IMPLICATVRA -- in 16 volumes, vol. 15

senone: (or as Strawson would prefer, Zeno). "Senone *loved* his native Velia. Vivid evidence of the cultural impact of Senone's arguments in Italia is to be found in the interior of a red-figure drinking cup (Roma, Villa Giulia, inv. 3591) discovered in the Etrurian city of Falerii. It depicts a heroic figure racing nimbly ahead of a large tortoise and has every appearance of being the first known ‘response’ to the Achilles (or Mercurio, Ermete) paradox. “Was ‘Senone’ BORN in Velia?” – that is the question!” – Grice. Italian philosopher, as as such, or as Grice prefers, ‘senone’ -- Zenos paradoxes. “Since Elea is in Italy, we can say Zeno is Italian.” – H. P. Grice. “Linguistic puzzles, in nature.”  H. P. Grice. four paradoxes relating to space and motion attributed to Zeno of Elea fifth century B.C.: the racetrack, Achilles and the tortoise, the stadium, and the arrow. Zeno’s work is known to us through secondary sources, in particular Aristotle. The racetrack paradox. If a runner is to reach the end of the track, he must first complete an infinite number of different journeys: getting to the midpoint, then to the point midway between the midpoint and the end, then to the point midway between this one and the end, and so on. But it is logically impossible for someone to complete an infinite series of journeys. Therefore the runner cannot reach the end of the track. Since it is irrelevant to the argument how far the end of the track is  it could be a foot or an inch or a micron away  this argument, if sound, shows that all motion is impossible. Moving to any point will involve an infinite number of journeys, and an infinite number of journeys cannot be completed. The paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Achilles can run much faster than the tortoise, so when a race is arranged between them the tortoise is given a lead. Zeno argued that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise no matter how fast he runs and no matter how long the race goes on. For the first thing Achilles has to do is to get to the place from which the tortoise started. But the tortoise, though slow, is unflagging: while Achilles was occupied in making up his handicap, the tortoise has advanced a little farther. So the next thing Achilles has to do is to get to the new place the tortoise occupies. While he is doing this, the tortoise will have gone a little farther still. However small the gap that remains, it will take Achilles some time to cross it, and in that time the tortoise will have created another gap. So however fast Achilles runs, all that the tortoise has to do, in order not to be beaten, is not to stop. The stadium paradox. Imagine three equal cubes, A, B, and C, with sides all of length l, arranged in a line stretching away from one. A is moved perpendicularly out of line to the right by a distance equal to l. At the same time, and at the same rate, C is moved perpendicularly out of line to the left by a distance equal to l. The time it takes A to travel l/2 relative to B equals the time it takes A to travel to l relative to C. So, in Aristotle’s words, “it follows, Zeno thinks, that half the time equals its double” Physics 259b35. The arrow paradox. At any instant of time, the flying arrow “occupies a space equal to itself.” That is, the arrow at an instant cannot be moving, for motion takes a period of time, and a temporal instant is conceived as a point, not itself having duration. It follows that the arrow is at rest at every instant, and so does not move. What goes for arrows goes for everything: nothing moves. Scholars disagree about what Zeno himself took his paradoxes to show. There is no evidence that he offered any “solutions” to them. One view is that they were part of a program to establish that multiplicity is an illusion, and that reality is a seamless whole. The argument could be reconstructed like this: if you allow that reality can be successively divided into parts, you find yourself with these insupportable paradoxes; so you must think of reality as a single indivisible One.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Zeno’s sophisma;” Luigi Speranza, "Senone e Grice," The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

sensus: sensationalism, the belief that all mental states  particularly cognitive states  are derived, by composition or association, from sensation. It is often joined to the view that sensations provide the only evidence for our beliefs, or more rarely to the view that statements about the world can be reduced, without loss, to statements about sensation. Hobbes was the first important sensationalist in modern times. “There is no conception in man’s mind,” he wrote, “which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.” But the belief gained prominence in the eighteenth century, due largely to the influence of Locke. Locke himself was not a sensationalist, because he took the mind’s reflection on its own operations to be an independent source of ideas. But his distinction between simple and complex ideas was used by eighteenthcentury sensationalists such as Condillac and Hartley to explain how conceptions that seem distant from sense might nonetheless be derived from it. And to account for the particular ways in which simple ideas are in fact combined, Condillac and Hartley appealed to a second device described by Locke: the association of ideas. “Elementary” sensations  the building blocks of our mental life  were held by the sensationalists to be non-voluntary, independent of judgment, free of interpretation, discrete or atomic, and infallibly known. Nineteenth-century sensationalists tried to account for perception in terms of such building blocks; they struggled particularly with the perception of space and time. Late nineteenth-century critics such as Ward and James advanced powerful arguments against the reduction of perception to sensation. Perception, they claimed, involves more than the passive reception or recombination and association of discrete pellets of incorrigible information. They urged a change in perspective  to a functionalist viewpoint more closely allied with prevailing trends in biology  from which sensationalism never fully recovered.  sensibile: Austin, “Sense and sensibile,” as used by Russell, those entities that no one is at the moment perceptually aware of, but that are, in every other respect, just like the objects of perceptual awareness. If one is a direct realist and believes that the objects one is aware of in sense perception are ordinary physical objects, then sensibilia are, of course, just physical objects of which no one is at the moment aware. Assuming with common sense that ordinary objects continue to exist when no one is aware of them, it follows that sensibilia exist. If, however, one believes as Russell did that what one is aware of in ordinary sense perception is some kind of idea in the mind, a so-called sense-datum, then sensibilia have a problematic status. A sensibile then turns out to be an unsensed sense-datum. On some the usual conceptions of sense-data, this is like an unfelt pain, since a sense-datum’s existence not as a sense-datum, but as anything at all depends on our someone’s perception of it. To exist for such things is to be perceived see Berkeley’s “esse est percipii“. If, however, one extends the notion of sense-datum as Moore was inclined to do to whatever it is of which one is directly aware in sense perception, then sensibilia may or may not exist. It depends on what  physical objects or ideas in the mind  we are directly aware of in sense perception and, of course, on the empirical facts about whether objects continue to exist when they are not being perceived. If direct realists are right, horses and trees, when unobserved, are sensibilia. So are the front surfaces of horses and trees things Moore once considered to be sensedata. If the direct realists are wrong, and what we are perceptually aware of are “ideas in the mind,” then whether or not sensibilia exist depends on whether or not such ideas can exist apart from any mind.  sensorium, the seat and cause of sensation in the brain of humans and other animals. The term is not part of contemporary psychological parlance; it belongs to prebehavioral, prescientific psychology, especially of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only creatures possessed of a sensorium were thought capable of bodily and perceptual sensations. Some thinkers believed that the sensorium, when excited, also produced muscular activity and motion. sensus communis, a cognitive faculty to which the five senses report. It was first argued for in Aristotle’s On the Soul II.12, though the term ‘common sense’ was first introduced in Scholastic thought. Aristotle refers to properties such as magnitude that are perceived by more than one sense as common sensibles. To recognize common sensibles, he claims, we must possess a single cognitive power to compare such qualities, received from the different senses, to one another. Augustine says the “inner sense” judges whether the senses are working properly, and perceives whether the animal perceives De libero arbitrio II.35. Aquinas In De anima II, 13.370 held that it is also by the common sense that we perceive we live. He says the common sense uses the external senses to know sensible forms, preparing the sensible species it receives for the operation of the cognitive power, which recognizes the real thing causing the sensible species.  sentential connective, also called sentential operator, propositional connective, propositional operator, a word or phrase, such as ‘and’, ‘or’, or ‘if . . . then’, that is used to construct compound sentences from atomic  i.e., non-compound  sentences. A sentential connective can be defined formally as an expression containing blanks, such that when the blanks are replaced with sentences the result is a compound sentence. Thus, ‘if ——— then ———’ and ‘——— or ———’ are sentential connectives, since we can replace the blanks with sentences to get the compound sentences ‘If the sky is clear then we can go swimming’ and ‘We can go swimming or we can stay home’. Classical logic makes use of truth-functional connectives only, for which the truth-value of the compound sentence can be determined uniquely by the truth-value of the sentences that replace the blanks. The standard truth-functional sensibilia sentential connective 834    834 connectives are ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if . . . then’, and ‘if and only if’. There are many non-truth-functional connectives as well, such as ‘it is possible that ———’ and ‘——— because ———’.  sentimentalism, the theory, prominent in the eighteenth century, that epistemological or moral relations are derived from feelings. Although sentimentalism and sensationalism are both empiricist positions, the latter view has all knowledge built up from sensations, experiences impinging on the senses. Sentimentalists may allow that ideas derive from sensations, but hold that some relations between them are derived internally, that is, from sentiments arising upon reflection. Moral sentimentalists, such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, argued that the virtue or vice of a character trait is established by approving or disapproving sentiments. Hume, the most thoroughgoing sentimentalist, also argued that all beliefs about the world depend on sentiments. On his analysis, when we form a belief, we rely on the mind’s causally connecting two experiences, e.g., fire and heat. But, he notes, such causal connections depend on the notion of necessity  that the two perceptions will always be so conjoined  and there is nothing in the perceptions themselves that supplies that notion. The idea of necessary connection is instead derived from a sentiment: our feeling of expectation of the one experience upon the other. Likewise, our notions of substance the unity of experiences in an object and of self the unity of experiences in a subject are sentimentbased. But whereas moral sentiments do not purport to represent the external world, these metaphysical notions of necessity, substance, and self are “fictions,” creations of the imagination purporting to represent something in the outside world. -- sententia: For some reason, perhaps of his eccentricity, J. L. Austin was in love with Chomsky. He would read “Syntactic Structures” aloud to the Play Group. And Grice was listening. This stuck with Grice, who started to use ‘sentence,’ even in Polish, when translating Tarski. Hardie had taught him that ‘sententia’ was a Roman transliteration of ‘dia-noia,’ which helped. Since “Not when the the of dog” is NOT a sentence, not even an ‘ill-formed sentence,’ Grice concludes that like ‘reason,’ and ‘cabbage,’ sentence is a value-paradeigmatic concept. His favourite sentence was “Fido is shaggy,” uttered to communicate that Smith’s dog is hairy coated. One of Grice’s favourite sentences was Carnap’s “Pirots karulise elatically,” which Carnap borrowed from (but never returned to) Baron Russell. (“I later found out a ‘pirot’ is an extinct fish, which destroyed my whole implicaturum – talk of ichthyological necessity!” (Carnap contrasted, “Pirots karulise elatically,” with “The not not if not the dog the.”

shaggy-dog story, v. Grice’s shaggy-dog story.

shared experience: WoW: 286. Grice was fascinated by the etymology of ‘share,’ – “which is so difficult to translate to Grecian!” – “Co-operation can be regarded as a shared experience. You cooperate not just when you help, but, as the name indicates, when you operate along with another – when you SHARE some task – in this case influencing the other in the dyad, and being influenced by him.”

set: “Is the idea of a one-member set implicatural?” – Grice. “I distinguish between a class and a set, but Strawson does not.” – Grice --  the study of collections, ranging from familiar examples like a set of encyclopedias or a deck of cards to mathematical examples like the set of natural numbers or the set of points on a line or the set of functions from a set A to another set B. Sets can be specified in two basic ways: by a list e.g., {0, 2, 4, 6, 8} and as the extension of a property e.g., {x _ x is an even natural number less than 10}, where this is read ‘the set of all x such that x is an even natural number less than 10’. The most fundamental relation in set theory is membership, as in ‘2 is a member of the set of even natural numbers’ in symbols: 2 1 {x _ x is an even natural number}. Membership is determinate, i.e., any candidate for membership in a given set is either in the set or not in the set, with no room for vagueness or ambiguity. A set’s identity is completely determined by its members or elements i.e., sets are extensional rather than intensional. Thus {x _ x is human} is the same set as {x _ x is a featherless biped} because they have the same members. The smallest set possible is the empty or null set, the set with no members. There cannot be more than one empty set, by extensionality. It can be specified, e.g., as {x _ x & x}, but it is most often symbolized as / or { }. A set A is called a subset of a set B and B a superset of A if every member of A is also a member of B; in symbols, A 0 B. So, the set of even natural numbers is a subset of the set of all natural numbers, and any set is a superset of the empty set. The union of two sets A and B is the set whose members are the members of A and the members of B  in symbols, A 4 B % {x _ x 1 A or x 1 B}  so the union of the set of even natural numbers and the set of odd natural numbers is the set of all natural numbers. The intersection of two sets A and B is the set whose members are common to both A and B  in symbols, A 3 B % {x _ x 1 A and x 1 B}  so the intersection of the set of even natural numbers and the set of prime natural numbers is the singleton set {2}, whose only member is the number 2. Two sets whose intersection is empty are called disjoint, e.g., the set of even natural numbers and the set of odd natural numbers. Finally, the difference between a set A and a set B is the set whose members are members of A but not members of B  in symbols, A  B % {x _ x 1 A and x 2 B}  so the set of odd numbers between 5 and 20 minus the set of prime natural numbers is {9, 15}. By extensionality, the order in which the members of a set are listed is unimportant, i.e., {1, 2, 3} % {2, 3, 1}. To introduce the concept of ordering, we need the notion of the ordered pair of a and b  in symbols, a, b or . All that is essential to ordered pairs is that two of them are equal only when their first entries are equal and their second entries are equal. Various sets can be used to simulate this behavior, but the version most commonly used is the Kuratowski ordered pair: a, b is defined to be {{a}, {a, b}}. On this definition, it can indeed be proved that a, b % c, d if and only if a % c and b % d. The Cartesian product of two sets A and B is the set of all ordered pairs whose first entry is in A and whose second entry is B  in symbols, A $ B % {x _ x % a, b for some a 1 A and some b 1 B}. This set-theoretic reflection principles set theory 836    836 same technique can be used to form ordered triples  a, b, c % a, b, c; ordered fourtuples  a, b, c, d % a, b, c, d; and by extension, ordered n-tuples for all finite n. Using only these simple building blocks, substitutes for all the objects of classical mathematics can be constructed inside set theory. For example, a relation is defined as a set of ordered pairs  so the successor relation among natural numbers becomes {0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3 . . . }  and a function is a relation containing no distinct ordered pairs of the form a, b and a, c  so the successor relation is a function. The natural numbers themselves can be identified with various sequences of sets, the most common of which are finite von Neumann ordinal numbers: /, {/}, {/, {/}, {/}, {/}, {/, {/}}}, . . . . On this definition, 0 % /, 1 % {/}, 2 % {/, {/}}, etc., each number n has n members, the successor of n is n 4 {n}, and n ‹ m if and only if n 1 m. Addition and multiplication can be defined for these numbers, and the Peano axioms proved from the axioms of set theory; see below. Negative, rational, real, and complex numbers, geometric spaces, and more esoteric mathematical objects can all be identified with sets, and the standard theorems about them proved. In this sense, set theory provides a foundation for mathematics. Historically, the theory of sets arose in the late nineteenth century. In his work on the foundations of arithmetic, Frege identified the natural numbers with the extensions of certain concepts; e.g., the number two is the set of all concepts C under which two things fall  in symbols, 2 % {x _ x is a concept, and there are distinct things a and b which fall under x, and anything that falls under x is either a or b}. Cantor was led to consider complex sets of points in the pursuit of a question in the theory of trigonometric series. To describe the properties of these sets, Cantor introduced infinite ordinal numbers after the finite ordinals described above. The first of these, w, is {0, 1, 2, . . .}, now understood in von Neumann’s terms as the set of all finite ordinals. After w, the successor function yields w ! 1 % w 4 {w} % {0, 1, 2, . . . n, n + 1, . . . , w}, then w ! 2 % w ! 1 ! 1 % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w , w ! 1}, w ! 3 % w ! 2 ! 1 % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w, w ! 1, w ! 2}, and so on; after all these comes w ! w % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w, w ! 1, w ! 2, . . . , w ! n, w ! n ! 1, . . .}, and the process begins again. The ordinal numbers are designed to label the positions in an ordering. Consider, e.g., a reordering of the natural numbers in which the odd numbers are placed after the evens: 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . 1, 3, 5, 7, . . . . The number 4 is in the third position of this sequence, and the number 5 is in the w + 2nd. But finite numbers also perform a cardinal function; they tell us how many so-andso’s there are. Here the infinite ordinals are less effective. The natural numbers in their usual order have the same structure as w, but when they are ordered as above, with the evens before the odds, they take on the structure of a much larger ordinal, w ! w. But the answer to the question, How many natural numbers are there? should be the same no matter how they are arranged. Thus, the transfinite ordinals do not provide a stable measure of the size of an infinite set. When are two infinite sets of the same size? On the one hand, the infinite set of even natural numbers seems clearly smaller than the set of all natural numbers; on the other hand, these two sets can be brought into one-to-one correspondence via the mapping that matches 0 to 0, 1 to 2, 2 to 4, 3 to 6, and in general, n to 2n. This puzzle had troubled mathematicians as far back as Galileo, but Cantor took the existence of a oneto-one correspondence between two sets A and B as the definition of ‘A is the same size as B’. This coincides with our usual understanding for finite sets, and it implies that the set of even natural numbers and the set of all natural numbers and w ! 1 and w! 2 and w ! w and w ! w and many more all have the same size. Such infinite sets are called countable, and the number of their elements, the first infinite cardinal number, is F0. Cantor also showed that the set of all subsets of a set A has a size larger than A itself, so there are infinite cardinals greater than F0, namely F1, F2, and so on. Unfortunately, the early set theories were prone to paradoxes. The most famous of these, Russell’s paradox, arises from consideration of the set R of all sets that are not members of themselves: is R 1 R? If it is, it isn’t, and if it isn’t, it is. The Burali-Forti paradox involves the set W of all ordinals: W itself qualifies as an ordinal, so W 1 W, i.e., W ‹ W. Similar difficulties surface with the set of all cardinal numbers and the set of all sets. At fault in all these cases is a seemingly innocuous principle of unlimited comprehension: for any property P, there is a set {x _ x has P}. Just after the turn of the century, Zermelo undertook to systematize set theory by codifying its practice in a series of axioms from which the known derivations of the paradoxes could not be carried out. He proposed the axioms of extensionality two sets with the same members are the same; pairing for any a and b, there is a set {a, b}; separation for any set A and property P, there is a set {x _ x 1 A and x has P}; power set for any set A, there is a set {x _ x0 A}; union for any set of sets F, there is a set {x _ x 1 A for some A 1 F}  this yields A 4 B, when F % {A, B} and {A, B} comes from A and B by pairing; infinity w exists; and choice for any set of non-empty sets, there is a set that contains exactly one member from each. The axiom of choice has a vast number of equivalents, including the well-ordering theorem  every set can be well-ordered  and Zorn’s lemma  if every chain in a partially ordered set has an upper bound, then the set has a maximal element. The axiom of separation limits that of unlimited comprehension by requiring a previously given set A from which members are separated by the property P; thus troublesome sets like Russell’s that attempt to collect absolutely all things with P cannot be formed. The most controversial of Zermelo’s axioms at the time was that of choice, because it posits the existence of a choice set  a set that “chooses” one from each of possibly infinitely many non-empty sets  without giving any rule for making the choices. For various philosophical and practical reasons, it is now accepted without much debate. Fraenkel and Skolem later formalized the axiom of replacement if A is a set, and every member a of A is replaced by some b, then there is a set containing all the b’s, and Skolem made both replacement and separation more precise by expressing them as schemata of first-order logic. The final axiom of the contemporary theory is foundation, which guarantees that sets are formed in a series of stages called the iterative hierarchy begin with some non-sets, then form all possible sets of these, then form all possible sets of the things formed so far, then form all possible sets of these, and so on. This iterative picture of sets built up in stages contrasts with the older notion of the extension of a concept; these are sometimes called the mathematical and the logical notions of collection, respectively. The early controversy over the paradoxes and the axiom of choice can be traced to the lack of a clear distinction between these at the time. Zermelo’s first five axioms all but choice plus foundation form a system usually called Z; ZC is Z with choice added. Z plus replacement is ZF, for Zermelo-Fraenkel, and adding choice makes ZFC, the theory of sets in most widespread use today. The consistency of ZFC cannot be proved by standard mathematical means, but decades of experience with the system and the strong intuitive picture provided by the iterative conception suggest that it is. Though ZFC is strong enough for all standard mathematics, it is not enough to answer some natural set-theoretic questions e.g., the continuum problem. This has led to a search for new axioms, such as large cardinal assumptions, but no consensus on these additional principles has yet been reached. Then there are the set-theoretica paradoxes, a collection of paradoxes that reveal difficulties in certain central notions of set theory. The best-known of these are Russell’s paradox, Burali-Forti’s paradox, and Cantor’s paradox. Russell’s paradox, discovered in 1 by Bertrand Russell, is the simplest and so most problematic of the set-theoretic paradoxes. Using it, we can derive a contradiction directly from Cantor’s unrestricted comprehension schema. This schema asserts that for any formula Px containing x as a free variable, there is a set {x _ Px} whose members are exactly those objects that satisfy Px. To derive the contradiction, take Px to be the formula x 1 x, and let z be the set {x _ x 2 x} whose existence is guaranteed by the comprehension schema. Thus z is the set whose members are exactly those objects that are not members of themselves. We now ask whether z is, itself, a member of z. If the answer is yes, then we can conclude that z must satisfy the criterion of membership in z, i.e., z must not be a member of z. But if the answer is no, then since z is not a member of itself, it satisfies the criterion for membership in z, and so z is a member of z. All modern axiomatizations of set theory avoid Russell’s paradox by restricting the principles that assert the existence of sets. The simplest restriction replaces unrestricted comprehension with the separation schema. Separation asserts that, given any set A and formula Px, there is a set {x 1 A _ Px}, whose members are exactly those members of A that satisfy Px. If we now take Px to be the formula x 2 x, then separation guarantees the existence of a set zA % {x 1 A _ x 2 x}. We can then use Russell’s reasoning to prove the result that zA cannot be a member of the original set A. If it were a member of A, then we could prove that it is a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself. Hence it is not a member of A. But this result is not problematic, and so the paradox is avoided. The Burali-Forte paradox and Cantor’s paradox are sometimes known as paradoxes of size, since they show that some collections are too large to be considered sets. The Burali-Forte paradox, discovered by Cesare Burali-Forte, is concerned with the set of all ordinal numbers. In Cantor’s set theory, an ordinal number can be assigned to any well-ordered set. A set is wellordered if every subset of the set has a least element. But Cantor’s set theory also guarantees the existence of the set of all ordinals, again due to the unrestricted comprehension schema. This set of ordinals is well-ordered, and so can be associated with an ordinal number. But it can be shown that the associated ordinal is greater than any ordinal in the set, hence greater than any ordinal number. Cantor’s paradox involves the cardinality of the set of all sets. Cardinality is another notion of size used in set theory: a set A is said to have greater cardinality than a set B if and only if B can be mapped one-to-one onto a subset of A but A cannot be so mapped onto B or any of its subsets. One of Cantor’s fundamental results was that the set of all subsets of a set A known as the power set of A has greater cardinality than the set A. Applying this result to the set V of all sets, we can conclude that the power set of V has greater cardinality than V. But every set in the power set of V is also in V since V contains all sets, and so the power set of V cannot have greater cardinality than V. We thus have a contradiction. Like Russell’s paradox, both of these paradoxes result from the unrestricted comprehension schema, and are avoided by replacing it with weaker set-existence principles. Various principles stronger than the separation schema are needed to get a reasonable set theory, and many alternative axiomatizations have been proposed. But the lesson of these paradoxes is that no setexistence principle can entail the existence of the Russell set, the set of all ordinals, or the set of all sets, on pain of contradiction. 

sextus empiricus: the sixth son of Empiricus the Elder – “My five brothers were not philosophers” -- Grecian Skeptic philosopher whose writings are the chief source of our knowledge about the extreme Skeptic view, Pyrrhonism. Practically nothing is known about him as a person. He was apparently a medical doctor and a teacher in a Skeptical school, probably in Alexandria. What has survived are his Hypotoposes, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and a series of Skeptical critiques, Against the Dogmatists, questioning the premises and conclusions in many disciplines, such as physics, mathematics, rhetoric, and ethics. In these works, Sextus summarized and organized the views of Skeptical arguers before him. The Outlines starts with an attempt to indicate what Skepticism is, to explain the terminology employed by the Skeptics, how Pyrrhonian Skepticism differs from other so-called Skeptical views, and how the usual answers to Skepticism are rebutted. Sextus points out that the main Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Academic Skepticism which is presented as a negative dogmatism, claimed that they would bring the adherent peace of mind, ataraxia. Unfortunately the dogmatic adherent would only become more perturbed by seeing the Skeptical objections that could be brought against his or her view. Then, by suspending judgment, epoche, one would find the tranquillity being sought. Pyrrhonian Skepticism is a kind of mental hygiene or therapy that cures one of dogmatism or rashness. It is like a purge that cleans out foul matter as well as itself. To bring about this state of affairs there are sets of Skeptical arguments that should bring one to suspense of judgment. The first set are the ten tropes of the earlier Skeptic, Anesidemus. The next are the five tropes about causality. And lastly are the tropes about the criterion of knowledge. The ten tropes stress the variability of sense experience among men and animals, among men, and within one individual. The varying and conflicting experiences present conflicts about what the perceived object is like. Any attempt to judge beyond appearances, to ascertain that which is non-evident, requires some way of choosing what data to accept. This requires a criterion. Since there is disagreement about what criterion to employ, we need a criterion of a criterion, and so on. Either we accept an arbitrary criterion or we get into an infinite regress. Similarly if we try to prove anything, we need a criterion of what constitutes a proof. If we offer a proof of a theory of proof, this will be circular reasoning, or end up in another infinite regress. Sextus devotes most of his discussion to challenging Stoic logic, which claimed that evident signs could reveal what is non-evident. There might be signs that suggested what is temporarily non-evident, such as smoke indicating that there is a fire, but any supposed linkage between evident signs and what is non-evident can be challenged and questioned. Sextus then applies the groups of Skeptical arguments to various specific subjects  physics, mathematics, music, grammar, ethics  showing that one should suspend judgment on any knowledge claims in these areas. Sextus denies that he is saying any of this dogmatically: he is just stating how he feels at given moments. He hopes that dogmatists sick with a disease, rashness, will be cured and led to tranquillity no matter how good or bad the Skeptical arguments might be. 

sgalambro: important Italian philosopher – Manlio Sgalambro Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Questa voce è da wikificare Questa voce o sezione sugli argomenti filosofia e musica non è ancora formattata secondo gli standard. Commento: Gli elenchi a fine voce (Collaborazioni) sono fuori standard, didascalici, pieni di informazioni non enciclopedici. Vanno riordinati nelle rispettive sezioni (Bibliografia, Discografia, Filmografia). In particolare per la discografia indicare solo * ANNO - [[Autore]] ''[[Titolo]]'', come da linee guida. Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di Wikipedia. Segui i suggerimenti dei progetti di riferimento 1, 2. Manlio Sgalambro Manlio Sgalambro.jpg Nazionalità Italia Italia Genere Musica d'autore Pop Periodo di attività musicale 1993 – 2014 Album pubblicati 1 Sito ufficiale Modifica dati su Wikidata · Manuale Manlio Sgalambro (Lentini, 9 dicembre 1924 – Catania, 6 marzo 2014) è stato un filosofo, scrittore, poeta, aforista, paroliere e cantautore italiano.  La sua opera filosofica è stata definita di orientamento nichilista[1][2], definizione spesso respinta da Sgalambro stesso[3][4], ma talvolta anche accettata[5], e si può piuttosto definire un'originale sintesi tra la filosofia della vita di Arthur Schopenhauer[6] e il materialismo e pessimismo di Giuseppe Rensi[7], con le influenze dell'esistenzialismo sui generis di Emil Cioran[8], di alcuni temi della scolastica e della "teologia empia" e naturalistica di Vanini e Mauthner[9].  Sgalambro è noto anche per la collaborazione con il cantautore Franco Battiato, delle cui canzoni fu autore dei testi tra il 1995 e il 2012.   Indice 1 Biografia 1.1 La produzione filosofica 1.2 Le collaborazioni con Franco Battiato ed altri 2 Partecipazioni dirette alle opere di Battiato 2.1 Canzoni 3 Opere 3.1 Libri 3.2 Saggi 3.3 Album 3.4 Singoli 4 Collaborazioni 4.1 Album 4.2 Singoli 4.3 Opere teatrali 4.4 Film 4.5 Documentari 4.6 Videoclip 4.7 Programmi televisivi 5 Bibliografia 5.1 Libri 5.2 Saggi 5.3 Articoli 5.4 Tesi di laurea 6 Filmografia 7 Note 8 Altri progetti 9 Collegamenti esterni Biografia Manlio Sgalambro nacque a Lentini nel 1924, da una famiglia benestante (il padre era un farmacista). Ha sempre osservato un riserbo quasi "conventuale"[10] nella sua vita privata, fornendo tuttavia alcuni elementi biografici nelle sue interviste o presentazioni. Dopo l'infanzia trascorsa a Lentini, si trasferisce a Catania, dove rimane per tutta la vita. Nel 1947 si iscrive all'Università degli studi di Catania:  «All'università decisi di non iscrivermi in Filosofia perché la coltivavo già autonomamente. Mi piaceva il diritto penale e per questo scelsi la facoltà di Giurisprudenza.[11]»  (Manlio Sgalambro) Inoltre non si trovava d'accordo con la cultura filosofica dominante allora nelle accademie, troppo legata all'idealismo di Croce e Gentile:  «Erano loro che occupavano tutto lo spazio culturale, ma io non mi ritrovavo affatto in quei sistemi complessi e completi, dove ogni cosa era già stata incasellata. Per me pensare era una destructio piuttosto che una costructio: ero uno che notava le rovine, piuttosto che la bellezza. Questo era un po' scomodo, e non certamente accademico.[5]»  Nel 1963, a 39 anni, si sposa, e dal matrimonio nascono cinque figli (Elena, Simona, Riccardo, Irene, Elisa). Il reddito che proveniva da un agrumeto (lasciatogli in eredità dal padre) non basta più, così sceglie di integrarlo compilando tesi di laurea e facendo supplenze nelle scuole:  «Il matrimonio è un momento, come dice Hegel, in cui «la realtà determinata entra in un individuo». Dunque il matrimonio non coincide semplicemente con l'amore per una persona, ma con la durata: ecco dove sta l'essenza, quasi teologica, del matrimonio.[11]»  (Manlio Sgalambro) Muore il 6 marzo 2014 a Catania, all'età di 89 anni.[12] Sgalambro era dichiaratamente ateo anche se credeva nella reincarnazione, come ricordato anche dall'amico Battiato[13], e ha avuto un funerale religioso.[14] Da molti anni viveva da solo nella sua casa catanese.[5]  La produzione filosofica «Che non ci sia niente di peggiore del mondo, non si deve dimostrare.»  (La conoscenza del peggio) Sgalambro ripeteva spesso che non possedeva titoli né lauree «per i biglietti da visita» e quindi come sia riuscito a diventare uno scrittore di filosofia – i cui libri sono tradotti in francese, tedesco e spagnolo – era «un mistero» che egli stesso stentava a spiegarsi.  Il suo primo contatto con un'opera filosofica avviene nel periodo dell'adolescenza, quando legge La formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solare di Roberto Ardigò nella biblioteca di un parente[15]. Seguono i Principi di psicologia di William James, le Ricerche logiche di Husserl (un'opera che ritornerà più volte nella sua riflessione[16]), e, soprattutto, Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione di Schopenhauer[17]. L'incontro con il pensatore tedesco spinge Sgalambro ad un interesse sempre crescente per la cultura nordeuropea, che sfocerà poi nella scoperta di Kant, Hegel[18], Friedrich Nietzsche[15], e Kierkegaard, a cui dedica i suoi primi saggi.  Nel 1945 inizia a collaborare alla rivista catanese Prisma (diretta da Leonardo Grassi): il primo scritto è Paralipomeni all'irrazionalismo, dove, influenzato da Rensi, sviluppa un attacco all'idealismo crociano allora in piena egemonia.[19] Egli si ispira anche all'ironia di Karl Kraus di cui ama lo stile aforistico ("Se Karl Kraus avesse scritto Il Capitale lo avrebbe fatto in tre righe").  Dal 1959, assieme a Sebastiano Addamo, scrive per il periodico Incidenze (fondato da Antonio Corsano): il primo articolo è Crepuscolo e notte (che viene ristampato nel 2011), un breve saggio di "esistenzialismo negativo", ispirato ad Heidegger e Céline.[5] Frattanto inizia a scrivere anche per la rivista Tempo presente (diretta da Nicola Chiaromonte ed Ignazio Silone).[5]  Alla fine degli anni settanta decide di organizzare il suo pensiero in un'opera sistematica: a 55 anni Sgalambro manda il suo primo libro, La morte del sole, con un biglietto di due righe alla casa editrice Adelphi; al proposito dirà:  «E lì è rimasto due anni. Ma siccome io sono fatto in questo modo, non ho chiesto niente. Poi è arrivata una telefonata a mia moglie. Mi chiedevano di andare a Milano, per prendere contatto con l'editore. Roberto Calasso mi disse che quel libro non era maturo, era marcio: ed era esattamente così”.[20]»  (Manlio Sgalambro) Negli anni seguenti, con lo stesso editore, pubblica anche: Trattato dell'empietà (1987), Anatol (1990), Del pensare breve (1991), Dialogo teologico (1993), Dell'indifferenza in materia di società (1994), La consolazione (1995), Trattato dell'età (1999), De mundo pessimo (2004), La conoscenza del peggio (2007), Del delitto (2009) e Della misantropia (2012).[5]  Spesso viene avvicinato alla corrente nichilista; talvolta ha respinto la definizione, mentre altre volte l'ha accettata, nel senso di un nichilismo attivo e demolitore, non passivo e chiuso: «Indubbiamente questa visione è nell'intimo di me stesso. Per un nichilista le cose – il Papa, Mussolini, un vaso di terracotta – si equivalgono. Questo non significa che non si ha il senso di ciò che vale: significa piuttosto che si prova a romperlo come si può, per esempio con il martello del pensare.[5]»  Intanto, all'inizio degli anni novanta, con alcuni amici avvia una piccola attività editoriale a Catania: nasce così la De Martinis. All'interno di questa casa editrice, Sgalambro si occupa di saggistica, pubblicando un paio di propri testi (Dialogo sul comunismo e Contro la musica) e ristampando alcune opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini e di Julien Benda.  Nel 2005 suscita polemiche una sua intervista a Francesco Battistini sulla mafia, dove critica anche Leonardo Sciascia e il mito dell'antimafia "militante" (che tra l'altro fu criticata da Sciascia stesso negli ultimi anni di vita): «L'immagine della Sicilia… C'è, come no? Ma cercarla in faccende di Cuffaro e di Gabanelli è come cercare un tesoro fra le spine dei fichi d'India. Cercare che cosa, poi? La griglia mafiosa è una gabbia. È chiaro che ha ragione la Gabanelli e che Cuffaro vuole cancellare a suo modo la mafia, con un tratto di parole. Ma contesto che la mafiosità sia una chiave di conoscenza... Non cambio idea. La mafia è un concetto astratto. E gli astratti si distruggono con la logica, non con la polizia... La polizia può arrestare la mafia. Eliminarla, mai. Quello che importa è la Mafia maiuscola, concetto generale e perciò indistruttibile... La mafia in sé non mi fa venire in mente nulla. Come la patria, i morti di Solferino. Cose vetuste. Leonardo Sciascia era lo scrittore sociale, un maestro di scuola che voleva insegnarci le buone maniere sociali. Ma rivisitarlo oggi è come rileggere Silvio Pellico. La sua funzione si è esaurita... La mafia è l'unica economia reale di quest'isola... Ci sono fenomeni della storia, ricchezze che non si possono fare con le mani pulite. Qui la ricchezza è sempre stata fondiaria, senza investimenti... La ricchezza è per sua natura sporca... Basta col gioco della spartizione: è mafioso o no? Domande da periodo di lotte religiose: è luterano o cattolico? In Sicilia sono arrivati anche i laici, per fortuna.[21]»  Definisce poi Claudio Fava "quel piagnone", affermando che "i famosi Cavalieri", soprannome dato dal padre di Fava a quattro imprenditori catanesi considerati collusi con Cosa nostra, «erano l'unica economia possibile» per la città.[21] Nel 2014 è tornato in maniera sarcastica sull'argomento: «Considero la Sicilia come un fenomeno estetico e non ne cambierei nulla. In questo senso potrei dire che mi considero un mafioso…».[5] Già nel 1995 era stato attaccato dal sociologo Franco Ferrarotti che lo definì "un neo-reazionario" e di "intolleranza aristocratica e silenzio sulla mafia".[22]  Alla sua isola ha dedicato l'opera Teoria della Sicilia:  «Là dove domina l'elemento insulare è impossibile salvarsi. Ogni isola attende impaziente di inabissarsi. Una teoria dell'isola è segnata da questa certezza. Un'isola può sempre sparire. Entità talattica, essa si sorregge sui flutti, sull'instabile. Per ogni isola vale la metafora della nave: vi incombe il naufragio.»  Oltre ai saggi per Adelphi, ha pubblicato per Bompiani Teoria della canzone (1997), Variazioni e capricci morali (2013) e due raccolte di poesie, Nietzsche (frammenti di una biografia per versi e voce) (1998) e Marcisce anche il pensiero (frammenti di un poema) (2011), dedicato all'ultima mezz'ora di vita di Immanuel Kant, nonché L'impiegato di Filosofia (2010), nel quale ironicamente afferma di aver rinunciato alla filosofia ritrovandosi più filosofo che mai, curioso libretto stampato in un museo della stampa con caratteri mobili, edito da La Pietra Infinita.  Infine, ha pubblicato con Il Girasole: Del metodo ipocondriaco (1989), Quaternario (racconto parigino) (2006), la raccolta di poesie Nell'anno della pecora di ferro (2011), la pièce teatrale L'illusion comique (2013) e Dal ciclo della vita (2014, postumo).  Le collaborazioni con Franco Battiato ed altri «La matematica è il tribunale del mondo. Il numero è ordine e disciplina. Ciò con cui si indica lo scopo della scienza, tradisce col termine la cosa. L'ordine, già il termine ha qualcosa di bieco, che sa di polizia, adombra negli adepti le forze dell'ordine cosmico, i riti cosmici. L'autentico sentimento scientifico è impotente davanti all'universo. L'inflazione che caccia nelle mani dell'individuo, in un gesto solo, miliardi di marchi, lasciandolo più miserabile di prima, dimostra punto per punto che il denaro è un'allucinazione collettiva»  (M. Sgalambro, La morte del sole, frasi recitate da Franco Battiato in 23 coppie di cromosomi) Nel 1993 avviene l'incontro con Franco Battiato, del tutto casualmente, perché presentavano insieme un volume di poesie dell'amico comune Angelo Scandurra. Dopo pochi giorni da quell'incontro, Battiato gli chiede un appuntamento per proporgli di scrivere il libretto dell'opera Il cavaliere dell'intelletto:  «Un anno fa non ci conoscevamo neppure. Da allora non abbiamo fatto altro che lavorare insieme. Lui sarà anche un filosofo, ma per me è un talento che mi stimola e arricchisce. Mi sembra impossibile, oggi, tornare a scrivere i testi delle mie cose.[23]»  (Franco Battiato) «In mezzo a tutto questo, mi capitò tra i piedi Franco Battiato. Per un certo verso direi che è stato uno di quegli incontri che ti portano fuori strada, ma questa è una percezione che ho avuto molto tardi. A volte trovo che è come se tutto quel tempo io lo abbia perduto: la questione starebbe nel vedere se sia possibile recuperarlo…[5]»   Sgalambro a Conegliano nel 2007 Sgalambro accetta e risponde ironicamente all'invito di Battiato chiedendogli di scrivere insieme un disco di musica pop[10]. Tra Sgalambro e Battiato si sviluppa un sodalizio artistico e umano, anche se non sempre facile: «Anche perché io non sono un grande seguace dell'amicizia. Con Battiato abbiamo avuto lunghe liti, che duravano parecchio. Poi uno dei due, in genere lui, telefonava e il rapporto riprendeva. Tutti i litigi erano per un rigo da cambiare in una canzone: io non accettavo le esigenze della musica e per lui questo era costoso. Il suo impegno in politica? Non ho mai capito come si sia potuto lasciare tentare, tutti i giorni ho cercato di convincerlo a levarsi, solo ora per fortuna sta tornando in se stesso.[5]»  A partire dal 1994 collabora a quasi tutti i progetti di Franco Battiato, per cui scrive:  i libretti delle opere Il cavaliere dell'intelletto (su Federico II di Svevia), Socrate impazzito, Gli Schopenhauer e Telesio (su Bernardino Telesio), e del balletto Campi magnetici; i testi di svariati album musicali (L'ombrello e la macchina da cucire, L'imboscata, Gommalacca, Ferro battuto, Dieci stratagemmi, Il vuoto, Apriti sesamo) e vari inediti, presenti ad esempio nell'album Fleurs; le sceneggiature dei film Perduto amor, Musikanten (sugli ultimi anni della vita di Beethoven) e Niente è come sembra, del programma televisivo Bitte, keine Réclame e del documentario Auguri don Gesualdo (su Gesualdo Bufalino). Benché affermasse che la canzone era per lui "una distrazione"[5], dal 1998 scrive testi di canzoni anche per Patty Pravo (Emma), Alice (Come un sigillo, Eri con me), Fiorella Mannoia (Il movimento del dare), Carmen Consoli (Marie ti amiamo), Milva (Non conosco nessun Patrizio), Adriano Celentano (Facciamo finta che sia vero) e Ornella Vanoni (Aurora).  Dopo essere intervenuto anche ai concerti di Battiato, nel 2000 si cimenta lui stesso con la musica e pubblica il singolo La mer, contenente la cover del celebre brano di Charles Trenet.  In una rappresentazione de L'histoire du soldat di Igor' Stravinskij (2000) interpretò la voce narrante, con Franco Battiato nella parte del soldato e Giovanni Lindo Ferretti in quella del Diavolo.  Nel 2001 pubblica l'album Fun club, prodotto da Franco Battiato e Saro Cosentino, che contiene «evergreen» del calibro di La vie en rose (di Édith Piaf) e Moon river (di Henry Mancini), ma anche l'ironica Me gustas tú (di Manu Chao):  «Un alleggerimento che considero doveroso. Dobbiamo sgravare la gente dal peso del vivere, invece che dare pane e brioches. Questa volta, mi sono sgravato anch'io. E poi, la musica leggera ha questo di bello, che in tre minuti si può dire quanto in un libro di 400 pagine o in un'opera completa a teatro.[24]»  (Manlio Sgalambro) Nel 2007 dà la voce all'aereo DC-9 Itavia nell'opera Ultimo volo di Pippo Pollina sulla strage di Ustica.  Nel 2009 pubblica il singolo La canzone della galassia, contenente la cover di The galaxy song (tratto da Il senso della vita dei Monty Python), cantata assieme al gruppo sardo-inglese Mab.  Nel 2009 torna dopo 40 anni ad esibirsi in un pub di Catania, assieme al filosofo Salvatore Massimo Fazio e il curatore del suo sito Alessio Cantarella. Finita l'esibizione alla presenza di Pippo Russo e Franco Battiato, seguì il concerto delle Lilies on Mars, band formata da due ex componenti del gruppo MAB (Lisa Masia e Marina Cristofalo), band che si era esibita con Battiato nella canzone Il vuoto, su testo di Sgalambro.  Partecipazioni dirette alle opere di Battiato Canzoni In Di passaggio (da L'imboscata) recita in greco antico: (EL) «Ταὐτὸ τενὶ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν' τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεινά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν ταῦτα.»  (IT) «La stessa cosa sono il vivente e il morto, lo sveglio e il dormiente, il giovane e il vecchio: questi infatti mutando son quelli e quelli mutando son questi.»  (Eraclito, Frammenti, 88) Interviene recitando in Shakleton, dall'album Gommalacca (1998) In Invito al viaggio (da Fleurs) recita: «Ti invito al viaggio in quel paese che ti somiglia tanto. I soli languidi dei suoi cieli annebbiati hanno per il mio spirito l'incanto dei tuoi occhi quando brillano offuscati. Laggiù, tutto è ordine e bellezza, calma e voluttà; il mondo s'addormenta in una calda luce di giacinto e d'oro; dormono pigramente i vascelli vagabondi, arrivati da ogni confine per soddisfare i tuoi desideri.»  (Charles Baudelaire, I fiori del male) In Corpi in movimento (da Campi magnetici) recita: «Se io, come miei punti, penso quali si vogliano sistemi di cose, per esempio, il sistema: amore, legge, spazzacamino… e poi non faccio altro che assumere tutti i miei assiomi come relazioni tra tali cose, allora le mie proposizioni, per esempio, il teorema di Pitagora, valgono anche per queste cose.»  (David Hilbert, Lettera a Frege del 29 dicembre 1899) Dal 1996 partecipa a quasi tutti i tour di Franco Battiato:  Nel tour del '97 recita versi in latino sul brano di Battiato Areknames (da Pollution), ribattezzato per l'occasione Canzone chimica: «Bacterium flourescens liquefaciens, Bacterium histolyticum, Bacterium mesentericum, Bacterium sporagenes, Bacterium putrificus…»  (Manlio Sgalambro, Canzone chimica) Nel tour del 2002 esegue una nuova versione – con il testo riadattato in chiave filosofica – di Accetta il consiglio (tratto da The Big Kahuna), che viene pubblicato l'anno dopo nell'album live Last Summer Dance. Nel 2004 canta due brevi strofe dei suoi versi nella canzone La porta dello spavento supremo, dall'album Dieci stratagemmi di Battiato: «Quello che c'è / ciò che verrà / ciò che siamo stati / e comunque andrà /tutto si dissolverà (...) Sulle scogliere fissavo il mare / che biancheggiava nell'oscurità / tutto si dissolverà.»  (La porta dello spavento supremo/Il sogno, testo di Manlio Sgalambro e Carlotta Wieck) Opere Libri Manlio Sgalambro, La morte del sole, Milano, Adelphi, 1982 Manlio Sgalambro, Trattato dell'empietà, Milano, Adelphi, 1987 Manlio Sgalambro, Vom Tod der Sonne (edizione tedesca de La morte del sole), traduzione di Dora Winkler, Monaco (Germania), Hanser, 1988 Manlio Sgalambro, Del metodo ipocondriaco, Valverde (CT), Il Girasole, 1989 Manlio Sgalambro, Anatol, Milano, Adelphi, 1990 Manlio Sgalambro, Anatol (edizione francese), traduzione di Dominique Bouveret, Saulxures (Francia), Circé, 1991 Manlio Sgalambro, Del pensare breve, Milano, Adelphi, 1991 Manlio Sgalambro, Dialogo teologico, Milano, Adelphi, 1993 Manlio Sgalambro, Contro la musica. (Sull'ethos dell'ascolto), Catania, De Martinis, 1994 Manlio Sgalambro, Dell'indifferenza in materia di società, Milano, Adelphi, 1994 Manlio Sgalambro, De la pensée brève (edizione francese di Del pensare breve), traduzione di Carole Walter, Saulxures (Francia), Circé, 1995 Manlio Sgalambro, Dialogo sul comunismo, Catania, De Martinis, 1995 Manlio Sgalambro, La consolazione, Milano, Adelphi, 1995 Manlio Sgalambro, La morte del sole (seconda edizione), Milano, Adelphi, 1996 Manlio Sgalambro, Teoria della canzone, Milano, Bompiani, 1997 Manlio Sgalambro-Jacques Robaud, Deux dialogues philosophiques (contiene l'edizione francese di Dialogo teologico), traduzione di Carole Walter, Saulxures (Francia), Circé, 1993 Manlio Sgalambro, Nietzsche. (Frammenti di una biografia per versi e voce), Bompiani, Milano, 1998 Manlio Sgalambro, Poesie (edizione a tiratura limitata di 72 esemplari numerati), a cura di Antonio Contiero, Reggio Emilia, La Pietra Infinita, 1999 Manlio Sgalambro, Trattato dell'età. Una lezione di metafisica, Milano, Adelphi, 1999 Manlio Sgalambro-Davide Benati, Segrete (edizione a tiratura limitata di 30 esemplari numerati), a cura di Antonio Contiero, Reggio Emilia, La Pietra Infinita, 2001 Manlio Sgalambro, Traité de l'âge. Une leçon de métaphysique (edizione francese di Trattato dell'età), traduzione di Dominique Férault, Parigi (Francia), Payot, 2001 Manlio Sgalambro, Opus postumissimum. (Frammento di un poema), a cura di Silvia Batisti - Rossella Lisi, Firenze, Giubbe Rosse, 2002 Manlio Sgalambro, Dolore e poesia (edizione a tiratura limitata di 32 esemplari numerati), a cura di Antonio Contiero, Reggio Emilia, La Pietra Infinita, 2003 Manlio Sgalambro, De mundo pessimo (contiene Contro la musica. (Sull'ethos dell'ascolto) e Dialogo sul comunismo), Milano, Adelphi, 2004 Manlio Sgalambro, Trattato dell'empietà (seconda edizione), Milano, Adelphi, 2005 Manlio Sgalambro, Quaternario. Racconto parigino, Valverde (CT), Il Girasole, 2006 Manlio Sgalambro, Nietzsche. Frammenti di una biografia per versi e voce (seconda edizione), Milano, Bompiani, 2006 Manlio Sgalambro, La conoscenza del peggio, Milano, Adelphi, 2007 Manlio Sgalambro, Del delitto, Milano, Adelphi, 2009 Manlio Sgalambro, La consolación (edizione spagnola de La consolazione), traduzione di Martín López-Vega, Valencia (Spagna), Pre-Textos, 2009 Manlio Sgalambro, L'impiegato di filosofia (edizione a tiratura limitata di 100 esemplari numerati), Reggio Emilia, La Pietra Infinita, 2010 Manlio Sgalambro, Crepuscolo e notte, Messina, Mesogea, 2011 Manlio Sgalambro, Nell'anno della pecora di ferro, Valverde (CT), Il Girasole, 2011 Manlio Sgalambro, Marcisce anche il pensiero. Frammenti di un poema (seconda edizione di Opus postumissimum. (Frammento di un poema)), Milano, Bompiani, 2011 Manlio Sgalambro, Della misantropia, Milano, Adelphi, 2012 Manlio Sgalambro, Teoria della canzone (seconda edizione con una nuova introduzione dell'autore), Milano, Bompiani, 2012 Manlio Sgalambro, L'illusion comique, Valverde (CT), Il Girasole, 2013 Manlio Sgalambro, Variazioni e capricci morali, Milano, Bompiani, 2013 Manlio Sgalambro, Dal ciclo della vita, Valverde (CT), Il Girasole, 2014 (postumo) Saggi Manlio Sgalambro, Devozione allo spazio in Giuseppe Raciti, Dello spazio, Catania, CUECM, 1990, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Sciascia e le aporie del fare in Sciascia. Scrittura e verità, Palermo, Flaccovio, 1991, pp. 33–36 Manlio Sgalambro, Carpe veritatem in Arthur Schopenhauer, La filosofia delle università, Milano, Adelphi, 1992, pp. 121–141 Manlio Sgalambro, Empedocle o della fine del ciclo cosmico in Antonio Di Grado, Grandi siciliani. Tre millenni di civiltà, v. 1, Catania, Maimone, pp. 29–31 Manlio Sgalambro, Gentile o del pensare in Antonio Di Grado, Grandi siciliani. Tre millenni di civiltà, v. 2, Catania, Maimone, pp. 415–418 Manlio Sgalambro, Post scriptum in Pietro Barcellona, Lo spazio della politica. Tecnica e democrazia, Roma, Riuniti, 1993, pp. 161–171 Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione in Julien Benda, Saggio di un discorso coerente sui rapporti tra Dio e il mondo, Catania, De Martinis, 1993, pp. 185–190 Manlio Sgalambro, Rensi in Giuseppe Rensi, La filosofia dell'autorità, Catania, De Martinis, 1993, quarta di copertina Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Angelo Scandurra, Trigonometria di ragni, Milano, All'Insegna del Pesce d'Oro, 1993, pp. 7–8 Manlio Sgalambro, La malattia dello spazio in Insulæ. L'arte dell'esilio, Genova, Costa & Nolan, 1993, pp. 51–53 Manlio Sgalambro, Vanini e l'empietà in Giulio Cesare Vanini, Confutazione delle religioni, Catania, De Martinis, 1993, pp. I-VI Manlio Sgalambro, Breve introduzione in Giuseppe Tornatore, Una pura formalità, Catania, De Martinis, 1994, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Piccola glossa al “Trattato della concupiscenza” in Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, Trattato della concupiscenza, Catania, De Martinis, 1994, pp. 7–10 Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione in Ernst Jünger - Klaus Ulrich Leistikov, Mantrana. Un gioco, Catania, De Martinis, 1995, quarta di copertina Manlio Sgalambro, Gentile e il tedio del pensare in Giovanni Gentile, L'atto del pensare come atto puro, Catania, De Martinis, 1995, pp. 7–13 Manlio Sgalambro, Il bene non può fondarsi su un Dio omicida in Carlo Maria Martini - Umberto Eco, In cosa crede chi non crede?, Roma, Liberal, 1996, pp. 95–98 Manlio Sgalambro, Sciascia e le aporie del fare in Leonardo Sciascia. La memoria, il futuro, a cura di Matteo Collura, Milano, Bompiani, 1998, pp. 69–72 Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Tommaso Ottonieri, Elegia sanremese, Milano, Bompiani, 1998, p. V Manlio Sgalambro, La morale di un cavallo in Ottavio Cappellani, La morale del cavallo, Scordia (CT), Nadir, 1998, p. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Prefazione in Maurizio Cosentino, I sistemi morali, Catania, Boemi, 1998, p. 7 Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione in Domenico Trischitta, Daniela Rocca. Il miraggio in celluloide, Catania, Boemi, 1999, p. 71 Manlio Sgalambro, Piccole note in margine a Salvo Basso in Salvo Basso, Dui, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 1999, p. 5 Manlio Sgalambro, Il fabbricante di chiavi in Mariacatena De Leo - Luigi Ingaliso, Nell'antro del filosofo. Dialogo con Manlio Sgalambro, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 2002, pp. 87–94 Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione in Alessandro Pumo, Il destino del corpo. L'uomo e le nuove frontiere della scienza medica, Palermo, Nuova Ipsa, 2002, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Sodalizio in Franco Battiato. L'alba dentro l'imbrunire (allegato a Franco Battiato. Parole e canzoni), a cura di Vincenzo Mollica, Torino, Einaudi, 2004, p. V Manlio Sgalambro, Del vecchio in Riccardo Mondo - Luigi Turinese, Caro Hillman… Venticinque scambi epistolari con James Hillman, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2004, pp. 227–228 Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Anna Vasta, I malnati, Porretta Terme (BO), I Quaderni del Battello Ebbro, 2004, seconda di copertina Manlio Sgalambro, Lettera a un giovane poeta in Luca Farruggio, Bugie estatiche, Roma, Il Filo, 2006, p. 5 Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Toni Contiero, Galleria Buenos Aires, Reggio Emilia, Aliberti, 2006, p. 7 Manlio Sgalambro, Teoria della Sicilia in Guido Guidi Guerrera, Battiato. Another link, Baiso (RE), Verdechiaro, 2006, p. 117 Manlio Sgalambro, Nota introduttiva in Michele Falzone, Franco Battiato. La Sicilia che profuma d'oriente, Palermo, Flaccovio, 2007, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Una nota in Franco Battiato, In fondo sono contento di aver fatto la mia conoscenza (allegato a Niente è come sembra), Milano, Bompiani, 2007, pp. 87–90 Manlio Sgalambro, Nadia Boulanger e l'ethos della musica in Bruno Monsaingeon, Incontro con Nadia Boulanger, Palermo, rueBallu, 2007, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Arnold de Vos, Il giardino persiano, Fanna (PN), Samuele, 2009, p. 7 Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Angelo Scandurra, Quadreria dei poeti passanti, Milano, Bompiani, 2009, seconda di copertina Manlio Sgalambro, Sull'idea di nazione in Catania. Non vi sarà facile, si può fare, lo facciamo. La città, le regole, la cultura, Catania, ANCE, 2010, pp. 49–50 Manlio Sgalambro, Dicerie in Franco Battiato, Don Gesualdo (allegato a Auguri don Gesualdo), Milano, Bompiani, 2010, pp. 7–10 Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione in Carlo Guarrera, Occhi aperti spalancati, Messina, Mesogea, 2011, pp. 101–105 Manlio Sgalambro, Nota critica in Anna Vasta, Di un fantasma e di mari, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 2011, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Nota in Georges Bataille, W.C., a cura di Antonio Contiero, Massa, Transeuropa, Massa, 2011, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Giampaolo Bellucci, Un grappolo di rose appese al sole, Villafranca Lunigiana (MS), Cicorivolta, 2011, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Selenia Bellavia, Pourparler, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 2012, p. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Apologia del teologo in Fabio Presutti, Deleuze e Sgalambro: dell'espressione avversa, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 2012, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Breve riflessione in Massimiliano Scuriatti, Mico è tornato coi baffi, Milano, Bietti, 2012, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Presentazione in Armando Rotoletti, Circoli di conversazione a Biancavilla, Modugno (BA), Arti Grafiche Favia, 2013, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Il senso della bellezza in Franco Battiato, Jonia me genuit. Discografia leggera, discografia classica, filmografia, pittura, Firenze, Della Bezuga, 2013, p. 168 Manlio Sgalambro, Moralità plutarchee in Domenico Trischitta, 1999, Catania, Il Garufi, 2013, p. 109 Manlio Sgalambro, La città dei morti in Luigi Spina, Monumentale. Un viaggio fotografico all'interno del gran camposanto di Messina, Milano, Electa, 2013, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Ghesia Bellavia, Fermo immagine, Catania, Il Garufi, 2014, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Sulla mia morte in Franco Battiato, Attraversando il bardo. Sguardi sull'aldilà, Milano, Bompiani, 2014, pp. 44–45 Album Manlio Sgalambro, Fun club, Milano, Sony, 2001 Singoli Manlio Sgalambro, La mer, Milano, Sony, 2000 Manlio Sgalambro, Me gustas tú, Milano, Sony, 2001 Manlio Sgalambro feat. Mab, La canzone della galassia, Milano, Sony, 2009 Collaborazioni Album testi (L'ombrello e la macchina da cucire, Breve invito a rinviare il suicidio, Piccolo pub, Fornicazione, Gesualdo da Venosa, Moto browniano, Tao, Un vecchio cameriere, L'esistenza di Dio) in Franco Battiato, L'ombrello e la macchina da cucire, Milano, EMI, 1995 testi (Di passaggio, Strani giorni, La cura, Ein Tag aus dem Leben des kleinen Johannes, Amata solitudine, Splendide previsioni, Ecco com'è che va il mondo, Segunda-feira, Memorie di Giulia, Serial killer) e voce (Di passaggio) in Franco Battiato, L'imboscata, Milano, Polygram, 1996 voce (Canzone chimica) in Franco Battiato, L'imboscata live tour (registrazione video di un concerto), Milano, Polygram, 1997 testo (Emma Bovary) in Patty Pravo, Notti, guai e libertà, Milano, Sony, 1998 testi (Shock in my town, Auto da fé, Casta diva, Il ballo del potere, La preda, Il mantello e la spiga, È stato molto bello, Quello che fu, Vite parallele, Shackleton) e voce (Shackleton) in Franco Battiato, Gommalacca, Milano, Polygram, 1998 testi (Medievale, Invito al viaggio) e voce (Invito al viaggio) in Franco Battiato, Fleurs. Esempi affini di scritture e simili, Milano, Universal, 1999 testi (Running against the grain, Bist du bei mir, La quiete dopo un addio, Personalità empirica, Il cammino interminabile, Lontananze d'azzurro, Sarcofagia, Scherzo in minore, Il potere del canto) e voce (Personalità empirica) in Franco Battiato, Ferro battuto, Milano, Sony, 2001 testo (Invasione di campo) in AA.VV., Invasioni, ???, New Scientist, 2001 testo (Come un sigillo) in Franco Battiato, Fleurs 3 (album), Milano, Sony, 2002 voce (Non dimenticar le mie parole) in Franco Battiato, Colonna sonora di Perduto amor (colonna sonora del film), Milano, Sony, 2003 voce (Shackleton, Accetta il consiglio) in Franco Battiato, Last summer dance (registrazione audio di un concerto), Milano, Sony, 2003 testi (Tra sesso e castità, Le aquile non volano a stormi, Ermeneutica, Fortezza Bastiani, Odore di polvere da sparo, I'm that, Conforto alla vita, 23 coppie di cromosomi, Apparenza e realtà, La porta dello spavento supremo) e voce (La porta dello spavento supremo) in Franco Battiato, Dieci stratagemmi. Attraversare il mare per ingannare il cielo, Milano, Sony, 2004 voce (La porta dello spavento supremo) in Franco Battiato, Un soffio al cuore di natura elettrica (registrazione audio e video di un concerto), Milano, Sony, 2005 testi (Il vuoto, I giorni della monotonia, Aspettando l'estate, Niente è come sembra, Tiepido aprile, The game is over, Io chi sono?, Stati di gioia) e dell'adattamento in italiano di Era l'inizio della primavera (da Aleksej Nikolaevič Tolstoj, It was in the early days of spring) in Franco Battiato, Il vuoto, Milano, Universal, 2007 testo (Maori legend) in Lilies on Mars, Lilies on Mars, 2008 testo (Il movimento del dare) in Fiorella Mannoia, Il movimento del dare, Milano, Sony, 2008 testi (Tutto l'universo obbedisce all'amore, Tibet) e dell'adattamento in italiano di Del suo veloce volo (da Antony Hegarthy, Frankenstein) in Franco Battiato, Fleurs 2, Universal, 2008 testo (Marie ti amiamo) in Carmen Consoli, Elettra, Milano, Universal, 2009 testi (Inneres Auge, 'U cuntu) e voce ('U cuntu) in Franco Battiato, Inneres Auge. Il tutto è più della somma delle sue parti, Milano, Universal, 2009 testo (Non conosco nessun Patrizio!) in Milva, Non conosco nessun Patrizio!, Milano, Universal, 2010 testo (Facciamo finta che sia vero) in Adriano Celentano, Facciamo finta che sia vero, Milano, Universal, 2011 testo (Eri con me) in Alice, Samsara, ???, Arecibo, 2012 testi (Un irresistibile richiamo, Testamento, Quand'ero giovane, Eri con me, Passacaglia, La polvere del branco, Caliti junku, Aurora, Il serpente, Apriti sesamo) in Franco Battiato, Apriti sesamo, Milano, Universal, 2012 Singoli testi (Strani giorni, Decline and fall of the Roman empire) in Franco Battiato, Strani giorni, Milano, Polygram, 1996 testo in Patty Pravo, Emma Bovary, Milano, Sony, 1998 testi (Shock in my town, Stage door) in Franco Battiato, Shock in my town, Milano, Polygram, 1998 testi (Il ballo del potere, Stage door, Emma, L'incantesimo) in Franco Battiato, Il ballo del potere, Milano, Polygram, 1998 testi (Running against the grain, Sarcofagia, In trance) in Franco Battiato, Running against the grain, Milano, Sony, 2001 testo in Franco Battiato, Il vuoto, Milano, Universal, 2007 testo in Franco Battiato feat. Carmen Consoli, Tutto l'universo obbedisce all'amore, Milano, Universal, 2008 testo in Franco Battiato, Inneres Auge, Milano, Universal, 2009 testo in Franco Battiato, Passacaglia, Milano, Universal, 2012 Opere teatrali testi in Franco Battiato, Il cavaliere dell'intelletto, inedito (prima rappresentazione: Palermo, 20 settembre 1994) testi e attore in Martin Kleist, Socrate impazzito, inedito (prima rappresentazione: Catania, 30 luglio 1995) testi e attore in Franco Battiato, Gli Schopenhauer, inedito (prima rappresentazione: Fano (PU), 8 agosto 1998) attore in Igor' Fëdorovič Stravinskij, L'histoire du soldat, inedito, 1999 (prima rappresentazione: Roma, 4 febbraio 2000) libretto e voce (Corpi in movimento, La mer) in Franco Battiato, Campi magnetici. I numeri non si possono amare, Milano, Sony, 2000 (prima rappresentazione: Firenze, 13 giugno 2000) voce (Volare è un'arte, Negli abissi, Pratica di mare, A tu per tu con il Mig, Verso Bologna, Simulacro) in Pippo Pollina, Ultimo volo. Orazione civile per Ustica, Bologna, Storie di Note, 2007 (prima rappresentazione: Bologna, 27 giugno 2007) attore in Manlio Sgalambro - Rosalba Bentivoglio - Carlo Guarrera, Frammenti per versi e voce, inedito (prima rappresentazione: Catania, 7 maggio 2009) testi in Franco Battiato, Telesio. Opera in due atti e un epilogo, Milano, Sony, 2011 (prima rappresentazione: Cosenza, 7 maggio 2011) Film sceneggiatura e attore (Martino Alliata) in Franco Battiato, Perduto amor, Giarre (CT), L'Ottava, 2003 sceneggiatura e attore (nobile senese) in Franco Battiato, Musikanten, Giarre (CT), L'Ottava, 2005 sceneggiatura in Franco Battiato, Niente è come sembra, Milano, Bompiani, 2007 Documentari intervento in Daniele Consoli, La verità sul caso del signor Ciprì e Maresco, Zelig, 2004 intervento in Franco Battiato, Auguri don Gesualdo, Milano, Bompiani, 2010 intervento in Massimiliano Perrotta, Sicilia di sabbia, Movie Factory, 2011 intervento in Franco Battiato, Attraversando il bardo. Sguardi sull'aldilà, Milano, Bompiani, 2014 Videoclip attore in Franco Battiato, L'ombrello e la macchina da cucire, 1995 attore in Franco Battiato, Di passaggio, 1996 attore in Franco Battiato, Strani giorni, 1996 attore in Franco Battiato, Shock in my town, 1998 attore in Franco Battiato, Running against the grain, 2001 attore in Franco Battiato, Bist du bei mir, 2001 attore in Franco Battiato, Ermeneutica, 2004 attore in Franco Battiato, La porta dello spavento supremo, 2004 attore in Franco Battiato, Il vuoto, 2007 attore in Franco Battiato, Inneres Auge, 2009 Programmi televisivi Franco Battiato, Bitte, keine Réclame, 2004 Bibliografia Libri Francesco Saverio Niso, Comunità dello sguardo. Halbwachs, Sgalambro, Cordero, Torino, Giappichelli, 2001 Mariacatena De Leo - Luigi Ingaliso, Nell'antro del filosofo. Dialogo con Manlio Sgalambro, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 2002 Lina Passione, La notte e il tempo. Divagazioni su Franco Battiato, Manlio Sgalambro e… altro, Catania, CUECM, 2009 Alessandro Max Cantello, Sgalambro speaks. Uno scherzo mimetico che possa introdurre ad una filosofia, ???, Mas Club, 2014 Manlio Sgalambro. L'ultimo chierico, a cura di Rita Fulco, Messina, Mesogea, 2015 Caro misantropo. Saggi e testimonianze per Manlio Sgalambro, a cura di Antonio Carulli - Francesco Iannello, Napoli, La Scuola di Pitagora, 2015 Salvatore Massimo Fazio, Regressione suicida. Dell'abbandono disperato di Emil Cioran e Manlio Sgalambro, Barrafranca (EN), Bonfirraro, 2016 Manlio Sgalambro. Breve invito all'opera, a cura di Davide Miccione, Caltagirone (CT), Lettere da Qalat, 2017 Antonio Carulli, Introduzione a Sgalambro, Genova, Il Melangolo, 2017 Patrizia Trovato - Antonio Carulli - Piercarlo Necchi - Manuel Pérez Cornejo, La piccola verità. Quattro saggi su Manlio Sgalambro, Milano, Mimesis, 2019 Saggi Sergio Zavoli, Le ombre della sera in Di questo passo. Cinquecento domande per capire dove andiamo, Torino, Nuova ERI, 1993, pp. 377–389 Calogero Rizzo, De consolatione theologie in Massimo Iiritano, Sergio Quinzio. Profezie di un'esistenza, Soveria Mannelli (CZ), Rubettino, 2000, pp. 105–126 Armando Matteo, Manlio Sgalambro: il dovere dell'empietà in Della fede dei laici. Il cristianesimo di fronte alla mentalità postmoderna, Soveria Mannelli (CZ), Rubettino, 2001, pp. 27–34 Stefano Lanuzza, Il filosofo insulare in Erranze in Sicilia, Napoli, Guida, 2003, pp. 43–55 Leonor Sáez Méndez, Zwischen der kritischen Bedingung der praktischen Erfahrung und der Doktrin: Dechiffrierung der Perversion (Zwei Beispiele) in Kant ein illusionist? Das retorsive und kompositive Verfahren der kantischen Urteilskraft nach dem philosophischen Empirismus, Murcia (Spagna), Universidad de Murcia, 2010, pp. 201–204 Pino Aprile, La morte del sole in Giù al sud. Perché i terroni salveranno l'Italia, Segrate (MI), Piemme, 2011, pp. 331–338 Marco Risadelli, Note su “Dell'indifferenza in materia di società” di Manlio Sgalambro in Alessandra Mallamo - Angelo Nizza, Polisofia, Roma, Nuova Cultura, 2012, pp. 17–31 Giuseppe Raciti, Until the end of the world. Sgalambro lettore di Spengler in Per la critica della notte. Saggio sul “Tramonto dell’Occidente” di Oswald Spengler, Milano, Mimesis, 2014, pp. 131–135 Articoli Enrico Arosio, Ora Sgalambro il mondo in L'Espresso, n. 7, 21 febbraio 1988, pp. 141–145 Stefano Lanuzza, Il pensiero ipocondriaco in Il Ponte, IVL, n. 2, febbraio 1990, pp. 146–148 Gerd Bergfleth, Finis mundi. Manlio Sgalambro und der Weltuntergang in Der Pfahl. Jahrbuch aus dem Niemandsland zwischen Kunst und Wissenschaft, n. 5, 1991, pp. 20–56 Alberto Corda, Profilo di Manlio Sgalambro, filosofo “irregolare” in Arenaria, VIII, n. 22, gennaio-aprile 1992, pp. 81–82 Giuseppe Raciti, Sgalambro maestro “cattivo” per elezione in Ideazione, IV, n. 6, 1997, pp. 215–216 Ferdinando Raffaele, Intorno alla creatività filosofica. A colloquio con il filosofo Manlio Sgalambro in Parolalibera, n. 8, 1998, pp. 17–19 Francesco Saverio Nisio, Sgalambro, l'unico che canta. Mille sguardi, II in Democrazia e diritto. Guerra e individuo, n. 1, 1999, pp. 190–202 Marcello Faletra, Dialogo con Manlio Sgalambro, Cyberzone n° 20, 2006. Fabio Presutti, Manlio Sgalambro, Giorgio Agamben: on metaphysical suspension of language and the destiny of its inorganic re-absorption in Italica, v. 85, nn. 2-3, 2008, pp. 243–272 Concetta Bonini, Manlio Sgalambro. Il cavaliere dell'intelletto in Freetime. Sicilia, febbraio-marzo 2014, pp. 88–91 Marcello Faletra, La pistola di Sgalambro, 2014 in http://www.peppinoimpastato.com/visualizza.asp?val=2115 Marcello Faletra, L'azzardo del pensiero o il filosofo della crudeltà: Manlio Sgalambro. Cyberzone n° 20 2006. Marcello Faletra, In ricordo di Manlio Sgalambro, Artribune, 07/03/ 2017. Manuel Pérez Cornejo, En la estela de Schopenhauer y Mainländer: la filosofía «peorista» de Manlio Sgalambro in Schopenhaueriana. Revista española de estudios sobre Schopenhauer, n. 3, 2018, pp. 9–31 Tesi di laurea Salvatore Massimo Fazio, Cioran e Sgalambro: un confronto, Università degli Studi di Catania, a.a. ??? Fatima Scaglione, Battiato - Sgalambro. Tra musica e filosofia, Università degli Studi di Palermo, a.a. 2006-2007 Cecilia Comparoni, L'impossibilità di essere consolati. L'itinerario tragico di Manlio Sgalambro, Università degli Studi di Genova, a.a. 2014-2015 Filmografia Guido Cionini, Manlio Sgalambro. Il consolatore, inedito (2006) Guido Cionini, Another side of Sgalambro, inedito (2008) Marcello Faletra, Mario Bellone, Manlio Sgalambro. Del pensare breve, inedito (2015) Note ^ Franco Battiato su Storia della musica.it ^ Articolo su Repubblica, Manlio Sgalambro: adesso il filosofo diventa crooner ^ Intervista a Battiato e Sgalambro - YouTube ^ Intervista a Manlio Sgalambro: Il filosofo rock che dà del “lei” a Battiato www.livesicilia.it | elena giordano  Manlio Sgalambro, l'ultima intervista ^ "Teoria della canzone", pag.60, Bompiani, e la prefazione a "La filosofia delle università", Adelphi ^ Sgalambro, il ricordo commosso di Cacciari: “Con lui incontro straordinario” – Video Il Fatto Quotidiano TV, su tv.ilfattoquotidiano.it. URL consultato il 30 maggio 2014 (archiviato dall'url originale il 31 maggio 2014). ^ “A un tratto ci si accorge di quella cosa che chiamiamo pensare”: Addio a Sgalambro. La sua ultima intervista. URL consultato il 22 novembre 2014. ^ cfr. "De mundo pessimo", "Frammenti di storia dell'empietismo", "Trattato dell'empietà" Adelphi  GAP Speciali. Manlio Sgalambro - Un viaggio oltre il luogo comune - Rai Scuola  Mariacatena De Leo & Luigi Ingaliso, Nell'antro del filosofo: dialogo con Manlio Sgalambro (Prova d'autore, 2002). ^ È morto Manlio Sgalambro, il filosofo di Franco Battiato, radiomusik.it, 6 marzo 2014. ^ Franco Battiato choc a Napoli: «Sento la fine vicina, meglio cogliere il giorno». URL consultato il 22 novembre 2014. ^ Sgalambro, il filosofo che cantò il nichilismo  Giovanni Tesio, "In ginocchio davanti a Nietzsche", TuttoLibri, 2/6/2012 ^ "La conoscenza del peggio", pag.58, Adelphi ^ La scrittura aforistica di Manlio Sgalambro | ^ Intervista a Manlio Sgalambro:: LaRecherche.it ^ Paralipomeni all'irrazionalismo Archiviato il 7 marzo 2014 in Internet Archive. ^ Giorgio Calcagno, Sgalambro: il filosofo è uno spione (da La Stampa del 28 agosto 1996).  Francesco Battistini, Sgalambro: Sciascia addio, non servi più, Corriere della Sera, 11 febbraio 2005. ^ Carlo Formenti, Ferrarotti accusa: «Sgalambro neoreazionario», in “Corriere della Sera”, 20 dicembre 1995 ^ Liliana Madeo, Battiato: note per un filosofo (da La Stampa del 19 settembre 1994). ^ Marinella Venegoni, Così Sgalambro canta la sua filosofia (da La Stampa del 20 ottobre 2001) Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Manlio Sgalambro Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Manlio Sgalambro Collegamenti esterni Sito ufficiale, su sgalambro.altervista.org. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Manlio Sgalambro, su AllMusic, All Media Network. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Manlio Sgalambro, su Discogs, Zink Media. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Manlio Sgalambro, su MusicBrainz, MetaBrainz Foundation. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Manlio Sgalambro, su Internet Movie Database, IMDb.com. Modifica su Wikidata Manlio Sgalambro. Il filosofo cantante maestro dell'ironia: "Sono un uomo felice di stare su quest'Isola", in la Repubblica, 20 febbraio 2011. Incontro con Sgalambro (PDF), in Le conversazioni di Perelandra, n. 3-4, gennaio-agosto 2002. Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 79045628 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 8158 7237 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\057374 · LCCN (EN) n82105664 · GND (DE) 111680166 · BNF (FR) cb120279706 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1626691 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n82105664 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Letteratura Portale Letteratura Musica Portale Musica Sicilia Portale Sicilia Categorie: Cantautori popFilosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloScrittori italiani del XX secoloScrittori italiani del XXI secoloPoeti italiani del XX secoloPoeti italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1924Morti nel 2014Nati il 9 dicembreMorti il 6 marzoNati a LentiniMorti a CataniaParolieri italianiCantautori italiani del XX secoloAforisti italianiPersone legate all'Università di CataniaEditori italianiInsegnanti italiani del XX secoloAttori italiani del XXI secoloLibrettisti italianiSceneggiatori italianiPoeti in lingua sicilianaStudenti dell'Università di Catania[altre] Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Sgalamabro," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

