conversational implicaturum. Grice plays with the ambiguity of ‘implication’ as a
logical term, and ‘implicitness’ as a rhetorical one. He wants to make a
distinction between ‘dicere,’ to convey explicitly that p, and to convey
implicitly, or ‘imply’ (always applied to the emissor) that q. A joke. Surely
if he is going to use ‘implicaturum’ in Roman, this would be ‘implicaturum
conversationale,’ if there were such thing. And there were! The Roman is formed
from cum- plus ‘verso.’ So there’s Roman ‘conversatio.’ And –alis, ale is a
productive suffix. Or implicitum. Grice
is being philosophical and sticking with ‘implicatio’ as used by logicians.
Implicitum does not have much of a philosophical pedigree. But even
‘implicatio’ was not THAT used, ‘consequentia’ was preferred, as in ‘non
sequitur, and seguitur, quod demonstrandumm erat. Strawson criticism of ‘the,’
only tentative by Grice, unlike ‘if,’ so forgivable! See common-ground status. Grice
loved an implicaturum. The use of ‘conversational’ by Grice is NEVER emphatic.
In his detailed, even fastidious, taxonomy of ‘implication,’ he decisively does
not want to have a mere conventional implicaturum (as in “She was poor but she
was honest”) as conversational. Not even a “Thank you”, generated by the maxim
“be polite.” That would be an implicaturum which is nonconventional and yet NOT
conversational, because ‘be polite’ is NOT a conversational maxim (moral,
aesthetic, and social maxims are not). And an implicaturum. An elaboration of
his Oxonian seminar on Logic and conversation. Theres a principle of
conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational candour
and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of
conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational
benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis
for a conversational implicaturum, as his term of art goes. Observation of the
principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the
following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is
supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should
only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the
assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of
conversational helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice
takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an implicaturum is
conversational in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicaturum is
rationally calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or
stance that the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being
helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part
of the sense and never an entailment of this or that piece of philosophical
vocabulary, in Davidson and Harman, the logic of Grammar, also in Cole and
Morgan, repr. in a revised form in Grice, logic and conversation, the second
James lecture, : principle of conversational helpfulness, implicaturum,
cancellability. While the essay was also repr. by Cole and Morgan. Grice
always cites it from the two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar, ed. by
Davidson and Harman. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter
Grice through this essay. A philosopher usually gets first acquainted with his
In defence of a dogma, or Meaning. In Logic and Conversation, Grice
re-utilises the notion of an implicaturum and the principle of conversational helpfulness
that he introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. The idea Grice is that
the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational
(reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the
two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information,
to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it
is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational
helfpulness. Grices point is methodological. He is not at all interested
in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts in
media res, and skips Grices careful list of Oxonian examples of disregard
for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational
move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum
(roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This
concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent,
conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by
a few philosophers leaving them confused. I do not know what Davidson and
Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in The logic of grammar. I mean:
it is obviously in media res. Grice starts with the logical devices, and never
again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and hyperbole, and
surely the philosopher who bought The logic of grammar must be left puzzled. He
has to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion. Oxonian philosophers
would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from unpublished material! Cohen had to
rely on memory, and thats why he got all his Grice wrong! And so did Strawson
in If and the horseshoe. Even Walker responding to Cohen is relying on memory.
Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar. At Oxford, everybody knew
what Grice was up to. Hare was talking implicaturum in Mind, and Pears was
talking conversational implicaturum in Ifs and cans. And Platts was dedicating
a full chapter to “Causal Theory”. It seems the Oxonian etiquette was to quote
from Causal Theory. It was obvious that Grices implication excursus had to read
implicaturum! In a few dictionaries of philosophy, such as Hamlyns, under implication,
a reference to Grices locus classicus Causal theory is made – Passmore quotes
from Causal theory in Hundred years of philosophy. Very few Oxonians would care
to buy a volume published in Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted
The logic of grammar, though. At Oxford, Grices implicatura remained part of
the unwritten doctrines of a few. And philosophers would not cite a cajoled
essay in the references. The implicaturum allows a display of truth-functional
Grice. For substitutional-quantificational Grice we have to wait for his
treatment of the. In Prolegomena, Grice had quoted verbatim from Strawsons
infamous idea that there is a sense of inferrability with if. While the lecture
covers much more than if (He only said if; Oh, no, he said a great deal more
than that! the title was never meant to be original. Grice in fact provides a
rational justification for the three connectives (and, or, and if) and before
that, the unary functor not. Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, not
and If, Sinton on Grice on denials of indicative conditionals, not,
if. Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between
Whiteheads and Russells horseshoe, and if. Grice thought Strawsons observations
could be understood in terms of entailment + implicaturum (Robbing Peter to Pay
Paul). But problems, as first noted to Grice, by Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when
it comes to the scope of the implicaturum within the operation of, say,
negation. Analogous problems arise with implicatura for the other earlier
dyadic functors, and and or, and Grice looks for a single explanation of the
phenomenon. The qualification indicative is modal. Ordinary language
allows for if utterances to be in modes other than the imperative.
Counter-factual, if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, Subjectsive
is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a cavalier to the problem: Surely
it wont do to say You couldnt have done that, since you were in Seattle, to
someone who figuratively tells you hes spend the full summer cleaning the
Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the centerpiece of the lectures.
Grice takes good care of not, and, or, and concludes with the if of the title.
For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook Wilson in Statement and Inference. And
they all connect with rationality. So he is using material from his Oxford
seminars on the principle of conversational helpfulness. Plus Cook Wilson makes
more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The last bit, citing Kripke and Dummett,
is meant as jocular. What is important is the teleological approach to the
operators, where a note should be made about dyadicity. In Prolegomena, when he
introduces the topic, he omits not (about which he was almost obsessed!). He
just gives an example for and (He went to bed and took off his dirty boots),
one for or (the garden becomes Oxford and the kitchen becomes London, and the implicaturum
is in terms, oddly, of ignorance: My wife is either in town or country,making
fun of Town and Country), and if. His favourite illustration for if is Cock
Robin: If the Sparrow did not kill him, the Lark did! This is because Grice is
serious about the erotetic, i.e. question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to
things, but he manages to bring Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just
to impress! Most importantly, he introduces the square brackets! Hell use them
again in Presupposition and Conversational Implicaturum and turns them into
subscripts in Vacuous Namess. This is central. For he wants to impoverish the
idea of the implicaturum. The explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is
syntactic-cum-pragmatic import. The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable,
and as he knows: what the eye no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves
for! The modal implicaturum. Since Grice uses indicative, for the
title of his third James lecture (Indicative Conditionals) surely he implicates
subjunctive ‒ i.e. that someone might be thinking that he should
give an account of indicative-cum-subjective. This relates to an example Grice
gives in Causal theory, that he does not reproduce in Prolegomena. Grice states
the philosophical mistake as follows. What is actual is not also
possible. Grice seems to be suggesting that a subjective conditional would
involve one or other of the modalities, he is not interested in exploring. On
the other hand, Mackie has noted that Grices conversationalist hypothesis
(Mackie quotes verbatim from Grices principle of conversational helpfulness)
allows for an explanation of the Subjectsive if that does not involve
Kripke-type paradoxes involving possible worlds, or other. In Causal Theory,
Grice notes that the issue with which he has been mainly concerned may be
thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are
several philosophical theses or dicta which would he thinks need to be examined
in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis
which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general
kind. An examples which occurs to me is the following. What is actual is not
also possible. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is
importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for
all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted
by Grices objector seems to Grice to involve a type of manoeuvre which is
characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. He is not
condemning that kind of manoeuvre. He is merely suggesting that to embark on it
without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead
to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure
that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. If was also of
special interest to Grice for many other reasons. He defends a dispositional
account of intending that in terms of ifs and cans. He considers akrasia
conditionally. He explored the hypothetical-categorical distinction in the
buletic mode. He was concerned with therefore as involved with the associated
if of entailment. Refs.: “Implicaturum” is introduced in Essay 2 in WoW –
but there are scattered references elsewhere. He often uses the plural ‘implicatura’
too, as in “Retrospective Epilogue,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. An implicaturum
requires a complexum. Frege was the topic of the explorations by Dummett. A
tutee of Grices once brought Dummetts Frege to a tutorial and told Grice that
he intended to explore this. Have you read it? No I havent, Grice
answered. And after a pause, he went on: And I hope I will not. Hardly
promising, the tutee thought. Some authors, including Grice, but alas, not
Frege, have noted some similarities between Grices notion of a conventional implicaturum
and Freges schematic and genial rambles on colouring. Aber Farbung, as Frege
would state! Grice was more interested in the idea of a Fregeian sense, but he
felt that if he had to play with Freges aber he should! One of Grices
metaphysical construction-routines, the Humeian projection, is aimed at the
generation of concepts, in most cases the rational reconstruction of an
intuitive concept displayed in ordinary discourse. We arrive at something
like a Fregeian sense. Grice exclaimed, with an intonation of Eureka, almost.
And then he went back to Frege. Grices German was good, so he could read
Frege, in the vernacular. For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grices, not
Freges): In einem obliquen Kontext, Frege says, Grice says, kann ja z. B. die
Ersetzung eines „aber durch ein „und, die in einem direkten Kontext keinen
Unterschied des Wahrheitswerts ergibt, einen solchen Unterschied bewirken. Ill
make that easy for you, darlings: und is and, and aber is but. But surely,
Papa, aber is not cognate with but! Its not. That is Anglo-Saxon, for you. But
is strictly Anglo-Saxon short for by-out; we lost aber when we sailed the North
Sea. Grice went on: Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn und Färbung (oder
Konnotationen) eines Satzes fragwürdig. I. e. he is saying that She was poor
but she was honest only conventionally implicates that there is a contrast
between her poverty and her honesty. I guess he heard the ditty during the War?
Grice ignored that remark, and went on: Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von
Sinn und Färbung genauer zu unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante
Bedeutungs Komponenten hin, bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu
differenzieren, da er letztlich nur betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der
Logik keine Rolle spielen. They play a role in the lingo, that is! What do?
Stuff like but. But surely they are not rational conversational implicatura!?
No, dear, just conventional tricks you can ignore on a nice summer day! Grice
however was never interested in what he dismissively labels the conventional implicaturum.
He identifies it because he felt he must! Surely, the way some Oxonian
philosophers learn to use stuff like, on the one hand, and on the other, (or
how Grice learned how to use men and de in Grecian), or so, or therefore, or
but versus and, is just to allow that he would still use imply in such cases.
But surely he wants conversational to stick with rationality: conversational
maxim and converational implicaturum only apply to things which can be
justified transcendentally, and not idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice follows
Church in noting that Russell misreads Frege as being guilty of ignoring the
use-mention distinction, when he doesnt. One thing that Grice minimises is that
Freges assertion sign is composite. Tha is why Baker prefers to use the dot “.”
as the doxastic correlative for the buletic sign ! which is NOT composite. The
sign „├‟ is composite. Frege explains his Urteilstrich, the vertical component
of his sign ├ as conveying assertoric force. The principal role of the
horizontal component as such is to prevent the appearance of assertoric force
belonging to a token of what does not express a thought (e.g. the expression
22). ─p expresses a thought even if p does not.) cf. Hares four sub-atomic
particles: phrastic (dictum), neustic (dictor), tropic, and clistic. Cf. Grice
on the radix controversy: We do not want the “.” in p to become a vanishing
sign. Grices Frege, Frege, Words, and Sentences, Frege, Farbung, aber. Frege
was one of Grices obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum,
a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the
generation of conversational implicatura, that can only mean progress for
philosophy! Fregeian senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The
employment of the routine of Humeian projection may be expected to deliver for
us, as its result, a concept – the concept(ion) of value, say, in
something like a Fregeian sense, rather than an object. There is also a
strong affinity between Freges treatment of colouring (of the German particle
aber, say) and Grices idea of a convetional implicaturum (She was poor, but she
was honest,/and her parents were the same,/till she met a city feller,/and she
lost her honest Names, as the vulgar Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem
interested in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicatura,
and there is a reason for this. Conventional implicatura are not
essentially connected, as conversational implicatura are, with rationality.
Conventional implicatura cannot be calculable. They have less of a
philosophical interest, too, in that they are not cancellable. Grice sees
cancellability as a way to prove some (contemporary to him, if dated)
ordinary-language philosophers who analyse an expression in terms of sense and
entailment, where a cancellable conversational implicaturum is all there is (to
it). He mentions Benjamin in Prolegomena, and is very careful in noting
how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian sense. In his Causal theory, Grice lists
another mistake: What is known to be the case is not believed to be the
case. Grice gives pretty few example of a conventional implicaturum:
therefore, as in the utterance by Jill: Jack is an Englishman; he is,
therefore, brave. This is interesting because therefore compares to so
which Strawson, in PGRICE, claims is the asserted counterpart to if. But
Strawson is never associated with the type of linguistic botany that Grice is.
Grice also mentions the idiom, on the one hand/on the other hand, in some
detail in “Epilogue”: My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my sister, on the
other hand, lives on a peak at Darien. Grice thinks that Frege misuses the
use-mention distinction but Russell corrects that. Grice bases this on Church.
And of course he is obsessed with the assertion sign by Frege, which Grice
thinks has one stroke tooo many. The main reference is give above for
‘complexum.’ Those without a philosophical background tend to ignore a joke by
Grice. His echoing Kant in the James is a joke, in the sense that he is using
Katns well-known to be pretty artificial quartet of ontological caegories to
apply to a totally different phenomenon: the taxonomy of the maxims! In his
earlier non-jocular attempts, he applied more philosophical concepts with a
more serious rationale. His key concept, conversation as rational co-operation,
underlies all his attempts. A pretty worked-out model is in terms then of this
central, or overarching principle of conversational helpfulness (where
conversation as cooperation need not be qualified as conversation as rational
co-operation) and being structured by two contrasting sub-principles: the
principle of conversational benevolence (which almost overlaps with the
principle of conversational helpfulness) and the slightly more jocular
principle of conversational self-love. There is something oxymoronic about
self-love being conversational, and this is what leads to replace the two
subprinciples by a principle of conversational helfpulness (as used in WoW:IV)
simpliciter. His desideratum of conversational candour is key. The clash
between the desideratum of conversational candour and the desideratum of
conversational clarity (call them supermaxims) explains why I believe that p
(less clear than p) shows the primacy of candour over clarity. The idea remains
of an overarching principle and a set of more specific guidelines. Non-Oxonian
philosophers would see Grices appeal to this or that guideline as ad hoc, but
not his tutees! Grice finds inspiration in Joseph Butler’s sermon on benevolence
and self-love, in his sermon 9, upon the love of our neighbour, preached on
advent Sunday. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly
comprehended in this saying, Namesly, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,
Romans xiii. 9. It is commonly observed, that there is a disposition in
men to complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they
live, as greater than that of former ones: which is usually followed with this
further observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all
times. Now, to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts
of history: thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes
different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in
some ages than in others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the
distinction of the present, to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards
to self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it
seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted
in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over
all other principles; "or whether the contracted affection may not
possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own
end, private good?" Repr. in revised form as WOW, I. Grice felt
the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, Never contradict. Never
explain) of the nuances about seem and cause (“Causal theory”.). Grice uses ‘My
wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom,’ by Smith, as relying on a requirement
of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice.
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged. Variations on a theme by Grice. I wish to represent a certain
subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall
call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with
certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what
these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a
general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession
of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant
recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at
least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed
from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or
it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so
indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants, as in a
casual conversation. But at each stage, some possible conversational moves
would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a
rough general principle which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to
observe, viz.: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the co-operative
principle. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants
will be expected ceteris paribus to observe,
viz.: Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative Principle.
Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants are. Less
literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the accepted goal
of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why logic and
conversation? Logica had been part of the trivium for ages ‒ Although they
called it dialectica, then. Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by
Strawsons treatment of the formal devices in “Introduction to logical theory”
(henceforth, “Logical theory”), Grice targets these, in their ordinary-discourse
counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his logic tutor – Strawson
was following a PPE., and his approach to logic is practical. His philosophy
tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit. Hum. the situation is
different. Grice knows that the Categoriae and De Int. of his beloved Aristotle
are part of the Logical Organon which had been so influential in the history of
philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile Strawsons observations with the
idea that the formal devices reproduce some sort of explicatum, or explicitum,
as identified by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica. In the
proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or
conversation as a rational co-operation. The alleged divergence between the
ordinary-language operators and their formal counterparts is explained in terms
of the conversational implicatura, then. I.e. the content of the
psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to
account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged
ordinary-language counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a
co-operative transaction. The utterer and his addressee are seen as
caring for the mutual goals of conversation ‒ the exchange of
information and the institution of decisions ‒ and judging that
conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if
conducted under some form of principle of conversational helpfulness. The
observation of a principle of conversational helpfulness is
reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone who cares
about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving
and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be
expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in
a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is
conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational
helpfulness. In titling his seminar Logic and conversation, Grice is
thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal “Logical theory,” that every
Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never
ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti
Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he
acknwoledges Grices difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the
strength or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses
an adjective that Grice will seldom do, pragmatic. On top, Strawson attributes
the adjective to rule. For Grice, in Strawsons wording, there is this or that
pragmatic rule to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a
weaker conversational move. Strawsons Introduction was published before Grice
aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes
the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it
is Grices occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as
generating implicatura under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes
it obvious that Grices interest is methodological, and not philological. He is
not interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle
of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicaturum,
which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his
expression does, a distinction apparently denied by Witters and all too
frequently ignored by Austin. Logic and conversation, an Oxford seminar, implicaturum,
principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational implicaturum,
conversational implicaturum. Conversational Implicaturum Grices main
invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer implies
and what his expression does. A distinction apparently denied by Witters,
and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin. Grice is
implicating that Austins sympathies were for the Subjectsification of
Linguistic Nature. Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never
loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicaturum,
which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly
particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. I can very well mean that my tutee
is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering It is raining.Grice
notes that since the object of the present exercise, is to provide
a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of
cases, why is it that a particular implicaturum is present, I
would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this
model should be: can it be used to construct an explanation of
the presence of such an implicaturum, and is it more comprehensive
and more economical than any rival? is the no
doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give
of such an implicaturum consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer
towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise:
whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics,
Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their
own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and
spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own
familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed
syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the
casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery
questions in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever
physician, who, when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for
poison even from a serpent.qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos
cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti
machinamentis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si
repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia
sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem
tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones
tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio
compellit et de serpente conficivnt. If he lectured on Logic and
Conversation on implicaturum, Grice must have thought that Strawsons area was
central. Yet, as he had done in Causal theory and as he will at Harvard, Grice
kept collecting philosophers mistakes. So its best to see Grice as a
methodologist, and as using logic and conversation as an illustration of his
favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a
place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area
minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a balance: surely logic and
conversation is a topic of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all philosophers
– unless they are Griceians – to keep a broad unitarian view of philosophy
as a virtuous whole. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. Destructive implicaturum
to it: Mr. Puddle is our man in æsthetics implicates that he is not good at it.
