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The club for all those whose members have no (other) club.

Is Grice the greatest philosopher that ever lived?

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Wednesday, November 8, 2017

Norm for Implicature

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Timothy Williamson and others have made a strong case for the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. 

Reasons to think that assertion has an epistemic norm also, interestingly, provide a reason to think that conversational implicature has a norm as well. 

This norm, it is argued, cannot be knowledge. 

In addition to highlighting an under-explored topic at the intersection of epistemology and linguistics, the discussion of conversational implicature puts dialectical pressure on the knowledge norm of assertion account. 

The fact that knowledge is not the norm of conversational implicature forces one either to claim that there is one epistemic norm for the conveying of information and that it is not knowledge, or else to embrace a heterogeneous picture of communicative norms generally that undercuts some of the grounds for thinking that the norm of assertion should be presumed to be a simple norm as Williamson argues.

Grice: principles and desiderata for implicature

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Grice: norm for implicature

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Grice on norms for implicature

Speranza

Timothy Williamson and others have made a strong case for the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Reasons to think that assertion has an epistemic norm also, interestingly, provide a reason to think that conversational implicature has a norm as well. This norm, it is argued, cannot be knowledge. In addition to highlighting an under-explored topic at the intersection of epistemology and linguistics, the discussion of conversational implicature puts dialectical pressure on the knowledge norm of assertion account. The fact that knowledge is not the norm of conversational implicature forces one either to claim that there is one epistemic norm for the conveying of information and that it is not knowledge, or else to embrace a heterogeneous picture of communicative norms generally that undercuts some of the grounds for thinking that the norm of assertion should be presumed to be a simple norm as Williamson argues.

Conative and Doxastic Norms for Implicature

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Norm for Implicature

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A psychological-attitude norm for implicature

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An epistemic norm for implicature?

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Wednesday, November 1, 2017

Grice's Friend, Kantotle

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Judith Baker, as cited by Grice, provides a conceptual analysis of ‘friend’ from an Aristotelian (or Kantotelian) point of view. 

Is 'friend' a value-oriented concept? It obviously seems so!

Although Grice gives “He is a fine friend,” as said of a scoundrel, as his first example of ‘irony,’ it might be argued that ‘fine’ is not ‘good’. 

“Good” is more basic. 

Thus, to use another example, ‘sentence,’ is a value-oriented concept, so that ‘good sentence’ is well-formed sentence, making ‘good’ otiose.

But why did Aristotle think that one’s friend is one’s alter ego? 

Grice mentions Baker’s analysis, “Another Self: Aristotle on Friendship,” in Grice’s WoW – Way of Words.

As Grice notes, rather than ‘another self’ we should have ‘another me’, or ‘another I,’ strictly.

“At his point,” Grice notes, “I turn to [this] essay by Judith Baker, entitled, "Another Self": Aristotle on friendship. On the present occasion, my concern is focused on METHODOLOGICAL,” rather than substantive “questions; so I propose first to consider the ideas about METHODOLOGY, in particular Aristotle's methodology,” with a view to an analysis as to “whether these ideas by Aristotle suggest any additions to the subject matter of philosophical eschatology.” “Baker
suggests that Aristotle's philosophical method treats the existence of a common consensus of opinions with respect to a proposition as conferring at least provisional validity (validity ceteris paribus) upon the proposition in question. In general, no external justification of the acceptance of the objects of universal agreement is called for. This idea has not always been accepted by philosophers." "If my perception of Moore is correct, he would in Aristotle's view have been looking for an EXTERNAL justification for the acceptance of the deliverances of common sense where none is required. Though no EXTERNAL justification is
required for accepting the validity of propositions which are generally or
universally believed, the validity in question is only provisional. For a common consensus may be undermined in either of two ways. First, there may be a common consensus that proposition “p” is true, but there may be two mutually inconsistent propositions, (q1 and q2), where while there is a common consensus that q1 or q2, there is no common consensus concerning the truth of q1 or the truth of q2; there are, so to speak, two schools of thought, one favouring q1 and one favouring q2. Furthermore (we may suppose) the combination of q1 with p will yield r1, whereas the combination of q2 with p will yield r2; and r1 and r2 are mutually inconsistent. In such a situation, it becomes a question whether the acceptability of p is LEFT INTACT. If it is, a method will have to be devided for deciding between q1 and q2. Second, to cope with problems created by the appearance on the scene of conflicts or other stumbling blocks the theorist may be expected to systematise
the data which are vouched for by common consensus by himself devising general
propositions which are embedded in his theory. Such generalities will NOT be directly attested by the consensus, but their ACCEPTABILITY will depend on the ADEQUACY of the theory in which they appear to yield propositions which are directly matters of general agreement. When an impasse ("aporia") arises, the aim of the theorist will be to ELIMINATE the impasse with minimal disturbance to the material regarded as acceptable BEFORE the impasse, including the theoretical generalities of the theorist."

It is here that Grice makes use of Aristotle:

amicus = alter ego.

Or in Grice’s translation:

friend = another I.

Since Aristotle’s equivalence (“friend = another I”) HAS BEEN MET with criticism (Baker mentions David Sachs), Grice concludes that the reflections in which I have just been engaged, suggest to me TWO FURTHER items which might be added to a prospective subject matter of philosophical eschatology. One would be a classification of the various kinds of impasse or “aporia” by theorists who engaged in the Aristotelian undertaking of attempting to systematise mterial with which they are presented as LAY inquirers, together with a classification of the variety of responses which might be effective against such impasses. The other would be a thorough-going analysis of the boundary between legitimate and ILLEGITIMATE imputations to a theorist of the sin of 'having changed the subject.’ Beyond these additions I have at the moment only one further suggestion. Sometimes, the activities of the eschatologist might involve the suggestion of certain PRINCIPLES and some of the material embodied in those principles might contain the potentialty of independent life, a potentiality which it would be theoretically advantageous to explore. This further exploration might be regarded as being itself A PROPER OCCUPATION for the eschatologist. One example might be a further examination of the theoretical notion of an “alter ego.””

In fact, it is Cicero who translates Aristotle here (“állos egṓ,” “héteros egṓ,
 “heteros autos,” Nich. Eth. 9. 9.10
), as “alter ego” (Ad Atticum 3.15.4, Ad familiaris, 7.5.1). Grice’s “another I.” Cicero prefers to translate Aristotle’s “heteros autos” as “alter idem,” in the nominative (“De Amicitia.”). For the record, Zeno uses “allos ego” (as cited by Diogenes Laertius).

Aristotle does not strictly argue that one ought to have only ONE friend, but, as Richard Kraut notes, he does not argue, either, that “one is always too few.” Kraut continues to note that Aristotle notes that “the friendships commemorated in verse are those that exist between just two people” (Eth. Nich. 1171a15).

Aristotle: “[T]he famous examples [of friendships] of poetry [such as Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Pirithous] are pairs of friends.”

The passage is slightly tricky: “Friendships between comrades only include a few people, and the famous examples of poetry are pairs of friends.”


Therefore, it is not quite or exactly clear whether pairs like Achilles/Patroclus, Orestes/Pylades and Theseus/Pirithous] are quoted as examples of comradeship or friendship in general.

And stuff!