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Friday, March 15, 2013

IN SYMBOLS: Grice's UNMARRIED MAN (Is: Bachelor)


”Being a bachelor is the same thing as being an unmarried man” is given by identity of terms

(x) Bx <---> Ux & Mx

with B for ’bachelor’, U for ’unmarried’, and M for ’man’ -- all unary predicates.
Note the use of "iff"
the mark of "REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS", properly understood. Or not!

Grice's Unmarried Man (Is: Bachelor)


'A triangle hath three sides' or 'A bachelor is an unmarried man', on the other hand, are self-evident propositions which would not be included as logical truths.

Grice on the paradox of analysis: bachelor, unmarried man


Articoli accademici per "paradox of analysis" bachelor "unmarried man"
What is a Philosophical Analysis? - King - Citato da 30
The paradox of analysis - Fumerton - Citato da 14

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resources concerning the paradox of analysis: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: ... The definiendum is “bachelor” and its defiens is “unmarried man.” To be ...

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"All bachelors are unmarried" can be expanded out with the formal definition of bachelor as "unmarried man" to form "All unmarried men are unmarried," which is ...

Collected Papers of Stig Kanger with Essays on His Life and Work - Pagina 48 - Risultati da Google Libri
Stig Kanger, Ghita Holmström-Hintikka, Sten Lindström - 2001 - Philosophy
The last puzzle I shall consider is 'the paradox of analysis'.

The  'paradox of analysis' may be stated as follows:

Suppose we analyse (reductively) "bachelor" as "unmarried man".

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As to question v, various things have been called "the paradox of analysis" over the years, but despite these .....

For all x, x is a bachelor iff x is an unmarried man.

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di S KANGER - 1957 - Citato da 73 - Articoli correlati
The last puzzle I shall consider is 'the paradox of analysis'.'' This. 'paradox' may be stated as follows: Suppose we analyse “bachelor” as “unmarried man”.

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The Paradox of Analysis: Why You Already Know the Solution ....

Thus if you know what "bachelor" and "unmarried man" mean, the analysis

X is a bachelor iff X is an unmarried man

becomes redundant.

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2 risposte - 4 gen 2012
... come to be called the paradox of analysis—an intractable problem that, ...

In order for “unmarried man” to be a good definition of “bachelor,” it should convince McEvoy.

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di JC KING - 1998 - Citato da 30 - Articoli correlati
“paradox of analysis”. Though ... etc. are components of the property of being a bachelor.7 Of course, ..... (10)

For all x, x is a bachelor iff x is an unmarried man ...

In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori ... - Pagina 32 - Risultati da Google Libri
Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Philosophy

... i.e., the relation in which the concepts "bachelor" and " unmarried man" stand to each ... The issue lurking here is, of course, the so-called paradox of analysis.

Grice on the paradox of analysis: bachelor, unmarried man


Articoli accademici per "paradox of analysis" bachelor "unmarried man"

What is a Philosophical Analysis? - King - Citato da 30
The paradox of analysis - Fumerton - Citato da 14

Grice's Unmarried Man (Is: Bachelor) -- "creature with a heart", "creature with a kidney" (coextensional) -- example also by Quine.



"There is no assurance here that the extensional agreement of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' rests on meaning rather than merely on accidental matters of fact, as does extensional agreement of 'creature with a heart' and 'creature with a kidney.'"

Grice's Unmarried Man (Is: Bachelor)



(3) All and only bachelors are unmarried men

is analytic.

What we need is an account of cognitive synonymy not presupposing analyticity -- if we are to explain analyticity conversely with help of cognitive synonymy as undertaken in Section 1. And indeed such an independent account of cognitive synonymy is at present up for consideration, namely, interchangeability salva veritate everywhere except within words. The question before us, to resume the thread at last, is whether such interchangeability is a sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy. We can quickly assure ourselves that it is, by examples of the following sort. The statement:

(4) Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors

"Bachelor" and "Unmarried man": an extralogical synonym pair


Extralogical synonym-pairs, such as 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man'.

Grice's Unmarried Man (Is: Bachelor)


Passage by Quine discussed by Grice:


"There is also a second class of analytic statements."
"This class is typified by utterances such as:

"No bachelor is married".