What is important to Grice is that the mistakes of these philosophers (notably
Strawson!) arise from some linguistic phenomena, or, since we must use singular
expressions this or that linguistic phenomenon. Or as Grice puts it, it is this
or that linguistic phenomenon which provides the material for the philosopher
to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory of conversation as rational
co-operation is posited – technically, as a way to explain (never merely
describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf. never explain, never
apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: Never contradict. Never explain.) these phenomena –
his principle of conversational helpfulness and the idea of a conversational implicaturum.
The latter is based not so much on rationality per se, but on the
implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly plays with, since his earlier
semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But back to this or that linguistic
phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle for providing this or that
linguistic phenomenon that no philosopher would ever feel excited about, Grice
himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a philosophical point with
this or that linguistic phenomenon that would not be necessarily connected with
philosophy. Grice rarely quotes authors, but surely the section in “Causal
theory,” where he lists seven philosophical theses (which are ripe for an implicaturum
treatment) would be familiar enough for anybody to be able to drop a names to
attach to each. At Harvard, almost every example Grice gives of this or that
linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and sometimes he expands on his own view
of them, just to amuse his audience – and show how committed to this or that
thesis he was), but some are not unauthored. And they all belong to the
linguistic turn: In his three groups of examples, Grice quotes from Ryle (who
thinks he knows about ordinary language), Witters, Austin (he quotes him in
great detail, from Pretending, Plea of excuses, and No modification without
aberration,), Strawson (in “Logical theory” and on Truth for Analysis), Hart
(as I have heard him expand on this), Grice, Searle, and Benjamin. Grice
implicates Hare on ‘good,’ etc. When we mention the explicit/implicit
distinction as source for the implicaturum, we are referring to Grices own
wording in Retrospective epilogue where he mentions an utterer as conveying in
some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a gentler, more (midland or
southern) English, way, via implicaturum, or implIciture, if you mustnt. Cf.
Fowler: As a southern Englishman, Ive stopped trying teaching a northern
Englishman the distinction between ought and shall. He seems to get it always
wrong. It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His point
would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of conversational
helpfulness is in order allows P-1 not just to convey in a direct explicit
fashion that p, but in an implicit fashion that q, where q is the implicaturum.
The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of this or that implicatura,
to use Grices word (generate). Surely, He took off his boots and went to bed; I
wont say in which order sounds hardly in the vein of conversational helpfulness
– but provided Grice does not see it as logically incoherent, it is still a
rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The point may be difficult to
discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying, Viva Boole. Grices
point about rationality is mentioned in his later Prolegomena, on at least two
occasions. Rational behaviour is the phrase he uses (as applied first to
communication and then to discourse) and in stark opposition with a
convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin. Grice is here less
interested here as he will be on rationality, but coooperation as such.
Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a mutual one between
decent chaps, as he puts it. His charming decent chap is so Oxonian. His tutee
would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more! A rather obscure exploration on the
connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice is aware that there
is an allegation in the air about a possible vicious circle in trying to define
category of expression in terms of a category of representation. He does not
provide a solution to the problem which hell take up in his Method in
philosophical psychology, in his role of President of the APA. It is the implicaturum
behind the lecture that matters, since Grice will go back to it, notably in the
Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, its all rational enough. Theres a P, in a
situation, say of danger – a bull ‒. He perceives the bull. The bulls attack
causes this perception. Bull! the P1 G1 screams, and causes in
P2 G2 a rearguard movement. So where is the circularity? Some
pedants would have it that Bull cannot be understood in a belief about a bull
which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he brought back implicaturum,
which had become obliterated in the lectures, back to title position! But it is
also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly rationalist models for implicaturum.
He had played with a model, and an explanatory one at that, for implicaturum,
in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness, a
desideratum of conversational clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour,
and two sub-principles: a principle of conversational benevolence, and a
principle of conversational self-interest! Surely Harvard could be spared of
the details! Implicaturum. Grice disliked a presupposition. BANC also contains
a folder for Odd ends: Urbana and non-Urbana. Grice continues with the
elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it System Q in honour
of Quine. At a later stage, Myro will re-Names it System G, in a special
version, System GHP, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G,
in gratitude to Grice. Odd Ends: Urbana and Not Urbana, Odds and ends: Urbana
and not Urbana, or not-Urbana, or Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents,
urbane and not urbane, semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures are
on language and reality. Grice keeps revising them, as these items
show. Language and reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The
Urbana Lectures, Language and reference, language and reality, The Urbana
lectures, University of Illinois at Urbana, language, reference, reality. Grice
favours a transcendental approach to communication. A beliefs by a communicator
worth communicating has to be true. An order by a communicator worth
communicating has to be satisfactory. The fourth lecture is the one Grice dates
in WOW . Smith has not ceased from beating his wife, presupposition and
conversational implicaturum, in Radical pragmatics, ed. by R. Cole, repr. in a
revised form in Grice, WOW, II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics,
essay, presupposition and implicaturum, presupposition, conversational implicaturum,
implicaturum, Strawson. Grice: The loyalty examiner will not summon you, do not
worry. The cancellation by Grice could be pretty subtle. Well, the loyalty
examiner will not be summoning you at any rate. Grice goes back to the issue of
negation and not. If, Grice notes, is is a matter of dispute whether the
government has a very undercover person who interrogates those whose loyalty is
suspect and who, if he existed, could be legitimately referred to as the
loyalty examiner; and if, further, I am known to be very sceptical about the
existence of such a person, I could perfectly well say to a plainly loyal
person, Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate,
without, Grice would think, being taken to imply that such a person
exists. Further, if the utterer U is well known to disbelieve in the existence
of such a person, though others are inclined to believe in him, when U finds a
man who is apprised of Us position, but who is worried in case he is summoned,
U may try to reassure him by uttering, The loyalty examiner will not summon
you, do not worry. Then it would be clear that U uttered this because U is sure
there is no such person. The lecture was variously reprinted, but the Urbana
should remain the preferred citation. There are divergences in the various
drafts, though. The original source of this exploration was a seminar.
Grice is interested in re-conceptualising Strawsons manoeuvre regarding
presupposition as involving what Grice disregards as a metaphysical concoction:
the truth-value gap. In Grices view, based on a principle of conversational
tailoring that falls under his principle of conversational
helpfulness ‒ indeed under the desideratum of conversational clarity
(be perspicuous [sic]). The king of France is bald entails there is a king of
France; while The king of France aint bald merely implicates it. Grice
much preferred Collingwoods to Strawsons presuppositions! Grice thought, and
rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicaturum was to gain
Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawsons idea of the
præ-suppositum. Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with
Quines idea of a truth-value gap. Grice shows that neither the metaphysical
concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the
præ-suppositum is needed. The king of France is bald entails that there is a
king of France. It is part of what U is logically committed to by what he
explicitly conveys. By uttering, The king of France is not bald on the other
hand, U merely implicitly conveys or implicates that there is a king of France.
A perfectly adequate, or impeccable, as Grice prefers, cancellation, abiding
with the principle of conversational helpfulness is in the offing. The king of
France ain’t bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain’t real!
Grice credits Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with the
definite descriptor or definite article or the iota quantifier the formally.
One thing Russell discovered is that the variable denoting function is to be
deduced from the variable propositional function, and is not to be taken as an
indefinable. Russell tries to do without the iota i as an indefinable, but
fails. The success by Russell later, in On denoting, is the source of all his
subsequent progress. The iota quantifier consists of an inverted iota to be
read the individuum x, as in (℩x).F(x). Grice opts for the
Whiteheadian-Russellian standard rendition, in terms of the iota operator.
Grices take on Strawson is a strong one. The king of France is bald; entails
there is a king of France, and what the utterer explicitly conveys is
doxastically unsatisfactory. The king of France aint bald does not. By uttering
The king of France aint bald U only implicates that there is a king of France,
and what he explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Grice knew he was
not exactly robbing Peter to pay Paul, or did he? It is worth placing the
lecture in context. Soon after delivering in the New World his exploration on
the implicaturum, Grice has no better idea than to promote Strawsons philosophy
in the New World. Strawson will later reflect on the colder shores of the Old
World, so we know what Grice had in mind! Strawsons main claim to fame in the
New World (and at least Oxford in the Old World) was his On referring, where he
had had the cheek to say that by uttering, The king of France is not bald, the
utterer implies that there is a king of France (if not that, as Grice has it,
that what U explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Strawson later
changed that to the utterer presupposes that there is a king of France. So
Grice knows what and who he was dealing with. Grice and Strawson had
entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson was particularly keen on that turn of
phrase he learned from Quine, the truth-value gap. Grice, rather, found it
pretty repulsive: Tertium exclusum! So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering
The king of France is bald, one entailment of what U explicitly conveys is
indeed There is a king of France. However, in its negative co-relate, things
change. By uttering The king of France aint bald, the utterer merely implicitly
conveys or implicates (in a pretty cancellable format) that there is a king of
France. The king of France aint bald: theres no king of France! The loyalty
examiner is like the King of France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grices
re-introduction of the square-bracket device: [The king of France] is bald;
[The king of France] aint bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square
brackets is to be read as having attained common-ground status and therefore,
out of the question, to use Collingwoods jargon! Grice was very familiar with
Collingwood on presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwoods
reflections on presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie
behind Grices metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest
exploration by Grice on this is his infamous, Smith has not ceased from beating
his wife, discussed by Ewing in Meaninglessness for Mind. Grice goes back to
the example in the excursus on implying that in Causal Theory, and it is best
to revisit this source. Note that in the reprint in WOW Grice does NOT go, one
example of presupposition, which eventually is a type of conversational implicaturum.
Grices antipathy to Strawsons presupposition is metaphysical: he dislikes the
idea of a satisfactory-value-gap, as he notes in the second paragraph to Logic
and conversation. And his antipathy crossed the buletic-doxastic divide! Using φ to represent a sentence in either mode,
he stipulate that ~φ is satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A crunch,
as he puts it, becomes obvious: ~ ⊢The king of France is bald may perhaps be
treated as equivalent to ⊢~(The king of
France is bald). But what about ~!Arrest the intruder? What do we say in cases
like, perhaps, Let it be that I now put my hand on my head or Let it be that my
bicycle faces north, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that
neither !p nor !~p is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory? If !p is neither
satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesnt to me), does
the philosopher assign a third buletically satisfactory value (0.5) to !p
(buletically neuter, or indifferent). Or does the philosopher say that we have
a buletically satisfactory value gap, as Strawson, following Quine, might
prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see that the
problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem connected with
Strawsons doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty is not so much
to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present
themselves. The main reference is Essay 2 in WoW, but there are scattered
references elsewhere. Refs.: The main sources are the two
sets of ‘logic and conversation,’ in BANC, but there are scattered essays on ‘implicaturum’
simpliciter, too -- “Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum,” c. 2-f. 25; and “Convesational implicaturum,” c.
4-f. 9, “Happiness, discipline, and implicaturums,” c. 7-f. 6; “Presupposition
and implicaturum,” c. 9-f. 3, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational manual: -- Grice was fascinated by the etymology of ‘etiquette’ – from
Frankish *stikkan, cognate with Old English stician "to pierce," from
Proto-Germanic *stikken "to be stuck," stative form from PIE *steig-
"to stick; pointed" (It.
etichetta) -- of conversational rational etiquette -- conversational iimmanuel,
cnversational manual. Before playing with ‘immanuel,’ Grice does use ‘manual’
more technically. A know-how. “Surely, I can have a manual, but don’t know how
to play bridge.” “That’s not how I’m using ‘manual.’” It should be pointed out
that it’s the visual thing that influenced. When people (especially
non-philosophers) saw the list of maxims, they thought: “Washington!” “A
manual!”. In the Oxford seminrs, Grice was never so ‘additive.’ His desideratum
of conversational clarity, his desideratum of conversational candour, his
principle of conversational self-love and his principle of conversational
benevolence, plus his principle of conversational helpfulness, were meant as
‘philosophical’ leads to explain this or that philosophical mistake. The
seminars were given for philosophy tutees. And Grice is playing on the ‘manuals
of etiquette’ – conversational etiquette. If you do not BELONG to this targeted
audience, it is likely that you’ll misconstrue Grice’s point, and you will!
Especially R. T. L.!The Gentlemen's Book of Etiquette and Manual of Politeness
Being a Complete Guide for a Gentleman's Conduct in All His Relations Towards
Society by Cecil B. Hartley. Wit and vivacity are two highly important
ingredients in the conversation of a man in polite society, yet a straining for
effect, or forced wit, is in excessively bad taste. There is no one more
insupportable in society than the everlasting talkers who scatter puns,
witticisms, and jokes with so profuse a hand that they become as tiresome as a
comic newspaper, and whose loud laugh at their own wit drowns other voices which
might speak matter more interesting. The really witty man does not shower forth
his wit so indiscriminately; his charm consists in wielding his powerful weapon
delicately and easily, and making each highly polished witticism come in the
right place and moment to be effectual. While real wit is a most delightful
gift, and its use a most charming accomplishment, it is, like many other bright
weapons, dangerous to use too often. You may wound where you meant only to
amuse, and remarks which you mean only in for general applications, may be
construed into personal affronts, so, if you have the gift, use it wisely, and
not too freely. The most important requisite for a good conversational power is
education, and, by this is meant, not merely the matter you may store in your
memory from observation or books, though this is of vast importance, but it
also includes the developing of the mental powers, and, above all, the
comprehension. An English writer says, “A man should be able, in order to enter
into conversation, to catch rapidly the meaning of anything that is advanced;
for instance, though you know nothing of science, you should not be obliged to
stare and be silent, when a man who does understand it is explaining a new
discovery or a new theory; though you have not read a word of Blackstone, your
comprehensive powers should be sufficiently acute to enable you to take in the
statement that may be made of a recent cause; though you may not have read some
particular book, you should be capable of appreciating the criticism which you
hear of it. Without such power—simple enough, and easily attained by attention
and practice, yet too seldom met with in general society—a conversation which
departs from the most ordinary topics cannot be maintained without the risk of
lapsing into a lecture; with such power, society becomes instructive as well as
amusing, and you have no remorse at an evening’s end at having wasted three or
four hours in profitless banter, or simpering platitudes. This facility of
comprehension often startles us in some women, whose education we know to have
been poor, and whose reading is limited. If they did not rapidly receive your
ideas, they could not, therefore, be fit companions for intellectual men, and
it is, perhaps, their consciousness of a deficiency which leads them to pay the
more attention to what you say. It is this which makes married women so much
more agreeable to men of thought than young ladies, as a rule, can be, for they
are accustomed to the society of a husband, and the effort to be a companion to
his mind has engrafted the habit of attention and ready reply.” Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “Paget’s conversational manual.”
conversational maxim. The idea of a maxim implies freewill and freedom in
general. A beautiful thing about Grice’s conversational maxims is that surely
they do not ‘need to be necessarily’ independent, as Strawson and Wiggins emphatically
put it (p.520). The important thing is other. A conversational maxim is
UNIVERSALISABLE (v. universalierung) into a ‘manual,’ the “Immanuel,” strictly,
the “Conversational Immanuel.” Grice is making fun of those ‘conversational
manuals’ for the learning of some European language in the Grand Tour (as in
“Learn Swiss in five easy lessons”). Grice is echoing Kant. Maximen (subjektive
Grundsätze): selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen ausdrücken, vs.
Imperative (objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft bestimmt;
Ratschläge, moralisch relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das objektive
Prinzip, gültig für jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach dem es
handeln soll, d. i. ein Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die Subjektivität
der Maxime. When considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational maxim,’ one
has to be careful. First, he hesitated as to the choice of the label. He used
‘objective’ and ‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this, in WoW:PandCI he
adds one – leading the number of maxims to ten, what he called the
‘conversational catalogue.’ So when exploring the maxims, it is not necessary
to see their dependence on the four functions that Kant tabulated: quantitas,
qualitas, relatio, and modus, or quantity, quality, relation, and mode (Grice
follows Meiklejohn’s translation), but in terms of their own formulation, one
by one. Grice
formulates the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general
principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe,
namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”He
then goes on to introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’“On the
assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may
perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall
certain more specific MAXIMS maxims and
submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance
with the Cooperative Principle.” Note that in his
comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in terms of the
force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicaturum, he could
have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general principle as
this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or
another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.”
He is
comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the
principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior
genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’He is having in mind something
like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the
introductory passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is
very interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as
SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he
is calling the submaxim.Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one
may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim.
Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he
grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is
actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you
are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the
desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do
not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for
the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”Grice: “Echoing
Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or
Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the
exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that
surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!“The category of QUANTITY” – i. e. either
the conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category
of conversational quantity – “relates to the quantity of information to be
provided,”So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have
it – just QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the
quantity of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re:
the pillar box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used
‘strength,’ even ‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailment – and here, neither
the phenomenalist nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.“and under it
fall the following maxims:”That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational
maxim.’ He will provide supermaxim for the other three conversational
categories.Why is the category of conversational quantity lacking a
supermaxim?The reason is that it would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be appropriately
informative.’ By having TWO maxims, he is playing with a weighing in, or
balance between one maxim and the other. Cf.To say the truth, all the truth,
and nothing but the truth.No more no less.One maximm states the ‘at most,’ the
other maxim states the ‘at least.’One maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the other maxim
states the ‘min.’ Together they state the ‘maximin.’First, “Make your
contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).”It’s
the contribution which is informative, not the utterer. Cf. “Be as informative
as is required.” Grice implicates that if you make your contribution as
informative as is required YOU are being as informative as is required. But
there is a category-shift here. Grice means, ‘required BY the goal of the
exchange). e.g.How are youFine thanks – the ‘and you’ depends on whether you
are willing to ‘keep the conversation going’ or your general mood. Second, “Do
not make your contribution more informative than is required.”“ (The second
maxim is disputable;”He goes on to give a different reason. But the primary
reason is that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required” is ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange)” – vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative
inferences” IN a diagram:Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange)Therefore, do not make your
contribution more informative than is required (by the current purposes of the
exchange).Grice gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the
maxim is ‘disputable.’“it might be said that to be overinformative is not a
transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time.”For both
conversationalists, who are thereby abiding by Ferraro’s law of the least
conversational effort.”“A waste of time” relates to Grice’s previous
elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and ‘unnecessary trouble.’He is proposing a
conversational maximin.When he formulates his principle of economy of rational
effort, it is a waste of ‘time and energy.’Here it is just ‘time.’ “Energy” is
a more generic concept.“However, it might be answered that such
overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side
issues;”Methinks the lady doth protest too much.His example, “He was in a
blacked out city.”It does not seem to relate to the pillar boxA: What color is
the pillar boxB: It seems red.Such a ‘confusion’ and ‘side issue,’ if so
designed, is part of the implicaturum.“and there may also be an indirect
effect, in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a result of
thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of
information.”Cf. Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”More
boringly, it is part of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of
information.”This may be counterproductive, or not.“Meet Mr. Puddle”“Meet Mr.
Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”The introducer
point: to keep the conversation going.Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless
at nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED). One
has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice
cares for. Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!” – Malcolm
implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide
the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims
Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’ – If knowledge is justified true
belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE
CONDITIONS for it. Cf.I didn’t know you were pregnant.You still do not. (Here
the cancellation is to the third clause). Grice: “However this may be, there is
perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this
second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which
concems relevance.)”He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows
in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:“there is another reason to
doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”No “later” about
it!Grice:“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim” – he forgets to
add, as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of
information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm
genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf.
Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over
abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS
the case. Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he
means “more specific supermaxims and maxims” – He is following Porophyry in
being confusing! Cf. supramaxim. Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one
that is true' –“This surely requires generality – and Grice spent the next two
decades about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’ “Try to make
your contribution one that is acceptable”“True for your statements; good for
your desiderative-mode utterances.”“and two more specific maxims:”“1. Do not say
what you believe to be false.”There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make
your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe
to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!”
“Say the true!” “MAKE – don’t just TRY – to make your contribution one that is
true.”“I was only trying.”Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill” “Thou shalt trye not to
kylle.”Grice:“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”This is
involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth
is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you
have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?The qualification, “adequate,” turns the
maxim slightly otiose. Do not say that for you lack evidence which would make
your contribution not a true one.However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And
Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.If we are
talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential
justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on
‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential
justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential
justification.’“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz.,
'Be relevant.'”The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in
relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman
‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or
‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with
Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place
predicate. What about X = xIs identity a relation, in the case of x = x?Can a
thing relate to itself?In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim
states that one brings y back to x.“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”“The weather
has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”If INTENDED to mean, “You
ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark
about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.To utter an utterly
irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.“Though the maxim itself is
terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good
deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may
be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact
that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the
treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them
in a later work.”He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as
the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette
becomes logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the
north, to settle in the very fashionable Kent. Grice is also having in mind
Urmson’s appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your
painting “Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!” – and Grice is also having in
mind P. F. Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance
vis-à-vis the principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.So it was in
the Oxonian air.“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as
relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE
EXPLICITUM, THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said
is to be said,”Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p
reduces to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares
with ‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what
is seen.’He is having the form-content distinction.If that is a distinction. This
multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative
form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a
uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or
posited. The Role of the Form/Content
Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com ›
2012/01 › formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Researchwww.karger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction
is a potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain
characteristics of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG
Levine - 1979 - Cited by 25 - Related articles The
Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research ...www.karger.com ›
Article › Abstract Dec 23, 2009 - The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Research. Levine C.G.. Author affiliations. University of Western
Ontario, London, Ont. by CG Levine - 1979 - Cited by 25 - Related
articles Preschool children's mastery
of the form/content distinction in ...www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pubmed Preschool
children's mastery of the form/content distinction in communicative tasks.
Hedelin L(1), Hjelmquist E. Author information: (1)Department of Psychology,
... by L Hedelin - 1998 - Cited by 10 - Related articles Form and Content: An Introduction to Formal
Logic - Digital ...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi › viewcontentPDF
terminology has to do with anything. In this context, 'material' means having
to do with content. This is our old friend, the form/content distinction again.
Consider. by DD Turner - 2020
Simmel's Dialectic of Form and Content in Recent Work in
...www.tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1, 2019 - This suggests that for
Simmel, the form/content distinction was not a dualism; instead, it was a
duality.11 Ronald L. Breiger, “The Duality of ... Are these distinctions between “form” and
“content” intentionally ...www.reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments ›
are_th... The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction
between form and matter (say, in Aristotle), although Hegel develops the
distinction between form ... Preschool
Children's Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com ›
article Preschoolers' mastery of the form/content distinction in language and
communication, along its contingency on the characteristics of p. by L Hedelin
- 1998 - Cited by 10 - Related articles
Verbal Art: A Philosophy of Literature and Literary
Experiencebooks.google.com › books Even if form and content were in fact
inseparable in the sense indicated, that would not make the form/content
distinction unjustified. Form and matter are clearly ... Anders Pettersson -
2001 - Literary Criticism One Century
of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathologybooks.google.com › books He then
outlines the most important implications of the form–content distinction in a
statement which is identical in the first three editions, with only minor ...
Giovanni Stanghellini, Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Medical“I include the
supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –” Or supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and
submaxims” becomes the clumsier “supermaxims and maxims”Note that in under the
first category it is about making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer
himself who has to be ‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be
relevant. It’s not the weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or
“Make your contribution a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”Knowing
that most confound ‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but
forgot to pronounce it, in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’
under the prolixity maxim.“and various maxims such as: The “such as” is a
colloquialism.Surely it was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it
becomes viz. The fact that the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicaturable.
“1. Avoid obscurity of expression.”Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me,
Heraclitus, they told me you were dead, /They brought me bitter news to hear
and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd how often you and I/Had tired
the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my
dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still
are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all
away, but them he cannot take. In a way this is entailed by “Be perspicuous,”
if that means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.Be clearTherefore, or what is the
same thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.2. Avoid ambiguity.”Except as a
trope, or ‘figure, (schema, figura). “Aequi-vocate, if that will please your
clever addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma: “My apartment was so small, that I've
barely enough room to lay a hat and a few friends“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary
prolixity).”Here he added a ‘sic’ that he failed to pronounce in case it may
felt as insulting. But the idea of a self-refuting conversational maxim is
surely Griceian, in a quessertive way. Since this concerns FORM rather than
CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with ‘informativeness.’So given that p and
q are equally informative, if q is less brief (longer – ars longa, vita
brevis), utter p. This has nothing to do with logical strength. It is just to
be assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.Vide “Syntactics in Semiotics”“4. Be orderly.”This
involves two moves in the contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’
if one just utters ‘p.’ So this involves a molecular proposition. The ‘order’
can be of various types. Indeed, one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between
Smith and Williams” – order of merit or size?‘Between’ is not ambiguous!There
is LOGICAL order, which is prior.But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’
‘keep your room tidy.’orderly (adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from
order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning "observant of rule or discipline, not
unruly" is from 1590s. Related: Orderliness.He does not in the lecture
give a philosophical example, but later will in revisiting the Urmson example
and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson, “He went to bed and took off his
boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and took arsenic.”“And one might need
others.”Regarding ‘mode,’ that is. “It is obvious that the observance of some
of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others;”Not
as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say these are not MORAL.“a man who has
expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder
comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false.”Except
in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were obsessed with commenting on
prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the prisoner?” “He left [while he
is hiding in the attic].”That’s why Grice has the ‘in general.’“Indeed, it
might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is
such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;”But
since ‘should’ is weak, I will. “other maxims come into operation only on the
assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.”So the keyword is
co-ordination.“While this may be correct, so far as the generation of implicaturums
is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other
maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a
member of the list of maxims.”He is having weighing, and clashing in mind. And
he wants a conversationalist to honour truth over informativeness, which begs
the question that as he puts it, ‘false’ “information” is no information.In the
earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a university lecturer, he was sure that his
tutee will know that he was introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO
MORALISE, but as GENERATORS of implicatura – in philosophers’s mistakes.But
this manoeuver is only NOW disclosed. Those without a philosophical background
may not realise about this. “There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims
(aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also
normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate
nonconventional implicaturums.”He is obviously aware that Émile DurkheimWill Know that
‘conversational’ is subsumed under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps). – keyword: ‘norm.’ Grice excludes ‘moral’
because while a moral maxim makes a man ‘good,’ a conversational maxim makes a
man a ‘good’ conversationalist. Not because there is a distinction in
principle!“The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicaturums
connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with”He had this way with
idioms.Cf. Einstein,“E =, I hope, mc2.”“the particular purposes that talk (and
so, talk exchange)”He is playing Dutch.The English lost the Anglo-Saxon for
‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has ‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch
have ‘taal.’So he is distinguishing between the TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.“is
adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to serve.”The ‘adapted’ is
mechanistic talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’ elsewhere. He means ‘the
particular goal language evolved to serve, viz.’ groom.Grooming, Gossip and the
Evolution of Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, in
which the author argues that language evolved from social grooming. He further
suggests that a stage of this evolution was the telling of gossip, an argument
supported by the observation that language is adapted for storytelling.
The book has been criticised on the grounds that since words are so cheap,
Dunbar's "vocal grooming" would fall short in amounting to an honest
signal. Further, the book provides no compelling story[citation needed] for how
meaningless vocal grooming sounds might become syntactical speech. Thesis
Dunbar argues that gossip does for group-living humans what manual grooming
does for other primates—it allows individuals to service their relationships
and thus maintain their alliances on the basis of the principle: if you scratch
my back, I'll scratch yours. Dunbar argues that as humans began living in increasingly
larger social groups, the task of manually grooming all one's friends and
acquaintances became so time-consuming as to be unaffordable.[1] In response to
this problem, Dunbar argues that humans invented 'a cheap and ultra-efficient
form of grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now needs only to
'groom' them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple allies
simultaneously while keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal grooming
then evolved gradually into vocal language—initially in the form of
'gossip'.[1] Dunbar's hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that the
structure of language shows adaptations to the function of narration in
general.[2] Criticism Critics of Dunbar's theory point out that the very
efficiency of "vocal grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would
have undermined its capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed
by time-consuming and costly manual grooming.[3] A further criticism is that
the theory does nothing to explain the crucial transition from vocal
grooming—the production of pleasing but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive
complexities of syntactical speech.[citation needed] References
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. London:
Faber and Faber. ISBN 9780571173969. OCLC 34546743. von Heiseler, Till
Nikolaus (2014) Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast evolution.
In: R. L. C. Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World Scientific,
pp. 114-121. https://www.academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION
Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of
cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds),
Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 111 29. Categories: 1996 non-fiction
booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin DunbarEnglish-language
booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press booksPopular science booksGrice:
“I have stated my maxims”the maxims“as if this purpose were a maximally effective
exchange of information;”“MAXIMALLY EFFECTIVE”“this specification is, of
course, too narrow,”But who cares?This is slightly sad in that he is thinking
Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own controversy with G. A. Paul on the
sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’ and ‘the pillar box is red,’
involving an intensional context, are less amenable to fall under the maxims.“and
the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as
influencing or directing the actions of others.”He has a more obvious way
below:Giving and receving informationInfluencing and being influenced by others.He
never sees the purpose as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but maximally effective EXCHANGE
of information – does he mean merely ‘transmission.’ It may well be.If I say,
“I rain,” I have ex-changed information.I don’t need anything in return.If so,
it makes sense that he is equating INFORMING With INFLUENCING or better DIRECTION your
addresse’s talk.Note that, for all he loved introspection and conversational
avowals, and self-commands, these do not count.It’s informing your addressee
about some state of affairs, and directing his action. Grice is always clear
that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s ACTION.“As one of my avowed aims is to
see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational,
behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions
connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in
the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges.”Transaction is a good
one.TRANS-ACTIO“I list briefly one such analog for each conversational
category.”While he uses ‘conversational category,’ he also applies it to the
second bit: ‘category of conversational quantity,’ ‘category of conversational
quality,’ ‘category of conversational relation,’ and ‘category of
conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that justifies the
sub-specifications.They are not categories of thought or ontological or
‘expression’.His focus is on the category as conversation.His focus is on the
‘conversational category.’“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car,
I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required; if, e.
g., at a particular stage I need fourscrews, I expect you to hand me four,
rather than two or six. He always passed six, since two will drop.“Make your
contribution neither more nor less informative than is required (for the
purposes of the exchange).”This would have covered the maxi and the min.“NEITHER
MORE NOR LESS” is the formula of effectiveness, and economy, and minimization
of expenditure.“2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not
spurious.”Here again he gives an expansion of the conversational category,
which is more general than ‘try to make your contribution one that is true,’
and the point about the ‘quality of information,’ which he did not make.Perhaps
because it would have led him to realise that ‘false’ information, i.e.
‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious, is not ‘information.’But “Make
your contribution one that is genuine and not spurious.”Be candid.Does not need
a generalization as it covers both informational and directive utterances.“If I
need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not
expect you to hand me salt;”Or you won’t eat the cake.“if I need a spoon, I do
not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”Spurious and genuine are different.In
the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just not being SERIOUS.But surely a
maxim, “Be serious” is too serious. – Seriously!“3. Relation. I expect a
partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of
the transaction;”Odd that he would use ‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of
the “Prolegomena,” and what he was supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the
explanation.For each of the philosophers making a mistake are giving a judgment
of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational appropriateness. Here it is good that he
relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO the ‘need’.Grice is not quite sticking to
the etymology of ‘relatio’ and ‘refer,’ bring y back to x. Or he is. Bring y
(your contribution) back to the need x.Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on
relation, when he did a good bit!“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do
not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might
be an appropriate contribution at a later stage).”“I just expect you to be
silent.”“4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is
making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.” For Lewis,
clarity is not enough!The ‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’
seems quite different from “Be perspicuous.”“Execute your performance with
reasonable dispatch”Is more like“Execute your performance”And not just STAND
there!A: What time is it B just stands there“These analogies are relevant to
what I regard as a fundamental question about the principle of conversational
helpfulness and its attendant conversational maxims,”For Boethius, it is a
PRINCIPLE because it does not need an answer!“viz., what the basis is for the
assumption which we seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a
great range of implicaturums depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the
rather otiose maxims], that talkers will ingeneral (ceteris paribus and in the
absence of indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these
principles prescribe.”Grice really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of
the maxim, as in his response to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:“Paul, I
surely do not mean to imply that you may end up believing that I have a doubt
about the pillar box being red: it seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum
of ‘redness’ which attaches to me as I am standing in front of the pillar box
in clear daylight.”Grice is EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING
SOMETHING TRUE, so at least he is not VIOLATING the principle of conversational
helpfulness, or the category of conversational quality, or the desideratum of
conversational candour.And that is what he is concerned with. “A dull but, no doubt at a certain level,
adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that *people*
(not pirots, although perhaps Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in
these ways;”Elinor Ochs was terrified Grice’s maxims are violated – never
exploited, she thought – in Madagascar.“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have
learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed,
it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the
habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”Effort
again; least effort. And ease. Great Griceian guidelines!“I am, however, enough
of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,”OR
EXPLAIN.“undeniable though they may be;”BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORY – not
the theory for the generation of implicate, but for the theory of conversation.He
is less interested in this than the other. “I would like to be able to think of
the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all
or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to
follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea
that observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational
maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter,
with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am
struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation
that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my
expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications
that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to
exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish
cooperative transactions:”So how is this not quasi-contractual? He is listing THIS OR THAT FEATURE that
jointly distinguishes a cooperative transaction – all grand great words.But he
wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!He is playing, as a
philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from what.A1.
Conversasation is purposiveA2. Conversation is rationalA3. Conversation is
cooperativeA4. There is such a thing as non-rational cooperation (is there?)So
he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that jointly distinguish cooperative
transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice surely does not wish THAT to
demolish his model. If he bases it in general constraints of rationality, the
better.“1. The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car
mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in
conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the
other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even
if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one,”Is he being logical?“second-order
predicate calculus”“meta-language”He means higher or supervenientOr
‘operative’“, that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with
the transitory conversational interests of the other.”By identify he means
assume.YOU HAVE TO DESIRE what your partner desires.The intersection between
your desirability and your addressee’s desirability is not NULL.And the way to
do this is conditionalIF: You perceive B has Goal G, you assume Goal G. “2. The
contributions of the participants .should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. Unless
it’s one of those seminars by Grice and J. F. Thomson!“3. There is some sort of
understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit)”i.e. implicated
rather than explicated – part of the implicaturum, or implicitum, rather than
the explicatum or explicitum.“that, other things being equal, the transaction
should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it
should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.”This
is especially tricky over the phone (“He never ends!” Or in psychiatric
interviews!)Note that ‘starting doing something else’ may work. E. g. watch
your watch!“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to
some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter
writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”TWO OPPOSITE EXAMPLES.Fighting is
arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not conversation,
cooperation, friendly, collaborative
venture, and diagoge.Letter writing is usually otiose – “what, with the
tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.“In any case, one feels that
the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience
but himself.”And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant down!”“So
I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle of
conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the
following lines”That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.“: that any
one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption
that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of
conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”Where the keyword is: profit,
effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble. That
conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable. That a conversational
exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.“Whether
any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”It’s not clear what the
premises are!Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached?
Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.It
seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the
state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.“in any case, I am fairly
sure that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of
relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”For perhaps “I
don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”IS irrelevant,
yet true!“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of
conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and
conversational implicaturum on the other.”This is clearer in the seminars. The
whole thing was a preamble “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to
fulfill a maxim in various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly
and unostentatiously VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases
he will be liable to mislead.”And be blamed by Kant.Mislead should not worry
Grice, cf. “Misleading, but true.”The violate (or fail to observe) shows that
(1) covers two specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim
as to ‘be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew obfuscation!”This
is Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is KNOWLEDGE of the
maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to observe them “2. He
may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the principle of
conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain
that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, e.
g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.” Where is the criminal?I cannot say
more; my lips are sealed.I shall unseal them. What do you mean ‘cannot.’ You
don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?I think Grice means ‘may not.’Is the universe
finite? Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed. “3. He may be faced by
a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than one – or at least two
specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to fulfill the
first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating
the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).” Odd
that he doesn’t think this generates implicaturum: He has obviously studied the
sub-perceptualities here.For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus, thinks that
by utteringThe pillar box seems red to me – that is all I have adequate
evidence forHe is conveying that he is unable to answer the question (“What
colour is the pillar box?”) And being as ‘informative’ as is requiredWithout
saying something for which it is not the case that he has or will ever have
adequate evidence.Cf.Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the noumenon?Kant:
My lips are sealed.It may require some research to list ALL CLASHES.Because
each clash shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be all VERY CETERIS
PARIBUS.Cf.Where is the criminal?My lips are sealed.The utterer has NOT opted
out. He has answered, via implicaturum, that he is not telling. He is being
relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to DISCLOSE the whereabouts
of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a conversation! Odd that
Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a clash with ‘Be
truthful!’“4. He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill (or
observe) it.Mock? Taunt?The magic flute. Grice’s magic flute.flout (v.)
