IMPLICATVRA, in 18 volumes -- vol. 6

E 

E: SUBJECT INDEX: EXPLICATVM

E: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN:

ECO

ENESIDEMO

EMPEDOCLE

EPITTETO

EVOLA

E: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH.

e: the ‘universalis abdicative.’ Cf. Grice on the Square of Opposition, or figura quadrata -- Grice, “Circling the square of Opposition.” Grice: “There is an asymmetry here. It’s supposed to be from Affirmo/Nego, but Affirmo has THREE vowels, and Nego, two; therefore, the o in affirmo is otiose.”

Ǝ: Ǝx. From EX-SISTENS -- Grice: “The inverted E is supposed to stand for ‘exist,’ which is a Ciceronianism – I mean, The Romans thought that you could sist, insist, or exist!” -- The existential quantifier. When Gentzen used /\ and \/ for ‘all’ and ‘some’ he is being logical, since ‘all’ and ‘some’ behave like ‘and’ and ‘or.’ This is not transparently shown at all by the use of the inverted A and the inverted E. This Grice called Grice’s Proportion: “and:or::every:some”. Grice: “Surely there is a relation of ‘every’ to ‘and’ and ‘some’ to ‘or.’” “Given a finite domain of discourse D = {a1, ... an} “every” is equivalent to an “and” propositions “Pai /\, … Pan.””“Analogously, “some (at least one”) is equivalent to an “or” proposition having the same structure as before:“Pai V, … Pan.”“For an infinite domain of discourse the equivalences are pretty similar, and I shouldn’t bother you with it for two long. But consider the statement, “1 + 1, and 2 + 2, 3 + 3, ..., and 100 + 100, and ..., etc.” This is an infinite  “and” proposition.  From the point of view of a system like System G, this may seem a  problem. Syntax rules are expected to generate finite formulae. But my example above is fortunate in that there is a procedure to generate every conjunct. Now, as Austin once suggested to me, having translated Frege, an assertion were to be made about every *irrational* number, it would seem that is no (Fregeian) way to enumerate every conjunct, since irrational numbers cannot be enumerated. However, a succinct equivalent formulation which avoids this problem with the ‘irrational’ number uses “every” quantification. For each natural number n, n · 2 = n + n.  An analogous analysis applies to the “or” proposition: “1 is equal to 5 + 5,  2\/  is equal to 5 + 5, \/ 3 is equal to 5 + 5, ... , \/ 100 is equal to 5 + 5, or ..., etc.” This is easily rephrasable using “some (at least one)” quantification:  “For SOME natural number n, n is equal to 5+5. Aristotelian predicate calculus rescued from undue existential import As ... universal quantifier and conjunction and, on the other, between the existential quantifier and disjunction. This analogy has not passed unnoticed in logical circles. ... existential quantifiers correspond to the conjunction and disjunction operators, ...analogous analysis applies to propositional logic. ... symbol 'V' for the existential quantifier in the 'Californian' notation’ (so-called by H. P. Grice when briefly visiting Berkeley) which was ... In Grice’s system G, the quantifiers are symbolized with larger versions of the symbols used for conjunction and disjunction. Although quantified expressions cannot be translated into expressions without quantifiers, there is a conceptual connection between the universal quantifier and conjunction and between the existential quantifier and disjunction. Consider the sentence ∃xPxxPx, for example. It means that either the first member of the UD is a PP, or the second one is, or the third one is, . . . . Such a system uses the symbol ‘⋁’ instead of ‘∃.’ Grice’s manoeuver to think of the quantifier versions of De Morgan's laws is an interesting one. The statement ∀xP(x)∀xP(x) is very much like a big conjunction. If the universe of discourse is the positive integers, for example, then it is equivalent to the statement that “P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯” or, more concisely, we might write “⋀x∈UP(x),⋀x∈UP(x),” using notation similar to "sigma notation'' for sums. Of course, this is not really a "statement'' in our official mathematical logic, because we don't allow infinitely long formulas. In the same way, ∃xP(x)∃xP(x) can be thought of as “⋁x∈UP(x).⋁x∈UP(x). Now the first quantifier law can be written “¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),” which looks very much like the law “¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),” but with an infinite conjunction and disjunction. Note that we can also rewrite De Morgan's laws for ∧∧ and ∨∨ as “¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).” As Grice says, “this may look initially cumbersome, but it reflects the close relationship with the quantifier forms of De Morgan's laws.” Cited by Grice as translatable by “some (at least one)”. Noting the divergence that Strawson identified but fails to identify as a conversational implicaturum. It relates in the case of the square of opposition to the ‘particularis’ but taking into account or NOT taking into account the ‘unnecessary implication,’ as Russell calls it. “Take ‘every man is mortal.’ Surely we don’t need the unnecessary implication that there is a man!”

eco: Eco philosophised at the oldest varsity, Bologna – Grice: “Of course, ‘varsity’ is over-rated, as I’m sure Cicero would agree!” -- Grice: “I would not call Eco a philosopher, since his dissertation is on aesthetics in Aquinas! Plus, he wrote a novel!” -- scuola bolognese-- possibly, after Speranza, one of the most Griceian of Italian philosophers (Only Speranza calls himself an Oxonian, rather! – “Surely alma mater trumps all!”). Umberto Eco (Alessandria, 5 gennaio 1932 – Milano, 19 febbraio 2016[1][2]) è stato un semiologo, filosofo, scrittore, traduttore, accademico, bibliofilo e medievista italiano.   Autografo di Eco apposto all'edizione tedesca di Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale. Saggista e intellettuale di fama mondiale, ha scritto numerosi saggi di semiotica, estetica medievale, linguistica e filosofia, oltre a romanzi di successo. Nel 1971 è stato tra gli ispiratori del primo corso del DAMS all'Università di Bologna[3][4]. Sempre nello stesso ateneo, negli anni Ottanta ha promosso l'attivazione del corso di laurea in Scienze della comunicazione[5], già attivo in altre sedi. Nel 1988 ha fondato il Dipartimento della Comunicazione dell'Università di San Marino. Dal 2008 era professore emerito e presidente della Scuola Superiore di Studi Umanistici dell'Università di Bologna.[6] Dal 12 novembre 2010 Umberto Eco era socio dell'Accademia dei Lincei, per la classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filosofiche.[7] Tra i suoi romanzi più famosi figura Il nome della rosa, tradotto in più di 40 lingue, che è divenuto un bestseller internazionale avendo venduto oltre 50 milioni di copie in tutto il mondo; da quest'opera sono stati tratti un film ed una serie televisiva.[8] Figlio di Rita Bisio e di Giulio Eco, un impiegato nelle Ferrovie, conseguì la maturità al liceo classico Giovanni Plana di Alessandria,[9] sua città natale. Tra i suoi compagni di classe, vi era il fisarmonicista Gianni Coscia, con il quale scrisse spettacoli di rivista.[10] In gioventù fu impegnato nella GIAC (l'allora ramo giovanile dell'Azione Cattolica) e nei primi anni cinquanta fu chiamato tra i responsabili nazionali del movimento studentesco dell'AC (progenitore dell'attuale MSAC). Nel 1954 abbandonò l'incarico (così come avevano fatto Carlo Carretto e Mario Rossi) in polemica con Luigi Gedda. Durante i suoi studi universitari su Tommaso d'Aquino, smise di credere in Dio e lasciò definitivamente la Chiesa cattolica;[11] in una nota ironica, in seguito commentò: «si può dire che lui Tommaso d'Aquino mi abbia miracolosamente curato dalla fede».[12][13]  Laureatosi in filosofia nel 1954 all'Università di Torino (agli esami riportò sempre 30/30, anche con lode, tranne quattro casi: filosofia teoretica e letteratura latina, in cui ottenne 29/30, e storia della letteratura italiana e pedagogia, entrambi superati con 27/30) [14] con relatore Luigi Pareyson e tesi sull'estetica di San Tommaso d'Aquino (controrelatore Augusto Guzzo), cominciò a interessarsi di filosofia e cultura medievale, campo d'indagine mai più abbandonato (vedi il volume Dall'albero al labirinto), anche se successivamente si dedicò allo studio semiotico della cultura popolare contemporanea e all'indagine critica sullo sperimentalismo letterario e artistico.  Nel 1956 pubblicò il suo primo libro, un'estensione della sua tesi di laurea dal titolo Il problema estetico in San Tommaso. Nel 1954 partecipò e vinse un concorso della Rai per l'assunzione di telecronisti e nuovi funzionari; con Eco vi entrarono anche Furio Colombo e Gianni Vattimo. Tutti e tre abbandonarono l'ente televisivo entro la fine degli anni cinquanta. Nel concorso successivo entrarono Emmanuele Milano, Fabiano Fabiani, Angelo Guglielmi, e molti altri. I vincitori dei primi concorsi furono in seguito etichettati come i "corsari" perché seguirono un corso di formazione diretto da Pier Emilio Gennarini e avrebbero dovuto, secondo le intenzioni del dirigente Filiberto Guala, "svecchiare" i programmi. Con altri ingressi successivi, come quelli di Gianni Serra, Emilio Garroni e Luigi Silori, questi giovani intellettuali innovarono davvero l'ambiente culturale della televisione, ancora molto legato a personalità provenienti dall'EIAR, venendo in seguito considerati come i veri promotori della centralità della RAI nel sistema culturale italiano.[15]  Dall'esperienza lavorativa in RAI, incluse amicizie con membri del Gruppo 63, Eco trasse spunto per molti scritti, tra cui il celebre articolo del 1961 Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno. Dal 1959 al 1975 fu codirettore editoriale della casa editrice Bompiani. Nel 1962 pubblicò il saggio Opera aperta che, con sorpresa dello stesso autore, ebbe notevole risonanza a livello internazionale e diede le basi teoriche al Gruppo 63, movimento d'avanguardia letterario e artistico italiano che suscitò interesse negli ambienti critico-letterari anche per le polemiche che destò criticando fortemente autori all'epoca già "consacrati" dalla fama come Carlo Cassola, Giorgio Bassani e Vasco Pratolini, ironicamente definiti "Liale", con riferimento a Liala, autrice di romanzi rosa.[16] Nel 1961 ebbe inizio anche la sua carriera universitaria che lo portò a tenere corsi, in qualità di professore incaricato, in diverse università italiane: Torino, Milano, Firenze e, infine, Bologna dove ha ottenuto la cattedra di Semiotica nel 1975, diventando professore ordinario.[16] All'Università di Bologna è stato fra i fondatori del primo corso di laurea in DAMS (era il 1971), poi è stato direttore dell'Istituto di Comunicazione e spettacolo del DAMS, e in seguito ha dato inizio al corso di laurea in Scienze della comunicazione. Infine è divenuto Presidente della Scuola Superiore di Studi Umanistici, fondata nel 2000, che coordina l'attività dei dottorati bolognesi del settore umanistico, e dove nel 2001 ha ideato il Master in Editoria Cartacea e Digitale.[17]  Nel corso degli anni ha insegnato come professore invitato alla New York University, Northwestern University, Columbia University, Yale University, Harvard University, University of California-San Diego, Cambridge University, Oxford University, Università di São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro, La Plata e Buenos Aires, Collège de France, École normale supérieure (Parigi). Nell'ottobre 2007 si è ritirato dall'insegnamento per limiti di età. Dalla fine degli anni cinquanta, Eco cominciò a interessarsi all'influenza dei mass media nella cultura di massa, su cui pubblicò articoli in diversi giornali e riviste, poi in gran parte confluiti in Diario minimo (1963) e Apocalittici e integrati (1964).[18] Apocalittici e integrati (che ebbe una nuova edizione nel 1977) analizzò con taglio sociologico le comunicazioni di massa. Il tema era già stato affrontato in Diario minimo, che includeva tra gli altri il breve articolo del 1961 Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno.  Sullo stesso tema, nel 1967 svolse a New York il seminario Per una guerriglia semiologica, in seguito pubblicato ne Il costume di casa (1973) e frequentemente citato nelle discussioni sulla controcultura e la resistenza al potere dei mass media[19].  Significativa fu anche la sua attenzione per le correlazioni tra dittatura e cultura di massa ne Il fascismo eterno, capitolo del saggio Cinque scritti morali,[20] dove individuava le caratteristiche, ricorrenti nel tempo, del cosiddetto "fascismo eterno", o "Ur-fascismo": il culto della tradizione, il rifiuto del modernismo, il culto dell'azione per l'azione, il disaccordo come tradimento, la paura delle differenze, l'appello alle classi medie frustrate, l'ossessione del complotto, il machismo, il "populismo qualitativo Tv e Internet" e altre ancora; da esse e dalle loro combinazioni, secondo Eco, è possibile anche "smascherare" le forme di fascismo che si riproducono da sempre "in ogni parte del mondo".  In un'intervista del 24 aprile 2010 mise in evidenza la sua visione rispetto a Wikipedia, della quale Eco si definiva un "utente compulsivo", e al mondo dell'open source.[21] Nel 1968 pubblicò il suo primo libro di teoria semiotica, La struttura assente,[19] cui seguirono il fondamentale Trattato di semiotica generale (1975) e gli articoli per l'Enciclopedia Einaudi poi riuniti in Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio (1984).  Nel 1971 fondò Versus - Quaderni di studi semiotici, una delle maggiori riviste internazionali di semiotica, rimanendone direttore responsabile e membro del comitato scientifico fino alla morte. È anche stato segretario, vicepresidente e dal 1994 presidente onorario della IASS/AIS ("International Association for Semiotic Studies"). È stato invitato a tenere le prestigiose conferenze Tanner (Università di Cambridge, 1990), Norton (Università di Harvard, 1993), Goggio (Università di Toronto, 1998), Weidenfeld (Università di Oxford, 2002) e Richard Ellmann (Università Emory, 2008). Collaborò sin dalla sua fondazione, nel 1955, al settimanale L'Espresso, sul quale dal 1985 al 2016 tenne in ultima pagina la rubrica La bustina di minerva (nella quale, tra l'altro, dichiarò di aver contribuito personalmente alla propria voce su Wikipedia[22]), ai giornali Il Giorno, La Stampa, Corriere della Sera, la Repubblica, il manifesto[23] e a innumerevoli riviste internazionali specializzate, tra cui Semiotica (fondata nel 1969 da Thomas Albert Sebeok), Poetics Today, Degrès, Structuralist Review, Text, Communications (rivista parigina del EHESS), Problemi dell'informazione, Word & Images, o riviste letterarie e di dibattito culturale quali Quindici, Il Verri (fondata da Luciano Anceschi), Alfabeta, Il cavallo di Troia, ecc.  Collaborò alla collana "Fare l'Europa" diretta da Jacques Le Goff con lo studio La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea (1993), in cui si espresse a favore dell'utilizzo dell'esperanto. Tradusse gli Esercizi di stile di Raymond Queneau (nel 1983) e Sylvie di Gérard de Nerval (nel 1999 entrambi presso Einaudi) e introdusse opere di numerosi scrittori e di artisti. Ha anche collaborato con i musicisti Luciano Berio e Sylvano Bussotti.  I suoi dibattiti, spesso dal tono divertito, con Luciano Nanni, Omar Calabrese, Paolo Fabbri, Ugo Volli, Francesco Leonetti, Nanni Balestrini, Guido Almansi, Achille Bonito Oliva o Maria Corti, tanto per nominarne alcuni, hanno aggiunto contributi non scritti alla storia degli intellettuali italiani, soprattutto quando sfioravano argomenti non consueti (o almeno non ritenuti tali prima dell'intervento di Eco), come la figura di James Bond, l'enigmistica, la fisiognomica, la serialità televisiva, il romanzo d'appendice, il fumetto, il labirinto, la menzogna, le società segrete o più seriamente gli annosi concetti di abduzione, di canone e di classico.[senza fonte]  Grande appassionato del fumetto Dylan Dog,[24] a Eco è stato fatto tributo sul numero 136 attraverso il personaggio Humbert Coe, che ha affiancato l'indagatore dell'incubo in un'indagine sull'origine delle lingue del mondo. È stato inoltre amico del pittore e autore di fumetti Andrea Pazienza[25] che fu suo allievo al DAMS di Bologna, e ha scritto la prefazione a libri di Hugo Pratt, Charles Monroe Schulz, Jules Feiffer e Raymond Peynet. Scrisse la presentazione di "Cuore" a fumetti, di F. Bonzi e Alain Denis, pubblicata su "Linus" nel 1975. Nel 1980 Eco esordì nella narrativa. Il suo primo romanzo, Il nome della rosa, riscontrò un grande successo sia presso la critica sia presso il pubblico, tanto da divenire un best seller internazionale tradotto in 47 lingue e venduto in trenta milioni di copie. Il nome della rosa è stato anche tra i finalisti del prestigioso Edgar Award nel 1984 e ha vinto il Premio Strega.[26] Dal lavoro fu tratto anche un celebre film con Sean Connery.  Nel 1988 pubblicò il suo secondo romanzo, Il pendolo di Foucault, satira dell'interpretazione paranoica dei fatti veri o leggendari della storia e delle sindromi del complotto. Questa critica dell'interpretazione incontrollata viene ripresa in opere teoriche sulla ricezione (cfr. I limiti dell'interpretazione). Romanzi successivi sono L'isola del giorno prima (1994), Baudolino (2000), La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana (2004), Il cimitero di Praga (2010) e Numero zero (2015), tutti editi in italiano da Bompiani.  Nel 2012 è stata pubblicata una versione "riveduta e corretta" del suo primo romanzo Il nome della rosa, con una nota finale dello stesso Eco che, mantenendo stile e struttura narrativa, è intervenuto a eliminare ripetizioni ed errori, a modificare l'impianto delle citazioni latine e la descrizione della faccia del bibliotecario per togliere un riferimento neogotico. Molte opere furono dedicate alle teorie della narrazione e della letteratura: Il superuomo di massa (1976), Lector in fabula (1979), Sei passeggiate nei boschi narrativi (1994), Sulla letteratura (2002), Dire quasi la stessa cosa (2003, sulla traduzione). È stato inoltre precursore e divulgatore dell'applicazione della tecnologia alla scrittura.  In contemporanea alla nomina di "guest curator" (curatore ospite) del Louvre, dove nel mese di novembre 2009 organizzò una serie di eventi e manifestazioni culturali[27], uscì per Bompiani Vertigine della lista, pubblicato in quattordici paesi del mondo.  Nel 2011 Bompiani pubblicò una raccolta dal titolo Costruire il nemico e altri scritti occasionali, che raccoglie saggi occasionali che spaziano nei vari interessi dell'autore, come quello per la narratologia e il feuilleton ottocentesco. Il primo saggio riprende temi già presenti ne Il cimitero di Praga. Muore nella sua casa di Milano il 19 febbraio 2016 alle ore 22:30,[1][2] a causa di un tumore del pancreas che lo aveva colpito due anni prima.[28] I funerali laici si sono svolti il 23 febbraio 2016 nel Castello Sforzesco di Milano, dove migliaia di persone si sono recate per l'ultimo saluto.[29] Sono state eseguite due composizioni alla viola da gamba e al clavicembalo: Couplets de folies (Les folies d'Espagne) dalla Suite n. 1 in re maggiore dai Pièces de viole, Livre II (1701) di Marin Marais e La Folia dalla Sonata per violino e basso continuo in re minore, op. 5 n. 12 (1700) di Arcangelo Corelli.[30]  Nel proprio testamento Eco ha chiesto ai suoi familiari di non autorizzare né promuovere, per i dieci anni successivi alla sua morte (quindi sino al 2026), alcun seminario o conferenza su di lui.[31]  Il corpo di Eco è stato infine cremato. La moglie, Renate Eco-Ramge, rifiutando la proposta di tumularne le ceneri nel Civico Mausoleo Garbin, ex edicola privata del Cimitero Monumentale di Milano ora provvista di piccole cellette destinate a ceneri o resti ossei di personalità artistiche illustri, ne ha preferito la conservazione privata, con il progetto di costruire un'edicola di famiglia nel medesimo cimitero.[32] Nei suoi romanzi, Eco racconta storie realmente accadute o leggende che hanno come protagonisti personaggi storici o inventati. Inserisce nelle sue opere accesi dibattiti filosofici sull'esistenza del vuoto, di Dio o sulla natura dell'universo.  Attratto da temi piuttosto misteriosi e oscuri (i cavalieri Templari, il sacro Graal, la sacra Sindone ecc.), nei suoi romanzi gli scienziati e gli uomini che hanno fatto la storia sono spesso trattati con indifferenza dai contemporanei.  L'umorismo è l'arma letteraria preferita dallo scrittore di Alessandria, che inserisce innumerevoli citazioni e collegamenti a opere di vario genere, conosciute quasi esclusivamente da filologi e bibliofili. Ciò rende romanzi come Il nome della rosa o L'isola del giorno prima un turbinio variopinto di nozioni di carattere storico, filosofico, artistico e matematico.  Centrale ne Il nome della rosa è la questione del riso, post-modernisticamente declinata.  Ne Il pendolo di Foucault Eco affronta temi come la ricerca del sacro Graal e la storia dei cavalieri Templari, facendo numerosi cenni ai misteri dell'età antica e moderna, rivisitati in chiave parodistica.  Ne L'isola del giorno prima l'umanità intera è simboleggiata dal naufrago Roberto de la Grive, che cerca un'isola al di fuori del tempo e dello spazio.  In Baudolino dà vita ad un picaresco personaggio medioevale tutto dedito alla ricerca di un paradiso terrestre (il regno leggendario di Prete Giovanni).  Ne La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana riflette sulla forza e sull'essenza stessa del ricordo, rivolto, in questo caso, ad episodi del XX secolo.  Il cimitero di Praga è incentrato sulla natura del complotto e, in particolar modo, sulla storia 'europea' del popolo ebraico.  Il suo ultimo romanzo, Numero zero, riprendendo temi da sempre cari all'autore (il falso, la costruzione del complotto e delle notizie) si sofferma sulla storia italiana recente, narrando fatti realmente accaduti, ma riletti attraverso una chiave complottistica. Nel 1971 fu tra i 757 firmatari della lettera aperta a L'Espresso sul caso Pinelli e successivamente della autodenuncia di solidarietà a Lotta Continua, in cui una cinquantina di firmatari esprimevano solidarietà verso alcuni militanti e direttori responsabili del giornale, inquisiti per istigazione a delinquere.[33]  I firmatari si autodenunciavano alla magistratura dicendo di condividere il contenuto dell'articolo. Peraltro le severe critiche di Eco al terrorismo e ai vari progetti di lotta armata[34] sono contenute in una serie di articoli scritti sul settimanale L'Espresso e su Repubblica, specie ai tempi del caso Moro (articoli poi ripubblicati nel volume Sette anni di desiderio). In effetti l'arma che ha caratterizzato l'impegno politico di Eco è diventata l'analisi critica dei discorsi politici e delle comunicazioni di massa.  Questo impegno è sintetizzato nella metafora della guerriglia semiologica dove si sostiene che non è tanto importante cambiare il contenuto dei messaggi alla fonte ma cercare di animare la loro analisi là dove essi arrivano (la formula era: non serve occupare la televisione, bisogna occupare una sedia davanti a ogni televisore). In questo senso la guerriglia semiologica è una forma di critica sociale attraverso l'educazione alla ricezione.[35] Dal 2002 partecipa alle attività dell'associazione Libertà e Giustizia, di cui è uno dei fondatori e garanti più noti, partecipando attivamente tramite le sue iniziative al dibattito politico-culturale italiano.  Il suo libro A passo di gambero (2006) contiene le critiche a quello che lui definisce populismo berlusconiano, alla politica di Bush, al cosiddetto scontro tra etnie e religioni. Nel 2011, nelle settimane delle rivolte arabe, durante una conferenza stampa registrata alla Fiera del libro di Gerusalemme, scatena una polemica politica la sua risposta a un giornalista italiano che gli domanda se condivida il paragone fra Berlusconi e Mubarak, avanzato da alcuni: "Il paragone potrebbe essere fatto con Hitler: anche lui giunse al potere con libere elezioni";[36] lo stesso Eco, dalle colonne de l'Espresso, smentirà tale dichiarazione chiarendo le circostanze della sua risposta.[37]  Eco faceva parte dell'associazione Aspen Institute Italia.[38] Onorificenze italiane Cavaliere di gran croce dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiana - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCavaliere di gran croce dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiana — Roma, 9 gennaio 1996[39] Medaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della cultura e dell'arte - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaMedaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della cultura e dell'arte — Roma, 13 gennaio 1997[40] Onorificenze straniere Commendatore dell'Ordine delle Arti e delle Lettere (Francia) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine delle Arti e delle Lettere (Francia) — 1985 Cavaliere dell'Ordine pour le Mérite für Wissenschaften und Künste (Repubblica Federale di Germania) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCavaliere dell'Ordine pour le Mérite für Wissenschaften und Künste (Repubblica Federale di Germania) — 1998 Premio Principe delle Asturie per la comunicazione e l'umanistica (Spagna) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaPremio Principe delle Asturie per la comunicazione e l'umanistica (Spagna) — 2000 Ufficiale dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaUfficiale dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) — 2003 Gran croce al merito con placca dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica Federale di Germania - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaGran croce al merito con placca dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica Federale di Germania — 2009 Commendatore dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) — Parigi, 13 gennaio 2012[41] Cittadinanze onorarie Monte Cerignone, 1981. Nizza Monferrato, 6 novembre 2010. San Leo, 11 giugno 2011. Torre Pellice, 2013. Lauree Eco ha ricevuto 40 lauree honoris causa da prestigiose università europee e americane,[42] come quella del 2014, che gli è stata conferita dall'Università federale del Rio Grande do Sul, di Porto Alegre, in Brasile.[43] Nel giugno 2015 in occasione della laurea in comunicazione conferita dall'Università di Torino, Umberto Eco ha rilasciato severi giudizi sui social del Web che, a suo dire, possono essere utilizzati da «legioni di imbecilli» per porsi sullo stesso piano di un vincitore di un Premio Nobel.[44] Le affermazioni di Eco hanno suscitato approvazioni ma anche vivaci discussioni.[45][46]  Affiliazioni e sodalizi accademici Umberto Eco è stato membro onorario (Honorary Trustee) della James Joyce Association, dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Bologna, dell'Academia Europea de Yuste, dell'American Academy of Arts and Letters, dell'Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, della Polska Akademia Umiejętności ("Accademia polacca della Arti"), "Fellow" del St Anne's College di Oxford e socio dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei.[47] Eco è stato inoltre membro onorario del CICAP.  Altro Gli è stato dedicato l'asteroide 13069 Umbertoeco, scoperto nel 1991 dall'astronomo belga Eric Walter Elst.  Il 12 aprile 2008 è stato nominato Duca dell'Isola del Giorno Prima del regno di Redonda dal re Xavier.  Nel 2016 il comune di Milano ha deciso che il suo nome venga iscritto nel Pantheon di Milano, all'interno del cimitero monumentale.[48] Saggistica Eco ha anche scritto numerosi saggi di filosofia, semiotica, linguistica, estetica:  Il problema estetico in San Tommaso, Torino, Edizioni di Filosofia, 1956; poi Il problema estetico in Tommaso d'Aquino, 2ª ed., Milano, Bompiani, 1970. Filosofi in libertà, come Dedalus, Torino, Taylor, 1958, poi in Il secondo diario minimo. Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale, in Momenti e problemi di storia dell'estetica, I, Dall'antichità classica al Barocco, Milano, Marzorati, 1959. Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale, Milano, Bompiani, 1987. Storia figurata delle invenzioni. Dalla selce scheggiata al volo spaziale, a cura di e con G. B. Zorzoli, Milano, Bompiani, 1961. Opera aperta. Forma e indeterminazione nelle poetiche contemporanee, Milano, Bompiani, 1962; 1967 sulla base dell'ed. francese 1965; 1971; 1976. Diario minimo, Milano, A. Mondadori, 1963; 1975. (include i saggi Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno e Elogio di Franti) Apocalittici e integrati, Milano, Bompiani, 1964; 1977. Il caso Bond. [Le origini, la natura, gli effetti del fenomeno 007], a cura di e con Oreste del Buono, Milano, Bompiani, 1965. Le poetiche di Joyce. Dalla "Summa" al "Finnegans Wake", Milano, Bompiani, 1966. (ed. modificata sulla base della seconda parte di Opera aperta, 1962) Appunti per una semiologia delle comunicazioni visive, Milano, Bompiani, 1967. (poi in La struttura assente) L'Italie par elle-meme. A portrait of Italy. Autoritratto dell'Italia, a cura di e con Giulio Carlo Argan, Guido Piovene, Luigi Chiarini, Vittorio Gregotti e altri, Milano, Bompiani, 1967. La struttura assente, Milano, Bompiani, 1968; 1980. La definizione dell'arte, Milano, Mursia, 1968. L'arte come mestiere, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. I sistemi di segni e lo strutturalismo sovietico, a cura di e con Remo Faccani, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. L'industria della cultura, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. Le forme del contenuto, Milano, Bompiani, 1971. I fumetti di Mao, a cura di e con Jean Chesneaux e Gino Nebiolo, Bari, Laterza, 1971. Cent'anni dopo. Il ritorno dell'intreccio, a cura di e con Cesare Sughi, Milano, Bompiani, 1971. Documenti su il nuovo Medioevo, con Francesco Alberoni, Furio Colombo e Giuseppe Sacco, Milano, Bompiani, 1972. Estetica e teoria dell'informazione, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1972. I pampini bugiardi. Indagine sui libri al di sopra di ogni sospetto: i testi delle scuole elementari, a cura di e con Marisa Bonazzi, Rimini, Guaraldi, 1972. Il segno, Milano, Isedi, 1973; Milano, A. Mondadori, 1980. Il costume di casa. Evidenze e misteri dell'ideologia italiana, Milano, Bompiani, 1973. Beato di Liébana. Miniature del Beato de Fernando I y Sancha. Codice B.N. Madrid Vit. 14-2, testo e commenti alle tavole di, Milano, Franco Maria Ricci, 1973. Eugenio Carmi. Una pittura di paesaggio?, Milano, Prearo, 1973. Trattato di semiotica generale, Milano, Bompiani, 1975. (EN) A Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1976. (e London, Macmillan, 1977) [versione inglese originale del Trattato di semiotica generale] Il superuomo di massa. Studi sul romanzo popolare, Roma, Cooperativa Scrittori, 1976; Milano, Bompiani, 1978. Stelle & stellette. La via lattea mormorò, illustrazioni di Philippe Druillet, Conegliano Treviso, Quadragono Libri, 1976. Storia di una rivoluzione mai esistita. L'esperimento Vaduz. Appunti del Servizio opinioni, n.292, settembre 1976, Roma, Rai, Servizio Opinioni, 1976. Dalla periferia dell'impero, Milano, Bompiani, 1977. Come si fa una tesi di laurea, Milano, Bompiani, 1977. Carolina Invernizio, Matilde Serao, Liala, con altri, Firenze, La nuova Italia, 1979. (EN) The Role of the Reader, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979. (contiene saggi tratti da Opera aperta, Apocalittici e integrati, Forme del contenuto, Lector in Fabula e Il superuomo di massa) (EN, FR) A semiotic Landscape. Panorama sémiotique. Proceedings of the Ist Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Den Haag, Paris, New York, Mouton (Approaches to Semiotics, 29) (a cura di, con Seymour Chatman e Jean-Marie Klinkenberg). Lector in fabula, Milano, Bompiani, 1979. (EN) Function and sign, the semiotics of architecture; A componential analysis of the architectural sign /column/, in Geoffrey Broadbent, Richard Bunt, Charles Jencks (a cura di), Signs, symbols and architecture, Chichester-New York, Wiley, 1980. (EL) E semeiologia sten kathemerine zoe, Thessaloniki, Malliares, 1980. (antologia di saggi). De bibliotheca, Milano, Comune di Milano, 1981. Postille al nome della rosa, Milano, Bompiani, 1983. The Sign of Three. Peirce, Holmes, Dupin (a cura di, con Thomas A. Sebeok), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983 (trad. Il segno dei tre, Milano, Bompiani) Sette anni di desiderio. [Cronache, 1977-1983], Milano, Bompiani, 1983. Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, Torino, Einaudi, 1984, ISBN 88-06-05690-5. (PT) Conceito de texto, São Paulo, Queiroz, 1984. Sugli specchi e altri saggi, Milano, Bompiani, 1985. (DE) Streit der Interpretationen, Konstanz, Universitätverlag Konstanz GMBH, 1987. (FR) Notes sur la sémiotique de la réception, in "Actes sémiotiques. Documents", IX, 81, 1987. (ZH) Jie gou zhu yi he fu hao xue. Dian ying wen ji, San lien shu dian chu ban fa xing, Np, 1987. (edizione cinese di articoli vari originariamente pubblicati in inglese e francese) (EN) Meaning and mental representations (a cura di, con M. Santambrogio e Patrizia Violi), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988. (DE) Im Labyrinth der Vernunft. Texte über Kunst und Zeichen, Leipzig, Reclam, 1989. (antologia di saggi) Lo strano caso della Hanau 1609, Milano, Bompiani, 1989. Saggio in Leggere i Promessi sposi. Analisi semiotiche, a cura di Giovanni Manetti, Milano, Gruppo editoriale Fabbri-Bompiani-Sonzogno-ETAS, 1989, ISBN 88-452-1466-4. (DE) Auf dem Wege zu einem Neuen Mittelalter, München, DTV Grossdruck, 1990. (antologia di saggi). I limiti dell'interpretazione, Milano, Bompiani, 1990, ISBN 88-452-1657-8. Vocali, con Soluzioni felici di Paolo Domenico Malvinni, Napoli, Collana "Clessidra" di Alfredo Guida Ed., 1991, ISBN 88-7188-024-2. Il secondo diario minimo, Milano, Bompiani, 1992, ISBN 88-452-1833-3. (EN) Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. La memoria vegetale, Milano, Rovello, 1992. La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1993, ISBN 88-420-4287-0. (EL) Ton augousto den Uparchoun eideseis, Thessaloniki, Parateretés, 1993. (antologia di saggi). (EN) Apocalypse Postponed, Bloomington, Indiana U.P, 1994. (saggi tratti da Apocalittici e integrati scelti e curati da Robert Lumley) (EN) Six Walks in the Fictional Woods, Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1994. (tradotto come Sei passeggiate nei boschi narrativi, Milano, Bompiani) Povero Pinocchio. Giochi linguistici di studenti del Corso di Comunicazione, a cura di, Modena, Comix, 1995, ISBN 88-7686-601-9. In cosa crede chi non crede?, con Carlo Maria Martini, Roma, Liberal, 1996, ISBN 88-86838-03-4. (DE) Neue Streichholzbriefe, München, DTV, 1997. Kant e l'ornitorinco, Milano, Bompiani, 1997, ISBN 88-452-2868-1. Cinque scritti morali, Milano, Bompiani, 1997, ISBN 88-452-3124-0. (EN) Talking of Joyce, con Liberato Santoro-Brienza, Dublin, University College Dublin Press, 1998. (DE) Gesammelte Streichholzbriefe, München, Hanser, 1998. (EN) Serendipities. Language and Lunacy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. Tra menzogna e ironia, Milano, Bompiani, 1998, ISBN 88-452-3829-6. La bustina di minerva, Milano, Bompiani, 1999, ISBN 88-452-4383-4. (NO) Den nye Middelalderen og andre essays, Oslo, Tiden Norske, 2000. (antologia di saggi) (DE) Mein verrücktes Italien, Berlin, Wagenbach, 2000. (antologia di saggi) (CS) Mysl a smysl, Praha, Moravia press, 2000. (antologia di saggi) (EN) Experiences in translation, Toronto, Toronto U.P., 2000. Riflessioni sulla bibliofilia, Milano, Rovello, 2001. (DE) Sämtliche Glossen und Parodien, München, Hanser, 2001. (raccolta completa da Diario minimo, Secondo diario minimo, Bustina di minerva e altre parodie da raccolte in tedesco) Sulla letteratura, Milano, Bompiani, 2002, ISBN 88-452-5069-5. Guerre sante, passione e ragione. Pensieri sparsi sulla superiorità culturale; Scenari di una guerra globale, in Islam e Occidente. Riflessioni per la convivenza, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002, ISBN 88-420-6784-9. Bellezza. Storia di un'idea dell'Occidente, CD-ROM a cura di, Milano, Motta On Line, 2002. Dire quasi la stessa cosa. Esperienze di traduzione, Milano, Bompiani, 2003, ISBN 88-452-5397-X. (EN) Mouse or Rat?, Translation as Negociation, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003. (Experiences in translation e saggi selezionati da Dire quasi la stessa cosa) Storia della bellezza, a cura di, testi di Umberto Eco e Girolamo de Michele, Milano, Bompiani, 2004, ISBN 88-452-3249-2. Il linguaggio della Terra Australe, Milano, Bompiani, 2004. (non in commercio) Il codice Temesvar, Milano, Rovello, 2005. Nel segno della parola, con Daniele Del Giudice e Gianfranco Ravasi, a cura e con un saggio di Ivano Dionigi, Milano, BUR, 2005, ISBN 88-17-00632-7. A passo di gambero. Guerre calde e populismo mediatico, Collana Overlook, Milano, Bompiani, 2006, ISBN 88-452-5620-0. La memoria vegetale e altri scritti di bibliofilia, Milano, Rovello, 2006, ISBN 88-452-5785-1. Sator Arepo eccetera, Roma, Nottetempo, 2006, ISBN 88-7452-085-9. Storia della bruttezza, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 2007, ISBN 978-88-452-5965-4. 11/9 La cospirazione impossibile, con Piergiorgio Odifreddi, Michael Shermer, James Randi, Paolo Attivissimo, Lorenzo Montali, Francesco Grassi, Andrea Ferrero e Stefano Bagnasco, a cura di Massimo Polidoro, Casale Monferrato, Piemme, 2007, ISBN 978-88-384-6847-6. Dall'albero al labirinto. Studi storici sul segno e l'interpretazione, Milano, Bompiani, 2007, ISBN 978-88-452-5902-9. Historia. La grande storia della civiltà europea, a cura di e con altri, 9 voll., Milano, Motta, 2007. Storia della civiltà europea, a cura di e con altri, 18 voll., Milano, Corriere della Sera, 2007-2008. Nebbia, a cura di e con Remo Ceserani, con la collaborazione di Francesco Ghelli e un saggio di Antonio Costa, Torino, Einaudi, 2009. ISBN 978-88-06-18724-8. (antologia letteraria di racconti a tema) Non sperate di liberarvi dei libri, con Jean-Claude Carrière, Milano, Bompiani, 2009. ISBN 978-88-452-6215-9. Vertigine della lista, Milano, Bompiani, 2009. ISBN 978-88-452-6345-3. Il Medioevo, a cura di, 4 voll., Milano, Encyclomedia, 2010-2011. ISBN 978-88-905082-0-2, ISBN 978-88-905082-1-9, ISBN 978-88-905082-5-7, ISBN 978-88-905082-9-5. La grande Storia, a cura di, 28 voll., Milano, Corriere della Sera, 2011. Costruire il nemico e altri scritti occasionali, Milano, Bompiani, 2011. ISBN 978-88-452-6585-3. Scritti sul pensiero medievale, Collana Il pensiero occidentale, Milano, Bompiani, 2012, ISBN 978-88-452-7156-4. L'età moderna e contemporanea, a cura di, 22 voll., Roma, Gruppo editoriale L'Espresso, 2012-2013. Storia delle terre e dei luoghi leggendari, Milano, Bompiani, 2013. ISBN 978-88-452-7392-6. Da dove si comincia?, con Stefano Bartezzaghi, Roma, La Repubblica, 2013. Riflessioni sul dolore, Bologna, ASMEPA, 2014. ISBN 978-88-97620-73-0. La filosofia e le sue storie, a cura di e con Riccardo Fedriga, 3 voll., Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2014-2015. ISBN 978-88-581-1406-3, ISBN 978-88-581-1742-2, ISBN 978-88-581-1741-5. Pape Satàn Aleppe. Cronache di una società liquida, Milano, La nave di Teseo, 2016, ISBN 978-88-9344-021-9. Come viaggiare con un salmone, Milano, La nave di Teseo, 2016, ISBN 978-88-9344-023-3. Sulle spalle dei giganti, Collana I fari, Milano, La nave di Teseo, 2017, ISBN 978-88-934-4271-8. Il fascismo eterno, Collana Le onde, Milano, La nave di Teseo, 2018, ISBN 978-88-934-4241-1. [già pubblicato in Cinque scritti morali, Bompiani, 1997] Sulla televisione. Scritti 1956-2015, A cura di Gianfranco Marrone, Collana I fari, Milano, La Nave di Teseo, 2018, ISBN 978-88-934-4456-9. Narrativa Il nome della rosa, Milano, Bompiani, 1980. Il pendolo di Foucault, Milano, Bompiani, 1988, ISBN 88-452-0408-1 L'isola del giorno prima, Milano, Bompiani, 1994, ISBN 88-452-2318-3 Baudolino, Milano, Bompiani, 2000, ISBN 88-452-4736-8 La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana. Romanzo illustrato, Milano, Bompiani, 2004, ISBN 88-452-1425-7 Il cimitero di Praga, Milano, Bompiani, 2010, ISBN 978-88-452-6622-5 Numero zero, Milano, Bompiani, 2015, ISBN 978-88-452-7851-8 Narrativa per l'infanzia La bomba e il generale, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1966. I tre cosmonauti, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1966. Ammazza l'uccellino, come Dedalus, illustrazioni di Monica Sangberg, Milano, Bompiani, 1973. Gli gnomi di Gnu, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1992, ISBN 88-452-1885-6. Tre racconti, Milano, Fabbri, 2004, ISBN 88-451-0300-5. (raccolta dei tre precedenti) La storia de "I promessi sposi", raccontata da, Torino-Roma, Scuola Holden-La biblioteca di Repubblica-L'Espresso, 2010, ISBN 978-88-8371-311-8. Traduzioni Raymond Queneau, Esercizi di stile, Torino, Einaudi, 1983. Note  Claudio Gerino, Morto lo scrittore Umberto Eco. Ci mancherà il suo sguardo nel mondo, in la Repubblica, 20 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 22 febbraio 2016.  Massimo Delfino e Emma Camagna, Alessandria piange Umberto Eco, in La Stampa, 20 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 22 febbraio 2016. ^ [1] ^ Cosimo Di Bari, "A passo di critica: il modello di media education nell'opera di Umberto Eco", Firenze University Press 2009 ^ [2] ^ Èco, Umberto, in Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. ^ LINCEI, ENRICO MENESTO' E UMBERTO ECO NUOVI SOCI DELL'ACCADEMIA, su tuttoggi.info. URL consultato il 30 ottobre 2017. ^ 'Il nome della rosa' debutta su Rai1 e conquista gli ascolti della prima serata, su la Repubblica, 5 marzo 2019. URL consultato il 30 gennaio 2020. ^ quotidiano la Stampa del 22/11/2000, p. 25. ^ Gianni Coscia: «quando suono col mio amico Umberto Eco», su genova.mentelocale.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016 (archiviato dall'url originale il 12 ottobre 2014). ^ «È il lato dolente e angoscioso di un uomo che è cresciuto nell'Azione Cattolica, che l'ha lasciata in polemica con il grande Gedda; un uomo, Eco, che ha studiato – dicono - Tommaso d'Aquino, e che un giorno se n'è uscito dalla Chiesa proclamandosi orgogliosamente ateo, o se si preferisce, agnostico.» (In Rassegna stampa cattolica: Mario Palmaro, Eco è solo un refuso, 21 settembre 2011 ^ (EN) «His new book touches on politics, but also on faith. Raised Catholic, Eco has long since left the church. "Even though I'm still in love with that world, I stopped believing in God in my 20s after my doctoral studies on St. Thomas Aquinas. You could say he miraculously cured me of my faith..."»  (IT) «Il suo nuovo libro tratta di politica, ma anche di fede. Cresciuto nel cattolicesimo, Eco ha lasciato da tempo la Chiesa. "Anche se io sono ancora innamorato di quel mondo, ho smesso di credere in Dio durante i miei anni 20, dopo i miei studi universitari su Tommaso d'Aquino. Potete dire che egli mi ha miracolosamente curato dalla mia fede..."»  (Articolo in Time, 13 giugno 2005) ^ Liukkonen, Petri (2003) Umberto Eco (1932–) – Pseudonym: Dedalus Archiviato il 4 agosto 2006 in Internet Archive. ^ Eco, quando l'Università di Torino gli consegnò il libretto con 27 in letteratura italiana, su la Repubblica, 20 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 17 febbraio 2020. ^ Antonio Galdo, Saranno potenti? Storia, declino e nuovi protagonisti della classe dirigente italiana, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano  Giuseppe Antonio Camerino, ECO, Umberto, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. ^ "Riparte il Master in Editoria, ideato da Umberto Eco" ^ Capozzi (2008)  Bondanella (2005) pp.53 ^ Umberto Eco, Cinque scritti morali, Bompiani 1997, pp. 25-48 ^ Intervista a Umberto Eco - Wikinotizie, su it.wikinews.org. ^ Umberto Eco, Ho sposato Wikipedia?, «l'Espresso», 4 settembre 2009. ^ Con lo pseudonimo di Dedalus: Dedalus e il manifesto, su ilmanifesto.it, 20 Febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 13 febbraio 2019 (archiviato il 13 febbraio 2019). ^ Ostini (1998) ^ Sclavi (1998) p. 94, citazione: "Sto leggendo un libro [In cosa crede chi non crede, N.d.R.] di Umberto Eco che mi è arrivato dall'Italia. Curioso no? Ha il mio stesso nome e il cognome è l'anagramma del mio..." ^ 1981, Umberto Eco, su premiostrega.it. URL consultato il 16 aprile 2019. ^ Italian Writer Umberto Eco is the Louvre's New Guest Curator ^ Emma Camagna, La morte di Eco, il ricordo di Gianni Coscia, in La Stampa, 20 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 22 febbraio 2016. ^ L'ultimo saluto a Umberto Eco: "Grazie maestro", in La Stampa, 23 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 23 febbraio 2016. ^ Marco Del Corona, «Follie di Spagna»: ecco che cos'è la musica suonata per Umberto Eco, su Corriere della Sera. URL consultato il 23 febbraio 2016. ^ Umberto Eco, la richiesta nel testamento: "Non autorizzate convegni su di me per i prossimi 10 anni", su Il Fatto Quotidiano. URL consultato il 23 marzo 2016. ^ La lettera della vedova Eco al Comune, in Corriere della Sera. URL consultato il 30 marzo 2017. ^ Pinelli, Calabresi e l'eskimo in redazione Archiviato il 19 gennaio 2012 in Internet Archive., opinione.it, 30 gennaio 1997 ^ Bruno Pischedda, Come leggere Il nome della rosa di Umberto Eco, Mursia, 1994 p.99 ^ La struttura assente, 1968, pp. 413-18. ^ "Eco a Gerusalemme attacca il Cavaliere. È polemica", di Francesco Battistini (dal Corriere della Sera, 24 febbraio 2011) Corriere della Sera ^ Berlusconi, Hitler e io, su l'Espresso. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Comitato Esecutivo | Aspen Institute Italia, su www.aspeninstitute.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato. ^ Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato. ^ Umberto Eco all'Eliseo onorato da Sarkozy con Legion D'Honneur, su liberoquotidiano.it. URL consultato il 14 gennaio 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 29 ottobre 2013). ^ Curriculum Vitae, su umbertoeco.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Unibo e Brasile: Laurea ad honorem a Umberto Eco, su magazine.unibo.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Umberto Eco contro i social: "Hanno dato diritto di parola a legioni di imbecilli", su Il Fatto Quotidiano. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Il problema di Umberto Eco con internet, su Il Post. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Imbecilli e non, tutto il mondo è social, su LaStampa.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Serena Vitale e Umberto Eco entrano nell'Accademia dei Lincei, 12 novembre 2010, Il Giornale. ^ Decise all'unanimità le 15 personalità illustri da iscrivere nel Pantheon di Milano, su comune.milano.it, 20 settembre 2016. URL consultato il 28 settembre 2017. Riferimenti Opere:  Bondanella, Peter (2005) Umberto Eco and the Open Text: Semiotics, Fiction, Popular Culture Capozzi, Rocco (2008) Eco's Prophetic Vision of Mass Culture in McLuhan Studies: Premier Issue, Antonio Galdo (2003) Saranno potenti? Storia, declino e nuovi protagonisti della classe dirigente italiana, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano ISBN 88-200-3501-4 Alberto Ostini (a cura di), Umberto Eco e Tiziano Sclavi. Un dialogo, in Dylan Dog, indocili sentimenti, arcane paure, Milano, Euresis, 1998. Tiziano Sclavi, Bruno Brindisi, Lassù qualcuno ci chiama, Dylan Dog n. 136, Milano, Sergio Bonelli Editore, gennaio 1998, p. 94. Film  Walt Disney e l'Italia - Una storia d'amore (2014): viene mostrata un'intervista durante lo "speciale Walt Disney" (1965) con Ettore Della Giovanna e Gianni Rodari Bibliografia Luigi Bauco, Francesco Millocca, Dizionario del «Pendolo di Foucault», Milano, Corbo, 1989. Manlio Talamo, I segreti del Pendolo, Napoli, Simone, 1989. Francesco Pansa, Anna Vinci, Effetto Eco, Roma, Nuova Edizione del Gallo, 1990. Marco Testi, "Il romanzo al passato": medioevo e invenzione in tre autori contemporanei in Analisi letteraria, 27, Roma, Bulzoni, 1992. Walter Pedullà, «L'utilitaria di Eco» in Le caramelle di Musil, Milano, Rizzoli, 1992, pp. 236-243. Salman Rushdie, «Umberto Eco» in Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991, Londra, Penguin, 1992. Bruno Pischedda, Come leggere «Il nome della rosa» di Umberto Eco, Milano, Mursia, 1994. Jean Petitot, Paolo Fabbri (a cura di), Nel nome del senso. Intorno all'opera di Umberto Eco, Milano, Sansoni, 2001. Antonio Sorella (a cura di), Umberto Eco. Sponde remote e nuovi orizzonti, Pescara, Tracce, 2002. Roberto Rampi, L'ornitorinco. Umberto Eco, Peirce e la conoscenza congetturale, M & B Publishing, Milano 2005, ISBN 88-7451-065-9 Marco Sonzogni, Echi di Eco, Balerna, Edizione Ulivo, 2007. Cinzia Bianchi, Clare Vassallo, “Umberto Eco's interpretative semiotics: Interpretation, encyclopedia, translation”, in Semiotica. Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter), 2015, vol. 206, issue 1/4, pp. 1-218. Peter Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the open text. Semiotics, fiction, popular culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Peter Bondanella (a cura di), New Essays on Umberto Eco, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. Jean-Jacques Brochier (a cura di), Umberto Eco. Du semiologue au romancier, in Le Nouveau Magazine Littéraire [inserto speciale], n. 262, febbraio 1989. Michael Caesar, Umberto Eco. Philosophy, Semiotics and the Work of Fiction, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999. Rocco Capozzi (a cura di), Reading Eco. An Anthology, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997. Michele Castelnovi, La mappa della biblioteca: geografia reale ed immaginaria secondo Umberto Eco, in Miscellanea di Storia delle esplorazioni n. LX, Genova, 2015, pp. 195-253. Remo Ceserani, Eco e il postmoderno consapevole in Raccontare il postmoderno, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, pp. 180-200. Michele Cogo, Fenomenologia di Umberto Eco. Indagine sulle origini di un mito intellettuale contemporaneo. Introduzione di Paolo Fabbri. Bologna, Baskerville, 2010, ISBN 978-88-8000-310-6 Furio Colombo, «L'isola del giorno prima», in La rivista dei libri, IV, n. 10, ottobre 1994, pp. 4-8. Roberto Cotroneo, La diffidenza come sistema. Saggio sulla narrativa di Umberto Eco, Milano, Anabasi, 1995. Roberto Cotroneo, Eco: due o tre cose che so di lui, Milano, Bompiani, 2001. Teresa de Lauretis, Umberto Eco, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1981. Nunzio Dell'Erba, Alla ricerca delle fonti del romanzo "Il Cimitero di Praga" , in Id., L'eco della storia. Saggi di critica storica: massoneria, anarchia, fascismo e comunismo, Universitas Studiorum, Mantova 2013, ISBN 978-88-97683-30-8 Cosimo Di Bari, A passo di critica. Il modello di Media Education nell'opera di Umberto Eco, Firenze, Firenze University Press, 2009, ISBN 978-88-8453-928-1. Richard Ellmann, Murder in the Monastery?, in The New York Review of Books, n. 12, luglio 1983. Lorenzo Flabbi, La disposizione del sapere di Umberto Eco, in Atlante dei movimenti culturali. 1968-2007, a cura di C. Cretella e P. Pieri, Clueb, Bologna 2007, ISBN 978-8849128994. Cristina Farronato, Eco's Chaosmos, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003. Franco Forchetti, Il segno e la rosa. I segreti della narrativa di Umberto Eco, Roma, Castelvecchi, 2005. Grit Fröhlich, Umberto Eco. Philosophie – Ästhetik – Semiotik, Paderborn, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009, ISBN 978-3-7705-4880-4. Margherita Ganeri, Il «caso» Eco, Palermo, Palumbo, 1991. Alfredo Giuliani, «Scherzare col fuoco» in Autunno del novecento, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1984. Renato Giovannoli (a cura di), Saggi su «Il Nome della Rosa», Milano, Bompiani, 1985. Fabio Izzo, Eco a perdere, Associazione Culturale Il Foglio, 2005. Paolo Jachia, Umberto Eco. Arte semiotica letteratura, San Cesario, Manni, 2006. Anna Maria Lorusso, Umberto Eco. Temi, problemi e percorsi semiotici, Roma, Carocci, 2008. Patrizia Magli et. al. (a cura di), Semiotica: Storia Teoria Interpretazione. Saggi intorno a Umberto Eco, Milano, Bompiani, 1992, ISBN 978-88-452-1835-4. Sandro Montalto (a cura di), Umberto Eco: l'uomo che sapeva troppo, Pisa, ETS, 2007. Franco Musarra et al., Eco in fabula. Umberto Eco in the Humanities. Umberto Eco dans les sciences humaines. Umberto Eco nelle scienze umane, Proceedings of the International Conference, Leuven, 24-27 febbraio 1999, Leuven, Leuven U.P. e Firenze, Franco Cesati Editore, 2002. Claudio Paolucci, Umberto Eco. Tra ordine e avventura, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2017. Voci correlate Semiotica Monte Cerignone, luogo di residenza Struttura (semiotica) Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Umberto Eco Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Umberto Eco Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Umberto Eco Collegamenti esterni Sito ufficiale, su umbertoeco.it. Modifica su Wikidata Umberto Eco, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Umberto Eco, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco, su The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction. Modifica su Wikidata Umberto Eco, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Umberto Eco, su Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Umberto Eco, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Umberto Eco, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (FR) Pubblicazioni di Umberto Eco, su Persée, Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Bibliografia di Umberto Eco, su Internet Speculative Fiction Database, Al von Ruff. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco (autore), su Goodreads. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco (personaggio), su Goodreads. Modifica su Wikidata Bibliografia italiana di Umberto Eco, su Catalogo Vegetti della letteratura fantastica, Fantascienza.com. Modifica su Wikidata Registrazioni di Umberto Eco, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco, su Internet Movie Database, IMDb.com. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco, su AllMovie, All Media Network. Modifica su Wikidata (DE, EN) Umberto Eco, su filmportal.de. Modifica su Wikidata Eco, Umberto, in Lessico del XXI secolo, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2012-2013. "La bustina di minerva": la rubrica periodica di Eco su L'Espresso, L'Espresso. URL consultato il 10 gennaio 2012. www.signosemio.com - Signo - Biografia di Umberto Eco e la presentazione della sua teoria semiotica, su signosemio.com. URL consultato il 19 giugno 2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 4 giugno 2009). Approfondimento, su italialibri.net. Curiosità (anche la "cacopedia" - in PDF) (PDF), su bibliotecheoggi.it. Opere in TecaLibri/1, su tecalibri.info. Opere in TecaLibri/2, su tecalibri.info. Considerazioni su: "Non sperate di liberarvi dei libri", su antonietta.philo.unibo.it (archiviato dall'url originale il 18 gennaio 2012). Golem L'indispensabile (il sito della rivista) - rivista online diretta da Umberto Eco, Renato Mannheimer, Carlo Bertelli, Danco Singer Un articolo di Eco su Wikipedia, su espresso.repubblica.it. www.encyclomedia.it, su encyclomedia.it. Il «questionario Proust» a Umberto Eco, su elapsus.it. URL consultato il 22 maggio 2016. (DE) Umberto Eco, in Perlentaucher, Perlentaucher Medien GmbH. Opere di Umberto Eco V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Strega V · D · M Vincitori internazionali del Prix Médicis V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Bancarella V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Cesare Pavese V · D · M Vincitori del Premio di Stato austriaco per la letteratura europea V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Mediterraneo per stranieri Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 108299403 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2283 9390 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\006213 · Europeana agent/base/145365 · LCCN (EN) n79021285 · GND (DE) 11852884X · BNF (FR) cb11901536g (data) · BNE (ES) XX1044144 (data) · ULAN (EN) 500075019 · NLA (EN) 35607219 · BAV (EN) 495/158121 · NDL (EN, JA) 00438594 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n79021285 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Giallo Portale Giallo Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Semiologi italianiFilosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloScrittori italiani del XX secoloScrittori italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1932Morti nel 2016Nati il 5 gennaioMorti il 19 febbraioNati ad AlessandriaMorti a MilanoUmberto EcoScrittori per ragazziFondatori di riviste italianeVincitori del Premio BancarellaVincitori del Premio StregaCavalieri di gran croce OMRIBenemeriti della cultura e dell'arteDecorati con la Legion d'onoreAutori del Gruppo 63Accademici dei LinceiPersone legate all'Università di HarvardProfessori dell'Università di BolognaProfessori della Columbia UniversityPatafisicaTraduttori italianiAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti italiani del XXI secoloUomini universaliStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di TorinoTraduttori dal franceseTraduttori all'italianoMedievisti italianiBibliofiliDirettori di periodici italianiCritici e teorici dei nuovi media[altre]. Econ provides a bridge between Graeco-Roman philosophy and Grice! Eco is one of the few philosophers who considers the very origins of philosophy in Bologna – and straight from Rome – On top, Eco is one of the first to generalise most of Grice’s topics under ‘communication,’ rather than using the Anglo-Saxon ‘mean’ that does not really belong in the Graeco-Roman tradition. Eco cites H. P. Grice in “Cognitive constraints of communication.” Umberto b.2,  philosopher, intellectual historian, and novelist. A leading figure in the field of semiotics, the general theory of signs. Eco has devoted most of his vast production to the notion of interpretation and its role in communication. In the 0s, building on the idea that an active process of interpretation is required to take any sign as a sign, he pioneered reader-oriented criticism The Open Work, 2, 6; The Role of the Reader, 9 and championed a holistic view of meaning, holding that all of the interpreter’s beliefs, i.e., his encyclopedia, are potentially relevant to word meaning. In the 0s, equally influenced by Peirce and the  structuralists, he offered a unified theory of signs A Theory of Semiotics, 6, aiming at grounding the study of communication in general. He opposed the idea of communication as a natural process, steering a middle way between realism and idealism, particularly of the Sapir-Whorf variety. The issue of realism looms large also in his recent work. In The Limits of Interpretation 0 and Interpretation and Overinterpretation 2, he attacks deconstructionism. Kant and the Platypus 7 defends a “contractarian” form of realism, holding that the reader’s interpretation, driven by the Peircean regulative idea of objectivity and collaborating with the speaker’s underdetermined intentions, is needed to fix reference. In his historical essays, ranging from medieval aesthetics The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, 6 to the attempts at constructing artificial and “perfect” languages The Search for the Perfect Language, 3 to medieval semiotics, he traces the origins of some central notions in contemporary philosophy of language e.g., meaning, symbol, denotation and such recent concerns as the language of mind and translation, to larger issues in the history of philosophy. All his novels are pervaded by philosophical queries, such as Is the world an ordered whole? The Name of the Rose, 0, and How much interpretation can one tolerate without falling prey to some conspiracy syndrome? Foucault’s Pendulum, 8. Everywhere, he engages the reader in the game of controlled interpretations. “Il nome della rosa” is about the dark ages in Northern Italy, where the monks were the only to find a slight interest in philosophy, unlike the barbaric Lombards!” --  Refs.: Umberto Econ on H. P. Grice in “Cognitive constraints on communication,” Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Eco: semantica filosofica," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia. 