The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms.
"No bachelor is married"
can be turned into
[a more primitive class of analytic statements, viz: "No unmarried man is married"] by putting 'unmarried man' for its alleged synonym 'bachelor.'
"We still lack a proper characterization of this second class of analytic statements, and therewith of analyticity generally, inasmuch as we have had in the above description to lean on a notion of 'synonymy' which is no less in need of clarification than analyticity itself."

Grice's Unmarried Man (Is: Bachelor)


But how do we find that 'bachelor' is defined as 'unmarried man'?

Grice's Unmarried Man (Is: Bachelor)


Quine: then 'bachelor' is not synonymous with 'unmarried man':  '“Bachelor” has seven letters' = true.  '“Unmarried man” has seven letters = false.

Grice's Unmarried Man (Is: Bachelor)


"No bachelor is married" can be turned into "No unmarried man is married" because "bachelor" is defined as "unmarried man".

Bachelor =df unmarried man -- Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, p. 200


Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Tuesday, March 12, 2013

J. L. Austin on "the metaphysics of the stone age": "Ordinary language has no claim to be the last word, if there is such a thing. It imbodies, indeed, something BETTER THAN the metaphysics of the Sone Age, namely, ... the inherited experience and acumen of MANY GENERATIONS of [cavemen and] men" since. "A Plea for Excuses".


"Certainly ordinary language has no claim to be the last word, if there is such a thing. It embodies, indeed, something better than the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely, as was said, the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men" J. L. Austin
("A Plea for Excuses," Philosophical Papers, third ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock [Oxford: OUP, 1979], 185). Thanks to Prof. William Day, Le Moyne College for the correction of this quote.

KEYWORD: Grice, stone-age physics -- the physics of the Stone Age.

Common sense IZ (if you have enough common sense to see this) the metaphysics of the stone age.


Common sense is the metaphysics of the Stone Age‟ [BERTRAND RUSSELL].

KEYWORD: metaphysical cavemen.

Grice: physical cavemen.

"its exponents as wantonly dedicating themselves to what Russell, in talking about common sense or some allied idea -- such as ordinary language -- once [or twice] called "stone-age metaphysics".



its exponents as wantonly dedicating themselves to what Russell, in talking about common sense or some allied idea, once called 'stone-age metaphysics'.

Grice's quip ("stone-age physic") -- Russell's earlier quip ("stone-age metaphysic"): "the metaphysics of the stone age to which common sense is due".


It all even occasioned on Russell's part a caustic quip about "the metaphysics of the stone age to which common sense is due.

Grice: "the PHYSICS OF THE STONE AGE to which common sense (and English, for that matter) is due."

Stone-Age Metaphysic -- Metaphysic of the Stone Age

Speranza  Ordinary language embodies the metaphysics of the Stone Age. Paraphrase of Bertrand Russell.
Cited by Grice.

Grice's correction: stone-age PHYSIC.

Saturday, March 9, 2013

"Because" and Its Implicatures -- epiphenomenon -- emergence


Descartes held that non-human animals could be reductively explained as automataDe homine, 1662.

Reductionism can mean either

(a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or

(b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents.

This can be said of things (or entitties), objects, phenomena, explanation, theories, and meanings.

Reductionism strongly reflects a certain perspective on causality.

In a reductionist framework, phenomena that can be explained completely in terms of relations between other more fundamental phenomena, are called epiphenomena.

Often there is an implication that the epiphenomenon exerts no causal agency on the fundamental phenomena that explain it.

Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be called emergent phenomena, but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed.

This reductionist understanding is very different from that usually implied by the term 'emergence', which typically intends that what emerges is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges.

Religious reductionism generally attempts to explain religion by boiling it down to certain nonreligious causes.

A few examples of reductionistic explanations for the presence of religion are:

-- that religion can be reduced to humanity's conceptions of right and wrong.
-- that religion is fundamentally a primitive attempt at controlling our environments.
-- that religion is a way to explain the existence of a physical world.
--  that religion confers an enhanced survivability for members of a group and so is reinforced by natural selection.

