Vieri: Essentail Italian philosopher
Francesco de' Vieri Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump
to search Liber in quo a calumnijs
detractorum philosophia defenditur, & eius praestantia demonstratur, 1586
Francesco de' Vieri, detto Verino secondo (Firenze, 1524 – 1591), è stato un
filosofo italiano. Di famiglia nobile,
era nipote di Francesco de' Vieri detto Verino primo. Allo Studio di Pisa fu
professore di logica e poi (dal 1559 al 1590) di filosofia. Come l'avo fu molto
attivo nell'Accademia fiorentina.[1] Era contestato dai colleghi per il suo
vagheggiare una nuova accademia platonica improntata su Giovanni Pico della Mirandola;
suo principale avversario era Girolamo Borri.
Indice 1 Opere
2Note 3Bibliografia 4 Altri
progetti 5Collegamenti esterni Opere Francesco de' Vieri, Liber in quo a
calumnijs detractorum philosophia defenditur, & eius praestantia
demonstratur, Romae, Giovanni Angelo Ruffinelli, Giacomo Ruffinelli, 1586. URL
consultato il 12 luglio 2015. Note ^ Jill Kraye, Cambridge Translations of
Renaissance Philosophical Texts: Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge
University Press, 28 agosto 1997, pp. 166–, ISBN 978-0-521-42604-6.
Bibliografia Francesco de' Vieri, detto il Verino secondo, IMSS Jill Kraye,
Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts: Moral and Political
Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 28 agosto 1997, pp. 166–, ISBN 978-0-521-42604-6.
Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Francesco de' Vieri Collegamenti esterni Francesco de'
Vieri, su accademicidellacrusca.org, Accademia della Crusca. Modifica su
Wikidata Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 89449392 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1856 4486 · LCCN (EN) n89600973 · GND (DE)
121972232 · BNF (FR) cb12232889p (data) · BNE (ES) XX5524786 (data) · CERL
cnp00446620 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n89600973 Biografie Portale
Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XVI
secoloNati nel 1524Morti nel 1591Nati a Firenze[altre]
Vigna: essential Italian philosopherCarmelo Vigna Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to
navigationJump to search Carmelo Vigna (Rosolini, 26 novembre 1940) è un
filosofo, storico della filosofia e accademico italiano. Indice 1 Biografia 2Pensiero 3Scritti
principali 4Curatele 5Note 6 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Carmelo Vigna ha studiato Filosofia all'Università Cattolica
di Milano, legandosi in special modo all'insegnamento di Gustavo Bontadini e di
Emanuele Severino. Con Severino si laurea nel 1963, discutendo una tesi sulla
logica dell'astratto e la logica del concreto di Giovanni Gentile. Dal 1981 è
professore ordinario di Filosofia morale presso l'Università Ca’ Foscari di
Venezia, ma ha insegnato anche presso l'Università Cattolica di Milano. Nel
2014 l'Università di Venezia lo ha nominato professore emerito. È stato,
inoltre, il presidente della Società Italiana di Filosofia Morale
(S.I.F.M.). Pensiero Si è occupato inizialmente di neoidealismo
italiano[1], di marxismo[2], e del pensiero di Aristotele[3].
Successivamente si è concentrato in maniera speciale sull'ontologia e sulla
metafisica, proponendo una nuova semantizzazione dell'essere capace di
risolvere le aporie del parmenidismo di Severino, che in qualche modo gravavano
anche sulla speculazione di Bontadini[4]. Questa nuova semantizzazione permette
di leggere nel divenire non l'annullamento dell'essere, ma piuttosto quello
dell'ente[5]. La differenza ontologica fondamentale è proprio quella che passa
tra l'essere assoluto che non diviene e l'ente finito che comincia e cessa di
essere[6]. Questa impostazione ha consentito di raffinare ulteriormente il tema
della mediazione metafisica che sfrutta e compone la posizione necessaria della
totalità dell'essere con la posizione della totalità molteplice e mutabile
dell'esperienza[7]. Insieme alle analisi di metafisica si sono svolte
quelle di etica fondamentale e di etica applicata (bioetica, etica pubblica,
etica dell'ambiente, etica della differenza sessuale). L'etica è intesa
fondamentalmente come un'etica del desiderio umano, il quale, a sua volta, è
fondamentalmente desiderio di un altro desiderio, cioè poi di un altro essere
umano che ci desideri e ci riconosca[8]. L'etica viene così ricondotta alle
dinamiche delle relazioni intersoggettive, che si possono descrivere secondo
tre modelli basilari. Il primo modello è quello regolativo per l'etica: quello
in cui le soggettività si riconoscono reciprocamente come delle soggettività, e
cioè come delle persone o degli esseri che pensano e desiderano in senso
trascendentale. Il secondo modello è quello trasgressivo: quello in cui le
soggettività confliggono e cercano di dominare il soggetto che hanno di fronte,
trattandolo come un oggetto o una cosa manipolabile a loro piacimento. Il terzo
modello, che si colloca a mezza strada fra i due precedenti, è quello che
Vigna definisce oblativo, in cui mentre una delle due soggettività riconosce
l'altra e si dispone a trattare l'altra secondo la cura e il rispetto che le
convengono, l'altra soggettività non offre nessun riconoscimento e cerca di
imporsi sulla soggettività riconoscente come soggettività dominante[9].
Questa impostazione ontoetica si caratterizza per il tentativo di fondare la
regolatività etica del primo modello su argomentazioni che partono dal rilievo
irrefutabile della trascendentalità umana, la quale si trova invece
contraddetta in tutte le situazioni di rapporto intersoggettivo riconducibili
agli altri due modelli[10]. Le indagini di antropologia trascendentale
completano e chiudono questo percorso, ponendosi come il termine medio che
stringe e salda l'ontologia metafisica all'etica[11]. Il concetto di persona viene
inteso come sinergia del concetto di sostanza e di quello di relazione.
Sostanza è classicamente quello che permane e sta in sé. Relazione, invece, è
qui il rapporto intenzionale ad altro da sé. L'essere umano è una sinergia di
sostanza e relazione perché è sia rapporto a se stesso sia rapporto all'altro
da sé, in quanto è essenzialmente una intenzionalità trascendentale, ovverosia
un orizzonte consistente di relazione all'altro da sé, secondo il corso
illimitato del desiderio che lo abita[12]. Scritti principali La
dialettica gentiliana, in “Giornale critico della filosofia italiana”, 1964,
fasc. III, pp. 362–392. Religione e filosofia nel pensiero di Giovanni Gentile,
in “Giornale critico della filosofia italiana”, 1967, fasc. II, pp. 260–281.
Gentile interprete di Marx, in AA.VV., Enciclopedia 76-77. Il pensiero di
Giovanni Gentile, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma 1977, vol. II, pp.
885–899. Ragione e religione, CELUC, Milano 1971. Filosofia e marxismo, CELUC,
Milano 1974. Le origini del marxismo teorico in Italia. Il dibattito tra
Labriola, Croce, Gentile e Sorel sui rapporti tra marxismo e filosofia, Città
Nuova, Roma 1977. Antonio Gramsci. Il pensiero teorico e politico. La
"questione leninista", Città Nuova, Roma 1979 (con V. Melchiorre e G.
de Rosa). Invito al pensiero di Aristotele, Mursia, Milano 1992. Sostanza e
relazione. Una aporetica della persona, in L'idea di persona, a cura di V.
Melchiorre, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1996, pp. 175–203. L'enigma del desiderio,
Edizioni San Paolo, Cinisello Balsamo 1999 (con L. Ancona e P.A. Sequeri). La
politica e la speranza, Edizioni Lavoro, Roma 1999 (con V. Melchiorre). Il
frammento e l'Intero. Indagini sul senso dell'essere e sulla stabilità del
sapere, 2 volumi, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2015 (1ª ed. 2000). Sul
trascendentale come intersoggettività originaria, in Le avventure del
trascendentale, a cura di A. Rigobello, Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino 2001,
pp. 11–34. Sulla verità e sul bene, Petite Plaisance, Pistoia 2001 (con L.
Grecchi). Etica del desiderio come etica del riconoscimento, 2 volumi,
Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2015. Sostanza e relazione. Indagini di struttura
sull'umano che ci è comune, 2 volumi, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2016. Studi
gentiliani, 2 volumi, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2018. Studi marxiani, 2 volumi,
Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2019. Studi aristotelici, 2 volumi, Orthotes,
Napoli-Salerno 2020. Curatele La ragione e la dialettica. Studi su Marx e della
Volpe, Marsilio, Venezia 1980 (a cura di). Teorie della felicità. II,
Francisci, Abano Terme 1986 (a cura di). La qualità dell'uomo. Filosofi e
psicologi a confronto, Franco Angeli, Milano 1988 (curato insieme a G.
Trentini). Dio e la ragione, Marietti, Genova 1993 (a cura di). L'etica e il
suo altro, Franco Angeli, Milano 1994. Strutture del sapere filosofico, Il
Cardo, Venezia 1997 (con E. Berti, A. Masullo, L. Ruggiu, E. Severino). La
libertà del bene, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1998 (a cura di). Essere giusti con
l'altro, Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino 2000 (a cura di). Introduzione all'etica,
Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2001 (a cura di). Etica trascendentale e
intersoggettività, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2002 (a cura di). Multiculturalismo
e identità, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2002 (cura insieme a S. Zamagni). La
persona e i nomi dell'essere. Scritti di filosofia in onore di V. Melchiorre,
Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2002 (curato con F. Botturi e F. Totaro). Libertà,
giustizia e bene in una società plurale, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2003 (a cura
di). Etiche e politiche della post-modernità, Milano, Vita e Pensiero 2003 (a
cura di). Etica del plurale. Giustizia, riconoscimento, responsabilità, Vita e
Pensiero, Milano 2004 (curato con E. Bonan). Affetti e legami, Vita e Pensiero,
Milano 2004 (curato con F. Botturi). La regola d'oro come etica universale,
Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2005 (curato con S. Zanardo). Bontadini e la
metafisica, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2008 (a cura di). Metafisica e violenza,
Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2008 (curato con P. Bettineschi). Etica di frontiera.
Nuove forme del bene e del male, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2008 (curato con S.
Zanardo). Di un altro genere: etica al femminile, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2008
(curato con P. Ricci Sindoni). Giorgio La Pira. Un san Francesco nel Novecento,
AVE, Roma 2008 (curato con E. Zambruno). Multiculturalismo e interculturalità.
L'etica in questione, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2011 (curato con E. Bonan). Life
and the Sacred, Olms, Hildesheim-Zuerich-New York 2012 (curato con R. Alvira).
La vita spettacolare. Questioni di etica, Orthotes, Napoli 2013 (curato con R.
Fanciullacci). Etica dell'economia. Idee per una critica del riduzionismo
economico, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2016 (curato con A. Biasini). Differenza di
genere e differenza sessuale. Un problema di etica di frontiera, Orthotes,
Napoli-Salerno 2017. Il dovere dell'ospitalità, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2018.
Note ^ Dell'interpretazione di Gentile offerta da Vigna discutono, fra gli
altri, M. Berlanda, Gentile e l'ipoteca kantiana. Linee di formazione del primo
attualismo (1898-1912), Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2007, e P. Bettineschi, Critica
della prassi assoluta. Analisi dell'idealismo gentiliano, Orthotes, Napoli
2011. Ora si vedano anche C. Vigna, Studi gentiliani, 2 volumi, Orthotes,
Napoli-Salerno 2018. ^ Cfr. gli scritti raccolti in C. Vigna, Studi marxiani, 2
volumi, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2019. ^ Cfr. gli scritti raccolti in C. Vigna,
Studi aristotelici, 2 volumi, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2020. ^ Cfr. F.
Saccardi, Semantizzazione dell'essere e inferenza metempirica, in P. Pagani (a
cura di), Debili postille. Lettere a Carmelo Vigna, Orthotes, Napoli 2012, pp.
141-151. ^ Cfr. anche L. Messinese, L'apparire del mondo. Dialogo con Emanuele
Severino sulla "struttura originaria" del sapere, Mimesis,
Milano-Udine 2008, p. 363: "Carmelo Vigna, invece, che pur si è formato
alla scuola di Bontadini e di Severino, non segue più i suoi maestri, perché
ormai egli ritiene che, se si accetta la semantizzazione parmenidea
dell'essere, non si può evitare di estendere gli attributi dell'essere assoluto
agli enti, come precisamente è avvenuto nello svolgimento del pensiero di
Severino. L'errore, però, prosegue Vigna, sta proprio in questo "aver
trattato la questione dell'essere come una questione di essenza". L'errore
viene eliminato convincendosi che la semantizzazione dell'essere coincide con
la 'relazione di essenza ed esistenza': questo è il 'tratto comune' tra tutti
gli enti". ^ Cfr. C. Vigna, Il frammento e l'Intero, pp. 119-134, 187-221,
475-488; C. Vigna, Sulla semantizzazione dell'essere. L'eredità speculativa di
Gustavo Bontadini, in Bontadini e la metafisica, pp. 41-57. Si veda inoltre
G.P. Solliani, Dell'essere come essenza. Per una rivisitazione del problema a
partire da Tommaso d'Aquino, in Debili postille, pp. 169-178. ^ Cfr. C. Vigna,
Il frammento e l'Intero, pp. 135-182. Cfr. anche P. Pagani, Una rivisitazione
della via del divenire e A. Peratoner, Intorno alla conoscibilità di Dio, la
ragione, la fede, in Debili postille, pp. 91-102 e pp. 113-126. Si veda
poi A. Barzaghi, Percorsi di rigorizzazione della teologia naturale nella
filosofia neoclassica milanese, in Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 2018,
n. 4, pp. 827-848. ^ Cfr. C. Vigna, Etica del desiderio umano (in nuce), in
Introduzione all'etica, pp. 119-154. ^ Cfr. C. Vigna, Aporetica dei rapporti intersoggettivi
e sua risoluzione, in Etica trascendentale e intersoggettività, pp. 165-204. Si
veda anche il saggio di R. Fanciullacci, Dell'intersoggettività e del
riconoscimento. Per Carmelo Vigna, in Debili postille, pp. 49-62. ^ Cfr. C.
Vigna, Sul trascendentale come intersoggettività originaria. Inoltre: G.
Venuti, Sulla Cura d'Altri come Regola d'Oro. Lettera a perta a Carmelo Vigna,
e S. Zanardo, Sul dono della differenza, in Debili postille, pp. 199-212 e pp.
213-225. ^ Per una discussione complessiva del pensiero di Vigna si vedano i
saggi contenuti in P. Pagani (a cura di) Debili postille. Lettere a Carmelo
Vigna, Orthotes, Napoli 2012. ^ Cfr. C. Vigna, Sostanza e relazione. Una
aporetica della persona. Si può vedere anche P. Bettineschi, Finità e infinità
della soggettività. Lettera aperta a Carmelo Vigna, in P. Bettineschi,
Intenzionalità e riconoscimento. Scritti di etica e antropologia
trascendentale, Orthotes, Napoli 2012, pp. 29-40. Collegamenti esterni
Bergamofestival: l'intuizione, su youtube.com. Malato o persona?, su
youtube.com. L'etica, su youtube.com. Treccani. Intervista a Carmelo Vigna: la
filosofia morale, su youtube.com. Claudio Tugnoli, Carmelo Vigna: il desiderio
come orizzonte trascendentale, su mondodomani.org. Profilo di Carmelo Vigna sul
sito dell’Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, su unive.it (archiviato dall'url
originale il 14 marzo 2014). Bollettino della Società filosofica italiana (n.
178 del 2003 (PDF), su sfi.it. Centro di Etica Generale e Applicata, su
centrodietica.it. Centro Interuniversitario per gli Studi sull’Etica, su
venus.unive.it. URL consultato il 14 marzo 2014 (archiviato dall'url originale
il 5 marzo 2016). Società Italiana di Filosofia Morale, su sifm.it. Intervento
su La Pira, su avvenire.it. URL consultato il 16 marzo 2014 (archiviato
dall'url originale il 16 marzo 2014). Attualismo, problematicismo, metafisica
(PDF), su filosofia.it. URL consultato il 16 marzo 2014 (archiviato dall'url
originale il 16 marzo 2014). La politica e il sacro, su inschibboleth.org.
Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 118378079 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0939 1886 · SBN
IT\ICCU\CFIV\044635 · LCCN (EN) n79065035 · GND (DE) 136342272 · BNF (FR)
cb120306670 (data) · BAV (EN) 495/289118 · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n79065035 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI
secoloStorici della filosofia italianiAccademici italiani del XX
secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1940Nati il 26 novembreNati a
RosoliniProfessori dell'Università Ca' FoscariProfessori dell'Università
Cattolica del Sacro CuoreStudenti dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro
Cuore[altre]
Vignoli: essential Italian philosopher. Tito
Vignoli Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search
Abbozzo Questa voce sull'argomento filosofi italiani è solo un abbozzo.
Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di Wikipedia. Tito Vignoli Tito Vignoli (Rosignano
Marittimo, 1º febbraio 1829 – Milano, 5 dicembre 1914) è stato un filosofo italiano. Indice 1Biografia 2Bibliografia 3Altri
progetti 4Collegamenti esterni Biografia A vent'anni si trasferì a Milano, dove
svolse la sua attività scientifica. Docente di antropologia presso la Reale
Accademia di Scienze e Lettere, divenne nel 1893 direttore del Museo civico di
storia naturale. I suoi scritti
apparvero su Il Politecnico e sulla Rivista di filosofia scientifica. Due sue
opere ebbero risonanza europea: Della legge fondamentale dell'intelligenza nel
mondo animale (1877) e Mito e scienza (1879); quest'ultima, tradotta in lingua
tedesca nel 1880, influenzò Aby Warburg, in inglese ("Myth and
Science", New York, Appleton Publication, 1882 ISBN
978-1-152-56088-8). Bibliografia Questo
testo proviene in parte dalla relativa voce del progetto Mille anni di scienza
in Italia, opera del Museo Galileo. Istituto Museo di Storia della Scienza di
Firenze (home page), pubblicata sotto licenza Creative Commons CC-BY-3.0 Elena
Canadelli, In Search of Animal Intelligence: The Case of the Italian
Psychologist Tito Vignoli (1824-1914), in The European Yearbook of the History
of Psychology 1 (2015), p. 91-103 Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource
Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Tito Vignoli Collegamenti esterni
Opere di Tito Vignoli, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su
Wikidata (EN) Opere di Tito Vignoli, su Open Library, Internet Archive.
Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Tito Vignoli, su Progetto Gutenberg.
Modifica su Wikidata Elena Canadelli, Tito Vignoli. Da professore di
antropologia a direttore del Museo civico d storia naturale[collegamento
interrotto] nel sito "Milano Città delle Scienze". Elena Canadelli,
La biblioteca di antropologia e biologia di Tito Vignoli
(1824-1914[collegamento interrotto] nel sito "Milano Città delle
Scienze". «Tito Vignoli» in Biblioteche dei filosofi, Scuola Normale
Superiore di Pisa - Università degli studi di Cagliari Controllo di autoritàVIAF
(EN) 18005722 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2122 7288 · SBN IT\ICCU\TO0V\091838 · LCCN
(EN) n85813484 · GND (DE) 117682551 · BNF (FR) cb102952600 (data) · CERL
cnp00696318 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n85813484 Biografie Portale
Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XIX
secoloFilosofi italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1829Morti nel 1914Nati il 1º
febbraioMorti il 5 dicembreNati a Rosignano MarittimoMorti a Milano[altre]
VISUM
– Grice: “The Grecian root ‘id-,’ as in Plato’s infamous ideas, is cognate with
Latin, ‘visum,’ -- ideatum. Quite
used by Grice. Cf. Conceptum. Sub-perceptual. Cognate with ‘eidos,’ that Grice
translates as ‘forma.’ Why is an ‘eidos’ an ‘idea’ and in what sense is an idea
a ‘form’? These are deep questions! idem:
a
key philosophical notion that encompasses linguistic, logic, and metaphysical
issues, and also epistemology. Possibly the central question in philosophy.
Vide the principle of ‘identity.’ amicus est tamquam alter idem,” a second self, Identicum. Grecian ‘tautotes.’ late L. identitās (Martianus
Capella, c425), peculiarly formed from ident(i)-, for L. idem ‘same’ + -tās,
-tātem: see -ty. Various suggestions have been offered as to the
formation. Need was evidently felt of a noun of condition or quality from
idem to express the notion of ‘sameness’, side by side with those of ‘likeness’
and ‘oneness’ expressed by similitās and ūnitās: hence the form of the
suffix. But idem had no combining stem. Some have thought that
ident(i)- was taken from the L. adv. "identidem" ‘over and over
again, repeatedly’, connexion with which appears to be suggested by Du Cange's
explanation of identitās as ‘quævis actio repetita’. Meyer-Lübke suggests
that in the formation there was present some association between idem and id
ens ‘that being’, whence "identitās" like "entitās." But
assimilation to "entitās" may have been merely to avoid the solecism
of *idemitās or *idemtās. sameness. However originated, "ident(i)-"
(either from adverb "identidem" or an assimilation of "id
ens," "id ens," that being, "id entitas" "that
entity") became the combining stem of idem, and the series ūnitās, ūnicus,
ūnificus, ūnificāre, was paralleled by identitās, identicus, identificus, identificāre:
see identic, identific, identify above.] to OED 3rd: identity, n.
Pronunciation: Brit./ʌɪˈdɛntᵻti/ , U.S. /aɪˈdɛn(t)ədi/ Forms: 15
idemptitie, 15 ydemptyte, 15–16 identitie, 15– identity, 16 idemptity.
Etymology: < Middle French identité, ydemtité, ydemptité, ydentité (French
identité) quality or condition of being the same (a1310; 1756 in sense
‘individuality, personality’, 1801 in sense ‘distinct impression of a single
person or thing presented to or perceived by others’) and its etymon
post-classical Latin identitat-, identitas quality of being the same
(4th cent.), condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not
something else (8th cent. in a British source), fact of being the same (from
12th cent. in British sources), continual sameness, lack of variety, monotony
(from 12th cent. in British sources; 14th cent. in a continental source)
< classical Latin idem same (see idem n.) + -tās (see -ty suffix1)
[sameness], after post-classical Latin essentitas ‘being’ (4th cent.).The
Latin word was formed to provide a translation equivalent for ancient Greek
ταὐτότης (tautotes) identity. identity: identity was a key concept for Grice.
Under identity, he views both identity simpliciter and personal identity. Grice
advocates psychological or soul criterianism. Psychological or soul criterianism
has been advocated, in one form or another, by philosophers such as Locke,
Butler, Duncan-Jones, Berkeley, Gallie, Grice, Flew, Haugeland, Jones, Perry,
Shoemaker and Parfit, and Quinton. What all of these theories have in
common is the idea that, even if it is the case that some kind of physical
states are necessary for being a person, it is the unity of consciousness which
is of decisive importance for personal identity over time. In this sense,
person is a term which picks out a psychological, or mental, "thing".
In claiming this, all Psychological Criterianists entail the view that personal
identity consists in the continuity of psychological features. It is
interesting that Flew has an earlier "Selves," earlier than his essay
on Locke on personal identity. The first, for Mind, criticising Jones,
"The self in sensory cognition"; the second for Philosophy. Surely
under the tutelage of Grice. Cf. Jones, Selves: A reply to Flew,
Philosophy. The stronger thesis asserts that there is no conceivable
situation in which bodily identity would be necessary, some other conditions
being always both necessary and sufficient. Grice takes it that Locke’s theory
(II, 27) is an example of this latter type. To say
"Grice remembers that he heard a noise", without irony or
inverted commas, is to imply that Grice did hear a noise. In this respect
remember is like, know, a factive. It does not follow from this, nor is it
true, that each claim to remember, any more than each claim to know, is alethic
or veridical; or, not everything one seems to remember is something one really
remembers. So much is obvious, although Locke -- although admittedly
referring only to the memory of actions, section 13 -- is forced to invoke
the providence of God to deny the latter. These points have been emphasised by
Flew in his discussion of Locke’s views on personal identity. In formulating
Locke’ thesis, however, Flew makes a mistake; for he offers Lockes thesis in
the form if Grice can remember Hardies doing such-and-such, Grice and Hardie
are the same person. But this obviously will not do, even for Locke, for we
constantly say things like I remember my brother Derek joining the army without
implying that I and my brother are the same person. So if we are to formulate
such a criterion, it looks as though we have to say something like the
following. If Derek Grice remembers joining my, he is the person who did that
thing. But since remembers doing means remembers himself doing, this is
trivially tautologous, and moreover lends colour to Butlers famous objection
that memory, so far from constituting personal identity, presupposes
it. As Butler puts it, one should really think it self-evident that
consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot
constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can
constitute truth, which it presupposes. Butler then asserts that Locke’s
misstep stems from his methodology. This wonderful mistake may possibly have
arisen from hence; that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the
idea of a person, or intelligent being. For this might be expressed
inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and from hence it
might be concluded to make personal identity. One of the points that Locke
emphasizes—that persistence conditions are determined via defining kind
terms—is what, according to Butler, leads Locke astray. Butler
additionally makes the point that memory is not required for personal
persistence. But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel
is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of
past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who
performed those actions, or had those feelings. This is a point that others develop
when they assert that Lockes view results in contradiction. Hence the
criterion should rather run as follows. If Derek Grice claims to remember
joining the army. We must then ask how such a criterion might be
used. Grices example is: I remember I smelled a smell. He needs two
experiences to use same. I heard a noise and I smelled a smell.The singular
defines the hearing of a noise is the object of some consciousness. The pair
defines, "The hearing of a noise and the smelling of a smell are objects
of the same -- cognate with self as in I hurt me self, -- consciousness. The
standard form of an identity question is Is this x the same x as that x
which E and in the simpler situation we are at least presented with just
the materials for constructing such a question; but in the more complicated
situation we are baffled even in asking the question, since both the
transformed persons are equally good candidates for being its Subjects, and the
question Are these two xs the same (x?) as the x which E is not a recognizable
form of identity question. Thus, it might be argued, the fact that we could not
speak of identity in the latter situation is no kind of proof that we could not
do so in the former. Certainly it is not a proof, as Strawson points out to
Grice. This is not to say that they are identical at all. The only case in
which identity and exact similarity could be distinguished, as we have just
seen, is that of the body, same body and exactly similar body really do mark a
difference. Thus one may claim that the omission of the body takes away all
content from the idea of personal identity, as Pears pointed out to
Grice. Leaving aside memory, which only partially applies to the case,
character and attainments are quite clearly general things. Joness character is,
in a sense, a particular; just because Jones’s character refers to the
instantiation of certain properties by a particular (and bodily) man, as
Strawson points out to Grice (Particular and general). If in ‘Negation and
privation,’ Grice tackles Aristotle, he now tackles Locke. Indeed, seeing that
Grice went years later to the topic as motivated by, of all people, Haugeland,
rather than perhaps the more academic milieu that Perry offers, Grice became
obsessed with Hume’s sceptical doubts! Hume writes in the Appendix that when he
turns his reflection on himself, Hume never can perceive this self without
some one or more perceptions. Nor can Hume ever perceive any
thing but the perceptions. It is the composition of these, therefore,
which forms the self, Hume thinks. Hume grants that one can conceive a thinking
being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose, says Hume, the mind to
be reduced even below the life of an oyster. Suppose the oyster to have only
one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider the oyster in that situation.
Does the oyster conceive any thing but merely that perception? Has the oyster
any notion of, to use Gallies pretentious Aristotelian jargon, self or
substance? If not, the addition of this or other perception can never give
the oyster that notion. The annihilation, which this or that philosopher,
including Grices first post-war tutee, Flew, supposes to follow upon
death, and which entirely destroys the oysters self, is nothing but
an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and
hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore
must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other.
Is self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have
place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of
substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? For his
part, Hume claims, he has a notion of neither, when conceived distinct
from this or that particular perception. However extraordinary Hume’s conclusion
may seem, it need not surprise us. Most philosophers, such as
Locke, seems inclined to think, that personal identity arises
from consciousness. But consciousness is nothing but a reflected
thought or perception, Hume suggests. This is Grices quandary about personal
identity and its implicatura. Some philosophers have taken Grice as trying to
provide an exegesis of Locke. However, their approaches surely differ. What
works for Grice may not work for Locke. For Grice it is analytically true that
it is not the case that Person1 and Person may have the
same experience. Grice explicitly states that he thinks that his
logical-construction theory is a modification of Locke’s theory. Grice does not
seem terribly interested to find why it may not, even if the York-based Locke
Society might! Rather than introjecting into Lockes shoes, Grices strategy
seems to dismiss Locke, shoes and all. Specifically, it not clear to Grice what
Lockes answer in the Essay would be to Grices question about this or that I
utterance that he sets his analysis with. Admittedly, Grice does quote, albeit
briefly, directly from Lockes Essay. As far as any intelligent being can repeat
the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first,
and with the same consciousness it has of any present action, Locke claims, so
far the being is the same personal self. Grice tackles Lockes claim with four
objections. These are important to consider since Grice sees as improving on
Locke. A first objection concerns icircularity, with which Grice easily
disposes by following Hume and appealing to the experience of memory or
introspection. A second objection is Reid’s alleged counterexample about the
long-term memory of the admiral who cannot remember that he was flogged as a
boy. Grice dismisses this as involving too long-term of a memory. A third
objection concerns Locke’s vagueness about the aboutness of consciousness,
a point made by Hume in the Appendix. A fourth objection concerns again
circularity, this time in Locke’s use of same in the definiens ‒ cf. Wiggins,
Sameness and substance. It’s extraordinary that Wiggins is philosophising on
anything Griceian. Grice is concerned with the implicaturum involved in the use
of the first person singular. I will be fighting soon. Grice means in body and
soul. The utterance also indicates that this is Grices pre-war days at Oxford.
No wonder his choice of an example. What else could he have in his soul? The
topic of personal identity, which label Hume and Austin found pretentious, and
preferred to talk about the illocutionary force of I, has a special Oxonian
pedigree, perhaps as motivated by Humes challenge, that Grice has occasion to
study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum. with Locke’s Essay as mandatory
reading. Locke, a philosopher with whom Oxford identifies most, infamously
defends this memory-based account of I. Up in Scotland, Reid reads it and
concocts this alleged counter-example. Hume, or Home, if you must, enjoys it.
In fact, while in the Mind essay he is not too specific about Hume, Grice will,
due mainly to his joint investigations with Haugeland, approach, introjecting
into the shoes of Hume ‒ who is idolised in The New World ‒ in ways he does not
introject into Lockes. But Grices quandary is Hume’s quandary, too. In his own
approach to I, the Cartesian ego, made transcendental and apperceptive by Kant,
Grice updates the time-honoured empiricist mnemonic analysis by Locke. The
first update is in style. Grice embraces, as he does with negation, a logical
construction, alla Russell, via Broad, of this or that “I” (first-person)
utterance, ending up with an analysis of a “someone,” third-person, less
informative, utterance. Grices immediate source is Gallie’s essay on self and
substance in Mind. Mind is still a review of psychology and philosophy, so poor
Grice has not much choice. In fact, Grice is being heterodoxical or heretic enough
to use Broad’s taxonomy, straight from the other place of I utterances. The
logical-construction theory is a third proposal, next to the Bradleyian
idealist pure-ego theory and the misleading covert-description theory.
Grice deals with the Reids alleged counterexample of the brave
officer. Suppose, Reid says, and Grice quotes verbatim, a brave officer to
have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a
standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general
in advanced life. Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that
when he2 took the standard, he2 was conscious
of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he3 was
conscious of his2 taking the standard, but had absolutely lost
the consciousness of his1 flogging. These things being supposed, it follows,
from Lockes doctrine, that he1 who is flogged at school is the same person as
him2 who later takes the standard, and that he2 who
later takes the standard is the same person as him3 who is
still later made a general. When it follows, if there be any truth in logic,
that the general is the same person with him1 who is flogged at
school. But the general’s consciousness does emphatically not reach so far back
as his1 flogging. Therefore, according to Locke’s doctrine, he3 is
emphatically not the same person as him1 who is flogged. Therefore, we can say
about the general that he3 is, and at the same time, that he3 is
not the same person as him1 who was flogged at school. Grice, wholl
later add a temporal suffix to =t yielding, by transitivity. The flogged boy =t1 the
brave officer. And the brave officer =t2 the admiral. But the
admiral ≠t3 the flogged boy. In Mind, Grice tackles the basic
analysans, and comes up with a rather elaborate analysans for a simple I or
Someone statement. Grice just turns to a generic affirmative variant of the
utterance he had used in Negation. It is now someone, viz. I, who hears that
the bell tolls. It is the affirmative counterpart of the focus of his earlier
essay on negation, I do not hear that the bell tolls. Grice dismisses what, in
the other place, was referred to as privileged-access, and the indexicality of
I, an approach that will be made popular by Perry, who however reprints Grices essay
in his influential collection for the University of California Press. By
allowing for someone, viz. I, Grice seems to be relying on a piece of reasoning
which hell later, in his first Locke lecture, refer to as too good. I hear that
the bell tolls; therefore, someone hears that the bell tolls. Grice attempts to
reduce this or that I utterance (Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls) is
in terms of a chain or sequence of mnemonic states. It poses a few quandaries
itself. While quoting from this or that recent philosopher such as Gallie and
Broad, it is a good thing that Grice has occasion to go back to, or revisit,
Locke and contest this or that infamous and alleged counterexample presented by
Reid and Hume. Grice adds a methodological note to his proposed
logical-construction theory of personal identity. There is some intricacy of
his reductive analysis, indeed logical construction, for an apparently simple
and harmless utterance (cf. his earlier essay on I do not hear that the bell
tolls). But this intricacy does not prove the analysis wrong. Only that Grice
is too subtle. If the reductive analysis of not is in terms of each state which
I am experiencing is incompatible with phi), that should not be a minus, or
drawback, but a plus, and an advantage in terms of philosophical progress. The
same holds here in terms of the concept of a temporary state. Much later,
Grice reconsiders, or revisits, indeed, Broads remark and re-titles his
approach as the (or a) logical-construction theory of personal identity. And,
with Haugeland, Grice re-considers Humes own vagaries, or quandary, with
personal identity. Unlike the more conservative Locke that Grice favours in the
pages of Mind, eliminationist Hume sees ‘I’ as a conceptual muddle, indeed a
metaphysical chimæra. Hume presses the point for an empiricist verificationist
account of I. For, as Russell would rhetorically ask, ‘What can be more direct
that the experience of myself?’ The Hume Society should take notice of Grices
simplification of Hume’s implicaturum on I, if The Locke Society won’t. As a
matter of fact, Grice calls one of his metaphysical construction routines the
Humeian projection, so it is not too adventurous to think that Grice considers
I as an intuitive concept that needs to be metaphysically re-constructed
and be given a legitimate Fregeian sense. Why that label for a construction
routine? Grice calls this metaphysical construction routine Humeian projection,
since the mind (or soul) as it were, spreads over its objects. But, by mind,
Hume does not necessarily mean the I. Cf. The minds I. Grice is especially
concerned with the poverty and weaknesses of Humes criticism to Lockes account
of personal identity. Grice opts to revisit the Lockeian memory-based of this
or that someone, viz. I utterance that Hume rather regards as vague, and
confusing. Unlike Humes, neither Lockes nor Grices reductive analysis of
personal identity is reductionist and eliminationist. The
reductive-reductionist distinction Grice draws in Retrospective epilogue as he
responds to Rountree-Jack on this or that alleged wrong on meaning that. It is
only natural that Grice would be sympathetic to Locke. Grice explores these
issues with Haugeland mainly at seminars. One may wonder why Grice spends so
much time in a philosopher such as Hume, with whom he agreed almost on nothing!
The answer is Humes influence in the Third World that forced Grice to focus on
this or that philosopher. Surely Locke is less popular in the New World than
Hume is. One supposes Grice is trying to save Hume at the implicaturum level,
at least. The phrase or term of art, logical construction is Russells and
Broads, but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar.
Grice prefers Russells and Broads more conservative label. This is more than a
terminological point. If Hume is right and there is NO intuitive concept behind
I, one cannot strictly re-construct it, only construct it. Ultimately, Grice
shows that, if only at the implicaturum level, we are able to provide an
analysandum for this or that someone, viz. I utterance without using I, by
implicating only this or that mnemonic concept, which belongs, naturally, as
his theory of negation does, in a theory of philosophical psychology, and again
a lower branch of it, dealing with memory. The topic of personal identity
unites various interests of Grice. The first is identity “=” simpliciter.
Instead of talking of the meaning of I, as, say, Anscombe would, Grice sticks
to the traditional category, or keyword, for this, i. e. the theory-laden, personal
identity, or even personal sameness. Personal identity is a type of identity,
but personal adds something to it. Surely Hume was stretching person a bit when
using the example of a soul with a life lower than an oyster. Since Grice
follows Aristotles De Anima, he enjoys Hume’s choice, though. It may be argued
that personal adds Locke’s consciousness, and rational agency. Grice plays with
the body-soul distinction. I, viz someone or somebody, fell from the stairs,
perhaps differs from I will be fighting soon. This or that someone, viz. I
utterance may be purely bodily. Grice would think that the idea that his soul
fell from the stairs sounds, as it would to Berkeley, harsh. But then theres
this or that one may be mixed utterance. Someone, viz. I, plays cricket, where
surely your bodily mechanisms require some sort of control by the soul.
Finally, this or that may be purely souly ‒ the one Grice ends up analysing,
Someone, viz. I, hear that the bell tolls. At the time of his Mind essay, Grice
may have been unaware of the complications that the concept of a person may
bring as attached in adjective form to identity. Ayer did, and Strawson and
Wiggins will, and Grice learns much from Strawson. Since Parfit, this has
become a common-place topic for analysis at Oxford. A person as a complexum of
a body-soul spatio-temporal continuant substance. Ultimately, Grice finds a
theoretical counterpart here. A P may become a human, which Grice understands
physiologically. That is not enough. A P must aspire, via meteousis, to become
a person. Thus, person becomes a technical term in Grices grand metaphysical
scheme of things. Someone, viz. I, hear that the bell is tolls is analysed
as ≡df, or if and only if, a hearing that the bell tolls is a
part of a total temporary tn souly state S1 which is
one in a s. such that any state Sn, given this or that
condition, contains as a part a memory Mn of the
experience of hearing that the bell tolls, which is a component in some
pre-sequent t1n item, or contains an experience of hearing
that the bell tolls a memory M of which would, given this or that
condition, occur as a component in some sub-sequent t2>tn item,
there being no sub-set of items which is independent of the rest. Grice
simplifies the reductive analysans. Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls
iff a hearing that the bell tolls is a component in an item of an interlocking
s. with emphasis on lock, s. of this or that memorable and memorative
total temporary tn state S1. Is Grice’s Personal
identity ever referred to in the Oxonian philosophical literature? Indeeed.
Parfit mentions, which makes it especially memorable and memorative. P. Edwards
includes a reference to Grices Mind essay in the entry for Personal identity,
as a reference to Grice et al on Met. , is referenced in Edwardss encyclopædia
entry for metaphysics. Grice does not attribute privileged access or
incorrigibility to I or the first person. He always hastens to add that I can
always be substituted, salva veritate (if baffling your addressee A) by someone
or other, if not some-body or other, a colloquialism Grice especially detested.
Grices agency-based approach requires that. I am rational provided thou art,
too. If, by explicitly saying he is a Lockeian, Grice surely does not wish us
to see him as trying to be original, or the first to consider this or that
problem about I; i.e. someone. Still, Grice is the philosopher who explores
most deeply the reductive analysis of I, i.e. someone. Grice needs the
reductive analysis because human agency (philosophically, rather than
psychologically interpreted) is key for his approach to things. By uttering The
bell tolls, U means that someone, viz. himself, hears that the bell tolls, or
even, by uttering I, hear, viz. someone hears, that the bell tolls, U means
that the experience of a hearing that the bell tolls is a component in a
total temporary state which is a member of a s. such that each member
would, given certain conditions, contain as an component one
memory of an experience which is a component in a pre-sequent member, or
contains as a component some experience a memory of which would,
given certain conditions, occur as a component in a post-sequent member;
there being no sub-set of members which is independent of the rest.
Thanks, the addressee might reply. I didnt know that! The reductive bit to
Grices analysis needs to be emphasised. For Grice, a person, and consequently,
a someone, viz. I utterance, is, simpliciter, a logical construction out of
this or that Humeian experience. Whereas in Russell, as Broad notes, a
logical construction of this or that philosophical concept, in this case
personal identity, or cf. Grices earlier reductive analysis of not, is thought
of as an improved, rationally reconstructed conception. Neither Russell nor
Broad need maintain that the logical construction preserves the original
meaning of the analysandum someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls, or I do
not hear that the bell tolls ‒ hence their paradox of reductionist analysis.
This change of Subjects does not apply to Grice. Grice emphatically intends to
be make explicit, if rationally reconstructed (if that is not an
improvement) through reductive (if not reductionist) analysis, the concept
Grice already claims to have. One particular development to consider is within
Grices play group, that of Quinton. Grice and Quinton seem to have been the
only two philosophers in Austins play group who showed any interest on someone,
viz. I. Or not. The fact that Quinton entitles his thing “The soul” did not
help. Note that Woozley was at the time editing Reid on “Identity,” Cf.
Duncan-Jones on mans mortality. Note that Quintons immediate trigger is
Shoemaker. Grice writes that he is not “merely a series of perceptions,” for he
is “conscious of a permanent self, an I who experiences these perceptions
and who is now identical with the I who experienced perceptions
yesterday.” So, leaving aside that he is using I with the third person verb,
but surely this is no use-mention fallacy, it is this puzzle that provoked his
thoughts on temporal-relative “=” later on. As Grice notes, Butler argued that
consciousness of experience can contribute to identity but not define it. Grice
will use Butler in his elaboration of conversational benevolence versus
conversational self-interest. Better than Quinton, it is better to consider
Flew in Philosophy, 96, on Locke and the problem of personal identity,
obviously suggested as a term paper by Grice! Wiggins cites Flew. Flew actually
notes that Berkeley saw Lockes problem earlier than Reid, which concerns the
transitiveness of =. Recall that Wigginss tutor at Oxford was a tutee by Grice,
Ackrill. identity,
the relation each thing bears just to itself. Formally, a % b Q EF(Fa P Fb);
informally, the identity of a and b implies and is implied by their sharing of
all their properties. Read from left to right, this biconditional asserts the
indiscernibility of identicals; from right to left, the identity of
indiscernibles. The indiscernibility of identicals is not to be confused with a
metalinguistic principle to the effect that if a and b are names of the same
object, then each may be substituted for the other in a sentence without change
of truth-value: that may be false, depending on the semantics of the language
under discussion. Similarly, the identity of indiscernibles is not the claim
that if a and b can be exchanged in all sentential contexts without affecting
truth-value, then they name the same object. For such intersubstitutability may
arise when the language in question simply lacks predicates that could discriminate
between the referents of a and b. In short, the identity of things is not a
relation among names. Identity proper is numerical identity, to be
distinguished from exact similarity (qualitative identity). Intuitively, two
exactly similar objects are “copies” of each other; still they are two, hence
not identical. One way to express this is via the notions of extrinsic and
intrinsic properties: exactly similar objects differ in respect of the former
only. But we can best explain ‘instrinsic property’ by saying that a thing’s
intrinsic properties are those it shares with its copies. These notions appear
virtually interdefinable. (Note that the concept of an extrinsic property must
be relativized to a class or kind of things. Not being in San Francisco is an
extrinsic property of persons but arguably an intrinsic property of cities.)
