semantics – Grice, “Mathematics and the
synthetic a priorir,” Grice on Warnock’s Oxford readings in philosophy, ‘The
philosophy of mathematics,’ Austin on Frege’s arithmetic -- philosophical
geometer, philosophical mathematician –
H. P. Grice, “ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΜΗΔΕΙΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ;
or, The school of Plato.” philosophy of
mathematics, the study of ontological and epistemological problems raised by
the content and practice of mathematics. The present agenda in this field
evolved from critical developments, notably the collapse of Pythagoreanism, the
development of modern calculus, and an early twentieth-century foundational
crisis, which forced mathematicians and philosophers to examine mathematical
methods and presuppositions. Grecian mathematics. The Pythagoreans, who
represented the height of early demonstrative Grecian mathematics, believed
that all scientific relations were measureable by natural numbers 1, 2, 3, etc.
or ratios of natural numbers, and thus they assumed discrete, atomic units for the
measurement of space, time, and motion. The discovery of irrational magnitudes
scotched the first of these beliefs. Zeno’s paradoxes showed that the second
was incompatible with the natural assumption that space and time are infinitely
divisible. The Grecian reaction, ultimately codified in Euclid’s Elements,
included Plato’s separation of mathematics from empirical science and, within
mathematics, distinguished number theory
a study of discretely ordered entities
from geometry, which concerns continua. Following Aristotle and
employing methods perfected by Eudoxus, Euclid’s proofs used only “potentially
infinite” geometric and arithmetic procedures. The Elements’ axiomatic form and
its constructive proofs set a standard for future mathematics. Moreover, its
dependence on visual intuition whose consequent deductive gaps were already
noted by Archimedes, together with the challenge of Euclid’s infamous fifth
postulate about parallel lines, and the famous unsolved problems of compass and
straightedge construction, established an agenda for generations of
mathematicians. The calculus. The two millennia following Euclid saw new
analytical tools e.g., Descartes’s geometry that wedded arithmetic and
geometric considerations and toyed with infinitesimally small quantities.
These, together with the demands of physical application, tempted
mathematicians to abandon the pristine Grecian dichotomies. Matters came to a
head with Newton’s and Leibniz’s almost simultaneous discovery of the powerful
computational techniques of the calculus. While these unified physical science
in an unprecedented way, their dependence on unclear notions of infinitesimal
spatial and temporal increments emphasized their shaky philosophical
foundation. Berkeley, for instance, condemned the calculus for its
unintuitability. However, this time the power of the new methods inspired a
decidedly conservative response. Kant, in particular, tried to anchor the new
mathematics in intuition. Mathematicians, he claimed, construct their objects
in the “pure intuitions” of space and time. And these mathematical objects are
the a priori forms of transcendentally ideal empirical objects. For Kant this
combination of epistemic empiricism and ontological idealism explained the
physical applicability of mathematics and thus granted “objective validity”
i.e., scientific legitimacy to mathematical procedures. Two nineteenth-century
developments undercut this Kantian constructivism in favor of a more abstract
conceptual picture of mathematics. First, Jànos Bolyai, Carl F. Gauss, Bernhard
Riemann, Nikolai Lobachevsky, and others produced consistent non-Euclidean
geometries, which undid the Kantian picture of a single a priori science of
space, and once again opened a rift between pure mathematics and its physical applications.
Second, Cantor and Dedekind defined the real numbers i.e., the elements of the
continuum as infinite sets of rational and ultimately natural numbers. Thus
they founded mathematics on the concepts of infinite set and natural number.
Cantor’s set theory made the first concept rigorously mathematical; while Peano
and Frege both of whom advocated securing rigor by using formal languages did
that for the second. Peano axiomatized number theory, and Frege ontologically
reduced the natural numbers to sets indeed sets that are the extensions of
purely logical concepts. Frege’s Platonistic conception of numbers as
unintuitable objects and his claim that mathematical truths follow analytically
from purely logical definitions the
thesis of logicism are both highly
anti-Kantian. Foundational crisis and movements. But antiKantianism had its own
problems. For one thing, Leopold Kronecker, who following Peter Dirichlet
wanted mathematics reduced to arithmetic and no further, attacked Cantor’s
abstract set theory on doctrinal grounds. Worse yet, the discovery of internal
antinomies challenged the very consistency of abstract foundations. The most
famous of these, Russell’s paradox the set of all sets that are not members of
themselves both is and isn’t a member of itself, undermined Frege’s basic
assumption that every well-formed concept has an extension. This was a
full-scale crisis. To be sure, Russell himself together with Whitehead
preserved the logicist foundational approach by organizing the universe of sets
into a hierarchy of levels so that no set can be a member of itself. This is
type theory. However, the crisis encouraged two explicitly Kantian foundational
projects. The first, Hilbert’s Program, attempted to secure the “ideal” i.e.,
infinitary parts of mathematics by formalizing them and then proving the
resultant formal systems to be conservative and hence consistent extensions of
finitary theories. Since the proof itself was to use no reasoning more
complicated than simple numerical calculations
finitary reasoning the whole
metamathematical project belonged to the untainted “contentual” part of
mathematics. Finitary reasoning was supposed to update Kant’s intuition-based
epistemology, and Hilbert’s consistency proofs mimic Kant’s notion of objective
validity. The second project, Brouwer’s intuitionism, rejected formalization,
and was not only epistemologically Kantian resting mathematical reasoning on
the a priori intuition of time, but ontologically Kantian as well. For
intuitionism generated both the natural and the real numbers by temporally
ordered conscious acts. The reals, in particular, stem from choice sequences,
which exploit Brouwer’s epistemic assumptions about the open future. These
foundational movements ultimately failed. Type theory required ad hoc axioms to
express the real numbers; Hilbert’s Program foundered on Gödel’s theorems; and
intuitionism remained on the fringes because it rejected classical logic and
standard mathematics. Nevertheless the legacy of these movements their formal methods, indeed their
philosophical agenda still characterizes
modern research on the ontology and epistemology of mathematics. Set theory,
e.g. despite recent challenges from category theory, is the lingua franca of
modern mathematics. And formal languages with their precise semantics are
ubiquitous in technical and philosophical discussions. Indeed, even
intuitionistic mathematics has been formalized, and Michael Dummett has recast
its ontological idealism as a semantic antirealism that defines truth as
warranted assertability. In a similar semantic vein, Paul Benacerraf proposed
that the philosophical problem with Hilbert’s approach is inability to provide
a uniform realistic i.e., referential, non-epistemic semantics for the
allegedly ideal and contentual parts of mathematics; and the problem with
Platonism is that its semantics makes its objects unknowable. Ontological
issues. From this modern perspective, the simplest realism is the outright
Platonism that attributes a standard model consisting of “independent” objects
to classical theories expressed in a first-order language i.e., a language
whose quantifiers range over objects but not properties. But in fact realism
admits variations on each aspect. For one thing, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem
shows that formalized theories can have non-standard models. There are
expansive non-standard models: Abraham Robinson, e.g., used infinitary
non-standard models of Peano’s axioms to rigorously reintroduce infinitesimals.
Roughly, an infinitesimal is the reciprocal of an infinite element in such a
model. And there are also “constructive” models, whose objects must be
explicitly definable. Predicative theories inspired by Poincaré and Hermann
Weyl, whose stage-by-stage definitions refer only to previously defined objects,
produce one variety of such models. Gödel’s constructive universe, which uses
less restricted definitions to model apparently non-constructive axioms like
the axiom of choice, exemplifies another variety. But there are also views
various forms of structuralism which deny that formal theories have unique
standard models at all. These views
inspired by the fact, already sensed by Dedekind, that there are
multiple equivalid realizations of formal arithmetic allow a mathematical theory to characterize
only a broad family of models and deny unique reference to mathematical terms.
Finally, some realistic approaches advocate formalization in secondorder
languages, and some eschew ordinary semantics altogether in favor of
substitutional quantification. These latter are still realistic, for they still
distinguish truth from knowledge. Strict finitists inspired by Vitters’s more stringent
epistemic constraints reject even the
open-futured objects admitted by Brouwer, and countenance only finite or even
only “feasible” objects. In the other direction, A. A. Markov and his school in
Russia introduced a syntactic notion of algorithm from which they developed the
field of “constructive analysis.” And the
mathematician Errett Bishop, starting from a Brouwer-like disenchantment
with mathematical realism and with strictly formal approaches, recovered large
parts of classical analysis within a non-formal constructive framework. All of
these approaches assume abstract i.e., causally isolated mathematical objects, and
thus they have difficulty explaining the wide applicability of mathematics
constructive or otherwise within empirical science. One response, Quine’s
“indispensability” view, integrates mathematical theories into the general
network of empirical science. For Quine, mathematical objects just like ordinary physical objects exist simply in virtue of being referents for
terms in our best scientific theory. By contrast Hartry Field, who denies that
any abstract objects exist, also denies that any purely mathematical assertions
are literally true. Field attempts to recast physical science in a relational
language without mathematical terms and then use Hilbert-style conservative
extension results to explain the evident utility of abstract mathematics.
Hilary Putnam and Charles Parsons have each suggested views according to which
mathematics has no objects proper to itself, but rather concerns only the
possibilities of physical constructions. Recently, Geoffrey Hellman has
combined this modal approach with structuralism. Epistemological issues. The
equivalence proved in the 0s of several different representations of
computability to the reasoning representable in elementary formalized
arithmetic led Alonzo Church to suggest that the notion of finitary reasoning had
been precisely defined. Church’s thesis so named by Stephen Kleene inspired
Georg Kreisel’s investigations in the 0s and 70s of the general conditions for
rigorously analyzing other informal philosophical notions like semantic
consequence, Brouwerian choice sequences, and the very notion of a set. Solomon
Feferman has suggested more recently that this sort of piecemeal conceptual
analysis is already present in mathematics; and that this rather than any
global foundation is the true role of foundational research. In this spirit,
the relative consistency arguments of modern proof theory a continuation of
Hilbert’s Program provide information about the epistemic grounds of various
mathematical theories. Thus, on the one hand, proofs that a seemingly problematic
mathematical theory is a conservative extension of a more secure theory provide
some epistemic support for the former. In the other direction, the fact that
classical number theory is consistent relative to intuitionistic number theory
shows contra Hilbert that his view of constructive reasoning must differ from
that of the intuitionists. Gödel, who did not believe that mathematics required
any ties to empirical perception, suggested nevertheless that we have a special
nonsensory faculty of mathematical intuition that, when properly cultivated,
can help us decide among formally independent propositions of set theory and
other branches of mathematics. Charles Parsons, in contrast, has examined the
place of perception-like intuition in mathematical reasoning. Parsons himself
has investigated models of arithmetic and of set theory composed of
quasi-concrete objects e.g., numerals and other signs. Others consistent with
some of Parsons’s observations have given a Husserlstyle phenomenological
analysis of mathematical intuition. Frege’s influence encouraged the logical
positivists and other philosophers to view mathematical knowledge as analytic
or conventional. Poincaré responded that the principle of mathematical
induction could not be analytic, and Vitters also attacked this
conventionalism. In recent years, various formal independence results and
Quine’s attack on analyticity have encouraged philosophers and historians of
mathematics to focus on cases of mathematical knowledge that do not stem from
conceptual analysis or strict formal provability. Some writers notably Mark
Steiner and Philip Kitcher emphasize the analogies between empirical and
mathematical discovery. They stress such things as conceptual evolution in
mathematics and instances of mathematical generalizations supported by
individual cases. Kitcher, in particular, discusses the analogy between
axiomatization in mathematics and theoretical unification. Penelope Maddy has
investigated the intramathematical grounds underlying the acceptance of various
axioms of set theory. More generally, Imre Lakatos argued that most
mathematical progress stems from a concept-stretching process of conjecture,
refutation, and proof. This view has spawned a historical debate about whether
critical developments such as those mentioned above represent Kuhn-style
revolutions or even crises, or whether they are natural conceptual advances in
a uniformly growing science. Semantics
-- philosophical mathematics: Grice: “Not for nothing Plato’s academy motto
was, “Lascite ogni non-geometria voi ch’entrate!” ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ
ΜΗΔΕΙΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ – “a-gemetretos medeis eiseto” Grice thought that “7 + 5 =
12” was either synthetic or analytic – “but hardly both”. Grice on real numbers
-- continuum problem, an open question that arose in Cantor’s theory of
infinite cardinal numbers. By definition, two sets have the same cardinal
number if there is a one-to-one correspondence between them. For example, the
function that sends 0 to 0, 1 to 2, 2 to 4, etc., shows that the set of even
natural numbers has the same cardinal number as the set of all natural numbers,
namely F0. That F0 is not the only infinite cardinal follows from Cantor’s
theorem: the power set of any set i.e., the set of all its subsets has a
greater cardinality than the set itself. So, e.g., the power set of the natural
numbers, i.e., the set of all sets of natural numbers, has a cardinal number
greater than F0. The first infinite number greater than F0 is F1; the next
after that is F2, and so on. When arithmetical operations are extended into the
infinite, the cardinal number of the power set of the natural numbers turns out
to be 2F0. By Cantor’s theorem, 2F0 must be greater than F0; the conjecture
that it is equal to F1 is Cantor’s continuum hypothesis in symbols, CH or 2F0 %
F1. Since 2F0 is also the cardinality of the set of points on a continuous
line, CH can also be stated in this form: any infinite set of points on a line
can be brought into one-to-one correspondence either with the set of natural
numbers or with the set of all points on the line. Cantor and others attempted
to prove CH, without success. It later became clear, due to the work of Gödel
and Cohen, that their failure was inevitable: the continuum hypothesis can
neither be proved nor disproved from the axioms of set theory ZFC. The question
of its truth or falsehood the continuum
problem remains open. Philosophical mathematics: Grice on “7 + 5 =
12” -- Dedekind, R. G. mathematician, one of the most important figures in the
mathematical analysis of foundational questions that took place in the late
nineteenth century. Philosophically, three things are interesting about
Dedekind’s work: 1 the insistence that the fundamental numerical systems of
mathematics must be developed independently of spatiotemporal or geometrical
notions; 2 the insistence that the numbers systems rely on certain mental
capacities fundamental to thought, in particular on the capacity of the mind to
“create”; and 3 the recognition that this “creation” is “creation” according to
certain key properties, properties that careful mathematical analysis reveals
as essential to the subject matter. 1 is a concern Dedekind shared with
Bolzano, Cantor, Frege, and Hilbert; 2 sets Dedekind apart from Frege; and 3
represents a distinctive shift toward the later axiomatic position of Hilbert
and somewhat away from the concern with the individual nature of the central
abstract mathematical objects which is a central concern of Frege. Much of
Dedekind’s position is sketched in the Habilitationsrede of 1854, the procedure
there being applied in outline to the extension of the positive whole numbers
to the integers, and then to the rational field. However, the two works best
known to philosophers are the monographs on irrational numbers Stetigkeit und
irrationale Zahlen, 1872 and on natural numbers Was sind und was sollen die
Zahlen?, 8, both of which pursue the procedure advocated in 1854. In both we
find an “analysis” designed to uncover the essential properties involved,
followed by a “synthesis” designed to show that there can be such systems, this
then followed by a “creation” of objects possessing the properties and nothing
more. In the 1872 work, Dedekind suggests that the essence of continuity in the
reals is that whenever the line is divided into two halves by a cut, i.e., into
two subsets A1 and A2 such that if p 1 A1 and q 1 A2, then p ‹ q and, if p 1 A1
and q ‹ p, then q 1 A1, and if p 1 A2 and q
p, then q 1 A2 as well, then there is real number r which “produces” this
cut, i.e., such that A1 % {p; p ‹ r}, and A2 % {p: r m p}. The task is then to
characterize the real numbers so that this is indeed true of them. Dedekind
shows that, whereas the rationals themselves do not have this property, the
collection of all cuts in the rationals does. Dedekind then “defines” the
irrationals through this observation, not directly as the cuts in the rationals
themselves, as was done later, but rather through the “creation” of “new
irrational numbers” to correspond to those rational cuts not hitherto
“produced” by a number. The 8 work starts from the notion of a “mapping” of one
object onto another, which for Dedekind is necessary for all exact thought.
Dedekind then develops the notion of a one-toone into mapping, which is then
used to characterize infinity “Dedekind infinity”. Using the fundamental notion
of a chain, Dedekind characterizes the notion of a “simply infinite system,”
thus one that is isomorphic to the natural number sequence. Thus, he succeeds
in the goal set out in the 1854 lecture: isolating precisely the characteristic
properties of the natural number system. But do simply infinite systems, in
particular the natural number system, exist? Dedekind now argues: Any infinite
system must Dedekind, Richard Dedekind, Richard 210 210 contain a simply infinite system Theorem
72. Correspondingly, Dedekind sets out to prove that there are infinite systems
Theorem 66, for which he uses an infamous argument reminiscent of Bolzano’s
from thirty years earlier involving “my thought-world,” etc. It is generally
agreed that the argument does not work, although it is important to remember
Dedekind’s wish to demonstrate that since the numbers are to be free creations
of the human mind, his proofs should rely only on the properties of the mental.
The specific act of “creation,” however, comes in when Dedekind, starting from
any simply infinite system, abstracts from the “particular properties” of this,
claiming that what results is the simply infinite system of the natural
numbers. Philosophical mathematics --
mathematical analysis, also called standard analysis, the area of mathematics
pertaining to the so-called real number system, i.e. the area that can be based
on an axiom set whose intended interpretation (standard model) has the set of
real numbers as its domain (universe of discourse). Thus analysis includes,
among its many subbranches, elementary algebra, differential and integral
calculus, differential equations, the calculus of variations, and measure
theory. Analytic geometry involves the application of analysis to geometry.
Analysis contains a large part of the mathematics used in mathematical physics.
The real numbers, which are representable by the ending and unending decimals,
are usefully construed as (or as corresponding to) distances measured, relative
to an arbitrary unit length, positively to the right and negatively to the left
of an arbitrarily fixed zero point along a geometrical straight line. In
particular, the class of real numbers includes as increasingly comprehensive
proper subclasses the natural numbers, the integers (positive, negative, and
zero), the rational numbers (or fractions), and the algebraic numbers (such as
the square root of two). Especially important is the presence in the class of
real numbers of non-algebraic (or transcendental) irrational numbers such as
pi. The set of real numbers includes arbitrarily small and arbitrarily large,
finite quantities, while excluding infinitesimal and infinite quantities.
Analysis, often conceived as the mathematics of continuous magnitude, contrasts
with arithmetic (natural number theory), which is regarded as the mathematics
of discrete magnitude. Analysis is often construed as involving not just the
real numbers but also the imaginary (complex) numbers. Traditionally analysis
is expressed in a second-order or higher-order language wherein its axiom set
has categoricity; each of its models is isomorphic to (has the same structure
as) the standard model. When analysis is carried out in a first-order language,
as has been increasingly the case since the 1950s, categoricity is impossible
and it has nonstandard mass noun mathematical analysis models in addition to
its standard model. A nonstandard model of analysis is an interpretation not
isomorphic to the standard model but nevertheless satisfying the axiom set.
Some of the nonstandard models involve objects reminiscent of the much-despised
“infinitesimals” that were essential to the Leibniz approach to calculus and
that were subject to intense criticism by Berkeley and other philosophers and
philosophically sensitive mathematicians. These non-standard models give rise
to a new area of mathematics, non-standard analysis, within which the
fallacious arguments used by Leibniz and other early analysts form the
heuristic basis of new and entirely rigorous proofs. -- mathematical function,
an operation that, when applied to an entity (set of entities) called its
argument(s), yields an entity known as the value of the function for that
argument(s). This operation can be expressed by a functional equation of the
form y % f(x) such that a variable y is said to be a function of a variable x
if corresponding to each value of x there is one and only one value of y. The x
is called the independent variable (or argument of the function) and the y the
dependent variable (or value of the function). (Some definitions consider the
relation to be the function, not the dependent variable, and some definitions
permit more than one value of y to correspond to a given value of x, as in x2 !
y2 % 4.) More abstractly, a function can be considered to be simply a special
kind of relation (set of ordered pairs) that to any element in its domain
relates exactly one element in its range. Such a function is said to be a
one-to-one correspondence if and only if the set {x,y} elements of S and {z,y}
elements of S jointly imply x % z. Consider, e.g., the function {(1,1), (2,4),
(3,9), (4,16), (5,25), (6,36)}, each of whose members is of the form (x,x2) –
the squaring function. Or consider the function {(0,1), (1,0)} – which we can
call the negation function. In contrast, consider the function for exclusive
alternation (as in you may have a beer or glass of wine, but not both). It is
not a one-to-one correspondence. For, 0 is the value of (0,1) and of (1,0), and
1 is the value of (0,0) and of (1,1). If we think of a function as defined on
the natural numbers – functions from Nn to N for various n (most commonly n % 1
or 2) – a partial function is a function from Nn to N whose domain is not
necessarily the whole of Nn (e.g., not defined for all of the natural numbers).
A total function from Nn to N is a function whose domain is the whole of Nn
(e.g., all of the natural numbers). -- mathematical induction, a method of
definition and a method of proof. A collection of objects can be defined
inductively. All members of such a collection can be shown to have a property
by an inductive proof. The natural numbers and the set of well-formed formulas
of a formal language are familiar examples of sets given by inductive
definition. Thus, the set of natural numbers is inductively defined as the
smallest set, N, such that: (B) 0 is in N and (I) for any x in N the successor
of x is in N. (B) is the basic clause and (I) the inductive clause of this
definition. Or consider a propositional language built on negation and
conjunction. We start with a denumerable class of atomic sentence symbols ATOM
= {A1, A2, . . .}. Then we can define the set of well-formed formulas, WFF, as
the smallest set of expressions such that: (B) every member of ATOM is in WFF
and (I) if x is in WFF then (- x) is in WFF and if x and y are in WFF then (x
& y) is in WFF. We show that all members of an inductively defined set have
a property by showing that the members specified by the basis have that
property and that the property is preserved by the induction. For example, we
show that all WFFs have an even number of parentheses by showing (i) that all
ATOMs have an even number of parentheses and (ii) that if x and y have an even
number of parentheses then so do (- x) and (x & y). This shows that the set
of WFFs with an even number of parentheses satisfies (B) and (I). The set of
WFFs with an even number of parentheses must then be identical to WFF, since –
by definition – WFF is the smallest set that satisfies (B) and (I). Ordinary
proof by mathematical induction shows that all the natural numbers, or all
members of some set with the order type of the natural numbers, share a
property. Proof by transfinite induction, a more general form of proof by
mathematical induction, shows that all members of some well-ordered set have a
certain property. A set is well-ordered if and only if every non-empty subset
of it has a least element. The natural numbers are well-ordered. It is a
consequence of the axiom of choice that every set can be well-ordered. Suppose
that a set, X, is well-ordered and that P is the subset of X whose mathematical
constructivism mathematical induction 541 4065m-r.qxd 08/02/1999 7:42 AM Page
541 members have the property of interest. Suppose that it can be shown for any
element x of X, if all members of X less that x are in P, then so is x. Then it
follows by transfinite induction that all members of X have the property, that
X % P. For if X did not coincide with P, then the set of elements of x not in P
would be non-empty. Since X is well-ordered, this set would have a least
element, x*. But then by definition, all members of X less than x* are in P,
and by hypothesis x* must be in P after all.. -- mathematical intuitionism, a
twentieth-century movement that reconstructs mathematics in accordance with an
epistemological idealism and a Kantian metaphysics. Specifically, Brouwer, its
founder, held that there are no unexperienced truths and that mathematical
objects stem from the a priori form of those conscious acts which generate
empirical objects. Unlike Kant, however, Brouwer rejected the apriority of
space and based mathematics solely on a refined conception of the intuition of
time. Intuitionistic mathematics. According to Brouwer, the simplest
mathematical act is to distinguish between two diverse elements in the flow of
consciousness. By repeating and concatenating such acts we generate each of the
natural numbers, the standard arithmetical operations, and thus the rational
numbers with their operations as well. Unfortunately, these simple, terminating
processes cannot produce the convergent infinite sequences of rational numbers
that are needed to generate the continuum (the nondenumerable set of real
numbers, or of points on the line). Some “proto-intuitionists” admitted
infinite sequences whose elements are determined by finitely describable rules.
However, the set of all such algorithmic sequences is denumerable and thus can
scarcely generate the continuum. Brouwer’s first attempt to circumvent this –
by postulating a single intuition of an ever growing continuum – mirrored
Aristotle’s picture of the continuum as a dynamic whole composed of inseparable
parts. But this approach was incompatible with the set-theoretic framework that
Brouwer accepted, and by 1918 he had replaced it with the concept of an
infinite choice sequence. A choice sequence of rational numbers is, to be sure,
generated by a “rule,” but the rule may leave room for some degree of freedom
in choosing the successive elements. It might, e.g., simply require that the n !
1st choice be a rational number that lies within 1/n of the nth choice. The set
of real numbers generated by such semideterminate sequences is demonstrably
non-denumerable. Following his epistemological beliefs, Brouwer admitted only
those properties of a choice sequence which are determined by its rule and by a
finite number of actual choices. He incorporated this restriction into his
version of set theory and obtained a series of results that conflict with
standard (classical) mathematics. Most famously, he proved that every function
that is fully defined over an interval of real numbers is uniformly continuous.
(Pictorially, the graph of the function has no gaps or jumps.) Interestingly,
one corollary of this theorem is that the set of real numbers cannot be divided
into mutually exclusive subsets, a property that rigorously recovers the
Aristotelian picture of the continuum. The clash with classical mathematics.
Unlike his disciple Arend Heyting, who considered intuitionistic and classical
mathematics as separate and therefore compatible subjects, Brouwer viewed them
as incompatible treatments of a single subject matter. He even occasionally
accused classical mathematics of inconsistency at the places where it differed
from intuitionism. This clash concerns the basic concept of what counts as a
mathematical object. Intuitionism allows, and classical mathematics rejects,
objects that may be indeterminate with respect to some of their properties.
Logic and language. Because he believed that mathematical constructions occur
in prelinguistic consciousness, Brouwer refused to limit mathematics by the
expressive capacity of any language. Logic, he claimed, merely codifies already
completed stages of mathematical reasoning. For instance, the principle of the
excluded middle stems from an “observational period” during which mankind
catalogued finite phenomena (with decidable properties); and he derided
classical mathematics for inappropriately applying this principle to infinitary
aspects of mathematics. Formalization. Brouwer’s views notwithstanding, in 1930
Heyting produced formal systems for intuitionistic logic (IL) and number
theory. These inspired further formalizations (even of the theory of choice
sequences) and a series of proof-theoretic, semantic, and algebraic studies
that related intuitionistic and classical formal systems. Stephen Kleene, e.g.,
interpreted IL and other intuitionistic formal systems using the classical
theory of recursive functions. Gödel, who showed that IL cannot coincide with
any finite many-valued logic, demonstrated its relation to the modal logic, S4;
and Kripke provided a formal semantics for IL similar to the possible worlds
semantics for S4. For a while the study of intuitionistic formal systems used
strongly classical methods, but since the 1970s intuitionistic methods have
been employed as well. Meaning. Heyting’s formalization reflected a theory of
meaning implicit in Brouwer’s epistemology and metaphysics, a theory that
replaces the traditional correspondence notion of truth with the notion of
constructive proof. More recently Michael Dummett has extended this to a
warranted assertability theory of meaning for areas of discourse outside of
mathematics. He has shown how assertabilism provides a strategy for combating
realism about such things as physical objects, mental objects, and the past. --
mathematical structuralism, the view that the subject of any branch of
mathematics is a structure or structures. The slogan is that mathematics is the
science of structure. Define a “natural number system” to be a countably
infinite collection of objects with one designated initial object and a
successor relation that satisfies the principle of mathematical induction.
Examples of natural number systems are the Arabic numerals and an infinite
sequence of distinct moments of time. According to structuralism, arithmetic is
about the form or structure common to natural number systems. Accordingly, a
natural number is something like an office in an organization or a place in a
pattern. Similarly, real analysis is about the real number structure, the form
common to complete ordered fields. The philosophical issues concerning
structuralism concern the nature of structures and their places. Since a
structure is a one-over-many of sorts, it is something like a universal.
Structuralists have defended analogues of some of the traditional positions on
universals, such as realism and nominalism. Philosophical mathematics --
metamathematics, the study and establishment, by restricted (and, in
particular, finitary) means, of the consistency or reliability of the various
systems of classical mathematics. The term was apparently introduced, with
pejorative overtones relating it to ‘metaphysics’, in the 1870s in connection
with the discussion of non-Euclidean geometries. It was introduced in the sense
given here, shorn of negative connotations, by Hilbert (see his “Neubegründung
der Mathematik. Erste Mitteilung,” 1922), who also referred to it as
Beweistheorie or proof theory. A few years later (specifically, in the 1930
papers “Über einige fundamentale Begriffe der Metamathematik” and “Fundamentale
Begriffe der Methodologie der deduktiven Wissenschaften. I”) Tarski fitted it
with a somewhat broader, less restricted sense: broader in that the scope of
its concerns was increased to include not only questions of consistency, but
also a host of other questions (e.g. questions of independence, completeness
and axiomatizability) pertaining to what Tarski referred to as the “methodology
of the deductive sciences” (which was his synonym for ‘metamathematics’); less
restricted in that the standards of proof were relaxed so as to permit other
than finitary – indeed, other than constructive – means. On this broader
conception of Tarski’s, formalized deductive disciplines form the field of
research of metamathematics roughly in the same sense in which spatial entities
form the field of research in geometry or animals that of zoology. Disciplines,
he said, are to be regarded as sets of sentences to be investigated from the
point of view of their consistency, axiomatizability (of various types),
completeness, and categoricity or degree of categoricity, etc. Eventually (see
the 1935 and 1936 papers “Grundzüge des Systemenkalkül, Erster Teil” and
“Grundzüge der Systemenkalkül, Zweiter Teil”) Tarski went on to include all
manner of semantical questions among the concerns of metamathematics, thus
diverging rather sharply from Hilbert’s original syntactical focus. Today, the
terms ‘metatheory’ and ‘metalogic’ are used to signify that broad set of
interests, embracing both syntactical and semantical studies of formal
languages and systems, which Tarski came to include under the general heading
of metamathematics. Those having to do specifically with semantics belong to
that more specialized branch of modern logic known as model theory, while those
dealing with purely syntactical questions belong to what has come to be known
as proof theory (where this latter is now, however, permitted to employ other
than finitary methods in the proofs of its theorems). Refs.: H. P. Grice,
“Philosophical geometry, Plato, and Walter Pater.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΜΗΔΕΙΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ; or, the school of Plato.”
philosophical
theology:
Grice: “At Oxford, pretentious as they are, they like ‘divinity’ – there are
doctors in divinity!” -- philosophy of religion, the subfield of philosophy
devoted to the study of religious phenomena. Although religions are typically
complex systems of theory and practice, including both myths and rituals,
philosophers tend to concentrate on evaluating religious truth claims. In the
major theistic traditions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the most important
of these claims concern the existence, nature, and activities of God. Such
traditions commonly understand God to be something like a person who is
disembodied, eternal, free, all-powerful, all-knowing, the creator and
sustainer of the universe, and the proper object of human obedience and
worship. One important question is whether this conception of the object of
human religious activity is coherent; another is whether such a being actually
exists. Philosophers of religion have sought rational answers to both
questions. The major theistic traditions draw a distinction between religious
truths that can be discovered and even known by unaided human reason and those
to which humans have access only through a special divine disclosure or
revelation. According to Aquinas, e.g., the existence of God and some things
about the divine nature can be proved by unaided human reason, but such
distinctively Christian doctrines as the Trinity and Incarnation cannot be thus
proved and are known to humans only because God has revealed them. Theists
disagree about how such divine disclosures occur; the main candidates for
vehicles of revelation include religious experience, the teachings of an
inspired religious leader, the sacred scriptures of a religious community, and
the traditions of a particular church. The religious doctrines Christian
traditions take to be the content of revelation are often described as matters
of faith. To be sure, such traditions typically affirm that faith goes beyond
mere doctrinal belief to include an attitude of profound trust in God. On most accounts,
however, faith involves doctrinal belief, and so there is a contrast within the
religious domain itself between faith and reason. One way to spell out the
contrast though not the only way is to imagine that the content of revelation
is divided into two parts. On the one hand, there are those doctrines, if any,
that can be known by human reason but are also part of revelation; the
existence of God is such a doctrine if it can be proved by human reason alone.
Such doctrines might be accepted by some people on the basis of rational
argument, while others, who lack rational proof, accept them on the authority
of revelation. On the other hand, there are those doctrines that cannot be
known by human reason and for which the authority of revelation is the sole
basis. They are objects of faith rather than reason and are often described as
mysteries of faith. Theists disagree about how such exclusive objects of faith
are related to reason. One prominent view is that, although they go beyond
reason, they are in harmony with it; another is that they are contrary to
reason. Those who urge that such doctrines should be accepted despite the fact
that, or even precisely because, they are contrary to reason are known as
fideists; the famous slogan credo quia absurdum ‘I believe because it is
absurd’ captures the flavor of extreme fideism. Many scholars regard
Kierkegaard as a fideist on account of his emphasis on the paradoxical nature
of the Christian doctrine that Jesus of Nazareth is God incarnate. Modern
philosophers of religion have, for the most part, confined their attention to
topics treatable without presupposing the truth of any particular tradition’s
claims about revelation and have left the exploration of mysteries of faith to
the theologians of various traditions. A great deal of philosophical work
clarifying the concept of God has been prompted by puzzles that suggest some
incoherence in the traditional concept. One kind of puzzle concerns the
coherence of individual claims about the nature of God. Consider the
traditional affirmation that God is allpowerful omnipotent. Reflection on this
doctrine raises a famous question: Can God make a stone so heavy that even God
cannot lift it? No matter how this is answered, it seems that there is at least
one thing that even God cannot do, i.e., make such a stone or lift such a
stone, and so it appears that even God cannot be all-powerful. Such puzzles
stimulate attempts by philosophers to analyze the concept of omnipotence in a
way that specifies more precisely the scope of the powers coherently
attributable to an omnipotent being. To the extent that such attempts succeed,
they foster a deeper understanding of the concept of God and, if God exists, of
the divine nature. Another sort of puzzle concerns the consistency of
attributing two or more properties to philosophy of religion philosophy of
religion 696 696 God. Consider the
claim that God is both immutable and omniscient. An immutable being is one that
cannot undergo internal change, and an omniscient being knows all truths, and
believes no falsehoods. If God is omniscient, it seems that God must first know
and hence believe that it is now Tuesday and not believe that it is now
Wednesday and later know and hence believe that it is now Wednesday and not
believe that it is now Tuesday. If so, God’s beliefs change, and since change
of belief is an internal change, God is not immutable. So it appears that God
is not immutable if God is omniscient. A resolution of this puzzle would
further contribute to enriching the philosophical understanding of the concept
of God. It is, of course, one thing to elaborate a coherent concept of God; it
is quite another to know, apart from revelation, that such a being actually
exists. A proof of the existence of God would yield such knowledge, and it is
the task of natural theology to evaluate arguments that purport to be such
proofs. As opposed to revealed theology, natural theology restricts the
assumptions fit to serve as premises in its arguments to things naturally
knowable by humans, i.e., knowable without special revelation from supernatural
sources. Many people have hoped that such natural religious knowledge could be
universally communicated and would justify a form of religious practice that
would appeal to all humankind because of its rationality. Such a religion would
be a natural religion. The history of natural theology has produced a
bewildering variety of arguments for the existence of God. The four main types
are these: ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, teleological
arguments, and moral arguments. The earliest and most famous version of the
ontological argument was set forth by Anselm of Canterbury in chapter 2 of his
Proslogion. It is a bold attempt to deduce the existence of God from the
concept of God: we understand God to be a perfect being, something than which
nothing greater can be conceived. Because we have this concept, God at least
exists in our minds as an object of the understanding. Either God exists in the
mind alone, or God exists both in the mind and as an extramental reality. But
if God existed in the mind alone, then we could conceive of a being greater
than that than which nothing greater can be conceived, namely, one that also
existed in extramental reality. Since the concept of a being greater than that
than which nothing greater can be conceived is incoherent, God cannot exist in
the mind alone. Hence God exists not only in the mind but also in extramental
reality. The most celebrated criticism of this form of the argument was Kant’s,
who claimed that existence is not a real predicate. For Kant, a real predicate
contributes to determining the content of a concept and so serves as a part of
its definition. But to say that something falling under a concept exists does
not add to the content of a concept; there is, Kant said, no difference in
conceptual content between a hundred real dollars and a hundred imaginary
dollars. Hence whether or not there exists something that corresponds to a
concept cannot be settled by definition. The existence of God cannot be deduced
from the concept of a perfect being because existence is not contained in the
concept or the definition of a perfect being. Contemporary philosophical
discussion has focused on a slightly different version of the ontological
argument. In chapter 3 of Proslogion Anselm suggested that something than which
nothing greater can be conceived cannot be conceived not to exist and so exists
necessarily. Following this lead, such philosophers as Charles Hartshorne,
Norman Malcolm, and Alvin Plantinga have contended that God cannot be a
contingent being who exists in some possible worlds but not in others. The
existence of a perfect being is either necessary, in which case God exists in
every possible world, or impossible, in which case God exists in no possible
worlds. On this view, if it is so much as possible that a perfect being exists,
God exists in every possible world and hence in the actual world. The crucial
premise in this form of the argument is the assumption that the existence of a
perfect being is possible; it is not obviously true and could be rejected
without irrationality. For this reason, Plantinga concedes that the argument
does not prove or establish its conclusion, but maintains that it does make it
rational to accept the existence of God. The key premises of various
cosmological arguments are statements of obvious facts of a general sort about
the world. Thus, the argument to a first cause begins with the observation that
there are now things undergoing change and things causing change. If something
is a cause of such change only if it is itself caused to change by something
else, then there is an infinitely long chain of causes of change. But, it is
alleged, there cannot be a causal chain of infinite length. Therefore there is
something that causes change, but is not caused to change by anything else,
i.e., a first cause. Many critics of this form of the argument deny its
assumption that there cannot be an infinite causal regress or chain of causes.
This argument also fails to show that there is only one first cause and does
not prove that a first cause must have such divine attributes as omniscience,
omnipotence, and perfect goodness. A version of the cosmological argument that
has attracted more attention from contemporary philosophers is the argument
from contingency to necessity. It starts with the observation that there are
contingent beings beings that could have
failed to exist. Since contingent beings do not exist of logical necessity, a
contingent being must be caused to exist by some other being, for otherwise
there would be no explanation of why it exists rather than not doing so. Either
the causal chain of contingent beings has a first member, a contingent being
not caused by another contingent being, or it is infinitely long. If, on the
one hand, the chain has a first member, then a necessary being exists and
causes it. After all, being contingent, the first member must have a cause, but
its cause cannot be another contingent being. Hence its cause has to be
non-contingent, i.e., a being that could not fail to exist and so is necessary.
If, on the other hand, the chain is infinitely long, then a necessary being
exists and causes the chain as a whole. This is because the chain as a whole,
being itself contingent, requires a cause that must be noncontingent since it
is not part of the chain. In either case, if there are contingent beings, a
necessary being exists. So, since contingent beings do exist, there is a
necessary being that causes their existence. Critics of this argument attack
its assumption that there must be an explanation for the existence of every
contingent being. Rejecting the principle that there is a sufficient reason for
the existence of each contingent thing, they argue that the existence of at
least some contingent beings is an inexplicable brute fact. And even if the
principle of sufficient reason is true, its truth is not obvious and so it
would not be irrational to deny it. Accordingly, William Rowe b.1 concludes
that this version of the cosmological argument does not prove the existence of
God, but he leaves open the question of whether it shows that theistic belief
is reasonable. The starting point of teleological arguments is the phenomenon
of goal-directedness in nature. Aquinas, e.g., begins with the claim that we
see that things which lack intelligence act for an end so as to achieve the
best result. Modern science has discredited this universal metaphysical
teleology, but many biological systems do seem to display remarkable
adaptations of means to ends. Thus, as William Paley 17431805 insisted, the eye
is adapted to seeing and its parts cooperate in complex ways to produce sight.
This suggests an analogy between such biological systems and human artifacts,
which are known to be products of intelligent design. Spelled out in mechanical
terms, the analogy grounds the claim that the world as a whole is like a vast
machine composed of many smaller machines. Machines are contrived by
intelligent human designers. Since like effects have like causes, the world as
a whole and many of its parts are therefore probably products of design by an
intelligence resembling the human but greater in proportion to the magnitude of
its effects. Because this form of the argument rests on an analogy, it is known
as the analogical argument for the existence of God; it is also known as the
design argument since it concludes the existence of an intelligent designer of
the world. Hume subjected the design argument to sustained criticism in his
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. If, as most scholars suppose, the
character Philo speaks for Hume, Hume does not actually reject the argument. He
does, however, think that it warrants only the very weak conclusion that the
cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to
human intelligence. As this way of putting it indicates, the argument does not
rule out polytheism; perhaps different minor deities designed lions and tigers.
Moreover, the analogy with human artificers suggests that the designer or designers
of the universe did not create it from nothing but merely imposed order on
already existing matter. And on account of the mixture of good and evil in the
universe, the argument does not show that the designer or designers are morally
admirable enough to deserve obedience or worship. Since the time of Hume, the
design argument has been further undermined by the emergence of Darwinian
explanations of biological adaptations in terms of natural selection that give
explanations of such adaptations in terms of intelligent design stiff
competition. Some moral arguments for the existence of God conform to the
pattern of inference to the best explanation. It has been argued that the
hypothesis that morality depends upon the will of God provides the best explanation
of the objectivity of moral obligations. Kant’s moral argument, which is
probably the best-known specimen of this type, takes a different tack.
According to Kant, the complete good consists of perfect virtue rewarded with
perfect happiness, and virtue deserves to be rewarded with proportional
happiness because it makes one worthy to be happy. If morality is to command
the allegiance of reason, the complete good must be a real possibility, and so
practical reason is entitled to postulate that the conditions necessary to
guarantee its possibility obtain. As far as anyone can tell, nature and its
laws do not furnish such a guarantee; in this world, apparently, the virtuous
often suffer while the vicious flourish. And even if the operation of natural
laws were to produce happiness in proportion to virtue, this would be merely
coincidental, and hence finite moral agents would not have been made happy just
because they had by their virtue made themselves worthy of happiness. So
practical reason is justified in postulating a supernatural agent with
sufficient goodness, knowledge, and power to ensure that finite agents receive
the happiness they deserve as a reward for their virtue, though theoretical
reason can know nothing of such a being. Critics of this argument have denied
that we must postulate a systematic connection between virtue and happiness in
order to have good reasons to be moral. Indeed, making such an assumption might
actually tempt one to cultivate virtue for the sake of securing happiness rather
than for its own sake. It seems therefore that none of these arguments by
itself conclusively proves the existence of God. However, some of them might
contribute to a cumulative case for the existence of God. According to Richard
Swinburne, cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments individually
increase the probability of God’s existence even though none of them makes it
more probable than not. But when other evidence such as that deriving from
providential occurrences and religious experiences is added to the balance,
Swinburne concludes that theism becomes more probable than its negation.
Whether or not he is right, it does appear to be entirely correct to judge the
rationality of theistic belief in the light of our total evidence. But there is
a case to be made against theism too. Philosophers of religion are interested
in arguments against the existence of God, and fairness does seem to require
admitting that our total evidence contains much that bears negatively on the
rationality of belief in God. The problem of evil is generally regarded as the
strongest objection to theism. Two kinds of evil can be distinguished. Moral
evil inheres in the wicked actions of moral agents and the bad consequences
they produce. An example is torturing the innocent. When evil actions are
considered theologically as offenses against God, they are regarded as sins.
Natural evils are bad consequences that apparently derive entirely from the
operations of impersonal natural forces, e.g. the human and animal suffering produced
by natural catastrophes such as earthquakes and epidemics. Both kinds of evil
raise the question of what reasons an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly
good being could have for permitting or allowing their existence. Theodicy is
the enterprise of trying to answer this question and thereby to justify the
ways of God to humans. It is, of course, possible to deny the presuppositions
of the question. Some thinkers have held that evil is unreal; others have
maintained that the deity is limited and so lacks the power or knowledge to
prevent the evils that occur. If one accepts the presuppositions of the
question, the most promising strategy for theodicy seems to be to claim that
each evil God permits is necessary for some greater good or to avoid some alternative
to it that is at least as bad if not worse. The strongest form of this doctrine
is the claim made by Leibniz that this is the best of all possible worlds. It
is unlikely that humans, with their cognitive limitations, could ever
understand all the details of the greater goods for which evils are necessary,
assuming that such goods exist; however, we can understand how some evils
contribute to achieving goods. According to the soul-making theodicy of John
Hick b.2, which is rooted in a tradition going back to Irenaeus, admirable
human qualities such as compassion could not exist except as responses to
suffering, and so evil plays a necessary part in the formation of moral
character. But this line of thought does not seem to provide a complete theodicy
because much animal suffering occurs unnoticed by humans and child abuse often
destroys rather than strengthens the moral character of its victims. Recent
philosophical discussion has often focused on the claim that the existence of
an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being is logically inconsistent
with the existence of evil or of a certain quantity of evil. This is the
logical problem of evil, and the most successful response to it has been the
free will defense. Unlike a theodicy, this defense does not speculate about
God’s reasons for permitting evil but merely argues that God’s existence is
consistent with the existence of evil. Its key idea is that moral good cannot
exist apart from libertarian free actions that are not causally determined. If
God aims to produce moral good, God must create free creatures upon whose
cooperation he must depend, and so divine omnipotence is limited by the freedom
God confers on creatures. Since such creatures are also free to do evil, it is
possible that God could not have created a world containing moral good but no
moral evil. Plantinga extends the defense from moral to natural evil by
suggesting that it is also possible that all natural evil is due to the free
actions of non-human persons such as Satan and his cohorts. Plantinga and
Swinburne have also addressed the probabilistic problem of evil, which is the
claim that the existence of evil disconfirms or renders improbable the
hypothesis that God exists. Both of them argue for the conclusion that this is
not the case. Finally, it is worth mentioning three other topics on which
contemporary philosophers of religion have worked to good effect. Important
studies of the meaning and use of religious language were stimulated by the
challenge of logical positivism’s claim that theological language is
cognitively meaningless. Defenses of such Christian doctrines as the Trinity,
Incarnation, and Atonement against various philosophical objections have
recently been offered by people committed to elaborating an explicitly
Christian philosophy. And a growing appreciation of religious pluralism has
both sharpened interest in questions about the cultural relativity of religious
rationality and begun to encourage progress toward a comparative philosophy of
religions. Such work helps to make philosophy of religion a lively and diverse
field of inquiry. Grice: “It is extremely important that in a dictionary entry
we keep the ‘philosophical’ – surely we are not lower ourselves to the level of
a theologian – if I am a theologican, I am a philosophical theologian. -- theodicy from Grecian theos, ‘God’, and dike,
‘justice’, a defense of the justice or goodness of God in the face of doubts or
objections arising from the phenomena of evil in the world ‘evil’ refers here
to bad states of affairs of any sort. Many types of theodicy have been proposed
and vigorously debated; only a few can be sketched here. 1 It has been argued
that evils are logically necessary for greater goods e.g., hardships for the
full exemplification of certain virtues, so that even an omnipotent being
roughly, one whose power has no logically contingent limits would have a
morally sufficient reason to cause or permit the evils in order to obtain the
goods. Leibniz, in his Theodicy 1710, proposed a particularly comprehensive
theodicy of this type. On his view, God had adequate reason to bring into
existence the actual world, despite all its evils, because it is the best of
all possible worlds, and all actual evils are essential ingredients in it, so
that omitting any of them would spoil the design of the whole. Aside from
issues about whether actual evils are in fact necessary for greater goods, this
approach faces the question whether it assumes wrongly that the end justifies
the means. 2 An important type of theodicy traces some or all evils to sinful
free actions of humans or other beings such as angels created by God.
Proponents of this approach assume that free action in creatures is of great
value and is logically incompatible with divine causal control of the creatures’
actions. It follows that God’s not intervening to prevent sins is necessary,
though the sins themselves are not, to the good of created freedom. This is
proposed as a morally sufficient reason for God’s not preventing them. It is a
major task for this type of theodicy to explain why God would permit those
evils that are not themselves free choices of creatures but are at most
consequences of such choices. 3 Another type of theodicy, both ancient and
currently influential among theologians, though less congenial to orthodox
traditions in the major theistic religions, proposes to defend God’s goodness
by abandoning the doctrine that God is omnipotent. On this view, God is
causally, rather than logically, unable to prevent many evils while pursuing sufficiently
great goods. A principal sponsor of this approach at present is the movement
known as process theology, inspired by Whitehead; it depends on a complex
metaphysical theory about the nature of causal relationships. 4 Other
theodicies focus more on outcomes than on origins. Some religious beliefs
suggest that God will turn out to have been very good to created persons by
virtue of gifts especially religious gifts, such as communion with God as
supreme Good that may be bestowed in a life Tetractys theodicy 910 910 after death or in religious experience
in the present life. This approach may be combined with one of the other types
of theodicy, or adopted by people who think that God’s reasons for permitting
evils are beyond our finding out. Then
there’s heologia naturalis Latin, ‘natural theology’, theology that uses the
methods of investigation and standards of rationality of any other area of
philosophy. Traditionally, the central problems of natural theology are proofs
for the existence of God and the problem of evil. In contrast with natural
theology, supernatural theology uses methods that are supposedly revealed by
God and accepts as fact beliefs that are similarly outside the realm of
rational acceptability. Relying on a prophet or a pope to settle factual
questions would be acceptable to supernatural, but not to natural, theology.
Nothing prevents a natural theologian from analyzing concepts that can be used
sanguinely by supernatural theologians, e.g., revelation, miracles,
infallibility, and the doctrine of the Trinity. Theologians often work in both
areas, as did, e.g., Anselm and Aquinas. For his brilliant critiques of
traditional theology, Hume deserves the title of “natural
anti-theologian.” Grice was totally
against “the philosophy of X” – never the philosophy of god – but philosophical
theology -- theological naturalism, the attempt to develop a naturalistic
conception of God. As a philosophical position, naturalism holds 1 that the
only reliable methods of knowing what there is are methods continuous with
those of the developed sciences, and 2 that the application of those methods
supports the view that the constituents of reality are either physical or are
causally dependent on physical things and their modifications. Since
supernaturalism affirms that God is purely spiritual and causally independent
of physical things, naturalists hold that either belief in God must be
abandoned as rationally unsupported or the concept of God must be reconstituted
consistently with naturalism. Earlier attempts to do the latter include the
work of Feuerbach and Comte. In twentieth-century naturalism the most significant attempts to
develop a naturalistic conception of God are due to Dewey and Henry Nelson
Wieman 45. In A Common Faith Dewey proposed a view of God as the unity of ideal
ends resulting from human imagination, ends arousing us to desire and action.
Supernaturalism, he argued, was the product of a primitive need to convert the
objects of desire, the greatest ideals, into an already existing reality. In
contrast to Dewey, Wieman insisted on viewing God as a process in the natural
world that leads to the best that humans can achieve if they but submit to its
working in their lives. In his earlier work he viewed God as a cosmic process
that not only works for human good but is what actually produced human life.
Later he identified God with creative interchange, a process that occurs only
within already existing human communities. While Wieman’s God is not a human
creation, as are Dewey’s ideal ends, it is difficult to see how love and
devotion are appropriate to a natural process that works as it does without
thought or purpose. Thus, while Dewey’s God ideal ends lacks creative power but
may well qualify as an object of love and devotion, Wieman’s God a process in
nature is capable of creative power but, while worthy of our care and
attention, does not seem to qualify as an object of love and devotion. Neither
view, then, satisfies the two fundamental features associated with the
traditional idea of God: possessing creative power and being an appropriate
object of supreme love and devotion. H.
P. Grice, “Why I never pursued a doctorate in divinity!” --. philosophical
theology: Grice: “My mother was High Church, but my father was a
non-conformist, and the fact that my resident paternal aunt was a converted
Roman certainly did not help!” -- Philosophical theology -- deism, the view
that true religion is natural religion. Some self-styled Christian deists
accepted revelation although they argued that its content is essentially the
same as natural religion. Most deists dismissed revealed religion as a fiction.
God wants his creatures to be happy and has ordained virtue as the means to it.
Since God’s benevolence is disinterested, he will ensure that the knowledge
needed for happiness is universally accessible. Salvation cannot, then, depend
on special revelation. True religion is an expression of a universal human
nature whose essence is reason and is the same in all times and places.
Religious traditions such as Christianity and Islam originate in credulity,
political tyranny, and priestcraft, which corrupt reason and overlay natural
religion with impurities. Deism is largely a seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century phenomenon and was most prominent in England. Among the more
important English deists were John Toland 16701722, Anthony Collins 16761729,
Herbert of Cherbury 15831648, Matthew Tindal 16571733, and Thomas Chubb
16791747. Continental deists included Voltaire and Reimarus. Thomas Paine and
Elihu Palmer 17641806 were prominent
deists. Orthodox writers in this period use ‘deism’ as a vague term of
abuse. By the late eighteenth century, the term came to mean belief in an
“absentee God” who creates the world, ordains its laws, and then leaves it to
its own devices. Philosophical theology -- de Maistre, Joseph-Marie, political
theorist, diplomat, and Roman Catholic exponent of theocracy. He was educated
by the Jesuits in Turin. His counterrevolutionary political philosophy aimed at
restoring the foundations of morality, the family, society, and the state in
postrevolutionary Europe. Against Enlightenment ideals, he reclaimed Thomism,
defended the hereditary and absolute monarchy, and championed ultramontanism
The Pope, 1821. Considerations on France 1796 argues that the decline of moral
and religious values was responsible for the “satanic” 1789 revolution. Hence
Christianity and Enlightenment philosophy were engaged in a fight to the death
that he claimed the church would eventually win. Deeply pessimistic about human
nature, the Essay on the Generating Principle of Political Constitutions 1810
traces the origin of authority in the human craving for order and discipline.
Saint Petersburg Evenings 1821 urges philosophy to surrender to religion and
reason to faith. Philosophical theology -- divine attributes, properties of
God; especially, those properties that are essential and unique to God. Among
properties traditionally taken to be attributes of God, omnipotence,
omniscience, and omnibenevolence are naturally taken to mean having,
respectively, power, knowledge, and moral goodness to the maximum degree. Here
God is understood as an eternal or everlasting being of immense power,
knowledge, and goodness, who is the creator and sustainer of the universe and
is worthy of human worship. Omnipotence is maximal power. Some philosophers,
notably Descartes, have thought that omnipotence requires the ability to do
absolutely anything, including the logically impossible. Most classical
theists, however, understood omnipotence as involving vast powers, while
nevertheless being subject to a range of limitations of ability, including the
inability to do what is logically impossible, the inability to change the past
or to do things incompatible with what has happened, and the inability to do
things that cannot be done by a being who has other divine attributes, e.g., to
sin or to lie. Omniscience is unlimited knowledge. According to the most
straightforward account, omniscience is knowledge of all true propositions. But
there may be reasons for recognizing a limitation on the class of true
propositions that a being must know in order to be omniscient. For example, if
there are true propositions about the future, omniscience would then include
foreknowledge. But some philosophers have thought that foreknowledge of human
actions is incompatible with those actions being free. This has led some to
deny that there are truths about the future and others to deny that such truths
are knowable. In the latter case, omniscience might be taken to be knowledge of
all knowable truths. Or if God is eternal and if there are certain tensed or
temporally indexical propositions that can be known only by someone who is in
time, then omniscience presumably does not extend to such propositions. It is a
matter of controversy whether omniscience includes middle knowledge, i.e.,
knowledge of what an agent would do if other, counterfactual, conditions were
to obtain. Since recent critics of middle knowledge in contrast to Báñez and
other sixteenth-century Dominican opponents of Molina usually deny that the
relevant counterfactual conditionals alleged to be the object of such knowledge
are true, denying the possibility of middle knowledge need not restrict the
class of true propositions a being must know in order to be omniscient.
Finally, although the concept of omniscience might not itself constrain how an
omniscient being acquires its knowledge, it is usually held that God’s
knowledge is neither inferential i.e., derived from premises or evidence nor
dependent upon causal processes. Omnibenevolenceis, literally, complete desire
for good; less strictly, perfect moral goodness. Traditionally it has been
thought that God does not merely happen to be good but that he must be so and
that he is unable to do what is wrong. According to the former claim God is
essentially good; according to the latter he is impeccable. It is a matter of
controversy whether God is perfectly good in virtue of complying with an
external moral standard or whether he himself sets the standard for goodness.
Divine sovereignty is God’s rule over all of creation. According to this
doctrine God did not merely create the world and then let it run on its own; he
continues to govern it in complete detail according to his good plan.
Sovereignty is thus related to divine providence. A difficult question is how
to reconcile a robust view of God’s control of the world with libertarian free
will. Aseity or perseity is complete independence. In a straightforward sense,
God is not dependent on anyone or anything for his existence. According to
stronger interpretation of aseity, God is completely independent of everything
else, including his properties. This view supports a doctrine of divine
simplicity according to which God is not distinct from his properties.
Simplicity is the property of having no parts of any kind. According to the
doctrine of divine simplicity, God not only has no spatial or temporal parts,
but there is no distinction between God and his essence, between his various
attributes in him omniscience and omnipotence, e.g., are identical, and between
God and his attributes. Attributing simplicity to God was standard in medieval
theology, but the doctrine has seemed to many contemporary philosophers to be
baffling, if not incoherent. divine command
ethics, an ethical theory according to which part or all of morality divine
attributes divine command ethics 240
240 depends upon the will of God as promulgated by divine commands. This
theory has an important place in the history of Christian ethics. Divine
command theories are prominent in the Franciscan ethics developed by John Duns
Scotus and William Ockham; they are also endorsed by disciples of Ockham such
as d’Ailly, Gerson, and Gabriel Biel; both Luther and Calvin adopt divine
command ethics; and in modern British thought, important divine command
theorists include Locke, Berkeley, and Paley. Divine command theories are
typically offered as accounts of the deontological part of morality, which
consists of moral requirements obligation, permissions rightness, and
prohibitions wrongness. On a divine command conception, actions forbidden by
God are morally wrong because they are thus forbidden, actions not forbidden by
God are morally right because they are not thus forbidden, and actions commanded
by God are morally obligatory because they are thus commanded. Many Christians
find divine command ethics attractive because the ethics of love advocated in
the Gospels makes love the subject of a command. Matthew 22:3740 records Jesus
as saying that we are commanded to love God and the neighbor. According to
Kierkegaard, there are two reasons to suppose that Christian love of neighbor
must be an obligation imposed by divine command: first, only an obligatory love
can be sufficiently extensive to embrace everyone, even one’s enemies; second,
only an obligatory love can be invulnerable to changes in its objects, a love
that alters not when it alteration finds. The chief objection to the theory is
that dependence on divine commands would make morality unacceptably arbitrary.
According to divine command ethics, murder would not be wrong if God did not
exist or existed but failed to forbid it. Perhaps the strongest reply to this
objection appeals to the doctrines of God’s necessary existence and essential
goodness. God could not fail to exist and be good, and so God could not fail to
forbid murder. In short, divine commands are not arbitrary fiats. divine foreknowledge, God’s knowledge of the
future. It appears to be a straightforward consequence of God’s omniscience
that he has knowledge of the future, for presumably omniscience includes
knowledge of all truths and there are truths about the future. Moreover, divine
foreknowledge seems to be required by orthodox religious commitment to divine
prophecy and divine providence. In the former case, God could not reliably
reveal what will happen if he does know what will happen. And in the latter
case, it is difficult to see how God could have a plan for what happens without
knowing what that will be. A problem arises, however, in that it has seemed to
many that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human free action. Some
philosophers notably Boethius have reasoned as follows: If God knows that a
person will do a certain action, then the person must perform that action, but
if a person must perform an action, the person does not perform the action
freely. So if God knows that a person will perform an action, the person does
not perform the action freely. This reason for thinking that divine
foreknowledge is incompatible with human free action commits a simple modal
fallacy. What must be the case is the conditional that if God knows that a
person will perform an action then the person will in fact perform the action.
But what is required to derive the conclusion is the implausible claim that
from the assumption that God knows that a person will perform an action it
follows not simply that the person will perform the action but that the person
must perform it. Perhaps other attempts to demonstrate the incompatibility,
however, are not as easily dismissed. One response to the apparent dilemma is
to say that there really are no such truths about the future, either none at
all or none about events, like future free actions, that are not causally
necessitated by present conditions. Another response is to concede that there
are truths about the future but to deny that truths about future free actions
are knowable. In this case omniscience may be understood as knowledge, not of
all truths, but of all knowable truths. A third, and historically important,
response is to hold that God is eternal and that from his perspective
everything is present and thus not future. These responses implicitly agree
that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom, but they provide different
accounts of omniscience according to which it does not include foreknowledge,
or, at any rate, not foreknowledge of future free actions. Philosophical theology -- double truth, the
theory that a thing can be true in philosophy or according to reason while its
opposite is true in theology or according to faith. It serves as a response to
conflicts between reason and faith. For example, on one interpretation of
Aristotle, there is only one rational human soul, whereas, according to
Christian theology, there are many rational human souls. The theory of double
truth was attributed to Averroes and to Latin Averroists such as Siger of
Brabant and Boethius of Dacia by their opponents, but it is doubtful that they
actually held it. Averroes seems to have held that a single truth is
scientifically formulated in philosophy and allegorically expressed in
theology. Latin Averroists apparently thought that philosophy concerns what
would have been true by natural necessity absent special divine intervention,
and theology deals with what is actually true by virtue of such intervention.
On this view, there would have been only one rational human soul if God had not
miraculously intervened to multiply what by nature could not be multiplied. No
one clearly endorsed the view that rational human souls are both only one and
also many in number. H. P. Grice, “Must
the Articles be 39 – and if we add one more, what might it say?.”
Implicatuum – implicatura, implicans,
implicatum, implicandum – implicans, what implies, implicatum, what is implied,
implicaturum, what is to imply, implicandum, what is to be implied, implicatura, the act of the implying.
Scientism: One of the twelve labours of H.
P. Grice --. Grice: “When Cicero coined ‘scientia’ out of scire he didn’t know what
he was doing!” -- philosophy of science, the branch of philosophy that is
centered on a critical examination of the sciences: their methods and their
results. One branch of the philosophy of science, methodology, is closely
related to the theory of knowledge. It explores the methods by which science
arrives at its posited truths concerning the world and critically explores
alleged rationales for these methods. Issues concerning the sense in which
theories are accepted in science, the nature of the confirmation relation
between evidence and hypothesis, the degree to which scientific claims can be
falsified by observational data, and the like, are the concern of methodology.
