The Grice Club


The Grice Club

The club for all those whose members have no (other) club.

Is Grice the greatest philosopher that ever lived?

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Sunday, August 30, 2015

Grice: Sentences and Prose Style


It might (but then again it might not) argued that philosophy, for Grice, was a branch of stylistics. His style became pretty barroque, but then, once a barroque always a barroque.

His very first essay, "Negation", is barroque enough, and a proof of this is that he manages to quote from Bradley and Bosanquet!

Grice: Sentences in Sequence


Grice thought that 'and' was otiose.

It is raining. It is cold.

Why bother with 'and'? Mere succession seems to do!

For Witters,

It is raining AND it is cold.

was enough to give him a claim to fame, as inventor of the truth-tables!

Grice: Master Sentences


Grice recollects all he learned from Wilson (or Cook Wilson, to be more precise). He was fascinated by once hearing Wilson (or Cook Wilson) utter a 'master sentence':

i. What we know, we know.

Grice uses the Oxford comma, but when this master sentence travelled to Cambridge it lost it!

ii. What we know we know.

Grice: Balanced Series and Serial Balances


Grice thought, with Cook Wilson (his surname was Wilson but everybody at Oxford referred to him as Cook Wilson, for some reason -- was he a closet cook?), that there is balance and order in the introduction of connectives.

The Sheffer stroke is hardly balanced!

Grice: the rhythm of threes


Grice once considered the example:

James is between Tom and Jerry.

He was wondering if 'between' should have two different SENSES here. Suppose we are talking of height.

But suppose we are talking of MORAL height.

He concludes that 'between' has only ONE sense even if the utterance can be used to mean one thing and implicate the other!

Grice: The rhythm of twos


Comparisons come usually in twos. You compare A with B.

Grice: Balanced Sentences and Balanced Forms


Grice was fascinated by the phrase, "logical form", and he found that a sentence, as Lord Russell said, more or less reflects pretty transparently its own logical form. In other words, syntax is a fairly good guide to logical form.

When it came to 'connectives', Grice did discuss the Sheffer stroke, but he found it not too balanced!

Grice: Prefab Patterns of Suspense


Degrees of suspensiveness is a Fregeian notion: but then there are prefab patterns of suspense, which are more Griceian in nature.

Grice: The Mechanics of Delay


"Delay" is almost like a 'Fregeian' notion, like 'degrees of suspensiveness'. If you are going to CONCLUDE that Q, say, why bother to state the premise P from which Q follows?

This troubled Robin Talmach, who said that one should not really mind about one's Ps and Qs!

Grice: Degrees of Suspensiveness


"Suspense" is almost a Fregeian notion, like 'colour'. So is 'suspensiveness'. In Grice's case it is a case when an implicature is 'triggered', or as Stephen Yablo would prefer, when 'implicature happens', because, implicature, like sh*t, happens!

Others, like Zwicky, would prefer to speak of an inference or an implicature being INVITED: some uninvited guest!

Grice: Cumulative Syntax to Create Suspense


"Suspense" is a Fregean notion, almost, like 'colour'. Grice would prefer: 'cumulative syntax to trigger an implicature'.

Sherlock Holmes was good at detecting them, as the film with Ian McKellen testifies!

Grice: The riddle of prose rhythm


Grice was of course not into prosody itself, but he found that there are two points:

i. John knew it.
ii. John KNEW it, and not merely believed it.

So, there is an implicature to a suprasegmental.

More importantly, he found that the FLOW of speech should follow the FLOW of meaning which should follow the FLOW of thought!

This he does in his last William James lecture, to the fascination of those who attended it!

Grice: Prompts of Explanation


Grice was fascinated by the misuse, by people (rather than chimps -- cfr. "Chimps can talk"), of 'because'.

The bridge collapsed because...

In his John Locke lectures, Grice distinguishes between justificatory and explanatory reasons. He then finds that he is not explaining or justifying his distinction too well and grants that there may be justificatory-cum-explanatory reasons, too!

The John Locke lectures audience was delighted!

Grice: Prompts of Comparison


Grice does not deal with similes, but with metaphors directly.

You, I tell you, are the cream in my coffee.

This is of course TOTALLY different from

You, I tell you, are LIKE the cream in my coffee.

But since the former is a categorial mistake and obviously a FALSE thing to say, it's best to see the logical form of metaphor as involving a 'prompt of comparison'.

"Shakespeare used a lot of these prompts," but then he was an actor!

Grice: Subordinate and Mixed Cumulatives


The house that Grice built.

This is the stairs to the house that Grice built.

Matter of fact, he never built it. But when he became professor at Berkeley, he found this lovely 'mansion' (he called it 'cottage') and full of garden stairways it was, too!

But the prize was the lovely view of the bay!

Grice: Coordinate Cumulative Sentences


This is almost like the house that Grice built. Only he never touched a stab!

Grice: Coordinate, Subordinate, and Mixed Patterns


Grice was fascinated, and irritated, by some of L. J. Cohen's criticism (The fact that Cohen was an Oxonian irritated Grice even more).

Cohen's criticism has to do with implicatures in suboordination.

Cohen failed to explain the problem, but Grice found a solution!

Grice: Direction of Modification


Grice deals with this:

-- French professor

a professor who is French
a professor who teaches french.

Cfr. "French poem"

There may be an implicature to the effect that "French poem" is a poem written by a Frenchman, say, in Arabic!

Grice: The rhythm of cumulative syntax


Grice thought, rightly, that there is an ORDER in which connectives have to be introduced:

First come conjunction.

Then disjunction.

And then 'if'.

He was so fascinated (and irritated) by what Strawson (his tutee, of all people) had said, wrongly, about 'inferrability' and 'if' that when he (Grice) had to entitle his fourth William James lecture he chose, "Indicative Conditionals"!

Grice: Adjectival Steps


Grice was fascinated by adjectives. His examples don't proliferate, though!

-- The dog is shaggy

was his example.

He chose 'shaggy' after that idiom, 'a shaggy-dog story'.

He formulates adjectives in "Way of Words" as "beta". Thus, "The dog is shaggy" becomes, rightly,

"The alpha is beta".

Grice: How Sentences Grow


Grice is a compositionalist, but one has to be careful! It's utterer's meaning that's basic, not expression meaning!

Grice: Propositions and Meaning


Why was Grice against 'propositions' and preferred 'propositional complexes' isntead? I know!

Grice: Grammar and Rhetoric


A fascinating area to explore!

Grice: A Sequence of Words


Monday, August 24, 2015

Fifty Shades Of Grice


Grice was once asked if his surname was Scots (In Scots, 'grice' means 'pig'). He was offended (about the denotatum of the alleged derivation of his surname). "Hardly: it's Anglo-Norman: it means 'grey'" -- as implicating, 'as in fifty shades of Grice,' you know.

