The Grice Club

Welcome

The Grice Club

The club for all those whose members have no (other) club.

Is Grice the greatest philosopher that ever lived?

Search This Blog

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Oxford change, Cambridge change

Speranza

P. T. Geach writes:

"As I have said, the question of ‘real’ relations is a question of how a true relational property latches on to reality."
 
Geach goes on:
 
"I must begin by refuting a false view as to the logical syntax of relational propositions: the view that such propositions do not admit of subject-predicate analysis."
 
"This is a narrowly logical point to make; but the acceptance of such a view would prevent us from accepting or even understanding the Thomistic doctrine of ‘real’ relations."
 
"If a relational proposition indeed made no predications about A or B, but only affirmed a relation ‘between’ them, then it would be quite unintelligible how, if true, the proposition could correspond to a reality in A rather than to a reality in B; and as the two converse relations, alike holding ‘between’ A and B, one could not very well be more ‘real’ than the other. So we need to see why the ‘between’ account of relations is wrong."
 
Geach later notes:
 
"I have thus tied up ‘real’ relations with real changes."

"I have written about the problem of ‘real’ changes elsewhere (cf. The index to my recent collection God and the Soul)."

Geach goes on:

"I have urged that we need to distinguish ‘real’ [or "Oxford" as Grice might prefer] changes, processes that actually go on in a given individual, from among ‘Cambridge’ changes."


-----

Why "Cambridge"?

"The great Cambridge philosophical works published in the early years of this century, like Russell's Principles of Mathematics and McTaggart’s Nature of Existence, explained "change" as simply a matter of contradictory attributes holding good of individuals at different times."

"Clearly ANY change [even an "Oxford change"] logically implies a ‘Cambridge’ change."

"But the converse is clearly not true."

"There is a *sense* of ‘change,’ hard to explicate, in which it is false to say that

EXAMPLE 1:

Socrates changes by coming to be shorter than Theatetus when the boy grows up, or

EXAMPLE 2:

that the butter changes by rising in price, or that

EXAMPLE 3:

Herbert changes by becoming an ‘object of envy to Edith’."

--- BUT SURELY THIS CAN BE DISIMPLICATED. And what Peter Thomas Geach means by 'sense' is not what Herbert Paul Grice means by IMPLICATURE. "It is FALSE to say" versus "It is ODD to say" ('misleadingly odd, but true").

"In these cases, a ‘Cambridge’ change of an object (Socrates, the butter, Herbert) makes no ‘real’ change in that object."

Monday, January 20, 2014

Oxonian Philosophers of Logic: Herbert Paul Grice and Peter Thomas Geach

Speranza

Peter Thomas Geach was a philosopher who argued that, far from being 'above logic’, the existence of God was in fact perfectly logical.

Grice preferred 'genitorial'. His view is best described as seeing his project as that of the 'creator' or 'genitor' -- what philosophers call the 'ideal-observer' approach.

Peter Geach is a formidable logician.

He happened to be married to one of the 20th century’s leading English-language philosophers, Irish-born G. E. M. Anscombe.

In a way, this meant Geach was overshadowed.

In another, it doesn't.

Geach did have a strong philosophical life of his own -- and I know people who have ONLY read Geach, but never Anscombe! --.

Further, without the thousands (literally) of hours of discussion that G. E. M. Anscombe had with him, *her* philosophy would not have attained the eminence it did.

Grice quotes Anscombe -- twice. In his unpublications he lists Anscombe as one (along with Murdoch) who NEVER attained a meeting with J. L. Austin on a Saturday morning. Not the Play Group type.

Geach always had sharp teeth in an argument and, the harder the opposition, the harder he bit.

In this he resembled Grice.

Geach's father was a Welsh-born philosopher, who never, since he was a gentleman, took up a paid position, but was properly educated at Cambridge -- Trinity to be more specific --.

It was under Geach senior's influence, that Geach junior got to admire, in his youth, the philosophy of J. M. E. McTaggart, the Edwardian Hegelian who espoused the positions that Geach came to reject:

-- atheism
-- re-incarnation
-- determinism, and
-- the unreality of time.

Still, Geach admired the irresistible force of reasoning that he found in the prose of McTaggart.

Geach writes:

“Under God, I owe my
very self to McTaggart for it
was knowledge of his philosophy
that kept alight in me a longing
for the infinite and eternal that
was not to be quenched by the
noisy winds of the world.”

Even after decades, Geach still thinks it important to publish an introduction to McTaggart’s philosophy: "Truth, Love, and Immortality".

Geach found his own feet while arguing against his master.

Thus, in response to McTaggart’s argument that it was impossible to believe in a solitary God, Geach showed how McTaggart’s demands for a deity were fulfilled only by the Holy Trinity of orthodox Christianity: three in one.

Not surprisingly, Geach's favourite hymn was "Holy, Holy, Holy", which got parodied during the War as "Raining, Raining, Raining".

In the philosophy of religion, Geach contributed to a better understanding of "existence", or the act of "being".

Geach makes an important distinction between

i. There is a God” and

ii. God is, or lives.

In the latter sense, Geach (but not Grice) claims that God is identical with his being.

Geach’s thinking on this question is touched on in "God and the Soul" and "Providence and Evil".

In ethics, G. E. M. Anscombe makes a celebrated rejection of a kind of utilitarianism that she named Consequentialism ("It's the consequences that matter", echoing Kant).

Since many modern ethicists reject a divine system of laws,  Miss Anscombe proposes a system of morals based on the Greek and Roman idea of virtue (or 'arete').

Some of Geach’s own ideas on virtue ethics were given in The Virtues, based on his Stanton Lectures.

There were some surprises.

“We ought, I think, to judge
about Cannabis indica
much as we judge about
 alcohol,” Geach said in one lecture.

“Cannabis indica
 appears to be less mentally
disturbing than alcohol, less
productive of damaging accidents
like car crashes, and very
much less addictive.”

In his paper “Good and Evil”, published in the journal "Analysis", Geach had shows how the meaning of the word “good” depended on the substantive or noun that it qualifies.

A  good apple is very different from a good knife.

And the best apple is not the best knife.

It was an influential insight, taken up by Philippa Foot among others, whom Grice quotes in CONCEPTION OF VALUE.

Geach notes that we can understand the meaning of 'good' in expressions like

"This is a good phylochronoteleobarometre."

even if we have no idea what a phylochronoteleobarometre is. A good phylochronoteleobarometre is a phylochronoteleobarometre that fulfils its goal.

Similarly, Grice would go on to argue, with 'humans'. A good human is a good person. A good person is a rational person, and more.

Unlike the dense, un-sign-posted prose of Miss Anscombe, Geach’s style was a pleasure to read.

And it was a pleasure to read because one feels, alla Grice, that it was a pleasure to WRITE!

In their joint volume Three Philosophers, G. E. M. Anscombe contributes a penetrating analysis of Aristotle that was a hard slog for readers, and Geach two sections: one on Aquinas that was both clear and full of new insights, and one on Frege in which the chief obstacle for the general reader was the mathematical language of the philosopher’s logic.

It was largely through Geach, whose lectures on Frege were encouraged by Wittgenstein, that the importance of Frege’s philosophy was realised in England -- for better or worse!

Grice disliked the idea of a Fregean sense. And on one occasion, when one of his graduate students at Berkeley told him that he meant to write his PhD dissertation on Frege, Grice was unamused.

"I'll base the thesis on Dummett's _Frege_, if you've read it."

"I haven't read it," answered Grice, "and I hope I won't".

----

Geach’s style was described by the philosopher Jenny Teichman as deliberately outrageous.

In opposition, I would describe Grice's style as outrageously deliberate.

Having sharpened his wits on philosophers as formidable as Hume or Russell, Geach seems fiercer than an Old Testament prophet and did not fear to give hard knocks to living philosophers.

There was something Old Testamentarian about Grice too, who would often refer to the ten commandments, and would love to lecture on issues "from Genesis to Revelations".

Yet some of Geach’s phrases became the common coin of philosophers, such as a “Cambridge change”, and "pleonetetic" (a lovely word for the logic of 'most' and 'many', not just 'all' -- also for 'few' and 'some').

This, a "Cambridge change", is the notion suggested by Bertrand Russell’s thought:

that Socrates changes if something can be predicated of him that could not be predicated before.

This relates to Grice's view on relative identity, which he came to develop via Wiggins, who was influenced by Geach ("Logic matters").

Thus if Socrates’s son grows bigger than him, it becomes true to say Socrates is shorter than his son, and so Socrates would have changed.

But this is not a real change, only a “Cambridge change” --. On the other hand, the changes that matter are specimens of what Grice calls an "Oxford change".

Geach’s interest in the thought of both Wittgenstein and Tomasso d'Aquino, the Italian philosopher,  made him an honorary founder of the philosophical school A. J. P. Kenny called  “analytical Thomism”.

But while Geach was a philosopher and Catholic, his philosophy went wherever the force of logic demanded, rather than being tailored to a religious conclusion.

“To me, it appears blasphemous to say God is 'above’ logic,” he wrote. ("To my wife it doesn't", he seems to be implicating).

“Logic is NOT partisan, and knows nothing but to strike straight."

"But the sword is invincible, bearing the Maker’s name.”

Peter Thomas Geach was born in Lower Chelsea, London on March 29 1916, the son of George Hender Geach, a Cambridge-educated Welsh-born philosopher, and Eleonora Sgonina, the daughter of Polish emigrants.

Herbert Paul Grice was born in Staffordshire in 1913, the son of Herbert Grice, a musician ("and dreadful businessman") and Mabel Felton, an aristocrat.