Other branches of the philosophy of science are concerned with the meaning and content
of the posited scientific results and are closely related to metaphysics and
the philosophy of language. Typical problems examined are the nature of
scientific laws, the cognitive content of scientific theories referring to
unobservables, and the structure of scientific explanations. Finally,
philosophy of science explores specific foundational questions arising out of
the specific results of the sciences. Typical questions explored might be
metaphysical presuppositions of space-time theories, the role of probability in
statistical physics, the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, the
structure of explanations in evolutionary biology, and the like. Concepts of
the credibility of hypotheses. Some crucial concepts that arise when issues of the
credibility of scientific hypotheses are in question are the following:
Inductivism is the view that hypotheses can receive evidential support from
their predictive success with respect to particular cases falling under them.
If one takes the principle of inductive inference to be that the future will be
like the past, one is subject to the skeptical objection that this rule is
empty of content, and even self-contradictory, if any kind of “similarity” of
cases is permitted. To restore content and consistency to the rule, and for
other methodological purposes as well, it is frequently alleged that only
natural kinds, a delimited set of “genuine” properties, should be allowed in
the formulation of scientific hypotheses. The view that theories are first arrived
at as creative hypotheses of the scientist’s imagination and only then
confronted, for justificatory purposes, with the observational predictions
deduced from them, is called the hypotheticodeductive model of science. This
model is contrasted with the view that the very discovery of hypotheses is
somehow “generated” out of accumulated observational data. The view that
hypotheses are confirmed to the degree that they provide the “best explanatory
account” of the data is often called abduction and sometimes called inference
to the best explanation. The alleged relation that evidence bears to
hypothesis, warranting its truth but not, generally, guaranteeing that truth,
is called confirmation. Methodological accounts such as inductivism countenance
such evidential warrant, frequently speaking of evidence as making a hypothesis
probable but not establishing it with certainty. Probability in the
confirmational context is supposed to be a relationship holding between
propositions that is quantitative and is described by the formal theory of
probability. It is supposed to measure the “degree of support” that one
proposition gives to another, e.g. the degree of support evidential statements
give to a hypothesis allegedly supported by them. Scientific methodologists often
claim that science is characterized by convergence. This is the claim that
scientific theories in their historical order are converging to an ultimate,
final, and ideal theory. Sometimes this final theory is said to be true because
it corresponds to the “real world,” as in realist accounts of convergence. In
pragmatist versions this ultimate theory is the defining standard of truth. It
is sometimes alleged that one ground for choosing the most plausible theory,
over and above conformity of the theory with the observational data, is the
simplicity of the theory. Many versions of this thesis exist, some emphasizing
formal elements of the theory and others, e.g., emphasizing paucity of
ontological commitment by the theory as the measure of simplicity. It is
sometimes alleged that in choosing which theory to believe, the scientific
community opts for theories compatible with the data that make minimal changes
in scientific belief necessary from those demanded by previously held theory.
The believer in methodological conservatism may also try to defend such
epistemic conservatism as normatively rational. An experiment that can
decisively show a scientific hypothesis to be false is called a crucial
experiment for the hypothesis. It is a thesis of many philosophers that for
hypotheses that function in theories and can only confront observational data
when conjoined with other theoretical hypotheses, no absolutely decisive
crucial experiment can exist. Concepts of the structure of hypotheses. Here are
some of the essential concepts encountered when it is the structure of
scientific hypotheses that is being explored: In its explanatory account of the
world, science posits novel entities and properties. Frequently these are
alleged to be not accessible to direct observation. A theory is a set of
hypotheses positing such entities and properties. Some philosophers of science
divide the logical consequences of a theory into those referring only to
observable things and features and those referring to the unobservables as
well. Various reductionist, eliminationist, and instrumentalist approaches to
theory agree that the full cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its
observational consequences reported by its observation sentences, a claim
denied by those who espouse realist accounts of theories. The view that the
parts of a theory that do not directly relate observational consequences ought
not to be taken as genuinely referential at all, but, rather, as a “mere
linguistic instrument” allowing one to derive observational results from
observationally specifiable posits, is called instrumentalism. From this point
of view terms putatively referring to unobservables fail to have genuine
reference and individual non-observational sentences containing such terms are
not individually genuinely true or false. Verificationism is the general name
for the doctrine that, in one way or another, the semantic content of an
assertion is exhausted by the conditions that count as warranting the
acceptance or rejection of the assertion. There are many versions of
verificationist doctrines that try to do justice both to the empiricist claim
that the content of an assertion is its totality of empirical consequences and
also to a wide variety of anti-reductionist intuitions about meaning. The
doctrine that theoretical sentences must be strictly translatable into
sentences expressed solely in observational terms in order that the theoretical
assertions have genuine cognitive content is sometimes called operationalism.
The “operation” by which a magnitude is determined to have a specified value,
characterized observationally, is taken to give the very meaning of attributing
that magnitude to an object. The doctrine that the meanings of terms in
theories are fixed by the role the terms play in the theory as a whole is often
called semantic holism. According to the semantic holist, definitions of
theoretical terms by appeal to observational terms cannot be given, but all of
the theoretical terms have their meaning given “as a group” by the structure of
the theory as a whole. A related doctrine in confirmation theory is that
confirmation accrues to whole theories, and not to their individual assertions
one at a time. This is confirmational holism. To see another conception of
cognitive content, conjoin all the sentences of a theory together. Then replace
each theoretical term in the sentence so obtained with a predicate variable and
existentially quantify over all the predicate variables so introduced. This is
the Ramsey sentence for a finitely axiomatized theory. This sentence has the
same logical consequences framable in the observational vocabulary alone as did
the original theory. It is often claimed that the Ramsey sentence for a theory
exhausts the cognitive content of the theory. The Ramsey sentence is supposed
to “define” the meaning of the theoretical terms of the original theory as well
as have empirical consequences; yet by asserting the existence of the
theoretical properties, it is sometimes alleged to remain a realist construal
of the theory. The latter claim is made doubtful, however, by the existence of
“merely representational” interpretations of the Ramsey sentence. Theories are
often said to be so related that one theory is reducible to another. The study
of the relation theories bear to one another in this context is said to be the
study of intertheoretic reduction. Such reductive claims can have philosophical
origins, as in the alleged reduction of material objects to sense-data or of
spatiotemporal relations to causal relations, or they can be scientific
discoveries, as in the reduction of the theory of light waves to the theory of
electromagnetic radiation. Numerous “models” of the reductive relation exist,
appropriate for distinct kinds and cases of reduction. The term scientific realism
has many and varied uses. Among other things that have been asserted by those
who describe themselves as scientific realists are the claims that “mature”
scientific theories typically refer to real features of the world, that the
history of past falsifications of accepted scientific theories does not provide
good reason for persistent skepticism as to the truth claims of contemporary
theories, and that the terms of theories that putatively refer to unobservables
ought to be taken at their referential face value and not reinterpreted in some
instrumentalistic manner. Internal realism denies irrealist claims founded on
the past falsification of accepted theories. Internal realists are, however,
skeptical of “metaphysical” claims of “correspondence of true theories to the
real world” or of any notion of truth that can be construed in radically
non-epistemic terms. While theories may converge to some ultimate “true”
theory, the notion of truth here must be understood in some version of a
Peircian idea of truth as “ultimate warranted assertability.” The claim that
any theory that makes reference to posited unobservable features of the world
in its explanatory apparatus will always encounter rival theories incompatible
with the original theory but equally compatible with all possible observational
data that might be taken as confirmatory of the original theory is the claim of
the underdetermination thesis. A generalization taken to have “lawlike force”
is called a law of nature. Some suggested criteria for generalizations having
lawlike force are the ability of the generalization to back up the truth of
claims expressed as counterfactual conditions; the ability of the
generalization to be confirmed inductively on the basis of evidence that is
only a proper subset of all the particular instances falling under the
generality; and the generalization having an appropriate place in the simple,
systematic hierarchy of generalizations important for fundamental scientific
theories of the world. The application of a scientific law to a given actual
situation is usually hedged with the proviso that for the law’s predictions to
hold, “all other, unspecified, features of the situation are normal.” Such a
qualifying clause is called a ceteris paribus clause. Such “everything else
being normal” claims cannot usually be “filled out,” revealing important
problems concerning the “open texture” of scientific claims. The claim that the
full specification of the state of the world at one time is sufficient, along
with the laws of nature, to fix the full state of the world at any other time,
is the claim of determinism. This is not to be confused with claims of total
predictability, since even if determinism were true the full state of the world
at a time might be, in principle, unavailable for knowledge. Concepts of the
foundations of physical theories. Here, finally, are a few concepts that are
crucial in discussing the foundations of physical theories, in particular
theories of space and time and quantum theory: The doctrine that space and time
must be thought of as a family of spatial and temporal relations holding among
the material constituents of the universe is called relationism. Relationists
deny that “space itself” should be considered an additional constituent of the
world over and above the world’s material contents. The doctrine that “space
itself” must be posited as an additional constituent of the world over and
above ordinary material things of the world is substantivalism. Mach’s
principle is the demand that all physical phenomena, including the existence of
inertial forces used by Newton to argue for a substantivalist position, be
explainable in purely relationist terms. Mach speculated that Newton’s
explanation for the forces in terms of acceleration with respect to “space
itself” could be replaced with an explanation resorting to the acceleration of
the test object with respect to the remaining matter of the universe the “fixed
stars”. In quantum theory the claim that certain “conjugate” quantities, such
as position and momentum, cannot be simultaneously “determined” to arbitrary
degrees of accuracy is the uncertainty principle. The issue of whether such a
lack of simultaneous exact “determination” is merely a limitation on our
knowledge of the system or is, instead, a limitation on the system’s having
simultaneous exact values of the conjugate quantities, is a fundamental one in
the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bell’s theorem is a mathematical
result aimed at showing that the explanation of the statistical correlations
that hold between causally noninteractive systems cannot always rely on the
positing that when the systems did causally interact in the past independent
values were fixed for some feature of each of the two systems that determined
their future observational behavior. The existence of such “local hidden
variables” would contradict the correlational predictions of quantum mechanics.
The result shows that quantum mechanics has a profoundly “non-local” nature.
Can quantum probabilities and correlations be obtained as averages over
variables at some deeper level than those specifying the quantum state of a
system? If such quantities exist they are called hidden variables. Many
different types of hidden variables have been proposed: deterministic, stochastic,
local, non-local, etc. A number of proofs exist to the effect that positing
certain types of hidden variables would force probabilistic results at the
quantum level that contradict the predictions of quantum theory.
Complementarity was the term used by Niels Bohr to describe what he took to be
a fundamental structure of the world revealed by quantum theory. Sometimes it
is used to indicate the fact that magnitudes occur in conjugate pairs subject
to the uncertainty relations. Sometimes it is used more broadly to describe
such aspects as the ability to encompass some phenomena in a wave picture of
the world and other phenomena in a particle picture, but implying that no one
picture will do justice to all the experimental results. The orthodox
formalization of quantum theory posits two distinct ways in which the quantum
state can evolve. When the system is “unobserved,” the state evolves according
to the deterministic Schrödinger equation. When “measured,” however, the system
suffers a discontinuous “collapse of the wave packet” into a new quantum state
determined by the outcome of the measurement process. Understanding how to
reconcile the measurement process with the laws of dynamic evolution of the
system is the measurement problem. Conservation and symmetry. A number of
important physical principles stipulate that some physical quantity is
conserved, i.e. that the quantity of it remains invariant over time. Early
conservation principles were those of matter mass, of energy, and of momentum.
These became assimilated together in the relativistic principle of the
conservation of momentum-energy. Other conservation laws such as the
conservation of baryon number arose in the theory of elementary particles. A
symmetry in physical theory expressed the invariance of some structural feature
of the world under some transformation. Examples are translation and rotation
invariance in space and the invariance under transformation from one uniformly
moving reference frame to another. Such symmetries express the fact that
systems related by symmetry transformations behave alike in their physical
evolution. Some symmetries are connected with space-time, such as those noted
above, whereas others such as the symmetry of electromagnetism under socalled
gauge transformations are not. A very important result of the mathematician
Emma Noether shows that each conservation law is derivable from the existence
of an associated underlying symmetry. Chaos theory and chaotic systems. In the
history of the scientific study of deterministic systems, the paradigm of
explanation has been the prediction of the future states of a system from a
specification of its initial state. In order for such a prediction to be
useful, however, nearby initial states must lead to future states that are close
to one another. This is now known to hold only in exceptional cases. In general
deterministic systems are chaotic systems, i.e., even initial states very close
to one another will lead in short intervals of time to future states that
diverge quickly from one another. Chaos theory has been developed to provide a
wide range of concepts useful for describing the structure of the dynamics of
such chaotic systems. The theory studies the features of a system that will
determine if its evolution is chaotic or non-chaotic and provides the necessary
descriptive categories for characterizing types of chaotic motion. Randomness.
The intuitive distinction between a sequence that is random and one that is
orderly plays a role in the foundations of probability theory and in the
scientific study of dynamical systems. But what is a random sequence?
Subjectivist definitions of randomness focus on the inability of an agent to
determine, on the basis of his knowledge, the future occurrences in the
sequence. Objectivist definitions of randomness seek to characterize it without
reference to the knowledge of any agent. Some approaches to defining objective
randomness are those that require probability to be the same in the original
sequence and in subsequences “mechanically” selectable from it, and those that
define a sequence as random if it passes every “effectively constructible”
statistical test for randomness. Another important attempt to characterize
objective randomness compares the length of a sequence to the length of a computer
program used to generate the sequence. The basic idea is that a sequence is
random if the computer programs needed to generate the sequence are as long as
the sequence itself. H. P. Grice, “My
labour with Scientism.”
scire – scitum -- scientism: Grice: “Winch
is not only happy with natural science that he wants a social science –
linguistics included!” -- philosophy of the social sciences, the study of the
logic and methods of the social sciences. Central questions include: What are
the criteria of a good social explanation? How if at all are the social
sciences distinct from the natural sciences? Is there a distinctive method for
social research? Through what empirical procedures are social science
assertions to be evaluated? Are there irreducible social laws? Are there causal
relations among social phenomena? Do social facts and regularities require some
form of reduction to facts about individuals? What is the role of theory in
social explanation? The philosophy of social science aims to provide an
interpretation of the social sciences that answers these questions. The
philosophy of social science, like that of natural science, has both a
descriptive and a prescriptive side. On the one hand, the field is about the
social sciences the explanations,
methods, empirical arguments, theories, hypotheses, etc., that actually occur
in the social science literature. This means that the philosopher needs
extensive knowledge of several areas of social science research in order to be
able to formulate an analysis of the social sciences that corresponds
appropriately to scientists’ practice. On the other hand, the field is
epistemic: it is concerned with the idea that scientific theories and
hypotheses are put forward as true or probable, and are justified on rational
grounds empirical and theoretical. The philosopher aims to provide a critical
evaluation of existing social science methods and practices insofar as these
methods are found to be less truth-enhancing than they might be. These two
aspects of the philosophical enterprise suggest that philosophy of social
science should be construed as a rational reconstruction of existing social
science practice a reconstruction guided
by existing practice but extending beyond that practice by identifying faulty
assumptions, forms of reasoning, and explanatory frameworks. Philosophers have
disagreed over the relation between the social and natural sciences. One
position is naturalism, according to which the methods of the social sciences
should correspond closely to those of the natural sciences. This position is
closely related to physicalism, the doctrine that all higher-level phenomena
and regularities including social
phenomena are ultimately reducible to
physical entities and the laws that govern them. On the other side is the view
that the social sciences are inherently distinct from the natural sciences.
This perspective holds that social phenomena are metaphysically distinguishable
from natural phenomena because they are intentional they depend on the meaningful actions of
individuals. On this view, natural phenomena admit of causal explanation,
whereas social phenomena require intentional explanation. The anti-naturalist
position also maintains that there is a corresponding difference between the
methods appropriate to natural and social science. Advocates of the Verstehen
method hold that there is a method of intuitive interpretation of human action
that is radically distinct from methods of inquiry in the natural sciences. One
important school within the philosophy of social science takes its origin in
this fact of the meaningfulness of human action. Interpretive sociology
maintains that the goal of social inquiry is to provide interpretations of
human conduct within the context of culturally specific meaningful
arrangements. This approach draws an analogy between literary texts and social
phenomena: both are complex systems of meaningful elements, and the goal of the
interpreter is to provide an interpretation of the elements that makes sense of
them. In this respect social science involves a hermeneutic inquiry: it
requires that the interpreter should tease out the meanings underlying a
particular complex of social behavior, much as a literary critic pieces
together an interpretation of the meaning of a complex philosophy of the social
sciences philosophy of the social sciences 704 704 literary text. An example of this
approach is Weber’s treatment of the relation between capitalism and the
Protestant ethic. Weber attempts to identify the elements of western European
culture that shaped human action in this environment in such a way as to
produce capitalism. On this account, both Calvinism and capitalism are
historically specific complexes of values and meanings, and we can better
understand the emergence of capitalism by seeing how it corresponds to the
meaningful structures of Calvinism. Interpretive sociologists often take the
meaningfulness of social phenomena to imply that social phenomena do not admit
of causal explanation. However, it is possible to accept the idea that social
phenomena derive from the purposive actions of individuals without
relinquishing the goal of providing causal explanations of social phenomena.
For it is necessary to distinguish between the general idea of a causal
relation between two events or conditions and the more specific idea of “causal
determination through strict laws of nature.” It is true that social phenomena
rarely derive from strict laws of nature; wars do not result from antecedent
political tensions in the way that earthquakes result from antecedent
conditions in plate tectonics. However, since non-deterministic causal
relations can derive from the choices of individual persons, it is evident that
social phenomena admit of causal explanation, and in fact much social
explanation depends on asserting causal relations between social events and
processes e.g., the claim that the
administrative competence of the state is a crucial causal factor in
determining the success or failure of a revolutionary movement. A central goal
of causal explanation is to discover the conditions existing prior to the event
that, given the law-governed regularities among phenomena of this sort, were
sufficient to produce this event. To say that C is a cause of E is to assert
that the occurrence of C, in the context of a field of social processes and
mechanisms F, brought about E or increased the likelihood of the occurrence of
E. Central to causal arguments in the social sciences is the idea of a causal
mechanism a series of events or actions
leading from cause to effect. Suppose it is held that the extension of a
trolley line from the central city to the periphery caused the deterioration of
public schools in the central city. In order to make out such a claim it is
necessary to provide some account of the social and political mechanisms that
join the antecedent condition to the consequent. An important variety of causal
explanation in social science is materialist explanation. This type of
explanation attempts to explain a social feature in terms of features of the
material environment in the context of which the social phenomenon occurs.
Features of the environment that often appear in materialist explanations
include topography and climate; thus it is sometimes maintained that banditry
thrives in remote regions because the rugged terrain makes it more difficult
for the state to repress bandits. But materialist explanations may also refer
to the material needs of society e.g.,
the need to produce food and other consumption goods to support the population.
Thus Marx holds that it is the development of the “productive forces”
technology that drives the development of property relations and political
systems. In each case the materialist explanation must refer to the fact of
human agency the fact that human beings
are capable of making deliberative choices on the basis of their wants and
beliefs in order to carry out the
explanation; in the banditry example, the explanation depends on the fact that
bandits are prudent enough to realize that their prospects for survival are
better in the periphery than in the core. So materialist explanations too
accept the point that social phenomena depend on the purposive actions of
individuals. A central issue in the philosophy of social science involves the relation
between social regularities and facts about individuals. Methodological
individualism is the position that asserts the primacy of facts about
individuals over facts about social entities. This doctrine takes three forms:
a claim about social entities, a claim about social concepts, and a claim about
social regularities. The first version maintains that social entities are
reducible to ensembles of individuals as
an insurance company might be reduced to the ensemble of employees,
supervisors, managers, and owners whose actions constitute the company.
Likewise, it is sometimes held that social concepts must be reducible to
concepts involving only individuals
e.g., the concept of a social class might be defined in terms of
concepts pertaining only to individuals and their behavior. Finally, it is
sometimes held that social regularities must be derivable from regularities of
individual behavior. There are several positions opposed to methodological
individualism. At the extreme there is methodological holism the doctrine that social entities, facts, and
laws are autonomous and irreducible; for example, that social structures such
as the state have dynamic properties independent of the beliefs and purposes of
the particular persons who occupy positions within the structure. A third
position intermediate between these two holds that every social explanation
requires microfoundations an account of
the circumstances at the individual level that led individuals to behave in
such ways as to bring about the observed social regularities. If we observe
that an industrial strike is successful over an extended period of time, it is
not sufficient to explain this circumstance by referring to the common interest
that members of the union have in winning their demands. Rather, we need
information about the circumstances of the individual union member that induce
him or her to contribute to this public good. The microfoundations dictum does
not require, however, that social explanations be couched in non-social concepts;
instead, the circumstances of individual agents may be characterized in social
terms. Central to most theories of explanation is the idea that explanation
depends on general laws governing the phenomena in question. Thus the discovery
of the laws of electrodynamics permitted the explanation of a variety of
electromagnetic phenomena. But social phenomena derive from the actions of
purposive men and women; so what kinds of regularities are available on the
basis of which to provide social explanations? A fruitful research framework in
the social sciences is the idea that men and women are rational, so it is
possible to explain their behavior as the outcome of a deliberation about means
of achieving their individual ends. This fact in turn gives rise to a set of
regularities about individual behavior that may be used as a ground for social
explanation. We may explain some complex social phenomenon as the aggregate
result of the actions of a large number of individual agents with a
hypothesized set of goals within a structured environment of choice. Social
scientists have often been inclined to offer functional explanations of social
phenomena. A functional explanation of a social feature is one that explains
the presence and persistence of the feature in terms of the beneficial
consequences the feature has for the ongoing working of the social system as a
whole. It might be held, e.g., that sports clubs in working-class Britain exist
because they give working-class people a way of expending energy that would otherwise
go into struggles against an exploitative system, thus undermining social
stability. Sports clubs are explained, then, in terms of their contribution to
social stability. This type of explanation is based on an analogy between
biology and sociology. Biologists explain species traits in terms of their
contribution to reproductive fitness, and sociologists sometimes explain social
traits in terms of their contribution to “social” fitness. However, the analogy
is misleading, because there is a general mechanism establishing functionality
in the biological realm that is not present in the social realm. This is the
mechanism of natural selection, through which a species arrives at a set of
traits that are locally optimal. There is no analogous process at work in the
social realm, however; so it is groundless to suppose that social traits exist
because of their beneficial consequences for the good of society as a whole or
important subsystems within society. So functional explanations of social
phenomena must be buttressed by specific accounts of the causal processes that
underlie the postulated functional relationships. Grice: “It’s a good thing I
studied at Oxford: at other places you HAVE to learn a non-Indo-Euroopean
lingo!” –
.
physicalism: One of the twelve labours of
H. P. Grice. (“As different from Naturalism, you know.”) - Churchland, p. s.,
philosopher and advocate of neurophilosophy. She received her B.Phil. from
Oxford in 9 and held positions at the Unichün-tzu Churchland, Patricia Smith
140 140 versity of Manitoba and the
Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, settling at the
ofCalifornia,SanDiego, with appointments in philosophy and the Institute for
Neural Computation. Skeptical of philosophy’s a priori specification of mental
categories and dissatisfied with computational psychology’s purely top-down
approach to their function, Churchland began studying the brain at the of Manitoba medical school. The result was a
unique merger of science and philosophy, a “neurophilosophy” that challenged
the prevailing methodology of mind. Thus, in a series of articles that includes
“Fodor on Language Learning” 8 and “A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research” 0,
she outlines a new neurobiologically based paradigm. It subsumes simple
non-linguistic structures and organisms, since the brain is an evolved organ;
but it preserves functionalism, since a cognitive system’s mental states are
explained via high-level neurofunctional theories. It is a strategy of
cooperation between psychology and neuroscience, a “co-evolutionary” process
eloquently described in Neurophilosophy 6 with the prediction that genuine
cognitive phenomena will be reduced, some as conceptualized within the
commonsense framework, others as transformed through the sciences. The same
intellectual confluence is displayed through Churchland’s various
collaborations: with psychologist and computational neurobiologist Terrence
Sejnowski in The Computational Brain 2; with neuroscientist Rodolfo Llinas in
The Mind-Brain Continuum 6; and with philosopher and husband Paul Churchland in
On the Contrary 8 she and Paul Churchland are jointly appraised in R. McCauley,
The Churchlands and Their Critics, 6. From the viewpoint of neurophilosophy,
interdisciplinary cooperation is essential for advancing knowledge, for the
truth lies in the intertheoretic details. Churchland: Paul M. b.2, -born philosopher, leading proponent of eliminative
materialism. He received his Ph.D. from the
of Pittsburgh in 9 and held positions at the Universities of Toronto,
Manitoba, and the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. He is professor
of philosophy and member of the Institute for Neural Computation at the of California, San Diego. Churchland’s
literary corpus constitutes a lucidly written, scientifically informed narrative
where his neurocomputational philosophy unfolds. Scientific Realism and the
Plasticity of Mind 9 maintains that, though science is best construed
realistically, perception is conceptually driven, with no observational given,
while language is holistic, with meaning fixed by networks of associated usage.
Moreover, regarding the structure of science, higher-level theories should be
reduced by, incorporated into, or eliminated in favor of more basic theories
from natural science, and, in the specific case, commonsense psychology is a
largely false empirical theory, to be replaced by a non-sentential,
neuroscientific framework. This skepticism regarding “sentential” approaches is
a common thread, present in earlier papers, and taken up again in “Eliminative
Material
ism and the Propositional Attitudes” 1.
When fully developed, the non-sentential, neuroscientific framework takes the
form of connectionist network or parallel distributed processing models. Thus,
with essays in A Neurocomputational Perspective 9, Churchland adds that genuine
psychological processes are sequences of activation patterns over neuronal
networks. Scientific theories, likewise, are learned vectors in the space of
possible activation patterns, with scientific explanation being prototypical
activation of a preferred vector. Classical epistemology, too, should be
neurocomputationally naturalized. Indeed, Churchland suggests a semantic view
whereby synonymy, or the sharing of concepts, is a similarity between patterns
in neuronal state-space. Even moral knowledge is analyzed as stored prototypes
of social reality that are elicited when an individual navigates through other
neurocomputational systems. The entire picture is expressed in The Engine of
Reason, the Seat of the Soul 6 and, with his wife Patricia Churchland, by the
essays in On the Contrary 8. What has emerged is a neurocomputational
embodiment of the naturalist program, a panphilosophy that promises to capture
science, epistemology, language, and morals in one broad sweep of its
connectionist net. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Physicalism and naturalism.” physicalism:
On second thoughts, Grice saw that naturalism and physicalism were synonymous,
but kept both! One of the twelve labours of Grice. in the widest sense of the
term, materialism applied to the question of the nature of mind. So construed,
physicalism is the thesis call it
ontological physicalism that whatever
exists or occurs is ultimately constituted out of physical entities. But
sometimes ‘physicalism’ is used to refer to the thesis that whatever exists or
occurs can be completely described in the vocabulary of physics. Such a view
goes with either reductionism or eliminativism about the mental. Here
reductionism is the view that psychological explanations, including explanations
in terms of “folk-psychological” concepts such as those of belief and desire,
are reducible to explanations formulable in a physical vocabulary, which in
turn would imply that entities referred to in psychological explanations can be
fully described in physical terms; and elminativism is the view that nothing
corresponds to the terms in psychological explanations, and that the only
correct explanations are in physical terms. The term ‘physicalism’ appears to
have originated in the Vienna Circle, and the reductionist version initially
favored there was a version of behaviorism: psychological statements were held
to be translatable into behavioral statements, mainly hypothetical
conditionals, expressible in a physical vocabulary. The psychophysical identity
theory held by Herbert Feigl, Smart, and others, sometimes called type
physicalism, is reductionist in a somewhat different sense. This holds that
mental states and events are identical with neurophysiological states and
events. While it denies that there can be analytic, meaning-preserving
translations of mental statements into physicalistic ones, it holds that by
means of synthetic “bridge laws,” identifying mental types with physical ones,
mental statements can in principle be tr. into physicalistic ones with which
they are at least nomologically equivalent if the terms in the bridge laws are
rigid designators, the equivalence will be necessary. The possibility of such a
translation is typically denied by functionalist accounts of mind, on the grounds
that the same mental state may have indefinitely many different physical
realizations, and sometimes on the grounds that it is logically possible, even
if it never happens, that mental states should be realized non-physically. In
his classic paper “The ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ “ 8, Feigl distinguishes two
senses of ‘physical’: ‘physical1’ and ‘physical2’. ‘Physical1’ is practically
synonymous with ‘scientific’, applying to whatever is “an essential part of the
coherent and adequate descriptive and explanatory account of the spatiotemporal
world.” ‘Physical2’ refers to “the type of concepts and laws which suffice in
principle for the explanation and prediction of inorganic processes.” It would
seem that if Cartesian dualism were true, supposing that possible, then once an
integrated science of the interaction of immaterial souls and material bodies
had been developed, concepts for describing the former would count as
physical1. Construed as an ontological doctrine, physicalism says that whatever
exists or occurs is entirely constituted out of those entities that constitute
inorganic things and processes. Construed as a reductionist or elminativist
thesis about description and explanation, it is the claim that a vocabulary
adequate for describing and explaining inorganic things and processes is
adequate for describing and explaining whatever exists. While the second of
these theses seems to imply the first, the first does not imply the second. It
can be questioned whether the notion of a “full” description of what exists
makes sense. And many ontological physicalists materialists hold that a
reduction to explanations couched in the terminology of physics is impossible,
not only in the case of psychological explanations but also in the case of
explanations couched in the terminology of such special sciences as biology.
Their objection to such reduction is not merely that a purely physical
description of e.g. biological or psychological phenomena would be unwieldy; it
is that such descriptions necessarily miss important laws and generalizations,
ones that can only be formulated in terms of biological, psychological, etc.,
concepts. If ontological physicalists materialists are not committed to the
reducibility of psychology to physics, neither are they committed to any sort
of identity theory claiming that entities picked out by mental or psychological
descriptions are identical to entities fully characterizable by physical
descriptions. As already noted, materialists who are functionalists deny that
there are typetype identities between mental entities and physical ones. And
some deny that materialists are even committed to token-token identities,
claiming that any psychological event could have had a different physical
composition and so is not identical to any event individuated in terms of a
purely physical taxonomy. Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “From Physicalism to Naturalism – and Back: fighting two at once!”
natura: the Grecian
equivalent is “physis,” – whereas the Roman idea has to do with ‘birth,’ cf.
‘renaissance,’ the Grecian idea has to do with ‘growth,’ Grecian term for nature, primarily used to
refer to the nature or essence of a living thing Aristotle, Metaphysics V.4.
Physis is defined by Aristotle in Physics II.1 as a source of movement and rest
that belongs to something in virtue of itself, and identified by him primarily
with the form, rather than the matter, of the thing. The term is also used to
refer to the natural world as a whole. Physis is often contrasted with techne,
art; in ethics it is also contrasted with nomos, convention, e.g. by Callicles
in Plato’s Gorgias 482e ff., who distinguishes natural from conventional
justice.
physiologicum: Oddly, among the twelve isms that attack Grice on his
ascent to the city of eternal truth, there is Naturalism and Physicalism – but
Roman natura is Grecian physis. In “Some remarks about the senses,” Grice
distinguishes a physicalist identification of the senses (in terms of the
different stimuli and the mechanisms that connects the organs to the brain)
versus other criteria, notably one involving introspection and the nature of
‘experience’ – “providing,” he adds, that ‘seeing’ is an experience! Grice would
use ‘natural,’ relying on the idea that it’s Grecian ‘physis.’ Liddell and Scott
have “φύσις,” from “φύω,” and which they render as “origin.” the natural form
or constitution of a person or thing as the result of growth, and hence nature,
constitution, and nature as an originating power, “φ. λέγεται . . ὅθεν ἡ
κίνησις ἡ πρώτη ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν φύσει ὄντων” Arist.Metaph.1014b16; concrete, the
creation, 'Nature.’ Grice is casual in his use of ‘natural’ versus
‘non-natural’ in 1948 for the Oxford Philosophical Society. In later works,
there’s a reference to naturalism, which is more serious. Refs.: The keyword
should be ‘naturalism,’ but also Grice’s diatribes against ‘physicalism,’ and
of course the ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural,’ BANC.
lapis
philosophorum: alchemy:
a quasi-scientific practice and mystical art, mainly ancient and medieval, that
had two broad aims: to change baser metals into gold and to develop the elixir
of life, the means to immortality. Classical Western alchemy probably
originated in Egypt in the first three centuries A.D. with earlier Chin. and
later Islamic and variants and was
practiced in earnest in Europe by such figures as Paracelsus and Newton until
the eighteenth century. Western alchemy addressed concerns of practical
metallurgy, but its philosophical significance derived from an early Grecian
theory of the relations among the basic elements and from a
religious-allegorical understanding of the alchemical transmutation of ores
into gold, an understanding that treats this process as a spiritual ascent from
human toward divine perfection. The purification of crude ores worldly matter
into gold material perfection was thought to require a transmuting agent, the
philosopher’s stone, a mystical substance that, when mixed with alcohol and swallowed,
was believed to produce immortality spiritual perfection. The alchemical search
for the philosopher’s stone, though abortive, resulted in the development of
ultimately useful experimental tools e.g., the steam pump and methods e.g.,
distillation.
piaget: philosopher who profoundly
influenced questions, theories, and methods in the study of cognitive
development. The philosophical interpretation and implications of his work,
however, remain controversial. Piaget regarded himself as engaged in genetic
epistemology, the study of what knowledge is through an empirical investigation
of how our epistemic relations to objects are improved. Piaget hypothesized
that our epistemic relations are constructed through the progressive
organization of increasingly complex behavioral interactions with physical
objects. The cognitive system of the adult is neither learned, in the
Skinnerian sense, nor genetically preprogrammed. Rather, it results from the
organization of specific interactions whose character is shaped both by the
features of the objects interacted with a process called accommodation and by
the current cognitive system of the child a process called assimilation. The
tendency toward equilibrium results in a change in the nature of the
interaction as well as in the cognitive system. Of particular importance for
the field of cognitive development were Piaget’s detailed descriptions and
categorizations of changes in the organization of the cognitive system from
birth through adolescence. That work focused on changes in the child’s
understanding of such things as space, time, cause, number, length, weight, and
morality. Among his major works are The Child’s Conception of Number 1, Biology
and Knowledge 7, Genetic Epistemology 0, and Psychology and Epistemology 0.
pico
della mirandola
-- philosopher who wrote a series of 900 theses which he hoped to dispute
publicly in Rome. Thirteen of these theses are criticized by a papal
commission. When Pico defends himself in his “Apologia,” the pope condemns all
900 theses. Pico flees to France, but is imprisoned. On his escape, he returns to
Florence and devotes himself to private study at the swimming-pool at his
villa. He hoped to write a Concord of Plato and Aristotle, but the only part he
was able to complete was “On Being and the One,” – “Blame it on the Toscana!”
-- in which he uses Aquinas and Christianity to reconcile Plato’s and
Aristotle’s views about God’s being and unity. Mirandola is often described as
a syncretist, but in fact he made it clear that the truth of Christianity has
priority over the prisca theologia or ancient wisdom found in the hermetic
corpus and the cabala. Though he was interested in magic and astrology,
Mirandola adopts a guarded attitude toward them in his “Heptaplus,” which
contains a mystical interpretation of Genesis; and in his Disputations Against
Astrology, he rejects them both. The treatise is largely technical, and the
question of human freedom is set aside as not directly relevant. This fact
casts some doubt on the popular thesis that Pico’s philosophy is a celebration
of man’s freedom and dignity. Great weight has been placed on Pico’s “On the
Dignity of Man.” This is a short oration intended as an introduction to the
disputation of his 900 theses – all condemned by the evil pope --, and the
title was suggested by his wife (“She actually suggested, “On the dignity of
woman,” but I found that otiose.””). Mirandola has been interpreted as saying
that man (or woman) is set apart from the rest of creation, and is completely
free to form his (or her) own nature. In fact, as The Heptaplus shows, Pico
sees man as a microcosm containing elements of the angelic, celestial, and
elemental worlds. Man (if not woman) is thus firmly within the hierarchy of
nature, and is a bond and link between the worlds. In the oration, the emphasis
on freedom is a moral one: man is free to choose between good and evil. Grice:
“This irritated Nietzsche so much that he wrote ‘beyond good and evil.’ Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “Goodwill and illwill – must we have both?” Giovanni Pico della Mirandola Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia
libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Heraldic Crown of Spanish Count.svg
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola Pico1.jpg Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Galleria
degli Uffizi Conte di Mirandola e di Concordia Stemma NascitaMirandola, 1463
MorteFirenze, 1494 SepolturaConvento di San Marco, Firenze DinastiaPico
PadreGianFrancesco I, Signore di Mirandola e Conte della Concordia MadreGiulia
Boiardo, Contessa di Scandiano Religionecattolicesimo Giovanni Pico dei conti
della Mirandola e della Concordia, noto come Pico della Mirandola[1]
(Mirandola, 24 febbraio 1463 – Firenze, 17 novembre 1494), è stato un umanista
e filosofo italiano. È l'esponente più conosciuto della dinastia dei
Pico, signori di Mirandola. Indice 1Biografia 1.1Gli studi e
l'attività 1.2La morte 1.3Fama postuma 2Ascendenza 3Dottrina 3.1L'ideale di una
filosofia universale 3.2La dignità dell'uomo 3.3La sapienza della Cabala
3.3.1Critica dell'astrologia 4Opere 5Note 6Bibliografia 6.1Le fonti
cabalistiche di Pico 7Voci correlate 8Altri progetti 9Collegamenti esterni
Biografia L'infanzia di Pico della Mirandola, di Paul Delaroche, 1842,
Museo delle belle arti di Nantes (Francia) Giovanni nacque a Mirandola, presso
Modena, il figlio più giovane di Gianfrancesco I, signore di Mirandola e conte
della Concordia (1415-1467), e sua moglie Giulia, figlia di Feltrino Boiardo,
conte di Scandiano.[2] La famiglia aveva a lungo abitato il castello di
Mirandola, città che si era resa indipendente nel XIV secolo e aveva ricevuto
nel 1414 dall'imperatore Sigismondo il feudo di Concordia. Pur essendo
Mirandola uno stato molto piccolo, i Pico governarono come sovrani indipendenti
piuttosto che come nobili vassalli. I Pico della Mirandola erano strettamente
imparentati agli Sforza, ai Gonzaga e agli Este, e i fratelli di Giovanni
sposarono gli eredi al trono di Corsica, Ferrara, Bologna e Forlì.[2] Durante
la sua vita Giovanni soggiornò in molte dimore. Tra queste, quando visse a
Ferrara, quella che si trovava in via del Turco gli permetteva di essere vicino
agli Strozzi ed ai Boiardo. Epigrafe che ricorda Pico della
Mirandola in via del Turco a Ferrara Gli studi e l'attività Pico compì i suoi
studi fra Bologna, Pavia, Ferrara, Padova e Firenze; mostrò grandi doti nel
campo della matematica e imparò molte lingue, tra cui perfettamente il latino,
il greco, l'ebraico, l'aramaico, l'arabo e il francese. Ebbe anche modo di
stringere rapporti di amicizia con numerose personalità dell'epoca come
Girolamo Savonarola, Marsilio Ficino, Lorenzo il Magnifico, Angelo Poliziano,
Egidio da Viterbo, Girolamo Benivieni, Girolamo Balbi, Yohanan Alemanno, Elia
del Medigo. A Firenze in particolare entrò a far parte della nuova Accademia
Platonica. Nel 1484 si recò a Parigi, ospite della Sorbona, allora centro
internazionale di studi teologici, dove conobbe alcuni uomini di cultura come
Lefèvre d'Étaples, Robert Gaguin e Georges Hermonyme. Ben presto divenne celebre
in tutta Europa e si diceva che avesse una memoria talmente fuori dal comune
che conosceva l'intera Divina Commedia a memoria. Nel 1486 fu a Roma dove
preparò 900 tesi in vista di un congresso filosofico universale (per la cui
apertura compose il De hominis dignitate), che tuttavia non ebbe mai luogo.
Subì infatti alcune accuse di eresia,[3] in seguito alle quali fuggì in Francia
dove venne anche arrestato da Filippo II presso Grenoble e condotto a
Vincennes, per essere tuttavia subito scarcerato. Con l'assoluzione di papa
Alessandro VI, il quale vedeva di buon occhio la volontà di Pico di dimostrare
la divinità di Cristo attraverso la magia e la cabala, nonché godendo della
rete di protezioni dei Medici, dei Gonzaga e degli Sforza, si stabilì quindi
definitivamente a Firenze, continuando a frequentare l'Accademia di
Ficino. La morte Morì per avvelenamento[4] da arsenico[5] il 17 Novembre
1494, all'età di trentun anni,[6] mentre Firenze veniva occupata dalle truppe
francesi di Carlo VIII[7][8] durante la Guerra d'Italia del 1494-1498. Fu
sepolto nel cimitero dei domenicani dentro il convento di San Marco. Le sue
ossa saranno rinvenute da padre Chiaroni nel 1933 accanto a quelle di Angelo
Poliziano e dell'amico Girolamo Benivieni. «Siamo vissuti celebri, o
Ermolao, e tali vivremo in futuro, non nelle scuole dei grammatici, non là dove
si insegna ai ragazzi, ma nelle accolte dei filosofi e nei circoli dei
sapienti, dove non si tratta né si discute sulla madre di Andromaca, sui figli
di Niobe e su fatuità del genere, ma sui principî delle cose umane e
divine.» (Pico della Mirandola) Nel novembre del 2018, più di 500 anni
dopo, uno studio coordinato del dipartimento di Biologia dell'Università di
Pisa, del Reparto Investigazioni Scientifiche dell'Arma dei Carabinieri di
Parma e di studiosi spagnoli, britannici e tedeschi, ha dimostrato che Pico
della Mirandola fu avvelenato con l'arsenico.[5][9] Fama postuma Il
volto di Giovanni Pico ricostruito con le moderne tecniche forensi Di Pico
della Mirandola è rimasta letteralmente proverbiale la prodigiosa memoria: si
dice conoscesse a mente numerose opere su cui si fondava la sua vasta cultura
enciclopedica, e che sapesse recitare la Divina Commedia al contrario, partendo
dall'ultimo verso, impresa che pare gli riuscisse con qualunque poema appena
terminato di leggere.[10] Tutt'oggi è ancora in uso attribuire
l'appellativo "Pico della Mirandola" a chiunque sia dotato di ottima
memoria.[11] Secondo una popolare diceria, Pico della Mirandola avrebbe
avuto una amante o una concubina segreta[12]; tuttavia, si è sostenuto che
potrebbe aver avuto un rapporto amoroso con l'umanista Girolamo Benivieni,
sulla base di alcuni scritti, tra cui sonetti, che quest'ultimo aveva dedicato
a Pico,[13] e di alcune allusioni poco chiare di Savonarola.[12] Pico era
comunque un seguace dell'ideale dell'amor socratico,[12] privo cioè di
contenuti erotici e passionali; anche la figura femminile ricorrente nei suoi
versi viene celebrata su un piano prevalentemente filosofico.[14] Ascendenza
GenitoriNonniBisnonni Giovanni I PicoFrancesco II PicoGianfrancesco I Pico
Caterina BevilacquaGuglielmo BevilacquaTaddea Tarlati Giovanni PicoFeltrino
Boiardo Matteo BoiardoBernardina Lambertini.Giulia BoiardoGuiduccia da
Correggio Gherardo VI da CorreggioDottrina Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola e Agnolo Poliziano, ritratti da Cosimo Rosselli nella Cappella
del Miracolo del Sacramento a Firenze Il pensiero di Pico della Mirandola
si riallaccia al pensiero neoplatonico di Marsilio Ficino, senza però occuparsi
della polemica anti-aristotelica. Al contrario, egli cerca di riconciliare
aristotelismo e platonismo in una sintesi superiore, fondendovi anche altri
elementi culturali e religiosi, come per esempio la tradizione misterica di
Ermete Trismegisto e della cabala.[15] All'interno del testo delle
Conclusiones Pico si scaglia duramente contro Ficino, considerando inefficace
la sua magia naturale perché carente di un legame con le forze superiori nonché
di un'adeguata conoscenza cabalistica.[16] L'ideale di una filosofia
universale Il proposito di Pico, esplicitamente dichiarato ad esempio nel De
ente et uno, consiste infatti nel ricostruire i lineamenti di una filosofia
universale, che nasca dalla concordia fra tutte le diverse correnti di pensiero
sorte sin dall'antichità, accomunate dall'aspirazione al divino e alla
sapienza, e culminanti nel messaggio della Rivelazione cristiana. In questo suo
ecumenismo filosofico, oltre che religioso, vengono accolti non solo i teologi
cristiani ed esoterici insieme a Platone, Aristotele, i neoplatonici e tutto il
sapere gnostico ed ermetico proprio della filosofia greca, ma anche il pensiero
islamico, quello ebraico e appunto cabbalistico, nonché dei mistici di ogni
tempo e luogo.[17] Il congresso da lui organizzato a Roma in vista di una
tale "pace filosofica" avrebbe dovuto inserirsi proprio in questo
progetto culturale basato su una concezione della verità come princìpio eterno
ed universale, al quale ogni epoca della storia ha saputo attingere in misura
in più o meno diversa. In seguito tuttavia ai vari contrasti che gli si
presentarono, sorti a causa della difficoltà di una tale conciliazione, Pico si
accorse che il suo ideale era difficilmente perseguibile; ad esso, a poco a
poco, si sostituirà nella sua mente il proposito riformatore di Girolamo
Savonarola, rivolto al rinnovamento morale, più che culturale, della città di
Firenze. L'armonia universale da lui ricercata in ambito filosofico si
trasformerà così nell'aspirazione religiosa ad una santità e una moralità meno
generica e più attinente al suo particolare momento storico. A differenza di
Ficino, nel Pico emergono dunque nei suoi ultimi anni un maggiore senso di
irrequietezza e una visione più cupa ed esistenziale della vita.[17] La dignità
dell'uomo Ritratto di Pico della Mirandola eseguito da un anonimo del
XVII secolo: xilografia dal libro Della celestiale fisionomia, Padova 1616 Al
centro del suo ideale di concordia universale risalta fortemente il tema della
dignità e della libertà umana. L'uomo infatti, dice Pico, è l'unica creatura
che non ha una natura predeterminata, poiché: «[...] Già il Sommo Padre,
Dio Creatore, aveva foggiato, [...] questa dimora del mondo quale ci appare,
[...]. Ma, ultimata l'opera, l'Artefice desiderava che ci fosse qualcuno capace
di afferrare la ragione di un'opera così grande, di amarne la bellezza, di
ammirarne la vastità. [...] Ma degli archetipi non ne restava alcuno su cui
foggiare la nuova creatura, né dei tesori [...] né dei posti di tutto il mondo
[...]. Tutti erano ormai pieni, tutti erano stati distribuiti nei sommi, nei
medi, negli infimi gradi. [...]» (Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oratio
de hominis dignitate,[18] 1486) Dunque, per Pico, l'uomo non ha affatto una
natura determinata in un qualche grado (alto o basso), bensì: «[...]
Stabilì finalmente l'Ottimo Artefice che a colui cui nulla poteva dare di
proprio fosse comune tutto ciò che aveva singolarmente assegnato agli altri.
Perciò accolse l'uomo come opera di natura indefinita e, postolo nel cuore del
mondo, così gli parlò: -non ti ho dato, o Adamo, né un posto determinato, né un
aspetto proprio, né alcuna prerogativa tua, perché [...] tutto secondo il tuo
desiderio e il tuo consiglio ottenga e conservi. La natura limitata degli altri
è contenuta entro leggi da me prescritte. Tu te la determinerai senza essere
costretto da nessuna barriera, secondo il tuo arbitrio, alla cui potestà ti
consegnai. [...]» (Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oratio de hominis
dignitate[18]) Pico della Mirandola afferma, in sostanza, che Dio ha posto
nell'uomo non una natura determinata, ma una indeterminatezza che è dunque la
sua propria natura, e che si regola in base alla volontà, cioè all'arbitrio
dell'uomo, che conduce tale indeterminatezza dove vuole. Pico aggiunge
poi: «[...] Non ti ho fatto né celeste né terreno, né mortale né
immortale, perché di te stesso quasi libero e sovrano artefice ti plasmassi e
ti scolpissi nella forma che avresti prescelto. Tu potrai degenerare nelle cose
inferiori che sono i bruti; tu potrai, secondo il tuo volere, rigenerarti nelle
cose superiori che sono divine.- [...] Nell'uomo nascente il Padre ripose semi
d'ogni specie e germi d'ogni vita. E a seconda di come ciascuno li avrà
coltivati, quelli cresceranno e daranno in lui i loro frutti. [...] se
sensibili, sarà bruto, se razionali, diventerà anima celeste, se intellettuali,
sarà angelo, e si raccoglierà nel centro della sua unità, fatto uno spirito
solo con Dio, [...].» (Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oratio de hominis dignitate[18])
Giovanni Pico, quindi, sostiene che è l'uomo a «forgiare il proprio destino»,
secondo la propria volontà, e la sua libertà è massima, poiché non è né animale
né angelo, ma può essere l'uno o l'altro secondo la «coltivazione» di alcuni
tra i «semi d'ogni sorta» che vi sono in lui. Questa visione verrà, seppur solo
in parte, ripresa nel 1600 dallo scienziato e filosofo Blaise Pascal, che
afferma che l'uomo non è né «angelo né bestia», e che la sua propria posizione
nel mondo è un punto mediano tra questi due estremi; tale punto mediano, però,
per Pico non è una mediocrità (in parte angelo e in parte bruto) ma è la
volontà (o l'arbitrio) che ci consente di scegliere la nostra posizione. Dunque
l'uomo, per Pico, è la più dignitosa fra tutte le creature, anche più degli
angeli, poiché può scegliere che creatura essere.[19] La sapienza della
Cabala Raffigurazione della Cabala con l'albero della vita Il secondo
grande interesse di Pico è rivolto alla cabala, che viene da lui spiegata come
una fonte di sapienza a cui attingere per decifrare il mistero del mondo, e
nella quale Dio appare oscuro, in quanto apparentemente irraggiungibile dalla
ragione; ma l'uomo può ricavare la massima luce da tale oscurità.[20]
(LA) «Nulla est scientia quae nos magis certificat de divinitate Christi, quam
Magia et Cabala.» (IT) «Non esiste alcuna scienza che possa attestare
meglio la divinità di Cristo che la magia e la cabala.» (Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola, Novecento tesi[21]) Connessa alla sapienza cabbalistica è la
magia: infatti, il mago, per Pico, opererebbe attraverso simboli e metafore di
una realtà assoluta che è oltre il visibile, e dunque, partendo dalla natura,
può giungere a conoscere tale sfera invisibile (ossia metafisica) attraverso la
conoscenza della struttura matematica che è il fondamento simbolico-metaforico
della natura stessa.[22] Critica dell'astrologia Se la magia è giudicata
positivamente da Pico della Mirandola, per quanto riguarda invece l'astrologia
egli ebbe un atteggiamento diverso, che lo portò a distinguere nettamente tra
«astrologia matematica o speculativa», cioè l'astronomia, e l'«astrologia
giudiziale o divinatrice»; mentre la prima ci consente di conoscere la realtà
armonica dell'universo, e dunque è giusta, la seconda crede di poter sottomettere
l'avvenire degli uomini alle congiunture astrali.[23] Partendo
dall'affermazione della piena dignità e libertà dell'uomo, che può scegliere
cosa essere, Pico muove una forte critica a questo secondo tipo di credenze e
di pratiche astrologiche, che costituirebbero una negazione proprio della
dignità e della libertà umane. Secondo Pico, questa scienza astrologica
attribuisce erroneamente ai corpi celesti il potere di influire sulle vicende
umane (fisiche e spirituali), sottraendo tale potere alla Provvidenza divina e
togliendo agli uomini la libertà di scegliere. Egli non nega che un certo
influsso vi possa essere, ma mette in guardia contro il pericolo insito
nell'astrologia di subordinare il superiore (cioè l'uomo) all'inferiore (ossia
la forza astrale). Le vicende dell'esistenza umana sono tanto intrecciate e
complesse che non se ne può spiegare la ragione se non attraverso la piena
libertà d'arbitrio dell'uomo. Opera quae exstant omnia di Pico
della Mirandola stampata nel 1601 Il suo Disputationes adversus astrologiam
divinatricem (tale è il titolo dell'opera a cui Pico si dedicò nell'ultimo
periodo della sua vita) rimase incompiuto e come tale fu pubblicato postumo,
nel 1494, con il commento di Giovanni Manardo; tuttavia, alcuni concetti base furono
ripresi e rielaborati da Girolamo Savonarola nel suo Trattato contra li
astrologi.[24] Opere Ad Hermolaum de genere dicendi philosophorum,
(Lettera a Ermolao Barbaro sul modo di parlare dei filosofi), 1485. Commento
sopra una canzone d'amore di Girolamo Benivieni, 1486. Oratio de hominis
dignitate, (Discorso sulla dignità dell'uomo), 1486. 900 Tesis de omni re
scibili o Conclusiones philosophicae, cabalisticae et theologicae nongentae in
omni genere scientiarum, (900 tesi su tutte le cose conoscibili o Novecento
conclusioni filosofiche, cabalistiche e teologiche in ogni genere di scienze),
1486. Apologia, 1487. Heptaplus: de septiformi sex dierum Geneseos enarratione,
(Heptaplus: della settemplice interpretazione dei sei giorni della Genesi),
1489. Expositiones in Psalmos, 1489. De ente et uno, (L'essere e l'uno), 1491.
Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem, (Dispute contro l'astrologia
divinatrice), 1493. Altre opere Carmina, (Carmi). Auree Epistole. Sonetti.
Duodecim regulae, (Le dodici regole). Duodecim arma spiritualis pugnae, (Le
dodici armi della battaglia spirituale. Duodecim conditiones amantis, (Le
dodici condizioni di un amante). Deprecatoria ad Deum, (Preghiera a Dio). De
omnibus rebus et de quibusdam aliis, (Tutte le cose e alcune altre). Secondo
alcuni studi, a Pico della Mirandola sarebbe da attribuire anche la paternità
dell’Hypnerotomachia Poliphili (Amoroso combattimento onirico di
Polifilo).[25] Note ^ Sebbene egli preferisse farsi chiamare Conte della
Concordia Miroslav Marek, Genealogy.eu, su Pico family, 16 settembre
2002. URL consultato il 9 marzo 2008. ^ Fu in particolare il cardinale spagnolo
Pedro Grazias, dopo essere intervenuto presso i reali di Spagna Isabella e
Ferdinando, ad essere incaricato da papa Innocenzo VIII di confutarne
l'Apologia. ^ Pico della Mirandola "fu avvelenato", caso risolto 500
anni dopo, in Gazzetta di Modena, 2017-09. G. Gallello et al.
"Poisoning histories in the Italian renaissance: The case of Pico Della
Mirandola and Angelo Poliziano", Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine,
vol. 56, 2018, pp. 83-89. ^ Già all'epoca della morte si vociferò che Pico
fosse stato avvelenato (cfr. Simon Critchley, Il libro dei filosofi morti,
Garzanti, 2009, p. 143). ^ Recenti indagini condotte a Ravenna dall'équipe del
professor Giorgio Gruppioni dell'Università di Bologna avrebbero riscontrato
elevati livelli di arsenico nei campioni di tessuti e di ossa prelevati dalle
spoglie del filosofo, che avvalorerebbero la tesi dell'avvelenamento per la sua
morte (cfr. Delitti e misteri del passato, a cura di L. Garofano, S. Vinceti,
G. Gruppioni, Rizzoli, Milano 2008 ISBN 978-88-17-02191-3; e Malcolm Moore,
Medici philosopher's mysterious death is solved, The Daily Telegraph, Londra
2008). ^ Secondo lo storico dell'arte Silvano Vicenti, il presunto
avvelenamento di Pico della Mirandola, la cui morte finora si riteneva fosse
stata causata dalla sifilide, sarebbe avvenuto ad opera della stessa mano che
due mesi prima avrebbe ucciso Angelo Poliziano, legato a Pico da grande amicizia
(Rainews: Pico della Mirandola e Poliziano assassinati con l'arsenico) ^
Risolto il giallo della morte di Pico della Mirandola, Università di Pisa, 15
novembre 2018. URL consultato il 15 novembre 2018. ^ La Memoria Straordinaria
di Pico della Mirandola, articolo su Notizie.it. ^ Enciclopedia Treccani.it
alla voce omonima. Robert Aldrich, Garry Wotherspoon, Who's who in Gay
and Lesbian History: From Antiquity to World War II, pp. 412-3, Routledge,
2005. ^ Girolamo Benivieni fece porre anche una lapide sulle spoglie di Pico
della Mirandola tumulate nella chiesa di San Marco a Firenze. Sul fronte della
tomba è tuttora inciso: «Qui giace Giovanni Mirandola, il resto lo sanno anche
il Tago e il Gange e forse perfino gli Antipodi. Morì nel 1494 e visse 32 anni.
Girolamo Benivieni, affinché dopo la morte la separazione di luoghi non
disgiunga le ossa di coloro i cui animi in vita congiunse Amore, dispose
d'essere sepolto nella terra qui sotto. Morì nel 1542, visse 89 anni e 6
mesi.» Sul retro invece, in posizione poco visibile, è riportato
l'epitaffio: «Girolamo Benivieni per Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e se stesso
pose nell'anno 1532. Io priego Dio Girolamo che 'n pace così in ciel sia
il tuo Pico congiunto come 'n terra eri, et come 'l tuo defunto corpo hor con
le sacr'ossa sue qui iace» ^ Eugenio Garin, Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola: vita e dottrina, Le Monnier, 1937, p. 18. ^ Kurt Zeller, Pico della
Mirandola e l'aristolelismo rinascimentale, edizioni Luria, 1979. ^ Frances
Yates Giordano Bruno e la tradizione ermetica Laterza p.101 ISBN
978-88-420-9239-1 U. Perone, C. Ciancio, Storia del pensiero filosofico,
II, pagg. 31-32, SEI, Torino 1975. Edizione a cura di Eugenio Garin,
Vallecchi, 1942, pagg. 105-109. ^ Sul richiamo di Pascal a Pico della Mirandola,
cfr. B. Pascal, Colloquio con il Signore di Saci su Epitteto e Montagne in B.
Pascal, Pensieri, a cura di Paolo Serini, Einaudi, Torino 1967, pagg. 423–439.
^ François Secret, I cabbalisti cristiani del Rinascimento, trad. it., Arkeios,
Roma 2002. ^ Conclusiones nongentae. Le novecento tesi dell'anno 1486, a cura
di Albano Biondi, Studi pichiani, vol. 1, FIrenze Olschki 1995,
"Conclusiones Magicae numero XXVI, secundum opinione propria", numero
9. ^ Fra le tesi redatte in vista del congresso filosofico di Roma, Pico ad
esempio scriveva: «Non vi è scienza che ci dia maggiori certezze sulla divinità
del Cristo della magia e della cabala» (cit. da F. Secret, ibidem, e in Zenit
studi. Pico della Mirandola e la cabala cristiana). ^ «Per Pico, la natura è una
correlazione misteriosa di forze occulte che l'uomo può conoscere tramite
l'astrologia e controllare tramite la magia. [...] Pico distingue due tipi di
astrologia - matematica e divinatrice - e naga il valore della seconda» (G.
Granata, Filosofia, vol. II, pag. 13, Alpha Test, Milano 2001). ^ Lo stesso
Savonarola sostenne di aver scritto il suo trattato «in corroborazione delle
refutazione astrologice del Signor conte Joan Pico della Mirandola» (cit. in
Romeo De Maio, Riforme e miti nella Chiesa del Cinquecento, pag. 40, Guida
editori, Napoli 1992). ^ Indizi e prove: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e
Alberto Pio da Carpi nella genesi dell’Hypnerotomachia Poliphili. Bibliografia
Questo testo proviene in parte dalla relativa voce del progetto Mille anni di scienza
in Italia, opera del Museo Galileo. Istituto Museo di Storia della Scienza di
Firenze (home page), pubblicata sotto licenza Creative Commons CC-BY-3.0 Opere
(LA) Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Opere, Lodovico Mazzali, 1506. URL
consultato il 9 aprile 2015. (LA) Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Opere. 1,
Basileae, per Sebastianum Henricpetri, 1601. (LA) Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola, Opere. 2, Basileae, per Sebastianum Henricpetri, 1601. Doctissimi
Viri Ioannis Pici Mirandulae, Concordiae comitis, Exactissima expositio in
orationem dominicam, Officina S. Bernardini, 1537 Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola, Apologia. L'autodifesa di Pico di fronte al Tribunale
dell'Inquisizione, a cura di Paolo Edoardo Fornaciari, SISMEL (Società
internazionale per lo studio del Medioevo latino) Edizioni del Galluzzo,
Firenze 2010 Giuseppe Barone (a cura di), Antologia Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola, Virgilio Editore, Milano 1973 Studi Dario Bellini, La profezia
di Pico della Mirandola. Oltre la cinquantesima porta, Sometti editore, 2009
ISBN 978-88-7495-319-6 Giulio Busi, Vera relazione sulla vita e i fatti di
Giovanni Pico, conte della Mirandola, Aragno, 2010 Ernst Cassirer, Individuo e
cosmo nella filosofia del Rinascimento [1927], trad. it., La Nuova Italia,
Firenze 1974 (FR) Henri-Marie de Lubac, Pic de la Mirandole. Études et
discussions, Aubier Montaigne, Parigi 1974, trad. it. di Giuseppe Colombo, Pico
della Mirandola. L'alba incompiuta del Rinascimento, Jaca Book, Milano 1994
Vincenzo Di Giovanni, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia del
Rinascimento e della filosofia in Italia, Palermo, Boccone del Povero, 1894,
pp. 232. Fabrizio Frigerio, "Il commento di Pico della Mirandola alla
Canzona d'Amore di Gerolamo Benivieni" (PDF), Conoscenza Religiosa, Firenze,
1974, n. 4, pp. 402–422. Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri, Pico della
Mirandola, Casale Monferrato, Edizioni Piemme, 1999, pp. 208, ISBN
88-384-4160-X. Eugenio Garin, L'Umanesimo italiano [1947], Laterza, Bari 1990
(FR) Thomas Gilbhard, Paralipomena pichiana: a propos einer Pico–Bibliographie,
in «Accademia. Revue de la Société Marsile Ficin», VII, 2005, pp. 81–94
Salvatore Puledda, Interpretazioni dell'Umanesimo, Associazione Multimage, 1997
Leonardo Quaquarelli, Zita Zanardi, Pichiana. Bibliografia delle edizioni e
degli studi, in "Studi pichiani 10", Olschki, Firenze 2005 Alberto
Sartori, Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, Filosofia, teologia, concordia,
Edizioni Messaggero Padova, 2017 (FR) Stéphane Toussaint, L'esprit du
Quattrocento. Pic de la Mirandole, le "De Ente et Uno" & réponses
à Antonio Cittadini, testo latino e trad. fr., Honoré Champion Editeur, Parigi
1995 Paola Zambelli, L'apprendista stregone. Astrologia, cabala e arte lulliana
in Pico della Mirandola e seguaci, Saggi Marsilio, Venezia 1995 Le fonti
cabalistiche di Pico (EN) The Great Parchment. Flavius Mithridates' Latin
Translation, the Hebrew Text, and an English Version, a cura di Giulio Busi,
Maria Simonetta Bondoni Pastorio, Saverio Campanini, appartenente alla collana
"The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola", 1, Nino
Aragno Editore, Torino 2004 (EN) Saverio Campanini, Talmud, Philosophy,
Kabbalah: A Passage from Pico della Mirandola's Apologia and its Source, in M.