"treat with disdain or contempt" (transitive), 1550s, intransitive
sense "mock, jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of uncertain origin; perhaps
a special use of Middle English “flowten,”"to play the flute"
(compare Middle Dutch “fluyten,” "to play the flute," also "to
jeer"). Related: Flouted; flouting.Grice: “One thing we do not know is if
the flute came to England via Holland.”“Or he may, as we may say, ‘play the
flute’ with a maxim, expecting others to be agreeable.”“Or he may, as we might
say, ‘play the flute’ with the conversational maxim, expecting others to join with
some other musical instrument – or something – occasionally the same.”“On the
assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without
violating another maxim (because oi a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in
view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead,”This is interesting.
It’s the TRYING to mislead.Grice and G. A. Paul:Grice cannot be claimed to have
TRIED to mislead, and thus deemed to have misled G. A. Paul, even if he had,
when he said, “I hardly think there is any doubt about it, but that pillar box
seems red to me.”“the hearer is faced with a minor problem:”Implicaturum: This
reasoning is all abductive – to the ‘best’ explanation“How can his saying what
he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall
principle of conversational helfpulness?”This was one of Grice’s conversations
with G. A. Paul:Paul (to Grice): This is what I do not understand, Grice. How
can your saying what you did say be reconciled with the supposition that you
are not going to mislead me?”Unfortunately, on that Saturday, Paul went to the
Irish Sea. Grice “This situation is one that characteristically”There are
others – vide clash, above – but not marked by Grice as one such situation – “gives
rise to a conversational implicaturum; and when a conversational implicaturum
is generated”Chomskyan jargon borrowed from Austin (“I don’t see why Austin
admired Chomsky so!”)“in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being
EXPLOITED.”Why not ‘flouted’? Some liked the idea of playing the flute.EXPLOIT
is figurative.Grice exploits a Griceian maxim.exploit
(v.) c. 1400, espleiten, esploiten "to accomplish, achieve, fulfill,"
from Old French esploitier, espleiter "carry out, perform,
accomplish," from esploit (see exploit (n.)). The sense of "use
selfishly" first recorded 1838, from a sense development in French perhaps
from use of the word with reference to mines, etc. (compare exploitation).
Related: Exploited; exploiting.exploit (n.) late 14c., "outcome of an
action," from Old French esploit "a carrying out; achievement,
result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern French exploit), a very common
word, used in senses of "action, deed, profit, achievement," from
Latin explicitum "a thing settled, ended, or displayed," noun use of
neuter of explicitus, past participle of explicare "unfold, unroll,
disentangle," from ex "out" (see ex-) + plicare "to
fold" (from PIE root *plek- "to plait"). Meaning
"feat, achievement" is c. 1400. Sense evolution is from
"unfolding" to "bringing out" to "having
advantage" to "achievement." Related:
Exploits. exploitative (adj.) "serving for or used in
exploitation," 1882, from French exploitatif, from exploit (see exploit
(n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859) appears to be a native formation from
exploit + -ive.exploitation (n.) 1803, "productive working" of
something, a positive word among those who used it first, though regarded as a
Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun of action from exploiter (see exploit
(v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in part from influence of French
socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also perhaps influenced by use of
the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and exploitation was hurled in insult at
activities it once had crowned as praise. It follows from this science
[conceived by Saint Simon] that the tendency of the human race is from a state
of antagonism to that of an universal peaceful association -- from the
dominating influence of the military spirit to that of the industriel one; from
what they call l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme to the exploitation of the
globe by industry. ["Quarterly Review," April & July 1831] Grice: “I am now
in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicaturum.”Not to
provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it with
one of my metaphysical routines.”“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as
if to say) that p”That seems good for the analysandumGrice loves the “by (in,
when)” “(or making as if to). Note the oratio obliqua.Or ‘that’-clause. So this
is not ‘uttering’As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’“By uttering ‘x’ U means
that p.’The “by” already involves a clause with a ‘that’-clause.So this is not
a report of a physical event.It is a report embued already with intentionality.The
utterer is not just ‘uttering’The utterer is EXPLICITLY conveying that p.We
cannot say MEANING that p.Because Grice uses “mean” as opposed to “explicitly
convey”His borderline scenarios are such,“Keep me company, dear”“If we are to
say that when he uttererd that he means that his wife was to keep him company
or not is all that will count for me to change my definition of ‘mean’ or
not.”Also irony.But here it is more complicated. A man utters, “Grice defeated
Strawson”If he means it ironically, to mean that Strawson defeated Grice, it is
not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite. He explicitly conveyed that.Grice
considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’“If I am dead, I shall have no time
for reading.”He is careful here that the utterer does not explicitly conveys
that he will have no time for reading – because it’s conditioned on he being
dead.“has implicated that q,” “may be said to have conversationally implicated
that q,”So this is a specification alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly conveying
that p, U implicitly conveys that q.’Where he is adding the second-order
adverb, ‘conversationally.’By explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly
conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL FASHION” iff or if“PROVIDED THAT”“(1) he is
to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle
of conversational helfpulness;”Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that
an implicaturum is ‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when AT LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.“(2) the
supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE terms)
consistent with this presumption;”THIS IS THE CRUCIAL CLAUSE – and the one that
not only requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the expectation that one’s addressee,
BEING RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE RATIONAL.This is the
‘rationalisation’ he refers to in “Retrospective Epilogue.”Note that ‘q’ is
obviously now the content of a state in the utterer’s soul – a desideratum or a
creditum --, at least a CREDITUM, in view of Grice’s view of everything at
least exhibitive and perhaps protreptic --“and (3) the speaker thinks (and
would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the
competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition
mentioned in (2) IS required.”All that jargon about mutuality is a result of
Strawson tutoring Schiffer!“Apply this to my initial example, to B's remark that
C has not yet been to prison.”What made Grice think of such a convoluted
example?He was laughing at Searle for providing non-philosophical examples, and
there he is!“In a suitable setting A might reason as follows:”“(1) B has
APPARENTLY violated – indeed he has played the flute with -- the maxim 'Be
relevant' and so may be regarded as [ALSO] having flouted one of the maxims
conjoining perspicuity,”In previous versions, under the desideratum of
conversational clarity Grice had it that the desideratum included the
expectation of this ‘relatedness’ AND that of ‘perspicuity’ (sic). In the
above, Grice is stating that if you are irrelevant (or provide an unrelated
contribution) you are not being perspicuous.But “He hasn’t been to prison” is
perspicuous enough.And so is the link to the question --.Plus, wasn’t
perspicuity only to apply to the ‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather than the
content.Here it is surely the CONTENT – that it is not the case that C is a
criminal – that triggers it all.So, since there is a “not,” here this is
parallel to the example examined by Strawson in the footnote to “Logical
Theory.”The utterer is saying that it is not the case that C has been in prison
yet.The ‘yet’ makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian colouring
‘convention’!“It is not the case that C has been in prison” Is, admittedly, not
very perspicuous.“So what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”So there
is an equivocation here as to the utterance perhaps not being perspicuous,
while the utterer IS perspicuous.“yet I have no reason to suppose that he is
opting out from the operation of the CP;”Or playing the flute with my beloved
principle of conversational helpfulness.“(2) given the circumstances, I can
regard his irrelevance as only apparent – as when we say that a plastic flower
is not a flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy duck is surely not a
duck! That trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only if, I suppose him to
think that C is potentially dishonest;”As many are!The potentially is the
trick.Recall Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially dishonest?! Not me!
PLATO was! Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”“(3) B knows that I am capable
of working out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially dishonest.'”Unless
he goes on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not mean of course to mean that I
mean that he is potentially dishonest, because although he is, he shouldn’t, or
rather, I don’t think you are expecting me to convey explicitly that he shouln’t
or should for that matter.”“The presence of a conversational implicaturum must
be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively
grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicaturum
(if present at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”This is
the Humpty Dumpty in Grice.Cf. Provide the sixteen derivational steps in Jane
Austen’s Novel remark, “I sense and sensibilia” – This is what happens
sometimes when people who are not philosophers engage with Grice!For a
philosopher, it is clear Grice is not being serious there. He is mocking an
‘ideal’-language philosopher (as Waissmann called them). Let’s revise the
word:By “counting” he means “DEEM.” He has said that “She is poor, but she is
honest,” is NOT CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not produced, this may not be
a matter of argument.Philosophers are OBSESSED, and this is Grice’s trick, with
ARGUMENT. Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my father, who was rather blunt,
Hardie taught me to ARGUE for this or that reason.”His mention of “INTUITION”
is not perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree that meaning is a matter of
INTUITION, not a theoretical concept within a theory.So it’s not like Grice
does not trust the intuition. So the point is TERMINOLOGICAL and
methodological. Terminological, in that this is a specfification of
‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases like “How rude!” (he just flouted the
maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not a CONVERSATIONAL maxim. Is Grice
implicating that nonconversational nonconventional implicate are not
calculable? We don’t think so.But he might.I think he will. Because in the case
of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and ‘social maxim’ – such as “be polite,”
– the calculation may involve such degree of gradation that you better not get
Grice started!“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum.”OK – So perhaps he does
allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate ARE calculable.But he
may add:“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, it will not be a
conversational implicaturum; it will be a conventional implicaturum.”Strawson:
“And what nonconventional nonconversational implicate?Grice: You are right,
Strawon. Let me modify and refine the point: “It will be a dull, boring,
undetachable, conventional implicaturum – OR any of those dull implicate that
follow from (or result – I won’t use ‘generate’) one of those maxims that I
have explicitly said they were NOT conversational maxims.“For surely, there is
something very ‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicaturum is
involved with the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and
yet that the maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”“Therefore, I restrict
calculability to CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURUM, because it involves the
conversational maxims that contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas
you’ll agree that Queen Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as
she frequently did not – “We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and
Sullivan amuse me!””“To work out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind
nonconversational nonconventional] implicaturum is present, the hearer will
reply on the following data:”As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’Perhaps assumption,
alla Gettier, is better:“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used,
together with the identity of any references that may be involved;”WoW Quite a
Bit. This is the reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.In he hasn’t been
to ‘prison’ we are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my
prison”).Strawson: But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?He hasn't been to prisonprison (n.) early 12c., from Old
French prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive"
(11c., Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;"
see prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin
prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative
*prehensio) "a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of
prehendere "to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, +
-hendere, from PIE root *ghend- "to seize, take"). "Captivity,"
hence by extension "a place for captives," the MAIN modern sense.”
(There are 34 other unmain ones). He hasn't been to a place for captives
yet.You mean he is one.Cf. He hasn't been to asylum.You mean Foucault?(2) the principle
of conversational helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”This is
more crucial seeing that the utterer may utter something which has no
conventional meaning?Cf. Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so
for the ‘conventional’ one!”What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have
the ‘spirit’ as the implicaturum. Or he needs the lines, so he can have the implicaturum
as a reading ‘between the lines.’If the utterance is a gesture, like showing a
bandaged leg, or a Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to distinguish or
to identify what is EXPLICITLY conveyed.By showing his bandaged leg, U
EXPLICITLY conveys that he has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys that he
cannot really play cricket.The requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even tricker,
“Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational? Substitutional?In any case,
Grice is not being circular in requiring that the addressee should use as an
assumption or datum that U thinks that the expression E is generally uttered by
utterers when they m-intend that p.But there are tricks here.“(3) the context,
linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”Cf. Grice, “Is there a general
context for a general theory of context?”“(4) other items of background
knowledge;”So you don’t get:How is C getting on at the bank? My lips are sealed
Why do you care Mind your own business. Note that “he hasn’t been to prison
yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’) is the sort of
tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS that he’ll get
that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does. “and (5) the fact (or
supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are
available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be
the case.”This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.“A general pattern for the
working out of a conversational implicaturum might be given as follows:”Again
the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might expect 'He has said
that p;”Ie explicitly conveys that p.Note the essential oratio obliqua, or
that-clause.“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not observing the
maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness”That is, he is
not a prisoner of war, or anything.“He could not be doing this unless he
thought that q;”Or rather, even if more tautologically still, he could not be
doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’ For if the utterer is
IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do it!“he knows (and
knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he
thinks that q IS required;”Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY, which Grice fails to
have added as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent logics – “he is using
‘and’ and ‘or’ in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,” – He is an intuitionist,
his name is Dummett.“he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends
me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has
implicated that q.'”The ‘or’ is delightful, for m-intention requires
‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous positions, so ‘willingess to
allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE! Especially at Oxford where
we are ever so subtle!
Conversational compassion --
conversational empathy – sympathy – empathy – compassion
-- principle of conversational empathy -- Principle of Conversational Empathy – a
term devised by Grice for the expectation a conversationalist has that his
co-partner will honour his conversational goal, however transitory. imaginative
projection into another person’s situation, especially for vicarious capture of
its emotional and motivational qualities. The term is an English rendering by
the Anglo psychologist E. G. Titchener, 1867 7 of the G. Einfühlung, made
popular by Theodore Lipps 18514, which also covered imaginative identification
with inanimate objects of aesthetic contemplation. Under ‘sympathy’, many
aspects were earlier discussed by Hume, Adam Smith, and other Scottish
philosophers. Empathy has been considered a precondition of ethical thinking
and a major contributor to social bonding and altruism, mental state
attribution, language use, and translation. The relevant spectrum of phenomena
includes automatic and often subliminal motor mimicry of the expressions or
manifestations of another’s real or feigned emotion, pain, or pleasure;
emotional contagion, by which one “catches” another’s apparent emotion, often
unconsciously and without reference to its cause or “object”; conscious and
unconscious mimicry of direction of gaze, with consequent transfer of attention
from the other’s response to its cause; and conscious or unconscious
role-taking, which reconstructs in imagination with or without imagery aspects
of the other’s situation as the other “perceives” it.
conversational
maxim of ambiguity avoidance, the: Grice thought that there should be a way
to characterise each maxim other than by its formulation. “It’s a good exercise
to grasp the concept behind the maxim.” Quality relates to Strength or
Fortitutde, the first to “at least,” the
second to “at most.” For Quality, he has a supra-maxim, “of trust” – the two
maxims are “maxim of candour” and “maxim of evidence”. Under relation, “maxim
of relevance.” Under manner, suprapaxim “maxim of perspicuity” and four maxims,
the first is exactly the same as the supramaxim, “maxim of percpicuity” now
becomes “maxim of obscurity avoidance” – or “maxim of clarity” – obscure and
clear are exact opposites – perspicuous [sic] is more of a trick. The second
maxin under mode is this one of ambiguity avoidance – perhaps there should be a
positive way to express this: be univocal. Do not be equivocal. Do not
equivocate, univocate! The next two, plus the extra one that makes this a
catalogue – the next is ‘maxim of brevity’ or “conversational maxim of unnecessary
prolixity avoidance,” here we see the ‘sic’: “Grice’s maxim of conversational
brevity, or of avoidance of conversationally unnecessary prolixity.” The next
is “maxim of order” – and the one that makes this a decalogue: “maxim of
conversational tailoring” --. a phonological or orthographic form having
multiple meanings senses, characters, semantic representations assigned by the
language system. A lexical ambiguity occurs when a lexical item word is
assigned multiple meanings by the language. It includes a homonymy, i.e.,
distinct lexical items having the same sound or form but different senses ‘knight’/’night’, ‘lead’ n./‘lead’ v., ‘bear’
n./‘bear’ v.; and b polysemy, i.e., a single lexical item having multiple senses ‘lamb’ the animal/‘lamb’ the flesh, ‘window’
glass/‘window’ opening. The distinction between homonymy and polysemy is
problematic. A structural ambiguity occurs when a phrase or sentence is
correlated by the grammar of the language with distinct constituent structures
phrase markers or sequences of phrase markers. Example: ‘Competent women and
men should apply’ ‘[NP[NPCompetent
women] and men] . . .’ vs. ‘[NPCompetent[NPwomen and men]] . . .’, where ‘NP’
stands for ‘noun phrase’. A scope ambiguity is a structural ambiguity deriving
from alternative interpretations of scopes of operators see below. Examples:
‘Walt will diet and exercise only if his doctor approves’ sentence operator scope: doctor’s approval is
a necessary condition for both diet and exercise wide scope ‘only if’ vs.
approval necessary for exercise but not for dieting wide scope ‘and’; ‘Bertie
has a theory about every occurrence’
quantifier scope: one grand theory explaining all occurrences ‘a theory’
having wide scope over ‘every occurrence’ vs. all occurrences explained by several
theories together ‘every occurrence’ having wide scope. The scope of an
operator is the shortest full subformula to which the operator is attached.
Thus, in `A & B C’, the scope of ‘&’ is ‘A & B’. For natural
languages, the scope of an operator is what it C-commands. X C-commands Y in a
tree diagram provided the first branching node that dominates X also dominates
Y. An occurrence of an operator has wide scope relative to that of another
operator provided the scope of the former properly includes scope of the
latter. Examples: in ‘~A & B’, ’-’ has wide scope over ‘&’; in ‘Dx Ey
Fxy’, the existential quantifier has wide scope over the universal quantifier.
A pragmatic ambiguity is duality of use resting on pragmatic principles such as
those which underlie reference and conversational implicaturum; e.g., depending
on contextual variables, ‘I don’t know that he’s right’ can express doubt or
merely the denial of genuine knowledge.
maxim of conversational maximin
informativeness: a maxim combining the maximum and the minimum.
maxim of maximal conversational
informativeness: a maxim only dealing with the ‘maximum,’ not the ‘minimum,’
which is a problem for Grice. “Why regulate volunteerness?”
maxim of minimal conversational
informativeness: maxim dealing with the minimum, not the maximum.
maxim of conversational trust: Grice
preferred ‘trust’ to ‘truth.’ Grice: “One of the few useful items in the
English philosophical vocabulary: a word that encompasses the volitional and
the non-volitional. Of course, the same could be said of ‘verum,’ cognate with
German ‘wahr.’
maxim of conversational veracity: Grice:
“When I’m feeling Latinate, you’ll hear me refer to this as the maxim of
conversational veracity – The Romans distinguished the verax and the mendax. I don’t.”
maxim of conversational evidential
adequacy: Grice: “We need a maxim to ensure adequate evidence – this would be
otiose in the volitional – but then we can always generalise the ‘evidence’ to
‘ground,’ or reason, which is what my American tutee, R. J. Fogelin, did.
maxim of conversational relevance: Grice:
“Personally, I prefer ‘relation,’ but Strawson doesn’t. But then Strawson
thinks this is ‘unimportant.’ Not to me, ‘relevant,’ like ‘important,’ are the
most unrelevant and unimportant pieces, especially as abused by an Oxford
philosopher who should know better!”
maxim of conversational perspicuity:
Grice: “D. H. Lewis made me ‘hate’ clarity – “clarity is not enough – plus,
it’s metaphorical? How can I render clear what is essentially obscure? In fact,
I would go on to say that the task of the philosopher is to dramatise the
mundane, to render obscure what seems clear. Perspicuity is unclear enough and
will do fine.”
maxim of conversational clarity, or maxim
of conversational obscurity avoidance: Grice: “It might be said that ‘be
perspicuous’ YIELDS ‘avoid obscurity,’ alla ‘be clear, don’t be obscure.’ But I
prefer to be repetitive, if not AS repetitive as the Jewish God – the Jews have
more than ten commandments!”
maxim of conversational ambiguity
avoidance, maxim of conversational equivocation avoidance, maxim of
conversational univocity: Grice: “This is a teaser, as how ‘ambiguous’ can
‘ambiguous’ be? And why should I dumb down my wit to help my addressee? Dorothy
Parker never did!”
maxim of conversational brevity – or maxim of conversationally unnecessary prolixity avoidance – Grice: “I would call it maxim of redundancy.” “Or maxim of redundancy avoidance,” or maxim of conversational entropy.” A: Did you watch the programme? – Grice: A friend suggested this to me. B: No, I was in a blacked-out city. Versus “No, I was in New York, which was blacked-out. Grice: "In response to my exploration on conversation, I was given an example by a fellow playgroup member which seems to me, as far as it goes, to provide a welcome kind of support for the picture I am putting forward in that it appears to exhibit a kind of interaction between the members of my list of conversational maxims to which I had not really paid due attention — perhaps for the matter not really concerning directly philosophical methodology.” Suppose that it is generally known that Oxford and London were blacked out the day prior. The following conversation takes place: A: Did Smith see the show on the bobby box last night? Grice: “It will be CONVERSATIONALLY unobjectionable for B, who knows that Smith was in London, to reply, B: No, he was in a blacked-out city. "B could have said that Smith was in *London*, thereby providing a further piece of information.” “However, I should like to be able to argue that, in preferring the conversational move featuring the indefinite descriptor, ‘a blacked-out city' B implicates (or communicates the implicaturum) (by the maxims prescribing relation and redundancy avoidance) a more appropriate piece of information, viz., why_ Smith was prevented from seeing the ‘show’ on the bobby box.” "B could have provided BOTH pieces of information, in an over-prolixic version of the above: ‘Smith was in London , which, as every schoolboy knows, was blacked-out yesterday.” — thereby insulting A. But THE ***GAIN****, as Bentham would put it, would have been **INSUFFICIENT** to **JUSTIFY** the additional conversational **COST**.” “Or so I think.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bobby-box implicatura.”
maxim of conversational order: Grice:
“Order is vague: first is the generalised, then the particularized.” By “the
very particularized,” Grice means ‘temporal ordered sequence.” E. g. “Were I to
say, Lady Ogilvy fainted and took arsenic, Strawson would get a different
feeling if I were to utter instead, ‘Lady Ogilvy took arsenic and fainted.’”
maxim of conversational tailoring: ‘The
king of France is not bald – France is a monarchy.”
conversational
point:
Grice distinguishes between ‘point’ and ‘conversational point.’ “What’s the good
of being quoted by another philosopher on the point of ‘point.’?” But that is
what Winch does. So, as a revenge, Grice elaborated on the point. P. London-born philosopher. He quotes Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s
point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of
one’s remarks – Grice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any
desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t
hesitate to say that it seems red to me” – Surely pointless, but an incredible
truth meant to refute G. A. Paul
“conversational postulate” – an otiosity
deviced by Lakoff and Gordon (or Gordon and Lakoff) after Carnap’s infamous
meaning postulate, a sentence that specifies part or all of the meaning of a
predicate. Meaning postulates would thus include explicit, contextual, and
recursive definitions, reduction sentences for dispositional predicates, and,
more generally, any sentences stating how the extensions of predicates are
interrelated by virtue of the meanings of those predicates. For example, any
reduction sentence of the form (x) (x has f / (x is malleable S x has y)) could
be a meaning postulate for the predicate ‘is malleable’. The notion of a
meaning postulate was introduced by Carnap, whose original interest stemmed
from a desire to explicate sentences that are analytic (“true by virtue of
meaning”) but not logically true. Where G is a set of such postulates, one
could say that A is analytic with respect to G if and only if A is a logical
consequence of G. On this account, e.g., the sentence ‘Jake is not a married
bachelor’ is analytic with respect to {’All bachelors are unmarried’}.
conversational reason, or ‘dialogical reason.’ With ‘reason,’ Grice is following
Ariskant. There’s the ‘ratio’ and there’s the “Vernunft.” “To converse” can
mean to have sex (cf. know) so one has to be careful. Grice is using
‘conversational’ casually. First, he was aware of the different qualifications
for ‘implication’. There is Nowell-Smith’s contextual implication and C. K.
Grant’s ‘pragmatic implication.’ So he chose ‘conversational implication’
himself. Later, when narrowing down the notion, he distinguished between
‘conversational implication’ and ‘non-conversational implication’: “Thank you.
B: You’re welcome.” If B is following the maxim, ‘be polite,’ the implication
that he is pleased he was able to assist his emissor is IMPLICATED but not
conversationally so. It is not a ‘conversational implication.’ Grice needs to
restrict the notion for philosophical purposes. Both for the framework of his
theory (it is easier to justify transcendentally conversational implication
than it is non-conversational implication). Note that ‘I am pleased I was able
to assist’ is CANCELLABLE or defeatible, so that’s not the issue. In any case,
both ‘conversational impication’ and these type of calculable
‘non-conversational’ implication still yielding from some ‘maxim’ (such as ‘be
polite’) Grice covers under the generic “non-conventional” precisely because
they can be defeated. When it comes to NON-DEFEASIBLE implicatura, Grice uses
‘conventional implication’ (as in “She was poor but she was honest.”). Grice
did not find these fun. And it shows. Strawson stuck with them, but his
philosophising about them ain’t precisely ‘fun.’ Used in Retrospective, p. 369.
Also: conversational rationality. Surely, “principle of conversational
rationality” sounds otiose. Expectation of mutual rationality sounds better.
Critique of conversational reason sounds best! Grice is careful here. When he
provides a reductive analysis of ‘reasoning,’ this goes as follows: the
reasoner reasons from premise to conclusion. That’s the analysandum. What’s the
analysans? At least it involves TWO clauses: If the reasoner reasons from
premise to conclusion, it is assumed that he BELIEVES that the premise obtains;
and he believes that the conclusion obtains. This has to be generalised to
cover the desiderative, using ‘accept.’ He accepts that the premise obtains,
and he accepts that the conclusion obtains. But there is obviously a SECOND
condition: that the conclusion follows from the premise! He uses ‘demonstrably’
for that, or the demonstratum.’ He is open as to what kind of yielding is
involved because he wants to allow for inductive reasoning and abductive
reasoning, not just deductive reasoning. AND THERE IS A TYPICALLY GRICEIAN
third condition, involving CAUSATION. He had used ‘cause’ in reductive analyses
before – if not so much in ‘meaning,’ due to Urmson’s counterexample involving
‘bribery,’ where ‘cause’ does not seem to do – but in his analysis of
‘intending’ for the British Academy. So at Oxford he promotes this THIRD causal
condition as involving that, naturally enough, it is the rasoner’s BELIEF that
demonstrably q follows from p, which CAUSES the reasoner TO BELIEVE (or more
generally, accept) that the conclusion obtains. Grice is happy with that belief
in the validity of the demonstration ‘populates’ the world of alethic beliefs,
and does not concern with generalising that into a generic ‘acceptance.’ The word
‘rationalist’ is anathema at Oxford, because tutor after tutor has brainwashed
their tutees that the distinction is ‘empiricst-rationalist’ and that at Oxford
we are ‘empiricists.’ So Grice is really being ‘heretic’ here in the words of
G. P. Baker. demonstratum: The Eng. word
“reason” and the Fr. word “raison” are
both formed on the basis of Roman “reor,” to count or calculate, whence think,
believe. The Roman verb translates the Grecian “λέγειν,” two of whose principal
meanings it retains, but only two: count and think. The third principal meaning
of the Grecian term, speak, discourse, which designates a third type of putting
into relation and proportion, is rendered by other Roman series: “dicere”
(originally cognate with ‘deixis,’ and so not necessarily ‘verbal’), “loquor,”
“orationem habere” (the most ‘vocal’ one, as it relates to the ‘mouth,’ cf.
‘orality’) or “sermonem habere,” so that ultimately the Grecian λόγος is
approached by Roman philosophers by means of a syntagm, “ratio et oratio,”
reason and discourse. Each vernacular fragments the meaning of logos into a
greater or lesser. Cf. ‘principium reddendae rationis.’ Rationality functions
as a principle of the intelligibility of the world and history, particularly in
Hegel. Then there’s The Partitions of Reason and Semantic diffractions.
Although there is no language that retains under a single word all the meanings
of logos except by bringing logos into the language in question, the
distribution of these meanings is more or less close to Roman. For the
classical Fr. word “raison,” which
maintains almost all the Roman meanings including the mathematical sense of
proportion, as in “raison d’une série,” or “raison inverse,” a contemporary Fr.
-G. dictionary proposes the following
terms: Vernunft, Verstand rational faculty. This example shows that the whole
of the vocabulary is thus mobilized. Reason and faculties We can distinguish
between two interfering systems. The first designates reason, identified with
thought in general, in its relationship to a bodily and/or mental instance. The
second situates reason in a hierarchy of faculties whose organization it
determines. Regarding the first system, as it is expressed in various
languages, where one will find studies of the main distortions, especially
around the expressions of the Roman ‘anima.’ Philosophers especially emphasize
the ways of designating reason and mind that appear to be the most irreducible
from one language to another. Regarding the second system, and the partitions
that do not coincide. For Grice, ‘to understand’ presupposes ‘rationality – not
for Kant, who sticks with Verstand/Vernunft distinction. Ratio speculatum,
praticatum. From Aristotle to Kant, two great domains of rationality have been
distinguished: theory, or speculative reason, and practice. The lurality of
meanings, each represented by one or more specific words. The first question,
from the point of view of the difference of languages, is thus that of the
breadth of the meaning of “reason” or its equivalents, and of the systems
diffracting the meanings of logos and then of ratio. But another complex of
problems immediately arises. The Roman “ratio” absorbs the meanings of other
Grecian terms, such as νοῦς and διάνοια, which are also translated in other,
more technical ways, such as intellectus; so that reason, in the sense of
rationality, is a comprehensive term, whereas ‘reason’ in the sense of
intellect or understanding is a singular and differentiated faculty. However,
none of the comprehensive terms or systems of opposition coincides with those of
another language, which are moreover changing. Then there’s Reason and
Rationality: man, animal, god. Since Aristotle’s definition of man as an animal
endowed with logos, which Roman writers rendered by “animal rationale” —
omitting the discursive dimension—reason, or the logos, is a specific
difference that defines man by his difference from other living beings and/or
his participation in a divine or cosmic nature. Reason is opposed to madness
understood as de-mentia. More broadly, reason is conceived in terms of
difference from what does not belong to its domain and falls outside its
immediate law, but which man may, in certain ways, share with other animals,
such as sensation, passion, imagination, and possibly memory. Rationality and
the principle of intelligibility. Rationality, defined by the logos, is
connected with logic as the art of speaking and thinking, and with its founding
principles. Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept. Ed. by M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans. Louvain,
Belg.: Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 191 Hegel, Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Phil.
of Right. Tr. H. Nisbet and
ed. by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge
, . . Science of LogiTr. V. Miller.
London: Allen and Unwin, . . Werke. Ed.
by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. 20 vols. FrankfuSuhrkamp, .
Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Tr. Albert Hofstadter Bloomington: Indiana , . .
Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington:
Indiana , . Hume, D. . A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. by D.
Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford , . Kant, Immanuel.
Critique of Practical Reason. Translated and ed. by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge , . .
Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. Tr. N.
Kemp-Smith. : Macmillan, 193 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Opuscules et fragments
inédits de Leibniz. Extraits des manuscrits. Ed. by Louis Couturat. : Presses Universitaires
de France, 190 Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . . Philosophical Essays.
Translated and ed. by Roger Ariew and
Dan Garber. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . . Philosophical Papers and Letters.
2nd ed. Ed. and Tr. Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht, Neth.: D.
Reidel, . . Die philosophischen Schriften. Ed.
by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 187590. Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms,
. . Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. Ed. by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 18496 .
Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre.
Ed. by Gaston Gru2 vols. : Presses Universitaires
de France, 194 Locke, J.. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon, .
Micraelius, J. . Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum. 2nd
ed. Stettin, 166 Paulus, J.. Henri de Gand: Essai sur les tendances de sa
métaphysique. : Vrin, 193 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph.
Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Ed. by
Jörg Jantzen, T. Buchheim, Jochem
Hennigfeld, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Siegbert Peetz. 40 vols.
StuttgaFrommann-Holzboog, . . Of the I as the Principle of Phil. , or On the
Unconditional in Human Knowledge. In The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four
Early Essays 17949 Translated with commentary by F. Marti. Lewisburg, PA:
Bucknell , . Spinoza, Baruch. Complete Works. With tr.s by Samuel Shirley.
Ed. by Michael L. Morgan. Indianapolis,
IN: Hackett, . . Oper2nd ed. Ed. by
Gebhardt. 5 vols. Heidelberg: Carl Winters.
conversational
trustworthiness
– or just trust. Principle of Conversational trustworthiness -- Conversational
desideratum of maximal evidence, information bearing on the truth or falsity of
a proposition. In philosophical discussions, a person’s evidence is generally
taken to be all the information a person has, positive or negative, relevant to
a proposition. The notion of evidence used in philosophy thus differs from the
ordinary notion according to which physical objects, such as a strand of hair
or a drop of blood, counts as evidence. One’s information about such objects
could be evidence in the philosophical sense. The concept of evidence plays a
central role in our understanding of knowledge and rationality. According to a
traditional and widely held view, one has knowledge only when one has a true
belief based on very strong evidence. Rational belief is belief based on
adequate evidence, even if that evidence falls short of what is needed for
knowledge. Many traditional philosophical debates, such as those about our
knowledge of the external world, the rationality of religious belief, and the
rational basis for moral judgments, are largely about whether the evidence we
have in these areas is sufficient to yield knowledge or rational belief. The
senses are a primary source of evidence. Thus, for most, if not all, of our
beliefs, ultimately our evidence traces back to sensory experience. Other
sources of evidence include memory and the testimony of others. Of course, both
of these sources rely on the senses in one way or another. According to
rationalist views, we can also get evidence for some propositions through mere reason
or reflection, and so reason is an additional source of evidence. The evidence
one has for a belief may be conclusive or inconclusive. Conclusive evidence is
so strong as to rule out all possibility of error. The discussions of
skepticism show clearly that we lack conclusive evidence for our beliefs about
the external world, about the past, about other minds, and about nearly any
other topic. Thus, an individual’s perceptual experiences provide only
inconclusive evidence for beliefs about the external world since such
experiences can be deceptive or hallucinatory. Inconclusive, or prima facie,
evidence can always be defeated or overridden by subsequently acquired
evidence, as, e.g., when testimonial evidence in favor of a proposition is
overridden by the evidence provided by subsequent experiences. evidentialism, in the philosophy of religion,
the view that religious beliefs can be rationally accepted only if they are
supported by one’s “total evidence,” understood to mean all the other
propositions one knows or justifiably believes to be true. Evidentialists
typically add that, in order to be rational, one’s degree of belief should be
proportioned to the strength of the evidential support. Evidentialism was
formulated by Locke as a weapon against the sectarians of his day and has since
been used by Clifford among many others to attack religious belief in general.
A milder form of evidentialism is found in Aquinas, who, unlike Clifford,
thinks religion can meet the evidentialist challenge. A contrasting view is
fideism, best understood as the claim that one’s fundamental religious
convictions are not subject to independent rational assessment. A reason often
given for this is that devotion to God should be one’s “ultimate concern,” and
to subject faith to the judgment of reason is to place reason above God and
make of it an idol. Proponents of fideism include Tertullian, Kierkegaard, Karl
Barth, and some Vittersians. A third view, which as yet lacks a generally
accepted label, may be termed experientialism; it asserts that some religious
beliefs are directly justified by religious experience. Experientialism differs
from evidentialism in holding that religious beliefs can be rational without
being supported by inferences from other beliefs one holds; thus theistic
arguments are superfluous, whether or not there are any sound ones available.
But experientialism is not fideism; it holds that religious beliefs may be
directly grounded in religious experience wtihout the mediation of other
beliefs, and may be rationally warranted on that account, just as perceptual
beliefs are directly grounded in perceptual experience. Recent examples of
experientialism are found in Plantinga’s “Reformed Epistemology,” which asserts
that religious beliefs grounded in experience can be “properly basic,” and in
the contention of Alston that in religious experience the subject may be
“perceiving God.”
converse. 1 Narrowly, the result of the
immediate logical operation called conversion on any categorical proposition,
accomplished by interchanging the subject term and the predicate term of that
proposition. Thus, the converse of the categorical proposition ‘All cats are
felines’ is ‘All felines are cats’. 2 More broadly, the proposition obtained
from a given ‘if . . . then . . .’ conditional proposition by interchanging the
antecedent and the consequent clauses, i.e., the propositions following the
‘if’ and the ‘then’, respectively; also, the argument obtained from an argument
of the form ‘P; therefore Q’ by interchanging the premise and the
conclusion. converse, outer and inner,
respectively, the result of “converting” the two “terms” or the relation verb
of a relational sentence. The outer converse of ‘Abe helps Ben’ is ‘Ben helps
Abe’ and the inner converse is ‘Abe is helped by Ben’. In simple, or atomic,
sentences the outer and inner converses express logically equivalent
propositions, and thus in these cases no informational ambiguity arises from
the adjunction of ‘and conversely’ or ‘but not conversely’, despite the fact
that such adjunction does not indicate which, if either, of the two converses
intended is meant. However, in complex, or quantified, relational sentences
such as ‘Every integer precedes some integer’ genuine informational ambiguity
is produced. Under normal interpretations of the respective sentences, the
outer converse expresses the false proposition that some integer precedes every
integer, the inner converse expresses the true proposition that every integer
is preceded by some integer. More complicated considerations apply in cases of
quantified doubly relational sentences such as ‘Every integer precedes every
integer exceeding it’. The concept of scope explains such structural ambiguity:
in the sentence ‘Every integer precedes some integer and conversely’, ‘conversely’
taken in the outer sense has wide scope, whereas taken in the inner sense it
has narrow scope.
convey: used in index to WoW. Etymology is
funny. From con-via – cum-via, go on the road with.
coonway: a., english
philosopher whose Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae 1690;
English translation, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy,
1692 proposes a monistic ontology in which all created things are modes of one
spiritual substance emanating from God. This substance is made up of an
infinite number of hierarchically arranged spirits, which she calls monads.