Grice went to live with his Polish grandparents in Cardiff, his mother having separated from his father when he was four.

Mrs. Geach went up in Oxford, writing against Mr. Geach!

-----

Peter Thomas Geach  was sent to Llandaff Cathedral, or rather, to the School therein, and then to Clifton (like Herbert Paul Grice).

Both Grice and Geach were awarded scholarships to attend Oxford: Grice ended up in Oxford's best college then: Corpus Christi.

Geach ended up in Balliol College, Oxford.

Grice gained a first in Greats. He became a Merton research student and later Fellow of St. John's (the best of Oxford's colleges).

Geach gained a first in Greats in 1938.

Geach was to spend the years 1945 to 1951 in philosophical research in Cambridge (under Witters and von Wright), and the next 15 years at Birmingham (Grice's country -- West Midlands -- Staffordshire border, Harborne), before being appointed Professor of Logic at Leeds.

Geach gave the Stanton Lectures in the philosophy of religion at Cambridge. Grice didn't. Instead, Grice gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford.

The year 1938 had seen Geach received into the Catholic Church. Grice remained an Anglican all his life ("I can be said to be committed to the 39 Articles even if I don't know what they mean").

1938 was, oddly, also the year Geach (but not Grice) met G. E. M. Anscombe, who had independently become a Catholic.

Once Anscombe had taken her finals, she married to Geach, on Boxing Day 1941, and decided that she should keep her beautiful maiden name (Geach kept his name, too).

With Anscombe, Geach had seven children, four of them girls. One of the girls is a philosopher, and a very good one, too.

Most of the apocryphal stories in academe about the children had some basis in reality.

For example, how they would at a tender age cook alarming meals for their parents and guests.

Or, how they would appear clothed strangely, or not at all, in the middle of some seminar.

Or how one child, on being told that if her teddy was not in the drawing room it MUT be in her bedroom, retorted:

“But that doesn’t follow.”

The reasoning behind this motivated Grice.

Your teddy is either in the drawing-room OR in your bedroom.
It's not in the drawing-room.
----- Therefore, it is in your bedroom.

If your teddy is not in the drawing-room it MUST be in your bedroom.

Versus:

If your teddy is not in the drawing-room IT MAY BE in your bedroom.

That _seems_ to follow. Or not.

The “Geachcombes”, though each sometimes holding a post elsewhere, shuttled between Oxford and Cambridge, where Geach got to know Witters. So, in the words of Philomena Lee, the Geachcombes count as Oxbridges.

Witters lodged with them in Oxford towards the end of his life.

Together, Geach and Anscombe translated Descartes’s "Philosophical Writings," directly from the French (or Latin).

In the fifties, while G. E. M. Anscombe was doing the work that became her dense, short and influential book on "Intention", Geach also turned his attention to the philosophy of mind in "Mental Acts", where his focus, as always, was mediaeval: he loved Occam. Or Ockham, as he preferred to spell him.

Peter Geach listed his recreations as reading stories of detection, mystery and horror; collecting and annotating old bad logic texts.

G. E. M. Anscombe died in 2001; Peter Geach is survived by his children.

Peter Geach, born March 29 1916, died December 21 2013.

The Grice Point, The Geach Point -- HERBERT PAUL GRICE and PETER THOMAS GEACH

Speranza

Peter Geach was a philosopher who argued that far from being 'above logic’, the existence of God was in fact perfectly logical.


Peter Geach is a formidable logician and happened to be married to one of the 20th century’s leading English-language philosophers, Irish-born G. E. M. Anscombe.

In a way this meant Geach was overshadowed.

Geach did, though, have a strong philosophical life of his own, and without the thousands of hours of discussion that G. E. M. Anscombe had with him, *her* philosophy would not have attained the eminence it did.

Geach always had sharp teeth in an argument and, the harder the opposition, the harder he bit.

His father was a Welsh-born philosopher who never took up a paid position, but was properly educated at Cambridge, and, under his influence, Geach junior admired in his youth JME McTaggart, the Edwardian Hegelian who espoused most positions that Geach came to reject: atheism, reincarnation, determinism, the unreality of time.

Geach admired the irresistible force of reasoning that he found in McTaggart.

“Under God, I owe my very self to McTaggart for it was knowledge of his philosophy that kept alight in me a longing for the infinite and eternal that was not to be quenched by the noisy winds of the world.”

Even after decades, Geach still thinks it important to publish an introduction to McTaggart’s philosophy, Truth, Love, and Immortality.

Geach found his own feet while arguing against his master.

Thus, in response to McTaggart’s argument that it was impossible to believe in a solitary God, Geach showed how McTaggart’s demands for a deity were fulfilled only by the Holy Trinity of orthodox Christianity.

In the philosophy of religion, Geach contributed to a better understanding of existence, or the act of being.

An important distinction he made was between the ideas “there is a God” and “God is, or lives”.

In the latter sense God is identical with his being.

Geach’s thinking on this question is touched on in God and the Soul (1969) and Providence and Evil (1977).

In ethics, G. E. M. Anscombe made a celebrated rejection of a kind of utilitarianism that she named consequentialism.

Since many modern ethicists rejected a divine system of laws, she proposed a system of morals based on virtues.

Some of Geach’s own ideas on virtue ethics were given in The Virtues, based on his Stanton Lectures.

There were some surprises.

“We ought, I think, to judge about Cannabis indica much as we judge about alcohol,” he said in one lecture.

“Cannabis indica appears to be less mentally disturbing than alcohol, less productive of damaging accidents like car crashes, and very much less addictive.”

In his paper “Good and Evil”, published in the journal Analysis in 1956, Geach had shown how the meaning of the word “good” depended on the substantive that it qualified.

A  good apple is very different from a good knife.

It was an influential insight, taken up by Philippa Foot among others, that Grice quotes in CONCEPTION OF VALUE.

Unlike the dense, unsignposted prose of Anscombe, Geach’s style was a pleasure to read.

In their joint volume Three Philosophers (1961), G. E. M. Anscombe contributed a penetrating analysis of Aristotle that was a hard slog for readers, and Geach two sections: one on Aquinas that was both clear and full of new insights, and one on Frege in which the chief obstacle for the general reader was the mathematical language of the philosopher’s logic.

It was largely through Geach, whose lectures on Frege were encouraged by Wittgenstein in 1950, that the importance of Frege’s philosophy was realised in England

Geach’s style was described by the philosopher Jenny Teichman as deliberately outrageous.

Having sharpened his wits on philosophers as formidable as Hume or Russell, he could seem fiercer than an Old Testament prophet and did not fear to give hard knocks to living philosophers.

Yet some of Geach’s phrases became the common coin of philosophers, such as a “Cambridge change”.

This is the notion suggested by Bertrand Russell’s thought: that Socrates changes if something can be predicated of him that could not be predicated before.

Thus if Socrates’s son grows bigger than him, it becomes true to say Socrates is shorter than his son, and so Socrates would have changed.

But this is not a real change, only a “Cambridge change”.

Geach’s interest in the thought of both Wittgenstein and Aquinas made him an honorary founder of the philosophical school that called itself “analytical Thomism”.

But while Geach was a philosopher and Catholic, his philosophy went wherever the force of logic demanded, rather than being tailored to a religious conclusion.

“To me it appears blasphemous to say God is 'above’ logic,” he wrote.

“Logic is not partisan, and knows nothing but to strike straight; but the sword is invincible, bearing the Maker’s name.”

Peter Thomas Geach was born in Lower Chelsea, London on March 29 1916, the son of George Hender Geach, a Cambridge-educated Welsh-born philosopher, and Eleonora Sgonina, the daughter of Polish emigrants.

He went to live with his Polish grandparents in Cardiff, his mother having separated from his father when he was four.

He was sent to Llandaff Cathedral School, and then Clifton College (like Herbert Paul Grice), before going up to Balliol College, Oxford, gaining a first in Greats in 1938.

He was to spend the years 1945 to 1951 in philosophical research in Cambridge, and the next 15 years at Birmingham University, before being appointed Professor of Logic at Leeds in 1966, retiring in 1981.

From 1971 to 1974 he gave the Stanton Lectures in the philosophy of religion at Cambridge.

The year 1938 had seen him received into the Catholic Church.

It was also the year he met G. E. M. Anscombe, who had independently become a Catholic.

Once she had taken her finals, they married, on Boxing Day 1941, and decided that she should keep her maiden name.

With her, Geach had seven children, four of them girls. One of the girls is a philosopher.

Most of the apocryphal stories in academe about the children had some basis in reality: how they would at a tender age cook alarming meals for their parents and guests.

How they would appear clothed strangely, or not at all, in the middle of some seminar; how one child, on being told that if her teddy was not in the drawing room it must be in her bedroom, retorted:

“But that doesn’t follow.”

The “Geachcombes”, though each sometimes holding a post elsewhere, shuttled between Oxford and Cambridge, where Geach got to know Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein lodged with them (in Oxford) towards the end of his life.

Together, Geach and Anscombe translated Descartes’s Philosophical Writings (1954).

In the Fifties, while G. E. M. Anscombe was doing the work that became her dense, short and influential book Intention (1957), Geach also turned his attention to the philosophy of mind in Mental Acts (1957).

Peter Geach listed his recreations as reading stories of detection, mystery and horror; collecting and annotating old bad logic texts.

G. E. M. Anscombe died in 2001; Peter Geach is survived by his children.

Peter Geach, born March 29 1916, died December 21 2013.