shaftesbury, Lord, in full, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, title of Anthony Ashley Cooper, English philosopher and politician who originated the moral sense theory. He was born at Wimborne St. Giles, Dorsetshire. As a Country Whig he served in the House of Commons for three years and later, as earl, monitored meetings of the House of Lords. Shaftesbury introduced into British moral philosophy the notion of a moral sense, a mental faculty unique to human beings, involving reflection and feeling and constituting their ability to discern right and wrong. He sometimes represents the moral sense as analogous to a purported aesthetic sense, a special capacity by which we perceive, through our emotions, the proportions and harmonies of which, on his Platonic view, beauty is composed. For Shaftesbury, every creature has a “private good or interest,” an end to which it is naturally disposed by its constitution. But there are other goods as well  notably, the public good and the good without qualification of a sentient being. An individual creature’s goodness is defined by the tendency of its “natural affections” to contribute to the “universal system” of nature of which it is a part  i.e., their tendency to promote the public good. Because human beings can reflect on actions and affections, including their own and others’, they experience emotional responses not only to physical stimuli but to these mental objects as well e.g., to the thought of one’s compassion or kindness. Thus, they are capable of perceiving  and acquiring through their actions  a particular species of goodness, namely, virtue. In the virtuous person, the person of integrity, natural appetites and affections are in harmony with each other wherein lies her private good and in harmony with the public interest. Shaftesbury’s attempted reconciliation of selflove and benevolence is in part a response to the egoism of Hobbes, who argued that everyone is in fact motivated by self-interest. His defining morality in terms of psychological and public harmony is also a reaction to the divine voluntarism of his former tutor, Locke, who held that the laws of nature and morality issue from the will of God. On Shaftesbury’s view, morality exists independently of religion, but belief in God serves to produce the highest degree of virtue by nurturing a love for the universal system. Shaftesbury’s theory led to a general refinement of eighteenth-century ideas about moral feelings; a theory of the moral sense emerged, whereby sentiments are  under certain conditions  perceptions of, or constitutive of, right and wrong. In addition to several essays collected in three volumes under the title Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times second edition, 1714, Shaftesbury also wrote stoical moral and religious meditations reminiscent of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. His ideas on moral sentiments exercised considerable influence on the ethical theories of Hutcheson and Hume, who later worked out in detail their own accounts of the moral sense.  H. P. Grice, “My favourite Cooper.”

shyreswood: “I prefer the spelling shyreswood, since it SAYS what ‘sherwood’ merely implicates.” -- Sherwood, William, also called William Shyreswood, English logician who taught logic at Oxford and at Paris between 1235 and 1250. He was the earliest of the three great “summulist” writers, the other two whom he influenced strongly being Peter of Spain and Lambert of Auxerre. His main works are “Introductiones in Logicam,” “Syncategoremata,” “De insolubilibus,” and “Obligationes.” Some serious doubts have recently arisen about the authorship of the latter work. Since M. Grabmann published Sherwood’s Introductiones, philosophers have paid considerable attention to this seminal Griceian. While the first part of Introductiones offer the basic ideas of Aristotle’s Organon, and the latter part neatly lays out the Sophistical Refutations, the final tract expounds the doctrine of the four properties of a term. First, signification. Second, supposition. Third, conjunction, Fourth, appellation -- hence the label ‘terminist’ for this sort of logic. These logico-semantic discussions, together with the discussions of syncategorematic words, constitute the “logica moderna,” (Grice’s ‘mdoernism’) as opposed to the more strictly Aristotelian contents of the earlier logica vetus (Grice’s neo-traditionalism) and logica nova (“It took me quite a while to explain to Strawson the distinction between ‘logica nova’ and ‘logica moderna,’ only to have him tell me, “worry not, Grice – I’ll be into ‘logica vetus’ anyways!””. The doctrine of properties of terms and the analysis of syncategorematic terms, especially those of ‘all’ (or every) ‘no’ (or not or it is not the case) and ‘nothing’, ‘only’, ‘not’, ‘begins’ and ‘ceases (to eat iron) ‘necessarily’, ‘if’ (Latin ‘si,’ Grecian ‘ei’), ‘and’ (Latin ‘et’, Grecian ‘kai’) and ‘or’ (Latin ‘vel’)  may be said to constitute Sherwood’s or Shyrewood’s philosophy of logic. Shyrewood not only distinguishes categorematic descriptive and syncategorematic logical words but also shows how some terms are used categorematically in some contexts and syncategorematically in others – “he doesn’t explain which, and that’s one big map in his opus.”– Grice. He recognizes the importance of the order of words (hence Grice, ‘be orderly’) and of the scope of logical functors; he also anticipates the variety of composite and divided senses of propositions. Obligationes, if indeed his, attempts to state conditions under which a formal disputation may take place. De Insolubilibus deals with paradoxes of self-reference and with ways of solving them. Understanding Sherwood’s logic is important for understanding the later medieval developments of logica moderna down to Occam whom Grice laughed at (“modified Occam’s razor.”). Refs.: Grice, “Shyreswood at Oxford.”

All figures of rhetoric

All fallacies – argumentum ad:

ship of Theseus: the ship of the Grecian hero Theseus, which, according to Plutarch “Life of Theseus,” 23, the Athenians preserved by gradually replacing its timbers. A classic debate ensued concerning identity over time. Suppose a ship’s timbers are replaced one by one over a period of time; at what point, if any, does it cease to be the same ship? What if the ship’s timbers, on removal, are used to build a new ship, identical in structure with the first: which ship has the best claim to be the original ship?

shpet: phenomenologist and highly regarded friend of Husserl. Shpet plays a major role in the development of phenomenology. Graduating from Kiev  in 6, Shpet accompanied his mentor Chelpanov to Moscow, ommencing graduate studies at Moscow  M.A., 0; Ph.D., 6. He attends Husserl’s seminars at Göttingen during 213, out of which developed a continuing friendship between the two, recorded in correspondence extending through 8. In 4 Shpet published a meditation, “Iavlenie i smysl,” nspired by Husserl’s Logical Investigations and, especially, Ideas I, which had appeared in 3. Between 4 and 7 he published six additional books on such disparate topics as the concept of history, Herzen, philosophy, aesthetics, ethnic psychology, and language. He founds and edited the philosophical yearbook Mysl’ i slovo Thought and Word between 8 and 1, publishing an important article on skepticism in it. He was arrested and sentenced to internal exile. Under these conditions he made a running commentary of Hegel’s Phenomenology. He was executed.

sidgwick:  English philosopher. Best known for “The Methods of Ethics,” he also wrote “Outlines of the History of Ethics.” In the “Methods,” Sidgwick tries to assess the rationality of the main ways in which ordinary people go about making this or that moral decision. Sidgwick thinks that our common “methods of ethics” fall into three main patterns. The first pattern is articulated by the philosophical theory known as intuitionism. This is the view that we can just see straight off either what particular act is right or what binding rule or general principle we ought to follow. A second pattern is spelled out by what self-love or egoism, the view that we ought in each act to get as much good as we can for ourselves. – vide: H. P. Grice, “The principle of conversational self-love and the principle of conversational benevolence,” H. P.  Grice, “Conversational benevolence, not conversational self-love.” The third widely used method is represented by utilitarianism, the view that we ought in each case to bring about as much good as possible for everyone affected. Can any or all of the methods prescribed by these views be rationally defended? And how are they related to one another? By framing his philosophical questions in these terms, Sidgwick makes it centrally important to examine the chief philosophical theories of morality in the light of the common-sense morals of his time. Sidgwick thinks that no theory wildly at odds with common-sense morality would be acceptable. Intuitionism, a theory originating with Butler (of ‘self-love and benevolence’ fame), transmitted by Reid, and most systematically expounded during the Victorian era by Whewell, is widely held to be the best available defense of Christian morals. Egoism (Self-love) was thought by many to be the clearest pattern of practical (or means-end) rationality and is frequently said to be compatible with Christianity. And J. S. Mill had argues that utilitarianism is both rational and in accord with common sense. But whatever their relation to ordinary morality, the three methods or patterns seem to be seriously at odds with one another. Examining all the chief commonsense precepts and rules of morality, such as that promises ought to be kept, Sidgwick argues that none is truly self-evident or intuitively certain. Each fails to guide us at certain points where we expect it to answer our practical questions. Utilitarianism, he found, could provide a complicated method for filling these gaps. But what ultimately justifies utilitarianism is certain very general axioms seen intuitively to be true. Among them are the principles that what is right in one case must be right in any similar case, and that we ought to aim at good generally, not just at some particular part of it. Thus intuitionism and utilitarianism can be reconciled. When taken together they yield a complete and justifiable method of ethics that is in accord with common sense. What then of egoism and self-love? Self love and egoirm can provide as complete a method as utilitarianism, and it also involves a self-evident axiom. But  the results of egoism and self-love often contradict those of utilitarianism. Hence there is a serious problem. The method that instructs us to act always for the good generally and the method that tells one to act solely for one’s own good are equally rational. Since the two methods give contradictory directions, while each method rests on self-evident axioms, it seems that practical reason is fundamentally incoherent. Sidgwick could see no way to solve the problem. Sidgwick’s bleak conclusion is not generally accepted (especially at Oxford), but his Methods is widely viewed as one of the best works of moral philosophy ever written in what Grice calls ‘insular’ philosophy (as opposed to mainland philosophy).  Sidgwick’s account of classical utilitarianism is unsurpassed. Sidwick’s discussions of the general status of morality and of particular moral concepts are enduring models of clarity and acumen. His insights about the relations between egoism (self-love) and utilitarianism have stimulated much valuable research. And his way of framing moral problems, by asking about the relations between commonsense beliefs and the best available theories, has set much of the agenda for ethics. 

sì/no -- “sic” et “ne” – modus interrogativus. Grice: “Oddly that the Italians call themselves as speaking the ‘lingua del si,’ contra the Gallics, who speak the ‘lingua del’oc,” or worse, the ‘lingua d’oil”!! -- Grice: Or yes/no question. “Cicero has this as ‘sic’ and ‘non.’ For Grice, tertium non datur. Grice’s example is “Have you stopped beating  your wife, Smith?” “Smith is tricked into having to say ‘yes,’ which makes him a criminal, or “no,” which doesn’t but *implicates* him in a crime.” “The explicit cancellation would be, “No, because I never started it.” – “But usually Smith is never so intelligently Griceian like *that*! Vide: modus interrogatives.  Grice finds the formalisation of a yes-no question more complicated than that of an x-question. Like Carnap, he concludes that the distinction is otiose, because a yes/no question also is after a variable to be filled by a definite value, regarding the truth-value of the proposition as a whole rather than a part thereof. Grice: “While I’ll casually use ‘yes,’ I’m well aware that the ‘s,’ as every German schoolboy knows, is otiose – it’s ‘yeah’ which is the correct form!” -- Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Cicero on ‘sic’ and ‘ne’.” BANC, Speranza, “First time in Corpus?”

signum – Grice: “I prefer token, so Anglo-Saxon! Plus I’m a ‘teacher’ – “to teach philosophy” --” whose explorations on the Nicomachean Ethics, in one of their earlier incarnations, as a set of lecture notes, sees me through terms of teaching Aristotle's moral theory.” “My own philosophical life in this period involves two especially important aspects.” ROBBING PETER TO PAY PAUL.. “The first is my prolonged collaboration with my tutee at St. John’s, P. F. Strawson.”“Strawson’s and my efforts are partly directed towards the giving of joint seminars.”“Strawson and I stage a number of joint seminars on topics related to the notions of meaning, categories, and logical form.” “But my association with P. F. Strawson is much more than an alliance for the purpose of teaching.” -- theory of signs, the philosophical and scientific theory of information-carrying entities, communication, and information transmission. The term ‘semiotic’ was introduced by Locke for the science of signs and signification. The term became more widely used as a result of the influential work of Peirce and Charles Morris. With regard to linguistic signs, three areas of semiotic were distinguished: pragmatics  the study of the way people, animals, or machines such as computers use signs; semantics  the study of the relations between signs and their meanings, abstracting from their use; and syntax  the study of the relations among signs themselves, abstracting both from use and from meaning. In Europe, the near-equivalent term ‘semiology’ was introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure, the Swiss linguist. Broadly, a sign is any information-carrying entity, including linguistic and animal signaling tokens, maps, road signs, diagrams, pictures, models, etc. Examples include smoke as a sign of fire, and a red light at a highway intersection as a sign to stop. Linguistically, vocal aspects of speech such as prosodic features intonation, stress and paralinguistic features loudness and tone, gestures, facial expressions, etc., as well as words and sentences, are signs in the most general sense. Peirce defined a sign as “something that stands for something in some respect or capacity.” Among signs, he distinguished symbols, icons, and indices. A symbol, or conventional sign, is a sign, typical of natural language forms, that lacks any significant relevant physical correspondence with or resemblance to the entities to which the form refers manifested by the fact that quite different forms may refer to the same class of objects, and for which there is no correlation between the occurrence of the sign and its referent. An index, or natural sign, is a sign whose occurrence is causally or statistically correlated with occurrences of its referent, and whose production is not intentional. Thus, yawning is a natural sign of sleepiness; a bird call may be a natural sign of alarm. Linguistically, loudness with a rising pitch is a sign of anger. An icon is a sign whose form corresponds to or resembles its referent or a characteristic of its referent. For instance, a tailor’s swatch is an icon by being a sign that resembles a fabric in color, pattern, and texture. A linguistic example is onomatopoeia  as with ‘buzz’. In general, there are conventional and cultural aspects to a sign being an icon.  signatum: Cf. “to sign” as a verb – from French. Grice uses designatum, too – but more specifically within the ‘propositio’ as a compound of a subjectum and a predicatum. The subject-item indicates a thing; and the predicate-item designates a property. As Grice notes, there is a distinction between Aristotle’s use, in De Int., of ‘sumbolon,’ for which Aristotle sometimes means ‘semeion,’ and their Roman counterparts, ‘signum’ sounds otiose enough. But ‘significo’ does not. There is this –fico thing that sounds obtrusive. The Romans, however, were able to distinguish between ‘make a sign,’ and just ‘signal.’ The point is important when Grice tries to apply the Graeco-Roman philosophical terminology to a lexeme which does not belong in there: “mean.” His example is someone in pain, uttering “Oh.” If he later gains voluntary control, by uttering “Oh” he means that he is in pain, and even at a later stage, provided he learns ‘lupe,’ he may utter the expression which is somewhat correlated in a non-iconic fashion with something which iconically is a vehicle for U to mean that he is in pain. In this way, in a communication-system, a communication-device, such as “Oh” does for the state of affairs something that the state of affairs cannot do for itself, govern the addresee’s thoughts and behaviour (very much as the Oxfordshire cricket team does for Oxfordshire what Oxfordshire cannot do for herself, viz. to engage in a game of cricket. There’s rae-presentatum, for you! Short and Lewis have ‘signare,’ from ‘signum,’ and which they render as ‘to set a mark upon, to mark, mark out, designate (syn.: noto, designo),’ Lit. A. In gen. (mostly poet. and in post-Aug. prose): discrimen non facit neque signat linea alba, Lucil. ap. Non. 405, 17: “signata sanguine pluma est,” Ov. M. 6, 670: “ne signare quidem aut partiri limite campum Fas erat,” Verg. G. 1, 126: “humum limite mensor,” Ov. M. 1, 136; id. Am. 3, 8, 42: “moenia aratro,” id. F. 4, 819: “pede certo humum,” to print, press, Hor. A. P. 159; cf.: “vestigia summo pulvere,” to mark, imprint, Verg. G. 3, 171: auratā cyclade humum, Prop. 4 (5), 7, 40. “haec nostro signabitur area curru,” Ov. A. A. 1, 39: “locum, ubi ea (cistella) excidit,” Plaut. Cist. 4, 2, 28: “caeli regionem in cortice signant,” mark, cut, Verg. G. 2, 269: “nomina saxo,” Ov. M. 8, 539: “rem stilo,” Vell. 1, 16, 1: “rem carmine,” Verg. A. 3, 287; “for which: carmine saxum,” Ov. M. 2, 326: “cubitum longis litteris,” Plaut. Rud. 5, 2, 7: “ceram figuris,” to imprint, Ov. M. 15, 169: “cruor signaverat herbam,” had stained, id. ib. 10, 210; cf. id. ib. 12, 125: “signatum sanguine pectus,” id. A. A. 2, 384: “dubiā lanugine malas,” id. M. 13, 754: “signata in stirpe cicatrix,” Verg. G. 2, 379: “manibus Procne pectus signata cruentis,” id. ib. 4, 15: “vocis infinitios sonos paucis notis,” Cic. Rep. 3, 2, 3: “visum objectum imprimet et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem,” id. Fat. 19, 43.— B. In partic. 1. To mark with a seal; to seal, seal up, affix a seal to a thing (usually obsignare): “accepi a te signatum libellum,” Cic. Att. 11, 1, 1: “volumina,” Hor. Ep. 1, 13, 2: locellum tibi signatum remisi, Caes. ap. Charis. p. 60 P.: “epistula,” Nep. Pel. 3, 2: “arcanas tabellas,” Ov. Am. 2, 15, 15: “signatis quicquam mandare tabellis,” Tib. 4, 7, 7: “lagenam (anulus),” Mart. 9, 88, 7: “testamentum,” Plin. Ep. 2, 20, 8 sq.; cf. Mart. 5, 39, 2: “nec nisi signata venumdabatur (terra),” Plin. 35, 4, 14, § 33.—Absol., Mart. 10, 70, 7; Quint. 5, 7, 32; Suet. Ner. 17.— 2. To mark with a stamp; hence, a. Of money, to stamp, to coin: “aes argentum aurumve publice signanto,” Cic. Leg. 3, 3, 6; cf.: “qui primus ex auro denarium signavit ... Servius rex primus signavit aes ... Signatum est nota pecudum, unde et pecunia appellata ... Argentum signatum est anno, etc.,” Plin. 33, 3, 13, § 44: “argentum signatum,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 25, § 63; Quint. 5, 10, 62; 5, 14, 26: “pecunia signata Illyriorum signo,” Liv. 44, 27, 9: “denarius signatus Victoriā,” Plin. 33, 3, 13, § 46: “sed cur navalis in aere Altera signata est,” Ov. F. 1, 230: “milia talentūm argenti non signati formā, sed rudi pondere,” Curt. 5, 2, 11.— Hence, b. Poet.: “signatum memori pectore nomen habe,” imprinted, impressed, Ov. H. 13, 66: “(filia) quae patriā signatur imagine vultus,” i. e. closely resembles her father, Mart. 6, 27, 3.— c. To stamp, i. e. to license, invest with official authority (late Lat.): “quidam per ampla spatia urbis ... equos velut publicos signatis, quod dicitur, calceis agitant,” Amm. 14, 6, 16.— 3. Pregn., to distinguish, adorn, decorate (poet.): “pater ipse suo superūm jam signat honore,” Verg. A. 6, 781 Heyne: caelum corona, Claud. Nupt. Hon. et Mar. 273. to point out, signify, indicate, designate, express (rare; more usually significo, designo; in Cic. only Or. 19, 64, where dignata is given by Non. 281, 10; “v. Meyer ad loc.): translatio plerumque signandis rebus ac sub oculos subiciendis reperta est,” Quint. 8, 6, 19: “quotiens suis verbis signare nostra voluerunt (Graeci),” id. 2, 14, 1; cf.: “appellatione signare,” id. 4, 1, 2: “utrius differentiam,” id. 6, 2, 20; cf. id. 9, 1, 4; 12, 10, 16: “nomen (Caieta) ossa signat,” Verg. A. 7, 4: “fama signata loco est,” Ov. M. 14, 433: “miratrixque sui signavit nomine terras,” designated, Luc. 4, 655; cf.: “(Earinus) Nomine qui signat tempora verna suo,” Mart. 9, 17, 4: “Turnus ut videt ... So signari oculis,” singled out, looked to, Verg. A. 12, 3: signare responsum, to give a definite or distinct answer, Sen. Ben. 7, 16, 1.—With rel.-clause: “memoria signat in quā regione quali adjutore legatoque fratre meo usus sit,” Vell. 2, 115.— B. To distinguish, recognize: “primi clipeos mentitaque tela Adgnoscunt, atque ora sono discordia signant,” Verg. A. 2, 423; cf.: “sonis homines dignoscere,” Quint. 11, 3, 31: “animo signa quodcumque in corpore mendum est,” Ov. R. Am. 417.— C. To seal, settle, establish, confirm, prescribe (mostly poet.): “signanda sunt jura,” Prop. 3 (4), 20, 15. “signata jura,” Luc. 3, 302: jura Suevis, Claud. ap. Eutr. 1, 380; cf.: “precati deos ut velint ea (vota) semper solvi semperque signari,” Plin. Ep. 10, 35 (44). To close, end: “qui prima novo signat quinquennia lustro,” Mart. 4, 45, 3.—Hence, A. signan-ter , adv. (acc. to II. A.), expressly, clearly, distinctly (late Lat. for the class. significanter): “signanter et breviter omnia indicare,” Aus. Grat. Act. 4: “signanter et proprie dixerat,” Hier. adv. Jovin. 1, 13 fin. signātus, a, um, P. a. 1. (Acc. to I. B. 1. sealed; hence) Shut up, guarded, preserved (mostly ante- and post-class.): signata sacra, Varr. ap. Non. 397, 32: limina. Prop. 4 (5), 1, 145. Chrysidem negat signatam reddere, i. e. unharmed, intact, pure, Lucil. ap. Non. 171, 6; cf.: “assume de viduis fide pulchram, aetate signatam,” Tert. Exhort. 12.— 2. (Acc. to II. A.) Plain, clear, manifest (post-class. for “significans” – a back formation!): “quid expressius atque signatius in hanc causam?” Tert. Res. Carn.Adv.: signātē , clearly, distinctly (post-class.): “qui (veteres) proprie atque signate locuti sunt,” Gell. 2, 6, 6; Macr. S. 6, 7 Comp.: “signatius explicare aliquid,” Amm. 23, 6, 1. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Sign and sign-making – the Roman signi-ficare, and beyond.” significatum: or better ‘signatum.’ Grice knew that in old Roman, signatum was intransitive, as originally ‘significatum’ was – “He is signifying,” i. e. making signs. In the Middle Ages it was applied to ‘utens’ of this or that expression, as was an actum, ‘agitur,’ Thus an expression was not said to ‘signify’ in the same way. Grice plays with the expression-communication distinction. When dealing with a lexeme that does NOT belong in the Graeco-Roman tradition, that of “mean,” he is never sure. His doubts were hightlighted in essays on “Grice without an audience.” While Grice explicitly says that a ‘word’ is not a sign, he would use ‘signify’ at a later stage, including the implicaturum as part of the significatum. There is indeed an entry for signĭfĭcātĭo, f. significare. L and S render it, unhelpfully, as “a pointing out, indicating, denoting, signifying; an expression, indication, mark, sign, token, = indicium, signum, ἐπισημασία, etc., freq. and class. As with Stevenson’s ‘communico,’ Grice goes sraight to ‘signĭfĭco,’ also dep. “signĭfĭcor,” f. ‘significare,’ from signum-facere, to make sign, signum-facio, I make sign, which L and S render as to signify, which is perhaps not too helpful. Grice, if not the Grecians, knew that. Strictly, L and S render significare as to show by signs; to show, point out, express, publish, make known, indicate; to intimate, notify, signify, etc. Note that the cognate signify almost comes last, but not least, if not first. Enough to want to coin a word to do duty for them all. Which is what Grice (and the Grecians) can, but the old Romans cannot, with mean. If that above were not enough, L and S go on, also, to betoken, prognosticate, foreshow, portend, mean (syn. praedico), as in to betoken a change of weather (post-Aug.): “ventus Africus tempestatem significat, etc.,”cf. Grice on those dark clouds mean a storm is coming.  Short and Lewis go on, to say that significare may be rendered as to call, name; to mean, import, signify. Hence, ‘signĭfĭcans,’ in rhet. lang., of speech, full of meaning, expressive, significant; graphic, distinct, clear: adv.: signĭfĭcanter, clearly, distinctly, expressly, significantly, graphically: “breviter ac significanter ordinem rei protulisse;” “rem indicare (with proprie),”  “dicere (with ornate),”  “apertius, significantius dignitatem alicujus defendere,” “narrare,”“disponere,” “appellare aliquid (with consignatius);” “dicere (with probabilius).” -- signifier, a vocal sound or a written symbol. The concept owes its modern formulation to the Swiss linguist Saussure. Rather than using the older conception of sign and referent, he divided the sign itself into two interrelated parts, a signifier and a signified. The signified is the concept and the signifier is either a vocal sound or writing. The relation between the two, according to Saussure, is entirely arbitrary, in that signifiers tend to vary with different languages. We can utter or write ‘vache’, ‘cow’, or ‘vaca’, depending on our native language, and still come up with the same signified i.e., concept. H. P. Grice, “Significatum and English ‘meaning.’”

simplicius: Grecian Neoplatonist philosopher. His surviving works are extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, Physics, and Categories, and on the Encheiridion of Epictetus. The authenticity of the commentary on Aristotle’s “De anima”  attributed to Simplicius has been disputed. He studied with Ammonius in Alexandria, and with Damascius, the last known head of the Platonist school in Athens. Justinian closed the school in 529. Two or three years later a group of philosophers, including Damascius and Simplicius, visited the court of the Sassanian king Khosrow I Chosroes but soon returned to the Byzantine Empire under a guarantee of their right to maintain their own beliefs. It is generally agreed that most, if not all, of Simplicius’s extant works date from the period after his stay with Khosrow. But there is no consensus about where Simplicius spent his last years both Athens and Harran have been proposed recently, or whether he resumed teaching philosophy; his commentaries, unlike most of the others that survive from that period, are scholarly treatises rather than classroom expositions. Simplicius’s Aristotle commentaries are the most valuable extant works in the genre. He is our source for many of the fragments of the preSocratic philosophers, and he frequently invokes material from now-lost commentaries and philosophical works. He is a deeply committed Neoplatonist, convinced that there is no serious conflict between the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. The view of earlier scholars that his Encheiridion commentary embodies a more moderate Platonism associated with Alexandria is now generally rejected. Simplicius’s virulent defense of the eternity of the world in response to the attack of the Christian John Philoponus illustrates the intellectual vitality of paganism at a time when the Mediterranean world had been officially Christian for about three centuries.  H. P. Grice, “Why we should study Simplicius;” Luigi Speranza, “The history of philosophical psychology, from the Grecians to the Griceians,” J. O. Urmson, “Grice and Simplicius on the soul,” for The Grice Club.

simulatum: Grice: “If x simulates y, x is not y – or is this an implicature – if x is x, is x LIKE x?” -- simulation theory: Grice: “How does one simulate an implicature? I challenge AI, so-called, to do it!” --  the view that one represents the mental activities and processes of others by mentally simulating them, i.e., generating similar activities and processes in oneself. By simulating them, one can anticipate their product or outcome; or, where this is already known, test hypotheses about their starting point. For example, one anticipates the product of another’s theoretical or practical inferences from given premises by making inferences from the same premises oneself; or, knowing what the product is, one retroduces the premises. In the case of practical reasoning, to reason from the same premises would typically require indexical adjustments, such as shifts in spatial, temporal, and personal “point of view,” to place oneself in the other’s physical and epistemic situation insofar as it differs from one’s own. One may also compensate for the other’s reasoning capacity and level of expertise, if possible, or modify one’s character and outlook as an actor might, to fit the other’s background. Such adjustments, even when insufficient for making decisions in the role of the other, allow one to discriminate between action options likely to be attractive or unattractive to the agent. One would be prepared for the former actions and surprised by the latter. The simulation theory is usually considered an alternative to an assumption sometimes called the “theory theory” that underlies much recent philosophy of mind: that our commonsense understanding of people rests on a speculative theory, a “folk psychology” that posits mental states, events, and processes as unobservables that explain behavior. Some hold that the simulation theory undercuts the debate between philosophers who consider folk psychology a respectable theory and those the eliminative materialists who reject it. Unlike earlier writing on empathic understanding and historical reenactment, discussions of the simulation theory often appeal to empirical findings, particularly experimental results in developmental psychology. They also theorize about the mechanism that would accomplish simulation: presumably one that calls up computational resources ordinarily used for engagement with the world, but runs them off-line, so that their output is not “endorsed” or acted upon and their inputs are not limited to those that would regulate one’s own behavior. Although simulation theorists agree that the ascription of mental states to others relies chiefly on simulation, they differ on the nature of selfascription. Some especially Robert Gordon and simple supposition simulation theory 845   845 Jane Heal, who independently proposed the theory give a non-introspectionist account, while others especially Goldman lean toward a more traditional introspectionist account. The simulation theory has affected developmental psychology as well as branches of philosophy outside the philosophy of mind, especially aesthetics and philosophy of the social sciences. Some philosophers believe it sheds light on traditional topics such as the problem of other minds, referential opacity, broad and narrow content, and the peculiarities of self-knowledge. 

singulare: Grice: “I use ‘singular’ in triadic opposition to plural and singular, and reject Urquart’s bi-dual -- singular term -- singŭlāris , e, adj. singuli. I. Lit. A. In gen., one by one, one at a time, alone, single, solitary; alone of its kind, singular (class.; “syn.: unus, unicus): non singulare nec solivagum genus (sc. homines),” i. e. solitary, Cic. Rep. 1, 25, 39: “hostes ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi egredientes conspexerant,” Caes. B. G. 4, 26: “homo,” id. ib. 7, 8, 3; so, “homo (with privatus, and opp. isti conquisiti coloni),” Cic. Agr. 2, 35, 97: “singularis mundus atque unigena,” id. Univ. 4 med.: “praeconium Dei singularis facere,” Lact. 4, 4, 8; cf. Cic. Ac. 1, 7, 26: “natus,” Plin. 28, 10, 42, § 153: “herba (opp. fruticosa),” id. 27, 9, 55, § 78: singularis ferus, a wild boar (hence, Fr. sanglier), Vulg. Psa. 79, 14: “hominem dominandi cupidum aut imperii singularis,” sole command, exclusive dominion, Cic. Rep. 1, 33, 50; so, “singulare imperium et potestas regia,” id. ib. 2, 9, 15: “sunt quaedam in te singularia ... quaedam tibi cum multis communia,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 88, § 206: “singulare beneficium (opp. commune officium civium),” id. Fam. 1, 9, 4: “odium (opp. communis invidia),” id. Sull. 1, 1: “quam invisa sit singularis potentia et miseranda vita,” Nep. Dion, 9, 5: “pugna,” Macr. S. 5, 2: “si quando quid secreto agere proposuisset, erat illi locus in edito singularis,” particular, separate, Suet. Aug. 72.— B. In partic. 1. In gram., of or belonging to unity, singular: “singularis casus,” Varr. L. L. 7, § 33 Müll.; “10, § 54 ib.: numerus,” Quint. 1, 5, 42; 1, 6, 25; 8, 3, 20; Gell. 19, 8, 13: “nominativus,” Quint. 1, 6, 14: “genitivus,” id. 1, 6, 26 et saep. —Also absol., the singular number: “alii dicunt in singulari hac ovi et avi, alii hac ove et ave,” Varr. L. L. 8, § 66 Müll.; Quint. 8, 6, 28; 4, 5, 25 al.— 2. In milit lang., subst.: singŭlāris , is, m. a. In gen., an orderly man (ordonance), assigned to officers of all kinds and ranks for executing their orders (called apparitor, Lampr. Alex. Sev. 52): “SINGVLARIS COS (consulis),” Inscr. Orell. 2003; cf. ib. 3529 sq.; 3591; 6771 al.— b. Esp., under the emperors, equites singulares Augusti, or only equites singulares, a select horse body-guard (selected from barbarous nations, as Bessi, Thraces, Bæti, etc.), Tac. H. 4, 70; Hyg. m. c. §§ 23 and 30; Inscr. Grut. 1041, 12 al.; cf. on the Singulares, Henzen, Sugli Equiti Singolari, Roma, 1850; Becker, Antiq. tom. 3, pass. 2, p. 387 sq.— 3. In the time of the later emperors, singulares, a kind of imperial clerks, sent into the provinces, Cod. Just. 1, 27, 1, § 8; cf. Lyd. Meg. 3, 7.— II. Trop., singular, unique, matchless, unparalleled, extraordinary, remarkable (syn.: unicus, eximius, praestans; “very freq. both in a good and in a bad sense): Aristoteles meo judicio in philosophiā prope singularis,” Cic. Ac. 2, 43, 132: “Cato, summus et singularis vir,” id. Brut. 85, 293: “vir ingenii naturā praestans, singularis perfectusque undique,” Quint. 12, 1, 25; so, “homines ingenio atque animo,” Cic. Div. 2, 47, 97: “adulescens,” Plin. Ep. 7, 24, 2.—Of things: “Antonii incredibilis quaedam et prope singularis et divina vis ingenii videtur,” Cic. de Or. 1, 38, 172: “singularis eximiaque virtus,” id. Imp. Pomp. 1, 3; so, “singularis et incredibilis virtus,” id. Att. 14, 15, 3; cf. id. Fam. 1, 9, 4: “integritas atque innocentia singularis,” id. Div. in Caecil. 9, 27: “Treviri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio est singularis,” Caes. B. G. 2, 24: “Pompeius gratias tibi agit singulares,” Cic. Fam. 13, 41, 1; cf.: “mihi gratias egistis singularibus verbis,” id. Cat. 4, 3: “fides,” Nep. Att. 4: “singulare omnium saeculorum exemplum,” Just. 2, 4, 6.—In a bad sense: “nequitia ac turpitudo singularis,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 44, § 106; so, “nequitia,” id. ib. 2, 2, 54, § 134; id. Fin. 5, 20, 56: “impudentia,” Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 7, § 18: audacia (with scelus incredibile), id. Fragm. ap. Quint. 4, 2, 105: “singularis et nefaria crudelitas,” Caes. B. G. 7, 77.— Hence, adv.: singŭlārĭter (singlā-rĭter , Lucr. 6, 1067). 1. One by one, singly, separately. a. In gen. (ante- and post-class.): “quae memorare queam inter se singlariter apta, Lucr. l. l. Munro (Lachm. singillariter): a juventā singulariter sedens,” apart, separately, Paul. Nol. Carm. 21, 727.— b. In partic. (acc. to I. B. 1.), in the singular number: “quod pluralia singulariter et singularia pluraliter efferuntur,” Quint. 1, 5, 16; 1, 7, 18; 9, 3, 20: “dici,” Gell. 19, 8, 12; Dig. 27, 6, 1 al.— 2. (Acc. to II.) Particularly, exceedingly: “aliquem diligere,” Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 47, § 117: “et miror et diligo,” Plin. Ep. 1, 22, 1: “amo,” id. ib. 4, 15, 1. Grice: “I would define a ‘singular implicaturum’ as any vehicle of communicatum such as an expression, like ‘Zeus’, ‘Pegasus,’ ‘the President’, ‘Strawson’s dog,’ ‘Fido,’ or ‘my favorite chair’, that can be the grammatical subject of what is semantically a subject-predicate sentence.” Grice: “By contrast, what one might call a ‘general,’ or ‘non-singular term, such as ‘horse,’ ‘dog,’‘table’ or ‘swam’ is one that can serve in predicative position.” It is also often said that a singular term (‘nomen singularis,’ ‘expressio singularis’) is a word or phrase that could refer or ostensibly refer, on a given occasion of use, only to a single (or ‘singular’) object – unless you show me a ‘general’ object --, whereas a general term is predicable of *more than one* singular object, if not a ‘general’ object, which does not exist. A singular term is thus the expression that replace, or are replaced by, an individual variable (x, y, z, …) in applications of such quantifier rules as universal instantiation and existential generalization or flank ‘%’ in identity statements.” H. P. Grice, “System G: the rudiments.”

situation ethics: what Grice calls the ‘particularised’ – prior obviously to the ‘generalised.’ --  a kind of anti-theoretical, case-by-case applied ethics in vogue largely in some European and  religious circles for twenty years or so following World War II. It is characterized by the insistence that each moral choice must be determined by one’s particular context or situation  i.e., by a consideration of the outcomes that various possible courses of action might have, given one’s situation. To that degree, situation ethics has affinities to both act utilitarianism and traditional casuistry. But in contrast to utilitarianism, situation ethics rejects the idea that there are universal or even fixed moral principles beyond various indeterminate commitments or ideals e.g., to Christian love or humanism. In contrast to traditional casuistry, it rejects the effort to construct general guidelines from a case or to classify the salient features of a case so that it can be used as a precedent. The anti-theoretical stance of situation ethics is so thoroughgoing that writers identified with the position have not carefully described its connections to consequentialism, existentialism, intuitionism, personalism, pragmatism, relativism, or any other developed philosophical view to which it appears to have some affinity. 

st. john’s: st. john’s keeps a record of all of H. P. Grice’s tutees. It is fascinating that Strawson’s closest collaboration, as Plato with Socrates, and Aristotle with Plato, was with his tutee Strawson – whom Grice calls a ‘pupil,’ finding ‘tutee’ too French to his taste. G. J. Warnock recalls that, of all the venues that the play group held, their favourite one was the room overlooking the garden at st. john’s. “It’s one of the best gardens in England, you know. Very peripathetic.” In alphabetical order, some of his English ‘gentlemanly’ tutees include: London-born J. L. Ackrill, London-born David Bostock, London-born A. G. N. Flew, Leeds-born T. C. Potts, London-born P. F. Strawson. They were happy to have Grice as a tutorial fellow, since he, unlike Mabbot, was English, and did not instill on the tutees a vernacular furrin to the area.