eddington: “Some like Einstein, but Eddington’s MY man.” – H. P. Grice. Einstein – discussed by Grice in “Eddington’s Two Tables” -- Albert 18795, G.-born  physicist, founder of the special and general theories of relativity and a fundamental contributor to several branches of physics and to the philosophical analysis and critique of modern physics, notably of relativity and the quantum theory. Einstein was awarded the Nobel Prize for physics in 2, “especially for his discovery of the law of the photoelectric effect.” Born in Ulm in the G. state of Württemberg, Einstein studied physics at the Polytechnic in Zürich, Switzerland. He was called to Berlin as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics 4 at the peak of the G. ultranationalism that surrounded World War I. His reaction was to circulate an internationalist “Manifesto to Europeans” and to pursue Zionist and pacifist programs. Following the dramatic confirmation of the general theory of relativity 9 Einstein became an international celebrity. This fame also made him the frequent target of G. anti-Semites, who, during one notable episode, described the theory of relativity as “a Jewish fraud.” In 3 Einstein left G.y for the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Although his life was always centered on science, he was also engaged in the politics and culture of his times. He carried on an extensive correspondence whose publication will run to over forty volumes with both famous and ordinary people, including significant philosophical correspondence with Cassirer, Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, and others. Despite reservations over logical positivism, he was something of a patron of the movement, helping to secure academic positions for several of its leading figures. In 9 Einstein signed a letter drafted by the nuclear physicist Leo Szilard informing President Roosevelt about the prospects for harnessing atomic energy and warning of the G. efforts to make a bomb. Einstein did not further participate in the development of atomic weapons, and later was influential in the movement against them. In 2 he was offered, and declined, the presidency of Israel. He died still working on a unified field theory, and just as the founders of the Pugwash movement for nuclear disarmament adopted a manifesto he had cosigned with Russell. Einstein’s philosophical thinking was influenced by early exposure to Kant and later study of Hume and Mach, whose impact shows in the operationalism used to treat time in his famous 5 paper on special relativity. That work also displays a passion for unity in science characteristic of nearly all his physical thinking, and that may relate to the monism of Spinoza, a philosopher whom he read and reread. Einstein’s own understanding of relativity stressed the invariance of the space-time interval and promoted realism with regard to the structure of spacetime. Realism also shows up in Einstein’s work on Brownian motion 5, which was explicitly motivated by his long-standing interest in demonstrating the reality of molecules and atoms, and in the realist treatment of light quanta in his analysis 5 of the photoelectric effect. While he pioneered the development of statistical physics, especially in his seminal investigations of quantum phenomena 525, he never broke with his belief in determinism as the only truly fundamental approach to physical processes. Here again one sees an affinity with Spinoza. Realism and determinism brought Einstein into conflict with the new quantum theory 526, whose observer dependence and “flight into statistics” convinced him that it could not constitute genuinely fundamental physics. Although influential in its development, he became the theory’s foremost critic, never contributing to its refinement but turning instead to the program of unifying the electromagnetic and gravitational fields into one grand, deterministic synthesis that would somehow make room for quantum effects as limiting or singular cases. It is generally agreed that his unified field program was not successful, although his vision continues to inspire other unification programs, and his critical assessments of quantum mechanics still challenge the instrumentalism associated with the theory. Einstein’s philosophical reflections constitute an important chapter in twentieth-century thought. He understood realism as less a metaphysical doctrine than a motivational program, and he argued that determinism was a feature of theories rather than an aspect of the world Einstein, Albert Einstein, Albert 256   256 directly. Along with the unity of science, other central themes in his thinking include his rejection of inductivism and his espousal of holism and constructivism or conventionalism, emphasizing that meanings, concepts, and theories are free creations, not logically derivable from experience but subject rather to overall criteria of comprehensibility, empirical adequacy, and logical simplicity. Holism is also apparent in his acute analysis of the testability of geometry and his rejection of Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism. 

einheit – Grice: “I will use the Germanism for two reasons: it’s pompous, and no Englishman would use ‘unity’ (literally ‘onehood’) like that!” --  H. P. Grice, “Unity of science and teleology.” unity of science, a situation in which all branches of empirical science form a coherent system called unified science. Unified science is sometimes extended to include formal sciences e.g., branches of logic and mathematics. ‘Unity of science’ is also used to refer to a research program aimed at unified science. Interest in the unity of science has a long history with many roots, including ancient atomism and the work of the  Encyclopedists. In the twentieth century this interest was prominent in logical empiricism see Otto Neurath et al., International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. I, 8. Logical empiricists originally conceived of unified science in terms of a unified language of science, in particular, a universal observation language. All laws and theoretical statements in any branch of science were to be translatable into such an observation language, or else be appropriately related to sentences of this language. In unified science unity of science 939   939 addition to encountering technical difficulties with the observationaltheoretical distinction, this conception of unified science also leaves open the possibility that phenomena of one branch may require special concepts and hypotheses that are explanatorily independent of other branches. Another concept of unity of science requires that all branches of science be combined by the intertheoretic reduction of the theories of all non-basic branches to one basic theory usually assumed to be some future physics. These reductions may proceed stepwise; an oversimplified example would be reduction of psychology to biology, together with reductions of biology to chemistry and chemistry to physics. The conditions for reducing theory T2 to theory T1 are complex, but include identification of the ontology of T2 with that of T1, along with explanation of the laws of T2 by laws of T1 together with appropriate connecting sentences. These conditions for reduction can be supplemented with conditions for the unity of the basic theory, to produce a general research program for the unification of science see Robert L. Causey, Unity of Science, 7. Adopting this research program does not commit one to the proposition that complete unification will ever be achieved; the latter is primarily an empirical proposition. This program has been criticized, and some have argued that reductions are impossible for particular pairs of theories, or that some branches of science are autonomous. For example, some writers have defended a view of autonomous biology, according to which biological science is not reducible to the physical sciences. Vitalism postulated non-physical attributes or vital forces that were supposed to be present in living organisms. More recent neovitalistic positions avoid these postulates, but attempt to give empirical reasons against the feasibility of reducing biology. Other, sometimes a priori, arguments have been given against the reducibility of psychology to physiology and of the social sciences to psychology. These disputes indicate the continuing intellectual significance of the idea of unity of science and the broad range of issues it encompasses.  Einheitswissenschaft:  Used by Grice ironically. While he was totally ANTI-Einheitwisseschaft, he was ALL for einheitsphilosophie!  The phrase is used by Grice in a more causal way. He uses the expression ‘unity of science’ vis-à-vis the topic of teleology. Note that ‘einheitswissenschaft,’ literally translates as unity-science – there is nothing about ‘making’ if one, which is what –fied implies. The reason why ‘einheitswissenschaft’ was transliterated as ‘unified science’ was that Neurath thought that ‘unity-science’ would be a yes-yes in New England, most New Englanders being Unitarians, but they would like to include Theology there, ‘into the bargain.’  “Die Einheit von Wissenschaft.” Die Einheit der Wissenschaft und die neopositivistische Theorie der „Einheitswissenschaft”. O. Neurath, „Einheit der Wissenschaft als Aufgabe“,Einheitswissenschaft oder Einheit der Wissenschaft? | Frank F Vierter Internationaler Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft, Cambridge 1938 ... Einheitswissenschaft als Basis der Wissenschaftsgeschichte (pp. positivists held that no essential differences in aim and method exist between the various branches of science. The scientists of all disciplines should collaborate closely with each other and should unify the vocabulary of sciences by logical analysis. According to this view, there is no sharp demarcation between natural sciences and social sciences. In particular, to establish universal laws in the social sciences may be difficult in practice, but it is not impossible in principle. Through Otto Neurath, this ideal of scientific unity became a program for logical positivists, who published a series of books in Vienna under the heading Unified Science. After the dissolution of the Vienna Circle, Neurath renamed the official journal Erkenntnis as The Journal of Unified Science, and planned to continue publication of a series of works in the United States under the general title The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. He thought that the work would be similar in historical importance to the eighteenth-century French Encyclopédie under the direction of Diderot. Unfortunately, this work was never completed, although Carnap and Morris published some volumes originally prepared for it under the title Foundations of the Unity of Science. “We have repeatedly pointed out that the formation of the constructional system as a whole is the task of unified science.” Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World.

empedocle: one of the most important Italian philosophers. Grecian preSocratic philosopher who created a physical theory in response to Parmenides while incorporating Pythagorean ideas of the soul into his philosophy. Following Parmenides in his rejection of coming-to-be and perishing, he accounted for phenomenal change by positing four elements his “roots,” rizomata, earth, water, air, and fire. When they mix together in set proportions they create compound substances such as blood and bone. Two forces act on the elements, Love and Strife, the former joining the different elements, the latter separating them. In his cyclical cosmogony the four elements combine to form the Sphere, a completely homogeneous spherical body permeated by Love, which, shattered by Strife, grows into a cosmos with the elements forming distinct cosmic masses of earth, water the seas, air, and fire. There is controversy over whether Empedocles posits one or two periods when living things exist in the cycle. On one view there are two periods, between which intervenes a stage of complete separation of the elements. Empedocles accepts the Pythagorean view of reincarnation of souls, seeing life as punishment for an original sin and requiring the expiation of a pious and philosophical life. Thus the exile and return of the individual soul reflects in the microcosm the cosmic movement from harmony to division to harmony. Empedocles’ four elements became standard in natural philosophy down to the early modern era, and Aristotle recognized his Love and Strife as an early expression of the efficient cause.  Vide “Italic Griceians” – While in the New World, ‘Grecian philosophy’ is believed to have happened ‘in Greece,’ Grice was amused that ‘most happened in Italy!’ Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Empedocle," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

enantiamorphs: “When Moore said that he knew he had two hands, he implicated, ‘I have two enantiamorphic hands,’ before they were able to cancel his talk and his implicaturum.” from Grecian enantios, ‘opposite’, and morphe, ‘form’, objects whose shapes differ as do those of a right and left hand. One of a pair of enantiamorphs can be made to look identical in shape to the other by viewing it in a mirror but not merely by changing its spatial orientation. Enantiamorphs figure prominently in the work of Kant, who argued that the existence of enantiamorphic pairs entailed that Leibnizian relational theories of space were to be rejected in favor of Newtonian absolutist theories, that some facts about space could be apprehended empiricism, constructive enantiamorphs 263   263 only by “pure intuition,” and that space was mind-dependent. 

ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA: he way Grice is known in Italy, due to the efforts of Luigi Speranza, of the Grice Club. Speranza saw that Grice connected, somehow, with philosophy in general, and tried to pursue a way to make him accessible to anti-Oxonians. The encyclopædia Griceiana. Grice went to Paris and became enamoured with encyclopedia, or “encyclopédie,” “or a Descriptive Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Trades,” launched by the Parisian publisher Le Breton, who had secured d’Alembert’s and Diderot’s editorship, the Encyclopedia was gradually released despite a temporary revocation of its royal privilege. Comprising seventeen folio volumes of 17,818 articles and eleven folio volumes of 2,885 plates, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA required a staff of 272 Griceian engravers. “But the good thing,” Grice says, “is that it incorporates the accumulated knowledge and rationalist, secularist views of the  Enlightenment and prescribed economic, social, and political reforms.” Strawson adds: “Enormously successful at Oxford, ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA was reprinted with revisions five times before Grice died.” “Contributions were made by anyone we could bribe!” – As in the old encycloopaedia, the philosophes Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, d’Holbach, Naigeon, and Saint-Lambert; the writers Duclos and Marmontel; the theologians Morellet and Malet; enlightened clerics, e.g. Raynal; explorers, e.g. La Condamine; natural scientists, e.g. Daubenton; physicians, e.g. Bouillet; the economists Turgot and Quesnay; engineers, e.g. Perronet; horologists, e.g. Berthoud; and scores of other experts. “The purpose of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA,” writes Grice in the “Foreword”, “is to collect this or that bit of Griceian knowledge dispersed on the surface of the earth, and to unfold its general system.” “The Encyclopedia,” Strawson adds, “offers the educated Oxonian a comprehensive, systematic, and descriptive repository of contemporary liberal and mechanical arts, with an appendix on implicaturum by Grice hisself.” D’Alembert and Diderot developed a sensationalist epistemology, “but I don’t.” “Preliminary Discourse” under the influence of Locke and Condillac. Grice and Strawson (with the occasional help from Austin, Warnock, Pears and Thomson) compiled and rationally classified existing knowledge according to the noetic process memory, imagination, and reason. Based on the assumption of the unity of theory and praxis, the approach of the ENCYCLOOPÆDIA GRICEIANA is positivistic and ‘futilitarian.’ The ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA vindicates experimental reason and the rule of nature, fostered the practice of criticism, and stimulated the development of both old and new sciences. In religious matters, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA cultivates ambiguity and implicaturum to escape censorship by Queen Elizabeth II, an avid reader of the supplements. Whereas most contributors held either conciliatory or orthodox positions, J. F. Thomson barely concealed his naturalistic and atheistic opinions. Thomson’s radicalism was pervasive. Supernaturalism, obscurantism, and fanaticism, and Heideggerianism are among the Encyclopedists’ favorite targets. The Griceian Encyclopaedists identify Roman Catholicism (of the type Dummett practiced) with superstition and theology with occult magic; assert the superiority of natural morality over theological ethics; demand religious toleration; and champion human rights and conventional implicaturum alike. They innovatively retrace the historical conditions of the development of Oxford (“and a little Cambridge”) philosophy. They furthermore pioneer ideas on trade and industry and anticipate the relevance of historiography, sociology, economics, and ‘conversational pragmatics.’ As the most ambitious and expansive reference work Oxford ever saw, the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA crystallizes the confidence of England’s midlands bourgeoisie in the capacity of reason to dispel the shadows of ignorance and improve society – “at least Oxonian society, if I can.”

enesidemo: or ‘aenesidemus,’ as Strawson would prefer. Although Grecian, he is listed in the name glossay to the essay on “Roman philosophers,” and that is because he influenced some Roman-born philosophers and nnobles. “Nothing beats a Grecian don,” as Cicero remarked. Academic philosopher, founder of a Pyrrhonist revival in Rome. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Scetticismo romano.”

Eiconicum -- Would Ciero prefer the spelling ‘eiconicus’ or ‘iconicus’? We know Pliny preferred ‘icon.’īcon , ŏnis, f., = εἰκών,I.an image, figure: “fictae ceră icones,” Plin. 8, 54, 80, § 215.Iconicity -- depiction, pictorial representation, also sometimes called “iconic representation.” Linguistic representation is conventional: it is only by virtue of a convention that the word ‘cats’ refers to cats. A picture of a cat, however, seems to refer to cats by other than conventional means; for viewers can correctly interpret pictures without special training, whereas people need special training to learn languages. Though some philosophers, such as Goodman Languages of Art, deny that depiction involves a non-conventional element, most are concerned to give an account of what this non-conventional element consists in. Some hold that it consists in resemblance: pictures refer to their objects partly by resembling them. Objections to this are that anything resembles anything else to some degree; and that resemblance is a symmetric and reflexive relation, whereas depiction is not. Other philosophers avoid direct appeal to resemblance: Richard Wollheim Painting as an Art argues that depiction holds by virtue of the intentional deployment of the natural human capacity to see objects in marked surfaces; and dependence, causal depiction Kendall Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe argues that depiction holds by virtue of objects serving as props in reasonably rich and vivid visual games of make-believe. 

                                                                                                                                                                                                          

English futilitarians, The: Bergmann’s pun on H. P. Grice and J. L. Austin. from futile. Cf. conversational futilitarianism. Can there be a futilitarian theory of communication? Grice’s! The issue is a complex one. Some may interpret Grice’s theory as resting “on Kantian grounds.” Not everybody was present at Grice’s seminars at Oxford on helpfulness, where he discusses the kind of reasoning that a participant to a conversation will display in assuming that his co-conversationalist is being conversationally helpful, conversationally benevolent, conversationally ‘altruist,’ almost, and conversationally, well, co-operative. So, as to the basis for this. We can simplify the scenario by using the plural. A conversationalist assumes that his co-conversationalist is being co-operative on Kantian grounds. What are the alternatives, if any? One can re-describe “Kantian grounds” as “moral grounds.” Conversationalists abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness on Kantian, moral grounds. Kant wrote the “Critique of practical reason,” so Kant would allow for a rephrase of this as follows. Conversationalists abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness on practical, indeed moral, grounds – which is the topic of Grice’s last Kant lecture at Stanford. How to turn a ‘counsel of prudence,’ which is ‘practical’ into something that covers Kant’s “Kategorische Imperativ.” And then there’s the utilitarian. Utilitarianism IS a moral theory, or a meta-ethical theory. So one would have to allow for the possibility that conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on “utilitarian grounds,” which would be “practical grounds,” AND “moral grounds,” if not Kantian grounds. In any case, the topic WAS raised, and indeed, for someone like Grice who wrote on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘happiness,’ it does not seem futilitarian to see him as a futilitarian. Unfortunately, you need a serious philosophical background to appreciate all this, since it touches on the very serious, or ‘deep,’ as Grice would say, “and fascinating,” suburbia or practicality. But surely the keyword ‘utilitarian’ as per “conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on utilitarian grounds” is a possibility. Cf. Grice’s reference to the ‘least effort,’ and in the Oxford lectures on helpfulness to a conversationalist not getting involved in “undue effort,” or getting into “unnecessary trouble.” “Undue effort” is ‘forbidden’ by the desideratum of conversational candour; the ‘unnecessary trouble’ is balanced by the ‘principle of conversational self-love.’ And I don’t think Kant would ever considered loving himself! Grice being keen on neuter adjectives, he saw the ‘utile’ at the root of utilitarianism. There is much ‘of value’ in the old Roman concept of ‘utile.’ Lewis and Short have it as Neutr. absol.: ūtĭle , is, n., what is useful, the useful: omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci, Hor. A. P. 343: “bonus atque fidus Judex honestum praetulit utili,” id. C. 4, 9, 41: “utilium tardus provisor,” id. A. P. 164: “sententiae de utilibus honestisque,” Quint. 3, 8, 13; cf. id. 1, 2, 29. —Ultimately, Grice’s meta-ethics, like Hare’s, Nowell-Smith’s, Austin’s, Hampshire’s, and Warnock’s derives into a qualified utilitarianism, with notions of agreeableness and eudaemonia being crucial. Grice well knows that for Aristotle pleasure is just one out of the three sources for phulia; the others being profit, and virtue. As an English utilitarian, or English futilitarian, Grice plays with Griceian pleasures. Democritus, as Grice remarks, seems to be the earliest philosopher to have categorically embraced a hedonistic philosophy. Democritus claims that the supreme goal of life is contentment or cheerfulness, stating that joy and sorrow are the distinguishing mark of things beneficial and harmful. The Cyrenaics are an ultra-hedonist Grecoam school of philosophy founded by Aristippus. Many of the principles of the school were set by his grandson, Aristippus the Younger, and Theodorus. The Cyrenaic school is one of the earliest Socratic schools. The Cyrenaics teach that the only intrinsic ‘agathon’ is pleasure ‘hedone,’ which means not just the absence of pain, but a positively enjoyable momentary sensation. A physical pleasure is stronger than a pleasure of anticipation or memory. The Cyrenaics do, however, recognize the value of social obligation, and that pleasure may be gained from altruism. The Cyrenaic school dies out within a century, and is replaced by Epicureanism.  The Cyrenaics are known for their sceptical epistemology. The Cyrenaics reduce logic to a basic doctrine concerning the criterion of truth. The Cyrenaics think that one can only know with certainty his immediate sense-experience, e. g., that he is having a sweet sensation. But one can know nothing about the nature of the object that causes this sensation, e.g., that honey is sweet. The Cyrenaics also deny that we can have knowledge of what the experience of others are like. All knowledge is immediate sensation. Sensation is a motion which is purely subjective, and is painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as it is violent, tranquil or gentle. Further, sensation is entirely individual and can in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only possible criterion of knowledge and of conduct. The way of being affected is alone knowable. Thus the sole aim for everyone should be pleasure. Cyrenaicism deduces a single, universal aim for all which is pleasure. Furthermore, feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows that past and future pleasure have no real existence for us, and that in present pleasure there is no distinction of kind. Socrates speaks of the higher pleasure of the intellect. The Cyrenaics denies the validity of this distinction and say that bodily pleasure (hedone somatike), being more simple and more intense, is preferable. Momentary pleasure, preferably of a physical kind, is the only good for a human. However, an action which gives immediate pleasure can create more than their equivalent of pain. The wise person should be in control (egcrateia) of pleasure rather than be enslaved to it, otherwise pain results, and this requires judgement to evaluate this or that pleasure of life. Regard should be paid to law and custom, because even though neither law nor custom have an intrinsic value on its own, violating law or custom leads to an unpleasant penalty being imposed by others. Likewise, friendship and justice are useful because of the pleasure they provide. Thus the Cyrenaics believe in the hedonistic value of social obligation and altruistic behaviour.  Epicureanism is a system of philosophy based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an atomic materialist, following in the steps of Democritus and Leucippus. Epicurus’s materialism leads him to a general stance against superstition or the idea of divine intervention. Following Aristippus, Epicurus believes that the greatest good is to seek modest, sustainable pleasure in the form of a state of tranquility and freedom from fear (ataraxia) and absence of bodily pain (aponia) through knowledge of the workings of the world and the limits of desire. The combination of these two states, ataraxia and aponia, is supposed to constitute happiness in its highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism, insofar as it declares pleasure as the sole intrinsic good, its conception of absence of pain as the greatest pleasure and its advocacy of a simple life make it different from hedonism as it is commonly understood. In the Epicurean view, the highest pleasure (tranquility and freedom from fear) is obtained by knowledge, friendship and living a virtuous and temperate life. Epicurus lauds the enjoyment of a simple pleasure, by which he means abstaining from the bodily desire, such as sex and the appetite, verging on asceticism. Epicurus argues that when eating, one should not eat too richly, for it could lead to dissatisfaction later, such as the grim realization that one could not afford such delicacies in the future. Likewise, sex could lead to increased lust and dissatisfaction with the sexual partner. Epicurus does not articulate a broad system of social ethics that has survived but had a unique version of the golden rule.  It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, agreeing neither to harm nor be harmed, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life. Epicureanism is originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the main opponent of Stoicism. Epicurus and his followers shun politics. After the death of Epicurus, his school is headed by Hermarchus. Later many Epicurean societies flourish in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era, such as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes and Ercolano. The poet Lucretius is its most known Roman proponent. By the end of the Roman Empire, having undergone attack and repression, Epicureanism has all but died out, and would be resurrected in the seventeenth century by the atomist Pierre Gassendi. Some writings by Epicurus have survived. Some scholars consider the epic poem “De natura rerum” by Lucretius to present in one unified work the core arguments and theories of Epicureanism. Many of the papyrus scrolls unearthed at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum are Epicurean texts. At least some are thought to have belonged to the Epicurean Philodemus. Cf. Barnes on epicures and connoiseurs. Many a controversy arising out of this or that value judgement is settled by saying, ‘I like it and you don’t, and that s the end of the matter.’ I am content to adopt this solution of the difficulty on matters such as food and drink. Even here, though, we admit the existence of epicures and connoisseurs.Why are we not content to accept the same solution on every matter where value is concerned? The reason I am not so content lies in the fact that the action of one man dictated by his approval of something is frequently incompatible with the action of another man dictated by his approval of something. This is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian hedonistic Epicureians made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Oxford. L and S have "ἡδονή,” also “ἁδονά,” or in a chorus in tragedy, “ἡδονά,” ultimately from "ἥδομαι,” which they render it as “enjoyment, pleasure,” “prop. of sensual pleasure.” αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡ. Plato, Republic, 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Plato, Republic, 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R. 582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ.; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to pleasure; Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or so as to humour you? εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ, “one feels pleasure at the thought that …” ; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied with; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple; δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν;  ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ.; πρὸς ἡ. Λέγειν, “to speak so as to please another”; δημηγορεῖν; οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα; πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας; later πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι; καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν κλύειν; καθ᾽ ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν; καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, it is a pleasure or delight to another; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς, to take pleasure in them; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, oοἱ λυπηροί; μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ; ἡδονᾷ with pleasure; a pleasure; ἡδοναὶ τραγημάτων sweetmeats; plural., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts. In Ionic philosophers, taste, flavour, usually joined with χροιή. Note that Aristotle uses somatike hedone. As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of hedone in Aristotles system. Pleasure is sometimes rendered “placitum,” as in “ad placitum,” in scholastic philosophy, but that is because scholastic philosophy is not as Hellenic as it should be. Actually, Grice prefers “agreeable.” One of Grices requisites for an ascription of eudaemonia (to have a fairy godmother) precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an agreeable one. One form or mode of agreeableness, Grice notes, is, unless counteracted, automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of ends to another. However, some other mode of agreeableness, such as e. g. being a source of delight, which is not routinely associated with the fulfilment of this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of other features relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and another. Further, a system of ends the operation of which is especially agreeable is stable not only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the somewhat weakening effect of ‘egcrateia,’ incontinence, or akrasia, if you mustn’t. A disturbing influence, as Aristotle knows from experience, is more surely met by a principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the principle alone. Grices favourite hedonistic implicaturum was “please,” as in “please, please me,” by The Beatles. While Grice claims to love Kantotle, he cannot hide his greater reverence for Aristotle, instilled early on at Corpus. An Oxonian need not recite Kant in what during the Second World War was referred to as the Hun, and while Aristotle was a no-no at Clifton (koine!), Hardie makes Grice love him. With eudaemonia, Grice finds a perfect synthetic futilitarian concept to balance his innate analytic tendencies. There is Grecian eudaemonism and there is Griceian eudaemonism. L and S are not too helpful. They have “εὐδαιμονία” (Ion. –ιη), which they render not as happiness, but as “prosperity, good fortune, opulence;” “χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐ.;” of countries; “μοῖρ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας.” In a second use, the expression is indeed rendered as “true, full happiness;” “εὐ. οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐν χρυσῷ; εὐ. ψυχῆς, oκακοδαιμονίη, cf. Pl. Def. 412d, Arist. EN 1095a18, sometimes personified as a divinity. There is eudaemonia and there is kakodaemonia. Of course, Grice’s locus classicus is EN 1095a18, which is Grice’s fairy godmother, almost. Cf. Austin on agathon and eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics, unearthed by Urmson and Warnock, a response to an essay by Prichard in “Philosophy” on the meaning of agathon in Aristotle’s ethics. Pritchard argues that Aristotle regards “agathon” to mean conducive to “eudaemonia,” and, consequently, that Aristotle maintains that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire for eudaemonia. Austin finds fault with this. First, agathon in Aristotle does not have a single usage, and a fortiori not the one Pritchard suggests. Second, if one has to summarise the usage of “agathon” in one phrase, “being desired” cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides “τό άγαθόν,” even if Davidson would disagree. Prichard endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, “agathon” seems to mean simply that being desired or an ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim of a person. In other contexts, “αγαθον” takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as “a good.” Prichard argues that by "αγαθον" Aristotle actually means, except in the Nicomachean Ethics, conducive to eudaemonia, and holds that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to attain eudaemonia. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of man’s ultimate aim. Grice takes life seriously: philosophical biology. He even writes an essay entitled “Philosophy of life,” listed is in PGRICE. Grice bases his thought on his tutee Ackrill’s Dawes Hicks essay for the BA, who quotes extensively from Hardie. Grice also reviews that “serious student of Greek philosophy,” Austin, in his response to Prichard, Grice’s fairy godmother. Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Grecian eudaimonia means is that eudaemonia is to be understood as the name for that state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for one. One’s good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to one, solely by concern for one’s eudaemonia, well-being or happiness. To change the idiom, eudæmonia is the general characterisation of what a full-time and unhampered fairy godmother would secure for one. Grice is concerned with the specific system of ends that eudaemonia consists for Ariskant. Grice borrows, but never returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. Johns, Ackrill. Ackrills point is about the etymological basis for eudaemonia, from eudaemon, the good dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken literally. Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of eudaemonia to the agent. For Grice, as for Kantotle, telos and eudaemonia are related in subtle ways. For eudaemonia we cannot deal with just one end, but a system of ends, although such a system may be a singleton. Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising end so that a particular ascription of an end may entail an ascription of eudaemonia. Grice follows the textual criticism of his tutee Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that eudaemonia is literally related to the eudaemon. In PGRICE Warner explores Grice’s concept of eudaemonia. Warner is especially helpful with the third difficult Carus lecture by Grice, a metaphysical defence of absolute value. Warner connects with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception seen in an evolutionary light and the Kantotelian idea of eudaemonia. In response to Warner’s overview of the oeuvre of Grice for the festschrift that Warner co-edited with Grandy, Grice refers to the editors collectively as Richards. While he feels he has to use “happiness,” Grice is always having Aristotle’s eudaemonia in mind. The implicaturum of Smith is ‘happy’ is more complex than Kantotle thinks. Austen knew. For Emma, you decide if youre happy. Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life. Grice took life seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes essay in WOW, where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is no Cartesian scholar – what Oxonian would? It concerns certainty. And certainty is originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer says that to know is to assure that one is certain or sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is authoritative. And Grice plays with meaning, too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know? Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian and otiose. Tutees. Grice loved to place himself in the role of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutees inabilities, a whole week long – until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning. Now, the logical form of certain is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as numbering of operators. If G ψs p, G ψs ψs p, and G ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesnt think so. Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver his BA lecture he chooses ‘intention and uncertainty’ as its topic, just to provoke. Not surprisingly, the “Uncertainty” piece opens with the sceptics challenge. And he will not conclude that the intender is certain. Only that theres some good chance (p ˃0.5) that what he intends will get through! When there is a will, there is a way, when there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing! Perhaps by know Moore means certain. Grice was amused by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasnt. He uses Moores misuse of know – according to Malcolm – both in Causal theory and Prolegomena. And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptics implicaturum, above, with the two essays Scepticism and Common sense and Moore and Philosophers Paradoxes repr. partially in WOW. With regard to certainty, it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still, may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and desires are incorrigible? One of Grices problems is, as he puts it, how to accommodate privileged access and, maybe, incorrigibility. This or that a second-order state may be, in some fashion, incorrigible. On the contrary, for Grice, this or that lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged access. Note that while he is happy to allow privileged access to lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or second-order may, in some fashion, be said to count as an incorrigible avowal. It rains. P judges it rains (privileged access). P judges that P judges that it rains (incorrigible). The justification is conversational. It rains says the P, or expresses the P. Grice wants to be able to say that if a P expresses that p, the P judges₂ that p. If the P expresses that it rains, the P judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order, higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick with judging here. Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones. If P expresses !p, P ψ-s₂ that !p. His second-order, higher-order buletic state is incorrigible (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a matter only of privileged access. For a study of conversation as rational co-operation this utilitarian revival modifies the standard exegesis of Grice as purely Kantian, and has him more in agreement with the general Oxonian meta-ethical scene. Refs.: Under ‘futilitarianism,’ we cover Grice’s views on ‘pleasure’ (he has an essay on “Pleasure,”) and “eudaemonia” (He has an essay on ‘happiness’); other leads are given under ‘grecianism,’ since this is the Grecian side to Grice’s Ariskant; for specific essays on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘eudaimonia,’ the keywords ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ are useful. A good source is the essay on happiness in “Aspects,” which combines ‘eudaemonia’ and ‘agreebleness,’ his futilitarianism turned Kantotelian. BANC. English futilitarians: utilitarianism, the moral theory that an action is morally right if and only if it produces at least as much good utility for all people affected by the action as any alternative action the person could do instead. Its best-known proponent is J. S. Mill, who formulated the greatest happiness principle also called the principle of utility: always act so as to produce the greatest happiness. Two kinds of issues have been central in debates about whether utilitarianism is an adequate or true moral theory: first, whether and how utilitarianism can be clearly and precisely formulated and applied; second, whether the moral implications of utilitarianism in particular cases are acceptable, or instead constitute objections to it. Issues of formulation. A central issue of formulation is how utility is to be defined and whether it can be measured in the way utilitarianism requires. Early utilitarians often held some form of hedonism, according to which only pleasure and the absence of pain have utility or intrinsic value. For something to have intrinsic value is for it to be valuable for its own sake and apart from its consequences or its relations to other things. Something has instrumental value, on the other hand, provided it brings about what has intrinsic value. Most utilitarians have held that hedonism is too narrow an account of utility because there are many things that people value intrinsically besides pleasure. Some nonhedonists define utility as happiness, and among them there is considerable debate about the proper account of happiness. Happiness has also been criticized as too narrow to exhaust utility or intrinsic value; e.g., many people value accomplishments, not just the happiness that may accompany them. Sometimes utilitarianism is understood as the view that either pleasure or happiness has utility, while consequentialism is understood as the broader view that morally right action is action that maximizes the good, however the good is understood. Here, we take utilitarianism in this broader interpretation that some philosophers reserve for consequentialism. Most utilitarians who believe hedonism gives too narrow an account of utility have held that utility is the satisfaction of people’s informed preferences or desires. This view is neutral about what people desire, and so can account for the full variety of things and experiences that different people in fact desire or value. Finally, ideal utilitarians have held that some things or experiences, e.g. knowledge or being autonomous, are intrinsically valuable or good whether or not people value or prefer them or are happier with them. Whatever account of utility a utilitarian adopts, it must be possible to quantify or measure the good effects or consequences of actions in order to apply the utilitarian standard of moral rightness. Happiness utilitarianism, e.g., must calculate whether a particular action, or instead some possible alternative, would produce more happiness for a given person; this is called the intrapersonal utility comparison. The method of measurement may allow cardinal utility measurements, in which numerical units of happiness may be assigned to different actions e.g., 30 units for Jones expected from action a, 25 units for Jones from alternative action b, or only ordinal utility measurements may be possible, in which actions are ranked only as producing more or less happiness than alternative actions. Since nearly all interesting and difficult moral problems involve the happiness of more than one person, utilitarianism requires calculating which among alternative actions produces the greatest happiness for all people affected; this is called the interpersonal utility comparison. Many ordinary judgments about personal action or public policy implicitly rely on interpersonal utility comparisons; e.g., would a family whose members disagree be happiest overall taking its vacation at the seashore or in the mountains? Some critics of utilitarianism doubt that it is possible to make interpersonal utility comparisons. Another issue of formulation is whether the utilitarian principle should be applied to individual actions or to some form of moral rule. According to act utilitarianism, each action’s rightness or wrongness depends on the utility it produces in comparison with possible alternatives. Even act utilitarians agree, however, that rules of thumb like ‘keep your promises’ can be used for the most part in practice because following them tends to maximize utility. According to rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, individual actions are evaluated, in theory not just in practice, by whether they conform to a justified moral rule, and the utilitarian standard is applied only to general rules. Some rule utilitarians hold that actions are right provided they are permitted by rules the general acceptance of which would maximize utility in the agent’s society, and wrong only if they would be prohibited by such rules. There are a number of forms of rule utilitarianism, and utilitarians disagree about whether act or rule utilitarianism is correct. Moral implications. Most debate about utilitarianism has focused on its moral implications. Critics have argued that its implications sharply conflict with most people’s considered moral judgments, and that this is a strong reason to reject utilitarianism. Proponents have argued both that many of these conflicts disappear on a proper understanding of utilitarianism and that the remaining conflicts should throw the particular judgments, not utilitarianism, into doubt. One important controversy concerns utilitarianism’s implications for distributive justice. Utilitarianism requires, in individual actions and in public policy, maximizing utility without regard to its distribution between different persons. Thus, it seems to ignore individual rights, whether specific individuals morally deserve particular benefits or burdens, and potentially to endorse great inequalities between persons; e.g., some critics have charged that according to utilitarianism slavery would be morally justified if its benefits to the slaveowners sufficiently outweighed the burdens to the slaves and if it produced more overall utility than alternative practices possible in that society. Defenders of utilitarianism typically argue that in the real world there is virtually always a better alternative than the action or practice that the critic charges utilitarianism wrongly supports; e.g., no system of slavery that has ever existed is plausibly thought to have maximized utility for the society in question. Defenders of utilitarianism also typically try to show that it does take account of the moral consideration the critic claims it wrongly ignores; for instance, utilitarians commonly appeal to the declining marginal utility of money  equal marginal increments of money tend to produce less utility e.g. happiness for persons, the more money they already utilitarianism utilitarianism have  as giving some support to equality in income distribution. Another source of controversy concerns whether moral principles should be agent-neutral or, in at least some cases, agent-relative. Utilitarianism is agent-neutral in that it gives all people the same moral aim  act so as to maximize utility for everyone  whereas agent-relative principles give different moral aims to different individuals. Defenders of agent-relative principles note that a commonly accepted moral rule like the prohibition of killing the innocent is understood as telling each agent that he or she must not kill, even if doing so is the only way to prevent a still greater number of killings by others. In this way, a non-utilitarian, agent-relative prohibition reflects the common moral view that each person bears special moral responsibility for what he or she does, which is greater than his or her responsibility to prevent similar wrong actions by others. Common moral beliefs also permit people to give special weight to their own projects and commitments and, e.g., to favor to some extent their own children at the expense of other children in greater need; agent-relative responsibilities to one’s own family reflect these moral views in a way that agent-neutral utilitarian responsibilities apparently do not. The debate over neutrality and relativity is related to a final area of controversy about utilitarianism. Critics charge that utilitarianism makes morality far too demanding by requiring that one always act to maximize utility. If, e.g., one reads a book or goes to a movie, one could nearly always be using one’s time and resources to do more good by aiding famine relief. The critics believe that this wrongly makes morally required what should be only supererogatory  action that is good, but goes beyond “the call of duty” and is not morally required. Here, utilitarians have often argued that ordinary moral views are seriously mistaken and that morality can demand greater sacrifices of one’s own interests for the benefit of others than is commonly believed. There is little doubt that here, and in many other cases, utilitarianism’s moral implications significantly conflict with commonsense moral beliefs  the dispute is whether this should count against commonsense moral beliefs or against utilitarianism. Refs.:  H. P. Grice, “Bergmann on Stephen and the English utilitarians.”

