conjunctum: There is the conjunctum, Grice notes, and the disjunctum,
and the adjunctum, as Myro was (adjunct professor). One has to be careful
because the scholastic vocabulary also misleadingly has ‘copulatum’ for this.
The ‘copulatum’ should be restricted to other usages, which Grice elaborates on
‘izzing’ and hazing. traditional parlance, one ‘pars orationis.’ Aulus Gellius writes; “What the Greeks call
“sympleplegmenon” we call conjunctum or copulatum, copulative sentence. For
example. The Stoic copulative sentence — sumpleplegmenon axioma — is translated
by “conjunctum” or “copulatum,” for example: „P. Scipio, son of Paulus, was a
consul twice and was given the honour of triumph and also performed the
function of censor and was the colleague of L. Mummius during his censorship”.
Here, Aulus Gellius made a noteworthy remark, referring to the value of truth
of the composing propositions ■ (a Stoic problem). In keeping with the Stoics,
he wrote: “If one element of the copulative sentence is false, even if all the
other elements are true, the copulative sentence is false” (“in omni aiitem
conjuncto si unum est mendacium etiamsi, caetera vera sunt, totum esse
mendacium dicitur”). In the identification of ‘and’ with ‘Λ’
there is already a considerable
distortion of the facts. ‘And’ can perform many jobs which ‘Λ’ cannot perform. It can, for instance, be used to couple
nouns (“Tom and William arrived”), or adjectives (“He was hungry and thirsty”),
or adverbs (“He walked slowly and painfully”); while ' . ' can be used only to
couple expressions which could appear as separate sentences. One might be
tempted to say that sentences in which “and” coupled words or phrases, were
short for sentences in which “and” couples clauses; e.g., that “He was hungry
and thirsty” was short for “He was hungry and he was thirsty.” But this is
simply false. We do not say, of anyone who uses sentences like “Tom and William
arrived,” that he is speaking elliptically, or using abbreviations. On the
contrary, it is one of the functions of “and,” to which there is no counterpart
In the case of “.,” to form plural subjects or compound predicates. Of course
it is true of many statements of the forms “x and y” are/* or ' x is /and g \
that they are logically equivalent to corresponding statements of the"
form * x Is /and yisf'oT^x is /and x is g \ But, first, this is a fact about
the use, in certain contexts, of “and,”
to which there corresponds no rule for the use of * . '. And, second, there are
countless contexts for which such an equivalence does not hold; e.g. “Tom and
Mary made friends” is not equivalent to “Tom made friends and Mary made
friends.” They mean, usually, quite different things. But notice that one could
say “Tom and Mary made friends; but not with one another.” The implication of
mutuality in the first phrase is not so strong but that it can be rejected
without self-contradiction; but it is strong enough to make the rejection a
slight shock, a literary effect. Nor does such an equivalence hold if we
replace “made friends” by “met yesterday,” “were conversing,” “got married,” or
“were playing chess.” Even “Tom and William arrived” does not mean the same as
“Tom arrived and William arrived;” for the first suggests “together” and the
second an order of arrival. It might be conceded that “and” has functions which
“ .” has not (e.g., may carry in certain contexts an implication of mutuality
which ‘.’ does not), and yet claimed
that the rules which hold for “and,” where it is used to couple clauses, are
the same as the rules which hold for “.” Even this is not true. By law (11),
" p , q ' is logically equivalent to * q . p ' ; but “They got married and
had a child” or “He set to work and found a job” are by no means logically
equivalent to “They had a child and got married” or “He found a job and set to
work.” One might try to avoid these difficulties by regarding ‘.’ as having the
function, not of ' and ', but of what it looks like, namely a full stop. We
should then have to desist from talking of statements of the forms ' p .q\ * p
. J . r * &CM and talk of sets-of-statements of these forms instead.
But this would not avoid all, though it would avoid some, of the difficulties.
Even in a passage of prose consisting of several indicative sentences, the
order of the sentences may be in general vital to the sense, and in particular,
relevant (in a way ruled out by law (II)) to the truth-conditions of a
set-of-statements made by such a passage. The fact is that, in general, in
ordinary speech and writing, clauses and sentences do not contribute to the
truthconditions of things said by the use of sentences and paragraphs in which
they occur, in any such simple way as that pictured by the truth-tables for the
binary connectives (' D ' * . ', 4 v ', 35 ') of the system, but in far more
subtle, various, and complex ways. But it is precisely the simplicity of the
way in which, by the definition of a truth-function, clauses joined by these
connectives contribute to the truth-conditions of sentences resulting from the
junctions, which makes possible the stylized, mechanical neatness of the
logical system. It will not do to reproach the logician for his divorce from
linguistic realities, any more than it will do to reproach the abstract painter
for not being a representational artist; but one may justly reproach him if he
claims to be a representational artist. An abstract painting may be,
recognizably, a painting of something. And the identification of “.” with
‘and,’ or with a full stop, is not a simple mistake. There is a great deal of
point in comparing them. The interpretation of, and rules for, “.”define a
minimal linguistic operation, which we might call ‘simple conjunction’ and
roughly describe as the joining together of two (or more) statements in the
process of asserting them both (or all). And this is a part of what we often do
with ' and ', and with the full stop. But we do not string together at random
any assertions we consider true; we bring them together, in spoken or written
sentences or paragraphs, only when there is some further reason for the
rapprochement, e.g., when they record successive episodes in a single
narrative. And that for the sake of which we conjoin may confer upon the
sentences embodying the conjunction logical features at variance with the rules
for “.” Thus we have seen that a statement of the form “p and q” may carry an
implication of temporal order incompatible with that carried by the
corresponding statement of the form “q and p.” This is not to deny that
statements corresponding to these, but of the forms ‘pΛq’ and ‘qΛp’would
be, if made, logically equivalent; for such statements would carry no
implications, and therefore no incompatible implications, of temporal order.
Nor is it to deny the point, and merit, of the comparison; the statement of the
form ‘pΛq’ means at least a part of what is
meant by the corresponding statement of the form ‘p and q.’ We might say: the form ‘p q’ is an abstraction from the
different uses of the form ‘p and q.’ Simple conjunction is a minimal element in
colloquial conjunction. We may speak of ‘. ‘ as the conjunctive sign; and read
it, for simplicity's sake, as “and” or “both … and … “I have already remarked
that the divergence between the meanings given to the truth-functional
constants and the meanings of the ordinary conjunctions with which they are
commonly identified is at a minimum in the cases of ' ~ ' and ‘.’ We have seen,
as well, that the remaining constants of the system can be defined in terms of
these two. Other interdefinitions are equally possible. But since ^’ and ‘.’ are more nearly identifiable with ‘not’ and
‘and’ than any other constant with any other English word, I prefer to
emphasize the definability of the remaining constants in terms of ‘ .’ and ‘~.’
It is useful to remember that every rule or law of the system can be expressed
in terms of negation and simple conjunction. The system might, indeed, be
called the System of Negation and Conjunction. Grice lists ‘and’ as the first
binary functor in his response to Strawson. Grice’s conversationalist
hypothesis applies to this central ‘connective.’ Interestingly, in his essay on
Aristotle, and discussing, “French poet,” Grice distinguishes between
conjunction and adjunction. “French” is adjuncted to ‘poet,’ unlike ‘fat’ in
‘fat philosopher.’ And
Grice:substructural logics, metainference, implicaturum. Grice explores some of
the issues regarding pragmatic enrichment and substructural logics with a
special focus on the first dyadic truth-functor, ‘and.’ In particular,
attention is given to a sub-structural “rule” pertaining to the commutativeness
of conjunction, applying a framework that sees Grice as clarifying the extra
material that must be taken into account, and which will referred to as the ‘implicaturum.’
Grice is thus presented as defending a “classical-logical” rule that assigns
commutativeness to conjunction while accounting for Strawson-type alleged
counterexamples to the effect that some utterances of the schema “p and q”
hardly allow for a ‘commutative’ “inference” (“Therefore, q and p”). How to
proceed conservatively while allowing room for pluralism? Embracing the
“classical-logical” syntactic introduction-cum-elimination and semantic
interpretation of “and,” the approach by Cook Wilson in “Statement and
inference” to the inferential métier of “and” is assessed. If Grice grants that
there is some degree of artificiality in speaking of the meaning or sense of
“and,” the polemic brings us to the realm of ‘pragmatic inference,’ now
contrasted to a ‘logical inference.’ The endorsement by Grice of an
‘impoverished’ reading of conjunction appears conservative vis-à-vis not just
Strawson’s ‘informalist’ picture but indeed the formalist frameworks of
relevant, linear, and ordered logic. An external practical decision à la Carnap
is in order, that allows for an enriched, stronger, reading, if not in terms of
a conventional implicaturum, as Strawson suggests. A ‘classical-logic’ reading
in terms of a conversational implicaturum agrees with Grice’s ‘Bootstrap,’ a
methodological principle constraining the meta-language/object-language divide.
Keywords: conjunction, pragmatic
enrichment, H. Paul Grice, Bootstrap. “[I]n recent years, my disposition to
resort to formalism has markedly diminished. This retreat may well have been
accelerated when, of all people, Hilary Putnam remarked to me that I was too
formal!”H.P. Grice, ‘Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and
opinions of Paul Grice,’ in Grandy & Warner, 1986:61 Keywords:
metainference, substructural logics, classical logic, conjunction, H. Paul
Grice, pragmatic inference; Rudolf Carnap, bootstrap, modernism, formalism,
neotraditionalism, informalism, pragmatics, inference, implicaturum,
extensional conjunction, intensional conjunction, multiplicative conjunction,
additive conjunction. Grice’s approach consistent with Rudolf Carnap’s logical
pluralism that allows room for the account put forward by H. Paul Grice in
connection with a specific meta-inference (or second-order “… yields …”) as it
may help us take an ‘external’ practical decision as to how to recapture a
structural ‘rule’ of classical logic. The attempt involves a reconsideration,
with a special focus on the sub-structural classical logic rules for
conjunction of Grice’s ultimately metaphilosophical motivation in the opening
paragraphs to “Logic and Conversation.” Grice explores stick the first dyadic truth-functor Grice lists. In
fact, it’s the first alleged divergence, between “p and q” and “p. . q” that
Grice had quotes in “Prolegomena” to motivate his audience, and the example he
brings up vis-à-vis an ‘alleged’ “linguistic offence” (a paradox?) that an
utterer may incur by uttering “He got into bed and took his clothes off, but I
don’t mean to suggest he did it in that order” (Grice 1981:186). Implicatura are
cancellable. In the present scheme, which justifies substructural logics, this
amounts to any ‘intensional’ reading of a connective (e. g. ‘and’) being
susceptible of being turned or ‘trans-formed’
into
the correlative extensional one in light of the cancelling clause, which brings
new information to the addressee A. This is hardly problematic if we consider
that sub-structural logics do not aim to capture the ‘semantics’ of a
logical constant, and that the sub-structural logical ‘enrichment’ is relevant,
rather, for the constant’s ‘inferential role.’Neither is it problematic that
the fact that the ‘inferential role’ of a logical constant (such as ‘and’) may
change (allowing this ‘trans-formation’ from classical-logical extensional to
sub-structural logical intension, given new information which will be used by
the addressee A to ‘work out’ the utterer U’s meaning. The obvious, but worthemphasizing, entailment in Grice’s
assertion about the “mistake” shared by Formalism and Informalism is that
FORMALISM (as per the standard presentations of ‘classical logic’) does commit
a mistake! Re-capturing the FORMALISM of classical logic is hardly as direct in
the Griceian programme as one would assume. Grice’s ultimate meta-philosophical
motivation, though, seems to be more in agreement with FORMALISM. Formalism can
repair the mistake, Grice thinks, not by allowing a change in the assigning of
an ‘interpretation’ rule of an empoverished “and” (““p and q” is 1 iff both p
and q are 1, 0 otherwise.” (Cfr. Pap: “Obviously,
I cannot prove that
“(p and q) ≡ (q and p)”
is tautologous (and that
therefore “He got into bed and took off his clothes’ iff ‘he took of his
clothes and got into bed,’) unless I first construct an adequate truth-table defining the use
of “and.” But surely one of the points of constructing such a table is to
‘reproduce’ or capture’ the meaning of ‘and’ in a natural language! The proposal
seems circular!) and a deductive ‘syntactics’ rule,
involving the Gentzen-type elimination of ‘and’ (“ “p and q” yields “p”; and
its reciprocal, “ “p and q” yields “q”.” To avoid commiting the mistake,
formalism must recognise the conversational implicaturum ceteris paribus
derived from some constraint of rational co-operation (in particular, the
desideratum or conversational maxim, “be orderly!”) and allow for some
syntactical scope device to make the implicaturum obvious, an ‘explicatum,’
almost (without the need to reinforce “and” into “and then”). In Grice’s
examples, it may not even be a VIOLATION, but a FLOUT, of a conversational
maxim or desideratum, within the observance of an overarching co-operation
principle (A violation goes unnoticed; a flout is a rhetorical device. Cfr.
Quintilian’s observation that Homer would often use “p & q” with the implicaturum
“but not in that order” left to the bard’s audience to work out). Grice’s attempt
is to recapture “classical-logic” “and,” however pragmatically ‘enriched,’
shares some features with other sub-structural logics, since we have allowed
for a syntactical tweak of the ‘inference’ rules; which we do via the
pragmatist (rather than pragmatic) ‘implicatural’ approach to logic,
highlighting one pragmatic aspect of a logic without CUT. Grice grants that “p and q” should read “p .
q” “when [“p . q” is] interpreted in the classical two-valued way.” His wording
is thus consistent with OTHER ways (notably relevant logic, linear and ordered
logic). Grice seems to have as one of his ‘unspeakable truths’ things like “He
got into bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a man who proceeds otherwise.”
After mentioning “and” “interpreted in the classical
two-valued way,” Grice dedicates a full
paragraph to explore the classical logic’s manifesto. The idea is to
provide a SYSTEM that will give us an algorithm to decide which formulae are
theorems. The ‘logical consequence’ (or “… yields …”) relation is given a
precise definition.Grice
notes that “some logicians [whom he does not mention] may at some time have
wanted to claim that there are in fact no such divergences [between “p and q”
and “p . q”]; but such claims, if made at all, have been somewhat rashly made,
and those suspected of making them have been subjected to some pretty rough
handling.” “Those who concede that such
divergences [do] exist” are the formalists. “An outline of a not
uncharacteristic FORMALIST position may be given as follows,” Grice notes. We
proceed to number the thesis since it sheds light on what makes a
sub-structural logic sub-structural“Insofar as logicians are concerned with the
formulation of very general patterns of VALID INFERENCE (“… yields…”) the
formal device (“p . q”) possesses a decisive advantage over their natural
counterpart (“p and q.”) For it will be possible to construct in terms of the
formal device (“p . q”) a system of very general formulas, a considerable
number of which can be regarded as, or are closely related to, a pattern of
inferences the expression of which involves the device.”“Such a system may
consist of a certain set of simple formulas that MUST BE ACCEPTABLE if the
device has the MEANING (or sense) that has been ASSIGNED to it, and an
indefinite number of further formulas, many of them less obviously acceptable (“q
. p”), each of which can be shown to be acceptable if the members of the
original set are acceptable.”“We have, thus, a way of handling dubiously
acceptable patterns of inference (“q. p,” therefore, “p. q”) and if, as is
sometimes possible, we can apply A DECISION PROCEDURE, we have an even better
way.”“Furthermore, from a PHILOSOPHICAL point of view, the possession by the
natural counterpart (“p and q”) of that element in their meaning (or sense),
which they do NOT share with the corresponding formal device, is to be regarded
as an IMPERFECTION; the element in question is an undesirable excrescence. For
the presence of this element has the result that the CONCEPT within which it
appears cannot be precisely/clearly defined, and that at least SOME statements
involving it cannot, in some circumstances, be assigned a definite TRUTH VALUE;
and the indefiniteness of this concept is not only objectionable in itself but
leaves open the way to METAPHYSICS: we cannot be certain that the
natural-language expression (“p and q”) is METAPHYSICALLY ‘LOADED.’”“For these
reasons, the expression, as used in natural speech (“p and q”), CANNOT be
regarded as finally acceptable, and may tum out to be, finally, not fully
intelligible.” “The proper course is to conceive and begin to construct an
IDEAL language, incorporating the formal device (“p . q”), the sentences of
which will be clear, determinate in TRUTH-VALUE, and certifiably FREE FROM
METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS.”“The foundations of SCIENCE will now be
PHILOSOPHICALLY SECURE, since the statements of the scientist will be
EXPRESSIBLE (though not necessarily actually expressed) within this ideal
language.”What kind of enrichment are we talking
about? It may be understood as a third conjunct ptn-l & qtn
& (tn > tn-l) FIRST
CONJUNCT + SECOND CONJUNCT + “TEMPORAL SUCCESSION” p AND THEN q To
buttress the buttressing of ‘and,’ Grice uses ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ for other
operators like ‘disjunction – and his rationale for the Modified Occam’s razor
would be: “A STRONGER SENSE for a truth-functional dyadic operator SHOULD NOT
BE POSTULATED when A WEAK (or minimal) SENSE does, provided we add the
CANCELLABLE IMPLICATURUM.” Grice SIMPLIFIES semantics, but there’s no free
lunch, since he now has to explain how the IMPLICATURUM arises. Let’s revise the way “and,” the first ‘dyadic’ device in
“Logic and Conversation,” is invoked by Grice in “Prolegomena.” “He got into
bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a someone who took his clothes off and
got into bed.” Cfr. theorems ∧I
= ` ∀ φ ψ• [φ; ψ] |= φ ∧
ψ ∧E = ` ∀
φ ψ• ([φ ∧ ψ] |= φ) ∧ ([φ ∧
ψ] |= ψ)We have: He got into bed and took his clothes off (Grice, 1989:9). He took his clothes off and got into bed (Grice, 1989:9). He got into bed and took his clothes off but I don’t want to
suggest that he did those things in that order (Grice, 1981:186). He first took his clothes off and then got into bed (Grice
1989:9). In invoking Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory, is Grice being
fair? Strawson had noted, provocatively: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
logically equivalent to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a
child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means logically equivalent
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’”How
easier things would have gone should Strawson have used the adjective
‘pragmatic’ that he mentions later in his treatise in connection with Grice. Strawson
is sticking with the truth-functionality and thinking of ‘equivalence’ in terms
of ‘iff’ – but his remark may be rephrased as involving a notion of
‘inference.’ In terms of LOGICAL INFERENCE, the premise “He got into bed and
took his clothes off” YIELDS “He took off his clothes and got into bed,” even
if that does NOT ‘yield’ in terms of ceteris paribus PRAGMATIC inference. It
would have pleased Grice to read the
above as: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
equivalentL to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had
a child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means equivalentP
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’” By appealing to a desideratum of rational co-operative
discourse, “be orderly,” Grice thinks he can restore “and” to its
truth-functional sense, while granting that the re-inforced “then” (or an
alleged extra sense of “temporal succession,” as he has it in “Prolegomena”) is
merely and naturally (if cancellable on occasion) conversationally implicated
(even if under a generalised way) under the assumption that the addressee A
will recognise that the utterer U is observing the desideratum, and is being
orderly. But witness variants to the cancellation (3) above. There is an indifferent,
indeterminate form: He got into bed and took off his clothes, though I don’t
mean to imply that he did that in that order.versus the less indeterminate He
got into bed and took his clothes off, but not in that order. +> i.e. in the
reverse one.Postulating a pragmatic desideratum allows Grice to keep any
standard sub-structural classical rule for “and” and “&” (as s he does when
he goes more formalist in “Vacuous Names,” his tribute to Quine).How are to
interpret the Grice/Strawson ‘rivalry’ in meta-inference? Using Frege’s
assertion “⊦LK” as our operator to read “… yields…” we have:p & q ⊦LK q & p and q & p ⊦LK p & q. In
“Prolegomena,” then, Grice introduces:“B. Examples involve an area of special
interest to me [since he was appointed logic tutor at St. John’s], namely
that of expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical
constants and which may, or may not, ‘diverge’ in meaning [not use] from the
related constants (considered as elements in a classical logic, standardly
interpreted). It has, for example, been suggested that because it would be
incorrect or inappropriate [or misleading, even false?] to say “He got into bed
and took off his clothes” of [someone] who first took off his clothes and then
got into bed, it is part of the meaning [or sense] or part of one meaning
[sub-sense] of “and” to convey temporal succession” (Grice 1989:8). The explanation
in terms of a reference to “be orderly” is mentioned in “Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum” (Grice 1981:186). Grice notes: “It has been suggested
by [an informalist like] Strawson, in [An] Introduction to Logical Theory [by
changing the title of Strawson’s essay, Grice seems to be implicating that
Strawson need not sound pretentious] that there is a divergence between the
ordinary use or meaning of ‘and’ and the conjunction sign [“.”] of
propositional or predicate calculus because “He took off his clothes and got
into to bed” does not seem to have the same meaning as “He got into bed and
took off his clothes.”” Grice goes on: “[Strawson’s] suggestion here is, of course, that, in order properly to represent
the ordinary use of [the word] “and,” one would
have to allow a special sense (or
sub-sense) for [the word] “and” which contained some reference to the idea that
what was mentioned before [the word]
“and” was temporally prior to what was mentioned after it, and that, on that
supposition, one could deal with this
case.”Grice goes on: “[Contra Strawson,] I want to suggest in reply that
it is not necessary [call him an Occamist,
minimalist] if one operates on some general principle [such as M. O. R., or Modified
Occam’s Razor] of keeping down, as far as
possible, the number of special sense [sic] of words that one has to
invoke, to give countenance to the alleged divergence of meaning.” The constraint is not an arbitrary assignation
of sense, but a rational one derived from the nature of conversation:“It is
just that there is a general supposition [which would be sub-sidiary to the
general maxim of Manner or ‘Modus’ (‘be perspicuous! [sic]’) that one presents
one's material in an orderly manner and, if what
one is engaged upon is a narration (if one is talking about events), then the most orderly manner for a narration
of events is an order that corresponds to
the order in which they took place.”Grice concludes: “So, the meaning of the
expression ‘He took off his clothes and he got into bed” and the corresponding expression with a [classical] logician's
constant "&" [when given a standard two-valued interpretation]
(i.e. “He took his clothes off & he got into
bed") would be exactly the same.”Grice’s
indifference with what type of formalism to adopt is obvious: “And, indeed, if
anybody actually used in ordinary speech the "&" as a piece of vocabulary instead of as a formal(ist)
device, and used it to connect together sentences of this type, they would collect just the same
[generalised conversational] implicatura as the ordinary English sentences have without any extra explanation
of the meaning of the word ‘and’.” It is
then that Grice goes on to test the ‘cancellability,’ producing the
typical Gricean idiom, above:He took his
clothes off and got into bed but I don't mean to suggest that he did those
things in that order. Grice goes on: “I
should say that I did suggest, in [my essay] on implicaturum, two sorts of tests by which one might hope to identify a conversational implicaturum.
[...] I did not mean to suggest that these tests were final, only that they
were useful. One test was the possibility of cancellation; that is to say,
could one without [classical] logical absurdity [when we have a standard
two-valued interpretation], attach a cancellation clause. For instance, could I
say (9)?” Grice: “If that is not a linguistic offense [and ‘false’], or does
not seem to be, then, so far as it goes, it is an indication that what one has
here is a conversational implicaturum, and that the original [alleged meaning,
sense, or] suggestion of temporal succession [is] not part of the conventional
meaning of the sentence.” Grice (1981, p. 186). Formalising the temporal succession
is never enough but it may help, and (9) becomes (10):p & q and ptn-l &
qtn where “tn-l” is a temporal index
for a time prior to “tn”. It is interesting to note that Chomsky, of all
people, in 1966, a year before Grice’s William James lectures, in Aspects of
the theory of syntax refers to “A [sic] P. Grice” as propounding that temporal
succession be considered implicaturum (Since this pre-dates the William James
lectures by a year, it was via the seminars at Oxford that reached Chomsky at
MIT via some of Grice’s tutees).Let us revise Urmson’s wording in his treatment
of the ‘clothes’ example, to check if Grice is being influenced by Urmson’s
presentation of the problem to attack Strawson. Urmson notes: “In
formal[ist] logic, the connective[…] ‘and’ [is] always given a minimum
[empoverished] meaning, as [I] have done above, such that any complex
[molecular sentence] formed by the use of [it] alone is [always] a
truth-function of its constituents.”Urmson goes on to sound almost like
Strawson, whose Introduction to Logical Theory he credits. Urmson notes: “In
ordinary discourse the connective[… ‘and]] often [has] a *richer* meaning.”Urmson
must be credited, with this use of ‘richer’ as the father of pragmatic
enRICHment!Urmson goes on: “Thus ‘He took his clothes off and got into bed’
implies temporal succession and has a different meaning from [the impoverished,
unreinforced] ‘He got into bed and took off his clothes.’” Urmson does not play
with Grice’s reinforcement: “He first got into bed and then took his clothes
off.’ Urmson goes on, however, in his concluding remark, to side with Grice
versus Strawson, as he should! Urmson notes: “[Formal(ist) l]ogicians would
justify their use of the minimum [impoverished, unreinforced, weak] meaning by
pointing out that it is the common element in all our uses [or every use] of
‘and.’” (Urmson, 1956:9-10). The
commutativeness of ‘and’ in the examples he gives is rejected by Strawson. How
does Strawson reflect this in his sub-structural rule for ‘and’?
As Humberstone puts it, “It
is possible to define a version of the calculus, which defines most of the
syntax of the logical operators by means of axioms, and which uses only one
inference rule.”Axioms: Let φ, χ and ψ stand for
well-formed formulae. The wff's themselves would not contain any Greek letters,
but only capital Roman letters, connective operators, and parentheses. The
axioms include:ANDFIRST-CONJUNCT: φ ∧ χ → φ and ANDSECOND-CONJUNCT:
φ ∧ χ → χ. Our (13) and (14) correspond to
Gentzen’s “conjunction elimination” (or (& -), as Grice has it in “Vacuous
Names.”). The relation between (13) and
(14) reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. Cfr. Cohen 1971: “Another conversational maxim of Grice's, “be orderly”, is intended to
govern such matters as the formalist can show that it was not appropriate to
postulate a special non-commutative temporal
conjunction.”“The locus classicus for complaints of this nature being Strawson (1952).” Note that
the commutative “and” is derived from Grice’s elimination of conjunction, “p
& q ⊦
p” and “p & q ⊦ q
-- as used by Grice in his system Q.Also note that the truth-evaluation would
be for Grice ‘semantic,’ rather than ‘syntactic’ as the commutative (understood
as part of elimination). Grice has it as: If phi and psi are formulae, “φ and ”
is 1 iff both φ and ψ are true, 0 otherwise. Grice grants that however “baffling” (or misleading)
would be to utter or assert (7) if no one has doubts about the temporal order of the
reported the events, due to the expectation that the utterer is observing the
conversational maxim “be orderly” subsumed under the conversational category of
‘Modus’ (‘be perspicuous! [sic]” – cfr. his earlier desideratum of
conversational clarity). Relevant logic (which was emerging by the time Grice
was delivering his William James lectures) introduces two different formal
signs for ‘conjunction’: the truth-functional conjunction relevant logicians
call ‘extensional’ conjunction, and they represent by (13).
Non-truth-functional conjunction is represented by ‘X’ and termed fusion or
‘intensional’ conjunction:
p ^ q versus p X q.
The truth-table for Strawson’s enriched uses of
“and” is not the standard one, since we require the additional condition that
“p predates q,” or that one conjunct predates the other. Playing with structural and substructural logical rules is
something Carnap would love perhaps more than Grice, and why not, Strawson?
They liked to play with ‘deviant’ logics. For Carnap, the choice of a logic is
a pragmatic ‘external’ decision – vide his principle of tolerance and the
rather extensive bibliography on Carnap as a logic pluralist. For Grice,
classical logic is a choice guided by his respect for ordinary language, WHILE
attempting to PROVOKE the Oxonian establishment by rallying to the defense of
an under-dogma and play the ‘skilful heretic’ (turning a heterodoxy into
dogma). Strawson is usually more difficult to classify! In his contribution to
Grandy & Warner (1986), he grants that Grice’s theory may be ‘more
beautiful,’ and more importantly, seems to suggest that his view be seen as
endorsing Grice’s account of a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum (For Strawson, ‘if’
(used for unasserted antecedent and consequence) conventionally implicates the
same inferrability condition that ‘so’ does for asserted equivalents. The
aim is to allow for a logically pluralist thesis, almost alla Carnap about the
‘inferential role’ of a logical constant such as ‘and’, which embraces
‘classical,’ (or ‘formalist,’ or ‘modernist’), relevant, linear and ordered
logic. PLURALISM (versus MONISM) has it that, for any logical constant c (such as “and”), “c” has more
than one *correct* inferential “role.” The pluralist thesis depends on a
specific interpretation of the vocabulary of sub-structural logics. According
to this specific interpretation, a classical logic captures the literal, or
EXPLICIT, explicatum, or truth-functional or truth-conditonal meaning, or what
Grice would have as ‘dictiveness’ of a logical constant. A sub-structural logic
(relevant logic, linear and ordered logic), on the other hand, encodes a
pragmatically,” i.e. not SEMANTICALLY, “-enriched sense” of a logical constant
such as “and.” Is this against the spirit of Grice’s overall thesis as
formulated in his “M. O. R.,” Modified Occam’s Razor, “Senses [of ‘and’] are
not to be multiplied beyond necessity”? But it’s precisely Grice’s Occamism (as
Neale calls it) that is being put into question. At Oxford, at the time, EVERYBODY (except
Grice!) was an informalist. He is coming to the defense of Russell, Oxford’s
underdog! (underdogma!). Plus, it’s important to understand the INFORMALISM
that Grice is attacking – Oxford’s ORTHO-doxy – seriously. Grice is being the
‘skilful HERETIC,’ in the words of his successor as Tutorial Fellow at Oxford,
G. P. Baker. We may proceed by four stages.
First, introduce the philosophical motivation for the pluralist thesis.
It sounds good to be a PLURALIST. Strawson was not. He was an informalist.
Grice was not, he was a post-modernist. But surely we not assuming that one
would want to eat the cake and have it! Second, introduce the calculus for the
different (or ‘deviant,’ as Haack prefers) logics endorsed in the pluralist
thesis – classical itself, relevant, linear and ordered logic. Third, shows how
the different “behaviours” of an item of logical vocabulary (such as “and”) of
each of these logics (and they all have variants for ‘conjunction.’ In the case
of ‘relevant’ logic, beyond Grice’s “&,” or classical conjunction, there is
“extensional conjunction,” FORMALISED as “p X q”, or fusion, and “INTENSIONAL
conjunction,” formalized by “p O q”. These can be, not semantically (truth-functionally,
or truth-conditional, or at the level of the EXPLICATUM), but pragmatically
interpreted (at the level of the IMPLICATURUM). Fourth, shows how the
*different* (or ‘deviant,’ or pluralist), or alternative inferential “roles”
(that justifies PLURALISM) that *two* sub-structural logics (say, Grice’s
classical “&” the Strawson’s informalist “and”) attribute to a logical
constant “c” can co-exist – hence pluralism. A particular version of logical
“pluralism” can be argued from the plurality of at least *two* alterative
equally legitimate formalisations of the logical vocabulary, such as the first
dyadic truth-functor, or connective, “and,” which is symbolized by Grice as
“&,” NOT formalized by Strawson (he sticks with “and”) and FORMALISED by
relevant logicians as ‘extensional’ truth-functional conjunction (fision, p X
a) and intentional non-truth-functional conjunction (p O q). In particular, it can be argued that the
apparent “rivalry” between classical logic (what Grice has as Modernism, but he
himself is a post-modernist) and relevant logic (but consider Grice on
Strawson’s “Neo-Traditionalism,” first called INFORMALISM by Grice) can be
resolved, given that both logics capture and formalise normative and legitimate
alternative senses of ‘logical consequence.’ A revision of
the second paragraph to “Logic and Conversation” should do here. We can
distinguish between two operators for “… yields …”: ├ and ├: “A1, A2, … An├MODERNISM/FORMALISM-PAUL B” and “A1, A2, … An├NEO-TRADITIONALISM/INFORMALISM-PETER
B. As Paoli has it: “[U]pholding weakening amounts to failing to
take at face value the [slightly Griceian] expression ‘assertable on the basis
of’.’”Paoli goes on:“If I am in a
position to assert [the conclusion q, “He took his clothes off and got into
bed”] on the basis of the information provided by [the premise p, “He got into
bed and took his clothes off”], I need NOT be in a position to assert the
conclusion P [“He took his clothes off and got into bed”] on the basis of both
p (“He got into bed and took off his clothes” and an extra premise C - where C
is just an idle assumption (“The events took place in the order reported”) ,
irrelevant to my conclusion.”Can we regard Strawson as holding that
UNFORMALISED “and” is an INTENSIONAL CONJUNCTION? Another option is to see
Strawson as holding that the UNFORMALISED “and” can be BOTH truth-functional
and NON-truth-functional (for which case, the use of a different expression,
“and THEN,” is preferred). The Gricean theory of implicaturum is capable of
explaining this mismatch (bewtween “and” and “&”).Grice argues that the
[truth-conditional, truth-functional] semantics [DICTUM or EXPLICATUM, not IMPLICATURUM
– cfr. his retrospective epilogue for his view on DICTIVENESS] of “and”
corresponds [or is identical, hence the name of ‘identity’ thesis versus
‘divergence’ thesis] to the classical “∧,” & of
Russell/Whitehead, and Quine, and Suppes, and that the [truth-functional semantics
of “if [p,] [q]” corresponds to the classical p ⊃ q.” There is scope
for any theory capable of resolving or [as Grice would have it] denying the
apparent disagreement [or ‘rivalry’] among two or more logics.” What Grice does
is DENY THE APPARENT DISAGREEMENT. It’s
best to keep ‘rivalry’ for the fight of two ‘warring camps’ like FORMALISM and
INFORMALISM, and stick with ‘disagreement’ or ‘divergence’ with reference to
specific constants. For Strawson, being a thorough-bred Oxonian, who perhaps
never read the Iliad in Greek – he was Grice’s PPE student – the RIVALRY is not
between TWO different formalisations, but between the ‘brusque’ formalisation
of the FORMALISTS (that murder his English!) and NO FORMALISATION at all. Grice
calls this ‘neo-traditionalist,’ perhaps implicating that the
‘neo-traditionalists’ WOULD accept some level of formalisation (Aristotle did!)
ONLY ONE FORMALISATION, the Modernism. INFORMALISM or Neo-Traditionalism aims
to do WITHOUT formalisation, if that means using anything, but, say, “and” and
“and then”. Talk of SENSES helps. Strawson may say that “and” has a SENSE which
differs from “&,” seeing that he would find “He drank the poison and died,
though I do not mean to imply in that order” is a CONTRADICTION. That is why
Strawson is an ‘ordinary-LANGUAGE philosopher,” and not a logician! (Or should
we say, an ‘ordinary-language logician’? His “Introduction to Logical Theory”
was the mandatory reading vademecum for GENERATIONS of Oxonians that had to
undergo a logic course to get their M. A. Lit. Hum.Then there’s what we can
call “the Gricean picture,” only it’s not too clear who painted it!We may agree
that there is an apparent “mismatch,” as opposed to a perfect “match” that
Grice would love! Grice thought with Russell that grammar is a pretty good
guide to logical form. If the utterer says “and” and NOT “and then,” there is
no need to postulate a further SENSE to ‘and.’Russell would criticize
Strawson’s attempt to reject modernist “&” as a surrogate for “and” as
Strawson’s attempt to regress to a stone-age metaphysics. Grice actually at
this point, defended Strawson: “stone-age PHYSICS!” And this relates to “…
yields…” and Frege’s assertion “/-“ as ‘Conclusion follows from Premise’ where
‘Premise yields Conclusion’ seems more natural in that we preserve the order
from premise to conclusion. We shouldn’t underestimate one crucial feature of
an implicaturum: its cancellability, on which Grice expands quite a bit in
1981: “He got into bed and took his clothes off, although I don’t intend to
suggest, in any shape or form, that he proceed to do those things in the order
I’ve just reported!”The lack of any [fixed, rigid, intolerant] structural rule
implies that AN INSTANCE I1 of the a logical constant (such as “and”) that
*violate* any of Grice’s conversational maxim (here “be orderly!”) associated
with the relevant structural rule [here we may think of ADDITION AND
SIMPLIFICATION as two axioms derived from the Gentzen-type elimination of
“and”, or the ‘interpretation’ of ‘p & q’ as 1 iff both p and q are 1, but
0 otherwise] and for which the derived conversational implicaturum is false
[“He went to bed and took his clothes off, but not in that order!”] should be
distinguished from ANY INSTANCE I2 that does NOT violate the relevant maxim (“be
orderly”) and for which the conversational IMPLICATURUM (“tn > tn-l”) is
true.” We may nitpick here.Grice would rather prefer, ‘when the IMPLICATURUM
applies.” An implicaturum is by definition cancellable (This is clear when
Grice expands in the excursus “A causal theory of perception.” “I would hardly
be said to have IMPLIED that Smith is hopeless in philosophy should I utter,
“He has beautiful handwriting; I don’t mean to imply he is hopeless in
philosophy,” “even if that is precisely what my addressee ends up thinking!”When
it comes to “and,” we are on clearer ground. The kinds of “and”-implicaturums
may be captured by a distinction of two ‘uses’ of conjunctions in a single substructural
system S that does WITHOUT a ‘structural rule’ such as exchange, contraction or
both. Read, relies, very UNLIKE Strawson, on wo FORMALISATIONS besides “and”
(for surely English “and” does have a ‘form,’ too, pace Strawson) in Relevant
Logic: “p ^ q” and “p X q.” “p ^ q” and
“p X q” have each a different inferential role. If the reason the UTTERER has
to assert it – via the DICTUM or EXPLICATUM [we avoid ‘assert’ seeing that we
want logical constants to trade on ‘imperative contexts,’ too – Grice, “touch
the beast and it will bite you!” -- is the utterer’s belief that Smith took his
clothes AND THEN got into bed, it would be illegitimate, unwarranted, stupid,
otiose, incorrect, inappropriate, to infer that Smith did not do these two
things in that order upon discovering that he in fact DID those things in the
order reported. The very discovery that
Smith did the things in the order reported would “just spoil” or unwarrant the
derivation that would justify our use of “… yields …” (¬A ¬(A u B) A ¬B”). As Read notes, we have ADJUNCTION ‘p and q’
follows from p and q – or p and q yields ‘p and q.’ And we have SIMPLIFICATION:
p and q follow from ‘p and q,’ or ‘p and q’ yields p, and ‘p and q’ yields q.”
Stephen Read: “From adjunction and simplification we can infer, by
transitivity, that q follows from p and q, and so by the Deduction Equivalence,
‘if p, q’ follows from q.’” “However, […] this has the unacceptable consequence
that ‘if’ is truth-functional.” “How can
this consequence be avoided?” “Many options are open.” “We can reject the
transitivity of entailment, the deduction equivalence, adjunction, or
simplification. Each has been tried; and each seems contrary to intuition.” “We
are again in the paradoxical situation that each of these conceptions seems
intuitively soundly based; yet their combination appears to lead to something
unacceptable.” “Are we nonetheless forced to reject one of these plausible
principles?” “Fortunately, there is a fifth option.” Read: “There is a familiar
truth-functional conjunction, expressed by ‘p and q’, which entails each of p
and q, and so for the falsity (Grice’s 0) of which the falsity of either
conjunct suffices, and the truth of both for the truth of the whole.” “But
there is also a NON-truth-functional conjunction, a SENSE of ‘p and q’ whose
falsity supports the inference from p to ‘~q’.” “These two SENSES of
‘conjunction’ cannot be the same, for, if the ground for asserting ‘not-(p and
q)’ (e.g. “It is not the case that he got into bed and took off his clothes”)
is simply that ‘p’ is false, to learn that p is true, far from enabling one to
proceed to ‘~q’, undercuts the warrant for asserting ‘~(p & q)’ in the
first place.” “In this sense, ‘~(p & q)’ is weaker than both ‘~p’ and ‘~q’,
and does not, even with the addition of p, entail ‘~q’, even though one
possible ground for asserting ‘~(p & q))’, viz ‘~q’, clearly does.” Stephen
Read: “The intensional sense of ‘and’ is often referred to as fusion; I will
use the symbol ‘×’ for it. Others write ‘◦.’”We add some relevant observations
by a palaeo-Griceian: Ryle. Ryle often felt
himself to be an outsider. His remarks on “and” are however illuminating in the
context of our discussion of meta-inference in substructural logic.Ryle writes:
“I have spoken as if our ordinary ‘and’ […] [is] identical with the logical
constant with which the formal logician operates.”“But this is not true.”“The
logician’s ‘and’ […] [is] not our familiar civilian term[…].”“It is [a]
conscript term, in uniform and under military discipline, with memories,
indeed, of [its] previous more free and easy civilian life, though it is not
leaving that life now.”“If you hear on good authority that she took arsenic and
fell ill you will reject the rumour that she fell ill and took arsenic.”“This
familiar use of ‘and’ carries with it the temporal notion expressed by ‘and
subsequently’ and even the causal notion expressed by ‘and in
consequence.’”“The logician’s conscript ‘and’ does only its appointed duty – a
duty in which ‘she took arsenic and fell ill’ is an absolute paraphrase of ‘she
fell ill and took arsenic.’ This might be call the minimal force of ‘and.’”
(Ryle,, 1954:118). When we speaks of PRAGMATIC enrichment, we obviously
don’t mean SEMANTIC enrichment. There is a distinction, obviously, between the
‘pragmatic enrichment’ dimension, as to whether the ‘enriched’ content is
IMPLICATED or, to use a neologism, ‘EX-plicated.’ Or cf. as Kent Bach would
prefer, “IMPLICITATED” (vide his “Implciture.”) Commutative
law: p & q iff q & p. “Axiom AND-1” and “Axiom AND-2” correspond
to "conjunction elimination". The relation between “AND-1” and
“AND-2” reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. A VERY IMPORTANT POINT to consider is Grice’s
distinction between ‘logical inference’ and ‘pragmatic inference.’ He does so
in “Retrospective Epilogue” in 1987. “A few years after the appearance of […]
Introduction to Logical Theory, I was devoting much attention to what might be
loosely called the distinction between logical and pragmatic inferences. … represented
as being a matter not of logical but of pragmatic import.” (Grice
1987:374).Could he be jocular? He is emphasizing the historical role of his
research. He mentions FORMALISM and INFORMALISM and notes that his own interest
in maxims or desiderata of rational discourse arose from his interest to
distinguish between matters of “logical inference” from those of “pragmatic
inference.” Is Grice multiplying ‘inference’ beyond necessity? It would seem
so. So it’s best to try to reformulate his proposal, in agreement with logical
pluralism.By ‘logical inference’ Grice must mean ‘practical/alethic
satisfactoriness-based inference,’ notably the syntactics and semantics
(‘interpretative’) modules of his own System Q. By ‘pragmatic inference’ he
must mean a third module, the pragmatic module, with his desiderata. We may say
that for Grice ‘logical inference’ is deductive (and inductive), while
‘pragmatic inference’ is abductive. Let us apply this to the ‘clothes off’
exampleThe Utterer said: “Smith got into bed and took his clothes off, but I’m
reporting the events in no particular order.” The ‘logical inference’ allows to
treat ‘and’ as “&.” The ‘pragmatic inference’ allows the addressee to
wonder what the utterer is meaning! Cf. Terres on “⊢k” for “logical inference” and “⊢r,” “⊢l,” and “⊢o,” for pragmatic inference, and where the
subscripts “k,” “r,” “l” and “o” stand for ‘classical,’ ‘relevant,’ ‘linear’
and ‘ordered’ logic respectively, with each of the three sub-structural
notions of “follows from” or “… yields …”
require the pragmatic enrichment
of a logical constant, that ‘classical logical’ inference may retain the
‘impoverished’ version (Terres, 2019, Inquiry, p. 13). Grice himself
mentions this normative dimension: “I would like to be able to
think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely
as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE
for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon.”Grice, 1989a, p.48]However, the
fact that we should observe the conversational maxims may not yet be a reason
for endorsing the allegedly ‘deviant’
inferential role of a logical constant in the three sub-structural logics under
examination.The legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ ‘inferential role’ of each constant
in each sub-structural logic emerges, rather from at least two sources.A first
source is a requirement for logic (or reasoning) to be normative: that its
truth-bearers [or satisfactoriness-bearers, to allow for ‘imperative’-mode
inferences) are related to what Grice calls ‘psychological attitudes’ of
‘belief’ (indicative-mode inference) and ‘desire’ (imperative-mode inference)
(Grice, 1975, cfr. Terres, Inquiry, 2019, p. 13). As Steinberg puts it:“Presumably,
if logic is normative for thinking or reasoning, its normative force will stem,
at least in part, from the fact that truth bearers which act as the relata of
our consequence relation and the bearers of other logical properties are
identical to (or at least are very closely related in some other way) to the
objects of thinking or reasoning: the contents of one’s mental states or acts
such as the content of one’s beliefs or inferences, for example.”[Steinberger,
2017a – and cf. Loar’s similar approach when construing Grice’s maxims as
‘empirical generalisations’ of ‘functional states’ for a less committed view of
the embedding of logical and pragmatic inference within the scope of psychological-attitude
ascriptions). A second source for the legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ inferential
role is the fact that the pragmatic enrichment of the logical vocabulary (both
a constant and ‘… yields …) is part, or a ‘rational-construction,’ of our
psychological representation of certain utterances involving the natural
counterparts of those constants. This may NOT involve a new sense of ‘and’ which is
with what Grice is fighting. While the relevant literature emphasizes “reasons
to assert” (vide Table on p. 9, Terres, 2019), it is worth pointing out that
the model should be applicable to what we might broadly construe as ‘deontic’
reasoning (e.g. Grice on “Arrest the intruder!” in Grice 1989, and more
generally his practical syllogisms in Grice 2001). We seem to associate
“assert” with ‘indicative-mode’ versions only of premise and conclusion.
“Reasons to express” or “reasons to make it explicit” may serve as a
generalization to cover both “indicative-mode” and “imperative-mode” versions
of the inferences to hand. When Grice says that, contra Strawson, he wants to
see things in terms of ‘pragmatic inference,’ not ‘logical inference,’ is he
pulling himself up by his own bootstraps? Let us clarify.When thinking of what META-language need be used to
formulate both Grice’s final account vis-à-vis Strawson’s, it is relevant to
mention that Grice once invoked what he called the “Bootstrap” principle. In
the course of considering a ‘fine distinction’ in various levels of conceptual
priority, slightly out of the blue, he adds – this is from “Prejudices and
predilections, which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice,” so expect
some informality, and willingness to amuse: “It is perhaps reasonable to regard
such fine distinctions as indispensable if we are to succeed in the business of
pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps,” Grice writes. And then trust him
to add: “In this connection, it will be relevant for me to say that I once
invented (though I did not establish its validity) a principle which I labelled
as ‘Bootstrap.’” Trust him to call with a good title. “The principle,” Grice
goes on, “laid down that, when one is introducing some primitive concept [such
as conjunction] of a theory [or calculus or system] formulated in an
object-language [G1], one has freedom to use any concept from a
battery of concepts expressible in the meta-language [System G2],
subject to the condition that a *counterpart* of such a concept [say,
‘conjunction’] is sub-sequently definable, or otherwise derivable, in the
object-language [System G1].”Grice concludes by emphasizing the
point of the manoeuvre: “So, the more
economically one introduces a primitive object-language concept, the less of a
task one leaves oneself for the morrow.” [Grice 1986]. With
uncharacteristic humbleness, Grice notes that while he was able to formulate
and label “Bootstrap,” he never cared to establish its ‘validity.’ We hope we
have! “Q. E. D.,” as they say! Cf. Terres, 2019, Inquiry, p. 17: In conclusion,
the pragmatic interpretation of substructural logics may be a new and
interesting research field for the logical pluralist who wishes to endorse
classical and/or substructural logics, but also for the logical monist who aims
to interpret their divergence with a pluralist logician. The possibility is
also open of an interesting dialogue between philosophical logicians and
philosophers of language as they explore the pragmatic contributions of a
logical constant to the meaning of a complete utterance, given that a
substructural logic encodes what has been discussed by philosophers of
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Principia Mathematica. Cambridge University Press.
Conjunctum -- conjunction, the logical operation on a pair of
propositions that is typically indicated by the coordinating conjunction ‘and’.
The truth table for conjunction is Besides ‘and’, other coordinating
conjunctions, including ‘but’, ‘however’, ‘moreover’, and ‘although’, can
indicate logical conjunction, as can the semicolon ‘;’ and the comma ‘,’. conjunction elimination. 1 The argument form
‘A and B; therefore, A or B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference
that permits one to infer either conjunct from a conjunction. This is also
known as the rule of simplification or 8-elimination. conjunction introduction. 1 The argument form
‘A, B; therefore, A and B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference
that permits one to infer a conjunction from its two conjuncts. This is also
known as the rule of conjunction introduction, 8-introduction, or adjunction. Conjunctum
-- Why Grice used inverse V as symbol for “and” Conjunctum -- De Morgan, A.
prolific British mathematician, logician, and philosopher of mathematics and
logic. He is remembered chiefly for several lasting contributions to logic and
philosophy of logic, including discovery and deployment of the concept of
universe of discourse, the cofounding of relational logic, adaptation of what are
now known as De Morgan’s laws, and several terminological innovations including
the expression ‘mathematical induction’. His main logical works, the monograph
Formal Logic 1847 and the series of articles “On the Syllogism” 184662,
demonstrate wide historical and philosophical learning, synoptic vision,
penetrating originality, and disarming objectivity. His relational logic
treated a wide variety of inferences involving propositions whose logical forms
were significantly more complex than those treated in the traditional framework
stemming from Aristotle, e.g. ‘If every doctor is a teacher, then every
ancestor of a doctor is an ancestor of a teacher’. De Morgan’s conception of
the infinite variety of logical forms of propositions vastly widens that of his
predecessors and even that of his able contemporaries such as Boole, Hamilton,
Mill, and Whately. De Morgan did as much as any of his contemporaries toward
the creation of modern mathematical logic.
-- De Morgan’s laws, the logical principles - A 8 B S - A 7 - B, - A 7 B
S - A 8 - B, - -A 8 - B S A 7 B, and - - A 7 - B S A 8 B, though the term is
occasionally used to cover only the first two. Refs.The
main published source is “Studies in the Way of Words” (henceforth, “WOW”), I
(especially Essays 1 and 4), “Presupposition and conversational implicaturum,”
in P. Cole, and the two sets on ‘Logic and conversation,’ in The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC.
connectum – from con-nexus –
nexus is the key – connection – syntagma –syncategoremata – categoremata -- connected,
said of a relation R where, for any two distinct elements x and y of the
domain, either xRy or yRx. R is said to be strongly connected if, for any two
elements x and y, either xRy or yRx, even if x and y are identical. Given the
domain of positive integers, for instance, the relation ‹ is connected, since
for any two distinct numbers a and b, either a ‹ b or b ‹ a. ‹ is not strongly
connected, however, since if a % b we do not have either a ‹ b or b ‹ a. The
relation o, however, is Confucius connected 174 174 strongly connected, since either a o b
or b o a for any two numbers, including the case where a % b. An example of a
relation that is not connected is the subset relation 0, since it is not true
that for any two sets A and B, either A 0 B or B 0 A. connectionism, an approach to modeling
cognitive systems which utilizes networks of simple processing units that are
inspired by the basic structure of the nervous system. Other names for this
approach are neural network modeling and parallel distributed processing.
Connectionism was pioneered in the period 065 by researchers such as Frank
Rosenblatt and Oliver Selfridge. Interest in using such networks diminished
during the 0s because of limitations encountered by existing networks and the
growing attractiveness of the computer model of the mind according to which the
mind stores symbols in memory and registers and performs computations upon
them. Connectionist models enjoyed a renaissance in the 0s, partly as the
result of the discovery of means of overcoming earlier limitations e.g.,
development of the back-propagation learning algorithm by David Rumelhart,
Geoffrey Hinton, and Ronald Williams, and of the Boltzmann-machine learning
algorithm by David Ackley, Geoffrey Hinton, and Terrence Sejnowski, and partly
as limitations encountered with the computer model rekindled interest in
alternatives. Researchers employing connectionist-type nets are found in a
variety of disciplines including psychology, artificial intelligence,
neuroscience, and physics. There are often major differences in the endeavors
of these researchers: psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers are
interested in using these nets to model cognitive behavior, whereas
neuroscientists often use them to model processing in particular neural
systems. A connectionist system consists of a set of processing units that can
take on activation values. These units are connected so that particular units
can excite or inhibit others. The activation of any particular unit will be
determined by one or more of the following: inputs from outside the system, the
excitations or inhibitions supplied by other units, and the previous activation
of the unit. There are a variety of different architectures invoked in
connectionist systems. In feedforward nets units are clustered into layers and
connections pass activations in a unidirectional manner from a layer of input
units to a layer of output units, possibly passing through one or more layers
of hidden units along the way. In these systems processing requires one pass of
processing through the network. Interactive nets exhibit no directionality of
processing: a given unit may excite or inhibit another unit, and it, or another
unit influenced by it, might excite or inhibit the first unit. A number of
processing cycles will ensue after an input has been given to some or all of
the units until eventually the network settles into one state, or cycles
through a small set of such states. One of the most attractive features of
connectionist networks is their ability to learn. This is accomplished by
adjusting the weights connecting the various units of the system, thereby
altering the manner in which the network responds to inputs. To illustrate the
basic process of connectionist learning, consider a feedforward network with
just two layers of units and one layer of connections. One learning procedure
commonly referred to as the delta rule first requires the network to respond,
using current weights, to an input. The activations on the units of the second
layer are then compared to a set of target activations, and detected
differences are used to adjust the weights coming from active input units. Such
a procedure gradually reduces the difference between the actual response and
the target response. In order to construe such networks as cognitive models it
is necessary to interpret the input and output units. Localist interpretations
treat individual input and output units as representing concepts such as those
found in natural language. Distributed interpretations correlate only patterns
of activation of a number of units with ordinary language concepts. Sometimes
but not always distributed models will interpret individual units as
corresponding to microfeatures. In one interesting variation on distributed representation,
known as coarse coding, each symbol will be assigned to a different subset of
the units of the system, and the symbol will be viewed as active only if a
predefined number of the assigned units are active. A number of features of
connectionist nets make them particularly attractive for modeling cognitive
phenomena in addition to their ability to learn from experience. They are
extremely efficient at pattern-recognition tasks and often generalize very well
from training inputs to similar test inputs. They can often recover complete
patterns from partial inputs, making them good models for content-addressable
memory. Interactive networks are particularly useful in modeling cognitive
tasks in which multiple constraints must be satisfied simultaneously, or in
which the goal is to satisfy competing constraints as well as possible. In a
natural manner they can override some constraints on a problem when it is not
possible to satisfy all, thus treating the constraints as soft. While the
cognitive connectionist models are not intended to model actual neural
processing, they suggest how cognitive processes can be realized in neural
hardware. They also exhibit a feature demonstrated by the brain but difficult
to achieve in symbolic systems: their performance degrades gracefully as units
or connections are disabled or the capacity of the network is exceeded, rather
than crashing. Serious challenges have been raised to the usefulness of
connectionism as a tool for modeling cognition. Many of these challenges have
come from theorists who have focused on the complexities of language,
especially the systematicity exhibited in language. Jerry Fodor and Zenon
Pylyshyn, for example, have emphasized the manner in which the meaning of
complex sentences is built up compositionally from the meaning of components,
and argue both that compositionality applies to thought generally and that it
requires a symbolic system. Therefore, they maintain, while cognitive systems
might be implemented in connectionist nets, these nets do not characterize the
architecture of the cognitive system itself, which must have capacities for
symbol storage and manipulation. Connectionists have developed a variety of
responses to these objections, including emphasizing the importance of cognitive
functions such as pattern recognition, which have not been as successfully
modeled by symbolic systems; challenging the need for symbol processing in
accounting for linguistic behavior; and designing more complex connectionist
architectures, such as recurrent networks, capable of responding to or
producing systematic structures.
connotatum –a variation on
notatum, cf. denotatum -- adnotatum,
annotate -- intension -- connotation. 1 The ideas and associations brought to
mind by an expression used in contrast with ‘denotation’ and ‘meaning’. 2 In a
technical use, the properties jointly necessary and sufficient for the correct
application of the expression in question.
sequentia: consequentia – “In
‘consequentia,’ the ‘con’ is possibly otiose, as cons usually are.” -- consequentialism,
the doctrine that the moral rightness of an act is determined solely by the
goodness of the act’s consequences. Prominent consequentialists include J. S.
Mill, Moore, and Sidgwick. Maximizing versions of consequentialism the most common sort hold that an act is morally right if and only
if it produces the best consequences of those acts available to the agent.
Satisficing consequentialism holds that an act is morally right if and only if
it produces enough good consequences on balance. Consequentialist theories are
often contrasted with deontological ones, such as Kant’s, which hold that the
rightness of an act is determined at least in part by something other than the
goodness of the act’s consequences. A few versions of consequentialism are
agentrelative: that is, they give each agent different aims, so that different
agents’ aims may conflict. For instance, egoistic consequentialism holds that
the moral rightness of an act for an agent depends solely on the goodness of
its consequences for him or her. However, the vast majority of consequentialist
theories have been agent-neutral and consequentialism is often defined in a
more restrictive way so that agentrelative versions do not count as
consequentialist. A doctrine is agent-neutral when it gives to each agent the
same ultimate aims, so that different agents’ aims cannot conflict. For
instance, utilitarianism holds that an act is morally right if and only if it produces
more happiness for the sentient beings it affects than any other act available
to the agent. This gives each agent the same ultimate aim, and so is
agent-neutral. Consequentialist theories differ over what features of acts they
hold to determine their goodness. Utilitarian versions hold that the only
consequences of an act relevant to its goodness are its effects on the
happiness of sentient beings. But some consequentialists hold that the
promotion of other things matters too
achievement, autonomy, knowledge, or fairness, for instance. Thus
utilitarianism, as a maximizing, agent-neutral, happiness-based view is only
one of a broad range of consequentialist theories. consequentia mirabilis, the logical principle
that if a statement follows from its own negation it must be true. Strict
consequentia mirabilis is the principle that if a statement follows logically
from its own negation it is logically true. The principle is often connected
with the paradoxes of strict implication, according to which any statement
follows from a contradiction. Since the negation of a tautology is a
contradiction, every tautology follows from its own negation. However, if every
expression of the form ‘if p then q’ implies ‘not-p or q’ they need not be
equivalent, then from ‘if not-p then p’ we can derive ‘not-not-p or p’ and by
the principles of double negation and repetition derive p. Since all of these
rules are unexceptionable the principle of consequentia mirabilis is also
unexceptionable. It is, however, somewhat counterintuitive, hence the name ‘the
astonishing implication’, which goes back to its medieval discoverers or
rediscoverers.
consistens: in traditional
Aristotelian logic, a semantic notion: two or more statements are called
consistent if they are simultaneously true under some interpretation cf., e.g.,
W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, 1870. In modern logic there is a
syntactic definition that also fits complex e.g., mathematical theories
developed since Frege’s Begriffsschrift 1879: a set of statements is called
consistent with respect to a certain logical calculus, if no formula ‘P &
P’ is derivable from those statements by the rules of the calculus; i.e., the
theory is free from contradictions. If these definitions are equivalent for a
logic, we have a significant fact, as the equivalence amounts to the
completeness of its system of rules. The first such completeness theorem was
obtained for sentential or propositional logic by Paul Bernays in 8 in his
Habilitationsschrift that was partially published as Axiomatische Untersuchung
des Aussagen-Kalküls der “Principia Mathematica,” 6 and, independently, by Emil
Post in Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions, 1; the
completeness of predicate logic was proved by Gödel in Die Vollständigkeit der
Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, 0. The crucial step in such proofs
shows that syntactic consistency implies semantic consistency. Cantor applied
the notion of consistency to sets. In a well-known letter to Dedekind 9 he
distinguished between an inconsistent and a consistent multiplicity; the former
is such “that the assumption that all of its elements ‘are together’ leads to a
contradiction,” whereas the elements of the latter “can be thought of without
contradiction as ‘being together.’ “ Cantor had conveyed these distinctions and
their motivation by letter to Hilbert in 7 see W. Purkert and H. J. Ilgauds,
Georg Cantor, 7. Hilbert pointed out explicitly in 4 that Cantor had not given
a rigorous criterion for distinguishing between consistent and inconsistent
multiplicities. Already in his Über den Zahlbegriff 9 Hilbert had suggested a
remedy by giving consistency proofs for suitable axiomatic systems; e.g., to
give the proof of the “existence of the totality of real numbers or in the terminology of G. Cantor the proof of the fact that the system of real
numbers is a consistent complete set” by establishing the consistency of an
axiomatic characterization of the reals
in modern terminology, of the theory of complete, ordered fields. And he
claimed, somewhat indeterminately, that this could be done “by a suitable
modification of familiar methods.” After 4, Hilbert pursued a new way of giving
consistency proofs. This novel way of proceeding, still aiming for the same
goal, was to make use of the formalization of the theory at hand. However, in
the formulation of Hilbert’s Program during the 0s the point of consistency
proofs was no longer to guarantee the existence of suitable sets, but rather to
establish the instrumental usefulness of strong mathematical theories T, like
axiomatic set theory, relative to finitist mathematics. That focus rested on
the observation that the statement formulating the syntactic consistency of T
is equivalent to the reflection principle Pra, ‘s’ P s; here Pr is the finitist
proof predicate for T, s is a finitistically meaningful statement, and ‘s’ its
translation into the language of T. If one could establish finitistically the
consistency of T, one could be sure on
finitist grounds that T is a reliable
instrument for the proof of finitist statements. There are many examples of
significant relative consistency proofs: i non-Euclidean geometry relative to
Euclidean, Euclidean geometry relative to analysis; ii set theory with the
axiom of choice relative to set theory without the axiom of choice, set theory
with the negation of the axiom of choice relative to set theory; iii classical
arithmetic relative to intuitionistic arithmetic, subsystems of classical
analysis relative to intuitionistic theories of constructive ordinals. The
mathematical significance of relative consistency proofs is often brought out
by sharpening them to establish conservative extension results; the latter may
then ensure, e.g., that the theories have the same class of provably total
functions. The initial motivation for such arguments is, however, frequently
philosophical: one wants to guarantee the coherence of the original theory on
an epistemologically distinguished basis.
the english
constitution:
an example Grice gives of a ‘vacuous
name’ -- constitution, a relation between concrete particulars including
objects and events and their parts, according to which at some time t, a
concrete particular is said to be constituted by the sum of its parts without
necessarily being identical with that sum. For instance, at some specific time
t, Mt. Everest is constituted by the various chunks of rock and other matter
that form Everest at t, though at t Everest would still have been Everest even
if, contrary to fact, some particular rock that is part of the sum had been
absent. Hence, although Mt. Everest is not identical to the sum of its material
parts at t, it is constituted by them. The relation of constitution figures
importantly in recent attempts to articulate and defend metaphysical physicalism
naturalism. To capture the idea that all that exists is ultimately physical, we
may say that at the lowest level of reality, there are only microphysical
phenomena, governed by the laws of microphysics, and that all other objects and
events are ultimately constituted by objects and events at the microphysical
level.
contactum --
syntactics: cf. para-tactum – a
paratactic construction the Romans called a co-ordinatum, a sub-ordinatum would
be hypotaxis. (From syn- and tassein, from PIE, cognate with ‘tact,’ to touch)
-- Being the gentleman he was, Grice
takes a cavlier attitude to ‘syntax’ as something that someone else must give
to him, and right he is. The philosopher should concern with more important
issues. Usually Grice uses ‘unstructured’ to mean ‘syntactically unstructured,’
such as a handwave. With a handwave, an
emissor can rationally explicate and implicate. vide compositum – Strictly,
compositum translates Grecian synthesis, rather than syntax – which is better
phrased as Latin ‘contactum. Or better combinatum – syntaxis , is, f., = σύνταξις, I.the connection of words, Prisc. 17, 1, 1. When Grice uses ‘unsructured’ he
sometimes expands this into ‘syntactically unstructured.’ Since syntax need not
be linguistic, this is an interesting semiotic perspective by Grice. He is
allowing for compositionality in a semotic system with a comibinatory other
than the first, second, and third articulation. The Latinate is ‘contactum.’
Morris thought he was being bright when he proposed ‘syntactics,’ “long for
syntax,” he wrote. syntax, περὶ τῆς ς. τῶν λεγομένων, title of work by Chrysipp., Stoic.2.6, cf. Plu.2.731f (pl.);
“τὴν ς. τῶν ὀνομάτων” Gal.16.736, cf. 720; περὶ συντάξεως, title of work by A.D.; but also, compound forms, Id.Conj.214.7; ποιεῖσθαι μετά τινος τὴν ς. ib.221.19; also, rule
for combination of sounds or letters, τὸ χ (in δέγμενος）“ εἰς γ μετεβλήθη, τῆς ς. οὕτως ἀπαιτούσης” EM252.45, cf. Luc.Jud. Voc.3; also, connected speech, ἐν τῇ ς. ἐγκλιτέον Sch.Il.16.85.Grice’s presupposition is that a
‘syntactics’ is not enough for a system to be a ‘communication-system’. Nothing
is communicated. With the syntagma, there is no communicatum. Grice loved two
devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the
assignment of common-ground status). Grice is a conservative
(dissenting rationalist) when it comes to syntax and semantics. He hardly uses
pragmatics albeit in a loose way (pragmatic import, pragmatic inference), but
was aware of Morriss triangle. Syntax is presented along the lines of
Gentzen, i.e. a system of natural deduction in terms of inference rules of
introduction and elimination for each formal device. Semantics pertains
rather to Witterss truth-values, i.e. the assignment of a
satisfactory-valuation: the true and the good. A syntactic approach to Grice’s
System does not require value-assignment. The system is constructed alla Gentzen
with introduction and elimination rules which are regarded as syntactic in
nature. One
can easily check that the rules statedabove adequately characterise the meaning
of classical conjunction which is true iff both conjuncts are true. Hence the
syntactic deducibility relation coincides with the semantic relation of /=
or logical consequence (or entailment).
Refs.: The most direct source is “Vacuous names,” but the keyword
‘syntax’ is helpful. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
context: ‘text’ provides a few nice Romanisms – Grice: text,
pre-text, con-text, sub-text --. while Grice jocularly echoes Firth with his
‘context of utterance,’ he thought the theory of context was ‘totally lacking
in context.’ H. P. Grice, “The general theory of context,” -- contextualism,
the view that inferential justification always takes place against a background
of beliefs that are themselves in no way evidentially supported. The view has
not often been defended by name, but Dewey, Popper, Austin, and Vitters are
arguably among its notable exponents. As this list perhaps suggests,
contextualism is closely related to the “relevant alternatives” conception of
justification, according to which claims to knowledge are justified not by
ruling out any and every logically possible way in which what is asserted might
be false or inadequately grounded, but by excluding certain especially relevant
alternatives or epistemic shortcomings, these varying from one context of
inquiry to another. Formally, contextualism resembles foundationalism. But it
differs from traditional, or substantive, foundationalism in two crucial
respects. First, foundationalism insists that basic beliefs be self-justifying
or intrinsically credible. True, for contemporary foundationalists, this
intrinsic credibility need not amount to incorrigibility, as earlier theorists
tended to suppose: but some degree of intrinsic credibility is indispensable
for basic beliefs. Second, substantive foundational theories confine intrinsic
credibility, hence the status of being epistemologically basic, to beliefs of
some fairly narrowly specified kinds. By contrast, contextualists reject all
forms of the doctrine of intrinsic credibility, and in consequence place no
restrictions on the kinds of beliefs that can, in appropriate circumstances,
function as contextually basic. They regard this as a strength of their
position, since explaining and defending attributions of intrinsic credibility
has always been the foundationalist’s main problem. Contextualism is also
distinct from the coherence theory of justification, foundationalism’s
traditional rival. Coherence theorists are as suspicious as contextualists of
the foundationalist’s specified kinds of basic beliefs. But coherentists react
by proposing a radically holistic model of inferential justification, according
to which a belief becomes justified through incorporation into a suitably
coherent overall system of beliefs or “total view.” There are many well-known
problems with this approach: the criteria of coherence have never been very clearly
articulated; it is not clear what satisfying such criteria has to do with
making our beliefs likely to be true; and since it is doubtful whether anyone
has a very clear picture of his system of beliefs as a whole, to insist that
justification involves comparing the merits of competing total views seems to
subject ordinary justificatory practices to severe idealization. Contextualism,
in virtue of its formal affinity with foundationalism, claims to avoid all such
problems. Foundationalists and coherentists are apt to respond that
contextualism reaps these benefits by failing to show how genuinely epistemic
justification is possible. Contextualism, they charge, is finally
indistinguishable from the skeptical view that “justification” depends on unwarranted
assumptions. Even if, in context, these are pragmatically acceptable,
epistemically speaking they are still just assumptions. This objection raises
the question whether contextualists mean to answer the same questions as more
traditional theorists, or answer them in the same way. Traditional theories of
justification are framed so as to respond to highly general skeptical
questions e.g., are we justified in any
of our beliefs about the external world? It may be that contextualist theories
are or should be advanced, not as direct answers to skepticism, but in
conjunction with attempts to diagnose or dissolve traditional skeptical
problems. Contextualists need to show how and why traditional demands for
“global” justification misfire, if they do. If traditional skeptical problems
are taken at face value, it is doubtful whether contextualism can answer
them.
continental
breakfast:
Grice enjoyed a continental breakfast at Oxford, and an English breakfast in
Rome – As for ‘continental’ “philosophy,” Grice applied it to the gradually
changing spectrum of philosophical views that in the twentieth century
developed in Continental Europe and that are notably different from the various
forms of analytic philosophy that during the same period flourished at Oxford.
Immediately after World War II the expression “philosophie continentale” was
more or less synonymous with ‘phenomenology’. The latter term, already used
earlier in G. idealism, received a completely new meaning in the work of
Husserl. Later on “phainomenologie” was also applied, often with substantial
changes in meaning, to the thought of a great number of other Continental
philosophers such as Scheler, Alexander Pfander, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and
Nicolai Hartmann. For Husserl the aim of philosophy is to prepare humankind for
a genuinely philosophical form of life, in and through which each human being
gives him- or herself a rule through reason. Since the Renaissance, many
philosophers have tried in vain to materialize this aim. In Husserl’s view, the
reason was that philosophers failed to use the proper philosophical method.
Husserl’s phenomenology was meant to provide philosophy with the method needed.
Among those deeply influenced by Husserl’s ideas the so-called existentialists
must be mentioned first. If ‘existentialism’ is construed strictly, it refers
mainly to the philosophy of Sartre and Beauvoir. In a very broad sense
‘existentialism’ refers to the ideas of an entire group of thinkers influenced
methodologically by Husserl and in content by Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre, or
Merleau-Ponty, and one may go and include S. N. Hampshire into the bargain. In
this case one often speaks of existential phenomenology. When Heidegger’s
philosophy became better known at Oxford, ‘continental philosophy’ received
again a new meaning. From Heidegger’s first publication, Being and Time 7, it
was clear that his conception of phenomenology differs from that of Husserl in
several important respects. That is why he qualified the term and spoke of
hermeneutic phenomenology and clarified the expression by examining the
“original” meaning of the Grecian words from which the term was formed. In his
view phenomenology must try “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself
in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” Heidegger applied the
method first to the mode of being of man with the aim of approaching the
question concerning the meaning of being itself through this phenomenological
interpretation. Of those who took their point of departure from Heidegger, but
also tried to go beyond him, Gadamer and Ricoeur must be mentioned. The
structuralist movement in France added another connotation to ‘Continental
philosophy’. The term structuralism above all refers to an activity, a way of
knowing, speaking, and acting that extends over a number of distinguished
domains of human activity: linguistics, aesthetics, anthropology, psychology,
psychoanalysis, mathematics, philosophy of science, and philosophy itself.
Structuralism, which became a fashion in Paris and later in Western Europe
generally, reached its high point on the Continent between 0 and 0. It was
inspired by ideas first formulated by Russian formalism 626 and Czech
structuralism 640, but also by ideas derived from the works of Marx and Freud.
In France Foucault, Barthes, Althusser, and Derrida were the leading figures.
Structuralism is not a new philosophical movement; it must be characterized by
structuralist activity, which is meant to evoke ever new objects. This can be
done in a constructive and a reconstructive manner, but these two ways of
evoking objects can never be separated. One finds the constructive aspect
primarily in structuralist aesthetics and linguistics, whereas the
reconstructive aspect is more apparent in philosophical reflections upon the
structuralist activity. Influenced by Nietzschean ideas, structuralism later
developed in a number of directions, including poststructuralism; in this
context the works of Gilles Deleuze, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Kristeva must be
mentioned. After 0 ‘Continental philosophy’ received again a new connotation:
deconstruction. At first deconstruction presented itself as a reaction against
philosophical hermeneutics, even though both deconstruction and hermeneutics
claim their origin in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology.
The leading philosopher of the movement is Derrida, who at first tried to think
along phenomenological and structuralist lines. Derrida formulated his “final”
view in a linguistic form that is both complex and suggestive. It is not easy
in a few sentences to state what deconstruction is. Generally speaking one can
say that what is being deconstructed is texts; they are deconstructed to show
that there are conflicting conceptions of meaning and implication in every text
so that it is never possible definitively to show what a text really means.
Derrida’s own deconstructive work is concerned mainly with philosophical texts,
whereas others apply the “method” predominantly to literary texts. What
according to Derrida distinguished philosophy is its reluctance to face the
fact that it, too, is a product of linguistic and rhetorical figures.
Deconstruction is here that process of close reading that focuses on those
elements where philosophers in their work try to erase all knowledge of its own
linguistic and rhetorical dimensions. It has been said that if construction
typifies modern thinking, then deconstruction is the mode of thinking that
radically tries to overcome modernity. Yet this view is simplistic, since one
also deconstructs Plato and many other thinkers and philosophers of the
premodern age. People concerned with social and political philosophy who have
sought affiliation with Continental philosophy often appeal to the so-called
critical theory of the Frankfurt School in general, and to Habermas’s theory of
communicative action in particular. Habermas’s view, like the position of the
Frankfurt School in general, is philosophically eclectic. It tries to bring
into harmony ideas derived from Kant, G. idealism, and Marx, as well as ideas
from the sociology of knowledge and the social sciences. Habermas believes that
his theory makes it possible to develop a communication community without
alienation that is guided by reason in such a way that the community can stand
freely in regard to the objectively given reality. Critics have pointed out
that in order to make this theory work Habermas must substantiate a number of
assumptions that until now he has not been able to justify.
Grice’s
contingency planning
– ‘contingens.’ “What is actual is not also possible” “What is necessary is not
also contingent” -- contingent, neither impossible nor necessary; i.e., both
possible and non-necessary. The modal property of being contingent is
attributable to a proposition, state of affairs, event, or more debatably an object. Muddles about the relationship
between this and other modal properties have abounded ever since Aristotle, who
initially conflated contingency with possibility but later realized that something
that is possible may also be necessary, whereas something that is contingent
cannot be necessary. Even today many philosophers are not clear about the
“opposition” between contingency and necessity, mistakenly supposing them to be
contradictory notions probably because within the domain of true propositions
the contingent and the necessary are indeed both exclusive and exhaustive of
one another. But the contradictory of ‘necessary’ is ‘non-necessary’; that of
‘contingent’ is ‘non-contingent’, as the following extended modal square of
opposition shows: These logico-syntactical relationships are preserved through
various semantical interpretations, such as those involving: a the logical
modalities proposition P is logically contingent just when P is neither a
logical truth nor a logical falsehood; b the causal or physical modalities
state of affairs or event E is physically contingent just when E is neither
physically necessary nor physically impossible; and c the deontic modalities
act A is morally indeterminate just when A is neither morally obligatory nor
morally forbidden. In none of these cases does ‘contingent’ mean ‘dependent,’
as in the phrase ‘is contingent upon’. Yet just such a notion of contingency
seems to feature prominently in certain formulations of the cosmological
argument, all created objects being said to be contingent beings and God alone
to be a necessary or non-contingent being. Conceptual clarity is not furthered
by assimilating this sense of ‘contingent’ to the others.
contrapositum: -- in Grecian,
‘antithesis’ – cfr. Hegel’s triad: thesis/antithesis,/synthesis. -- the immediate logical operation on any
categorical proposition that is accomplished by first forming the complements
of both the subject term and the predicate term of that proposition and then
interchanging these complemented terms. Thus, contraposition applied to the
categorical proposition ‘All cats are felines’ yields ‘All non-felines are
non-cats’, where ‘nonfeline’ and ‘non-cat’ are, respectively, the complements
or complementary terms of ‘feline’ and ‘cat’. The result of applying
contraposition to a categorical proposition is said to be the contrapositive of
that proposition. contraries, any pair
of propositions that cannot both be true but can both be false; derivatively,
any pair of properties that cannot both apply to a thing but that can both fail
to apply to a thing. Thus the propositions ‘This object is red all over’ and
‘This object is green all over’ are contraries, as are the properties of being
red all over and being green all over. Traditionally, it was considered that
the categorical A-proposition ‘All S’s are P’s’ and the categorical
E-proposition ‘No S’s are P’s’ were contraries; but according to De Morgan and
most subsequent logicians, these two propositions are both true when there are
no S’s at all, so that modern logicians do not usually regard the categorical
A- and E-propositions as being true contraries.
contravalid, designating a proposition P in a logical system such that
every proposition in the system is a consequence of P. In most of the typical
and familiar logical systems, contravalidity coincides with
self-contradictoriness.
voluntary
and rational control
– the power structure of the soul -- Grice’s intersubjective conversational
control, -- for Grice only what is under one’s control is communicated – spots
mean measles only metaphorically, the spots don’t communicate measles. An
involuntary cry does not ‘mean.’ Only a simulated cry of pain is a vehicle by
which an emissor may mean that he is in pain. an apparently causal phenomenon
closely akin to power and important for such topics as intentional action,
freedom, and moral responsibility. Depending upon the control you had over the
event, your finding a friend’s stolen car may or may not be an intentional
action, a free action, or an action for which you deserve moral credit. Control
seems to be a causal phenomenon. Try to imagine controlling a car, say, without
causing anything. If you cause nothing, you have no effect on the car, and one
does not control a thing on which one has no effect. But control need not be
causally deterministic. Even if a genuine randomizer in your car’s steering
mechanism gives you only a 99 percent chance of making turns you try to make,
you still have considerable control in that sphere. Some philosophers claim
that we have no control over anything if causal determinism is true. That claim
is false. When you drive your car, you normally are in control of its speed and
direction, even if our world happens to be deterministic.
conversational
avowal: The phrase is a Ryleism, but
Grice liked it. Grice’s point is with corrigibility or lack thereof. He recalls
his tutorials with Strawson. “I want you to bring me a paper on Friday.” “You
mean The Telegraph?” “You know what I mean.”
“But perhaps you don’t.” Grice’s favourite conversational avowal, mentioned
by Grice, is a declaration of an intention.. Grice starts using the phrase
‘conversational avowal’ after exploring Ryle’s rather cursory exploration of
them in The Concept of Mind. This is interesting because in general Grice
is an anti-ryleist. The verb is of course ‘to avow,’ which is ultimately a
Latinate from ‘advocare.’ A processes or event of the soul is, on the official
view, supposed to be played out in a private theatre. Such an event is known
directly by the man who has them either through the faculty of introspection or
the ‘phosphorescence’ of consciousness. The subject is, on this view,
incorrigible—his avowals of the state of his soul cannot be corrected by
others—and he is infallible—he cannot be wrong about which states he is
in. The official doctrine mistakenly construes an avowals or a report of
such an episode as issuing from a special sort of observation or perception of
shadowy existents. We should consider some differences between two sorts
of 'conversational' avowals: (i) I feel a tickle and (ii) I feel ill. If a man
feels a tickle, he has a tickle, and if he has a tickle, he feels it. But
if he feels ill, he may not be ill, and if he is ill, he may not feel
ill. Doubtless a man’s feeling ill is some evidence for his being ill. But
feeling a tickle is not evidence for his having a tickle, any more than
striking a blow is evidence for the occurrence of a blow. In ‘feel a tickle’
and ‘strike a blow’, ‘tickle’ and ‘blow’ are cognate accusatives to the verbs
‘feel’ and ‘strike’. The verb and its accusative are two expressions for
the same thing, as are the verbs and their accusatives in ‘I dreamt a dream’
and ‘I asked a question’. But ‘ill’ and ‘capable of climbing the tree’ are not
cognate accusatives to the verb ‘to feel.' So they are not in grammar bound to
signify feelings, as ‘tickle’ is in grammar bound to signify a
feeling. Another purely grammatical point shows the same thing. It is
indifferent whether I say ‘I feel a tickle’ or ‘I have a tickle’; but ‘I have .
. .’ cannot be completed by ‘. . . ill’, (cf. ‘I have an illness’), ‘. . .
capable of climbing the tree’, (cf. I have a capability to climb that tree’) ‘.
. . happy’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of happiness’ or ‘I have happiness in my
life’) or ‘. . . discontented’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of strong discontent
towards behaviourism’). If we try to restore the verbal parallel by bringing in
the appropriate abstract nouns, we find a further incongruity; ‘I feel
happiness’(I feel as though I am experiencing happiness), ‘I feel illness’ (I
feel as though I do have an illness’) or ‘I feel ability to climb the tree’ (I
feel that I am endowed with the capability to climb that tree), if they mean
anything, they do not mean at all what a man means by uttering ‘I feel happy,’
or ‘I feel ill,’ or ‘I feel capable of climbing the tree’. On the other
hand, besides these differences between the different uses of ‘I feel . . .’
there are important CONVERSATIONAL analogies as well. If a man says that
he has a tickle, his co-conversationalist does not ask for his evidence, or
requires him to make quite sure. Announcing a tickle is not proclaiming the
results of an investigation. A tickle is not something established by
careful witnessing, or something inferred from a clue, nor do we praise for his
powers of observation or reasoning a man who let us know that he feels tickles,
tweaks and flutters. Just the same is true of avowals of moods. If a man
makes a conversational contribution, such as‘I feel bored’, or ‘I feel
depressed’, his co-conversationalist does not usually ask him for his evidence,
or request him to make sure. The co-conversationalist may accuse the man of
shamming to him or to himself, but the co-conversationalist does not accuse him
of having been careless in his observations or rash in his inferences, since a
co-conversationalist would not usually think that his conversational avowal is
a report of an observation or a conclusion. He has not been a good or a
bad detective; he has not been a detective at all. Nothing would surprise us more
than to hear him say ‘I feel depressed’ in the alert and judicious tone of
voice of a detective, a microscopist, or a diagnostician, though this tone of
voice is perfectly congruous with the NON-AVOWAL past-tense ‘I WAS feeling
depressed’ or the NON-AVOWAL third-person report, ‘HE feels depressed’. If the
avowal is to do its conversational job, it must be said in a depressed tone of
voice. The conversational avowal must be blurted out to a sympathizer, not
reported to an investigator. Avowing ‘I feel depressed’ is doing one of the
things, viz. one CONVERSATIONAL thing, that depression is the mood to do. It is
not a piece of scientific premiss-providing, but a piece of ‘conversational
moping.’That is why, if the co-conversationalist is suspicious, he does not ask
‘Fact or fiction?’, ‘True or false?’, ‘Reliable or unreliable?’, but ‘Sincere
or shammed?’ The CONVERSATIONAL avowal of moods requires not acumen, but
openness. It comes from the heart, not from the head. It is not
discovery, but voluntary non-concealment. Of course people have to learn how to
use avowal expressions appropriately and they may not learn these lessons very
well. They learn them from ordinary discussions of the moods of others and from
such more fruitful sources as novels and the theatre. They learn from the same
sources how to cheat both other people and themselves by making a sham
conversational avowal in the proper tone of voice and with the other proper
histrionic accompaniments. If we now raise the question ‘How does a man find out
what mood he is in?’ one can answer that if, as may not be the case, he finds
it out at all, he finds it out very much as we find it out. As we have seen, he
does not groan ‘I feel bored’ because he has found out that he is bored, any
more than the sleepy man yawns because he has found out that he is
sleepy. Rather, somewhat as the sleepy man finds out that he is sleepy by
finding, among other things, that he keeps on yawning, so the bored man finds
out that he is bored, if he does find this out, by finding that among other
things he glumly says to others and to himself ‘I feel bored’ and ‘How bored I
feel’. Such a blurted avowal is not merely one fairly reliable index among
others. It is the first and the best index, since being worded and voluntarily
uttered, it is meant to be heard and it is meant to be understood. It calls for
no sleuth-work.In some respects a conversational avowal of a moods, like ‘I
feel cheerful,’ more closely resemble announcements of sensations like ‘I feel
a tickle’ than they resemble utterances like ‘I feel better’ or ‘I feel capable
of climbing the tree’. Just as it would be absurd to say ‘I feel a tickle but
maybe I haven’t one’, so, in ordinary cases, it would be absurd to say ‘I feel
cheerful but maybe I am not’. But there would be no absurdity in saying ‘I FEEL
better but, to judge by the doctor’s attitude, perhaps I am WORSE’, or ‘I do
FEEL as if I am capable of climbing the tree but maybe I cannot climb it.’This
difference can be brought out in another way. Sometimes it is natural to say ‘I
feel AS IF I could eat a horse’, or ‘I feel AS IF my temperature has returned
to normal’. But, more more immediate conversational avowals, it would seldom if
ever be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I were in the dumps’, or ‘I feel AS IF I
were bored’, any more than it would be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I had a
pain’. Not much would be gained by discussing at length why we use ‘feel’ in
these different ways. There are hosts of other ways in which it is also used. I
can say ‘I felt a lump in the mattress’, ‘I felt cold’, ‘I felt queer’, ‘I felt
my jaw-muscles stiffen’, ‘I felt my gorge rise’, ‘I felt my chin with my
thumb’, ‘I felt in vain for the lever’, ‘I felt as if something important was
about to happen’, ‘I felt that there was a flaw somewhere in the argument’, ‘I
felt quite at home’, ‘I felt that he was angry’. A feature common to most
of these uses of ‘feel’ is that the utterer does not want further questions to
be put. They would be either unanswerable questions, or unaskable questions.
That he felt it is enough to settle some debates.That he merely felt it is
enough to show that debates should not even begin. Names of moods, then, are
not the names of feelings. But to be in a particular mood is to be in the mood,
among other things, to feel certain sorts of feelings in certain sorts of
situations. To be in a lazy mood, is, among other things, to tend to have
sensations of lassitude in the limbs when jobs have to be done, to have cosy
feelings of relaxation when the deck-chair is resumed, not to have electricity
feelings when the game begins, and so forth. But we are not thinking
primarily of these feelings when we say that we feel lazy; in fact, we seldom
pay much heed to sensations of these kinds, save when they are abnormally acute. Is
a name of a mood a name of an emotion?
The only tolerable reply is that of course they are, in that some people some
of the time use ‘emotion’. But then we must add that in this usage an emotion
is not something that can be segregated from thinking, daydreaming, voluntarily
doing things, grimacing or feeling pangs and itches. To have the emotion, in
this usage, which we ordinarily refer to as ‘being bored’, is to be in the mood
to think certain sorts of thoughts, and not to think other sorts, to yawn and not
to chuckle, to converse with stilted politeness, and not to talk with
animation, to feel flaccid and not to feel resilient. Boredom is not some
unique distinguishable ingredient, scene or feature of all that its victim is
doing and undergoing. Rather it is the temporary complexion of that totality.
It is not like a gust, a sunbeam, a shower or the temperature; it is like the
morning’s weather. An unstudied conversational utterance may embody an
explicit interest phrase, or a conversational avowal, such as ‘I want it’, ‘I
hope so’, ‘That’s what I intend’, ‘I quite dislike it’, ‘Surely I am
depressed’, ‘I do wonder, too’, ‘I guess so’ and ‘I am feeling hungry.’The
surface grammar (if not logical form) makes it tempting to misconstrue all the
utterances as a description. But in its primary employment such a
conversational avowal as ‘I want it’ is not used to convey information.‘I want
it’ is used to make a request or demand. ‘I want it’ is no more meant as a
contribution to general knowledge than ‘please’. For a co-conversationalist to
respond with the tag ‘Do you?’ or worse, as Grice’s tutee, with ‘*how* do you
*know* that you want it?’ is glaringly inappropriate. Nor, in their primary
employment, are conversational avowals such as ‘I hate it’ or ‘That’s what I I
intend’ used for the purpose of telling one’s addressee facts about the
utterer; or else we should not be surprised to hear them uttered in the cool,
informative tones of voice in which one says ‘HE hates it’ and ‘That’s what he
intends’. We expect a conversational avowal, on the contrary, to be spoken in a
revolted and a resolute tone of voice respectively. It is an utterances of a
man in a revolted and resolute frame of mind. A conversational avowal is a
thing said in detestation and resolution and not a thing said in order to
advance biographical knowledge about detestations and resolutions. A man
who notices the unstudied utterances of the utterer, who may or may not be
himself, is, if his interest in the utterer has the appropriate direction, especially
well situated to pass comments upon the qualities and frames of mind of its
author.‘avowal’ as a philosophical lexeme may not invite an immediate correlate
in the Graeco-Roman, ultimately Grecian, tradition. ‘Confessio’ springs to
mind, but this is not what Grice is thinking about. He is more concerned with
issues of privileged access and incorrigibility, or corrigibility, rather, as
per the alleged immediacy of a first-person report of the form, “I feel that …”
. Grice does use ‘avowal’ often especially in the early stages, when the
logical scepticism about incorrigibility comes under attack. Just to be
different, Grice is interested in the corrigibility of the avowal. The issue is
of some importance in his account of the act of communication, and how one can
disimplicate what one means. Grice loves to play with his tutee doubting as to
whether he means that p or q. Except at Oxford, the whole thing has a
ridiculous ring to it. I want you to bring me a paper by Friday. You mean the
newspaper? You very well know what I mean. But perhaps you do not. Are you sure
you mean a philosophy paper when you utter, ‘I want you to bring a paper by
Friday’? As Grice notes, in case of self-deception and egcrateia, it may well
be that the utterer does not know what he desires, if not what he intends, if
anything. Freud and Foucault run galore. The topic will interest a collaborator
of Grice’s, Pears, with his concept of ‘motivated irrationality.’ Grice likes
to discuss a category mistake. I may be categorically mistaken but I am
not categorically confused. Now when it comes to avowal-avowal, it is only
natural that if he is interested in Aristotle on ‘hedone,’ Grice would be
interested in Aristotle on ‘lupe.’ This is very philosophical, as Urmson
agrees. Can one ‘fake’ pain? Why would one fake pain? Oddly, this is for Grice
the origin of language. Is pleasure just the absence of pain? Liddell and Soctt
have “λύπη” and render it as pain of body, oἡδον; also, sad plight or
condition, but also pain of mind, grief; “ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ
προσικνεῖται; τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; ἐρωτικὴ λ.’ λύπας
προσβάλλειν;” “λ. φέρειν τινί; oχαρά.” Oddly, Grice goes back to pain in
Princeton, since it is explored by Smart in his identity thesis. Take
pain. Surely, Grice tells the Princetonians, it sounds harsh, to echo Berkeley,
to say that it is the brain of Smith being in this or that a state which is
justified by insufficient evidence; whereas it surely sounds less harsh that it
is the C-fibres that constitute his ‘pain,’ which he can thereby fake. Grice
distinguishes between a complete unstructured utterance token – “Ouch” – versus
a complete syntactically structured erotetic utterance of the type, “Are you in
pain?”. At the Jowett, Corpus Barnes has read Ogden and says ‘Ouch’ (‘Oh’)
bears an ‘emotional’ or ‘emotive’ communicatum provided there is an intention
there somewhere. Otherwise, no communicatum occurs. But if there is an
intention, the ‘Oh’ can always be a fake. Grice distinguishes between a ‘fake’
and a ‘sneak.’ If U intends A to perceive ‘Oh’ as a fake, U means that he is in
pain. If there is a sneaky intention behind the utterance, which U does NOT
intend his A to recognise, there is no communicatum. Grice criticises emotivism
as rushing ahead to analyse a nuance before exploring what sort of a nuance it
is. Surely there is more to the allegedly ‘pseudo-descriptive’ ‘x is good,’
than U meaning that U emotionally approves of x. In his ‘myth,’ Grice uses pain
magisterially as an excellent example for a privileged-access allegedly
incorrigible avowal, and stage 0 in his creature progression. By uttering
‘Oh!,’ under voluntary control, Barnes means, iconically, that he is in pain.
Pain fall under the broader keyword: emotion, as anger does. Cf. Aristotle on the
emotion in De An., Rhet., and Eth. Nich. Knowing that at Oxford, if you are a
classicist, you are not a philosopher, Grice never explores the Stoic, say,
approach to pain, or lack thereof (“Which is good, since Walter Pater did it
for me!”). Refs.: “Can I have a pain in my tail?” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
conversational benevolence: benevolentia, beneficentia, malevolentia, maleficentia --
. In Grice it’s not benevolence per se but as a force in a two-force model,
with self-love on the other side. The fact that he later subsumed everything
under ONE concept: that of co-operation (first helpfulness) testifies that he
is placing more conceptual strength on ‘benevolence’ than ‘self love.’ But the
self-love’ remains in all the caveats and provisos that Grice keeps guarding
his claims with: ‘ceteris paribus,’ ‘provided there’s not much effort
involved,’ ‘if no unnecessary trouble arises,’ and so on. It’s never
benevolence simpliciter or tout court. When it comes to co-operation, the
self-love remains: the mutual goal of that co-operation is in the active and
the passive voice – You expect me to be helpful as much as I expect you to be
helpful. We are in this together. The active/passive voice formulation is
emphatic in Grice: informing AND BEING INFORMED; influencing AND BEING
INFLUENCED. The self-love goes: I won’t inform you unless you’ll inform me. I
won’t influence you unless you influence me. The ‘influence’ bit does not seem
to cooperative. But the ‘inform’ side does. By ‘inform,’ the idea is that the
psi-transmission concerns a true belief. “I’ll be truthful if you will.” This
is the sort of thing that Nietzsche found repugnant and identified with the
golden rule was totally immoral. – It was felt by Russell to be immoral enough
that he cared to mention in a letter to The Times about how abusive Nietzsche
can be – yet what a gem “Beyond good and evil” still is! In the hypocritical
milieu that Grice expects his tuttees know they are engaged in, Grice does not
find Nietzsche pointing to a repugnant fact, but a practical, even jocular way
of taking meta-ethics in a light way. There is nothing other-oriented about
benevolence. What Grice needs is conversational ALTRUISM, or helpfulness –
‘cooperation’ has the advantage, with the ‘co-’, of avoiding the ‘mutuality’
aspect, which is crucial (“What’s the good of helping you – I’m not your
servant! – if thou art not going to help me!” It may be said that when Butler
uses ‘benevolentia’ he means others. “It is usually understood that one is
benevolent towards oneself, if that makes sense.” Grice writes. Then there’s
Smith promising Jones a job – and the problem that comes with it. For Grice, if
Smith promised a job to Jones, and Jones never gets it – “that’s Jones’s
problem.” So we need to distinguish beneficentia and benevolentia. The opposite
is malevolentia and maleficientia. Usually Grice states his maxims as
PROHIBITIONS: “Do not say what you believe to be false” being the wittiest! So,
he might just as well have appealed to or invoked a principle of absence of
conversational ill-will. Grice uses ‘conversational benevolence’ narrowly, to
refer to the assumption that conversationalists will agree to make a contribution
appropriate to the shared purposes of the exhcnage. It contrasts with the
limiting conversational self-love, which is again taken narrowly to indicate
that conversationalists are assumed to be conversationally ‘benevolent,’ in the
interpretation above, provided doing that does not get them into unnecessary
trouble. The type of rationality that Grice sees in conversational is one that
sees conversation as ‘rational co-operation.’ So it is obvious that he has to
invoke some level of benevolence. When tutoring his rather egoistic tutees he
had to be careful, so he hastened to add a principle of conversational
self-love. It was different when lecturing outside a tutorial! In fact
‘benevolence’ here is best understood as ‘altruism’. So, if there is a
principle of conversational egoism, there is a correlative principle of
conversational altruism. If Grice uses ‘self-love,’ there is nothing about
‘love,’ in ‘benevolence.’ Butler may have used ‘other-love’! Even if of course
we must start with the Grecians! We must not forget that Plato and Aristotle
despised "autophilia", the complacency and self-satisfaction making
it into the opposite of "epimeleia heautou” in Plato’s Alcibiades.
Similarly, to criticize Socratic ethics as a form of egoism in opposition to a
selfless care of others is inappropriate. Neither a self-interested seeker of
wisdom nor a dangerous teacher of self-love, Socrates, as the master of
epimeleia heautou, is the hinge between the care of self and others. One has to
be careful here. A folk-etymological connection between ‘foam’ may not be
needed – when the Romans had to deal with Grecian ‘aphrodite.’ This requires
that we look for another linguistic botany for Grecian ‘self-love’ that Grice
opposes to ‘benevolentia.’ Hesiod derives Aphrodite from “ἀφρός,” ‘sea-foam,’ interpreting
the name as "risen from the foam", but most modern scholars regard
this as a spurious folk etymology. Early modern scholars of classical mythology
attempted to argue that Aphrodite's name was of Griceain or Indo-European
origin, but these efforts have now been mostly abandoned. Aphrodite's name is
generally accepted to be of non-Greek, probably Semitic, origin, but its exact
derivation cannot be determined. Scholars in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, accepting Hesiod's "foam" etymology as genuine,
analyzed the second part of Aphrodite's name as -odítē "wanderer" or -dítē
"bright". Janda, also accepting Hesiod's etymology, has argued in
favor of the latter of these interpretations and claims the story of a birth
from the foam as an Indo-European mytheme. Similarly, an Indo-European compound
abʰor-, very" and dʰei- "to shine" have been proposed, also
referring to Eos. Other have argued that these hypotheses are unlikely since
Aphrodite's attributes are entirely different from those of both Eos and the
Vedic deity Ushas.A number of improbable non-Greek etymologies have also been
suggested. One Semitic etymology compares Aphrodite to the Assyrian ‘barīrītu,’
the name of a female demon that appears in Middle Babylonian and Late
Babylonian texts. Hammarström looks to Etruscan, comparing eprϑni
"lord", an Etruscan honorific loaned into Greek as πρύτανις.This
would make the theonym in origin an honorific, "the lady".Most scholars
reject this etymology as implausible, especially since Aphrodite actually
appears in Etruscan in the borrowed form Apru (from Greek Aphrō, clipped form
of Aphrodite). The medieval Etymologicum Magnum offers a highly contrived
etymology, deriving Aphrodite from the compound habrodíaitos (ἁβροδίαιτος),
"she who lives delicately", from habrós and díaita. The alteration
from b to ph is explained as a "familiar" characteristic of Greek
"obvious from the Macedonians". It is much easier with the Romans. Lewis and Short have ‘ămor,’ old form “ămŏs,”
“like honos, labos, colos, etc.’ obviously from ‘amare,’ and which they render
as ‘love,’ as in Grice’s “conversational self-love.” Your tutor will reprimand
you if you spend too much linguistic botany on ‘eros.’ “Go straight to
‘philos.’” But no. There are philosophical usages of ‘eros,’ especially when it
comes to the Grecian philosophers Grice is interested in: Aristotle reading
Plato, which becomes Ariskant reading Plathegel. So, Liddell and Scott have
“ἔρως” which of course is from a verb, or two: “ἕραμαι,” “ἐράω,” and which they
render as “love, mostly of the sexual passion, ““θηλυκρατὴς ἔ.,” “ἐρῶσ᾽ ἔρωτ᾽
ἔκδημον,” “ἔ. τινός love for one, S.Tr.433, “παίδων” E. Ion67, and “generally,
love of a thing, desire for it,” ““πατρῴας γῆς” “δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔ.” “ἔχειν
ἔμφυτον ἔρωτα περί τι” Plato, Lg. 782e ; “πρὸς τοὺς λόγους” (love of law),
“ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος γενέσθαι” Hdt.5.32 ; ἔ. ἔχει με c. inf.,
A.Supp.521 ; “θανόντι κείνῳ συνθανεῖν ἔρως μ᾽ ἔχει” S.Fr.953 ; “αὐτοῖς ἦν ἔρως
θρόνους ἐᾶσθαι” Id.OC367 ; ἔ. ἐμπίπτει μοι c. inf., A.Ag.341, cf. Th.6.24 ; εἰς
ἔρωτά τινος ἀφικέσθαι, ἐλθεῖν, Antiph.212.3,Anaxil.21.5 : pl., loves, amours,
“ἀλλοτρίων” Pi.N.3.30 ; “οὐχ ὅσιοι ἔ.” E.Hipp.765 (lyr.) ; “ἔρωτες ἐμᾶς πόλεως”
Ar.Av.1316 (lyr.), etc. ; of dolphins, “πρὸς παῖδας” Arist.HA631a10 :
generally, desires, S.Ant.617 (lyr.). 2. object of love or desire, “ἀπρόσικτοι
ἔρωτες” Pi.N.11.48, cf. Luc.Tim.14. 3. passionate joy, S.Aj.693 (lyr.); the god
of love, Anacr.65, Parm.13, E.Hipp.525 (lyr.), etc.“Έ. ἀνίκατε μάχαν” S.Ant.781
(lyr.) : in pl., Simon.184.3, etc. III. at Nicaea, a funeral wreath, EM379.54.
IV. name of the κλῆρος Ἀφροδίτης, Cat.Cod.Astr.1.168 ; = third κλῆρος,
Paul.Al.K.3; one of the τόποι, Vett.Val.69.16. And they’ll point to you that
the Romans had ‘amor’ AND ‘cupidus’ (which they meant as a transliteration of
epithumia). If for Kant and Grice it is the intention that matters, ill-will
counts. If Smith does not want Jones have a job, Smith has ill-will towards
Jones. This is all Kant and Grice need to call Smith a bad person. It means it
is the ill-will that causes Joness not having a job. A conceptual elucidation.
Interesting from a historical point of view seeing that Grice had introduced a
principle of conversational benevolence (i.e. conversational goodwill) pretty
early. Malevolentia was over-used by Cicero, translating the Grecian. Grice
judges that if Jones fails to get the job that benevolent Smith promised, Smith
may still be deemed, for Kant, if not Aristotle, to have given him the
job. A similar elucidation was carried by Urmson with his idea of
supererogation (heroism and sainthood). For a hero or saint, someones goodwill
but not be good enough! Which does not mean it is ill, either! Conversational
benevolence -- Self-love Philosophical theology -- Edwards, J., philosopher and
theologian. He was educated at Yale, preached in New York City, and in 1729
assumed a Congregational pastorate in Northampton, Massachusetts, where he
became a leader in the Great Awakening. Because of a dispute with his
parishioners over qualifications for communion, he was forced to leave in 1750.
In 1751, he took charge of congregations in Stockbridge, a frontier town sixty
miles to the west. He was elected third president of Princeton in 1757 but died
shortly after inauguration. Edwards deeply influenced Congregational and
Presbyterian theology in America for over a century, but had little impact on
philosophy. Interest in him revived in the middle of the twentieth century,
first among literary scholars and theologians and later among philosophers.
While most of Edwards’s published work defends the Puritan version of Calvinist
orthodoxy, his notebooks reveal an interest in philosophical problems for their
own sake. Although he was indebted to Continental rationalists like
Malebranche, to the Cambridge Platonists, and especially to Locke, his own
contributions are sophisticated and original. The doctrine of God’s absolute
sovereignty is explicated by occasionalism, a subjective idealism similar to
Berkeley’s, and phenomenalism. According to Edwards, what are “vulgarly” called
causal relations are mere constant conjunctions. True causes necessitate their
effects. Since God’s will alone meets this condition, God is the only true
cause. He is also the only true substance. Physical objects are collections of
ideas of color, shape, and other “corporeal” qualities. Finite minds are series
of “thoughts” or “perceptions.” Any substance underlying perceptions, thoughts,
and “corporeal ideas” must be something that “subsists by itself, stands
underneath, and keeps up” physical and mental qualities. As the only thing that
does so, God is the only real substance. As the only true cause and the only
real substance, God is “in effect being in general.” God creates to communicate
his glory. Since God’s internal glory is constituted by his infinite knowledge
of, love of, and delight in himself as the highest good, his “communication ad
extra” consists in the knowledge of, love of, and joy in himself which he
bestows upon creatures. The essence of God’s internal and external glory is
“holiness” or “true benevolence,” a disinterested love of being in general
i.e., of God and the beings dependent on him. Holiness constitutes “true
beauty,” a divine splendor or radiance of which “secondary” ordinary beauty is
an imperfect image. God is thus supremely beautiful and the world is suffused
with his loveliness. Vindications of Calvinist conceptions of sin and grace are
found in Freedom of the Will 1754 and Original Sin 1758. The former includes
sophisticated defenses of theological determinism and compatibilism. The latter
contains arguments for occasionalism and interesting discussions of identity.
Edwards thinks that natural laws determine kinds or species, and kinds or
species determine criteria of identity. Since the laws of nature depend on
God’s “arbitrary” decision, God establishes criteria of identity. He can thus,
e.g., constitute Adam and his posterity as “one thing.” Edwards’s religious
epistemology is developed in A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections 1746
and On the Nature of True Virtue 1765. The conversion experience involves the
acquisition of a “new sense of the heart.” Its core is the mind’s apprehension
of a “new simple idea,” the idea of “true beauty.” This idea is needed to
properly understand theological truths. True Virtue also provides the fullest
account of Edwards’s ethics a moral
sense theory that identifies virtue with benevolence. Although indebted to
contemporaries like Hutcheson, Edwards criticizes their attempts to construct
ethics on secular foundations. True benevolence embraces being in general.
Since God is, in effect, being in general, its essence is the love of God. A
love restricted to family, nation, humanity, or other “private systems” is a
form of self-love. Refs.: The source is Grice’s seminar in the first set on
‘Logic and conversation.’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational
category:
-- Greek ‘categoria,’ Cicero couldn’t translate it and kept it as ‘categoria,’.
Cf Kant ‘categoric versus hypotheticum
or conditionale -- used jocularly by Grice. But can it be used non-jocularly?
How can the concept of ‘category,’ literally, apply to what Grice says it
applies, so that we have, assuming Kant is using ‘quantity,’ ‘quality,’
‘relation’ and ‘mode,’ as SUPRA-categories (functions, strictly) for his twelve
categories? Let’s revise, the quantity applies to the quantification (in
Frege’s terms) or what Boethius applied to Aristotle’s posotes – and there are
three categories involved, but the three deal with the ‘quantum: ‘every,’
‘some,’ and ‘one.’ ‘some’ Russell would call an indefinite. Strictly, if Grice
wants to have a category of conversational quantity – it should relate to the
‘form’ of the ‘conversational move.’ “Every nice girl loves a sailor” would be
the one with most ‘quantity.’ Grice sees a problem there, and would have that
rather translated as ‘The altogether nice girl loves the one-at-a-time sailor.’
But that would be the most conversational move displaying ‘most quantity.’ (It
can be argued it isn’t). When it comes to the category of conversational
quality, the three categories by Kant under the ‘function’ of qualitas involves
the well known trio, the affirmative, the negative, and the infinite. In terms
of the ‘quality’ of a conversational move, it may be argued that a move in
negative form (as in Grice, “I’m not hearing any noise,” “That pillar box is
not blue” seem to provide ‘less’ quality than the affirmative counterparts. But
as in quantity, it is not sure Kant has some ordering in mind. It seems he
does. It seems he ascribes more value to the first category in each of the four
functions. When it comes to the category of conversational relation, the
connection with Kant could be done. Since this involves the categoric, the
hypothetic, and the disjunctive. So here we may think that a conversational
move will be either a categoric response – A: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B: The
weather has been delightful. Or a hypothetical. A: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B:
If that’s what you think. Or a dijunctive: Mrs. Smith is a wind bag. B: Or she
is not. When it comes, lastly, to the category of conversational mode, we have
just three strict categories under this ‘function’ in Kant, which relate to the
strength of the copula: ‘must be,’ must not be’ and ‘may.’ A conversational
move that states a necessity would be the expected move. “You must do it.”
Impossibility involves negation, so it is more problematic. And ‘may be’ is an
open conversational move. So there IS a way to justify the use of
‘conversational category’ to apply to the four functions that Kant decides the
Aristotelian categories may subsumed into. He knows that Kant has TWELVE
categories, but he keeps lecturing the Harvardites about Kant having FOUR
categories. On top, he finds ‘modus’ boring, and, turned a manierist, changes
the idiom. This is what Austin called a ‘philosophical hack’ searching for some
para-philosophy! One has to be careful here. Grice does speak of this or that
‘conversational category.’ Seeing that he is ‘echoing,’ as he puts it,
Ariskant, we migt just as well have an entry for each of the four. These would
be the category of conversational quantity, the category of conversational
quality, the category of conversational relation, and the category of
conversational modality. Note that in this rephrasing Grice applies
‘conversational’ directly to the category. As Boethius pointed out (and Grice
loved to read Minio-Paullelo’s edition of Boethus’s commentary on the
Categories), the motivation by Aristotle to posit this or that category was
expository. A mind cannot know a multitude of things, so we have to ‘reduce’
things. It is important to note that while ‘quantitas,’ ‘qualitas’ ‘relatio’
and ‘modus’ are used by Kant, he actually augments the number of categories.
These four would be supra-categories. The sub-categories, or categories
themselves turn out to be twelve. Kant proposed 12 categories: unity,
plurality, and totality for concept of quantity; reality, negation, and
limitation, for the concept of quality; inherence and subsistence, cause and
effect, and community for the concept of relation; and
possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity and contingency. Kategorien
sind nach Kant apriorisch und unmittelbar gegeben. Sie sind Werkzeuge des
Urteilens und Werkzeuge des Denkens. Als solche dienen sie nur der Anwendung
und haben keine Existenz. Sie bestehen somit nur im menschlichen Verstand. Sie
sind nicht an Erfahrung gebunden.[5] Durch ihre
Unmittelbarkeit sind sie auch nicht an Zeichen gebunden.[6] Kants
erkenntnistheoretisches Ziel ist es, über die Bedingungen der Geltungskraft von
Urteilen Auskunft zu geben. Ohne diese Auskunft können zwar vielerlei Urteile
gefällt werden, sie müssen dann allerdings als „systematische Doktrin(en)“
bezeichnet werden.[7] Kant
kritisiert damit das rein analytische Denken der Wissenschaft als falsch und
stellt ihm die Notwendigkeit des synthetisierenden Denkens gegenüber.[8] Kant begründet
die Geltungskraft mit dem Transzendentalen Subjekt.[9] Das Transzendentalsubjekt
ist dabei ein reiner Reflexionsbegriff, welcher das synthetisierende Dritte
darstellt (wie in späteren Philosophien Geist (Hegel), Wille, Macht, Sprache
und Wert (Marx)), das nicht durch die Sinne wahrnehmbar ist. Kant sucht hier
die Antwort auf die Frage, wie der Mensch als vernunftbegabtes Wesen
konstituiert werden kann, nicht in der Analyse, sondern in einer Synthesis.[10]Bei Immanuel Kant,
der somit als bedeutender Erneuerer der bis dahin „vorkritischen“
Kategorienlehre gilt, finden sich zwölf „Kategorien der reinen Vernunft“. Für
Kant sind diese Kategorien Verstandesbegriffe,
nicht aber Ausdruck des tatsächlichen Seins der Dinge an sich. Damit wandelt
sich die ontologische Sichtweise
der Tradition in eine erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtung,
weshalb Kants „kritische“ Philosophie (seit der Kritik der
reinen Vernunft) oft auch als „Kopernikanische
Wende in der Philosophie“ bezeichnet wird.Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität sind
die vier grundlegenden Urteilsfunktionen des Verstandes, nach denen die
Kategorien gebildet werden. Demnach sind z. B. der Urteilsfunktion „Quantität“
die Kategorien bzw. Urteile „Einheit“, „Vielheit“ und „Allheit“ untergeordnet,
und der Urteilsfunktion „Relation“ die Urteile der „Ursache“ und der „Wirkung“.Siehe auch: Kritik der
reinen Vernunft und Transzendentale
AnalytikBereits bei Friedrich
Adolf Trendelenburg findet man den Hinweis auf
die verbreitete Kritik, dass Kant die den Kategorien zugrunde liegenden
Urteilsformen nicht systematisch hergeleitet und damit als notwendig begründet
hat. Einer der Kritikpunkte ist dabei, dass die Kategorien sich teilweise auf
Anschauungen (Einzelheit, Realität, Dasein), teilweise auf Abstraktionen wie
Zusammenfassen, Begrenzen oder Begründen (Vielheit, Allheit, Negation,
Limitation, Möglichkeit, Notwendigkeit) beziehen.
conversational
compact:
conversational pact in Grice’s conversational quasi-contractualism, contractarianism,
a family of moral and political theories that make use of the idea of a social
contract. Traditionally English philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke used the
social contract idea to justify certain conceptions of the state. In the
twentieth century philosophers such as G. R. Grice, H. P. Grice, and John Rawls
have used the social contract notion (‘quasi-contractualism’ in Grice’s sense) to
define and defend moral conceptions both conceptions of political justice and
individual morality, often but not always doing so in addition to developing
social contract theories of the state. The term ‘contractarian’ most often
applies to this second type of theory. There are two kinds of moral argument
that the contract image has spawned, the first rooted in Hobbes and the second
rooted in Kant. Hobbesians start by insisting that what is valuable is what a
person desires or prefers, not what he ought to desire or prefer for no such
prescriptively powerful object exists; and rational action is action that
achieves or maximizes the satisfaction of desires or preferences. They go on to
insist that moral action is rational for a person to perform if and only if
such action advances the satisfaction of his desires or preferences. And they
argue that because moral action leads to peaceful and harmonious living
conducive to the satisfaction of almost everyone’s desires or preferences, moral
actions are rational for almost everyone and thus “mutually agreeable.” But
Hobbesians believe that, to ensure that no cooperative person becomes the prey
of immoral aggressors, moral actions must be the conventional norms in a
community, so that each person can expect that if she behaves cooperatively,
others will do so too. These conventions constitute the institution of morality
in a society. So the Hobbesian moral theory is committed to the idea that
morality is a human-made institution, which is justified only to the extent
that it effectively furthers human interests. Hobbesians explain the existence
of morality in society by appealing to the convention-creating activities of
human beings, while arguing that the justification of morality in any human
society depends upon how well its moral conventions serve individuals’ desires
or preferences. By considering “what we could agree to” if we reappraised and
redid the cooperative conventions in our society, we can determine the extent
to which our present conventions are “mutually agreeable” and so rational for
us to accept and act on. Thus, Hobbesians invoke both actual agreements or
rather, conventions and hypothetical agreements which involve considering what
conventions would be “mutually agreeable” at different points in their theory;
the former are what they believe our moral life consists in; the latter are
what they believe our moral life should consist in i.e., what our actual moral life should
model. So the notion of the contract does not do justificational work by itself
in the Hobbesian moral theory: this term is used only metaphorically. What we
“could agree to” has moral force for the Hobbesians not because make-believe
promises in hypothetical worlds have any binding force but because this sort of
agreement is a device that merely reveals how the agreed-upon outcome is
rational for all of us. In particular, thinking about “what we could all agree
to” allows us to construct a deduction of practical reason to determine what
policies are mutually advantageous. The second kind of contractarian theory is
derived from the moral theorizing of Kant. In his later writings Kant proposed
that the “idea” of the “Original Contract” could be used to determine what
policies for a society would be just. When Kant asks “What could people agree
to?,” he is not trying to justify actions or policies by invoking, in any
literal sense, the consent of the people. Only the consent of real people can
be legitimating, and Kant talks about hypothetical agreements made by
hypothetical people. But he does believe these make-believe agreements have
moral force for us because the process by which these people reach agreement is
morally revealing. Kant’s contracting process has been further developed by
subsequent philosophers, such as Rawls, who concentrates on defining the
hypothetical people who are supposed to make this agreement so that their
reasoning will not be tarnished by immorality, injustice, or prejudice, thus
ensuring that the outcome of their joint deliberations will be morally sound.
Those contractarians who disagree with Rawls define the contracting parties in
different ways, thereby getting different results. The Kantians’ social
contract is therefore a device used in their theorizing to reveal what is just
or what is moral. So like Hobbesians, their contract talk is really just a way
of reasoning that allows us to work out conceptual answers to moral problems.
But whereas the Hobbesians’ use of contract language expresses the fact that,
on their view, morality is a human invention which if it is well invented ought
to be mutually advantageous, the Kantians’ use of the contract language is
meant to show that moral principles and conceptions are provable theorems
derived from a morally revealing and authoritative reasoning process or “moral
proof procedure” that makes use of the social contract idea. Both kinds of
contractarian theory are individualistic, in the sense that they assume that
moral and political policies must be justified with respect to, and answer the
needs of, individuals. Accordingly, these theories have been criticized by
communitarian philosophers, who argue that moral and political policies can and
should be decided on the basis of what is best for a community. They are also
attacked by utilitarian theorists, whose criterion of morality is the
maximization of the utility of the community, and not the mutual satisfaction
of the needs or preferences of individuals. Contractarians respond that whereas
utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons,
contractarian theories make moral and political policies answerable to the
legitimate interests and needs of individuals, which, contra the
communitarians, they take to be the starting point of moral theorizing.
conversational co-öperation: Grice is perfectly right that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. His earlier principle of conversational helpfulness
becomes the principle of conversational co-operation.Tthere is a distinction
between mutual help and cooperation. First, the Romans never knew. Their
‘servants’ were ‘help’ – and this remains in the British usage of ‘civil
servant,’ one who helps. Some philosophical tutees by Hare were often reminded,
in the midst of their presenting their essays, “Excuse me for interrupting,
Smith, but have you considered a career in the civil service?” Then some Romans
found Christianism fashionable, and they were set to translate the Bible. So
when this Hebrew concept appeared, they turned it into ad-judicatum, which was
translated by Wycliff as ‘help.’ Now ‘operatio’ is quite a different animal.
It’s the ‘opus’ of the Romans, who also had ‘labor.’ Surely to ‘co-laborate’ is
to ‘co-operate.’ There is an idea that ‘operate,’ can be more otiose, in the
view of Rogers Albritton. “He is operating the violin,” was his favourite
utterance. “Possibly his opus 5.” The fact that English needs a hyphen and an
umlaut does not make it very ‘ordinary’ in Austin’s description. Grice is more
interested in the conceptualization of this, notably as it relates to
rationality. Can cooperation NOT be rational? For most libertarians,
cooperation IS “irrational,” rather. But Grice points is subtler. He is
concerned with an emissor communicating that p. The least thing he deserves is
a rational recipient. “Otherwise I might just as well scream to the walls!” Used
by Grice WOW:368 – previously, ‘rational cooperation’ – what cooperation is not
rational? Grice says that if Smith promised Jones a job; Jones doesn’t get it.
Smith must be DEEMED to have given the job to Jones. It’s the intention, as
Kant shows, the pure motive, that matters. Ditto for communication. If
Blackburn draws a skull, he communicates that there is danger. If his addressee
fails to recognise the emissor’s intention the emissor will still be deemed to
have communicated that there is danger. So communication does NOT require
co-operation. His analysis of “emissor communicates that p” is not one of
“emissor successfully communicates that p,” because “communicates” reduces to
“intends” not to ‘fulfilled intention.’ Cooperation enters when we go beyond
ONE act of communication. To communicate is to give information and to
influence another, and it is also to receive information and to be influenced
by another. When these communicative objectives are made explicit, helpfulness
or cooperation becomes essential. He uses ‘converational cooperation” and
“supreme principle of conversational cooperation” (369). He uses ‘supreme
conversational principle” of “cooperativeness” (369), to avoid seeing the
conversational imperatives as an unorganized heap of conversational
obligations. Another variant is Grice’s use of “principle of conversational
co-operation.” He also uses “principle of conversational rational
co-operation.” Note that irrational or non-rational co-operation is not an
oxymoron. Another expression is conversational cooperative rationality. So
Grice was amused that you can just as well refer to ‘cooperative rationality”
or “rational cooperation,” “a category shift if ever there was one.”
conversational explicaturum –
explicitirum – cf. the implicaturum and the impliciturm –
implicatura/implicitura – implicaturm-impliciturm -- To be explicit is bad
manners at Oxford if not in Paris or MIT. The thing is to imply! Englishmen are
best at implying – their love for understatement is unequalled in the world. Grice
needs the explicatio, or explicit. Because the mistake the philosopher makes is
at the level of the implicatio, as Nowell-Smith, and C. K. Grant had noted. It
is not OBVIOUSLY at the explicit level. Grice was never interested in the
explicit level, and takes a very cavalier attitude to it. “This brief
indication of my use of say leaves it open whether a man who says (today)
Harold Wilson is a great man and another who says (also today) The British
Prime Minister is a great man would, if each knew that the two singular terms
had the same reference, have said the same thing. But whatever decision is made
about this question, the apparatus that I am about to provide will be capable
of accounting for any implicaturums that might depend on the presence of one
rather than another of these singular terms in the sentence uttered. Such implicaturums
would merely be related to different maxims.”Rephrase: “A brief indication of
my use of ‘the explicit’ leaves it open whether a man who states (today),
‘Harold Wilson is a great man’ thereby stating that Wilson is a great man, and
another who states (also today),‘The British Prime Minister is a great man,’
viz. that the Prime Minister is a great mand, would, if each singular term,
‘the Prime Minister’ and ‘Wilson’ has the same denotatum (co-relata) have put
forward in an explicit fashion the same propositional complex, and have stated
the same thing. On the face of it, it would seem they have not. But cf. ‘Wilson
will be the prime minister’ versus ‘Wilson shall be the prime minister.’ Again,
a subtler question arises as to whether the first emissor who has stated that
Wilson will be the next prime minster and the other one who has stated that
Wilson *shall* be the next prime minster, have both but forward the same
proposition. If the futurm indicatum is ENTAILED by the futurum intentionale,
the question is easy to settle. Whatever methodological decision or stipulation
I end up making about the ‘explicitum,’ the apparatus that I rely on is capable
of accounting for any implicaturum that might depend on the presence of this or
that singular term in the utterance. Such an implicaturum would merely be
related to a different conversational maxims. Urmson has elaborated on this,
“Mrs. Smith’s husband just passed by.” “You mean the postman! Why did you use
such contrived ‘signular term’?” If the emissor draws a skull what he
explicitly conveys is that this is a skull. This is the EPLICITUM. If he
communicates that there is danger, that’s via some further reasoning. That
associates a skull with death. Grice’s example is Grice displaying his bandaged
leg. Strictly, he communicates that he has a bandaged leg. Second, that his leg
is bandaged (the bandage may be fake). And third, that he cannot play cricket. It
all started in Oxford when they started to use ‘imply’ in a sense other than
the ‘logical’ one. This got Grice immersed in a deep exploration of types of
‘implication.’ There is the implicaturum, and the implicitum, both from
‘implico.’ As correlative there is the explicatio, which yields both the
explicatum and the explicitum. Grice has under the desideratum of
conversational clarity that a conversationalist is assumed to make the point of
his conversational contribution ‘explicit.’ So in his polemic with G. A. Paul,
Grice knows that the ‘doubt-or-denial’ condition will be at the level NOT of
the explicitum or explicatum. Surely an implicaturum can be CANCELLED
explicitly. Grice uses ‘contextual’ or ‘explicit,’ here but grants that the
‘contextual’ may be subsumed under the ‘explicit.’ It is when the sub-perceptual utterance is
copulated with the formulation of the explicatum of the implicaturum that Grice
shows G. A. Paul that the statement is still ‘true,’ and which Grice sees as a
reivindication of the causal theory of perception. In the twenty or so examples
of philosophical mistakes, both in “Causal” and “Prolegomena,” all the mistakes
can be rendered back to the ‘explicatum’ versus ‘implicaturum’ distinction.
Unfortunately, each requires a philosophical background to draw all the
‘implications,’ and Grice has been read by people without a philosophical
background who go on to criticise him for ignoring things where he never had
focused his attention on. His priority is to deal with these philosophical
mistakes. He also expects the philosopher to come up with a general
methodological statement. Grice distinguishes between the conversational
explicitum and the conversational explicatum. Grice plays with ‘explicit’ and
‘implicit’ at various places. He often uses ‘explicit’and ‘implicit’
adverbially: the utterer explicitly conveys that p versus the utterer
implicitly conveys that p (hints that p, suggests that p, indicates that p,
implicates that p, implies that p). Grice regards that both dimensions form
part of the total act of signification, accepting as a neutral variant, that
the utterer has signified that p.
conversational game: In a conversational game, you don’t say “The pillar box
seems red” if you know it IS red. So, philosophers at Oxford (like Austin,
Strawson, Hare, Hampshire, and Hart) are all victims of ignoring the rules of
the game, and just not understanding that a game is being played. the expression is used by Grice systematically.
He speaks of players making the conversational move in the conversational game
following the conversational rule, v. rational choice
conversational
haggle
-- bargaining theory, the branch of game theory that treats agreements, e.g.,
wage agreements between labor and management. In the simplest bargaining
problems there are two bargainers. They can jointly realize various outcomes,
including the outcome that occurs if they fail to reach an agreement, i.e. if
they fail to help each other or co-operate. Each bargainer assigns a certain
amount of utility to each outcome. The question is, what outcome will they
realise if each conversationalist is rational? Methods of solving bargaining
problems are controversial. The best-known proposals are Grice’s and Nash’s and
Kalai and Smorodinsky’s. Grice proposes that if you want to get a true answer
to your question, you should give a true answer to you co-conversationalist’s
question (“ceteris paribus”). Nash proposes maximizing the product of utility
gains with respect to the disagreement point. Kalai and Smorodinsky propose
maximsiing utility gains with respect to the disagreement point, subject to the
constraint that the ratio of utility gains equals the ratio of greatest
possible gains. These three methods of selecting an outcome have been
axiomatically characterized. For each method, there are certain axioms of
outcome selection such that that method alone satisfies the axioms. The axioms
incorporate principles of rationality from cooperative game theory. They focus
on features of outcomes rather than bargaining strategies. For example, one
axiom requires that the outcome selected be Pareto-optimal, i.e., be an outcome
such that no alternative is better for one of the bargainers and not worse for
the other. A bargaining problem may become more complicated in several ways.
First, there may be more than two bargainers (“Suppose Austin joins in.”). If
unanimity is not required for beneficial agreements, splinter groups or co-alitions
may form. Second, the protocol for offers, counte-roffers (“Where does C live?”
“Why do you want to know?”) etc., may be relevant. Then principles of *non-cooperative*
but competitive game theory concerning war strategies (“l’art de la guerre”) are
needed to justify this or that solution. Third, the context of a bargaining
problem may be relevant. For instance, opportunities for side payments,
differences in bargaining power, and interpersonal comparisons of utility may
influence the solution. Fourth, simplifying assumptions, such as the assumption
that bargainers have complete information about their bargaining situation, may
be discarded. Bargaining theory is part of the philosophical study of
rationality. It is also important in ethics as a foundation for contractarian
theories of morality and for certain theories of distributive justice.
conversational helpfulness. It’s not clear if ‘helpfulness’ has a Graeco-Roman
counterpart! The Grecians and the Romans could be VERY individualistic! – adiuvare,
(adiuare, old for adiūverare), iūtus, āre,” which Lewis and Short render as “to
help, assist, aid, support, further, sustain. “fortīs fortuna adiuvat, T.:
maerorem orationis meae lacrimis suis: suā sponte eos, N.: pennis adiutus
amoris, O.: in his causis: alqm ad percipiendam virtutem: si quid te adiuero,
poet ap. C.: ut alqd consequamur, adiuvisti: multum eorum opinionem adiuvabat,
quod, etc., Cs.—With ellips. of obj, to be of assistance, help: ad verum
probandum: non multum, Cs.: quam ad rem humilitas adiuvat, is convenient,
Cs.—Supin. acc.: Nectanebin adiutum profectus, N.—P. pass.: adiutus a
Demosthene, N.—Fig.: clamore militem, cheer, L.: adiuvat hoc quoque, this too
is useful, H.: curā adiuvat illam (formam), sets off his beauty, O. Grice is right that ‘cooperation’ does NOT equate
‘helpfulness’ and he appropriately changes
his earlier principle of conversational helpfulness to a principle of
conversational co-operation. Was there a Graeco-Roman equivalent for
Anglo-Saxon ‘help’? helpmeet (n.) a ghost word from the 1611 translation of the
Bible, where it originally was a two-word noun-adjective phrase translating
Latin adjutorium simile sibi [Genesis ii.18] as "an help meet for
him," and meaning literally "a helper like himself." See help
(n.) + meet (adj.). By 1670s it was hyphenated help-meet and mistaken as a
modified noun. Compare helpmate. The original Hebrew is 'ezer keneghdo. Related
entries & more aid (v.) "to
assist, help," c. 1400, from Old French aidier "help, assist"
(Modern French aider), from Latin adiutare, frequentative of adiuvare (past
participle adiutus) "to give help to," from ad "to" (see
ad-) + iuvare "to help, assist, give strength, support, sustain,"
which is from a PIE source perhaps related to the root of iuvenis "young
person" (see young (adj.)). Related: Aided; aiding. Related entries &
more succor (n.) c. 1200, socour,
earlier socours "aid, help," from Anglo-French succors "help,
aid," Old French socors, sucurres "aid, help, assistance"
(Modern French secours), from Medieval Latin succursus "help,
assistance," from past participle of Latin succurrere "run to help,
hasten to the aid of," from assimilated form of sub "up to" (see
sub-) + currere "to run" (from PIE root *kers- "to run").
Final -s mistaken in English as a plural inflection and dropped late 13c.
Meaning "one who aids or helps" is from c. 1300. There is a fashion
in which to help is to cooperate, but co-operate, strictly, requires operation
by A and operation by B. We do use cooperate loosely. “She is very
cooperative.” “Help” seems less formal. One can help without ever engaging or
honouring the other’s goal. I can help you buy a house, say. So the principle
of conversational cooperation is stricter and narrower than the principle of
conversational helpfulness. Cooperation involves reciprocity and mutuality in a
way that helpfulness does not. That’s why Grice needs to emphasise that there
is an expectation of MUTUAL helpfulness. One is expected to be helpful, and one
expects the other to be helpful. Grice was doubtful about the implicaturum of
‘co-operative,’ – after all, who at Oxford wants a ‘co-operative.’ It sounds
anti-Oxonian. So Grice elaborates on ‘helping others’ and ‘assuming others will
help you’ in the event that we ‘are doing something together.’ Does this equate
cooperation, he wonders. Just in case, he uses ‘helpfulness’ as a variant.
There are other concepts he plays with, notably ‘altruism,’ and ‘benevolence,’
or other-love.’Helpfulness is Grice’s favourite virtue. Grice is clear that
reciprocity is essential here. One exhibits helpfulness and expects helpfulness
from his conversational partner. He dedicates a set of seven lectures to it,
entitled as follows. Lecture 1, Prolegomena; Lecture 2: Logic and Conversation;
Lecture 3: Further notes on logic and conversation; Lecture 4: Indicative
conditionals; Lecture 5: Us meaning and intentions; Lecture 6: Us meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word-meaning; and Lecture 7: Some models for implicaturum.
I hope they dont expect me to lecture on James! Grice admired James, but
not vice versa. Grice entitled the set as being Logic and Conversation.
That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing
that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the
second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and
Harman, The Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is
indicated below. In the first, Grice manages to quote from
Witters. In the last, he didnt! The original set consisted of seven
lectures. To wit: Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic
and conversation, Indicative Conditionals, Us meaning and intentions, Us
meaning, sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicaturum.
They were pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an implicaturum had
been introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of
conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of
rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational
helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who
cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,
influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted
along the lines set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In
Prolegomena he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a
disregard for the implicaturum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor,
Senses are not to be muliplied beyond necessity. In Indicative conditionals he
tackles Strawson on if as not representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell.
The next two lectures on the meaning by the utterer and intentions, and meaning
by the utterer, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning refine his earlier, more
austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the
lectures with an exploration on the relevance of the implicaturum to
philosophical psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had
become enamoured with the s. and would love to give it a continuous perusal.
The set is indeed grandiose. It starts with a Prolegomena to set the scene: He
notably quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of justifies
the general title. In the second lecture, Logic and Conversation, he expands on
the principle of conversational helpfulness and the explicitum/implicaturum
distinction – all very rationalist! The third lecture is otiose in that he
makes fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The
fourth lecture, on Indicative conditionals, is indeed on MOST of the formal
devices he had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather than the
quantifiers and the iota operator, with which he deals in Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum, since, as he notes, they refer to reference). This
lecture is the centrepiece of the set. In the fifth lecture, he plays with
mean, and discovers that it is attached to the implicaturum or the implicitum.
In the sixth lecture, he becomes a nominalist, to use Bennetts phrase, as he
deals with dog and shaggy in terms of this or that resultant procedure. Dont
ask me what they are! Finally, in “Some models for implicaturum,” he attacks
the charge of circularity, and refers to nineteenth-century explorations on the
idea of thought without language alla Wundt. I dont think a set of James
lectures had even been so comprehensive! Conversational helpfulness. This is
Grice at his methodological best. He was aware that the type of philosophying
he was about to criticise wass a bit dated, but whats wrong with being
old-fashioned? While this may be seen as a development of his views on implicaturum
at that seminal Oxford seminar, it may also be seen as Grice popularising the
views for a New-World, non-Oxonian audience. A discussion of Oxonian
philosophers of the play group of Grice, notably Austin, Hare, Hart, and
Strawson. He adds himself for good measure (“Causal theory”). Philosophers,
even at Oxford, have to be careful with the attention that is due to general
principles of discourse. Grice quotes philosophers of an earlier generation,
such as Ryle, and some interpreters or practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such
as Benjamin and Searle. He even manages to quote from Witterss Philosophical
investigations, on seeing a banana as a banana. There are further items in the
Grice collection that address Austins manoeuvre, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs
and cans, : conditional, power. Two of Grices favourites. He opposed
Strawsons view on if. Grice thought that if was the horseshoe of Whitehead and
Russell, provided we add an implicaturum to an entailment. The can is
merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice! Ifs and cans, intention,
disposition. Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of
free will. Pears had noted that conversational implicaturum may account for the
conditional perfection (if yields iff). Cf. Ayers on Austin on if and can.
Recall that for Grice the most idiomatic way to express a disposition is with
the Subjectsive mode, the if, and the can ‒ The ice can break. Cf. the mistake:
It is not the case that what you must do, you can do. The can-may distinction
is one Grice played with too. As with will and shall, the attachment of one mode
to one of the lexemes is pretty arbitrary and not etymologically justified ‒
pace Fowler on it being a privilege of this or that Southern Englishman as
Fowler is. If he calls it Prolegomena, he is being jocular. Philosophers
Mistakes would have been too provocative. Benjamin, or rather Broad, erred, and
so did Ryle, and Ludwig Witters, and my friends, Austin (the mater that
wobbled), and in order of seniority, Hart (I heard him defend this about
carefully – stopping at every door in case a dog comes out at breakneck speed),
Hare (To say good is to approve), and Strawson (“Logical theory”: To utter if
p, q is to implicate some inferrability, To say true! is to endorse –
Analysis). If he ends with Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes Searle from
an essay in British philosophy in Lecture I, and from an essay in Philosophy in
America in Lecture V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas oilmens club
example! We may think of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a meta-linguistic
botanizer: his hobby was to collect philosophers mistakes, and he catalogued
them. In Causal theory he produces his first list of seven. The pillar box
seems red to me. One cannot see a dagger as a dagger. Moore didnt know that the
objects before him were his own hands. What is actual is not also possible. For
someone to be called responsible, his action should be condemnable. A cause
must be given only of something abnormal or unusual (cf. ætiology). If you know
it, you dont believe it. In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated.
Examples A (the use of an expression, by Austin, Benjamin, Grice, Hart, Ryle,
Wittgenstein), Examples B (Strawson on and, or, and especially if), and
Examples C (Strawson on true and Hare on good – the performative theories). But
even if his taxonomy is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving other
examples as he goes on to discuss how to assess the philosophical mistake. Cf.
his elaboration on trying, I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque, Trying to cash a
cheque, you mean. Or cf. his remarks on remember, and There is an analogy here
with a case by Wittgenstein. In summary, he wants to say. Its the philosopher
who makes his big mistake. He has detected, as Grice has it, some
conversational nuance. Now he wants to exploit it. But before rushing ahead to
exploit the conversational nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected
in his exercise of linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know
with clarity what type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that the
nuance depends on a general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general,
and most likely rational) governing discourse – that participants in a
conversation should be aware of, and not on some minutiæ that has been
identified by the philosopher making the mistake, unsystematically, and merely
descriptively, and taxonomically, but without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy.
The fact that he directs this to his junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest
are all Grices seniors! The point is of philosophical interest, rather than
other. And he keeps citing philosophers, Tarski or Ramsey, in the third James
leture, to elaborate the point about true in Prolegomena. He never seems
interested in anything but an item being of philosophical interest, even if
that means HIS and MINE! On top, he is being Oxonian: Only at Oxford my
colleagues were so obsessed, as it has never been seen anywhere else, about the
nuances of conversation. Only they were all making a big mistake in having no
clue as to what the underlying theory of conversation as rational co-operation
would simplify things for them – and how! If I introduce the explicatum as a
concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned! Is Grices intention epagogic, or
diagogic in Prolegomena? Is he trying to educate Strawson, or just delighting
in proving Strawson wrong? We think the former. The fact that he quotes himself
shows that Grice is concerned with something he still sees, and for the rest of
his life will see, as a valid philosophical problem. If philosophy generated no
problems it would be dead. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Whence I took helpfulness,’; the
main sources are the two sets on ‘logic and conversation.’ There are good
paraphrases in other essays when he summarises his own views, as he did at
Urbana. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational imperative: Grice is loose in the use of ‘imperative.’ It obviously
has to do with the will in command mode! -- The problem with ‘command’ is that
for Habermas, it springs from ‘power,’ and we need to have it sprung from
‘auctoritas,’ rather – the voice of reason, that is – “Impero” gives also
pre-pare. “Imperare, prepare, etc. What was the Greek for ‘imperative mode’? προστακτική
prostaktike. προσ-τακτικός , ή, όν, A.of or for
commanding, imperative, imperious, τὸ π. [ἡ ψυχή], opp. τὸ ὑπηρετικόν (of the
body), Arist.Top.128b19; “π. τινῶν” Corn.ND16; “λόγος” Plu.2.1037f;
Προστακτικός (sc. λόγος), title of work by Protagoras, D.L.9.55; “βραχυλογία”
Plu.Phoc.5; also of persons, “ἄρχων” Max.Tyr.13.2 (Sup.). II. Gramm., ἡ -κὴ
ἔγκλισις the imperative mood, D.T.638.7, A.D.Synt.31.20; π. ἐκφορὰ τῶν ῥημάτων
ib.69.20; “τὸ π. σχῆμα” Anon.Fig.24; also “τὸ -κόν” D.L. 7.66,67,
Ps.-Plu.Vit.Hom.53. Adv. “-κῶς” in the imperative mood, D.H.4.18,
Sch.Ar.Av.1163.Grice became famous for his ‘maxims,’ which in Nowell-Smith’s
view they are more like rules of etiquette for sylish conversation. As such,
many had been proposed. But Grice proposes them AS A PHILOSOPHER would, and
ONLY TO REBUFF the mistake made by this or that philosopher who would rather
EXPLAIN the phenomenon in terms OTHER than involving as PART OF THE DATA, i. e.
as a datum (as he says) or assumption, that there are these ‘assumptions,’
which guide behaviour. Grice is having in mind Kant’s “Imperativ.” He also uses
‘conversational objective.” In most versions that Grice provides of the
‘general expectations’ of rational discourse, he chooses the obvious imperative
form. On occasion he does use ‘imperative.’ Grice is vague as to the term of
choice for this or that ‘expectation.’ According to Strawson, Grice even once
used ‘conversational rule,’ and he does use ‘conversational rule of the
conversational game of making this or that conversational move.’ Notably, he
also uses ‘conversational principle,’ and ‘conversational desideratum.’ And
‘maxim’! And ‘conversational directive (371), and ‘conversational obligation’
(369). By ‘conversational maxim,’ he means ‘conversational maxim.’ He uses
‘conversational sub-maxim’ very occasionally. He rather uses ‘conversational
super-maxim.’ He uses ‘immanuel,’ and he uses ‘conversational immanuel.’ It is
worth noting that the choice of word influences the exegesis. Loar takes these
things to be ‘empirical generalisations over functional states’! And Grice
agrees that there is a dull, empiricist way, in which these things can be seen
as things people conform to. There is a quasi-contractualist approach to:
things people convene on. And there is an Ariskantian approach: things people
SHOULD abide by. Surely Grice is not requiring that the conversationalists ARE
explicitly or consciously AWARE of these things. There is a principle of effort
of economical reason to cope with that!
conversational implicaturum. Grice plays with the ambiguity of ‘implication’ as a
logical term, and ‘implicitness’ as a rhetorical one. He wants to make a
distinction between ‘dicere,’ to convey explicitly that p, and to convey
implicitly, or ‘imply’ (always applied to the emissor) that q. A joke. Surely
if he is going to use ‘implicaturum’ in Roman, this would be ‘implicaturum
conversationale,’ if there were such thing. And there were! The Roman is formed
from cum- plus ‘verso.’ So there’s Roman ‘conversatio.’ And –alis, ale is a
productive suffix. Or implicitum. Grice
is being philosophical and sticking with ‘implicatio’ as used by logicians.
Implicitum does not have much of a philosophical pedigree. But even
‘implicatio’ was not THAT used, ‘consequentia’ was preferred, as in ‘non sequitur,
and seguitur, quod demonstrandumm erat. Strawson criticism of ‘the,’ only
tentative by Grice, unlike ‘if,’ so forgivable! See common-ground status. Grice
loved an implicaturum. The use of ‘conversational’ by Grice is NEVER emphatic.
In his detailed, even fastidious, taxonomy of ‘implication,’ he decisively does
not want to have a mere conventional implicaturum (as in “She was poor but she
was honest”) as conversational. Not even a “Thank you”, generated by the maxim
“be polite.” That would be an implicaturum which is nonconventional and yet NOT
conversational, because ‘be polite’ is NOT a conversational maxim (moral,
aesthetic, and social maxims are not). And an implicaturum. An elaboration of
his Oxonian seminar on Logic and conversation. Theres a principle of
conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational
candour and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of
conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational
benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis
for a conversational implicaturum, as his term of art goes. Observation of the
principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the
following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is
supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should
only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the
assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of
conversational helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice
takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an implicaturum is
conversational in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicaturum is
rationally calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or
stance that the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being
helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part
of the sense and never an entailment of this or that piece of philosophical
vocabulary, in Davidson and Harman, the logic of Grammar, also in Cole and
Morgan, repr. in a revised form in Grice, logic and conversation, the second
James lecture, : principle of conversational helpfulness, implicaturum,
cancellability. While the essay was also repr. by Cole and Morgan. Grice
always cites it from the two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar, ed. by
Davidson and Harman. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter
Grice through this essay. A philosopher usually gets first acquainted with his
In defence of a dogma, or Meaning. In Logic and Conversation, Grice
re-utilises the notion of an implicaturum and the principle of conversational helpfulness
that he introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. The idea Grice is that
the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational
(reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the
two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information,
to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it
is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational
helfpulness. Grices point is methodological. He is not at all interested
in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts in
media res, and skips Grices careful list of Oxonian examples of disregard
for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational
move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum
(roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This
concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent,
conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by
a few philosophers leaving them confused. I do not know what Davidson and
Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in The logic of grammar. I
mean: it is obviously in media res. Grice starts with the logical devices, and
never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and
hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought The logic of grammar must be
left puzzled. He has to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion.
Oxonian philosophers would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from unpublished
material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and thats why he got all his Grice
wrong! And so did Strawson in If and the horseshoe. Even Walker responding to
Cohen is relying on memory. Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar.
At Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking implicaturum
in Mind, and Pears was talking conversational implicaturum in Ifs and cans. And
Platts was dedicating a full chapter to “Causal Theory”. It seems the Oxonian
etiquette was to quote from Causal Theory. It was obvious that Grices
implication excursus had to read implicaturum! In a few dictionaries of
philosophy, such as Hamlyns, under implication, a reference to Grices locus
classicus Causal theory is made – Passmore quotes from Causal theory in Hundred
years of philosophy. Very few Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in
Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted The logic of grammar, though.
At Oxford, Grices implicatura remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a
few. And philosophers would not cite a cajoled essay in the references. The implicaturum
allows a display of truth-functional Grice. For substitutional-quantificational
Grice we have to wait for his treatment of the. In Prolegomena, Grice had
quoted verbatim from Strawsons infamous idea that there is a sense of
inferrability with if. While the lecture covers much more than if (He only said
if; Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that! the title was never meant to
be original. Grice in fact provides a rational justification for the three
connectives (and, or, and if) and before that, the unary functor not.
Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, not and If, Sinton on Grice on
denials of indicative conditionals, not, if. Strawson had elaborated on
what he felt was a divergence between Whiteheads and Russells horseshoe, and
if. Grice thought Strawsons observations could be understood in terms of
entailment + implicaturum (Robbing Peter to Pay Paul). But problems, as first
noted to Grice, by Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicaturum
within the operation of, say, negation. Analogous problems arise with implicatura
for the other earlier dyadic functors, and and or, and Grice looks for a single
explanation of the phenomenon. The qualification indicative is modal.
Ordinary language allows for if utterances to be in modes other than the
imperative. Counter-factual, if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical,
Subjectsive is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a cavalier to the
problem: Surely it wont do to say You couldnt have done that, since you were in
Seattle, to someone who figuratively tells you hes spend the full summer
cleaning the Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the centerpiece of the
lectures. Grice takes good care of not, and, or, and concludes with the if of
the title. For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook Wilson in Statement and Inference.
And they all connect with rationality. So he is using material from his Oxford
seminars on the principle of conversational helpfulness. Plus Cook Wilson makes
more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The last bit, citing Kripke and Dummett,
is meant as jocular. What is important is the teleological approach to the
operators, where a note should be made about dyadicity. In Prolegomena, when he
introduces the topic, he omits not (about which he was almost obsessed!). He
just gives an example for and (He went to bed and took off his dirty boots),
one for or (the garden becomes Oxford and the kitchen becomes London, and the implicaturum
is in terms, oddly, of ignorance: My wife is either in town or country,making
fun of Town and Country), and if. His favourite illustration for if is Cock
Robin: If the Sparrow did not kill him, the Lark did! This is because Grice is
serious about the erotetic, i.e. question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to
things, but he manages to bring Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just
to impress! Most importantly, he introduces the square brackets! Hell use them
again in Presupposition and Conversational Implicaturum and turns them into
subscripts in Vacuous Namess. This is central. For he wants to impoverish the
idea of the implicaturum. The explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is
syntactic-cum-pragmatic import. The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable,
and as he knows: what the eye no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves
for! The modal implicaturum. Since Grice uses indicative, for the
title of his third James lecture (Indicative Conditionals) surely he implicates
subjunctive ‒ i.e. that someone might be thinking that he should
give an account of indicative-cum-subjective. This relates to an example Grice
gives in Causal theory, that he does not reproduce in Prolegomena. Grice states
the philosophical mistake as follows. What is actual is not also
possible. Grice seems to be suggesting that a subjective conditional would
involve one or other of the modalities, he is not interested in exploring. On
the other hand, Mackie has noted that Grices conversationalist hypothesis
(Mackie quotes verbatim from Grices principle of conversational helpfulness)
allows for an explanation of the Subjectsive if that does not involve Kripke-type
paradoxes involving possible worlds, or other. In Causal Theory, Grice notes
that the issue with which he has been mainly concerned may be thought rather a
fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several
philosophical theses or dicta which would he thinks need to be examined in
order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which
Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind.
An examples which occurs to me is the following. What is actual is not also
possible. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is
importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for
all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted
by Grices objector seems to Grice to involve a type of manoeuvre which is
characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. He is not
condemning that kind of manoeuvre. He is merely suggesting that to embark on it
without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead
to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure
that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. If was also of
special interest to Grice for many other reasons. He defends a dispositional
account of intending that in terms of ifs and cans. He considers akrasia
conditionally. He explored the hypothetical-categorical distinction in the
buletic mode. He was concerned with therefore as involved with the associated
if of entailment. Refs.: “Implicaturum” is introduced in Essay 2 in WoW –
but there are scattered references elsewhere. He often uses the plural ‘implicatura’
too, as in “Retrospective Epilogue,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. An implicaturum
requires a complexum. Frege was the topic of the explorations by Dummett. A
tutee of Grices once brought Dummetts Frege to a tutorial and told Grice that
he intended to explore this. Have you read it? No I havent, Grice
answered. And after a pause, he went on: And I hope I will not. Hardly
promising, the tutee thought. Some authors, including Grice, but alas, not
Frege, have noted some similarities between Grices notion of a conventional implicaturum
and Freges schematic and genial rambles on colouring. Aber Farbung, as Frege
would state! Grice was more interested in the idea of a Fregeian sense, but he
felt that if he had to play with Freges aber he should! One of Grices
metaphysical construction-routines, the Humeian projection, is aimed at the
generation of concepts, in most cases the rational reconstruction of an
intuitive concept displayed in ordinary discourse. We arrive at something
like a Fregeian sense. Grice exclaimed, with an intonation of Eureka, almost.
And then he went back to Frege. Grices German was good, so he could read
Frege, in the vernacular. For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grices, not
Freges): In einem obliquen Kontext, Frege says, Grice says, kann ja z. B. die
Ersetzung eines „aber durch ein „und, die in einem direkten Kontext keinen Unterschied
des Wahrheitswerts ergibt, einen solchen Unterschied bewirken. Ill make that
easy for you, darlings: und is and, and aber is but. But surely, Papa, aber is
not cognate with but! Its not. That is Anglo-Saxon, for you. But is strictly
Anglo-Saxon short for by-out; we lost aber when we sailed the North Sea. Grice
went on: Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn und Färbung (oder Konnotationen)
eines Satzes fragwürdig. I. e. he is saying that She was poor but she was
honest only conventionally implicates that there is a contrast between her
poverty and her honesty. I guess he heard the ditty during the War? Grice
ignored that remark, and went on: Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von Sinn und
Färbung genauer zu unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante Bedeutungs
Komponenten hin, bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu differenzieren, da er
letztlich nur betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der Logik keine Rolle
spielen. They play a role in the lingo, that is! What do? Stuff like but. But
surely they are not rational conversational implicatura!? No, dear, just
conventional tricks you can ignore on a nice summer day! Grice however was
never interested in what he dismissively labels the conventional implicaturum.
He identifies it because he felt he must! Surely, the way some Oxonian
philosophers learn to use stuff like, on the one hand, and on the other, (or
how Grice learned how to use men and de in Grecian), or so, or therefore, or
but versus and, is just to allow that he would still use imply in such cases. But
surely he wants conversational to stick with rationality: conversational maxim
and converational implicaturum only apply to things which can be justified
transcendentally, and not idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice follows Church in
noting that Russell misreads Frege as being guilty of ignoring the use-mention
distinction, when he doesnt. One thing that Grice minimises is that Freges
assertion sign is composite. Tha is why Baker prefers to use the dot “.” as the
doxastic correlative for the buletic sign ! which is NOT composite. The sign
„├‟ is composite. Frege explains his Urteilstrich, the vertical component of
his sign ├ as conveying assertoric force. The principal role of the horizontal
component as such is to prevent the appearance of assertoric force belonging to
a token of what does not express a thought (e.g. the expression 22). ─p
expresses a thought even if p does not.) cf. Hares four sub-atomic particles:
phrastic (dictum), neustic (dictor), tropic, and clistic. Cf. Grice on the
radix controversy: We do not want the “.” in p to become a vanishing sign. Grices
Frege, Frege, Words, and Sentences, Frege, Farbung, aber. Frege was one of
Grices obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum, a
concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the
generation of conversational implicatura, that can only mean progress for
philosophy! Fregeian senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The
employment of the routine of Humeian projection may be expected to deliver for
us, as its result, a concept – the concept(ion) of value, say, in
something like a Fregeian sense, rather than an object. There is also a
strong affinity between Freges treatment of colouring (of the German particle
aber, say) and Grices idea of a convetional implicaturum (She was poor, but she
was honest,/and her parents were the same,/till she met a city feller,/and she
lost her honest Names, as the vulgar Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem
interested in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicatura,
and there is a reason for this. Conventional implicatura are not
essentially connected, as conversational implicatura are, with rationality.
Conventional implicatura cannot be calculable. They have less of a
philosophical interest, too, in that they are not cancellable. Grice sees
cancellability as a way to prove some (contemporary to him, if dated)
ordinary-language philosophers who analyse an expression in terms of sense and
entailment, where a cancellable conversational implicaturum is all there is (to
it). He mentions Benjamin in Prolegomena, and is very careful in noting
how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian sense. In his Causal theory, Grice lists
another mistake: What is known to be the case is not believed to be the
case. Grice gives pretty few example of a conventional implicaturum:
therefore, as in the utterance by Jill: Jack is an Englishman; he is,
therefore, brave. This is interesting because therefore compares to so
which Strawson, in PGRICE, claims is the asserted counterpart to if. But
Strawson is never associated with the type of linguistic botany that Grice is.
Grice also mentions the idiom, on the one hand/on the other hand, in some
detail in “Epilogue”: My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my sister, on the
other hand, lives on a peak at Darien. Grice thinks that Frege misuses the
use-mention distinction but Russell corrects that. Grice bases this on Church.
And of course he is obsessed with the assertion sign by Frege, which Grice
thinks has one stroke tooo many. The main reference is give above for
‘complexum.’ Those without a philosophical background tend to ignore a joke by
Grice. His echoing Kant in the James is a joke, in the sense that he is using
Katns well-known to be pretty artificial quartet of ontological caegories to
apply to a totally different phenomenon: the taxonomy of the maxims! In his
earlier non-jocular attempts, he applied more philosophical concepts with a
more serious rationale. His key concept, conversation as rational co-operation,
underlies all his attempts. A pretty worked-out model is in terms then of this
central, or overarching principle of conversational helpfulness (where
conversation as cooperation need not be qualified as conversation as rational
co-operation) and being structured by two contrasting sub-principles: the
principle of conversational benevolence (which almost overlaps with the
principle of conversational helpfulness) and the slightly more jocular
principle of conversational self-love. There is something oxymoronic about self-love
being conversational, and this is what leads to replace the two subprinciples
by a principle of conversational helfpulness (as used in WoW:IV) simpliciter.
His desideratum of conversational candour is key. The clash between the
desideratum of conversational candour and the desideratum of conversational
clarity (call them supermaxims) explains why I believe that p (less clear than
p) shows the primacy of candour over clarity. The idea remains of an
overarching principle and a set of more specific guidelines. Non-Oxonian
philosophers would see Grices appeal to this or that guideline as ad hoc, but
not his tutees! Grice finds inspiration in Joseph Butler’s sermon on benevolence
and self-love, in his sermon 9, upon the love of our neighbour, preached on advent
Sunday. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in
this saying, Namesly, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, Romans xiii.
9. It is commonly observed, that there is a disposition in men to complain
of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they live, as greater
than that of former ones: which is usually followed with this further
observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all times.
Now, to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts of
history: thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes different
turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages
than in others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the distinction
of the present, to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to
self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it
seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted
in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over
all other principles; "or whether the contracted affection may not
possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own
end, private good?" Repr. in revised form as WOW, I. Grice felt
the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, Never contradict. Never
explain) of the nuances about seem and cause (“Causal theory”.). Grice uses ‘My
wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom,’ by Smith, as relying on a requirement
of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice.
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged. Variations on a theme by Grice. I wish to represent a
certain subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall
call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with
certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what
these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a
general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession
of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of
purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction
may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for
discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite,
or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the
participants, as in a casual conversation. But at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might
then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected
ceteris paribus to observe, viz.: Make your conversational contribution such as
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this
the co-operative principle. We might then formulate a rough general principle
which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to
observe, viz.: Make your contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative
Principle. Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants
are. Less literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the
accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why logic and
conversation? Logica had been part of the trivium for ages ‒ Although they
called it dialectica, then. Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by
Strawsons treatment of the formal devices in “Introduction to logical theory”
(henceforth, “Logical theory”), Grice targets these, in their
ordinary-discourse counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his logic
tutor – Strawson was following a PPE., and his approach to logic is practical.
His philosophy tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit. Hum. the
situation is different. Grice knows that the Categoriae and De Int. of his
beloved Aristotle are part of the Logical Organon which had been so influential
in the history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile Strawsons
observations with the idea that the formal devices reproduce some sort of
explicatum, or explicitum, as identified by Whitehead and Russell in Principia
Mathematica. In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of
discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The alleged
divergence between the ordinary-language operators and their formal
counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicatura,
then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has
to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal
device and its alleged ordinary-language counterpart, while still assuming that
U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his
addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation ‒
the exchange of information and the institution of decisions ‒ and
judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and
rational) if conducted under some form of principle of conversational
helpfulness. The observation of a principle of conversational
helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone
who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption
that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational
helpfulness. In titling his seminar Logic and conversation, Grice is
thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal “Logical theory,” that every
Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never
ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti
Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he
acknwoledges Grices difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the
strength or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses
an adjective that Grice will seldom do, pragmatic. On top, Strawson attributes
the adjective to rule. For Grice, in Strawsons wording, there is this or that pragmatic
rule to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a weaker
conversational move. Strawsons Introduction was published before Grice aired
his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes the
opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it is
Grices occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as
generating implicatura under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes
it obvious that Grices interest is methodological, and not philological. He is
not interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle
of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicaturum,
which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his
expression does, a distinction apparently denied by Witters and all too
frequently ignored by Austin. Logic and conversation, an Oxford seminar, implicaturum,
principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational implicaturum,
conversational implicaturum. Conversational Implicaturum Grices main
invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer implies
and what his expression does. A distinction apparently denied by Witters,
and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin. Grice is
implicating that Austins sympathies were for the Subjectsification of
Linguistic Nature. Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never
loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicaturum,
which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly
particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. I can very well mean that my
tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering It is
raining.Grice notes that since the object of the present exercise, is to
provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of
cases, why is it that a particular implicaturum is present, I
would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this
model should be: can it be used to construct an explanation of
the presence of such an implicaturum, and is it more comprehensive
and more economical than any rival? is the no
doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give
of such an implicaturum consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer
towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise:
whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics,
Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their
own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and
spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own
familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed
syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the
casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery
questions in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever
physician, who, when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for
poison even from a serpent.qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos
cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti
machinamentis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si
repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia
sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem
tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones
tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio
compellit et de serpente conficivnt. If he lectured on Logic and
Conversation on implicaturum, Grice must have thought that Strawsons area was
central. Yet, as he had done in Causal theory and as he will at Harvard, Grice
kept collecting philosophers mistakes. So its best to see Grice as a
methodologist, and as using logic and conversation as an illustration of his
favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a
place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area
minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a balance: surely logic and
conversation is a topic of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all
philosophers – unless they are Griceians – to keep a broad unitarian view of
philosophy as a virtuous whole. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
Destructive implicaturum to it: Mr. Puddle is our man in æsthetics implicates
that he is not good at it. What is important to Grice is that the mistakes of
these philosophers (notably Strawson!) arise from some linguistic phenomena, or,
since we must use singular expressions this or that linguistic phenomenon. Or
as Grice puts it, it is this or that linguistic phenomenon which provides the
material for the philosopher to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory
of conversation as rational co-operation is posited – technically, as a way to
explain (never merely describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf.
never explain, never apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: Never contradict. Never
explain.) these phenomena – his principle of conversational helpfulness and the
idea of a conversational implicaturum. The latter is based not so much on
rationality per se, but on the implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly
plays with, since his earlier semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But
back to this or that linguistic phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle
for providing this or that linguistic phenomenon that no philosopher would ever
feel excited about, Grice himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a
philosophical point with this or that linguistic phenomenon that would not be
necessarily connected with philosophy. Grice rarely quotes authors, but surely
the section in “Causal theory,” where he lists seven philosophical theses
(which are ripe for an implicaturum treatment) would be familiar enough for
anybody to be able to drop a names to attach to each. At Harvard, almost every
example Grice gives of this or that linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and
sometimes he expands on his own view of them, just to amuse his audience – and
show how committed to this or that thesis he was), but some are not unauthored.
And they all belong to the linguistic turn: In his three groups of examples,
Grice quotes from Ryle (who thinks he knows about ordinary language), Witters,
Austin (he quotes him in great detail, from Pretending, Plea of excuses, and No
modification without aberration,), Strawson (in “Logical theory” and on Truth
for Analysis), Hart (as I have heard him expand on this), Grice, Searle, and
Benjamin. Grice implicates Hare on ‘good,’ etc. When we mention the
explicit/implicit distinction as source for the implicaturum, we are referring
to Grices own wording in Retrospective epilogue where he mentions an utterer as
conveying in some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a gentler, more
(midland or southern) English, way, via implicaturum, or implIciture, if you
mustnt. Cf. Fowler: As a southern Englishman, Ive stopped trying teaching a
northern Englishman the distinction between ought and shall. He seems to get it
always wrong. It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His
point would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of
conversational helpfulness is in order allows P-1 not just to convey in a
direct explicit fashion that p, but in an implicit fashion that q, where q is
the implicaturum. The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of
this or that implicatura, to use Grices word (generate). Surely, He took off
his boots and went to bed; I wont say in which order sounds hardly in the vein
of conversational helpfulness – but provided Grice does not see it as logically
incoherent, it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The point
may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying,
Viva Boole. Grices point about rationality is mentioned in his later
Prolegomena, on at least two occasions. Rational behaviour is the phrase he
uses (as applied first to communication and then to discourse) and in stark
opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin.
Grice is here less interested here as he will be on rationality, but
coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a
mutual one between decent chaps, as he puts it. His charming decent chap is so
Oxonian. His tutee would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more! A rather obscure
exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice
is aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible vicious circle
in trying to define category of expression in terms of a category of
representation. He does not provide a solution to the problem which hell take
up in his Method in philosophical psychology, in his role of President of the
APA. It is the implicaturum behind the lecture that matters, since Grice
will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, its all
rational enough. Theres a P, in a situation, say of danger – a bull ‒. He
perceives the bull. The bulls attack causes this perception. Bull! the P1 G1
screams, and causes in P2 G2 a rearguard movement. So where is
the circularity? Some pedants would have it that Bull cannot be understood in a
belief about a bull which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he
brought back implicaturum, which had become obliterated in the lectures, back
to title position! But it is also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly
rationalist models for implicaturum. He had played with a model, and an
explanatory one at that, for implicaturum, in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a
principle of conversational helpfulness, a desideratum of conversational
clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour, and two sub-principles: a
principle of conversational benevolence, and a principle of conversational
self-interest! Surely Harvard could be spared of the details! Implicaturum.
Grice disliked a presupposition. BANC also contains a folder for Odd ends:
Urbana and non-Urbana. Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal
calculus. He originally baptised it System Q in honour of Quine. At a
later stage, Myro will re-Names it System G, in a special version, System GHP,
a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G, in gratitude to
Grice. Odd Ends: Urbana and Not Urbana, Odds and ends: Urbana and not
Urbana, or not-Urbana, or Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents,
urbane and not urbane, semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures are
on language and reality. Grice keeps revising them, as these items
show. Language and reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The
Urbana Lectures, Language and reference, language and reality, The Urbana
lectures, University of Illinois at Urbana, language, reference, reality. Grice
favours a transcendental approach to communication. A beliefs by a
communicator worth communicating has to be true. An order by a
communicator worth communicating has to be satisfactory. The fourth lecture is
the one Grice dates in WOW . Smith has not ceased from beating his wife,
presupposition and conversational implicaturum, in Radical pragmatics, ed. by
R. Cole, repr. in a revised form in Grice, WOW, II, Explorations in semantics
and metaphysics, essay, presupposition and implicaturum, presupposition, conversational
implicaturum, implicaturum, Strawson. Grice: The loyalty examiner will not
summon you, do not worry. The cancellation by Grice could be pretty subtle. Well,
the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate. Grice goes back to
the issue of negation and not. If, Grice notes, is is a matter of dispute
whether the government has a very undercover person who interrogates those
whose loyalty is suspect and who, if he existed, could be legitimately referred
to as the loyalty examiner; and if, further, I am known to be very sceptical
about the existence of such a person, I could perfectly well say to a plainly
loyal person, Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate,
without, Grice would think, being taken to imply that such a person
exists. Further, if the utterer U is well known to disbelieve in the existence
of such a person, though others are inclined to believe in him, when U finds a
man who is apprised of Us position, but who is worried in case he is summoned,
U may try to reassure him by uttering, The loyalty examiner will not summon
you, do not worry. Then it would be clear that U uttered this because U is sure
there is no such person. The lecture was variously reprinted, but the Urbana
should remain the preferred citation. There are divergences in the various
drafts, though. The original source of this exploration was a seminar.
Grice is interested in re-conceptualising Strawsons manoeuvre regarding
presupposition as involving what Grice disregards as a metaphysical concoction:
the truth-value gap. In Grices view, based on a principle of conversational
tailoring that falls under his principle of conversational
helpfulness ‒ indeed under the desideratum of conversational clarity
(be perspicuous [sic]). The king of France is bald entails there is a king of
France; while The king of France aint bald merely implicates it. Grice
much preferred Collingwoods to Strawsons presuppositions! Grice thought, and
rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicaturum was to gain
Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawsons idea of the
præ-suppositum. Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with
Quines idea of a truth-value gap. Grice shows that neither the metaphysical
concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the
præ-suppositum is needed. The king of France is bald entails that there is a
king of France. It is part of what U is logically committed to by what he
explicitly conveys. By uttering, The king of France is not bald on the other
hand, U merely implicitly conveys or implicates that there is a king of France.
A perfectly adequate, or impeccable, as Grice prefers, cancellation, abiding
with the principle of conversational helpfulness is in the offing. The king of
France ain’t bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain’t real!
Grice credits Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with the
definite descriptor or definite article or the iota quantifier the formally.
One thing Russell discovered is that the variable denoting function is to be
deduced from the variable propositional function, and is not to be taken as an
indefinable. Russell tries to do without the iota i as an indefinable, but
fails. The success by Russell later, in On denoting, is the source of all his
subsequent progress. The iota quantifier consists of an inverted iota to be
read the individuum x, as in (℩x).F(x). Grice opts for the
Whiteheadian-Russellian standard rendition, in terms of the iota operator.
Grices take on Strawson is a strong one. The king of France is bald; entails
there is a king of France, and what the utterer explicitly conveys is
doxastically unsatisfactory. The king of France aint bald does not. By uttering
The king of France aint bald U only implicates that there is a king of France,
and what he explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Grice knew he was
not exactly robbing Peter to pay Paul, or did he? It is worth placing the
lecture in context. Soon after delivering in the New World his exploration on
the implicaturum, Grice has no better idea than to promote Strawsons philosophy
in the New World. Strawson will later reflect on the colder shores of the Old
World, so we know what Grice had in mind! Strawsons main claim to fame in the
New World (and at least Oxford in the Old World) was his On referring, where he
had had the cheek to say that by uttering, The king of France is not bald, the
utterer implies that there is a king of France (if not that, as Grice has it,
that what U explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Strawson later
changed that to the utterer presupposes that there is a king of France. So
Grice knows what and who he was dealing with. Grice and Strawson had
entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson was particularly keen on that turn of
phrase he learned from Quine, the truth-value gap. Grice, rather, found it
pretty repulsive: Tertium exclusum! So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering
The king of France is bald, one entailment of what U explicitly conveys is
indeed There is a king of France. However, in its negative co-relate, things
change. By uttering The king of France aint bald, the utterer merely implicitly
conveys or implicates (in a pretty cancellable format) that there is a king of
France. The king of France aint bald: theres no king of France! The loyalty
examiner is like the King of France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grices
re-introduction of the square-bracket device: [The king of France] is bald;
[The king of France] aint bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square brackets
is to be read as having attained common-ground status and therefore, out of the
question, to use Collingwoods jargon! Grice was very familiar with Collingwood
on presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwoods reflections on
presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie behind Grices
metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest exploration by Grice
on this is his infamous, Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, discussed
by Ewing in Meaninglessness for Mind. Grice goes back to the example in the
excursus on implying that in Causal Theory, and it is best to revisit this
source. Note that in the reprint in WOW Grice does NOT go, one example of
presupposition, which eventually is a type of conversational implicaturum.
Grices antipathy to Strawsons presupposition is metaphysical: he dislikes the
idea of a satisfactory-value-gap, as he notes in the second paragraph to Logic
and conversation. And his antipathy crossed the buletic-doxastic divide! Using φ to represent a sentence in either mode,
he stipulate that ~φ is satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A crunch,
as he puts it, becomes obvious: ~ ⊢The king of France is bald may perhaps be
treated as equivalent to ⊢~(The king of
France is bald). But what about ~!Arrest the intruder? What do we say in cases
like, perhaps, Let it be that I now put my hand on my head or Let it be that my
bicycle faces north, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that
neither !p nor !~p is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory? If !p is neither
satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesnt to me), does
the philosopher assign a third buletically satisfactory value (0.5) to !p
(buletically neuter, or indifferent). Or does the philosopher say that we have
a buletically satisfactory value gap, as Strawson, following Quine, might
prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see that the
problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem connected with
Strawsons doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty is not so much
to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present
themselves. The main reference is Essay 2 in WoW, but there are scattered
references elsewhere. Refs.: The main sources are the two
sets of ‘logic and conversation,’ in BANC, but there are scattered essays on ‘implicaturum’
simpliciter, too -- “Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum,” c. 2-f. 25; and “Convesational implicaturum,” c.
4-f. 9, “Happiness, discipline, and implicaturums,” c. 7-f. 6; “Presupposition
and implicaturum,” c. 9-f. 3, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational manual: -- Grice was fascinated by the etymology of ‘etiquette’ – from
Frankish *stikkan, cognate with Old English stician "to pierce," from
Proto-Germanic *stikken "to be stuck," stative form from PIE *steig-
"to stick; pointed" (It.
etichetta) -- of conversational rational etiquette -- conversational iimmanuel,
cnversational manual. Before playing with ‘immanuel,’ Grice does use ‘manual’
more technically. A know-how. “Surely, I can have a manual, but don’t know how
to play bridge.” “That’s not how I’m using ‘manual.’” It should be pointed out
that it’s the visual thing that influenced. When people (especially
non-philosophers) saw the list of maxims, they thought: “Washington!” “A
manual!”. In the Oxford seminrs, Grice was never so ‘additive.’ His desideratum
of conversational clarity, his desideratum of conversational candour, his
principle of conversational self-love and his principle of conversational
benevolence, plus his principle of conversational helpfulness, were meant as
‘philosophical’ leads to explain this or that philosophical mistake. The
seminars were given for philosophy tutees. And Grice is playing on the ‘manuals
of etiquette’ – conversational etiquette. If you do not BELONG to this targeted
audience, it is likely that you’ll misconstrue Grice’s point, and you will!
Especially R. T. L.!The Gentlemen's Book of Etiquette and Manual of Politeness
Being a Complete Guide for a Gentleman's Conduct in All His Relations Towards
Society by Cecil B. Hartley. Wit and vivacity are two highly important
ingredients in the conversation of a man in polite society, yet a straining for
effect, or forced wit, is in excessively bad taste. There is no one more
insupportable in society than the everlasting talkers who scatter puns,
witticisms, and jokes with so profuse a hand that they become as tiresome as a
comic newspaper, and whose loud laugh at their own wit drowns other voices
which might speak matter more interesting. The really witty man does not shower
forth his wit so indiscriminately; his charm consists in wielding his powerful
weapon delicately and easily, and making each highly polished witticism come in
the right place and moment to be effectual. While real wit is a most delightful
gift, and its use a most charming accomplishment, it is, like many other bright
weapons, dangerous to use too often. You may wound where you meant only to
amuse, and remarks which you mean only in for general applications, may be
construed into personal affronts, so, if you have the gift, use it wisely, and
not too freely. The most important requisite for a good conversational power is
education, and, by this is meant, not merely the matter you may store in your
memory from observation or books, though this is of vast importance, but it
also includes the developing of the mental powers, and, above all, the
comprehension. An English writer says, “A man should be able, in order to enter
into conversation, to catch rapidly the meaning of anything that is advanced;
for instance, though you know nothing of science, you should not be obliged to
stare and be silent, when a man who does understand it is explaining a new
discovery or a new theory; though you have not read a word of Blackstone, your
comprehensive powers should be sufficiently acute to enable you to take in the
statement that may be made of a recent cause; though you may not have read some
particular book, you should be capable of appreciating the criticism which you
hear of it. Without such power—simple enough, and easily attained by attention
and practice, yet too seldom met with in general society—a conversation which
departs from the most ordinary topics cannot be maintained without the risk of
lapsing into a lecture; with such power, society becomes instructive as well as
amusing, and you have no remorse at an evening’s end at having wasted three or
four hours in profitless banter, or simpering platitudes. This facility of
comprehension often startles us in some women, whose education we know to have
been poor, and whose reading is limited. If they did not rapidly receive your
ideas, they could not, therefore, be fit companions for intellectual men, and
it is, perhaps, their consciousness of a deficiency which leads them to pay the
more attention to what you say. It is this which makes married women so much
more agreeable to men of thought than young ladies, as a rule, can be, for they
are accustomed to the society of a husband, and the effort to be a companion to
his mind has engrafted the habit of attention and ready reply.” Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “Paget’s conversational manual.”
conversational maxim. The idea of a maxim implies freewill and freedom in
general. A beautiful thing about Grice’s conversational maxims is that surely
they do not ‘need to be necessarily’ independent, as Strawson and Wiggins emphatically
put it (p.520). The important thing is other. A conversational maxim is
UNIVERSALISABLE (v. universalierung) into a ‘manual,’ the “Immanuel,” strictly,
the “Conversational Immanuel.” Grice is making fun of those ‘conversational
manuals’ for the learning of some European language in the Grand Tour (as in
“Learn Swiss in five easy lessons”). Grice is echoing Kant. Maximen (subjektive
Grundsätze): selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen ausdrücken, vs.
Imperative (objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft bestimmt;
Ratschläge, moralisch relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das objektive
Prinzip, gültig für jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach dem es
handeln soll, d. i. ein Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die Subjektivität
der Maxime. When considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational maxim,’ one
has to be careful. First, he hesitated as to the choice of the label. He used
‘objective’ and ‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this, in WoW:PandCI he
adds one – leading the number of maxims to ten, what he called the
‘conversational catalogue.’ So when exploring the maxims, it is not necessary
to see their dependence on the four functions that Kant tabulated: quantitas,
qualitas, relatio, and modus, or quantity, quality, relation, and mode (Grice
follows Meiklejohn’s translation), but in terms of their own formulation, one by
one. Grice
formulates the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general
principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe,
namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”He
then goes on to introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’“On the
assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may
perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall
certain more specific MAXIMS maxims and
submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance
with the Cooperative Principle.” Note that in his
comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in terms of the
force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicaturum, he could
have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general principle as
this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or
another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.”
He is
comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the
principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior
genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’He is having in mind something
like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the
introductory passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is
very interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as
SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he
is calling the submaxim.Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one
may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim.
Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he
grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is
actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you
are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the
desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do
not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for
the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”Grice: “Echoing
Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or
Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the
exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that
surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!“The category of QUANTITY” – i. e. either
the conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category
of conversational quantity – “relates to the quantity of information to be
provided,”So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have
it – just QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the
quantity of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re:
the pillar box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used
‘strength,’ even ‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailment – and here, neither
the phenomenalist nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.“and under it
fall the following maxims:”That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational
maxim.’ He will provide supermaxim for the other three conversational
categories.Why is the category of conversational quantity lacking a
supermaxim?The reason is that it would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be
appropriately informative.’ By having TWO maxims, he is playing with a weighing
in, or balance between one maxim and the other. Cf.To say the truth, all the
truth, and nothing but the truth.No more no less.One maximm states the ‘at
most,’ the other maxim states the ‘at least.’One maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the
other maxim states the ‘min.’ Together they state the ‘maximin.’First, “Make
your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of
the exchange).”It’s the contribution which is informative, not the utterer. Cf.
“Be as informative as is required.” Grice implicates that if you make your
contribution as informative as is required YOU are being as informative as is
required. But there is a category-shift here. Grice means, ‘required BY the
goal of the exchange). e.g.How are youFine thanks – the ‘and you’ depends on
whether you are willing to ‘keep the conversation going’ or your general mood.
Second, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.”“ (The
second maxim is disputable;”He goes on to give a different reason. But the
primary reason is that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required” is ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange)” – vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative
inferences” IN a diagram:Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange)Therefore, do not make your
contribution more informative than is required (by the current purposes of the
exchange).Grice gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the
maxim is ‘disputable.’“it might be said that to be overinformative is not a
transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time.”For both conversationalists,
who are thereby abiding by Ferraro’s law of the least conversational effort.”“A
waste of time” relates to Grice’s previous elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and
‘unnecessary trouble.’He is proposing a conversational maximin.When he
formulates his principle of economy of rational effort, it is a waste of ‘time
and energy.’Here it is just ‘time.’ “Energy” is a more generic concept.“However,
it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is
liable to raise side issues;”Methinks the lady doth protest too much.His
example, “He was in a blacked out city.”It does not seem to relate to the
pillar boxA: What color is the pillar boxB: It seems red.Such a ‘confusion’ and
‘side issue,’ if so designed, is part of the implicaturum.“and there may also
be an indirect effect, in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a
result of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the
excess of information.”Cf. Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”More
boringly, it is part of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of
information.”This may be counterproductive, or not.“Meet Mr. Puddle”“Meet Mr.
Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”The introducer
point: to keep the conversation going.Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless
at nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED). One
has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice
cares for. Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!” – Malcolm
implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide
the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims
Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’ – If knowledge is justified true
belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE
CONDITIONS for it. Cf.I didn’t know you were pregnant.You still do not. (Here
the cancellation is to the third clause). Grice: “However this may be, there is
perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this
second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which
concems relevance.)”He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows
in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:“there is another reason to
doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”No “later” about
it!Grice:“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim” – he forgets to
add, as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of
information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm
genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf.
Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over
abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS
the case. Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he
means “more specific supermaxims and maxims” – He is following Porophyry in
being confusing! Cf. supramaxim. Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one
that is true' –“This surely requires generality – and Grice spent the next two
decades about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’ “Try to make
your contribution one that is acceptable”“True for your statements; good for
your desiderative-mode utterances.”“and two more specific maxims:”“1. Do not say
what you believe to be false.”There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make
your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe
to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!”
“Say the true!” “MAKE – don’t just TRY – to make your contribution one that is
true.”“I was only trying.”Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill” “Thou shalt trye not to
kylle.”Grice:“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”This is
involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth
is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you
have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?The qualification, “adequate,” turns
the maxim slightly otiose. Do not say that for you lack evidence which would
make your contribution not a true one.However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And
Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.If we are
talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential
justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on
‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential
justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential
justification.’“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz.,
'Be relevant.'”The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in
relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman
‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or
‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with
Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place
predicate. What about X = xIs identity a relation, in the case of x = x?Can a
thing relate to itself?In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim
states that one brings y back to x.“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”“The weather
has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”If INTENDED to mean, “You
ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark
about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.To utter an utterly
irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.“Though the maxim itself is
terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good
deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may
be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact
that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the
treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them
in a later work.”He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as
the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette
becomes logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the
north, to settle in the very fashionable Kent. Grice is also having in mind
Urmson’s appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your
painting “Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!” – and Grice is also having in
mind P. F. Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance
vis-à-vis the principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.So it was in
the Oxonian air.“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as
relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE
EXPLICITUM, THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said
is to be said,”Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p
reduces to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares
with ‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what
is seen.’He is having the form-content distinction.If that is a distinction. This
multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative
form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a
uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or
posited. The Role of the Form/Content
Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com ›
2012/01 › formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Researchwww.karger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction
is a potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain
characteristics of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG
Levine - 1979 - Cited by 25 - Related articles The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Research ...www.karger.com › Article › Abstract Dec 23, 2009 - The
Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research. Levine C.G.. Author
affiliations. University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. by CG Levine - 1979
- Cited by 25 - Related articles
Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in
...www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pubmed Preschool children's mastery of the
form/content distinction in communicative tasks. Hedelin L(1), Hjelmquist E.
Author information: (1)Department of Psychology, ... by L Hedelin - 1998 -
Cited by 10 - Related articles Form
and Content: An Introduction to Formal Logic - Digital
...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi › viewcontentPDF terminology has to do
with anything. In this context, 'material' means having to do with content.
This is our old friend, the form/content distinction again. Consider. by DD
Turner - 2020 Simmel's Dialectic of
Form and Content in Recent Work in ...www.tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1,
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“form” and “content” intentionally ...www.reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments
› are_th... The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction
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Children's Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com ›
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Experiencebooks.google.com › books Even if form and content were in fact
inseparable in the sense indicated, that would not make the form/content
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2001 - Literary Criticism One Century
of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathologybooks.google.com › books He then
outlines the most important implications of the form–content distinction in a
statement which is identical in the first three editions, with only minor ...
Giovanni Stanghellini, Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Medical“I include the
supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –” Or supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and
submaxims” becomes the clumsier “supermaxims and maxims”Note that in under the
first category it is about making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer
himself who has to be ‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be
relevant. It’s not the weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or
“Make your contribution a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”Knowing
that most confound ‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but
forgot to pronounce it, in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’
under the prolixity maxim.“and various maxims such as: The “such as” is a
colloquialism.Surely it was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it
becomes viz. The fact that the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicaturable.
“1. Avoid obscurity of expression.”Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me,
Heraclitus, they told me you were dead, /They brought me bitter news to hear
and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd how often you and I/Had tired
the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my
dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still
are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all
away, but them he cannot take. In a way this is entailed by “Be perspicuous,”
if that means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.Be clearTherefore, or what is the
same thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.2. Avoid ambiguity.”Except as a
trope, or ‘figure, (schema, figura). “Aequi-vocate, if that will please your
clever addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma: “My apartment was so small, that I've
barely enough room to lay a hat and a few friends“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary
prolixity).”Here he added a ‘sic’ that he failed to pronounce in case it may
felt as insulting. But the idea of a self-refuting conversational maxim is
surely Griceian, in a quessertive way. Since this concerns FORM rather than
CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with ‘informativeness.’So given that p and
q are equally informative, if q is less brief (longer – ars longa, vita brevis),
utter p. This has nothing to do with logical strength. It is just to be
assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.Vide “Syntactics in Semiotics”“4. Be orderly.”This
involves two moves in the contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’
if one just utters ‘p.’ So this involves a molecular proposition. The ‘order’
can be of various types. Indeed, one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between
Smith and Williams” – order of merit or size?‘Between’ is not ambiguous!There
is LOGICAL order, which is prior.But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’
‘keep your room tidy.’orderly (adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from
order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning "observant of rule or discipline, not
unruly" is from 1590s. Related: Orderliness.He does not in the lecture
give a philosophical example, but later will in revisiting the Urmson example
and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson, “He went to bed and took off his
boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and took arsenic.”“And one might need
others.”Regarding ‘mode,’ that is. “It is obvious that the observance of some
of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others;”Not
as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say these are not MORAL.“a man who has
expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder
comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false.”Except
in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were obsessed with commenting on
prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the prisoner?” “He left [while he
is hiding in the attic].”That’s why Grice has the ‘in general.’“Indeed, it
might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is
such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;”But
since ‘should’ is weak, I will. “other maxims come into operation only on the
assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.”So the keyword is
co-ordination.“While this may be correct, so far as the generation of implicaturums
is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other
maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a
member of the list of maxims.”He is having weighing, and clashing in mind. And
he wants a conversationalist to honour truth over informativeness, which begs
the question that as he puts it, ‘false’ “information” is no information.In the
earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a university lecturer, he was sure that his
tutee will know that he was introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO
MORALISE, but as GENERATORS of implicatura – in philosophers’s mistakes.But
this manoeuver is only NOW disclosed. Those without a philosophical background
may not realise about this. “There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims
(aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also
normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate
nonconventional implicaturums.”He is obviously aware that Émile DurkheimWill Know that
‘conversational’ is subsumed under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps). – keyword: ‘norm.’ Grice excludes ‘moral’
because while a moral maxim makes a man ‘good,’ a conversational maxim makes a
man a ‘good’ conversationalist. Not because there is a distinction in
principle!“The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicaturums
connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with”He had this way with
idioms.Cf. Einstein,“E =, I hope, mc2.”“the particular purposes that talk (and
so, talk exchange)”He is playing Dutch.The English lost the Anglo-Saxon for
‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has ‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch
have ‘taal.’So he is distinguishing between the TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.“is
adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to serve.”The ‘adapted’ is mechanistic
talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’ elsewhere. He means ‘the particular goal
language evolved to serve, viz.’ groom.Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of
Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, in which the author
argues that language evolved from social grooming. He further suggests that a
stage of this evolution was the telling of gossip, an argument supported by the
observation that language is adapted for storytelling. The book has been
criticised on the grounds that since words are so cheap, Dunbar's "vocal
grooming" would fall short in amounting to an honest signal. Further, the
book provides no compelling story[citation needed] for how meaningless vocal
grooming sounds might become syntactical speech. Thesis Dunbar argues that
gossip does for group-living humans what manual grooming does for other
primates—it allows individuals to service their relationships and thus maintain
their alliances on the basis of the principle: if you scratch my back, I'll
scratch yours. Dunbar argues that as humans began living in increasingly larger
social groups, the task of manually grooming all one's friends and
acquaintances became so time-consuming as to be unaffordable.[1] In response to
this problem, Dunbar argues that humans invented 'a cheap and ultra-efficient
form of grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now needs only to
'groom' them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple allies
simultaneously while keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal grooming
then evolved gradually into vocal language—initially in the form of
'gossip'.[1] Dunbar's hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that the
structure of language shows adaptations to the function of narration in
general.[2] Criticism Critics of Dunbar's theory point out that the very
efficiency of "vocal grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would
have undermined its capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed
by time-consuming and costly manual grooming.[3] A further criticism is that
the theory does nothing to explain the crucial transition from vocal
grooming—the production of pleasing but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive
complexities of syntactical speech.[citation needed] References
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language.
London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 9780571173969. OCLC 34546743. von Heiseler,
Till Nikolaus (2014) Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast
evolution. In: R. L. C. Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World
Scientific, pp. 114-121.
https://www.academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION
Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of
cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds),
Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 111 29. Categories: 1996 non-fiction
booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin DunbarEnglish-language
booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press booksPopular science
booksGrice: “I have stated my maxims”the maxims“as if this purpose were a
maximally effective exchange of information;”“MAXIMALLY EFFECTIVE”“this
specification is, of course, too narrow,”But who cares?This is slightly sad in
that he is thinking Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own controversy with
G. A. Paul on the sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’ and ‘the pillar
box is red,’ involving an intensional context, are less amenable to fall under
the maxims.“and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general
purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others.”He has a more
obvious way below:Giving and receving informationInfluencing and being
influenced by others.He never sees the purpose as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but
maximally effective EXCHANGE of information – does he mean merely ‘transmission.’
It may well be.If I say, “I rain,” I have ex-changed information.I don’t need
anything in return.If so, it makes sense that he is equating INFORMING With INFLUENCING or better DIRECTION your
addresse’s talk.Note that, for all he loved introspection and conversational
avowals, and self-commands, these do not count.It’s informing your addressee
about some state of affairs, and directing his action. Grice is always clear
that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s ACTION.“As one of my avowed aims is to
see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational,
behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions
connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in
the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges.”Transaction is a good
one.TRANS-ACTIO“I list briefly one such analog for each conversational
category.”While he uses ‘conversational category,’ he also applies it to the
second bit: ‘category of conversational quantity,’ ‘category of conversational
quality,’ ‘category of conversational relation,’ and ‘category of
conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that justifies the sub-specifications.They
are not categories of thought or ontological or ‘expression’.His focus is on
the category as conversation.His focus is on the ‘conversational category.’“1.
Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to
be neither more nor less than is required; if, e. g., at a particular stage I
need fourscrews, I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six. He
always passed six, since two will drop.“Make your contribution neither more nor
less informative than is required (for the purposes of the exchange).”This
would have covered the maxi and the min.“NEITHER MORE NOR LESS” is the formula
of effectiveness, and economy, and minimization of expenditure.“2. Quality. I
expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious.”Here again he gives
an expansion of the conversational category, which is more general than ‘try to
make your contribution one that is true,’ and the point about the ‘quality of
information,’ which he did not make.Perhaps because it would have led him to
realise that ‘false’ information, i.e. ‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious,
is not ‘information.’But “Make your contribution one that is genuine and not
spurious.”Be candid.Does not need a generalization as it covers both informational
and directive utterances.“If I need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are
assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt;”Or you won’t eat the
cake.“if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”Spurious
and genuine are different.In the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just
not being SERIOUS.But surely a maxim, “Be serious” is too serious. –
Seriously!“3. Relation. I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to
immediate needs at each stage of the transaction;”Odd that he would use
‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of the “Prolegomena,” and what he was
supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the explanation.For each of the philosophers
making a mistake are giving a judgment of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational
appropriateness. Here it is good that he relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO
the ‘need’.Grice is not quite sticking to the etymology of ‘relatio’ and
‘refer,’ bring y back to x. Or he is. Bring y (your contribution) back to the
need x.Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on relation, when he did a good
bit!“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good
book, or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate contribution
at a later stage).”“I just expect you to be silent.”“4. Manner. I expect a
partner to make it clear what contribution he is making, and to execute his
performance with reasonable dispatch.” For Lewis, clarity is not enough!The
‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’ seems quite different from
“Be perspicuous.”“Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch”Is more
like“Execute your performance”And not just STAND there!A: What time is it B
just stands there“These analogies are relevant to what I regard as a
fundamental question about the principle of conversational helpfulness and its
attendant conversational maxims,”For Boethius, it is a PRINCIPLE because it
does not need an answer!“viz., what the basis is for the assumption which we
seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a great range of implicaturums
depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the rather otiose maxims], that
talkers will ingeneral (ceteris paribus and in the absence of indications to
the contrary) proceed in the manner that these principles prescribe.”Grice
really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of the maxim, as in his response
to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:“Paul, I surely do not mean to imply that
you may end up believing that I have a doubt about the pillar box being red: it
seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum of ‘redness’ which attaches to me
as I am standing in front of the pillar box in clear daylight.”Grice is
EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING SOMETHING TRUE, so at least he is
not VIOLATING the principle of conversational helpfulness, or the category of
conversational quality, or the desideratum of conversational candour.And that
is what he is concerned with. “A dull
but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer is that it is just a
well-recognized empirical fact that *people* (not pirots, although perhaps
Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in these ways;”Elinor Ochs was
terrified Grice’s maxims are violated – never exploited, she thought – in
Madagascar.“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have learned to do so in childhood
and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed, it would involve a good deal
of effort to make a radical departure from the habit. It is much easier, for
example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”Effort again; least effort. And
ease. Great Griceian guidelines!“I am, however, enough of a rationalist to want
to find a basis that underlies these facts,”OR EXPLAIN.“undeniable though they
may be;”BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORY – not the theory for the generation of
implicate, but for the theory of conversation.He is less interested in this
than the other. “I would like to be able to think of the standard type of
conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do IN FACT
follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to follow, that we SHOULD
NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea that observance of the
principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational maxims, in a
talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter, with
parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am struggling
with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation that you will
offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations
become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications
that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to
exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish
cooperative transactions:”So how is this not quasi-contractual? He is listing THIS OR THAT FEATURE that
jointly distinguishes a cooperative transaction – all grand great words.But he
wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!He is playing, as a
philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from what.A1.
Conversasation is purposiveA2. Conversation is rationalA3. Conversation is
cooperativeA4. There is such a thing as non-rational cooperation (is there?)So
he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that jointly distinguish cooperative
transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice surely does not wish THAT to
demolish his model. If he bases it in general constraints of rationality, the
better.“1. The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car
mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in
conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the
other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even
if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one,”Is he being logical?“second-order
predicate calculus”“meta-language”He means higher or supervenientOr
‘operative’“, that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with
the transitory conversational interests of the other.”By identify he means
assume.YOU HAVE TO DESIRE what your partner desires.The intersection between
your desirability and your addressee’s desirability is not NULL.And the way to
do this is conditionalIF: You perceive B has Goal G, you assume Goal G. “2. The
contributions of the participants .should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. Unless
it’s one of those seminars by Grice and J. F. Thomson!“3. There is some sort of
understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit)”i.e. implicated
rather than explicated – part of the implicaturum, or implicitum, rather than
the explicatum or explicitum.“that, other things being equal, the transaction
should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it
should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.”This
is especially tricky over the phone (“He never ends!” Or in psychiatric
interviews!)Note that ‘starting doing something else’ may work. E. g. watch
your watch!“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to
some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter
writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”TWO OPPOSITE EXAMPLES.Fighting is
arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not conversation,
cooperation, friendly, collaborative
venture, and diagoge.Letter writing is usually otiose – “what, with the
tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.“In any case, one feels that
the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience
but himself.”And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant down!”“So
I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle of
conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the
following lines”That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.“: that any
one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption
that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of
conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”Where the keyword is: profit,
effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble. That
conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable. That a conversational
exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.“Whether
any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”It’s not clear what the
premises are!Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached?
Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.It
seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the
state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.“in any case, I am fairly
sure that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of
relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”For perhaps “I
don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”IS irrelevant,
yet true!“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of
conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and conversational
implicaturum on the other.”This is clearer in the seminars. The whole thing was
a preamble “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in
various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly and unostentatiously
VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to
mislead.”And be blamed by Kant.Mislead should not worry Grice, cf. “Misleading,
but true.”The violate (or fail to observe) shows that (1) covers two
specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim as to ‘be brief,
avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew obfuscation!”This is
Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is KNOWLEDGE of the
maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to observe them “2. He
may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the principle of
conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain
that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, e.
g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.” Where is the criminal?I cannot say
more; my lips are sealed.I shall unseal them. What do you mean ‘cannot.’ You
don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?I think Grice means ‘may not.’Is the universe
finite? Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed. “3. He may be faced by
a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than one – or at least two
specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to fulfill the
first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating
the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).” Odd
that he doesn’t think this generates implicaturum: He has obviously studied the
sub-perceptualities here.For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus, thinks that
by utteringThe pillar box seems red to me – that is all I have adequate
evidence forHe is conveying that he is unable to answer the question (“What
colour is the pillar box?”) And being as ‘informative’ as is requiredWithout
saying something for which it is not the case that he has or will ever have
adequate evidence.Cf.Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the noumenon?Kant:
My lips are sealed.It may require some research to list ALL CLASHES.Because
each clash shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be all VERY CETERIS
PARIBUS.Cf.Where is the criminal?My lips are sealed.The utterer has NOT opted
out. He has answered, via implicaturum, that he is not telling. He is being
relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to DISCLOSE the whereabouts
of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a conversation! Odd that
Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a clash with ‘Be
truthful!’“4. He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill (or
observe) it.Mock? Taunt?The magic flute. Grice’s magic flute.flout (v.)
"treat with disdain or contempt" (transitive), 1550s, intransitive
sense "mock, jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of uncertain origin; perhaps
a special use of Middle English “flowten,”"to play the flute"
(compare Middle Dutch “fluyten,” "to play the flute," also "to
jeer"). Related: Flouted; flouting.Grice: “One thing we do not know is if
the flute came to England via Holland.”“Or he may, as we may say, ‘play the
flute’ with a maxim, expecting others to be agreeable.”“Or he may, as we might
say, ‘play the flute’ with the conversational maxim, expecting others to join
with some other musical instrument – or something – occasionally the same.”“On
the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so
without violating another maxim (because oi a clash), is not opting out, and is
not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead,”This is
interesting. It’s the TRYING to mislead.Grice and G. A. Paul:Grice cannot be
claimed to have TRIED to mislead, and thus deemed to have misled G. A. Paul,
even if he had, when he said, “I hardly think there is any doubt about it, but
that pillar box seems red to me.”“the hearer is faced with a minor problem:”Implicaturum:
This reasoning is all abductive – to the ‘best’ explanation“How can his saying
what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the
overall principle of conversational helfpulness?”This was one of Grice’s
conversations with G. A. Paul:Paul (to Grice): This is what I do not
understand, Grice. How can your saying what you did say be reconciled with the
supposition that you are not going to mislead me?”Unfortunately, on that
Saturday, Paul went to the Irish Sea. Grice “This situation is one that
characteristically”There are others – vide clash, above – but not marked by
Grice as one such situation – “gives rise to a conversational implicaturum; and
when a conversational implicaturum is generated”Chomskyan jargon borrowed from
Austin (“I don’t see why Austin admired Chomsky so!”)“in this way, I shall say
that a maxim is being EXPLOITED.”Why not ‘flouted’? Some liked the idea of
playing the flute.EXPLOIT is figurative.Grice exploits a Griceian maxim.exploit (v.) c. 1400, espleiten, esploiten "to
accomplish, achieve, fulfill," from Old French esploitier, espleiter
"carry out, perform, accomplish," from esploit (see exploit (n.)).
The sense of "use selfishly" first recorded 1838, from a sense
development in French perhaps from use of the word with reference to mines,
etc. (compare exploitation). Related: Exploited; exploiting.exploit (n.) late
14c., "outcome of an action," from Old French esploit "a
carrying out; achievement, result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern French
exploit), a very common word, used in senses of "action, deed, profit,
achievement," from Latin explicitum "a thing settled, ended, or
displayed," noun use of neuter of explicitus, past participle of explicare
"unfold, unroll, disentangle," from ex "out" (see ex-) +
plicare "to fold" (from PIE root *plek- "to plait").
Meaning "feat, achievement" is c. 1400. Sense evolution is from
"unfolding" to "bringing out" to "having
advantage" to "achievement." Related:
Exploits. exploitative (adj.) "serving for or used in
exploitation," 1882, from French exploitatif, from exploit (see exploit
(n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859) appears to be a native formation from
exploit + -ive.exploitation (n.) 1803, "productive working" of
something, a positive word among those who used it first, though regarded as a
Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun of action from exploiter (see exploit
(v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in part from influence of French
socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also perhaps influenced by use of
the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and exploitation was hurled in insult at
activities it once had crowned as praise. It follows from this science
[conceived by Saint Simon] that the tendency of the human race is from a state
of antagonism to that of an universal peaceful association -- from the
dominating influence of the military spirit to that of the industriel one; from
what they call l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme to the exploitation of the
globe by industry. ["Quarterly Review," April & July 1831] Grice: “I am now
in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicaturum.”Not to
provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it with
one of my metaphysical routines.”“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as
if to say) that p”That seems good for the analysandumGrice loves the “by (in,
when)” “(or making as if to). Note the oratio obliqua.Or ‘that’-clause. So this
is not ‘uttering’As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’“By uttering ‘x’ U means
that p.’The “by” already involves a clause with a ‘that’-clause.So this is not
a report of a physical event.It is a report embued already with intentionality.The
utterer is not just ‘uttering’The utterer is EXPLICITLY conveying that p.We
cannot say MEANING that p.Because Grice uses “mean” as opposed to “explicitly
convey”His borderline scenarios are such,“Keep me company, dear”“If we are to
say that when he uttererd that he means that his wife was to keep him company
or not is all that will count for me to change my definition of ‘mean’ or
not.”Also irony.But here it is more complicated. A man utters, “Grice defeated
Strawson”If he means it ironically, to mean that Strawson defeated Grice, it is
not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite. He explicitly conveyed that.Grice
considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’“If I am dead, I shall have no time
for reading.”He is careful here that the utterer does not explicitly conveys
that he will have no time for reading – because it’s conditioned on he being
dead.“has implicated that q,” “may be said to have conversationally implicated
that q,”So this is a specification alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly
conveying that p, U implicitly conveys that q.’Where he is adding the second-order
adverb, ‘conversationally.’By explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly
conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL FASHION” iff or if“PROVIDED THAT”“(1) he is
to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle
of conversational helfpulness;”Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that
an implicaturum is ‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when AT LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.“(2) the
supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE terms)
consistent with this presumption;”THIS IS THE CRUCIAL CLAUSE – and the one that
not only requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the expectation that one’s addressee,
BEING RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE RATIONAL.This is the
‘rationalisation’ he refers to in “Retrospective Epilogue.”Note that ‘q’ is
obviously now the content of a state in the utterer’s soul – a desideratum or a
creditum --, at least a CREDITUM, in view of Grice’s view of everything at
least exhibitive and perhaps protreptic --“and (3) the speaker thinks (and
would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the
competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition
mentioned in (2) IS required.”All that jargon about mutuality is a result of
Strawson tutoring Schiffer!“Apply this to my initial example, to B's remark that
C has not yet been to prison.”What made Grice think of such a convoluted
example?He was laughing at Searle for providing non-philosophical examples, and
there he is!“In a suitable setting A might reason as follows:”“(1) B has
APPARENTLY violated – indeed he has played the flute with -- the maxim 'Be
relevant' and so may be regarded as [ALSO] having flouted one of the maxims
conjoining perspicuity,”In previous versions, under the desideratum of
conversational clarity Grice had it that the desideratum included the
expectation of this ‘relatedness’ AND that of ‘perspicuity’ (sic). In the
above, Grice is stating that if you are irrelevant (or provide an unrelated
contribution) you are not being perspicuous.But “He hasn’t been to prison” is
perspicuous enough.And so is the link to the question --.Plus, wasn’t
perspicuity only to apply to the ‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather than the
content.Here it is surely the CONTENT – that it is not the case that C is a
criminal – that triggers it all.So, since there is a “not,” here this is
parallel to the example examined by Strawson in the footnote to “Logical
Theory.”The utterer is saying that it is not the case that C has been in prison
yet.The ‘yet’ makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian colouring
‘convention’!“It is not the case that C has been in prison” Is, admittedly, not
very perspicuous.“So what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”So there
is an equivocation here as to the utterance perhaps not being perspicuous,
while the utterer IS perspicuous.“yet I have no reason to suppose that he is
opting out from the operation of the CP;”Or playing the flute with my beloved
principle of conversational helpfulness.“(2) given the circumstances, I can regard
his irrelevance as only apparent – as when we say that a plastic flower is not
a flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy duck is surely not a duck!
That trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only if, I suppose him to think
that C is potentially dishonest;”As many are!The potentially is the trick.Recall
Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially dishonest?! Not me! PLATO was!
Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”“(3) B knows that I am capable of working
out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially dishonest.'”Unless he goes
on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not mean of course to mean that I mean that
he is potentially dishonest, because although he is, he shouldn’t, or rather, I
don’t think you are expecting me to convey explicitly that he shouln’t or
should for that matter.”“The presence of a conversational implicaturum must be
capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped,
unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicaturum (if present
at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”This is the Humpty
Dumpty in Grice.Cf. Provide the sixteen derivational steps in Jane Austen’s
Novel remark, “I sense and sensibilia” – This is what happens sometimes when
people who are not philosophers engage with Grice!For a philosopher, it is
clear Grice is not being serious there. He is mocking an ‘ideal’-language
philosopher (as Waissmann called them). Let’s revise the word:By “counting” he
means “DEEM.” He has said that “She is poor, but she is honest,” is NOT
CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not produced, this may not be a matter of
argument.Philosophers are OBSESSED, and this is Grice’s trick, with ARGUMENT.
Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my father, who was rather blunt, Hardie taught
me to ARGUE for this or that reason.”His mention of “INTUITION” is not
perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree that meaning is a matter of INTUITION, not
a theoretical concept within a theory.So it’s not like Grice does not trust the
intuition. So the point is TERMINOLOGICAL and methodological. Terminological,
in that this is a specfification of ‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases
like “How rude!” (he just flouted the maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not
a CONVERSATIONAL maxim. Is Grice implicating that nonconversational
nonconventional implicate are not calculable? We don’t think so.But he might.I
think he will. Because in the case of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and
‘social maxim’ – such as “be polite,” – the calculation may involve such degree
of gradation that you better not get Grice started!“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum.”OK
– So perhaps he does allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate
ARE calculable.But he may add:“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an
argument, it will not be a conversational implicaturum; it will be a
conventional implicaturum.”Strawson: “And what nonconventional
nonconversational implicate?Grice: You are right, Strawon. Let me modify and
refine the point: “It will be a dull, boring, undetachable, conventional implicaturum
– OR any of those dull implicate that follow from (or result – I won’t use
‘generate’) one of those maxims that I have explicitly said they were NOT
conversational maxims.“For surely, there is something very
‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicaturum is involved with
the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and yet that the
maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”“Therefore, I restrict calculability to
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURUM, because it involves the conversational maxims that
contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas you’ll agree that Queen
Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as she frequently did not
– “We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and Sullivan amuse me!””“To work
out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind nonconversational
nonconventional] implicaturum is present, the hearer will reply on the
following data:”As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’Perhaps assumption, alla Gettier,
is better:“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the
identity of any references that may be involved;”WoW Quite a Bit. This is the
reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.In he hasn’t been to ‘prison’ we
are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my prison”).Strawson:
But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?He hasn't been to prisonprison (n.) early 12c., from Old French
prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive" (11c.,
Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;" see
prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin
prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative
*prehensio) "a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of
prehendere "to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, +
-hendere, from PIE root *ghend- "to seize, take"). "Captivity,"
hence by extension "a place for captives," the MAIN modern sense.”
(There are 34 other unmain ones). He hasn't been to a place for captives
yet.You mean he is one.Cf. He hasn't been to asylum.You mean Foucault?(2) the principle
of conversational helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”This is
more crucial seeing that the utterer may utter something which has no
conventional meaning?Cf. Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so
for the ‘conventional’ one!”What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have
the ‘spirit’ as the implicaturum. Or he needs the lines, so he can have the implicaturum
as a reading ‘between the lines.’If the utterance is a gesture, like showing a
bandaged leg, or a Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to distinguish or
to identify what is EXPLICITLY conveyed.By showing his bandaged leg, U
EXPLICITLY conveys that he has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys that he
cannot really play cricket.The requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even tricker,
“Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational? Substitutional?In any case,
Grice is not being circular in requiring that the addressee should use as an
assumption or datum that U thinks that the expression E is generally uttered by
utterers when they m-intend that p.But there are tricks here.“(3) the context,
linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”Cf. Grice, “Is there a general
context for a general theory of context?”“(4) other items of background
knowledge;”So you don’t get:How is C getting on at the bank? My lips are sealed
Why do you care Mind your own business. Note that “he hasn’t been to prison
yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’) is the sort of
tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS that he’ll get
that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does. “and (5) the fact (or
supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are
available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be
the case.”This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.“A general pattern for the
working out of a conversational implicaturum might be given as follows:”Again
the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might expect 'He has said
that p;”Ie explicitly conveys that p.Note the essential oratio obliqua, or
that-clause.“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not observing the
maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness”That is, he is
not a prisoner of war, or anything.“He could not be doing this unless he
thought that q;”Or rather, even if more tautologically still, he could not be
doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’ For if the utterer is
IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do it!“he knows (and
knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks
that q IS required;”Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY, which Grice fails to have added
as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent logics – “he is using ‘and’ and ‘or’
in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,” – He is an intuitionist, his name
is Dummett.“he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to
think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has
implicated that q.'”The ‘or’ is delightful, for m-intention requires
‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous positions, so ‘willingess to
allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE! Especially at Oxford where
we are ever so subtle!
conversational
maxim of ambiguity avoidance, the: Grice thought that there should be a way
to characterise each maxim other than by its formulation. “It’s a good exercise
to grasp the concept behind the maxim.” Quality relates to Strength or
Fortitutde, the first to “at least,” the
second to “at most.” For Quality, he has a supra-maxim, “of trust” – the two
maxims are “maxim of candour” and “maxim of evidence”. Under relation, “maxim
of relevance.” Under manner, suprapaxim “maxim of perspicuity” and four maxims,
the first is exactly the same as the supramaxim, “maxim of percpicuity” now
becomes “maxim of obscurity avoidance” – or “maxim of clarity” – obscure and
clear are exact opposites – perspicuous [sic] is more of a trick. The second
maxin under mode is this one of ambiguity avoidance – perhaps there should be a
positive way to express this: be univocal. Do not be equivocal. Do not
equivocate, univocate! The next two, plus the extra one that makes this a
catalogue – the next is ‘maxim of brevity’ or “conversational maxim of
unnecessary prolixity avoidance,” here we see the ‘sic’: “Grice’s maxim of
conversational brevity, or of avoidance of conversationally unnecessary
prolixity.” The next is “maxim of order” – and the one that makes this a
decalogue: “maxim of conversational tailoring” --. a phonological or
orthographic form having multiple meanings senses, characters, semantic
representations assigned by the language system. A lexical ambiguity occurs
when a lexical item word is assigned multiple meanings by the language. It
includes a homonymy, i.e., distinct lexical items having the same sound or form
but different senses ‘knight’/’night’,
‘lead’ n./‘lead’ v., ‘bear’ n./‘bear’ v.; and b polysemy, i.e., a single
lexical item having multiple senses
‘lamb’ the animal/‘lamb’ the flesh, ‘window’ glass/‘window’ opening. The
distinction between homonymy and polysemy is problematic. A structural
ambiguity occurs when a phrase or sentence is correlated by the grammar of the
language with distinct constituent structures phrase markers or sequences of
phrase markers. Example: ‘Competent women and men should apply’ ‘[NP[NPCompetent women] and men] . . .’ vs.
‘[NPCompetent[NPwomen and men]] . . .’, where ‘NP’ stands for ‘noun phrase’. A
scope ambiguity is a structural ambiguity deriving from alternative interpretations
of scopes of operators see below. Examples: ‘Walt will diet and exercise only
if his doctor approves’ sentence
operator scope: doctor’s approval is a necessary condition for both diet and
exercise wide scope ‘only if’ vs. approval necessary for exercise but not for
dieting wide scope ‘and’; ‘Bertie has a theory about every occurrence’ quantifier scope: one grand theory explaining
all occurrences ‘a theory’ having wide scope over ‘every occurrence’ vs. all
occurrences explained by several theories together ‘every occurrence’ having
wide scope. The scope of an operator is the shortest full subformula to which
the operator is attached. Thus, in `A & B C’, the scope of ‘&’ is ‘A
& B’. For natural languages, the scope of an operator is what it
C-commands. X C-commands Y in a tree diagram provided the first branching node
that dominates X also dominates Y. An occurrence of an operator has wide scope
relative to that of another operator provided the scope of the former properly
includes scope of the latter. Examples: in ‘~A & B’, ’-’ has wide scope
over ‘&’; in ‘Dx Ey Fxy’, the existential quantifier has wide scope over
the universal quantifier. A pragmatic ambiguity is duality of use resting on
pragmatic principles such as those which underlie reference and conversational implicaturum;
e.g., depending on contextual variables, ‘I don’t know that he’s right’ can
express doubt or merely the denial of genuine knowledge.
maxim of conversational maximin
informativeness: a maxim combining the maximum and the minimum.
maxim of maximal conversational
informativeness: a maxim only dealing with the ‘maximum,’ not the ‘minimum,’
which is a problem for Grice. “Why regulate volunteerness?”
maxim of minimal conversational
informativeness: maxim dealing with the minimum, not the maximum.
maxim of conversational trust: Grice
preferred ‘trust’ to ‘truth.’ Grice: “One of the few useful items in the
English philosophical vocabulary: a word that encompasses the volitional and
the non-volitional. Of course, the same could be said of ‘verum,’ cognate with
German ‘wahr.’
maxim of conversational veracity: Grice:
“When I’m feeling Latinate, you’ll hear me refer to this as the maxim of
conversational veracity – The Romans distinguished the verax and the mendax. I
don’t.”
maxim of conversational evidential
adequacy: Grice: “We need a maxim to ensure adequate evidence – this would be
otiose in the volitional – but then we can always generalise the ‘evidence’ to
‘ground,’ or reason, which is what my American tutee, R. J. Fogelin, did.
maxim of conversational relevance: Grice:
“Personally, I prefer ‘relation,’ but Strawson doesn’t. But then Strawson
thinks this is ‘unimportant.’ Not to me, ‘relevant,’ like ‘important,’ are the
most unrelevant and unimportant pieces, especially as abused by an Oxford
philosopher who should know better!”
maxim of conversational perspicuity:
Grice: “D. H. Lewis made me ‘hate’ clarity – “clarity is not enough – plus,
it’s metaphorical? How can I render clear what is essentially obscure? In fact,
I would go on to say that the task of the philosopher is to dramatise the
mundane, to render obscure what seems clear. Perspicuity is unclear enough and
will do fine.”
maxim of conversational clarity, or maxim
of conversational obscurity avoidance: Grice: “It might be said that ‘be
perspicuous’ YIELDS ‘avoid obscurity,’ alla ‘be clear, don’t be obscure.’ But I
prefer to be repetitive, if not AS repetitive as the Jewish God – the Jews have
more than ten commandments!”
maxim of conversational ambiguity
avoidance, maxim of conversational equivocation avoidance, maxim of
conversational univocity: Grice: “This is a teaser, as how ‘ambiguous’ can
‘ambiguous’ be? And why should I dumb down my wit to help my addressee? Dorothy
Parker never did!”
maxim of conversational brevity – or maxim of conversationally unnecessary prolixity avoidance – Grice: “I would call it maxim of redundancy.” “Or maxim of redundancy avoidance,” or maxim of conversational entropy.” A: Did you watch the programme? – Grice: A friend suggested this to me. B: No, I was in a blacked-out city. Versus “No, I was in New York, which was blacked-out. Grice: "In response to my exploration on conversation, I was given an example by a fellow playgroup member which seems to me, as far as it goes, to provide a welcome kind of support for the picture I am putting forward in that it appears to exhibit a kind of interaction between the members of my list of conversational maxims to which I had not really paid due attention — perhaps for the matter not really concerning directly philosophical methodology.” Suppose that it is generally known that Oxford and London were blacked out the day prior. The following conversation takes place: A: Did Smith see the show on the bobby box last night? Grice: “It will be CONVERSATIONALLY unobjectionable for B, who knows that Smith was in London, to reply, B: No, he was in a blacked-out city. "B could have said that Smith was in *London*, thereby providing a further piece of information.” “However, I should like to be able to argue that, in preferring the conversational move featuring the indefinite descriptor, ‘a blacked-out city' B implicates (or communicates the implicaturum) (by the maxims prescribing relation and redundancy avoidance) a more appropriate piece of information, viz., why_ Smith was prevented from seeing the ‘show’ on the bobby box.” "B could have provided BOTH pieces of information, in an over-prolixic version of the above: ‘Smith was in London , which, as every schoolboy knows, was blacked-out yesterday.” — thereby insulting A. But THE ***GAIN****, as Bentham would put it, would have been **INSUFFICIENT** to **JUSTIFY** the additional conversational **COST**.” “Or so I think.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bobby-box implicatura.”
maxim of conversational order: Grice:
“Order is vague: first is the generalised, then the particularized.” By “the
very particularized,” Grice means ‘temporal ordered sequence.” E. g. “Were I to
say, Lady Ogilvy fainted and took arsenic, Strawson would get a different
feeling if I were to utter instead, ‘Lady Ogilvy took arsenic and fainted.’”
maxim of conversational tailoring: ‘The
king of France is not bald – France is a monarchy.”
conversational
point:
Grice distinguishes between ‘point’ and ‘conversational point.’ “What’s the
good of being quoted by another philosopher on the point of ‘point.’?” But that
is what Winch does. So, as a revenge, Grice elaborated on the point. P. London-born philosopher. He quotes Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s
point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of
one’s remarks – Grice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any
desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t
hesitate to say that it seems red to me” – Surely pointless, but an incredible
truth meant to refute G. A. Paul
“conversational postulate” – an otiosity
deviced by Lakoff and Gordon (or Gordon and Lakoff) after Carnap’s infamous
meaning postulate, a sentence that specifies part or all of the meaning of a
predicate. Meaning postulates would thus include explicit, contextual, and
recursive definitions, reduction sentences for dispositional predicates, and,
more generally, any sentences stating how the extensions of predicates are
interrelated by virtue of the meanings of those predicates. For example, any
reduction sentence of the form (x) (x has f / (x is malleable S x has y)) could
be a meaning postulate for the predicate ‘is malleable’. The notion of a
meaning postulate was introduced by Carnap, whose original interest stemmed
from a desire to explicate sentences that are analytic (“true by virtue of
meaning”) but not logically true. Where G is a set of such postulates, one
could say that A is analytic with respect to G if and only if A is a logical
consequence of G. On this account, e.g., the sentence ‘Jake is not a married
bachelor’ is analytic with respect to {’All bachelors are unmarried’}.
conversational reason, or ‘dialogical reason.’ With ‘reason,’ Grice is following
Ariskant. There’s the ‘ratio’ and there’s the “Vernunft.” “To converse” can
mean to have sex (cf. know) so one has to be careful. Grice is using
‘conversational’ casually. First, he was aware of the different qualifications
for ‘implication’. There is Nowell-Smith’s contextual implication and C. K.
Grant’s ‘pragmatic implication.’ So he chose ‘conversational implication’
himself. Later, when narrowing down the notion, he distinguished between
‘conversational implication’ and ‘non-conversational implication’: “Thank you.
B: You’re welcome.” If B is following the maxim, ‘be polite,’ the implication
that he is pleased he was able to assist his emissor is IMPLICATED but not
conversationally so. It is not a ‘conversational implication.’ Grice needs to
restrict the notion for philosophical purposes. Both for the framework of his
theory (it is easier to justify transcendentally conversational implication
than it is non-conversational implication). Note that ‘I am pleased I was able to
assist’ is CANCELLABLE or defeatible, so that’s not the issue. In any case,
both ‘conversational impication’ and these type of calculable
‘non-conversational’ implication still yielding from some ‘maxim’ (such as ‘be
polite’) Grice covers under the generic “non-conventional” precisely because
they can be defeated. When it comes to NON-DEFEASIBLE implicatura, Grice uses
‘conventional implication’ (as in “She was poor but she was honest.”). Grice
did not find these fun. And it shows. Strawson stuck with them, but his
philosophising about them ain’t precisely ‘fun.’ Used in Retrospective, p. 369.
Also: conversational rationality. Surely, “principle of conversational
rationality” sounds otiose. Expectation of mutual rationality sounds better.
Critique of conversational reason sounds best! Grice is careful here. When he
provides a reductive analysis of ‘reasoning,’ this goes as follows: the
reasoner reasons from premise to conclusion. That’s the analysandum. What’s the
analysans? At least it involves TWO clauses: If the reasoner reasons from
premise to conclusion, it is assumed that he BELIEVES that the premise obtains;
and he believes that the conclusion obtains. This has to be generalised to
cover the desiderative, using ‘accept.’ He accepts that the premise obtains,
and he accepts that the conclusion obtains. But there is obviously a SECOND
condition: that the conclusion follows from the premise! He uses ‘demonstrably’
for that, or the demonstratum.’ He is open as to what kind of yielding is
involved because he wants to allow for inductive reasoning and abductive
reasoning, not just deductive reasoning. AND THERE IS A TYPICALLY GRICEIAN
third condition, involving CAUSATION. He had used ‘cause’ in reductive analyses
before – if not so much in ‘meaning,’ due to Urmson’s counterexample involving
‘bribery,’ where ‘cause’ does not seem to do – but in his analysis of
‘intending’ for the British Academy. So at Oxford he promotes this THIRD causal
condition as involving that, naturally enough, it is the rasoner’s BELIEF that
demonstrably q follows from p, which CAUSES the reasoner TO BELIEVE (or more
generally, accept) that the conclusion obtains. Grice is happy with that belief
in the validity of the demonstration ‘populates’ the world of alethic beliefs,
and does not concern with generalising that into a generic ‘acceptance.’ The
word ‘rationalist’ is anathema at Oxford, because tutor after tutor has
brainwashed their tutees that the distinction is ‘empiricst-rationalist’ and
that at Oxford we are ‘empiricists.’ So Grice is really being ‘heretic’ here in
the words of G. P. Baker. demonstratum: The Eng. word “reason”
and the Fr. word “raison” are both
formed on the basis of Roman “reor,” to count or calculate, whence think,
believe. The Roman verb translates the Grecian “λέγειν,” two of whose principal
meanings it retains, but only two: count and think. The third principal meaning
of the Grecian term, speak, discourse, which designates a third type of putting
into relation and proportion, is rendered by other Roman series: “dicere”
(originally cognate with ‘deixis,’ and so not necessarily ‘verbal’), “loquor,” “orationem
habere” (the most ‘vocal’ one, as it relates to the ‘mouth,’ cf. ‘orality’) or
“sermonem habere,” so that ultimately the Grecian λόγος is approached by Roman
philosophers by means of a syntagm, “ratio et oratio,” reason and discourse.
Each vernacular fragments the meaning of logos into a greater or lesser. Cf.
‘principium reddendae rationis.’ Rationality functions as a principle of the
intelligibility of the world and history, particularly in Hegel. Then there’s
The Partitions of Reason and Semantic diffractions. Although there is no
language that retains under a single word all the meanings of logos except by
bringing logos into the language in question, the distribution of these
meanings is more or less close to Roman. For the classical Fr. word “raison,” which maintains almost all the
Roman meanings including the mathematical sense of proportion, as in “raison
d’une série,” or “raison inverse,” a contemporary Fr. -G. dictionary proposes the following terms:
Vernunft, Verstand rational faculty. This example shows that the whole of the
vocabulary is thus mobilized. Reason and faculties We can distinguish between
two interfering systems. The first designates reason, identified with thought
in general, in its relationship to a bodily and/or mental instance. The second
situates reason in a hierarchy of faculties whose organization it determines.
Regarding the first system, as it is expressed in various languages, where one
will find studies of the main distortions, especially around the expressions of
the Roman ‘anima.’ Philosophers especially emphasize the ways of designating
reason and mind that appear to be the most irreducible from one language to
another. Regarding the second system, and the partitions that do not coincide.
For Grice, ‘to understand’ presupposes ‘rationality – not for Kant, who sticks
with Verstand/Vernunft distinction. Ratio speculatum, praticatum. From
Aristotle to Kant, two great domains of rationality have been distinguished:
theory, or speculative reason, and practice. The lurality of meanings, each
represented by one or more specific words. The first question, from the point
of view of the difference of languages, is thus that of the breadth of the
meaning of “reason” or its equivalents, and of the systems diffracting the meanings
of logos and then of ratio. But another complex of problems immediately arises.
The Roman “ratio” absorbs the meanings of other Grecian terms, such as νοῦς and
διάνοια, which are also translated in other, more technical ways, such as
intellectus; so that reason, in the sense of rationality, is a comprehensive
term, whereas ‘reason’ in the sense of intellect or understanding is a singular
and differentiated faculty. However, none of the comprehensive terms or systems
of opposition coincides with those of another language, which are moreover
changing. Then there’s Reason and Rationality: man, animal, god. Since
Aristotle’s definition of man as an animal endowed with logos, which Roman
writers rendered by “animal rationale” — omitting the discursive dimension—reason,
or the logos, is a specific difference that defines man by his difference from
other living beings and/or his participation in a divine or cosmic nature.
Reason is opposed to madness understood as de-mentia. More broadly, reason is
conceived in terms of difference from what does not belong to its domain and
falls outside its immediate law, but which man may, in certain ways, share with
other animals, such as sensation, passion, imagination, and possibly memory.
Rationality and the principle of intelligibility. Rationality, defined by the
logos, is connected with logic as the art of speaking and thinking, and with
its founding principles. Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept. Ed. by M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans. Louvain,
Belg.: Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 191 Hegel, Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Phil.
of Right. Tr. H. Nisbet and
ed. by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge
, . . Science of LogiTr. V. Miller.
London: Allen and Unwin, . . Werke. Ed.
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de France, 190 Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . . Philosophical Essays.
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Dan Garber. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . . Philosophical Papers and Letters.
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conversational
trustworthiness
– or just trust. Principle of Conversational trustworthiness -- Conversational
desideratum of maximal evidence, information bearing on the truth or falsity of
a proposition. In philosophical discussions, a person’s evidence is generally
taken to be all the information a person has, positive or negative, relevant to
a proposition. The notion of evidence used in philosophy thus differs from the
ordinary notion according to which physical objects, such as a strand of hair
or a drop of blood, counts as evidence. One’s information about such objects
could be evidence in the philosophical sense. The concept of evidence plays a
central role in our understanding of knowledge and rationality. According to a
traditional and widely held view, one has knowledge only when one has a true
belief based on very strong evidence. Rational belief is belief based on
adequate evidence, even if that evidence falls short of what is needed for
knowledge. Many traditional philosophical debates, such as those about our
knowledge of the external world, the rationality of religious belief, and the
rational basis for moral judgments, are largely about whether the evidence we
have in these areas is sufficient to yield knowledge or rational belief. The
senses are a primary source of evidence. Thus, for most, if not all, of our
beliefs, ultimately our evidence traces back to sensory experience. Other
sources of evidence include memory and the testimony of others. Of course, both
of these sources rely on the senses in one way or another. According to
rationalist views, we can also get evidence for some propositions through mere reason
or reflection, and so reason is an additional source of evidence. The evidence
one has for a belief may be conclusive or inconclusive. Conclusive evidence is
so strong as to rule out all possibility of error. The discussions of
skepticism show clearly that we lack conclusive evidence for our beliefs about
the external world, about the past, about other minds, and about nearly any
other topic. Thus, an individual’s perceptual experiences provide only
inconclusive evidence for beliefs about the external world since such
experiences can be deceptive or hallucinatory. Inconclusive, or prima facie,
evidence can always be defeated or overridden by subsequently acquired
evidence, as, e.g., when testimonial evidence in favor of a proposition is
overridden by the evidence provided by subsequent experiences. evidentialism, in the philosophy of religion,
the view that religious beliefs can be rationally accepted only if they are
supported by one’s “total evidence,” understood to mean all the other
propositions one knows or justifiably believes to be true. Evidentialists
typically add that, in order to be rational, one’s degree of belief should be
proportioned to the strength of the evidential support. Evidentialism was
formulated by Locke as a weapon against the sectarians of his day and has since
been used by Clifford among many others to attack religious belief in general.
A milder form of evidentialism is found in Aquinas, who, unlike Clifford,
thinks religion can meet the evidentialist challenge. A contrasting view is
fideism, best understood as the claim that one’s fundamental religious
convictions are not subject to independent rational assessment. A reason often
given for this is that devotion to God should be one’s “ultimate concern,” and
to subject faith to the judgment of reason is to place reason above God and
make of it an idol. Proponents of fideism include Tertullian, Kierkegaard, Karl
Barth, and some Vittersians. A third view, which as yet lacks a generally
accepted label, may be termed experientialism; it asserts that some religious
beliefs are directly justified by religious experience. Experientialism differs
from evidentialism in holding that religious beliefs can be rational without
being supported by inferences from other beliefs one holds; thus theistic
arguments are superfluous, whether or not there are any sound ones available.
But experientialism is not fideism; it holds that religious beliefs may be
directly grounded in religious experience wtihout the mediation of other
beliefs, and may be rationally warranted on that account, just as perceptual
beliefs are directly grounded in perceptual experience. Recent examples of
experientialism are found in Plantinga’s “Reformed Epistemology,” which asserts
that religious beliefs grounded in experience can be “properly basic,” and in
the contention of Alston that in religious experience the subject may be
“perceiving God.”
converse. 1 Narrowly, the result of the
immediate logical operation called conversion on any categorical proposition,
accomplished by interchanging the subject term and the predicate term of that
proposition. Thus, the converse of the categorical proposition ‘All cats are
felines’ is ‘All felines are cats’. 2 More broadly, the proposition obtained
from a given ‘if . . . then . . .’ conditional proposition by interchanging the
antecedent and the consequent clauses, i.e., the propositions following the
‘if’ and the ‘then’, respectively; also, the argument obtained from an argument
of the form ‘P; therefore Q’ by interchanging the premise and the
conclusion. converse, outer and inner,
respectively, the result of “converting” the two “terms” or the relation verb
of a relational sentence. The outer converse of ‘Abe helps Ben’ is ‘Ben helps
Abe’ and the inner converse is ‘Abe is helped by Ben’. In simple, or atomic,
sentences the outer and inner converses express logically equivalent
propositions, and thus in these cases no informational ambiguity arises from
the adjunction of ‘and conversely’ or ‘but not conversely’, despite the fact
that such adjunction does not indicate which, if either, of the two converses
intended is meant. However, in complex, or quantified, relational sentences
such as ‘Every integer precedes some integer’ genuine informational ambiguity
is produced. Under normal interpretations of the respective sentences, the
outer converse expresses the false proposition that some integer precedes every
integer, the inner converse expresses the true proposition that every integer
is preceded by some integer. More complicated considerations apply in cases of
quantified doubly relational sentences such as ‘Every integer precedes every
integer exceeding it’. The concept of scope explains such structural ambiguity:
in the sentence ‘Every integer precedes some integer and conversely’, ‘conversely’
taken in the outer sense has wide scope, whereas taken in the inner sense it
has narrow scope.
convey: used in index to WoW. Etymology is
funny. From con-via – cum-via, go on the road with.
coonway: a., english
philosopher whose Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae 1690;
English translation, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy,
1692 proposes a monistic ontology in which all created things are modes of one
spiritual substance emanating from God. This substance is made up of an
infinite number of hierarchically arranged spirits, which she calls monads.
Matter is congealed spirit. Motion is conceived not dynamically but vitally.
Lady Conway’s scheme entails a moral explanation of pain and the possibility of
universal salvation. She repudiates the dualism of both Descartes and her
teacher, Henry More, as well as the materialism of Hobbes and Spinoza. The work
shows the influence of cabalism and affinities with the thought of the mentor
of her last years, Francis Mercurius van Helmont, through whom her philosophy
became known to Leibniz.
co-operatum: Grice previously used ‘help’ – which has a Graeco-Roman
counterpart -- Grice is very right in noting that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. Correspondingly he changed the principle of
conversational helpfulness into the principle of conversational co-operation.
He also points that one has to distinguish between the general theisis that
conversation is rational from the thesis that the particular form of
rationality that conversation takes is cooperative rationality, which most
libertarians take as ‘irrationality’ personified, almost! Grice is obsessed
with this idea that ‘co-operation’ need not just be ‘conversational.’ Indeed,
his way to justify a ‘rationalist’ approach is through analogy. If he can find
‘co-operative’ traits in behaviour other than ‘conversational,’ the greater the
chance to generalise, and thus justify. The co-operation would be
self-justifying. co-operation. The hyphen in Strawson and Wiggins (p. 520). Grice
found ‘co-operative’ too Marxist, and would prefer ‘help,’ as in ‘mutual help.’
This element of ‘mutuality’ is necessary. And it is marked grammatical, with
the FIRST person and the SECOND person. The third need NOT be a person – can be
a dog (as in “Fido is shaggy”). The mututality is necessary in that the
emissor’s intention involves the belief that his recipient is rational. You
cannot co-operate with a rock. You cannot co-operate with a vegetal. You cannot
cooperate with a non-rational animal. You can ONLY cooperate with a co-rational
agent. Animal co-operation poses a nice side to the Griceian idea. Surely the
stereotype is a member of species S cooperating with another specimen of the
same species. But then there are great examples of ‘sym-biosis’: the crane that
gets rid off the hippopotamus’s ticks. Is this cooperation? Is this
intentional? If Grice thinks that there is a ‘mechanistically derivable’
explanation,, it isn’t. He did not necessarily buy ‘bio-sociological’
approaches. Which was a problem, because we don’t have much philosophical
seriouis discourse on ‘cooperation’ at the general level Grice is aiming at.
Except in ethics, which is biased. So it is no wonder that Grice had to rely on
‘meta-ethics’ to even conceptualise the field of cooperation: the maximin
becomes a balance between a principle of conversational egoism and a principle
of conversational altruism. He later found the egoism-tag as ‘understood.’ And
his ‘altruism’ became ‘helpfulness,’ became ‘benevolence,’ and became
‘co-operation.’
copulatum: It was an Oxonian exercise to trace the ‘copula.’ “I’ve
been working like a dog, should be sleeping like a log.” Where is the copula:
Lennon is a dog-like worker – Lennon is a potential log-like sleeper.” Grice
uses ‘copula’ in PPQ. The term is
sometimes used ambiguously, for ‘conjunctum.’ A conjunctive is called a
copulative. But Grice obviously narrows down the use of copulatum to izz and
hazz. He is having in mind Strawson.The formula does not allow for differences
in tense and grammatical number; nor for the enormous class of * all
'-sentences which do not contain, as their main verb, the verb * to be '. We
might try to recast the sentences so that they at least fitted into one of the
two patterns * All x is y ' or ' All x are y ' ; but the results would be, as
English, often clumsy andt sometimes absurd. for Aristotle, 'Socrates is a man'
is true "in virtue of his being that thing which constitutes existing for
him (being which constitutes his mode of existence)," Hermann Weidemann,
"In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication," p. 84— only so
long as that "being" be taken as an assertion of being per se. But
Weidemann wants to take it merely copulatively. In "Prädikation," p.
1196, he says that when 'is' is used as tertium adiacens it has no meaning by
itself, but merely signifies the connection of subject and predicate. Cf. his
"Aristoteles über das isolierte Aussagenwort," p. 154. H. P. Grice,
"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being," also rejects an existential
reading of tertium adiacens and pushes for a copulative one. Cf. Alan Code,
"Aristotle: Essence and Accident," pp. 414-7. Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation
between predicates of one subject, but with variation between essential (per
se)predications upon different (indeed categorially different) subjects (such ...eads
me to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula exhibits
semantic ...An extended treatment of my views about izzing and hazzing can be found in
Alan. A crucial ... on occasion admit catégorial variation in the sense
of the copulative 'is',
evidently is ... Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with
variation ...with the copulative 'is';
so he rather strangely interprets the last remark. (1017a27-30) as alluding to
semantic multiplicity in
the copula as being. (supposedly)
a consequence of semantic multiplicity in the existential 'is'. This
interpretation seems difficult to defend. When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes
say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its quality), sometimes how
much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be saying that if we consider
the range of predicates which can be applied to some item, for example to
a substance like Socrates or a cow, these predicates are categorically
various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription of these predicates will undergo
corresponding variation"H. P. Grice brings the question he had
considered with J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson at Oxford about Aristotle’s
categories.In “Categoriae,” Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of case of the
application of word or phrase to a range of situations. In one sort of case,
both the word and a single definition (account, “logos”) apply throughout that
range. In the other sort of case, the word but no single definition applies
through the range.These two sorts of case have a different nature. In the first
case, the word is applied synonymously (of better as “sunonuma” – literally
“sun-onuma”, cognomen). In the second case the word is applied homonymously (or
better “homonuma”, or aequi-vocally, literally “homo-numa.”)Grice notes that a
homonymous application has some sort of sub-division which Aristotle calls
"paronymy" (“paronuma”), literally ‘para onuma.’To put it roughly,
homonyms have multiple meanings – what Grice has as “semantic
multiplicity.”Synonyms have one meaning or ONE SENSE, but apply to different
kinds of thing.A paronym, such as ‘be,’ derives from other things of a different
kind. Paronyms display a ‘UNIFIED semantic multiplicity,’ if that’s not too
oxymoronic: how can the multiplicity be unified while remaining a multiplicity?
Aristotle states, confusingly, that "being is said in many ways". As
Grice notes, ‘good’ (agathon) also is a paronym that displays unified semantic
multiplicity.In Nichomachean Ethics, even more confusingly, Aristotle says that
"good is said in as many ways as being". He doesn’t number the
ways.So the main goal for Grice is to answer the question: If, as Aristotle
suggests, at least some expressions connected with the notion of
"being" exhibit semantic multiplicity, of which expressions is the
suggestion true? Grice faces the question of existential being and Semantic
Multiplicity. Grice stresses that Semantic Multiplicity of "be" is not only the case of it
interpretation. Other words he wants to know in what way of interpretation of
this word the philosophers can detect the SM. Generally speaking there are four
possible interpretations of "being": First, "be" is taken
to mean "exist.”Second, "be" is taken as a copula in a
predication statement.Third, "be" is taken for expressing the
identity.Fourth, "Being" is considered to be a noun (equivalent to
‘object' or ‘entity') – subjectification, category shift: “Smith’s being tall
suggests he is an athlete.” (cfr. A. G. N. Flew on the ‘rubbish’ that adding
‘the’ to ‘self’ results in – contra J. R. Jones). Philosophers have some
problems for this kind of theory with separating interpretations from each
other. It is natural for thinkers to unite the first and the fourth. The object
or entity should be the things which already exist. So the SM would attach to
such a noun as "entity" if, and only if, it also attaches to the word
"exist". Furthermore, it seems to be a good idea to unite the first
and the third. In some ways theorist can paraphrase the word "exist"
in the terms of self-identity. Grice gives an example: “Julius Caesar exists if
and only if Julius Caesar is identical for Julius Caesar.” Cf. Grice on ‘relative
identity.’So the philosophers should investigate SM in two possible
interpretations – when "be" is understood as "exist" and
when "be" is understood as copula. From Aristotle's point of view
‘being’ is predicated of everything. From this statement, Grice draws the
conclusion that "exist" can apply to every thing, even a square
circle.This word should signify a plurality of universals and exhibits semantic
multiplicity. But Grice continue his analyses and tries to show, that
"exist" has not merely SM, but UNIFIED semantic multiplicity. God
forbid that he breaks M. O. R., Modifed Occam’s Razor – Semantic multiplicies
are not to be multiplied unificatory necessity.”In “Metaphysics,” Aristotle
says that whatever things are signified by the "forms of predication".
Philosophers understood the forms of predication (praedicabilium,
praedicamentum) as a category. So in this way "being" has as many
significations as there are forms of predication. "Be" in this case
indicates what a thing is, what is like or how much it is and ctr. And no
reasons to make a difference between two utterances like "man walks
(flourishes)" and "the man is walking (flourishing)" – cfr.
Strawson on no need to have ‘be’ explicitly in the surface form, which render
some utterances absurd. Grice says that it is not a problem with interpretation
of verb-forms like ‘walks' and ‘flourishes' while we can replace them by
expression in a canonical form like ‘is walking' and ‘is flourishing'.
Aristotle names them as canonical in form within the multiplicity of use of
"be" because ‘is’ is not existential, but copulative.Cf. Descartes, I
think therefore I am – I am a res cogitans, ergo I am a res. "When
Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is
it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he
seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of predicates which can be
applied to some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow, these
predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the
ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation" It
means that, from Aristotle's point of view, "Socrates is F" is not an
essential predication, where "F" shows the item in the category C. So
the logical form of the proposition “Socrates is F” is understood as
"Socrates has something which is (C) F" where is (C) represent
essential connection to category C. In conclusion it can be said that the
copula is a matter of the logical nature of constant connection expressed by
"has" and a categorical variant relation expressed by essential
"is". So we have both types of interpretation: as existence and as a
copula. (Our gratitude to P. A.
Sobolevsky). ases of ''Unified Semantic Multiplicity''
(USM). Prominent among examples of USM is the application of the word 'be';
according to. Aristotle, “being is said in ... Aristotle and the
alleged multiplicity of being (or something). Grice is all
for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic multiplicity (homonymy), it is in the end UNIFIED semantic
multiplicity (paronymy). Or something. Copula – H. P.
Grice on Aristotle on the copula (“Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”) --
copula, in logic, a form of the verb ‘to be’ that joins subject and predicate
in singular and categorical propositions. In ‘George is wealthy’ and ‘Swans are
beautiful’, e.g., ‘is’ and ‘are’, respectively, are copulas. Not all
occurrences of forms of ‘be’ count as copulas. In sentences such as ‘There are
51 states’, ‘are’ is not a copula, since it does not join a subject and a
predicate, but occurs simply as a part of the quantifier term ‘there are’.
corpus: -- Grice’s alma mater – he later
became a Hamsworth scholar at Merton and finally fellow of St. John’s.. Grice
would not have gone to Oxford had his talent not been in the classics, Greek
and Latin. As a Midlander, he was sent to Corpus. At the time, most of Oxford
was oriented towards the classics, or Lit. Hum. (Philosophia). At some point,
each college attained some stereotypical fame, which Grice detested (“Corpus is
for classicists”). By this time, Grice, after a short stay at Merton, accepted
the fellowship at St. John’s, which was “a different animal.” In them days,
there were only two tutorial fellows in philosophy, Scots Mabbott, and English
Grice. But Grice also was “University Lecturer in Philosophy,” which meant he
delivered seminars for tutees all over Oxford. St. John’s keeps a record of all
the tutees by Grice. They include, alphabetically, a few good names. Why is
Corpus so special? Find out! History of “Corpus Christi.” Cf. St. John’s. Cf.
Merton. Each should have an entry. Corpus is Grice’s alma mater – so crucial. Hardieian: you only have one tutor in your life, and Grice’s
was Hardie. So an exploration on Hardie may be in order. Grice hastens to add
that he only learned ‘form,’ not matter, from Hardie, but the ethical and
Aristotelian approach he also admitted. Corpus -- Grice, “Personal identity” –
soul and body -- disembodiment, the immaterial state of existence of a person
who previously had a body. Disembodiment is thus to be distinguished from
nonembodiment or immateriality. God and angels, if they exist, are
non-embodied, or immaterial. By contrast, if human beings continue to exist
after their bodies die, then they are disembodied. As this example suggests,
disembodiment is typically discussed in the context of immortality or survival
of death. It presupposes a view according to which persons are souls or some
sort of immaterial entity that is capable of existing apart from a body.
Whether it is possible for a person to become disembodied is a matter of
controversy. Most philosophers who believe that this is possible assume that a
disembodied person is conscious, but it is not obvious that this should be the
case. Corpus -- Grice’s body --
embodiment, the bodily aspects of human subjectivity. Embodiment is the central
theme in European phenomenology, with its most extensive treatment in the works
of Maurice MerleauPonty. Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment distinguishes
between “the objective body,” which is the body regarded as a physiological
entity, and “the phenomenal body,” which is not just some body, some particular
physiological entity, but my or your body as I or you experience it. Of course,
it is possible to experience one’s own body as a physiological entity. But this
is not typically the case. Typically, I experience my body tacitly as a unified
potential or capacity for doing this and that
typing this sentence, scratching that itch, etc. Moreover, this sense
that I have of my own motor capacities expressed, say, as a kind of bodily
confidence does not depend on an understanding of the physiological processes
involved in performing the action in question. The distinction between the
objective and phenomenal body is central to understanding the phenomenological
treatment of embodiment. Embodiment is not a concept that pertains to the body
grasped as a physiological entity. Rather it pertains to the phenomenal body
and to the role it plays in our object-directed experiences.
cosmologicum. Grice systematized metaphysics quite carefully. He
distinguished between eschatology (or the theory of categories) and ontology
proper. Within ontology, there is ‘ontologia generalis’ and ‘ontologia
specialis.’ There are at least two branches of ‘ontologia specialis’:
‘cosmologia’ and ‘anthropologia.’ Grice would often refer to the ‘world’ in
toto. For example, in “Meaning revisited,” when he speaks of the ‘triangle’:
world-denotatum; signum-emissor, and soul. Grice was never a solipsist, and
most of his theories are ‘causal’ in nature, including that of meaning and
perception. As such, he was constantly fighting against acosmism. While not one
of his twelve labours, he took a liking for the coinage. ‘Acosmism’ is formed
in analogy to ‘atheism,’ meaning the denial of the ultimate reality of the
world. Ernst Platner used it in 1776 to describe Spinoza’s philosophy, arguing
that Spinoza did not intend to deny “the existence of the Godhead, but the
existence of the world.” Maimon, Fichte, Hegel, and others make the same claim.
By the time of Feuerbach it was also used to characterize a basic feature of
Christianity: the denial of the world or worldliness. Cosmologicum -- emanationism, a doctrine
about the origin and ontological structure of the world, most frequently
associated with Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, according to which everything
else that exists is an emanation from a primordial unity, called by Plotinus
“the One.” The first product of emanation from the One is Intelligence noûs, a
realm resembling Plato’s world of Forms. From Intelligence emanates Soul
psuche, conceived as an active principle that imposes, insofar as that is
possible, the rational structure of Intelligence on the matter that emanates
from Soul. The process of emanation is typically conceived to be necessary and
timeless: although Soul, for instance, proceeds from Intelligence, the notion
of procession is one of logical dependence rather than temporal sequence. The
One remains unaffected and undiminished by emanation: Plotinus likens the One
to the sun, which necessarily emits light from its naturally infinite abundance
without suffering change or loss of its own substance. Although emanationism
influenced some Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thinkers, it was incompatible
with those theistic doctrines of divine activity that maintained that God’s
creative choice and the world thus created were contingent, and that God can,
if he chooses, interact directly with individual creatures.
cotton onto the implicaturum:
this is not cognate with the plant. It’s Welsh, rather.Strawson’s and Wiggins’s
example of the ‘suggestio falsi’ – or alternative to Grice’s tutee example.
Since Strawson and Wiggins are presenting the thing to the ultra-prestigious
British Academy, they thought a ‘tutee’ example would not be prestigious
enough. So they have two philosophers, Strawson and Grice, talking about a
third party, another philosopher, well known by his mood outbursts. They are
assessing the third party’s philosophical abilities at their London club.
Strawson volunteers: “And Smith?”. Grice responds: “If he had a more angelic
temperament…” Strawson, “like a fool, I rushed in – Strawson Wiggins p. 520. The
angelic temperament. To like someone or something; to view someone or something
favorably. ... After we explained our plan again, the rest of the group
seemed to cotton onto it.
2. To begin to understand something. Has nothing to do with cotton 1560s,
"to prosper, succeed;" of things, "to agree, suit, fit," a
word of uncertain origin. Perhaps from Welsh cytuno "consent,
agree;" but perhaps rather a metaphor from cloth-finishing and thus
from cotton (n.).
Hensleigh Wedgwood compares cot "a fleece of wool matted together."
Meaning "become closely or intimately associated (with)," is from
1805 via the sense of "to get along together" (of persons), attested
from c. 1600. Related: Cottoned; cottoning.
cournot: H. P. Grice draws
from Cournot for his idea of a scientific law. -- Antoine-Augustin, a critical
realist in scientific and philosophical matters, he was a conservative in
religion and politics. His Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the
Theory of Wealth 1838, though a fiasco at the time, pioneered mathematical
economics. Cournot upheld a position midway between science and metaphysics.
His philosophy rests on three basic counteridenticals Cournot, Antoine-Augustin concepts: order, chance, and probability.
The Exposition of the Theory of Chances and Probabilities 1843 focuses on the
calculus of probability, unfolds a theory of chance occurrences, and
distinguishes among objective, subjective, and philosophical probability. The
Essay on the Foundations of Knowledge 1861 defines science as logically
organized knowledge. Cournot developed a probabilist epistemology, showed the
relevance of probabilism to the scientific study of human acts, and further
assumed the existence of a providential and complex order undergirding the
universe. Materialism, Vitalism, Rationalism 1875 acknowledges transrationalism
and makes room for finality, purpose, and God.
craig: Grice loved his interpolation
theorem, a theorem for firstorder logic: if a sentence y of first-order logic
entails a sentence q there is an “interpolant,” a sentence F in the vocabulary
common to q and y that entails q and is entailed by y. Originally, William
Craig proved his theorem in 7 as a lemma, to give a simpler proof of Beth’s
definability theorem, but the result now stands on its own. In abstract model
theory, logics for which an interpolation theorem holds are said to have the
Craig interpolation property. Craig’s interpolation theorem shows that
first-order logic is closed under implicit definability, so that the concepts
embodied in first-order logic are all given explicitly. In the philosophy of
science literature ‘Craig’s theorem’ usually refers to another result of
Craig’s: that any recursively enumerable set of sentences of first-order logic
can be axiomatized. This has been used to argue that theoretical terms are in
principle eliminable from empirical theories. Assuming that an empirical theory
can be axiomatized in first-order logic, i.e., that there is a recursive set of
first-order sentences from which all theorems of the theory can be proven, it
follows that the set of consequences of the axioms in an “observational”
sublanguage is a recursively enumerable set. Thus, by Craig’s theorem, there is
a set of axioms for this subtheory, the Craig-reduct, that contains only
observation terms. Interestingly, the Craig-reduct theory may be semantically
weaker, in the sense that it may have models that cannot be extended to a model
of the full theory. The existence of such a model would prove that the
theoretical terms cannot all be defined on the basis of the observational
vocabulary only, a result related to Beth’s definability theorem.
crazy-bayesy: cited by H. P.
Grice, “Aspects of reason.” Bayesian rationality, minimally, a property a
system of beliefs or the believer has in virtue of the system’s “conforming to
the probability calculus.” “Bayesians” differ on what “rationality” requires,
but most agree that i beliefs come in degrees of firmness; ii these “degrees of
belief” are theoretically or ideally quantifiable; iii such quantification can
be understood in terms of person-relative, time-indexed “credence functions”
from appropriate sets of objects of belief propositions or sentences each set closed under at least finite truth-functional
combinations into the set of real
numbers; iv at any given time t, a person’s credence function at t ought to be
usually: “on pain of a Dutch book argument” a probability function; that is, a
mapping from the given set into the real numbers in such a way that the
“probability” the value assigned to any given object A in the set is greater
than or equal to zero, and is equal to unity % 1 if A is a necessary truth,
and, for any given objects A and B in the set, if A and B are incompatible the negation
of their conjunction is a necessary truth then the probability assigned to
their disjunction is equal to the sum of the probabilities assigned to each; so
that the usual propositional probability axioms impose a sort of logic on
degrees of belief. If a credence function is a probability function, then it or
the believer at the given time is “coherent.” On these matters, on conditional
degrees of belief, and on the further constraint on rationality many Bayesians
impose that change of belief ought to accord with “conditionalization”, the
reader should consult John Earman, Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of
Bayesian Confirmation Theory 2; Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, Scientific
Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach 9; and Richard Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision
5. Bayes’s theorem, any of several
relationships between prior and posterior probabilities or odds, especially 13
below. All of these depend upon the basic relationship 0 between
contemporaneous conditional and unconditional probabilities. Non-Bayesians think
these useful only in narrow ranges of cases, generally because of skepticism
about accessibility or significance of priors. According to 1, posterior
probability is prior probability times the “relevance quotient” Carnap’s term.
According to 2, posterior odds are Bayesian Bayes’s theorem 74 74 prior odds times the “likelihood ratio”
R. A. Fisher’s term. Relationship 3 comes from 1 by expanding P data via the
law of total probability. Bayes’s rule 4 for updating probabilities has you set
your new unconditional probabilities equal to your old conditional ones when
fresh certainty about data leaves probabilities conditionally upon the data
unchanged. The corresponding rule 5 has you do the same for odds. In decision
theory the term is used differently, for the rule “Choose so as to maximize
expectation of utility.”
Credible – by speaking of
probability and credibility, Grice is going modal! credibility: While Grice uses ‘probability’ as the correlatum of
desirability, he suggests ‘credibility’ is a better choice. It relates to the
‘creditum.’ Now, what is the generic for ‘trust’ when it comes to the creditum
and the desideratum? An indicative utterance expresses a belief. The utterer is
candid if he holds that belief. “Candid” applies to imperative utterances which
express genuine desires and notably the emissor’s intention that his recipient
will form a ‘desideratum.’ Following
Jeffrey and Davidson, respectively, Grice uses ‘desirability’ and
‘probability,’ but sometimes ‘credibibility,’ realizing that ‘credibility’ is
more symmetrical with ‘desirability’ than ‘probability’ is. Urmson had explored
this in “Parenthetical verbs.” Urmson co-relates, ‘certaintly’ with ‘know’ and
‘probably’ with ‘believe.’ But Urmson adds four further adverbs: “knowingly,”
“unknowingly,” “believably,” and “unbelievably.” Urmson also includes three
more: “uncredibly,” in variation with “incredibly,” and ‘credibly.” The keyword
should be ‘credibility.’
creditum: The Romans were good at this. Notably in negative
contexts. They distinguished between an emissor being fallax and being mendax.
It all has to do with ‘creditum.’ “Creditum’ is vero, more or less along
correspondence-theoretical lines. Used by Grice for the doxastic equivalent of
the buletic or desideratum. A creditum is an implicaturum, as Grice defines the
implicaturum of the content that an addresse has to assume the utterer BELIEVES
to deem him rational. The ‘creditum’-condition is essential for Grice in his
‘exhibitive’ account to the communication. By uttering “Smoke!”, U means that
there is some if the utterer intends that his addressee BELIEVE that he, the
utterer, is in a state of soul which has the propositional complex there is smoke.
It is worth noting that BELIEF is not needed for the immediate state of the
utterer’s soul: this can always be either a desire or a belief. But a belief is
REQUIRED as the immediate (if not ultimate) response intended by the utterer
that his addressee adapt. It is curious that given the primacy that Grice held
of the desirability over the credibility that many of his conversational maxims
are formulated as imperatives aimed at matters of belief, conditions and value
of credibility, probability and adequate evidence. In the cases where Grice
emphasizes ‘information,’ which one would associate with ‘belief,’ this
association may be dropped provided the exhibitive account: you can always
influence or be influenced by others in the institution of a common decision
provided you give and receive the optimal information, or rather, provided the
conversationalists assume that they are engaged in a MAXIMAL exchange of
information. That ‘information’ does not necessarily apply to ‘belief’ is
obvious in how complicated an order can get, “Get me a bottle”. “Is that all?”
“No, get me a bottle and make sure that it is of French wine, and add something
to drink the wine with, and drive careful, and give my love to Rosie.” No
belief is explicitly transmitted, yet the order seems informative enough. Grice
sometimes does use ‘informative’ in a strict context involving credibility. He
divides the mode of credibility into informational (when addressed to others)
and indicative (when addressed to self), for in a self-addressed utterance such
as, “I am being silly,” one cannot intend to inform oneself of something one
already knows! The English have ‘credibility’ and belief, which is
cognate with ‘love.’ H. P. Grice, “Disposition and belief,” H. P. Grice,
“Knowledge and belief.” a dispositional psychological state in virtue of which
a person will assent to a proposition under certain conditions. Propositional
knowledge, traditionally understood, entails belief. A behavioral view implies
that beliefs are just dispositions to behave in certain ways. Your believing
that the stove is hot is just your being disposed to act in a manner
appropriate to its being hot. The problem is that our beliefs, including their
propositional content indicated by a “that”-clause, typically explain why we do
what we do. You avoid touching the stove because you believe that it’s
dangerously hot. Explaining action via beliefs refers indispensably to
propositional content, but the behavioral view does not accommodate this. A
state-object view implies that belief consists of a special relation between a
psychological state and an object of belief, what is believed. The objects of
belief, traditionally understood, are abstract propositions existing
independently of anyone’s thinking of them. The state of believing is a
propositional attitude involving some degree of confidence toward a
propositional object of belief. Such a view allows that two persons, even
separated by a long period of time, can believe the same thing. A state-object
view allows that beliefs be dispositional rather than episodic, since they can
exist while no action is occurring. Such a view grants, however, that one can
have a disposition to act owing to believing something. Regarding mental
action, a belief typically generates a disposition to assent, at least under
appropriate circumstances, to the proposition believed. Given the central role
of propositional content, however, a state-object view denies that beliefs are
just dispositions to act. In addition, such a view should distinguish between
dispositional believing and a mere disposition to believe. One can be merely
disposed to believe many things that one does not actually believe, owing to
one’s lacking the appropriate psychological attitude to relevant propositional
content. Beliefs are either occurrent or non-occurrent. Occurrent belief,
unlike non-occurrent belief, requires current assent to the proposition
believed. If the assent is self-conscious, the belief is an explicit occurrent
belief; if the assent is not self-conscious, the belief is an implicit
occurrent behaviorism, supervenient belief 78
78 belief. Non-occurrent beliefs permit that we do not cease to believe
that 2 ! 2 % 4, for instance, merely because we now happen to be thinking of
something else or nothing at all. . --
belief revision, the process by which cognitive states change in light of new
information. This topic looms large in discussions of Bayes’s Theorem and other
approaches in decision theory. The reasons prompting belief revision are
characteristically epistemic; they concern such notions as quality of evidence
and the tendency to yield truths. Many different rules have been proposed for
updating one’s belief set. In general, belief revision typically balances risk
of error against information increase. Belief revision is widely thought to
proceed either by expansion or by conceptual revision. Expansion occurs in
virtue of new observations; a belief is changed, or a new belief established,
when a hypothesis or provisional belief is supported by evidence whose
probability is high enough to meet a favored criterion of epistemic warrant.
The hypothesis then becomes part of the existing belief corpus, or is
sufficient to prompt revision. Conceptual revision occurs when appropriate
changes are made in theoretical assumptions
in accordance with such principles as simplicity and explanatory or
predictive power by which the corpus is
organized. In actual cases, we tend to revise beliefs with an eye toward
advancing the best comprehensive explanation in the relevant cognitive
domain.
Cremonini: essential
Italian philosopher. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Cremonini," per
Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia.
Grice’s criterion for the implicaturum, --
cf. G. P. Baker, “Grice and criterial semantics” -- broadly, a sufficient
condition for the presence of a certain property or for the truth of a certain
proposition. Generally, a criterion need be sufficient merely in normal
circumstances rather than absolutely sufficient. Typically, a criterion is
salient in some way, often by virtue of being a necessary condition as well as
a sufficient one. The plural form, ‘criteria’, is commonly used for a set of
singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. A set of truth conditions
is said to be criterial for the truth of propositions of a certain form. A
conceptual analysis of a philosophically important concept may take the form of
a proposed set of truth conditions for paradigmatic propositions containing the
concept in question. Philosophers have proposed criteria for such notions as meaningfulness,
intentionality,
creationism, theological criterion knowledge, justification, justice,
rightness, and identity including personal identity and event identity, among
many others. There is a special use of the term in connection with Vitters’s
well-known remark that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria,”
e.g., moans and groans for aches and pains. The suggestion is that a
criteriological connection is needed to forge a conceptual link between items
of a sort that are intelligible and knowable to items of a sort that, but for
the connection, would not be intelligible or knowable. A mere symptom cannot
provide such a connection, for establishing a correlation between a symptom and
that for which it is a symptom presupposes that the latter is intelligible and
knowable. One objection to a criteriological view, whether about aches or
quarks, is that it clashes with realism about entities of the sort in question
and lapses into, as the case may be, behaviorism or instrumentalism. For it
seems that to posit a criteriological connection is to suppose that the nature
and existence of entities of a given sort can depend on the conditions for
their intelligibility or knowability, and that is to put the epistemological
cart before the ontological horse.
critical legal studies: explored by Grice
in his analysis of legal vs. moral right --
a loose assemblage of legal writings and thinkers in the United States
and Great Britain since the mid-0s that aspire to a jurisprudence and a
political ideology. Like the legal
realists of the 0s and 0s, the jurisprudential program is largely negative,
consisting in the discovery of supposed contradictions within both the law as a
whole and areas of law such as contracts and criminal law. The jurisprudential
implication derived from such supposed contradictions within the law is that
any decision in any case can be defended as following logically from some
authoritative propositions of law, making the law completely without guidance
in particular cases. Also like the legal
realists, the political ideology of critical legal studies is vaguely leftist,
embracing the communitarian critique of liberalism. Communitarians fault
liberalism for its alleged overemphasis on individual rights and individual
welfare at the expense of the intrinsic value of certain collective goods.
Given the cognitive relativism of many of its practitioners, critical legal
studies tends not to aspire to have anything that could be called a theory of
either law or of politics.
Grice’s
critique of conversational reason – “What does Kant mean by ‘critique’?
Should he?” – Grice. Critical Realism, a philosophy that at the highest level
of generality purports to integrate the positive insights of both New Realism
and idealism. New Realism was the first wave of realistic reaction to the
dominant idealism of the nineteenth century. It was a version of immediate and
direct realism. In its attempt to avoid any representationalism that would lead
to idealism, this tradition identified the immediate data of consciousness with
objects in the physical world. There is no intermediary between the knower and
the known. This heroic tour de force foundered on the phenomena of error,
illusion, and perceptual variation, and gave rise to a successor realism Critical Realism that acknowledged the mediation of “the
mental” in our cognitive grasp of the physical world. ’Critical Realism’ was
the title of a work in epistemology by Roy Wood Sellars 6, but its more general
use to designate the broader movement derives from the 0 cooperative volume,
Essays in Critical Realism: A Cooperative Study of the Problem of Knowledge,
containing position papers by Durant Drake, A. O. Lovejoy, J. B. Pratt, A. K.
Rogers, C. A. Strong, George Santayana, and Roy Wood Sellars. With New Realism,
Critical Realism maintains that the primary object of knowledge is the
independent physical world, and that what is immediately present to consciousness
is not the physical object as such, but some corresponding mental state broadly
construed. Whereas both New Realism and idealism grew out of the conviction
that any such mediated account of knowledge is untenable, the Critical Realists
felt that only if knowledge of the external world is explained in terms of a
process of mental mediation, can error, illusion, and perceptual variation be
accommodated. One could fashion an account of mental mediation that did not
involve the pitfalls of Lockean representationalism by carefully distinguishing
between the object known and the mental state through which it is known. The
Critical Realists differed among themselves both epistemologically and
metaphysically. The mediating elements in cognition were variously construed as
essences, ideas, or sensedata, and the precise role of these items in
cognicriterion, problem of the Critical Realism tion was again variously construed.
Metaphysically, some were dualists who saw knowledge as unexplainable in terms
of physical processes, whereas others principally Santayana and Sellars were
materialists who saw cognition as simply a function of conscious biological
systems. The position of most lasting influence was probably that of Sellars
because that torch was taken up by his son, Wilfrid, whose very sophisticated
development of it was quite influential.
-- critical theory, any social theory that is at the same time
explanatory, normative, practical, and self-reflexive. The term was first
developed by Horkheimer as a self-description of the Frankfurt School and its
revision of Marxism. It now has a wider significance to include any critical,
theoretical approach, including feminism and liberation philosophy. When they
make claims to be scientific, such approaches attempt to give rigorous
explanations of the causes of oppression, such as ideological beliefs or
economic dependence; these explanations must in turn be verified by empirical
evidence and employ the best available social and economic theories. Such
explanations are also normative and critical, since they imply negative
evaluations of current social practices. The explanations are also practical,
in that they provide a better self-understanding for agents who may want to
improve the social conditions that the theory negatively evaluates. Such change
generally aims at “emancipation,” and theoretical insight empowers agents to
remove limits to human freedom and the causes of human suffering. Finally,
these theories must also be self-reflexive: they must account for their own
conditions of possibility and for their potentially transformative effects.
These requirements contradict the standard account of scientific theories and
explanations, particularly positivism and its separation of fact and value. For
this reason, the methodological writings of critical theorists often attack
positivism and empiricism and attempt to construct alternative epistemologies.
Critical theorists also reject relativism, since the cultural relativity of
norms would undermine the basis of critical evaluation of social practices and
emancipatory change. The difference between critical and non-critical theories
can be illustrated by contrasting the Marxian and Mannheimian theories of
ideology. Whereas Mannheim’s theory merely describes relations between ideas of
social conditions, Marx’s theory tries to show how certain social practices
require false beliefs about them by their participants. Marx’s theory not only
explains why this is so, it also negatively evaluates those practices; it is
practical in that by disillusioning participants, it makes them capable of
transformative action. It is also self-reflexive, since it shows why some
practices require illusions and others do not, and also why social crises and
conflicts will lead agents to change their circumstances. It is scientific, in
that it appeals to historical evidence and can be revised in light of better
theories of social action, language, and rationality. Marx also claimed that
his theory was superior for its special “dialectical method,” but this is now
disputed by most critical theorists, who incorporate many different theories
and methods. This broader definition of critical theory, however, leaves a gap
between theory and practice and places an extra burden on critics to justify
their critical theories without appeal to such notions as inevitable historical
progress. This problem has made critical theories more philosophical and
concerned with questions of justification.
Grice’s
critters:
one is never sure if Grice uses ‘creature’ seriously! creation ex nihilo, the
act of bringing something into existence from nothing. According to traditional
Christian theology, God created the world ex nihilo. To say that the world was
created from nothing does not mean that there was a prior non-existent
substance out of which it was fashioned, but rather that there was not anything
out of which God brought it into being. However, some of the patristics
influenced by Plotinus, such as Gregory of Nyssa, apparently understood
creation ex nihilo to be an emanation from God according to which what is
created comes, not from nothing, but from God himself. Not everything that God
makes need be created ex nihilo; or if, as in Genesis 2: 7, 19, God made a
human being and animals from the ground, a previously existing material, God
did not create them from nothing. Regardless of how bodies are made, orthodox
theology holds that human souls are created ex nihilo; the opposing view,
traducianism, holds that souls are propagated along with bodies. creationism, acceptance of the early chapters
of Genesis taken literally. Genesis claims that the universe and all of its
living creatures including humans were created by God in the space of six days.
The need to find some way of reconciling this story with the claims of science
intensified in the nineteenth century, with the publication of Darwin’s Origin
of Species 1859. In the Southern states of the United States, the indigenous
form of evangelical Protestant Christianity declared total opposition to
evolutionism, refusing any attempt at reconciliation, and affirming total
commitment to a literal “creationist” reading of the Bible. Because of this,
certain states passed laws banning the teaching of evolutionism. More recently,
literalists have argued that the Bible can be given full scientific backing,
and they have therefore argued that “Creation science” may properly be taught
in state-supported schools in the United States without violation of the
constitutional separation of church and state. This claim was challenged in the
state of Arkansas in 1, and ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
creationism dispute has raised some issues of philosophical interest and
importance. Most obviously, there is the question of what constitutes a genuine
science. Is there an adequate criterion of demarcation between science and
nonscience, and will it put evolutionism on the one side and creationism on the
other? Some philosophers, arguing in the spirit of Karl Popper, think that such
a criterion can be found. Others are not so sure; and yet others think that
some such criterion can be found, but shows creationism to be genuine science,
albeit already proven false. Philosophers of education have also taken an
interest in creationism and what it represents. If one grants that even the
most orthodox science may contain a value component, reflecting and influencing
its practitioners’ culture, then teaching a subject like biology almost
certainly is not a normatively neutral enterprise. In that case, without
necessarily conceding to the creationist anything about the true nature of
science or values, perhaps one must agree that science with its teaching is not
something that can and should be set apart from the rest of society, as an
entirely distinct phenomenon.
Grice
as Croceian:
expression and intention -- Croce, B., philosopher. He was born at
Pescasseroli, in the Abruzzi, and after 6 lived in Naples. He briefly attended
the of Rome and was led to study
Herbart’s philosophy. In 4 he founded the influential journal La critica. In 0
he was made life member of the senate.
Early in his career he befriended Giovanni Gentile, but this friendship was
breached by Gentile’s Fascism. During the Fascist period and World War II Croce
lived in isolation as the chief anti-fascist thinker in Italy. He later became
a leader of the Liberal party and at the age of eighty founded the Institute
for Historical Studies. Croce was a literary and historical scholar who joined
his great interest in these fields to philosophy. His best-known work in the
Englishspeaking world is Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General
Linguistic 2. This was the first part of his “Philosophy of Spirit”; the second
was his Logic 5, the third his theory of the Practical 9, and the fourth his
Historiography 7. Croce was influenced by Hegel and the Hegelian aesthetician
Francesco De Sanctis 181783 and by Vico’s conceptions of knowledge, history,
and society. He wrote The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico 1 and a famous
commentary on Hegel, What Is Living and What Is critical theory Croce,
Benedetto Dead in the Philosophy of
Hegel 7, in which he advanced his conception of the “dialectic of distincts” as
more fundamental than the Hegelian dialectic of opposites. Croce held that
philosophy always springs from the occasion, a view perhaps rooted in his
concrete studies of history. He accepted the general Hegelian identification of
philosophy with the history of philosophy. His philosophy originates from his
conception of aesthetics. Central to his aesthetics is his view of intuition,
which evolved through various stages during his career. He regards aesthetic
experience as a primitive type of cognition. Intuition involves an awareness of
a particular image, which constitutes a non-conceptual form of knowledge. Art is
the expression of emotion but not simply for its own sake. The expression of
emotion can produce cognitive awareness in the sense that the particular
intuited as an image can have a cosmic aspect, so that in it the universal
human spirit is perceived. Such perception is present especially in the
masterpieces of world literature. Croce’s conception of aesthetic has
connections with Kant’s “intuition” Anschauung and to an extent with Vico’s
conception of a primordial form of thought based in imagination fantasia.
Croce’s philosophical idealism includes fully developed conceptions of logic,
science, law, history, politics, and ethics. His influence to date has been
largely in the field of aesthetics and in historicist conceptions of knowledge
and culture. His revival of Vico has inspired a whole school of Vico
scholarship. Croce’s conception of a “Philosophy of Spirit” showed it was
possible to develop a post-Hegelian philosophy that, with Hegel, takes “the
true to be the whole” but which does not simply imitate Hegel. Croce -- expression theory of art, a theory
that defines art as the expression of feelings or emotion sometimes called
expressionism in art. Such theories first acquired major importance in the
nineteenth century in connection with the rise of Romanticism. Expression
theories are as various as the different views about what counts as expressing
emotion. There are four main variants. 1 Expression as communication. This
requires that the artist actually have the feelings that are expressed, when they
are initially expressed. They are “embodied” in some external form, and thereby
transmitted to the perceiver. Leo Tolstoy 18280 held a view of this sort. 2
Expression as intuition. An intuition is the apprehension of the unity and
individuality of something. An intuition is “in the mind,” and hence the
artwork is also. Croce held this view, and in his later work argued that the
unity of an intuition is established by feeling. 3 Expression as clarification.
An artist starts out with vague, undefined feelings, and expression is a
process of coming to clarify, articulate, and understand them. This view
retains Croce’s idea that expression is in the artist’s mind, as well as
explanation, covering law expression theory of art 299 299 his view that we are all artists to the
degree that we articulate, clarify, and come to understand our own feelings.
Collingwood held this view. 4 Expression as a property of the object. For an
artwork to be an expression of emotion is for it to have a given structure or
form. Suzanne K. Langer 55 argued that music and the other arts “presented” or
exhibited structures or forms of feeling in general.
Grice’s
crucial experiment:
a means of deciding between rival theories (or arguments) for this or that
impicatum, that, providing parallel explanations of large classes of phenomena,
come to be placed at issue by a single fact. For example, the Newtonian
emission theory predicts that light travels faster in water than in air;
according to the wave theory, light travels slower in water than in air.
