Botta (Cavallermaggiore).
Filosofo. Grice: “The most relevant of his tracts is his ‘storia della
filosofia romana,’ – but he also played with Leopardi, and he is especially
loved in the Piemonte as a ‘dantista’! --
Grice: ““You’ve gotta love Botta – my favourite is his tract on
Alighieri as a philosopher – he applied all he had learned about philosophy at
Cuneo to Aligheri – the result is overwhelming!” Studia e insegna a Torino. Il
suo palazzo divenne un rinomato salotto culturale. Examina la filosofia
italiana, Cavour, Alighieri. Dizionario
biografico degli italiani. The rise of what Italians call philosophy ‘in the
volgare’ is contemporary with the Revival of Letters, when the hahit of
independent thought, gradually developing, asserted itself in opposition to Scholasticism.
The early establishment of the four Republics (Genova, Pisa, Venezia and
Amalfi), the growth of industry, commerce and wealth, the increasing
communication with the East, the propagation of Arabic Science, the influence
of the Schools of Roman Jurisprudence, the gradual formation of the ‘volgare’
out of the Roman language, and above all, the growing passion for the
literature of Ancient Rome, all combined to stimulate the human mind to free
itself from the servitude of prevailing methods and ideas. The Catharists
appeared in Lombardy, and extending throughout the Peninsula under various
names, such as the ‘Paterini’, the ‘Templari’, the ‘Albigesi,’ the ‘Publicani’,
and others, remained the unconqnered champions of intellectual liberty. A numerous
and powerful school of philosophers, embracing the most prominent
representatives of the Ghibelline party, laboured so persistently for freedom
of thought and expression, that it was denounced by the Roman Popist Church as
a School of Epicureans and Atheists. Foremost among these, according to
Aligheri, himself a Ghibelline, is the Emperor Frederick II., the patron of the
Arabian scholars, a poet, a statesman and
aphilosopher. His friend, CardinalUbaldini;Farinata degli Uberti, a hero in war
and peace; Latini, the teacher of Alighieri; and Cavalcanti, ‘the physicist,
the logician and Epicurean,’ as a contemporary biographer calls him. Meanwhile
Brescia strives to extend to the field of politics the philosophical revolution
which had so early begun, and which is now sustained by secret societies widely
spread throughout the Peninsula, alluded to in the early poem of St. Paul's
Descent to the Infernal Regions. To the same object of intellectual
emancipation are directed the religious and social movements headed by such
Reformers as Parma, San Douuino, Padova, Casale, Valdo, and Dolciuo. But- as a
promoter of freedom in philosophy as well as in political science, Aligheri stands
preeminent in the history of his country. He is sthe first to construct a philosophical
theory of the separation of the ‘lo stato fiorentino’ from the Pope’s Church in
his De Monarchia, in which he advocates the independence of the civil power
from all ecclesiastical control. Aligheri also opposes the Papal power in
immortal strains in the Divina Commedia; and, under the popular symbols of the
age, strive to enlarge the idea of Christianity far beyond the limits, to which
it wasconfined by the Scholastics. Petrara boldly attacked Scholasticism in
every form, denounced the Church of Rome as the impious Babylon which has lost
all shame and all truth, with his friend Boccaccio devoted himself to the
publication of ancient MSS., and laboured throughout his life to excite among
his contemporaries an enthusiasmfor Classical Ancient Roman Literature. His works
“DeVera Sapientia”; “De Remediis Utriunque Fortunes”; “De Vita, Solitaria”; “De
Contempu Mundi”;, blending Platonic ideas with the doctrines of Cicero and
Seneca, are the first philosophical protest against the metaphysical subtilties
of his age. Thus the fathers of Italian literature are also the fathers of the
revolution which give birth to the philosophy in ‘the volgare’. The study of the original writings of Plato and
Aristotle, and the introduction of an independent exegesis of the ancient
philosophers, soon produces a still more decided opposition to Scholasticism; a
movement aided by the arrival of Greek scholars in Italy before, and after
thefall of Constantinople. Prominent among these, were the Platonists Pletho
and Bessarion, and the Aristotelians Gaza and Trebizond, who place themselves at
the head of the philosophical revival in Italy. While Platonism becomes predominant
in Tuscany under the patronage of Medici, the influence of Ficino, and the
Platonic Academy founded by the former in Florence, Aristotelianism extends to
the Universities of Northern Italy and particularly to those of Padua and Bologna,
taking two distinct forms, according to the sources from which the interpretation
of Aristotle is derived. The Averroists followed the great commentary of
Averroes, and the Hellenists, or the Alexandrians, sought the spirit of the
Stagirite in the original, or in his Greek
commentators,chiefamongwhomwasAlexanderofAphrodisias. The Averroistic School,
mainly composed of physicists and naturalists,was the most decided opponent of
the Scholastic system in its relation to theology.
Indeed,medicine,Arahicphilos ophy,Averroism,astrology, and infidelity,
early in the Middle Ages hud become synonymous terms. Abano, who may he
considered as the founder of the Avcrroistic School in Italy, was one of the
first who asserts, under astrological forms, that religion has only a relative
value in accordance with the intellectual development of the people. He was arrested
by the order of the Inquisition; but he died before sentence was passed upon
him. His body was burnt, and his memory transmitted to posterity as connected
with infernal machinations. Ascoli, a professor at Bologna and a friend of
Petrarca, is condemned to burn all his books on astrology, and to listen every
Sunday to the sermons preached in the church of the Dominicans. Later he was
burnt at the stake, and his picture appears in one of the many Infernos painted
on the walls of the Italian churches by Orcagna. The eternity of matter and the
unity of human intellect are the two great principles of the Averroistic
doctrine. Hence the negation of creation, of permanent personality and of the
immortality of the soul became its principal characteristics. Although some of the
members of this School endeavour to reconcile its doctrines with the dogmas of
the Church, others accept the consequences of its philosophy, and boldly assert
the eternity of the imiverse and the destruction of personality at death. Fra
Urbano di Bologna, Paolo of Ven ice, Nicola da Foligno, and many others, are
among the first. Among the second may be mentioned Nicoletto Verniaa, Cajetano
and above all Pomponazzi, with whom began a period in the development of Anti-Scholastic
philosophy. Hitherto the followers of Averroism confine their teaching to
commentaries upon the great Arabian philosopher; but with Pomponazzi philosophy
assumes a more positive and independent character and becomes the living
organ of contemporary thought. Indeed. while he adheres to the Averroists in
his earnest opposition to Scholasticism, he is a follower of the Alexandrians
in certain specific doctrines. Thus on the question of theimmortality of the
sonl (‘l’animo’), which so agitated the mind of the age, while the Averroists
assert that the intellect after death returns to God and in time losses its
ndividuality, Pompouazzi with the Alexandrians reject that compromise, and
openly denies all future eexistence. He holds that theorigin of man (‘l’uomo’)
is due to the same causes which produce other things in nature: that miracles a
but illusions, and that the rise and the decadence of religion depends on theinfluence
of th estars. It is truet hat he insists on the opposition of philosophy and
faith, and thought that what is true in the former might be false in the
latter, and vice versa; a subterfuge, into which many philosophers of the
Middle Ages are forced by the dangers, to which they are exposed. Pomponazzi is
the author of many works, one of which, De immortalitate animae, was burnt in public.
His most celebrated disciples are Gonzaga, Giovio, Porta, and Grattarolo. His
opponents are Achillini, Nifo, Castellani and Contarini, all moderate
Averroists, who strive to reconcile Christianity with natural philosophy; an
effort, in which they are joined by Zimara, Zabarella, Pendasio and Cremonini.
Among the Hellenists, who maintained in part the opinions of Pomponazzi, is
Thomeo, a physician at Padua, who, on account of the vivacity of his polemic
against Scholasticism, the Hippocratic character of his doctrines, and the
beauty of his style, is considered as the founder of Hellenic criticism and naturalism
in the Age of the Renaissance. To the same class of philosophers, although
neither pure Hellenists nor Averroists, belong Pico and Cardano, who strive to
substitute in place of Scholasticism philosophic systems founded partly on
Christianity, and partly on Platonic ideas, or on doctrines derived from the
Cabala and astrology; Cesalpino, who constructs a pantheistic philosophy on
Averroistic ideas, and Vanini, who for advocating a system of naturalism is
burnt at the stake. Other philosophers oppose contemporary philosophy chiefly
for the barbarous form, in which it is expressed, such as Valla, Poliziano,
Barbaro, Nizolio, and Vives. But a more effectual opposition to Scholasticism
is due to the introduction of the experimental method into scientific
investigations, which was first inaugurated by Vinci, who, within the compass
of a few pages anticipates almost all the discoveries which have been made in
science, from Galilei to thecontemporar ygeologists. Nizolio, Aconzio, Erizzo,
Mocenigo and Piccolomini continue the work of Vinci in insisting on the
application of the experimental method in philosophy. This application is partially
at least attempted by Telesio aud by Patrizi who oppose Scholasticism by
striving to create a philosophy founded on nature. Bruno boldly undertakes the
philosophical reconstruction of mind and nature on the basis of the unity and
the universality of substance; while Campanella establishes his philosophy on
experience and consciousness. To promote this scientific movement learned
associations everywhere arise; the "Acadeinia Secretorum Naturae” is
instituted at Naples by Porta; the Telesiana is established by Telesio in the
same city; the Lynchean is founded in Rome by Cesi, and the Academia del
Cimento in Florence. Meantime the opposition to Scholasticism extends to the
field of politics, where Machiavelli establishee the principles of that policy,
which is destined to triumph in the
establishment of Italian unity on the ruins of papal sovereignty, a policy
which found a powerful impulse in the religious revolution attempted by
Savonarola, a still more effectual aid in the invention of the art of printing,
and a pledge of its final triumph in the great Reformation. In vain the
sacerdotal caste persecute and imprison the philosophers and reformers, and
burn them at th e stake; in vain it strives to drown philosophical liberty in blood.
The opposition increases and reappears in th ewritingsof Gnicciardini and
Sarpi, the bold defender of the Republic of Venice against the encroachments of
the Papal See, the philosopher and the naturalist, to whom many discoveries in
science are attributed. The political writings of Giannoti, of Paruta, and
Bottero, which are devoted to the emancipation of society from the authority of
the Church, close the period which opens with the aspirations of Alighieri
aud Petrarch, and is now crowned by the martyrdom of Bruno and Vamni. For
the exposition of the doctrines of the Italian philosophers of the Renaissance,
the reader is referred to Ueberweg's statements. See further: Tiedemann,
Geistder Speculative/} Philosophic; John 6. Biihle, Gesch. der neueren Philos.
; Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophic ; Ritter, GescMchU der Philos. ;
Supplement) alia Storia delta Filosofia di Tennemann, by Romagnosi and Poli ; Mamiani, Jiinnovamento delia Filmofm antica Italiana;
Spaventa, Carattere e sviluppo della Filosofia ItaliamidalSctxlo16"finoalnostrotempo.
On the philosophy of Aligheri, see A. F. Ozanam, Dante et la Philosophie
Cathdique. tranal. byBoissard,Lond.1854; N.Tommaseo.LaCommediadiDante, G.Frap- porti,SuMaFiiosofiadiDante,
UgoFoscolo,DiseorsomiltestodelPoemadiDante, G. Rossetti, Commento analitico
delta Diuina Commedia, Barlow, Critical, Historical, and Philosophical
Contributions to the Study of the.Dicina Commedia, Botta, Dante as Philosopher,
Patriot and Poet, New York; Rossetti, A Shadow of Dante, Boston, and the
valuable works written on the Italian poet by Schlosser, Kopish, Wegele, Blanc,
Goschel, Witte, and Philalethes (the present King John of Saxony). On Petrarch,
seeT.Bonifas, De Petrarca Philosopho, and Maggiolo, De la Philosophie morale de
Petrarque. On the opposition of Petrarch to Scholasticism cf. Renan's Averroes
et VArenvisme. The doctrines of Averroes -were introduced into the Peninsula
from Sicily, where appeared the first translations of the commentary of the Arabian
philosopher. They soon became naturalizedi at Padua, Bologna, and Ferrara, and
the absorbing subject of lectures and discussions. The principal lecturers
belonging to this School are Abano, the author of “Conciliator differentiarum
Philosophorum et Medicorum”; Gonduno, whose
Quastiones et Comments on Aristotle, Averroes, and Abano are extant in the
national library of Paris, some of which were published in Venice; Fra Urbano
da Bologna who wrote a voluminous commentary of the work of Averroes on the book
of Aristotle, De Physico Audita. It was published in Venice with a preface of
Nicoletto Vernias; Paolo di Venezia, the author of Summa totius Philosophiae,
who defends the doctrines of Averroes in the presence of eight hundredAugustinians
against Fava, the Hellenist; Tiene, Bazilieri, Foligno, Siena, Santa Sofia,
Forll, Vio, Vernias and many others have left voluminous MSS. in the libraries
of Venice, Padua, and Bologna, as witnesses of their devotion to the ideas of
the great Arabian philosopher. Pomponazz may be classed among the Averroists,
as far as he believes in the existence of a radical antithesis between religion
and philosophy; he, however, rejects the fundamental principle of Averroism,
the unity of the intellect, and in this respect he belongs to the Alexandrian
School. He is the author of several works: De Immortalitate Animae; De Fato; De
Libero Arbitrio; De Pmdes Unatione; De Providentia Dei; and De naturatium effectaum
admirandorum causis, scilicet de Incantationibus. Achillini is one of his opponents,
and the School o fPadua has left no record more celebrated, than that of the public
discussions held by those two philosophers. Achillini's works were published
inVenice. The two adversaries having been obliged to leave Padua, established
themselves in Bologna, where they continued their disputations till the occurrence
of their death. Nifo is another opponent of Pomponazzi. At the request of Leo
X. he writes his “De Anima”, which gives occasion to Pomponazzi to publish his “Defensorium
contra Niphum”. Nifo was also the author of “Dilucidarium Metaphyscarum
Disputationum.. Marta in his Apologia de Animae Immortalitate, Contarini in his
De Immortalitate Animae and several others strive to confute the doctrines of
Pomponazzi on the mortality of the soul. He is defended by several o fhispupils,and
particularly by Simon Porta in his De Aniina, de Spcciebus inteUigibiUbus. S.
Porta was also the author of De Humana Mente DispuUitU), De Merum Naluralium
Prindpiis, De Dolore ; A n homo bonus vel malus vokns fiat. The Lattr. m
Council condemned both those, who taught that the human soul
wasnotimmortal,andthosewhoassertedthatthesoulisoneandidenticalinallmen. It
condemned also the philosophers who affirmed that those opinions, although con
trary to faith, were philosophically true. It enjoined professors of philosophy
to refute all heretical doctrines to which they might allude, and prohibited
the clergy to studyphilosophyforacourselongerthanfiveyears.
Indeed,Averroismasearlyas the.thirteenth century had become hostile to the
doctrines of the Church, and itwas condemned by Stephen Tempier, archbishop of
Paris, who causeditsprinciplestobeembodied indistinctpropositions. Among
thesewerethe following:Quodiermoi.est/wologicisuntfundatiinfabulia.
QuodnUiilplussciturprop tersciretheologian. Quod Jobulmandfalsasuntinlege Christiana,sicutetinaliis.
QuodlexChristianaimpeditaddiscere. Quodsapicntesinundisuntphilosophitantum.
Notwithstanding the condemnation of the Church, those ideas seemed to have
taken hold of the philosophical mind of the age, and long continued to find
favor among teachersandstudents.
Therewere,however,philosopherswho,adheringtothedoo- trines of Averroes, strove
to blend them with the standard of an orthodox creed. Among them Marc-Antonio
Zimara in his Solutiones contradictionum in dicta Aristotelis et Aeerrois,
Antonio Posi di Monselice, Giulio Palamede, Bernandino Tomi-tanodiFeltreandseveralothersinthebeginningofthesixteenthcentury.
Mean time new translations and new editions of the works of Averroes, more
correct and more complete, appeared, due to the labors of G. B. Bagolini of
Verona, Marco Oddo, Giacobbe Mantino, Abramo de Balmes, Gian Francesco Buranaandothers.
Giacomo Zabarella, followedAverroesinhislecturesattheUniversityofPadua,
andfoundanopponentinGiovanniFrancescoPiccolomini;FedericoPendasiostroveto blend
Averroism with Alexandrianism, and Cesare Cremonini, the last repre sentative
of Averroism in Italy, gave new forms and new tendencies to the doctrines of
hismaster. HislecturesarepreservedinthelibraryofSt.MarcinVenice,andform
twenty-fourlargevolumes. Cf.PUtro Pomponacci ,Studi Storicisulla Scuola di Bologna
t di Padua by Fiorentino, P. Pomponacci by B. Podesta ; and P. Pomponacci e la
Scienza by Luigi Ferri, published in the Archivio Storico Italiano, Hellenic
Aristotelianism, not less than Averroism, was a step toward the emancipa
tionofthehumanintellect. ThesameobjectwasgreatlypromotedbytheSchoolof
Humanists, represented by L. Valla, Poliziano and L. Vives, and by the Platonic
revival Uirough the Academy of Florence, and the translations and the works of
Marsiglio Ficino; cf. Tiraboschi's Storia delta, Letteratura Italiarut;
Heeren's GeschkhU det Studiums der dassischen LUeratur seitdem WiederauJUben der
Wissensehaften, Renan's op. c. ; I. Burckhardt's Die Cultur der Renaissance in
It/Uien, Von Alfred von Reumont's Geschicht* der Stadl Home; I. Zeller's Italit
et In Renaissance, and the Edinburgh Review, Tiie Popes and Ute Italian
Humanists. TheHumanistrevival,properlyspeaking,commencedwiththeadventto Florence
of Manuel Chrysoloras; and it was promoted and illustrated by the researches
and the writings of many scholars, such as Poggio, Filelfo, Aretino, Valla,
Traversari, Vegio, and Tommaso di Sarzana, who afterwards became Pope under the
name of Nicholas V. The Council of Constance contained among its mem bers
several of the most learned humanists of the age. and for a time the Papal See
was at the head of the movement for the revival of the study of classical
literature- Prominent among the popes who promoted that revival were Nicholas
V., alreadj mentioned, Martin V., Eugene IV., Pius II., known under the name of
Enea Silvio Piccolomini, and Leo X. To this revival may also be referred the
origin of the Academical bodies and literary associations which formed so
characteristic a fea tureoftheliterarylifeofItalyofthattime.