While qualitative identity is a familiar notion, its theoretical utility is
unclear. The absolute notion of qualitative identity should, however, be
distinguished from an unproblematic relative notion: if some list of salient
properties is fixed in a given context (say, in mechanics or normative ethics),
then the exactly similar things, relative to that context, are those that agree
on the properties listed. Both the identity of indiscernibles and (less
frequently) the indiscernibility of identicals are sometimes called Leibniz’s
law. Neither attribution is apt. Although Leibniz would have accepted the
former principle, his distinctive claim was the impossibility of exactly
similar objects: numerically distinct individuals cannot even share all
intrinsic properties. Moreover, this was not, for him, simply a law of identity
but rather an application of his principle of sufficient reason. And the
indiscernibility of identicals is part of a universal understanding of
identity. What distinguishes Leibniz is the prominence of identity statements
in his metaphysics and logical theory. Although identity remains a clear and
basic logical notion, identity questions about problematic kinds of objects
raise difficulties. One example is the identification of properties,
particularly in contexts involving reduction. Although we know what identity
is, the notion of a property is unclear enough to pose systematic obstacles to
the evaluation of theoretically significant identity statements involving
properties. Other difficulties involve personal identity or the possible
identification of numbers and sets in the foundations of mathematics. In these
cases, the identity questions simply inherit – and provide vivid ways of
formulating – the difficulties pertaining to such concepts as person, property,
or number; no rethinking of the identity concept itself is indicated. But
puzzles about the relation of an ordinary material body to its constituent
matter may suggest that the logician’s analysis of identity does not cleanly
capture our everyday notion(s). Consider a bronze statue. Although the statue
may seem to be nothing besides its matter, reflection on change over time
suggests a distinction. The statue may be melted down, hence destroyed, while
the bronze persists, perhaps simply as a mass or perhaps as a new statue formed
from the same bronze. Alternatively, the statue may persist even as some of its
bronze is dissolved in acid. So the statue seems to be one thing and the bronze
another. Yet what is the bronze besides a statue? Surely we do not have two
statues (or statuelike objects) in one place? Some authors feel that variants
of the identity relation may permit a perspicuous description of the relation
of statue and bronze: (1) tensed identity: Assume a class of timebound
properties – roughly, properties an object can have at a time regardless of
what properties it has at other times. (E.g., a statue’s shape, location, or
elegance.) Then a % t b provided a and b share all timebound properties at time
t. Thus, the statue and the bronze may be identical at time t 1 but not at t 2.
(2) relative identity: a and b may be identical relative to one concept (or
predicate) but not to another. Thus, the statue may be held to be the same lump
of matter as the bronze but not the same object of art. identity identity 415
4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 415 In each case, only detailed study will
show whether the variant notion can at once offer a natural description of
change and qualify as a viable identity concept. (Strong doubts arise about
(2).) But it seems likely that our everyday talk of identity has a richness and
ambiguity that escapes formal characterization.
identity, ‘is’ of. See IS. identity, psychophysical. See PHYSICALISM.
identity, theoretical. See PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. identity of indiscernibles, any
of a family of principles, important members of which include the following:
(1) If objects a and b have all properties in common, then a and b are
identical. (2) If objects a and b have all their qualitative properties in
common, then a and b are identical. (3) If objects a and b have all their
non-relational qualitative properties in common, then a and b are identical.
Two questions regarding these principles are raised: Which, if any, are true?
If any are true, are they necessarily true? Discussions of the identity of
indiscernibles typically restrict the scope of the principle to concrete
objects. Although the notions of qualitative and non-relational properties play
a prominent role in these discussions, they are notoriously difficult to
define. Intuitively, a qualitative property is one that can be instantiated by
more than one object and does not involve being related to another particular object.
It does not follow that all qualitative properties are non-relational, since
some relational properties, such as being on top of a brown desk, do not
involve being related to some particular object. (1) is generally regarded as
necessarily true but trivial, since if a and b have all properties in common
then a has the property of being identical with b and b has the property of
being identical with a. Hence, most discussions focus on (2) and (3). (3) is
generally regarded as, at best, a contingent truth since it appears possible to
conceive of two distinct red balls of the same size, shade of color, and
composition. Some have argued that elementary scientific particles, such as
electrons, are counterexamples to even the contingent truth of (3). (2) appears
defensible as a contingent truth since, in the actual world, objects such as
the red balls and the electrons differ in their relational qualitative
properties. It has been argued, however, that (2) is not a necessary truth
since it is possible to conceive of a world consisting of only the two red
balls. In such a world, any qualitative relational property possessed by one
ball is also possessed by the other. Defenders of the necessary truth of (2)
have argued that a careful examination of such counterexamples reveals hidden
qualitative properties that differentiate the objects. Grice learned about
idem, ipsum and simile via his High Church maternal grandfather. “What an iota
can do!” – Under visum we should have:
ideo-motor action – the idea of ‘ideo-‘ is cognate with Latin ‘visum’” –
Grice. a theory of the will according to
which “every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual
movement which is its object” (William James). Proposed by physiologist W. B.
Carpenter, and taught by Lotze and Renouvier, ideo-motor action was developed
by James. He rejected the regnant analysis of voluntary behavior, which held
that will operates by reinstating “feelings of innervation” (Wundt) in the
efferent nerves. Deploying introspection and physiology, James showed that
feelings of innervation do not exist. James advanced ideo-motor action as the
psychological basis of volition: actions tend to occur automatically when
thought, unless inhibited by a contrary idea. Will consists in fixing attention
on a desired idea until it dominates consciousness, the execution of movement
following automatically. James also rejected Bain’s associationist thesis that
pleasure or pain is the necessary spring of action, since according to
ideo-motor theory thought of an action by itself produces it. James’s analysis
became dogma, but was effectively attacked by psychologist E. L. Thorndike
(1874– 1949), who proposed in its place the behavioristic doctrine that ideas
have no power to cause behavior, and argued that belief in ideo-motor action
amounted to belief in sympathetic magic. Thus did will leave the vocabulary of
psychology. Refs.: The main references covering
identity simpliciter are in “Vacuous Names,” and his joint work on metaphysics
with G. Myro. The main references relating to the second group, of personal
identity, are his “Mind” essay, an essay on ‘the logical-construction theory of
personal identity,’ and a second set of essays on Hume’s quandary, The H. P.
Grice Papers, BANC.
valitum: Oddly Vitters has a couple of lectures on ‘value,’
that Grice ‘ignored.’ Valitum should be contrasted from‘validum.’ ‘Valid,’
which is cognate with ‘value,’ a noun Grice loved, is used by logicians. In
Grice’s generalised alethic-cum-deontic logic, ‘valid’ applies, too. ‘Valid’ is
contrasted to the ‘satisfactoriness’ value that attaches directly to the
utterance. ‘Valid’ applies to the reasoning, i.e. the sequence of psychological
states from the premise to the conclusion. How common and insidious was the
talk of a realm of ‘values’ at Oxford in the early 1930s to have Barnes attack
it, and Grice defend it? ‘The realm of values’ sounds like an ordinary man’s
expression, and surely Oxford never had a Wilson Chair of Metaphysical
Axiology. validum is the correct form
out of Roman ‘valeor.’ Grice finds the need for the English equivalent, and
plays with constructing the ‘concept’ “to be of value”! There’s also the
axiologicum. The root for ‘value’ as ‘axis’ is found in Grice’s favourite book
of the Republic, the First! Grice sometimes enjoys sounding pretentious and
uses the definite article ‘the’ indiscriminately, just to tease Flew, his
tutee, who said that talking of ‘the self’ is just ‘rubbish’. It is different
with Grice’s ‘the good’ (to agathon), ‘the rational,’ (to logikon), ‘the
valuable’ (valitum), and ‘the axiological’. Of course, whilesticking with
‘value,’ Grice plays with Grecian “τιμή.” Lewis and
Short have ‘vălor,’ f. ‘valeo,’ which
they render as ‘value,’ adding that it is supposed to translate in Gloss. Lab,
Grecian ‘τιμή.’
‘valor, τιμή, Gloss. Lab.’ ‘Valere,’ which of course algo gives English
‘valid,’ that Grice overuses, is said by Lewis and Short to be cognate with
“vis,” “robur,” “fortissimus,” cf. debilis” and they render as “to be strong.”
So one has to be careful here. “Axiology” is a German thing, and not used at
Clifton or Oxford, where they stick with ‘virtus’ or ‘arete.’ This or that
Graeco-Roman philosopher may have explored a generic approach to ‘value.’ Grice
somewhat dismisses Hare who in Language of Morals very clearly distinguishes
between deontic ‘ought’ and teleological, value-judgemental ‘good.’ For ‘good’
may have an aesthetic use: ‘that painting is good,’ the food is good). The
sexist ‘virtus’ of the Romans perhaps did a disservice to Grecian ‘arete,’ but
Grice hardly uses ‘arete,’ himself. It is etymologically unrelated to
‘agathon,’ yet rumour has it that ‘arete,’ qua ‘excellence,’ is ‘aristos,’ the
superlative of ‘agathon.’ Since Aristotle is into the ‘mesotes,’ Grice worries
not. Liddell and Scott have “ἀρετή” and render it simpliciter as “goodness,
excellence, of any kind,” adding that “in Hom. esp. of manly qualities”: “ποδῶν
ἀρετὴν ἀναφαίνων;” “ἀμείνων παντοίας ἀρετὰς ἠμὲν πόδας ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι καὶ νόον;”
so of the gods, “τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀ. τιμή τε βίη τε;” also of women, “ἀ.
εἵνεκα for valour,” “ἀ. ἀπεδείκνυντο,” “displayed brave deeds.” But when Liddell and Scott give the
philosophical references (Plathegel and Ariskant), they do render “ἀρετή,” as
‘value,’ generally, excellence, “ἡ ἀ. τελείωσίς
τις” Arist. Met. 1021b20, cf. EN1106a15, etc.; of persons, “ἄνδρα πὺξ ἀρετὰν
εὑρόντα,” “τὸ φρονεῖν ἀ. μεγίστη,” “forms of excellence, “μυρίαι ἀνδρῶν ἀ.;”
“δικαστοῦ αὕτη ἀ.;” esp. moral virtue, opp. “κακία,” good nature, kindness,
etc. We should not be so concerned about this, were not for the fact that Grice
explored Foot, not just on meta-ethics as a ‘suppositional’ imperratives,
but on ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ by Foot, who
had edited a reader in meta-ethics for the series of Grice’s friend, Warnock.
Grice knows that when he hears the phrases value system, or belief system, he
is conversing with a relativist. So he plays jocular here. If a value is not a
concept, a value system at least is not what Davidson calls a conceptual
scheme. However, in “The conception of value” (henceforth, “Conception”) Grice
does argue that value IS a concept, and thus part of the conceptual scheme by
Quine. Hilary Putnam congratulates Grice on this in “Fact and value,” crediting
Baker – i. e. Judy – into the bargain. While utilitarianism, as exemplified by
Bentham, denies that a moral intuition need be taken literally, Bentham assumes
the axiological conceptual scheme of hedonistic eudaemonism, with eudaemonia as
the maximal value (summum bonum) understood as hedone. The idea of a system of values (cf. system of ends) is meant to
unify the goals of the agent in terms of the pursuit of eudæmonia. Grice wants
to disgress from naturalism, and the distinction
between a description and anything else. Consider the use of ‘rational’ as
applied to ‘value.’ A naturalist holds that ‘rational’ can be legitimately
apply to the ‘doxastic’ realm, not to the ‘buletic’ realm. A desire (or a
‘value’) a naturalist would say is not something of which ‘rational’ is
predicable. Suppose, Grice says, I meet a philosopher who is in the habit of
pushing pins into other philosophers. Grice asks the philosopher why he does
this. The philosopher says that it gives him pleasure. Grice asks him whether
it is the fact that he causes pain that gives him pleasure. The philosopher
replies that he does not mind whether he causes pain. What gives him pleasure
is the physical sensation of driving a pin into a philosopher’s body. Grice
asks him whether he is aware that his actions cause pain. The philosopher says
that he is. Grice asks him whether he would not feel pain if others did this to
him. The philosopher agrees that he would. I ask him whether he would allow
this to happen. He says that he guesses he would seek to prevent it. Grice asks
him whether he does not think that others must feel pain when he drives pins
into them, and whether he should not do to others what he would try to prevent
them from doing to him. The philosopher says that pins driven into him cause
him pain and he wishes to prevent this. Pins driven by him into others do not
cause him pain, but pleasure, and he therefore wishes to do it. Grice asks him
whether the fact that he causes pain to other philosophers does not seem to him
to be relevant to the issue of whether it is rationally undesirable to drive
pins into people. He says that he does not see what possible difference can
pain caused to others, or the absence of it, make to the desirability of
deriving pleasure in the way that he does. Grice asks him what it is that
gives him pleasure in this particular activity. The philosopher replies that he
likes driving pins into a philosopher’s resilient body. Grice asks whether he
would derive equal pleasure from driving pins into a tennis ball. The
philosopher says that he would derive equal pleasure, that into what he drives
his pins, a philosopher or a tennis ball, makes no difference to him – the
pleasure is similar, and he is quite prepared to have a tennis ball
substituted, but what possible difference can it make whether his pins perforate
living men or tennis balls? At this point, Grice begins to suspect that the
philosopher is evil. Grice does not feel like agreeing with a naturalist, who
reasons that the pin-pushing philosopher is a philosopher with a very different
scale of moral values from Grice, that a value not being susceptible to
argument, Grice may disagree but not reason with the pin-pushing philosopher.
Grice rather sees the pin-pushing philosopher beyond the reach of communication
from the world occupied by him. Communication is as unattainable as it is with
a philosopher who that he is a doorknob, as in the story by Hoffman. A value
enters into the essence of what constitutes a person. The pursuit of a rational
end is part of the essence of a person. Grice does not claim any originality
for his position (which much to Ariskant), only validity. The implicaturum by
Grice is that rationalism and axiology are incompatible, and he wants to cancel
that. So the keyword here is rationalistic axiology, in the neo-Kantian
continental vein, with a vengeance. Grice arrives at value (validitum, optimum,
deeming) via Peirce on meaning. And then there is the truth “value,” a German
loan-translation (as value judgment, Werturteil). The sorry story of deontic
logic, Grice says, faces Jørgensens dilemma. The dilemma by
Jørgensens is best seen as a trilemma, Grice says; viz. Reasoning requires that
premise and conclusion have what Boole, Peirce, and Frege call a “truth” value.
An imperative dos not have a “truth” value. There may be a reasoning with an
imperative as premise or conclusion. A philosopher can reject the first horn
and provide an inference mechanism on elements – the input of the premise and
the output of the conclusion -- which are not presupposed to have a “truth”
value. A philosopher can reject the second horn and restrict ‘satisfactory’
value to a doxastic embedding a buletic (“He judges he wills…”). A philosopher
can reject the third horn, and refuse to explore the desideratum. Grice
generalizes over value as the mode-neutral ‘satisfactory.’ Both ‘p’ and “!p”
may be satisfactory. ‘.p’ has doxastic value (0/1); ‘!p’ has buletic value (0/1). The mode marker of the utterance
guides the addresse you as to how to read ‘satisfactory.’ Grice’s ‘satisfactory’
is a variation on a theme by Hofstadter and McKinsey, who elaborate a
syntax for the imperative mode, using satisfaction. They refer to what they
call the ‘satisfaction-function’ of a fiat. A fiat is ‘satisfied’ (as The door
is closed may also be said to be satisfied iff the door is closed) iff what is
commanded is the case. The fiat ‘Let the door be closed’ is satisfied if the
door is closed. An unary or dyadic operator becomes a satisfaction-functor. As Grice puts it, an inferential rule, which
flat rationality is the capacity to apply, is not arbitrary. The
inferential rule picks out a transition of acceptance in which
transmission of ‘satisfactory’ is guaranteed or expected. As Grice notes,
since mode marker indicate the species ‘satisfactory’ does. He imports
into the object-language ‘It is satisfactory-d/p that’ just in case psi-d/b-p
is satisfactory. Alla Tarski, Grice introduces ‘It is acceptable that’: It
is acceptable that psi-d/b-p is satisfactory-b/d just in case ‘psi-d/b-p is
satisfactory-d/b’ is satisfactory-b/d. Grice goes on to provide a generic value-assignment
for satisfactoriness-functors. For coordinators: “φ Λ ψ” is
1-b/d just in case φ is 1-b/d and ψ is 1-b/d. “φ ν ψ” is 1-b/d just in case one of the pair, φ and
ψ, is 1-b/d. For subordinator: “φ⊃ψ” is 1-b/d just in case either
φ is 0-b/d or ψ is 0-b/d. There are, however, a number of points to
be made. It is not fully clear to Grice just how strong the motivation is for
assigning a value to a mode-neutral, generic functor. Also he is assuming
symmetry, leaving room for a functor is introduced if a restriction is imposed.
Consider a bi-modal utterance. “The beast is filthy and do not touch it” and
“The beast is filthy and I shall not touch it” seem all right. The commutated
“Do not touch the beast and it is filthy” is dubious. “Touch the beast and it
will bite you,” while idiomatic is hardly an imperative, since ‘and’ is hardly
a conjunction. “Smith is taking a bath or leave the bath-room door open” is
intelligible. The commutated “Leave the bath-room door open or Smith is taking
a bath” is less so. In a bi-modal utterance, Grice makes a case for the buletic
to be dominant over the doxastic. The crunch comes, however, with one of the
four possible unary satisfactoriness-functors, especially with regard to the
equivalence of “~psi-b/d-p” and
“psi-b/d-~p). Consider “Let it be that I now put my hand on my head” or “Let it be that my bicycle faces north” in
which neither seems to be either satisfactory or unsatisfactory. And it is a
trick to assign a satisfactory value to “~psi-b/d-p” and “~psi-b/d~p.” Do we
proscribe this or that form altogether, for every cases? But that would seem to
be a pity, since ~!~p seems to be quite promising as a representation for you
may (permissive) do alpha that satisfies p; i.e., the utterer explicitly
conveys his refusal to prohibit his addressee A doing alpha. Do we disallow
embedding of (or iterating) this or that form? But that (again if we use ~!p
and ~!~p to represent may) seems too restrictive. Again, if !p is neither
buletically satisfactory nor buletically unsatisfactory (U could care less) do
we assign a value other than 1 or 0 to !p (desideratively neuter, 0.5). Or do
we say, echoing Quine, that we have a buletically satisfactoriness value gap?
These and other such problems would require careful consideration. Yet Grice
cannot see that those problems would prove insoluble, any more than this or
that analogous problem connected with Strawsons presupposition (Dont arrest the
intruder!) are insoluble. In Strawsons case, the difficulty is not so much to
find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present
themselves. Grice takes up the topic of a calculus in connection with the
introduction rule and the elimination rule of a modal such as must. We
might hope to find, for each member of a certain family of modalities, an
introduction rule and an elimination rule which would be analogous to the rules
available for classical logical constants. Suggestions are not hard to come by.
Let us suppose that we are seeking to provide such a pair of rules for the
particular modality of necessity □. For
(□,+) Grice considers the following (Grice
thinks equivalent) forms: if φ is demonstrable, □φ
is demonstrable. Provided φ is dependent on no assumptions, derive φ from □φ. For (□,-), Grice considers From □φ derive φ. It is to be understood, of course, that the
values of the syntactical variable φ would contain either a buletic or a
doxastic mode markers. Both !p and .p would be proper substitutes for φ but p
would not. Grice wonders: [W]hat should be said of Takeuti’s conjecture
(roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of
the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about
allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in P’s
personalised system that φ, it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ is
doxastically satisfactory/establishable. The accompanying elimination rule is,
however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if
one is committed to the idea that it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ,
one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble.
For such a rule is not acceptable. φ will be a buletic expression such as Let
it be that Smith eats his hat. And my commitment to the idea that Smiths system
requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting
volitively Let Smith eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as
telling us that, if it is necessary, with respect to X, that let X eat his hat,
then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the
situation is easier. For this person-relativised version of the rule seems
inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. Grice, following Mackie, uses
absolutism, as opposed to
relativism, which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions (but cf.
Hare on Subjectsivism). Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough
discussion of value by English philosophers, other than Hare (and he is only
responding to Mackie!). Continental philosophers, by comparison, have a special
discipline, axiology, for it! Similarly, a continental-oriented tradition
Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a pragmatist bent, such as
Carus. Grice wants to say that rationality is a value, because it is a
faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and survive to his changing
environments. The implicaturum of the title is that values have been considered
in the English philosophical tradition, almost alla Nietzsche, to belong to the
realm irrational. Grice grants that axiological implicaturum rests on a
PRE-rational propension. While Grice could
play with “the good” in the New World, as a Lit. Hum. he knew he had to be
slightly more serious. The good is one of the values, but what is valuing?
Would the New Worlders understand valuing unattached to the pragmatism that
defines them? Grice starts by invoking Hume on his bright side: the concept of
value, versus the conception of value. Or rather, how the concept of value
derives from the conception of value. A distinction that would even please
Aquinas (conceptum/conceptio), and the Humeian routine. Some background for his
third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what Mackie means when he says that a
value is ultimately Subjectsive. What about inter-Subjectsive, and
constructively objective? Grice constructs absolute value out of relative
value. But once a rational pirot P (henceforth, P – Grice liked how it sounded
like Locke’s parrot) constructs value, the P assigns absolute status to
rationality qua value. The P cannot then choose not to be rational at the risk
of ceasing to exist (qua person, or essentially rationally human agent). A
human, as opposed to a person, assigns relative value to his rationality. A
human is accidentally rational. A person is necessarily so. A distinction
seldom made by Aristotle and some of his dumbest followers obsessed with the
modal-free adage, Homo rationale animal. Short and Lewis have “hūmānus”
(old form: hemona humana et hemonem hominem dicebant, Paul. ex Fest. p. 100
Müll.; cf. homo I.init.), adj., f. “homo,” and which they render as “of or
belonging to man, human.” Grice also considers the etymology of ‘person.’ Lewis
and Short have ‘persōna,’ according to
Gabius Bassus ap. Gell. 5, 7, 1 sq., f. ‘persŏno,’ “to sound through, with the
second syllable lengthened.’ Falsa est (finitio), si dicas, Equus est animal
rationale: nam est equus animal, sed irrationale, Quint.7,3,24:homo est animal
rationale; “nec si mutis finis voluptas, rationalibus quoque: quin immo ex
contrario, quia mutis, ideo non rationalibus;” “a rationali ad rationale;” “τὸ
λογικόν ζῷον,” ChrysiStoic.3.95; ἀρεταὶ λ., = διανοητικαί, oἠθικαί, Arist.
EN1108b9; “λογικός, ή, όν, (λόγος), ζῶον λόγον ἔχον NE, 1098a3-5. λόγον δὲ
μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων, man alone of all animals possesses speech, from
the Politics. Grice takes the stratification of values by Hartmann much more
seriously than Barnes. Grice plays with rational motivation. He means it
seriously. The motivation is the psychological bite, but since it is qualified
by rational, it corresponds to the higher more powerful bit of the soul, the
rational soul. There are, for Grice, the Grecians, Kantotle and Plathegel,
three souls: the vegetal, the animal, and the rational. As a matter of history,
Grice reaches value (in its guises of optimum and deeming) via his analysis of
meaning by Peirce. Many notions are value-paradeigmatic. The most
important of all philosophical notions that of rationality, presupposes
objective value as one of its motivations. For Grice, ratio can be
understood cognoscendi but also essendi, indeed volendi and fiendi, too.
Rational motivation involves a ratio cognoscendi and a ratio volendi;
objective, “objectum,” and “objectus,” ūs, m. f. “obicio,” rendered as “a
casting before, a putting against, in the way, or opposite, an opposing; or,
neutr., a lying before or opposite (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose): dare
objectum parmaï, the opposing of the shield” “vestis;” “insula portum efficit
objectu laterum,” “by the opposition,” “cum terga flumine, latera objectu
paludis tegerentur;” “molis;” “regiones, quæ Tauri montis objectu separantur;”
“solem interventu lunæ occultari, lunamque terræ objectu, the interposition,”
“eademque terra objectu suo umbram noctemque efficiat;” “al. objecta soli: hi
molium objectus (i. e. moles objectas) scandere, the projection,” transf., that
which presents itself to the sight, an object, appearance, sight, spectacle;”
al. objecto; and if not categoric. This
is analogous to the overuse by Grice of psychoLOGICAL when he just means
souly. It is perhaps his use of psychological for souly that leads to take
any souly concept as a theoretical concept within a folksy psychoLOGICAL
theory. Grice considered the stratification of values, alla Hartmann,
unlike Barnes, who dismissed him in five minutes. “Some like Philippa Foot, but
Hare is MY man,” Grice would say. “Virtue” ethics was becoming all the fashion,
especially around Somerville. Hare was getting irritated by the worse offender,
his Anglo-Welsh tutee, originally with a degree from the other place, Williams.
Enough for Grice to want to lecture on value, and using Carus as an excuse!
Mackie was what Oxonians called a colonial, and a clever one! In fact, Grice
quotes from Hares contribution to a volume on Mackie. Hares and Mackies
backgrounds could not be more different. Like Grice, Hare was a Lit. Hum., and
like Grice, Hare loves the Grundlegung. But unlike Grice and Barnes, Hare would
have nothing to say about Stevenson. Philosophers in the play group of Grice
never took the critique by Ayer of emotivism seriously. Stevenson is the thing.
V. Urmson on the emotive theory of ethics, tracing it to English philosphers
like Ogden, Barnes, and Duncan-Jones. Barnes was opposing both Prichard (who
was the Whites professor of moral philosophy – and more of an interest than
Moore is, seeing that Prichard is Barness tutor at Corpus) and Hartmann. Ryle
would have nothing to do with Hartmann, but these were the days before Ryle
took over Oxford, and forbade any reference to a continental philosopher, even
worse if a “Hun.” Grice reaches the notion of value through that of meaning. If
Peirce is simplistic, Grice is not. But his ultra-sophisticated analysis ends
up being deemed to hold in this or that utterer. And deeming is valuing, as is
optimum. While Grice rarely used axiology, he should! A set of three
lectures, which are individually identified below. I love Carus! Grice was
undecided as to what his Carus lectures were be on. Grice explores meaning
under its value optimality guise in Meaning revisited. Grice thinks that a
value-paradeigmatic notion allows him to respond in a more apt way to what some
critics were raising as a possible vicious circle in his approach to semantic
and psychological notions. The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the
construction, alla Hume, of a value-paradeigmatic notion in general, and value
itself. Grice starts by quoting Austin, Hare, and Mackie, of
Oxford. The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a
philosophical general audience. Most of the second lecture is a subtle
exploration by Grice of the categorical imperative of Kant, with which he had
struggled in the last Locke lecture in “Aspects,” notably the reduction of the
categorical imperative to this or that counsel of prudence with an implicated
protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at eudæmonia. The Carus
Lectures are three: on objectivity and value, on relative and absolute value,
and on metaphysics and value. The first lecture, on objectivity and value,
is a review Inventing right and wrong by Mackie, quoting Hare’s
antipathy for a value being ‘objective’. The second lecture, on relative and
absolute value, is an exploration on the categorical imperative, and its connection
with a prior hypothetical or suppositional imperative. The third
lecture, on metaphycis and value, is an eschatological defence of absolute
value. The collective citation should be identified by each lecture separately.
This is a metaphysical defence by Grice of absolute value. The topic fascinates
Grice, and he invents a few routines to cope with it. Humeian projection
rationally reconstructs the intuitive concept being of value. Category
shift allows to put a value such as the disinterestedness by Smith in grammatical
subject position, thus avoiding to answer that the disinterestedness of Smith
is in the next room, since it is not the spatio-temporal continuan prote ousia
that Smith is. But the most important routine is that of
trans-substantatio, or metousiosis. A human reconstructs as a
rational personal being, and alla Kantotle, whatever he judges is
therefore of absolute value. The issue involves for Grice the introduction
of a telos qua aition, causa finalis (final cause), role, or métier. The final
cause of a tiger is to tigerise, the final cause of a reasoner is to
reason, the final cause of a person is to personise. And this entails absolute
value, now metaphysically defended. The justification involves the ideas of
end-setting, unweighed rationality, autonomy, and freedom. In something
like a shopping list that Grice provides for issues on free. Attention to
freedom calls for formidably difficult undertakings including the search for a
justification for the adoption or abandonment of an ultimate end. The point is
to secure that freedom does not dissolve into compulsion or chance. Grice
proposes four items for this shopping list. A first point is that full action
calls for strong freedom. Here one has to be careful that since Grice abides by
what he calls the Modified Occams Razor in the third James lecture on Some
remarks about logic and conversation, he would not like to think of this two
(strong freedom and weak freedom) as being different senses of free. Again, his
calls for is best understood as presupposes. It may connect with, say, Kanes
full-blown examples of decisions in practical settings that call for or
presuppose libertarianism. A second point is that the buletic-doxastic
justification of action has to accomodate for the fact that we need freedom
which is strong. Strong or serious autonomy or freedom ensures that this or
that action is represented as directed to this or that end E which are is not
merely the agents, but which is also freely or autonomously adopted or pursued
by the agent. Grice discusses the case of the gym instructor commanding, Raise
your left arm! The serious point then involves this free adoption or free
pursuit. Note Grices use of this or that personal-identity pronoun: not merely
mine, i.e. not merely the agents, but in privileged-access position. This
connects with what Aristotle says of action as being up to me, and Kant’s idea
of the transcendental ego. An end is the agents in that the agent adopts
it with liberum arbitrium. This or that ground-level desire may be circumstantial.
A weak autonomy or freedom satisfactorily accounts for this or that action as
directed to an end which is mine. However, a strong autonomy or freedom, and a
strong autonomy or freedom only, accounts for this or that action as directed
to an end which is mine, but, unlike, say, some ground-level circumstantial
desire which may have sprung out of some circumstantial adaptability to a given
scenario, is, first, autonomously or freely adopted by the agent, and, second,
autonomously or freely pursued by the agent. The use of the disjunctive
particle or in the above is of some interest. An agent may autonomously or
freely adopt an end, yet not care to pursue it autonomously or freely, even in
this strong connotation that autonomous or free sometimes has. A further point
relates to causal indeterminacy. Any attempt to remedy this situation by
resorting to causal indeterminacy or chance will only infuriate the scientist
without aiding the philosopher. This remark by Grice has to be understood
casually. For, as it can be shown, this or that scientist may well have
resorted to precisely that introduction and in any case have not
self-infuriated. The professional tag that is connoted by philosopher should
also be seen as best implicated than entailed. A scientist who does resort to
the introduction of causal indeterminacy may be eo ipso be putting forward a
serious consideration regarding ethics or meta-ethics. In other words, a
cursory examination of the views of a scientist like Eddington, beloved by
Grice, or this or that moral philosopher like Kane should be born in mind when
considering this third point by Grice. The reference by Grice to chance,
random, and causal indeterminacy, should best be understood vis-à-vis
Aristotles emphasis on tykhe, fatum, to the effect that this or that event may
just happen just by accident, which may well open a can of worms for the naive
Griceian, but surely not the sophisticated one (cf. his remarks on
accidentally, in Prolegomena). A further item in Grices shopping list involves
the idea of autonomous or free as a value, or optimum. The specific character
of what Grice has as strong autonomy or freedom may well turn out to
consist, Grice hopes, in the idea of this or that action as the outcome of a
certain kind of strong valuation ‒ where this would include the
rational selection, as per e.g. rational-decision theory, of this or that
ultimate end. What Grice elsewhere calls out-weighed or extrinsically weighed
rationality, where rational includes the buletic, of the end and not the means
to it. This or that full human action calls for the presence of this or that
reason, which require that this or that full human action for which this or
that reason accounts should be the outcome of a strong rational valuation. Like
a more constructivist approach, this line suggests that this or that action may
require, besides strong autonomy or freedom, now also strong valuation. Grice
sets to consider how to adapt the buletic-doxastic soul progression to reach
these goals. In the case of this or that ultimate end E, justification should
be thought of as lying, directly, at least, in this or that outcome, not on the
actual phenomenal fulfilment of this or that end, but rather of the, perhaps
noumenal, presence qua end. Grice relates to Kants views on the benevolentia or
goodwill and malevolentia, or evil will, or illwill. Considers Smiths action of
giving Jones a job. Smith may be deemed to have given Jones a job, whether or
not Jones actually gets the job. It is Smiths benevolentia, or goodwill, not
his beneficentia, that matters. Hence in Short and Lewis, we have
“bĕnĕfĭcentĭa,” f. “beneficus,” like “magnificentia” f. magnificus, and
“munificentia” f. munificus; Cicero, Off. 1, 7, 20, and which they thus render
as “the quality of beneficus, kindness, beneficence, an honorable and kind
treatment of others” (omaleficentia, Lact. Ira Dei, 1, 1; several times in the
philos. writings of Cicero. Elsewhere rare: quid praestantius bonitate et
beneficentiā?” “beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem
appellari licet,” “comitas ac beneficentia,” “uti beneficentiā adversus
supplices,”“beneficentia augebat ornabatque subjectsos.” In a more general
fashion then, it is the mere presence of an end qua end of a given action that
provides the justification of the end, and not its phenomenal satisfaction or
fulfilment. Furthermore, the agents having such and such an end, E1, or
such and such a combination of ends, E1 and E2, would be justified by showing
that the agents having this end exhibits some desirable feature, such as this
or that combo being harmonious. For how can one combine ones desire to smoke
with ones desire to lead a healthy life? Harmony is one of the six requirements
by Grice for an application of happy to the life of Smith. The buletic-doxastic
souly ascription is back in business at a higher level. The suggestion would
involve an appeal, in the justification of this or that end, to this or that
higher-order end which would be realised by having this or that lower, or
first-order end of a certain sort. Such valuation of this or that lower-order
end lies within reach of a buletic-doxastic souly ascription. Grice has an
important caveat at this point. This or that higher-order end involved in the
defense would itself stand in need of justification, and the regress might well
turn out to be vicious. One is reminded of Watson’s requirement for a thing
like freedom or personal identity to overcome this or that alleged
counterexample to freewill provided by H. Frankfurt. It is after the laying
of a shopping list, as it were, and considerations such as those above that
Grice concludes his reflection with a defense of a noumenon, complete with the
inner conflict that it brings. Attention to the idea of autonomous and free
leads the philosopher to the need to resolve if not dissolve the most important
unsolved problem of philosophy, viz. how an agent can be, at the same time, a
member of both the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, or, to settle the
internal conflict between one part of our rational nature, the doxastic, even
scientific, part which seems to call for the universal reign of a deterministic
law and the other buletic part which insists that not merely moral
responsibility but every variety of rational belief demands exemption from just
such a reign. In this lecture, Grice explores freedom and value from a
privileged-access incorrigible perspective rather than the creature
construction genitorial justification. Axiology – v. axiological. Valitum
-- Fact-value distinction, the apparently fundamental difference between how
things are and how they should be. That people obey the law or act honestly or
desire money is one thing; that they should is quite another. The first is a
matter of fact, the second a matter of value. Hume is usually credited with
drawing the distinction when he noticed that one cannot uncontroversially infer
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ the isought gap. From the fact, say, that an action
would maximize overall happiness, we cannot legitimately infer that it ought to
be done without the introduction of some
so far suppressed evaluative premise. We could secure the inference by assuming
that one ought always to do what maximizes overall happiness. But that
assumption is evidently evaluative. And any other premise that might link the
non-evaluative premises to an evaluative conclusion would look equally
evaluative. No matter how detailed and extensive the non-evaluative premises,
it seems no evaluative conclusion follows directly and as a matter of logic.
Some have replied that at least a few non-evaluative claims do entail
evaluative ones. To take one popular example, from the fact that some promise
was made, we might it appears legitimately infer that it ought to be kept,
other things equal and this without the
introduction of an evaluative premise. Yet many argue that the inference fails,
or that the premise is actually evaluative, or that the conclusion is not. Hume
himself was both bold and brief about the gap’s significance, claiming simply
that paying attention to it “wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality,
and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely
on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason” Treatise of Human
Nature. Others have been more expansive. Moore, for instance, in effect relied
upon the gap to establish via the open question argument that any attempt to
define evaluative terms using non-evaluative ones would commit the naturalistic
fallacy. Moore’s main target was the suggestion that ‘good’ means “pleasant”
and the fallacy, in this context, is supposed to be misidentifying an
evaluative property, being good, with a natural property, being pleasant.
Assuming that evaluative terms have meaning, Moore held that some could be
defined using others he thought, e.g., that ‘right’ could be defined as
“productive of the greatest possible good” and that the rest, though
meaningful, must be indefinable terms denoting simple, non-natural, properties.
Accepting Moore’s use of the open question argument but rejecting both his
non-naturalism and his assumption that evaluative terms must have descriptive
meaning, emotivists and prescriptivists e.g. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, and Hare
argued that evaluative terms have a role in language other than to denote
properties. According to them, the primary role of evaluative language is not
to describe, but to prescribe. The logical gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, they
argue, establishes both the difference between fact and value and the
difference between describing how things are and recommending how they might
be. Some naturalists, though, acknowledge the gap and yet maintain that the
evaluative claims nonetheless do refer to natural properties. In the process
they deny the ontological force of the open question argument and 302 F 302 treat evaluative claims as describing a
special class of facts. Refs.: The main
source is The construction of value, the Carus lectures, Clarendon. But there
are scattered essays on value and valuing in the Grice Papers. H. P. Grice,
“Objectivity and value,” s. V, c. 8-f. 18, “The rational motivation for
objective value,” s. V, c. 8-f. 19, “Value,” s. V, c. 9-f. 20; “Value,
metaphysics, and teleology,” s. V, c. 9-f. 23, “Values, morals, absolutes, and
the metaphysical,” s. V., c. 9-f. 24;
“Value sub-systems and the Kantian problem,” s. V. c. 9-ff. 25-27; “Values and
rationalism,” s. V, c. 9-f. 28; while the Carus are in the second series, in
five folders, s. II, c-2, ff. 12-16, the H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. value, the
worth of something. Philosophers have discerned these main forms: intrinsic,
instrumental, inherent, and relational value. Intrinsic value may be taken as
basic and many of the others defined in terms of it. Among the many attempts to
explicate the concept of intrinsic value, some deal primarily with the source
of value, while others employ the concept of the “fittingness” or
“appropriateness” to it of certain kinds of emotions and desires. The first is
favored by Moore and the second by Brentano. Proponents of the first view hold
that the intrinsic value of X is the value that X has solely in virtue of its
intrinsic nature. Thus, the state of affairs, Smith’s experiencing pleasure,
has intrinsic value provided it has value solely in virtue of its intrinsic
nature. Followers of the second approach explicate intrinsic value in terms of
the sorts of emotions and desires appropriate to a thing “in and for itself” or
“for its own sake”. Thus, one might say X has intrinsic value or is
intrinsically good if and only if X is worthy of desire in and for itself, or,
alternatively, it is fitting or appropriate for anyone to favor X in and for
itself. Thus, the state of affairs of Smith’s experiencing pleasure is
intrinsically valuable provided that state of affairs is worthy of desire for
its own sake, or it is fitting for anyone to favor that state of affairs in and
for itself. Concerning the other forms of value, we may say that X has
instrumental value if and only if it is a means to, or causally contributes to,
something that is intrinsically valuable. If Smith’s experiencing pleasure is
intrinsically valuable and his taking a warm bath is a means to, or Valentinus
value 948 948 causally contributes to,
his being pleased, then his taking a warm bath is instrumentally valuable or
“valuable as a means.” Similarly, if health is intrinsically valuable and
exercise is a means to health, then exercise is instrumentally valuable. X has
inherent value if and only if the experience, awareness, or contemplation of X
is intrinsically valuable. If the experience of a beautiful sunset is
intrinsically valuable, then the beautiful sunset has inherent value. X has
contributory value if and only if X contributes to the value of some whole, W,
of which it is a part. If W is a whole that consists of the facts that Smith is
pleased and Brown is pleased, then the fact that Smith is pleased contributes
to the value of W, and Smith’s being pleased has contributory value. Our
example illustrates that something can have contributory value without having
instrumental value, for the fact that Smith is pleased is not a means to W and,
strictly speaking, it does not bring about or causally contribute to W. Given
the distinction between instrumental and contributory value, we may say that
certain sorts of experiences and activities can have contributory value if they
are part of an intrinsically valuable life and contribute to its value, even
though they are not means to it. Finally, we may say that X has relational
value if and only if X has value in virtue of bearing some relation to
something else. Instrumental, inherent, and contributory value may be construed
as forms of relational value. But there are other forms of relational value one
might accept, e.g. one might hold that X is valuable for S in virtue of being
desired by S or being such that S would desire X were S “fully informed” and
“rational.” Some philosophers defend the organicity of intrinsic value. Moore,
for example, held that the intrinsic value of a whole is not necessarily equal
to the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. According to this view, the
presence of an intrinsically good part might lower the intrinsic value of a
whole of which it is a part and the presence of an intrinsically bad part might
raise the intrinsic value of a whole to which it belongs. Defenders of
organicity sometimes point to examples of Mitfreude taking joy or pleasure in
another’s joy and Schadenfreude taking joy or pleasure in another’s suffering
to illustrate their view. Suppose Jones believes incorrectly that Smith is
happy and Brown believes incorrectly that Gray is suffering, but Jones is
pleased that Smith is happy and Brown is pleased that Gray is suffering. The
former instance of Mitfreude seems intrinsically better than the latter
instance of Schadenfreude even though they are both instances of pleasure and
neither whole has an intrinsically bad part. The value of each whole is not a
“mere sum” of the values of its parts. Valitum
-- axiology: value theory, also called axiology, the branch of philosophy
concerned with the nature of value and with what kinds of things have value.