Perani (ed.), The Words of a Wise Man's Mouth are Gracious. Festschrift for
Günter Stemberger on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, W. De Gruyter Verlag,
Berlino–New York 2005, pp. 429–447 (EN) The Book of Bahir. Flavius Mithridates'
Latin Translation, the Hebrew Text, and an English Version, a cura di Saverio Campanini,
in "The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola", 2,
Nino Aragno Editore, Torino 2005 Giulio Busi, "Chi non ammirerà il nostro
camaleonte?" La biblioteca cabbalistica di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola,
in G. Busi, L'enigma dell'ebraico nel Rinascimento, Nino Aragno Editore, Torino
2007, pp. 25–45 Saverio Campanini, Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada (alias Flavio
Mitridate) traduttore di opere cabbalistiche, in Mauro Perani (a cura di),
Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada alias Flavio Mitridate. Un ebreo converso siciliano,
Officina di Studi Medievali, Palermo 2008, pp. 49–88 (EN) The Gate of Heaven.
Flavius Mithridates' Latin Translation, the Hebrew Text, and an English
Version, a cura di Susanne Jurgan e Saverio Campanini, con un testo di Giulio
Busi, in "The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola",
5, Nino Aragno Editore, Torino 2012 ISBN 9788884195449 Saverio Campanini (ed.),
Four Short Kabbalistic Treatises, "The Kabbalistic Library of Giovanni
Pico della Mirandola" 6, Fondazione Palazzo Bondoni Pastorio, Castiglione
delle Stiviere 2019. Voci correlate Cabala cristiana Marsilio Ficino Filosofia
rinascimentale Mirandola Umanesimo Prisca theologia Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina in lingua
latina dedicata a Giovanni Pico della Mirandola Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote
contiene citazioni di o su Giovanni Pico della Mirandola Collabora a Wikimedia
Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola Collegamenti esterni Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, su Treccani.it –
Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica
su Wikidata Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (DE)
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, su ALCUIN, Università di Ratisbona. Modifica su
Wikidata Opere di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola / Giovanni Pico della Mirandola
(altra versione) / Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (altra versione), su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (FR)
Bibliografia su Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, su Les Archives de littérature
du Moyen Âge. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in
Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. Modifica su Wikidata (EN)
Spartiti o libretti di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, su International Music Score
Library Project, Project Petrucci LLC. Modifica su Wikidata Il Centro
Internazionale di Cultura Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, su
picodellamirandola.it. Pico della Mirandola e l'Umanesimo, su
web.tiscalinet.it. Pico della Mirandola e la cabala cristiana, su
vrijmetselaarsgilde.eu. Pico della Mirandola nel progetto biblioteche dei
filosofi, su picus.unica.it. The Pico Project, su brown.edu. progetto
dell'Università di Bologna e della Brown University per rendere completo,
accessibile e leggibile il Discorso sulla dignità dell'uomo Pico della
Mirandola, Orazione sulla dignità dell'essere umano (1486), prima parte, su
panarchy.org. (LA) I "Carmina" e l'"Oratio de hominis
dignitate", su thelatinlibrary.com. (EN) The Kabbalistic Library of
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, su pico-kabbalah.eu. V · D · M Platonici
Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 34491108 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1024 5931 · SBN
IT\ICCU\CFIV\022983 · Europeana agent/base/206 · LCCN (EN) n50019730 · GND (DE)
118742418 · BNF (FR) cb12128375p (data) · BNE (ES) XX898932 (data) · ULAN (EN)
500341594 · NLA (EN) 35747158 · BAV (EN) 495/36709 · CERL cnp01238589 · NDL
(EN, JA) 00452781 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n50019730 Biografie Portale
Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Umanisti italianiFilosofi
italiani del XV secoloNati nel 1463Morti nel 1494Nati il 24 febbraioMorti il 17
novembreNati a MirandolaMorti a FirenzeGiovanni Pico della MirandolaNobili
italiani del XV secoloPicoStudenti dell'Università di BolognaStudenti
dell'Università degli Studi di FerraraStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di
PadovaStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di PaviaAlchimisti italianiCabalisti
italianiEbraisti italianiFilosofi cristianiPersonaggi legati a
un'antonomasiaNeoplatoniciScrittori in lingua latinaMembri dell'Accademia
neoplatonicaMnemonistiUomini universaliMorti per avvelenamento[altre] Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Pico: the dignity
of man," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa
Grice, Liguria, Italia.
pico della mirandola, Gianfranco: Important
if unjustly neglected, murdered, Italian philosopher. Giovanni Francesco Pico
della Mirandola (1470-1533) è stato un italiano nobile e il filosofo , il
nipote di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola . Il suo nome è in genere troncato come
Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola .
Contenuto 1 Biografia 2Opere
scelte 3Fonti 4Collegamenti esterni Biografia Gianfrancesco era figlio di
Galeotto I Pico , signore di Mirandola , e Bianca Maria d'Este , figlia di
Niccolò III d'Este . Come lo zio si dedica
principalmente alla filosofia, ma ha reso soggetto alla Bibbia, anche se nei
suoi trattati, De monolocale divinae et Humanæ Sapientiæ e in particolare nei
sei libri intitolati Examen doctrinæ Vanitatis gentium , si deprezza l'autorità
dei filosofi, al di sopra tutti Aristotele . Ha scritto una biografia
dettagliata di suo zio, pubblicato nel 1496, e un altro di Girolamo Savonarola
, di cui era un seguace. Avendo
osservato i pericoli a cui la società italiana è stata esposta, al momento, ha
lanciato un avvertimento in occasione del Concilio Lateranense : Joannis
Francisci Pici Oratio ad Leonem X et concilium Lateranense de reformandis
Ecclesiæ Moribus (Hagenau, 1512, dedicato a Willibald Pirckheimer ) . Morì a Mirandola nel 1533, assassinato dal
nipote Galeotto , insieme a suo figlio più giovane, Alessandro. L'altro figlio
Giantommaso è stato ambasciatore a Papa Clemente VII . Charles B. Schmitt ha
scritto: Mentre Giovanni Pico aveva
spesso sostenuto che tutte le filosofie e le religioni hanno raggiunto una
parte della verità, Gianfrancesco detto, in effetti, che tutte le religioni e
tutte le filosofie - salva la religione cristiana da soli - sono semplici
raccolte di falsità confusi e internamente incoerenti. In possesso di un tale
punto di vista, si schiera non solo con Savonarola, ma con alcuni dei padri e
con i riformatori pure. Su questo punto, era insistente. Il cristianesimo è una
realtà auto-sussistente e che ha poco o nulla da guadagnare dalla filosofia, le
scienze e le arti. Questa tesi centrale si diffonde attraverso quasi l'intera
produzione letteraria di Gianfrancesco. Egli scrive di non lodare o estendere
il regno della filosofia, ma di demolirlo.
Steepto Le opere selezionate De
studio di Divinae et humanae philosophiae (1496) Ioannis Pici Mirandulae Vita
(1496) De imaginatione (1501) De Providentia Dei (1508) De rerum praenotione
(1506-1507) Quaestio de falsitate Astrologiae (ca. 1510) Examen Vanitatis
gentium doctrinae, et veritatis Christianae disciplinae (1520) Libro Detto
strega o delle illusioni del demonio (1524) Opera Omnia (1573) fonti
Wikisource-logo.svg Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). " Giovanni Francesco
Pico della Mirandola ". Enciclopedia Cattolica . New York: Robert Appleton
Company. Burke, Peter. (1977). "Stregoneria e Magia in Italia del
Rinascimento: Gianfrancesco Pico e la sua Strix, " di Sydney Anglod, ed.
The Damned Art: Saggi in letteratura di Magia, pp 32-48.. Londra. Herzig, T.
(2003). "La reazione dei demoni alla sodomia: Magia e omosessualità in
Strix di Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola." Il Cinquecento Journal , 34,
1, 53. Kors, Alan Charles e Edward Peters. (2001) La stregoneria in Europa,
400-1700: Una storia Documentario. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press (Estratti dal Pico Strix ., Pp 239-44) Schmitt, CB (1967). Gianfrancesco
Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533) e la sua critica di Aristotele. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff. Pappalardo, L. (2015). "Gianfrancesco Pico della
Mirandola: Fede, Immaginazione e scetticismo" (Nutrix, 8), Turnhout: Brepols
Publishers. link esterno Opere di Giovanni Francesco Pico della Mirandola a
Progetto Gutenberg Opere di o su Giovanni Francesco Pico della Mirandola a
Internet Archive Giovan Francesco Pico: panoramica biografica presso il Centro
Internazionale di Cultura "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola"
Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533) e la sua critica di Aristotele |
Charles B. Schmitt | Springer . This page is based on the copyrighted Wikipedia
article "Giovanni_Francesco_Pico_della_Mirandola"Refs: Luigi Speranza,
"Grice e Pico," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool
Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia -- Gianfranco Pico della Mirandola.
pigliucci: important Italian philosopher. Massimo Pigliucci Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump
to navigationJump to search Massimo Pigliucci Massimo Pigliucci
(Monrovia, 16 gennaio 1964[1]) è un accademico, filosofo, blogger nonché
divulgatore scientifico italiano naturalizzato statunitense. Pigliucci è
professore di filosofia al CUNY-City College di New York[2], è stato
co-conduttore del podcast Rationally Speaking (Parlando razionalmente)[3] e
redattore capo della rivista online Scientia Salon.[4] Pigliucci è un deciso
critico della pseudoscienza[5][6] e del creazionismo[7] ed un sostenitore del
secolarismo[8] e della educazione scientifica.[9] Indice 1Biografia
2Pensiero critico e scetticismo scientifico 2.1Rationally Speaking 3Libri
3.1Articoli 4Note 5Voci correlate 6Altri progetti 7Collegamenti esterni
Biografia Pigliucci è nato a Monrovia, Liberia, ma è cresciuto a Roma.[1] Ha
conseguito il dottorato in genetica all'Università degli Studi di Ferrara,
Italia, un Ph. D. in biologia dell'Università del Connecticut e un Ph. D. in
filosofia della scienza dall'Università del Tennessee.[10]; è socio di American
Association for the Advancement of Science (Associazione americana per
l'avanzamento della scienza) e di Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.[1] Pigliucci
è stato professore di ecologia e evoluzione all'Università di Stony Brook
compiendo ricerche sulla plasticità fenotipica, le interazioni
genotipo-ambiente, la selezione naturale e i vincoli imposti sulla selezione
naturale da parte del corredo genetico e dello sviluppo degli organismi.[11]
Nel 1997, ha ricevuto il premio Theodosius Dobzhansky,[12] conferito annualmente
dalla Society for the Study of Evolution (Associazione per lo studio
dell'evoluzione)[1]. Come filosofo, si è interessato alla struttura e ai
fondamenti della teoria dell'evoluzione, alla relazione tra scienza e filosofia
e alla relazione tra la scienza e la religione[10] ed è un sostenitore della
sintesi evolutiva estesa.[13] Pigliucci scrive regolarmente sullo
Skeptical Inquirer sui temi di negazionismo o scetticismo del cambiamento
climatico, disegno intelligente, pseudoscienza e filosofia.[14] Ha scritto per
Philosophy Now e ha un blog intitolato "Rationally Speaking (Parlando
razionalmente)". Ha contrastato "i negazionisti dell'evoluzione"
(creazionismo della Terra Giovane e sostenitori del disegno intelligente), tra
cui i creazionisti della terra giovane Duane Gish e Kent Hovind, i sostenitori
del disegno intelligente William Dembski e Jonathan Wells, in molte
occasioni.[15][16][17][18] Pensiero critico e scetticismo
scientifico Michael Shermer, Julia Galef e Massimo Pigliucci durante una
registrazione dal vivo a Northeast Conference on Science and Skepticism
(Conferenza del nord-est sulla scienza e sullo scetticismo), 2013 Pur essendo
ateo,[19] Pigliucci non crede che la scienza richieda di essere atei, se si
ammettono due distinzioni: la distinzione tra naturalismo metodologico e
naturalismo filosofico e la distinzione tra giudizi di valore e le questioni di
fatto. Crede che molti scienziati ed insegnanti di scienze non apprezzino tali
differenze.[9] Pigliucci ha criticato gli scrittori Nuovi Atei per aver
sostenuto quello che lui considera scientismo (sebbene escluda il filosofo
Daniel Dennett da questa accusa).[20] In una discussione del suo libro Answers
for Aristotle: How science and philosophy can lead us to a more meaningful life
(Risposte per Aristotele: come la scienza e la filosofia possono condurci ad
una vita più ricca di significato), Pigliucci ha detto al conduttore del
podcast Skepticality, Derek Colanduno, “Aristotele era il primo pensatore
antico a prendere sul serio l'idea che hai bisogno di fatti empirici, e che hai
bisogno di un approccio basato sull'evidenza nel mondo, e che devi essere in
grado di riflettere sul significato di quei fatti....Se vuoi delle risposte a
delle domande morali, non chiedi al neurobiologo, non chiedi al biologo
dell'evoluzione, chiedi al filosofo.”[21] Pigliucci descrive la missione
degli scettici, facendo riferimento al libro di Carl Sagan Il mondo infestato
dai demoni: La scienza e il nuovo oscurantismo dicendo “Ciò che fanno gli
scettici è tenere accesa quella candela e cercare di diffonderla il più
possibile.”[22] Pigliucci fa parte del consiglio di NYC Skpetics e fa parte del
comitato consultivo di Secular Coalition for America (Coalizione secolare per
l'America).[8] Nel 2001, ha preso parte a un dibattito sull'esistenza di
Dio con William Lane Craig.[23] Massimo Pigliucci ha criticato l'articolo
di giornale di Papa Francesco intitolato Un dialogo aperto con i non-credenti
(An open dialogue with non-believers). Secondo Pigliucci l'articolo assomigliava
più ad un monologo che ad un dialogo, e ha indirizzato una risposta personale a
Papa Francesco nella quale ha scritto che il papa ha solo offerto ai
non-credenti "una riaffermazione di fantasie senza fondamento riguardo a
Dio e a suo Figlio...seguite da affermazioni confuse tra il concetto d'amore e
di verità, il tutto condito da una significativa dose di revisionismo storico e
negazione degli aspetti più brutti della tua Chiesa (noterai che non ho nemmeno
menzionato la pedofilia!).”[24] Rationally Speaking Nell'agosto 2000
Pigliucci ha iniziato una rubrica su internet intitolata Rationally Speaking
(Parlando razionalmente). Nell'agosto 2005, la rubrica è diventata un blog,[25]
dove ha scritto fino a marzo 2014.[26] Dal 1º febbraio 2010 Pigliucci co-conduce
il podcast bi-settimanale Rationally Speaking con Juilia Galef, che ha
conosciuto al Northeast Conference on Science and Skepticism (Conferenza del
nord-est sulla scienza e sullo scetticismo), tenuta nel settembre 2009.[27] Il
podcast è prodotto da New York City skeptics (Scettici della città di New
York). Il programma vede la partecipazione di ricercatori, divulgatori
scientifici ed insegnanti per presentare libri o discutere di temi di attualità
su temi di filosofia e scienza. In una puntata del 2010, Neil deGrasse Tyson
descrisse la necessità di finanziare con denaro pubblico i programmi spaziali.
La trascrizione della puntata venne poi pubblicata nel libro Space Chronicles
(Cronache Spaziali).[28] In un altro episodio Tyson spiegò la propria opinione
sul significato di essere ateo, poi commentata in una trasmissione di NPR.[29]
Pigliucci ha poi lasciato il podcast per dedicarsi ad altri
interessi.[30] Libri Copertina di Philosophy of Pseudoscience (EN)
Schlichting, Carl e Pigliucci, Massimo, Phenotypic evolution : a reaction norm
perspective, Sunderland, Mass., Sinauer, 1998. (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo, Tales
of the Rational : Skeptical Essays About Nature and Science, Freethought Press,
2000, ISBN 978-1-887392-11-2. (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo, Phenotypic Plasticity:
Beyond Nature and Nurture , Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, ISBN
978-0-8018-6788-0. (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo, Denying Evolution: Creationism,
Scientism, and the Nature of Science, Sinauer, 2002, ISBN 0-87893-659-9. (EN)
Pigliucci, Massimo e Preston, Katherine, Phenotypic Integration: Studying the
Ecology and Evolution of Complex Phenotypes, Oxford University Press, 2004,
ISBN 978-0-19-516043-7. (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo e Kaplan, Jonathan, Making
Sense of Evolution: The Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Biology ,
University of Chicago Press, 2006, ISBN=978-0-226-66837-6). (EN) Pigliucci,
Massimo e Muller, Gerd B., Evolution: The Extended Synthesis, MIT Press, 2010,
ISBN 978-0-262-51367-8. (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo, Nonsense on Stilts: How to
Tell Science from Bunk, University of Chicago Press, 2010, ISBN
978-0-226-66786-7. (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo, Answers for Aristotle: How Science
and Philosophy Can Lead Us to a More Meaningful Life, Basic Books, 2012, ISBN
978-0-465-02138-3. (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo e Boudry, Maarten, Philosophy of
Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem, University of Chicago
Press, 2013, ISBN 978-0-226-05196-3. Articoli Di seguito sono pochi articoli di
Pigliucci. (EN) M. Pigliucci, Is evolutionary psychology a
pseudoscience?, in Skeptical Inquirer, vol. 30, n. 2, 2006, pp. 23–24. (EN) M.
Pigliucci, Science and fundamentalism, in EMBO reports, vol. 6, n. 12, 2005,
pp. 1106–1109, DOI:10.1038/sj.embor.7400589. (EN) M. Pigliucci, The power and
perils of metaphors in science, in Skeptical Inquirer, vol. 29, n. 5, 2005, pp.
20–21. (EN) M. Pigliucci, What is philosophy of science good for?, in
Philosophy Now, vol. 44, gennaio-febbraio 2004, p. 45. (EN) Pigliucci M, Bossu
C, Crouse P, Dexter T, Hansknecht K e Muth N, The alleged fallacies of
evolutionary theory, in Philosophy Now, vol. 46, maggio-giugno 2004, pp. 36–39.
Altri articoli si possono trovare sui siti web personali (vedere
"Collegamenti esterni" sotto). Note Massimo Pigliucci — Curriculum
Vitae (PDF), su lehman.edu. URL consultato il 24 novembre 2015 (archiviato
dall'url originale il 17 aprile 2015). ^ (EN) www.ccny.cuny.edu,
https://www.ccny.cuny.edu/profiles/massimo-pigliucci. URL consultato il 24
novembre 2015. ^ (EN) Rationally Speaking Podcast, su
rationallyspeakingpodcast.org. ^ (EN) Scientia Salon, su
scientiasalon.wordpress.com. ^ (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo e Boudry, Maarten,
Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem, University
of Chicago Press, 2013, ISBN 978-0-226-05196-3. ^ (EN) Pigliucci, Massimo, The
Dangers of Pseudoscience, in The New York Times, 10 ottobre 2013. ^ (EN)
Pigliucci, Massimo, Denying evolution: Creationism, scientism, and the nature
of science, Sunderland, MA, Sinauer Associates, 2002. (EN) Secular Coalition
for America Advisory Board Biography, su secular.org. URL consultato il 28
novembre 2015 (archiviato dall'url originale il 22 novembre 2015). (EN)
M. Pigliucci, Science and fundamentalism, in EMBO reports, vol. 6, n. 12, 2005,
pp. 1106–1109, DOI:10.1038/sj.embor.7400589. Massimo Pigliucci — Short
Bio (PDF), su lehman.edu. URL consultato il 28 novembre 2015 (archiviato
dall'url originale il 17 aprile 2012). ^ (EN) Massimo Pigliucci — Selected
Papers, su lehman.edu. URL consultato il 28 novembre 2015 (archiviato dall'url
originale il 5 agosto 2012). ^ (EN) Society for the Study of Evolution —
Description of Awards, su evolutionsociety.org. URL consultato il 28 novembre
2015 (archiviato dall'url originale il 25 ottobre 2015). ^ (EN) Wade, Michael
J., The Neo-Modern Synthesis: The Confluence of New Data and Explanatory
Concepts, in BioScience, n. 61, 2011, pp. 407-408. ^ (EN) Massimo Pigliucci,
Committee for Skeptical Inquiry. URL consultato il 28 novembre 2015 (archiviato
dall'url originale il 21 novembre 2015). ^ (EN) Massimo Pigliucci, Denying
evolution: creationism, scientism, and the nature of science, Sunderland,
Mass., Sinauer Associates, 2002, ISBN 0-87893-659-9. ^ (EN) Evolution Debate —
Pigliucci vs Hovind, Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science, 31
gennaio 2007. URL consultato il 16 dicembre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale
l'11 giugno 2013). ^ (EN) CV of William Dembski, su designinference.com. URL
consultato il 1° gennaio 2014 (archiviato dall'url originale il 26 gennaio
2015). ^ (EN) Evolution and Intelligent Design: Pigliucci vs Wells, Uncommon
Knowledge, 14 gennaio 2005. URL consultato il 17 luglio 2008 (archiviato
dall'url originale l'8 marzo 2008). ^ (EN) Massimo Pigliucci, Excommunicated by
the Atheists!, su rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com, 18 agosto 2008. ^ (EN)
Pigliucci, M., New Atheism and the Scientistic Turn in the Atheism Movement
(PDF), in Midwest Studies In Philosophy, vol. 37, n. 1, pp. 142–153. ^ (EN)
Derek Colanduno, Should You Answer Aristotle?, Skeptic Magazine, 13 febbraio
2013. URL consultato il 14 maggio 2014. ^ (EN) Richard Saunders, The Skeptic
Zone #101, su http://skepticzone.tv/, 24 settembre 2010. URL consultato il 20
luglio 2014. ^ Moreland, J.P. (2013). Debating Christian Theism. USA: Oxford
University Press. ISBN 978-0199755431. ^ (EN) Massimo Pigliucci, Dear Pope, su
Rationally Speaking, 20 settembre 2013. ^ (EN) Massimo Pigliucci, Welcome,
everyone!, su rationallyspeaking.blogspot.nl, 1º agosto 2005. ^ (EN) Massimo
Pigliucci, So long, and thanks for all the fish, su
rationallyspeaking.blogspot.nl, 20 marzo 2014. ^ Todd Stiefel e Amanda K.
Metskas, Julia Galef, The Humanist, 22 maggio 2013. URL consultato il 3 marzo
2015. ^ (EN) Jennifer Culp, Neil DeGrasse Tyson, Great Science Writers Series,
The Rosen Publishing Group, 2014, p. 74, ISBN 978-1-4777-7692-6. ^ (EN) Tania
Lombrozo, What If Atheists Were Defined By Their Actions?, NPR, 8 dicembre
2014. URL consultato il 4 marzo 2015. ^ (EN) RS128 - 5th Anniversary Live Show,
su Rationally Speaking, New York City Skeptics, 27 febbraio 2015. URL
consultato il 20 ottobre 2015. Voci correlate Committee for Skeptical Inquiry
Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Massimo Pigliucci Collegamenti esterni Plato's
Footnote – Pagina web di Pigliucci Rationally Speaking – blog di Pigliucci
sullo scetticismo scientifico skepticism e sull'umanismo. Dr. Pigliucci's
Rationally Speaking Podcast Massimo Pigliucci su Secular Web Philosophy &
Theory in Biology(Filosofia e Teoria in Biologia), su
philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org. Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 77472624 ·
ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2282 1422 · Europeana agent/base/145843 · LCCN (EN)
n98036590 · GND (DE) 13235053X · BNF (FR) cb135963268 (data) · BNE (ES)
XX1100957 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n98036590 Areligiosità Portale
Areligiosità Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Scienza e
tecnica Portale Scienza e tecnica Categorie: Accademici italiani del XX
secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloAccademici statunitensiFilosofi
italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloFilosofi statunitensi del
XX secoloFilosofi statunitensi del XXI secoloBlogger italianiBlogger
statunitensiNati nel 1964Nati il 16 gennaioNati a MonroviaGenetisti italianiStudenti
dell'Università degli Studi di FerraraBiologi italianiUmanisti italianiFilosofi
ateiProfessori dell'Università di New York[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Pigliucci," per il
Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia
pilgrimage: Grice’s
pilgrimage. In his pilgrimage towards what he calls the city of Eternal Truth
he finds twelve perils – which he lists. The first is Extensionalism (as
opposed to Intensionalism – vide intentum -- consequentes
rem intellectam: intendere est
essentialiter ipsum esse intentio ...
quam a concepto sibi adequato: Odint 226; esse intentum est esse non reale: The second is
Nominalism (opposite Realism and Conceptualism – Universalism, Abstractionism).
It is funny that Grice was criticised for representing each of the perils!The
third is Positivism. Opposite to Negativism. Just kidding. Opposite to anything Sir Freddie Ayer was
opposite to!The fourth is Naturalism. Opposite Non-Naturalism. Just joking! But
that’s the hateful word brought by G. E. Moore, whom Grice liked (“Some like
Witters, but Moore’s MY man.”) The fifth is Mechanism. Opposite Libertarianism,
or Finalism, But I guess one likes Libertarianism.The sixth is Phenomenalism.
You cannot oppose it to Physicalism, beause that comes next. So this is G. A.
Paul (“Is there a problem about sense data?). And the opposite is anything this
Scots philosopher was against!The seventh is Reductionism. Opposite
Reductivism. Grice was proud to teach J. M. Rountree the distinction between a
benevolent reductionist and a malignant eliminationist reductionist. The eighth
is physicalism.Opposite metaphysicalism.
The ninth is materialism. Hyleism. Opposite Formalism. Or Immaterialism.
The tenth is Empiricism. Opposite Rationalism. The eleventh is
Scepticism.Opposite Dogmatism.and the twelfth is functionalism. Opposite Grice!
So now let’s order the twelve perils alphabetically. Empiricism.
Extensionalism. Functionalism. MaterialismMechanism. Naturalism. Nominalism.
Phenomenalism. Positivism. Physicalism. Reductionism. Scepticism. Now let us
see how they apply to the theory of the conversational implicaturum and
conversation as rational cooperation. Empiricism – Grice is an avowed
rationalist.Extensionalism – His main concern is that the predicate in the
proposition which is communicated is void, we yield the counterintuitive result
that an emissor who communicates that the S is V, where V is vacuous
communicates the same thing he would be communicating for any other vacuous
predicate V’Functionalism – There is a purely experiential qualia in some
emissor communicating that p that is not covered by the common-or-garden
variety of functionalism. E.g. “I love myself.” Materialism – rationalism means
dealing with a realm of noumena which goes beyond materialismMechanism –
rationalism entails end-setting unweighed finality and freedom. Naturalism –
communication involves optimality which is beyond naturalism Nominalism – a
predicate is an abstractum. Phenomenalism – there is realism which gives priority
to the material thing, not the sense datum. A sense datum of an apple does not
nourish us. Positivism – an emissor may communicate a value, which is not
positivistically reduced to something verifiable. Physicalism – there must be
multiple realization, and many things physicalists say sound ‘harsh’ to Grice’s
ears (“Smith’s brain being in state C doesn’t have adequate evidence”).
Reductionism – We are not eliminating anything. Scepticism – there are dogmas
which are derived from paradigm cases, even sophisticated ones.How to introduce
the twelve entriesEmpiricism – from Greek empereia – cf. etymology for English
‘experience.’Extensionalism -- extensumFunctionalism – functum.
Materialism -- Mechanism Naturalism
Nominalism Phenomenalism Positivism Physicalism Reductionism Scepticism. this section events are reviewed according to
principal scenes of action. Place names appear in the order in which major
incidents occur. City of Destruction. The
city stands as a symbol of the entire world as it is, with all of its sins,
corruptions, and sorrows. No one living there can have any hope of salvation.
Convinced that the city is about to be blasted by the wrath of God, Christian
flees and sets out alone on a pilgrimage which he hopes will lead him to Mount Zion,
to the Celestial City, where he can enjoy eternal life in the happy company of
God and the Heavenly Host. Slough of
Despond. A swamp, a bog, a quagmire, the first obstacle in Christian's
course. Pilgrims are apt to get mired down here by their doubts and fears.
After much difficulty and with some providential help, Christian finally
manages to flounder across the treacherous bog and is on his way again. Village of Morality. Near the village
Christian meets Mr. Worldly Wiseman, who, though not religiously inclined, is a
friendly and well-disposed person. He tells Christian that it would be foolish
of him to continue his pilgrimage, the end of which could only be hunger, pain,
and death. Christian should be a sensible fellow and settle down in the Village
of Morality. It would be a good place to raise a family, for living was cheap
there and they would have honest, well-behaved people as neighbors — people who
lived by the Ten Commandments. More than a little tempted by this, Christian
decides that he should at least have a look at Morality. But along the way he
is stopped by his friend Evangelist, who berates him sharply for having
listened to anything Mr. Worldly Wiseman might have to say. If Christian is
seriously interested in saving his soul, he would be well advised to get back
as quickly as possible on the path to the Wicket Gate which Evangelist had
pointed out to him before. Wicket Gate.
Arriving almost out of breath, Christian reads the sign on the gate:
"Knock and it shall be opened unto you." He knocks a number of times
before arousing the gatekeeper, a "grave person" named Good-will, who
comes out to ask what Christian wants. After the latter has explained his
mission, he is let through the gate, which opens on the Holy Way, a straight
and narrow path leading toward the Celestial City. Christian asks if he can now
be relieved of the heavy burden — a sack filled with his sins and woes — that
he has been carrying on his back for so long. Good-will replies that he cannot
help him, but that if all goes well, Christian will be freed of his burden in
due course. Interpreter's House. On
Good-will's advice, Christian makes his first stop at the large house of
Interpreter, a character symbolizing the Holy Spirit. Interpreter shows his
guest a number of "excellent things." These include a portrait of the
ideal pastor with the Bible in his hand and a crown of gold on his head; a
dusty parlor which is like the human heart before it is cleansed with the
Gospel; a sinner in an iron cage, an apostate doomed to suffer the torments of
Hell through all eternity; a wall with a fire burning against it. A figure (the
Devil himself) is busily throwing water on the fire to put it out. But he would
never succeed, Interpreter explains, because the fire represents the divine spirit
in the human heart and a figure on the far side of the wall keeps the fire
burning brightly by secretly pouring oil on it — "the oil of Christ's
Grace." The Cross. Beyond
Interpreter's House, Christian comes to the Cross, which stands on higher ground
beside the Holy Way. Below it, at the foot of the gentle slope, is an open
sepulcher. When Christian stops by the Cross, the burden on his back suddenly
slips from his shoulders, rolls down the slope, and falls into the open
sepulcher, to be seen no more. As Christian stands weeping with joy, three
Shining Ones (angels) appear. They tell him all his sins are now forgiven, give
him bright new raiment to replace his old ragged clothes, and hand him a
parchment, "a Roll with a seal upon it." For his edification and
instruction, Christian is to read the Roll as he goes along, and when he
reaches the Pearly Gates, he is to present it as his credentials a sort of
passport to Heaven, as it were. Difficulty
Hill. The Holy Way beyond the Cross is fenced in with a high wall on
either side. The walls have been erected to force all aspiring Pilgrims to
enter the Holy Way in the proper manner, through the Wicket Gate. As Christian
is passing along, two men — Formalist and Hypocrisy — climb over the wall and
drop down beside him. Christian finds fault with this and gives the
wall-jumpers a lecture on the dangers of trying shortcuts. They have been
successfully taking shortcuts all their lives, the intruders reply, and all
will go well this time. Not too pleased with his company, Christian proceeds
with Hypocrisy and Formalist to the foot of Difficulty Hill, where three paths
join and they must make a choice. One path goes straight ahead up the steep
slope of the hill; another goes around the base of the hill to the right; the
third, around the hill to the left. Christian argues that the right path is the
one leading straight ahead up Difficulty Hill. Not liking the prospect of much
exertion, Formalist and Hypocrisy decide to take the easier way on the level
paths going around the hill. Both get lost and perish. Halfway up Difficulty
Hill, so steep in places that he has to inch forward on hands and knees,
Christian comes to a pleasant arbor provided for the comfort of weary Pilgrims.
Sitting down to rest, Christian reaches into his blouse and takes out his
precious Roll. While reading it, he drops off to sleep, being awakened when he
hears a voice saying sternly: "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her
ways, and be wise." Jumping up, Christian makes with all speed to the top
of the hill, where he meets two Pilgrims coming toward him — Timorous and
Mistrust. They have been up ahead, they say, and there are lions there. They
are giving up their pilgrimage and returning home, and unsuccessfully try to
persuade Christian to come with them. Their report about the lions disturbs
Christian, who reaches into his blouse to get his Roll so that he may read it
and be comforted. To his consternation, the Roll is not there. Carefully
searching along the way, Christian retraces his steps to the arbor, where, as
he recalls, he had been reading the Roll when he allowed himself to doze off in
"sinful sleep." Not finding his treasure immediately, he sits down
and weeps, considering himself utterly undone by his carelessness in losing
"his pass into the Celestial City." When in deepest despair, he
chances to see something lying half-covered in the grass. It is his precious
Roll, which he tucks away securely in his blouse. Having offered a prayer of
thanks "to God for directing his eye to the place where it lay,"
Christian wearily climbs back to the top of Difficulty Hill. From there he sees
a stately building and as it is getting on toward dark, hastens there. Palace Beautiful. A narrow path leads
off the Holy Way to the lodge in front of Palace Beautiful. Starting up the
path, Christian sees two lions, stops, and turns around as if to retreat. The
porter at the lodge, Watchful, who has been observing him, calls out that there
is nothing to be afraid of if one has faith. The lions are chained, one on
either side of the path, and anyone with faith can pass safely between them if
he keeps carefully to the middle of the path, which Christian does. Arriving at
the lodge, he asks if he can get lodging for the night. The porter, Watchful,
replies that he will find out from those in charge of Palace Beautiful. Soon,
four virgins come out to the lodge, all of them "grave and beautiful
damsels": Discretion, Prudence, Piety, and Charity. Satisfied with
Christian's answers to their questions, they invite him in, introduce him to
the rest of the family, serve him supper, and assign him to a beautiful bedroom
— Peace — for the night. Next morning, the virgins show him the
"rarities" of the place: First, the library, filled with ancient
documents dating back to the beginning of time; next, the armory, packed with
swords, shields, helmets, breastplates, and other things sufficient to equip
all servants of the Lord, even if they were as numerous as the stars in the
sky. Leading their guest to the roof of the palace, the virgins point to
mountains in the distance — the Delectable Mountains, which lie on the way to
the Celestial City. Before allowing Christian to depart, the virgins give him
arms and armor to protect himself during the next stretch of his journey, which
they warn will be dangerous. Valley of
Humiliation. Here Christian is attacked and almost overcome by a
"foul fiend" named Apollyon — a hideous monster with scales like a
fish, wings like a dragon, mouth like a lion, and feet like a bear; flames and
smoke belch out of a hole in his belly. Christian, after a painful struggle,
wounds the fiend with his sword and drives him off. Valley of the Shadow of Death. This is a wilderness, a land of
deserts and pits, inhabited only by yowling hobgoblins and other dreadful
creatures. The path here is very narrow, edged on one side by a deep,
water-filled ditch in which many have drowned; on the other side, by a
treacherous bog. Walking carefully, Christian goes on and soon finds himself
close to the open mouth of Hell, the Burning Pit, out of which comes a cloud of
noxious fumes, long fingers of fire, showers of sparks, and hideous noises.
With flames flickering all around and smoke almost choking him, Christian
manages to get through by use of "All-prayer." Nearing the end of the
valley, he hears a shout raised by someone up ahead: "Though I walk
through the Valley of the Shadow of Death, I will fear none ill, for Thou art
with me." As only a Pilgrim could have raised that cry, Christian hastens
forward to see who it might be. To his surprise and delight he finds that it is
an old friend, Faithful, one of his neighbors in the City of Destruction. Vanity Fair. Happily journeying
together, exchanging stories about their adventures and misadventures, the two
Pilgrims come to the town of Vanity Fair, through which they must pass.
Interested only in commerce and money-making, the town holds a year-round fair
at which all kinds of things are bought and sold — "houses, lands, trades,
titles, . . . lusts, pleasures, . . . bodies, souls, silver, gold, pearls,
precious stones, and what not." Christian and Faithful infuriate the
merchandisers by turning up their noses at the wares offered them, saying that
they would buy nothing but the Truth. Their presence and their attitude cause a
hubbub in the town, which leads the authorities to jail them for disturbing the
peace. The prisoners conduct themselves so well that they win the sympathy of
many townspeople, producing more strife and commotion in the streets, and the
prisoners are held responsible for this, too, though they have done nothing. It
is decided to indict them on the charge of disrupting trade, creating
dissension, and treating with contempt the customs and laws laid down for the
town by its prince, old Beelzebub himself. Brought to trial first, Faithful is
convicted and sentenced to be executed in the manner prescribed by the
presiding judge, Lord Hate-good. The hapless Faithful is scourged, brutally
beaten, lanced with knives, stoned, and then burned to ashes at the stake. Thus,
he becomes another of the Christian martyrs assured of enjoying eternal bliss
up on high. Doubting Castle and Giant
Despair. In a manner only vaguely explained, Christian gets free and
goes on his way — but not alone, for he has been joined by Hopeful, a native of
Vanity Fair who is fleeing in search of better things. After a few minor
adventures, the two reach a sparkling stream, the River of the Water of Life,
which meanders through beautiful meadows bright with flowers. For a time the
Holy Way follows the river bank but then veers off into rougher ground which is
hard on the sore tired feet of the travelers. Wishing there were an easier way,
they plod along until they come to another meadow behind a high fence. Having
climbed the fence to have a look, Christian persuades Hopeful that they should
move over into By-path Meadow, where there is a soft grassy path paralleling
theirs. Moving along, they catch up with Vain-confidence, who says that he is
bound for the Celestial City and knows the way perfectly. Night comes on, but
he continues to push ahead briskly, with Christian and Hopeful following.
Suddenly, the latter hear a frightened cry and a loud thud. Vain-confidence has
been dashed to pieces by falling into a deep pit dug by the owner of the meadow.
Christian and Hopeful retreat, but as they can see nothing in the dark, they
decide to lie down in the meadow to pass the night. Next morning, they are
surprised and seized by the prince of By-path Meadow, a giant named Despair.
Charging them with malicious trespassing, he hauls them to his stronghold,
Doubting Castle, and throws them into a deep dark dungeon, where they lie for
days without food or drink. At length, Giant Despair appears, beats them almost
senseless, and advises them to take their own lives so that he will not have to
come back to finish them off himself. When all seems hopeless, Christian
suddenly brightens up, "as one half amazed," and exclaims: "What
a fool am I, thus to lie in a stinking dungeon when I may as well walk at
liberty. I have a key in my bosom called Promise which will (I am persuaded)
open any lock in Doubting Castle." Finding that the magic key works, the
prisoners are soon out in the open and running as fast as they can to get back
onto the Holy Way, where they erect a sign warning other Pilgrims against being
tempted by the apparent ease of traveling by way of By-path Meadow. Delectable Mountains. Christian and
Hopeful next come to the Delectable Mountains, where they find gardens,
orchards, vineyards, and fountains of water. Four shepherds — Experience,
Knowledge, Watchful, and Sincere — come to greet them, telling them that the
mountains are the Lord's, as are the flocks of sheep grazing there. Having been
escorted around the mountains and shown the sights there, the two Pilgrims on
the eve of their departure receive from the shepherds a paper instructing them
on what to do and what to avoid on the journey ahead. For one thing, they
should not lie down and sleep in the Enchanted Ground, for that would be fatal.
Country of Beulah. This is a
happy land where the sun shines day and night, flowers bloom continuously, and
the sweet and pleasant air is filled with bird-song. There is no lack of grain
and wine. Christian and Hopeful stop to rest and enjoy themselves here, pleased
that the Celestial City is now within sight, which leads them to assume that
the way there is now clear. Dark River.
Proceeding, they are amazed when they come to the Dark River, a wide,
swift-flowing stream. They look around for a bridge or boat on which to cross.
A Shining One appears and tells them that they must make their way across as
best they can, that fording the river is a test of faith, that those with faith
have nothing to fear. Wading into the river, Hopeful finds firm footing, but
Christian does not He is soon floundering in water over his head, fearing that
he will be drowned, that he will never see "the land that flows with milk
and honey." Hopeful helps Christian by holding his head above water, and
the two finally achieve the crossing. Celestial
City. On the far side of the river, two Shining Ones are waiting for the
Pilgrims and take them by the arm to assist them in climbing the steep slope to
the Celestial City, which stands on a "mighty hill . . . higher than the
clouds." Coming to the gate of the city, built all of precious stones,
Christian and Hopeful present their credentials, which are taken to the King
(God). He orders the gate to be opened, and the two weary but elated Pilgrims
go in, to find that the streets are paved with gold and that along them walk
many men with crowns on their heads and golden harps in their hands.
Placitvm
-- hedonism,
the view that pleasure including the absence of pain is the sole intrinsic good
in life. The hedonist may hold that, questions of morality aside, persons
inevitably do seek pleasure psychological hedonism; that, questions of
psychology aside, morally we should seek pleasure ethical hedonism; or that we
inevitably do, and ought to, seek pleasure ethical and psychological hedonism
combined. Psychological hedonism itself admits of a variety of possible forms.
One may hold, e.g., that all motivation is based on the prospect of present or
future pleasure. More plausibly, some philosophers have held that all choices
of future actions are based on one’s presently taking greater pleasure in the
thought of doing one act rather than another. Still a third type of
hedonism with roots in empirical
psychology is that the attainment of
pleasure is the primary drive of a wide range of organisms including human
beings and is responsible, through some form of conditioning, for all acquired
motivations. Ethical hedonists may, but need not, appeal to some form of
psychological hedonism to buttress their case. For, at worst, the truth of some
form of psychological hedonism makes ethical hedonism empty or inescapable but not false. As a value theory a theory of
what is ultimately good, ethical hedonism has typically led to one or the other
of two conceptions of morally correct action. Both of these are expressions of
moral consequentialism in that they judge actions strictly by their
consequences. On standard formulations of utilitarianism, actions are judged by
the amount of pleasure they produce for all sentient beings; on some
formulations of egoist views, actions are judged by their consequences for
one’s own pleasure. Neither egoism nor utilitarianism, however, must be wedded
to a hedonistic value theory. A hedonistic value theory admits of a variety of
claims about the characteristic sources and types of pleasure. One contentious
issue has been what activities yield the greatest quantity of pleasure with prominent candidates including
philosophical and other forms of intellectual discourse, the contemplation of
beauty, and activities productive of “the pleasures of the senses.” Most
philosophical hedonists, despite the popular associations of the word, have not
espoused sensual pleasure. Another issue, famously raised by J. S. Mill, is
whether such different varieties of pleasure admit of differences of quality as
well as quantity. Even supposing them to be equal in quantity, can we say,
e.g., that the pleasures of intellectual activity are superior in quality to
those of watching sports on television? And if we do say such things, are we
departing from strict hedonism by introducing a value distinction not really
based on pleasure at all? Most philosophers have found hedonism both psychological and ethical exaggerated in its claims. One difficulty for
both sorts of hedonism is the hedonistic paradox, which may be put as follows.
Many of the deepest and best pleasures of life of love, of child rearing, of
work seem to come most often to those who are engaging in an activity for
reasons other than pleasure seeking. Hence, not only is it dubious that we
always in fact seek or value only pleasure, but also dubious that the best way
to achieve pleasure is to seek it. Another area of difficulty concerns
happiness and its relation to pleasure.
In the tradition of Aristotle, happiness is broadly understood as something
like well-being and has been viewed, not implausibly, as a kind of natural end
of all human activities. But ‘happiness’ in this sense is broader than
‘pleasure’, insofar as the latter designates a particular kind of feeling,
whereas ‘well-being’ does not. Attributions of happiness, moreover, appear to
be normative in a way in which attributions of pleasure are not. It is thought
that a truly happy person has achieved, is achieving, or stands to achieve,
certain things respecting the “truly important” concerns of human life. Of
course, such achievements will characteristically produce pleasant feelings;
but, just as characteristically, they will involve states of active enjoyment
of activities where, as Aristotle first
pointed out, there are no distinctive feelings of pleasure apart from the doing
of the activity itself. In short, the Aristotelian thesis that happiness is the
natural end of all human activities, even if it is true, does not seem to lend
much support to hedonism psychological
or ethical.
plathegel
and ariskant
– Hegel, “one of the most influential and systematic of the idealists” (Grice),
also well known for his philosophy of history and philosophy of religion. Life
and works. Hegel, the eldest of three children, was born in Stuttgart, the son
of a minor financial official in the court of the Duchy of Württemberg. His
mother died when he was eleven. At eighteen, he began attending the theology
seminary or Stift attached to the at
Tübingen; he studied theology and classical languages and literature and became
friendly with his future colleague and adversary, Schelling, as well as the
great genius of G. Romantic poetry, Hölderlin. In 1793, upon graduation, he
accepted a job as a tutor for a family in Bern, and moved to Frankfurt in 1797
for a similar post. In 1799 his father bequeathed him a modest income and the
freedom to resign his tutoring job, pursue his own work, and attempt to
establish himself in a position. In
1801, with the help of Schelling, he moved to the town of Jena, already widely known as the
home of Schiller, Fichte, and the Schlegel brothers. After lecturing for a few
years, he became a professor in 1805. Prior to the move to Jena, Hegel’s essays
had been chiefly concerned with problems in morality, the theory of culture, and
the philosophy of religion. Hegel shared with Rousseau and the G. Romantics
many doubts about the political and moral implications of the European
Enlightenment and modern philosophy in general, even while he still
enthusiastically championed what he termed the principle of modernity,
“absolute freedom.” Like many, he feared that the modern attack on feudal
political and religious authority would merely issue in the reformulation of
new internalized and still repressive forms of authority. And he was among that
legion of G. intellectuals infatuated with ancient Greece and the superiority
of their supposedly harmonious social life, compared with the authoritarian and
legalistic character of the Jewish and later Christian religions. At Jena,
however, he coedited a journal with Schelling, The Critical Journal of
Philosophy, and came to work much more on the philosophic issues created by the
critical philosophy or “transcendental idealism” of Kant, and its legacy in the
work of Rheinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. His written work became much more
influenced by these theoretical projects and their attempt to extend Kant’s
search for the basic categories necessary for experience to be discriminated
and evaluated, and for a theory of the subject that, in some non-empirical way,
was responsible for such categories. Problems concerning the completeness,
interrelation, and ontological status of such a categorial structure were quite
prominent, along with a continuing interest in the relation between a free,
self-determining agent and the supposed constraints of moral principles and
other agents. In his early years at Jena especially before Schelling left in
1803, he was particularly preoccupied with this problem of a systematic
philosophy, a way of accounting for the basic categories of the natural world
and for human practical activity that would ground all such categories on
commonly presupposed and logically interrelated, even interdeducible,
principles. In Hegel’s terms, this was the problem of the relation between a “Logic”
and a “Philosophy of Nature” and “Philosophy of Spirit.” After 1803, however,
while he was preparing his own systematic philosophy for publication, what had
been planned as a short introduction to this system took on a life of its own
and grew into one of Hegel’s most provocative and influential books. Working at
a furious pace, he finished hedonistic paradox Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
365 AM
365 what would be eventually called The Phenomenology of Spirit in a
period of great personal and political turmoil. During the final writing of the
book, he had learned that Christina Burkhard would give birth to his
illegitimate son. Ludwig was born in February 1807. And he is supposed to have
completed the text on October 13, 1807, the day Napoleon’s armies captured
Jena. It was certainly an unprecedented work. In conception, it is about the
human race itself as a developing, progressively more self-conscious subject,
but its content seems to take in a vast, heterogeneous range of topics, from
technical issues in empiricist epistemology to the significance of burial
rituals. Its range is so heterogeneous that there is controversy to this day
about whether it has any overall unity, or whether it was pieced together at
the last minute. Adding to the interpretive problem, Hegel often invented his
own striking language of “inverted worlds,” “struggles to the death for
recognition,” “unhappy consciousness,” “spiritual animal kingdoms,” and
“beautiful souls.” Continuing his career
at Jena in those times looked out of the question, so Hegel accepted a job at
Bamberg editing a newspaper, and in the following year began an eight-year
stint 180816 as headmaster and philosophy teacher at a Gymnasium or secondary
school at Nürnberg. During this period, at forty-one, he married the
twenty-year-old Marie von Tucher. He also wrote what is easily his most
difficult work, and the one he often referred to as his most important, a
magisterial two-volume Science of Logic, which attempts to be a philosophical
account of the concepts necessary in all possible kinds of account-givings.
Finally, in 1816, Hegel was offered a chair in philosophy at the of Heidelberg, where he published the first
of several versions of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, his own
systematic account of the relation between the “logic” of human thought and the
“real” expression of such interrelated categories in our understanding of the
natural world and in our understanding and evaluation of our own activities. In
1818, he accepted the much more prestigious post in philosophy at Berlin, where
he remained until his death in 1831. Soon after his arrival in Berlin, he began
to exert a powerful influence over G. letters and intellectual life. In 1821,
in the midst of a growing political and nationalist crisis in Prussia, he
published his controversial book on political philosophy, The Philosophy of
Right. His lectures at the were later
published as his philosophy of history, of aesthetics, and of religion, and as
his history of philosophy. Philosophy. Hegel’s most important ideas were formed
gradually, in response to a number of issues in philosophy and often in
response to historical events. Moreover, his language and approach were so
heterodox that he has inspired as much controversy about the meaning of his
position as about its adequacy. Hence any summary will be as much a summary of
the controversies as of the basic position. His dissatisfactions with the
absence of a public realm, or any forms of genuine social solidarity in the G.
states and in modernity generally, and his distaste with what he called the
“positivity” of the orthodox religions of the day their reliance on law,
scripture, and abstract claims to authority, led him to various attempts to
make use of the Grecian polis and classical art, as well as the early Christian
understanding of love and a renewed “folk religion,” as critical foils to such
tendencies. For some time, he also regarded much traditional and modern
philosophy as itself a kind of lifeless classifying that only contributed to
contemporary fragmentation, myopia, and confusion. These concerns remained with
him throughout his life, and he is thus rightly known as one of the first
modern thinkers to argue that what had come to be accepted as the central
problem of modern social and political life, the legitimacy of state power, had
been too narrowly conceived. There are now all sorts of circumstances, he
argued, in which people might satisfy the modern criterion of legitimacy and
“consent” to the use of some power, but not fully understand the terms within
which such issues are posed, or assent in an attenuated, resentful,
manipulated, or confused way. In such cases they would experience no connection
between their individual will and the actual content of the institutions they
are supposed to have sanctioned. The modern problem is as much alienation
Entfremdung as sovereignty, an exercise of will in which the product of one’s
will appears “strange” or “alien,” “other,” and which results in much of modern
life, however chosen or willed, being fundamentally unsatisfying. However,
during the Jena years, his views on this issue changed. Most importantly,
philosophical issues moved closer to center stage in the Hegelian drama. He no
longer regarded philosophy as some sort of self-undermining activity that
merely prepared one for some leap into genuine “speculation” roughly
Schelling’s position and began to champion a unique kind of comprehensive, very
determinate reflection on the interrelations among all the various classical alternatives
in philosophy. Much more controversially, he also attempted to understand the
way in which such relations and transitions were also reflected in the history
of the art, politics, and religions of various historical communities. He thus
came to think that philosophy should be some sort of recollection of its past
history, a realization of the mere partiality, rather than falsity, of its past
attempts at a comprehensive teaching, and an account of the centrality of these
continuously developing attempts in the development of other human
practices.Through understanding the “logic” of such a development, a
reconciliation of sorts with the implications of such a rational process in
contemporary life, or at least with the potentialities inherent in contemporary
life, would be possible. In all such influences and developments, one
revolutionary aspect of Hegel’s position became clearer. For while Hegel still
frequently argued that the subject matter of philosophy was “reason,” or “the
Absolute,” the unconditioned presupposition of all human account-giving and
evaluation, and thereby an understanding of the “whole” within which the
natural world and human deeds were “parts,” he also always construed this claim
to mean that the subject matter of philosophy was the history of human
experience itself. Philosophy was about the real world of human change and
development, understood by Hegel to be the collective self-education of the
human species about itself. It could be this, and satisfy the more traditional ideals
because, in one of his most famous phrases, “what is actual is rational,” or
because some full account could be given of the logic or teleological order,
even the necessity, for the great conceptual and political changes in human
history. We could thereby finally reassure ourselves that the way our species
had come to conceptualize and evaluate is not finite or contingent, but is
“identical” with “what there is, in truth.” This identity theory or Absolute
Knowledgemeans that we will then be able to be “at home” in the world and so
will have understood what philosophers have always tried to understand, “how
things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest
possible sense of the term.” The way it all hangs together is, finally, “due to
us,” in some collective and historical and “logical” sense. In a much disputed
passage in his Philosophy of Religion lectures, Hegel even suggested that with
such an understanding, history itself would be over. Several elements in this
general position have inspired a good deal of excitement and controversy. To
advance claims such as these Hegel had to argue against a powerful, deeply
influential assumption in modern thought: the priority of the individual,
self-conscious subject. Such an assumption means, for example, that almost all
social relations, almost all our bonds to other human beings, exist because and
only because they are made, willed into existence by individuals otherwise
naturally unattached to each other. With respect to knowledge claims, while
there may be many beliefs in a common tradition that we unreflectively share
with others, such shared beliefs are also taken primarily to be the result of
individuals continuously affirming such beliefs, however implicitly or
unreflectively. Their being shared is simply a consequence of their being
simultaneously affirmed or assented to by individuals. Hegel’s account requires
a different picture, an insistence on the priority of some kind of collective
subject, which he called human “spirit” or Geist. His general theory of
conceptual and historical change requires the assumption of such a collective
subject, one that even can be said to be “coming to self-consciousness” about
itself, and this required that he argue against the view that so much could be
understood as the result of individual will and reflection. Rather, he tried in
many different ways to show that the formation of what might appear to an
individual to be his or her own particular intention or desire or belief
already reflected a complex social inheritance that could itself be said to be
evolving, even evolving progressively, with a “logic” of its own. The
completion of such collective attempts at self-knowledge resulted in what Hegel
called the realization of Absolute Spirit, by which he either meant the
absolute completion of the human attempt to know itself, or the realization in
human affairs of some sort of extrahuman transcendence, or full expression of
an infinite God. Hegel tried to advance all such claims about social subjectivity
without in some way hypostatizing or reifying such a subject, as if it existed
independently of the actions and thoughts of individuals. This claim about the
deep dependence of individuals on one another even for their very identity,
even while they maintain their independence, is one of the best-known examples
of Hegel’s attempt at a dialectical resolution of many of the traditional
oppositions and antinomies of past thought. Hegel often argued that what
appeared to be contraries in philosophy, such as mind/body,
freedom/determinism, idealism/materialism, universal/particular, the state/the
individual, or even God/man, appeared such incompatible alternatives only
because of the undeveloped and so incomplete perspective within which the
oppositions were formulated. So, in one of his more famous attacks on such
dualisms, human freedom according to Hegel could not be understood coherently
as some purely rational self-determination, independent of heteronomous
impulses, nor the human being as a perpetual opposition between reason and
sensibility. In his moral theory, Kant had argued for the latter view and Hegel
regularly returned to such Kantian claims about the opposition of duty and
inclination as deeply typical of modern dualism. Hegel claimed that Kant’s
version of a rational principle, the “categorical imperative,” was so formal
and devoid of content as not to be action-guiding it could not coherently rule
in or rule out the appropriate actions, and that the “moral point of view”
rigoristically demanded a pure or dutiful motivation to which no human agent
could conform. By contrast, Hegel claimed that the dualisms of morality could
be overcome in ethical life Sittlichkeit, those modern social institutions
which, it was claimed, provided the content or true “objects” of a rational
will. These institutions, the family, civil society, and the state, did not
require duties in potential conflict with our own substantive ends, but were
rather experienced as the “realization” of our individual free will. It has
remained controversial what for Hegel a truly free, rational
self-determination, continuous with, rather than constraining, our desire for
happiness and self-actualization, amounted to. Many commentators have noted
that, among modern philosophers, only Spinoza, whom Hegel greatly admired, was
as insistent on such a thoroughgoing compatibilism, and on a refusal to adopt
the Christian view of human beings as permanently divided against themselves.
In his most ambitious analysis of such oppositions Hegel went so far as to
claim that, not only could alternatives be shown to be ultimately compatible
when thought together within some higher-order “Notion” Begriff that resolved
or “sublated” the opposition, but that one term in such opposition could
actually be said to imply or require its contrary, that a “positing” of such a
notion would, to maintain consistency, require its own “negating,” and that it
was this sort of dialectical opposition that could be shown to require a
sublation, or Aufhebung a term of art in Hegel that simultaneously means in G.
‘to cancel’, ‘to preserve’, and ‘to raise up’. This claim for a dialectical
development of our fundamental notions has been the most severely criticized in
Hegel’s philosophy. Many critics have doubted that so much basic conceptual
change can be accounted for by an internal critique, one that merely develops
the presuppositions inherent in the affirmation of some notion or position or
related practice. This issue has especially attracted critics of Hegel’s Science
of Logic, where he tries first to show that the attempt to categorize anything
that is, simply and immediately, as “Being,” is an attempt that both “negates
itself,” or ends up categorizing everything as “Nothing,” and then that this
self-negation requires a resolution in the higher-order category of “Becoming.”
This analysis continues into an extended argument that purports to show that
any attempt to categorize anything at all must ultimately make use of the
distinctions of “essence” and “appearance,” and elements of syllogistic and
finally Hegel’s own dialectical logic, and both the details and the grand
design of that project have been the subject of a good deal of controversy.
Unfortunately, much of this controversy has been greatly confused by the popular
association of the terms “thesis,” “antithesis,” and “synthesis” with Hegel’s
theory of dialectic. These crude, mechanical notions were invented in 1837 by a
less-than-sensitive Hegel expositor, Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, and were never
used as terms of art by Hegel. Others have argued that the tensions Hegel does
identify in various positions and practices require a much broader analysis of
the historical, especially economic, context within which positions are
formulated and become important, or some more detailed attention to the
empirical discoveries or paradoxes that, at the very least, contribute to basic
conceptual change. Those worried about the latter problem have also raised
questions about the logical relation between universal and particular implied
in Hegel’s account. Hegel, following Fichte, radicalizes a Kantian claim about
the inaccessibility of pure particularity in sensations Kant had written that
“intuitions without concepts are blind”. Hegel charges that Kant did not draw
sufficiently radical conclusions from such an antiempiricist claim, that he
should have completely rethought the traditional distinction between “what was
given to the mind” and “what the mind did with the given.” By contrast Hegel is
confident that he has a theory of a “concrete universal,” concepts that cannot
be understood as pale generalizations or abstract representations of given
particulars, because they are required for particulars to Hegel, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 368
AM 368 be apprehended in the
first place. They are not originally dependent on an immediate acquaintance
with particulars; there is no such acquaintance. Critics wonder if Hegel has
much of a theory of particularity left, if he does not claim rather that particulars,
or whatever now corresponds to them, are only interrelations of concepts, and
in which the actual details of the organization of the natural world and human
history are deduced as conceptual necessities in Hegel’s Encyclopedia. This
interpretation of Hegel, that he believes all entities are really the thoughts,
expressions, or modes of a single underlying mental substance, and that this
mind develops and posits itself with some sort of conceptual necessity, has
been termed a panlogicism, a term of art coined by Hermann Glockner, a Hegel
commentator in the first half of the twentieth century. It is a much-disputed
reading. Such critics are especially concerned with the implications of this
issue in Hegel’s political theory, where the great modern opposition between
the state and the individual seems subjected to this same logic, and the
individual’s true individuality is said to reside in and only in the political
universal, the State. Thus, on the one hand, Hegel’s political philosophy is
often praised for its early identification and analysis of a fundamental, new
aspect of contemporary life the
categorically distinct realm of political life in modernity, or the
independence of the “State” from the social world of private individuals
engaged in competition and private association “civil society”. But, on the
other hand, his attempt to argue for a completion of these domains in the
State, or that individuals could only be said to be free in allegiance to a
State, has been, at least since Marx, one of the most criticized aspects of his
philosophy. Finally, criticisms also frequently target the underlying intention
behind such claims: Hegel’s career-long insistence on finding some basic unity
among the many fragmented spheres of modern thought and existence, and his
demand that this unity be articulated in a discursive account, that it not be
merely felt, or gestured at, or celebrated in edifying speculation.
PostHegelian thinkers have tended to be suspicious of any such intimations of a
whole for modern experience, and have argued that, with the destruction of the
premodern world, we simply have to content ourselves with the disconnected,
autonomous spheres of modern interests. In his lecture courses these basic
themes are treated in wide-ranging accounts of the basic institutions of
cultural history. History itself is treated as fundamentally political history,
and, in typically Hegelian fashion, the major epochs of political history are
claimed to be as they were because of the internal inadequacies of past epochs,
all until some final political semiconsciousness is achieved and realized. Art
is treated equally developmentally, evolving from symbolic, through
“classical,” to the most intensely self-conscious form of aesthetic
subjectivity, romantic art. The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion embody
these themes in some of the most controversial ways, since Hegel often treats
religion and its development as a kind of picture or accessible
“representation” of his own views about the relation of thought to being, the
proper understanding of human finitude and “infinity,” and the essentially
social or communal nature of religious life. This has inspired a characteristic
debate among Hegel scholars, with some arguing that Hegel’s appropriation of
religion shows that his own themes are essentially religious if an odd,
pantheistic version of Christianity, while others argue that he has so
Hegelianized religious issues that there is little distinctively religious
left. Influence. This last debate is typical of that prominent in the
post-Hegelian tradition. Although, in the decades following his death, there
was a great deal of work by self-described Hegelians on the history of law, on
political philosophy, and on aesthetics, most of the prominent academic
defenders of Hegel were interested in theology, and many of these were
interested in defending an interpretation of Hegel consistent with traditional
Christian views of a personal God and personal immortality. This began to
change with the work of “young Hegelians” such as D. F. Strauss 180874,
Feuerbach 180472, Bruno Bauer 180982, and Arnold Ruge 180380, who emphasized
the humanistic and historical dimensions of Hegel’s account of religion,
rejected the Old Hegelian tendencies toward a reconciliation with contemporary
political life, and began to reinterpret and expand Hegel’s account of the
productive activity of human spirit eventually focusing on labor rather than
intellectual and cultural life. Strauss himself characterized the fight as
between “left,” “center,” and “right” Hegelians, depending on whether one was
critical or conservative politically, or had a theistic or a humanistic view of
Hegelian Geist. The most famous young or left Hegelian was Marx, especially
during his days in Paris as coeditor, with Ruge, of the Deutsch-französischen
Jahrbücher 1844. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
369 AM
369 In Great Britain, with its long skeptical, empiricist, and
utilitarian tradition, Hegel’s work had little influence until the latter part
of the nineteenth century, when philosophers such as Green and Caird took up
some of the holistic themes in Hegel and developed a neo-Hegelian reading of
issues in politics and religion that began to have influence in the academy.
The most prominent of the British neo-Hegelians of the next generation were
Bosanquet, McTaggart, and especially Bradley, all of whom were interested in
many of the metaphysical implications of Hegel’s idealism, what they took to be
a Hegelian claim for the “internally related” interconnection of all
particulars within one single, ideal or mental, substance. Moore and Russell
waged a hugely successful counterattack in the name of traditional empiricism
and what would be called “analytic philosophy” against such an enterprise and
in this tradition largely finished off the influence of Hegel or what was left
of the historical Hegel in these neo-Hegelian versions. In G.y, Hegel has
continued to influence a number of different schools of neo-Marxism, sometimes
itself simply called “Hegelian Marxism,” especially the Frankfurt School, or
“critical theory” group especially Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse. And he has
been extremely influential in France, particularly thanks to the lectures of a
brilliant if idiosyncratic Russian émigré, Alexander Kojève, who taught Hegel
in the 0s at the École Pratique des Hautes Études to the likes of Merleau-Ponty
and Lacan. Kojève was as much influenced by Marx and Heidegger as Hegel, but
his lectures inspired many thinkers to turn again to Hegel’s account of human
selfdefinition in time and to the historicity of all institutions and practices
and so forged an unusual link between Hegel and postwar existentialism.
Hegelian themes continue to resurface in contemporary hermeneutics, in
“communitarianism” in ethics, and in the increasing attention given to
conceptual change and history in the philosophy of science. This has meant for
many that Hegel should now be regarded not only as the origin of a distinctive
tradition in European philosophy that emphasizes the historical and social
nature of human existence, but as a potential contributor to many new and often
interdisciplinary approaches to philosophy.
platonic --: Grice: “At Oxford you HAVE to
be platonic! Aristotelian is jaded!” -- H. P. Grice as a Platonian commentator
– vide his “Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and Plato’s Republic” --
commentaries on Plato, a term designating the works in the tradition of
commentary hypomnema on Plato that may go back to the Old Academy Crantor is
attested by Proclus to have been the first to have “commented” on the Timaeus.
More probably, the tradition arises in the first century B.C. in Alexandria,
where we find Eudorus commenting, again, on the Timaeus, but possibly also if
the scholars who attribute to him the Anonymous Theaetetus Commentary are
correct on the Theaetetus. It seems also as if the Stoic Posidonius composed a
commentary of some sort on the Timaeus. The commentary form such as we can
observe in the biblical commentaries of Philo of Alexandria owes much to the
Stoic tradition of commentary on Homer, as practiced by the second-century B.C.
School of Pergamum. It was normal to select usually consecutive portions of
text lemmata for general, and then detailed, comment, raising and answering “problems”
aporiai, refuting one’s predecessors, and dealing with points of both doctrine
and philology. By the second century A.D. the tradition of Platonic commentary
was firmly established. We have evidence of commentaries by the Middle
Platonists Gaius, Albinus, Atticus, Numenius, and Cronius, mainly on the
Timaeus, but also on at least parts of the Republic, as well as a work by
Atticus’s pupil Herpocration of Argos, in twentyfour books, on Plato’s work as
a whole. These works are all lost, but in the surviving works of Plutarch we
find exegesis of parts of Plato’s works, such as the creation of the soul in
the Timaeus 35a36d. The Latin commentary of Calcidius fourth century A.D. is
also basically Middle Platonic. In the Neoplatonic period after Plotinus, who
did not indulge in formal commentary, though many of his essays are in fact
informal commentaries, we have evidence of much more comprehensive exegetic
activity. Porphyry initiated the tradition with commentaries on the Phaedo,
commentaries on Plato commentaries on Plato 160 160 Cratylus, Sophist, Philebus, Parmenides
of which the surviving anonymous fragment of commentary is probably a part, and
the Timaeus. He also commented on the myth of Er in the Republic. It seems to
have been Porphyry who is responsible for introducing the allegorical
interpretation of the introductory portions of the dialogues, though it was
only his follower Iamblichus who also commented on all the above dialogues, as
well as the Alcibiades and the Phaedrus who introduced the principle that each
dialogue should have only one central theme, or skopos. The tradition was
carried on in the Athenian School by Syrianus and his pupils Hermeias on the
Phaedrus surviving and Proclus
Alcibiades, Cratylus, Timaeus, Parmenides
all surviving, at least in part, and continued in later times by
Damascius Phaedo, Philebus, Parmenides and Olympiodorus Alcibiades, Phaedo,
Gorgias also surviving, though sometimes
only in the form of pupils’ notes. These commentaries are not now to be valued
primarily as expositions of Plato’s thought though they do contain useful
insights, and much valuable information; they are best regarded as original
philosophical treatises presented in the mode of commentary, as is so much of
later Grecian philosophy, where it is not originality but rather faithfulness
to an inspired master and a great tradition that is being striven for. Platonism Platonism -- Damascius c.462c.550,
Grecian Neoplatonist philosopher, last head of the Athenian Academy before its
closure by Justinian in A.D. 529. Born probably in Damascus, he studied first
in Alexandria, and then moved to Athens shortly before Proclus’s death in 485.
He returned to Alexandria, where he attended the lectures of Ammonius, but came
back again to Athens in around 515, to assume the headship of the Academy.
After the closure, he retired briefly with some other philosophers, including
Simplicius, to Persia, but left after about a year, probably for Syria, where
he died. He composed many works, including a life of his master Isidorus, which
survives in truncated form; commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, On the
Heavens, and Meteorologics I all lost; commentaries on Plato’s Alcibiades,
Phaedo, Philebus, and Parmenides, which survive; and a surviving treatise On
First Principles. His philosophical system is a further elaboration of the
scholastic Neoplatonism of Proclus, exhibiting a great proliferation of
metaphysical entities. Platonism --
Eudoxus, Grecian astronomer and mathematician, a student of Plato. He created a
test of the equality of two ratios, invented the method of exhaustion for
calculating areas and volumes within curved boundaries, and introduced an
astronomical system consisting of homocentric celestial spheres. This system
views the visible universe as a set of twenty-seven spheres contained one
inside the other and each concentric to the earth. Every celestial body is
located on the equator of an ideal eudaimonia Eudoxus of Cnidus 291 291 sphere that revolves with uniform speed
on its axis. The poles are embedded in the surface of another sphere, which
also revolves uniformly around an axis inclined at a constant angle to that of
the first sphere. In this way enough spheres are introduced to capture the
apparent motions of all heavenly bodies. Aristotle adopted the system of
homocentric spheres and provided a physical interpretation for it in his
cosmology. R.E.B. Euler diagram, a logic diagram invented by the mathematician
Euler that represents standard form statements in syllogistic logic by two circles
and a syllogism by three circles. In modern adaptations of Euler diagrams,
distributed terms are represented by complete circles and undistributed terms
by partial circles circle segments or circles made with dotted lines: Euler
diagrams are more perspicuous ways of showing validity and invalidity of
syllogisms than Venn diagrams, but less useful as a mechanical test of validity
since there may be several choices of ways to represent a syllogism in Euler
diagrams, only one of which will show that the syllogism is invalid. Plato: preeminent Grecian philosopher whose
chief contribution consists in his conception of the observable world as an
imperfect image of a realm of unobservable and unchanging “Forms,” and his
conception of the best life as one centered on the love of these divine
objects. Life and influences. Born in Athens to a politically powerful and
aristocratic family, Plato came under the influence of Socrates during his
youth and set aside his ambitions for a political career after Socrates was executed
for impiety. His travels in southern Italy and Sicily brought him into closer
contact with the followers of Pythagoras, whose research in mathematics played
an important role in his intellectual development. He was also acquainted with
Cratylus, a follower of Heraclitus, and was influenced by their doctrine that
the world is in constant flux. He wrote in opposition to the relativism of
Protagoras and the purely materialistic mode of explanation adopted by
Democritus. At the urging of a devoted follower, Dion, he became involved in
the politics of Syracuse, the wealthiest city of the Grecian world, but his
efforts to mold the ideas of its tyrant, Dionysius II, were unmitigated
failures. These painful events are described in Plato’s Letters Epistles, the
longest and most important of which is the Seventh Letter, and although the
authenticity of the Letters is a matter of controversy, there is little doubt
that the author was well acquainted with Plato’s life. After returning from his
first visit to Sicily in 387, Plato established the Academy, a fraternal
association devoted to research and teaching, and named after the sacred site
on the outskirts of Athens where it was located. As a center for political
training, it rivaled the school of Isocrates, which concentrated entirely on
rhetoric. The bestknown student of the Academy was Aristotle, who joined at the
age of seventeen when Plato was sixty and remained for twenty years. Chronology
of the works. Plato’s works, many of which take the form of dialogues between
Socrates and several other speakers, were composed over a period of about fifty
years, and this has led scholars to seek some pattern of philosophical
development in them. Increasingly sophisticated stylometric tests have been
devised to calculate the linguistic similarities among the dialogues. Ancient
sources indicate that the Laws was Plato’s last work, and there is now
consensus that many affinities exist between the style of this work and several
others, which can therefore also be safely regarded as late works; these
include the Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus perhaps written in that order.
Stylometric tests also support a rough division of Plato’s other works into
early and middle periods. For example, the Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro,
Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, and Protagoras listed alphabetically are widely
thought to be early; while the Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus
perhaps written in that order are agreed to belong to his middle period. But in
some cases it is difficult or impossible to tell which of two works belonging
to the same general period preceded the other; this is especially true of the
early dialogues. The most controversial chronological question concerns the
Timaeus: stylometric tests often place it with the later dialogues, though some
scholars think that its philosophical doctrines are discarded in the later
dialogues, and they therefore assign it to Plato’s middle period. The
underlying issue is whether he abandoned some of the main doctrines of this middle
period. Early and middle dialogues. The early dialogues typically portray an
encounter between Socrates and an interlocutor who complacently assumes that he
understands a common evaluative concept like courage, piety, or beauty. For
example, Euthyphro, in the dialogue that bears his name, denies that there is
any impiety in prosecuting his father, but repeated questioning by Socrates
shows that he cannot say what single thing all pious acts have in common by
virtue of which they are rightly called pious. Socrates professes to have no
answer to these “What is X?” questions, and this fits well with the claim he
makes in the Apology that his peculiarly human form of wisdom consists in
realizing how little he knows. In these early dialogues, Socrates seeks but
fails to find a philosophically defensible theory that would ground our use of
normative terms. The Meno is similar to these early dialogues it asks what virtue is, and fails to find an
answer but it goes beyond them and marks
a transition in Plato’s thinking. It raises for the first time a question about
methodology: if one does not have knowledge, how is it possible to acquire it
simply by raising the questions Socrates poses in the early dialogues? To show
that it is possible, Plato demonstrates that even a slave ignorant of geometry
can begin to learn the subject through questioning. The dialogue then proposes
an explanation of our ability to learn in this way: the soul acquired knowledge
before it entered the body, and when we learn we are really recollecting what
we once knew and forgot. This bold speculation about the soul and our ability
to learn contrasts with the noncommittal position Socrates takes in the
Apology, where he is undecided whether the dead lose all consciousness or
continue their activities in Hades. The confidence in immortality evident in
the Meno is bolstered by arguments given in the Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus.
In these dialogues, Plato uses metaphysical considerations about the nature of
the soul and its ability to learn to support a conception of what the good
human life is. Whereas the Socrates of the early dialogues focuses almost
exclusively on ethical questions and is pessimistic about the extent to which
we can answer them, Plato, beginning with the Meno and continuing throughout
the rest of his career, confidently asserts that we can answer Socratic
questions if we pursue ethical and metaphysical inquiries together. The Forms.
The Phaedo is the first dialogue in which Plato decisively posits the existence
of the abstract objects that he often called “Forms” or “Ideas.” The latter
term should be used with caution, since these objects are not creations of a
mind, but exist independently of thought; the singular Grecian terms Plato
often uses to name these abstract objects are eidos and idea. These Forms are
eternal, changeless, and incorporeal; since they are imperceptible, we can come
to have knowledge of them only through thought. Plato insists that it would be
an error to identify two equal sticks with what Equality itself is, or
beautiful bodies with what Beauty itself is; after all, he says, we might
mistakenly take two equal sticks to be unequal, but we would never suffer from
the delusion that Equality itself is unequal. The unchanging and incorporeal
Form is the sort of object that is presupposed by Socratic inquiry; what every
pious act has in common with every other is that it bears a certain
relationship called “participation” to one and the same thing, the Form of Piety.
In this sense, what makes a pious act pious and a pair of equal sticks equal
are the Forms Piety and Equality. When we call sticks equal or acts pious, we
are implicitly appealing to a standard of equality or piety, just as someone
appeals to a standard when she says that a painted portrait of someone is a
man. Of course, the pigment on the canvas is not a man; rather, it is properly
called a man because it bears a certain relationship to a very different sort
of object. In precisely this way, Plato claims that the Forms are what many of
our words refer to, even though they are radically different sorts of objects
from the ones revealed to the senses. For Plato the Forms are not merely an
unusual item to be added to our list of existing objects. Rather, they are a
source of moral and religious inspiration, and their discovery is therefore a
decisive turning point in one’s life. This process is described by a fictional
priestess named Diotima in the Symposium, a dialogue containing a series of
speeches in praise of love and concluding with a remarkable description of the
passionate response Socrates inspired in Alcibiades, his most notorious
admirer. According to Diotima’s account, those who are in love are searching
for something they do not yet understand; whether they realize it or not, they seek
the eternal possession of the good, and they can obtain it only through
productive activity of some sort. Physical love perpetuates the species and
achieves a lower form of immortality, but a more beautiful kind of offspring is
produced by those who govern cities and shape the moral characteristics of
future generations. Best of all is the kind of love that eventually attaches
itself to the Form of Beauty, since this is the most beautiful of all objects
and provides the greatest happiness to the lover. One develops a love for this
Form by ascending through various stages of emotional attachment and
understanding. Beginning with an attraction to the beauty of one person’s body,
one gradually develops an appreciation for the beauty present in all other beautiful
bodies; then one’s recognition of the beauty in people’s souls takes on
increasing strength, and leads to a deeper attachment to the beauty of customs,
laws, and systems of knowledge; and this process of emotional growth and
deepening insight eventually culminates in the discovery of the eternal and
changeless beauty of Beauty itself. Plato’s theory of erotic passion does not
endorse “Platonic love,” if that phrase designates a purely spiritual
relationship completely devoid of physical attraction or expression. What he
insists on is that desires for physical contact be restrained so that they do
not subvert the greater good that can be accomplished in human relationships.
His sexual orientation like that of many of his Athenian contemporaries is clearly
homosexual, and he values the moral growth that can occur when one man is
physically attracted to another, but in Book I of the Laws he condemns genital
activity when it is homosexual, on the ground that such activity should serve a
purely procreative purpose. Plato’s thoughts about love are further developed
in the Phaedrus. The lover’s longing for and physical attraction to another
make him disregard the norms of commonplace and dispassionate human
relationships: love of the right sort is therefore one of four kinds of divine
madness. This fourfold classificatory scheme is then used as a model of proper
methodology. Starting with the Phaedrus, classification what Plato calls the “collection and division
of kinds” becomes the principal method
to be used by philosophers, and this approach is most fully employed in such
late works as the Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus. Presumably it contributed
to Aristotle’s interest in categories and biological classification. The
Republic. The moral and metaphysical theory centered on the Forms is most fully
developed in the Republic, a dialogue that tries to determine whether it is in
one’s own best interests to be a just person. It is commonly assumed that
injustice pays if one can get away with it, and that just behavior merely
serves the interests of others. Plato attempts to show that on the contrary
justice, properly understood, is so great a good that it is worth any
sacrifice. To support this astonishing thesis, he portrays an ideal political
community: there we will see justice writ large, and so we will be better able
to find justice in the individual soul. An ideal city, he argues, must make
radical innovations. It should be ruled by specially trained philosophers,
since their understanding of the Form of the Good will give them greater
insight into everyday affairs. Their education is compared to that of a
prisoner who, having once gazed upon nothing but shadows in the artificial
light of a cave, is released from bondage, leaves the cave, eventually learns to
see the sun, and is thereby equipped to return to the cave and see the images
there for what they are. Everything in the rulers’ lives is designed to promote
their allegiance to the community: they are forbidden private possessions,
their sexual lives are regulated by eugenic considerations, and they are not to
know who their children are. Positions of political power are open to women,
since the physical differences between them and men do not in all cases deprive
them of the intellectual or moral capacities needed for political office. The
works of poets are to be carefully regulated, for the false moral notions of
the traditional poets have had a powerful and deleterious impact on the general
public. Philosophical reflection is to replace popular poetry as the force that
guides moral education. What makes this city ideally just, according to Plato,
is the dedication of each of its components to one task for which it is
naturally suited and specially trained. The rulers are ideally equipped to
rule; the soldiers are best able to enforce their commands; and the economic
class, composed of farmers, craftsmen, builders, and so on, are content to do
their work and to leave the tasks of making and enforcing the laws to others.
Accordingly what makes the soul of a human being just is the same principle:
each of its components must properly perform its own task. The part of us that
is capable of understanding and reasoning is the part that must rule; the
assertive part that makes us capable of anger and competitive spirit must give
our understanding the force it needs; and our appetites for food and sex must
be trained so that they seek only those objects that reason approves. It is not
enough to educate someone’s reason, for unless the emotions and appetites are properly
trained they will overpower it. Just individuals are those who have fully
integrated these elements of the soul. They do not unthinkingly follow a list
of rules; rather, their just treatment of others flows from their own balanced
psychological condition. And the paradigm of a just person is a philosopher,
for reason rules when it becomes passionately attached to the most intelligible
objects there are: the Forms. It emerges that justice pays because attachment
to these supremely valuable objects is part of what true justice of the soul
is. The worth of our lives depends on the worth of the objects to which we
devote ourselves. Those who think that injustice pays assume that wealth,
domination, or the pleasures of physical appetite are supremely valuable; their
mistake lies in their limited conception of what sorts of objects are worth
loving. Late dialogues. The Republic does not contain Plato’s last thoughts on
moral or metaphysical matters. For example, although he continues to hold in
his final work, the Laws, that the family and private wealth should ideally be
abolished, he describes in great detail a second-best community that retains
these and many other institutions of ordinary political life. The sovereignty
of law in such a state is stressed continually; political offices are to be
filled by elections and lots, and magistrates are subject to careful scrutiny
and prosecution. Power is divided among several councils and offices, and
philosophical training is not a prerequisite for political participation. This
second-best state is still worlds apart from a modern liberal democracy poetic works and many features of private
life are carefully regulated, and atheism is punished with death but it is remarkable that Plato, after having
made no concessions to popular participation in the Republic, devoted so much
energy to finding a proper place for it in his final work. Plato’s thoughts
about metaphysics also continued to evolve, and perhaps the most serious
problem in interpreting his work as a whole is the problem of grasping the
direction of these further developments. One notorious obstacle to
understanding his later metaphysics is presented by the Parmenides, for here we
find an unanswered series of criticisms of the theory of Forms. For example, it
is said that if there is reason to posit one Form of Largeness to select an
arbitrary example then there is an equally good reason to posit an unlimited
number of Forms of this type. The “first” Form of Largeness must exist because
according to Plato whenever a number of things are large, there is a Form of
Largeness that makes them large; but now, the argument continues, if we
consider this Form together with the other large things, we should recognize
still another Form, which makes the large things and Largeness itself large.
The argument can be pursued indefinitely, but it seems absurd that there should
be an unlimited number of Forms of this one type. In antiquity the argument was
named the Third Man, because it claims that in addition to a second type of
object called “man” the Form of Man there is even a third. What is Plato’s
response to this and other objections to his theory? He says in the Parmenides
that we must continue to affirm the existence of such objects, for language and
thought require them; but instead of responding directly to the criticisms, he
embarks on a prolonged examination of the concept of unity, reaching apparently
conflicting conclusions about it. Whether these contradictions are merely
apparent and whether this treatment of unity contains a response to the earlier
critique of the Forms are difficult matters of interpretation. But in any case
it is clear that Plato continues to uphold the existence of unchanging
realities; the real difficulty is whether and how he modifies his earlier views
about them. In the Timaeus, there seem to be no modifications at all a fact that has led some scholars to believe,
in spite of some stylometric evidence to the contrary, that this work was
written before Plato composed the critique of the Forms in the Parmenides. This
dialogue presents an account of how a divine but not omnipotent craftsman
transformed the disorderly materials of the universe into a harmonious cosmos
by looking to the unchanging Forms as paradigms and creating, to the best of
his limited abilities, constantly fluctuating images of those paradigms. The
created cosmos is viewed as a single living organism governed by its own
divinely intelligent soul; time itself came into existence with the cosmos,
being an image of the timeless nature of the Forms; space, however, is not
created by the divine craftsman but is the characterless receptacle in which
all change takes place. The basic ingredients of the universe are not earth,
air, fire, and water, as some thinkers held; rather, these elements are
composed of planes, which are in turn made out of elementary triangular shapes.
The Timaeus is an attempt to show that although many other types of objects
besides the Forms must be invoked in order to understand the orderly nature of
the changing universe souls, triangles,
space the best scientific explanations
will portray the physical world as a purposeful and very good approximation to
a perfect pattern inherent in these unchanging and eternal objects. But Forms
do not play as important a role in the Philebus, a late dialogue that contains
Plato’s fullest answer to the question, What is the good? He argues that
neither pleasure not intelligence can by itself be identified with the good,
since no one would be satisfied with a life that contained just one of these
but totally lacked the other. Instead, goodness is identified with proportion,
beauty, and truth; and intelligence is ranked a superior good to pleasure
because of its greater kinship to these three. Here, as in the middle dialogues,
Plato insists that a proper understanding of goodness requires a metaphysical
grounding. To evaluate the role of pleasure in human life, we need a
methodology that applies to all other areas of understanding. More
specifically, we must recognize that everything can be placed in one of four
categories: the limited, the unlimited, the mixture of these two, and the
intelligent creation of this mixture. Where Forms are to be located in this
scheme is unclear. Although metaphysics is invoked to answer practical
questions, as in the Republic, it is not precisely the same metaphysics as
before. Though we naturally think of Plato primarily as a writer of
philosophical works, he regards the written word as inferior to spoken
interchange as an instrument for learning and teaching. The drawbacks inherent
in written composition are most fully set forth in the Phaedrus. There is no
doubt that in the Academy he participated fully in philosophical debate, and on
at least one occasion he lectured to a general audience. We are told by
Aristoxenus, a pupil of Aristotle, that many in Plato’s audience were baffled
and disappointed by a lecture in which he maintained that Good is one. We can
safely assume that in conversation Plato put forward important philosophical ideas
that nonetheless did not find their way into his writings. Aristotle refers in
Physics IV.2 to one of Plato’s doctrines as unwritten, and the enigmatic
positions he ascribes to Plato in Metaphysics I.6 that the Forms are to be explained in terms
of number, which are in turn generated from the One and the dyad of great and
small seem to have been expounded solely
in discussion. Some scholars have put great weight on the statement in the
Seventh Letter that the most fundamental philosophical matters must remain
unwritten, and, using later testimony about Plato’s unwritten doctrines, they
read the dialogues as signs of a more profound but hidden truth. The
authenticity of the Seventh Letter is a disputed question, however. In any
case, since Aristotle himself treats the middle and late dialogues as
undissembling accounts of Plato’s philosophy, we are on firm ground in adopting
the same approach. Cf. Plato and Platonism by Pater, an early philosophical
reading by Grice. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Commentary on Plato’s Republic,” H. P.
Grice, “Semantics as footnotes to Cratylus.” H. P. Grice, “Plato and Cassirer,
Aristotle and I.” Luigi Speranza, “The Aristotle-Plato polemic at Oxford and
how Grice suffered iit.”
playgroup: Grice: “Strictly,
a playgroup is institutional – I wouldn’t say that Tom and Jerry form a
playgroup if they played chess together only once!” -- The motivation for the
three playgroups were different. Austin’s first playgroup was for fun. Grice
never attended. Austin’s new playgroup, or ‘second’ playgroup, if you must, was
a sobriquet Grice gave because it was ANYTHING BUT. Grice’s playgroup upon
Austin’s death was for fun, like the ‘first’ playgroup. Since Grice
participated in the second and third, he expanded. The second playgroup was for
‘philosophical hacks’ who needed ‘para-philosophy.’ The third playgroup was for
fun fun. While Austin belonged to the first and the second playgroups, there
were notorious differences. In the first playgroup, he was not the master, and
his resentment towards Ayer can be seen in “Sense and Sensibilia.” The second
playgroup had Austin as the master. It is said that the playgroup survived
Austin’s demise with Grice’s leadership – But Grice’s playgroup was still a
different thing – some complained about the disorderly and rambling nature –
Austin had kept a very tidy organisation and power structure. Since Grice does
NOT mention his own playgroup, it is best to restrict playgroup as an ironic
sobriquet by Grice to anything but a playgroup, conducted after the war by
Austin, by invitation only, to full-time university lecturers in philosophy.
Austin would hold a central position, and Austin’s motivation was to ‘reach’
agreement. Usually, when agreement was not reached, Austin could be pretty
impolite. Grice found himself IN THE PLAYGROUP. He obviously preferred a
friendlier atmosphere, as his own group later testified. But he was also
involved in philosophical activity OTHER than the play group. Notably his joint
endeavours with Strawson, Warnock, Pears, and Thomson. For some reason he chose
each for a specific area: Warnock for the philosophy of perception (Grice’s implicaturum
is that he would not explore meta-ethics with Warnock – he wouldn’t feel like,
nor Warnock would). Philosophy of action of all things, with J. F. Thomson.
Philosophical psychology with D. F. Pears – so this brings Pears’s observations
on intending, deciding, predicting, to the fore. And ontology with P. F.
Strawson. Certainlty he would not involve with Strawson on endless
disagreements about the alleged divergence or lack thereof between
truth-functional devices and their vernacular counterparts! Grice also mentions
collaboration with Austin in teaching – “an altogether flintier experience,” as
Warnock knows and “Grice can testify.” – There was joint seminars with A. M.
Quinton, and a few others. One may add the tutorials. Some of his tutees left
Griceian traces: A. G. N. Flew, David Bostock, J. L. Ackrill, T. C. Potts. The term was meant ironically. The playgroup
activities smack of military or civil service! while this can be safely called Grice’s
playgroup, it was founded by Austin at All Souls, where it had only seven
members. After the war, Grice joined in. The full list is found elsewhere. With
Austin’s death, Grice felt the responsibility to continue with it, and plus, he
enjoyed it! In alphabetical order. It is this group that made history. J. L. Austin, A. G. N. Flew, P. L. Gardiner,
H. P. Grice, S. N. Hampshire, R. M. Hare, H. L. A. Hart, P. H. Nowell-Smith, G. A. Paul, D. F. Pears,
P. F. Strawson, J. F. Thomson, J. O. Urmson, G. J. Warnock, A. D. Woozley. Grice
distinguishes it very well from Ryle’s group, and the group of
neo-Wittgensteinians. And those three groups were those only involved with
‘ordinary language.’
plotino: Greco-Roman Neoplatonist
philosopher. Born in Egypt, though doubtless of Grecian ancestry, and thus
“more of a Roman than a ‘gypsy’”– Grice – Plotinus studied Platonic philosophy
in Alexandria with Ammonius Saccas 23243; then, after a brief adventure on the
staff of the Emperor Gordian III on an unsuccessful expedition against the
Persians, he came to Rome in 244 and continued teaching philosophy there until
his death. He enjoyed the support of many prominent people, including even the
Emperor Gallienus and his wife. His chief pupils were Amelius and Porphyry, the
latter of whom collected and edited his philosophical essays, the Enneads so
called because arranged by Porphyry in six groups of nine. The first three
groups concern the physical world and our relation to it, the fourth concerns
Soul, the fifth Intelligence, and the sixth the One. Porphyry’s arrangement is
generally followed today, though a chronological sequence of tractates, which
he also provides in his introductory Life of Plotinus, is perhaps preferable.
The most important treatises are I.1; I.2; I.6; II.4; II.8; III.23; III.6;
III.7; IV.34; V.1; V.3; VI.45; VI.7; VI.8; VI.9; and the group III.8, V.8, V.5,
and II.9 a single treatise, split up by Porphyry, that is a wide-ranging
account of Plotinus’s philosophical position, culminating in an attack on
gnosticism. Plotinus saw himself as a faithful exponent of Plato see especially
Enneads V.1, but he is far more than that. Platonism had developed considerably
in the five centuries that separate Plato from Plotinus, taking on much from
both Aristotelianism and Stoicism, and Plotinus is the heir to this process. He
also adds much himself. Grice was
fascinated by Plotinus’s use of ‘hyper,’ or supra. If God is hyper-good, that
does mean that he is not good? For Grice, Plotinus means ‘hyper’
implicaturally. So, if God is hypergood, this does not yield the negation that God is good. Only
that if Plotinus KNOWS that God is hyper-good he is right in thus saying, but
he would never reprimand his co-conversationalists were he to say that God is
good.
pluralism: -- versus singularism, dualigm,
bi-dualism, and monism – the one and the many -- a philosophical perspective on the world that
emphasizes diversity rather than homogeneity, multiplicity rather than unity,
difference rather than sameness. The philosophical consequences of pluralism
were addressed by Grecian antiquity in its preoccupation with the problem of
the one and the many. The proponents of pluralism, represented principally by
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists Leucippus and Democritus, maintained
that reality was made up of a multiplicity of entities. Adherence to this
doctrine set them in opposition to the monism of the Eleatic School Parmenides,
which taught that reality was an impermeable unity and an unbroken solidarity.
It was thus that pluralism came to be defined as a philosophical alternative to
monism. In the development of Occidental thought, pluralism came to be
contrasted not only with monism but also with dualism, the philosophical
doctrine that there are two, and only two, kinds of existents. Descartes, with
his doctrine of two distinct substances
extended non-thinking substance versus non-extended thinking
substance is commonly regarded as having
provided the clearest example of philosophical dualism. Pluralism thus needs to
be understood as marking out philosophical alternatives to both monism and
dualism. Pluralism as a metaphysical doctrine requires that we distinguish
substantival from attributive pluralism. Substantival pluralism views the world
as containing a multiplicity of substances that remain irreducible to each
other. Attributive pluralism finds the multiplicity of kinds not among the
furniture of substances that make up the world but rather among a diversity of
attributes and distinguishing properties. However, pluralism came to be defined
not only as a metaphysical doctrine but also as a regulative principle of
explanation that calls upon differing explanatory principles and conceptual
schemes to account for the manifold events of nature and the varieties of human
experience. Recent philosophical thought has witnessed a resurgence of interest
in pluralism. This was evident in the development of pragmatism, where pluralism received piquant
expression in James’s A Pluralistic Universe 9. More recently pluralism was
given a voice in the thought of the later Vitters, with its heavy accent on the
plurality of language games displayed in our ordinary discourse. Also, in the
current developments of philosophical postmodernism Jean-François Lyotard, one
finds an explicit pluralistic orientation. Here the emphasis falls on the
multiplicity of signifiers, phrase regimens, genres of discourse, and
narrational strategies. The alleged unities and totalities of thought,
discourse, and action are subverted in the interests of reclaiming the
diversified and heterogeneous world of human experience. Pluralism in
contemporary thought initiates a move into a postmetaphysical age. It is less
concerned with traditional metaphysical and epistemological issues, seeking
answers to questions about the nature and kinds of substances and attributes;
and it is more attuned to the diversity of social practices and the multiple
roles of language, discourse, and narrative in the panoply of human
affairs.
singular-dual-bidual-plural quartet, the: pluralitive
logic, also called pleonetetic logic, the logic of ‘many’, ‘most’, ‘few’, and
similar terms including ‘four out of five’, ‘over 45 percent’ and so on.
Consider 1 ‘Almost all F are G’ 2 ‘Almost all F are not G’ 3 ‘Most F are G’ 4
‘Most F are not G’ 5 ‘Many F are G’ 6 ‘Many F are not G’ 1 i.e., ‘Few F are not
G’ and 6 are contradictory, as are 2 and 5 and 3 and 4. 1 and 2 cannot be true
together i.e., they are contraries, nor can 3 and 4, while 5 and 6 cannot be
false together i.e., they are subcontraries. Moreover, 1 entails 3 which
entails 5, and 2 entails 4 which entails 6. Thus 16 form a generalized “square
of opposition” fitting inside the standard one. Sometimes 3 is said to be true
if more than half the F’s are G, but this makes ‘most’ unnecessarily precise,
for ‘most’ does not literally mean ‘more than half’. Although many pluralitive
terms are vague, their interrelations are logically precise. Again, one might
define ‘many’ as ‘There are at least n’, for some fixed n, at least relative to
context. But this not only erodes the vagueness, it also fails to work for
arbitrarily large and infinite domains. ‘Few’, ‘most’, and ‘many’ are binary
quantifiers, a type of generalized quantifier. A unary quantifier, such as the
standard quantifiers ‘some’ and ‘all’, connotes a second-level property, e.g.,
‘Something is F’ means ‘F has an instance’, and ‘All F’s are G’ means ‘F and
not G has no instance’. A generalized quantifier connotes a second-level
relation. ‘Most F’s are G’ connotes a binary relation between F and G, one that
cannot be reduced to any property of a truth-functional compound of F and G. In
fact, none of the standard pluralitive terms can be defined in first-order
logic. Grice lists (x) and (Ex) as “all” and “the,” and of course (Ex), “some
(at least one).” So his approach welcomes the pluralitive logic – o
pleonetetic. There may be a scale, as Urmson calls it, involving ‘few’ and
‘most.’ ‘Many’ may bring many a trick. Quine deals with numerical quantifiers,
in “The logical form of ‘The apostles were twelve.” – In Grice, this is a clear
case of what he calls the principle of conversational fortitude: in a scale
(alla Urmson) involving a and b, the conversationalist’s preference for one
item in the ordered pair yields that the utterer implicates the negation of the
other item. These implicatura are defeasible. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice and
Altham on Geach’s pleoretetics, with and without implicatura.”
Causans – causaturum -- Causatum: plurality
of causes, as used by Mill, more than one cause of a single effect; i.e.,
tokens of different event types causing different tokens of the same event
type. Plurality of causes is distinct from overdetermination of an event by
more than one actual or potential token cause. For example, an animal’s death
has a plurality of causes: it may die of starvation, of bleeding, of a blow to
the head, and so on. Mill thought these cases were important because he saw
that the existence of a plurality of causes creates problems for his four
methods for determining causes. Mill’s method of agreement is specifically
vulnerable to the problem: the method fails to reveal the cause of an event
when the event has more than one type of cause, because the method presumes
that causes are necessary for their effects. Actually, plurality of causes is a
commonplace fact about the world because very few causes are necessary for
their effects. Unless the background conditions are specified in great detail,
or the identity of the effect type is defined very narrowly, almost all cases
involve a plurality of causes. For example, flipping the light switch is a
necessary cause of the light’s going on, only if one assumes that there will be
no short circuit across the switch, that the wiring will remain as it is, and
so on, or if one assumes that by ‘the light’s going on’ one means the light’s
going on in the normal way.
poiesis Grecian, ‘production’, behavior
aimed at an external end. In Aristotle, poiesis is opposed to praxis action. It
is characteristic of crafts e.g.
building, the end of which is houses. It is thus a kinesis process. For
Aristotle, exercising the virtues, since it must be undertaken for its own
sake, cannot be poiesis. The knowledge involved in virtue is therefore not the
same as that involved in crafts. R.C. Grice, who liked opera, was fascinated by
the history of the Bardi camerata, and their idea of the ‘melopea,’ or music
making.
polarity, the relation between distinct
phenomena, terms, or concepts such that each inextricably requires, though it
is opposed to, the other, as in the relation between the north and south poles
of a magnet. In application to terms or concepts, polarity entails that the
meaning of one involves the meaning of the other. This is conceptual polarity.
Terms are existentially polar provided an instance of one cannot exist unless
there exists an instance of the other. The second sense implies the first.
Supply and demand and good and evil are instances of conceptual polarity. North
and south and buying and selling are instances of existential polarity. Some
polar concepts are opposites, such as truth and falsity. Some are correlative,
such as question and answer: an answer is always an answer to a question; a
question calls for an answer, but a question can be an answer, and an answer can
be a question. The concept is not restricted to pairs and can be extended to
generate mutual interdependence, multipolarity.
civis -- political philosophy, the study
of the nature and justification of coercive institutions. Coercive institutions
range in size from the family to the nation-state and world organizations like
the United Nations. They are institutions that at least sometimes employ force
or the threat of force to control the behavior of their members. Justifying
such coercive institutions requires showing that the authorities within them
have a right to be obeyed and that their members have a corresponding
obligation to obey them, i.e., that these institutions have legitimate
political authority over their members. Classical political philosophers, like
Plato and Aristotle, were primarily interested in providing a justification for
city-states like Athens or Sparta. But historically, as larger coercive
institutions became possible and desirable, political philosophers sought to
justify them. After the seventeenth century, most political philosophers
focused on providing a justification for nationstates whose claim to legitimate
authority is restricted by both geography and nationality. But from time to
time, and more frequently in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some
political philosophers have sought to provide a justification for various forms
of world government with even more extensive powers than those presently
exercised by the United Nations. And quite recently, feminist political
philosophers have raised important challenges to the authority of the family as
it is presently constituted. Anarchism from Grecian an archos, ‘no government’
rejects this central task of political philosophy. It maintains that no
coercive institutions are justified. Proudhon, the first self-described
anarchist, believed that coercive institutions should be replaced by social and
economic organizations based on voluntary contractual agreement, and he
advocated peaceful change toward anarchism. Others, notably Blanqui and
Bakunin, advocated the use of violence to destroy the power of coercive
institutions. Anarchism inspired the anarcho-syndicalist movement, Makhno and
his followers during the Russian Civil War, the
anarchists during the Civil War,
and the anarchist gauchistes during the 8 “May Events” in France. Most
political philosophers, however, have sought to justify coercive institutions;
they have simply disagreed over what sort of coercive institutions are
justified. Liberalism, which derives from the work of Locke, is the view that
coercive institutions are justified when they promote liberty. For Locke,
liberty requires a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary government. Over
time, however, the ideal of liberty became subject to at least two
interpretations. The view that seems closest to Locke’s is classical
liberalism, which is now more frequently called political libertarianism. This
form of liberalism interprets constraints on liberty as positive acts i.e.,
acts of commission that prevent people from doing what they otherwise could do.
According to this view, failing to help people in need does not restrict their
liberty. Libertarians maintain that when liberty is so interpreted only a
minimal or night-watchman state that protects against force, theft, and fraud
can be justified. In contrast, in welfare liberalism, a form of liberalism that
derives from the work of T. H. Green, constraints on liberty are interpreted to
include, in addition, negative acts i.e., acts of omission that prevent people
from doing what they otherwise could do. According to this view, failing to
help people in need does restrict their liberty. Welfare liberals maintain that
when liberty is interpreted in this fashion, coercive institutions of a welfare
state requiring a guaranteed social minimum and equal opportunity are
justified. While no one denies that when liberty is given a welfare liberal interpretation
some form of welfare state is required, there is considerable debate over
whether a minimal state is required when liberty is given a libertarian
interpretation. At issue is whether the liberty of the poor is constrained when
they are prevented from taking from the surplus possessions of the rich what
they need for survival. If such prevention does constrain the liberty of the
poor, it could be argued that their liberty should have priority over the
liberty of the rich not to be interfered with when using their surplus
possessions for luxury purposes. In this way, it could be shown that even when
the ideal of liberty is given a libertarian interpretation, a welfare state,
rather than a minimal state, is justified. Both libertarianism and welfare liberalism
are committed to individualism. This view takes the rights of individuals to be
basic and justifies the actions of coercive institutions as promoting those
rights. Communitarianism, which derives from the writings of Hegel, rejects
individualism. It maintains that rights of individuals are not basic and that
the collective can have rights that are independent of and even opposed to what
liberals claim are the rights of individuals. According to communitarians,
individuals are constituted by the institutions and practices of which they are
a part, and their rights and obligations derive from those same institutions
and practices. Fascism is an extreme form of communitarianism that advocates an
authoritarian state with limited rights for individuals. In its National
Socialism Nazi variety, fascism was also antiSemitic and militarist. In
contrast to liberalism and communitarianism, socialism takes equality to be the
basic ideal and justifies coercive institutions insofar as they promote
equality. In capitalist societies where the means of production are owned and
controlled by a relatively small number of people and used primarily for their
benefit, socialists favor taking control of the means of production and
redirecting their use to the general welfare. According to Marx, the principle
of distribution for a socialist society is: from each according to ability, to
each according to needs. Socialists disagree among themselves, however, over
who should control the means of production in a socialist society. In the
version of socialism favored by Lenin, those who control the means of
production are to be an elite seemingly differing only in their ends from the
capitalist elite they replaced. In other forms of socialism, the means of
production are to be controlled democratically. In advanced capitalist
societies, national defense, police and fire protection, income redistribution,
and environmental protection are already under democratic control. Democracy or
“government by the people” is thought to apply in these areas, and to require
some form of representation. Socialists simply propose to extend the domain of
democratic control to include control of the means of production, on the ground
that the very same arguments that support democratic control in these
recognized areas also support democratic control of the means of production. In
addition, according to Marx, socialism will transform itself into communism
when most of the work that people perform in society becomes its own reward,
making differential monetary reward generally unnecessary. Then distribution in
society can proceed according to the principle, from each according to ability,
to each according to needs. It so happens that all of the above political views
have been interpreted in ways that deny that women have the same basic rights
as men. By contrast, feminism, almost by definition, is the political view that
women and men have the same basic rights. In recent years, most political
philosophers have come to endorse equal basic rights for women and men, but
rarely do they address questions that feminists consider of the utmost
importance, e.g., how responsibilities and duties are to be assigned in family
structures. Each of these political views must be evaluated both internally and
externally by comparison with the other views. Once this is done, their
practical recommendations may not be so different. For example, if welfare
liberals recognize that the basic rights of their view extend to distant
peoples and future generations, they may end up endorsing the same degree of
equality socialists defend. Whatever their practical requirements, each of
these political views justifies civil disobedience, even revolution, when
certain of those requirements have not been met. Civil disobedience is an illegal
action undertaken to draw attention to a failure by the relevant authorities to
meet basic moral requirements, e.g., the refusal of Rosa Parks to give up her
seat in a bus to a white man in accord with the local ordinance in Montgomery,
Alabama, in 5. Civil disobedience is justified when illegal action of this sort
is the best way to get the relevant authorities to bring the law into better
correspondence with basic moral requirements. By contrast, revolutionary action
is justified when it is the only way to correct a radical failure of the
relevant authorities to meet basic moral requirements. When revolutionary
action is justified, people no longer have a political obligation to obey the
relevant authorities; that is, they are no longer morally required to obey
them, although they may still continue to do so, e.g. out of habit or fear.
Recent contemporary political philosophy has focused on the
communitarianliberal debate. In defense of the communitarian view, Alasdair
MacIntyre has argued that virtually all forms of liberalism attempt to separate
rules defining right action from conceptions of the human good. On this
account, he contends, these forms of liberalism must fail because the rules
defining right action cannot be adequately grounded apart from a conception of
the good. Responding to this type of criticism, some liberals have openly
conceded that their view is not grounded independently of some conception of
the good. Rawls, e.g., has recently made clear that his liberalism requires a
conception of the political good, although not a comprehensive conception of
the good. It would seem, therefore, that the debate between communitarians and
liberals must turn on a comparative evaluation of their competing conceptions
of the good. Unfortunately, contemporary communitarians have not yet been very
forthcoming about what particular conception of the good their view
requires.
res publica: -- political theory,
reflection concerning the empirical, normative, and conceptual dimensions of
political life. There are no topics that all political theorists do or ought to
address, no required procedures, no doctrines acknowledged to be authoritative.
The meaning of ‘political theory’ resides in its fluctuating uses, not in any
essential property. It is nevertheless possible to identify concerted
tendencies among those who have practiced this activity over twenty-five
centuries. Since approximately the seventeenth century, a primary question has
been how best to justify the political rule of some people over others. This
question subordinated the issue that had directed and organized most previous
political theory, namely, what constitutes the best form of political regime.
Assuming political association to be a divinely ordained or naturally necessary
feature of the human estate, earlier thinkers had asked what mode of political
association contributes most to realizing the good for humankind. Signaling the
variable but intimate relationship between political theory and political
practice, the change in question reflected and helped to consolidate acceptance
of the postulate of natural human equality, the denial of divinely or naturally
given authority of some human beings over others. Only a small minority of
postseventeenth-century thinkers have entertained the possibility, perhaps
suggested by this postulate, that no form of rule can be justified, but the
shift in question altered the political theory agenda. Issues concerning
consent, individual liberties and rights, various forms of equality as integral
to justice, democratic and other controls on the authority and power of
government none of which were among the
first concerns of ancient or medieval political thinkers moved to the center of political theory.
Recurrent tendencies and tensions in political theory may also be discerned
along dimensions that cross-cut historical divisions. In its most celebrated
representations, political theory is integral to philosophy. Systematic
thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Hobbes and Hegel,
present their political thoughts as supporting and supported by their ethics
and theology, metaphysics and epistemology. Political argumentation must
satisfy the same criteria of logic, truth, and justification as any other; a
political doctrine must be grounded in the nature of reality. Other political
theorists align themselves with empirical science rather than philosophy. Often
focusing on questions of power, they aim to give accurate accounts and
factually grounded assessments of government and politics in particular times
and places. Books IVVI of Aristotle’s Politics inaugurate this conception of
political theory; it is represented by Montesquieu, Marx, and much of
utilitarianism, and it is the numerically predominant form of academic
political theorizing in the twentieth century. Yet others, e.g., Socrates,
Machiavelli, Rousseau, and twentieth-century thinkers such as Rawls, mix the
previously mentioned modes but understand themselves as primarily pursuing the
practical objective of improving their owpolitical societies. Grice: “I always
wonder how Cicero felt happy about his translation into Roman of Grecian
‘politeia.’ Indeed, the Romans preferred to use Lat. civitas as
a literal transliteration of ‘politeia,” in geographical sense, SIG888.118 (Scaptopara, iii A. D.),
Mitteis Chr.78.6 (iv A. D.), etc. Indeed, The Romans
used ‘res publica,’ also as one word,
respublica, the common weal, a commonwealth, state, republic (cf.
civitas); also, civil affairs, administration, or power,
etc.: qui pro republicā, non pro suā obsonat, Cato ap. Ruf.
18, p. 210; cf.: “erat tuae virtutis, in minimis tuas res ponere, de re publicā vehementius laborare,” Cic. Fam. 4, 9, 3: “dummodo ista privata sit calamitas et a rei publicae periculis sejungatur,” id. Cat. 1, 9; cf.: “si re publicā non possis frui, stultum est nolle privatā,” id. Fam. 4, 9, 4: “egestates tot egentissimorum hominum nec privatas posse res nec rem publicam sustinere,” id. Att. 9, 7, 5 (v. publicus); Cato ap. Gell. 10, 14, 3: auguratum est, rem Romanam
publicam summam fore, Att. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 22, 45: “quo utiliores rebus suis publicis essent,” Cic. Off. 1, 44, 155: “commutata ratio est rei totius publicae,” id. Att. 1, 8, 4: pro republicā niti, Cato
ap. Charis. p. 196 fin.: “merere de republicā,” Plaut. Am. prol. 40: “de re publicā disputatio . . . dubitationem ad rem publicam adeundi tollere, etc.,” Cic. Rep. 1, 7, 12: “oppugnare rem publicam,” id. Cael. 1, 1; id. Har. Resp. 8, 15; id. Sest. 23, 52: “paene victā re publicā,” id. Fam. 12, 13, 1: “delere rem publicam,” id. Sest. 15, 33; Lact. 6,
18, 28.—Esp. in the phrase e re publicā, for the good of the
State, for the public benefit: “senatūs consultis bene et e re publicā factis,” Cic. Phil. 3, 12, 30: “ea si dicam non esse e re publicā dividi,” id. Fam. 13, 8, 2; id. Mil. 5, 14; Liv. 8, 4, 12; 25, 7, 4; 34, 34, 9; Suet. Rhet.
1 init.—Post-class. and rare, also ex republicā, Gell. 6, 3, 47; 11, 9, 1; “but exque is used for euphony (class.): id eum recte atque ordine exque re publicā fecisse,” Cic. Phil. 3, 15, 38; 5, 13,
36; 10, 11, 26.— In plur.: “eae nationes respublicas suas amiserunt, C. Gracch. ap. Fest. s. h. v. p. 286 Müll.: hoc loquor de tribus his generibus rerum publicarum,” Cic. Rep. 1, 28, 44: “circuitus in rebus publicis commutationum,” id. ib. 1, 29, 45 et
saep.— At times, Grice preferred to stick with the more literal, ‘civitas.’ cīvĭtas , ātis ( I.gen. plur. civitatium, Cic. Rep. 1, 34,
51; id. Leg. 2, 4, 9; Caes. B. G. 4, 3; 5, 22; Sall. C. 40, 2; Liv. 1, 17, 4;
2, 6, 5; 33, 20, 11 Drak.; 42, 30, 6; 42, 44, 1; 45, 34, 1; Vell. 2, 42, 2;
Quint. 2, 16, 4 N. cr.; Suet. Tit. 8 Oud.; Cornut. ap. Charis. p. 100 P.; cf.
Varr. L. L. 8, § 66; Prisc. p. 771 P.; Neue, Formenl. 1, 268), f. civis. I. Abstr.,
the condition or privileges of a (Roman) citizen, citizenship, freedom of the
city (upon its conditions, v. Zimmern, Rechtsgesch. 2, § 123 sq.; “Dict. of
Antiq. p. 260 sqq.): Cato, cum esset Tusculi natus, in populi romani civitatem
susceptus est: ita, cum ortu Tusculanus esset, civitate Romanus, etc.,” Cic.
Leg. 2, 2, 5: “donare aliquem civitate,” id. Balb. 13, 20; Suet. Caes. 24; 42;
76; id. Aug. 47; id. Tib. 51; id. Ner. 24: “dare civitatem alicui,” Cic. Arch.
4, 7; 5, 10; Liv. 1, 28, 7; 8, 14, 8; Suet. Aug. 40; id. Galb. 14: accipere
aliquem in civitatem, Cic. Off. 1, 11, 35: “adsciscere in civitatem,” Liv. 6,
40, 4: “ascribere aliquem in civitatem,” Cic. Arch. 4, 6: “aliquem foederatis
civitatibus ascribere,” id. ib. 4, 7: “in aliis civitatibus ascriptus,” id. ib.
5, 10: “assequi,” Tac. A. 11, 23: “consequi,” Cic. Balb. 13, 31: “deponere,”
id. Caecin. 34, 100: “decedere de civitate,” id. Balb. 5, 11: “dicare se
civitati,” id. ib. 11, 28: “in civitatem,” id. ib. 12, 30: “eripere,” id.
Caecin. 34, 99: “habere,” id. Balb. 13, 31: “impertiri civitatem,” id. Arch. 5,
10: “furari civitatem,” id. Balb. 2, 5: “petere,” Suet. Caes. 8: “Romanam
assequi,” Tac. A. 11, 23: “adipisci,” Suet. Aug. 40: “Romanam usurpare,” id.
Calig. 38; id. Claud. 25: “amittere civitatem,” Cic. Caecin. 34, 98: “adimere,”
id. ib.; Suet. Caes. 28: “petere,” id. ib. 8: “negare,” id. Aug. 40: “jus
civitatis,” Cic. Caecin. 34, 98; id. Arch. 5, 11: “recipere aliquem in
civitatem,” id. Caecin. 34, 100; id. Arch. 10,22; id. Balb. 13, 31: “relinquere,”
id. Caecin. 34, 100: “retinere civitatem,” id. Balb. 12, 30: “retinere aliquem
in civitate,” id. Lig. 11, 33: “ademptio civitatis,” id. Dom. 30, 78:
“commemoratio,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 62, § 162: “nomen,” id. ib.: “ereptor,” id.
Dom. 30, 81.— B. Trop.: “ut oratio Romana plane videatur, non civitate donata,”
Quint. 8, 1, 3; cf.: “civitate Romanā donare agricolationem,” Col. 1, 1, 12:
“verbum hoc a te civitate donatum,” naturalized, Gell. 19, 3, 3; Sen. Ep. 120,
4; id. Q. N. 5, 16, 4.—More freq., II. Concr., the citizens united in a
community, the body - politic, the state, and as this consists of one city and
its territory, or of several cities, it differs from urbs, i.e. the compass of
the dwellings of the collected citizens; “but sometimes meton., = urbs, v. B.:
concilia coetusque hominum jure sociati, quae civitates appellantur,” Cic. Rep.
6, 13, 13: “tum conventicula hominum, quae postea civitates nominatae sunt, tum
domicilia conjuncta, quas urbes dicimus, etc.,” id. Sest. 42, 91; cf.: omnis
populus, qui est talis coetus multitudinis, qualem exposui; omnis civitas, quae
est constitutio populi; “omnis res publica, quae populi res est, etc.,” id.
Rep. 1, 26, 41: “quia sapiens non sum, nec haec urbs nec in eā civitas ... non
dubitavisset, quin et Roma urbs (esset), et eam civitas incoleret,” id. Ac. 2,
45, 137: “aucta civitate magnitudine urbis,” Liv. 1, 45, 1: “Orgetorix civitati
persuasit, ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent,” Caes. B. G. 1, 2
Oud.; so id. ib. 1, 4; 1, 19; 1, 31; cf. Sisenn. ap. Non. p. 429, 15:
“civitates aut nationes devictae,” Cic. Off. 1, 11, 35; Sall. C. 31, 1; Liv.
21, 1, 2: “io triumphe non semel dicemus civitas omnis,” Hor. C. 4, 2, 51; cf.
id. Epod. 16, 36 and 18: “cum civitas in foro exspectatione erecta staret,” Liv.
3, 47, 1; so id. 2, 37, 5; 26, 18, 6; 34, 41, 1; Tac. A. 3, 11; Suet. Calig. 6;
id. Tib. 17; 42: “civitates aut condere novas aut conservare jam conditas,”
Cic. Rep. 1, 7, 12; id. Sull. 9, 28; id. Rep. 1, 8, 13; 1, 3, 5: “omnis civitas
Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est,” Caes. B. G. 1, 12: “quae pars civitatis
Helvetiae, etc.,” id. ib.: “non longe a Tolosatium finibus, quae civitas est in
provinciā,” id. ib. 1, 10: “Ubii, quorum fuit civitas ampla atque florens,” id.
ib. 4, 3: “Rhodiorum civitas, magna atque magnifica,” Sall. C. 51, 5; cf. id.
J. 69, 3: “Heraclea quae est civitas aequissimo jure ac foedere,” Cic. Arch. 4,
6 et saep.: “administrare civitatem,” id. Off. 1, 25, 88: “mutari civitatum
status,” id. Leg. 3, 14, 32; so, “civitatis status,” Quint. 6, 1, 16; 11, 1,
85: “(legibus) solutis stare ipsa (civitas) non possit,” id. 11, 1, 85: “lege
civitatis,” id. 12, 10, 26; cf. id. 5, 10, 25: “mos civitatis,” id. 10, 1, 107;
12, 3, 7; 1, 2, 2.—Of Plato's ideal republic: “si in illā commenticiā Platonis
civitate res ageretur,” Cic. de Or. 1, 53, 230.— 2. Trop.: “civitas caelitum,”
Plaut. Rud. prol. 2: “ut jam universus hic mundus una civitas sit communis
deorum atque hominum existimanda,” Cic. Leg. 1, 7, 23.— B. Meton., = urbs, a
city (rare and mostly post-Aug.; not in Cic. or Cæs.): civitatem incendere,
Enn. ap. Non. p. 429, 5 (Trag. 382 Vahl.): “cum errarem per totam civitatem,”
Petr. 8, 2; cf. id. 8, 141 fin.: “Lingonum,” Tac. H. 1, 54; 1, 64: “ab excidio
civitatis,” id. ib. 1, 63; “1, 69: circumjectae civitates,” id. ib. 3, 43:
“muri civitatis,” id. ib. 4, 65; id. A. 6, 42: “pererrata nocturnis
conversationibus,” Sen. Ben. 6, 32, 1: “expugnare civitatem,” Quint. 8, 3, 67;
cf.: “expugnandae civitates,” id. 12, 9, 2: “plurimas per totum orbem civitates,
terrae motu aut incendio afflictas restituit in melius,” Suet. Vesp. 17; cf.
id. Tit. 8; id. Tib. 84 fin.; Lact. 2, 7, 19.— 2. Esp., the city, i. e. Rome
and its inhabitants, Tac. H. 1, 19; 2, 92; 4, 2.
pro-epi
distinction, the:
polysyllogism: a series of syllogisms connected by the fact that the conclusion
of one syllogism becomes a premise of another. The syllogism whose conclusion is
used as a premise in another syllogism within the chain is called the pro-syllogism;
the syllogism is which the conclusion of another syllogism within the chain is
used as a premise is called the epi-syllogism. To illustrate, take the standard
form of the simplest polysyllogism: “All
B is A,”All C is B, “All C is A,” “All C is A,” “ All D is C,” “All D is
A. The first member of this polysyllogism is the pro-syllogism, since its
conclusion occurs as a premise in the epi-syllogism. Grice: “Part of the charm
of my conversations with Strawson was that they were polysyllogistical, my
episyllogism invariably following his prosyllogism.””Part of the charm of my
conversations with Strawson was that they were polysyllogistical, my
episyllogism explicating at what his prosyllogism merely hinted.” Refs.: Grice,
“Robbing peter to pay paul.”
pomponazzi: important Italian
philosopher. an Aristotelian who taught at the universities of Padua and
Bologna. In De incantationibus “On Incantations,” 1556, he regards the world as
a system of natural causes that can explain apparently miraculous phenomena.
Human beings are subject to the natural order of the world, yet divine
predestination and human freedom are compatible De fato, “On Fate,” 1567.
Furthermore, he distinguishes between what is proved by natural reason and what
is accepted by faith, and claims that, since there are arguments for and
against the immortality of the human individual soul, this belief is to be
accepted solely on the basis of faith De immortalitate animae, “On the
Immortality of the Soul,” He defended his view of immortality in the Apologia
1518 and in the Defensorium 1519. These three works were reprinted as Tractatus
acutissimi 1525. Pomponazzi’s work was influential until the seventeenth
century, when Aristotelianism ceased to be the main philosophy taught at the
universities. The eighteenth-century freethinkers showed new interest in his
distinction between natural reason and faith. P.Gar. pons asinorum Latin,
‘asses’ bridge’, a methodological device based upon Aristotle’s description of
the ways in which one finds a suitable middle term to demonstrate categorical propositions.
Thus, to prove the universal affirmative, one should consider the characters
that entail the predicate P and the characters entailed by the subject S. If we
find in the two groups of characters a common member, we can use it as a middle
term in the syllogistic proof of say ‘All S are P’. Take ‘All men are mortal’
as the contemplated conclusion. We find that ‘organism’ is among the characters
entailing the predicate ‘mortal’ and is also found in the group of characters
entailed by the subject ‘men’, and thus it may be used in a syllogistic proof
of ‘All men are mortal’. To prove negative propositions we must, in addition,
consider characters incompatible with the predicate, or incompatible with the
subject. Finally, proofs of particular propositions require considering characters
that entail the subject. Pietro Pomponazzi Da
Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Pietro
Pomponazzi Pietro Pomponazzi, noto anche col soprannome di Peretto Mantovano
(Mantova, 16 settembre 1462 – Bologna, 18 maggio 1525), è stato un filosofo e
umanista italiano. Indice 1La vita e l'opera 2Il De immortalitate
animae 3La critica dei miracoli 4Il destino dell'uomo 5Conclusioni 6Note
7Bibliografia 8Altri progetti 9Collegamenti esterni La vita e l'opera Di
famiglia agiata, nasce a Mantova nel 1462. A ventidue anni si iscrive (1484)
all'Università di Padova, dove frequenta le lezioni di metafisica del
domenicano Francesco Securo da Nardò, le lezioni di medicina di Pietro
Riccobonella e quelle di filosofia naturale di Pietro Trapolino, laureandosi
come Magister artium nel 1487. Dal 1488 al 1496 è professore di filosofia nello
stesso ateneo e ottiene la cattedra di filosofia naturale dopo la morte del suo
maestro Nicoletto Vernia (1420-1499), massimo esponente dell'averroismo locale,
di spirito laico e spregiudicato sino alla miscredenza. A Padova pubblica
il trattato De maximo et minimo, in polemica con le teorie di Guglielmo
Heytesbury. Passa poi a Carpi (nel 1496) per insegnare logica alla corte di
Alberto III Pio, principe di Carpi, seguendolo nel 1498 nel suo esilio a
Ferrara e restandovi fino al 1499. Nel frattempo, nel 1497, sposa a Mantova
Cornelia Dondi, dalla quale ha due figlie. Morto Vernia, e succeduto a
lui nel 1499, il Pomponazzi rimane poi vedovo nel 1507 e si risposa con
Ludovica di Montagnana. Chiude lo studio di Padova nel 1509 e si trasferisce a
Ferrara dove redige un commento al De anima aristotelico. Questo avviene in
seguito all'occupazione di Padova nel giugno 1509 da parte della Lega di
Cambrai nella guerra con la Repubblica veneziana. Quando Venezia rioccupa la
città il mese dopo, le lezioni universitarie vengono sospese ed egli, con altri
insegnanti, lascia la città trasferendosi, come si è visto, a Ferrara su invito
di Alfonso I d'Este per insegnare nella locale università. Chiusa anche questa
nel 1510, si trasferisce fino al 1511 a Mantova e dal 1512 all'università di
Bologna. Nuovamente vedovo, si risposa con Adriana della Scrofa. A
Bologna scrive le opere maggiori, il Tractatus de immortalitate animae, il De
fato e il De incantationibus, oltre a commenti delle opere di Aristotele,
conservati grazie agli appunti dei suoi studenti. Il Tractatus de
immortalitate animae, del 1516, in cui sostiene che l'immortalità dell'anima non
può essere dimostrata razionalmente, fece scandalo: attaccato da più parti, il
libro è pubblicamente bruciato a Venezia. Denunciato dall'agostiniano Ambrogio
Fiandino per eresia, la difesa del cardinale Pietro Bembo gli permette di
evitare terribili conseguenze ma nel 1518 è condannato da papa Leone X a
ritrattare le sue tesi. Pomponazzi non ritratta ma si difende con la sua
Apologia del 1518 e con il Defensorium adversus Augustinum Niphum del 1519, una
risposta al De immortalitate animae libellus di Agostino Nifo, in cui sostiene
la distinzione tra verità di fede e verità di ragione, idea ripresa dal
filosofo Roberto Ardigò. Queste controversie gli impediscono di
pubblicare due opere che aveva completato nel 1520: il De naturalium effectuum
causis sive de incantationibus e i Libri quinque de fato, de libero arbitrio et
de praedestinatione, pubblicati postumi rispettivamente nel 1556 e 1557, con
alcune modifiche, a Basilea, da Guglielmo Grataroli. Evita ogni problema
teologico pubblicando nel 1521 il De nutritione et augmentatione, il De
partibus animalium nel 1521 e il De sensu nel 1524. Malato di calcoli
renali, stende il proprio testamento nel 1524 e muore l'anno dopo. Secondo i
suoi allievi Antonio Brocardo ed Ercole Strozzi (1473-1508) egli si sarebbe
suicidato. Il De immortalitate animae Aristotele nella Scuola
di Atene di Raffaello Per Aristotele l'anima è l'atto (entelechia) primo di un
corpo che ha la vita in potenza, è la sostanza che realizza le funzioni vitali
del corpo. Tre sono le funzioni dell'anima: la funzione vegetativa per la quale
gli esseri vegetali, animali e umani si nutrono e si riproducono; la funzione
sensitiva per la quale gli esseri animali e umani hanno sensazioni e immagini;
la funzione intellettiva, per la quale gli esseri umani comprendono.
L'intelletto è la capacità di giudicare le immagini fornite dai sensi. L'atto
dell'intendere si identifica con l'oggetto intelligibile, cioè con la sostanza
dell'oggetto, ossia con la verità. Aristotele distingue l'intelletto
potenziale o possibile o passivo, che è la capacità umana di intendere,
dall'intelletto attuale o attivo o agente, che è la luce intellettuale.
Quest'ultimo contiene in atto tutti gli intelligibili, e agisce sull'intelletto
potenziale come - l'esempio è di Aristotele - la luce mostra, mette in atto i
colori che al buio non sono visibili ma pure esistono e dunque sono in potenza:
l'intelletto agente mette in atto le verità che nell'intelletto potenziale sono
soltanto in potenza. L'intelletto agente è separato, non composto, impassibile,
per sua essenza atto…separato, esso è solo quel che è realmente, e questo solo
è immortale ed eterno. Che ne è dunque dell'anima? Nella Metafisica
Aristotele dice solo che "Bisogna esaminare se la forma esista anche dopo
la dissoluzione del composto; per alcune cose nulla lo impedisce, come, ad
esempio nel caso dell'anima, ma non dell'anima nella sua interezza, bensì
dell'intelletto, poiché è forse impossibile l'esistenza separata dell'anima
intera".[1] L'aristotelismo a Padova si era diviso in due correnti
fondamentali, gli averroisti e gli alessandrini, seguaci questi delle
interpretazioni aristoteliche di Alessandro di Afrodisia. Averroè,
secondo una concezione influenzata dal platonismo, sosteneva l'unicità e la
trascendenza non solo dell'intelletto agente, ma anche dell'intelletto
potenziale, che per lui non appartiene ai singoli uomini ma è unico e comune
all'intera specie umana. . La dottrina di Alessandro mantiene l'unicità
dell'intelletto agente, che egli fa coincidere con Dio, ma attribuisce a
ciascun uomo un intelletto potenziale individuale, mortale insieme con il
corpo. Tommaso d'Aquino ritratto dal Beato Angelico Infine, va
ricordato che per Tommaso d'Aquino nell'uomo è presente un'unica anima per sua
natura (simpliciter) immortale, ma per un certo aspetto (secundum quid)
mortale, in quanto anche legata alle funzioni più materiali dell'essere
umano. Il Trattato dell'immortalità dell'anima, terminato il 24 settembre
1516 ed edito a Bologna il 6 novembre 1516, trae spunto da una discussione con
il domenicano Girolamo Raguseo il quale, avendo il Pomponazzi sostenuto che la
teoria di Tommaso sull'anima non si accorda con quella aristotelica, lo aveva
pregato di provare le sue affermazioni mediante prove puramente razionali.
"Fecero bene gli antichi a porre l'uomo tra le cose eterne e quelle
temporali, cosicché egli, né puramente eterno né semplicemente temporale,
partecipa delle due nature e stando a metà fra loro, può vivere quella che
vuole. Così, alcuni uomini sembrano dei perché, dominando il proprio essere
vegetativo e sensitivo, sono quasi completamente razionali. Altri, sommersi nei
sensi, sembrano bestie. Altri ancora, uomini nel vero senso della parola,
vivono mediamente secondo la virtù, senza concedersi completamente né
all'intelletto e né ai piaceri del corpo."[2] L'uomo dunque, "è
di natura non semplice ma molteplice, non determinata ma bifronte (ancipitis),
media fra il mortale e l'immortale"ref>Pietro Pomponazzi, Trattato
sull'immortalità dell'anima, Capitolo I, 5. e questa medietà non è il
provvisorio incontro di due nature, una corporea e l'altra spirituale, che si
divideranno con la morte, ma è la dimostrazione della reale unità dell'uomo:
"La natura procede per gradi: i vegetali hanno un poco di anima, gli animali
hanno i sensi e una certa immaginazione…alcuni animali arrivano a costruirsi
case e a organizzarsi civilmente tanto che molti uomini sembrano avere
un'intelligenza molto inferiore alla loro…vi sono animali intermedi fra la
pianta e la bestia, come la spugna…della scimmia non sai se sia uomo o bruto,
analogamente l'anima intellettiva è media fra il temporale e
l'eterno."[3] Polemizza con Averroè che ha scisso dalla naturale
unità umana il principio razionale da quello sensitivo e con Tommaso d'Aquino,
rilevando che l'anima, essendo unica, non può avere due modi di intendere, uno
dipendente e un altro indipendente dalle funzioni del corpo; la dipendenza
dell'intelligenza dalla fantasia, che dipende a sua volta dai sensi, lega
l'anima indissolubilmente al corpo e ne fa seguire lo stesso destino di morte.
È capovolta la tesi fondamentale di Tommaso: per Pomponazzi l'anima è per sé
mortale e secundum quid, in un certo senso, immortale, e non il contrario,
perché "nobilissima fra le cose materiali e al confine con le immateriali,
profuma di immortalità ma non in senso assoluto" (aliquid immortalitatis
odorat, sed non simpliciter).[4]E ricorda che per Aristotele l'anima non è
creata da Dio, "Un uomo infatti è generato da un uomo e anche dal sole".[5]
Riguardo al problema del rapporto fra ragione e fede, per Pomponazzi solo la
fede, non le ragioni naturali, può affermare l'immortalità dell'anima e
"coloro che camminano per le vie dei credenti sono fermi e saldi",[6]
mentre per quanto attiene i problemi etici che la mortalità dell'anima potrebbe
suscitare, afferma che per comportarsi virtuosamente non è affatto necessario
credere all'immortalità dell'anima e alle ricompense ultraterrene, perché la
virtù è premio a sé stessa e chi afferma che l'anima è mortale salva il
principio della virtù meglio di chi la considera immortale, perché la speranza
di un premio e il terrore della pena provoca comportamenti servili contrari
alla virtù. Il Tractatus provocò clamore e polemiche alle quale rispose
nel 1518, ribadendo le sue tesi con l'Apologia, dove nel primo libro risponde
alle critiche amichevoli del suo allievo e futuro cardinale Gaspare Contarini e
negli altri due al domenicano Vincenzo Colzade e all'agostiniano Ambrogio
Fiandino. Nel 1519 replica con il Defensorium adversus Agostinum Niphum alle
critiche di Agostino Nifo, professore di filosofia nell'università di
Padova. La critica dei miracoli Nel 1520 il medico mantovano Ludovico
Panizza avrebbe chiesto a Pomponazzi se possono esserci cause soprannaturali di
eventi naturali, in contrasto con le affermazioni di Aristotele, e se si debba
ammettere l'esistenza di demoni, come sostiene la Chiesa, anche per spiegare
molti fenomeni che si sono verificati. Per Pomponazzi "dobbiamo
spiegare questi fenomeni con cause naturali, senza ricorrere ai demoni…è
ridicolo lasciare l'evidenza per cercare quello che non è né evidente né
credibile". D'altra parte, poiché l'intelletto percepisce dati sensibili,
un puro spirito non potrebbe esercitare un'azione qualunque su qualcosa di materiale:
gli spiriti non possono entrare in contatto con il nostro mondo; "in
realtà vi sono uomini che, pur agendo per mezzo della scienza, hanno prodotto
effetti che, mal compresi, li hanno fatti ritenere opera di santi o di maghi,
com'è successo con Pietro d'Abano o con Cecco d'Ascoli…altri, ritenuti santi
dal volgo che pensava avessero rapporti con gli angeli…erano magari dei
mascalzoni…io credo che facessero tutto questo per ingannare il
prossimo". Ma, a parte casi di incomprensione o di malafede, è possibile
che fenomeni mirabolanti abbiano la loro causa nell'influsso degli astri:
"È assurdo che i corpi celesti, che reggono tutto l'universo…non possano
produrre effetti che di per sé sono nulla considerando l'insieme
dell'universo". Cause naturali, comunque, secondo la scienza del tempo: il
determinismo astrologico governa anche le religioni: "al tempo degli idoli
non c'era maggior vergogna della croce, nell'età successiva non c'è nulla di
più venerato...ora si curano i languori con un segno di croce nel nome di Gesù,
mentre un tempo ciò non accadeva perché non era giunta la Sua ora".
Ogni religione ha i suoi miracoli "quali quelli che si leggono e si
ricordano nella legge di Cristo ed è logico, perché non ci possono essere
profonde trasformazioni senza grandi miracoli. Ma non sono miracoli perché
contrari all'ordine dei corpi celesti ma perché sono inconsueti e
rarissimi". Nessun fenomeno ha dunque cause non naturali:
l'astrologo che abbia colto la natura delle forze celesti, può spiegare tanto
le cause di fenomeni che sembrano soprannaturali che realizzare opere
straordinarie che il popolino considererà miracolose solo perché incapace di
individuarne la causa. L'ignoranza del volgo è del resto sfruttata da politici
e da sacerdoti per tenerlo in soggezione, presentandosi ad esso come personaggi
straordinari o addirittura inviati da Dio stesso. Inoltre Pomponazzi
sostiene la sua tesi conducendo un discorso di questo tipo:"se Dio ha
creato l'universo ponendo su di esso leggi fisiche precise, sarebbe paradossale
che egli stesso agisse contro queste leggi utilizzando eventi sovrannaturali
come i miracoli". Per Pomponazzi appunto l'universo è controllato e
determinato dall'agire degli astri e Dio agisce indirettamente muovendo questi
ultimi; Pomponazzi sviluppa quindi una concezione dell'universo
deterministica. Il destino dell'uomo Se tali sono le forze che governano
il mondo, se anche i fenomeni soprannaturali hanno una spiegazione
nell'esistenza di forze naturali così potenti, esiste ancora una libertà nelle
scelte individuali dell'uomo? In Dio, conoscenza e causa delle cose coincidono
e dunque egli è veramente libero; l'uomo si esprime invece in un mondo dove
tutto è già determinato. Rifiutato il contingentismo di Alessandro di
Afrodisia, che salva la libertà umana criticando gli stoici per i quali non
esiste né contingenza né libertà umana, Pomponazzi è costretto dalla sua
concezione strettamente deterministica, ove tutto è regolato da forze naturali
superiori all'uomo, a propendere per l'impossibilità del libero
arbitrio:"...l'argomento è per me difficilissimo. Gli stoici sfuggono
facilmente alle difficoltà facendo dipendere da Dio l'atto di volontà. Per
questo l'opinione stoica appare molto probabile". Nel cristianesimo
c'è maggiore difficoltà a risolvere il problema del libero arbitrio e della
predestinazione: "Se Dio odia ab aeterno i peccatori e li condanna, è
impossibile che non li odi e non li condanni; e questi, così odiati e reietti,
è impossibile che non pecchino e non si perdano. Che rimane, allora, se non una
somma crudeltà e ingiustizia divina, e odio e bestemmia contro Dio? E questa è
una posizione molto peggiore di quella stoica. Gli stoici dicono infatti che
Dio si comporta così perché la necessità e la natura lo impongono. Secondo il
cristianesimo il fato dipende invece dalla cattiveria di Dio, che potrebbe fare
diversamente ma non vuole, mentre secondo gli stoici Dio fa così perché non può
fare altrimenti". Conclusioni Lo scrittore Matteo Bandello
Chiamato anche Peretto per la piccola statura, secondo Matteo Bandello
(Novelle, III, 38) Pietro Pomponazzi "era un omicciolo molto piccolo, con
un viso che nel vero aveva più del giudeo che del cristiano e vestiva anco ad
una certa foggia che teneva più del rabbi che del filosofo, e andava sempre
raso e toso; parlava anche in certo modo che parea un giudeo tedesco che
volesse imparar a parlar italiano". Ma lo storico Paolo Giovio dirà che
egli "esponeva Aristotele e Averroè con voce dolce e limpidissima; il suo
discorso era preciso e pacato nella trattazione, mobile e concitato nella
polemica; quando poi giungeva a definire e a trarre le conclusioni, era così
grave e posato che gli studenti dai loro posti potevano annotarsi le
spiegazioni". Per nulla tenero con gli uomini di chiesa, "isti
fratres truffaldini, domenichini, franceschini, vel diabolini" riassumeva
il suo spirito ironico e motteggiante consigliando "alla filosofia credete
fin dove vi detta la ragione, alla teologia credete quel che vogliono i teologi
e i prelati con tutta la chiesa romana, perché altrimenti farete la fine delle
castagne" ma fu serio e senza compromessi nelle sue convinzioni scrivendo
nel De fato che "Prometeo è il filosofo che, nello sforzo di scoprire i
segreti divini, è continuamente tormentato da pensieri affannosi, non ha sete,
non ha fame, non dorme, non mangia, non spurga, deriso, dileggiato, insultato,
perseguitato dagli inquisitori, ludibrio del volgo. Questo è il guadagno dei
filosofi, questa la loro ricompensa". Epperò i filosofi sono per lui
"come Dei terreni, tanto lontani dagli altri come gli uomini veri lo sono
dalle figure dipinte" e lui sarebbe pronto, per amore della verità, anche
a "ritrattare quel che ho detto. Chi dice che polemizzo per il gusto di
contrastare, mente. In filosofia, chi vuol trovare la verità, dev'essere
eretico". Note ^ Aristotele, Metafisica, XII, 1070a, 2-27. ^
Pietro Pomponazzi, Trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima, Capitolo I, 3-4. ^
Pietro Pomponazzi, Trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima, Capitolo IX. ^ Pietro
Pomponazzi, Trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima, Capitolo IX, 20. ^
Aristotele, Fisica, II, 194b 11-15; Pietro Pomponazzi, Trattato
sull'immortalità dell'anima, Capitolo VII. ^ Pietro Pomponazzi, Trattato
sull'immortalità dell'anima, Capitolo XV. Bibliografia Testi De naturalium
effectuum causis sive de incantationibus, trad. Innocenti, Firenze, La Nuova
Italia, 1996. Trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima, a cura di Vittoria Perrone
Compagni, Firenze, Olschki, 1999. Il fato, il libero arbitrio e la
predestinazione in cinque libri, a cura di Vittoria Perrone Compagni, Torino,
Aragno, 2004. Tutti i trattati peripatetici, a cura di F.P. Raimondi e J.M.G.
Valverde, Milano, Bompiani, 2013. Studi Giovanni Di Napoli, L'immortalità
dell'anima nel Rinascimento, Torino, S. E. I., 1963. Bruno Nardi, Studi su
Pietro Pomponazzi, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1965. Nicola Badaloni, Cultura e vita
civile tra Riforma e Controriforma, Bari, Laterza, 1973. Giancarlo Zannier,
Ricerche sulla diffusione e fortuna del «De Incantationibus» di Pomponazzi, Firenze,
La Nuova Italia, 1975. Eugenio Garin, Aristotelismo veneto e scienza moderna,
Padova, Antenore, 1981. Paola Zambelli, L'ambigua natura della magia, Milano,
Il Saggiatore, 1991. Cuttini Elisa, Unità e pluralità nella tradizione europea
della filosofia pratica di Aristotele. Girolamo Savonarola, Pietro Pomponazzi e
Filippo Melantone, Soveria Mannelli (CZ), Rubbettino, 2005. Ramberti Rita, Il
problema del libero arbitrio nel pensiero di Pietro Pomponazzi, Firenze,
Olschki, 2007. Marco Sgarbi, Pietro Pomponazzi. Tra tradizione e dissenso,
Firenze, Olschki, 2010. Pasquale Vitale,Un aristotelismo problematico: il «De
fato» di Pietro Pomponazzi, in Aristotele si dice in tanti modi, Rivista di
filosofia «Lo sguardo»,ISSN 2036-6558, n°5, 2011, pp. 120–135. Altri progetti
Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Pietro
Pomponazzi Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Pietro
Pomponazzi Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Pietro Pomponazzi Collegamenti esterni Pietro Pomponazzi, su
Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata Pietro Pomponazzi, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Pietro Pomponazzi, su
Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata
Pietro Pomponazzi, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Pietro Pomponazzi, su
Mathematics Genealogy Project, North Dakota State University. Modifica su
Wikidata Opere di Pietro Pomponazzi, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.
Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Pietro Pomponazzi, su Open Library, Internet
Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Pietro Pomponazzi, in Catholic Encyclopedia,
Robert Appleton Company. Modifica su Wikidata Pomponazzi, Pietro (latinizz.
Petrus Pomponatius), in Dizionario di filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 2009. Vittoria Perrone Compagni, Pomponazzi, Pietro, in Il contributo
italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 2012. (EN) Craig Martin, Pietro Pomponazzi, in Edward N. Zalta (a
cura di), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center for the Study of Language
and Information (CSLI), Università di Stanford. Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN)
27113040 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0881 7208 · SBN IT\ICCU\TO0V\091536 · LCCN (EN)
n50055009 · GND (DE) 118595628 · BNF (FR) cb121975325 (data) · BNE (ES)
XX1402840 (data) · BAV (EN) 495/76124 · CERL cnp00396165 · WorldCat Identities
(EN) lccn-n50055009 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XV secoloUmanisti italianiNati nel 1462Morti
nel 1525Nati il 16 settembreMorti il 18 maggioNati a MantovaMorti a
BolognaPersone legate all'Università degli Studi di PadovaProfessori
dell'Università di Bologna[altre]. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, "Grice, Shropshire and Pomponazzi on the immortality of the
soul," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice,
Liguria, Italia.
porfirio: Grice preferred to read the
Latin version by Boezio – “Perhaps not literal, but implicatural.” -- Grecian
Neoplatonist philosopher, second to Plotinus in influence. He was born in Tyre,
and is thus sometimes called Porphyry the Phoenician. As a young man he went to
Athens, where he absorbed the Platonism of Cassius Longinus, who had in turn
been influenced by Ammonius Saccas in Alexandria. Porphyry went to Rome in 263,
where he became a disciple of Plotinus, who had also been influenced by
Ammonius. Porphyry lived in Rome until 269, when, urged by Plotinus to pons
asinorum Porphyry 722 722 travel as a
cure for severe depression, he traveled to Sicily. He remained there for
several years before returning to Rome to take over Plotinus’s school. He
apparently died in Rome. Porphyry is not noted for original thought. He seems
to have dedicated himself to explicating Aristotle’s logic and defending
Plotinus’s version of Neoplatonism. During his years in Sicily, Porphyry wrote
his two most famous works, the lengthy Against the Christians, of which only
fragments survive, and the Isagoge, or “Introduction.” The Isagoge, which
purports to give an elementary exposition of the concepts necessary to
understand Aristotle’s Categories, was tr. into Latin by Boethius and routinely
published in the Middle Ages with Latin editions of Aristotle’s Organon, or
logical treatises. Its inclusion in that format arguably precipitated the
discussion of the so-called problem of universals in the twelfth century.
During his later years in Rome, Porphyry collected Plotinus’s writings, editing
and organizing them into a scheme of his own
not Plotinus’s design, six groups
of nine treatises, thus called the Enneads. Porphyry prefaced his edition with
an informative biography of Plotinus, written shortly before Porphyry’s own
death.
positive and negative freedom,
respectively, the area within which the individual is self-determining and the
area within which the individual is left free from interference by others. More
specifically, one is free in the positive sense to the extent that one has
control over one’s life, or rules oneself. In this sense the term is very close
to that of ‘autonomy’. The forces that can prevent this self-determination are
usually thought of as internal, as desires or passions. This conception of
freedom can be said to have originated with Plato, according to whom a person
is free when the parts of the soul are rightly related to each other, i.e. the
rational part of the soul rules the other parts. Other advocates of positive
freedom include Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. One is free in the negative
sense if one is not prevented from doing something by another person. One is
prevented from doing something if another person makes it impossible for one to
do something or uses coercion to prevent one from doing something. Hence
persons are free in the negative sense if they are not made unfree in the
negative sense. The term ‘negative liberty’ was coined by Bentham to mean the
absence of coercion. Advocates of negative freedom include Hobbes, Locke, and
Hume.
Positivism: one of the twelve labours by
Grice. Each has an entry in this alphabetum, even if conceptually, what they
deal with is treated in other entries too.
posse --- potentia --
dunamis, also dynamis Grecian, ‘power’, ‘capacity’, as used by pre-Socratics
such as Anaximander and Anaxagoras, one of the elementary character-powers,
such as the hot or the cold, from which they believed the world was
constructed. Plato’s early theory of Forms borrowed from the concept of
character-powers as causes present in things; courage, e.g., is treated in the
Laches as a power in the soul. Aristotle also used the word in this sense to
explain the origins of the elements. In the Metaphysics especially Book IX,
Aristotle used dunamis in a different sense to mean ‘potentiality’ in contrast
to ‘actuality’ energeia or entelecheia. In the earlier sense of dunamis, matter
is treated as potentiality, in that it has the potential to receive form and so
be actualized as a concrete substance. In the later Aristotelian sense of
dunamis, dormant abilities are treated as potentialities, and dunamis is to
energeia as sleeping is to waking, or having sight to seeing. Potentia -- dynamic logic, a branch of logic
in which, in addition to the usual category of formulas interpretable as
propositions, there is a category of expressions interpretable as actions.
Dynamic logic originally called the modal logic of programs emerged in the late
0s as one step in a long tradition within theoretical computer science aimed at
providing a way to formalize the analysis of programs and their action. A
particular concern here was program verification: what can be said of the
effect of a program if started at a certain point? To this end operators [a]
and ‹a were introduced with the following intuitive readings: [a]A to mean
‘after every terminating computation according to a it is the case that A’ and
‹aA to mean ‘after some terminating computation according to a it is the case
that A’. The logic of these operators may be seen as a generalization of
ordinary modal logic: where modal logic has one box operator A and one diamond
operator B, dynamic logic has one box operator [a] and one diamond operator ‹a
for every program expression a in the language. In possible worlds semantics
for modal logic a model is a triple U, R, V where U is a universe of points, R
a binary relation, and V a valuation assigning to each atomic formula a subset
of U. In dynamic logic, a model is a triple U, R, V where U and V are as before
but R is a family of binary relations Ra, one for every program expression a in
the language. Writing ‘Xx A’, where x is a point in U, for ‘A is true at x’ in
the model in question, we have the following characteristic truth conditions
truth-functional compounds are evaluated by truth tables, as in modal logic: Xx
P if and only if x is a point in VP, where P is an atomic formula, Xx[a]A if
and only if, for all y, if x is Ra- related to y then Xy A, Xx ‹a if and only
if, for some y, x is Ra-related to y and Xy A. Traditionally, dynamic logic
will contain machinery for rendering the three regular operators on programs:
‘!’ sum, ‘;’ composition, and ‘*’ Kleene’s star operation, as well as the test
operator ‘?’, which, operating on a proposition, will yield a program. The
action a ! b consists in carrying out a or carrying out b; the action a;b in
first carrying out a, then carrying out b; the action a* in carrying out a some
finite number of times not excluding 0; the action ?A in verifying that A. Only
standard models reflect these intuitions: Ra ! b % Ra 4 Rb, Ra;b % Ra _ Rb, Ra*
% Ra*, R?A % {x,x : Xx A} where ‘*’ is the ancestral star The smallest
propositional dynamic logic PDL is the set of formulas true at every point in
every standard model. Note that dynamic logic analyzes non-deterministic
action this is evident at the level of
atomic programs p where Rp is a relation, not necessarily a function, and also
in the definitions of Ra + b and Ra*. Dynamic logic has been extended in
various ways, e.g., to first- and second-order predicate logic. Furthermore,
just as deontic logic, tense logic, etc., are referred to as modal logic in the
wide sense, so extensions of dynamic logic in the narrow sense such as process logic
are often loosely referred to as dynamic logic in the wide sense. Dyad dynamic
logic 250 250 The philosophical
interest in dynamic logic rests with the expectation that it will prove a
fruitful instrument for analyzing the concept of action in general: a
successful analysis would be valuable in itself and would also be relevant to
other disciplines such as deontic logic and the logic of imperatives. potency, for Aristotle, a kind of capacity
that is a correlative of action. We require no instruction to grasp the
difference between ‘X can do Y’ and ‘X is doing Y’, the latter meaning that the
deed is actually being done. That an agent has a potency to do something is not
a pure prediction so much as a generalization from past performance of individual
or kind. Aristotle uses the example of a builder, meaning someone able to
build, and then confronts the Megaric objection that the builder can be called
a builder only when he actually builds. Clearly one who is doing something can
do it, but Aristotle insists that the napping carpenter has the potency to
hammer and saw. A potency based on an acquired skill like carpentry derives
from the potency shared by those who acquire and those who do not acquire the
skill. An unskilled worker can be said to be a builder “in potency,” not in the
sense that he has the skill and can employ it, but in the sense that he can
acquire the skill. In both acquisition and employment, ‘potency’ refers to the
actual either the actual acquisition of
the skill or its actual use. These post-structuralism potency 726 726 potentiality, first practical attitude
727 correlatives emerged from Aristotle’s analysis of change and becoming. That
which, from not having the skill, comes to have it is said to be “in potency”
to that skill. From not having a certain shape, wood comes to have a certain
shape. In the shaped wood, a potency is actualized. Potency must not be
identified with the unshaped, with what Aristotle calls privation. Privation is
the negation of P in a subject capable of P. Parmenides’ identification of
privation and potency, according to Aristotle, led him to deny change. How can
not-P become P? It is the subject of not-P to which the change is attributed
and which survives the change that is in potency to X. Potestas – Energeia – actus – entelechia --
power, a disposition; an ability or capacity to yield some outcome. One
tradition which includes Locke distinguishes active and passive powers. A knife
has the active power to slice an apple, which has the passive power to be
sliced by the knife. The distinction seems largely grammatical, however. Powers
act in concert: the power of a grain of salt to dissolve in water and the
water’s power to dissolve the salt are reciprocal and their manifestations
mutual. Powers or dispositions are sometimes thought to be relational
properties of objects, properties possessed only in virtue of objects standing
in appropriate relations to other objects. However, if we distinguish, as we
must, between a power and its manifestation, and if we allow that an object
could possess a power that it never manifested a grain of salt remains soluble
even if it never dissolves, it would seem that an object could possess a power
even if appropriate reciprocal partners for its manifestation were altogether
non-existent. This appears to have been Locke’s view An Essay concerning Human
Understanding, 1690 of “secondary qualities” colors, sounds, and the like,
which he regarded as powers of objects to produce certain sorts of sensory
experience in observers. Philosophers who take powers seriously disagree over
whether powers are intrinsic, “built into” properties this view, defended by C.
B. Martin, seems to have been Locke’s, or whether the connection between
properties and the powers they bestow is contingent, dependent perhaps upon
contingent laws of nature a position endorsed by Armstrong. Is the solubility
of salt a characteristic built into the salt, or is it a “second-order”
property possessed by the salt in virtue of i the salt’s possession of some “firstorder”
property and ii the laws of nature? Reductive analyses of powers, though
influential, have not fared well. Suppose a grain of salt is soluble in water.
Does this mean that if the salt were placed in water, it would dissolve? No.
Imagine that were the salt placed in water, a technician would intervene,
imposing an electromagnetic field, thereby preventing the salt from dissolving.
Attempts to exclude “blocking” conditions
by appending “other things equal” clauses perhaps face charges of circularity: in nailing down
what other things must be equal we find ourselves appealing to powers. Powers
evidently are fundamental features of our world. In the romance languages, “it
may run” means “It has power to rain.” “Il peut …” This has a cognate in the Germanic languages,
“it might rain.” “Might is right.” possibile
– “what is actual is not also possible – grave mistake!” – H. P. Grice.
compossible, capable of existing or occurring together. E.g., two individuals
are compossible provided the existence of one of them is compatible with the
existence of the other. In terms of possible worlds, things are compossible
provided there is some possible world to which all of them belong; otherwise
they are incompossible. Not all possibilities are compossible. E.g., the
extinction of life on earth by the year 3000 is possible; so is its
continuation until the year 10,000; but since it is impossible that both of
these things should happen, they are not compossible. Leibniz held that any
non-actualized possibility must be incompossible with what is actual. possible worlds, alternative worlds in terms
of which one may think of possibility. The idea of thinking about possibility
in terms of such worlds has played an important part, both in Leibnizian
philosophical theology and in the development of modal logic and philosophical
reflection about it in recent decades. But there are important differences in
the forms the idea has taken, and the uses to which it has been put, in the two
contexts. Leibniz used it in his account of creation. In his view God’s mind
necessarily and eternally contains the ideas of infinitely many worlds that God
could have created, and God has chosen the best of these and made it actual,
thus creating it. Similar views are found in the thought of Leibniz’s
contemporary, Malebranche. The possible worlds are thus the complete
alternatives among which God chose. They are possible at least in the sense
that they are logically consistent; whether something more is required in order
for them to be coherent as worlds is a difficult question in Leibniz
interpretation. They are complete in that they are possible totalities of
creatures; each includes a whole possible universe, in its whole spatial extent
and its whole temporal history if it is spatially and temporally ordered. The
temporal completeness deserves emphasis. If “the world of tomorrow” is “a
better world” than “the world of today,” it will still be part of the same
“possible world” the actual one; for the actual “world,” in the relevant sense,
includes whatever actually has happened or will happen throughout all time. The
completeness extends to every detail, so that a milligram’s difference in the
weight of the smallest bird would make a different possible world. The
completeness of possible worlds may be limited in one way, however. Leibniz
speaks of worlds as aggregates of finite things. As alternatives for God’s
creation, they may well not be thought of as including God, or at any rate, not
every fact about God. For this and other reasons it is not clear that in
Leibniz’s thought the possible can be identified with what is true in some
possible world, or the necessary with what is true in all possible worlds. That
identification is regularly assumed, however, in the recent development of what
has become known as possible worlds semantics for modal logic the logic of
possibility and necessity, and of other conceptions, e.g. those pertaining to
time and to morality, that have turned out to be formally analogous. The basic
idea here is that such notions as those of validity, soundness, and
completeness can be defined for modal logic in terms of models constructed from
sets of alternative “worlds.” Since the late 0s many important results have
been obtained by this method, whose best-known exponent is Saul Kripke. Some of
the most interesting proofs depend on the idea of a relation of accessibility
between worlds in the set. Intuitively, one world is accessible from another if
and only if the former is possible in or from the point of view of the latter.
Different systems of modal logic are appropriate depending on the properties of
this relation e.g., on whether it is or is not reflexive and/or transitive
and/or symmetrical. The purely formal results of these methods are well
established. The application of possible worlds semantics to conceptions
occurring in metaphysically richer discourse is more controversial, however.
Some of the controversy is related to debates over the metaphysical reality of
various sorts of possibility and necessity. Particularly controversial, and
also a focus of much interest, have been attempts to understand modal claims de
re, about particular individuals as such e.g., that I could not have been a
musical performance, in terms of the identity and nonidentity of individuals in
different possible worlds. Similarly, there is debate over the applicability of
a related treatment of subjunctive conditionals, developed by Robert Stalnaker
and David Lewis, though it is clear that it yields interesting formal results.
What is required, on this approach, for the truth of ‘If it were the case that
A, then it would be the case that B’, is that, among those possible worlds in
which A is true, some world in which B is true be more similar, in the relevant
respects, to the actual world than any world in which B is false. One of the
most controversial topics is the nature of possible worlds themselves.
Mathematical logicians need not be concerned with this; a wide variety of sets
of objects, real or fictitious, can be viewed as having the properties required
of sets of “worlds” for their purposes. But if metaphysically robust issues of
modality e.g., whether there are more possible colors than we ever see are to
be understood in terms of possible worlds, the question of the nature of the
worlds must be taken seriously. Some philosophers would deny any serious
metaphysical role to the notion of possible worlds. At the other extreme, David
Lewis has defended a view of possible worlds as concrete totalities, things of
the same sort as the whole actual universe, made up of entities like planets,
persons, and so forth. On his view, the actuality of the actual world consists
only in its being this one, the one that we are in; apart from its relation to
us or our linguistic acts, the actual is not metaphysically distinguished from
the merely possible. Many philosophers find this result counterintuitive, and
the infinity of concrete possible worlds an extravagant ontology; but Lewis
argues that his view makes possible attractive reductions of modality both logical
and causal, and of such notions as that of a proposition, to more concrete
notions. Other philosophers are prepared to say there are non-actual possible
worlds, but that they are entities of a quite different sort from the actual
concrete universe sets of propositions,
perhaps, or some other type of “abstract” object. Leibniz himself held a view
of this kind, thinking of possible worlds as having their being only in God’s
mind, as intentional objects of God’s thought.
post-modern – H. P. Grice plays with the
‘modernists,’ versus the ‘neo-traditionalists.’ Since he sees a
neotraditionalist like Strawson (neotraditionalist, like neocon, is a joke) and
a modernist like Whitehead as BOTH making the same mistake, it is fair to see
Grice as a ‘post-modernist’ -- of or relating to a complex set of reactions to
modern philosophy and its presuppositions, as opposed to the kind of agreement
on substantive doctrines or philosophical questions that often characterizes a
philosophical movement. Although there is little agreement on precisely what
the presuppositions of modern philosophy are, and disagreement on which
philosophers exemplify these presuppositions, postmodern philosophy typically
opposes foundationalism, essentialism, and realism. For Rorty, e.g., the
presuppositions to be set aside are foundationalist assumptions shared by the
leading sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century philosophers. For
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida, the contested presuppositions to
be set aside are as old as metaphysics itself, and are perhaps best exemplified
by Plato. Postmodern philosophy has even been characterized, by Lyotard, as
preceding modern philosophy, in the sense that the presuppositions of
philosophical modernism emerge out of a disposition whose antecedent,
unarticulated beliefs are already postmodern. Postmodern philosophy is
therefore usefully regarded as a complex cluster concept that includes the
following elements: an anti- or post- epistemological standpoint;
anti-essentialism; anti-realism; anti-foundationalism; opposition to
transcendental arguments and transcendental standpoints; rejection of the
picture of knowledge as accurate representation; rejection of truth as
correspondence to reality; rejection of the very idea of canonical descriptions;
rejection of final vocabularies, i.e., rejection of principles, distinctions,
and descriptions that are thought to be unconditionally binding for all times,
persons, and places; and a suspicion of grand narratives, metanarratives of the
sort perhaps best illustrated by dialectical materialism. In addition to these
things postmodern philosophy is “against,” it also opposes characterizing this
menu of oppositions as relativism, skepticism, or nihilism, and it rejects as
“the metaphysics of presence” the traditional, putatively impossible dream of a
complete, unique, and closed explanatory system, an explanatory system
typically fueled by binary oppositions. On the positive side, one often finds
the following themes: its critique of the notion of the neutrality and
sovereignty of reason including
insistence on its pervasively gendered, historical, and ethnocentric character;
its conception of the social construction of wordworld mappings; its tendency
to embrace historicism; its critique of the ultimate status of a contrast
between epistemology, on the one hand, and the sociology of knowledge, on the
other hand; its dissolution of the notion of the autonomous, rational subject;
its insistence on the artifactual status of divisions of labor in knowledge
acquisition and production; and its ambivalence about the Enlightenment and its
ideology. Many of these elements or elective affinities were already surfacing
in the growing opposition to the spectator theory of knowledge, in Europe and
in the English-speaking world, long before the term ‘postmodern’ became a
commonplace. In Anglophone philosophy this took the early form of Dewey’s and
pragmatism’s opposition to positivism, early Kuhn’s redescription of scientific
practice, and Vitters’s insistence on the language-game character of
representation; critiques of “the myth of the given” from Sellars to Davidson
and Quine; the emergence of epistemology naturalized; and the putative
description-dependent character of data, tethered to the theory dependence of
descriptions in Kuhn, Sellars, Quine, and Arthur Fine perhaps in all constructivists in the
philosophy of science. In Europe, many of these elective affinities surfaced
explicitly in and were identified with poststructuralism, although traces are
clearly evident in Heidegger’s and later in Derrida’s attacks on Husserl’s
residual Cartesianism; the rejection of essential descriptions
Wesensanschauungen in Husserl’s sense; Saussure’s and structuralism’s attack on
the autonomy and coherence of a transcendental signified standing over against
a selftransparent subject; Derrida’s deconstructing the metaphysics of
presence; Foucault’s redescriptions of epistemes; the convergence between - and
English-speaking social constructivists; attacks on the language of enabling
conditions as reflected in worries about the purchase of necessary and
sufficient conditions talk on both sides of the Atlantic; and Lyotard’s many
interventions, particularly those against grand narratives. Many of these
elective affinities that characterize postmodern philosophy can also be seen in
the virtually universal challenges to moral philosophy as it has been
understood traditionally in the West, not only in G. and philosophy, but in the reevaluation of “the
morality of principles” in the work of MacIntyre, Williams, Nussbaum, John
McDowell, and others. The force of postmodern critiques can perhaps best be
seen in some of the challenges of feminist theory, as in the work of Judith
Butler and Hélène Cixous, and gender theory generally. For it is in gender
theory that the conception of “reason” itself as it has functioned in the
shared philosophical tradition is redescribed as a conception that, it is often
argued, is engendered, patriarchal, homophobic, and deeply optional. The term
‘postmodern’ is less clear in philosophy, its application more uncertain and
divided than in some other fields, e.g., postmodern architecture. In
architecture the concept is relatively clear. It displaces modernism in
assignable ways, emerges as an oppositional force against architectural
modernism, a rejection of the work and tradition inaugurated by Walter Gropius,
Henri Le Corbusier, and Mies van der Rohe, especially the International Style.
In postmodern architecture, the modernist principle of abstraction, of geometric
purity and simplicity, is displaced by multivocity and pluralism, by renewed
interest in buildings as signs and signifiers, interest in their referential
potential and resources. The modernist’s aspiration to buildings that are
timeless in an important sense is itself read by postmodernists as an
iconography that privileges the brave new world of science and technology, an
aspiration that glorifies uncritically the industrial revolution of which it is
itself a quintessential expression. This aspiration to timelessness is
displaced in postmodern architecture by a direct and self-conscious openness to
and engagement with history. It is this relative specificity of the concept
postmodern architecture that enabled Charles Jencks to write that “Modern Architecture
died in St. Louis Missouri on July 15, 2 at 3:32 P.M.” Unfortunately, no
remotely similar sentence can be written about postmodern philosophy.
PARS-TOTUM
-- partiale-impartialis
– impartiality: Grice found this amusing. “Surely conversational maxims,
constituting the conversational immanuel, are impartial – i.e. they are not
part of any other part!” – “However, it’s only because they can be partial
that’s the only way they can have a bite on us!” -- a state or disposition
achieved to the degree that one’s actions or attitudes are not influenced in a
relevant respect by which members of a relevant group are benefited or harmed
by one’s actions or by the object of one’s attitudes. For example, a basketball
referee and that referee’s calls are impartial when the referee’s applications
of the rules are not affected by whether the calls help one team or the other.
A fan’s approval of a call lacks impartiality if that attitude results from the
fan’s preference for one team over the other. Impartiality in this general
sense does not exclude arbitrariness or guarantee fairness; nor does it require
neutrality among values, for a judge can be impartial between parties while
favoring liberty and equality for all. Different situations might call for
impartiality in different respects toward different groups, so disagreements
arise, for example, about when morality requires or allows partiality toward
friends or family or country. Moral philosophers have proposed various tests of
the kind of impartiality required by morality, including role reversibility
(Kurt Baier), universalizability (Hare), a veil of ignorance (Rawls), and a
restriction to beliefs shared by all rational people (Bernard Gert).
potching and
cotching: Grice coined ‘cotching’
because he was irritated to hear that Chomsky couldn’t stand ‘know’ and how to
coin ‘cognise’ to do duty for it! cognition -- cognitive dissonance, mental
discomfort arising from conflicting beliefs or attitudes held simultaneously.
Leon Festinger, who originated the theory of cognitive dissonance in a book of
that title 7, suggested that cognitive dissonance has motivational
characteristics. Suppose a person is contemplating moving to a new city. She is
considering both Birmingham and Boston. She cannot move to both, so she must
choose. Dissonance is experienced by the person if in choosing, say,
Birmingham, she acquires knowledge of bad or unwelcome features of Birmingham
and of good or welcome aspects of Boston. The amount of dissonance depends on
the relative intensities of dissonant elements. Hence, if the only dissonant
factor is her learning that Boston is cooler than Birmingham, and she does not
regard climate as important, she will experience little dissonance. Dissonance may
occur in several sorts of psychological states or processes, although the bulk
of research in cognitive dissonance theory has been on dissonance in choice and
on the justification and psychological aftereffects of choice. Cognitive
dissonance may be involved in two phenomena of interest to philosophers,
namely, self-deception and weakness of will. Why do self-deceivers try to get
themselves to believe something that, in some sense, they know to be false? One
may resort to self-deception when knowledge causes dissonance. Why do the
weak-willed perform actions they know to be wrong? One may become weak-willed
when dissonance arises from the expected consequences of doing the right thing.
-- cognitive psychotherapy, an expression introduced by Brandt in A Theory of
the Good and the Right to refer to a process of assessing and adjusting one’s
desires, aversions, or pleasures henceforth, “attitudes”. This process is
central to Brandt’s analysis of rationality, and ultimately, to his view on the
justification of morality. Cognitive psychotherapy consists of the agent’s
criticizing his attitudes by repeatedly representing to himself, in an ideally
vivid way and at appropriate times, all relevant available information. Brandt
characterizes the key definiens as follows: 1 available information is
“propositions accepted by the science of the agent’s day, plus factual
propositions justified by publicly accessible evidence including testimony of
others about themselves and the principles of logic”; 2 information is relevant
provided, if the agent were to reflect repeatedly on it, “it would make a
difference,” i.e., would affect the attitude in question, and the effect would
be a function of its content, not an accidental byproduct; 3 relevant
information is represented in an ideally vivid way when the agent focuses on it
with maximal clarity and detail and with no hesitation or doubt about its
truth; and 4 repeatedly and at appropriate times refer, respectively, to the
frequency and occasions that would result in the information’s having the
maximal attitudinal impact. Suppose Mary’s desire to smoke were extinguished by
her bringing to the focus of her attention, whenever she was about to inhale
smoke, some justified beliefs, say that smoking is hazardous to one’s health and
may cause lung cancer; Mary’s desire would have been removed by cognitive
psychotherapy. According to Brandt, an attitude is rational for a person
provided it is one that would survive, or be produced by, cognitive
psychotherapy; otherwise it is irrational. Rational attitudes, in this sense,
provide a basis for moral norms. Roughly, the correct moral norms are those of
a moral code that persons would opt for if i they were motivated by attitudes
that survive the process of cognitive psychotherapy; and ii at the time of
opting for a moral code, they were fully aware of, and vividly attentive to,
all available information relevant to choosing a moral code for a society in
which they are to live for the rest of their lives. In this way, Brandt seeks a
value-free justification for moral norms
one that avoids the problems of other theories such as those that make
an appeal to intuitions. -- cognitive
science, an interdisciplinary research cluster that seeks to account for
intelligent activity, whether exhibited by living organisms especially adult
humans or machines. Hence, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence
constitute its core. A number of other disciplines, including neuroscience,
linguistics, anthropology, and philosophy, as well as other fields of
psychology e.g., developmental psychology, are more peripheral contributors.
The quintessential cognitive scientist is someone who employs computer modeling
techniques developing computer programs for the purpose of simulating
particular human cognitive activities, but the broad range of disciplines that
are at least peripherally constitutive of cognitive science have lent a variety
of research strategies to the enterprise. While there are a few common
institutions that seek to unify cognitive science e.g., departments, journals,
and societies, the problems investigated and the methods of investigation often
are limited to a single contributing discipline. Thus, it is more appropriate
to view cognitive science as a cross-disciplinary enterprise than as itself a
new discipline. While interest in cognitive phenomena has historically played a
central role in the various disciplines contributing to cognitive science, the
term properly applies to cross-disciplinary activities that emerged in the 0s.
During the preceding two decades each of the disciplines that became part of
cogntive science gradually broke free of positivistic and behavioristic
proscriptions that barred systematic inquiry into the operation of the mind.
One of the primary factors that catalyzed new investigations of cognitive
activities was Chomsky’s generative grammar, which he advanced not only as an
abstract theory of the structure of language, but also as an account of
language users’ mental knowledge of language their linguistic competence. A
more fundamental factor was the development of approaches for theorizing about
information in an abstract manner, and the introduction of machines computers
that could manipulate information. This gave rise to the idea that one might
program a computer to process information so as to exhibit behavior that would,
if performed by a human, require intelligence. If one tried to formulate a
unifying question guiding cognitive science research, it would probably be: How
does the cognitive system work? But even this common question is interpreted
quite differently in different disciplines. We can appreciate these differences
by looking just at language. While psycholinguists generally psychologists seek
to identify the processing activities in the mind that underlie language use,
most linguists focus on the products of this internal processing, seeking to
articulate the abstract structure of language. A frequent goal of computer
scientists, in contrast, has been to develop computer programs to parse natural
language input and produce appropriate syntactic and semantic representations.
These differences in objectives among the cognitive science disciplines
correlate with different methodologies. The following represent some of the
major methodological approaches of the contributing disciplines and some of the
problems each encounters. Artificial intelligence. If the human cognition
system is viewed as computational, a natural goal is to simulate its
performance. This typically requires formats for representing information as
well as procedures for searching and manipulating it. Some of the earliest
AIprograms drew heavily on the resources of first-order predicate calculus,
representing information in propositional formats and manipulating it according
to logical principles. For many modeling endeavors, however, it proved
important to represent information in larger-scale structures, such as frames
Marvin Minsky, schemata David Rumelhart, or scripts Roger Schank, in which
different pieces of information associated with an object or activity would be
stored together. Such structures generally employed default values for specific
slots specifying, e.g., that deer live in forests that would be part of the
representation unless overridden by new information e.g., that a particular
deer lives in the San Diego Zoo. A very influential alternative approach,
developed by Allen Newell, replaces declarative representations of information
with procedural representations, known as productions. These productions take
the form of conditionals that specify actions to be performed e.g., copying an
expression into working memory if certain conditions are satisfied e.g., the
expression matches another expression. Psychology. While some psychologists
develop computer simulations, a more characteristic activity is to acquire
detailed data from human subjects that can reveal the cognitive system’s actual
operation. This is a challenging endeavor. While cognitive activities transpire
within us, they frequently do so in such a smooth and rapid fashion that we are
unaware of them. For example, we have little awareness of what occurs when we
recognize an object as a chair or remember the name of a client. Some cognitive
functions, though, seem to be transparent to consciousness. For example, we might
approach a logic problem systematically, enumerating possible solutions and
evaluating them serially. Allen Newell and Herbert Simon have refined methods
for exploiting verbal protocols obtained from subjects as they solve such
problems. These methods have been quite fruitful, but their limitations must be
respected. In many cases in which we think we know how we performed a cognitive
task, Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson have argued that we are misled,
relying on folk theories to describe how our minds work rather than reporting
directly on their operation. In most cases cognitive psychologists cannot rely
on conscious awareness of cognitive processes, but must proceed as do
physiologists trying to understand metabolism: they must devise experiments that
reveal the underlying processes operative in cognition. One approach is to seek
clues in the errors to which the cognitive system cognitive science cognitive
science is prone. Such errors might be more easily accounted for by one kind of
underlying process than by another. Speech errors, such as substituting ‘bat
cad’ for ‘bad cat’, may be diagnostic of the mechanisms used to construct
speech. This approach is often combined with strategies that seek to overload
or disrupt the system’s normal operation. A common technique is to have a
subject perform two tasks at once e.g.,
read a passage while watching for a colored spot. Cognitive psychologists may
also rely on the ability to dissociate two phenomena e.g., obliterate one while
maintaining the other to establish their independence. Other types of data
widely used to make inferences about the cognitive system include patterns of
reaction times, error rates, and priming effects in which activation of one
item facilitates access to related items. Finally, developmental psychologists
have brought a variety of kinds of data to bear on cognitive science issues.
For example, patterns of acquisition times have been used in a manner similar
to reaction time patterns, and accounts of the origin and development of
systems constrain and elucidate mature systems. Linguistics. Since linguists
focus on a product of cognition rather than the processes that produce the
product, they tend to test their analyses directly against our shared knowledge
of that product. Generative linguists in the tradition of Chomsky, for
instance, develop grammars that they test by probing whether they generate the
sentences of the language and no others. While grammars are certainly G.e to
developing processing models, they do not directly determine the structure of
processing models. Hence, the central task of linguistics is not central to
cognitive science. However, Chomsky has augmented his work on grammatical
description with a number of controversial claims that are psycholinguistic in
nature e.g., his nativism and his notion of linguistic competence. Further, an
alternative approach to incorporating psycholinguistic concerns, the cognitive
linguistics of Lakoff and Langacker, has achieved prominence as a contributor
to cognitive science. Neuroscience. Cognitive scientists have generally assumed
that the processes they study are carried out, in humans, by the brain. Until
recently, however, neuroscience has been relatively peripheral to cognitive
science. In part this is because neuroscientists have been chiefly concerned
with the implementation of processes, rather than the processes themselves, and
in part because the techniques available to neuroscientists such as single-cell
recording have been most suitable for studying the neural implementation of
lower-order processes such as sensation. A prominent exception was the
classical studies of brain lesions initiated by Broca and Wernicke, which
seemed to show that the location of lesions correlated with deficits in
production versus comprehension of speech. More recent data suggest that
lesions in Broca’s area impair certain kinds of syntactic processing. However,
other developments in neuroscience promise to make its data more relevant to
cognitive modeling in the future. These include studies of simple nervous
systems, such as that of the aplysia a genus of marine mollusk by Eric Kandel,
and the development of a variety of techniques for determining the brain
activities involved in the performance of cognitive tasks e.g., recording of
evoked response potentials over larger brain structures, and imaging techniques
such as positron emission tomography. While in the future neuroscience is
likely to offer much richer information that will guide the development and
constrain the character of cognitive models, neuroscience will probably not
become central to cognitive science. It is itself a rich, multidisciplinary
research cluster whose contributing disciplines employ a host of complicated
research tools. Moreover, the focus of cognitive science can be expected to
remain on cognition, not on its implementation. So far cognitive science has
been characterized in terms of its modes of inquiry. One can also focus on the
domains of cognitive phenomena that have been explored. Language represents one
such domain. Syntax was one of the first domains to attract wide attention in
cognitive science. For example, shortly after Chomsky introduced his
transformational grammar, psychologists such as George Miller sought evidence
that transformations figured directly in human language processing. From this
beginning, a more complex but enduring relationship among linguists,
psychologists, and computer scientists has formed a leading edge for much
cognitive science research. Psycholinguistics has matured; sophisticated
computer models of natural language processing have been developed; and
cognitive linguists have offered a particular synthesis that emphasizes
semantics, pragmatics, and cognitive foundations of language. Thinking and
reasoning. These constitute an important domain of cognitive science that is
closely linked to philosophical interests. Problem cognitive science cognitive
science solving, such as that which figures in solving puzzles, playing games,
or serving as an expert in a domain, has provided a prototype for thinking.
Newell and Simon’s influential work construed problem solving as a search
through a problem space and introduced the idea of heuristics generally reliable but fallible simplifying
devices to facilitate the search. One arena for problem solving, scientific
reasoning and discovery, has particularly interested philosophers. Artificial
intelligence researchers such as Simon and Patrick Langley, as well as
philosophers such as Paul Thagard and Lindley Darden, have developed computer
programs that can utilize the same data as that available to historical
scientists to develop and evaluate theories and plan future experiments.
Cognitive scientists have also sought to study the cognitive processes
underlying the sorts of logical reasoning both deductive and inductive whose
normative dimensions have been a concern of philosophers. Philip JohnsonLaird,
for example, has sought to account for human performance in dealing with
syllogistic reasoning by describing a processing of constructing and manipulating
mental models. Finally, the process of constructing and using analogies is
another aspect of reasoning that has been extensively studied by traditional
philosophers as well as cognitive scientists. Memory, attention, and learning.
Cognitive scientists have differentiated a variety of types of memory. The
distinction between long- and short-term memory was very influential in the
information-processing models of the 0s. Short-term memory was characterized by
limited capacity, such as that exhibited by the ability to retain a seven-digit
telephone number for a short period. In much cognitive science work, the notion
of working memory has superseded short-term memory, but many theorists are
reluctant to construe this as a separate memory system as opposed to a part of
long-term memory that is activated at a given time. Endel Tulving introduced a
distinction between semantic memory general knowledge that is not specific to a
time or place and episodic memory memory for particular episodes or occurrences.
More recently, Daniel Schacter proposed a related distinction that emphasizes
consciousness: implicit memory access without awareness versus explicit memory
which does involve awareness and is similar to episodic memory. One of the
interesting results of cognitive research is the dissociation between different
kinds of memory: a person might have severely impaired memory of recent events
while having largely unimpaired implicit memory. More generally, memory
research has shown that human memory does not simply store away information as
in a file cabinet. Rather, information is organized according to preexisting
structures such as scripts, and can be influenced by events subsequent to the
initial storage. Exactly what gets stored and retrieved is partly determined by
attention, and psychologists in the information-processing tradition have
sought to construct general cognitive models that emphasize memory and
attention. Finally, the topic of learning has once again become prominent.
Extensively studied by the behaviorists of the precognitive era, learning was
superseded by memory and attention as a research focus in the 0s. In the 0s,
artificial intelligence researchers developed a growing interest in designing
systems that can learn; machine learning is now a major problem area in AI.
During the same period, connectionism arose to offer an alternative kind of
learning model. Perception and motor control. Perceptual and motor systems
provide the inputs and outputs to cognitive systems. An important aspect of perception
is the recognition of something as a particular kind of object or event; this
requires accessing knowledge of objects and events. One of the central issues
concerning perception questions the extent to which perceptual processes are
influenced by higher-level cognitive information top-down processing versus how
much they are driven purely by incoming sensory information bottom-up
processing. A related issue concerns the claim that visual imagery is a
distinct cognitive process and is closely related to visual perception, perhaps
relying on the same brain processes. A number of cognitive science inquiries
e.g., by Roger Shepard and Stephen Kosslyn have focused on how people use
images in problem solving and have sought evidence that people solve problems
by rotating images or scanning them. This research has been extremely
controversial, as other investigators have argued against the use of images and
have tried to account for the performance data that have been generated in
terms of the use of propositionally represented information. Finally, a
distinction recently has been proposed between the What and Where systems. All
of the foregoing issues concern the What system which recognizes and represents
objects as exemplars of categories. The Where system, in contrast, concerns
objects in their environment, and is particularly adapted to the dynamics of
movement. Gibson’s ecological psychology is a long-standing inquiry into this
aspect of perception, and work on the neural substrates is now attracting the
interest of cognitive scientists as well. Recent developments. The breadth of
cognitive science has been expanding in recent years. In the 0s, cognitive
science inquiries tended to focus on processing activities of adult humans or
on computer models of intelligent performance; the best work often combined
these approaches. Subsequently, investigators examined in much greater detail
how cognitive systems develop, and developmental psychologists have
increasingly contributed to cognitive science. One of the surprising findings
has been that, contrary to the claims of William James, infants do not seem to
confront the world as a “blooming, buzzing confusion,” but rather recognize
objects and events quite early in life. Cognitive science has also expanded along
a different dimension. Until recently many cognitive studies focused on what
humans could accomplish in laboratory settings in which they performed tasks
isolated from reallife contexts. The motivation for this was the assumption
that cognitive processes were generic and not limited to specific contexts.
However, a variety of influences, including Gibsonian ecological psychology
especially as interpreted and developed by Ulric Neisser and Soviet activity
theory, have advanced the view that cognition is much more dynamic and situated
in real-world tasks and environmental contexts; hence, it is necessary to study
cognitive activities in an ecologically valid manner. Another form of expansion
has resulted from a challenge to what has been the dominant architecture for
modeling cognition. An architecture defines the basic processing capacities of
the cognitive system. The dominant cognitive architecture has assumed that the
mind possesses a capacity for storing and manipulating symbols. These symbols
can be composed into larger structures according to syntactic rules that can
then be operated upon by formal rules that recognize that structure. Jerry
Fodor has referred to this view of the cognitive system as the “language of
thought hypothesis” and clearly construes it as a modern heir of rationalism.
One of the basic arguments for it, due to Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, is that
thoughts, like language, exhibit productivity the unlimited capacity to
generate new thoughts and systematicity exhibited by the inherent relation
between thoughts such as ‘Joan loves the florist’ and ‘The florist loves Joan’.
They argue that only if the architecture of cognition has languagelike
compositional structure would productivity and systematicity be generic
properties and hence not require special case-by-case accounts. The challenge
to this architecture has arisen with the development of an alternative
architecture, known as connectionism, parallel distributed processing, or
neural network modeling, which proposes that the cognitive system consists of
vast numbers of neuronlike units that excite or inhibit each other. Knowledge
is stored in these systems by the adjustment of connection strengths between
processing units; consequently, connectionism is a modern descendant of associationism.
Connectionist networks provide a natural account of certain cognitive phenomena
that have proven challenging for the symbolic architecture, including pattern
recognition, reasoning with soft constraints, and learning. Whether they also
can account for productivity and systematicity has been the subject of debate.
Philosophical theorizing about the mind has often provided a starting point for
the modeling and empirical investigations of modern cognitive science. The
ascent of cognitive science has not meant that philosophers have ceased to play
a role in examining cognition. Indeed, a number of philosophers have pursued
their inquiries as contributors to cognitive science, focusing on such issues
as the possible reduction of cognitive theories to those of neuroscience, the
status of folk psychology relative to emerging scientific theories of mind, the
merits of rationalism versus empiricism, and strategies for accounting for the
intentionality of mental states. The interaction between philosophers and other
cognitive scientists, however, is bidirectional, and a number of developments
in cognitive science promise to challenge or modify traditional philosophical
views of cognition. For example, studies by cognitive and social psychologists
have challenged the assumption that human thinking tends to accord with the
norms of logic and decision theory. On a variety of tasks humans seem to follow
procedures heuristics that violate normative canons, raising questions about
how philosophers should characterize rationality. Another area of empirical
study that has challenged philosophical assumptions has been the study of
concepts and categorization. Philosophers since Plato have widely assumed that
concepts of ordinary language, such as red, bird, and justice, should be
definable by necessary and sufficient conditions. But celebrated studies by
Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues indicated that many ordinary-language concepts
had a prototype structure instead. On this view, the categories employed in
human thinking are characterized by prototypes the clearest exemplars and a
metric that grades exemplars according to their degree of typicality. Recent
investigations have also pointed to significant instability in conceptual
structure and to the role of theoretical beliefs in organizing categories. This
alternative conception of concepts has profound implications for philosophical
methodologies that portray philosophy’s task to be the analysis of
concepts.
potts: “One of the few non-Oxonian English philosohpers
I can stand, but then he was my genial tutee!, so he IS Oxford. Oxford made me
and him!” --. English philosopher, tutee of H. P. Grice. Semanticist of the
best order! Structures and Categories for the
Representation of Meaning T.C. Potts. Potts, alla Grice, addresses the
representation problem ... how best to represent the meanings of linguistic
expressions... One might call this the 'semantic form' of expressions (p. xi,
italics in the original). The book begins with "three chapters in which I
survey the contributions made by linguistics, logic and computer science
respectively to the representation of meaning" (p. xii). These three
chapters are not easy to understand, principally because of Potts's obtuse
style, an example of which is that instead of saying "'either P or Q' is
false if 'P' and 'Q' are both false; otherwise, it is true," he says,
"we lay down that a proposition having the structure represented by
'either P or Q' is to be accounted false if a false proposition is substituted
for 'P' and a false proposition for 'Q', but is otherwise to be accounted
true" (p. 53). These chapters are also outdated. In particular, the
chapter on computer science, discussing the work of researchers whose goals are
the closest to Potts's own stated goals, is mainly a review of work as of the
seventies. There are citations to several of the papers in Findler (1979), but
only three to more recent research publications: Hayes (1980), Sowa (1984), and
Hobbs and Shieber (1987). Perhaps the most valuable aspect of these three chapters
is Potts's criticisms of some of the work he surveys. Of course, some of the
problems noted have been corrected in literature that Potts hasn't yet got
around to reading. By the end of the three survey chapters, Potts has
introduced two techniques that he 427 Computational Linguistics Volume
21, Number 3 then develops into his own representation-- categorial grammars
and graphs as representation formalisms. He takes the categorial analysis to be
the prior of the two, with his graphs, which he calls categorialgraphs, being
the clearer representation of sentence meaning. Unfortunately,
"formalism" and "clearer" must be taken with a grain of
salt. Potts never formally defines his categorial graphs, let alone gives a
formal semantics for them. Although I have had extensive experience reading,
interpreting, and devising graphical representations of meaning, I could not
understand the details of Potts's graphs. But then, neither, apparently, can
he: "The relationship between semantic and syntactic structures has not
been spelled out, so that it is not fully determinate what our semantic
representations represent at the syntactic level" (p. 168). The four
substantive chapters are useful for the linguistic issues that they address,
even if they are not useful for the representation scheme that they develop.
