open-close
distinction, the:
open formula: also called open sentence, a sentence with a free occurrence of a
variable. A closed sentence, sometimes called a ‘statement,’ has no free
occurrences of variables. In a language whose only variable-binding operators
are quantifiers, an occurrence of a variable in a formula is bound provided
that occurrence either is within the scope of a quantifier employing that
variable or is the occurrence in that quantifier. An occurrence of a variable
in a formula is free provided it is not bound. The formula ‘xy O’ is open because both ‘x’ and ‘y’ occur as
free variables. In ‘For some real number y, xy
O’, no occurrence of ‘y’ is free; but the occurrence of ‘x’ is free, so
the formula is open. The sentence ‘For every real number x, for some real
number y, xy O’ is closed, since none of
the variables occur free. Semantically, an open formula such as ‘xy 0’ is neither true nor false but rather true
of or false of each assignment of values to its free-occurring variables. For
example, ‘xy 0’ is true of each
assignment of two positive or two negative real numbers to ‘x’ and to ‘y’ and
it is false of each assignment of 0 to either and false at each assignment of a
positive real to one of the variables and a negative to the other. Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “Implicatura of free-variable utterances.”
porosität: porosity -- open texture, the possibility of
vagueness. Waismann “Verifiability,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
introduced the metaphor, claiming that open texture is a universal property of
empirical terms. Waismann claims that an inexhaustible source of vagueness
remains even after measures are taken to make an expression precise. His grounds
were, first, that there are an indefinite number of possibilities for which it
is indeterminate whether the expression applies i.e., for which the expression
is vague. There is, e.g., no definite answer whether a catlike creature that
repeatedly vanishes into thin air, then reappears, is a cat. Waismann’s
explanation is that when we define an empirical term, we frame criteria of its
applicability only for foreseeable circumstances. Not all possible situations
in which we may use the term, however, can be foreseen. Thus, in unanticipated
circumstances, real or merely possible, a term’s criteria of applicability may
yield no definite answer to whether it applies. Second, even for terms such as
‘gold’, for which there are several precise criteria of application specific
gravity, X-ray spectrograph, solubility in aqua regia, applying different
criteria can yield divergent verdicts, the result being vagueness. Waismann
uses the concept of open texture to explain why experiential statements are not
conclusively verifiable, and why phenomenalist attempts to translate material
object statements fail. Waismanns Konzept der offenen Struktur oder Porosität, hat
in der ... πόρος , ὁ, (πείρω, περάω) A.means of passing a river, ford,
ferry, Θρύον Ἀλφειοῖο π. Thryum the ford of the Alphëus, Il.2.592, h.Ap.423,
cf. h.Merc.398; “πόρον ἷξον Ξάνθου” Il.14.433; “Ἀξίου π.” A.Pers.493; ἀπικνέεται
ἐς τὸν π.τῆς διαβάσιος to the place of the passage, Hdt.8.115; “π. διαβὰς Ἅλυος”
A.Pers.864(lyr.); “τοῦ κατ᾽ Ὠρωπὸν π. μηδὲν πραττέσθω” IG12.40.22. 2. narrow
part of the sea, strait, “διαβὰς πόρον Ὠκεανοῖο” Hes.Th.292; “παρ᾽ Ὠκεανοῦ . . ἄσβεστον
π.” A.Pr.532 (lyr.); π. Ἕλλης (Dor. Ἕλλας), = Ἑλλήσποντος, Pi.Fr.189, A.Pers.
875(lyr.), Ar.V.308(lyr.); Ἰόνιος π. the Ionian Sea which is the passage-way
from Greece to Italy, Pi.N.4.53; “πέλαγος αἰγαίου πόρου” E.Hel.130; Εὔξεινος, ἄξενος
π. (cf. “πόντος” 11), Id.Andr.1262, IT253; διάραντες τὸν π., i.e. the sea
between Sicily and Africa, Plb.1.37.1; ἐν πόρῳ in the passage-way (of ships),
in the fair-way, Hdt.7.183, Th. 1.120, 6.48; “ἐν π. τῆς ναυμαχίης” Hdt.8.76; “ἕως
τοῦ π. τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ὅρμον τὸν Ἀφροδιτοπολίτην” PHib.1.38.5(iii B.C.). 3.
periphr., πόροι ἁλός the paths of the sea, i.e. the sea, Od.12.259; “Αἰγαίου
πόντοιο πλατὺς π.” D.P.131; “ἐνάλιοι π.” A.Pers.453; π.ἁλίρροθοι ib.367,
S.Aj.412(lyr.); freq. of rivers, π. Ἀλφεοῦ, Σκαμάνδρου, i.e. the Alphëus,
Scamander, etc., Pi.O.1.92, A.Ch.366(lyr.), etc.; “ῥυτοὶ π.” Id.Eu.452, cf.293;
Πλούτωνος π. the river Pluto, Id.Pr.806: metaph., βίου π. the stream of life,
Pi.I.8(7).15; “π. ὕμνων” Emp.35.1. 4. artificial passage over a river, bridge,
Hdt.4.136,140, 7.10.“γ́;” aqueduct, IG7.93(Megara, V A.D., restd.),
Epigr.Gr.1073.4 (Samos). 5. generally, pathway, way, A.Ag. 910, S.Ph.705(lyr.),
etc.; track of a wild beast, X.Cyr.1.6.40; αἰθέρα θ᾽ ἁγνὸν πόρον οἰωνῶν their
pathway, A.Pr.284(anap.); ἐν τῷ π.εἶναι to be in the way, Sammelb.7356.11(ii
A.D.): metaph., “πραπίδων πόροι” A.Supp.94(lyr.). 6. passage through a porous
substance, opening, Epicur.Ep.1pp.10,18 U.; esp. passage through the skin, οἱ
πόροι the pores or passages by which the ἀπορροαί passed, acc. to Empedocles,
“πόρους λέγετε εἰς οὓς καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται” Pl.Men.76c, cf.
Epicur. Fr.250, Metrod. Fr.7,Ti.Locr.100e; “νοητοὶ π.” S.E.P.2.140; opp. ὄγκοι,
Gal. 10.268; so of sponges, Arist. HA548b31; of plants, Id.Pr. 905b8,
Thphr.CP1.2.4, HP1.10.5. b. of other ducts or openings of the body, π. πρῶτος,
of the womb, Hp. ap. Poll.2.222; πόροι σπερματικοί, θορικοὶ π., Arist.GA716b17,
720b13; π. “ὑστερικοί” the ovaries. Id.HA570a5, al.; τροφῆς π., of the
oesophagus, Id.PA650a15, al.; of the rectum, Id.GA719b29; of the urinal duct,
ib.773a21; of the arteries and veins, Id.HA510a14, etc. c. passages leading
from the organs of sensation to the brain, “ψυχὴ παρεσπαρμένη τοῖς π.”
Pl.Ax.366a; “οἱ π. τοῦ ὄμματος” Arist.Sens.438b14, cf. HA495a11, PA 656b17; ὤτων,
μυκτήρων, Id.GA775a2, cf. 744a2; of the optic nerves, Heroph. ap. Gal.7.89. II.
c. gen. rei, way or means of achieving, accomplishing, discovering, etc., “οὐκ ἐδύνατο
π. οὐδένα τούτου ἀνευρεῖν” Hdt.2.2; “οὐδεὶς π. ἐφαίνετο τῆς ἁλώσιος” Id.3.156;
“τῶν ἀδοκήτων π. ηὗρε θεός” E.Med.1418 (anap.); π. ὁδοῦ a means of performing
the journey, Ar.Pax124; “π. ζητήματος” Pl.Tht.191a; but also π. κακῶν a means
of escaping evils, a way out of them, E.Alc.213 (lyr.): c. inf., “πόρος νοῆσαι”
Emp.4.12; “π. εὐθαρσεῖν” And.2.16; “π. τις μηχανή τε . . ἀντιτείσασθαι”
E.Med.260: with Preps., “π. ἀμφί τινος” A.Supp.806 codd. (lyr.); περί τινος
dub. in Ar.Ec.653; “πόροι πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν” X. An.2.5.20. 2. abs., providing,
means of providing, opp. ἀπορία, Pl. Men.78d sq.; contrivance, device, “οἵας
τέχνας τε καὶ π. ἐμησάμην” A.Pr. 477; δεινὸς γὰρ εὑρεῖν κἀξ ἀμηχάνων πόρον
ib.59, cf. Ar.Eq.759; “μέγας π.” A.Pr.111; “τίνα π. εὕρω πόθεν;” E.IA356
(troch.). 3. π. χρημάτων a way of raising money, financial provision,
X.Ath.3.2, HG1.6.12, D.1.19, IG7.4263.2 (Oropus, iii B.C.), etc.; “ὁ π. τῶν
χρ.” D.4.29, IG12(5).1001.1 (Ios, iv B.C.); without χρημάτων, SIG284.23
(Erythrae, iv B.C.), etc.; “μηχανᾶσθαι προσόδου π.” X.Cyr.1.6.10, cf. PTeb.75.6
(ii B.C.): in pl., 'ways and means', resources, revenue, “πόροι χρημάτων” D.
18.309: abs., “πόρους πορίζειν” Hyp.Eux.37, cf. X.Cyr.1.6.9 (sg.), Arist.
Rh.1359b23; πόροι ἢ περὶ προσόδων, title of work by X.: sg., source of revenue,
endowment, OGI544.24 (Ancyra, ii A.D.), 509.12,14 (Aphrodisias, ii A.D.), etc.
b. assessable income or property, taxable estate, freq. in Pap., as BGU1189.11
(i A.D.), etc.; liability, PHamb.23.29 (vi A.D.), etc. III. journey, voyage,
“μακρᾶς κελεύθου π.” A. Th. 546; “παρόρνιθας π. τιθέντες” Id.Eu.770, cf.
E.IT116, etc.; ἐν τῷ π. πλοῖον ἀνατρέψαι on its passage, Aeschin.3.158. IV. Π
personified as father of Ἔρως, Pl.Smp.203b.
operationalism:
a program in philosophy of science that aims to interpret scientific concepts
via experimental procedures and observational outcomes. P. W. Bridgman
introduced the terminology when he required that theoretical concepts be
identified with the operations used to measure them. Logical positivism’s
criteria of cognitive significance incorporated the notion: Bridgman’s
operationalism was assimilated to the positivistic requirement that theoretical
terms T be explicitly defined via logically equivalent to directly observable
conditions O. Explicit definitions failed to accommodate alternative
measurement procedures for the same concept, and so were replaced by reduction
sentences that partially defined individual concepts in observational terms via
sentences such as ‘Under observable circumstances C, x is T if and only if O’.
Later this was weakened to allow ensembles of theoretical concepts to be
partially defined via interpretative systems specifying collective observable
effects of the concepts rather than effects peculiar to single concepts. These
cognitive significance notions were incorporated into various behaviorisms,
although the term ‘operational definition’ is rarely used by scientists in
Bridgman’s or the explicit definition senses: intervening variables are
theoretical concepts defined via reduction sentences and hypothetical
constructs are definable by interpretative systems but not reduction sentences.
In scientific contexts observable terms often are called dependent or
independent variables. When, as in science, the concepts in theoretical
assertions are only partially defined, observational consequences do not
exhaust their content, and so observational data underdetermines the truth of
such assertions in the sense that more than one theoretical assertion will be
compatible with maximal observational data.
Operatum
– “Unoriginally, I will use “O” to symbolise an ‘operator’” – Grice. if you
have an operaturm, you also have an operator – operans, operaturum, operandum,
operatum – The operans is like the operator: a one-place sentential connective;
i.e., an expression that may be prefixed to an open or closed sentence to
produce, respectively, a new open or closed sentence. Thus ‘it is not the case
that’ is a truth-functional operator. The most thoroughly investigated
operators are the intensional ones; an intensional operator O, when prefixed to
an open or closed sentence E, produces an open or closed sentence OE, whose
extension is determined not by the extension of E but by some other property of
E, which varies with the choice of O. For example, the extension of a closed
sentence is its truth-value A, but if the modal operator ‘it is necessary that’
is prefixed to A, the extension of the result depends on whether A’s extension
belongs to it necessarily or contingently. This property of A is usually
modeled by assigning to A a subset X of a domain of possible worlds W. If X % W
then ‘it is necessary that A’ is true, but if X is a proper subset of W, it is
false. Another example involves the epistemic operator ‘it is plausible that’.
Since a true sentence may be either plausible or implausible, the truth-value
of ‘it is plausible that A’ is not fixed by the truth-value of A, but rather by
the body of evidence that supports A relative to a thinker in a given context.
This may also be modeled in a possible worlds framework, by operant
conditioning operator 632 632
stipulating, for each world, which worlds, if any, are plausible relative to
it. The topic of intensional operators is controversial, and it is even
disputable whether standard examples really are operators at the correct level
of logical form. For instance, it can be argued that ‘it is necessary that’,
upon analysis, turns out to be a universal quantifier over possible worlds, or
a predicate of expressions. On the former view, instead of ‘it is necessary
that A’ we should write ‘for every possible world w, Aw’, and, on the latter,
‘A is necessarily true’.
adverb
– for the speculative grammarian like Alcuin, or Occam, a part of speech – pars
orationis – surely not one of Plato’s basic ones! -- operator theory of
adverbs, a theory that treats adverbs and other predicate modifiers as
predicate-forming operators on predicates. The theory expands the syntax of
first-order predicate calculus of identity – Sytem G, Gricese -- by adding
operators of various degrees, and makes corresponding additions to the
semantics. Romane Clark, Terence Parsons, and Richard Montague with Hans Kamp
developed the theory independently. Grice discusses it in “Actions and events.”
For example: ‘John runs quickly through the kitchen’ contains a simple
one-place predicate, ‘runs’ applied to John; a zero-place operator, ‘quickly’,
and a one-place operator, ‘through ’ with ‘the kitchen’ filling its place. The
semantics of the expression becomes [O1 1a [O2 0 [Pb]]], which can be read as “[through
the kitchen [quickly [runs John]]]. Semantically ‘quickly’ will be associated
with an operation that takes us from the extension of ‘runs’ to a subset of
that extension. ‘John runs quickly’ entails, but does not implicate, ‘John
runs’. ‘Through the kitchen’ and other operators are handled similarly. The
wide variety of predicate modifiers complicates the inferential conditions and
semantics of the operators. ‘John is finally done’ entails, but does not
implicate, ‘John is done’. Oddly, ‘John is nearly done’ or “John is hardly
done” entails, but does not implicate ‘John is not done’ (whereas “John is
hardly done” entails that it is not the case that John is done. Clark tries to
distinguish various types of predicate modifiers and provides a different
semantic analysis for operators of different sorts. The theory can easily characterize
syntactic aspects of predicate modifier iteration. In addition, after being
modified the original predicates remain as predicates, and maintain their
original degree. Further, there is no need to force John’s running into subject
position as might be the case if we try to make ‘quickly’ an ordinary
predicate. Refs.: Grice, “Actiosn and events,” H. P. Grice, “Why adverbs matter
to philosophy,” Grice, “The semantics of action.” Grice, “Austin on Mly.” --
optimum. Grice: “We must distinguish between the optimum, the
maximum, and the satisficing!” -- If (a) S accepts at t
an alethic acceptability-conditional C 1 , the antecedent of which favours, to
degree d, the consequent of C 1 , (b) S accepts at t the antecedent of C 1 ,
end p.81 (c) after due search by S for such a (further) conditional, there is
no conditional C 2 such that (1) S accepts at t C 2 and its antecedent, (2) and
the antecedent of C 2 is an extension of the antecedent of C 1 , (3) and the
consequent of C 2 is a rival (incompatible with) of the consequent of C 1 , (4)
and the antecedent of C 2 favours the consequent of C 2 more than it favours
the consequent of C 1 : then S may judge (accept) at t that the consequent of C
1 is acceptable to degree d. For convenience, we might abbreviate the complex
clause (C) in the antecedent of the above rule as 'C 1 is optimal for S at t';
with that abbreviation, the rule will run: "If S accepts at t an alethic
acceptability-conditional C 1 , the antecedent of which favours its consequent
to degree d, and S accepts at t the antecedent of C 1 , and C 1 is optimal for
S at C 1 , then S may accept (judge) at t that the consequent of C 1 is
acceptable to degree d." Before moving to the practical dimension, I have
some observations to make.See validum. For
Grice, the validum can attain different shapes or guises. One is the optimum.
He uses it for “Emissor E communicates thata p” which ends up denotating an
‘ideal,’ that can only be deemed, titularily, to be present ‘de facto.’ The
idea is that of the infinite, or rather self-reference regressive closure. Vide
Blackburn on “open GAIIB.” Grice uses ‘optimality’ as one guise of value.
Obviously, it is, as Short and Lewis have it, the superlative of ‘bonum,’ so
one has to be careful. Optimum is used in value theory and decision theory,
too. Cf. Maximum, and minimax. In terms
of the principle of least conversational effort, the optimal move is the least
costly. To utter, “The pillar box seems red” when you can utter, “The pillar box
IS red” is to go into the trouble when you shouldn’t. So this maximin regulates
the conversational exchange. The utterer is meant to be optimally efficient,
and the addressee is intended to recognise that.
order: the level of a
system as determined by the type of entity over which the free variables of
that logic range. Entities of the lowest type, usually called type O, are known
as individuals, and entities of higher type are constructed from entities of
lower type. For example, type 1 entities are i functions from individuals or
n-tuples of individuals to individuals, and ii n-place relations on
individuals. First-order logic is that logic whose variables range over
individuals, and a model for first-order logic includes a domain of individuals.
The other logics are known as higher-order logics, and the first of these is
second-order logic, in which there are variables that range over type 1
entities. In a model for second-order logic, the first-order domain determines
the second-order domain. For every sentence to have a definite truth-value,
only totally defined functions are allowed in the range of second-order
function variables, so these variables range over the collection of total
functions from n-tuples of individuals to individuals, for every value of n.
The second-order predicate variables range over all subsets of n-tuples of
individuals. Thus if D is the domain of individuals of a model, the type 1
entities are the union of the two sets {X: Dn: X 0 Dn$D}, {X: Dn: X 0 Dn}. Quantifiers
may bind second-order variables and are subject to introduction and elimination
rules. Thus whereas in first-order logic one may infer ‘Someone is wise,
‘DxWx’, from ‘Socrates is wise’, ‘Ws’, in second-order logic one may also infer
‘there is something that Socrates is’, ‘DXXs’. The step from first- to
second-order logic iterates: in general, type n entities are the domain of n !
1thorder variables in n ! 1th order logic, and the whole hierarchy is known as
the theory of types.
ordering: an arrangement of
the elements of a set so that some of them come before others. If X is a set,
it is useful to identify an ordering R of X with a subset R of X$X, the set of
all ordered pairs with members in X. If ‹ x,y
1 R then x comes before y in the ordering of X by R, and if ‹ x,y 2 R and ‹ y,x
2 R, then x and y are incomparable. Orders on X are therefore relations
on X, since a relation on a set X is any subset of X $ X. Some minimal
conditions a relation must meet to be an ordering are i reflexivity: ExRxx; ii
antisymmetry: ExEyRxy & Ryx / x % y; and iii transitivity: ExEyEzRxy &
Ryz / Rxz. A relation meeting these three conditions is known as a partial
order also less commonly called a semi-order, and if reflexivity is replaced by
irreflexivity, Ex-Rxx, as a strict partial order. Other orders are
strengthenings of these. Thus a tree-ordering of X is a partial order with a
distinguished root element a, i.e. ExRax, and that satisfies the backward
linearity condition that from any element there is a unique path back to a:
ExEyEzRyx & Rzx / Ryz 7 Rzy. A total order on X is a partial order
satisfying the connectedness requirement: ExEyRxy 7 Ryx. Total orderings are
sometimes known as strict linear orderings, contrasting with weak linear
orderings, in which the requirement of antisymmetry is dropped. The natural
number line in its usual order is a strict linear order; a weak linear ordering
of a set X is a strict linear order of levels on which various members of X may
be found, while adding antisymmetry means that each level contains only one
member. Two other important orders are dense partial or total orders, in which,
between any two elements, there is a third; and well-orders. A set X is said to
be well-ordered by R if R is total and every non-empty subset of Y of X has an
R-least member: EY 0 X[Y & / / Dz 1 YEw 1 YRzw]. Well-ordering rules out
infinite descending sequences, while a strict well-ordering, which is
irreflexive rather than reflexive, rules out loops. The best-known example is
the membership relation of axiomatic set theory, in which there are no loops
such as x 1 y 1 x or x 1 x, and no infinite descending chains . . . x2 1 x1 1
x0.
order
type omega: in mathematics, the order type of the infinite set of natural
numbers. The last letter of the Grecian alphabet, w, is used to denote this
order type; w is thus the first infinite ordinal number. It can be defined as
the set of all finite ordinal numbers ordered by magnitude; that is, w %
{0,1,2,3 . . . }. A set has order type w provided it is denumerably infinite,
has a first element but not a last element, has for each element a unique
successor, and has just one element with no immediate predecessor. The set of
even numbers ordered by magnitude, {2,4,6,8 . . . }, is of order type w. The
set of natural numbers listing first all even numbers and then all odd numbers,
{2,4,6,8 . . .; 1,3,5,7 . . . }, is not of order type w, since it has two
elements, 1 and 2, with no immediate predecessor. The set of negative integers
ordered by magnitude, { . . . 3,2,1}, is also not of order type w, since it has
no first element. V.K. ordinal logic, any means of associating effectively and
uniformly a logic in the sense of a formal axiomatic system Sa with each
constructive ordinal notation a. This notion and term for it was introduced by
Alan Turing in his paper “Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals” 9. Turing’s aim
was to try to overcome the incompleteness of formal systems discovered by Gödel
in 1, by means of the transfinitely iterated, successive adjunction of unprovable
but correct principles. For example, according to Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem, for each effectively presented formal system S containing a modicum of
elementary number theory, if S is consistent then S does not prove the purely
universal arithmetical proposition Cons expressing the consistency of S via the
Gödelnumbering of symbolic expressions, even though Cons is correct. However,
it may be that the result S’ of adjoining Cons to S is inconsistent. This will
not happen if every purely existential statement provable in S is correct; call
this condition E-C. Then if S satisfies E-C, so also does S; % S ! Cons ; now
S; is still incomplete by Gödel’s theorem, though it is more complete than S.
Clearly the passage from S to S; can be iterated any finite number of times,
beginning with any S0 satisfying E-C, to form S1 % S; 0, S2 % S; 1, etc. But
this procedure can also be extended into the transfinite, by taking Sw to be
the union of the systems Sn for n % 0,1, 2 . . . and then Sw!1 % S;w, Sw!2 % S;w!1,
etc.; condition EC is preserved throughout. To see how far this and other
effective extension procedures of any effectively presented system S to another
S; can be iterated into the transfinite, one needs the notion of the set O of
constructive ordinal notations, due to Alonzo Church and Stephen C. Kleene in
6. O is a set ordering ordinal logic 634
634 of natural numbers, and each a in O denotes an ordinal a, written as
KaK. There is in O a notation for 0, and with each a in O is associated a
notation sca in O with KscaK % KaK ! 1; finally, if f is a number of an
effective function {f} such that for each n, {f}n % an is in O and KanK <
Kan!1K, then we have a notation øf in O with KøfK % limnKanK. For quite general
effective extension procedures of S to S; and for any given S0, one can
associate with each a in O a formal system Sa satisfying Ssca % S;a and Søf %
the union of the S{f}n for n % 0,1, 2. . . . However, as there might be many
notations for each constructive ordinal, this ordinal logic need not be
invariant, in the sense that one need not have: if KaK % KbK then Sa and Sb
have the same consequences. Turing proved that an ordinal logic cannot be both
complete for true purely universal statements and invariant. Using an extension
procedure by certain proof-theoretic reflection principles, he constructed an
ordinal logic that is complete for true purely universal statements, hence not
invariant. The history of this and later work on ordinal logics is traced by
the undersigned in “Turing in the Land of Oz,” in The Universal Turing Machine:
A Half Century Survey, edited by Rolf Herken.
‘ordinary’-language
philosophy:
“I never knew what language Austin meant – Greek most likely, given his
background!” – Grice prefers ‘vernacular,’ which is charming. Back in Oxford,
Occam had to struggle against his vernacular (“Englysse”) and speak Roman! Then
Latin was the lingua franca, i.e . tongue of the Franks! vide, H. P. Grice, “Post-War Oxford
Philosophy,” a loosely structured philosophical movement holding that the
significance of concepts, including those central to traditional
philosophy e.g., the concepts of truth
and knowledge is fixed by linguistic
practice. Philosophers, then, must be attuned to the actual uses of words
associated with these concepts. The movement enjoyed considerable prominence
chiefly among English-speaking philosophers between the mid-0s and the early
0s. It was initially inspired by the work of Vitters, and later by John Wisdom,
Gilbert Ryle, Norman Malcolm, J. L. Austin and H. P. Grice, though its roots go
back at least to Moore and arguably to Socrates. ‘Ordinary’-language
philosophers do not mean to suggest that, to discover what truth is, we are to
poll our fellow speakers or consult dictionaries (“Naess philosopher is not” –
Grice). Rather, we are to ask how the word ‘truth’ functions in everyday,
nonphilosophical settings. A philosopher whose theory of truth is at odds with
ordinary usage has simply misidentified the concept. Philosophical error,
ironically, was thought by Vitters to arise from our “bewitchment” by language.
When engaging in philosophy, we may easily be misled by superficial linguistic
similarities. We suppose minds to be special sorts of entity, for instance, in
part because of grammatical parallels between ‘mind’ and ‘body’. When we fail
to discover any entity that might plausibly count as a mind, we conclude that
minds must be nonphysical entities. The cure requires that we remind ourselves
how ‘mind’ and its cognates are actually used by ordinary speakers. Refs.: H.
P. Grice, “Post-war Oxford philosophy,” “Conceptual analysis and the province
of philosophy.”
organic:
having parts that are organized and interrelated in a way that is the same as,
or analogous to, the way in which the parts of a living animal or other
biological organism are organized and interrelated. Thus, an organic unity or
organic whole is a whole that is organic in the above sense. These terms are
primarily used of entities that are not literally organisms but are supposedly
analogous to them. Among the applications of the concept of an organic unity
are: to works of art, to the state e.g., by Hegel, and to the universe as a
whole e.g., in absolute idealism. The principal element in the concept is
perhaps the notion of an entity whose parts cannot be understood except by
reference to their contribution to the whole entity. Thus to describe something
as an organic unity is typically to imply that its properties cannot be given a
reductive explanation in terms of those of its parts; rather, at least some of
the properties of the parts must themselves be explained by reference to the
properties of the whole. Hence it usually involves a form of holism. Other
features sometimes attributed to organic unities include a mutual dependence
between the existence of the parts and that of the whole and the need for a
teleological explanation of properties of the parts in terms of some end or
purpose associated with the whole. To what extent these characteristics belong
to genuine biological organisms is disputed.
organicism,
a theory that applies the notion of an organic unity, especially to things that
are not literally organisms. G. E. Moore, in Principia Ethica, proposed a
principle of organic unities, concerning intrinsic value: the intrinsic value of
a whole need not be equivalent to the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts.
Moore applies the principle in arguing that there is no systematic relation
between the intrinsic value of an element of a complex whole and the difference
that the presence of that element makes to the value of the whole. E.g., he
holds that although a situation in which someone experiences pleasure in the
contemplation of a beautiful object has far greater intrinsic goodness than a
situation in which the person contemplates the same object without feeling
pleasure, this does not mean that the pleasure itself has much intrinsic value.
organism,
a carbon-based living thing or substance, e.g., a paramecium, a tree, or an
ant. Alternatively, ‘organism’ can mean, as in a typical Gricean gedenke
experiment, a hypothetical living thing
of another natural kind, e.g., a silicon-based living thing, in sum, a pirot –
“Pirots karulise elatically.” -- Defining conditions of a carbon-based living
thing, x, are as follows. 1 x has a layer made of m-molecules, i.e.,
carbonbased macromolecules of repeated units that have a high capacity for
selective reactions with other similar molecules. x can absorb and excrete
through this layer. 2 x can metabolize m-molecules. 3 x can synthesize
m-molecular parts of x by means of activities of a proper part of x that is a
nuclear molecule, i.e., an m-molecule that can copy itself. 4 x can exercise
the foregoing capacities in such a way that the corresponding activities are
causally interrelated as follows: x’s absorption and excretion causally
contribute to x’s metabolism; these processes jointly causally contribute to
x’s synthesizing; and x’s synthesizing causally contributes to x’s absorption,
excretion, and metabolism. 5 x belongs to a natural kind of compound physical
substance that can have a member, y, such that: y has a proper part, z; z is a
nuclear molecule; and y reproduces by means of z’s copying itself. 6 x is not
possibly a proper part of something that satisfies 16. The last condition
expresses the independence and autonomy of an organism. For example, a part of
an organism, e.g., a heart cell, is not an organism. It also follows that a
colony of organisms, e.g., a colony of ants, is not an organism.
Origen
(vide Patrologia – series Graeca – Migne) -- he became head of the catechetical
school in Alexandria. Like his mentor, Clement of Alexandria, he was influenced
by Middle Platonism. His principal works were Hexapla, On First Principles, and
Contra Celsum. The Hexapla, little of which survives, consisted of six Hebrew
and two Grecian versions of the Old Testament with Origen’s commentary. On
First Principles sets forth the most systematic Christian theology of the early
church, including some doctrines subsequently declared heretical, such as the
subordination of the Son “a secondary god” and Spirit to the Father,
preexisting human souls but not their transmigration, and a premundane fall
from grace of each human soul. The most famous of his views was the notion of
apocatastasis, universal salvation, the universal restoration of all creation
to God in which evil is defeated and the devil and his minions repent of their
sins. He interpreted hell as a temporary purgatory in which impure souls were
purified and made ready for heaven. His notion of subordination of the Son of
God to the Father was condemned by the church in 533. Origen’s Contra Celsum is
the first sustained work in Christian apologetics. It defends Christianity
before the pagan world. Origen was a leading exponent of the allegorical
interpretation of the Scriptures, holding that the text had three levels of
meaning corresponding to the three parts of human nature: body, soul, and
spirit. The first was the historical sense, sufficient for simple people; the
second was the moral sense; and the third was the mystical sense, open only to
the deepest souls.
Orphism – ovvero Orfeo a
Crotone -- or as Grice preferred Orpheusianism -- a religious movement in ancient Graeco-Roman
culture that may have influenced Plato and some of the pre-Socratics. Neither
the nature of the movement nor the scope of its influence is adequately
understood: ancient sources and modern scholars tend to confuse Orphism with the
Pythagoreanism school led by the native Crotonian “Filolao” at Crotone, and
with ancient mystery cults, especially the Bacchic or Dionysiac mysteries.
“Orphic poems,” i.e., poems attributed to Orpheus a mythic figure, circulated
as early as the mid-sixth century B.C. We have only indirect evidence of the
early Orphic poems; but we do have a sizable body of fragments from poems
composed in later antiquity. Central to both early and later versions is a
theogonic-cosmogonic narrative that posits Night (Nox) as the primal
entity ostensibly a revision of the
account offered by Hesiod and gives
major emphasis to the birth, death through dismemberment, and rebirth of the
god Dionysus, that the Romans called Bacchus. Plato gives us clear evidence of
the existence in his time of itinerant religious teachers who, drawing on the
“books of Orpheus,” performed and taught rituals of initiation and purification
intended to procure divine favor either in this life or in an afterlife. The
extreme skepticism of such scholars as Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and
I. M. Linforth concerning the importance of early Orphism for Graeco-Roman
religion and Graeco-Roman philosophy has been undermined by archaeological
findings in recent decades: the Derveni papyrus, which is a fragment of a
philosophical commentary on an Orphic theogony; and inscriptions with Orphic
instructions for the dead, from a funerary sites Crotone.
ostensum: In his
analysis of the two basic procedures, one involving the subjectum, and another
the praedicatum, Grice would play with the utterer OSTENDING that p. This
relates to his semiotic approach to communication, and avoiding to the maximum
any reference to a linguistic rule or capacity or faculty as different from
generic rationality. In WoW:134 Grice explores what he calls ‘ostensive
correlation.’ He is exploring communication scenarios where the Utterer is
OSTENDING that p, or in predicate terms, that the A is B. He is not so much
concerned with the B, but with the fact that “B” is predicated of a particular
denotatum of “the A,” and by what criteria. He is having in mind his uncle’s
dog, Fido, who is shaggy, i.e. fairy coated. So he is showing to Strawson that
that dog over there is the one that belongs to his uncle, and that, as Strawson
can see, is a shaggy dog, by which Grice means hairy coated. That’s the type of
‘ostensive correlation’ Grice is having in mind. In an attempted ostensive
correlation of the predicate B (‘shaggy’) with the feature or property of being
hairy coated, as per a standard act of communication in which Grice, uttering,
“Fido is shaggy’ will have Strawson believe that Uncle Grice’s dog is hairy
coated – (1) U will perform a number of acts in each of which he ostends a
thing (a1, a2, a3, etc.). (2)
Simultaneously with each ostension, he utters a token of the predicate “shaggy.”