Construed very broadly, value theory is concerned with all forms of value, such
as the aesthetic values of beauty and ugliness, the ethical values of right,
wrong, obligation, virtue, and vice, and the epistemic values of justification
and lack of justification. Understood more narrowly, value theory is concerned
with what is intrinsically valuable or ultimately worthwhile and desirable for
its own sake and with the related concepts of instrumental, inherent, and
contributive value. When construed very broadly, the study of ethics may be
taken as a branch of value theory, but understood more narrowly value theory
may be taken as a branch of ethics. In its more narrow form, one of the chief
questions of the theory of value is, What is desirable for its own sake? One
traditional sort of answer is hedonism. Hedonism is roughly the view that i the
only intrinsically good experiences or states of affairs are those containing
pleasure, and the only instrinsically bad experiences or states of affairs are
those containing pain; ii all experiences or states of affairs that contain
more pleasure than pain are intrinsically good and all experiences or states of
affairs that contain more pain than pleasure are intrinsically bad; and iii any
experience or state of affairs that is intrinsically good is so in virtue of
being pleasant or containing pleasure and any experience or state of affairs
that is intrinsically bad is so in virtue of being painful or involving pain.
Hedonism has been defended by philosophers such as Epicurus, Bentham, Sidgwick,
and, with significant qualifications, J. S. Mill. Other philosophers, such as
C. I. Lewis, and, perhaps, Brand Blanshard, have held that what is
intrinsically or ultimately desirable are experiences that exhibit
“satisfactoriness,” where being pleasant is but one form of being satisfying.
Other philosophers have recognized a plurality of things other than pleasure or
satisfaction as having intrinsic value. Among the value pluralists are Moore,
Rashdall, Ross, Brentano, Hartmann, and Scheler. In addition to certain kinds
of pleasures, these thinkers count some or all of the following as
intrinsically good: consciousness and the flourishing of life, knowledge and
insight, moral virtue and virtuous actions, friendship and mutual affection,
beauty and aesthetic experience, a just distribution of goods, and
self-expression. Many, if not all, of the philosophers mentioned above
distinguish between what has value or is desirable for its own sake and what is
instrumentally valuable. Furthermore, they hold that what is desirable for its
own sake or intrinsically good has a value not dependent on anyone’s having an
interest in it. Both of these claims have been challenged by other value theorists.
Dewey, for example, criticizes any sharp distinction between what is
intrinsically good or good as an end and what is good as a means on the ground
that we adopt and abandon ends to the extent that they serve as means to the
resolution of conflicting impulses and desires. Perry denies that anything can
have value without being an object of interest. Indeed, Perry claims that ‘X is
valuable’ means ‘Interest is taken in X’ and that it is a subject’s interest in
a thing that confers value on it. Insofar as he holds that the value of a thing
is dependent upon a subject’s interest in that thing, Perry’s value theory is a
subjective theory and contrasts sharply with objective theories holding that
some things have value not dependent on a subject’s interests or attitudes.
Some philosophers, dissatisfied with the view that value depends on a subject’s
actual interests and theories, have proposed various alternatives, including
theories holding that the value of a thing depends on what a subject would desire
or have an interest in if he were fully rational or if desires were based on
full information. Such theories may be called “counterfactual” desire theories
since they take value to be dependent, not upon a subject’s actual interests,
but upon what a subject would desire if certain conditions, which do not
obtain, were to obtain. Value theory is also concerned with the nature of
value. Some philosophers have denied that sentences of the forms ‘X is good’ or
‘X is intrinsically good’ are, strictly speaking, either true or false. As with
other forms of ethical discourse, they claim that anyone who utters these
sentences is either expressing his emotional attitudes or else prescribing or
commending something. Other philosophers hold that such sentences can express
what is true or false, but disagree about the nature of value and the meaning
of value terms like ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘better’. Some philosophers, such as
Moore, hold that in a truth of the form ‘X is intrinsically good’, ‘good’
refers to a simple, unanalyzable, non-natural property, a property not
identical with or analyzable by any “natural” property such as being pleasant
or being desired. Moore’s view is one form of non-naturalism. Other
philosophers, such as Brentano, hold that ‘good’ is a syncategorematic
expression; as such it does not refer to a property or relation at all, though
it contributes to the meaning of the sentence. Still other philosophers have
held that ‘X is good’ and ‘X is intrinsically good’ can be analyzed in natural
or non-ethical terms. This sort of naturalism about value is illustrated by
Perry, who holds that ‘X is valuable’ means ‘X is an object of interest’. The
history of value theory is full of other attempted naturalistic analyses, some
of which identify or analyze ‘good’ in terms of pleasure or being the object of
rational desire. Many philosophers argue that naturalism is preferable on
epistemic grounds. If, e.g., ‘X is valuable’ just means ‘X is an object of
interest’, then in order to know whether something is valuable, one need only
know whether it is the object of someone’s interest. Our knowledge of value is
fundamentally no different in kind from our knowledge of any other empirical
fact. This argument, however, is not decisive against non-naturalism, since it
is not obvious that there is no synthetic a priori knowledge of the sort Moore
takes as the fundamental value cognition. Furthermore, it is not clear that one
cannot combine non-naturalism about value with a broadly empirical
epistemology, one that takes certain kinds of experience as epistemic grounds
for beliefs about value. Valitum --
valid, having the property that a well-formed formula, argument, argument form,
or rule of inference has when it is logically correct in a certain respect. A
well-formed formula is valid if it is true under every admissible
reinterpretation of its non-logical symbols. If truth-value gaps or multiple
truth-values are allowed, ‘true’ here might be replaced by ‘non-false’ or takes
a “designated” truth-value. An argument is valid if it is impossible for the
premises all to be true and, at the same time, the conclusion false. An
argument form schema is valid if every argument of that form is valid. A rule
of inference is valid if it cannot lead from all true premises to a false conclusion.
Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The conception of value,” The Paul Carus Lectures for the
American Philosophical Association, published by Oxford, at the Clarendon
Press.
variable: in semantics, a symbol interpreted so as to be
associated with a range of values, a set of entities any one of which may be
temporarily assigned as a value of the variable. Grice uses more specifically
for a variable for a ‘grice,’ a type of extinct pig that existed (‘in the
past’) in Northern England – “There is a variable number of grices in the
backyard, Paul.” An occurrence of a variable in a mathematical or logical
expression is a free occurrence if assigning a value is necessary in order for
the containing expression to acquire a semantic value a denotation, truth-value, or other meaning.
Suppose a semantic value is assigned to a variable and the same value is
attached to a constant as meaning of the same kind; if an expression contains
free occurrences of just that variable, the value of the expression for that
assignment of value to the variable is standardly taken to be the same as the
value of the expression obtained by substituting the constant for all the free
occurrences of the variable. A bound occurrence of a variable is one that is
not free. Grice: “Strictly, a variable is the opposite of a constant, but a
constant varies – ain’t that paradoxical?” -- H. P. Grice, “The variable and
the constant;” H. P. Grice, “Variable and meta-variable,” “Order and variable.”
velia -- Velia -- Grice as Eleatic -- School, strictly, two fifth-century
B.C. Grecian philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno of Elea. The Ionian Grecian
colony of Elea or Hyele in southern Italy became Velia in Roman times and
retains that name today. A playful remark by Plato in Sophist 242d gave rise to
the notion that Xenophanes of Colophon, who was active in southern Italy and
Sicily, was Parmenides’ teacher, had anticipated Parmenides’ views, and founded
the Eleatic School. Moreover, Melissus of Samos and according to some ancient
sources even the atomist philosopher Leucippus of Abdera came to be regarded as
“Eleatics,” in the sense of sharing fundamental views with Parmenides and Zeno.
In the broad and traditional use of the term, the Eleatic School
characteristically holds that “all is one” and that change and plurality are
unreal. So stated, the School’s position is represented best by Melissus.
Grice: “Crotone and Velia are the origins of western philosophy, since Greece
is eastern!” – Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice a Velia,” Villa Grice.
venn diagram, a logic diagram invented by the English philosopher
J. Venn in which standard form statements the four kinds listed below are
represented by two appropriately marked overlapping circles, as follows:
Syllogisms are represented by three overlapping circles, as in the examples
below. If a few simple rules are followed, e.g. “diagram universal premises
first,” then in a valid syllogism diagramming the premises automatically gives
a diagram in which the conclusion is represented. In an invalid syllogism
diagramming the premises does not automatically give a diagram in which the
conclusion is represented, as below. Venn diagrams are less perspicuous for the
beginner than Euler diagrams. Grice: “I tried to teach Strawson some Euler
first; but English as he is, he said, ‘Stick with Venn.’” – Refs.: H. P. Grice,
“From Euler to Strawson via Venn: diagramme and impicaturum.”
verificatum:
Grice: “Strictly, what is ‘verified’ is therefore ‘made true,’ analytically.”
-- see ayerism. Grice would possibly NOT be interested in verificationism had
not been for Ayer ‘breaking tradition’ “and other things” with it --. Oppoiste
Christian virtuous –ism: falsificationism. Verificationism is one of the twelve
temptations Grice finds on his way to the City of Eternal Truth. (Each one has
its own entry). Oddly, Boethius was the first verificationist. He use
‘verifico’ performatively. “When I say, ‘verifico’, I verify that what I say is
true.” He didn’t mean it as a sophisma (or Griceisma, but it was
(mis-)understood as such! “When I was listing the temptations, I thought of
calling this ‘Ayerism,’ but then I changed my mind. verification theory of
meaning The theory of meaning advocated by the logical positivists and
associated with the criterion of verifiability. The latter provides a criterion
of meaningfulness for sentences, while the verification theory of meaning
specifies the nature of meaning. According to the criterion, a sentence is
cognitively meaningful if and only if it is logically possible for it to be
verified. The meaning of a sentence is its method of verification, that is, the
way in which it can be verified or falsified, particularly by experience. The
theory has been challenged because the best formulations still exclude
meaningful sentences and allow meaningless sentences. Critics also claim that
the theory is a test for meaningfulness rather than a theory of meaning proper.
Further, they claim that it fails to recognize that the interconnectedness of
language might allow a sentence that cannot itself be verified to be meaningful.
“The verification theory of meaning, which dominated the Vienna Circle, was
concerned with the meaning and meaningfulness of sentences rather than words.”
Quine, Theories and Things verificationism Philosophical method, philosophy of
science, philosophy of language A position fundamental to logical positivism,
claiming that the meaning of a statement is its method of verification.
Accordingly, apparent statements lacking a method of verification, such as
those of religion and metaphysics, are meaningless. Theoretical expressions can
be defined in terms of the experiences by means of which assertions employing
them can be verified. In the philosophy of mind, behaviorism, which tries to
reduce unobserved inner states to patterns of behavior, turns out to be a
version of verificationism. Some philosophers require conclusive verification
for a statement to be meaningful, while others allow any positive evidence to
confer meaning. There are disputes whether every statement must be verified
separately or theories can be verified as a whole even if some of their
statements cannot be individually verified. Attempts to offer a rigorous
account of verification have run into difficulties because statements that
should be excluded as meaningless nevertheless pass the test of verification and
statements that should be allowed as meaningful are excluded. “For over a
hundred years, one of the dominant tendencies in the philosophy of science has
been verificationism, that is, the doctrine that to know the meaning of a scientific
proposition . . . is to know what would be evidence for that proposition.”
Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality verisimilitude Philosophy of science [from
Latin verisimilar, like the truth] The degree of approximation or closeness to
truth of a statement or a theory. Popper defined it in terms of the difference
resulting from truth-content minus falsity-content. The truthcontent of a
statement is all of its true consequences, while the falsity-content of a
statement is all of its false consequences. The aim of science is to find
better verisimilitude. One theory has a better verisimilitude than competing
theories if it can explain the success of competing theories and can also
explain cases where the other theories fail. Popper emphasized that verisimilitude
is different from probability. Probability is the degree of logical certainty
abstracted from content, while verisimilitude is degree of likeness to truth
and combines truth and content. “This suggests that we combine here the ideas
of truth and content into one – the idea of a degree of better (or worse)
correspondence to truth or of greater (or less) likeness or similarity to
truth; or to use a term already mentioned above (in contradistinction to
probability) the idea of (degrees of ) verisimilitude.” Popper, Conjectures and
Refutations.
verisimile -- verisimilitude -- truthlikeness, a term introduced
by Karl Popper to explicate the idea that one theory may have a better
correspondence with reality, or be closer to the truth, or have more verisimilitude,
than another theory. Truthlikeness, which combines truth with information
content, has to be distinguished from probability, which increases with lack of
content. Let T and F be the classes of all true and false sentences,
respectively, and A and B deductively closed sets of sentences. According to
Popper’s qualitative definition, A is more truthlike than B if and only if B 3
T 0 A 3 T and A 3 F 0 B 3 F, where one of these setinclusions is strict. In
particular, when A and B are non-equivalent and both true, A is more truthlike
than B if and only if A logically entails B. David Miller and Pavel Tichý
proved in 4 that Popper’s definition is not applicable to the comparison of
false theories: if A is more truthlike than B, then A must be true. Since the
mid-0s, a new approach to truthlikeness has been based upon the concept of
similarity: the degree of truthlikeness of a statement A depends on the
distances from the states of affairs allowed by A to the true state. In Graham
Oddie’s Likeness to Truth 6, this dependence is expressed by the average
function; in Ilkka Niiniluoto’s Truthlikeness 7, by the weighted average of the
minimum distance and the sum of all distances. The concept of verisimilitude is
also used in the epistemic sense to express a rational evaluation of how close
to the truth a theory appears to be on available evidence.
verum – verum – Grice: “Cognate with German ‘wahr’” -- there’s
the ‘truth table’ and the ‘truth’ -- truth table, a tabular display of one or
more truth-functions, truth-functional operators, or representatives of
truth-functions or truth-functional operators such as well-formed formulas of
propositional logic. In the tabular display, each row displays a possible
assignment of truthvalues to the arguments of the truth-functions or
truth-functional operators. Thus, the collection of all rows in the table
displays all possible assignments of truth-values to these arguments. The
following simple truth table represents the truth-functional operators negation
and conjunction: truth, coherence theory of truth table 931 931 Because a truth table displays all
possible assignments of truth-values to the arguments of a truth-function,
truth tables are useful devices for quickly ascertaining logical properties of
propositions. If, e.g., all entries in the column of a truth table representing
a proposition are T, then the proposition is true for all possible assignments
of truth-values to its ultimate constituent propositions; in this sort of case,
the proposition is said to be logically or tautologically true: a tautology. If
all entries in the column of a truth table representing a proposition are F,
then the proposition is false for all possible assignments of truth-values to
its ultimate constituent propositions, and the proposition is said to be
logically or tautologically false: a contradiction. If a proposition is neither
a tautology nor a contradiction, then it is said to be a contingency. The truth
table above shows that both Not-P and Pand-Q are contingencies. For the same reason
that truth tables are useful devices for ascertaining the logical qualities of
single propositions, truth tables are also useful for ascertaining whether
arguments are valid or invalid. A valid argument is one such that there is no
possibility no row in the relevant truth table in which all its premises are
true and its conclusion false. Thus the above truth table shows that the
argument ‘P-and-Q; therefore, P’ is valid.
Verum -- truth-value, most narrowly, one of the values T for ‘true’ or F
for ‘false’ that a proposition may be considered to have or take on when it is
regarded as true or false, respectively. More broadly, a truth-value is any one
of a range of values that a proposition may be considered to have when taken to
have one of a range of different cognitive or epistemic statuses. For example,
some philosophers speak of the truth-value I for ‘indeterminate’ and regard a
proposition as having the value I when it is indeterminate whether the
proposition is true or false. Logical systems employing a specific number n of
truthvalues are said to be n-valued logical systems; the simplest sort of
useful logical system has two truth-values, T and F, and accordingly is said to
be two-valued. Truth-functions are functions that take truth-values as arguments
and that yield truth-values as resultant values. The truthtable method in
propositional logic exploits the idea of truth-functions by using tabular
displays. Verum -- truth-value semantics, interpretations of formal systems in
which the truth-value of a formula rests ultimately only on truth-values that
are assigned to its atomic subformulas where ‘subformula’ is suitably defined.
The label is due to Hugues Leblanc. On a truth-value interpretation for
first-order predicate logic, for example, the formula atomic ExFx is true in a
model if and only if all its instances Fm, Fn, . . . are true, where the
truth-value of these formulas is simply assigned by the model. On the standard
Tarskian or objectual interpretation, by contrast, ExFx is true in a model if
and only if every object in the domain of the model is an element of the set
that interprets F in the model. Thus a truth-value semantics for predicate
logic comprises a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers and a
“non-denotational” interpretation of terms and predicates. If t 1, t 2, . . .
are all the terms of some first-order language, then there are objectual models
that satisfy the set {Dx-Fx, Ft1, Ft2 . . . .}, but no truth-value
interpretations that do. One can ensure that truth-value semantics delivers the
standard logic, however, by suitable modifications in the definitions of
consistency and consequence. A set G of formulas of language L is said to be
consistent, for example, if there is some G' obtained from G by relettering
terms such that G' is satisfied by some truth-value assignment, or,
alternatively, if there is some language L+ obtained by adding terms to L such
that G is satisfied by some truth-value assignment to the atoms of L+.
Truth-value semantics is of both technical and philosophical interest.
Technically, it allows the completeness of first-order predicate logic and a
variety of other formal systems to be obtained in a natural way from that of
propositional logic. Philosophically, it dramatizes the fact that the formulas in
one’s theories about the world do not, in themselves, determine one’s
ontological commitments. It is at least possible to interpret first-order
formulas without reference to special truth-table method truth-value semantics
932 932 domains of objects, and
higher-order formulas without reference to special domains of relations and
properties. The idea of truth-value semantics dates at least to the writings of
E. W. Beth on first-order predicate logic in 9 and of K. Schütte on simple type
theory in 0. In more recent years similar semantics have been suggested for
secondorder logics, modal and tense logics, intuitionistic logic, and set
theory. Truth, the quality of those propositions that accord with reality,
specifying what is in fact the case. Whereas the aim of a science is to
discover which of the propositions in its domain are true i.e., which
propositions possess the property of Trinity truth 929 929 truth
the central philosophical concern with truth is to discover the nature
of that property. Thus the philosophical question is not What is true? but
rather, What is truth? What is one
saying about a proposition in saying that it is true? The importance of this
question stems from the variety and depth of the principles in which the
concept of truth is deployed. We are tempted to think, e.g., that truth is the
proper aim and natural result of scientific inquiry, that true beliefs are
useful, that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions that would
render it true, and that valid reasoning preserves truth. Therefore insofar as
we wish to understand, assess, and refine these epistemological, ethical,
semantic, and logical views, some account of the nature of truth would seem to
be required. Such a thing, however, has been notoriously elusive. The belief
that snow is white owes its truth to a certain feature of the external world:
the fact that snow is white. Similarly, the belief that dogs bark is true
because of the fact that dogs bark. Such trivial observations lead to what is
perhaps the most natural and widely held account of truth, the correspondence
theory, according to which a belief statement, sentence, proposition, etc. is
true provided there exists a fact corresponding to it. This Aristotelian thesis
is unexceptionable in itself. However, if it is to provide a complete theory of
truth and if it is to be more than
merely a picturesque way of asserting all instances of ‘the belief that p is
true if and only if p’ then it must be
supplemented with accounts of what facts are, and what it is for a belief to
correspond to a fact; and these are the problems on which the correspondence
theory of truth has foundered. A popular alternative to the correspondence
theory has been to identify truth with verifiability. This idea can take on
various forms. One version involves the further assumption that verification is
holistic i.e., that a belief is verified
when it is part of an entire system of beliefs that is consistent and
“harmonious.” This is known as the coherence theory of truth and was developed
by Bradley and Brand Blanchard. Another version, due to Dummett and Putnam,
involves the assumption that there is, for each proposition, some specific
procedure for finding out whether one should believe it or not. On this
account, to say that a proposition is true is to say that it would be verified
by the appropriate procedure. In mathematics this amounts to the identification
of truth with provability and is sometimes referred to as intuitionistic truth.
Such theories aim to avoid obscure metaphysical notions and explain the close
relation between knowability and truth. They appear, however, to overstate the
intimacy of that link: for we can easily imagine a statement that, though true,
is beyond our power to establish as true. A third major account of truth is
James’s pragmatic theory. As we have just seen, the verificationist selects a
prominent property of truth and considers it to be the essence of truth.
Similarly the pragmatist focuses on another important characteristic namely, that true beliefs are a good basis
for action and takes this to be the very
nature of truth. True assumptions are said to be, by definition, those that
provoke actions with desirable results. Again we have an account with a single
attractive explanatory feature. But again the central objection is that the
relationship it postulates between truth and its alleged analysans in this case, utility is implausibly close. Granted, true beliefs
tend to foster success. But often actions based on true beliefs lead to
disaster, while false assumptions, by pure chance, produce wonderful results.
One of the few fairly uncontroversial facts about truth is that the proposition
that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white, the proposition that
lying is wrong is true if and only if lying is wrong, and so on. Traditional
theories of truth acknowledge this fact but regard it as insufficient and, as
we have seen, inflate it with some further principle of the form ‘X is true if
and only if X has property P’ such as corresponding to reality, verifiability,
or being suitable as a basis for action, which is supposed to specify what
truth is. A collection of radical alternatives to the traditional theories
results from denying the need for any such further specification. For example,
one might suppose with Ramsey, Ayer, and Strawson that the basic theory of
truth contains nothing more than equivalences of the form, ‘The proposition
that p is true if and only if p’ excluding instantiation by sentences such as
‘This proposition is not true’ that generate contradiction. This so-called
deflationary theory is best presented following Quine in conjunction with an
account of the raison d’être of our notion of truth: namely, that its function
is not to describe propositions, as one might naively infer from its syntactic
form, but rather to enable us to construct a certain type of generalization.
For example, ‘What Einstein said is true’ is intuitively equivalent to the
infinite conjunction ‘If Einstein said that nothing goes faster than light, then
nothing goes faster than light; and if Einstein said truth truth 930 930 that nuclear weapons should never be
built, then nuclear weapons should never be built; . . . and so on.’ But
without a truth predicate we could not capture this statement. The deflationist
argues, moreover, that all legitimate uses of the truth predicate including those in science, logic, semantics,
and metaphysics are simply displays of
this generalizing function, and that the equivalence schema is just what is
needed to explain that function. Within the deflationary camp there are various
competing proposals. According to Frege’s socalled redundancy theory,
corresponding instances of ‘It is true that p’ and ‘p’ have exactly the same
meaning, whereas the minimalist theory assumes merely that such propositions
are necessarily equivalent. Other deflationists are skeptical about the
existence of propositions and therefore take sentences to be the basic vehicles
of truth. Thus the disquotation theory supposes that truth is captured by the
disquotation principle, ‘p’ is true if and only if p’. More ambitiously, Tarski
does not regard the disquotation principle, also known as Tarski’s T schema, as
an adequate theory in itself, but as a specification of what any adequate
definition must imply. His own account shows how to give an explicit definition
of truth for all the sentences of certain formal languages in terms of the
referents of their primitive names and predicates. This is known as the
semantic theory of truth. Grice: “From ‘verum’ we have to ‘make’ true, as the
Romans put it, ‘verificare’ -- verificatum -- verificationism, a metaphysical
theory about what determines meaning: the meaning of a statement consists in
its methods of verification. Verificationism thus differs radically from the
account that identifies meaning with truth conditions, as is implicit in
Frege’s work and explicit in Vitters’s Tractatus and throughout the writings of
Davidson. On Davidson’s theory, e.g., the crucial notions for a theory of
meaning are truth and falsity. Contemporary verificationists, under the
influence of the Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett, propose what they see as a
constraint on the concept of truth rather than a criterion of meaningfulness.
No foundational place is generally assigned in modern verificationist semantics
to corroboration by observation statements; and modern verificationism is not
reductionist. Thus, many philosophers read Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”
as rejecting verificationism. This is because they fail to notice an important
distinction. What Quine rejects is not verificationism but “reductionism,”
namely, the theory that there is, for each statement, a corresponding range of
verifying conditions determinable a priori. Reductionism is inherently localist
with regard to verification; whereas verificationism, as such, is neutral on
whether verification is holistic. And, lastly, modern verificationism is, veil
of ignorance verificationism 953 953
whereas traditional verificationism never was, connected with revisionism in
the philosophy of logic and mathematics e.g., rejecting the principle of
bivalence. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The taming of the true.” Porphyry called the
verum one of the four transcendental, along with unum, pulchrum and bonum –
Grice agreed. Grice’s concern with the ‘verum’ is serious. If Quine is right,
and logical truth should go, so truth should go. Grice needs ‘true’ to correct
a few philosophical mistakes. It is true that Grice sees a horse as a horse,
for example. The nuances of the implicaturum are of a lesser concern for Grice
than the taming of the true. The root of
Latin ‘vero’ is cognate with an idea Grice loved: that of ‘sincerity.’ The
point is more obviously realised lexically in the negative: the fallax versus
the mendax. But ‘verum’ had to do with candidum – and thus very much cognate
with the English that Grice avoided, ‘truth,’ cognate with ‘trust.’ quod non
possit ab honestate sejungi The true and simple Good which cannot be separated
from honesty, Cicero, Academica, I, 2, but also for the ontological which one
can find in Cicero’s tr. Topica, 35 of etumologia ἐτυμολογία by veriloquium.
Most contemporary hypotheses propose that verus —and the words signifying true,
vrai, vérité, G. wahr, G. Wahrheit — derive from an Indo-European root, *wer,
which would retain meanings of to please, pleasing, manifesting benevolence,
gifts, services rendered, fidelity, pact. Chantraine Dictionnaire étymologique
de la langue grecque links it to the Homeric expression êra pherein ἦϱα φέϱειν,
to please, as well as to ἐπίηϱα, ἐπίηϱος, and ἐπιήϱανος, agreeable Odyssey, 19,
343, just like the Roman verus cf. se-vere, without benevolence, the G. war, and the Russian vera, faith, or verit’
верить, to believe. Pokorny adds to this same theme the Grecian ἑοϱτή, religious
feast, cult. And from the same basis have come terms signifying guarantee,
protect: Fr. garir and later garant,
G. Gewähren, Eng. warrant, to grant.
According to Chantraine, this root *wer should be distinguished from another
root ver-, whence eirô εἴϱω in Grecian , verbum in Roman word in English, etc.,
and words from the family of vereor, revereor, to fear, to respect, verecundia
respectful fear. According to Chantraine, this root *wer should be
distinguished from another root ver-, whence eirô εἴϱω in Grecian , verbum in
Roman word in English, etc., and words from the family of vereor, revereor, to
fear, to respect, verecundia respectful fear. Alfred Ernout does not support
this separation. We should recall that plays on the words verum and verbum were
common, as Augustine mentions verbum = verum boare, proclaiming the truth,
Dialectics 1. P. Florensky, following G. Curtius, “Grundzüge der griechischen
Etymologie,” also claims a single root for the ensemble of these derivations,
including the Sanskrit vratum, sacred act, vow, promise, the Grecian bretas
βϱέτας, cult object, wooden idol Aeschylus, Eumenides, v. 258, and the Roman
“ver-bum.” The signification of verus must be considered as belonging first to
the field of religious ritual and subsequently of juridical formulas: strictly
speaking, verus means protected or grounded in the sense of that which is the
object of a taboo or consecration Pillar and Ground. Then there’s from the
juridical to the philosophical. “Verum” implies a rectification of an
adversarial allegation considered to be fraudulent, as is indicated by the
original opposition verax/fallax-mendax. It thus signifies the properly founded
in fact or in the rules of law: crimen verissimum a well-founded accusation
Cicero, In Verrem, 5, 15. In texts of grammar and rhetoric, but also in
juridical texts as well, verus and veritas signify the veracity of the rule,
inasmuch as it can be distinguished from usage. “Quid verum sit intellego; sed
alias ita loquor ut concessum est I know what is correct, but sometimes I avail
myself of the variation in usage, Cicero, De oratore, Loeb Classical Library;
Consule veritatem: reprehendet; refer ad auris: probabunt If you consult the
strict rule of analogy, it will say this practice is wrong, but if you consult
the ear, it will approve 1586. The juridical connotation of the word verus and
thus of veritas is retained and subsequently reinforced. In the glosses of the
Middle Ages, verus signifies legitimate and the Roman sense of the word, legal
and authentic or conforming to existing law. One normally finds “verum est” in
legal texts to certify that a new rule conforms to preexisting ones Digest, 8,
4, 1. It is this juridical dimension that produces the meaning of verus as
authenticated, authentic in contrast to false, imitative, deceiving and thus
real as in real cream or a genuine Rolex watch.
The juridical here provides a foundation not only for the moral Verum et
simplex bonum. The paradigm of “verum” is not easy to separate from any
epistemological dimensions, as is evident in the varied fates of the
Indo-European root *wer, from which derives, in addition to vera in Russian,
belief, the old Fr. garir, in the sense
of certifying as true, designating as true, whence the participle garant. The
evolution of these derived words inscribes G. “wahr,” and “Wahrheit” in a
semantic network from which emerge two directions, belief and salvation.
Belief. “Wahr” is often linked back, in composite words, to the idea of belief,
in the sense of true belief, to take as true. “Wahrsagen,” to predict, “wahr
haben,” to admit, agree upon, “für wahr halten,” to hold as true, to believe.
This is the term that Kant employs in the Critique of Pure Reason,
Transcendental theory of method, ch.2, 3 On Opinion, Science, and Belief: “das
Fürwahrhalten” is a belief, as a modality of subjectivity, that can be divided
into conviction Überzeugung or persuasion Überredung and that is capable of
three degrees: opinion Meinung, belief Glaube, and science Wissenschaft.
Safeguarding, conservation. Similarly “wahren,” “bewahren” in the sense of to
guard, to conserve is linked to “Wahrung” in the sense of defending one’s
interests or safeguarding. One might refer to Heidegger’s use of this
etymological and semantic relation in reference to Nietzsche. It remains to be
said that many common or colloquial expressions, in Fr. as well as in English, play on the semantic
slippages of vrai and real, between the ontological sense and linguistic
meanings. Thus in Fr. , c’est pas vrai! does not mean it is false, but rather
that it is not reality. In English, the opposite is the case: get real! means
come back down to earth, accept the truth. Grice’s main manoeuvre may be seen
as intended to crack the crib of reality. For he wants to say some philosophers
engaged in conceptual analysis are misled if they think an inappropriate usage
reveals a truth-condition. By coining ‘implicaturum,’ his point is to give room
for “Emissor E communicates that p,” as opposed to ‘emissum x ‘means’ ‘p.’
Therefore, Grice can claim that an utterance may very well totally baffling and
misleading YET TRUE (or otherwise ‘good’), and that in no way that reveals
anything about the emissum itself. This is due to the fact that ‘Emissor E
communicates that p’ is diaphanous. And one can conjoin what the emissor E
communicates to what he explicitly conveys and NOT HAVE the emissor
contradicting himself or uttering a falsehood. And that is what in philosophy
should count. H. P. Grice was always happy with a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth.
It was what Aristotle thought. So why change? The fact that Austin agreed
helped. The fact that Strawson applied Austin’s shining new tool of the
performatory had him fashion a new shining skid, and that helped, because, once
Grice has identified a philosophical mistake, that justifies his role as
methodologist in trying to ‘correct’ the mistake. The Old Romans did not have
an article. For them it is the unum, the verum, the bonum, and the pulchrum.
They were trying to translate the very articled Grecian ‘to alethes,’ ‘to
agathon,’ and ‘to kallon.’ Grecian Grice is able to restore the articles. He
would use ‘the alethic’ for the ‘verum,’ after von Wright. But occasionally
uses the ‘verum’ root. E. g. when his account of ‘personal identity’ was seen
to fail to distinguish between a ‘veridical’ memory and a non-veridical one. If
it had not been for Strawson’s ‘ditto’ theory to the ‘verum,’ Grice would not
have minded much. Like Austin, his inclination was for a ‘correspondence’
theory of truth alla Aristotle and Tarski, applied to the utterance, or
‘expressum.’ So, while we cannot say that an utterer is TRUE, we can say that
he is TRUTHFUL, and trustworthy (Anglo-Saxon ‘trust,’ being cognate with
‘true,’ and covering both the credibility and desirability realms. Grice
approaches the ‘verum’ in terms of predicate calculus. So we need at least an
utterance of the form, ‘the dog is shaggy.’ An utterance of ‘The dog is shaggy’
is true iff the denotatum of ‘the dog’ is a member of the class ‘shaggy.’ So,
when it comes to ‘verum,’ Grice feels like ‘solving’ a problem rather than
looking for new ones. He thought that Strawson’s controversial ‘ditto’ was
enough of a problem ‘to get rid of.’ VERUM. Along with verum, comes the falsum.
fallibilism, the doctrine, relative to some significant class of beliefs or
propositions, that they are inherently uncertain and possibly mistaken. The
most extreme form of the doctrine attributes uncertainty to every belief; more
restricted forms attribute it to all empirical beliefs or to beliefs concerning
the past, the future, other minds, or the external world. Most contemporary
philosophers reject the doctrine in its extreme form, holding that beliefs
about such things as elementary logical principles and the character of one’s
current feelings cannot possibly be mistaken. Philosophers who reject
fallibilism in some form generally insist that certain beliefs are analytically
true, self-evident, or intuitively obvious. These means of supporting the
infallibility of faculty psychology fallibilism 303 303 some beliefs are now generally
discredited. W. V. Quine has cast serious doubt on the very notion of analytic
truth, and the appeal to self-evidence or intuitive obviousness is open to the
charge that those who officially accept it do not always agree on what is thus
evident or obvious there is no objective way of identifying it, and that
beliefs said to be self-evident have sometimes been proved false, the causal
principle and the axiom of abstraction in set theory being striking examples.
In addition to emphasizing the evolution of logical and mathematical
principles, fallibilists have supported their position mainly by arguing that
the existence and nature of mind-independent objects can legitimately be
ascertained only be experimental methods and that such methods can yield
conclusions that are, at best, probable rather than certain. false
consciousness, 1 lack of clear awareness of the source and significance of
one’s beliefs and attitudes concerning society, religion, or values; 2 objectionable
forms of ignorance and false belief; 3 dishonest forms of self-deception.
Marxists if not Marx use the expression to explain and condemn illusions
generated by unfair economic relationships. Thus, workers who are unaware of
their alienation, and “happy homemakers” who only dimly sense their dependency
and quiet desperation, are molded in their attitudes by economic power
relationships that make the status quo seem natural, thereby eclipsing their
long-term best interests. Again, religion is construed as an economically
driven ideology that functions as an “opiate” blocking clear awareness of human
needs. Collingwood interprets false consciousness as self-corrupting
untruthfulness in disowning one’s emotions and ideas The Principles of Art, 8. . false pleasure, pleasure taken in something
false. If it is false that Jones is honest, but Smith believes Jones is honest
and is pleased that Jones is honest, then Smith’s pleasure is false. If
pleasure is construed as an intentional attitude, then the truth or falsity of
a pleasure is a function of whether its intentional object obtains. On this
view, S’s being pleased that p is a true pleasure if an only if S is pleased
that p and p is true. S’s being pleased that p is a false pleasure if and only
if S is pleased that p and p is false. Alternatively, Plato uses the expression
‘false pleasure’ to refer to things such as the cessation of pain or neutral
states that are neither pleasant nor painful that a subject confuses with
genuine or true pleasures. Thus, being released from tight shackles might
mistakenly be thought pleasant when it is merely the cessation of a pain. Refs:
Grice, “Rationality and Trust,” Grice, “The alethic.” “P. F. Strawson and the
performatory account of ‘true’”, The Grice Papers.
villa grice: -- Kept by Luigi Speranza -- Grice kept a nice garden in
his cottage on Banbury Road, not far from St. John’s. It was more of a villa
than his town house at Harborne. While Grice loved Academia, he also loved
non-Academia. He would socialize at the Flag and Lamb, at the Bird and Baby,
and the cricket club, at the bridge club, etc. In this way, he goes back to
Plato’s idea of an ‘academy,’ established by Plato at his villa outside Athens near
the public park and gymnasium known by that name. Although it may not have
maintained a continuous tradition, the many and varied philosophers of the
Academy all considered themselves Plato’s successors, and all of them
celebrated and studied his work. The school survived in some form until A.D.
529, when it was dissolved, along with the other pagan schools, by the Eastern
Roman emperor Justinian I. The history of the Academy is divided by some
authorities into that of the Old Academy Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and
their followers and the New Academy the Skeptical Academy of the third and
second centuries B.C.. Others speak of five phases in its history: Old as
before, Middle Arcesilaus, New Carneades, Fourth Philo of Larisa, and Fifth
Antiochus of Ascalon. For most of its history the Academy was devoted to elucidating
doctrines associated with Plato that were not entirely explicit in the
dialogues. These “unwritten doctrines” were apparently passed down to his
immediate successors and are known to us mainly through the work of Aristotle:
there are two opposed first principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad Great
and Small; these generate Forms or Ideas which may be identified with numbers,
from which in turn come intermediate mathematicals and, at the lowest level,
perceptible things Aristotle, Metaphysics I.6. After Plato’s death, the Academy
passed to his nephew Speusippus, who led the school until his death. Although
his written works have perished, his views on certain main points, along with
some quotations, were recorded by surviving authors. Under the influence of
late Pythagoreans, Speusippus anticipated Plotinus by holding that the One
transcends being, goodness, and even Intellect, and that the Dyad which he
identifies with matter is the cause of all beings. To explain the gradations of
beings, he posited gradations of matter, and this gave rise to Aristotle’s
charge that Speusippus saw the universe as a series of disjointed episodes.
Speusippus abandoned the theory of Forms as ideal numbers, and gave heavier
emphasis than other Platonists to the mathematicals. Xenocrates who once went
with Plato to Sicily, succeeded Speusippus and led the Academy till his own
death. Although he was a prolific author, Xenocrates’ works have not survived,
and he is known only through the work of other authors. He was induced by
Aristotle’s objections to reject Speusippus’s views on some points, and he
developed theories that were a major influence on Middle Platonism, as well as
on Stoicism. In Xenocrates’ theory the One is Intellect, and the Forms are
ideas in the mind of this divine principle; the One is not transcendent, but it
resides in an intellectual space above the heavens. While the One is good, the
Dyad is evil, and the sublunary world is identified with Hades. Having taken
Forms to be mathematical entities, he had no use for intermediate
mathematicals. Forms he defined further as paradigmatic causes of regular
natural phenomena, and soul as self-moving number. Polemon led the Academy, and
was chiefly known for his fine character, which set an example of self-control
for his students. The Stoics probably derived their concept of oikeiosis an
accommodation to nature from his teaching. After Polemon’s death, his colleague
Crates led the Academy until the accession of Arcesilaus. The New Academy arose
when Arcesilaus became the leader of the school and turned the dialectical
tradition of Plato to the Skeptical aim of suspending belief. The debate
between the New Academy and Stoicism dominated philosophical discussion for the
next century and a half. On the Academic side the most prominent spokesman was
Carneades. In the early years of the first century B.C., Philo of Larisa
attempted to reconcile the Old and the New Academy. His pupil, the former
Skeptic Antiochus of Ascalon, was enraged by this and broke away to refound the
Old Academy. This was the beginning of Middle Platonism. Antiochus’s school was
eclectic in combining elements of Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelian
philosophy, and is known to us mainly through Cicero’s Academica. Middle
Platonism revived the main themes of Speusippus and Xenocrates, but often used
Stoic or neo-Pythagorean concepts to explain them. The influence of the Stoic
Posidonius was strongly felt on the Academy in this period, and Platonism
flourished at centers other than the Academy in Athens, most notably in
Alexandria, with Eudorus and Philo of Alexandria. After the death of Philo, the
center of interest returned to Athens, where Plutarch of Chaeronia studied with
Ammonius at the Academy, although Plutarch spent most of his career at his home
in nearby Boeotia. His many philosophical treatises, which are rich sources for
the history of philosophy, are gathered under the title Moralia; his interest
in ethics and moral education led him to write the Parallel Lives paired
biographies of famous Romans and Athenians, for which he is best known. After
this period, the Academy ceased to be the name for a species of Platonic
philosophy, although the school remained a center for Platonism, and was
especially prominent under the leadership of the Neoplatonist Proclus.
villa
speranza: the grander sourroundings
where the Casino Grice belongs – Grice used to call it ‘Villa Grice.’ Villa
Speranza counts with an excellent host in the charming A. M. G. -- . Villa
Speranza holds a grand swimming pool where Grice would keep his Loeb collection
(“Loeb is all you need”) – It became known in the neighbourhood as The
Swimming-Pool Library. Anna Speranza has been a splendid host and gardener at
the Villa.
vio:
essential Italian philosopher. Grice was irritated that when ‘vio’ became a
saint, the Italians list them under ‘c’. He wrote extensively on freewill, and
had a colourful dispute with, of all people, Calvin – well represented in a
painting Grice adored. Vio – tomasso di
vio -- cajetan,
original name, -- H. P. Grice thinks that Shropshire borrowed his proof for the
immortality of the soul from Cajetan -- Tommaso de Vio, prelate and theologian.
Born in Gaeta from which he took his name, he entered the Dominican order in
1484 and studied philosophy and theology at Naples, Bologna, and Padua. He
became a cardinal in 1517; during the following two years he traveled to G.y,
where he engaged in a theological controversy with Luther. His major work is a
Commentary on St. Thomas’ Summa of Theology 1508, which promoted a renewal of
interest in Scholastic and Thomistic philosophy during the sixteenth century.
In agreement with Aquinas, Cajetan places the origin of human knowledge in
sense perception. In contrast with Aquinas, he denies that the immortality of
the soul and the existence of God as our creator can be proved. Cajetan’s work
in logic was based on traditional Aristotelian syllogistic logic but is
original in its discussion of the notion of analogy. Cajetan distinguishes
three types: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, and analogy of
proportion. Whereas he rejected the first two types as improper, he regarded
the last as the basic type of analogy and appealed to it in explaining how
humans come to know God and how analogical reasoning applied to God and God’s
creatures avoids being equivocal. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice e de Vio.” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia.
violence: Grice: “I would define ‘violence’ as the use of force
to cause physical harm, death, or destruction physical violence; the causing of severe mental or emotional
harm, as through humiliation, deprivation, or brainwashing, whether using force
or not psychological violence; more broadly, profaning, desecrating, defiling,
or showing disrespect for i.e., “doing violence” to something valued, sacred,
or cherished; extreme physical force in the natural world, as in tornados,
hurricanes, and earthquakes. Physical violence may be directed against persons,
animals, or property.” Grice goes on: “In the first two cases, harm, pain,
suffering, and death figure prominently; in the third, illegality or
illegitimacy the forceful destruction of property is typically considered
violence when it lacks authorization. Psychological violence applies
principally to persons. It may be understood as the violation of beings worthy
of respect. But it can apply to higher animals as well as in the damaging
mental effects of some experimentation, e.g., involving isolation and
deprivation. Environmentalists sometimes speak of violence against the
environment, implying both destruction and disrespect for the natural world.