Grice, “philosophical semanticist.”

smart and place: Cambridge-born Australian philosopher whose name is associated with three very non-Oxonian doctrines in particular: the mind-body identity theory, scientific realism, and utilitarianism. A student of Ryle’s at Oxford, from the other place, he rejected logical behaviorism in favor of what came to be known as Australian or ‘colonial’ or “Dominion” materialism. This is the view that mental processes  and, as, -- “the other colonial,” – Grice -- Armstrong brought Smart to see, mental states  cannot be explained simply in terms of behavioristic dispositions. In order to make good sense of how the ordinary person talks of them we have to see them as brain processes  and states  under other names. Smart developed this identity theory of mind and brain, under the stimulus of his colleague, Yorkshire-born, Rugby and Corpus-Christi (via Open Scholarship), tutee of Ryle, U. T. Place, in “Sensations and Brain Processes” Philosophical Review. It became a mainstay of twentieth-century philosophy. Smart endorsed the materialist analysis of mind on the grounds that it gave a simple picture that was consistent with the findings of science. He took a realist view of the claims of science, rejecting phenomenalism, instrumentalism, and the like, and he argued that commonsense beliefs should be maintained only so far as they are plausible in the light of total science. Philosophy and Scientific Realism 3 gave forceful expression to this physicalist picture of the world, as did some later works. He attracted attention in particular for his argument that if we take science seriously then we have to endorse the four-dimensional picture of the universe and recognize as an illusion the experience of the passing of time. He published a number of defenses of utilitarianism, the best known being his contribution to J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism, For and Against 3. He gave new life to act utilitarianism at a time when utilitarians were few and most were attached to rule utilitarianism or other restricted forms of the doctrine. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Ryle and the devil of scientism,” H. P. Grice, “What Smart learned from Ryle.”

smith: Scots philosopher, a founder of modern political economy and a major contributor to ethics and the psychology of morals. His first published work is “The Theory of Moral Sentiments.” This book immediately made him famous, and earned the praise of thinkers of the stature of Hume, Burke, and Kant. It sought to answer two questions: Wherein does virtue consist, and by means of what psychological principles do we determine this or that to be virtuous or the contrary? His answer to the first combined ancient Stoic and Aristotelian views of virtue with modern views derived from Hutcheson and others. His answer to the second built on Hume’s theory of sympathy  our ability to put ourselves imaginatively in the situation of another  as well as on the notion of the “impartial spectator.” Smith throughout is skeptical about metaphysical and theological views of virtue and of the psychology of morals. The self-understanding of reasonable moral actors ought to serve as the moral philosopher’s guide. Smith’s discussion ranges from the motivation of wealth to the psychological causes of religious and political fanaticism. Smith’s second published work, the immensely influential An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 1776, attempts to explain why free economic, political, and religious markets are not only more efficient, when properly regulated, but also more in keeping with nature, more likely to win the approval of an impartial spectator, than monopolistic alternatives. Taken together, Smith’s two books attempt to show how virtue and liberty can complement each other. He shows full awareness of the potentially dehumanizing force of what was later called “capitalism,” and sought remedies in schemes for liberal education and properly organized religion. Smith did not live to complete his system, which was to include an analysis of “natural jurisprudence.” We possess student notes of his lectures on jurisprudence and on rhetoric, as well as several impressive essays on the evolution of the history of science and on the fine arts. 

saggio: philosophical essay: ‘saggio filosofico.’ – a subgenre of the prose genre of ‘essay.’ Grice seems to prefer ‘study’ (“Studies in the way of words”) but surely each piece is an essay. Austin preferred “papers” (vide his “Philosophical Papers.”). “The implicature,” Grice says, “seems to be that an essay is too sketchy!” --. “Storia del saggio filosofico in Italia” --. Grice: “It is strictly not true that a philosopher needs to engage in the subgenre of the ‘philosophical essay;’ after all, at Oxford, we always thought Jowett’s dialogues were the epitome of philosophy – and they are!”

società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale: Grice: “It always amazed me that the mediaevals at Bologna and Oxford ‘knew’ that they were in the middle of it!” -- the title of this Society is telling. For the Italians, they do not want to distinguish Politics, Economics, Theology, and Philosophy – It is all covered under ‘thought,’ ‘pensiero.’ This is in accordance with de Sanctis’s view of philosophy as one of the belles lettres (“if perhaps less ‘belle’ than the rest). The subgenre of the essay – ‘philosophical essay.’ Grice: “While it is easy to take ‘mediaeval’ in a boring chronological fashion, the mediaevals themselves saw themselves to be in the ‘middle’ of it, of the ‘aevus,’ that is.”

sozzini: -- Socinianism, NELLA PRIMA METÀ DEL SEDICESIMO SECOLO NACQUERO IN QUESTA CASA LELIO E FAUSTO SOZZINI LETTERATI INSIGNI FILOSOFI SOMMI DELLA LIBERTÀ DI PENSIERO STRENUI PROPUGNATORI ______ CONTRO IL SOPRANNATURALE VINDICI DELLA UMANA RAGIONE FONDARONO LA CELEBRE SCUOLA SOCINIANA PRECORRENDO DI TRE SECOLI LE DOTTRINE DEL MODERNO RAZIONALISMO ______  I LIBERALI SENESI AMMIRATORI REVERENTI QUESTA MEMORIA POSERO 1879 a movement originating in the sixteenth century from the work of  reformer Laelius Socinus “Sozzini” and his nephew Faustus Socinus.  Born in Siena of a patrician family, Sozzini is widely read. Influenced by the evangelical movement, Sozzini makes contact with noted Protestant reformers, including Calvin and Melanchthon, some of whom questioned his orthodoxy. In response, Sozzini writes a confession of faith, one of a small number of his writings to have survived. After his death, Sozzini’s oeuvre was carried on by his nephew, Faustus, whose writings including “On the Authority of Scripture,” “On the Savior Jesus Christ,”  and “On Predestination,” expressed heterodox views. Sozzini believed that Christ’s nature is entirely human, that the souls does not possess immortality by nature though there is selective resurrection for believers, that invocation of Christ in prayer is permissible but not required, and he argues, like Grice, Pears, and Thomson, against predestination. After publication of his  writings, Sozzini is invited to Transylvania and Poland to engage in a dispute within the Reformed churches there. He decides to make his permanent residence in Poland, which, through his tireless efforts, became the center of the Socinian movement. The most important document of this movement was the Racovian Catechism, published shortly after Faustus’s death. The Minor church of Poland, centered at Racov, became the focal point of the movement. Its academy attracted hundreds of students and its publishing house produced books in many languages defending Socinian ideas. Socinianism, as represented by the Racovian Catechism and other writings collected by Faustus’s disciples, involves the views of Laelius and especially Faustus Socinus, aligned with the anti-Trinitarian views of the Polish Minor church.. It accepts Christ’s message as the definitive revelation of God, but regards Christ as human, not divine; rejects the natural immortality of the soul, but argues for the selective resurrection of the faithful; rejects the doctrine of the Trinity; emphasizes human free will against predestinationism; defends pacifism and the separation of church and state; and argues that reason  not creeds, dogmatic tradition, or church authority  must be the final interpreter of Scripture. Its view of God is temporalistic: God’s eternity is existence at all times, not timelessness, and God knows future free actions only when they occur. In these respects, the Socinian view of God anticipates aspects of modern process theology. Socinianism was suppressed in Poland in 1658, but it had already spread to other European countries, including Holland where it appealed to followers of Arminius and England, where it influenced the Cambridge Platonists, Locke, and other philosophers, as well as scientists like Newton. In England, it also influenced and was closely associated with the development of Unitarianism.  H. P. Grice, “Sozzini, rationalism, and moi.”

solus ipse, solipsism: Grice: “If my theory of conversation has any value, is the refutation of solipsism!” -- the doctrine that there exists a firstperson perspective possessing privileged and irreducible characteristics, in virtue of which we stand in various kinds of isolation from any other persons or external things that may exist. This doctrine is associated with but distinct from egocentricism. On one variant of solipsism Thomas Nagel’s we are isolated from other sentient beings because we can never adequately understand their experience empathic solipsism. Another variant depends on the thesis that the meanings or referents of all words are mental entities uniquely accessible only to the language user semantic solipsism. A restricted variant, due to Vitters, asserts that first-person ascriptions of psychological states have a meaning fundamentally different from that of second- or thirdperson ascriptions psychological solipsism. In extreme forms semantic solipsism can lead to the view that the only things that can be meaningfully said to exist are ourselves or our mental states ontological solipsism. Skepticism about the existence of the world external to our minds is sometimes considered a form of epistemological solipsism, since it asserts that we stand in epistemological isolation from that world, partly as a result of the epistemic priority possessed by firstperson access to mental states. In addition to these substantive versions of solipsism, several variants go under the rubric methodological solipsism. The idea is that when we seek to explain why sentient beings behave in certain ways by looking to what they believe, desire, hope, and fear, we should identify these psychological states only with events that occur inside the mind or brain, not with external events, since the former alone are the proximate and sufficient causal explanations of bodily behavior.

sophisma: Grice’s favourite for a time was “Have you stopped beating your wife.” In “Presupposition and conversational implicature,” he does admit that he has grown tired of it, what he calls his having had his eyes glued to “the inquiry whether you have left off beating your wife” --. an utterance illustrating a semantic or logical issue associated with the analysis of a syncategorematic term, or a term lacking independent signification. Typically a sophisma was used from the thirteenth century into the sixteenth century to analyze relations holding between logic or semantics and broader philosophical issues. For example, the syncategorematic term ‘besides’ praeter in ‘Socrates twice sees every man besides Plato’ is ambiguous, because it could mean ‘On two occasions Socrates sees every-man-but-Plato’ and also ‘Except for overlooking Plato once, on two occasions Socrates sees every man’. Roger Bacon used this sophisma to discuss the ambiguity of distribution, in this case, of the scope of the reference of ‘twice’ and ‘besides’. Sherwood used the sophisma to illustrate the applicability of his rule of the distribution of ambiguous syncategoremata, while Pseudo-Peter of Spain uses it to establish the truth of the rule, ‘If a proposition is in part false, it can be made true by means of an exception, but not if it is completely false’. In each case, the philosopher uses the ambiguous signification of the syncategorematic term to analyze broader logical problems. The sophisma ‘Every man is of necessity an animal’ has ambiguity through the syncategorematic ‘every’ that leads to broader philosophical problems. In the 1270s, Boethius of Dacia analyzed this sophisma in terms of its applicability when no man exists. Is the knowledge derived from understanding the proposition destroyed when the object known is destroyed? Does ‘man’ signify anything when there are no men? If we can correctly predicate a genus of a species, is the nature of the genus in that species something other than, or distinct from, what finally differentiates the species? In this case, the sophisma proves a useful approach to addressing metaphysical and epistemological problems central to Scholastic discourse.   sophisma: Grice: “Literally, a wisecrack.” “’Sophisma’ is a very Griceian and Grecian pun on ‘sophos,’ the wise men of Gotham -- any of a number of ancient Grecians, roughly contemporaneous with Socrates, who professed to teach, for a fee, rhetoric, philosophy, and how to succeed in life. They typically were itinerants, visiting much of the Grecian world, and gave public exhibitions at Olympia and Delphi. They were part of the general expansion of Grecian learning and of the changing culture in which the previous informal educational methods were inadequate. For example, the growing litigiousness of Athenian society demanded Solovyov, Vladimir Sophists 862   862 instruction in the art of speaking well, which the Sophists helped fulfill. The Sophists have been portrayed as intellectual charlatans hence the pejorative use of ‘sophism’, teaching their sophistical reasoning for money, and at the other extreme as Victorian moralists and educators. The truth is more complex. They were not a school, and shared no body of opinions. They were typically concerned with ethics unlike many earlier philosophers, who emphasized physical inquiries and about the relationship between laws and customs nomos and nature phusis. Protagoras of Abdera c.490c.420 B.C. was the most famous and perhaps the first Sophist. He visited Athens frequently, and became a friend of its leader, Pericles; he therefore was invited to draw up a legal code for the colony of Thurii 444. According to some late reports, he died in a shipwreck as he was leaving Athens, having been tried for and found guilty of impiety. He claimed that he knew nothing about the gods, because of human limitations and the difficulty of the question. We have only a few short quotations from his works. His “Truth” also known as the “Throws,” i.e., how to overthrow an opponent’s arguments begins with his most famous claim: “Humans are the measure of all things  of things that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not.” That is, there is no objective truth; the world is for each person as it appears to that person. Of what use, then, are skills? Skilled people can change others’ perceptions in useful ways. For example, a doctor can change a sick person’s perceptions so that she is healthy. Protagoras taught his students to “make the weaker argument the stronger,” i.e., to alter people’s perceptions about the value of arguments. Aristophanes satirizes Protagoras as one who would make unjust arguments defeat just arguments. This is true for ethical judgments, too: laws and customs are simply products of human agreement. But because laws and customs result from experiences of what is most useful, they should be followed rather than nature. No perception or judgment is more true than another, but some are more useful, and those that are more useful should be followed. Gorgias c.483376 was a student of Empedocles. His town, Leontini in Sicily, sent him as an ambassador to Athens in 427; his visit was a great success, and the Athenians were amazed at his rhetorical ability. Like other Sophists, he charged for instruction and gave speeches at religious festivals. Gorgias denied that he taught virtue; instead, he produced clever speakers. He insisted that different people have different virtues: for example, women’s virtue differs from men’s. Since there is no truth and if there were we couldn’t know it, we must rely on opinion, and so speakers who can change people’s opinions have great power  greater than the power produced by any other skill. In his “Encomium on Helen” he argues that if she left Menelaus and went with Paris because she was convinced by speech, she wasn’t responsible for her actions. Two paraphrases of Gorgias’s “About What Doesn’t Exist” survive; in this he argues that nothing exists, that even if something did, we couldn’t know it, and that even if we could know anything we couldn’t explain it to anyone. We can’t know anything, because some things we think of do not exist, and so we have no way of judging whether the things we think of exist. And we can’t express any knowledge we may have, because no two people can think of the same thing, since the same thing can’t be in two places, and because we use words in speech, not colors or shapes or objects. This may be merely a parody of Parmenides’ argument that only one thing exists. Antiphon the Sophist fifth century is probably although not certainly to be distinguished from Antiphon the orator d. 411, some of whose speeches we possess. We know nothing about his life if he is distinct from the orator. In addition to brief quotations in later authors, we have two papyrus fragments of his “On Truth.” In these he argues that we should follow laws and customs only if there are witnesses and so our action will affect our reputation; otherwise, we should follow nature, which is often inconsistent with following custom. Custom is established by human agreement, and so disobeying it is detrimental only if others know it is disobeyed, whereas nature’s demands unlike those of custom can’t be ignored with impunity. Antiphon assumes that rational actions are selfinterested, and that justice demands actions contrary to self-interest  a position Plato attacks in the Republic. Antiphon was also a materialist: the nature of a bed is wood, since if a buried bed could grow it would grow wood, not a bed. His view is one of Aristotle’s main concerns in the Physics, since Aristotle admits in the Categories that persistence through change is the best test for substance, but won’t admit that matter is substance. Hippias fifth century was from Elis, in the Peloponnesus, which used him as an ambasSophists Sophists 863   863 sador. He competed at the festival of Olympus with both prepared and extemporaneous speeches. He had a phenomenal memory. Since Plato repeatedly makes fun of him in the two dialogues that bear his name, he probably was selfimportant and serious. He was a polymath who claimed he could do anything, including making speeches and clothes; he wrote a work collecting what he regarded as the best things said by others. According to one report, he made a mathematical discovery the quadratrix, the first curve other than the circle known to the Grecians. In the Protagoras, Plato has Hippias contrast nature and custom, which often does violence to nature. Prodicus fifth century was from Ceos, in the Cyclades, which frequently employed him on diplomatic missions. He apparently demanded high fees, but had two versions of his lecture  one cost fifty drachmas, the other one drachma. Socrates jokes that if he could have afforded the fifty-drachma lecture, he would have learned the truth about the correctness of words, and Aristotle says that when Prodicus added something exciting to keep his audience’s attention he called it “slipping in the fifty-drachma lecture for them.” We have at least the content of one lecture of his, the “Choice of Heracles,” which consists of banal moralizing. Prodicus was praised by Socrates for his emphasis on the right use of words and on distinguishing between synonyms. He also had a naturalistic view of the origin of theology: useful things were regarded as gods.

sort: Grice, “One of the few technicisms introduced by an English philosopher, in this case Locke.” – a sortal predicate, roughly, a predicate whose application to an object says what kind of object it is and implies conditions for objects of that kind to be identical. Person, green apple, regular hexagon, and pile of coal would generally be regarded as sortal predicates, whereas tall, green thing, and coal would generally be regarded as non-sortal predicates. An explicit and precise definition of the distinction is hard to come by. Sortal predicates are sometimes said to be distinguished by the fact that they provide a criterion of counting or that they do not apply to the parts of the objects to which they apply, but there are difficulties with each of these characterizations. The notion figures in recent philosophical discussions on various topics. Robert Ackermann and others have suggested that any scientific law confirmable by observation might require the use of sortal predicates. Thus ‘all non-black things are non-ravens’, while logically equivalent to the putative scientific law ‘all ravens are black’, is not itself confirmable by observation because ‘non-black’ is not a sortal predicate. David Wiggins and others have discussed the sortal sortal predicate 865   865 idea that all identity claims are sortal-relative in the sense that an appropriate response to the claim a % b is always “the same what as b?” John Wallace has argued that there would be advantages in relativizing the quantifiers of predicate logic to sortals. ‘All humans are mortal’ would be rendered Ex[m]Dx, rather than ExMxPDx. Crispin Wright has suggested that the view that natural number is a sortal concept is central to Frege’s or any other number-theoretic platonism. The word ‘sortal’ as a technical term in philosophy apparently first occurs in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke argues that the so-called essence of a genus or sort unlike the real essence of a thing is merely the abstract idea that the general or sortal name stands for. But ‘sortal’ has only one occurrence in Locke’s Essay. Its currency in contemporary philosophical idiom probably should be credited to P. F. Strawson’s Individuals. The general idea may be traced at least to the notion of second substance in Aristotle’s Categories.

Sotione, teacher of Seneca. In glossary to Roman philosophers, in “Roman philosophers.”

animatum - soul: -- cf. Grice on “soul-to-soul transfer” -- also called spirit, an entity supposed to be present only in living things, corresponding to the Grecian psyche and Latin anima. Since there seems to be no material difference between an organism in the last moments of its life and the organism’s newly dead body, many philosophers since the time of Plato have claimed that the soul is an immaterial component of an organism. Because only material things are observed to be subject to dissolution, Plato took the soul’s immateriality as grounds for its immortality. Neither Plato nor Aristotle thought that only persons had souls: Aristotle ascribed souls to animals and plants since they all exhibited some living functions. Unlike Plato, Aristotle denied the transmigration of souls from one species to another or from one body to another after death; he was also more skeptical about the soul’s capacity for disembodiment  roughly, survival and functioning without a body. Descartes argued that only persons had souls and that the soul’s immaterial nature made freedom possible even if the human body is subject to deterministic physical laws. As the subject of thought, memory, emotion, desire, and action, the soul has been supposed to be an entity that makes self-consciousness possible, that differentiates simultaneous experiences into experiences either of the same person or of different persons, and that accounts for personal identity or a person’s continued identity through time. Dualists argue that soul and body must be distinct in order to explain consciousness and the possibility of immortality. Materialists argue that consciousness is entirely the result of complex physical processes. 

soundness: Grice: “The etymology if fascinating.” The English Grice. "Most of the terms I use are Latinate." "I implicate: a few are not." "I say that System G should be sound." "free from special defect or injury," c. 1200, from Old English gesund "sound, safe, having the organs and faculties complete and in perfect action," from Proto-Germanic *sunda-, from Germanic root *swen-to- "healthy, strong" (source also of Old Saxon gisund, Old Frisian sund, Dutch gezond, Old High German gisunt, German gesund "healthy," as in the post-sneezing interjection gesundheit; also Old English swið "strong," Gothic swinþs "strong," German geschwind "fast, quick"), with connections in Indo-Iranian and Balto-Slavic. Meaning "right, correct, free from error" is from mid-15c. Meaning "financially solid or safe" is attested from c. 1600; of sleep, "undisturbed," from 1540s. Sense of "holding accepted opinions" is from 1520s Grice: “’sound’ is not polysemous, but it has different usages: of an argument the property of being valid and having all true premises; of a system, like Sytem G,  the property of being not too strong in a certain respect. A System G  has weak soundness provided every theorem of G  is valid. And G has strong soundness if for every set S of sentences, every sentence deducible from S using system G is a logical consequence of S.

spatium: space, an extended manifold of several dimensions, where the number of dimensions corresponds to the number of variable magnitudes Soto, Domingo de space 866   866 needed to specify a location in the manifold; in particular, the three-dimensional manifold in which physical objects are situated and with respect to which their mutual positions and distances are defined. Ancient Grecian atomism defined space as the infinite void in which atoms move; but whether space is finite or infinite, and whether void spaces exist, have remained in question. Aristotle described the universe as a finite plenum and reduced space to the aggregate of all places of physical things. His view was preeminent until Renaissance Neoplatonism, the Copernican revolution, and the revival of atomism reintroduced infinite, homogeneous space as a fundamental cosmological assumption. Further controversy concerned whether the space assumed by early modern astronomy should be thought of as an independently existing thing or as an abstraction from the spatial relations of physical bodies. Interest in the relativity of motion encouraged the latter view, but Newton pointed out that mechanics presupposes absolute distinctions among motions, and he concluded that absolute space must be postulated along with the basic laws of motion Principia, 1687. Leibniz argued for the relational view from the identity of indiscernibles: the parts of space are indistinguishable from one another and therefore cannot be independently existing things. Relativistic physics has defused the original controversy by revealing both space and spatial relations as merely observer-dependent manifestations of the structure of spacetime. Meanwhile, Kant shifted the metaphysical controversy to epistemological grounds by claiming that space, with its Euclidean structure, is neither a “thing-in-itself” nor a relation of thingsin-themselves, but the a priori form of outer intuition. His view was challenged by the elaboration of non-Euclidean geometries in the nineteenth century, by Helmholtz’s arguments that both intuitive and physical space are known through empirical investigation, and finally by the use of non-Euclidean geometry in the theory of relativity. Precisely what geometrical presuppositions are inherent in human spatial perception, and what must be learned from experience, remain subjects of psychological investigation.  -- space-time: a four-dimensional continuum combining the three dimensions of space with time in order to represent motion geometrically. Each point is the location of an event, all of which together represent “the world” through time; paths in the continuum worldlines represent the dynamical histories of moving particles, so that straight worldlines correspond to uniform motions; three-dimensional sections of constant time value “spacelike hypersurfaces” or “simultaneity slices” represent all of space at a given time. The idea was foreshadowed when Kant represented “the phenomenal world” as a plane defined by space and time as perpendicular axes Inaugural Dissertation, 1770, and when Joseph Louis Lagrange 17361814 referred to mechanics as “the analytic geometry of four dimensions.” But classical mechanics assumes a universal standard of simultaneity, and so it can treat space and time separately. The concept of space-time was explicitly developed only when Einstein criticized absolute simultaneity and made the velocity of light a universal constant. The mathematician Hermann Minkowski showed in 8 that the observer-independent structure of special relativity could be represented by a metric space of four dimensions: observers in relative motion would disagree on intervals of length and time, but agree on a fourdimensional interval combining spatial and temporal measurements. Minkowski’s model then made possible the general theory of relativity, which describes gravity as a curvature of spacetime in the presence of mass and the paths of falling bodies as the straightest worldlines in curved space-time.  -- spatio-temporal continuancy: or continunity, a property of the careers, or space-time paths, of well-behaved objects. Let a space-time path be a series of possible spatiotemporal positions, each represented in a selected coordinate system by an ordered pair consisting of a time its temporal component and a volume of space its spatial component. Such a path will be spatiotemporally continuous provided it is such that, relative to any inertial frame selected as coordinate system, space, absolute spatiotemporal continuity 867   867 1 for every segment of the series, the temporal components of the members of that segment form a continuous temporal interval; and 2 for any two members ‹ti, Vi and ‹tj, Vj of the series that differ in their temporal components ti and tj, if Vi and Vj the spatial components differ in either shape, size, or location, then between these members of the series there will be a member whose spatial component is more similar to Vi and Vj in these respects than these are to each other. This notion is of philosophical interest partly because of its connections with the notions of identity over time and causality. Putting aside such qualifications as quantum considerations may require, material objects at least macroscopic objects of familiar kinds apparently cannot undergo discontinuous change of place, and cannot have temporal gaps in their histories, and therefore the path through space-time traced by such an object must apparently be spatiotemporally continuous. More controversial is the claim that spatiotemporal continuity, together with some continuity with respect to other properties, is sufficient as well as necessary for the identity of such objects  e.g., that if a spatiotemporally continuous path is such that the spatial component of each member of the series is occupied by a table of a certain description at the time that is the temporal component of that member, then there is a single table of that description that traces that path. Those who deny this claim sometimes maintain that it is further required for the identity of material objects that there be causal and counterfactual dependence of later states on earlier ones ceteris paribus, if the table had been different yesterday, it would be correspondingly different now. Since it appears that chains of causality must trace spatiotemporally continuous paths, it may be that insofar as spatiotemporal continuity is required for transtemporal identity, this is because it is required for transtemporal causality. Refs.: H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, “Categories,” in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

specious present: the supposed time between past and future. The phrase was first offered by  Clay in “The Alternative: A Study in Psychology,”  and is cited by James in his Principles of Psychology  Clay challenges the assumption that the “present” as a “datum” is given as “present” to us in our experience. “The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the *past*, a recent past  delusively given as benign time that intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named ‘the specious present,’ and let the past that is given as being the past be known as ‘the obvious past.’” For James, this position is supportive of his contention that consciousness (conscientia) is a stream and can be divided into parts only by conceptual addition, i.e., only by our ascribing past, present, and future to what is, in our actual experience, a seamless flow. James holds that the “practically cognized present is no knife-edge but a saddleback,” a sort of “ducatum” which we experience as a whole, and only upon reflective attention do we “distinguish its beginning from its end.” Whereas Clay refers to the datum of the present as “delusive,” one might rather say that it is perpetually *elusive*, for as we have our experience, now, it is always bathed retrospectively and prospectively. Contrary to common wisdom, no single experience ever is had by our consciousness utterly alone, single and without relations, fore and aft. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The logical-construction theory of personal identity.”

speculatum: Grice: “Philosophy may broadly be divided into ‘philosophia speculativa” and “philosophia practica.”” -- speculative philosophy, a form of theorizing that goes beyond verifiable observation; specifically, a philosophical approach informed by the impulse to construct a grand narrative of a worldview that encompasses the whole of reality. Speculative philosophy purports to bind together reflections on the existence and nature of the cosmos, the psyche, and God. It sets for its goal a unifying matrix and an overarching system whereswith to comprehend the considered judgments of cosmology, psychology, and theology. Hegel’s absolute idealism, particularly as developed in his later thought, paradigmatically illustrates the requirements for speculative philosophizing. His system of idealism offered a vision of the unity of the categories of human thought as they come to realization in and through their opposition to each other. Speculative thought tends to place a premium on universality, totality, and unity; and it tends to marginalize the concrete particularities of the natural and social world. In its aggressive use of the systematic principle, geared to a unification of human experience, speculative philosophy aspires to a comprehensive understanding and explanation of the structural interrelations of the culture spheres of science, morality, art, and religion. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Practical and doxastic attitudes: why I need exhibitive clauses.”

spencer: English philosopher, social reformer, and editor of The Economist. In epistemology, Spencer adopted the ninespeculative reason Spencer, Herbert 869   869 teenth-century trend toward positivism: the only reliable knowledge of the universe is to be found in the sciences. His ethics were utilitarian, following Bentham and J. S. Mill: pleasure and pain are the criteria of value as signs of happiness or unhappiness in the individual. His Synthetic Philosophy, expounded in books written over many years, assumed both in biology and psychology the existence of Lamarckian evolution: given a characteristic environment, every animal possesses a disposition to make itself into what it will, failing maladaptive interventions, eventually become. The dispositions gain expression as inherited acquired habits. Spencer could not accept that species originate by chance variations and natural selection alone: direct adaptation to environmental constraints is mainly responsible for biological changes. Evolution also includes the progression of societies in the direction of a dynamical equilibrium of individuals: the human condition is perfectible because human faculties are completely adapted to life in society, implying that evil and immorality will eventually disappear. His ideas on evolution predated publication of the major works of Darwin; A. R. Wallace was influenced by his writings. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Evolutionary pirotology,” in “Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.”

speranza: luigi della --. Italian philosopher, attracted, for some reason, to H. P. Grice. Speranza knows St. John’s very well. He is the author of “Dorothea Oxoniensis.” He is a member of a number of cultivated Anglo-Italian societies, like H. P. Grice’s Playgroup. He is the custodian of Villa Grice, not far from Villa Speranza. He works at the Swimming-Pool Library. Cuisine is one of his hobbies – grisottoa alla ligure, his specialty. He can be reached via H. P. Grice. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Vita ed opinion di Luigi Speranza,” par Luigi Speranza. A. M. Ghersi Speranza – vide Ghersi-Speranza. Ghersi is a collaborator of Speranza. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Speranza, villa – The Swimming-Pool Library – H. P. Grice’s Play Group, Liguria, Italia.

spinoza: Jewish metaphysician, born in the Netherlanads -- epistemologist, psychologist, moral philosopher, political theorist, and philosopher of religion, generally regarded as one of the most important figures of seventeenth-century rationalism. Life and works. Born and educated in the Jewish ‘community’ of Amsterdam, he forsook his given name ‘Baruch’ in favor of the Latin ‘Benedict’ at the age of twenty-two. Between 1652 and 1656 he studied the philosophy of Descartes in the school of Francis van den Enden. Having developed unorthodox views of the divine nature and having ceased to be fully observant of Jewish practice, he was excommunicated by the Jewish community in 1656. He spent his entire life in Holland; after leaving Amsterdam in 1660, he resided successively in Rijnsburg, Voorburg, and the Hague. He supported himself at least partly through grinding lenses, and his knowledge of optics involved him in an area of inquiry of great importance to seventeenth-century science. Acquainted with such leading intellectual figures as Leibniz, Huygens, and Henry Oldenberg, he declined a professorship at the  of Heidelberg partly on the grounds that it might interfere with his intellectual freedom. His premature death at the age of fortyfour was due to consumption. The only work published under Spinoza’s name during his lifetime was his Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae, Pars I et II, 1663, an attempt to recast and present Parts I and II of Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy in the manner that Spinoza called geometrical order or geometrical method. Modeled on the Elements of Euclid and on what Descartes called the method of synthesis, Spinoza’s “geometrical order” involves an initial set of definitions and axioms, from which various propositions are demonstrated, with notes or scholia attached where necessary. This work, which established his credentials as an expositor of Cartesian philosophy, had its origins in his endeavor to teach Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy to a private student. Spinoza’s TheologicalPolitical Treatise Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was published anonymously in 1670. After his death, his close circle of friends published his Posthumous Works Opera Postuma, 1677, which included his masterpieces, Ethic, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. The Posthumous Works also included his early unfinished Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, his later unfinished Political Treatise Tractatus Politicus, a Hebrew Grammar, and Correspondence. An unpublished early work entitled Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being Korte Vorhandelung van God, de Mensch en deszelvs Welstand, in many ways a forerunner of the Ethics, was rediscovered in copied manuscript and published in the nineteenth century. Spinoza’s authorship of two brief scientific treatises, On the Rainbow and On the Calculation of Chances, is still disputed. Metaphysics. Spinoza often uses the term ‘God, or Nature’ “Deus, sive Natura“, and this identification of God with Nature is at the heart of his metaphysics. Because of this identification, his philosophy is often regarded as a version of pantheism and/or naturalism. But although philosophy begins with metaphysics for Spinoza, his metaphysics is ultimately in the service of his ethics. Because his naturalized God has no desires or purposes, human ethics cannot properly be derived from divine command. Rather, Spinozistic ethics seeks to demonstrate, from an adequate understanding of the divine nature and its expression in human nature, the way in which human beings can maximize their advantage. Central to the successful pursuit of this advantage is adequate knowledge, which leads to increasing control of the passions and to cooperative action. Spinoza’s ontology, like that of Descartes, consists of substances, their attributes which Descartes called principal attributes, and their modes. In the Ethics, Spinoza defines ‘substance’ as what is “in itself, and is conceived through itself”; ‘attribute’ as that which “the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence”; and ‘mode’ as “the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which also it is conceived.” While Descartes had recognized a strict sense in which only God is a substance, he also recognized a second sense in which there are two kinds of created substances, each with its own principal attribute: extended substances, whose only principal attribute is extension; and minds, whose only principal attribute is thought. Spinoza, in contrast, consistently maintains that there is only one substance. His metaphysics is thus a form of substantial monism. This one substance is God, which Spinoza defines as “a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” Thus, whereas Descartes limited each created substance to one principal attribute, Spinoza claims that the one substance has infinite attributes, each expressing the divine nature without limitation in its own way. Of these infinite attributes, however, humans can comprehend only two: extension and thought. Within each attribute, the modes of God are of two kinds: infinite modes, which are pervasive features of each attribute, such as the laws of nature; and finite modes, which are local and limited modifications of substance. There is an infinite sequence of finite modes. Descartes regarded a human being as a substantial union of two different substances, the thinking soul and the extended body, in causal interaction with each other. Spinoza, in contrast, regards a human being as a finite mode of God, existing simultaneously in God as a mode of thought and as a mode of extension. He holds that every mode of extension is literally identical with the mode of thought that is the “idea of” that mode of extension. Since the human mind is the idea of the human body, it follows that the human mind and the human body are literally the same thing, conceived under two different attributes. Because they are actually identical, there is no causal interaction between the mind and the body; but there is a complete parallelism between what occurs in the mind and what occurs in the body. Since every mode of extension has a corresponding and identical mode of thought however rudimentary that might be, Spinoza allows that every mode of extension is “animated to some degree”; his view is thus a form of panpsychism. Another central feature of Spinoza’s metaphysics is his necessitarianism, expressed in his claim that “things could have been produced . . . in no other way, and in no other order” than that in which they have been produced. He derives this necessitarianism from his doctrine that God exists necessarily for which he offers several arguments, including a version of the ontological argument and his doctrine that everything that can follow from the divine nature must necessarily do so. Thus, although he does not use the term, he accepts a very strong version of the principle of sufficient reason. At the outset of the Ethics, he defines a thing as free when its actions are determined by its own nature alone. Only God  whose actions are determined entirely by the necessity of his own nature, and for whom nothing is external  is completely free in this sense. Nevertheless, human beings can achieve a relative freedom to the extent that they live the kind of life described in the later parts of the Ethics. Hence, Spinoza is a compatibilist concerning the relation between freedom and determinism. “Freedom of the will” in any sense that implies a lack of causal determination, however, is simply an illusion based on ignorance of the true causes of a being’s actions. The recognition that all occurrences are causally determined, Spinoza holds, has a positive consolatory power that aids one in controlling the passions. Epistemology and psychology. Like other rationalists, Spinoza distinguishes two representational faculties: the imagination and the intellect. The imagination is a faculty of forming imagistic representations of things, derived ultimately from the mechanisms of the senses; the intellect is a faculty of forming adequate, nonimagistic conceptions of things. He also distinguishes three “kinds of knowledge.” The first or lowest kind he calls opinion or imagination opinio, imaginatio. It includes “random or indeterminate experience” experientia vaga and also “hearsay, or knowledge from mere signs”; it thus depends on the confused and mutilated deliverances of the senses, and is inadequate. The second kind of knowledge he calls reason ratio; it depends on common notions i.e., features of things that are “common to all, and equally in the part and in the whole” or on adequate knowledge of the properties as opposed to the essences of things. The third kind of knowledge he calls intuitive knowledge scientia intuitiva; it proceeds from adequate knowledge of the essence or attributes of God to knowledge of the essence of things, and hence proceeds in the proper order, from causes to effects. Both the second and third kinds of knowledge are adequate. The third kind is preferable, however, as involving not only certain knowledge that something is so, but also knowledge of how and why it is so. Because there is only one substance  God  the individual things of the world are not distinguished from one another by any difference of substance. Rather, among the internal qualitative modifications and differentiations of each divine attribute, there are patterns that have a tendency to endure; these constitute individual things. As they occur within the attribute of extension, Spinoza calls these patterns fixed proportions of motion and rest. Although these individual things are thus modes of the one substance, rather than substances in their own right, each has a nature or essence describable in terms of the thing’s particular pattern and its mechanisms for the preservation of its own being. This tendency toward self-preservation Spinoza calls conatus sometimes tr. as ‘endeavor’. Every individual thing has some conatus. An individual thing acts, or is active, to the extent that what occurs can be explained or understood through its own nature i.e., its selfpreservatory mechanism alone; it is passive to the extent that what happens must be explained through the nature of other forces impinging on it. Thus, every thing, to whatever extent it can, actively strives to persevere in its existence; and whatever aids this self-preservation constitutes that individual’s advantage. Spinoza’s specifically human psychology is an application of this more general doctrine of conatus. That application is made through appeal to several specific characteristics of human beings: they form imagistic representations of other individuals by means of their senses; they are sufficiently complex to undergo increases and decreases in their capacity for action; and they are capable of engaging in reason. The fundamental concepts of his psychology are desire, which is conatus itself, especially as one is conscious of it as directed toward attaining a particular object; pleasure, which is an increase in capacity for action; and pain, which is a decrease in capacity for action. He defines other emotions in terms of these basic emotions, as they occur in particular combinations, in particular kinds of circumstances, with particular kinds of causes, and/or with particular kinds of objects. When a person is the adequate cause of his or her own emotions, these emotions are active emotions; otherwise, they are passions. Desire and pleasure can be either active emotions or passions, depending on the circumstances; pain, however, can only be a passion. Spinoza does not deny the phenomenon of altruism: one’s self-preservatory mechanism, and hence one’s desire, can become focused on a wide variety of objects, including the well-being of a loved person or object  even to one’s own detriment. However, because he reduces all human motivation, including altruistic motivation, to permutations of the endeavor to seek one’s own advantage, his theory is arguably a form of psychological egoism. Ethics. Spinoza’s ethical theory does not take the form of a set of moral commands. Rather, he seeks to demonstrate, by considering human actions and appetites objectively  “just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies”  wherein a person’s true advantage lies. Readers who genuinely grasp the demonstrated truths will, he holds, ipso facto be motivated, to at least some extent, to live their lives accordingly. Thus, Spinozistic ethics seeks to show how a person acts when “guided by reason“; to act in this way is at the same time to act with virtue, or power. All actions that result from understanding  i.e., all virtuous actions  may be attributed to strength of character fortitudo. Such virtuous actions may be further divided into two classes: those due to tenacity animositas, or “the Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to preserve his being”; and those due to nobility generositas, or “the Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and join them to him in friendship.” Thus, the virtuous person does not merely pursue private advantage, but seeks to cooperate with others; returns love for hatred; always acts honestly, not deceptively; and seeks to join himself with others in a political state. Nevertheless, the ultimate reason for aiding others and joining them to oneself in friendship is that “nothing is more useful to man than man”  i.e., because doing so is conducive to one’s own advantage, and particularly to one’s pursuit of knowledge, which is a good that can be shared without loss. Although Spinoza holds that we generally use the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ simply to report subjective appearances  so that we call “good” whatever we desire, and “evil” whatever we seek to avoid  he proposes that we define ‘good’ philosophically as ‘what we certainly know to be useful to us’, and ‘evil’ as ‘what we certainly know prevents us from being masters of some good’. Since God is perfect and has no needs, it follows that nothing is either good or evil for God. Spinoza’s ultimate appeal to the agent’s advantage arguably renders his ethical theory a form of ethical egoism, even though he emphasizes the existence of common shareable goods and the instrumental ethical importance of cooperation with others. However, it is not a form of hedonism; for despite the prominence he gives to pleasure, the ultimate aim of human action is a higher state of perfection or capacity for action, of whose increasing attainment pleasure is only an indicator. A human being whose self-preservatory mechanism is driven or distorted by external forces is said to be in bondage to the passions; in contrast, one who successfully pursues only what is truly advantageous, in consequence of genuine understanding of where that advantage properly lies, is free. Accordingly, Spinoza also expresses his conception of a virtuous life guided by reason in terms of an ideal “free man.” Above all, the free man seeks understanding of himself and of Nature. Adequate knowledge, and particularly knowledge of the third kind, leads to blessedness, to peace of mind, and to the intellectual love of God. Blessedness is not a reward for virtue, however, but rather an integral aspect of the virtuous life. The human mind is itself a part of the infinite intellect of God, and adequate knowledge is an eternal aspect of that infinite intellect. Hence, as one gains knowledge, a greater part of one’s own mind comes to be identified with something that is eternal, and one becomes less dependent on  and less disturbed by  the local forces of one’s immediate environment. Accordingly, the free man “thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death.” Moreover, just as one’s adequate knowledge is literally an eternal part of the infinite intellect of God, the resulting blessedness, peace of mind, and intellectual love are literally aspects of what might be considered God’s own eternal “emotional” life. Although this endows the free man with a kind of blessed immortality, it is not a personal immortality, since the sensation and memory that are essential to personal individuality are not eternal. Rather, the free man achieves during his lifetime an increasing participation in a body of adequate knowledge that has itself always been eternal, so that, at death, a large part of the free man’s mind has become identified with the eternal. It is thus a kind of “immortality” in which one can participate while one lives, not merely when one dies. Politics and philosophical theology. Spinoza’s political theory, like that of Hobbes, treats rights and power as equivalent. Citizens give up rights to the state for the sake of the protection that the state can provide. Hobbes, however, regards this social contract as nearly absolute, one in which citizens give up all of their rights except the right to resist death. Spinoza, in contrast, emphasizes that citizens cannot give up the right to pursue their own advantage as they see it, in its full generality; and hence that the power, and right, of any actual state is always limited by the state’s practical ability to enforce its dictates so as to alter the citizens’ continuing perception of their own advantage. Furthermore, he has a more extensive conception of the nature of an individual’s own advantage than Hobbes, since for him one’s own true advantage lies not merely in fending off death and pursuing pleasure, but in achieving the adequate knowledge that brings blessedness and allows one to participate in that which is eternal. In consequence, Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, recommends a limited, constitutional state that encourages freedom of expression and religious toleration. Such a state  itself a kind of individual  best preserves its own being, and provides both the most stable and the most beneficial form of government for its citizens. In his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza also takes up popular religion, the interpretation of Scripture, and their bearing on the well-being of the state. He characterizes the Old Testament prophets as individuals whose vivid imaginations produced messages of political value for the ancient Hebrew state. Using a naturalistic outlook and historical hermeneutic methods that anticipate the later “higher criticism” of the Bible, he seeks to show that Scriptural writers themselves consistently treat only justice and charity as essential to salvation, and hence that dogmatic doxastic requirements are not justified by Scripture. Popular religion should thus propound only these two requirements, which it may imaginatively represent, to the minds of the many, as the requirements for rewards granted by a divine Lawgiver. The few, who are more philosophical, and who thus rely on intellect, will recognize that the natural laws of human psychology require charity and justice as conditions of happiness, and that what the vulgar construe as rewards granted by personal divine intervention are in fact the natural consequences of a virtuous life. Because of his identificaton of God with Nature and his treatment of popular religion, Spinoza’s contemporaries often regarded his philosophy as a thinly disguised atheism. Paradoxically, however, nineteenth-century Romanticism embraced him for his pantheism; Novalis, e.g., famously characterized him as “the God-intoxicated man.” In fact, Spinoza ascribes to Nature most of the characteristics that Western theologians have ascribed to God: Spinozistic Nature is infinite, eternal, necessarily existing, the object of an ontological argument, the first cause of all things, all-knowing, and the being whose contemplation produces blessedness, intellectual love, and participation in a kind of immortality or eternal life. Spinoza’s claim to affirm the existence of God is therefore no mere evasion. However, he emphatically denies that God is a person or acts for purposes; that anything is good or evil from the divine perspective; or that there is a personal immortality involving memory. In addition to his influence on the history of biblical criticism and on literature including not only Novalis but such writers as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Heine, Shelley, George Eliot, George Sand, Somerset Maugham, Jorge Luis Borges, and Bernard Malamud, Spinoza has affected the philosophical outlooks of such diverse twentieth-century thinkers as Freud and Einstein. Contemporary physicists have seen in his monistic metaphysics an anticipation of twentieth-century field metaphysics. More generally, he is a leading intellectual forebear of twentieth-century determinism and naturalism, and of the mindbody identity theory. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Hampshire’s Spinoza.”