(3) It is his intention TO OSTEND, and to be recognised as ostending, only
things which are either, in his view, plainly hairy-coated, or are, in his view,
plainly NOT hairy-coated. (4) In a model sequence these intentions are
fulfilled. Grice grants that this does not finely distinguish between ‘being
hairy-coated’ from ‘being such that the UTTERER believes to be unmistakenly
hairy coated.’ But such is a problem of any explicit correlation, which are
usually taken for granted – and deemed ‘implicit’ in standard acts of
communication. In primo actu non indiget volunta* diiectivo , sed sola_»
objecti ostensio ...
non potest errar* ciica finem in universali ostensum , potest tamen secundum eos
merton: Oxford
Calculators, a group of philosophers who flourished at Oxford. The name derives
from the “Liber calculationum.”. The author of this work, often called
“Calculator” by later Continental authors, is Richard Swineshead. The “Liber
calculationum” discussed a number of issues related to the quantification or
measurement of local motion, alteration, and augmentation for a fuller description
– v. Murdoch and Sylla, “Swineshead” in Dictionary of Scientific Biography. The
“Liber calculationum” has been studied mainly by historians of science and
grouped together with a number of other works discussing natural philosophical
topics by such authors as Bradwardine, Heytesbury, and Dumbleton. In earlier
histories many of the authors now referred to as Oxford Calculators are
referred to as “The Merton School,” since many of them were fellows of Merton .
But since some authors whose oeuvre appears to fit into the same intellectual
tradition e.g., Kilvington, whose “Sophismata” represents an earlier stage of
the tradition later epitomized by Heytesbury’s Sophismata have no known
connection with Merton , ‘Oxford Calculators’ would appear to be a more
accurate appellation. The works of the Oxford Calculators or Mertonians –
Grice: “I rather deem Kilvington a Mertonian than change the name of his
school!” -- were produced in the context of education in the Oxford arts
faculty – Sylla -- “The Oxford
Calculators,” in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of
Later Medieval Philosophy. At Oxford semantics is the centerpiece of the Lit.
Hum. curriculum. After semantics, Oxford came to be known for its work in
mathematics, astronomy, and natural philosophy. Students studying under the
Oxford faculty of arts not only heard lectures on the seven liberal arts and on
natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and metaphysics. They were also required
to take part in disputations. Heytesbury’s “Regule solvendi sophismatum” explicitly
and Swineshead’s “Liber calculationum” implicitly are written to prepare
students for these disputations. The three influences most formative on the
work of the Oxford Calculators were the tradition of commentaries on the works
of Aristotle; the developments in semantics, particularly the theories of
categorematic and syncategorematic terms and the theory of conseequentia,
implicate, and supposition; and and the theory of ratios as developed in
Bradwardine’s De proportionibus velocitatum in motibus. In addition to Swineshead,
Heytesbury, Bradwardine, Dumbleton, and Kilvington, other authors and works
related to the work of the Oxford Calculators are Burleigh, “De primo et ultimo
instanti, Tractatus Primus De formis accidentalibus, Tractatus Secundus De
intensione et remissione formarum; Swineshead, Descriptiones motuum; and Bode, “A
est unum calidum.” These and other works had a considerable later influence on
the Continent. Refs.: H. P. Grice,
“Sophismata in the Liber calculationum,” H. P. Grice, “My days at Merton.” – H.
P. Grice, “Merton made me.” – H. P. Grice, “Merton and post-war Oxford
philosophy.”
esse -- ousia: The abstractum
behind Grice’s ‘izz’ --. Grecian term traditionally tr. as ‘substance,’
although the strict transliteration is ‘essentia,’ a feminine abstract noun out
of the verb ‘esse.’ Formed from the participle for ‘being’, the term ousia
refers to the character of being, beingness, as if this were itself an entity.
Just as redness is the character that red things have, so ousia is the
character that beings have. Thus, the ousia of something is the character that
makes it be, its nature. But ousia also refers to an entity that possesses
being in its own right; for consider a case where the ousia of something is
just the thing itself. Such a thing possesses being by virtue of itself; because
its being depends on nothing else, it is self-subsistent and has a higher
degree of being than things whose being depends on something else. Such a thing
would be an ousia. Just which entities meet the criteria for ousia is a
question addressed by Aristotle. Something such as redness that exists only as
an attribute would not have being in its own right. An individual person is an
ousia, but Aristotle also argues that his form is more properly an ousia; and
an unmoved mover is the highest type of ousia. The traditional rendering of the
term into Latin as substantia and English as ‘substance’ is appropriate only in
contexts like Aristotle’s Categories where an ousia “stands under” attributes.
In his Metaphysics, where Aristotle argues that being a substrate does not
characterize ousia, and in other Grecian writers, ‘substance’ is often not an
apt translation.
outweighed rationality – the grammar – rationality of the
end, not just the means – extrinsic rationality – not intrinsic to the means. -- The intrinsic-extrinsic – outweigh --
extrinsic desire, a desire of something for its conduciveness to something else
that one desires. An extrinsic desire is distinguished from an intrinsic desire,
a desire of items for their own sake, or as an end. Thus, an individual might
desire financial security extrinsically, as a means to her happiness, and
desire happiness intrinsically, as an end. Some desires are mixed: their
objects are desired both for themselves and for their conduciveness to
something else. Jacques may desire to jog, e.g., both for its own sake as an
end and for the sake of his health. A desire is strictly intrinsic if and only
if its object is desired for itself alone. A desire is strictly extrinsic if
and only if its object is not desired, even partly, for its own sake. Desires
for “good news” e.g., a desire to hear
that one’s child has survived a car accident
are sometimes classified as extrinsic desires, even if the information
is desired only because of what it indicates and not for any instrumental value
that it may have. Desires of each kind help to explain action. Owing partly to
a mixed desire to entertain a friend, Martha might acquire a variety of
extrinsic desires for actions conducive to that goal. Less happily,
intrinsically desiring to be rid of his toothache, George might extrinsically
desire to schedule a dental appointment. If all goes well for Martha and
George, their desires will be satisfied, and that will be due in part to the
effects of the desires upon their behavior.
ordinary
language
– There are two topics about ordinary language, as anyone who ever consulted a
philosophical dictionary will realise. Words like ‘know’ and words like
“transcendental deduction.” Is Austin promoting that we stick with ‘know’ and
that no technical terms are even allowed for their analysis. We don’t thnk so..
The phatic and the rhetic and the phemic and the illocution and the perlocution
are not ‘ordinary’. –as opposed to
‘ideal’ language -- ideal language, a system of notation that would correct
perceived deficiencies of ordinary language by requiring the structure of
expressions to mirror the structure of that which they represent. The notion
that conceptual errors can be corrected and philosophical problems solved (or
dissolved) by properly representing them in some such system figured
prominently in the writings of Leibniz, Carnap, Russell, Wittgenstein, and
Frege, among others. For Russell, the ideal, or “logically perfect,” language
is one in which grammatical form coincides with logical form, there are no
vague or ambiguous expres sions, and no proper names that fail to denote.
Frege’s Begriffsschrift is perhaps the most thorough and successful execution
of the ideal language project. Deductions represented within this system (or
its modern descendants) can be effectively checked for correctness.
Oxford
idealism:
Grice is a member of “The F. H. Bradley Society,” at Mansfield. -- ideal
market, a hypothetical market, used as a tool of economic analysis, in which
all relevant agents are perfectly informed of the price of the good in question
and the cost of its production, and all economic transactions can be undertaken
with no cost. A specific case is a market exemplifying perfect competition. The
term is sometimes extended to apply to an entire economy consisting of ideal
markets for every good. -- ideal
observer, a hypothetical being, possessed of various qualities and traits,
whose moral reactions (judgments or attitudes) to actions, persons, and states
of affairs figure centrally in certain theories of ethics. There are two main
versions of ideal observer theory: (a) those that take the reactions of ideal
observers as a standard of the correctness of moral judgments, and (b) those
that analyze the meanings of moral judgments in terms of the reactions of ideal
observers. Theories of the first sort – ideal observer theories of correctness
– hold, e.g., that judgments like ‘John’s lying to Brenda about her father’s
death was wrong (bad)’ are correct provided any ideal observer would have a
negative attitude toward John’s action. Similarly, ‘Alison’s refusal to divulge
confidential information about her patient was right (good)’ is correct
provided any ideal observer would have a positive attitude toward that action.
This version of the theory can be traced to Adam Smith, who is usually credited
with introducing the concept of an ideal observer into philosophy, though he
used the expression ‘impartial spectator’ to refer to the concept. Regarding
the correctness of moral judgments, Smith wrote: “That precise and distinct
measure can be found nowhere but in the sympathetic feelings of the impartial
and well-informed spectator” (A Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759). Theories of
a second sort – ideal observer theories of meaning – take the concept of an
ideal observer as part of the very meaning of ordinary moral judgments. Thus,
according to Roderick Firth (“Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1952), moral judgments of the form ‘x
is good (bad)’, on this view, mean ‘All ideal observers would feel moral
approval (disapproval) toward x’, and similarly for other moral judgments
(where such approvals and disapprovals are characterized as felt desires having
a “demand quality”). Different conceptions of an ideal observer result from
variously specifying those qualities and traits that characterize such beings.
Smith’s characterization includes being well informed and impartial. However,
according to Firth, an ideal observer must be omniscient; omnipercipient, i.e.,
having the ability to imagine vividly any possible events or states of affairs,
including the experiences and subjective states of others; disinterested, i.e.,
having no interests or desires that involve essential reference to any
particular individuals or things; dispassionate; consistent; and otherwise a
“normal” human being. Both versions of the theory face a dilemma: on the one
hand, if ideal observers are richly characterized as impartial, disinterested,
and normal, then since these terms appear to be moral-evaluative terms, appeal
to the reactions of ideal observers (either as a standard of correctness or as
an analysis of meaning) is circular. On the other hand, if ideal observers
receive an impoverished characterization in purely non-evaluative terms, then
since there is no reason to suppose that such ideal observers will often all
agree in their reactions to actions, people, and states of affairs, most moral
judgments will turn out to be incorrect. Grice: “We have to distinguish between
idealism and hegelianism; but the English being as they are, they don’t! And being
English, I shouldn’t, either!” – “There is so-called ‘idealist’ logic; if so,
there is so called ‘idealist implicaturum’” “My favourite idealist philosopher
is Bosanquet.” “I like Bradley because Russell was once a Bradleyian, when it
was fashionable to be so! But surely Russell lacked the spirit to understand,
even, Bradley! It is so much easier to mock him!” --. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Pre-war Oxford philosophy.” The
reference to mentalism in the essay on ‘modest mentalism,’ after Myro, in The
H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
oxonian or oxford
aristototelian:
or the Oxonian peripatos – or the Peripatos in the Oxonian lycaeum -- Cambridge
Platonists: If Grice adored Aristotle, it was perhaps he hated the Cambridge
platonists so! a group of seventeenth-century philosopher-theologians at
the of Cambridge, principally including
Benjamin Whichcote 160983, often designated the father of the Cambridge
Platonists; Henry More; Ralph Cudworth 161788; and John Smith 161652.
Whichcote, Cudworth, and Smith received their
education in or were at some time fellows of Emmanuel , a stronghold of
the Calvinism in which they were nurtured and against which they rebelled under
mainly Erasmian, Arminian, and Neoplatonic influences. Other Cambridge men who
shared their ideas and attitudes to varying degrees were Nathanael Culverwel
1618?51, Peter Sterry 161372, George Rust d.1670, John Worthington 161871, and
Simon Patrick 1625 1707. As a generic label, ‘Cambridge Platonists’ is a handy
umbrella term rather than a dependable signal of doctrinal unity or
affiliation. The Cambridge Platonists were not a self-constituted group
articled to an explicit manifesto; no two of them shared quite the same set of
doctrines or values. Their Platonism was not exclusively the pristine teaching
of Plato, but was formed rather from Platonic ideas supposedly prefigured in
Hermes Trismegistus, in the Chaldean Oracles, and in Pythagoras, and which they
found in Origen and other church fathers, in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and
Proclus, and in the Florentine Neoplatonism of Ficino. They took contrasting
and changing positions on the important belief originating in Florence with
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola that Pythagoras and Plato derived their wisdom
ultimately from Moses and the cabala. They were not equally committed to
philosophical pursuits, nor were they equally versed in the new philosophies
and scientific advances of the time. The Cambridge Platonists’ concerns were
ultimately religious and theological rather than primarily philosophical. They
philosophized as theologians, making eclectic use of philosophical doctrines
whether Platonic or not for apologetic purposes. They wanted to defend “true
religion,” namely, their latitudinarian vision of Anglican Christianity,
against a variety of enemies: the Calvinist doctrine of predestination;
sectarianism; religious enthusiasm; fanaticism; the “hide-bound, strait-laced
spirit” of Interregnum Puritanism; the “narrow, persecuting spirit” that
followed the Restoration; atheism; and the impieties incipient in certain
trends in contemporary science and philosophy. Notable among the latter were
the doctrines of the mechanical philosophers, especially the materialism and
mechanical determinism of Hobbes and the mechanistic pretensions of the
Cartesians. The existence of God, the existence, immortality, and dignity of
the human soul, the existence of spirit activating the natural world, human
free will, and the primacy of reason are among the principal teachings of the
Cambridge Platonists. They emphasized the positive role of reason in all
aspects of philosophy, religion, and ethics, insisting in particular that it is
irrationality that endangers the Christian life. Human reason and understanding
was “the Candle of the Lord” Whichcote’s phrase, perhaps their most cherished
image. In Whichcote’s words, “To go against Reason, is to go against God . . .
Reason is the Divine Governor of Man’s Life; it is the very Voice of God.”
Accordingly, “there is no real clashing at all betwixt any genuine point of
Christianity and what true Philosophy and right Reason does determine or allow”
More. Reason directs us to the self-evidence of first principles, which “must
be seen in their own light, and are perceived by an inward power of nature.”
Yet in keeping with the Plotinian mystical tenor of their thought, they found
within the human soul the “Divine Sagacity” More’s term, which is the prime
cause of human reason and therefore superior to it. Denying the Calvinist
doctrine that revelation is the only source of spiritual light, they taught
that the “natural light” enables us to know God and interpret the Scriptures.
Cambridge Platonism was uncompromisingly innatist. Human reason has inherited
immutable intellectual, moral, and religious notions, “anticipations of the
soul,” which negate the claims of empiricism. The Cambridge Platonists were
skeptical with regard to certain kinds of knowledge, and recognized the role of
skepticism as a critical instrument in epistemology. But they were dismissive
of the idea that Pyrrhonism be taken seriously in the practical affairs of the
philosopher at work, and especially of the Christian soul in its quest for
divine knowledge and understanding. Truth is not compromised by our inability
to devise apodictic demonstrations. Indeed Whichcote passed a moral censure on
those who pretend “the doubtfulness and uncertainty of reason.” Innatism and
the natural light of reason shaped the Cambridge Platonists’ moral philosophy.
The unchangeable and eternal ideas of good and evil in the divine mind are the
exemplars of ethical axioms or noemata that enable the human mind to make moral
judgments. More argued for a “boniform faculty,” a faculty higher than reason
by which the soul rejoices in reason’s judgment of the good. The most
philosophically committed and systematic of the group were More, Cudworth, and
Culverwel. Smith, perhaps the most intellectually gifted and certainly the most
promising note his dates, defended Whichcote’s Christian teaching, insisting
that theology is more “a Divine Life than a Divine Science.” More exclusively
theological in their leanings were Whichcote, who wrote little of solid
philosophical interest, Rust, who followed Cudworth’s moral philosophy, and
Sterry. Only Patrick, More, and Cudworth all fellows of the Royal Society were sufficiently
attracted to the new science especially the work of Descartes to discuss it in
any detail or to turn it to philosophical and theological advantage. Though
often described as a Platonist, Culverwel was really a neo-Aristotelian with
Platonic embellishments and, like Sterry, a Calvinist. He denied innate ideas
and supported the tabula rasa doctrine, commending “the Platonists . . . that
they lookt upon the spirit of a man as the Candle of the Lord, though they were
deceived in the time when ‘twas lighted.” The Cambridge Platonists were
influential as latitudinarians, as advocates of rational theology, as severe
critics of unbridled mechanism and materialism, and as the initiators, in
England, of the intuitionist ethical tradition. In the England of Locke they
are a striking counterinstance of innatism and non-empirical philosophy.
camera obscura: cited by H. P.
Grice and G. J. Warnock on “Seeing” – and the Causal Theory of Seeing – “visa”
-- a darkened enclosure that focuses light from an external object by a
pinpoint hole instead of a lens, creating an inverted, reversed image on the
opposite wall. The adoption of the camera obscura as a model for the eye
revolutionized the study of visual perception by rendering obsolete previous
speculative philosophical theories, in particular the emanation theory, which
explained perception as due to emanated copy-images of objects entering the
eye, and theories that located the image of perception in the lens rather than
the retina. By shifting the location of sensation to a projection on the
retina, the camera obscura doctrine helped support the distinction of primary
and secondary sense qualities, undermining the medieval realist view of
perception and moving toward the idea that consciousness is radically split off
from the world.
oxonian
dialectic, or rather Mertonian dialectic – (“You need to go to Merton to do
dialectic” – Grice).- dialectic: H. P. Grice, “Athenian dialectic and Oxonian
dialectic,” an argumentative exchange involving contradiction or a technique or
method connected with such exchanges. The word’s origin is the Grecian
dialegein, ‘to argue’ or ‘converse’; in Aristotle and others, this often has
the sense ‘argue for a conclusion’, ‘establish by argument’. By Plato’s time,
if not earlier, it had acquired a technical sense: a form of argumentation
through question and answer. The adjective dialektikos, ‘dialectical’, would
mean ‘concerned with dialegein’ or of persons ‘skilled in dialegein’; the
feminine dialektike is then ‘the art of dialegein’. Aristotle says that Zeno of
Elea invented diagonalization dialectic 232
232 dialectic. He apparently had in mind Zeno’s paradoxical arguments
against motion and multiplicity, which Aristotle saw as dialectical because
they rested on premises his adversaries conceded and deduced contradictory
consequences from them. A first definition of dialectical argument might then
be: ‘argument conducted by question and answer, resting on an opponent’s
concessions, and aiming at refuting the opponent by deriving contradictory
consequences’. This roughly fits the style of argument Socrates is shown
engaging in by Plato. So construed, dialectic is primarily an art of
refutation. Plato, however, came to apply ‘dialectic’ to the method by which
philosophers attain knowledge of Forms. His understanding of that method
appears to vary from one dialogue to another and is difficult to interpret. In
Republic VIVII, dialectic is a method that somehow establishes
“non-hypothetical” conclusions; in the Sophist, it is a method of discovering
definitions by successive divisions of genera into their species. Aristotle’s
concept of dialectical argument comes closer to Socrates and Zeno: it proceeds
by question and answer, normally aims at refutation, and cannot scientifically
or philosophically establish anything. Aristotle differentiates dialectical
arguments from demonstration apodeixis, or scientific arguments, on the basis
of their premises: demonstrations must have “true and primary” premises,
dialectical arguments premises that are “apparent,” “reputable,” or “accepted”
these are alternative, and disputed, renderings of the term endoxos. However,
dialectical arguments must be valid, unlike eristic or sophistical arguments.
The Topics, which Aristotle says is the first art of dialectic, is organized as
a handbook for dialectical debates; Book VIII clearly presupposes a
ruledirected, formalized style of disputation presumably practiced in the
Academy. This use of ‘dialectic’ reappears in the early Middle Ages in Europe,
though as Aristotle’s works became better known after the twelfth century
dialectic was increasingly associated with the formalized disputations
practiced in the universities recalling once again the formalized practice
presupposed by Aristotle’s Topics. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
declared that the ancient meaning of ‘dialectic’ was ‘the logic of illusion’
and proposed a “Transcendental Dialectic” that analyzed the “antinomies”
deductions of contradictory conclusions to which pure reason is inevitably led
when it extends beyond its proper sphere. This concept was further developed by
Fichte and Schelling into a traidic notion of thesis, opposing antithesis, and
resultant synthesis. Hegel transformed the notion of contradiction from a
logical to a metaphysical one, making dialectic into a theory not simply of
arguments but of historical processes within the development of “spirit”; Marx
transformed this still further by replacing ‘spirit’ with ‘matter’.
oxonian
Epicureanism, -- cf. Grice, “Il giardino di Epicuro a Roma.” -- Walter Pater,
“Marius, The Epicurean” -- one of the three leading movements constituting
Hellenistic philosophy. It was founded by Epicurus 341271 B.C., together with
his close colleagues Metrodorus c.331 278, Hermarchus Epicurus’s successor as
head of the Athenian school, and Polyaenus d. 278. He set up Epicurean
communities at Mytilene, Lampsacus, and finally Athens 306 B.C., where his
school the Garden became synonymous with Epicureanism. These groups set out to
live the ideal Epicurean life, detached from political society without actively
opposing it, and devoting themselves to philosophical discussion and the cult
of friendship. Their correspondence was anthologized and studied as a model of
the philosophical life by later Epicureans, for whom the writings of Epicurus
and his three cofounders, known collectively as “the Men,” held a virtually
biblical status. Epicurus wrote voluminously, but all that survives are three
brief epitomes the Letter to Herodotus on physics, the Letter to Pythocles on
astronomy, etc., and the Letter to Menoeceus on ethics, a group of maxims, and
papyrus fragments of his magnum opus On Nature. Otherwise, we are almost
entirely dependent on secondary citations, doxography, and the writings of his
later followers. The Epicurean physical theory is atomistic, developed out of
the fifth-century system of Democritus. Per se existents are divided into
bodies and space, each of them infinite in quantity. Space is, or includes,
absolute void, without which motion would be impossible, while body is
constituted out of physically indivisible particles, “atoms.” Atoms are
themselves further analyzable as sets of absolute “minima,” the ultimate quanta
of magnitude, posited by Epicurus to circumvent the paradoxes that Zeno of Elea
had derived from the hypothesis of infinite divisibility. Atoms themselves have
only the primary properties of shape, size, and weight. All secondary
properties, e.g. color, are generated out of atomic compounds; given their
dependent status, they cannot be added to the list of per se existents, but it
does not follow, as the skeptical tradition in atomism had held, that they are
not real either. Atoms are in constant rapid motion, epapoge Epicureanism
269 269 at equal speed since in the
pure void there is nothing to slow them down. Stability emerges as an overall
property of compounds, which large groups of atoms form by settling into
regular patterns of complex motion, governed by the three motive principles of
weight, collisions, and a minimal random movement, the “swerve,” which
initiates new patterns of motion and blocks the danger of determinism. Our
world itself, like the countless other worlds, is such a compound, accidentally
generated and of finite duration. There is no divine mind behind it, or behind
the evolution of life and society: the gods are to be viewed as ideal beings,
models of the Epicurean good life, and therefore blissfully detached from our
affairs. Canonic, the Epicurean theory of knowledge, rests on the principle
that “all sensations are true.” Denial of empirical cognition is argued to
amount to skepticism, which is in turn rejected as a self-refuting position.
Sensations are representationally not propositionally true. In the paradigm
case of sight, thin films of atoms Grecian eidola, Latin simulacra constantly
flood off bodies, and our eyes mechanically report those that reach them,
neither embroidering nor interpreting. Inference from these guaranteed
photographic, as it were data to the nature of external objects themselves
involves judgment, and there alone error can occur. Sensations thus constitute
one of the three “criteria of truth,” along with feelings, a criterion of
values and introspective information, and prolepseis, or naturally acquired
generic conceptions. On the basis of sense evidence, we are entitled to infer
the nature of microscopic or remote phenomena. Celestial phenomena, e.g.,
cannot be regarded as divinely engineered which would conflict with the
prolepsis of the gods as tranquil, and experience supplies plenty of models that
would account for them naturalistically. Such grounds amount to consistency
with directly observed phenomena, and are called ouk antimarturesis “lack of
counterevidence”. Paradoxically, when several alternative explanations of the
same phenomenon pass this test, all must be accepted: although only one of them
can be true for each token phenomenon, the others, given their intrinsic
possibility and the spatial and temporal infinity of the universe, must be true
for tokens of the same type elsewhere. Fortunately, when it comes to the basic
tenets of physics, it is held that only one theory passes this test of
consistency with phenomena. Epicurean ethics is hedonistic. Pleasure is our
innate natural goal, to which all other values, including virtue, are subordinated.
Pain is the only evil, and there is no intermediate state. Philosophy’s task is
to show how pleasure can be maximized, as follows: Bodily pleasure becomes more
secure if we adopt a simple way of life that satisfies only our natural and
necessary desires, with the support of like-minded friends. Bodily pain, when
inevitable, can be outweighed by mental pleasure, which exceeds it because it
can range over past, present, and future. The highest pleasure, whether of soul
or body, is a satisfied state, “katastematic pleasure.” The pleasures of
stimulation “kinetic pleasures”, including those resulting from luxuries, can
vary this state, but have no incremental value: striving to accumulate them
does not increase overall pleasure, but does increase our vulnerability to
fortune. Our primary aim should instead be to minimize pain. This is achieved
for the body through a simple way of life, and for the soul through the study
of physics, which achieves the ultimate katastematic pleasure, ”freedom from
disturbance” ataraxia, by eliminating the two main sources of human anguish,
the fears of the gods and of death. It teaches us a that cosmic phenomena do
not convey divine threats, b that death is mere disintegration of the soul,
with hell an illusion. To fear our own future non-existence is as irrational as
to regret the non-existence we enjoyed before we were born. Physics also
teaches us how to evade determinism, which would turn moral agents into
mindless fatalists: the swerve doctrine secures indeterminism, as does the
logical doctrine that future-tensed propositions may be neither true nor false.
The Epicureans were the first explicit defenders of free will, although we lack
the details of their positive explanation of it. Finally, although Epicurean
groups sought to opt out of public life, they took a keen and respectful
interest in civic justice, which they analyzed not as an absolute value, but as
a contract between humans to refrain from harmful activity on grounds of
utility, perpetually subject to revision in the light of changing
circumstances. Epicureanism enjoyed widespread popularity, but unlike its great
rival Stoicism it never entered the intellectual bloodstream of the ancient
world. Its stances were dismissed by many as philistine, especially its
rejection of all cultural activities not geared to the Epicurean good life. It
was also increasingly viewed as atheistic, and its ascetic hedonism was
misrepresented as crude sensualism hence the modern use of ‘epicure’. The
school nevertheless continued to flourish down to and well beyond the end of
the Hellenistic age. In the first century B.C. its exponents Epicureanism
Epicureanism 270 270 included
Philodemus, whose fragmentarily surviving treatise On Signs attests to
sophisticated debates on induction between Stoics and Epicureans, and
Lucretius, the Roman author of the great Epicurean didactic poem On the Nature
of Things. In the second century A.D. another Epicurean, Diogenes of Oenoanda,
had his philosophical writings engraved on stone in a public colonnade, and
passages have survived. Thereafter Epicureanism’s prominence declined. Serious
interest in it was revived by Renaissance humanists, and its atomism was an
important influence on early modern physics, especially through Gassendi. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e il giardino
di Epicuro a Roma,” per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library,
Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
oxonianism:
Grice was “university lecturer in philosophy” and “tutorial fellow in
philosophy” – that’s why he always saw philosophy, like virtue, as entire. He
would never accept a post like “professor of moral philosophy” or “professor of
logic,” or “professor of metaphysical philosophy,” or “reader in natural
theology,” or “reader in mental philosophy.” So he felt a responsibility
towards ‘philosophy undepartmentilised’ and he succeded in never disgressing
from this gentlemanly attitude to philosophy as a totum, and not a technically
specified field of ‘expertise.’ See playgroup. The playgroup was Oxonian. There
are aspects of Grice’s philosophy which are Oxonian but not playgroup-related,
and had to do with his personal inclinations. The fact that it was Hardie who
was his tutor and instilled on him a love for Aristotle. Grice’s rapport with
H. A. Prichard. Grice would often socialize with members of Ryle’s group, such
as O. P. Wood, J. D. Mabbott, and W. C. Kneale. And of course, he had a
knowleddge of the history of Oxford philosophy, quoting from J. C. Wilson, G.
F. Stout, H. H. Price, Bosanquet, Bradley. He even had his Oxonian ‘enemies,’
Dummett, Anscombe. And he would quote from independents, like A. J. P. Kenny.
But if he had to quote someone first, it was a member of his beloved playgroup:
Austin, Strawson, Warnock, Urmson, Hare, Hart, Hampshire. Grice cannot possibly
claim to talk about post-war Oxford philosophy, but his own! Cf. Oxfords
post-war philosophy. What were Grices first impressions when
arriving at Oxford. He was going to learn. Only the poor learn at Oxford was an
adage he treasured, since he wasnt one! Let us start with an alphabetical
listing of Grices play Group companions: Austin, Butler, Flew,
Gardiner, Grice, Hare, Hampshire, Hart, Nowell-Smith, Parkinson, Paul,
Pears, Quinton, Sibley, Strawson, Thomson, Urmson, and
Warnock. Grices main Oxonian association is St. Johns, Oxford.
By Oxford Philosophy, Grice notably refers to Austins Play Group, of which he
was a member. But Grice had Oxford associations pre-war, and after the
demise of Austin. But back to the Play Group, this, to some, infamous,
playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including
Grices own St. John’s ‒ apparently, Austins favourite venue. Austin
regarded himself and his kindergarten as linguistic or language botanists. The
idea was to list various ordinary uses of this or that philosophical
notion. Austin: They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let’s botanise! Grices
involvement with Oxford philosophy of course predated his associations with
Austins play group. He always said he was fortunate of having been a tutee to
Hardie at Corpus. Corpus, Oxford. Grice would occasionally refer to the
emblematic pelican, so prominently displayed at Corpus. Grice had an
interim association with the venue one associates most directly with philosophy,
Merton ‒: Grice, Merton, Oxford. While Grice loved to drop
Oxonian Namess, notably his rivals, such as Dummett or Anscombe, he knew when
not to. His Post-war Oxford philosophy, as opposed to more specific items in
The Grice Collection, remains general in tone, and intended as a defense of the
ordinary-language approach to philosophy. Surprisingly, or perhaps not (for
those who knew Grice), he takes a pretty idiosyncratic characterisation of
conceptual analysis. Grices philosophical problems emerge with Grices idiosyncratic
use of this or that expression. Conceptual analysis is meant to solve his
problems, not others, repr. in WOW . Grice finds it important to reprint
this since he had updated thoughts on the matter, which he displays in his
Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy. The topic represents
one of the strands he identifies behind the unity of his philosophy. By
post-war Oxford philosophy, Grice meant the period he was interested
in. While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. Johns in the pre-war
days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war
period. The historical reason Grice gives is understandable
enough. In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow
of St. Johns ‒ the other one was Mabbott. But he had not been able to
engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of
Hardie. After the war, Grice indeed joins Austins more popular, less secretive
Saturday mornings. Indeed, for Grice, post-war means all philosophy after the
war (and not just say, the forties!) since he never abandoned the methods he
developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself
displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like Negation and Personal identity.