Sometimes the concept of violence is used to characterize acts or practices of
which one morally disapproves. To this extent it has a normative force. But
this prejudges whether violence is wrong. One may, on the other hand, regard
inflicting harm or death as only prima facie wrong i.e., wrong all other things
being equal. This gives violence a normative character, establishing its prima
facie wrongness. But it leaves open the ultimate moral justifiability of its
use. Established practices of physical or psychological violence e.g., war, capital punishment constitute institutionalized violence. So do
illegal or extralegal practices like vigilantism, torture, and state terrorism
e.g., death squads. Anarchists sometimes regard the courts, prisons, and police
essential to maintaining the state as violence. Racism and sexism may be
considered institutional violence owing to their associated psychological as
well as physical violence. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Causes and reasons.”
Virno: essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “Virno,
like me, is a semiotician.” Virno (n. Napoli), filosofo. Paolo Virno Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to
navigationJump to search Paolo Virno (Napoli, 14 maggio 1952) è un filosofo,
semiologo, attivista ed accademico italiano, di orientamento marxista
operaista, docente di filosofia del linguaggio presso il Dipartimento di
Filosofia, Comunicazione e Spettacolo dell'Università Roma Tre.[1] Tra i
principali esponenti dell'organizzazione della sinistra extraparlamentare
Potere Operaio, negli anni '60 e '70 il suo nome ricorse nelle cronache dei
cosiddetti "anni di piombo" in Italia. Accusato di appartenere ad una
formazione armata eversiva fu arrestato e detenuto in prigione per diversi anni
sino alla sua definitiva assoluzione. Nel corso della detenzione elaborò il suo
pensiero che trovò espressione nella rivista Luogo comune. Indice
1Biografia 2Pensiero 3Opere 4Note 5Voci correlate 6Altri progetti 7Collegamenti
esterni Biografia «Democrazia è il fucile in spalla agli operai», slogan
attribuito a Potere Operaio «Mi sono formato politicamente a Genova, dove la
mia famiglia viveva e io facevo liceo. Genova era esposta all’influenza di
Torino, dove vi furono le prime occupazioni nel ’67; quindi nell’estate di
quell’anno si mobilitarono gli studenti medi (più vivaci di quelli
universitari, che invece erano in contatto con le organizzazioni tradizionai
dei partiti, UGI e via dicendo). Come studenti medi fondammo dunque il
Sindacato degli Studenti, che nell’autunno del ’67 fece i primi scioperi su
tematiche già sessantottesche, la lotta all’autoritarismo, solidarietà con gli
studenti greci dopo il golpe dei colonnelli e quant’altro...nell’autunno del ’68,
sempre per un trasferimento della famiglia, sono venuto ad abitare a Roma, e di
lì a non molto ho preso contatti e rapporti con il gruppo che sarebbe diventato
Potere Operaio, che allora sostanzialmente nella capitale era il gruppo delle
facoltà scientifiche... Entro in Potere operaio dopo gli episodi cruciali della
primavera ’69 a Torino.[2]» Negli anni tra il 1970 e il 1972 lavorò a
Milano come insegnante all'Alfa Romeo di Arese e all'Innocenti, organizzando
anche azioni collettive nelle fabbriche sino alla dissoluzione di Potere
operaio nel 1973. Nel 1977 Virno presentò la sua tesi di laurea sul
concetto di lavoro e la teoria della coscienza di Theodor Adorno e partecipò
attivamente alle manifestazioni del 1977 ad opera dei lavoratori precari e di altri
emarginati. Fondò assieme a Oreste Scalzone e a Franco Piperno la rivista
Metropoli organo ideologico del movimento politico. Nel giugno del 1979,
nell'ambito dell'inchiesta giudiziaria nota come "7 aprile", la
redazione della rivista viene accusata di appartenere in blocco
all'organizzazione eversiva «costituita in più bande armate variamente
denominate». «siamo arrestati io, Castellano, Maesano e Pace (che però
sfugge all’arresto, di nuovo, giuro, non per sagacia). Noi siamo arrestati il 6
giugno ’79, poi ci fanno confluire nel 7 aprile, ritroviamo gli altri nel
cortile di Rebibbia, nel braccio speciale, stiamo un po’ di mesi lì, poi c’è la
diaspora, cioè il Ministero ordina di mandare ognuno di questi detenuti in un
carcere speciale diverso, perché ovviamente, tramite avvocati, visite, benché
ci fosse il regime di braccio speciale, quello era diventato una specie di
luogo in cui si elaboravano documenti, lettere a giornali, si faceva campagna
politica, c’erano state delle lotte interne. Quindi, c’è la diaspora, io
vado a Novara, Oreste va a Cuneo, quell’altro va a Favignana, quell’altro
ancora da un’altra parte. Comincia questo giro negli speciali, e ci ritroviamo
non tutti ma in parte nel carcere di Palmi, inaugurato nell’autunno del ’79,
carcere per soli politici o per detenuti comuni completamente politicizzati,
una specie di “Kesh”. Là dentro c’era una situazione curiosa, anche molto
spettacolare, perché si incontrano assolutamente tutti. Infatti, per un primo
periodo con i compagni delle BR o con Alunni o quelli dei NAP, si pensò anche
di approfittare di questa situazione per avviare una discussione larga, di
carattere "costituente": però, il problema è che anche lì c’è il
fatto che i più spregiudicati di loro, come Curcio, erano d’accordo, avevano
capito di aver perso l’essenziale, cioè il cambio di paradigma del ’77, cioè il
fatto che i giovani operai erano non più riconducibili a quelli del ’69; altri
invece no.[...] Riassumendo in breve, la mia detenzione fu un anno dal
’79 all’80, poi due anni liberi in cui curai la serie continua di Metropoli
nell’81, due anni ancora di carcere, condanna a 12 anni in primo grado, un anno
di arresti domiciliari ... l’assoluzione (insieme a tanti altri imputati del 7
aprile) fu nell’87, la conferma nell’88.[3]» La travagliata esperienza
politica e esistenziale di questi anni sarà trasfusa da Virno nella
pubblicazione di Luogo Comune una rivista dedicata all'analisi della vita nella
situazione sociale del "postfordismo".[4] Nel 1993 Virno lasciò
il lavoro di editore della rivista per insegnare filosofia nell'Università di
Urbino. Nel 1996 è stato professore invitato all'Università di Montréal e al
suo ritorno in Italia occupò la cattedra di filosofia del linguaggio, semiotica
ed etica della comunicazione nell'Università della Calabria da dove si
trasferirà all'Università Roma Tre. Pensiero Paolo Virno, convinto della
necessità di un nuovo linguaggio della politica che chiarisca le trasformazioni
economiche, sociali e culturali che da più di un decennio caratterizzano le
società occidentali, introduce nell'opera Grammatica della moltitudine, una
riflessione sul contrasto tra i termini di "popolo" e
"moltitudine" che generarono una accesa polemica teorico-filosofica
nel secolo XVII. Quando avvenne la formazione degli stati nazionali fu il
termine popolo a prevalere e Virno si domanda se non sia venuto il tempo di
restaurare l'altro concetto. I primi a discutere sulla contrapposizione
di popolo-moltitudine furono Spinoza e Hobbes. Per Spinoza, la "multitudo"
è quell'insieme di persone che nell'azione politica e in quella economica, pur
agendo collettivamente non perdono il senso della propria individualità,
resistendo sempre alla riduzione a unica massa informe com'è nel termine di
"popolo". Per Spinoza moltitudine è dunque la base delle libertà
civili.[5] Al contrario Hobbes vede nel concetto di moltitudine, cioè in
una pluralità che non si sintetizza nell'uno, il più grave pericolo per
l'autorità dello Stato che esercita il «supremo imperio». «Dopo i secoli
del «popolo» e quindi dello Stato (Stato-nazione, Stato centralizzato ecc.),
torna infine a manifestarsi la polarità contrapposta, abrogata agli albori
della modernità. La moltitudine come ultimo grido della teoria sociale,
politica e filosofica? Forse.[6]» Opere L'idea di mondo. Intelletto
pubblico e uso della vita, Editore: Quodlibet, 2015 Saggio sulla negazione. Per
una antropologia linguistica, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri, 2013 E così via,
all'infinito. Logica e antropologia, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri, 2010 Motto
di spirito e azione innovativa. Per una logica del cambiamento, Editore:
Bollati Boringhieri, 2005 Quando il verbo si fa carne. Linguaggio e natura
umana, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri, 2003 Scienze sociali e «natura umana».
Facoltà di linguaggio, invariante biologico, rapporti di produzione, Editore:
Rubbettino, 2003 Grammatica della moltitudine. Per una analisi delle forme di
vita contemporanee, Editore: DeriveApprodi, 2003 Esercizi di esodo. Linguaggio
e azione politica, Editore: Ombre Corte, 2002 Il ricordo del presente. Saggio
sul tempo storico, Editore: Bollati Boringhieri, 1999 Parole con parole. Poteri
e limiti del linguaggio, Editore: Donzelli, 1995 Mondanità. L'idea di «Mondo»
tra esperienza sensibile e sfera pubblica, Editore: Manifestolibri, 1994
Convenzione e materialismo, Editore: Theoria, 1986 [Ristampa Editore:
DeriveApprodi, 2011 Note ^ Scheda docente - Università Roma Tre ^ Intervista a
Paolo Virno – 21 aprile 2001 ^ Intervista di P. Virno a Hecceitasweb ^ «Questo
termine è entrato nel linguaggio corrente negli anni '90 per indicare un
insieme di caratteristiche economiche, sociali e istituzionali del nostro
presente, avvertite [pessimisticamente] come profondamente diverse rispetto al
nostro recente passato» e in genere come molto negativamente mutate. (In
articolo di Maria Turchetto, Fordismo e postfordismo. Qualche dubbio su alcune
"certezze" della sinistra italiana., edito nel n° 67 di Protagonisti,
agosto 1997) ^ Paolo Virno, Grammatica della moltitudine. Per una analisi delle
forme di vita contemporanee, ed.DeriveApprodi, 2002, p.5 ^ P. Virno, Op. cit.,
p.6 Voci correlate Anni di piombo Potere operaio Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Paolo Virno Collegamenti esterni
Virno, Paolo. "General intellect". In Zanini, A.; Fadini, U. (a cura
di). Lessico postfordista: dizionario di idee della mutazione. Feltinelli, 2001
(visualizzazione parziale su Google Books; Testo completo in inglese). Paolo
Virno a cura di Giovanni Copertino, sito "Filosofico.net". Controllo
di autorità VIAF
(EN) 44353225 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1059 7814 · SBN IT\ICCU\RAVV\007082 ·
Europeana agent/base/146291 · LCCN (EN) n96017940 · GND (DE) 120295776 · BNF
(FR) cb12242873h (data) · BNE (ES) XX1624039 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n96017940 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Politica
Portale Politica Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani
del XXI secoloSemiologi italianiAttivisti italianiNati nel 1952Nati il 14
maggioNati a NapoliFilosofia del linguaggio[altre]
Viroli: essential Italian philosopher. Actually
“Viroli-Cavalieri”? Viroli (n. Forli), filosofo. Grice, “I shall be fighting
soon.” “The loyalty for one’s country is not based on evidence.” Maurizio Viroli Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump
to navigationJump to search Maurizio Viroli (Forlì, 14 marzo 1952) è un
accademico, saggista e filosofo italiano, professore emerito di Teoria politica
alla Princeton University. Durante il settennato di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi ha servito
la Presidenza della Repubblica Italiana. Attualmente è Professore ordinario
alla Università del Texas ad Austin e all'Università della Svizzera Italiana a
Lugano. I suoi campi di ricerca sono la Filosofia politica e la Storia del
Pensiero politico. I suoi autori di riferimento sono Niccolò Machiavelli,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Giuseppe Mazzini, Benedetto Croce, Carlo Rosselli e
Nello Rosselli. La sua ricerca si basa sul metodo contestualista di Quentin
Skinner a cui ha apportato alcune innovazioni. Il suoi riferimenti
politico-ideali sono il Repubblicanesimo e l'Azionismo (Partito d'Azione). Alle
numerose pubblicazioni scientifiche affianca l'attività di saggista e quella di
editorialista. Collabora e ha collaborato ad alcune testate giornalistiche, tra
cui La Stampa, il Sole 24 ORE e Il Fatto Quotidiano. Nel 2008 ha acquisito
anche la cittadinanza statunitense.. Indice 1Biografia
1.1Formazione 1.2Posizione accademica 1.3Ideali politici 1.4Incarichi
Istituzionali 2Onorificenze 3Pubblicazioni 3.1Monografie (con indicazione delle
rispettive traduzioni) 3.2Saggi e articoli 3.3Curatele 4Note 5Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Formazione Maurizio Viroli ha frequentato il Liceo
scientifico statale Fulcieri Paulucci di Calboli di Forlì. Come egli stesso
racconta nel libro L'autunno della Repubblica, per mantenersi agli studi ha
lavorato fin da giovanissimo come garzone di bottega, come cameriere d'albergo
e come operaio presso lo zuccherificio della sua città. Di quegli anni
dice:" [...] quando ero bambino abitavo a Forlì con i miei genitori, in
via Archimede Mellini, in un appartamento angusto e freddissimo, riscaldato
soltanto da una stufa a gas tenuta, per la nostra povertà, sempre con la
fiammella azzurrognola al minimo."[1] Al termine degli studi liceali
si è iscritto alla facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università di Bologna.
Nel 1976 si è laureato magna cum laude in Filosofia con una tesi dal titolo
Metodo e Sistema in Friedrich Engels. Dal maggio 1976 al maggio 1977 ha
svolto il Servizio di leva a Casarsa della Delizia, in Friuli-Venezia
Giulia. Il ritorno alla vita civile è stato all'insegna del precariato.
Percepiva un piccolo salario organizzando convegni e lavorando come redattore
alla rivista Problemi della transizione presso Istituto Gramsci di Bologna.
Nel 1982 è stato ammesso al dottorato di ricerca presso l'Istituto
Universitario Europeo di Firenze. Nel 1985, di fronte alla commissione composta
dai Professori Werner Maihofer, Quentin Skinner, Norberto Bobbio, Maurice
Cranston, Athanasios Moulakisha, ha discusso la tesi dal titolo La théorie de
la société bien ordonnée chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pubblicata prima in
francese poi, nel 1988, per la Cambridge University Press con il titolo di Jean
Jacques Rousseau and the 'Well-Ordered Society', e nel 1993 per Il Mulino con
il titolo Jean-Jacques Rousseau e la teoria della società bene ordinata.
Ha perfezionato la sua formazione svolgendo attività di ricerca al Clare Hall
dell'Università di Cambridge e al Max-Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
in Köln. Posizione accademica Maurizio Viroli è Professore Emerito
all'Università di Princeton dal 2014. A Princeton è giunto nel 1987, dopo aver
vinto un concorso come Assistant Professor. Nel 1993 ha ottenuto tenured
appointment ed è diventato Associate Professor. Nel 1997 è diventato Full
Professor . È Professore ordinario di Government all'Università del Texas
ad Austin, e di Comunicazione politica all'Università della Svizzera italiana.
Dirige il Laboratorio di Studi civili presso l'Università della Svizzera
italiana. Con Letizia Tedeschi (Accademia di Architettura di Mendrisio),
Michele Luminati (Università di Lucerna) e Jean-Philippe Garric (Sorbonne
Université), nel 2018 ha vinto il finanziamento del FNSNF (Fondo Nazionale
Svizzero per la Ricerca Scientifica) per gli anni 2018-2022 con il progetto di
ricerca Milan and Ticino (1796-1848): Shaping the Spatiality of a European
Capital, che prevede l'impegno di un folto gruppo di ricercatori. I suoi
interessi di studio ruotano intorno alla Filosofia politica e alla Storia del
Pensiero politico. Studia il Repubblicanesimo nella sua accezione classica (da
Machiavelli a Rousseau) e in quella contemporanea. Si occupa e scrive di
religione e politica, di retorica classica, libertà e tirannide, di patriottismo
e nazionalismo, di etica civile, di diritti e doveri. Pone particolare
attenzione ai fondamenti della convivenza civile. I suoi periodi storici di
riferimento sono il Rinascimento, il Risorgimento e l'Antifascismo. I suoi
autori di riferimento sono Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Giuseppe
Mazzini, Benedetto Croce, Carlo e Nello Rosselli. Come impegno civile si
occupa di Educazione civica e della difesa e dell'attuazione della Costituzione
della Repubblica Italiana. Ha collaborato con la Direzione Generale
dell'Ufficio Scolastico Regionale per le Marche a progetti di Educazione alla
Cittadinanza. Nel 2006 ha fondato e dirige il Master in Civic Education presso
l'associazione Ethica di Asti. Ha coordinato e diretto progetti di Educazione civica
per la Fondazione per la Scuola della Compagnia di San Paolo. Con il professor
Gianni Sinni dirige il progetto Designing Civic Consciousness presso Università
degli Studi della Repubblica di San Marino. Dirige il progetto Lezioni di Casa
Cervi-Scuola di Etica civile presso Casa Cervi. Ha preso parte attivamente alle
campagne referendarie svoltesi in occasione del referendum costituzionale del
2006, contro la riforma proposta dal centro-destra, e del referendum
costituzionale del 2016, contro la cosiddetta riforma costituzionale
Renzi-Boschi. Ha collezionato inviti e incarichi di insegnamento presso
prestigiose istituzioni culturali internazionali come l'Institute for Advanced
Study di Princeton, Georgetown University, Yale University, Harvard University,
UCLA, Università Complutense di Madrid, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo di
Mendoza, New School for Social Research di New York, Peking University,
Pontifica Universitad Catolica del Cile, Cambridge University, University of
Brisbane, Columbia University, Queen Mary, University of London, United Arab
Emirates University, Università Nazionale Autonoma del Messico, Hebrew
University di Gerusalemme, il Collège de France In Italia ha insegnato
presso la Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Università degli Studi di Trento,
l'Università del Molise, l'Università di Ferrara, la Scuola Superiore di
Catania e l'Università degli Studi di Urbino "Carlo Bo". Ha
collaborato e collabora con istituzioni quali il Collegio di Milano e la Scuola
Superiore della Pubblica Amministrazione, Scuola superiore di polizia,
Fondazione per la Scuola della Compagnia di San Paolo, il Collegio Carlo
Alberto e l'Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani, laFondazione Alcide Cervi
presso Casa Cervi. Ideali politici Maurizio Viroli, nel libro L'autunno
della Repubblica, spiega così le sue posizioni politiche "Non sono
soltanto uno studioso del repubblicanesimo, mi sento repubblicano. Amo i
princìpi fondamentali di questa tradizione e cerco di applicarli nella vita e
nell’analisi dei fatti politici e sociali."[2] Più oltre, in riferimento
al Presidente Carlo Azeglio Ciampi racconta: "La prima volta che lo
incontrai provai la sensazione di trovarmi di fronte ad un uomo di
straordinaria energia morale, l’esempio vero della migliore cultura del Risorgimento
e dell’azionismo. Rammento ancora le parole che mi disse dopo aver ascoltato
con attenzione le mie considerazioni sul significato del concetto di amor di
patria: «Quello che lei dice, professore, l’ho sempre sentito e vissuto nella
mia coscienza». Fu allora che realizzai che io sono prima uno studioso di
repubblicanesimo e poi un repubblicano; Ciampi è repubblicano nell’intimo della
coscienza: repubblicano e azionista; anzi, credo, repubblicano perché
azionista."[3] Anche l'Antifascismo é rilevante nel patrimonio
ideale di Maurizio Viroli. Ne L'Autunno della Repubblica si legge: "Ho
trovato nelle pagine di Benedetto Croce, Carlo Rosselli, Ferruccio Parri,
Ernesto Rossi, Piero Calamandrei – per citare soltanto i nomi più noti – non
solo idee e argomenti in perfetta sintonia con il mio antifascismo assoluto e
intransigente, ma anche e soprattutto le più convincenti riflessioni sulle
ragioni della fragilità della libertà italiana."[4] Il patriottismo
di Maurizio Viroli si oppone al nazionalismo, anzi, ne è l'antidoto. Ancora ne
L'Autunno della Repubblica si legge a proposito del libro Per amore della
patria[5]: "In Italia abbiamo una tradizione di patriottismo di
straordinario valore morale e politico, la migliore che io conosca. Mi
riferisco in primo luogo al patriottismo di Giuseppe Mazzini, fondato sul
principio che la patria non è il territorio bensì un principio di libertà, e al
patriottismo degli antifascisti di «Giustizia e Libertà», concordi
nell’affermare che la nostra patria coincide con il mondo morale delle persone
libere [...] non era poi idea tanto peregrina sostenere [in Per amore della
patria. Patriottismo e nazionalismo nella storia. n.d.r.] che il patriottismo
repubblicano potesse essere il mezzo più efficace per combattere la marea del nazionalismo
che cominciava a montare. Oggi, credo sia troppo tardi."[6] Infine,
Maurizio Viroli ci spiega il suo relativismo: "Sulle questioni etiche sono
stato sempre un convinto relativista, con comprensibile scandalo di molti amici
e colleghi. Di fatto, se il dovere esiste soltanto là dove la coscienza morale
personale lo riconosce come tale, segue necessariamente che ci sono persone che
riconoscono quali loro doveri determinati princìpi, altre che riconoscono quali
loro doveri princìpi diversi, se non del tutto opposti. Il pluralismo e il
contrasto dei doveri sono sotto gli occhi di tutti. Ad alcuni il dovere indica
il servizio e la pratica della carità, ad altri la pura e semplice affermazione
di sé stessi, anche a costo di usare altri esseri umani come mezzi. [...] La
ragione, tante volte invocata quale guida sicura all’agire umano, non detta i
fini ma solo i mezzi. Lo ha spiegato in modo esemplare un filosofo morale
completamente dimenticato, Erminio Juvalta: «La ragione per sé non comanda
nulla; né l’egoismo, né l’altruismo, né la giustizia. La ragione cerca, e
mostra, se le riesce, i mezzi che servono a conservar la vita a chi la vuol
conservare, a distruggerla a chi la vuol distruggere; addita ai pietosi le vie
della pietà, ai giusti le vie della giustizia, e le vie del proprio tornaconto
agli uomini senza scrupoli. Ma l’egoismo non è per sé più ‘razionale’
dell’altruismo, né il regresso più razionale del progresso, né la conservazione
dell’individuo più razionale di quella della specie, né l’utile proprio più
razionale che l’utile della collettività. Razionali non sono i fini, ma le
relazioni dei mezzi ai fini. Ed è così ragionevole che dia la vita per un’idea
chi pregia più l’idea che la vita, come che taccia la verità per un ciondolo
chi ama più i ciondoli che la verità.»"[7] Incarichi Istituzionali È
stato consulente della Presidenza della Repubblica Italiana per le attività
culturali durante il settennato del Presidente Carlo Azeglio Ciampi
(1999-2006). Ha collaborato con la Presidenza della Camera dei Deputati
durante la presidenza di Luciano Violante (1996-2001). È stato
coordinatore del Comitato Nazionale per la Valorizzazione della Cultura della
Repubblica presso il Ministero dell'Interno. È stato Presidente nazionale
dell'Associazione Mazziniana Italiana. Onorificenze Ufficiale dell'Ordine
al merito della Repubblica italiana - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaUfficiale
dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiana «Di iniziativa del Presidente
della Repubblica» — 30 maggio 2001[8]. Pubblicazioni Questa voce è da
wikificare Questa voce o sezione sull'argomento scrittori non è ancora
formattata secondo gli standard. Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le
convenzioni di Wikipedia. Segui i suggerimenti del progetto di riferimento.
Monografie (con indicazione delle rispettive traduzioni) 2019
Nazionalisti e patrioti, Roma-Bari, Laterza 2018 Etica del servizio
e etica del comando, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica. 2016 The
Quotable Machiavelli, Princeton, Princeton University Press. How to choose
a leader. Machiavelli’s advice to citizens, Princeton, Princeton University
Press. L’autunno della Repubblica, Roma-Bari, Laterza. 2013
Redeeming The Prince: The Meaning of Machiavelli’s Masterpiece, Princeton,
Princeton University Press. Traduzione italiana, La redenzione dell’Italia.
Saggio sul «Principe» di Machiavelli, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2013. Traduzione
spagnola, La redención de El príncipe: el significado de la obra maestra de
Maquiavelo, Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes: Ediciones Uniandes, 2016.
Il sorriso di Niccolò. Storia di Machiavelli, nuova edizione, Roma-Bari,
Laterza. Scegliere il principe. I consigli di Machiavelli al cittadino
elettore, Roma-Bari, Laterza. traduzione spagnola, La elección del príncipe:
los consejos de Maquiavelo al ciudadano elector, tradotto da Paula Caballero
Sánchez, Barcelona, Paidós, 2014. Traduzione coreana, 누구를 뽑아야 하는가: 민주공화국을 위한 마키아벨리의 투표 강령 (Nugu reul
ppobaya haneunga), tradotto da Jaejung Gim, 안티고네, Anyang : Antigone, 2017. In uscita la traduzione portoghese.
2012 L’Intransigente, Roma-Bari, Laterza. Le parole del cittadino,
Roma-Bari, Laterza. 2010 La libertà dei servi, Roma-Bari, Laterza
(paperback edition: 2012). Traduzione inglese, The liberty of servants:
Berlusconi’s Italy, tradotto da Antony Shugaar, con una nuova prefazione
dell'autore, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011. Lo scrittore di
ricami, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis. 2009 Come se Dio ci fosse.
Religione e libertà nella storia d’Italia, Torino, Einaudi. Traduzione inglese,
As If God Existed: Religion and Liberty in the History of Italy, tradotto da
Alberto Nones, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012. 2008
How to read Machiavelli, Cambridge, Granta. Traduzione italiana, Machiavelli
filosofo della libertà, tradotto da Silvia Righini, Roma, Castelvecchi, 2013.
Traduzione coreana, How to read 마키아벨리/, 웅진지식하우스, 웅진씽크빅,
2014. L’Italia dei doveri, Milano, Rizzoli. 2005 Il Dio di
Machiavelli e il problema morale dell’Italia, Roma-Bari, Laterza. Traduzione
inglese, Machiavelli’s God, tradotto da Antony Shugaar, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2010. 2001 Con Norberto Bobbio, Dialogo intorno
alla repubblica, Roma-Bari, Laterza (paperback edition: 2003). Traduzione
spagnola, Diálogo en torno a la república, tradotto da Rosa Ruis Gatell,
Barcelona, Tusquets, 2002. Traduzione portoghese, Diálogo em Torno da
República, tradotto da Daniela Beccaccia Versiani, Rio de Janeiro, Campus
Editora, 2002 (paperback edition con titolo diverso: Direitos e Deveres na
República: os Grandes Temas da Política e da Cidadania, Rio de Janeiro,
Elsevier, 2007). Traduzione inglese, The Idea of the Republic, tradotto da
Allan Cameron, con una nuova introduzione dell'autore, Cambridge, Polity, 2003.
Traduzione francese, Dialogue autour de la république, tradotto da Guillaume
Lagrée, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006. Traduzione cinese, 共和的理念 (Gong he de li nian), tradotto da 杨立峰译 (Yang Li Feng), 应奇校 (Chang chun), 吉林出版集团 (Jilin Publishing Group LLC), 2009.
1999 Repubblicanesimo, Roma-Bari, Laterza. Traduzione inglese,
Republicanism, tradotto da Anthony Shugaar, New York, Farrar Straus and Giroux,
2002. Traduzione tedesca, Die Idee der Republikanischen Freiheit, tradotto da
Friederike Hausmann, Zurich, Pendo, 2002. Traduzione bulgara, Републиканизъм
(Republikanizŭm), Sofia, Ciela, 2005. Traduzione coreana, 공화주의 (Konghwajuŭi), tradotto da Kyŏng-hŭi Kim and Tong-gyu
Kim, Kyŏnggi-do Goyang-si, In’gan Sarang, 2006. Traduzione catalana,
Republicanisme, tradotto da Gabriel Genescà Dueñas, Barcelona, Angle, 2007.
Traduzione francese, Républicanisme, translated by Christopher Hamel, Paris,
Bord de l’eau, 2011. Traduzione araba, الفكر الجمهوري (al-Fikr al-jumhūrī),
tradotto da ʻIzz al-Dīn ʻAnāyah, Abū Ẓaby, Hayʼat Abū Ẓaby lil-thaqāfah
wa-al-turāth (Kalimah), 2011. Spanish translation, Republicanismo, introduction
by Manuel Suárez Cortina, Santander, Universidad de Cantabria, 2015.
1998 Machiavelli, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Il sorriso di
Niccolò. Storia di Machiavelli, Roma-Bari, Laterza (paperback edition: 2000;
pubblicato anche da Milano, Edizioni de Il Giornale, 2007; e da Milano, Edizioni
de Il Sole 24 Ore, 2010). traduzione inglese, Niccolò’s Smile. A Biography of
Machiavelli, tradotto da Antony Shugaar, New York, Farrar Straus and Giroux,
2000 (paperback edition: 2002). Traduzione spagnola, La sonrisa de Maquiavelo,
tradotto da Atilio Pentimalli, Barcelona, Tusquets, 2000 (ripubblicato nel
2002; pubblicato anche da Barcelona, Folio, 2004). Traduzione tedesca, Das
Lächeln des Niccolò: Machiavelli und seine Zeit, tradotto da Friederike
Hausmann, Zurich-Munich, Pendo, 2000 (pubblicato anche da Darmstadt,
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000; e da Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt,
2001). Traduzione portoghese, O sorriso de Nicolau. História de Maquiavel,
tradotto da Valéria Pereira de Silva, São Paulo (Brazil), Estação Liberdade,
2002. Traduzione olandese, De glimlach van Niccolo: een biografie van
Machiavelli, tradotto da Mieke Geuzebroek and Pietha de Voogd, Amsterdam, Mets
& Schilt, 2002 (pubblicato anche da Roeselare, Roularta Books, 2003).
Traduzione svedese, Niccolòs leende: historien om Machiavelli, tradotto da Paul
Enoksson, Paul, Stockholm, Atlantis, 2004. Traduzione polacca, Uśmiech
Machiavellego, tradotto da Krzysztof Żaboklicki, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo W.A.B.,
2006. Traduzione giapponese, マキァヴェッリの生涯 : その微笑の謎
(Makiaverri no shōgai : Sono bishō no nazo), tradotto da Yoshimi Takeda, Tokyo,
Hakusuisha, 2007. Traduzione cinese, 尼科洛的微笑
: 马基雅维里传, tradotto
da 段保良译 (Duan Bao Liang), 上海人民出版社 (Shanghai Translation Publishing House),
Shanghai, 2008. Traduzione araba, Projectemirati. 1995 For Love of
Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism, Oxford, Oxford University
Press (paperback edition: 1997). Traduzione italiana, Per Amore della Patria.
Patriottismo e nazionalismo nella storia, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1995 (paperback
edition con una nuova introduzione dell'autore: 2001). Traduzione spagnola, Por
amor a la patria: un ensayo sobre el patriotismo y el nacionalismo, tradotto da
Patrick Alfaya MacSchane, Madrid, Acento Editorial, 1997. Traduzione turca,
Vatan Aşkı: Yurtseverlik ve Milliyetçilik Üzerine Bir Deneme, tradotto da
Abdullah Yılmaz, Istanbul, Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1997. Traduzione rumena, Din
dragoste de patrie: un eseu despre patriotism și naționalism, Bucureştii,
Humanitas, 2002. Traduzione giapponese, パトリオティズムとナショナリズム : 自由を守る祖国愛,
(Patoriotizumu to nashonarizumu : Jiyū o mamoru sokokuai), tradotto da Rui Satō
and Makiko Satō, Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2007. Traduzione cinese, 关于爱国 (Guan yu ai guo: Lun ai guo zhu yi yu min
zu zhu yi), translated by 潘亚玲译, Shanghai, 上海人民出版社 (Shang hai ren min chu ban she),
2016. 1992 From Politics to Reason of State. The Acquisition and
Transformation of the Language of Politics (1250-1600), Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press. Traduzione italiana, Dalla politica alla ragion di stato,
Roma, Donzelli, 1994. Traduzione spagnola, De la política a la razón de estado:
la adquisición y transformación del lenguaje político (1250-1600), tradotto da
Sandra Chaparro Martinez, con prefazione di Sandra Chaparro Martinez and Rafael
del Águila, Madrid, Akal, 2009. Traduzione cinese, 从善的政治到国家理由, translated by 郑红译, 吉林人民出版社,
2011. 1988 La théorie de la société bien ordonnée chez Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter. Traduzione inglese, Jean Jacques
Rousseau and the “Well-Ordered Society”, tradotto da Derek Hanson, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1988. traduzione italiana, Jean-Jacques Rousseau e
la teoria della società bene ordinata, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993.
1987 L’etica laica di Erminio Juvalta, Milano, Franco Angeli. Saggi
e articoli In uscita ‘La civiltà statuale’, in Francesco Di Donato (ed.),
Cultura civica e civiltà statuale, Bologna, Il Mulino. ‘Libertà e
profezia in Machiavelli’, in Attilio Scuderi (ed.), Machiavelli e i confini del
potere, Milano, Mimesis. ‘La passione civile e la scienza politica di Giovanni
Sartori’, in Jorge Islas López (ed.), Homenaje pòstumo: la ciencia política de
Giovanni Sartori, Fondo de cultura económica, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México, Mexico City. 2018 ‘Civic religion, Patriotism and Prophecy
in early-Modern Italian City-Republics’, in Kurt Almqvist (ed.) Nation, state
and empire. Perspectives from the Engelsberg seminar, Stockholm, Axess
Publishing AB, pp. 89-96. 2017 ‘Debunking “Machiavellian” Myths’,
review of David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati and Camila Vergara (eds.), Machiavelli
on Liberty and Conflict, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, 2017,
in Law and Liberty, July 3. ‘Machiavelli and Rousseau’, in
Thinking with Rousseau: From Machiavelli to Schmitt, ed. by Helena
Rosenblatt and Paul Schweigert, Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-28.
‘Postfazione’, in Roberto Bertoni, Protagonisti sempre. Un secolo di storia
visto con gli occhi dei ragazzi, with a preface by Enrico Letta, Reggio Emilia,
Imprimatur. ‘Realism and prophecy in Machiavelli and in Italian political
culture’, The Italianist, vol. 37, n. 3, pp. 308-323. 2016 ‘The
redeeming Prince’, in Timothy Fuller (ed.), Machiavelli's Legacy. "The
Prince" After Five Hundred Years, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania
Press, pp. 34-53. ‘Prefazione’, in Carlo Mosca, Il prefetto e l’unità
nazionale, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica. 2014 ‘Skinner’, ‘God’
and ‘Macaulay’, in Gennaro Sasso and Giorgio Inglese (directors), Enciclopedia
machiavelliana, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. ‘Introduction’,
new edition of the Vita di Niccolò Machiavelli by Roberto Ridolfi, Roma,
Castelvecchi. ‘Introduction’, new edition of The Prince by Niccolò
Machiavelli, Roma, Castelvecchi. ‘Preface’, in Nicolas Maquiavelo, El
Principe, Edicion Commemorativa, Mexico City, Taurus. ‘Preface’, in Leone
Ginzburg, La tradizione del Risorgimento, Roma, Castelvecchi. ‘Se è
libero bisogna che creda’, in 5 variazioni sul credere, ed. by Marco Bouchard,
Torino, Edizioni Gruppo Abele. 2013 ‘L’attualità del Principe’, in
Alessandro Campi (ed.), Il principe di Niccolò Machiavelli e il suo tempo:
1513-2013, Roma, Complesso del Vittoriano, Salone centrale, 25 aprile-16 giugno
2013, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana. Review of Corrado
Vivanti, ‘Niccolo Machiavelli: An Intellectual Biography’, Renaissance
Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Winter 2013), pp. 1448-1449. ‘Premessa’, in
Antonio Gisondi, La moralità della Resistenza: l’esperienza del partigiano
Bosco, Benevento, Associazione Terre dei Gambacorta, 2013. 2012 ‘Prefazione’,
in Fernanda Gallo, Dalla patria allo Stato. Una biografia intellettuale di
Bertrando Spaventa, Roma-Bari, Laterza. 2011 ‘Patriotism and
European Unity’, in B. Ehrenzeller, C. Grewe, P. Gomez, A. Kley, M. Kotzur, K.
Odendahl, B. Schindler & D. Thürer, (Eds.), Vom Staatsbürger zum Weltbürger
- ein republikanischer Diskurs in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Drittes Kolloquium
der 'Peter Häberle-Stiftung' an der Universität St.Gallen, Zurich/St. Gallen,
Dike Verlag. ‘La costituzione repubblicana: un manuale di educazione
civica’, in Ilario Belloni and Marcello Gisondi (eds.), Lessico civico: teorie
e pratiche della cittadinanza, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis. ‘Le origini
meridiane del repubblicanesimo’, in Federica Frediani and Fernanda Gallo
(eds.), Ethos repubblicano e pensiero meridiano, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis.
‘La dimensione religiosa del Risorgimento’, in Alberto Melloni (ed.), Cristiani
d’Italia. Chiese, società, stato, 1861-2011, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. ‘La libertà politica è un bene fragile’, Lettera
internazionale. Rivista trimestrale europea, n.110, (4/2011), pp.21-22.
2010 ‘Ragione e passioni nell’educazione civica’, in Ilario Belloni and
Rosario Forlenza (eds.), Questioni civiche. Forme, simboli e confini della cittadinanza,
Reggio Emilia, Diabasis. ‘Prefazione’, in Giuseppe Fonseca, La
Costituzione: il pilastro di cristallo, Napoli, La scuola di Pitagora.
2009 ‘1513. Machiavelli, il carcere, Il Principe’, in Gli anni di
Firenze, Roma-Bari, . ‘The Republican Content of the Italian
Constitution’, in La Costituzione ieri e oggi. Roma, 8-9 Gennaio 2008, Atti dei
Convegni Lincei Roma, Bardi. ‘Etica e diritto: la forza intelligente per
sconfiggere la violenza’ in Regione Piemonte, Piano regionale per la
prevenzione della violenza contro le donne e per il sostegno alle
vittime. 2008 ‘Religione e libertà nella Democratie en Amérique’,
in Dante Bolognesi e Sauro Mattarelli (eds.), Fra libertà e democrazia:
l’eredità di Tocqueville e J. S. Mill, Milano, Franco Angeli. ‘Una nuova
utopia della libertà’, Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli, XXVIII, new series, n.1
(2008), pp. 19-27. 2007 ‘Machiavelli’s Realism’, Constellations,
Volume 14, Issue 4 (December 2007), pp. 466-482. ‘Religione/2: Tutte le
ragioni del liberalismo’, with Ackerman, Amato, Bassetti, Buruma, Cacciari,
Carandini, Crowder, Eder, Parisi, Pombeni, Roman, Schlegel, Schwarzenberg,
Taylor, Nadia Urbinati, Reset, 101 (2007) Dove Ratzinger sbaglia/Where
Ratzinger is mistaken. 2006 ‘Machiavelli oratore’, in Jean-Jacques
Marchand (ed.), Machiavelli senza i Medici, 1498-1512: scrittura del potere,
potere della scrittura. Atti del convegno di Losanna, 18-20 novembre 2004,
Roma, Salerno Editrice. ‘Due concetti di religione civile’, in Maurizio
Ridolfi (ed.), Rituali civili: storie nazionali e memorie pubbliche nell’Europa
contemporanea, Roma, Gangemi. ‘Patriottismo e rinascita civile’, Aspenia,
34 (September 2006), pp. 140-146. 2005 ‘Introduction’, in Niccolò
Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by Peter Bondanella, Oxford, Oxford
University Press. ‘Prefazione’, in Giuseppe Mazzini, Scritti politici,
edited by Terenzio Grandi and Augusto Comba, 2nd edition, Torino, UTET.
‘Introduzione’, in What is a man? Collection of young thouths – Che cos’è
l’uomo? Raccolta di giovani pensieri, Senigallia, MIUR, Le Marche.
2004 ‘Repubblicanesimo’, in Norberto Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci and
Gianfranco Pasquino (directors), Dizionario di Politica, 3rd edition, Torino,
UTET, pp. 840-843. ‘Libertà democratica, libertà repubblicana e libertà socialista’,
in Thomas Casadei (ed.), Repubblicanesimo democrazia socialismo delle libertà.
“Incroci” per una rinnovata cultura politica, Milan, Franco Angeli, pp.
185-201. ‘Il lavoro nobilita l’uomo e l’impresa’, Impegno. Mensile di
cultura sociale, I, n.1 (November 2004), pp. 6-11. 2003 ‘Els ideals
del republicanisme: república, llibertat, virtut i patriotisme’, Idees: Revista
de temes contemporanis, n. 19, 2003, pp. 91-97. ‘Libertad republicana y
emancipación social’, Revista de la Fundación Juan March, n. 326, 2003, pp.
42-44. ‘Republic and Democracy: On Early Modern Origins of Democratic
Theory’, in Theodor K. Raab and Ezra Suleiman (eds.), The Making and Unmaking
of Democracy. Lessons From History and World Politics, New York and London, Routledge.
‘Della lontananza’, in Alberto Sinigaglia (ed.), La saggezza del vivere. Tracce
di etica, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis. ‘Repubblicanesimo e Costituzione della
Repubblica’ in Maurizio Ridolfi (ed.), Almanacco della Repubblica: storia
d’Italia attraverso le tradizioni, le istituzioni e le simbologie repubblicane,
Milano, Bruno Mondadori. ‘Europa contro america?’, Il pensiero
mazziniano, LVIII, n.2-3 (2003), pp. 16-19. ‘Dio nella costituzione’, Il
pensiero mazziniano, LVIII, n.4 (2003), pp. 6-7. 2002 Con Norberto
Bobbio, ‘Berlusconi y el poder oculto. Diálogo con Maurizio Viroli’, Claves de
razón práctica, n. 126, 2002, pp. 50-56. ‘Sul rientro dei savoia’, Il
pensiero mazziniano, LVII, 3 (2002), pp. 5-7. ‘Scrivere la costituziuone.