Wednesday, August 19, 2015

Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka and Herbert Paul Grice: Implicature as a Game


Hintikka has written a delightful 'intellectual autobiography' for the 
Schilpp volume series.

Was he (Hintikka, not Schilpp) jealous of his  wife's previous lovers?

He doesn't think so. The thing was remote. But  interesting from a
philosophical point of view:

Jane Merrill Bristow (she  later dropped the "Jane") was studying
philosophy and considered herself a  "follower of Sartre’s thoughts".

When an influential Senator from  Massachusetts, New England, visited
Bristow's college, he took part in a  discussion with students. Jane Merrill
Bristow was selected.

During the  conversation, Bristow took the Massachusetts senator by
surprise with  her knowledge of the notorious trade union Teamsters.

Afterwards the senator's press secretary, invites Jane to a one-on-one 
meeting with the senator.

At first, Bristow thought that the senator wanted to hear more about 
Teamsters but he had other things in mind.

As a (not logical) consequence, the pair became what Americans call 

Bristow kept the affair a secret, only telling Hintikka some time later 
(when she had chosen the name "Merrill Hintikka").

Merrill Hintikka told Hintikka: He [the senator] cried almost every time 
after we had made love."

(Recall they were what Americans call 'lovers', and "lovers make love" is 
analytic a priori).

Hintikka was frequently asked of his feelings on being  compared with such
a well-known ladies’ man as the senator for Massachussets  was.

Hintikka held a distinct belief: "Their affair was in the distant past  by
that time. So there was no jealousy on my part but of course you had to 
wonder if you were found wanting in that contest. But this is something I 
touched upon in my book."

The book was selected by the Helsinki book club which meets weekly.

Grice was married once, and at one point he discusses the 'evidence' for a 
belief versus the 'acceptance' for a belief. Grice holds that certain
beliefs  (or other attitudes) are accepted notably NOT on the basis of their
evidence (in  this he may contrast with Popper but most notably with the
Inductivists). He  gives just one example: the belief in one's fideltity to one's

The case with Hintikka's first wife -- not Merrill Hintikka -- was an 
interesting one to discuss in this respect since as Hintikka suggests in  his
"Intellectual Autobiography", there is evidence for belief and acceptance of 
belief other than based on evidence.

When Hintikka met for a second time Merrill Provence (Jane Merrill Bristow 
the "Jane" and married Provence) at the Statler Hilton Hotel in New York,
she  "was going through a divorce", while Hintikka himself was married to
Soili  Hintikka -- "happily as far as [he knew]."

A conversation with Merrill Provence ended in Hintikka’s room at the Hilton
"and finally in his bed where Hintikka and Provence make love "tenderly,
albeit  clumsily"".

It may be interesting to study the scenarios in terms of what Dennett calls

hintikka, n. A measure of belief, the smallest logically discernible 
difference between beliefs. "He argued with me all night, but did not alter my 
beliefs one hintikka."

Hintikka's third wife wrote her dissertation on what she calls a formal 
theory of the will; so we have to broaden Dennett's definition to cover the 
measure of ANY PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE [and not those only accepted on their 
basis of their evidence], to wit: "the smallest logically discernible
difference  between" propositional attitudes.

Witters thought that some attitudes were not propositional, and not merely 
Italian! [Witters was insisting that a proposition and that which it describes must
have the same 'logical form', the same 'logical multiplicity'. Sraffa [the
Torino son of Angelo Sraffa and Irma Sraffa (née Tivoli), a wealthy 
couple] made a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans [although Sraffa was from 
Torino] as meaning something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the  underneath
of his chin with an outward sweep of the finger-tips of one hand. And  he
asked: 'What is the logical form of that?' The implicature was that some 
attitudes are not propositional _in nature_.]

Dennett's example: "He argued with me all night, but did not alter my 
beliefs one hintikka". This sort of scenario led to a development in epistemics,
doxastics, boulemaics, and denotics based on the idea of CHANGE in one's
tableau  of such attitudes.

Monday, August 17, 2015



Some say that if you are going to write an essay for a festschrift, you should state that you don't allow any reprint of that essay elsewhere: to reprint a festschrift essay elsewhere kills the point of the festchrift. Yet. Strawson re-published his "if and -->' elsewhere, as did Hintikka his essay on the logic of conversation (in Kasher, Pragmatics). Both were intended for the Grice festschrift.

For the record, a commentary on the volume in the "Library of Living 
Philosophers" series on Hintikka.

This is VOLUME 30.

While his full name was K. J. J. H., Hintikka went most of the time by 

Hintikka is recognized as one of the handful of most creative, 
comprehensive, and rigorous philosophical minds.

His major contributions to philosophy range over a very wide area, most 

-- logic
-- epistemology
-- philosophy of science
-- history of philosophy.

In this celebration, twenty-seven philosophers expound and criticise 
aspects of Hintikka's though, and he responds directly to each one of them with 
elegance and precision.

The volume also contains Hintikka's intellectual autobiography, as well as 
a comprehensive, up-to-date bibliography of all his published work.


Jaako Hintikka: Intellectual Autobiography


Simo Knuuttila: Hintikka's View of the History of Philosophy

---- What are Hintikka's views on the history of philosophy? He seems to 
have had a fascination (via his mentor, von Wright, for Witters, but he also 
liked Aristotle, and always enjoyed the work of Grice who was the cynosure
of  everyone while Hintikka was at Harvard.


Gabriel Motzkin: Hintikka's Ideas About the History of Ideas

"The History of Ideas" is a chair in Oxford once held by Berlin. By "Ideas"
we mean "Ideology". Not any idea does. "It was Joe's idea to do it" does
not  form part of the history of ideas, but Jefferson's views were.


Juliet Floyd:

On the Use and Abuse of Logic in Philosophy: Kant, Frege, and Hintikka on 
the Verb "To Be"

--- This relates to the essay by Grice on "Aristotle on the multiplicity of
being". Grice, against G. E. L. Owen ("The snares of ontology") thinks
that 'be'  is uniguous. But Grice distinguishes between:

(a) Socrates izz rational.


(b) Socrates hazz a flat nose.

Both come up as 'is' in Aristotle, but they shouldn't!

ESSAY IV: Judson C. Webb: Hintikka on Aristotelian Constructions, Kantian 
Intuitions, and Peircean Theorems

This is a comprehensive view of Hintikka's take on Aristotle, Kant and 
Peirce. I think he preferred Aristotle of all, and his last volume of Selected 
Papers is dedicated to Aristotle.


R.M. Dancy: Hintikka, Aristotle, and Existence

This overlaps a bit with Essay III. "Existentia" is not a word Aristotle 
would use. He would use 'ousia'. Hintikka distinguishes between 'existence'
(not  a predicate for Kant) and essence.


Aaron Garrett: The Method of the Analyst

Hintikka is, like Grice, an analytic philosopher; but unlike Grice, 
Hintikka skips 'linguistic botanising' and goes straight to formalism.


Karl-Otto Apel: Speculative-Hermeneutic Remarks on Hintikka's  Performatory
Interpretation of Descartes's Cogito, Ergo Sum

By 'performatory', Apel means 'performative' which is a lexical item J. L. 
Austin borrowed (but never returned from Scots law: 'operative'). The idea
is  that when Descartes said what he did in French he was doing things with
words.  Some have argued, wrongly, that performatives are neither true nor
false, and  Hintikka thinks this may shed light on what Descartes actually
DID with his  words.


Dagfinn Follesdal: Hintikka On Phenomenology

Phenomenology is not supposed to be analytic philosophy, but continental 
philosophy. The fat that Follesdal, who taught with Hintikka at Stanford,
thinks  that what Hintikka (an analytic philosopher) says about phenomenology
(a branch  of continental philosophy) is important goes to show how arbitrary
(contra Woody  Allen's recent film, "Irrational man", after book by
Barrett) can be.


David Pears: Private Language

D. F. Pears with collaborator with H. P. Grice on work in the philosophy of
action. A student at Christ Church (the most prestigious college in
Oxford),  Pears knows what he is saying. Robinson Crusoe did have a private


Mathieu Marion: Phenomenological Language, Thoughts, and Operations in  the

Hintikka had, via von Wright, a fascination for the three Witters: the 
first Witters of the Tractatus, the middle Witters, and the latter Witters. 
Operations is a key concept in the early Witters as Marion shows, and he
learned  this from Hintikka.

Essay XI:

Raymond M. Smullyan: A Logical Miscellany

By 'miscellany', Smullyan means a mischmasch. He learned this from 


Solomon Feferman: What Kind of Logic Is "Independence Friendly"  Logic?

We speak of X-friendly figuratively. Logic is not friendly, since only 
persons are friendly. A logician may be friendy. So a logician who is 
independence-friendly is possibly revolutionary, so beware! (Hintikka was  one!)


Johan Van Benthem: The Epistemic Logic of IF Games

Grice laughed at Strawson's account of 'if', for Strawson thought that he 
was doing first-rate ordinary language philosophy (in "Introduction to
Logical  Theory") and laughed at the fact that logicians's 'if' has NOTHING to do
with  HIS use of 'if'. Hintikka underestimates this polemic and bases his
games on  'if' -- as a background for his epistemic logic.


Wilfrid Hodges: The Logic of Quantifiers

Hodges wrote a nice little volume on Logic for Penguin. Hintikka was 
obsessed with quantifiers: any, each, all. He noted that they can NOT all be 
symbolised, as Grice thinks, by (x). "Each clown can be funny". But this does 
not implicate that "ALL" clows are funny, let alone that "any clown is
funny" or  "every clown is funny". In fact, it may well be that NO clown is funny.


Gabriel Sandu: Hintikka and the Fallacies of the New Theory of  Reference

By the New Theory of Reference we mean Ruth Barcan Marcus and Saul Kripke. 
Hintikka thought it was plagued with fallacies. This gave Dennett the idea
to  coin 'hintikka': "We discussed all night, but that did not lead me to
change ONE  hintikka about stuff".


James Higginbotham: The Scope Hypothesis

This is a very important philosopher. Some say that Higginbotham is no 
philosopher, but a linguist, but Hintikka sometimes felt himself honoured that 
he was being treated seriously be linguists! The scope hypothesis
fascinated  Grice. He developed two theories to deal with it: the subscript device,
in  "Vacuous Names" (in Davidson/Hintikka, "Words and Objections) and the 
square-bracket device: e.g. "[The king of France] is not bald." IMPLICATES
there  is a king of France and we write that between square bracket and thus
make it  immune to criticism: a presupposition alla Collingwood. This allows
Grice to  avoid problems with truth-value gaps.


Hans Sluga: Jaakko Hintikka (and Others) on Truth

Sluga is credited by Grice in "Presupposition and Conversational 
Implicature" for his help in analysing "the king of France is bald". Sluga,  unlike
Hintikka, was Oxonian-educated.


Pascal Engel: Is Truth Effable?

Engel is playing on Witters for whom truth like the naming of cats is 

Engel (not to be confused with the plural Engels, a dangerous philosopher) 

i. truth is effable.
ii. truth is ineffable
iii. truth is effanineffable.

Witters would have thought that truth was effanineffable, but G. E. M. 
Anscombe found that hard to translate.


Jan Wolenski: Tarskian and Post-Tarskian Truth

If Popper learned from Tarksi while seating on a bench in Vienna, Hintikka 


Philippe De Rouilhan and Serge Bozon: The Truth of IF: Has Hintikka  Really
Exorcised Tarski's Curse?

D. M. S. Edginton, once professor of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, 
held that 'if' sentences do not have truth values. Tarski was known to curse
in  Polish (his native language). You make the connections. For the
exorcising of  curses vide Geary, "Secret Papers".

Essay XXI

Martin Kusch: Hintikka on Heidegger and the Universality of  Language

For Heidegger German was a universal language; for Hintikka Finnish was a 
universal language. For Kusch both were!


Patrick Suppes: Hintikka's Generalizations of Logic and their Relation  to

Suppes taught with Hinitkka at Stanford. Logic ain't science and science 
ain't logic. Logicians play with silly examples like "All ravens are black". 
Scientists, unless you are a biologist (and play with "Some ravens are
albino"),  don't.


Isaac Levi: Induction, Abduction, and Oracles

Hintikka delivered the second von Wright lecture on induction. Ab-duction 
was of course a coinage by Peirce. Oracles were heard at Delphi. Levi makes
all  the proper connections in connection with the War of the Peloponnesus.


Risto Hilpinen: Jaakko Hintikka on Epistemic Logic and  Epistemology

Perhaps the most quoted essay by Hintikka is his essay on knowledge, for 
which he uses the symbol "K", as in KAP, KKAP. The second reads that A knows 
that he knows that p.

Epistemology, for Hintikka, is epistemics, i.e. epistemic logic. And right 
he is!


Matti Sintonen: From the Logic of Questions to the Logic of  Inquiry

Questions and inquiry have been related since Hobbes. For Hobbes, the 
scientist asks questions to Nature, and Nature never lies.


Theo A.F. Kuipers: Inductive Aspects of Confirmation, Information, and 

Hintikka, unlike Popper, was stuck with induction. But also with 
confirmation, information, and content. He was so much into content that Dennett 
coined 'hintikka' to refer to a belief that varies infinitesimally from 


Michael Meyer: Questioning Art

The sad thing is that it's artist (notably Andy Warhol) who first and 
foremost question art, when they should just sell it!

The volume concludes with a Bibliography of the Writings of Jaakko  Hintikka



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Hintikka and Grice: Impicature as Game


Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka and Herbert Paul Grice: Implicature as Game


So, Paul Grice and Rogers Albritton, and K. J. J. Hintikka were at the 
Harvard cafeteria. S. Bernadette turns up, and doesn't seem to be understanding
what Albritton and Grice are discussing. "Free will," Hintikka's curt
answer  was.

For the record, the contents of Hintikka's "Selected Papers", in six 

Vol. 1: "Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and  One-and-a-Half-Truths"

Because of his legendary impatience, Witters's published books are focused 
on his solutions to his latest problems and consequently often fail to
explain  not only his earlier solutions but also his problem situation.

In the essays collected the first volume of Hintikka's selected  essays, he
counteracts the difficulty which this peculiarity of Witters''s  poses to
his readers by analysing in depth the crucial stages of Witters's 
philosophical career and the relation of his ideas to those of other  philosophers,
especially Russell, Carnap and Husserl, with sometimes surprising  results.

(Incidentally, Husserl is cited in Woody Allen's latest, "Irrational man" *
now playing * -- "We'll deal with Husserl's phenomenology tomorrow, so I
hope  you get the reading done by then. I realise it can be difficult").

Vol. 2: Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator

Twentieth-century philosophy has tacitly been dominated by a deep contrast 
between universalist and model-theoretical visions of language.

The role of this contrast is studied here in Peirce, Frege, Witters, 
Carnap, Quine, Husserl, Heidegger and in the development of logical theory.

Hintikka also develops a new approach to truth-definitions which strongly 
supports the model-theoretical view.

Vol. 3: Language, Truth and Logic in Mathematics.

The foundations of mathematics are examined by reference to such  crucial
concepts as the informational independence of quantifiers, the 
standard-nonstandard distinction, completeness, computability, parallel  processing and
the extremality of models.

Vol. 4: Paradigms for Language Theory and Other Essays

Several of the basic ideas of current language theory are subjected to 
critical scrutiny and found wanting, including the concept of scope, the 
hegemony of generative syntax, the Frege-Russell claim that verbs like `is' are 
ambiguous [cfr. Grice, "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being], and the 
assumptions underlying the so-called New Theory of Reference. In their stead, 
new constructive ideas are proposed.

Vol. 5: Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery

In the essays collected here, Hintikka both defends and outlines a  genuine
logic of scientific discovery, the logic of questions and answers.

Thus inquiry in the sense of knowledge-seeking becomes inquiry in the sense
of interrogation.

Using this new logic, Hintikka establishes a result that will undoubtedly 
be considered the fundamental theorem of all epistemology, viz., the virtual
identity of optimal strategies of pure discovery with optimal deductive 

Vol. 6: Analyses of Aristotle

This collection comprises several striking interpretations of  Aristotle's
logic and methodology that Hintikka has put forward over the years, 
constituting a challenge not only to Aristotelian scholars and historians of 
ideas, but to everyone interested in logic, epistemology or metaphysics and in 
their history.

Incidentally, both Hintikka's second and third wives were philosophers. His
second philosophical wife is Ghita Holmström.

Her work includes:

"A Formal Theory of Will", Licentiate Thesis. Department of Philosophy, 
University of Helsinki.
"Wills, Purposes and Actions" in Ghita Holmström and Andrew J.I. Jones 
(eds.), Action, Logic and Social Theory, Acta Philosophica.



Sunday, August 16, 2015

Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka and Herbert Paul Grice: Implicature as a Game -- Both were John Locke Lecturers, Oxford and Kant Lectures, Stanford.

Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka was born in Vantaa, Finland. He was educated at the Kerava High School, Kerava and Helsinki University and Williams College, America (as an exchange student). He held a Cand. Phil. (Helsinki), Lic. Phil. (Helsinki), Dr. Phil. (Helsinki). He was Junior Fellow of the Society of Fellows, Harvard University, Professor of "Practical Philosophy", University of Helsinki, Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University, Research Professor, The Academy of Finland, Professor of Philosophy, Florida, Professor of Philosophy, Boston. Docent in Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Visiting Professor, Brown University, Visiting Professor, University of California, Berkeley, Assistant Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, Visiting Professor, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Courtesy Professor, Department of Computer Science, Florida. American Philosophical Association (APA). Vice-President of the Pacific Division, President of the Division, Member of the committee for International Co-operation, International Union of of History and Philosophy of Science, Vice-President of the Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (LMPS), President, Chairman of the Program Committee for the Fifth International Congress of LMPS, Chairman of the Joint Commission, Association for Symbolic Logic, Vice-President, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Philosophy of Science Association, Member of the Governing Board, Fellow of the Institut International de Philosophie,  Vice-President, Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie, Member of the Comité Directeur, Member of the Finance Committee of the same, Chair of the Committee, Co-chair of the American Organizing committee for the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Scientific Advisor and Foreign member of the Internationales Forschungszentrum Salzburg (Salzburg, Austria), Member of the Academy of Science and Letters of Finland, Member of the Council, Fellow of Societas Scientiarum Fennica,  Council for Philosophical Studies,  Member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters,  Ernst Lindelöf Prize, University of Helsinki, The John Locke Lectures, Oxford University, W. T. Jones Lectures, Pomona College, Wihuri International Prize, Guggenheim Fellow, Phi Beta Kappa (honorary), Williams College chapter, Hägerström Lectures, University of Uppsala, Honorary Doctorate, University of Liége.Immanuel Kant Lectures, Stanford University, Florida State University Foundation Professor,  (renamed McKenzie Professor), Commander of the Order of the Lion of Finland, First Class, E. J. Nyström Prize of the Societas Scientiarum Fennica, Erik Ahlman Lecture, University of Jyväskylä, The Grand Prize of Suomen Kulttuurirahasto, Finland, Honorary Doctorate, Jagiellonian University of Krakow, Editor-in-Chief, international journal Synthese (Dordrecht), Senior Advisory Editor, Synthese, Editor, Synthese Library (Dordrecht), Managing Editor, Synthese Library, Managing Co-editor, Synthese Language Library (Dordrecht), Editor, Acta Philosophica Fennica, Consulting Editor of over ten journals or series.
Areas of Interest (Research, Teaching, and/or Advising):  
-- Philosophy of Language and Theoretical Linguistics:

game-theoretical semantics

methodology of linguistics

logic and semantics of questions and of question-based dialogues

semantic information and its varieties

the analytic-synthetic distinction

possible-worlds semantics, etc.).
  • Foundations of Cognitive Science (interrogative model of inquiry, differences between information-processing by humans and computers, knowledge representation and reasoning about knowledge, the psychology of reasoning, mental models, etc.
  • Philosophical Logic (semantics of intensional logics, game-theoretical semantics, independence-friendly logics, non=standard interpretations of logic, problems of individuation and identification, nature of reasoning, urn models, deductive information, etc.).
  • Mathematical Logic and Foundations of Mathematics (distributive normal forms, independence-friendly logic, definability, infinitely deep languages, extremality assumptions in mathematical theories, etc.).
  • Philosophy of Science (interrogative models of scientific inquiry, the concepts of experiment and induction, why-questions and explanation, inductive logic, decision-theoretical approaches to theory choice, information as utility, identifiability problems in science, theory structure and the different ingredients of an empirical theory, interplay between history of science and philosophy of science, etc.).
  • History of Philosophy and History of Ideas (Aristotle, the general assumptions of Greek philosophy, modal concepts in mediaeval philosophy, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, the history of the method of analysis, the "principle of plenitude" in the history of philosophy, methodology of the history of ideas, etc.).
  • Interpretations of Recent and Contemporary Philosophy (Frege, Peirce, Russell, the Bloomsbury Group, Wittgenstein, Husserl, Carnap, Quine, etc.).
  • Philosophy of Education (models of instruction, the role of questions and answers in education, etc.).
  • Aesthetics (problems of pictorial representation, philosophy and literature, intentionalty and artistic creation, etc.).

What are Grice and Albritton talking about? -- "Free will".


"Which would you prefer, to be good or nice?" -- Grice. "Good" -- Grice: "Really?"


Grice, the cynosure of everyone


Hintikka and Grice

Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka and Herbert Paul Grice: Implicature as a Game


"Logic of Conversation as a Logic of Dialogue" is K. Jaakko J. Hintikka's 
contribution to the Grice festschrift, in P.G.R.I.C.E., Philosophhical
Grounds  of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.

In this celebratory essay, Hintikka -- whose affiliations to the Oxonian 
school of philosophy to which Grice belonged were minimal -- compliments
Grice  on a body of work.

However, Hintikka singles out “Logic and Conversation” to criticize --
i.e.  the second lecture at Harvard, where Hintikka was a fellow. It should be 
reminded that this was just ONE out of a series of lectures that Grice gave
at  Harvard, as he tried to combine his interests in implicature
(introduced as a  coinage -- but cfr. Sidonius, "implicatura", Lewis/Short, Latin
Dictionary) and  meaning.

Hintikka believes that the Gricean maxims "are not, and cannot be, the rock
bottom of a satisfactory analysis of the logic of conversation" (Hintikka
1986,  273). 

Hintikka is using 'rock bottom' figuratively. Figures are tricky. Grice's 
example is

i. You are the cream in my coffee.

which is literally false as it involves a categorial mistake, unless we 
suppose that one's addressee -- cream -- has ears to understand what Utterer
is  saying.

Similarly, a maxim is not a rock bottom.

Kant knew this, and by using "maxim", Grice is merely, and jocularly (such 
was his obscure sense of humour) referring to Kant (as does Joaquin Phoenix
in  the recent "Irrational man" when he discusses Kant's categorical
imperative and  Kant's universal prohibition on lying).

One of the reasons Hintikka thinks this -- that a maxim is not a rock 
bottom -- is his belief that, “when the time comes to conceptualize the results 
of […] discourse-theoretical observations Grice often seems to retreat back
to  formulations that pertain to utterances taken one by one rather than to
the  interplay of different utterances in discourse".

Which is of course an OVER-SIMPLIFICATION.

In the original OXFORD (*not* Harvard) lectures on implicature, Grice 
tortured his students ALWAYS with dialogues, between whom Grice called "A" and 
"B". Perhaps his most famous example is:

A: I'm out of petrol.
B: There's a garage round the corner. (Implicature: Which is open and with 
petrol to sell).

Grice is considering co-operativeness (or helpfulness) and you cannot have 
THAT with a single utterance, unless you are God ("Let there be light!").

Hintikka is interested in a "different, more flexible framework in which 
the dynamics of discourse are spelt out more explicitly."

The use of 'discourse' is vague. Grice prefers the more conversational 
adjective, 'conversational' and its corresponding noun, 'conversation'.

First-order predicate logic is clearly not the logic of dialogue. 

This point, as Hintikka wants to explore, leads to a fundamental difference
between propositions and the utterances of dialogue. 

The new strategy for understanding conversation Hintikka wants to employ is
explained as follows.

Grice says that one of his ‘avowed aims is to see talking as a special 
case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behaviour’.

If so, the bag of conceptual tools one can profitably use in studying 
conversational "logic" (although Grice never used this phrase) should be a 
special case, or variety, of the conceptual tools one uses in studying the 
rationality of human behaviour in general.  One such tool is game  theory.

This had been tried before Hintikka, and at Harvard, too, by D. K. Lewis in
his dissertation under Quine. Lewis was thinking that co-operation is 
conventional and that conventions invite a game-theoretical approach.

Thus, Hintikka argues that the framework for studying dialogue needs to  be
shifted from formal logic to game theory. 

Game theory is geared toward better understanding which appropriate 
strategies one ought to use in given situations, or games. 

The use of 'strategy' is vague. Strictly, for Grice, there are no 
strategies, since he knew Greek, and 'strategy' comes from a Greek word meaning 
'general' -- as in military. And a military person KNOWS that his strategies 
have to be SECRETIVE. But Grice wants all ABOVE-BOARD. So we need another
term  to categorise what is going one when, to use S. Yablo's phrase,
'implicature  happens'.

Hintikka sketches a simple schema in which conversations can be viewed 
game theoretically.

He writes, “Utterer 1 and Utterer 2 make ‘moves’  alternately. 

There are four different kinds of moves for Hintikka.

-- The phrase 'conversational move' and 'conversational game' and 
'conversational rule' DO APPEAR in Grice's "Logic and Conversation", so it's not 
like Hintikka is being 100% original --

(a) Assertoric moves. 
----- as in "We've been having some delightful weather this summer, no?" --
This implicating: "You've just committed a social gaffe: what about
changing the  topic?")
(b) Interrogative moves. 
----- Humpty Dumpty: How old did you say you were?
----- Alice: Seven years and six months.
----- Humpty Dumpty: Wrong! You never said a word like it!

(c) Deductive moves.
---- as in what Grice calls trivial reasoning:
-------------------- A: You have two hands, right?
-------------------- B: Yes.
---------------------A: Well, if I had THREE more hands, you  would have 5
---------------------B: And if I were permitted to double that, I  would
have 10 hands.
---------------------A: Exactly: But If four of your hands were  removed,
you would still remain with six hands.
---------------------B: Exactly, and I would still have four more  hands
than I have now.
---------------------A: Brilliant.

(d) Definitory moves, as in
-------------------A: All swans are black.
-------------------B: You never ventured outside Australia, right?

Hintikka then explains how each of these steps work. 

First, a "player" must make an assertoric move -- as in "The weather has 
been delightful this summer, no?" --  in which he or she “puts forward a  new
proposition (a new ‘thesis’)".

An interrogative move is a questioning move, the answer (if one can be 
given) to which "is then added to the list of the answerer’s theses".

The deductive moves are pretty straightforward, it is comprised of "a 
logical conclusion from the totality of his/her opponent’s theses," and previous
conclusions obtained by the same means.

Finally, definitory moves are when one "introduces a new non-logical symbol
by and appropriate explicit definition".

These four conversational moves in the conversational game are used to 
prove all the players’ theses, but according to Hintikka the goals can be 

Hintikka believes that the Gricean maxims can be incorporated  into this
model. Had he attended Grice's original implicature lectures at  Oxford, he
would have known Grice had already done that!

In referring to maxims enjoining 'strength' or 'informativeness' of 
conversational moves, Hintikka notes, while Grice remarks that one ought not 
violate these maxims for fear of confusing one's co-conversationalist, for 
Hintikka there "is nevertheless operative,… in ordinary discourse, a different 
pressure against extra information.  Everything a player of my dialogical 
games says can be used against him (or her) by the opponent".

Here, the player will want his discourse to be as weak as possible.

Thus, requiring him to prove less by the rules of the game. 

This is a fundamentally different reason to act in accordance with the 
maxims enjoining strength or informativeness. However the "end result" is  the

The same result will be found regarding the maxims of  quality, enjoining

Recall that Grice uses 'quality/quantity/relation/mode' just to tease  Kant!

Because one only gets a payoff by proving the maximum amount of statements 
in the dialogue, one will only want to propose things that he or she may be
able  to show to be true. 

Surprisingly, the maxims enjoining trustworthiness are also satisfied  by
this game. 

Hintikka writes: "iif my opponent gives true answers to my question, if the
opponent is fairly well-informed, and if the effects of my own answers can
be  discounted, then it is ceteris paribus in my own best interest to put
forward  true theses".

Modus, unlike quantity, quality, and relevance, is not of interest to 

He states that it "is different in kind from the first three" -- which 
shows that Hintikka does NOT share Grice's obscure sense of humour. What is the
point of poking fun of Kant if you are not going to accept the FOUR 
'categories'. Note that in an outburst of humour, Grice calls these the 
'conversational categories' -- in his critique of conversational reason, of  course!

This should become apparent, as arguments to this affect will be made 

Relation, however, must be addressed and is actually reworded to state that
it is a move within the rules to increase one’s pay-off. 

This Hintikka must explain.

He states: "For instead of the relevance of the several utterances in a 
dialogue I could collectively speak of the coherence of the dialogue".

Hintikka refers to a Sherlock Holmes story (now played by Ian  McKellen) in
which Holmes solves a mystery about a prize race horse by  asking a
shepherd an apparently irrelevant question about the recent status of  his sheep.

However, this question, as is often the case with the solutions to 
intricate puzzles, was the crucial link between a series of facts that  ultimately
achieved the goal of solving this mystery. 

This shows that Hintikka read the novels of Sherlock Holmes, as did Grice, 
and Grice's mother.

From all this, one can see that Hintikka has crafted a formal game that 
models the Griceian maxims. 

This game does not however require a Cooperative Principle, which was 
another outburst of humour on Grice's part. In his Oxford lectures on 
implicature, he had spoken of desiderata of candour, benevolence, clarity, and 
self-interest, to account for the same phenomena! He wasn't literally wedded to 
calling his desiderata, principles, maxims or stuff THIS or THAT!

For Hintikka, in fact, this becomes a competition between the players of 
the game. 

Still, there are clearly some problematic results of this account. 

For example, intuitions of conversation stray far from this schema. 

Conversations are certainly not games in which one must prove, or at least 
hope to prove, all the propositions that one puts forward. 

Still, the idea of conversation as a goal oriented game, with pay-offs and 
costs, is certainly an idea which has not been explored, and may have some 

The primary significance of Hintikka's Griceian exegesis, however, may  be
his alternative approach to the theory of conversation, which is based  on
rationality theory in a way that explores Grice's ideas under a different 

Oxonians prefer Grice's Oxonian light, though -- any night!

Hintikka and Grice: Implicature as a Game


Hintikka is known as the main architect of game-theoretical semantics and of the interrogative approach to inquiry, and also as one of the architects of distributive normal forms, possible-worlds semantics, tree methods, infinitely deep logics, and the present-day theory of inductive generalization. 

He has authored or co-authored lots of essays that have appeared in many languages. 

Five volumes of his "Selected Papers" were published by Kluwer.

Jaakko Hintikka has edited or co-edited a lot of volumes and authored or co-authored a lot of essays.

A comprehensive examination of his thought appeared as the volume The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka in the series "The Library of Living Philosophers."

Hintikka and Grice

Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka and Herbert Paul Grice: Implicature as a Game


The difference between obituaries and Wikipedia is that Wikipedia, like 
Popper's W3 GROWS. So let's provide a running commentary on the ever-growing 
entry for Hintikka.

Hintikka was baptised Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka.

So, strictly, his initials go:

Hintikka, K. J. J.

In this he is superior to

Grice, H. P. -- who only has TWO Christian names.

Hintikka was "a Finnish philosopher and logician."

This implicates that logicians are not philosophers. Similarly, Bartlett's 
Dictionary's entry for Grice is "British logician", which WRONGLY
implicates he  was not a philosopher. In fact he was not a logician but a philosopher
of logic  or philosophical logician if you must.

Hintikka was born in Helsingin maalaiskunta (now Vantaa).

The 'now' Vanta is important and interesting. Similarly, Baron Russell was 
born English (or Welsh) because that part of England (or Wales) where he
had his  family seat was then part of England (or Wales) to later become part
of Wales  (or England). So we can say that Russell was Welsh or English (if
not  both).

After teaching for a number of years at Florida, Stanford, Helsinki, and 
the Academy of Finland, K. J. J. Hintikka became a Professor of Philosophy at

He was familiar with the area since he had been a Harvard fellow earlier in
his career.

He lived in Marlborough, a charming little New England borough.

The prolific author or co-author of lots of books and essays, Hintikka 
contributed to

-- mathematical logic (his first love: recall his tutors were one 
philosopher -- von Wright -- and one mathematical logician).

-- philosophical logic

-- the philosophy of mathematics

-- epistemology -- or 'epistemics' and 'doxastics', as he preferred)

-- language theory

-- and the philosophy of science.

His works have appeared in over nine languages, that is 10.

Hintikka is regarded as the founder of formal epistemic logic and of  game
semantics for logic.

"Game-theoretical" semantics, as Geary reminds us, 'is no game'. The word 
'game' is used figuratively, after Witters used the example of 'game' to 
disprove the idea of a family resemblance ("Do I have a family resemblance
with  other members of the aristocratic Witters family?").

Early in his career, K. J. J. Hintikka devised a semantics of modal  logic
essentially analogous to Saul Kripke's frame semantics.

Kripke later got into a fight with Ruth Barcan Marcus about who invented 
stuff first.

-- No such polemic arose between Hintikka and Kripke.

K. J. J. Hintikka discovered the now widely taught semantic tableau, 
independently of Evert Willem Beth.

The word 'independently' is interesting from a Popperian point of view: 
'semantic tableaux' are part of W3, but there are different rigid-designators
to  Hintikka and Beth attached to them.

Later, K. J. J. Hintikka worked mainly on game semantics, and on 
independence-friendly logic, known for its "branching quantifiers", which he 
believed do better justice to our intuitions about quantifiers than does 
conventional first-order logic.

Grice also had doubts about the correctness of the 'classical logic' about 
quantifiers and he developed special quantifiers to deal with slogans like 
"Every nice girl loves a sailor": One-at-a-time-sailor and 

Hintikka did important exegetical work on Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, and Charles Sanders Peirce and he provided at least ONE
exegesis  of Grice's logic of conversation in Philosophical Grounds of
Rationality:  Intentions, Categories, Ends (P. G. R. I. C. E. for short). Grice was
supposed  to provide a reply to Hintikka's contribution, but he changed his
mind (Changing  one's mind is accounted by K. J. J. Hintikka in terms of
'semantic tableaux':  Grice's tableau changed from one where he wanted to provide
a reply to one where  he did not).

Hintikka's work can be seen as a continuation of the analytic tendency in 
philosophy founded by Franz Brentano and Peirce, advanced by Gottlob Frege
and  Bertrand Russell, and continued by Rudolf Carnap, Willard Van Orman
Quine, and  by Hintikka's teacher Georg Henrik von Wright.

Von Wright brilliantly coined 'alethic' that Grice overuses in "Aspects of 

Reason". In Finnish, 'Wright' is pronounced /rixt/.

Hintikka wrote "The Principles of Mathematics Revisited", which takes  an
exploratory stance comparable to that Russell made with his "The Principles 
of Mathematics" in 1903.

"The Principles of Mathematics Revisited" has been compared (by Geary) to 
Evelyn Waugh's "Brideshead Revisited" -- "only it's not fictional," he  adds.

Hintikka edited the academic journal "Synthese" and was a consultant 
editor for more than ten journals -- perhaps eleven.

Hintikka was the first vice-president of the Fédération Internationale  des
Sociétés de Philosophie, the Vice-President of the Institut International
de  Philosophie, as well as a member of the American Philosophical
Association, the  International Union of History and Philosophy of Science,
Association for  Symbolic Logic, and a member of the governing board of the Philosophy
of Science  Association.

Hintikka won the Rolf Schock prize in logic and philosophy "for his 
pioneering contributions to the logical analysis of modal concepts, in  particular
the concepts of knowledge and belief".

Some say that Rolf Schock was a genius.

Hintikka was president of the Florida Philosophical Association, based in 
Florida -- the 'sunshine state'.

Hintikka was a member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and  Letters.

-- where "Letters" is "Humanities". Snow develops the distinction between 
"Science" and "Letters" in his "Two Cultures". The Norwegian Academy is
supposed  to refute Snow.

A pretty complete bibliography of Hintikka is to be found in Auxier and 

Hintikka's essays include:

Knowledge and Belief – An Introduction to the Logic of the Two  Notions.

-- Popper possibly criticised this as it sees 'knowledge' as JTB (justified
true belief).

Models for Modalities: Selected Essays

The intentions of intentionality and other new models for modalities 

The semantics of questions and the questions of semantics: case studies in 
the interrelations of logic, semantics, and syntax

The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths

Lingua Universalis vs Calculus Ratiocinator

The Principles of Mathematics Revisited

Paradigms for Language Theory and Other Essays

Language, Truth and Logic in Mathematics

Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery  -- an echo of 
Popper's more rotund, "THE logic of scientific discovery".

Analyses of Aristotle

Socratic Epistemology: Explorations of Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning


Auxier, R.E., and Hahn, L., eds., The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka  (The
Library of Living Philosophers).
Open Court. Includes a complete bibliography of Hintikka's publications.

Bogdan, Radu, ed., Jaakko Hintikka, Kluwer Academic Publishers

Daniel Kolak, On Hintikka, Wadsworth -- there is a volume on Grice in this 

Daniel Kolak and John Symons, eds., Quantifiers, Questions and Quantum 
Physics: Essays on the Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka Springer.

See also: Rudolf Carnap, Saul Kripke, Charles Sanders Peirce, Willard  Van
Orman Quine, Alfred Tarski, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Doxastic logic



Gruppe 3: Idéfag" (in Norwegian). Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters.

Philosopher Jaakko Hintikka reveals love affair between his wife and  JFK
Analytic philosophy
Notable logicians
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Schock Prize  laureates

Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka and Herbert Paul Grice: Implicature as a Game


Kaarl Jaakko Juhani Hintikka was born in Vantaa, Helsinki, Finland.

Hintikka studied mathematics with Rolf Nevanlinna and philosophy with 
Georg Henrik von Wright at the University of Helsinki where defended his 
doctoral dissertation on distributive normal forms.

So we see the cross-reference mathematics -- as per mathematics logic, that
today, for example, is taught at Oxford not within the Sub-Faculty of
Philosophy  but across the street, so that people enrolled in disciplines other
than  Philosophy can attend. The chair is called "Mathematical logic" -- and

Grice loved Wright and he borrowed from him (but never returned) the word 
'alethic'. That Hintikka was inspired by these two people (and these two
fields:  mathematical logic and philosophy -- moral theory --) to write his
essay on  'distributive normal forms' is interesting.

Geary commented: "A distributive normal form is not as normal as it 
seems," and adds with sarcasm: "especially if you catch it  undistributed!".