entelecheia --  used by Grice in his philosophical psychology -- from Grecian entelecheia, energeia, actuality. Aristotle, who coins both terms, entelecheia and energeia, treats entelecheia as a near synonym of Energeia (“which makes me often wonder why he felt the need to coin TWICE” – H. P. Grice.). Entelecheia figures in Aristotle’s definition of the soul (psyche) as the first actuality of the natural body (De Anima, II.1). This is explained by analogy with knowledge: first actuality is to knowledge as second actuality is to the active use of knowledge. ’Entelechia’ is also a technical term, but in German, in Leibniz for the primitive active force in every monad, which is combined with primary matter, and from which the active force, vis viva, is somehow derived (“But I rather use ‘entelecheia’ in the original Grecian.” – Grice). “The vitalist philosopher Hans Driesch used the Aristotelian term in his account of biology, and I feel vitalistic on occasion.” “Life, Driesch holds, is not a bowl of cherries, but an entelechy; and an entelechy is a substantial entity, rather like a mind, that controls organic processes.” “To me, life is rather a bowl of cherries, don’t make it serious! It’s just mysterious!”

enthymeme: an incompletely stated syllogism, with one premise, or even the conclusion, omitted. The term sometimes designates incompletely stated arguments of other kinds. We are expected to supply the missing premise or draw the conclusion if it is not stated. The result is supposed to be a syllogistic inference. For example: ‘He will eventually get caught, for he is a thief’; or ‘He will eventually be caught, for all habitual thieves get caught’. This notion of enthymeme as an incompletely stated syllogism has a long tradition and does not seem inconsistent with Aristotle’s own characterization of it. Thus, Peter of Spain openly declares that an enthymeme is an argument with a single premise that needs to be reduced to syllogism. But Peter also points out that Aristotle spoke of enthymeme as “being of ycos and signum,” and he explains that ycos here means ‘probable proposition’ while signum expresses the necessity of inference. ‘P, therefore Q’ is an ycos in the sense of a proposition that appears to be true to all or to many; but insofar as P has virtually a double power, that of itself and of the proposition understood along with it, it is both probable and demonstrative, albeit from a different point of view. 

EPI-STEMIC – Grice: “Philosophers hardly realise how artificial the idea of a Grecian epi-steme is! from epi "over, near" (see epi-) + histasthai "to stand," from PIE root *sta- "to stand, make or be firm." epistemic deontologism, a duty-based view of the nature of epistemic justification. A central concern of epistemology is to account for the distinction between justified and unjustified beliefs. According to epistemic deontologism, the concept of justification may be analyzed by using, in a specific sense relevant to the pursuit of knowledge, terms such as ‘ought’, ‘obligatory’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’. A subject S is justified in believing that p provided S does not violate any epistemic obligations  those that arise from the goal of believing what is true and not believing what is false. Equivalently, S is justified in believing that p provided believing p is  from the point of view taken in the pursuit of truth  permissible for S. Among contemporary epistemologists, this view is held by Chisholm, Laurence BonJour, and Carl Ginet. Its significance is twofold. If justification is a function of meeting obligations, then it is, contrary to some versions of naturalistic epistemology, normative. Second, if the normativity of justification is deontological, the factors that determine whether a belief is justified must be internal to the subject’s mind. Critics of epistemic deontologism, most conspicuously Alston, contend that belief is involuntary and thus cannot be a proper object of obligations. If, e.g., one is looking out the window and notices that it is raining, one is psychologically forced to believe that it is raining. Deontologists can reply to this objection by rejecting its underlying premise: epistemic obligations require that belief be voluntary. Alternatively, they may insist that belief is voluntary after all, and thus subject to epistemic obligations, for there is a means by which one can avoid believing what one ought not to believe: weighing the evidence, or deliberation.  -- epistemic logic, the logical investigation of epistemic concepts and statements. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, evidence, certainty, and related notions. Epistemic logic is usually taken to include the logic of belief or doxastic logic. Much of the recent work on epistemic logic is based on the view that it is a branch of modal logic. In the early 0s von Wright observed that the epistemic notions verified known to be true, undecided, and falsified are related to each other in the same way as the alethic modalities necessary, contingent, and impossible, and behave logically in analogous ways. This analogy is not surprising in view of the fact that the meaning of modal concepts is often explained epistemically. For example, in the 0s Peirce defined informational possibility as that “which in a given state of information is not perfectly known not to be true,” and called informationally necessary “that which is perfectly known to be true.” The modal logic of epistemic and doxastic concepts was studied systematically by Hintikka in his pioneering Knowledge and Belief2, which applied to the concepts of knowledge and belief the semantical method the method of modal sets that he had used earlier for the investigation of modal logic. In this approach, the truth of the proposition that a knows that p briefly Kap in a possible world or situation u is taken to mean that p holds in all epistemic alternatives of u; these are understood as worlds compatible with what a knows at u. If the relation of epistemic alternativeness is reflexive, the principle ‘KapPp’ only what is the case can be known is valid, and the assumption that the alternativeness relation is transitive validates the so-called KK-thesis, ‘Kap P Ka Ka p’ if a knows that p, a knows that a knows that p; these two assumptions together make the logic of knowledge similar to an S4-type modal logic. If the knowledge operator Ka and the corresponding epistemic possibility operator Pa are added to quantification theory with identity, it becomes possible to study the interplay between quantifiers and epistemic operators and the behavior of individual terms in epistemic contexts, and analyze such locutions as ‘a knows who what b some F is’. The problems of epistemic logic in this area are part of the general problem of giving a coherent semantical account of propositional attitudes. If a proposition p is true in all epistemic alternatives of a given world, so are all logical consequences of p; thus the possible-worlds semantics of epistemic concepts outlined above leads to the result that a person knows all logical consequences of what he knows. This is a paradoxical conclusion; it is called the problem of logical omniscience. The solution of this problem requires a distinction between different levels of knowledge  for example, between tacit and explicit knowledge. A more realistic model of knowledge can be obtained by supplementing the basic possible-worlds account by an analysis of the processes by which the implicit knowledge can be activated and made explicit. Modal epistemic logics have found fruitful applications in the recent work on knowledge representation and in the logic and semantics of questions and answers in which questions are interpreted as requests for knowledge or “epistemic imperatives.”  -- epistemic principle, a principle of rationality applicable to such concepts as knowledge, justification, and reasonable belief. Epistemic principles include the principles of epistemic logic and principles that relate different epistemic concepts to one another, or epistemic concepts to nonepistemic ones e.g., semantic concepts. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, epistemic probability, and other concepts that are used for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of beliefs and knowledge claims. Epistemic principles can be formulated as principles concerning belief systems or information systems, i.e., systems that characterize a person’s possible doxastic state at a given time; a belief system may be construed as a set of accepted propositions or as a system of degrees of belief. It is possible to distinguish two kinds of epistemic principles: a principles concerning the rationality of a single belief system, and b principles concerning the rational changes of belief. The former include the requirements of coherence and consistency for beliefs and for probabilities; such principles may be said to concern the statics of belief systems. The latter principles include various principles of belief revision and adjustment, i.e., principles concerning the dynamics of belief systems.  -- epistemic privacy, the relation a person has to a proposition when only that person can have direct or non-inferential knowledge of the proposition. It is widely thought that people have epistemic privacy with respect to propositions about certain of their own mental states. According to this view, a person can know directly that he has certain thoughts or feelings or sensory experiences. Perhaps others can also know that the person has these thoughts, feelings, or experiences, but if they can it is only as a result of inference from propositions about the person’s behavior or physical condition.  -- epistemic regress argument, an argument, originating in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, aiming to show that knowledge and epistemic justification have a two-tier structure as described by epistemic foundationalism. It lends itself to the following outline regarding justification. If you have any justified belief, this belief occurs in an evidential chain including at least two links: the supporting link i.e., the evidence and the supported link i.e., the justified belief. This does not mean, however, that all evidence consists of beliefs. Evidential chains might come in any of four kinds: circular chains, endless chains, chains ending in unjustified beliefs, and chains anchored in foundational beliefs that do not derive their justification from other beliefs. Only the fourth, foundationalist kind is defensible as grounding knowledge and epistemic justification. Could all justification be inferential? A belief, B1, is inferentially justified when it owes its justification, at least in part, to some other belief, B2. Whence the justification for B2? If B2 owes its justification to B1, we have a troublesome circle. How can B2 yield justification or evidence for B1, if B2 owes its evidential status to B1? On the other hand, if B2 owes its justification to another belief, B3, and B3 owes its justification to yet another belief, B4, and so on ad infinitum, we have a troublesome endless regress of justification. Such a regress seems to deliver not actual justification, but at best merely potential justification, for the belief at its head. Actual finite humans, furthermore, seem not to be able to comprehend, or to possess, all the steps of an infinite regress of justification. Finally, if B2 is itself unjustified, it evidently will be unable to provide justification for B1. It seems, then, that the structure of inferential justification does not consist of either circular justification, endless regresses of justification, or unjustified starter-beliefs. We have foundationalism, then, as the most viable account of evidential chains, so long as we understand it as the structural view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially i.e., without deriving justification from other beliefs, but can nonetheless provide justification for other beliefs. More precisely, if we have any justified beliefs, we have some foundational, non-inferentially justified beliefs. This regress argument needs some refinement before its full force can be appreciated. With suitable refinement, however, it can seriously challenge such alternatives to foundationalism as coherentism and contextualism. The regress argument has been a key motivation for foundationalism in the history of epistemology.  -- epistemology from Grecian episteme, ‘knowledge’, and logos, ‘explanation’, the study of the nature of knowledge and justification; specifically, the study of a the defining features, b the substantive conditions or sources, and c the limits of knowledge and justification. The latter three categories are represented by traditional philosophical controversy over the analysis of knowledge and justification, the sources of knowledge and justification e.g., rationalism versus empiricism, and the viability of skepticism about knowledge and justification. Kinds of knowledge. Knowledge can be either explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge is self-conscious in that the knower is aware of the relevant state of knowledge, whereas tacit knowledge is implicit, hidden from self-consciousness. Much of our knowledge is tacit: it is genuine but we are unaware of the relevant states of knowledge, even if we can achieve awareness upon suitable reflection. In this regard, knowledge resembles many of our psychological states. The existence of a psychological state in a person does not require the person’s awareness of that state, although it may require the person’s awareness of an object of that state such as what is sensed or perceived. Philosophers have identified various species of knowledge: for example, propositional knowledge that something is so, non-propositional knowledge of something e.g., knowledge by acquaintance, or by direct awareness, empirical a posteriori propositional knowledge, nonempirical a priori propositional knowledge, and knowledge of how to do something. Philosophical controversy has arisen over distinctions between such species, for example, over i the relations between some of these species e.g., does knowing-how reduce to knowledge-that?, and ii the viability of some of these species e.g., is there really such a thing as, or even a coherent notion of, a priori knowledge?. A primary concern of classical modern philosophy, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the extent of our a priori knowledge relative to the extent of our a posteriori knowledge. Such rationalists as Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza contended that all genuine knowledge of the real world is a priori, whereas such empiricists as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume argued that all such knowledge is a posteriori. In his Critique of Pure Reason 1781, Kant sought a grand reconciliation, aiming to preserve the key lessons of both rationalism and empiricism. Since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a posteriori knowledge has been widely regarded as knowledge that depends for its supporting ground on some specific sensory or perceptual experience; and a priori knowledge has been widely regarded as knowledge that does not depend for its supporting ground on such experience. Kant and others have held that the supporting ground for a priori knowledge comes solely from purely intellectual processes called “pure reason” or “pure understanding.” Knowledge of logical and mathematical truths typically serves as a standard case of a priori knowledge, whereas knowledge of the existence or presence of physical objects typically serves as a standard case of a posteriori knowledge. A major task for an account of a priori knowledge is the explanation of what the relevant purely intellectual processes are, and of how they contribute to non-empirical knowledge. An analogous task for an account of a posteriori knowledge is the explanation of what sensory or perceptual experience is and how it contributes to empirical knowledge. More fundamentally, epistemologists have sought an account of propositional knowledge in general, i.e., an account of what is common to a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Ever since Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus c.400 B.C., epistemologists have tried to identify the essential, defining components of knowledge. Identifying these components will yield an analysis of knowledge. A prominent traditional view, suggested by Plato and Kant among others, is that propositional knowledge that something is so has three individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This is the tripartite definition that has come to be called the standard analysis. We can clarify it by attending briefly to each of its three conditions. The belief condition. This requires that anyone who knows that p where ‘p’ stands for any proposition or statement must believe that p. If, therefore, you do not believe that minds are brains say, because you have not considered the matter at all, then you do not know that minds are brains. A knower must be psychologically related somehow to a proposition that is an object of knowledge for that knower. Proponents of the standard analysis hold that only belief can provide the needed psychological relation. Philosophers do not share a uniform account of belief, but some considerations supply common ground. Beliefs are not actions of assenting to a proposition; they rather are dispositional psychological states that can exist even when unmanifested. You do not cease believing that 2 ! 2 % 4, for example, whenever your attention leaves arithmetic. Our believing that p seems to require that we have a tendency to assent to p in certain situations, but it seems also to be more than just such a tendency. What else believing requires remains highly controversial among philosophers. Some philosophers have opposed the belief condition of the standard analysis on the ground that we can accept, or assent to, a known proposition without actually believing it. They contend that we can accept a proposition even if we fail to acquire a tendency, required by believing, to accept that proposition in certain situations. On this view, acceptance is a psychological act that does not entail any dispositional psychological state, and such acceptance is sufficient to relate a knower psychologically to a known proposition. However this view fares, one underlying assumption of the standard analysis seems correct: our concept of knowledge requires that a knower be psychologically related somehow to a known proposition. Barring that requirement, we shall be hard put to explain how knowers psychologically possess their knowledge of known propositions. Even if knowledge requires belief, belief that p does not require knowledge that p, since belief can typically be false. This observation, familiar from Plato’s Theaetetus, assumes that knowledge has a truth condition. On the standard analysis, if you know that p, then it is true that p. If, therefore, it is false that minds are brains, then you do not know that minds are brains. It is thus misleading to say, e.g., that astronomers before Copernicus knew that the earth is flat; at best, they justifiably believed that they knew this. The truth condition. This condition of the standard analysis has not attracted any serious challenge. Controversy over it has focused instead on Pilate’s vexing question: What is truth? This question concerns what truth consists in, not our ways of finding out what is true. Influential answers come from at least three approaches: truth as correspondence i.e., agreement, of some specified sort, between a proposition and an actual situation; truth as coherence i.e., interconnectedness of a proposition with a specified system of propositions; and truth as pragmatic cognitive value i.e., usefulness of a proposition in achieving certain intellectual goals. Without assessing these prominent approaches, we should recognize, in accord with the standard analysis, that our concept of knowledge seems to have a factual requirement: we epistemology epistemology 274   274 genuinely know that p only if it is the case that p. The pertinent notion of “its being the case” seems equivalent to the notion of “how reality is” or “how things really are.” The latter notion seems essential to our notion of knowledge, but is open to controversy over its explication. The justification condition. Knowledge is not simply true belief. Some true beliefs are supported only by lucky guesswork and hence do not qualify as knowledge. Knowledge requires that the satisfaction of its belief condition be “appropriately related” to the satisfaction of its truth condition. This is one broad way of understanding the justification condition of the standard analysis. More specifically, we might say that a knower must have adequate indication that a known proposition is true. If we understand such adequate indication as a sort of evidence indicating that a proposition is true, we have reached the traditional general view of the justification condition: justification as evidence. Questions about justification attract the lion’s share of attention in contemporary epistemology. Controversy focuses on the meaning of ‘justification’ as well as on the substantive conditions for a belief’s being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge. Current debates about the meaning of ‘justification’ revolve around the question whether, and if so how, the concept of epistemic knowledge-relevant justification is normative. Since the 0s Chisholm has defended the following deontological obligation-oriented notion of justification: the claim that a proposition, p, is epistemically justified for you means that it is false that you ought to refrain from accepting p. In other terms, to say that p is epistemically justified is to say that accepting p is epistemically permissible  at least in the sense that accepting p is consistent with a certain set of epistemic rules. This deontological construal enjoys wide representation in contemporary epistemology. A normative construal of justification need not be deontological; it need not use the notions of obligation and permission. Alston, for instance, has introduced a non-deontological normative concept of justification that relies mainly on the notion of what is epistemically good from the viewpoint of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity. Alston links epistemic goodness to a belief’s being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reasons to the contrary. Some epistemologists shun normative construals of justification as superfluous. One noteworthy view is that ‘epistemic justification’ means simply ‘evidential support’ of a certain sort. To say that p is epistemically justifiable to some extent for you is, on this view, just to say that p is supportable to some extent by your overall evidential reasons. This construal will be non-normative so long as the notions of supportability and an evidential reason are nonnormative. Some philosophers have tried to explicate the latter notions without relying on talk of epistemic permissibility or epistemic goodness. We can understand the relevant notion of “support” in terms of non-normative notions of entailment and explanation or, answering why-questions. We can understand the notion of an “evidential reason” via the notion of a psychological state that can stand in a certain truth-indicating support relation to propositions. For instance, we might regard nondoxastic states of “seeming to perceive” something e.g., seeming to see a dictionary here as foundational truth indicators for certain physical-object propositions e.g., the proposition that there is a dictionary here, in virtue of those states being best explained by those propositions. If anything resembling this approach succeeds, we can get by without the aforementioned normative notions of epistemic justification. Foundationalism versus coherentism. Talk of foundational truth indicators brings us to a key controversy over justification: Does epistemic justification, and thus knowledge, have foundations, and if so, in what sense? This question can be clarified as the issue whether some beliefs can not only a have their epistemic justification non-inferentially i.e., apart from evidential support from any other beliefs, but also b provide epistemic justification for all justified beliefs that lack such non-inferential justification. Foundationalism gives an affirmative answer to this issue, and is represented in varying ways by, e.g., Aristotle, Descartes, Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Chisholm. Foundationalists do not share a uniform account of non-inferential justification. Some construe non-inferential justification as self-justification. Others reject literal self-justification for beliefs, and argue that foundational beliefs have their non-inferential justification in virtue of evidential support from the deliverances of non-belief psychological states, e.g., perception “seem-ing-to-perceive” states, sensation “seeming-to-sense” states, or memory “seeming-toremember” states. Still others understand noninferential justification in terms of a belief’s being “reliably produced,” i.e., caused and sustained by some non-belief belief-producing process or source e.g., perception, memory, introspection that tends to produce true rather than false beliefs. This last view takes the causal source of a belief to be crucial to its justification. Unlike Descartes, contemporary foundationalists clearly separate claims to non-inferential, foundational justification from claims to certainty. They typically settle for a modest foundationalism implying that foundational beliefs need not be indubitable or infallible. This contrasts with the radical foundationalism of Descartes. The traditional competitor to foundationalism is the coherence theory of justification, i.e., epistemic coherentism. This is not the coherence definition of truth; it rather is the view that the justification of any belief depends on that belief’s having evidential support from some other belief via coherence relations such as entailment or explanatory relations. Notable proponents include Hegel, Bosanquet, and Sellars. A prominent contemporary version of epistemic coherentism states that evidential coherence relations among beliefs are typically explanatory relations. The rough idea is that a belief is justified for you so long as it either best explains, or is best explained by, some member of the system of beliefs that has maximal explanatory power for you. Contemporary coherentism is uniformly systemic or holistic; it finds the ultimate source of justification in a system of interconnected beliefs or potential beliefs. One problem has troubled all versions of coherentism that aim to explain empirical justification: the isolation argument. According to this argument, coherentism entails that you can be epistemically justified in accepting an empirical proposition that is incompatible with, or at least improbable given, your total empirical evidence. The key assumption of this argument is that your total empirical evidence includes non-belief sensory and perceptual awareness-states, such as your feeling pain or your seeming to see something. These are not belief-states. Epistemic coherentism, by definition, makes justification a function solely of coherence relations between propositions, such as propositions one believes or accepts. Thus, such coherentism seems to isolate justification from the evidential import of non-belief awareness-states. Coherentists have tried to handle this problem, but no resolution enjoys wide acceptance. Causal and contextualist theories. Some contemporary epistemologists endorse contextualism regarding epistemic justification, a view suggested by Dewey, Vitters, and Kuhn, among others. On this view, all justified beliefs depend for their evidential support on some unjustified beliefs that need no justification. In any context of inquiry, people simply assume the acceptability of some propositions as starting points for inquiry, and these “contextually basic” propositions, though lacking evidential support, can serve as evidential support for other propositions. Contextualists stress that contextually basic propositions can vary from context to context e.g., from theological inquiry to biological inquiry and from social group to social group. The main problem for contextualists comes from their view that unjustified assumptions can provide epistemic justification for other propositions. We need a precise explanation of how an unjustified assumption can yield evidential support, how a non-probable belief can make another belief probable. Contextualists have not given a uniform explanation here. Recently some epistemologists have recommended that we give up the traditional evidence condition for knowledge. They recommend that we construe the justification condition as a causal condition. Roughly, the idea is that you know that p if and only if a you believe that p, b p is true, and c your believing that p is causally produced and sustained by the fact that makes p true. This is the basis of the causal theory of knowing, which comes with varying details. Any such causal theory faces serious problems from our knowledge of universal propositions. Evidently, we know, for instance, that all dictionaries are produced by people, but our believing that this is so seems not to be causally supported by the fact that all dictionaries are humanly produced. It is not clear that the latter fact causally produces any beliefs. Another problem is that causal theories typically neglect what seems to be crucial to any account of the justification condition: the requirement that justificational support for a belief be accessible, in some sense, to the believer. The rough idea is that one must be able to access, or bring to awareness, the justification underlying one’s beliefs. The causal origins of a belief are, of course, often very complex and inaccessible to a believer. Causal theories thus face problems from an accessibility requirement on justification. Internalism regarding justification preserves an accessibility requirement on what confers justification, whereas epistemic externalism rejects this requirement. Debates over internalism and externalism abound in current epistemology, but internalists do not yet share a uniform detailed account of accessibility. The Gettier problem. The standard analysis of knowledge, however elaborated, faces a devastating challenge that initially gave rise to causal theories of knowledge: the Gettier problem. In 3 Edmund Gettier published a highly influential challenge to the view that if you have a justified true belief that p, then you know that p. Here is one of Gettier’s counterexamples to this view: Smith is justified in believing the false proposition that i Jones owns a Ford. On the basis of i, Smith infers, and thus is justified in believing, that ii either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. As it happens, Brown is in Barcelona, and so ii is true. So, although Smith is justified in believing the true proposition ii, Smith does not know ii. Gettier-style counterexamples are cases where a person has justified true belief that p but lacks knowledge that p. The Gettier problem is the problem of finding a modification of, or an alternative to, the standard analysis that avoids difficulties from Gettier-style counterexamples. The controversy over the Gettier problem is highly complex and still unsettled. Many epistemologists take the lesson of Gettier-style counterexamples to be that propositional knowledge requires a fourth condition, beyond the justification, truth, and belief conditions. No specific fourth condition has received overwhelming acceptance, but some proposals have become prominent. The so-called defeasibility condition, e.g., requires that the justification appropriate to knowledge be “undefeated” in the general sense that some appropriate subjunctive conditional concerning defeaters of justification be true of that justification. For instance, one simple defeasibility fourth condition requires of Smith’s knowing that p that there be no true proposition, q, such that if q became justified for Smith, p would no longer be justified for Smith. So if Smith knows, on the basis of his visual perception, that Mary removed books from the library, then Smith’s coming to believe the true proposition that Mary’s identical twin removed books from the library would not undermine the justification for Smith’s belief concerning Mary herself. A different approach shuns subjunctive conditionals of that sort, and contends that propositional knowledge requires justified true belief that is sustained by the collective totality of actual truths. This approach requires a detailed account of when justification is undermined and restored. The Gettier problem is epistemologically important. One branch of epistemology seeks a precise understanding of the nature e.g., the essential components of propositional knowledge. Our having a precise understanding of propositional knowledge requires our having a Gettier-proof analysis of such knowledge. Epistemologists thus need a defensible solution to the Gettier problem, however complex that solution is. Skepticism. Epistemologists debate the limits, or scope, of knowledge. The more restricted we take the limits of knowledge to be, the more skeptical we are. Two influential types of skepticism are knowledge skepticism and justification skepticism. Unrestricted knowledge skepticism implies that no one knows anything, whereas unrestricted justification skepticism implies the more extreme view that no one is even justified in believing anything. Some forms of skepticism are stronger than others. Knowledge skepticism in its strongest form implies that it is impossible for anyone to know anything. A weaker form would deny the actuality of our having knowledge, but leave open its possibility. Many skeptics have restricted their skepticism to a particular domain of supposed knowledge: e.g., knowledge of the external world, knowledge of other minds, knowledge of the past or the future, or knowledge of unperceived items. Such limited skepticism is more common than unrestricted skepticism in the history of epistemology. Arguments supporting skepticism come in many forms. One of the most difficult is the problem of the criterion, a version of which has been stated by the sixteenth-century skeptic Montaigne: “To adjudicate [between the true and the false] among the appearances of things, we need to have a distinguishing method; to validate this method, we need to have a justifying argument; but to validate this justifying argument, we need the very method at issue. And there we are, going round on the wheel.” This line of skeptical argument originated in ancient Greece, with epistemology itself. It forces us to face this question: How can we specify what we know without having specified how we know, and how can we specify how we know without having specified what we know? Is there any reasonable way out of this threatening circle? This is one of the most difficult epistemological problems, and a cogent epistemology must offer a defensible solution to epistemology epistemology 277   277 it. Contemporary epistemology still lacks a widely accepted reply to this urgent problem

erfahrung: Grice used the German, ‘since I find it difficult to translate.” G. term tr. into English, especially since Kant, as ‘experience’. Kant does not use it as a technical term; rather, it indicates that which requires explanation through more precisely drawn technical distinctions such as those among ‘sensibility’, ‘understanding’, and ‘reason’. In the early twentieth century, Husserl sometimes distinguishes between Erfahrung and Erlebnis, the former indicating experience as capable of being thematized and methodically described or analyzed, the latter experience as “lived through” and never fully available to analysis. Such a distinction occasionally reappears in later texts of phenomenology and existentialism. 

eristic, the art of controversy, often involving fallacious but persuasive reasoning. The ancient Sophists brought this art to a high level to achieve their personal goal. They may have found their material in the “encounters” in the law courts as well as in daily life. To enhance persuasion they endorsed the use of unsound principles such as hasty generalizations, faulty analogies, illegitimate appeal to authority, the post hoc ergo propter hoc i.e., “after this, therefore because of this” and other presumed principles. Aristotle exposed eristic argumentation in his Sophistical Refutations, which itself draws examples from Plato’s Euthydemus. From this latter work comes the famous example: ‘That dog is a father and that dog is his, therefore that dog is his father’. What is perhaps worse than its obvious invalidity is that the argument is superficially similar to a sound argument such as ‘This is a table and this is brown, therefore this is a brown table’. In the Sophistical Refutations Aristotle undertakes to find procedures for detection of bad arguments and to propose rules for constructing sound arguments. 

erlebnis: G. Grice used the German term, “since I find it difficult to translate it” -- term for experience used in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century G. philosophy. Erlebnis denotes experience in all its direct immediacy and lived fullness. It contrasts with the more typical G. word Erfahrung, denoting ordinary experience as mediated through intellectual and constructive elements. As immediate, Erlebnis eludes conceptualization, in both the lived present and the interiority of experience. As direct, Erlebnis is also disclosive and extraordinary: it reveals something real that otherwise escapes thinking. Typical examples include art, religion, and love, all of which also show the anti-rationalist and polemical uses of the concept. It is especially popular among the Romantic mystics like Novalis and the anti-rationalists Nietzsche and Bergson, as well as in phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie, and existentialism. As used in post-Hegelian G. philosophy, the term describes two aspects of subjectivity. The first concerns the epistemology of the human sciences and of phenomenology. Against naturalism and objectivism, philosophers appeal to the ineliminable, subjective qualities of experience to argue that interpreters must understand “what it is like to be” some experiencing subject, from the inside. The second use of the term is to denote extraordinary and interior experiences like art, religion, freedom, and vital energy. In both cases, it is unclear how such experience could be identified or known in its immediacy, and much recent G. thought, such as Heidegger and hermeneutics, rejects the concept. 

erotetic: in the strict sense, pertaining to questions. Erotetic logic is the logic of questions. Different conceptions of questions yield different kinds of erotetic logic. A Platonistic approach holds that questions exist independently of interrogatives. For P. Tichý, a question is a function on possible worlds, the right answer being the value of the function at the actual world. Erotetic logic is the logic of such functions. In the epistemic-imperative approach of L. Bqvist, Hintikka, et al., one begins with a system for epistemic sentences and embeds this in a system for imperative sentences, thus obtaining sentences of the form ‘make it the case that I know . . .’ and complex compounds of such sentences. Certain ones of these are defined to be interrogatives. Then erotetic logic is the logic of epistemic imperatives and the conditions for satisfaction of these imperatives. In the abstract interrogative approach of N. Belnap, T. Kubigski, and many others, one chooses certain types of expression to serve as interrogatives, and, for each type, specifies what expressions count as answers of various kinds direct, partial, . . .. On this approach we may say that interrogatives express questions, or we may identify questions with interrogatives, in which case the only meaning that an interrogative has is that it has the answers that it does. Either way, the emphasis is on interrogatives, and erotetic logic is the logic of systems that provide interrogatives and specify answers to them. In the broad sense, ‘erotetic’ designates what pertains to utterance-and-response. In this sense erotetic logic is the logic of the relations between 1 sentences of many kinds and 2 the expressions that count as appropriate replies to them. This includes not only the relations between question and answer but also, e.g., between assertion and agreement or denial, command and report of compliance or refusal, and for many types of sentence S between S and various corrective replies to S e.g., denial of the presupposition of S. Erotetic logics may differ in the class of sentences treated, the types of response counted as appropriate, the assignment of other content presupposition, projection, etc., and other details. 

eschatologicum: Possibly related to Latin ‘summum, ‘as in ‘summum genus,’ and ‘summun bonum. From Greek, 5. in the Logic of Arist., τὰ ἔ. are the last or lowest species, Metaph.1059b26, or individuals, ib.998b16, cf. AP0.96b12, al.; “τὸ ἔ. ἄτομον” Metaph.1058b10. b. ὁ ἔ. ὅρος the minor term of a syllogism, EN1147b14. c. last step in geom. analysis or ultimate condition of action, “τὸ ἔ. ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως” de An.433a16. II. Adv. -τως to the uttermost, exceedingly, “πῦρ ἐ. καίει” Hp.de Arte8; “ἐ. διαμάχεσθαι” Arist.HA613a11 ; “ἐ. φιλοπόλεμος” X.An.2.6.1 ; “φοβοῦμαί σ᾽ ἐ.” Men.912, cf. Epicur.Ep. 1p.31U. b. -τως διακεῖσθαι to be at the last extremity, Plb.1.24.2, D.S.18.48 ; “ἔχειν” Ev.Marc.5.23 ; “ἀπορεῖν” Phld.Oec.p.72J. 2. so ἐς τὸ ἔ.,=ἐσχάτως, Hdt.7.229; “εἰς τὰ ἔ.” X.HG5.4.33 ; “εἰς τὰ ἔ. μάλα” Id.Lac.1.2 ; “τὸ ἔ.” finally, in the end, Pl.Grg.473c ; but, τὸ ἔ. what is worst of all, ib.508d. Why ontology is not enough. The philosopher needs to PLAY with cross-categorial barriers. He is an eschatologist. Socrates was. being and good, for Aristotle and Grice cover all. Good was a favourite of Moore and Hare, as Barnes was well aware! Like Barnes, Grice dislikes Prichards analysis of good. He leans towards the emotion-based approach by Ogden. If Grice, like Humpty Dumpty, opposes the Establishment with his meaning liberalism (what a word means is what I mean by uttering it), he certainly should be concerned with category shifts. Plus, Grice was a closet Platonist. As Plato once remarked, having the ability to see horses but not horsehood (ἱππότης) is a mark of stupidity – rendered by Liddell and Scott as “horse-nature, the concept of horse” (Antisth. et Pl. ap. Simp.in Cat.208.30,32, Sch.AristId.p.167F). Grice would endure the flinty experience of giving joint seminars at Oxford with Austin on the first two books of Aristotles Organon, Categoriae, and De Int. Grice finds the use of a category, κατηγορία, by Aristotle a bit of a geniality. Aristotle is using legalese, from kata, against, on, and agoreuô [ἀγορεύω], speak in public), and uses it to designate both the prosecution in a trial and the attribution in a logical proposition, i. e., the questions that must be asked with regard to a Subjects, and the answers that can be given. As a representative of the linguistic turn in philosophy, Grice is attracted to the idea that a category can thus be understood variously, as applying to the realm of reality (ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of expression) and to philosophical psychology (category of representation). Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate, shall we say, categories: his explorations with Austin (very serious), and those with Strawson (more congenial). Where is Smiths altruism? Nowhere to be seen. Should we say it is idle (otiose) to speak of altruism? No, it is just an attribute, which, via category shift, can be made the Subjects of your sentence, Strawson. It is not spatio-temporal, though, right. Not really.  ‒ I do not particularly like your trouser words. The essay is easy to date since Grice notes that Strawson reproduced some of the details in his Individuals, which we can very well date. Grice thought Aristotle was the best! Or at any rate almost as good as Kantotle! Aristotle saw Categoriæ, along with De Int. as part of his Organon. However, philosophers of language tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts of the Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics ‒ the boring bits! The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian category (as Austin and Strawson equally were) is that category allows for a linguistic-turn reading. Plus, its a nice, pretentious (in the Oxonian way) piece of philosophical jargon! Aristotle couldnt find category in the koine, so he had to coin it. While meant by Aristotle in a primarily ontological way, Oxonian philosophers hasten to add that a category of expression, as Grice puts it, is just as valid a topic for philosophical exploration. His tutee Strawson will actually publish a book on Subjects and predicate in grammar! (Trivial, Strawson!). Grice will later add an intermediary category, which is the Subjects of his philosophical psychology. As such, a category can be construed ontologically, or representationally: the latter involving philosophical psychological concepts, and expressions themselves. For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford (Only the poor learn at Oxford ‒ Arnold), there are (at least ‒ at most?) ten categories. Grice doesnt (really) care about the number. But the first are important. Actually the very first: theres substantia prima, such as Grice. And then theres substantia secunda, such as Grices rationality. The essentia. Then there are various types of attributes. But, as Grice sharply notes, even substantia secunda may be regarded as an attribute. Grices favourite game with Strawson was indeed Category Shift, or Subjects-ification, as Strawson preferred. Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute. We would have substantia prima AND attribute, which in turn gets divided into essential, the izzing, and non-essential, the hazzing. While Austin is not so fun to play with, Strawson is. Smith is a very altruist person. Where is his altruism? Nowhere to be seen, really. Yet we may sensically speak of Smiths altruism. It is just a matter of a category shift. Grice scores. Grice is slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understands, that Strawson, who footnotes Grice as the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic in Introduction to logical lheory, fails to acknowledge that most of the research in Strawsons Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations at joint seminars with Grice. Grice later elaborates on this with Code, who is keen on Grices other game, the hazz and the hazz not, the izz. But then tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics sounds slightlier clumsier, as far as the implicaturum goes. Categories, the Grice-Myro theory of identity, Relative identity, Grice on =, identity, notes, with Myro, metaphysics, philosophy, with Code, Grice izz Grice – or izz he? The idea that = is unqualified requires qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didnt. Grice wants to allow for It is the case that a = b /t1 and it is not the case that a = b /t2. The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a Leibnizian bent are too accustomed to deal with = as an absolute. Grice applies this to human vs. person. A human may be identical to a person, but cease to be so. Indeed, Grices earlier attempt to produce a reductive analsysis of I may be seen as remedying a circularity he detected in Locke about same. Cf. Wiggins, Sameness and substance. Grice makes Peano feel deeply Griceian, as Grice lists his = postulates, here for consideration. And if you wondered why Grice prefers Latinate individuum to the Grecian. The Grecian is “ἄτομον,” in logic, rendered by L and S as ‘individual, of terms,’ Pl. Sph. 229d; of the εἶδος or forma, Arist. Metaph.1034a8, de An. 414b27.2. individual, Id. APo. 96b11, al.: as a subst., τό ἄτομον, Id. Cat. 1b6, 3a38, Metaph.1058a18 (pl.), Plot. 6.2.2, al. subst.; latinised from Grecian. Lewis and Short have “indīvĭdŭum,” an atom, indivisible particle: ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni affirmat, Cic. Ac. 2, 17 fin.: ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit, id. N. D. 3, 12, 29. Note the use of individuum in alethic modalities for necessity and possibility, starting with (11).  ⊢ (α izzes α). This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. Grice applies it to war: War is war, as yielding a most peculiar implicaturum. (α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ) ⊃ α izzes γ. This above is transitivity, which is crucial for Grices tackling of Reids counterexample to Locke (and which according to Flew in Locke on personal identity was predated by Berkeley.  α hazzes β ⊃ ~(α izzes β). Or, what is accidental is not essential. Grice allows that what is essential is accidental is, while misleading, true. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β)  ⊢ (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes a forma). This above defines a universalium as a forma, or eidos. (α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular) ⊃ (∃γ).(γ≠α ∧ α izzes β) ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α)  ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α  ⊢ α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) α = β ⊃⊂ α izzes β ∧ β izzes α  ⊢ α izzes an individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β)  ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)); α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)  ⊢ α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum.  ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium) 16. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α)  ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of α  ⊢ α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β; ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β 20. α izzes a particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) 22. ⊢~ (∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma) α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α)  x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izz β)  ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazz α); α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazz A)  ⊢ (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α) ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing); (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing) ⊢ α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α); (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β)⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. The use of this or that doxastic modality, necessity and possibility, starting above, make this a good place to consider one philosophical mistake Grice mentions in “Causal theory.” What is actual is not also possible. Cf. What is essential is also accidental. He is criticising a contemporary, if possible considered dated in the New World, form of ordinary-language philosophy, where the philosopher detects a nuance, and embarks risking colliding with the facts, rushing ahead to exploit it before he can clarify it! Grice liked to see his explorations on = as belonging to metaphysics, as the s.  on his Doctrines at the Grice Collection testifies. While Grice presupposes the use of = in his treatment of the king of France, he also explores a relativisation of =. His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against Strawsons criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the substantia prima. Grice wants to apply = to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that a=b in scenario S, but that it may not be the case that a = b in a second scenario S. Myro had an occasion to expand on Grices views in his contribution on the topic for PGRICE. Myro mentions his System Ghp, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grices System Q, in gratitude to to Grice. Grice explored also the logic of izzing and hazzing with Code. Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of qualified identity. The formal aspects were developed by Myro, and also by Code. Grice discussed Wigginss Sameness and substance, rather than Geach. Cf. Wiggins and Strawson on Grice for the BA. At Oxford, Grice was more or less given free rein to teach what he wanted. He found the New World slightly disconcerting at first. At Oxford, he expected his tutees to be willing to read the classics in the vernacular Greek. His approach to teaching was diagogic, as Socratess! Even in his details of izzing and hazzing. Greek enough to me!, as a student recalled! correspondence with Code, Grice sees in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotles underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as izzing and hazing, izzing and hazzing, Code on the significance of the middle book in Aristotles Met. , Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book. Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this! The organisation of Aristotle’s metaphysics was a topic of much concern for Grice. With Code, Grice coined izzing and hazzing to refer to essential and non-essential attribution. Izzing and hazzing, “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being” (henceforth, “Aristotle”) PPQ, Aristotle on multiplicity, “The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly” (henceforth, “PPQ,” posthumously ed. by Loar, Aristotle, multiplicity, izzing, hazzing, being, good, Code. Grice offers a thorough discussion of Owens treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the snares of ontology. Grice distinguishes between izzing and hazzing, which he thinks help in clarifying, more axiomatico, what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on essential versus non-essential predication. Surely, for Grice, being, nor indeed good, should not be multiplied beyond necessity, but izzing and hazzing are already multiplied. The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication by Loar in memoriam Grice. Note that the Grice Papers contains a typically Griceian un-publication, entitled Aristotle and multiplicity simpliciter. Rather than Aristotle on, as the title for the PPQ piece goes. Note also that, since its multiplicity simpliciter, it refers to Aristotle on two key ideas: being and the good. As Code notes in his contribution to PGRICE, Grice first presents his thoughts on izzing and hazzing publicly at Vancouver. Jones has developed the axiomatic treatment favoured by Grice. For Grice there is multiplicity in both being and good (ton agathon), both accountable in terms of conversational implicatura, of course. If in Prolegomena, Grice was interested in criticising himself, in essays of historical nature like these, Grice is seeing Aristotles Athenian dialectic as a foreshadow of the Oxonian dialectic, and treating him as an equal. Grice is yielding his razor: senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. But then Aristotle is talking about the multiplicity of is and is good. Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be! There is a further item in the Grice collection that combines Aristotle on being with Aristotle on good, which is relevant in connection with this. Aristotle on being and good (ἀγαθόν). Aristotle, being, good (agathon), ἀγαθός. As from this f., the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with Aristotle, Grice will explore Aristotle on being or is and good (ἀγαθός) in explorations with Code. Grice comes up with izzing and hazzing as the two counterparts to Aristotles views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication. Grices views on Aristotle on the good (strictly, there is no need to restrict Arisstotles use to the neuter form, since he employs ἀγαθός) connect with Grices Aristotelian idea of eudaemonia, that he explores elsewhere. Strictly: Aristotle on being and the good. If that had been Grices case, he would have used the definite article. Otherwise, good may well translate as masculine, ἀγαθός ‒the agathetic implicaturum.  He plays with Dodgson, cabbages and kings. For what is a good cabbage as opposed to a cabbage? It does not require very sharp eyes, but only our willingness to use the eyes one has, to see that speech is permeated with the notion of purpose. To say what a certain kind of thing is is only too frequently partly to say that it is for. This feature applies to talk of, e. g., ships, shoes, sailing wax, and kings; and, possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it extends even to cabbages! Although Grice suspects Urmson might disagree. v. Grice on Urmsons apples. Grice at his jocular best. If he is going to be a Kantian, he will. He uses Kantian jargon to present his theory of conversation. This he does only at Harvard. The implicaturum being that talking of vaguer assumptions of helpfulness would not sound too convincing. So he has the maxim, the super-maxim, and the sub-maxim. A principle and a maxim is Kantian enough. But when he actually echoes Kant, is when he introduces what he later calls the conversational categories – the keyword here is conversational category, as categoria is used by Aristotle and Kant  ‒ or Kantotle. Grice surely knew that, say, his Category of Conversational Modality had nothing to do with the Kantian Category of Modality. Still, he stuck with the idea of four categories (versus Aristotles ten, eight or seven, as the text you consult may tell you): category of conversational quantity (which at Oxford he had formulated in much vaguer terms like strength and informativeness and entailment), the category of conversational quality (keyword: principle of conversational trust), and the category of conversational relation, where again Kants relation has nothing to do with the maxim Grice associates with this category. In any case, his Kantian joke may be helpful when considering the centrality of the concept category simpliciter that Grice had to fight with with his pupils at Oxford – he was lucky to have Austin and Strawson as co-lecturers! Grice was irritated by L and S defining kategoria as category. I guess I knew that. He agreed with their second shot, predicable. Ultimately, Grices concern with category is his concern with person, or prote ousia, as used by Aristotle, and as giving a rationale to Grices agency-based approach to the philosophical enterprise. Aristotle used kategorein in the sense of to predicate, assert something of something, and kategoria. The prote ousia is exemplified by o tis anthropos. It is obvious that Grice wants to approach Aristotles semantics and Aristotles metaphysics at one fell swoop. Grice reads Aristotles Met. , and finds it understandable. Consider the adjective French (which Aristotle does NOT consider) ‒ as it occurs in phrases such as Michel Foucault is a French citizen.  Grice is not a French citizen. Michel Foucault once wrote a nice French poem.  Urmson once wrote a nice French essay on pragmatics. Michel Foucault was a French professor.  Michel Foucault is a French professor.  Michel Foucault is a French professor of philosophy. The following features are perhaps significant. The appearance of the adjective French, or Byzantine, as the case might be ‒ cf. I’m feeling French tonight. In these phrases is what Grice has as adjunctive rather than conjunctive, or attributive. A French poem is not necessarily something which combines the separate features of being a poem and being French, as a tall philosopher would simply combine the features of being tall and of being a philosopher. French in French poem, occurs adverbially. French citizen standardly means citizen of France. French poem standardly means poem in French. But it is a mistake to suppose that this fact implies that there is this or that meaning, or, worse, this or that Fregeian sense, of the expression French.  In any case, only metaphorically or metabolically can we say that French means this or that or has sense. An utterer means. An utterer makes sense. Cf. R. Pauls doubts about capitalizing major. French means, and figuratively at that, only one thing, viz. of or pertaining to France. And English only means of or pertaining to England.  French may be what Grice (unfollowing his remarks on The general theory of context) call context-sensitive. One might indeed say, if you like, that while French means ‒ or means only this or that, or that its only sense is this or that, French still means, again figuratively, a variety of things. French means-in-context of or pertaining to France. Symbolise that as expression E means-in-context that p. Expression E means-in-context C₂ that p₂. Relative to Context C₁ French means of France; as in the phrase French citizen. Relative to context C₂, French means  in the French language, as in the phrase, French poem ‒ whereas history does not behave, like this. Whether the focal item is a universal or a particular is, contra Aristotle, quite irrelevant to the question of what this or that related adjective means, or what its sense is. The medical art is no more what an utterer means when he utters the adjective medical, as is France what an utterer means by the adjective French. While the attachment of this or that context may suggest an interpretation in context of this or that expression as uttered by the utterer U, it need not be the case that such a suggestion is indefeasible. It might be e.g. that French poem would have to mean, poem composed in French, unless there were counter indications, that brings the utterer and the addressee to a different context C₃. In which case, perhaps what the utterer means by French poem is poem composed by a French competitor in this or that competition. For French professor there would be two obvious things an utterer might mean. Disambiguation will depend on the wider  expression-context  or in the situational context attaching to the this or that circumstance of utterance. Eschatology. Some like Hegel, but Collingwoods *my* man!  ‒ Grice. Grice participated in two consecutive evenings of the s. of programmes on metaphysics organised by Pears. Actually, charming Pears felt pretentious enough to label the meetings to be about the nature of metaphysics! Grice ends up discussing, as he should, Collingwood on presupposition. Met.  remained a favourite topic for Grices philosophical explorations, as it is evident from his essay on Met. , Philosophical Eschatology, and Platos Republic, repr. in his WOW . Possibly Hardie is to blame, since he hardly tutored Grice on metaphysics! Grices two BBC lectures are typically dated in tone. It was the (good ole) days when philosophers thought they could educate the non-elite by dropping Namess like Collingwood and stuff! The Third Programme was extremely popular, especially among the uneducated ones at London, as Pears almost put it, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know what is going on down at Oxford, the only place an uneducated (or educated, for that matter) Londoner at the time was interested in displaying some interest about! I mean, Johnson is right: if a man is tired of the nature of metaphysics, he is tired of life! Since the authorship is Grice, Strawson, and Pears, Met. , in Pears, The Nature of Met., The BBC Third Programme, it is somewhat difficult to identify what paragraphs were actually read by Grice (and which ones by Pears and which ones by Strawson). But trust the sharp Griceian to detect the correct implicaturum! There are many (too many) other items covered by these two lectures: Kant, Aristotle, in no particular order. And in The Grice Collection, for that matter, that cover the field of metaphysics. In the New World, as a sort of tutor in the graduate programme, Grice was expected to cover the discipline at various seminars. Only I dislike discipline! Perhaps his clearest exposition is in the opening section of his Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos Republic, repr. in his WOW , where he states, bluntly that all you need is  metaphysics! metaphysics, Miscellaneous, metaphysics notes, Grice would possible see metaphysics as a class – category figuring large. He was concerned with the methodological aspects of the metaphysical enterprise, since he was enough of a relativist to allow for one metaphysical scheme to apply to one area of discourse (one of Eddingtons tables) and another metaphysical scheme to apply to another (Eddingtons other table). In the third programme for the BBC Grice especially enjoyed criticising John Wisdoms innovative look at metaphysics as a bunch of self-evident falsehoods (Were all alone). Grice focuses on Wisdom on the knowledge of other minds. He also discusses Collingwoods presuppositions, and Bradley on the reality-appearance distinction. Grices reference to Wisdom was due to Ewings treatment of Wisdom on metaphysics. Grices main motivation here is defending metaphysics against Ayer. Ayer thought to win more Oxonian philosophers than he did at Oxford, but he was soon back in London. Post-war Oxford had become conservative and would not stand to the nonsense of Ayers claiming that metaphysics is nonsense, especially, as Ayers implicaturum also was, that philosophy is nonsense! Perhaps the best summary of Griceian metaphysics is his From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics. It’s an ontological answer that one must give to Grices metabolic operation from utterers meaning to expression meaning, Grice had been interested in the methodology of metaphysics since his Oxford days. He counts as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for the BBC Third Programme on The nature of metaphysics with the organiser, Pears, and his former tutee, Strawson on the panel. Grice was particularly keen on Collingwoods views on metaphysical presuppositions, both absolute and relative! Grice also considers John Wisdoms view of the metaphysical proposition as a blatant falsehood. Grice considers Bradleys Hegelian metaphysics of the absolute, in Appearance and reality. Refs.: While Grice’s choice was ‘eschatology,’ as per WoW, Essay, other keywords are useful, notably “metaphysics,” “ontology,” “theorizing,” and “theory-theory,” in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

ESSE: Grice: “Surely the most important verb, philosophically speaking. It was good of Boezio to turn Aristotle’s troublesome ‘belonging’ into a simple ‘est’.” ens a se: Grice defines an ‘ens a se’ as a being that is completely independent and self-sufficient. Since every creature depends at least upon God for its existence, only God could be ens a se. In fact, only God is, and he must be. For if God depended on any other being, he would be dependent and hence not self-sufficient. To the extent that the ontological argument is plausible, it depends on conceiving of God as ens a se. In other words, God as ens a se is the greatest conceivable being. The idea of ens a se is very important in the Monologion and Proslogion of Anselm, in various works of Duns Scotus, and later Scholastic thought. Ens a se should be distinguished from ens ex se, according to Anselm in Monologion. Ens a se is from itself and not “out of itself.” In other words, ens a se does not depend upon itself for its own existence, because it is supposed to be dependent on absolutely nothing. Further, if ens a se depended upon itself, it would cause itself to exist, and that is impossible, according to medieval and Scholastic philosophers, who took causality to be irreflexive. It is also transitive and asymmetric. Hence, the medieval idea of ens a se should not be confused with Spinoza’s idea of causa sui. Later Scholastics often coined abstract terms to designate the property or entity that makes something to be what it is, in analogy with forming, say, ‘rigidity’ from ‘rigid’. The Latin term ‘aseitas’ is formed from the prepositional phrase in ‘ens a se’ in this way; ‘aseitas’ is tr. into English as ‘aseity’. A better-known example of forming an abstract noun from a concrete word is ‘haecceitas’ thisness from ‘haec’ this.  -- ens rationis Latin, ‘a being of reason’, a thing dependent for its existence upon reason or thought; sometimes known as an intentional being. Ens rationis is the contrasting term for a real being res or ens in re extra animam, such as an individual animal. Real beings exist independently of thought and are the foundation for truth. A being of reason depends upon thought or reason for its existence and is an invention of Enlightenment ens rationis 266   266 the mind, even if it has a foundation in some real being. This conception requires the idea that there are degrees of being. Two kinds of entia rationis are distinguished: those with a foundation in reality and those without one. The objects of logic, which include genera and species, e.g., animal and human, respectively, are entia rationis that have a foundation in reality, but are abstracted from it. In contrast, mythic and fictional objects, such as a chimera or Pegasus, have no foundation in reality. Blindness and deafness are also sometimes called entia rationis.  -- ens realissimum: used by Grice. Latin, ‘most real being’, an informal term for God that occurs rarely in Scholastic philosophers. Within Kant’s philosophy, it has a technical sense. It is an extension of Baumgarten’s idea of ens perfectissimum most perfect being, a being that has the greatest number of possible perfections to the greatest degree. Since ens perfectissimum refers to God as the sum of all possibilities and since actuality is greater than possibility, according to Kant, the idea of God as the sum of all actualities, that is, ens realissimum, is a preferable term for God. Kant thinks that human knowledge is “constrained” to posit the idea of a necessary being. The necessary being that has the best claim to necessity is one that is completely unconditioned, that is, dependent on nothing; this is ens realissimum. He sometimes explicates it in three ways: as the substratum of all realities, as the ground of all realities, and as the sum of all realities. Ens realissimum is nonetheless empirically invalid, since it cannot be experienced by humans. It is something ideal for reason, not real in experience. According to Kant, the ontological argument begins with the concept of ens realissimum and concludes that an existing object falls under that concept Critique of Pure Reason, Book II, chapter 3.  esse, essentia: Grice: “Perhaps the most important verb, philosophical speaking.” Grice: “It was Boezio who had the witty occurrence of translating the Aristotelian ‘belong’ by the much simpler ‘est’ – “S est P.” -- Explored byy Grice in “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”. To avoid equivocation, Grice distinguishes between the ‘izz’ of essentia, and the ‘hazz’ of accidentia. ssentialism, a metaphysical theory that objects have essences and that there is a distinction between essential and non-essential or accidental predications. Different issues have, however, been central in debates about essences and essential predication in different periods in the history of philosophy. In our own day, it is commitment to the notion of de re modality that is generally taken to render a theory essentialist; but in the essentialist tradition stemming from Aristotle, discussions of essence and essential predication focus on the distinction between what an object is and how it is. According to Aristotle, the universals that an ordinary object instantiates include some that mark it out as what it is and others that characterize it in some way but do not figure in an account of what it is. In the Categories, he tells us that while the former are said of the object, the latter are merely present in it; and in other writings, he distinguishes between what he calls kath hauto or per se predications where these include the predication of what-universals and kata sumbebekos or per accidens predications where these include the predication of how-universals. He concedes that universals predicated of an object kath hauto are necessary to that object; but he construes the necessity here as derivative. It is because a universal marks out an entity, x, as what x is and hence underlies its being the thing that it is that the universal is necessarily predicated of x. The concept of definition is critically involved in Aristotle’s essentialism. First, it is the kind  infima species  under which an object falls or one of the items genus or differentia included in the definition of that kind that is predicated of the object kath hauto. But, second, Aristotle’s notion of an essence just is the notion of the ontological correlate of a definition. The term in his writings we translate as ‘essence’ is the expression to ti ein einai the what it is to be. Typically, the expression is followed by a substantival expression in the dative case, so that the expressions denoting essences are phrases like ‘the what it is to be for a horse’ and ‘the what it is to be for an oak tree’; and Aristotle tells us that, for any kind, K, the what it is to be for a K just is that which we identify when we provide a complete and accurate definition of K. Now, Aristotle holds that there is definition only of universals; and this commits him to the view that there are no individual essences. Although he concedes that we can provide definitions of universals from any of his list of ten categories, he gives pride of place to the essences of universals from the category of substance. Substance-universals can be identified without reference to essences from other categories, but the essences of qualities, quantities, and other non-substances can be defined only by reference to the essences of substances. In his early writings, Aristotle took the familiar particulars of common sense things like the individual man and horse of Categories V to be the primary substances; and in these writings it is the essences we isolate by defining the kinds or species under which familiar particulars fall that are construed as the basic or paradigmatic essences. However, in later writings, where ordinary particulars are taken to be complexes of matter and form, it is the substantial forms of familiar particulars that are the primary substances, so their essences are the primary or basic essences; and a central theme in Aristotle’s most mature writings is the idea that the primary substances and their essences are necessarily one and the same in number. error theory essentialism 281   281 The conception of essence as the ontological correlate of a definition  often called quiddity  persists throughout the medieval tradition; and in early modern philosophy, the idea that the identity of an object is constituted by what it is plays an important role in Continental rationalist thinkers. Indeed, in the writings of Leibniz, we find the most extreme version of traditional essentialism. Whereas Aristotle had held that essences are invariably general, Leibniz insisted that each individual has an essence peculiar to it. He called the essence associated with an entity its complete individual concept; and he maintained that the individual concept somehow entails all the properties exemplified by the relevant individual. Accordingly, Leibniz believed that an omniscient being could, for each possible world and each possible individual, infer from the individual concept of that individual the whole range of properties exemplified by that individual in that possible world. But, then, from the perspective of an omniscient being, all of the propositions identifying the properties the individual actually exhibits would express what Aristotle called kath hauto predications. Leibniz, of course, denied that our perspective is that of an omniscient being; we fail to grasp individual essences in their fullness, so from our perspective, the distinction between essential and accidental predications holds. While classical rationalists espoused a thoroughgoing essentialism, the Aristotlelian conceptions of essence and definition were the repeated targets of attacks by classical British empiricists. Hobbes, e.g., found the notion of essence philosophically useless and insisted that definition merely displays the meanings conventionally associated with linguistic expressions. Locke, on the other hand, continued to speak of essences; but he distinguished between real and nominal essences. As he saw it, the familiar objects of common sense are collections of copresent sensible ideas to which we attach a single name like ‘man’ or ‘horse’. Identifying the ideas constitutive of the relevant collection gives us the nominal essence of a man or a horse. Locke did not deny that real essences might underlie such collections, but he insisted that it is nominal rather than real essences to which we have epistemic access. Hume, in turn, endorsed the idea that familiar objects are collections of sensible ideas, but rejected the idea of some underlying real essence to which we have no access; and he implicitly reinforced the Hobbesian critique of Aristotelian essences with his attack on the idea of de re necessities. So definition merely expresses the meanings we conventionally associate with words, and the only necessity associated with definition is linguistic or verbal necessity. From its origins, the twentieth-century analytic tradition endorsed the classical empiricist critique of essences and the Humean view that necessity is merely linguistic. Indeed, even the Humean concession that there is a special class of statements true in virtue of their meanings came into question in the forties and fifties, when philosophers like Quine argued that it is impossible to provide a noncircular criterion for distinguishing analytic and synthetic statements. So by the late 0s, it had become the conventional wisdom of philosophers in the Anglo- tradition that both the notion of a real essence and the derivative idea that some among the properties true of an object are essential to that object are philosophical dead ends. But over the past three decades, developments in the semantics of modal logic have called into question traditional empiricist skepticism about essence and modality and have given rise to a rebirth of essentialism. In the late fifties and early sixties, logicians like Kripke, Hintikka, and Richard Montague showed how formal techniques that have as their intuitive core the Leibnizian idea that necessity is truth in all possible worlds enable us to provide completeness proofs for a whole range of nonequivalent modal logics. Metaphysicians seized on the intuitions underlying these formal methods. They proposed that we take the picture of alternative possible worlds seriously and claimed that attributions of de dicto modality necessity and possibility as they apply to propositions can be understood to involve quantification over possible worlds. Thus, to say that a proposition, p, is necessary is to say that for every possible world, W, p is true in W; and to say that p is possible is to say that there is at least one possible world, W, such that p is true in W. These metaphysicians went on to claim that the framework of possible worlds enables us to make sense of de re modality. Whereas de dicto modality attaches to propositions taken as a whole, an ascription of de re modality identifies the modal status of an object’s exemplification of an attribute. Thus, we speak of Socrates as being necessarily or essentially rational, but only contingently snub-nosed. Intuitively, the essential properties of an object are those it could not have lacked; whereas its contingent properties are properties it exemplifies but could have failed to exemplify. The “friends of possible worlds” insisted that we can make perfectly good sense of this intuitive distinction if we say that an object, x, exhibits a property, P, essentially just in case x exhibits P in the actual world and in every possible world in which x exists and that x exhibits P merely contingently just in case x exhibits P in the actual world, but there is at least one possible world, W, such that x exists in W and fails to exhibit P in W. Not only have these neo-essentialists invoked the Leibnizian conception of alternative possible worlds in characterizing the de re modalities, many have endorsed Leibniz’s idea that each object has an individual essence or what is sometimes called a haecceity. As we have seen, the intuitive idea of an individual essence is the idea of a property an object exhibits essentially and that no other object could possibly exhibit; and contemporary essentialists have fleshed out this intuitive notion by saying that a property, P, is the haecceity or individual essence of an object, x, just in case 1 x exhibits P in the actual world and in all worlds in which x exists and 2 there is no possible world where an object distinct from x exhibits P. And some defenders of individual essences like Plantinga have followed Leibniz in holding that the haecceity of an object provides a complete concept of that object, a property such that it entails, for every possible world, W, and every property, P, either the proposition that the object in question has P in W or the proposition that it fails to have P in W. Accordingly, they agree that an omniscient being could infer from the individual essence of an object a complete account of the history of that object in each possible world in which it exists. 

eudaemonia: from Grecian eudaimonia, and then there’s eudaemonism --‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’, the ethical doctrine that happiness is the ultimate justification for morality. The ancient Grecian philosophers typically begin their ethical treatises with an account of happiness, and then argue that the best way to achieve a happy life is through the cultivation and exercise of virtue. Most of them make virtue or virtuous activity a constituent of the happy life; the Epicureans, however, construe happiness in terms of pleasure, and treat virtue as a means to the end of pleasant living. Ethical eudaimonism is sometimes combined with psychological eudaimonism  i.e., the view that all free, intentional action is aimed ultimately at the agent’s happiness. A common feature of ancient discussions of ethics, and one distinguishing them from most modern discussions, is the view that an agent would not be rationally justified in a course of action that promised less happiness than some alternative open to him. Hence it seems that most of the ancient theories are forms of egosim. But the ancient theories differ from modern versions of egoism since, according to the ancients, at least some of the virtues are dispositions to act from primarily other-regarding motives: although the agent’s happiness is the ultimate justification of virtuous action, it is not necessarily what motivates such action. Since happiness is regarded by most of the ancients as the ultimate end that justifies our actions, their ethical theories seem teleological; i.e., right or virtuous action is construed as action that contributes to or maximizes the good. But appearances are again misleading, for the ancients typically regard virtuous action as also valuable for its own sake and hence constitutive of the agent’s happiness. 

event: used by Grice in “Actions and Events,” -- anything that happens; an occurrence. Two fundamental questions about events, which philosophers have usually treated together, are: 1 Are there events?, and 2 If so, what is their nature? Some philosophers simply assume that there are events. Others argue for that, typically through finding semantic theories for ordinary claims that apparently concern the fact that some agent has done something or that some thing has changed. Most philosophers presume that the events whose existence is proved by such arguments are abstract particulars, “particulars” in the sense that they are non-repeatable and spatially locatable, “abstract” in the sense that more than one event can occur simultaneously in the same place. The theories of events espoused by Davidson in his causal view, Kim though his view may be unstable in this respect, Jonathan Bennett, and Lawrence Lombard take them to be abstract particulars. However, Chisholm takes Euler diagram event 292   292 events to be abstract universals; and Quine and Davidson in his later view take them to be concrete particulars. Some philosophers who think of events as abstract particulars tend to associate the concept of an event with the concept of change; an event is a change in some object or other though some philosophers have doubts about this and others have denied it outright. The time at which an event, construed as a particular, occurs can be associated with the shortest time at which the object, which is the subject of that event, changes from the having of one property to the having of another, contrary property. Events inherit whatever spatial locations they have from the spatial locations, if any, of the things that those events are changes in. Thus, an event that is a change in an object, x, from being F to being G, is located wherever x is at the time it changes from being F to being G. Some events are those of which another event is composed e.g., the sinking of a ship seems composed of the sinkings of its parts. However, it also seems clear that not every group of events comprises another; there just is no event composed of a certain explosion on Venus and my birth. Any adequate theory about the nature of events must address the question of what properties, if any, such things have essentially. One issue is whether the causes or effects of events are essential to those events. A second is whether it is essential to each event that it be a change in the entity it is in fact a change in. A third is whether it is essential to each event that it occur at the time at which it in fact occurs. A chief component of a theory of events is a criterion of identity, a principle giving conditions necessary and sufficient for an event e and an event eH to be one and the same event. Quine holds that events may be identified with the temporal parts of physical objects, and that events and physical objects would thus share the same condition of identity: sameness of spatiotemporal location. Davidson once proposed that events are identical provided they have the same causes and effects. More recently, Davidson abandoned this position in favor of Quine’s. Kim takes an event to be the exemplification of a property or relation by an object or objects at a time. This idea has led to his view that an event e is the same as an event eH if and only if e and eH are the exemplifications of the same property by the same objects at the same time. Lombard’s view is a variation on this account, and is derived from the idea of events as the changes that physical objects undergo when they alter.