Grice is a bit of an expert on Oxonian philosophy. He sees himself as
a member of the school of analytic philosophy, rather than the abused term
ordinary-language philosophy. This is evident by the fact that he
contributed to such polemic ‒ but typically Oxonian ‒
volumes such as Butler, Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (of all
publishers). Grice led a very social life at Oxford, and held frequent
philosophical discussions with the Play group philosophers (alphabetically
listed above), and many others, such as Wood. Post-war Oxford philosophy,
miscellaneous, Oxford philosophy, in WOW, II, Semantics and Met. , Essay. By
Oxford philosophy, Grice means his own. Grice went back to the topic of
philosophy and ordinary language, as one of his essays is precisely entitled,
Philosophy and ordinary language, philosophy and ordinary language, :
ordinary-language philosophy, linguistic botanising. Grice is not really
interested in ordinary language as a philologist might. He spoke
ordinary language, he thought. The point had been brought to the fore by
Austin. If they think philosophy is a play on words, well then, lets play
the game. Grices interest is methodological. Malcolm had been claiming
that ordinary language is incorrigible. While Grice agreed that language can be
clever, he knew that Aristotle was possibly right when he explored ta
legomena in terms of the many and the selected wise, philosophy and
ordinary language, philosophy and ordinary language, : philosophy, ordinary
language. At the time of writing, ordinary-language philosophy had become,
even within Oxford, a bit of a term of abuse. Grice tries to defend
Austins approach to it, while suggesting ideas that Austin somewhat ignored,
like what an utterer implies by the use of an ordinary-language expression,
rather than what the expression itself does. Grice is concerned, contra
Austin, in explanation (or explanatory adequacy), not taxonomy (or descriptive
adequacy). Grice disregards Austins piecemeal approach to ordinary
language, as Grice searches for the big picture of it all. Grice never used
ordinary language seriously. The phrase was used, as he explains, by those who
HATED ordinary-language philosophy. Theres no such thing as ordinary language.
Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old
Cliftonian as even remotely ordinary. Extra-ordinary more likely! As far as the
philosophy bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the
linguistic turn. But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the
ideal language and the ordinary language. Grice defends the choice by Austin of
the ordinary seeing that it was what he had to hand! While Grice seems to be in
agreement with the tone of his Wellesley talk, his idioms there in. Youre
crying for the moon! Philosophy need not be grand! These seem to contrast with
his more grandiose approach to philosophy. His struggle was to defend the
minutiæ of linguistic botanising, that had occupied most of his professional
life, with a grander view of the discipline. He blamed Oxford for that. Never
in the history of philosophy had philosophers shown such an attachment to
ordinary language as they did in post-war Oxford, Grice liked to say.
Having learned Grecian and Latin at Clifton, Grice saw in Oxford a way to go
back to English! He never felt the need to explore Continental modern languages
like German or French. Aristotle was of course cited in Greek, but Descartes is
almost not cited, and Kant is cited in the translation available to Oxonians
then. Grice is totally right that never has philosophy experienced such a
fascination with ordinary use except at Oxford. The ruthless and unswerving
association of philosophy with ordinary language has been peculiar to the
Oxford scene. While many found this attachment to ordinary usage insidious, as
Warnock put it, it fit me and Grice to a T, implicating you need a sort of
innate disposition towards it! Strawson perhaps never had it! And thats why
Grices arguments contra Strawson rest on further minutiæ whose detection by
Grice never ceased to amaze his tutee! In this way, Grice felt he WAS Austins
heir! While Grice is associated with, in chronological order, Corpus, Merton,
and St. Johns, it is only St. Johns that counts for the Griceian! For it is at
St. Johns he was a Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy! And we love him as a
philosopher. Refs.: The obvious keyword is “Oxford.” His essay in WoW on
post-war Oxford philosophy is general – the material in the H. P. Grice papers
is more anecdotic. Also “Reply to Richards,” and references above under ‘linguistic
botany’ and ‘play group,’ in BANC.
P
P:
SUBJECT INDEX: PRAEDICATVM -- PERSON – POSSE -- PROBABILITY – PROPOSITVM --
P:
NAME INDEX: ITALIAN:
PARETO
PASSERI
PATRIZI
PEANO
PERA
PERONE
PICO
PICO
PIGLIUCCI
POMPONAZZI
PREVE
P:
NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: PEARS (Grice’s collaborator)
pacifism:
Grice fought in the second world war with the Royal Navy and earned the rank of
captain. 1 opposition to war, usually on moral or religious grounds, but
sometimes on the practical ground pragmatic pacifism that it is wasteful and
ineffective; 2 opposition to all killing and violence; 3 opposition only to war
of a specified kind e.g., nuclear pacifism. Not to be confused with passivism,
pacifism usually involves actively promoting peace, understood to imply
cooperation and justice among peoples and not merely absence of war. But some
usually religious pacifists accept military service so long as they do not
carry weapons. Many pacifists subscribe to nonviolence. But some consider
violence and/or killing permissible, say, in personal self-defense, law
enforcement, abortion, or euthanasia. Absolute pacifism rejects war in all
circumstances, hypothetical and actual. Conditional pacifism concedes war’s
permissibility in some hypothetical circumstances but maintains its wrongness
in practice. If at least some hypothetical wars have better consequences than
their alternative, absolute pacifism will almost inevitably be deontological in
character, holding war intrinsically wrong or unexceptionably prohibited by
moral principle or divine commandment. Conditional pacifism may be held on
either deontological or utilitarian teleological or sometimes consequentialist
grounds. If deontological, it may hold war at most prima facie wrong
intrinsically but nonetheless virtually always impermissible in practice
because of the absence of counterbalancing right-making features. If
utilitarian, it will hold war wrong, not intrinsically, but solely because of
its consequences. It may say either that every particular war has worse
consequences than its avoidance act utilitarianism or that general acceptance
of or following or compliance with a rule prohibiting war will have best
consequences even if occasional particular wars have best consequences rule
utilitarianism.
paine:
philosopher, revolutionary defender of democracy and human rights, and champion
of popular radicalism in three countries. Born in Thetford, England, he emigrated
to the colonies in 1774 (but was never
accepted by the descendants of the Mayfower), and moved to France, where he was
made a proper French citizen in 1792. In
1802 he returned to the United States (as that section of the New World was
then called), where he was rebuffed by the public because of his support for
the Revolution. Paine was the bestknown
polemicist for the Revolution. In many
incendiary pamphlets, he called for a new, more democratic republicanism. His
direct style and uncompromising egalitarianism had wide popular appeal. In
Common Sense 1776 Paine asserted that commoners were the equal of the landed
aristocracy, thus helping to spur colonial resentments sufficiently to support
independence from Britain. The sole basis of political legitimacy is universal,
active consent; taxation without representation is unjust; and people have the
right to resist when the contract between governor and governed is broken. He
defended the Revolution in The Rights of
Man 179, arguing against concentrating power in any one individual and against
a property qualification for suffrage. Since natural law and right reason as
conformity to nature are accessible to all rational persons, sovereignty
resides in human beings and is not bestowed by membership in class or nation.
Opposed to the extremist Jacobins, he helped write, with Condorcet, a
constitution to secure the Revolution. The Age of Reason 1794, Paine’s most
misunderstood work, sought to secure the social cohesion necessary to a
well-ordered society by grounding it in belief in a divinity. But in supporting
deism and attacking established religion as a tool of enslavement, he alienated
the very laboring classes he sought to enlighten. A lifelong adversary of
slavery and supporter of universal male suffrage, Paine argued for
redistributing property in Agrarian Justice 1797.
palæo-Griceian:
Within the Oxford group, Grice was the first, and it’s difficult to find a
precursor. It’s obviously Grice was not motivated to create or design his
manoeuvre to oppose a view by Ryle – who cared about Ryle in the playgroup?
None – It is obviously more clear that Grice cared a hoot about Vitters,
Benjamin, and Malcolm. So that leaves us with the philosophers Grice personally
knew. And we are sure he was more interested in criticizing Austin than his own
tutee Strawson. So ths leaves us with Austin. Grice’s manoeuvre was intended
for Austin – but he waited for Austin’s demise to present it. Even though the
sources were publications that were out there before Austin died (“Other
minds,” “A plea for excuses”). So Grice is saying that Austin is wrong, as he
is. In order of seniority, the next was Hart (who Grice mocked about
‘carefully’ in Prolegomena. Then came more or less same-generational Hare (who
was not too friendly with Grice) and ‘to say ‘x is good’ is to recommend x’ (a
‘performatory fallacy’) and Strawson with ‘true’ and, say, ‘if.’ So, back to
the palaeo-Griceian, surely nobody was in a position to feel a motivation to
criticise Austin, Hart, Hare, and Strawson! When philosophers mention this or
that palaeo-Griceian philosopher, surely the motivation was different. And a
philosophical manoevre COMES with a motivation. If we identify some previous
(even Oxonian) philosopher who was into the thing Grice is, it would not have
Austin, Hart, Hare or Strawson as ‘opponents.’ And of course it’s worse with
post-Griceians. Because, as Grice says, there was no othe time than post-war
Oxford philosophy where “my manoeuvre would have make sense.’ If it does, as it
may, post-Grice, it’s “as derivative” of “the type of thing we were doing back
in the day. And it’s no fun anymore.” “Neo-Griceian” is possibly a misnomer. As
Grice notes, “usually you add ‘neo-’ to sell; that’s why, jokingly, I call
Strawson a neo-traditionalist; as if he were a bit of a neo-con, another
oxymoron, as he was!’That is H. P. Grice was the first member of the play group
to come up with a system of ‘pragmatic rules.’ Or perhaps he wasn’t. In any
case, palaeo-Griceian refers to any attempt by someone who is an Oxonian
English philosopher who suggested something like H. P. Grice later did! There
are palaeo-Griceian suggestions in Bradley – “Logic” --, Bosanquet, J. C.
Wilson (“Statement and inference”) and a few others. Within those who
interacted with Grice to provoke him into the ‘pragmatic rule’ account were two
members of the play group. One was not English, but a Scot: G. A. Paul. Paul
had been to ‘the other place,’ and was at Oxford trying to spread Witters’s
doctrine. The bafflement one gets from “I certainly don’t wish to cast any
doubt on the matter, but that pillar box seems red to me; and the reason why it
is does, it’s because it is red, and its redness causes in my sense of vision
the sense-datum that the thing is red.” Grice admits that he first came out
with the idea when confronted with this example. Mainly Grice’s motivation is
to hold that such a ‘statement’ (if statement, it is, -- vide Bar-Hillel) is
true. The other member was English: P. F. Strawson. And Grice notes that it was
Strawson’s Introduction to logical theory that motivated him to apply a
technique which had proved successful in the area of the philosophy of
perception to this idea by Strawson that Whitehead and Russell are ‘incorrect.’
Again, Grice’s treatment concerns holding a ‘statement’ to be ‘true.’ Besides
these two primary cases, there are others. First, is the list of theses in
“Causal Theory.” None of them are assigned to a particular philosopher, so the
research may be conducted towards the identification of these. The theses are,
besides the one he is himself dealing, the sense-datum ‘doubt or denial’ implicaturum:
One, What is actual is not also possible. Two, What is known to be the case is
not also believed to be the case. Three, Moore was guilty of misusing the
lexeme ‘know.’ Four, To say that someone is responsible is to say that he is
accountable for something condemnable. Six, A horse cannot look like a horse.
Now, in “Prolegomena” he add further cases. Again, since this are
palaeo-Griceian, it may be a matter of tracing the earliest occurrences. In
“Prolegomena,” Grice divides the examples in Three Groups. The last is an easy
one to identity: the ‘performatory’ approach: for which he gives the example by
Strawson on ‘true,’ and mentions two other cases: a performatory use of ‘I
know’ for I guarantee; and the performatory use of ‘good’ for ‘I approve’
(Ogden). The second group is easy to identify since it’s a central concern and
it is exactly Strawson’s attack on Whitehead and Russell. But Grice is clear
here. It is mainly with regard to ‘if’ that he wants to discuss Strawson, and
for which he quotes him at large. Before talking about ‘if’, he mentions the
co-ordinating connectives ‘and’ and ‘or’, without giving a source. So, here
there is a lot to research about the thesis as held by other philosophers even
at Oxford (where, however, ‘logic’ was never considered a part of philosophy
proper). The first group is the most varied, and easier to generalise, because
it refers to any ‘sub-expression’ held to occur in a full expression which is
held to be ‘inappropriate.’ Those who judge the utterance to be inappropriate
are sometimes named. Grice starts with Ryle and The Concept of Mind –
palaeo-Griceian, in that it surely belongs to Grice’s previous generation. It
concerns the use of the adverb ‘voluntary’ and Grice is careful to cite Ryle’s
description of the case, using words like ‘incorrect,’ and that a ‘sense’
claimed by philosophers is an absurd one. Then there is a third member of the
playgroup – other than G. A. Paul and P. F. Strawson – the Master Who Wobbles,
J. L. Austin. Grice likes the way Austin offers himself as a good target –
Austin was dead by then, and Grice would otherwise not have even tried – Austin
uses variables: notably Mly, and a general thesis, ‘no modification without
aberration.’ But basically, Grice agrees that it’s all about the ‘philosophy of
action.’ So in describing an agent’s action, the addition of an adverb makes
the whole thing inappropriate. This may relate to at least one example in
“Causal” involving ‘responsible.’ While Grice there used the noun and
adjective, surely it can be turned into an adverb. The fourth member of the
playgroup comes next: H. L. A. Hart. Grice laughs at Hart’s idea that to add
‘carefully’ in the description of an action the utterer is committed to the
idea that the agent THINKS the steps taken for the performance are reasonable.
There is a thesis he mentions then which alla “Causal Theory,” gets uncredited
– about ‘trying.’ But he does suggest Witters. And then there is his own ‘doubt
or denial’ re: G. A. Paul, and another one in the field of the philosophy of
perception that he had already mentioned vaguely in “Causal”: a horse cannot
look like a horse. Here he quotes Witters in extenso, re: ‘seeing as.’ While
Grice mentions ‘philosophy of action,’ there is at least one example involving
‘philosophical psychology’: B. S. Benjamin on C. D. Broad on the factiveness of
‘remember.’ When one thinks of all the applications that the ‘conversational
model’ has endured, one realizes that unless your background is philosophical,
you are bound not to realise the centrality of Grice’s thesis for philosophical
methodology.
palæo-Kantian: Kantian, neo-Kantian. Cohen, Hermann – Grice liked to
think of himself as a neo-Kantian (“rather than a palaeo-Kantian, you see”)
-- philosopher who originated and led,
with Paul Natorp, the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism. He taught at Marburg.
Cohen wrote commentaries on Kant’s Critiques prior to publishing System der
Philosophie 212, which consisted of parts on logic, ethics, and aesthetics. He
developed a Kantian idealism of the natural sciences, arguing that a
transcendental analysis of these sciences shows that “pure thought” his system
of Kantian a priori principles “constructs” their “reality.” He also developed
Kant’s ethics as a democratic socialist ethics. He ended his career at a
rabbinical seminary in Berlin, writing his influential Religion der Vernunft
aus den Quellen des Judentums “Religion of Reason out of the Sources of
Judaism,” 9, which explicated Judaism on the basis of his own Kantian ethical
idealism. Cohen’s ethical-political views were adopted by Kurt Eisner 18679,
leader of the Munich revolution of 8, and also had an impact on the revisionism
of orthodox Marxism of the G. Social Democratic Party, while his philosophical
writings greatly influenced Cassirer.
paley: English moral philosopher and
theologian. He was born in Peterborough and educated at Cambridge, where he
lectured in moral philosophy, divinity, and Grecian New Testament before
assuming a series of posts in the C. of E., the last as archdeacon of Carlisle.
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy first introduced
utilitarianism to a wide public. Moral obligation is created by a divine
command “coupled” with the expectation of everlasting rewards or punishments.
While God’s commands can be ascertained “from Scripture and the light of
nature,” Paley emphasizes the latter. Since God wills human welfare, the
rightness or wrongness of actions is determined by their “tendency to promote
or diminish the general happiness.” Horae Pauline: Or the Truth of the
Scripture History of St Paul Evinced appeared in 1790, A View of the Evidences
of Christianity in 1794. The latter defends the authenticity of the Christian
miracles against Hume. Natural Theology 1802 provides a design argument for
God’s existence and a demonstration of his attributes. Nature exhibits abundant
contrivances whose “several parts are framed and put together for a purpose.”
These contrivances establish the existence of a powerful, wise, benevolent
designer. They cannot show that its power and wisdom are unlimited, however,
and “omnipotence” and “omniscience” are mere “superlatives.” Paley’s Principles
and Evidences served as textbooks in England and America well into the
nineteenth century.
panpsychism, the doctrine that
the physical world is pervasively psychical, sentient or conscious understood
as equivalent. The idea, usually, is that it is articulated into certain
ultimate units or particles, momentary or enduring, each with its own distinct
charge of sentience or consciousness, and that some more complex physical units
possess a sentience emergent from the interaction between the charges of
sentience pertaining to their parts, sometimes down through a series of levels
of articulation into sentient units. Animal consciousness is the overall
sentience pertaining to some substantial part or aspect of the brain, while
each neuron may have its own individual charge of sentience, as may each
included atom and subatomic particle. Elsewhere the only sentient units may be
at the atomic and subatomic level. Two differently motivated versions of the
doctrine should be distinguished. The first implies no particular view about
the nature of matter, and regards the sentience pertaining to each unit as an
extra to its physical nature. Its point is to explain animal and human
consciousness as emerging from the interaction and perhaps fusion of more
pervasive sentient units. The better motivated, second version holds that the
inner essence of matter is unknown. We know only structural facts about the
physical or facts about its effects on sentience like our own. Panpsychists
hypothesize that the otherwise unknown inner essence of matter consists in
sentience or consciousness articulated into the units we identify externally as
fundamental particles, or as a supervening character pertaining to complexes of
such or complexes of complexes, etc. Panpsychists can thus uniquely combine the
idealist claim that there can be no reality without consciousness with
rejection of any subjectivist reduction of the physical world to human
experience of it. Modern versions of panpsychism e.g. of Whitehead, Hartshorne,
and Sprigge are only partly akin to hylozoism as it occurred in ancient
thought. Note that neither version need claim that every physical object
possesses consciousness; no one supposes that a team of conscious cricketers must
itself be conscious.
pantheism, the view that God
is identical with everything. It may be seen as the result of two tendencies:
an intense religious spirit and the belief that all reality is in some way
united. Pantheism should be distinguished from panentheism, the view that God
is in all things. Just as water might saturate a sponge and in that way be in
the entire sponge, but not be identical with the sponge, God might be in
everything without being identical with everything. Spinoza is the most distinguished
pantheist in Western philosophy. He argued that since substance is completely
self-sufficient, and only God is self-sufficient, God is the only substance. In
other words, God is everything. Hegel is also sometimes considered a pantheist
since he identifies God with the totality of being. Many people think that
pantheism is tantamount to atheism, because they believe that theism requires
that God transcend ordinary, sensible reality at least to some degree. It is
not obvious that theism requires a transcendent or Panaetius pantheism 640 640 personal notion of God; and one might
claim that the belief that it does is the result of an anthropomorphic view of
God. In Eastern philosophy, especially the Vedic tradition of philosophy, pantheism is part of a rejection
of polytheism. The apparent multiplicity of reality is illusion. What is
ultimately real or divine is Brahman. pantheismusstreit: a debate primarily
between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, although it also included Lessing, Kant, and
Goethe. The basic issue concerned what pantheism is and whether every
pantheists is an atheist. In particular, it concerned whether Spinoza was a
pantheist, and if so, whether he was an atheist; and how close Lessing’s
thought was to Spinoza’s. The standard view, propounded by Bayle and Leibniz,
was that Spinoza’s pantheism was a thin veil for his atheism. Lessing and
Goethe did not accept this harsh interpretation of him. They believed that his
pantheism avoided the alienating transcendence of the standard Judeo-Christian
concept of God. It was debated whether Lessing was a Spinozist or some form of
theistic pantheist. Lessing was critical of dogmatic religions and denied that
there was any revelation given to all people for rational acceptance. He may
have told Jacobi that he was a Spinozist; but he may also have been speaking
ironically or hypothetically.
paracelsus,
pseudonym of Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, philosopher. He pursued
medical studies at various G. and Austrian universities, probably completing
them at Ferrara. Thereafter he had little to do with the academic world, apart
from a brief and stormy period as professor of medicine at Basle 152728.
Instead, he worked first as a military surgeon and later as an itinerant
physician in G.y, Austria, and Switzerland. His works were mainly in G. rather
than Latin, and only a few were published during his lifetime. His importance
for medical practice lay in his insistence on observation and experiment, and
his use of chemical methods for preparing drugs. The success of Paracelsian
medicine and chemistry in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was,
however, largely due to the theoretical background he provided. He firmly
rejected the classical medical inheritance, particularly Galen’s explanation of
disease as an imbalance of humors; he drew on a combination of biblical
sources, G. mysticism, alchemy, and Neoplatonic magic as found in Ficino to
present a unified view of humankind and the universe. He saw man as a
microcosm, reflecting the nature of the divine world through his immortal soul,
the sidereal world through his astral body or vital principle, and the
terrestrial world through his visible body. Knowledge requires union with the
object, but because elements of all the worlds are found in man, he can acquire
knowledge of the universe and of God, as partially revealed in nature. The
physician needs knowledge of vital principles called astra in order to heal.
Disease is caused by external agents that can affect the human vital principle
as well as the visible body. Chemical methods are employed to isolate the
appropriate vital principles in minerals and herbs, and these are used as
antidotes. Paracelsus further held that matter contains three principles,
sulfur, mercury, and salt. As a result, he thought it was possible to transform
one metal into another by varying the proportions of the fundamental
principles; and that such transformations could also be used in the production
of drugs.
para-consistency: cf. paralogism --
the property of a logic in which one cannot derive all statements from a
contradiction. What is objectionable about contradictions, from the standpoint
of classical logic, is not just that they are false but that they imply any
statement whatsoever: one who accepts a contradiction is thereby committed to
accepting everything. In paraconsistent logics, however, such as relevance
logics, contradictions are isolated inferentially and thus rendered relatively
harmless. The interest in such logics stems from the fact that people sometimes
continue to work in inconsistent theories even after the inconsistency has been
exposed, and do so without inferring everything. Whether this phenomenon can be
explained satisfactorily by the classical logician or shows instead that the
underlying logic of, e.g., science and mathematics is some non-classical
paraconsistent logic, is disputed. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “Implicatura as
para-semantic.”
para-philosophy
– used by Austin, borrowed (but never returned) by Grice.
para-semantic
-- before vowels, par-, word-forming element,
originally in Greek-derived words, meaning "alongside, beyond; altered;
contrary; irregular, abnormal," from Greek para- from para (prep.)
"beside, near; issuing from; against, contrary to," from PIE *prea,
from root *per- (1) "forward," hence "toward, near;
against." Cognate with Old English for- "off, away." Mostly used
in scientific and technical words; not usually regarded as a naturalized
formative element in English.
paradigm-case argument:
Grice tries to give the general form of this argument, as applied to Urmson,
and Grice and Strawson. I wonder if Grice thought that STRAWSON’s appeal to
resentment to prove freewill is paradigm case? The idiom was coined by Grice’s
first tutee at St. John’s, G. N. A. Flew, and he applied it to ‘free will.’
Grice later used it to describe the philosophising by Urmson (in
“Retrospetive”). he issue of analyticity is, as Locke puts it, the issue of
whats trifle. That a triangle is trilateral Locke considers a trifling
proposition, like Saffron is yellow. Lewes (who calls mathematical propositions
analytic) describes the Kantian problem. The reductive analysis of meaning Grice
offers depends on the analytic. Few Oxonian philosophers would follow Loar, D.
Phil Oxon, under Warnock, in thinking of Grices conversational maxims as
empirical inductive generalisations over functional states! Synthesis may do in
the New World,but hardly in the Old! The locus classicus for the
ordinary-language philosophical response to Quine in Two dogmas of empiricism.
Grice and Strawson claim that is analytic does have an ordinary-language use,
as attached two a type of behavioural conversational response. To an
analytically false move (such as My neighbours three-year-old son is an adult)
the addressee A is bound to utter, I dont understand you! You are not being
figurative, are you? To a synthetically false move, on the other hand (such as
My neighbours three-year-old understands Russells Theory of Types), the
addressee A will jump with, Cant believe it! The topdogma of analyticity
is for Grice very important to defend. Philosophy depends on it! He
knows that to many his claim to fame is his In defence of a dogma, the topdogma
of analyticity, no less. He eventually turns to a pragmatist justification
of the distinction. This pragmatist justification is still in accordance
with what he sees as the use of analytic in ordinary language. His infamous
examples are as follows. My neighbours three-year old understands Russells
Theory of Types. A: Hard to believe, but I will. My neighbours three-year
old is an adult. Metaphorically? No. Then I dont understand you, and
what youve just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically false. Ultimately,
there are conversational criteria, based on this or that principle of
conversational helfpulness. Grice is also circumstantially concerned with the
synthetic a priori, and he would ask his childrens playmates: Can a
sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed! The distinction is
ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the linguistic turn,
Oxonian and other! In defence of a dogma, Two dogmas of
empiricism, : the analytic-synthetic distinction. For Quine, there
are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a
distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. Grice considers Empiricism
as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth. Grice
came back time and again to explore the analytic-synthetic distinction. But his
philosophy remained constant. His sympathy is for the practicality of it, its
rationale. He sees it as involving formal calculi, rather than his own theory
of conversation as rational co-operation which does not presuppose the analytic-synthetic
distinction, even if it explains it! Grice would press the issue here: if one
wants to prove that such a theory of conversation as rational co-operation has
to be seen as philosophical, rather than some other way, some idea of
analyticity may be needed to justify the philosophical enterprise. Cf. the
synthetic a priori, that fascinated Grice most than anything Kantian else! Can
a sweater be green and red all over? No stripes allowed. With In defence of a
dogma, Grice and Strawson attack a New-World philosopher. Grice had previously
collaborated with Strawson in an essay on Met.
(actually a three-part piece, with Pears as the third author). The
example Grice chooses to refute attack by Quine of the top-dogma is the
Aristotelian idea of the peritrope, as Aristotle refutes Antiphasis in
Met. (v. Ackrill, Burnyeat and Dancy).
Grice explores chapter Γ 8 of Aristotles Met. . In Γ
8, Aristotle presents two self-refutation arguments against two theses,
and calls the asserter, Antiphasis, T1 = Everything is true, and T2 =
Everything is false, Metaph. Γ 8, 1012b13–18. Each thesis is exposed to
the stock objection that it eliminates itself. An utterer who explicitly
conveys that everything is true also makes the thesis opposite to his own true,
so that his own is not true (for the opposite thesis denies that his is true),
and any utterer U who explicitly conveys that everything is false also belies
himself. Aristotle does not seem to be claiming that, if everything
is true, it would also be true that it is false that everything is true and,
that, therefore, Everything is true must be false: the final, crucial
inference, from the premise if, p, ~p to the conclusion ~p is
missing. But it is this extra inference that seems required to have a
formal refutation of Antiphasiss T1 or T2 by consequentia mirabilis. The
nature of the argument as a purely dialectical silencer of Antiphasis is
confirmed by the case of T2, Everything is false. An utterer who explicitly
conveys that everything is false unwittingly concedes, by self-application,
that what he is saying must be false too. Again, the further and different
conclusion Therefore; it is false that everything is false is
missing. That proposal is thus self-defeating, self-contradictory (and
comparable to Grices addressee using adult to apply to three-year old, without
producing the creature), oxymoronic, and suicidal. This seems all that
Aristotle is interested in establishing through the self-refutation stock
objection. This is not to suggest that Aristotle did not believe that
Everything is true or Everything is false is false, or that he excludes that he
can prove its falsehood. Grice notes that this is not what Aristotle seems
to be purporting to establish in 1012b13–18. This holds for a περιτροπή (peritrope)
argument, but not for a περιγραφή (perigraphe) argument (συμβαίνει δὴ καὶ τὸ
θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ
ἀληθῆ (ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ καὶ αὐτὸς
αὑτόν.) It may be emphasized that Aristotles argument does not contain an
explicit application of consequentia mirabilis. Indeed, no
extant self-refutation argument before Augustine, Grice is told by Mates,
contains an explicit application of consequentia mirabilis. This observation is
a good and important one, but Grice has doubts about the consequences one may
draw from it. One may take the absence of an explicit application of
consequentia mirabilis to be a sign of the purely dialectical nature of the
self-refutation argument. This is questionable. The formulation of a
self-refutation argument (as in Grices addressee, Sorry, I misused adult.) is
often compressed and elliptical and involves this or that implicaturum. One
usually assumes that this or that piece in a dialectical context has been
omitted and should be supplied (or worked out, as Grice prefers) by the
addressee. But in this or that case, it is equally possible to supply some
other, non-dialectical piece of reasoning. In Aristotles arguments from Γ
8, e.g., the addressee may supply an inference to the effect that the thesis
which has been shown to be self-refuting is not true. For if Aristotle
takes the argument to establish that the thesis has its own contradictory
version as a consequence, it must be obvious to Aristotle that the thesis is
not true (since every consequence of a true thesis is true, and two
contradictory theses cannot be simultaneously true). On the further
assumption (that Grice makes explicit) that the principle of bivalence is
applicable, Aristotle may even infer that the thesis is false. It is
perfectly plausible to attribute such an inference to Aristotle and to supply
it in his argument from Γ 8. On this account, there is no reason to think
that the argument is of an intrinsically dialectical nature and cannot be
adequately represented as a non-dialectical proof of the non-truth, or even
falsity, of the thesis in question. It is indeed difficult to see signs of
a dialectical exchange between two parties (of the type of which Grice and
Strawson are champions) in Γ8, 1012b13–18. One piece of evidence is
Aristotles reference to the person, the utterer, as Grice prefers who
explicitly conveys or asserts (ὁ λέγων) that T1 or that T2. This reference
by the Grecian philosopher to the Griceian utterer or asserter of the thesis
that everything is true would be irrelevant if Aristotles aim is to prove
something about T1s or T2s propositional content, independently of the act
by the utterer of uttering its expression and thereby explicitly conveying
it. However, it is not clear that this reference is essential to
Aristotles argument. One may even doubt whether the Grecian philosopher is
being that Griceian, and actually referring to the asserter of T1 or T2. The
*implicit* (or implicated) grammatical Subjects of Aristotles ὁ λέγων (1012b15)
might be λόγος, instead of the utterer qua asserter. λόγος is surely the
implicit grammatical Subjects of ὁ λέγων shortly after ( 1012b21–22. 8). The
passage may be taken to be concerned with λόγοι ‒ this or that statement,
this or that thesis ‒ but not with its asserter. In the Prior
Analytics, Aristotle states that no thesis (A three-year old is an adult) can
necessarily imply its own contradictory (A three-year old is not an adult)
(2.4, 57b13–14). One may appeal to this statement in order to argue for
Aristotles claim that a self-refutation argument should NOT be analyzed as
involving an implicit application of consequentia mirabilis. Thus, one should
deny that Aristotles self-refutation argument establishes a necessary
implication from the self-refuting thesis to its contradictory. However,
this does not explain what other kind of consequence relation Aristotle takes
the self-refutation argument to establish between the self-refuting thesis and
its contradictory, although dialectical necessity has been suggested.
Aristotles argument suffices to establish that Everything is false is either
false or liar-paradoxical. If a thesis is liar-paradoxical (and Grice
loved, and overused the expression), the assumption of its falsity leads to
contradiction as well as the assumption of its truth. But Everything is
false is only liar-paradoxical in the unlikely, for Aristotle perhaps
impossible, event that everything distinct from this thesis is false. So,
given the additional premise that there is at least one true item distinct from
the thesis Everything is false, Aristotle can safely infer that the thesis is
false. As for Aristotles ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής,, or eliding
the γὰρ, ὁ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής, (ho
legon ton alethe logon alethe alethes) may be rendered as either: The statement
which states that the true statement is true is true, or, more alla Grice,
as He who says (or explicitly conveys, or indicates) that the true thesis
is true says something true. It may be argued that it is quite baffling
(and figurative or analogical or metaphoric) in this context, to take ἀληθής to
be predicated of the Griceian utterer, a person (true standing for truth
teller, trustworthy), to take it to mean that he says something true,
rather than his statement stating something true, or his statement being true.
But cf. L and S: ἀληθής [α^], Dor. ἀλαθής, [α^], Dor. ἀλαθής, ές, f. λήθω, of
persons, truthful, honest (not in Hom., v. infr.), ἀ. νόος Pi. O.2.92;
κατήγορος A. Th. 439; κριτής Th. 3.56; οἶνος ἀ. `in vino veritas, Pl. Smp.
217e; ὁ μέσος ἀ. τις Arist. EN 1108a20. Admittedly, this or that non-Griceian
passage in which it is λόγος, and not the utterer, which is the implied
grammatical Subjects of ὁ λέγων can be found in Metaph. Γ7, 1012a24–25; Δ6,
1016a33; Int. 14, 23a28–29; De motu an. 10, 703a4; Eth. Nic. 2.6, 1107a6–7.