Matter is congealed spirit. Motion is conceived not dynamically but vitally.
Lady Conway’s scheme entails a moral explanation of pain and the possibility of
universal salvation. She repudiates the dualism of both Descartes and her
teacher, Henry More, as well as the materialism of Hobbes and Spinoza. The work
shows the influence of cabalism and affinities with the thought of the mentor
of her last years, Francis Mercurius van Helmont, through whom her philosophy
became known to Leibniz.
co-operatum: Grice previously used ‘help’ – which has a Graeco-Roman
counterpart -- Grice is very right in noting that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. Correspondingly he changed the principle of
conversational helpfulness into the principle of conversational co-operation.
He also points that one has to distinguish between the general theisis that
conversation is rational from the thesis that the particular form of rationality
that conversation takes is cooperative rationality, which most libertarians
take as ‘irrationality’ personified, almost! Grice is obsessed with this idea
that ‘co-operation’ need not just be ‘conversational.’ Indeed, his way to
justify a ‘rationalist’ approach is through analogy. If he can find
‘co-operative’ traits in behaviour other than ‘conversational,’ the greater the
chance to generalise, and thus justify. The co-operation would be
self-justifying. co-operation. The hyphen in Strawson and Wiggins (p. 520). Grice
found ‘co-operative’ too Marxist, and would prefer ‘help,’ as in ‘mutual help.’
This element of ‘mutuality’ is necessary. And it is marked grammatical, with
the FIRST person and the SECOND person. The third need NOT be a person – can be
a dog (as in “Fido is shaggy”). The mututality is necessary in that the
emissor’s intention involves the belief that his recipient is rational. You
cannot co-operate with a rock. You cannot co-operate with a vegetal. You cannot
cooperate with a non-rational animal. You can ONLY cooperate with a co-rational
agent. Animal co-operation poses a nice side to the Griceian idea. Surely the
stereotype is a member of species S cooperating with another specimen of the
same species. But then there are great examples of ‘sym-biosis’: the crane that
gets rid off the hippopotamus’s ticks. Is this cooperation? Is this
intentional? If Grice thinks that there is a ‘mechanistically derivable’
explanation,, it isn’t. He did not necessarily buy ‘bio-sociological’
approaches. Which was a problem, because we don’t have much philosophical
seriouis discourse on ‘cooperation’ at the general level Grice is aiming at.
Except in ethics, which is biased. So it is no wonder that Grice had to rely on
‘meta-ethics’ to even conceptualise the field of cooperation: the maximin
becomes a balance between a principle of conversational egoism and a principle
of conversational altruism. He later found the egoism-tag as ‘understood.’ And
his ‘altruism’ became ‘helpfulness,’ became ‘benevolence,’ and became
‘co-operation.’
copulatum: It was an Oxonian exercise to trace the ‘copula.’ “I’ve
been working like a dog, should be sleeping like a log.” Where is the copula:
Lennon is a dog-like worker – Lennon is a potential log-like sleeper.” Grice
uses ‘copula’ in PPQ. The term is
sometimes used ambiguously, for ‘conjunctum.’ A conjunctive is called a
copulative. But Grice obviously narrows down the use of copulatum to izz and
hazz. He is having in mind Strawson.The formula does not allow for differences
in tense and grammatical number; nor for the enormous class of * all
'-sentences which do not contain, as their main verb, the verb * to be '. We
might try to recast the sentences so that they at least fitted into one of the
two patterns * All x is y ' or ' All x are y ' ; but the results would be, as
English, often clumsy andt sometimes absurd. for Aristotle, 'Socrates is a man'
is true "in virtue of his being that thing which constitutes existing for
him (being which constitutes his mode of existence)," Hermann Weidemann,
"In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication," p. 84— only so
long as that "being" be taken as an assertion of being per se. But
Weidemann wants to take it merely copulatively. In "Prädikation," p.
1196, he says that when 'is' is used as tertium adiacens it has no meaning by
itself, but merely signifies the connection of subject and predicate. Cf. his
"Aristoteles über das isolierte Aussagenwort," p. 154. H. P. Grice,
"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being," also rejects an existential
reading of tertium adiacens and pushes for a copulative one. Cf. Alan Code,
"Aristotle: Essence and Accident," pp. 414-7. Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not
with variation between predicates of one subject, but with variation between
essential (per se)predications upon different (indeed categorially
different) subjects (such ...eads
me to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula exhibits
semantic ...An extended treatment of my views about izzing and hazzing can
be found in Alan. A crucial ... on occasion admit catégorial variation in
the sense of the copulative 'is', evidently is ... Aristotle has
connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation ...with
the copulative 'is';
so he rather strangely interprets the last remark. (1017a27-30) as alluding to
semantic multiplicity in
the copula as being.
(supposedly) a consequence of semantic multiplicity in the existential
'is'. This interpretation seems difficult to defend. When Aristotle says that
predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its
quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be
saying that if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to
some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow,
these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription
of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation"H. P.
Grice brings the question he had considered with J. L. Austin and P. F.
Strawson at Oxford about Aristotle’s categories.In “Categoriae,” Aristotle
distinguishes two sorts of case of the application of word or phrase to a range
of situations. In one sort of case, both the word and a single definition
(account, “logos”) apply throughout that range. In the other sort of case, the
word but no single definition applies through the range.These two sorts of case
have a different nature. In the first case, the word is applied synonymously
(of better as “sunonuma” – literally “sun-onuma”, cognomen). In the second case
the word is applied homonymously (or better “homonuma”, or aequi-vocally,
literally “homo-numa.”)Grice notes that a homonymous application has some sort
of sub-division which Aristotle calls "paronymy" (“paronuma”),
literally ‘para onuma.’To put it roughly, homonyms have multiple meanings –
what Grice has as “semantic multiplicity.”Synonyms have one meaning or ONE
SENSE, but apply to different kinds of thing.A paronym, such as ‘be,’ derives
from other things of a different kind. Paronyms display a ‘UNIFIED semantic
multiplicity,’ if that’s not too oxymoronic: how can the multiplicity be
unified while remaining a multiplicity? Aristotle states, confusingly, that
"being is said in many ways". As Grice notes, ‘good’ (agathon) also
is a paronym that displays unified semantic multiplicity.In Nichomachean
Ethics, even more confusingly, Aristotle says that "good is said in as
many ways as being". He doesn’t number the ways.So the main goal for Grice
is to answer the question: If, as Aristotle suggests, at least some expressions
connected with the notion of "being" exhibit semantic multiplicity,
of which expressions is the suggestion true? Grice faces the question of
existential being and Semantic Multiplicity. Grice stresses that Semantic
Multiplicity of "be" is not
only the case of it interpretation. Other words he wants to know in what way of
interpretation of this word the philosophers can detect the SM. Generally speaking
there are four possible interpretations of "being": First,
"be" is taken to mean "exist.”Second, "be" is taken as
a copula in a predication statement.Third, "be" is taken for
expressing the identity.Fourth, "Being" is considered to be a noun
(equivalent to ‘object' or ‘entity') – subjectification, category shift:
“Smith’s being tall suggests he is an athlete.” (cfr. A. G. N. Flew on the
‘rubbish’ that adding ‘the’ to ‘self’ results in – contra J. R. Jones).
Philosophers have some problems for this kind of theory with separating
interpretations from each other. It is natural for thinkers to unite the first
and the fourth. The object or entity should be the things which already exist.
So the SM would attach to such a noun as "entity" if, and only if, it
also attaches to the word "exist". Furthermore, it seems to be a good
idea to unite the first and the third. In some ways theorist can paraphrase the
word "exist" in the terms of self-identity. Grice gives an example:
“Julius Caesar exists if and only if Julius Caesar is identical for Julius
Caesar.” Cf. Grice on ‘relative identity.’So the philosophers should
investigate SM in two possible interpretations – when "be" is
understood as "exist" and when "be" is understood as
copula. From Aristotle's point of view ‘being’ is predicated of everything.
From this statement, Grice draws the conclusion that "exist" can
apply to every thing, even a square circle.This word should signify a plurality
of universals and exhibits semantic multiplicity. But Grice continue his
analyses and tries to show, that "exist" has not merely SM, but
UNIFIED semantic multiplicity. God forbid that he breaks M. O. R., Modifed
Occam’s Razor – Semantic multiplicies are not to be multiplied unificatory
necessity.”In “Metaphysics,” Aristotle says that whatever things are signified
by the "forms of predication". Philosophers understood the forms of
predication (praedicabilium, praedicamentum) as a category. So in this way
"being" has as many significations as there are forms of predication.
"Be" in this case indicates what a thing is, what is like or how much
it is and ctr. And no reasons to make a difference between two utterances like
"man walks (flourishes)" and "the man is walking
(flourishing)" – cfr. Strawson on no need to have ‘be’ explicitly in the
surface form, which render some utterances absurd. Grice says that it is not a
problem with interpretation of verb-forms like ‘walks' and ‘flourishes' while
we can replace them by expression in a canonical form like ‘is walking' and ‘is
flourishing'. Aristotle names them as canonical in form within the multiplicity
of use of "be" because ‘is’ is not existential, but copulative.Cf.
Descartes, I think therefore I am – I am a res cogitans, ergo I am a res.
"When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes
what is it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so
on, he seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of predicates which
can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow,
these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in
the ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation"
It means that, from Aristotle's point of view, "Socrates is F" is not
an essential predication, where "F" shows the item in the category C.
So the logical form of the proposition “Socrates is F” is understood as
"Socrates has something which is (C) F" where is (C) represent
essential connection to category C. In conclusion it can be said that the
copula is a matter of the logical nature of constant connection expressed by
"has" and a categorical variant relation expressed by essential
"is". So we have both types of interpretation: as existence and as a
copula. (Our gratitude to P. A.
Sobolevsky). ases of ''Unified Semantic
Multiplicity'' (USM). Prominent among examples of USM is the
application of the word 'be'; according to. Aristotle, “being is said
in ... Aristotle and the alleged multiplicity of being (or
something). Grice is all for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic
multiplicity (homonymy), it is in the
end UNIFIED semantic multiplicity (paronymy). Or something. Copula – H. P.
Grice on Aristotle on the copula (“Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”) --
copula, in logic, a form of the verb ‘to be’ that joins subject and predicate
in singular and categorical propositions. In ‘George is wealthy’ and ‘Swans are
beautiful’, e.g., ‘is’ and ‘are’, respectively, are copulas. Not all
occurrences of forms of ‘be’ count as copulas. In sentences such as ‘There are
51 states’, ‘are’ is not a copula, since it does not join a subject and a
predicate, but occurs simply as a part of the quantifier term ‘there are’.
corpus: -- Grice’s alma mater – he later
became a Hamsworth scholar at Merton and finally fellow of St. John’s.. Grice
would not have gone to Oxford had his talent not been in the classics, Greek
and Latin. As a Midlander, he was sent to Corpus. At the time, most of Oxford
was oriented towards the classics, or Lit. Hum. (Philosophia). At some point,
each college attained some stereotypical fame, which Grice detested (“Corpus is
for classicists”). By this time, Grice, after a short stay at Merton, accepted
the fellowship at St. John’s, which was “a different animal.” In them days,
there were only two tutorial fellows in philosophy, Scots Mabbott, and English
Grice. But Grice also was “University Lecturer in Philosophy,” which meant he
delivered seminars for tutees all over Oxford. St. John’s keeps a record of all
the tutees by Grice. They include, alphabetically, a few good names. Why is
Corpus so special? Find out! History of “Corpus Christi.” Cf. St. John’s. Cf.
Merton. Each should have an entry. Corpus is Grice’s alma mater – so crucial. Hardieian: you only have one tutor in your life, and Grice’s
was Hardie. So an exploration on Hardie may be in order. Grice hastens to add
that he only learned ‘form,’ not matter, from Hardie, but the ethical and
Aristotelian approach he also admitted. Corpus -- Grice, “Personal identity” –
soul and body -- disembodiment, the immaterial state of existence of a person
who previously had a body. Disembodiment is thus to be distinguished from
nonembodiment or immateriality. God and angels, if they exist, are
non-embodied, or immaterial. By contrast, if human beings continue to exist
after their bodies die, then they are disembodied. As this example suggests,
disembodiment is typically discussed in the context of immortality or survival
of death. It presupposes a view according to which persons are souls or some
sort of immaterial entity that is capable of existing apart from a body.
Whether it is possible for a person to become disembodied is a matter of
controversy. Most philosophers who believe that this is possible assume that a
disembodied person is conscious, but it is not obvious that this should be the
case. Corpus -- Grice’s body --
embodiment, the bodily aspects of human subjectivity. Embodiment is the central
theme in European phenomenology, with its most extensive treatment in the works
of Maurice MerleauPonty. Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment distinguishes
between “the objective body,” which is the body regarded as a physiological
entity, and “the phenomenal body,” which is not just some body, some particular
physiological entity, but my or your body as I or you experience it. Of course,
it is possible to experience one’s own body as a physiological entity. But this
is not typically the case. Typically, I experience my body tacitly as a unified
potential or capacity for doing this and that
typing this sentence, scratching that itch, etc. Moreover, this sense
that I have of my own motor capacities expressed, say, as a kind of bodily
confidence does not depend on an understanding of the physiological processes
involved in performing the action in question. The distinction between the
objective and phenomenal body is central to understanding the phenomenological
treatment of embodiment. Embodiment is not a concept that pertains to the body
grasped as a physiological entity. Rather it pertains to the phenomenal body
and to the role it plays in our object-directed experiences.
cosmologicum. Grice systematized metaphysics quite carefully. He
distinguished between eschatology (or the theory of categories) and ontology
proper. Within ontology, there is ‘ontologia generalis’ and ‘ontologia
specialis.’ There are at least two branches of ‘ontologia specialis’:
‘cosmologia’ and ‘anthropologia.’ Grice would often refer to the ‘world’ in
toto. For example, in “Meaning revisited,” when he speaks of the ‘triangle’:
world-denotatum; signum-emissor, and soul. Grice was never a solipsist, and
most of his theories are ‘causal’ in nature, including that of meaning and
perception. As such, he was constantly fighting against acosmism. While not one
of his twelve labours, he took a liking for the coinage. ‘Acosmism’ is formed
in analogy to ‘atheism,’ meaning the denial of the ultimate reality of the
world. Ernst Platner used it in 1776 to describe Spinoza’s philosophy, arguing
that Spinoza did not intend to deny “the existence of the Godhead, but the
existence of the world.” Maimon, Fichte, Hegel, and others make the same claim.
By the time of Feuerbach it was also used to characterize a basic feature of
Christianity: the denial of the world or worldliness. Cosmologicum -- emanationism, a doctrine
about the origin and ontological structure of the world, most frequently
associated with Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, according to which everything
else that exists is an emanation from a primordial unity, called by Plotinus
“the One.” The first product of emanation from the One is Intelligence noûs, a
realm resembling Plato’s world of Forms. From Intelligence emanates Soul
psuche, conceived as an active principle that imposes, insofar as that is
possible, the rational structure of Intelligence on the matter that emanates
from Soul. The process of emanation is typically conceived to be necessary and
timeless: although Soul, for instance, proceeds from Intelligence, the notion
of procession is one of logical dependence rather than temporal sequence. The
One remains unaffected and undiminished by emanation: Plotinus likens the One
to the sun, which necessarily emits light from its naturally infinite abundance
without suffering change or loss of its own substance. Although emanationism
influenced some Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thinkers, it was incompatible
with those theistic doctrines of divine activity that maintained that God’s
creative choice and the world thus created were contingent, and that God can,
if he chooses, interact directly with individual creatures.
cotton onto the implicaturum:
this is not cognate with the plant. It’s Welsh, rather.Strawson’s and Wiggins’s
example of the ‘suggestio falsi’ – or alternative to Grice’s tutee example.
Since Strawson and Wiggins are presenting the thing to the ultra-prestigious
British Academy, they thought a ‘tutee’ example would not be prestigious
enough. So they have two philosophers, Strawson and Grice, talking about a
third party, another philosopher, well known by his mood outbursts. They are
assessing the third party’s philosophical abilities at their London club.
Strawson volunteers: “And Smith?”. Grice responds: “If he had a more angelic
temperament…” Strawson, “like a fool, I rushed in – Strawson Wiggins p. 520. The
angelic temperament. To like someone or something; to view someone or something
favorably. ... After we explained our plan again, the rest of the group
seemed to cotton onto it.
2. To begin to understand something. Has nothing to do with cotton 1560s,
"to prosper, succeed;" of things, "to agree, suit, fit," a
word of uncertain origin. Perhaps from Welsh cytuno "consent,
agree;" but perhaps rather a metaphor from cloth-finishing and thus
from cotton (n.).
Hensleigh Wedgwood compares cot "a fleece of wool matted together."
Meaning "become closely or intimately associated (with)," is from
1805 via the sense of "to get along together" (of persons), attested
from c. 1600. Related: Cottoned; cottoning.
craig: Grice loved his interpolation
theorem, a theorem for firstorder logic: if a sentence y of first-order logic
entails a sentence q there is an “interpolant,” a sentence F in the vocabulary
common to q and y that entails q and is entailed by y. Originally, William
Craig proved his theorem in 7 as a lemma, to give a simpler proof of Beth’s
definability theorem, but the result now stands on its own. In abstract model
theory, logics for which an interpolation theorem holds are said to have the
Craig interpolation property. Craig’s interpolation theorem shows that
first-order logic is closed under implicit definability, so that the concepts
embodied in first-order logic are all given explicitly. In the philosophy of
science literature ‘Craig’s theorem’ usually refers to another result of
Craig’s: that any recursively enumerable set of sentences of first-order logic
can be axiomatized. This has been used to argue that theoretical terms are in
principle eliminable from empirical theories. Assuming that an empirical theory
can be axiomatized in first-order logic, i.e., that there is a recursive set of
first-order sentences from which all theorems of the theory can be proven, it
follows that the set of consequences of the axioms in an “observational”
sublanguage is a recursively enumerable set. Thus, by Craig’s theorem, there is
a set of axioms for this subtheory, the Craig-reduct, that contains only
observation terms. Interestingly, the Craig-reduct theory may be semantically
weaker, in the sense that it may have models that cannot be extended to a model
of the full theory. The existence of such a model would prove that the
theoretical terms cannot all be defined on the basis of the observational
vocabulary only, a result related to Beth’s definability theorem.
crazy-bayesy: cited by H. P.
Grice, “Aspects of reason.” Bayesian rationality, minimally, a property a
system of beliefs or the believer has in virtue of the system’s “conforming to
the probability calculus.” “Bayesians” differ on what “rationality” requires,
but most agree that i beliefs come in degrees of firmness; ii these “degrees of
belief” are theoretically or ideally quantifiable; iii such quantification can
be understood in terms of person-relative, time-indexed “credence functions”
from appropriate sets of objects of belief propositions or sentences each set closed under at least finite truth-functional
combinations into the set of real
numbers; iv at any given time t, a person’s credence function at t ought to be
usually: “on pain of a Dutch book argument” a probability function; that is, a
mapping from the given set into the real numbers in such a way that the
“probability” the value assigned to any given object A in the set is greater
than or equal to zero, and is equal to unity % 1 if A is a necessary truth,
and, for any given objects A and B in the set, if A and B are incompatible the
negation of their conjunction is a necessary truth then the probability
assigned to their disjunction is equal to the sum of the probabilities assigned
to each; so that the usual propositional probability axioms impose a sort of
logic on degrees of belief. If a credence function is a probability function,
then it or the believer at the given time is “coherent.” On these matters, on
conditional degrees of belief, and on the further constraint on rationality
many Bayesians impose that change of belief ought to accord with
“conditionalization”, the reader should consult John Earman, Bayes or Bust? A
Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory 2; Colin Howson and Peter
Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach 9; and Richard Jeffrey, The
Logic of Decision 5. Bayes’s theorem,
any of several relationships between prior and posterior probabilities or odds,
especially 13 below. All of these depend upon the basic relationship 0 between
contemporaneous conditional and unconditional probabilities. Non-Bayesians
think these useful only in narrow ranges of cases, generally because of
skepticism about accessibility or significance of priors. According to 1,
posterior probability is prior probability times the “relevance quotient”
Carnap’s term. According to 2, posterior odds are Bayesian Bayes’s theorem
74 74 prior odds times the “likelihood
ratio” R. A. Fisher’s term. Relationship 3 comes from 1 by expanding P data via
the law of total probability. Bayes’s rule 4 for updating probabilities has you
set your new unconditional probabilities equal to your old conditional ones
when fresh certainty about data leaves probabilities conditionally upon the
data unchanged. The corresponding rule 5 has you do the same for odds. In
decision theory the term is used differently, for the rule “Choose so as to
maximize expectation of utility.”
Credible – by speaking of
probability and credibility, Grice is going modal! credibility: While Grice uses ‘probability’ as the correlatum of
desirability, he suggests ‘credibility’ is a better choice. It relates to the
‘creditum.’ Now, what is the generic for ‘trust’ when it comes to the creditum
and the desideratum? An indicative utterance expresses a belief. The utterer is
candid if he holds that belief. “Candid” applies to imperative utterances which
express genuine desires and notably the emissor’s intention that his recipient
will form a ‘desideratum.’ Following
Jeffrey and Davidson, respectively, Grice uses ‘desirability’ and
‘probability,’ but sometimes ‘credibibility,’ realizing that ‘credibility’ is
more symmetrical with ‘desirability’ than ‘probability’ is. Urmson had explored
this in “Parenthetical verbs.” Urmson co-relates, ‘certaintly’ with ‘know’ and
‘probably’ with ‘believe.’ But Urmson adds four further adverbs: “knowingly,”
“unknowingly,” “believably,” and “unbelievably.” Urmson also includes three
more: “uncredibly,” in variation with “incredibly,” and ‘credibly.” The keyword
should be ‘credibility.’
creditum: The Romans were good at this. Notably in negative contexts.
They distinguished between an emissor being fallax and being mendax. It all has
to do with ‘creditum.’ “Creditum’ is vero, more or less along
correspondence-theoretical lines. Used by Grice for the doxastic equivalent of
the buletic or desideratum. A creditum is an implicaturum, as Grice defines the
implicaturum of the content that an addresse has to assume the utterer BELIEVES
to deem him rational. The ‘creditum’-condition is essential for Grice in his
‘exhibitive’ account to the communication. By uttering “Smoke!”, U means that
there is some if the utterer intends that his addressee BELIEVE that he, the
utterer, is in a state of soul which has the propositional complex there is
smoke. It is worth noting that BELIEF is not needed for the immediate state of
the utterer’s soul: this can always be either a desire or a belief. But a
belief is REQUIRED as the immediate (if not ultimate) response intended by the
utterer that his addressee adapt. It is curious that given the primacy that
Grice held of the desirability over the credibility that many of his
conversational maxims are formulated as imperatives aimed at matters of belief,
conditions and value of credibility, probability and adequate evidence. In the
cases where Grice emphasizes ‘information,’ which one would associate with
‘belief,’ this association may be dropped provided the exhibitive account: you
can always influence or be influenced by others in the institution of a common
decision provided you give and receive the optimal information, or rather, provided
the conversationalists assume that they are engaged in a MAXIMAL exchange of
information. That ‘information’ does not necessarily apply to ‘belief’ is
obvious in how complicated an order can get, “Get me a bottle”. “Is that all?”
“No, get me a bottle and make sure that it is of French wine, and add something
to drink the wine with, and drive careful, and give my love to Rosie.” No
belief is explicitly transmitted, yet the order seems informative enough. Grice
sometimes does use ‘informative’ in a strict context involving credibility. He
divides the mode of credibility into informational (when addressed to others)
and indicative (when addressed to self), for in a self-addressed utterance such
as, “I am being silly,” one cannot intend to inform oneself of something one
already knows! The English have ‘credibility’ and belief, which is
cognate with ‘love.’ H. P. Grice, “Disposition and belief,” H. P. Grice,
“Knowledge and belief.” a dispositional psychological state in virtue of which
a person will assent to a proposition under certain conditions. Propositional
knowledge, traditionally understood, entails belief. A behavioral view implies
that beliefs are just dispositions to behave in certain ways. Your believing
that the stove is hot is just your being disposed to act in a manner
appropriate to its being hot. The problem is that our beliefs, including their
propositional content indicated by a “that”-clause, typically explain why we do
what we do. You avoid touching the stove because you believe that it’s
dangerously hot. Explaining action via beliefs refers indispensably to
propositional content, but the behavioral view does not accommodate this. A
state-object view implies that belief consists of a special relation between a
psychological state and an object of belief, what is believed. The objects of
belief, traditionally understood, are abstract propositions existing
independently of anyone’s thinking of them. The state of believing is a
propositional attitude involving some degree of confidence toward a
propositional object of belief. Such a view allows that two persons, even
separated by a long period of time, can believe the same thing. A state-object
view allows that beliefs be dispositional rather than episodic, since they can
exist while no action is occurring. Such a view grants, however, that one can
have a disposition to act owing to believing something. Regarding mental
action, a belief typically generates a disposition to assent, at least under
appropriate circumstances, to the proposition believed. Given the central role
of propositional content, however, a state-object view denies that beliefs are
just dispositions to act. In addition, such a view should distinguish between
dispositional believing and a mere disposition to believe. One can be merely
disposed to believe many things that one does not actually believe, owing to
one’s lacking the appropriate psychological attitude to relevant propositional
content. Beliefs are either occurrent or non-occurrent. Occurrent belief,
unlike non-occurrent belief, requires current assent to the proposition
believed. If the assent is self-conscious, the belief is an explicit occurrent
belief; if the assent is not self-conscious, the belief is an implicit
occurrent behaviorism, supervenient belief 78
78 belief. Non-occurrent beliefs permit that we do not cease to believe
that 2 ! 2 % 4, for instance, merely because we now happen to be thinking of
something else or nothing at all. . --
belief revision, the process by which cognitive states change in light of new
information. This topic looms large in discussions of Bayes’s Theorem and other
approaches in decision theory. The reasons prompting belief revision are
characteristically epistemic; they concern such notions as quality of evidence
and the tendency to yield truths. Many different rules have been proposed for
updating one’s belief set. In general, belief revision typically balances risk
of error against information increase. Belief revision is widely thought to
proceed either by expansion or by conceptual revision. Expansion occurs in
virtue of new observations; a belief is changed, or a new belief established,
when a hypothesis or provisional belief is supported by evidence whose
probability is high enough to meet a favored criterion of epistemic warrant.
The hypothesis then becomes part of the existing belief corpus, or is
sufficient to prompt revision. Conceptual revision occurs when appropriate
changes are made in theoretical assumptions
in accordance with such principles as simplicity and explanatory or
predictive power by which the corpus is
organized. In actual cases, we tend to revise beliefs with an eye toward
advancing the best comprehensive explanation in the relevant cognitive domain.
cremonini: essential
Italian philosopher. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Cremonini," per
Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia.
Grice’s criterion for the implicaturum, --
cf. G. P. Baker, “Grice and criterial semantics” -- broadly, a sufficient
condition for the presence of a certain property or for the truth of a certain
proposition. Generally, a criterion need be sufficient merely in normal
circumstances rather than absolutely sufficient. Typically, a criterion is
salient in some way, often by virtue of being a necessary condition as well as
a sufficient one. The plural form, ‘criteria’, is commonly used for a set of
singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. A set of truth conditions
is said to be criterial for the truth of propositions of a certain form. A
conceptual analysis of a philosophically important concept may take the form of
a proposed set of truth conditions for paradigmatic propositions containing the
concept in question. Philosophers have proposed criteria for such notions as meaningfulness,
intentionality,
creationism, theological criterion knowledge, justification, justice,
rightness, and identity including personal identity and event identity, among
many others. There is a special use of the term in connection with Vitters’s
well-known remark that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria,”
e.g., moans and groans for aches and pains. The suggestion is that a
criteriological connection is needed to forge a conceptual link between items
of a sort that are intelligible and knowable to items of a sort that, but for
the connection, would not be intelligible or knowable. A mere symptom cannot
provide such a connection, for establishing a correlation between a symptom and
that for which it is a symptom presupposes that the latter is intelligible and
knowable. One objection to a criteriological view, whether about aches or
quarks, is that it clashes with realism about entities of the sort in question
and lapses into, as the case may be, behaviorism or instrumentalism. For it
seems that to posit a criteriological connection is to suppose that the nature
and existence of entities of a given sort can depend on the conditions for
their intelligibility or knowability, and that is to put the epistemological
cart before the ontological horse.
critical legal studies: explored by Grice
in his analysis of legal vs. moral right --
a loose assemblage of legal writings and thinkers in the United States
and Great Britain since the mid-0s that aspire to a jurisprudence and a
political ideology. Like the legal
realists of the 0s and 0s, the jurisprudential program is largely negative,
consisting in the discovery of supposed contradictions within both the law as a
whole and areas of law such as contracts and criminal law. The jurisprudential
implication derived from such supposed contradictions within the law is that
any decision in any case can be defended as following logically from some
authoritative propositions of law, making the law completely without guidance
in particular cases. Also like the legal
realists, the political ideology of critical legal studies is vaguely leftist,
embracing the communitarian critique of liberalism. Communitarians fault
liberalism for its alleged overemphasis on individual rights and individual
welfare at the expense of the intrinsic value of certain collective goods.
Given the cognitive relativism of many of its practitioners, critical legal
studies tends not to aspire to have anything that could be called a theory of
either law or of politics.
Grice’s
critique of conversational reason – “What does Kant mean by ‘critique’?
Should he?” – Grice. Critical Realism, a philosophy that at the highest level
of generality purports to integrate the positive insights of both New Realism
and idealism. New Realism was the first wave of realistic reaction to the
dominant idealism of the nineteenth century. It was a version of immediate and
direct realism. In its attempt to avoid any representationalism that would lead
to idealism, this tradition identified the immediate data of consciousness with
objects in the physical world. There is no intermediary between the knower and
the known. This heroic tour de force foundered on the phenomena of error,
illusion, and perceptual variation, and gave rise to a successor realism Critical Realism that acknowledged the mediation of “the
mental” in our cognitive grasp of the physical world. ’Critical Realism’ was
the title of a work in epistemology by Roy Wood Sellars 6, but its more general
use to designate the broader movement derives from the 0 cooperative volume,
Essays in Critical Realism: A Cooperative Study of the Problem of Knowledge,
containing position papers by Durant Drake, A. O. Lovejoy, J. B. Pratt, A. K.
Rogers, C. A. Strong, George Santayana, and Roy Wood Sellars. With New Realism,
Critical Realism maintains that the primary object of knowledge is the
independent physical world, and that what is immediately present to
consciousness is not the physical object as such, but some corresponding mental
state broadly construed. Whereas both New Realism and idealism grew out of the
conviction that any such mediated account of knowledge is untenable, the
Critical Realists felt that only if knowledge of the external world is
explained in terms of a process of mental mediation, can error, illusion, and
perceptual variation be accommodated. One could fashion an account of mental
mediation that did not involve the pitfalls of Lockean representationalism by
carefully distinguishing between the object known and the mental state through
which it is known. The Critical Realists differed among themselves both
epistemologically and metaphysically. The mediating elements in cognition were
variously construed as essences, ideas, or sensedata, and the precise role of
these items in cognicriterion, problem of the Critical Realism tion was again variously construed.
Metaphysically, some were dualists who saw knowledge as unexplainable in terms
of physical processes, whereas others principally Santayana and Sellars were
materialists who saw cognition as simply a function of conscious biological
systems. The position of most lasting influence was probably that of Sellars
because that torch was taken up by his son, Wilfrid, whose very sophisticated
development of it was quite influential.
-- critical theory, any social theory that is at the same time
explanatory, normative, practical, and self-reflexive. The term was first
developed by Horkheimer as a self-description of the Frankfurt School and its
revision of Marxism. It now has a wider significance to include any critical,
theoretical approach, including feminism and liberation philosophy. When they
make claims to be scientific, such approaches attempt to give rigorous
explanations of the causes of oppression, such as ideological beliefs or
economic dependence; these explanations must in turn be verified by empirical
evidence and employ the best available social and economic theories. Such
explanations are also normative and critical, since they imply negative
evaluations of current social practices. The explanations are also practical,
in that they provide a better self-understanding for agents who may want to
improve the social conditions that the theory negatively evaluates. Such change
generally aims at “emancipation,” and theoretical insight empowers agents to
remove limits to human freedom and the causes of human suffering. Finally,
these theories must also be self-reflexive: they must account for their own
conditions of possibility and for their potentially transformative effects.
These requirements contradict the standard account of scientific theories and
explanations, particularly positivism and its separation of fact and value. For
this reason, the methodological writings of critical theorists often attack
positivism and empiricism and attempt to construct alternative epistemologies.
Critical theorists also reject relativism, since the cultural relativity of
norms would undermine the basis of critical evaluation of social practices and
emancipatory change. The difference between critical and non-critical theories
can be illustrated by contrasting the Marxian and Mannheimian theories of
ideology. Whereas Mannheim’s theory merely describes relations between ideas of
social conditions, Marx’s theory tries to show how certain social practices
require false beliefs about them by their participants. Marx’s theory not only
explains why this is so, it also negatively evaluates those practices; it is
practical in that by disillusioning participants, it makes them capable of
transformative action. It is also self-reflexive, since it shows why some
practices require illusions and others do not, and also why social crises and
conflicts will lead agents to change their circumstances. It is scientific, in
that it appeals to historical evidence and can be revised in light of better
theories of social action, language, and rationality. Marx also claimed that
his theory was superior for its special “dialectical method,” but this is now
disputed by most critical theorists, who incorporate many different theories and
methods. This broader definition of critical theory, however, leaves a gap
between theory and practice and places an extra burden on critics to justify
their critical theories without appeal to such notions as inevitable historical
progress. This problem has made critical theories more philosophical and
concerned with questions of justification.
Grice’s
critters:
one is never sure if Grice uses ‘creature’ seriously! creation ex nihilo, the
act of bringing something into existence from nothing. According to traditional
Christian theology, God created the world ex nihilo. To say that the world was
created from nothing does not mean that there was a prior non-existent
substance out of which it was fashioned, but rather that there was not anything
out of which God brought it into being. However, some of the patristics
influenced by Plotinus, such as Gregory of Nyssa, apparently understood
creation ex nihilo to be an emanation from God according to which what is
created comes, not from nothing, but from God himself. Not everything that God
makes need be created ex nihilo; or if, as in Genesis 2: 7, 19, God made a
human being and animals from the ground, a previously existing material, God
did not create them from nothing. Regardless of how bodies are made, orthodox
theology holds that human souls are created ex nihilo; the opposing view,
traducianism, holds that souls are propagated along with bodies. creationism, acceptance of the early chapters
of Genesis taken literally. Genesis claims that the universe and all of its
living creatures including humans were created by God in the space of six days.
The need to find some way of reconciling this story with the claims of science
intensified in the nineteenth century, with the publication of Darwin’s Origin
of Species 1859. In the Southern states of the United States, the indigenous
form of evangelical Protestant Christianity declared total opposition to
evolutionism, refusing any attempt at reconciliation, and affirming total
commitment to a literal “creationist” reading of the Bible. Because of this,
certain states passed laws banning the teaching of evolutionism. More recently,
literalists have argued that the Bible can be given full scientific backing,
and they have therefore argued that “Creation science” may properly be taught
in state-supported schools in the United States without violation of the
constitutional separation of church and state. This claim was challenged in the
state of Arkansas in 1, and ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
creationism dispute has raised some issues of philosophical interest and
importance. Most obviously, there is the question of what constitutes a genuine
science. Is there an adequate criterion of demarcation between science and
nonscience, and will it put evolutionism on the one side and creationism on the
other? Some philosophers, arguing in the spirit of Karl Popper, think that such
a criterion can be found. Others are not so sure; and yet others think that
some such criterion can be found, but shows creationism to be genuine science,
albeit already proven false. Philosophers of education have also taken an
interest in creationism and what it represents. If one grants that even the
most orthodox science may contain a value component, reflecting and influencing
its practitioners’ culture, then teaching a subject like biology almost
certainly is not a normatively neutral enterprise. In that case, without
necessarily conceding to the creationist anything about the true nature of
science or values, perhaps one must agree that science with its teaching is not
something that can and should be set apart from the rest of society, as an
entirely distinct phenomenon.
Croce
– Grice: “I would think the fashionable Englishwoman may think Croce is the
most important philosopher that ever lived!” -- vide under “Grice as Croceian”
-- Grice as Croceian:
expression and intention -- Croce, B., philosopher. He was born at
Pescasseroli, in the Abruzzi, and after 6 lived in Naples. He briefly attended
the of Rome and was led to study Herbart’s
philosophy. In 4 he founded the influential journal La critica. In 0 he was
made life member of the senate. Early in
his career he befriended Giovanni Gentile, but this friendship was breached by
Gentile’s Fascism. During the Fascist period and World War II Croce lived in
isolation as the chief anti-fascist thinker in Italy. He later became a leader
of the Liberal party and at the age of eighty founded the Institute for
Historical Studies. Croce was a literary and historical scholar who joined his
great interest in these fields to philosophy. His best-known work in the
Englishspeaking world is Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General
Linguistic 2. This was the first part of his “Philosophy of Spirit”; the second
was his Logic 5, the third his theory of the Practical 9, and the fourth his
Historiography 7. Croce was influenced by Hegel and the Hegelian aesthetician
Francesco De Sanctis 181783 and by Vico’s conceptions of knowledge, history,
and society. He wrote The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico 1 and a famous
commentary on Hegel, What Is Living and What Is critical theory Croce,
Benedetto Dead in the Philosophy of
Hegel 7, in which he advanced his conception of the “dialectic of distincts” as
more fundamental than the Hegelian dialectic of opposites. Croce held that
philosophy always springs from the occasion, a view perhaps rooted in his
concrete studies of history. He accepted the general Hegelian identification of
philosophy with the history of philosophy. His philosophy originates from his
conception of aesthetics. Central to his aesthetics is his view of intuition,
which evolved through various stages during his career. He regards aesthetic
experience as a primitive type of cognition. Intuition involves an awareness of
a particular image, which constitutes a non-conceptual form of knowledge. Art
is the expression of emotion but not simply for its own sake. The expression of
emotion can produce cognitive awareness in the sense that the particular
intuited as an image can have a cosmic aspect, so that in it the universal
human spirit is perceived. Such perception is present especially in the
masterpieces of world literature. Croce’s conception of aesthetic has
connections with Kant’s “intuition” Anschauung and to an extent with Vico’s conception
of a primordial form of thought based in imagination fantasia. Croce’s
philosophical idealism includes fully developed conceptions of logic, science,
law, history, politics, and ethics. His influence to date has been largely in
the field of aesthetics and in historicist conceptions of knowledge and
culture. His revival of Vico has inspired a whole school of Vico scholarship.
Croce’s conception of a “Philosophy of Spirit” showed it was possible to
develop a post-Hegelian philosophy that, with Hegel, takes “the true to be the
whole” but which does not simply imitate Hegel.
Croce -- expression theory of art, a theory that defines art as the
expression of feelings or emotion sometimes called expressionism in art. Such
theories first acquired major importance in the nineteenth century in
connection with the rise of Romanticism. Expression theories are as various as
the different views about what counts as expressing emotion. There are four
main variants. 1 Expression as communication. This requires that the artist
actually have the feelings that are expressed, when they are initially
expressed. They are “embodied” in some external form, and thereby transmitted
to the perceiver. Leo Tolstoy 18280 held a view of this sort. 2 Expression as
intuition. An intuition is the apprehension of the unity and individuality of
something. An intuition is “in the mind,” and hence the artwork is also. Croce
held this view, and in his later work argued that the unity of an intuition is
established by feeling. 3 Expression as clarification. An artist starts out
with vague, undefined feelings, and expression is a process of coming to
clarify, articulate, and understand them. This view retains Croce’s idea that
expression is in the artist’s mind, as well as explanation, covering law
expression theory of art 299 299 his
view that we are all artists to the degree that we articulate, clarify, and
come to understand our own feelings. Collingwood held this view. 4 Expression
as a property of the object. For an artwork to be an expression of emotion is
for it to have a given structure or form. Suzanne K. Langer 55 argued that
music and the other arts “presented” or exhibited structures or forms of
feeling in general.
Grice’s
crucial experiment:
a means of deciding between rival theories (or arguments) for this or that
impicatum, that, providing parallel explanations of large classes of phenomena,
come to be placed at issue by a single fact. For example, the Newtonian
emission theory predicts that light travels faster in water than in air;
according to the wave theory, light travels slower in water than in air.
Dominique François Arago proposed a crucial experiment comparing the respective
velocities. Léon Foucault then devised an apparatus to measure the speed of
light in various media and found a lower velocity in water than in air. Arago
and Foucault concluded for the wave theory, believing that the experiment
refuted the emission theory. Other examples include Galileo’s discovery of the
phases of Venus Ptolemaic versus Copernican astronomy, Pascal’s Puy-de-Dôme
experiment with the barometer vacuists versus plenists, Fresnel’s prediction of
a spot of light in circular shadows particle versus wave optics, and
Eddington’s measurement of the gravitational bending of light rays during a solar
eclipse Newtonian versus Einsteinian gravitation. At issue in crucial
experiments is usually a novel prediction. The notion seems to derive from
Francis Bacon, whose New Organon 1620 discusses the “Instance of the Fingerpost
Instantia later experimentum crucis,” a term borrowed from the post set up
at crossroads to indicate several directions. Crucial experiments were
emphasized in early nineteenth-century scientific methodology e.g., in John F. Herschel’s A Preliminary
Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy 1830. Duhem argued that crucial
experiments resemble false dilemmas: hypotheses in physics do not come in
pairs, so that crucial experiments cannot transform one of the two into a
demonstrated truth. Discussing Foucault’s experiment, Duhem asks whether we
dare assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable and suggests that instead of
light being either a simple particle or wave, light might be something else,
perhaps a disturbance propagated within a dielectric medium, as theorized by
Maxwell. In the twentieth century, crucial experiments and novel predictions
figured prominently in the work of Imre Lakatos 274. Agreeing that crucial
experiments are unable to overthrow theories, Lakatos accepted them as
retroactive indications of the fertility or progress of research programs.
cumberland -- Law – Grice was
obsessed with laws that would introduce psychological concepts -- Cumberland,
R. English philosopher and bishop. He wrote a Latin Treatise of the Laws of
Nature 1672, tr. twice into English and once into . Admiring Grotius,
Cumberland hoped to refute Hobbes in the interests of defending Christian
morality and religion. He refused to appeal to innate ideas and a priori
arguments because he thought Hobbes must be attacked on his own ground. Hence
he offered a reductive and naturalistic account of natural law. The one basic
moral law of nature is that the pursuit of the good of all rational beings is
the best path to the agent’s own good. This is true because God made nature so
that actions aiding others are followed by beneficial consequences to the
agent, while those harmful to others harm the agent. Since the natural
consequences of actions provide sanctions that, once we know them, will make us
act for the good of others, we can conclude that there is a divine law by which
we are obligated to act for the common good. And all the other laws of nature
follow from the basic law. Cumberland refused to discuss free will, thereby
suggesting a view of human action as fully determined by natural causes. If on
his theory it is a blessing that God made nature including humans to work as it
does, the religious
reader must wonder if there is any role left for God concerning morality.
Cumberland is generally viewed as a major forerunner of utilitarianism.
inductum – Grice knew a lot
about induction theory via Kneale and Keynes -- curve-fitting problem, the
problem of making predictions from past observations by fitting curves to the
data. Curve fitting has two steps: first, select a family of curves; then, find
the bestfitting curve by some statistical criterion such as the method of least
squares e.g., choose the curve that has the least sum of squared deviations
between the curve and data. The method was first proposed by Adrian Marie
Legendre 17521833 and Carl Friedrich Gauss 1777 1855 in the early nineteenth
century as a way of inferring planetary trajectories from noisy data. More
generally, curve fitting may be used to construct low-level empirical
generalizations. For example, suppose that the ideal gas law, P % nkT, is
chosen as the form of the law governing the dependence of the pressure P on the
equilibrium temperature T of a fixed volume of gas, where n is the molecular
number per unit volume and k is Boltzmann’s constant a universal constant equal
to 1.3804 $ 10†16 erg°C†1. When the parameter nk is adjustable, the law
specifies a family of curves one for
each numerCudworth, Damaris curve-fitting problem ical value of the parameter. Curve fitting
may be used to determine the best-fitting member of the family, thereby
effecting a measurement of the theoretical parameter, nk. The philosophically
vexing problem is how to justify the initial choice of the form of the law. On
the one hand, one might choose a very large, complex family of curves, which
would ensure excellent fit with any data set. The problem with this option is
that the best-fitting curve may overfit the data. If too much attention is paid
to the random elements of the data, then the predictively useful trends and
regularities will be missed. If it looks too good to be true, it probably is.
On the other hand, simpler families run a greater risk of making grossly false
assumptions about the true form of the law. Intuitively, the solution is to
choose a simplefamily of curves that maintains a reasonable degree of fit. The
simplicity of a family of curves is measured by the paucity of parameters. The
problem is to say how and why such a trade-off between simplicity and goodness
of fit should be made. When a theory can accommodate recalcitrant data only by
the ad hoc i.e., improperly
motivated addition of new terms and
parameters, students of science have long felt that the subsequent increase in
the degree of fit should not count in the theory’s favor, and such additions
are sometimes called ad hoc hypotheses. The best-known example of this sort of
ad hoc hypothesizing is the addition of epicycles upon epicycles in the
planetary astronomies of Ptolemy and Copernicus. This is an example in which a
gain in fit need not compensate for the loss of simplicity. Contemporary
philosophers sometimes formulate the curve-fitting problem differently. They
often assume that there is no noise in the data, and speak of the problem of
choosing among different curves that fit the data exactly. Then the problem is
to choose the simplest curve from among all those curves that pass through
every data point. The problem is that there is no universally accepted way of
defining the simplicity of single curves. No matter how the problem is
formulated, it is widely agreed that simplicity should play some role in theory
choice. Rationalists have championed the curve-fitting problem as exemplifying
the underdetermination of theory from data and the need to make a priori
assumptions about the simplicity of nature. Those philosophers who think that
we have no such a priori knowledge still need to account for the relevance of
simplicity to science. Whewell described curve fitting as the colligation of
facts in the quantitative sciences, and the agreement in the measured
parameters coefficients obtained by different colligations of facts as the
consilience of inductions. Different colligations of facts say on the same gas
at different volume or for other gases may yield good agreement among
independently measured values of parameters like the molecular density of the
gas and Boltzmann’s constant. By identifying different parameters found to
agree, we constrain the form of the law without appealing to a priori knowledge
good news for empiricism. But the accompanying increase in unification also
worsens the overall degree of fit. Thus, there is also the problem of how and
why we should trade off unification with total degree of fit. Statisticians
often refer to a family of hypotheses as a model. A rapidly growing literature
in statistics on model selection has not yet produced any universally accepted
formula for trading off simplicity with degree of fit. However, there is wide
agreement among statisticians that the paucity of parameters is the appropriate
way of measuring simplicity.
Grice’s
defense of modernist logic -- cut-elimination theorem, a theorem stating that a
certain type of inference rule including a rule that corresponds to modus
ponens is not needed in classical logic. The idea was anticipated by J.
Herbrand; the theorem was proved by G. Gentzen and generalized by S. Kleene.
Gentzen formulated a sequent calculus
i.e., a deductive system with rules for statements about derivability.
It includes a rule that we here express as ‘From C Y D,M and M,C Y D, infer C Y
D’ or ‘Given that C yields D or M, and that C plus M yields D, we may infer
that C yields D’. Cusa cut-elimination theorem This is called the cut rule because it
cuts out the middle formula M. Gentzen showed that his sequent calculus is an
adequate formalization of the predicate logic, and that the cut rule can be
eliminated; anything provable with it can be proved without it. One important
consequence of this is that, if a formula F is provable, then there is a proof
of F that consists solely of subformulas of F. This fact simplifies the study
of provability. Gentzen’s methodology applies directly to classical logic but
can be adapted to many nonclassical logics, including some intuitionistic
logics. It has led to some important theorems about consistency, and has
illuminated the role of auxiliary assumptions in the derivation of consequences
from a theory.
cybernetic
implicaturum
– What Grice disliked about the cybernetic implicaturum is that it is
‘mechanisitically derivable” and thus not really ‘rational’ in the way an implicaturum
is meant to be rational. A machine cannot implicate. Grice “Method in
philosophical psychology” -- cybernetics coined by N. Wiener in 7 from Grecian
kubernetes, ‘helmsman’, the study of the communication and manipulation of
information in service of the control and guidance of biological, physical, or
chemical energy systems. Historically, cybernetics has been intertwined with
mathematical theories of information communication and computation. To describe
the cybernetic properties of systems or processes requires ways to describe and
measure information reduce uncertainty about events within the system and its
environment. Feedback and feedforward, the basic ingredients of cybernetic
processes, involve information as what
is fed forward or backward and are basic
to processes such as homeostasis in biological systems, automation in industry,
and guidance systems. Of course, their most comprehensive application is to the
purposive behavior thought of cognitively goal-directed systems such as
ourselves. Feedback occurs in closed-loop, as opposed to open-loop, systems.
Actually, ‘open-loop’ is a misnomer involving no loop, but it has become
entrenched.
The standard example
of an openloop system is that of placing a heater with constant output in a
closed room and leaving it switched on. Room temperature may accidentally
reach, but may also dramatically exceed, the temperature desired by the
occupants. Such a heating system has no means of controlling itself to adapt to
required conditions. In contrast, the standard closed-loop system incorporates
a feedback component. At the heart of cybernetics is the concept of control. A
controlled process is one in which an end state that is reached depends
essentially on the behavior of the controlling system and not merely on its
external environment. That is, control involves partial independence for the
system. A control system may be pictured as having both an inner and outer
environment. The inner environment consists of the internal events that make up
the system; the outer environment consists of events that causally impinge on
the system, threatening disruption and loss of system integrity and stability.
For a system to maintain its independence and identity in the face of fluctuations
in its external environment, it must be able to detect information about those
changes in the external environment. Information must pass through the
interface between inner and outer environments, and the system must be able to
compensate for fluctuations of the outer environment by adjusting its own inner
environmental variables. Otherwise, disturbances in the outer environment will
overcome the system bringing its inner
states into equilibrium with the outer states, thereby losing its identity as a
distinct, independent system. This is nowhere more certain than with the
homeostatic systems of the body for temperature or blood sugar levels. Control
in the attainment of goals is accomplished by minimizing error. Negative
feedback, or information about error, is the difference between activity a
system actually performs output and that activity which is its goal to perform
input. The standard example of control incorporating negative feedback is the
thermostatically controlled heating system. The actual room temperature system
output carries information to the thermostat that can be compared via
goal-state comparator to the desired temperature for the room input as embodied
in the set-point on the thermostat; a correction can then be made to minimize
the difference error the furnace turns
on or off. Positive feedback tends to amplify the value of the output of a
system or of a system disturbance by adding the value of the output to the
system input quantity. Thus, the system accentuates disturbances and, if
unchecked, will eventually pass the brink of instability. Suppose that as room
temperature rises it causes the thermostatic set-point to rise in direct
proportion to the rise in temperature. This would cause the furnace to continue
to output heat possibly with disastrous consequences. Many biological maladies
have just this characteristic. For example, severe loss of blood causes
inability of the heart to pump effectively, which causes loss of arterial
pressure, which, in turn, causes reduced flow of blood to the heart, reducing
pumping efficiency. cybernetics cybernetics
Cognitively goal-directed systems are also cybernetic systems. Purposive
attainment of a goal by a goal-directed system must have at least: 1 an
internal representation of the goal state of the system a detector for whether
the desired state is actual; 2 a feedback loop by which information about the
present state of the system can be compared with the goal state as internally
represented and by means of which an error correction can be made to minimize
any difference; and 3 a causal dependency of system output upon the
error-correction process of condition 2 to distinguish goal success from
fortuitous goal satisfaction.
cynical
implicaturum,
Cynic -- a classical Grecian philosophical school characterized by asceticism
and emphasis on the sufficiency of virtue for happiness eudaimonia, boldness in
speech, and shamelessness in action. The Cynics were strongly influenced by
Socrates and were themselves an important influence on Stoic ethics. An ancient
tradition links the Cynics to Antisthenes c.445c.360 B.C., an Athenian. He
fought bravely in the battle of Tanagra and claimed that he would not have been
so courageous if he had been born of two Athenians instead of an Athenian and a
Thracian slave. He studied with Gorgias, but later became a close companion of
Socrates and was present at Socrates’ death. Antisthenes was proudest of his
wealth, although he had no money, because he was satisfied with what he had and
he could live in whatever circumstances he found himself. Here he follows
Socrates in three respects. First, Socrates himself lived with a disregard for
pleasure and pain e.g., walking barefoot
in snow. Second, Socrates thinks that in every circumstance a virtuous person
is better off than a nonvirtuous one; Antisthenes anticipates the Stoic
development of this to the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness,
because the virtuous person uses properly whatever is present. Third, both
Socrates and Antisthenes stress that the soul is more important than the body,
and neglect the body for the soul. Unlike the later Cynics, however, both
Socrates and Antisthenes do accept pleasure when it is available. Antisthenes
also does not focus exclusively on ethics; he wrote on other topics, including
logic. He supposedly told Plato that he could see a horse but not horseness, to
which Plato replied that he had not acquired the means to see horseness.
Diogenes of Sinope c.400c.325 B.C. continued the emphasis on self-sufficiency
and on the soul, but took the disregard for pleasure to asceticism. According
to one story, Plato called Diogenes “Socrates gone mad.” He came to Athens
after being exiled from Sinope, perhaps because the coinage was defaced, either
by himself or by others, under his father’s direction. He took ‘deface the
coinage!’ as a motto, meaning that the current standards were corrupt and
should be marked as corrupt by being defaced; his refusal to live by them was
his defacing them. For example, he lived in a wine cask, ate whatever scraps he
came across, and wrote approvingly of cannibalism and incest. One story reports
that he carried a lighted lamp in broad daylight looking for an honest human,
probably intending to suggest that the people he did see were so corrupted that
they were no longer really people. He apparently wanted to replace the debased
standards of custom with the genuine standards of nature but nature in the sense of what was minimally
required for human life, which an individual human could achieve, without society.
Because of this, he was called a Cynic, from the Grecian word kuon dog, because
he was as shameless as a dog. Diogenes’ most famous successor was Crates fl.
c.328325 B.C.. He was a Boeotian, from Thebes, and renounced his wealth to
become a Cynic. He seems to have been more pleasant than Diogenes; according to
some reports, every Athenian house was open to him, and he was even regarded by
them as a household god. Perhaps the most famous incident involving Crates is
his marriage to Hipparchia, who took up the Cynic way of life despite her
family’s opposition and insisted that educating herself was preferable to
working a loom. Like Diogenes, Crates emphasized that happiness is
self-sufficiency, and claimed that asceticism is required for self-sufficiency;
e.g., he advises us not to prefer oysters to lentils. He argues that no one is
happy if happiness is measured by the balance of pleasure and pain, since in
each period of our lives there is more pain than pleasure. Cynicism continued
to be active through the third century B.C., and returned to prominence in the
second century A.D. after an apparent decline.
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