L’esempio della storia americana’, Il pensiero mazziniano, LVII, 3 (2002),
pp. 21-23. ‘Il despota e il tiranno si sono fatti furbi’, Il pensiero
mazziniano, LVII, 4 (2002), pp. 13-16. 2001 ‘Il repubblicanesimo di
Machiavelli’ and ‘Le ragioni di un dibattito’, in Simonetta Adorni Braccesi and
Mario Ascheri (eds.), Politica e cultura nelle repubbliche italiane dal
Medioevo all’età moderna: Firenze, Genova, Lucca, Siena, Venezia. Atti del
convegno (Siena 1997), Roma, Istituto Storico Italiano per l’età moderna e
contemporanea. ‘El sentido olvidado del patriotismo republicano’,
Isegoría: Revista de filosofía moral y política, n. 24, 2001, pp. 5-14.
‘El patriotismo multicultural’, in Ramón Máiz Suárez (ed.), Construcción de
Europa, democracia y globalización, Vol. 2, Santiago de Compostela,
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. ‘El significado de la libertad’,
Revista de libros, n. 52, 2001, pp. 6-8. ‘Giù le mani da Carlo Cattaneo’,
Il pensiero mazziniano, LVI, n.2 (2001), pp. 22-24. 2000 ‘Questioni
attorno al repubblicanesimo:un dialogo fra Salvatore Veca e Maurizio Viroli’,
Il pensiero mazziniano, LIV, n.3 (2000), pp. 9-20. ‘Repubblicanesimo,
liberalismo e comunitarismo’, Filosofia e questioni pubbliche, V, n.1 (2000),
pp. 71-79. 1999 ‘Niccolò Machiavelli’, in Alberto Andreatta and
Artemio Enzo Baldini (eds.), Il pensiero politico. Idee, teorie, dottrine. Età
moderna, Torino, UTET. ‘Multicultura e individualismo’, review of Michael
Walzer, ‘Tratado sobre la tolerancia’, Revista de libros, No. 26 (February,
1999), pp. 17-19. ‘Nacionalismo y democracia’, Revista de ciencia
política, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de
Chile, Vol. XX, no.1 (1999), pp. 180-194. ‘El significado histórico del
patriotismo’, Revista de ciencia política / Instituto de Ciencia Política,
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Vol.XX, no.1 (1999), p.
165-179. ‘La Repubblica romana’, Il pensiero mazziniano, LIV, n.2 (1999),
pp. 30-37. ‘Repubblicanesimo’, Il pensiero mazziniano, LIV, n.3 (1999),
pp.4-6. 1998 ‘Rousseau y el derecho natural’, review of Helena
Rosenblatt, ‘Rousseau and Geneva. From the First Discourse to the Social
Contract’, Revista de libros, No. 17 (May, 1998), pp. 20-21. ‘Patriotismo
y nacionalismo entre el final del siglo XVIII y los inicios del siglo XIX’, in
José María Portillo Valdés and José María Iñurritegui Rodríguez (eds.),
Constitución en España: orígenes y destinos. ‘La sinistra non scordi la
Patria’, Il pensiero mazziniano, LIII, n.4 (1998), pp. 13-16. 1997
‘I guerrieri di Dio: chi sono i «theoconservatori» che scendono in lotta contro
aborto, eutanasia e gay’, La Stampa, April 2. ‘L’arcipelago progressista:
l’orgogliosa cultura liberal, fra battaglie per le minoranze, ambientalismo e
progetti per riprendere il New Deal’, La Stampa, April 11. ‘Un desafío al
liberalismo, en nombre de la libertad’, review of Philip Pettit,
‘Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government’, Revista de libros, No. 11
(November, 1997), pp. 9-11. 1995 ‘Discussione americana e caso
italiano’, in Martha Nussbaum, Gian Enrico Rusconi and Maurizio Viroli (eds.),
Piccole patrie, grande mondo, Roma, Donzelli. Review of Anthony J. Parel,
‘The Machiavellian Cosmos’, Renaissance Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Summer,
1995), pp. 369-370. ‘Il significato storico della nascita del concetto di
Ragion di Stato’, in Enzo Baldini (ed.), Aristotelismo politico e ragion di
Stato. Atti del Convegno internazionale di Torino, 11-13 febbraio 1993,
Firenze, Olschki. ‘Patrioti o Traditori?’, L’Indice, April 1995.
‘Il ritorno della Nazione’, I democratici, May 1995. 1994 ‘L’etica
politica ciceroniana e il suo significato moderno’, Nuova Civiltà delle
Macchine, 12, n. 1 (January-March 1994), pp. 197-202. ‘La cattiva
retorica dell’autonomia della politica’, Il Mulino, 43, n. 3, (May-June 1994),
pp. 417-422. ‘Politika kot državljanska filozofija’, Časopis za kritiko
znanosti, 22, 172/173 (1994), pp. 169-176. 1993 ‘Nazionalismo e
patriottismo’, Il Mulino, 42, n. 3, (May-June 1993), pp. 459-465.
1992 ‘Politics as Civil Philosophy’, in William R. Shea and Antonio
Spadafora (eds.), From the Twilight of Probability: Ethics and Politics, Canton
(MA), Science History Publications. ‘The Revolution in the Concept of
Politics’, Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August 1992), pp. 473-495.
1991 Review of Sebastian De Grazia, ‘Machiavelli in Hell’, Political
Theory, Vol. 19, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. 292-295. ‘Una filosofia civile tra
comunitari e liberali’, Ragioni Critiche, 8, pp. 5-9. 1990
‘Introduction’, in Quentin Skinner, Le origini del pensiero politico moderno,
Bologna, Il Mulino. Review of Michael Walzer, ‘The Company of Critics’,
L’Indice, n. 3. ‘Machiavelli and the classical idea of politics’, in
Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and
Republicanism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1989
‘Republic and Politics in Machiavelli and Rousseau’, History of Political
Thought, 10, n. 3, pp. 405-420. 1988 ‘Machiavelli e Rousseau: i
dilemmi della politica republicana’, Teoria Politica, 4, pp. 29-42.
1987 ‘The concept of “order” and the language of classical republicanism
in Jean Jacques Rousseau’, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political
Theory in Early-Modern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
‘“Revisionisti” e “ortodossi” nella storia delle idee politiche’, Rivista di
filosofia, n. 1, pp. 111-126. ‘La Théorie du Contrat Social et le concept
de “Republique” chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, Archiv fur
Recht-und-Sozialphilosophie, n. 2, pp. 195-215. 1986 ‘Dovere morale
e pluralismo etico in Erminio Juvalta’, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, n.
3, pp. 543-569. ‘La “Morale dei Positivisti” e l’etica del socialismo’,
in Paolo Rossi Monti (ed.), L’età del positivismo, Bologna, Il Mulino.
1985 ‘Il Marxismo e l’ideologia del socialismo italiano’, in Georges
Labica (ed.), 1883-1983: l’oeuvre de Marx, un siecle apres, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France. ‘Despotismo e cittadini’, Transizione, n.
3. 1984 Erminio Juvalta e la teoria della giustizia, Rivista di
filosofia, n. 3, pp. 397-431. ‘Antonio Labriola “filosofo del
socialismo”’, Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, LXIV, I,
January-April, pp. 105-125. 1983 ‘Aspetti della recezione di Engels
in Italia. Tra socialismo scientifico e crisi del marxismo’, in Franco Zannino
(ed.), L’Antidühring: affermazione e deformazione del marxismo? Annale V (1981)
della Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso -Issoco, Milano, Franco Angeli.
1982 ‘Il problema dell’etica razionale in Erminio Juvalta’, Studi sulla
cultura filosofica italiana tra Ottocento e Novecento, Bologna, CLUEB.
‘Etica e marxismo. A proposito di una recente discussione’, Problemi della
Transizione, n. 5, 1982, pp. 91-107. 1981 Socialismo e cultura,
'Studi Storici’, 22, n. 1 (January-March 1981), pp. 179-197. Il dialogo
fra Engels e Labriola, ‘Critica marxista’, n. 2, pp. 163-178. 1980
‘Nella crisi del positivismo: la ricerca teorica del «Divenire Sociale»
(1905-1910)’, Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, LIX, I-IV, pp.
167-189. 1979 ‘Filosofia e politica nel “Federico Engels” di
Rodolfo Mondolfo’, in Antonio Santucci (ed.), Pensiero antico e pensiero
moderno in Rodolfo Mondolfo, Bologna, Cappelli. Curatele 2008
Con Nerio Alessandri, Wellness. Storia e cultura del vivere bene, Milano, Sperling
& Kupfer. Traduzione inglese , Wellness. History and culture of living
well, Milano, Sperling & Kupfer, 2008. 2005 Niccolò
Machiavelli, The Prince, tradotto da Peter Bondanella, Oxford, Oxford
University Press. 2004 Libertà politica e virtù civile. Significati
e percorsi del repubblicanesimo classico, Torino, Fondazione Giovanni
Agnelli. 2001 Lezioni per la repubblica: la festa è tornata in
città, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis. 1997 Con Domenico Losurdo, Ascesa e
declino delle repubbliche, Urbino, Quattro Venti. 1990 Con Gisela
Bock e Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press. Note ^ Maurizio Viroli, L'Autunno della Repubblica,
Laterza, 2016, pp. XII-XIII. ^ Maurizio Viroli, L'Autunno della Repubblica,
Laterza, 2016, p. XII. ^ Maurizio Viroli, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza,
2016, pp. XXII. ^ Maurizio Viroli, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza, 2016. ^
Maurizio Viroli, Per Amore della patria. Patriottismo e nazionalismo nella
storia, Laterza, 1995. ^ Maurizio Viroli, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza,
2016. ^ Maurizio Viroli, L'Autunno della Repubblica, Laterza, 2016, pp.
XXV-XXVI. ^ Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato. Collegamenti esterni
Blog ufficiale, su maurizioviroli.blogspot.com. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di
Maurizio Viroli, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata
Registrazioni di Maurizio Viroli, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale. Modifica
su Wikidata https://issuu.com/edizioni-in-magazine/docs/forli_in_1-2011
Maurizio Viroli, pagina personale all'Università di Princeton Maurizio Viroli
da Emsf-Enciclopedia multimediale delle scienze filosofiche della RAI Maurizio
Viroli, profilo biografico da Ethica Forum Maurizio Viroli, profilo
dall'Università della Svizzera italiana Nello Ajello, Quanti servi in giro per
l'Italia, recensione a La libertà dei servi, la Repubblica, 6 luglio 2010 La
libertà dei servi, dal sito dell'Associazione Paolo Sylos Labini La libertà dei
servi di Maurizio Viroli, recensione del libro (EN) Brian Lamb, Intervista a
Maurizio Viroli su Niccolo's Smile: A Biography of Machiavelli, Booknotes del
18 febbraio 2001, da C-SPAN (video e trascrizione) L'intransigente, con
Maurizio Viroli, da Fahrenheit del 22 febbraio 2012, Radio Tre Controllo di
autorità VIAF
(EN) 71451732 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1668 6586 · LCCN (EN) n87879990 · BNF (FR)
cb12278945m (data) · BNE (ES) XX1155069 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n87879990 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Politica
Portale Politica Categorie: Accademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici
italiani del XXI secoloSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti italiani del XXI
secoloFilosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloNati nel
1952Nati il 14 marzoNati a ForlìFilosofi della politica[altre]
virtuosum – Grice: “The etymology of ‘virtue’ is fantastic: it
is strictly a bit like ‘manliness,’ only the Romans were never sure who was
‘vir’ and who wasn’t!” -- “virtue is entire” – “Do not multiply virtues beyond
necessity” -- virtue ethics, also called virtue-based ethics and agent-based
ethics, conceptions or theories of morality in which virtues play a central or
independent role. Thus, it is more than simply the account of the virtues
offered by a given theory. Some take the principal claim of virtue ethics to be
about the moral subject that, in living
her life, she should focus her attention on the cultivation of her or others’
virtues. Others take the principal claim to be about the moral theorist that, in mapping the structure of our moral thought,
she should concentrate on the virtues. This latter view can be construed weakly
as holding that the moral virtues are no less basic than other moral concepts.
In this type of virtue ethics, virtues are independent of other moral concepts
in that claims about morally virtuous character or action are, in the main,
neither reducible to nor justified on the basis of underlying claims about
moral duty or rights, or about what is impersonally valuable. It can also be
construed strongly as holding that the moral virtues are more basic than other
moral concepts. In such a virtue ethics, virtues are fundamental, i.e., claims
about other moral concepts are either reducible to underlying claims about
moral virtues or justified on their basis. Forms of virtue ethics predominated
in Western philosophy before the Renaissance, most notably in Aristotle, but
also in Plato and Aquinas. Several ancient and medieval philosophers endorsed
strong versions of virtue ethics. These views focused on character rather than
on discrete behavior, identifying illicit behavior with vicious behavior, i.e.,
conduct that would be seriously out of character for a virtuous person. A
virtuous person, in turn, was defined as one with dispositions relevantly
linked to human flourishing. On these views, while a person of good character,
or someone who carefully observes her, may be able to articulate certain
principles or rules by which she guides her conduct or to which, at least, it
outwardly conforms, the principles are not an ultimate source of moral
justification. On the contrary, they are justified only insofar as the conduct
they endorse would be in character for a virtuous person. For Aristotle, the
connection between flourishing and virtue seems conceptual. He conceived moral
virtues as dispositions to choose under the proper guidance of reason, and
defined a flourishing life as one lived in accordance with these virtues. While
most accounts of the virtues link them to the flourishing of the virtuous
person, there are other possibilities. In principle, the flourishing to which
virtue is tied whether causally or conceptually may be either that of the
virtuous subject herself, or that of some patient who is a recipient of her
virtuous behavior, or that of some larger affected group the agent’s community, perhaps, or all
humanity, or even sentient life in general. For the philosophers of ancient
Greece, it was human nature, usually conceived teleologically, that fixed the
content of this flourishing. Medieval Christian writers reinterpreted this,
stipulating both that the flourishing life to which the virtues lead extends
past death, and that human flourishing is not merely the fulfillment of
capacities and tendencies inherent in human nature, but is the realization of a
divine plan. In late twentieth-century versions of virtue ethics, some
theorists have suggested that it is neither to a teleology inherent in human
nature nor to the divine will that we should look in determining the content of
that flourishing to which the virtues lead. They understand flourishing more as
a matter of a person’s living a life that meets the standards of her cultural,
historical tradition. In his most general characterization, Aristotle called a
thing’s virtues those features of it that made it and its operation good. The
moral virtues were what made people live well. This use of ‘making’ is
ambiguous. Where he and other premodern thinkers thought the connection between
virtues and living well to be conceptual, moral theorists of the modernist era
have usually virtue ethics virtue ethics understood it causally. They commonly
maintain that a virtue is a character trait that disposes a person to do what
can be independently identified as morally required or to effect what is best
best for herself, according to some theories; best for others, according to
different ones. Benjamin Franklin, e.g., deemed it virtuous for a person to be
frugal, because he thought frugality was likely to result in her having a less
troubled life. On views of this sort, a lively concern for the welfare of
others has moral importance only inasmuch as it tends to motivate people
actually to perform helpful actions. In short, benevolence is a virtue because
it conduces to beneficent conduct; veracity, because it conduces to truth
telling; fidelity, because it conduces to promise keeping; and so on. Reacting
to this aspect of modernist philosophy, recent proponents of virtue ethics deny
that moral virtues derive from prior determinations of what actions are right
or of what states of affairs are best. Some, especially certain theorists of
liberalism, assign virtues to what they see as one compartment of moral thought
and duties to a separate, and only loosely connected compartment. For them, the
life and theory of virtue is autonomous. They hold that virtues and duties have
independent sources of justification, with virtues chiefly concerned with the
individual’s personal “ideals,” self-image, or conception of her life goals,
while duties and rights are thought to derive from social rules regulating
interpersonal dealings. Proponents of virtue ethics maintain that it has
certain advantages over more modern alternatives. They argue that virtue ethics
is properly concrete, because it grounds morality in facts about human nature
or about the concrete development of particular cultural traditions, in
contrast with modernist attempts to ground morality in subjective preference or
in abstract principles of reason. They also claim that virtue ethics is truer
to human psychology in concentrating on the less conscious aspects of
motivation on relatively stable
dispositions, habits, and long-term goals, for example where modern ethics focuses on decision
making directed by principles and rules. Virtue ethics, some say, offers a more
unified and comprehensive conception of moral life, one that extends beyond
actions to comprise wants, goals, likes and dislikes, and, in general, what
sort of person one is and aims to be. Proponents of virtue ethics also contend
that, without the sensitivity and appreciation of their situation and its
opportunities that only virtues consistently make available, agents cannot
properly apply the rules that modernist ethical theories offer to guide their
actions. Nor, in their view, will the agent follow those rules unless her virtues
offer her sufficient clarity of purpose and perseverance against temptation.
Several objections have been raised against virtue ethics in its most recent
forms. Critics contend that it is antiquarian, because it relies on conceptions
of human nature whose teleology renders them obsolete; circular, because it
allegedly defines right action in terms of virtues while defining virtues in
terms of right action; arbitrary and irrelevant to modern society, since there
is today no accepted standard either of what constitutes human flourishing or
of which dispositions lead to it; of no practical use, because it offers no
guidance when virtues seem to conflict; egoistic, in that it ultimately directs
the subject’s moral attention to herself rather than to others; and fatalistic,
in allowing the morality of one’s behavior to hinge finally on luck in one’s
constitution, upbringing, and opportunities. There may be versions of virtue
ethics that escape the force of all or most of the objections, but not every
form of virtue ethics can claim for itself all the advantages mentioned
above. virtue epistemology, the subfield
of epistemology that takes epistemic virtue to be central to understanding
justification or knowledge or both. An epistemic virtue is a personal quality
conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other
intellectually valuable goal. Following Aristotle, we should distinguish these
virtues from such qualities as wisdom or good judgment, which are the
intellectual basis of practical but not
necessarily intellectual success. The
importance, and to an extent, the very definition, of this notion depends,
however, on larger issues of epistemology. For those who favor a naturalist
conception of knowledge say, as belief formed in a “reliable” way, there is
reason to call any truth-conducive quality or properly working cognitive
mechanism an epistemic virtue. There is no particular reason to limit the
epistemic virtues to recognizable personal qualities: a high mathematical
aptitude may count as an epistemic virtue. For those who favor a more
“normative” conception of knowledge, the corresponding notion of an epistemic
virtue or vice will be narrower: it will be tied to personal qualities like
impartiality or carelessness whose exercise one would associate with an ethics
of belief. H. P. Grice, “Philosophy, like virtue, is entire;” H. P. Grice,
“Virtutes non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem,” H. P. Grice,
“Aristotle’s mesotes – where virtue lies.”
vis: When in a Latinate mood, Grice would refer to a ‘vis’
of an expression. Apparently, ‘vis’ is cognate with ‘validum,’ transf., of abstr. things, force, notion, meaning, sense, import, nature, essence (cf. significatio): “id, in quo est omnis vis amicitiae,” Cic. Lael. 4, 15: “eloquentiae vis et natura,” id. Or. 31, 112: “vis honesti (with natura),” id. Off. 1, 6, 18; cf. id. Fin. 1, 16, 50: “virtutis,” id. Fam. 9, 16, 5: “quae est alia vis legis?” id. Dom. 20, 53: “vis, natura, genera verborum et simplicium et copulatorum,” i.e. the sense, signification, id. Or. 32, 115: “vis verbi,” id. Inv. 1, 13, 17; id. Balb. 8, 21: “quae vis insit in his paucis verbis, si attendes, si attendes, intelleges,” id. Fam. 6, 2, 3: “quae vis subjecta sit vocibus,” id. Fin. 2, 2, 6: “nominis,” id. Top. 8, 35: μετωνυμία, cujus vis est, pro eo, quod dicitur,
causam, propter quam dicitur, ponere, Quint. 8, 6, 23.
vital lie: Grice: “I would define a vital life as an instance of
self-deception or lying to oneself when it fosters hope, confidence,
self-esteem, mental health, or creativity; or any false belief or unjustified
attitude that helps people cope with difficulties; or a lie to other people designed to promote
their wellbeing; e.. g.: self-deceiving optimism about one’s prospects for
success in work or personal relationships may generate hope, mobilize energy,
enrich life’s meaning, and increase chances for success. Grice considers the
optimism law as basic in folk-psychology. Ibsen dramatises “life-lies” as essential
for happiness The Wild Duck, and O’Neill portrays “pipe dreams” as necessary
crutches The Iceman Cometh. Nietzsche endorsed “pious illusions” or “holy
fictions” about the past that liberate individuals and societies from shame and
guilt On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. In Problems of
belief, Schiller praised normal degrees of vanity and self-conceit because they
support selfesteem. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “Optimism,” in “Method in philosophical
psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.”
vittielo: essential Italian philosopher. Vincenzo? Vitiello (n. Napoli), filosofo. Vincenzo Vitiello Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Vincenzo Vitiello (Napoli, 26 settembre 1935) è un filosofo italiano. Indice 1Biografia 2Opere 2.1 Monografie 2.2Articoli (parziale) 3Bibliografia 4Altri progetti 5Collegamenti esterni Biografia È stato professore ordinario di Filosofia teoretica all'Università di Salerno. Studioso di Vico, dell'idealismo tedesco e del pensiero di Friedrich Nietzsche e Martin Heidegger in rapporto con la filosofia greca e la tradizione cristiana, ha elaborato una teoria ermeneutica, la "Topologia", fondata su una reinterpretazione del concetto di spazio come orizzonte trascendentale dell'operare umano. Gli sviluppi recenti della topologia riguardano in particolare la genealogia del linguaggio e del tempo. Ha affrontato più volte il tema della fede, da un punto di vista laico, collaborando con teologi quali Bruno Forte e Piero Coda. Ha fondato la rivista di filosofia Paradosso (1990-2002); di cui è stato condirettore con Massimo Cacciari, Umberto Curi, Sergio Givone, Carlo Sini e Giacomo Marramao. Collabora all'annuario Filosofia, edito da Laterza, e a numerose altre riviste specialistiche del settore filosofico, tra cui aut aut. Dirige la rivista di filosofia Il pensiero. Ha collaborato all'Annuario Filosofia, curato da Gianni Vattimo, e all'Annuario Europeo sulla Religione, curato da Jacques Derrida e Gianni Vattimo. Scrive su Teoria, Celan-Jahrbuch (Heidelberg), ER. Revista de Filosofía (Barcellona), Revista de Occidente (Madrid), Sileno (Madrid), Criterio (Buenos Aires) ed altre ancora. Ha svolto un'intensa attività pubblicistica su quotidiani e periodici italiani. Ha tenuto cicli di conferenze e seminari in Europa (Germania, Francia, Spagna, Croazia), negli USA (New York, Chicago), e in America latina (Messico, Argentina). Suoi scritti sono stati tradotti in tedesco, francese, inglese e spagnolo. Opere Monografie Filosofia della pratica e dottrina politica in Benedetto Croce, Napoli, 1963 Etica e liberalismo nel pensiero di B. Croce, Napoli, 1964 Il carattere discorsivo del conoscere, Napoli, 1965 Carlo Antoni interprete di Croce, Napoli, 1968 Storiografia e storia nel pensiero di Benedetto Croce, Libreria Scientifica Editrice, Napoli, 1968 Feeling e relation nella filosofia del conoscere di David Hume, Napoli, 1968 Storiografia e storia nel pensiero di Benedetto Croce, Napoli, 1968 Heidegger: il nulla e la fondazione della storicità, Argalia, Urbino, 1976 Dialettica ed ermeneutica: Hegel e Heidegger, Guida, Napoli, 1983 Utopia del nichilismo, Guida, Napoli, 1983 Studi Heideggeriani, Roma, 1983 Ethos ed eros in Hegel e Kant, ESI, Napoli, 1984 Logica e storia in Hegel (in collaborazione con R. Racinato), Napoli, 1985 Bertrando Spaventa ed il problema del cominciamento, Guida, Napoli 1990 La palabra hendida, Barcellona, 1990 Hegel e la comprensione della modernità, 1991 Topologia del moderno, Marietti, Genova, 1992 La voce riflessa. Logica ed etica della contraddizione, Lanfranchi, Milano, 1994 Elogio dello spazio. Ermeneutica e topologia, Bompiani, Milano, 1994 Cristianesimo senza redenzione, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1995 Non dividere il sì dal no. Tra filosofia e letteratura, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1996 Filosofia teoretica: le domande fondamentali: percorsi e interpretazioni, Milano, 1997 La favola di Cadmo, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1998 Vico e la topologia, Cronopio, Napoli 2000 La vita e il suo oltre. Dialogo sulla morte (in collaborazione con Bruno Forte), Roma 2001 Il Dio possibile, esperienze di cristianesimo, Città Nuova, Roma 2002 Hegel in Italia, Milano 2003 Dire Dio in segreto, Roma 2005 Cristianesimo e nichilismo: Dostoevskij-Heidegger, Morcelliana, Brescia 2005 Estetica e ascesi, Modena 2006 E pose la tenda in mezzo a noi, AlboVersorio, 2007 Il Decalogo. Ricordati di Santificare le feste (in dialogo con Emanuele Severino), 2007 I tempi della poesia. Ieri/oggi, Mimesis, Milano 2007 Dipingere Dio (con Bruno Forte e Serena Nono), AlboVersorio, 2008 Vico. Storia, linguaggio, natura, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2008 Ripensare il cristianesimo-De Europa, Ananke, 2008 Oblio e memoria del sacro, Moretti & Vitali, Bergamo 2008 Grammatiche del pensiero. Dalla kenosi dell'io alla logica della seconda persona, Edizioni ETS, 2009 Celan Heidegger (con Félix Duque), Mimesis, 2011 I comandamenti. Non dire falsa testimonianza, Il Mulino, 2011 L'ethos della topologia. Un itinerario di pensiero, Le Lettere, Firenze 2013 Paolo e l'Europa. Cristianesimo e filosofia (con G. Rossé), Città Nuova, Roma 2014, pp. 151-254 L'immagine infranta. Linguaggio e mondo da Vico a Pollock, Bompiani, Milano 2014 Articoli (parziale) Vico: tra storia e natura, in aut aut, 280/281, 1997, pp. 59-92 Complessità e aporie del moderno, in Filosofia politica, 2 (1), 1988, pp. 187-94 Dall'ermeneutica alla topologia, in aut aut, 296/297, 2000, pp. 109-16 Goethe interprete della modernità, in aut aut, 301/302, 2001, pp. 141-63 Per amicizia: Epochè e metafora, in aut aut, 310/311, 2002, pp. 27-38 Sentire le Radici, la Terra stessa, in aut aut, 313/314, 2003, pp. 199-211 Andrea Zanzotto, ovvero: la poesia come genealogia della parola in aut aut, 316-117, 2003, pp. 173-90 Bibliografia Enrico Redaelli, Il nodo dei nodi. L'esercizio del pensiero in Vattimo, Vitiello, Sini, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2008. Luoghi del pensare. Contributi in onore di Vincenzo Vitiello, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano 2005, ISBN 88-8483-354-X Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Vincenzo Vitiello Collegamenti esterni Vincenzo Vitiello, scheda personale e link ai contributi per l'EMSF-Enciclopedia multimediale delle scienze filosofiche di RAI Educational Intervista a Vincenzo Vitiello di Federico Lijoi, nel sito "Filosofia.it". URL visitato l'8 gennaio 2014. Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 120157233 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2096 9183 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\006513 · LCCN (EN) n80066858 · GND (DE) 124519636 · BNF (FR) cb12020592q (data) · BNE (ES) XX1155237 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n80066858 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1935Nati il 26 settembreNati a NapoliProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di Salerno[altre]
volition: cf. desideratum. a mental event involved with the
initiation of action. ‘To will’ is sometimes taken to be the corresponding verb
form of ‘volition’. The concept of volition is rooted in modern philosophy;
contemporary philosophers have transformed it by identifying volitions with
ordinary mental events, such as intentions, or beliefs plus desires. Volitions,
especially in contemporary guises, are often taken to be complex mental events
consisting of cognitive, affective, and conative elements. The conative element
is the impetus the underlying
motivation for the action. A velleity is
a conative element insufficient by itself to initiate action. The will is a
faculty, or set of abilities, that yields the mental events involved in
initiating action. There are three primary theories about the role of volitions
in action. The first is a reductive account in which action is identified with
the entire causal sequence of the mental event the volition causing the bodily
behavior. J. S. Mill, for example, says: “Now what is action? Not one thing,
but a series of two things: the state of mind called a volition, followed by an
effect. . . . [T]he two together constitute the action” Logic. Mary’s raising
her arm is Mary’s mental state causing her arm to rise. Neither Mary’s
volitional state nor her arm’s rising are themselves actions; rather, the
entire causal sequence the “causing” is the action. The primary difficulty for
this account is maintaining its reductive status. There is no way to delineate
volition and the resultant bodily behavior without referring to action. There
are two non-reductive accounts, one that identifies the action with the
initiating volition and another that identifies the action with the effect of
the volition. In the former, a volition is the action, and bodily movements are
mere causal consequences. Berkeley advocates this view: “The Mind . . . is to
be accounted active in . . . so far forth as volition is included. . . . In
plucking this flower I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand,
which was consequent upon my volition” Three Dialogues. In this century,
Prichard is associated with this theory: “to act is really to will something”
Moral Obligation, 9, where willing is sui generis though at other places
Prichard equates willing with the action of mentally setting oneself to do
something. In this sense, a volition is an act of will. This account has come
under attack by Ryle Concept of Mind. Ryle argues that it leads to a vicious
regress, in that to will to do something, one must will to will to do it, and
so on. It has been countered that the regress collapses; there is nothing
beyond willing that one must do in order to will. Another criticism of Ryle’s,
which is more telling, is that ‘volition’ is an obscurantic term of art;
“[volition] is an artificial concept. We have to study certain specialist
theories in order to find out how it is to be manipulated. . . . [It is like]
‘phlogiston’ and ‘animal spirits’ . . . [which] have now no utility” Concept of
Mind. Another approach, the causal theory of action, identifies an action with
the causal consequences of volition. Locke, e.g., says: “Volition or willing is
an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and
thereby exerting its power to produce it. . . . [V]olition is nothing but that
particular determination of the mind, whereby . . . the mind endeavors to give
rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power”
Essay concerning Human Understanding. This is a functional account, since an
event is an action in virtue of its causal role. Mary’s arm rising is Mary’s
action of raising her arm in virtue of being caused by her willing to raise it.
If her arm’s rising had been caused by a nervous twitch, it would not be
action, even if the bodily movements were photographically the same. In
response to Ryle’s charge of obscurantism, contemporary causal theorists tend
to identify volitions with ordinary mental events. For example, Davidson takes
the cause of actions to be beliefs plus desires and Wilfrid Sellars takes
volitions to be intentions to do something here and now. Despite its
plausibility, however, the causal theory faces two difficult problems: the
first is purported counterexamples based on wayward causal chains connecting
the antecedent mental event and the bodily movements; the second is provision
of an enlightening account of these mental events, e.g. intending, that does
justice to the conative element. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “A. J. P. Kenny on
voliting.”
volpe. Essential Italian philosopher. Actually DellaVolpe.
Volpe (n. Imola), filosofo. Galvano della Volpe Da
Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search
Galvano della Volpe (secondo da destra) tra Giacomo Debenedetti e Sibilla
Aleramo a Genova nel 1950 Galvano della Volpe (Imola, 24 settembre 1895 – Roma,
13 luglio 1968) è stato un filosofo e accademico italiano. Indice
1Biografia 2Opere 3Bibliografia 4Collegamenti esterni Biografia Si laurea in
filosofia con Rodolfo Mondolfo all'Università di Bologna, insegnando dapprima
Storia e Filosofia presso il liceo bolognese "Luigi Galvani" e il
liceo "Dante Alighieri" a Ravenna e dal 1939 al 1965 Storia della
Filosofia ed Estetica presso l'Università di Messina. Legato inizialmente
alla tradizione gentiliana, dedica gran parte dei propri lavori giovanili e
della prima maturità a questioni strettamente teoretiche e storico-filosofiche,
attestandosi infine su posizioni fortemente anti-idealistiche. Approda così
attraverso la rivalutazione dell'empirismo a un umanesimo positivo di
ispirazione marxista, mantenendo un'impostazione fondamentalmente
dialettico-materialistica in costante confronto critico e polemico soprattutto
con la dialettica hegeliana e l'idealismo post-hegeliano, ma anche con le
correnti positivistiche contemporanee (positivismo logico e neo-empirismo) e
con l'esistenzialismo tanto laico (Heidegger, ma soprattutto Jaspers) quanto
religioso (Berdjaev e Marcel). Questa svolta filosofica, testimoniata dal
Discorso sull'ineguaglianza del 1943, lo conduce a un sempre maggiore interesse
per i problemi della filosofia politica e dell'etica, considerati comunque in
stretto rapporto con le questioni teoretiche (logiche e gnoseologiche). Non
abbandona comunque i propri interessi storico-filosofici, rivolgendoli
principalmente alle opere postume di Marx e alla storia dell'estetica. Tra gli
scritti della maturità quello che oltre ad aver avuto più ampia diffusione
rappresenta il più perspicuo esempio della capacità dell'autore di muoversi con
piena consapevolezza critica tra i piani teoretico, storico e politico è
senz'altro il saggio Rousseau e Marx. Per della Volpe il concetto di libertà
implicitamente contenuto nel pensiero marxiano è perfettamente integrabile con
quello esplicitamente formulato da Rousseau, il quale quindi non sarebbe da
considerarsi né tra i teorici della rivoluzione borghese né tra i nostalgici di
una società parcellizzata in piccolissime unità politiche cittadine, ma tra i
più attuali preconizzatori della società senza classi o egualitaria. Un
altro dei punti nodali del pensiero di della Volpe è il tentativo di elaborare
una teoria estetica rigorosamente materialistica. Egli sottolinea il ruolo
delle caratteristiche strutturali e del processo sociale di produzione delle
opere d'arte nella formazione del giudizio estetico e in forte polemica con la
dottrina crociana dell'intuizione, da lui considerata in continuità con la
tradizione romantica e misticheggiante dell'Ottocento, elabora il concetto di
gusto come principale fonte del giudizio estetico stesso. In complesso la sua
opera presenta nell'ambito del marxismo e della cultura filosofica italiani una
posizione originale e controcorrente, ripresa negli anni sessanta dal più noto
dei suoi allievi, ovvero Lucio Colletti. Opere L'idealismo dell'atto e il
problema delle categorie, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1924. Le origini e la formazione
della dialettica hegeliana, I, Hegel romantico e mistico (1793-1800), Firenze,
Le Monnier, 1929. Il misticismo speculativo di maestro Eckhart nei suoi
rapporti storici, Bologna, Cappelli, 1930. La filosofia dell'esperienza di
David Hume, 2 voll., Firenze, Sansoni, 1933-1935. Fondamenti di una filosofia
dell'espressione, Bologna, Meridiani, 1936. Il principio di contraddizione e il
concetto di sostanza prima in Aristotele. Contributo a una critica dei pensieri
logici, Bologna, Azzoguidi, 1938. Crisi dell'estetica romantica, Messina,
D'Anna, 1941. Critica dei principi logici, Messina, D'Anna, 1942. Discorso
sull'ineguaglianza. Con due saggi sull'etica dell'esistenzialismo, Roma, Ciuni,
1943. La teoria marxista dell'emancipazione umana. Saggio sulla trasmutazione
marxista dei valori, Messina, Ferrara, 1945. La libertà comunista. Saggio di
una critica della ragion “pura” pratica, Messina, Ferrara, 1946. Studi sulla
dialettica mistificata, I, Marx e lo stato moderno rappresentativo, Bologna,
UPEB, 1947. Per la teoria di un umanesimo positivo. Studi e documenti sulla
dialettica materialistica, Bologna, Zuffi, 1949. Logica come scienza positiva,
Messina-Firenze, D'Anna, 1950; 1956. Eckhart o della filosofia mistica, Roma,
Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1952. Poetica del Cinquecento. La poetica
aristotelica nei commenti essenziali degli ultimi umanisti italiani con
annotazioni e un saggio introduttivo, Bari, Laterza, 1954. Il verosimile filmico
e altri scritti di Estetica, Roma, Edizioni Filmcritica, 1954; Roma, La nuova
sinistra, 1971. Rousseau e Marx e altri saggi di critica materialistica, Roma,
Editori Riuniti, 1957. Critica del gusto, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1960; 1964;
1966. Chiave della dialettica storica, Roma, Samonà e Savelli, 1964. Umanesimo
positivo e emancipazione marxista, Milano, Sugar, 1964. Critica dell'ideologia
contemporanea. Saggi di teoria dialettica, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1967. Schizzo
di una storia del gusto, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1971. Opere, a cura di Ignazio
Ambrogio, 6 voll., Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1972-1973. Bibliografia Carlo Violi,
Galvano della Volpe: testi e studi 1922-1977, introduzione di Nicolao Merker,
La Libra, Messina 1978. Nicolao Merker, DELLA VOLPE, Galvano, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, vol. 38, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana,
1990. Collegamenti esterni Galvano della Volpe, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie
on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Galvano
della Volpe, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Galvano della Volpe, su Enciclopedia Britannica,
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Galvano della
Volpe, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Galvano
della Volpe, su Goodreads. Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN)
39375863 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0889 3286 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\098036 · LCCN (EN)
n79049298 · GND (DE) 118524585 · BNF (FR) cb11899366g (data) · BNE (ES)
XX916061 (data) · NLA (EN) 35801197 · BAV (EN) 495/127395 · NDL (EN, JA)
00527068 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n79049298 Biografie Portale Biografie
Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX
secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1895Morti nel 1968Nati il 24
settembreMorti il 13 luglioNati a ImolaMorti a RomaProfessori dell'Università
degli Studi di MessinaStudenti dell'Università di Bologna[alter].
volpi: essential Italian philosopher. Volpi (n. Vicenza),
filoso. “Wild clarity” in Heidegger! Franco Volpi
(filosofo) Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to
search Franco Volpi Franco Volpi (Vicenza, 4 ottobre 1952 – Vicenza, 14
aprile 2009[1]) è stato un filosofo e storico della filosofia italiano.
Indice 1Biografia 2Note 3Opere principali 4Bibliografia 5Altri progetti
6Collegamenti esterni Biografia Vicentino, storico della filosofia (e
filosofo), fu professore ordinario di "storia della filosofia" presso
l'Università di Padova e insegnò in varie università europee, canadesi e
latinoamericane. Borsista della Fondazione Alexander von Humboldt di Bonn,
membro dell'"Institut International de Philosophie" di Parigi,
dell'Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti e dell'Accademia Olimpica di
Vicenza, fu insignito dei premi "Montecchio" (1989) e
"Nietzsche" (2000). Tra le sue numerose pubblicazioni:
Heidegger e Brentano (1976), La rinascita della filosofia pratica in Germania
(1980), Heidegger e Aristotele (1984), Il nichilismo (1996, tradotto in varie
lingue), Guida a Heidegger (1997), I prossimi Titani. Conversazioni con Jünger
(1997, con Antonio Gnoli), Dizionario delle opere filosofiche (2000), Il Dio
degli acidi. Conversazioni con Albert Hofmann (2003, con A. Gnoli), L'ultimo
sciamano. Conversazioni heideggeriane (2006, con A. Gnoli), Storia della
filosofia dall'antichità a oggi (2007, con Enrico Berti). Per Adelphi
curò opere di Schopenhauer, Heidegger e Carl Schmitt. Collaborò al quotidiano
"la Repubblica" e occasionalmente alla "Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung". Il 13 aprile 2009, mentre era in sella alla sua bicicletta
a San Germano dei Berici, venne investito da un'auto e cadde in coma
irreversibile. Morì il giorno successivo. Il 17 aprile fu commemorato dal
preside Paolo Bettiolo assieme a tutto il corpo docente dell'Università di
Padova[2]. Le sue ceneri sono al cimitero Carpaneda di Creazzo.
Note ^ Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti ^ Lorenzo Parolin,
Commozione al Bo per l'addio a Volpi Il Giornale di Vicenza[collegamento
interrotto], 18 aprile 2009. URL consultato il 19 aprile 2009. Opere principali
Heidegger e Brentano. L'aristotelismo e il problema dell'univocità dell'essere
nella formazione filosofica del giovane Martin Heidegger, Cedam, Padova, 1976,
pp. 144 La rinascita della filosofia pratica in Germania, Francisci,
Albano/Padova, 1980 in:Filosofia pratica e scienza politica, Francisci,
Abano/Padova, 1980, pp. 180 (con Carlo Natali, Laura Iseppi, Claudio Pacchiani)
Heidegger e Aristotele, Daphne, Padova, 1984, pp. 226 (ristampa Bari, Laterza,
2010) Lexikon der philosophischen Werke, Kröner, Stuttgart, 1988 Sulla fortuna
del concetto di decadence nella cultura tedesca: Nietzsche e le sue fonti
francesi, "Filosofia politica", 1995 Il nichilismo, Biblioteca
Universale Laterza, Laterza, Roma-Bari, pp. IV-152; trad. port. O niilismo,
Edicoes Loyola, Sao Paulo, 1999, pp. 163 Guida a Heidegger, Laterza, Roma-Bari
1997, 19982, pp. XVI-387 Hegel e i suoi critici, Per i licei e gli istituti
magistrali, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1998 Bibliografia Ángel Xolocotzi, La aventura
de interpretar: los impulsos filosóficos de Franco Volpi, México D.F., Eón,
2011 Francisco de Lara López, Entre fenomenología y hermenéutica: in Memoriam
Franco Volpi, Madrid, Plaza y Valdés, 2011. Franco Volpi interprete del
pensiero contemporaneo, Atti dell'incontro internazionale di studio, Padova, 19
novembre 2009, Vicenza, Accademia Olimpica, 2012 Ricordando Franco Volpi
filosofo: 04.10.1952-14.04.2009, Atti dell'Incontro internazionale del 24
aprile 2010, Lavarone, Comune di Lavarone, 2017 Franco Volpi: il pudore del
pensiero, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2019 Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote
Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Franco Volpi Collegamenti esterni (EN)
Opere di Franco Volpi, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata
Franco Volpi [Breve biografia con elenco pubblicazioni e traduzioni], su
istitutoveneto.it, Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti. URL consultato
il 20/01/2015. Essere, tempo, esistenza, lezione-intervista concessa dal prof.