Oftheseassociations,thosewhichheld their meetings in Florence, at the
Camaldolese Convent degli Angeli and at the
AugustineConventdelloSpirito,werethemostcelebrated. Thecontroversybetween the
Platonists and Aristotelians of the Age of the Renaissance is described in De
GeorgWs Dmtriba by Leo Allatius in Script. Bizant. ; in Boivin's QuereUe rtes
Phib- sophes du XV. Hidcle (M/'tnoires de literature de l'Academie des
Inscriptions, vol. II.), and in Gcnnadius and Pletho, Aristotdismus und
Platonismus in der Grieehixclien Kirehe, by W. Gass. The following are the
works of L. Thomeo, the Hellenist : Arist'itelis Stagirita par&i owe vacant
naturaUa, 1530. Dialogide Divinatione; Be Animorum ImmorUtlitate; De Tribus
Animorum Vehiculis; De Nominum Ineentione; De Precibus; De Com- pescendo
Luctii; De JEUitum. Moribus; De Belativorum Natura; De Animorum Essentia. Giovanni
Pico della Mirandola wrote De Ente et Una: Twelve book* against Judiciary
Astrokigy ; Ileptaplon, or a treatise on Mosaic Phileisophy; Rtgu!* Oirigentis
lwminem in pugna spirituali, and Nine hundred Theses on Dialectics, moral,
physical,andmathematicalsciences,whichhedefendedinpublicinRome. Hisne phew,
Giovanni Francesco Pico, held the same doctrines, and wrote in defence of the book
De Ente et Uno. Cf. Das System des John Pico von Mirandola by Dreydorff.
Cardano writes many works, which are published in ten volumes in quarto. The
principal ones are: “De Subttilitate librixx ; De Rermn Varielate. He is celebrated
for his Formula for solving equations of the third degree. He is also the author
of an autobiography. His doctrines are refuted by Scaligero in his Exereitalionesexotcrica.
And defended by himself in his Apologia.
Cf. Rixner's and Siber's Beitrage zur Geschiehte der Physiologie im weiteren
und engeren Sinne [Ltben nnd MeinungenberuhmterPhysiherim.). Cesalpinoia the
author of several works on physiology and medicine, PerifHJtetiearum Quasii'w*m
libriqvinque,and “DtemonumInvestigatin Peripatetiea. Valla writes Etegas-
tutrumlibrisex.DialeetiroyDixputatioiws, and DeVeraBono. He translates also the
Iliad, Herodotus, and Thucydides. Poliziano translates the Manual of Epictectus,
the Questions and Problems of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Aphorism of
Hippocrates, and the Sayings and the Deeds of Xenophon. He writes also
Parepistomenon ,in which he proposed to describe the tree of human knowledge.
Barbaro writes on Themistius, and on the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul. Tives
De Causis corruptarum artium, De Initiis, SectisetLaudibus Philosop7tia, id.;
De Anima et Vita. Of the numerous treatises of Vinci the greater part still remainin
manuscript in theAmbrosian library at Milan. They are written from right to
left, and in such manner that it is necessary to employ a glass in order to decipher
them. Extracts from his MSS. Were published in Paris by Yenturi. Xizolio writes
the Antibarbarusiseu de veris principiis et vera rntviM philosophandi contra
Pseudo-PhUosi/phos. Aconzio, Metliodus, scilicet recta investigandarum
tradendnrumque artium ac scientiarum ratio. Sadoleto, Phadrus, seu de laudibus
Philosophia. Erizzo, De W Istrumentu e Via incentrice degli Antichi. Mocenigo, De
eo quod est paradoxa. Piccolomini, “L'Istrumento della Filosofia”, Filo-
«"Jin luiturale, and Istituzione morale. According to Tiraboschi,
Piccolomini is the first philosopher who used ‘the volgare’ in his writings. He
is however, preceded by T. Golferani, who long before writes treatise in that
language, Della Memoria locale. Piccolomini, a nephew of Piccolomini, writes “DeRerumDefinUionibus;andUnicersade
MoribusPhilotophia. Here may also be mentioned Porta, the author of “De Humana
Physiognomia” andDeoc- eulti* Uterarum initio, seu De A rte animi sensi occulta
aliis significandi”; Brisiani Methodus Scientinram”; “Veneto, De Hdrmoaia
ifundi”; Con tarini, De Perfectione rerum, libri sex”; “Mazzoni, De TripUci
Hominum Vita”, “De Consensu Aristotelis et Ptatonis” and “In AristoteU*etPlatonis
unitersam Philosophiam Praludia”, and Valerii, “Opus aureum in quo omnia explicantur,
qua Scientiarum omnium parens Lullus tarn in Scientiarum arbore, quam arte
gcnerali, tradit. Telesio writes “De Rerum Natura juxta propria principia. Varii
de naturalibusrebuslibelli, “Dehisquainaerefiuntetdeterra-motibus. Quod aniirud
universum ab unica anima substantia gubernatur, adversus Oalenum. Cf. Hixter's and
Siber'sop.c.;alsoli.Telesio by Fiorentino. The method pursued by Telesio he
himself thus describes. “Sensum videlicet et nos et naturam, aliud praterea
nihil sequutis umus, qua summes ibiipsa concorsidem semper, et eo demagit modo ,a
tque iilemsem perojteratur. Of the origin of the world he says as follows. Liemotissimamsci
licet obscurissimamque rem et minime naturali ratione afferendam; cujus
cognitio omnis a sensu peiulet, et de quanihilomninoasserendumsitunqumn, quod volnonipso,
telipsiussimile perceperit sensu. Patrizi, a Croatian, writes “DiscussionesPeripatetica,
Nonade L'niccrsis Pliilosuphia, in qua Aristolelica methodo nun per m/itum, sed
per lucem ad primaincausamascenditur; DeliaPoeticaolaDecaistoriale. Cf.Rixner
and Siber op. cit. Of the works of Bruno some are written in the learned and
some in the vulgar. The latter are edited by Wagner, Leipzic, the former (only
in part) by Gefrorer, Stuttgart. The following is the complete catalogue of his
writings: “L’Area di N'ie”; “De Sphara”; “Dei Segni dei tempi”; “De Anima”;
“Claris magna”; “Dei Predieamenti di Dio”; “De Umbris Ideurnm”; “De Compendiosa
Architectura”; “II Candelajo, a Comedy, “Purgatorio dell’Inferno”; “Explicatio
tri- ginta S giU/irum, l a Cenadelle Ceneri, five dialogues; “Delta Causa,
Princi-fiio et Uno, De, flnfinito Unieerso e Mondi, Spaccio delta bestia
trionfante, Cabala dd cacallo Pegaseo con Fagyiunta de/F asino C'iUenico ;Degli
heroici Furori”; “Figuratio AristoteliciAuditusphys”; “DtalogiduodeFabriciimorden
tuSaUrnitanipropediritiaadinttntKmeadpeTftctam Cmmimttx impraiim. J$ri Brum
intomnium”; “De Lampade combirtaturia Lulliana”; “De Program a Lampade
cenatoria Logieorum, Acrotirmu*. teu ration** articuiorvat phyxiomm advertu*
Arisloteiieat, Oratio Valedictoria”; Yitemberga habiUi; De Sfxtrrum
ScruiinioetLampade eombinaVoria Raymondi Luilit.Centum ft Seragikt-i ArtieuU
adeem* hvju* tempettati* Mathtmatico» atque PhAutuplto*. Oratio «*»>
latoriahabitainobituPriridpUJuUiBrun*ricen*iumD»ci*.IS"*!*;DtItnagiuum.S§**-
rumetIdearumCompomtiane, De TriplieeMinimaetMemura, DeMonadt.
NutneroetFigura.1591;DererumImagmibut”; Libredew tette arti liberali”; “Liber
triginta Statuarum, Tempiam Mnemonidi”; “BeMuttipUciJfundiVita,1591(unpublishedandlost);DeSatmie
gettibu*(id.); De Prindpii* Yeriiid.); De Attrobigia {.id); De Magia pAgnca
;Itt Phytica ; Libretto di eongiurazioni ; Surmna terminorum metayJtysicorum,
pubL W H ; Artiftcium perorandi. pubL 1012. Cf. Bruno oder uber da* uaturliche.
and gi-ttlxit PrineipderDinge,bySchelling.1802.
AlsotheintroductionofT.Mami.iiitothe translation of Schelling's dialogue by the
Marchioness M. Florenzi Waddington ;Bax ter's and Siber's op. cit Bruckerii
Hutoria PhMonophia, 1744. L 6. Buhle, Commentat» deOrtuetProgre**u PantheimniindeaXenophane
Cohfoiaoprimaeju*authtrreunptt ad Spinozam ; Nioeron, M'moiret pour »ercir a
Chiatoire de* hmmnt* iiitutre* ; C. Stepo. Jordan, Di*qui*itio de Jordano Bruno
Nolano ; Guil. F. Christiani. De Studii* Jordan
Brunimathematicis;Kindervater,BeitrdgeturLebentgetchichUde*Jord.Bruno. D.
Lessman. Giordano Bruno in Cisalpinische Blatter. Tom. 1 ; Fullebom. BeitrAye
tur G e*chiehte der PhUmoph., F. L Clemens, Giordano Bruno und Nicheiae* t'/n
Cusa, 1847; John A. Scartazzini, Ein BluUeuge de* Wittens, 18(37; Ch. Bar-
tholmes, Jordano Bruno, George Henry Lewes, History of Philosophy, laBS:
Sigwart. Spinoza's neuentdeckter fractal von Gott, A. Debs, Jordani Bruni Vila
et Scripta, Lange, Geochiehtc de* Materialumus, 1800 ; Donienico Berti, Vita di
Bruno, which contains the proceedings of Bruno's trial before the Inquisition
of Venice, recently discovered in the archives of that city., Tommaso
Campanella's principal works are as follows: L'nicersm PhilnsoyJiiaten Metaphyxicarum
Rerum juxta propria dogmata, parte* Ire*, Philoaephia teia&u demonttrata et
in octo disputation** di*tincta, advertu* eo* qui propria arbitral*, non autem
semata duce natura, philosophati aunt, 1591 ; Beak* Philosopher eptiegutit*
parte* quatuor, hoc e*t de rerum natura, hominum, moribus, etc. His Ciiitas
Soli*, akindofUtopianromance,formspartofthelatterwork. Delibruproprii*etrecta ratione
studendi Syntagma, De Seiuu rerum et Mugia. De GentSesimo
nonretinendo;Atheismu»triumphatu*;ApologiaproGalihro;DeMonarchU\Ui*pa*i- cti ;
Disputationum in quatuor partes PhUosophia BeaU* libri quatuor ; several philo
sophicalpoemsinLatinandItalian. Cf.Baldachini,VitaeFilosofiadiT.Campaneila, A.
D. Ancona. Introduction to the new edition of Campanella's works, Turin, 1854;S.Centofanti,anessaypublishedintheArchirioStoricoItaliano;
Spaventa and Mamiani, op. cit. ; also Sigwart, Tit. Campaneila und Heine
poUtischen Idem, in the Preuss. Jahrb., Mile. Louise Colet, QSucrechoutie de
CampaneBa, Pierre Leroux, Encyclopedic nouveUe, and G. Ferrari, Corso sugli Scrittvri
pdititi Italiani. L. Vanini is the author of Amphitheatrum JEternai
Procidentia; De edau- randi* Natura;, Regina Detrque morlalium, arcatti», Dt
Vera Sapientia; Phytic- Magicum;DeContemneiidaGloria;ApolngiiiproMotaieaetOirirtianalege.
Cf.W.D. Fuhrmann, Leben und Schicksale, Character und Meinungeii de* L. Yaumi, Emue
Waisse. L. Vantili, sa vie, sa doctrine, et sa mort ; Bxtrait dea
mcmoires de P Aoadémie dea Sciences de Toulose. Arpe, Bayle, and Voltaire in
several of their works undertake thedefenceofVanirò.
Cf.alsoLaVieetlesSentimentsdeL.VanirtibyDavidDurand,and Rousselot CEuvres P/Ulosophiques
de L. Vanini. Of all the editions of Machiavelli's works, that of Florence, in 8
vols. 8vo. is the fullest and thebest.
AneweditionhasbeenrecentlypublishedinFlorencepartlyby Lemmonier and partly by G.Barbera.
Ofhiswritings,11Principe,writteninloll, Discorsi sulle Decite di T. Livio, and
Le Storie Fiorentine are the most celebrated. Cf. Gesohichte der Staatswissensc/uiften,
by B. von Mohi, Banke's zar Kritik neuerer Gesc/iichts/icreiber, 1834 ;
Macaulay's Essay on Machiavelli in his Critical and Historical Essays. Ferrari
in his Corso sugli Scrittoripolitici Italiani, and Pasquale St.Mancini, Della Dottrinapolitica
del Machiavelli. See also the life of Machiavelli published in the Florentine edition
of his works. The principal work of Guicciardini
is “La Storia d'Italia”, extendingfrom1490to Its best edition is that of Pisa in
10 vols. An edition of his unpublished works appeared in Florence,under the editorship
of G.Canestrini. This valuable publication contains “Le Considerazioni intorno al
Discorso di Nicolò Macliiavélli sopra la prima Deca di T.Livio; I Ricordi politici
e civili; I Discorsi politici; Il Trattato ei Discorsi sulla Costtuziome della
Republica Fiorentina e sulla riforma del suo governo; Im Storia di Firenze; Scelta
dalla corrispondenza ufficiile tenuta dal Guicciardinidurante le diverse sue
Legazioni ; and il Carteggio, or his correspondence with Princes, Popes,
Cardinals, Ambassadors, and Statesmen of his time.
Cf.Banke'sop.cit.;Thiers'Ilis- totre du Consulat et de l'Empire — Avertissement
; the Preface by Canestrini to the Opere inedite di Guicciardini, and Storia
della Letteratura Italiana, by Guidici. For the works of Savonarola, Sarpi,
Giannoti, Parata, and Bottero, cf. Ferrari, op.cit. Savonarola is the author of
Compendium totius philosopliimtarnnaturalisquammoralit, and of Trattato circa il
reggimento e il governo della città di Firenze; cf .Storia di Savonarola by
Villari. Sarpi writes in the volgare “La Storia del Concilio Tridentino”, a
work which has been translated into the learned, also, “Opinione come debba
governarsi la Republica Veneziana”, and many other works, of which a full
catalogue may be found in the Biografia di FraPaoloSarpi bhyk.Bianchi-Giovini. The
principal writings of Giannoti are “Della Republica di Venezia”; “Della
RepubUca Fiorentina”, and Opuscoli ; of Parata, Perfezione della vita politica,
Discorsi politici. Of G. Bottero, La Ragione di Stato; Republica Veneziana;
Cause della grandezza delle Città, and I Principi. The sun of philosophy in
Italy rose with Galilei, a native o fPisa,
and the chief of the School, which a century before had begun with Vinci. At an
early age, Galileo is a professor at Pisa and Padua, and afterwards holds the
office of mathematician and philosopher at the Court of Tuscany. He is the true
founder of inductive philosophy. Regarding nature as the great object of
science, the autograph book of the Creator, Galilei holds that it cannot be
read by authority, nor by any process a priori, but only by means of
observation, experiment, measure and calculation. While, to aid his
investigations, he invents, the hydrostatic balance, the proportional compass,
the thermoseope, the compound microscope and the telescope, he borrows from
mathematics the formulas, the analyses, the transformation and development of his
discoveries. Applying this method to terrestrial and celestial mechanics, he
makes important discoveries in every branch of physical science, and places th eheliocentric
system on a scientific basis. Having thus given the death-blow to Scholasticism,
he is arrested by the Inquisition, forced publicly to recant, and to remain
under its surveillance for the rest of his life. Speaking of the comparative merit
of Galilei and Bacon, Brewster says that had Bacon never lived, the student of
nature would have found in the writings and the works of Galilei not only the
principles of inductive philosophy, but also its practical application to the
noblest efforts of invention and discovery. The eminent scientist Biot, while asserting
the uselesness of the Baconian method, insists upon the permanent validity of
that of Galilei; and Trouessart declares that in science we are all his pupils.