split-brain effect: one of a wide array of behavioral effects consequent upon the severing of the cerebral commisures, and generally interpreted as indicating asymmetry in cerebral functions. The human brain has considerable leftright functional differentiation, or asymmetry, that affects behavior. The most obvious example is handedness. By the 1860s Bouillaud, Dax, and Broca had observed that the effects of unilateral damage indicated that the left hemisphere was preferentially involved in language. Since the 0s, this commitment to functional asymmetry has been reinforced by studies of patients in whom communication between the hemispheres has been surgically disrupted. Split brain effects depend on severing the cerebral commisures, and especially the corpus callosum, which are neural structures mediating communication between the cerebral hemispheres. Commisurotomies have been performed since the 0s to control severe epilepsy. This is intended to leave both hemispheres intact and functioning independently. Beginning in the 0s, J. E. Bogen, M. S. Gazzaniga, and R. W. Sperry conducted an array of psychological tests to evaluate the distinctive abilities of the different hemispheres. Ascertaining the degree of cerebral asymmetry depends on a carefully controlled experimental design in which access of the disassociated hemispheres to peripheral cues is limited. The result has been a wide array of striking results. For example, patients are unable to match an object such as a key felt in one hand with a similar object felt in the other; patients are unable to name an object Spir, Afrikan split brain effects 874   874 held in the left hand, though they can name an object held in the right. Researchers have concluded that these results confirm a clear lateralization of speech, writing, and calculation in the left hemisphere for righthanded patients, leaving the right hemisphere largely unable to respond in speech or writing, and typically unable to perform even simple calculations. It is often concluded that the left hemisphere is specialized for verbal and analytic modes of thinking, while the right hemisphere is specialized for more spatial and synthetic modes of thinking. The precise character and extent of these differences in normal subjects are less clear.

sraffa: an Italian noble -- vitters, and Grice --  L. – cited by H. P. Grice, “Some like Vitters, but Moore’s MY man.” Vienna-born philosopher trained as an enginner at Manchester. Typically referred to Wittgenstein in the style of English schoolboy slang of the time as, “Witters,” pronounced “Vitters.”“I heard Austin said once: ‘Some like Witters, but Moore’s MY man.’ Austin would open the “Philosophical Investigations,” and say, “Let’s see what Witters has to say about this.” Everybody ended up loving Witters at the playgroup.” Witters’s oeuvre was translated first into English by C. K. Ogden. There are interesting twists. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Vitters.” Grice was sadly discomforted when one of his best friends at Oxford, D. F. Pears, dedicated so much effort to the unveiling of the mysteries of ‘Vitters.’ ‘Vitters’ was all in the air in Grice’s inner circle. Strawson had written a review of Philosophical Investigations. Austin was always mocking ‘Vitters,’ and there are other connections. For Grice, the most important is that remark in “Philosohpical Investigations,” which he never cared to check ‘in the Hun,’ about a horse not being seen ‘as a horse.’ But in “Prolegomena” he mentions Vitters in other contexts, too, and in “Causal Theory,” almost anonymously – but usually with regard to the ‘seeing as’ puzzle. Grice would also rely on Witters’s now knowing how to use ‘know’ or vice versa. In “Method” Grice quotes verbatim: ‘No psyche without the manifestation the ascription of psyche is meant to explain,” and also to the effect that most ‘-etic’ talk of behaviour is already ‘-emic,’ via internal perspective, or just pervaded with intentionalism. One of the most original and challenging philosophical writers of the twentieth century. Born in Vienna into an assimilated family of Jewish extraction, he went to England as a student and eventually became a protégé of Russell’s at Cambridge. He returned to Austria at the beginning of The Great War I, but went back to Cambridge in 8 and taught there as a fellow and professor. Despite spending much of his professional life in England, Vitters never lost contact with his Austrian background, and his writings combine in a unique way ideas derived from both the insular and the continental European tradition. His thought is strongly marked by a deep skepticism about philosophy, but he retained the conviction that there was something important to be rescued from the traditional enterprise. In his Blue Book 8 he referred to his own work as “one of the heirs of the subject that used to be called philosophy.” What strikes readers first when they look at Vitters’s writings is the peculiar form of their composition. They are generally made up of short individual notes that are most often numbered in sequence and, in the more finished writings, evidently selected and arranged with the greatest care. Those notes range from fairly technical discussions on matters of logic, the mind, meaning, understanding, acting, seeing, mathematics, and knowledge, to aphoristic observations about ethics, culture, art, and the meaning of life. Because of their wide-ranging character, their unusual perspective on things, and their often intriguing style, Vitters’s writings have proved to appeal to both professional philosophers and those interested in philosophy in a more general way. The writings as well as his unusual life and personality have already produced a large body of interpretive literature. But given his uncompromising stand, it is questionable whether his thought will ever be fully integrated into academic philosophy. It is more likely that, like Pascal and Nietzsche, he will remain an uneasy presence in philosophy. From an early date onward Vitters was greatly influenced by the idea that philosophical problems can be resolved by paying attention to the working of language  a thought he may have gained from Fritz Mauthner’s Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache 102. Vitters’s affinity to Mauthner is, indeed, evident in all phases of his philosophical development, though it is particularly noticeable in his later thinking.Until recently it has been common to divide Vitters’s work into two sharply distinct phases, separated by a prolonged period of dormancy. According to this schema the early “Tractarian” period is that of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1, which Vitters wrote in the trenches of World War I, and the later period that of the Philosophical Investigations 3, which he composed between 6 and 8. But the division of his work into these two periods has proved misleading. First, in spite of obvious changes in his thinking, Vitters remained throughout skeptical toward traditional philosophy and persisted in channeling philosophical questioning in a new direction. Second, the common view fails to account for the fact that even between 0 and 8, when Vitters abstained from actual work in philosophy, he read widely in philosophical and semiphilosophical authors, and between 8 and 6 he renewed his interest in philosophical work and wrote copiously on philosophical matters. The posthumous publication of texts such as The Blue and Brown Books, Philosophical Grammar, Philosophical Remarks, and Conversations with the Vienna Circle has led to acknowledgment of a middle period in Vitters’s development, in which he explored a large number of philosophical issues and viewpoints  a period that served as a transition between the early and the late work. Early period. As the son of a greatly successful industrialist and engineer, Vitters first studied engineering in Berlin and Manchester, and traces of that early training are evident throughout his writing. But his interest shifted soon to pure mathematics and the foundations of mathematics, and in pursuing questions about them he became acquainted with Russell and Frege and their work. The two men had a profound and lasting effect on Vitters even when he later came to criticize and reject their ideas. That influence is particularly noticeable in the Tractatus, which can be read as an attempt to reconcile Russell’s atomism with Frege’s apriorism. But the book is at the same time moved by quite different and non-technical concerns. For even before turning to systematic philosophy Vitters had been profoundly moved by Schopenhauer’s thought as it is spelled out in The World as Will and Representation, and while he was serving as a soldier in World War I, he renewed his interest in Schopenhauer’s metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, and mystical outlook. The resulting confluence of ideas is evident in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and gives the book its peculiar character. Composed in a dauntingly severe and compressed style, the book attempts to show that traditional philosophy rests entirely on a misunderstanding of “the logic of our language.” Following in Frege’s and Russell’s footsteps, Vitters argued that every meaningful sentence must have a precise logical structure. That structure may, however, be hidden beneath the clothing of the grammatical appearance of the sentence and may therefore require the most detailed analysis in order to be made evident. Such analysis, Vitters was convinced, would establish that every meaningful sentence is either a truth-functional composite of another simpler sentence or an atomic sentence consisting of a concatenation of simple names. He argued further that every atomic sentence is a logical picture of a possible state of affairs, which must, as a result, have exactly the same formal structure as the atomic sentence that depicts it. He employed this “picture theory of meaning”  as it is usually called  to derive conclusions about the nature of the world from his observations about the structure of the atomic sentences. He postulated, in particular, that the world must itself have a precise logical structure, even though we may not be able to determine it completely. He also held that the world consists primarily of facts, corresponding to the true atomic sentences, rather than of things, and that those facts, in turn, are concatenations of simple objects, corresponding to the simple names of which the atomic sentences are composed. Because he derived these metaphysical conclusions from his view of the nature of language, Vitters did not consider it essential to describe what those simple objects, their concatenations, and the facts consisting of them are actually like. As a result, there has been a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement among interpreters about their character. The propositions of the Tractatus are for the most part concerned with spelling out Vitters’s account of the logical structure of language and the world and these parts of the book have understandably been of most interest to philosophers who are primarily concerned with questions of symbolic logic and its applications. But for Vitters himself the most important part of the book consisted of the negative conclusions about philosophy that he reaches at the end of his text: in particular, that all sentences that are not atomic pictures of concatenations of objects or truth-functional composites of such are strictly speaking meaningless. Among these he included all the propositions of ethics and aesthetics, all propositions dealing with the meaning of life, all propositions of logic, indeed all philosophical propositions, and finally all the propositions of the Tractatus itself. These are all strictly meaningless; they aim at saying something important, but what they try to express in words can only show itself. As a result Vitters concluded that anyone who understood what the Tractatus was saying would finally discard its propositions as senseless, that she would throw away the ladder after climbing up on it. Someone who reached such a state would have no more temptation to pronounce philosophical propositions. She would see the world rightly and would then also recognize that the only strictly meaningful propositions are those of natural science; but those could never touch what was really important in human life, the mystical. That would have to be contemplated in silence. For “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent,” as the last proposition of the Tractatus declared. Middle period. It was only natural that Vitters should not embark on an academic career after he had completed that work. Instead he trained to be a school teacher and taught primary school for a number of years in the mountains of lower Austria. In the mid-0s he also built a house for his sister; this can be seen as an attempt to give visual expression to the logical, aesthetic, and ethical ideas of the Tractatus. In those years he developed a number of interests seminal for his later development. His school experience drew his attention to the way in which children learn language and to the whole process of enculturation. He also developed an interest in psychology and read Freud and others. Though he remained hostile to Freud’s theoretical explanations of his psychoanalytic work, he was fascinated with the analytic practice itself and later came to speak of his own work as therapeutic in character. In this period of dormancy Vitters also became acquainted with the members of the Vienna Circle, who had adopted his Tractatus as one of their key texts. For a while he even accepted the positivist principle of meaning advocated by the members of that Circle, according to which the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. This he would later modify into the more generous claim that the meaning of a sentence is its use. Vitters’s most decisive step in his middle period was to abandon the belief of the Tractatus that meaningful sentences must have a precise hidden logical structure and the accompanying belief that this structure corresponds to the logical structure of the facts depicted by those sentences. The Tractatus had, indeed, proceeded on the assumption that all the different symbolic devices that can describe the world must be constructed according to the same underlying logic. In a sense, there was then only one meaningful language in the Tractatus, and from it one was supposed to be able to read off the logical structure of the world. In the middle period Vitters concluded that this doctrine constituted a piece of unwarranted metaphysics and that the Tractatus was itself flawed by what it had tried to combat, i.e., the misunderstanding of the logic of language. Where he had previously held it possible to ground metaphysics on logic, he now argued that metaphysics leads the philosopher into complete darkness. Turning his attention back to language he concluded that almost everything he had said about it in the Tractatus had been in error. There were, in fact, many different languages with many different structures that could meet quite different specific needs. Language was not strictly held together by logical structure, but consisted, in fact, of a multiplicity of simpler substructures or language games. Sentences could not be taken to be logical pictures of facts and the simple components of sentences did not all function as names of simple objects. These new reflections on language served Vitters, in the first place, as an aid to thinking about the nature of the human mind, and specifically about the relation between private experience and the physical world. Against the existence of a Cartesian mental substance, he argued that the word ‘I’ did not serve as a name of anything, but occurred in expressions meant to draw attention to a particular body. For a while, at least, he also thought he could explain the difference between private experience and the physical world in terms of the existence of two languages, a primary language of experience and a secondary language of physics. This duallanguage view, which is evident in both the Philosophical Remarks and The Blue Book, Vitters was to give up later in favor of the assumption that our grasp of inner phenomena is dependent on the existence of outer criteria. From the mid-0s onward he also renewed his interest in the philosophy of mathematics. In contrast to Frege and Russell, he argued strenuously that no part of mathematics is reducible purely to logic. Instead he set out to describe mathematics as part of our natural history and as consisting of a number of diverse language games. He also insisted that the meaning of those games depended on the uses to which the mathematical formulas were put. Applying the principle of verification to mathematics, he held that the meaning of a mathematical formula lies in its proof. These remarks on the philosophy of mathematics have remained among Vitters’s most controversial and least explored writings. Later period. Vitters’s middle period was characterized by intensive philosophical work on a broad but quickly changing front. By 6, however, his thinking was finally ready to settle down once again into a steadier pattern, and he now began to elaborate the views for which he became most famous. Where he had constructed his earlier work around the logic devised by Frege and Russell, he now concerned himself mainly with the actual working of ordinary language. This brought him close to the tradition of British common sense philosophy that Moore had revived and made him one of the godfathers of the ordinary language philosophy that was to flourish in Oxford in the 0s. In the Philosophical Investigations Vitters emphasized that there are countless different uses of what we call “symbols,” “words,” and “sentences.” The task of philosophy is to gain a perspicuous view of those multiple uses and thereby to dissolve philosophical and metaphysical puzzles. These puzzles were the result of insufficient attention to the working of language and could be resolved only by carefully retracing the linguistic steps by which they had been reached. Vitters thus came to think of philosophy as a descriptive, analytic, and ultimately therapeutic practice. In the Investigations he set out to show how common philosophical views about meaning including the logical atomism of the Tractatus, about the nature of concepts, about logical necessity, about rule-following, and about the mindbody problem were all the product of an insufficient grasp of how language works. In one of the most influential passages of the book he argued that concept words do not denote sharply circumscribed concepts, but are meant to mark family resemblances between the things labeled with the concept. He also held that logical necessity results from linguistic convention and that rules cannot determine their own applications, that rule-following presupposes the existence of regular practices. Furthermore, the words of our language have meaning only insofar as there exist public criteria for their correct application. As a consequence, he argued, there cannot be a completely private language, i.e., a language that in principle can be used only to speak about one’s own inner experience. This private language argument has caused much discussion. Interpreters have disagreed not only over the structure of the argument and where it occurs in Vitters’s text, but also over the question whether he meant to say that language is necessarily social. Because he said that to speak of inner experiences there must be external and publicly available criteria, he has often been taken to be advocating a logical behaviorism, but nowhere does he, in fact, deny the existence of inner states. What he says is merely that our understanding of someone’s pain is connected to the existence of natural and linguistic expressions of pain. In the Philosophical Investigations Vitters repeatedly draws attention to the fact that language must be learned. This learning, he says, is fundamentally a process of inculcation and drill. In learning a language the child is initiated in a form of life. In Vitters’s later work the notion of form of life serves to identify the whole complex of natural and cultural circumstances presupposed by our language and by a particular understanding of the world. He elaborated those ideas in notes on which he worked between 8 and his death in 1 and which are now published under the title On Certainty. He insisted in them that every belief is always part of a system of beliefs that together constitute a worldview. All confirmation and disconfirmation of a belief presuppose such a system and are internal to the system. For all this he was not advocating a relativism, but a naturalism that assumes that the world ultimately determines which language games can be played. Vitters’s final notes vividly illustrate the continuity of his basic concerns throughout all the changes his thinking went through. For they reveal once more how he remained skeptical about all philosophical theories and how he understood his own undertaking as the attempt to undermine the need for any such theorizing. The considerations of On Certainty are evidently directed against both philosophical skeptics and those philosophers who want to refute skepticism. Against the philosophical skeptics Vitters insisted that there is real knowledge, but this knowledge is always dispersed and not necessarily reliable; it consists of things we have heard and read, of what has been drilled into us, and of our modifications of this inheritance. We have no general reason to doubt this inherited body of knowledge, we do not generally doubt it, and we are, in fact, not in a position to do so. But On Certainty also argues that it is impossible to refute skepticism by pointing to propositions that are absolutely certain, as Descartes did when he declared ‘I think, therefore I am’ indubitable, or as Moore did when he said, “I know for certain that this is a hand here.” The fact that such propositions are considered certain, Vitters argued, indicates only that they play an indispensable, normative role in our language game; they are the riverbed through which the thought of our language game flows. Such propositions cannot be taken to express metaphysical truths. Here, too, the conclusion is that all philosophical argumentation must come to an end, but that the end of such argumentation is not an absolute, self-evident truth, but a certain kind of natural human practice. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Il gesto della mano di Sraffa.” Speranza, “Sraffa’s handwave, and his impicaturum.” Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “L’implicatura di Sraffa,” per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

standard:  Grice: “People, philosophers included, misuse ‘standard’ – in Italian, it just means ‘flag’!” -- model, a term that, like ‘non-standard model’, is used with regard to theories that systematize part of our knowledge of some mathematical structure, for instance the structure of natural numbers with addition, multiplication, and the successor function, or the structure of real numbers with ordering, addition, and multiplication. Models isomorphic to this intended mathematical structure are the “standard models” of the theory, while any other, non-isomorphic, model of the theory is a ‘non-standard’ model. Since Peano arithmetic is incomplete, it has consistent extensions that have no standard model. But there are also non-standard, countable models of complete number theory, the set of all true first-order sentences about natural numbers, as was first shown by Skolem in 4. Categorical theories do not have a non-standard model. It is less clear whether there is a standard model of set theory, although a countable model would certainly count as non-standard. The Skolem paradox is that any first-order formulation of set theory, like ZF, due to Zermelo and Fraenkel, has a countable model, while it seems to assert the existence of non-countable sets. Many other important mathematical structures cannot be characterized by a categorical set of first-order axioms, and thus allow non-standard models. The  philosopher Putnam has argued that this fact has important implications for the debate about realism in the philosophy of language. If axioms cannot capture the spontaneity, liberty of standard model 875   875 “intuitive” notion of a set, what could? Some of his detractors have pointed out that within second-order logic categorical characterizations are often possible. But Putnam has objected that the intended interpretation of second-order logic itself is not fixed by the use of the formalism of second-order logic, where “use” is determined by the rules of inference for second-order logic we know about. Moreover, categorical theories are sometimes uninformative. 

stabilitatum – stabilire -- Establishment – Grice speaks of the Establishment twice. Once re: Gellner: non-Establishment criticizing the English Establishment. Second: to refute Lewis. Something can be ‘established’ and not be conventional. “Surely Lewis should know the Graeco-Roman root of establish to figure that out!” stăbĭlĭo , īvi, ītum (sync. I.imperf. stabilibat, Enn. Ann. 44), 4, v. a. stabilis, to make firm, steadfast, or stable; to fix, stay, establish (class.; esp. in the trop. sense). I. Lit.: semita nulla pedem stabilibat, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 20, 40 (Ann. v. 44 Vahl.): “eo stabilita magis sunt,” Lucr. 3, 202; cf.: confirmandi et stabiliendi causā singuli ab infimo solo pedes terrā exculcabantur, * Caes. B. G. 7, 73: “vineas,” Col. 4, 33, 1: “loligini pedes duo, quibus se velut ancoris stabiliunt,” Plin. 9, 28, 44, § 83.— II. Trop.: regni stabilita scamna solumque, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 48 fin. (Ann. v. 99 Vahl.): “alicui regnum suom,” Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 39; cf.: libertatem civibus, Att. ap. Cic. Sest. 58, 123: “rem publicam (opp. evertere),” Cic. Fin. 4, 24, 65; so, “rem publicam,” id. Sest. 68, 143: “leges,” id. Leg. 1, 23, 62: “nisi haec urbs stabilita tuis consiliis erit,” id. Marcell. 9, 29: “matrimonia firmiter,” id. Rep. 6, 2, 2: pacem, concordiam, Pseud.-Sall. Rep. Ordin. 1 fin. (p. 267 Gerl.): “res Capuae stabilitas Romana disciplina,” Liv. 9, 20: “nomen equestre in consulatu (Cicero),” Plin. 33, 2, 8, § 34: “(aegrum) ad retinendam patientiam,” to strengthen, fortify him, Gell. 12, 5, 3. While Grice’s play with ‘estaablished’ is in the second metabolical stage of his programme – where ‘means’ applies to things other than the emissor, surely metaphorically – he is allowing that ‘estabalish’ may be used in the one-off predicament. By drawing a skull, U is establishing a procedure. Grice notably wants to make ‘established’ a weaker variant of ‘conventional.’ So that x, whatever, may be ‘established’ but not ‘conventional.’ In fact, it can be argued that to establish you have to do it at least once. Cfr. ‘settled. ‘Greenwich, Conn., settled in 1639.’ ‘Established’ Surely it would be obtuse to say that Greenwich, Conn. Was “conventionalized”.

state, Grice: “I will use the phrase ‘state of the soul’ – This may sound pedantic, and it is!” – “I will use ‘psychological state,’ where the more correct phrase would be ‘state’ of the ‘soul,’ since theory – as in ‘-logical,’ has nothing to do with it. Now you’ll wonder if the soul has states. A state of the soul – or a ‘frame of mind,’ as Strawson wrongly puts it – is a physical state on which a ‘state’ of the soul supervenes, alla Funcionalism” – “Note that a ’state’ of the soul may be quite specific and involving other states, like the belief that Strawson’s dog is shaggy.” – “A state is anything that follows a ‘that’-clause; the way an object or system basically is; the fundamental, intrinsic properties of an object or system, and the basis of its other properties. An instantaneous state is a state at a given time. State variables are constituents of a state whose values may vary with time. In classical or Newtonian mechanics the instantaneous state of an n-particle system consists of the positions and momenta masses multiplied by velocities of the n particles at a given time. Other mechanical properties are functions of those in states. Fundamental and derived properties are often, though possibly misleadingly, called observables. The set of a system’s possible states can be represented as an abstract phase space or state space, with dimensions or coordinates for the components of each state variable. In quantum theory, states do not fix the particular values of observables, only the probabilities of observables assuming particular values in particular measurement situations. For positivism or instrumentalism, specifying a quantum state does nothing more than provide a means for calculating such probabilities. For realism, it does more  e.g., it refers to the basis of a quantum system’s probabilistic dispositions or propensities. Vectors in Hilbert spaces represent possible states, and Hermitian operators on vectors represent observables.  -- state of affairs: Grice: “My poor friend D. F. Pears got himself into a lot of trouble by offering to correct C. K. Ogden’s passe translation of Vitters’s Tractatus!” a possibility, actuality, or impossibility of the kind expressed by a nominalization of a declarative sentence. The declarative sentence ‘This die comes up six’ can be nominalized either through the construction ‘that this die comes up six’ or through the likes of ‘this die’s coming up six’. The resulting nominalizations might be interpreted as naming corresponding propositions or states of affairs. States of affairs come in several varieties. Some are possible states of affairs, or possibilities. Consider the possibility of a certain die coming up six when rolled next. This possibility is a state of affairs, as is its “complement”  the die’s not coming up six when rolled next. There is in addition the state of affairs which conjoins that die’s coming up six with its not coming up six. And this contradictory state of affairs is of course not a possibility, not a possible state of affairs. Moreover, for every actual state of affairs there is a non-actual one, its complement. For every proposition there is hence a state of affairs: possible or impossible, actual or not. Indeed some consider propositions to be states of affairs. Some take facts to be actual states of affairs, while others prefer to define them as true propositions. If propositions are states of affairs, then facts are of course both actual states of affairs and true propositions. In a very broad sense, events are just possible states of affairs; in a narrower sense they are contingent states of affairs; and in a still narrower sense they are contingent and particular states of affairs, involving just the exemplification of an nadic property by a sequence of individuals of length n. In a yet narrower sense events are only those particular and contingent states of affairs that entail change. A baseball’s remaining round throughout a certain period does not count as an event in this narrower sense but only as a state of that baseball, unlike the event of its being hit by a certain bat. 

statistics: Grice: “I shall use the singular, ‘statistic’”  -- statistical explanation. Grice: “Jill says, “Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.” Is the validty of her reasoning based on statistics?” -- an explanation expressed in an explanatory argument containing premises and conclusions making claims about statistical probabilities. These arguments include deductions of less general from more general laws and differ from other such explanations only insofar as the contents of the laws imply claims about statistical probability. Most philosophical discussion in the latter half of the twentieth century has focused on statistical explanation of events rather than laws. This type of argument was discussed by Ernest Nagel The Structure of Science, 1 under the rubric “probabilistic explanation,” and by Hempel Aspects of Scientific Explanation, 5 as “inductive statistical” explanation. The explanans contains a statement asserting that a given system responds in one of several ways specified by a sample space of possible outcomes on a trial or experiment of some type, and that the statistical probability of an event represented by a set of points in the sample space on the given kind of trial is also given for each such event. Thus, the statement might assert that the statistical probability is near 1 of the relative frequency r/n of heads in n tosses being close to the statistical probability p of heads on a single toss, where the sample space consists of the 2n possible sequences of heads and tails in n tosses. Nagel and Hempel understood such statistical probability statements to be covering laws, so that inductive-statistical explanation and deductivenomological explanation of events are two species of covering law explanation. The explanans also contains a claim that an experiment of the kind mentioned in the statistical assumption has taken place e.g., the coin has been tossed n times. The explanandum asserts that an event of some kind has occurred e.g., the coin has landed heads approximately r times in the n tosses. In many cases, the kind of experiment can be described equivalently as an n-fold repetition of some other kind of experiment as a thousandfold repetition of the tossing of a given coin or as the implementation of the kind of trial thousand-fold tossing of the coin one time. Hence, statistical explanation of events can always be construed as deriving conclusions about “single cases” from assumptions about statistical probabilities even when the concern is to explain mass phenomena. Yet, many authors controversially contrast statistical explanation in quantum mechanics, which is alleged to require a singlecase propensity interpretation of statistical probability, with statistical explanation in statistical mechanics, genetics, and the social sciences, which allegedly calls for a frequency interpretation. The structure of the explanatory argument of such statistical explanation has the form of a direct inference from assumptions about statistical probabilities and the kind of experiment trial which has taken place to the outcome. One controversial aspect of direct inference is the problem of the reference class. Since the early nineteenth century, statistical probability has been understood to be relative to the way the experiment or trial is described. Authors like J. Venn, Peirce, R. A. Fisher, and Reichenbach, among many others, have been concerned with how to decide on which kind of trial to base a direct inference when the trial under investigation is correctly describable in several ways and the statistical probabilities of possible outcomes may differ relative to the different sorts of descriptions. The most comprehensive discussion of this problem of the reference class is found in the work of H. E. Kyburg e.g., Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, 1. Hempel acknowledged its importance as an “epistemic ambiguity” in inductive statistical explanation. Controversy also arises concerning inductive acceptance. May the conclusion of an explanatory direct inference be a judgment as to the subjective probability that the outcome event occurred? May a judgment that the outcome event occurred is inductively “accepted” be made? Is some other mode of assessing the claim about the outcome appropriate? Hempel’s discussion of the “nonconjunctiveness of inductivestatistical” explanation derives from Kyburg’s earlier account of direct inference where high probability is assumed to be sufficient for acceptance. Non-conjunctiveness has been avoided by abandoning the sufficiency of high probability I. Levi, Gambling with Truth, 7 or by denying that direct inference in inductive-statistical explanation involves inductive acceptance at all R. C. Jeffrey, “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference,” in Essays in Honor of C. G. Hempel. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Jack and Jill.”

stillingfleet: English divine and controversialist who first made his name with “Irenicum,” using natural-law doctrines to oppose religious sectarianism. His “Origines Sacrae” ostensibly on the superiority of the Scriptural record over other forms of ancient history, was for its day a learned study in the moral certainty of historical evidence, the authority of testimony, and the credibility of miracles. In drawing eclectically on philosophy from antiquity to the Cambridge Platonists, he was much influenced by the Cartesian theory of ideas, but later repudiated Cartesianism for its mechanist tendency. For three decades he pamphleteered on behalf of the moral certainty of orthodox Protestant belief against what he considered the beliefs “contrary to reason” of Roman Catholicism. This led to controversy with Unitarian and deist writers who argued that mysteries like the Trinity were equally contrary to “clear and distinct” ideas. He was alarmed at the use made of Locke’s “new,” i.e. nonCartesian, way of ideas by John Toland in Christianity not Mysterious, and devoted his last years to challenging Locke to prove his orthodoxy. The debate was largely over the concepts of substance, essence, and person, and of faith and certainty. Locke gave no quarter in the public controversy, but in the fourth edition of his Essay he silently amended some passages that had provoked Stillingfleet. 

sttochasis: stochastic process –“"pertaining to conjecture," from Greek stokhastikos "able to guess, conjecturing," from stokhazesthai "to guess, aim at, conjecture," from stokhos "a guess, aim, fixed target, erected pillar for archers to shoot at," perhaps from PIE *stogh-, variant of root *stegh- "to stick, prick, sting." The sense of "randomly determined" is from 1934, from German stochastik (1917). a process that evolves, as time goes by, according to a probabilistic principle rather than a deterministic principle. Such processes are also called random processes, but ‘stochastic’ does not imply complete disorderliness. The principle of evolution governing a stochastic or random process is precise, though probabilistic, in form. For example, suppose some process unfolds in discrete successive stages. And suppose that given any initial sequence of stages, S1, S2, . . . , Sn, there is a precise probability that the next stage Sn+1 will be state S, a precise probability that it will be SH, and so on for all possible continuations of the sequence of states. These probabilities are called transition probabilities. An evolving sequence of this kind is called a discrete-time stochastic process, or discrete-time random process. A theoretically important special case occurs when transition probabilities depend only on the latest stage in the sequence of stages. When an evolving process has this property it is called a discrete-time Markov process. A simple example of a discrete-time Markov process is the behavior of a person who keeps taking either a step forward or a step back according to whether a coin falls heads or tails; the probabilistic principle of movement is always applied to the person’s most recent position. The successive stages of a stochastic process need not be discrete. If they are continuous, they constitute a “continuous-time” stochastic or random process. The mathematical theory of stochastic processes has many applications in science and technology. The evolution of epidemics, the process of soil erosion, and the spread of cracks in metals have all been given plausible models as stochastic processes, to mention just a few areas of research.  H. P. Grice, “Stochastic implicatum.”

stoa – stoa -- Stoicus: stoicism -- Neo-stoicism -- du Vair, Guillaume, philosopher, bishop, and political figure. Du Vair and Justus Lipsius were the two most influential propagators of neo-Stoicism in early modern Europe. Du Vair’s Sainte Philosophie “Holy Philosophy,” 1584 and his shorter Philosophie morale des Stoïques “Moral Philosophy of the Stoics,” 1585, were tr. and frequently reprinted. The latter presents Epictetus in a form usable by ordinary people in troubled times. We are to follow nature and live according to reason; we are not to be upset by what we cannot control; virtue is the good. Du Vair inserts, moreover, a distinctly religious note. We must be pious, accept our lot as God’s will, and consider morality obedience to his command. Du Vair thus Christianized Stoicism, making it widely acceptable. By teaching that reason alone enables us to know how we ought to live, he became a founder of modern rationalism in ethics. Stōĭcus , a, um, adj., = Στωϊκός, I.of or belonging to the Stoic philosophy or to the Stoics, Stoic: “schola,” Cic. Fam. 9, 22 fin.: “secta,” Sen. Ep. 123, 14: “sententia,” id. ib. 22, 7: “libelli,” Hor. Epod. 8, 15: “turba,” Mart. 7, 69, 4: “dogmata,” Juv. 13, 121: “disciplina,” Gell. 19, 1, 1: “Stoicum est,” it is a saying of the Stoics, Cic. Ac. 2, 26, 85: “non loquor tecum Stoicā linguā, sed hac submissiore,” Sen. Ep. 13, 4: “est aliquid in illo Stoici dei: nec cor nec caput habet,” Sen. Apoc. 8.— Subst.: Stōĭcus , i, m., a Stoic philosopher, a Stoic, Cic. Par. praef. § 2; Hor. S. 2, 3, 160; 2, 3, 300; plur., Cic. Mur. 29, 61; and in philosophical writings saepissime.— 2. Stōĭca , ōrum, n. plur., the Stoic philosophy, Cic. N. D. 1, 6, 15.—Adv.: Stōĭcē , like a Stoic, Stoically: “agere austere et Stoice,” Cic. Mur. 35, 74: dicere, id. Par. praef. § 3.H. P. Grice, “The Stoa: from Athenian to Oxonian dialectic,” H. P. Grice, “The Stoa and Athenian dialectic.”  H. P. Grice: “The Stoa and Athenian dialectic.” -- stoicism, one of the three leading movements constituting Hellenistic philosophy. Its founder was Zeno of Citium, who was succeeded as school head by Cleanthes. But the third head, Chrysippus, was its greatest exponent and most voluminous writer. These three are the leading representatives of Early Stoicism. No work by any early Stoic survives intact, except Cleanthes’ short “Hymn to Zeus.” Otherwise we are dependent on doxography, on isolated quotations, and on secondary sources, most of them hostile. Nevertheless, a remarkably coherent account of the system can be assembled. The Stoic world is an ideally good organism, all of whose parts interact for the benefit of the whole. It is imbued with divine reason logos, its entire development providentially ordained by fate and repeated identically from one world phase to the next in a never-ending cycle, each phase ending with a conflagration ekpyrosis. Only bodies strictly “exist” and can interact. Body is infinitely divisible, and contains no void. At the lowest level, the world is analyzed into an active principle, god, and a passive principle, matter, both probably corporeal. Out of these are generated, at a higher level, the four elements air, fire, earth, and water, whose own interaction is analogous to that of god and matter: air and fire, severally or conjointly, are an active rational force called breath Grecian pneuma, Latin spiritus, while earth and water constitute the passive substrate on which these act, totally interpenetrating each other thanks to the non-particulate structure of body and its capacity to be mixed “through and through.” Most physical analysis is conducted at this higher level, and pneuma becomes a key concept in physics and biology. A thing’s qualities are constituted by its pneuma, which has the additional role of giving it cohestochastic process Stoicism 879   879 sion and thus an essential identity. In inanimate objects this unifying pneuma is called a hexis state; in plants it is called physis nature; and in animals “soul.” Even qualities of soul, e.g. justice, are portions of pneuma, and they too are therefore bodies: only thus could they have their evident causal efficacy. Four incorporeals are admitted: place, void which surrounds the world, time, and lekta see below; these do not strictly “exist”  they lack the corporeal power of interaction  but as items with some objective standing in the world they are, at least, “somethings.” Universals, identified with Plato’s Forms, are treated as concepts ennoemata, convenient fictions that do not even earn the status of “somethings.” Stoic ethics is founded on the principle that only virtue is good, only vice bad. Other things conventionally assigned a value are “indifferent” adiaphora, although some, e.g., health, wealth, and honor, are naturally “preferred” proegmena, while their opposites are “dispreferred” apoproegmena. Even though their possession is irrelevant to happiness, from birth these indifferents serve as the appropriate subject matter of our choices, each correct choice being a “proper function” kathekon  not yet a morally good act, but a step toward our eventual end telos of “living in accordance with nature.” As we develop our rationality, the appropriate choices become more complex, less intuitive. For example, it may sometimes be more in accordance with nature’s plan to sacrifice your wealth or health, in which case it becomes your “proper function” to do so. You have a specific role to play in the world plan, and moral progress prokope consists in learning it. This progress involves widening your natural “affinity” oikeiosis: an initial concern for yourself and your parts is later extended to those close to you, and eventually to all mankind. That is the Stoic route toward justice. However, justice and the other virtues are actually found only in the sage, an idealized perfectly rational person totally in tune with the divine cosmic plan. The Stoics doubted whether any sages existed, although there was a tendency to treat at least Socrates as having been one. The sage is totally good, everyone else totally bad, on the paradoxical Stoic principle that all sins are equal. The sage’s actions, however similar externally to mere “proper functions,” have an entirely distinct character: they are renamed ‘right actions’ katorthomata. Acting purely from “right reason,” he is distinguished by his “freedom from passion” apatheia: morally wrong impulses, or passions, are at root intellectual errors of mistaking what is indifferent for good or bad, whereas the sage’s evaluations are always correct. The sage alone is happy and truly free, living in perfect harmony with the divine plan. All human lives are predetermined by the providentially designed, all-embracing causal nexus of fate; yet being the principal causes of their actions, the good and the bad alike are responsible for them: determinism and morality are fully compatible. Stoic epistemology defends the existence of cognitive certainty against the attacks of the New Academy. Belief is described as assent synkatathesis to an impression phantasia, i.e. taking as true the propositional content of some perceptual or reflective impression. Certainty comes through the “cognitive impression” phantasia kataleptike, a self-certifying perceptual representation of external fact, claimed to be commonplace. Out of sets of such impressions we acquire generic conceptions prolepseis and become rational. The highest intellectual state, knowledge episteme, in which all cognitions become mutually supporting and hence “unshakable by reason,” is the prerogative of the wise. Everyone else is in a state of mere opinion doxa or of ignorance. Nevertheless, the cognitive impression serves as a “criterion of truth” for all. A further important criterion is prolepseis, also called common conceptions and common notions koinai ennoiai, often appealed to in philosophical argument. Although officially dependent on experience, they often sound more like innate intuitions, purportedly indubitable. Stoic logic is propositional, by contrast with Aristotle’s logic of terms. The basic unit is the simple proposition axioma, the primary bearer of truth and falsehood. Syllogistic also employs complex propositions  conditional, conjunctive, and disjunctive  and rests on five “indemonstrable” inference schemata to which others can be reduced with the aid of four rules called themata. All these items belong to the class of lekta  “sayables” or “expressibles.” Words are bodies vibrating portions of air, as are external objects, but predicates like that expressed by ‘ . . . walks’, and the meanings of whole sentences, e.g., ‘Socrates walks’, are incorporeal lekta. The structure and content of both thoughts and sentences are analyzed by mapping them onto lekta, but the lekta are themselves causally inert. Conventionally, a second phase of the school is distinguished as Middle Stoicism. It developed largely at Rhodes under Panaetius and Posidonius, both of whom influenced the presentation of Stoicism in Cicero’s influential philosophical treatises mid-first century B.C.. Panaetius Stoicism Stoicism 880   880 c.185c.110 softened some classical Stoic positions, his ethics being more pragmatic and less concerned with the idealized sage. Posidonius c.135c.50 made Stoicism more open to Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, reviving Plato’s inclusion of irrational components in the soul. A third phase, Roman Stoicism, is the only Stoic era whose writings have survived in quantity. It is represented especially by the younger Seneca A.D. c.165, Epictetus A.D. c.55c.135, and Marcus Aurelius A.D. 12180. It continued the trend set by Panaetius, with a strong primary focus on practical and personal ethics. Many prominent Roman political figures were Stoics. After the second century A.D. Stoicism as a system fell from prominence, but its terminology and concepts had by then become an ineradicable part of ancient thought. Through the writings of Cicero and Seneca, its impact on the moral and political thought of the Renaissance was immense. 

stoutianism: philosophical psychologist, astudent of Ward, he was influenced by Herbart and especially Brentano. He influenced Grice to the point that Grice called himself “a true Stoutian.”  He was editor of Mind 20. He followed Ward in rejecting associationism and sensationism, and proposing analysis of mind as activity rather than passivity, consisting of acts of cognition, feeling, and conation. Stout stressed attention as the essential function of mind, and argued for the goal-directedness of all mental activity and behavior, greatly influencing McDougall’s hormic psychology. He reinterpreted traditional associationist ideas to emphasize primacy of mental activity; e.g., association by contiguity  a passive mechanical process imposed on mind  became association by continuity of attentional interest. With Brentano, he argued that mental representation involves “thought reference” to a real object known through the representation that is itself the object of thought, like Locke’s “idea.” In philosophy he was influenced by Moore and Russell. His major works are Analytic Psychology 6 and Manual of Psychology 9.

strato: Grecian philosopher and polymath nicknamed “the Physicist” for his innovative ideas in natural science. He succeeded Theophrastus as head of the Lyceum. Earlier he served as royal tutor in Alexandria, where his students included Aristarchus, who devised the first heliocentric model. Of Strato’s many writings only fragments and summaries survive. These show him criticizing the abstract conceptual analysis of earlier theorists and paying closer attention to empirical evidence. Among his targets were atomist arguments that motion is impossible unless there is void, and also Aristotle’s thesis that matter is fully continuous. Strato argued that no large void occurs in nature, but that matter is naturally porous, laced with tiny pockets of void. His investigations of compression and suction were influential in ancient physiology. In dynamics, he proposed that bodies have no property of lightness but only more or less weight. 

strawson: Grice’s tutee. b.9, London-born, Oxford-educated philosopher who has made major contributions to logic, metaphysics, and the study of Kant. His career has been mainly at Oxford (he spent a term in Wales and visited the New World a lot), where he was the leading philosopher of his generation, due to that famous tutor he had for his ‘logic paper’: H. P. Grice, at St. John’s. His first important work, “On Referring” argues that Baron Russell’s theory of descriptions fails to deal properly with the role of descriptions as “referring expressions” because Russell assumed the “bogus trichotomy” that sentences are true, false, or meaningless: for Strawson, sentences with empty descriptions are meaningful but “neither true nor false” because the general presuppositions governing the use of referring expressions are not fulfilled. One aspect of this argument was Russell’s alleged insensitivity to the ordinary use of definite descriptions. The contrast between the abstract schemata of formal logic and the manifold richness of the inferences inherent in ordinary language is the central theme of Strawson’s “ Introduction to Logical Theory,” where he credits H. P. Grice for making him aware of ‘pragmatic rules’ of conversation – Grice was amused that Baron Russell cared to respond to Strawson in “Mind” – where Russell’s original “On denoting” had been published. Together, after a joint seminar with Quine, Strawson submitted “In defense of a dogma,” co-written with Grice – A year later Strawson submitted on Grice’s behalf “Meaning” to the same journal – They participated with Pears in a Third programme lecture, published by Pears in “The nature of metaphysics” (London, Macmillan”). In Individuals, provocatively entitled “an essay in DESCRIPTIVE (never revisionary) metaphysics,” Strawson, drawing “without crediting” on joint seminars with Grice on Categories and De Interpretatione, Strawson  reintroduced metaphysics as a respectable philosophical discipline after decades of positivist rhetoric. But his project is only “descriptive” metaphysics  elucidation of the basic features of our own conceptual scheme  and his arguments are based on the philosophy of language: “basic” particulars are those like “Grice” or his “cricket bat”, which are basic objects of reference, and it is the spatiotemporal and sortal conditions for their identification and reidentification by speakers that constitute the basic categories. Three arguments are especially famous. First, even in a purely auditory world objective reference on the basis of experience requires at least an analogue of space. Second, because self-reference presupposes reference to others, persons, conceived as bearers of both physical and psychological properties, are a type of basic particular – cfr. Grice on “Personal identity.” Third, “feature-placing” discourse, such as ‘it is snowing here now’, is “the ultimate propositional level” through which reference to particulars enters discourse. Strawson’s next book, The Bounds of Sense 6, provides a critical reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. His aim is to extricate what he sees as the profound truths concerning the presuppositions of objective experience and judgment that Kant’s transcendental arguments establish from the mysterious metaphysics of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Strawson’s critics have argued, however, that the resulting position is unstable: transcendental arguments can tell us only what we must suppose to be the case. So if Kant’s idealism, which restricts such suppositions to things as they appear to us, is abandoned, we can draw conclusions concerning the way the world itself must be only if we add the verificationist thesis that ability to make sense of such suppositions requires ability to verify them. In his next book, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties 5, Strawson conceded this: transcendental arguments belong within descriptive metaphysics and should not be regarded as attempts to provide an external justification of our conceptual scheme. In truth no such external justification is either possible or needed: instead  and here Strawson invokes Hume rather than Kant  our reasonings come to an end in natural propensities for belief that are beyond question because they alone make it possible to raise questions. In a famous earlier paper Strawson had urged much the same point concerning the free will debate: defenders of our ordinary attitudes of reproach and gratitude should not seek to ground them in the “panicky metaphysics” of a supra-causal free will; instead they can and need do no more than point to our unshakable commitment to these “reactive” attitudes through which we manifest our attachment to that fundamental category of our conceptual scheme  persons.  strawsonise: verb invented by A. M. Kemmerling. To adopt Strawson’s manoever in the analysis of ‘meaning.’ “A form of ‘disgricing,’” – Kemmerling adds.  strawsonism – Grice’s favourite Strawsonisms were too many to count. His first was Strawson on ‘true’ for ‘Analysis.’ Grice was amazed by the rate of publishing in Strawson’s case. Strawson kept publishing and Grice kept criticizing. In “Analysis,’ Strawson gives Grice his first ‘strawsonism’ “To say ‘true’ is ditto.’ The second strawsonism is that there is such a thing as ‘ordinary language’ which is not Russellian. As Grice shows, ordinary language IS Russellian. Strawson said that composing “In defence of a dogma” was torture and that it is up to Strawson to finish the thing off.  So there are a few strawonisms there, too. Strawson had the courtesy never to reprint ‘In defence’ in any of his compilations, and of course to have Grice as fist author. There are ‘strawsonisms’ in Grice’s second collaboration with Strawson – that Grice intentionally ignores in “Life and opinions.” This is a transcript of the talk of the dynamic trio: Grice, Pears, and Strawson, published three years later by Pears in “The nature of metaphysics.” Strawson collaborated with “If and the horseshoe” to PGRICE, but did not really write it for the occasion. It was an essay he had drafted ages ago, and now saw fit to publish. He expands on this in his note on Grice for the British Academy, and in his review of Grice’s compilation. Grice makes an explicit mention of Strawson in a footnote in “Presupposition and conversational implicaturum,” the euphemism he uses is ‘tribute’: the refutation of Strawson’s truth-value gap as a metaphysical excrescence and unnecessary is called a ‘tribute,’ coming from the tutor – “in this and other fields,” implicating, “there may be mistakes all over the place.” Kemmerling somewhat ignores Urmson when he says, “Don’t disgrice if you can grice.” To strawsonise, for Kemmerling is to avoid Grice’s direct approach and ask for a higher-level intention. To strawsonise is the first level of disgrice. But Grice first quotes Urmson and refers to Stampe’s briddge example before he does to Strawson’s rat-infested house example. strawson’s rat-infested house. Few in Grice’s playgroup had Grice’s analytic skills. Only a few cared to join him in his analysis of ‘mean.’ The first was Urmson with the ‘bribe.’ The second was Strawson, with his rat-infested house. Grice re-writes Strawson’s alleged counterexample. To deal with his own rat-infested house example, Strawson proposes that the analysans of "U means that p" might be restricted by the addition of a further condition, namely that the utterer U should utter x not only, as already provided, with the intention that his addressee should think that U intends to obtain a certain response from his addressee, but also with the intention that his addressee should think (recognize) that U has the intention just mentioned. In Strawson's example, in The Philosohical Review (that Grice cites on WOW:x) repr. in his "Logico-Linguistic Papers," the potential home buyer is intended to think that the realtor wants him to think that the house is rat-infested. However, the potential house-buyer is not intended by the realtor to think that he is intended to think that the realtor wants him to think that the house is rat infested. The addressee is intended to think that it is only as a result of being too clever for the realtor that he has learned that the potential home buyer wants him to think that the house is rat-infested; the potential home-buyer is to think that he is supposed to take the artificially displayed dead rat  as a evidence that the house is rat infested. U wants to get A to believe that the house A is thinking of buying is rat-infested. S decides to· bring about this belief in A by taking into the house and letting loose a big fat sewer rat. For S has the following scheme. He knows that A is watching him and knows that A believes that S is unaware that he, A, is watching him. It isS's intention that A should (wrongly) infer from the fact that S let the rat loose that S did so with the intention that A should arrive at the house, see the rat, and, taking the rat as "natural evidence", infer therefrom that the house is rat-infested. S further intends A to realize that given the nature of the rat's arrival, the existence of the rat cannot be taken as genuine or natural evidence that the house is rat-infested; but S kilows that A will believe that S would not so contrive to get A to believe the house is rat-infested unless Shad very good reasons for thinking that it was, and so S expects and intends A to infer that the house is rat-infested from the fact that Sis letting the rat loose with the intention of getting A to believe that the house is rat-infested. Thus S satisfies the conditions purported to be necessary and sufficient for his meaning something by letting the rat loose: S lets the rat loose intending (4) A to think that the house is rat-infested, intending (1)-(3) A to infer from the fact that S let the rat loose that S did so intending A to think that the house is rat-infested, and intending (5) A's recognition of S's . intention (4) to function as his reason for thinking that the house is rat-infested. But even though S's action meets these conditions, Strawson feels that his scenario fits Grice's conditions in Grice's reductive analysis and not yet Strawson's intuition about his own use of 'communicate.' To minimise Strawson's discomfort, Grice brings an anti-sneaky clause. ("Although I never shared Strawson's intuition about his use of 'communicate;' in fact, I very rarely use 'communicate that...' To exterminate the rats in Strawson's rat-infested house, Grice uses, as he should, a general "anti-deception" clause. It may be that the use of this exterminating procedure is possible. It may be that any 'backward-looking' clauses can be exterminated, and replaced by a general prohibitive, or closure clause, forbidding an intention by the utterer to be sneaky. It is a conceptual point that if you intend your addressee NOT TO REALISE that p, you are not COMMUNICATING that p. (3A) (if) (3r) (ic): (a) U utters x intending (I) A to think x possesses f (2) A to thinkf correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (3) A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (I) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (4) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r, and (b) There is no inference-element E such that U intends both (I') A in his determination of r to rely on E (2') A to think Uto intend (I') to be false. In the final version Grice reaches after considering alleged counterexamples to the NECESSITY of some of the conditions in the analysans, Grice reformulates. It is not the case that, for some inference element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and  think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E. Embedded in the general definition. By uttering x, U means that-ψ­_b-dp ≡ (Ǝφ)(Ǝf)(Ǝc) U utters x  intending x to be such that anyone who has φ think that x has f, f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, and (Ǝφ') U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has f and that f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, and in view of (Ǝφ') U intending x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has f, and f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, U ψ-s that p, and, for some substituends of ψ_b-d, U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking in view of (Ǝφ') U intending x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has f, and  f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, U ψ-s that p himself ψ that p, and it is not the case that, for some inference element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and  think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E,

stimulus-response -- poverty of the stimulus, a psychological phenomenon exhibited when behavior is stimulusunbound, and hence the immediate stimulus characterized in straightforward physical terms does not completely control behavior. Human beings sort stimuli in various ways and hosts of influences seem to affect when, why, and how we respond  our background beliefs, facility with language, hypotheses about stimuli, etc. Suppose a person visiting a museum notices a painting she has never before seen. Pondering the unfamiliar painting, she says, “an ambitious visual synthesis of the music of Mahler and the poetry of Keats.” If stimulus painting controls response, then her utterance is a product of earlier responses to similar stimuli. Given poverty of the stimulus, no such control is exerted by the stimulus the painting. Of course, some influence of response must be conceded to the painting, for without it there would be no utterance. However, the utterance may well outstrip the visitor’s conditioning and learning history. Perhaps she had never before talked of painting in terms of music and poetry. The linguist Noam Chomsky made poverty of the stimulus central to his criticism of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior 7. Chomsky argued that there is no predicting, and certainly no critical stimulus control of, much human behavior.