Anthropologists Edward Burnett Tylor and James George Frazer employed some religious reductionist arguments.

Sigmund Freud's idea that religion is nothing more than an illusion, or even a mental illness, and the Marxist view that religion is "the sigh of the oppressed," providing only "the illusory happiness of the people," are two other influential reductionist explanations of religion.

There is a certain degree of reductionism in the social sciences, which often try to explain whole areas of social activity as mere subfields of their own field.

As an example, Marxist economists often try to explain politics as subordinated to economy, and sociologists sometimes see economy and politics as mere sub-spheres of society.



Theoretical reduction is the process by which one theory absorbs another.

For example, both Kepler's laws of the motion of the planets and Galileo's theories of motion worked out for terrestrial objects are reducible to Newtonian theories of mechanics, because all the explanatory power of the former are contained within the latter.

Furthermore, the reduction is considered to be beneficial because Newtonian mechanics is a more general theory—that is, it explains more events than Galileo's or Kepler's.

Theoretical reduction, therefore, is the reduction of one explanation ("because"-statement) or theory to another—that is, it is the absorption of one of our ideas about a particular thing into another idea.


Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities.

Methodological reductionism would thus hold that the atomic explanation of a substance's boiling point is preferable to the chemical explanation, and that an explanation based on even smaller particles (quarks and leptons, perhaps) would be even better.

Methodological reductionism, therefore, is the position that all scientific theories either can or should be reduced to a single super-theory through the process of theoretical reduction.


Ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances.

This claim is usually metaphysical, and is most commonly a form of monism, in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance.

A dualist (like Popper) who is an ontological reductionist would believe that everything is reducible to two substances — as one possible example, a dualist might claim that reality is composed of "matter" and "spirit".

There are two species of ontological reductionism:

(a) one that denies that wholes are anything more than their parts

(b) the stronger thesis of atomist reductionism that wholes are not "really real".

Granted, the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but nonetheless it has been used in an attempt (often failed) to explicate the supposed difference between the two.


Reductionist thinking and methods form the basis for many of the well-developed areas of modern science, including much of physics, chemistry and cell biology.

Classical mechanics in particular is seen as a reductionist framework, and statistical mechanics can be viewed as a reconciliation of macroscopic thermodynamic laws with the reductionist approach of explaining macroscopic properties in terms of microscopic components.

In science, reductionism implies that certain fields of study are based on areas that study smaller spatial scales or organizational units.

While it is commonly accepted that the foundations of chemistry are based in physics, and molecular biology is rooted in chemistry, similar statements become controversial when one considers less rigorously defined intellectual pursuits.

For example, claims that sociology is based on psychology, or that economics is based on sociology and psychology would be met with reservations.

These claims are difficult to substantiate even though there are clear connections between these fields (for instance, most would agree that psychology can affect and inform economics).

The limit of reductionism's usefulness stems from emergent properties of complex systems, which are more common at certain levels of organization.

For example, certain aspects of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology are rejected by some who claim that complex systems are inherently irreducible and that a holistic approach is needed to understand them -- cfr. Popper's ANTI-REDUCTIONISM.

Some strong reductionists believe that the behavioural sciences should become "genuine" scientific disciplines based on genetic biology, and on the systematic study of culture (see Richard Dawkins's concept of memes).

In his book The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins introduced the term "hierarchical reductionism" to describe the view that complex systems can be described with a hierarchy of organizations, each of which is only described in terms of objects one level down in the hierarchy.

Dawkins provides the example of a computer, which under hierarchical reductionism is explained in terms of the operation of hard drives, processors, and memory, but not on the level of AND OR gates, or on the even lower level of electrons in a semiconductor medium.

Others argue that inappropriate use of reductionism limits our understanding of complex systems.

In particular, ecologist Robert Ulanowicz says that science must develop techniques to study ways in which larger scales of organization influence smaller ones, and also ways in which feedback loops create structure at a given level, independently of details at a lower level of organization.

Ulanowicz advocates (and uses, and worse, teaches) information theory as a framework to study propensities in natural systems.

Ulanowicz attributes these criticisms of reductionism to the philosopher of science Karl Popper and biologist Robert Rosen.


In mathematics, reductionism can be interpreted as the philosophy that all mathematics can (or ought to) be built on a common foundation, which is usually axiomatic set theory.

Ernst Zermelo was one of the major advocates of such a view.

Zermelo also developed much of axiomatic set theory.

It has been argued that the generally accepted method of justifying mathematical axioms by their usefulness in common practice can potentially undermine Zermelo's reductionist program.

As an alternative to set theory, Jouko Väänänen has argued for second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics instead of set theory,  whereas others have argued for category theory as a foundation for certain aspects of mathematics.

The incompleteness theorems of Kurt Gödel, published in 1931, raised doubts about the attainability of an axiomatic foundation for all of mathematics.

Any such foundation would have to include axioms powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers (a subset of all mathematics).

Yet Gödel proved that for any self-consistent recursive axiomatic system powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers, there are true propositions about the natural numbers that cannot be proved from the axioms.

Such propositions are known as formally undecidable propositions.


Ontological reductionism is the claim that everything that exists is made from a small number of basic substances that behave in regular ways (compare to monism).

Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological emergence, and claims that emergence is an epistemological phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist on a fundamental level.

Ontological reductionism takes two different forms: token ontological reductionism and type ontological reductionism.

Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item.

For perceivable items, it says that every perceivable item is a sum of items at a smaller level of complexity.

Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.

Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum type of item, and that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items at a lower level of complexity.

Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.

Michael Ruse has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against vitalism.[


Linguistic reductionism is the idea that everything can be described in a language with a limited number of core concepts, and combinations of those concepts.


A contrast to the reductionist approach is holism or emergentism.

Holism is the idea that things can have properties, (emergent properties), as a whole that are not explainable from the sum of their parts.

The principle of holism was concisely summarized by Aristotle in the Metaphysics:

"The whole is more than the sum of its parts".

The term greedy reductionism, coined by Daniel Dennett, is used to criticize inappropriate use of reductionism.

Other authors use different language when describing the same thing.


The concept of downward causation poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy.

This view is developed and explored by Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann, and Peder Voetmann Christiansen, among others.

These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science.

In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.

cfr. Grice on 'because' and 'reason' in "Aspects of reason".
Morton, "Because she thought so", Journal of Philosophy.
Woodfield on orton.

 The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as self-organization, natural selection, adaptation, and control.[17]


The idea that phenomena such as emergence and work within the field of complex systems theory pose limits to reductionism has been advocated by Stuart Kauffman.

Emergence is strongly related to nonlinearity.

The limits of the application of reductionism become especially evident at levels of organization with higher amounts of complexity, including culture, neural networks, ecosystems, and other systems formed from assemblies of large numbers of interacting components.

Nobel laureate P.W.Anderson used the idea that symmetry breaking is an example of an emergent phenomenon in his 1972 Science paper 'More is different' to make an argument about the limitations of reductionism.

One observation he made was that the sciences can be arranged roughly in a linear hierarchy — particle physics, many body physics, chemistry, molecular biology, cellular biology, physiology, psychology, social sciences — in that the elementary entities of one science obeys the laws of the science that precedes it in the hierarchy.

Yet this does not imply that one science is just an applied version of the science that precedes it.

He writes that "At each stage, entirely new laws, concepts and generalizations are necessary, requiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as in the previous one. Psychology is not applied biology nor is biology applied chemistry."

Disciplines such as cybernetics and systems theory embrace a non-reductionist view of science, sometimes going as far as explaining phenomena at a given level of hierarchy in terms of phenomena at a higher level, in a sense, the opposite of a reductionist approach.


Philosophers of the Enlightenment worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. Descartes separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "noumenal" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "phenomenal" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality.[22] The most influential formulation was by Immanuel Kant, who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians moved in a new direction, led by Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl. They took the Romantic approach of rooting religion in the inner world of the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.[23]


An ontological reduction reduces the number of ontological primitives that exist within an ontology.
This simplifies philosophy, because every ontological primitive demands a special explanation for its existence. If one maintains that life is not a physical property, for example, then one must give a separate explanation of why some objects possess it and why others do not; this sort of process can prove to be quite complex. Additionally, one would have to prove that a primitive is actually worthy of this status, and not better defined as a variant of something else which is more basic. For example, it would be hard to defend a planet as a primitive, and it would probably be better to treat it as any other massive nonliving body, which is an example of reductionism.

On the other hand, excessive reduction can lead to oversimplification.

For example, there is a clear distinction between animal life and plant life, as animals have powers that plants lack, such as sensation, active locomotion, and arguably emotion.

Reducing these both to the same thing could then confuse thought involving either animals or plants.

Reductionism can erase important distinctions, especially in more abstract fields of philosophy such as morality or theology.

Now, not all distinctions are important.

Treating white and black people (or Oxford-, such as Grice was, and Cambridge-, such as other philosophers were, educated people) as the same would usually be valid, outside of medicine, history, or cultural studies, for example.

This is because, outside of such fields, it is easy to argue that there is no intrinsic difference between the two, though obviously there are possible extrinsic differences, such as traditions and culture.

In cases such as this, where the difference between two things is not relevant to the topic at hand, they may be treated as the same kind of thing.


In recent years, the development of systems thinking has provided methods for tackling issues in a holistic rather than a reductionist way, and many scientists approach their work in a holistic paradigm.

When the terms are used in a scientific context, holism and reductionism refer primarily to what sorts of models or theories offer valid explanations of the natural world; the scientific method of falsifying hypotheses, checking empirical data against theory, is largely unchanged, but the approach guides which theories are considered. The conflict between reductionism and holism in science is not universal—it usually centers on whether or not a holistic or reductionist approach is appropriate in the context of studying a specific system or phenomenon.

In many cases (such as the kinetic theory of gases), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other cases, trying to do this leads to a fallacy of composition. In those systems, emergent properties of the system are almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. Complexity theory studies such systems.

Alfred North Whitehead set his metaphysical thinking in opposition to reductionism. He refers to this as the 'fallacy of the misplaced concreteness'. His scheme set out to frame a rational, general understanding of things, that was derived from our reality.

The reductionist strategy or any method of simplification in scientific disciplines risks overlooking or negating awareness that already exists. Chaos theory, the concept of entropy in study of chemistry, and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in particle physics, all indicate that knowledge and cognition of the world becomes more complex as the level of awareness of it increases.[

Scientists who use reductionist methods often take an approach that relies on contradicting previous contributions in their own context to science in order to validate a new theory, when sometimes there is no need to disprove existing theories in order to provide new insight. Proving a theory to be invalid and proving a new assumption to be true must both take place on their own merits. Scientific theories that are half-valid and half-invalid can be entirely brushed aside with reductionism, whereas with a holistic paradigm such as additivism, one can add the half-valid parts to updated assumptions. A reductionist would be less likely to view currently invalid theories as valid contributions in the context in which they were observed, utilized and presented, whereas a complexity theorist would be more likely to.

Sven Erik Jorgensen, an ecologist, lays out both theoretical and practical arguments for a holistic approach in certain areas of science, especially ecology. He argues that many systems are so complex that it will not ever be possible to describe all their details. Drawing an analogy to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in physics, he argues that many interesting and relevant ecological phenomena cannot be replicated in laboratory conditions, and thus cannot be measured or observed without influencing and changing the system in some way. He also points to the importance of interconnectedness in biological systems. His viewpoint is that science can only progress by outlining what questions are unanswerable and by using models that do not attempt to explain everything in terms of smaller hierarchical levels of organization, but instead model them on the scale of the system itself, taking into account some (but not all) factors from levels both higher and lower in the hierarchy.[25]

