GRICE E CAPPELLETTI: ENTELECHEIA

  3: Energeia and Entelecheia Entelecheia 9  possible to transfer this meaning to the opposite extreme, so something can be “completely ruined”  or destr oyed: “even death is by a transference of meaning called an end, because both are extremes,  and the end for the sake of which something  is  is an extreme” (  Met.  V.16 1021b21-30). 27  Thus,  telos  is not determined by its being opposed to something; it is not logically or ontologically dependent on its opposite. Rather, the opposite is borrows its meaning from the  telos . It is not defined as the endpoint of a sequence, rather, the sequence is derived from it by positing an opposite. Aristotle argues for the primacy of an ongoing condition of  telos  over  telos  as endpoint in his discussion of happiness in a complete life ( NE  I.10). The primacy of the completion-related sense over the sequence-related sense is reinforced by  Aristotle’s use of  telos  to mean  source  ( archē  ).   The completion-related sense is evident in the phrase  hoi en telei  , which refers to a governor or magistrate; so  telos  suggests “origin ( archē  )”: a source of  action, events, or being that directs or structures what arises from it. Aristotle argues for the identification of  telos  with  archē   in   Met.  IX.8 and XI.1: to be a  telos  is primarily to be that for the sake of which, which is different than (though not exclusive of) being an endpoint of change (  Met.  IX.8 1050a6-8, XI.1 1059a35-7).  When we speak of teleology today, we do not mean Aristotle’s concept of  telos ; we mean the Scholastic idea of teleology, that is, an assimilation of the Aristotelian idea to the Christian historical concept of Divine Providence. It thus takes on the sense, for us, of a kind of goal set for a creature in advance, external to it, and toward which it is confined to strive. By contrast, at minimum,  telos  in Aristotle means the  inherent  completeness or wholeness of a thing, a completeness that can coincide with, and be  the thing itself. “ Telos  ,”  for Aristotle, does not   primarily mean  “ end ed,”  or  “ finished .”  It means  “ complete  ,”   “ fully there  ,”   “ whole  ,”   “ entire ;” and here it means “having its complete sense.”  Its finality is akin to what makes us say  “ at last  ,” as   in “at last we find water.”   Echein    The word  echein   means “to have” or “to hold on” to something. The “grip” of having, as it were, is “being in charge of, keeping,” or even “holding in guard, keeping safe,” and in a related sense, “holding fast, supporting, sustaining, or staying.” The infinitive can mean “to be able.” When a location is specified, it can mean “to dwell” there.  The relationship of  telos  to being is the reason the word  echei  , “have,” is im portant to  entelecheia.  Aristotle uses  echein  to say: “Those things are said to be complete [ teleia ]   for which a good  telos  initiates activity from within [ huparchei ], since it is by having the  telos  that they are complete ”  (  Met . V.16 1021b23). 28   A thing is complete ( teleia ) by having or holding onto  telos . “Having,” then, stands in for the term “initiate from within” ( huparchei ), a word often translated as “belong to” or “be present.”  Echein,  then, is another way to express the inherence of the  telos . The most revelatory sense of  echein  for our current context, perhaps, is that in ordinary Greek  the verb can substitute for “be”: in response to a greeting,   kalōs echei   means “it is well.” 29  Now3: Energeia and Entelecheia Energeia and Entelecheia in the Proof of Change 10  “having,” “holding on,” and “sustaining” are ongoing conditio ns or activities. Using  echein  as a synonym for being, then suggests that being is not static or passive, but a continual accomplishment.   Translation  Based on these considerations, it seems clear that the standard practice, which translates  both  energeia  and  entelecheia  with the word “actuality,” should be abandoned.  Energeia  should be  rendered “being -at- work” or “activity,” but could also be translated “being insofar as it works.”  Entelecheia  can only be rendered by a range of nearly-equivalent renderings. To recap:  en-  literally  makes the word mean ‘being in the  telos, ’   telos   is not conceived horizontally as “at the end of a sequence” or “finished off,” but vertically, as fulfillment, completion, or accomplishment, while  echein  means ongoing activity, but also is a word for being. In general,  entelecheia  should be rendered   by “being - complete,” with the word “being” a translation of “having” ( echein ), and understood as an  ongoing accomplishment. Less versatile translations are “staying - fulfilled,” “holding o nto  completion,” “holding itself in completion,” “holding its completion in itself,” “in active completion,” and other such formulae.   Energeia   and  Entelecheia  in the Proof of Change  Now that we have examined the words  energeia  and  entelecheia  themselves in general, we  need to see how they are used in Aristotle’s account of change, and to resolve an apparent self -contradiction in the use of being-complete ( entelecheia )   to define incomplete motion. I shall argue that  energeia  applies to individuals, while  entelecheia  applies to composites, a broader class of things that includes individuals. In the proof for the existence of change,  energeia  and  entelecheia  are used differently: being- built ( oikodomeitai )   is the being-at-work ( energeia ) of what is built ( oi kodomēton ), while building ( oikodomēsis ) is change ( kinēsis ) and the being-in-completion ( entelecheia ) of what is built as built:  being-complete ( entelecheia ) change  building  being-at-work ( energeia ) of agent being-at-work ( energeia ) of what is worked-on  builder / agent ( oikodomikon ) buildable / patient ( oikodomēton ) requires buildable requires builder  Energeia  as being-built ( oikodomeitai ) means the