Saturday, January 11, 2014

Because Causes

Speranza

From World Wide Words:

"Words of 2013."

"The American Dialect Society continued its tradition of voting for its 
Word of the Year at its annual conference, held this year in Minneapolis."

"The winner was a curious choice:

"because X," where

"X" is a noun or noun phrase *without* the intermediate of that would be 
expected in _standard_ English."

Examples:

“because homework”, “because internet”.

Speranza's examples:

"Because Implicature"
"Because Grice".

"In such phrases, most often encountered online, "because" has changed" -- 
as Grice would say -- "from a conjunction to a preposition"

thus complicating what Grice calls its logical form.

"It may suggest [or implicate -- Speranza] the logic behind the reasoning 
is too poor to survive exposure or the reason is so obvious the speaker [or 
utterer, as Grice prefers -- Speranza] doesn’t need to elaborate."

""The version found most often is

"because reasons,"

a hand-waving way of saying that the speaker [or utterer -- Speranza]  doesn
’t want or need to explain."

It may be that the Griceian conversational maxim is alleged to be 'under 
control': "do not say what you lack adequate reasons for".

""Because X "had also been chosen as "Most Useful Word of the Year" [where 
the implicature is not Witters's -- 'meaning is use', meaning should be
useful  -- Speranza], beating "struggle bus", a difficult situation, as in

"I’m riding the struggle bus"."

But cf. Speranza's

"Because Struggle Bus".

"It is likely that journalists will have a struggle bus telling their 
readers why because X won (try “because language”, guys)."

Cheers

Speranza

World Wide Words is copyright © Michael Quinion 2014.
http://www.worldwidewords.org.

There is an appendix to the item in today's World Wide Words.

World Wide Words is copyright © Michael Quinion 2014.
http://www.worldwidewords.org.

Quinion writes:

"The choice of "because X" as the Word of the Year by the American Dialect 
Society has led to much confused comment."

"As an example of the grammatical difficulties accompanying this word, as 
much in its conventional usages as the new one, see Professor Geoffrey Pullum
’s  mind-stretching discussion on Language Log."

"Pullum says that dictionaries wrongly call "because" a conjunction  “
because they are all lazy followers of a stupid tradition that has needed 
rethinking for 200 years.”"

"Pullum argues that the word is a preposition."

"You may find it hard work following him, but the destination is worth the 
journey."

"If you would like a different view, pop over to Gretchen McCulloch’s blog 
All Things Linguistic, in which she argues the opposite view, that because
in  the new construction isn’t a preposition."

----

Grice discusses

p because of p.

Or

p; therefore, p.

In general, it is related to reasons:

"The reason why the bridge collapsed was that it was made of cellophane." 
(His example in Aspects of Reason).

"Because" is of course a Latinism.

The proper Anglo-Saxon (almost expletive?) is 'for':

"I did it for I did it".

"I went to bed for I was tired."

And so on.

I don't think Strawson discusses "because" in "Introduction to Logical 
Theory". He SHOULD. In that case, Grice would have criticised him. There are 
various possibilities for the formalisation of 'because' in logical theory,
or  for the 'logical form' (to use an idiom favourite with Witters) of
"because"  utterances.

And as a corollary, this may lead to the logical form of this alleged new 
usage (not to Geary) of 'because' that Quinion is referring to.

Or not.

Quinion:

""The version found most often is

"because reasons" [...]."

I propose it should be:

"because causes"?

Quinion:

""The version found most often is

"because reasons,"

a hand-waving way of saying that the speaker [or utterer -- Speranza]  
doesn’t want or need to explain."

"Because causes" sounds more to the (or at least my) point.

Cf.

What I did for love.

What I did because love.

Cheers,

Speranza

Wednesday, January 8, 2014

Folksy Grice

Speranza

The concept of "folk psychology" (or as I prefer, 'folklore', to generalise) has played a significant role in philosophy of mind (or as Grice prefers, 'philosophical psychology') and cognitive science over the last half century.
 
However, even a cursory examination of the literature reveals that there are at least three distinct usages in which the term “folk psychology” is used.
 
(1)
 
Sometimes “folk psychology” is used to refer to a particular set of cognitive capacities which include—but are not exhausted by—the capacities to predict and explain behaviour.
 
Or: (2)
 
The term “folk psychology” is also used to refer to a theory of behaviour represented in the brain.
 
According to many philosophers and cognitive scientists, the set of cognitive capacities identified above are underpinned by folk psychology in this second sense.
 
Or (3):
 
The final usage of “folk psychology” is closely associated with the work of David Lewis (who wrote his PhD in Harvard drawing extensively from the work of H. P. Grice).
 
On Lewis's view, folk psychology is a psychological theory constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse.

To reduce terminological ambiguity, throughout this entry the term “mindreading” will be used to refer to that set of cognitive capacities which include (but is not exhausted by) the capacities to predict and explain behavior.
 
 “Folk psychology” will be used only in the second and third senses identified above.
 
When separate names are required to avoid confusion, the second sense of “folk psychology” will be called the mindreading approach to folk psychology and the third sense the platitude approach to folk psychology.
 
This terminology is due to Stich & Nichols 2003.
 
In an earlier publication, Stephen Stich and I called the mind-reading sense of folk psychology the internal sense, and the platitude sense the external sense (Stich & Ravenscroft 1994).
 
However, the current labels are more informative.

It's not clear who introduced the term “folk psychology” into the philosophy of mind. Grice was using 'folksy' by 1975.
 
It gained wide usage during the 1980s and is rarely used outside philosophy -- or "outside Grice", as I prefer.
 
The phrase “commonsense psychology” is sometimes used by philosophers synonymously with “folk psychology”, although the former term seems to be dying out.
 
Psychologists rarely use “folk psychology”, preferring the phrase “theory of mind” (or sometimes “na├»ve psychology”).
 
Just as there is ambiguity in the use of “folk psychology”, “theory of mind” is used to refer both to mindreading and to the theory hypothesized to underpin mindreading.

There's an important set of human cognitive capacities first noticed by social psychologists and philosophers in the middle of last century (see for example Heider 1958 and Sellars 1956.) The members of this set of cognitive capacities are almost always assumed to be closely related, perhaps in virtue of their being produced by a single underlying cognitive mechanism. To a first approximation the set consists of—

The capacity to predict human behavior in a wide range of circumstances.
The capacity to attribute mental states to humans.

The capacity to explain the behavior of humans in terms of their possessing mental states.
(See for example Stich & Nichols 1992.) The second and third capacities are clearly related: explaining the behavior of humans in terms of their mental states involves attributing mental states to them. But we should not assume without further investigation that all mental state attributions take the form of explanations of behavior.

The characterization of mindreading given above is too restrictive. In addition to attributing mental states and predicting and explaining behavior, there is a wide range of closely related activities. To begin with, we not only seek to predict and explain people's behavior, we also seek to predict and explain their mental states. In addition, we speculate about, discuss, recall and evaluate both people's mental states and their behavior. We also speculate about, discuss, recall and evaluate people's dispositions to behave in certain ways and to have certain mental states; that is, we consider their character traits. It may be that these additional activities are grounded in the three capacities mentioned above, but we cannot simply assume that they are. Throughout this entry the term “mindreading” is used in a wide sense to include all of these activities.

As characterized above, mindreading is a human capacity directed at humans. But in two ways this is overly exclusive. First, we attribute mental states to non-human animals and to non-animal systems such as machines and the weather. It's not uncommon to hear people say that their dog wants a bone, or that the chess program is thinking about its next move. We do not have to accept every such attribution at face value; plausibly, some of this talk is metaphorical. Nevertheless, there seem to exist plenty of examples of non-metaphorical attributions of mental states to non-humans. (Notice that insisting that mental state attributions to animals are not metaphorical is compatible with such attributions being systematically false.) Consequently, we must be careful not to characterize mindreading in a way which makes it definitional that only humans can be the objects of mindreading. The second way in which the characterization of mindreading offered above is overly focused on humans is that it remains an open question whether some non-human primates can predict the behavior of their conspecifics. (See for example Call & Tomasello 2008.) Consequently, we should avoid characterizing the mindreading capacities in a way that makes it analytic that non-human animals lack those capacities.

One way to avoid the risk of over-emphasizing human capacities when characterizing mindreading is to begin with the human capacities and then let the empirical chips fall where they may. For example, it may turn out that some non-human primates can predict the behavior of their conspecifics, and that there are significant similarities (including neurological similarities) between the human capacity to predict the behavior of others and that of the non-human primate. In that case we should widen the characterization of mindreading given above so that it is not exclusively focused on human capacities. Similarly, it may turn out that precisely the same cognitive mechanisms are engaged when humans attribute mental states to their conspecifics and when they attribute mental states to animals and machines. In that case we should widen the characterization of mindreading to allow that animals and machines can be the objects of mindreading. Defining the precise extension of “mindreading” by stipulation from the armchair is not likely to be fruitful.

A final comment on mindreading is in order. The characterization of mindreading given here is compatible with the existence of first person mindreading. But it may turn out that we deploy quite distinct mechanisms when we predict or explain our own behavior, or attribute mental states to ourselves, than when we predict or explain other's behavior, or attribute mental states to them. However, this is not an issue which can be settled here. (See the entry on self-knowledge.)

How is mindreading achieved?
 
One popular theory, often called the “theory-theory”, holds that when we mindread we access and utilize a theory of human behavior represented in our brains. The posited theory of human behavior is commonly called “folk psychology”.
 