evola: Italian philosopher – Giulio Cesare Andrea Evola, meglio conosciuto come Julius Evola (n. Roma), è stato un filosofo. Fu personalità poliedrica nel panorama culturale italiano del Novecento, in ragione dei suoi molteplici interessi: arte, filosofia, storia, politica, esoterismo, religione, costume, studi sulla razza.  Le sue posizioni si inquadrano nell'ambito di una cultura di tipo aristocratico-tradizionale e di tendenze ideologiche in gran parte presenti anche nel fascismo e nel nazionalsocialismo, pur esprimendosi talvolta in chiave critica nei confronti dei due regimi. Mussolini ne apprezza alcune impostazioni: in particolare il ritorno alla romanità e una teoria della razza in chiave spirituale. Da parte sua il filosofo nutre una pacata ammirazione nei confronti del Duce.  Evola ha una sua influenza, anche se difficilmente quantificabile, nel variegato mondo della cultura fascista: con lo scopo di indirizzarne l'impostazione culturale ed ideologica verso posizioni più affini al suo pensiero, scrive numerosi saggi, collabora intensamente con riviste e giornali di grande tiratura e partecipa alla vita accademica del suo tempo in veste di conferenziere, sia presso alcune prestigiose università italiane e straniere che nell'ambito dei corsi di mistica fascista.  Ma è lo stesso Evola, nel primo numero della rivista da lui diretta, La Torre, quando espone il suo pensiero sul mondo della tradizione, a sintetizzare la sua posizione verso il fascismo: «Nella misura che il fascismo segua e difenda tali principi, in questa stessa misura noi possiamo considerarci fascisti. E questo è tutto».[1] C'è anche chi ritiene che in sede diplomatica Evola svolgesse missioni ad altissimi livelli per conto dello stesso governo italiano.[2]  Nonostante ciò, le sue idee eterodosse non sempre sono ben accette dalla classe dirigente italiana del tempo e gli valgono la sospensione di alcune pubblicazioni da parte dello stesso PNF e in Germania il sospetto delle gerarchie naziste.[3] Evola contribuisce alla divulgazione in Italia di importanti autori europei del XIX e del XX secolo: Bachofen, Guénon, Jünger, Ortega y Gasset, Spengler, Weininger, traducendo alcune loro opere e pubblicando saggi critici.  La complessità del suo pensiero gli procura, anche dopo la fine della guerra, un grande seguito negli ambienti conservatori italiani ed europei, da quelli più tradizionalisti del neofascismo (Pino Rauti ed Enzo Erra del Centro Studi Ordine Nuovo) fino a quelli rappresentati da esponenti della destra più moderata (Giano Accame, Marcello Veneziani). Le sue opere vengono tradotte e pubblicate in Germania, Francia, Spagna, Portogallo, Belgio, Grecia, Svizzera, Gran Bretagna, Russia, Stati Uniti, Messico, Canada, Romania, Argentina, Brasile, Ungheria, Polonia, Turchia.[4] Giulio Cesare Evola nacque a Roma[5]. I genitori di Giulio Cesare Evola furono Vincenzo Evola, nato il 4 maggio 1854[6] e Concetta Mangiapane, nata il 15 agosto 1865[7]. Entrambi i genitori erano siciliani, nati a Cinisi, un comune della Provincia di Palermo. I nonni paterni di Giulio Cesare Evola erano Giuseppe Evola e Maria Cusumano. Giuseppe Evola è riportato come falegname nell'atto di nascita di Vincenzo. I nonni materni di Giulio Cesare Evola erano Cesare Mangiapane e Caterina Munacó. Cesare Mangiapane è riportato come bottegaio nel registro delle nascite di Concetta. Vincenzo Evola e Concetta Mangiapane si sposarono a Cinisi il 25 novembre 1892[8]. Nell'atto di matrimonio Vincenzo Evola è riportato come capo meccanico telegrafico e già residente a Roma, mentre Concetta Mangiapane è riportata come possidente. Giulio Cesare Evola aveva un fratello maggiore, Giuseppe Gaspare Dinamo Evola, nato a Roma il 7 Agosto 1895[9], per cui, essendo il secondo figlio maschio, seguendo la convenzione di denominazione siciliana dell'epoca, seppur con una leggera variazione, Giulio Cesare Evola fu in parte denominato in onore al nonno materno.  Benché non lo fosse, Giulio Cesare Evola è stato spesso riportato come barone[10], in riferimento a un presunto distante rapporto di discendenza con una famiglia aristocratica siciliana di antica origine normanna (gli Evoli, baroni di Castropignano in Molise, nel Tardo Medioevo[11], poi passati in Sicilia) del Regno di Sicilia.  Formazione Giulio Cesare Evola studiò all'Istituto Tecnico "Leonardo da Vinci" di Roma. Le poche notizie sui suoi anni di formazione si possono ricavare dall'autobiografia intitolata Il cammino del cinabro, pubblicata nel 1963 dall'editore Scheiwiller e che, nelle intenzioni dell'autore, sarebbe dovuta uscire postuma:[12]  «Nella prima adolescenza, mentre seguivo studi tecnici e matematici, si sviluppò in me un interesse naturale e vivo per le esperienze del pensiero e dell'arte. Da giovinetto, sùbito dopo il periodo dei romanzi d'avventure, mi ero messo in mente di compilare, insieme ad un amico, una storia della filosofia, a base di sunti. D'altra parte, se mi ero già sentito attratto da scrittori, come Wilde e D'Annunzio, presto il mio interesse si estese, da essi, a tutta la letteratura e l'arte più recenti. Passavo intere giornate in biblioteca, in un regime serrato ma libero di letture. In particolare, per me ebbe importanza l'incontro con pensatori, come Nietzsche, Michelstaedter e Weininger. Esso valse ad alimentare una tendenza di base, anche se, a tutta prima, in forme confuse e in parte distorte, quindi con una mescolanza del positivo col negativo»  (Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 5.) La lettura delle opere degli autori su citati (in particolare Nietzsche), ha sul giovane Evola alcune dirette conseguenze: in primo luogo un'opposizione al Cristianesimo, soprattutto in riferimento alla teoria del peccato e della redenzione, del sacrificio divino e della grazia. In secondo luogo una sorta di insofferenza verso il mondo borghese, la sua piccola morale e il suo conformismo.[13]  Decide dunque di svincolarsi dalla routine borghese, soprattutto nei suoi aspetti più concreti e quotidiani: famiglia, lavoro, amicizie. Si iscrive alla facoltà di ingegneria, ma rifiuta di discutere la tesi per disprezzo dei titoli accademici[14], poiché «l'apparire come un "dottore" o un "professore" in veste autorizzata e per scopi pratici, mi sembrò cosa intollerabile, benché in seguito dovessi vedermi continuamente applicati titoli che non ho».[15]  Prosegue nello studio dell'arte e della filosofia:  «A parte gli autori accennati, va menzionata l'influenza che su me adolescente esercitò anche il movimento che alla vigilia della prima guerra mondiale e durante la prima parte di essa ebbe per centro Giovanni Papini con le riviste Leonardo e Lacerba, in seguito in parte anche con La Voce. Fu il periodo dell'unico vero Sturm und Drang che la nostra nazione abbia conosciuto, dell'urgere di forze insofferenti del clima soffocante dell'Italietta borghese del primo novecento […] A lui e al suo gruppo si deve il nostro venire a contatto con le correnti straniere più varie e interessanti del pensiero e dell'arte d'avanguardia, con l'effetto di un rinnovamento e di un ampliamento di orizzonti»  (Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 5.) Successivamente si distacca anche da Papini, soprattutto per la sua conversione al cattolicesimo ed a seguito della pubblicazione del libro Storia di Cristo (1921). Inizia giovane l'attività in campo artistico: i primi quadri risalgono al 1915, le prime poesie al 1916.  Attraverso Giovanni Papini entra in contatto con alcuni esponenti del Futurismo quali Giacomo Balla e Filippo Tommaso Marinetti. Nel 1919 partecipa alla "Grande Esposizione Nazionale Futurista" di Palazzo Cova a Milano.[16] Ben presto si stacca da questo movimento per ragioni che lui stesso espone: «Non tardai però a riconoscere che, a parte il lato rivoluzionario, l'orientamento del futurismo si accordava assai poco con le mie inclinazioni. In esso mi infastidiva il sensualismo, la mancanza di interiorità, tutto il lato chiassoso e esibizionistico, una grezza esaltazione della vita e dell'istinto curiosamente mescolata con quella del macchinismo e di una specie di americanismo, mentre, per un altro verso, ci si dava a forme sciovinistiche di nazionalismo. A quest'ultimo riguardo la divergenza mi apparve netta allo scoppio della prima guerra mondiale, a causa della violenta campagna interventista svolta sia dai futuristi che dal gruppo di Lacerba. Per me era inconcepibile che tutti costoro, con alla testa l'iconoclasta Papini, sposassero a cuor leggero i più vieti luoghi comuni patriottardi della propaganda antigermanica, credendo sul serio che si trattasse di una guerra per la difesa della civiltà e della libertà contro il barbaro e l'aggressore»  (Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 8.) A questa prima fase, definita dallo stesso Evola idealismo sensoriale,[17] appartengono le opere: Fucina, studio di rumori (1917 circa), Five o'clock tea (1918 circa) e Mazzo di fiori (1917-18).  Gli anni della Prima guerra mondiale  Monte Cimone di Tonezza, 1917 Frequenta a Torino un corso per allievi ufficiali e partecipa alla Prima guerra mondiale come ufficiale di artiglieria sull'altopiano di Asiago dal 1917 al 1918. Rientra a Roma dopo il conflitto ed attraversa una profonda crisi esistenziale che lo porta al bordo del suicidio, come egli stesso riporta ne Il cammino del cinabro: «Questa soluzione [...] fu evitata grazie a qualcosa di simile ad una illuminazione, che io ebbi nel leggere un testo del buddhismo delle origini. Fu per me una luce improvvisa: in quel momento deve essersi prodotto in me un mutamento, e il sorgere di una fermezza capace di resistere a qualsiasi crisi»  (Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 10.) Il passo cui si riferisce Evola è il seguente: «Chi prende l'estinzione come estinzione e, presa l'estinzione come estinzione, pensa all'estinzione, pensa sull'estinzione, pensa "Mia è l'estinzione" e si rallegra dell'estinzione, costui, io dico, non conosce l'estinzione».[18] Si tratta di una traduzione e rielaborazione di una frase del Buddha contenuta nel discorso del Mulapariyâya Sutta (Canone pāli, Majjhima Nikaya, I).[19]  Il secondo periodo artistico: l'astrattismo mistico Nel 1920 aderisce al Dadaismo ed entra in contatto epistolare con Tristan Tzara.[20] Come pittore diviene uno dei massimi esponenti del Dadaismo in Italia.[21] Questa seconda fase viene definita, sempre da Evola, astrattismo mistico[22][23][24] ovvero una reinterpretazione dada in chiave di spiritualismo e di idealismo. A questa fase appartengono alcune importanti opere: Paesaggio interiore 10,30 (1918-20) e Astrazione (1918-20). Questo periodo vede Evola impegnato in due mostre personali: quella del gennaio 1920 alla casa d'arte Bragaglia di Roma, e quella del gennaio 1921 alla galleria Der Sturm di Berlino in cui presenta sessanta dipinti.[25]  Pubblica nel 1920, per la Collection Dada, l'opuscolo Arte astratta. Sempre nello stesso anno fonda con Gino Cantarelli la rivista Bleu e pubblica a Zurigo il poema dada La parole obscure du paysage intérieur. Collabora inoltre con Cronache d'attualità di Anton Giulio Bragaglia e con Noi di Enrico Prampolini. Nel 1923 cessa l'attività pittorica e fino al 1925 fa uso di sostanze stupefacenti con il fine di raggiungere stati alterati di coscienza: «In questo contesto, vi è anche da accennare all'effetto di alcune esperienze interiori da me affrontate a tutta prima senza una precisa tecnica e coscienza del fine, con l'aiuto di certe sostanze che non sono gli stupefacenti più in uso [...] Mi portai, per tal via, verso forme di coscienza in parte staccate dai sensi fisici».[26]  Il mancato suicidio è per Evola il momento di passaggio più significativo: fine del periodo artistico e inizio del periodo filosofico. Esce nel 1925 il primo libro di filosofia: Saggi sull'idealismo magico. Coerentemente con le posizioni teoriche della sua seconda fase artistica (astrattismo mistico) Evola si distacca dall'idealismo hegeliano in favore di una libertà interiore assoluta. Il pensiero deve prefiggersi il compito di superare i limiti dell'umano per andare verso l'oltre-uomo teorizzato da Nietzsche. L'attualismo gentiliano diventa dunque il punto di partenza: dall'Io come principio attivo della realtà su un piano logico-astratto, all'Io come criterio di potenza capace di affermare l'individuo assoluto.[30]  Secondo Evola l'individuo assoluto è immediatamente sé nelle infinite affermazioni individuali ed in ciascuna di esse si fruisce come libertà, come incondizionata agilità ed arbitrio assoluto.[31] Termina nel 1924 la Teoria e fenomenologia dell'individuo assoluto che inizia a scrivere già in trincea (nel 1917) e che viene pubblicata in due volumi (nel 1927 e nel 1930) dall'editore Bocca. In questo testo Evola si interessa delle dottrine riguardanti il sovrarazionale, il sacro e la gnosi, con l'obiettivo di tentare il superamento della dualità io/non-io. Il suo interesse verso le tradizioni orientali si manifesta in L'uomo come potenza, pubblicato nel 1926, dove compare una concezione dell'io ispirata ai dettami del tantrismo e del taoismo.  Queste ultime opere segnano un'ulteriore svolta: passaggio da una posizione filosofica di tipo teoretico ad una di tipo pragmatico. Evola cerca infatti di individuare strumenti concreti per mezzo dei quali calare nella vita quotidiana la teoria dell'Individuo assoluto. A partire dal 1924 inizia un'intensa esperienza giornalistica: partecipa alla redazione di Lo Stato democratico, una rivista contemporaneamente antifascista ed antidemocratica, e tra il 1924 e il 1926 collabora a riviste come Ultra, Bilychnis, Ignis, Atanor e Il mondo. In questo periodo Evola frequenta i circoli esoterici romani e partecipa alla vita notturna della capitale intrattenendo un tempestoso rapporto sentimentale con Sibilla Aleramo, come lei stessa riporta nel libro Amo dunque sono del 1927:  «Disumano qual è, gelido architetto di teorie funambolesche, vanitoso, perverso, s'è trovato dinanzi a me come a cosa tutta viva, tutta schietta, mentre aveva fantasticato chissà... quale avventura necrofila. E questa cosa tutta schietta l'ha turbato, l'ha commosso, segretamente […]»  (Sibilla Aleramo, Amo dunque sono, Milano, Mondadori, 1927, p. 104.)  La versione tedesca di Imperialismo pagano Tra il 1927 e il 1929 coordina il Gruppo di Ur, che si occupa di esoterismo e di ricerche sulle tradizioni extra europee: un'antologia dei fascicoli editi viene più tardi pubblicata in tre volumi (tra il 1955 e il 1956) con il titolo Introduzione alla magia quale scienza dell'Io. Conosce Arturo Reghini e legge i suoi scritti. Anche sulla scorta di esperienze condivise con il noto esoterista, nel 1928 pubblica un libro che gli procura grande fama: Imperialismo pagano. In questo pamphlet (poi tradotto in tedesco nel 1933[32]) Evola attacca violentemente il Cristianesimo ed esorta il Fascismo a ritrovare l'antica grandezza della civiltà romana:  «Oserà dunque il fascismo assumere qui, qui donde già le aquile imperiali partirono per il dominio del mondo sotto la potenza augustea, solare, regale […] oserà qui riprendere la fiaccola della tradizione mediterranea?»  (Julius Evola, Imperialismo pagano, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1996, p. 24.) Influenzato dalla lettura delle opere di René Guénon abbandona in seguito le tesi estremiste di Imperialismo pagano a favore del concetto di "tradizione" e fonda con Emilio Servadio la rivista La Torre (uscita in soli dieci numeri tra febbraio e giugno del 1930), destinata a difendere principi sovrapolitici, in realtà «una tribuna di intellettuali che si battevano per un fascismo più radicale e più intrepido».[33] Critiche mosse ad alcuni personaggi del Regime dalle pagine de La Torre, provocano l'intervento di Starace che prima diffida Evola dal continuare la pubblicazione, poi proibisce a tutte le tipografie romane di stampare la rivista la cui pubblicazione, alla fine, viene sospesa.  Evola viene sorvegliato dal regime in quanto accusato di affiliazione all'Ordo Templi Orientis ed è costretto ad assumere alcune guardie del corpo (come testimoniato da Massimo Scaligero) .[14] Inizia un periodo dedicato interamente all'alpinismo. Nel 1930, con la guida alpina Eugenio David, affronta la scalata della parete settentrionale del Lyskamm Orientale.[34] Di questa e di altre esperienze viene poi redatto un libro nel 1973: Meditazioni delle vette.[35] Evola intende l'alpinismo come pratica ascetica e meditazione spirituale: superamento dei limiti della condizione umana attraverso l'azione e la contemplazione, che divengono due elementi inseparabili, «un'ascesa che si trasforma in ascesi».[36]  Successivamente pubblica due opere: La tradizione ermetica (1931) e Maschera e volto dello spiritualismo contemporaneo (1932). La prima è una disamina dell'aspetto magico, esoterico e simbolico dell'alchimia. La seconda è un saggio critico su quelle correnti di pensiero che, secondo Evola, «invece di elevare l'uomo dal razionalismo moderno e dal materialismo, lo portano ancora più in basso: spiritismo, teosofia, antroposofia e psicoanalisi».[37] Nel 1934 appare la sua opera fondamentale, Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, nella quale traccia un affresco della storia letta secondo lo schema ciclico tradizionale delle quattro età: oro, argento, bronzo e ferro nella tradizione occidentale e satya, treta, dvapara e Kali Yuga in quella induista.  In Rivolta Evola oppone il mondo tradizionale al mondo moderno. Nella prima parte analizza le categorie qualificanti l'uomo della tradizione e le antiche "razze divine"; nella seconda analizza la genesi del mondo moderno ed i processi a causa dei quali la civiltà tradizionale è crollata (dal dominio dell'autorità spirituale al dominio del "quarto stato"). Partendo da questi presupposti, tre anni dopo, esamina a fondo Il mistero del Graal (1937) e le sue implicazioni dottrinarie nelle visioni dei diversi periodi storici, impostando tutta la sua disamina sul concetto di "tradizione ghibellina dell'impero", cercando di svincolare il Graal e la sua portata simbolica dalla tradizione cristiana. A partire dal 1934 Evola collabora attivamente con la Scuola di mistica fascista, fondata da Niccolò Giani nel 1930, tenendo alcune conferenze e figurando nel comitato di redazione della rivista Dottrina fascista. La maggior parte degli interventi di Evola in conferenze e scritti, riguardano principalmente il tema del razzismo, argomento che trova appoggio sia da parte di Giani che da parte dello stesso Mussolini. Secondo Evola, tuttavia, l'espressione mistica fascista rappresenta un'incongruenza potendo parlare, al più, di etica fascista. Questo perché in realtà il fascismo, secondo Evola, «non affronta il problema dei valori superiori, i valori del sacro, solo in relazione ai quali si può parlare di mistica».[38]  Jean-Paul Lippi – giurista e saggista francese, tra i più importanti studiosi d'oltralpe del pensatore tradizionale – rileva di come Evola ravveda nella mistica «un elemento rilevatore di una spiritualità lunare e del polo femminile dello spirito».[39] E infatti il sottotitolo di Diorama filosofico – la pagina prima mensile e poi quindicinale curata da Evola nel quotidiano Il Regime Fascista di Cremona tra il 1934 e il 1943 – è: Problemi dello spirito nell'etica fascista. Nel 2009 una serie di scritti di Evola relativi alla scuola di mistica fascista, sono stati pubblicati dall'editore Controcorrente di Napoli,[40] e aiutano in parte a chiarire le posizioni assunte dal filosofo all'interno della suddetta corrente.  Le tesi sulla razza «Sia razzialmente, sia in fatto di ideali, esiste una grande opposizione fra l'uomo ariano e tradizionale europeo e il giudeo. Fin dalle origini il giudeo ci è apparso come un essere diviso in se stesso. A differenza dell’ariano egli fu sempre incapace di concepire e di realizzare un'armonia fra spirito e corpo. Il corpo significò per lui la carne, cioè una crassa e peccaminosa materialità, da cui deve redimersi per raggiungere lo spirito che per lui sta in una sfera astratta, fuori della vita. Ma nel giudeo questo impulso alla liberazione fallisce ed allora le prospettive si invertono: colui che era tormentato dal pungolo della redenzione si precipita disperatamente nella materia, si abbandona ad una brama illimitata per la materia, per la potenza materiale e per il piacere. Voi così vedete un uomo che si sente schiavo della carne e per questo vuol vedere intorno a sé solo degli schiavi come lui. Perciò egli gode dovunque egli scopra l’illusorietà dei valori superiori, dovunque torbidi retroscena si palesino dietro la facciata della spiritualità, della sacralità, della giustizia e dell’innocenza.»  (Julius Evola, La civiltà occidentale e l’intelligenza ebraica) A metà degli anni trenta Evola inizia ad orientare i propri studi su aspetti più propriamente politici, legati in particolar modo alla "questione della razza". Riprende l'attività giornalistica scrivendo su quotidiani: Il Regime Fascista, Corriere Padano, Il Giornale della Domenica, Roma, Il Popolo d'Italia, La Stampa e Il Mattino; su stampe e periodici: Logos, Educazione Fascista, La Rivista del Club Alpino Italiano, Politica, Nuova Antologia, '900, Il progresso religioso, La difesa della razza, Augustea, Carattere, Insegnare e Scuola e cultura.[56]  Nel 1937 pubblica Il Mito del Sangue (poi riedito nel 1942) dove ricostruisce le concezioni sulla razza dalle civiltà antiche fino alle teorie del XVIII secolo (de Gobineau, Woltmann, de Lapouge, Chamberlain), contrapponendole alla versione moderna del razzismo biologico di stampo nazionalsocialista. Segue nel 1941 Sintesi di dottrina della razza. In questi testi esprime le sue concezioni antisemite non basate su un razzismo biologico, ma spirituale. Gli ebrei, per Evola, non possono essere considerati una razza: «Già la Bibbia parla di 7 popoli che avrebbero concorso a formare il sangue ebraico [...] Come da questo composto etnico abbia potuto sorgere un sentimento così vivo di solidarietà e di fedeltà al sangue [...] tale da far pensare che il popolo ebraico praticamente sia stato fra i popoli più razzisti della storia - questo è un mistero [...] La formula, in ogni modo, è che gli ebrei non sono una razza ma solo una Nazione».[57]   Edizione russa dei Protocolli del 1912 Egli oppone a livello tradizionale "Giudei" ed "Ariani" (da "Arya") nel nome di una differenza di spirito. Nel 1937 pubblica la Introduzione alla quinta edizione italiana dei Protocolli dei savi di Sion, manifestando adesione al feroce e maniacale antisemitismo di Giovanni Preziosi, traduttore ed editore del pamphlet. In questa Introduzione afferma che non avrebbe importanza la non autenticità storica dell'opuscolo, visto che comunque lo stesso manifesta veridicità secondo lui attendibile nel descrivere i maneggi ebraici per il controllo della società (banche, stampa, mercato, politica). L'ebraismo è per Evola una colpa senza redenzione: «nemmeno il battesimo e la crocefissione cambia la natura ebraica».[58]  Si esprime negativamente sul colonialismo giudicando l'Etiopia conquistata dall'Italia nient'altro che una «contraffazione degenerescente di un organismo tradizionale».[59] Sempre in quegli anni tiene un ciclo di conferenze presso le Università di Firenze e di Milano su richiesta del Ministro dell'Educazione Nazionale Bottai. Benché non ve ne sia traccia nella biografia dell'autore, il saggista Franco Cuomo scrive che Evola, nel 1938, è tra i firmatari del cosiddetto Manifesto della razza.[60] Tutt'oggi la "questione razziale" di Evola rimane un tema molto dibattuto tra gli studiosi[senza fonte]. A partire dagli anni sessanta, Evola, a più riprese, cerca di ribadire – in alcuni casi rivedendo certe posizioni giovanili – la sua concezione sulla razza.  Già ne Il mito del sangue (1937) Evola, in riferimento alla concezione biologica che i tedeschi fanno del razzismo, espone le sue perplessità: «È ben possibile che in questo stato il razzismo avrebbe potuto aver la possibilità di sviluppare più proficuamente gli elementi valevoli che esso può comprendere in sé. Invece, con l'assurgere a ideologia ufficiale di una rivoluzione [quella nazionalsocialista germanica], il razzismo ha finito con il pregiudicare siffatti elementi»[61] facendo riferimenti espliciti alla figura di Hitler: «[...] l'idea razzista da parte dello Hitler [...] quanto a idee nuove rispetto a quel che finora abbiamo conosciuto, non ve ne è quasi nessuna».[62]  Dedica un intero capitolo (Il problema della razza) della sua autobiografia a questo tema in cui ribadisce la necessità di interpretare il concetto di razza da un punto di vista spirituale e non biologico, contestando ad Alfred Rosenberg (il principale esponente del razzismo nazionalsocialista) la strada del razzismo materialistico intrapresa a suo tempo dalla Germania, definendola «materialismo zoologico»[63] e condannando apertamente il «fanatismo antisemita».[18] Fanatismo verso il quale, nel 1963, dichiara: «né io, né i miei amici in Germania sapevamo degli eccessi nazisti contro gli ebrei [...] e se ne avessimo saputo in alcun modo avremmo potuto approvarli».[64]  Evola ha una concezione dell'uomo come essere costituito da corpo, anima e spirito, dove la parte spirituale deve avere il primato su quella corporea. Secondo Evola «l'opportunità di questa formulazione risiede nel fatto che una razza può degenerare, anche restando biologicamente pura, se la parte interiore e spirituale è morta, diminuita o obnubilata, se ha perso la propria forza (come presso certi tipi nordici attuali). Inoltre gli incroci, di cui oggi pochissime stirpi sono esenti, possono avere come conseguenza che ad un corpo di una data razza siano legati, in un individuo, il carattere e l'orientamento spirituale propri di un'altra razza, donde una più complessa concezione del meticciato».[65]  Lo storico Renzo De Felice, pur molto critico e severo rispetto al pensiero e alle tesi di Evola, testimonia di come lo stesso Evola respinge «anche più recisamente [dell'Acerbo] ogni teorizzazione del razzismo in chiave esclusivamente biologica»,[66] ponendo il pensatore tradizionale tra coloro che «imboccata una certa strada, la seppero percorrere, in confronto con tanti che scelsero quella della menzogna, dell'insulto, del completo obnubilamento di ogni valore culturale e morale, con dignità e persino con serietà».[66]  A tale proposito De Felice segnala anche che Evola non è il solo a prendere le distanze dal razzismo biologico di matrice nazionalsocialista. Altre note figure della cultura fascista del tempo, come Giacomo Acerbo, e meno note, come Vincenzo Mazzei, se ne dissociano.[67] L'impostazione critica data da De Felice su questo passaggio del pensiero di Evola è particolarmente apprezzata dagli autori filo-evoliani.[68]  Anche Paolo Orano sviluppa, secondo taluni, una forma di antisemitismo etico-sociale che rinvia a Il mito del sangue di Evola.[69] L'approccio al "problema della razza" di Evola, come quello di Acerbo ed Orano, pur se sviluppato da posizioni e secondo logiche diverse, viene apprezzato da Mussolini che ne intravede gli elementi differenziatori da quello germanico, anche se successivamente il "Duce" non si farà scrupolo di dare patente di legittimità anche all'antisemitismo di un Preziosi, di un Interlandi e di un Gayda.  Altri autori, invece, ritengono che l'opera e il pensiero di Evola continuino ad essere razzisti tout court o addirittura emuli delle tesi di Paolo Orano. È di questo avviso Attilio Milano che, a proposito della campagna antiebraica fascista, scrive: «Primo, in ordine di tempo, e per notorietà personale, come già ricordato, fu Paolo Orano [...] dietro di lui, con una vena più scadente, comparvero anche Ebrei, Cristianesimo, Fascismo, di Alfredo Romanini, Tre aspetti del problema ebraico, di Giulio Evola [...]».[70] Lo storico Francesco Germinario nel suo saggio Razza del Sangue, razza dello Spirito[71] analizza in particolare il progressivo avvicinamento di Evola al nazionalsocialismo, specialmente in relazione all'ammirazione che il filosofo aveva nei confronti delle SS.  La tesi di maggior rilievo del saggio di Germinario consiste nel tentativo di interpretare il razzismo evoliano come una sorta di differenzialismo in nuce, ovvero un razzismo che identifica il suo obiettivo principale nella ricomposizione dei cosiddetti tre ordini di razza: corpo, anima, spirito. Dunque, secondo Germinario, Evola riprende, seppur in maniera meno esplicita, alcune delle teorie del de Gobineu che cercano di identificare una gerarchia ideale nei gruppi delle razze umane.[72] Lo storico torinese Francesco Cassata, che ha dedicato molti suoi scritti al rapporto tra fascismo e razzismo e agli studi sull'eugenetica, nel suo A destra del fascismo,[73] sottolinea di come il razzismo sia un aspetto centrale del pensiero evoliano, e che in realtà lo stesso è volutamente depotenziato e purificato dai suoi estimatori con lo scopo di dare una visione edulcorata delle teorie del filosofo.  Più dura la posizione del giornalista Gianni Scipione Rossi, che con il volume Il razzista totalitario[74] cerca di mettere in luce quegli aspetti contraddittori del pensiero evoliano rispetto al tema della razza. Ma soprattutto Il razzista totalitario tenta di dimostrare che quella di Evola non è una parentesi razzista, ma una costruzione originale ed autonoma di una teoria che accompagna tutta l'opera evoliana. Per il germanista Furio Jesi Evola è «un razzista così sporco che ripugna toccarlo con le dita».[75] Lo storico e saggista torinese infatti dubita fortemente della definizione spiritualistica attribuita al razzismo di Evola[76] e ritiene anzi che le sue teorie farmeticanti e triviali conducano direttamente ad Auschwitz: «Egli [Evola] non si è mai dichiarato paladino dei roghi dei libri, anche se bisogna precisare che implicitamente, da intellettuale, s'intende, ha dato una mano ai forni crematori non per libri ma per uomini».[77]  La maggior parte delle critiche mosse a Evola e ai suoi studi sulla razza (per esempio da Dana Lloyd Thomas, Gianni Scipione Rossi, Francesco Germinario, Francesco Cassata), sostanzialmente, cercano di dimostrare che il cosiddetto razzismo spirituale in realtà è una sofisticata costruzione teorica utilizzata dall'autore e ancor più dai suoi epigoni per celare il convincimento di un vero e proprio razzismo di matrice biologica, e che dunque c'è in realtà un filo diretto tra le teorie nazionalsocialiste e quelle evoliane, queste ultime solo apparentemente diverse.[78] In ogni caso è in concomitanza con la campagna antiebraica scatenata dal regime fascista a partire dal 1937 che Julius Evola, grazie al suo "razzismo spirituale", entra definitivamente a far parte, a pieno titolo, della cultura e dell'intelligencija fascista di quegli anni. Secondo Fabio Venzi, in maniera del tutto infondata, ciò non impedisce ad Evola di avere una "doppia affiliazione" ed essere pure membro della Massoneria[79].  Evola non aderisce al Partito fascista e tale mancata adesione gli impedisce nel 1940 di arruolarsi come volontario contro l'Unione Sovietica nel corso della Seconda guerra mondiale. Nel 1942 viene pubblicato un suo saggio dal titolo Per un allineamento politico-culturale dell'Italia e della Germania[80] nel quale esprime ammirazione per il nazismo tedesco, considerandolo superiore al fascismo in ragione del coraggio nel risvegliare l'antico spirito ariano e germanico. Critica tuttavia l'incompletezza nell'attuazione di questo programma, non abbastanza radicale e aderente ai principi della "Tradizione": per esempio una difesa della razza improntata giuridicamente ad una sorta di "igiene razziale" e il potere del Führer derivato dal popolo e non un potere regale di origine divina come nell'ideale società ario-germanica delle origini.  Evola teorizza dunque il tradizionalismo puro, ideale e radicale, capace di attuare i propri principi e di far trionfare la cultura romana e pagana delle origini. Tra l'Unione Sovietica bolscevica e gli Stati Uniti d'America capitalistici, il nazionalsocialismo tedesco gli sembra proporre una terza via: un impero europeo e pagano sotto la guida egemonica della Germania di Hitler. Nel 1943, riprendendo temi già trattati nei suoi anni giovanili, pubblica La dottrina del risveglio, un saggio sull'ascesi buddhista. Nel 1951 l'opera viene poi tradotta in inglese[81] da Harold Edward Musson (Ñāṇavīra Thera) con l'avallo della Pali Society, anche se l'unica fonte che riporta questa informazione è lo stesso Evola: «L'edizione inglese aveva avuto il crisma della Pali Society, noto istituto accademico di studi sul buddhismo delle origini, che aveva riconosciuto la validità della mia trattazione».[82]  Ancor oggi rimane aperto, tra gli studiosi, il dibattito sull'adesione di Evola alla Repubblica Sociale, alla quale fanno accenno saggi ed opere enciclopediche di larga diffusione.[83] In realtà subito dopo l'8 settembre, il filosofo romano, che si trova in Germania per tenere alcune conferenze, raggiunge a Monaco gli altri esuli fascisti «[...] osservando con distacco reazionario scelte che non lo convincono».[84] Farà ritorno nell'Italia liberata solo al termine della guerra. Essendo Evola rigorosamente contrario all'abrogazione della Monarchia e alla trasformazione dell'Italia in una Repubblica, intraprende tentativi di influenza sulle SS e sui nazisti tedeschi, compreso lo stesso Heinrich Himmler. Si scopre poi, nel dopoguerra, che Evola è – sia in Germania che in Italia – tenuto sotto stretta sorveglianza dall'Ahnenerbe.[85] Le SS gli permettono di avere ruoli culturali di rilievo solo nei casi in cui questo giovi alla causa tedesca. Tuttavia Evola collaborò con la sezione delle SS che si occupava di studiare e combattere le trame occulte e antitradizionali della massoneria e dei poteri forti in genere[86].  Nel 1945 Evola si trova a Vienna e nell'intento «di non schivare anzi di cercare i pericoli, nel senso di un tacito interrogare la sorte»[87] si avventura in una passeggiata durante i bombardamenti sovietici che colpiscono la capitale austriaca. Sbalzato da uno spostamento d'aria, subisce una lesione al midollo spinale che gli provoca una paralisi permanente agli arti inferiori.[88] Solo nel 1948, grazie all'interessamento di Umberto Zanotti Bianco – presidente della Croce Rossa Internazionale – viene trasferito prima al sanatorio di Cuasso al Monte, poi a Bologna e infine, nel 1951, a Roma, come egli stesso riporta in una lettera inviata all'amico poeta Girolamo Comi.[89 A partire dal 1949 inizia la collaborazione con la rivista La Sfida fondata da Enzo Erra, Pino Rauti ed Egidio Sterpa, ispirando poi la nascita della nuova rivista Imperium che vede la luce nel 1950. Nel 1950 pubblica su Imperium l'opuscolo Orientamenti nel quale vengono sintetizzate in undici punti le sue idee (poi sviluppate nei libri successivi e riedite nel 1970).  Nel 1951 Evola viene arrestato con le accuse di apologia di fascismo e di essere l'ispiratore di alcuni gruppi neofascisti: si tratta del processo ai FAR (Fasci di Azione Rivoluzionaria). In questa occasione Evola viene difeso gratuitamente dall'avvocato Francesco Carnelutti[90] e dall'ex ministro dell'RSI Piero Pisenti ed egli stesso tiene dinanzi al Tribunale un'autodifesa poi pubblicata integralmente dalla Fondazione Julius Evola.[91] Scrive Evola:  «Dissi che attribuirmi idee fasciste era un assurdo, non in quanto erano fasciste, ma solo in quanto, rappresentavano, nel fascismo, la riapparizione di principi della grande tradizione Politica europea di Destra in genere. Io potevo aver difeso e potevo continuare a difendere certe concezioni in fatto di dottrina dello Stato. Si era liberi di fare il processo a tali concezioni. Ma in tal caso si dovevano far sedere sullo stesso banco degli accusati: Platone, un Metternich, un Bismarck, il Dante del De Monarchia e via dicendo»  (Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., pp. 94-95.) Pino Rauti ricorda che Evola viene portato dall'infermeria di Regina Coeli nella I sezione della Corte d'Assise di Roma su un telo retto da quattro detenuti, per l'occasione trasformati in infermieri, in quanto in tutta la Corte non vi è una sedia a rotelle.[92]   Una rara fotografia degli anni cinquanta Il processo ai FAR si conclude il 20 novembre del 1951 con l'assoluzione di Evola con formula piena.  Successivamente lo scrittore Marcello Veneziani, in relazione all'accusa mossa ad Evola di essere l'ispiratore e ideologo dei FAR, scrive che «[...] gli errori compiuti da chi ha cercato di tradurre Evola sul terreno sismico della politica, appartengono a chi li ha compiuti e non ad Evola».[93] Analoga tesi sostiene Giorgio Galli,[94] sottolineando inoltre di come lo stesso Evola è molto polemico nei confronti delle ristampe cosiddette "non autorizzate" che alcuni fanno dei suoi testi, soprattutto in relazione agli scritti giovanili (Imperialismo pagano in particolare) e a quelli relativi al problema della razza (Il mito del sangue, Indirizzi per una educazione razziale, Sintesi di dottrina della razza).  Scrive Evola in L'Italiano: «Non è certo colpa mia se alcuni giovani hanno fatto un uso arbitrario, confuso e poco serio di alcune idee dei miei libri, scambiando piani molto diversi».[95] Secondo Gianfranco De Turris, non potendo accusare Evola direttamente per i suoi scritti, si tenta di effettuare una "doppia lettura" dei suoi testi: una lettura palese per il volgo ed una "esoterica" per gli "iniziati".[96] Furio Jesi è il primo ad avanzare questa teoria nel suo famoso Cultura di destra del 1979.[77]  Altri autori sostengono invece che Evola sia un vero e proprio cattivo maestro. Felice Pallavicini – partigiano e frequentatore di Evola – così stigmatizza l'influenza del pensatore tradizionale sui giovani neofascisti: «Non ha fabbricato ordigni esplosivi, non è stato il capo di una banda di dinamitardi, ma le idee producono fatti, conseguenze [...] Ebbene l'evolismo ha prodotto fascismo, razzismo e antisemitismo. La rivolta ha senso solo se alla distruzione segue la ricostruzione, ma Evola ha badato solo a distruggere».[97] Nel 1953 pubblica Gli uomini e le rovine – testo che esercita grande influenza negli ambienti della destra italiana – nel quale spiega la decadenza del mondo moderno in seguito alla distruzione del principio di autorità e di ogni possibilità di trascendenza per l'affermarsi del razionalismo, in contrasto con le antiche civiltà e i valori della Tradizione. Nel 1958 esce la Metafisica del sesso sulla forza magica e potentissima dell'atto sessuale, attraverso lo studio dei simboli esteso a numerose tradizioni. Nel 1959 esce un testo sul pensiero di Jünger: L'«Operaio» nel pensiero di Ernst Jünger. Nel 1961 è la volta di Cavalcare la tigre in cui prosegue la sua critica al mondo moderno, offrendo una guida per coloro che pur non sentendo di appartenere interiormente a questo mondo, hanno intenzione di non cedervi psicologicamente ed esistenzialmente.  Scrive anche su alcune riviste ispirate al concetto metafisico ed immanente di Tradizione, come Il Ghibellino. Gli uomini e le rovine e Cavalcare la tigre sono considerati due testi fondamentali grazie ai quali c'è «una fattiva adesione dei giovani di destra al ribellismo antisistema partito dalle università»[98] alla fine degli anni sessanta. Scrive Pino Tosca: «Se si medita bene, ci si accorgerà che la posizione dei tradizionalisti nei fatti del '68, proviene in massima parte dalla lettura miscellanea di questi due testi».[99] Nel 1963 pubblica Il cammino del cinabro, la sua autobiografia, e nel 1968 un volume di saggi: L'arco e la clava.  In questi anni torna all'attenzione del pubblico la sua produzione artistica: nel 1963 Enrico Crispolti organizza una mostra dei suoi quadri alla galleria La Medusa di Roma; nel 1969 viene pubblicata da Scheiwiller Raâga Blanda, una raccolta di tutte le sue poesie, tra cui alcuni lavori inediti. Riprende anche l'attività giornalistica e scrive su Meridiano d'Italia, Monarchia, Barbarossa, Ordine Nuovo, Domani, Il Conciliatore, Totalità, Vie della Tradizione e Il Borghese. In questo periodo Evola assiste alla costituzione del Gruppo dei Dioscuri, sodalizio dedito al ripristino della cultualità romana ed italica, di cui è uno degli ispiratori,[100] attraverso i suoi scritti sulla romanità, il paganesimo e le idee imperiali, oltre che attraverso un particolare rapporto di intimità intellettuale con i fondatori dei Dioscuri.  Gli ultimi anni  Julius Evola in una fotografia del 1973 Vive gli ultimi anni con una pensione di invalido di guerra facendo traduzioni e scrivendo articoli, sostenuto economicamente da alcuni ammiratori guidati da Sergio Bonifazi, direttore del trimestrale Solstitivm. Un primo scompenso cardiaco si manifesta nel 1968, un secondo nel 1970. In quest'ultima occasione viene fatto ricoverare in ospedale da Placido Procesi, suo medico personale. Evola è infastidito dalle suore che lo assistono e minaccia di denunciarle per sequestro di persona. Viene fatto rientrare nella sua abitazione. La sua salute continua costantemente a peggiorare: inizia ad avere difficoltà respiratorie ed epatiche.  Poco prima della morte detta lo statuto originario di quella che sarebbe diventata la Fondazione Julius Evola per la difesa dei valori di una cultura conforme alla Tradizione.[101] Muore nella sua casa romana di corso Vittorio Emanuele l'11 giugno del 1974.  Pierre Pascal così lo ricorda nei suoi ultimi giorni: «Gli dissi il desiderio supremo di Henry de Montherlant: essere ridotto in ceneri dal fuoco, affinché fossero disperse a brezza leggera del Foro, tra i Rostri e il Tempio di Vesta. Allora quest'uomo, che era davanti a me, disteso, con le belle mani incrociate sul petto mi mormorò dolcemente e quasi impercettibilmente: "Io vorrei... ho disposto... che le mie fossero lanciate dall'alto di una montagna"».[102] L'esecuzione testamentaria è affidata all'avvocato Paolo Andriani, condirettore della rivista Civiltà e amico fraterno, il quale riesce, dopo molte peripezie, a far cremare il corpo di Evola – come da sua esplicita richiesta – presso il cimitero di Spoleto. L'amica di Evola Amalia Baccelli ricorda che il feretro rimane per molti giorni bloccato al Cimitero del Verano nella stanza mortuaria.[103] Un'urna contenente le ceneri viene consegnata alla guida emerita del CAI Eugenio David – compagno di scalate di Evola in giovinezza – e calata nel crepaccio del Lyskamm Orientale sul Monte Rosa dal Direttore del Centro Studi Evoliani di Genova Renato Del Ponte[104]. Una seconda urna si trova invece presso la tomba di famiglia al cimitero del Verano. Evola è propugnatore del Tradizionalismo, un modello ideale e sovratemporale di società caratterizzato in senso spirituale, aristocratico e gerarchico. Secondo l'autore tale modello si riscontra, da un punto di vista storico, in civiltà quali quella egiziana, romana e indiana. Tali civiltà non si basano su criteri economici, materiali e biologici, ma sono suddivise e gestite in base a criteri di gerarchia sociale di carattere ereditario e spirituale.  L'essere e il divenire Secondo Evola ogni azione che avviene durante la vita biologica (il divenire) rispecchia direttamente una medesima azione di carattere metafisico (l'essere) e dunque imperitura e sovratemporale.  Il tempo e l'involuzione dell'uomo Il cammino dell'uomo durante la sua involuzione (come la definisce lo stesso Evola in aperto contrasto con le teorie darwiniane) avviene attraverso un percorso di tipo circolare, non lineare. Traccia di questa teoria la si trova, ad esempio, nello schema proposto da Esiodo relativo alla cosiddetta teoria delle cinque età (dell'oro, dell'argento, del bronzo, degli eroi, del ferro), corrispondenti ai quattro yuga dell'induismo. Queste civiltà menzionate – ritenute superiori da Evola – si basano dunque su una più elevata dimensione metafisica e spirituale dell'esistenza, anziché su criteri di ordine materiale. La naturale decadenza di queste società è direttamente proporzionale all'aumento del progresso e della modernità.  Tale processo di decadenza ha inizio con la perdita dell'unico polo che in passato racchiude sia l'autorità spirituale che quella temporale e prosegue con la spinta propulsiva dei valori illuministi espressi con la Rivoluzione francese: si arriva così alla società odierna dove la dimensione spirituale dell'esistenza è andata definitivamente perduta. In particolare Evola rifiuta totalmente il concetto di egualitarismo, in favore di una visione differenziatrice della natura umana. Ne consegue un netto rifiuto per la democrazia (intesa come strumento di massa) e parimenti per ogni forma di totalitarismo, anch'esso ritenuto uno strumento di massa che si basa non su un'autorità spirituale, bensì su un'autorità esclusivamente di tipo temporale.  La via iniziatica Secondo Evola l'uomo ha la possibilità di elevarsi alla sfera divina e metafisica attraverso precise strade (il rito e l'iniziazione), utilizzando determinati strumenti (l'azione e la contemplazione) all'interno di contesti sociali predeterminati (la casta, l'impero). In aperto contrasto con le teorie di Sant'Agostino espresse nel De civitate dei ed in sintonia con i dettami del buddhismo delle origini, Evola sostiene che non esiste differenza quantitativa tra l'uomo e il dio. Per l'autore ogni uomo è un dio mortale e ogni dio un uomo immortale.[106]  Il razzismo "spirituale" Conseguenza di questo pensiero è che le differenze naturali tra gli esseri umani si rispecchierebbero anche nelle razze. Il filosofo rifiuta una visione razzista della vita in senso biologico, sostenendo invece la sua teoria del cosiddetto "razzismo spirituale". La "razza interiore" di cui parla Evola è definita come un patrimonio di tendenze e attitudini che, a seconda delle influenze ambientali, giungerebbero o meno a manifestarsi compiutamente. L'appartenenza a una razza si individuerebbe dunque sulla base delle caratteristiche spirituali, e in seguito di quelle fisiche, diventandone col tempo queste ultime il segno visibile. Partendo da questi presupposti assiomatici, Evola definisce gli ebrei come razza materialista e spiritualmente inferiore rispetto alla razza ariana, in sintonia con alcune idee del nazismo tedesco.  Nonostante il rifiuto della concezione pseudo-scientifica del razzismo biologico, nei confronti degli ebrei il "razzismo spirituale" di Evola non rappresenta una versione attenuata dell'antisemitismo nazista, ma un suo ribaltamento in senso metafisico: secondo Enzo Collotti, «il razzismo spirituale del quale parla Evola vuole partire appunto dal dato biologico, che gli pare ancora troppo rozzo e deterministico, per sublimarlo e portarlo a pieno compimento "sul piano dello spirito", ossia sul piano metafisico. In tal modo Evola intendeva potenziare e nobilitare, e non già attenuare, il razzismo, avvolgendolo in una nebulosa filosofeggiante e scrostandolo di quel tanto di ruvido antropologismo»[107]. Nel 1994 vengono ritrovate presso l'archivio crociano di Napoli sette lettere scritte da Evola a Benedetto Croce (più una, l'ottava, indirizzata all'editore Laterza). Tale ritrovamento, ad opera di Stefano Arcella – funzionario dei Beni Culturali presso la biblioteca di Napoli – permette di ricostruire almeno in parte i rapporti tra Evola e il filosofo del liberalismo. Evola invia inizialmente a Croce, in una lettera del 13 aprile 1925, la richiesta di intercedere presso l'editore Laterza per la pubblicazione dei Saggi sull'idealismo magico e Teoria dell'individuo assoluto. Pochi giorni dopo Evola risponde ad una cartolina postale di Croce ringraziandolo per il giudizio di apprezzamento sul lato formale dei due manoscritti.  Laterza, nonostante l'appoggio favorevole di Benedetto Croce, scrive ad Evola una lettera il 14 settembre 1925 in cui precisa di volersi riservare «la massima libertà di decidere anche nei riguardi di autorevoli amici».[108] L'8 aprile 1930 Evola scrive nuovamente a Croce chiedendo aiuto per la sua nuova opera sull'alchimia: La tradizione ermetica. In una successiva, breve lettera, Evola ringrazia Croce per l'interessamento e l'anno successivo, il manoscritto esce per i tipi dell'editore barese.  Secondo Stefano Arcella[109] in questo periodo si realizza un collegamento tra due opposizioni culturali al fascismo: una in senso tradizionale (Evola) ed una in senso liberale (Croce). Secondo Gianfranco De Turris[110] Evola si rivolge a Croce in quanto preferisce aperture presso uomini e gruppi non dogmatici, più che presso l'ufficialità del regime fascista. Poiché Evola non lascia un archivio epistolare, non è possibile analizzare le risposte date da Croce alle missive dello stesso Evola. Senza le risposte di Croce diventa infatti difficile valutare l'apertura del pensatore liberale verso i contributi filosofici del pensatore tradizionale.  Lettere a Giovanni Gentile  Giovanni Gentile Evola invia, tra il 1927 e il 1929, quattro lettere al Senatore Gentile. Nonostante le marcate divergenze sul piano filosofico – Evola si discosta dall'attualismo gentiliano in favore di una rigida codificazione teoretica (l'idealismo magico) – il pensatore tradizionale cerca un confronto con uno dei massimi esponenti del mondo accademico. Tale confronto, secondo Stefano Arcella[111] – curatore del volume Lettere di Julius Evola a Giovanni Gentile (1927-1929) – non produce risvolti interessanti sotto il profilo speculativo in quanto i due filosofi sono su posizioni eccessivamente distanti, ed anche i presupposti dottrinali e religiosi sono inconciliabili.  Sempre Arcella afferma che «il tentativo evoliano di aprire un colloquio costruttivo rimane un fiore che non sboccia».[112] Evola cerca di costruire, pur senza risultati apprezzabili, un punto di riferimento culturale alternativo all'ambiente gentiliano. Nel Cammino dei cinabro tenta di spiegare così le ragioni di questo mancato incontro:  «Tutti i riferimenti extra-filosofici di cui il mio sistema filosofico era ricco servirono come un comodo pretesto per l'ostracismo. Si poteva liquidare con un'alzata di spalle un sistema che accordava un posto perfino al mondo dell'iniziazione, della "magia" e di altri relitti superstiziosi. Che tutto ciò da me fosse fatto valere nei termini di un rigoroso pensiero speculativo, a poco servì. Però anche da parte mia vi era un equivoco, nei riguardi di coloro ai quali, sul piano pratico, la mia fatica speculativa poteva servire a qualcosa. Si trattava di una introduzione filosofica ad un mondo non filosofico, la quale poteva avere un significato nei soli rarissimi casi in cui la filosofia ultima avesse dato luogo ad una profonda crisi esistenziale. Ma vi era anche da considerare (e di questo in seguito mi resi sempre più conto) che i precedenti filosofici, cioè l'abito del pensiero astratto discorsivo, rappresentavano la qualificazione più sfavorevole affinché tale crisi potesse essere superata nel senso positivo da me indicato, con un passaggio a discipline realizzatrici»  (Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 61.) Gentile tuttavia riconosce ad Evola una certa competenza in campo esoterico-alchemico ed infatti chiede al filosofo della tradizione di curare la voce Atanor per l'Enciclopedia Italiana.[113] Anche alcuni allievi di Gentile riconoscono ad Evola una certa stima, in particolare Guido Calogero.[114]  Alessandro Giuli successivamente[115] riporta altre informazioni, relative al carteggio Evola-Gentile, reperite all'interno della "Fondazione Giovanni Gentile per gli studi filosofici", occupandosi in particolare dei vari volumi[116] che Evola invia con dedica al Senatore.  Lettere a Carl Schmitt  Carl Schmitt Si tratta di sette lettere inviate da Evola a Schmitt tra il 1951 e il 1963, conservate nel Nachlass Carl Schmitt dell'Archivio di Stato di Düsseldorf.[117] L'epistolario mette in luce da una parte alcune amicizie e conoscenze in comune tra i due pensatori (Ernst Jünger, Armin Mohler e il principe di Rohan), dall'altra il tentativo di proporre la pubblicazione in italiano del saggio di Schmitt sul tradizionalista cattolico Donoso Cortés.[118] Tale tentativo non va in porto, così come fallisce anche il secondo progetto editoriale, risalente al 1963, di pubblicare un'antologia schmittiana.  Di rilievo, all'interno dello scambio epistolare, le due divergenti visioni rispetto alle teorie di Donoso Cortés sul ruolo dell'uomo politico e la sua autonomia. Evola interpreta il concetto di dictatura coronada come «necessità di un potere che decida assolutamente, ma ad un livello di una dignità superiore, indicata dall'aggettivo coronada».[119] Per il giurista tedesco, invece, esiste prima di tutto un passaggio significativo che porta dal concetto della legittimità del regnare a quello della dittatura. Per Cortés, scrive Schmitt, «la dittatura incoronata, la dictadura coronada, significava solo un pis-aller pratico [...] mai ha concepito questo espediente pragmatico come una forma di salvezza religiosa o teologica».[120]  Anche in questo caso – così come già ampiamente esposto in Rivolta contro il mondo moderno[121] – il costante rimando evoliano ad un fondamento trascendente dell'ordine politico rimane «quell'ineliminabile discrimine che non può essere in alcun modo occultato o minimizzato».[122] Antonio Caracciolo sottolinea anche di come l'epistolario assume rilievo in relazione al tentativo di «fornire di solidi contrafforti ideologici e culturali il mondo conservatore che, nel dopoguerra italiano, si trovava a combattere la sua battaglia politica».[123]  Lettere a Gottfried Benn  Gottfried Benn Evola entra in contatto epistolare con Gottfried Benn – medico e poeta tedesco appartenente alla cosiddetta Rivoluzione conservatrice – fin dal 1930. Il primo incontro risale invece al 1934, durante la tappa berlinese di un viaggio che Evola effettua in Germania. Da quell'incontro scaturisce una famosa recensione-saggio di Benn alla traduzione tedesca di Rivolta contro il mondo moderno[124] che appare nel 1935 sulla rivista Die Literatur di Stoccarda.[125] Nel presentare l'opera, Benn espone le sue teorie convergendo con la visione del mondo di Evola.[126]  Successivamente Francesco Tedeschi rintraccia nello Schiller-Nationalmuseum Deutsches Literaturarchiv di Marbach due lettere manoscritte (la prima del 30 luglio e la seconda del 9 agosto 1934) più una dattiloscritta del 13 settembre 1955 che Evola invia a Benn. Le prime due lettere sono importanti in quanto chiariscono la comunanza di vedute dei due autori rispetto al tema della tradizione e di una visione del mondo conservatrice, oltre al fatto che entrambi non si riconoscono nel nazismo tedesco. Dalla lettera del 9 agosto: «Sono sempre più convinto che a chi voglia difendere e realizzare senza compromessi di sorta una tradizione spirituale e aristocratica non rimanga purtroppo, oggi e nel mondo moderno, alcun margine di spazio; a meno che non si pensi unicamente a un lavoro elitario».[3] La terza lettera è importante in quanto testimonia il tentativo di Evola di riprendere, nel dopoguerra, i rapporti con quegli esponenti conservatori che conosce negli anni trenta e quaranta.[127]  Lettere a Tristan Tzara  Tristan Tzara in un ritratto di Lajos Tihanyi Nel 1975 compaiono, in un articolo di Giovanni Lista,[128] brani di due lettere inviate da Evola a Tristan Tzara, il fondatore del Dadaismo. Dall'articolo non si evince però la loro collocazione. Solo nel 1989, grazie al lavoro di ricerca della studiosa Elisabetta Valento, tutta la corrispondenza viene trovata presso l'archivio della Fondation Jaques Doucet della biblioteca Sainte-Geneviève di Parigi.  Si tratta di una trentina di documenti tra lettere e cartoline: la prima è del 7 ottobre 1919, l'ultima del 1º agosto 1923. Molte tappe del cammino artistico del filosofo romano sono già note prima del rinvenimento della corrispondenza con Tzara: in parte perché lo stesso Evola ne parla nella sua autobiografia,[129] in parte perché dedotte dai critici e dagli studiosi nelle partecipazioni, in qualità di articolista, che Evola ha in alcune riviste d'arte dell'epoca: Noi, Cronache d'Attualità, Dada e Bleu. Secondo la Valento, ciò che invece non è noto prima del rinvenimento della corrispondenza, sono «le modalità dell'avventura evoliana nella sfera artistica, ovvero come essa si attuò, come fu vissuta, a che mirava».[130]  L'archivio della corrispondenza tra i due artisti ha, inoltre, il pregio di colmare il vuoto di un periodo giovanile poco conosciuto di Evola. Questo vuoto si colma sia attraverso la ricostruzione di tappe cronologiche (il recupero di alcune date, partecipazioni a mostre, riviste, incontri) sia attraverso il recupero di tappe più specificamente «psicologiche».[131] In particolare quelle che portano Evola ad annunciare il proprio suicidio (lettera 24 del 2 luglio 1921) e che raccontano di un uomo colto nel pieno male di vivere, di una sperimentazione del travaglio interiore che l'artista vive tra il 1920 e il 1921, dove la «sofferenza acuta si alterna alla disperazione».[130]Opere dell'autore Julius Evola, Arte Astratta, posizione teorica, Roma, Maglione e Strini, 1920. ISBN non esistente (FR) Julius Evola, La parole obscure du paysage intérieur, Roma-Zurigo, Collection Dada, 1921. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Saggi sull'idealismo magico, Todi-Roma, Atanòr, 1925. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, L'individuo e il divenire del mondo, Roma, Libreria di Scienze e Lettere, 1926. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, L'uomo come potenza, Todi-Roma, Atanòr, 1927a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Teoria dell'individuo assoluto, Torino, Bocca, 1927b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Imperialismo pagano, Todi-Roma, Atanòr, 1928. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Fenomenologia dell'individuo assoluto, Torino, Bocca, 1930. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La tradizione ermetica, Bari, Laterza, 1931. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Maschera e volto dello spiritualismo contemporaneo, Torino, Bocca, 1932. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, Milano, Hoepli, 1934. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Tre aspetti del problema ebraico, Roma, Mediterranee, 1936. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il mistero del Graal, Bari, Laterza, 1937a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il mito del sangue, Milano, Hoepli, 1937b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Indirizzi per una educazione razziale, Napoli, Conte, 1941a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Sintesi di dottrina della razza, Milano, Hoepli, 1941b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La dottrina del risveglio, Bari, Laterza, 1943. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Lo Yoga della potenza, Torino, Bocca, 1949. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Orientamenti, Roma, Imperium, 1950. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Gli uomini e le rovine, Roma, Edizioni dell'Ascia, 1953. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Metafisica del sesso, Todi-Roma, Atanòr, 1958. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, L'«Operaio» nel pensiero di Ernst Jünger, Roma, Armando, 1959. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Cavalcare la tigre, Milano, Vanni Scheiwiller, 1961. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, Milano, Vanni Scheiwiller, 1963a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il Fascismo. Saggio di una analisi critica dal punto di vista della destra, Roma, Volpe, 1963b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, L'arco e la clava, Milano, Vanni Scheiwiller, 1968. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Raâga Blanda, Milano, Vanni Scheiwiller, 1969. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il taoismo, Roma, Mediterranee, 1972. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Ricognizioni. Uomini e problemi, Roma, Mediterranee, 1974. ISBN non esistente Opere curate dall'autore Lao Tze, Il libro della via e della virtù, a cura di Julius Evola, Lanciano, Carabba, 1923. ISBN non esistente Cesare Della Riviera, Il mondo magico de gli heroi, a cura di Julius Evola, Bari, Laterza, 1932. ISBN non esistente René Guénon, La crisi del mondo moderno, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Hoepli, 1937. ISBN non esistente Emanuel Malinski , Léon De Poncins, La guerra occulta, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Hoepli, 1939. ISBN non esistente Gustav Meyrink, Il Domenicano bianco, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1944. ISBN non esistente Gustav Meyrink, La notte di Valpurga, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1944. ISBN non esistente Johann Jakob Bachofen, Le madri e la virilità olimpica, a cura di Julius Evola, Torino, Bocca, 1949. ISBN non esistente Gustav Meyrink, L'Angelo della finestra d'Occidente, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1949. ISBN non esistente Mircea Eliade, Lo sciamanesimo e le tecniche dell'estasi, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1954. ISBN non esistente Gruppo di Ur, Introduzione alla magia come scienza dell'Io, a cura di Julius Evola, Torino, Bocca, 1955. ISBN non esistente Otto Weininger, Sesso e carattere, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Bocca, 1956. ISBN non esistente Oswald Spengler, Il tramonto dell'occidente, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Longanesi, 1957. ISBN non esistente Eduard Erkes, Credenze religiose della Cina antica, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, IsMEO, 1958. ISBN non esistente Pitagora I Versi d'Oro, 1959, a cura di Julius Evola, Todi-Roma, Atanòr. ISBN non esistente Lao Tze, Il Libro del Principio e della sua azione, a cura di Julius Evola, Milano, Ceschina, 1959. ISBN non esistente Gabriel Marcel, L'uomo contro l'umano, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Volpe, 1963. ISBN non esistente Ernst Jünger, Al muro del tempo, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Volpe, 1965. ISBN non esistente Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Questa fu la Prussia, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Volpe, 1966. ISBN non esistente Erik Von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, L'errore democratico, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Volpe, 1966. ISBN non esistente Theodor Litt, Le scienze e l'uomo, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Armando, 1967. ISBN non esistente Pascal Bewerly Randolph, Magia Sexualis, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Mediterranee, 1969. ISBN non esistente Karl Loewenstein, La Monarchia nello Stato moderno, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Volpe, 1969. ISBN non esistente Robert Reininger, Nietzsche e il senso della vita, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Volpe, 1971. ISBN non esistente Arthur Avalon, Il mondo come potenza, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Mediterranee, 1973. ISBN non esistente Daisetsu Teitarō Suzuki, Saggi sul Buddhismo Zen Vol.1, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Mediterranee, 1975. ISBN non esistente Lu Tzu, Il mistero del fiore d'oro, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Mediterranee, 1971. ISBN non esistente Lu K'uan Yû, Lo Yoga del Tao, a cura di Julius Evola, Roma, Mediterranee, 1976. ISBN 978-88-27203-15-6. Opere curate dall'autore con lo pseudonimo Carlo d'Altavilla Theodor Litt, Istruzione tecnica e formazione umana, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Armando, 1958. ISBN non esistente Gustav Meyrink, Alla frontiera dell'Aldilà, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Napoli, Casa Editrice Rocco, 1959. ISBN non esistente Theodor Litt , Eduard Spranger, Enrico Pestalozzi, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Armando, 1961. ISBN non esistente Franz Hilker, Pedagogia comparata: storia, teoria e prassi, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Armando, 1967. ISBN non esistente Jacques Ulmann, Ginnastica, educazione fisica e sport dall'antichità ad oggi, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Armando, 1967. ISBN non esistente Karlfried Graf Dürckheim, Hara: il centro vitale dell'uomo secondo lo Zen, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Mediterranee, 1969. ISBN non esistente Bernard George, L'ondata rossa sulla Germania dell'Est 1945-1951, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Volpe, 1969. ISBN non esistente Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, L'errore democratico, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Volpe, 1969. ISBN non esistente Hans Reiner, Etica, teoria e storia, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Armando, 1971. ISBN non esistente Stephan Leibfried, L'università integrata: l'istruzione superiore nella Repubblica federale tedesca e negli Usa, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Armando, 1971. ISBN non esistente Ernst Cassirer, Saggio sull'uomo: introduzione ad una filosofia della cultura, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Armando, 1972. ISBN non esistente Walter Wefers, Basi e idee dello Stato spagnolo d'oggi, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Volpe, 1965. ISBN non esistente François Gaucher, Idee per un movimento, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Roma, Volpe, 1966. ISBN non esistente Donald Edward Keyhoe, La verità sui dischi volanti, a cura di Carlo d'Altavilla (Julius Evola), Milano, Atlante, 1954. ISBN non esistente Antologie di scritti non compilate dall'autore Julius Evola, I saggi di "Bilychnis", Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1970a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, I saggi della "Nuova Antologia", Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1970b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, L'idea di Stato, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1970c. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Gerarchia e democrazia, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1970d. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Meditazioni delle vette, La Spezia, Edizioni del Tridente, 1971. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Diario 1943-44, Genova, Centro Studi Evoliani, 1975. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Etica aria, Genova, Centro Studi Evoliani, 1976a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, L'individuo e il divenire del mondo, Carmagnola, Edizioni Arktos, 1976b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Simboli della Tradizione Occidentale, Carmagnola, Edizioni Arktos, 1977a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La via della realizzazione di sé secondo i misteri di Mitra, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1977b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Considerazioni sulla guerra occulta, Genova, Centro Studi Evoliani, 1977c. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Le razze e il mito delle origini di Roma, Monfalcone, Sentinella, 1977d. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il problema della donna, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1977e. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Ultimi scritti, Napoli, Controcorrente, 1977f. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La Tradizione di Roma, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1977g. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Due imperatori, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1977h. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Cultura e politica, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1978a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Citazioni sulla Monarchia, Palermo, Edizioni Thule, 1978b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, L'infezione psicanalitica, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1978c. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il nichilismo attivo di Federico Nietzsche, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1978d. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Lo Stato, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1978e. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Europa una: forma e presupposti, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1979a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La questione sociale, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1979b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Saggi di dottrina politica, Sanremo, Mizar, 1979c. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La satira politica di Trilussa, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1980a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Scienza ultima, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1980b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Spengler e il "Tramonto dell'Occidente", Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1981a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Lo zen, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1981b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, I tempi e la storia, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1982a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Civiltà americana, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1982b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La forza rivoluzionaria di Roma, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1984a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Scritti sulla massoneria, Roma, Edizioni Settimo Sigillo, 1984b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Oriente e occidente, Milano, La Queste, 1984c. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Una maestro dei tempi moderni: René Guénon, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1984d. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Filosofia, etica e mistica del razzismo, Monfalcone, Sentinella d'Italia, 1985. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Monarchia, aristocrazia, tradizione, Sanremo, Casabianca, 1986a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, I placebo, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1986b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Gli articoli de "La Vita Italiana" durante il periodo bellico, Treviso, Centro Studi Tradizionali, 1988. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Dal crepuscolo all'oscuramento della tradizione nipponica, Treviso, Centro Studi Tradizionali, 1989. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il ciclo si chiude, americanismo e bolscevismo (1929-1969), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1991. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il genio d'Israele, Catania, Il Cinabro, 1992a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il problema di oriente e occidente, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1992b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Fenomenologia della sovversione in scritti politici del 1933-70, Borzano, SeaR, 1993. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Scritti sull'arte d'avanguardia, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1994a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Esplorazioni e disamine, gli scritti di "Bibliografia fascista" (1934-1939), Parma, Edizioni all'insegna del veltro, 1994b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Esplorazioni e disamine, gli scritti di "Bibliografia fascista" (1940-1943), Parma, Edizioni all'insegna del veltro, 1995a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Lo Stato (1934-1943), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1995b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La tragedia della Guardia di Ferro, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1996a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Scritti per "Vie della Tradizione" (1971-1974), Palermo, Edizioni Vie della Tradizione, 1996b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Carattere, Catania, Il Cinabro, 1996c. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, L'idealismo realistico (1924-1928), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1997a. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Idee per una destra, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1997b. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Fascismo e Terzo Reich, Roma, Mediterranee, 2001. ISBN 978-88-272-1393-3. Julius Evola, Il "mistero iperboreo". Scritti sugli Indoeuropei 1934-1970, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 2003. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Critica del costume, Catania, Il Cinabro, 2005. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Augustea (1941-1943). La Stampa (1942-1943), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 2006. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Anticomunismo positivo. Scritti su bolscevismo e marxismo (1938-1968), Napoli, Controcorrente, 2008. ISBN 978-88-89015-62-9. Julius Evola, Il Mondo alla Rovescia (Saggi critici e recensioni 1923-1959), Edizioni Arya, Genova 2008. ISBN non esistente. Julius Evola, La scuola di mistica fascista. Scritti di mistica, ascesi e libertà (1940-1941), Napoli, Controcorrente, 2009. ISBN 978-88-89015-71-1. Julius Evola, Le sacre radici del potere, Edizioni Arya, Genova 2010. ISBN non esistente. Julius Evola, Civiltà americana. Scritti sugli Stati Uniti (1930-1968), Napoli, Controcorrente, 2010. ISBN 978-88-89015-82-7. Julius Evola, Scritti sulla Massoneria volgare speculativa, Edizioni Arya, Genova 2012. ISBN 978-88-907256-0-9. Julius Evola, Par delà Nietzsche, Torino, Nino Aragno Editore, 2015. ISBN 978-88-84197-57-3. Julius Evola, Fascismo Giappone Zen. Scritti sull'Oriente 1927-1975, Roma, Pagine, 2016. ISBN 978-88-75574-92-5. Julius Evola, Ernst Jünger. Il combattente, l'operaio, l'anarca, Passaggio al Bosco, 2017, a cura di RigenerAzione Evola, ISBN 9788885574014. Julius Evola, Il Fascismo e l'idea politica tradizionale, Documenti per il Fronte della Tradizione - Fascicolo n. 7, Raido, ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Mussolini e il razzismo, Documenti per il Fronte della Tradizione - Fascicolo n. 8, Raido, ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Le SS. Guardia e Ordine della rivoluzione nazionalsocialista, Documenti per il Fronte della Tradizione - Fascicolo n. 11, Raido, ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, I "Castelli dell'Ordine" e i nuovi Junker, Documenti per il Fronte della Tradizione - Fascicolo n. 12, Raido, ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Il significato di Roma per lo spirito "olimpico" germanico, Documenti per il Fronte della Tradizione - Fascicolo n. 13, Raido, ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La Dottrina aria di Lotta e Vittoria, Documenti per il Fronte della Tradizione - Fascicolo n. 13, Raido, ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Etica Aria - Orizzonte Tradizionale, Edizioni Arya, Genova 2018. ISBN 9788898324101. Raccolte di lettere e carteggi Julius Evola, Lettere di Julius Evola a Girolamo Comi (1934-1962), a cura di Gianfranco De Turris, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1987. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Lettere di Julius Evola a Tristan Tzara (1919-1923), a cura di Elisabetta Valento, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1991. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Lettere di Julius Evola a Benedetto Croce (1925-1933), a cura di Stefano Arcella, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1995. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, La biblioteca esoterica. Evola Croce Laterza. Carteggi editoriali, a cura di Antonio Barbera, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1997. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Lettere di Julius Evola a Carl Schmitt (1951-1963), a cura di Antonio Caracciolo, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 2000. ISBN non esistente Julius Evola, Lettere di Julius Evola a Giovanni Gentile (1927-1929), a cura di Stefano Arcella, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 2000. ISBN non esistente.Note ^ Julius Evola, La Torre. Foglio di Tradizioni varie e di espressione una, a cura di Marco Tarchi, Milano, Il Falco, 1977, p. 43. ^ Claudio Mutti, Julius Evola sul fronte dell'Est, in Quaderni del Veltro, n. 33, 1998, p. 108.  Gianfranco De Turris, La corrispondenza tra Julius Evola e Gottfried Benn, su centrostudilaruna.it, 2008. URL consultato l'8 maggio 2009. ^ Gianfranco De Turris, Profilo di Julius Evola, in Julius Evola, Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, 4ª ed., Roma, Mediterranee, 2008. ISBN 978-88-272-1224-0 ^ Registro degli atti di nascita di Roma per l'anno 1898, Archivio di Stato di Roma ^ Registro degli atti di nascita di Cinisi per l'anno 1854, Archivio di Stato di Palermo ^ Registro degli atti di nascita di Cinisi per l'anno 1865, Archivio di Stato di Palermo ^ Registro degli atti di matrimonio di Cinisi per l'anno 1892, Tribunale di Palermo ^ Registro degli atti di nascita di Roma per l'anno 1895, Archivio di Stato di Roma ^ Il Barone Immaginario Il Barone Immaginario, AA.VV., a cura di Gianfranco De Turris, Ugo Mursia Editore, Milano, 2018 ^ Catalogus Baronum, pagina 143, numero 788. ^ Vanni Scheiwiller, Nota dell'editore, in Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, Milano, Scheiwiller, 1963, p. 3. ^ (FR) Gabriel Matzneff, Julius Evola l'éveilleur, in Le Monde des livres, 25 novembre 1977.  [senza fonte]  Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 46. ^ Catalogo della mostra con tutte le opere in: AA.VV., Grande Esposizione Nazionale Futurista, Milano, Le Presse, 1919. ^ Claudio Bruni, Evola Dada, in Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Testimonianze su Evola, Roma, Mediterranee, 1973, p. 60.  Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, p. 7 ^ Testo Archiviato il 21 ottobre 2016 in Internet Archive., estratto: «Egli prende la terra come terra, pensa alla terra, pensa sulla terra, pensa 'Mia è la terra' e si rallegra di ciò: e perché? Perché egli non la conosce, dico io. (...) L'estinzione vale a lui come estinzione, allora egli deve non pensare all'estinzione, non pensare sull'estinzione, non pensare 'Mia è l'estinzione', non rallegrarsi dell'estinzione: e perché? Perché impari a conoscerla, dico io.»  ^ Per un approfondimento: Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Lettere di Julius Evola a Tristan Tzara (1919-1923), Roma, Edizioni Fondazione Julius Evola, 1991. ^ Carlo Fabrizio Carli, Evola pittore tra futurismo e dadaismo, su juliusevola.it. URL consultato il 2 maggio 2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 3 ottobre 2008). ^ Claudio Bruni, Evola Dada, op. cit., p. 60. ^ Per un approfondimento: Vitaldo Conte, Maschere di Evola come percorso controcorrente, Atti del convegno di studi "Julius Evola e la politica", Alatri 23-24 maggio 2008, a cura di Emiliano Di Terlizzi [1] Archiviato il 24 luglio 2011 in Internet Archive.. ^ Luciano De Maria, Introduzione a: FT. Marinetti, Teoria e invenzione futurista, Milano, Mondadori, 1969, p. 54. ^ Per un approfondimento sulla produzione pittorica di Evola si rimanda a due cataloghi: AA.VV., Julius Evola e l'arte delle avanguardie. Tra Futurismo, Dada e Alchimia, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1998 e Vitaldo Conte, Julius Evola. Arte come alchimia, mistica, biografia, Reggio Calabria, Iriti, 2005. ISBN 978-88-87935-97-4. ^ Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 9. ^ Poi ristampati sotto forma di antologia: Gruppo di Ur, Introduzione alla magia come scienza dell'Io, Torino, Bocca, 1955. ^ Per una trattazione esaustiva dell'argomento si rimanda a Renato Del Ponte, Evola e il magico gruppo di Ur, Borzano, SeaR, 1994. ISBN 978-600-08-7063-8. ^ Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 88. ^ Francesco Lamendola, Alcuni aspetti del pensiero filosofico di Julius Evola, su esonet.org, 2007. URL consultato il 4 maggio 2009. ^ Julius Evola, Fenomenologia dell'Individuo assoluto, Roma, Mediterranee, 1985, pp. 286-287. ^ Julius Evola, Heidnischer Imperialismus, Lipsia, Armanen-Verlag, 1933. ^ Alessandra Tarquini, Il Gentile dei fascisti, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2009, p. 273. ^ Giuseppe Gangi, Misteri esoterici. La tradizione ermetico-esoterica in occidente, Roma, Mediterranee, 2006, p. 256. ^ Julius Evola, Renato Dal Ponte (a cura di), Meditazioni delle vette, La Spezia, Edizioni del Tridente, 1973. ^ Francesco Demattè, Julius Evola, Meditazioni delle vette, in Secolo d'Italia, 26 agosto 2003. URL consultato il 15 maggio 2009. ^ Gianfranco De Turris, Biografia, in Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Testimonianze su Evola, op. cit., p. 221. ^ Julius Evola, Fascismo e Terzo Reich, op. cit., p. 87. ^ Alain de Benoist, Julius Evola, reazionario radicale e metafisico impegnato, in Julius Evola, Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Gli uomini e le Rovine e Orientamenti, Roma, Mediterranee, 2001, p. 46. ^ Julius Evola, La scuola di mistica fascista. Scritti di mistica, ascesi e libertà (1940-1941), Napoli, Controcorrente, 2009. ^ Julius Evola, Il fascismo quale volontà di impero e il cristianesimo, in Critica Fascista, vol. 5, n. 24, dicembre 1927. ^ Silvio Bertoldi, Salò. Vita e morte della Repubblica Sociale Italiana, Milano, Rizzoli, 1976, p. 395. ^ Roberto Vivarelli, Fascismo e fascismi, in Nuova storia contemporanea, vol. 5, n. 1, 2001. ^ Evola stipendiato dal Duce, in Avvenire, 19 giugno 2001. ^ Marco Tarchi, Julius Evola e il fascismo: note per un percorso non ordinario, in AA.VV., Cultura e fascismo. Letteratura, arti e spettacolo di un ventennio, Firenze, Ponte alle Grazie, 1990, pp. 123-142. ^ Giuseppe Parlato, Fascismo, Nazionalsocialismo, Tradizione, in Julius Evola, Fascismo e Terzo Reich, Roma, Mediterranee, 2001, p. 15. ISBN 978-88-272-1393-3. ^ Renzo De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo, op. cit., p. 246. ^ Julius Evola, Il Fascismo, saggio di un'analisi critica dal punto di vista della Destra, Volpe, Roma, 1964, p. 98. ^ Claudio Pavone, Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1991, p. 212. ^ Pino Rauti e Rutilio Sermonti, Storia del fascismo, Roma, Centro Editoriale Nazionale, 1976, vol. 1, p. 46. ^ Giuseppe Parlato, Fascismo, Nazionalsocialismo, Tradizione, op. cit., p. 20. ^ Cfr. anche, sulla critica allo stato educatore, Julius Evola, Fascismo e Terzo Reich, op. cit., p. 113. ^ Julius Evola, Fascismo e Terzo Reich, op. cit., p. 58. ^ Julius Evola, Fascismo e Terzo Reich, op. cit., pp. 93-100. ^ Gianfranco De Turris, Nota del curatore, in Julius Evola, Fascismo e Terzo Reich, op. cit., pp. 8-9. ^ Per un elenco completo delle collaborazioni giornalistiche: Gianfranco De Turris, Biografia, in Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Testimonianze su Evola, op. cit., pp. 223-224. ^ Julius Evola, Il mito del sangue, Milano, Hoepli, 1937, p. 204. ^ Julius Evola, L'esposizione antiebraica di Monaco, "Il Regime fascista", 28 dicembre 1937. ^ Julius Evola, I testi del Corriere Padano, Padova, Edizioni di AR, 2002, p. 41. ^ Franco Cuomo, I Dieci. Chi erano gli scienziati italiani che firmarono il manifesto della razza, Milano, Baldini Castoldi Dalai, 2005, pp. 202-207. ISBN 978-88-8490-825-4. ^ Julius Evola, Il mito del sangue, op. cit., p. 241. ^ Julius Evola, Il mito del sangue, op. cit., p. 242. ^ Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 84. ^ Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 174. ^ (FR) Franco Rosati, Un pessimismo giustificato? Intervista a Julius Evola, in La Nation Européenne, 15 dicembre 1966. URL consultato il 6 maggio 2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 25 dicembre 2007).  Renzo De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo, 1ª ed., Torino, Einaudi, 1961, p. 447. ^ Renzo de Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo, Torino, Einaudi, 1993, pp. 392-393. ^ Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Testimonianze su Evola, Roma, Edizioni Mediterranee, p. 224 e Vanni Scheiwiller, Note dell'editore in Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 2. ^ Tale è l'opinione di un'importante testata giornalistica italiana del tempo: Il Giornale d'Italia del 20 aprile 1937 (l'articolo è firmato da Adone Nosari). Il rif. si trova in: Renzo De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo, op. cit., p. 214. ^ Attilio Milano, Storia degli ebrei in Italia, Torino, Einaudi, 1992, p. 692. ^ Francesco Germinario, Razza del Sangue, razza dello Spirito. Julius Evola, l'antisemitismo e il nazionalsocialismo (1930-1943), Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2001. ^ Alberto Lombardo, Razza del sangue, razza dello spirito, Centro Studi La Runa. URL consultato il 2 luglio 2011. ^ Francesco Cassata, A destra del fascismo. Profilo politico di Julius Evola, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2003. ^ Gianni Scipione Rossi, Il razzista totalitario. Evola e la leggenda dell'antisemitismo spirituale, Catanzaro, Rubbettino, 2007. ^ Furio Jesi, Cultura di destra, Milano, Garzanti, 1993, p. 91. ^ Guido Caldiron, Un filosofo buono per tutte le destre, in Avvenire, 29 maggio 2001 (archiviato dall'url originale il 12 maggio 2006).  Furio Jesi, op. cit., p. 97. ^ Luca Leonello Rimbotti, Linea, 14 settembre 2007, https://web.archive.org/web/20160304192759/http://www.juliusevola.it/risorse/template.asp?cod=657&cat=ART&page=3 (archiviato dall'url originale il 4 marzo 2016). ^ Massoneria e fascismo. Dall'intesa cordiale alla distruzione delle Logge: come nasce una «guerra di religione», Castelvecchi, 2008, ISBN 9788876152290. ^ Julius Evola, Per un allineamento politico-culturale dell'Italia e della Germania, in Lo Stato, vol. 13, n. 5, maggio 1942, pp. 141-153. ^ Julius Evola, The Doctrine of Awakening, Londra, Luzac & Co., 1951. Ora in Julius Evola, The Doctrine of Awakening: The Attainment of Self-Mastery According to the Earliest Buddhist Texts, Rochester, Inner Traditions, 1996. ISBN 978-0-89281-553-1. ^ Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 158. ^ Fra queste la Piccola Treccani, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1995, vol. 4, p. 461. ^ Giorgio Bocca, La Repubblica di Mussolini, Roma-Bari, Editori Laterza, 1977, p. 14. ^ Bruno Zoratto (a cura di), Julius Evola nei documenti segreti dell'Ahnenerbe, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1997. ^ G. De Turris, Julius Evola. Un Filosofo in Guerra 1943-45, Milano, Mursia, 2016. ^ Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., p. 93. ^ Fondazione Julius Evola, Una biografia di Julius Evola, su fondazionejuliusevola.it. URL consultato il 29 aprile 2013. ^ Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Lettere di Julius Evola a Girolamo Comi (1933-1964), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1987, p. 25. ^ Francesco Carnelutti, In difesa di Giulio Evola, in L'Eloquenza, n. 11-12, 1951. ^ Julius Evola, Autodifesa, Roma, Edizioni Fondazione Julius Evola, 1976. ^ Pino Rauti, Evola: una guida per domani, in Civiltà, vol. 2, n. 8-9, 1974. ^ Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Elogio e difesa di Julius Evola, Roma, Mediterranee, 1985, p. 5. ^ Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Elogio e difesa di Julius Evola, op. cit., pp. 9-11. ^ Julius Evola, Razzismo e altri orrori (compreso il ghibellinismo), in L'Italiano, n. 5-6, 1959, p. 67. ^ Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Elogio e difesa di Julius Evola, op. cit., p. 118. ^ Felice Pallavicini, Evola, traditore dello spirito, in Corriere della Sera, 5 luglio 2000. URL consultato l'8 maggio 2009 (archiviato dall'url originale in data pre 1/1/2016). ^ Gianfranco De Turris (a cura di), Elogio e difesa di Julius Evola, op. cit., p. 91. ^ Pino Tosca, Il cammino della Tradizione, Rimini, Il Cerchio, 1995, pp. 51-52. ^ La via romana, Centro Studi sulle Nuove Religioni. URL consultato il 2 gennaio 2012. ^ Julius Evola, Statuto della Fondazione Julius Evola, su juliusevola.it, 1974. URL consultato il 1º maggio 2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 25 dicembre 2007). ^ Riccardo Paradisi, Gli Arya seggono ancora al picco dell'avvoltoio, in Giovanni Conti, Evola tascabile, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 1998, p. 25. ^ Amalia Baccelli, Ricordo dell'uomo, in Civiltà, vol. 2, n. 8-9, 1974. ^ http://www.lastampa.it/2016/01/15/edizioni/aosta/la-nostra-fuga-dagli-sul-monte-rosa-per-seppellire-le-ceneri-di-evola-OCtvBCvd8w4FQuyKGxUjLK/pagina.html ^ Julius Evola, Franco Freda (a cura di) Orientamenti - undici punti, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 2000, p. 7. ^ Julius Evola, Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, op. cit., p. 327. ^ Enzo Collotti, Il fascismo e gli ebrei, Bari-Roma, Laterza, 2006, p. 48. ^ Alessandro Barbera (a cura di), La biblioteca esoterica. Carteggi editoriali Evola-Croce-Laterza 1925-1959, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1997, p. 40. ^ Cesare Medail, Julius Evola: mi manda Don Benedetto, in Corriere della Sera, 11 gennaio 1996. ^ Cfr. la prefazione del testo Lettere di Julius Evola a Benedetto Croce (1925-1933) pubblicato dalla Fondazione Evola nel 1995. ^ Guglielmo Savelli, Cronache di un incontro mancato. Gli ardui rapporti tra l'attualismo e l'idealismo magico, su italiasociale.org, 2007. URL consultato il 4 maggio 2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 29 agosto 2008). ^ Stefano Arcella, Gentile amico e nemico, "L'Italia Settimanale", 15 giugno 1994, pp. 44-46. ^ Margarete Durst, Il contributo di Julius Evola all'"Enciclopedia Italiana", in Il Veltro, vol. 17, n. 3-4, 1998, pp. 335-339. ^ Guido Calogero, Come ci si orienta nel pensiero contemporaneo?, Sansoni, Firenze, 1940, pp. 57-59. ^ Alessandro Giuli, Evola-Gentile-Spirito: tracce di un incontro impossibile, in Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, vol. 9, 1997, pp. 411-442. ^ I volumi sono: Saggi sull'idealismo magico, Teoria dell'individuo assoluto, Imperialismo pagano e Fenomenologia dell'individuo assoluto. ^ Alberto Lombardo, Caro conservatore ti scrivo, su centrostudilaruna.it, 2000. URL consultato il 4 maggio 2009. ^ Si tratta del saggio Donoso Cortes in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation del 1950, poi pubblicato in Carl Schmitt, Donoso Cortés - Interpretato in una prospettiva paneuropea, Milano, Adelphi, 1995. ^ Julius Evola, Ricognizioni. Uomini e problemi, Roma, Mediterranee, 1985, p. 171. ^ Carl Schmitt, Donoso Cortés - Interpretato in una prospettiva paneuropea, op. cit., p. 107. ^ Julius Evola, Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, op. cit., pp. 47-56. ^ Giovanni Damiano, Evola e l'utonomia del politico, Atti del convegno di studi "Julius Evola e la politica", Alatri 23-24 maggio 2008, a cura di Emiliano Di Terlizzi [2] Archiviato il 24 luglio 2011 in Internet Archive.. ^ Antonio Caracciolo, Due atteggiamenti di fronte alla modernità, in Antonio Caracciolo (a cura di), Lettere di Julius Evola a Carl Schmitt (1951-1963), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 2000, p. 6. ^ Julius Evola, Erhebung wider die moderne Welte, Stoccarda, Verlags-Anstalt, 1935. ^ (DE) Gottfried Benn, Sein und Werden, in Die Literatur, n. 3, 1935. ^ Gottfried Benn, Essere e divenire, in Julius Evola, Rivolta contro il mondo moderno, op. cit., pp. 438-444. ^ Evola, infatti, oltre a Benn, scrive a Guénon (1947), Eliade e Schmitt (1951) e Jünger (1953). ^ (FR) Giovanni Lista, Tristan Tzara et le dadaisme italien, in Europe, n. 7-8, 1975. ^ Julius Evola, Il cammino del cinabro, op. cit., pp. 23-28.  Elisabetta Valento (a cura di), Lettere di Julius Evola a Tristan Tzara (1919-1923), Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1991, p. 13. ^ Elisabetta Valento (a cura di), op. cit., p. 14. Bibliografia In italiano Adriano Tilgher, Giulio Evola, in Antologia dei Filosofi Italiani del dopoguerra, Modena, Guanda, 1937. Gianfranco De Turris, Omaggio a Julius Evola per il suo LXXV compleanno, Roma, Volpe, 1973a. ISBN non esistente Gianfranco De Turris, Testimonianze su Evola, Roma, Mediterranee, 1973b. ISBN 978-88-272-0509-9. Maura Del Serra, L'avanguardia distonica del primo Evola, in Studi Novecenteschi, n. 11, 1975, pp. 129-154. Pier Luigi Aurea, Evola e il nichilismo, Palermo, Edizioni Thule, 1976. ISBN non esistente Piero Vassallo, Modernità e tradizione nell'opera evoliana, Palermo, Edizioni Thule, 1978. ISBN non esistente Philippe Baillet, Julius Evola e l'affermazione assoluta, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1978. ISBN non esistente Marcello Veneziani, La ricerca dell'assoluto in Julius Evola, Palermo, Edizioni Thule, 1979. ISBN non esistente Gian Franco Lami, Introduzione a Julius Evola, Roma, Volpe, 1980. ISBN non esistente Marcello Veneziani, Julius Evola tra filosofia e tradizione, Roma, Ciarrapico editore, 1984, SBN IT\ICCU\TSA\0055880. Roberto Melchionda, Il volto di Dioniso, Roma, Basaia, 1984. ISBN non esistente Giovanni Ferracuti, Julius Evola, Rimini, Il Cerchio, 1984. ISBN non esistente AA.VV. Anna Maria Jellamo, Julius Evola. Il filosofo della tradizione, in La destra radicale, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1984. ISBN non esistente Piero Di Vona, Evola e Guénon. Tradizione e Civiltà, Napoli, Società Editrice Napoletana, 1985. ISBN non esistente Marguerite Yourcenar, Incontri col Tantrismo, in Il tempo grande scultore, Torino, Einaudi, 1985, pp. 173-181. Gennaro Malgieri, Modernità e Tradizione, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 1987. ISBN non esistente AA.VV. Tradizione e/o Nichilismo, letture e ri-letture di "Cavalcare la tigre", 1988, Milano, Società Editrice Barbarossa. ISBN non esistente Antimo Negri, Julius Evola e la filosofia, Milano, Spirali, 1988. ISBN 978-88-7770-209-8.a filosofi Luca Lo Bianco, Evola, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol. 43, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1993, p. 575. ISBN non esistente Marco Fraquelli, Il filosofo proibito, tradizione e reazione nell'opera di Julius Evola, Milano, Terziaria, 1994a. ISBN non esistente Pablo Echaurren, Evola in Dada, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 1994. ISBN non esistente Gianfranco De Turris, Adolfo Morganti;, Julius Evola, mito, azione, civiltà, Rimini, Il Cerchio, 1994. ISBN 978-88-86583-10-7. Elisabetta Valento, Homo Faber, Julius Evola fra arte e alchimia, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1994d. ISBN non esistente Renato Del Ponte, Evola e il magico "Gruppo di UR", Borzano, SeaR, 1994. ISBN non esistente Sandro Consolato, Julius Evola e il buddismo, Borzano, SeaR, 1995. ISBN non esistente AA.VV. Delle rovine ed oltre, saggi su Julius Evola, 1995, Roma, A. Pellicani. ISBN non esistente Gianfranco De Turris, Elogio e difesa di Julius Evola, il Barone e i terroristi, Roma, Mediterranee, 1997. ISBN 978-88-272-0456-6. Adriano Romualdi, Su Evola, Roma, Fondazione Julius Evola, 1998. ISBN non esistente Giovanni Damiano, La filosofia della libertà di Julius Evola, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 1998. ISBN non esistente Gigi Montonato, Comi-Evola. Un rapporto ai margini del fascismo, Lecce, Congedo, 2000. ISBN 978-88-8086-355-7. Beniamino Di Dario, La via romana al Divino. Julius Evola e la religione romana, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 2001. ISBN non esistente Francesco Germinario, Razza del sangue, razza dello spirito, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2001. ISBN 978-88-339-1301-8. Patricia Chiantera Stutte, Julius Evola. Dal dadaismo alla rivoluzione conservatrice (1919-1940), Roma, Aracne, 2002. ISBN 978-88-7999-317-3. Francesco Cassata, A destra del fascismo. Profilo politico di Julius Evola, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2003. ISBN 978-88-339-1498-5. Giovanni Damiano (a cura di), L'ora che viene. Intorno a Evola e a Spengler, Padova, Edizioni di Ar, 2004. ISBN non esistente Sandro Consolato, Julius Evola trentanni dopo, Roma, I libri del Graal, 2004. ISBN non esistente Vitaldo Conte, Julius Evola. Arte come alchimia, mistica, biografia, Reggio Calabria, Iriti, 2005. ISBN 978-88-87935-97-4. Thomas Dana, Julius Evola e la tentazione razzista, Mesagne, Sulla rotta del sole, 2006. ISBN 978-88-88456-33-1. Alberto Lombardo, Evola, gli evoliani e gli antievoliani, Roma, Nuove Idee, 2006. ISBN 978-88-7557-183-2. Gianfranco De Turris, Esoterismo e fascismo, Roma, Mediterranee, 2006. ISBN 88-272-1831-9. Hans Thomas Hakl, La questione dei rapporti fra Julius Evola e Aleister Crowley, in Arthos, n. 13, 2006, pp. 269-289. Gianni Scipione Rossi, Il razzista totalitario, Catanzaro, Rubbettino, 2007. ISBN 978-88-498-1683-9. Marco Iacona, Il maestro della tradizione. Dialoghi su Julius Evola, Napoli, Controcorrente, 2008. ISBN 88-89015-68-3. Alessandra Tarquini, Il Gentile dei fascisti, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2009. ISBN 978-88-15-12817-1. Marco Iacona, Julius Evola e le vicende processuali legate ai Far (1951-54), in Nuova Storia Contemporanea, vol. 3, n. 13, 2009. Fabio Venzi, Julius Evola e la libera muratoria, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 2010. ISBN 978-88-61-48081-0. Gianfranco De Turris, Julius Evola. Un filosofo in guerra 1943 1945, Milano, Ugo Mursia Editore, 2016, ISBN 978-88-425-5675-6. Rene Guenon, Lettere a Julius Evola, edizioni Arktos, 2005 AA.VV.,Heliodromos, n. 6 Nuova Serie, 1995 - Speciale Evola, Catania In altre lingue (FR) Christophe Boutin, Politique et tradition: Julius Evola dans le siecle, 1898-1974, Editions Kime, 1992. ISBN 978-2-908212-15-0. (FR) Jean-Paul Lippi, Julius Evola, metaphysicien et penseur politique: Essai d'analyse structurale, Éditions L'Âge d'Homme, 1998. ISBN 978-2-8251-1125-3. (FR) Jean-Paul Lippi, Julius Evola: qui suis-je?, Pardès, 1999. ISBN 978-2-86714-183-6. (FR) Hans Thomas Hakl, Julius Evola et la "révolution conservatrice" allemande, Deux Etendards, 2002. (sotto lo pseudonimo di H.T. Hansen) (ES) Marta Monedero, Evola, Libros en Red, 2004. ISBN 978-987-561-069-9. (EN) Mark Sedgwik, Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. ISBN 978-0-19-515297-5. (EN) Paul Furlong, Social and Political Thought of Julius Evola (Extremism and Democracy), London, Routledge, 2011. ISBN 978-0-41558-968-0. Documentari Dalla Trincea a Dada (2006) di Maurizio Murelli. DVD pubblicato nel 2006 dalla Società Editrice Barbarossa di Milano, della durata di 101 min., che ripercorre il periodo artistico di Evola. Con musiche di: Ain Soph, Kaiserbund, Roma, Wien, Zetazeroalfa.  Voci correlate Arte e cultura Avanguardia Dadaismo Futurismo Gruppo di Ur Idealismo magico Rivoluzione conservatrice Sturm und Drang Autori e pensatori tradizionali Johann Jakob Bachofen René Guénon Pio Filippani Ronconi Ernst Jünger Friedrich Nietzsche José Ortega y Gasset Arturo Reghini Giulio Parise Carl Schmitt Oswald Spengler Otto Weininger Filosofia Anticattolicesimo Esistenzialismo Idealismo Illuminismo Metafisica Neopaganesimo Neoplatonismo Pitagorismo Tradizionalismo Religione Buddhismo Cattolicesimo Cristianesimo Induismo Paganesimo Tantrismo Taoismo Via romana agli dei Storia Fascismo Nazismo Prima guerra mondiale Rivoluzione francese Seconda guerra mondiale Teoria della razza Antisemitismo Darwinismo Ebrei Protocolli dei savi di Sion Razzismo Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Julius Evola Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Julius Evola Collegamenti esterni Sito ufficiale, su fondazionejuliusevola.it. Modifica su Wikidata Julius Evola, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Julius Evola, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Julius Evola, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Julius Evola, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Bibliografia italiana di Julius Evola, su Catalogo Vegetti della letteratura fantastica, Fantascienza.com. Modifica su Wikidata Siti web italiani Julius Evola sito non ufficiale, su juliusevola.it. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 14 novembre 2012). Rigenerazionevola, su rigenerazionevola.it Centro Studi La Runa, su centrostudilaruna.it. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Siti web in altre lingue (DE) Im Geist der Tradition, su juliusevola.de. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. (EN) Traditionalist visionary, su juliusevola.com. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Approfondimenti biografici Gianfranco De Turris, Julius Evola, su fondazionejuliusevola.it. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Julius Evola: biografia essenziale, su juliusevola.it. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 1º luglio 2012). Giuseppe Vatinno, Julius Evola, un filosofo scomodo per tutti, su fondazionejuliusevola.it. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Approfondimenti sul pensiero Francesco Rosati, Intervista a Julius Evola, su juliusevola.it, 1967. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 4 marzo 2016). Giovanni Monastra, Julius Evola tra le seduzioni del razzismo e la ricerca di una antropologia aristocratica durante il fascismo, su juliusevola.it. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 4 marzo 2016). Curzio Nitoglia, Le teorie evoliane dal punto di vista della tradizione cattolica, su doncurzionitoglia.com, 1994. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Michele Ognissanti, Luci ed ombre su Evola, su salpan.org, 1999. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Alberto Lombardo, Da Rivolta contro il mondo moderno a Gli uomini e le rovine. Julius Evola 1934-1951, su centrostudilaruna.it, 2000. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Giuseppe Vatinno, Julius Evola: un filosofo scomodo per tutti, su juliusevola.it, 2004. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 4 marzo 2016). Mario Polia, Linee per una critica al concetto di Tradizione in Julius Evola, su juliusevola.it, 2005. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 4 marzo 2016). Giano Accame, Evola e la Konservative Revolution, su centrostudilaruna.it, 2006. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Luca Lionello Rimbotti, Evola così com'era [collegamento interrotto], su juliusevola.it, 2007. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Vitaldo Conte, Maschere di Evola come percorso controcorrente (PDF), su politicamente.net, 2008. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 30 ottobre 2012). Aleksandr Dugin, Astrazione e differenziazione in Julius Evola, su ereticamente.net, 2019. URL consultato il 20 agosto 2019. Approfondimenti su Evola artista Alcune opere dadaiste di Julius Evola, su futur-ism.it. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Julius Evola [collegamento interrotto], su artericerca.it. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Interviste Intervista a Julius Evola, su youtube.com. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Intervista a Salvatore Tringali, su youtube.com, 2005. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Intervista a Gian Franco Lami, su youtube.com, 2008. URL consultato il 29 dicembre 2012. Quando Evola intervistò il conte Kalergi, su rigenrazioneevola.it Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 66462101 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1856 2907 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\010823 · Europeana agent/base/62967 · LCCN (EN) n50010889 · GND (DE) 119395835 · BNF (FR) cb118862590 (data) · BNE (ES) XX891255 (data) · ULAN (EN) 500073539 · NLA (EN) 49860148 · BAV (EN) 495/16058 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n50010889 Arte Portale Arte Biografie Portale Biografie Fascismo Portale Fascismo Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloPittori italiani del XX secoloPoeti italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1898Morti nel 1974Nati il 19 maggioMorti l'11 giugnoNati a RomaMorti a RomaAntisemitismoIdealistiEsoteristi italianiMassoniScrittori italiani del XX secoloPersonalità dell'Italia fascistaPersonalità del neofascismoOrientalisti italianiSepolti nel cimitero del VeranoNeopaganesimo in ItaliaAnticomunisti italiani[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Evola," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