Galileo founds a School honoured by the names of Torricelli, Viviani, Castelli,
Borelli, Cavalieri, Malpighi, Spallaiizani, Morgani, Galvani, Volta and other
eminent scientific men, who, following his method successively, take the lead in
the scientific progress of Europe. It is due to this activity in science, that the
Italian soul is enabled to resist the oppressive influence of the political and
ecclesiastical servitude, under which Italy labored, and it is through the
example of Galilei, that physical science never becomes so predominant, as to
exclude the stndy of philosophy. Throughout hi sworks he loses no occasion to
insist n efficient and final causes, and on the infinite difference which
exists between the divine and the human intelligence; and while he deprecates
the scepticism, which denies the legitimate power of reason, Galieli rejects
pure rationalism, which knows no limit for human knowledge. Galilei asserts that
beyond all secondcauses, there must necessarily exist a First Cause, whose
omnipotent and allwise creative energy alone can explain the origin of the
world ; and he professes faith in that Divine Providence which embraces the
universe as well as its atoms, like the sun which diffuses light and heat
through all our planetary system, while at the same time it matures a grain of
wheat as perfectly, as if that were the only object of its action. The
works of Galilei have een published in a complete edition, 10 vols., under the editorship
of Alberi. “Le Opere dì Galileo Galilei, prima edizione completa,condutta sugli
autentici Manoscritti Palatini,Firenze. This edition contains the life of
Galilei ,written by hi spupil Viviani. Among his biographers and critics may be
mentioned Ghilini in his Teatro di uomini letterati; Rossi in his Pinacotheca Nustnum
Virorum, Frisi, Eloggo di Galileo, which is inserted in the Supplement de L’Encyclopedic
de Diderot and D’Alembert; Andres in his history of literature and in Saggio delli
Filosofia di Galileo; Brenna, “Vita di
Galileo”, inserted in the work of Fabroni, “Vita Italorum doctrina excettentium
qui Saculis xvii. et xviii. Jloruerunt; Tozzetti, in his Notizie degli
aggrandimenti dette Scienze fisiche in Toscana, in which he publishes the life
of Galileo written by Gherardini, his contemporary; C. Nelli, Vita e Commercio
letterario di Galileo; Bailly, Histoire de l’Astronomie moderne; G. Tiraboschi,
Storia della Letteratura Italiana; Montucla, Histoire des Mathematiques, Libes,
Histoire Philosophique de Progrès de la Physique, IL T. Biot, Artide Galileo in
Biographie universelle, published by Michaud; Barbier in his Examen critique et
complement des Dictionnaires hlistoriques les plus repandus; Brougham, Life of
Galileo; Salii, in his continuation of
the Histoire Uttiraire d'Italie de Ginguenò; Cuvier,
Histoire des Sciences Naturelles; Libri, “Histoire des Sciences Mathematiques
en Italie”; Brewster, Lines of Copernicus and Galileo (Edinburgh Review), Life of
Newton,and the Martyrs of Science; Boncompagni, Intorno adalcani avanzamenti delibi
Fisica in Italia; Wbewell, History of the Inductive Sciences”; Marini, Galileoe
VInquisizione, D.Bezzi, in the Atti dell'Academia Pontificia dei nuovi Lincei; A.
de Keumont, Galilei und Rom, published in his “Beitrage zur lUiUeniscJten
Geschicltte; Chasles, Galileo Galilei, sa Vie, son Proeès et ses Contemporains,
Madden, Galileo and the Inquisition; Bertrand, in his Les Fon diteurs de l’Astronomie
moderne; Trouessart, in his “Galilee, sa Missionscientìfique, saVie ets
onProeès”; Panhappe, “Galilee, sa Vie, ses Découvertes et ses Travaux”; Epinois,
Galilee, son Proeès, sa Condam'nation, d'après des document» inédits, in the
Revue des Sciences Historiques; Rallaye, Galilee, la Science et l’Eglise, in
the Revue du Monde Catholique; Jagemann, “Geschichte des Lebens und der Schriften
des Galileo Galilei”; Drinkwater, “Life of Galileo”; Selmi, “Nel Trecentesimo
Natalizio di Galileo in Pisa”; Feliciani, “Filosofia Positiva di Galileo”; Wohlwill,
Der Inquisition — Process des G. G.”; “Galileo and his Condemnation,Rambler(Lond.),
Casc of Galileo, Dublin Rerietp.specially worthy of consultation; The Martyrdom
of Galileo, North British Review, in reply
to Biot in the Joural des Savants; Castelnnu, Vie, Trataux. Proeès, etc. de Galil,
Paris; Martin, “Galilee et les Droits de la Science; “Galileo's ''System of the
World " was translated into English by Thomas Salusbury, fol. Lond. --. Giovanni
Battista Vico, as the founder of the philosophy of history, stands foremost
among the philosophers of modern times. He was born in Naples, and early
devotes himself to the study of law, philosophy, philology and history. Living in
an age when the philosophy of Descartes had become popular in Italy, Vico
attacks the psychological method as the exclusive process of philosophic
investigation, maintains the validity of common sense, and upholds the importance
of historic and philological studies. Vico’s writings, “De Ratione Studiorum,”
“De Antiquissiiiia Italorum Sapientia”, and “Jus Universale”, containing his “De
Una et Universi Juris Principio et Fine”; his “De ConstantiaPkUosophiceandDC
Constantia-Pht- luloyias, form a sort of introduction to his “Priiicipii di
Scienza Nuova”, in which he develops his theoryof the historyof civilization.
Of this work, twice re-written, he publishes two editions. In his introductory
writings, Vico discusses the question of method, particularly as applied to
moral and juridical science, and strives to evolve a metaphysical theory from
the analysis of the roots of the language of the Ancient Romans and from the
general study of philology, which, according to him, embraces all the facts of historical
experience. Knowledge consists essentially in a relation of causality between the
knowing principle and the knowable. Since the mind can only know that which it can
produce through its own activity; that is to say, the mind can only know those
data of experience, which it can convert into truth by aprocess of reason. This
conversion, in which, according to Vico, lies the principle of all science, neither
the psychological method, nor the geometrical process introduced by Descartes,
can effect. It can only be produced by a method in which certainty and truth,
authority and reason, philology and philosophy become united and harmonized, so
as to embrace the necessary principles of nature as well as the contingent
productions of human activity. To establish a fact which may be converted into
truth, to find a principle which has its basis in experience and common sense, yet
is in harmony with the eternal order of the universe, is the problem of
metaphysics. This factorthis principle, according to Vico, is to be found in God
alone. the only true “ens” who, being an infinite cause, contains in himself all facts and allintelligence. Thus DivineProvidence,
acting inu» mysterious way, but through the spontaneous development of human
activity, is the basis of all history, which reveals itself in the evolution of
language, mythology, religion, law and government. Whether we accept the mosaic
account, which points ont a state of de-gradation as a consequence of the fall,
or admit a primitive condition of barbarism, it is certain that, at a remote
period, the human race is in a condition far above that of the brutes. Gigantic
in stature, their bodies covered with hair, men roam through the forests
which covered th eearth, without family, language, laws, or gods.
Tetwithin them, though latent, there are the principles of humanity, sympathy,
sociability, pudor, honour and liberty, which, call forth by extraordinary
events, gradually raise them from animalityto the first condition of human beings.
This awakening is caused by terrific phenomena of nature, which, stimulating
the mind to consciousness, brought a jxirtion of mankind under the influence of
a super-natural power, and induces a number of individuals to take refuge in
caverns and to commence the formation of families. From thi spoint the dynamic
process of civilization is subject to certain laws, which preside over the development
of all history. Prominent among these laws is that which produces the universal
belief of all people in the great principles of religion, marriage and burial,
which from the first beome the true./ter/tfra humanitatix. This lawm anifests itself
in all the progress of civilization, which is divided into three different
ages: the divine, the heroic, and the human. The divine age is the first stage
of civilization, when the chief of the family is king and priest, ruling over his
subordinates as the delegate of heaven. It is the age of the origin of
language, rude and concrete, the age of sacred or hieroglyphic characters, of
right identified with the will of the gods, and of a jurisprudence identified
with theology, the age of idolatry, divination, mythology, auspices and oracles.
The heroic age has its birth when that portion of mankind which remains in a
savage condition, seeks refuge from the violence of their companions, still
more degraded than themselves, in the homes of those families already
established, and at the feet of the altars erected on the heights. The newcomers
are admitted into the family on condition of becoming servants of their
defenders, who now claim to be the off-spring of the gods,and heroes by right of
birth and power. Thus the primitive families are the rulers of the community,
enjoying rights which are not accorded to slaves -- such as the solemnity of
marriage, the possession of land, etc. Gradually the number of slaves
increases. They become restless under the domination of their masters, who
after long struggle are finally constrained to grant them some of their rights.
Hence the origin of agrarian laws, patronages, serfs, patricians, vas sals, and
plebeians, and with them the rise of cities, subject to aristocratic government.
Meantime language, losing some of its primitive rudeness, becomes imaginative
and mythologic; its characters become more fantastic and universal. Law is no
longer from the gods, but from the heroes, though still identified with
force; and the duel and retaliation take place of sacerdotal justice. In this period
the predominance of imagination is so great that general types become
represented bv proper names, and accepted as historical characters. Thus the
inventive genius of Egyptians finds a personification in Hermes, the heroism of
ancient Greece in Hercules, and its poetry in Homer. So Romulus and the other
kings of ancient Rome, in whom periods of civilization have been personified,
descend to posterity as historical characters. With the gradual development of
democracy the human age appears: and with it aristocratic or democratic
republics and modern monarchies, established more or less on the equality of the
people. Language becomes more and more positive, and prose and poetry more
natural and more philosophic. Religion loses a great part of its mythologic
alcharacter, and tends to morality and to refinement. Civil and political
equality is extended, natural right is considered superior to civil legality, and private right becomes distinguished from public.
In the pefection o fdemocratic governments there is only one exception to
equality, and that is wealth. But wealth is the cause of corruption in those
who possessit, and of envy and passion in those who desireit. Hence abuse of
power, discords, insurrections, and civil wars, from which monarchy often
arises as a guarantee of public order. Monarchy failing, the country which is
rent by corruption and anarchy will finally fall by conquest, or, in the
absence of conquest, it will relapse into a state of barbarism equal to that
which preceded the divine age, with the only difference that the first was a
barbarism of nature, the second will be a barbarism of reflection. The one is
ferocious and beastly, the other is perfidious and base. Only after a longp eriodof
decadence will that nation again begin the course of civilization, passing
through its different stages, liable again to fall and rise, thus revolving in
an indefinite series of “corsi” and “ricorsi”,
which express the static and the dynamic conditions of human society.
This theory is evolved by Vico from the history of Rome, making that the
typical history of mankind, whose principal features are repeated in the histories
of all nations. Thus the same law manifests itself again after the fall of the
Roman empire, when in the dark, the middle ages, and modern times, the divine,
.the heroic, and the human ages reappear. Civilization therefore in a given
people, that is to say, their progress from brutal force to right, from
authority to reason, and from selfishness to justice, is not the work of
legislators and philosophers, not the result of communication with other communities;
but it is the spontaneous growth of their own activity working under the
influence of exterior circumstances. The primitive elements of civilization are
found only in the structure of their language and mythology, their poetry and traditions.
The "Scienza Nuova," according to Vico, may he regarded as a natural
theology, for it shows the permanent action of Divine Providence in human
history; and as a philosophy, for it establishes the basis of the origin and
the development of human society, points out the origin of its fundamental
ideas, and distinguishes the real from the mythical in the history of nations.
This distinction, so far as it regards the history of Rome, is fully confirmed
by the more recent researches of Niebuhr, Schwegler, and Mommsen. The treatise
of Vico may also be regarded as the natural history of mankind and a philosophy
of law, for it gives the principles of ail historical development and the genesis
of the idea of natural right, as deduced from the common wisdom of the people.
The complete edition of the works of Vico in 6vols, was published in Milan, under
the editorship of Ferrari, the author of “La Mente di G. B. Vico”, an important
work on theNewScience.Giudice publishes “Scritti inediti diVico.” Vico's
philosophy gives birth to aconsiderablebranchof literature containing writings
of criticism and exegesis. Among his contemporary opponents may be mentioned Romano
in his “Difesa Storiai delleLeggi GrecJte venule a Roma, contro topinione
moderna del Signirr Vico”, and in his Lettere ml terzoprindpio della Scienza
Nvoua, in which he defends the Greek origin of the laws contained in the XII Tables,
and opposes the theory on spontaneous formation of language and civilization.
He is also the author of ScienzadelDirittoPublico, of the Origine della Societa
and other works, in which he holds doctrines antagonistic to those of Vico.
Finetti in his “De Principiis Juris Naturae et Gentium ad cerisuillobbeniuin,
Pufendorfium, Woljium et alios, and in his Sommario dell’ opposizione dd
sistema ferino,elafalsitddditstatoferineattacks thedoctrinesofVicoon
theoriginofciviliza tion. HisdefensewasundertakenbyEmanuele Duniinhis
Origineeprogramdelcittadino, edelgovemo civile di Roma, 1703, and in his La
Scienza del Costume oimia Sistema del Diritlo Universale; also by Ganassoni in
his Memoria in difesa del Prindpio del VicosiilTe/riginedettexn. Tatole.;and
Rogadei in his DeWanticostatoeldpopo L’ItaliaCisliberina. Among Vico's followers
and imitators may bementioned Stellini, in his “De Ortu et Progreami morum” and
in his “Ethica”; Pagano, the patriot who suffers death for his adhesion to the
Partbenopean Republic, in his Suggi politici d d Prindpii, Progresso e Decadenza
dtlle Soctetda”; Cuoco, in his “Platone in Italia”; Filaugeri. in his “Scienza
della legislazione”, who adopts many of the principles of Vico, and particularly
that of the original incommunicability of primitive myths among different
people, and spontaneous origin of historical manifestations; and Delfico who, in his “Ricerclie mil rero carattere della
juriurisprudema Romana e de' suoi outtori exaggerates the principies of Vico and
falls into a system of historical scepticism. Foscolo in his “Discorso dflC
Origine e deS1 Uffizio delta Lettemtura adopted the doctrines of Vico on the
origin and the nature of language as well as society and civil government. Janelli,
one of the most eminent critics of Vico, in his SuUa Naturti e NeoettitA dfUa
ijcienza deUe Cose e delle Storie wnane gives the critical analysis of the
historical Synthesis, as expressed in the Scienza Nuova. of the original and
spontaneous growth of different civilizations. Jamelli introduces the three ages
of the senses, imagination and reason in history, corresponding to the divine,
heroic, and human ages of Vico, and characterises the last age by the
development of Telo&ifoi and Etiolngia, the former the science of finalities,
the latter that of causalities. Romagnosi I nhis OmerrasioM tnti Scitiaii
Nuota, and other works, examines the doctrines of Vico from a critical point of
view, and while he accepts some of his principles he rejects his fundamental
idea of the spontaneity of the growth of civilization, and holds that this is always
the result of a derivation from another people. LuigiTontiinhisSagyiv Htpra, la
Scienza Nvota, makes a philosophical exposition of the doctrines of Vico, and
dwells particularly on the relations existing between Vico, Machiavelli, Gravina.
Herder, and other jurists and philosophers. Predari undertakes the edition of
Vico's works, but he published only one volume, in which he gives an historical
analysis of Vico’s mind in relation to the science of civilization. Cattaneo in
his Vico e F Ittiliti in the PoHtecnito, holds that Vico succeeds in fusing together
Machiavelli's doctrine of the supremacy of self-interest with that of the supremacy
of reason, as denied by Grotius. Tommaso, in Studi critiei maintains that the
idea of progress is apparent in the Scienza Nuova, in which, although the
course of history is fixed within the limits of a certain orbit determined by
the law of the Corsi and Ricorsi, this orbit is not limited, and may become
wider and wider in the progress of time. Mamiani, in his “RinnocamentodettaFtiotnjiaantteaIaliaana”,
adopts the criterium of the conversion of fact into truth as expressed by Vico,
his doctrine on the unity, identity, and continuity of force, the spontaneity
of motion as belonging to a principle inherent to every atom independently of
the mass, and the idea of the indivisible, indefinite, and immovable, as
evolved from phenomenical reality. And so Rosmini and Gioberti have in their
various works endeavoured to bring hie authority to the support of their
theories, while Centofanti, in his “Formda logic* dellii Fifvsojia (IMa Storia”
follows Vico in considering historical reality in its ideal genesis, in
ascending from experience to the philosophical idea of history, and in connecting
under one principle the cosmic, psychologic, and social orders. Carmignani, in
his 8t/ma deW Oriffini e dei Progressi della Filosofia del Diritto”, attributes
to Vico the origin of a true philosophy of jurisprudence, and Amari in his “Critica
di una Scienza delle legislazioni comparate”, gives a complete analysis of
Vico’s doctrines having relation to the philosophical and historical department
of comparative legislation. Carlo, in his FUosofiatetondoiPrindpUdiVico and La
Mente (ClUttia e O. B. Vico; Fornari, in his Delhi Vita di Cntto; Zocchi, in his Studi sopra T. Jfenwi; Galasso,
in his Del Stulema Hegdiano, and Del Metoda Storico del Vico; Spaventa,
Florentine, Vera, Bertrai, Conti, Franchi, Mazzarella and others either adopt
some of the fundamental principles of Vico, or subject his doctrine to critical
examination. Siciliani, in his Sid Rinnotamento della FUo»ofin ponitiva in
Italia”, having examined all the principal systems of philosophy, rejects them
all, and contends that the reconciliation of modern positivism with ancient
idealism can only be effected throuch the doctrines of Vico, from which he
strives to develop not only a historical philosophy, but a logical and metaphysical
doctrine. Siciliani isa lsotheauthor of “Dante, Galileo e Vico”. Other works of
criticism on the philosophy of Vico are Colangelo's “Consideraaoni sulla
Scienza Nuova”, Cesare's “Kmimario dcUe dottrine del Vico”; Gallotti's
Principii di una Scderna Nuova di G. B. Vico”; P. Jola'B Studio snl Vico”; Mancini's
“Intorno alia Fihsofia d d Diritto”, Valle's Stiggi nulla Scienza ddla Storia”;
Rocco's Elogio Storico di G. B. Vico”; Reggio's “Introduzioneai1rincipiidclleUinaneSucieta”;
Marini'sG. B.Victo; Giani'sDeW UnicoPrincipioedell'UnicoFine ddV Universo
Diritto”; Fagnani's “Delia necessitd e dcW uso ddla Ditinazione UntificatadallaScienzaNuova
diVico”; Fontana's/>(FiUisofiuneJlaStoria”; J. Merletta's “G. B. Vico e la sapienza
antichissima degli Italiani”; Luca’s “Saggio ontiilogico suVe dottrine deW
Aquinute e del Vico”; Cantoni's G. B. Vico”. In Germany the philosophy of Vico
finds interpreters in Savigny in his NtebuJir, E. Gans in his preface to UegeVs
Philosophy of HiMory ; Jacoby in his Cantoni uber Vico”; Wolff in the Museum
dcr Alterthumswissenschaft”; OrelliinhisVicoandNiebuhr; Weber, thetranslatoroftheScienzaNuova;
Giischel in the Zerstreute Blatter; Cauer in the Germanic Museum, and C.EiMiiller.
thetranslatorofVico' s minor works. In France, Michelethas interprets Vico’s
doctrines in his Principe-i de la Philosophie de CHi*toirc”; Ballanche, in his
Prolegomenc* din Palingenesie Sociale, and in his Orphee”; Cousin, in his
Introduction a F'ITM'irt'delu Philosophic”; Lerminior." in his
Introduction generate a Fllistoire dn Droit; Jouffroy, in his Melanges
Philosophiques; Bouchez, in his Introduction, dla Science deVllistoire; the
anonymous author of la Science Nouvelle par Vico”; Franck, in the Journal de*
Savants”; Ferron, in his Theorie du Progres”; Vacherot, in his Science et
Conscience”; Laurent, in his Etudes sur l’histoiredeVHumanite”; Barthlomess, in
the Dictionnuire des Sciences PhUosophiques; Boullier in his Histoire dela
Philosophic Cartesienne”; Renouvier,in his “Manuel de la Philosophie Moderne” and
Comte in his letter to Mill. Cf. Littr6,A. C'ornteetla.PhilosophicPositire. Among
the English philosophers, Mill has given attention to the historical principles
of Vico in his “System of Logic”. Cf.Vico's "New Science and Ancient Wisdom
of Italians," in Foreign Review, Lond., Foreign Quarterly Review. The
philosophic revolution which began with Descartes in France, soon extends toItaly
and manifests itself in the two forms of psychologism (or idealism), and sensualism
-- represented by Descartes and Malebranehe on the one side, and by Locke and
Condillac on the other. Among the followers of the Psychologism of Descartes are
Cornelio, who in his “Progymnaxmata Physica” tries to blend the doctrines of Telesio
with the method of the French philosopher; Fardella, the friend of Amauld and
Malebranehe, and the author of Universe PhUosopliijt Systcma”; Doria, who in his “Difesa ddla Metafisica”
opposes the doctrines of Locke; Grimaldi, who in his Discussioni htoriclie, TetHugiche
e Filosofiehe” vindicates the Cartesian philosophy against the attacks of the
Aristotelians of his age; and Brescia, the authorof “Philosophia Mentis methodice
tractate”. Among the opponents of Aristotle may also be mentioned Basso,PluUmtphias
Natural!* adcersw Aristotelem, libri 12. The following writers belong to
the school of Descartes through the affinities with Malebranche: Gerdil who
held to the vision of ideas in the divine mind, and opposed the Sensualism of Locke,
the Ontologism of Wolff, and the Pantheism of Spinoza. Among his numerous works
the following relate to philosophical subjects: “L immateriality de Cdute
dimmlti coidre Locke”; “Defense du sentiment du P. Malebranclie— sur la nature
et Corigine da idee*contreteaamendeMr.Locke; “Anti-Emile,or,Reflexion*svrlatlteorieetlapra
tique tie l’education contre les principes de Rousseau”; Traite de* combat*
singnliert ; Discours philosoplugue* nur Vhomme ; Dintostrazione maternaltea
eontro CeferMtd deBa materia ; Del? inflnito Assoluto consulerato iitUa
grandezza; Esame e coitfuUtzi-me dti principii deUa FHosofla WiAfiana; Introdtmone
alio Studio deUa Religion. Rossi, contemporary of Vico, and author of “La
Meitte Sorrana “; Mieeli. who strives to reconcile Christian idealism with the Eleatic
doctrines, and whose system may be found in Gioanni's work, “Mieeii. ovcerotldCEnte
I'noeRente; Palmieri, who defends Christianity against the materialistic doctrines
of Frerct and oother French writers; Carli, who in his “Elemesti di Morale”
attempts a philosophical confutation of Rousseau on the inequality of men; Falletti,who,
in his work on Condillac, establishes the principle of knowledge on the idea of
being as evolved from the ego; Draghetti, who founds his Psychology on moral
instinct and reason ; Torelli, in his treatise “De Sihtl/t”; Chiavacci in his
Saggio sulla grandezza di Dio”; Orazi in his” MeJodo mi tersnle di filosofare”;
Pini, author of the “Protologia”, in which he establishes all principles of
knowledge and morality on the unity of the Divine Nature; Giovenale, who in his
“Soli* intdligentitr, cttinon nieeedit itox. lumen iiideficiensac
inextinguibile Muminan* omrtem hominem” seeks in divine illumination the source
of all science; Tellino, who in his “These*PhUosojiltiea1deInflnito.1(W1”
ascends to the idea of the Infinite as the principle of all knowledge; a
principle which was also regarded as transcendental by Pasqualigo in “Disputationes
Met'tphgxicae”. By M.TerralavoroinMetaphysial; and by Boschovich in
“SullaLeggediCo&- tinuitd”. While these philosophers are characterized by a
Platonic tendency, the following professed themselves disciples of Aristotle:
Liccto in his “De Ortu Aninur IJtiman^r”; “DeInteMectuAgente”; DeLurerni*aittiqitorninreeonditi*;DeAi,mili*a»ti-
qui* ; Apologia pro AristoUU. Athei-tini aceunato; De, Pittate Aristotetis”;
Polizzo in his “Philosophical Disputationes”; Andrioli, in his “Plttlosophia
Erperimentale”; Langhi, in his “Xoriasima Philvsophia”; Jlorandi. in his Curm*
Ph&*np/ua”; Maso. in his Theatrum Pldlosophicum”; Scrbelloni. in his Phibtnphii”;
Spinola, in his “Korissima Plttlosophia”; Ambrosini, in his Method**
ineentiea”; Benedetti, in his Plttlosophia Peripatetica”; Rocco. in his
Esercitnzionifi'.otofiche”. As Empiricists more independent of scholastic influence
may be mentioned Borelli, the eminent scientist, in his great work, “De Motu
Animalium”, in which animal mechanics are established on scientific principles;
Magalotti, in his Lettere famigliari against Atheism”; Grandi, author of a
Logic in which he opposed Scholasticism, and of “Diacresi”, in which he refutes
the doctrines of Ceva, as expressed in his “PlttlosophiaNovo-Antigua”, a workwritten
in verse, intended as a confutation of Gassendi, Descartes, and Copernicus;
Severino, who in his “Pawofta”stives to investigate nature through the study of
ancient monuments. Magneno precedes Gassendi in the restoration oft he
atomistic philosophy in his “Democritus reviciscens” and in “De Re*tauraU'oite
Phitotopki Z>em. Epieurea”; Ciassi anticipates Leibnitz in the doctrine of
Monades, in his “Tntorno (die Forte Vice; and Algarotti calls the attention of
his contemporaries to the works of Newton in his “Netctonuinismo”. The philosophy
of Wolff finds an exponent in the author of “InstUutiones Pliilosophm
Wo'.fianae” and the doctrine of Leibnitz is interpreted in the works of
Trevisani and Cattanco. Meanwhile, the questions as to the soul of animals, and
the union of the soul with the body, are treated by Cadonici in “Dissertazionc
epistolare”, Fassoni, in “Libro suW anima delle bestie”, L. Barbini, “Nuoro
Sistema intorno all’anima dei bruti”, Sbaragli, “Enteleehia, sen anima
sensitiva brutorum demonstrate contra Cartesium”; Pino, “Trattato sojyra
l’essenza dtW anima ihlle bestie”, Vitale, “L'unione dell’anima col corpo”, Papi,
“Sull’anima delle bestie”, Monti, “Anima brutorum”; Corte, “Sul tempo in cui si
injbnde Vanima nelfeto. Empiricism is greatly extended. At first it remains independent,
but it soon falls under the influence of the doctrines of Locke and Condillac.
Among the early Empiricists of that age may bementioned Martini, “Logica, seu
Ars coffutandi”, Fuginelli, “Prina'pia Metaphysial gcomctriai meUiodopertractata”,
Visconti, “Theses ex Universa Philosophia”; Sanctis, “Delle passioni e rizi
drWintelktto”; Fromond, “NonaIntroductioadPMosophiam”, Spedalieri, Dei Diritti
dtW Homo”, Zanotti, philosophical works, Longano, Dell’uomo naturale”; Boccalossi,
“Sulla-liiflessione”, Amati, EtMca ex tem pore conciitnata”, Verri,
philosophical works, Baldinotti, “Tentaminum Mttap/iyskorum, Libri 3, and “De
Recta Humana! Mentis Institutione”, Tettoni, “Priacipii del Diritto naturale”, Capocasale,
“Cursxs PhUosophicus”, Bianchi, “Meditozioni”, Muratori, the author of the Annals
of Italy, and of DdleForzc deWIntiiulimento, DeliaForzadeUaFantasia,and DaFilosofiaMorale”;
Gravina, the author of De Origine Juris Ronnini, and La Ragione poetica”. The influence of the
sensualistic school of France is chiefly introduced into Italy through the
translation of Locke's "Essay on tlut Understanding" by Soave (il
modo delle parole, la parola e segno dell’idea, e l’idea e segno della cosa), a
member of the Order of the Somaschi, and the author of “Instituzioni di Logica,
Metafisica e Morale” and of many other philosophical works, all moulded on the
philosophy o fLocke. His “Instituzioni” have long been the text-book of philosophical
instruction in the Colleges of Northern Italy. The translations of the writings
of Bonnet, D’Alembert, Rousseau, Helvetius, Holbach, De Tracy, and, above all,
the philosophical works of Condillac give a powerful impulse to the doctrine,
and the philosophy of the senses became predominant in the universities and
colleges of the Peninsula. The personal influence of Condillac, who resided at theCourt
of Parma as tutor to a Bourbon prince, greatly contributes to this result. The
philosophical text-books written by Mako and Storcheneau also greatly added to
the propagation of Sensualism in the Italian Schools. Among the representatives
of this philosophy may be mentioned, besides Soave already named Bini, “Lettere
Teologiehe e MeUifisicliche”, Pavesi, “Elementa Logices, Meta- physicei, et
Phil. Moralis”, F. Barkovich, SaggiosuUe passioni”, Rezzonico, SuHa FUmofia”; Tomaio,
InstituzionidiMetaj Utiea”, Valdr.s- tri, Lezioni di analisi delle Idee”, Lomonaco,
Analisi della scnsibilita”, Schedoni, “Delle morali influenze”, Cestari, “Tentatiro
secondo delta rigenerazione delle Scienze”, Abba, “Elementa Logices et
Metaphysices, Delle Cognizioni umane and Letterea F Uomatomille credenze primitive,
;and "Patio,Blemeata PhilosophimMoralis. On the same basis Cicognara seeks
to establish Aesthetics in his “Del Bello”, Cesarotti, Philology, in his Sulla
Filosofia deUe Scienze”, Costa, Rhetoric, in his D d modo di comporre, le idee,
and Borrelli, Psychology, in his “Prineipii della Genealogia del Pensiero”. To
counteract these materialistic tendencies, some philosophers endeavour to
construct a philosophy ou the basis of revelation, while others seek refuge in
a kind of eclecticism. Among the first may bementioned Premoli, “De
etistentiaDei”, Riccioli, “De distinction sentium in Deo et in creaturis”, Sicco,
“Logica et Metaph.Institutiones”, Semery, Triennium Philosophicum”, Ferrari,
PJal<m>- phia Peripatetica adcersus teteres et recensiores prasertim
PhUosoplios, and Leti, “Nihil sub Sole Novum” and “De unico rerum naturalium
formali principio, ten de Spirita Materiali”. Among the second class are Ceva ,alreadymentioned;
Corsini, Institution** Phtf.osofJiic* uè Matematico”, Gorini, Antropologia”, Luini,
Meditazione Filotvfie”, Ansaldi, Riflessioni sulla Filosofia Morale”, “De
traditioneprincipiorvm legis naturalis” and “Vindicim Maupertuisinnm”,
Scarella, “Element* Logica; Ontologia, Psycdnght et Teologia naturalis, and
above all, Genovesi in his “Elementa Mdaphysices”, “Elementorum Artis Logico-Critiar”,
“Instituzioni delle Scienze Metafisicli”, “Logica pei Giovanetti, “Diceosina or
moni science”, “MeditazioniFàosoficJie”, “Elementi di Fisica sperimentale” and in
his “Lezioni<& Commercio e di EeonAnia Citile”, which work contains his
lectures on political economy, delivered from the chair established at Naples by
his friend Interi, a wealthy Florentine who resided in that city. To this same
School may be referred Galiani, tne author of “Trattato della moneta” and tin
Dialogues stir le Commerce de Uè”, Bianchini, who, in his “Storia Unitersale”
strives to separate history from its legendary elements by a philosophic
interpretation of ancient monuments, Giannone, who, in his “Storia arile del
Regno di Napoli” puts in evidence the usurpations of the Church over the State,
and boldly asserted the independence of the latter ; and Beccaria, the author
of “Dei Delitti e delle Pene”, a work which, more than any other, contributes
to a radical reform of penal law in Europe. Cf. StoriadellaLetteraturaItaliana di
G.Tiraboschi; Della Storia e detf Indole (fogni Filosofia di Buonafede, Delia Ristanrazione (Fogni
Filosofia nei Secoli 15°, 16°, 17°, by thesanv? writer, Dell’Origine e Progresso
d'ogni Letteratura, by Andres; /ecali della Letteratura Italiana, di Corniani
continuata da Ticozà e C. tigoni ls>5fi; Storiadella Letteratura Italiana di
Lombardi, HistoireUttérair' <fItalie, par Ginguène— eontinuée par Salfi; Storia
della Letteratura Italiana, di Maffei, Storia, della Letteratura Italiana, di
Giudici. Cf. also Supplementi alla Storia della Filosofia di Tennemann” by Bomagnosi
and Poli. OnGenovesi cf.Genovesi by Racciopi,and on Beccaria, “Beccar»
eilDirittoPenale” by Cantù. The predominance of French philosophy makes the
ideas of the French encyclopedists and sensualists popular among the more
advanced philosophers of Italy. The progress of natural science, of
jurisprudence and political economy contributes to foster the habit of mental
independence, while the national spirit which had penetrated the literature in
‘the volgare’ from the age of Aligheri, becomes more powerful than ever,
especially through the writings of VAlfieri, who, in his Misoyatto, earnestly
opposes the prevailing influence of French philosophy, and in his tragedies
strives to excite his countrymen to noble and independent deeds by the dramatic
representation of ancient Roman patriotism. This spirit is kept alive by the
poetry of Foscolo and Leopardi, the satires of Parini and Giusti, the political
writings of *.!;./.ini, the historical novels of Guerrazzi and Azeglio, the
tragedies of Manzoni and Niccolini, and the historical works of Troya,
Colletta, Hotta,SlidCesareBalbo. But no department of mental activity
contributes so powerfully to the advance of the national sentiment as
philosophy, which, embodying the aspirations of the people, aims to give them a
scientific basis and a rational direction. In its development it passes through
the same phases as in France, adjusting itself to the wants of the country, yet
keeping on the whole an independent character. The Italian contemporary
philosophy may be divided as follows: Empiricism, Criticism, Idealism,
Ontologism, Absolute Idealism or Hegelianism, Scholasticism, and Positivism. Of
the School of Empiricism Gioja is the first representative. He was born in Piacenza,
an dearly devoted himself to the cause of liberty and national independence.
Witht he advent of Napoleon in Italy he enters public life, and advocates a
Republican government. Under the Cisalpine Republic Gioja is appointed historiographer
and director of national statistics. With the fall of Napoleon Gioja retires
from office; and twice suffers imprisonment for his liberal views. Accepting
the doctrines of Locke and Condillac, Gioja strives to apply them to the social
and economic sciences in the defence of human rights, and the promotion of
wealth, and happiness among the people. In his “ElementidiFtlvsojin”, Gioja defines
the nature of external observation, and describes its methods its instruments,
its rules, and the other means through which its sphere may be extended. The foundation
of all science, according to him, lies in the science of Statistics, which
supplies the phenomena of scientitic investigation, classifies them, and brings
them under general laws. Thus, Statistic embraces nature and mind, man and
society;it originates in philosophy and ends in politics, to which it reveals
the economic resources of nations, wealth, poverty, education, ignorance,
virtue, andvice. This process he follows in his “FllosojiudtHaStatistioa”, in
which he reduces all economic and political phenomena to certain fundamental
categories, the bases of social science, and the criteria of productive forces in
society. Gioja follows the same method in defining the nature of social merit
in his “Del Merita e delle Ricompense”, fixing its constituent elements, he
verifies them in the history of nations, and by their presence or absence
traces the different degrees of their civilization. A follower of Condillac in psychology,
Gioja is the disciple of Bacon in his method, and of Bentham in hi smorals. The
general good constitutes the source of duty, right, and virtue; even self-
sacrifice springs from utility. Imagination and illusion play a great part in
human life, indeed it is only through these faculties that man excels other animals.
Through them man loves fame, wealth, and power, his greatest motives to action.
Virtue itself finds its bestcompensation in illusion, and religion has in the
eyes of a true statesman no other value than the influence it exerts on the
people. Gioja writes also “Teoria Civile e Penale del Divorzio”, “Indole,
Estenxione e Vantaggi dfllaStatistical”, “Nuovo ProspcttodelleScienseEconomise”,
“Ideolo gia” and “11Nuovo Gakitco. Gf. ElogioStorico di Gioja by Romagnosi, Discorso
su Gioja, by Falco, and Es*at sur PHistoire de la Philosophical Italieau Dix-Neuvieme
Sieclt,\^ Louis Ferri. Romagnosi, the eminent jurist, marks a step in advance in
the empiric philosophy. Romagnosi was born in Piacenza, supports the government
of Napoleon in Lombardy, and holds a professorship of jurisprudence at Parma, Pisa,
and Milan. He is tried for treason againstAustria, and acquitted. His psychologic
doctrines are contained in his “Che Cosa e la Mcnte Sana”, “La Supremo, Economia
deW Umano Sapcre”, Vcdutefondameiitali sulT Arte loyica”, “Dottrine della
Ragione. W'hile he admits the general tenets of Condillac, Romagnosi rejects
tho notion that our ideas are but transformed sensations. Lier ecognizes in the
mind a specific sense, the logical, to which he attributes the formation of
universal ideas and ideal syntheses. It is this faculty which perceives differences
and totalities, as well as all relations which form the chain of creation.
The harmony between the faculties of the mind and the forces of nature is the foundation
of all philosophy. It is through the logical sense that that harmony is reached,
and the connection and co-ordination of mind and nature are effected. Its sphere,
however, is limited to experience, and is therefore essentially phenomenal. The
reality of nature, cause, substance and force escapes our mind. Moral
obligation arises from the necessary conjunction of our actions with the laws of
nature, in reference to our own perfection. The ideal of this perfection,
formed from experience and reason, constitutes the rational necessity of moral order.
Right is thepower of doing whatever is in accordance with that order; hence
right is subordinate to duty. Hence, too, human rights are inalienable and
immutable; they are not created by law, but originate in nature, and culminate
in reason. Civil society is the child of nature and reason, and not the
offspring of an arbitrary contract, as Rousseau believed. Civilization is thecreation
of the collective intelligence, in the pursuit of the ends established by
nature. It is both internal and external; the first is the result of the
circumstances amidst which a nation may find itself, in relation to its own
perfection; the second is transmitted from one people to another, and modified by
local causes. As a general rule, civilization is always exteriorly transmitted
through colonies or conquest, or communicated by Thesmothetes (law-givers), foreign
or native. Romagnosi develops these ideas in his “Introduzione alio Studio del
Dlritto Publico Univer sale”, “Principii della Scienza del Diritto”; “Delia
Natura ed<?FattorideWIncivilimento”, “HisDella GenesidelDiritto Penale” in
which he limits the right of punishment to the necessity of social defence, has
contributed, not less than the work of Becaria on crimes and punishments, to
the reform of penal law in Europe since the beginning of the present century. A
complete edition of Romagnosi's works is published in Milan under the
editorship of Giorgi. Cf. La Mente di Romagnosi by Ferrari, his Biografia by
Cantu, and Ferri, op. tit. 2. The philosophic scheme of Criticism proposes to
establish the validity of knowledge by the analysis of thought. Its chief Italian
representative is Galuppi. Galuppi was born in Calabria, and holds a
professorship of philosophy at Naples. A student of Descartes, Locke,
Condillac, and Kant, Galuppi directs his attention chiefly to psychology, which
in connection with ideology constitutes, according to him, all metaphysical science.
Philosophy is the science of thought in its relation to knowledge and to
action; hence It is theoretical or practical. The former embrace pure logic -- which
occupies itself with thought, that is,with timjorM ofknowledge which is
independentofexperience.; Ideologyand Psychology -- the science of thought and
of its causes, and, third, Mixed Logic -- which considers empiiic thoughts, the
matter of knowledge, and unites the principles of pure reason with the data
given by sensations. A fourth branch, Practical philosophy, or Ethics,
considers thought in relation to the will,the motivesandrulesofitsactions. To this
a fifth branch, Natural Theology is added, which from the conditional evolves
the unconditional and from the relative the absolute. Philosophy from another point
of view may also be divided nto subjective and objective, as its object is th emind
itself, or th erelations which unite it to the externalworld. The fundamental
problem of philosophy is found in the question of the reality of knowledge.
Rejecting the solution of it given by Locke and Condillac, Galuppi accepts the
distinction of Kant between the form and the matter, the pure and the empiric
elements in human thought; but he insists that by making the former the product
of the mind, the philosopher of Konigsberg renders it a merely subjective
function, in a de knowledge entirely subjective, and paved the way for the
Scepticism of Hume. Realism in knowledge can only be obtained from the assumption
of two principles. First, the immediate consciousness of the Ego; second, the objectivity
of sensation. The consciousness of the substantiality of the Ego is inseparable
from the modifications of our sensibility; at the same time sensation, either
internal or external, is not merely a modification of our existence, but is
essentially objective; it affects thesubject and contains the object. Our mindi
s thus indirect communication with itself and the external world through a relation
which is not arbitrary, as Reid supposes, but essential, necessary, and direct.
This relation is expressed in the immediate sentiment of the metaphysical unity
of the Ego, which thus becomes the foundation of knowledge. From the primitive consciousness
of the Ego, and of the non-Ego, the mind rises to distinct ideas through
reflection, aided by analysis and synthesis— the analysis preceding the
synthesis— by distinguishing the sensation both from the ego, and the object
which produces it. Thus, an idea is essentially an analytic product, although
it may be considered a ssynthetic,iur elation to the substantial unity of the ego in which it is formed. Although all
knowledge of reality is developed from the consciousness of experience, there
is a previous element in the mind which renders that development possible. This
element is subjective, that is, it is given by th emind itself in its own
activity, andc onsists in the immediate perception of the identity of our
ideas, from which arises metaphysical evidence or logical necessity, which
forms the basis of allphilosophicalreasoningandscientificcertainty.
Thuseveryjudg ment based on logical necessity proceeds from the principle of
iden tity, which in its negative form becomes the principle of contradic tion.
It is therefore analytical ; indeed no synthetic; judgment d priori is
admissible, and those which were held as such by Kant may all be reduced to
analytical ones, in which the attribute is contained in the subject, and which
therefore are based on identity. General ideas are all the product of
comparison and abstraction ; none of them are innate, although they are all
natural, that is to say, the product of mental activity. Thus from the perception
of another body than its own, the mind evolves the ideas of duality, plurality,
extension, and solidity; from these the idea of matter; and through further
analysis, those of substance, causality,time and space. They are all analytical,
subjective and objective; analytic because derived through analysis from
identity, subjective because elaborated by theactivity of the mind out of its own
consciousness, and objective because contained in the objective perceptions of
sensibility. A spiritualist in psychology, Galuppi maintains the unity, the
simplicity, the indivisibility and the immortality of the human soul, which he
considers as a substantial force, developing into various faculties as it
becomes modified by diverse surrounding circumstances, from the consciousness
of the Ego and of the non-Ego (or Tu) arising to abstract and universal principles.
Remaining, however, withinthe bonds of empiricism, though he places the human
mind above nature, yet Romagnosi also holds that it cannot attain to the
knowledge of its own essence, or of the essence of matter, nor understand the
origin of the universe, and the processes of its development. In Ethics,
Galuppi rejects both the doctrine of Helvetius, which founds morality on the
instinct of pleasure, and that of Wolff and Romagnosi, who derive its essence
from our natural longing for perfection. First among modern philosophers of
Italy, Galuppi establishes with Kant the absolute obligation of moral law, and
its pre-eminence above self-interest and self-perfection. Happiness is a motive
to our actions; it is not the essence of moral obligation, nor the source of virtue.
Absolute imperatives, or practical judgments a priori,such as "Do
thy rduty” are at thefoundationof moral law; they originate from the very
nature of practical reason, which contains also the principle of the final
harmony between virtue and happinesss -- expressed in the moral axiom, virtue
merits reward, and vice punishment. From this principle as well as from ou rown
consciousness, Galuppi demonstrates the freedom of the will, both as a psychological
and moral fact. Natural religion has for it sobject the existence of God, of
whom we may obtain the idea by rising from the conditional to the
unconditional, from the finite to the infinite, and from the relative to the absolute.
This idea is subjective: it is developed from that of identity, that,is, the one
isi ncluded in the other. But we reach also the existence of infinite reality
through the principle of causality, and in this sense the idea of God is objective.
Theism alone can reconcile the infinite goodness of God with the existence of
evil; a reconciliation, however, which is imperfect, from the very fact that
human reason cannot understand all the relations which exist between all beings.
God is incomprehensible, creation is amystery, miracles are a possibility, and
revealed religion is an important aid to our education. Cf. L.Ferri,op.cit. ,and
It.Mariano,LaPhilosophicContemporaine en Ltalie. he following are the works of
Galuppi: “Saggio FUosqfico sulla Critlca della Conoseema”, “Letter? Fllosofiche
suite Vicende della FUosofia intorno ai Prineipii dtlla, Conoscenza Umana da
Cartesio fino a Kant, Elementi di Filosofia”; “Lezioni di Logica e di
Metajlsica”; Fili* sojuidellaVolontd”’ “ConsiderazionisuWIdealismotrascen-
dentala e sid Itazionalismo assoluto”. The following writers may be referred partly
to Empiricism, and partly to Criticism:P.Tamburini, “IntroduzionealioStudwddlaFUosofiaMorale”;
ElementaJitri*Xa- turce”, “CennisiiilaPerfettibiUtddtW Umana Famiglia”, Ceresa.Prineipiit
Leggigeneralidi FUosofiae Medieina”, Zantedeschi, Elementi di Psieologia Empirica”,
Poli, Saggio FUotofico sopra la Swola dei modernifilosofi naturalisti”, “Saggio
cFun Corso di Filosofia ; and Primi Elementi di FUosofia”, Ricci. in his
C'ottsiuitmo (AntologiadiFirenze). Rivato, Ricobelli.and Devincenzi, who wrote on
theFrench Eclecticism in the CommentarideW Alencodi Brescia”, Lusverti,
Inxtituzioni Logico-lfetafisiche”, Gigli,AnalisidnUe.Idee”, Bini,LezioniLogieo-itfta-
fixieo Morali”, Pezzi, Lezioni di FUosofia della mente e del more ; Accordino,
ElementidiFUosofia”, ZeUi,ElementidiMetafisim”, Alberi,DdXaciWe”, Gatti,PrineipiidiIdeologic”,
Passeri,Ddlanaturaumanasocietoie”, DeW umana perfezione”, Scaramuzza, Esame
analiUco ddUi facoliA di*»• tire, Bonfadini, Sulk Categoric di Kant”, Bruschelli,
Prdectiones Logico- Mctaphisicm”, Bellura, La Coseieiua”, Fagnani, Storia
naiurale ddla potenza umana”, Delle intime
relazioni in cui progrediscono la Filosofia, la Religione e la. Libertà”, Ocheda,
Della Filosofia degli Antichi”, Pizzolato, Introduzione allo Studio detta
Filosofia”, DomowBki, a Jesuit, In stitution!s Philosophica”, Testa, La Filosofia
del Sentimento”, “La Filosofia dell' Intelligenza”, “Esame e discussione della
Critica della Ragione Pura ài Kant, Critica del Nuovo Saggio suW Origine delle
Idee di A. Rosmini, Grazia, “Saggio sulla realtà della conoscenza umana”, I.ettieri,
“Dialoghi filosofici suW intuizione”,
Introduzione alla Filosofia monde e al Liiilto razionale”, Longo, Pensieri
filosofici”, Teoria della conoscenza”, Dimostrazione analitica delle facoltà
dell' anima”, Tedeschi, Elementi di Filo sofia”, Mancini, Elementi di
Filosofia”, Mantovani, Traduzione della Critica della Ragione Pura di Kant”, Mazzarella,
Critica della Scienza”, Della Critica. Empiricism is applied to ^Esthetics by Delfico
in his Nuove Ricerche sid Bello, Talia, Princijni di Estetica, Ermes Visconti,
Saggi sul Bello, and Riflessioni
idcologicìie intorno al linguaggio grammaticale dei popoli colti”, Venanzio,
Callofilia”, Zuccaia, Principi! eMetici, Lichtenthal, Estetica”, Longhi,
Callografia” and Pasquali, lnsliluziind di Estetica”. Zuccaia and Lichtenthal,
however, separate themselves from the empirical School, and strive to find the
essence of beauty in the idea. The same principles of Empiricism are followed
by writers who undertake to construct a genealogy of sciences, such as Ferrarese
in his “Saggio di una nuova classificazione delle Scienze”. He is also the author
of “Delle diverse specie di follia”, “Ricerche intorno all'origine diWistinto”,
“Trattato della monomania suicida”, De Pamphilis in his Geografia del'j>
Scibile considerato nelXn sua unità di utile e di fine” and Rossetti in his “DelloScibileedelsuoinsegnamento”.
Amongthe writers on Pedagogy who follow empirical doctrines may be mentioned
Pasetti in his “Saggio suW Educazione fisico-morale”, Raffaele, Opere Pedagogiche”,
Boneschi, recetti di Eilucazione”, Fontana, Manuale per l'Educa zione umana”, Parravicini
in his various educational works ; Aporti, Manuale di Educazione e di
Ammaestramento per le Scuole infantile”, Assarotti, Istruzione dei Sordi-Muti”,
Bazutti, Sullo stato fisico intellettuale e morale deiSordi-Muti”, Renzi, SiuT
indole dei deciti, and Fantonetti, “Della Pazzia”. Among the historians who
follow the doctrines of historical criticism may be named Rossi in his
”StudiStorici”, Denina in his “Rivoluzioni d'Italia”, Verri in his “Storia di
Milano”, Gregorio in his “ConsiderazionisullaStoriadiSicilia”, Colletta inhis “StoriadelRegnodiNapoli,
Botta in his Storia della Guerra dell' Indipendenza Americana” and “Storia
d'Italia, continued from that of Guicciardini”, Palmieri in his Saggio Storico
e Politico sulla Costituzione del Regno di Sicilia”, Cantù in his Storia
Universale” and Storia degli Italiani”. Also by Micali in his L'Italia avanti
ilDominio de' Romani”, Mazzoldi in his
Delle Origini Italiche”, Lamperdi in his Filosofia degli Etruschi”, Berchetti
in his Filosofia degli antichi pojioli”, “Sacchi in his Stona dilla Filosofia
Greca, Roggero in hisori. della Filosofia da Cartesio a Kant”, Raguisco, Storia
delle Categorie da Taletead Hegel”, Sclopis, Storia detta Legislazione
Itidiana”, Farini, Stati Romani” and Farina, Storia d'Italia”. Next is
Idealism. Whatever may be the value of the psychological investigations of
Galuppi, and the seeming "realism" by which his theory is
characterized, his doctrine, founded as it was on the subjective activity of
the miiid in connection with experience, could not supply an objective foundation
for science. It therefore left the problem of knowledge unsolved. To establish the
objectivity of human thought on an independent and absolute principle is the
task which Rosmini, the founder of modem Idealism in Italy, proposes to himself.
Rosmini was born in Rovereto in the ItalianTyrol, and receives hiseducation at
Padua. He enters the priesthood, and at a later period founds a religious
institute of charity, whose members devote themselves to the education of youth
and the ecclesiastical ministry. He is charged by King (Jharlcs Albert with a
mission to Rome, the object of which was to induce Pius IX. to join the Italian
Confederation, and to allow the citizens of the Roman States to participate in
the W r of National Independence. Rosmini’s efforts at first promised success.
He is made a member of the Papal Cabinet and is even invited to the honours of
the Cardinalate. But the influence of the reactionary party in the Church
having become predominant, the Pope withdraws from the liberal path on which he
had entered, Rosmini's proposal is rejected, and the ambassador himself dismissed in disgrace. He returns to his retreat
at Stress on the Lago Maggiore, where he again devotes himself to the work of
the restoration of philosophy, for which he had so long laboured. Philosophy,
according to Rosmini, is the science of the ultimate reasons; the product of
highest reflection, it is the basis of all sciences in the universal sphere of
the knowable, embracing ideality, reality and morality, the three forms under which
Being manifests itself. Hence there are three classes of philosophical
sciences. First, the Sciences of intuition, of which ideality is the object, such
as Ideology and Logic. Second, he Sciences of perception, the object of which
is reality, as given in the sensibility, such as Psychology and Cosmology.
Third, the Sciences of reason, whose object is not immediately perceived, but
is found through the inferences of reason, such as Ontology and Deontology; the
former considering Being in itself and in its three intrinsic rela tions; the
latter, Being in its ideal perfection, of which morality is the
highestcomplement. Ideology is the first science. It investigates the origin,
the nature, and the validity of ideas, and with Logic establishes the
principle, the method, and the object of philosophic investigation. His
Ideologic and Logical works, containing the fundamental principle of his
system, and the germ of all his doctrines, are as follows : “Sagyio sutt'
Origine delle Idee”, “Rliinnovamento ddla Filog<yia in Italia”, a
polemical work directed against Mamiani, “Introduzione alla Filosojia”, and
“LaLogioa”. Having reduced the problem of knowledge to the intellectual per
ception of reality, Rosmini examines and rejects the solutions given by the principal
philosophers of ancient and modern times. He however accepts the views of Kant
on the essence of that perception, and places it in a synthetic judgment a priori,
the subject of which is given by our sensibility, and the attribute by our mind;
the one being furnished by experience, the other having a transcendental origin.
But against Kant, Rosmini contends that this transcendental element is one and
objective, not plural and subjective. It is not evolved by the activity of the
mind, but although essentially united to it, it has an absolute, objective and independent
existence. This element, the objective form of the mind, to which all Kantian
forms may be reduced, is Being in its ideality (“l’esere ideale”), which contains
no real or ideal determinations, but is ideal activity itself, deprived of all
modes and outlines, the potential intelligibility of all things, native to the
mind, the light of reason, the source of all intelligence, the principle of all
objectivity, and the foundation of all knowledge. Essentially simple, one and
identical for all minds, universal, necessary, immutable and eternal, the idea of
being is the condition of every mental act. It cannot originate from
reflection, abstraction, or consciousness. It has a divine origin. Indeed, it is
the very intelligence of God, permanently communicated to the human mind under the
form of pure ideality. All transcendental ideas, logical principles, identity,
contradiction, substance, causality, the very idea of the Absolute, are
potentially contained within it, and become distinct through the process of
reflection. It is only through the synthesis of sensibility and ideality, that
man intellectually perceives the existence of realities. To think is to judge,
says Rosmini, and to think of reality is to judge that it is actually existent.
To this judgment sensibility gives the matter or the subject, mind the form or
the attribute, by applying to the former the attribute of existence; while the
substantial unity of our nature, at once sentient and intelligent, affords the
basis on which that synthesisi saccomplished. Thus reality, which is subjective,
that is to say, is essentially connected with sensibility, becomes objectively
known through the affirmation of its existence. Thus ideality alone is knowable
per se; while reality acting on our sensibility is perceived only through
ideality. Through the faculty of universalizing, separating the possibility, or
the intelligibility, or the essence (these terms have the same meaning) of the
objects so perceived, the fluid forms universal ideas, which are thus but
specific determinations of the infinite ideality. Logic establishes the truth
of knowledge and the foundation of its certainty. Now truth is aquality of knowledge;
that is to say, our knowledge is true when that which we know exists. Truth is,
accordingly, the same as existence, and as existence is the form of our
intelligence, so our mind, in its very structure, is in the posses sion of
truth. No error is possible on this subject; for the idea of existence is
affirmed in the very act of denying it. So delusion is possible as to its modes;
for that idea has no mode, or determination. So all specific ideas and logical principles
are free from error; for they represent mere possibilities, considered in
themselves and without relation to other things. The same may be said of the
primitive judgment, in which the existence of reality is affirmed. Confining
ourselves to the simple affirmation of the actual existence of the object as it
is given in sensibility, we cannot err; error beginswhen we undertake to affirm
more than we perceive, or when we assert relations between ideas which do not
exist. Error, therefore, is always voluntary, although not always a free act; it
may occur in the reflex, but never in the direct or primitive knowledge. On
these principles, Rosmini rejects the doctrine of Hume and Berkeley as to the
validity of our knowledge. Rosmini's psychological, cosmological, and
ontological ideas are contained in his Psicoloyia, Antropologia, Teodic&i, and TiMsofia. Psychology considers the human
sol in its essence, development, and destiny. A fundamental sensibility
(“sentimento fondamentale”), substantial and primitive, at once corporeal and
spiritual, having two terms, one of which is a force acting in space, the other
ideality itself, constitutes the essence of the soul. It is active and passive;
it is united with internal and external extension, and its body has double relation
to it, of subjectivity and of extra-subjectivity. It is one, simple and spiritual,
and by this quality it I sessentially distinguished from the souls of mere animals.
Having for its aim and end the potential ideality of all things, it will last
as long as this intuition: it is therefore immortal, although its term of
extension will perish with th edisorganization of the body. Life consists in fundamental
sensibility, the result of that double hypo-static relation, in which the
body partakes of the subjective life of the soul, and the soul of the
immortality of the infinite ideal. Cosmology considers the totality and the
order of the universe, its parts and their relations to the whole. As reality
is essentially connected with sensibility, so that the idea of the one involves
the idea of the other, Rosinini admits a primitive sensibility in matter, and
holds, with Campanella, that chemical atoms are endowed with a principle of
life. Hence a hierarchy of all beings exists in nature, from the primitive
elements to the highest organisms, a hierarchy founded on the basis of the
different degrees of sensibility, with which they are endowed. Hence, also,
Rosmini affirms the existenceof a universal soul in nature, much like that
admitted by Bruno, whose sphere is indefinite space; a soul one in itself, yet
multiplied and individualized in the numberless existences of the universe.
Spontaneous generation is a natural consequence of the theory of universal life.
Ontology includes Theology; but while the former considers the essence of
Being, its unity and the trinity of its forms in the abstract, the latter
regards it in its substantial existence, as the absolute cause and finality of
the universe. The intelligibility of things, as revealed to the human mind,
being only potential and ideal, cannot properly be called ‘god’, who is the
absolute realization of the infinite essence of being, and therefore contains
in the unity of his eternal substance an infinite intelligibility, as well as
an infinite reality and morality, a reality which is essentially an infinite
sensibility, and a morality which is essentially an infinite love. It is thereforenot
through a natural intuition, but through the process of reasoning that the mind
acquires a knowledge of an existing God. It is by reflecting on the logical
necessity and the immutability which belong to ideality, on the conditions
required by the existence of contingent realities, and the nature of moral
obligation, that, by the process of integration, our reason is led to believe
in the existence of an absolute mind, the source of all intelligibility, reality,and
morality. Thus the idea of god is essentially negative, that is to say, affirms
his existence, but it excludes the comprehension of his nature. Creation is the
result of divine love. The Absolute Being cannot but love being, not only in itself,
but in all the possibilitiesof its mani festations. It is by an nfinitely wise
abstraction that the divine mind separates from it sown intelligibility the
ideal type of the univers ; and it is by an infinitely sublime imagination that
it makes it blossom, as a grand reality in the space. Yet the universe is distinct
from the Creator, because it is necessarily limited and finite; and as such
it cannot be confounded with the Infinite and the Absolute, although it is
identi fied with it in its ideal type, which indeed flows from the very bosom
of the divine nature. Thus creation in its ideal essence is God; but it is not God
in its realization, which his essentially finite. In hisTefxii&sa, Rosmini
strives to show that the existence of evil does not stand in contradiction with
an all wise and omnipotent Providence. Man is necessarily limited, and evil is
a necessary consequence of his limitation. Perfect wisdom in its action must necessarily
follow immutable laws, which in their intrinsic development will come in antagonism
with partial forces, and produce discords in the universal harmony. Such are
thelaws of the maximum good to be obtained through the minimum, of action, the
exclusion of all superfluities, the graduation of all things and their mutual
dependence; the universal law of development; the existence of extremes and
their mutual antagonism; finally, the unity and the celerity of the divine
action, which presides over the government of the universe. The problem of the possibility
of a better world has no meaning: God may create numberless worlds, but each of
them will always be best in relation to its own object. As from a box full of
golden coins we can only draw golden coins, so the Creator can only draw from
his own mind thatwhichisbest. Deontology considers the archetypes of perfection
in all spheres, and the means through which they may be realized. Moral
science, including the philosophy of right, is one of its principal branches.
This is treated by Rosmini in the following works: “Princij_rii <lrl!<t Seiema
Mbrale, Storia Cumparativae CriticadeiSwtemiMorali, Antropologia, Trattato
delta Cosdema Morale” FilunojiadelDiritto, OpuscoliMorali”. The essence of
morality consists in the relation of the will to the intrinsic order of being,
as it reveals itself to our mind; hence the supreme moral principle is expressed
in the formula, recognize practically being as you know it, or rdapt your
reverence and love to the degree of worth of the being, and act accordingly. The
idea of being giving us the standard of this recognition, implies the first
moral law, which is tin; identified with the primum notum, the first truth, the
very light of reason. Hence moral good is essentially objective, consisting in the
relation of the will to ideal necessity. Thus morality is essentially distinct
from utility, the former being the cause, the latter the effect; hence
Eudemonology, the science of happiness, cannot be confounded with Ethics, of which
it is only a corollary. The relative worth of beings arises from the degree of
their participation in the Infinite; hence man, whose mind is allied with an
infinite ideality, has an infinite worth. It is through this union, not through
the moralautonomy of the will, as Kant maintains, that man is a “person” and not
a thing; and it is for this reason that actions, to be morally good, must have
for their object an intelligent being. Moral categories are therefore founded
on the gradations of intelligence and virtue, which is but the realization of intelligence.
The duties towards ourselves are derived from the Imperative, which commands
the respect and love of humanity, and we are the standard, by which we estimate
the faculties and the wants of our neighbours. Rights are found in the faculty of
acting according to our will, so far a sprotected by morall aw. Man has an
inalienable right to truth, virtue, and happiness, and his right to liberty and
property is founded on his very personality. Domestic societyis the basis of
all civil organization, and the authority of the State is limited to the
regulation of the modality of right, and never can place itself against rights given
by nature. Indeed its principal objectis the protection of those rights.
Liberal in almost all his doctrines, Rosmini’s ideas on the rights of the
Church betray a confusion of Catholicism with Christianity, indeed with
humanity. They are therefore extravagant as they are indefensible. It is true that
in his Le CinquePlayheildla C/tiesa, Rosmini strives to introduce intotheChurch
such reforms, as would have made it less antagonistic to the spiritof
Christianity. In that work Rosmini urges th enecessity of abolishing the use of
a dead language in the religious services, of raising the standard of clerical education,
of emancipating the episcopate from political ambitions and feudal pretensions,
and, above all, of intrusting the election of bishops to the people and the
clergy, as is required by the very nature of the Church. His essay is placed at
once in the “Index Expnrgatorius”. Rosmini applies also his philosophy to politics
in his filosojiu detta Politica, and to pedagogic science in his Principle Supremo
della Metodologia. Rosmini is also the author of Eponizione Critica della
Filosojia di Aristetele, “Gioberti e il Panteismo”, “Opuscoli Filosofi” and of
several volumes of correspondence. A complete edition of Rosmlni's works has been
published in Milan and inTurin. His posthumous work published in Turin under
the editorship of his disciple Paoli. ARJsumiof his system, written by himself,
may be found in the Storia universale di O. C'antil, in its documentary part.
Rosmini’s philosophy is early introduced into the universities and colleges of
Piedmont, through the labours of Sciolla, Corte and Tarditi, the chief
professors in the philosophical faculty at Turin. The two first embody the doctrines
of Rosmini in their text-books of mental and moral philosophy, while the third,
in his “Lettere di un Rosminiano”, undertakes to refute the objections which
Gioberti advances against that philosophy. It was this work, which gives Gioberti
occasion to publish his voluminous essay on Rosmini. Meanwhile, Rosmini’s
doctrines extend to the schools of Lombardy, owing to the essays of Pestalozza.
whose Element! di KUo-nyfiii, contain the best exposition of Rosminianism.
Pestalozza is also the author of “Difesa delle Dottrine di Rosmini” and LuMenie
di Rosmini, To the same School belong Manzoni, the author of the “Promessi
Sposi” who, in his Dialogo »>j2T /»- venzwne, applies the Rosminian
principles to the art of composition; Tommaseo, the author of the “Dizionario
Estetico”, the “Dizionario dei Sinonimi”, and of several educational works, in
his Espoxizione del Sistema Filosofico di Rosmini, A. Rosmini. Studi
Filosofici” and “Studi critici”. G. Cavour. the brother of the statesman of that
name, in his Fragment* Phitosopluquts; Bonghi, translator of several works of
Plato and Aristotle, and author of “Compendio di Logica”, who gives an
exposition of philosophical discussions held with Rosmini in his Le Sresiane; Rayneri,
in his “Primi Principii di Metodica”, and “Dlla Pedagogia”; Berti, the author
of “La Vita di Bruno”, Garelli, in his “Sulla Filosofia Morale” and in
“Biografia di Rosmini”, Villa, in his “Kant e Rosmini”; Peyretti, in his “Ekmenti
di FUosofui” and “Saggio di Logiea
generate”; B. Monti, in his “Del Fondamento, Progresso, e Sistema delle
Conoteeme Umnne”; Imbriani, in his Sul Fautsto di Goethe” and/Mr
Organism)poeticio e delta Poetica popolare Itliana”, Minghetti, the statesman
and colleague of Cavour, whose work, Dell’Economia Publica, bears the traces of
the influence of Rosmini's doctrines; Allievo, in his “Jlegdinnismo, la Scienza
e hi Vita”, and P. Paganini, in his “Bella Natura delle Idee secondo Platone”;
“Considerazumi sulle profonde armonie della Filosofia Naturale”, tkiggio Cosmologleo
sullo fypazin. and Stiggio sopra S.Tommaso e il Rosmini. To this classification
may be referred Les Principes de Philosophic, of Caluso. ptranslated into Italian
by P.Corte,an published with notes of Rosmini. Corte is the author of “EkmentidiFilosqfla”, embracing logical, metaphysical,
and ethical sciences. He publishes also Anthologia ex M. T. Cicerone and L. A.
Seneca in usum Philiw/phi-r Studiosorumconcinnaia ,The doctrine of Rosmini on the
nature of originalsin, as it was expressed in his Trattato delta C'oscienza”, having
been violently attacked by several ecclesiastical writers belonging to the Order
of the Jesuits, it is ablydefended by eminent theologians of the Catholic
Church, Bertolozzi, Fantozzi, Pagani. and by Gastaldi, a collegiate doctor of
divinity at Turin, and Archbishop of that See. On Rosmini's System, see
further.— Leydel, in “Zeitschrift f. Philosophic, Annales de Philos.
Chretiennr, Bonnetty, ed. Paris, on Rosmini and the decree of the Index. Also
same Annaks, Bartholmcss, Hist. critique des Doctrines Religieuses, Paris, Lockhard, “Life of Rosmini”, Lond, Ferri, op.
cit., and Ferrari in the Revue des Deux Monde. Next comes Ontologism. The ontologic
school places the "primum philosoophicum" not in simple ideal existence,
but in absolute reality, the cause of all things as well as theprinciple of all
knowledge. This doctrine, held by St. Augustine and Fidanza, and revived by
Malebranche, is developed under a new form by Gioberti. Gioberti was born in
Turin, receives his education in that city, and early becomes a priest.
Arrested as a sympathiser with the revolutionar schemes of Mazzini, he is
condemned to exile.While in France and Belgium he devotes himself to the work
of Italian regeneration, and endeavours to attach the clergy to this cause. In
his “Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani” Gioberti urges upon the papacy the
necessity of placing itself at the head of the liberal movement, and becoming
the champion of Italian nationality and the centre of European civilization. In
his Prlegomeni, and “Il Jesuita Moderno”, Gioberti labours o crush the opposition
with which his views are received by the reactionary party of the Church and
exposes the dangers of its policy. With th eaccession of Pius IX, and the subsequent establishment of
constitutional governments in the Peninsula, Gioberti’s ideas seem to have
triumphed. Gioberti returns to Italy and enters at once into public life,
accepting a seat in the Parliament and in the Cabinet of Piedmont, where he
soon becomes a ruling spirit. After the battle of Novara he is sent to Paris as
ambassador, in the hope of obtaining aid for the national cause. Unable to accomplish
his mission, Gioberti resigns his office, and remaining in that city a voluntary
exile, he again devotes himself to philosophical studies. The philosophy of
Gioberti is embodied in the following works: “La Teoria del Supra-naturale”,
“Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia”, “Trattato del Buono”, “Trattato del
Bello”, “Errori Filosofici di Rosmini”. Philosophy, according to Gioberti, has
long since ceased to exist; the last genuine philosophers are Leibnitz,
Malebranche, and Vico. By substituting psychologic for the ontologic method and
principles, Descartes renders all genuine philosophic development impossible.
Descartes does in regard to philosophy what Luther does in regard to religion,
by substituting private judgment for the authority of the Church. Sensualism,
subjectivism, scepticism, materialism and atheism are the legitimate fruits of
the doctrine of Descartes. To do away with these errors is theobject of
true philosophy. Rosmini's theory cannot attain it; for it is founded on a
psychologic process, assumes as a principle of knowledge a pure abstraction,
and thus falls into the very errors which it proposes to combat. Through ideality,
the mind cannot reach reality, nor from the fact of consciousness can it ascend
to universal and necessary ideas. We must therefore invert the process, and look
both for method and principles not in the subject, but in the object. The object
is the idea in its absolute reality, immanently present to the mind under the
form of a synthetic judgment, which comprehends in itself all being and
knowledge. This judgment, as it is produced through reflection, finds its expres
sion in the ideal formula, “Ens creat existentias,” Being create existences —
the supreme principle of Ontology and of Philosophy. Through the intuition of
this principle, mind is in possession at once of the real and the ideal; for
the first member of the formula (the “Ens”) contains the object, Being, the
absolute idea as well as the absolute substance and cause; the second (“Existences”)
gives the organic multiplicity of contingent substances and causes and relative
ideas; the third, The Creative Act, expresses the relation existing between the
absolute and the relative, the unconditional and the conditional, and the
production of real and ideal existences from the Absolute. But although this intuition
gives the power of intelligence to the mind, it is in itself not yet an act of knowledge;
as long as it is not reproduced by the mind, it remains in a latent or germinal
condition. It is only by a reflex judgment that we affirm the contents of
intuition; coming to the consciousness of its elements, we become acquainted
with their mutual bearing and relations. This reproduction therefore is made through
ontok>gi«ilreflection, by which the mind, so to say, reflects itself upon
the object, and through which alone it is capable of acquiring the knowledge of
that ideal organism, which is expressed in the intuition. Thus the ontological
method is the only true philosophical process, and stands in opposition to the
psychological method, which is founded on psychological reflection, through
which the mind turns its attention, not upon the object, but upon itself. But to
direct its reflection upon the object of its intuition, the mind needs the
stimulus of *language*, through which it may determine and limit the object for
its comprehension. Hence the necessity of a first divine revelation, which by
language supplies the instrument of our reflection, and constitutes that
relation which necessarily exists between the idea itself, and the idea as it
manifests itself to our rmind. Fo ralthough the idea in itself is one and
indivisible, in reference to the human mind it has two sides: the one which is
intelligible, the other incomprehensible— thus being antithetic towards each
other, and giving rise to all the apparent antinomies between Science and
Religion. The faculty of super-intelligence, which is inherent in all finite
minds, consists in the sense which reveals to the mind its own limitations, as to
the comprehension of theidea. It is through revelation that the mind acquires
some positive knowledge of the superi-ntelligibility of the idea, although
always limited and clouded in mystery. Science, being the reproduction of the
ideal formula, must therefore be divided into two branches, corresponding to
the intelligibility and the super-intelligibility of the idea;— the one
constituting the Rational Sciences, the other the Super-Rational, the last
being superior to the former from their more extensive comprehension of the
idea through positive revelation. The genesis of sciences from the ideal formula
is as follows : " Jfiia" or the subject of the formula, gives
Ontology and Theology. The copula (creat) demands a science which shall com prise
the double relation between “ens” and existences, in both an ascending and a
descending method. The descending process (from Jieuifj to faiatenees) originates
the science of time and space, or Mathe matics. The ascending (from Existences
to Being) the science of the true, the good, and the beautiful, that is, Logic,
Ethics, and AEsthetics. The predicate (Existences) gives rise to the spiritual
and material sciences. Oon the one side Psychology and Cosmology, on the other,
physical Science in its various branches. The super-natural sciences follow the
same division. As to the validity of the knowledge arising from this formula, its
first member expresses its own absolute reality and necessity. The intuitive
judgment in which this reality and necessity are pronounced, viz.. '"En*
*'•*," and ^Ens is necessary" do not originate in the human mind, but
are contained in the idea itself, while the mind in its primitive intuition
only listens to them — repeating them in its succeeding reflex judgments. So
that the validity of those judgments is not affected by the subjectivity of the
mind. Thus is it with the funda mental ideas of necessity, possibility, and
existence. The first being the relation of the En sto itself; the second the
relation of the necessary to the existing; and the third the relation of
possibility to necessity. To these ideas correspond three great realities. To thefirst, the
Absolute reality, God. To the second, infinite or continuous m agnitude, pure
time and pure space. To the third, actual and discrete magnitude, the universe an
dits contents. Time and space are ideas, at once pure and empirical, necessary
and contingent. As pure and necessary, they may be conceived as a circular
expansion growing out of a single centre and extending to the infinite; by this
centre, Ens (Being) is symbolized. As contingent and empirical, they may be
represented by a circumference which projects from the centre and develops in
successive degrees. In this projective development, we have the finite reality,
multiple and contingent in itself, but one and necessary, if considered as
existing in the central point from which it emerges. For existences have a necessary
relation to the Ens, and it is only in that relation that it is possible to
know them. The very word existences implies their derivation from the Absolute
reality. But the nature of that derivation cannot be reached through reasoning.
It manifests itself in the intuition, in which it is revealed in the creative
act. By considering the two extreme terms of the formula out of the relation of
its copula, they become identified, and philosophy at once falls into Pantheism.
Thus the creative act is the only basis of our knowledge of contingent existences.
It is by bringing the phenomenal elements of perception into their relations to
creative activity that the sensible becomes intelligible, and the
individualization is of the idea are brought in the concrete into our minds.
And as our own ideas are formed in witnessing the creative act, it follows that
that they may be considered as copies of the divine idea, created and limited,
yet stamped with the character of a divine origin. Thus the ideal formula
considered in relation to the universe becomes transformed into these other
formulas. The one creates the multiple. The multiple returns to the one. These
two formulas express the two cycles of creative development, viz., the one, by
virtue of which existences descend from Ens; the other, by which they return to
I -- a double movement, which is accomplished in the very bosom of the ens
itself, at once the efficient and the final cause of the universe. The first cycle,
however, is entirely divine, while the second is divine and human, because in
it human powers are brought into play. In the Garden of Eden ther&- tiini
of the mind to its Creator is perfect; reason predominant over passion, man's
reflection was in perfect accord with the organic intui tion; but theFallalteredthatorder,andman
puthimselfmoreorless intooppositionwiththeformula. Ileucetheerrorsofancient
theogonies and Mythologies, and their Pantheistic and Uualistic Philosophies.
Thus the Bralnuinicand Buddhistic doctrinesoftheEast absorbed the universe and
man himself in the first member of the formula; while the philosophical systems
of the Greeks reduced everything; to the third member, with the exception of
Pythagoreanism and Platonism, in which the condition of its organic order is
substantially preserved. Christianity restores that order through the
miraculous intervention by which God, becoming man, brings the human race back
to its primitive condition. In such a dispensation, the tradition which contains
the organic structure of the fomula was placed in the keeping of the Church; hence
its infallibility, and its right to preside over Theology, as well as the whole
development of Science. The idea as expressed in the formula becomes, in its
application to the will, the supreme moral law, the basis of Ethics. While its first
and second terms give us the idea of moral good, its first cause, law and
obligation, the third term supplies the moral agent, and contains the conditions
of moral development. It is through his free will that man can copy the creative
act by placing himself in accord with the will of God, as manifested in moral law.
Hence, moral law partakes of the character of absolute reality; it is
objective, apodeictic, and religious, because it is founded on the very
relation of God to the human will. From this relation arises an absolute right
in the Creator, to which an absolute duty in man corresponds, the source of all
the relative duties and rights, which spring from his relation to his fellow-creatures.
It is through this accord of the human with the divine will, that man attains
happiness, consisting in the voluntary union of his intellectual nature with the
divine. The supreme formula of ethics is this: Being creates moral good through
the free-will of man. Fom this two others follow, corresponding with the two
cycles of creation. The first: that free will produces virtue by the sacrifice
of passion to law. Second, that virtue produces happiness by the reconciliation
of passion to law. AEsthetic science likewise finds its principles in the ideal
formula. Creation, with the ideas of time, space, and force, gives us the idea
of the sublime, while Exigences, that is to say. the real in its relation to
the idea, contain the elements of the beautiful. Thus, as existences are
produced arid contained in the creative act, so the sublime creates and contains
the beautiful. Hence the formula, being creates the beautiful through the sublime.
The two ideas are co-related. They both consist in the union of the intelligible
with an imaginative element, but while, in the sublime, one element
predominates over the other, in the beautiful the harmony of the two is preserved.
Yet the two ideas are subject to the cycles already noticed in the development
of the formula: The Sublime creates the Beautiful, and the Beautiful returns to th eSublime. In the
history of art the sublime precedes the beautiful. The temple and the epic poem
are the oldest forms of art. The super-intelligibility of the idea gives rise to
th emarvellons, which, expressing itself in language, poetry, painting, and
music, becomes an element of AEsthetics. The first arts resting in the organic
structure of formula, it follows that only in orthodoxy can the full realization
of beauty be found. Heterodoxy, altering more or less that structure,
introduces an intrinsic disorder into the lield of AEsthetics, as well as into
that of science, morality, and religion. Gioberti at the time of his death was
preparing other works, in which his idea sseem to have undergone considerable
change. Imperfect and fragmentary as they are left, they were published under the
editorship of his friend Massari, and bear the follow ing titles, “La
Protologla”; “La Filosofia della Rivelazione”, “La Itifor-ma detta Chiesa. A
tendency to rationalism blended with Hegelian transcendentalism appears in
those works, although ostensibly founded on the idealformula ofthen'rst philosophy.
The idea here becomes the absolute thought, which creates by its very act of
thinking. Sensibility is thought undeveloped, as reason is thought developed;
and even the incomprehensible is but thought undeveloped,
whichbecomesintelligiblethroughdevelopment. Languageasthe instrument of
reflexion plays still a conspicuous part in the woof of the absolute thought,
as wrought out in creation, but it has become a natural product: and even of
supernatural revelation itissaid, that it may be considered natural, as soon as
it is received into th emind. It is through the creative act that absolute thought
appears in the development of Nature and Mind, a development which proceeds
under the logical form of a sorites, the principle of which is inexhaustible,
the progress continuous. The members of this sorites are prop»>-r which rest
on categories, or fundamental ideas produced by the absolute thought in its
union with the mind, and the tinners which it creates. In the absolute, the categories
are one and in<! idea, but become, multiple through the creative act. These
are < and trine. The first express the opposite while the last reconcile the
oppositions of the former. The absolute thought is the concrete and supreme
Category, out of which all others receive existence through its creative
activity. An existence which is developed, according to a dialectic movement.
The organic structure of the Categories, which embraces the relations between
the terms of each dual one, and the relations between their couples, is moulded
on the ideal formula. Pantheism does not consist, in a substantial synthesis of
God and the universe, but in the confusion of the finite and the infinite, and
of the different modes of existence which belong to them. God is infinite,both actually
and potentially. The world is potentially infinite, but actually finite. With Cusa
and Giordano lining it may properly be said, that the universe is a potential
God or a limited or contracted God. Hence,God and the universe are one in the
infinite reality of the first, and in the infinite potentiality of the second; for
the potentiality of the universe exists in God. As to its finitude, it is given
as a term of the creative act; it is a primitive fact which is presupposed by
all mental acts, which therefore cannot be reduced to other categories and thus
to the unity of the absolute. Finite realities, however, have a double relation
to the absolute, which is determined by the metexis and the mimesis. Through
metexis they are phenomenal copies of the divine ideas.. Through the mimesis
they participate in the divine essence, the condition of their existence. The
change in Gioberti's metaphysical ideas manifests itself in his thoughts in relation
to the Church. Catholic philosophy rests nolonger on the authority of an
ecclesiastical organization, but on the universality and continuity of human
thought, in the history of mental evolution. Religion is no longer superior to philosophy;
but it is philosophy itself, enveloped in myths and symbols, so as to bring it
to the intelligence of the common people. All religions are effects of the
creativeact, having different degrees of moral value. Christianity, however, is
the complement of all religious forms, and Christ is the Pan-Idea, in which the
realization of the moral type fully corresponds its inner excellence.
Mysteries:ui lmiracles are facts, whichcannot considered as complete. Their
value consists in their relation to the ;i!» phenomena which containtin; doctrinesof
Palingenesis. No can live which dm-s not follow the laws of ideal development;
•i i verse would perish, the moment it should cease to be subchange. The
modification introduced in his political doctrine, Gioberti himself
published a year before his death, in his “Rinnocamento Civile(VItalia”, where the
papacy no longer appears as the natural support of Italian regeneration, but as
its greatest obstacle. In Lois work, by far the best of all his voluminous
productions, Gioberti gives a new programme to Italian patriots; placing the
national cause under the hegemony of the king of Piedmont, he urges his country
men to rally around that throne, the only hope of the Peninsula. This
programme, carried out to the letter, brings the Italian States under one
national government, and finally made Rome the capital of th enation. No statesman
,with the exception of Cavour, has ever exerted for a time so great influence
on the affairs of Italy as Gioberti. His name is preserved in honuor among his
countrymen for the purity of his patriotism, the loftiness of his aspirations,
and the liberality of his views, rather than for the solidity and the permanent
value of hi sphilosophy. On the political relations o fGioberti to Cavour, cf.
Life, Character, and Policy of Count Cavour, by V. Botta, New York. As a
philosopher, Gioberti does not succeed in forming a large school, although the
following writers doubtless derive their inspirations from his works: Fomari, “Dell'
Armonia Universale, Lezioni suW arte della parata”, G. Eomano, aJesuit, LaScknzadelTuomointerno«ituoirapporticollaNaturaeconDio;
“Elementi di Filosofi"-; Gioanni, Principii della Filosofia Prima, Micrti,
o dei- VEiaereUno e Reale”, Miceliol'ApologiadelSistema” N.Garzilli, Saggioatti
rn]ypor(idella Formula idealeeoiproblemi importanti della Filosofia”, Acquisto,
“Sistema della Scienza universale”; “ElementidiFilosofiafondamentale”; “Corso
di Filosofia morale”; Corso di Diritto naturale”; “Necessità dtW autorità e
della legge”; “Saggio sulla- naturae sulla genesi del Diritto di proprietà,
Trattato(fIdeologia. In the United States of America. Gioberti finds a devoted
interpreter in Brownson, whose able exposition of the doctrine contained in the
ideal formula was published in in the Review bearing his name. To the
Ontological School, although independent of Gioberti, belong Bertóni, Idee di una
Filosofia della Vita, Questione Religiosa, ;and La Filosofia Greca prima di
Socrate”; Centofanti, “Delia Filosofia detta Storia”; A. Conti, “Storia della Filosofia”;
“Evidenza,AmoreeFede, Dio e il male”; J.Puecinotti, Serilti Storici e
Filosofici, Storia della Medicina”, Baldacchini, Trattato sullo Scetticismo; La
Filosofia dopo Kant”; Corleo, Filosofia vnirermle”; Mangeri. Corso di Filosofia
e Sistema Pitico-Ontologico”; Labranca, Lezioni di Filosofia razionale, Mora
and Lavarino, in their Enciclopedia Scientifica, Turbiglio,” L'impero della
Logica” and “Analisi Storica delle FUo-vfie di Ix-rte e Leibnizio. On Gioberti,
cf. h. Ferri, and R Mariano, op. cit.; Seydel in Zeit- schrift fi Pftilosophie,
C. B. Smyth, Christian Metaphysicians, Lond. Prominent among the Ontologists is
Mamiani. He was born in Pesaro. Mamiani joins the revolutionary movement of the
Romagnas, but was arrested and condemned to exile. He takes up his residence in
Paris, where he is engaged in literary and philosophical pursuits. He returns to
Italy, and gives his support to the liberal reforms inaugurated by Pius IX.
When the Pope abandons Rome, Mamiani, as a member of the Constituent Assembly,
opposes the proclamation of the Republic, as contrary to the interest of the
national cause. With the restoration of the papal power by the aid of France,
Mamiani retires to Piedmont, where he is elected member of Parliament and
appointed professor of philosophy at Turin. He is a staunch supporter of the policy
of Cavour, under whose administration he holds successively the offices of
minister of Public Instruction and that of minister to Greece. He is member of
the Senate and professor of the philosophy of history atRome. In the early part
of his philosophical career, represented by his “Del RintwvameiUsi dtW antica
Filusojw italiana”, Mamiaui holds the doctrine of Empiricism founded on
psychological investigations, in which he strives to combine experience with
reason. Mamiani maintainsthat the principal question of philosophy is that of
method; and that this can only be found in experience and nature. It is this
method which prevails among the philosophers of the Renaissance, and to which
science is indebted for its great achievements, particularly through the teachings
and the example of Galilei. This essay calls forth the work of Rosmini, II
Itinnovamento, etc., in which he controverts some of Mamiani's statements, and
tries to show that the experimental method alone cannot philosophically
reconstruct the science of Nature and Mind. Mamiani himself soon becomes convinced
of this, and in his works “Discorso sull’Ontologia e sul Mt-todo” and Dialoghi
di Sciema 1'riina”, he endeavours to find a philosophical basis in common sense.
In these essays appears for the first time his doctrine on immediate perception
as the only foundation of the knowledge of reality. The last phase of his doctrine
is containedin his “Confessioni di un Metafisico”. It is divided into two
parts: Ontology and Cosmology. In the first, Mamiani considers theAbsolute,
ideas, natural theology, and the creative act; in the second, the finite, its
relation to the Infinite, the co-ordinatiou of nature's means, life, finality,
and progress in the universe. Mamiani’s fundamental doctrines are as follows. The
knowledge of the real and the ideal is effected through two faculties
essentially distinct, although both acting in the subjective unity of the mind:
perception and intellection. The first does not consist in a syntheticjudgment
a priori, as Rosmini and Gioberti hold after Kant, but in a direct and
immediate relation of the mind to finite realities, as Reid and Galuppi
maintains, although Reid and Galuppi overlook its intellectual character.
Intellection consists in the relation of the mind to ideas; and, as these have
an essential connection with Absolute reality, the mind may be said to possess an
intrinsic relation to the "entia realissima"— the most real being.
Ideas indeed are intellectual *symbols* of the Absolute reality in its relation
of causality; and they are supplied by the intellective faculty, when the mind
apprehends their realizations through perception. Tims our intelligence attains
to Absolute reality through the intermedium of ideal representations, but it
does not penetrate so far as to reach its essence; it remains on its surface. A
similar process occurs in perception, through which the mind reaches the object
given in sensibility, not in essence, but through the medium of sensation. But while
our ideas are mere *representative emblems* -- simbolo ed embolo -- in the
divine mind they are real objects in themselves. They are identical with the
absolute intelligibility, the possibility, the reason of all things. They are
therefore the foundation of all Unite realities, their common attributes and
final perfection. They are indeed the efficient and final causes of the world,
manifesting themselves under the triple relation of the true, the good, and the
beautiful. Hence our ideas, as *representations* and determinations of the
divine causality, are essentially objective and immutable representations, and
determinations of eternal truth. It follows that the existence of God is
founded on the very nature of primitive intuition, which includes the eternal
substantiality of truth, and that its demonstration a priori is a simple
process of deduction from the principle of identity. It follows also that every
ideal relation contains an eternal truth, to which an intelligible reality in
God corresponds. It is therefore independent of the human mind. Ideas however are
not innate. Threy originate in finite reality, from which they receive their
determinations, and have a necessary reference to absolute reality through
their *representative* character. It is only through reflection that the minddisc.
in itself its relation both to finite reality, contained in internal and
external perception, and to infinite reality, contained in the Infinity.
Creation is the result of the infinite good, which of necessity tends to
communicate itself. The idea of a God infinitely good implies the idea of a
creation, founded on the greatest good, as its outward manifestation and
ultimate end. This manifestation is brought forth by an infinite power, and an
infinite wisdom, under the forms of the laws of causality and finality. From the
very nature of the finite, and its opposition to the infinite, arises the
immense cosmic diversity. Hence the universe cannot be properly represented as
a sphere; it is rather to be regarded as a system of numberless spheres, moving
concentrically in various directions, and forming that universal harmonv, which
is the highest expression of the infinite good. As the cosmic diversity is
equal to its possibility, it follows that there is only one idea of the
universe in the divine mind as well as in the universe itself, although in a
continuous generation and development. The idea of a better world is impossible
; because the idea of the universe, which is in the act of developing, contains
already all possibilities. Evil is inherent in the finite; but it diminishes,
as the finite more and more approaches the infinite, and in this progressive
union of the one with the other lies the ultimate end of creation. In the achievement
of this end, the divine causality creates and determines the whole, the divine
intelligence pre-arranges the whole, while nature produces the whole under the
influence of that causality and intelligence. The finite is an aggregate of
monads or forces, which are brought together by their mutual attraction; thus a
communication arises between those, which have a diameter of similarity, a
participation between the diverse ones, and a co-ordination of all. Hence
arises the cosmic system, with its great divisions of nature, life, and mind.
Nature reveals itself first in the stellar order, in the ether in connection
with light, heat, and electricity, and in the order of chemical compounds, such
as water and twater. In the elaboration of the syntheses preparatory to the
final ones, the divine art is revealed in that wise co-ordination of means
which is produced by the union and separation, the action and reaction of
homogeneous, as well as heterogenons forces. But it is only in life (vita) that
finality (fine) appears, for life alone contains the possibility of receiving
the communication of JJIXK], which is the essence and the object of creation.
Life is the development through a suitable organization of the individual, in
reference to its participation in the good. At its lowest degree it is nothing but
a chemical compound – the amoeba --, enclosed in a cellular envelope and capable
of reproducing itself. At its highest point, life is an intellectual and
volitional activity which tends to an absolute object, and to this end co-ordinates
all the means at its disposal. Between the two extremes there are numberless
degrees of vital activity, each developing in accordance with its own end.
Vegetation, animality, and humanity or spirituality mark the principal degrees
in the scale of life. In these three manifestations, life is a specific force.
Bflchner and other Scientists, who give to matter the power of producing life,
deny the existence of this specific force, and attribute it to a cause, which
in itself has not the elements necessary to its development. So Darwin's theory
of the genesis of species involves the negation of the objective reality of the
idea or specific essence, containing a substantial fixedness of character and
form, and the power of producing itself within the limits of its own nature. It
confounds accidental varieties with substantial transformations, and artificial
means with natural processes. It is contrary to all historical experience, and
the constant fact of the sterility of hybrids. It stands in contradiction with
itself in the bearing of the two laws of the struggle for life, and natural
selection, which will restrict rather than widen the limits of development, and
keep the species within their own boundaries, rather than expand them into new
forms and modes of existence. The order of life in relation to the general end
of creation begins with plants. In plants, the living force has the specific
value of being the organ for life, or rather it is the laboratory in which its
elements are prepared. This passes over into animality, which has a real
relation of finality, although limited and relative, as are its senses and
instincts, through which it enjoys participation in the divine good. Man (Homo
sapiens sapiens) alone, whose life is partly the growth of vegetation and
animality, is an absolute finality, for he alone has a life, through which he
can know and act in accordance with the absolute. The law of indefinite
progress is universal and necessary, founded as it is in the very object of
creation, in the divine goodness, and the progressive union of the finite with
the infinite. This law, which embraces all the universe, is still more apparent
in the development of mankind. But in order that it may be verified in history,
its application must comprehend humanity as an organic and spiritual unit. It
would fail if applied to an isolated nation, or measured by the invariable Roman
type, as Vico insists. To see the full bearing of this law, mankind must be regarded
in the multitude of its nationalities, in the variety of their character,
in the multiplicity of the elements and of the ages of civilization. The law
itself must he viewed in its different aspects, and in the agencies which are at
work to carry it ont in history; such as the influence of a national
aristocracy, the subordination of lower to higher forms of civilization, the
mingling of the Italian three tribes, and the expansion of social forces,
through which a kind of polarity among the tree tribes is created. All these and
other causes, while they preserve the spiritual unity of mankind, maintain its
growth and secure its general advancement. Besides the works already mentioned,
Mamiani writes also “Meditazi- oniCarte&iane, and “Di un Nuovo Diritto Europe”, in which he strives to
establish international right on a philosophical basis. In his “Iiinaacimento
Cattolico”, Mamiani contemplates the possibility of a reform in the Catholic
Church, that should reconcile it with the spirit of modern times. Mamiani is also
the author of “Teoria dclla Religions e dello Stato, e dei suoi raj/porti
speciali con Roma e colle Nazioni Cattoliche”, “Sei Lettere a Rosmini”, “Saggi
di Filosofia Civile” and “Saggi Politici”. Among the philosophers who have
treated of Mamiani's philosophy, the more prominent are Ferri, the author of
the “Esmi sar CHUtoire de la Philosophic en Ilalie au 19ine Steele”; Debrit, “Histoire
de» Doctrine* Philosophiqves daiu Vltalie Con- temporaine”. These two
philosophers, particularly the first, give a complete survey of the principal
systems of contemporary philosophy in Italy.) See also Lavarino, “La Logica e
la Filosofia di Mamiani” and Fiorentino, several articles in the Rivista di
Bologna, under the title of Positivismo e Platonismo in Italia; Brentazzoli,
the author of “Di uri1 ultcriore e deflnitico arplicamento della Filosofia
Seokxttka”; Tagliaferri, who writes on Mamiani's theory, and Bonatti, who
discusses the ontological argument of the existence of God as presented by Mamiani
in Bonatti iand Mamiani, Bonatelli is also the author of “La Concienza”, and of
a sketch of Italian philosophy published in the “Zeituchrift fiir Philorphie
und Philosophische Kritik” in Halle. To the Ontologic classification may also be
reduced the “Dialoghi Politico-Filosofici” di Buscarini; and “Sopra la Filosofia
del Diritto Publico Interno di L.C. di Montagnini; also,1stFUomfiadette Scuote
Italiane, a philosophical review supported by Mamiani, D. Berti, R. Bonghi, G.
Barzellotti, and other members of an association recently established in Rome
for the promotion of philosophical studies; Oerdil, a weekly periodical
published in Turin, under the editorship of Allievo, chiefly intended to
reconcile philosophy with Christianity; and Il Campo della FUosoflItaUani, a
philosophical periodical published in Naples, and edited by Milone. Next is
Absolute Idealism or Hegelianism. Vera is the recognized head of the Hegelian
School in Italy. He was born in Amelia, a city of Umbria, and early goes to Paris, where he completed
his education. Having spent some years in Switzerland, he returned to
Paris, and is appointed professor of philosophy in several colleges connected with the University of
France. He rreturns to Italy, where he is at once made professor of philosophy
at the Royal Academy of Milan. He ransfers to the University of Naples, where
he sholds the professorship of the history of philosophy and the philosophy of
history. Vera’s works are devoted to the interpretation and application of the
Hegelian pliilosophy.They include— ProW.me dela Certitude ; VHcgiUanisme et la
Philosophit. Melanges Philono- phiques; Essais de Philosophic Hegelienr.e,
1804; Introduction a la Philasrqkfc cCHegel, Logique d Hegel ; Philo»,plue de
la Nature d'Hegel ; Phi losophic de CEsprit (VHegel; Philosophic de la Heligion
<THegel; Platonis Aristattiu el Hegelii de medio termino Doctrina ; Inquiry
into Speculative and Experimental .Se»>v««. Lond; “Lezioni sulla filosofia
delta storia”; PrUusiovi alla Storia della Filosofia (epoca Socratica), ed alla
Filosofia delta -Storia ; II Problema deff Avm-'iito; II Cataitr e la libera
Chiesa in Ubero Statot in which the doctrine of the separation of the Church
from the Stateheld by Cavour is opposed on philosophical and political grounds.
He also translated into English the History of Heligion and of the Christian
Church by Bretschneider, London. Vera not only interprets and expounds. Hegel's
philosophy, but develops it and expresses it in a more intelligible form, thus
rendering it accessible to students not familiar with Hegelian terminology. In his
Introduction dla Philosophica"Hegel he rejects the Trinity of being, thought,
and motion which Trendelenburg proposes to substitute to the Hegelian trinity of
being (thesis), not being (antithesis) and becoming (synthesis). Vera also
confutes French Eclecticism and the materialistic theories of Bilchner and
Moleschott. In his Inquiry into Spcndatice and Experimental Science, Vera refutes
the doctrines of Bacon, Locke, and other representatives of Empiricism. Vera’s
labours have been highly praised by eminent German Hegelians, among whom is Eoeenkranz in
"Der Gedanke" and in his Wissenschaft iter hyifchc Idee. See also an article
of Saisset in the ItecuedtsDeuxMonde. Among other Hegelians in Italy
maybementioned Spaveuta.who. in his “Filosofia di Gioberti” aims to show the
connection of the doctrines of this philosopher with the ideas of Hegel.
Spaventa is also the author of Introduzione alle Lezioni di Filosofia.
Principii di Filosofia, Saggi di Critiea filosofica, politca e religiata, Filosofia
di Kant e sua relatione colla Filosofia Italiana. D H T intmoraW.ildel Vanimavmana;ltiiflcssionimlSodalitmoeComunismo.
Herebe longs also Fr. Fiorentino, the author of Pietro Pomponazzi— Ttlesio, and
Stvdj Stnriei sullaScuoladiBolognaep"PadomalSecolo16°. He also wrote on Positivism
and Platonium in Italy (Rivista di Bologna). Miriano wrote La Philomphie Contemporaine
en Italie; Lasalle e il sua Ernclito, II Ilisnrgimcn Italiano secondo i principii
della Filosofia della Storia di Hegel, Il Problema Rdigioso in Italia.
Among those who have devoted themselves to the application of the Hegelian doctrine
to the special branches of science may be mentioned Meis, naturalist and
physiologist; Sanctis, Mareelli, Delzio, Salvetti, Gatti, Vitto, Camerim, and
Trani, who applied it particularly to literary and historical criticism, and to
political, juridical and aathetical sciences. Next is Scholasticism. The
philosophical development of Italian
philosophy is distinguished by its national character, and the decided impulse
it has given to the reconstruction of Italy, on the basis of independence and liberty.
An exception to this general tendency is to be found in the writers who, labouring
in the interests of the Church, h a vestr iventore-establish Scholasticism, and
with its a cerdotal domination over national thought. Ventura is the principal
representative of this School. He was born in Palermo, and early becomes a amember
of the Order of the Theatins. He is soon elected Superior-General of the Order,
and holds a high position in the government of the Church. He is one of the
most prominent supporters of the reforms
inaugurated by Pius IX. In his eulogy on O'Connell, in his funeral oration on
the victims of the revolution of Vienna, and in his sermons delivered in the
Chapel of the Tuileries, in Paris, he continues to show himself a warm champion
of popular rights. In his philosophical works, howover, he constantly maintains
the fundamental idea of scholasticism, placing the authorityof the Church above
reason and human conscience, indeed above all sovereignty. Holding that philosophy
was buta deduction from revelation, he
asserts that the ultimate criterion of truth lies in that authority. It is true,
Ventura says, that ideas originate in sensations, and in the subsequent images
which are left by them in the mind; but ideas have no value if not incorporated
in language, which is itself derived from revelation. Philosophy reaches its
culminating point in Aquino, and nothing is left to philosophers but to study, and
to expound the doctrines of that philosopher. Ventura is the author of the following
works: De Mctlwdo Philosophandi, De la Vraie et de la Fausse Philosophie; La
Tradition et Us Semipelagiens de la Philosophie, La Raison Philosophique et
Catholique, La Phil/jxophie Chretienne, Of. Le Pere Ventura et la Philosophie, par
Clis.deRemusatinLaRevuedesDeux Mondes,Fevrier;also,EtudesMoralesetLitteraircsparA.de
Broglie, SeealsoonVentura, Drownson's Quarterly Review, and Annates de
Philosophie Chretienne, Paris. To the same school belongs Liberatore, a Jesuit,
the author of Trwtitutlines Phllosophiaoe, Sitjjio aulta Conoscenza
Intellettuale, EthicaetJusNatural,Compendium LogicaletJfe- taphy»ivc. Liberatore
rejects the vision of God, as well as the doctrine of pure tradition, as the
principle of knowledge, and holds that human reason, aided by the senses and
the power of abstraction, can originate ideas, and attain truth and certainty
in the order of nature. But above nature and man there is the authority of the
Church, the only infallible guide in philosophy as well as in theology. To the
same School may bereferred Sanseverino, author of Philosophia Christianacumantl'juaetnovacomparata,
Crescenzio who wrote Seuole di Filosofia; Capozza, author of Sulla Filosofia
dei Padri e Dottori della Chiesa e in ixpecialitd d’Aquino in opposizione alla
filosofia moderna. Also Azeglio, a Jesuit, brother of the statesman of the same
name, the author of Etame Crltlco dei Ooverni Jiapprefsentativi delle Sorieta
Moderna, and Soggio teorico del Diritto Naturale fondato sull’esperienza. La
Clvilta Cattolica, a monthly Review, literary, political, and phillosophical,
published in Rome, is the principal organ of this sect. Since its origin it has
been chiefly edited by writers belonging to the Order of the Jesuits, such as
Liberatore, Perrone, Azeglio, Bresciani, and Curci. The fundamental idea of
this periodical is the insufficiency of human reason in all questions which
refer to religion, philosophy, morality, jurisprudence, and politics. European
civilization is the result of Catholicism, and it is onlv in Catholicism that
man and society can find a basis for their develop ment. Protestantism, liberty
of conscience and thought are only sources of infidelity and revolution, and it
is only by subjecting itself to the authority of the Church, that the human
mind can re-establish its natural relations with God and man. The revolution
which has made Italy one, having been carried out against the interests of the
Church, isa nti-Catholic and anti-Christian. These doctrines have received the sanction
of Piu sIX., who in his Syllabus condemns as monstrous errors the following
propositions. Moral science and philosophy are independent of the authority of
the Church. Philosophy may be treated without regard to revelation. The principles
and the method of the Scholastics are not in accordance with the need, and the
progress of science. Everyone may embrace that religion,which he in his conscience
may think true. Protestantism is a form of Christianity, in which man may
please God, equally as well as if he were in the Catholic Church. Common
schools ought to be exempted from the authority of the Church. These and other
propositions, proclaimed as religious errors, received formal condemnation from
the Church in the Council of the Vatican, through the dogmatic definition of
papal infallibility, the logical consequence of genuine Catholicism and the
highest synthesis of Scholasticism. Positivism, or rationalistic naturalism, as
implying the negation of all metaphysical science, is represented by Ferrari. A
Lombard by birth, and a disciple of Romagnosi, he early visits Paris, where he
becoes connected with the University of France, as associate doctor, he afterwards
holds a professorship at Strasbourg, which he iss obliged to resign on account
of his radical opinions. He returns to Italy, enters Parliament, and is appointed
professor of philosophy successively in Turin, Milan, and Florence. Admitting
as insoluble the antinomies of reason in the sense of Kant, Ferrari holds that
experience is the only foundation of truth. There are two species of contradiction
into which the mind may fall: the positive and thecritical. The former arise from
faults of reasoning, and may disappear through a verification of the intellectual
process. The latter are theresults of a fatal law of the mind, and cannot be avoided.
Kant reduces these contradictions to the ideas having reference to God, the
world, and man; but in fact they are numberless. They are in us and out of us;
they manifest themselves in our ideas and actions, in both the theoretical and the
practical order. The universality is the law of mind and nature. Hegel with an effort
of genius attempts to reduce them to a rational unity. But he succeeds only in
giving us a philosophy of contradictions. Hegel’s failure shows the
impossibility of metaphysical science, and the futility of the labours of
metaphysicians to find a relation between Nature and Logic. Between the two there
is no relation; the former is founded on the law of con trastand change, the
latter on identity. Hence there is an essential opposition between them, which
renders it impossible to represent unity in accordance with mental ideality.
Indeed the mind itself is subject to the law of opposition, so that in reality
an absolute identity even in the logical order is an impossibility. The effort
therefore to reduce nature and mind to scientific unity must ine vitably result
in transforming the critical antimonies into positive ones, and thus in making
error a necessity. The mind is neither superior nor equal to nature ; it is its
child ; and it is only in sub mission to nature that it can co-ordinate its
thoughts, determine its knowledge,andfindabasisforspeculation.
Phenomenalism,there fore, with all the oppositions which are revealed in the
ever-chang ing movement of nature, is the object as well as the limit of our
intelligence. The ideal relations, such as the relations of quality and
substance, of effect and cause, of finite and infinite, and all others which
relate to the supreme laws of nature and thought, are so many oppositions which
predominate in the universe, and in all our analyses ; they are the
inexplicable conditionsof our knowledge, and the insuperable limits of all science.
An impenetrable mystery envelopes them, and the mind cann either explain or.reconcile
them. Hence it follows that no absolute truth exists in the human mind, and
that philoophy is only so far true as it does not overstep the limits of a
phenomenal experience, the cause of which is an everlasting movement, and its
law a perpetual opposition. Led by these ideas, Ferrari attempts a
philosophical reconstruction of the political development of nations, founded
exclusively on experience and induction. Ferrari establishes therefore a general
and uniform type of this development, and divides I tinto four periods, each
comprising about thirty years. The first period is an epoch of preparation, in
which new ideas are manifested, and the genus of future events and laws deposited
in the soul of th epeople. This isfollowed by the period of explosion, in which
those germs, having reached their maturity, burst forth in explicit ideas, and
are transformed into politica laction. A phasis of reaction, next appears, by which
a temporary return is made to the ancient regime, and the new form of
civilization and the doctrines of revolution are momentarily suppressed. In this
phase the body politic finds itself in a kind of oscillation between the old
and the new, seeking its equilibrium. Finally, the last period completes the
movement through a solution, and it ends with ingrating the new ideas in the
minds of the people, and in the character of the government. Thus in France,
Louis X1Y. represents the first period, the revolution the second, the last
years of Napoleon and the kingdoms of Louis XVIII., Charles X., and Louis
Philippe the third, while the fourth begins in the revolution, is interrupted
by thes econd empire, and recommences with its fall. Ferrari is the author of “La
Mente di G. B.Vico”, “La Mente di G.D.Romagnosi”; “De l’Erreur”; “Vico e l’Italie”,
“Idees&urlaPoiii 51o de Platon et d'Aristote”, “Essai stir h Principe
et lea Limites de la Philosophie dell’histoire”, Histoire de hi RaisondeVEtat”;
“Histoire des Revolutions oVItalie, “Corso di Lezioni swjli Scrittori Politici
Italiani, Filosofia della Rivoluzione. Bonavino is another representative of this
School. In his youth he became a priest, but soon renounces this position, and
avows himself a rationalist and a naturalist. He is professor of the philosophy
of history at Pavia. In “La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane”, Bonavino attempts
a criticism of the philosophies of Rosmini, Gioberti, and Mamiani, and rejects
them all as exponents of old Scholasticism under new forms. Admitting the
negative part of the doctrine of Kant, Bonavino derives his positive ideas from
the French philosophers of the 18th century. Nature and its phenomena are the
limits of our knowledge, and time and space its exclusive conditions. There is no
other reality, which the mind can reach; there is no substance, no truth in
itself. The infinite is only the indefinite, and even this is not real,bu tideal.
In “Del Sentimento”, Bonavino rests his psychology on sensation, and makes this
the origin of all mental faculties. Applying these ideas to religion in his “La
Religione del Secolo 19°”, and in his “II Razionalismo del Popolo”, Bonavino borrows
from Feuerbach, from Comte and other positivists, the idea of humanity as the
basis and the object of a genuine rationalistic religion. In his Review, La Raaione,
he discussed the most important questions of philosophy, religion, and
politics, showing a decided tendency towards Socialism, yet maintain ing a
proper regard for the rights of property and the institution of thefamily. He is
also the author of “Lezioni sulla Storia della Filosofia Moderna” and of the
work “Sulla Teorica del Giudizio”. Moleschott, professor at Turin,in his “LaCirculation
de la Vie” and other numerous works on physiology, Tommasi, professor at Naples,
author of the Naturalismo Moderno, and other eminent physiologists and
scientists, contend that all knowledge is essentially relative and finite, and
that therefore all questions relating to the b solute and the Infinite are insoluble. Hence
they assert that the province of philosophy must be confined within the limits
of natural science. To this School, although from an entirely different
point of view, may be referred Villari, the authorof “La Storia di Savonarola,”
who in his “Saggi di Storia, Critica, e Politica” insists on the exclusive
application of the historical method to philosophical sciences, a method, the
adoption of which is urged by Lambruschini, the author of “Dell’Educazione e
dell'Istruzione”, “La Guida, dell’Educatore” and other valuable works on
education ; cf. his La Filosofia Positiva esaminata secondo I Principii della Pedagogia,
in the Gioventù of Florence, a weekly paper devoted to the progress of education.
The following writers, under different aspects, illustrate the contemporary
history of Positive Philosophy in Italy. Bissolati, “Introduzione alle
Istituzioni Pirroniane”, Secchi, “Unità delle Forze Fisiche”; Pozzolini, “Induzione
delle Forz Fisiche”; Barbera, “La Legge
universale di rotazione, and “Newton e la Filosofia naturale”; A.Martinozzoli,
“La Teoria detta Filosofia”; Bianco, “La Rivoluzione nela Filosofia, ossia il
Vero ed il Lecito applicati al Materialismo”; Dandolo, “Storia del Pensiero nei
tempi moderni”; G. Coco-Zanghi, “Antropologia: l’uomo e la scimmia”; Angiulli,
“La Filosofia e la Ricerca Positiva”, P. Siciliani, “Sul Rinnovamento della
Filosofia Positiva in Italia”; Barzellotti, “La morale nella Filosofia
Positiva”; Lanciano, “Saggio di Scienza Prima, Universo,T'Astroe, L’Individuo”;
Panizza, “Il Positivismo Filosofico e il Positivismo Scientifico”, “Lettere ad Tclmholtz”.
Vincenzo Botta. Keywords: filosofia
italiana, dall’A alla Z – indice di nome della storia della filosofia italiana
di Botta – Botta, storico dela fiosofia italiana, Botta su Alighieri, Botta su
Cavour, empiricismo, positivismo, Vico, criticismo, idealismo, scolasticismo,
ontologia, psicologia filosofica. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Botta” – The
Swimming-Pool Library.
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