These issues, which must eventually be faced by all knowledge representation
formalisms that aspire to complete coverage of natural language include:
quantifier scope; pronouns; relative clauses; count nouns, substance nouns, and
proper names; generic propositions; deictic terms; plurals; identity; and
adverbs. Appropriately, the book does not end on a note of claimed
accomplishment, but on a note of work yet to do: "The purpose of a
philosophical book is to stimulate thought, not to put it to rest with
solutions to every problem ... It is still premature to formulate a graph
grammar for semantic representation of everyday language... The representation
problem is commonly not accorded the respect which it deserves" (p. 288).
Many people agree, and have, accordingly, produced a vast literature that Potts
is apparently not familiar with. (Some relevant collections are Cercone and
McCalla 1987, Sowa 1991, and Lehmann 1992.) Nevertheless, Potts is still correct
when he suggests that there is much work left to do.--Stuart C. Shapiro, State
University of New York at Buffalo References Cercone, Nick and McCalla, Gordon
(editors) (1987). The Knowledge Frontier: Essays in the Representation of
Knowledge. Springer-Verlag. Findler, Nicholas V. (editor) (1979). Associative
Networks: The Representation and Use of Knowledge in Computers. Academic Press.
Hayes, Patrick J. (1980). "The logic of frames." In Frame Conceptions
and Text Understanding, edited by Dieter Metzing, 46-61. de Gruyter, 1980. Also
in Readings in Knowledge Representation, edited by Ronald J. Brachman and
Hector J. Levesque, 287-295. Morgan Kaufmann. 1985. Hobbs, Jerry R., and
Shieber, Stuart M. (1987). "An algorithm for generating quantifier
scopings." Computational Linguistics, 13(1-2), 47-63. Lehmann, Fritz
(editor) (1992). Semantic Networks in Artificial Intelligence. Pergamon Press.
Sowa, John E (1984). Conceptual Structures. Addison-Wesley. Sowa, John F.
(editor) (1991). Principles of Semantic Networks: Explorations in the
Representation of Knowledge. Morgan Kaufmann. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Potts at
Villa Grice.”
practical reason, the capacity for
argument or demonstrative inference, considered in its application to the task
of prescribing or selecting behavior. Some philosophical concerns in this area
pertain to the actual thought processes by which plans of action are formulated
and carried out in practical situations. A second major issue is what role, if
any, practical reason plays in determining norms of conduct. Here there are two
fundamental positions. Instrumentalism is typified by Hume’s claim that reason
is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions. According to
instrumentalism, reason by itself is incapable of influencing action directly.
It may do so indirectly, by disclosing facts that arouse motivational impulses.
And it fulfills an indispensable function in discerning meansend relations by
which our objectives may be attained. But none of those objectives is set by
reason. All are set by the passions the
desiderative and aversive impulses aroused in us by what our cognitive
faculties apprehend. It does not follow from this alone that ethical motivation
reduces to mere desire and aversion, based on the pleasure and pain different
courses of action might afford. There might yet be a specifically ethical
passion, or it might be that independently based moral injunctions have in
themselves a special capacity to provoke ordinary desire and aversion.
Nevertheless, instrumentalism is often associated with the view that pleasure
and pain, happiness and unhappiness, are the sole objects of value and
disvalue, and hence the only possible motivators of conduct. Hence, it is
claimed, moral injunctions must be grounded in these motives, and practical
reason is of interest only as subordinated to inclination. The alternative to
instrumentalism is the view championed by Kant, that practical reason is an
autonomous source of normative principles, capable of motivating behavior
independently of ordinary desire and aversion. On this view it is the passions
that lack intrinsic moral import, and the function of practical reason is to
limit their motivational role by formulating normative principles binding for
all rational agents and founded in the operation of practical reason itself.
Theories of this kind usually view moral principles as grounded in consistency,
and an impartial respect for the autonomy of all rational agents. To be morally
acceptable, principles of conduct must be universalizable, so that all rational
agents could behave in the same way without their conduct either destroying
itself or being inconsistently motivated. There are advantages and
disadvantages to each of these views. Instrumentalism offers a simpler account
of both the function of practical reason and the sources of human motivation.
But it introduces a strong subjective element by giving primacy to desire,
thereby posing a problem of how moral principles can be universally binding.
The Kantian approach offers more promise here, since it makes
universalizability essential to any type of behavior being moral. But it is
more complex, and the claim that the deliverances of practical reason carry
intrinsic motivational force is open to challenge. practical
reasoning, the inferential process by which considerations for or against
envisioned courses of action are brought to bear on the formation and execution
of intention. The content of a piece of practical reasoning is a practical
argument. Practical arguments can be complex, but they are often summarized in
syllogistic form. Important issues concerning practical reasoning include how
it relates to theoretical reasoning, whether it is a causal process, and how it
can be evaluated. Theories of practical reasoning tend to divide into two basic
categories. On one sort of view, the intrinsic features of practical reasoning
exhibit little or no difference from those of theoretical reasoning. What makes
practical reasoning practical is its subject matter and motivation. Hence the
following could be a bona fide practical syllogism: Exercise would be good for
me. Jogging is exercise. Therefore, jogging would be good for me. This argument
has practical subject matter, and if made with a view toward intention
formation it would be practical in motivation also. But it consists entirely of
propositions, which are appropriate contents for belief-states. In principle,
therefore, an agent could accept its conclusion without intending or even
desiring to jog. Intention formation requires a further step. But if the
content of an intention cannot be a proposition, that step could not count in
itself as practical reasoning unless such reasoning can employ the contents of
strictly practical mental states. Hence many philosophers call for practical
syllogisms such as: Would that I exercise. Jogging is exercise. Therefore, I
shall go jogging. Here the first premise is optative and understood to
represent the content of a desire, and the conclusion is the content of a
decision or act of intention formation. These contents are not true or false,
and so are not propositions. Theories that restrict the contents of practical
reasoning to propositions have the advantage that they allow such reasoning to
be evaluated in terms of familiar logical principles. Those that permit the
inclusion of optative content entail a need for more complex modes of
evaluation. However, they bring more of the process of intention formation
under the aegis of reason; also, they can be extended to cover the execution of
intentions, in terms of syllogisms that terminate in volition. Both accounts
must deal with cases of self-deception, in which the considerations an agent
cites to justify a decision are not those from which it sprang, and cases of
akrasia, where the agent views one course of action as superior, yet carries
out another. Because mental content is always abstract, it cannot in itself be
a nomic cause of behavior. But the states and events to which it belongs desires, beliefs, etc. can count as causes, and are so treated in
deterministic explanations of action. Opponents of determinism reject this
step, and seek to explain action solely through the teleological or justifying
force carried by mental content. Practical syllogisms often summarize very
complex thought processes, in which multiple options are considered, each with
its own positive and negative aspects. Some philosophers hold that when
successfully concluded, this process issues in a judgment of what action would
be best all things considered i.e., in
light of all relevant considerations. Practical reasoning can be evaluated in
numerous ways. Some concern the reasoning process itself: whether it is timely
and duly considers the relevant alternatives, as well as whether it is well
structured logically. Other concerns have to do with the products of practical
reasoning. Decisions may be deemed irrational if they result in incompatible
intentions, or conflict with the agent’s beliefs regarding what is possible.
They may also be criticized if they conflict with the agent’s best interests.
Finally, an agent’s intentions can fail to accord with standards of morality.
The relationship among these ways of evaluating intentions is important to the
foundations of ethics.
Praedicatum –praedicabile:
As in qualia being the plural of quale and universalia being the plural of
universale, predicabilia is Boethius’s plural for the ‘predicabile’ --
something Grice knew by heart from giving seminars at Oxfrod on Aristotle’s
categories with Austin and Strawson. He found the topic boring enough to give
the seminar ALONE! prædicatum: vide
Is there a praedicatum in Blackburn’s one-off predicament. He draws a skull and
communicates that there is danger. The drawsing of the skull is not
syntactically structured. So it is difficult to isolate the ‘praedicatum.’
That’s why Grice leaves matters of the praedicatum’ to reductive analyses at a
second stage of his programme, where one wants to apply, metabolically,
‘communicate’ to what an emissum does. The emissum of the form, The S is P,
predicates P of S. Vide
subjectification, and subjectum. Of especial interest to Grice and Strawson.
Lewis and Short have “praedīco,” which they render as “to say or mention before
or beforehand, to premise.” Grice as a modista is interested in parts of
speech: nomen (onoma) versus verbum (rhema) being the classical, since Plato.
The mediaeval modistae like Alcuin adapted Aristotle, and Grice follows suit.
Of particular relevance are the ‘syncategoremata,’ since Grice was obsessed
with particles, and we cannot say that ‘and’ is a predicate! This relates to
the ‘categorema.’ Liddell and Scott have “κατηγόρ-ημα,” which they render as
“accusation, charge,” Gorg.Pal.22; but in philosophy, as “predicate,” as per
Arist.Int.20b32, Metaph.1053b19, etc.; -- “οὐκ εὔοδον τὸ ἁπλοῖν ἐστι κ.”
Epicur.Fr.18. – and as “head of predicables,” in
Arist.Metaph.1028a33,Ph.201a1, Zeno Stoic.1.25, etc.; περὶ κατηγορημάτων
Sphaer.ib.140. The term syncategorema comes from a passage of Priscian in
his Institutiones grammatice II , 15. “coniunctae
plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem partes, κατηγορήματα, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant.” A distinction is made between two types
of word classes ("partes orationis," singular, "pars
orationis") distinguished by philosophers since Plato, viz. nouns (nomen,
onoma) and verbs (verbum, rhema) on the one hand, and a 'syncategorema or
consignificantium. A consignificantium, just as the unary functor
"non," and any of the three dyadic functors, "et,"
"vel" (or "aut") and "si," does not have a
definitive meaning on its own -- cf. praepositio, cited by Grice, -- "the
meaning of 'to,' the meaning of 'of,'" -- rather, they acquire meaning in
combination or when con-joined to one or more categorema. It is one thing to
say that we employ a certain part of speech when certain conditions are
fulfilled and quite another to claim that the role in the language of that part
of speech is to say, even in an extended sense, that those conditions are
fulfilled. In Logic, the verb 'kategoreo' is 'predicate of a person or thing,'
“τί τινος” Arist.Cat.3a19,al., Epicur.Fr.250; κυρίως, καταχρηστικῶς κ.,
Phld.Po.5.15; “ἐναντίως ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν” Id.Oec.p.60 J.: —more freq. in Pass.,
to be predicated of . . , τινος Arist.Cat.2a21, APr. 26b9, al.; “κατά τινος”
Id.Cat.2a37; “κατὰ παντὸς ἢ μηδενός” Id.APr.24a15: less freq. “ἐπί τινος”
Id.Metaph.998b16, 999a15; so later “ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς οἴονται θεοῦ ἑκάτερον τῶν ὀνομάτων
-εῖσθαι” D.H.2.48; “περί τινος” Arist. Top.140b37; “τὸ κοινῇ -ούμενον ἐπὶ
πᾶσιν” Id.SE179a8: abs., τὸ κατηγορούμενον the predicate, opp.
τὸ ὑποκείμενον (the subject), Id.Cat.1b11, cf.Metaph.1043a6, al.; κατηγορεῖν
καὶ -εῖσθαι to be subject and predicate, Id.APr.47b1. BANC. Praedicatum -- praedicamenta singular:
praedicamentum, in medieval philosophy, the ten Aristotelian categories:
substance, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, position i.e.,
orientation e.g., “upright”, having,
action, and passivity. These were the ten most general of all genera. All of
them except substance were regarded as accidental. It was disputed whether this
tenfold classification was intended as a linguistic division among
categorematic terms or as an ontological division among extralinguistic
realities. Some authors held that the division was primarily linguistic, and
that extralinguistic realities were divided according to some but not all the
praedicamenta. Most authors held that everything in any way real belonged to
one praedicamentum or another, although some made an exception for God. But
authors who believed in complexe significabile usually regarded them as not belonging
to any praedicamentum. Praedicabile,
also praedicabilia, sometimes called the quinque voces five words, in medieval
philosophy, genus, species, difference, proprium, and accident, the five main
ways general predicates can be predicated. The list comes from Porphyry’s
Isagoge. It was debated whether it applies to linguistic predicates only or
also to extralinguistic universals. Things that have accidents can exist
without them; other predicables belong necessarily to whatever has them. The
Aristotelian/Porphyrian notion of “inseparable accident” blurs this picture. Genus
and species are natural kinds; other predicables are not. A natural kind that
is not a narrowest natural kind is a genus; one that is not a broadest natural
kind is a species. Some genera are also species. A proprium is not a species,
but is coextensive with one. A difference belongs necessarily to whatever has
it, but is neither a natural kind nor coextensive with one.
praxis from Grecian prasso, ‘doing’,
‘acting’, in Aristotle, the sphere of thought and action that comprises the
ethical and political life of man, contrasted with the theoretical designs of
logic and epistemology theoria. It was thus that ‘praxis’ acquired its general
definition of ‘practice’ through a contrastive comparison with ‘theory’.
Throughout the history of Western philosophy the concept of praxis found a
place in a variety of philosophical vocabularies. Marx and the neoMarxists
linked the concept with a production paradigm in the interests of historical
explanation. Within such a scheme of things the activities constituting the
relations of production and exchange are seen as the dominant features of the
socioeconomic history of humankind. Significations of ‘praxis’ are also
discernible in the root meaning of pragma deed, affair, which informed the
development of pragmatism. In more
recent times the notion of praxis has played a prominent role in the formation
of the school of critical theory, in which the performatives of praxis are seen
to be more directly associated with the entwined phenomena of discourse,
communication, and social practices. The central philosophical issues addressed
in the current literature on praxis have to do with the theorypractice
relationship and the problems associated with a value-free science. The general
thrust is that of undermining or subverting the traditional bifurcation of
theory and practice via a recognition of praxis-oriented endeavors that
antedate both theory construction and the construal of practice as a mere
application of theory. Both the project of “pure theory,” which makes claims for
a value-neutral standpoint, and the purely instrumentalist understanding of
practice, as itself shorn of discernment and insight, are jettisoned. The
consequent philosophical task becomes that of understanding human thought and
action against the backdrop of the everyday communicative endeavors, habits,
and skills, and social practices that make up our inheritance in the
world. Praxis school, a school of
philosophy originating in Zagreb and Belgrade which, from 4 to 4, published the
international edition of the leading postwar Marxist journal Praxis. During the
same period, it organized the Korcula Summer School, which attracted scholars
from around the Western world. In a reduced form the school continues each
spring with the Social Philosophy Course in Dubrovnik, Croatia. The founders of
praxis philosophy include Gajo Petrovic Zagreb, Milan Kangrga Zagreb, and
Mihailo Markovic Belgrade. Another wellknown member of the group is Svetozar
Stojanovic Belgrade, and a second-generation leader is Gvozden Flego Zagreb.
The Praxis school emphasized the writings of the young Marx while subjecting
dogmatic Marxism to one of its strongest criticisms. Distinguishing between
Marx’s and Engels’s writings and emphasizing alienation and a dynamic concept
of the human being, it contributed to a greater understanding of the
interrelationship between the individual and society. Through its insistence on
Marx’s call for a “ruthless critique,” the school stressed open inquiry and
freedom of speech in both East and West. Quite possibly the most important and
original philosopher of the group, and certainly Croatia’s leading
twentieth-century philosopher, was Gajo Petrovic 793. He called for 1
understanding philosophy as a radical critique of all existing things, and 2
understanding human beings as beings of praxis and creativity. This later led
to a view of human beings as revolutionary by nature. At present he is probably
best remembered for his Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century and Philosophie und
Revolution. Milan Kangrga b.3 also emphasizes human creativity while insisting
that one should understand human beings as producers who humanize nature. An
ethical problematic of humanity can pragmatism, ethical Praxis school 731 731 be realized through a variety of
disciplines that include aesthetics, philosophical anthropolgy, theory of
knowledge, ontology, and social thought. Mihailo Markovic b.3, a member of the
Belgrade Eight, is best known for his theory of meaning, which leads him to a
theory of socialist humanism. His most widely read work in the West is From
Affluence to Praxis: Philosophy and Social Criticism. pragmatic contradiction, a contradiction that
is generated by pragmatic rather than logical implication. A logically implies
B if it is impossible for B to be false if A is true, whereas A pragmatically
implies B if in most but not necessarily all contexts, saying ‘A’ can
reasonably be taken as indicating that B is true. Thus, if I say, “It’s
raining,” what I say does not logically imply that I believe that it is raining,
since it is possible for it to be raining without my believing it is. Nor does
my saying that it is raining logically imply that I believe that it is, since
it is possible for me to say this without believing it. But my saying this does
pragmatically imply that I believe that it is raining, since normally my saying
this can reasonably be taken to indicate that I believe it. Accordingly, if I
were to say, “It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s raining,” the result
would be a pragmatic contradiction. The first part “It’s raining” does not
logically imply the negation of the second part “I don’t believe that it’s
raining” but my saying the first part does pragmatically imply the negation of
the second part.
Old-World pragmatism: Grice: “I dislike the
expression Old World if it means Eurasia – if it means just Europe, that’s OK.”
-- a philosophy that stresses the relation of theory to praxis and takes the
continuity of experience and nature as revealed through the outcome of directed
action as the starting point for reflection. Experience is the ongoing
transaction of organism and environment, i.e., both subject and object are
constituted in the process. When intelligently ordered, initial conditions are
deliberately transformed according to ends-inview, i.e., intentionally, into a
subsequent state of affairs thought to be more desirable. Knowledge is
therefore guided by interests or values. Since the reality of objects cannot be
known prior to experience, truth claims can be justified only as the fulfillment
of conditions that are experimentally determined, i.e., the outcome of inquiry.
As a philosophic movement, pragmatism was first formulated by Peirce in the
early 1870s in the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, Massachusetts; it was
announced as a distinctive position in James’s 8 address to the Philosophical
Union at the of California at Berkeley,
and further elaborated according to the Chicago School, especially by Dewey,
Mead, and Jane Addams 18605. Emphasis on the reciprocity of theory and praxis,
knowledge and action, facts and values, follows from its postDarwinian
understanding of human experience, including cognition, as a developmental,
historically contingent, process. C. I. Lewis’s pragmatic a priori and Quine’s
rejection of the analytic synthetic distinction develop these insights further.
Knowledge is instrumental a tool for
organizing experience satisfactorily. Concepts are habits of belief or rules of
action. Truth cannot be determined solely by epistemological criteria because
the adequacy of these criteria cannot be determined apart from the goals sought
and values instantiated. Values, which arise in historically specific cultural
situations, are intelligently appropriated only to the extent that they
satisfactorily resolve problems and are judged worth retaining. According to
pragmatic theories of truth, truths are beliefs that are confirmed in the
course of experience and are therefore fallible, subject to further revision.
True beliefs for Peirce represent real objects as successively confirmed until
they converge on a final determination; for James, leadings that are
worthwhile; and according to Dewey’s theory of inquiry, the transformation of
an indeterminate situation into a determinate one that leads to warranted
assertions. Pragmatic ethics is naturalistic, pluralistic, developmental, and
experimental. It reflects on the motivations influencing ethical systems,
examines the individual developmental process wherein an individual’s values
are gradually distinguished from those of society, situates moral judgments
within problematic situations irreducibly individual and social, and proposes
as ultimate criteria for decision making the value for life as growth,
determined by all those affected by the actual or projected outcomes. The original
interdisciplinary development of pragmatism continues in its influence on the
humanities. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., member of the Metaphysical Club, later
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, developed a pragmatic theory of law.
Peirce’s Principle of Pragmatism, by which meaning resides in conceivable
practical effects, and his triadic theory of signs developed into the field of
semiotics. James’s Principles of Psychology 0 not only established experimental
psychology in North America, but shifted philosophical attention away from
abstract analyses of rationality to the continuity of the biological and the
mental. The reflex arc theory was reconstructed into an interactive loop of
perception, feeling, thinking, and behavior, and joined with the selective
interest of consciousness to become the basis of radical empiricism. Mead’s
theory of the emergence of self and mind in social acts and Dewey’s analyses of
the individual and society influenced the human sciences. Dewey’s theory of
education as community-oriented, based on the psychological developmental
stages of growth, and directed toward full participation in a democratic
society, was the philosophical basis of progressive education.
prae-analytic, considered but naive;
commonsensical; not tainted by prior explicit theorizing; said of judgments
and, derivatively, of beliefs or intuitions underlying such judgments.
Preanalytic judgments are often used to test philosophical theses. All things
considered, we prefer theories that accord with preanalytic judgments to those
that do not, although most theorists exhibit a willingness to revise
preanalytic assessments in light of subsequent inquiry. Thus, a preanalytic
judgment might be thought to constitute a starting point for the philosophical
consideration of a given topic. Is justice giving every man his due? It may
seem so, preanalytically. Attention to concrete examples, however, may lead us
to a different view. It is doubtful, even in such cases, that we altogether
abandon preanalytic judgments. Rather, we endeavor to reconcile apparently
competing judgments, making adjustments in a way that optimizes overall
coherence.
prædicatum:
Grice
on the praedicatum/impraedicatum distinction – an impredicative definition is
the definition of a concept in terms of the totality to which it belongs.
Whitehead and Russell, in their “Principia Mathematica” introduce
‘im-predicative’ (earlier, ‘non-predicative,’ which Grice prefers) prohibiting
an impredicative definition from conceptual analysis, on the grounds that an
impredicative definition entails (to use Moore’s jargon) a paradox – which
Grice loves. An impredicative definition of the set R of all sets that are not
members of themselves leads to the self-contradictory conclusion that R is a
member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself. In Grice’s
rewrite: “Austin’s paradoxical dream was to create a ‘class’ each of whose
member was such that his class had no other member.” To avoid an antinomy of
this kind in the formalization of logic, Whitehead and Russell first implement
in their ramified type theory the vicious circle principle, that no whole
(totum) may contain parts (pars) that are definable only in terms of that whole
(totum). The limitation of ramified type theory is that without use of an
impredicative definition it is impossible to quantify over every item, but only
over every item of a certain order or type. Without being able to quantify over
every item generally, many of the most important definitions and theorems of
classical philosophy cannot be formulated. Whitehead and Russell for this
reason later abandoned ramified in favour of simple type theory, which avoids a
logical paradox without outlawing an impredicative definition by forbidding the
predication of terms of any type (object, property and relation, higher-order
propertiy and relations of properties and relations, etc.) to terms of the same
type.
correctum: there’s‘corrigibility’ (=
correctum) and ‘incorrigibility’ – “The implicaturum is that something
is incorrigibile it cannot be corrected – but Chisholm never explies ‘by
whom’”! (Grice uses ‘exply’ as opposite of ‘imply’). Who is corrigible? The emissor. “I am sorry I
have to tell you you are wrong.” On WoW: 142, Grice refers to the ‘authority’
of the utterer as a ‘rational being’ to DEEM that an M-intention is an
antecedent condition for his act of meaning. Grice uses ‘privilege’ as synonym
for ‘authority’ here. But not in the phrase ‘privileged access.’ His point is
not so much about the TRUTH (which ‘incorrigibility’ suggests), but about the
DEEMING. It is part of the authority or privilege of the utterer as rational to
provide an ACCEPTABLE assignment of an M-intention behind his utterance.
prejudices: the life and opinions of H. P. Grice, by H.
P. Grice! PGRICE had been in the works for a while. Knowing this, Grice is able
to start his auto-biography, or memoir, to which he later adds a specific reply
to this or that objection by the editors. The reply is divided in neat
sections. After a preamble displaying his gratitude for the volume in
his honour, Grice turns to his prejudices and predilections; which become,
the life and opinions of H. P. Grice. The third section is a reply to the
editorss overview of his work. This reply itself is itself subdivided into
questions of meaning and rationality, and questions of Met. , philosophical
psychology, and value. As the latter is repr. in “Conception” it is possible to
cite this sub-section from the Reply as a separate piece. Grice originally
entitles his essay in a brilliant manner, echoing the style of an English
non-conformist, almost: Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life
and opinions of H. P. Grice. With his Richards, a nice Welsh surNames, Grice is
punning on the first Names of both Grandy and Warner. Grice is especially
concerned with what Richards see as an ontological commitment on Grices
part to the abstract, yet poorly individuated entity of a proposition. Grice
also deals with the alleged insufficiency in his conceptual analysis of
reasoning. He brings for good measure a point about a potential regressus ad
infinitum in his account of a chain of intentions involved in meaning that p and
communicating that p. Even if one of the drafts is titled festschrift, not by
himself, this is not strictly a festschrift in that Grices Names is hidden
behind the acronym: PGRICE. Notably on the philosophy of perception. Also in
“Conception,” especially that tricky third lecture on a metaphysical foundation
for objective value. Grice is supposed to reply to the individual
contributors, who include Strawson, but does not. I cancelled the implicaturum!
However, we may identify in his oeuvre points of contacts of his own views with
the philosophers who contributed, notably Strawson. Most of this material is
reproduced verbatim, indeed, as the second part of his Reply to Richards, and
it is a philosophical memoir of which Grice is rightly proud. The life and opinions
are, almost in a joke on Witters, distinctly separated. Under Life, Grice
convers his conservative, irreverent rationalism making his early initial
appearance at Harborne under the influence of his non-conformist father, and
fermented at his tutorials with Hardie at Corpus, and his associations with
Austins play group on Saturday mornings, and some of whose members he lists
alphabetically: Austin, Gardiner, Grice, Hampshire, Hare, Hart, Nowell-Smith,
Paul, Pears, Strawson, Thomson, Urmson, and Warnock. Also, his joint
philosophising with Austin, Pears, Strawson, Thomson, and Warnock. Under
Opinions, Grice expands mainly on ordinary-language philosophy and his
Bunyanesque way to the City of Eternal Truth. Met. , Philosophical
Psychology, and Value, in “Conception,” is thus part of his Prejudices and
predilections. The philosophers Grice quotes are many and varied, such as
Bosanquet and Kneale, and from the other place, Keynes. Grice spends some
delightful time criticising the critics of ordinary-language philosophy such as
Bergmann (who needs an English futilitarian?) and Gellner. He also quotes from
Jespersen, who was "not a philosopher but wrote a philosophy of
grammar!" And Grice includes a reminiscence of the bombshells brought from
Vienna by the enfant terrible of Oxford philosophy Freddie Ayer, after being
sent to the Continent by Ryle. He recalls an air marshal at a dinner with
Strawson at Magdalen relishing on Cook Wilsons adage, What we know we know. And
more besides! After reminiscing for Clarendon, Grice will go on to reminisce
for Harvard University Press in the closing section of the Retrospective
epilogue. Refs.: The main source is “Reply to Richards,” and references to
Oxonianism, and linguistic botanising, BANC.
Prae-latum --
anaphora: a device of reference or
cross-reference in which a term called an anaphor, typically a pronoun, has its
semantic properties determined by a term or noun phrase called the anaphor’s
antecedent that occurs earlier. Sometimes the antecedent is a proper name or
other independently referring expression, as in ‘Jill went up the hill and then
she came down again’. In such cases, the anaphor refers to the same object as
its antecedent. In other cases, the anaphor seems to function as a variable
bound by an antecedent quantifier, as in ‘If any miner bought a donkey, he is
penniless’. But anaphora is puzzling because not every example falls neatly
into one of these two groups. Thus, in ‘John owns some sheep and Harry
vaccinates them’ an example due to Gareth Evans the anaphor is arguably not
bound by its antecedent ‘some sheep’. And in ‘Every miner who owns a donkey
beats it’ a famous type of case discovered by Geach, the anaphor is arguably
neither bound by ‘a donkey’ nor a uniquely referring expression.
Prae--existence, existence of the individual soul or
psyche prior to its current embodiment, when the soul or psyche is taken to be
separable and capable of existing independently from its embodiment. The
current embodiment is then often described as a reincarnation of the soul.
Plato’s Socrates refers to such a doctrine several times in the dialogues,
notably in the myth of Er in Book X of the Republic. The doctrine is
distinguished from two other teachings about the soul: creationism, which holds
that the individual human soul is directly created by God, and traducianism,
which held that just as body begets body in biological generation, so the soul
of the new human being is begotten by the parental soul. In Hinduism, the cycle
of reincarnations represents the period of estrangement and trial for the soul
or Atman before it achieves release moksha.
Prae-scriptivism, the theory that evaluative judgments
necessarily have prescriptive meaning. Associated with noncognitivism and moral
antirealism, prescriptivism holds that moral language is such that, if you say
that you think one ought to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not
committed to doing that kind of act in the relevant circumstances, then you
either spoke insincerely or are using the word ‘ought’ in a less than
full-blooded sense. Prescriptivism owes its stature to Hare. One of his
innovations is the distinction between “secondarily evaluative” and “primarily
evaluative” words. The prescriptive meaning of secondarily evaluative words,
such as ‘soft-hearted’ or ‘chaste’, may vary significantly while their
descriptive meanings stay relatively constant. Hare argues the reverse for the
primarily evaluative words ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘ought’, and
‘must’. For example, some people assign to ‘wrong’ the descriptive meaning
‘forbidden by God’, others assign it the descriptive meaning ‘causes social
conflict’, and others give it different descriptive meanings; but since all use
‘wrong’ with the same prescriptive meaning, they are using the same concept. In
part to show how moral judgments can be prescriptive and yet have the same
logical relations as indicative sentences, Hare distinguished between phrastics
and neustics. The phrastic, or content, can be the same in indicative and
prescriptive sentences; e.g., ‘Sam’s leaving’ is the phrastic not only of the
indicative ‘Sam will leave’ but also of the prescription ‘Sam ought to leave’.
Hare’s Language of Morals 2 specified that the neustic indicates mood, i.e.,
whether the sentence is indicative, imperative, interrogative, etc. However, in
an article in Mind 9 and in Sorting Out Ethics 7, he used ‘neustic’ to refer to
the sign of subscription, and ‘tropic’ to refer to the sign of mood.
Prescriptivity is especially important if moral judgments are universalizable.
For then we can employ golden rulestyle moral reasoning.
prae-Socratics: cf. pre-Griceians. the early Grecian
philosophers who were not influenced by Socrates. Generally they lived before
Socrates, but some are contemporary with him or even younger. The
classification though not the term goes back to Aristotle, who saw Socrates’
humanism and emphasis on ethical issues as a watershed in the history of
philosophy. Aristotle rightly noted that philosophers prior to Socrates had
stressed natural philosophy and cosmology rather than ethics. He credited them
with discovering material principles and moving causes of natural events, but
he criticized them for failing to stress structural elements of things formal
causes and values or purposes final causes. Unfortunately, no writing of any
pre-Socratic survives in more than a fragmentary form, and evidence of their
views is thus often indirect, based on reports or criticisms of later writers.
In order to reconstruct pre-Socratic thought, scholars have sought to collect
testimonies of ancient sources and to identify quotations from the preSocratics
in those sources. As modern research has revealed flaws in the interpretations
of ancient witnesses, it has become a principle of exegesis to base reconstructions
of their views on the actual words of the pre-Socratics themselves wherever
possible. Because of the fragmentary and derivative nature of our evidence,
even basic principles of a philosopher’s system sometimes remain controversial;
nevertheless, we can say that thanks to modern methods of historiography, there
are many points we understand better than ancient witnesses who are our
secondary sources. Our best ancient secondary source is Aristotle, who lived
soon after the pre-Socratics and had access to most of their writings. He
interprets his predecessors from the standpoint of his own theory; but any
historian must interpret philosophers in light of some theoretical background.
Since we have extensive writings of Aristotle, we understand his system and can filter out his
own prejudices. His colleague Theophrastus was the first professional historian
of philosophy. Adopting Aristotle’s general framework, he systematically
discussed pre-Socratic theories. Unfortunately his work itself is lost, but
many fragments and summaries of parts of it remain. Indeed, virtually all
ancient witnesses writing after Theophrastus depend on him for their general
understanding of the early philosophers, sometimes by way of digests of his
work. When biography became an important genre in later antiquity, biographers
collected facts, anecdotes, slanders, chronologies often based on crude a
priori assumptions, lists of book titles, and successions of school directors,
which provide potentially valuable information. By reconstructing ancient
theories, we can trace the broad outlines of pre-Socratic development with some
confidence. The first philosophers were the Milesians, philosophers of Miletus
on the Ionian coast of Asia Minor, who in the sixth century B.C. broke away
from mythological modes of explanation by accounting for all phenomena, even
apparent prodigies of nature, by means of simple physical hypotheses. Aristotle
saw the Milesians as material monists, positing a physical substrate of water, or the apeiron, or air; but their
material source was probably not a continuing substance that underlies all
changes as Aristotle thought, but rather an original stuff that was transformed
into different stuffs. Pythagoras migrated from Ionia to southern Italy,
founding a school of Pythagoreans who believed that souls transmigrated and
that number was the basis of all reality. Because Pythagoras and his early
followers did not publish anything, it is difficult to trace their development
and influence in detail. Back in Ionia, Heraclitus criticized Milesian
principles because he saw that if substances changed into one another, the
process of transformation was more important than the substances that appeared
in the cycle of changes. He thus chose the unstable substance fire as his material
principle and stressed the unity of opposites. Parmenides and the Eleatic
School criticized the notion of notbeing that theories of physical
transformations seemed to presuppose. One cannot even conceive of or talk of
not-being; hence any conception that presupposes not-being must be ruled out.
But the basic notions of coming-to-be, differentiation, and indeed change in
general presuppose not-being, and thus must be rejected. Eleatic analysis leads
to the further conclusion, implicit in Parmenides, explicit in Melissus, that
there is only one substance, what-is. Since this substance does not come into
being or change in any way, nor does it have any internal differentiations, the
world is just a single changeless, homogeneous individual. Parmenides’ argument
seems to undermine the foundations of natural philosophy. After Parmenides
philosophers who wished to continue natural philosophy felt compelled to grant
that coming-to-be and internal differentiation of a given substance were
impossible. But in order to accommodate natural processes, they posited a
plurality of unchanging, homogeneous elements
the four elements of Empedocles, the elemental stuffs of Anaxagoras, the
atoms of Democritus that by arrangement
and rearrangement could produce the cosmos and the things in it. There is no
real coming-to-be and perishing in the world since the ultimate substances are
everlasting; but some limited kind of change such as chemical combination or
mixture or locomotion could account for changing phenomena in the world of
experience. Thus the “pluralists” incorporated Eleatic principles into their
systems while rejecting the more radical implications of the Eleatic critique.
Pre-Socratic philosophers developed more complex systems as a response to
theoretical criticisms. They focused on cosmology and natural philosophy in
general, championing reason and nature against mythological traditions. Yet the
pre-Socratics have been criticized both for being too narrowly scientific in
interest and for not being scientific experimental enough. While there is some
justice in both criticisms, their interests showed breadth as well as
narrowness, and they at least made significant conceptual progress in providing
a framework for scientific and philosophical ideas. While they never developed
sophisticated theories of ethics, logic, epistemology, or metaphysics, nor
invented experimental methods of confirmation, they did introduce the concepts
that ultimately became fundamental in modern theories of cosmic, biological,
and cultural evolution, as well as in atomism, genetics, and social contract
theory. Because the Socratic revolution turned philosophy in different
directions, the pre-Socratic line died out. But the first philosophers supplied
much inspiration for the sophisticated fourthcentury systems of Plato and
Aristotle as well as the basic principles of the great Hellenistic schools,
Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism.
praesupposition, 1 a relation between sentences or
statements, related to but distinct from entailment and assertion; 2 what a
speaker takes to be understood in making an assertion. The first notion is
semantic, the second pragmatic. The semantic notion was introduced by Strawson
in his attack on Russell’s theory of descriptions, and perhaps anticipated by Frege.
Strawson argued that ‘The present king of France is bald’ does not entail
‘There is a present king of France’ as Russell held, but instead presupposes
it. Semantic presupposition can be defined thus: a sentence or statement S
presupposes a sentence or statement SH provided S entails SH and the negation
of S also entails SH . SH is a condition of the truth or falsity of S. Thus,
since ‘There is a present king of France’ is false, ‘The present king of France
is bald’ is argued to be neither true nor false. So construed, presupposition
is defined in terms of, but is distinct from, entailment. It is also distinct
from assertion, since it is viewed as a precondition of the truth or falsity of
what is asserted. The pragmatic conception does not appeal to truth conditions,
but instead contrasts what a speaker presupposes and what that speaker asserts
in making an utterance. Thus, someone who utters ‘The present king of France is
bald’ presupposes believes and believes
that the audience believes that there is
a present king of France, and asserts that this king is bald. So conceived,
presuppositions are beliefs that the speaker takes for granted; if these
beliefs are false, the utterance will be inappropriate in some way, but it does
not follow that the sentence uttered lacks a truth-value. These two notions of
presupposition are logically independent. On the semantic characterization,
presupposition is a relation between sentences or statements requiring that
there be truth-value gaps. On the pragmatic characterization, it is speakers
rather than sentences or statements that have presuppositions; no truth-value
gaps are required. Many philosophers and linguists have argued for treating
what have been taken to be cases of semantic presupposition, including the one
discussed above, as pragmatic phenomena. Some have denied that semantic
presuppositions exist. If not, intuitions about presupposition do not support
the claims that natural languages have truth-value gaps and that we need a
three-valued logic to represent the semantics of natural language adequately.
Presupposition is also distinct from implicaturum. If someone reports that he
has just torn his coat and you say, “There’s a tailor shop around the corner,”
you conversationally implicate that the shop is open. This is not a semantic
presupposition because if it is false that the shop is open, there is no
inclination to say that your assertion was neither true nor false. It is not a
pragmatic presupposition because it is not something you believe the hearer believes.
Prae-theoretical, independent of theory. More
specifically, a proposition is pretheoretical, according to some philosophers,
if and only if it does not depend for its plausibility or implausibility on
theoretical considerations or considerations of theoretical analysis. The term
‘preanalytic’ is often used synonymously with ‘pretheoretical’, but the former
is more properly paired with analysis rather than with theory. Some
philosophers characterize pretheoretical propositions as “intuitively” plausible
or implausible. Such propositions, they hold, can regulate philosophical
theorizing as follows: in general, an adequate philosophical theory should not
conflict with intuitively plausible propositions by implying intuitively
implausible propositions, and should imply intuitively plausible propositions.
Some philosophers grant that theoretical considerations can override
“intuitions” in the sense of intuitively
plausible propositions when overall
theoretical coherence or reflective equilibrium is thereby enhanced.
praescriptum: prescriptivism. According to Grice’s prescriptive
meta-ethics, by uttering ‘p,’ the emissor may intend his recipient to entertain
a desiderative state of content ‘p.’ In which case, the emissor is
‘prescribing’ a course of conduct. As opposed to the ‘descriptum,’ which just
depicts a ‘state’ of affairs that the emissor wants to inform his recipient
about. Surely there are for Grice at
least two different modes, the buletic, which tends towards the prescriptive,
and the doxastic, which is mostly ‘descriptive.’ One has to be careful because
Grice thinks that what a philosopher like Strawson does with ‘descriptive’
expression (like ‘true,’ ‘know’ and ‘good’) and talk of pseudo-descriptive. What
is that gives the buletic a ‘prescritive’ or deontic ring to it? This is Kant’s
question. Grice kept a copy of Foots on morality as a system of hypothetical
imperatives. “So Somervillian Oxonian it hurts!”. Grice took virtue ethics more
seriously than the early Hare. Hare will end up a virtue ethicist, since he
changed from a meta-ethicist to a moralist embracing a hedonistic version of
eudaemonist utilitarianism. Grice was more Aristotelianly conservative! Unlike
Hares and Grices meta-ethical sensitivities (as members of the Oxonian school
of ordinary-language philosophy), Foot suggests a different approach to ethics.
Grice admired Foots ability to make the right conceptual distinction. Foot
is following a very Oxonian tradition best represented by the work of
Warnock. Of course, Grice was over-familiar with the virtue vs. vice
distinction, since Hardie had instilled it on him at Corpus! For Grice,
virtue and vice (and the mesotes), display an interesting logical grammar,
though. Grice would say that rationality is a virtue; fallacious reasoning is a
vice. Some things Grice takes more of a moral standpoint about. To cheat
is neither irrational nor unreasonble: just plain repulsive. As
such, it would be a vice ‒ mind not getting caught in its grip! Grice is
concerned with vice in his account of akrasia or incontinentia. If agent A
KNOWS that doing x is virtuous, yet decides to do ~x, which is vicious, A is
being akratic. For Grice, akratic behaviour applies both in the buletic or
boulomaic realm and in the doxastic realm. And it is part of the
philosopher’s job to elucidate the conceptual intricacies attached to
it. 1. prima-facie (p⊃!q)
V probably (p⊃q). 2.
prima-facie ((A and B) ⊃!p) V probably ( (A and B) ⊃p). 3. prima-facie
((A and B and C) ⊃!p)
V probably ( (A and B and C,) ⊃p). 4. prima-facie ((all things before P V!p) V
probably ((all things before P) ⊃ p). 5. prima-facie ((all things are
considered ⊃ !p)
V probably (all things are considered, ⊃ p). 6. !q V .q 7. Acc. Reasoning P
wills that !q V Acc. Reasoning P that judges q. Refs.: The main sources under
‘meta-ethics,’ above, BANC.
Preve: important Italian
philosopher. He is the tutor of Diego Fusaro, of Torino. Costanzo Preve Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search «Il comunitarismo è la via
maestra che conduce all'universalismo, inteso come campo di confronto fra
comunità unite dai caratteri del genere umano, della socialità e della
razionalità.» (da Elogio del Comunitarismo) Costanzo Preve Costanzo
Preve (Valenza, 14 aprile 1943 – Torino, 23 novembre 2013) è stato un filosofo,
saggista, insegnante e politologo italiano. Di ispirazione marxiana[1] ed
hegeliana, Preve ha scritto numerosi volumi e saggi di argomento filosofico,
pubblicati in Italia e all'estero. Indice 1Biografia 2Pensiero
2.1Interpretazione della storia della filosofia 2.2Analisi filosofica del
capitalismo 2.2.1 Politicamente corretto 2.3 Comunismo comunitario 3Attività
politica 4Opere 5Note 6Bibliografia 7Voci correlate 8Altri progetti
9Collegamenti esterni Biografia Il padre, che al momento della nascita di
Costanzo è mobilitato, lavora come funzionario delle Ferrovie dello Stato
mentre la madre, casalinga, proviene da una famiglia ortodossa di origine
armena. Viene cresciuto dalla nonna materna in lingua francese, e attraverso di
lei inizia a conoscere la cultura e la lingua greca; come vedremo, entrambe
queste circostanze avranno un grande rilievo nella vita di Preve. Personalmente
non è credente, pur riconoscendo l'importanza del fenomeno religioso.[2] Studia
a Torino, dove conseguirà la maturità classica nel 1962; durante i mesi estivi
lavora in campagna nel Regno Unito. Dietro pressioni del padre, nel 1962 si
iscrive alla facoltà di giurisprudenza dell'Università di Torino. Verificando
il suo totale disinteresse per gli studi giuridici, nel 1963 decide di passare
alla facoltà di Scienze politiche, che però non frequenterà mai; nel giugno
1967 ne conseguirà ugualmente la laurea, discutendo con il professor Alessandro
Galante Garrone una tesi sui "Temi delle elezioni politiche italiane del
18 aprile 1948". Sempre nel 1963 vince per concorso una borsa di
studio all'Università di Parigi, dove si reca con il proposito di condurre
studi filosofici; qui seguirà i corsi su Hegel tenuti da Jean Hyppolite,
frequenterà i seminari di Louis Althusser e Jean-Paul Sartre, e sotto la guida
di Roger Garaudy e di Gilbert Mury, si avvicinerà a Karl Marx. A Parigi segue
soprattutto corsi di filosofia greca classica e di germanistica, e nel 1964
grazie ad una borsa di studio si reca per un semestre invernale alla Freie
Universität di Berlino. Nel 1965 passa dal dipartimento di germanistica a
quello di neoellenistica, e vince una borsa di studio per recarsi ad Atene;
all'Università di Atene studia greco classico con Panagis Lekatsas e storia
contemporanea con Nikos Psyroukhis, che esercitano su di lui un grande
ascendente. Qui prepara una tesi di laurea in greco moderno sul tema:
"L'illuminismo greco e le sue tendenze radicali e rivoluzionarie.
Etnogenesi della nazione greca moderna fra Settecento e Ottocento. Il problema
della discontinuità con la grecità classica e con la grecità bizantina”.
Poliglotta dagli anni dell'università, e fermo sostenitore della lettura dei
testi filosofici nella lingua originale, egli apprenderà inglese, portoghese,
francese, tedesco, spagnolo, russo, greco antico e moderno, arabo, ebraico, e
latino. Nel 1967 ritorna a Torino e si sposa l'anno seguente; nello
stesso 1968 consegue per concorso l'abilitazione all'insegnamento liceale di
lingua e letteratura francese e di storia della filosofia mentre nel 1970 vince
il concorso nazionale di ordinariato per l'insegnamento della filosofia e della
storia nei licei. Insegnante dal 1967 fino alla pensione del 2002, per due anni
(1967-69) insegna francese e inglese, mentre per trentatré anni (1969-2002) è
docente di storia e filosofia al V Liceo Scientifico di Torino (oggi Liceo
Alessandro Volta). Trascorre gli anni che vanno dal 1967 al 1978 in un'intensa
attività politica, aderendo dal 1973 al 1975 al PCI per poi militare in vari
gruppi della sinistra extraparlamentare; in questi anni, l'attività filosofica
di Preve è incentrata nel tentativo di conciliare esistenzialmente il
comunismo, il marxismo e la filosofia. Nel 1978 Gianfranco La Grassa,
Maria Turchetto ed Augusto Illuminati lo invitano a varie collaborazioni; con
essi fonderà nel 1982 il CSMS (Centro Studi di Materialismo Storico) di Milano,
del quale redigerà inoltre il manifesto programmatico. In questo contesto, e
per finanziamento di questo centro, esce il suo primo volume indipendente (cfr.
La filosofia imperfetta, Franco Angeli, Milano 1984). Questo testo testimonia
la sua adesione di massima alla proposta filosofica dell'Ontologia dell'essere
sociale dell'ultimo Lukács[3], ed anche, indirettamente, il suo distacco
definitivo dalla scuola di Louis Althusser. Insieme con Franco Volpi, Maria
Turchetto, Augusto Illuminati, Fabio Cioffi, Amedeo Vigorelli, ed altri fonda
nel 1980 a Milano la rivista di dibattito “Metamorfosi”, che pubblicherà sedici
numeri di tipo monografico per tutti gli anni ottanta. In quasi tutti i
fascicoli vi sono suoi contributi, che spaziano da un esame dell'operaismo
italiano da Panzieri a Tronti e Negri, all'analisi del marxismo dissidente nei
paesi socialisti, alla discussione sulla filosofia di Lukács, alla critica
delle ideologie del progresso storico, all'indagine sullo statuto filosofico
della critica marxiana dell'economia politica. Nel 1983 contribuisce ad
organizzare, insieme con Emilio Agazzi, un congresso internazionale dedicato al
centenario della morte di Marx (Milano, dicembre 1983), e vi svolge una
relazione sulle categorie modali di necessità e di possibilità in Marx. Da
quest'esperienza nasce una rivista chiamata “Marx 101”, che uscirà nei due
decenni successivi in due serie di numeri monografici e di cui Preve sarà
membro del comitato di redazione. Per tutti gli anni ottanta collabora al
mensile teorico “Democrazia Proletaria”, organo dell'omonimo partito
(1976-1991)[4], che poi diverrà insieme con i fuoriusciti dal PCI la seconda
componente politica e militante del PRC (Partito della Rifondazione
Comunista). Sarà iscritto a DP soltanto per un breve periodo (1988-1991),
facendo parte della direzione nazionale; nella battaglia politica fra i
sostenitori di una scelta ecologista (Mario Capanna) e neocomunista, Preve
sostiene la seconda con una serie di articoli. Nel 1991, quando le componenti
di Democrazia Proletaria e dell'Associazione Culturale Marxista confluiscono
nel Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, Preve abbandona la militanza politica
diretta. Fra il 1989 ed il 1994, con la pubblicazione di otto volumi
consecutivi usciti presso l'editore Vangelista di Milano, Preve affronta il suo
“ultimo tentativo personale di coerentizzazione di un paradigma filosofico
marxista globale”. A partire dalla seconda metà degli anni novanta si verifica
infatti una discontinuità nella sua produzione; Preve opta per l'abbandono di
ogni “ismo” di riferimento, uscendo del tutto “dalla cosiddetta Sinistra” e
dalle sue procedure di “accoglimento e cooptazione”. Ritenendo che la
globalizzazione nata dall'implosione dell'Unione Sovietica non si lasci più
“interrogare” attraverso le categorie di Destra e di Sinistra, ma richieda
altre categorie interpretative, Preve diviene inoltre un convinto sostenitore
della necessità di superare la dicotomia sinistra-destra[5]. Questa posizione,
condivisa da alcuni intellettuali e movimenti internazionali, è stata criticata
da molti, tra cui lo scrittore Valerio Evangelisti, che ne ha sottolineato
l'ambiguità ideologica[6]. Autore e saggista molto prolifico, ha dedicato
le sue ultime riflessioni a temi come il comunitarismo[7], la geopolitica[8],
l'universalismo[9], la questione nazionale[10], oltre ovviamente ad
un'ininterrotta attenzione al rapporto marxismo-filosofia.[11] Muore a Torino
il 23 novembre 2013[12][13][14][15] per un male incurabile[16]; il Consiglio
Comunale di Torino lo ha omaggiato sottolineando il ruolo di Preve e
l'importante stimolo al dibattito culturale e politico da lui sviluppato, rilevante
per la crescita politica collettiva in Italia[17]. Pensiero La sua
riflessione può essere distinta in due periodi successivi. Nel primo periodo
(1975-1991 circa), ha cercato di opporsi alla deriva post-moderna seguita dalla
stragrande maggioranza della sinistra italiana (in particolare dagli
intellettuali legati al PCI) con un recupero dei punti alti della tradizione
marxista indipendente, del tutto estranea alle incorporazioni burocratiche del
marxismo come ideologia di legittimazione di partiti e di stati (soprattutto
l'ultimo Lukács, l'ultimo Althusser, Ernst Bloch, Adorno). In un secondo
periodo, dopo la fine del socialismo reale (che Preve chiama comunismo storico
novecentesco 1917-1991), ed in dissenso con tutti i tentativi di sua
continuazione/rifondazione puramente politico-organizzativa, ha invece lavorato
su di una generale rifondazione antropologica del comunismo, marcando sempre
più la discontinuità teorica e politica con i conglomerati identitari della
sinistra italiana[18] (Rifondazione Comunista in primis, ma anche la scuola
operaista e Toni Negri in particolar modo). Durante gli anni novanta i
suoi interventi sono apparsi sia su riviste legate alla sinistra alternativa
(L'Ernesto, Bandiera Rossa) che su riviste come Indipendenza e Koiné, dove
Preve ha sostenuto l'esplicito superamento del dualismo Destra/Sinistra[19],
approdando a posizioni antitetiche a quelle del filosofo Norberto Bobbio (con
cui ebbe uno stretto rapporto per più di vent'anni). Nei primi anni del nuovo
millennio ha collaborato con la rivista Comunitarismo, prima, e Comunità e
Resistenza, poi. È stato fino alla morte redattore del quadrimestrale Comunismo
e Comunità[20]. Al di là delle prese di posizione sulla congiuntura politica,
tre cardini del pensiero di Costanzo Preve sono l'interpretazione della storia
della filosofia, l'analisi filosofica del capitalismo e la proposta politica
per un comunismo comunitario universalistico. Interpretazione della
storia della filosofia Rileggendo l'intera storia della filosofia soprattutto
occidentale, Preve utilizza una deduzione sociale delle categorie del pensiero
non riduzionistica, che gli permette di discernere la genesi particolare delle
idee dalla loro validità universale. Infatti quello di Preve è un orizzonte
aperto universalisticamente alla verità, intesa hegelianamente come processo di
autocoscienza storica e sintesi di ontologia e assiologia, dell'esperienza
umana nella storia. Nella sua proposta di ontologia dell'essere sociale
riconosce razionalmente la natura solidale e comunitaria dell'anima umana e
l'autonomia conoscitiva della filosofia, contrastando ogni forma di
riduzionismo nichilistico, relativistico o partigianamente ideologico. Preve
viene definito «strenuo difensore dello statuto veritativo della filosofia da una
parte, e [...] deciso oppositore di ogni fraintendimento relativistico
dall’altra»[21]. Analisi filosofica del capitalismo Preve intende il
capitalismo come totalità economica, politica e culturale da indagare in tutte
le sue dimensioni. Propone di suddividerlo filosoficamente e idealisticamente
in tre fasi: astratta (XVII-XVIII secolo); dialettica (dal 1789 al 1991) con
una protoborghesia illuministica o romantica, una medioborghesia dal 1848
positivistica e poi dal 1914 esistenzialistica, e una tardoborghesia dal 1968
al 1990 sempre più individualistica e libertaria; speculativa (post-borghese e
post-proletaria, dal 1991 in poi) in cui il capitale si concretizza come
assoluto, espandendosi al di là delle dicotomie precedenti a destra
economicamente, al centro politicamente e a sinistra culturalmente.
Politicamente corretto Nell'analisi filosofica del capitalismo, più volte
insiste sulla critica al politicamente corretto, dove riprende alcuni dei suoi
temi già trattati; il concetto consterebbe dei seguenti punti nella concezione
previana (dove è considerato un'arma del capitalismo per attrarre fasce deboli
a sé, nonché un'ideologia di fondo dell'occidente imperialista)[22]:
americanismo come collocazione presupposta, anche sotto forma di benevola critica
al governo statunitense; "religione olocaustica": Preve non aderisce
al negazionismo dell'Olocausto e condanna i genocidi, ma considera la shoah un
fatto non "unico", utilizzato dal sionismo per legittimare le azioni
di Israele tramite il senso di colpa dell'Europa: «Auschwitz non può e non deve
essere dimenticato, perché la memoria dei morti innocenti deve essere
riscattata, e questo mondo nella sua interezza appartiene a tre tipi di esseri
umani: coloro che sono già vissuti, coloro che sono tuttora in vita, e coloro
che devono ancora nascere. Ma Auschwitz non deve diventare un simbolo di
legittimazione del sionismo, che agita l'accusa di antisemitismo in tutti
coloro che non lo accettano radicalmente, e che non sono disposti a derubricare
a semplici errori i suoi veri e propri crimini[23]» "teologia dei
diritti umani", che Preve considera (come altri filosofi marxisti come
Slavoj Žižek o Domenico Losurdo, o comunitaristi come Alain de Benoist) solo un
grimaldello e un paravento del capitalismo per imporsi ed eliminare, in realtà,
i diritti dei popoli e dei lavoratori, attuando il liberismo e l'imperialismo
globali; antifascismo in assenza completa di fascismo: l'antifascismo, positivo
un tempo, è considerato un fenomeno dannoso e a favore del sistema capitalistico,
visto che il fascismo (da lui deprecato soprattutto per la colonizzazione
imperialistica dell'Africa e la "mascalzonaggine imperdonabile"
dell'invasione della Grecia) è stato ormai sconfitto, volto a creare tensioni
tra le diverse forze anti-sistema, e a fungere da nuova ideologia della
sinistra postcomunista e post-stalinista (dopo il graduale abbandono del
marxismo-leninismo avvenuto secondo Preve a partire dal 1956 per gli effetti
della destalinizzazione), che diviene così inutile; falsa dicotomia
Sinistra/Destra come "protesi di manipolazione politologica":
derivata dal precedente, questa teoria punterebbe a indebolire le critiche
anticapitalistiche, impedendo l'unione tra comunisti, comunitaristi e
socialisti nazionalitari contro il capitale. Al contempo, anche per le nette e
costanti affermazioni contro i tribalismi, i razzismi e i nazionalismi
soprattutto coloniali, è da ritenersi estranea al cosiddetto
"rossobrunismo" (un termine coniato all'inizio per descrivere i
cosiddetti nazionalboscevichi) di cui fu tacciato dal citato Valerio
Evangelisti[6], che a suo dire si configurerebbe come una folle somma dei
difetti degli estremismi opposti: «L'unione di sostenitori rasati del razzismo
biologico con sostenitori barbuti della dittatura del proletariato sarebbe
certamente un buon copione di pornografia hard, ma non potrebbe uscire dal
piccolo circuito a luci rosse del sottobosco politico.[24]» nismo
comunitario La proposta politica di Costanzo Preve va nella direzione di un
comunismo comunitario universalistico, da intendersi come correzione
democratica e umanistica del comunismo, dal momento che quello storico
novecentesco sarebbe stato reo di non aver messo in comune innanzitutto la
verità. Quello tratteggiato da Preve è un sistema sociale che costituisce una
sintesi di individui liberati e comunità solidali. Non è inteso come
inevitabile sbocco storicistico o positivistico di una storia che si
svilupperebbe linearmente, né tuttavia in modo aleatorio in senso
althusseriano, bensì aristotelicamente in potenza, a partire dalla resistenza
alla dissoluzione comunitaria innescata dall'accumulazione individuale di
merci. Qui il problema dell'auspicabile democrazia viene impostato su basi
antropologiche, scommettendo sulle potenzialità ontologiche della bontà
dell'anima umana, potenzialmente politico-comunitaria (zόon politikόn);
razionale e valutativa della giusta misura sociale (zόon lόgon échon) e
generica, in senso marxiano (Gattungswesen), cioè in grado di costruire diversi
modelli di convivenza sociale, compreso quello in cui l'uomo, affermando la
priorità etica e comunitaria per contenere i processi economici altrimenti
dispiegantisi in modo illimitato e disumano, può realizzare le sue potenzialità
ontologiche immanenti, attualmente alienate. La liberazione dell'individuo
avverrebbe quindi a partire dal suo radicamento comunitario in cui agisce
collettivamente, pur rimanendo l'individuo stesso l'unità minima di resistenza
al potere. Attività politica In gioventù aderì al PCI dal 1973 al 1975, ma
presto si allontanò (essendo ostile al compromesso storico tra PCI e DC,
promosso da Berlinguer e Moro), entrando poi a far parte della Commissione
culturale di Lotta Continua. In seguito si iscrisse a Democrazia Proletaria
durante la sua ultima fase (1988-1991)[25] Dopo lo scioglimento di DP, e in
seguito alla confluenza di quest'ultima in Rifondazione Comunista, si è sempre
più allontanato dall'attività politica in senso stretto[26]. In seguito
manifestò critiche verso l'operaismo e il trotskismo che animavano talvolta
queste esperienze della post-sinistra extraparlamentare. Se dal punto di
vista teorico si era già distanziato dalla sinistra italiana a seguito della
dissoluzione dell'Unione Sovietica e della svolta della Bolognina (1989), il
distacco emotivo definitivo dalla "sinistra" avvenne con il
bombardamento NATO in Jugoslavia del marzo 1999 durante la guerra del Kosovo,
che ricevette il beneplacito del governo italiano guidato da Massimo D'Alema;
Preve ha considerato questo fatto come la fine della legalità costituzionale
italiana riferendosi alla violazione dell'articolo 11 e un atto di tradimento
verso i valori fondanti della Repubblica Italiana.[27] Sul tema scrisse Il
bombardamento etico. Saggio sull'interventismo umanitario, l'embargo
terapeutico e la menzogna evidente (2000). Molto clamore ha suscitato
(anche tra le file della sinistra alternativa) la sua adesione ad alcune tesi
del Campo Antimperialista, nel 2003, per l'esplicito sostegno da questi fornito
alla resistenza irachena[28]. È stato uno dei filosofi di riferimento del
comunismo comunitario, nonché animatore della rivista Comunismo e
Comunità. Opere La classe operaia non va in paradiso: dal marxismo
occidentale all'operaismo italiano, in Alla ricerca della produzione perduta,
Bari, Dedalo, 1982. ISBN 978-88-220-0179-5. Cosa possiamo chiedere al marxismo.
Sull'identità filosofica del materialismo storico, in Marxismo in mare aperto.
Rilevazioni, ipotesi, prospettive, Milano, Angeli, 1983. ISBN 978-88-204-3981-1
La filosofia imperfetta. Una proposta di ricostruzione del marxismo
contemporaneo, Milano, Angeli, 1984. La teoria in pezzi. La dissoluzione del
paradigma teorico operaista in Italia (1976-1983), Bari, Dedalo, 1984. ISBN
88-220-3805-3. La ricostruzione del marxismo fra filosofia e scienza, in La
cognizione della crisi. Saggi sul marxismo di Louis Althusser, Milano, Angeli,
1986. Vers une nouvelle alliance. Actualité et possibilités de développement de
l'effort ontologique de Bloch et de Lukàcs, in Ernst Bloch et György Lukács. Un
siècle après). 1986, Actes Sud [tradotto in tedesco con il titolo
Verdinglichung und Utopie. 1987, Sendler]. La rivoluzione teorica di Louis
Althusser, in Il marxismo di Louis Althusser, Pisa, Vallerini, 1987. Viewing
Lukàcs from the 1980s. The University of Chicago Press, 1987. La passione
durevole, Milano, Vangelista, 1989. La musa di Clio vestita di rosso, in
Trasformazione e persistenza. Saggi sulla storicità del capitalismo, Milano,
Angeli, 1990. ISBN 978-88-204-3658-2. Il filo di Arianna. Quindici lezioni di
filosofia marxista, Milano, Vangelista, 1990. Il marxismo ed il problema
teorico dell'eguaglianza oggi, in Egalitè-inegalitè. Atti del Convegno
organizzato dall'Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici e dalla Biblioteca
comunale di Cattolica. Cattolica, 13-15 settembre 1989, Urbino, Quattro venti,
1990. Il convitato di pietra. Saggio su marxismo e nichilismo, Milano,
Vangelista, 1991. L'assalto al cielo. Saggio su marxismo e individualismo,
Milano, Vangelista, 1992. Il pianeta rosso. Saggio su marxismo e universalismo,
Milano, Vangelista, 1992. Ideologia Italiana. Saggio sulla storia delle idee
marxiste in Italia, Milano, Vangelista, 1993. The dream and the reality. The
spiritual crisis of western Marxism, in Marxism and spirituality. An
international anthology. Bengin and Gavey, 1993. Il tempo della ricerca. Saggio
sul moderno, il postmoderno e la fine della storia, Milano, Vangelista, 1993.
Louis Althusser. La lutte contre le sens commun dans le mouvement communiste
"historique" au XX siècle, in Politique et philosophie dans l'œuvre
de Louis Althusser). 1993, Presses Universitaires de France. L'eguale libertà.
Saggio sulla natura umana, Milano, Vangelista, 1994. Oltre la gabbia d'acciaio.
Saggio su capitalismo e filosofia, con Gianfranco La Grassa, Milano,
Vangelista, 1994. Il teatro dell'assurdo (cronaca e storia dei recenti
avvenimenti italiani). Una critica alla cultura dominante della sinistra
nell'attuale scontro tra berlusconismo e progressismo, con Gianfranco La
Grassa, Milano, Punto Rosso, 1995. Una teoria nuova per una diversa strategia
politica. Premesse teoriche alla critica della cultura dominante della sinistra
esposta nel Teatro dell'assurdo, con Gianfranco La Grassa, Milano, Punto Rosso,
1995. Il marxismo vissuto del Che, in Adys Cupull e Froìlan Gonzales, Càlida
presencia. Lettere di Che Guevara a Tita Infante, 1952-1956, Milano, Punto
Rosso, 1996. Un elogio della filosofia, Milano, Punto Rosso, 1996. Quale
comunismo?, in Uomini usciti di pianto in ragione. Saggi su Franco Fortini,
Roma, Manifestolibri, 1996. ISBN 88-7285-074-6. La fine di una teoria. Il
collasso del marxismo storico del Novecento, con Gianfranco La Grassa, Milano,
UNICOPLI, 1996. ISBN 88-400-0409-2. Il comunismo storico novecentesco
(1917-1991). Un bilancio storico e teorico, Milano, Punto Rosso, 1997.
Nichilismo Verità Storia. Un manifesto filosofico della fine del XX secolo, con
Massimo Bontempelli, Pistoia, CRT, 1997. Gesù. Uomo nella storia, Dio nel
pensiero, con Massimo Bontempelli, Pistoia, CRT, 1997. Il crepuscolo della
profezia comunista. A 150 anni dal “Manifesto”, il futuro oltre la scienza e
l'utopia, Pistoia, CRT, 1998. ISBN 88-87296-08-1. L'alba del Sessantotto. Una
interpretazione filosofica, Pistoia, CRT, 1998. ISBN 88-87296-13-8. Marxismo,
Filosofia, Verità, Pistoia, CRT, 1998. ISBN 88-87296-14-6. Destra e sinistra.
La natura inservibile di due categorie tradizionali, Pistoia, CRT, 1998. ISBN
88-87296-24-3. La questione nazionale alle soglie del XXI secolo. Note
introduttive ad un problema delicato e pieno di pregiudizi, Pistoia, CRT, 1998.
ISBN 88-87296-23-5. Le stagioni del nichilismo. Un'analisi filosofica ed una
prognosi storica, Pistoia, CRT, 1998. ISBN 88-87296-15-4. Individui liberati,
comunità solidali. Sulla questione della società degli individui, Pistoia, CRT,
1998. ISBN 88-87296-16-2. Contro il capitalismo, oltre il comunismo.
Riflessioni su di una eredità storica e su un futuro possibile, Pistoia, CRT,
1998. La fine dell'Urss. Dalla transizione mancata alla dissoluzione reale,
Pistoia, CRT, 1999. ISBN 88-87296-35-9. Il ritorno del clero. La questione
degli intellettuali oggi, Pistoia, CRT, 1999. ISBN 88-87296-34-0. Le avventure
dell'ateismo. Religione e materialismo oggi, Pistoia, CRT, 1999. ISBN
88-87296-66-9. Un nuovo manifesto filosofico. Prospettive inedite e orizzonti
convincenti per il pensiero, con Andrea Cavazzini, Pistoia, CRT, 1999. ISBN
88-87296-33-2. Hegel Marx Heidegger. Un percorso nella filosofia contemporanea,
Pistoia, CRT, 1999. ISBN 88-87296-68-5. Scienza, politica, filosofia. Un'interpretazione
filosofica del Novecento, Pistoia, CRT, 1999. ISBN 88-87296-67-7. I secoli
difficili. Introduzione al pensiero filosofico dell'Ottocento e del Novecento,
Pistoia, CRT, 1999. ISBN 88-87296-32-4. L'educazione filosofica. Memoria del
passato, compito del presente, sfida del futuro, Pistoia, CRT, 2000. ISBN
88-87296-73-1. Il bombardamento etico. Saggio sull'interventismo umanitario,
l'embargo terapeutico e la menzogna evidente, Pistoia, CRT, 2000. ISBN
88-87296-77-4. Marxismo e filosofia. Note, riflessioni e alcune novità,
Pistoia, CRT, 2002. ISBN 88-88172-14-9. Un secolo di marxismo. Idee e
ideologie, Pistoia, CRT, 2003. ISBN 88-88172-29-7. Un filosofo controvoglia.
Introduzione a Günther Anders, L'uomo è antiquato, 2003, Bollati Boringhieri.
Le contraddizioni di Norberto Bobbio. Per una critica del bobbianesimo
cerimoniale, Pistoia, CRT, 2004. ISBN 88-88172-20-3. Marx inattuale. Eredità e
prospettiva, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2004. ISBN 88-339-1511-5. Verità
filosofica e critica sociale. Religione, filosofia, marxismo, Pistoia, CRT,
2004. ISBN 88-88172-22-X. Dove va la sinistra?, a cura di Stefano Boninsegni,
Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 2004. Comunitarismo filosofia politica, Molfetta,
Noctua, 2004. La filosofia classica tedesca, prefazione a Renato Pallavidini,
Dialettica e prassi critica. Dall'idealismo al marxismo, Molfetta, Noctua,
2004. L'ideocrazia imperiale americana, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 2004. ISBN
88-6148-135-3 Filosofia del presente. Un mondo alla rovescia da interpretare,
Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 2004. ISBN 978-88-6148-141-1 Filosofia e geopolitica,
Parma, All'insegna del Veltro, 2005. Del buon uso dell'universalismo. Elementi
di filosofia politica per il XXI secolo, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 2005. ISBN
88-6148-142-6 Dialoghi sul presente. Alienazione, globalizzazione
destra/sinistra, atei devoti. Per un pensiero ribelle, con Alain de Benoist e
Giuseppe Giaccio, Napoli, Controcorrente, 2005. ISBN 88-89015-58-6. Prefazione
a Renato Pallavidini, La comunità ritrovata. Rousseau critico della modernità
illuminista, Torino, Libreria Stampatori, 2005. ISBN 88-88057-61-7. Marx e gli
antichi greci, con Luca Grecchi, Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2005. ISBN
88-7588-088-3. Il popolo al potere. Il problema della democrazia nei suoi
aspetti storici e filosofici, Casalecchio, Arianna Editrice, 2006. ISBN
88-87307-57-1. Verità e relativismo. Religione, scienza, filosofia e politica
nell'epoca della globalizzazione, Torino, Alpina, 2006. ISBN 978-88-902470-3-3.
Elogio del comunitarismo Napoli, Controcorrente, 2006. ISBN 88-89015-50-0. Il
paradosso De Benoist. Un confronto politico e filosofico, Roma, Settimo
Sigillo, 2006. ISBN 978-88-6148-008-7. Storia della dialettica, Pistoia, Petite
plaisance, 2006. ISBN 88-7588-083-2. La democrazia in Grecia. Storia di un'idea,
forza di un valore, in Presidiare la democrazia realizzare la Costituzione.
Atti del seminario itinerante sulla difesa della Costituzione, 12-13-14
dicembre 2005, Bardonecchia, Susa, Bussoleno, Condove, Borgone Susa, Edizioni
Melli-Quaderni Sarà Dura!, 2006. Storia critica del marxismo. Dalla nascita di
Karl Marx alla dissoluzione del comunismo storico novecentesco, 1818-1991,
Napoli, La città del sole, 2007. ISBN 978-88-8292-344-0. Postfazione a Luca
Grecchi, Il presente della filosofia italiana, Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2007.
ISBN 88-7588-009-3. Storia dell'etica, Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2007. ISBN
88-7588-011-5. Hegel antiutilitarista, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 2007. ISBN
978-88-6148-017-9. Storia del materialismo, Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2007. ISBN
88-7588-015-8. Una approssimazione al pensiero di Karl Marx. Tra materialismo e
idealismo, Saonara, Il Prato, 2007. ISBN 978-88-89566-76-3. Ripensare Marx.
Filosofia, Idealismo, Materialismo, Potenza, Ermes, 2007. ISBN 88-87687-61-7.
Un trotzkismo capitalistico? Ipotesi sociologico-religiosa dei Neocons
americani e dei loro seguaci europei, in Neocons. L'ideologia neoconservatrice
e le sfide della storia, Rimini, Il Cerchio, 2007. ISBN 88-8474-150-5. Alla
ricerca della speranza perduta. Un intellettuale di sinistra e un intellettuale
di destra "non omologati" dialogano su ideologie e globalizzazione,
con Luigi Tedeschi, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 2008. ISBN 978-88-6148-033-9. La
quarta guerra mondiale, Parma, All'insegna del Veltro, 2008. L'enigma dialettico
del Sessantotto quarant'anni dopo, in La rivoluzione dietro di noi. Filosofia e
politica prima e dopo il '68, Roma, Manifestolibri, 2008. ISBN
978-88-7285-549-2. Il marxismo e la tradizione culturale europea, Pistoia,
Petite plaisance, 2009. ISBN 88-7588-024-7. Nuovi signori e nuovi sudditi.
Ipotesi sulla struttura di classe del capitalismo contemporaneo, con Eugenio
Orso, Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2010. ISBN 88-7588-036-0. Logica della storia
e comunismo novecentesco. L'effetto di sdoppiamento, con Roberto Sidoli,
Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2010. ISBN 88-7588-038-7. Elementi di Politicamente
Corretto. Studio preliminare su di un fenomeno ideologico destinato a diventare
in futuro sempre più invasivo e importante, Petite Plaisance, 2010 Filosofia
della verità e della giustizia. Il pensiero di Karel Kosík, con Linda Cesana,
Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2012. ISBN 978-88-7588-062-0. Lettera
sull'Umanesimo, Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2012. ISBN 978-88-7588-066-8. Una
nuova storia alternativa della filosofia. Il cammino ontologico-sociale della
filosofia, Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2013. ISBN 978-88-7588-108-5. Lineamenti
per una nuova filosofia della storia. La passione dell'anticapitalismo, con
Luigi Tedeschi, Saonara, Il Prato, 2013. ISBN 978-88-6336-184-1. Dialoghi
sull'Europa e sul nuovo ordine mondiale, con Luigi Tedeschi, Saonara, Il Prato,
2015. ISBN 978-88-6336-238-1. Collisioni. Dialogo su scienza, religione e
filosofia, con Andrea Bulgarelli, Pistoia, Petite plaisance, 2015, ISBN
978-88-7588-153-5. Karl Marx: un'interpretazione, NovaEuropa Edizioni, 2018,
ISBN 978-88-8524-212-8. Note ^ Preve preferiva non definirsi marxista ma
appartenente alla "scuola di Marx", e «allievo indipendente di Marx»
(C. Preve, Elogio del comunitarismo, Controcorrente, Napoli, 2006, p. 10). ^
«Personalmente, non sono credente né praticante. Non credo in nessun Dio
personale, considero ogni personalizzazione del divino una indebita e
superstiziosa antropomorfizzazione, e sono pertanto in linea di massima
d’accordo con Spinoza. Ma ritengo anche la religione, così come la scienza,
l’arte e la filosofia, dati permanenti dell’antropologia umana in quanto tali
destinati a durare tutto il tempo in cui durerà il genere umano.» (C. Preve,
Elementi di politicamente corretto, 2010) ^ C.Preve: Convegno György Lukács e
la cultura europea (II intervento) ^ Relazione VIII Congresso Nazionale di DP
(terzultimo intervento) ^ Destra e Sinistra: confronto tra C.Preve e
D.Losurdo Carmilla: I rosso-bruni: vesti nuove per una vecchia storia ^
Democrazia comunitaria o democrazia proprietaria?
(L.Tedeschi-C.Preve)Archiviato il 12 settembre 2007 in Internet Archive. ^
Considerazioni sulla geopolitica (di C.Preve) Archiviato il 25 settembre 2008
in Internet Archive.. ^ Intervista di Luigi Tedeschi a Costanzo Preve
Archiviato il 2 marzo 2008 in Internet Archive. ^ Il bombardamento etico dieci
anni dopo (recensione di G. Di Martino), 17 agosto 2009. ^ Fonte: A.
Monchietto, Lucio Colletti - Costanzo Preve. Marxismo, Filosofia, Scienza. ^
Morto Costanzo Preve, l'“ultimo” filosofo marxista su la Repubblica - Torino ^
Addio al filosofo Costanzo Preve ^ In memoria di Costanzo Preve di Diego Fusaro
^ Un lutto veramente grande per noi di Gianfranco La Grassa ^ In morte di
Costanzo Preve ^ La Sala Rossa ricorda la figura di Costanzo Preve e
raccogliendosi in un minuto di silenzio Archiviato il 19 dicembre 2013 in
Internet Archive. ^ C.Preve, Con Marx e oltre il marxismo (overleft.it)
Archiviato il 9 febbraio 2010 in Internet Archive. ^ Copia archiviata (PDF), su
files.splinder.com. URL consultato il 2 dicembre 2007 (archiviato dall'url
originale il 20 agosto 2008). ^ Comunismo e Comunità » Laboratorio per una
teoria anticapitalistica ^ Alessandro Volpe e Piotr Zygulski, Verità e
filosofia, in Alessandro Monchietto e Giacomo Pezzano (a cura di), Invito allo
Straniamento. I. Costanzo Preve filosofo, Pistoia, Petite Plaisance, 2014, ISBN
978-88-7588-111-5. ^ C. Preve, Elementi di politicamente corretto; ad es. «22.
E qui concludiamo con una serie di previsioni artigianali. Ricordo al lettore
che questo non è ancora un Trattato di Politicamente Corretto, che ho peraltro
intenzione di scrivere, in cui i cinque punti principali indicati (americanismo
come collocazione presupposta, religione olocaustica, teologia dei diritti umani,
antifascismo in assenza completa di fascismo, dicotomia Sinistra/Destra come
protesi di manipolazione politologica) verranno discussi in modo più analitico
e preciso». ^ Da Intellettuali e cultura politica nell'Italia di fine secolo,
Rivista Indipendenza n.° 3 (Nuova Serie), novembre 1997/Febbraio 1998. ^ Da Gli
Usa, l’Occidente, la Destra, la Sinistra, il fascismo ed il comunismo. Problemi
del profilo culturale di un movimento di resistenza all’Impero americano,
Noctua Edizioni, 2003. ^ C.Preve: audio congressi DP (RadioRadicale.it) ^
Intervista politico-filosofica (G. Repaci - C. Preve) ^ «La costituzione
italiana è stata distrutta per sempre nel 1999 con i bombardamenti sulla
Jugoslavia, e da allora l’Italia è senza costituzione, e lo resterà finché i responsabili
politici di allora non saranno condannati a morte per alto tradimento (parlo
letteralmente pesando le parole), con eventuale benevola commutazione della
condanna a morte a lavori forzati a vita. Eppure, questi crimini passano sotto
silenzio, perché si continuano ad interpretare gli eventi di oggi in base ad
una distinzione completamente finita nel 1945». (C. Preve, Elementi di
politicamente corretto) ^ http://www.aginform.org/preve.html. Bibliografia
Étienne Balibar, La filosofia di Marx, Manifestolibri, 1994 (p. 15) Norberto
Bobbio, Né con Marx né contro Marx, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1997 (pp. 223–240)
André Tosel, Devenir du marxisme: de la fin du marxisme-léninisme aux mille
marxismes, France-Italie 1975-1995, in Dictionnaire Marx contemporain, Jacques
Bidet-Eustache Kouvélakis (a cura di), PUF, Parigi 2001, (p. 72 sgg.) Cristina
Corradi, Storia dei marxismi in Italia, Manifestolibri, Roma, 2005 (pp.
278–294) Alessandro Monchietto, Marxismo e filosofia in Costanzo Preve,
Editrice Petite Plaisance, Pistoia, 2007[1]. Piotr Zygulski, Costanzo Preve: la
passione durevole della filosofia, presentazione di Giacomo Pezzano, Pistoia,
Editrice Petite Plaisance, 2012, ISBN 978-88-7588-068-2. Alessandro Monchietto
e Giacomo Pezzano (a cura di), Invito allo Straniamento. I. Costanzo Preve
filosofo, Pistoia, Petite Plaisance, 2014, ISBN 978-88-7588-111-5. Piotr
Zygulski, Costanzo Preve e l'educazione filosofica (PDF), in Educazione
Democratica, n. 7/2014, Foggia, Edizioni del Rosone, gennaio 2014, pp. 242-251,
ISSN 2038-579X (WC · ACNP). URL consultato il 13 marzo 2018. Alessandro
Monchietto (a cura di), Invito allo Straniamento. II. Costanzo Preve marxiano,
Pistoia, Petite Plaisance, 2016, ISBN 978-88-7588-152-8. Massimo Bontempelli -
Fabio Bentivoglio, Il senso dell'essere nelle culture occidentali, Milano,
Trevisini, 1992. Vol III, pp. 516–522 Carlo Formenti, Il socialismo è morto.
Viva il socialismo!, Meltemi, Milano 2019, pp. 86-90. Voci correlate
Comunitarismo Domenico Losurdo Massimo Bontempelli (storico) Nazionalismo di
sinistra Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o
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Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI
secoloSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti italiani del XXI secoloInsegnanti
italiani del XX secoloInsegnanti italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1943Morti nel
2013Nati il 14 aprileMorti il 23 novembreNati a Valenza (Italia)Morti a
TorinoMarxistiComunisti in ItaliaFilosofi della politicaStudenti
dell'Università degli Studi di TorinoPolitologi italianiPersonalità
dell'agnosticismoAntiglobalizzazionePolitici di Democrazia ProletariaMilitanti
di Lotta Continua[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Preve," per il
Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
Prichard: h. a. – H. P. Grice called himself a
neo-Prichardian, but then “I used to be a neo-Stoutian before that!” – London-born
Welshman and philosopher and founder of the Oxford school of intuitionism. An
Oxford fellow and professor, he published Kant’s Theory of Knowledge 9 and
numerous essays, collected in Moral Obligation 9, 8 and in Knowledge and
Perception 0. Prichard was a realist in his theory of knowledge, following Cook
Wilson. He held that through direct perception in concrete cases we obtain
knowledge of universals and of necessary connections between them, and he
elaborated a theory about our knowledge of material objects. In “Does Moral
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” 2 he argued powerfully that it is wrong to think
that a general theory of obligation is possible. No single principle captures
the various reasons why obligatory acts are obligatory. Only by direct
perception in particular cases can we see what we ought to do. With this essay
Prichard founded the Oxford school of intuitionism, carried on by, among
others, Ross.
Priestley, J.: British philosopher. In 1774 he prepared
oxygen by heating mercuric oxide. Although he continued to favor the phlogiston
hypothesis, his work did much to discredit that idea. He discovered many gases,
including ammonia, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and hydrochloric acid.
While studying the layer of carbon dioxide over a brewing vat, he conceived the
idea of dissolving it under pressure. The resulting “soda water” was famous
throughout Europe. His Essay on Government 1768 influenced Jefferson’s ideas in
the Declaration of Independence. The
essay also contributed to the utilitarianism of Bentham, supplying the phrase “the
greatest happiness of the greatest number.” Priestley modified the
associationism of Locke, Hume, and Hartley, holding that a sharp distinction
must be drawn between the results of association in forming natural
propensities and its effects on the development of moral ideas. On the basis of
this distinction, he argued, against Hume, that differences in individual moral
sentiments are results of education, through the association of ideas, a view
anticipated by Helvétius. Priestley served as minister to anti-Establishment
congregations. His unpopular stress on individual freedom resulted in his move
to Pennsylvania, where he spent his last years.
Primum -- prime mover, the original source and cause of
motion change in the universe an idea
that was developed by Aristotle and became important in Judaic, Christian, and
Islamic thought about God. According to Aristotle, something that is in motion
a process of change is moving from a state of potentiality to a state of
actuality. For example, water that is being heated is potentially hot and in
the process of becoming actually hot. If a cause of change must itself actually
be in the state that it is bringing about, then nothing can produce motion in
itself; whatever is in motion is being moved by another. For otherwise
something would be both potentially and actually in the same state. Thus, the
water that is potentially hot can become hot only by being changed by something
else the fire that is actually hot. The prime mover, the original cause of
motion, must itself, therefore, not be in motion; it is an unmoved mover.
Aquinas and other theologians viewed God as the prime mover, the ultimate cause
of all motion. Indeed, for these theologians the argument to establish the
existence of a first mover, itself unmoved, was a principal argument used in
their efforts to prove the existence of God on the basis of reason. Many modern
thinkers question the argument for a first mover on the ground that it does not
seem to be logically impossible that the motion of one thing be caused by a
second thing whose motion in turn is caused by a third thing, and so on without
end. Defenders of the argument claim that it presupposes a distinction between
two different causal series, one temporal and one simultaneous, and argue that
the objection succeeds only against a temporal causal series. PRIMA PHILOSOPHIA -- first philosophy, in
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the study of being qua being, including the study of
theology as understood by him, since the divine is being par excellence.
Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy was concerned chiefly with the
existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the nature of matter and of
the mind.
Prince
Maurice’s parrot: The ascription of
‘that’-clause in the report of a communicatum by a pirot of stage n-1 may be a
problem by a priot in stage n. Do we want to say that the parrot communicates
that he finds Prince Maurice an idiot? While some may not be correct that
Griciean principles can be explained on practical, utilitarian grounds, Grice’s
main motivation is indeed to capture the ‘rational’ capacity. Since I think I
may be confident, that, whoever should see a creature of his own shape or make,
though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call
him still a man; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason,
and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot; and
say, the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent
rational parrot. A relation we have in an author of great note, is sufficient
to countenance the supposition of a rational parrot. His words are: "I had
a mind to know, from Prince Maurice's own mouth, the account of a common, but
much credited story, that I had heard so often from many others, of an old
parrot he had in Brazil, during his government there, that spoke, and asked,
and answered common questions, like a reasonable creature: so that those of his
train there generally concluded it to be witchery or possession; and one of his
chaplains, who lived long afterwards in Holland, would never from that time
endure a parrot, but said they all had a devil in them. I had heard many
particulars of this story, and as severed by people hard to be discredited,
which made me ask Prince Maurice what there was of it. He said, with his usual
plainness and dryness in talk, there was something true, but a great deal false
of what had been reported. I desired to know of him what there was of the first.
He told me short and coldly, that he had heard of such an old parrot when he
had been at Brazil; and though he believed nothing of it, and it was a good way
off, yet he had so much curiosity as to send for it: that it was a very great
and a very old one; and when it came first into the room where the prince was,
with a great many Dutchmen about him, it said presently, What a company of
white men are here! They asked it, what it thought that man was, pointing to
the prince. It answered, Some General or other. When they brought it close to
him, he asked it, D'ou venez-vous? It answered, De Marinnan. The Prince, A qui
estes-vous? The Parrot, A un Portugais. The Prince, Que fais-tu la? Parrot, Je
garde les poulles. The Prince laughed, and said, Vous gardez les poulles? The
Parrot answered, Oui, moi; et je scai bien faire; and made the chuck four or
five times that people use to make to chickens when they call them. I set down
the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said them
to me. I asked him in what language the parrot spoke, and he said in Brazilian.
I asked whether he understood Brazilian; he said No, but he had taken care to
have two interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that spoke Brazilian, and the
other a Brazilian that spoke Dutch; that he asked them separately and
privately, and both of them agreed in telling him just the same thing that the
parrot had said. I could not but tell this odd story, because it is so much out
of the way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I
dare say this Prince at least believed himself in all he told me, having ever
passed for a very honest and pious man: I leave it to naturalists to reason,
and to other men to believe, as they please upon it; however, it is not, perhaps,
amiss to relieve or enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digressions,
whether to the purpose or no." I have taken care that the reader should
have the story at large in the author's own words, because he seems to me not
to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a man as
he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of
himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to
pin so close, not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a Prince
in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety, a story which, if he
himself thought incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince,
it is plain, who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it from him,
both of them call this talker a parrot: and I ask any one else who thinks such
a story fit to be told, whether, if this parrot, and all of its kind, had
always talked, as we have a prince's word for it this one did,- whether, I say,
they would not have passed for a race of rational animals; but yet, whether,
for all that, they would have been allowed to be men, and not parrots? For I
presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the
idea of a man in most people's sense: but of a body, so and so shaped, joined
to it: and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted
all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of
the same man.
Principle:
a philosopher loves a principle. principium. Grice. Principle of conversational
helpfulness. “I call it ‘principle,’ echoing Boethius.”Mention should also he made of Boethius’ conception, that
there are certain principles, sentences which have no demonstration — probatio
— which he calls principales propositiones or probationis principia. Here is
the fragment from his Commentary on Topics treating of principles; El iliac
quidem (propositiones) quarum nulla probatio est, maximae ac principales
vocantur, quod his illas necesse est approbari, quae ut demonstrari valeant,
non recusant/ est auteni maxima proposiiio ut liaec « si de aequalibus aequalia
demas, quae derelinquitur aequalia sunt », ita enim hoc per se notion est, ut
aliud notius quo approbari valeat esse non possit; quae proposi- tiones cum
(idem sui natura propria gerant, non solum alieno ad (idem non egent argumento,
oerum ceteris quoque probationis sclent esse principium; igitur per se notae
propositiones, quibus nihil est notius, indemonstrabiles ac maxime et
principales vocantur (“Indeed those sentences that have no demonstration are
called maximum or principal [sentences], because they are not rejected since
they are necessary to those that have to be demonstrated and which are valid
for making a demonstration ; but a maximum sentence such as « if from equal
[quantifies], equal [quantities] are taken, what is left are equal
[quantities]*, is self- evident, and there is nothing which can be better known
self-evidently valid, and self- demonstrating, therefore they are sentences containing
their certitude in their very nature and not only do they need no additional
argument to demonstrate their certitude, but are also the principles of
demonstration of the other [sentences]; so they are, self-evident sen- tences,
nothing being better known than they are, and are called undemonstrable or
maxi- mum and principal”). Boethius’ idea coincides with Aristotle’s; deduction
must start from somewhere, we must begin with something unproved. The
Stagirite, how- ever, gave an explanation of the existence of principles and
the possibility of their being grasjied by the active intellect, whereas with
Boethius princi- ples appear as severed from the sentences demonstrated in a
more formal manner: there are two kinds of sentences: some which are demonstrable
and others which need no demonstration There’s
the principle of economy of rational effort: (principium oeconomiae effortis
rationalis). Cf. his metaphor of the hamburger. Grice knew that ‘economy’ is
vague. It relates to the ‘open house.’ But is a crucial concept. It is not the
principle of parsimony of rational effort. It is not the principle of
‘minimisaation’ of rational effort. It is the principle of the ‘economy’ of rational
effort. ‘Economy’ is already a value-oriented word, since it is a branch of
politics and meta-ethics. oecŏnŏmĭcus , a, um, adj., = οἰκονομικός. I. Of or
relating to domestic economy; subst.: oecŏnŏmĭcus , i, m., a work of Xenophon
on domestic economy. in eo libro, qui Oeconomicus inscribitur, Cic. Off. 2, 24,
87; Gell. 15, 5, 8.— II. Of or belonging to a proper (oratorical) division or
arrangement; orderly, methodical: “oeconomica totius causae dispositio,” Quint.
7, 10, 11. οἰκονομ-ικός , ή, όν, A.practised
in the management of a household or family, opp. πολιτικός, Pl.Alc.1.133e,
Phdr.248d, X.Oec.1.3, Arist.Pol.1252a8, etc. : Sup., [κτημάτων] τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ-ώτατον,
of man, Phld.Oec.p.30 J. : hence, thrifty, frugal, economical, X.Mem.4.2.39,
Phylarch.65 J. (Comp.) : ὁ οἰ. title of treatise on the duties of domestic
life, by Xenophon ; and τὰ οἰ. title of treatise on public finance, ascribed to
Aristotle, cf. X.Cyr.8.1.14 : ἡ -κή (sc. τέχνη) domestic economy, husbandry,
Pl.Plt.259c, X.Mem. 3.4.11, etc. ; οἰ. ἀρχή defined as ἡ τέκνων ἀρχὴ καὶ γυναικὸς
καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης, Arist.Pol.1278b38 ; applied to patriarchal rule,
ib.1285b32. Adv.“-κῶς” Ph.2.426, Plu.2.1126a ; also in literary sense, in a
well ordered manner, Sch.Th.1.63. Grice’s conversational maximin. Blackburn
draws a skull to communicate that there is danger. The skull complete with the
rest of the body will not do. So abiding by this principle has nothing to do
with an arbitrary convention. Vide principle of least conversational effort.
Principle of conversational least effort. No undue effort (candour), no
unnecessary trouble (self-love) if doing A involves too much conversational
effort, never worry: you will be DEEMED to have made the effort. Invoked by
Grice in “Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of
H. P. Grice.” When Grice qualifies this as ‘rational’ effort, what other
efforts are there? Note that the lexeme ‘effort’ does NOT feature in the
formulation of the principle itself. Grice confesses to be strongly inclined to
assent to the principle of economy of rational conversational effort or the
principle of economy of conversational effort, or the principle of economy of
conversational expenditure, or the principle of minimisation of rational expenditure,
or the principle of minimization of conversational expenditure, or the principle
of minimisation of rational cost, or the conversational maximin. The principle
of least cost. The principle of economy of rational expenditure states that,
where there is a ratiocinative procedure for arriving rationally at certain
outcome, a procedure which, because it is ratiocinative, involves an
expenditure of time and energy, if there is a NON-ratiocinative, and so more
economical procedure which is likely, for the most part, to reach the same
outcome as the ratiocinative procedure, provided the stakes are not too high,
it is rational to employ the cheaper though somewhat less reliable
non-ratiocinative procedure as a substitute for ratiocination. Grice thinks
this principle would meet with genitorial approval, in which case the genitor
would install it for use should opportunity arise. This applies to the charge
of overcomplexity and ‘psychological irreality’ of the reasoning involved in
the production and design of the maximally efficient conversational move and
the reasoning involved in the recognition of the implicaturum by the addressee.
In “Epilogue” he goes by yet another motto, Do not multiply rationalities
beyond necessity: The principle of conversational rationality, as he calls it
in the Epilogue, is a sub-principle of a principle of rationality simpiciter,
not applying to a pursuit related to ‘communication,’ as he puts it. Then
there’s the principium individuationis, the cause or basis of individuality in
individuals; what makes something individual as opposed to universal, e.g.,
what makes the cat Minina individual and thus different from the universal,
cat. Questions regarding the principle of individuation were first raised
explicitly in the early Middle Ages. Classical authors largely ignored
individuation; their ontological focus was on the problem of universals. The
key texts that originated the discussion of the principle of individuation are
found in Boethius. Between Boethius and 1150, individuation was always
discussed in the context of more pressing issues, particularly the problem of
universals. After 1150, individuation slowly emerged as a focus of attention,
so that by the end of the thirteenth century it had become an independent
subject of discussion, especially in Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Most early modern
philosophers conceived the problem of individuation epistemically rather than
metaphysically; they focused on the discernibility of individuals rather than
the cause of individuation, as in Descartes. With few exceptions, such as Karl
Popper, the twentieth century has followed this epistemic approach e. g. P. F.
Strawson. principle of bivalence, the
principle that any significant statement is either true or false. It is often
confused with the principle of excluded middle. Letting ‘Tp’ stand for ‘p is
true’ and ‘Tp’ for ‘p is false’ and otherwise using standard logical notation,
bivalence is ‘Tp 7 T-p’ and excluded middle is ‘T p 7 -p’. That they are
different principles is shown by the fact that in probability theory, where
‘Tp’ can be expressed as ‘Prp % 1’, bivalence ‘Pr p % 1 7 Pr ~p % 1’ is not
true for all values of p e.g. it is not
true where ‘p’ stands for ‘given a fair toss of a fair die, the result will be
a six’ a statement with a probability of 1 /6, where -p has a probability of 5
/6 but excluded middle ‘Prp 7 -p % 1’ is
true for all definite values of p, including the probability case just given.
If we allow that some significant statements have no truth-value or probability
and distinguish external negation ‘Tp’ from internal negation ‘T-p’, we can
distinguish bivalence and excluded middle from the principle of
non-contradiction, namely, ‘-Tp • T-p’, which is equivalent to ‘-Tp 7 -T-p’.
Standard truth-functional logic sees no difference between ‘p’ and ‘Tp’, or
‘-Tp’ and ‘T-p’, and thus is unable to distinguish the three principles. Some
philosophers of logic deny there is such a difference. principle of
contradiction, also called principle of non-contradiction, the principle that a
statement and its negation cannot both be true. It can be distinguished from
the principle of bivalence, and given certain controversial assumptions, from
the principle of excluded middle; but in truth-functional logic all three are
regarded as equivalent. Outside of formal logic the principle of
non-contradiction is best expressed as Aristotle expresses it: “Nothing can
both be and not be at the same time in the same respect.” principle of double effect, the view that
there is a morally relevant difference between those consequences of our
actions we intend and those we do not intend but do still foresee. According to
the principle, if increased literacy means a higher suicide rate, those who
work for education are not guilty of driving people to kill themselves. A
physician may give a patient painkillers foreseeing that they will shorten his
life, even though the use of outright poisons is forbidden and the physician
does not intend to shorten the patient’s life. An army attacking a legitimate
military target may accept as inevitable, without intending to bring about, the
deaths of a number of civilians. Traditional moral theologians affirmed the
existence of exceptionless prohibitions such as that against taking an innocent
human life, while using the principle of double effect to resolve hard cases
and avoid moral blind alleys. They held that one may produce a forbidden
effect, provided 1 one’s action also had a good effect, 2 one did not seek the
bad effect as an end or as a means, 3 one did not produce the good effect
through the bad effect, and 4 the good effect was important enough to outweigh
the bad one. Some contemporary philosophers and Roman Catholic theologians hold
that a modified version of the principle of double effect is the sole
justification of deadly deeds, even when the person killed is not innocent.
They drop any restriction on the causal sequence, so that e.g. it is legitimate
to cut off the head of an unborn child to save the mother’s life. But they
oppose capital punishment on the ground that those who inflict it require the
death of the convict as part of their plan. They also play down the fourth
requirement, on the ground that the weighing of incommensurable goods it
requires is impossible. Consequentialists deny the principle of double effect,
as do those for whom the crucial distinction is between what we cause by our
actions and what just happens. In the most plausible view, the principle does
not presuppose exceptionless moral prohibitions, only something stronger than
prima facie duties. It is easier to justify an oblique evasion of a moral
requirement than a direct violation, even if direct violations are sometimes
permissible. So understood, the principle is a guide to prudence rather than a
substitute for it. principle of excluded
middle, the principle that the disjunction of any significant statement with
its negation is always true; e.g., ‘Either there is a tree over 500 feet tall
or it is not the case that there is such a tree’. The principle is often
confused with the principle of bivalence. principle of indifference, a rule for
assigning a probability to an event based on “parity of reasons.” According to
the principle, when the “weight of reasons” favoring one event is equal to the
“weight of reasons” favoring another, the two events should be assigned the
same probability. When there are n mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive events, and there is no reason to favor one over another, then we
should be “indifferent” and the n events should each be assigned probability 1/n
the events are equiprobable, according to the principle. This principle is
usually associated with the names Bernoulli Ars Conjectandi, 1713 and Laplace
Théorie analytique des probabilités, 1812, and was so called by J. M. Keynes A
Treatise on Probability, 1. The principle gives probability both a subjective
“degree of belief” and a logical “partial logical entailment” interpretation.
One rationale for the principle says that in ignorance, when no reasons favor
one event over another, we should assign equal probabilities. It has been
countered that any assignment of probabilities at all is a claim to some
knowledge. Also, several seemingly natural applications of the principle,
involving non-linearly related variables, have led to some mathematical contradictions,
known as Bertrand’s paradox, and pointed out by Keynes. principle of insufficient reason, the
principle that if there is no sufficient reason or explanation for something’s
being the case, then it will not be the case. Since the rise of modern probability
theory, many have identified the principle of insufficient reason with the
principle of indifference a rule for assigning a probability to an event based
on “parity of reasons”. The two principles are closely related, but it is
illuminating historically and logically to view the principle of insufficient
reason as the general principle stated above which is related to the principle
of sufficient reason and to view the principle of indifference as a special
case of the principle of insufficient reason applying to probabilities. As Mach
noted, the principle of insufficient reason, thus conceived, was used by
Archimedes to argue that a lever with equal weights at equal distances from a
central fulcrum would not move, since if there is no sufficient reason why it
should move one way or the other, it would not move one way or the other.
Philosophers from Anaximander to Leibniz used the same principle to argue for
various metaphysical theses. The principle of indifference can be seen to be a
special case of this principle of insufficient reason applying to
probabilities, if one reads the principle of indifference as follows: when
there are N mutually exclusive and exhaustive events and there is no sufficient
reason to believe that any one of them is more probable than any other, then no
one of them is more probable than any other they are equiprobable. The idea of
“parity of reasons” associated with the principle of indifference is, in such
manner, related to the idea that there is no sufficient reason for favoring one
outcome over another. This is significant because the principle of insufficient
reason is logically equivalent to the more familiar principle of sufficient
reason if something is [the case], then there is a sufficient reason for its
being [the case] which means that the
principle of indifference is a logical consequence of the principle of
sufficient reason. If this is so, we can understand why so many were inclined
to believe the principle of indifference was an a priori truth about probabilities,
since it was an application to probabilities of that most fundamental of all
alleged a priori principles of reasoning, the principle of sufficient reason.
Nor should it surprise us that the alleged a priori truth of the principle of
indifference was as controversial in probability theory as was the alleged a
priori truth of the principle of sufficient reason in philosophy
generally. principle of plenitude, the
principle that every genuine possibility is realized or actualized. This
principle of the “fullness of being” was named by A. O. Lovejoy, who showed
that it was commonly assumed throughout the history of Western science and
philosophy, from Plato to Plotinus who associated it with inexhaustible divine
productivity, through Augustine and other medieval philosophers, to the modern
rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz and the Enlightenment. Lovejoy connected
plenitude to the great chain of being, the idea that the universe is a
hierarchy of beings in which every possible form is actualized. In the eighteenth
century, the principle was “temporalized”: every possible form of creature
would be realized not necessarily at all
times but at some stage “in the fullness
of time.” A clue about the significance of plenitude lies in its connection to
the principle of sufficient reason everything has a sufficient reason [cause or
explanation] for being or not being. Plenitude says that if there is no
sufficient reason for something’s not being i.e., if it is genuinely possible,
then it exists which is logically equivalent
to the negative version of sufficient reason: if something does not exist, then
there is a sufficient reason for its not being. principle of verifiability, a
claim about what meaningfulness is: at its simplest, a sentence is meaningful
provided there is a method for verifying it. Therefore, if a sentence has no
such method, i.e., if it does not have associated with it a way of telling
whether it is conclusively true or conclusively false, then it is meaningless.
The purpose for which this verificationist principle was originally introduced
was to demarcate sentences that are “apt to make a significant statement of
fact” from “nonsensical” or “pseudo-” sentences. It is part of the emotive
theory of content, e.g., that moral discourse is not literally, cognitively
meaningful, and therefore, not factual. And, with the verifiability principle,
the central European logical positivists of the 0s hoped to strip “metaphysical
discourse” of its pretensions of factuality. For them, whether there is a
reality external to the mind, as the realists claim, or whether all reality is
made up of “ideas” or “appearances,” as idealists claim, is a “meaningless
pseudo-problem.” The verifiability principle proved impossible to frame in a
form that did not admit all metaphysical sentences as meaningful. Further, it
casts doubt on its own status. How was it to be verified? So, e.g., in the
first edition of Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer proposed that a sentence is
verifiable, and consequently meaningful, if some observation sentence can be
deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being
deducible from those other premises alone. It follows that any metaphysical
sentence M is meaningful since ‘if M, then O’ always is an appropriate premise,
where O is an observation sentence. In the preface to the second edition, Ayer
offered a more sophisticated account: M is directly verifiable provided it is
an observation sentence or it entails, in conjunction with certain observation
sentences, some observation sentence that does not follow from them alone. And
M is indirectly verifiable provided it entails, in conjunction with certain
other premises, some directly verifiable sentence that does not follow from
those other premises alone and these additional premises are either analytic or
directly verifiable or are independently indirectly verifiable. The new
verifiability principle is then that all and only sentences directly or
indirectly verifiable are “literally meaningful.” Unfortunately, Ayer’s
emendation admits every nonanalytic sentence. Let M be any metaphysical
sentence and O1 and O2 any pair of observation sentences logically independent
of each other. Consider sentence A: ‘either O1 or not-M and not-O2’. Conjoined
with O2, A entails O1. But O2 alone does not entail O1. So A is directly
verifiable. Therefore, since M conjoined with A entails O1, which is not
entailed by A alone, M is indirectly verifiable. Various repairs have been
attempted; none has succeeded. principle
of economy of rational effort -- cheapest-cost avoider, in the economic
analysis of law, the party in a dispute that could have prevented the dispute,
or minimized the losses arising from it, with the lowest loss to itself. The
term encompasses several types of behavior. As the lowest-cost accident
avoider, it is the party that could have prevented the accident at the lowest
cost. As the lowest-cost insurer, it is the party that could been have insured
against the losses arising from the dispute. This could be the party that could
have purchased insurance at the lowest cost or self-insured, or the party best
able to appraise the expected losses and the probability of the occurrence. As
the lowest-cost briber, it is the party least subject to transaction costs.
This party is the one best able to correct any legal errors in the assignment
of the entitlement by purchasing the entitlement from the other party. As the
lowest-cost information gatherer, it is the party best able to make an informed
judgment as to the likely benefits and costs of an action. Principle of economy of rational effort:
Coase theorem, a non-formal insight by R. Coase: 1: assuming that there are no
transaction costs involved in exchanging rights for money, then no matter how
rights are initially distributed, rational agents will buy and sell them so as
to maximize individual returns. In jurisprudence this proposition has been the
basis for a claim about how rights should be distributed even when as is usual
transaction costs are high: the law should confer rights on those who would
purchase them were they for sale on markets without transaction costs; e.g.,
the right to an indivisible, unsharable resource should be conferred on the
agent willing to pay the highest price for it.
prisoner’s dilemma, a problem in game theory, and more
broadly the theory of rational choice, that takes its name from a familiar sort
of pleabargaining situation: Two prisoners Robin and Carol are interrogated
separately and offered the same deal: If one of them confesses “defects” and
the other does not, the defector will be given immunity from prosecution and
the other will get a stiff prison sentence. If both confess, both will get
moderate prison terms. If both remain silent cooperate with each other, both
will get light prison terms for a lesser offense. There are thus four possible
outcomes: 1 Robin confesses and gets immunity, while Carol is silent and gets a
stiff sentence. 2 Both are silent and get light sentences. 3 Both confess and
get moderate sentences. 4 Robin is silent and gets a stiff sentence, while
Carol confesses and gets immunity. Assume that for Robin, 1 would be the best
outcome, followed by 2, 3, and 4, in that order. Assume that for Carol, the
best outcome is 4, followed by 2, 3, and 1. Each prisoner then reasons as
follows: “My confederate will either confess or remain silent. If she
confesses, I must do likewise, in order to avoid the ‘sucker’s payoff’ immunity
for her, a stiff sentence for me. If she remains silent, then I must confess in
order to get immunity the best outcome
for me. Thus, no matter what my confederate does, I must confess.” Under those
conditions, both will confess, effectively preventing each other from achieving
anything better than the option they both rank as only third-best, even though
they agree that option 2 is second-best. This illustrative story attributed to
A. W. Tucker must not be allowed to obscure the fact that many sorts of social
interactions have the same structure. In general, whenever any two parties must
make simultaneous or independent choices over a range of options that has the
ordinal payoff structure described in the plea bargaining story, they are in a
prisoner’s dilemma. Diplomats, negotiators, buyers, and sellers regularly find
themselves in such situations. They are called iterated prisoner’s dilemmas if
the same parties repeatedly face the same choices with each other. Moreover,
there are analogous problems of cooperation and conflict at the level of
manyperson interactions: so-called n-person prisoner’s diemmas or free rider problems.
The provision of public goods provides an example. Suppose there is a public
good, such as clean air, national defense, or public radio, which we all want.
Suppose that is can be provided only by collective action, at some cost to each
of the contributors, but that we do not have to have a contribution from
everyone in order to get it. Assume that we all prefer having the good to not
having it, and that the best outcome for each of us would be to have it without
cost to ourselves. So each of us reasons as follows: “Other people will either
contribute enough to produce the good by themselves, or they will not. If they
do, then I can have it cost-free the best option for me and thus I should not
contribute. But if others do not contribute enough to produce the good by
themselves, and if the probability is very low that my costly contribution
would make the difference between success and failure, once again I should not
contribute.” Obviously, if we all reason in this way, we will not get the
public good we want. Such problems of collective action have been noticed by
philosophers since Plato. Their current nomenclature, rigorous game-theoretic
formulation, empirical study, and systematic philosophical development,
however, has occurred since 0.
private language argument, an argument designed to show
that there cannot be a language that only one person can speak a language that is essentially private, that
no one else can in principle understand. In addition to its intrinsic interest,
the private language argument is relevant to discussions of linguistic rules
and linguistic meaning, behaviorism, solipsism, and phenomenalism. The argument
is closely associated with Vitters’s Philosophical Investigations 8. The exact
structure of the argument is controversial; this account should be regarded as
a standard one, but not beyond dispute. The argument begins with the
supposition that a person assigns signs to sensations, where these are taken to
be private to the person who has them, and attempts to show that this
supposition cannot be sustained because no standards for the correct or
incorrect application of the same sign to a recurrence of the same sensation
are possible. Thus Vitters supposes that he undertakes to keep a diary about
the recurrence of a certain sensation; he associates it with the sign ‘S’, and
marks ‘S’ on a calendar every day he has that sensation. Vitters finds the
nature of the association of the sign and sensation obscure, on the ground that
‘S’ cannot be given an ordinary definition this would make its meaning publicly
accessible or even an ostensive definition. He further argues that there is no
difference between correct and incorrect entries of ‘S’ on subsequent days. The
initial sensation with which the sign ‘S’ was associated is no longer present,
and so it cannot be compared with a subsequent sensation taken to be of the
same kind. He could at best claim to remember the nature of the initial
sensation, and judge that it is of the same kind as today’s. But since the
memory cannot confirm its own accuracy, there is no possible test of whether he
remembers the initial association of sign and sensation right today.
Consequently there is no criterion for the correct reapplication of the sign
‘S’. Thus we cannot make sense of the notion of correctly reapplying ‘S’, and
cannot make sense of the notion of a private language. The argument described
appears to question only the claim that one could have terms for private mental
occurrences, and may not seem to impugn a broader notion of a private language
whose expressions are not restricted to signs for sensations. Advocates of
Vitters’s argument would generalize it and claim that the focus on sensations
simply highlights the absence of a distinction between correct and incorrect
reapplications of words. A language with terms for publicly accessible objects
would, if private to its user, still be claimed to lack criteria for the
correct reapplication of such terms. This broader notion of a private language
would thus be argued to be equally incoherent.
privation: H. P. Grice, “Negation and privation,” a
lack of something that it is natural or good to possess. The term is closely
associated with the idea that evil is itself only a lack of good, privatio
boni. In traditional theistic religions everything other than God is created by
God out of nothing, creation ex nihilo. Since, being perfect, God would create
only what is good, the entire original creation and every creature from the
most complex to the simplest are created entirely good. The original creation
contains no evil whatever. What then is evil and how does it enter the world?
The idea that evil is a privation of good does not mean, e.g., that a rock has
some degree of evil because it lacks such good qualities as consciousness and courage.
A thing has some degree of evil only if it lacks some good that is 741 privileged access privileged access 742
proper for that thing to possess. In the original creation each created thing
possessed the goods proper to the sort of thing it was. According to Augustine,
evil enters the world when creatures with free will abandon the good above
themselves for some lower, inferior good. Human beings, e.g., become evil to
the extent that they freely turn from the highest good God to their own private
goods, becoming proud, selfish, and wicked, thus deserving the further evils of
pain and punishment. One of the problems for this explanation of the origin of
evil is to account for why an entirely good creature would use its freedom to
turn from the highest good to a lesser good.
privileged access: H. P. Grice, “Privileged access and
incorrigibility,” special first-person awareness of the contents of one’s own
mind. Since Descartes, many philosophers have held that persons are aware of
the occurrent states of their own minds in a way distinct from both their mode
of awareness of physical objects and their mode of awareness of the mental
states of others. Cartesians view such apprehension as privileged in several
ways. First, it is held to be immediate, both causally and epistemically. While
knowledge of physical objects and their properties is acquired via spatially
intermediate causes, knowledge of one’s own mental states involves no such
causal chains. And while beliefs about physical properties are justified by
appeal to ways objects appear in sense experience, beliefs about the properties
of one’s own mental states are not justified by appeal to properties of a
different sort. I justify my belief that the paper on which I write is white by
pointing out that it appears white in apparently normal light. By contrast, my
belief that white appears in my visual experience seems to be self-justifying.
Second, Cartesians hold that first-person apprehension of occurrent mental
contents is epistemically privileged in being absolutely certain. Absolute
certainty includes infallibility, incorrigibility, and indubitability. That a
judgment is infallible means that it cannot be mistaken; its being believed
entails its being true even though judgments regarding occurrent mental
contents are not necessary truths. That it is incorrigible means that it cannot
be overridden or corrected by others or by the subject himself at a later time.
That it is indubitable means that a subject can never have grounds for doubting
it. Philosophers sometimes claim also that a subject is omniscient with regard
to her own occurrent mental states: if a property appears within her
experience, then she knows this. Subjects’ privileged access to the immediate
contents of their own minds can be held to be necessary or contingent.
Regarding corrigibility, for example, proponents of the stronger view hold that
first-person reports of occurrent mental states could never be overridden by
conflicting evidence, such as conflicting readings of brain states presumed to
be correlated with the mental states in question. They point out that knowledge
of such correlations would itself depend on first-person reports of mental
states. If a reading of my brain indicates that I am in pain, and I sincerely
claim not to be, then the law linking brain states of that type with pains must
be mistaken. Proponents of the weaker view hold that, while persons are
currently the best authorities as to the occurrent contents of their own minds,
evidence such as conflicting readings of brain states could eventually override
such authority, despite the dependence of the evidence on earlier firstperson
reports. Weaker views on privileged access may also deny infallibility on more
general grounds. In judging anything, including an occurrent mental state, to
have a particular property P, it seems that I must remember which property P
is, and memory appears to be always fallible. Even if such judgments are always
fallible, however, they may be more immediately justified than other sorts of
judgments. Hence there may still be privileged access, but of a weaker sort. In
the twentieth century, Ryle attacked the idea of privileged access by analyzing
introspection, awareness of what one is thinking or doing, in terms of
behavioral dispositions, e.g. dispositions to give memory reports of one’s
mental states when asked to do so. But while behaviorist or functional analyses
of some states of mind may be plausible, for instance analyses of cognitive
states such as beliefs, accounts in these terms of occurrent states such as
sensations or images are far less plausible. A more influential attack on
stronger versions of privileged access was mounted by Wilfrid Sellars.
According to him, we must be trained to report non-inferentially on properties
of our sense experience by first learning to respond with whole systems of
concepts to public, physical objects. Before I can learn to report a red sense
impression, I must learn the system of color concepts and the logical relations
among them by learning to respond to colored objects. Hence, knowledge of my
own mental states cannot be the firm basis from which I progress to other
knowledge. Even if this order of concept
acquisition is determined necessarily, it still may be that persons’ access to
their own mental states is privileged in some of the ways indicated, once the
requisite concepts have been acquired. Beliefs about one’s own occurrent states
of mind may still be more immediately justified than beliefs about physical
properties, for example.
pro attitude, a favorable disposition toward an object
or state of affairs. Although some philosophers equate pro attitudes with
desires, the expression is more often intended to cover a wide range of
conative states of mind including wants, feelings, wishes, values, and
principles. My regarding a certain course of action open to me as morally
required and my regarding it as a source of selfish satisfaction equally
qualify as pro attitudes toward the object of that action. It is widely held
that intentional action, or, more generally, acting for reasons, is necessarily
based, in part, on one or more pro attitudes. If I go to the store in order to
buy some turnips, then, in addition to my regarding my store-going as conducive
to turnip buying, I must have some pro attitude toward turnip buying.
Probabile: probability -- doomsday argument, an
argument examined by Grice -- an argument associated chiefly with the
mathematician Brandon Carter and the philosopher John Leslie purporting to
show, by appeal to Bayes’s theorem and Bayes’s rule, that whatever antecedent
probability we may have assigned to the hypothesis that human life will end
relatively soon is magnified, perhaps greatly, upon our learning or noticing
that we are among the first few score thousands of millions of human beings to
exist.Leslie’s The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human Extinction
6. The argument is based on an allegedly close analogy between the question of
the probability of imminent human extinction given our ordinal location in the
temporal swath of humanity and the fact that the reader’s name being among the
first few drawn randomly from an urn may greatly enhance for the reader the
probability that the urn contains fairly few names rather than very many. probability, a numerical value that can
attach to items of various kinds e.g., propositions, events, and kinds of
events that is a measure of the degree to which they may or should be
expected or the degree to which they
have “their own disposition,” i.e., independently of our psychological
expectations to be true, to occur, or to
be exemplified depending on the kind of item the value attaches to. There are
both multiple interpretations of probability and two main kinds of theories of
probability: abstract formal calculi and interpretations of the calculi. An
abstract formal calculus axiomatically characterizes formal properties of
probability functions, where the arguments of the function are often thought of
as sets, or as elements of a Boolean algebra. In application, the nature of the
arguments of a probability function, as well as the meaning of probability, are
given by interpretations of probability. The most famous axiomatization is
Kolmogorov’s Foundations of the Theory of Probability, 3. The three axioms for
probability functions Pr are: 1 PrX M 0 for all X; 2 PrX % 1 if X is necessary
e.g., a tautology if a proposition, a necessary event if an event, and a
“universal set” if a set; and 3 PrX 7 Y % PrX ! PrY where ‘7’ can mean, e.g.,
logical disjunction, or set-theoretical union if X and Y are mutually exclusive
X & Y is a contradiction if they are propositions, they can’t both happen
if they are events, and their set-theoretical intersection is empty if they are
sets. Axiom 3 is called finite additivity, which is sometimes generalized to
countable additivity, involving infinite disjunctions of propositions, or
infinite unions of sets. Conditional probability, PrX/Y the probability of X
“given” or “conditional on” Y, is defined as the quotient PrX & Y/PrY. An
item X is said to be positively or negatively statistically or
probabilistically correlated with an item Y according to whether PrX/Y is
greater than or less than PrX/-Y where -Y is the negation of a proposition Y,
or the non-occurrence of an event Y, or the set-theoretical complement of a set
Y; in the case of equality, X is said to be statistically or probabilistically
independent of Y. All three of these probabilistic relations are symmetric, and
sometimes the term ‘probabilistic relevance’ is used instead of ‘correlation’.
From the axioms, familiar theorems can be proved: e.g., 4 Pr-X % 1 PrX; 5 PrX 7 Y % PrX ! PrY PrX & Y for all X and Y; and 6 a simple
version of Bayes’s theorem PrX/Y % PrY/XPrX/PrY. Thus, an abstract formal
calculus of probability allows for calculation of the probabilities of some
items from the probabilities of others. The main interpretations of probability
include the classical, relative frequency, propensity, logical, and subjective
interpretations. According to the classical interpretation, the probability of
an event, e.g. of heads on a coin toss, is equal to the ratio of the number of
“equipossibilities” or equiprobable events favorable to the event in question
to the total number of relevant equipossibilities. On the relative frequency
interpretation, developed by Venn The Logic of Chance, 1866 and Reichenbach The
Theory of Probability, probability attaches to sets of events within a
“reference class.” Where W is the reference class, and n is the number of
events in W, and m is the number of events in or of kind X, within W, then the
probability of X, relative to W, is m/n. For various conceptual and technical
reasons, this kind of “actual finite relative frequency” interpretation has
been refined into various infinite and hypothetical infinite relative frequency
accounts, where probability is defined in terms of limits of series of relative
frequencies in finite nested populations of increasing sizes, sometimes
involving hypothetical infinite extensions of an actual population. The reasons
for these developments involve, e.g.: the artificial restriction, for finite
populations, of probabilities to values of the form i/n, where n is the size of
the reference class; the possibility of “mere coincidence” in the actual world,
where these may not reflect the true physical dispositions involved in the
relevant events; and the fact that probability is often thought to attach to
possibilities involving single events, while probabilities on the relative
frequency account attach to sets of events this is the “problem of the single
case,” also called the “problem of the reference class”. These problems also
have inspired “propensity” accounts of probability, according to which
probability is a more or less primitive idea that measures the physical
propensity or disposition of a given kind of physical situation to yield an
outcome of a given type, or to yield a “long-run” relative frequency of an
outcome of a given type. A theorem of probability proved by Jacob Bernoulli Ars
Conjectandi, 1713 and sometimes called Bernoulli’s theorem or the weak law of
large numbers, and also known as the first limit theorem, is important for
appreciating the frequency interpretation. The theorem states, roughly, that in
the long run, frequency settles down to probability. For example, suppose the
probability of a certain coin’s landing heads on any given toss is 0.5, and let
e be any number greater than 0. Then the theorem implies that as the number of
tosses grows without bound, the probability approaches 1 that the frequency of
heads will be within e of 0.5. More generally, let p be the probability of an
outcome O on a trial of an experiment, and assume that this probability remains
constant as the experiment is repeated. After n trials, there will be a
frequency, f n, of trials yielding outcome O. The theorem says that for any
numbers d and e greater than 0, there is an n such that the probability P that
_pf n_ ‹ e is within d of 1 P 1d.
Bernoulli also showed how to calculate such n for given values of d, e, and p.
It is important to notice that the theorem concerns probabilities, and not
certainty, for a long-run frequency. Notice also the assumption that the
probability p of O remains constant as the experiment is repeated, so that the
outcomes on trials are probabilistically independent of earlier outcomes. The kinds
of interpretations of probability just described are sometimes called
“objective” or “statistical” or “empirical” since the value of a probability,
on these accounts, depends on what actually happens, or on what actual given
physical situations are disposed to produce
as opposed to depending only on logical relations between the relevant
events or propositions, or on what we should rationally expect to happen or
what we should rationally believe. In contrast to these accounts, there are the
“logical” and the “subjective” interpretations of probability. Carnap “The Two
Concepts of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 5 has
marked this kind of distinction by calling the second concept probability1 and
the first probability2. According to the logical interpretation, associated
with Carnap Logical Foundations of
Probability, 0; and Continuum of Inductive Methods, 2, the probability of a
proposition X given a proposition Y is the “degree to which Y logically entails
X.” Carnap developed an ingenious and elaborate set of systems of logical
probability, including, e.g., separate systems depending on the degree to which
one happens to be, logically and rationally, sensitive to new information in
the reevaluation of probabilities. There is, of course, a connection between
the ideas of logical probability, rationality, belief, and belief revision. It
is natural to explicate the “logical-probabilistic” idea of the probability of
X given Y as the degree to which a rational person would believe X having come
to learn Y taking account of background knowledge. Here, the idea of belief
suggests a subjective sometimes called epistemic or partial belief or degree of
belief interpretation of probability; and the idea of probability revision
suggests the concept of induction: both the logical and the subjective
interpretations of probability have been called “inductive probability” a formal apparatus to characterize rational
learning from experience. The subjective interpretation of probability,
according to which the probability of a proposition is a measure of one’s
degree of belief in it, was developed by, e.g., Ramsey “Truth and Probability,”
in his Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays, 6; Definetti “Foresight:
Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources,” 7, translated by H. Kyburg, Jr., in
H. E. Smokler, Studies in Subjective Probability, 4; and Savage The Foundations
of Statistics, 4. Of course, subjective probability varies from person to
person. Also, in order for this to be an interpretation of probability, so that
the relevant axioms are satisfied, not all persons can count only rational, or “coherent” persons should
count. Some theorists have drawn a connection between rationality and
probabilistic degrees of belief in terms of dispositions to set coherent
betting odds those that do not allow a “Dutch book” an arrangement that forces the agent to lose
come what may, while others have described the connection in more general
decision-theoretic terms.
Problem – problem – “Philosophy is about problems” –
Grice. Problem of induction. First stated by Hume, this problem concerns the
logical basis of inferences from observed matters of fact to unobserved matters
of fact. Although discussion often focuses upon predictions of future events
e.g., a solar eclipse, the question applies also to inferences to past facts
e.g., the extinction of dinosaurs and to present occurrences beyond the range
of direct observation e.g., the motions of planets during daylight hours. Long
before Hume the ancient Skeptics had recognized that such inferences cannot be
made with certainty; they realized there can be no demonstrative deductive
inference, say, from the past and present to the future. Hume, however, posed a
more profound difficulty: Are we justified in placing any degree of confidence
in the conclusions of such inferences? His question is whether there is any
type of non-demonstrative or inductive inference in which we can be justified
in placing any confidence at all. According to Hume, our inferences from the
observed to the unobserved are based on regularities found in nature. We
believe, e.g., that the earth, sun, and moon move in regular patterns according
to Newtonian mechanics, and on that basis astronomers predict solar and lunar
eclipses. Hume notes, however, that all of our evidence for such uniformities
consists of past and present experience; in applying these uniformities to the
future behavior of these bodies we are making an inference from the observed to
the unobserved. This point holds in general. Whenever we make inferences from
the observed to the unobserved we rely on the uniformity of nature. The basis
for our belief that nature is reasonably uniform is our experience of such
uniformity in the past. If we infer that nature will continue to be uniform in
the future, we are making an inference from the observed to the unobserved precisely the kind of inference for which we
are seeking a justification. We are thus caught up in a circular argument.
Since, as Hume emphasized, much of our reasoning from the observed to the
unobserved is based on causal relations, he analyzed causality to ascertain
whether it could furnish a necessary connection between distinct events that
could serve as a basis for such inferences. His conclusion was negative. We cannot
establish any such connection a priori, for it is impossible to deduce the
nature of an effect from its cause e.g.,
we cannot deduce from the appearance of falling snow that it will cause a
sensation of cold rather than heat. Likewise, we cannot deduce the nature of a
cause from its effect e.g., looking at a
diamond, we cannot deduce that it was produced by great heat and pressure. All
such knowledge is based on past experience. If we infer that future snow will
feel cold or that future diamonds will be produced by great heat and pressure,
we are again making inferences from the observed to the unobserved.