Dominique François Arago proposed a crucial experiment comparing the respective
velocities. Léon Foucault then devised an apparatus to measure the speed of
light in various media and found a lower velocity in water than in air. Arago
and Foucault concluded for the wave theory, believing that the experiment
refuted the emission theory. Other examples include Galileo’s discovery of the
phases of Venus Ptolemaic versus Copernican astronomy, Pascal’s Puy-de-Dôme
experiment with the barometer vacuists versus plenists, Fresnel’s prediction of
a spot of light in circular shadows particle versus wave optics, and
Eddington’s measurement of the gravitational bending of light rays during a
solar eclipse Newtonian versus Einsteinian gravitation. At issue in crucial
experiments is usually a novel prediction. The notion seems to derive from
Francis Bacon, whose New Organon 1620 discusses the “Instance of the Fingerpost
Instantia later experimentum crucis,” a term borrowed from the post set up
at crossroads to indicate several directions. Crucial experiments were
emphasized in early nineteenth-century scientific methodology e.g., in John F. Herschel’s A Preliminary
Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy 1830. Duhem argued that crucial
experiments resemble false dilemmas: hypotheses in physics do not come in
pairs, so that crucial experiments cannot transform one of the two into a
demonstrated truth. Discussing Foucault’s experiment, Duhem asks whether we
dare assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable and suggests that instead of
light being either a simple particle or wave, light might be something else,
perhaps a disturbance propagated within a dielectric medium, as theorized by
Maxwell. In the twentieth century, crucial experiments and novel predictions
figured prominently in the work of Imre Lakatos 274. Agreeing that crucial
experiments are unable to overthrow theories, Lakatos accepted them as
retroactive indications of the fertility or progress of research programs.
crusius: As C. of E., Grice
was pretty protestant -- Christian August, philosopher, theologian, and a
devout Lutheran pastor who believed that religion was endangered by the
rationalist views especially of Wolff. He devoted his considerable
philosophical powers to working out acute and often deep criticisms of Wolff
and developing a comprehensive alternative to the Wolffian system. His main
philosophical works were published in the 1740s. In his understanding of
epistemology and logic Crusius broke with many of the assumptions that allowed
Wolff to argue from how we think of things to how things are. For instance,
Crusius tried to show that the necessity in causal connection is not the same
as logical necessity. He rejected the Leibnizian view that this world is
probably the best possible world, and he criticrucial experiment Crusius,
Christian August cized the Wolffian
view of freedom of the will as merely a concealed spiritual mechanism. His
ethics stressed our dependence on God and his commands, as did the natural law
theory of Pufendorf, but he developed the view in some strikingly original
ways. Rejecting voluntarism, Crusius held that God’s commands take the form of
innate principles of the will not the understanding. Everyone alike can know
what they are, so contra Wolff there is no need for moral experts. And they
carry their own motivational force with them, so there is no need for external
sanctions. We have obligations of prudence to do what will forward our own
ends; but true obligation, the obligation of virtue, arises only when we act
simply to comply with God’s law, regardless of any ends of our own. In this
distinction between two kinds of obligation, as in many of his other views,
Crusius plainly anticipated much that Kant came to think. Kant when young read
and admired his work, and it is mainly for this reason that Crusius is now
remembered.
cumberland -- Law – Grice was
obsessed with laws that would introduce psychological concepts -- Cumberland,
R. English philosopher and bishop. He wrote a Latin Treatise of the Laws of
Nature 1672, tr. twice into English and once into . Admiring Grotius,
Cumberland hoped to refute Hobbes in the interests of defending Christian
morality and religion. He refused to appeal to innate ideas and a priori
arguments because he thought Hobbes must be attacked on his own ground. Hence
he offered a reductive and naturalistic account of natural law. The one basic
moral law of nature is that the pursuit of the good of all rational beings is
the best path to the agent’s own good. This is true because God made nature so
that actions aiding others are followed by beneficial consequences to the
agent, while those harmful to others harm the agent. Since the natural
consequences of actions provide sanctions that, once we know them, will make us
act for the good of others, we can conclude that there is a divine law by which
we are obligated to act for the common good. And all the other laws of nature
follow from the basic law. Cumberland refused to discuss free will, thereby
suggesting a view of human action as fully determined by natural causes. If on
his theory it is a blessing that God made nature including humans to work as it
does, the religious reader must wonder if there is any role left for God
concerning morality. Cumberland is generally viewed as a major forerunner of
utilitarianism.
inductum – Grice knew a lot
about induction theory via Kneale and Keynes -- curve-fitting problem, the
problem of making predictions from past observations by fitting curves to the
data. Curve fitting has two steps: first, select a family of curves; then, find
the bestfitting curve by some statistical criterion such as the method of least
squares e.g., choose the curve that has the least sum of squared deviations
between the curve and data. The method was first proposed by Adrian Marie
Legendre 17521833 and Carl Friedrich Gauss 1777 1855 in the early nineteenth
century as a way of inferring planetary trajectories from noisy data. More
generally, curve fitting may be used to construct low-level empirical
generalizations. For example, suppose that the ideal gas law, P % nkT, is
chosen as the form of the law governing the dependence of the pressure P on the
equilibrium temperature T of a fixed volume of gas, where n is the molecular
number per unit volume and k is Boltzmann’s constant a universal constant equal
to 1.3804 $ 10†16 erg°C†1. When the parameter nk is adjustable, the law
specifies a family of curves one for
each numerCudworth, Damaris curve-fitting problem ical value of the parameter. Curve fitting
may be used to determine the best-fitting member of the family, thereby
effecting a measurement of the theoretical parameter, nk. The philosophically
vexing problem is how to justify the initial choice of the form of the law. On
the one hand, one might choose a very large, complex family of curves, which
would ensure excellent fit with any data set. The problem with this option is
that the best-fitting curve may overfit the data. If too much attention is paid
to the random elements of the data, then the predictively useful trends and
regularities will be missed. If it looks too good to be true, it probably is.
On the other hand, simpler families run a greater risk of making grossly false
assumptions about the true form of the law. Intuitively, the solution is to
choose a simplefamily of curves that maintains a reasonable degree of fit. The
simplicity of a family of curves is measured by the paucity of parameters. The
problem is to say how and why such a trade-off between simplicity and goodness
of fit should be made. When a theory can accommodate recalcitrant data only by
the ad hoc i.e., improperly motivated addition of new terms and parameters,
students of science have long felt that the subsequent increase in the degree
of fit should not count in the theory’s favor, and such additions are sometimes
called ad hoc hypotheses. The best-known example of this sort of ad hoc
hypothesizing is the addition of epicycles upon epicycles in the planetary
astronomies of Ptolemy and Copernicus. This is an example in which a gain in
fit need not compensate for the loss of simplicity. Contemporary philosophers sometimes
formulate the curve-fitting problem differently. They often assume that there
is no noise in the data, and speak of the problem of choosing among different
curves that fit the data exactly. Then the problem is to choose the simplest
curve from among all those curves that pass through every data point. The
problem is that there is no universally accepted way of defining the simplicity
of single curves. No matter how the problem is formulated, it is widely agreed
that simplicity should play some role in theory choice. Rationalists have
championed the curve-fitting problem as exemplifying the underdetermination of
theory from data and the need to make a priori assumptions about the simplicity
of nature. Those philosophers who think that we have no such a priori knowledge
still need to account for the relevance of simplicity to science. Whewell
described curve fitting as the colligation of facts in the quantitative
sciences, and the agreement in the measured parameters coefficients obtained by
different colligations of facts as the consilience of inductions. Different
colligations of facts say on the same gas at different volume or for other
gases may yield good agreement among independently measured values of
parameters like the molecular density of the gas and Boltzmann’s constant. By
identifying different parameters found to agree, we constrain the form of the
law without appealing to a priori knowledge good news for empiricism. But the
accompanying increase in unification also worsens the overall degree of fit.
Thus, there is also the problem of how and why we should trade off unification
with total degree of fit. Statisticians often refer to a family of hypotheses
as a model. A rapidly growing literature in statistics on model selection has
not yet produced any universally accepted formula for trading off simplicity
with degree of fit. However, there is wide agreement among statisticians that
the paucity of parameters is the appropriate way of measuring simplicity.
Grice’s
defense of modernist logic -- cut-elimination theorem, a theorem stating that a
certain type of inference rule including a rule that corresponds to modus
ponens is not needed in classical logic. The idea was anticipated by J.
Herbrand; the theorem was proved by G. Gentzen and generalized by S. Kleene.
Gentzen formulated a sequent calculus
i.e., a deductive system with rules for statements about derivability.
It includes a rule that we here express as ‘From C Y D,M and M,C Y D, infer C Y
D’ or ‘Given that C yields D or M, and that C plus M yields D, we may infer
that C yields D’. Cusa cut-elimination theorem This is called the cut rule because it
cuts out the middle formula M. Gentzen showed that his sequent calculus is an
adequate formalization of the predicate logic, and that the cut rule can be
eliminated; anything provable with it can be proved without it. One important
consequence of this is that, if a formula F is provable, then there is a proof
of F that consists solely of subformulas of F. This fact simplifies the study
of provability. Gentzen’s methodology applies directly to classical logic but
can be adapted to many nonclassical logics, including some intuitionistic
logics. It has led to some important theorems about consistency, and has
illuminated the role of auxiliary assumptions in the derivation of consequences
from a theory.
cybernetic
implicaturum
– What Grice disliked about the cybernetic implicaturum is that it is
‘mechanisitically derivable” and thus not really ‘rational’ in the way an implicaturum
is meant to be rational. A machine cannot implicate. Grice “Method in
philosophical psychology” -- cybernetics coined by N. Wiener in 7 from Grecian
kubernetes, ‘helmsman’, the study of the communication and manipulation of
information in service of the control and guidance of biological, physical, or
chemical energy systems. Historically, cybernetics has been intertwined with
mathematical theories of information communication and computation. To describe
the cybernetic properties of systems or processes requires ways to describe and
measure information reduce uncertainty about events within the system and its
environment. Feedback and feedforward, the basic ingredients of cybernetic
processes, involve information as what
is fed forward or backward and are basic
to processes such as homeostasis in biological systems, automation in industry,
and guidance systems. Of course, their most comprehensive application is to the
purposive behavior thought of cognitively goal-directed systems such as
ourselves. Feedback occurs in closed-loop, as opposed to open-loop, systems.
Actually, ‘open-loop’ is a misnomer involving no loop, but it has become
entrenched. The standard example of an openloop system is that of placing a
heater with constant output in a closed room and leaving it switched on. Room
temperature may accidentally reach, but may also dramatically exceed, the
temperature desired by the occupants. Such a heating system has no means of
controlling itself to adapt to required conditions. In contrast, the standard
closed-loop system incorporates a feedback component. At the heart of
cybernetics is the concept of control. A controlled process is one in which an
end state that is reached depends essentially on the behavior of the
controlling system and not merely on its external environment. That is, control
involves partial independence for the system. A control system may be pictured
as having both an inner and outer environment. The inner environment consists
of the internal events that make up the system; the outer environment consists
of events that causally impinge on the system, threatening disruption and loss
of system integrity and stability. For a system to maintain its independence
and identity in the face of fluctuations in its external environment, it must
be able to detect information about those changes in the external environment.
Information must pass through the interface between inner and outer
environments, and the system must be able to compensate for fluctuations of the
outer environment by adjusting its own inner environmental variables.
Otherwise, disturbances in the outer environment will overcome the system bringing its inner states into equilibrium
with the outer states, thereby losing its identity as a distinct, independent
system. This is nowhere more certain than with the homeostatic systems of the
body for temperature or blood sugar levels. Control in the attainment of goals
is accomplished by minimizing error. Negative feedback, or information about
error, is the difference between activity a system actually performs output and
that activity which is its goal to perform input. The standard example of
control incorporating negative feedback is the thermostatically controlled
heating system. The actual room temperature system output carries information
to the thermostat that can be compared via goal-state comparator to the desired
temperature for the room input as embodied in the set-point on the thermostat;
a correction can then be made to minimize the difference error the furnace turns on or off. Positive
feedback tends to amplify the value of the output of a system or of a system
disturbance by adding the value of the output to the system input quantity.
Thus, the system accentuates disturbances and, if unchecked, will eventually
pass the brink of instability. Suppose that as room temperature rises it causes
the thermostatic set-point to rise in direct proportion to the rise in
temperature. This would cause the furnace to continue to output heat possibly
with disastrous consequences. Many biological maladies have just this
characteristic. For example, severe loss of blood causes inability of the heart
to pump effectively, which causes loss of arterial pressure, which, in turn,
causes reduced flow of blood to the heart, reducing pumping efficiency.
cybernetics cybernetics Cognitively
goal-directed systems are also cybernetic systems. Purposive attainment of a
goal by a goal-directed system must have at least: 1 an internal representation
of the goal state of the system a detector for whether the desired state is
actual; 2 a feedback loop by which information about the present state of the
system can be compared with the goal state as internally represented and by
means of which an error correction can be made to minimize any difference; and
3 a causal dependency of system output upon the error-correction process of
condition 2 to distinguish goal success from fortuitous goal satisfaction.
cynical
implicaturum,
Cynic -- a classical Grecian philosophical school characterized by asceticism
and emphasis on the sufficiency of virtue for happiness eudaimonia, boldness in
speech, and shamelessness in action. The Cynics were strongly influenced by
Socrates and were themselves an important influence on Stoic ethics. An ancient
tradition links the Cynics to Antisthenes c.445c.360 B.C., an Athenian. He
fought bravely in the battle of Tanagra and claimed that he would not have been
so courageous if he had been born of two Athenians instead of an Athenian and a
Thracian slave. He studied with Gorgias, but later became a close companion of
Socrates and was present at Socrates’ death. Antisthenes was proudest of his
wealth, although he had no money, because he was satisfied with what he had and
he could live in whatever circumstances he found himself. Here he follows
Socrates in three respects. First, Socrates himself lived with a disregard for
pleasure and pain e.g., walking barefoot
in snow. Second, Socrates thinks that in every circumstance a virtuous person
is better off than a nonvirtuous one; Antisthenes anticipates the Stoic
development of this to the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness,
because the virtuous person uses properly whatever is present. Third, both
Socrates and Antisthenes stress that the soul is more important than the body, and
neglect the body for the soul. Unlike the later Cynics, however, both Socrates
and Antisthenes do accept pleasure when it is available. Antisthenes also does
not focus exclusively on ethics; he wrote on other topics, including logic. He
supposedly told Plato that he could see a horse but not horseness, to which
Plato replied that he had not acquired the means to see horseness. Diogenes of
Sinope c.400c.325 B.C. continued the emphasis on self-sufficiency and on the
soul, but took the disregard for pleasure to asceticism. According to one
story, Plato called Diogenes “Socrates gone mad.” He came to Athens after being
exiled from Sinope, perhaps because the coinage was defaced, either by himself
or by others, under his father’s direction. He took ‘deface the coinage!’ as a
motto, meaning that the current standards were corrupt and should be marked as
corrupt by being defaced; his refusal to live by them was his defacing them.
For example, he lived in a wine cask, ate whatever scraps he came across, and
wrote approvingly of cannibalism and incest. One story reports that he carried
a lighted lamp in broad daylight looking for an honest human, probably
intending to suggest that the people he did see were so corrupted that they
were no longer really people. He apparently wanted to replace the debased
standards of custom with the genuine standards of nature but nature in the sense of what was minimally
required for human life, which an individual human could achieve, without
society. Because of this, he was called a Cynic, from the Grecian word kuon
dog, because he was as shameless as a dog. Diogenes’ most famous successor was
Crates fl. c.328325 B.C.. He was a Boeotian, from Thebes, and renounced his
wealth to become a Cynic. He seems to have been more pleasant than Diogenes;
according to some reports, every Athenian house was open to him, and he was
even regarded by them as a household god. Perhaps the most famous incident
involving Crates is his marriage to Hipparchia, who took up the Cynic way of
life despite her family’s opposition and insisted that educating herself was
preferable to working a loom. Like Diogenes, Crates emphasized that happiness
is self-sufficiency, and claimed that asceticism is required for
self-sufficiency; e.g., he advises us not to prefer oysters to lentils. He
argues that no one is happy if happiness is measured by the balance of pleasure
and pain, since in each period of our lives there is more pain than pleasure.
Cynicism continued to be active through the third century B.C., and returned to
prominence in the second century A.D. after an apparent decline.
cyrenaic
implicaturum
-- Cyrenaics, a classical Grecian philosophical school that began shortly after
Socrates and lasted for several centuries, noted especially for hedonism.
Ancient writers trace the Cyrenaics back to Aristippus of Cyrene fifth-fourth
century B.C., an associate of Socrates. Aristippus came to Athens because of
Socrates’ fame and later greatly enjoyed the luxury of court life in Sicily.
Some people ascribe the founding of the school to his grandchild Aristippus,
because of an ancient report that the elder Aristippus said nothing clear about
the human end. The Cyrenaics include Aristippus’s child Arete, her child
Aristippus taught by Arete, Hegesius, Anniceris, and Theodorus. The school
seems to have been superseded by the Epicureans. No Cyrenaic writings survive,
and the reports we do have are sketchy. The Cyrenaics avoid mathematics and
natural philosophy, preferring ethics because of its utility. According to
them, not only will studying nature not make us virtuous, it also won’t make us
stronger or richer. Some reports claim that they also avoid logic and
epistemology. But this is not true of all the Cyrenaics: according to other
reports, they think logic and epistemology are useful, consider arguments and also
causes as topics to be covered in ethics, and have an epistemology. Their
epistemology is skeptical. We can know only how we are affected; we can know,
e.g., that we are whitening, but not that whatever is causing this sensation is
itself white. This differs from Protagoras’s theory; unlike Protagoras the
Cyrenaics draw no inferences about the things that affect us, claiming only
that external things have a nature that we cannot know. But, like Protagoras,
the Cyrenaics base their theory on the problem of conflicting appearances.
Given their epistemology, if humans ought to aim at something that is not a way
of being affected i.e., something that is immediately perceived according to
them, we can never know anything about it. Unsurprisingly, then, they claim
that the end is a way of being affected; in particular, they are hedonists. The
end of good actions is particular pleasures smooth changes, and the end of bad
actions is particular pains rough changes. There is also an intermediate class,
which aims at neither pleasure nor pain. Mere absence of pain is in this
intermediate class, since the absence of pain may be merely a static state.
Pleasure for Aristippus seems to be the sensation of pleasure, not including
related psychic states. We should aim at pleasure although not everyone does,
as is clear from our naturally seeking it as children, before we consciously
choose to. Happiness, which is the sum of the particular pleasures someone
experiences, is choiceworthy only for the particular pleasures that constitute
it, while particular pleasures are choiceworthy for themselves. Cyrenaics,
then, are not concerned with maximizing total pleasure over a lifetime, but
only with particular pleasures, and so they should not choose to give up
particular pleasures on the chance of increasing the total. Later Cyrenaics
diverge in important respects from the original Cyrenaic hedonism, perhaps in
response to the development of Epicurus’s views. Hegesias claims that happiness
is impossible because of the pains associated with the body, and so thinks of
happiness as total pleasure minus total pain. He emphasizes that wise people
act for themselves, and denies that people actually act for someone else.
Anniceris, on the other hand, claims that wise people are happy even if they
have few pleasures, and so seems to think of happiness as the sum of pleasures,
and not as the excess of pleasures over pains. Anniceris also begins
considering psychic pleasures: he insists that friends should be valued not
only for their utility, but also for our feelings toward them. We should even
accept losing pleasure because of a friend, even though pleasure is the end.
Theodorus goes a step beyond Anniceris. He claims that the end of good actions
is joy and that of bad actions is grief. Surprisingly, he denies that
friendship is reasonable, since fools have friends only for utility and wise
people need no friends. He even regards pleasure as intermediate between
practical wisdom and its opposite. This seems to involve regarding happiness as
the end, not particular pleasures, and may involve losing particular pleasures
for long-term happiness.
D
Experitum
-- Empiricism
– “with a capital E, of course.” – Grice. Czolbe, H., philosopher. He was born
in Danzig and trained in theology and medicine. His main works are Neue
Darstellung des Sensualismus “New Exposition of Sensualism,” 1855, Entstehung
des Selbstbewusstseins “Origin of Self-Consciousness,” 1856, Die Grenzen und
der Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntnis “The Limits and Origin of Human Knowledge,”
1865, and a posthumously published study, Grundzüge der extensionalen
Erkenntnistheorie 1875. Czolbe proposed a sensualistic theory of knowledge:
knowledge is a copy of the actual, and spatial extension is ascribed even to
ideas. Space is the support of all attributes. His later work defended a
non-reductive materialism. Czolbe made the rejection of the supersensuous a
central principle and defended a radical “senCzolbe, Heinrich Czolbe, Heinrich
201 201 sationalism.” Despite this, he
did not present a dogmatic materialism, but cast his philosophy in hypothetical
form. In his study of the origin of self-consciousness Czolbe held that
dissatisfaction with the actual world generates supersensuous ideas and branded
this attitude as “immoral.” He excluded supernatural phenomena on the basis not
of physiological or scientific studies but of a “moral feeling of duty towards
the natural world-order and contentment with it.” The same valuation led him to
postulate the eternality of terrestrial life. Nietzsche was familiar with
Czolbe’s works and incorporated some of his themes into his philosophy.
englishry: Grice was first
an Englishman, and then an Oxonian – and then a philosopher – and then a
genius! Englishness – Englishry, -- St. George for England. A critique of
racism, hostility, contempt, condescension, or prejudice, on the basis of
social practices of racial classification, and the wider phenomena of social,
economic, and political mistreatment that often accompany such classification.
The most salient instances of racism include the Nazi ideology of the “Aryan
master race,” chattel slavery, South African
apartheid in the late twentieth century, and the “Jim Crow” laws and traditions
of segregation that subjugated African descendants in the Southern United
States during the century after the
Civil War. Social theorists dispute whether, in its essence, racism is a
belief or an ideology of racial inferiority, a system of social oppression on
the basis of race, a form of discourse, discriminatory conduct, or an attitude
of contempt or heartlessness and its expression in individual or collective
behavior. The case for any of these as the essence of racism has its drawbacks,
and a proponent must show how the others can also come to be racist in virtue
of that essence. Some deny that racism has any nature or essence, insisting it
is nothing more than changing historical realities. However, these thinkers
must explain what makes each reality an instance of racism. Theorists differ
over who and what can be racist and under what circumstances, some restricting
racism to the powerful, others finding it also in some reactions by the
oppressed. Here, the former owe an explanation of why power is necessary for
racism, what sort economic or political? general or contextual?, and in whom or
what racist individuals? their racial groups?. Although virtually everyone thinks
racism objectionable, people disagree over whether its central defect is
cognitive irrationality, prejudice, economic/prudential inefficiency, or moral
unnecessary suffering, unequal treatment. Finally, racism’s connection with the
ambiguous and controversial concept of race itself is complex. Plainly, racism
presupposes the legitimacy of racial classifications, and perhaps the
metaphysical reality of races. Nevertheless, some hold that racism is also
prior to race, with racial classifications invented chiefly to explain and help
justify the oppression of some peoples by others. The term originated to
designate the pseudoscientific theories of racial essence and inferiority that
arose in Europe in the nineteenth century and were endorsed by G.y’s Third Reich.
Since the civil rights movement in the United States after World War II, the
term has come to cover a much broader range of beliefs, attitudes,
institutions, and practices. Today one hears charges of unconscious, covert,
institutional, paternalistic, benign, anti-racist, liberal, and even reverse
racism. Racism is widely regarded as involving ignorance, irrationality,
unreasonableness, injustice, and other intellectual and moral vices, to such an
extent that today virtually no one is willing to accept the classification of
oneself, one’s beliefs, and so on, as racist, except in contexts of
self-reproach. As a result, classifying anything as racist, beyond the most
egregious cases, is a serious charge and is often hotly disputed.
rational
Griceian deconstruction of communication -- a demonstration of the incompleteness
or incoherence of a philosophical position using concepts and principles of
argument whose meaning and use is legitimated only by that philosophical
position. A deconstruction is thus a kind of internal conceptual critique in
which the critic implicitly and provisionally adheres to the position
criticized. The early work of Derrida is the source of the term and provides
paradigm cases of its referent. That deconstruction remains within the position
being discussed follows from a fundamental deconstructive argument about the
nature of language and thought. Derrida’s earliest deconstructions argue
against the possibility of an interior “language” of thought and intention such
that the senses and referents of terms are determined by their very nature.
Such terms are “meanings” or logoi. Derrida calls accounts that presuppose such
magical thought-terms “logocentric.” He claims, following Heidegger, that the
conception of such logoi is basic to the concepts of Western metaphysics, and
that Western metaphysics is fundamental to our cultural practices and
languages. Thus there is no “ordinary language” uncontaminated by philosophy.
Logoi ground all our accounts of intention, meaning, truth, and logical
connection. Versions of logoi in the history of philosophy range from Plato’s
Forms through the self-interpreting ideas of the empiricists to Husserl’s
intentional entities. Thus Derrida’s fullest deconstructions are of texts that
give explicit accounts of logoi, especially his discussion of Husserl in Speech
and Phenomena. There, Derrida argues that meanings that are fully present to
consciousness are in decision tree deconstruction 209 209 principle impossible. The idea of a
meaning is the idea of a repeatable ideality. But “repeatability” is not a
feature that can be present. So meanings, as such, cannot be fully before the
mind. Selfinterpreting logoi are an incoherent supposition. Without logoi,
thought and intention are merely wordlike and have no intrinsic connection to a
sense or a referent. Thus “meaning” rests on connections of all kinds among
pieces of language and among our linguistic interactions with the world.
Without logoi, no special class of connections is specifically “logical.” Roughly
speaking, Derrida agrees with Quine both on the nature of meaning and on the
related view that “our theory” cannot be abandoned all at once. Thus a
philosopher must by and large think about a logocentric philosophical theory
that has shaped our language in the very logocentric terms that that theory has
shaped. Thus deconstruction is not an excision of criticized doctrines, but a
much more complicated, self-referential relationship. Deconstructive arguments
work out the consequences of there being nothing helpfully better than words,
i.e., of thoroughgoing nominalism. According to Derrida, without logoi
fundamental philosophical contrasts lose their principled foundations, since
such contrasts implicitly posit one term as a logos relative to which the other
side is defective. Without logos, many contrasts cannot be made to function as
principles of the sort of theory philosophy has sought. Thus the contrasts
between metaphorical and literal, rhetoric and logic, and other central notions
of philosophy are shown not to have the foundation that their use
presupposes.
deductum – also
demonstratum, argumentum -- deduction, a finite sequence of sentences whose
last sentence is a conclusion of the sequence the one said to be deduced and
which is such that each sentence in the sequence is an axiom or a premise or
follows from preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. A
synonym is ‘derivation’. Deduction is a system-relative concept. It makes sense
to say something is a deduction only relative to a particular system of axioms
and rules of inference. The very same sequence of sentences might be a
deduction relative to one such system but not relative to another. The concept
of deduction is a generalization of the concept of proof. A proof is a finite
sequence of sentences each of which is an axiom or follows from preceding
sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. The last sentence in the
sequence is a theorem. Given that the system of axioms and rules of inference
are effectively specifiable, there is an effective procedure for determining,
whenever a finite sequence of sentences is given, whether it is a proof
relative to that system. The notion of theorem is not in general effective
decidable. For there may be no method by which we can always find a proof of a
given sentence or determine that none exists. The concepts of deduction and
consequence are distinct. The first is a syntactical; the second is semantical.
It was a discovery that, relative to the axioms and rules of inference of classical
logic, a sentence S is deducible from a set of sentences K provided that S is a
consequence of K. Compactness is an important consequence of this discovery. It
is trivial that sentence S is deducible from K just in case S is deducible from
Dedekind cut deductíon 211 211 some
finite subset of K. It is not trivial that S is a consequence of K just in case
S is a consequence of some finite subset of K. This compactness property had to
be shown. A system of natural deduction is axiomless. Proofs of theorems within
a system are generally easier with natural deduction. Proofs of theorems about
a system, such as the results mentioned in the previous paragraph, are
generally easier if the system has axioms. In a secondary sense, ‘deduction’
refers to an inference in which a speaker claims the conclusion follows
necessarily from the premises. -- deduction theorem, a result about certain
systems of formal logic relating derivability and the conditional. It states
that if a formula B is derivable from A and possibly other assumptions, then
the formula APB is derivable without the assumption of A: in symbols, if G 4
{A} Y B then GYAPB. The thought is that, for example, if Socrates is mortal is
derivable from the assumptions All men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then
If Socrates is a man he is mortal is derivable from All men are mortal.
Likewise, If all men are mortal then Socrates is mortal is derivable from
Socrates is a man. In general, the deduction theorem is a significant result
only for axiomatic or Hilbert-style formulations of logic. In most natural
deduction formulations a rule of conditional proof explicitly licenses
derivations of APB from G4{A}, and so there is nothing to prove.
Dis-factum – dis-faccere -- defeasibility. Strawson Wiggins ‘somehwere in the kitchen,’ ‘in one of
the dining-room cupboards’ unless some feature of the context defeats the
implication, there is an implicaturum to the effect that the emissor cannot
make a ‘stronger’ move by Grice’s principle of conversational fortitude (“Be ‘a
fortiori’”). Cf. G. P. Baker on H. L. A.
Hart. All very Oxonian. Cf. R. Hall, Oxonian, on ‘Excluders.’ For Strawson and
Wiggins that a principle holds ‘generally, ceteris paribus, is a condition for
the existence of conversation, or of a good conversation. Defeasibility is a
sign of the freedom of the will. The communicators can always opt out. Not a
salivating dog. Note that defeasibility does not apply just to the implicaturum.
Since probabilistic demonstrate are uncertain, there is an element of
defeasibility in the EXplicatum of a probabilistic utterance. Levinson’s quote,
“Probability, Defeasibility, and Mode Operators.” Defeasibility
-- Grice: “So far as generalizations of these kinds are concerned, it seems to
me that one needs to be able to mark five features: (1) conditionality; (2)
generality; (3) type of generality (absolute, ceteris paribus, etc., thereby,
ipso facto, discriminating with respect to defeasibility or indefeasibility).” -- Baker, “Meaning
and defeasibility” – defeater – in Aspects of reason -- defeasibility, a
property that rules, principles, arguments, or bits of reasoning have when they
might be defeated by some competitor. For example, the epistemic principle
‘Objects normally have the properties they appear to have’ or the normative
principle ‘One should not lie’ are defeated, respectively, when perception
occurs under unusual circumstances e.g., under colored lights or when there is
some overriding moral consideration e.g., to prevent murder. Apparently
declarative sentences such as ‘Birds typically fly’ can be taken in part as
expressing defeasible rules: take something’s being a bird as evidence that it
flies. Defeasible arguments and reasoning inherit their defeasibility from the
use of defeasible rules or principles. Recent analyses of defeasibility include
circumscription and default logic, which belong to the broader category of
non-monotonic logic. The rules in several of these formal systems contain
special antecedent conditions and are not truly defeasible since they apply
whenever their conditions are satisfied. Rules and arguments in other
non-monotonic systems justify their conclusions only when they are not defeated
by some other fact, rule, or argument. John Pollock distinguishes between
rebutting and undercutting defeaters. ‘Snow is not normally red’ rebuts in
appropriate circumstances the principle ‘Things that look red normally are
red’, while ‘If the available light is red, do not use the principle that
things that look red normally are red’ only undercuts the embedded rule.
Pollock has influenced most other work on formal systems for defeasible
reasoning.
defensible – H. P. Grice, “Conceptual analysis and the defensible
province of philosophy.” Grice uses the ‘territorial’ province, and the further
implicaturum is that conceptual analysis as the province of philosophy is a
defensible one. Grice thinks it is.
definitum: Grice: There is the definitum and what Kant called the
infinitum --. Grice lists ‘the’ in his list of communicative devices. He was
interested in the iota operator. After Sluga, he knew there were problems here.
He proposed a quantificational approach alla Whitehead and Russell, indeed a
Whitehead and Russellian expansion in three clauses, with identity, involved.
Why wasn’t Russell not involved with the ‘indefinite’. One would think because
that’s rendered already by (Ex), ‘some (at least one)’. Russell’s interest in definitum is not
philosophical. His background was mathematics, rather --. Grice was obsessed
with ‘aspects’ in verbs. There’s the ‘imperfect’ and the ‘perfect.’ These
translate Aristotle’s ‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos.’ But why the change from “factum”
to “fectum”? So it’s better to turn to ‘definitum,’ and ‘indefinitum, as better
paraphrases of Aristotle’s jargon – keeping in mind we are talking of his
‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos. Aristotle
and telos. In the Met. Y.1048b1835, Aristotle discusses the definition of an
action πϱᾶξις. He distinguishes two kinds of activities: kinêseis ϰινήσεις and
energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι: Only that movement in which the end is present is an
action. E.g., at the same time we are v.ing and have v.n ὁϱᾷ ἅμα, are
understanding and have understood φϱονεῖ, are thinking and have thought noei
kai nenoêken νοεῖ ϰαὶ νενόηϰεν when it is not true that at the same time we are
learning and have learnt ou manthanei kai memathêken οὐ μανθάνει ϰαὶ μεμάθηϰεν,
or are being cured and have been cured oud’ hugiazetai kai hugiastai οὐδ᾿ ὑγιάζεται
ϰαὶ ὑγίασται. At the same time we are living well and have lived well εὖ ζῇ ϰαὶ
εὖ ἔζηϰεν ἅμα, and are happy and have been happy εὐδαιμονεῖ ϰαὶ εὐδαιμόνηϰεν.
Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements ϰινήσεις, and the
other actualities energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι. We v. that the distinctive properties of
these two categories of verbs are provided by relations of inference and
semantic compatibility between the form of the present and the form of the
perfect. In the case of energeiai, there is a relation of inference between the
present and the perfect, in the sense that when someone says I v. we can infer
I have v.n. There is also a relation of semantic compatibility since one can
very well say I have v.n and continue to v.. Thus the two forms—the present and
the perfect— are verifiable at the same time ἅμα, simultaneously. On the other
hand, in the case of kinêseis, the present and the perfect are not verifiable
at the same time. In fact, when someone says I am building a house, we cannot
infer I have built a house, at least in the sense in which the house is
finished. In addition, once the house is finished, one is no longer
constructing it, which means that there is a semantic incompatibility between
the present and the perfect. τέλος, which means both complete action, that is,
end, and limit in competition with πέϱας, plays a crucial role in this
opposition. In the category of energeiai, we have actions proper, that is,
activities that are complete τέλεια because they have an immanent finality ἐνυπάϱχει
τὸ τέλος. In the category of kinêseis, we have imperfect activities ἀτελείς
that do not carry their own end within themselves but are transitive and aim at
realizing something. Thus activities having an external goal that is at the
same time a limit peras do not carry their own goal telos within themselves;
they are directed toward a goal but this goal is not attained during the
activity, but is realized at the end of the activity. And history repeated itself, in the same
terms, regarding Slavic languages, with on the one hand the words perfective
and imperfective, modeled on the Roman opposition and imported to describe an
opposition in which lexicon and grammar are truly interwoven since it is a question
of categories of verbs, which determine the whole organization of conjugation,
and on the other hand the Russian words that are used to characterize the same
categories of verbs, and that signify the accomplished and the unaccomplished.
In the terminological imbroglio, we can once again v. the effects of a
confusion connected with the inability to acknowledge the autonomy of lexical
aspect, or, in the particular case of Slavic languages, the difficulty of
isoRomang the aspectual dimension in the general system of the language.
Nevertheless, the same questions, that of the telos and that of accomplishment,
are at the foundation of the two aspectual dimensions. They are even so
prominent that, alongside the heterogeneous inventory from which we began, we
also find, and almost simultaneously in the aspectual tradition, a leveling of
all differences in favor of two categories that are supposed to be the
categories par excellence of grammatical aspect: the perfective on the one
hand, and the imperfective on the other. However, there is also the continuing
competition of the perfect, another tr. of the same word, perfectum,
designating a category that is not exactly the same as that of the perfective,
and which is, for its part, always a grammatical category, never a lexical
category: one speaks of perfect to designate compound tenses in G. ic
languages, e. g. , of the type I have received
as opposed to I received, which corresponds to the idea that the telos
is not only achieved, but transcended in the constitution of a fixed state,
given as the result of the completion of the process. Two, or three,
grammatical categories that are the same and not the same as the two, three, or
four lexical categories. It is in the name of these categories, and literally
behind their name, that the aspectual descriptions succeeded in being
applicable to all languages, confRomang all the imperfects of all languages and
also the Eng. progressive and the Russian imperfective, all the aorists in all
languages, and aligning perfects, perfectives, the Eng. perfect, the G. Perfekt, the Roman perfectum and the Grecian
perfect. The facts are different, but the words, and the recurrence of a
problematics that v.ms invariable, are too strong. Although it is a matter of
conjugations, the lexicon and the relation to ontological questions are too
influential. The word imperfectum was invented, we
v. a hesitation that is precisely the one that causes a problem here, between
imperfectum and infectum a nonachieved finality, an absence of finality. The
important point is that the whole history of aspectual terminology is
constituted by such exchanges. The invention of the words perfectum and
imperfectum itself proceeds from an enterprise of tr., in which it is a
question of taking as a model, or rephrasing, the Grecian grammarians’
opposition between suntelikos συντελιϰός and non-suntelikos. However, the
difference between the two terminologies is noticeable. A supine past
participle, -fectum, has replaced telikos, and hence telos, thereby reintroducing,
if not tense was tense really involved in that past participle?, at least the
achievement of an act, and consequently merges with the question of the
accomplished. In this operation, the Stoics’ opposition between suntelikos
which would thus designate the choice of perfects or imperfects and παϱατατιϰός
the extensive, in which the question of the telos is not involved was made
symmetrical, introducing into aspectual terminology a binariness from which we
have never recovered. And this symmetricalization, which sought to describe the
organization of a conjugation, was then modeled on the distinction introduced
by Aristotle between tτέλειος and aἀτελής, which was not grammatical but
lexical. This resulted in a new confusion that is not without foundation
because it was already implicit in the montage constructed by the Grecian
philosophers, with on the one hand the telos used by Aristotle to differentiate
types of process, and on the other the same telos used by the Stoics to
structure conjugation. exist in G. , is said to be primarily a matter of
discursive construction with the imparfait forming the background of a
narration, and the past tenses forming the foreground of what develops and
occurs. More recently, this area has been dominated by theories that situate
aspect in a theory of discursive representations cf. Kamp’s discourse
representation theory, and try to reduce it to a matter of discursive
organization: thus the models currently most discussed make the imparfait an
anaphoric mark that repeats an element of the context instead of constructing
an independent referent. Once again the relations are inextricably confused:
the types of discourse clearly have particular aspectual properties we have
already v.n this in connection with aoristic utterances that structure both
aspect and tense differently, and yet all or almost all aspectual forms can
appear anywhere, in all or almost all types of discursive contexts. Thus we
have foregrounded imparfaits, which have been recorded and are sometimes called
narrative imparfaits— e. g. , in an utterance like Trois jours après, il
mourait Three days later, he was dying, where it is a question of narrating a
prominent event, and where the distinction between imparfait and passé simple
becomes more difficult to evaluate. We also find passé composés in narratives,
where they compete with the passé simple: that is why many analysts of the
language consider the passé simple an archaic form that is being abandoned in
favor of the passé composé. The difficulty is clear: it is hard to attach a
given formal procedure to a given enunciative structuration, not only because
enunciative structures are supposed to be compatible with several aspectual
values, but first of all because the formal procedures themselves are all, more
or less broadly, polysemous, their value depending precisely on the context and
thus on the enunciative structure in which they are situated. Here again, this
is commonplace: polysemy is everywhere in languages. But in this case it
affects aspect: it consists precisely in running through aspectual oppositions,
the very ones that are also supposed to be associated with some aspectual
marker. The case of narrative uses of the imparfait v.ms to indicate that the
imparfait can have different aspectual values, of which some are more or less
apparently perfective. The narrative passé composés for instance, Il s’est levé
et il est sorti He got up and went out describe the process in its advent and
thus do not have the same aspectual properties as those that appear in
utterances describing the state resulting from the process e.g., Désolé, en ce
moment il est sorti Sorry, he left just now. Not to mention the presents, which
are highly polysemous in many languages and which, depending on the language,
therefore occupy a more or less extensive aspectual terrain. We are obliged to
note that aspect is at least partially independent of formal procedures, that
it also plays a role elsewhere, in particular, in the enunciative
configuration. teleology: the objectivum. Grice
speaks of the objective as a maxim. This is very Latinate. So if the maxim is
an objective, the goal is the objective, or objectivum. Meaning
"goal, aim" (1881) is from military term objective point (1852),
reflecting a sense evolution in French. This
is an expansion on the desideratum. Cf. ‘desirable,’ and ‘desirability,’ and
‘end.’ Grice feels like introducing goal-oriented conceptual machinery. In a
later stage of his career he ensured that this machinery be seen as NOT
mechanistically derivable. Which is odd seeing that in the ‘progression’ of the
‘soul,’ he allows for talk of adaptiveness and survival which suggest a
mechanist explanation. If an agent has a desideratum that means that, to echo
Bennett, A displays a goal-oriented behaviour, where the goal is the ‘telos.’
Smoke cannot ‘mean’ fire, because smoke doesn’t really behave in a
goal-oriented matter. Grice does play with the idea of finality in nature,
because that would allow him to justify the objectivity of his system. how does
soul originate from matter? Does the vegetal soul have a telos.
Purposive-behaviour is obvious in plants (phototropism). If it is present in
the vegetal soul, it is present in the animal soul. If it is present in the
animal soul, it is present in the rational soul. With each stage, alla
Hartmann, there are distinctions in the specification of the telos. Grice could
be more continental than Scheler! Grices métier. Unity of science was a very
New-World expression that Grice did not quite buy. Grice was brought up in a world,
the Old World, indeed, as he calls it in his Proem to the Locke lectures, of
Snows two cultures. At the time of Grices philosophising, philosophers such as
Winch (who indeed quotes fro Grice) were contesting the idea that science is
unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a
philosophical approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including
conversational behaviour (to account for the conversational implicatura) is his
priority, Grice needs to distinguish himself from those who propose a unified
science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist. Grice is
ambivalent about science and also playful (philosophia regina scientiarum).
Grice seems to presuppose, or implicate, that, since there is the devil of scientism,
science cannot get at teleology. The devil is in the physiological details,
which are irrelevant. The language Grice uses to describe his Ps as
goal-oriented, aimed at survival and reproduction, seems teleological and
somewhat scientific, though. But he means that ironically! As the scholastics
use it, teleology is a science, the science of telos, or finality (cf.
Aristotle on telos aitia, causa finalis. The unity of science is threatened by
teleology, and vice versa. Unified science seeks for a mechanistically
derivable teleology. But Grices sympathies lie for detached finality. Grice is
obsessed with the Greek idea of a telos, as slightly overused by Aristotle.
Grice thinks that some actions are for their own sake. What is the telos of
Oscar Wilde? Can we speak of Oscar Wilde’s métier? If a tiger is to tigerise, a
human is to humanise, and a person is to personise. Grice thought that
teleology is a key philosophical way to contest mechanism, so popular in The
New World. Strictly, and Grice knew this, teleology is constituted as a
discipline. One term that Cicero was unable to translate! For the philosopher,
teleology is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the telos.
Informally, teleological is opposed to mechanistic. Grice is interested in the
mechanism/teleology debate, indeed jumps into it, with a goal in mind! Grice
finds some New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with
the more two-culture atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford! Code is the
Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of causa
finalis. For Grice only detached finality poses a threat to Mechanism, as it
should! Axiological objectivity is possible only given finality or purpose in
Nature, the admissibility of a final cause. Grice’s “Definition” of Meaning – and
Communicatum – Oddly, in “Utterer’s meaning and intentions,” Grice keeps
calling his analyses ‘definition,’ and ‘re-definition.’ He is well aware of the
trick introduced by Robinson on this. definiendum plural: definienda, the
expression that is defined in a definition. The expression that gives the
definition is the definiens plural: definientia. In the definition father, male
parent, ‘father’ is the definiendum and ‘male parent’ is the definiens. In the
definition ‘A human being is a rational animal’, ‘human being’ is the
definiendum and ‘rational animal’ is the definiens. Similar terms are used in
the case of conceptual analyses, whether they are meant to provide synonyms or
not; ‘definiendum’ for ‘analysandum’ and ‘definiens’ for ‘analysans’. In ‘x
knows that p if and only if it is true that p, x believes that p, and x’s
belief that p is properly justified’, ‘x knows that p’ is the analysandum and
‘it is true that p, x believes that p, and x’s belief that p is properly
justified’ is the analysans. definist,
someone who holds that moral terms, such as ‘right’, and evaluative terms, such
as ‘good’ in short, normative terms are definable in non-moral, non-evaluative
i.e., non-normative terms. William Frankena offers a broader account of a
definist as one who holds that ethical terms are definable in non-ethical
terms. This would allow that they are definable in nonethical but evaluative
terms say, ‘right’ in terms of what is
non-morally intrinsically good. Definists who are also naturalists hold that
moral terms can be defined by terms that denote natural properties, i.e.,
properties whose presence or absence can be determined by observational means.
They might define ‘good’ as ‘what conduces to pleasure’. Definists who are not
naturalists will hold that the terms that do the defining do not denote natural
properties, e.g., that ‘right’ means ‘what is commanded by God’. definition, specification of the meaning or,
alternatively, conceptual content, of an expression. For example, ‘period of
fourteen days’ is a definition of ‘fortnight’. Definitions have traditionally
been judged by rules like the following: 1 A definition should not be too
narrow. ‘Unmarried adult male psychiatrist’ is too narrow a definition for ‘bachelor’,
for some bachelors are not psychiatrists. ‘Having vertebrae and a liver’ is too
narrow for ‘vertebrate’, for, even though all actual vertebrate things have
vertebrae and a liver, it is possible for a vertebrate thing to lack a liver. 2
A definition should not be too broad. ‘Unmarried adult’ is too broad a
definition for ‘bachelor’, for not all unmarried adults are bachelors.
‘Featherless biped’ is too broad for ‘human being’, for even though all actual
featherless bipeds are human beings, it is possible for a featherless biped to
be non-human. 3 The defining expression in a definition should ideally exactly
match the degree of vagueness of the expression being defined except in a
precising definition. ‘Adult female’ for ‘woman’ does not violate this rule,
but ‘female at least eighteen years old’ for ‘woman’ does. 4 A definition
should not be circular. If ‘desirable’ defines ‘good’ and ‘good’ defines
‘desirable’, these definitions are circular. Definitions fall into at least the
following kinds: analytical definition: definition whose corresponding
biconditional is analytic or gives an analysis of the definiendum: e.g.,
‘female fox’ for ‘vixen’, where the corresponding biconditional ‘For any x, x
is a vixen if and only if x is a female fox’ is analytic; ‘true in all possible
worlds’ for ‘necessarily true’, where the corresponding biconditional ‘For any
P, P is necessarily true if and only if P is true in all possible worlds’ gives
an analysis of the definiendum. contextual definition: definition of an expression
as it occurs in a larger expression: e.g., ‘If it is not the case that Q, then
P’ contextually defines ‘unless’ as it occurs in ‘P unless Q’; ‘There is at
least one entity that is F and is identical with any entity that is F’
contextually defines ‘exactly one’ as it occurs in ‘There is exactly one F’.
Recursive definitions see below are an important variety of contextual
definition. Another important application of contextual definition is Russell’s
theory of descriptions, which defines ‘the’ as it occurs in contexts of the
form ‘The so-and-so is such-and-such’. coordinative definition: definition of a
theoretical term by non-theoretical terms: e.g., ‘the forty-millionth part of
the circumference of the earth’ for ‘meter’. definition by genus and species:
When an expression is said to be applicable to some but not all entities of a
certain type and inapplicable to all entities not of that type, the type in
question is the genus, and the subtype of all and only those entities to which
the expression is applicable is the species: e.g., in the definition ‘rational
animal’ for ‘human’, the type animal is the genus and the subtype human is the
species. Each species is distinguished from any other of the same genus by a
property called the differentia. definition in use: specification of how an
expression is used or what it is used to express: e.g., ‘uttered to express
astonishment’ for ‘my goodness’. Vitters emphasized the importance of
definition in use in his use theory of meaning. definition per genus et
differentiam: definition by genus and difference; same as definition by genus
and species. explicit definition: definition that makes it clear that it is a
definition and identifies the expression being defined as such: e.g., ‘Father’
means ‘male parent’; ‘For any x, x is a father by definition if and only if x
is a male parent’. implicit definition: definition that is not an explicit
definition. lexical definition: definition of the kind commonly thought
appropriate for dictionary definitions of natural language terms, namely, a
specification of their conventional meaning. nominal definition: definition of
a noun usually a common noun, giving its linguistic meaning. Typically it is in
terms of macrosensible characteristics: e.g., ‘yellow malleable metal’ for
‘gold’. Locke spoke of nominal essence and contrasted it with real essence.
ostensive definition: definition by an example in which the referent is
specified by pointing or showing in some way: e.g., “ ‘Red’ is that color,”
where the word ‘that’ is accompanied with a gesture pointing to a patch of
colored cloth; “ ‘Pain’ means this,” where ‘this’ is accompanied with an
insertion of a pin through the hearer’s skin; “ ‘Kangaroo’ applies to all and
only animals like that,” where ‘that’ is accompanied by pointing to a
particular kangaroo. persuasive definition: definition designed to affect or
appeal to the psychological states of the party to whom the definition is
given, so that a claim will appear more plausible to the party than it is:
e.g., ‘self-serving manipulator’ for ‘politician’, where the claim in question
is that all politicians are immoral. precising definition: definition of a
vague expression intended to reduce its vagueness: e.g., ‘snake longer than
half a meter and shorter than two meters’ for ‘snake of average length’;
‘having assets ten thousand times the median figure’ for ‘wealthy’.
prescriptive definition: stipulative definition that, in a recommendatory way,
gives a new meaning to an expression with a previously established meaning: e.g.,
‘male whose primary sexual preference is for other males’ for ‘gay’. real
definition: specification of the metaphysically necessary and sufficient
condition for being the kind of thing a noun usually a common noun designates:
e.g., ‘element with atomic number 79’ for ‘gold’. Locke spoke of real essence
and contrasted it with nominal essence. recursive definition also called
inductive definition and definition by recursion: definition in three clauses
in which 1 the expression defined is applied to certain particular items the
base clause; 2 a rule is given for reaching further items to which the
expression applies the recursive, or inductive, clause; and 3 it is stated that
the expression applies to nothing else the closure clause. E.g., ‘John’s
parents are John’s ancestors; any parent of John’s ancestor is John’s ancestor;
nothing else is John’s ancestor’. By the base clause, John’s mother and father
are John’s ancestors. Then by the recursive clause, John’s mother’s parents and
John’s father’s parents are John’s ancestors; so are their parents, and so on.
Finally, by the last closure clause, these people exhaust John’s ancestors. The
following defines multiplication in terms of definition definition 214 214 addition: ‘0 $ n % 0. m ! 1 $ n % m $ n
! n. Nothing else is the result of multiplying integers’. The base clause tells
us, e.g., that 0 $ 4 % 0. The recursive clause tells us, e.g., that 0 ! 1 $ 4 %
0 $ 4 ! 4. We then know that 1 $ 4 % 0 ! 4 % 4. Likewise, e.g., 2 $ 4 % 1 ! 1 $
4 % 1 $ 4 ! 4 % 4 ! 4 % 8. stipulative definition: definition regardless of the
ordinary or usual conceptual content of the expression defined. It postulates a
content, rather than aiming to capture the content already associated with the
expression. Any explicit definition that introduces a new expression into the
language is a stipulative definition: e.g., “For the purpose of our discussion
‘existent’ means ‘perceivable’ “; “By ‘zoobeedoobah’ we shall mean ‘vain
millionaire who is addicted to alcohol’.” synonymous definition: definition of
a word or other linguistic expression by another word synonymous with it: e.g.,
‘buy’ for ‘purchase’; ‘madness’ for ‘insanity’.
Refs.: There are specific essays on
‘teleology,’ ‘final cause,’ and ‘finality,’ the The Grice Papers. Some of the material
published in “Reply to Richards” (repr. in “Conception”) and “Actions and
events,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
Degradatum
-- degree:
Grice on the flat/variable distinction – Grice considers that ‘ought’ is weaker
than ‘must’ – ‘ought’ displays ‘degree-acceptability.’ Grice loved a degree –
he uses “d” in aspects of reason -- degree, also called arity, adicity, in
formal languages, a property of predicate and function expressions that
determines the number of terms with which the expression is correctly combined
to yield a well-formed expression. If an expression combines with a single term
to form a wellformed expression, it is of degree one monadic, singulary.
Expressions that combine with two terms are of degree two dyadic, binary, and
so on. Expressions of degree greater than or equal to two are polyadic. The
formation rules of a formalized language must effectively specify the degrees
of its primitive expressions as part of the effective determination of the
class of wellformed formulas. Degree is commonly indicated by an attached
superscript consisting of an Arabic numeral. Formalized languages have been
studied that contain expressions having variable degree or variable adicity and
that can thus combine with any finite number of terms. An abstract relation
that would be appropriate as extension of a predicate expression is subject to
the same terminology, and likewise for function expressions and their
associated functions. -- degree of
unsolvability, a maximal set of equally complex sets of natural numbers, with
comparative complexity of sets of natural numbers construed as
recursion-theoretic reducibility ordering. Recursion theorists investigate
various notions of reducibility between sets of natural numbers, i.e., various
ways of filling in the following schematic definition. For sets A and B of
natural numbers: A is reducible to B iff if and only if there is an algorithm
whereby each membership question about A e.g., ‘17 1 A?’ could be answered
allowing consultation of an definition, contextual degree of unsolvability
215 215 “oracle” that would correctly
answer each membership question about B. This does not presuppose that there is
a “real” oracle for B; the motivating idea is counterfactual: A is reducible to
B iff: if membership questions about B were decidable then membership questions
about A would also be decidable. On the other hand, the mathematical
definitions of notions of reducibility involve no subjunctive conditionals or
other intensional constructions. The notion of reducibility is determined by
constraints on how the algorithm could use the oracle. Imposing no constraints
yields T-reducibility ‘T’ for Turing, the most important and most studied
notion of reducibility. Fixing a notion r of reducibility: A is r-equivalent to
B iff A is r-reducible to B and B is rreducible to A. If r-reducibility is
transitive, r-equivalence is an equivalence relation on the class of sets of
natural numbers, one reflecting a notion of equal complexity for sets of
natural numbers. A degree of unsolvability relative to r an r-degree is an
equivalence class under that equivalence relation, i.e., a maximal class of
sets of natural numbers any two members of which are r-equivalent, i.e., a
maximal class of equally complex in the sense of r-reducibility sets of natural
numbers. The r-reducibility-ordering of sets of natural numbers transfers to
the rdegrees: for d and dH r-degrees, let d m, dH iff for some A 1 d and B 1 dH
A is r-reducible to B. The study of r-degrees is the study of them under this
ordering. The degrees generated by T-reducibility are the Turing degrees.
Without qualification, ‘degree of unsolvability’ means ‘Turing degree’. The
least Tdegree is the set of all recursive i.e., using Church’s thesis, solvable
sets of natural numbers. So the phrase ‘degree of unsolvability’ is slightly
misleading: the least such degree is “solvability.” By effectively coding
functions from natural numbers to natural numbers as sets of natural numbers,
we may think of such a function as belonging to a degree: that of its coding
set. Recursion theorists have extended the notions of reducibility and degree
of unsolvability to other domains, e.g. transfinite ordinals and higher types
taken over the natural numbers.
demonstratum: Cf. illatum – In act of communication, Grice’s focus is on
the reasoning on the emissor’s part. This is end-means. The conversational
moves is the most effectively designed move. The potential uptake by the
emissee is also taken into the consideration by the emissor. And actual uptake
is not of philosophical importance. hen Grice tried to conceptualise what
‘communicating’ and ‘smoke means fire’ have in common he came with the idea of
‘consequentia,’ as a dyadic relation that, eventually, will become triadic,
with the missor and the missee brought into the bargain. “Look that smoke,
there must be fire somewhere’ – “By that handwave, he meant that he was about
to leave me.” In any case, Grice’s arriving at ‘consequentia’ is exactly
Hobbes’s idea in “Computatio.’ And ‘con-sequentia’ involves a bit of
‘demonstratio.’ One thing follows the other. One thing YIELDS the other. The
link may be causal (smoke means fire) or ‘communicative’). ‘Rationality’ is one
of those words Austin forbids to use. Grice would venture with ‘reason,’ and
better, ‘reasons’ to make it countable, and good for botanising. Only in the
New World, and when he started to get input from non-philosophers, did Grice
explore ‘rationality’ itself. Oxonians philosophers take it for granted, and do
not have to philosophise about it. Especially those who belong to Grice’s play
group of ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers! Oxonian philosophers will quote from
the Locke version! Obviously, while each of the four lectures credits their own
entry below, it may do to reflect on Grices overall aim. Grice structures the
lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The
first lecture is intended to provide a bit of linguistic botanising for
reasonable, and rational. In later lectures, Grice tackles reason qua
noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls the
Aequi-vocality thesis: must has only one Fregeian that crosses what he calls
the buletic-doxastic divide. He is especially concerned ‒ this being
the Kant lectures ‒ with Kants attempt to reduce the
categorical imperative to a counsel of prudence (Ratschlag der Klugheit), where
Kants prudence is Klugheit, versus skill, as in rule of skill, and even if Kant
defines Klugheit as a skill to attain what is good for oneself ‒
itself divided into privatKlugheit and Weltklugheit. Kant re-introduces the
Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia. While a further lecture on happiness as
the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT strictly part of the either the
Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaemonia may be
regarded as the goal involved in the relevant
imperative. “Aspects”, Clarendon, Stanford, The Kant memorial
Lectures, “Aspects,” Clarendon, Some aspects of reason, Stanford; reason,
reasoning, reasons. The lectures were also delivered as the Locke
lectures. Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical
imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. His main
thesis he calls the æqui-vocality thesis: must has one unique or singular
sense, that crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide. “Aspects,”
Clarendon, Grice, “Aspects, Clarendon, Locke lecture notes: reason. On
“Aspects”. Including extensive language botany on rational, reasonable, and
indeed reason (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed). At this point,
Grice notes that linguistic botany is indispensable towards the construction of
a more systematic explanatory theory. It is an exploration of a range of
uses of reason that leads him to his Aequi-vocality thesis that must has only
one sense; also ‘Aspects of reason and reasoning,’ in Grice, “Aspects,”
Clarendon, the Locke lectures, the Kant lectures, Stanford, reason,
happiness. While Locke hardly mentions reason, his friend Burthogge does,
and profusely! It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these
lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford. He was honoured to
be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a Locke lecture you have to be
*visiting* Oxford. While Grice was a fellow of St. Johns, he was still
most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of
Philosophy. He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his proemium,
Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day,
he was extremely happy to be under Lockes ægis now! When preparing for his
second lecture, he had occasion to revise some earlier drafts dated pretty
early, on reasons, Grice, “Aspects,” Clarendon, reason,
reasons. Linguistic analysis on justificatory, explanatory and mixed uses
of reason. While Grice knows that the basic use of reason is qua verb
(reasoner reasons from premise p to conclusion c), he spends some time in
exploring reason as noun. Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to
approach rationality. However, his distinction between justificatory and
explanatory reason is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of reason qua
noun. Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than justificatory
reason. Explanatory reason explains the behaviour of a rational
agent. Grice is aware of Freud and his rationalizations. An agent may
invoke some reason for his acting which is not legitimate. An agent may
convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather;
when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and
join the yacht club there. Grice loved an enthymeme. Grices enthymeme. Grice,
the implicit reasoner! As the title of the lecture implies, Grice takes the
verb, to reason, as conceptually prior. A reasoner reasons, briefly, from a
premise to a conclusion. There are types of reason: flat reason and gradual
reason. He famously reports Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie, and his
proof on the immortality of the human soul. Grice makes some remarks on akrasia
as key, too. The first lecture is then dedicated to an elucidation, and indeed
attempt at a conceptual analysis in terms of intentions and doxastic conditions
reasoner R intends that premise P yields conclusion C and believes his
intention will cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his entertaining
the premise. One example of particular interest for a study of the use of
conversational reason in Grice is that of the connection between implicaturum
and reasoning. Grice entitles the sub-section of the lecture as Too good to be
reasoning, which is of course a joke. Cf. too much love will kill you, and
Theres no such thing as too much of a good thing (Shakespeare, As you like it).
Grice notes: I have so far been considering difficulties which may arise from
the attempt to find, for all cases of actual reasoning, reconstructions of
sequences of utterances or explicit thoughts which the reasoner might plausibly
be supposed to think of as conforming to some set of canonical patterns of
inference. Grice then turns to a different class of examples, with regard to
which the problem is not that it is difficult to know how to connect them with
canonical patterns, but rather that it is only too easy (or shall I say
trivial) to make the connection. Like some children (not many), some cases of
reasoning are too well behaved for their own good. Suppose someone says to
Grice, and It is very interesting that Grice gives conversational examples.
Jack has arrived, Grice replies, I conclude from that that Jack has arrived. Or
he says Jack has arrived AND Jill has *also* arrived, And Grice replies, I
conclude that Jill has arrived.(via Gentzens conjunction-elimination). Or he
says, My wife is at home. And Grice replies, I reason from that that someone
(viz. your wife) is at home. Is there not something very strange about the
presence in my three replies of the verb conclude (in example I and II) and the
verb reason (in the third example)? misleading, but doxastically fine,
professor! It is true, of course, that if instead of my first reply I had said
(vii) vii. So Jack has arrived, has he? the strangeness would have been
removed. But here so serves not to indicate that an inference is being made,
but rather as part of a not that otiose way of expressing surprise. One might
just as well have said (viii). viii. Well, fancy that! Now, having spent a
sizeable part of his life exploiting it, Grice is not unaware of the truly fine
distinction between a statements being false (or axiologically satisfactory),
and its being true (or axiologically satisfactory) but otherwise
conversationally or pragmatically misleading or inappropriate or pointless,
and, on that account and by such a fine distinction, a statement, or an
utterance, or conversational move which it would be improper (in terms of the
reasonable/rational principle of conversational helfpulness) in one way or
another, to make. It is worth considering Grices reaction to his own
distinction. Entailment is in sight! But Grice does not find himself lured by
the idea of using that distinction here! Because Moores entailment, rather than
Grices implicaturum is entailed. Or because explicatu, rather than implicaturum
is involved. Suppose, again, that I were to break off the chapter at this
point, and switch suddenly to this argument. ix. I have two hands (here is one
hand and here is another). If had three more hands, I would have five. If I
were to have double that number I would have ten, and if four of them were
removed six would remain. So I would have four more hands than I have now. Is
one happy to describe this performance as reasoning? Depends whos one and whats
happy!? There is, however, little doubt that I have produced a canonically
acceptable chain of statements. So surely that is reasoning, if only
conversationally misleadingly called so. Or suppose that, instead of writing in
my customary free and easy style, I had framed my remarks (or at least the
argumentative portions of my remarks) as a verbal realization, so to speak, of
sequences of steps in strict conformity with the rules of a natural-deduction
system of first-order predicate logic. I give, that is to say, an updated
analogue of a medieval disputation. Implicaturum. Gentzen is Ockham. Would
those brave souls who continued to read be likely to think of my performance as
the production of reasoning, or would they rather think of it as a crazy
formalisation of reasoning conducted at some previous time? Depends on crazy or
formalisation. One is reminded of Grice telling Strawson, If you cannot
formalise, dont say it; Strawson: Oh, no! If I can formalise it, I shant say
it! The points suggested by this stream of rhetorical questions may be
summarized as follows. Whether the samples presented FAIL to achieve the title
of reasoning, and thus be deemed reasoning, or whether the samples achieve the
title, as we may figuratively put it, by the skin of their teeth, perhaps does
not very greatly matter. For whichever way it is, the samples seem to offend
against something (different things in different cases, Im sure) very central
to our conception of reasoning. So central that Moore would call it entailment!
A mechanical application of a ground rule of inference, or a concatenation
thereof, is reluctantly (if at all) called reasoning. Such a mechanical
application may perhaps legitimately enter into (i.e. form individual steps in)
authentic reasonings, but they are not themselves reasonings, nor is a string
of them. There is a demand that a reasoner should be, to a greater or lesser
degree, the author of his reasonings. Parroted sequences are not reasonings
when parroted, though the very same sequences might be reasoning if not
parroted. Ped sequences are another matter. Some of the examples Grice gives
are deficient because they are aimless or pointless. Reasoning is
characteristically addressed to this or that problem: a small problem, a large
problem, a problem within a problem, a clear problem, a hazy problem, a
practical problem, an intellectual problem; but a problem! A mere flow of ideas
minimally qualifies (or can be deemed) as reasoning, even if it happens to be
logically respectable. But if it is directed, or even monitored (with
intervention should it go astray, not only into fallacy or mistake, but also
into such things as conversational irrelevance or otiosity!), that is another
matter! Finicky over-elaboration of intervening steps is frowned upon, and in
extreme cases runs the risk of forfeiting the title of reasoning. In
conversation, such over-elaboration will offend against this or that
conversational maxim, against (presumably) some suitably formulated maxim
conjoining informativeness. As Grice noted with regard to ‘That pillar box
seems red to me.’ That would be baffling if the addressee fails to detect the
communication-point. An utterance is supposed to inform, and what is the above
meant to inform its addressee? In thought, it will be branded as pedantry or
neurotic caution. If a distinction between brooding and conversing is to be
made! At first sight, perhaps, one would have been inclined to say that greater
rather than lesser explicitnessness is a merit. Not that inexplicitness, or implicaturum-status,
as it were ‒ is bad, but that, other things being equal, the more explicitness
the better. But now it looks as if proper explicitness (or explicatum-status)
is an Aristotelian mean, or mesotes, and it would be good some time to enquire what
determines where that mean lies. The burden of the foregoing observations seems
to me to be that the provisional account of reasoning, which has been before
us, leaves out something which is crucially important. What it leaves out is
the conception of reasoning, as I like to see conversation, as a purposive
activity, as something with goals and purposes. The account or picture leaves
out, in short, the connection of reasoning with the will! Moreover, once we
avail ourselves of the great family of additional ideas which the importation
of this conception would give us, we shall be able to deal with the quandary
which I laid before you a few minutes ago. For we could say e.g. that R reasons
(informally) from p to c just in case R thinks that p and intends that, in
thinking c, he should be thinking something which would be the conclusion of a
formally valid argument the premisses of which are a supplementation of p. This
will differ from merely thinking that there exists some formally valid
supplementation of a transition from p to c, which I felt inclined NOT to count
as (or deem) reasoning. I have some hopes that this appeal to the purposiveness
or goal-oriented character of authentic reasoning or good reasoning might be
sufficient to dispose of the quandary on which I have directed it. But I am by
no means entirely confident that this is the case, and so I offer a second
possible method of handling the quandary, one to which I shall return later
when I shall attempt to place it in a larger context. We have available to us
(let us suppose) what I might call a hard way of making inferential moves. We
in fact employ this laborious, step-by-step procedure at least when we are in
difficulties, when the course is not clear, when we have an awkward (or
philosophical) audience, and so forth. An inferential judgement, however, is a
normally desirable undertaking for us only because of its actual or hoped for
destinations, and is therefore not desirable for its own sake (a respect in
which, possibly, it may differ from an inferential capacity). Following the
hard way consumes time and energy. These are in limited supply and it would,
therefore, be desirable if occasions for employing the hard way were minimized.
A substitute for the hard way, the quick way, which is made possible by
habituation and intention, is available to us, and the capacity for it (which
is sometimes called intelligence, and is known to be variable in degree) is a
desirable quality. The possibility of making a good inferential step (there
being one to be made), together with such items as a particular inferers
reputation for inferential ability, may determine whether on a particular
occasion we suppose a particular transition to be inferential (and so to be a
case of reasoning) or not. On this account, it is not essential that there
should be a single supplementation of an informal reasoning which is supposed
to be what is overtly in the inferers mind, though quite often there may be
special reasons for supposing this to be the case. So Botvinnik is properly
credited with a case of reasoning, while Shropshire is not. Drawing from his
recollections of an earlier linguistic botany on reason. Grice distinguishes
between justificatory reason and explanatory reason. There is a special case of
mixed reason, explanatory-cum-justificatory. The lecture can be seen as the way
an exercise that Austin took as taxonomic can lead to explanatory adequacy,
too! Bennett is an excellent correspondent. He holds a very interesting
philosophical correspondence with Hare. This is just one f. with Grices
correspondence with Bennett. Oxford don, Christchurh, NZ-born Bennett, of
Magdalen, B. Phil. Oxon. Bennett has an essay on the interpretation of a formal
system under Austin. It is interesting that Bennett was led to consider the
interpretation of a formal system under Austins Play Group. Bennett attends
Grices seminars. He is my favourite philosopher. Bennett quotes Grice in his
Linguistic behaviour. In return, Grice quotes Bennett in the Preface
toWOW. Bennett has an earlier essay on rationality, which evidences that
the topic is key at Grices Oxford. Bennett has studied better than anyone the
way Locke is Griceian. A word or expression does not just stand for idea, but
for the intention of the utterer to stand for it! Grice also enjoyed construal
by Bennett of Grice as a nominalist. Bennett makes a narrow use of the epithet.
Since Grice does distinguish between an utterance-token (x) and an
utterance-type, and considers that the attribution of meaning from token to
type is metabolic, this makes Grice a nominalist. Bennett is one of the few to
follow Kantotle and make him popular on the pages of the Times Literary
Supplement, of all places. Refs.: The locus classicus is “Aspects,” Clarendon.
But there are allusions on ‘reason’ and ‘rationality, in The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC.
denotatum -- denotation, the
thing or things that an expression applies to; extension. The term is used in
contrast with ‘meaning’ and ‘connotation’. A pair of expressions may apply to
the same things, i.e., have the same denotation, yet differ in meaning:
‘triangle’, ‘trilateral’; ‘creature with a heart’, ‘creature with a kidney’;
‘bird’, ‘feathered earthling’; ‘present capital of France’, ‘City of Light’. If
a term does not apply to anything, some will call it denotationless, while
others would say that it denotes the empty set. Such terms may differ in
meaning: ‘unicorn’, ‘centaur’, ‘square root of pi’. Expressions may apply to
the same things, yet bring to mind different associations, i.e., have different
connotations: ‘persistent’, ‘stubborn’, ‘pigheaded’; ‘white-collar employee’,
‘office worker’, ‘professional paper-pusher’; ‘Lewis Carroll’, ‘Reverend
Dodgson’. There can be confusion about the denotation-connotation terminology,
because this pair is used to make other contrasts. Sometimes the term
‘connotation’ is used more broadly, so that any difference of either meaning or
association is considered a difference of connotation. Then ‘creature with a
heart’ and ‘creature with a liver’ might be said to denote the same individuals
or sets but to connote different properties. In a second use, denotation is the
semantic value of an expression. Sometimes the denotation of a general term is
said to be a property, rather than the things having the property. This occurs
when the denotation-connotation terminology is used to contrast the property
expressed with the connotation. Thus ‘persistent’ and ‘pig-headed’ might be
said to denote the same property but differ in connotation.
Grice’s
deontic operator
– “The deon is like the Roman ‘necesse,’ Grice was aware of Bentham’s play on
words with deontology -- as a Kantian, Griceian is a deontologist. However, he
refers to the ‘sorry story of deontic logic,’ because of von Wright (from whom
he borrowed but to whom he never returned ‘alethic’) deontic logic, the logic
of obligation and permission. There are three principal types of formal deontic
systems. 1 Standard deontic logic, or SDL, results from adding a pair of
monadic deontic operators O and P, read as “it ought to be that” and “it is
permissible that,” respectively, to the classical propositional calculus. SDL
contains the following axioms: tautologies of propositional logic, OA S - P -
A, OA / - O - A, OA / B / OA / OB, and OT, where T stands for any tautology.
Rules of inference are modus ponens and substitution. See the survey of SDL by
Dagfinn Follesdal and Risto Hilpinin in R. Hilpinin, ed., Deontic Logic, 1. 2
Dyadic deontic logic is obtained by adding a pair of dyadic deontic operators O
/ and P / , to be read as “it ought to
be that . . . , given that . . .” and “it is permissible that . . . , given
that . . . ,” respectively. The SDL monadic operator O is defined as OA S OA/T;
i.e., a statement of absolute obligation OA becomes an obligation conditional
on tautologous conditions. A statement of conditional obligation OA/B is true
provided that some value realized at some B-world where A holds is better than
any value realized at any B-world where A does not hold. This axiological
construal of obligation is typically accompanied by these axioms and rules of
inference: tautologies of propositional logic, modus ponens, and substitution,
PA/C S - O-A/C, OA & B/C S [OA/C & OB/C], OA/C / PA/C, OT/C / OC/C,
OT/C / OT/B 7 C, [OA/B & OA/C] / OA/B 7 C, [PB/B 7 C & OA/B 7 C] /
OA/B, and [P< is the negation of any tautology. See the comparison of
alternative dyadic systems in Lennart Aqvist, Introduction to Deontic Logic and
the Theory of Normative Systems, 7. 3 Two-sorted deontic logic, due to
Castañeda Thinking and Doing, 5, pivotally distinguishes between propositions,
the bearers of truth-values, and practitions, the contents of commands,
imperatives, requests, and such. Deontic operators apply to practitions,
yielding propositions. The deontic operators Oi, Pi, Wi, and li are read as “it
is obligatory i that,” “it is permissible i that,” “it is wrong i that,” and
“it is optional i denotation deontic logic 219
219 that,” respectively, where i stands for any of the various types of
obligation, permission, and so on. Let p stand for indicatives, where these
express propositions; let A and B stand for practitives, understood to express
practitions; and allow p* to stand for both indicatives and practitives. For
deontic definition there are PiA S - Oi - A, WiA S Oi - A, and LiA S - OiA
& - Oi - A. Axioms and rules of inference include p*, if p* has the form of
a truth-table tautology, OiA / - Oi - A, O1A / A, where O1 represents
overriding obligation, modus ponens for both indicatives and practitives, and
the rule that if p & A1 & . . . & An / B is a theorem, so too is p
& OiA1 & . . . & OiAn / OiB.
-- deontic paradoxes, the paradoxes of deontic logic, which typically
arise as follows: a certain set of English sentences about obligation or
permission appears logically consistent, but when these same sentences are
represented in a proposed system of deontic logic the result is a formally
inconsistent set. To illustrate, a formulation is provided below of how two of
these paradoxes beset standard deontic logic. The contrary-to-duty imperative
paradox, made famous by Chisholm Analysis, 3, arises from juxtaposing two
apparent truths: first, some of us sometimes do what we should not do; and
second, when such wrongful doings occur it is obligatory that the best or a
better be made of an unfortunate situation. Consider this scenario. Art and
Bill share an apartment. For no good reason Art develops a strong animosity
toward Bill. One evening Art’s animosity takes over, and he steals Bill’s
valuable lithographs. Art is later found out, apprehended, and brought before
Sue, the duly elected local punishment-and-awards official. An inquiry reveals
that Art is a habitual thief with a history of unremitting parole violation. In
this situation, it seems that 14 are all true and hence mutually consistent: 1
Art steals from Bill. 2 If Art steals from Bill, Sue ought to punish Art for
stealing from Bill. 3 It is obligatory that if Art does not steal from Bill,
Sue does not punish him for stealing from Bill. 4 Art ought not to steal from Bill.
Turning to standard deontic logic, or SDL, let sstand for ‘Art steals from
Bill’ and let p stand for ‘Sue punishes Art for stealing from Bill’. Then 14
are most naturally represented in SDL as follows: 1a s. 2a s / Op. 3a O- s / -
p. 4a O - s. Of these, 1a and 2a entail Op by propositional logic; next, given
the SDL axiom OA / B / OA / OB, 3a implies O - s / O - p; but the latter, taken
in conjunction with 4a, entails O - p by propositional logic. In the
combination of Op, O - p, and the axiom OA / - O - A, of course, we have a
formally inconsistent set. The paradox of the knower, first presented by
Lennart Bqvist Noûs, 7, is generated by these apparent truths: first, some of
us sometimes do what we should not do; and second, there are those who are obligated
to know that such wrongful doings occur. Consider the following scenario. Jones
works as a security guard at a local store. One evening, while Jones is on
duty, Smith, a disgruntled former employee out for revenge, sets the store on
fire just a few yards away from Jones’s work station. Here it seems that 13 are
all true and thus jointly consistent: 1 Smith set the store on fire while Jones
was on duty. 2 If Smith set the store on fire while Jones was on duty, it is
obligatory that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire. 3 Smith ought not
set the store on fire. Independently, as a consequence of the concept of
knowledge, there is the epistemic theorem that 4 The statement that Jones knows
that Smith set the store on fire entails the statement that Smith set the store
on fire. Next, within SDL 1 and 2 surely appear to imply: 5 It is obligatory
that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire. But 4 and 5 together yield 6
Smith ought to set the store on fire, given the SDL theorem that if A / B is a
theorem, so is OA / OB. And therein resides the paradox: not only does 6 appear
false, the conjunction of 6 and 3 is formally inconsistent with the SDL axiom
OA / - O - A. The overwhelming verdict among deontic logicians is that SDL
genuinely succumbs to the deontic operator deontic paradoxes 220 220 deontic paradoxes. But it is
controversial what other approach is best followed to resolve these puzzles.
Two of the most attractive proposals are Castañeda’s two-sorted system Thinking
and Doing, 5, and the agent-and-time relativized approach of Fred Feldman
Philosophical Perspectives, 0.
Grice
on types of priority
-- Grice often uses ‘depend’ – but not clearly in what sense – there’s
ontological dependence, the basic one. dependence, in philosophy, a relation of
one of three main types: epistemic dependence, or dependence in the order of
knowing; conceptual dependence, or dependence in the order of understanding;
and ontological dependence, or dependence in the order of being. When a
relation of dependence runs in one direction only, we have a relation of
priority. For example, if wholes are ontologically dependent on their parts,
but the latter in turn are not ontologically dependent on the former, one may
say that parts are ontologically prior to wholes. The phrase ‘logical priority’
usually refers to priority of one of the three varieties to be discussed here.
Epistemic dependence. To say that the facts in some class B are epistemically
dependent on the facts in some other class A is to say this: one cannot know
any fact in B unless one knows some fact in A that serves as one’s evidence for
the fact in B. For example, it might be held that to know any fact about one’s
physical environment e.g., that there is a fire in the stove, one must know as
evidence some facts about the character of one’s own sensory experience e.g.,
that one is feeling warm and seeing flames. This would be to maintain that
facts about the physical world are epistemically dependent on facts about
sensory experience. If one held in addition that the dependence is not
reciprocal that one can know facts about
one’s sensory experience without knowing as evidence any facts about the
physical world one would be maintaining
that the former facts are epistemically prior to the latter facts. Other
plausible though sometimes disputed examples of epistemic priority are the
following: facts about the behavior of others are epistemically prior to facts
about their mental states; facts about observable objects are epistemically
prior to facts about the invisible particles postulated by physics; and
singular facts e.g., this crow is black are epistemically prior to general
facts e.g., all crows are black. Is there a class of facts on which all others
epistemically depend and that depend on no further facts in turn a bottom story in the edifice of knowledge?
Some foundationalists say yes, positing a level of basic or foundational facts
that are epistemically prior to all others. Empiricists are usually foundationalists
who maintain that the basic level consists of facts about immediate sensory
experience. Coherentists deny the need for a privileged stratum of facts to
ground the knowledge of all others; in effect, they deny that any facts are
epistemically prior to any others. Instead, all facts are on a par, and each is
known in virtue of the way in which it fits in with all the rest. Sometimes it
appears that two propositions or classes of them each epistemically depend on
the other in a vicious way to know A,
you must first know B, and to know B, you must first know A. Whenever this is
genuinely the case, we are in a skeptical predicament and cannot know either
proposition. For example, Descartes believed that he could not be assured of
the reliability of his own cognitions until he knew that God exists and is not
a deceiver; yet how could he ever come to know anything about God except by
relying on his own cognitions? This is the famous problem of the Cartesian
circle. Another example is the problem of induction as set forth by Hume: to
know that induction is a legitimate mode of inference, one would first have to
know that the future will resemble the past; but since the latter fact is
establishable only by induction, one could know it only if one already knew
that induction is legitimate. Solutions to these problems must show that
contrary to first appearances, there is a way of knowing one of the problematic
propositions independently of the other. Conceptual dependence. To say that B’s
are conceptually dependent on A’s means that to understand what a B is, you
must understand what an A is, or that the concept of a B can be explained or
understood only through the concept of an A. For example, it could plausibly be
claimed that the concept uncle can be understood only in terms of the concept
male. Empiricists typically maintain that we understand what an external thing
like a tree or a table is only by knowing what experiences it would induce in
us, so that the concepts we apply to physical things depend on the concepts we
apply to our experideontological ethics dependence 221 221 ences. They typically also maintain that
this dependence is not reciprocal, so that experiential concepts are
conceptually prior to physical concepts. Some empiricists argue from the thesis
of conceptual priority just cited to the corresponding thesis of epistemic
priority that facts about experiences
are epistemically prior to facts about external objects. Turning the tables,
some foes of empiricism maintain that the conceptual priority is the other way
about: that we can describe and understand what kind of experience we are
undergoing only by specifying what kind of object typically causes it “it’s a
smell like that of pine mulch”. Sometimes they offer this as a reason for
denying that facts about experiences are epistemically prior to facts about
physical objects. Both sides in this dispute assume that a relation of
conceptual priority in one direction excludes a relation of epistemic priority
in the opposite direction. But why couldn’t it be the case both that facts about
experiences are epistemically prior to facts about physical objects and that
concepts of physical objects are conceptually prior to concepts of experiences?
How the various kinds of priority and dependence are connected e.g., whether
conceptual priority implies epistemic priority is a matter in need of further
study. Ontological dependence. To say that entities of one sort the B’s are
ontologically dependent on entities of another sort the A’s means this: no B
can exist unless some A exists; i.e., it is logically or metaphysically
necessary that if any B exists, some A also exists. Ontological dependence may
be either specific the existence of any B depending on the existence of a
particular A or generic the existence of any B depending merely on the existence
of some A or other. If B’s are ontologically dependent on A’s, but not
conversely, we may say that A’s are ontologically prior to B’s. The traditional
notion of substance is often defined in terms of ontological priority substances can exist without other things, as
Aristotle said, but the others cannot exist without them. Leibniz believed that
composite entities are ontologically dependent on simple i.e., partless
entities that any composite object
exists only because it has certain simple elements that are arranged in a
certain way. Berkeley, J. S. Mill, and other phenomenalists have believed that
physical objects are ontologically dependent on sensory experiences that the existence of a table or a tree consists
in the occurrence of sensory experiences in certain orderly patterns. Spinoza
believed that all finite beings are ontologically dependent on God and that God
is ontologically dependent on nothing further; thus God, being ontologically
prior to everything else, is in Spinoza’s view the only substance. Sometimes
there are disputes about the direction in which a relationship of ontological
priority runs. Some philosophers hold that extensionless points are prior to
extended solids, others that solids are prior to points; some say that things are
prior to events, others that events are prior to things. In the face of such
disagreement, still other philosophers such as Goodman have suggested that
nothing is inherently or absolutely prior to anything else: A’s may be prior to
B’s in one conceptual scheme, B’s to A’s in another, and there may be no saying
which scheme is correct. Whether relationships of priority hold absolutely or
only relative to conceptual schemes is one issue dividing realists and
anti-realists.
de re: as opposed to de dicto, of what is said or of the
proposition, as opposed to de re, of the thing. Many philosophers believe the
following ambiguous, depending on whether they are interpreted de dicto or de
re: 1 It is possible that the number of U.S. states is even. 2 Galileo believes
that the earth moves. Assume for illustrative purposes that there are
propositions and properties. If 1 is interpreted as de dicto, it asserts that
the proposition that the number of U.S. states is even is a possible truth something true, since there are in fact fifty
states. If 1 is interpreted as de re, it asserts that the actual number of
states fifty has the property of being possibly even something essentialism takes to be true.
Similarly for 2; it may mean that Galileo’s belief has a certain content that the earth moves or that Galileo believes, of the earth, that
it moves. More recently, largely due to Castañeda and John Perry, many
philosophers have come to believe in de se “of oneself” ascriptions, distinct
from de dicto and de re. Suppose, while drinking with others, I notice that
someone is spilling beer. Later I come to realize that it is I. I believed at
the outset that someone was spilling beer, but didn’t believe that I was. Once
I did, I straightened my glass. The distinction between de se and de dicto
attributions is supposed to be supported by the fact that while de dicto
propositions must be either true or false, there is no true proposition
embeddable within ‘I believe that . . .’ that correctly ascribes to me the
belief that I myself am spilling beer. The sentence ‘I am spilling beer’ will
not do, because it employs an “essential” indexical, ‘I’. Were I, e.g., to
designate myself other than by using ‘I’ in attributing the relevant belief to
myself, there would be no explanation of my straightening my glass. Even if I
believed de re that LePore is spilling beer, this still does not account for
why I lift my glass. For I might not know I am LePore. On the basis of such
data, some philosophers infer that de se attributions are irreducible to de re
or de dicto attributions. Internal-external
distinction – de re -- externalism, the view that there are objective reasons
for action that are not dependent on the agent’s desires, and in that sense
external to the agent. Internalism about reasons is the view that reasons for
action must be internal in the sense that they are grounded in motivational
facts about the agent, e.g. her desires and goals. Classic internalists such as
Hume deny that there are objective reasons for action. For instance, whether
the fact that an action would promote health is a reason to do it depends on
whether one has a desire to be healthy. It may be a reason for some and not for
others. The doctrine is hence a version of relativism; a fact is a reason only
insofar as it is so connected to an agent’s psychological states that it can
motivate the agent. By contrast, externalists hold that not all reasons depend
on the internal states of particular agents. Thus an externalist could hold
that promoting health is objectively good and that the fact that an action
would promote one’s health is a reason to perform it regardless of whether one
desires health. This dispute is closely tied to the debate over motivational
internalism, which may be conceived as the view that moral beliefs for instance
are, by virtue of entailing motivation, internal reasons for action. Those who
reject motivational internalism must either deny that expressive completeness
externalism 300 300 sound moral beliefs
always provide reasons for action or hold that they provide external reasons.
Derridaian
implicaturum
-- J., philosopher, author of deconstructionism, and leading figure in the
postmodern movement. Postmodern thought seeks to move beyond modernism by
revealing inconsistencies or aporias within the Western European tradition from
Descartes to the present. These aporias are largely associated with
onto-theology, a term coined by Heidegger to characterize a manner of thinking
about being and truth that ultimately grounds itself in a conception of
divinity. Deconstruction is the methodology of revelation: it typically
involves seeking out binary oppositions defined interdependently by mutual
exclusion, such as good and evil or true and false, which function as founding
terms for modern thought. The ontotheological metaphysics underlying modernism
is a metaphysics of presence: to be is to be present, finally to be absolutely
present to the absolute, that is, to the divinity whose own being is conceived
as presence to itself, as the coincidence of being and knowing in the Being
that knows all things and knows itself as the reason for the being of all that
is. Divinity thus functions as the measure of truth. The aporia here, revealed
by deconstruction, is that this modernist measure of truth cannot meet its own
measure: the coincidence of what is and what is known is an impossibility for
finite intellects. Major influences on Derrida include Hegel, Freud, Heidegger,
Sartre, Saussure, and structuralist thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, but it was
his early critique of Husserl, in Introduction à “L’Origine de la géometrie” de
Husserl 2, that gained him recognition as a critic of the phenomenological
tradition and set the conceptual framework for his later work. Derrida sought
to demonstrate that the origin of geometry, conceived by Husserl as the guiding
paradigm for Western thought, was a supratemporal ideal of perfect knowing that
serves as the goal of human knowledge. Thus the origin of geometry is
inseparable from its end or telos, a thought that Derrida later generalizes in
his deconstruction of the notion of origin as such. He argues that this ideal
cannot be realized in time, hence cannot be grounded in lived experience, hence
cannot meet the “principle of principles” Husserl designated as the prime
criterion for phenomenology, the principle that all knowing must ground itself
in consciousness of an object that is coincidentally conscious of itself. This
revelation of the aporia at the core of phenomenology in particular and Western
thought in general was not yet labeled as a deconstruction, but it established
the formal structure that guided Derrida’s later deconstructive revelations of
the metaphysics of presence underlying the modernism in which Western thought
culminates. Griceians were amused by the bit of a scandal at The Other Place,
when D. H. Mellor (of all people) opposed with a “non placet” to the honouring
of Derrida. Derrida can be Griceian in a French sort of way.
descriptum: Grice: “The root
script provides many niceties in Roman: inscriptum, descriptum, prescriptum,
subscriptum, … -- descriptivism, the thesis that the meaning of any evaluative
statement is purely descriptive or factual, i.e., determined, apart from its
syntactical features, entirely by its truth conditions. Nondescriptivism of
which emotivism and prescriptivism are the main varieties is the view that the
meaning of full-blooded evaluative statements is such that they necessarily
express the speaker’s sentiments or commitments. Nonnaturalism, naturalism, and
supernaturalism are descriptivist views about the nature of the properties to
which the meaning rules refer. Descriptivism is related to cognitivism and
moral realism. Discussed at large by
Grice just because his tutee, P. F. Strawson, showed an interst in it. theory
of descriptions, an analysis, initially developed by Peano, and borrowed from
(but never returned to) Peano by Russell, of sentences containing descriptions.
In Peano’s view, it’s about the ‘article,’ definite (‘the’) and ‘indefinite’
(‘some (at least one).’ Descriptions include indefinite descriptions such as
‘an elephant’ and definite descriptions such as ‘the positive square root of
four’. On Russell’s analysis, descriptions are “incomplete symbols” that are
meaningful only in the context of other symbols, i.e., only in the context of
the sentences containing them. Although the words ‘the first president of the
United States’ appear to constitute a singular term that picks out a particular
individual, much as the name ‘George Washington’ does, Russell held that
descriptions are not referring expressions, and that they are “analyzed out” in
a proper specification of the logical form of the sentences in which they
occur. The grammatical form of ‘The first president of the United States is
tall’ is simply misleading as to its logical form. According to Russell’s
analysis of indefinite descriptions, the sentence ‘I saw a man’ asserts that
there is at least one thing that is a man, and I saw that thing symbolically, Ex Mx & Sx. The role of the
apparent singular term ‘a man’ is taken over by the existential quantifier ‘Ex’
and the variables it binds, and the apparent singular term disappears on
analysis. A sentence containing a definite description, such as ‘The present
king of France is bald’, is taken to make three claims: that at least one thing
is a present king of France, that at most one thing is a present king of
France, and that that thing is bald
symbolically, Ex {[Fx & y Fy / y % x] & Bx}. Again, the apparent
referring expression ‘the present king of France’ is analyzed away, with its
role carried out by the quantifiers and variables in the symbolic
representation of the logical form of the sentence in which it occurs. No
element in that representation is a singular referring expression. Russell held
that this analysis solves at least three difficult puzzles posed by descriptions.
The first is how it could be true that George IV wished to know whether Scott
was the author of Waverly, but false that George IV wished to know whether
Scott was Scott. Since Scott is the author of Waverly, we should apparently be
able to substitute ‘Scott’ for ‘the author of Waverly’ and infer the second
sentence from the first, but we cannot. On Russell’s analysis, ‘George IV
wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly’ does not, when properly
understood, contain an expression ‘the author of Waverly’ for which the name
‘Scott’ can be substituted. The second puzzle concerns the law of excluded
middle, which rules that either ‘The present king of France is bald’ or ‘The
present king of France is not bald’ must be true; the problem is that neither
the list of bald men nor that of non-bald men contains an entry for the present
king of France. Russell’s solution is that ‘The present king of France is not
bald’ is indeed true if it is understood as ‘It is not the case that there is
exactly one thing that is now King of France and is bald’, i.e., as -Ex {Fx
& y {[Fy / y % x] & Bx}. The final puzzle is how ‘There is no present
king of France’ or ‘The present king of France does not exist’ can be true if ‘the present king of France’ is a referring
expression that picks out something, how can we truly deny that that thing
exists? Since descriptions are not referring expressions on Russell’s theory,
it is easy for him to show that the negation of the claim that there is at
least and at most i.e., exactly one present king of France, -Ex [Fx & y Fy
/ y % x], is true. Strawson offered the first real challenge to Russell’s
theory, arguing that ‘The present king of France is bald’ does not entail but
instead presupposes ‘There is a present king of France’, so that the former is
not falsified by the falsity of the latter, but is instead deprived of a
truth-value. Strawson argued for the natural view that definite descriptions
are indeed referring expressions, used to single something out for predication.
More recently, Keith Donnellan argued that both Russell and Strawson ignored
the fact that definite descriptions have two uses. Used attributively, a
definite description is intended to say something about whatever it is true of,
and when a sentence is so used it conforms to Russell’s analysis. Used
referentially, a definite description is intended to single something out, but
may not correctly describe it. For example, seeing an inebriated man in a
policeman’s uniform, one might say, “The cop on the corner is drunk!” Donnellan
would say that even if the person were a drunken actor dressed as a policeman,
the speaker would have referred to him and truly said of him that he was drunk.
If it is for some reason crucial that the description be correct, as it might
be if one said, “The cop on the corner has the authority to issue speeding
tickets,” the use is attributive; and because ‘the cop on the corner’ does not
describe anyone correctly, no one has been said to have the authority to issue
speeding tickets. Donnellan criticized Russell for overlooking referential uses
of theory of descriptions theory of descriptions 914 914 descriptions, and Strawson for both
failing to acknowledge attributive uses and maintaining that with referential
uses one can refer to something with a definite description only if the
description is true of it. Discussion of Strawson’s and Donnellan’s criticisms
is ongoing, and has provoked very useful work in both semantics and speech act
theory, and on the distinctions between semantics and pragmatics and between
semantic reference and speaker’s reference, among others. .
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