Franco Volpi all'Associazione Asia, sul valore e la funzione della filosofia, e
sul significato e lo statuto di Essere e tempo di Heidegger. Controllo di
autoritàVIAF (EN) 71433278 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2102 2311 · SBN
IT\ICCU\CFIV\039548 · LCCN (EN) n85165911 · GND (DE) 122340833 · BNF (FR)
cb12179450w (data) · BNE (ES) XX1319782 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n85165911 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloStorici della filosofia italianiNati
nel 1952Morti nel 2009Nati il 4 ottobreMorti il 14 aprileNati a VicenzaMorti a
VicenzaMorti per incidente stradale[altre]
volpicelli: essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “I read with
intereset his early “Nature and spirit.” At that time at Oxford, there was not
much of an Oxford spirit, so it spirited me.” Arnaldo
Volpicelli (Roma, 1892 – 1968) è stato un filosofo e accademico italiano.
Indice 1 Biografia 2 Opere 3 Note 4 Bibliografia 5 Collegamenti esterni
Biografia Fratello maggiore di Luigi Volpicelli. Prese parte come sottotenente
alla prima guerra mondiale. Si laureò prima in Giurisprudenza e poi in
Filosofia nel 1923. Allievo di Giovanni Gentile, fu docente prima alle
università di Urbino e Pisa e alla Sapienza di Roma di Filosofia del diritto e
poi di Dottrina dello Stato. Seguace del pensiero di Santi Romano, Fu, con Ugo
Spirito, un teorico del "corporativismo integrale". Fu direttore
delle riviste "Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica" (1927-33)
e, con Giuseppe Bottai, di "Archivio di studi corporativi"
(1933-1935). Epurato dall'insegnamento alla caduta del fascismo, fu poi
reintegrato,[1] insegnando alla Facoltà di Scienze politiche fino al
1967. Opere Natura e spirito, 1925 L'educazione politica dell'Italia, 1929
I presupposti scientifici dell'ordinamento corporativo, 1933 Corporativismo e
scienza giuridica, 1934 La certezza del diritto e la crisi odierna, 1952 Note ^
Dizionario di Filosofia Bibliografia Giovanni Franchi, Arnaldo Volpicelli Per
una teoria dell'autogoverno, ESI, Napoli, 2003; Carlotta Latini, Arnaldo
Volpicelli, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Diritto,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2012. Collegamenti esterni Arnaldo
Volpicelli, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 74913178 · ISNI
(EN) 0000 0000 1749 9806 · LCCN (EN) nb2012019601 · BNF (FR) cb17114649g (data)
· BNE (ES) XX5259030 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-nb2012019601
Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi
italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1892Morti nel
1968Nati a RomaDirettori di periodici italianiFilosofi del dirittoProfessori
della Sapienza - Università di RomaProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di
Napoli Federico IIProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di UrbinoProfessori
dell'Università di PisaStudenti della Sapienza - Università di Roma[altre]
voltaggio: essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “I enjoyed “What
Leibniz actually said – and not just implicated.” “He also clarified Husserl to
me.” Francesco
Voltaggio, detto Franco (Palermo, 29 settembre 1934), è un filosofo, storico
della scienza e della medicina italiano. Ha studiato presso l'Università
di Roma La Sapienza, dove ha avuto come amici e colleghi Gabriele Giannantoni,
Ari Derecin, Enzo Siciliano, Muzi Epifani e Ester Fano, per poi laurearsi con
Carlo Antoni. Ha insegnato nelle Università di Roma (“La Sapienza”),
Mogadiscio e Macerata. Già caporedattore della rivista Sapere, ha collaborato
fra gli altri con Il manifesto, Lettera Internazionale (di cui è socio
fondatore), Apeiron, Janus e Medical. Consulente scientifico della Fondazione
SigmaTau di Roma e dell'Istituto Psiconanalitico per le Ricerche Sociali
(IPRS), è membro permanente del “Workshop internazionale di Storia, Filosofia e
Antropologia della Medicina” di Senigallia. Il figlio Stefano è un noto
sceneggiatore cinematografico e televisivo. Opere originali Fondamenti
della logica di Husserl (1965), Milano, Edizioni di Comunità; Fondamenti della
funzione critica (1969), Roma; Che cosa ha veramente detto Leibniz (1971),
Roma, Ubaldini; Bernard Bolzano e la dottrina della scienza (1974), Milano,
Edizioni di Comunità; I filosofi e la storia: per le scuole medie superiori
(1981), Milano, Principato; L'arte della guarigione nelle culture umane (1992),
Torino, Bollati Boringhieri; Il medico nel bosco (1995), Roma, Di Renzo
Editore; La medicina come scienza filosofica (Collana Lezioni Italiane) (1998),
Roma, Laterza; Italia Mediterranea. I flussi migratori nelle principali città
rivierasche (2010), Roma, Edizioni Edup; ISBN 9788884212337; Antigone tradita.
Una contraddizione della modernità: libertà e Stato nazionale (2013), Roma,
Editori Internazionali Riuniti. Volumi curati Bernard Bolzano: I paradossi
dell'infinito (1965). Prefazione e Appendice a cura di FV, Milano, Feltrinelli;
Gerard Radnitzky: Epistemologia e politica della ricerca, a cura di FV. (1978),
Roma, Armando; Conrad Hal Waddington: L'evoluzione di un evoluzionista, a cura
di FV.(1979), Roma, Armando; Michael Polanyi: La conoscenza inespressa, a cura
di FV.(1979), Roma, Armando; Yves Christen: L'ora della sociobiologia, a cura
di FV, (1980), Roma, Armando; W. I. B. Beveridge: L'arte della ricerca
scientifica, a cura di FV, (1981), Roma, Armando; David C. McClelland: Il
potere: processi e strutture: un'analisi dall'interno, a cura di FV, (1983),
Roma, Armando; Gerard Radnitsky et al: Progresso e razionalita della scienza
Gerard Radnitzky, Gunnar Andersson (a cura di); prefazione di Francesco Barone;
traduzione e premessa di FV, (1984), Armando, Roma; Donald Philip Verene: Vico:
La Scienza della fantasia; con prefazione di Vittorio Mathieu, a cura di FV,
1984, Armando, Roma; Gerald Holton: L'intelligenza scientifica: un'indagine
sull'immaginazione creatrice dello scienziato, a cura di FV, (1984), Roma,
Armando; Filosofi per la pace / Jeremy Bentham... [et al.], a cura di Daniele
Archibugi e FV, 1991, Roma, Editori Riuniti; Galeno: Trattato sulla bile nera,
a cura di FV, (2003), Torino, Nino Aragno Editore Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 91953144 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 6652 8618 · LCCN (EN) n99025920 · GND (DE)
1057935697 · BNF (FR) cb128456773 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n99025920 Biografie Portale Biografie: accedi alle voci di Wikipedia che
trattano di biografie Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloStorici della
scienza italianiNati nel 1934Nati il 29 settembreNati a Palermo[altre]. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, “Voltaggio: what Leibniz implicated – as explicated by Grice.”
H. P. Grice, “Voltaggio,” BANC MSS 90/135 c.
voluntarism: -- W. James: “I will that the chair slides over the
floor toward me. It doesn’t.” cf. Grice on the volitive – desiderative -- any
philosophical view that makes our ability to control the phenomena in question
an essential part of the correct understanding of those phenomena. Thus,
ethical voluntarism is the doctrine that the standards that define right and
wrong conduct are in some sense chosen by us. Doxastic voluntarism is the
doctrine that we have extensive control over what we believe; we choose what to
believe. A special case of doxastic voluntarism is theological voluntarism,
which implies that religious belief requires a substantial element of choice; the
evidence alone cannot decide the issue. This is a view that is closely
associated with Pascal, Kierkegaard, and James. Historical voluntarism is the
doctrine that the human will is a major factor in history. Such views contrast
with Marxist views of history. Metaphysical voluntarism is the doctrine, linked
with Schopenhauer, that the fundamental organizing principle of the world is
not the incarnation of a rational or a moral order but rather the will, which
for Schopenhauer is an ultimately meaningless striving for survival, to be
found in all of nature. Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “The will”
voting
paradox: the possibility that if there
are three candidates, A, B, and C, for democratic choice, with at least three
choosers, and the choosers are asked to make sequential choices among pairs of
candidates, A could defeat B by a majority vote, B could defeat C, and C could
defeat A. This would be the outcome if the choosers’ preferences were ABC, BCA,
and CAB. Hence, although each individual voter may have a clear preference
ordering over the candidates, the collective may have cyclic preferences, so
that individual and majoritarian collective preference orderings are not
analogous. While this fact is not a logical paradox, it is perplexing to many
analysts of social choice. It may also be morally perplexing in that it
suggests majority rule can be quite capricious. For example, suppose we vote
sequentially over various pairs of candidates, with the winner at each step
facing a new candidate. If the candidates are favored by cyclic majorities, the
last candidate to enter the fray will win the final vote. Hence, control over
the sequence of votes may determine the outcome. It is easy to find cyclic
preferences over such candidates as movies and other matters of taste. Hence,
the problem of the voting paradox is clearly real and not merely a logical
contrivance. But is it important? Institutions may block the generation of
evidence for cyclic majorities by making choices pairwise and sequentially, as
above. And some issues over which we vote provoke preference patterns that
cannot produce cycles. For example, if our issue is one of unidimensional
liberalism versus conservatism on some major political issue such as welfare
programs, there may be no one who would prefer to spend both more and less
money than what is spent in the status quo. Hence, everyone may display
single-peaked preferences with preferences falling as we move in either
direction toward more money or toward less from the peak. If all important
issues and combinations of issues had this preference structure, the voting
paradox would be unimportant. It is widely supposed by many public choice
scholars that collective preferences are not single-peaked for many issues or,
therefore, for combinations of issues. Hence, collective choices may be quite
chaotic. What order they display may result from institutional manipulation. If
this is correct, we may wonder whether democracy in the sense of the
sovereignty of the electorate is a coherent notion. Refs.: H. P. Grice,
“Grice’s Book of Paradoxes – with pictures and illustrations.”
vyse: an unfortunate example by Grice. He wants to give an
ambiguous sentence, “Strawson is caught in the grip of a vice.” Oddly, in The
New World, Webster noticed this, and favoured the spelling ‘vyse.’ “But what
Webster fails,” Grice adds, “to note, is that ‘vice’ and ‘vyse’ ARE cognate,
hence no need for double talk!” “They both can be traced to ‘violence.’” Sir
Cecil Vyse happens to be a character in Forster’s “A room with a view,” which gives
a triple ambiguity, to “Strawson was caught in the grip of a Vyse.” Vyse was
wonderfully played by Daniel Day Lewis in the film. “What is your profession,
Mister Vyse?” Vyse: “Must one have a profeesion?” – Vyse’s favourite motto
applies to Grice, “Ingelese italianato, diavolo incarnate.” – Grice: “Stupidly,
when this is reversed the implicature is lost.
*
ward: j. English philosopher and psychologist. Influenced
by Lotze, Herbart, and Brentano, Ward sharply criticized Bain’s associationism
and its allied nineteenth-century reductive naturalism. His psychology rejected
the associationists’ sensationism, which regarded mind as passive, capable only
of sensory receptivity and composed solely of cognitive presentations. Ward
emphasized the mind’s inherent activity, asserting, like Kant, the prior
existence of an inferred but necessarily existing ego or subject capable of
feeling and, most importantly, of conation, shaping both experience and
behavior by the willful exercise of attention. Ward’s psychology stresses
attention and will. In his metaphysics, Ward resisted the naturalists’
mechanistic materialism, proposing instead a teleological spiritualistic
monism. While his criticisms of associationism and naturalism were telling,
Ward was a transitional figure whose positive influence is limited, if we
except H. P. Grice who follows him to a T. Although sympathetic to scientific
psychology – he founded scientific psychology in Britain by establishing a
psychology laboratory – he, with his
student Stout, represented the beginning of armchair psychology at Oxford,
which Grice adored. Through Stout he influenced the hormic psychology of
McDougall, and Grice who calls himself a Stoutian (“until Prichard converted
me”). Ward’s major work is “Psychology” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed.,
1886), reworked as Psychological Principles (1918). “one of the most
philosophical psychologists England (if not Oxford) ever produced!” – H. P.
Grice -- cited by H. P. Grice. -- English philosopher. Influenced by Lotze,
Herbart, and Brentano, Ward sharply criticized Bain’s associationism and its
allied nineteenth-century reductive naturalism. His psychology rejected the
associationists’ sensationism, which regarded mind as passive, capable only of
sensory receptivity and composed solely of cognitive presentations. Ward
emphasized the mind’s inherent activity, asserting, like Kant, the prior
existence of an inferred but necessarily existing ego or subject capable of
feeling and, most importantly, of conation, shaping both experience and
behavior by the willful exercise of attention. Ward’s psychology stresses
attention and will. In his metaphysics, Ward resisted the naturalists’
mechanistic materialism, proposing instead a teleological spiritualistic
monism. While his criticisms of associationism and naturalism were telling,
Ward was a transitional figure whose positive influence is limited, if we
except H. P. Grice who follows him to a T. Although sympathetic to scientific
psychology he founded scientific
psychology in Britain by establishing a psychology laboratory he, with his student Stout, represented the
beginning of armchair psychology at Oxford, which Grice adored. Through Stout
he influenced the hormic psychology of McDougall, and Grice who calls himself a
Stoutian “until Prichard converted me”. Ward’s major work is “Psychology”
Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., 6, reworked as Psychological Principles
8.
warnock: Irish
philosopher, born in the north of England (“He was so Irish, I could sing
‘Danny Boy’ to him all day long – Dame Mary Warnock). “One of my most
intelligent collaborators.” Unlike any other of the collaborators, Warnock had
what Grice calls “the gift for botanising.” They would spend hours on the
philosophy of perception. His other English collaborators were, in alphabetic
order: Pears, Strawson, and Thomson. And you can see the difference. Thomson
was pretty obscure. Pears was a closet Vittersian. And Strawson was ‘to the
point.’ With Warnock, Grice could ramble at ease. Warnock became the custodian
of Austin’s heritage which somehow annoyed Grice. But the Warnock that Grice
enjoyed most was the Warnock-while-the-SchoolMaster-Austin-was-around. Because
they could play. And NOT in the play group, which was “anything but.” But Grice
would philosophise on ‘perception,’ and especially ‘see’ – with Warnock. Their
idiolects differed. Warnock, being Irish, was more creative, and less
conservative. So it was good for Warnock to have Grice to harness him! Through
Warnock, Grice got to discuss a few things with Urmson, the co-custodian of
Austin’s legacy. But again, most of the discussions with Urmson were before
Austin’s demise. Urmson and Warnock are the co-editors of Austin’s
“Philosophical Papers.” Would Austin have accepted? Who knows. The essays were
more or less easily available. Still. warnockianism:
Grice: “I told Warnock, ‘How clever language is!” “He agreed, for we realised
that language makes all the distinctions you need, and when you feel there is
one missing, language allows you to introduce it!” --. Refs.: H. P. Grice and
G. J. Warnock, The philosophy of perception – Folder – BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
weapon: Grice’s shining new tool. The funny thing is that his
tutee Strawson didn’t allow him to play with it ONCE! Or weapon. Grice refers
to the implicaturum as a philosopher’s tool, and that the fun comes in the
application. Strawson and Wiggins p. 522, reminds us of Austin. Austin used to
say that when a philosopher “forges a new weapon, he is also fshioning new
skids to put under his feet.” It is perhaps inappropriate that a memorial
should mention this, but here they were, the memorialists. They were suggesting
that Grice forged a shining new tool, the implicaturum, or implicaturum –
rather, he proposed a rational explanation for the distinction between what an
emissor means (e. g., that p) and what anything else may be said,
‘metabolically,’ to “mean.” Suggesting an analogy with J. L. Austin and his
infelicitious notion of infelicity, which found him fashioning a shining new
skid, the memorialists suggest the same for Grice – but of course the analogy
does not apply.
well-formed
formula (Villa Grice: formula). For Grice, an otiosity – surely an ill-formed
formula is an oxymoron -- a grammatically wellformed sentence or structured
predicate of an artificial language of the sort studied by logicians. A
well-formed formula is sometimes known as a wff pronounced ‘woof’ or simply a
formula. Delineating the formulas of a language involves providing it with a
syntax or grammar, composed of both a vocabulary a specification of the symbols
from which the language is to be built, sorted into grammatical categories and
formation rules a purely formal or syntactical specification of which strings
of symbols are grammatically well-formed and which are not. Formulas are
classified as either open or closed, depending on whether or not they contain
free variables variables not bound by quantifiers. Closed formulas, such as x
Fx / Gx, are sentences, the potential bearers of truth-values. Open formulas,
such as Fx / Gx, are handled in any of three ways. On some accounts, these
formulas are on a par with closed ones, the free variables being treated as
names. On others, open formulas are structured predicates, the free variables
being treated as place holders for terms. And on still other accounts, the free
variables are regarded as implicitly bound by universal quantifiers, again
making open formulas sentences.
“what-is-hinted”
-- hint hinting. Don’t expect Cicero
used this. It’s Germanic and related to ‘hunt,’ to ‘seize.’ As if you throw
something in the air, and expect your recipient will seize it. Grice spends
quite a long section in “Retrospective epilogue” to elucidate “Emissor E
communicates that p via a hint,” versus “Emissor E communicates that p via a
suggestion.” Some level of explicitness (vide candour) is necessary. If it is
too obscure it cannot be held to have been ‘communicated’ in the first place!
Cf. Holdcroft, “Some forms of indirect communication” for the Journal of
Rhetoric. Grice had to do a bit of linguistic botany for his “E implicates that
p”: To do duty for ‘imply,’ suggest, indicate, hint, mean, -- “etc.” indirectly
or implicitly convey.
what the eye
no longer sees the heart no longer grieves for. Grice. Vide sytactics. Grice played with ‘elimination
rules’ for his scope device. Once applied, Grice said: “What the eye no longer
sees the heart no longer grieves for.” “As they say,” he added.
whewell: English philosopher of science. He was a master of Trinity
, Cambridge. Francis Bacon’s early work on induction was furthered by Whewell,
J. F. W. Herschel, and J. S. Mill, who attempted to create a logic of welfare
economics Whewell, William 970 970
induction, a methodology that can both discover generalizations about
experience and prove them to be necessary. Whewell’s theory of scientific
method is based on his reading of the history of the inductive sciences. He
thought that induction began with a non-inferential act, the superimposition of
an idea on data, a “colligation,” a way of seeing facts in a “new light.”
Colligations generalize over data, and must satisfy three “tests of truth.”
First, colligations must be empirically adequate; they must account for the
given data. Any number of ideas may be adequate to explain given data, so a
more severe test is required. Second, because colligations introduce
generalizations, they must apply to events or properties of objects not yet
given: they must provide successful predictions, thereby enlarging the evidence
in favor of the colligation. Third, the best inductions are those where
evidence for various hypotheses originally thought to cover unrelated kinds of
data “jumps together,” providing a consilience of inductions. Consilience
characterizes those theories achieving large measures of simplicity,
generality, unification, and deductive strength. Furthermore, consilience is a
test of the necessary truth of theories, which implies that what many regard as
merely pragmatic virtues of theories like simplicity and unifying force have an
epistemic status. Whewell thus provides a strong argument for scientific
realism. Whewell’s examples of consilient theories are Newton’s theory of
universal gravitation, which covers phenomena as seemingly diverse as the
motions of the heavenly bodies and the motions of the tides, and the undulatory
theory of light, which explains both the polarization of light by crystals and
the colors of fringes. There is evidence that Whewell’s methodology was
employed by Maxwell, who designed the influential Cavendish Laboratories at
Cambridge. Peirce and Mach favored Whewell’s account of method over Mill’s
empiricist theory of induction. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “From induction to
deduction, via abduction.”
whistle. If you can’t say it you can’t whistle it either – But
you can implicate it. “To say” takes a ‘that’-clause. “To implicate” takes a
‘that’-clause. Grice: “ ‘To whisle’ takes a ‘that’-clause, “By whistling, E
communicates that he intends his emissee to be there.” “Whistle and I’ll be
there” – Houseman to a Shropshire farmer.
whitehead: cited by H. P. Grice, a. n., philosopher of science,
educated first at the Sherborne School in Dorsetshire and then at Trinity ,
Cambridge, Whitehead emerged as a first-class mathematician with a rich general
background. In 5 he became a fellow of Trinity
and remained there in a teaching role until 0. In the early 0s Bertrand
Russell entered Trinity as a student in mathematics;
by the beginning of the new century Russell had become not only a student and
friend but a colleague of Whitehead’s at Trinity . Each had written a first
book on algebra Whitehead’s A Treatise on Universal Algebra won him election to
the Royal Society in 3. When they discovered that their projected second books
largely overlapped, they undertook a collaboration on a volume that they
estimated would take about a year to write; in fact, it was a decade later that
the three volumes of their ground-breaking Principia Mathematica appeared,
launching symbolic logic in its modern form. In the second decade of this
century Whitehead and Russell drifted apart; their responses to World War I
differed radically, and their intellectual interests and orientations diverged.
Whitehead’s London period 024 is often viewed as the second phase of a
three-phase career. His association with the
of London involved him in practical issues affecting the character of
working-class education. For a decade Whitehead held a professorship at the
Imperial of Science and Technology and
also served as dean of the Faculty of Science in the , chair of the Academic
Council which managed educational affairs in London, and chair of the council
that managed Goldsmith’s . His book The Aims of Education 8 is a collection of
essays largely growing out of reflections on the experiences of these years.
Intellectually, Whitehead’s interests were moving toward issues in the
philosophy of science. In the years 922 he published An Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Natural Knowledge, The Concept of Nature, and The Principle of
Relativity the third led to his later 1
election as a fellow of the British Academy. In 4, at the age of sixty-three,
Whitehead made a dramatic move, both geographically and intellectually, to
launch phase three of his career: never having formally studied philosophy in
his life, he agreed to become professor of philosophy at Harvard , a position
he held until retirement in 7. The accompanying intellectual shift was a move
from philosophy of science to metaphysics. The earlier investigations had
assumed the self-containedness of nature: “nature is closed to mind.” The
philosophy of nature examined nature at the level of abstraction entailed by
this assumption. Whitehead had come to regard philosophy as “the critic of
abstractions,” a notion introduced in Science and the Modern World 5. This book
traced the intertwined emergence of Newtonian science and its philosophical
presuppositions. It noted that with the development of the theory of relativity
in the twentieth century, scientific understanding had left behind the
Newtonian conceptuality that had generated the still-dominant philosophical
assumptions, and that those philosophical assumptions considered in themselves
had become inadequate to explicate our full concrete experience. Philosophy as the
critic of abstractions must recognize the limitations of a stance that assumes
that nature is closed to mind, and must push deeper, beyond such an
abstraction, to create a scheme of ideas more in harmony with scientific
developments and able to do justice to human beings as part of nature. Science
and the Modern World merely outlines what such a philosophy might be; in 9
Whitehead published his magnum opus, titled Process and Reality. In this
volume, subtitled “An Essay in Cosmology,” his metaphysical understanding is
given its final form. It is customary to regard this book as the central
document of what has become known as process philosophy, though Whitehead
himself frequently spoke of his system of ideas as the philosophy of organism.
Process and Reality begins with a sentence that sheds a great deal of light
upon Whitehead’s metaphysical orientation: “These lectures are based upon a
recurrence to that phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and
ended with Hume.” Descartes, adapting the classical notion of substance to his
own purposes, begins a “phase of philosophic thought” by assuming there are two
distinct, utterly different kinds of substance, mind and matter, each requiring
nothing but itself in order to exist. This assumption launches the reign of
epistemology within philosophy: if knowing begins with the experiencing of a
mental substance capable of existing by itself and cut off from everything
external to it, then the philosophical challenge is to try to justify the claim
to establish contact with a reality external to it. The phrase “and ended with
Hume” expresses Whitehead’s conviction that Hume and more elegantly, he notes,
Santayana showed that if one begins with Descartes’s metaphysical assumptions,
skepticism is inevitable. Contemporary philosophers have talked about the end
of philosophy. From Whitehead’s perspective such talk presupposes a far too
narrow view of the nature of philosophy. It is true that a phase of philosophy
has ended, a phase dominated by epistemology. Whitehead’s response is to offer
the dictum that all epistemological difficulties are at bottom only camouflaged
metaphysical difficulties. One must return to that moment of Cartesian
beginning and replace the substance metaphysics with an orientation that avoids
the epistemological trap, meshes harmoniously with the scientific
understandings that have displaced the much simpler physics of Descartes’s day,
and is consonant with the facts of evolution. These are the considerations that
generate Whitehead’s fundamental metaphysical category, the category of an
actual occasion. An actual occasion is not an enduring, substantial entity.
Rather, it is a process of becoming, a process of weaving together the
“prehensions” a primitive form of ‘apprehension’ meant to indicate a “taking
account of,” or “feeling,” devoid of conscious awareness of the actual
occasions that are in the immediate past. Whitehead calls this process of
weaving together the inheritances of the past “concrescence.” An actual entity
is its process of concrescence, its process of growing together into a unified
perspective on its immediate past. The seeds of Whitehead’s epistemological
realism are planted in these fundamental first moves: “The philosophy of
organism is the inversion of Kant’s philosophy. . . . For Kant, the world
emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges
from the world.” It is customary to compare an actual occasion with a
Leibnizian monad, with the caveat that whereas a monad is windowless, an actual
occasion is “all window.” It is as though one were to take Aristotle’s system
of categories and ask what would result if the category of substance were
displaced from its position of preeminence by the category of relation the result would, mutatis mutandis, be an
understanding of being somewhat on the model of a Whiteheadian actual occasion.
In moving from Descartes’s dualism of mental substance and material substance
to his own notion of an actual entity, Whitehead has been doing philosophy conceived
of as the critique of abstractions. He holds that both mind and matter are
abstractions from the concretely real. They are important abstractions,
necessary for everyday thought and, of supreme importance, absolutely essential
in enabling the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries to accomplish their
magnificent advances in scientific thinking. Indeed, Whitehead, in his
philosophy of science phase, by proceeding as though “nature is closed to
mind,” was operating with those selfsame abstractions. He came to see that
while these abstractions were indispensable for certain kinds of
investigations, they were, at the philosophical level, as Hume had
demonstrated, a disaster. In considering mind and matter to be ontological
ultimates, Descartes had committed what Whitehead termed the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness. The category of an actual occasion designates the fully
real, the fully concrete. The challenge for such an orientation, the challenge
that Process and Reality is designed to meet, is so to describe actual
occasions that it is intelligible how collections of actual occasions, termed
“nexus” or societies, emerge, exhibiting the characteristics we find associated
with “minds” and “material structures.” Perhaps most significantly, if this
challenge is met successfully, biology will be placed, in the eyes of
philosophy, on an even footing with physics; metaphysics will do justice both
to human beings and to human beings as a part of nature; and such vexing
contemporary problem areas as animal rights and environmental ethics will
appear in a new light. Whitehead’s last two books, Adventures of Ideas 3 and
Modes of Thought 8, are less technical and more lyrical than is Process and
Reality. Adventures of Ideas is clearly the more significant of these two. It
presents a philosophical study of the notion of civilization. It holds that the
social changes in a civilization are driven by two sorts of forces: brute,
senseless agencies of compulsion on the one hand, and formulated aspirations
and articulated beliefs on the other. These two sorts of forces are epitomized
by barbarians and Christianity in the ancient Roman world and by steam and
democracy in the world of the industrial revolution. Whitehead’s focal point in
Adventures of Ideas is aspirations, beliefs, and ideals as instruments of
change. In particular, he is concerned to articulate the ideals and aspirations
appropriate to our own era. The character of such ideals and aspirations at any
moment is limited by the philosophical understandings available at that moment,
because in their struggle for release and efficacy such ideals and aspirations
can appear only in the forms permitted by the available philosophical
discourse. In the final section of Adventures of Ideas Whitehead presents a
statement of ideals and aspirations fit for our era as his own philosophy of
organism allows them to take shape and be articulated. The notions of beauty,
truth, adventure, zest, Eros, and peace are given a content drawn from the
technical understandings elaborated in Process and Reality. But in Adventures
of Ideas a less technical language is used, a language reminiscent of the
poetic imagery found in the style of Plato’s Republic, a language making the
ideas accessible to readers who have not mastered Process and Reality, but at
the same time far richer and more meaningful to those who have. Whitehead notes
in Adventures of Ideas that Plato’s later thought “circles round the
interweaving of seven main notions, namely, The Ideas, The Physical Elements,
The Psyche, The Eros, The Harmony, The Mathematical Relations, The Receptacle.
These notions are as important for us now, as they were then at the dawn of the
modern world, when civilizations of the old type were dying.” Whitehead uses
these notions in quite novel and modern ways; one who is unfamiliar with his
metaphysics can get something of what he means as he speaks of the Eros of the
Universe, but if one is familiar from Process and Reality with the notions of
the Primordial Nature of God and the Consequent Nature of God then one sees
much deeper into the meanings present in Adventures of Ideas. Whitehead was not
religious in any narrow, doctrinal, sectarian sense. He explicitly likened his
stance to that of Aristotle, dispassionately considering the requirements of his
metaphysical system as they refer to the question of the existence and nature
of God. Whitehead’s thoughts on these matters are most fully developed in
Chapter 11 of Science and the Modern World, in the final chapter of Process and
Reality, and in Religion in the Making 6. These thoughts are expressed at a
high level of generality. Perhaps because of this, a large part of the interest
generated by Whitehead’s thought has been within the community of theologians.
His ideas fairly beg for elaboration and development in the context of
particular modes of religious understanding. It is as though many modern
theologians, recalling the relation between the theology of Aquinas and the
metaphysics of Aristotle, cannot resist the temptation to play Aquinas to Whitehead’s
Aristotle. Process theology, or Neo-Classical Theology as it is referred to by
Hartshorne, one of its leading practitioners, has been the arena within which a
great deal of clarification and development of Whitehead’s ideas has occurred.
Whitehead was a gentle man, soft-spoken, never overbearing or threatening. He
constantly encouraged students to step out on their own, to develop their
creative capacities. His concern not to inhibit students made him a notoriously
easy grader; it was said that an A-minus in one of his courses was equivalent
to failure. Lucien Price’s Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead chronicles many
evenings of discussion in the Whitehead household. He there described Whitehead
as follows: his face, serene, luminous, often smiling, the complexion pink and
white, the eyes brilliant blue, clear and candid as a child’s yet with the
depth of the sage, often laughing or twinkling with humour. And there was his
figure, slender, frail, and bent with its lifetime of a scholar’s toil. Always
benign, there was not a grain of ill will anywhere in him; for all his
formidable armament, never a wounding word.
Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Definite descriptions in Whitehead and Russell and
in the vernacular,” “Definite descriptions in Whitethead’s and Russell’s
formalese and in Strawson’s vernacular” -- BANC.
weiner kraus -- Vienna Circle
vide ayerism -- a group of philosophers and scientists who met
periodically for discussions in Vienna from 2 to 8 and who proposed a
self-consciously revolutionary conception of scientific knowledge. The Circle
was initiated by the mathematician Hans Hahn to continue a prewar forum with
the physicist Philip Frank and the social scientist Otto Neurath after the
arrival in Vienna of Moritz Schlick, a philosopher who had studied with Max
Planck. Carnap joined in 6 from 1 in Prague; other members included Herbert
Feigl from 0 in Iowa, Friedrich Waismann, Bergmann, Viktor Kraft, and Bela von
Juhos. Viennese associates of the Circle included Kurt Gödel, Karl Menger,
Felix Kaufmann, and Edgar Zilsel. Popper was not a member or associate. During
its formative period the Circle’s activities were confined to discussion
meetings many on Vitters’s Tractatus. In 9 the Circle entered its public period
with the formation of the Verein Ernst Mach, the publication of its manifesto
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis by Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath
tr. in Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology, 3, and the first of a series of
philosophical monographs edited by Frank and Schlick. It also began
collaboration with the independent but broadly like-minded Berlin “Society of
Empirical Philosophy,” including Reichenbach, Kurt Grelling, Kurt Lewin,
Friedrich Kraus, Walter Dubislav, Hempel, and Richard von Mises: the groups
together organized their first public conferences in Prague and Königsberg,
acquired editorship of a philosophical journal renamed Erkenntnis, and later
organized the international Unity of Science congresses. The death and
dispersion of key members from 4 onward Hahn died in 4, Neurath left for
Holland in 4, Carnap left for the United States in 5, Schlick died in 6 did not
mean the extinction of Vienna Circle philosophy. Through the subsequent work of
earlier visitors Ayer, Ernest Nagel, Quine and members and collaborators who emigrated
to the United States Carnap, Feigl, Frank, Hempel, and Reichenbach, the logical
positivism of the Circle Reichenbach and Neurath independently preferred
“logical empiricism” strongly influenced the development of analytic
philosophy. The Circle’s discussions concerned the philosophy of formal and
physical science, and even though their individual publications ranged much
wider, it is the attitude toward science that defines the Circle within the
philosophical movements of central Europe at the time. The Circle rejected the
need for a specifically philosophical epistemology that bestowed justification
on knowledge claims from beyond science itself. In this, the Circle may also
have drawn on a distinct Austrian tradition a thesis of its historian Neurath:
in most of G.y, science and philosophy had parted ways during the nineteenth
century. Starting with Helmholtz, of course, there also arose a movement that
sought to distinguish the scientific respectability of the Kantian tradition
from the speculations of G. idealism, yet after 0 neo-Kantians insisted on the
autonomy of epistemology, disparaging earlier fellow travelers as “positivist.”
Yet the program of reducing the knowledge claim of science and providing
legitimations to what’s left found wide favor with the more empirical-minded
like Mach. Comprehensive description, not explanation, of natural phenomena
became the task for theorists who no longer looked to philosophy for
foundations, but found them in the utility of their preferred empirical procedures.
Along with the positivists, the Vienna Circle thought uneconomical the Kantian
answer to the question of the possibility of objectivity, the synthetic a
priori. Moreover, the Vienna Circle and its conventionalist precursors Poincaré
and Duhem saw them contradicted by the results of formal science. Riemann’s
geometries showed that questions about the geometry of physical space were open
to more than one answer: Was physical space Euclidean or non-Euclidean? It fell
to Einstein and the pre-Circle Schlick Space and Time in Contemporary Physics,
7 to argue that relativity theory showed the untenability of Kant’s conception
of space and time as forever fixed synthetic a priori forms of intuition. Yet
Frege’s anti-psychologistic critique had also shown empiricism unable to
account for knowledge of arithmetic and the conventionalists had ended the
positivist dream of a theory of experiential elements that bridged the gap
between descriptions of fact and general principles of science. How, then,
could the Vienna Circle defend the claim
under attack as just one worldview among others that science provides knowledge? The Circle
confronted the problem of constitutive conventions. As befitted their
self-image beyond Kant and Mach, they found their paradigmatic answer in the
theory of relativity: they thought that irreducible conventions of measurement
with wide-ranging implications were sharply separable from pure facts like
point coincidences. Empirical theories were viewed as logical structures of
statements freely created, yet accountable to experiential input via their
predictive consequences identifiable by observation. The Vienna Circle defended
empiricism by the reconceptualization of the relation between a priori and a
posteriori inquiries. First, in a manner sympathetic to Frege’s and Russell’s
doctrine of logicism and guided by Vitters’s notion of tautology, arithmetic
was considered a part of logic and treated as entirely analytical, without any
empirical content; its truth was held to be exhausted by what is provable from
the premises and rules of a formal symbolic system. Carnap’s Logical Syntax of
Language, 4, assimilated Gödel’s incompleteness result by claiming that not
every such proof could be demonstrated in those systems themselves which are powerful
enough to represent classical arithmetic. The synthetic a priori was not needed
for formal science because all of its results were non-synthetic. Second, the
Circle adopted verificationism: supposedly empirical concepts whose
applicability was indiscernible were excluded from science. The terms for
unobservables were to be reconstructed by logical operations from the
observational terms. Only if such reconstructions were provided did the more
theoretical parts of science retain their empirical character. Just what kind
of reduction was aimed for was not always clear and earlier radical positions
were gradually weakened; Reichenbach instead considered the relation between
observational and theoretical statements to be probabilistic. Empirical science
needed no synthetic a priori either; all of its statements were a posteriori.
Combined with the view that the analysis of the logical form of expressions
allowed for the exact determination of their combinatorial value,
verificationism was to exhibit the knowledge claims of science and eliminate
metaphysics. Whatever meaning did not survive identification with the
scientific was deemed irrelevant to knowledge claims Reichenbach did not share
this view either. Since the Circle also observed the then long-discussed ban on
issuing unconditional value statements in science, its metaethical positions
may be broadly characterized as endorsing noncognitivism. Its members were not
simply emotivists, however, holding that value judgments were mere expressions
of feeling, but sought to distinguish the factual and evaluative contents of
value judgments. Those who, like Schlick Questions of Ethics, 0, engaged in
metaethics, distinguished the expressive component x desires y of value
judgments from their implied descriptive component doing zfurthers aim y and
held that the demand inherent in moral principles possessed validity if the
implied description was true and the expressed desire was endorsed. This
analysis of normative concepts did not render them meaningless but allowed for
psychological and sociological studies of ethical systems; Menger’s formal
variant Morality, Decision and Social Organization, 4 proved influential for
decision theory. The semiotic view that knowledge required structured
representations was developed in close contact with foundational research in
mathematics and depended on the “new” logic of Frege, Russell, and Vitters, out
of which quantification theory was emerging. Major new results were quickly
integrated albeit controversially and Carnap’s works reflect the development of
the conception of logic itself. In his Logical Syntax he adopted the “Principle
of Tolerance” vis-à-vis the question of the foundation of the formal sciences:
the choice of logics and languages was conventional and constrained, apart from
the demand for consistency, only by pragmatic considerations. The proposed
language form and its difference from alternatives simply had to be stated as
exactly as possible: whether a logico-linguistic framework as a whole correctly
represented reality was a cognitively meaningless question. Yet what was the
status of the verifiability principle? Carnap’s suggestion that it represents
not a discovery but a proposal for future scientific language use deserves to
be taken seriously, for it not only characterizes his own conventionalism, but
also amplifies the Circle’s linguistic turn, according to which all philosophy
concerned ways of representing, rather than the nature of the represented. What
the Vienna Circle “discovered” was how much of science was conventional: its
verificationism was a proposal for accommodating the creativity of scientific
theorizing without accommodating idealism. Whether an empirical claim in order
to be meaningful needed to be actually verified or only potentially verifiable,
or fallible or only potentially testable, and whether so by current or only by
future means, became matters of discussion during the 0s. Equally important for
the question whether the Circle’s conventionalism avoided idealism and
metaphysics were the issues of the status of theoretical discourse about
unobservables and the nature of science’s empirical foundation. The view
suggested in Schlick’s early General Theory of Knowledge 8, 2d. ed. 5 and
Frank’s The Causal Law and its Limitations 2 and elaborated in Carnap’s
“Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science” in Foundations of the Unity of
Science I.1, 8 characterized the theoretical language as an uninterpreted
calculus that is related to the fully interpreted observational language only
by partial definitions. Did such an instrumentalism require for its empirical
anchor the sharp separation of observational from theoretical terms? Could such
a separation even be maintained? Consider the unity of science thesis.
According to the methodological version, endorsed by all members, all of
science abides by the same criteria: no basic methodological differences
separate the natural from the social or cultural sciences Geisteswissenschaften
as claimed by those who distinguish between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’.
According to the metalinguistic version, all objects of scientific knowledge
could in principle be comprehended by the same “universal” language.
Physicalism asserts that this is the language that speaks of physical objects.
While everybody in the Circle endorsed physicalism in this sense, the
understanding of its importance varied, as became clear in the socalled
protocol sentence debate. The nomological version of the unity thesis was only
later clearly distinguished: whether all scientific laws could be reduced to
those of physics was another matter on which Neurath came to differ.
Ostensively, this debate concerned the question of the form, content, and
epistemological status of scientific evidence statements. Schlick’s unrevisable
“affirmations” talked about phenomenal states in statements not themselves part
of the language of science “The Foundation of Knowledge,” 4, tr. in Ayer, ed.,
Logical Positivism. Carnap’s preference changed from unrevisable statements in
a primitive methodologically solipsistic protocol language that were fallibly
translatable into the physicalistic system language 1; see Unity of Science, 4,
via arbitrary revisable statements of that system language that are taken as
temporary resting points in testing 2, to revisable statements in the
scientific observation language 5; see “Testability and Meaning,” Philosophy of
Science, 637. These changes were partly prompted by Neurath, whose own
revisable “protocol statements” spoke, amongst other matters, of the relation
between observers and the observed in a “universal slang” that mixed
expressions of the physicalistically cleansed colloquial and the high
scientific languages “Protocol Statements,”
tr. in Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism. Ultimately, these proposals
answered to different projects. Since all agreed that all statements of science
were hypothetical, the questions of their “foundation” concerned rather the
very nature of Vienna Circle philosophy. For Schlick philosophy became the
activity of meaning determination inspired by Vitters; Carnap pursued it as the
rational reconstruction of knowledge claims concerned only with what
Reichenbach called the “context of justification” its logical aspects, not the
“context of discovery”; and Neurath replaced philosophy altogether with a
naturalistic, interdisciplinary, empirical inquiry into science as a
distinctive discursive practice, precluding the orthodox conception of the
unity of science. The Vienna Circle was neither a monolithic nor a necessarily
reductionist philosophical movement, and quick assimilation to the tradition of
British empiricism mistakes its struggles with the formcontent dichotomy for
foundationalism, when instead sophisticated responses to the question of the
presuppositions of their own theories of knowledge were being developed. In its
time and place, the Circle was a minority voice; the sociopolitical dimension
of its theories stressed more by some
Neurath than others Schlick as a renewal
of Enlightenment thought, ultimately against the rising tide of Blutund-Boden
metaphysics, is gaining recognition. After the celebrated “death” of
reductionist logical positivism in the 0s the historical Vienna Circle is
reemerging as a multifaceted object of the history of analytical philosophy
itself, revealing in nuce different strands of reasoning still significant for
postpositivist theory of science. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “What Freddie brought us
from Vienna.”
williams: “There are many Williams in Oxford, but only one “B.
A. O., “ as he pretentiously went by!” – H. P. Grice. B. A. O. London-born
Welsh philosopher who has made major contributions to many fields but is
primarily known as a moral philosopher. His approach to ethics, set out in
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 5, is characterized by a wide-ranging skepticism,
directed mainly at the capacity of academic moral philosophy to further the aim
of reflectively living an ethical life. One line of skeptical argument attacks
the very idea of practical reason. Attributions of practical reasons to a
particular agent must, in Williams’s view, be attributions of states that can
potentially explain the agent’s action. Therefore such reasons must be either
within the agent’s existing set of motivations or within the revised set of
motivations that the agent would acquire upon sound reasoning. Williams argues
from these minimal assumptions that this view of reasons as internal reasons
undermines the idea of reason itself being a source of authority over practice.