Furthermore, if we carefully observe cases in which we believe a causeeffect
relation holds, we cannot perceive any necessary connection between cause and
effect, or any power in the cause that brings about the effect. We observe only
that an event of one type e.g., drinking water occurs prior to and contiguously
with an event of another type quenching thirst. Moreover, we notice that events
of the two types have exhibited a constant conjunction; i.e., whenever an event
of the first type has occurred in the past it has been followed by one of the
second type. We cannot discover any necessary connection or causal power a
posteriori; we can only establish priority, contiguity, and constant
conjunction up to the present. If we infer that this constant conjunction will
persist in future cases, we are making another inference from observed to
unobserved cases. To use causality as a basis for justifying inference from the
observed to the unobserved would again invovle a circular argument. Hume
concludes skeptically that there can be no rational or logical justification of
inferences from the observed to the unobserved
i.e., inductive or non-demonstrative inference. Such inferences are
based on custom and habit. Nature has endowed us with a proclivity to
extrapolate from past cases to future cases of a similar kind. Having observed
that events of one type have been regularly followed by events of another type,
we experience, upon encountering a case of the first type, a psychological
expectation that one of the second type will follow. Such an expectation does
not constitute a rational justification. Although Hume posed his problem in
terms of homely examples, the issues he raises go to the heart of even the most
sophisticated empirical sciences, for all of them involve inference from
observed phenomena to unobserved facts. Although complex theories are often
employed, Hume’s problem still applies. Its force is by no means confined to
induction by simple enumeration. Philosophers have responded to the problem of
induction in many different ways. Kant invoked synthetic a priori principles.
Many twentieth-century philosophers have treated it as a pseudo-problem, based
on linguistic confusion, that requires dissolution rather than solution. Carnap
maintained that inductive intuition is indispensable. Reichenbach offered a
pragmatic vindication. Goodman has recommended replacing Hume’s “old riddle”
with a new riddle of induction that he has posed. Popper, taking Hume’s
skeptical arguments as conclusive, advocates deductivism. He argues that
induction is unjustifiable and dispensable. None of the many suggestions is
widely accepted as correct. problem of
the criterion, a problem of epistemology, arising in the attempt both to
formulate the criteria and to determine the extent of knowledge. Skeptical and
non-skeptical philosophers disagree as to what, or how much, we know. Do we
have knowledge of the external world, other minds, the past, and the future?
Any answer depends on what the correct criteria of knowledge are. The problem
is generated by the seeming plausibility of the following two propositions: 1
In order to recognize instances, and thus to determine the extent, of
knowledge, we must know the criteria for it. 2 In order to know the criteria
for knowledge i.e., to distinguish between correct and incorrect criteria, we
must already be able to recognize its instances. According to an argument of
ancient Grecian Skepticism, we can know neither the extent nor the criteria of
knowledge because 1 and 2 are both true. There are, however, three further
possibilities. First, it might be that 2 is true but 1 false: we can recognize
instances of knowledge even if we do not know the criteria of knowledge.
Second, it might be that 1 is true but 2 false: we can identify the criteria of
knowledge without prior recognition of its instances. Finally, it might be that
both 1 and 2 are false. We can know the extent of knowledge without knowing
criteria, and vice versa. Chisholm, who has devoted particular attention to
this problem, calls the first of these options particularism, and the second
methodism. Hume, a skeptic about the extent of empirical knowledge, was a
methodist. Reid and Moore were particularists; they rejected Hume’s skepticism
on the ground that it turns obvious cases of knowledge into cases of ignorance.
Chisholm advocates particularism because he believes that, unless one knows to
begin with what ought to count as an instance of knowledge, any choice of a
criterion is ungrounded and thus arbitrary. Methodists turn this argument
around: they reject as dogmatic any identification of instances of knowledge
not based on a criterion. problem of the
speckled hen: a problem propounded by Ryle as an objection to Ayer’s analysis
of perception in terms of sense-data. It is implied by this analysis that, if I
see a speckled hen in a good light and so on, I do so by means of apprehending
a speckled sense-datum. The analysis implies further that the sense-datum
actually has just the number of speckles that I seem to see as I look at the
hen, and that it is immediately evident to me just how many speckles this is.
Thus, if I seem to see many speckles as I look at the hen, the sense-datum I
apprehend must actually contain many speckles, and it must be immediately
evident to me how many it does contain. Now suppose it seems to me that I see
more than 100 speckles. Then the datum I am apprehending must contain more than
100 speckles. Perhaps it contains 132 of them. The analysis would then imply,
absurdly, that it must be immediately evident to me that the number of speckles
is exactly 132. One way to avoid this implication would be to deny that a
sense-datum of mine could contain exactly 132 speckles or any other large, determinate number of
them precisely on the ground that it
could never seem to me that I was seeing exactly that many speckles. A possible
drawback of this approach is that it involves committing oneself to the claim, which
some philosophers have found problem of the criterion problem of the speckled
hen 747 747 self-contradictory, that a
sense-datum may contain many speckles even if there is no large number n such
that it contains n speckles.
prolatum – participle for ‘proferre,’ to utter. A much better choice than
Austin’s pig-latin “utteratum”! Grice prefferd Latinate when going serious. While
the verb is ‘profero – the participle corresponds to the ‘implicaturum’: what
the emissor profers. profer (v.)c. 1300, "to utter, express," from Old
French proferer (13c.)
"utter, present verbally, pronounce," from Latin proferre "to
bring forth, produce," figuratively "make known, publish, quote,
utter." Sense confused with proffer. Related: Profered; profering.
process-product ambiguity, an ambiguity that occurs
when a noun can refer either to a process or activity or to the product of that
process or activity. E.g., ‘The definition was difficult’ could mean either
that the activity of defining was a difficult one to perform, or that the
definiens the form of words proposed as equivalent to the term being defined
that the definer produced was difficult to understand. Again, ‘The writing
absorbed her attention’ leaves it unclear whether it was the activity of
writing or a product of that activity that she found engrossing.
Philosophically significant terms that might be held to exhibit processproduct
ambiguity include: ‘analysis’, ‘explanation’, ‘inference’, ‘thought’. P.Mac.
process theology, any theology strongly influenced by the theistic metaphysics
of Whitehead or Hartshorne; more generally, any theology that takes process or
change as basic characteristics of all actual beings, including God. Those
versions most influenced by Whitehead and Hartshorne share a core of
convictions that constitute the most distinctive theses of process theology:
God is constantly growing, though certain abstract features of God e.g., being
loving remain constant; God is related to every other actual being and is
affected by what happens to it; every actual being has some self-determination,
and God’s power is reconceived as the power to lure attempt to persuade each
actual being to be what God wishes it to be. These theses represent significant
differences from ideas of God common in the tradition of Western theism,
according to which God is unchanging, is not really related to creatures
because God is not affected by what happens to them, and has the power to do
whatever it is logically possible for God to do omnipotence. Process
theologians also disagree with the idea that God knows the future in all its
details, holding that God knows only those details of the future that are
causally necessitated by past events. They claim these are only certain
abstract features of a small class of events in the near future and of an even
smaller class in the more distant future. Because of their understanding of
divine power and their affirmation of creaturely self-determination, they claim
that they provide a more adequate theodicy. Their critics claim that their idea
of God’s power, if correct, would render God unworthy of worship; some also
make this claim about their idea of God’s knowledge, preferring a more
traditional idea of omniscience. Although Whitehead and Hartshorne were both
philosophers rather than theologians, process theology has been more
influential among theologians. It is a major current in contemporary Protestant theology and has attracted the
attention of some Roman Catholic theologians as well. It also has influenced
some biblical scholars who are attempting to develop a distinctive process
hermeneutics.
production theory, the economic theory dealing with the
conversion of factors of production into consumer goods. In capitalistic
theories that assume ideal markets, firms produce goods from three kinds of
factors: capital, labor, and raw materials. Production is subject to the
constraint that profit the difference between revenues and costs be maximized.
The firm is thereby faced with the following decisions: how much to produce,
what price to charge for the product, what proportions to combine the three
kinds of factors in, and what price to pay for the factors. In markets close to
perfect competition, the firm will have little control over prices so the
decision problem tends to reduce to the amounts of factors to use. The range of
feasible factor combinations depends on the technologies available to firms.
Interesting complications arise if not all firms have access to the same
technologies, or if not all firms make accurate responses concerning
technological changes. Also, if the scale of production affects the feasible
technologies, the firms’ decision process must be subtle. In each of these
cases, imperfect competition will result. Marxian economists think that the
concepts used in this kind of production theory have a normative component. In
reality, a large firm’s capital tends to be owned by a rather small, privileged
class of non-laborers and labor is treated as a commodity like any other
factor. This might lead to the perception that profit results primarily from
capital and, therefore, belongs to its owners. Marxians contend that labor is
primarily responsible for profit and, consequently, that labor is entitled to
more than the market wage.
professional ethics, a term designating one or more of
1 the justified moral values that should govern the work of professionals; 2
the moral values that actually do guide groups of professionals, whether those
values are identified as a principles in codes of ethics promulgated by
professional societies or b actual beliefs and conduct of professionals; and 3
the study of professional ethics in the preceding senses, either i normative
philosophical inquiries into the values desirable for professionals to embrace,
or ii descriptive scientific studies of the actual beliefs and conduct of
groups of professionals. Professional values include principles of obligation
and rights, as well as virtues and personal moral ideals such as those
manifested in the lives of Jane Addams, Albert Schweitzer, and Thurgood
Marshall. Professions are defined by advanced expertise, social organizations,
society-granted monopolies over services, and especially by shared commitments
to promote a distinctive public good such as health medicine, justice law, or
learning education. These shared commitments imply special duties to make
services available, maintain confidentiality, secure informed consent for
services, and be loyal to clients, employers, and others with whom one has
fiduciary relationships. Both theoretical and practical issues surround these
duties. The central theoretical issue is to understand how the justified moral
values governing professionals are linked to wider values, such as human
rights. Most practical dilemmas concern how to balance conflicting duties. For
example, what should attorneys do when confidentiality requires keeping
information secret that might save the life of an innocent third party? Other
practical issues are problems of vagueness and uncertainty surrounding how to
apply duties in particular contexts. For example, does respect for patients’
autonomy forbid, permit, or require a physician to assist a terminally ill
patient desiring suicide? Equally important is how to resolve conflicts of
interest in which self-seeking places moral values at risk.
proof by recursion, also called proof by mathematical
induction, a method for conclusively demonstrating the truth of universal
propositions about the natural numbers. The system of natural numbers is
construed as an infinite sequence of elements beginning with the number 1 and
such that each subsequent element is the immediate successor of the preceding
element. The immediate successor of a number is the sum of that number with 1.
In order to apply this method to show that every number has a certain chosen
property it is necessary to demonstrate two subsidiary propositions often
called respectively the basis step and the inductive step. The basis step is
that the number 1 has the chosen property; the inductive step is that the
successor of any number having the chosen property is also a number having the
chosen property in other words, for every number n, if n has the chosen
property then the successor of n also has the chosen property. The inductive
step is itself a universal proposition that may have been proved by recursion.
The most commonly used example of a theorem proved by recursion is the
remarkable fact, known before the time of Plato, that the sum of the first n
odd numbers is the square of n. This proposition, mentioned prominently by
Leibniz as requiring and having demonstrative proof, is expressed in universal
form as follows: for every number n, the sum of the first n odd numbers is n2.
1 % 12, 1 ! 3 % 22, 1 ! 3 ! 5 % 32, and so on. Rigorous formulation of a proof
by recursion often uses as a premise the proposition called, since the time of
De Morgan, the principle of mathematical induction: every property belonging to
1 and belonging to the successor of every number to which it belongs is a
property that belongs without exception to every number. Peano took the
principle of mathematical induction as an axiom in his 9 axiomatization of
arithmetic or the theory of natural numbers. The first acceptable formulation
of this principle is attributed to Pascal.
proof theory, a branch of mathematical logic founded by David Hilbert in
the 0s to pursue Hilbert’s Program. The foundational problems underlying that
program had been formulated around the turn of the century, e.g., in Hilbert’s
famous address to the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris 0. They
were closely connected with investigations on the foundations of analysis
carried out by Cantor and Dedekind; but they were also related to their
conflict with Kronecker on the nature of mathematics and to the difficulties of
a completely unrestricted notion of set or multiplicity. At that time, the
central issue for Hilbert was the consistency of sets in Cantor’s sense. He
suggested that the existence of consistent sets multiplicities, e.g., that of
real numbers, could be secured by proving the consistency of a suitable,
characterizing axiomatic system; but there were only the vaguest indications on
how to do that. In a radical departure from standard practice and his earlier
hints, Hilbert proposed four years later a novel way of attacking the
consistency problem for theories in Über die Grundlagen der Logik und der
Arithmetik 4. This approach would require, first, a strict formalization of
logic together with mathematics, then consideration of the finite syntactic
configurations constituting the joint formalism as mathematical objects, and
showing by mathematical arguments that contradictory formulas cannot be
derived. Though Hilbert lectured on issues concerning the foundations of
mathematics during the subsequent years, the technical development and
philosophical clarification of proof theory and its aims began only around 0.
That involved, first of all, a detailed description of logical calculi and the
careful development of parts of mathematics in suitable systems. A record of
the former is found in Hilbert and Ackermann, Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik
8; and of the latter in Supplement IV of Hilbert and Bernays, Grundlagen der
Mathematik II 9. This presupposes the clear distinction between metamathematics
and mathematics introduced by Hilbert. For the purposes of the consistency
program metamathematics was now taken to be a very weak part of arithmetic,
so-called finitist mathematics, believed to correspond to the part of
mathematics that was accepted by constructivists like Kronecker and Brouwer.
Additional metamathematical issues concerned the completeness and decidability
of theories. The crucial technical tool for the pursuit of the consistency
problem was Hilbert’s e-calculus. The metamathematical problems attracted the
collaboration of young and quite brilliant mathematicians with philosophical
interests; among them were Paul Bernays, Wilhelm Ackermann, John von Neumann,
Jacques Herbrand, Gerhard Gentzen, and Kurt Schütte. The results obtained in
the 0s were disappointing when measured against the hopes and ambitions:
Ackermann, von Neumann, and Herbrand established essentially the consistency of
arithmetic with a very restricted principle of induction. That limits of
finitist considerations for consistency proofs had been reached became clear in
1 through Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Also, special cases of the decision
problem for predicate logic Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem had been solved; its
general solvability was made rather implausible by some of Gödel’s results in
his 1 paper. The actual proof of unsolvability had to wait until 6 for a
conceptual clarification of ‘mechanical procedure’ or ‘algorithm’; that was
achieved through the work of Church and Turing. The further development of
proof theory is roughly characterized by two complementary tendencies: 1 the
extension of the metamathematical frame relative to which “constructive”
consistency proofs can be obtained, and 2 the refined formalization of parts of
mathematics in theories much weaker than set theory or even full second-order
arithmetic. The former tendency started with the work of Gödel and Gentzen in 3
establishing the consistency of full classical arithmetic relative to
intuitionistic arithmetic; it led in the 0s and 0s to consistency proofs of
strong subsystems of secondorder arithmetic relative to intuitionistic theories
of constructive ordinals. The latter tendency reaches back to Weyl’s book Das
Kontinuum 8 and culminated in the 0s by showing that the classical results of
mathematical analysis can be formally obtained in conservative extensions of
first-order arithmetic. For the metamathematical work Gentzen’s introduction of
sequent calculi and the use of transfinite induction along constructive
ordinals turned out to be very important, as well as Gödel’s primitive
recursive functionals of finite type. The methods and results of proof theory
are playing, not surprisingly, a significant role in computer science. Work in
proof theory has been motivated by issues in the foundations of mathematics,
with the explicit goal of achieving epistemological reductions of strong
theories for mathematical practice like set theory or second-order arithmetic
to weak, philosophically distinguished theories like primitive recursive
arithmetic. As the formalization of mathematics in strong theories is crucial
for the metamathematical approach, and as the programmatic goal can be seen as
a way of circumventing the philosophical issues surrounding strong theories,
e.g., the nature of infinite sets in the case of set theory, Hilbert’s
philosophical position is often equated with formalism in the sense of Frege in his Über die
Grundlagen der Geometrie 306 and also of Brouwer’s inaugural address
Intuitionism and Formalism 2. Though such a view is not completely unsupported
by some of Hilbert’s polemical remarks during the 0s, on balance, his
philosophical views developed into a sophisticated instrumentalism, if that
label is taken in Ernest Nagel’s judicious sense The Structure of Science, 1.
Hilbert’s is an instrumentalism emphasizing the contentual motivation of
mathematical theories; that is clearly expressed in the first chapter of Hilbert
and Bernays’s Grundlagen der Mathematik I 4. A sustained philosophical analysis
of proof-theoretic research in the context of broader issues in the philosophy
of mathematics was provided by Bernays; his penetrating essays stretch over
five decades and have been collected in Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der
Mathematik 6.
Propensum -- propensity, an irregular or
non-necessitating causal disposition of an object or system to produce some
result or effect. Propensities are usually conceived as essentially
probabilistic in nature. A die may be said to have a propensity of “strength”
or magnitude 1 /6 to turn up a 3 if thrown from a dice box, of strength 1 /3 to
turn up, say, a 3 or 4, etc. But propensity talk is arguably appropriate only
when determinism fails. Strength is often taken to vary from 0 to 1. Popper
regarded the propensity notion as a new physical or metaphysical hypothesis,
akin to that of forces. Like Peirce, he deployed it to interpret probability
claims about single cases: e.g., the probability of this radium atom’s decaying
in 1,600 years is 1 /2. On relative frequency interpretations, probability
claims are about properties of large classes such as relative frequencies of
outcomes in them, rather than about single cases. But single-case claims appear
to be common in quantum theory. Popper advocated a propensity interpretation of
quantum theory. Propensities also feature in theories of indeterministic or
probabilistic causation. Competing theories about propensities attribute them
variously to complex systems such as chance or experimental set-ups or
arrangements a coin and tossing device, to entities within such set-ups the
coin itself, and to particular trials of such set-ups. Long-run theories
construe propensities as dispositions to give rise to certain relative
frequencies of, or probability distributions over, outcomes in long runs of
trials, which are sometimes said to “manifest” or “display” the propensities.
Here a propensity’s strength is identical to some such frequency. By contrast,
single-case theories construe propensities as dispositions of singular trials
to bring about particular outcomes. Their existence, not their strength, is
displayed by such an outcome. Here frequencies provide evidence about
propensity strength. But the two can always differ; they converge with a
limiting probability of 1 in an appropriate long run.
propositio
universalis: cf. substitutional
account of universal quantification, referred to by Grice for his treatment of
what he calls a Ryleian agitation caused by his feeling Byzantine. Vide
inverted A. A proposition (protasis), then, is a sentence affirming or denying
something of something; and this is either universal or particular or
indefinite. By universal I mean a statement that something belongs to all or
none of something; by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not
to all; by indefinite that it does or does not belong, without any mark of
being universal or particular, e.g. ‘contraries are subjects of the same
science’, or ‘pleasure is not good’. (Prior Analytics I, 1, 24a16–21.). propositional
complexum: In logic, the first proposition of a syllogism (class.): “propositio
est, per quem locus is breviter exponitur, ex quo vis omnis oportet emanet
ratiocinationis,” Cic. Inv. 1, 37, 67; 1, 34, 35; Auct. Her. 2, 18, 28.— B.
Transf. 1. A principal subject, theme (class.), Cic. de Or. 3, 53; Sen. Ben. 6,
7, 1; Quint. 5, 14, 1.— 2. Still more generally, a proposition of any kind
(post-Aug.), Quint. 7, 1, 47, § 9; Gell. 2, 7, 21.—Do not expect Grice to use
the phrase ‘propositional content,’ as Hare does so freely. Grices proposes a
propositional complexum, rather, which frees him from a commitment to a
higher-order calculus and the abstract entity of a feature or a proposition.
Grice regards a proposition as an extensional family of propositional complexa
(Paul saw Peter; Peter was seen by Paul). The topic of a propositional
complex Grice regards as Oxonian in nature. Peacocke struggles with the same
type of problems, in his essays on content. Only a perception-based
account of content in terms of qualia gets the philosopher out of the vicious
circle of appealing to a linguistic entity to clarify a psychological
entity. One way to discharge the burden of giving an account of a proposition
involves focusing on a range of utterances, the formulation of which features
no connective or quantifier. Each expresses a propositional complexum
which consists of a sequence simplex-1 and simplex-2, whose elements would be a
set and an ordered sequence of this or that individuum which may be a member of
the set. The propositional complexum ‘Fido is shaggy’ consists of a
sequence of the set of shaggy individua and the singleton consisting of the
individuum Fido. ‘Smith loves Fido’ is a propositional complexum, i. e., a
sequence whose first element is the class “love” correlated to a two-place
predicate) and a the ordered pair of the singletons Smith and Fido. We define
alethic satisfactoriness. A propositional complexum is alethically satisfactory
just in case the sequence is a member of the set. A “proposition” (prosthesis)
simpliciter is defined as a family of propositional complexa. Family
unity may vary in accordance with context. proposition, an abstract
object said to be that to which a person is related by a belief, desire, or
other psychological attitude, typically expressed in language containing a
psychological verb ‘think’, ‘deny’, ‘doubt’, etc. followed by a thatclause. The
psychological states in question are called propositional attitudes. When I
believe that snow is white I stand in the relation of believing to the
proposition that snow is white. When I hope that the protons will not decay,
hope relates me to the proposition that the protons will not decay. A
proposition can be a common object for various attitudes of various agents:
that the protons will not decay can be the object of my belief, my hope, and
your fear. A sentence expressing an attitude is also taken to express the
associated proposition. Because ‘The protons will not decay’ identifies my
hope, it identifies the proposition to which my hope relates me. Thus the
proposition can be the shared meaning of this sentence and all its synonyms, in
English or elsewhere e.g., ‘die Protonen werden nicht zerfallen’. This, in sum,
is the traditional doctrine of propositions. Although it seems indispensable in
some form for theorizing about thought
and language, difficulties abound. Some critics regard propositions as excess
baggage in any account of meaning. But unless this is an expression of nominalism,
it is confused. Any systematic theory of meaning, plus an apparatus of sets or
properties will let us construct proposition-like objects. The proposition a
sentence S expresses might, e.g., be identified with a certain set of features
that determines S’s meaning. Other sentences with these same features would
then express the same proposition. A natural way to associate propositions with
sentences is to let the features in question be semantically significant
features of the words from which sentences are built. Propositions then acquire
the logical structures of sentences: they are atomic, conditional, existential,
etc. But combining the view of propositions as meanings with the traditional
idea of propositions as bearers of truthvalues brings trouble. It is assumed
that two sentences that express the same proposition have the same truth-value
indeed, that sentences have their truth-values in virtue of the propositions
they express. Yet if propositions are also meanings, this principle fails for sentences
with indexical elements: although ‘I am pale’ has a single meaning, two
utterances of it can differ in truth-value. In response, one may suggest that
the proposition a sentence S expresses depends both on the linguistic meaning
of S and on the referents of S’s indexical elements. But this reveals that
proposition is a quite technical concept
and one that is not motivated simply by a need to talk about meanings.
Related questions arise for propositions as the objects of propositional
attitudes. My belief that I am pale may be true, yours that you are pale false.
So our beliefs should take distinct propositional objects. Yet we would each
use the same sentence, ‘I am pale’, to express our belief. Intuitively, your
belief and mine also play similar cognitive roles. We may each choose the sun
exposure, clothing, etc., that we take to be appropriate to a fair complexion.
So our attitudes seem in an important sense to be the same an identity that the assignment of distinct
propositional objects hides. Apparently, the characterization of beliefs e.g.
as being propositional attitudes is at best one component of a more refined,
largely unknown account. Quite apart from complications about indexicality,
propositions inherit standard difficulties about meaning. Consider the beliefs
that Hesperus is a planet and that Phosphorus is a planet. It seems that
someone might have one but not the other, thus that they are attitudes toward
distinct propositions. This difference apparently reflects the difference in meaning
between the sentences ‘Hesperus is a planet’ and ‘Phosphorus is a planet’. The
principle would be that non-synonymous sentences express distinct propositions.
But it is unclear what makes for a difference in meaning. Since the sentences
agree in logico-grammatical structure and in the referents of their terms,
their specific meanings must depend on some more subtle feature that has
resisted definition. Hence our concept of proposition is also only partly
defined. Even the idea that the sentences here express the same proposition is
not easily refuted. What such difficulties show is not that the concept of
proposition is invalid but that it belongs to a still rudimentary descriptive
scheme. It is too thoroughly enmeshed with the concepts of meaning and belief
to be of use in solving their attendant problems. This observation is what
tends, through a confusion, to give rise to skepticism about propositions. One
may, e.g., reasonably posit structured abstract entities propositions
that represent the features on which the truth-values of sentences
depend. Then there is a good sense in which a sentence is true in virtue of the
proposition it expresses. But how does the use of words in a certain context
associate them with a particular proposition? Lacking an answer, we still
cannot explain why a given sentence is true. Similarly, one cannot explain
belief as the acceptance of a proposition, since only a substantive theory of
thought would reveal how the mind “accepts” a proposition and what it does to
accept one proposition rather than another. So a satisfactory doctrine of
propositions remains elusive.
propositional function, an operation that, when applied to something as
argument or to more than one thing in a given order as arguments, yields a
truth-value as the value of that function for that argument or those arguments.
This usage presupposes that truth-values are objects. A function may be
singulary, binary, ternary, etc. A singulary propositional function is
applicable to one thing and yields, when so applied, a truth-value. For
example, being a prime number, when applied to the number 2, yields truth;
negation, when applied to truth, yields falsehood. A binary propositional
function is applicable to two things in a certain order and yields, when so applied,
a truth-value. For example, being north of when applied to New York and Boston
in that order yields falsehood. Material implication when applied to falsehood
and truth in that order yields truth. The term ‘propositional function’ has a
second use, to refer to an operation that, when applied to something as
argument or to more than one thing in a given order as arguments, yields a
proposition as the value of the function for that argument or those arguments.
For example, being a prime number when applied to 2 yields the proposition that
2 is a prime number. Being north of, when applied to New York and Boston in
that order, yields the proposition that New York is north of Boston. This usage
presupposes that propositions are objects. In a third use, ‘propositional
function’ designates a sentence with free occurrences of variables. Thus, ‘x is
a prime number’, ‘It is not the case that p’, ‘x is north of y’ and ‘if p then
q’ are propositional functions in this sense. C.S. propositional justification.
propositional opacity, failure of a clause to express any particular
proposition especially due to the occurrence of pronouns or demonstratives. If
having a belief about an individual involves a relation to a proposition, and
if a part of the proposition is a way of representing the individual, then
belief characterizations that do not indicate the believer’s way of
representing the individual could be called propositionally opaque. They do not
show all of the propositional elements. For example, ‘My son’s clarinet teacher
believes that he should try the bass drum’ would be propositionally opaque
because ‘he’ does not indicate how my son John’s teacher represents John, e.g.
as his student, as my son, as the boy now playing, etc. This characterization
of the example is not appropriate if propositions are as Russell conceived
them, sometimes containing the individuals themselves as constituents, because
then the propositional constituent John has been referred to. Generally, a
characterization of a propositional
754 attitude is propositionally opaque if the expressions in the
embedded clause do not refer to the propositional constituents. It is
propositionally transparent if the expressions in the embedded clause do so
refer. As a rule, referentially opaque contexts are used in propositionally
transparent attributions if the referent of a term is distinct from the
corresponding propositional constituent.
Proprium – From ‘proprium’ you get the abstdract noun,
“proprietas” – as in “proprietates terminorum,” each one being a “proprietas”--
Latin, ‘properties of terms’, in medieval logic from the twelfth century on, a
cluster of semantic properties possessed by categorematic terms. For most
authors, these properties apply only when the terms occur in the context of a
proposition. The list of such properties and the theory governing them vary
from author to author, but always include 1 suppositio. Some authors add 2
appellatio ‘appellating’, ‘naming’, ‘calling’, often not sharply distinguishing
from suppositio, the property whereby a term in a certain proposition names or
is truly predicable of things, or in some authors of presently existing things.
Thus ‘philosophers’ in ‘Some philosophers are wise’ appellates philosophers
alive today. 3 Ampliatio ‘ampliation’, ‘broadening’, whereby a term refers to
past or future or merely possible things. The reference of ‘philosophers’ is
ampliated in ‘Some philosophers were wise’. 4 Restrictio ‘restriction’,
‘narrowing’, whereby the reference of a term is restricted to presently existing
things ‘philosophers’ is so restricted in ‘Some philosophers are wise’, or
otherwise narrowed from its normal range ‘philosophers’ in ‘Some Grecian
philosophers were wise’. 5 Copulatio ‘copulation’, ‘coupling’, which is the
type of reference adjectives have ‘wise’ in ‘Some philosophers are wise’, or
alternatively the semantic function of the copula. Other meanings too are
sometimes given to these terms, depending on the author. Appellatio especially
was given a wide variety of interpretations. In particular, for Buridan and
other fourteenth-century Continental authors, appellatio means ‘connotation’.
Restrictio and copulatio tended to drop out of the literature, or be treated
only perfunctorily, after the thirteenth century. proprium:
idion. See Nicholas White's "The Origin of Aristotle's
Essentialism," Review of Metaphysics ~6. (September 1972): ... vice
versa. The proprium is
a necessary, but non-essential, property. ... Alan Code pointed this out to me. ' Does
Aristotle ... The proprium is defined by the fact that it only
holds of a particular subject or ... Of the appropriate answers some are more
specific or distinctive (idion)
and are in ... and property possession comes close to what Alan Code in a seminal
paper ... but "substance of" is what is "co-extensive
(idion) with each
thing" (1038b9); so ... by an alternative name or definition, and by
a proprium) and
the third which is ... Woods's idea (recently nicknamed "Izzing before
Having" by Code and Grice) . As my chairmanship
was winding down, I suggested to Paul Grice on one of his ... in Aristotle's technical sense
of an idion (Latin proprium), i.e., a characteristic
or feature ... Code,
which, arguably, is part of the theory of Izzing and Having: D. Keyt. a proprium, since proprium belongs to the
genus of accident. ... Similarly, Code claims (10): 'In its other uses the predicate
“being'' signifies either “what ... Grice adds a few steps to show that the plurality of
universals signified correspond ... Aristotle elsewhere calls an idion.353 If one predicates the
genus in the absence of. has described it by a paronymous form, nor as a
property (idion), nor
... terminology of Code and Grice.152 Thus there is no
indication that they are ... (14,20-31) 'Genus' and 'proprium' (ἰδίου) are said
homonymously in ten ways, as are. Ackrill replies to this line of
argument (75) as follows: [I]t is perfectly clear that Aristotle’s fourfold
classification is a classification of things and not names, and that what is
‘said of’ something as subject is itself a thing (a species or genus) and not a
name. Sometimes, indeed, Aristotle will speak of ‘saying’ or ‘predicating’ a
name of a subject; but it is not linguistic items but the things they signify
which are ‘said of a subject’… Thus at 2a19 ff. Aristotle sharply distinguishes
things said of subjects from the names of those things. This last argument
seems persuasive on textual grounds. After all, τὰ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λεγόμενα
‘have’ definitions and names (τῶν καθ᾽ υποκειμένου λεγομένων… τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν
λὸγον, 2a19-21): it is not the case that they ‘are’ definitions and names, to
adapt the terminology of Code and Grice.152 See A. Code, ‘Aristotle: Essence
and Accident’, in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of
Rationality (Oxford, 1986), 411-39: particulars have their predicables, but
Forms are their predicables. Thus there is no indication that they are
linguistic terms in their own right.proprium, one of Porphyry’s five
predicables, often tr. as ‘property’ or ‘attribute’; but this should not be
confused with the broad modern sense in which any feature of a thing may be
said to be a property of it. A proprium is a nonessential peculiarity of a
species. There are no propria of individuals or genera generalissima, although
they may have other uniquely identifying features. A proprium necessarily holds
of all members of its species and of nothing else. It is not mentioned in a
real definition of the species, and so is not essential to it. Yet it somehow
follows from the essence or nature expressed in the real definition. The
standard example is risibility the ability to laugh as a proprium of the
species man. The real definition of ‘man’ is ‘rational animal’. There is no
mention of any ability to laugh. Nevertheless anything that can laugh has both
the biological apparatus to produce the sounds and so is an animal and also a
certain wit and insight into humor and so is rational. Conversely, any rational
animal will have both the vocal chords and diaphragm required for laughing
since it is an animal, although the inference may seem too quick and also the
mental wherewithal to see the point of a joke since it is rational. Thus any
rational animal has what it takes to laugh. In short, every man is risible, and
conversely, but risibility is not an essential feature of man. property, roughly, an attribute,
characteristic, feature, trait, or aspect. propensity property 751 751 Intensionality. There are two salient
ways of talking about properties. First, as predicables or instantiables. For
example, the property red is predicable of red objects; they are instances of
it. Properties are said to be intensional entities in the sense that distinct
properties can be truly predicated of i.e., have as instances exactly the same
things: the property of being a creature with a kidney & the property of
being a creature with a heart, though these two sets have the same members.
Properties thus differ from sets collections, classes; for the latter satisfy a
principle of extensionality: they are identical if they have the same elements.
The second salient way of talking about properties is by means of property
abstracts such as ‘the property of being F’. Such linguistic expressions are
said to be intensional in the following semantical vs. ontological sense: ‘the
property of being F’ and ‘the property of being G’ can denote different
properties even though the predicates ‘F’ and ‘G’ are true of exactly the same
things. The standard explanation Frege, Russell, Carnap, et al. is that ‘the
property of being F’ denotes the property that the predicate ‘F’ expresses.
Since predicates ‘F’ and ‘G’ can be true of the same things without being
synonyms, the property abstracts ‘being F’ and ‘being G’ can denote different
properties. Identity criteria. Some philosophers believe that properties are
identical if they necessarily have the same instances. Other philosophers hold
that this criterion of identity holds only for a special subclass of
properties those that are purely
qualitative and that the properties for
which this criterion does not hold are all “complex” e.g., relational,
disjunctive, conditional, or negative properties. On this theory, complex
properties are identical if they have the same form and their purely
qualitative constituents are identical. Ontological status. Because properties
are a kind of universal, each of the standard views on the ontological status
of universals has been applied to properties as a special case. Nominalism:
only particulars and perhaps collections of particulars exist; therefore,
either properties do not exist or they are reducible following Carnap et al. to
collections of particulars including perhaps particulars that are not actual
but only possible. Conceptualism: properties exist but are dependent on the
mind. Realism: properties exist independently of the mind. Realism has two main
versions. In rebus realism: a property exists only if it has instances. Ante
rem realism: a property can exist even if it has no instances. For example, the
property of being a man weighing over ton has no instances; however, it is
plausible to hold that this property does exist. After all, this property seems
to be what is expressed by the predicate ‘is a man weighing over a ton’.
Essence and accident. The properties that a given entity has divide into two
disjoint classes: those that are essential to the entity and those that are
accidental to it. A property is essential to an entity if, necessarily, the
entity cannot exist without being an instance of the property. A property is
accidental to an individual if it is possible for the individual to exist
without being an instance of the property. Being a number is an essential
property of nine; being the number of the planets is an accidental property of
nine. Some philosophers believe that all properties are either essential by
nature or accidental by nature. A property is essential by nature if it can be
an essential property of some entity and, necessarily, it is an essential
property of each entity that is an instance of it. The property of being
self-identical is thus essential by nature. However, it is controversial
whether every property that is essential to something must be essential by
nature. The following is a candidate counterexample. If this automobile
backfires loudly on a given occasion, loudness would seem to be an essential
property of the associated bang. That particular bang could not exist without
being loud. If the automobile had backfired softly, that particular bang would
not have existed; an altogether distinct bang
a soft bang would have existed. By
contrast, if a man is loud, loudness is only an accidental property of him; he
could exist without being loud. Loudness thus appears to be a counterexample:
although it is an essential property of certain particulars, it is not
essential by nature. It might be replied echoing Aristotle that a loud bang and
a loud man instantiate loudness in different ways and, more generally, that
properties can be predicated instantiated in different ways. If so, then one
should be specific about which kind of predication instantiation is intended in
the definition of ‘essential by nature’ and ‘accidental by nature’. When this
is done, the counterexamples might well disappear. If there are indeed
different ways of being predicated instantiated, most of the foregoing remarks
about intensionality, identity criteria, and the ontological status of
properties should be refined accordingly.
prosona – Grice’s favoured spelling for ‘person’ –
“seeing that it means a mask to improve sonorisation’ personalism, a Christian
socialism stressing social activism and personal responsibility, the
theoretical basis for the Christian workers’ Esprit movement begun in the 0s by
Emmanuel Mounier 550, a Christian philosopher and activist. Influenced by both
the religious existentialism of Kierkegaard and the radical social action
called for by Marx and in part taking direction from the earlier work of
Charles Péguy, the movement strongly opposed fascism and called for worker
solidarity during the 0s and 0s. It also urged a more humane treatment of
France’s colonies. Personalism allowed for a Christian socialism independent of
both more conservative Christian groups and the Communist labor unions and
party. Its most important single book is Mounier’s Personalism. The quarterly
journal Esprit has regularly published contributions of leading and international thinkers. Such well-known
Christian philosophers as Henry Duméry, Marcel, Maritain, and Ricoeur were
attracted to the movement.
Protocol: “The etymology is fascinating – if I knew
it.” – Grice – Grice’s protocol. from Medieval Latin
protocollum "draft," literally "the first sheet of a
volume" (on which contents and errata were written), from Greek
prōtokollon "first sheet glued onto a manuscript," from prōtos
"first" (see proto-) + kolla "glue. -- one of the
statements that constitute the foundations of empirical knowledge. The term was
introduced by proponents of foundationalism, who were convinced that in order
to avoid the most radical skepticism, one must countenance beliefs that are
justified but not as a result of an inference. If all justified beliefs are
inferentially justified, then to be justified in believing one proposition P on
the basis of another, E, one would have to be justified in believing both E and
that E confirms P. But if all justification were inferential, then to be
justified in believing E one would need to infer it from some other proposition
one justifiably believes, and so on ad infinitum. The only way to avoid this
regress is to find some statement knowable without inferring it from some other
truth. Philosophers who agree that empirical knowledge has foundations do not
necessarily agree on what those foundations are. The British empiricists
restrict the class of contingent protocol statements to propositions describing
the contents of mind sensations, beliefs, fears, desires, and the like. And
even here a statement describing a mental state would be a protocol statement
only for the person in that state. Other philosophers, however, would take
protocol statements to include at least some assertions about the immediate
physical environment. The plausibility of a given candidate for a protocol
statement depends on how one analyzes non-inferential justification. Some
philosophers rely on the idea of acquaintance. One is non-inferentially
justified in believing something when one is directly acquainted with what
makes it true. Other philosophers rely on the idea of a state that is in some
sense self-presenting. Still others want to understand the notion in terms of
the inconceivability of error. The main difficulty in trying to defend a
coherent conception of non-inferential justification is to find an account of
protocol statements that gives them enough conceptual content to serve as the
premises of arguments, while avoiding the charge that the application of
concepts always brings with it the possibility of error and the necessity of inference.
prototype: a theory according to which human cognition
involves the deployment of “categories” organized around stereotypical
exemplars. Prototype theory differs from traditional theories that take the
concepts with which we think to be individuated by means of boundary-specifying
necessary and sufficient conditions. Advocates of prototypes hold that our
concept of bird, for instance, consists in an indefinitely bounded conceptual
“space” in which robins and sparrows are central, and chickens and penguins are
peripheral though the category may be
differently organized in different cultures or groups. Rather than being
all-ornothing, category membership is a matter of degree. This conception of
categories was originally inspired by the notion, developed in a different
context by Vitters, of family resemblance. Prototypes were first discussed in
detail and given empirical credibility in the work of Eleanor Rosch see, e.g.,
“On the Internal Structure of Perceptual and Semantic Categories,” 3.
prudens:
practical reason: In “Epilogue” Grice
states that the principle of conversational rationality is a sub-principle of
the principle of rationality, simpliciter, which is not involved with
‘communication’ per se. This is an application of Occam’s razor: Rationalities
are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.” This motto underlies his
aequi-vocality thesis: one reason: desiderative side, judicative side.
Literally, ‘practical reason’ is the buletic part of the soul (psyche) that
deals with praxis, where the weighing is central. We dont need means-end
rationality, we need value-oriented rationality. We dont need the rationality
of the means – this is obvious --. We want the rationality of the ends. The end
may justify the means. But Grice is looking for what justifies the end. The
topic of freedom fascinated Grice, because it merged the practical with the
theoretical. Grice sees the conception of freedom as crucial in his
elucidation of a rational being. Conditions of freedom are necessary for the
very idea, as Kant was well aware. A thief who is forced to steal is just a
thief. Grice would engage in a bit of language botany, when exploring the ways
the adjective free is used, freely, in ordinary language: free fall,
alcohol-free, sugar-free, and his favourite: implicaturum-free. Grices more
systematic reflections deal with Pology, or creature construction. A vegetals,
for example is less free than an animal, but more free than a stone! And Humans
are more free than non-human. Grice wants to deal with some of the paradoxes
identified by Kant about freedom, and he succeeds in solving some of them.
There is a section on freedom in Action and events for PPQ where he expands on eleutheria and notes the
idiocy of a phrase like free fall. Grice was irritated by the fact that his
friend Hart wrote an essay on liberty and not on freedom, cf. praxis. Refs.:
essays on ‘practical reason,’ and “Aspects,” in BANC.
ψ-transmissum. Or ‘soul-to-soul transfer’ “Before we study
‘psi’-transmission we should study ‘transmission’ simpliciter. It is cognate
with ‘emission.’ So the emissor is a transmissor. And the emissee is a
transemissee. Grice would never have
thougth that he had to lecture on what conversation is all about! He would
never have lectured on this to his tutees at St. John’s – but at Brighton is
all different. So, to communicate, for an emissor is to intend his recipient to
be in a state with content “p.” The modality of the ‘state’ – desiderative or
creditative – is not important. In a one-off predicament, the emissor draws a
skull to indicate that there is danger. So his belief and desire were
successfully transmitted. A good way to formulate the point of communication.
Note that Grice is never sure about analsans and analysandum: Emissor
communicates THAT P iff Emissor M-INTENDS THAT addressee is to psi- that P.
Which seems otiose. “It is raining” can be INFORMATIVE, but it is surely
INDICATIVE first. So it’s moke like the emissor intends his addressee to
believe that he, the utterer believes that p (the belief itself NOT being part
of what is meant, of course). So, there is psi-transmission not necessarily
when the utterer convinces his addressee, but just when he gets his addressee
to BELIEF that he, the utterer, psi-s that p. So the psi HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED.
Surely when the Beatles say “HELP” they don’t expect that their addressee will
need help. They intend their addressee to HELP them! Used by Grice in WoW: 287,
and emphasised by J. Baker. The gist of communication. trans-mitto or trāmitto
, mīsi, missum, 3, v. a. I. To send, carry, or convey across, over, or through;
to send off, despatch, transmit from one place or person to another (syn.:
transfero, traicio, traduco). A. Lit.: “mihi illam ut tramittas: argentum
accipias,” Plaut. Ep. 3, 4, 27: “illam sibi,” id. ib. 1, 2, 52: “exercitus
equitatusque celeriter transmittitur (i. e. trans flumen),” are conveyed
across, Caes. B. G. 7, 61: “legiones,” Vell. 2, 51, 1: “cohortem Usipiorum in
Britanniam,” Tac. Agr. 28: “classem in Euboeam ad urbem Oreum,” Liv. 28, 5, 18:
“magnam classem in Siciliam,” id. 28, 41, 17: “unde auxilia in Italiam
transmissurus erat,” id. 23, 32, 5; 27, 15, 7: transmissum per viam tigillum,
thrown over or across, id. 1, 26, 10: “ponte transmisso,” Suet. Calig. 22 fin.:
in partem campi pecora et armenta, Tac. A. 13, 55: “materiam in formas,” Col.
7, 8, 6.— 2. To cause to pass through: “per corium, per viscera Perque os
elephanto bracchium transmitteres,” you would have thrust through, penetrated,
Plaut. Mil. 1, 30; so, “ensem per latus,” Sen. Herc. Oet. 1165: “facem telo per
pectus,” id. Thyest. 1089: “per medium amnem transmittit equum,” rides, Liv. 8,
24, 13: “(Gallorum reguli) exercitum per fines suos transmiserunt,” suffered to
pass through, id. 21, 24, 5: “abies folio pinnato densa, ut imbres non
transmittat,” Plin. 16, 10, 19, § 48: “Favonios,” Plin. Ep. 2, 17, 19; Tac. A.
13, 15: “ut vehem faeni large onustam transmitteret,” Plin. 36, 15, 24, § 108.—
B. Trop. 1. To carry over, transfer, etc.: “bellum in Italiam,” Liv. 21, 20, 4;
so, “bellum,” Tac. A. 2, 6: “vitia cum opibus suis Romam (Asia),” Just. 36, 4,
12: vim in aliquem, to send against, i. e. employ against, Tac. A. 2, 38.— 2.
To hand over, transmit, commit: “et quisquam dubitabit, quin huic hoc tantum
bellum transmittendum sit, qui, etc.,” should be intrusted, Cic. Imp. Pomp. 14,
42: “alicui signa et summam belli,” Sil. 7, 383: “hereditas transmittenda
alicui,” to be made over, Plin. Ep. 8, 18, 7; and with inf.: “et longo
transmisit habere nepoti,” Stat. S. 3, 3, 78 (analog. to dat habere, Verg. A.
9, 362; “and, donat habere,” id. ib. 5, 262); “for which: me famulo famulamque
Heleno transmisit habendam,” id. ib. 3, 329: “omne meum tempus amicorum
temporibus transmittendum putavi,” should be devoted, Cic. Imp. Pomp. 1, 1:
“poma intacta ore servis,” Tac. A. 4, 54.— 3. To let go: animo transmittente
quicquid acceperat, letting pass through, i. e. forgetting, Sen. Ep. 99, 6:
“mox Caesarem vergente jam senectā munia imperii facilius tramissurum,” would
let go, resign, Tac. A. 4, 41: “Junium mensem transmissum,” passed over,
omitted, id. ib. 16, 12 fin.: “Gangen amnem et quae ultra essent,” to leave unconquered,
Curt. 9, 4, 17: “leo imbelles vitulos Transmittit,” Stat. Th. 8, 596.— II. To
go or pass over or across, to cross over; to cross, pass, go through, traverse,
etc. A. Lit. 1. In gen. (α). Act.: “grues cum maria transmittant,” Cic. N. D.
2, 49, 125: “cur ipse tot maria transmisit,” id. Fin. 5, 29, 87; so, “maria,”
id. Rep. 1, 3, 6: “satis constante famā jam Iberum Poenos transmisisse,” Liv.
21, 20, 9 (al. transisse): “quem (Euphratem) ponte,” Tac. A. 15, 7: “fluvium
nando,” Stat. Th. 9, 239: “lacum nando,” Sil. 4, 347: “murales fossas saltu,”
id. 8, 554: “equites medios tramittunt campos,” ride through, Lucr. 2, 330;
cf.: “cursu campos (cervi),” run through, Verg. A. 4, 154: quantum Balearica
torto Funda potest plumbo medii transmittere caeli, can send with its hurled
bullet, i. e. can send its bullet, Ov. M. 4, 710: “tectum lapide vel missile,”
to fling over, Plin. 28, 4, 6, § 33; cf.: “flumina disco,” Stat. Th. 6, 677.—In
pass.: “duo sinus fuerunt, quos tramitti oporteret: utrumque pedibus aequis tramisimus,”
Cic. Att. 16, 6, 1: “transmissus amnis,” Tac. A. 12, 13: “flumen ponte
transmittitur,” Plin. Ep. 8, 8, 5.— (β). Neutr.: “ab eo loco conscendi ut
transmitterem,” Cic. Phil. 1, 3, 7: “cum exercitus vestri numquam a Brundisio
nisi summā hieme transmiserint,” id. Imp. Pomp. 12, 32: “cum a Leucopetrā
profectus (inde enim tramittebam) stadia circiter CCC. processissem, etc.,” id.
Att. 16, 7, 1; 8, 13, 1; 8, 11, 5: “ex Corsicā subactā Cicereius in Sardiniam
transmisit,” Liv. 42, 7, 2; 32, 9, 6: “ab Lilybaeo Uticam,” id. 25, 31, 12: “ad
vastandam Italiae oram,” id. 21, 51, 4; 23, 38, 11; 24, 36, 7: “centum
onerariae naves in Africam transmiserunt,” id. 30, 24, 5; Suet. Caes. 58:
“Cyprum transmisit,” Curt. 4, 1, 27. — Pass. impers.: “in Ebusum insulam transmissum
est,” Liv. 22, 20, 7.—* 2. In partic., to go over, desert to a party: “Domitius
transmisit ad Caesa rem,” Vell. 2, 84 fin. (syn. transfugio).— B. Trop.
(post-Aug.). 1. In gen., to pass over, leave untouched or disregarded (syn
praetermitto): “haud fas, Bacche, tuos taci tum tramittere honores,” Sil. 7,
162; cf.: “sententiam silentio, deinde oblivio,” Tac. H. 4, 9 fin.: “nihil
silentio,” id. ib. 1, 13; “4, 31: aliquid dissimulatione,” id. A. 13, 39: “quae
ipse pateretur,” Suet. Calig. 10; id. Vesp. 15. — 2. In partic., of time, to
pass, spend (syn. ago): “tempus quiete,” Plin. Ep. 9, 6, 1: so, “vitam per
obscurum,” Sen. Ep. 19, 2: steriles annos, Stat. S. 4, 2, 12: “aevum,” id. ib.
1, 4, 124: “quattuor menses hiemis inedia,” Plin. 8, 25, 38, § 94: “vigiles
noctes,” Stat. Th. 3, 278 et saep. — Transf.: “febrium ardorem,” i. e. to
undergo, endure, Plin. Ep. 1, 22, 7; cf. “discrimen,” id. ib. 8, 11, 2:
“secessus, voluptates, etc.,” id. ib. 6, 4, 2
pseudo-hallucination, a non-deceptive hallucination. An
ordinary hallucination might be thought to comprise two components: i a sensory
component, whereby one experiences an image or sensory episode similar in many
respects to a veridical perceiving except in being non-veridical; and ii a
cognitive component, whereby one takes or is disposed to take the image or
sensory episode to be veridical. A pseudohallucination resembles a
hallucination, but lacks this second component. In experiencing a
pseudohallucination, one appreciates that one is not perceiving veridically.
The source of the term seems to be the painter Wassily Kandinsky, who employed
it in 5 to characterize a series of apparently drug-induced images experienced
and pondered by a friend who recognized them, at the very time they were
occurring, not to be veridical. Kandinsky’s account is discussed by Jaspers in
his General Psychopathology, 6, and thereby entered the clinical lore.
Pseudohallucinations may be brought on by the sorts of pathological condition
that give rise to hallucinations, or by simple fatigue, emotional adversity, or
loneliness. Thus, a driver, late at night, may react to non-existent objects or
figures on the road, and immediately recognize his error.
psycholinguistics, an interdisciplinary research area
that uses theoretical descriptions of language taken from linguistics to
investigate psychological processes underlying language production, perception,
and learning. There is considerable disagreement as to the appropriate
characterization of the field and the major problems. Philosophers discussed
many of the problems now studied in psycholinguistics before either psychology
or linguistics were spawned, but the self-consciously interdisciplinary field
combining psychology and linguistics emerged not long after the birth of the two
disciplines. Meringer used the adjective ‘psycholingisch-linguistische’ in an 5
book. Various national traditions of psycholinguistics continued at a steady
but fairly low level of activity through the 0s and declined somewhat during
the 0s and 0s because of the antimentalist attitudes in both linguistics and
psychology. Psycholinguistic researchers in the USSR, mostly inspired by L. S.
Vygotsky Thought and Language, 4, were more active during this period in spite
of official suppression. Numerous quasi-independent sources contributed to the
rebirth of psycholinguistics in the 0s; the most significant was a seminar held
at a during the summer of 3 that led to
the publication of Psycholinguistics: A Survey of Theory and Research Problems
4, edited by C. E. Osgood and T. A. Sebeok
a truly interdisciplinary book jointly written by more than a dozen
authors. The contributors attempted to analyze and reconcile three disparate
approaches: learning theory from psychology, descriptive linguistics, and
information theory which came mainly from engineering. The book had a wide
impact and led to many further investigations, but the nature of the field
changed rapidly soon after its publication with the Chomskyan revolution in
linguistics and the cognitive turn in psychology. The two were not unrelated:
Chomsky’s positive contribution, Syntactic Structures, was less broadly
influential than his negative review Language, 9 of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal
Behavior. Against the empiricist-behaviorist view of language understanding and
production, in which language is merely the exhibition of a more complex form
of behavior, Chomsky argued the avowedly rationalist position that the ability
to learn and use language is innate and unique to humans. He emphasized the
creative aspect of language, that almost all sentences one hears or produces
are novel. One of his premises was the alleged infinity of sentences in natural
languages, but a less controversial argument can be given: there are tens of
millions of five-word sentences in English, all of which are readily understood
by speakers who have never heard them. Chomsky’s work promised the possibility
of uncovering a very special characteristic of the human mind. But the promise
was qualified by the disclaimer that linguistic theory describes only the
competence of the ideal speaker. Many psycholinguists spent countless hours
during the 0s and 0s seeking the traces of underlying competence beneath the
untidy performances of actual speakers. During the 0s, as Chomsky frequently
revised his theories of syntax and semantics in significant ways, and numerous
alternative linguistic models were under consideration, psychologists generated
a range of productive research problems that are increasingly remote from the
Chomskyan beginnings. Contemporary psycholinguistics addresses phonetic,
phonological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic influences on language
processing. Few clear conclusions of philosophical import have been
established. For example, several decades of animal research have shown that
other species can use significant portions of human language, but controversy
abounds over how central those portions are to language. Studies now clearly
indicate the importance of word frequency and coarticulation, the dependency of
a hearer’s identification of a sound as a particular phoneme, or of a visual
pattern as a particular letter, not only on the physical features of the
pattern but on the properties of other patterns not necessarily adjacent.
Physically identical patterns may be heard as a d in one context and a t in
another. It is also accepted that at least some of the human lignuistic
abilities, particularly those involved in reading and speech perception, are
relatively isolated from other cognitive processes. Infant studies show that children
as young as eight months learn statistically important patterns characteristic
of their natural language suggesting a
complex set of mechanisms that are automatic and invisible to us.
pulchrum -- beauty, an aesthetic property commonly
thought of as a species of aesthetic value. As such, it has been variously
thought to be 1 a simple, indefinable property that cannot be defined in terms
of any other properties; 2 a property or set of properties of an object that
makes the object capable of producing a certain sort of pleasurable experience
in any suitable perceiver; or 3 whatever produces a particular sort of
pleasurable experience, even though what produces the experience may vary from
individual to individual. It is in this last sense that beauty is thought to be
“in the eye of the beholder.” If beauty is a simple, indefinable property, as
in 1, then it cannot be defined conceptually and has to be apprehended by
intuition or taste. Beauty, on this account, would be a particular sort of
aesthetic property. If beauty is an object’s Bayle, Pierre beauty 75 75 capacity to produce a special sort of
pleasurable experience, as in 2, then it is necessary to say what properties
provide it with this capacity. The most favored candidates for these have been
formal or structural properties, such as order, symmetry, and proportion. In
the Philebus Plato argues that the form or essence of beauty is knowable,
exact, rational, and measurable. He also holds that simple geometrical shapes,
simple colors, and musical notes all have “intrinsic beauty,” which arouses a
pure, “unmixed” pleasure in the perceiver and is unaffected by context. In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many treatises were written on individual
art forms, each allegedly governed by its own rules. In the eighteenth century,
Hutcheson held that ‘beauty’ refers to an “idea raised in us,” and that any
object that excites this idea is beautiful. He thought that the property of the
object that excites this idea is “uniformity in variety.” Kant explained the
nature of beauty by analyzing judgments that something is beautiful. Such
judgments refer to an experience of the perceiver. But they are not merely
expressions of personal experience; we claim that others should also have the
same experience, and that they should make the same judgment i.e., judgments
that something is beautiful have “universal validity”. Such judgments are
disinterested determined not by any
needs or wants on the part of the perceiver, but just by contemplating the mere
appearance of the object. These are judgments about an object’s free beauty,
and making them requires using only those mental capacities that all humans
have by virtue of their ability to communicate with one another. Hence the
pleasures experienced in response to such beauty can in principle be shared by
anyone. Some have held, as in 3, that we apply the term ‘beautiful’ to things
because of the pleasure they give us, and not on the basis of any specific
qualities an object has. Archibald Alison held that it is impossible to find
any properties common to all those things we call beautiful. Santayana believed
beauty is “pleasure regarded as a quality of a thing,” and made no pretense
that certain qualities ought to produce that pleasure. The Grecian term to kalon,
which is often tr. as ‘beauty’, did not refer to a thing’s autonomous aesthetic
value, but rather to its “excellence,” which is connected with its moral worth
and/or usefulness. This concept is closer to Kant’s notion of dependent beauty,
possessed by an object judged as a particular kind of thing such as a beautiful
cat or a beautiful horse, than it is to free beauty, possessed by an object
judged simply on the basis of its appearance and not in terms of any concept of
use
punishment, a distinctive form of legal sanction,
distinguished first by its painful or unpleasant nature to the offender, and
second by the ground on which the sanction is imposed, which must be because
the offender offended against the norms of a society. None of these three
attributes is a strictly necessary condition for proper use of the word
‘punishment’. There may be unpleasant consequences visited by nature upon an
offender such that he might be said to have been “punished enough”; the
consequences in a given case may not be unpleasant to a particular offender, as
in the punishment of a masochist with his favorite form of self-abuse; and
punishment may be imposed for reasons other than offense against society’s
norms, as is the case with punishment inflicted in order to deter others from
like acts. The “definitional stop” argument in discussions of punishment seeks
to tie punishment analytically to retributivism. Retributivism is the theory
that punishment is justified by the moral desert of the offender; on this view,
a person who culpably does a wrongful action deserves punishment, and this
desert is a sufficient as well as a necessary condition of just punishment.
Punishment of the deserving, on this view, is an intrinsic good that does not
need to be justified by any other good consequences such punishment may
achieve, such as the prevention of crime. Retributivism is not to be confused
with the view that punishment satisfies the feelings of vengeful citizens nor
with the view that punishment preempts such citizens from taking the law into
their own hands by vigilante action
these latter views being utilitarian. Retributivism is also not the view
sometimes called “weak” or “negative” retributivism that only the deserving are
to be punished, for desert on such a view typically operates only as a limiting
and not as a justifying condition of punishment. The thesis known as the
“definitional stop” says that punishment must be retributive in its
justification if it is to be punishment at all. Bad treatment inflicted in
order to prevent future crime is not punishment but deserves another name,
usually ‘telishment’. The dominant justification of non-retributive punishment
or telishment is deterrence. The good in whose name the bad of punishing is
justified, on this view, is prevention of future criminal acts. If punishment
is inflicted to prevent the offender from committing future criminal acts, it
is styled “specific” or “special” deterrence; if punishment is inflicted to
prevent others from committing future criminal acts, it is styled “general”
deterrence. In either case, punishment of an action is justified by the future
effect of that punishment in deterring future actors from committing crimes.
There is some vagueness in the notion of deterrence because of the different
mechanisms by which potential criminals are influenced not to be criminals by
the example of punishment: such punishment may achieve its effects through fear
or by more benignly educating those would-be criminals out of their criminal
desires.
Pyrrho of Elis, Grecian philosopher, regarded as the
founder of Skepticism. Like Socrates, he wrote nothing, but impressed many with
provocative ideas and calm demeanor. His equanimity was admired by Epicurus;
his attitude of indifference influenced early Stoicism; his attack on knowledge
was taken over by the skeptical Academy; and two centuries later, a revival of
Skepticism adopted his name. Many of his ideas were anticipated by earlier
thinkers, notably Democritus. But in denying the veracity of all sensations and
beliefs, Pyrrho carried doubt to new and radical extremes. According to ancient
anecdote, which presents him as highly eccentric, he paid so little heed to
normal sensibilities that friends often had to rescue him from grave danger;
some nonetheless insisted he lived into his nineties. He is also said to have
emulated the “naked teachers” as the Hindu Brahmans were called by Grecians
whom he met while traveling in the entourage of Alexander the Great. Pyrrho’s
chief exponent and publicist was Timon of Phlius c.325c.235 B.C.. His
bestpreserved work, the Silloi “Lampoons”, is a parody in Homeric epic verse
that mocks the pretensions of numerous philosophers on an imaginary visit to
the underworld. According to Timon, Pyrrho was a “negative dogmatist” who
affirmed that knowledge is impossible, not because our cognitive apparatus is
flawed, but because the world is fundamentally indeterminate: things themselves
are “no more” cold than hot, or good than bad. But Timon makes clear that the
key to Pyrrho’s Skepticism, and a major source of his impact, was the ethical
goal he sought to achieve: by training himself to disregard all perception and
values, he hoped to attain mental tranquility.
Pitagora – or as Strawson would prefer, “Pythagoras.”La
scuola pitagorica a Crotone -- Pythagoras, the most famous of the pre-Socratic
Grecian philosophers. He emigrated from the island of Samos off Asia Minor to
Crotone, in southern Italy in 530. There he founded societies based on a strict
way of life. They had great political impact in southern Italy and aroused
opposition that resulted in the burning of their meeting houses and,
ultimately, in the societies’ disappearance in the fourth century B.C.
Pythagoras’s fame grew exponentially with the pasage of time. Plato’s immediate
successors in the Academy saw true philosophy as an unfolding of the original
insight of Pythagoras. By the time of Iamblichus late third century A.D.,
Pythagoreanism and Platonism had become virtually identified. Spurious writings
ascribed both to Pythagoras and to other Pythagoreans arose beginning in the
third century B.C. Eventually any thinker who saw the natural world as ordered
according to pleasing mathematical relations e.g., Kepler came to be called a
Pythagorean. Modern scholarship has shown that Pythagoras was not a scientist,
mathematician, or systematic philosopher. He apparently wrote nothing. The
early evidence shows that he was famous for introducing the doctrine of
metempsychosis, according to which the soul is immortal and is reborn in both
human and animal incarnations. Rules were established to purify the soul
including the prohibition against eating beans and the emphasis on training of
the memory. General reflections on the natural world such as “number is the
wisest thing” and “the most beautiful, harmony” were preserved orally. A belief
in the mystical power of number is also visible in the veneration for the
tetractys tetrad: the numbers 14, which add up to the sacred number 10. The
doctrine of the harmony of the spheres
that the heavens move in accord with number and produce music may go back to Pythagoras. It is often
assumed that there must be more to Pythagoras’s thought than this, given his
fame in the later tradition. However, Plato refers to him only as the founder
of a way of life Republic 600a9. In his account of pre-Socratic philosophy,
Aristotle refers not to Pythagoras himself, but to the “so-called Pythagoreans”
whom he dates in the fifth century.
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