strozzi: Important Italian philosopher, especially influential at what Grice called Italy’s Oxford, i. e. Firenze – “Palla Strozzi was more a mentor than a philosopher, but I would consider him both a Grecian and Griceian in spirit.”  --  Palla Strozzi Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search  Palla e Lorenzo Strozzi, dettaglio dell'Adorazione dei Magi di Gentile da Fabriano (1423) Palla di Onofrio Strozzi (o Palla di Noferi) (Firenze, 1372 – Padova, 18 maggio 1462) è stato un banchiere, politico, letterato, filosofo e filologo italiano.   Stemma degli Strozzi  Indice 1 Biografia 1.1 L'opposizione ai Medici 1.2 L'esilio 2 Matrimoni e discendenza 3 Onorificenze 4 Bibliografia 5 Altri progetti 6 Collegamenti esterni Biografia Grazie alla ricchezza accumulata nelle ultime generazioni dalla sua famiglia degli Strozzi, il padre poté far istruire il figlio da letterati ed umanisti, e grazie all'interesse e all'intelligenza, Palla divenne di fatto uno dei più fini uomini di cultura fiorentini del suo tempo.  Ricco e colto, commissionò numerose opere d'arte, tra le quali la Cappella Strozzi (oggi Sagrestia) nella Basilica di Santa Trinita, opera di Filippo Brunelleschi e Lorenzo Ghiberti (1419-1423). La cappella, progetto irrealizzato del padre Noferi, venne fatta erigere in sua memoria da Palla dopo la morte, e ne ospitò la sepoltura monumentale. Per questo ambiente commissionò l'Adorazione dei Magi a Gentile da Fabriano e la Deposizione dalla Croce a Lorenzo Monaco, terminata poi da Beato Angelico che ne fece uno dei suoi capolavori.  L'opposizione ai Medici Collezionista di libri rari e conoscitore del greco e del latino, si trovò già sessantenne invischiato nell'opposizione strenua contro Cosimo de' Medici.  Cosimo il Vecchio infatti era l'uomo che per la prima volta si era di fatto preso tutto il potere cittadino, grazie a un sistema di clientelismo con uomini chiave alla guida degli uffici della Repubblica fiorentina. Davanti a Cosimo solo due strade erano possibili: l'alleanza accettando un ruolo subordinato o lo scontro frontale; e Palla, forte della sua ricchezza e fiero della propria cultura, fu a capo della fazione antimedicea assieme ad un altro oligarca indomabile, Rinaldo degli Albizi.  In un primo momento la fortuna arrise alla sua fazione, riuscendo ad ottenere prima l'incarcerazione di Cosimo, poi la dichiarazione del medesimo come magnate, cioè tiranno, ed il suo conseguente esilio dalla città (1433). L'obiettivo dello Strozzi comunque non era tanto l'eliminazione di un avversario, ma la restaurazione della libertas fiorentina e in questo fu diverso dall'alleato Rinaldo degli Albizi.  Intanto Cosimo mandava già segni di prepararsi a un rientro, che avvenne puntuale al cambio di governo con il veloce avvicendamento dei gonfalonieri, meno di un anno dopo la sua partenza da Firenze.  L'esilio Tra i primi provvedimenti vi è proprio la vendetta sugli avversari, con l'esilio delle famiglie degli Albizi e degli Strozzi, e in questo Cosimo fu favorito anche dall'appoggio popolare che lui e la sua casata si erano saputi conquistare.  Nel 1434 quindi lo Strozzi parte per Padova, dove si preparava per un rientro che non avvenne mai. La sua casa di Padova, nella quale egli visse una seconda giovinezza, fu un ritrovo di artisti e letterati, nel periodo d'oro quando la città veneta era uno dei centri culturali più notevoli della penisola italiana, per certi risultati artistici più importante della stessa Firenze (si pensi ai capolavori lasciati proprio da due fiorentini come Giotto o Donatello).  Lasciò la sua raccolta di libri rari, arricchita ulteriormente durante il suo soggiorno padovano, al monastero di Santa Giustina. Morì a Padova l'8 maggio 1462, nel suo palazzo verso il Prato della Valle. Fu sepolto nella vicina chiesa di Santa Maria di Betlemme.  Matrimoni e discendenza Dalla moglie Maria Strozzi, sua lontana parente, ebbe undici figli:  Lorenzo (1404-1452) Onofrio (1411-1452) Nicola detto Tita (1412-?) Gianfrancesco (1418-1468 circa) Carlo Bartolomeo Margherita Lena (morta nel 1449, moglie di Felice Brancacci) Ginevra Jacopa (moglie di Giovanni di Paolo Rucellai) Tancia. In tarda età si sposò con una figlia di Felice Brancacci, che lo seguì a Padova.  I suoi discendenti si stabilirono in seguito a Ferrara e diedero origine al ramo ferrarese degli Strozzi (quello di Tito Vespasiano ed Ercole Strozzi).  Onorificenze Cavaliere dello Speron d'oro - nastrino per uniforme ordinaria Cavaliere dello Speron d'oro Bibliografia Marcello Vannucci, Le grandi famiglie di Firenze, Roma, Newton Compton Editori, 2006. ISBN 88-8289-531-9 Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Palla Strozzi Collegamenti esterni G. Reichenbach, «STROZZI, Palla», in Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1936. Roberto Palmarocchi, «La famiglia STROZZI», in Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1936. Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 32432314 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 4346 1318 · LCCN (EN) no91009565 · GND (DE) 104350172 · CERL cnp00369282 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-no91009565 Biografie Portale Biografie Storia Portale Storia Categorie: Banchieri italianiPolitici italiani del XIV secoloPolitici italiani del XV secoloLetterati italianiNati nel 1372Morti nel 1462Morti il 18 maggioNati a FirenzeMorti a PadovaUmanisti italianiCollezionisti d'arte italianiStrozziCavalieri dello Speron d'oro[altre]. Refs.:Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Strozzi -- Grecian, Griceian," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

structuratum: mid-15c., "action or process of building or construction;" 1610s, "that which is constructed, a building or edifice;" from Latin structura "a fitting together, adjustment; a building, mode of building;" figuratively, "arrangement, order," from structus, past participle of struere "to pile, place together, heap up; build, assemble, arrange, make by joining together," related to strues "heap," from PIE *streu-, extended form of root *stere- "to spread.” structuralism, a distinctive yet extremely wide range of productive research conducted in the social and human sciences from the 0s through the 0s, principally in France. It is difficult to describe structuralism as a movement, because of the methodological constraints exercised by the various disciplines that came to be influenced by structuralism  e.g., anthropology, philosophy, literary theory, psychoanalysis, political theory, even mathematics. Nonetheless, structuralism is generally held to derive its organizing principles from the early twentieth-century work of Saussure, the founder of structural linguistics. Arguing against the prevailing historicist and philological approaches to linguistics, he proposed a “scientific” model of language, one understood as a closed system of elements and rules that account for the production and the social communication of meaning. Inspired by Durkheim’s notion of a “social fact”  that domain of objectivity wherein the psychological and the social orders converge  Saussure viewed language as the repository of discursive signs shared by a given linguistic community. The particular sign is composed of two elements, a phonemic signifier, or distinctive sound element, and a corresponding meaning, or signified element. The defining relation between the sign’s sound and meaning components is held to be arbitrary, i.e., based on conventional association, and not due to any function of the speaking subject’s personal inclination, or to any external consideration of reference. What lends specificity or identity to each particular signifier is its differential relation to the other signifiers in the greater set; hence, each basic unit of language is itself the product of differences between other elements within the system. This principle of differential  and structural  relation was extended by Troubetzkoy to the order of phonemes, whereby a defining set of vocalic differences underlies the constitution of all linguistic phonemes. Finally, for Saussure, the closed set of signs is governed by a system of grammatical, phonemic, and syntactic rules. Language thus derives its significance from its own autonomous organization, and this serves to guarantee its communicative function. Since language is the foremost instance of social sign systems in general, the structural account might serve as an exemplary model for understanding the very intelligibility of social systems as such  hence, its obvious relevance to the broader concerns of the social and human sciences. This implication was raised by Saussure himself, in his Course on General Linguistics6, but it was advanced dramatically by the  anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss  who is generally acknowledged to be the founder of modern structuralism  in his extensive analyses in the area of social anthropology, beginning with his Elementary Structures of Kinship 9. Lévi-Strauss argued that society is itself organized according to one form or another of significant communication and exchange  whether this be of information, knowledge, or myths, or even of its members themselves. The organization of social phenomena could thus be clarified through a detailed elaboration of their subtending structures, which, collectively, testify to a deeper and all-inclusive, social rationality. As with the analysis of language, these social structures would be disclosed, not by direct observation, but by inference and deduction from the observed empirical data. Furthermore, since these structures are models of specific relations, which in turn express the differential properties of the component elements under investigation, the structural analysis is both readily formalizable and susceptible to a broad variety of applications. In Britain, e.g., Edmund Leach pursued these analyses in the domain of social anthropology; in the United States, Chomsky applied insights of structuralism to linguistic theory and philosophy of mind; in Italy, Eco conducted extensive structuralist analyses in the fields of social and literary semiotics. With its acknowledgment that language is a rule-governed social system of signs, and that effective communication depends on the resources available to the speaker from within the codes of language itself, the structuralist approach tends to be less preoccupied with the more traditional considerations of “subjectivity” and “history” in its treatment of meaningful discourse. In the post-structuralism that grew out of this approach, the  philosopher Foucault, e.g., focused on the generation of the “subject” by the various epistemic discourses of imitation and representation, as well as on the institutional roles of knowledge and power in producing and conserving particular “disciplines” in the natural and social sciences. These disciplines, Foucault suggested, in turn govern our theoretical and practical notions of madness, criminality, punishment, sexuality, etc., notions that collectively serve to “normalize” the individual subject to their determinations. Likewise, in the domain of psychoanalysis, Lacan drew on the work of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss to emphasize Freud’s concern with language and to argue that, as a set of determining codes, language serves to structure the subject’s very unconscious. Problematically, however, it is the very dynamism of language, including metaphor, metonymy, condensation, displacement, etc., that introduces the social symbolic into the constitution of the subject. Althusser applied the principles of structuralist methodology to his analysis of Marxism, especially the role played by contradiction in understanding infrastructural and superstructural formation, i.e., for the constitution of the historical dialectic. His account followed Marx’s rejection of Feuerbach, at once denying the role of traditional subjectivity and humanism, and presenting a “scientific” analysis of “historical materialism,” one that would be anti-historicist in principle but attentive to the actual political state of affairs. For Althusser, such a philosophical analysis helped provide an “objective” discernment to the historical transformation of social reality. The restraint the structuralists extended toward the traditional views of subjectivity and history dramatically colored their treatment both of the individuals who are agents of meaningful discourse and of the linguistically articulable object field in general. This redirection of research interests particularly in France, due to the influential work of Barthes and Michel Serres in the fields of poetics, cultural semiotics, and communication theory has resulted in a series of original analyses and also provoked lively debates between the adherents of structuralist methodology and the more conventionally oriented schools of thought e.g., phenomenology, existentialism, Marxism, and empiricist and positivist philosophies of science. These debates served as an agency to open up subsequent discussions on deconstruction and postmodernist theory for the philosophical generation of the 0s and later. These post-structuralist thinkers were perhaps less concerned with the organization of social phenomena than with their initial constitution and subsequent dynamics. Hence, the problematics of the subject and history  or, in broader terms, temporality itself  were again engaged. The new discussions were abetted by a more critical appraisal of language and tended to be antiHegelian in their rejection of the totalizing tendency of systematic metaphysics. Heidegger’s critique of traditional metaphysics was one of the major influences in the discussions following structuralism, as was the reexamination of Nietzsche’s earlier accounts of “genealogy,” his antiessentialism, and his teaching of a dynamic “will to power.” Additionally, many poststructuralist philosophers stressed the Freudian notions of the libido and the unconscious as determining factors in understanding not only the subject, but the deep rhetorical and affective components of language use. An astonishing variety of philosophers and critics engaged in the debates initially framed by the structuralist thinkers of the period, and their extended responses and critical reappraisals formed the vibrant, poststructuralist period of  intellectual life. Such figures as Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, Kristeva, Maurice Blanchot, Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Philippe LacoueLabarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Irigaray inaugurated a series of contemporary reflections that have become international in scope. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The structure of structure.” . 

subiectum: sub-iectum – sub-iectificatio -- subjectification: Grice is right in distinguishing this from nominalization, because not all nominalization takes the subject position. Grice plays with this. It is a derivation of the ‘subjectum,’ which Grice knows it is Aristotelian. Liddell and Scott have the verb first, and the neuter singular later. “τὸ ὑποκείμενον,” Liddell and Scott note “has three main applications.” The first is “to the matter (hyle) which underlies the form (eidos), as opp. To both “εἶδος” and “ἐντελέχεια” Met. 983a30; second, to the substantia (hyle + morphe) which underlies the accidents, and as opposed to “πάθη,” and “συμβεβηκότα,” as in Cat. 1a20,27 and Met.1037b16, 983b16; third, and this is the use that ‘linguistic’ turn Grice and Strawson are interested in, “to the logical subject to which attributes are ascribed,” and here opp. “τὸ κατηγορούμενον,” (which would be the ‘praedicatum’), as per Cat.1b10,21, Ph.189a31. If Grice uses Kiparsky’s factive, he is also using ‘nominalisation’ as grammarians use it. Refs.: Grice, “Reply to Richards,” in PGRICE, also BANC. subjectivism: When Grice speaks of the subjective condition on intention, he is using ‘subject,’ in a way a philosophical psychologist would. He does not mean Kant’s transcendental subject or ego. Grice means the simpler empiricist subject, personal identity, or self. The choice is unfelicitious in that ‘subject’ contrasts with ‘object.’ So when he speaks of a ‘subjective’ person he means an ‘ego-centric’ condition, or a self-oriented condition, or an agent-oriented condition, or an ‘utterer-oriented’ or ‘utterer-relative’ condition. But this is tricky. His example: “Nixon should get that chair of theology.” The utterer may have to put into Nixon’s shoes. He has to perceive Nixon as a PERSON, a rational agent, with views of his own. So, the philosophical psychologist that Grice is has to think of a conception of the self by the self, and the conception of the other by the self. Wisdom used to talk of ‘other minds;’ Grice might speak of other souls. Grice was concerned with intending folloed by a that-clause. Jeffrey defines desirability as doxastically modified. It is entirely possible for someone to desire the love that he already has. It is what he thinks that matters. Cf. his dispositional account to intending. A Subjectsive condition takes into account the intenders, rather than the ascribers, point of view: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees. Bloggs might reason: Given my present state, I should do what is fun. Given my present state, the best thing for me to do would be to do what is fun. For me in my present state it would make for my well-being, to have fun. Having fun is good, or, a good. Climbing a mountain would be fun. Climbing the Everest would be/make for climbing fun. So, I shall climb the Everest. Even if a critic insisted that a practical syllogism is the way to represent Bloggs finding something to be appealing, and that it should be regarded as a respectable evaluation, the assembled propositions dont do the work of a standard argument. The premises do not support or yield the conclusion as in a standard argument. The premises may be said to yield the conclusion, or directive, for the particular agent whose reasoning process it is, only on the basis of a Subjectsive condition: that the agent is in a certain Subjectsive state, e.g. feels like going out for dinner-fun. Rational beings (the agent at some other time, or other individuals) who do not have that feeling, will not accept the conclusion. They may well accept as true. It is fun to climb Everest, but will not accept it as a directive unless they feel like it now. Someone wondering what to do for the summer might think that if he were to climb Everest he would find it fun or pleasant, but right now she does not feel like it. That is in general the end of the matter. The alleged argument lacks normativity. It is not authoritative or directive unless there is a supportive argument that he needs/ought to do something diverting/pleasant in the summer. A practical argument is different. Even if an agent did not feel like going to the doctor, an agent would think I ought to have a medical check up yearly, now is the time, so I should see my doctor to be a directive with some force. It articulates a practical argument. Perhaps the strongest attempt to reconstruct an (acceptable or rational) thought transition as a standard arguments is to treat the Subjectsive condition, I feel like having climbing fun in the summer, as a premise, for then the premises would support the conclusion. But the individual, whose thought transition we are examining, does not regard a description of his psychological state as a consideration that supports the conclusion. It will be useful to look more closely at a variant of the example to note when it is appropriate to reconstruct thinking in the form of argument. Bloggs, now hiking with a friend in the Everest, comes to a difficult spot and says: I dont like the look of that, I am frightened. I am going back. That is usually enough for Bloggs to return, and for the friend to turn back with him. Bloggss action of turning back, admittedly motivated by fear, is, while not acting on reasons, nonetheless rational unless we judge his fear to be irrational. Bloggss Subjectsive condition can serve as a premise, but only in a very different situation. Bloggs resorts to reasons. Suppose that, while his friend does not think Bloggss fear irrational, the friend still attempts to dissuade Bloggs from going back. After listening and reflecting, Bloggs may say I am so frightened it is not worth it. I am not enjoying this climbing anymore. Or I am too frightened to be able to safely go on. Or I often climb the Everest and dont usually get frightened. The fact that I am now is a good indication that this is a dangerous trail and I should turn back. These are reasons, considerations implicitly backed by principles, and they could be the initial motivations of someone. But in Bloggss case they emerged when he was challenged by his friend. They do not express his initial practical reasoning. Bloggs was frightened by the trail ahead, wanted to go back, and didnt have any reason not to. Note that there is no general rational requirement to always act on reasons, and no general truth that a rational individual would be better off the more often he acted on reasons. Faced with his friends objections, however, Bloggs needed justification for acting on his fear. He reflected and found reason(s) to act on his fear. Grice plays with Subjectsivity already in Prolegomena. Consider the use of carefully. Surely we must include the agents own idea of this. Or consider the use of phi and phi – surely we dont want the addressee to regard himself under the same guise with which the utterer regards him. Or consider “Aspects”: Nixon must be appointed professor of theology at Oxford. Does he feel the need? Grice raises the topic of Subjectsivity again in the Kant lectures just after his discussion of mode, in a sub-section entitled, Modalities: relative and absolute. He finds the topic central for his æqui-vocality thesis: Subjectsive conditions seem necessary to both practical and alethic considerations. Refs.: The source is his essay on intentions and the subjective condition, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. The subject: hypokeimenon -- When Frege turned from ‘term logic’ to ‘predicate logic’ “he didn’t know what he was doing.” Cf. Oxonian nominalization. Grice plays a lot on that. His presentation at the Oxford Philosophical Society he entitled, in a very English way, as “Meaning” (echoing Ogden and Richards). With his “Meaning, Revisited,” it seems more clearly that he is nominalizing. Unless he means, “The essay “Meaning,” revisited,” – alla Putnam making a bad joke on Ogden: “The meaning of ‘meaning’” – “ ‘Meaning,’ revisited” --  Grice is very familiar with this since it’s the literal transliteration of Aristotle’s hypokeimenon, opp. in a specific context, to the ‘prae-dicatum,’ or categoroumenon. And with the same sort of ‘ambiguity,’ qua opposite a category of expression, thought, or reality. In philosophical circles, one has to be especially aware of the subject-object distinction (which belong in philosophical psychology) and the thing which belongs in ontology. Of course there’s the substance (hypousia, substantia), the essence, and the sumbebekon, accidens. So one has to be careful. Grice expands on Strawson’s explorations here. Philosophy, to underlie, as the foundation in which something else inheres, to be implied or presupposed by something else, “ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων . . ὑ. τις ἴδιος οὐσία” Pl.Prt.349b, cf. Cra.422d, R.581c, Ti.Locr.97e: τὸ ὑποκείμενον has three main applications: (1) to the matter which underlies the form, opp. εἶδος, ἐντελέχεια, Arist.Metaph.983a30; (2) to the substance (matter + form) which underlies the accidents, opp. πάθη, συμβεβηκότα, Id.Cat.1a20,27, Metaph.1037b16, 983b16; (3) to the logical subject to which attributes are ascribed, opp. τὸ κατηγορούμενον, Id.Cat.1b10,21, Ph.189a31: applications (1) and (2) are distinguished in Id.Metaph.1038b5, 1029a1-5, 1042a26-31: τὸ ὑ. is occasionally used of what underlies or is presupposed in some other way, e. g. of the positive termini presupposed by change, Id.Ph.225a3-7. b. exist, τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον the external reality, Stoic.2.48, cf. Epicur.Ep.1pp.12,24 U.; “φῶς εἶναι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖς ὑ. ἐπιπῖπτον” Aristarch. Sam. ap. Placit.1.15.5; “τὸ κρῖνον τί τε φαίνεται μόνον καὶ τί σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔτι καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται” S.E.M.7.143, cf. 83,90,91, 10.240; = ὑπάρχω, τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα the existing state of affairs, Plb.11.28.2, cf. 11.29.1, 15.8.11,13, 3.31.6, Eun.VSp.474 B.; “Τίτος ἐξ ὑποκειμένων ἐνίκα, χρώμενος ὁπλις μοῖς καὶ τάξεσιν αἷς παρέλαβε” Plu.Comp.Phil.Flam.2; “τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ὑποκειμένης” Id.2.336b; “ἐχομένου τοῦ προσιόντος λόγου ὡς πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον” A.D.Synt.122.17. c. ὁ ὑ. ἐνιαυτός the year in question, D.S.11.75; οἱ ὑ. καιροί the time in question, Id.16.40, Plb.2.63.6, cf. Plu.Comp.Sol.Publ.4; τοῦ ὑ. μηνός the current month, PTeb.14.14 (ii B. C.), al.; ἐκ τοῦ ὑ. φόρου in return for a reduction from the said rent, PCair.Zen.649.18 (iii B. C.); πρὸς τὸ ὑ. νόει according to the context, Gp.6.11.7. Note that both Grice and Strawson oppose Quine’s Humeian dogma that, since the subjectum is beyond comprehension, we can do with a ‘predicate’ calculus, only. Vide Strawson, “Subject and predicate in logic and grammar.” Refs: H. P. Grice, Work on the categories with P. F. Strawson, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c. subjectum – Grecian hypokeimenon – Grice’s ‘implying,’ qua nominalization, is a category shift, a subjectification, or objectificiation. – We have ‘employ,’ ‘imply,’ and then ‘implication,’ ‘implicature, and ‘implying’ Using the participles, we have the active voice present implicans, the active voice future, implicaturum, and the passive perfect ‘impicatum.’ subjectivism, any philosophical view that attempts to understand in a subjective manner what at first glance would seem to be a class of judgments that are objectively either true or false  i.e., true or false independently of what we believe, want, or hope. There are two ways of being a subjectivist. In the first way, one can say that the judgments in question, despite first appearances, are really judgments about our own attitudes, beliefs, emotions, etc. In the second way, one can deny that the judgments are true or false at all, arguing instead that they are disguised commands or expressions of attitudes. In ethics, for example, a subjective view of the second sort is that moral judgments are simply expressions of our positive and negative attitudes. This is emotivism. Prescriptivism is also a subjective view of the second sort; it is the view that moral judgments are really commands  to say “X is good” is to say, details aside, “Do X.” Views that make morality ultimately a matter of conventions or what we or most people agree to can also be construed as subjective theories, albeit of the first type. Subjectivism is not limited to ethics, however. According to a subjective view of epistemic rationality, the standards of rational belief are the standards that the individual or perhaps most members in the individual’s community would approve of insofar as they are interested in believing those propositions that are true and not believing those propositions that are false. Similarly, phenomenalists can be regarded as proposing a subjective account of material object statements, since according to them, such statements are best understood as complex statements about the course of our experiences.  -- -obiectum-abiectumm-exiectum quartet, the: Grice: subject-object dichotomy, the distinction between thinkers and what they think about. The distinction is not exclusive, since subjects can also be objects, as in reflexive self-conscious thought, which takes the subject as its intended object. The dichotomy also need not be an exhaustive distinction in the strong sense that everything is either a subject or an object, since in a logically possible world in which there are no thinkers, there may yet be mind-independent things that are neither subjects nor objects. Whether there are non-thinking things that are not objects of thought in the actual world depends on whether or not it is sufficient in logic to intend every individual thing by such thoughts and expressions as ‘We can think of everything that exists’. The dichotomy is an interimplicative distinction between thinkers and what they think about, in which each presupposes the other. If there are no subjects, then neither are there objects in the true sense, and conversely. A subjectobject dichotomy is acknowledged in most Western philosophical traditions, but emphasized especially in Continental philosophy, beginning with Kant, and carrying through idealist thought in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. It is also prominent in intentionalist philosophy, in the empirical psychology of Brentano, the object theory of Meinong, Ernst Mally, and Twardowski, and the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Subjectobject dichotomy is denied by certain mysticisms, renounced as the philosophical fiction of duality, of which Cartesian mindbody dualism is a particular instance, and criticized by mystics as a confusion that prevents mind from recognizing its essential oneness with the world, thereby contributing to unnecessary intellectual and moral dilemmas.

sub-ordination. Grice must be the only Oxonian philosopher in postwar Oxford that realised the relevance of subordination. Following J. C. Wilson, Grice notes that ‘if’ is a subordinating connective, and the only one of the connectives which is not commutative. This gives Grice the idea to consult Cook Wilson and develop his view of ‘interrogative subordination.’ Who killed Cock Robin. If it was not the Hawk, it was the Sparrow. It was not the Hawk. It was the Sparrow. What Grecian idiom is Romanesque sub-ordinatio translating. The opposite is co-ordination. “And” and “or” are coordinative particles. Interrogative coordination is provided by ‘or,’ but it relates to yes/no questions. Interrogative subordination involves x-question. WHO killed Cock Robin. The Grecians were syntactic and hypotactic. Varro uses jungendi. is the same and wherefrom it is different, in relation to what &c." It may well be doubted whether he has thus improved upon his predecessors. Surely the discernment of sameness and difference is a function necessarily belonging to soul and necessarily included in the catalogue of her functions : yet Stallbaum's rendering excludes it from that catalogue. The fact that we have ory hv $, not orcp ecri, does not really favour his view—" with whatsoever a thing may be the same, she declares it the same.' I coincide then with the other interpreters in regarding the whole sentence from orw t' hv as indirect INTERROGATION SUBORDINATE interrogation subordinateto \iyeiThis mistake in logic carries with it serious mistakes in trans lation. The clause otw t av ti tovtov rj kcu otov hv erepov is made an indirect INTERROGATIVE COORDINATE with itpbs o tC re pu£Aio-ra xai ottt? [ 39 ] k.t.\., which is impossible. Stallbaum rightly makes the clause a substantive clause and subject of elvai or £vp.f}aivei elvai. (3) eKao-ra is of course predicate with elvai to this sthe question, ‘How many sugars would Tom like in his tea?’ is not ‘satisfied’ by the answer ‘Tom loves sugar’. It may well be true that Tom loves sugar, but the question is not satisfied by that form of answer. Conversely the answer ‘one spoonful’ satisfies the question, even though it might be the wrong answer and leave the tea insufficiently sugary for the satisfaction of Tom’s sweet tooth.

sub-perceptum: This relates to Stich and his sub-doxastic. For Aristotle, “De An.,” the anima leads to the desideratum. Unlike in ‘phuta,’ or vegetables, which are still ‘alive,’ (‘zoa’ – he had a problem with ‘sponges’ which were IN-animate, to him, most likely) In WoW:139, Grice refers to “the pillar box seems red” as “SUB-PERCEPTUAL,” the first of a trio. The second is the perceptual, “A perceives that the pillar box is red,” and the third, “The pillar box is red.” He wishes to explore the truth-conditons of the subperceptum, and although first in the list, is last in the analsysis. Grice proposes: ‘The pillar box seems red” iff (1) the pillar box is red; (2) A perceives that the pillar box is red; and (3) (1) causes (2). In this there is a parallelism with his quasi-causal account of ‘know’ (and his caveat that ‘literally,’ we may just know that 2 + 2 = 4 (and such) (“Meaning Revisited). In what he calls ‘accented sub-perceptum,’ the idea is that the U is choosing the superceptum (“seems”) as opposed to his other obvious choices (“The pillar box IS red,”) and the passive-voice version of the ‘perceptum’: “The pillar box IS PERCEIVED red.” The ‘accent’ generates the D-or-D implicaturum: By uttering “The pillar box seems red,” U IMPLICATES that it is denied that or doubted that the pillar box is perceived red by U or that the pillar box is red. In this, the accented version contrasts with the unaccented version where the implicaturum is NOT generated, and the U remains uncommitted re: this doubt or denial implicaturum. It is this uncommitment that will allow to disimplicate or cancel the implicaturum should occasion arise. The reference Grice makes between the sub-perceptum and the perceptum is grammatical, not psychological. Or else he may be meaning that in uttering, “I perceive that the pillar box is red,” one needs to appeal to Kant’s apperception of the ego. Refs.: Pecocke, Sense and content, Grice, BANC. sub-perceptual -- subdoxastic, pertaining to states of mind postulated to account for the production and character of certain apparently non-inferential beliefs. These were first discussed by Stephen P. Stich in “Beliefs and Subdoxastic States” 8. I may form the belief that you are depressed, e.g., on the basis of subtle cues that I am unable to articulate. The psychological mechanism responsible for this belief might be thought to harbor information concerning these cues subdoxastically. Although subdoxastic states resemble beliefs in certain respects  they incorporate intentional content, they guide behavior, they can bestow justification on beliefs  they differ from fullyfledged doxastic states or beliefs in at least two respects. First, as noted above, subdoxastic states may be largely inaccessible to introspection; I may be unable to describe, even on reflection, the basis of my belief that you are depressed. Second, subdoxastic states seem cut off inferentially from an agent’s corpus of beliefs; my subdoxastic appreciation that your forehead is creased may contribute to my believing that you are depressed, but, unlike the belief that your forehead is creased, it need not, in the presence of other beliefs, lead to further beliefs about your visage. 

subscriptum: Quine thought that Grice’s subscript device was otiose, and that he would rather use brackets, or nothing, any day.  Grice plays with various roots of ‘scriptum.’ He was bound to. Moore had showed that ‘good’ was not ‘descriptive.’ Grice thinks it’s pseudo-descriptive. So here we have the first, ‘descriptum,’ where what is meant is Griceian: By uttering the “The cat is on the mat” U means, by his act of describing, that the cat is on the mat. Then there’s the ‘prae-scriptum.’ Oddly, Grice, when criticizing the ‘descriptive’ fallacy, seldom mentions the co-relative ‘prescriptum.’ “Good” would be understood in terms of a ‘prae-scriptum’ that appeals to his utterer’s intentions. Then there’s the subscriptum. This may have various use, both in Grice. “I subscribe,” and in the case of “Pegasus flies.” Where the utterer subscribes to his ontological commitment. subscript device. Why does Grice think we NEED a subscript device? Obviously, his wife would not use it. I mean, you cannot pronounce a subscript device or a square-bracket device. So his point is ironic. “Ordinary” language does not need it. But if Strawson and Quine are going to be picky about stuff – ontological commitment, ‘existential presupposition,’ let’s subscribe and bracket! Note that Quine’s response to Grice is perfunctory: “Brackets would have done!” Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him.Grice notes that there are clearly at least two possible readings of an utterance like our (i): a first reading in which, as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii). A second reading is one in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv). Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order predicate calculus. Ja wants that p becomes W^jap where ja stands for the individual constant Jack as a super-script attached to the predicate standing for Jacks psychological state or attitude. Grice writes: Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent, respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as (Ǝx)W^jaFxja and W^ja(Ǝx)Fxja. Grice then goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an intentio seconda.Grice notes: But suppose that Jack wants a specific individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been deceived into thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though in fact Joe is an only child. The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent. Let us recall that Grices main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, emptiness! In these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading (vii), where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the psychological-state or -attitude verb, but we cannot now represent (ii) or (iii), with Jill being vacuous, by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the psychological-attitude verb, want, since [well,] Jill does not really exist, except as a figment of Jacks imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as purely intentionalist, and thus favouring by far Suppess over Chomskys characterisation of Grice as a mere behaviourist, Grice hopes that we should be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings of, now: Jack wants Jill to marry him and Jack wants Jill to marry him. It is at this point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for the predicate calculus in question. Only the first formulation represents the internal reading (where ji stands for Jill): W₂^ja4F₁ji₃ja₄ and W₃^ja4F₂ji₁ja_4. Note that in the second formulation, the individual constant for Jill, ji, is introduced prior to want, – jis sub-script is 1, while Ws sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. Grice notes: Given that Jill does not exist, only the internal reading can be true, or alethically satisfactory. Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like that expressed by wanting with one observation that further marks him as an intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. He is willing to allow for existential phrases in cases of vacuous designata, provided they occur within opaque psychological-state or attitude verbs, and he thinks that by doing this, he is being faithful to the richness and exuberance of ordinary discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, we should also have available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs), as a philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a generality! Jill now becomes x. W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5, Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3, Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4. As Grice notes, since in (xii) the individual variable x (ranging over Jill) does not dominate the segment following the (Ǝx) quantifier, the formulation does not display any existential or de re, force, and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii) or (iii), if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully represent ordinary discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.

stupid. Grice loved Plato. They are considering ‘horseness.’ “I cannot see horeseness; I can see horses.” “You are the epitome of stupidity.” “I cannot see stupidity. I see stupid.”

sub-gestum -- suggestio falsi – suggest. To suggest is like to ‘insinuate,’ only different. The root involves a favourite with Grice, ‘a gesture.’ That gesture is very suggesture. Grice explores hint versus suggest in Retrospective epilogue. Also cited by Strawson and Wiggins. The emissor’s implication is exactly this suggestio, for which suggestum. To suggest, advise, prompt, offer, bring to mind: “quoties aequitas restitutionem suggerit,” Dig. 4, 6, 26 fin.; cf.: “quae (res) suggerit, ut Italicarum rerum esse credantur eae res,” reminds, admonishes, ib. 28, 5, 35 fin.: “quaedam de republicā,” Aur. Vict. Vir. Ill. 66, 2. — Absol.: “suggerente conjuge,” at the instigation of, Aur. Vict. Epit. 41, 11; cf.: “suggerente irā,” id. ib. 12, 10 suggestio falsi. Pl. suggestiones falsi.  [mod.L., = suggestion of what is false.]  A misrepresentation of the truth whereby something incorrect is implied to be true; an indirect lie. Often in contexts with suppressio veri.  QUOTES:  1815 H. Maddock Princ. & Pract. Chancery I. 208  Whenever Suppressio veri or Suggestio falsi occur..they afford a sufficient ground for setting aside any Release or Conveyance.   1855 Newspaper & Gen. Reader's Pocket Compan. i.4  He was bound to say that the suppressio veri on that occasion approached very nearly to a positive suggestio falsi.   1898 Kipling Stalky & Co. (1899) 36  It seems..that they had held back material facts; that they were guilty both of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.  1907 W. de Morgan Alice-for-Short xxxvi. 389   That's suppressio veri and suggestio falsi! Besides, it's fibs!   1962 J. Wilson Public Schools & Private Practice i. 19  It is rare to find a positively verifiable untruth in a school brochure: but it is equally rare not to find a great many suggestiones falsi, particularly as regards the material comfort and facilities available.   1980 D. Newsome On Edge of Paradise 7  There are undoubted cases of suppressio veri; on the other hand, he appears to eschew suggestio falsi.  --- Fibs indeed. Suppress, suggest.   Write: "Griceland, Inc."   "Yes, I agree to become a Doctor in Gricean Studies"   EXAM QUESTION:  1. Discuss suggestio falsi in terms of detachability.  2. Compare suppresio veri and suggestion falsi in connection with "The king of France is bald" uttered during Napoleon's time.  3. Invent things for 'suppressio falsi' and 'suggestio veri'.  4. No. You cannot go to the bathroom. -- sub-gestum -- suggestum: not necesarilyy ‘falsi.’ The verb is ‘to suggest that…’ which is diaphanous. Note that the ‘su-‘ stands for ‘sub-‘ which conveys the implicitness or covertness of the impicatum. Indirectness. It’s ‘under,’ not ‘above’ board.’ To suggest, advise, prompt, offer, bring to mind: “quoties aequitas restitutionem suggerit,” Dig. 4, 6, 26 fin.; cf.: “quae (res) suggerit, ut Italicarum rerum esse credantur eae res,” reminds, admonishes, ib. 28, 5, 35 fin.: “quaedam de republicā,” Aur. Vict. Vir. Ill. 66, 2. — Absol.: “suggerente conjuge,” at the instigation of, Aur. Vict. Epit. 41, 11; cf.: “suggerente irā,” id. ib. 12, 10.— The implicaturum is a suggestum – ALWAYS cancellable. Or not? Sometimes not, if ‘reasonable,’ but not ‘rational.’ Jill suggests that Jack is brave when she says, “He is an Englishman, he is; therefore, brave.” The tommy suggests that her povery contrasts with her honesty (“’Tis the same the whole world over.”) So the ‘suggestum’ is like the implicaturum. A particular suggesta are ‘conversational suggestum.’ For Grice this is philosophically important, because many philosophical adages cover ‘suggesta’ which are not part of the philosopher’s import! Vide Holdcroft, “Some forms of indirect communication.”

sub-pressum -- suppresum veri: This is a bit like an act of omission – about which Urmson once asked, “Is that ‘to do,’ Grice?” – Strictly, it is implicatural. “Smith has a beautiful handwriting.” Grice’s abductum: “He must be suppressing some ‘veri,’ but surely the ‘suggestio falsi’ is cancellable. On the other hand, my abent-minded uncle, who ‘suppresses,’ is not ‘implicating.’ The ‘suppressio’ has to be ‘intentional,’ as an ‘omission’ is. Since for the Romans, the ‘verum’ applied to a unity (alethic/practical) this was good. No multiplication, but unity – cf. untranslatable (think) – modality ‘the ‘must’, neutral – desideratum-doxa – think – Yes, when Untranslatable discuss ‘vero’ they do say it applies to ‘factual’ and sincerity, I think. At Collections, the expectation is that Grice gives a report on the philosopher’s ability – not on  his handwriting. It is different when Grice applied to St. John’s. “He doesn’t return library books.” G. Richardson. Why did he use this on two occasions? In “Prolegomena,” he uses it for his desideratum of conversational fortitude (“make a strong conversational move”). To suppress. suggestio falsi. Pl. suggestiones falsi.  [mod.L., = suggestion of what is false.]  A misrepresentation of the truth whereby something incorrect is implied to be true; an indirect lie. Often in contexts with suppressio veri.  QUOTES:  1815 H. Maddock Princ. & Pract. Chancery I. 208  Whenever Suppressio veri or Suggestio falsi occur..they afford a sufficient ground for setting aside any Release or Conveyance.   1855 Newspaper & Gen. Reader's Pocket Compan. i.4  He was bound to say that the suppressio veri on that occasion approached very nearly to a positive suggestio falsi.   1898 Kipling Stalky & Co. (1899) 36  It seems..that they had held back material facts; that they were guilty both of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.  1907 W. de Morgan Alice-for-Short xxxvi. 389   That's suppressio veri and suggestio falsi! Besides, it's fibs!   1962 J. Wilson Public Schools & Private Practice i. 19  It is rare to find a positively verifiable untruth in a school brochure: but it is equally rare not to find a great many suggestiones falsi, particularly as regards the material comfort and facilities available.   1980 D. Newsome On Edge of Paradise 7  There are undoubted cases of suppressio veri; on the other hand, he appears to eschew suggestio falsi.  --- Fibs indeed. Suppress, suggest.   Write: "Griceland, Inc."   "Yes, I agree to become a Doctor in Gricean Studies"   EXAM QUESTION:  1. Discuss suggestio falsi in terms of detachability.  2. Compare suppresio veri and suggestion falsi in connection with "The king of France is bald" uttered during Napoleon's time.  3. Invent things for 'suppressio falsi' and 'suggestio veri'.  4. No. You cannot go to the bathroom.

super-knowing. In WoW. A notion Grice detested. Grice, “I detest superknowing.” “For that reason, I propose a closure clause – for a communicatum to count as one, there should not be any sneaky intention.” The use of ‘super’ is Plotinian. If God is super-good, he is not good. If someobody superknows, he doesn’t know. This is an implicaturum. Surely it is cancellable: “God is supergood; therefore, He is good.” “Smith superknows that p; therefore, Smith, as per a semantic entailment, knows that p.” Grice: “The implicature arise out of the postulate of conversational fortitude: why stop at knowing if you can claim that Smith superknows? Why say that God is love, when He is super-love?”

sublime: sub-lime, neuter.  sublīmie (collat. form sublīmus , a, um: ex sublimo vertice, Cic. poët. Tusc. 2, 7, 19; Enn. ap. Non. 169; Att. and Sall. ib. 489, 8 sq.; Lucr. 1, 340), adj. etym. dub.; perh. sub-limen, up to the lintel; cf. sublimen (sublimem est in altitudinem elatum, Fest. p. 306 Müll.), I.uplifted, high, lofty, exalted, elevated (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose; not in Cic. or Cæs.; syn.: editus, arduus, celsus, altus). I. Lit. A. In gen., high, lofty: “hic vertex nobis semper sublimis,” Verg. G. 1, 242; cf. Hor. C. 1, 1, 36: “montis cacumen,” Ov. M. 1, 666: “tectum,” id. ib. 14, 752: “columna,” id. ib. 2, 1: “atrium,” Hor. C. 3, 1, 46: “arcus (Iridis),” Plin. 2, 59, 60, § 151: “portae,” Verg. A. 12, 133: “nemus,” Luc. 3, 86 et saep.: os, directed upwards (opp. to pronus), Ov. M. 1, 85; cf. id. ib. 15, 673; Hor. A. P. 457: “flagellum,” uplifted, id. C. 3, 26, 11: “armenta,” Col. 3, 8: “currus,” Liv. 28, 9.—Comp.: “quanto sublimior Atlas Omnibus in Libyā sit montibus,” Juv. 11, 24.—Sup.: “triumphans in illo sublimissimo curru,” Tert. Apol. 33.— B. Esp., borne aloft, uplifted, elevated, raised: “rapite sublimem foras,” Plaut. Mil. 5, 1: “sublimem aliquem rapere (arripere, auferre, ferre),” id. As. 5, 2, 18; id. Men. 5, 7, 3; 5, 7, 6; 5, 7, 13; 5, 8, 3; Ter. And. 5, 2, 20; id. Ad. 3, 2, 18; Verg. A. 5, 255; 11, 722 (in all these passages others read sublimen, q. v.); Ov. M 4, 363 al.: “campi armis sublimibus ardent,” borne aloft, lofty, Verg. A. 11, 602: sublimes in equis redeunt, id. ib. 7, 285: “apparet liquido sublimis in aëre Nisus,” id. G. 1, 404; cf.: “ipsa (Venus) Paphum sublimis abit,” on high through the air, id. A. 1, 415: “sublimis abit,” Liv. 1, 16; 1, 34: “vehitur,” Ov. M. 5, 648 al.— C. On high, lofty, in a high position: “tenuem texens sublimis aranea telum,” Cat. 68, 49: “juvenem sublimem stramine ponunt,” Verg. A. 11, 67: “sedens solio sublimis avito,” Ov. M. 6, 650: “Tyrio jaceat sublimis in ostro,” id. H. 12, 179.— D. Subst.: sublīme , is, n., height; sometimes to be rendered the air: “piro per lusum in sublime jactato,” Suet. Claud. 27; so, in sublime, Auct. B. Afr. 84, 1; Plin. 10, 38, 54, § 112; 31, 6, 31, § 57: “per sublime volantes grues,” id. 18, 35, 87, § 362: “in sublimi posita facies Dianae,” id. 36, 5, 4, § 13: “ex sublimi devoluti,” id. 27, 12, 105, § 129.—Plur.: “antiquique memor metuit sublimia casus,” Ov. M. 8, 259: “per maria ac terras sublimaque caeli,” Lucr. 1, 340.— II. Trop., lofty, exalted, eminent, distinguished. A. In gen.: “antiqui reges ac sublimes viri,” Varr. R. R. 2, 4, 9; cf. Luc. 10, 378: “mens,” Ov. P. 3, 3, 103: “pectora,” id. F. 1, 301: “nomen,” id. Tr. 4, 10, 121: “sublimis, cupidusque et amata relinquere pernix,” aspiring, Hor. A. P. 165; cf.: “nil parvum sapias et adhuc sublimia cures,” id. Ep. 1, 12, 15.—Comp.: “quā claritate nihil in rebus humanis sublimius duco,” Plin. 22, 5, 5, § 10; Juv. 8, 232.—Sup.: “sancimus supponi duos sublimissimos judices,” Cod. Just. 7, 62, 39.— B. In partic., of language, lofty, elevated, sublime (freq. in Quint.): “sublimia carmina,” Juv. 7, 28: “verbum,” Quint. 8, 3, 18: “clara et sublimia verba,” id. ib.: “oratio,” id. 8, 3, 74: “genus dicendi,” id. 11, 1, 3: “actio (opp. causae summissae),” id. 11, 3, 153: “si quis sublimia humilibus misceat,” id. 8, 3, 60 et saep.—Transf., of orators, poets, etc.: “natura sublimis et acer,” Hor. Ep. 2, 1, 165: “sublimis et gravis et grandiloquus (Aeschylus),” Quint. 10, 1, 66: “Trachalus plerumque sublimis,” id. 10, 1, 119.—Comp.: “sublimior gravitas Sophoclis,” Quint. 10, 1, 68: “sublimius aliquid,” id. 8, 3, 14: “jam sublimius illud pro Archiā, Saxa atque solitudines voci respondent,” id. 8, 3, 75.—Hence, advv. 1. Lit., aloft, loftily, on high. (α). Form sub-līmĭter (rare ): “stare,” upright, Cato, R. R. 70, 2; so id. ib. 71: “volitare,” Col. 8, 11, 1: “munitur locus,” id. 8, 15, 1.— (β). Form sub-līme (class. ): “Theodori nihil interest, humine an sublime putescat,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 43, 102; cf.: “scuta, quae fuerant sublime fixa, sunt humi inventa,” id. Div. 2, 31, 67: “volare,” Lucr. 2, 206; 6, 97: “ferri,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 17, 40; id. N. D. 2, 39, 101; 2, 56, 141 Orell. N. cr.: “elati,” Liv. 21, 30: “expulsa,” Verg. G. 1, 320 et saep.— b. Comp.: “sublimius altum Attollit caput,” Ov. Hal. 69.— 2. Trop., of speech, in a lofty manner, loftily (very rare): “alia sublimius, alia gravius esse dicenda,” Quint. 9, 4, 130. Grice’s favoured translation of Grecian ‘hypsos’ -- a feeling brought about by objects that are infinitely large or vast such as the heavens or the ocean or overwhelmingly powerful such as a raging torrent, huge mountains, or precipices. The former in Kant’s terminology is the mathematically sublime and the latter the dynamically sublime. Though the experience of the sublime is to an important extent unpleasant, it is also accompanied by a certain pleasure: we enjoy the feeling of being overwhelmed. On Kant’s view, this pleasure results from an awareness that we have powers of reason that are not dependent on sensation, but that legislate over sense. The sublime thus displays both the limitations of sense experience and hence our feeling of displeasure and the power of our own mind and hence the feeling of pleasure. The sublime was an especially important concept in the aesthetic theory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Reflection on it was stimulated by the appearance of a translation of Longinus’s Peri hypsous On the Sublime in 1674. The “postmodern sublime” has in addition emerged in late twentieth century thought as a basis for raising questions about art. Whereas beauty is associated with that whose form can be apprehended, the sublime is associated with the formless, that which is “unpresentable” in sensation. Thus, it is connected with critiques of “the aesthetic”  understood as that which is sensuously present  as a way of understanding what is important about art. It has also been given a political reading, where the sublime connects with resistance to rule, and beauty connects with conservative acceptance of existing forms or structures of society. 

subsidiarium: sub-sidiarium -- subsidiarity, a basic principle of social order and the common good governing the relations between the higher and lower associations in a political community. Positively, the principle of subsidiarity holds that the common good, i.e., the ensemble of social resources and institutions that facilitate human self-realization, depends on fostering the free, creative initiatives of individuals and of their voluntary associations; thus, the state, in addition to its direct role in maintaining public good which comprises justice, public peace, and public morality also has an indirect role in promoting other aspects of the common good by rendering assistance subsidium to those individuals and associations whose activities facilitate cooperative human self-realization in work, play, the arts, sciences, and religion. Negatively, the principle of subsidiarity holds that higher-level i.e., more comprehensive associations  while they must monitor, regulate, and coordinate  ought not to absorb, replace, or undermine the free initiatives and activities of lower-level associations and individuals insofar as these are not contrary to the common good. This presumption favoring free individual and social initiative has been defended on various grounds, such as the inefficiency of burdening the state with myriad local concerns, as well as the corresponding efficiency of unleashing the free, creative potential of subordinate groups and individuals who build up the shared economic, scientific, and artistic resources of society. But the deeper ground for this presumption is the view subjunctive conditional subsidiarity 886   886 that human flourishing depends crucially on freedom for individual self-direction and for the self-government of voluntary associations and that human beings flourish best through their own personal and cooperative initiatives rather than as the passive consumers or beneficiaries of the initiatives of others. 

subsistum: sub-sistum -- subsistence translation of G. Bestand, in current philosophy, especially Meinong’s system, the kind of being that belongs to “ideal” objects such as mathematical objects, states of affairs, and abstractions like similarity and difference. By contrast, the kind of being that belongs to “real” wirklich objects, things of the sorts investigated by the sciences other than psychology and pure mathematics, is called existence Existenz. Existence and subsistence together exhaust the realm of being Sein. So, e.g., the subsistent ideal figures whose properties are investigated by geometers do not exist  they are nowhere to be found in the real world  but it is no less true of them that they have being than it is of an existent physical object: there are such figures. Being does not, however, exhaust the realm of objects or things. The psychological phenomenon of intentionality shows that there are in some sense of ‘there are’ objects that neither exist nor subsist. Every intentional state is directed toward an object. Although one may covet the Hope Diamond or desire the unification of Europe, one may also covet a non-existent material object or desire a non-subsistent state of affairs. If one covets a non-existent diamond, there is in some sense of ‘there is’ something that one covets  one’s state of mind has an object  and it has certain properties: it is, e.g., a diamond. It may therefore be said to inhabit the realm of Sosein ‘being thus’ or ‘predication’ or ‘having properties’, which is the category comprising the totality of objects. Objects that do not have any sort of being, either existence or subsistence, belong to non-being Nichtsein. In general, the properties of an object do not determine whether it has being or non-being. But there are special cases: the round square, by its very nature, cannot subsist. Meinong thus maintains that objecthood is ausserseiend, i.e., independent of both existence and subsistence.

substratum: sub-statum: hypoeinai, hypostasis, hypokemeinon -- substantia – Grice: “The Romans never felt the need for the word ‘substantia’ but trust Cicero to force them to use it!” -- Grice lectured on this with J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. hypousia -- as defined by Aristotle in the Categories, that which is neither predicable “sayable” of anything nor present in anything as an aspect or property of it. The examples he gives are an individual man and an individual horse. We can predicate being a horse of something but not a horse; nor is a horse in something else. He also held that only substances can remain self-identical through change. All other things are accidents of substances and exist only as aspects, properties, or relations of substances, or kinds of substances, which Aristotle called secondary substances. An example of an accident would be the color of an individual man, and an example of a secondary substance would be his being a man. For Locke, a substance is that part of an individual thing in which its properties inhere. Since we can observe, indeed know, only a thing’s properties, its substance is unknowable. Locke’s sense is obviously rooted in Aristotle’s but the latter carries no skeptical implications. In fact, Locke’s sense is closer in meaning to what Aristotle calls matter, and would be better regarded as a synonym of ‘substratum’, as indeed it is by Locke. Substance may also be conceived as that which is capable of existing independently of anything else. This sense is also rooted in Aristotle’s, but, understood quite strictly, leads to Spinoza’s view that there can be only one substance, namely, the totality of reality or God. A fourth sense of ‘substance’ is the common, ordinary sense, ‘what a thing is made of’. This sense is related to Locke’s, but lacks the latter’s skeptical implications. It also corresponds to what Aristotle meant by matter, at least proximate matter, e.g., the bronze of a bronze statue Aristotle analyzes individual things as composites of matter and form. This notion of matter, or stuff, has great philosophical importance, because it expresses an idea crucial to both our ordinary and our scientific understandings of the world. Philosophers such as Hume who deny the existence of substances hold that individual things are mere bundles of properties, namely, the properties ordinarily attributed to them, and usually hold that they are incapable of change; they are series of momentary events, rather than things enduring through time. 

substantialism, the view that the primary, most fundamental entities are substances, everything else being dependent for its existence on them, either as a property of them or a relation between them. Different versions of the view would correspond to the different senses of the word ‘substance’. 

salva-veritate/salva-congruitate distinction, the The phrase occurs in two fragments from Gottfried Leibniz's General Science. Characteristics:  In Chapter 19, Definition 1, Leibniz writes: "Two terms are the same (eadem) if one can be substituted for the other without altering the truth of any statement (salva veritate)." In Chapter 20, Definition 1, Leibniz writes: "Terms which can be substituted for one another wherever we please without altering the truth of any statement (salva veritate), are the same (eadem) or coincident (coincidentia). For example, 'triangle' and 'trilateral', for in every proposition demonstrated by Euclid concerning 'triangle', 'trilateral' can be substituted without loss of truth (salva veritate)." ubstitutivity salva veritate: Grice: “The phrase ‘salva veritate’ has been used at Oxford for years, Kneale tells me!” -- a condition met by two expressions when one is substitutable for the other at a certain occurrence in a sentence and the truth-value truth or falsity of the sentence is necessarily unchanged when the substitution is made. In such a case the two expressions are said to exhibit substitutivity or substitutability salva veritate literally, ‘with truth saved’ with respect to one another in that context. The expressions are also said to be interchangeable or intersubstitutable salva veritate in that context. Where it is obvious from a given discussion that it is the truth-value that is to be preserved, it may be said that the one expression is substitutable for the other or exhibits substitutability with respect to the other at that place. Leibniz proposed to use the universal interchangeability salva veritate of two terms in every “proposition” in which they occur as a necessary and sufficient condition for identity  presumably for the identity of the things denoted by the terms. There are apparent exceptions to this criterion, as Leibniz himself noted. If a sentence occurs in a context governed by a psychological verb such as ‘believe’ or ‘desire’, by an expression conveying modality e.g., ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, or by certain temporal expressions such as ‘it will soon be the case that’, then two terms may denote the same thing but not be interchangeable within such a sentence. Occurrences of expressions within quotation marks or where the expressions are both mentioned and used cf. Quine’s example, “Giorgione was so-called because of his size” also exhibit failure of substitutivity. Frege urged that such failures are to be explained by the fact that within such contexts an expression does not have its ordinary denotation but denotes instead either its usual sense or the expression itself. Salva congruitate From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search Salva congruitate[1] is a Latin scholastic term in logic, which means "without becoming ill-formed",[2] salva meaning rescue, salvation, welfare and congruitate meaning combine, coincide, agree. Salva Congruitate is used in logic to mean that two terms may be substituted for each other while preserving grammaticality in all contexts.[3][4]   Contents 1 Remarks on salva congruitate 1.1 Timothy C. Potts 1.2 Bob Hale 2See also 3References Remarks on salva congruitate Timothy C. Potts Timothy C. Potts describes salva congruitate as a form of replacement in the context of meaning. It is a replacement which preserves semantic coherence and should be distinguished from a replacement which preserves syntactic coherence but may yield an expression to which no meaning has been given. This means that supposing an original expression is meaningful, the new expression obtained by the replacement will also be meaningful, though it will not necessarily have the same meaning as the original one, nor, if the expression in question happens to be a proposition, will the replacement necessarily preserve the truth value of the original.[5]  Bob Hale Bob Hale explains salva congruitate, as applied to singular terms, as substantival expressions in natural language, which are able to replace singular terms without destructive effect on the grammar of a sentence.[6] Thus the singular term 'Bob' may be replaced by the definite description 'the first man to swim the English Channel' salva congruitate. Such replacement may shift both meaning and reference, and so, if made in the context of a sentence, may cause a change in truth-value. Thus terms which may be interchanged salva congruitate may not be interchangeable salva veritate (preserving truth). More generally, expressions of any type are interchangeable salva congruitate if and only if they can replace one another preserving grammaticality or well-formedness.  See also Salva veritate Reference principle Referential opacity Crispin Wright Peter Geach References  W.V.O. Quine, Philosophy of logic  Dr. Benjamin Schnieder, Canonical Property Designators, P9  W.V.O. Quine, Quiddities, P204  W.V.O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, P18  Timothy C. Potts, Structures and categories for the representation of meaning, p57  Bob Hale, Singular Terms, P34 Categories: Concepts in logicPhilosophical logicPhilosophy of languageLatin logical phrases. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Implicaturum salva veritate,” H. P. Grice, “What I learned from T. C. Potts.” – T. C. Potts, “My tutorials with Grice at St. John’s.”

summum bonum: Grice: “that in relation to which all other things have at most instrumental value value only insofar as they are productive of what is the highest good. Philosophical conceptions of the summum bonum have for the most part been teleological in character. That is, they have identified the highest good in terms of some goal or goals that human beings, it is supposed, pursue by their very nature. These natural goals or ends have differed considerably. For the theist, this end is God; for the rationalist, it is the rational comprehension of what is real; for hedonism, it is pleasure; etc. The highest good, however, need not be teleologically construed. It may simply be posited, or supposed, that it is known, through some intuitive process, that a certain type of thing is “intrinsically good.” On such a view, the relevant contrast is not so much between what is good as an end and what is good as a means to this end, as between what is good purely in itself and what is good only in combination with certain other elements the “extrinsically good”. Perhaps the best example of such a view of the highest good would be the position of Moore. Must the summum bonum be just one thing, or one kind of thing? Yes, to this extent: although one could certainly combine pluralism the view that there are many, irreducibly different goods with an assertion that the summum bonum is “complex,” the notion of the highest good has typically been the province of monists believers in a single good, not pluralists.

summum genus. What adjective is the ‘sumum’ translating, Grice wondered. And he soon found out. We know that the Romans were unoriginally enough with their ‘genus’ (cf. ‘gens’) translating Grecian ‘genos.’ The highest category in the ‘arbor griceiana’ -- The categories. There is infimum genus, or sub-summum. Talk of categories becomes informal in Grice when he ‘echoes’ Kant in the mention of four ‘functions’ that generate for Kant twelve categories. Grice however uses the functions themselves, echoing Ariskant, rather, as ‘caegory’. We have then a category of conversational quantity (involved in a principle of maximization of conversational informativeness). We have a category of conversational quality (or a desideratum of conversational candour). We have a category of conversational relation (cf. Strawson’s principle of relevance along with Strawson’s principles of the presumption of knowledge and the presumption of ignorance). Lastly, we have a category of conversational mode. For some reason, Grice uses ‘manner’ sometimes in lieu of Meiklejohn’s apt translation of Kant’s modality into the shorter ‘mode.’ The four have Aristotelian pedigree, indeed Grecian and Graeco-Roman: The quantity is Kant’s quantitat which is Aristotle’s posotes (sic abstract) rendered in Roman as ‘quantitas.’ Of course, Aristotle derives ‘posotes,’ from ‘poson,’ the quantum. No quantity without quantum. The quality is Kant’s qualitat, which again has Grecian and Graeco-Roman pediegree. It is Aristotel’s poiotes (sic in abstract), rendered in Roman as qualitas. Again, derived from the more basic ‘poion,’ or ‘quale.’ Aristotle was unable to find a ‘-tes’ ending form for what Kant has as ‘relation.’ ‘pros it’ is used, and first translated into Roman as ‘relatio.’ We see here that we are talking of a ‘summum genus.’ For who other but a philosopher is going to lecture on the ‘pros it’? What Aristotle means is that Socrates is to the right of Plato. Finally, for Grice’s mode, there is Kant’s wrong ‘modalitat,’ since this refers to Aristotle ‘te’ and translated in Roman as ‘modus,’ which Meiklejohn, being a better classicist than Kant, renders as ‘mode,’ and not the pretentious sounding ‘modality.’ Now for Kant, 12 categories are involved here. Why? Because he subdivides each summum genus into three sub-summum or ‘inferiore’ genus. This is complex. Kant would DISAGREE with Grice’s idea that a subject can JUDGE in generic terms, say, about the quantum. The subject has THREE scenarios. It’s best to reverse the order, for surely unity comes before totality. One scenario, he utters a SINGULAR or individual utterance (Grice on ‘the’). The CATEGORY is the first category, THE UNUM or UNITAS. The one. The unity. Second scenario, he utters a PARTICULAR utterance (Grice’s “some (at least one). Here we encounter the SECOND category, that of PLURALITAS, the plurum, plurality. It’s a good thing Kant forgot that the Greeks had a dual number, and that Urquhart has fourth number, a re-dual. A third scenario: the nirvana. He utters a UNIVERSAL (totum) utterance (Grice on “all”). The category is that of TOTUM, TOTALITAS, totality. Kant does not deign to specify if he means substitutional or non-substitutional. For the quale, there are again three scenarios for Kant, and he would deny that the subject is confronted with the FUNCTION quale and be able to formulate a judgement. The first scenario involves the subject uttering a PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA (Grice elaborates on this before introducing ‘not’ in “Indicative conditionals” – “Let’s start with some unstructured amorophous proposition.” Here the category is NOT AFFIRMATION, but the nirvana “REALITAS,” Reality, reale.Second scenario, subject utters a PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA (Grice on ‘not’). While Kant does not consider affirmatio a category (why should he?), he does consider NEGATIO a category. Negation. See abdicatum. Third scenario, subject utters an PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Here the category is that of LIMITATION, which is quite like NEGATIO (cf. privatio, stelesis, versus habitus or hexis), but not quite. Possibly LIMITATUM. Regarding the ‘pros ti.’ The first scenario involves a categorema, PROPOSITIO CATEGORICA. Here Kant seems to think that there is ONE category called “INHERENCE AND SUBSTISTENCE or substance and accident. There seem rather two. He will go to this ‘pair’ formulation in one more case in the relation, and for the three under modus. If we count the ‘categorical pairs’ as being two categories. The total would not be 12 categories but 17, which is a rather ugly number for a list of categories, unles it is not. Kant is being VERY serious here, because if he has SUBSTISTENCE or SUBSTANCE as a category, this is SECUNDA SUBSTANTIA or ‘deutero-ousia.’ It is a no-no to count the prote ousia or PRIMA SUBSTANTIA as a category. It is defined as THE THING which cannot be predicated of anything! “SUMBEBEKOS” is a trick of Kant, for surely EVERYTHING BUT THE SUBSTANCE can be seen as an ‘accidens’ (In fact, those who deny categories, reduce them to ‘attribute’, or ‘property.’ The second scenario involves an ‘if’ Grice on ‘if’ – PROPOSITIO CONDITIONALIS – hypothetike protasis -- this involves for the first time a MOLECULAR proposition. As in the previous case, we have a ‘category pair’, which is formulated either as CAUSALITY (CAUSALITAS) and DEPENDENCE (Dependentia), or “cause’ (CAUSA) and ‘effect’ (Effectum). Kant is having in mind Strawson’s account of ‘if’ (The influence of P. F. Strawson on Kant). For since this is the hypothetical, Kant is suggeseting that in ‘if p, q’ q depends on p, or q is an effect of its cause, p. As in “If it rains, the boots are in the closet.” (J). The third scenario also involves a molectural proposition, A DISJUNCTUM. PROPOSITIO DISJUNCTIVA. Note that in Kant, ‘if’ before ‘or’! His implicaturum: subordination before coordination, which makes sense. Grice on ‘or.’ FOR SOME REASON, the category here for Kant is that of COMMUNITAS (community) or RECIPROCITAS, reciprocity. He seems to be suggesting that if you turn to the right or to the left, you are reciprocally forbidden to keep on going straight. For the modus, similar. Here Kant is into modality. Again, it is best to re-order the scenarios in terms of priority. Here it’s the middle which is basic. The first scenario, subject utters an ASSERTORIC. The category is a pair: EXISTENCE (how is this different from REALITY) and NON-EXISTENCE (how is this different from negation?). He has in mind: ‘the cat is in the room,’ ‘the room is empty.’ Second scenario, the subject doubts. subject utters a problematical. (“The pillar box may be red”). Here we have a category pair: POSSIBILITIAS (possibility) and, yes, IMPOSSIBILITAS – IMPOSSIBILITY. This is odd, because ‘impossibility’ goes rather with the negation of necessity. The third and last scenario, subject utters an APODEICTIC. Here again there is a category pair – yielding 17 as the final number --: NECESSITAS, necessity, and guess what, CONTINGENTIA, or contingency. Surely, possibilitas and contingentia are almost the same thing. It may be what Grice has in mind when he blames a philosopher to state that ‘what is actual is not also possible.’ Or not. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of Ariskant’s categories,” Ryle, “Categories.” “The nisnamed categories.” Ryle notes that when it comes to ‘relatio,’ Kant just murders Aristotle’s idea of a ‘relation’ as in higher than, or smaller than. – “His idea of the molecular propositions has nothing to do with Aristotle’s ‘relation’ or ‘pros ti.’”

sub-positum, suppositum – (literally, ‘sub-positum,’) -- cf. presuppositum -- in the Middle Ages, reference. The theory of supposition, the central notion in the theory of proprietates terminorum, was developed in the twelfth century, and was refined and discussed into early modern times. It has two parts their names are a modern convenience. 1 The theory of supposition proper. This typically divided suppositio into “personal” reference to individuals not necessarily to persons, despite the name, “simple” reference to species or genera, and “material” reference to spoken or written expressions. Thus ‘man’ in ‘Every man is an animal’ has personal supposition, in ‘Man is a species’ simple supposition, and in ‘Man is a monosyllable’ material supposition. The theory also included an account of how the range of a term’s reference is affected by tense and by modal factors. 2 The theory of “modes” of personal supposition. This part of supposition theory divided personal supposition typically into “discrete” ‘Socrates’ in ‘Socrates is a man’, “determinate” ‘man’ in ‘Some man is a Grecian’, “confused and distributive” ‘man’ in ‘Every man is an animal’, and “merely confused” ‘animal’ in ‘Every man is an animal’. The purpose of this second part of the theory is a matter of some dispute. By the late fourteenth century, it had in some authors become a theory of quantification. The term ‘suppositio’ was also used in the Middle Ages in the ordinary sense, to mean ‘assumption’, ‘hypothesis’. H. P. Grice, “Implicaturum, implicatum, positum, subpositum;” H. P. Grice: “A communicational analogy: explicatum/expositum:implicatum/impositum,” H. P. Grice, “The positum: between the sub-positum and the supra-positum,” H. P. Grice, “The implicaturum, the sous-entendu, and the sub-positum.”

survival: discussed by Grice in what he calls the ‘genoritorial programme, where the philosopher posits himself as a creature-constructor. It’s an expository device that allows to ask questions in the third person, “seeing that we can thus avoid the so-called ‘first-person bias’” -- continued existence after one’s biological death. So understood, survival can pertain only to beings that are organisms at some time or other, not to beings that are disembodied at all times as angels are said to be or to beings that are embodied but never as organisms as might be said of computers. Theories that maintain that one’s individual consciousness is absorbed into a universal consciousness after death or that one continues to exist only through one’s descendants, insofar as they deny one’s own continued existence as an individual, are not theories of survival. Although survival does not entail immortality or anything about reward or punishment in an afterlife, many theories of survival incorporate these features. Theories about survival have expressed differing attitudes about the importance of the body. supervenient behaviorism survival 892   892 Some philosophers have maintained that persons cannot survive without their own bodies, typically espousing a doctrine of resurrection; such a view was held by Aquinas. Others, including the Pythagoreans, have believed that one can survive in other bodies, allowing for reincarnation into a body of the same species or even for transmigration into a body of another species. Some, including Plato and perhaps the Pythagoreans, have claimed that no body is necessary, and that survival is fully achieved by one’s escaping embodiment. There is a similar spectrum of opinion about the importance of one’s mental life. Some, such as Locke, have supposed that survival of the same person would require memory of one’s having experienced specific past events. Plato’s doctrine of recollection, in contrast, supposes that one can survive without any experiential memory; all that one typically is capable of recollecting are impersonal necessary truths. Philosophers have tested the relative importance of bodily versus mental factors by means of various thought experiments, of which the following is typical. Suppose that a person’s whole mental life  memories, skills, and character traits  were somehow duplicated into a data bank and erased from the person, leaving a living radical amnesiac. Suppose further that the person’s mental life were transcribed into another radically amnesiac body. Has the person survived, and if so, as whom? 

swinburne: Grice: “Those Savoyards among us should never confuse Swinburne, parodied in “Patience,” and the Oxonian theologian – hardly an aesthete!” -- English philosopher of religion and of science. In philosophy of science, he has contributed to confirmation theory and to the philosophy of space and time. His work in philosophy of religion is the most ambitious project in philosophical theology undertaken by a British philosopher in the twentieth century. Its first part is a trilogy on the coherence and justification of theistic belief and the rationality of living by that belief: TheCoherence of Theism 7, The Existence of God 9, and Faith and Reason 1. Since 5, when Swinburne became Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at the  of Oxford, he has written a tetralogy about some of the most central of the distinctively Christian religious doctrines: Responsibility and Atonement 9, Revelation 2, The Christian God 4, and Providence and the Problem of Evil 8. The most interesting feature of the trilogy is its contribution to natural theology. Using Bayesian reasoning, Swinburne builds a cumulative case for theism by arguing that its probability is raised sustaining cause Swinburne, Richard 893   893 by such things as the existence of the universe, its order, the existence of consciousness, human opportunities to do good, the pattern of history, evidence of miracles, and religious experience. The existence of evil does not count against the existence of God. On our total evidence theism is more probable than not. In the tetralogy he explicates and defends such Christian doctrines as original sin, the Atonement, Heaven, Hell, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and Providence. He also analyzes the grounds for supposing that some Christian doctrines are revealed truths, and argues for a Christian theodicy in response to the problem of evil. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Swinburne et moi.”

synæsthesia: cum-perceptum: co-sensibile – cum-sensibile – co-sensatio, co-sensation -- a conscious experience in which qualities normally associated with one sensory modality are or seem to be sensed in another. Examples include auditory and tactile visions such as “loud sunlight” and “soft moonlight” as well as visual bodily sensations such as “dark thoughts” and “bright smiles.” Two features of synaesthesia are of philosophic interest. First, the experience may be used to judge the appropriateness of sensory metaphors and similes, such as Baudelaire’s “sweet as oboes.” The metaphor is appropriate just when oboes sound sweet. Second, synaesthesia challenges the manner in which common sense distinguishes among the external senses. It is commonly acknowledged that taste, e.g., is not only unlike hearing, smell, or any other sense, but differs from them because taste involves gustatory rather than auditory experiences. In synaesthesia, however, one might taste sounds sweet-sounding oboes. G.A.G. syncategoremata, 1 in grammar, words that cannot serve by themselves as subjects or predicates of categorical propositions. The opposite is categoremata, words that can do this. For example, ‘and’, ‘if’, ‘every’, ‘because’, ‘insofar’, and ‘under’ are syncategorematic terms, whereas ‘dog’, ‘smooth’, and ‘sings’ are categorematic ones. This usage comes from the fifth-century Latin grammarian Priscian. It seems to have been the original way of drawing the distinction, and to have persisted through later periods along syllogism, demonstrative syncategoremata 896   896 with other usages described below. 2 In medieval logic from the twelfth century on, the distinction was drawn semantically. Categoremata are words that have a definite independent signification. Syncategoremata do not have any independent signification or, according to some authors, not a definite one anyway, but acquire a signification only when used in a proposition together with categoremata. The examples used above work here as well. 3 Medieval logic distinguished not only categorematic and syncategorematic words, but also categorematic and syncategorematic uses of a single word. The most important is the word ‘is’, which can be used both categorematically to make an existence claim ‘Socrates is’ in the sense ‘Socrates exists’ or syncategorematically as a copula ‘Socrates is a philosopher’. But other words were treated this way too. Thus ‘whole’ was said to be used syncategorematically as a kind of quantifier in ‘The whole surface is white’ from which it follows that each part of the surface is white, but categorematically in ‘The whole surface is two square feet in area’ from which it does not follow that each part of the surface is two square feet in area. 4 In medieval logic, again, syncategoremata were sometimes taken to include words that can serve by themselves as subjects or predicates of categorical propositions, but may interfere with standard logical inference patterns when they do. The most notorious example is the word ‘nothing’. If nothing is better than eternal bliss and tepid tea is better than nothing, still it does not follow by the transitivity of ‘better than’ that tepid tea is better than eternal bliss. Again, consider the verb ‘begins’. Everything red is colored, but not everything that begins to be red begins to be colored it might have been some other color earlier. Such words were classified as syncategorematic because an analysis called an expositio of propositions containing them reveals implicit syncategoremata in sense 1 or perhaps 2. Thus an analysis of ‘The apple begins to be red’ would include the claim that it was not red earlier, and ‘not’ is syncategorematic in both senses 1 and 2. 5 In modern logic, sense 2 is extended to apply to all logical symbols, not just to words in natural languages. In this usage, categoremata are also called “proper symbols” or “complete symbols,” while syncategoremata are called “improper symbols” or “incomplete symbols.” In the terminology of modern formal semantics, the meaning of categoremata is fixed by the models for the language, whereas the meaning of syncategoremata is fixed by specifying truth conditions for the various formulas of the language in terms of the models. H. P. Grice, “Implicatures of synaesthesia,” “Some remarks about the senses.”

syneidesis, conscientia -- synderesis: Grice disliked the word as a ‘barbarism.’ Grice: “synderesis was by most of us at the Playgroup reckoned to be a corruption of the Greician “συνείδησις” shared knowledge, literally ‘co-ideatio,’ formed from ‘syn’ and ‘eidesis,’ ‘co-vision,’ or conscience,  the corruption appearing in the medieval manuscripts of what Austin called ‘that ignorant saint,’ Jerome in his Commentary.” Douglas Kries in Traditio vol. 57: Origen, Plato, and Conscience (Synderesis) in Jerome's Ezekiel Commentary, p. 67. συνείδησις , εως, ἡ, A. Liddell and Scott render as “knowledge shared with another,” -- τῶν ἀλγημάτων (in a midwife) Sor.1.4. 2. communication, information, εὑρήσεις ς. PPar. p.422 (ii A.D.); “ς. εἰσήνεγκαν τοῖς κολλήγαις αὐτῶν” POxy. 123.13 (iii/iv A.D.). 3. knowledge, λῦε ταῦτα πάντα μὴ διαλείψας ἀγαθῇ ς. (v.l. ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ) Hp.Ep.1. 4. consciousness, awareness, [τῆς αὑτοῦ συστάσεως] Chrysipp.Stoic.3.43, cf. Phld.Rh.2.140 S., 2 Ep.Cor.4.2, 5.11, 1 Ep.Pet.2.19; “τῆς κακοπραγμοσύνης” Democr.297, cf. D.S.4.65, Ep.Hebr.10.2; “κατὰ συνείδησιν ἀτάραχοι διαμενοῦσι” Hero Bel.73; inner consciousness, “ἐν ς. σου βασιλέα μὴ καταράσῃ” LXX Ec. 10.20; in 1 Ep.Cor.8.7 συνειδήσει is f.l. for συνηθείᾳ. 5. consciousness of right or wrong doing, conscience, Periander and Bias ap. Stob.3.24.11,12, Luc.Am.49; ἐὰν ἐγκλήματός τινος ἔχῃ ς. Anon. Oxy.218 (a） ii 19; “βροτοῖς ἅπασιν ἡ ς. θεός” Men.Mon.654, cf. LXX Wi.17.11, D.H.Th.8 (but perh. interpol.); “ς. ἀγαθή” Act.Ap.23.1; ἀπρόσκοπος πρὸς τὸν θεόν ib.24.16; “καθαρά” 1 Ep.Ti.3.9, POsl.17.10 (ii A.D.); “κολαζομένους κατὰ συνείδησιν” Vett.Val.210.1; “θλειβομένη τῇ ς. περὶ ὧν ἐνοσφίσατο” PRyl.116.9 (ii A.D.); τὸν . . θεὸν κεχολωμένον ἔχοιτο καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ς. Ath.Mitt.24.237 (Thyatira); conscientiousness, Arch.Pap.3.418.13 (vi A.D.).--Senses 4 and 5 sts. run one into the other, v. 1 Ep.Cor.8.7, 10.27 sq. 6. complicity, guilt, crime, “περὶ τοῦ πεφημίσθαι αὐτὴν ἐν ς. τοιαύτῃ” Supp.Epigr.4.648.13 (Lydia, ii A.D.). Grice: “The rough Romans could not do with the ‘cum-‘ of the ‘syn-‘ but few of us at Oxford think of Laurel and Hardy or Grice and Strawson when they say ‘conscientia’!” con-scĭo , īre, v. a. * I. To be conscious of wrong: nil sibi, * Hor. Ep. 1, 1, 61.— II. To know well (late Lat.): “consciens Christus, quid esset,” Tert. Carn. Chr. 3. moral theology, conscience. Jerome used ‘synderesis.’ ‘Synderesis’ becomes a fixture because of Peter Lombard’s inclusion of it in his Sentences. Despite this origin, Grecian ‘synderesis’ is distinguished from Roman ‘conscience’ (from cum-scire) --  by Aquinas. For Aquinas, Grecian ‘synderesis’ is the quasi-habitual grasp of the most common principles of the moral order i.e., natural law, whereas ‘conscienntia’ is the *application* of such knowledge to fleeting and unrepeatable circumstances. ’Conscientia,’ Aquinas misleadingly claims, is allegedly ambiguous in the way in which ‘knowledge’ is. Knowledge (Scientia) can be the mental state of the knower or what the knower knows (scitum, cognitum) – Grice: “In fact, Roman has four participles, active present, sciens, passive perfect, sctium, future active, sciendus, future passive, sciturus -- But ‘conscientia’  like ‘synderesis’, is typically used for the state of the soul. Sometimes, however, conscientia is taken to include general moral knowledge as well as its application here and now; but the content of synderesis is the most general precepts, whereas the content of conscience, if general knowledge, will be less general precepts. Since conscience can be erroneous, the question arises as to whether synderesis and its object, natural law precepts, can be obscured and forgotten because of bad behavior or upbringing. Aquinas holds that while great attrition can take place, such common moral knowledge cannot be wholly expunged from the soul. This is a version of the Aristotelian doctrine that there are starting points of knowledge so easily grasped that the grasping of them is a defining mark of the human being. However perversely the human agent behaves there will remain not only the comprehensive realization that good (bonum) is to be done and evil (malum) avoided, but also the recognition of some substantive human goods. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice ad Aquino,” Villa Grice --. H. P. Grice, “Kenny on Aquinas,” “Kenny uses barbaric Griceian and Grecian.”

synergism: in soteriology, the cooperation within human consciousness of free will and divine grace in the processes of conversion and regeneration. Synergism became an issue in sixteenth-century Lutheranism during a controversy prompted by Philip Melanchthon 1497 syncategorematic synergism 897   897 1569. Under the influence of Erasmus, Melanchthon mentioned, in the 1533 edition of his Common Places, three causes of good actions: “the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will.” Advocated by Pfeffinger, a Philipist, synergism was attacked by the orthodox, predestinarian, and monergist party, Amsdorf and Flacius, who retorted with Gnesio-Lutheranism. The ensuing Formula of Concord 1577 officialized monergism. Synergism occupies a middle position between uncritical trust in human noetic and salvific capacity Pelagianism and deism and exclusive trust in divine agency Calvinist and Lutheran fideism. Catholicism, Arminianism, Anglicanism, Methodism, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberal Protestantism have professed versions of synergism. 

systems theory: the transdisciplinary study of the abstract organization of phenomena, independent of their substance, type, or spatial or temporal scale of existence. It investigates both the principles common to all complex entities and the usually mathematical models that can be used to describe them. Systems theory was proposed in the 0s by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy and furthered by Ross Ashby Introduction to Cybernetics, 6. Von Bertalanffy was both reacting against reductionism and attempting to revive the unity of science. He emphasized that real systems are open to, and interact with, their environments, and that they can acquire qualitatively new properties through emergence, resulting in continual evolution. Rather than reduce an entity e.g. the human body to the properties of its parts or elements e.g. organs or cells, systems theory focuses on the arrangement of and relations among the parts that connect them into a whole cf. holism. This particular organization determines a system, which is independent of the concrete substance of the elements e.g. particles, cells, transistors, people. Thus, the same concepts and principles of organization underlie the different disciplines physics, biology, technology, sociology, etc., providing a basis for their unification. Systems concepts include: system environment boundary, input, output, process, state, hierarchy, goal-directedness, and information. The developments of systems theory are diverse Klir, Facets of Systems Science, 1, including conceptual foundations and philosophy e.g. the philosophies of Bunge, Bahm, and Laszlo; mathematical modeling and information theory e.g. the work of Mesarovic and Klir; and practical applications. Mathematical systems theory arose from the development of isomorphies between the models of electrical circuits and other systems. Applications include engineering, computing, ecology, management, and family psychotherapy. Systems analysis, developed independently of systems theory, applies systems principles to aid a decision maker with problems of identifying, reconstructing, optimizing, and controlling a system usually a socio-technical organization, while taking into account multiple objectives, constraints, and resources. It aims to specify possible courses of action, together with their risks, costs, and benefits. Systems theory is closely connected to cybernetics, and also to system dynamics, which models changes in a network of synergy systems theory 898   898 coupled variables e.g. the “world dynamics” models of Jay Forrester and the Club of Rome. Related ideas are used in the emerging “sciences of complexity,” studying self-organization and heterogeneous networks of interacting actors, and associated domains such as far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, chaotic dynamics, artificial life, artificial intelligence, neural networks, and computer modeling and simulation. 

T

T SUBJECT INDEX: TRANSCENDENTALE

T: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: TELESIO – TERTULLIANO -- TRABIA

T: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: THOMSON (Grice’s collaborator) -- TURING TOULMIN

tautologum: The difference between a truth and a tautological truth is part of the dogma Grice defends. “A three-year old cannot understand Russell’s theory of types” is possibly true. “It is not the case that a three-year old is an adult” is TAUTOLOGICALLY true. As Strawson and Wiggins note, by coining implicaturum Grice is mainly interested in having the MAN implying this or that, as opposed to what the man implies implying this or that. So, in Strawson and Wiggins’s rephrasing, the implicaturum is to be distinguished with the logical and necessary implication, i. e., the ‘tautological’ implication. Grice uses ‘tautological’ variously. It is tautological that we smell smells, for example. This is an extension of ‘paradigm-case,’ re: analyticity. Without ‘analytic’ there is no ‘tautologicum.’ tautŏlŏgĭa , ae, f., = ταυτολογία,I.a repetition of the same meaning in different words, tautology, Mart. Cap. 5, § 535; Charis, p. 242 P. ταὐτολογ-έω ,A.repeat what has been said, “περί τινος” Plb.1.1.3; “ὑπέρ τινος” Id.1.79.7; “τ. τὸν λόγον” Str.12.3.27:—abs., Plb.36.12.2, Phld. Po.Herc.994.30, Hermog.Inv.3.15. Oddly why Witters restricts tautology to truth-table propositional logic, Grice’s two examples are predicate calculus: Women are women and war is war. 4.46 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Unter den möglichen Gruppen von Wahrheitsbedingungen gibt es zwei extreme Fälle. In dem einen Fall ist der Satz für sämtliche Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten der Elementarsätze wahr. Wir sagen, die Wahrheitsbedingungen sind t a u t o l o g i s c h. Im zweiten Fall ist der Satz für sämtliche Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten falsch: Die Wahrheitsbedingungen sind k o n t r a d i k t o r i s c h. Im ersten Fall nennen wir den Satz eine Tautologie, im zweiten Fall eine Kontradiktion. 4.461 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Der Satz zeigt was er sagt, die Tautologie und die Kontradiktion, dass sie nichts sagen. Die Tautologie hat keine Wahrheitsbedingungen, denn sie ist bedingungslos wahr; und die Kontradiktion ist unter keiner Bedingung wahr. Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind sinnlos. (Wie der Punkt, von dem zwei Pfeile in entgegengesetzter Richtung auseinandergehen.) (Ich weiß z. B. nichts über das Wetter, wenn ich weiß, dass es regnet oder nicht regnet.) 4.4611 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind aber nicht unsinnig; sie gehören zum Symbolismus, und zwar ähnlich wie die „0“ zum Symbolismus der Arithmetik. 4.462 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind nicht Bilder der Wirklichkeit. Sie stellen keine mögliche Sachlage dar. Denn jene lässt j e d e mögliche Sachlage zu, diese k e i n e. In der Tautologie heben die Bedingungen der Übereinstimmung mit der Welt—die darstellenden Beziehungen—einander auf, so dass sie in keiner darstellenden Beziehung zur Wirklichkeit steht. 4.463 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Die Wahrheitsbedingungen bestimmen den Spielraum, der den Tatsachen durch den Satz gelassen wird. (Der Satz, das Bild, das Modell, sind im negativen Sinne wie ein fester Körper, der die Bewegungsfreiheit der anderen beschränkt; im positiven Sinne, wie der von fester Substanz begrenzte Raum, worin ein Körper Platz hat.) Die Tautologie lässt der Wirklichkeit den ganzen—unendlichen—logischen Raum; die Kontradiktion erfüllt den ganzen logischen Raum und lässt der Wirklichkeit keinen Punkt. Keine von beiden kann daher die Wirklichkeit irgendwie bestimmen. 4.464 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Die Wahrheit der Tautologie ist gewiss, des Satzes möglich, der Kontradiktion unmöglich. (Gewiss, möglich, unmöglich: Hier haben wir das Anzeichen jener Gradation, die wir in der Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre brauchen.) 4.465 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Das logische Produkt einer Tautologie und eines Satzes sagt dasselbe, wie der Satz. Also ist jenes Produkt identisch mit dem Satz. Denn man kann das Wesentliche des Symbols nicht ändern, ohne seinen Sinn zu ändern. 4.466 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Einer bestimmten logischen Verbindung von Zeichen entspricht eine bestimmte logische Verbindung ihrer Bedeutungen; j e d e b e l i e - b i g e Verbindung entspricht nur den unverbundenen Zeichen. Das heißt, Sätze, die für jede Sachlage wahr sind, können überhaupt keine Zeichenverbindungen sein, denn sonst könnten ihnen nur bestimmte Verbindungen von Gegenständen entsprechen. (Und keiner logischen Verbindung entspricht k e i n e Verbindung der Gegenstände.) Tautologie und Kontradiktion sind die Grenzfälle der Zeichenverbindung, nämlich ihre Auflösung. 4.4661 GER [→OGD | →P/M] Freilich sind auch in der Tautologie und Kontradiktion die Zeichen noch mit einander verbunden, d. h. sie stehen in Beziehungen zu einander, aber diese Beziehungen sind bedeu- tungslos, dem S y m b o l unwesentlich. 4.46 OGD [→GER | →P/M] Among the possible groups of truthconditions there are two extreme cases. In the one case the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological. In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities. The truth-conditions are self-contradictory. In the first case we call the proposition a tautology, in the second case a contradiction. 4.461 OGD [→GER | →P/M] The proposition shows what it says, the tautology and the contradiction that they say nothing. The tautology has no truth-conditions, for it is unconditionally true; and the contradiction is on no condition true. Tautology and contradiction are without sense. (Like the point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions.) (I know, e.g. nothing about the weather, when I know that it rains or does not rain.) 4.4611 OGD [→GER | →P/M] Tautology and contradiction are, however, not nonsensical; they are part of the symbol- ism, in the same way that “0” is part of the symbolism of Arithmetic. 4.462 OGD [→GER | →P/M] Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of the reality. They present no possible state of affairs. For the one allows every possible state of affairs, the other none. In the tautology the conditions of agreement with the world—the presenting relations— cancel one another, so that it stands in no presenting relation to reality. 4.463 OGD [→GER | →P/M] The truth-conditions determine the range, which is left to the facts by the proposition. (The proposition, the picture, the model, are in a negative sense like a solid body, which restricts the free movement of another: in a positive sense, like the space limited by solid substance, in which a body may be placed.) Tautology leaves to reality the whole infinite logical space; contradiction fills the whole logi- cal space and leaves no point to reality. Neither of them, therefore, can in any way determine reality. 4.464 OGD [→GER | →P/M] The truth of tautology is certain, of propositions possible, of contradiction impossible. (Certain, possible, impossible: here we have an indication of that gradation which we need in the theory of probability.) 4.465 OGD [→GER | →P/M] The logical product of a tautology and a proposition says the same as the proposition. Therefore that product is identical with the proposition. For the essence of the symbol cannot be altered without altering its sense. 4.466 OGD [→GER | →P/M] To a definite logical combination of signs corresponds a definite logical combination of their meanings; every arbitrary combination only corresponds to the unconnected signs. That is, propositions which are true for ev- ery state of affairs cannot be combinations of signs at all, for otherwise there could only correspond to them definite combinations of objects. (And to no logical combination corresponds no combination of the objects.) Tautology and contradiction are the limiting cases of the combination of symbols, namely their dissolution. 4.4661 OGD [→GER | →P/M] Of course the signs are also combined with one another in the tautology and contradiction, i.e. they stand in relations to one another, but these relations are meaningless, unessential to the symbol. 4.46 P/M [→GER | →OGD] Among the possible groups of truthconditions there are two extreme cases. In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological. In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities: the truth-conditions are contradictory. In the first case we call the proposition a tautology; in the second, a contradiction. 4.461 P/M [→GER | →OGD] Propositions show what they say: tautolo- gies and contradictions show that they say nothing. A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition. Tautologies and contradictions lack sense. (Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.) (For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.) 4.4611 P/M [→GER | →OGD] Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism, much as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic. 4.462 P/M [→GER | →OGD] Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations. For the former admit all possible situations, and latter none. In a tautology the conditions of agreement with the world—the representational relations—cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representational relation to reality. 4.463 P/M [→GER | →OGD] The truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open to the facts. (A proposition, a picture, or a model is, in the negative sense, like a solid body that restricts the freedom of movement of others, and, in the positive sense, like a space bounded by solid substance in which there is room for a body.) A tautology leaves open to reality the whole—the infinite whole—of logical space: a contradiction fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus neither of them can determine reality in any way. 4.464 P/M [→GER | →OGD] A tautology’s truth is certain, a proposition’s possible, a contradiction’s impossible. (Certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale that we need in the theory of probability.) 4.465 P/M [→GER | →OGD] The logical product of a tautology and a proposition says the same thing as the proposition. This product, therefore, is identical with the proposition. For it is impossible to alter what is essential to a symbol without altering its sense. 4.466 P/M [→GER | →OGD] What corresponds to a determinate logical combination of signs is a determinate logical combination of their meanings. It is only to the uncombined signs that absolutely any combination corresponds. In other words, propositions that are true for every situation cannot be combinations of signs at all, since, if they were, only determinate combinations of objects could correspond to them. (And what is not a logical combination has no combination of objects corresponding to it.) Tautology and contradiction are the limiting cases—indeed the disintegration—of the combination of signs. 4.4661 P/M [→GER | →OGD] Admittedly the signs are still combined with one another even in tautologies and contradictions—i.e. they stand in certain relations to one another: but these relations have no meaning, they are not essential to the symbol. Grice would often use ‘tautological,’ and ‘self-contradiction’ presupposes ‘analyticity,’ or rather the analytic-synthetic distinction. Is it contradictory, or a self-contradiction, to say that one’s neighbour’s three-year-old child is an adult? Is there an implicaturum for ‘War is not war’? Grice refers to Bayes in WOW re Grices paradox, and to crazy Bayesy, as Peter Achinstein does (Newton was crazy, but not Bayesy).  We can now, in principle, characterize the desirability of the action a 1 , relative to each end (E1 and E2), and to each combination of ends (here just E1 and E2), as a function of the desirability of the end and the probability that the action a 1 will realize that end, or combination of ends. If we envisage a range of possible actions, which includes a 1 together with other actions, we can imagine that each such action has a certain degree of desirability relative to each end (E1 and (or) E2) and to their combination. If we suppose that, for each possible action, these desirabilities can be compounded (perhaps added), then we can suppose that one particular possible action scored higher (in actiondesirability relative to these ends) than any alternative possible action; and that this is the action which wins out; that is, is the action which is, or at least should, end p.105 be performed. (The computation would in fact be more complex than I have described, once account is taken of the fact that the ends involved are often not definite (determinate) states of affairs  (like becoming President), but are variable in respect of the degree to which they might be realized (if ones end is to make a profit from a deal, that profit might be of a varying magnitude); so one would have to consider not merely the likelihood of a particular actions realizing the end of making a profit, but also the likelihood of its realizing that end to this or that degree; and this would considerably complicate the computational problem.) No doubt most readers are far too sensible ever to have entertained any picture even remotely resembling the "Crazy-Bayesy" one I have just described. Grice was fascinated by the fact that paradox translates the Grecian neuter paradoxon. Some of the paradoxes of entailment, entailment and paradoxes. This is not the first time Grice uses paradox. As a classicist, he was aware of the nuances between paradox (or paradoxon, as he preferred, via Latin paradoxum, and aporia, for example. He was interested in Strawsons treatment of this or that paradox of entailment. He even called his own paradox involving if and probablility Grices paradox. tautologicum: Grice gives two examples: War is war, and Women are women – “Note that “Men are men” sounds contingent.” tautology, a proposition whose negation is inconsistent, or self- contradictory, e.g. ‘Socrates is Socrates’, ‘Every human is either male or nonmale’, ‘No human is both male and non-male’, ‘Every human is identical to itself’, ‘If Socrates is human then Socrates is human’. A proposition that is or is logically equivalent to the negation of a tautology is called a self-contradiction. According to classical logic, the property of being Tao Te Ching tautology 902   902 implied by its own negation is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a tautology and the property of implying its own negation is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a contradiction. Tautologies are logically necessary and contradictions are logically impossible. Epistemically, every proposition that can be known to be true by purely logical reasoning is a tautology and every proposition that can be known to be false by purely logical reasoning is a contradiction. The converses of these two statements are both controversial among classical logicians. Every proposition in the same logical form as a tautology is a tautology and every proposition in the same logical form as a contradiction is a contradiction. For this reason sometimes a tautology is said to be true in virtue of form and a contradiction is said to be false in virtue of form; being a tautology and being a contradiction tautologousness and contradictoriness are formal properties. Since the logical form of a proposition is determined by its logical terms ‘every’, ‘some’, ‘is’, etc., a tautology is sometimes said to be true in virtue of its logical terms and likewise mutatis mutandis for a contradiction. Since tautologies do not exclude any logical possibilities they are sometimes said to be “empty” or “uninformative”; and there is a tendency even to deny that they are genuine propositions and that knowledge of them is genuine knowledge. Since each contradiction “includes” implies all logical possibilities which of course are jointly inconsistent, contradictions are sometimes said to be “overinformative.” Tautologies and contradictions are sometimes said to be “useless,” but for opposite reasons. More precisely, according to classical logic, being implied by each and every proposition is necessary and sufficient for being a tautology and, coordinately, implying each and every proposition is necessary and sufficient for being a contradiction. Certain developments in mathematical logic, especially model theory and modal logic, seem to support use of Leibniz’s expression ‘true in all possible worlds’ in connection with tautologies. There is a special subclass of tautologies called truth-functional tautologies that are true in virtue of a special subclass of logical terms called truthfunctional connectives ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if’, etc.. Some logical writings use ‘tautology’ exclusively for truth-functional tautologies and thus replace “tautology” in its broad sense by another expression, e.g. ‘logical truth’. Tarski, Gödel, Russell, and many other logicians have used the word in its broad sense, but use of it in its narrow sense is widespread and entirely acceptable. Propositions known to be tautologies are often given as examples of a priori knowledge. In philosophy of mathematics, the logistic hypothesis of logicism is the proposition that every true proposition of pure mathematics is a tautology. Some writers make a sharp distinction between the formal property of being a tautology and the non-formal metalogical property of being a law of logic. For example, ‘One is one’ is not metalogical but it is a tautology, whereas ‘No tautology is a contradiction’ is metalogical but is not a tautology. 

telementationalism: see psi-transmission. The coinage is interesting. Since Grice has an essay on ‘modest mentalism,’ and would often use ‘mental’ for ‘psychological,’ it does make sense. ‘Ideationalism’ is analogous. this is a special note, or rather, a very moving proem, on Grices occasion of delivering his lectures on ‘Aspects of reason and reasoning’ at Oxford as the Locke Lectures at Merton. Particularly apt in mentioning, with humility, his having failed, *thrice* [sic] to obtain the Locke lectureship, Strawson did, at once, but feeling safe under the ægis of that great English philosopher (viz. Locke! always implicated, never explicited) now. Grice starts the proem in a very moving, shall we say, emotional, way: I find it difficult to convey to you just how happy I am, and how honoured I feel, in being invited to give these lectures. Difficult, but not impossible. I think of this university and this city, it has a cathedral, which were my home for thirty-six years, as my spiritual and intellectual parents. The almost majestic plural is Grices implicaturum to the town and gown! Whatever I am was originally fashioned here; I never left Oxford, Oxford made me, and I find it a moving experience to be, within these splendid and none too ancient walls, once more engaged in my old occupation of rendering what is clear obscure, by flouting the desideratum of conversational clarity and the conversational maxim, avoid obscurity of expression, under be perspicuous [sic]!. Grices implicaturum on none too ancient seems to be addressed to the truly ancient walls that saw Athenian dialectic! On the other hand, Grices funny variant on the obscurum per obscurius ‒ what Baker found as Grices skill in rendering an orthodoxy into a heterodoxy! Almost! By clear Grice implicates Lewis and his clarity is not enough! I am, at the same time, proud of my mid-Atlantic [two-world] status, and am, therefore, delighted that the Old World should have called me in, or rather recalled me, to redress, for once, the balance of my having left her for the New. His implicaturum seems to be: Strictly, I never left? Grice concludes his proem: I am, finally, greatly heartened by my consciousness of the fact that that great English philosopher, under whose ægis I am now speaking, has in the late afternoon of my days extended to me his Lectureship as a gracious consolation for a record threefold denied to me, in my early morning, of his Prize. I pray that my present offerings may find greater favour in his sight than did those of long ago. They did! Even if Locke surely might have found favour to Grices former offerings, too, Im sure. Refs.: The allusions to Locke are in “Aspects.” Good references under ‘ideationalism,’ above, especially in connection with Myro’s ‘modest mentalism,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

telesio: philosopher whose empiricism influences Francis Bacon and Galileo. Telesio studies in Padova, where he completed his doctorate,  and practiced philosophy in Naples and Cosenza without holding any academic position. His major oeuvre, “De rerum natura iuxta propria principia,” contains an attempt to interpret nature on the basis of its own principles, which Telesio identifies with the two incorporeal active forces of heat and cold, and the corporeal and passive physical substratum. As the two active forces permeate all of nature and are endowed with sensation, Telesio argues that all of nature possesses some degree of sensation. Human beings share with animals a material substance produced by heat and coming into existence with the body, called spirit. They are also given a mind by God. Telesio knew various interpretations of Aristotle. However, Telesio  broke with foreign exegeses, criticizing Aristotle’s Physics and claiming that nature is investigated better by the senses than by the intellect. Bernardino Telesio (n. Cosenza) è stato un filosofo. Mentre le sue teorie naturali sono state successivamente smentite, la sua enfasi sull'osservazione fece il "primo dei moderni" che alla fine hanno sviluppato il metodo scientifico.  Telesio è nato da genitori nobili in Cosenza , una città in Calabria, Italia meridionale. È stato istruito a Milano dallo zio, Antonio, lui stesso uno studioso e poeta di eminenza, e poi a Roma e Padova . I suoi studi hanno incluso tutta la vasta gamma di argomenti, classici , scienza e filosofia, che costituivano il curriculum degli rinascimentali sapienti. Così equipaggiata, ha iniziato il suo attacco sul aristotelismo medievale che poi fiorì a Padova e Bologna . Nel 1553 si sposò e si stabilì a Cosenza, diventando il fondatore dell'Accademia Cosentina . Per un certo periodo ha vissuto nella casa di Alfonso III Carafa , duca di Nocera. Nel 1563, o forse due anni più tardi, apparve la sua grande opera De Rerum Natura Iuxta Propria Principia ( Sulla natura delle cose secondo i loro propri principi ), seguito da un gran numero di opere scientifiche e filosofiche di importanza sussidiaria. Le opinioni eterodosse, che ha mantenuto suscitato l'ira della Chiesa per conto del suo amato aristotelismo , e poco tempo dopo la sua morte i suoi libri sono stati immessi sul Index.  Steepto  Teoria della materia, calore e freddo Invece di postulare materia e forma, si basa l'esistenza sulla materia e la forza. Questa forza ha due elementi opposti: calore, che si espande, e fredde, che i contratti. Questi due processi rappresentano tutte le diverse forme e tipi di esistenza, mentre la massa su cui opera la forza rimane la stessa. L'armonia del tutto consiste nel fatto che ogni cosa separata sviluppa in sé e per sé conformemente alla sua natura e allo stesso tempo il suo moto avvantaggia il resto. I difetti evidenti di questa teoria, (1) che solo i sensi possono non comprendere materia stessa, (2) che non è chiaro come la molteplicità dei fenomeni potrebbe derivare da queste due forze, pensato non è meno convincente di Aristotles caldo / freddo , secca spiegazione / umido, e (3) che ha addotto alcuna prova per dimostrare l'esistenza di queste due forze, sono stati sottolineato a suo tempo dal suo allievo, Patrizzi .  Inoltre, la sua teoria della terra fredda a riposo e il sole caldo in moto era destinato a confutazione per mano di Copernico . Allo stesso tempo, la teoria era sufficientemente coerente per fare una grande impressione sul pensiero italiano. Va ricordato, però, che la sua obliterazione di una distinzione tra superlunar e fisica sublunare era certamente abbastanza preveggente anche se non riconosciuto dai suoi successori come particolarmente degno di nota. Quando Telesio ha continuato a spiegare la relazione tra mente e materia, era ancora più eterodossa. Forze materiali sono, per ipotesi, in grado di sentire; questione deve anche essere stato fin dal primo dotato di coscienza. Per la coscienza esiste, e non avrebbe potuto essere sviluppato dal nulla. Questo lo porta a una forma di ilozoismo . Anche in questo caso, l'anima è influenzato dalle condizioni materiali; di conseguenza, l'anima deve avere un esistenza materiale. Ha inoltre dichiarato che tutta la conoscenza è sensazione ( "non-ratione sensu sed") e che l'intelligenza è, quindi, un agglomerato di dati isolati, in sensi. Non lo fa, però, riesce a spiegare come solo i sensi possono percepire la differenza e identità.  Alla fine del suo schema, probabilmente in ossequio alla teologiche pregiudizi, ha aggiunto un elemento che era completamente estraneo, vale a dire, un impulso più alto, un'anima sovrapposta da Dio, in virtù della quale ci sforziamo di là del mondo sensibile. Questa anima divina non è affatto un concetto completamente nuovo, se visto nel contesto di Averroestic o tommasiana teoria percettiva.  L'intero sistema di Telesio mostra lacune nella sua tesi, e l'ignoranza dei fatti, ma allo stesso tempo è un precursore di tutte le successive dell'empirismo , scientifico e filosofico, e segna chiaramente il periodo di transizione da autorità e la ragione di sperimentare e individuale responsabilità. Il ricorso a dati sensoriali  Statua di Bernardino Telesio in Piazza XV Marzo, Cosenza Telesio era il capo del grande movimento italiano del sud, che ha protestato contro l'autorità accettata della ragione astratta e semina i semi da cui spuntavano i metodi scientifici di Tommaso Campanella e Giordano Bruno , di Francis Bacon e René Descartes , con i loro risultati ampiamente divergenti. Egli, quindi, ha abbandonato la sfera puramente intellettuale e ha proposto un'indagine sui dati forniti dai sensi, dai quali ha ricoperto che tutta la vera conoscenza viene veramente (la sua teoria della percezione sensoriale era essenzialmente una rielaborazione della teoria di Aristotele dal De anima ).  Telesio scrive all'inizio del Proemio del primo libro della terza edizione del De Rerum Natura Iuxta propria principia Libri Ix ... "che la costruzione del mondo e la grandezza dei corpi in esso contenuti, e la natura del mondo, è da ricercare non dalla ragione, come è stato fatto dagli antichi, ma è da intendersi per mezzo di osservazione." ( Mundi constructionem, corporumque in eo contentorum magnitudinem, naturamque non ratione, quod antiquioribus factum est, inquirendam, sed sensu percipiendam. ) Questa affermazione, che si trova sulla prima pagina, riassume ciò che molti studiosi moderni hanno generalmente considerato filosofia telesiana, e spesso sembra che molti non leggere oltre per nella pagina successiva si imposta il suo caldo teoria / freddo della materia informata, una teoria che non è chiaramente informato dalla nostra idea moderna di osservazione. Per Telesio, l'osservazione ( sensu percipiendam ) è un processo mentale molto più grande di una semplice registrazione dei dati, l'osservazione comprende anche il pensiero analogico.  Anche se Francis Bacon è generalmente accreditato al giorno d'oggi, con la codificazione di un induttiva metodo che sottoscrive pienamente l'osservazione come procedura primaria per l'acquisizione di conoscenze, non era certamente il primo a suggerire che la percezione sensoriale dovrebbe essere la fonte primaria per la conoscenza. Tra i filosofi naturali del Rinascimento, questo onore è generalmente conferito a Telesio. Bacone si riconosce Telesio come "il primo dei moderni" ( De Telesio autem bene sentimus, atque eum ut amantem veritatis, e Scientiis utilem, e nonnullorum Placitorum emendatorem & novorum hominum primum agnoscimus. , Da Bacon De principiis atque originibus ) per mettere l'osservazione di sopra di tutti gli altri metodi di acquisizione delle conoscenze sul mondo naturale. Questa frase spesso citata da Bacon, però, è fuorviante, perché semplifica eccessivamente e travisa l'opinione di Bacone di Telesio. La maggior parte del saggio di Bacon è un attacco a Telesio e questa frase, invariabilmente fuori contesto, ha facilitato un malinteso generale della filosofia naturale telesiana dando ad essa un timbro baconiana di approvazione, che era lontano dalle intenzioni originali di Bacon. Bacone vede in Telesio un alleato nella lotta contro l'antica autorità, ma ha poco positivo da dire su specifiche teorie di Telesio.  Ciò che forse colpisce di più De Rerum Natura è il tentativo di Telesio di meccanizzare il più possibile. Telesio si sforza di spiegare tutto chiaramente in termini di materia informati dalla calda e fredda e per mantenere i suoi argomenti il più semplice possibile. Quando i suoi colloqui si rivolgono agli esseri umani che introduce un istinto di auto-conservazione per spiegare le loro motivazioni. E quando discute la mente umana e la sua capacità di ragionare in astratto su argomenti immateriali e divine, aggiunge un'anima. Per senza anima, tutto il pensiero, dal suo ragionamento, sarebbe limitato alle cose materiali. Ciò renderebbe Dio impensabile e chiaramente questo non era il caso, per l'osservazione dimostra che la gente pensa di Dio.  Telesii, Bernardini (1586). De Rerum Natura Iuxta Propia Principii, Libri IX . Horatium Saluianum, Napoli. Oltre a De Rerum Natura , ha scritto:  de Somno De la quae in aere fiunt de Mari De cometis et Circulo Lactea respirationis De USU. Gli appunti Riferimenti Neil C. Van Deusen, Telesio: primo dei moderni (New York, 1932) link esterno  Wikimedia Commons ha mezzi relativi a Bernardino Telesio . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry De La sua, Quae in aere Sunt, & de Terraemotibus - piena facsimile digitale a Linda Hall Library. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Telesio e Grice,” per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