On this view, mindreading is essentially an exercise in theoretical reasoning. When we predict behavior, for example, we utilize folk psychology to reason from representations of the target's past and present circumstances and behavior (including verbal behavior), to representations of the target's future behavior. Chomsky's claim that understanding and producing grammatical sentences involves a representation of the grammar of the relevant language is frequently offered as analogy. (See for example Carruthers 1996a: 29.)

The claim that folk psychology is represented “in the head” raises a range of important empirical questions. These questions are extensively interrelated, with research in one area very often having significant consequences for research in other areas.
We can ask about the way in which folk psychology is represented in the brain. Is it represented in a language-like medium (Fodor 1975) or is it represented in a connectionist network (Churchland 1995, especially Ch.6)?

We can ask about the implementation of folk psychology in the brain. A wide range of brain areas have been correlated with mindreading. (For a summary see Goldman 2006: 140–2.)

We can ask about the content of folk psychology. What states and properties does it quantify over, and what regularities does in postulate (Von Eckardt 1994)?

We can ask questions about the structure of folk psychology. Is it a “proto-scientific” theory with a structure akin to that of scientific theories, or does it take some other form? (See for example Gopnik& Meltzoff 1997; Hutto 2008.)

We can ask about the status of folk psychology. Might it be, as Paul Churchland (1981) famously proposed, radically false?

We can ask about the development of folk psychology in young children. Does it exhibit a characteristic developmental pattern? (See for example Wellman 1990.)

We can ask about the natural history of folk psychology, and about its existence in our evolutionary relatives. (See especially Sterelny 2003: Ch. 11.)

Closely related to questions F and G is the issue of universality.
 
We can ask about the extent to which the development of folk psychology, and the mature competence, vary from culture to culture. (See for example the papers by Lillard and Vinden in the reference list.)

We can ask if the mechanism which deploys folk psychology is modular in something close to Fodor's (1983) sense of the term. (See especially Sterelny 2003: Ch. 10.)

And we can ask about pathologies of folk psychology. What happens when folk psychology fails to mature normally? (See for example the papers in Carruthers & Smith 1996, Part III.)

In addition to the issues just outlined, there is a further empirical question with which theory-theorists have been engaged. Is it the case that mindreading is in fact underpinned by a theory of human psychology? Is mindreading really a theoretical activity? A variety of philosophers and psychologists have argued that it is not, or have at least argued that there is more to mindreading than theorizing. According to simulation theory, mindreading involves a kind of mental projection in which we temporarily adopt the target's perspective (Gordon 1986; Goldman 1989). (See the entry on folk psychology: as mental simulation.) According to the Narrative Practice Hypothesis, mindreading involves not theoretical reasoning but the construction of a certain kind of narrative (Hutto 2008). And according to intentional systems theory, mindreading is achieved by adopting a particular stance towards a system such as another human being (Dennett 1971; 1987). Important though these alternatives are, they will not be assessed in this entry.

The remainder of this section is in two parts. Part 2.2 briefly surveys some of the important issues surrounding the development of mindreading in children and its evolution in our lineage. Part 2.3 provides a quick overview of work in social psychology aimed at exploring mindreading.

There exists a very substantial body of research on the development of mindreading in young children.
 
In their essay, Heinz Wimmer and Joseph Perner (1983) describe what is now usually called the “false belief test”.
 
In the original version of the test, the participants are introduced to a puppet, Maxi.
 
Maxi shows the participants that he has a piece of chocolate, and then hides his chocolate in the “cupboard”—a cardboard box. He then announces that he is going out to play and leaves the scene. A second puppet now enters and is introduced as Maxi's Mom. Mom finds the chocolate in the cupboard and moves it to a second box, the “refrigerator”. Mom leaves and Maxi returns, saying that he is going to retrieve his chocolate. The action stops and the subjects are asked some control questions to check that they understand what has happened. They are then asked in which box Maxi will look for his chocolate, the cupboard or the refrigerator? Strikingly, children up to about four years of age typically reply that Maxi will look in the refrigerator, while children older than five typically say that Maxi will look in the cupboard. The standard interpretation of this experiment is that children younger than four typically lack the concept of belief, or at best have only a poor grasp of the concept of belief. In particular, they don't appreciate that beliefs can misrepresent reality. (Not everyone accepts that the false belief task reveals a conceptual deficit: various authors have argued that the task reveals a deficit of performance rather competence. For a judicious review of some of this literature see Goldman 2006, Section 4.3.) The Maxi experiment set off an avalanche of research aimed at discovering exactly how and when mindreading develops in young children. (Useful references for this literature are Astington, Harris & Olson 1988; Wellman 1990; and Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 2000.) A debate between empiricists and nativists quickly emerged, strongly reminiscent of the empiricism versus nativism debate about the development of grammar.
One of the most important defenders of empiricism about folk psychology is the developmental psychologist Alison Gopnik (Gopnik& Wellman 1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; Gopnik, Meltzoff & Kuhl 1999). Gopnik and her co-workers begin with a bold empirical conjecture—that the cognitive mechanisms which drive the child's development of folk psychology are exactly those mechanisms which drive the adult scientist's development of scientific theories. This view has been dubbed the “child as little scientist view”. In support of this conjecture, Gopnik appeals to the history of science. Drawing on the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962), she identifies a pattern in the way scientists respond to anomalous observations. Gopnik argues that when scientists are confronted by an anomaly they are initially inclined to dismiss it as noise or some other form of aberration. If the anomaly cannot easily be handled in this fashion, ad hoc conjectures are added to the original theory to deal with it. If counterevidence continues to accumulate, new theories are developed which are unencumbered by the growing excrescence of ad hoc conjectures. Very often, though, the new theory is applied only to the more recalcitrant anomalies. Finally, the new theory is applied across the domain and becomes very widely accepted. (See Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997: 39–41. See the entry on Thomas Kuhn.)
Gopnik argues that the pattern of scientific progress just sketched is recapitulated in the child's acquisition of folk psychology, thus supporting her claim that the mechanisms used by the child to acquire folk psychology are the same as those used by the adult to make scientific discoveries. (See Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997: Ch.5.) Gopnik's view is open to a number of objections. To begin with, it is not at all clear that the pattern of scientific progress Gopnik identifies is universal. For example, the history of geological science seems to provide an example where two competing research programs—vulcanism and neptunism—merged into a single, widely accepted paradigm. (I owe this example to George Couvalis.) If Gopnik's historical claims are mistaken then the pattern of conceptual development she observes in young children does not support the claim that the child deploys the same mechanisms as the adult scientist. Second, it has been argued that Gopnik's view is at odds with the apparent universality of the development of folk psychology: the vast majority of children pass through similar developmental stages to arrive at the same theory of human psychology, and do so on a common developmental timetable. Surely individual child-scientists beavering away in isolation would pass through different developmental stages to arrive at divergent theories of human psychology, and do so on distinct developmental timetables (Carruthers 1996b: 23). The claim that there is a universal developmental time table for the acquisition of folk psychology has not gone unopposed. Some author's have argued for the existence of considerable cross-cultural variation in the development of mindreading. See for example Lillard 1997; 1998 and Vinden 1996; 1999; 2002.
 
Assessing this literature is beyond the scope of this entry.

Nativists take the (purported) existence of a near-universal competence arrived at via a near-universal developmental pathway as evidence that the development of folk psychology is very strongly influenced by the child's genes: the species-wide developmental pattern is explained by our species-wide genetic inheritance (Carruthers 1996b: 23). They also offer a poverty of stimulus argument to the same conclusion. Children as young five are highly competent mindreaders and so must possess an extensive array of psychological concepts and a rich body of information about human psychology. They could not, though, have acquired those concepts and that information from their environment—their environment simply does not provide sufficient learning opportunities. Consequently, a considerable amount of folk psychology must be innate. (See for example Scholl & Leslie 1999.) A great deal of work is required, however, to sustain an argument of this nature. The proponent of any poverty of stimulus argument must demonstrate that the stimulus is impoverished relative to the mature competence. That in turn requires measuring the information content of the environment and comparing it with the information demands of the competence. In the case of folk psychology, we lack an accurate measure of the information demands of the competence because crucial questions about the nature of mature mindreading remain unresolved. For example, Daniel Hutto has suggested that many cases of successful behavior prediction rely not on a sophisticated theory of mind but on simple generalizations (Hutto 2008: 6). Consider a case where John predicts that Betty will stop at a red traffic signal. Perhaps John arrived at his prediction by reasoning as follows.

1. Betty believes that it is safest to stop at red traffic signals.

2. Betty desires to be safe.

3. Ceteris paribus, people act so as to realize their desires in light of their beliefs.
Therefore,
CONCLUSION:
 
4. Betty will stop at the red traffic signal.

However, John might arrive at his prediction in quite a different way.
 
He might simply rely on the following generalization: most drivers stop at red traffic signals. Hutto suspects that the latter explanation is the right one (a similar observation is made in Goldman 1987). More generally, Hutto endorses a kind of deflationism about mindreading: he thinks that philosophers and psychologists have exaggerated the amount of folk psychologizing that occurs. If it could be demonstrated that a great deal of mindreading rests not on folk psychologizing but on the deployment of simple generalizations, then we would have to reduce our estimate of the information demands of mindreading. Such a reduction would in turn weaken the plausibility of the poverty of stimulus argument. (See Hutto 2008: 181–6; Sterelny 2003: 214–8.)

So far we have seen that we are not presently in a position to accurately measure the information demands of the human mindreading competence. In addition, we are only beginning to appreciate the informational richness of the child’s learning environment. Kim Sterelny (2003: Ch. 8) has placed great stress on what he calls “epistemic niche construction”. Animals can modify their environments to generate new information, make old information more salient, and reduce cognitive demands. Sometimes these environmental modifications endure long enough to enhance the fitness of the next generation. In particular, parents may modify their child's environment in ways which facilitate their acquisition of folk psychological concepts and information (Sterelny 2003: 221–5). Hutto has suggested that one way in which this might occur is by story telling (Hutto 2008). As Hutto observes, many stories make apparent the links between the characters’ environment, mental states and behavior, and so may facilitate the child’s understanding of those links. If Sterelny and Hutto are right, the child’s learning environment is richer than we might have supposed, and the poverty of stimulus argument for folk psychology is correspondingly weakened.

Since the 1950s, social psychologists have explored the ways in which humans think about and describe behavior and personality. Fritz Heider (1958) marked an important distinction between intentional and unintentional behavior, and argued that everyday explanations of intentional behavior are importantly different from those of unintentional behavior. In particular, explanations of an agent's intentional behavior very often appeal to the agent's reasons. Subsequent work in the field, however, tended to draw a fundamental distinction between “person” and “situation” causes of behavior. Person causes are located within the agent; situation causes are located in the agent's environment. Bertram Malle has noted that the person/situation distinction is importantly different from the intentional/unintentional one (2004, especially Section 1.1). The proximate causes of intentional behavior—the agent's reasons—are indeed internal to the agent; however, the proximate causes of some unintentional behaviors are also internal to the agent. For example, screaming in response to a terrifying stimulus is unintentional and yet its proximate cause—fear—is internal. So the distinction between behavior due to person causes and that due to situation causes cuts across the distinction between behavior caused by reasons and behavior caused by other factors.
We can see the person-situation distinction at work in Harold Kelley's theory of attribution (Kelley 1967). A theory of attribution is a theory of how ordinary people assign causes to events such as behaviors and mental states (understood broadly to include character traits). For ease of expression, I shall focus on cases in which the aim is to explain a person's behavior. Kelley elaborates the person-situation distinction by distinguishing between two kinds of potential situational causes: the object towards which the behavior is directed and the circumstances in which the behavior occurs. Consider a case in which person P performs an action A towards an object O in circumstance C: John kissed Betty at the party. The causal attributions we make depend on our assessment of the following three questions.

How often does John kiss Betty in other circumstances?

How often does John kiss people other than Betty?
How often do other people kiss Betty?
Kelley predicted that John's behavior would be attribute to a property of John, a property of Betty, or a property of the party according to the following table:
Response to Q.1Response to Q.2Response to Q.3Attribution
oftenrarelyrarelyJohn
oftenoftenoftenBetty
rarelyoftenrarelyparty

Kelley's prediction has been experimentally confirmed by a range of studies (see Von Eckardt 1997 for details).

Perhaps because the category of person causes fails to distinguish between reasons and other internal causes, social psychologists in the 1960s and 1970s paid little attention to reasons. Rather, much of the focus was on character traits. Research during this period explored important correlations between judgments of appearance and judgments of character trait, and between judgments of one character trait and another. For example, participants who judge that a person is attractive on the basis of a photo (appearance) are also likely to judge that he or she is kindly (trait) (Berscheid & Walster 1974). Again, if a person is judged to be talkative (trait), they are also likely to be judged to be adventurous (trait) (Norman 1963). As Barbara Von Eckardt has observed, these kinds of folk psychological inferences have been almost entirely ignored in the philosophy of mind (Von Eckardt 1994 and 1997).

Whilst the person-situation distinction has underpinned important research in the social psychology of mindreading, it has not been universally endorsed. Lee Ross (1977: 176) invites us to consider the following pair of explanations:

Jack bought the house because it was secluded.

Jill bought the house because she wanted privacy.

The cause cited in explanation (1) would standardly be coded as situational; that in explanation (2) as personal. However, most people are inclined to say that Jack and Jill's respective house purchases were motivated by the same reason. This strongly suggests that the linguistic structure of explanations is a poor guide to the causal antecedents of behavior.

Over the last decade, Malle has urged a return to Heider's original insight, which marked an important distinction between intentional and unintentional behavior (see especially Malle 2004). Malle's research strongly supports the claim that people distinguish between intentional and unintentional behavior. For example, Malle and Knobe (1997) gave subjects descriptions of 20 behaviors, and asked them to rate how intentional the behaviors were on an eight point scale (0 = “not at all”; 7 = “completely”). (Half the subjects were given a definition of intentionality; the other half had to rely on their untutored conception of intentionality.) There was considerable agreement amongst all the subjects as to which of the described behaviors were intentional and which were not.
Within the category of intentional behaviors, Malle has identified three different modes (his term) of explanations.

Reason explanations locate the causes of an agent's behavior in his or her reasons for acting. (Sally bought some vitamin C tablets because she believed taking vitamin C would prevent her getting a cold.)

Causal history of reason explanations locate the causes of an agent's behavior in the background conditions which caused the agent to have the reasons which in turn caused the behavior. (Sally bought the vitamin C tablets because she had been convinced of vitamin C's efficacy by an article in a magazine.)

Enabling factor explanations identify the conditions which enabled the agent to bring about her intentions. (Sally bought the vitamin C tablets because she had some money left over after doing the shopping.)
(See Malle 2004, Ch. 4.)
 
Notice the centrality of reasons in all these modes of explanation.
 
Reason explanations and causal history of reason explanations are obviously concerned with the agent's reasons.
 
Enabling factor explanations also involve the agent's reasons since they concern the factors which render the agent's reasons efficacious.
 
In contrast, explanations of unintentional behaviors don't appeal to the agent's reasons.
 
Unintentional behaviors include overt behaviors over which the agent has no control (slipping on an icy step) and emotional expressions such as blushing. In these cases the explanations people offer resemble the kinds of explanations they offer for the behavior of inanimate objects (Malle 2004: 111).

In addition to identifying a variety of explanatory modes people adopt towards intentional behavior, Malle also identifies the features of the explanatory situation which drive the selection of one explanatory mode rather than another. Two examples of Malle's work in this area are as follows (Malle 2004, Section 5.2).

The action is difficult to perform v. the action is easy to perform.
 
Difficult actions (eg Jill's riding a unicycle) are usually explained by appealing to enabling factors (eg She practiced a lot). In contrast, if the action is easy to produce (eg Jill went for a walk), we tend to produce either reason explanations (eg She wanted to keep fit) or causal history of reason explanations (eg Her trainer told her that walking is an ideal way to keep fit).
The explanation is produced by the agent v. the explanation is produced by an observer. Actors tend to produce explanations of their own behavior which stress their beliefs. For example, consider Jack who wrote a letter to the mayor protesting against the city's housing policy. Jack explains his action by saying that he thought the mayor would listen. In contrast, observers tend to produce explanations which stress the agent's desires. Jill, who has observed Jack's letter writing, explains Jack's action by saying that he wanted to change the policy.
There is more to an explanation of intentional behavior than its mode. Jill did not explain Jack's letter writing by merely saying that he had a desire; she said that he wanted to change the policy. Reasons are propositional attitudes, and normally reason explanations specify the propositions involved as well as the attitudes. How do folk psychologists identify the propositions of an agent's attitudes when offering reason causes? Malle suggests a number of cognitive processes which perform this task. One of his central claims is that propositional contents are inferred from specific or generic information about the agent (Malle 2004: 140). Consider again Jill's explanation of Jack's writing to the mayor: He wrote to the mayor because he wanted to change the city's housing policy. Jill might attribute this particular desire to Jack because she has often heard Jack talk disparagingly about the city's current policy. However, there must be inferential processes which enable Jill to (a) locate information relevant to explaining Jack's action and (b) pass from the belief that Jack objects to the current policy to the conclusion that Jack wrote the letter because he wanted to change the current policy. According to the theory-theory, these inferential processes involve a theory which maps the complex relations between stimuli, mental states and behavior; that is, the inferences involve folk psychology. So the account of propositional attitude attribution is incomplete until we have a detailed—and empirically validated—account of folk psychology. What is required here is a response to item C in the list of empirical issues given in Part 2.1: What is the content of folk psychology? What states and properties does it quantify over, and what regularities does in postulate? (See Von Eckardt 1994.) It's fair to say that, at present, we lack detailed answers to these questions.

In a series of influential papers, D. K. Lewis (1966, 1970, 1972, 1994) defended a particular approach to the semantics of theoretical terms, applied that approach to the everyday psychological vocabulary (eg “belief” and “desire”), and thereby obtain a functionalist theory of mental states. Whilst Lewis does not give an explicit definition of the term “folk psychology”, an account of folk psychology naturally emerges from his approach.

On Lewis's view, theoretical terms get their meaning from the role they play in the theory in which they are used; they are, says Lewis, “definable functionally, by reference to their causal roles” (Lewis 1972: 204). Lewis begins with a theory, T, which includes both new terms introduced by T and old terms already understood before T emerged. The new terms are called “theoretical terms” or “T-terms” for short. The label “theoretical term” is merely intended to indicate that the terms were introduced by T rather than by, say, ostension or by some theory which pre-dates T. The old terms are called “O-terms” for short. (Lewis stresses that the O-terms are not necessarily observational terms, “whatever those maybe” (1972: 205).) T can be expressed as a single sentence—perhaps as a long conjunction:

T[t1 … tn],

where
 
 “t1 … tn”
 
stands for all the T-terms in T.
 
The O-terms have been suppressed to reduce clutter.
 
If we systematically replace the T-terms with free variables, x1 … xn, and prefix an existential quantifier binding the n-tuple x1 … xn, we obtain the Ramsey sentence for T:

∃(x1 … xn)T(x1 … xn).

The Ramsey sentence says that there exists an n-tuple of entities which realizes T.
 
That is, T has at least one realization. Lewis is concerned to rule out the possibility of multiple realizations of T.
 
It is, he claims, implicit in the stating of a theory that it has a unique realization; if a theory is multiply realized then it is false and its T-terms fail to refer (Lewis 1972: 205). He therefore adopts the modified Ramsey sentence
∃!(x1 … xn)T(x1 … xn),

which says that there exists a unique n-tuple of entities that realizes T.
The Carnap sentence is a conditional with the Ramsey sentence as antecedent and T as its consequent:

∃(x1 … xn)T(x1 … xn) → T[t1 … tn].

The Carnap sentence says that if T is realized, the t-terms name the corresponding entities of some realization of T. Given Lewis's aversion to multiple realization, he prefers the modified Carnap sentence which is a conditional with the modified Ramsey sentence as antecedent and T as the consequent:

∃!(x1 … xn)T(x1 … xn) → T[t1 … tn].

The modified Carnap sentence says that if T is uniquely realized, the t-terms name the corresponding entities of the unique realization of T. To cover those cases in which T is not uniquely realized, either because it is multiply realized or not realized at all, Lewis adds an additional conditional:

~∃!(x1 … xn)T(x1 … xn) → (t1 = * & … &tn = *).

This conditional says that, if T is not uniquely realized, then t1 … tn name nothing. Taken together, the last two conditionals are equivalent to a series of sentences which define each T-term strictly in O-terms:

T1 = ∃!x1T[x1]
    .
    .
    .
Tn = ∃!xnT[xn]

We have now obtained an explicit definition for each T-term.
 
Moreover, says Lewis, the definitions are functional definitions: “The t-terms have been defined as the occupants of the causal roles specified by the theory T; as the entities, whatever those maybe, that bear certain causal relations to one another and to the referents of the O-terms” (Lewis 1972: 207). These definitions were implicit in the original theory T in the sense that no additional content has been added to T in their derivation. (Lewis observes that the definitions do in fact contain additional content, for their derivation assumes that T is uniquely realized. He claims, though, that the assumption of uniqueness was made implicitly when T was stated. See the remarks about uniqueness scattered through out Section I of Lewis 1972.) Let's now turn to the way Lewis applies his theory of theoretical terms to the everyday psychological vocabulary.

Lewis begins by imagining the set of all the everyday, commonsense platitudes about mental states.
 
He treats this set of platitudes as a term-introducing psychological theory, with the T-terms being the names of the commonsense psychological states—beliefs, desires, pains, hungers, etc—and the O-terms being terms drawn from the non-psychological part of the everyday English vocabulary.
 
The formal method sketched above yields explicit definitions of the T-terms.
 
These definitions are functionalist in that they describe the causal roles in which the named entities participate:
 
“pain” names the state which occupies so-and-so causal role. (Lewis 1966 (fn 6) distinguishes between pain and the attribute of having pain.
 
Pain is the state which plays the pain-role, and which state plays the pain-role may differ from world to world.
 
The attribute of having pain is the having of a state—whatever state that might be—which plays the pain-role.)

Clearly, we need an account of the platitudes.
 
Which everyday claims about mental states count as part of the term-introducing theory? Here's Lewis (1972: 207–8. See also Lewis 1966: 100):
 
Collect all the platitudes you can think of regarding the causal relations of mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses. Perhaps we can think of them as having the form:

When someone is in so-and-so combination of mental states and receives sensory stimuli of so-and-so kind, he tends with so-and-so probability to be caused thereby to go into so-and-so mental states and produce so-and-so motor responses.

Also add all the platitudes to the effect that one mental state falls under another—“toothache is a kind of pain” and the like. Perhaps there are platitudes of other forms as well. Include only platitudes which are common knowledge among us—everyone knows them, everyone knows that everyone knows them, and so on.

Lewis uses the explicit functional definitions of the commonsense psychological terms he has obtained as premises in an argument for physicalism about mental states (Lewis 1972: 204):
1. Mental state M = the occupant of causal role R.
2. The occupant of causal role R = neural state N.
From (1) and (2) by transitivity we obtain:
3. Mental state M = neural state N.

Premise (1) is a functional definition of M obtained by the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method sketched above.
 
Premise (2) is overwhelmingly supported by physiology. (In Lewis 1966, the second premise is more general: the occupant of the causal role is identified with a physical state. Lewis then defends the second premise by endorsing the explanatory adequacy of physics.) So Lewis argues straightforwardly from functionalism to physicalism.

With this picture in place, it is worth asking what precisely folk psychology is on Lewis's approach. To my knowledge, Lewis never explicitly defines the term. However, when giving the semantics of the everyday psychological vocabulary, he treats the conjunction of commonsense platitudes about mental states as a term-introducing theory, so it is natural to identify folk psychology with that conjunction. Alternatively, we could think of folk psychology as a systematization of the set of platitudes.

It is important to stress that Lewis's position has not been without its detractors.
 
In particular, many philosophers of language have objected to Lewis's semantic theory.
 
In the 1960s and 1970s an alternative approach to semantics was introduced by David Kaplan (1968), Keith Donellan (1970), Hilary Putnam (1975) and Saul Kripke (1980).
 
This approach separates the meaning of a theoretical term from the role it plays in the theories in which it is found; that is, it separates meaning from use.
 
These alternative conceptions of meaning are broadly compatible with of Lewis's metaphysical conclusions; for example, they are compatible with Lewis's physicalism. However, they are incompatible with the way Lewis obtains his conclusions.

Setting aside questions of semantics, note that Lewis is hostage to empirical fortune in ways he does not acknowledge. Lewis's claims about the platitudes are empirical claims—they are claims about what is commonly believed about mental states and as such can only properly be investigated by careful scientific research. There is no evidence that Lewis undertook the appropriate studies. Moreover, it is very likely that Lewis's own intuitions about mental states were influenced by his theoretical stance, and consequently there is little reason to think that Lewis's own intuitions are a good guide to what people typically believe about the mind.

Notice that Lewis only recognizes two kinds of platitudes: those that express causal relations between mental states, stimuli and behavior, and those that indicate when one type of mental state is contained by another. He admits that there maybe “platitudes of other forms as well” (Lewis 1972: 207–8), but this is disingenuous because his overall functionalist conclusion requires that all platitudes take one of the two forms he identifies.
 
Thus the functionalist conclusion could not be obtained if there were platitudes expressing the view that mental states are substances which have their causal powers non-essentially, or which lack causal powers altogether. It may turn out, for example, that the folk conceive of pain as an essentially experiential state with non-essential causal connections to stimuli and behavior. Lewis is simply assuming that commonsense is resolutely committed to the idea that mental states are characterized by causal role; that is, the functionalist conclusion drives the characterization of the platitudes. No doubt Lewis has philosophical arguments for denying that mental states are substances which have their causal powers non-essentially, or substances that lack causal powers altogether. But that is beside the present point. Lewis's intention was to capture what the folk think about mental states, not what the philosophical literati think about mental states.
 
Lewis also assumes that the platitudes form a largely coherent set. He can handle minor inconsistencies because he proposes to form not a grand conjunction of all the platitudes, but a grand disjunction of conjunctions of most of the platitudes. However, he is still assuming that consistent sets containing most of the platitudes can be obtained. This may or may not be the case, and we will only find out by doing the relevant empirical research.
There is some evidence that Lewis recognized these difficulties himself. In his “Reduction of Mind” he remarks that “Pace Lewis, 1972, p. 256, eliciting the general principles of folk psychology is no mere matter of gathering platitudes” (1994: 416). He also remarks that folk psychology “is common knowledge among us; but it is tacit, as our grammatical knowledge is” (1994: 416). These remakes are consistent with his adopting some version of the mindreading sense of folk psychology (see section 2 above); however, they are too cryptic for us to establish exactly what Lewis's final position was.

Eliminativists have argued that there are no beliefs and no desires (see for example Churchland 1981; Stich 1983). One prominent argument for eliminativism begins with folk psychology:
1. Beliefs and desires are the posits of folk psychology.
2. Folk psychology is false.
3. The posits of false theories do not exist.
Therefore,
4. Beliefs and desires do not exist.

It is not immediately obvious that this argument is valid, for we may have a range of reasons for accepting the existence of beliefs and desires—reasons unaffected by the truth or falsity of folk psychology (see Kitcher 1984; Von Eckardt 1994).
 
Moreover, in light of the proceeding discussion it is clear that the first two premises are ambiguous. As we have seen, the term “folk psychology” is used in at least two different ways in the philosophical and psychological literatures.
 
Consequently, the argument just sketched has at least two interpretations, and may be sound on one but not on the other (Stich & Ravenscroft 1992). Similar remarks apply to an anti-eliminativist argument advanced by early simulation theorists such as Robert Gordon (1986) and Alvin Goldman (1989). On their view, mindreading does not involve a representation of folk psychology in the mindreader's brain, and consequently we have no reason to think that folk psychology exists. They then argue that, since there is no such thing as folk psychology, the question of the existence or otherwise of its posits simply does not arise. However, the first premise of this argument needs to be stated more carefully. If simulation theory (as conceived by its early proponents) is true, then there is no such thing as folk psychology on the mindreading sense of that term. But that is entirely compatible with the existence of folk psychology on the platitude sense of the term. (For useful discussions of eliminativism see Kitcher 1984; Horgan & Woodward 1985; Von Eckardt 1994; and the entry on eliminative materialism.)

Further reading:
 
Recent and valuable monographs which discuss folk psychology include Nichols & Stich 2003; Sterelny 2003; Goldman 2006; and Hutto 2008.
 
REFERENCES:

Astington, J., P. Harris, and D. Olson (eds.), 1988, Developing Theories of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baron-Cohen, S., H. Tager-Flusberg, & D. Cohen (eds.), 2000,
Understanding Other Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition.

Berscheid, E. & G. Walster, 1974,
 “Physical Attractiveness,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 7: 157–215.

Call, J. & M. Tomasello, 2008,
“Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later,” Trends in Cognitive Science, 12: 187–92.
 
Carnap, R. The Carnap Sentence -- referred to above.

Carruthers, P., 1996a,
Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

––– 1996b, “Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defense of Theory-Theory,” in Carruthers & Smith 1996, 22–68.

Carruthers, P. and P. Smith, 1996, Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Churchland, P. M., 1981, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67– 90.

–––, 1995, The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D., 1971, “Intentional Systems,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 87–106.
–––, 1987, “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works,” in D. Dennett, The Intentional Stance, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 14–35.
Donnellan, K., 1970, “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,” Synthese, 21: 335–58.
Fodor, J., 1975, The Language of Thought, New York: Thomas Cromell.
–––, 1983, The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Goldman, A., 1989, “Interpretation Psychologized,” Mind and Language, 4: 161–85.
Goldman, A., 2006, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, A. and A. N. Meltzoff, 1997, Words, Thoughts and Theories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gopnik, A., A. N. Meltzoff, and P. Kuhl, 1999, The Scientist in the Crib, New York: HarperCollins.
Gopnik, A. and H. Wellman, 1994, “The Theory Theory”, in L. Hirschfield and S. Gelman (eds.), Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 257–93.
Gordon, R., 1986. “Folk Psychology as Simulation,” Mind and Language, 1: 158–71.
 
Grice, H. P. Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre, American Philosophical Association (1975). Repr. in "The conception of value" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

Heider, F., 1958, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, New York: Wiley.
Horgan, T. and J. Woodward, 1985, “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay,” Philosophical Review, 94: 197–225.
Hutto, D., 2008, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Kaplan, D., 1968, “Quantifying in,” Synthese, 19: 178–24.
Kelley, H., 1967, “Attribution Theory in Social Psychology,” in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, D. Levine (ed.), Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 15: 192–238.
Kitcher, P., 1984, “In Defense of Intentional Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy, 81: 89–106.
Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell.
Kuhn, T. S., 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lewis, D., 1966, “An Argument for the Identity Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25; reprinted in D. Lewis 1983 , Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1: 99–107. All page references are to the reprint.
Lewis, D., 1970, “How to Define Theoretical Terms,” Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–46.
–––, 1972, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–58; reprinted in Rosenthal 1994, pp. 204–10. All page references are to the reprint.
–––, 1994, “Reduction of Mind,” in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 412–31.
Lillard, A., 1997, “Other Folks' Theories of Minds and Behaviour,” Psychological Science, 8: 268–74.
–––, 1998, “Ethnopsychologies: Cultural Variations in Theory of Mind,”, Psychological Bulletin, 123: 3–32.
Malle, B., 2004, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Nichols, S., and S. Stich, 2003, Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-awareness, and Understanding Other Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Norman, W., 1963, “Toward an Adequate Taxonomy of Personality Attributes: Replicated Factor Structure in Peer Nomination Personality Ratings,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66: 574–83.
Pears, D. F. Questions in the philosophy of mind. London: Duckworth.

Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2: 215–71.
Rosenthal, D., 1994, The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ross, L., 1977, “The Intuitive Psychologist and his Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process,” in L. Berkowitz (ed.) Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, New York: Academic Press, 10: 174–220.
Scholl, B. and A. Leslie, 1999, “Modularity, Development and ‘Theory of Mind’,” Mind and Language, 14: 131–53.
Sellars, W., 1956, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, 1: 253–329.
 
Speranza -- Join the Grice Club!

Sterelny, K., 2003, Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Cognition, Malden MA: Blackwell.
Stich, S., 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Stich, S. and S. Nichols, 2003, “Folk Psycholgy,” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, S. Stich and T. Warfield (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 235–55. [Preprint available online].
Stich, S. and I. Ravenscroft, 1992, “What is Folk Psychology?” Cognition, 50: 447–68.
Vinden, P., 1996, “Junin Quechua Children's Understanding of Mind,” Child Development, 67: 1707–16.
–––, 1999, “Children's Understanding of Mind and Emotion: A Multi-Culture Study,” Cognition and Emotion, 13: 19–48.
–––, 2002, “Understanding Minds and Evidence for Belief: A Study of Mofu Children in Cameroon” International Journal of Behavioral Development, 26: 445–52.
Von Eckardt, B., 1994, “Folk Psychology (1),” in A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, S. Guttenplan (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 300–7.
–––, 1997, “The Empirical Naivete of the Current Philosophical Conception of Folk Psychology,” in Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, M. Carrier and P. K. Machamer (eds.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 23–51.
Wellman, H., 1990, The Child's Theory of Mind, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Wimmer, H. and J. Perner, 1983, “Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding of Deception,” Cognition, 13: 103–28.
Other Internet Resources
Nichols, S., 2002, Folk Psychology, article in the Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, London: Nature Publishing Group.
Baker, Lynne, 1999, Folk Psychology (in PDF), in Rob Wilson and Frank Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 317–318.
Related Entries
folk psychology: as mental simulation | functionalism | Lewis, David | materialism: eliminative | Sellars, Wilfrid
Ian Ravenscroft would like to thank Daniel Hutto, Frank Jackson and (especially) Barbara Von Eckardt for helpful comments on a draft of this entry, and thank his home institution Flinders University.
 
A commentary on Ian Ravenscroft's entry on"Folk Psychology as a Theory" for The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-theory/>.

Tuesday, January 7, 2014

Folksy Grice

Speranza

All music is folk music.

Folk psychology, or commonsense psychology, is the natural capacity to explain and predict the behavior and mental state of other people.

In "Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre", Grice does defend folk psychology. ("I'm folksy").

Processes and items encountered in daily life such as pain, pleasure, excitement and anxiety use common linguistic terms as opposed to technical or scientific jargon.

Folk psychology and analogy are linked.

The easiest way to describe something is through references to familiar items. In this way, the union between analogy and folk psychology was inevitable.
Traditionally, the study of folk psychology has focused on how everyday people—those without formal training in the various academic fields of science—go about attributing mental states. This domain has primarily been centred on intentional states reflective of an individual's beliefs and desires; each described in terms of everyday language and concepts such as "beliefs", "desires", "fear", and "hope".

When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behaviour, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions.

An evaluation of an action as stemming from purposeful action or accidental circumstances is the key determinant in social interaction. For example, a critical remark that is judged to be intentional on the part of the receiver of the message can be viewed as a hurtful insult. Conversely, if considered unintentional, the same remark may be dismissed and forgiven.
This folk concept of intentionality is used to distinguish between intentional and unintentional behaviour in sports where intentional fouls are punished more harshly than ones deemed to be unintentional. It is also applied in the legal system in terms of criminal law distinguishing between murder and manslaughter.

The importance of this concept transcends almost all aspects of everyday life: with empirical studies in social and developmental psychology exploring perceived intentionality's role as a mediator for aggression, relationship conflict, judgments of responsibility blame or punishment.

Recent empirical literature on folk psychology has shown that people's theories regarding intentional actions involve four distinct factors: beliefs, desires, causal histories, and enabling factors.

Here, beliefs and desires represent the central variables responsible for the folk theories of intention.
Desires embody outcomes that an individual seeks, including those that are impossible to achieve. The key difference between desires and intentions is that desires can be purely hypothetical, whereas intentions specify an outcome that the individual is actually trying to bring to fruition.

In terms of beliefs, there are several types that are relevant to intentions—outcome beliefs and ability beliefs. Outcome beliefs are beliefs as to whether a given action will fulfill an intention, as in "purchasing a new watch will impress my friends".

Ability consists of an actor's conviction regarding his or her ability to perform an action, as in " I really can afford the new watch". In light of this, Heider postulated that ability beliefs could be attributed with causing individuals to form goals that would not otherwise have been entertained.

Folk psychology is crucial to evaluating and ultimately understanding novel concepts and items. Developed by Medin, Altom, and Murphy, the Context Model hypothesizes that as a result of mental models in the form of prototype and exemplar representations, individuals are able to more accurately represent and comprehend the environment around them.
According to the model, the overall similarity between the prototype and a given instance of a category is evaluated based on multiple dimensions (e.g., shape, size, color). A multiplicative function modeled after this phenomenon was created.

Here, S(P,Ei) represents the similarity between the prototype and the ith exemplar, k is the subscript for the dimensions (k = 1…k), and S(P,Eik) is the similarity between the prototype and the ith exemplar on the kth dimension.

Given that folk psychology represents causal knowledge associated with the mind's categorization processes[citation needed], it follows that folk psychology is actively employed in aiding the explanation of everyday actions.

Hilton's (1990) Conversational Model was created with this causal explanation in mind, with the model having the ability to generate specific predictions. Hilton coined his model the 'conversational' model because he argued that as a social activity, unlike prediction, explanation requires an audience: to whom the individual explains the event or action.[12]

According to the model, causal explanations follow two particular conversational maxims from Grice's (1975) models of conversation—the manner maxim and the quantity maxim. Grice indicated that the content of a conversation should be relevant, informative, and fitting of the audience's gap in knowledge

 Cognizant of this, the Conversational Model indicates that the explainer, upon evaluation of his audience, will modify his explanation to cater their needs. In essence, demonstrating the inherent need for mental comparison and in subsequent modification of behaviour in everyday explanations.

The belief-desire model of psychology illustrates one method in which Folk Psychology is utilized in everyday life. According to this model, an individual performs an action if he or she wants an outcome and believes that it can be obtained by performing the action. However, beliefs and desires are not responsible for immediate action; intention acts as a mediator of in this relationship belief-desire and action.[9] In other words, an individual who wants to achieve a goal, G, and believes action A will aid him or her in attaining G; this leads to an intention to perform A, which is then carried out to produce action A.

Schank & Asbelson (1977) described this inclusion of typical beliefs, desires, and intentions underlying an action as akin to a "script" whereby an individual is merely following an unconscious framework that leads to the ultimate decision of whether an action will be performed.[14] Similarly, Barsalou (1985) described the category of the mind as an "ideal" whereby if a desire, a belief, and an intention were all present, they would "rationally" lead to a given action. They coined this phenomenon the Ideal of Rational Action.

Existing literature has widely corroborated the fact that social behavior is greatly affected by the causes to which people attribute actions.[10] In particular, it has been shown that an individual's interpretation of the causes of behaviour reflects their pre-existing beliefs regarding the actor's mental state and motivation behind his or her actions.[16] It follows that they draw on the assumed intentions of actors to guide their own responses to punish or reward the actor. This concept is extended to cover instances in which behavioural evidence is lacking. Under these circumstances, it has been shown that the individual will again draw on assumed intentions in order to predict the actions of the third party.

Although the two components are often used interchangeably in common parlance, there is an important distinction between the goals and intentions. This discrepancy lies in the fact that individuals with an intention to perform an action also foster the belief that it will be achieved, whereas the same person with a goal may not necessarily believe that the action is able to be performed in spite of having a strong desire to do so.

Predicting goals and actions, much like the Belief-Desire Model, involves moderating variables that determine whether an action will be performed. In the Goal-Intentional Action Model, the predictors of goals and actions are: the actors' beliefs about his or her abilities and their actual possession of preconditions required to actually carry out the action.[17] Additionally, preconditions consist of the various conditions necessary in order for realization of intentions. This includes abilities and skills in addition to environmental variables that may come into play. Schank & Abelson raises the example of going to a restaurant, where the preconditions include the ability to afford the bill and get to the correct venue, in addition to the fact that the restaurant must be open for business.[14] Traditionally, people prefer to allude to preconditions to explain actions that have a high probability of being unattainable, whereas goals tend to be described as a wide range of common actions.

Folk psychology remains the subject of much contention in academic circles with respect to its scope, method and the significance of its contributions to the scientific community.

A large part of this criticisms stems from the prevailing impression that folk psychology is a primitive practice reserved for the uneducated and non-academics in discussing their everyday lives.

There is significant debate over whether folk psychology is useful for academic purposes.

Specifically whether it can be relevant with regards to the scientific psychology domain. It has been argued that a mechanism used for laypeople's understanding, predicting, and explaining each other's actions is inapplicable with regards to the requirements of the Scientific Method.

Conversely, opponents have called for patience, seeing the mechanism employed by laypeople for understanding each other's actions as important in their formation of bases for future action when encountering similar situations. Malle & Knobe hailed this systematization of people's everyday understanding of the mind as an inevitable progression towards a more comprehensive field of psychology.[5] Medin et al. provide another advantage of conceptualizing folk psychology with their Mixture Model of Categorization:[20] it is advantageous due its facilitation of action prediction.

References:

Jump up ^ "Folk Psychology as a Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 2013-02-01.
Jump up ^ Wellman, H (1990). Chidlren's theories of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jump up ^ Bach, T. R. "Folk-psychology and analogy". Dissertation Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences.
Jump up ^ Arico, Adam (2010). "Folk psychology, consciousness, and context effects". Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 317–393. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0029-9. Retrieved 10 March 2012.
^ Jump up to: a b c Malle, Betram F; Knobe, Joshua (Mar 1997). "The folk concept of intentionality". Journal of experimental social psychology 33 (2): 101–121.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
Jump up ^ Karniol, Rachel (Jan 1978). "Children's use of intention cues in evaluating behaviour". Psychological Bulletin 85 (1): 76–85. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.85.1.76.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
Jump up ^ Piaget, Oxford (1932). The Language and Thought of the Child, 1926; Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, 1928; The Child's Conception of the World, 1929; The Child's Conception of Physical Causality, 1930; The Moral Judgment of the Child, 1932.. Oxford, England: Harcourt, Brace. pp. 54–93.
Jump up ^ Malle, Betram F; Knobe (Mar 1997). "The folk concept of intentionality". Journal of experimental social psychology 33 (2): 101–121. Retrieved 10 April 2012.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
^ Jump up to: a b c Kashima, Yoshihisa; McKintyre, Allison; Clifford, Paul (1 April 2000). "The category of the mind: Folk psychology of belief, desire, and intention. Author". Asian Journal of Social Psychology. 1 1 (3): 289–313. doi:10.1111/1467-839X.00019. Retrieved 21 February 2012.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
^ Jump up to: a b c Heider, F (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
Jump up ^ Medin, D.L.; Altom, M. W. & Murphy, T.D. (1984). "Given versus induced category representations: Use of prototype and exemplar information in classification.". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 10 (333): 352.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
Jump up ^ Hilton, Denis J. (Jan 1990). "Conversational processes and causal explanation". Psychological Bulletin 107 (1): 65–81. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.107.1.65.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
Jump up ^ Grice, H Paul (1979). "Logic and Conversation". Communications 30: 7–72.
^ Jump up to: a b Schank, R.C. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals and understanding. New Jersey: Eribaum.
Jump up ^ Barsalou, Lawrence W. (Oct 1985). "Ideals, central tendency, and frequency of instantiation as determinants of graded structure in categories.". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 11 (4). doi:10.1037/0278-7393.11.1-4.629.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
Jump up ^ Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: Springer.
Jump up ^ Boonzaier, A.; McClure, J. & Sutton, R. M. (2005). [doi:10.1002/ejsp.280 "Distinguishing the effects of beliefs and preconditions: The folk psychology of goals and actions"]. European Journal of Social Psychology 35 (6): 725–740.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
Jump up ^ Goldenweiser, A. A. (1912). "Folk-psychology". Psychological Bulletin 9 (10): 373–380.
^ Jump up to: a b Fletcher, G. (1995). The scientific credibility of folk psychology. Hilsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. ISBN 0805815708. OCLC 476199418.
Jump up ^ Medin, D. L.; Altom, M. W., & Murphy, T.D. (1984). "Given versus induced category representations: Use of prototype and exemplar information in classification". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 10: 333–352.  Cite uses deprecated parameters (help)
[hide]
v
t
e
Psychology

History
Portal
Psychologist


Basic psychologyAbnormal
Affective science
Affective neuroscience
Behaviorism
Behavioral neuroscience
Cognitive
Cognitive neuroscience
Comparative
Cultural
Developmental
Differential
Evolutionary
Experimental
Intelligence
Mathematical
Neuropsychology
Personality
Psycholinguistics
Psychophysics
Psychophysiology
Social
Theoretical


Applied psychologyAnomalistic
Applied behavior analysis
Assessment
Clinical
Community
Consumer
Counseling
Educational
Feminist
Forensic
Health
Industrial and organizational
Legal
Media
Military
Occupational health
Pastoral
Political
Psychometrics
School
Sport and exercise
Suicidology
Systems
Traffic


MethodologiesAnimal testing
Archival research
Behavior genetics
Behavior epigenetics
Case study
Content analysis
Experiments
Human subject research
Interviews
Neuroimaging
Observation
Qualitative research
Quantitative research
Self-report inventory
Statistical surveys


OrientationsAdlerian
Analytical
Behaviorism
Cognitive behavioral therapy
Cognitivism
Descriptive
Ecological systems theory
Existential therapy
Family therapy
Feminist therapy
Gestalt psychology
Humanistic
Logotherapy
Narrative therapy
Philosophy
Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalytic theory
Psychodynamic psychotherapy
Rational emotive behavior therapy
Transpersonal


Notable
psychologistsAlfred Adler
Gordon Allport
Albert Bandura
Aaron Beck
Hubert Benoit
John Bowlby
Raymond Cattell
Kenneth and Mamie Clark
Albert Ellis
Erik Erikson
Hans Eysenck
Leon Festinger
Viktor Frankl
Sigmund Freud
Harry Harlow
Donald O. Hebb
Clark L. Hull
William James
Carl Jung
Jerome Kagan
Kurt Lewin
Ivar Lovaas
Abraham Maslow
David McClelland
George A. Miller
Neal E. Miller
Walter Mischel
Ivan Pavlov
Jean Piaget
Carl Rogers
Stanley Schachter
B. F. Skinner
Edward Thorndike
John B. Watson
Wilhelm Wundt


ListsCounseling topics
Disciplines
Important publications
Organizations
Outline
Psychologists
Psychotherapies
Research methods
Schools of thought
Timeline
Topics


Wiktionary definition
Wiktionary category
Wikisource
Wikimedia Commons
Wikiquote
Wikinews
Wikibooks

 
Categories:
Psychology terminology
Alternative medicine
Folklore