Williams’s connected skepticism about the claims of moral realism is based both
on his general stance toward realism and on his view of the nature of modern
societies. In opposition to internal realism, Williams has consistently argued
that reflection on our conception of the world allows one to develop a conception
of the world maximally independent of our peculiar ways of conceptualizing
reality an absolute conception of the
world. Such absoluteness is, he argues, an inappropriate aspiration for ethical
thought. Our ethical thinking is better viewed as one way of structuring a form
of ethical life than as the ethical truth about how life is best lived. The
pervasive reflectiveness and radical pluralism of modern societies makes them
inhospitable contexts for viewing ethical concepts as making knowledge available
to groups of concept users. Modernity has produced at the level of theory a
distortion of our ethical practice, namely a conception of the morality system.
This view is reductionist, is focused centrally on obligations, and rests on
various fictions about responsibility and blame that Williams challenges in
such works as Shame and Necessity 3. Much academic moral philosophy, in his
view, is shaped by the covert influence of the morality system, and such
distinctively modern outlooks as Kantianism and utilitarianism monopolize the
terms of contemporary debate with insufficient attention to their origin in a
distorted view of the ethical. Williams’s views are not skeptical through and
through; he retains a commitment to the values of truth, truthfulness in a
life, and individualism. His most recent work, which thematizes the
long-implicit influence of Nietzsche on his ethical philosophy, explicitly
offers a vindicatory “genealogical” narrative for these ideals.
willkür, v.
Hobson’s choice. Grice: “‘will-kuer’ is a fascinating German expression,
literally will-care’.”
wilson’s
ultimate counterexample to Grice --
Grice’s counterexample – “the ultimate counter-example” -- counterinstance,
also called counterexample. 1 A particular instance of an argument form that
has all true premises but a false conclusion, thereby showing that the form is
not universally valid. The argument form ‘p 7 q, - p / , ~q’, for example, is
shown to be invalid by the counterinstance ‘Grass is either red or green; Grass
is not red; Therefore, grass is not green’. 2 A particular false instance of a
statement form, which demonstrates that the form is not a logical truth. A
counterinstance to the form ‘p 7 q / p’, for example, would be the statement
‘If grass is either red or green, then grass is red’. 3 A particular example
that demonstrates that a universal generalization is false. The universal
statement ‘All large cities in the United States are east of the Mississippi’
is shown to be false by the counterinstance of San Francisco, which is a large
city in the United States that is not east of the Mississippi. V.K. counterpart
theory, a theory that analyzes statements about what is possible and impossible
for individuals statements of de re modality in terms of what holds of counterparts
of those individuals in other possible worlds, a thing’s counterparts being
individuals that resemble it without being identical with it. The name
‘counterpart theory’ was coined by David Lewis, the theory’s principal
exponent. Whereas some theories analyze ‘Mrs. Simpson might have been queen of
England’ as ‘In some possible world, Mrs. Simpson is queen of England’,
counterpart theory analyzes it as ‘In some possible world, a counterpart of
Mrs. Simpson is queen of a counterpart of England’. The chief motivation for
counterpart theory is a combination of two views: a de re modality should be
given a possible worlds analysis, and b each actual individual exists only in
the actual world, and hence cannot exist with different properties in other
possible worlds. Counterpart theory provides an analysis that allows ‘Mrs.
Simpson might have been queen’ to be true compatibly with a and b. For Mrs.
Simpson’s counterparts in other possible worlds, in those worlds where she
herself does not exist, may have regal properties that the actual Mrs. Simpson
lacks. Counterpart theory is perhaps prefigured in Leibniz’s theory of
possibility.
wilson: this is the way to
quote J. C. Wilson. Grice loved him, and thanked Farquarhson for editing his
papers. A favourite with Grice and Collingwood. In the chapter on
“Language” in “The idea of art,” Collingwood refers to the infamous, “That
building is the Bodelian.” – which may repreeent two propositions: one as an
answer to what building is that? The other as an answer to Which building is
the Bodleian? Grice would consider that the distinction is impilcatural, and
that stress is merely implicatural – and only one proposition is at stake – do
not multiply propositions beyond necessity. not to be confused with wilson,
author of “Grice: The ultimate counterexample” -- Oxonian philosopher, like
Grice. Cook Wilson studied with T. H. Green before becoming Wykeham Professor
of Logic at Oxford and leading the Oxford reaction against the then entrenched
absolute idealism. More influential as a tutor than as a writer, his major
oeuvre, Statement and Inference, was posthumously reconstructed from drafts of
papers, philosophical correspondence, and an extensive set of often
inconsistent lectures for his logic courses. A staunch critic of Whitehead’s
mathematical logic, Wilson conceived of logic as the study of thinking, an
activity unified by the fact that thinking either is knowledge or depends on
knowledge “What we know we kow”. Wilson claims that knowledge involves
apprehending an object that in most cases is independent of the act of
apprehension and that knowledge is indefinable without circularity, views he
defended by appealing to common usage. Many of Wilson’s ideas are disseminated
by H. W. B. Joseph, especially in his “Logic.” Rejecting “symbolic logic,”
Joseph attempts to reinvigorate traditional logic conceived along Wilsonian
lines. To do so Joseph combined a careful exposition of Aristotle with insights
drawn from idealistic logicians. Besides Joseph, Wilson decisively influenced a
generation of Oxford philosophers including Prichard and Ross, and Grice who
explores the ‘interrogative subordination’ in the account of ‘if.’ “Who killed
Cock Robin”.
winchism: After P. Winch, P. London-born philosopher. He
quotes Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk:
“Grice’s point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the
point of one’s remarks – Grice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt
nor any desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I
won’t hesitate to say that it seems red to me” – Surely pointless, but an
incredible truth meant to refute G. A. Paul!” Winch translated Vitters’s
“little essay on value” which Grice “did not use for [his] essay on the
conception of value.” (“Kultur und Wert.”). Grice: “Not contented with natural
science, Winch wants a social one!”
winspeare: winspeare, filosofo italiano. winspeare:
essential Italian philosopher – “My Italian friends do not consider me Italian,
though!” – His ancestors were from Yorkshire in a bad time – Henry VIII. “So
the king’s option was clear: either your head off or move to Capri – I chose
the second.” (n. Portici), filosofo. Delle confessioni spontanee de' rei,
Stamp. Simoniana, Napoli Storia degli abusi feudali, Tip. Trani,
Napoli Voti de' napolitani, s.e., Napoli La voce di Napodano, o sia
Quarta illustrazione del patto di Capuana e Nido, Tip. Trani, Napoli I
libri delle leggi di Cicerone volgarizzati, Tip. Trani, Napoli Delle
chiese ricettizie del Regno. Dissertazione, Tip. Trani, Napoli Saggi di
filosofia intellettuale, Tip. Trani, Napoli Dissertazioni legali, a cura
di G. Winspeare, Tip. Agrelli, Napoli La colonia perpetua ed i diritti
feudali aboliti, Tip. Pesole, Napoli. Grice: “Hailing remotely from the Catholic
North Riding of Yorkshire and settling in the most beautiful coastline in the
world, Winspeare knew all you need to know about Cudworth, and what he calls
‘percezione.’ I would call him an Oxonian.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Winspeare,
Speranza, Napoli, and me!” – The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft.
wodeham: “If Adam of
Wodeham was called Wodeham, I should, by the same token, be called “Harborne””
– H. P. Grice. Oxonian philosopher, like Grice. Adam de English Franciscan
philosopher-theologian who lectured on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at London,
Norwich, and Oxford. His published works include the Tractatus de
indivisibilibus; his Lectura secunda Norwich lectures; and an abbreviation of
his Oxford lectures by Henry Totting of Oyta, published by John Major. Wodeham’s
main work, the Oxford lectures, themselves remain unpublished. A brilliant
interpreter of Duns Scotus, whose original manuscripts he consulted, Wodeham
deemed Duns Scotus the greatest Franciscan doctor. William Ockham, Wodeham’s
teacher, was the other great influence on Wodeham’s philosophical theology.
Wodeham defended Ockham’s views against attacks mounted by Walter Chatton; he
also wrote the prologue to Ockham’s Summa logicae. Wodeham’s own influence
rivaled that of Ockham. Among the authors he strongly influenced are Gregory of
Rimini, John of Mirecourt, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Pierre d’Ailly, Peter
Ceffons, Alfonso Vargas, Peter of Candia Alexander V, Henry Totting of Oyta,
and John Major. Wodeham’s theological works were written for an audience with a
very sophisticated understanding of current issues in semantics, logic, and
medieval mathematical physics. Contrary to Duns Scotus and Ockham, Wodeham
argued that the sensitive and intellective souls were not distinct. He further
develops the theory of intuitive cognition, distinguishing intellectual
intuition of our own acts of intellect, will, and memory from sensory intuition
of external objects. Scientific knowledge based on experience can be based on
intuition, according to Wodeham. He distinguishes different grades of evidence,
and allows that sensory perceptions may be mistaken. Nonetheless, they can form
the basis for scientific knowledge, since they are reliable; mistakes can be
corrected by reason and experience. In semantic theory, Wodeham defends the
view that the immediate object of scientific knowledge is the complexe
significabile, that which the conclusion is designed to signify. Oxonian
philosopher, like Grice. Adam de (c. 1295–1358), English Franciscan
philosopher- who lectured on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at Oxford. His oeuvre
includes a “Tractatus de indivisibilibus, divisum in cinque partibus”; his
“Lectura secunda” and “Lecturae
Oxonienses” as transcribed by Henry Totting of Oyta, and published by John
Major. Wodeham’s main work, like Grice’s, the Oxford lectures, themselves
remain only partially published. A brilliant interpreter of Duns Scotus, whose
original manuscripts he consulted in his main unpublication, Wodeham deems Duns
Scotus the greatest Franciscan doctor. Occam, Wodeham’s teacher, is the other
great influence on Wodeham (“I treasure the razor he gave me for my birthday.”)
Wodeham defends his tutor Ockham’s views against attacks mounted by Walter
Chatton. Grice was familiar with Wodeham (“from Wodeham, as it happens”) because
he wrote the prologue to Ockham’s Summa logicae. Wodeham’s own influence rivals
that of Ockham. Among the authors he strongly influenced are Gregory of Rimini,
John of Mirecourt, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Pierre d’Ailly, Peter Ceffons,
Alfonso Vargas, Peter of Candia (Alexander V), Henry Totting of Oyta, John
Major, and lastly, but certainly not leastly, H. P. Grice. Wodeham’s lectures
were composed for tutees with a very sophisticated understanding of current
issues in semantics, logic, and mathematical physics. Contrary to Duns Scotus
and Occam, Wodeham argues – and this is borrowed by Grice -- that the sensitive
and intellective souls are not distinct (vide Grice, “The power structure of
the soul”). Wodeham further develops the theory of intuitive cognition,
distinguishing intellectual intuition of our own acts of intellect, will, and
memory from sensory intuition of external objects. This is developed by Grice
in his contrast of “I am not hearing a noise,” and “That is not blue.” Thus,
knowledge based on experience can be based on intuition, according to Wodeham.
Wodeham goes on to distinguishs different grades (or degrees, as Grice prefers,
which Grice symbolises as ‘d’) of evidence (for credibility and desirability)
and allows that this or that sensory perception may be mistaken (“but if all
were, we are in trouble’). Nonetheless, they can form the basis for knowledge,
since they are, caeteris paribus, reliable. “A mistake can always be corrected
by reason and experience. In semantic and pragmatic theories, Wodeham defends
the view that the immediate object of knowledge is what he calls the “complexum
significabile,” that which the conclusion is designed to signify. wodeham,
adam. Obviously born at Wodeham, or Woodham as the current spelling goes (“But
I prefer the old, vide Occam” – Grice). Like Gregorio da Rimini, obsessed with
the complexe significabile, “which has obvious connections with what I call the
propositional complexus.”
wollaston: when Grice is in a humorous mood, or mode, as he
prefers, he cites Wollaston at large! Wollaston is notorious for arguing that
the immorality of this or that action lies in an utterer who describes it
implicating a false proposition. Wollaston maintains that there is harmony
between reason (or truth) and happiness. Therefore, any ction that contradict
truth through misrepresentation thereby frustrates human happiness and is thus
“plain evil.” Wollaston gives the example of Willard [Quine] who, to pay Paul
[Grice], robs Peter [Strawspm] stealing his watch. Grice comments: “In falsely epresenting
Strawson’s watch as his own, Willard makes the act wrong, even if he did it to
pay me what he owed me.” Wollaston’s views, particularly his taking morality to
consist in universal and necessary truths, were influenced by the rationalists
Ralph Cudworth and Clarke. Among his many critics the most famous is, as Grice
would expect, Hume, who contends that Wollaston’s theory implies an absurdity
(“unless you disimplicate it in the bud.”). For Hume, any action concealed from
public view (e.g., adultery) conveys (or ‘explicates’) no false proposition and
therefore is not immoral, since one can annul it, to use Grice’s jargon. Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “Wollaston and the longitudinal unity of philosophy.” cited by H.
P. Grice. English moralist notorious for arguing that the immorality of actions
lies in their implying false propositions. An assistant headmaster who later
took priestly orders, Wollaston maintains in his one published work, The
Religion of Nature Delineated 1722, that the foundations of religion and
morality are mutually dependent. God has preestablished a harmony between
reason or truth and happiness, so that actions that contradict truth through
misrepresentation thereby frustrate human happiness and are thus evil. For instance,
if a person steals another’s watch, her falsely representing the watch as her
own makes the act wrong. Wollaston’s views, particularly his taking morality to
consist in universal and necessary truths, were influenced by the rationalists
Ralph Cudworth and Clarke. Among his many critics the most famous was Hume, who
contends that Wollaston’s theory implies an absurdity: any action concealed
from public view e.g., adultery conveys no false proposition and therefore is
not immoral. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Why bother with Wollaston?” BANC.
wollheim: R. A. London-born philosopher of Eastern-European
ancestry, BPhil Oxon, Balliol (under D. Marcus) and All Souls. Examined by H. P. Grice. “What’s two times
two?” Wollheim treasured that examination. It was in the context of a
discussion of J. S. Mill and I. Kant, for whom addition and multiplication are
‘synthetic’ – a priori for Kant, a posteriori for Mill. Grice was trying to
provide a counterexample to Mill’s thesis that all comes via deduction or
induction. Refs.: I. C. Dengler and Luigi Speranza, “Wollheilm and Grice,” for
the Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
woodianism: Roy Hudd: “Not to be confused with the woodianisms of
Victoria Wood.” -- Grice loved O. P. Wood, as anyone at Oxford did – even those
who disliked Ryle! Refs.: H. P. Grice, “O. P. Wood and some remarks about the
senses,” -- O. P. Wood, “Implicatura in
Hereford,” for The Swimming-Pool Library, custodian: Luigi Speranza – Villa
Grice, Liguria, Italia.
woozleyianism: R. M. Harnish discussed H. P. Grice’s implicaturum
with A. D. Woozley. Woozley would know because he had been in contact with
Grice since for ever. Woozley had a closer contact with Austin, since, unlike
Grice, ‘being from the right side of the tracks,’ he socialized with Austin in
what Berlin pretentiously calls the ‘early beginnings of Oxford philosophy,’ as
if the Middle Ages never happened. Woozley edited Reid, that Grice read, or
reed. Since the first way to approach Grice’s philosophy is with his colleagues
at his Play Group, Woozley plays a crucial role. Grice: “While Woozley would
attend Austin’s Sat. morns., he wouldn’t say much – in fact, he seldom said
much.” Refs.: R. M. Harnish and A. D. Woozley, “Implicatura,” for The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
wyclif: “It never ceased to amaze me how Wyclif was able to
find Anglo-Saxon terms for all the “Biblia Vulgata”!” – H. P. Grice. English
Griceian philosophical theologian and religious reformer. He worked for most of
his life in Oxford as a secular clerk, teaching philosophy and writing
extensively in the field. The mode of thought expressed in his surviving works
is one of extreme realism, and in this his thought fostered the split of
Bohemian, later Hussite, philosophy from that of the G. masters teaching in
Prague. His worldline philosophical summa was most influential for his teaching
on universals, but also dealt extensively with the question of determinism;
these issues underlay his later handling of the questions of the Eucharist and
of the identity of the church respectively. His influence on English philosophy
was severely curtailed by the growing hostility of the church to his ideas, the
condemnation of many of his tenets, the persecution of his followers, and the
destruction of his writings. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “The problem of universals:
from Bologna to Oxford,” Villa Grice.
x: Grice: “I use ‘x’ to mean ‘token,’ and ‘X’ to
mean ‘type.’” Grice: “The idea is to use ‘x,’ ‘y,’ and ‘z.’” “In an early
tutorial, Strawson asked me, ‘What if we need four, don?” Strawson later
reminisced: “My question stuck with Grice, and he never again used x, y, and z,
but x1, x2, x3, …, xn – “That will teach you a lesson,” he said.”
x-question: Grice: “I prefer the idea of a
qu-question. It sounds like a stammer – as in do-do-dodgson, but it ain’t!” --.
Xy-question. Grice: “This would be a qu-1-qu-2
question, as in “He’s meeting a woman this evening?” “Who and where?” “His
wife, in his home,” – where ‘who and where?” is a qu-1 and qu-2 question.
Xyz-question. “He is meeting a woman this
evening.” “Who, who, and where?” “Smith, his wife, his home.” –
X1-x2-x3-…xn-question: Grice: “Since in theory
the number of variables in a conversational remark is almost infinite – “but
never infinite,” as Peano remarks – I shall use numerical subscripts. “Letters
are nice, but numbers are nicer.”
Xmas:
Grice: “The implicature of the “X” is the cross where allegedly Jesus died.”
y: Grice: “I shall use ‘y’ as a second variable; and z as a
third, if need be.”
yog and zog: Grice: “This is my paradox on ‘si’ – ‘if’ – All
philosophers have a paradox named after them, and I thought it was high time to
name a paradox after me.” --. “My inspiration was Carroll’s “What the tortoise
said to Achilles.” Trust me to go to the defense of the underdog, or
undertortoise!” “Achilles had enough praise by the Romans!” -- “If” (Cicero’s
‘si’) is a problem for Grice. “Especially in it being the only subordinate
particle I have seriously explored.” According to Strawson and Wiggins, this
was Grice having forged his shining new tool – the distinction between ‘By
emitting x, An emissor coomunicates that p” and “The emissum x ‘means’ ‘p.’
Apply that to ‘if.’ In Strawson and Wiggins’s precis, for Grice, ‘p yields q’
is part of the conversational implicaturum – for Strawson and Wiggins it is
part of the conventional implicaturum. They agree on ‘p horseshoe q’ being the explicit emissum or
explicatum in “Emissor explicitly conveys and communicates that p horseshoe q.”
For Grice, the implicaturum, which, being conversational is cancellable, is
calculated on the assumption that the addressee can work out that the emissor
has non-truth-functional grounds for the making of any stronger claim. For
Strawson, that non-truth-functional reason is precisely ‘p yields q,’ which
leads Strawson to think that the thing is not cancellable and conventionally
implicated. If Strawson were right that this is Grice forging a new shining
tool to crack the crib of reality and fashioning thereby a new shining skid
under his metaphysical feet, it would be almost the second use of the
tool! This is an expansion by Grice on
the implicaturum of a ‘propositio conditionalis.’ Grice, feeling paradoxical,
invites us to suppose a scenario involving ‘if.’ He takes it as a proof
that his account of the conversational implicaturum of ‘if’ is, as Strawson did
not agree, correct, and that what an utterer explicitly conveys by ‘if p, q’ is
‘p > q.’ that two chess players, Yog
and Zog, play 100 games under the following conditions. Yog is white nine of
ten times. There are no draws. And the results are: Yog, when
white, won 80 of 90 games. Yog, when black, won zero of ten games. This
implies that: 8/9 times, if Yog was white, Yog won. 1/2 of the time, if
Yog lost, Yog was black. 9/10 that
either Yog wasnt white or he won. From these statements, it might appear
one could make these deductions by contraposition and conditional
disjunction: If Yog was white, then 1/2 of the time Yog won. 9/10 times,
if Yog was white, then he won. But both propositions are untrue. They
contradict the assumption. In fact, they do not provide enough information to
use Bayesian reasoning to reach those conclusions. That might be clearer if the
propositions had instead been stated differently. When Yog was white, Yog won
8/9 times. No information is given about when Yog was black. When Yog lost, Yog
was black 1/2 the time. No information is given about when Yog won. (9/10
times, either Yog was black and won, Yog was black and lost, or Yog was white
and won. No information is provided on how the 9/10 is divided among those
three situations. The paradox by Grice shows that the exact meaning of
statements involving conditionals and probabilities is more complicated than
may be obvious on casual examination. Refs.: Grice’s interest with ‘if’ surely
started after he carefully read the section on ‘if’ and the horseshoe in
Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory. He was later to review his attack on
Strawson in view of Strawson’s defense in ‘If and the horseshoe.’ The polemic
was pretty much solved as a matter of different intuitions: what Grice sees as
a conversational implicaturum, Strawson does see as an ‘implicaturum,’ but a
non-defeasible one – what Grice would qualify as ‘conventional.’ Grice leaves
room for an implicaturum to be nonconversational and yet nonconventional, but
it is not worth trying to fit Strawson’s suggestion in this slot, since
Strawson, unlike Grice, has nothing against a convention. Grice was motivated
to formulate his ‘paradox,’ seeing that Strawson was saying that the so-called
‘paradoxes’ of ‘entailment’ and ‘implication’ are a misnomer. “They are not
paradoxical; they are false!” Grice has specific essays on both the paradoxes
of entailment and the paradoxes of implication-. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The University of California, Berkeley.
yolton.
Grice: “I find Yolton more readable than Locke.” Speranza had occasion to
discuss the semiotics of Locke as viewed by Yolton. Yolton, like J. F. Bennett,
and indeed Grice (via Peirce) has focused on Locke’s idea of a sign. The
contribution by Yolton is more thoroughly examined under ‘signatum.’
zabarella: zabarella (n.
padova), filosofo. Grice: “Zabarella is what I would call a proto-Griceain.” In
fact, at Villa Grice, Grice was often called the English Zabarella, after
philosopher Jacopo Zabarella, of Padova. Zabarella produces extensive
commentaries on Grice’s favourite tract by Aristotle, “De Anima,” and Physica
and also discussed some Aristotelian interpreters. However, Zabarella’s most
original contribution is his work in semantics, “Opera logica.” Zabarella
regards semantics as a preliminary study that provides the tools necessary for
philosophical analysis. Two such tools are what Zabarella calls “order” (cf.
Grice, ‘be orderly’). Another tool is what Zabarella calls “ method.” Order
teaches us how to organize the content of a discipline to apprehend it more
easily. Method teaches us how to draw a syllogistic inference. Zabarella
reduces the varieties of orders and methods classified by other interpreters to
compositive order, and resolutive order, and composite method and and
resolutive method. The compositive order from a principle to this or that
corollary applies to this or that speculative, alethic or theoretical
discipline. The ‘resolutive’ order, from a desired end to the means appropriate
to its achievement applies to this or that practical discipline, such as
‘pragmatics’ understood as a manual of rules of etiquette. This much is already
in Aristotle. However, Zabarella offers an original analysis of ‘method.’ The
compositive method infers a particular consequence or corollary from a
‘generic’ principle. The ‘resolutive’ method INFERS an originating gneric
principle from this or that particular consequence, corollary, or
instantiantion, as in inductive reasoning or in reasoning from effect to cause.
Zabarella’s terminology influenced Galileo’s mechanics, and has been applied to
Grice’s inference of the principle of conversational co-operation out from the
only evidence which Grice has, which is this or that ‘dyadic’ exchange, as he
calls it. In Grice’s case, his corpus is intentionally limited to conversations
between two philosophers: A: What’s that? B: A pillar box? A: What colour is
it? B: Seems red to me. From such an exchange, Grice infers the principle of
conversational co-operation. It clashes when a cancellation (or as Grice
prefers, an annulation) is on sight: “I surely don’t mean to imply that it
MIGHT actually be red.” “Then why be so guarded? I thought you were
cooperating.”H. P. Grice. “We can regard Jacopo as an Aristotelian philosopher
who taught at the of Padua. He wrote
extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and On the Soul and also
discussed other interpreters such as Averroes. However, his most original
contribution was his work in logic, Opera logica 1578. Zabarella regards logic
as a preliminary study that provides the tools necessary for philosophical
analysis. Two such tools are order and method: order teaches us how to organize
the content of a discipline to apprehend it more easily; method teaches us how
to draw syllogistic inferences. Zabarella reduces the varieties of orders and
methods classified by other interpreters to compositive and resolutive orders
and methods. The compositive order from first principles to their consequences
applies to theoretical disciplines. The resolutive order from a desired end to
means appropriate to its achievement applies to practical disciplines. This
much was already in Aristotle. Zabarella offers an original analysis of method.
The compositive method infers particular consequences from general principles.
The resolutive method infers originating principles from particular
consequences, as in inductive reasoning or in reasoning from effect to cause.
It has been suggested that Zabarella’s terminology might have influenced
Galileo’s mechanics. Grice liked to recite Zabarella’s works by heart. Opera Logica, Venezia; De methodis; De regressu, Venezia;
Tabula logicae, Venezia; In duos Aristotelis libros Posteriores Analyticos
commentarii, Venezia; De doctrinae ordine apologia, Venezia; De naturalis
scientiae constitutione, Venezia; De rebus naturalibus, Venezia; In libros
Aristotelis Physicorum commentarii, Venezia; Opera Physica, Francoforte; De generatione
et corruptione et Meteorologica commentarii, Francoforte; In tres libros
Aristotelis De anima commentarii, Venezia. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, Notes on I Tatti’s edition of Zabarella, “On methods,” -- H. P.
Grice, “Zabarella,” Speranza, “Grice and Zabarella,” Villa Grice.
zamboni. Grice: “Not everybody knows his zamboni.” There’s Giorgio
Zamboni.
zamboni: Essential Italian philosopher. Giovanni Zamboni (n.
Verona), filosofo. Zamboni Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) : commemorazione
e polemica, tip. Garagnani, Bologna, 1904 La filosofia neo-scolastica secondo
un professore positivista, Tip. vescovile G. Marchiori,Verona, 1912 Il valore
scientifico del positivismo di Roberto Ardigò e della sua “conversione”,
Verona, 1921. La dottrina morale e la psicologia del volere nel testo di etica
di un discepolo dell’Ardigò, Società Editrice Veronese, Verona, 1923. La
gnoseologia dell’atto come fondamento della filosofia dell’essere. Saggio di
interpretazione sistematica delle dottrine gnoseologiche di S. Tommaso d’Aquino,
Milano, 1923. Introduzione al corso di gnoseologia pura, Soc. Ed. Vita e
Pensiero (Tip. S. Giuseppe), Milano, 1924. L' origine delle idee: breve saggio
analitico introspettivo, proposto alla riflessione personale degli studenti...
, Società editrice veronese, Verona 1924. Sistema di gnoseologia e di morale:
basi teoretiche per esegesi e critica dei classici della filosofia moderna
,Editrice Studium, Roma,1930. Studi esegetici, critici, comparativi sulla
«Critica della Ragione pura», La tipografica veronese, Verona, 1931. Metafisica
e gnoseologia, Risposta a Mons. Francesco Olgiati, La Tipografica Veronese,
Verona, 1935. Il realismo critico della gnoseologia pura. Risposta al «Caso
Zamboni» (P. A. Gemelli, Mons. F. Olgiati e P. A. Rossi), Verona, 1936.
Realismo – Metafisica – Personalità (Rilievi – Note – Discussioni), La
Tipografica Veronese, Verona, 1937. La persona umana. Soggetto autocosciente
nell’esperienza integrale. Termine della gnoseologia. Base della metafisica,
Verona 1940; a cura di Giulietti G., Vita e pensiero, Milano, 1983.
Precisazioni e complementi ai testi scolastici. 1. La Religione naturale e
l’essenza della Religione Cristiana, La tipografica veronese, Verona, 1941. La
«filosofia dell’esperienza immediata, elementare, integrale» per la completa
autoconsapevolezza dello spirito umano, La Tipografica Veronese, Verona, 1944.
Itinerario filosofico dalla propria coscienza all’esistenza di Dio, La
Tipografica Veronese, Verona, 1949 (parte dell’opera fu pubblicata
autonomamente). Teodicea, a cura di Rodella A., Vita veronese, Verona, 1955. La
dottrina della coscienza immediata (struttura funzionale della psiche umana) è
la scienza positiva fondamentale, La tipografica veronese, Verona, 1951.
Dizionario filosofico; introduzione e note di Ferdinando L. Marcolungo, Vita e
Pensiero, Milano, 1978. 1.2:Idee e giudizi, a cura di Marcolungo F.L., IPL
,Milano, 1990 2: L' io e le nozioni soprasensibili; introdotta da Giovanni
Giulietti ; curata da Giovanni Giulietti e Albarosa Vighi Zonzini, IPL, Milano
1990. 2: Corso di gnoseologia pura elementare. 1.1, Spazio, tempo, percezione
intellettiva; introdotta e curata da Ferdinando L. Marcolungo ; presentazione
di Giovanni Giulietti, IPL, Milano, 1990. [ISBN] 88-7836-328-6 3: Corso di
gnoseologia pura elementare. 1.2, Idee e giudizi; a cura di Ferdinando L.
Marcolungo, IPL, Milano, 1992. 4: Corso di gnoseologia pura elementare. 2, L'
io e le nozioni soprasensibili; introdotta da Giovanni Giulietti; curata da
Giovanni Giulietti e Albarosa Vighi Zonzini, IPL, Milano,1990. Mons. Giuseppe
Zamboni : autobiografia di una personalità integrale (1875-1950) a cura di
Serio De Guidi,Archivio storico Curia diocesana, Verona, 2001. Studi sulla
Critica della ragione pura; a cura di Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo, QuiEdit,Verona,
2017. Sistema di gnoseologia e di morale; a cura di Ferdinando Luigi
Marcolungo, QuiEdit, Verona, 2019. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Gnoseologia,” The Grice
Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, Bancroft, University of California, Berkeley.
zanini: Essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “There are some
resemblances between what Zanini intelligently calls “the rhetorics, sic in
plural, of truth, and my idea of theoretical argument as a sort of deep down
practical argument.” Adelino Zanini (Legnago, 1954) è un filosofo italiano.
Indice 1 Biografia 2 Opere principali 3 Bibliografia
4 Collegamenti esterni Biografia Laureato in filosofia all'Università di Padova
con Umberto Curi, è stato borsista presso la Fondazione L. Einaudi di Torino,
ove ha studiato con Siro Lombardini. È professore di Filosofia politica e di
Etica economica presso l'Università Politecnica delle Marche. I suoi studi sono
indirizzati, in particolare, al rapporto tra pensiero politico e scienza
economica tra 1700 e secondo '900. È tra i principali interpreti italiani del
pensiero di Adam Smith e di Joseph Schumpeter. Opere principali Filosofie
del soggetto. Soggettività e costituzione, Ila Palma, Palermo 1982; Keynes: una
provocazione metodologica, Bertani, Verona 1985; Schumpeter impolitico, Istituto
della Enciclopedia Italiana - Treccani, Roma 1987; Il moderno come residuo.
Dieci lemmi, Pellicani, Roma 1989; Genesi imperfetta. Il governo delle passioni
in Adam Smith, Giappichelli, Torino 1995; Modernità e nomadismo, Calusca,
Padova 1995; Adam Smith. Economia, morale, diritto, B. Mondadori, Milano 1997
(II edizione, Liberilibri, Macerata, 2014). Macchine di pensiero. Schumpeter,
Keynes, Marx, Ombre corte, Verona 1999; Joseph A. Schumpeter, B. Mondadori,
Milano 2000; Lessico postfordista, (cura con U. Fadini), Feltrinelli, Milano
2001; Retoriche della verità. Stupore ed evento, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano 2004;
Filosofia economica. Fondamenti economici e categorie politiche,
Bollati-Boringhieri, Torino 2005 (tr. ingl., Peter Lang, Oxford, 2008);
L'ordine del discorso economico. Linguaggio delle ricchezze e pratiche di
governo in Michel Foucault, Ombre corte, Verona 2010. Principi e forme delle
scienze sociali. Cinque studi su Schumpeter, Il Mulino, Bologna 2013.
Bibliografia A. Graziano, Adam Smith ou les passions de l'homme moderne. Sur
deux ouvrages de Adelino Zanini, “Critique”, 1998, n° 617. A. Negri, Una
traccia per gli anni settanta, “Belfagor”, 1982, n. 6. E. Garin, L'etica della
simpatia, “L'indice”, 1991, n. 5. A. Salanti, L'economia politica come critica
della società (capitalistica): note sparse a Adelino Zanini, Filosofia
Economia. Fondamenti economici e categorie politiche, “Quaderni del
Dipartimento di Ingegneria gestionale”, 2009, n. 5, Università degli studi di
Bergamo. S. Caruso, Alla ricerca della filosofia economica, “Storia del
pensiero economico”, 2007, n. 2. A. Fumagalli, Sfera politica e sfera
economica: un difficile rapporto. A proposito di "Filosofia
economica" di Adelino Zanini, “Economia politica”, 2006, n. 2.
Collegamenti esterni Opere di Adelino Zanini, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited
srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Adelino Zanini, su Open Library,
Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Registrazioni di Adelino Zanini, su
RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale. Modifica su Wikidata Pagina docente nel sito
dell'Università Politecnica delle Marche, su univpm.it. Adelino Zanini in SWIF
- Sito web italiano per la filosofia, su swif.uniba.it. URL consultato l'8
gennaio 2014 (archiviato dall'url originale l'8 gennaio 2014). Intervista ad
Adelino Zanini su J.A. Schumpeter. Video Mediaset, su video.mediaset.it.
Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 54182114 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 6156 5532 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\026512 · LCCN
(EN) n86136541 · BNF (FR) cb121292311 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n86136541 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloNati
nel 1954Nati a Legnago[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice and Zanini: the
rhetorics of truth,” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia;
H. P. Grice, “Zanini,” The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, University of
California, Berkeley.
zanotti: zanotti (n. bologna), filosofo. Della
forza dei corpi che chiamiamo viva; Filosofia morale; De viribus centralibus,
Bononiae, Lelio dalla Volpe; Ragionamento sopra la filosofia; Paradossi;
Epistolario. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Zanotti and me,” The Grice Papers, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
zeigarnik
effect:
‘Conversation as a compete task and the Zeigmaik effect’ -- H. P. Grice. the
selective recall of uncompleted tasks in comparison to completed tasks. The
effect was named for Zeigarnik, a student of K. Lewin, who discovered it and
described it in the Psychologische Forschung. Subjects received an array of
short tasks, such as counting backward and stringing beads, for rapid
completion. Performance on half of these was interrupted. Subsequent recall for
the tasks favored the interrupted tasks. Zeigarnik concluded that recall is
influenced by motivation and not merely associational strength. The effect was
thought relevant to Freud’s claim that unfulfilled wishes are persistent. Lewin
attempted to derive the effect from field theory, suggesting that an attempt to
reach a goal creates a tension released only when that goal is reached;
interruption of the attempt produces a tension favoring recall. Conditions
affecting the Zeigarnik effect are incompletely understood, as is its
significance. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Conversation as a complete task and the
Zeigmarnik effect.” BANC
zettel: Grice entitled his further notes on logic and
conversation, “zettel” – “What’s good enough for Vitters is good enough for
me.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Conversation: Zettel,” BANC.
zimara: Essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “Zimara shows that
Aristotle was popular not just in Oxford!” -- zimara (n. Galatina), filosofo. Marcantonio
o Marco Antonio Zimara o Zimarra (San Pietro in Galatina, 1470 circa – Padova,
1532 circa[1]) è stato un filosofo e medico italiano. Marcantonio o Marco
Antonio Zimara, si laureò in medicina e filosofia all'Università di Padova e vi
insegnò nel 1507. Sindaco[termine anacronistico?] di Galatina, nel 1514 si recò
a Napoli per difendere la città dai soprusi dei Duchi Castriota.[senza
fonte] Insegnò filosofia a Salerno con la stesura di una guida alle opere
di Aristotele e Averroè. Curò la pubblicazione di alcune opere del grande
filosofo tedesco e dottore della Chiesa Alberto Magno e del teologo e filosofo
belga Giovanni di Jandun [2] Indice 1Note 2Bibliografia 3 Altri
progetti 4Collegamenti esterni Note ^ Dizionario di filosofia (2009),
riferimenti in Collegamenti esterni. ^ Vedi Delio Cantimori in Enciclopedia
Italiana, riferimenti in Collegamenti esterni. Bibliografia Opere (LA) Zimara
Marcantonio, Questio de primo cognito, Papie, Iacob de Burgofranco impresse,
1521. Studi AA.VV., Galatinesi illustri, Guida Biografica, TorGraf Galatina,
Galatina 1998. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una
pagina dedicata a Marcantonio Zimara Collegamenti esterni Marcantonio Zimara,
su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata Marcantonio Zimara, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Marcantonio
Zimara, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Zimara, Marco
Antonio, in Dizionario di filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2009.
Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 155377783 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0004 5448 8128 · LCCN
(EN) n85356636 · BNF (FR) cb12190857n (data) · CERL cnp00409248 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n85356636 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale
Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XVI secoloMedici italianiMorti a Padova[altre].
Grice: “It’s amazing how much Zimara loved Aristotle.” – Refs.: H. P. Grice,
The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c.
zini : zini (n. Firenze) è un filosofo.
Proprietà individuale o proprietà collettiva?, Torino, Fratelli Bocca; Il
pentimento e la morale ascetica, Torino, Bocca; Giustizia: storia d'una idea,
Torino, F.lli Bocca -- cf. Grice, “Justice in Plato’s Republic,” “Social
justice,” The Grice Papers; La morale al bivio, Torino, Fratelli Bocca; La doppia
maschera dell'universo: filosofia del tempo e dello spazio, Torino, Fratelli
Bocca; Il congresso dei morti, Roma, Libreria editrice del Partito comunista
d'Italia, ed. con introduzione di Giancarlo Bergami e prefazione di Nerio Nesi,
Calabritto, Mattia&Fortunato; Poesia e verità, Milano, Corbaccio, I
fratelli nemici: dialoghi e miti moderni, Torino, Einaudi; La tragedia del
proletariato in Italia: diario, Prefazione di Giancarlo Bergami, Milano,
Feltrinelli; Appunti di vita torinese, Firenze, Olschki Pagine di vita
torinese: note del diario, Torino, Centro studi piemontesi. Grice enjoyed
Zini’s approach. “His essay on justice is divided into six parts. The first is
‘the real and the ideal” (‘il relae e l’ideale”); the second is “La giustizia
come idea ed emozione” (Fairness as idea and as emotion), the first is “I fruit
del lavoro e la loro distribuzione scondo giustizia” (The fruits of labour and
their distribution according to fairness”), the fourth is “Libertà od
egualiglianza,” – Grice: “Note the ‘od,’ which need not be exclusive.” – The fifth
is “Analisis del merito,” an analysis of merit, and the last is “La pena
riparatrice” – the punishment that teaches.” – Grice: “In liberty or freedom
versus equality, Zini approaches the Roman attitude, rather brusque to those
Anglo-Saxon attitudes!” -- Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Justice from Plato to Zini: the
history of an idea, alla Berlin,” Luigi Speranza, The Swimming-Pool Library,
Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
zolla: Essential Italian philosopher. zolla è un filosofo italiano. Etica e estetica, Spaziani,
Torino Eclissi dell'intellettuale, Bompiani, Milano Volgarità e dolore,
Bompiani, Milano Le origini del trascendentalismo, Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura, Roma Storia del fantasticare, Bompiani, Milano Le potenze
dell'anima: morfologia dello spirito nella storia della cultura, anatomia
dell'uomo spirituale, Bompiani, Milano I letterati e lo sciamano, Bompiani,
Milano Che cos'è la tradizione? Bompiani, Milano Le meraviglie della natura:
introduzione all'alchimia, Bompiani, Milano Archetipi, Marsilio, Venezia
L'androgino: l'umana nostalgia dell'interezza, Red, Como Incontro con
l'androgino: l'esperienza della completezza sessuale, Como Aure: i luoghi e i riti,
Marsilio, Venezia L'amante invisibile: l'erotica sciamanica nelle religioni,
nella letteratura e nella legittimazione politica, Marsilio, Venezia Il
sincretismo, Guida, Napoli Verità segrete esposte in evidenza: sincretismo e
fantasia, contemplazione e esotericità, Marsilio, Venezia Tre discorsi
metafisici, Guida, Napoli Uscite dal mondo, Adelphi, Milano La luce. La ricerca
del sacro, Tallone, Alpignano Ioan Petru Culianu, Tallone, Alpignano Lo stupore
infantile, Adelphi, Milano Le tre vie, Adelphi, Milano Un destino itinerante:
conversazioni tra Oriente e Occidente con Doriano Fasoli, Marsilio, Venezia La
nube del telaio: Ragione e irrazionalità tra Oriente e Occidente, Arnoldo
Mondadori Editore, Milano La filosofia perenne. L'incontro fra le tradizioni d'Oriente
e d'Occidente, Mondadori, Milano Catabasi e Anastasi, Tallone, Alpignano
Discesa all'Ade e resurrezione, Adelphi, Milano Minuetto all'inferno, Einaudi,
Torino Cecilia o la disattenzione, Garzanti, Milano I moralisti moderni,
Garzanti, Milano (con Alberto Moravia) Saggi, Bompiani, Milano La psicanalisi,
Garzanti, Milano Emily Dickinson, Selected Poems and Letters, Mursia, Milano Il
Marchese de Sade, Le opere. Scelte e presentate da Elémire Zolla, Longanesi
& C., Milano I mistici, Garzanti, Milano Herman Melville, Clarel, Einaudi,
Torino 1965; nuova ed. Adelphi, Milano Nathaniel Hawthorne, Settimio Felton o
l'elisir di lunga vita, Neri Pozza, Vicenza 1966; poi Garzanti, Milano Il
superuomo e i suoi simboli nelle letterature moderne, La Nuova Italia, Firenze
Pavel Florenskij, Le porte regali. Saggio sull'icona, Adelphi, Milano
Novecento: Lucarini, Roma L'esotismo nella letteratura, La Nuova Italia
L'esotismo nelle letterature moderne, Liguori, Napoli Il dio dell'ebbrezza:
antologia dei moderni dionisiaci, Einaudi, Torino Conoscenza religiosa,
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma Gli arcani del potere: elzeviri,
Rizzoli, Milano 2009 Gli usi dell'immaginazione e il declino dell’Occidente,
A.I.R.E.Z., Montepulciano Filosofia perenne e mente naturale, Venezia Il
serpente di bronzo. Scritti antesignani di critica sociale, Venezia Civiltà
indigene, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma Archetipi. Aure. Verità
segrete. Dioniso errante. Tutto ciò che conosciamo ignorandolo, Marsilio,
Venezia 2016 (contiene Archetipi, Aure e Verità segrete esposte in evidenza, e
l'introduzione all'antologia Il dio dell'ebbrezza) Le tre vie. Soluzioni
sovrumane, a cura di Grazia Marchianò, Marsilio, Venezia. Refs.: H. P. Grice,
The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley.
zoroastro:
the
founder of so-called ‘zoroastrianism.’ H. P. Grice wrote, “Thus Implicated
Zarahustra,” the national religion of ancient Iran. Zoroastrianism suffered
a steep decline after the seventh century A.D. because of conversion to Islam.