tempus: cited by Grice and Myro in the Grice-Myro theory of identity. tense logic, an extension of classical logic introduced by Arthur Prior Past, Present, and Future, 7, involving operators P and F for the past and future tenses, or ‘it was the case that . . .’ and ‘it will be the case that . . .’. Classical or mathematical logic was developed as a logic of unchanging mathematical truth, and can be applied to tensed discourse only by artificial regimentation inspired by mathematical physics, introducing quantification over “times” or “instants.” Thus ‘It will have been the case that p,’ which Prior represents simply as FPp, classical logic represents as ‘There [exists] an instant t and there [exists] an instant tH such that t [is] later than the present and tH [is] earlier than t, and at tH it [is] the case that pH, or DtDtH t o‹t8tH ‹t8ptH, where the brackets indicate that the verbs are to be understood as tenseless. Prior’s motives were in part linguistic to produce a formalization less removed from natural language than the classical and in part metaphysical to avoid ontological commitment to such entities as instants. Much effort was devoted to finding tense-logical principles equivalent to various classical assertions about the structure of the earlierlater order among instants; e.g., ‘Between any two instants there is another instant’ corresponds to the validity of the axioms Pp P PPp and Fp P FFp. Less is expressible using P and F than is expressible with explicit quantification over instants, and further operators for ‘since’ and ‘until’ or ‘now’ and ‘then’ have been introduced by Hans Kamp and others. These are especially important in combination with quantification, as in ‘When he was in power, all who now condemn him then praised him.’ As tense is closely related to mood, so tense logic is closely related to modal logic. As Kripke models for modal logic consist each of a set X of “worlds” and a relation R of ‘x is an alternative to y’, so for tense logic they consist each of a set X of “instants” and a relation R of ‘x is earlier than y’: Thus instants, banished from the syntax or proof theory, reappear in the semantics or model theory. Modality and tense are both involved in the issue of future contingents, and one of Prior’s motives was a desire to produce a formalism in which the views on this topic of ancient, medieval, and early modern logicians from Aristotle with his “sea fight tomorrow” and Diodorus Cronos with his “Master Argument” through Ockham to Peirce could be represented. The most important precursor to Prior’s work on tense logic was that on many-valued logics by Lukasiewicz, which was motivated largely by the problem of future contingents. Also related to tense and mood is aspect, and modifications to represent this grammatical category evaluating formulas at periods rather than instants of time have also been introduced. Like modal logic, tense logic has been the object of intensive study in theoretical computer science, especially in connection with attempts to develop languages in which properties of programs can be expressed and proved; variants of tense logic under such labels as “dynamic logic” or “process logic” have thus been extensively developed for technological rather than philosophical motives. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “D. H. Mellor on real and irreal time.” applied by H. P. Grice and G. Myro in the so-called “Grice-Myro theory of identity,” a time-relative identity, drawing from A. N. Prior, of Oxford, D. Wiggins, Wykeham professor of logic at Oxford, and Geach (married to an Oxonian donna),  time, “a moving image of eternity” Plato; “the number of movements in respect of the before and after” Aristotle; “the Life of the Soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act or experience to another” Plotinus; “a present of things past, memory, a present of things present, sight, and a present of things future, expectation” Augustine. These definitions, like all attempts to encapsulate the essence of time in some neat formula, are unhelpfully circular because they employ temporal notions. Although time might be too basic to admit of definition, there still are many questions about time that philosophers have made some progress in answering by analysis both of how we ordinarily experience and talk about time, and of the deliverances of science, thereby clarifying and deepening our understanding of what time is. What follows gives a sample of some of the more important of these issues. Temporal becoming and the A- and B-theories of time. According to the B-theory, time consists in nothing but a fixed “B-series” of events running from earlier to later. The A-theory requires that these events also form an “A-series” going from the future through the present into the past and, moreover, shift in respect to these determinations. The latter sort of change, commonly referred to as “temporal becoming,” gives rise to well-known perplexities concerning both what does the shifting and the sort of shift involved. Often it is said that it is the present or now that shifts to ever-later times. This quickly leads to absurdity. ‘The present’ and ‘now’, like ‘this time’, are used to refer to a moment of time. Thus, to say that the present shifts to later times entails that this very moment of time  the present  will become some other moment of time and thus cease to be identical with itself! Sometimes the entity that shifts is the property of nowness or presentness. The problem is that every event has this property at some time, namely when it occurs. Thus, what must qualify some event as being now simpliciter is its having the property of nowness now; and this is the start of an infinite regress that is vicious because at each stage we are left with an unexpurgated use of ‘now’, the very term that was supposed to be analyzed in terms of the property of nowness. If events are to change from being future to present and from present to past, as is required by temporal becoming, they must do so in relation to some mysterious transcendent entity, since temporal relations between events and/or times cannot change. The nature of the shift is equally perplexing, for it must occur at a particular rate; but a rate of change involves a comparison between one kind of change and a change of time. Herein, it is change of time that is compared to change of time, resulting in the seeming tautology that time passes or shifts at the rate of one second per second, surely an absurdity since this is not a rate of change at all. Broad attempted to skirt these perplexities by saying that becoming is sui generis and thereby defies analysis, which puts him on the side of the mystically inclined Bergson who thought that it could be known only through an act of ineffable intuition. To escape the clutches of both perplexity and mysticism, as well as to satisfy the demand of science to view the world non-perspectivally, the B-theory attempted to reduce the A-series to the B-series via a linguistic reduction in which a temporal indexical proposition reporting an event as past, present, or future is shown to be identical with a non-indexical proposition reporting a relation of precedence or simultaneity between it and another event or time. It is generally conceded that such a reduction fails, since, in general, no indexical proposition is identical with any non-indexical one, this being due to the fact that one can have a propositional attitude toward one of them that is not had to the other; e.g., I can believe that it is now raining without believing that it rains tenselessly at t 7. The friends of becoming have drawn the wrong moral from this failure  that there is a mysterious Mr. X out there doing “The Shift.” They have overlooked the fact that two sentences can express different propositions and yet report one and the same event or state of affairs; e.g., ‘This is water’ and ‘this is a collection of H2O molecules’, though differing in sense, report the same state of affairs  this being water is nothing but this being a collection of H2O molecules. It could be claimed that the same holds for the appropriate use of indexical and non-indexical sentences; the tokening at t 7 of ‘Georgie flies at this time at present’ is coreporting with the non-synonymous ‘Georgie flies tenselessly at t 7’, since Georgie’s flying at this time is the same event as Georgie’s flying at t 7, given that this time is t 7. This effects the same ontological reduction of the becoming of events to their bearing temporal relations to each other as does the linguistic reduction. The “coreporting reduction” also shows the absurdity of the “psychological reduction” according to which an event’s being present, etc., requires a relation to a perceiver, whereas an event’s having a temporal relation to another event or time does not require a relation to a perceiver. Given that Georgie’s flying at this time is identical with Georgie’s flying at t 7, it follows that one and the same event both does and does not have the property of requiring relation to a perceiver, thereby violating Leibniz’s law that identicals are indiscernible. Continuous versus discrete time. Assume that the instants of time are linearly ordered by the relation R of ‘earlier than’. To say that this order is continuous is, first, to imply the property of density or infinite divisibility: for any instants i 1 and i 2 such that Ri1i 2, there is a third instant i 3, such that Ri1i 3 and Ri3i 2. But continuity implies something more since density allows for “gaps” between the instants, as with the rational numbers. Think of R as the ‘less than’ relation and the i n as rationals. To rule out gaps and thereby assure genuine continuity it is necessary to require in addition to density that every convergent sequence of instants has a limit. To make this precise one needs a distance measure d ,  on pairs of instants, where di m, i n is interpreted as the lapse of time between i m and i n. The requirement of continuity proper is then that for any sequence i l , i 2, i 3, . . . , of instants, if di m i n P 0 as m, n P C, there is a limit instant i ø such that di n, iø  P 0 as n P C. The analogous property obviously fails for the rationals. But taking the completion of the rationals by adding in the limit points of convergent sequences yields the real number line, a genuine continuum. Numerous objections have been raised to the idea of time as a continuum and to the very notion of the continuum itself. Thus, it was objected that time cannot be composed of durationless instants since a stack of such instants cannot produce a non-zero duration. Modern measure theory resolves this objection. Leibniz held that a continuum cannot be composed of points since the points in any finite closed interval can be put in one-to-one correspondence with a smaller subinterval, contradicting the axiom that the whole is greater than any proper part. What Leibniz took to be a contradictory feature is now taken to be a defining feature of infinite collections or totalities. Modern-day Zenoians, while granting the viability of the mathematical doctrine of the continuum and even the usefulness of its employment in physical theory, will deny the possibility of its applying to real-life changes. Whitehead gave an analogue of Zeno’s paradox of the dichotomy to show that a thing cannot endure in a continuous manner. For if i 1, i 2 is the interval over which the thing is supposed to endure, then the thing would first have to endure until the instant i 3, halfway between i 1 and i 2; but before it can endure until i 3, it must first endure until the instant i 4 halfway between i 1 and i 3, etc. The seductiveness of this paradox rests upon an implicit anthropomorphic demand that the operations of nature must be understood in terms of concepts of human agency. Herein it is the demand that the physicist’s description of a continuous change, such as a runner traversing a unit spatial distance by performing an infinity of runs of ever-decreasing distance, could be used as an action-guiding recipe for performing this feat, which, of course, is impossible since it does not specify any initial or final doing, as recipes that guide human actions must. But to make this anthropomorphic demand explicit renders this deployment of the dichotomy, as well as the arguments against the possibility of performing a “supertask,” dubious. Anti-realists might deny that we are committed to real-life change being continuous by our acceptance of a physical theory that employs principles of mathematical continuity, but this is quite different from the Zenoian claim that it is impossible for such change to be continuous. To maintain that time is discrete would require not only abandoning the continuum but also the density property as well. Giving up either conflicts with the intuition that time is one-dimensional. For an explanation of how the topological analysis of dimensionality entails that the dimension of a discrete space is 0, see W. Hurewicz, Dimension Theory, 1. The philosophical and physics literatures contain speculations about a discrete time built of “chronons” or temporal atoms, but thus far such hypothetical entities have not been incorporated into a satisfactory theory. Absolute versus relative and relational time. In a scholium to the Principia, Newton declared that “Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external.” There are at least five interrelated senses in which time was absolute for Newton. First, he thought that there was a frame-independent relation of simultaneity for events. Second, he thought that there was a frame-independent measure of duration for non-simultaneous events. He used ‘flows equably’ not to refer to the above sort of mysterious “temporal becoming,” but instead to connote the second sense of absoluteness and partly to indicate two further kinds of absoluteness. To appreciate the latter, note that ‘flows equably’ is modified by ‘without relation to anything external’. Here Newton was asserting third sense of ‘absolute’ that the lapse of time between two events would be what it is even if the distribution and motions of material bodies were different. He was also presupposing a related form of absoluteness fourth sense according to which the metric of time is intrinsic to the temporal interval. Leibniz’s philosophy of time placed him in agreement with Newton as regards the first two senses of ‘absolute’, which assert the non-relative or frame-independent nature of time. However, Leibniz was very much opposed to Newton on the fourth sense of ‘absolute’. According to Leibniz’s relational conception of time, any talk about the length of a temporal interval must be unpacked in terms of talk about the relation of the interval to an extrinsic metric standard. Furthermore, Leibniz used his principles of sufficient reason and identity of indiscernibles to argue against a fifth sense of ‘absolute’, implicit in Newton’s philosophy of time, according to which time is a substratum in which physical events are situated. On the contrary, the relational view holds that time is nothing over and above the structure of relations of events. Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity have direct bearing on parts of these controversies. The special theory necessitates the abandonment of frame-independent notions of simultaneity and duration. For any pair of spacelike related events in Minkowski space-time there is an inertial frame in which the events are simultaneous, another frame in which the first event is temporally prior, and still a third in which the second event is temporally prior. And the temporal interval between two timelike related events depends on the worldline connecting them. In fact, for any e  0, no matter how small, there is a worldline connecting the events whose proper length is less than e. This is the essence of the so-called twin paradox. The general theory of relativity abandons the third sense of absoluteness since it entails that the metrical structure of space-time covaries with the distribution of mass-energy in a manner specified by Einstein’s field equations. But the heart of the absoluterelational controversy  as focused by the fourth and fifth senses of ‘absolute’  is not settled by relativistic considerations. Indeed, opponents from both sides of the debate claim to find support for their positions in the special and general theories. H. P. Grice, “D. H. Mellor on real and irreal time.” Tempus is ne of Arsitotle’s categories, along with space – cfr. Kant – and Grice on Strawson’s “Individuals” -- time slice: used by Grice in two different contexts: personal identity, and identity in general. In identity in general, Grice draws from Geach and Wiggins, and with the formal aid of Myro, construct a system of a first-order predicate calculus with time-relative identity -- a temporal part or stage of any concrete particular that exists for some interval of time; a three-dimensional cross section of a fourdimensional object. To think of an object as consisting of time slices or temporal stages is to think of it as related to time in much the way that it is related to space: as extending through time as well as space, rather than as enduring through it. Just as an object made up of spatial parts is thought of as a whole made up of parts that exist at different locations, so an object made up of time slices is thought of as a whole made up of parts or stages that exist at successive times; hence, just as a spatial whole is only partly present in any space that does not include all its spatial parts, so a whole made up of time slices is only partly present in any stretch of time that does not include all its temporal parts. A continuant, by contrast, is most commonly understood to be a particular that endures through time, i.e., that is wholly present at each moment at which it exists. To conceive of an object as a continuant is to conceive of it as related to time in a very different way from that in which it is related to space. A continuant does not extend through time as well as space; it does not exist at different times by virtue of the existence of successive parts of it at those times; it is the continuant itself that is wholly present at each such time. To conceive an object as a continuant, therefore, is to conceive it as not made up of temporal stages, or time slices, at all. There is another, less common, use of ‘continuant’ in which a continuant is understood to be any particular that exists for some stretch of time, regardless of whether it is the whole of the particular or only some part of it that is present at each moment of the particular’s existence. According to this usage, an entity that is made up of time slices would be a kind of continuant rather than some other kind of particular. Philosophers have disputed whether ordinary objects such as cabbages and kings endure through time are continuants or only extend through time are sequences of time slices. Some argue that to understand the possibility of change one must think of such objects as sequences of time slices; others argue that for the same reason one must think of such objects as continuants. If an object changes, it comes to be different from itself. Some argue that this would be possible only if an object consisted of distinct, successive stages; so that change would simply consist in the differences among the successive temporal parts of an object. Others argue that this view would make change impossible; that differences among the successive temporal parts of a thing would no more imply the thing had changed than differences among its spatial parts would.  H. P. Grice, “D. H. Mellor on real and irreal time.”

terminus – horos – Cicero’s transliteration of the Greianism --. terminist logic, a school of semantics until its demise in the humanistic reforms. The chief goal of ‘terminisim’ – or terministic semantics -- is the elucidation (or conceptual analysis) of the  form, the “exposition,” of a proposition advanced in the context of Scholastic disputation. The cntral theory of terminisitc semantics concerns this or that property of this or that term, especially the suppositum. Terminisic semantics does the work of modern quantification theory. Important semanticists in the school include Peter of Spain, Sherwood, Burleigh (Burlaeus), Heytesbury, and Paolo Veneto. terminus a quo-terminus a quem distinction, the: used by Grice for the starting point of some process, as opposed to the terminus ad quem, the ending point. E. g., change is a process that begins from some state, the terminus a quo, and proceeds to some state at which it ends, the terminus ad quem. In particular, in the ripening of an apple, the green apple is the terminus a quo and the red apple is the terminus ad quem.

tertulliano: Roman – Grice says that ‘you’re the cream in my coffee’ is absurd – “Can you believe it?” -- Adored by Grice because he believed what he thought was absurd.  theologian, an early father of the Christian church. A layman from Carthage, he laid the conceptual and linguistic basis for the doctrine of the Trinity. Though appearing hostile to philosophy “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” and to rationality “It is certain because it is impossible”, Tertullian was steeped in Stoicism. He denounced all eclecticism not governed by the normative tradition of Christian doctrine, yet commonly used philosophical argument and Stoic concepts e.g., the corporeality of God and the soul. Despite insisting on the sole authority of the New Testament apostles, he joined with Montanism, which taught that the Holy Spirit was still inspiring prophecy concerning moral discipline. Reflecting this interest in the Spirit, Tertullian pondered the distinctions to which he gave the neologism trinitas within God. God is one “substance” but three “persons”: a plurality without division. The Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct, but share equally in the one Godhead. This threeness is manifest only in the “economy” of God’s temporal action toward the world; later orthodoxy e.g. Athanasius, Basil the Great, Augustine, would postulate a Triunity that is eternal and “immanent,” i.e., internal to God’s being. 

testing: Grice: “A token proving testability.” Grice: “We need a meta-test: a test for a test for implicatura.” late 14c., "small vessel used in assaying precious metals," from Old French test, from Latin testum "earthen pot," related to testa "piece of burned clay, earthen pot, shell" (see tete).  Sense of "trial or examination to determine the correctness of something" is recorded from 1590s. The connecting notion is "ascertaining the quality of a metal by melting it in a pot." Test Act was the name given to various laws in English history meant to exclude Catholics and Nonconformists from office, especially that of 1673, repealed 1828. Test drive (v.) is first recorded 1954. In the sciences, capacity of a theory to undergo experimental testing. Theories in the natural sciences are regularly subjected to experimental tests involving detailed and rigorous control of variable factors. Not naive observation of the workings of nature, but disciplined, designed intervention in such workings, is the hallmark of testability. Logically regarded, testing takes the form of seeking confirmation of theories by obtaining positive test results. We can represent a theory as a conjunction of a hypothesis and a statement of initial conditions, H • A. This conjunction deductively entails testable or observational consequences O. Hence, H • A P O. If O obtains, H • A is said to be confirmed, or rendered probable. But such confirmation is not decisive; O may be entailed by, and hence explained by, many other theories. For this reason, Popper insisted that the testability of theories should seek disconfirmations or falsifications. The logical schema H • A P O not-O not-H • A is deductively valid, hence apparently decisive. On this view, science progresses, not by finding the truth, but by discarding the false. Testability becomes falsifiability. This deductive schema modus tollens is also employed in the analysis of crucial tests. Consider two hypotheses H1 and H2, both introduced to explain some phenomenon. H1 predicts that for some test condition C, we have the test result ‘if C then e1’, and H2, the result ‘if C then e2’, where e1 and e2 are logically incompatible. If experiment falsifies ‘if C then e1’ e1 does not actually occur as a test result, the hypothesis H1 is false, which implies that H2 is true. It was originally supposed that the experiments of J. B. L. Foucault constituted a decisive falsifcation of the corpuscular theory of the nature of light, and thus provided a decisive establishment of the truth of its rival, the wave theory of light. This account of crucial experiments neglects certain points in logic and also the role of auxiliary hypotheses in science. As Duhem pointed term, minor testability 908   908 out, rarely, if ever, does a hypothesis face the facts in isolation from other supporting assumptions. Furthermore, it is a fact of logic that the falsification of a conjunction of a hypothesis and its auxiliary assumptions and initial conditions not-H • A is logically equivalent to not-H or not-A, and the test result itself provides no warrant for choosing which alternative to reject. Duhem further suggested that rejection of any component part of a complex theory is based on extra-evidential considerations factors like simplicity and fruitfulness and cannot be forced by negative test results. Acceptance of Duhem’s view led Quine to suggest that a theory must face the tribunal of experience en bloc; no single hypothesis can be tested in isolation. Original conceptions of testability and falsifiability construed scientific method as hypothetico-deductive. Difficulties with these reconstructions of the logic of experiment have led philosophers of science to favor an explication of empirical support based on the logic of probability. Grice: “Linguists never take ‘testability’ too conceptually, as one can witness in Saddock’s hasty proofs!” – Refs: H. P. Grice, “On testing for testing for conversational implicatura.”

testis: n., pl. testes; Latin testis "testicle," usually regarded as a special application of testis "witness" (see testament), presumably because it "bears witness to male virility" [Barnhart]. Stories that trace the use of the Latin word to some supposed swearing-in ceremony are modern and groundless.  Compare Greek parastatai "testicles," from parastates "one that stands by;" and French slang témoins, literally "witnesses." But Buck thinks Greek parastatai "testicles" has been wrongly associated with the legal sense of parastates "supporter, defender" and suggests instead parastatai in the sense of twin "supporting pillars, props of a mast," etc. Or it might be a euphemistic use of the word in the sense "comrades." OED, meanwhile, points to Walde's suggestion of a connection between testis and testa "pot, shell, etc." (see tete). testis "witness," from PIE *tri-st-i- "third person standing by," from root *tris- "three" (see three) on the notion of "third person, disinterested witness." -- as Grice notes, “it is etymologically  -- or etymythologically -- related to ‘testicles,’” --  Grice proposes an analysis of ‘testify’ in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, “t is a testimony iff t is an act of telling, including any assertion apparently intended to impart information, regardless of social setting.” In an extended use, personal letters and messages, books, and other published material purporting to contain factual information also constitute testimony. As Grice notes, “testimony may be sincere or insincere” -- and may express knowledge or baseless prejudice. When it expresses knowledge, and it is rightly believed, this knowledge is disseminated to its recipient, near or remote. Second-hand knowledge can be passed on further, producing long chains of testimony; but these chains always begin with the report of an eye-witness or expert. In any social group with a common language there is potential for the sharing, through testimony, of the fruits of individuals’ idiosyncratic acquisition of knowledge through perception and inference. In advanced societies specialization in the gathering and production of knowledge and its wider dissemination through spoken and written testimony is a fundamental socio-epistemic fact, and a very large part of each person’s body of knowledge and belief stems from testimony. Thus, the question when a person may properly believe what another tells her, and what grounds her epistemic entitlement to do so, is a crucial one in epistemology. Reductionists about testimony insist that this entitlement must derive from our entitlement to believe what we perceive to be so, and to draw inferences from this according to familiar general principles. See e.g., Hume’s classic discussion, in his “Enquiry into Human Understanding,” section X. On this view, I can perceive that someone has told me that p, but can thereby come to know that p only by means of an inference  one that goes via additional, empirically grounded knowledge of the trustworthiness of that person. Anti-reductionists insist, by contrast, that there is a general entitlement to believe what one is told just as such defeated by knowledge of one’s informant’s lack of trustworthiness her mendacity or incompetence, but not needing to be bolstered positively by empirically based knowledge of her trustworthiness. Anti-reductionists thus see testimony as an autonomous source of knowledge on a par with perception, inference, and memory. One argument adduced for anti-reductionism is transcendental: We have many beliefs acquired from testimony, and these beliefs are knowledge; their status as knowledge cannot be accounted for in the way required by the reductionist, i. e., the reliability of testimony cannot be independently confirmed; therefore, the reductionist’s insistence on this is mistaken. However, while it is perhaps true that the reliability of all the beliefs one has that depend on past testimony cannot be simultaneously confirmed, one can certainly sometimes ascertain, without circularity, that a specific assertion by a particular person is likely to be correct  if, e.g.,one’s own experience has established that that person has a good track record of reliability about that kind of thing. Grice: “Sometimes I use testimonium.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Trust and rationality.”

thales: Grice: “We call him Greek, but he certainly weren’t [sic] born in Greece!” -- called by Grice the first Grecian philosopher (“Oddly, we call him a Ionian, but the Ionian is quite a way from where he was born!”) – who poisted a ‘philosophical’ why-explanation.  Grecian philosopher who was regarded as one of the Seven Sages of Greece. He was also considered the first philosopher, founder of the Milesians. Thales is also reputed to have been an engineer, astronomer, mathematician, and statesman. His doctrines even early Grecian sources know only by hearsay: he said that water is the arche, and that the earth floats on water like a raft. The magnet has a soul, and all things are full of the gods. Thales’ attempt to explain natural phenomena in natural rather than exclusively supernatural terms bore fruit in his follower Anaximander. 

‘that’: a demonstrative. Since Grice would make so many references to the ‘that’-clause, he is aware that ‘that’ is etymologically a demonstrative, that has lost its efficacy there. But the important etymological lesson is that what follows a ‘that’-clause (cf. the classical languages Grice learned at Clifton, Greek and Latin) is a ‘propositio’ just because the ‘that’ POINTS at the proposition. Sometimes he refers to ‘obliquus casus,’ and ‘oratio obliqua,’ but he is more at home with things like ‘verba percipienda,’ verba volendi, etc. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bradley on this and that and thisnesss and thatness.’-- ‘that’-clause: Grice’s priority for the ‘that’-clause is multiple. He dislikes what he calls an ‘amorphous’ propositional complex. His idea is to have at least ‘The S is P,’ one act involving a subjectum or denotatum, and one involving the praedicatum. There is also what he calls sub-perceptual utterances. They do look like structured (“That red pillar seems red”) but they are not perceptual reports like “I perceive that the pillar box is red.” At points he wanst to restrict utterer’s communucatum to a ‘that’-clause; but ignoring Austin’s remark that to wonder about what a ‘word’ ‘means’ is senseless, Grice sometimes allows for things like ‘The cat sat on the mat’ to ‘mean’ that the cat sat on the mat. Grice thinks that his account of ‘the red-seeming pillar box’ succeeded, and that it was this success that prompted him to apply the thing to other areas, notably Strawson, but one hopes, all the theses he presents in “Causal” and “Prolegomena.” But he does not go back to the is/seems example, other than perhaps the tie is/seems blue. The reason is that the sense-datum theory is very complex. Note “seems.” “It seems to me that…” but the ‘that’-clause not as a content of a state of the agent. If the pillar box seems red to Grice because it is red, what ‘that’-clause are we talking about to involve in the implicaturum? And what generates the implicaturum. “By uttering “The pillar box seems red,” U conversationally implicates that there is a denial or doubt, somewhere as to whether the pillar box IS red.” Grice thought of Staal as particularly good at this type of formalistic philosophy, which was still adequate to reflect the subtleties of ordinary language.  How do we define a Griceian action? How do we define a Griceian event? This is Grices examination and criticism of Davidson, as a scientific realist, followed by a Kantian approach to freedom and causation. Grice is especially interested in the logical form, or explicitum, so that he can play with the implicaturum. One of his favourite examples: He fell on his sword, having tripped as he crossed the Galliæ. Grice manages to quote from many and varied authors (some of which you would not expect him to quote) such as Reichenbach, but also Robinson, of Oriel, of You Names it fame (for any x, if you can Names it, x exists). Robinson has a brilliant essay on parts of Cook Wilsons Statement and inference, so he certainly knows what he is talking about. Grice also quotes from von Wright and Eddington. Grice offers a linguistic botanic survey of autonomy and free (sugar-free, free fall, implicaturum-free) which some have found inspirational. His favourite is Finnegans alcohol-free. Finnegans obvious implicaturum is that everything is alcohol-laden. Grice kept a copy of Davidsons The logical form of action sentences, since surely Davidson, Grice thought, is making a primary philosophical point. Horses run fast; therefore, horses run. A Davidsonian problem, and there are more to come! Smith went fishing. Grices category shift allows us to take Smiths fishing as the grammatical Subjects of an action sentence. Cf. indeed the way to cope with entailment in The horse runs fast; therefore, the horse runs. Grices Actions and events is Davidsonian in motivation, but Kantian in method, one of those actions by Grice to promote a Griceian event! Davidson had published, Grice thought, some pretty influential (and provocative, anti-Quineian) stuff on actions and events, or events and actions, actually, and, worse, he was being discussed at Oxford, too, over which Grice always keeps an eye! Davidsons point, tersely put, is that while p.q (e.g. It is raining, and it is pouring) denotes a concatenation of events. Smith is fishing denotes an action, which is a kind of event, if you are following him (Davidson, not Smith). However, Davidson is fighting against the intuition, if you are a follower of Whitehead and Russell, to symbolise the Smith is fishing as Fs, where s stands for Smith and F for fishing. The logical form of a report of an event or an action seems to be slightly more complicated. Davidsons point specifically involves adverbs, or adverbial modifiers, and how to play with them in terms of entailment. The horse runs fast; therefore, the horse runs. Symbolise that! as Davidson told Benson Mates! But Mates had gone to the restroom. Grice explores all these and other topics and submits the thing for publication. Grice quotes, as isnt his wont, from many and various philosophers, not just Davidson, whom he saw every Wednesday, but others he didnt, like Reichenbach, Robinson, Kant, and, again even a physicist like Eddington. Grice remarks that Davidson is into hypothesis, suppositio, while he is, as he should, into hypostasis, substantia. Grice then expands on the apparent otiosity of uttering, It is a fact that grass is green. Grice goes on to summarise what he ironically dubs an ingenious argument. Let σ abbreviate the operator  consists in the fact that , which, when prefixed to a sentence, produces a predicate or epithet. Let S abbreviate Snow is white, and let G abbreviate Grass is green. In that case, xσS is 1 just in case xσ(y(y=y and S) = y(y=y) is 1, since the first part of the sub-sentence which follows σ in the main sentence is logically equivalent logically equivalent to the second part. And xσ(y(y=y and S) = y(y=y) is 1 just in case xσ(y(if y=y, G) = y(y=y) is 1, since y(if y=y, S) and y(if y=y, G) are each a singular term, which, if S and G are both true, each refers to y(y=y), and are therefore co-referential and inter-substitutable. And xσ(y(if y=y, G) = y(y=y) is true just in case xσG is 1, since G is logically equivalent to the sub-sentence which follows σ. So, this fallacy goes, provided that S and G are both 1, regardless of what an utterer explicitly conveys by uttering a token of it, any event which consists of the otiose fact that S also consists of the otiose fact that G, and vice versa, i. e. this randomly chosen event is identical to any other randomly chosen event. Grice hastens to criticise this slingshot fallacy licensing the inter-substitution of this or that co-referential singular term and this or that logically equivalent sub-sentence as officially demanded because it is needed to license a patently valid, if baffling, inference. But, if in addition to providing this benefit, the fallacy saddles the philosopher with a commitment to a hideous consequence, the rational course is to endeavour to find a way of retaining the benefit while eliminating the disastrous accompaniment, much as in set theory it seems rational to seek as generous a comprehension axiom as the need to escape this or that paradox permits. Grice proposes to retain the principle of co-reference, but prohibit is use after the principle of logical equivalence has been used. Grice finds such a measure to have some intuitive appeal. In the fallacy, the initial deployment of the principle of logical equivalence seems tailored to the production of a sentence which provides opportunity for trouble-raising application of the principle of co-referentiality. And if that is what the game is, why not stop it? On the assumption that this or that problem which originally prompts this or that analysis is at least on their way towards independent solution, Grice turns his attention to the possibility of providing a constructivist treatment of things which might perhaps have more intuitive appeal than a naïve realist approach. Grice begins with a class of happenstance attributions, which is divided into this or that basic happenstance attribution, i.e. ascriptions to a Subjects-item of an attribute which is metabolically expressible, and this or that non-basic resultant happenstance attribution, in which the attribute ascribed, though not itself metabolically expressible, is such that its possession by a Subjects item is suitably related to the possession by that or by some other Subjects item, of this or that attribute which is metabolically expressible. Any member of the class of happenstance attributions may be used to say what happens, or happens to be the case, without talking about any special entity belonging to a class of a happening or a happenstance. A next stage involves the introduction of the operator  consists of the fact that  This operator, when prefixed to a sentence S that makes a happen-stance attribution to a Subjects-item, yields a predicate which is satisfied by an entity which is a happenstance, provided that sentence S is doxastically satisfactory, i. e., 1, and that some further metaphysical condition obtains, which ensures the metaphysical necessity of the introduction into reality of the category of a happenstance, thereby ensuring that this new category is not just a class of this or that fiction. As far as the slingshot fallacy, and the hideous consequence that all facts become identical to one Great Big Fact, in the light of a defence of Reichenbach against the realist attack, Grice is reasonably confident that a metaphysical extension of reality will not saddle him with an intolerable paradox, pace the caveat that, to some, the slingshot is not contradictory in the way a paradox is, but merely an unexpected consequence ‒ not seriously hideous, at that. What this metaphysical condition would be which would justify the metaphysical extension remains, alas, to be determined. It is tempting to think that the metaphysical condition is connected with a theoretical need to have this or that happenstance as this or that item in, say, a causal relation. Grice goes on to provide a progression of linguistic botanising including free. Grice distinguishes four elements or stages in the step-by-step development of freedom. A first stage is the transeunt causation one finds in inanimate objects, as when we experience a stone in free fall. This is Hume’s realm, the atomistss realm. This is external or transeunt casuation, when an object is affected by processes in other objects. A second stage is internal or immanent causation, where a process in an object is the outcome of previous stages in that process, as in a freely moving body. A third stage is the internal causation of a living being, in which changes are generated in a creature by internal features of the creature which are not earlier stages of the same change, but independent items, the function or finality of which is to provide for the good of the creature in question. A fourth stage is a culminating stage at which the conception of a certain mode by a human of something as being for that creatures good is sufficient to initiate the doing of that thing. Grice expands on this interesting last stage. At this stage, it is the case that the creature is liberated from every factive cause. There is also a discussion of von Wrights table of adverbial modifiers, or Grices pentagram. Also an exploration of specificity: Jack buttering a parsnip in the bathroom in the presence of Jill. Grice revisits some of his earlier concerns, and these are discussed in the appropriate places, such as his exploration on the Grecian etymology of aition. “That”-clause should be preferred to ‘oratio obliqua,’ since the latter is a misnomer when you ascribe a psychological state rather than an utterance. Refs.: The main sources are given under ‘oratio obliqua’ above, The BANC.

theism:  as an Aristotelian scholar, H. P. Grice is aware of the centrality of God, nous nouseos, in Aristotle’s philosophy -- atheism from Grecian a-, ‘not’, and theos, ‘god’, the view that there are no gods. A widely used sense denotes merely not believing in God and is consistent with agnosticism. A stricter sense denotes a belief that there is no God; this use has become the standard one. In the Apology Socrates is accused of atheism for not believing in the official Athenian gods. Some distinguish between theoretical atheism and practical atheism. A theoretical atheist is one who self-consciously denies the existence of a supreme being, whereas a practical atheist may believe that a supreme being exists but lives as though there were no god. -- theology -- Grice’s philosophical theology -- concursus dei, God’s concurrence. The notion derives from a theory from medieval philosophical theology, according to which any case of causation involving created substances requires both the exercise of genuine causal powers inherent in creatures and the exercise of God’s causal activity. In particular, a person’s actions are the result of the person’s causal powers, often including the powers of deliberation and choice, and God’s causal endorsement. Divine concurrence maintains that the nature of God’s activity is more determinate than simply conserving the created world in existence. Although divine concurrence agrees with occasionalism in holding God’s power to be necessary for any event to occur, it diverges from occasionalism insofar as it regards creatures as causally active.  -- theosophia: any philosophical mysticism, especially those that purport to be mathematically or scientifically based, such as Pythagoreanism, Neoplatonism, or gnosticism. Vedic Hinduism, and certain aspects of Buddhism, Taoism, and Islamic Sufism, can also be considered theosophical. In narrower senses, ‘theosophy’ may refer to the philosophy of Swedenborg, Steiner, or Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky 183. Swedenborg’s theosophy originally consisted of a rationalistic cosmology, inspired by certain elements of Cartesian and Leibnizian philosophy, and a Christian mysticism. Swedenborg labored to explain the interconnections between soul and body. Steiner’s theosophy is a reaction to standard scientific theory. It purports to be as rigorous as ordinary science, but superior to it by incorporating spiritual truths about reality. According to his theosophy, reality is organic and evolving by its own resource. Genuine knowledge is intuitive, not discursive. Madame Blavatsky founded the Theosophical Society in 1875. Her views were eclectic, but were strongly influenced by mystical elements of  philosophy. 

thema: a term Grice borrows from Stoic logic, after attending a seminar on the topic by Benson Mates – a ‘thema’ is a ground rule used to reduce argument forms to basic forms. The Stoics analyzed arguments by their form schema, or tropos. They represented forms using numbers to represent claims; for example, ‘if the first, the second; but the first; therefore the second’. Grice uses “so-and-so” for ‘the first’ and ‘such and such’ for the ‘second’. “If so and so, such and such, but so and so; therefore, such and such.” Some forms were undemonstrable; others were reduced to the undemonstrable argument forms by ground rules themata; e.g., if R follows from P & Q, -Q follows from P & -R. The five undemonstrable arguments are: 1 modus ponendo ponens; 2 modus tollendo tollens; 3 not both P and Q, P, so not-Q; 4 P or Q but not both, P, so not-Q; and 5 disjunctive syllogism. The evidence about the four ground rules is incomplete, but a sound and consistent system for propositional logic can be developed that is consistent with the evidence we have. See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, for an introduction to the Stoic theory of arguments; other evidence is more scattered. 

theseus’s ship. Grice sails on Theseus’s ship. Theseus’ ship: Example used by Grice to relativise ‘identity.’ After the hero Theseus accomplished his mission to sail to Crete to kill the Minotaur, his ship (Ship 1) was put on display in Athens. As the time went by, its original planks and other parts were replaced one by one with new materials until one day all of its parts were new, with none of its original parts remaining. Do we want to say that the completely rebuilt ship (Ship 2) is the same as the original or that it is a different ship? The case is further complicated. If all the original materials were kept and eventually used to construct a ship (Ship 3), would this ship be the same as the original? This example has inspired much discussion concerning the problems of identity and individuation. “To be something later is to be its closest continuer. Let us apply this view to one traditional puzzle about identity over time: the puzzle of the ship of Theseus.” Nozick, Philosophical Explanation. Grice basically formalized this with G. Myro. Refs.: Collingwood, translation of Benedetto Croce, “Il paradosso della nave di Teseo,” H. P. Grice, “Relative identity,” The Grice Papers, BANC.

θ: or theta -- Grice’s symbol for a theory. Grice uses small-case theta for a token of a theory, and capital theta for a type of theory.– Grice couldn’t quite stand some type of attitude he found in people like J. M. Rountree – Rountree was claiming that one needs a ‘theory’ of meaning. Grice responded: “ Rountree is wrong: if meaning is a matter of theory, it cannot be a matter of intuition; and I’m sure it should be a matter of intuition for Rountree!” theoretical term – Grice was once attracted to Ramsey’s essay on “Theories,” but later came to see it as ‘pretentious’. “Surely the way *I* use ‘theory’ is not Ramsey’s!” – If something is an object of an intuition by Grice, it cannot be a theoretical term – theory and intuition don’t go together. They repel each other! a term occurring in a scientific theory that purports to make reference to an unobservable entity e.g., ‘electron’, property e.g., ‘the monatomicity of a molecule’, or relation ‘greater electrical resistance’. The qualification ‘purports to’ is required because instrumentalists deny that any such unobservables exist; nevertheless, they acknowledge that a scientific theory, such as the atomic theory of matter, may be a useful tool for organizing our knowledge of observables and predicting future experiences. Scientific realists, in contrast, maintain that at least some of the theoretical terms e.g., ‘quark’ or ‘neutrino’ actually denote entities that are not directly observable  they hold, i.e., that such things exist. For either group, theoretical terms are contrasted with such observational terms as ‘rope’, ‘smooth’, and ‘louder than’, which refer to observable entities, properties, or relations. Much philosophical controversy has centered on how to draw the distinction between the observable and the unobservable. Did Galileo observe the moons of Jupiter with his telescope? Do we observe bacteria under a microscope? Do physicists observe electrons in bubble chambers? Do astronomers observe the supernova explosions with neutrino counters? Do we observe ordinary material objects, or are sense-data the only observables? Are there any observational terms at all, or are all terms theory-laden? Another important meaning of ‘theoretical term’ occurs if one regards a scientific theory as a semiformal axiomatic system. It is then natural to think of its vocabulary as divided into three parts, i terms of logic and mathematics, ii terms drawn from ordinary language or from other theories, and iii theoretical terms that constitute the special vocabulary of that particular theory. Thermodynamics, e.g., employs i terms for numbers and mathematical operations, ii such terms as ‘pressure’ and ‘volume’ that are common to many branches of physics, and iii such special thermodynamical terms as ‘temperature’, ‘heat’, and ‘entropy’. In this second sense, a theoretical term need not even purport to refer to unobservables. For example, although special equipment is necessary for its precise quantitatheoretical entity theoretical term 912   912 tive measurement, temperature is an observable property. Even if theories are not regarded as axiomatic systems, their technical terms can be considered theoretical. Such terms need not purport to refer to unobservables, nor be the exclusive property of one particular theory. In some cases, e.g., ‘work’ in physics, an ordinary word is used in the theory with a meaning that departs significantly from its ordinary use. Serious questions have been raised about the meaning of theoretical terms. Some philosophers have insisted that, to be meaningful, they must be given operational definitions. Others have appealed to coordinative definitions to secure at least partial interpretation of axiomatic theories. The verifiability criterion has been invoked to secure the meaningfulness of scientific theories containing such terms. A theoretical concept or construct is a concept expressed by a theoretical term in any of the foregoing senses. The term ‘theoretical entity’ has often been used to refer to unobservables, but this usage is confusing, in part because, without introducing any special vocabulary, we can talk about objects too small to be perceived directly  e.g., spheres of gamboge a yellow resin less than 106 meters in diameter, which figured in a historically important experiment by Jean Perrin.  Grice uses Ramsey’s concept of ‘theory’ – “granting that Ramsey overrated theory, as all Cambridge men do!” -- theory-laden, dependent on theory; specifically, involving a theoretical interpretation of what is perceived or recorded. In the heyday of logical empiricism it was thought, by Carnap and others, that a rigid distinction could be drawn between observational and theoretical terms. Later, N. R. Hanson, Paul Feyerabend, and others questioned this distinction, arguing that perhaps all observations are theory-laden either because our perception of the world is colored by perceptual, linguistic, and cultural differences or because no attempt to distinguish sharply between observation and theory has been successful. This shift brings a host of philosophical problems. If we accept the idea of radical theoryladenness, relativism of theory choice becomes possible, for, given rival theories each of which conditions its own observational evidence, the choice between them would seem to have to be made on extra-evidential grounds, since no theory-neutral observations are available. In its most perplexing form, relativism holds that, theory-ladenness being granted, one theory is as good as any other, so far as the relationship of theory to evidence is concerned. Relativists couple the thesis of theory-ladenness with the alleged fact of the underdetermination of a theory by its observational evidence, which yields the idea that any number of alternative theories can be supported by the same evidence. The question becomes one of what it is that constrains choices between theories. If theory-laden observations cannot constrain such choices, the individual subjective preferences of scientists, or rules of fraternal behavior agreed upon by groups of scientists, become the operative constraints. The logic of confirmation seems to be intrinsically contaminated by both idiosyncratic and social factors, posing a threat to the very idea of scientific rationality. 

thomson: Grice did not collaborate with that many friends. He did with his tutee Strawson. He later did it with G. J. Warnock only on the theory of perception (notably the ‘visum’). He collaborated with two more Oxonian philosophers, and with both on the philosophy of action: D. F. Pears and J. F. Thomson.  J. F. Scots London-born philosopher who would often give seminars with H. P. Grice. They also explored ‘philosophy of action.’ Thomson presented his views on public occasons on the topic, usually under the guidance of D. F. Pears – on topics such as ‘freedom of the will.’ Thomson has assocations with University, and is a Fellow of Corpus, Grice’s alma. --thomsonianism: Grice explored philosophy of action with J. F. Thomson. Thomson would socialize mainly with Grice and D. F. Pears. Oddly, Thomson was also interested in ‘if’ and reached more or less the same Philonian consequences that Grice does.

three-year-old’s guide to Russell’s theory of types, the – by H. P. Grice, with an appendix by P. F. Strawson, “Advice to parents,” v. Grice’s three-year-old’s guide.

tillich:  philosopher, b. in Starzeddel, eastern Germany, he was educated in philosophy and theology and ordained in the Prussian Evangelical Church in 2. He served as an army chaplain during World War I and later taught at Berlin, Marburg, Dresden, Leipzig, and Frankfurt. In November 3, following suspension from his teaching post by the Nazis, he emigrated to the United States, where he taught at Columbia and Union Theological Seminary until 5, and then at Harvard and Chicago until his death. A popular preacher and speaker, he developed a wide audience in the United States through such writings as The Protestant Era 8, Systematic Theology three volumes: 1, 7, 3, The Courage to Be 2, and Dynamics of Faith 7. His sometimes unconventional lifestyle, as well as his syncretic yet original thought, moved “on the boundary” between theology and other elements of culture  especially art, literature, political thought, and depth psychology  in the belief that religion should relate to the whole extent, and the very depths, of human existence. Tillich’s thought, despite its distinctive “ontological” vocabulary, was greatly influenced by the voluntaristic tradition from Augustine through Schelling, Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. It was a systematic theology that sought to state fresh Christian answers to deep existential questions raised by individuals and cultures  his method of correlation. Every age has its distinctive kairos, “crisis” or “fullness of time,” the right time for creative thought and action. In Weimar G.y, Tillich found the times ripe for religious socialism. In postWorld War II America, he focused more on psychological themes: in the midst of anxiety over death, meaninglessness, and guilt, everyone seeks the courage to be, which comes only by avoiding the abyss of non-being welling up in the demonic and by placing one’s unconditional faith  ultit’ien Tillich, Paul 919   919 mate concern  not in any particular being e.g. God but in Being-Itself “the God above God,” the ground of being. This is essentially the Protestant principle, which prohibits lodging ultimate concern in any finite and limited reality including state, race, and religious institutions and symbols. Tillich was especially influential after World War II. He represented for many a welcome critical openness to the spiritual depths of modern culture, opposing both demonic idolatry of this world as in National Socialism and sectarian denial of cultural resources for faith as in Barthian neo-orthodoxy. 

tonk: a sentential connective whose meaning and logic are completely characterized by the two rules or axioms 1 [P P P tonk Q] and 2 [P tonk Q P Q]. If 1 and 2 are added to any normal system, then every Q can be derived from any P. A. N. Prior invented ‘tonk’ to show that deductive validity must not be conceived as depending solely on arbitrary syntactically defined rules or axioms. We may prohibit ‘tonk’ on the ground that it is not a natural, independently meaningful notion, but we may also prohibit it on purely syntactical grounds. E.g., we may require that, for every connective C, the C-introduction rule [xxx P . . . C . . .] and the C-elimination rule [ - - - C - - - P yyy] be such that the yyy is part of xxx or is related to xxx in some other syntactical way. 

token-reflexive, an expression that refers to itself in an act of speech or writing, such as ‘this token’. The term was coined by Reichenbach, who conjectured that all indexicals, all expressions whose semantic value depends partly on features of the context of utterance, are tokenreflexive and definable in terms of the phrase ‘this token’. He suggested that ‘I’ means the same as ‘the person who utters this token’, ‘now’ means the same as ‘the time at which this token is uttered’, ‘this table’ means the same as ‘the table pointed to by a gesture accompanying this token’, and so forth. Russell made a somewhat similar suggestion in his discussion of egocentric particulars. Reichenbach’s conjecture is widely regarded as false; although ‘I’ does pick out the person using it, it is not synonymous with ‘the person who utters this token’. If it were, as David Kaplan observes, ‘If no one were to utter this token, I would not exist’ would be true.  -- token-type distinction – Grice: “Strictly, they are not antonyms – and token is too English!” Grice: “Token is cognate with ‘teach,’ a Graeco-Roman thing, cfr. insignum – insignare – to teach is to show, almost, with an m-intention behind.” -- first the token, then the type – if necessary; “After all a type is a set of tokens” -- used by Grice: there’s a type of an utterer, but there’s the individual utterer: In symbols, “u” is an individual utterer, say, Grice. “U” is a type of utterer, say Oxonian philosophy dons. Aas drawn by Peirce, the contrast between a category and a member of that category. An individual or token is said to exemplify a type; it possesses the property that characterizes that type. In philosophy this distinction is often applied to linguistic expressions and to mental states, but it can be applied also to objects, events, properties, and states of affairs. Related to it are the distinctions between type and token individuation and between qualitative and numerical identity. Distinct tokens of the same type, such as two ants, may be qualitatively identical but cannot be numerically identical. Irrespective of the controversial metaphysical view that every individual has an essence, a type to which it belongs essentially, every individual belongs to many types, although for a certain theoretical or practical purpose it may belong to one particularly salient type e.g., the entomologist’s Formicidae or the picnicker’s buttinsky. The typetoken distinction as applied in the philosophy of language marks the difference between linguistic expressions, such as words and sentences, which are the subject of linguistics, and the products of acts of writing or speaking the subject of speech act theory. Confusing the two can lead to conflating matters of speaker meaning withmatters of word or sentence meaning as noted by Grice. An expression is a linguistic type and can be used over and over, whereas a token of a type can be produced only once, though of course it may be reproduced copied. A writer composes an essay a type and produces a manuscript a token, of which there might be many copies more tokens. A token of a type is not the same as an occurrence of a type. In the previous sentence there are two occurrences of the word ‘type’; in each inscription of that sentence, there are two tokens of that word. In philosophy of mind the typetoken distinction underlies the contrast between two forms of physicalism, the typetype identity theory or type physicalism and the tokentoken identity theory or token physicalism. 

topos: Grice: “I will use the Latinate ‘commonplace’” – ‘locus communis’-- topic, the analysis of common strategies of argumentation, later a genre of literature analyzing syllogistic reasoning. Aristotle considered the analysis of types of argument, or “topics,” the best means of describing the art of dialectical reasoning; he also used the term to refer to the principle underlying the strategy’s production of an argument. Later classical commentators on Aristotle, particularly Latin rhetoricians like Cicero, developed Aristotle’s discussions of the theory of dialectical reasoning into a philosophical form. Boethius’s work on topics exemplifies the later classical expansion of the scope of topics literature. For him, a topic is either a self-evidently true universal generalization, also called a “maximal proposition,” or a differentia, a member of the set of a maximal proposition’s characteristics that determine its genus and species. Man is a rational animal is a maximal proposition, and like from genus, the differentia that characterizes the maximal proposition as concerning genera, it is a topic. Because he believed dialectical reasoning leads to categorical, not conditional, conclusions, Boethius felt that the discovery of an argument entailed discovering a middle term uniting the two, previously unjoined terms of the conclusion. Differentiae are the genera of these middle terms, and one constructs arguments by choosing differentiae, thereby determining the middle term leading to the conclusion. In the eleventh century, Boethius’s logical structure of maximal propositions and differentiae was used to study hypothetical syllogisms, while twelfth-century theorists like Abelard extended the applicability of topics structure to the categorical syllogism. By the thirteenth century, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, and Boethius of Dacia applied topics structure exclusively to the categorical syllogism, principally those with non-necessary, probable premises. Within a century, discussion of topics structure to evaluate syllogistic reasoning was subsumed by consequences literature, which described implication, entailment, and inference relations between propositions. While the theory of consequences as an approach to understanding relations between propositions is grounded in Boethian, and perhaps Stoic, logic, it became prominent only in the later thirteenth century with Burley’s recognition of the logical significance of propositional logic.  topic-neutral, noncommittal between two or more ontological interpretations of a term. J. J. C. Smart suggested that introspective reports can be taken as topic-neutral: composed of terms neutral between “dualistic metaphysics” and “materialistic metaphysics.” When one asserts, e.g., that one has a yellowish-orange afterimage, this is tantamount to saying ‘There is something going on that is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, i.e., when I really see an orange’. The italicized phrase is, in Smart’s terms, topic-neutral; it refers to an event, while remaining noncommittal about whether it is material or immaterial. The term has not always been restricted to neutrality regarding dualism and materialism. Smart suggests that topic-neutral descriptions are composed of “quasi-logical” words, and hence would be suitable for any occasion where a relatively noncommittal expression of a view is required. 

toxin puzzle, a puzzle about intention and practical rationality: trustworthy billionaire, call him Paul, offers you, Peter, a million pounds for intending tonight to drink a certain toxin tomorrow. Peter is convinced that Paul can tell what Peter intends independently of what Peter does. The toxin would make Peter painfully ill for a day. But Peter needs to drink it to get the money. Constraints on the formation of a prize-winning intention include prohibitions against “gimmicks,” “external incentives,” and forgetting relevant details; e. g. Peter will not receive the money if Peter has a hypnotist “implant the intention” or hire a hit man to kill Peter should Peter not drink the toxin. If, by midnight tonight, without violating any rules, Peter forms an intention to drink the toxin tomorrow, Peter will find a million pounds in his bank account when he awakes tomorrow morning. Peter probably would drink the toxin for a million dollars. But can you, without violating the rules, intend tonight to drink it tomorrow? Apparently, you have no reason to drink it and an excellent reason not to drink it. Seemingly, you will infer from this that you will eschew drinking the toxin, and believing that you will top-down eschew drinking it seems inconsistent with intending to drink it. Even so, there are several reports in the philosophical literature of possible people who struck it rich when offered the toxin deal! Refs: H. P. Grice, “Grice’s book of paradoxes, with puzzling illustrations to  match!”  