9. So the topic is controversial. Indeed such a non-Griceian exegesis of the
passage is given by Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Metaph. 340. 26–29):9, when
Alexander observes that the statement, i.e. not the utterer, that says that
everything is false (ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγων λόγος) negates itself, not
himself, because if everything is false, this very statement, which, rather
than, by which the utterer, says that everything is false, would be false, and
how can an utterer be FALSE? So that the statement which, rather than the
utterer who, negates it, saying that not everything is false, would be true,
and surely an utterer cannot be true. Does Alexander misrepresent Aristotles
argument by omitting every Griceian reference to the asserter or utterer qua
rational personal agent, of the thesis? If the answer is negative, even if the
occurrence of ὁ λέγων at 1012b15 refers to the asserter, or utterer, qua
rational personal agent, this is merely an accidental feature of Aristotles
argument that cannot be regarded as an indication of its dialectical nature.
None of this is to deny that some self-refutation argument may be of an
intrinsically dialectical nature; it is only to deny that every one is This is
in line with Burnyeats view that a dialectical self-refutation, even if
qualified, as Aristotle does, as ancient, is a subspecies of self-refutation,
but does not exhaust it. Granted, a dialectical approach may provide a useful
interpretive framework for many an ancient self-refutation argument. A
statement like If proof does not exist, proof exists ‒ that occurs in an
anti-sceptical self-refutation argument reported by Sextus
Empiricus ‒ may receive an attractive dialectical re-interpretation.
It may be argued that such a statement should not be understood at the
level of what is explicated, but should be regarded as an elliptical reminder
of a complex dialectical argument which can be described as follows. Cf. If
thou claimest that proof doth not exist, thou must present a proof of what thou
assertest, in order to be credible, but thus thou thyself admitest that proof
existeth. A similar point can be made for Aristotles famous argument in the
Protrepticus that one must philosophise. A number of sources state that this
argument relies on the implicaturum, If one must not philosophize, one must
philosophize. It may be argued that this implicaturum is an elliptical reminder
of a dialectical argument such as the following. If thy position is that thou
must not philosophise, thou must reflect on this choice and argue in its
support, but by doing so thou art already choosing to do philosophy, thereby
admitting that thou must philosophise. The claim that every instance of an
ancient self-refutation arguments is of an intrinsically dialectical nature is
thus questionable, to put it mildly. V also 340.19–26, and A. Madigan, tcomm.,
Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotles Met.
4, Ithaca, N.Y., Burnyeat, Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek
Philosophy,. Grices implicaturum is that Quine should have learned Greek before
refuting Aristotle. But then *I* dont speak Greek! Strawson refuted. Refs.: The
obvious keyword is ‘analytic,’ in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. : For one,
Grice does not follow Aristotle, but Philo. the conditional If Alexander exists,
Alexander talks or If Alexander exists, he has such-and-such an age is not
true—not even if he is in fact of such-and-such an age when the proposition is
said. (in APr 175.34–176.6)⁴³ ⁴³
… δείκνυσιν ὅτι μὴ οἷόν τε δυνατῷ τι ἀδύνατον ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀνάγκη ἀδύνατον
εἶναι ᾧ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀκολουθεῖ, ἐπὶ πάσης ἀναγκαίας ἀκολουθίας. ἔστι δὲ ἀναγκαία
ἀκολουθία οὐχ ἡ πρόσκαιρος, ἀλλὰ ἐν ᾗ ἀεὶ τὸ ἑπόμενον ἕπεσθαι ἔστι τῷ τὸ εἰλημμένον
ὡς ἡγούμενον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὲς συνημμένον τὸ εἰ ᾿Αλέξανδρος ἔστιν, ᾿Αλέξανδρος
διαλέγεται, ἢ εἰ ᾿Αλέξανδρος ἔστι, τοσῶνδε ἐτῶν ἐστι, καὶ εἰ εἴη ὅτε λέγεται ἡ
πρότασις τοσούτων ἐτῶν. vide Barnes. ...
έχη δε και επιφοράν το 5 αντικείμενον τώ ήγουμένω, τότε ο τοιούτος γίνεται
δεύτερος αναπόδεικτος, ώς το ,,ει
ημέρα έστι, φώς έστιν ουχί δέ γε φώς έστιν ουκ άρα ...εί ημέρα εστι , φως έστιν ... eine unrichtige ( μοχθηρόν ) bezeichnet 142 ) , und Zwar
war es besonders Philo ...
οίον , , εί ημέρα εστι
, φως έστιν , ή άρχεται από ψεύδους και λήγει επί ψεύδος ... όπερ ήν λήγον .
bei der Obwaltende Conditional -
Nexus gar nicht in Betracht ...Philo:
If it is day, I am talking. One of Grice’s favorite paradoxes, that display the
usefulness of the implicaturum are the so-called ‘paradoxes of implication.’
Johnson, alas, uses ‘paradox’ in the singular. So there must be earlier
accounts of this in the history of philosophy. Notably in the ancient
commentators to Philo! (Greek “ei” and Roman “si”). Misleading but true – could
do.” Note that Grice has an essay on the ‘paradoxes of entailment’. As Strawson
notes, this is misleading. For Strawson these are not paradoxes. The things are
INCORRECT. For Grice, the Philonian paradoxes are indeed paradoxical because
each is a truth. Now, Strawson and Wiggins challenge this. For Grice, to utter
“if p, q” implicates that the utterer is not in a position to utter anything
stronger. He implicates that he has NON-TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL REASON or grounds to
utter “if p, q.” For Strawson, THAT is precisely what the ‘consequentialist’ is
holding. For Strawson, the utterer CONVENTIONALLY IMPLIES that the consequent
or apodosis follows, in some way, from the antecedent or protasis. Not for
Grice. For Grice, what the utterer explicitly conveys is that the conditions
that obtain are those of the Philonian conditional. He implicitly conveys that
there is n inferrability, and this is cancellable. If Strawson holds that it is
a matter of a conventional implicaturum, the issue of cancellation becomes
crucial. For Grice, to add that “But I don’t want to covey that there is any
inferrability between the protasis and the apodosis” is NOT a contradiction.
The utterer or emissor is NOT self-contradicting. And he isn’t! The first to
use the term ‘paracox’ here is a genius. Possibly Philo. It
was W. E. Johnson who first used
the expression 'paradox of
implication', explaining that a paradox of this sort arises when a
logician proceeds step by step, using accepted
principles, until a formula is reached which conflicts with common sense
[Johnson, 1921, 39].The
paradox of implication assumes many forms, some of which are not easily
recognised as involving mere varieties of the same fundamental principle.
But COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS 47 I believe that they
can all be resolved by the consideration that we cannot ivithotd qjialification
apply a com- posite and (in particular) an implicative proposition
to the further process of inference. Such application is possible
only when the composite has been reached irrespectively of any assertion
of the truth or falsity of its components. In other words, it is a
necessary con- dition for further inference that the components of
a composite should really have been entertained hypo- thetically
when asserting that composite. § 9. The theory of compound
propositions leads to a special development when in the conjunctives
the components are taken — not, as hitherto, assertorically — but
hypothetically as in the composites. The conjunc- tives will now be
naturally expressed by such words as possible or compatible, while the
composite forms which respectively contradict the conjunctives will be
expressed by such words as necessary or impossible. If we select
the negative form for these conjunctives, we should write as
contradictory pairs : Conjunctives {possible) Composites
{fiecessary) a. p does not imply q 1, p is not
implied by q c. p is not co-disjunct to q d. p is not
co-alternate to q a, p implies q b, p is implied
by q c, p is co-disjunct to q d, p is co-alternate to
q Or Otherwise, using the term 'possible' throughout,
the four conjunctives will assume the form that the several conjunctions
— pq^pq, pq ^-nd pq — are respectively /^i*- sidle. Here the word
possible is equivalent to being merely hypothetically entertained, so
that the several conjunctives are now qualified in the same way as
are the simple components themselves. Similarly the four CHAPTER
HI corresponding composites may be expressed negatively by
using the term 'impossible,' and will assume the form that the
^^;yunctions pq^ pq, pq and pq are re- spectively impossible, or (which
means the same) that the ^zVjunctions/^, ^^, pq Rnd pq are necessary.
Now just as 'possible* here means merely 'hypothetically
entertained/ so 'impossible' and 'necessary' mean re- spectively
'assertorically denied' and 'assertorically affirmed/ The
above scheme leads to the consideration of the determinate relations that
could subsist of p to q when these eight propositions (conjunctives and
composites) are combined in everypossibleway without contradiction.
Prima facie there are i6 such combinations obtained by selecting a or ay
b or 3, c or c, d or J for one of the four constituent terms. Out of
these i6 combinations, how- ever, some will involve a conjunction of
supplementaries (see tables on pp. 37, 38), which would entail the
as- sertorical affirmation or denial of one of the components / or
q, and consequently would not exhibit a relation of p to q. The
combinations that, on this ground, must be disallowed are the following
nine : cihcd, abed, abed, abed] abed, bacd, cabd, dabc\ abed.
The combinations that remain to be admitted are therefore the
followino- seven : abld, cdab\ abed, bald, cdab^ dcab\ abed.
In fact, under the imposed restriction, since a or b cannot be
conjoined with c or d, it follows that we must always conjoin a with c
and d\ b with e and d\ c with a and b\ ^with a and b. This being
understood, the COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS 49 seven
permissible combinations that remain are properly to be expressed in the
more simple forms: ab, cd\ ab, ba, cd, dc\ and abed
These will be represented (but re-arranged for purposes of
symmetry) in the following table giving all the possible relations of any
proposition/ to any proposition q. The technical names which 1 propose to
adopt for the several relations are printed in the second column of
the table. Table of possible relations of propositio7i p to
proposition q. 1. {a,b)\ p implies and is implied by q
2. (a, b) : p implies but is not implied by q, 3. {b^d): p is
implied by but does not imply q, 4. {djb^'c^d): p is neither
implicans nor impli cate nor co-disjunct nor co-alternate to
g. 5. {dy c)\ /is co-alternate but not co-disjunct to $r,
6. {Cyd): /isco-disjunctbutnotco-alternateto$^. 7. {Cjd)'. p
is co-disjunct and co-alternate to q, p is co-implicant to
q p is super-implicant to q. p is sub-implicant to q. p
is independent of q p is sub-opponent to q p is
super-opponent to q, p is co-opponent to q, Here the symmetry
indicated by the prefixes, co-, super-, sub-, is brought out by reading
downwards and upwards to the middle line representing independence.
In this order the propositional forms range from the supreme degree of
consistency to the supreme degree of opponency, as regards the relation
of/ to ^. In tradi- tional logic the seven forms of relation are known
respec- tively by the names equipollent, superaltern, subaltern,
independent, sub-contrary, contrary, contradictory. This latter
terminology, however, is properly used to express the formal relations of
implication and opposition, whereas the terminology which I have adopted
will apply indifferently both for formal and for material relations. One of Grice’s claims to fame is his paradox, under ‘Yog
and Zog.’ Another paradox that Grice examines at length is paradox by Moore.
For Grice, unlike Nowell-Smith, an utterer who, by uttering The cat is on the
mat explicitly conveys that the cat is on the mat does not thereby implicitly
convey that he believes that the cat is on the mat. He, more crucially
expresses that he believes that the cat is on the mat ‒ and this is not
cancellable. He occasionally refers to Moores paradox in the buletic mode,
Close the door even if thats not my desire. An imperative still expresses
someones desire. The sergeant who orders his soldiers to muster at dawn because
he is following the lieutenants order. Grices first encounter with paradox
remains his studying Malcolms misleading exegesis of Moore. Refs.: The main
sources given under ‘heterologicality,’ above. ‘Paradox’ is a good keyword in
The H. P. Grice Papers, since he used ‘paradox’ to describe his puzzle about
‘if,’ but also Malcolm on Moore on the philosopher’s paradox, and paradoxes of
material implication and paradoxes of entailment. Grice’s point is that a
paradox is not something false. For Strawson it is. “The so-called paradoxes of
‘entailment’ and ‘material implication’ are a misnomer. They statements are not
paradoxical, they are false.” Not for Grice! Cf. aporia. The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley.
Griceian paradigm, the-- paradigm:
as used by physicist – Grice: “Kuhn ain’t a philosopher – his BA was in
physics!” -- Kuhn in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” 2, a set of
scientific and metaphysical beliefs that make up a theoretical framework within
which scientific theories can be tested, evaluated, and if necessary revised.
Kuhn’s principal thesis, in which the notion of a paradigm plays a central
role, is structured around an argument against the logical empiricist view of
scientific theory change. Empiricists viewed theory change as an ongoing smooth
and cumulative process in which empirical facts, discovered through observation
or experimentation, forced revisions in our theories and thus added to our
ever-increasing knowledge of the world. It was claimed that, combined with this
process of revision, there existed a process of intertheoretic reduction that
enabled us to understand the macro in terms of the micro, and that ultimately
aimed at a unity of science. Kuhn maintains that this view is incompatible with
what actually happens in case after case in the history of science. Scientific
change occurs by “revolutions” in which an older paradigm is overthrown and is
replaced by a framework incompatible or even incommensurate with it. Thus the
alleged empirical “facts,” which were adduced to support the older theory,
become irrelevant to the new; the questions asked and answered in the new
framework cut across those of the old; indeed the vocabularies of the two
frameworks make up different languages, not easily intertranslatable. These
episodes of revolution are separated by long periods of “normal science,”
during which the theories of a given paradigm are honed, refined, and
elaborated. These periods are sometimes referred to as periods of “puzzle
solving,” because the changes are to be understood more as fiddling with the
details of the theories to “save the phenomena” than as steps taking us closer
to the truth. A number of philosophers have complained that Kuhn’s conception
of a paradigm is too imprecise to do the work he intended for it. In fact,
Kuhn, fifteen years later, admitted that at least two distinct ideas were
exploited by the term: i the “shared elements [that] account for the relatively
unproblematic character of professional communication and for the relative
unanimity of professional judgment,” and ii “concrete problem solutions,
accepted by the group [of scientists] as, in a quite usual sense, paradigmatic”
Kuhn, “Second Thoughts on Paradigms,” 7. Kuhn offers the terms ‘disciplinary
matrix’ and ‘exemplar’, respectively, for these two ideas. Refs.: H. P. Grice,
“Why Kuhn could never explain the ‘minor revolution’ in philosophy we had at
Oxford!; H. P. Grice, “The Griceian paradigm – crisis – revolution –
resolution: some implicatura from Kuhn (from Merton to St. John’s).”
paradigm-case
argument:
an argument designed by A. G. N. Flew, Grice’s first tutee at St. John’s –
almost -- to yield an affirmative answer to the following general type of
skeptically motivated question: Are A’s really B? E.g., Do material objects
really exist? Are any of our actions really free? Does induction really provide
reasonable grounds for one’s beliefs? The structure of the argument is simple:
in situations that are “typical,” “exemplary,” or “paradigmatic,” standards for
which are supplied by common sense, or ordinary language, part of what it is to
be B essentially involves A. Hence it is absurd to doubt if A’s are ever B, or
to doubt if in general A’s are B. More commonly, the argument is encountered in
the linguistic mode: part of what it means for something to be B is that, in
paradigm cases, it be an A. Hence the question whether A’s are ever B is
meaningless. An example may be found in the application of the argument to the
problem of induction. See Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, 2. When one
believes a generalization of the form ‘All F’s are G’ on the basis of good
inductive evidence, i.e., evidence constituted by innumerable and varied
instances of F all of which are G, one would thereby have good reasons for
holding this belief. The argument for this claim is based on the content of the
concepts of reasonableness and of strength of evidence. Thus according to
Strawson, the following two propositions are analytic: 1 It is reasonable to
have a degree of belief in a proposition that is proportional to the strength
of the evidence in its favor. 2 The evidence for a generalization is strong in
proportion as the number of instances, and the variety of circumstances in
which they have been found, is great. Hence, Strawson concludes, “to ask
whether it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedures is like
asking whether it is reasonable to proportion the degree of one’s convictions
to the strength of the evidence. Doing this is what ‘being reasonable’ means in
such a context” p. 257. In such arguments the role played by the appeal to
paradigm cases is crucial. In Strawson’s version, paradigm cases are constituted
by “innumerable and varied instances.” Without such an appeal the argument
would fail completely, for it is clear that not all uses of induction are
reasonable. Even when this appeal is made clear though, the argument remains
questionable, for it fails to confront adequately the force of the word
‘really’ in the skeptical challenges. paradigm case argument paradigm case
argument. H. P. Grice, “Paradigm-case arguments in Urmson and other play group
members,” H. P. Grice, “A. G. N. Flew and how I taught him the paradigm-case
argument for free-will.”
H.
P. Grice’s para-doxon -- παράδοξον, Liddell and
Scott render it as “contrary to expectation [doxa, belief], incredible,
[unbelievable]” – πaradoxos λόγος they render, unhelpfully, as “a paradox,” Pl.R.472a;
“πaradoxos τε καὶ ψεῦδος” – the paradoxical and the false -- Id.Plt.281a;
“παράδοξα λέγειν” – to utter a paradox -- X.Cyr.7.2.16; “ἂν παράδοξον εἴπω” D.3.10; ἐκ
τοῦ παραδόξου καὶ παραλόγου – Liddell and Scott render as “contrary to all
expectation,” contrary to all belief and dicta! -- ἐκ τοῦ παρα-δόξου καὶ
παρα-λόγου – cf. Kant’s paralogism -- -- -- Id.25.32, cf. Phld.Vit.p.23 J.; “πολλὰ
ποικίλλει χρόνος πaradoxa καὶ θαυμαστά” Men.593; “πaradoxon μοι τὸ πρᾶγμα”
Thphr.Char.1.6; “τὸ ἔνδοξον ἐκ τοῦ πaradoxon θηρώμενος” Plu.Pomp.14; παράδοξα
Stoical paradoxes, Id.2.1060b sq.: Comp., Phld.Mus.p.72 K., Plot.4.9.2: Sup.,
LXX Wi.16.17. Adv. “-ξως” Aeschin.2.40, Plb.1.21.11, Dsc.4.83: Sup. “-ότατα”
D.C.67.11; “-οτάτως” Gal.7.876. II. παράδοξος, title of distinguished athletes,
musicians, and artists of all kinds, the Admirable, IG3.1442, 14.916,
Arr.Epict.2.18.22, IGRom.4.468 (Pergam., iii A. D.), PHamb.21.3 (iv A. D.),
Rev.Ét.Gr.42.434 (Delph.), etc. For Grice, ‘unbelievable’ as opposed to
‘unthinkable’ or ‘unintelligible’ is the paradigm-case response for a
non-analytically false utterance. “Paradoxical, but true.”
para-doxon:
a seemingly sound piece of reasoning based on seemingly true assumptions that
leads to a contradiction or other obviously false conclusion. A paradox reveals
that either the principles of reasoning or the assumptions on which it is based
are faulty. It is said to be solved when the mistaken principles or assumptions
are clearly identified and rejected. The philosophical interest in paradoxes
arises from the fact that they sometimes reveal fundamentally mistaken
assumptions or erroneous reasoning techniques. Two groups of paradoxes have
received a great deal of attention in modern philosophy. Known as the semantic
paradoxes and the logical or settheoretic paradoxes, they reveal serious
difficulties in our intuitive understanding of the basic notions of semantics
and set theory. Other well-known paradoxes include the barber paradox and the
prediction or hangman or unexpected examination paradox. The barber paradox is
mainly useful as an example of a paradox that is easily resolved. Suppose we
are told that there is an Oxford barber who shaves all and only the Oxford men
who do not shave themselves. Using this description, we can apparently derive
the contradiction that this barber both shaves and does not shave himself. If
he does not shave himself, then according to the description he must be one of
the people he shaves; if he does shave himself, then according to the
description he is one of the people he does not shave. This paradox can be
resolved in two ways. First, the original claim that such a barber exists can
simply be rejected: perhaps no one satisfies the alleged description. Second,
the described barber may exist, but not fall into the class of Oxford men: a
woman barber, e.g., could shave all and only the Oxford men who do not shave
themselves. The prediction paradox takes a variety of forms. Suppose a teacher
tells her students on Friday that the following week she will give a single
quiz. But it will be a surprise: the students will not know the evening before
that the quiz will take place the following day. They reason that she cannot
give such a quiz. After all, she cannot wait until Friday to give it, since
then they would know Thursday evening. That leaves Monday through Thursday as
the only possible days for it. But then Thursday can be ruled out for the same
reason: they would know on Wednesday evening. Wednesday, Tuesday, and Monday
can be ruled out by similar reasoning. Convinced by this seemingly correct
reasoning, the students do not study for the quiz. On Wednesday morning, they
are taken by surprise when the teacher distributes it. It has been pointed out
that the students’ reasoning has this peculiar feature: in order to rule out
any of the days, they must assume that the quiz will be given and that it will
be a surprise. But their alleged conclusion is that it cannot be given or else
will not be a surprise, undermining that very assumption. Kaplan and Montague
have argued in “A Paradox Regained,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 0 that
at the core of this puzzle is what they call the knower paradox a paradox that arises when intuitively
plausible principles about knowledge and its relation to logical consequence
are used in conjunction with knowledge claims whose content is, or entails, a
denial of those very claims. Paradoxa A philosophical treatise of Cicero setting forth
six striking theorems of the Stoic system. It was composed in B.C. 46. Edited
by Orelli (with the Tusculans) (Zürich, 1829); and by Möser (Göttingen, 1846).
The three modals: Grice: “We
have, in all, then, three varieties of acceptability statement (each with
alethic and practical sub-types), associated with the modals "It is fully
acceptable that . . . " (non-defeasible), 'it is ceteris paribus
acceptable that . . . ', and 'it is to such-and-such a degree acceptable that .
. . ', both of the latter pair being subject to defeasibility. (I should
re-emphasize that, on the practical side, I am so far concerned to represent
only statements which are analogous with Kant's Technical Imperatives ('Rules
of Skill').) I am now visited by a
temptation, to which of course I shall yield, to link these varieties of
acceptability statement with common modals; however, to preserve a façade of
dignity I shall mark the modals I thus define with a star, to indicate that the
modals so defined are only candidates for identification with the common modals
spelled in the same way. I am tempted to introduce 'it must* be that' as a
modal whose sense is that of 'It is fully acceptable that' and 'it ought* to be
that' as a modal whose sense is that of 'It is ceteris paribus (other things
being equal) acceptable that'; for degree-variant acceptability I can think of
no appealing vernacular counterpart other than 'acceptable' itself. After such
introduction, we could allow the starred modals to become idiomatically
embedded in the sentences in which they occur; as in "A bishop must* get
fed up with politicians", and in "To keep his job, a bishop ought*
not to show his irritation with politicians". end p.78 But I now confess that
I am tempted to plunge even further into conceptual debauchery than I have
already; having just, at considerable pains, got what might turn out to be
common modals into my structures, I am at once inclined to get them out again.
For it seems to me that one might be able, without change of sense, to employ
forms of sentence which eliminate reference to acceptability, and so do not
need the starred modals. One might be able, to this end, to exploit
"if-then" conditionals (NB 'if . . . then', not just 'if') together
with suitable modifiers. One might, for example, be able to re-express "A
bishop must* get fed up with politicians" as "If one is a bishop,
then (unreservedly) one will get fed up with the politicians"; and
"To keep his job, a bishop ought* not to show his irritation with
politicians" as "If one is to keep one's job and if one is a bishop,
then, other things being equal, one is not to show one's irritation with
politicians". Of course, when it comes to applying detachment to
corresponding singular conditionals, we may need to have some way of indicating
the character of the generalization from which the detached singular
non-conditional sentence has been derived; the devising of such indices should
not be beyond the wit of man. So far as generalizations of these kinds are
concerned, it seems to me that one needs to be able to mark five features: (1)
conditionality; (2) generality; (3) type of generality (absolute, ceteris
paribus, etc., thereby, ipso facto, discriminating with respect to
defeasibility or indefeasibility); (4) mode; (5) (not so far mentioned) whether
or not the generalization in question has or has not been derived from a simple
enumeration of instances; because of their differences with respect to
direction of fit, any such index will do real work in the case of alethic
generalities, not in the case of practical generalities. So long as these
features are marked, we have all we need for our purposes. Furthermore, they
are all (in some legitimate and intelligible sense) formal features, and indeed
features which might be regarded as, in some sense, 'contained in' or 'required
by' the end p.79 concept of a rational being, since it would hardly be possible
to engage in any kind of reasoning without being familiar with them. So, on the
assumption that the starred modals are identifiable with their unstarred
counterparts, we would seem to have reached the following positions. (1) We
have represented practical and alethic generalizations, and their associated
conditionals, and with them certain common modals such as 'must' and 'ought',
under a single notion of acceptability (with specific variants). (2) We have
decomposed acceptability itself into formal features. (3) We have removed
mystery from the alleged logical fact that acceptable practical 'ought' statements
have to be derivable from an underlying generalization. (4) Though these
achievements (if such they be) might indeed not settle the 'univocality'
questions, they can hardly be irrelevant to them. I suspect that, if we were to
telephone the illustrious Kant at his Elysian country club in order to impart
to him this latest titbit of philosophical gossip, we might get the reply,
"Big deal! Isn't that what I've been telling you all along?"
paradoxes
of omnipotence – Grice: “a favourite with the second Wilde.” – Grice means
first Wilde, reader in philosophical psychology, second Wilde, reader in
natural religion -- a series of paradoxes in philosophical theology that
maintain that God could not be omnipotent because the concept is inconsistent,
alleged to result from the intuitive idea that if God is omnipotent, then God
must be able to do anything. 1 Can God perform logically contradictory tasks?
If God can, then God should be able to make himself simultaneously omnipotent
and not omnipotent, which is absurd. If God cannot, then it appears that there
is something God cannot do. Many philosophers have sought to avoid this
consequence by claiming that the notion of performing a logically contradictory
task is empty, and that question 1 specifies no task that God can perform or
fail to perform. 2 Can God cease to be omnipotent? If God can and were to do
so, then at any time thereafter, God would no longer be completely sovereign
over all things. If God cannot, then God cannot do something that others can
do, namely, impose limitations on one’s own powers. A popular response to
question 2 is to say that omnipotence is an essential attribute of a
necessarily existing being. According to this response, although God cannot
cease to be omnipotent any more than God can cease to exist, these features are
not liabilities but rather the lack of liabilities in God. 3 Can God create another
being who is omnipotent? Is it logically possible for two beings to be
omnipotent? It might seem that there could be, if they never disagreed in fact
with each other. If, however, omnipotence requires control over all possible
but counterfactual situations, there could be two omnipotent beings only if it
were impossible for them to disagree. 4 Can God create a stone too heavy for
God to move? If God can, then there is something that God cannot do move such a stone and if God cannot, then there is something
God cannot do create such a stone. One
reply is to maintain that ‘God cannot create a stone too heavy for God to move’
is a harmless consequence of ‘God can create stones of any weight and God can
move stones of any weight.’ paradox of analysis:
Grice: “One (not I, mind – I don’t take anything seriously) must take the
paradox of analysis very seriously.” an argument that it is impossible for an
analysis of a meaning to be informative for one who already understands the
meaning. Consider: ‘An F is a G’ e.g., ‘A circle is a line all points on which
are equidistant from some one point’ gives a correct analysis of the meaning of
‘F’ only if ‘G’ means the same as ‘F’; but then anyone who already understands
both meanings must already know what the sentence says. Indeed, that will be
the same as what the trivial ‘An F is an F’ says, since replacing one
expression by another with the same meaning should preserve what the sentence
says. The conclusion that ‘An F is a G’ cannot be informative for one who already
understands all its terms is paradoxical only for cases where ‘G’ is not only
synonymous with but more complex than ‘F’, in such a way as to give an analysis
of ‘F’. ‘A first cousin is an offspring of a parent’s sibling’ gives an
analysis, but ‘A dad is a father’ does not and in fact could not be informative
for one who already knows the meaning of all its words. The paradox appears to
fail to distinguish between different sorts of knowledge. Encountering for the
first time and understanding a correct analysis of a meaning one already grasps
brings one from merely tacit to explicit knowledge of its truth. One sees that
it does capture the meaning and thereby sees a way of articulating the meaning one
had not thought of before. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “Dissolving the paradox of
analysis via the principle of conversational helpfulness – How helpful is
‘unmarried male’ as an analysis of ‘bachelor’?”
paradox
of omniscience: Grice: “A favourite with the second Wilde,” i. e. the Wilde
reader in natural religion, as opposed to the Wilde reader in philosophical
psychology -- an objection to the possibility of omniscience, developed by
Patrick Grim, that appeals to an application of Cantor’s power set theorem.
Omniscience requires knowing all truths; according to Grim, that means knowing
every truth in the set of all truths. But there is no set of all truths.
Suppose that there were a set T of all truths. Consider all the subsets of T,
that is, all members of the power set 3T. Take some truth T1. For each member of
3T either T1 is a member of that set or T1 is not a member of that set. There
will thus correspond to each member of 3T a further truth specifying whether T1
is or is not a member of that set. Therefore there are at least as many truths
as there are members of 3T. By the power set theorem, there are more members of
3T than there are of T. So T is not the set of all truths. By a parallel
argument, no other set is, either. So there is no set of all truths, after all,
and therefore no one who knows every member of that set. The objection may be
countered by denying that the claim ‘for every proposition p, if p is true God
knows that p’ requires that there be a set of all true propositions.
paraphilosophy:
“I phoned Gellner: you chould entitle your essay, an attack on ordinary
language PARA-philosophy, since that is what Austin asks us to do.”
Paraphilosophy:
“Something Austin loved, and I not so much.” – Grice.
para-psychology, the study of certain
anomalous phenomena and ostensible causal connections neither recognized nor
clearly rejected by traditional science. Parapsychology’s principal areas of
investigation are extrasensory perception ESP, psychokinesis PK, and cases
suggesting the survival of mental functioning following bodily death. The study
of ESP has traditionally focused on two sorts of ostensible phenomena,
telepathy the apparent anomalous influence of one person’s mental states on
those of another, commonly identified with apparent communication between two
minds by extrasensory means and clairvoyance the apparent anomalous influence
of a physical state of affairs on a person’s mental states, commonly identified
with the supposed ability to perceive or know of objects or events not present
to the senses. The forms of ESP may be viewed either as types of cognition
e.g., the anomalous knowledge of another person’s mental states or as merely a
form of anomalous causal influence e.g., a distant burning house causing one to
have possibly incongruous thoughts about fire. The study of PK covers
the apparent ability to produce various physical effects independently of
familiar or recognized intermediate sorts of causal links. These effects
include the ostensible movement of remote objects, materializations the
apparently instantaneous production of matter, apports the apparently
instantaneous relocation of an object, and in laboratory experiments
statistically significant non-random behavior of normally random microscopic
processes such as radioactive decay. Survival research focuses on cases of
ostensible reincarnation and mental mediumship i.e., “channeling” of
information from an apparently deceased communicator. Cases of ostensible
precognition may be viewed as types of telepathy and clairvoyance, and suggest
the causal influence of some state of affairs on an earlier event an agent’s
ostensible precognitive experience. However, those opposed to backward
causation may interpret ostensible precognition either as a form of unconscious
inference based on contemporaneous information acquired by ESP, or else as a
form of PK possibly in conjunction with telepathic influence by which the
precognizer brings about the events apparently precognized. The data of
parapsychology raise two particularly deep issues. The evidence suggesting
survival poses a direct challenge to materialist theories of the mental. And
the evidence for ESP and PK suggests the viability of a “magical” worldview
associated usually with so-called primitive societies, according to which we
have direct and intimate access to and influence on the thoughts and bodily
states of others. H. P. Grice: "When, in the
late 1940s, J. L. Austin instituted his *second* playgroup, for full-time
philosophy dons -- my *first*, in a way --, its official rationale, given by
its founder, was that all its members were hacks, spending our weekdays
wrestling with the dissolution of this or that philosophical pseudo-problem,
and that we deserved to be spending our Saturday mornings -- my Saturday
afternoons were consacrated to the Demi-Johns -- in restorative para-philosophy.
And so we started on such topics as maps and diagrams and (in another
term) rules of games." Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “What J. L Austin meant by ‘paraphilosophy’!,” H. P. Grice,
“Philosophy and para-philosophy.”
Pareto: one of the most important Italian
philosophers, born in Paris (“His mother was a French woman.” – Grice.). Pareto’s efficiency, also called Pareto
optimality, a state of affairs in which no one can be made better off without
making someone worse off. “If you are provided information, the one who gives
you information loses.” “If you give information, you lose.” “If you influence,
you win.” “If you get influenced,” you lose.” The economist Vilfredo Pareto referred to ‘optimality,’
as used by Grice, rather than efficiency, but usage has drifted toward the less
normative term, ‘efficiency.’ Pareto supposes that the utilitarian addition of
welfare across conversationalist A and conversationalist B is meaningless.
Pareto concludes that the only useful aggregate measures of welfare must be
ordinal. One state of affairs is what Pareto calls “Pareto-superior” to another
if conversationalist A cannot move to the second state without making his
co-conversationalist B worse off. Although Pareto’s criterion is generally
thought to be positive or descriptive (‘empiricist’) rather than normative
(‘quasi-contractual, or rational’), it is often used as a normative principles
for justifying particular changes or refusals to make changes. Some philosophers,
such as Grice’s tutee Nozick, for example, take the Pareto criterion as a moral
constraint and therefore oppose certain government policies. In the context of
a voluntary exchange, it makes sense to suppose that every exchange is
“Pareto-improving,” at least for the direct parties to the exchange,
conversationalists A and B. If, however, we fail to account for any external
effect of A’s and B’s conversational exchange on a third party, the
conversational exchange may *not* be Pareto-improving (Grice’s example, “Mrs.
Smith is a bag.”. Moreover, we may fail to provide collective, or
intersubjective benefits that require the co-operation or co-ordination of A’s
and B’s individual efforts (A may be more ready to volunteer than B, say).
Hence, even in a conversational exchange, we cannot expect to achieve “Pareto
efficiency,” but what Grice calls “Grice efficiency.” We might therefore
suppose we should invite thet intervention of the voice of reason to help us
helping each other. But in a typical conversational context, it is often hard
to believe that a significant policy change can be Pareto-improving: there are
sure to be losers from any change – “but the it’s gentlemanly to accept a loss.”
– H. P. Grice. Vilfredo
Federico Damaso Pareto (n. Parigi, 15 luglio 1848 – Céligny, 19 agosto 1923) è
stato un ingegnere, economista e sociologo italiano. Con Gaetano Mosca fu
tra i teorici della corrente politica dell'elitismo. Di grande versatilità
mentale, Pareto è stato tra le menti più eclettiche vissute nella seconda metà
dell'Ottocento e all'inizio Novecento. Le sue capacità spaziavano dall'economia
politica, alla teoria dei giochi, all'ingegneria, alla matematica, alla
statistica e alla filosofia. Pareto ha assunto un ruolo determinante nel
rafforzare con rigore scientifico e analitico i concetti cardine della teoria
neoclassica elaborata da Léon Walras, Carl Menger e William Stanley Jevons
nell'ambito delle scienze economiche, facendo sì che si affermasse rispetto
alle altre in sviluppo o precedenti, e che dominasse come scuola incontrastata
fino alla metà del '900. Ancora oggi, i contributi di Pareto sono centrali e
largamente discussi a livello internazionale in economia e in quasi tutti i
campi applicativi di essa, come la matematica, la statistica e la teoria dei
giochi. Fu lui il primo a utilizzare il termine élite in campo
sociologico.[senza fonte Nacque a Parigi da padre italiano, Raffaele
Pareto (1812-1882), un ingegnere in esilio volontario per motivi politici
appartenente a un'antica famiglia nobile genovese, e da madre francese, Marie
Métenier (1813-1889). Suo zio paterno era il celebre geologo Lorenzo Pareto
(1800-1865). Rientrò in Italia con la famiglia e si stabilì a Genova, nei primi
anni cinquanta dell'Ottocento. Pareto frequentò il Regio Istituto Tecnico e
l'Università a Torino, conseguendo il diploma di Scienze Matematiche presso
l'Università e laureandosi infine presso la Scuola di Applicazione per
Ingegneri nel 1870, con una tesi sui "Principi fondamentali della teoria
della elasticità dei corpi solidi e ricerche sulla integrazione delle equazioni
differenziali che ne definiscono l'equilibrio".[1] Dopo un periodo
trascorso come ingegnere straordinario, a Firenze, presso la Società anonima
delle strade ferrate, nel 1880 divenne direttore generale della Società delle
ferriere italiane, a San Giovanni Valdarno. In questo stesso periodo
frequentò i circoli culturali fiorentini e, con articoli su riviste italiane ed
europee, partecipò intensamente al dibattito politico su posizioni liberiste e
anti-protezionistiche. Nel 1880 e nel 1882 presentò la propria candidatura come
deputato, prima nel collegio di Montevarchi, poi nel collegio Pistoia-Prato-San
Marcello, ma non fu eletto. Intanto, coltivò i suoi interessi culturali,
approfondendo l'economia, la sociologia, gli studi letterari classici. Nel 1889
sposò la russa Alexandra Bakunin (non imparentata con l'anarchico
rivoluzionario Michail Bakunin).[2] Nel 1890 conobbe il già insigne economista
Maffeo Pantaleoni, cui restò legato da sincera amicizia per il resto della sua
vita. Anche grazie a Pantaleoni, nel 1894 fu nominato professore ordinario di
economia politica all'Università di Losanna, dove prima di lui aveva insegnato
Léon Walras. Lavorò allo sviluppo e alla sistemazione della teoria dell'equilibrio
economico tenendo, nel 1901, alcune conferenze a Parigi, invitato da Georges
Sorel, con il quale fu in ottimi rapporti. In questo periodo fu abbandonato
dalla moglie ed ereditò una grossa fortuna da uno zio. Si legò more uxorio con
Jeanne Régis, una giovane parigina conosciuta tramite un'inserzione su un
giornale. Intanto, diventava sempre più vivo l'interesse per la teoria
sociologica. Abbandonò progressivamente l'insegnamento, anche per ragioni di
salute, e si dedicò alla redazione del Trattato di sociologia generale. Nel
1910 Pareto pubblicò Il mito virtuista e la letteratura immorale, uno scritto
mordace e satirico sul fenomeno Virtuista, nel quale l'autore demitizza in
maniera irriverente tutte le razionalizzazioni degli uomini bigotti e ipocriti
del suo tempo. Frattanto proseguì l'attività pubblicistica, che s'intensificò
dopo la pubblicazione del Trattato, avvenuta nel 1916. Fu in rapporti di
amicizia con Benito Mussolini, che conobbe tra il 1902 e il 1904 quando
l'ancora agitatore socialista era rifugiato in Svizzera e frequentava le
lezioni dell'economista. Mussolini fece suoi i principi della "filosofia
della vita" di Pareto, che considererà Mussolini "un grande
statista". Nell'ottobre 1922 Pareto dalla Svizzera, con un acceso telegramma
in cui diceva "ora o mai più", inviò il proprio incoraggiamento a
Benito Mussolini a dare il via alla Marcia su Roma e prendere il potere[3].
Alla fine del 1922 accettò l'invito fattogli da Benito Mussolini, diventato
capo del governo, a rappresentare l'Italia nella commissione per la riduzione
degli armamenti presso la Società delle Nazioni. Il 1º marzo del 1923, su
proposta del governo fascista, fu nominato Senatore del Regno. La nomina non
poté essere portata a termine perché Pareto non consegnò alla presidenza del
Senato i documenti richiestigli. Il 19 giugno dello stesso anno, ottenuto il
divorzio da Alexandra Bakunin, sposò Jeanne Régis dopo una convivenza
ventennale.[2] Morì il 19 agosto successivo e fu sepolto nel cimitero di
Céligny. Nel corso della sua vita, oltre alle personalità già menzionate,
intrattenne rapporti d'amicizia e di scambi culturali, spesso polemici, con
Galileo Ferraris, Ubaldino ed Emilia Peruzzi, Ernest Naville, Yves Guyot,
Gustave de Molinari, Antonio De Viti De Marco, Domenico Comparetti, Augusto
Franchetti, Arturo Linaker, Ernesto Teodoro Moneta, William Ewart Gladstone,
Filippo Turati, James Bryce, Alfred de Foville, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth,
Adrien Naville, Ettore Ciccotti, Arturo Labriola, Benedetto Croce, Luigi Einaudi,
Giovanni Papini, Giovanni Vailati, Tullio Martello, Luigi Amoroso, Joseph
Schumpeter, L. V. Furlan, Napoleone Colajanni, Gaetano Salvemini, Vittore
Pansini, Olinto Barsanti, Robert Michels, Corrado Gini, Dino Grandi e Carlo
Placci. Il resoconto giornalistico di una sua conferenza, tenuta nel
giugno del 1891, sciolta d'autorità per l'intervento della polizia, dice: «La
scienza economica non considera la proprietà come un dogma, non ne nega i
difetti, la riconosce variabile nel tempo e nello spazio; ma seguendo il metodo
sperimentale crede che la sua disparizione farebbe oggi più danni che
vantaggi» Riguardo al suo contributo alla teoria economica, egli, assieme
a Johann Heinrich von Thünen, Hermann Heinrich Gossen, Carl Menger, William
Jevons e il già nominato Léon Walras, è stato tra i maggiori rappresentanti
dell'indirizzo marginalistico o neo-classico, in contrapposizione alla scuola
classica dei primi economisti che ha in Adam Smith e in David Ricardo i suoi
capostipiti. A questa impostazione, fondata sul tentativo di trasferire nella
scienza economica il metodo sperimentale delle scienze fisiche, con il
conseguente uso delle matematiche, e che poi ha dominato lungo tutto il
Novecento, si possono ricondurre concetti tipicamente paretiani come la curva della
distribuzione dei redditi, il concetto detto poi di ottimo paretiano, le curve
di indifferenza, il concetto di distribuzione paretiana. Restando al
concetto della curva della distribuzione dei redditi, o legge di Pareto, essa è
l'estrapolazione statistica operata da Pareto del fatto che, non solo il numero
di percettori di reddito medio è più elevato del numero di coloro che
percepiscono redditi molto sopra e molto sotto la media, ma anche del fatto
che, man mano che si considerano livelli di reddito sempre più alti, il numero
dei percettori diminuisce in un modo che è all'incirca uguale in tutti i paesi
e in tutte le epoche. Tale legge è stata poi variamente affinata e modificata
sia nella sua base empirica che nella formalizzazione matematica, ma è rimasto
il problema di sapere se la distribuzione dei redditi è probabilistica, e
dunque risultante dalle abilità naturali umane distribuite casualmente in una
popolazione, oppure influenzata da fattori ambientali che quindi generano
ingiustizie. In definitiva, come si vede, dal marginalismo, e in
particolare dagli sviluppi apportati da Pareto, viene fuori una metodologia
utile, al di là dei regimi economici preferiti, ad affrontare problemi di
remunerazione e di allocazione delle risorse. L'indice di Pareto è tuttora una
misura delle ineguaglianze della distribuzione dei redditi. Tuttavia, negli
ultimi decenni del XX secolo, l'impostazione marginalistica, e quindi anche
quella di Pareto, è stata soggetta a critiche stringenti. Si è infatti
obiettato che non sempre ciò che l'agente sceglie è ciò che egli preferisce,
nel senso che l'agente economico non è quell'attore perfettamente razionale che
l'approccio marginalista presuppone. I neoclassici rispondono che il loro
modello non si applica ad ogni individuo ma solo al consumatore rappresentativo
o medio. Per quanto concerne l'ottimo paretiano, una critica particolarmente
incisiva è stata quella di Amartya Sen che, tra l'altro in un suo lavoro del
1970, argomenta, sulla scorta del Teorema di Arrow, l'impossibilità matematica
del liberismo paretiano. Proprio sul terreno delle costanti della natura
umana e della razionalità dell'agente avviene il passaggio di Pareto
dall'economia alla sociologia. Lo studio statistico della distribuzione dei
redditi gli aveva fornito una prima evidenza della stabilità della natura umana
pur nel variare delle situazioni storico-geografiche. D'altra parte,
l'osservazione del comportamento non solo economico, ma più generalmente
sociale, lo portava a constatare come l'individuo sociale agisca solo raramente
secondo una razionalità strumentale di mezzi adeguati al fine. A suo modo, egli
anticipa la critica antimarginalista ma, invece di rispondervi restando nel
recinto dell'analisi economica, passa a fondare quella che egli chiamava la «sociologia
scientifica». Il punto di partenza di questa nuova sociologia che, a suo dire,
né Comte né Spencer erano stati in grado di concepire, è che nella maggior
parte dei casi, l'individuo sociale si comporta in maniera non logica, ovvero
senza uno scopo apparente e, comunque, senza una chiara coscienza dello scopo
perseguito. Un marinaio dell'antica Grecia che, apprestandosi a navigare,
compie un sacrificio agli dei, realizza un'azione in nulla adeguata o utile al
suo scopo di navigare. E quando parliamo, non abbiamo nessuna coscienza
esplicita delle competenze grammaticali che utilizziamo per raggiungere lo
scopo di enunciare frasi ben formate. Il problema è però che l'individuo
sociale, pur agendo in modo non logico, cosa che lo accomuna alle specie animali,
rispetto a queste ultime presenta la caratteristica di accompagnare i propri
comportamenti con delle formulazioni verbali, la cui funzione è quella di
fornire un motivo del comportamento stesso. Si muore in combattimento per
qualcosa che chiamiamo patria, e allo stesso tempo si sottoscrive al motto che
vuole che sia dolce e meritevole di lode il morire per la patria. La sociologia
scientifica dovrà allora spiegare quali sono le costanti del comportamento
sociale non logico, e quali sono le caratteristiche e la funzione del discorso
sociale. Da questo nucleo di problemi nasce la sociologia di Pareto,
costituita da quattro grandi contrafforti: la teoria dell'azione non logica, la
teoria dei residui e delle derivazioni, la teoria delle élite, la teoria
dell'equilibrio sociale. Quanto alla teoria dell'azione non logica, oltre a ciò
che si è già anticipato, si può aggiungere che essa costituisce una
classificazione dei comportamenti sociali nei suoi aspetti percettivo-motori e
linguistico-cognitivi. Un particolare interesse è rivolto verso i comportamenti
linguistici. Per Pareto, il linguaggio in quanto competenza grammaticale è il
tipo puro di azione non logica. La teoria dei residui e delle derivazioni
intende spiegare natura e funzionamento delle manifestazioni simboliche, o
derivate, che accompagnano il comportamento sociale, e in particolare natura e
funzionamento del discorso sociale. I motivi che l'individuo sociale adduce a
giustificazione dei suoi comportamenti, sono, secondo Pareto, arbitrari rispetto
alle effettive motivazioni dell'agire. Nonostante ciò, dalla grande varietà di
essi, è possibile risalire alle costanti della natura umana - in termini più
attuali, della mente sociale. Dai discorsi è possibile, dunque, risalire ai
residui, o motivazioni costanti dell'agire, e alle tecniche verbali, o
derivazioni, tramite le quali vengono prodotti i discorsi. In questo senso, la
teoria dei residui e delle derivazioni è, al tempo stesso, una teoria della
cognizione sociale e una teoria delle tecniche argomentative che l'individuo
sociale adopera nella costruzione dei suoi discorsi. Questo schema
analitico non sempre è perseguito in maniera limpida, soprattutto per i
residui. Tuttavia, ciò che emerge abbastanza chiaramente è che la cognizione sociale,
nei suoi scambi con l'ambiente, incorpora una tendenza alle combinazioni e una
tendenza agli aggregati. La prima genera le novità. La seconda assicura la
stabilità. Questo livello psicologico è duplicato da un livello normativo che,
a sua volta, presenta due tendenze, il mantenimento dell'ordine e la sua
trasformazione sulla base di istanze di giustizia. In questo modo, il
comportamento dell'individuo sociale, anche nei suoi aspetti più minuti e
ripetitivi, appare sempre cognitivamente marcato e normativamente orientato.
Uno dei difetti di questo sofisticato modello della cognizione sociale è,
tuttavia, quello di operare con un concetto di norma assai ristretto, che nega
l'incidenza pratica di ciò che Pareto chiama gli «equilibri ideali», ovvero ciò
che un filosofo come Kant chiamerebbe gli ideali della ragione universale.
L'agire dell'individuo sociale appare così rinchiuso entro un rapporto
costrittivo di conformismo e di eterodirezione. Gaetano Mosca:
politologo italiano Venendo alla teoria delle élite, essa è un'ulteriore
conseguenza dell'ipotesi di Pareto circa, non solo la costanza della natura
umana, ma anche di una sua preminenza sui fattori ambientali. In ogni ramo
dell'attività sociale, sostiene Pareto, vi sono individui che, sulla base di
determinate abilità, eccellono. Pertanto, in forza di questo fatto, costoro
entrano a far parte dell'élite corrispondente, pur in presenza di fattori
distorsivi. L'attenzione di Pareto si appunta sull'élite politica, ma la sua
teoria delle élite non è solo una teoria del rapporto tra governanti e
governati, ma più generalmente una teoria della stratificazione sociale su base
naturale. Questo è sicuramente ciò che la differenzia dalla coeva teoria della
classe governante di Gaetano Mosca, fra i fondatori della moderna scienza
politica, cui lo si associa ormai acriticamente, benché Pareto, a ragione,
abbia sempre rivendicato l'autonomia della sua teorizzazione. Tuttavia,
come affermato, vi è in Pareto una particolare attenzione per il rapporto tra
l'élite di governo, cioè coloro che eccellono nell'arte del comando politico, e
i governati. La storia, egli afferma, è un cimitero di élite, ovvero un
susseguirsi di sempre nuovi ma, nella loro struttura, sempre immodificabili
rapporti unilaterali di rispetto tra governanti e governati. Infine, a
coronamento di questo grandioso edificio, sta la teoria dell'equilibrio
sociale. La quale, tuttavia, è la parte più debole di tutta la sua costruzione.
Pareto è conscio dell'impossibilità di una formalizzazione matematica. Inoltre,
la scelta di un concetto di equilibrio come equilibrio meccanico, rende questa
parte della sua sociologia una faticosa argomentazione intorno ai vincoli
sistemici dell'agire degli individui sociali. Di notevole vi è sicuramente il
tentativo di Pareto di spiegare il divenire sociale senza rinunciare al
presupposto della costanza della natura umana. Ne deriva un pessimismo
"ondulatorio" che non riesce però a conciliare il susseguirsi dei
cicli sociali con il fatto, pur riconosciuto, del progressivo stabilirsi della
«ragione» nelle attività umane. Pur con questo e altri limiti, che si sono
venuti man mano segnalando, Pareto, nel suo tentativo di una «sociologia
scientifica», desta ammirazione anzitutto per la creatività e la grandezza di
vedute con cui ha saputo districarsi dalle difficoltà del paradigma economico
marginalistico, alla cui piena ma problematica maturità aveva contribuito egli
stesso; in secondo luogo, per averci assicurato una fra le più originali
indagini intorno alla mente dell'individuo sociale, la cui portata è ancora in
larga parte da valutare e sfruttare. Il rapporto di Pareto con la
sociologia scientifica nell'età della fondazione si innesta in modo
paradigmatico nel momento in cui egli, partendo proprio dall'economia politica,
critica il positivismo come sistema totalizzante e metafisico privo di un
rigoroso metodo logico-sperimentale. In questo senso si può leggere il destino
della produzione paretiana all'interno di una storia delle scienze sociali che
continua a mostrare nel XXI secolo la sua peculiarità e tutto l'interesse per i
suoi contributi (Giovanni Busino, Sugli studi paretiani all'alba del XXI secolo
in Omaggio a Vilfredo Pareto Numero monografico in memoria di Giorgio Sola a
cura di Stefano Monti Bragadin, "Storia Politica Società", Quaderni
di Scienze Umane, anno IX, n. 15, giugno-dicembre 2009, p. 1 e sg.). La vicenda
di Pareto si colloca anche nell'alveo della ricerca multidisciplinare di un
modello scientifico che privilegia la sociologia come critica dei modelli cumulativi
di sapere nonché come disciplina tendente all'affermazione di modelli
relazionali della/nella scienza (Guglielmo Rinzivillo, Vilfredo Pareto e i
modelli interdisciplinari nella scienza, "Sociologia", A. XXIX, n.1,
Nuova Serie, 1995, pp. 207–222; si v. anche in Una epistemologia senza storia,
Roma, Nuova Cultura, 2013, pp. 13–29, ISBN 978-88-6812-222-5). Niccolò
Machiavelli Riguardo al suo pensiero politico, Pareto fu il primo a introdurre
il concetto di élite, che trascende quello di classe politica e comprende
l'analisi dei vari tipi di élite. È un liberista, insegna per un certo periodo
economia politica all'università di Losanna. La sua teoria delle élite trae
origine da un'analisi dell'eterogeneità sociale e dalla constatazione delle
disuguaglianze, in termini di ricchezza e di potere, presenti nella società.
Pareto intende studiare scientificamente queste disuguaglianze, percepite da
lui come naturali. Nel corso del suo sviluppo, ogni società ha dovuto di volta
in volta misurarsi con il problema dello sfruttamento e delle distribuzione di
risorse scarse. L'ottimizzazione di queste risorse è quella che viene
assicurata, in ogni ramo di attività, dagli individui dotati di capacità
superiori: l'élite. È interessato in particolar modo alla circolazione
delle élite: "la storia è un cimitero di élite". A un certo punto
l'élite non è più in grado di produrre elementi validi per la società e decade;
nelle élite si verificano due tipi di movimenti: uno orizzontale (movimenti
all'interno della stessa élite) e uno verticale (ascesa dal basso o
declassamento dall'élite). Altro punto cardine della teoria paretiana è che
l'umanità agisce principalmente secondo azioni non logiche. Tali azioni non
logiche (si badi, è una cosa diversa da illogiche) prendono il nome di residui:
manifestazione di qualcosa di non razionale che condiziona la nostra vita. Fra
le sei classi di residui individuate da Pareto due sono fondamentali: l'istinto
delle combinazioni (propensione al cambiamento) e la persistenza degli
aggregati (tendenza alla conservazione delle tradizioni). Se in un'élite
prevale l'istinto delle combinazioni essa sarà aperta, propensa all'avvento di
nuovi ingressi; se, viceversa, prevale la persistenza degli aggregati sarà
chiusa, propensa a scarsa circolazione, ecc. Per giustificare a posteriori le
proprie azioni e difendere i propri interessi si fa ricorso alle derivazioni:
attribuiscono all'agire politico la connotazione di oggettiva necessità sociale
(sono perciò, per sommi capi, assimilabili alla nozione di formula politica di
Gaetano Mosca). Pareto si dichiara realista e seguace di Machiavelli, la sua è
una descrizione della realtà con sfondi piuttosto pessimistici. È conservatore,
teme il suffragio universale, in economia ha fiducia nel liberismo e nel libero
mercato; è antisocialista, anche alla luce di quanto accade nella Russia della
rivoluzione d'ottobre. Analizzando alcuni brani tratti da I sistemi socialisti
si possono trarre alcune considerazioni sull'impianto teorico di Pareto:
Chi è al potere è anche, necessariamente, il più ricco: chi sta in alto non
gode solo di potere politico, ma di tutta una serie di privilegi, L'élite
svetta per le sue qualità, che possono essere sia buone che cattive, Le élite
sono tutte colpite da una decadenza piuttosto rapida, Una élite che non si
rigenera è destinata a perire brevemente (traspaiono, qui, retaggi tipici del
darwinismo sociale [citazione?]), Elementi di ricambio per le élite possono
provenire dalle classi rurali, le quali subiscono una selezione più forte
rispetto alle classi agiate; le classi agiate tendono a salvare tutti i loro
figli, facendo sì che rimangano in vita anche elementi deboli e non adatti.
Questo significa che l'élite al potere avrà in sé anche gli elementi peggiori e
ciò la destina a peggiorare, Ricorso alla metafora del fiore: l'élite è come un
fiore, appassisce, ma se la pianta, cioè la società, è sana, essa farà subito
nascere un altro fiore. La filosofia della storia di Pareto si fonda sulla
circolazione continua delle élite. Non esiste per Pareto un'idea trionfante in
politica, vede la storia come un moto ondoso: l'idea che trionfa oggi domani
decade, ma dopodomani potrà tornare in auge. Analizzando alcuni brani tratti
dal Trattato di sociologia generale si possono trarre alcune considerazioni sul
pensiero di Pareto: Non c'è netta separazione tra azione logica e azione
non logica: un'azione concreta presenta in misura differente tratti di entrambe
le categorie, I residui fanno sì che i comportamenti umani si differenzino e
non vi siano piattezza e omologazione: permettono, quindi, la circolazione, Chi
studia l'eticità e la morale di un popolo lo fa sempre con interesse: egli dà
una qualifica alla morale perché la vuole imporre. In realtà la morale è
qualcosa di molto difficile da qualificare e da imporre: la morale non è logica
ma residuale (questo è certamente un discorso libertario). Chi governa non lo
fa per il bene della collettività ma esclusivamente per il proprio interesse:
la necessità di giustificarsi agli occhi dei governati lo fa ricorrere alle
derivazioni. Le clientele in democrazia hanno un ruolo simile a quello dei
vassalli nel feudalesimo. La democrazia così come la intendono i teorici (cioè
come governo popolare) non è altro che un "pio desiderio".
Clientelismo e consorterie non sono una degenerazione della democrazia: sono
invece la realtà della democrazia: non è mai esistita una democrazia non
interessata da questi fenomeni e la storia lo dimostra. Ci sarà sempre chi,
stringendo un patto con le élite al potere, ne trae personale beneficio a
scapito degli altri. "Il governare è l'arte di adoperare i sentimenti
esistenti", questa frase dimostra il pragmatismo di
Pareto. Opere Compendio di sociologia generale, 1920 (FR)
Cours d'Économie politique professé a l'Université de Lausanne, vol. I, 1896;
vol. II, 1897. (FR) Les systèmes socialistes, 1902. I sistemi socialisti, 2
voll., Milano, collana « Raccolta di Breviari Intellettuali » n° 29, 1920.
Manuale di economia politica con una introduzione alla scienza sociale, Milano,
1906.[4] Il mito virtuista e la letteratura immorale, 1911. Trattato di
sociologia generale, 4 voll., 1916. Giulio Farina (a cura di), Compendio di
sociologia generale, Firenze, Barbèra, 1920. Fatti e teorie, Firenze, Vallecchi
Editore, 1920. Trasformazione della democrazia, Milano, Corbaccio, 1921.
Lettere a Maffeo Pantaleoni. 1890-1896, Roma, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 1960.
Lettere a Maffeo Pantaleoni. 1897-1906, Roma, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 1960.
Lettere a Maffeo Pantaleoni. 1907-1923, Roma, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 1960.
Borghesia, Élites, Fascismo, Roma, Giovanni Volpe, 1981. (FR) Écrits
politiques. Reazione, Libertà, Fascismo (1896-1923), Ginevra, Droz, 1989. Le
configurazioni del fascismo (1922-1923), AR, 2009. Note ^ Luigi Amoroso,
Vilfredo Pareto, in Econometrica, vol. 6, n. 1, January 1938, pp. 1–21,
DOI:10.2307/1910081, JSTOR 1910081. The Encyclopedia Sponsored by
Statistics and Probability Societies, StatProb, 19 agosto 1923. URL consultato
il 4 novembre 2015 (archiviato dall'url originale il 4 marzo 2016). «among a
menagerie of cats that he and his French lover kept [in their villa;] the local
divorce laws prevented him from divorcing his wife and remarrying until just a
few months prior to his death.». ^ Mauro Canali, Nascita di un italiano a Parigi:
Pareto (15/07/1848), RAI Storia, Copia archiviata, su raistoria.rai.it. URL
consultato il 19 agosto 2011 (archiviato dall'url originale il 13 agosto 2011).
(consultata il 19/8/2011) ^ Recensione di Federigo Enriques su Scientia.
Bibliografia Aqueci, F. Le funzioni del linguaggio secondo Pareto,
Berne-Frankfurt/M.-New York-Paris, Peter Lang, 1991 Aron, R., Les étapes de la
pensée sociologique, Paris, Gallimard, 1967 (nuova edizione 1983) Barbieri, G,
Vilfredo Pareto e il fascismo, Angeli, 2003 Bobbio, N., Saggi sulla scienza
politica in Italia, Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1969 (nuova edizione accresciuta 1996)
Bobbio, Norberto, Pareto e il sistema sociale, Firenze, Sansoni, 1973 Borkenau,
F., Modern Sociologists: Pareto, London, Chapmann & Hall, 1936 Bousquet, G.
H., Pareto (1848-1923), le savant et l'homme, Lausanne, Payot, 1928 Bridel, P.,
Tatti, E. (éditeurs), L'équilibre général. Entre économie et sociologie.
Colloque du Centre d'études interdisciplinaires Walras-Pareto de l'Université
de Lausanne, "Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales", tome XXXVII,
1999, no. 116, Librairie Droz, Genève-Paris Busino, G., Pareto, Croce, les
socialismes et la sociologie, Genève, Droz, 1983 Busino, G., Introduzione, Nota
biografica, Nota bibliografica, Nota al testo, Commento e Indici, in Pareto,
V., Trattato di sociologia generale (edizione critica a cura di G. Busino),
Torino, UTET, 1988, 4 voll. Fagioli, S., Vilfredo Pareto nella Toscana del
secondo Ottocento. Un'antologia di scritti editi e inediti, Firenze,
Polistampa, 2015. Federici, M. C., Federici, R., Ciak si gira... Appunti di
sociologia dello spettacolo, 2002, Morlacchi editore, Perugia. Forte, F.,
Silvestri, P., Pareto's sociological maximum of utility of the community and
the theory of the elites, in J. G. Backhaus (ed.), Essentials of Fiscal
Sociology. Conceptions of an Encyclopedia, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2013,
pp. 231–265. Gallo, Michele, La logica delle scienze sociali in Vilfredo
Pareto, Loffredo editore, Napoli 1990. Galmozzi, E. (a cura di), Pareto, in "Origini",
nº11 anno 1995, Società Editrice Barbarossa. Garzia, Mino B.C., Metodologia
paretiana. Tomo I. Differenziazione, non linearità, equilibrio, Peter Lang,
Bern, 2006. Garzia, Mino B.C., Metodologia paretiana. Tomo II. Stati psichici e
costanti dell'azione, Peter Lang, Bern, 2013. Garzia, Mino B.C., Metodologia
paretiana. Tomo III. Stati psichici e variabili dell'azione, Peter Lang, Bern,
2015. Malandrino, C., Marchionatti, R., (a cura di), Economia, sociologia e
politica nell'opera di Vilfredo Pareto, Firenze, Olschki, 2000 Manca, G.(a cura
di), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). L'uomo e lo scienziato, Milano, Libri
Scheiwiller, 2002 Millefiorini, A., Mutamento e costruzione di senso nel
Trattato di Sociologia generale di Vilfredo Pareto, in (Id., a cura di),
Fenomenologia del disordine. Prospettive sull'irrazionale nella riflessione
sociologica italiana, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, Roma, 2015, pp. 123–164 Pareto,
V. (a cura di Giovanni Busino), Oeuvres complètes: Tome 23, Lettres 1860-1890,
Genève: Droz, 1981 Ricossa, S., Dizionario di economia, Torino, UTET, 1982, ad
voces Amartya K. Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, Journal of
Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, n. 78, 1970, pp. 152–157 Ugo
Spirito, Pareto, edizioni Settimo Sigillo, Roma, 2000 Rutigliano Enzo, La
ragione e i sentimenti, Milano, Angeli, 1989 Rutigliano Enzo, Vilfredo Pareto,
in Teorie sociologiche classiche , Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2015/7 Voci
correlate Curva di indifferenza Diagramma di Pareto Microeconomia Distribuzione
paretiana Principio di Pareto Ottimo paretiano Charles Wright Mills Altri
progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a
Vilfredo Pareto Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina in lingua
francese dedicata a Vilfredo Pareto Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene
citazioni di o su Vilfredo Pareto Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia
Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Vilfredo Pareto Collegamenti esterni
Vilfredo Pareto, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Vilfredo Pareto, in
Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su
Wikidata Vilfredo Pareto, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata (IT, DE, FR) Vilfredo Pareto, su
hls-dhs-dss.ch, Dizionario storico della Svizzera. Modifica su Wikidata (EN)
Vilfredo Pareto, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
Modifica su Wikidata Vilfredo Pareto, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Vilfredo Pareto, su
siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo Unificato per le
Soprintendenze Archivistiche. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Vilfredo Pareto, su
openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Vilfredo
Pareto, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di
Vilfredo Pareto, su Progetto Gutenberg. Modifica su Wikidata Fondo Vilfredo
Pareto della Banca Popolare di Sondrio, su popso.it. Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 2475156 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0862 4561 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\063949 · LCCN
(EN) n79018804 · GND (DE) 118591711 · BNF (FR) cb11918602b (data) · BNE (ES)
XX1127319 (data) · NLA (EN) 35408738 · BAV (EN) 495/83862 · NDL (EN, JA)
00472732 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n79018804 Biografie Portale Biografie
Economia Portale Economia Ingegneria Portale Ingegneria Sociologia Portale
Sociologia Categorie: Ingegneri italiani del XIX secoloIngegneri italiani del XX
secoloEconomisti italianiSociologi italianiNati nel 1848Morti nel 1923Nati il
15 luglioMorti il 19 agostoNati a ParigiMorti a CélignyPolitologi
italianiStoria del pensiero economicoStudenti del Politecnico di
TorinoAnticomunisti italianiProfessori dell'Università di LosannaMembri
dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino[altre]. Refs.: “Conversational
efficiency and conversational optimality: Pareto and I;” Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Pareto," per il
Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
Griceian-cum-Parfitian identity: “Parfait
identity” – Grice: “Oddly, the Strawsons enjoy to involve themselves with
issues of identity.” Parfit cites H. P. Grice on “Personal identity,”
philosopher internationally known for his major contributions to the
metaphysics of persons, moral theory, and practical reasoning. Parfit first
rose to prominence by challenging the prevalent view that personal identity is
a “deep fact” that must be all or nothing and that matters greatly in rational
and moral deliberations. Exploring puzzle cases involving fission and fusion,
Parfit propounded a reductionist account of personal identity, arguing that
what matters in survival are physical and psychological continuities. These are
a matter of degree, and sometimes there may be no answer as to whether some
future person would be me. Parfit’s magnum opus, Reasons and Persons 4, is a
strikingly original book brimming with startling conclusions that have
significantly reshaped the philosophical agenda. Part One treats different
theories of morality, rationality, and the good; blameless wrongdoing; moral
immorality; rational irrationality; imperceptible harms and benefits; harmless
torturers; and the self-defeatingness of certain theories. Part Two introduces
a critical present-aim theory of individual rationality, and attacks the
standard selfinterest theory. It also discusses the rationality of different
attitudes to time, such as caring more about the future than the past, and more
about the near than the remote. Addressing the age-old conflict between
self-interest and morality, Parfit illustrates that contrary to what the
self-interest theory demands, it can be rational to care about certain other
aims as much as, or more than, about our own future well-being. In addition,
Parfit notes that the self-interest theory is a hybrid position, neutral with
respect to time but partial with respect to persons. Thus, it can be challenged
from one direction by morality, which is neutral with respect to both persons
and time, and from the other by a present-aim theory, which is partial with
respect to both persons and time. Part Three refines Parfit’s views regarding
personal identity and further criticizes the self-interest theory: personal
identity is not what matters, hence reasons to be specially concerned about our
future are not provided by the fact that it will be our future. Part Four
presents puzzles regarding future generations and argues that the moral
principles we need when considering future people must take an impersonal form.
Parfit’s arguments deeply challenge our understanding of moral ideals and, some
believe, the possibility of comparing outcomes. Parfit has three forthcoming
manuscripts, tentatively titled Rediscovering Reasons, The Metaphysics of the Self,
and On What Matters. His current focus is the normativity of reasons. A
reductionist about persons, he is a non-reductionist about reasons. He believes
in irreducibily normative beliefs that are in a strong sense true. A realist
about reasons for acting and caring, he challenges the views of naturalists,
noncognitivists, and constructivists. Parfit contends that internalists
conflate normativity with motivating force, that contrary to the prevalent view
that all reasons are provided by desires, no reasons are, and that Kant poses a
greater threat to rationalism than Hume. Parfit is Senior Research Fellow of
All Souls , Oxford, and a regular visiting professor at both Harvard and New
York . Legendary for monograph-length criticisms of book manuscripts, he is
editor of the Oxford Ethics Series, whose goal is to make definite moral
progress, a goal Parfit himself is widely believed to have attained. Refs.: H.
P. Grice, “A parfit identity.”
Parmenide: “One of the most important
Italian philosophers, if only because Plato dedicated a dialogue to him!” –
Grice. a Grecian philosopher, the most influential of the pre-socratics, active
in Elea Roman and modern Velia, an Ionian Grecian colony in southern Italy. He
was the first Grecian thinker who can properly be called an ontologist or
metaphysician. Plato refers to him as “venerable and awesome,” as “having
magnificent depth” Theaetetus 183e 184a, and presents him in the dialogue
Parmenides as a searching critic in a
fictional and dialectical transposition
of Plato’s own theory of Forms. Nearly 150 lines of a didactic poem by
Parmenides have been preserved, assembled into about twenty fragments. The
first part, “Truth,” provides the earliest specimen in Grecian intellectual
history of a sustained deductive argument. Drawing on intuitions concerning
thinking, knowing, and language, Parmenides argues that “the real” or “what-is”
or “being” to eon must be ungenerable and imperishable, indivisible, and
unchanging. According to a Plato-inspired tradition, Parmenides held that “all
is one.” But the phrase does not occur in the fragments; Parmenides does not
even speak of “the One”; and it is possible that either a holistic One or a
plurality of absolute monads might conform to Parmenides’ deduction.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to resist the impression that the argument
converges on a unique entity, which may indifferently be referred to as Being,
or the All, or the One. Parmenides embraces fully the paradoxical consequence
that the world of ordinary experience fails to qualify as “what-is.”
Nonetheless, in “Opinions,” the second part of the poem, he expounds a dualist
cosmology. It is unclear whether this is intended as candid phenomenology a doctrine of appearances or as an ironic foil to “Truth.” It is
noteworthy that Parmenides was probably a physician by profession. Ancient
reports to this effect are borne out by fragments from “Opinions” with
embryological themes, as well as by archaeological findings at Velia that link
the memory of Parmenides with Romanperiod remains of a medical school at that
site. Parmenides’ own attitude notwithstanding, “Opinions” recorded four major
scientific breakthroughs, some of which, doubtless, were Parmenides’ own
discoveries: that the earth is a sphere; that the two tropics and the Arctic
and Antarctic circles divide the earth into five zones; that the moon gets its
light from the sun; and that the morning star and the evening star are the same
planet. The term Eleatic School is misleading when it is used to suggest a
common doctrine supposedly held by Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Melissus of Samos,
and anticipating Parmenides Xenophanes of Colophon. The fact is, many
philosophical groups and movements, from the middle of the fifth century
onward, were influenced, in different ways, by Parmenides, including the
“pluralists,” Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. Parmenides’ deductions,
transformed by Zeno into a repertoire of full-blown paradoxes, provided the
model both for the eristic of the Sophists and for Socrates’ elenchus. Moreover,
the Parmenidean criteria for “whatis” lie unmistakably in the background not
only of Plato’s theory of Forms but also of salient features of Aristotle’s
system, notably, the priority of actuality over potentiality, the unmoved
mover, and the man-begets-man principle. Indeed, all philosophical and
scientific systems that posit principles of conservation of substance, of
matter, of matter-energy are inalienably the heirs to Parmenides’ deduction. Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “Negation and privation,” “Lectures on negation,” Wiggins, “Grice
and Parmenides;” Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Parmenide," per il Club
Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
pars/Totum
– Those who are inclined to Grecianisms will use “holism,” but unlike
‘totum,’ ‘holos,’ being from EASTERN Europe, did not develop in Western Europe,
whereas ‘totum’ gives us plenty of cognates in Grice’s vernacular, via
Anglo-Norman, ‘totality,’ for example. From Grecian ‘holon,’ Latin ‘totum.’
“One of Quine’s dogma of empiricism – the one I and Sir Peter had not the
slightest intereset in!” – Grice. Holism is one of a wide variety of theses
that in one way or another affirm the equal or greater reality or the
explanatory necessity of the whole of some system in relation to its parts. In
philosophy, the issues of holism (the word is more reasonably, but less often,
spelled ‘wholism’) have appeared Hohenheim, Theophrastus Bombastus von holism
390 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 390 traditionally in the philosophy of
biology, of psychology, and especially of the human sciences. In the context of
description, holism with respect to some system maintains that the whole has
some properties that its parts lack. This doctrine will ordinarily be trivially
true unless it is further held, in the thesis of descriptive emergentism, that
these properties of the whole cannot be defined by properties of the parts. The
view that all properties of the wholes in question can be so defined is
descriptive individualism. In the context of explanation, holism with respect
to some object or system maintains either (1) that the laws of the more complex
cases in it are not deducible by way of any composition laws or laws of
coexistence from the laws of the less complex cases (e.g., that the laws of the
behavior of people in groups are not deducible by composition laws or laws of
coexistence from the laws of solitary behavior), or (2) that all the variables
that constitute the system interact with each other. This denial of deducibility
is known also as metaphysical or methodological holism, whereas affirming the
deducibility is methodological individualism. In a special case of explanatory
holism that presupposes descriptive emergentism, holism is sometimes understood
as the thesis that with respect to some system the whole has properties that
interact “back” with the properties of its parts. In the philosophy of biology,
any of these forms of holism may be known as vitalism, while in the philosophy
of psychology they have been called Gestalt doctrine. In the philosophy of the
social sciences, where ‘holism’ has had its most common use in philosophy, the
many issues have often been reduced to that of metaphysical holism versus
methodological individualism. This terminology reflected the positivists’
belief that holism was non-empirical in postulating social “wholes” or the
reality of society beyond individual persons and their properties and relations
(as in Durkheim and other, mostly Continental, thinkers), while individualism
was non-metaphysical (i.e., empirical) in relying ultimately only on observable
properties in describing and explaining social phenomena. More recently,
‘holism’ has acquired additional uses in philosophy, especially in epistemology
and philosophy of language. Doxastic or epistemic holism are theses about the
“web of belief,” usually something to the effect that a person’s beliefs are so
connected that their change on any topic may affect their content on any other
topic or, perhaps, that the beliefs of a rational person are so connected.
Semantic or meaning holism have both been used to denote either the thesis that
the meanings of all terms (or sentences) in a language are so connected that
any change of meaning in one of them may change any other meaning, or the thesis
that changes of belief entail changes of meaning. Cited by Grice, “In defense
of a dogma” “My defense of the other dogma must be left for another longer day”
Duhem, Pierre-Maurice-Marie, physicist who wrote extensively on the history and
philosophy of science. Like Georg Helm, Wilhelm Ostwald, and others, he was an
energeticist, believing generalized thermodynamics to be the foundation of all
of physics and chemistry. Duhem spent his whole scientific life advancing
energetics, from his failed dissertation in physics a version of which was
accepted as a dissertation in mathematics, published as Le potentiel
thermodynamique 6, to his mature treatise, Traité d’énergétique 1. His
scientific legacy includes the Gibbs-Duhem and DuhemMargules equations. Possibly
because his work was considered threatening by the Parisian scientific
establishment or because of his right-wing politics and fervent Catholicism, he
never obtained the position he merited in the intellectual world of Paris. He
taught at the provincial universities of Lille, Rennes, and, finally, Bordeaux.
Duhem’s work in the history and philosophy of science can be viewed as a
defense of the aims and methods of energetics; whatever Duhem’s initial
motivation, his historical and philosophical work took on a life of its own.
Topics of interest to him included the relation between history of science and
philosophy of science, the nature of conceptual change, the historical
structure of scientific knowledge, and the relation between science and
religion. Duhem was an anti-atomist or anti-Cartesian; in the contemporary
debates about light and magnetism, Duhem’s anti-atomist stance was also
directed against the work of Maxwell. According to Duhem, atomists resolve the
bodies perceived by the senses into smaller, imperceptible bodies. The
explanation of observable phenomena is then referred to these imperceptible
bodies and their motions, suitably combined. Duhem’s rejection of atomism was
based on his instrumentalism or fictionalism: physical theories are not explanations
but representations; they do not reveal the true nature of matter, but give
general rules of which laws are particular cases; theoretical propositions are
not true or false, but convenient or inconvenient. An important reason for
treating physics as nonexplanatory was Duhem’s claim that there is general
consensus in physics and none in metaphysics
thus his insistence on the autonomy of physics from metaphysics. But he
also thought that scientific representations become more complete over time until
they gain the status of a natural classification. Accordingly, Duhem attacked
the use of models by some scientists, e.g. Faraday and Maxwell. Duhem’s
rejection of atomism was coupled with a rejection of inductivism, the doctrine
that the only physical principles are general laws known through induction,
based on observation of facts. Duhem’s rejection forms a series of theses
collectively known as the Duhem thesis: experiments in physics are observations
of phenomena accompanied by interpretations; physicists therefore do not submit
single hypotheses, but whole groups of them, to the control of experiment;
thus, experimental evidence alone cannot conclusively falsify hypotheses. For
similar reasons, Duhem rejected the possibility of a crucial experiment. In his
historical studies, Duhem argued that there were no abrupt discontinuities
between medieval and early modern science
the so-called continuity thesis; that religion played a positive role in
the development of science in the Latin West; and that the history of physics
could be seen as a cumulative whole, defining the direction in which progress
could be expected. Duhem’s philosophical works were discussed by the founders
of twentieth-century philosophy of science, including Mach, Poincaré, the members
of the Vienna Circle, and Popper. A revival of interest in Duhem’s philosophy
began with Quine’s reference in 3 to the Duhem thesis also known as the
Duhem-Quine thesis. As a result, Duhem’s philosophical works were tr. into
English as The Aim and Structure of
Physical Theory 4 and To Save the Phenomena 9. By contrast, few of Duhem’s
extensive historical works Les origines
de la statique 2 vols., 608, Études sur Léonard de Vinci 3 vols., 613, and
Système du monde 10 vols., 359, e.g.
have been tr., with five volumes of the Système du monde actually
remaining in manuscript form until 459. Unlike his philosophical work, Duhem’s
historical work was not sympathetically received by his influential
contemporaries, notably George Sarton. His supposed main conclusions were
rejected by the next generation of historians of science, who presented modern
science as discontinuous with that of the Middle Ages. This view was echoed by
historically oriented philosophers of science who, from the early 0s,
emphasized discontinuities as a recurrent feature of change in science e.g. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions 2.
parsing: the process of determining the
syntactic (strictly para-tactic) structure of a sentence according to the theorems
of a given system, say Gricese – or System G.This is to be distinguished from
the generally simpler task of recognition, which is merely the determination of
whether or not a given string is well-formed grammatical. In general, many
different parsing strategies can be employed for grammars of a particular type,
and a great deal of attention has been given to the relative efficiencies of
these techniques. The most thoroughly studied cases center on the contextfree
phrase structure grammars, which assign syntactic structures in the form of
singly-rooted trees with a left-to-right ordering of “sister” nodes. Parsing
procedures can then be broadly classified according to the sequence of steps by
which the parse tree is constructed: top-down versus bottom-up; depth-first
versus breadthfirst; etc. In addition, there are various strategies for
exploring alternatives agendas, backtracking, parallel processing and there are
devices such as “charts” that eliminate needless repetitions of previous steps.
Efficient parsing is of course important when language, whether natural or
artificial e.g., a programming language, is being processed by computer. Human
beings also parse rapidly and with apparently little effort when they
comprehend sentences of a natural language. Although little is known about the
details of this process, psycholinguists hope that study of mechanical parsing
techniques might provide insights. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Parsing in Gricese.”
partition: Grice: “the division of a set
into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subsets (e. g., ‘philosopher’
and ‘non-philosopher’ – whether we define ‘philosopher’ as engaged in
philosophical exploration,’ or ‘addicted to general reflections about his
life.’ -- Derivatively, ‘partition’ can mean any set P whose members are mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive subsets of set S. Each subset of a partition P
is called a partition class of S with respect to P. Partitions are intimately
associated with equivalence relations, i.e. with relations that are transitive,
symmetric, and reflexive. Given an equivalence relation R defined on a set S, R
induces a partition P of S in the following natural way: members s1 and s2
belong to the same partition class of P if and only if s1 has the relation R to
s2. Conversely, given a partition P of a set S, P induces an equivalence
relation R defined on S in the following natural way: members s1 and s2 are
such that s1 has the relation R to s2 if and only if s1 and s2 belong to the
same partition class of P. For obvious reasons, then, partition classes are
also known as equivalence classes. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “My love for Venn.”
passeri: genua: essential
Italian philosopher. Marco Antonio Passeri (anche noto come Gènua) (Padova, 1491 –
Padova, 1563) è stato un filosofo italiano, appartenente all'Averroismo attivo
nel periodo del Rinascimento. Figlio di Niccolò Passeri, professore di
medicina all'Università di Padova morto nel 1522, Marco Antonio fu egli stesso
dal 1517 professore nell'università patavina nella cattedra di filosofia.
Autore di commentarii ad alcune opere di Aristotele, in particolare al De Anima
e alla Fisica, tentò di dimostrare la perfetta convergenza fra le idee di
Averroè e di Simplicio sulla dottrina dell'unità dell'intelletto. Marco
Antonio Passeri fu insegnante e zio del filosofo rinascimentale Giacomo
Zabarella. Opere Aristotelis De anima libri tres, cum Auerrois
commentariis et antiqua tralatione suae integritati restituta. His accessit
eorundem librorum Aristotelis noua traslatio, ad Graeci exemplaris veritatem,
et scholarum usum accomodata, Michaele Sophiano interprete. Adiecimus etiam
Marci Antonii Passeri Ianuae disputationem ex eius lectionibus excerptam, in
qua cum de' horum de Anima li brorum ordine, tum reliquorum naturalium serie
pertractatur. Venetiis: apud Iunctas, 1562. Disputatio de intellectus humani
immortalitate, ex disertationibus Marci Antonii Genuae Patauini peripatetici
insignis, In Monte Regali: excudebat Leonardus Torrentinus, 1565. Marcii
Antonii Passeri, cognomento Genuae, Patauini philosophi, sua tempestate facile
principis, et in Academia Patauina philosophiae publici professoris In tres
libros Aristo. de anima exactissimi commentarij Iacobi Pratellii Monteflorensis
medici, et Ioannis Caroli Saraceni diligentia recogniti, et repurgati. Necnon locupletissimo
indice, propter maiorem legentium facilitatem, vtilitatemque, ab eodem Ioanne
Carolo Saraceno amplificati. Venetijs: apud Gratiosum Perchacinum & socios,
1576. Bibliografia Alba Paladini, La scienza animastica di Marco Antonio Genua,
Università degli Studi di Lecce, Volume 38, Galatina, Congedo, 2006. ISBN
88-8086-676-1 Voci correlate Averroismo Aristotele Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Marco
Antonio Passeri Collegamenti esterni Marco Antonio Passeri, su Treccani.it –
Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata
(EN) Opere di Marco Antonio Passeri, su Open Library, Internet Archive.
Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 76464089 · ISNI (EN) 0000
0000 6129 9350 · SBN IT\ICCU\PUVV\308934 · LCCN (EN) no2006134344 · GND (DE)
132303965 · BNF (FR) cb134760543 (data) · CERL cnp01364762 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-no2006134344 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale
Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XVI secoloNati nel 1491Morti nel
1563Nati a PadovaMorti a PadovaPersone legate all'Università degli Studi di
Padova[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Genua," per Il
Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
paternalism, interference with the liberty
or autonomy of another person, with justifications referring to the promotion
of the person’s good or the prevention of harm to the person. More precisely, A
acts paternalistically toward B iff A is B’s father or P acts with the intent
of averting some harm or promoting some benefit for Q; and P acts contrary to
or is indifferent to the current preferences, desires or values of his ‘son;’
and P’s act is a limitation on his ‘son’ autonomy or liberty. The presence of
both autonomy and liberty in the lasst clause is to allow for the fact that
lying to someone is not clearly an interference with liberty. Notice that one
can act ‘paternalistically’ by telling people the truth as when a doctor insists
that a patient know the exact nature of her illness, contrary to her wishes.
Note also that the definition does not settle any questions about the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of paternalistic interventions. Typical examples of
paternalistic actions are laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets; court
orders allowing physicians to transfuse Jehovah’s Witnesses against their
wishes; deception of a patient by physicians to avoid upsetting the patient; civil
commitment of persons judged dangerous to themselves; and laws forbidding
swimming while lifeguards are not on duty. Soft weak paternalism is the view
that paternalism is justified only when a ‘father’ is acting non-voluntarily or
one needs time to determine whether his ‘son’ is acting voluntarily or not.
Hard strong paternalism is the view that paternalism is sometimes justified
even when the person being interfered with is acting voluntarily. The analysis
of the term is relative to some set of problems. If one were interested in the
organizational behavior of large corporations, one might adopt a different
definition than if one were concerned with limits on the state’s right to
exercise coercion. The typical normative problems about paternalistic action
are whether, and to what extent, the welfare of individuals may outweigh the
need to respect their desire to lead their own lives and make their own decisions
even when mistaken. Mill is the best example of a virtually absolute ANTI-paternalism,
at least with respect to the right of the state to act paternalistically. Mill
(whose father was a devil) argues that unless we have reason to believe that my
‘son’ is not acting voluntarily, as in the case of a man walking across a
bridge that, unknown to him, is about to collapse, we ought to allow an adult
son the freedom to act even if his act is harmful to himself.
Patrologia series latina -- patristic
authors – Includes Aelwhinec, Grice’s favourite speculative grammarian. Migne’s
Patrologia – Series Latina -- patrologia latina -- also called church fathers –
“the implicature is that one can have more than one father, I suppose.” –
Grice. a group of philosophers originally so named because they were considered
the “patres” of the Church of England to which Grice belongs.. The term
“patries ecclesiae” is now used more broadly to designate philosophers, orthodox
or heterodox, who were active in the first six centuries or so of the Christian
era. The chronological division is quite flexible, and it is regularly moved
several centuries later for particular purposes. Moreover, the study of these
philosophers has traditionally been divided variously, of which the principal
ones are of course, Grecian and Roman. The often sharp divisions among
patristic scholarships are partly a reflection of the different histories of
the regional churches, partly a reflection of the sociology of cholarship. The
patristic period in Grecian is usually taken as extending from the writers
after the so-called “New” Testament (such as “Paul,” after whom Grice was named
– he was named “Herbert” after a Viking ancestor), to such figures as Maximus
the Confessor or John of Damascus. The period is traditionally divided around
the Council of Nicea. PreNicean Grecian authors of importance to the history of
philosophy include Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen. Important
Nicean and post-Nicean authors include Athanasius; the Cappadocians, i.e.,
Gregory of Nazianzum, Basil of Cesarea and his brother, Gregory of Nyssa, and John
Chrysostom. Philosophical topics and practices are constantly engaged by these
Grecian authors. Justin Martyr e.g., describes his conversion to Christianity
quite explicitly as a transit through lower forms of philosophy into the true
philosophy. Clement of Alexandria, again, uses the philosophic genre of the
protreptic and a host of ancient texts to persuade his pagan readers that they
ought to come to Christianity as to the true wisdom. Origen devotes his Against
Celsus to the detailed rebuttal of one pagan philosopher’s attack on Christianity.
More importantly, if more subtly, the major works of the Cappadocians
appropriate and transform the teachings of any number of philosophic
authors Plato and the Neoplatonists in
first place, but also Aristotle, the Stoics, and Galen. The Roman church came
to count four post-Nicean authors as its chief teachers in the “Patrologia
latina”: Ambrose Jerome, and Gregory the
Great. Other Roman authors of philosophical interest include Tertulliano, Lactanzio, Mario Vittorino, and Hilary of
Poitiers. The Roman patristic period is typically counted roughly from
Tertulliano (of “Credo quia assudrdo” infame) to Boezio, the translator of
Porfirio’s Isagoge.. The Roman ‘fathers’ share with their Grecian
contemporaries a range of relations to the pagan philosophic schools, both as
rival institutions and as sources of useful teaching. Tertullian’s Against the
Nations and Apology, e.. g., take up pagan accusations against Christianity and
then counterattack a number of pagan beliefs, including philosophical ones. By
contrast, the writings of Mario Vittorino, Ambrose, and Augustine enact
transformations of philosophic teachings, especially from the Neoplatonists.
Because philosophical erudition is generally less hellenistic among the Romans
as among the hellenes, they are, fortunately to us, both more eager to accept
philosophical doctrines and freer in improvising variations on them.
patrizi: Grice, “His
surname is Patrizi, his first name is Francesco – he was born on an island, but
taught at Rome -- important Italian philosopher, “even if he disliked
Aristotle.” “He shouldn’t count as Italian since he is of Croatian descent, but
he lived in what was then part of the republic of Venice, so that’s something.”
– Grice . Francesco Patrizi[1] (in latino: Franciscus Patricius, in croato:
Franjo Petriš/Frane Petrić; Cherso, Croazia, 25 aprile 1529 – Roma, 6 febbraio
1597) è stato un filosofo e scrittore italiano, di orientamento neoplatonico.
Non sono molte le notizie sulla sua vita; gli spunti tratti dalla sua opera furono
noti ai suoi successori solo attraverso altri pensatori. Della sua opera si
inizia a discutere solo verso l'Ottocento. Nel 1538 era già imbarcato su
una nave al comando dello zio Giovanni Giorgio Patrizi; dopo aver studiato a
Cherso con Petruccio da Bologna, nel 1544 fu a Venezia, dove studiò grammatica
con Andrea Fiorentino, passando poi a Ingolstadt, sotto la protezione del
cugino, il luterano Mattia Flacio Illirico. Nel 1547 era a Padova per
studiare filosofia con Bernardino Tomitano, Marco Antonio Passeri, detto
"Il Genua", Lazzaro Bonamico e Francesco Robortello; qui fu
presidente della Congrega degli Studenti Dalmati e pubblicò i suoi primi
scritti. In una tarda lettera, indirizzata il 12 gennaio 1587 all'amico
Baccio Valori, scrisse che a Padova aveva «trovato un Xenofonte greco e latino,
senza niuna guida o aiuto, si mise nella lingua greca, di che havea certi pochi
principi in Inghilstat, e fece tanto profitto che a principio di novembre e di
studio ardì di studiare e il testo di Aristotile e i commentatori sopra la
Loica greci. Andò ad udir il Tomitano, famoso loico, ma non gli pose mai
piacere, senza saper dire perché, onde studiò loica da sé. L'anno seguente
entrò alla filosofia di un certo Alberto e del Genoa e né anco questi gli
poterono piacere, onde studiò da sé. In fin di studio udì il Monte medico, e
gli piacque per il metodo di trattar le cose, e così Bassiano Lando, di cui fu
scolare mentre stette in istudio. E fra tanto, sentendo un frate di S.
Francesco sostentar conclusioni platoniche, se ne innamorò, e fatto poi seco
amicizia dimandogli che lo inviasse per la via di Platone. Gli propose come per
via ottima la Teologia del Ficino, a che si diede con grande avidità: E tale fu
il principio di quello che poi sempre ha seguitato». A Venezia nel 1553
pubblicò la Città felice, il Dialogo dell'Honore, il Discorso sulla diversità
dei furori poetici e le Lettere sopra un sonetto di Petrarca. Alla morte del
padre nel 1554 tornò a Cherso per occuparsi dell'eredità e vi rimase per
quattro anni. Tornato in Italia, intenzionato ad entrare nella corte del
duca di Ferrara Ercole II d'Este, gli presentò il suo poema, Eridano, scritto
negli innovativi versi martelliani tredecasillabi, senza tuttavia ottenere il
successo sperato. Passato allora a Venezia, sotto il patronato di Giorgio
Contarini, fondò con il poeta Bernardo Tasso, il padre di Torquato, l'Accademia
della Fama e scrisse i dieci Dialoghi della Historia nel 1560 e nel 1562 i
dieci Dialoghi della Retorica. Mandato a Cipro per curare gli interessi
del Contarini, si diede al commercio e all'acquisto di manoscritti greci e si
trovò a dover anche partecipare alla guerra turco-veneziana, imbarcato nella
flotta comandata da Andrea Doria. Passato al servizio dell'arcivescovo di Cipro
Filippo Mocenigo, nel 1568 ritornò in Italia, e si stabilì a Padova, precettore
di Zaccaria, nipote del Mocenigo e scrivendo le Discussioni peripatetiche il
cui primo volume fu pubblicato nel 1571 e interamente nel 1581 a Basilea,
dedicate a Zaccaria Mocenigo. Conquistata Cipro dai turchi, perdette il
patrimonio investito nell'isola; vendette allora i manoscritti greci a Filippo
II di Spagna e si trovò a dovere chiedere aiuto ad amici ai quali dedicò la sua
Amorosa filosofia. Dal 1577 al 1592 insegnò filosofia nell'università di
Ferrara, e fu membro dell'Accademia della Crusca nel 1587, continuando a
pubblicare scritti filosofici, letterari, di strategia militare, di ottica,
d'idraulica, di botanica; nel 1581 pubblicò le Discussioni peripatetiche, nel
1585 il Parere in difesa di Ludovico Ariosto, nel 1586 il Della Poetica, ove
sostenne la superiorità della lingua volgare sul latino, nel 1587 la Nuova
geometria dedicata a Carlo Emanuele I di Savoia, la Philosophia de rerum natura
e nel 1591 la Nova de universis philosophia, che fu temporaneamente messa
all'Indice dal Sant'Uffizio, per essere poi rimossa in seguito alle correzioni
fatte dello stesso Patrizi. Nel 1592 l'amico papa Clemente VIII lo nominò
professore presso lo Studium Urbis. A Roma pubblicò nel 1594 la sua ultima
opera, i Paralleli militari. Fu anche membro della confraternita di San
Girolamo di Roma, cui potevano accedere "illirici, dalmati e
schiavoni". È sepolto nella chiesa romana di Sant’Onofrio al
Gianicolo, nella stessa tomba di Torquato Tasso. Le Discussiones
peripateticae libri XV esaminano la tradizione aristotelica, confrontandola con
quella presocratica e platonica; immediata è la critica di Aristotele, a
partire dalla sua vita: «né i suoi costumi furono così santi, né così
magnifiche le sue azioni né così varie le sue azioni da ingenerare ammirazione»
(I, 2). Lo rimprovera di aver utilizzato scoperte di altri che tuttavia attaccò
polemicamente, senza mostrare alcuna riconoscenza. Il controverso
monumento innalzato di recente a Cherso, dove Francesco Patrizi è ribattezzato
Frane Petric. Nel merito, critica l'aristotelismo per aver teorizzato che le
cose derivino dalle altre attraverso il principio dei contrari; per il Patrizi,
ogni cose si origina da una simile, non già da una contraria; gli appare più
adeguata la filosofia naturalistica presocratica, a differenza dei principi
aristotelici che «non hanno nessuna forza, nessun vigore, nessuna capacità di
generare e non arrecano alcun contributo alla generazione di nessuna cosa. A
che serve infatti la freddezza al legno per riscaldare o bruciare col fuoco?
Che cosa la privazione della forma serve per produrre forma?» (IV, 1).
Nell'opera, il Patrizi fa sfoggio di molta erudizione con uno stile che si
compiace di non poca retorica, così dispiacendo al Bruno che la definì
"sterco di pedanti". Ma apprezzerà invece la successiva Nova de
Universis philosophia, del 1591, il cui titolo completo è Nova de Universis
philosophia, libris quinquaginta comprehensa: in qua Aristotelico methodo non
per motum, sed per lucem et lumina ad primam causam ascenditur. Deinde nova
quidam et peculiari methodo tota in contemplationem venit divinitas. Postremo
methodo platonico rerum universitas a conditore Deo deducitur. Fu pubblicata
con l'aggiunta degli oracoli di Zoroastro, Ermete Trismegisto, Asclepio, e
della Theologia Aristotelis, pubblicata in un'edizione romana nel 1519. È
divisa in quattro parti, la "Panaugia" o della luce, la
"Panarchia" o del principio delle cose, la "Pampsichya" o dell'animae
la "Pancosmia" o del mondo. Nella prima espone la teoria della luce
che, proveniente da Dio, «semplicissima tra le cose, non è duplice, sicché in
essa vi è forma e materia. Unica, è a se stessa materia e forma» e si diffonde,
con il calore e la materia fluida – il primaevus fluor - per lo spazio che,
come essa, è infinito; infatti, se la luce è infinita, anche lo spazio deve
essere infinito e così il mondo: «se lo spazio contiene tutto e così pure il
mondo, mondo e spazio saranno lo stesso per capacità e determinazione locale.
Dunque lo spazio è infinito sicché anche il mondo sarà infinito».
Continua la sua polemica antiaristotelica, sostenendo che la dottrina cristiana
si può ricavare dagli stessi dialoghi platonici e la teologia cristiana è già
presente in Plotino. Già i primi Padri della Chiesa «vedendo che con pochi
mutamenti i platonici potevano divenire facilmente cristiani, anteposero
Platone e i platonici a ogni altro e nominarono Aristotele solo con infamia. Ma
quasi quattrocento anni fa i teologi scolastici si sono comportati in modo
opposto fondando la fede sull'empietà aristotelica. Li scusiamo, perché non
poterono conoscere i platonici, non conoscendo il greco, ma non li scusiamo per
aver cercato di fondare la fede sull'empietà»[2]. Opere: Al molto magico
et magnanimo m. Giacomo Ragazzoni. In Giacomo Ragazzoni, Della Mercatura,
Venetia, 1573. In Chronica Magni Arueoli Cassiodori senatoris atque Patricii
prefatio. Sta in Speisshaimer, Iohan. Ioannis Cuspiani...de Consulibus. Basel
1553. L'Eridano. In nuovo verso heroico...Con i sostentamenti del detto verso,
Ferrara. Appresso Francesco de Rossi da Valenza 1557 Le rime di messer Luca
Contile...con discussioni e argomenti di M. Francesco Patritio, Venezia. F.
Sansovino, 1560 Della Historia dieci dialoghi, Venetia: Appresso Andrea
Arrivabene, 1560 Della retorica dieci dialoghi... nelli quali si favella
dell'arte oratoria con ragioni repugnanti all'opinione, che intorno a quella
hebbero gli antichi scrittori (Deset dijaloga o retorici) , Venetia: Appresso
Francesco Senese, 1562 Le imprese illustri con espositioni, et discorsi del
sor. Ieromimo Ruscelli. Con la giunta di altre imprese: tutto riordinato et
corretto da Franco. Patritio, In Venetia: Appresso Comin da Trino di
Monferrato, 1572 De historia dialogi X. In Artis historicae penus. Octodecim
scriptorum tam veterim quam recentiorum monumentis, Basileae, Ex officinia
Petri Paterna, 1579 Discussionum Peripateticarum tomi IV, quibus Aristotelicae
philosophiae universa Historia atque Dogmata cum Veterum Placitis collata,
eleganter et erudite declarantur, Basileae, 1581. Parere del s. Francesco
Patrici, in difesa di Lodovico Ariosto. All'Illustr. Sig. Giovanni Bardi di
Vernio, Ferrara, 1583 La militia Romana di Polibio, di Tito Livio, e di Dionigi
Alicarnasseo, Ferrara, 1583. Della poetica di Francesco Patricii la Deca
Istoriale, nella quale con diletteuole antica nouità, oltre a poeti e lor poemi
innumerabili, che ui si contano, si fan palesi tutte le cose compagne e seguaci
dell'antiche poesie. In Ferrara: per Vittorio Baldini, 1586. (on-line) Della
nvova geometria di Franc. Patrici libri XV. Ne' quali con mirabile ordine, e
con dimostrazioni à marauiglia più facili, e più forti delle usate si vede che
la matematiche per uia regia, e più piana che da gli antichi fatto non si è, si
possono trattare..., Ferrara, Vittorio Baldini, 1587.[3] Difesa di Francesco
Patrizi; dalle cento accuse dategli dal signor Iacopo Mazzoni, in Discorso
intorno alla Risposta del sig. F. Patrizio, Ferrara, 1587. Risposta di
Francesco Patrizi; a due opposizioni fattegli dal sign. Giacopo Mazzoni in
Della difesa della Comedia di Dante, Ferrara, Vitt. Baldini, 1587. De rerum
natura libri II priores. Aliter de spacio physico, aliter de spacio
mathematico, Victorius Baldinus, Ferrara, 1587. Zoroaster et eius CCCXX oracula
Chaldaica, eius opera e tenebris eruta et Latine reddita. Ferrara. Ex
Typographia Benedicti Mammarelli, 1591. Nova de universis philosophia. (Ad
calcem adiecta sunt Zoroastri oracula CCCXX ex Platonicis collecta, ecc.) , Ex
Typographia Benedicti Mammarelli, Ferrara, 1591; Venezia, 1593. Magia
philosophica, hoc est Francisci Patricij summi philosophi Zoroaster et eius 320
oracula Chaldaica. Asclepii dialogus, et philosophia magna: Hermetis
Trismegisti. Iam lat. reddita, Hamburg, 1593. Paralleli millitari, Roma, 1594.
Apologia ad censuram. La Città felice, Venezia, Griffio, 1553, in Utopisti
e Riformatori sociali del cinquecento, Bologna, 1941. L'amorosa filosofia,
Firenze, 1963. Della poetica. Edizione critica a cura di D. A. Barbali,
Bologna, 1971. Della retorica. Dieci dialoghi, a cura di A. L. Puliafito, 1994.
ISBN 8885979041 De spacio physico et mathematico, Libraire philosophique Vrin,
Paris, 1996. Studi P. M. Arcari, Il pensiero politico di Francesco Patrizi da
Cherso, Roma, 1905 N. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance. London,
1935 B. Brickman, An Introduction to Francesco Patrizi's Nova de Universis
Philosophia, New York, 1941 T. Gregory, L'Apologia e le Declarationes di
Francesco Patrizi, in Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi,
Firenze, 1955 Onoranze a Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, Mostra bibliografica,
Trieste, 1957 La negazione delle sfere dell'astrobiologia di Francesco Patrizi,
in P. Rossi, Immagini della scienza, Roma, 1977 "Tra misticismo
neoplatonico e 'filosofia dei fiumi'. Il tema delle acque in Francesco
Patrizi", in G. Piaia, "Sapienza e follia. Per una storia
intellettuale del Rinascimento europeo", Pisa, 2015 Note ^ Varianti:
Patrizzi, Patrizio, Patrici, Patricio, de Petris. ^ F. Patricius, Nova de
universis philosophia, Ferrariæ, 1591: sect. I, fol. IIv (Ad Gregorium XIIII).
^ Francesco Patrizi, Della nuova geometria, In Ferrara, Vittorio Baldini, 1587.
URL consultato il 29 giugno 2015. Bibliografia Mario Frezza, Patrizi (o
Patrizio), Francesco, in Dizionario Letterario Bompiani. Autori, III, p. 104,
Milano, Bompiani, 1957. Voci correlate Storia della fantascienza italiana Altri
progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a
Francesco Patrizi Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Francesco Patrizi Collegamenti esterni Francesco
Patrizi, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Francesco Patrizi, in Enciclopedia Italiana,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Francesco
Patrizi, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su
Wikidata Francesco Patrizi, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Francesco Patrizi, su
accademicidellacrusca.org, Accademia della Crusca. Modifica su Wikidata Opere
di Francesco Patrizi / Francesco Patrizi (altra versione), su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Francesco Patrizi,
su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Bibliografia italiana
di Francesco Patrizi, su Catalogo Vegetti della letteratura fantastica,
Fantascienza.com. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Fred Purnell, Francesco Patrizi, in
Edward N. Zalta (a cura di), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center for
the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Università di Stanford. Francesco
Patrizi, su Filosofico.net. Biografia Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 49269849
· ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0898 6618 · SBN IT\ICCU\CUBV\040938 · LCCN (EN) n79148979
· GND (DE) 118641522 · BNF (FR) cb121840069 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1319283 (data)
· NLA (EN) 35798078 · BAV (EN) 495/35345 · CERL cnp01302722 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n79148979 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale
Filosofia Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XVI
secoloScrittori italiani del XVI secoloNati nel 1529Morti nel 1597Nati il 25
aprileMorti il 6 febbraioNati a Cherso (città)Morti a RomaFilosofi
cattoliciFilosofi croatiNeoplatoniciScrittori di fantascienza italiani[alter. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Patrizio," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
peano: important Italian
philosopher. Peano’s postulates, also called Peano axioms, a list of
assumptions from which the integers can be defined from some initial integer,
equality, and successorship, and usually seen as defining progressions. The
Peano postulates for arithmetic were produced by G. Peano in 9. He took the set
N of integers with a first term 1 and an equality relation between them, and
assumed these nine axioms: 1 belongs to N; N has more than one member; equality
is reflexive, symmetric, and associative, and closed over N; the successor of
any integer in N also belongs to N, and is unique; and a principle of
mathematical induction applying across the members of N, in that if 1 belongs
to some subset M of N and so does the successor of any of its members, then in
fact M % N. In some ways Peano’s formulation was not clear. He had no explicit
rules of inference, nor any guarantee of the legitimacy of inductive
definitions which Dedekind established shortly before him. Further, the four
properties attached to equality were seen to belong to the underlying “logic”
rather than to arithmetic itself; they are now detached. It was realized by
Peano himself that the postulates specified progressions rather than integers
e.g., 1, ½, ¼, 1 /8, . . . , would satisfy them, with suitable interpretations of
the properties. But his work was significant in the axiomatization of
arithmetic; still deeper foundations would lead with Russell and others to a
major role for general set theory in the foundations of mathematics. In
addition, with O. Veblen, T. Skolem, and others, this insight led in the early
twentieth century to “non-standard” models of the postulates being developed in
set theory and mathematical analysis; one could go beyond the ‘. . .’ in the
sequence above and admit “further” objects, to produce valuable alternative
models of the postulates. These procedures were of great significance also to
model theory, in highlighting the property of the non-categoricity of an axiom
system. A notable case was the “non-standard analysis” of A. Robinson, where infinitesimals
were defined as arithmetical inverses of transfinite numbers without incurring
the usual perils of rigor associated with them.
Giuseppe Peano (Spinetta di Cuneo, 27 agosto
1858 – Cavoretto, 20 aprile 1932) è stato un matematico, logico e glottoteta
italiano. Fu l'ideatore del latino sine flexione, una lingua ausiliaria
internazionale derivata dalla semplificazione del latino
classico. Giuseppe Peano nacque il 27 agosto 1858 in una modesta fattoria
chiamata "Tetto Galant" presso la frazione di Spinetta di Cuneo. Fu
il secondogenito di Bartolomeo Peano e Rosa Cavallo; sette anni prima era nato
il fratello maggiore Michele e successivamente nacquero Francesco, Bartolomeo e
la sorella Rosa. Dopo un inizio estremamente difficile (doveva ogni mattina
fare svariati chilometri prima di raggiungere la scuola), la famiglia si
trasferì a Cuneo. Il fratello della madre, Giuseppe Michele Cavallo, accortosi
delle sue notevoli capacità intellettive, lo invitò a raggiungerlo a Torino,
dove continuò i suoi studi presso il Liceo classico Cavour. Assistente di
Angelo Genocchi all'Università di Torino, divenne professore di calcolo
infinitesimale presso lo stesso ateneo a partire dal 1890.[1] Vittima
della sua stessa eccentricità, che lo portava ad insegnare logica in un corso
di calcolo infinitesimale, fu più volte allontanato dall'insegnamento a
dispetto della sua fama internazionale, perché "più di una volta, perduto
dietro ai suoi calcoli, [..] dimenticò di presentarsi alle sessioni di
esame"[2]. Ricordi del grande matematico (e non solo della vita
familiare) sono raccontati con grazia e ammirazione nel romanzo biografico Una
giovinezza inventata della pronipote Lalla Romano, scrittrice e poetessa.
Il 24 dicembre del 1885 aderì alla massoneria, iniziato nella loggia Dante
Alighieri di Torino guidata dal socialista Giovanni Lerda.[3] Morì nella
sua casa di campagna a Cavoretto, presso Torino, per un attacco di cuore che lo
colse nella notte. Il matematico piemontese fu capostipite di una scuola
di matematici italiani, tra i quali possiamo annoverare Giovanni Vailati,
Filiberto Castellano, Cesare Burali-Forti, Alessandro Padoa, Giovanni Vacca,
Mario Pieri e Tommaso Boggio [4]. Peano precisò la definizione del limite
superiore e fornì il primo esempio di una curva che riempie una superficie (la
cosiddetta "curva di Peano", uno dei primi esempi di frattale),
mettendo così in evidenza come la definizione di curva allora vigente non fosse
conforme a quanto intuitivamente si intende per curva. Da questo lavoro
partì la revisione del concetto di curva, che fu ridefinito da Camille Jordan
(1838 – 1932) (curva secondo Jordan). Fu anche uno dei padri del calcolo
vettoriale insieme a Tullio Levi-Civita. Dimostrò importanti proprietà delle
equazioni differenziali ordinarie e ideò un metodo di integrazione per
successive approssimazioni. Sviluppò il Formulario mathematico, scritto
dapprima in francese e nelle ultime versioni in interlingua, come chiamava il
suo latino sine flexione, contenente oltre 4000 tra teoremi e formule, per la
maggior parte dimostrate. Come logico dette un eccezionale contributo
alla logica delle classi, elaborando un simbolismo di grande chiarezza e
semplicità. Diede una definizione assiomatica dei numeri naturali, i famosi
"assiomi di Peano" che vennero poi ripresi da Russell e Whitehead nei
loro Principia Mathematica per sviluppare la teoria dei tipi. I
contributi di Giuseppe Peano sulla logica furono osservati con molta attenzione
nel 1900 dal giovane Bertrand Russell, mentre i contributi di aritmetica e di
teoria dei numeri furono osservati con molta attenzione da Giovanni Vailati, il
quale sintetizzava in Italia il passaggio tra l'esame delle questioni
fondamentali e l'applicazione di metodiche di analisi del linguaggio
scientifico, tipica degli studi logici e matematici, e anche specificava gli
interessi di storia della scienza, allargando la prospettiva anche agli studi
sociali. Per questo Peano ebbe dei contatti molto stretti con il mondo degli
studiosi di logica e di filosofia del linguaggio nonché gli studiosi di scienze
sociali empiriche (Cfr. Guglielmo Rinzivillo, Giuseppe Peano, Giovanni Vailati.
Contributi invisibili in Guglielmo Rinzivillo, Una Epistemologia senza storia,
Roma Nuova Cultura, 2013, II, p. 165 e sg. - ISBN 978-88-6812-222-5).
Ebbe ampi riconoscimenti negli ambienti filosofici più aperti alle esigenze e
alle implicazioni critiche della nuova logica formale. Era affascinato
dall'ideale leibniziano della lingua universale e sviluppò il "latino sine
flexione", lingua con la quale cercò di tenere i suoi interventi ai
congressi internazionali di Londra e Toronto[4]. Tale lingua fu concepita
per semplificazione della grammatica ed eliminazione delle forme irregolari,
applicandola a un numero di vocaboli "minimo comune denominatore" tra
quelli principalmente di origine latina e greca rimasti in uso nelle lingue
moderne. Uno dei grandi meriti dell'opera di Peano sta nella ricerca della
chiarezza e della semplicità. Contributo fondamentale che gli si riconosce è la
definizione di notazioni matematiche entrate nell'uso corrente, come, per
esempio, il simbolo di appartenenza (es: x ∈ A) o il quantificatore esistenziale
"∃".
Tutta l'opera di Peano verte sulla ricerca della semplificazione, dello
sviluppo di una notazione sintetica, base del progetto del già citato
Formulario, fino alla definizione del Latino sine flexione. La ricerca del
rigore e della semplicità portarono Peano ad acquistare una macchina per la
stampa, allo scopo di comporre e verificare di persona i tipi per la Rivista di
Matematica (da lui diretta) e per le altre pubblicazioni. Peano raccolse una
serie di note per le tipografie relative alla stampa di testi di matematica,
uno per tutti il suo consiglio di stampare le formule su righe isolate, cosa
che ora viene data per scontata, ma che non lo era ai suoi tempi[5].
Onorificenze: 1905 - Cavaliere dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italia 1917 -
Ufficiale della Corona 1921 - Commendatore della corona L'asteroide 9987 Peano
è stato battezzato così in suo onore. Il dipartimento di Matematica della
facoltà di Scienze Matematiche, Fisiche e Naturali dell'Università degli Studi
di Torino è a lui dedicato[6]. Molti licei scientifici in Italia portano
il suo nome, come ad esempio a Roma, Cuneo, Tortona, Monterotondo, Cinisello Balsamo
(fino al 2013)[7] o Marsico Nuovo, così come la scuola elementare di Tetto
Canale, vicina alla sua città natale. Opere Giuseppe Peano, Aritmetica
generale e algebra elementare, Torino, Paravia, 1902. URL consultato il 30
giugno 2015. Aritmetica generale e algebra elementare (G.B. Paravia, 1902)
Giuseppe Peano, Formulario mathematico, Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1908. URL
consultato il 30 giugno 2015. Calcolo differenziale e principii di calcolo
integrale (Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1883) Lezioni di analisi infinitesimale (G.
Candeletti, 1893) Applicazioni geometriche del calcolo infinitesimale (Torino:
Fratelli Bocca, 1887) I principii di geometria logicamente esposti ... (Torino:
Fratelli Bocca, 1889) Giuseppe Peano, Arithmetices principia, nova methodo
exposita, Torino, Paravia, 1902. Giuseppe Peano. Giochi di aritmetica e
problemi interessanti. Paravia, Torino, 1925. Dissero di lui «Provai una grande
ammirazione per lui [Peano] quando lo incontrai per la prima volta al Congresso
di Filosofia del 1900, che fu dominato dall'esattezza della sua mente.»
(Bertrand Russell, 1932) Note ^ [1] ^ *Nicola D'Amico, Storia e storie della
scuola italiana. Dalle origini ai giorni nostri, Zanichelli, Bologna, 2009 (p.
43) ^ Celebrazioni di Giuseppe Peano nel 150° della nascita e nel 100° del
Formulario Mathematico a cura di Erika Luciano e Clara Silvia Roero Torino 2008
Dipartimento di Matematica dell’Università ISBN 8890087668 (.htm testo on
line). Hubert C. Kennedy, Peano - storia di un matematico. Boringhieri
1983 ^ Hubert C. Kennedy, Peano - storia di un matematico. Boringhieri 1983
pag. 200 ^ Dipartimento di Matematica "Giuseppe Peano": Home ^ Il
Giorno, Festa e lacrime: "Addio Peano" Il Liceo chiude i battenti, su
Il Giorno. URL consultato il 27 agosto 2019. Bibliografia Questo testo proviene
in parte dalla relativa voce del progetto Mille anni di scienza in Italia,
opera del Museo Galileo. Istituto Museo di Storia della Scienza di Firenze
(home page), pubblicata sotto licenza Creative Commons CC-BY-3.0 Kennedy Hubert
C., Peano: storia di un matematico, Boringhieri, 1983. Segre Michael, “Peano's
Axioms in their Historical Context,” Archive for History of Exact Sciences 48
(1994): 201-342. Lalla Romano, Una giovinezza inventata, Torino, Einaudi, 1979.
Racconta episodi del rapporto con il prozio Giuseppe. Voci correlate Assiomi di
Peano Glottoteta Lingua artificiale Matematica Latino sine flexione Ugo Cassina
Calcolatori ternari Maria Gramegna Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource
Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Giuseppe Peano Collabora a Wikiquote
Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Giuseppe Peano Collabora a Wikimedia
Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Giuseppe Peano
Collegamenti esterni Giuseppe Peano, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Giuseppe Peano, in
Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su
Wikidata (EN) Giuseppe Peano, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata Giuseppe Peano, in Dizionario biografico
degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN)
Giuseppe Peano, su MacTutor, University of St Andrews, Scotland. Modifica su
Wikidata (EN) Giuseppe Peano, su Mathematics Genealogy Project, North Dakota
State University. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Giuseppe Peano, su Liber Liber.
Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Giuseppe Peano, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited
srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Giuseppe Peano, su Open Library, Internet
Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Giuseppe Peano, su Progetto
Gutenberg. Modifica su Wikidata E Giuseppe Peano stregò Bertrand Russell
articolo di Piergiorgio Odifreddi, SWIF - Sito Web Italiano per la Filosofia.
Presentazione e Documentazione del Comune di Cuneo Controllo di autorità. VIAF
(EN) 73925733 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0858 5937 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\002335 · LCCN
(EN) n80009883 · GND (DE) 11873976X · BNF (FR) cb123401300 (data) · NLA (EN)
35413747 · CERL cnp01506372 · NDL (EN, JA) 00452364 · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n80009883 Biografie Portale Biografie Lingue artificiali Portale Lingue
artificiali Matematica Portale Matematica Categorie: Matematici italiani del
XIX secoloMatematici italiani del XX secoloLogici italianiGlottoteti italianiNati
nel 1858Morti nel 1932Nati il 27 agostoMorti il 20 aprileMorti a CavorettoNati
in ItaliaAccademici dei LinceiMembri dell'Accademia delle Scienze di
TorinoProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di Torino[altre]. Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “Definite descriptions in Peano and in the vernacular,” Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Peano: semantica
filosofica," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa
Grice, Liguria, Italia.
pearsianism – after D. F. Pears, one of Grice’s collaborators in the
Play Group. “In them days, we would never publish, since the only philosophers
we were interested in communicating with we saw at least every Saturday!” –
With D. F. Pears, and J. F. Thomson, H. P. Grice explored topics in the
philosophy of action and ‘philosophical psychology.’ Actually, Grice carefully
writes ‘philosophy of action.’ Why? Well, because while with Pears and Thomson
he explored toopics like ‘intending’ and ‘deciding,’ it was always with a vew
towards ‘acting,’ or ‘doing.’ Grice is
very clear on this, “even fastidiously so,” as Blackburn puts it. In the
utterance of an imperative, or an intention, which may well be other-directed,
the immediate response or effect in your co-conversationalist is a
‘recognition,’ i. e. what Grice calls an ‘uptake,’ some sort of
‘understanding.’ In the case of these ‘desiderative’ moves, the recognition is
that the communicator WILLS something. Grice uses a ‘that’-clause attached to
‘will,’ so that he can formulate the proposition “p” – whose realization is in
question. Now, this ‘will’ on the part of the ‘communicator’ needs to be
‘transmitted.’ So the communicator’s will includes his will that his emissee
will adopt this will. “And eventually act upon it!” So, you see, while it looks
as if Pears and Thomson and Grice are into ‘philosophical psychology,’ they are
into ‘praxis.’ Not alla Althuser, but almost! Pears explored the idea of the
conversational implicaturum in connection, obviously, with action. There is a
particular type of conditional that relates to action. Grice’s example, “If I
COULD do it, I would climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees.” Grice and Pears, and indeed Thomson, analysed
this ‘if.’ Pears thinks that ‘if’ conversationally implicates ‘if and only if.’
Grice called that “Perfecct pears.”
pelagianism: or as Grice
preferred, Pelagusianism --. the doctrine in Christian theology that, through
the exercise of free will, human beings can attain moral perfection. A broad
movement devoted to this proposition was only loosely associated with its
eponymous leader. Pelagius c.354c.425, a lay theologian from Britain or
Ireland, taught in Rome prior to its sacking in 410. He and his disciple
Celestius found a forceful adversary in Augustine, whom they provoked to
stiffen his stance on original sin, the bondage of the will, and humanity’s
total reliance upon God’s grace and predestination for salvation. To Pelagius,
this constituted fatalism and encouraged moral apathy. God would not demand
perfection, as the Bible sometimes suggested, were that impossible to attain.
Rather grace made the struggle easier for a sanctity that would not be
unreachable even in its absence. Though in the habit of sinning, in consequence
of the fall, we have not forfeited the capacity to overcome that habit nor been
released from the imperative to do so. For all its moral earnestness this
teaching seems to be in conflict with much of the New Testament, especially as
interpreted by Augustine, and it was condemned as heresy in 418. The bondage of
the will has often been reaffirmed, perhaps most notably by Luther in dispute
with Erasmus. Yet Christian theology and practice have always had their
sympathizers with Pelagianism and with its reluctance to attest the loss of
free will, the inevitability of sin, and the utter necessity of God’s grace.
pera: important Italian philosopher. Marcello Pera (Lucca, 28 gennaio 1943) è un
filosofo, politico e accademico italiano, senatore per Forza Italia e Popolo
della Libertà dal 1996 al 2013, e Presidente del Senato nella XIV Legislatura.
Il 12 novembre 2018 è stato nominato presidente del Comitato
storico-scientifico per gli anniversari di interesse nazionale istituito presso
la Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Diplomatosi in ragioneria
all'Istituto "F. Carrara" di Lucca nel 1962, lavora prima alla Banca
Toscana e poi alla Camera di Commercio di Lucca. Quindi decide di studiare
filosofia. Si laurea all'Università di Pisa nel 1972, con 110 su 110 e
lode. Carriera accademica Incoraggiato dal suo maestro Francesco Barone,
inizia la carriera accademica nel 1976 come incaricato di Filosofia della
scienza a Pisa. In seguito diventa professore straordinario di Filosofia
teoretica a Catania (1989-1992) e ordinario di Filosofia della scienza
all'Università di Pisa (1992). In questi anni viene presentato da Lucio
Colletti al direttore editoriale della casa editrice Laterza, Enrico Mistretta,
iniziando subito una intensa attività di consulenza editoriale per la filosofia
della scienza. Con questa Casa editrice pubblica anche i suoi primi importanti
libri scientifici, allontanandosi dalle posizioni ideologiche dell'estrema
sinistra per accostarsi insieme a Lucio Colletti al dibattito culturale allora
presente nel Partito Socialista Italiano. Iniziato alla politica dallo
stesso Lucio Colletti, trasmigra con lui e altri intellettuali nel neonato
partito di Forza Italia fondato da Silvio Berlusconi. Comincia qui una nuova
fase, in cui si è distinto come saggista per l'attività a favore di un avvicinamento
della politica alla religione cattolica[1]. Convinto che le libertà civili e
politiche, lungi dall'essere fondate sulla relatività delle nostre conoscenze,
debbano ricondursi invece alla dignità intrinseca della persona umana, che
permane quale che sia la verità delle convinzioni di ciascuno, ha più volte
rilevato come sia sbagliato fare del relativismo culturale il fondamento della
società liberale. Questa, secondo Pera, ha potuto sorgere piuttosto grazie a
quel terreno fertile rappresentato dai principi della religione cristiana. Al
tempo, Pera si dichiarava ateo e non credente, venendo pertanto annoverato tra
gli atei devoti.[2]. Nel 2001, eletto in Parlamento tra le file di Forza
Italia, ascese alla seconda carica dello Stato, la presidenza del Senato, che
ha ricoperto fino alla fine della legislatura. Pera è stato collaboratore dei
quotidiani “Corriere della Sera”, “Il Messaggero”, “La Stampa” e dei
settimanali “L'Espresso” e “Panorama”. Studi di Filosofia della
scienza Karl Popper insieme a Melitta Mew e Marcello Pera a Kenley (Regno
Unito), nel 1986. Il filosofo Marcello Pera ha svolto un'intensa attività di
ricerca nel campo della filosofia della scienza a livello internazionale[3]. Il
suo primo saggio filosofico di rilievo del 1978 riguarda il metodo scientifico
e l'induzione. Pera ha poi concentrato i suoi studi filosofici su Karl Popper.
Corrispondente del filosofo austriaco teorico della "società aperta",
Marcello Pera è uno dei suoi massimi studiosi italiani.[4]. Su di lui ha scritto
l'opera Popper e la scienza su palafitte (1981). Prima di scrivere il
libro, pubblicò alcuni articoli divulgativi, inserendosi in un vasto movimento
critico, su "L'Espresso", dedicati ai filosofi che avevano tentato di
confutare Karl Marx, il primo dei quali fu dedicato a Popper. Ulteriori studi
di Pera furono dedicati alle teorie sui metodi di ricerca del filosofo scozzese
David Hume e ai metodi induttivi e scientifici del Settecento: nel 1982
pubblicò i due saggi "Hume, Kant e l'induzione" e "Apologia del
metodo". Nel 1986 Pera sviluppò ricerche sui primi studi di elettricità
compiuti nel settecento da Alessandro Volta e da Luigi Galvani[5]. Il
testo fondamentale di Marcello Pera "Popper e la scienza su
palafitte" del 1982 contiene un'analisi dettagliata delle posizioni di
numerosi filosofi europei sul rapporto tra scienza e filosofia, in particolare
di Francesco Bacone, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre
Lakatos ed altri studiosi. Il significato del termine "scienza su
palafitte" è un ironico riferimento al fatto che, come le palafitte
dell'uomo preistorico, la scienza contemporanea (in particolare la teoria della
relatività e la fisica atomica) non sono fondate su basi solide come la roccia,
ma sono soggette a frequenti modifiche e revisioni, a seguito della scoperta di
nuove particelle, di nuovi fenomeni, o di nuove leggi fisiche che in parte
modificano quelle precedenti della fisica classica. Il saggio di Pera
inizia con una celebre citazione di Popper sull'evoluzione delle teorie scientifiche,
secondo la quale la scienza non poggerebbe su fondamenti immutabili, ma su
principi che possono essere oggetto di ulteriori analisi ed
approfondimenti.[6]. Come Popper, anche Pera ritiene che le teorie scientifiche
abbiano una validità limitata a un determinato contesto: secondo questo
orientamento le teorie scientifiche sono parzialmente modificabili nel tempo.
Fra le revisioni di sistemi scientifici studiate da Pera vi è la rivoluzione
scientifica, convenzionalmente iniziata con Niccolò Copernico e conclusasi con
l'opera di Isaac Newton, che ha reso obsolete la fisica aristotelica e
tolemaica. Sono poi analizzate le teorie elettromagnetiche, a partire dalle
prime formulazioni empiriche di Alessandro Volta e Luigi Galvani fino alle
teorie fisico-matematiche di James Clerk Maxwell. Infine, nel corso del
Novecento si sono avuti rinnovamenti significativi della fisica classica, che
hanno portato alla fisica moderna con le teorie della relatività (ristretta e
generale) di Einstein e la meccanica quantistica. Pera analizza l'evoluzione di
queste teorie scientifiche in relazione a quella del metodo scientifico, basato
su procedimenti razionali ed induttivi. Metodo scientifico ed induzione
Marcello Pera ha sostenuto una posizione intermedia fra il pensiero di Karl
Popper che non accetta l'induzione, e quella di altri filosofi che convalidano
il metodo scientifico basato sull'induzione, definito da David Hume, uno dei
maggiori esponenti dell'empirismo nel settecento. Pera condivide il contributo
di Popper e degli altri esponenti del Circolo di Vienna alla filosofia della
scienza del XX secolo, pur cercando di superare certe loro posizioni che
considera troppo radicali, rivalutando così un certo ruolo dell'induzione nella
ricerca scientifica. Sulle differenze fra la posizione di Pera e di Popper
riguardo al metodo induttivo, si veda[7]. Altri saggi sui metodi
scientifici Marcello Pera ha dedicato numerosi articoli su riviste
specializzate a temi di Filosofia della scienza e sul Metodo scientifico, tra
cui: Pera M., "Induzione, scandalo dell'empirismo", in
"Introduzione a Feigl", (1979). Pera M., "La scoperta
scientifica: congetture selvagge o argomentazioni induttive?", in
"Medicina nei secoli", XVI, n.1, pp.51-70, (1979). Pera M., "È
scientifico il programma scientifico di Marx?", in "Studium",
75, 4, pp.441-463, (1979). Pera M., "Principi a priori e canoni di
razionalità scientifica", in "Physis", XXII, 2, pp.261-278,
(1980). Pera M., "Le teorie come metafore e l'induzione", in
"Physis", XXII, 3-4, (1980). Pera M., "Inductive Method and
Scientific Discovery", in collaborazione con Grmek, Cohen, Cimino, (1980).