Of a remnant of roughly 100,000 adherents today, three-fourths are Parsis
“Persians” in or from western India; the others are Iranian Zoroastrians. The
tradition is identified with its prophet; his name in Persian, Zarathushtra, is
preserved in G. and Griceian, but the ancient Grecian rendering of that name,
Zoroaster, is the form used in most other modern European languages.
Zoroaster’s hymns to Ahura Mazda “the Wise Lord”, called the Gathas, are
interspersed among ritual hymns to other divine powers in the collection known
as the Avesta. In them, Zoroaster seeks reassurance that good will ultimately
triumph over evil and that Ahura Mazda will be a protector to him in his
prophetic mission. The Gathas expect that humans, by aligning themselves with
the force of righteousness and against evil, will receive bliss and benefit in
the next existence. The dating of the texts and of the prophet himself is an
elusive matter for scholars, but it is clear that Zoroaster lived somewhere in
Iran sometime prior to the emergence of the Achaemenid empire in the sixth
century B.C. His own faith in Ahura Mazda, reflected in the Gathas, came to be
integrated with other strains of old Indo-Iranian religion. We see these in the
Avesta’s hymns and the religion’s ritual practices. They venerate an array of
Iranian divine powers that resemble in function the deities found in the Vedas
of India. A common Indo-Iranian heritage is indicated conclusively by
similarities of language and of content between the Avesta and the Vedas.
Classical Zoroastrian orthodoxy does not replace the Indo-Iranian divinities
with Ahura Mazda, but instead incorporates them into its thinking more or less
as Ahura Mazda’s agents. The Achaemenid kings from the sixth through the fourth
centuries B.C. mention Ahura Mazda in their inscriptions, but not Zoroaster.
The Parthians, from the third century B.C. to the third century A.D.,
highlighted Mithra among the Indo-Iranian pantheon. But it was under the
Sasanians, who ruled Iran from the third to the seventh centuries, that
Zoroastrianism became the established religion. A salient doctrine is the
teaching concerning the struggle between good and evil. The time frame from the
world’s creation to the final resolution or judgment finds the Wise Lord, Ahura
Mazda or Ohrmazd, in the Pahlavi language of Sasanian times, locked in a
struggle with the evil spirit, Angra Mainyu in Pahlavi, Ahriman. The teaching
expands on an implication in the text of the Gathas, particularly Yasna 30, that
the good and evil spirits, coming together in the beginning and establishing
the living and inanimate realms, determined that at the end benefit would
accrue to the righteous but not the wicked. In Sasanian times, there was
speculative concern to assert Ahura Mazda’s infinity, omnipotence, and
omniscience, qualities that may indicate an impact of Mediterranean philosophy.
For example, the Bundahishn, a Pahlavi cosmological and eschatological
narrative, portrays Ahura Mazda as infinite in all four compass directions but
the evil spirit as limited in one and therefore doomed to ultimate defeat. Such
doctrine has been termed by some dualistic, in that it has at least in Sasanian
times seen the power of God rivaled by that of an evil spirit. Zoroastrians
today assert that they are monotheists, and do not worship the evil spirit. But
to the extent that the characterization may hold historically, Zoroastrianism
has manifested an “ethical” dualism, of good and evil forces. Although capable
of ritual pollution through waste products and decay, the physical world, God’s
creation, remains potentially morally good. Contrast “ontological” dualism, as
in gnostic and Manichaean teaching, where the physical world itself is the
result of the fall or entrapment of spirit in matter. In the nineteenth
century, Zoroastrian texts newly accessible to Europe produced an awareness of
the prophet’s concern for ethical matters. Nietzsche’s values in his work Thus
Spake Zarathustra, however, are his own, not those of the ancient prophet. The
title is arresting, but the connection of Nietzsche with historical
Zoroastrianism is a connection in theme only, in that the work advances ideas
about good and evil in an oracular style. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Nietzsche’s
implicatura,” BANC.
zorzi:
Essential
Italian philosopher. Grice: “For some reason, in the Veneto area, they cannot
pronounce the /dg/, which becomes /z./ as everyone who is familiar with
Giorgone – as used by Quine, would know! –“ zorzi (n. ) è un filosofo. L'armonia del mondo,
a cura di S. Campanini, "Il Pensiero Occidentale", Bompiani, Milano
De harmonia mundi, pref. C. Vasoli, Lavis-Firenze, La Finestra
editrice-Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze. L'Elegante Poema &
Commento sopra il Poema, a cura di J.-F. Maillard, Arché - Edidit, Milano -
Paris. S. Onda, Le vicende costruttive della chiesa e del convento. Il progetto
di Jacopo Sansovino e il «memoriale» di Francesco Zorzi; Le teorie ermetiche di
frate Zorzi, in La chiesa di San Francesco della Vigna e il convento dei Frati
Minori, Venezia (Edizione a cura della Parrocchia di San Francesco della
Vigna), Venezia; Saverio Campanini, Zorzi's Criticism of the Vulgata: Hebraica
Veritas or Mendosa Traductio? in G. Busi (ed.), Hebrew to Latin, Latin to
Hebrew. The Mirroring of Two Cultures in the Age of Humanism, Berlin Studies in
Judaism 1, N. Aragno Editore, Torino; Saverio Campanini, Ein unbekannter
Kommentar zum „Hohelied“ aus der kabbalistischen Schule von Francesco Zorzi:
Edition und Kommentar, in G. Frank – A. Hallacker – S. Lalla (edd.), Erzählende
Vernunft, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, Saverio Campanini, Le fonti ebraiche del De
Harmonia mundi di Francesco Zorzi, in «Annali di Ca' Foscari»; G. Busi,
Francesco Zorzi. A Methodical Dreamer, in The Christian Kabbalah. Jewish
Mystical Books and their Christian Interpreters, ed. J. Dan, Harvard. S. Campanini,
Haophan betoc haophan. La struttura simbolica del De Harmonia mundi di
Francesco Zorzi, in «Materia Giudaica». Alfonso Vesentini Argento. Il cardinale
e l'architetto. Girolamo Aleandro e il rinascimento adriatico veneziano. Apostrofo
edizioni-Pieve San Giacomo-Cremona; S. Campanini, Ein christlicher Kabbalist
liest Ficino: Francesco Zorzi, in J. Eming und M. Dallapiazza unter Mitarbeit
von F. Quenstedt und T. Renz, Marsilio Ficino in Deutschland und Italien.
Renaissance-Magie zwischen Wissenschaft und Literatur, Harrassowitz Verlag,
Wiesbaden. Refs.: H. P. Grice, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
zucca: zucca (n. Villaurbana)
è un filosofo. Grice: “I like his surname. Mine means ‘pig.’ His means
‘punpkin.’!” --. L'uomo e l'infinito, Imola, Tipografia
sociale; Il lamento del genio, parodia, Sassari, Gallizzi; Dopo il dolore,
canto, Chiari, Rivetti; Il grande enigma, Modena, Formiggini; Le lotte
dell'individuo, “Rivista di Filosofia”: Le lotte dell'individuo, Modena,
Formiggini; Essere e non essere, “Rivista di Filosofia”; Essere e non essere,
Roma, Formiggini; Pensieri, “Rivista sarda; Leggenda e realtà, “Rivista sarda”,
“Ardigò e il vescovo di Mantova (un'intervista nel sogno), Roma, Rivista sarda;
“Ardigò e il vescovo di Mantova (un'intervista nel sogno),’ Roma, Ferri; Un
filosofo di un filosofo, “Mediterranea”; I rapporti fra l'individuo e l'universo,
Padova, Cedam. Refs.: H. P. Grice, The Grice Papers, BANC, MSS The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
zuccarelli: Grice: “Not really a philosopher, but someone involved in the
death of one!” “Nonostante i dubbi, la questione venne ben presto chiusa;
secondo l'incaricato professor Zuccarelli, era plausibile che quelli fossero
parte dei resti di Leopardi. Il medico parla esplicitamente di aver rinvenuto
una parte di rachide e una di sterno entrambe deviate.
zubiena
Enrico Castelli Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to
search Nota disambigua.svg Disambiguazione – Se stai cercando l'omonimo
cestista, vedi Enrico Castelli (cestista). Enrico Castelli Gattinara di Zubiena
(Torino, 20 giugno 1900 – Roma, 10 marzo 1977[1]) è stato un filosofo e storico
della filosofia italiano. È stato professore ordinario, presso l'Università di
Roma La Sapienza, di Filosofia della religione sino al 1970, ha fondato
l'Archivio di Filosofia e ha organizzato i "Colloqui Castelli"
incontri che riuniscono studiosi di livello mondiale per discutere temi di
filosofia della religione [2] . Vicina all'esistenzialismo religioso, la sua
opera, partita da posizioni spiritualiste, si caratterizza per uno stile
filosofico dal tratto autobiografico. Si è interessato di temi legati al
rapporto tra ragione, arte e religione; e ha introdotto in Italia, attraverso i
"Colloqui" organizzati presso l'Università di Roma, il dibattito
sulla demitizzazione. Nel suo pensiero convergono suggestioni tratte da Agostino,
Kierkegaard, Lev Isaakovič Šestov, Heidegger, in una personale ricerca volta a
delineare una teologia della storia sulla base della considerazione del tema
del peccato originale. Nei Colloqui, nati dall'intento di contribuire ad una
rinascita culturale dell'Europa, convennero in Italia personalità di rilievo
della scena filosofica religiosa, teologica, ontologica, fenomenologica ed
ermeneutica. Vi fecero la loro comparsa Henri Gouhier, Stanislas Breton, Jean
Brun, Claude Bruaire, Xavier Tilliette, Jacques Lacan, Paul Ricœur, Emmanuel
Lévinas, Jacques Ellul, Giulio Carlo Argan, Jean Starobinski, Émile Benveniste,
Umberto Eco, Gershom Scholem, Gabriel Vahanian, Humberto Giannini. Dopo la sua
morte, ha preso il suo posto, come organizzatore dei Colloqui e direttore dell'Archivio
di Filosofia, Marco Maria Olivetti. Il filosofo e teologo Raimon Panikkar fu
suo grande amico e collaboratore.
Principali pubblicazioni Il tempo esaurito, Ed. della Bussola, Roma,
1947. Existentialisme théologique, Herman & Co., Paris 1948. I presupposti
di una teologia della storia, Cedam, Padova 1952. Il demoniaco nell'arte,
Electa, Milano, 1952; rist. Bollati Borighieri, Torino 2007. Pensieri e
giornate, Cedam, Padova, 1963. Simboli e Immagini, Edizioni Rinascimento, Roma,
1966. I presupposti di una teologia della storia, Cedam, Padova 1968. Il tempo
invertebrato, Cedam, Padova 1969. I paradossi del senso comune, Cedam, Padova
1970. La critica della demitizzazione, Cedam, Padova 1972. Il tempo
inqualificabile, Cedam, Padova 1975. Diari (4 volumi), Cedam, Biblioteca
dell'Archivio di Filosofia, Padova 1997. Bibliografia sul pensiero filosofico
di Castelli Marco Maria Olivetti, Enrico Castelli (1900-1977), in E. CORETH –
W.M. NEIDL – G. PFLIGERDORFFER (a cura di), La filosofia cristiana nei secoli
XIX e XX, Edizione italiana a cura di G. Mura e G. Penzo, Città Nuova, Roma
1995, Vol. II, pp. 677–689. Pietro Prini, L'esistenzialismo teologico di Enrico
Castelli, in Pietro Prini, La filosofia cattolica italiana del Novecento,
Laterza, Roma-Bari 1997, pp. 187–192. Note ^ Enciclopedia Treccani ^ Sapienza -
Università di Roma, su archivio.uniroma1.it. URL consultato il 3 agosto 2018
(archiviato dall'url originale il 3 agosto 2018). Voci correlate Filosofia
della religione Esistenzialismo Teologia razionale Collegamenti esterni
Istituzioni collegate, su filosofia.uniroma1.it. URL consultato il 3 febbraio
2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 15 marzo 2008). Archivio di filosofia,
su libraweb.net. Livio Sichirollo, «CASTELLI GATTINARA di Zubiena, Enrico» in
Enciclopedia Italiana - IV Appendice, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1978. Enrico Castelli, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Enrico Castelli, su Open Library, Internet
Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 108450693 · ISNI
(EN) 0000 0001 1779 3818 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\211195 · LCCN (EN) n50053603 · GND
(DE) 116472111 · BNF (FR) cb11895501g (data) · BNE (ES) XX4579681 (data) · BAV
(EN) 495/52786 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n50053603 Biografie Portale
Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX
secoloNati nel 1900Morti nel 1977Nati il 20 giugnoMorti il 10 marzoNati a
TorinoMorti a RomaDiaristi italiani[altre]
zweckrationalität: “I chose this to
be one of the last entries in my dictionary!” -- Grice: “What I like about
Weber’s ‘zweckrationalitaet’ is that it’s one of the latter items in my
dictionary!” -- Grice: “I’m slightly confused by Weber, who was hardly a
philosopher, and his use of ‘zweck,’ – which Kant would have disliked. H. P.
Grice used the vernacular here, since he found it tricky to look for the
Oxonian for ‘Zweck.’ As he was reading Weber, Grice realises that one
of the main theoretical goals of Weber’s work is to understand how a social process
(such as a conversation, seen as a two-player game) become “rationalized,”
taking up certain themes of philosophy of history since Hegel as part of social
theory. Conversation, as part of culture, e.g., becomes ‘rationalised’ in the
process of the “disenchantment of a world views” in the West, a process that
Weber thinks has “universal significance.” But because of his goal-oriented
theory of action and his non-cognitivism in ethics, Weber sees rationalization,
like Grice, and unlike, say, Habermas, exclusively in terms of the spread of
purposive, or MEANS–ends rationality (“Zweckrationalität”). Rational action
means choosing the most effective MEANS of achieving one’s goals and implies
judging the consequences of one’s actions and choices. In contrast, value
rationality (“Wertrationalität,” that Grice translates as ‘worth-rationality’) consists
of any action oriented to this or that ultimate END, where considerations of
consequences are irrelevant. Although such action is rational insofar as it
directs and organises human conduct, the choice of this or that end, or this or
that value itself cannot be, for Weber, unlike Grice, a matter for rational or
scientific judgment. Indeed, for Weber this means that politics is the sphere
for the struggle between at least two of this or that irreducibly competing
ultimate end, where “gods and demons fight it out” and charismatic leaders
invent new gods and values. Grice tries
to look for a way to give a criterion of rationality other than the
‘common-or-garden’ means-end variety. When it comes to conversation, see,
Speranza, “The feast of [conversational] reason – Grice’s Conversational
immanuel – three steps towards a critique of conversational reason.” Refs.: H.
P. Grice, “Conversational rationality,” in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
A:
SUBJECT INDEX: ABDICATVM – ABSOLVTVM – ACTUM -- ANIMA -- A: NAME INDEX:
FILOSOFO ITALIANO: ABANO – ABBÀ -- ABBAGNANO – ABBRI – ACCARSI – ACCETTO –
ACHILLINI -- ACITO – ACONZIO -- ACQUASPARTA -- ACQUISTOD’ -- ACRI -- ADDIEGO-D’
– ADORNO – AGAMBEN -- AGAZZI-Em -- AGAZZI-Ev – AGOSTINO -- AGOSTINO-D’ –
AGRESTA -- AGRIGENTO – AJELLO—ALBERGANO -- ALBERTI – ALBERTI – ALBERTINI –
ALDEROTTI – ALEMANNO – ALFIERI -- ALFONSO-D’ -- ALGAROTTI – ALICI --
ALIGHIERI -- ALIOTTA – ALLEGRETTI –
ALLIEVO -- ALLMEYER-FAZIO -- ALTAN-Tullio – AMADUZZI – AMANTEA -- AMBROGIO -- AMBROSOLINI – AMERIO – AMIDEI – AMUCO –
ANCESCHI – ANDINA -- ANDREA-D’ – ANDRIA – ANGELI – ANGIULLI -- ANNUNZIO-D’ –
ANTISERI – ANTONI -- ANTONINI -- AOSTA – APPOLINARE -- AQUINO – ARCAIS –
ARANGIO – ARCAIS – ARCHIBUGI – ARCHIDIACONO -- ARCO-L’ -- ARDIGÒ – ARE – ARENA
-- ARIMINO-GregoDa – ARMETTA – ARRIGHETI – ASSUNTO – ASTORINI – AURELIO -- AURELIO - -- AUSTINJL – AZEGLIO – AZULAI -- NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: --
AARON -- ACKRILL (Grice’s tutee at St. John’s) – AELFRIC -- AUSTIN
(collaborator with H. P. Grice) -- AYER (Anglo-Jewish) B: SUBJECT INDEX: BULETIC -- B: NAME INDEX:
-- FILOSOFO ITALIANO: BACCHIN – BACCI – BADALONI – BAFFA – BAGLIETTO – BALBO –
BALDINI – BALDINOTTI – BALDUINO – BANFI – BARATONO – BARBA – BARBARO –
BARCELLONA – BARIE – BARICELLI – BARLAAM – BARONCELLI -- BARONE-F -- BARONE-G –
BARSIO – BARTOLI – BARZAGHI – BARZELLOTTI – BATTAGLIA – BAUSOLA – BAZZANELLA –
BECCARIA – BECCHI – BEDESCHI – BELLEO – BEDONI – BELLONI – BELLUTO – BENARDI –
BENCIVENGA -- BENE-Del – BENEDETTO – BENINCASA – BENVENUTO – BENVENUTTI –
BERNARDI – BERNARDO -- BERNERI – BERTI – BERTINARIA – BERTO – BIANCO – BOBBIO –
BOCCADIFERRO -- BOCCANEGRA – BOCCHI -- BODEI – BOELLA -- BOEZIO – BOLANO –
BONATELLI – BONAVINO – BONCINELLI – BONIOLO – BONOMI – BONOMO – BONTADINI –
BONTEMPELLI – BONVECCHIO – bordon (scaligero) -- BORELLI-D -- BORRELI-P – BORSA
– BOTERO – BOTTA – BOTTIROLLI – BOTTONI -- BOVIO -- BOZZELLI -- BOZZETTI –
BRANCIFORTE -- BRANDALISE – BRECCIA – BRESSANI -- BRUNETTO LATINI – BRUNI --
BRUNO – BUONAFEDE -- BUONAMICI – BUONARROTI – BUONASANTI – BUONSANTO – BURGIO –
BURTIGLIONE – B: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH – BACON-R BACON-F BOSTOCK (Grice’s tutee
at St. John’s) – BRADLEY – BRAITHWAITE – BROAD C: SUBJECT INDEX: CONCEPTVS -- C:
NAME INDEX: ITALIANO – CABEO -- CACCIARI
-- CACCIATORE – CAFFARELLI – CAFFI – CAFFO – CALBOLI-PaulucciDiCalboli
-- CALDERONI – CALOGERO – CALOPRESE – CAMBRIA – CAMILLA – CAMMARATA – CAMPA-R –
CAMPA-R – CAMPAILLA -- CAMPANELLA – CANTONI – CAPITINI – CAPIZZI – CAPOCASALE –
CAPOCCI -- CAPOGRASSI – CAPORALI –
CAPPELLETTI – CAPRA – CAPUA-Di – CARABELLESE – CARACCIOLO – CARAMELLA –
CARAMELLO – CARANDO – CARAVITA --
CARBONARA – CARBONE – CARBONI – CARCANO – CARCHIA – CARDANO – CARDIA –
CARDONE – CARIFI – CARLE – CARLINI – CARO-De – CARRAVETTA – CARULLI –
CASALE—GiovanniDa – CASALEGNO – CASANOVA – CASATI – CASINI – CASOTTI --
CASTELLI -- CASSIODORO – CASTRUCCI – CATALFANO – CATARA-Letieri – CATENA –
CATTANEO-C – CATTANEO-M – CATTANI-DaDiaceto – CATUCCI – CAVALCANTI – CAVALIERI
– CAVALLO – CAZZANIGA – CECCATO – CEDRONI – CELLUCCI – CENTI – CENTOFANTI –
CEREBOTANI – CERETTI – CERONETTI – CERRONI – CERTANI – CERUTI – CERUTTI – CERVI
– CESA – CESARINI-Sforza – CESENA-MicheleDa – CHERCHI – CHIAPPELLI –
CHIAROMONTE – CHIAVACCI -- CHIOCCHETTI – CHIODI – CHITTI -- CICERONE –
CILIBERTO – CINATTI – CIONE – COCO – CODRONCHI – COLAZZA – COLECCHI – COLLETTI
– COLLI – COLLINI-Cosimo – COLOMBE – COLOMBO -- COLONNA – COLONNELLO – COLORNI
– CONTE – CONTESTABILE – Schinella-Conti, Antonio -- CONTI-Angelo –
CONTI-Augusto – CONTRI – CORBELLINI – CORDESCHI – CORLEO – CORNELIO – CORRADO –
CORSINI – CORTESE – CORVAGLIA – COSI – COSMACINI – COSIMO-Collini? – COSMI-De –
COSSOTTINI – COSTA – COSTA-II – COSTANZI -- COTTRONEO – COTTA – CREDARO --
CREMONINI – CRESPI – CRESPO -- CROCE – CURCIO-Corrado – CURI – CUSANI – CUTELLI
– C: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH – COLLINGWOOD D: SUBJECT INDEX: DEMONSTRATUM -- D:
NAME INDEX – ITALIAN – Dalmasso – Dandolo – Daniele
-- Annunzio/Annunzi – Dati
– DelficoM – DelfinoFederico
– Delia – Delminio
– Delogu – Demaria
– Demetrio – Desideri
– Diano – Dion
– Dionigi – Disertori
– Dodaro – Domanin
– Donà – Donatelli – Donati
– Dondi – Dorfles
– Doria – Dottarelli
– Duni – Duso
– D: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: DUMMETT E: SUBJECT INDEX: EXPLICATVM -- E: NAME
INDEX: ITALIAN: -- ECO – ENESIDEMO -- EMILIANI – EMO – ENRIQUES –
ENTREVESA – ENZO – EPICOCO -- EPITTETO – ERCOLE-D’ – ESPOSITO --
EVOLA – E: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH. F: SUBJECT INDEX -- F: NAME INDEX – ITALIANO --
FABRI – FABRO – FAGGIN – FALCIGLIA-DaSaleniG – FALLARMONICA -- FALZEA – FANO --
FARDELLA –-- FASSO – FAZIO -- FAZZINI – FELICE – FERDINANDOFioretti – FERGNANI
– Fernando (Epifanio) -- FERRABINO – FERRANDO -- FERRARI – FERRARI – FERRARIS –
FERRARIS-De – FERRETTI – FERRI -- FICINO
– FIDANZA – FIGLIUCCI – FILANGIERI –– FILLIPIS-De – FINESCHI -- FIORE –
FIORMONTE – FIORENTINO – FIORETTI – FISICHELLA – FLORIDI – Fonnesu – Fornero – ForlìJacopoDa – Formaggio – Fornari – Fracastoro – FrancescoDi
– Franchini – Franci – Francia(ToraldodiFrancia) -- Franzini – Frixione –
Frontino – Frosini – Fusaro – Fuschi -- F: NAME INDEX – ENGLISHMEN: FLEWG: SUBJECT INDEX: GOAL-ORIENTED BEHAVIOUR –
GRAMMAR – GESTURE – GUSTUM – GUSTATUM -- G: NAME INDEX: FILOSOFO ITALIANO:Gaetani – Gagliardi
– Galeffi – Galiani
– Galilei – Galimberti
– GalliGallo – Galli
– Gallo – Galluppi
– Galvano – Gangale
– GarboDinoDel – Gargani
– Garin – GarroniEmilio
– GarroniStefano – Gatti
– Gelli – GemmisDe
– Genovese – Genovesi
– Gentile -- Gentile – GentileMarino – Gentili – Gerratana – Geymonat
– Ghezzi – Ghisleri
– Giacché – Giacomo – GiacomoDi
– GiandomenicoDi – Giametta
– Giamnetti – GianiN
– GianiR – Giannantoni
– Giannetto – Giannone
– Gioberti – Gioia
– Giorello – Giorgi
– GiorgiDePiierPaolo – GiorgiDeRaffaele – GiovanniDeBiagio
– Giraldi – Girardi
– Girgenti – Girotti
– Giudice – GiudiceDel
– GiudiceLo --
Giuliano (imperatore) -- Giussani – Giusso – Givone – Gobetti – Gobbo – Gonnella – Goretti
– Gori – Gramsci
– Grandi – GrassiErnesto
– GrassiL – Grataroli – GraziaDe -- Gregorio-da-Rimini
– GregorioIlGrande – Gregory
-- Grice, H. P. – Griffero
– GrimaldiC – GrimaldiD
– GrimaldiF – Gruppi
– Guastela – Guicciardini
– Giuducci – Guzzi
– Guzzo –
G: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian tutors) – GARDINER – GRICE – H: --
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX: HABITVS – HERMENEUTIC – HOC -- H: NAME INDEX –
ITALIAN – FILOSOFO ITALIANO -- DON’T EXPECT AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER HERE: but
you’ll find one: Hoesle.- Hampshire, S. N.-- Hare, R. M. -- Hart, H. L.
A. -- Hillel ben Samuel – Hösle -- H: NAME INDEX – ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian
philosophy dons) male ENGLISH OXONIAN PHILOSOPHER – HALESOWEN – HAMPSHIRE –
HARE -- HARTI: PHILOSOPIHCAL SUBJECT INDEX: IN-,
philosophical prefix. Notably in “in plicaturum.” Antonym: ex-; INTER-,
philosophical prefix – IUS – the basis for all philosophy of right, or
philosophical jurisprudence -- I: NAME INDEX – FILOSOFO ITALIANO: Iacono – Illuminati – Incardona – Infantino -- IorioD’ – I: NAME INDEX – male ENGLISH OXONIAN PHILOSOPHERJ:
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX – None: because all “J” words in Italian came from
“I” words in Roman, as in ius, etc. J: NAME INDEX: FILOSOFO ITALIANO: jadelli
-- Jaja – Jammelli Jerocades – Jervolino – Javèlli
– Jori – Julia
– Juvalta – J: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHMEN
(Oxonian tutors) male ENGLISH OXONIAN PHILOSOPHER.Other (provided cited by
Grice or Speranza): Jevons, Johnson. k: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX – Speranza:
“I cannot find any pedigreed Roman vocabulary with ‘k’ since this is barbaric!”
-- K: NAME INDEX: FILOSOFO ITALIANO (none!) -- K: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHMEN
(Oxonian philosophy dons)maleENGLISHOXONIANPHILOSOPHER:Kneale.Other(eithercitedbyGriceorSperanza):Kneale
KNEAL L:
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX -- L: NAME INDEX – LIGATUM – LEX – LECTUM – LEKTON
– LOGOS – LIBER -- FILOSOFO ITALIANO – Labriola –
Lagalla – LallaDe – Lamanna – Lami – Lampronti -- Landi
(Rossi-Landi) – Landino – Landucci -- Lanza(vVasto)
–– Latini -- Lazzarelli – Lecaldano – Leon – Leoni – Leonico – LeopardiG – LeopardiM
– Levi –Lettieri -- Letieri – Liberatore – Liceti LiguoriDe – Lilla – Livi – Limentani – Limone
– Lodovici – Lodovici -- Lombardi –
Lombardia – Lombardo – Longano – Losano – Losurdo – Lottieri
– Luca – Lucrezio
– Luporini – Luzzago
– Luzzatto – L: NAME INDEX – ENGLISHMEN
(Oxonian philosophy dons) – male ENGLISH OXONIAN PHILOSOPHER: LOCKE M: SUBJECT
INDEX: MATERIA – MATERIALISMUS -- MENS -- MENTATUM – MENTALIS – MENTITUM –
MENTITURA – MENTATURA – MENTATURUM – MOS -- M: NAME INDEX – ITALIAN: Machiavelli – Madera
– Maffetone – Magalotti
– Maggi – Magi
– Magnani – Magni
– Mainardini -- Maistre – Malatesta – Malfitano
– Malipiero -- Mamiani
(Rovere) -- Mamini (v. Rovere) – Mancini – Mangione
– Manfredi – Manicone
– Manneli – Mantovani
– Marassi – Marca
– MarcaFrancDella – MarchesiniG
– MarchesiniR – Marchett
– Marchi – MarchiDe – Marconi – Mariano –
Marin – Marliani
– Marotta – Marramao
– Marsili – Marsilio
– MarsilioPadova – Martelli
– Martinetti – Martini
– Martino – MartinoDe
– Marzano – Masci
– Masi – Massarenti
– Mastri – Massolo
– Mastrofini – Masullo
– Matassi – MateraAlanoDa
--Mathieu --– Maturi
– Maurizi – Mazzantini
– Mazzarella – Mazzei
– Mazzini – Mazzoni
– MedigoEliaDel – MeisDe
– Melandri – Melchiorre
– Melli – Mercuriale
– Merker – Messere
– Micalori – Miccoli
– Miccolis – Michelstaedter
– Mieli – Miglio
– Miraglia – Misefari
– Modio – Moiso
– Moleschott – Mondin
– Mondolfo (his son is a brilliant architect)
– Montani – MonteDel
– Montefoschi –Montinari
– Monti-Monti – Moramarco
– Moravia – Mordacci
– Mordecai – Morelli
– MorettiG – – Mori
-- Moriggi – Mosca – MottaDellaAvogadro – Motterlini
– Musatti – Mustè
-- M: NAME INDEX – ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons) N: SUBJECT INDEX:
NATURA – NATURALISM – NOTUM -- N: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN: Nannini
–– Nardi – Natoli
– Negri– Neri
– Nesi – Nicoletti
– Nifo – Nizolio
– Noce -- Nola – Norcia – Noto – Novaro -- Nowell-Smith, P.
H. (vide under “Smith”) -- N: NAME INDEX: ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy
dons) – NOWELL-SMITH O: SUBJECT INDEX: OB- prefix,
OB-JAECTUM. “ALS OB” – “OB” cognate with “IF” – “OTHER” “OR” – Italian “O,”
“OD” “OVVERO.” -- O: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN
-- Ocone – Oddi – Offredi – Olgiati – Olivetti – Olivi – Opocher – Ordine – Orestano – Orioli –Ornato –OrsiD’ – Ortes – OtrantoNicolaDi – Ottaviano – O: NAME INDEX – ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons) P: SUBJECT INDEX:
prae-, prefix (antonym: post-), pro- (antonym: retro-), prefix, post-
prefix, PRAEDICATVM -- PERSON – POSSE --
PROBABILITY – PROPOSITVM -- P: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN: Pace
– Pace – Paci
– PadovaMarsilioDa – Padovani
– Pagani – Paganini – Pagano
– Paggi – Pagliaro
– Palazzani – Panella
– PanunzioSergio – PanunzioSilvano
--– Paolino -- Papi – Paravia
– Pareto – Pareyson – Parinetto
– Parrasio – Parrini
– Pascoli – Passer-RadicatiDiPasser -- Passeri
– Pasini – Pasqualino
– Pasqualotto – Passavanti
– Passeri – Passerini
– Pastore – Patrizi
– Peano -- Pears, D.
F. – Pecoraro – PelacaniAntonio – PelacaniBagio
– Pellegrini – Pennisi
– Pera – Peregalli
– PergolaPaoloDella – Perniola
– Perone – Persio
– Pessina – Petrarca
– Petrone – Pezzarossa
– Pezzella – Piana
– Piccolomini – Pico
– Pico – Pieralisi
– Pievani – Pigliaru
– Pigliucci – Piovani
– Pirandello – Pirro
– Pitagora (Crotone) – Pizzi – Pizzorno – Plebe – Poggi – PojeroGiusAmato
– Poli – Politeo
– Pollastri – Pomis
– Pomponazzi – Pontara
-- Ponte (DaPonte) – Ponzio -- Ponzio –
Porta – Porzio
– Porzio – PortaDella
–Possenti – PozzaDalla
– Pozzo --- PraDal – Prepostino
– Prestipino – Preti
– Preve – Prini
– Prodi – Prospero
– Pucci – Puccinotti
– Punzo
– Purgotti – P: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: PEARS
(Grice’s collaborator) Q: SUBJECT INDEX: QUIDDITAS, QV- Grice’s term for an
x-question. – the interrogative nature obvious in ‘quale’ and ‘quantum.’ Q: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN: -- Quarta -- Quattromani -- Quinto -- Q: NAME INDEX:
ENGLISH: QUINTON (Grice’s collaborator) R:
SUBJECT INDEX: radix, ratio, res. R: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: Raguse – Raimondi – Raio – Reale – Reggio – Reghini –
Regina – Renier – Rensi – Resta – Restaino – Ricasoli – RietaMosèbI -- Da Rignano
– Ricordi – Righetti – Rignano – Rigobello – RiminiGregorioDa – Rinaldini –
Riondato – RipaGiovanniDa – Riverso – Rocco – Rodano – Romagnosi – RomanoBruno
– RomanoJudahbM – RomanoEgidio – Roncaglia – RonchiRocco – Rosatti – Roselli –
Rosmini – RosselliC – RosselliN – Rossetti – RossiA – RossiFrancescodellaMarca
-- RossiM – RossiP –Rosso – Rota – Rotondi – Rovatti – Rovatti – Rovella –
Rovere – Rucellai – Ruffolo – RuggieroDe – Rusca – Rusconi – Ruta – R: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: RYLE S: SUBJECT
INDEX: sub-, prefx. As in substance, substratum. SIGNUM, SIGNATUM – SIGNATURA –
SEMEION – SOMA-SEMA – SPIRITUS – SPERANZA – SPEME – SPERATUM – STRAWSONISE --
S: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: Sacchi – Sacheli – Saitta – Salutati – Samuel -- Sanctis –
Sanseverino – Santilli – Santorio – Santucci – Sanzo – SarloDe – Sarno – Sarpi
-- Sasso – Sava – Scala – Scalfari -– Scarano – Scaravelli – Scarpelli –
SciaccaG – SciaccaM – Schinella – Scupoli – Selvatico-Estense -- Semerari –
Semmola – Senofane -- Senone (Velia) – Serra – Settara – Severino --
Sforza-CesariniSforza – Sgalambro – Siciliani – SignaBoncompagno – Simioni –
Simone – Simoni – Sini – SiracusaAlcaldino – Sirenio – Soave – Solari – Soleri
– Somenzi – SordiSerfaino – SoriaDe – Sorrentino – Sotione -- Sozzini --
Spadaro – Sparti – Spaventa – Spedalieri – Speranza – Speranza, Ugo – Speranza,
Alessandro – Speranza, Ettore – Speranza, Gianni – Speranza, Paola – Speranza,
Anna-Maria – Speranza-Ghersi – Speranza -- Speroni – SpinelliF – SpinelliT –
Spirito – Spisani – Sraffa -- Stabile – Stefanini – Stella – Stellini –
Sterlich – Steuco -- Strawson, P. F.—Strozzi -- Szecchi -- S: NAME INDEX
ENGLISH: SIBLEY -- STRAWSON -- T: SUBJECT INDEX: TRANSCENDENTALE – TEMPUS –
TROPOS – TOPOS – TELOS – TELIC – Thomason -- T: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: Taddio – Tagliabue – Tagliagambe – Taglialatela –
Tagliapietra – Tamburino – Tafuri – TarantinoF – TarantinoG – Tari --
Tartarotti – Tataranni – Tasso – Telesio – Tertulliano -- Tessitore – Travis –
Testa – Thaulero -- Tilgher – Timossi – Tincani – Tocco – Toderini – Tolomei –
Tomatis – Tomeo -- Tomitano – Tornolia – Torricelli – Trabucco – Tragella –
Trapè – Trasci -- Treves – Tria – Trincheri – Trissino – Troilo – Tronti –
Tulelli – Turco – Turoldo – Tuveri -- T: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: THOMSON
(Grice’s collaborator) -- TURING TOULMIN U: SUBJECT INDEX: USE – USUS – USATUM
-- U: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: UBALDI – Ubaldi – Unicorno
-- Urmson, J. O.-- U: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: URMSON (Grice’s collaborator)
V: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX: VAGUM, VARIABILIS, V: NAME INDEX
-- ITALIAN V: FILOSOFO ITALIANO: VACCA – VACCARINO – VACCARO -- VAILATI
– VALENT -- VALENTINO – VALERI -- VALLA – VALLAURI-LuigiLombardi – VALLETTA –
VALORE – VALPERGA-DiCaluso -- VANINI – VANNI -- VANNINI – VARISCO -- VARRONE --
VARZI – VASA – VASALLO(Nicla) – VASTARINI –- VATTIMO – VECA – – VEDOVELLI --
VEGETTI -- VENANZIO –VENEZIA -- VENTURA --
VERA – VERCELLONE – VERDIGLIONE – VERNIA – VERONELLI -- VERRECHIA --
VERRI --
VESEY -- VIANO – VIAZZI -- VICO (n.Napoli) – VIERI – VIGNA – VIGNOLI --
VIO – VIOTTO -- VIRNO --
VIROLI-Cavalieri? -- VITIELLO-Vincenzo? – VOLPE-Della – VOLPI – Volpicelli –
Voltaggio -- V: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: -- VESEY – Other: Grice’s club member:
Vanderveken – W: PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX: WORLD – WELT – WAHR – WORTH –
WISE -- W: DON’T EXPECT AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER WITH THIS BARBARIC LETTER – “but
actually you shall find one, although he wasn’t even sure where his surname
came! Winspeare!” (Grice) – Warnock – Winspeare -- W: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH:
WARNOCK (Grice’s collaborator) – WILSON -- X: SUBJECT INDEX: -- X: NAME INDEX: XENOPHANES – XENOPHON – XMAS –
Y: SUBJECT INDEX: YOG-AND-ZOG Z:
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECT INDEX: ZEIGARNICK -- ZETTEL – ZWECKRATIONALITÄT -- Z:
NAME INDEX: FILOSOFI ITALIANI: -- ZABARELLA – ZAMBONI-Gio – ZAMBONI-Giu –
ZANINI -- ZANOTTI – ZECCHI – ZIMARA --
ZINI -- ZOLLA -- ZORZI (Giorgi) – ZUCCA – ZUCCARELLI – ZUBIENA -- ENGLISH -- OTHER: ZOROASTRO
References (Following the tradition of H. P. Grice’s Playgroup, only
Oxonian English-born male philosophers of Grice’s generation listed): Abano, Pietro D’ (n. d.). Filosofia. Abbà. Abbagnano,
N. Dizionario di filosofia. Abbagnano,
Storia della filosofia.Austin, J. L. Philosophical papers, edited by J. O.
Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Austin, J. L. Sense and sensibilia, reconstructed from manuscript
notes by G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Austin, J. L. How to do things
with words, ed. by J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Blackburn, S. W.
Spreading the word. Oxford. Bostock, D. Logic.Croce, B. EsteticaFlew, A. G. N. Logic and language.
Oxford: Blackwell.Galileo, ScienzaGentile, Storia della filosofiaGhersi, A. M.
Griceiana. Grice, H. P. Studies in the Way of WordsGrice, H. P. Negation and
privationGrice, H. P. The conception of value. Oxford, at the Clarendon
Press.Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.Grice, H.
P., D. F. Pears, and P. F. Strawson, ‘Metaphysics,’ in D. F. Pears, The nature
of metaphysics. London: Macmillan. Hampshire, S. N. Thought and action. London:
Chatto and Windus.Hampshire, S. N. and H. L. A. Hart, Intention, decision, and
certainty. Mind. Hare, R. M. The language of morals. Oxford, at the Clarendon
Press.Hart, H. L. A. Review of Holloway, The Philosophical Quarterly’Leonardi,
FilosofiaMachiavelli, Il principeMondolfo, Storia della filosofiaNowell-Smith,
P. H. Ethics. Middlesex: PenguinPears, D. F. Philosophical psychology. London:
Duckworth. Pears, D. F. Motivated irrationality.Pears, D. F. and H. P. Grice,
The philosophy of action.Speranza, Minutes of H. P. Grice’s Play-Group – The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia. Strawson, P. F.
Introduction to Logical Theory.Strawson, P. F. Logico-Linguistic Papers.Strawson,
P. F. and H. P. Grice, In defense of a dogma.Strawson, P. F. and H. P. Grice,
CategoriesStrawson, P. F. and H. P. Grice, Meaning.Thomson, J. F. and H. P.
Grice, The philosophy of action.Urmson, J. O. Philosophical Analysis: its
development between the two wars.Vico, Scienza nuovaWarnock, G. J. The object
of moralityWarnock, G. J. Language and MoralsWinspeare, Il libro delle leggi di
Cicerone.Winspeare, Filosofia – Palazzo d’Acquaviva, Via Atri. Woozley, A. D.
On H. P. Grice. – (A. M. G. is Anna Maria Ghersi – Ghersi instilled and keeps
instilling – never ceases to instill -- in Luigi Speranza a love for philosophy),
The Gricce Club. Zabarella, De regressu, I Tatti.Zabarella, De methodis, I
Tatii.Zamboni, Giorgio. Grice: “Described himself as a philosopher.”Zamboni, G.
Gnoseoloogia pura.Zanetti, A.Retoriche della veritàZanotti, La vita e lo vivo.
Zimara, De primo cognito – Commentaria ad AristotelemZini, Giustizia: storia
d’una idea – liberta od …Zolla, L’androgino. Zorzi, L’armonia del mondo. Zucca,
L’uomo e l’infinito.Zuccarelli, “La morte di Leopardi.”
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment