Nell'anno accademico 1973/74 è stato borsista presso l'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, fondato da Benedetto Croce, in Napoli. Già docente nei Licei e Ginnasi, nel 1980 ha conseguito il ruolo di ricercatore universitario presso l'Napoli "Federico II". Dal 2001 insegna presso l'Università della Calabria, dapprima come Professore Associato e quindi, dal 2005, come Ordinario di Filosofia Teoretica.  Collabora a diversi periodici e riviste filosofiche tra cui: Kant Studien, Criterio, Filosofia Oggi, Nord e Sud, Sapienza, Choros, Studi Kantiani, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, The Journal of Value Inquiry (rivista di cui è anche Consulting Editor). È membro del Comitato scientifico di autorevoli riviste filosofiche.  È Visiting Professor nella Universidad Autónoma de Mèxico, nella Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (Città del Messico) e nella California State UniversityNorthridge Los Angeles. Ha organizzato Convegni e Congressi nazionali e internazionali.  Ha ricevuto per due volte il "Premio della Cultura" della Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri. Ha ricevuto il premio della Cultura "Salvatore Valitutti".  Pio Colonnello ha privilegiato alcuni filoni di ricerca: l'indagine su temi e autori compresi nell'arco tra criticismo trascendentale e pensiero fenomenologico (da Kant a Husserl); la riflessione sui problemi fondamentali della filosofia dell'esistenza e dell'ermeneutica contemporanea (Heidegger, Jaspers, Ricœur, Pareyson, Arendt); lo studio di alcune posizioni dello storicismo contemporaneo tra Europa e America (Croce, Ortega y Gasset, Gaos, Ímaz, Nicol, Dussel). La sua proposta è verificare l'interazione, in chiave storico-critica, dei temi fondamentali del kantismo, della fenomenologia husserliana e di quelli della filosofia dell'esistenza.   Heidegger interprete di Kant, Studio Editoriale di Cultura, Genova. Croce e i vociani, Studio Editoriale di Cultura, Genova 1984. Tempo e necessità, Japadre, L'Aquila-Roma 1987. Tra fenomenologia e filosofia dell'esistenza. Saggio su José Gaos, Morano, Napoli 1990 (tradotto in inglese e in spagnolo: The Philosophy of José Gaos, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta; Entre fenomenologia y filosofia de la existencia. Ensayo sobre José Gaos, Jitajanfora Morelia Editorial, Morelia México 2006). La questione della colpa tra filosofia dell'esistenza ed ermeneutica, Loffredo, Napoli 1995. Percorsi di confine. Analisi dell'esistenza e filosofia della libertà, Luciano, Napoli 1999. Croce e Dewey oggi (in collaborazione con G. Spadafora), Bibliopolis, Napoli 2002. Ragione e rivelazione (in collaborazione con P. Giustiniani), Borla, Roma 2003. Melanconia ed esistenza, Luciano, Napoli 2003. Filosofia e politica in America latina (Pio Colonnello), Armando, Roma,  Itinerari di filosofia ispanoamericana, Armando, Roma 2007. Storia esistenza liberta. Rileggendo Croce, Armando, Roma 2009. Martin Heidegger e Hannah Arendt, Guida, Napoli 2009 (tradotto in spagnolo: Martin Heidegger y Hannah Arendt, Ediciones del Signo, Buenos Aires ; tradotto in francese: Martin Heidegger à Hannah Arendt. Lettre jamais écrite, Editions Mimesis Philosophie, Paris ). Orizzonti del trascendentale, Mimesis, Milano . Il soggetto riflesso. Itinerari del corpo e della mente (Pio Colonnello), Mimesis, Milano . Fenomenologie e visioni del mondo. Tra mente e corpo (Pio Colonnello), Mimesis, Milano . Fenomenologia e patografia del ricordo, Mimesis, Milano-Udine  (tradotto in inglese: Phenomenology and Pathography of Memory, Mimesis International, ).  Filosofia latinoamericana  Curriculum, su polaris.unical.it 2Elenco pubblicazioni, su polaris.unical.it 22 luglio ). Pagina personale, su dipfilosofia.unical.it

 

COLORNI: Eugenio Colorni (Milano) filosofo. Oltre che per le sue opere filosofiche, Colorni è noto come uno dei massimi promotori del federalismo europeo: mentre era confinato, in quanto socialista e antifascista, nell'isola di Ventotene, partecipò con Altiero Spinelli ed Ernesto Rossi, anch'essi lì confinati, alla scrittura del Manifesto per un’Europa libera e unita, che poi da quel luogo prese il nome. In seguito, nella Roma occupata dai nazisti, curò l'introduzione e la pubblicazione clandestina di questo documento fondamentale per lo sviluppo dell'idea federalista europea.  Colorni nacque a Milano il 22 aprile del 1909 da una famiglia ebraica. Il padre, Alberto Colorni, era un commerciante originario di Mantova, mentre la madre, Clara Pontecorvo, milanese di famiglia pisana, era zia del fisico nucleare Bruno Pontecorvo, del regista Gillo, del genetista Guido e del giurista Tullio Ascarelli. Si sposò con Ursula Hirschman, un'ebrea tedesca, sorella dell'economista Albert O. Hirschmann, e da cui ebbe 3 figlie: Silvia, Renata e Eva Colorni.  Formazione Colorni frequentò il Liceo Ginnasio Statale Alessandro Manzoni di Milano. Durante gli anni del liceo, si appassionò al Breviario di estetica di Benedetto Croce. La sua formazione adolescenzialecome raccontò egli stesso nella Malattia filosoficafu influenzata dal rapporto intrattenuto con i cugini Enrico, Enzo ed Emilio Sereni, tutti più grandi di lui. Fu Enzo, che era un convinto socialista sionista, ad esercitare su di lui una forte influenza ideale e religiosa, tanto da far avvicinare il quattordicenne Eugenio, seppur per breve tempo, al sionismo.  Nel 1926 si iscrisse presso la facoltà milanese di Lettere e filosofia. Giuseppe Antonio Borgese e Piero Martinetti furono suoi insegnanti prediletti. Col secondo dei due si laureò in filosofia nel 1930, discutendo una tesi su Sviluppo e significato dell'individualismo leibniziano; a Leibniz dedicherà poi gran parte dei suoi studi.  Durante il periodo universitario, strinse amicizia con Guido Piovene, che sarà giornalista e scrittore, amicizia che però verrà interrotta nel 1931 per via di certi articoli anti-semitici scritti dallo stesso Piovene su L'Ambrosiano. In quel periodo, Colorni partecipò all'attività dei Gruppi goliardici per la libertà di Lelio Basso e Rodolfo Morandi.  Nel 1928, sotto lo pseudonimo di G. Rosenberg, pubblicò su Pietre, la rivista di Basso, un articolo sull'estetica di Roberto Ardigò. Nel 1930 si accostò alla divisione milanese del movimento anti-fascista Giustizia e Libertà; collaborò in seguito col nucleo giellista torinese, che fece capo prima a Leone Ginzburg e poi a Vittorio Foa.  Nel 1931 incontrò Benedetto Croce, con il quale discusse a lungo.  Nello stesso anno, compì un viaggio di studi in Germania, a Berlino, dove conobbe la futura compagna Ursula, che sposò nel 1935.  Dal 1931, cominciò a scrivere recensioni ed articoli per Il Convegno, La Cultura, Civiltà Moderna, Solaria e la Rivista di filosofia di Martinetti. Nel 1932 pubblicò, presso la società editrice "La Cultura" di Milano, uno studio critico su L'estetica di Croce.  Tra il 1932 ed il 1933, fu lettore d'italiano presso l'Marburgo; con l'avvento del nazismo in Germania, fu costretto a tornare in Italia.  Nel 1933, conclusa la tesi di perfezionamento sulla filosofia giovanile di Leibniz, vinse il concorso per l'insegnamento di storia e filosofia nei licei; dopo una prima assegnazione al liceo Grattoni di Voghera, nel 1934 ottenne la cattedra di filosofia e pedagogia all'istituto magistrale "Giosuè Carducci" di Trieste; qui conobbe e frequentò, fra gli altri, Umberto Saba (ritratto poi in Un poeta) ed anche Pier Antonio Quarantotti Gambini, Bruno Pincherle ed Eugenio Curiel.  Nel 1934, nella collana scolastica che Giovanni Gentile diresse per Sansoni, pubblicò una traduzione della Monadologia di Leibniz, preceduta da una lunga introduzione intitolata Esposizione antologica del sistema leibniziano. Come scrisse Eugenio Garin, «Leibniz lo costrinse ad affrontare studi di logica e di matematica, a rimettere in discussione il modo stesso di concepire la scienza, e i rapporti fra scienza e filosofia. [...] Ripartì da Kant e dalla problematica kantiana, e meditò sulle conseguenze che la fisica teorica e la psicanalisi potevano avere per la dissoluzione di impostazioni filosofiche tradizionali».  Quando, come si legge in Un poeta, Umberto Saba gli domanderà «Perché fa filosofia?», Colorni concluse: «Da quel giorno, io non faccio più filosofia», o come ebbe a dire lo stesso Garin, «In realtà non era la filosofia che rifiutava, ma un orientamento legato a quell'idealismo di cui erano seguaci [...] Croce come Gentile e Martinetti».  Attività politica A partire dal 1935, Colorni intensificò il proprio impegno politico contro il regime fascista.  Quando una riuscita operazione di polizia, nel maggio del 1935, portò all'arresto di quasi tutto il direttivo giellista torinese, prese contatto con il Centro interno socialista, costituito clandestinamente a Milano nell'estate del 1934 da Rodolfo Morandi, Lelio Basso, Lucio Mario Luzzatto, Bruno Maffi e altri, come organismo di collegamento dei socialisti in Italia.  Nell'aprile del 1937, dopo gli arresti di Luzzato e Morandi, Colorni divenne, di fatto, il responsabile del Centro.  Nell'estate del 1937, in occasione del "IX Congresso internazionale di filosofia" di Parigi, ebbe modo d'incontrare di persona Carlo Rosselli, Angelo Tasca, Pietro Nenni ed altri esponenti della direzione del PSI, del quale entrò poi a far parte, mantenendosi su un'originale posizione autonomista. Con vari pseudonimi, ma soprattutto con quello di Agostini, tra il 1936 ed il 1937, pubblicò importanti articoli su Politica socialista e sul Nuovo Avanti.  L'8 settembre del 1938, all'inizio della campagna razziale promossa dal regime, fu arrestato dall'OVRA a Trieste, in quanto ebreo ed anti-fascista militante, venendo pertanto rinchiuso nel carcere di Varese. I giornali pubblicarono la notizia con gran risalto, sottolineando che egli «di razza ebraica, manteneva rapporti di natura politica con altri ebrei residenti in Italia e all'estero»; in questa campagna giornalistica contro di lui si distinsero, con articoli di particolare livore anti-semita, Il Piccolo di Trieste ed il Corriere della Sera. La sottolineatura sul "complotto ebraico" serviva a giustificare la legislazione anti-semita appena varata in Italia dal regime, per potersi così allineare alla linea politica seguita dagli alleati nazisti. Il Tribunale speciale non riuscì però ad imbastire un formale processo nei suoi confronti. Venne quindi assegnato al confino per la durata massima, ovvero cinque anni.  Il confino a Ventotene Dal gennaio del 1939 all'ottobre del 1941, Colorni fu confinato nell'isola di Ventotene, dove proseguì i suoi studi filosofico-scientifici e discusse intensamente con gli altri compagni confinati, Ernesto Rossi, Manlio Rossi Doria e Altiero Spinelli: un'eco fedele di quelle discussioni si ritrova nei sette Dialoghi di Commodo, scritti in collaborazione con Spinelli e pubblicati postumi.  Risale a questo periodo la sua adesione alle idee federaliste europee propugnate da Spinelli e Rossi, con i quali, nel 1941, partecipò alla stesura del Manifesto per un’Europa libera e unita, meglio noto come Manifesto di Ventotene. Nel 1944, a Roma, nel mezzo della lotta partigiana, Colorni riuscì a pubblicare clandestinamente un volumetto dal titolo Problemi della Federazione Europea, che raccoglieva il Manifesto ed altri scritti sul tema dello stesso Spinelli. Nella sua "Prefazione" al Manifesto, auspicò la nascita di una politica federalista europea di respiro universalista, come scenario democraticamente praticabile dopo la catastrofe della guerra. In tale ottica, la creazione di una federazione di Stati europei era da lui considerata come condizione indispensabile per un profondo rinnovamento sociale, anche per iniziativa popolare, che partendo dagli enti territoriali avrebbe coinvolto tutta l’Italia e, quindi, l’intera Europa.  Circa le dinamiche che portarono alla stesura del Manifesto, è generalmente ricondotto ai soli Spinelli e Rossi il contributo maggioritario del testo, sebbene, alcuni recenti studi storiografici, abbiano seriamente rivalutato il suo ruolo:  «Di trinità si tratta, e lo spirito santo della situazione è Eugenio Colorni, che partecipò alle discussioni preparatorie alla stesura del Manifesto assieme a poche altre persone, ed ebbe una parte di rilievo, soprattutto nella funzione di stimolo e di critica, dal suo punto di vista di socialista autonomista, verso i due autori del documento, fino al suo trasferimento a Melfi, nell'ottobre del 1941, benché comunque i contatti non cessassero del tutto»  (Pietro S. Graglia.) Nell'ottobre del 1941, grazie anche all'intervento di Giovanni Gentile, riuscí ad essere trasferito a Melfi, in provincia di Potenza, dove, nonostante lo stretto controllo della polizia, riuscì ad avere contatti con alcuni degli anti-fascisti locali.  Nel 1942, assieme con Ludovico Geymonat, elaborò il progetto di una rivista di metodologia scientifica.  La resistenza romana e l'assassinio Il 6 maggio del 1943 riuscì a fuggire da Melfi, rifugiandosi a Roma, dove visse da latitante.  Dopo la capitolazione di Mussolini, il 25 luglio del 1943, si dedicò all'organizzazione del Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria, nato nell'agosto dalla fusione del PSI col giovane gruppo del Movimento di Unità Proletaria.  Tra il 27 e il 28 agosto partecipò, assieme ad Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, Ursula Hirschmann, Manlio Rossi Doria, Giorgio Braccialarghe e Vittorio Foa, in casa dello scienzato azionista Mario Alberto Rollier a Milano, alla riunione che diede vita al Movimento Federalista Europeo. Il movimento adottò come proprio programma il "Manifesto di Ventotene".  A seguito dell'8 settembre, svolse nella capitale un'intensissima attività nelle file della Resistenza: prese parte alla direzione del PSIUP e s'impegnò a fondo nella ricostruzione della Federazione Giovanile Socialista Italiana e nella formazione partigiana della prima brigata Matteotti.  «[...] io ero da poco stato nominato segretario della Federazione Giovanile Socialista per suggerimento e per decisione di Sandro Pertini, che era membro della segreteria del partito in quell'epoca. Avevamo organizzato una... chiamiamola brigata, anche se era un gruppo armato che era comandato da Eugenio Colorni che poi è stato assassinato alla vigilia della liberazione di Roma [...]»  (Matteo Matteotti) Fu redattore capo dell'Avanti! clandestino; così Sandro Pertini ricordò il suo impegno per la stampa del giornale socialista:  «Ricordare l'Avanti! clandestino di Roma vuol dire ricordare prima di tutto due nostri compagni che a forte ingegno univano una fede purissima, entrambi caduti sotto il piombo fascista: Eugenio Colorni e Mario Fioretti. Ricordo come Colorni, mio indimenticabile fratello d'elezione, si prodigasse per far sì che l'Avanti! uscisse regolarmente. Egli in persona, correndo rischi di ogni sorta, non solo scriveva gli articoli principali, ma ne curava la stampa e la distribuzione, aiutato in questo da Mario Fioretti, anima ardente e generoso apostolo del Socialismo. A questo compito cui si sentiva particolarmente portato per la preparazione e la capacità della sua mente, Colorni dedicava tutto se stesso, senza tuttavia tralasciare anche i più modesti incarichi nell'organizzazione politica e militare del nostro Partito. Egli amava profondamente il giornale e sognava di dirigerne la redazione nostra a Liberazione avvenuta e se non fosse stato strappato dalla ferocia fascista, egli sarebbe stato il primo redattore capo dell'Avanti! in Roma liberata e oggi ne sarebbe il suo direttore, sorretto in questo suo compito non solo dal suo forte ingegno e dalla sua vasta cultura, ma anche dalla sua profonda onestà e da quel senso di giustizia che ha sempre guidato le sue azioni. Per opera sua e di Mario Fioretti, l'Avanti! era tra i giornali clandestini quello che aveva più mordente e che sapeva porre con più chiarezza i problemi riguardanti le masse lavoratrici. La sua pubblicazione veniva attesa con ansia e non solo da noi, ma da molti appartenenti ad altri partiti, i quali nell'Avanti! vedevano meglio interpretati i loro interessi..»  Il 22 gennaio del 1944, nella Roma occupata dalle forze naziste, in una tipografia nascosta di Monte Mario, fece stampare 500 copie di un libriccino di 125 pagine intitolato Problemi della Federazione Europea, contenente il "Manifesto di Ventotene".  Il 28 maggio del 1944, pochi giorni prima della liberazione della capitale, venne fermato in via Livorno da una pattuglia di militi fascisti della famigerata banda Koch: tentò di fuggire, ma fu raggiunto e ferito gravemente da tre colpi di pistola. Trasportato all'Ospedale San Giovanni, morì il 30 maggio, a soli 35 anni, sotto la falsa identità di Franco Tanzi.  Nel 1946 gli fu conferita la medaglia d'oro al valor militare alla memoria.  È sepolto al Cimitero Monumentale di Milano, nella tomba di famiglia.  Onorificenze Medaglia d'oro al valor militarenastrino per uniforme ordinariaMedaglia d'oro al valor militare «Indomito assertore della libertà, confinato durante la dominazione fascista, evadeva audacemente dedicandosi quindi a rischiose attività cospirative. Durante la lotta antinazista, organizzato il centro militare del Partito Socialista Italiano, dirigeva animosamente partecipandovi, primo fra i primi, una intensa, continua e micidiale azione di guerriglia e di sabotaggio. Scoperto e circondato da nazisti li affrontò da solo, combattendo con estremo ardimento, finché travolto dal numero, cadde nell'impari gloriosa lotta.» — Roma, 28 maggio 1944. Commemorazioni Nel , in occasione del 70º anniversario della morte, il Comune di Melfi, la locale Sezione ANPI e l'Associazione "Francesco Saverio Nitti" hanno celebrato la Festa della Liberazione dedicando la ricorrenza del 25 aprile al ricordo della figura e dell'opera di Eugenio Colorni.  In via Livorno a Roma, luogo dove Colorni venne ferito a morte, vennero poste tre lapidi in suo ricordo, che furono distrutte da atti vandalici. Delle tre lapidi esistenti, una, posta nel 1982 dalla III Circoscrizione del Comune di Roma è semilleggibile perché scurita dal tempo, un'altra, posta nel 1978 dal Partito Socialista Italiano, è spaccata in due e un'ultima, posta nel 2004 sempre dalla III Circoscrizione del Comune di Roma, contiene un errore.  Note  Numerosi sono i riferimenti a Colorni nel carteggio tra i fratelli Sereni: Cfr. Enzo Sereni, Emilio Sereni, Politica e utopia. Lettere 1926-1943, D. Bidussa e M. G. Meriggi, La Nuova Italia, 2000.  Stefano Miccolis, Eugenio Colorni ventenne e Croce, Relazione tenuta al convegno su «Eugenio Colorni e la cultura italiana fra le due guerre» (Milano, 15-16 ottobre 2009), organizzato dal Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, pubblicata in Belfagor: rassegna di varia umanità, anno LXV, n. 4, 31 luglio  (n. 388),  (Firenze: L. S. Olschki, )416.  cfr. la biografia di Eugenio Colorni nel sito web dell'ANPI  cfr. Commissione di Trieste, ordinanza contro Eugenio Colorni ("Attività antifascista"). In: Adriano Dal Pont, Simonetta Carolini, L'Italia al confino 1926-1943. Le ordinanze di assegnazione al confino emesse dalle Commissioni provinciali dal novembre 1926 al luglio 1943, Milano 1983 (ANPPIA/La Pietra),  II620  cfr. Pietro S. Graglia, Colorni, Spinelli e il federalismo europeo, in Eugenio Colorni dall'antifascismo all'europeismo socialista e federalista, Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, Lacaita, Intervista di Sonia Schmidt ad Altiero Spinelli, Democratici Nel Mondo, 1982. 21 agosto  4 marzo ).  cfr. Enzo Cicchino, Dopo mezzo secolo l'incontro con i protagonisti, 1994, in Adattamento ed elaborazione dall'intervista originale a, Matteo Matteotti, partigiano, figlio del defunto Giacomo, realizzata dal regista Enzo Cicchino e andata in onda durante una puntata del programma televisivo della RAI Mixer di Giovanni Minoli.  cfr. Sandro Pertini, Cinquantenario dell'Avanti!, numero unico del 25 dicembre 1946, riprodotto nel sito web del Centro Espositivo "Sandro Pertini" di Firenze.  cfr. Ugo Intini, L’unità europea e i pericoli del post fascismo, in Il Mattino del 23 marzo , riprodotto in Avanti!online del 23 marzo   vicino piazza Bologna, nel quartiere Nomentano di Roma  Comune di Milano, App di ricerca defunti Not 2 4get.  Quirinale.it.  cfr. 70º della morte di Eugenio Colorni nel sito web dell'ANPI.  chieracostui.com, foto delle tre lapidi.  Scritti, Norberto Bobbio, la Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1975 Il coraggio dell'innocenza, Luca Meldolesi, La Città del Sole (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici), Napoli, 1998 Un poeta e altri racconti, con prefazione di Claudio Magris, Il Melangolo, Genova, 2002 La malattia della metafisica. Scritti filosofici e autobiografici, Geri Cerchiai, Einaudi, Torino, 2009 Fonti Elvira Gencarelli, Profilo politico di Eugenio Colorni, in «Mondo Operaio», n. 7, luglio 1974,  49–54 Elvira Gencarelli, Eugenio Colorni, voce in Il Movimento Operaio Italiano. Dizionario Biografico, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1976,  II,  74–81 Leo Solari, Eugenio Colorni. Ieri e sempre, Marsilio, Venezia, 1980 Eugenio Garin, Colorni, Eugenio, in «Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani», XXVII, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia italiana, Roma, 1982 Norberto Bobbio, Maestri e compagni, Passigli Editori, Firenze, 1984 Nunzio Dell'Erba, L'itinerario politico di Eugenio Colorni, in Id., Il socialismo riformista tra politica e cultura, Franco Angeli, Milano 1990,  135–150 Massimo Orlandi, Il socialismo federalista di Eugenio Colorni, tesi di laurea (inedita), Università degli studi di Firenze, Anno Accademico 1991-1992 Gaetano Arfé, Eugenio Colorni, l'antifascista, l'europeista, in , Matteotti, Buozzi, Colorni. Perché vissero, perché vivono, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1996,  58–77 Sandro Gerbi, Tempi di malafede. Una storia italiana tra fascismo e dopoguerra. Guido Piovene ed Eugenio Colorni, Einaudi, Torino 1999 e Hoepli, Milano, . Geri Cerchiai, L'itinerario filosofico di Eugenio Colorni, in «Rivista di Storia della Filosofia», n. 3, 2002 Stefano Miccolis, Eugenio Colorni ventenne e Croce, in «Belfagor», 4, LXV, 31 luglio ,  415–434 Geri Cerchiai, Alcune riflessioni su Eugenio Colorni, in «Rivista di Storia della Filosofia», LXVII ,  351–360. Michele Strazza, Melfi terra di confino. Il confino a Melfi durante il fascismo, Melfi, Tarsia, 2002. Maurizio Degl'Innocenti , Eugenio Colorni dall'antifascismo all'europeismo socialista e federalista, Lacaita, Altiero Spinelli Ernesto Rossi Manifesto di Ventotene Antifascismo Movimento Federalista Europeo Resistenza ebraica Ursula Hirschmann Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Eugenio Colorni Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Eugenio Colorni  Eugenio Colorni, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Eugenio Colorni, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Eugenio Colorni, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Opere di Eugenio Colorni, su Liber Liber. Opere di Eugenio Colorni, .  Roma: lapide commemorativa in via Livorno, su chieracostui.com. V D M Antifascismo V D M Resistenza romana V D M Logo MFE.svg Federalismo europeo Flag of Europe.svg Filosofi italiani del XX secoloPolitici italiani del XX secoloAntifascisti italiani 1909 1944 22 aprile 30 maggio Milano RomaAssassinati con arma da fuocoBrigate MatteottiEbrei italianiMedaglie d'oro al valor militarePartigiani italianiStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di MilanoPolitici del Partito Socialista ItalianoSepolti nel Cimitero Monumentale di Milano

 

CONTE: Grice: “Conte is what I – and Italians – would call a ‘Griceian conversationali pragmaticist.’” Amedeo Giovanni Conte (Pavia) filosofo. Dopo aver conseguito la maturità classica presso il liceo classico "Ugo Foscolo" di Pavia, proseguì gli studi presso Pavia, quale alunno del Collegio Ghislieri. Si laureò con una tesi in Filosofia del diritto. Dopo la laurea, studiò Logica matematica all'Münster e Filosofia all'Freiburg im Breisgau.  Sposò Maria-Elisabeth ed ha avuto neuna figlia, Adelheid. Tenne il primo corso italiano di Logica deontica, presso il Collegio Ghislieri di Pavia. Conseguì la libera docenza a Torino, sotto la guida di Bobbio. Insegnò Teoria generale del diritto e Filosofia del diritto, sempre all'Pavia. Fu socio (classe di scienze morali) dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei  e dell'Istituto Lombardo Accademia di Scienze e Lettere.  Conte si occupò prevalentemente di semiotica (in particolare: di semiotica dei performativi) e di deontica filosofica. Le sue ricerche di deontica filosofica si dividono in due insiemi: ricerche di deontica e ricerche sulla deontica. Delle prime fanno parte le ricerche sulle regole eidetico-costitutive, le ricerche sulla validità deontica, le ricerche sulla logica del linguaggio normativo, le ricerche sull'ontologia del normativo, le ricerche sulla pragmatic conversazionale – alla Grice -- del linguaggio normativo. Delle ricerche sulla deontica fanno invece parte le ricerche teoretiche di metadeontica (ricerche sullo statuto della deontica) e le ricerche storiografiche di storia della deontica.  Come scrive Conte stesso: "Queste ricerche sono come punti d'una circonferenza, punti accomunati dalla relazione intercorrente tra ognuno di essi ed un altro punto (il centro), che sulla circonferenza stessa non appare." A connettere le ricerche di Conte è la loro relazione con una domanda fondamentale: "In che cosa consiste quel déon, dal quale la deontica prende il nome, e del quale la deontica è teoria?"   Opere scientifiche Ricerche in tema d'interpretazione analogica. Pavia, Tipografia del Libro, Saggio sulla completezza degli ordinamenti giuridici. Torino, Giappichelli, Primi argomenti per una critica del normativismo. Pavia, Tipografia del Libro, Ricerca d'un paradosso deontico. Pavia, Tipografia del Libro, Deontische Logik und Semantik (con Risto Hilpinen e Georg Henrik von Wright). Wiesbaden, Athenaion, 1977. Nove studi sul linguaggio normativo. Torino, Giappichelli, 1985. Filosofia del linguaggio normativo. I. Studi 1965-1981. Torino, Giappichelli, 1989. Filosofia del linguaggio normativo. II. Studi 1982-1994. Con una lettera di Norberto Bobbio. Torino, Giappichelli, 1995. Filosofia dell'ordinamento normativo. Studi 1957-1968. Torino, Giappichelli, 1997. Filosofia del linguaggio normativo. III. Studi 1995-Torino, Giappichelli. Filosofia del diritto (con Paolo Di Lucia, Luigi Ferrajoli, Mario Jori). Milano, Cortina. Ricerche di Filosofia del diritto (con Paolo Di Lucia, Antonio Incampo, Giuseppe Lorini, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Wojciech Żełaniec). Torino, Giappichelli. Res ex nomine. Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica. Sociologia filosofica del diritto. Torino, Giappichelli, . Adelaster. Il nome del vero. Milano, LED, . È inventore del genere letterario da lui chiamato "eidogramma" ed autore di numerosi eidogrammi, solo parzialmente éditi:  Nella parola. Osnago, Pulcinoelefante,Kenningar. Bari, Adriatica. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Elenco dei soci, su lincei.it. Amedeo Giovanni Conte, "Per una critica della ragione deontica" (introduzione alla Filosofia del linguaggio normativo).  Scheda nel sito della Pavia Centro di filosofia sociale. Pragmatica. Filosofia del diritto Logica deontica Ontologia Performativo (atto verbale) Pragmatica Semiotica Semantica Filosofia Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani Professore, Accademici dei LinceiFilosofi del dirittoMembri dell'Istituto Lombardo Accademia di Scienze e LettereProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di PaviaStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di PadovaStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di PaviaStudenti dell'Friburgo

 

CONTESTABILE Domenico Contestabile, filosofo. Contestabile: «Cacciato con una telefonata» Intervista di Dino Martirano, Corriere della sera. Con il Psi non ho ricoperto grandi incarichi ma ho avuto l'onore di essere stato amico di Craxi. Mi mancherà la politica ma non è una tragedia. Torno ai miei studi, alla[filosofia medioevale. Mi mancheranno certi momenti. Io, che ero stato nel Psi fin quando nel '92 la procura della Repubblica lo ha sciolto, ricordo bene i mesi trascorsi al ministero della Giustizia: col ministro Biondi fummo i protagonisti del tentativo fallito, però generoso, di riportare la giustizia sui binari della normalità. Sciolto il partito [Psi], chi si è fatto maomettano, chi ebreo, chi cattolico. Però sempre socialisti siamo rimasti.

 

CONTI: Angelo Conti (Roma), filosofo.  La casa di Angelo Conti ad Arpino Nato a Roma in una famiglia originaria di Arpino, dove frequentò il locale liceo, studiò medicina, senza però arrivare alla laurea. Preferì occuparsi di musica, di storia dell'arte e di letteratura, ma soprattutto di filosofia estetica, scrivendo saggi critici per riviste quali Capitan Fracassa, Cronaca bizantina e a cominciare dal 1882 per La Tribuna e La Tribuna illustrata, sotto lo pseudonimo di Doctor Mysticus. Fu amico del pittore Adolfo De Carolis e di Gabriele D'Annunzio, che lo citò nel suo romanzo Giovanni Episcopo e si ispirò a lui per il personaggio di Daniele Glauro de Il fuoco.  Nel 1893 lavorò a Firenze presso la Galleria degli Uffizi, collaborando al Marzocco, poi nel 1894 a Venezia presso l'Accademia di Belle Arti. Nella città lagunare Conti conobbe Eleonora Duse, con la quale ebbe frequenti scambi epistolari. Qui scrisse Giorgione, un saggio d'arte ed estetica sul pittore veneto.  Tornato a Firenze, nel 1900 uscì La beata riva, raccolta di saggi che delineavano la sua concezione critica ed estetica, ispirata dichiaratamente a Platone, Kant e Schopenhauer. La prefazione fu curata da Gabriele D'Annunzio, il quale scriveva di stimare molto il Conti e di ammirare il suo ascetismo estetico.  Dal 1901 ricoprì l'incarico di direttore delle Antichità e Belle Arti di Roma, fino al 1925, anno in cui si trasferì a Napoli come direttore della Reggia di Capodimonte.  Nelle sue opere si ispirò alle poetiche di Walter Pater e John Ruskin.  Opere Giorgione, Firenze, F.lli Alinari, 1894. Catalogo delle regie gallerie di Venezia, Venezia, Tip. L. Merlo, 1895. La beata riva, Milano, F.lli Treves, 1900. Sul fiume del tempo, Napoli, R. Ricciardi, 1907. Dopo il canto delle Sirene, Napoli, R. Ricciardi, 1911. Domenico Morelli, Napoli, Edizioni d'arte Renzo Ruggiero, 1927. San Francesco, con un saggio di Giovanni Papini, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1931. Virgilio dolcissimo padre, Napoli, R. Ricciardi, 1931. Curiosità Mario Praz ha scritto che il suo maestro Ernesto Giacomo Parodi era solito leggere La beata riva di Conti prima di addormentarsi; quando morì, la lettura non era stata ancora terminata.  Note  Vedi M. Carlino, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, riferimenti in .  Angela Guidotti, Forme del tragico nel teatro italiano del Novecento. Modelli della tradizione e riscritture originali, Pisa, ETS42.  Mario Praz, Romantici, vittoriani, decadenti e museo dannunziano, in Bellezza e bizzarria, I Meridiani, Milano, Mondadori, 2002635.  Benedetto Croce, La letteratura della nuova Italia, Volume VI, Bari, Laterza, 1940. Marcello Carlino, CONTI, Angelo, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  28, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983. 18 giugno .  Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Angelo Conti  Angelo Conti, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Angelo Conti, su siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo Unificato per le Soprintendenze Archivistiche.  Opere di Angelo Conti, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Angelo Conti, .  A. Conti, Due disegni di Rembrandt nella Pinacoteca di Napoli, Bollettino d'Arte, 9, 1907 A. Conti, Due conviti di Mattia Preti, Bollettino d'Arte.

 

conti: Antonio Schinella Conti (Padova), filosofo. Famoso per essere stato arbitro nella controversia tra Leibniz e Newton, circa l'invenzione del calcolo infinitesimale.  Fu a lungo a Parigi dove si legò in amicizia con Charles Francois Du Fay, noto per gli esperimenti fisici che conduceva all'Accademia delle Scienze.  Una volta tornato in Italia, si ritirò a vita sedentaria tra Padova e Venezia. Di lui esiste una statua in Prato della Valle, opera dello scultore padovano Felice Chiereghin, che venne eretta da Carolina de' Conti.  Scrisse trattati riguardanti la struttura della tragedia, e nel caso del Trattato dei fantasmi poetici, discusse la funzione dei cori. Tra le sue tragedie, la più significativa fu il Giulio Cesare. Ne scrisse altre tre, tutte di soggetto romano: Marco Bruto, Giunio Bruto, e Druso (1748).  Apparvero a Firenze in volume unico le quattro opere teatrali, accompagnate ciascuna da una prefazione dell'autore.  Opere Antonio Schinella Conti, [Opere]. 1, In Venezia, presso Giambatista Pasquali, Antonio Schinella Conti, [Opere]. 2, In Venezia, presso Giambatista Pasquali, 1756. Antonio Schinella Conti, Versioni poetiche, Bari, Laterza, 1966.  Giovanna Scianatico, Il secolo neoclassico. Antonio Conti e la lezione di Gian Vincenzo Gravina, in "Esperienze Letterarie", a. XXXVI, , n. 2,  3–21. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Antonio Schinella Conti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Antonio Schinella Conti  Antonio Schinella Conti, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Giulio Natali, Antonio Schinella Conti, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Giovanna Gronda, Antonio Schinella Conti, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Opere di Antonio Schinella Conti, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Antonio Schinella Conti, . Spartiti o libretti di Antonio Schinella Conti, su International Music Score Library Project, Project Petrucci LLC.  Le quattro tragedie composte dal signor abate Antonio Conti patrizio veneto, Firenze, 1751, Appresso Andrea Bonducci, su books.google.it. Refs.: Speranza, “Calcolo finitesimale e calcolo infinitesimale.”

 

CONTI. Villa di castello, sede dell'accademia della crusca, busto di augusto conti.jpg Busto di Augusto Conti presso la sede dell'Accademia della Crusca Deputato del Regno d'Italia LegislatureIX, X Gruppo parlamentarecattolici-liberali Sito istituzionale Dati generali Titolo di studioLaurea in giurisprudenza ProfessionePedagogista  Augusto Conti, Mezzobusto ed epigrafeSan Miniato, Palazzo Comunale. Augusto Conti (San Miniato) filosofo. AConti nacque a San Pietro alle Fonti di San Miniato al Tedesco da famiglia oriunda livornese. Studiò a Siena e Pisa; in questa Università aggredì un professore da lui ritenuto reazionario. Fu espulso dall'ateneo e passò alcuni mesi in carcere. Dopo quell'episodio fu costretto a completare gli studi fuori dal Granducato di Toscana. Si trasferì dunque nel Ducato di Lucca e all'Lucca si laureò in legge. Fu combattente a Montanara con i volontari toscani; insegnò a Lucca, a Pisa e nell'Istituto superiore di Firenze. Insigne filosofo cristiano, scrittore di pregio, pedagogista, collaborò con Raffaello Lambruschini al periodico La famiglia e la scuola.  Il 31 marzo del 1869, per i suoi meriti letterari e scientifici, fu chiamato a sedere nel Collegio dei Residenti dell'Accademia della Crusca; in seguito ne ricoprì più volte l'Arciconsolato. Fu il filosofo della bellezza, che definì stare fra il vero e il buono, e li collegava come il mezzo tra il principio e fine. Ebbe stile classico e le sue opere a volte sono apprezzate più per l'eleganza della prosa che per il contenuto.  A Firenze fu a lungo consigliere superiore della pubblica istruzione e collaborò con l'architetto Emilio De Fabris per la definizione dell'apparato ornamentale della facciata di Santa Maria del Fiore.  Alcune sue opere Cose di storia e d'arte; Evidenza, amore e fede, o i criteri della filosofia, discorsi e dialoghi. Famiglia, patria, Dio, o i tre amori (1887). I discorsi del tempo in un viaggio in Italia (1867): in ogni città coglie occasione per un insegnamento civile; a Venezia il capitolo sulla religione, a Milano sullo stato, ecc. Il bello nel vero, o estetica. Il buono nel vero, o morale e diritto naturale. Illustrazione delle sculture e dei mosaici sulla facciata del Duomo di Firenze (1887). Il vero nell'ordine (1876), o ontologia e logica. L'armonia delle cose, o antropologia; cercò di costruire una metafisica fondata sulla relazione, l'armonia, l'ordine; ha capitoli sull'educazione religiosa, civile e private; Letteratura e patria, collana di ricordi nazionali; Nuovi discorsi del tempo, o famiglia, Patria, Dio Religione ed arte, collana di ricordi nazionali. Storia della filosofia, molto accreditata. Sveglie dell'anima. Il Messia redentore vaticinato, uomo dei dolori, re della gloria. La mia corona del rosario. Ai figli del popolo, consigli. Giovanni Duprè o Dell'arte, 2 dialoghi. Evidenza, amore e fede o i criteri della filosofia (1858), lezioni e dialoghi sulla filosofia cristiana; lavoro scientifico e popolare, e discorsi sulla storia della filosofia, accordo della filosofia con la tradizione; discussione sulla filosofia e la fede. La filosofia di Dante. La bellezza qual mezzo potente di educazione. Note  Nella stessa seduta era eletto Socio residente anche Terenzio Mamiani. Cfr. "La Rassegna nazionale", La prima volta dal 1873 al 1883 e poi dal 1897 fino alla morte.  C. Cresti, M. Cozzi, G. Carapelli, Il Duomo di Firenze; L'avventura della facciata, Firenze; Giovanni Casati, Dizionario degli scrittori d'Italia dalle origini fino ai viventi, Romolo Ghirlanda Editore, Milano, 1926-1934. Mario Themelly, «CONTI, Augusto» in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 28, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983. Grande Dizionario Enciclopedico UTET (Fedele), Torino, UTET, 1992, volume V, alla voce.  Facciata di Santa Maria del Fiore Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Augusto Conti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Augusto Conti  Augusto Conti, su Treccani.itEnciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Augusto Conti, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Augusto Conti, su accademicidellacrusca.org, Accademia della Crusca.  Opere di Augusto Conti, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Augusto Conti, . Augusto Conti, su storia.camera.it, Camera dei deputati.  Filosofia. Deputati della IX legislatura del Regno d'ItaliaDeputati della X legislatura del Regno d'Italia

 

CONTRI: Siro Contri (Cazzano di Tramigna), filosofo. Allievo diZamboni. Elaborò una minuziosa critica al pensiero logico di Hegel di cui mise in rilievo le incongruenze gnoseologiche e metodologiche che portano alla errata concezione hegeliana della realtà come vita dell'idea. Rovesciando l'immanentismo hegeliano, Contri scoprì un mondo di realtà sviluppando una concezione della filosofia della storia che denominò storiosofia.  Siro anagraficamente Luigi Sirio Contri nacque a Cazzano di Tramigna (Verona). Fu alunno del Collegio Don Mazza di Verona riservato a studenti indigenti dotati e meritevoli, si diplomò allo storico Liceo classico Scipione Maffei . Partecipò alla prima guerra mondiale e cadde prigioniero nel 1918 e trattenuto a Dunaszerdahely nella attuale Slovacchia.  Nel 1921 si laureò a Padova in Filosofia.  Nel 1923 entrò nella redazione del quotidiano di Bologna L'Avvenire d'Italia. Fu discepolo fervente di Giuseppe Zamboni, di cui accolse e sostenne la dottrina della gnoseologia pura. In alcune occasioni Il Contri si descrisse come elaboratore in contemporanea al suo maestro Zamboni di alcune teorie, collegate all’estetica ma non solo. Insegnò storia e filosofia al Liceo classico S. Luigi di Bologna dei P.P. Barnabiti. Intensificò l’attività di pubblicista e collaborò con il Corriere d'Italia, Il popolo veneto di Padova, L'Avvenire d'Italia, Il Carroccio, Il Nuovo cittadino e la La rivista pedagogica. Tenne conferenze, alcune delle quali furono pubblicate, al “Circolo di Cultura” di Bologna.  La polemica in difesa della Gnoseologia Pura di Giuseppe Zamboni e la rivista Criterion Nel 1931 in difesa e sostegno a Giuseppe Zamboni iniziò una vivace polemica con l'Università Cattolica di Milano in particolare contro Padre Agostino Gemelli, Francesco Olgiati e Amato Masnovo. Uno dei primi atti dello scontro filosofico fu la conferenza al Circolo di Cultura di Bologna su La filosofia scolastica in Italia nell'ora presente. A cui seguì la risposta firmata da Olgiati. Nel 1932 Zamboni, il maestro e amico di Contri, fu espulso da Gemelli con il supporto di Olgiati e Masnovo, dall'Università Cattolica con la motivazione di allontanamento dalla ortodossia tomistica e con accusa di non conformità al Magistero della Dottrina Cattolica Romana. Ad alcuni testi di Zamboni fu tolto l’imprimatur. Molti anni più tardi queste accuse sollevate a Zamboni risultarono errate e Zamboni fu riabilitato anche se tardivamente con la testimonianza di personalità quali Sofia Vanni Rovighi. Contri pubblicò la Lettera a S. Santità Pio XI sull'interpretazione di S. Tommaso in prosecuzione della lunga polemica promossa dal Contri contro i rappresentanti dell'Università Cattolica di Milano. Li accusò di mantenere una posizione chiusa a ogni proposta di rinnovamento del pensiero cattolico, mantenendolo ancorato ad un tomismo corretto ma non più sufficiente ad interpretare le dinamiche innovazioni della società industriale e di dare una adeguata interpretazione della storia. Contrì definì la posizione della Cattolica con il termine da lui coniato di “archeoscolastica”. La posizione “archeoscolastica” della Cattolica di Milano, di una conoscenza indimostrata, a priori, dell’ente era bersaglio di critiche da parte di filosofi cristiani e non che la ritenevano inadeguata nell’ambito del pensiero moderno. Contri sostenne che la dimostrazione della conoscenza dell’ente data dalla Gnoseologia Pura di Zamboni superava definitivamente tali critiche e ridava certezza dimostrata della conoscenza e dell’esistenza di Dio.  Sul giornale di Milano L'Ambrosiano, numeri 5, 8, 10, 15, 29, Contri accusò di plagio Padre Agostino Gemelli per aver pubblicato nella monografia Il mio contributo alla filosofia neoscolastica (Milano, 1926) pagine già scritte da Desiré Mercier e da Morice De Wulf, senza indicare le citazioni. Gemelli diede le dimissioni da Rettore della Università Cattolica ma rimase in carica. Successivamente a questo episodio, Contri fu licenziato come insegnante dal Liceo classico S. Luigi dei P.P. Barnabiti di Bologna. Il prof. Ferdinando Napoli, Generale dei Barnabiti, cultore di scienze naturali, venne depennato dalla Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze, allora presieduta dal Gemelli. Venne dato ordine ai giornali cattolici di non pubblicare più articoli a firma di Siro Contri.  Nel 1933 Contri, continuando la difesa della dottrina del suo maestro Zamboni, fondò la rivista quadrimestrale di polemica e di dottrina neoscolastica “Criterion”. La rivista di cui Contri era il direttore responsabile fu pubblicata dal 1933 al 1941. Il confronto con l’Università Cattolica di Milano continuò negli anni successivi con relazioni a numerosi congressi di cui Contri diede resoconto sulla rivista.  Contri tornò all’insegnamento nel 1934 quando fu nominato titolare di cattedra, al liceo classico di Ivrea.Nel 1936 incontrò Irene Baggio con cui si unì in matrimonio e ebbe tre figli.  La Genesi fenomenologica della Logica hegeliana Sulla rivista Criterion apparvero intanto i primi Saggi del Contri sui suoi studi hegeliani che prelusero all'opera definitiva del '38, '39, '40: La Genesi fenomenologica della Logica hegeliana. L’opera fu pubblicata sulla rivista Criterion a capitoli a partire dal gennaio 1938 e l’ultima parte nel 1941.  La compromissione con il Fascismo dal 1942 al 1945 Dal 1942 al 1945 Siro Contri partecipò attivamente agli organi culturali del fascismo e a frange cattoliche aderenti al partito fascista. Durante la svolta fascista, giudicata da alcuni autori” tardiva ed oggettivamente incomprensibile”, Contri scrisse su giornali quali Il Secolo Fascista, Quadrivio, Il Regime Fascista, Il meridiano di Roma e La Crociata Italica. Contri si avvalse della tribuna offerta da queste testate per promuovere i suoi studi filosofici e criticò filosoficamente un, da lui definito, pensiero ebraico negli scritti di Spinoza, Durkeheim e Bergson. Dal 25 aprile 1945, dopo la guerra, per questa sua compromissione politica con il fascismo Contri fu sospeso dall’insegnamento.  La storiosofia Dal 1947 Contri riprese il ruolo di insegnate presso il Liceo classico Giuseppe Parini di Milano e tenne conferenze su studi hegeliani e biblici. Nel 1948 sorse una disputa con Giuseppe Zamboni in seguito all'articolo Il campo della gnoseologia, il campo della storiosofia, Verona, 1948, in risposta alla pubblicazione del Contri Dallo storicismo alla storiosofia, Verona, Albarelli, 1947. Il carteggio Controversia Zamboni-Contri è conservato presso la Biblioteca Capitolare di Verona.  Nel 1952 fu docente in Storia della filosofia all'Milano. Prese parte attiva a congressi tomistici internazionali e a congressi rosminiani.  Dal 1957 partecipò attivamente alla “Missione di Milano”, lanciata dall’allora Arcivescovo di Milano, Giovanni Battista Montini.  Come riconoscimenti ai suoi studi nel 1958 conseguì alcuni premi fra i quali uno indetto dall'Angelicum sul tema “Quid est veritas”, e una segnalazione all'Accademia dei Lincei per l'opera: Punti di trascendenza nell'immanentismo hegeliano, Milano, LSU, 1955.  Nel 1968 andò in pensione e morì a Pegli nel 1969.  Pensiero L'adesione alla gnoseologia di Giuseppe Zamboni Siro Contri fu discepolo e, secondo Gaetano Peretti, geniale continuatore di Giuseppe Zamboni. Contri così potrebbe definire la situazione filosofica di oggi: "Il mondo del pensiero, perduta la bussola non teologica d'orientamento, è costituito da una miriade di metafisiche che cozzano le une contro le altre tanto da definirsi che heghelianicamente come il divenire in sè, che è puro fenomenismo."  A tale fenomenismo corrispondono molteplici fenomenologie. Per esempio quella di Martin Heidegger, afferma: "il reale è un solo, una totalità onniafferrante (Hegel direbbe begriff), tanto come essere quanto come niente". Anche Hidegger poi tenta la via della salvezza ammettendo la realtà del mondo esterno come di un che, che resiste al soggetto, ponendosi nel solco del pensiero di Zamboni. In questo modo Hidegger ha toccato "il problema che si volle e che si vuole eludere: la realtà del mondo esterno. Esistono queste realtà, come la mia realtà, indipendentemente dal pensarle?"  Per dare risposta a questo interrogativo cruciale, secondo Siro Contri è necessaria la gnoseologia pura di Giuseppe Zamboni.  Il filosofo veronese Giuseppe Zamboni, secondo Contri, scoprì la risoluzione definitiva del problema della certezza della conoscenza umana, con la fondazione della gnoseologia pura. Essa permise di risolvere il problema dell'esistenza di Dio, riavvalorando criticamente le cinque vie della dimostrazione di S.Tommaso d'Aquino. Sono meriti del metodo filosofico di Zamboni il poter affermare "la sostanzialità del mio io personale, la mia realtà individua e dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio, trascendente, personale".  Il metodo zamboniano distingue gli elementi della conoscenza umana tra sensazioni, che sono sempre oggettive, e stati d'animo e tra questi "quello stato d'animo che è anche atto: l'attenzione". Gli stati d'animo sono sempre soggettivi. Nel tentativo di fare una descrizione sintetica del metodo zamboniano Gaetano Peretti così scrisse: Zamboni "riesce a cogliere la realtà del proprio io, nei suoi atti e stati. Essi sono reali, per­ché immediatamente presenti all'io, e se sono reali gli accidenti dell'io, perché essi sono modo di essere dell'io, reale è l'io, come sostanza, cui essi ineriscono. Perciò dall'immediata certezza della realtà degli accidenti di un ente si giunge alla certezza della realtà sostanziale dell'io."  La critica alla posizione della neoscolastica di Gemelli, Olgiati e Masnovo sulla conoscenza indimostrata dell'ente e la soluzione tramite la gnoseologia pura di Zamboni La descrizione di Peretti, continua affrontando il tema della dimostrazione della realtà dell'ente:" Si fonda così nell'esperienza immediata ed integrale il concetto di ente, che non è più necessario assumere acriticamente, come qualcosa di razionalmente immediato, pena l'impossibilità di una logica razionale. L'assunzione acritica del concetto di ente è propria del neotomismo dell'Università Cattolica, che in un suo autore, Amato Masnovo, perviene alla sua massima teorizzazione nel "mio hic et nunc diveniente atto di pensiero". Ma con questo l'ente è solo pensato e ammesso acriticamente come pensiero, è un presupposto, mentre nella gnoseologia zamboniana è il risultato di un processo di astrazione, che deriva da una realtà immediatamente presente all'autocoscienza dell'io, che non ha la natura del pensiero, non è pensiero essa stessa, ma qualcosa di diverso. Si può pertanto uscire dalla formula logica della ragion sufficiente, che è sempre e comunque razionalista e riduce al razionalismo anche il neotomismo. Nell'ambito dell'esperienza immediata ed integrale si scopre invece non la ragion sufficiente, ma la sufficienza ad esistere o no. E la fondazione ed il ripensamento delle prove dell'esistenza di Dio, e in particolare della terza via tomistica, diventano inoppugnabili. Nessuno più può dubitare dell'esistenza del sufficiente ad esistere, che è Dio."  Secondo Peretti la fondazione gnoseologica della metafisica è il più grande merito di Giuseppe Zamboni.  L'ambiente filosofico dell'Università Cattolica non accettò la gnoseologia zamboniana e fondò la metafisica sul concetto di ente, assunto acriticamente, come un presupposto indimostrabile. Esso finì per identificarsi con l'ente di ragione, non sfuggendo all'insidia hegeliana, che lo aveva dialettizzato sia come essenza che come esistenza. La dialettica negativa di Hegel produsse ben presto nella corrente neotomista di Milano (ma anche in altre università cattoliche) i suoi effetti devastanti. Siro Contri, aveva messo in guardia i neotomisti dalla fraus hegeliana, che si svela nell'antitesi come negazione.  La critica alla logica di Hegel e la storiosofia Seguendo la metodologia gnoseologica zamboniana, Siro Contri ha affrontato Hegel, il "padre del fenomenismo" compiendo una minuziosa e sistematica analisi della fenomenologia hegeliana. Dopo averle individuate ha messo in rilievo le incongruenze gnoseologiche e perciò metodologiche degli scritti e del pensiero di Hegel, che sfocia nella concezione della realtà come vita dell'idea, presentandola "come uno svolgimento dialettico del begiff, come qualche cosa che non mai in sé, ma diviene eternamente in sé e per sé".  Contri resa evidente questa impostazione, anima del fenomenismo, e scoperta nella deficienza gnoseologica e pertanto metodologica, derivata dall'impostazione razionalista ed empirista che al fondo dello stesso criticismo, rovescia l'immanentismo hegeliano, che si gli scopre non più come mondo di idee, ma di realtà, di cui ognuna è altro del suo altro, in un ordito cosmologico, di cui la storia dell'uomo rappresenta l'essenza. Ed ecco la storiosofia contriana, che reclama, al posto dell'immanentismo gnoseologicamente insostenibile, la trascendenza della trama di questo ordito, che a questo punto in sé e per sé non può più essere spiegato (si ricordi che l'anima della spiegazione hegeliana è la "negazione"!). Tale trascendenza prova l'esistenza di un Dio trascendente, che ha concepito la trama creando le realtà ordito di questa trama, di realtà in reciproca relazione, in cui non c'è membro che sia fermo. In questo ordine si risolvono in modo nuovo i rapporti tra le realtà, che per esempio tra l'anima e il corpo, superando così gli scogli di una spinosa questione di eredità aristotelica, di grande importanza anche oggi, in cui le realtà terrene e spirituali non trovano la sintesi equilibratrice.  La storiosofia contriana rappresenta uno sviluppo realizzato da Contri del metodo di Zamboni, considerandolo la via per rinnovare tutta la filosofia "poiché esso non è storicismo filosofico, non è naturalismo, è avanti positivistico, non è speculazione, ma metodo appunto, ( metodo) che da secoli la filosofia europea ha cercato, perdendolo oggi nella disperazione del momento."  Opere: Il problema della verità in San Tommaso d'Aquino: passi scelti dalla Somma Teologica e da altre opere tomistiche con introduzione, inquadramento e interpretazione del dott. Siro Contri, Torino, SEI; Aspetti caratteristici di gnoseologia pura, Bologna, L.Cappelli; Verso l'armonia del pensiero, Bologna; Il tomismo e il pensiero moderno secondo le recenti parole del Pontefice, Bologna, Coop. tipografica Azzoguidi; Sintesi di gnoseologia pura, Bologna, Coop. tipografica Azzoguidi;  L'A.B.C. della filosofia del bello, Firenze, Libreria Editrice Fiorentina; La filosofia scolastica in Italia nell' era presente, op. I, Bologna, Cuppini;  La filosofia scolastica nell'era presente (dedicata a Giulio Canella), op. II,Bologna, ed. Galleri; Piccola enciclopedia filosofica: sintesi organica elementare di filosofia dell'ente e del pensiero, Bologna, C. Galleri; Lettera a S. Santità Papa Pio 11. sull'interpretazione di S. Tommaso, Bologna, Stab. tip. Felsineo; Un confronto istruttivo: Mercier, Gemelli, De Wulf ed altri ancora, Bologna, C. Galleri; Pane al pane: riassunto d'una situazione, Bologna, Costantino Gallera;  Filosofia e Cattolicesimo: neoscolastici e archeoscolastici, sulla rivista Italia letteraria; Alla ricerca del segreto di Hegel, Bologna, La Grafolita; Pedagogia mussoliniana: dai discorsi del duce, Bologna, La Diana scolastica; Giuseppe Zamboni e la sua gnoseologia pura di A. Hilckmann . Il segreto di Hegel di S. Contri, Bologna, Stabilimento Tipografico Felsineo; Riassunto della mia interpretazione di Hegel, Ivrea, ed. Criterion; La genesi fenomenologica della logica hegeliana, Bologna, ed.Criterion; Ambrogino o della neoscolastica, dialogo filosofico,  Bologna; La soluzione del nodo centrale della filosofia della storia, Bologna, Criterion; Complementi di storiosofia, Bologna, Criterion; Punti di storiosofia, Bologna, Criterion; Lettera a S.S. Pio XII sulla filosofia della storia, Bologna, Criterion; Il Reiner Begriff (=concetto puro) hegeliano ed una recensione gesuitica, Bologna, Criterion; Dallo storicismo alla storiosofia. Lettura prima, Verona, Albarelli; I tre chiasmi della storia del pensiero filosofico.  Inquadratura unitotale della controversia sulla storiosofia, Milano, ed. Criterion;  L'attualità del Rosmini, Domodossola, La cartografica C. Antonioli;  L'ispirazione divina della S. Scrittura secondo l'interpretazione storiosofica, Milano, Criterion;  La sapienza di Salomone, Milano, ed. Criterion; La riforma della metafisica, Milano, ed. Criterion; L'attualità della filosofia medioevale.  Raggiungere la forma nuova, Fiera Letteraria; Punti di trascendenza nell'immanentismo hegeliano, alla luce della momentalità storiosofica, Milano, Libreria Editrice Scientifico Universitaria; Il pensiero filosofico di Rosmini, Milano, Centro di cultura religiosa; Posizioni dello spiritualismo Cristiano: La dottrina della poieticita in un quadro rosminiano, Domodossola, Tip. La cartografica C. Antonioli; Assiologia ed estetica, Theorein, n. 2, 1956. 1957 Posizione dello spiritualismo cristiano. La dottrina della poieticità, in un quadro rosminiano, Rivista rosminiana, n. 1, 1957. Heidegger in una luce rosminiana: la favola di Igino e il sentimento fondamentale, Domodossola, La cartografica, 1958 Missione di Milano. Chiosa storico-filosofica, Ragguaglio,  1958 Heidegger in una luce rosminiana, Rivista rosminiana,  1958 La coscienza infelice nella filosofia hegeliana, Palermo, Manfredi, 1961 Husserl edito e Husserl inedito, Palermo, Manfredi, 1961 Kierkegaard: profeta laico dell'interiorità umana. Saggi di una poetica vichiana, Milano, Il ragguaglio librario, 1962 La fenomenologia dello spirito di G. Hegel, Rivista rosminiana, n.1, 1962. L'unità del pensiero filosofico, Sapienza, n. 5-6, 1962 Il pluralismo filosofico nell'ambito di una concezione cristiana, Sapienza, n. 3, 1965 In margine al centenario dantesco, Sapienza, n. 4, 1965 La negazione come principio metodologico di unificazione speculativa, Theorein, n. 2-3, 1967 Vita e pensiero di Hegel, Rivista rosminiana, n. 1, 1967 Possibilità di un accordo tra la dottrina rosminiana del sentimento fondamentale e le concezioni moderne  sull'inconscio, Rivista  rosminiana, n. 2, 1968 Morale e religione nella Fenomenologia dello spirito di G. Hegel, Palermo, Mori, 1968 Parallelo tra Hegel e Rosmini, Palermo, Mori, 1970  (postumo) Metafisica e storia, Palermo, Mori, 1970 (postumo). Il sofisma di Hegel. Siro Contri a cura e con due saggi di Irene Baggio, Milano, Jaca book, 1989 (postumo). Letteratura su Siro Contri Olgiati E., Il caso Contri, in Rivista di Filosofia neoscolastica271, maggio-giugno 1931 Bizzarri R., Gnoseologia e pedagogia in alcuni scrittori contemporanei, Milano, estratto da Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica, 1932-34 Zamboni G., Lettera sulla collaborazione e sulle coincidenze, Verona, 5 maggio 1941 Zamboni G., Il campo della gnoseologia, il campo della storiosofia, Verona, 1948 G.R., Lo spirito delle lingue semitiche, Aevum, Milano, gennaio, febbraio 1956. Scarlato G., La riforma della metafisica, Idea, Roma, 5 agosto 1956 Il Merito, annuario dei premi e dei premiati d'Italia, Siro Contri,  509, 1958 Demetrio da Crema, La questione del mondo esterno nella filosofia di G. Zamboni, Milano, Centro di Studi Cappuccini Lombardi, 1965 Tosi G., Ricordo del prof. S. Contri, Note mazziane,  n. 1, 87, 1969 Nicolaci G. , La propedeutica metafisica hegeliana al problema del pensare e la lettura rosminiana di S. Contri, Theorein, Palermo, anno VI, 1969 Peretti G., S. Contri tra gnoseologia e storiosofia, in Theorein , n. 2,  65 e ss, 1969 Peretti G., In ricordo di Siro Contri , in L'Arena, 26 gennaio 1969 Giunta P., Punti di trascendenza in S. Contri, in Sophia, gennaio-giugno 1972 Scalabiella S., S. Contri contestò la teologia, in Tribuna politica, 25 marzo 1973 Marcolungo F. L., Metafisica e Storia, in Verona Fedele, 24 novembre 1974 Peretti G., Mons. Zamboni a cent'anni dalla nascita, Verona Fedele, 12 ot­tobre 1975 Dordoni A., Crociata Italica, Fascismo e religione nella Repubblica di Salò, Milano, Sugar, 1976 Baggio I., Temi e fonti della filosofia del Contri, in Rivista rosminiana, fasc. II, 1981 Baggio I., Contri e la Neoscolastica, in Rivista rosminiana, fasc. II, 1983 Recensioni Redanò U., Italia che scrive, Roma, febbraio 1955. Repetto T., Il secolo XIX, Genova, 16 marzo 1955. Peretti G., Bollettino trimestrale Don Nicola Mazza, Verona, aprile 1955 Ciravegna M., estratto da Nuova rivista storica, fase. I, 1955 Peretti M., Giornale  di  metafisica,  Genova,  luglio-settembre  1955 Declou S.J., Revue Philosophique de Louvain,  440–444, agosto 1955 Raimondi P.,Corriere della Liguria, 19 marzo 1955 Amerio F., Humanitas, marzo 1956 Scarlata G., Sophia, Roma, luglio-dicembre 1965 Coccia A., OFM. Como, estratto dalla rivista Miscellanea francescana, Roma.  60 fase. 3-4,  436–38, 1969 Peretti M., Rassegna di pedagogia,  244–47, luglio-dicembre 1971 Miscellanea Francescana, Roma, fase. 3-4,  483–86, 1971 Agosti V., Humanitas, giugno 1972 Amerio F., Pontificio Ateneo Salesiano, 2 luglio 1972. Ferrero G., Giornale di metafisica, dicembre 1972 Note  Gaetano Peretti, In ricordo di Siro Contri, in L'Arena, Verona, 26 gennaio 19696.  Francesco Olgiati, Il caso Contri, in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica,  23, n. 3, 1931,  271-278 (archiviato dall'originale).  Siro Contri, (Circa il volume di Croce 'La storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915'), tratto da «L'Avvenire d'Italia»Patrimonio dell'Archivio storico Senato della Repubblica, su patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto .  Siro Contri, L'Estetica di Benedetto Croce, tratto da «Il carroccio» (1a parte)Patrimonio dell'Archivio storico Senato della Repubblica, su patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto .  Siro Contri, Ricerca e dottrina, tratto da «Il Nuovo cittadino» (Circa il volume di Zamboni 'Sistema di gnoseologia e morale')Patrimonio dell'Archivio storico Senato della Repubblica, su patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto .  Siro Contri, Il sofisma di Hegel, 1ª ed., Jaca Book, 1989, ©1988237,  88-16-95055-2,  32350261. 2 agosto .  Sina, Mario,, Studi su John Locke e su altri pensatori cristiani agli albori del secolo dei lumi,  978-88-343-2278-9,  900470701. 23 agosto .  «( in riferimento ad Agostino Gemelli )...Certi gestiscriveva la Vanni Rovighiche gli furono rimproverati come acquiescenza al potere politico fascista (e furono ben pochi in confronto a quelli di molti altri) furono dettati dalla preoccupazione di difendere la sua Università dalla minaccia di chiusura da parte del potere politico, minaccia tutt’altro che immaginaria. E forse fu il timore di fronte alle obiezioni di un’altra autorità, quella ecclesiastica, che gli premeva ben più di quella politica, a indurlo ad allontanare dall’Università un uomo di grande ingegno e di purezza adamantina: Giuseppe Zamboni, un gesto che non può non essergli rimproverato e che lasciò anche a noi allora studenti dell’amaro in bocca.».  Alberto Soave, Azione Cattolica. Lotta intorno alla filosofia neoscolastica, su Antonio Gramsci: I QUADERNI DEL CARCERE, 18 settembre . 2 agosto .  Siro Contri, (Circa il volume di Croce 'La storia come pensiero e come azione'), tratto da «Criterion»Patrimonio dell'Archivio storico Senato della Repubblica, su patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto .  Redazione, Inaugurazione ad Asti dei corsi della Università Popolare, in La Stampa, 2 aprile 19448 (archiviato dall'originale).  «...Siro Contri Presidente dell' Istituto di Cultura Fascista...».  Siro Contri, Un grande traduttore, tratto da «Il regime fascista» (circa Novelli)Patrimonio dell'Archivio storico Senato della Repubblica, su patrimonio.archivio.senato.it. 2 agosto .  Annarosa Dordoni, Crociata italica : fascismo e religione nella repubblica di Salò : gennaio 1944-aprile 1945, Milano, Sugar Co. Se Edizioni, 1976.  Foto di classe, su liceoparini.edu.it. 2 agosto .  «Foto di Classe al Liceo classico Giuseppe Parini con il professor Siro Contri nel 1952».  Gaetano Peretti, Siro Contri tra gnoseologia e storiosofia, in Theorein, n. 2, 196965.  Gaetano Peretti, Mons. Zamboni a cent'anni dalla nascita, in Verona Fedele, Verona, 12 ot­tobre 1975.  Gaetano Peretti, Maria Tu qui...!, Verona, Copygraph, F. L. Marcolungo, Metafisica e Storia, in Verona Fedele, 24 novembre 19746.  Gaetano Peretti, In ricordo di Siro Contri, in L'Arena, 26 gennaio 19696.  Giuseppe Zamboni Gaetano Peretti Neotomismo Gnoseologia Filosofia della storia Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel  Filosofia Categorie: Accademici italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1898 1969 27 maggioFilosofi cattoliciPersonalità del cattolicesimo

 

CORBELLINI: Gilberto Corbellini (Cadeo), filosofo. I sui interessi filosofichi riguardano la storia della medicina e la bioetica. Corbellini è Professore di storia della medicina e insegna bioetica alla Sapienza Roma, dove è anche direttore del Museo di storia della medicinaDipartimento di medicina molecolare.  Laureatosi in filosofia della scienza con una tesi sull'epistemologia evoluzionistica di Donald Campbell, Konrad Lorenz e Karl Popper, è dottore di ricerca in sanità pubblica. I suoi primi interessi di studio hanno riguardato la storia e la filosofia della biologia evoluzionistica, delle immunoscienze e delle neuroscienze, per includere poi anche lo studio della storia della malaria e della malariologia in Italia, delle ricadute della genetica molecolare in medicina, delle implicazioni del pensiero evoluzionistico darwiniano per la medicina e l'evoluzione della pedagogia medica.  L'approccio storico-epistemologico all'evoluzione del pensiero medico ha trovato una sintesi nella ricostruzione della storia delle idee di salute e malattia e delle trasformazioni metodologiche a cui è andata incontro la ricerca delle spiegazioni causali delle patologie (Storia e teorie della salute e della malattia, Carocci ).  La sua ricerca si è orientata anche verso l'esame delle radici storiche e culturali delle controversie bioetiche. Nei suoi libri, articoli e interventi pubblici difende un'idea non confessionale della bioetica, che ha radici filosofiche in uno scetticismo morale radicale, naturalistico e non relativista (Bioetica per perplessi. Una guida ragionata, Mondadori con Chiara Lalli).  Sulla base delle esperienze maturate come divulgatore e commentatore di temi scientifici nei mezzi di informazione, ha coltivato anche un interesse per la percezione sociale della scienza e per il ruolo della cultura scientifica nella costruzione dei valori civili della modernità. In Scienza, quindi democrazia (Einaudi ) sostiene che l'invenzione e l'espansione del metodo scientifico hanno consentito e favorito l'evoluzione del libero mercato e della stato di diritto, ovvero che la scienza ha funzionano come catalizzatore nella costruzione e manutenzione dei valori critico-cognitivi e morali che rendono possibile il funzionamento dei sistemi liberaldemocratici.  Collabora regolarmente, dal 1997, al supplemento culturale Domenica del Sole 24 Ore. È stato per dieci anni copresidente dell'Associazione Luca Coscioni per la Libertà di Ricerca Scientifica, è presidente della Fondazione Antonio Ruberti, ha fondato e codiretto la rivista di cultura scientifica “darwin” e ha fatto parte, dimettendosi dopo un anno, del Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica.  Il 7 aprile  è stato nominato direttore del Dipartimento di scienze sociali e umane, patrimonio culturale (Dsu) del Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerca, subentrando a Riccardo Pozzo.  Libri Nel Paese della Pseudoscienza. Perché i pregiudizi minacciano la nostra libertà. Milano, Feltrinelli, . Cavie? Sperimentazione e diritti animali (con Chiara Lalli), Bologna, Il Mulino, ; Tutta colpa del cervello: un'introduzione alla neuroetica (con Elisabetta Sirgiovanni), Milano, Mondadori Università, ; Scienza, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, ; Dalla cura alla scienza (con Maria Conforti e Valentina Gazzaniga), Milano, Encyclomedia Publishers, ; Scienza, quindi democrazia, Torino, Einaudi, ; Perché gli scienziati non sono pericolosi, Milano, Longanesi, 2009; La razionalità negata. Psichiatria e antipsichiatria in Italia (con Giovanni Jervis), Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2008; EBM. Medicina basata sull'evoluzione, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2007; Bi(blio)etica (con Pino Donghi e Armando Massarenti), Torino, Einaudi, 2006; Breve storia delle idee di salute e malattia, Roma, Carocci, 2004; Le grammatiche del vivente. Storia della biologia e della medicina molecolare, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1999; L'evoluzione del pensiero immunologico, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1990. Note Nominato il nuovo direttore Dsu-Cnr | Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, su cnr.it. 20 aprile .  Libro insignito del Premio Nazionale di Divulgazione Scientifica //cnr.it/news/index/news/id/5961 e del Premio alla Cultura Mario Tiengo da AISD (Associazione Italiana per lo Studio del Dolore)  Bioetica Epistemologia Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Gilberto Corbellini  Opere di Gilberto Corbellini, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Gilberto Corbellini, .  Registrazioni di Gilberto Corbellini, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale.  Scheda (al 22/10/) nel sito della Facoltà di Farmacia e Medicina. Corso di Laurea in BiotecnologieSapienza Roma, su biotecnologie.frm.uniroma1.it (archiviato il 22 ottobre ). «Paura degli Ogm? Agricoltori manipolati». L'opinione del piacentino Gilberto Corbellini, docente di bioetica alla Sapienza di Elena Salini, La cronaca di Piacenza, 27 marzo 2. Sito "salmone.org". Per una bioetica non difensiva, di Gilberto Corbellini, Ie Italianieuropei, 1º aprile 2003, sito "italianieuropei.it" La puntata del settimanale di informazione culturale di Rai Cinque "Terza Pagina" con gli interventi di Gilberto Corbellini 12 febbraio Filosofia Medicina  Medicina Università  Università Filosofo del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti italiani Professore1958 22 febbraio CadeoAttivisti italianiEpistemologiProfessori della SapienzaRomaStorici della medicinaStudenti della SapienzaRoma

 

CORDESCHI: Roberto Cordeschi (L'Aquila) filosofo. Dalla sua città natale si trasferisce a Roma dove intraprende gli studi in filosofia alla Sapienza a Roma sotto la supervisione di Somenzi. Si appassiona subito alla storia della cibernetica, di cui Somenzi fu tra i primi studiosi e contributori in Italia. Con la co-supervisione di Radice discute una tesi sui Teoremi di incompletezza di Gödel. Insegna in alcuni licei pubblici: prima a Morino, poi ad Avezzano e successivamente a Torino. Durante il periodo di insegnamento liceale inizia a collaborare all'attività filosofica svolgendo una serie di seminari all'interno del suo ateneo. Cntinua e consolida la sua attività accademica all'interno de La Sapienza grazie ad una serie di borse di studio e contratti di ricerca. Rricopre l ruolo di ricercatore associato sempre nel suo ateneo di origine. Viene nominato professore associato nel Dipartimento di Filosofia a Salerno. Viene strutturato come professore di Logica e Filosofia della scienza e diventa direttore del corso di studio in Scienze della comunicazione. Dopo gli intensi anni di ricerca che caratterizzarono il periodo salernitano, Cordeschi lascia Salerno  per una cattedra in Filosofia della scienza nella sua Alma mater. Insegnerà qui, nel Dipartimento di studi filosofici ed epistemologici, Filosofia della Scienza e Filosofia dell'Intelligenza artificiale e delle Scienze cognitive. Le sue ricerche hanno riguardato la storia dell'intelligenza artificiale, della cibernetica e della protocibernetica. Si è profondamente occupato del ruolo esplicativo degli artefatti nella comprensione della mente umana dalla protocibernetica fino alle recenti tendenze dell'intelligenza artificiale.  Opere e Pubblicazioni Cordeschi, R., Tamburrini G. (). Alan Turing e il programma di ricerca dell’intelligenza artificiale. In: Hosni H., a cura di. Menti e macchine. Alan Mathison Turing a cento anni dalla nascita. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale: 87-126. Boccignone, G., Cordeschi R. (). Coping with levels of explanation in the behavioral sciences. Frontiers in Psychology, 6: 4-5. Boccignone, G., Cordeschi, R., eds. (). What levels of explanation in the behavioural sciences? Lausanne: Frontiers media. Doi: 10.3389/978-2-88919-597-8. Cordeschi, R. (). Automatic decision-making and reliability in robotic system: some implications in the case of robot weapons. AI and Society, 28: 431-441. Cordeschi, R., Numerico, T. (). La cibernetica in Italia. In: Clericuzio A. and Ricci S., a cura di. Il contributo italiano alla storia del pensiero. Roma: Scienze, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana: 563-570. Boccignone, G., Cordeschi R. (). Predictive brains: forethought and the levels of explanation. Frontiers in Psychology 6: 213. Doi: 10.3389/ fpsyg..00213. Cordeschi R., Tamburrini G. (). Un padrino per l’Intelligenza Artificiale. Sapere, 78, 4: 20-27. Cordeschi R., Tamburrini G. (). L’intelligenza meccanica. Alan Turing (1912-1954). Alfabeta2, 3, 21. Numerico, T., Cordeschi R. (). Dalla cibernetica a internet: etica e politica tra mondo reale e mondo virtuale. In: Marini, L., Carlino, A., a cura di. Il post-umano e l’etica del nuovo. Dal corpo bionico al corpo sintetico. Roma: Carocci: 124-134. Continenza, B., Corbellini, G., Cordeschi, R., Gagliasso, E., Morabito, C., Stanzione, M., (). Vittorio Somenzi. 1918-2003. Antologia e testimonianze. Mantova: Fondazione Banca Agricola Mantovana. Corbellini G., Cordeschi, R. (). Natura, machine, cervello e conoscenza: attualità del pensiero di Vittorio Somenzi. In: Continenza, B., Corbellini, G., Cordeschi, R., Gagliasso E., Morabito, C., Stanzione, M., a cura di. Vittorio Somenzi. 1918-2003. Antologia e testimonianze. 33-45. Mantova: Fondazione Banca Agricola Mantovana. Cordeschi, R. (). Artificial intelligence and evolutionary theory: Herbert Simon’s unifying framework. In: Cellucci, C., Grosholz, E., Ippoliti, E., eds. Logic and knowledge, Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 197-215. Cordeschi, R. (). Autonomia delle macchine: dalla cibernetica alla robotica bellica. In: Barlotta, P., Longo, G., Negrotti, M., a cura di. Scienza, tecnologia e valori morali: quale futuro? Roma: Armando: 186-200. Cordeschi, R., Frixione, M. (). Rappresentare i concetti: filosofia, psicologia e modelli computazionali. Sistemi Intelligenti, 13: 25-40. Cordeschi, R. (). Which kind of machine consciousness? International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 2: 30-33. Fare a meno delle metafore: il metodo sintetico e la scienza cognitiva. In: Gagliasso E. and Frezza G., a cura di. Metafore del vivente. Linguaggi e ricerca scientifica tra filosofia, bios e psiche. Milano: Franco Angeli: 113-122. Cordeschi, R., D’Avanzo, E. (2009). Nuove prospettive nell’Intelligenza Artificiale, XXI SecoloNorme e idee. Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani: 183-190. Numerico, T., Cordeschi, R. (2009). Norbert Wiener’s vision of the “information society”. Ontology studies / Cuadernos de Ontolología, 8: 111-125. Cordeschi, R. (2008). Steps toward the synthetic method: symbolic information precessing and self-organizing systems in early Artificial Intelligence. In: Husbands, P., Holland, O. and Wheeler, M., eds. The mechanical mind in history. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press: 219-258. Cordeschi, R. (2008). Quale coscienza artificiale? Sistemi intelligenti, 20, 3: 531-534. Cordeschi, R. (2008), The synthetic method: epistemological issues in cognitive science. Sistemi intelligenti, 20, 2: 167-192. Somenzi, V., Cordeschi, R. (2008). “Adattamento” e “selezione” nel mondo della natura non vivente e degli artefatti. In: Forestiero, S., Stanzione, M., a cura di. Selezione e selezionismi. Milano: Franco Angeli: 305-319. Boccignone, G.,con. Bayesian models and simulations in cognitive science. Models and Simulations 2, Tilburg: PhilSci-Archive: 1-14. Cordeschi, R. (2007). AI turns fifty: revisiting its origins. Applied in Artificial Intelligence, 21: 259-279. Cordeschi, R., Frixione, M. (2006). Computazionalismo sotto attacco. In: Cherubini, P., Giarretta, P., Marraffa, M., Paternoster A., a cura di. Cognizione e computazione. Padova: CLEUP: 59-74. English translation: Computationalism under attack. In: Marraffa, M., De Caro, M., Ferretti, F., eds. (2007) Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer: 37-49. Chinese translation: (), Beijing: Science Press. Cordeschi, R. (2006). Searching in a maze, in search of knowledge. Lecture Notes in Computer science, 4155, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer. Simulation models of organism behavior: some lessons from precybernetic and cybernetic approaches. In: Termini S., ed. Imagination and rigor: essays on Eduardo R. Caianiello’s scientific heritage. Berlin-Milano: Springer: 39-46. Cordeschi, R., Frixione M. (2006). Premessa al Documento di Dartmouth, Sistemi Intelligenti, 18, 3: 407-413. Cordeschi, R. (2006). AI’s half century. On the thresholds of the Dartmouth conference. IA Retrospettiva, Ligorio, M.B., Cordeschi, R. (2005). Lessons Learnt from CSCL to Enrich E-Learning. 1st International ELeGI Conference on Advanced Technology for Enhanced Learning, Naples, 7:1-7. Cordeschi, R., Tamburrini, G. (2005). Intelligent machines and warfare: historical debates and epistemologically motivated concerns. Proceedings of the European Computing and Philosophy Coference (ECAP 2004), London: College Publications: 1-19. Numerico, T., Cordeschi, R. (2005). Meno’s dilemma and web mining: the influence of search engines on the discovery process. Yearbook of the Artificial, 3: 175-187. Cordeschi, R. (2004). Psicologia, fisicalismo e Intelligenza Artificiale. Teorie e Modelli, 19: 29-41. Cordeschi, R. (2004). Cybernetics. In: Floridi L., ed. The blackwell guide to philosophy of computing and information. Oxford: Blackwell: 186-196. Chinese translation: (). Cordeschi, R. (2004). Graziella Tonfoni, Forme e strutture della comunicazione linguistica. Intersezioni, 24, 1: 171-180. Cordeschi, R. (2004). Filosofia dell’intelligenza artificiale. In Floridi L., a cura di. Linee di ricerca, SWIF: 525-551. Una lezione per la scienza cognitiva. Sistemi Intelligenti, 15: 39-44. Funzionalismo e modelli nella Scienza Cognitiva. Forum SWIF on line. Cordeschi, R. (2003). Vecchi problemi filosofici per la nuova Intelligenza Artificiale. Networks. Rivista di Filosofia dell’Intelligenza Artificiale e Scienze Cognitive, 1: 1-23. Cordeschi, R. (2003). In ricordo di Vittorio Somenzi (1918-2003). Quaderno Filosofi e Classici SWIF on line. Burattini, E., Cordeschi R., (2001). Intelligenza artificiale. Manuale per le discipline della comunicazione. Roma: Carocci (Second reprint: 2008). The discovery of the artificial: behavior, mind and machines before and beyond cybernetics. Dordrech: Kluwer. Cordeschi, R., Tamburrini, G. (2001). L’intelligenza Artificiale: la storia e le idee. In: Burattini E. and Cordeschi R., a cura di. Intelligenza Artificiale. Manuale per le discipline della comunicazione. Roma: Carocci: 15-44. Cordeschi, R. (2000). Early connectionism machines. Artificial Intelligence and Society,Somenzi, V., Cordeschi, R. (2000). Naturale e artificiale. In: Di Giandomenico, M., a cura di. L’uomo e la macchina: trent’anni dopo. Filosofia e informatica ieri e oggi. Bari: Edizioni Laterza: 13-29. Cordeschi, R., Tamburrini, G., Trautteur, G. (1999). The notion of loop in the study of consciousness. In: Musio C. and Taddei Ferretti C., eds. Neuronal bases and psychological aspects of consciousness. Singapore: World Scientific: 524-540. Cordeschi, R. (1998). La scoperta dell’artificiale. Psicologia, filosofia e macchine intorno alla cibernetica. Milano-Bologna: Dunod-Zanichelli Cordeschi, R. (1998). “Pensiero meccanico” e giochi dell’imitazione. Sistemi Intelligenti, 10: 44-52. Abrusci, V.M., Cellucci, C., Cordeschi, R., Fano, V., eds. (1998). Prospettive della Logica e della Filosofia della scienza. Atti del Convegno SILFS. Pisa: ETS. con Tamburrini, G. (1997). I modelli della vita mentale, oggi e domani. Giornale Italiano di Psicologia, 3: 657-662. Cordeschi, R., (1996). Filosofia della mente. Quaderni di Le Scienze, 91. Cordeschi, R. (1996). The role of heuristics in automated theorem proving. Mathware and Soft Computing, 3: 281-293.  L’intelligenza artificiale. In: Bellone, E., Mangione, C., a cura di. Geymonat L., Storia del pensiero scientifico. Il Novecento,  3, Milano: Garzanti: 145-200. Somenzi, V., La filosofia degli automi. Origini dell’intelligenza artificiale. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. Cordeschi, R. (1994). Indagini meccanicistiche sulla mente: la cibernetica e l’intelligenza artificiale. In: Somenzi, V., Cordeschi, R., a cura di. La filosofia degli automi. Origini dell’intelligenza artificiale. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri: 15-52. Cordeschi, R., Giannini, M. (1994). Qualche problema per l’IA classica e connessionista. Lettera matematica PRISTEM, 13: 16-19. Cordeschi, R. (1994). Una macchina protoconnessionista. In: Cellucci, C., De Maio, M.C., Roncaglia, G., a cura di. Logica e filosofia della scienza: problemi e prospettive. Atti del convegno SILFS, Pisa: ETS: 499-518. Cordeschi, R. (1994). Pensée ou calcul? Science et Avenir, 97: 78-83. Cordeschi, R. (1993). Le radici moderne del recupero scientifico della teologia. Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine, 11: 3-4. Cordeschi, R. (1992). Scienza e filosofia della scienza. In: Mangione, C., a cura di. Le scienze della mente, Enciclopedia Le Scienze e le Tecnologie. Manuscript. Cordeschi, R. (1992). Book review: Roger Penrose, La mente nuova dell’imperatore. La mente, i computer, le leggi della fisica. Milano. Manuscript. Cordeschi, R. (1992). A few words on representation and meaning. A comment on a paper by H.A Simon on scientific discovery. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 6: 19-22. Cerasoli, M., Cordeschi, R. (1991). Norbert Wiener. In: Negri, A., a cura di. Novecento Filosofico e Scientifico. Protagonisti,  5, Milano: Marzorati: 403-426. Cordeschi, R. (1991). Alan M. Turing. In: Negri, A., a cura di. Novecento Filosofico e Scientifico. Protagonisti,  5, Milano: Marzorati: 427-448. Cordeschi, R. (1991). The discovery of the artificial: some protocybernetic developments, Artificial Intelligence and Society, 5, 218-238. Reprinted in: Chrisley, R., ed. (2000). Artificial Intelligence: critical concepts in cognitive science,  1, London-New York: Routledge: 301-326. Cordeschi, R. (1991). Brain, mind and computers. In: Corsi P., ed. The Enchanted Loom: chapters in the history of neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cordeschi, R. (1991). Significato e creatività: un problema per l’intelligenza artificiale. L’Automa spirituale: Menti, Cervelli e Computer, 1015: 189. Cordeschi, R. (1991). Distinctive features in men and machines: meaning and creativity. Abstract of Seminar “Human, All to Human”, Rome. Manuscript. Cordeschi, R. (1989). Philosophical assumptions in artificial intelligence: a tentative criticism of a criticism, Proceedings of the 5th Österreichische Artificial-Intelligence-Tagung, Berlin: Springer: 359-364. Cordeschi, R. (1989). Cervello, mente e calcolatori: précis storico dell’intelligenza artificiale. In: Corsi, P., a cura di. La fabbrica del pensiero. Dall’arte della memoria alle neuroscienze, Milano: Electa: 294-300 (French traslation: Cerveau, esprit et machines: précis historique de l’intelligence artificielle. In Corsi, P., éd. La fabrique de la pensee, aux soins Milano: Electa: 307-312. English translation: Brain, mind and computers: A very brief history of artificial intelligence. In: Corsied. The enchanted loom, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 315-320). Cordeschi, R. (1988). Intentional psychology and computational models. In: Leidlmair, K., Neumaier, O., Hrsg. Wozu Kunstliche Intelligenz? (Conceptus-Studien 5), Wien: VWGO: 69-77. Continenza, B., Cordeschi, R. Biological species: individuals or natural kinds? Atti del Congresso “Temi e prospettive della Logica e della Filosofia della scienza contemporanee”, 2, Bologna: CLUEB, 105-108. Cordeschi, R (1988). L’intelligenza artificiale tra psicologia e filosofia. Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine, 6, 1-2: 43-52. Cordeschi, R., (1987). Italian edition of the book of Putnam H., Mente, linguaggio e realtà. Milano: Adelphi. Cordeschi, R. (1987). Purpose, feedback and homeostasis: dimension of a controversy in psychological theory. In: Bem S. and Rappard H., eds. Studies in the history of psychology and the social science 4, Leiden: Psychologisch Istituut: 119-129. Cordeschi, R. (1986). Kenneth Craik and the “mechanistic tendency of modern psychology”, Rivista di Storia della Scienza, 3: 237-256. Cordeschi, R. (1985). Linguaggio mentalistico e modelli meccanici della mente. Osservazioni sulla relazione di Margaret Boden. Manuscript. Cordeschi, R. (1985). Mechanical models in psychology in the 1950s. In: Bem S., Rappard H. and van Horn W., eds. Studies in the History of Psychology and the Social Science 3, Leiden: Psychologisch Istituut, 28-42. Cordeschi, R. (1984). L’evoluzione dei calcolatori e l’intelligenza artificiale. Manuscript. Cordeschi, R. (1984). Craik e la psicologia meccanicistica, Storia e critica della psicologia, 5, 1: 161-175. Cordeschi, R. (1984). La teoria dell’elaborazione umana dell’informazione. Aspetti critici e problemi metodologici. In: Continenza, B., Cordeschi, R., Gagliasso, E., Ludovico, A., Stanzione, M., a cura di. Evoluzione e modelli. Il concetto di adattamento nelle teorie dei sistemi biologici, culturali e artificiali. Roma: Editori Riuniti: 321-422. Cordeschi, R. (1983). Dal comportamentismo alla simulazione del comportamento. Storia e Critica della Psicologia, I sillogismi di Lullo. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia della Logica. San Gimignano: 259-264. Cordeschi, R. (1978). Il duro lavoro del concetto: il neoidealismo e la razionalità scientifica. Giornale critico della Filosofia Italiana, LVII (LIX): 334-356. Cordeschi, R., Mecacci, L. (1978). La psicologia come scienza autonoma: Croce, De Sarlo e gli “sperimentalisti”. Per un’analisi storica e critica della Psicologia, 2: 3-32.  Dietro una recensione crociana di Couturat. Quaderni di Matematica, 1: 69-74. Review of the book of Nilsson N.J., Metodi per la risoluzione dei problemi nell’intelligenza artificiale, Per un’analisi storica e critica della psicologia, 2. Manuscript. Cordeschi, R., Mecacci, L. (1977). La psicologia tra scienze della natura e scienze dello spirito: Croce e De Sarlo. In: Cimino G., Dazzi N. (1980), a cura di. Gli studi di psicologia in Italia: Aspetti teorici scientifici e ideologici, Quaderni di storia critica della scienza. Nuova serie. 9, Pisa: Domus Galileana: 69-373. Cordeschi, R. (1977). Una critica del naturalismo: note sulla concezione crociana delle scienze. Critica marxista, 1: 163-188. Cellucci, C., Cordeschi, R., De Mauro, T., Freguglia, P., Giannantoni, G., Levi, R., Lombardo Radice, L., Veit, B., (1976). Introduzione alla logica. Roma: Editori Riuniti. Cordeschi, R., Levi R. (1976). Predicati. In: Cellucci, C., Cordeschi, R., De Mauro, T., Freguglia, P., Giannantoni, G., Levi, R., Lombardo Radice, L., Veit, B., (1976). Introduzione alla logica. Roma: Editori Riuniti. Cordeschi, R. (1975). Italian edition of the book of Novikov P.S., Elementi di logica matematica. Roma: Editori Riuniti. Cordeschi, R. (1973), Bilancio dell’empirismo contemporaneo. Scientia: 1-8. Cordeschi, R. (1972). Italian edition of the book of Russell B., La filosofia di Leibniz: esposizione critica con un’appendice antologica. Roma: Newton Compton Italiana. Cordeschi, R. (1967), Review of the book of Filiasi Carcano P., Paci E. et al., Filosofia e informazione. Padova: La Cultura, 5: 419-429. Cordeschi, R. (1966). Validità e reiezione nella logica aristotelica. Il problema della decisione. Report: Storia della Filosofia Antica. Istituto di Filosofia, Roma. Manuscript Note  Vittorio Somenzi, La filosofia degli automi, Torino, Boringhieri, 1965.  Profilo e  nel sito della Sapienza Roma. Scheda in MediaMente, sito mediamente.rai.it. Dalia Cilia, N. (). Roberto cordeschi. Biographical note and list of publications. PARADIGMI.

 

CORLEO: Deputato del Regno d'Italia LegislatureVIII, XIV, XV Dati generali Titolo di studiolaurea ProfessioneDocente universitario Simone Corleo (Salemi), filosofo. Studiò nel Seminario vescovile di Mazara del Vallo. Lasciata la carriera ecclesiastica si laureò nel 1849 in medicina presso l'Università degli Studi di Palermo e tornò per insegnare filosofia e matematica nel Seminario mazarese e in seguito in alcuni convitti a Palermo.  Nel 1864 fu nominato professore di filosofia morale nell'Palermo, e creò nel 1889 il primo laboratorio di psicologia sperimentale in Italia,presso l'Istituto di Fisiologia della Facoltà di Medicina.  Dal 1883 al 1885 è stato Rettore della Palermo.  Attività politica Liberale, aderì alla rivoluzione siciliana del 1848 e quell'anno scrisse il testo Progetto per una adeguata costituzione siciliana. Nel 1860 durante la spedizione dei Mille, fu nominato da Giuseppe Garibaldi governatore di Salemi. Su quel periodo scrisse nel 1886 il memoriale Garibaldi e i Mille.  Il 27 gennaio 1861 fu eletto deputato al primo Parlamento di Torino nel collegio di Calatafimi e vi restò fino al 1864. In questa veste prese il suo nome la legge disciplinante l'Enfiteusi dei beni ecclesiastici in Sicilia. Nel 1880 tornò alla Camera nella XIV legislatura e riconfermato nel 1882 nella XV, fino al 1886.  Il presidente del Consiglio Francesco Crispi lo fece investire del titolo di conte di Salemi.  Riconoscimenti Il suo corpo è tumulato nella Chiesa di Sant'Agostino di Salemi, divenuta con delibera comunale dell'11 ottobre 1891 pantheon dei salemitani illustri.  Uno busto del Corleo si trova all'ingresso dell'Palermo.  A Simone Corleo è intitolato inoltre (in coabitazione con l'erudito ottocentesco Gaetano Daita) un'importante segmento viario della pianta palermitana, che collega Piazza Croci al centralissimo Politeama e una piazza nella sua città natale (Salemi).  Anche la biblioteca di Salemi è intitolata a Simone Corleo. Si occupò di letteratura, medicina, scienza fisica e naturale. Scrisse diverse tragedie e opere di carattere filosofico.  Meditazioni filosofiche; Progetto per una adeguata costituzione siciliana; La filosofia universal; Per la filosofia morale; Storia della enfiteusi dei terreni ecclesiastici di Sicilia; Il sistema della filosofia universale, ovvero la filosofia della identità; Lezioni di filosofia morale. CORLEO, Simone in Dizionario BiograficoTreccani  Annuario dei Rettori della Palermo  Simone Corleo / Deputati / Camera dei deputati storico //trapaninostra.it/Foto_Trapanesi/Didascalie/Corleo_Simone.htm  Alfredo Li Vecchi, Simone Corleo, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  29, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983. 22 maggio .  Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Simone Corleo Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Simone Corleo  Opere di Simone Corleo, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Simone Corleo, .  Simone Corleo, su storia.camera.it, Camera dei deputati.  PredecessoreRettore Università degli Studi di PalermoSuccessoreStemma Università Palermo.jpg Gaetano Giorgio Gemmellaro18831885Emanuele Paternò Biografie  Biografie:  di   biografie Categorie: Deputati dell'VIII legislatura del Regno d'ItaliaDeputati della XIV legislatura del Regno d'ItaliaDeputati della XV legislatura del Regno d'Italia.

 

CORNELIO -- Tommaso Cornelio   ritratto di Tommaso Cornelio, 1688 Tommaso Cornelio (Rovito, 1614Napoli, 28 novembre 1684) medico, matematico e filosofo italiano, protagonista della rivoluzione scientifica del secolo XVII nel Regno di Napoli.  Tommaso Cornelio nacque in Calabria, dove poté formarsi alla scuola cosentina sulle teorie anti-aristoteliche di Bernardino Telesio, molto studiato nell'Accademia del capoluogo della Calabria Citeriore.  È una delle principali personalità che introdussero il pensiero moderno e scientifico nella penisola italiana e nel regno di Napoli. Studiò medicina a Roma, dove entrò a contatto con la cultura scientifica dell'Italia rinascimentale, approfondendo e facendo proprie molte tesi galileiane, conobbe il naturalismo telesiano e campanelliano, di cui fu erede il suo maestro Marco Aurelio Severino.  Appena rientrò a Napoli divenne professore di matematica e medicina teoretica: nella capitale del sud portò la filosofia di Cartesio e di Gassendi. Al 1663 risale la sua opera principale, i Progymnasmata physica, in cui sono esposte le sue teorie matematiche e filosofiche.  Opere Progymnasmata physica Ad illustriss. marchionem Marcellum Crescentium epistola... De cognatione aëris et aquae. Ad Marcum Aurelium Severinum epistola  Questo testo proviene in parte dalla relativa voce del progetto Mille anni di scienza in Italia, opera del Museo Galileo. Istituto Museo di Storia della Scienza di Firenze (home page), pubblicata sotto licenza Creative Commons CC-BY-3.0 Luca Addante, "Tommaso Cornelio (1614-1686)" in Cosenza e i cosentini: un volo lungo tre millenni. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore, 2001,  57–Regno di Napoli Cartesio Pierre Gassendi Lucantonio Porzio Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Tommaso Cornelio Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Tommaso Cornelio  Vittor Ivo Comparato, Tommaso Cornelio, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Opere di Tommaso Cornelio, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Opere di Tommaso Cornelio, .  Giuseppe Inzitari, Tommaso Cornelio, in Enciclopedia dantesca, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Biografie  Biografie Matematica  Matematica Medicina  Medicina Categorie: Medici italianiMatematici italiani del XVII secoloFilosofi italiani Professore1614 1684 28 novembre Rovito NapoliAccademia cosentinaRegno di NapoliSalottieri

 

CORRADO: Vincenzo Corrado (Oria), filosofo.Uomo di grande cultura, fu soprattutto grande gastronomo e uno dei maggiori cuochi che si distinsero tra il '700 e l'800 nelle corti nobiliari di Napoli, simbolo del suo tempo nella variegata realtà partenopea. Fu il primo cuoco che mette per iscritto la "cucina mediterranea", il primo, a valorizzare la grande cucina regionale italiana.  Scrisse Il cuoco galante nel 1773, definito all'epoca un libro di alta cucina, testo richiesto in tutto il mondo dalle principali autorità dell'epoca, e ristampato per ordini del principe per ben 6 volte.  Preparava elegantissimi banchetti in principio alla corte di Don Michele Imperiali Principe di Francavilla presso il palazzo Cellamare di Napoli, dove coordinava un piccolo esercito di maggiordomi, domestici, volanti e paggi e preparava i pranzi o le cene con particolare assortimento di vivande accoppiandole con tanta fantasia e particolari accorgimenti architettonici ed artistici al fine di formare una coreografia sontuosa e raffinata.   Vincenzo Corrado nacque in Oria il 18 gennaio 1736 da Domenico e da Maddalena Carbone. Rimasto orfano per la morte del padre, ancora adolescente, divenne paggio alla corte di Don Michele Imperiali che era Principe di Modena e Francavilla Fontana, Marchese di Oria e Gentiluomo di camera di S.M. il Re delle due Sicilie, che lo condusse a Napoli dove risedette per diversi anni. Appena maggiorenne, entrò a far parte della Congregazione dei Padri Celestini nel convento di Oria.  Dopo l'anno di noviziato, Vincenzo fu chiamato dal Superiore Generale De Leo nella residenza napoletana di San Piero in Maiella, dove si specializzò negli studi di matematica, di astronomia e filosofia. Dallo stesso padre generale fu avviato, anche, allo studio delle scienze naturali e dell'arte culinaria, per la quale divenne famoso. Non diventò mai sacerdote per cui, dopo la soppressione degli ordini religiosi, all'età di 38 anni, si stabilì a Napoli, ove risedette per oltre cinquant'anni, insegnando la lingua francese e spagnola ai figli delle famiglie aristocratiche della città, pubblicando contemporaneamente molte sue opere che gli diedero successo e notorietà. Per i molti impegni che ebbe a Napoli, V. Corrado non tornò più ad Oria, anche se non mancarono momenti di nostalgia per la lontananza dalla sua famiglia e dalla sua città natale. Egli morì proprio a Napoli il 11 novembre 1836 all'età di 100 anni.  Il Principe di Francavilla gli attribuì la mansione di "Capo dei Servizi di Bocca" (antica mansione con cui veniva chiamato colui che era preposto a sovrintendere alla cucina, alla preparazione delle vivande e all'organizzazione dei banchetti) di Palazzo Cellamare, sito sulla collina delle Mortelle prospiciente il golfo di Napoli e della famiglia del Principe, poiché molti illustri personaggi di un certo livello e rango, che venivano a Napoli, invitati a mensa poterono constatare la fama di questa opulenta ospitalità più spagnolesca e tipicamente partenopea che era in uso al tempo.  Parlando del suo lavoro Vincenzo Corrado così si esprimeva:  «L'abbondanza, la varietà, la delicatezza delle vivande, la splendidezza e la sontuosiotà delle tavole richiedevano una schiera di uomini d'arte, saggi e probi»  Questa mastodontica organizzazione, era guidata proprio da Vincenzo Corrado. Alle sue dipendenze lavoravano un maestro di casa, un maestro di cucina ed un maestro di scalco che aveva il compito di acquistare, di cucinare, di dissodare e di trinciare ogni tipo di animale, mentre una schiera di cuochi, rispettando la gerarchia allora in uso, lavorava secondo la propria specializzazione (oggi le grandi cucine dei Ristoranti hanno i cuochi di rango) : vi era il cuoco friggitorie, quello per le insalate, il pasticciere, il bottigliere e il ripostiere. Tutti questi erano aiutati da una serie di sguatteri e di serventi che avevano il compito di girare intorno al tavolo per esibire lo spettacolo fantasioso delle portate prima ancora di servirle. Tutta questa organizzazione era coadiuvata da un piccolo esercito di maggiordomi, domestici, volanti e paggi che interveniva non appena il servizio di cucina consegnava le varie portate artisticamente decorate. Vincenzo Corrado, a seconda degli ospiti del Principe preparava i pranzi o le cene con particolare assortimento di vivande accoppiandole con tanta fantasia e particolari accorgimenti architettonici ed artistici al fine di formare una coreografia sontuosa e raffinata. Egli stesso ci descrive queste splendide composizioni con pregevole gusto e raffinatezza, lasciando, anche, delle visioni grafiche. Gli elementi decorativi della tavola erano affidati al maestro ripostiere che usava gusto artistico e genialità: grandi vasi in porcellana ricolmi di fiori variopinti, alzate di cristallo e argento a tre o quattro piani colmi di dessert o frutta o fiori o ortaggi, bianchi gruppi di porcellana raffiguranti scene arcadiche o bucoliche; puttini d'argento; gabbiette dorate con piccoli uccellini cinguettanti; coppe di cristallo di varie fogge in cui guizzavano pesciolini tra foglie di rose ed altri fiori. Il centro veniva racchiuso da una cornice di frutta, di fiori freschi e di ortaggi, secondo la stagione variante, disposti, intervallati da piccole spalliere di agrumi in porcellana con ortolani nell'atto di raccoglierli. La composizione era la sintesi di un artista di provata esperienza, di raffinata fantasia e di vivace estro, capace di accoppiare tanti svariati elementi fondendoli insieme a formare uno spettacolo di gran gusto e di particolare gradevolezza. Il valore del tavolo di gala completato dal vasellame, cristalleria e argenteria di grande pregio era inestimabile.  Questo senso artistico, anche, nell'arte culinaria V. Corrado lo aveva ereditato da un suo antenato Q. M. Corrado, letterato di mestiere. Ma per quanto dotato di una cultura autodidatta, di vivacità d'ingegno, di originalità e di una particolare facilità nell'insegnamento, se non avesse avuto la fortuna di conoscere Don Michele Imperiali, che ne coltivò le particolari doti incoraggiandolo a scrivere della sua specifica arte per tramandarla ai posteri, probabilmente sarebbe rimasto un ottimo organizzatore, un appassionato gastronomo, ma la sua fama si sarebbe estinta con lui.  Le opere Il Cuoco Galante  Il Cuoco Galante  Il primo libro vegetariano della nostra storia  il credenziere: colui che si prendeva cura della credenza L'opera fu sottoposta, fino al 1857, a ben 7 ristampe. Prodotta fino al 1801 in 7500 copie, fu diffusa, in traduzione, anche all'estero. Dalla dedica si ricava il leitmotiv dello scritto nonché la filosofia in cui credeva l'autore, che è di questo tenore: il “buon Gusto nella Tavola” inteso come “sano pensare”. Questo trattato di gastronomia fu pubblicato in prima edizione nel 1773; il successo fu istantaneo e inaspettato, in quanto la precedente opera gastronomica, La lucerna dei cortigiani, stampata presso Napoli nel 1634 e dedicata a Ferdinando II duca di Toscana, non era riuscita ad attirare l'interesse del pubblico che la trascurò ignorandola.  Invece grande successo ottenne la prima edizione del "Cuoco Galante" che si esaurì rapidamente, tanto che nel 1778 il Principe ne ordinò una seconda edizione che ebbe eguale successo. Intanto Vincenzo Corrado migliorò e ampliò il testo di questa opera e ne preparò una terza edizione che venne pubblicata nel 1786.  La fama del libro superò i confini del Regno di Napoli e dell'Italia; infatti dall'estero giunsero richieste da tutti quegli stranieri che avevano conosciuto ed apprezzato il Corrado alla corte degli Imperiali, per cui nel 1794 si pervenne ad una quarta edizione, seguita nel 1806 dalla quinta e infine la sesta pubblicata. Assolute novità introdotte dall'autore erano allora la patata, il pomodoro, il caffè e la cioccolata.  Altre opere Incoraggiato dal successo del Cuoco Galante, il Principe spinse l'autore a pubblicare nel 1778 un Credenziere del buon gusto, del bello, del soave e del dilettevole per soddisfare gli uomini di sapere e di gusto. Egli scrisse e pubblicò inoltre Il cibo Pitagorico, Trattato sulle patate, Manovre del cioccolato e del caffè, Trattato sull'agricoltura e la pastorizia ed infine Poesie baccanali per commensali.  La dedizione alla grande nobiltà Siamo dunque a fine settecento. Vincenzo Corrado è il faro della cucina moderna della nobiltà a cavallo del periodo della rivoluzione francese. Egli privilegia i personaggi di rango in visita alla mensa del principe con opulenta ospitalità, più spagnolesca che partenopea. Orbene in questo contesto di sfarzo godereccio, di lusso e di differenze sociali abissali, il Corrado rimase fin dalla giovane età abbagliato dalla nobiltà, la gente ricca e potente, verso la quale nutrirà sempre sentimenti di grande reverenza se non addirittura di venerazione. Proprio per riconoscenza al Principe, Vincenzo Corrado, dando alle stampe i suoi due libri, confessa:  «Questi due libri che del buon gusto trattano, con la guida e norma scrissi, e pur mercé la tua generosità mandai alle stampe, e Tu di propria mano ne segnasti il titolo il -Cuoco Galante- l'uno e il -Credenziere del Buon Gusto- l'altro, tutti e due a te li porgo come frutto di un albero dalla mano piantato... Mio Scopo egli è di richiamare alla memoria dei nobili uomini dei quali Tu fosti la gloria l'ornamento alla memoria e la lode. Ah? Ma qual Tu fosti non basterebbe di dire di cento e mille lingue, per cui io stimo meglio il tacere e con il silenzio benedire gli anni che ti fu appresso.»  La preparazione dei banchetti L'organizzazione dei magnifici banchetti e delle cene lussuose gli diedero l'appellativo di cuoco galante. La cosa straordinaria è che dietro gli scenari di un favoloso pranzo o cena vi era una preparazione, quasi orchestrale della quale il direttore era il Corrado. Alle sue dipendenze vi era una vera e propria squadra di addetti alle cucine formata da precettori cuochi e servienti. La presentazione estetica, oltre al gusto, acquista la sua importanza in cucina, ed il Corrado dedica grande spazio alle decorazioni e al modo di imbandire le tavole dei banchetti. Nell'opera del Corrado sono anche presentati i sorbetti, in vari gusti, ed il caffè, che, a differenza dall'attuale espresso, veniva bollito in apposite caffettiere.   esempio di banchetto, tratta dall'opera il cuoco galante Precettori un precettore di alloggio e sistemazione posti per gli invitati, un precettore di preparazione dei cibi, un precettore abile con utensili domestici, che aveva la mansione di far provviste e comperare il necessario al mercato per le mense, di dissodare e di affettare ogni tipo di carne o pesce. Chef e Cuochi Il cuoco friggitore, il cuoco per le insalate, il pasticciere, il bottigliere, il ripostiere. Serventi lavapiatti, camerieri, maggiordomi, domestici, volteggianti e giullari che intervenivano non appena il servizio di cucina consegnava le varie portate artisticamente decorate.  Non era solo una semplice cena, era un vero e proprio spettacolo, fuori dall'immaginato. A volte comprendeva l'utilizzo di 100 persone per altrettanti o più invitati.  I banchetti o le cene con caratteristiche e assortimenti di piatti erano accoppiate con tanta inventiva e particolari astuzie architettoniche ed eleganti al fine di plasmare una scenografia sfarzosa e affinata.  Egli stesso nelle sue opere e nei suoi diari ci descrive queste splendide composizioni culinarie come opere d'arte, quasi uno spreco consumarle. Decorazioni  Bicchieri e coppe di cristallo, posate in argento intagliate, tovaglie di pizzo fiorentino, buche e composizioni floreali, piatti in porcellana di Capodimonte  Termini culinari "Il Cuoco Galante", proprio nella terza edizione (1786), alfine di una maggiore comprensione, Vincenzo Corrado spiega alcuni termini "cucinarj" usati per la preparazione delle varie pietanze, ne riportiamo un esempio:  Bianchire: Far per poco bollire in acqua quel che si vuole; Passare: Far soffriggere cosa in qualsiasi grasso; Barda: Fetta di lardo; Inviluppare: Involgere cosa in quel che si dirà; Arrossare: Ungere con uova sbattute cosa; Stagionare: Far ben soffrigere le carni o altro; Piccare: Trapassar esteriormente con fini lardelli carne; Farsa: Pastume di carne, uova, grasso ecc.; Farcire: Riempire cosa con la sarsa; Adobare: Condire con sughi acidi, erbette, ed aromi; Bucché: Mazzetto d'erbe aromatiche che si fa bollire nelle vivande; Salza: Brodo alterato con aromi, con erbe, o con sughi acidi; Colì: Denso brodo estratto dalla sostanza delle carni; Purè: Condimento che si estrae dai legumi, o d'altro; Sapore: La polpa della frutta condita, e ridotta in un denso liquido; Entrées: Vivande di primo servizio; Hors-dœuvres: Vivande di tramezzo a quelle di primo servizio; Entremets: Vivande di secondo servizio; Rilevé: Vivande di muta alle zuppe, potaggi, o d'altro. Note  Gian Paolo Spaliviero, Il Vitello tonnatoStoria e ricette. 14 agosto  14 agosto ).  Vincenzo Corrado, su mastroscappi.org. 14 agosto . Vincenzo Corrado, su pizzanapoletanismo.com. 14 agosto  14 agosto ). Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Citazionio su Vincenzo Corrado Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Vincenzo Corrado  Opere di Vincenzo Corrado, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.

 

CORSINI: Odoardo Corsini, o Edoardo, nato Silvestro, (Fellicarolo), filosofo. Studiò nel Collegio dei padri scolopi fananesi, dove in seguito entrò quale novizio nel 1717 e in seguito si trasferì nel Noviziato di Firenze.  Le sue capacità lo portarono a diventare docente di filosofia a soli vent'anni presso la stessa scuola nel 1723, prima ancora dell'ordinazione sacerdotale del 1725. Si trasferì quindi all'Pisa dove insegnò fino alla sua morte.  Tuttavia nel periodo che va dal 1754 al 1760, il Corsini fu eletto Superiore Generale e dovette trasferirsi a Roma.  I principali campi di studio ai quali si applicò furono: la filosofia, la cronologia, l'epigrafia, la filologia e la numismatica ma si interessò anche di matematica, di logica, di fisica, di idraulica, di didattica, di storia e di lettere antiche e moderne.   Illustrazione relativa alle recensioni su De Minnisari e Dubia de Minnisari pubblicate ne gli Acta Eruditorum.  Illustrazione relativa all'Epistola ad Paulum M. Paciaudum, ...pubblicata negli Acta Eruditorum; Ragionamento istorico sopra la Valdichiana, Firenze;  Index notarum Graecarum quae in aereis ac marmoreis Graecorum tabulis observantur, Firenze; De Minnisari aliorumque Armeniae regum nummis et Arsacidarum epocha dissertatio, Firenze. A. Fabbroni, Vitae Italorum...,  Pisis  E. de Tipaldo, Biografie degli italiani illustri,  X, Venezia 1845. C. Antonioli, Elogio di Odoardo Corsini, Nov. Lett. di Firenze, Ugo Baldini, CORSINI, Edoardo, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  29, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983. 3 dicembre .  F. Barbieri e M. Zuccoli, Un elogio inedito di Odoardo Corsini (con tre lettere del Fananese a Geminiano Rondelli), Rassegna Frignanese.

Biografia SISM, su dm.unito.it.  Biografia Pisa, su biblio.adm.unipi.it.

 

CORTESE: Alessandro Cortese (Milano) filosofo. Docente universitario di filosofia, Professore all'Università degli studi di Trieste, scrittore, curatore di opere filosofiche e docente di lingua danese, è stato allievo di Gustavo Bontadini e poi di Augusto del Noce che lo chiamò come assistente all'Trieste, dove poi salì in cattedra e insegnò per molti anni fino alla pensione.  Studioso di Søren Kierkegaard, tradusse e commentò buona parte della sua opera. Per la sua passione per questo filosofo, cominciò negli anni cinquanta, dapprima da autodidatta, lo studio della lingua danese, di cui in seguito divenne docente presso l'Università Cattolica di Milano, dopo averla perfezionata con lunghi soggiorni a Copenaghen durante i quali ebbe modo di entrare a stretto contatto con gli specialisti kierkegaardiani.  Tra i suoi campi di interesse si annovera anche Vincenzo Gioberti, di cui curò l'edizione critica; nel tempo libero si dedicava all'alpinismo, alla pittura ed alla musica.  È morto a 67 anni, pochi giorni dopo la conclusione della versione definitiva di un'opera a cui stava lavorando da anni. I suoi funerali sono stati concelebrati a Sant'Angelo Lodigiano, città d'origine della sua famiglia, dal Parroco della Chiesa dei SS. Antonio e Francesca, da don Aldo Locatelli e dal prefetto della Biblioteca Ambrosiana di Milano, Mons. Franco Buzzi, di cui era amico personale da tempo e che aveva curato la prefazione di alcuni suoi libri. È sepolto nella cappella di famiglia a Sant'Angelo Lodigiano.  Opere: Una nuova  kirkegaardiana, Vita e pensiero, Milano, Esistenzialismo e fenomenologia, SEI, Torino ,Protologia e temporalità, Gregoriana, Roma, Kierkegaard oggi , Vita e pensiero, Milan, Del principio di creazione o del significato, Liviana, Padova,Kierkegaard, La scuola, Brescia, Per il concetto di ironia, Marietti, Genova, La Creazione: Un'apologia accidentale della filosofia, prefazione di Mons. Franco Buzzi, Marietti, Genova, Traduzioni e commenti Søren Kierkegaard, La lotta tra il vecchio e il nuovo negozio del sapone, Liviana, Padova,Søren Kierkegaard, Enten-Eller ([Victor Eremita], 1843), Adelphi, Milano, tr. integrale, Søren Kierkegaard, L'attrice. Opera pseudonima di Kierkegaard, Antilia, Treviso,Søren Kierkegaard, Due discorsi edificanti del maggio 1843, Marietti, Genova, Edizioni critiche e curatele Vincenzo Gioberti, Teorica del sovrannaturale o sia discorso sulle convenienze della religione rivelata colla mente umana e col progresso civile delle nazioni, 3 voll., Cedam, Padova, 1970 (fa parte di Edizione nazionale delle opere di Vincenzo Gioberti) Angelo Marchesi, Di ermeneutica e rivelazione. Due conferenze, a cura e con una nota di Alessandro Cortese, Lint, Trieste, Vincenzo Gioberti, Introduzione allo studio della filosofia, Cedam, Padova, Uniba, su lgxserver.uniba.it.

 

CORVAGLIA  Nella sua biblioteca a Melissano. Luigi Corvaglia (Melissano) filosofoo.   Epigrafe casa natale di L. Corvaglia a Melissano Luigi Corvaglia ha operato soprattutto in tre campi: nella Filosofia del Rinascimento, nel Teatro e nella Letteratura Narrativa, pubblicandone a suo tempo i risultati.  Tra i lavori teatrali meritano di essere ricordate le commedie:La casa di Seneca (1926); Rondini (1928); Tantalo (1929); Santa Teresa e Aldonzo (1931).  Tra gli studi filosofico-scientifici si distinguono per vastità e profondità i volumi Le opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini e le loro fonti (1933-34) e VaniniEdizioni e plagi, risposta polemica condotta contro le veementi critiche ricevute da Guido Porzio.  Nel 1936 pubblica il romanzo Finibusterre, trasfigurazione quasi sacra della sua amata terra e del popolo del Basso Salento, ch'egli incitavacon ogni mezzo, anche se spesso travisato e intralciato e persino calunniatoa crescere, per migliorare materialmente e moralmente. Il romanzo fu ben accolto dalla critica. Benedetto Croce, a cui Corvaglia lo aveva dedicato, rimarcò "lo sfondo storico rappresentato in modo assai vigoroso" e il "trattamento dei caratteri e degli effetti". Con maggiore puntualità Annibale Pastore (già suo professore all'Torino) gli confidava di sentire emergere nella sua mente, attraverso figure e temi del romanzo, ricordi sepolti, "struggente malinconia", un mondo molto simile a quello del Manzoni, "anch'esso celato alla superficie, soffuso d'ironia-limite", e tuttavia turbato da altri affascinanti caratteri, quali: "il sorprendente realismo, la perfetta armonia, l'effusione poetica, l'occhio acuto e sicuro, che scruta l'animo umano fin nelle più remote pieghe".  Dal 1936 fino alla morte si dedica totalmente, per un trentennio intero, allo studio del pensiero del Rinascimento, animato dal bisogno di "trarre alla luce obliterate sorgive", e percorrendo il movimento (spesso alquanto sconosciuto) della filosofia europea, che dal Rinascimento risale fino al Medio Evo.  Dal 1943 al 1946 s'apre nella sua vita uno spiraglio di fiducia verso gli "uomini impegnati", e si presta"doverosamente" secondo la sua fede politicaall'attività politica, accogliendo e votandosi alla cultura mazziniana, cui rimane fedele sin dagli anni della prima giovinezza. È di questo periodo la pubblicazione, tra l'altro, dei Quaderni Mazziniani: Noi Mazziniani, Mazzini ed il Partito di Azione, L'Acherontico retaggio, Il Partito Repubblicano italiano, il discorso Ai giovani, la conferenza (edita da Laterza) su Giuseppe Mazzini.   Carta del Salento Dopo la proclamazione della Repubblica Italiana, però, si allontana da ogni azione politica, ritenendola del tutto estranea e lontana dall'ideale da lui vagheggiato e sperato. Si trasferisce a Roma, nell'ambiente culturale a lui più consono, ritornando agli studi tra i suoi libri, dove soltanto sente di vivere senza alcun compromesso, in assoluta libertà.   Cascata di S.M. di Leuca Opere postume Al lavoro dell'ultimo ventennio si deve il proseguimento degli studi vaniniani, con la stesura di un terzo, quarto e quinto volume, pubblicati postumi a cura della figlia Maria. Rimasta ancora inedita e inesplorata rimane, invece, la monografia di Giulio Cesare Scaligero, un lavoro di "speleologia dottrinaria", come egli stesso amava dire e come lasciò scritto. Luigi Corvaglia si spense proprio quando il traguardo era già vicino. Dovrebbe aver ultimato anche una monografia su Gerolamo Cardano, ma anche questa andrebbe posta tra gli inediti. Ancora oggi, a 50 anni di distanza dalla sua scomparsa, il problema degli inediti resta aperto e forse lontano dalla soluzione.  Nel , in occasione del 50º anniversario della morte del letterato-filosofo, su iniziativa dell'Amministrazione Comunale di Melissano, è stato avviato un "Biennio di Studio dell'opera di Luigi Corvaglia" (-), al fine di approfondirne e divulgarne la conoscenza. Alla realizzazione del progetto collaborano, come protagonisti, anche l'Amministrazione Provinciale di Lecce, l'Università degli Studi del Salento e l'Istituto Comprensivo Statale di Melissano, che chiuderanno il biennio dei lavori, organizzando nell'aprile  il "1º Convegno Nazionale di Studio su Luigi Corvaglia", al fine di dibattere argomenti di particolare interesse presenti nella sua opera. A tale riguardo si sta già operando non solo sul piano della ricerca specialistica e accademica, ma anche sulla promozione d'iniziative, che coinvolgano biblioteche e settori culturali degli Enti Locali, creando opportunità per sviluppare in maniera articolata e organica la ricognizione e la valorizzazione del patrimonio culturale salentino in generale e melissanese in particolare, lasciato in eredità da Luigi Corvaglia.   La casa di Seneca- Commedia di L. Corvaglia Opere Opere letterariecommedie La casa di Seneca (dedicata a "A mio Padre"); Tipografia Fratelli Carra, Matino (Lecce), 1926. Rondini (dedicata "Al mio povero innocente Nova, fuggevole visione di un Infinito", che avvampa e dilegua in vicenda amara di avventi senza natale"; Tipografia Fratelli Carra, Matino (Lecce), 1928. Tantalo (dedicata "A mia Madre"); Tipografia Fratelli Carra, Matino (Lecce), 1929. Santa Teresa e Aldonzo (dedicata "Alla mia donna"); L. Cappelli Editore, Bologna, 1931.  Rondini- Commedia di L. Corvaglia Opere LetterarieRomanzo Finibusterre, Editrice Dante Alighieri, Milano, 1936. Ristampato anastaticamente nel 1981con Introduzione di Donato Valli -, presso Congedo Editore di Galatina e successivamente nel 2006 presso Edizioni dell'Iride di Tricase . Opere Filosofiche Le opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini e le loro fonti,  I. Anphitheatrum Aeternae Providentiae, Società Dante Alighieri, Milano, 1933.  Introduzione semiseria dialogata per il lettore Vanini. Edizioni e plagi, Tipografia Carra di Casarano, 1934. Ricognizione delle opere di G.C. Vanini, in "Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana", fascicolo IV, 1957. Giulio Cesare Vanini e le sue fonti, (postumo), pubblicato dalla figlia Maria Corvaglia in "Zagaglia", n. 43, settembre 1969. La poetica di Giulio Cesare Scaligero nella sua genesi e nel suo sviluppo, in "Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana", Sansoni Edizioni Scientifiche, Firenze, 1959, fascicolo II,  213– 239. Le opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini, Ristampa Maria Corvaglia e Gino Pisanò, in vari tomi presso Congedo Editore, Galatina, negli anni 1991-1994. Ora anche in Le opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini e le loro fonti: 1 PDF Download. Opere Politiche Quaderni Mazziniani n° 1. Noi Mazziniani, Tipografica di Matino (Lecce), 1944 Quaderni Mazziniani n° 2. Mazzini e il partito d' azione (critica), Tipografica di Matino (Lecce), 1944 Quaderni Mazziniani n° 3. L'acherontico retaggio (con l'elogio della vita comune), Tipografica di Matino (Lecce), 1944 Quaderni Mazziniani n° 4. Il partito repubblicano italiano, Tipografica di Matino (Lecce). Discorso tenuto a Lecce nel Teatro Paisiello il 21 gennaio 1945. Giuseppe Mazzini, Discorso commemorativo tenuto a Lecce nel Teatro Apollo il 10 marzo 1947, Laterza, Bari, 1947   Tantalo- Commedia di L. Corvaglia G.R. Ceriello, Finibusterre, in "La Sera"di Milano, 1 ottobre 1936. Recensione ne "Il Mattino" di Napoli, 22 ottobre 1936. G. Gabrieli, Finibusterre, Il romanzo salentino di L. C., ne "La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno", 3 novembre 1936. Recensione ne "Il Mattino di Napoli, 17 novembre 1936. F. M. Pugliese, Recensione in "Voce del popolo" di Taranto, 25 dicembre 1936. E. Rivalta, Recensione ne "Il Giornale d'Italia", 25 febbraio 1937. O. Fava, Il romanzo dell'autore sconosciuto, in "Il popolo" di Roma, 2 marzo 1937. E. Vernole, Recensione in "Rinascenza salentina", a. V, n. 2, 1937,  182-194. E. Allodoli, Nuovi narratori, in "La Nazione", Firenze, 16 febbraio 1938. Aldo Vallone, Profilo di Luigi Corvaglia attraverso scritti inediti, in “Zagaglia”, XIII, n. 50, 1971, ora compreso nel volume Scritti salentini e pugliesi, Giancarlo Vallone, Galatina, Congedo, 2003. U. Franco, Finibusterre, in "La Voce del Sud", Lecce, 24 maggio 1975. Donato Valli, Introduzione a Finibusterre, nella ristampa fotomeccanica presso Congedo Editore, Galatina, nel 1981. Quintino Scozzi, Luigi Corvaglia, in Un Paese del Sud. Melissano. Storia e tradizioni popolari, Tipografia di Matino, 1981. Maria Corvaglia e Gino Pisanò, curatori della ristampa in vari tomi deile Opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini e le sue fonti, Congedo Editore, Galatina, 1991-1994. Aldo Vallone, Corvaglia Meridionalista e Polemista, in Scritti Salentini e Pugliesi, Giancarlo Vallone,, Congedo Editore, Galatina, 2003,  211-222. Enrico Gaballo, Il Salento nella produzione letteraria di Luigi Corvaglia (1892-1966), pubblicato su “Spicilegia Sallentina”, n° 7, 13 gennaio . Fernando Scozzi, Luigi Corvaglia: non solo letterato, in "Fondazione Terra d'Otranto", 11 febbraio . Gigi Montonato, Cinquant’anni fa scompariva Luigi Corvaglia, studioso del Vanini, scrittore e pensatore politico in “Necrologi e Ricordi”, dell’Università Popolare “Aldo Vallone” di Galatina, pubblicato anche in "Presenza Taurisanese" a. XXXIV n. 2febbraio . Cosimo Scarcella, Introduzione allo studio di Luigi Corvaglia da Melissano, Tipografia Emme, Tuglie,  Antonio Lucio Giannone, Luigi Corvaglia: una figura da riscoprire, in "Presenza Taurisanese" a. XXXVI n. 1Gennaio . Cosimo Scarcella, Luigi Corvaglia raccontato da Quintino Scozzi, in "Presenza Taurisanese" a. XXXVI n. 4Aprile . Cosimo Scarcella , Luigi Corvaglia. La Poetica di Giulio Cesare Scaligero nella sua genesi e nel suo sviluppo, Musicaos Editore, . Gigi Montonato, Scarcella ripubblica il saggio di Luigi Corvaglia sulla Poetica di G.C. Scaligero, in "Presenza Taurisanese" a. XXXVI n. 307, Dicembre . Gigi Montonato, Convegno di studio su Luigi Corvaglia. L'uomo, lo studioso, il pensatore politico. A Melissano un Centro Studi, in "Presenza Taurisanese" a. XXXVIII n. 317, Gennaio . Cosimo Scarcella, Note sul pensiero politico di Luigi Corvaglia. Popolo Sacralità Religiosità, in "Presenza Taurisanese"  salentolibri.it/corvaglia-luigi-finibusterre