After his Ph.D. studies Hintikka worked as junior fellow at Harvard  and
became (independently of Stig Kanger) the founder of possible world 

The keyterm is Leibniz, as in Leibniz's world: the best of all possible 
worlds. Woody Allen (who wrote "Irrational man") and Barrett (who wrote 
"Irrational man") have something to say about this, because Leibniz is concerned 
with the "best" (morally best) of all possible worlds and Lucas (the
character  in Allen's film fallaciously thinks he has discovered it!). Hintikka's
treatment  is more abstract: he uses subindexes w1 w2 w3 wn to represent
each world.  Thus

"All man is rational"

is true in all possible worlds if for any world n, man is rational.

Hintikka published his groundbreaking work "Knowledge and Belief" on 
epistemic logic -- the semantics of which is 'possible-worlds'. He uses now two 
dyadic operators:

B(A, p)


K(A, p)

to represent that A believes and knows that p respectively. He liked to 
play with 'paradoxes' like

K(A, p) --> KK(A, p)

i.e. if you know that God exists, you know that you know that God  exists.

Hintikka was appointed professor of Practical Philosophy at Helsinki -- 
which was a good thing since, having been born there, he never got lost! In 
fact, he moved not far from the house where he had been born. And a nice
house  it was, too!

Hintikka later became professor of philosophy at Stanford -- which is  a
bit away from Helsinki, if just more or less at the same distance from the 
beach (different beaches, admittedly).

Stanford, with Hintikka, Patrick Suppes and Dagfinn Föllesdal, and the 
programme initiated by Grice "Hands across the Bay" from across the Bay in 
UC/Berkeley -- became one of the leading centres of philosophy of science and 
philosophical logic, if not conceptual analysis: Urmson and S. N. Hampshire 
also taught there.

Hintikka’s new interests included inductive logic and semantic information.
He would say, "What's the good of a philosopher if you don't have a new 

He shared his time between Stanford and Helsinki for a while.

Later Hintikka started his work with D. Reidel’s Publishing Company (later 
Kluwer Academic Publishers) in Holland as the editor-in-chief of the
journal  "Synthese" and the book series "The Synthese Library" -- which Geary
calls  "hardly synthetic".

This activity made Hintikka the most influential editor of philosophical 
works. In fact, he was co-editor of a festschrift, as it were, for Quine, who
had written "Words and Objections". This came out in Reidel as Words and 
ObjectIONS -- what's the good of a philosophical theory if you are not going
to  criticise it, as Joaquin Phoenix says in "Irrational man"? -- and they
invited  H. P. Grice to contribute. Grice took his time -- which delayed the
publication  of the thing -- and Hintikka was strict with deadlines -- but
eventually the  thing came out with Grice's "Vacuous Names" in it, and a
short reply by Quine  crediting Grice's brilliancy.

Hintikka was appointed to a Research Professorship in the Academy of 
Finland which allowed him to establish a research group of Finnish scholars 
working mainly in logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and 
history of philosophy.

The Academy of Finland owes its name to the Academy of Athens founded by 
Plato. Most countries have Academies: Greece first, then Rome, then Italy,
then  France. Then Finland. Even Britain has its academy and Grice was
appointed FBA  in 1966 but he delayed the deliverance of his philosophical lecture
for the  British Academy to 1971, when he came up with "Intention and
Uncertanity": a  parody on Hart and Hampshire's 'slightly ridiculous' claims in
their joint essay  for "Mind" on intention and certainty.

As a teacher and supervisor, Hintikka was highly influential though the 
richness of his new ideas and research initiatives.

Many of the former students of Hintikka have been appointed to chairs in 
philosophy. To wit: Risto Hilpinen, Raimo Tuomela, Juhani Pietarinen, Ilkka 
Niiniluoto, Simo Knuuttila, Veikko Rantala, Juha Manninen, Lauri Carlson,
Esa  Saarinen, Matti Sintonen, Gabriel Sandu.

Lauri Carlson wrote a Synthese Library essay on "Dialogue games" -- the 
ideas will be later developed by Hintikka himself in his contribution to P. G.
R. I. C. E., the Grice festschrift edited by Grandy and Warner.

Hintikka divorced his first wife Soili.

Hintikka married Merrill Bristow Provence -- Mrs. Hintikka willl later 
co-edit with Vermazen a festschrift for Davidson and they invited H. P. Grice
to  contribute. He did with a brilliant essay on 'akrasia'.

Hintikka and Provence were appointed at Tallahassee, Florida.

Hintikka married Ghita Holmström.

Hintikka became philosophy professor at Boston -- not far from where  he
had been a fellow in the next town -- when he was in Harvard, Massachussets 
-- He would walk from Boston to Cambridge, and back, as he seemed to prefer
the  bookshops in Cambridge than those in Boston.

During his Boston pewriod, Hintikka resided in a 'cottage' (as 
non-New-Englanders call them) at Marlborough.

Marlborough was not named after the person -- via rigid designation -- but 
after the borough.

Hintikka retired from Boston and moved back to Finland.

Besides his activities in research, teaching, and publication, Hintikka 
served in many important positions in international organizations, among
others  vice president of The Association for Symbolic Logic, vice-president and
later  president of the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science  of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science
(DLMPS/IUHPS),  president of the Charles S. Peirce Society -- D. Ritchie was
mentioning this  genial philosopher recently -- and the chairman of the
organizing committee of  the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy.

As a proof of the appreciation of Hintikka’s work, a volume dedicated to 
him in "The Library of Living Philosophers" was published.

Hintikka’s publications cover an exceptionally wide range of topics.

During his career he published lots of books or monographs, edited lots of 
books, and authored lots of essays in international journals or 

His main works deal with:

-- mathematical logic (proof theory, infinitary logics,  IF-logic)
-- intensional logic and propositional attitudes
-- philosophy of logic and mathematics
-- philosophy of language (game-theoretical semantics, quantifiers, 
-- philosophy of science (interrogative model of inquiry)
-- epistemology, and
-- history of philosophy (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Peirce, Frege, 
Wittgenstein, Grice -- in the P. G. R. I. C. E. festschrift).

A genius.

Kaarlo Jaakko Juhani Hintikka and Herbert Paul Grice: IMPLICATURE AS A GAME


For the record, J. Hintikka contributed a piece on the logic of 
conversation to Grandy/Warner, "P. G. R. I. C. E.", short for "Philosophical  Grounds
of Rationality: Categories, Intentions, Ends. (*)

Most say that Hintikka was a genius.

Oops, another -iana!

The volume was meant as a festschrift for P. Grice, but The Clarendon 
Press said that they would not publish anything with "P. Grice" in the
title, as  it would decrease sales. So Grandy and Warner came up with the
acronym. Grice  was supposed to answer individually to each contribution (as Popper
does in his  festschrift that McEvoy often quotes) but changed his mind --
implicating: he  didn't. But the ultimate implicature seems to be that
"Yeah, I like Hintikka's  piece!" (only Grice would rather be seen dead than
uttering "Yeah").