[edit] See also


  1. ^ See e.g. Reductionism in the Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science.
  2. ^ For reductionism referred to explanations, theories, and meanings, see Willard Van Orman Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Quine objected to the positivistic, reductionist "belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct[ion -- as Grice would prefer] upon terms which refer to immediate experience" as an intractable problem.
  3. ^
  4. ^ Strenski, Ivan. "Classic Twentieth-Century Theorist of the Study of Religion: Defending the Inner Sanctum of Religious Experience or Storming It." Pages 176-209 in Thinking About Religion: An Historical Introduction to Theories of Religion. Malden: Blackwell, 2006.
  5. ^ For the Marx citation, see Opium of the people
  6. ^ "[]" Interview with Third Way magazine in which Richard Dawkins discusses reductionism and religion, February 28, 1995
  7. ^ R.E. Ulanowicz, Ecology: The Ascendant Perspective, Columbia University Press (1997) (ISBN 0-231-10828-1)
  8. ^ AAAS 1998 (no title)[dead link]
  9. ^ [1] R. Gregory Taylor, "Zermelo, Reductionism, and the Philosophy of Mathematics". Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Fall 1993)
  10. ^ [2] J. Väänänen, "Second-Order Logic and Foundations of Mathematics".The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 7: 504–520 (2001).
  11. ^ [3] S. Awodey, "Structure in mathematics and logic: a categorical perspective". Philos. Math. Series III, Vol. 4, No.3 (1996)
  12. ^ F.W. Lawvere, "The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics". Proceedings of the Conference on Categorical Algebra (La Jolla, Calif., 1965), pp. 1-20. Springer-Verlag, New York (1966)
  13. ^ [4] Michael Silberstein, John McGeever, "The Search for Ontological Emergence", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 195 (April 1999), (ISSN: 0031-8094).
  14. ^ The Basics of Philosophy
  15. ^ [5] Michael Ruse, "Do Organisms Exist?", Amer. Zool., 29:1061-1066 (1989)
  16. ^ P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter, Aarhus University Press (ISBN 87-7288-814-8) (2001)
  17. ^ — A. Juarrero, Causality as Constraint
  18. ^ Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred by Stuart Kauffman
  19. ^ A. Scott, Reductionism Revisited, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, No. 2, 2004 pp. 51-68
  20. ^ Link Anderson, P.W. (1972). "More is Different". Science 177 (4047): 393–396. Bibcode 1972Sci...177..393A. doi:10.1126/science.177.4047.393. PMID 17796623.
  21. ^ Downward Causation
  22. ^ Paul Guyer, "18th Century German Aesthetics," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  23. ^ Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (2006) p 161
  24. ^ Dossey, Larry. Reinventing Medicine: Beyond Mind-Body to a New Era of Healing. (ISBN 0-06-251622-1) HarperSanFrancisco. (1999)
  25. ^ S. E. Jørgensen, Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern, 3rd ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, (ISBN 1-4020-0651-9) (2002) Chapters 1 & 2.

Further reading

  • Dawkins, Richard (1976), The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press; 2nd edition, December 1989.
  • Descartes (1637), Discourses, Part V.
  • Dupre, John (1993), The Disorder of Things. Harvard University Press.
  • Grice, H. P. Studies in the way of words.
  • Grice, H. P. The conception of value.
  • Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason.
  • Jones, Richard H. (2000), Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality. Bucknell University Press.
  • Laughlin, Robert (2005), A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down. Basic Books.
  • Nagel, Ernest (1961), The Structure of Science. New York.
  • Ruse, Michael (1988), Philosophy of Biology. Albany, NY.
  • Dennett, Daniel. (1995) Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Simon & Schuster.
  • Fritjof Capra (1982), The Turning Point.
  • Alexander Rosenberg (2006), Darwinian Reductionism or How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology. University of Chicago Press.
  • Steven Pinker (2002), The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Viking Penguin.
  • Stephen Weinberg (1992), Dreams of a Final Theory: The Scientist's Search for the Ultimate Laws of Nature, Pantheon Books.
  • Steven Weinberg (2002) describes what he terms the culture war among physicists in his review of A New Kind of Science.
  • Eric Scerri The reduction of chemistry to physics has become a central aspect of the philosophy of chemistry. See several articles by this author.
  • Lopez, F., Il pensiero olistico di Ippocrate. Riduzionismo, antiriduzionismo, scienza della complessità nel trattato sull'Antica Medicina, vol. IIA, Ed. Pubblisfera, Cosenza Italy 2008.

[edit] External links