trabia: Giuseppe Giovanni Lanza del Vasto (n. San Vito dei Normanni) è un filosofo. Esponente della nobile famiglia siciliana dei Lanza di Trabia. Il suo vero nome è infatti Giuseppe Giovanni Luigi Enrico Lanza di Trabia-Branciforte. La sua personalità eccezionale riunisce caratteristiche disparate: filosofo con una forte vena mistica, ma anche patriarca fondatore di comunità rurali e attivista nonviolento contro la guerra d'Algeria o gli armamenti nucleari.   Trabia nacque in un piccolo paese salentino, San Vito dei Normanni, nella masseria "Specchia di Mare", da famiglia antica ed illustre: il padre, Luigi Giuseppe, nato a Ginevra il 18 novembre 1857, dottore in giurisprudenza e titolare di un'azienda agricola-vitivinicola era figlio illegittimo del principe siciliano Giuseppe III Lanza di Trabia (1833-1868) e la madre, belga, era la marchesa Anna Maria Enrichetta Nauts, nata ad Anversa il I luglio 1874. Giuseppe Giovanni aveva due fratelli: Lorenzo Ercole, e Angelo Carlo, cittadino americano nel 1939 (nel 1943 partecipò allo sbarco in Sicilia). Lanza studiò al liceo Condorcet a Parigi, poi filosofia a Firenze e Pisa, dove fu allievo di Armando Carlini.  «La guerra di Abissinia già iniziava ed il mio rifiuto a parteciparvi era la cosa più evidente. E poi questa guerra non era che l’inizio: in seguito forse sarei stato ad uccidere inglesi, tedeschi e un giorno avrei avuto dinanzi alla mia baionetta Rainer Maria Rilke. No, la mia risposta era no. “Ma che cosa è che rende la guerra inevitabile?”, mi domandavo. Benché giovane avevo capito la puerilità delle risposte ordinarie, quelle che si rifanno alla nostra cattiveria, al nostro odio e al pregiudizio. Sapevo che la guerra non aveva a che fare con tutto ciò. “Certo, una dottrina esiste per opporsi alla guerra e la vedo nel Vangelo”, dicevo, “ma com’è che i cristiani non la vedono? Manca quindi un metodo, un metodo per difendersi senza offendere. Un modo nuovo, diverso, umano di risolvere i conflitti umani”. Solo in Gandhi vedevo colui che avrebbe potuto darmi una risposta ed il metodo.»  (Pagni R., Ultimi dialoghi con Lanza del Vasto, p.50-51) Così Lanza del Vasto ricorda la sua decisione di partire per l'India, autofinanziandosi con la vendita a un'amica facoltosa del manoscritto della sua prima opera, Giuda. Lanza non partiva alla ricerca di spiritualità, tanto più che la conversione al cristianesimo gli impegnava pienamente l'animo:  «Ma mi ero, non senza pena, convertito alla mia propria religione, e avevo il mio da fare per meditare le Scritture ed applicarne i comandamenti. E se mi si chiedeva “siete cristiano?”, rispondevo: “Sarebbe ben prezioso dire di sì. Tento di esserlo".»  (L’Arca aveva una vigna per vela, p.11). In India, Lanza conobbe il Mahatma Gandhi, con il quale stette qualche mese, per poi recarsi in Himalaya. Durante il viaggio «conobbi le inquietudini sociali dell'India ed il suo metodo di liberazione, la non violenza, che era molto contraria al mio carattere (come del resto credo sia contraria al carattere di tutti). Nessuno è non violento per natura: siamo violenti e non proviamo vergogna a dirlo, anzi lo diciamo con un certo orgoglio. Ma ciò che non diciamo è che la vigliaccheria e la violenza fanno la forza delle nazioni e degli eserciti e la non violenza consiste nel superare questi due grandi motivi della storia umana». In India trova «un'umanità simile alla nostra quanto opposta: qualche cosa come un altro sesso.l ritorno in Europa  Lo scrittore e studioso in una delle sue comunità rurali (l'ultimo a destra) Tornato dall'India dopo ulteriori peregrinazioni in Terra Santa, Lanza comprende che la sua vocazione è di fondare una comunità rurale nonviolenta, sul modello del gandhiano ashram, la comunità autarchica ed egualitaria che per il Mahatma doveva essere la cellula della società. Gli ci volle del tempo prima di riuscire a concretizzarla attraverso la fondazione della comunità dell'Arca, che avvenne il 26 gennaio 1944[3]. Tra le poche persone a cui gli riesce di esporre il suo progetto c'è Simone Weil, che incontra a Marsiglia. Nonostante il suo pacifismo, la Weil non nutriva molta fiducia nella nonviolenza gandhiana. Lanza gliene parlò e lei sembrò comprendere meglio. Poi parlarono della visione dell'Arca, che allora non si chiamava ancora così, ed era la prima volta che Lanza ne parlava con qualcuno: «Lei capì subito! “È un diamante bellissimo”, disse. “Sì,” risposi “è vero. Ha solo un minuscolo difetto: che non esiste”. E lei: “Ma esisterà, esisterà, perché Dio lo vuole"."Simone aveva ragione. L'ultima sede della comunità fu la Borie Noble, con circa centocinquanta persone che vivono nel modo più frugale e gioiosamente comunitario. Il nome venne quando si cominciò a parlare di “lanzismo”: «Si cominciava a parlare di Lanzisti e Lanzismo, cosa che mi fece rizzare il pelo. “Amici miei”, annunciai, “noi ci chiameremo l'Arca, quella di Noè beninteso. E noi gli animali dell'Arca.»[5].  Negli anni successivi numerosissime iniziative nonviolente videro protagonista Lanza e i suoi compagni, che seppero attirare l'attenzione dell'opinione pubblica francese e non solo. La prima azione pubblica nonviolenta è del 1957, contro le torture e i massacri compiuti dai francesi in Algeria, e si svolge a Clichy in una casa dove aveva vissuto San Vincenzo de Paoli. L'azione fu guardata con relativo favore dalla stampa, e giunse la solidarietà di personalità come Mauriac o l'Abbé Pierre. Poi vennero le lotte contro il nucleare, la prima delle quali nel 1958: Lanza con i suoi compagni penetrano nel cancello di una centrale elettronucleare e vengono poi trascinati via dai poliziotti. Poi ancora la campagna contro i “campi di assegnazione per residenza”, sorta di campi di concentramento per gli algerini “sospetti”, e quella in favore degli obiettori di coscienza. Durante la Quaresima del 1963, tra due sessioni del Concilio Vaticano II Lanza fece un digiuno di quaranta giorni compiuto nell'attesa di una parola forte sulla pace da parte della Chiesa. Poco dopo il trentesimo giorno, il Segretario di Stato consegnò a Chanterelle, la moglie di Lanza, il testo dell'enciclica Pacem in Terris: «Dentro ci sono cose che non sono mai state dette, pagine che potrebbero essere firmate da suo marito!»[6].  Opere: Le pèlerinage aux sources, Denoël, Parigi, traduzione italiana: Pellegrinaggio alle sorgenti, Jaca Book, Milano; Approches de la vie intérieure, Denoël, Parigi; traduzione italiana: Introduzione alla vita interiore, Jaca Book, Milano 1989; Technique de la non-violence, Denoël, Parigi 1965; traduzione italiana: Che cos'è la non violenza, Jaca Book, Milano 1979; Il canzoniere del peregrin d'amore, Jaca Book, Milano 1980; Vinôbâ, ou le nouveau pèlerinage, Denoël, Parigi 1954; traduzione italiana: Vinoba, o il nuovo pellegrinaggio, Jaca Book, Milano 1980; L'Arche avait pour voilure une vigne, Denoël, Parigi 1978; traduzione italiana: L'Arca aveva una vigna per vela, Jaca Book, Milano 1980; Pour éviter la fin du monde, Rocher, Parigi; traduzione italiana: Per evitare la fine del mondo, Jaca Book, Milano 1991; Principes et préceptes du retour à l'évidence, Denoël, Parigi 1945; traduzione italiana: Principi e precetti del ritorno all'evidenza, Gribaudi, Torino 1988; Préface au Message Retrouvé de Louis Cattiaux, Denoël, Parigi 1956; traduzione italiana: Il Messaggio Ritrovato, Mediterranee, Roma 2002. Note ^ Pagni, cit., p. 51 ^ Lanza del Vasto, Pellegrinaggio alle sorgenti, p. 82 ^ Gabriella Fiori, Lanza del Vasto e Simone Weil, Prospettiva Persona n° 86/2013, http://www.prospettivapersona.it/editoriale/86/lanza_weil.pdf ^ Pagni, cit., p.58-59 ^ L'Arca aveva una vigna per vela, p. 48 ^ ivi, p. 99 Bibliografia Jacques Madaule, Chi è Lanza del Vasto Arnaud de Mareuil, Lanza del Vasto (Seghers, 1965) René Doumerc, Dialoghi con Lanza del Vasto (Albin Michel) Claude-Henri Roquet, Les Facettes du cristal (Conversazioni con Lanza del Vasto, Parigi 1981) Arnaud de Mareuil, Lanza del Vasto, sa vie, son oeuvre, son message (Saint-Jean-de-Braye 1998) Anne Fougère, Claude-Henri Rocquet: Lanza del Vasto. Pellegrino della nonviolenza, patriarca, poeta, (Paoline, Milano 2006) Antonino Drago, Paolo Trianni (a cura di), La filosofia di Lanza del Vasto (Jaka Book, Milano 2008)  Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina in lingua francese dedicata a Lanza del Vasto Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Lanza del Vasto Collegamenti esterni L'Arche de Lanza del Vasto (sito principale) (fr), su arche-nonviolence.eu. Comunità di St Antoine (Fr), su arche-de-st-antoine.com. Comunità dell'Arca in Italia, su xoomer.virgilio.it. Provincia di Brindisi su Lanza del Vasto. Lanza del Vasto & Ramon Llull (es), su denip.webcindario.com. Controllo di autorità                                                VIAF (EN) 2472923 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2275 7061 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\001261 · LCCN (EN) n50047299 · GND (DE) 121291928 · BNF (FR) cb11911016p (data) · BNE (ES) XX956618 (data) · NLA (EN) 35291519 · NDL (EN, JA) 00446875 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n50047299 Biografie Portale Biografie Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloPoeti italiani del XX secoloScrittori italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1901Morti nel 1981Nati il 29 settembreMorti il 5 gennaioNati a San Vito dei NormanniNonviolenzaLanza[altre]. vasto: essential Italian philosopher – Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e del Vasto," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

transcendentale: Grice: “Trust Cicero to look for the abstract!” -- transcendentia, broadly, the property of rising out of or above other things virtually always understood figuratively; in philosophy, the property of being, in some way, of a higher order. A being, such as God, may be said to be transcendent in the sense of being not merely superior, but incomparably superior, to other things, in any sort of perfection. God’s transcendence, or being outside or beyond the world, is also contrasted, and by some thinkers combined, with God’s immanence, or existence within the world. In medieval philosophy of logic, terms such as ‘being’ and ‘one’, which did not belong uniquely to any one of the Aristotelian categories or types of predication such as substance, quality, and relation, but could be predicated of things belonging to any or to none of them, were called transcendental. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, principles that profess wrongly to take us beyond the limits of any possible experience are called transcendent; whereas anything belonging to non-empirical thought that establishes, and draws consequences from, the possibility and limits of experience may be called transcendental. Thus a transcendental argument in a sense still current is one that proceeds from premises about the way in which experience is possible to conclusions about what must be true of any experienced world. Transcendentalism was a philosophical or religious movement in mid-nineteenth-century New England, characterized, in the thought of its leading representative, Ralph Waldo Emerson, by belief in a transcendent spiritual and divine principle in human nature. Grice: “The formation of this Ciceronian expression is fascinating. There’s the descent of the lark, and the transcend of the lark!” -- transcendentals, also called transcendentalia, terms or concepts that apply to all things regardless of the things’ ontological kind or category. transcendental deduction transcendentals 926   926 Terms or concepts of this sort are transcendental in the sense that they transcend or are superordinate to all classificatory categories. The classical doctrine of the transcendentals, developed in detail in the later Middle Ages, presupposes an Aristotelian ontology according to which all beings are substances or accidents classifiable within one of the ten highest genera, the ten Aristotelian categories. In this scheme being Grecian on, Latin ens is not itself one of the categories since all categories mark out kinds of being. But neither is it a category above the ten categories of substance and accidents, an ultimate genus of which the ten categories are species. This is because being is homonymous or equivocal, i.e., there is no single generic property or nature shared by members of each category in virtue of which they are beings. The ten categories identify ten irreducible, most basic ways of being. Being, then, transcends the categorial structure of the world: anything at all that is ontologically classifiable is a being, and to say of anything that it is a being is not to identify it as a member of some kind distinct from other kinds of things. According to this classical doctrine, being is the primary transcendental, but there are other terms or concepts that transcend the categories in a similar way. The most commonly recognized transcendentals other than being are one unum, true verum, and good bonum, though some medieval philosophers also recognized thing res, something aliquid, and beautiful pulchrum. These other terms or concepts are transcendental because the ontological ground of their application to a given thing is precisely the same as the ontological ground in virtue of which that thing can be called a being. For example, for a thing with a certain nature to be good is for it to perform well the activity that specifies it as a thing of that nature, and to perform this activity well is to have actualized that nature to a certain extent. But for a thing to have actualized its nature to some extent is just what it is for the thing to have being. So the actualities or properties in virtue of which a thing is good are precisely those in virtue of which it has being. Given this account, medieval philosophers held that transcendental terms are convertible convertuntur or extensionally equivalent idem secundum supposita. They are not synonymous, however, since they are intensionally distinct differunt secundum rationem. These secondary transcendentals are sometimes characterized as attributes passiones of being that are necessarily concomitant with it. In the modern period, the notion of the transcendental is associated primarily with Kant, who made ‘transcendental’ a central technical term in his philosophy. For Kant the term no longer signifies that which transcends categorial classification but that which transcends our experience in the sense of providing its ground or structure. Kant allows, e.g., that the pure forms of intuition space and time and the pure concepts of understanding categories such as substance and cause are transcendental in this sense. Forms and concepts of this sort constitute the conditions of the possibility of experience.  transcendental argument: Grice: “I prefer metaphysical argument.’ -- an argument that elucidates the conditions for the possibility of some fundamental phenomenon whose existence is unchallenged or uncontroversial in the philosophical context in which the argument is propounded. Such an argument proceeds deductively, from a premise asserting the existence of some basic phenomenon such as meaningful discourse, conceptualization of objective states of affairs, or the practice of making promises, to a conclusion asserting the existence of some interesting, substantive enabling conditions for that phenomenon. The term derives from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which gives several such arguments. The paradigmatic Kantian transcendental argument is the “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.” Kant argued there that the objective validity of certain pure, or a priori, concepts the “categories” is a condition for the possibility of experience. Among the concepts allegedly required for having experience are those of substance and cause. Their apriority consists in the fact that instances of these concepts are not directly given in sense experience in the manner of instances of empirical concepts such as red. This fact gave rise to the skepticism of Hume concerning the very coherence of such alleged a priori concepts. Now if these concepts do have objective validity, as Kant endeavored to prove in opposition to Hume, then the world contains genuine instances of the concepts. In a transcendental argument concerning the conditions for the possibility of experience, it is crucial that some feature entailed by the having of experience is identified. Then it is argued that experience could not have this feature without satisfying some substantive conditions. In the Transcendental Deduction, the feature of experience on which Kant concentrates is the ability of a subject of experience to be aware of several distinct inner states as all belonging to a single consciousness. There is no general agreement on how Kant’s argument actually unfolded, though it seems clear to most that he focused on the role of the categories in the synthesis or combination of one’s inner states in judgments, where such synthesis is said to be required for one’s awareness of the states as being all equally one’s own states. Another famous Kantian transcendental argument  the “Refutation of Idealism” in the CriToynbee, Arnold transcendental argument 925   925 tique of Pure Reason  shares a noteworthy trait with the Transcendental Deduction. The Refutation proceeds from the premise that one is conscious of one’s own existence as determined in time, i.e., knows the temporal order of some of one’s inner states. According to the Refutation, a condition for the possibility of such knowledge is one’s consciousness of the existence of objects located outside oneself in space. If one is indeed so conscious, that would refute the skeptical view, formulated by Descartes, that one lacks knowledge of the existence of a spatial world distinct from one’s mind and its inner states. Both of the Kantian transcendental arguments we have considered, then, conclude that the falsity of some skeptical view is a condition for the possibility of some phenomenon whose existence is acknowledged even by the skeptic the having of experience; knowledge of temporal facts about one’s own inner states. Thus, we can isolate an interesting subclass of transcendental arguments: those which are anti-skeptical in nature. Barry Stroud has raised the question whether such arguments depend on some sort of suppressed verificationism according to which the existence of language or conceptualization requires the availability of the knowledge that the skeptic questions since verificationism has it that meaningful sentences expressing coherent concepts, e.g., ‘There are tables’, must be verifiable by what is given in sense experience. Dependence on a highly controversial premise is undesirable in itself. Further, Stroud argued, such a dependence would render superfluous whatever other content the anti-skeptical transcendental argument might embody since the suppressed premise alone would refute the skeptic. There is no general agreement on whether Stroud’s doubts about anti-skeptical transcendental arguments are well founded. It is not obvious whether the doubts apply to arguments that do not proceed from a premise asserting the existence of language or conceptualization, but instead conform more closely to the Kantian model. Even so, no anti-skeptical transcendental argument has been widely accepted. This is evidently due to the difficulty of uncovering substantive enabling conditions for phenomena that even a skeptic will countenance.  transcendens -- transcendental argument: Transcendental argument -- Davidson, D.: H. P. Grice, “Reply to Davidson,” philosopher of mind and language. His views on the relationship between our conceptions of ourselves as persons and as complex physical objects have had an enormous impact on contemporary philosophy. Davidson regards the mindbody problem as the problem of the relation between mental and physical events; his discussions of explanation assume that the entities explained are events; causation is a relation between events; and action is a species of events, so that events are the very subject matter of action theory. His central claim concerning events is that they are concrete particulars  unrepeatable entities located in space and time. He does not take for granted that events exist, but argues for their existence and for specific claims as to their nature. In “The Individuation of Events” in Essays on Actions and Events, 0, Davidson argues that a satisfactory theory of action must recognize that we talk of the same action under different descriptions. We must therefore assume the existence of actions. His strongest argument for the existence of events derives from his most original contribution to metaphysics, the semantic method of truth Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 10580; Essays on Truth and Interpretation, 4, pp. 214. The argument is based on a distinctive trait of the English language one not obviously shared by signal systems in lower animals, namely, its productivity of combinations. We learn modes of composition as well as words and are thus prepared to produce and respond to complex expressions never before encountered. Davidson argues, from such considerations, that our very understanding of English requires assuming the existence of events. To understand Davidson’s rather complicated views about the relationships between mind and body, consider the following claims: 1 The mental and the physical are distinct. 2 The mental and the physical causally interact. 3 The physical is causally closed. Darwinism, social Davidson, Donald 206   206 1 says that no mental event is a physical event; 2, that some mental events cause physical events and vice versa; and 3, that all the causes of physical events are physical events. If mental events are distinct from physical events and sometimes cause them, then the physical is not causally closed. The dilemma posed by the plausibility of each of these claims and by their apparent incompatibility just is the traditional mind body problem. Davidson’s resolution consists of three theses: 4 There are no strict psychological or psychophysical laws; in fact, all strict laws are expressible in purely physical vocabulary. 5 Mental events causally interact with physical events. 6 Event c causes event e only if some strict causal law subsumes c and e. It is commonly held that a property expressed by M is reducible to a property expressed by P where M and P are not logically connected only if some exceptionless law links them. So, given 4, mental and physical properties are distinct. 6 says that c causes e only if there are singular descriptions, D of c and DH of e, and a “strict” causal law, L, such that L and ‘D occurred’ entail ‘D caused D'’. 6 and the second part of 4 entail that physical events have only physical causes and that all event causation is physically grounded. Given the parallel between 13 and 4 6, it may seem that the latter, too, are incompatible. But Davidson shows that they all can be true if and only if mental events are identical to physical events. Let us say that an event e is a physical event if and only if e satisfies a basic physical predicate that is, a physical predicate appearing in a “strict” law. Since only physical predicates or predicates expressing properties reducible to basic physical properties appear in “strict” laws, every event that enters into causal relations satisfies a basic physical predicate. So, those mental events which enter into causal relations are also physical events. Still, the anomalous monist is committed only to a partial endorsement of 1. The mental and physical are distinct insofar as they are not linked by strict law  but they are not distinct insofar as mental events are in fact physical events.  transcendentalism, a religious-philosophical viewpoint held by a group of New England intellectuals, of whom Emerson, Thoreau, and Theodore Parker were the most important. A distinction taken over from Samuel Taylor Coleridge was the only bond that universally united the members of the Transcendental Club, founded in 1836: the distinction between the understanding and reason, the former providing uncertain knowledge of appearances, the latter a priori knowledge of necessary truths gained through intuition. The transcendentalists insisted that philosophical truth could be reached only by reason, a capacity common to all people unless destroyed by living a life of externals and accepting as true only secondhand traditional beliefs. On almost every other point there were disagreements. Emerson was an idealist, while Parker was a natural realist  they simply had conflicting a priori intuitions. Emerson, Thoreau, and Parker rejected the supernatural aspects of Christianity, pointing out its unmistakable parochial nature and sociological development; while James Marsh, Frederick Henry Hedge, and Caleb Henry remained in the Christian fold. The influences on the transcendentalists differed widely and explain the diversity of opinion. For example, Emerson was influenced by the Platonic tradition, G. Romanticism, Eastern religions, and nature poets, while Parker was influenced by modern science, the Scottish realism of Reid and Cousin which also emphasized a priori intuitions, and the G. Higher Critics. Emerson, Thoreau, and Parker were also bonded by negative beliefs. They not only rejected Calvinism but Unitarianism as well; they rejected the ordinary concept of material success and put in its place an Aristotelian type of selfrealization that emphasized the rational and moral self as the essence of humanity and decried idiosyncratic self-realization that admires what is unique in people as constituting their real value. 

trans-finitum: definitum, infinitum: Trans-finite number, in set theory, an infinite cardinal or ordinal number.

transformation – Grice: “My system G makes minimal use of transformations” -- minimal transformation rule: an axiom-schema or rule of inference. Grice: “Strictly, an Ovidian metamorphose!” -- A transformation rule is thus a rule for transforming a possibly empty set of wellformed formulas into a formula, where that rule operates only upon syntactic information. It was this conception of an axiom-schema and rule of inference that was one of the keys to creating a genuinely rigorous science of deductive reasoning. In the 0s, the idea was imported into linguistics, giving rise to the notion of a transformational rule. Such a rule transforms tree structures into tree structures, taking one from the deep structure of a sentence, which determines its semantic interpretation, to the surface structure of that sentence, which determines its phonetic interpretation. Grice: “Chomsky misuses ‘transformation.’”

triangulus -- Grice’s triangle. He uses the word in “Meaning Revisited,” (WoW: 286). It’s the semiotic triange between what he calls the ‘communication device,’ the denotatum, and the soul. While often referred to as H. P. Grice’s triangle, or H. P. Grice’s semiotic triangle, or "Ogden/Richards triangle" the idea is also expressed in 1810, by Bernard Bolzano, in his rather obscure, Grice grants, “Beiträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik.” However, the triangle can be traced back to the 4th century BC, in Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (often referred to in its Latin translation De Interpretatione, second book of his Organon, on which Grice gave seminars as University Lecturer at Oxford with J. L. Austin). H. P. Grice’s semiotic Triangle relates to the problem of universals, a philosophical debate which split ancient and medieval philosophers (mainly realists and nominalists).  The triangle describes a simplified form of relationship between the emissor as subject, a concept as object or referent or denotatum, and its designation (sign, signans, or as Grice prefers ‘communication device’). For more elaborated research see Semiotics.  Ogden semiotic triangle.png  Contents 1Interlocutory applications 1.1Other triangles 1.2The communicative stand 1.3Direction of fit 2See also 3References 4External links Interlocutory applications Other triangles The relations between the triangular corners may be phrased more precisely in causal terms as follows[citation needed][original research?]. The matter evokes the emissor's soul. The emissor refers the matter to the symbol. The symbol evokes the emissee’s soul. The emissee refers the symbol back to the matter. The communicative stand Such a triangle represents ONE agent, the emissor, whereas communication takes place between TWO (objects, not necessarily agents). So imagine another triangle and consider that for the two to understand each other, the content that the "triangles" represent must fit or be aligned. Clearly, this calls for synchronisation and an interface as well as scale among other things. Notice also, that we perceive the world mostly through our eyes and in alternative phases of seeing and not seeing with change in the environment as the most important information to look for. Our eyes are lenses and we see a surface (2D) in ONE direction (focusing) if we are stationary and the object is not moving either. This is why you may position yourself in one corner of the triangle and by replicating (mirroring) it, you will be able to see the whole picture, your cognitive epistemological and the ontological existential or physical model of life, the universe, existence, etc. combined.[citation needed][original research?]  Direction of fit Main article: Direction of fit  This section has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these template messages) This section does not cite any sources. (December 2012) This section is written like a personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay that states a Wikipedia editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic. (December 2012) Grice uses the notion of "direction of fit" (in “Intention and Uncertainty”) to create a taxonomy of acts. [3] [4]   This table possibly contains original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. (December 2012) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) World or Referentintended →Writer's Thought   decoded ↑ ↓ encoded  Thought Emissee's← extendedSymbol or Word   Emissor's THOUGHT retrieves SYMBOL suited to REFERENT, Word suited to World.   Reader's THOUGHT retrieves REFERENT suited to SYMBOL, World suited to Word. Actually the arrows indicate that there is something exchanged between the two parties and it is a feedback cycle. Especially, if you imagine that the world is represented in the soul of both the emissor and the emissee and used for reality check. If you look at the triangle above again, remember that reality check is not what is indicated there between the sign and the referent and marked as "true', because a term or a sign is allocated "arbitrarily'. What you check for is the observance of the law of identity which requires you and your partner to sort out that you are on the same page, that the emissor is communicating and the emissee is understanding about the same thing. So the chunk of reality and the term are replaceable/interchangeable within limits and your concepts in the soul as presented in some appropriate way are all related and mean the same thing. Usually the check does not stop there, your ideas must also be tested for feasibility and doability to make sure that they are "real" and not "phantasy". Reality check comes from consolidating your experience with other people's experience to avoid solipsism and/or by putting your ideas (projection) in practice (production) and see the reaction. Notice, however how vague the verbs used and how the concept of a fit itself is left unexplained in details.[editorializing]  See also The Delta Factor De dicto De se De re References  Colin Cherry (1957) On Human Communication  C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards (1923) The Meaning of Meaning  John Searle (1975) "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts", in: Gunderson, K. (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) pp. 344-369.  John Searle (1976) "A Classification of Illocutionary Acts", Language in Society, Vol.5, pp. 1-24. External links Jessica Erickstad (1998) Richards' Meaning of Meaning Theory. University of Colorado at Boulder. Allie Cahill (1998) "Proper Meaning Superstition" (I. A. Richards). University of Colorado at Boulder. Categories: SemioticsSemanticsPragmaticsPhilosophy of languagePhilosophy of mind. Semiotisches Dreieck Zur Navigation springen. Zur Suche springen. Das semiotische Dreieck stellt die Relation zwischen dem Symbol, dem dadurch hervorgerufenen Begriff und dem damit gemeinten realen Ding dar. Das semiotische Dreieck ist ein in der Sprachwissenschaft und Semiotik verwendetes Modell. Es soll veranschaulichen, dass ein Zeichenträger (Graphem, Syntagma, Symbol) sich nicht direkt und unmittelbar auf einen außersprachlichen Gegenstand bezieht, sondern dieser Bezug nur mittelbar durch eine Vorstellung/einen Begriff erfolgt. Das semiotische Dreieck publizierten erstmals Charles Kay Ogden und Ivor Armstrong Richards in dem Werk The Meaning of Meaning. Das semiotische Dreieck in vereinfachter Beschreibung. Die Welt besteht aus Gegenständen, Sachverhalten, Ereignissen und Ähnlichem. Diese sind wirklich und bestimmen alles, was geschieht. Das Symbol für ein Einzelnes davon steht in den folgenden Dreiecken rechts und bedeutet vereinfacht: Ding oder „was Sache ist“. Wenn der Mensch ein Ding bemerkt oder sich vorstellt, macht er sich ein gedachtes Bild davon. Das Symbol dafür steht in den folgenden Dreiecken oben und bedeutet: Begriff oder „was man meint“. Wenn Menschen mit diesen Begriffen von Dingen reden, so verwenden sie Zeichen (meist hörbar, gelegentlich auch sichtbar oder anders wahrnehmbar). Das sind Wörter (auch Bezeichnungen, Benennungen, Symbole oder Ähnliches). Das Symbol dafür steht in den folgenden DREIECKEN links und bedeutet: Wort oder „was man dazu sagt“. Ding, Begriff und Wort sollen eindeutig zusammengehören. Das gelingt nicht immer, vielmehr muss man immerzu aufpassen, ob der eben verwendete Begriff das betrachtete Ding richtig erfasst, ob das eben verwendete Wort den gemeinten Begriff trifft, und sogar ob das eben betrachtete Ding überhaupt eins ist und nicht etwa einige oder gar keins. Passen die drei Ecken nicht zueinander, „So entstehen leicht die fundamentalsten Verwechslungen (deren die ganze Philosophie voll ist).“  Vitters: Tractatus 3.324. Das semiotische Dreieck als bildliche Darstellung der Mehrdimensionalität der Zeichen  Begriff  /\  /  \    /    \    /      \     /   \ Zeichen ...... Gegenstand  (Wort)  (Ding). Das semiotische Dreieck ist zunächst nur ein bildliches Hilfsmittel, um sich Beziehungen „im“ bzw. „des“ Zeichens zu veranschaulichen. Seine Interpretation und nähere Ausgestaltung hängt daher von der zugrunde gelegten Erkenntnistheorie ab.  In entscheidender Weise wird durch das semiotische Dreieck veranschaulicht, dass zwischen dem Wort (der Zeichenform, d. h. dem Schriftbild oder dem Lautbild) und dem Bezeichneten (Ding, Gegenstand) keine direkte Beziehung, sondern nur durch (mindestens) eine hier so genannte Vermittlungsinstanz vermittelte Beziehung besteht. Graphisch wird dies durch eine unterschiedliche Linie dargestellt.  Gebräuchlich ist ein Dreieck. Entscheidend ist die nicht-direkte Beziehung zwischen Zeichen (Wort) und Gegenstand (Ding). Je nach Anzahl der zu veranschaulichenden (nicht auszublendenden) Bezugspunkte und Vermittlungsinstanzen und der Art der betonten Beziehungen kann man auch ein Quadrat, ein sonstiges Vieleck bzw. einen mehrdimensionalen Körper benutzen.  Darauf hinzuweisen ist, dass die Vermittlungsinstanz – hier mit dem mehrdeutigen Ausdruck „Begriff“ bezeichnet – sehr unterschiedlich gesehen wird, was aus dem Terminologiebefund unten deutlich wird.  Das semiotische Dreieck ist Veranschaulichung eines Zeichenverständnisses, das dem Zeichenbegriff von Ferdinand de Saussure, wonach ein Zeichen eine „psychische Einheit“ zwischen einem „akustischen Bild“ (Signifikanten) und einem „Begriff“ (Signifikat) (bei ihm im Sinne einer psychischen Vorstellung)[2] sein soll, widersprechen dürfte:[3] statt der „Papierblattmetapher“ für das Verhältnis von Signifikant/Signifikat (von de Saussure) wird im semiotischen Dreieck eine optische Trennung und Distanzierung von Zeichenkörper und Begriff (Sinn) vorgenommen.  Das semiotische Dreieck blendet auch pragmatische Bedingungen und Bezüge aus bzw. reduziert sie auf die semantische Dimension und wird daher von pragmatischen Bedeutungstheorien kritisiert (vgl. Semiotik).  Das Fehlen einer unmittelbaren Beziehung zwischen Zeichen und Gegenstand wird zugleich als Ausdruck der (von de Saussure betonten) Arbitrarität und Konventionalität von Zeichen interpretiert.  Geschichte Man muss unterscheiden zwischen dem semiotischen Dreieck als Bild und einem dreiseitigen (triadischen) Zeichenbegriff, dessen Veranschaulichung es dient.  Verbreitet wird die sprachwissenschaftliche Entwicklung so dargestellt, als gäbe es ein semiotisches Dreieck erst seit Ogden/Richards, die damit einen nur zweigliedrigen Zeichenbegriff von de Saussure modifiziert/überwunden hätten.[4] Es heißt, bis ins 19. Jahrhundert sei der Zeichenbegriff im Wesentlichen hinsichtlich seines Sachbezugs als „zweistellige Relation“ diskutiert worden.[5]  Andere betonen den zugrunde liegenden dreiseitigen („triadischen“) Zeichenbegriff, der meist bei Aristoteles, mitunter auch schon bei Platon angesetzt wird. Schon bei Platon findet sich ein gedankliches Wort-Gegenstand-Modell zwischen Namen (Zeichen) – Idee (Begriff) und Ding. Bei Aristoteles ist ein Zeichen (semeion, damit meint er ein Wort) ein Symptom für eine Seelenregung, d. h. für etwas, das der Sprecher sich vorstellt. Diese Vorstellung des Sprechers ist dann ein Ikon für ein Ding. Dies sind für ihn die primären Zeichenrelationen (rot in der untenstehenden Figur). Davon abgeleitet ist die sekundäre Zeichenrelation (schwarz in der Figur).   Das Semiotische Dreieck bei Aristoteles Seit Aristoteles wird vertreten, dass Zeichen Dinge der Welt nicht unvermittelt, sondern vermittelt über einen „Begriff“, „Vorstellung“ etc. bezeichnen. Dies bedeutet eine Differenzierung gegenüber der einfachen aliquid-stat-pro-aliquo-Konzeption und ist „für die ganze Geschichte der Semiotik entscheidend“. Bei Aristoteles stehen „Zeichen […] für Sachen, welche von den Bewußtseinsinhalten abgebildet worden sind“. „Die Sachen werden von den Zeichen nicht präsentiert, sondern repräsentiert.“. Die Interpretation von De interpretatione ist dabei seit Jahrtausenden kontrovers. Die oben wiedergegebene Interpretation entspricht einer psychologischen Deutung, die einen Psychologismus nahelegt. Dies erscheint fraglich, da Aristoteles eher einen erkenntnistheoretischen Realismus vertreten haben dürfte.  Scholastik In der Sprachphilosophie der Scholastik finden sich Überlegungen zum Dreierschema res (Sache, Ding), intellectus (Verstand, Gedanken, Begriff), vox (Wortzeichen). Logik von Port-Royal. In der Grammatik von Port-Royal (Mitte des 17. Jh.) soll das semiotische Dreieck eingeführt worden sein.[10] In der Logik von Port-Royal sind die Gegenstände und die Sprachzeichen nicht unmittelbar, sondern über Universalien miteinander verknüpft. Nach KANT ist das zwischen Begrifflichkeit und Sinnlichkeit bzw. Gegenstand vermittelnde Element das Schema als ein bildhaftes und anschauliches Zeichen. Das Verfahren des Verstandes, mit Hilfe der ‚Einbildungskraft‘ die reinen Verstandesbegriffe zu versinnlichen, heißt Schematismus. Auch Arthur Schopenhauer, ein deutscher Philosoph des 19. Jahrhunderts, unterscheidet in seinem Hauptwerk Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung strikt zwischen Wort, Begriff und Anschauung. Ausblendung des Referenzbezugs im Zeichenmodell von de Saussure Nach verbreiteter Auffassung haben die moderne Sprachwissenschaft und der moderne Zeichenbegriff erst mit de Saussure eingesetzt. Nach de Saussure ist ein Zeichen die Verbindung eines Ausdrucks (signifiant) mit einem Inhalt (signifié), wobei das Zeichen als „psychische Einheit mit zwei Seiten“[14] aufgefasst wurde. In diesem zweigliedrigen (dyadischen) Zeichenmodell „hat die reale Welt keine Bedeutung“:[15] „Hier Bezeichnetes als geistige Vorstellung, dort Bezeichnendes als dessen Materialisation in der Sprache, aber kein Platz für das Objekt selbst“. Triadisches Zeichenmodells bei Peirce. Charles S. Peirce entwickelte eine pragmatische Semiotik[16] und die Pragmatik soll auf dem triadischen Zeichenmodell von Peirce beruhen.[17] Statt eines dyadischen entwickelte Peirce ein kommunikativ-pragmatisches, triadisches Zeichenmodell: das Zeichen ist eine „triadische Relation (semiotisches Dreieck)“. Dies, indem er zu Zeichenmittel und Objekt den „Interpretanten“ ergänzte, d. h. die Bedeutung, die durch Interpretation der Zeichenbenutzer (Sprecher bzw. Hörer) in einem Handlungszusammenhang zustande kommt. „Das, was als Bewusstseinsinhalt erscheint, der Interpretant, ist der individuell erkannte Sinn, der seinerseits kulturell vor- oder mitgeprägt sein kann. Daher wird in diesem Konzept die Zeichenbedeutung (…) auch als „kulturelle Einheit“ (Eco, 1972) postuliert.“Peirce-Interpreten wie Floyd Merrell oder Gerhard Schönrich wenden sich gegen die Dreiecksdarstellung peircescher Zeichentriaden, da sie suggerieren könnte, dass sich die irreduzible triadische Relation zerlegen lasse in einzelne zweistellige Relationen. Stattdessen schlagen sie eine Y-förmige Darstellung vor, bei der die drei Relate jeweils durch eine Linie mit dem Mittelpunkt verbunden sind, aber entlang der Seiten des „Dreiecks“ keine Linien verlaufen.  Charles Kay Ogden / Ivor Armstrong Richards Als „die“ Vertreter eines dreiseitigen Zeichenmodells bzw. eines semiotischen Dreiecks (unter Ausblendung ihrer Vorläufer) werden verbreitet Charles Kay Ogden und Ivor Armstrong Richards angeführt. Diese erkannten eine Welt außerhalb des menschlichen Bewusstseins ausdrücklich an und wandten sich gegen „idealistische Konzepte“. Nach Charles Kay Ogden und Ivor Armstrong Richards symbolisiert das Zeichen (symbol) etwas und ruft einen entsprechenden Bewusstseinsinhalt (reference) hervor, der sich auf das Objekt (referent) bezieht.[6] Das semiotische Dreieck wird wie folgt erklärt: „Umweltsachverhalte werden im Gedächtnis begrifflich bzw. konzeptuell repräsentiert und mit Sprachzeichen assoziiert. So ist z. B. das Wort „Baum“ ein Sprachzeichen, das mit dem Begriff bzw. Konzept von „BAUM“ assoziiert ist und über diesen auf reale Bäume (Buchen, Birken, Eichen usw.) verweisen kann.“. Siehe auch Organon-Modell (von Karl Bühler) Literatur Metamorphosen des semiotischen Dreieck. In: Zeitschrift für Semiotik. Band 10, (darin 8 einzelne Artikel). Umberto Eco: Semiotik – Entwurf einer Theorie der Zeichen. 2. Auflage. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München 1991, ISBN 3-7705-2323-7. Umberto Eco: Einführung in die Semiotik. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München 1994, ISBN 3-7705-0633-2. Einzelnachweise  C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards: The Meaning of Meaning. 1923  Kassai: Sinn. In: Martinet (Hrsg.): Linguistik. Ohne Problematisierung trotz der Nähe zu Saussure hingegen bei Kassai: Sinn. In: Martinet (Hrsg.): Linguistik. 1973, S. 251 (S. 254 f.) referiert  So wohl Fischer Kolleg Abiturwissen, Deutsch (2002), S. 27  So z. B. Schülerduden, Philosophie (2002), Semiotik  Triadische Zeichenrelation. In: Homberger: Sachwörterbuch zur Sprachwissenschaft. 2000  Trabant: Semiotik. Trabant: Semiotik. So auch Triadische Zeichenrelation. In: Homberger: Sachwörterbuch zur Sprachwissenschaft. 2000, wonach Aristoteles das Platonische Modell „psychologisiert“ haben soll  So Schülerduden, Philosophie (2002), Sprachphilosophie  Schülerduden, Philosophie (2002), Sprachphilosophie  Baumgartner: Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“, Anleitung zur Lektüre. [1988], neu ersch. 5. Auflage. ALBER, Freiburg Hierzu vor allem das Kapitel: „Zur Lehre von der abstrakten, oder Vernunft-Erkenntnis“ (Zweiter Band)  Fischer Kolleg Abiturwissen, Deutsch (2002), S. 26  Ernst: Pragmalinguistik. 2002, S. 66  Schülerduden, Philosophie (2002), Peirce  So Pelz: Linguistik. 1996, S. 242  Zeichenprozess. In: Homberger: Sachwörterbuch zur Sprachwissenschaft. 2000  Bedeutung. In: Homberger: Sachwörterbuch zur Sprachwissenschaft. 2000 Kategorien: SemiotikSemantik. For Grice, the triangle represents the three correspondences. First, psychophysical, second psychosemiotic, and third semio-physical.

trinitarianism, -- “Raining, raining, raining.” -- the theological doctrine that God consists of three persons, “in Strawson’s usage of the expression” – Vide Grice, “Personal identity,” -- The persons who constitute the Holy Trinity are the Father; the Son, who is Jesus Christ; and the Holy Spirit or Holy Ghost. The doctrine states that each of these three persons is God and yet they are not three Gods but one God. According to a traditional formulation, the three persons are but one substance. In the opinion of Aquinas, the existence of God can be proved by human reason, but the existence of the three persons cannot be proved and is known only by revelation. According to Christian tradition, revelation contains information about the relations among the three persons, and these relations ground proper attributes of each that distinguish them from one another. Thus, since the Father begets the Son, a proper attribute of the Father is paternity and a proper attribute of the Son is filiation. Procession transparent Trinitarianism 928   928 or spiration is a proper attribute of the Holy Spirit. A disagreement about procession has contributed to dividing Eastern and Western Christianity. The Eastern Orthodox church teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. A theory of double procession according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son has been widely accepted in the West. This disagreement is known as the filioque ‘and the Son’ controversy because it arose from the fact that adding this Latin phrase to the Nicene Creed became acceptable in the West but not in the East. Unitarianism denies that God consists of three persons and so is committed to denying the divinity of Jesus. The monotheistic faiths of Judaism and Islam are unitarian, but there are unitarians who consider themselves Christians. H. P. Grice, “Raining, raining, raining – my mother and the Trinitarians.”

tipperary: music-hall cited by Grice. Grice liked the song and would often accompany himself at the piano (“in Eb always”). He especially loved to recite the three verses (“Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day,” “Paddy wrote a letter to his Irish Molly-O,” and “Molly wrote a neat reply to Irish Paddy-O”). Grice devises a possible counter-example to his account of ‘communication,’ or strictly the conditions that have to be met for the state of affairs “Emisor E communicates that p” to hold. In Grice’s scenario, a reminiscence shared by his father, at a musical soirée in 1912, at Harborne, Grice’s grandfather sings "Tipperary” “in a raucous voice” (those are Grice’s father’s words) with the intention of getting his mother-in-law (whom he knew was never too keen on the music-hall) to leave the drawing-room. Grice’s grandfather’s mother-in-law is supposed to recognise (and to know that she is intended to recognise) that Grice’s grandfather wants to get rid of his mother in law – “to put it bluntly,” as Grice’s father has it. Grice’s grandfather, moreover, intends that his mother-in-law shall, in the event, leave because she recognizes Grice’s grandfather’s intention that she  shall go. Grice’s grandfather’s scheme is that his mother-in-law should, somewhat wrongly, think that Grice’s grandfather intends his mother-in-law to think that he intends to get rid of her by means of the recognition of his intention that she should go. In other words, the mother-in-law is supposed to argue: "My son-in-law intends me to *think* that he intends to get rid of me by the raucous singing of that awful ditty complete with the three verses – starting with “Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day” -- but of course he, rude as he is, really wants to get rid of me by means of the recognition of his intention to get rid of me. I am really intended to go because he wants me to go, not because I cannot stand the singing – I suppose. I mean, I could possibly stand it, if tied up, or something." The fact that the mother in law, while thinking she is seeing through his son-in-law’s plans, is really *conforming* to them (a situation that would not hold if she is known by her son-in-law to be ‘counter-suggestible’), is suggested as precluding Grice from deeming, here, that his grandfather means by the singing in a raucuous voice the opening line to “Tipperary” in a raucuous voice (“Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day”) that his mother-in-law should go. However, it is clear to Grice that, once one tries to fill in the detail of this description, the example becomes baffling – “even if I myself designed it.” “For, how is my grandfather’s mother-in-law sposed to reach the idea that my grandfather wants her to think that he intends to get rid of her by singing in a raucuous voice “Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day”?” “My father tells me that my grandfather sould sing in a *particular nasal tone*, so common at the music-hall, which he knows *not* necessarily to be displeasing to his mother in law (when put to use to a respectable drawing-room ballad), though it is to most people that visit the Grices.” Grice’s grandfather’s mother in law knows that Grice’s grandfather knows this particular nasa tone not to be displeasing to her, but she thinks, rather wrongly, that Grice’s grandfaather does not know that his mother-in-law knows this (she would never display his tastes in public). The mother-in-law might then be supposed to argue: "My son-in-law cannot want to drive me out of the drawing-room by his singing, awful to most, since he knows that that particularly nasal tone is not really displeasing to me. My son-in-law, however, does not know that I know he knows this. Therefore, maybe my son-in-law is does wantsme to think that he intends to drive me out, on the ground of a mere cause, rather than a reason, *by* his singing." “At this point,” Grice notes, “one would expect my grandfather’s mother-in-law to be completely at a loss to explain my grandfather’s performance.” “I see no reason at all why my grandfather’s mother in-law should then suppose that he *really* wants to get rid of her in some other way.” Whether or not this example could be made to work, its complexity is ennerving. “And the sad thing about it, is that any attempt on my part to introduce yet further restrictions would involve more ennerving complexities still.” “It is in general true that one cannot have intentions to achieve results which one sees no chance of achieving; and the success of intentions of the kind involved in communication requires he to whom communications or near-communications is addressed to be capable in the circumstances of having certain thoughts and drawing certain conclusions.” At some early stage in the attempted regression the calculations required of my grandfather’s mother-in-lawy by my grandfather will be impracticably difficult; and I suspect the limit has now been reached (if not exceeded).” “So my grandfather, is he is a Grice, cannot have the intentions – as reconstructed by my father, this was way back in 1912 -- required of him in order to force the addition of further restrictions. Not only are the calculations my grandfather would be requiring of his mother-in-law too difficult, but it would be impossible for him to find cues to indicate to her that the calculations should be made, even if they were within his mother-in-law’s compass. So one is tempted to conclude that no regress is involved.” But even should this conclusion be correct, we seem to be left with an uncomfortable situation. For though we may know that we do not need an infinite series of backward-looking sub-clauses, we cannot say just how many such sub-clauses are required. “Indeed, it looks as if the definitional expansion of "By uttering x emisor E communicates that p" might have to vary from case to case, depending on such things as the nature of the intended response, the circumstances in which the attempt to elicit the response is made (say, a musical soirée at Harborne in mid-1912), and the intelligence of the utterer (in this case my grandfather) and of the addressee (his mother in law).” It is dubious whether such variation can be acceptable. However, Grice genially finds out that this ennerving difficulty (of the type some of Grice’s tutees trying to outshine him would display) is avoided if we could eliminate potential counter-examples not by requiring the emisor to have certain additional, backward-looking, intentions, but rather by requiring the emisor *not* to have a certain sort of intention or complex of intentions. Potential counterexamples of the kind involves the construction of a situation in which the emisor E intends the sendee S, in the reflection process by which the sendee S is supposed to reach his response, both to rely on some inference-element, i. e., ome premise or some inferential step, E, and also to think that the emisor E intends his sendee S not to rely on E. “What I propose, then, is to uproot such potential counterexamples by a single clause which prohibits the emisor from having this kind of complex intention.” We reach a redefinition: "the emisor E means that p by uttering x" is true iff (for some sendee S and for some response r): (a) the emisor U utters x intending (i) the sendee to produce r  (2) the sendee S to think the emisor E to intend (i) (3) the sendee S’s fulfillment of (i) to be based on the sendee S’s fulfillment of (2) (b) there is no inference-element E such that the emsior E utters x intending both (i') that the sendee S’s determination of r should rely on the inference element e and (2') that the sendee S should think the emisor E to intend that (I') be false.”

transversum -- Transversality – a term Grice borrowed from Heidegger – ‘the greatest philosopher that ever lived.” --  transcendence of the sovereignty of identity or self-sameness by recognizing the alterity of the Other as Unterschied  to use Heidegger’s term  which signifies the sense of relatedness by way of difference. An innovative idea employed and appropriated by such diverse philosophers as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, transversality is meant to replace the Eurocentric formulation of truth as universal in an age when the world is said to be rushing toward the global village. Universality has been a Eurocentric idea because what is particular in the West is universalized, whereas what is particular elsewhere remains particularized. Since its center is everywhere and its circumference nowhere, truth is polycentric and correlative. Particularly noteworthy is the  phenomenologist Calvin O. Schrag’s attempt to appropriate transversality by splitting the difference between the two extremes of absolutism and relativism on the one hand and modernity’s totalizing practices and postmodernity’s fragmentary tendencies on the other.

tropic: Grice: “Cf. Cicero, ‘Tropicus, and sub-tropicus’ –“ used by R. M. Hare and H. P. Grice – Hare introduced the ‘tropic’ to contrast with the ‘phrastic,’ the ‘neustic,’ and the ‘clistic’ – “I often wondered if Hare was not distinguishing too narrowly” – H. P. Grice --trope, in recent philosophical usage, an “abstract particular”; an instance of a property occurring at a particular place and time, such as the color of the cover of this book or this . The whiteness of this  and the whiteness of the previous  are two distinct tropes, identical neither with the universal whiteness that is instantiated in both s, nor with the  itself; although the whiteness of this  cannot exist independently of this , this  could be dyed some other color. A number of writers, perhaps beginning with D. C. Williams, have argued that tropes must be included in our ontology if we are to achieve an adequate metaphysics. More generally, a trope is a figure of speech, or the use of an expression in a figurative or nonliteral sense. Metaphor and irony, e.g., fall under the category of tropes. If you are helping someone move a glass table but drop your end, and your companion says, “Well, you’ve certainly been a big help,” her utterance is probably ironical, with the intended meaning that you have been no help. One important question is whether, in order to account for the ironical use of this sentence, we must suppose that it has an ironical meaning in addition to its literal meaning. Quite generally, does a sentence usable to express two different metaphors have, in addition to its literal meaning, two metaphorical meanings  and another if it can be hyperbolic, and so forth? Many philosophers and other theorists from Aristotle on have answered yes, and postulated such figurative meanings in addition to literal sentence meaning. Recently, philosophers loath to multiply sentence meanings have denied that sentences have any non-literal meanings.Their burden is to explain how, e.g., a sentence can be used ironically if it does not have an ironical sense or meaning. Such philosophers disagree on whether tropes are to be explained semantically or pragmatically. A semantic account might hypothesize that tropes are generated by violations of semantical rules. An important pragmatic approach is Grice’s suggestion that tropes can be subsumed under the more general phenomenon of conversational implicaturum.

tukey’s bit: from binary digit, a unit or measure of information. Suggested by John W. Tukey, a bit is both an amount of information a reduction of eight equally likely possibilities to one generates three bits [% log2 8] of information and a system of representing that quantity. The binary system uses 1’s and 0’s.

Turing: Grice: “While not a philosopher, Turing’s thought experiment is about the ‘conceptual analysis’ of ‘thought’” --similar to a Griceian machine -- a machine, an abstract automaton or imagined computer consisting of a finite automaton operating an indefinitely long storage tape. The finite automaton provides the computing power of the machine. The tape is used for input, output, and calculation workspace; in the case of the universal Turing machine, it also specifies another Turing machine. Initially, only a finite number of squares of the tape are marked with symbols, while the rest are blank. The finite automaton part of the machine has a finite number of internal states and operates discretely, at times t % 0, 1, 2, . . . . At each time-step the automaton examines the tape square under its tape head, possibly changes what is there, moves the tape left or right, and then changes its internal state. The law governing this sequence of actions is deterministic and is defined in a state table. For each internal state and each tape symbol or blank under the tape head, the state table describes the tape action performed by the machine and gives the next internal state of the machine. Since a machine has only a finite number of internal states and of tape symbols, the state table of a machine is finite in length and can be stored on a tape. There is a universal Turing machine Mu that can simulate every Turing machine including itself: when the state table of any machine M is written on the tape of Mu, the universal machine Mu will perform the same input-output computation that M performs. Mu does this by using the state table of M to calculate M’s complete history for any given input. Turing machines may be thought of as conceptual devices for enumerating the elements of an infinite set e.g., the theorems of a formal language, or as decision machines e.g., deciding of any truth-functional formula whether it is a tautology. A. M. Turing showed that there are welldefined logical tasks that cannot be carried out by any machine; in particular, no machine can solve the halting problem. Turing’s definition of a machine was theoretical; it was not a practical specification for a machine. After the modern electronic computer was invented, he proposed a test for judging whether there is a computer that is behaviorally equivalent to a human in reasoning and intellectual creative power. The Turing test is a “black box” type of experiment that Turing proposed as a way of deciding whether a computer can think. Two rooms are fitted with the same input-output equipment going to an outside experimenter. A person is placed in one room and a programmed electronic computer in the other, each in communication with the experimenter. By issuing instructions and asking questions, the experimenter tries to decide which room has the computer and which the human. If the experimenter cannot tell, that outcome is strong evidence that the computer can think as well as the person. More directly, it shows that the computer and the human are equivalent for all the behaviors tested. Since the computer is a finite automaton, perhaps the most significant test task is that of doing creative mathematics about the non-enumerable infinite.

tychism: from Grecian tyche, ‘chance’, Peirce’s doctrine that there is absolute chance in the universe and its fundamental laws are probabilistic and inexact. Peirce’s tychism is part of his evolutionary cosmology, according to which all regularities of nature are products of growth and development, i.e., results of evolution. The laws of nature develop over time and become increasingly rigid and exact; the apparently deterministic laws of physics are limiting cases of the basic, probabilistic laws. Underlying all other laws is “the tendency of all things to take habits”; Peirce calls this the Law of Habit. In his cosmology his tychism is associated with synechism, the doctrine of the continuity of nature. His synechism involves the doctrine of the continuity of mind and matter; Peirce sometimes expressed this view by saying that “matter is effete mind.”