Eubulides’s paradox -- sorites: an argument consisting of categorical propositions that can be represented as or decomposed into a sequence of categorical syllogisms such that the conclusion of each syllogism except the last one in the sequence is a premise of the next syllogism in the sequence. An example is ‘All cats are felines; all felines are mammals; all mammals are warm-blooded animals; therefore, all cats are warm-blooded animals’. This sorites may be viewed as composed of the two syllogisms ‘All cats are felines; all felines are mammals; therefore, all cats are mammals’ and ‘All cats are mammals; all mammals are warm-blooded animals; therefore, all cats are warm-blooded animals’. A sorites is valid if and only if each categorical syllogism into which it decomposes is valid. In the example, the sorites decomposes into two syllogisms in the mood Barbara; since any syllogism in Barbara is valid, the sorites is valid. Then there is the sorites paradox from Grecian soros, ‘heap’, any of a number of paradoxes about heaps and their Sorel, Georges sorites paradox 864   864 elements, and more broadly about gradations. A single grain of sand cannot be arranged so as to form a heap. Moreover, it seems that given a number of grains insufficient to form a heap, adding just one more grain still does not make a heap. If a heap cannot be formed with one grain, it cannot be formed with two; if a heap cannot be formed with two, it cannot be formed with three; and so on. But this seems to lead to the absurdity that however large the number of grains, it is not large enough to form a heap. A similar paradox can be developed in the opposite direction. A million grains of sand can certainly be arranged so as to form a heap, and it is always possible to remove a grain from a heap in such a way that what is left is also a heap. This seems to lead to the absurdity that a heap can be formed even from just a single grain. These paradoxes about heaps were known in antiquity they are associated with Eubulides of Miletus, fourth century B.C., and have since given their name to a number of similar paradoxes. The loss of a single hair does not make a man bald, and a man with a million hairs is certainly not bald. This seems to lead to the absurd conclusion that even a man with no hairs at all is not bald. Or consider a long painted wall hundreds of yards or hundreds of miles long. The left-hand region is clearly painted red, but there is a subtle gradation of shades and the right-hand region is clearly yellow. A small double window exposes a small section of the wall at any one time. It is moved progressively rightward, in such a way that at each move after the initial position the left-hand segment of the window exposes just the area that was in the previous position exposed by the right-hand segment. The window is so small relative to the wall that in no position can you tell any difference in color between the exposed areas. When the window is at the extreme left, both exposed areas are certainly red. But as the window moves to the right, the area in the right segment looks just the same color as the area in the left, which you have already pronounced to be red. So it seems that one must call it red too. But then one is led to the absurdity of calling a clearly yellow area red. As some of these cases suggest, there is a connection with dynamic processes. A tadpole turns gradually into a frog. Yet if you analyze a motion picture of the process, it seems that there are no two adjacent frames of which you can say the earlier shows a tadpole, the later a frog. So it seems that you could argue: if something is a tadpole at a given moment, it must also be a tadpole and not a frog a millionth of a second later, and this seems to lead to the absurd conclusion that a tadpole can never turn into a frog. Most responses to this paradox attempt to deny the “major premise,” the one corresponding to the claim that if you cannot make a heap with n grains of sand then you cannot make a heap with n ! 1. The difficulty is that the negation of this premise is equivalent, in classical logic, to the proposition that there is a sharp cutoff: that, e.g., there is some number n of grains that are not enough to make a heap, where n ! 1 are enough to make a heap. The claim of a sharp cutoff may not be so very implausible for heaps perhaps for things like grains of sand, four is the smallest number which can be formed into a heap but is very implausible for colors and tadpoles. There are two main kinds of response to sorites paradoxes. One is to accept that there is in every such case a sharp cutoff, though typically we do not, and perhaps cannot, know where it is. Another kind of response is to evolve a non-classical logic within which one can refuse to accept the major premise without being committed to a sharp cutoff. At present, no such non-classical logic is entirely free of difficulties. So sorites paradoxes are still taken very seriously by contemporary philosophers. The heap was one of the four known paradoxes by Eubulides. Refs.: Grice, “Eubulides, and solving his paradoxes.”

EX-DVCTVM -- eductum: eduction, the process of initial clarification, as of a phenomenon, text, or argument, that normally takes place prior to logical analysis. Out of the flux of vague and confused experiences certain characteristics are drawn into some kind of order or intelligibility in order that attention can be focused on them Aristotle, Physics I. These characteristics often are latent, hidden, or implicit. The notion often is used with reference to texts as well as experience. Thus it becomes closely related to exegesis and hermeneutics, tending to be reserved for the sorts of clarification that precede formal or logical analyses. 

EX-FECTVM -- effectum: causa efficiencis -- effective procedure for the generation of a conversational implicaturum --, a step-by-step recipe for computing the values of a function. It determines what is to be done at each step, without requiring any ingenuity of anyone or any machine executing it. The input and output of the procedure consist of items that can be processed mechanically. Idealizing a little, inputs and outputs are often taken to be strings on a finite alphabet. It is customary to extend the notion to procedures for manipulating natural numbers, via a canonical notation. Each number is associated with a string, its numeral. Typical examples of effective procedures are the standard grade school procedures for addition, multiplication, etc. One can execute the procedures without knowing anything about the natural numbers. The term ‘mechanical procedure’ or ‘algorithm’ is sometimes also used. A function f is computable if there is an effective procedure A that computes f. For every m in the domain of f, if A were given m as input, it would produce fm as output. Turing machines are mathematical models of effective procedures. Church’s thesis, or Turing’s thesis, is that a function is computable provided there is a Turing machine that computes it. In other words, for every effective procedure, there is a Turing machine that computes the same function. 

EX-HIBITVM -- inhibitium/exhibitum distinction, the: exhibitum: Grice: “For one, I will introduce a pair of not really antonyms: the exhibitive and not the inhibitive, but the protreptic.” Grice contrasts this with the protrepticum – A piece of a communicatum is an exhitibum if it is a communication-device for the emisor to display his psychological attitude. It is protrepticum if the emisor intends the sendee to entertain a state other than the uptake – i. e. form a volition to close the door, for how else will he comply with the order in the imperative modeprotrepticum: the opposite of the exhibitium.

EX-MISSVM -- emissum: emissor. A construction out of ex- and ‘missum,’ cf. Grice on psi-trans-mis-sion. Grice’s utterer, but turned Griceian, To emit, to translate some Gricism or other. Cf. proffer.  emissum. emissor-emissum distinction. Frequently ignored by Austin. Grice usually formulates it ‘roughly.’ Strawson for some reason denied the reducibility of the emissum to the emissor. Vide his footnote in his Inaugural lecture at Oxford. it is a truth implicitly acknowledged by communication theorists themselves -- this acknowledgement is is certainly implicit in Grice's distinction between what speakers actually say, in a favored sense of 'say', and what they imply (see "Utterer's Meaning, SentenceMeaning and Word-Meaning," in Foundations of Language, 1968) -- that in almost all the things we should count as sentences there is a substantial central core of meaning which is explicable either in terms of truth-conditions or in terms of some related notion quite simply derivable from that of a truth-condition, for example the notion, as we might call it, of a compliance condition in the case of an imperative sentence or a fulfillment-condition in the case of an optative. If we suppose, therefore, that an account can be given of the notion of a truthcondition itself, an account which is indeed independent of reference to communicationintention, then we may reasonably think that the greater part of the task of a general theory of meaning has been accomplished without such reference. So let us see if we can rephrase the distinction for a one-off predicament. By drawing a skull, Blackburn communicates to his fellow Pembrokite that there is danger around. The proposition is ‘There is danger around’. Of the claims, one is literal; the other metabolical. Blackburn means that there is danger around. Blackburn communicates that there is danger around, possibly leading to death. The emissum, Blackburn’s drawing of the skull ‘means’ that there is danger around. Since the fact that Blackburn communicates that p is diaphanous, we have yet another way of posing the distinction: Blackburn communicates that there is danger around. What is communicated by Blackburn – his emissum – is true. Note that in this diaphanous change from ‘Blackburn communicates that there is danger around’ and ‘What Blackburn communicates, viz. that there is danger around, is true’ we have progressed quite a bit. There are ways of involving ‘true’ in the first stage. Blackburn communicates that there is danger around, and he communicates something true. In the classical languages, this is done in the accusative case. emissum. emit. V. emissor. A good verb used by Grice. It gives us ‘emitter, and it is more Graeco-Roman than his ‘utterer,’ which Cicero would think a barbarism.

EX-MOTVM -- emotum: the emotum, the motum. Grice enjoyed a bit of history of philosophy. Cf. conatum. And Urmson’s company helped. Urmson produced a brilliant study of the ‘emotive’ theory of ethics, which is indeed linguistic and based on Ogden. Diog. Laert. of Zeno of Citium. πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, "πολλοί σου καταγελῶσιν," "ἀλλ ἐγώ," ἔφη, "οὐ κατα- γελῶμαι; to the question, who is a friend?, Zeno’s answer is, ‘a second self (alter ego). One direct way to approach friend is via emotion, as Aristotle did, and found it aporetic as did Grice. Aristotle discusses philia in Eth. Nich. but it is in Rhet. where he allows for phulia to be an emotion. Grice was very fortunate to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardies lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees! Grice is concerned with the rather cryptic view by Aristotle of the friend (philos, amicus) as the alter ego. In Grices cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed! Grice is interested in Aristotle finding himself in an aporia. In Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix, Aristotle poses the question whether the happy man will need friends or not. Kosman correctly identifies this question as asking not whether friends are necessary in order to achieve eudæmonia, but why we require friends even when we are happy. The question is not why we need friends to become happy, but why we need friends when we are happy, since the eudæmon must be self-sufficient. Philia is required for the flourishing of the life of practical virtue. The solution by Aristotle to the aporia here, however, points to the requirement of friendships even for the philosopher, in his life of theoretical virtue. The olution by Aristotle to the aporia in Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix is opaque, and the corresponding passage in Eudeiman Ethics VII.xii is scarcely better. Aristotle thinks he has found the solution to this aporia. We must take two things into consideration, that life is desirable and also that the good is, and thence that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as it belongs to them. If then, of such a pair of corresponding s. there is always one s. of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are in general constituted by their participation in the nature of the determined, so that to wish to perceive ones self is to wish oneself to be of a certain definite character,—since, then we are not in ourselves possessed of each such characters, but only in participation in these qualities in perceiving and knowing—for the perceiver becomes perceived in that way in respect in which he first perceives, and according to the way in which and the object which he perceives; and the knower becomes known in the same way— therefore it is for this reason that one always desires to live, because one always desires to know; and this is because he himself wishes to be the object known. emotion, as conceived by philosophers and psychologists, any of several general types of mental states, approximately those that had been called “passions” by earlier philosophers, such as Descartes and Hume. Anger, e.g., is one emotion, fear a second, and joy a third. An emotion may also be a content-specific type, e.g., fear of an earthquake, or a token of an emotion type, e.g., Mary’s present fear that an earthquake is imminent. The various states typically classified as emotions appear to be linked together only by overlapping family resemblances rather than by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Thus an adequate philosophical or psychological “theory of emotion” should probably be a family of theories. Even to label these states “emotions” wrongly suggests that they are all marked by emotion, in the older sense of mental agitation a metaphorical extension of the original sense, agitated motion. A person who is, e.g., pleased or sad about something is not typically agitated. To speak of anger, fear, joy, sadness, etc., collectively as “the emotions” fosters the assumption which James said he took for granted that these are just qualitatively distinct feelings of mental agitation. This exaggerates the importance of agitation and neglects the characteristic differences, noted by Aristotle, Spinoza, and others, in the types of situations that evoke the various emotions. One important feature of most emotions is captured by the older category of passions, in the sense of ‘ways of being acted upon’. In many lanemotion emotion 259   259 guages nearly all emotion adjectives are derived from participles: e.g., the English words ‘amused’, ‘annoyed’, ‘ashamed’, ‘astonished’, ‘delighted’, ‘embarrassed’, ‘excited’, ‘frightened’, ‘horrified’, ‘irritated’, ‘pleased’, ‘terrified’, ‘surprised’, ‘upset’, and ‘worried’. When we are, e.g., embarrassed, something acts on us, i.e., embarrasses us: typically, some situation or fact of which we are aware, such as our having on unmatched shoes. To call embarrassment a passion in the sense of a way of being acted upon does not imply that we are “passive” with respect to it, i.e., have no control over whether a given situation embarrasses us and thus no responsibility for our embarrassment. Not only situations and facts but also persons may “do” something to us, as in love and hate, and mere possibilities may have an effect on us, as in fear and hope. The possibility emotions are sometimes characterized as “forward-looking,” and emotions that are responses to actual situations or facts are said to be “backward-looking.” These temporal characterizations are inaccurate and misleading. One may be fearful or hopeful that a certain event occurred in the past, provided one is not certain as to whether it occurred; and one may be, e.g., embarrassed about what is going to occur, provided one is certain it will occur. In various passions the effect on us may include involuntary physiological changes, feelings of agitation due to arousal of the autonomic nervous system, characteristic facial expressions, and inclinations toward intentional action or inaction that arise independently of any rational warrant. Phenomenologically, however, these effects do not appear to us to be alien and non-rational, like muscular spasms. Rather they seem an integral part of our perception of the situation as, e.g., an embarrassing situation, or one that warrants our embarrassment.  emotive conjugation: I went to Oxford; you went to Cambridge; he went to the London School of Economics”: a humorous verbal conjugation, designed to expose and mock first-person bias, in which ostensibly the same action is described in successively more pejorative terms through the first, second, and third persons e.g., “I am firm, You are stubborn, He is a pig-headed fool”. This example was used by Russell in the course of a BBC Radio “Brains’ Trust” discussion. It was popularized later that year when The New Statesman ran a competition for other examples. An “unprecedented response” brought in 2,000 entries, including: “I am well informed, You listen to gossip, He believes what he reads in the paper”; and “I went to Oxford, You went to Cambridge, He went to the London School of Economics” Russell was educated at Cambridge and later taught there.  -- emotivism, a noncognitivist metaethical view opposed to cognitivism, which holds that moral judgments should be construed as assertions about the moral properties of actions, persons, policies, and other objects of moral assessment, that moral predicates purport to refer to properties of such objects, that moral judgments or the propositions that they express can be true or false, and that cognizers can have the cognitive attitude of belief toward the propositions that moral judgments express. Noncognitivism denies these claims; it holds that moral judgments do not make assertions or express propositions. If moral judgments do not express propositions, the former can be neither true nor false, and moral belief and moral knowledge are not possible. The emotivist is a noncognitivist who claims that moral judgments, in their primary sense, express the appraiser’s attitudes  approval or disapproval  toward the object of evaluation, rather than make assertions about the properties of that object. Because emotivism treats moral judgments as the expressions of the appraiser’s pro and con attitudes, it is sometimes referred to as the boohurrah theory of ethics. Emotivists distinguish their thesis that moral judgments express the appraiser’s attitudes from the subjectivist claim that they state or report the appraiser’s attitudes the latter view is a form of cognitivism. Some versions of emotivism distinguish between this primary, emotive meaning of moral judgments and a secondary, descriptive meaning. In its primary, emotive meaning, a moral judgment expresses the appraiser’s attitudes toward the object of evaluation rather than ascribing properties to that object. But secondarily, moral judgments refer to those non-moral properties of the object of evaluation in virtue of which the appraiser has and expresses her attitudes. So if I judge that your act of torture is wrong, my judgment has two components. Its primary, emotive sense is to express my disapproval of your act. Its secondary, descriptive sense is to denote those non-moral properties of your act upon which I base my disapproval. These are presumably the very properties that make it an act of torture  roughly, a causing of intense pain in order to punish, coerce, or afford sadistic pleasure. By making emotive meaning primary, emotivists claim to preserve the univocity of moral language between speakers who employ different criteria of application for their moral terms. Also, by stressing the intimate connection between moral judgment and the agent’s non-cognitive attitudes, emotivists claim to capture the motivational properties of moral judgment. Some emotivists have also attempted to account for ascriptions of truth to moral judgments by accepting the redundancy account of ascriptions of truth as expressions of agreement with the original judgment. The emotivist must think that such ascriptions of truth to moral judgments merely reflect the ascriber’s agreement in noncognitive attitude with the attitude expressed by the original judgment. Critics of emotivism challenge these alleged virtues. They claim that moral agreement need not track agreement in attitude; there can be moral disagreement without disagreement in attitude between moralists with different moral views, and disagreement in attitude without moral disagreement between moralists and immoralists. By distinguishing between the meaning of moral terms and speakers’ beliefs about the extension of those terms, critics claim that we can account for the univocity of moral terms in spite of moral disagreement without introducing a primary emotive sense for moral terms. Critics also allege that the emotivist analysis of moral judgments as the expression of the appraiser’s attitudes precludes recognizing the possibility of moral judgments that do not engage or reflect the attitudes of the appraiser. For instance, it is not clear how emotivism can accommodate the amoralist  one who recognizes moral requirements but is indifferent to them. Critics also charge emotivism with failure to capture the cognitive aspects of moral discourse. Because emotivism is a theory about moral judgment or assertion, it is difficult for the emotivist to give a semantic analysis of moral predicates in unasserted contexts, such as in the antecedents of conditional moral judgments e.g., “If he did wrong, then he ought to be punished”. Finally, one might want to recognize the truth of some moral judgments, perhaps in order to make room for the possibility of moral mistakes. If so, then one may not be satisfied with the emotivist’s appeal to redundancy or disquotational accounts of the ascription of truth. Emotivism was introduced by Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic 2d ed., 6 and refined by C. L. Stevenson in Facts and Values 3 and Ethics and Language 4.  Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Croce, Collingwood, and Grice on the expression of emotion” -- There is an essay on “Emotions and akrasia,” but the topic is scattered in various places, such as Grice’s reply to Davidson on intending. Grice has an essay on ‘Kant and friendship,’ too, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

EX-PERITVM -- Experitum – ex-peri – In Roman, ex- preferred, in Grecian, im-preferred, ex-pĕrĭor , pertus ( I.act. experiero, Varr. L. L. 8, 9, 24 dub.), 4, v. dep. a. [ex- and root per-; Sanscr. par-, pi-parmi, conduct; Gr. περάω, pass through; πόρος, passage; πεῖρα, experience; Lat. porta, portus, peritus, periculum; Germ. fahren, erfahren; Eng. fare, ferry], to try a thing; viz., either by way of testing or of attempting it. I. To try, prove, put to the test. A. In tempp. praes. constr. with the acc., a rel. clause, or absol. (α). With acc.: “habuisse aiunt domi (venenum), vimque ejus esse expertum in servo quodam ad eam rem ipsam parato,” Cic. Cael. 24, 58: “taciturnitatem nostram,” id. Brut. 65, 231: “amorem alicujus,” id. Att. 16, 16, C, 1: “his persuaserant, uti eandem belli fortunam experirentur,” Caes. B. G. 2, 16, 3: “judicium discipulorum,” Quint. 2, 5, 12: “in quo totas vires suas eloquentia experiretur,” id. 10, 1, 109: “imperium,” Liv. 2, 59, 4: “cervi cornua ad arbores subinde experientes,” Plin. 8, 32, 50, § 117 et saep.— “With a personal object: vin' me experiri?” make trial of me, Plaut. Merc. 4, 4, 29: “hanc experiamur,” Ter. Hec. 5, 2, 12 Ruhnk.: “tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos (amicos) gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit,” Cic. Lael. 22, 84: “in periclitandis experiendisque pueris,” id. Div. 2, 46, 97.—So with se. reflex., to make trial of one's powers in any thing: “se heroo (versu),” Plin. Ep. 7, 4, 3 variis se studiorum generibus, id. ib. 9, 29, 1: “se in foro,” Quint. 12, 11, 16.— (β). With a rel.-clause, ut, etc.: vosne velit an me regnare era quidve ferat Fors, Virtute experiamur, Enn. ap. Cic. Off. 1, 12, 38 (Ann. v. 204, ed. Vahl.): “lubet experiri, quo evasuru'st denique,” Plaut. Trin. 4, 2, 93: “experiri libet, quantum audeatis,” Liv. 25, 38, 11; cf. Nep. Alcib. 1, 1: “in me ipso experior, ut exalbescam, etc.,” Cic. de Or. 1, 26, 121; cf. with si: “expertique simul, si tela artusque sequantur,” Val. Fl. 5, 562.— (γ). Absol.: “experiendo magis quam discendo cognovi,” Cic. Fam. 1, 7, 10: “judicare difficile est sane nisi expertum: experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia: ita praecurrit amicitia judicium tollitque experiendi potestatem,” id. Lael. 17, 62.— B. In the tempp. perf., to have tried, tested, experienced, i. e. to find or know by experience: “benignitatem tuam me experto praedicas,” Plaut. Merc. 2, 2, 18: “omnia quae dico de Plancio, dico expertus in nobis,” Cic. Planc. 9, 22: “experti scire debemus, etc.,” id. Mil. 26, 69: “illud tibi expertus promitto,” id. Fam. 13, 9, 3: “dicam tibi, Catule, non tam doctus, quam, id quod est majus, expertus,” id. de Or. 2, 17, 72: “puellae jam virum expertae,” Hor. C. 3, 14, 11; 4, 4, 3; cf. Quint. 6, 5, 7: “mala captivitatis,” Sulp. Sev. 2, 22, 5: “id opera expertus sum esse ita,” Plaut. Bacch. 3, 2, 3: “expertus sum prodesse,” Quint. 2, 4, 13: “expertus, juvenem praelongos habuisse sermones,” id. 10, 3, 32: “ut frequenter experti sumus,” id. 1, 12, 11.— “Rarely in other tenses: et exorabile numen Fortasse experiar,” may find, Juv. 13, 103.— C. To make trial of, in a hostile sense, to measure strength with, to contend with: “ut interire quam Romanos non experiri mallet,” Nep. Ham. 4, 3: “maritimis moribus mecum experitur,” Plaut. Cist. 2, 1, 11: “ipsi duces cominus invicem experti,” Flor. 3, 21, 7; 4, 10, 1; cf.: “hos cum Suevi, multis saepe bellis experti, finibus expellere non potuissent,” Caes. B. G. 4, 3, 4: “Turnum in armis,” Verg. A. 7, 434. II. To undertake, to attempt, to make trial of, undergo, experience a thing. A. In gen.: “qui desperatione debilitati experiri id nolent, quod se assequi posse diffidant. Sed par est omnes omnia experiri, qui, etc.,” Cic. Or. 1, 4; cf.: “istuc primum experiar,” Plaut. Truc. 2, 7, 47: “omnia experiri certum est, priusquam pereo,” Ter. And. 2, 1, 11: “omnia prius quam, etc.,” Caes. B. G. 7, 78, 1: “extrema omnia,” Sall. C. 26, 5; cf. “also: sese omnia de pace expertum,” Caes. B. C. 3, 57, 2: “libertatem,” i. e. to make use of, enjoy, Sall. J. 31, 5: “late fusum opus est et multiplex, etc. ... dicere experiar,” Quint. 2, 13, 17: “quod quoniam me saepius rogas, aggrediar, non tam perficiundi spe quam experiundi voluntate,” Cic. Or. 1, 2.—With ut and subj.: “nunc si vel periculose experiundum erit, experiar certe, ut hinc avolem,” Cic. Att. 9, 10, 3: “experiri, ut sine armis propinquum ad officium reduceret,” Nep. Dat. 2, 3.— B. In partic., jurid. t. t., to try or test by law, to go to law: “aut intra parietes aut summo jure experietur,” Cic. Quint. 11, 38; cf.: “in jus vocare est juris experiundi causa vocare,” Dig. 2, 4, 1; 47, 8, 4: “a me diem petivit: ego experiri non potui: latitavit,” Cic. Quint. 23, 75; Liv. 40, 29, 11: “sua propria bona malaque, cum causae dicendae data facultas sit, tum se experturum,” Liv. 3, 56, 10: “postulare ut judicium populi Romani experiri (liceat),” id. ib.—Hence, 1. expĕrĭens , entis, P. a. (acc. to II.), experienced, enterprising, active, industrious (class.): “homo gnavus et industrius, experientissimus ac diligentissimus arator,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 21, § 53: “promptus homo et experiens,” id. ib. 2, 4, 17, § “37: vir fortis et experiens,” id. Clu. 8, 23: “vir acer et experiens,” Liv. 6, 34, 4: “comes experientis Ulixei,” Ov. M. 14, 159: “ingenium,” id. Am. 1, 9, 32. —With gen.: “genus experiens laborum,” inured to, patient of, Ov. M. 1, 414: “rei militaris experientissimi duces,” Arn. 2, 38 init.; cf. Vulg. 2 Macc. 8, 9.—Comp. appears not to occur.— 2. expertus , a, um, P. a. (acc. to I.), in pass. signif., tried, proved, known by experience (freq. after the Aug. per.): “vir acer et pro causa plebis expertae virtutis,” Liv. 3, 44, 3: “per omnia expertus,” id. 1, 34, 12: “indignitates homines expertos,” id. 24, 22, 2: “dulcedo libertatis,” id. 1, 17, 3: “industria,” Suet. Vesp. 4: “artes,” Tac. A. 3, 17: saevitia, Prop. 1, 3, 18: “confidens ostento sibi expertissimo,” Suet. Tib. 19.—With gen.: “expertos belli juvenes,” Verg. A. 10, 173; cf. Tac. H. 4, 76.—Comp. and adv. appear not to occur. Empeireia – experiential -- empiricism: One of Grice’s twelve labours -- Condillac, Étienne Bonnot de, philosopher, an empiricist who was considered the great analytical mind of his generation. Close to Rousseau and Diderot, he stayed within the church. He is closely perhaps excessively identified with the image of the statue that, in the Traité des sensations Treatise on Sense Perception, 1754, he endows with the five senses to explain how perceptions are assimilated and produce understanding cf. also his Treatise on the Origins of Human Knowledge, 1746. He maintains a critical distance from precursors: he adopts Locke’s tabula rasa but from his first work to Logique Logic, 1780 insists on the creative role of the mind as it analyzes and compares sense impressions. His Traité des animaux Treatise on Animals, 1755, which includes a proof of the existence of God, considers sensate creatures rather than Descartes’s animaux machines and sees God only as a final cause. He reshapes Leibniz’s monads in the Monadologie Monadology, 1748, rediscovered in 0. In the Langue des calculs Language of Numbers, 1798 he proposes mathematics as a model of clear analysis. The origin of language and creation of symbols eventually became his major concern. His break with metaphysics in the Traité des systèmes Treatise on Systems, 1749 has been overemphasized, but Condillac does replace rational constructs with sense experience and reflection. His empiricism has been mistaken for materialism, his clear analysis for simplicity. The “ideologues,” Destutt de Tracy and Laromiguière, found Locke in his writings. Jefferson admired him. Maine de Biran, while critical, was indebted to him for concepts of perception and the self; Cousin disliked him; Saussure saw him as a forerunner in the study of the origins of language. Empiricism – one of Grice’s twelve labours – This implicates he saw himself as a Rationalist, rather -- Cordemoy, Géraud de, philosopher and member of the Cartesian school. His most important work is his Le discernement du corps et de l’âme en six discours, published in 1666 and reprinted under slightly different titles a number of times thereafter. Also important are the Discours physique de la parole 1668, a Cartesian theory of language and communication; and Une lettre écrite à un sçavant religieux 1668, a defense of Descartes’s orthodoxy on certain questions in natural philosophy. Cordemoy also wrote a history of France, left incomplete at his death. Like Descartes, Cordemoy advocated a mechanistic physics explaining physical phenomena in terms of size, shape, and local motion, and converse Cordemoy, Géraud de 186   186 held that minds are incorporeal thinking substances. Like most Cartesians, Cordemoy also advocated a version of occasionalism. But unlike other Cartesians, he argued for atomism and admitted the void. These innovations were not welcomed by other members of the Cartesian school. But Cordemoy is often cited by later thinkers, such as Leibniz, as an important seventeenth-century advocate of atomism.  Empiricism: one of Grice’s twelve labours -- Cousin, V., philosopher who set out to merge the  psychological tradition with the pragmatism of Locke and Condillac and the inspiration of the Scottish Reid, Stewart and G. idealists Kant, Hegel. His early courses at the Sorbonne 1815 18, on “absolute” values that might overcome materialism and skepticism, aroused immense enthusiasm. The course of 1818, Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien Of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, is preserved in the Adolphe Garnier edition of student notes 1836; other early texts appeared in the Fragments philosophiques Philosophical Fragments, 1826. Dismissed from his teaching post as a liberal 1820, arrested in G.y at the request of the  police and detained in Berlin, he was released after Hegel intervened 1824; he was not reinstated until 1828. Under Louis-Philippe, he rose to highest honors, became minister of education, and introduced philosophy into the curriculum. His eclecticism, transformed into a spiritualism and cult of the “juste milieu,” became the official philosophy. Cousin rewrote his work accordingly and even succeeded in having Du Vrai third edition, 1853 removed from the papal index. In 1848 he was forced to retire. He is noted for his educational reforms, as a historian of philosophy, and for his translations Proclus, Plato, editions Descartes, and portraits of ladies of seventeenth-century society. Empiricism – one of Grice’s twelve labours -- empirical decision theory, the scientific study of human judgment and decision making. A growing body of empirical research has described the actual limitations on inductive reasoning. By contrast, traditional decision theory is normative; the theory proposes ideal procedures for solving some class of problems. The descriptive study of decision making was pioneered by figures including Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Nisbett, and Lee Ross, and their empirical research has documented the limitations and biases of various heuristics, or simple rules of thumb, routinely used in reasoning. The representativeness heuristic is a rule of thumb used to judge probabilities based on the degree to which one class represents or resembles another class. For example, we assume that basketball players have a “hot hand” during a particular game  producing an uninterrupted string of successful shots  because we underestimate the relative frequency with which such successful runs occur in the entire population of that player’s record. The availability heuristic is a rule of thumb that uses the ease with which an instance comes to mind as an index of the probability of an event. Such a rule is unreliable when salience in memory misleads; for example, most people incorrectly rate death by shark attack as more probable than death by falling airplane parts. For an overview, see D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 2. These biases, found in laypeople and statistical experts alike, have a natural explanation on accounts such as Herbert Simon’s 7 concept of “bounded rationality.” According to this view, the limitations on our decision making are fixed in part by specific features of our psychological architecture. This architecture places constraints on such factors as processing speed and information capacity, and this in turn produces predictable, systematic errors in performance. Thus, rather than proposing highly idealized rules appropriate to an omniscient Laplacean genius  more characteristic of traditional normative approaches to decision theory  empirical decision theory attempts to formulate a descriptively accurate, and thus psychologically realistic, account of rationality. Even if certain simple rules can, in particular settings, outperform other strategies, it is still important to understand the causes of the systematic errors we make on tasks perfectly representative of routine decision making. Once the context is specified, empirical decision-making research allows us to study both descriptive decision rules that we follow spontaneously and normative rules that we ought to follow upon reflection.  empiricism from empiric, ‘doctor who relies on practical experience’, ultimately from Grecian empeiria, ‘experience’, a type of theory in epistemology, the basic idea behind all examples of the type being that experience has primacy in human knowledge and justified belief. Because empiricism is not a single view but a type of view with many different examples, it is appropriate to speak not just of empiricism but of empiricisms. Perhaps the most fundamental distinction to be drawn among the various empiricisms is that between those consisting of some claim about concepts and those consisting of some empirical empiricism 262   262 claim about beliefs  call these, respectively, concept-empiricisms and belief-empiricisms. Concept-empiricisms all begin by singling out those concepts that apply to some experience or other; the concept of dizziness, e.g., applies to the experience of dizziness. And what is then claimed is that all concepts that human beings do and can possess either apply to some experience that someone has had, or have been derived from such concepts by someone’s performing on those concepts one or another such mental operation as combination, distinction, and abstraction. How exactly my concepts are and must be related to my experience and to my performance of those mental operations are matters on which concept-empiricists differ; most if not all would grant we each acquire many concepts by learning language, and it does not seem plausible to hold that each concept thus acquired either applies to some experience that one has oneself had or has been derived from such by oneself. But though concept-empiricists disagree concerning the conditions for linguistic acquisition or transmission of a concept, what unites them, to repeat, is the claim that all human concepts either apply to some experience that someone has actually had or they have been derived from such by someone’s actually performing on those the mental operations of combination, distinction, and abstraction. Most concept-empiricists will also say something more: that the experience must have evoked the concept in the person having the experience, or that the person having the experience must have recognized that the concept applies to his or her experience, or something of that sort. What unites all belief-empiricists is the claim that for one’s beliefs to possess one or another truth-relevant merit, they must be related in one or another way to someone’s experience. Beliefempiricisms differ from each other, for one thing, with respect to the merit concerning which the claim is made. Some belief-empiricists claim that a belief does not have the status of knowledge unless it has the requisite relation to experience; some claim that a belief lacks warrant unless it has that relation; others claim that a belief is not permissibly held unless it stands in that relation; and yet others claim that it is not a properly scientific belief unless it stands in that relation. And not even this list exhausts the possibilities. Belief-empiricisms also differ with respect to the specific relation to experience that is said to be necessary for the merit in question to be present. Some belief-empiricists hold, for example, that a belief is permissibly held only if its propositional content is either a report of the person’s present or remembered experience, or the belief is held on the basis of such beliefs and is probable with respect to the beliefs on the basis of which it is held. Kant, by contrast, held the rather different view that if a belief is to constitute empirical knowledge, it must in some way be about experience. Third, belief-empiricisms differ from each other with respect to the person to whose experience a belief must stand in the relation specified if it is to possess the merit specified. It need not always be an experience of the person whose belief is being considered. It might be an experience of someone giving testimony about it. It should be obvious that a philosopher might well accept one kind of empiricism while rejecting others. Thus to ask philosophers whether they are empiricists is a question void for vagueness. It is regularly said of Locke that he was an empiricist; and indeed, he was a concept-empiricist of a certain sort. But he embraced no version whatsoever of belief-empiricism. Up to this point, ‘experience’ has been used without explanation. But anyone acquainted with the history of philosophy will be aware that different philosophers pick out different phenomena with the word; and even when they pick out the same phenomenon, they have different views as to the structure of the phenomenon that they call ‘experience.’ The differences on these matters reflect yet more distinctions among empiricisms than have been delineated above. 

EX-PLANATVM -- explanatum: cf. iustificatum – That the distinction is not absolute shows in that explanatum cannot be non-iustificatum or vice versa. To explain is in part to justify – but Grice was in a hurry, and relying on an upublication not meant for publication! Grice on explanatory versus justificatory reasons -- early 15c., explanen, "make (something) clear in the mind, to make intelligible," from Latin explanare "to explain, make clear, make plain," literally "make level, flatten," from ex "out" (see ex-) + planus "flat" (from PIE root *pele- (2) "flat; to spread"). The spelling was altered by influence of plain. Also see plane (v.2). In 17c., occasionally used more literally, of the unfolding of material things: Evelyn has buds that "explain into leaves" ["Sylva, or, A discourse of forest-trees, and the propagation of timber in His Majesties dominions," 1664]. Related: Explained; explaining; explains. To explain (something) away "to deprive of significance by explanation, nullify or get rid of the apparent import of," generally with an adverse implication, is from 1709. I think we may find, in our talk about reasons, three main kinds of case. (1) The first is that class of cases exemplified by the use of such a sentence as "The reason why the bridge collapsed was that the girders were made of cellophane". Variant forms would be exemplified in "The (one) reason for the collapse of the bridge was that . . ." and "The fact that the girders were made of cellophane was the (one) reason for the collapse of the bridge (why the bridge collapsed)", and so on. This type of case includes cases in which that for which the (a) reason is being given is an action. We can legitimately use such a sentence form as "The reason why he resigned his office (for his resigning his office) was that p"; and, so far as I can see, the same range of variant forms will be available. I shall take as canonical (paradigmatic) for this type of case (type (1)) the form "The (a) reason why A was (is) that B". The significant features of a type (1) case seem to me to include the following. (a) The canonical form is 'factive' both with respect to A and to B. If I use it, I imply both that it is true that A and that it is true that B. (b) If the reason why A was that B, then B is the explanation of its being the case that A; and if one reason why A was (that) B, then B is one explanation of its being the case that A, and if there are other explanations (as it is implicated that there are, or may be) then A is overdetermined; and (finally) if a part of the reason why A was that B, then B is a part of the explanation of A's being so. This feature is not unconnected with the previous one; if B is the explanation of A, then both B and A must be facts; and if one fact is a reason for another fact, then it looks as if the connection between them must be that the first explains the second. (c) In some, but not all, cases in which the reason why A was that B, we can speak of B as causing, or being the cause of, A (A's being the case). If the reason why the bridge collapsed was that the girders were made of cellophane, then we can say that the girders' being made of cellophane caused the bridge to collapse (or, at least, caused it to collapse when the bus drove onto it). But not end p.37 in all cases; it might be true that the reason why X took offence was that all Tibetans are specially sensitive to comments on their appearance, though it is very dubious whether it would be proper to describe the fact, or circumstance, that all Tibetans have this particular sensitivity as the cause of, or as causing, X to take offence. However, it may well be true that if B does cause A, then the (or a) reason why A is that B. (d) The canonical form employs 'reason' as a count-noun; it allows us to speak (for example) of the reason why A, of there being more than one reason why A, and so on. But for type (1) cases we have, at best, restricted licence to use variants in which 'reason' is used as a massnoun. "There was considerable reason why the bridge collapsed (for the bridge collapsing)" and "The weakness of the girders was some reason why the bridge collapsed" are oddities; so is "There was good reason why the bridge collapsed", though "There was a good reason why the bridge collapsed" is better; but "There was (a) bad reason why the bridge collapsed" is terrible. The discomforts engendered by attempts to treat 'reason' as a mass-noun persist even when A specifies an action; "There was considerable reason why he resigned his office" is unhappy, though one would not object to, for example, "There was considerable reason for him to resign his office", which is not a type (1) case. (e) Relativization to a person is, I think, excluded, unless (say) the relativizing 'for X' means "in X's opinion", as in "for me, the reason why the bridge collapsed was . . .". Again, this feature persists even when A specifies an action: "For him, the reason why he resigned was . . ." and "The reason for him why he resigned was . . ." are both unnatural (for different reasons). I shall call type (1) cases "reasons why" or "explanatory reasons" – for etymologically, they make something ‘plain’ – out of nothing, almost – vide Latin explanare – but never IM-planare – and in any case, not to be confused with what Carnap calls an ‘explication’! (2) The cases which I am allocating to type (2) are a slightly less tidy family than those of type (1). Examples are: "The fact that they were a day late was some (a)reason for thinking that the bridge had collapsed." "The fact that they were a day late was a reason for postponing the conference." We should particularly notice the following variants and allied examples (among others): end p.38 That they were a day late was reason to think that the bridge had collapsed. There was no reason why the bridge should have collapsed. The fact that they were so late was a (gave) good reason for us to think that . . . He had reason to think that . . . (to postpone . . .) but he seemed unaware of the fact. The fact that they were so late was a reason for wanting (for us to want) to postpone the meeting. I shall take as the paradigmatic form for type (2) "That B was (a) reason (for X) to A", where "A" may conceal a psychological verb like "think", "want", or "decide", or may specify an action. Salient features seem to me to include the following. (a) Unlike type (1), where there is double factivity, the paradigmatic form is non-factive with respect to A, but factive with respect to B; with regard to B, however, modifications are available which will cancel factivity; for example, "If it were (is) the case that B, that would be a reason to A." (b) In consonance with the preceding feature, it is not claimed that B explains A (since A may not be the case), nor even that if A were the case B would explain it (since someone who actually does the action or thinks the thought specified by A may not do so because of B). It is, however, in my view (though some might question my view) claimed that B is a justification (final or provisional) for doing, wanting, or thinking whatever is specified in A. The fact that B goes at least some way towards making it the case that an appropriate person or persons should (or should have) fulfil (fulfilled) A. (c) The word "cause" is still appropriate, but in a different grammatical construction from that used for type (1). In Example (1), the fact that they were so late is not claimed to cause anyone to think that the bridge had collapsed, but it is claimed to be (or to give) cause to think just that. (d) Within type (2), 'reason' may be treated either as a count-noun or as a mass-noun. Indeed, the kinds of case which form type (2) seem to be the natural habitat of 'reason' as a mass-noun. A short version of an explanation of this fact (to which I was helped end p.39 by George Myro) seems to me to be that (i) there are no degrees of explanation: there may be more than one explanation, and something may be a part (but only a part) of the explanation, but a set of facts either does explain something or it does not. There are, however, degrees of justification (justifiability); one action or belief may be more justifiable, in a given situation, than another (there may be a better case for it). (ii) Justifiability is not just a matter of the number of supporting considerations, but rather of their combined weight (together with their outweighing the considerations which favour a rival action or belief). So a mass-term is needed, together with specifications of degree or magnitude. (e) That B may plainly be a reason for a person or people to A; indeed, when no person is mentioned or implicitly referred to, it is very tempting to suppose that it is being claimed that the fact that B would be a reason for anyone, or any normal person, to A. One might call type (2) cases "justificatory reasons" or "reasons for (to)". (3) Examples: John's reason for thinking Samantha to be a witch was that he had suddenly turned into a frog. John's reason for wanting Samantha to be thrown into the pond was that (he thought that) she was a witch. John's reason for denouncing Samantha was that she kept turning him into a frog. John's reason for denouncing Samantha was to protect himself against recurrent metamorphosis. If X's reason for doing (thinking) A was that B, it follows that X A-ed because B (because X knew (thought) that B). If X's reason for doing (wanting, etc.) A was to B, it follows that X A-ed in order to (so as to) B. The sentence form "X had several reasons for A-ing, such as that (to) B" falls, in my scheme, under type (3), unlike the seemingly similar sentence "X had reason to A, since B", which I locate under type (2). The paradigmatic form I take as being "X's reason(s) for A-ing was that B (to B)". Salient features of type (3) cases should be fairly obvious. end p.40 (a) In type (3) cases reasons may be either of the form that B or of the form to B. If they are of the former sort, then the paradigmatic form is doubly factive, factive with respect both to A and to B. It is always factive with respect to A (A-ing). When it is factive with respect to B, factivity may be cancelled by inserting "X thought that" before B. (b) Type (3) reasons are "in effect explanatory". If X's reason for A-ing was that (to) B, X's thinking that B (or wanting to B) explains his A-ing. The connection between type (3) reasons being, in effect, explanatory, and their factivity is no doubt parallel to the connection which obtains for type (1) reasons. I reserve the question of the applicability of "cause" to a special concluding comment. (c) So far as I can see, "reason" cannot, in type (3) cases, be treated as a mass-noun. This may be accounted for by the explanatory character of reasons of this type. We can, however, here talk of reasons as being bad; X's reasons for A-ing may be weak or appalling. In type (2) cases, we speak of there being little reason, or even no reason, to A. But in type (3) cases, since X's reasons are explanatory of his actions or thoughts, they have to exist. (I doubt if this is the full story, but it will have to do for the moment.) (d) Of their very nature, type (3) reasons are relative to persons. Because of their hybrid nature (they seem, as will in a moment, I hope, emerge, in a way to partake of the character both of type (1) and of type (2)) one might call them "Justificatory-Explanatory" reasons. Strawson said my explanation required an explanation. ex-plāno , āvi, ātum, 1, v. a. * I. Lit., to flatten or spread out: “suberi cortex in denos pedes undique explanatus,” Plin. 16, 8, 13, § 34.— II. Trop., of speech, to make plain or clear, to explain (class.: “syn.: explico, expono, interpretor): qualis differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intelligi quam explanari potest,” Cic. Off. 1, 27, 94; cf. Quint. 5, 10, 4: “rem latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando, etc.,” Cic. Brut. 42, 152: “explanare apertiusque dicere aliquid,” id. Fin. 2, 19, 60: “docere et explanare,” id. Off. 1, 28, 101: “aliquid conjecturā,” id. de Or. 2, 69, 280: “rem,” id. Or. 24, 80: “quem amicum tuum ais fuisse istum, explana mihi,” Ter. Ph. 2, 3, 33: “de cujus hominis moribus pauca prius explananda sunt, quam initium narrandi faciam,” Sall. C. 4, 5.—Pass. impers.: “juxta quod flumen, aut ubi fuerit, non satis explanatur,” Plin. 6, 23, 26, § 97.— 2. To utter distinctly: “et ille juravit, expressit, explanavitque verba, quibus, etc.,” Plin. Pan. 64, 3.—Hence, explānātus , a, um, P. a. (acc. to II.), plain, distinct (rare): “claritas in voce, in lingua etiam explanata vocum impressio,” i. e. an articulate pronunciation, Cic. Ac. 1, 5, 19: parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus, Sen. de Ira, 1, 1, 4.—Adv. ex-plānāte , plainly, clearly, distinctly: “scriptum,” Gell. 16, 8, 3.—Comp.: “ut definire rem cum explanatius, tum etiam uberius (opp. presse et anguste),” Cic. Or. 33, 117.

EX-PLICATVM -- implicaturum-explicaturum distinction, the: – “I am aware that with ‘implicaturum,’ as opposed to ‘implicaturum,’ the distinction with ‘implicatio’ is lost – for ‘what is implied,’ in contrast, sounds vulgar.” And then there’s ‘entailment” is not as figurative as it sounds: it inovolves property and limitation -- “Paradoxes of entailment,” “Paradoxes of implication.” Philo and his teacher. Grice is not sure about ‘implicaturum.’ The quote by Moore, 1919 being:"It might be suggested that we should say "p ent q" 'means' "p ) q AND this proposition is an instance of a formal implication, which is not merely true but self-evident, like the laws of formal logic." This proposed definitions would avoid the paradoxes involved in Strachey's definition, since such true formal implications as 'All the persons in this room are more than five years old' are certainly not self-evident; and, so far as I can see, it may state something which is in fact true of p and q, whenever and only whenp ent q. I do not myself think that it gives the meaning of 'p ent q,' since the kind of relation which I see to hold between the premises and a conclusion of a syllogism seems to me one which is purely 'objective' in the sense that no psychological term, such as is involved in the meaning of 'self-evident' is involved in its definition (it it has one). I am not, however, concerned to dispute that some such definition of "p ent q" as this may be true." --- and so on. So, it is apparently all Strachey's fault. This view as to what φA . ent . ψA means has, for instance, if I understand him rightly, been asserted by Mr. O. Strachey in Mind, N.S., 93; since he asserts that, in his opinion, this is what Professor C. I. Lewis means by “φA strictly implies ψA,” and undoubtedly what Professor Lewis means by this is what I mean by φA . ent . ψA. And the same view has been frequently suggested (though I do not know that he has actually asserted it) by Mr. Russell himself (e.g., Principia Mathematica, p. 21). I 1903 B. Russell Princ. Math. ii. 14 How far formal implication is definable in terms of implication simply, or material implication as it may be called, is a difficult  question.  Source : Principles : Chapter III. Implication and Formal Implication. –  Source : Principia, page 7 : "When it is necessary explicitly to discriminate "implication" [i.e. "if p, then q" ] from "formal implication," it is called "material implication." – Source : Principia, page 20 : "When an implication, say ϕx.⊃.ψx, is said to hold always, i.e. when (x):ϕx.⊃.ψx, we shall say that ϕx formally implies ψx"Many logicians did use ‘implicaturum’ not necessarily to mean ‘conversational implicaturum,’ but as the result of ‘implicatio’. ‘Implicatio’ was often identified with the Megarian or Philonian ‘if.’ Why? thought that we probably did need an entailment. The symposium was held in New York with Dana Scott and R. K. Meyer. The notion had been mis-introduced (according to Strawson) in the philosophical literature by Moore. Grice is especially interested in the entailment + implicaturum pair. A philosophical expression may be said to be co-related to an entailment (which is rendered in terms of a reductive analysis).  However, the use of the expression may co-relate to this or that implicaturum which is rendered reasonable in the light of the assumption by the addressee that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice thinks many philosophers take an implicaturum as an entailment when they surely shouldnt! Grice was more interested than Strawson was in the coinage by Moore of entailment for logical consequence. As an analyst, Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive (if not reductionist). The prongs the analyst lists are thus entailments of the concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify what is an entailment for an implicaturum, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested in the second family of cases. With his coinage of disimplicaturum, Grice expands his interest to cover the first family of cases, too. Grice remains a philosophical methodologist. He is not so much concerned with any area or discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless its rationality), but with the misuses of some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of his colleagues at Oxford. While entailment, was, for Strawson mis-introduced in the philosophical literature by Moore, entailment seems to be less involved in paradoxes than if is. Grice connects the two, as indeed his tutee Strawson did! As it happens, Strawsons Necessary propositions and entailment statements is his very first published essay, with Mind, a re-write of an unpublication unwritten elsewhere, and which Grice read. The relation of consequence may be considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise. Grices Bootstrap is a principle designed to impoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own! Grice then takes a look at Strawsons very first publication (an unpublication he had written elsewhere). Grice finds Strawson thought he could provide a simple solution to the so-called paradoxes of entailment. At the time, Grice and Strawson were pretty sure that nobody then accepted, if indeed anyone ever did and did make, the identification of the relation symbolised by the horseshoe with the relation which Moore calls entailment, p⊃q, i. e. ~(pΛ~q) is rejected as an analysis of p entails q because it involves this or that allegedly paradoxical implicaturum, as that any false proposition entails any proposition and any true proposition is entailed by any proposition. It is a commonplace that Lewiss amendment had consequences scarcely less paradoxical in terms of the implicatura. For if p is impossible, i.e. self-contradictory, it is impossible that p and ~q. And if q is necessary, ~q is impossible and it is impossible that p and ~q; i. e., if p entails q means it is impossible that p and ~q any necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition and any self-contradictory proposition entails any proposition. On the other hand, Lewiss definition of entailment (i.e. of the relation which holds from p to q whenever q is deducible from p) obviously commends itself in some respects. Now, it is clear that the emphasis laid on the expression-mentioning character of the intensional contingent statement by writing pΛ~q is impossible instead of It is impossible that p and ~q does not avoid the alleged paradoxes of entailment. But it is equally clear that the addition of some provision does avoid them. One may proposes that one should use “entails” such that no necessary statement and no negation of a necessary statement can significantly be said to entail or be entailed by any statement; i. e. the function p entails q cannot take necessary or self-contradictory statements as arguments. The expression p entails q is to be used to mean p⊃q is necessary, and neither p nor q is either necessary or self-contradictory, or pΛ~q is impossible and neither p nor q, nor either of their contradictories, is necessary. Thus, the paradoxes are avoided. For let us assume that p1 expresses a contingent, and q1 a necessary, proposition. p1 and ~q1 is now impossible because ~q1 is impossible. But q1 is necessary. So, by that provision, p1 does not entail q1. We may avoid the paradoxical assertion that p1 entails q2 as merely falling into the equally paradoxical assertion that p1 entails q1 is necessary. For: If q is necessary, q is necessary is, though true, not necessary, but a contingent intensional (Latinate) statement. This becomes part of the philosophers lexicon: intensĭo, f. intendo, which L and S render as a stretching out, straining, effort. E. g. oculorum, Scrib. Comp. 255. Also an intensifying, increase. Calorem suum (sol) intensionibus ac remissionibus temperando fovet,” Sen. Q. N. 7, 1, 3. The tune: “gravis, media, acuta,” Censor. 12. Hence:~(q is necessary) is, though false, possible. Hence “p1Λ~(q1 is necessary)” is, though false, possible. Hence p1 does NOT entail q1 is necessary. Thus, by adopting the view that an entailment statement, and other intensional statements, are non-necessary, and that no necessary statement or its contradictory can entail or be entailed by any statement, Strawson thinks he can avoid the paradox that a necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition, and indeed all the other associated paradoxes of entailment. Grice objected that Strawsons cure was worse than Moores disease! The denial that a necessary proposition can entail or be entailed by any proposition, and, therefore, that necessary propositions can be related to each other by the entailment-relation, is too high a price to pay for the solution of the paradoxes. And here is where Grices implicaturum is meant to do the trick! Or not! When Levinson proposed + for conversationally implicaturum, he is thinking of contrasting it with ⊢.  But things aint that easy. Even the grammar is more complicated: By uttering He is an adult, U explicitly conveys that he is an adult. What U explicitly conveys entails that he is not a child. What U implies is that he should be treated accordingly. Refs.: One good reference is the essay on “Paradoxes of entailment,” in the Grice papers; also his contribution to a symposium for the APA under a separate series, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. EX-PLICATVM -- Implicaturum/explicaturum distinction, the: explicatum: Grice is clear here. There is explicat- and explicit-. Both yield different fields. The explicit- has to do with what is shown. The explicat- does not. But both are cognate. And of course, the ambiguity replicates in implicit- and implicat- Short and Lewis have both ‘explicatus’ and ‘explicitus’ as Part. and P. a., from explico. “I wonder why they had to have TWO!” – Grice.He once asked this to his master at Clifton. And he said, “because this is a participium heteroclitum.” Grice never forgot that! An Heteroclite Participle.  R E D U N D A N S abounding.  Art'cipium the Participle faepe o/?em redundat abounds, ut as Perfe&tum the perfe&? ter/? [aid] priùs before ; ut as explico to unfold conduplicat doubles [its Participle] explicitus explicatufque, making both explicitus and explicatus. Et and fic /3 fevi I have plantea folet is wont dare to give fatus planted, & and ferui I have put fertus placed. Cello to bcat vult will mittere produce -celfus ab -ui from [the perfe&* tenfe in] -ui ; fed but -culfus ab -i -cu!fus from [its perfr&7 in] -i. Compofitum à fto the Compound offlo to /fand [ makes] - ftaturus, pariterque amd aff? -ftiturus [in the future Participle.] Etiam alfo duplex two Participles fit are made à fimplice perfeéto from one perfe&i tenfe ; tendo to/lretch habet hath tentus, and tenfus; pando to opem takes fibi to itfejf paffus, and panfus : Item affo mifcui I have mixed miftus, vel or mixtus ; alo to breed up, altus and alitus ; Poto to drink makes potatus & and potus ; lavo to wa/h, lautus and lotus. A tundo from [tundo] to knock down -tufus is made ; retundo to blunt [makes] both -tufus and -tunfus. Pinfo to bake effert makes triplex three Participles piftus, pinfufque, & pinfitus, piftus, and pinfus, and pinfitus. Civi, the perfe&? tenfe à cieo ofcieo to provoke makes the participle citus [with the i. -- Vult tendo tenfus, tentus , vult flectere pando - Panfus  Panfus paffus 5 pinfo vult piftus dare pinfus  Pinfitus ; & fevi fatus, & ferui dare fertus.  Compofitum à fto-ftaturus meliufque-ftiturus.         * Conftaturus Lucan. Mart. Obftaturus Quint.   _ Tundo in compofitis -tufus ; -tunfufque retundo  Congeminat ; plico & explicitus facit, éx-que-plicatus.  Verba in-uo &-vo-ütus tendunt ; ruo fed breve-ütus dat.  A cieo pariter manat citus , à cio citus. -  Cello ab -ui celfus , fed ab-i vult mittere -culfus. At Oxford, nobody was interested in the explication. That’s too explicit. It was, being English, all about the ‘innuendo,’ the ‘understatement,’ the implication. The first Oxonian was C. K. Grant, with his ‘pragmatic implication.’ Then came Nowell-Smith with his ‘contextual implication.’ Urmson was there with his ‘implied’ claims. And Strawson was saying that ‘the king of France is not bald’ implies that thereis a king of France. So, it was enough, Grice thought! We have to analyse what we imply by imply, or at least what _I_ do. He thought publishing was always vulgar. But when he was invited for one of those popularisations, when he was invited to contribute to a symposium on a topic of his choice – he chose “The causal theory of perception” and dedicates an ‘extensum excursus’ on ‘implication.’ The conclusion is simple: “The pillar box seems red” implies. And implies a LOT. So much so that neo-Wittgensteinians were saying that what Grice implies is part of what Grice is committed in terms of ‘satisfactoriness’ of what he is expressing. Not so! What Grice implies is, surely, that the pillar box may not be red. But surely he can cancel that EXPLICITLY “The pillar box seems red and is red.” So, what he implies is not part of what he explicitly commits in terms of value satisfactoriness. In terms of value satisfactoriness, Grice distinguishes between the subperceptual (“The pillar box seems red”) and the perceptual proper (“Grice perceives that the pillar box is red”). The causal theory merely states that “Grice perceives that the pillar box is red” (a perceptum for the subperceptum, “the pillar box seems red”) if and only if, first,  the pillar box is red; second, the subperceptum: the pillar box seems red; and third and last, the fact that the pillar box is red CAUSES the pillar box seeming red. None of that is explicit, but none of it is implicit. It is merely a philosophical reductive analysis which has cleared away an unnecessary implication out of the picture. The philosopher, involved in conceptual analysis, has freed from the ‘pragmatic implication’ and can provide, for his clearly stated ‘analysans,’ three different prongs which together constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions – the analysandum. And his problem is resolved. Grice’s cavalier attitude towards the explicit is obvious in the way he treats “Wilson is a great man,” versus “the prime minister is a great man” “I don’t care if I’m not sure if I want to say that an emissor of (i) and an emissor of (ii) have put forward, in an explicit fashion, the same proposition. His account of ‘disambiguation’ is meant even more jocularly. He knows that in the New World, they spell ‘vice’ as  ‘vyse’ – So Wilson being in the grip of a vyse is possibly the same thing put forward as the prime minister being caught in the grip of either a carpenter’s tool or a sort of something like a sin – if not both. (Etymologically, ‘vice’ and ‘vice’ are cognate, since they are ‘violent’ things – cf. violence. While ‘implicare’ developed into vulgar Engish as ‘employ,’ “it’s funny explicature did not develop into ‘exploy.’”A logical construction is an explication. A reductive analysis is an explication. Cf. Grice on Reductionism as a bete noire, sometimes misquoted as Reductivism. Grice used both ‘explanation’ and ‘explication’, so one has to be careful. When he said that he looked for a theory that would explain conversation or the implicaturum, he did not mean explication. What is the difference, etymologically, between  explicate and explain? Well, explain is from ‘explanare,’ which gives ‘explanatum.’Trop., of speech, to make plain or clear, to explain (class.:“syn.: explico, expono, interpretor): qualis differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intelligi quam explanari potest,” Cic.Off. 1, 27, 94; cf. Quint. 5, 10, 4: “rem latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando, etc.,” Cic. Brut. 42, 152: “explanare apertiusque dicere aliquid,” id. Fin. 2, 19, 60: “docere et explanare,” id. Off. 1, 28, 101: “aliquid conjecturā,” id. de Or. 2, 69, 280: “rem,” id. Or. 24, 80: “quem amicum tuum ais fuisse istum, explana mihi,” Ter. Ph. 2, 3, 33: “de cujus hominis moribus pauca prius explananda sunt, quam initium narrandi faciam,” Sall. C. 4, 5.—Pass.impers.: “juxta quod flumen, aut ubi fuerit, non satis explanatur,” Plin. 6, 23, 26, § 97.—2. To utter distinctly: “et ille juravit, expressit, explanavitque verba, quibus, etc.,” Plin. Pan. 64, 3.Hence, explānātus , a, um, P. a. (acc. to II.), plain, distinct (rare): “claritas in voce, in lingua etiam explanata vocum impressio,” i. e. an articulate pronunciation, Cic. Ac. 1, 5, 19: parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus, Sen. de Ira, 1, 1, 4. Adv. ex-plānāte , plainly, clearly, distinctly: “scriptum,” Gell. 16, 8, 3.—Comp.: “ut definire rem cum explanatius, tum etiam uberius (opp. presse et anguste),” Cic. Or. 33, 117.Cr. Occam. M. O. R. the necessity is explanatory necessity. Senses or conventional implicaturata (not reachable by ‘argument’) and Strawson do not explain. G. A. Paul does not explain. Unlike Austin, who was in love with a taxonomy, Grice loved an explanation. “Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῶν πάντων ὕδωρ ὑπεστήσατο, καὶ τὸν κόσμον ἔμψυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη. “Arkhen de ton panton hudor hupestesato.” Thales’s doctrine is that water is the universal primary substance, and that the world is animate and full of divinities. “Ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ φησὶν εἶναι (διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι), λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων) – διά τε δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν ταύτην καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων τὰ σπέρματα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας οὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως ὑπολαβεῖν‧ Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τηθὺν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας [Hom. Ξ 201], καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν‧ τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον, ὅρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν [984a] ἀρχαία τις αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ τετύχηκεν οὖσα περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἡ δόξα, τάχ᾽ ἂν ἄδηλον εἴη, Θαλῆς μέντοι λέγεται οὕτως ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας. (Ἵππωνα γὰρ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε θεῖναι μετὰ τούτων διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας)‧ Ἀναξιμένης δὲ ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρότερον ὕδατος καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων.” De caelo: “Οἱ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος κεῖσθαι [sc. τὴν γὴν]. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον παρειλήφαμεν τὸν λόγον, ὅν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον, ὡς διὰ τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι μένουσαν ὥσπερ ξύλον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐπ᾽ ἀέρος μὲν οὐθὲν πέφυκε μένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος), ὥσπερ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὄντα περὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ ὀχοῦντος τὴν γῆν‧ οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ πέφυκε μένειν μετέωρον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπί τινός [294b] ἐστιν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἀὴρ ὕδατος κουφότερον, καὶ γῆς ὕδωρ‧ ὥστε πῶς οἷόν τε τὸ κουφότερον κατωτέρω κεῖσθαι τοῦ βαρυτέρου τὴν φύσιν; ἔτι δ᾽ εἴπερ ὅλη πέφυκε μένειν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον [αὐτῆς]‧ νῦν δ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχὸν μόριον φέρεται εἰς βυθόν, καὶ θᾶττον τὸ μεῖζον. The problem of the nature of matter, and its transformation into the myriad things of which the universe is made, engaged the natural philosophers, commencing with Thales. For his hypothesis to be credible, it was essential that he could explain how all things could come into being from water, and return ultimately to the originating material. It is inherent in Thaless hypotheses that water had the potentiality to change to the myriad things of which the universe is made, the botanical, physiological, meteorological and geological states. In Timaeus, 49B-C, Plato had Timaeus relate a cyclic process. The passage commences with that which we now call “water” and describes a theory which was possibly that of Thales. Thales would have recognized evaporation, and have been familiar with traditional views, such as the nutritive capacity of mist and ancient theories about spontaneous generation, phenomena which he may have observed, just as Aristotle believed he, himself had, and about which Diodorus Siculus, Epicurus (ap. Censorinus, D.N. IV.9), Lucretius (De Rerum Natura) and Ovid (Met. I.416-437) wrote. When Aristotle reported Thales’s pronouncement that the primary principle is water, he made a precise statement: Thales says that it [the nature of things] is water, but he became tentative when he proposed reasons which might have justified Thaless decision. Thales’s supposition may have arisen from observation. It is Aristotle’s opinion that Thales may have observed, that the nurture of all creatures is moist, and that warmth itself is generated from moisture and lives by it; and that from which all things come to be is their first principle. Then, Aristotles tone changed towards greater confidence. He declared: Besides this, another reason for the supposition would be that the semina of all things have a moist nature. In continuing the criticism of Thales, Aristotle wrote: That from which all things come to be is their first principle (Metaph. 983 b25).  Simple metallurgy had been practised long before Thales presented his hypotheses, so Thales knew that heat could return metals to a liquid state. Water exhibits sensible changes more obviously than any of the other so-called elements, and can readily be observed in the three states of liquid, vapour and ice. The understanding that water could generate into earth is basic to Thaless watery thesis. At Miletus it could readily be observed that water had the capacity to thicken into earth. Miletus stood on the Gulf of Lade through which the Maeander river emptied its waters. Within living memory, older Milesians had witnessed the island of Lade increasing in size within the Gulf, and the river banks encroaching into the river to such an extent that at Priene, across the gulf from Miletus the warehouses had to be rebuilt closer to the waters edge. The ruins of the once prosperous city-port of Miletus are now ten kilometres distant from the coast and the Island of Lade now forms part of a rich agricultural plain. There would have been opportunity to observe other areas where earth generated from water, for example, the deltas of the Halys, the Ister, about which Hesiod wrote (Theogony, 341), now called the Danube, the Tigris-Euphrates, and almost certainly the Nile. This coming-into-being of land would have provided substantiation of Thaless doctrine. To Thales water held the potentialities for the nourishment and generation of the entire cosmos. Aëtius attributed to Thales the concept that even the very fire of the sun and the stars, and indeed the cosmos itself is nourished by evaporation of the waters (Aëtius, Placita).  It is not known how Thales explained his watery thesis, but Aristotle believed that the reasons he proposed were probably the persuasive factors in Thaless considerations. Thales gave no role to the Olympian gods. Belief in generation of earth from water was not proven to be wrong until A.D. 1769 following experiments of Antoine Lavoisier, and spontaneous generation was not disproved until the nineteenth century as a result of the work of Louis Pasteur.The first philosophical explanation of the world was speculative not practical. has its intelligibility in being identified with one of its parts (the world is water). First philosophical explanation for Universe human is rational and the world in independent; He said the arché is water; Monist: He believed reality is one  Thales of Miletus, first philosophical explanation of the origin and nature of justice (and  Why after all, did a Thales  is Water.” Without the millions of species that make up the biosphere, and the billions of interactions between them that go on day by day,.Oddly, Grice had spent some time on x-questions in the Kant lectures. And why is an x-question. A philosophical explanation of conversation. A philosophical explanation of implicaturum. Description vs. explanation. Grice quotes from Fisher, Never contradict. Never explain. Taxonomy, is worse than explanation, always. Grice is exploring the taxonomy-description vs. explanation dichotomy. He would often criticise ordinary-language philosopher Austin for spending too much valuable time on linguistic botany, without an aim in his head. Instead, his inclination, a dissenting one, is to look for the big picture of it all, and disregard a piece-meal analysis. Conversation is a good example. While Austin would Subjectsify Language (Linguistic Nature), Grice rather places rationality squarely on the behaviour displayed by utterers as they make conversational moves that their addressees will judge as rational along specific lines. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to conversation, viz. giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others, is expected to have an interest in taking part in a conversation which will only be profitable (if not possible) under the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helpfulness. Grice is not interested in conversation per se, but as a basis for a theory that explains the mistakes ordinary-language philosophers are making. The case of What is known to be the case is not believed to be the case. EXPLICATUM -- “to understand” – to explain -- Dilthey, W. philosopher and historian whose main project was to establish the conditions of historical knowledge, much as Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had for our knowledge of nature. He studied theology, history, and philosophy at Heidelberg and Berlin and in 2 accepted the chair earlier held by Hegel at the  of Berlin. Dilthey’s first attempt at a critique of historical reason is found in the Introduction to the Human Sciences 3, the last in the Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences 0. He is also a recognized contributor to hermeneutics, literary criticism, and worldview theory. His Life of Schleiermacher and essays on the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Hegel are model works of Geistesgeschichte, in which philosophical ideas are analyzed in relation to their social and cultural milieu. Dilthey holds that life is the ultimate nexus of reality behind which we cannot go. Life is viewed, not primarily in biological terms as in Nietzsche and Bergson, but as the historical totality of human experience. The basic categories whereby we reflect on life provide the background for the epistemological categories of the sciences. According to Dilthey, Aristotle’s category of acting and suffering is rooted in prescientific experience, which is then explicated as the category of efficacy or influence Wirkung in the human sciences and as the category of cause Ursache in the natural sciences. Our understanding of influence in the human sciences is less removed from the full reality of life than are the causal explanations arrived at in the natural sciences. To this extent the human sciences can claim a priority over the natural sciences. Whereas we have direct access to the real elements of the historical world psychophysical human beings, the elements of the natural world are merely hypothetical entities such as atoms. The natural sciences deal with outer experiences, while the human sciences are based on inner experience. Inner experience is reflexive and implicitly self-aware, but need not be introspective or explicitly self-conscious. In fact, we often have inner experiences of the same objects that outer experience is about. An outer experience of an object focuses on its physical properties; an inner experience of it on our felt responses to it. A lived experience Erlebnis of it includes both. The distinction between the natural and the human sciences is also related to the methodological difference between explanation and understanding. The natural sciences seek causal explanations of nature  connecting the discrete representations of outer experience through hypothetical generalizations. The human sciences aim at an understanding Verstehen that articulates the typical structures of life given in lived experience. Finding lived experience to be inherently connected and meaningful, Dilthey opposed traditional atomistic and associationist psychologies and developed a descriptive psychology that Husserl recognized as anticipating phenomenological psychology. In Ideas 4 Dilthey argued that descriptive psychology could provide a neutral foundation for the other human sciences, but in his later hermeneutical writings, which influenced Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, he rejected the possibility of a foundational discipline or method. In the Formation, he asserted that all the human sciences are interpretive and mutually dependent. Hermeneutically conceived, understanding is a process of interpreting the “objectifications of life,” the external expressions of human experience and activity. The understanding of others is mediated by these common objectifications and not immediately available through empathy Einfühlung. Moreover, to fully understand myself I must interpret the expressions of my life just as I interpret the expressions of others. Whereas the natural sciences aim at ever broader generalizations, the human sciences place equal weight on understanding individuality and universality. Dilthey regarded individuals as points of intersection of the social and cultural systems in which they participate. Any psychological contribution to understanding human life must be integrated into this more public framework. Although universal laws of history are rejected, particular human sciences can establish uniformities limited to specific social and cultural systems. In a set of sketches 1 supplementing the Formation, Dilthey further developed the categories of life in relation to the human sciences. After analyzing formal categories such as the partwhole relation shared by all the sciences, he distinguished the real categories of the human sciences from those of the natural sciences. The most important human science categories are value, purpose, and meaning, but they by no means exhaust the concepts needed to reflect on the ultimate sense of our existence. Such reflection receives its fullest expression in a worldview Weltanschauung, such as the worldviews developed in religion, art, and philosophy. A worldview constitutes an overall perspective on life that sums up what we know about the world, how we evaluate it emotionally, and how we respond to it volitionally. Since Dilthey distinguished three exclusive and recurrent types of worldview naturalism e.g., Democritus, Hume, the idealism of freedom e.g., Socrates, Kant, and objective idealism e.g., Parmenides, Hegel  he is often regarded as a relativist. But Dilthey thought that both the natural and the human sciences could in their separate ways attain objective truth through a proper sense of method. Metaphysical formulations of worldviews are relative only because they attempt an impossible synthesis of all truth. Explicatum -- explanation, an act of making something intelligible or understandable, as when we explain an event by showing why or how it occurred. Just about anything can be the object of explanation: a concept, a rule, the meaning of a word, the point of a chess move, the structure of a novel. However, there are two sorts of things whose explanation has been intensively discussed in philosophy: events and human actions. Individual events, say the collapse of a bridge, are usually explained by specifying their cause: the bridge collapsed because of the pressure of the flood water and its weakened structure. This is an example of causal explanation. There usually are indefinitely many causal factors responsible for the occurrence of an event, and the choice of a particular factor as “the cause” appears to depend primarily on contextual considerations. Thus, one explanation of an automobile accident may cite the icy road condition; another the inexperienced driver; and still another the defective brakes. Context may determine which of these and other possible explanations is the appropriate one. These explanations of why an event occurred are sometimes contrasted with explanations of how an event occurred. A “how” explanation of an event consists in an informative description of the process that has led to the occurrence of the event, and such descriptions are likely to involve descriptions of causal processes. The covering law model is an influential attempt to represent the general form of such explanations: an explanation of an event consists in “subsuming,” or “covering,” it under a law. When the covering law is deterministic, the explanation is thought to take the form of a deductive argument: a statement  the explanandum  describing the event to be explained is logically derived from the explanans  the law together with statements of antecedent conditions. Thus, we might explain why a given rod expanded by offering this argument: ‘All metals expand when heated; this rod is metallic and it was heated; therefore, it expanded’. Such an explanation is called a deductive-nomological explanation. On the other hand, probabilistic or statistical laws are thought to yield statistical explanations of individual events. Thus, the explanation of the contraction of a contagious disease on the basis of exposure to a patient with the disease may take the form of a statistical explanation. Details of the statistical model have been a matter of much controversy. It is sometimes claimed that although explanations, whether in ordinary life or in the sciences, seldom conform fully to the covering law model, the model nevertheless represents an ideal that all explanations must strive to attain. The covering law model, though influential, is not universally accepted. Human actions are often explained by being “rationalized’  i.e., by citing the agent’s beliefs and desires and other “intentional” mental states such as emotions, hopes, and expectations that constitute a reason for doing what was done. You opened the window because you wanted some fresh air and believed that by opening the window you could secure this result. It has been a controversial issue whether such rationalizing explanations are causal; i.e., whether they invoke beliefs and desires as a cause of the action. Another issue is whether existential polarity explanation 298   298 these “rationalizing” explanations must conform to the covering law model, and if so, what laws might underwrite such explanations.  Refs.: One good source is the “Prejudices and predilections.” Also the first set of ‘Logic and conversation.” There is also an essay on the ‘that’ versus the ‘why.’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

EX-PORTATVM -- Importatum/exportatum distinction, the: exportatum – exportation: in classical logic, the principle that A 8 B / C is logically equivalent to A / B / C. 2 The principle A 8 B P C P A P B P C, which relevance logicians hold to be fallacious when ‘P’ is read as ‘entails’. 3 In discussions of propositional attitude verbs, the principle that from ‘a Vs that b is an f’ one may infer ‘a Vs f-hood of b’, where V has its relational transparent sense. For example, exportation in sense 3 takes one from ‘Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy’ to ‘Ralph believes spyhood of Ortcutt’, wherein ‘Ortcutt’ can now be replaced by a bound variable to yield ‘Dx Ralph believes spyhood of x’. 

EX-POSITVM -- impositum/expositum distinction, the: expositum: Grice: “My preferred term for what Strawson calls the exponible.’ In dialectica, an exponible proposition is that which needs to be expounded, i.e., elaborated or explicated in order to make clear their true ‘form,’ as opposed to its mere ‘matter.’ ‘Giorgione is so called because of his size.’ ‘Giorgione is so called because of his size’ has a misleading ‘matter’ (implicating at least two forms). It may suggestin a simple predication. In fact, it means, ‘Giorgione is called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size’. Grice’s examples: “An English pillar box is called ‘red’ because it is red,” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because he is Grice.” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because his Anglo-Norman ancestors had ‘grey’ in their coat of arms.” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because his ancestor kept grice, i. e. pigs.” Another example by Grice: ‘Every man except Strawson is running’, expounded as ‘Strawson is not running and every man other than Strawson is running (for Prime Minister)’; and ‘Only Strawson says something true’, uttered by Grice. Grice claims ‘Only Strawson says something true’ should be expounded (or explicated, or explciited, or exposed, or provided ‘what is expositum, or the expositum provided: not only as ‘Strawson says something true and no one other than Strawson says something true’, but needs an implicated third clause, ‘Grice says something false’ for surely Grice is being self-referentially ironic. If only Strawson says something true – that proposition can only be uttered by Strawson. Grice borrowed it from Descartes: “Only Descarets says something ture.” This last example brings out an important aspect of exponible propositions, viz., their use in a sophisma. Sophismatic treatises are a common genre at Oxford in which this or that semantic issue is approached dialectically (what Grice calls “the Oxonian dialectic”) by its application in solving a puzzle case. Another important ingredient of an exponible proposition is its containing a particular term, sometimes called the exponible term (terminus exponibilis in Occam). Attention on such a term is focused in the study of the implicaturum of a syncategorematic expression, Note that such an exponible term could only be expounded in context, not by an explicit definition. A syncategorematic term that generates an exponible proposition is one such as: ‘twice’, ‘except’, ‘begins’ and ‘ceases [to eat iron, or ‘beat your wife,’ to use Grice’s example in “Causal Theory of Perception”]’, and ‘insofar as’ e.g. ‘Strawson insofar as he is rational is risible’.  H. P. Grice, “Implicaturum and explicaturum”

EX-PRESSVM -- impressum-expressum distinction, the: expressum:  At one time, Oxford was all about the Croceans! It all changed! The oppositum is the impressum, or sense-datum. In a functionalist model, you have perceptual INPUT and behavioural OUTPUT, the expressum. In between, the black box of the soul. Darwin, Eckman. Drawing  a skull meaning there is danger. cf. impressum. Inside out. Expression of Impressions. As an empiricist, Grice was into ‘impress.’ But it’s always good to have a correlatum. Grice liked an abbreviation, especially because he loved subscripts. So, he starts to analyse the ‘ordinary-language’ philosohper’s mistake by using a few symbols: there’s the phrase, or utterance, and there’s the expression, for which Grice uses ‘e’ for a ‘token,’ and ‘E’ for a type. So, suppose we are considering Hart’s use of ‘carefully.’ ‘Carefully’ would be the ‘expression,’ occurring within an utterance. Surely, since Grice uses ‘expression’ in that way, he also uses to say what Hart is doing, Hart is expressing. Grice notes that ‘expressing’ may be too strong. Hart is expressing the belief THAT if you utter an utterance containing the ‘expression’ ‘carefully,’ there is an implicaturum to the effect that the agent referred to is taking RATIONAL steps towards something. IRRATIONAL behaviour does not count as ‘careful’ behaviour. Grice uses the same abbreviations in discussing philosophy as the ‘conceptual analysis’ of this or that expression. It is all different with Ogden, Collingwood, and Croce, that Collingwood loved!  "Ideas, we may say generally, are symbols, as serving to express some actual moment or phase of experience and guiding towards fuller actualization of what is, or seems to be, involved in its existence or MEANING . That no idea is ever wholly adequate MEANS that the suggestiveness of experience is inexhaustible" Forsyth, English Philosophy, 1910, . Thus the significance of sound, the meaning of an utterance is here identical with the active response to surroundings and with the natural expression of emotions According to Husserl, the function of expression is only directly and immediately adapted to what is usually described as the meaning (Bedeutung) or the sense (Sinn) of the speech or parts of speech. Only because the meaning associated with a wordsowid expresses something, is that word-sound called 'expres- sion' (Ideen, p. 256 f). "Between the ,nearnng and the what is meant, or what it expresses, there exists an essential relation, because the meaning is the expression of the meant through its own content (Gehalt) What is meant (dieses Bedeutete) lies in the 'object' of the thought or speech. We must therefore distinguish these three-Word, Meaning, Object "1 Geyser, Gp cit p z8 PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompresso These complexities are mentioned here to show how vague are most of the terms which are commonly thought satisfactory in this topic. Such a word as 'understand' is, unless specially treated, far too vague to serve except provisionally or at levels of discourse where a real understanding of the matter (in the reference sense) is not possible. The multiple functions of speech will be classified and discussed in the following chapter. There it will be seen that the expression of the speaker's intention is one of the five regular language functions. Grice hated Austin’s joke, the utteratum, “I use ‘utterance’ only as equivalent to 'utteratum;' for 'utteratio' I use ‘the issue of an utterance,’” so he needed something for ‘what is said’ in general, not just linguistic, ‘what is expressed,’ what is explicitly conveyed,’ ex-prĭmo , pressi, pressum, 3, v. a. premo. express (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose; “freq. in the elder Pliny): (faber) et ungues exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos,” Hor. A. P. 33; cf.: “alicujus furorem ... verecundiae ruborem,” Plin. 34, 14, 40, § 140: “expressa in cera ex anulo imago,” Plaut. Ps. 1, 1, 54: “imaginem hominis gypso e facie ipsa,” Plin. 35, 12, 44, § 153; cf.: “effigiem de signis,” id. ib.: “optime Herculem Delphis et Alexandrum, etc.,” id. 34, 8, 19, § 66 et saep.: “vestis stricta et singulos artus exprimens,” exhibiting, showing, Tac. G. 17: “pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos exercitatio expressit,” has well developed, made muscular, Quint. 8, 3, 10.

EX-SISTERE -- The insistens/existens distinction, the: exsistentia: Grice: “A rather complex Ciceronian construction!” – Grice: “The correct spelling, at Clifton, was ‘ex-sistentia.’” -- ex-sisto or existo , stĭti, stĭtum, 3, v. n. ( I.act. August. Civ. D. 14, 13), to step out or forth, to come forth, emerge, appear (very freq. and class.). I. Prop. A. In gen.: “e latebris,” Liv. 25, 21, 3: “ab inferis,” Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 37, § 94; Liv. 39, 37, 3: “anguem ab ara exstitisse,” Cic. Div. 2, 80 fin.; cf.: vocem ab aede Junonis ex arce exstitisse (shortly before: voces ex occulto missae; and: “exaudita vox est a luco Vestae),” id. ib. 1, 45, 101: “est bos cervi figura, cujus a media fronte inter aures unum cornu exsistit excelsius,” Caes. B. G. 6, 26, 1: “submersus equus voraginibus non exstitit,” Cic. Div. 1, 33, 73; cf. Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 48, § 107: “nympha gurgite medio,” Ov. M. 5, 413: “hoc vero occultum, intestinum ac domesticum malum, non modo non exsistit, verum, etc.,” does not come to light, Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 15, § 39.— B. In partic., with the accessory notion of originating, to spring, proceed, arise, become: “vermes de stercore,” Lucr. 2, 871: “quae a bruma sata sunt, quadragesimo die vix exsistunt,” Varr. R. R. 1, 34, 1: “ut si qui dentes et pubertatem natura dicat exsistere, ipsum autem hominem, cui ea exsistant, non constare natura, non intelligat, etc.,” Cic. N. D. 2, 33 fin.: “ex hac nimia licentia ait ille, ut ex stirpe quadam, exsistere et quasi nasci tyrannum,” id. Rep. 1, 44; id. Off. 2, 23, 80; cf.: “ex luxuria exsistat avaritia necesse est,” id. Rosc. Am. 27, 75; “ut exsistat ex rege dominus, ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et confusio,” id. Rep. 1, 45: “ut plerumque in calamitate ex amicis inimici exsistunt,” Caes. B. C. 3, 104, 1; “for which: videtisne igitur, ut de rege dominus exstiterit? etc.,” Cic. Rep. 2, 26: “ex quo exsistit id civitatis genus,” id. ib. 3, 14: “hujus ex uberrimis sermonibus exstiterunt doctissimi viri,” id. Brut. 8, 31; cf. id. Or. 3, 12: “ex qua (disserendi ratione) summa utilitas exsistit,” id. Tusc. 5, 25, 72: “sermo admirantium, unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium exstitisset,” id. N. D. 1, 3, 6: “exsistit hoc loco quaestio subdifficilis,” id. Lael. 19, 67: “magna inter eos exsistit controversia,” Caes. B. G. 5, 28, 2: “poëtam bonum neminem sine inflammatione animorum exsistere posse,” Cic. de Or. 2, 46 fin.: exsistit illud, ut, etc., it ensues, follows, that, etc., id. Fin. 5, 23, 67; cf.: “ex quo exsistet, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat,” id. Fat. 9, 18. II. Transf., to be visible or manifest in any manner, to exist, to be: “ut in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt, sic in animis exsistunt majores etiam varietates,” Cic. Off. 1, 30, 107: “idque in maximis ingeniis exstitit maxime et apparet facillime,” id. Tusc. 1, 15, 33: “si exstitisset in rege fides,” id. Rab. Post. 1, 1: “cujus magnae exstiterunt res bellicae,” id. Rep. 2, 17: “illa pars animi, in qua irarum exsistit ardor,” id. Div. 1, 29, 61: “si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis adeundis,” id. Lael. 7, 24 et saep.: “neque ullum ingenium tantum exstitisse dicebat, ut, etc.,” Cic. Rep. 2, 1; cf.: “talem vero exsistere eloquentiam, qualis fuit in Crasso, etc.,” id. de Or. 2, 2, 6; “nisi Ilias illa exstitisset,” id. Arch. 10, 24: “cujus ego dignitatis ab adolescentia fautor, in praetura autem et in consulatu adjutor etiam exstitissem,” id. Fam. 1, 9, 11; cf.: “his de causis ego huic causae patronus exstiti,” id. Rosc. Am. 2, 5: “timeo, ne in eum exsistam crudelior,” id. Att. 10, 11, 3: “sic insulsi exstiterunt, ut, etc.,” id. de Or. 2, 54, 217.Grice learned to use \/x for the existential quantifier, since “it shows the analogy with ‘or’ and avoids you fall into any ontological trap, of existential generalization, a rule of inference admissible in classical quantification theory. It allows one to infer an existentially quantified statement DxA from any instance A a/x of it. Intuitively, it allows one to infer ‘There exists a liar’ from ‘Epimenides is a liar’. It is equivalent to universal instantiation  the rule that allows one to infer any instance A a/x of a universally quantified statement ExA from ExA. Intuitively, it allows one to infer ‘My car is valuable’ from ‘Everything is valuable’. Both rules can also have equivalent formulations as axioms; then they are called specification ExA / A a/x and particularization Aa/x / DxA. All of these equivalent principles are denied by free logic, which only admits weakened versions of them. In the case of existential generalization, the weakened version is: infer DxA from Aa/x & E!a. Intuitively: infer ‘There exists a liar’ from ‘Epimenides is a liar and Epimenides exists’.  existential import, a commitment to the existence of something implied by a sentence, statement, or proposition. For example, in Aristotelian logic though not in modern quantification theory, any sentence of the form ‘All F’s are G’s’ implies ‘There is an F that is a G’ and is thus said to have as existential import a commitment to the existence of an F that is a G. According to Russell’s theory of descriptions, sentences containing definite descriptions can likewise have existential import since ‘The F is a G’ implies ‘There is an F’. The presence of singular terms is also often claimed to give rise to existential commitment. Underlying this notion of existential import is the idea  long stressed by W. V. Quine  that ontological commitment is measured by existential sentences statements, propositions of the form Dv f.  existential instantiation, a rule of inference admissible in classical quantification theory. It allows one to infer a statement A from an existentially quantified statement DxB if A can be inferred from an instance Ba/x of DxB, provided that a does not occur in either A or B or any other premise of the argument if there are any. Intuitively, it allows one to infer a contradiction C from ‘There exists a highest prime’ if C can be inferred from ‘a is a highest prime’ and a does not occur in C. Free logic allows for a stronger form of this rule: with the same provisions as above, A can be inferred from DxB if it can be inferred from Ba/x & E!a. Intuitively, it is enough to infer ‘There is a highest natural number’ from ‘a is a highest prime and a exists’.  existentialism, a philosophical and literary movement that came to prominence in Europe, particularly in France, immediately after World War II, and that focused on the uniqueness of each human individual as distinguished from abstract universal human qualities. Historians differ as to antecedents. Some see an existentialist precursor in Pascal, whose aphoristically expressed Catholic fideism questioned the power of rationalist thought and preferred the God of Scripture to the abstract “God of the philosophers.” Many agree that Kierkegaard, whose fundamentally similar but Protestant fideism was based on a profound unwillingness to situate either God or any individual’s relationship with God within a systematic philosophy, as Hegel had done, should be exact similarity existentialism 296   296 considered the first modern existentialist, though he too lived long before the term emerged. Others find a proto-existentialist in Nietzsche, because of the aphoristic and anti-systematic nature of his writings, and on the literary side, in Dostoevsky. A number of twentiethcentury novelists, such as Franz Kafka, have been labeled existentialists. A strong existentialist strain is to be found in certain other theist philosophers who have written since Kierkegaard, such as Lequier, Berdyaev, Marcel, Jaspers, and Buber, but Marcel later decided to reject the label ‘existentialist’, which he had previously employed. This reflects its increasing identification with the atheistic existentialism of Sartre, whose successes, as in the novel Nausea, and the philosophical work Being and Nothingness, did most to popularize the word. A mass-audience lecture, “Existentialism Is a Humanism,” which Sartre to his later regret allowed to be published, provided the occasion for Heidegger, whose early thought had greatly influenced Sartre’s evolution, to take his distance from Sartre’s existentialism, in particular for its self-conscious concentration on human reality over Being. Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, written in reply to a  admirer, signals an important turn in his thinking. Nevertheless, many historians continue to classify Heidegger as an existentialist  quite reasonably, given his early emphasis on existential categories and ideas such as anxiety in the presence of death, our sense of being “thrown” into existence, and our temptation to choose anonymity over authenticity in our conduct. This illustrates the difficulty of fixing the term ‘existentialism’. Other  thinkers of the time, all acquaintances of Sartre’s, who are often classified as existentialists, are Camus, Simone de Beauvoir, and, though with less reason, Merleau-Ponty. Camus’s novels, such as The Stranger and The Plague, are cited along with Nausea as epitomizing the uniqueness of the existentialist antihero who acts out of authenticity, i.e., in freedom from any conventional expectations about what so-called human nature a concept rejected by Sartre supposedly requires in a given situation, and with a sense of personal responsibility and absolute lucidity that precludes the “bad faith” or lying to oneself that characterizes most conventional human behavior. Good scholarship prescribes caution, however, about superimposing too many Sartrean categories on Camus. In fact the latter, in his brief philosophical essays, notably The Myth of Sisyphus, distinguishes existentialist writers and philosophers, such as Kierkegaard, from absurdist thinkers and heroes, whom he regards more highly, and of whom the mythical Sisyphus condemned eternally by the gods to roll a huge boulder up a hill before being forced, just before reaching the summit, to start anew is the epitome. Camus focuses on the concept of the absurd, which Kierkegaard had used to characterize the object of his religious faith an incarnate God. But for Camus existential absurdity lies in the fact, as he sees it, that there is always at best an imperfect fit between human reasoning and its intended objects, hence an impossibility of achieving certitude. Kierkegaard’s leap of faith is, for Camus, one more pseudo-solution to this hard, absurdist reality. Almost alone among those named besides Sartre who himself concentrated more on social and political thought and became indebted to Marxism in his later years, Simone de Beauvoir 886 unqualifiedly accepted the existentialist label. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, she attempted, using categories familiar in Sartre, to produce an existentialist ethics based on the recognition of radical human freedom as “projected” toward an open future, the rejection of inauthenticity, and a condemnation of the “spirit of seriousness” akin to the “spirit of gravity” criticized by Nietzsche whereby individuals identify themselves wholly with certain fixed qualities, values, tenets, or prejudices. Her feminist masterpiece, The Second Sex, relies heavily on the distinction, part existentialist and part Hegelian in inspiration, between a life of immanence, or passive acceptance of the role into which one has been socialized, and one of transcendence, actively and freely testing one’s possibilities with a view to redefining one’s future. Historically, women have been consigned to the sphere of immanence, says de Beauvoir, but in fact a woman in the traditional sense is not something that one is made, without appeal, but rather something that one becomes. The Sartrean ontology of Being and Nothingness, according to which there are two fundamental asymmetrical “regions of being,” being-in-itself and being-for-itself, the latter having no definable essence and hence, as “nothing” in itself, serving as the ground for freedom, creativity, and action, serves well as a theoretical framework for an existentialist approach to human existence. Being and Nothingness also names a third ontological region, being-for-others, but that may be disregarded here. However, it would be a mistake to treat even Sartre’s existentialist insights, much less those of others, as dependent on this ontology, to which he himself made little direct existentialism existentialism 297   297 reference in his later works. Rather, it is the implications of the common central claim that we human beings exist without justification hence “absurdly” in a world into which we are “thrown,” condemned to assume full responsibility for our free actions and for the very values according to which we act, that make existentialism a continuing philosophical challenge, particularly to ethicists who believe right choices to be dictated by our alleged human essence or nature. 

EX-TENSVM -- extensum -- extensionalism: one of the twelve labours of H. P. Grice -- a family of ontologies and semantic theories restricted to existent entities. Extensionalist ontology denies that the domain of any true theory needs to include non-existents, such as fictional, imaginary, and impossible objects like Pegasus the winged horse or round squares. Extensionalist semantics reduces meaning and truth to set-theoretical relations between terms in a language and the existent objects, standardly spatiotemporal and abstract entities, that belong to the term’s extension. The extension of a name is the particular existent denoted by the name; the extension of a predicate is the set of existent objects that have the property represented by the predicate. The sentence ‘All whales are mammals’ is true in extensionalist semantics provided there are no whales that are not mammals, no existent objects in the extension of the predicate ‘whale’ that are not also in the extension of ‘mammal’. Linguistic contexts are extensional if: i they make reference only to existent objects; ii they support substitution of codesignative terms referring to the same thing, or of logically equivalent propositions, salva veritate without loss of truthvalue; and iii it is logically valid to existentially quantify conclude that There exists an object such that . . . etc. objects referred to within the context. Contexts that do not meet these requirements are intensional, non-extensional, or referentially opaque. The implications of extensionalism, associated with the work of Frege, Russell, Quine, and mainstream analytic philosophy, are to limit its explanations of mind and meaning to existent objects and material-mechanical properties and relations describable in an exclusively extensional idiom. Extensionalist semantics must try to analyze away apparent references to nonexistent objects, or, as in Russell’s extensionalist theory of definite descriptions, to classify all such predications as false. Extensionalist ontology in the philosophy of mind must eliminate or reduce propositional attitudes or de dicto mental states, expressed in an intensional idiom, such as ‘believes that ————’, ‘fears that ————’, and the like, usually in favor of extensional characterizations of neurophysiological states. Whether extensionalist philosophy can satisfy these explanatory obligations, as the thesis of extensionality maintains, is controversial.