Sulla storia della scienza ha pubblicato: Pera M., "La rana ambigua:
la controversia sull'elettricità animale tra Galvani e Volta", il Mulino
(1986) - Edizione inglese: Princeton University Press (1991). Pera M.,
"Scienza e retorica", Laterza (1992) - Edizione inglese: "The
Discourses of Science", The University of Chicago Press (1994). Attività
politica Attività politica nel PSI Negli anni ottanta e nei primi anni novanta,
Marcello Pera fa parte del Partito Socialista Italiano. A ricordo del suo
periodo di vicinanza al Partito Socialista, nel 2004 Pera si è recato ad
Hammamet in visita alla tomba di Bettino Craxi, che ha definito un "patrimonio
della Repubblica", che appartiene alla "storia della sinistra
italiana"[8]. Nel 1994 durante la stagione di Mani Pulite, Marcello
Pera si impegnò sulla questione morale con impeto giustizialista; espresse
severe critiche alla corruzione della politica, schierandosi senza riserve
dalla parte dei magistrati di Milano. Pera si impegnò anche nell'area
laica, nel movimento referendario di Massimo Severo Giannini con la lista Sì
Referendum[9]. Viene inoltre ingaggiato come commentatore dal quotidiano La
Stampa, per il quale tra 1992 e 1993 formula diverse critiche alla corruzione
politica in Italia e si esprime nei seguenti termini: «Come alla caduta
di altri regimi, occorre una nuova Resistenza, un nuovo riscatto e poi una
vera, radicale, impietosa epurazione [...] Il processo è già cominciato e per
buona parte dell'opinione pubblica già chiuso con una condanna» (La Stampa, 19
luglio 1992) «I partiti devono retrocedere e alzare le mani [...] subito e
senza le furbizie che accompagnano i rantoli della loro agonia. Questo sì
sarebbe un golpe contro la democrazia: cercare di resistere contro la volontà
popolare» (1º febbraio 1993) «Il garantismo, come ogni ideologia preconcetta, è
pernicioso» (29 marzo 1993). «I giudici devono andare avanti. Nessuno chiede
che gli inquisiti eccellenti abbiano un trattamento diverso dagli altri
inquisiti» (5 marzo 1993) «No e poi no, onorevole Bossi. Lei deve chiedere
scusa... I giudici fanno il loro dovere... Molti magistrati sono già stati
assassinati per aver fatto rispettare la legge... Lei mette in discussione i
fondamenti stessi dello Stato di diritto» (24 settembre 1993) *«la rivoluzione
ha regole ferree e tempi stretti» (26 settembre 1993) «Quei politici che, come
Craxi, attaccano i magistrati di Milano, mostrano di non capire la sostanza
grave, epocale, del fenomeno» Con Luigi Manconi nel 1995 firmò un appello per
l'uso delle droghe leggere[10]. Ancora nel 1994 Pera dichiarò:
"Berlusconi è a metà strada tra un cabarettista azzimato e un venditore
televisivo di stoviglie, una roba che avrebbe ispirato e angosciato il povero
Fellini"[11]. Senatore di Forza Italia Pera nel 1996. Nel 1994
Pera cambia radicalmente schieramento e aderisce a Forza Italia di cui diventa
coordinatore nazionale della Convenzione per la riforma liberale. Pera, in
questo periodo, si allontana dalle precedenti posizioni giustizialiste
temperandole in senso garantista. Pera iniziò a criticare gli
"eccessi" del pool di Milano e Palermo, che arrivò a definire
golpisti e invitò D'Alema a «fermare i giudici», indicando nel garantismo una
posizione intermedia fra giustizialismo e corruzione, e proponendo la
separazione delle carriere e l'obbligatorietà dell'azione penale. Pera
polemizzò inoltre con i magistrati di Milano per una vicenda che vedeva
coinvolto Paolo Berlusconi nel caso Simec, la società di gestione della
discarica di Cerro Maggiore[12]. Alle elezioni politiche italiane del
1996 Pera viene candidato al Senato per Forza Italia nella sua Lucca, ma viene
sconfitto all'uninominale dal senatore locale, Patrizio Petrucci dei DS. Viene
poi ripescato in quota proporzionale tramite il sistema dei resti ed eletto nel
gruppo Forza Italia al Senato, ed è nominato nel 1998 vicepresidente del Gruppo
di Forza Italia al Senato. Assieme a Marco Boato fonda la "Convenzione
per la giustizia", un movimento politico "virtuale" che consente
il finanziamento pubblico de Il Foglio di Giuliano Ferrara. In Parlamento, Pera
si occupa soprattutto dei problemi della Giustizia in Italia: è stato
ispiratore della riforma costituzionale sul "giusto processo",
approvata nella XIII Legislatura, che ha modificato l'articolo 111 della
Costituzione[13]. La Presidenza del Senato (2001-2006) Il
Presidente del Senato Marcello Pera e il Presidente della Camera Pier Ferdinando
Casini accolgono papa Giovanni Paolo II al Parlamento italiano, 14 novembre
2002. Nelle elezioni politiche del 2001 vince nel collegio uninominale di
Lucca, l'unico della Toscana andato al centro-destra. Viene eletto al primo
scrutinio Presidente del Senato della Repubblica, seconda carica dello Stato,
che manterrà fino al 2006. Nel suo "Discorso di insediamento al Senato
della Repubblica" del 30 marzo 2001 Marcello Pera ha dichiarato:
«Questo è il nucleo della democrazia... Non è soltanto il governo del popolo,
la democrazia; non è neppure soltanto il governo delle regole o della legge: è
qualcosa di più difficile, ma anche di più esaltante. La democrazia è quel
regime di governo che permette a chi si oppone di sostituire pacificamente chi
prende le decisioni a nome della maggioranza. Per questo la democrazia o lo
strumento della democrazia non è soltanto il voto, ma l'argomentazione, il
discorso, il confronto. Per sostituire chi governa, prima di votare occorre
confutare e criticare. Allo stesso modo per governare occorre argomentare e
convincere» In quegli anni è Presidente onorario della "Fondazione
Magna Carta"[14]. Senatore con Forza Italia (2006-2008) e con il
Popolo della Libertà (2008-2013) Lasciata la presidenza del Senato, alle
elezioni politiche italiane del 2006 è rieletto senatore nella lista di Forza
Italia nel collegio della Emilia Romagna e dal 2007 vice-capogruppo di Forza
Italia al Senato[15]. Al seguito della caduta del governo Prodi e delle
elezioni politiche italiane del 2008, è stato confermato al Senato come
capolista della circoscrizione Lazio per il Popolo della Libertà.
Politica locale in Toscana Marcello Pera ha partecipato anche ad alcuni temi di
politica locale, in particolare in Toscana e a Lucca. Inoltre ha svolto un
ruolo attivo nell'ambito della Camera di Commercio di Lucca negli anni sessanta
e settanta e poi soprattutto nelle istituzioni dell'Università di Pisa negli
anni ottanta e novanta. Nel 2005 Marcello Pera ha espresso alcune critiche ai
rapporti fra il Comune di Lucca e la Azienda Municipalizzata del Gas; Pera
viene quindi accusato in Consiglio comunale dall'allora sindaco Pietro Fazzi
(sostenuto da una maggioranza di centrodestra) di essersi intromesso nella
gestione amministrativa del Comune. La vicenda verteva su supposte pressioni del
senatore per la cessione di quote societarie di Gesam gas, azienda
municipalizzata per la somministrazione del gas, ad Enel gas spa. La polemica
ha portato allo scioglimento del Consiglio comunale di Lucca e alle dimissioni
del sindaco Pietro Fazzi, successivamente espulso dal suo partito[16].
Della vicenda si è interessata anche la Procura di Lucca, che nel 2007 ha
archiviato il caso[17]. A settembre 2016 Marcello Pera insieme a Giuliano
Urbani ha fondato il Comitato "Liberi Sì" per il Referendum 2016.
Questo comitato era molto vicino alle posizioni di Scelta Civica e Alleanza
Liberalpopolare-Autonomie, e raccoglieva al suo interno alcune personalità del
centrodestra come Giuliano Urbani ed Enzo Ghigo. In dicembre 2016 il suo
nome era tra i papabili come possibile Ministro nel nuovo Governo
Gentiloni. L'avvicinamento al mondo cattolico In passato Marcello Pera si
era definito un "non credente"; Pera si è poi avvicinato al pensiero
cristiano, accogliendo l'invito di papa Benedetto XVI a vivere "come se
Dio esistesse". Dice infatti Pera in Perché dobbiamo dirci cristiani
(2008): "Io suggerisco di accettare l'esortazione che il Papa ha fatto ai
non credenti: seguire la vecchia formula di Pascal e Kant di vivere ‘come se
Dio esistesse’ (velut si Deus daretur)". La frase citata e commentata da
Pera è tratta da: Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion pratica, trad. it. di F.
Capra, riveduta da E. Garin, Roma-Bari, Laterza 1979, pag. 157. Pera ritiene
che sia una soluzione saggia, perché rende tutti moralmente più responsabili:
"Se Dio esiste, ci sono limiti morali alle mie azioni, comportamenti,
decisioni, progetti, leggi e così via...". Vedi in proposito il libro di
Pera Perché dobbiamo dirci cristiani (2008), al capitolo "Come se Dio
esistesse", pagine 54-58, in cui Pera indica due modi di avvicinarsi al
cristianesimo: quello della persona fermamente credente e quello della persona
che ammira i valori del cristianesimo (come Kant e Pascal) e che si avvicina al
messaggio cristiano vivendolo dal punto di vista etico. Per le posizioni
su questa tematica Pera è considerato un esponente del movimento
neoconservatore italiano e risulta essere attualmente il più autorevole
esponente Teocon in Italia. Nel periodo di presidenza del Senato nasce un
legame intellettuale tra Pera e il cardinale Joseph Ratzinger, il futuro
pontefice Benedetto XVI: i due si trovano in sintonia sull'analisi dei problemi
dell'Europa e manifestano comuni preoccupazioni per una civiltà occidentale
minata al suo interno dal relativismo e dal multiculturalismo.[18] Dopo
il 2000 Pera ha dedicato diversi articoli e saggi al rapporto fra la cultura
storica europea e il cattolicesimo. In generale Marcello Pera sostiene che il
denominatore culturale comune dei diversi stati europei non deve ravvisarsi nel
rinascimento o nell'illuminismo, ma nel Cristianesimo[19]. Pera in alcuni saggi
e interviste ha indicato l'esigenza di ricercare l'identità culturale del
continente europeo nel Vangelo e negli Atti degli Apostoli. In particolare Pera
ha sostenuto che le Lettere di S.Paolo e i racconti evangelici esprimono i
concetti di eguaglianza fra gli uomini e di solidarietà sociale, che sono oggi
alla base delle Costituzioni delle nazioni moderne e della stessa Comunità
Europea. Nel 2004 Pera è autore con l'allora cardinale Joseph Ratzinger
del libro “Senza radici”, sulla questione delle radici cristiane dell'Europa.
Nel libro, che contiene le due relazioni di Pera e Ratzinger sull'argomento e
uno scambio epistolare tra i due, denuncia il decadimento morale dell'Europa a
suo dire impoverita dal rifiuto delle sue radici cristiane e minacciata dal
terrorismo islamista. Nel libro Pera scrive: «Soffia sull'Europa un brutto
vento. Si tratta dell'idea che basta aspettare e i guai spariranno da soli, o
che si può essere accondiscendenti anche con chi ci minaccia e potremo
cavarcela. È lo stesso soffio del vento di Monaco nel 1938». In un'intervista
rilasciata alla Stampa dopo il no irlandese al trattato europeo, Pera
identifica il Papa, sulla scia di De Maistre, come unico riferimento possibile
per il Vecchio Continente.[20] Nel saggio Perché dobbiamo dirci cristiani
(2008) Pera condanna il relativismo e l'incertezza culturale della società
contemporanea e sviluppa il tema della vera identità dell'Europa da ricercarsi nella
forza etica e sociale del cristianesimo. Secondo Pera, la religione cattolica
non può essere una convinzione privata o tradizionale: l'impegno del cattolico
deve essere presente nella coerenza del suo comportamento etico. Secondo Pera,
il cristiano si deve impegnare in tutte le sfere della vita civile e
istituzionale, prestando la sua attenzione ai problemi di tutti i cittadini e
alla solidarietà sociale. Sul piano politico e culturale, Marcello Pera si
definisce un "conservatore liberale". Più precisamente “conservatore
sui valori da mantenere e liberale sulle riforme da fare”. Secondo Pera “si
tratta di una grande dottrina, una grande scuola, una grande tradizione
politica. Si basa soprattutto su due pilastri: attenzione e difesa della nostra
tradizione europea e occidentale, che è il riferimento da mantenere (da ciò il
conservatorismo); e custodia della nostra autonomia individuale, che è la
condizione su cui dobbiamo sempre vigilare (da ciò il nostro liberalismo)”.[21] Opere Induzione e metodo scientifico, Pisa,
Editrice Tecnico Scientifica, 1978. Popper e la scienza su palafitte,
Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1981. Hume, Kant e l'induzione, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1982.
Apologia del metodo, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1982. I modi del progresso. Teorie e
episodi della razionalita scientifica, a cura di e con Joseph Pitt, Milano, Il
Saggiatore, 1985. La rana ambigua. La controversia sull'elettricità animale tra
Galvani e Volta, Torino, Einaudi, 1986. ISBN 88-06-59310-2. Scienza e retorica,
Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1991. ISBN 88-420-3789-3. L'arte della persuasione
scientifica, a cura di e con William R. Shea, Milano, Guerini, 1992. ISBN
88-7802-330-2. La Martinella. 2001, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2003. ISBN
88-498-0544-6. La Martinella. 2002, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2003. ISBN
88-498-0641-8. La Martinella. 2003, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2004. ISBN
88-498-0868-2. Senza radici. Europa, relativismo, cristianesimo, islam, con
Joseph Ratzinger, Milano, Mondadori, 2004. ISBN 88-04-54474-0. La Martinella.
2004, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2005. ISBN 88-498-1078-4. Libertà e
laicità, a cura di, Siena, Cantagalli, 2006. ISBN 88-8272-266-X. La Martinella.
2005-2006, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2006. ISBN 88-498-1517-4. Perché
dobbiamo dirci cristiani. Il liberalismo, l'Europa, l'etica, Milano, Mondadori,
2008. ISBN 9788804588313. Alle origini del liberalismo. A proposito di
Pannunzio e Tocqueville, Torino, Centro Pannunzio, 2009. Onorificenze Gran
Decorazione d'Onore in Oro con Fascia dell'Ordine al Merito della Repubblica
Austriaca (Austria) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaGran Decorazione d'Onore
in Oro con Fascia dell'Ordine al Merito della Repubblica Austriaca (Austria) —
2002 Grand'Ufficiale dell'Ordine delle Tre Stelle (Lettonia) - nastrino per
uniforme ordinariaGrand'Ufficiale dell'Ordine delle Tre Stelle (Lettonia)
Compagno d'Onore Onorario dell'Ordine Nazionale al Merito (Malta) - nastrino
per uniforme ordinariaCompagno d'Onore Onorario dell'Ordine Nazionale al Merito
(Malta) — 20 gennaio 2004 Gran Croce dell'Ordine al Merito della Repubblica di
Polonia (Polonia) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaGran Croce dell'Ordine al
Merito della Repubblica di Polonia (Polonia) — 2002 Gran Croce dell'Ordine
dell'Infante Dom Henrique (Portogallo) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaGran Croce
dell'Ordine dell'Infante Dom Henrique (Portogallo) — 31 gennaio 2005 Cavaliere
di Gran Croce dell'Ordine Piano (Santa Sede) - nastrino per uniforme ordinaria Cavaliere
di Gran Croce dell'Ordine Piano (Santa Sede) — Roma, 11 luglio 2005[22] Gran
Croce - Classe Speciale - dell'Ordine pro Merito Melitensi (SMOM) - nastrino
per uniforme ordinariaGran Croce - Classe Speciale - dell'Ordine pro Merito
Melitensi (SMOM) — Roma, 10 marzo 2006[23][24] Note ^ Vedi i due saggi di
Marcello Pera "Senza Radici" del 2004 e "Perché dobbiamo dirci
cristiani: il liberalismo, l'Europa, l'etica" del 2008 ^ Marcello
Veneziani su Libero, 25 novembre 2008, da MarcelloPera.it ^ Visiting Fellow:
Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1984; Visiting
Fellow: The Van Leer Foundation, Gerusalemme, 1987; Visiting Fellow: Department
of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge in Massachusetts, 1990; Visiting
Fellow: Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences, London School
of Economics, 1995-96) ^ vedi la prefazione del saggio di Pera "Popper e
la scienza su palafitte", Laterza 1982, pag IX, in cui Pera indica:
"Sono molto grato a Sir Karl Popper per avermi privatamente precisato
alcuni punti sui quali permangono divergenze di opinione. Per altri punti ho
motivi di gratitudine verso amici e colleghi italiani e stranieri" ^ cfr.
il saggio La rana ambigua: la controversia sull'elettricità animale fra Galvani
e Volta, 1986 ^ La scienza non poggia su un solido strato di roccia. L'ardita
struttura delle sue teorie si eleva, per così dire sopra una palude. È come un
edificio costruito su palafitte. Le palafitte vengono conficcate dall'alto giù
nella palude: ma non in una base naturale o "data"; e il fatto che
desistiamo dai nostri tentativi di conficcare le palafitte più a fondo non
significa che abbiamo trovato un terreno solido. Semplicemente, ci fermiamo
quando siamo soddisfatti e riteniamo che almeno per il momento i sostegni siano
abbastanza stabili da sorreggere la struttura. (Karl Popper); in Pera M.,
"Popper e la scienza su palafitte", Introduzione "Una
epistemologia di frontiera tra positivismo logico e anarchismo
metodologico", p.3 (1982). ^ Pera M., Popper e la scienza su palafitte,
Prefazione, pp.VII-X (1982) ^ Pera sulla tomba di Craxi "Un patrimonio
della Repubblica", La Repubblica, 18 gennaio 2004 ^ "Campioni
d'Italia", di Gianni Barbacetto, Marco Tropea editore ^ Pera, il
ragioniere che diventò presidente Un carattere d'acciaio per il filosofo dalle
mille e mille contraddizioni, Il Tirreno, 28 dicembre 2001 ^ Citato in Michele
De Lucia, Siamo alla frutta, Kaos 2005. ISBN 8879531530 ^ Società civile.it ^
(Principi del giusto processo legge costituzionale 23 novembre 1999, n. 2; G.U.
n. 300 del 23 dicembre 1999) ^ Lettera al presidente del Senato Marcello Pera
in occasione del convegno di Norcia ^ senato.it - Scheda di attività di
Marcello PERA - XV Legislatura ^ vedi la fonte giornalistica "Ha offeso
Pera": Forza Italia espelle il sindaco ^ La procura chiede l'archiviazione
Archiviato il 18 gennaio 2007 in Internet Archive. ^ vedi il libro scritto in
collaborazione fra M. Pera e J. Ratzinger Senza radici: Europa, Relativismo,
Cristianesimo, Islam, Milano, Mondadori, 2004 e anche il successivo saggio di
Pera "Introduzione a Ratzinger", 2005 ^ vedi in particolare il libro
scritto in collaborazione fra M. Pera ed il cardinale J. Ratzinger, Senza
radici: Europa, Relativismo, Cristianesimo, Islam, Milano, Mondadori, 2004, e
il successivo libro di M. Pera, Perché dobbiamo dirci cristiani. Il
liberalismo, l'Europa, l'etica, Milano, Mondadori, 2008. ^ "Visto? Non sta
in piedi un'Unione senza Dio"[collegamento interrotto] ^ il rapporto di
vicinanza fra i movimenti politici liberali europei e il cattolicesimo è
sviluppato da Pera nel saggio Perché dobbiamo dirci cristiani. Il liberalismo,
l'Europa, l'etica, Milano, Mondadori, 2008. ^ Acta Apostolicae Sedis.
Commentarium officiale, Città del Vaticano, n.1, 6 gennaio 2006, p.89. ^ Dal
sito web del Sovrano Militare Ordine di Malta. Archiviato l'8 dicembre 2015 in Internet
Archive. ^ Marcello Pera viene insignito da Fra' Andrew Bertie Archiviato il 7
novembre 2008 in Internet Archive. Bibliografia Campioni d'Italia. G.
Barbacetto, Marco Tropea Editore, 2002, ISBN 8843803549. Siamo alla frutta.
Ritratto di Marcello Pera. M. De Lucia, Kaos Edizioni, 2005, ISBN
88-7953-153-0. "Tolleranza e radici cristiane secondo Marcello Pera".
F. Coniglione, in Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica, 46, XVIII (2005),
pp. 603–609 "La forza dell'Occidente. Pera, Ratzinger e il relativismo
della 'Vecchia Europa'”. F. Coniglione, in Il Protagora, luglio-dicembre 2005,
quinta serie, n. 6, pp. 7–46 *"Il sorriso di Crizia. Il relativismo
elitario di Marcello Pera". F. Coniglione, in La filosofia generosa. Studi
in onore di Anna Escher Di Stefano, Bonanno, Acireale-Roma 2006, pp. 183–201
Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a
Marcello Pera Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su
Marcello Pera Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini
o altri file su Marcello Pera Collegamenti esterni Sito ufficiale, su
marcellopera.it. Modifica su Wikidata Marcello Pera, su Treccani.it –
Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata
Opere di Marcello Pera, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su
Wikidata (EN) Opere di Marcello Pera, su Open Library, Internet Archive.
Modifica su Wikidata Marcello Pera / Marcello Pera (altra versione) / Marcello
Pera (altra versione) / Marcello Pera (altra versione), su senato.it, Senato
della Repubblica. Modifica su Wikidata Marcello Pera, su Openpolis,
Associazione Openpolis. Modifica su Wikidata Registrazioni di Marcello Pera, su
RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale. Modifica su Wikidata PredecessorePresidente
del Senato della Repubblica SuccessoreLogo
del Senato della Repubblica Italiana.svg Nicola Mancino30 maggio 2001 – 27
aprile 2006Franco Marini V · D · M Presidenti del Senato italiano Controllo di
autoritàVIAF (EN) 87352258 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0922 2994 · SBN
IT\ICCU\CFIV\042841 · LCCN (EN) n81065125 · GND (DE) 130476048 · BNF (FR)
cb120250540 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1615120 (data) · BAV (EN) 495/297554 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n81065125 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale
Filosofia Politica Portale Politica Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX
secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloPolitici italiani del XX secoloPolitici
italiani del XXI secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del
XXI secoloNati nel 1943Nati il 28 gennaioNati a LuccaSenatori della XIII
legislatura della Repubblica ItalianaSenatori della XIV legislatura della
Repubblica ItalianaSenatori della XV legislatura della Repubblica
ItalianaSenatori della XVI legislatura della Repubblica ItalianaPresidenti del
Senato della Repubblica ItalianaPolitici del Partito Socialista
ItalianoPolitici di Forza Italia (1994)Politici del Popolo della
LibertàFilosofi della scienzaStudenti dell'Università di PisaProfessori
dell'Università degli Studi di CataniaProfessori dell'Università di Pisa[altre]. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Pera," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
izzing/hazzing
– per-essentiam/per-accidentem: literally, “by, as, or being an accident
or non-essential feature.” A “per accidens” predication Grice calls a hazzing
(not an izzing) and is one in which an accident is predicated of a substance.
The terminology is medieval. Note that the accident and substance themselves, and
not expressions standing for them, are the terms of the predication relation.
An “ens per accidentem” is either an accident or the “accidental unity” of a
substance and an accident. Descartes, e.g., insists that a person is not a “per
accidentem” union of body and mind. H. P. Grice, “Izzing, hazzing: the
per-essentiam/per-accidentem distinction.”
PENDENS
-- DE-PENDENS -- dependens- independens distinction, the: independence
results, proofs of non-deducibility. Any of the following equivalent conditions
may be called independence: (1) A is not deducible from B; (2) its negation - A
is consistent with B; (3) there is a model of B that is not a model of A; e.g.,
the question of the non-deducibility of the parallel axiom from the other
Euclidean axioms is equivalent to that of the consistency of its negation with
them, i.e. of non-Euclidean geometry. Independence results may be not absolute
but relative, of the form: if B is consistent (or has a model), then B together
with - A is (or does); e.g. models of non-Euclidean geometry are built within
Euclidean geometry. In another sense, a set B is said to be independent if it
is irredundant, i.e., each hypothesis in B is independent of the others; in yet
another sense, A is said to be independent of B if it is undecidable by B,
i.e., both independent of and consistent with B. The incompleteness theorems of
Gödel are independence results, prototypes for many further proofs of
undecidability by subsystems of classical mathematics, or by classical
mathematics as a whole, as formalized in ZermeloFraenkel set theory with the
axiom of choice (ZF ! AC or ZFC). Most famous is the undecidability of the
continuum hypothesis, proved consistent relative to ZFC by Gödel, using his
method of constructible sets, and independent relative to ZFC by Paul J. Cohen,
using his method of forcing. Rather than build models from scratch by such
methods, independence (consistency) for A can also be established by showing A
implies (is implied by ) some A* already known independent (consistent). Many
suitable A* (Jensen’s Diamond, Martin’s Axiom, etc.) are now available.
Philosophically, formalism takes A’s undecidability by ZFC to show the question
of A’s truth meaningless; Platonism takes it to establish the need for new
axioms, such as those of large cardinals. (Considerations related to the
incompleteness theorems show that there is no hope even of a relative
consistency proof for these axioms, yet they imply, by way of determinacy
axioms, many important consequences about real numbers that are independent of
ZFC.) With non-classical logics, e.g. second-order logic, (1)–(3) above may not
be equivalent, so several senses of independence become distinguishable. The
question of independence of one axiom from others may be raised also for
formalizations of logic itself, where many-valued logics provide models.
perceptum: vide Grice/Warnock, “Notes on visa.” -- myse-en-abyme,
drodde effect Dahlenmacher, speculative – mirror in front of mirror -- , the
traditional distinction is perceptum-conceptum: nihil est in intellectu quod
prius non fuerit in sensu. this is Grice on sense-datum. Grice feels that the
kettle is hot; Grice sees that the kettle is hot; Grice perceives that the
kettle is hot. WoW:251 uses this example. It may be argued that the use of
‘see’ is there NOT factive. Cf. “I feel hot but it’s not hot.” Grice modifies
the thing to read, “DIRECTLY PERCEIVING”: Grice only indirectly perceives that
the kettle is hot’ if what he is doing is ‘seeing’ that the kettle is hot. When
Grice sees that the kettle is hot, it is a ‘secondary’ usage of ‘see,’ because
it means that Grice perceives that the kettle has some visual property that
INDICATES the presence of hotness (Grice uses phi for the general formula). Cf.
sensum. Lewis and Short have “sentĭo,” which they render, aptly, as “to sense,” ‘to
discern by the senses; to feel, hear, see, etc.; to perceive, be sensible of
(syn. percipio).” Note that Price is also cited by
Grice in Personal identity. Grice: That pillar box seems red to me. The locus
classicus in the philosophical literature for Grices implicaturum. Grice
introduces a dout-or-denial condition for an utterance of a phenomenalist report
(That pillar-box seems red to me). Grice attacks neo-Wittgensteinian approaches
that regard the report as _false_. In a long excursus on implication, he
compares the phenomenalist report with utterances like He has beautiful
handwriting (He is hopeless at philosophy), a particularised conversational implicaturum;
My wife is in the kitchen or the garden (I have non-truth-functional grounds to
utter this), a generalised conversational implicaturum; She was poor but she
was honest (a Great-War witty (her poverty and her honesty contrast), a
conventional implicaturum; and Have you stopped beating your wife? an old
Oxonian conundrum. You have been beating your wife, cf. Smith has not ceased
from eating iron, a presupposition. More importantly, he considers different
tests for each concoction! Those for the conversational implicaturum will
become crucial: cancellability, calculability, non-detachability, and
indeterminacy. In the proceedings he plays with something like the principle of
conversational helpfulness, as having a basis on a view of conversation as
rational co-operation, and as giving the rationale to the implicaturum. Past
the excursus, and back to the issue of perception, he holds a conservative view
as presented by Price at Oxford. One interesting reprint of Grices essay is in
Daviss volume on Causal theories, since this is where it belongs! White’s
response is usually ignored, but shouldnt. White is an interesting Australian
philosopher at Oxford who is usually regarded as a practitioner of
ordinary-language philosophy. However, in his response, White hardly touches
the issue of the implicaturum with which Grice is primarily concerned. Grice
found that a full reprint from the PAS in a compilation also containing the
James Harvard would be too repetitive. Therefore, he omits the excursus on
implication. However, the way Grice re-formulates what that excursus covers is
very interesting. There is the conversational implicaturum, particularised
(Smith has beautiful handwriting) and generalised (My wife is in the kitchen or
in the garden). Then there is the præsuppositum, or presupposition (You havent
stopped beating your wife). Finally, there is the conventional implicaturum
(She was poor, but she was honest). Even at Oxford, Grices implicaturum goes,
philosophers ‒ even Oxonian philosophers ‒ use imply for all those different animals!
Warnock had attended Austins Sense and Sensibilia (not to be confused with
Sense and Sensibility by Austen), which Grice found boring, but Warnock didnt
because Austin reviews his "Berkeley." But Warnock, for obvious
reasons, preferred philosophical investigations with Grice. Warnock reminisces
that Grice once tells him, and not on a Saturday morning, either, How clever
language is, for they find that ordinary language does not need the concept of
a visum. Grice and Warnock spent lovely occasions exploring what Oxford has as
the philosophy of perception. While Grice later came to see philosophy of
perception as a bit or an offshoot of philosophical psychology, the philosophy
of perception is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosophers
lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular! The cause involved is
crucial. Grice plays with an evolutionary justification of the material thing
as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement. If a material thing causes the
sense-datum of a nut, that is because the squarrel (or squirrel) will not be
nourished by the sense datum of the nut; only by the nut! There are many other
items in the Grice Collection that address the topic of perception – notably
with Warnock, and criticizing members of the Ryle group like Roxbee-Cox (on
vision, cf. visa ‒ taste, and perception, in general – And we should not forget
that Grice contributed a splendid essay on the distinction of the senses to
Butlers Analytic philosophy, which in a way, redeemed a rather old-fashioned
discipline by shifting it to the idiom of the day, the philosophy of
perception: a retrospective, with Warnock, the philosophy of perception, :
perception, the philosophy of perception, visum. Warnock was possibly the
only philosopher at Oxford Grice felt congenial enough to engage in different
explorations in the so-called philosophy of perception. Their joint adventures
involved the disimplicaturum of a visum. Grice later approached sense data in
more evolutionary terms: a material thing is to be vindicated transcendentally,
in the sense that it is a material thing (and not a sense datum or collection
thereof) that nourishes a creature like a human. Grice was particularly
grateful to Warnock. By reprinting the full symposium on “Causal theory” of
perception in his influential s. of Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Warnock had
spread Grices lore of implicaturum all over! In some parts of the draft he uses
more on visa, vision, vision, with Warnock, vision. Of the five senses,
Grice and Warnock are particularly interested in seeing. As Grice will put it
later, see is a factive. It presupposes the existence of the event reported
after the that-clause; a visum, however, as an intermediary between the
material thing and the perceiver does not seem necessary in ordinary discourse.
Warnock will reconsider Grices views too (On what is seen, in Sibley). While
Grice uses vision, he knows he is interested in Philosophers paradox concerning
seeing, notably Witters on seeing as, vision, taste and the philosophy of perception,
vision, seeing. As an Oxonian philosopher, Grice was of course more
interested in seeing than in vision. He said that Austin would criticise even
the use of things like sensation and volition, taste, The Grice Papers,
keyword: taste, the objects of the five senses, the philosophy of perception,
perception, the philosophy of perception; philosophy of perception, vision,
taste, perception. Mainly with Warnock. Warnock repr. Grice’s “Causal
theory” in his influential Reading in Philosophy, The philosophy of perception,
perception, with Warnock, with Warner; perception. Warnock learns about
perception much more from Grice than from Austin, taste, The philosophy of
perception, the philosophy of perception, notes with Warnock on visum, : visum,
Warnock, Grice, the philosophy of perception. Grice kept the lecture
notes to a view of publishing a retrospective. Warnock recalled Grice
saying, how clever language is! Grice took the offer by Harvard University
Press, and it was a good thing he repr. part of “Causal theory.” However, the
relevant bits for his theory of conversation as rational co-operation lie in
the excursus which he omitted. What is Grices implicaturum: that one should
consider the topic rather than the method here, being sense datum, and
causation, rather than conversational helpfulness. After all, That pillar box
seems red to me, does not sound very helpful. But the topic of Causal theory is
central for his view of conversation as rational co-operation. Why? P1 gets
an impression of danger as caused by the danger out there. He communicates the
danger to P1, causing in P2 some behaviour. Without
causation, or causal links, the very point of offering a theory of conversation
as rational co-operation seems minimized. On top, as a metaphysician, he was
also concerned with cause simpliciter. He was especially proud that Price’s
section on the casual theory of perception, from his Belief, had been repr.
along with his essay in the influential volume by Davis on “Causal theories.”
In “Actions and events,” Grice further explores cause now in connection with
Greek aitia. As Grice notes, the original usage of this very Grecian item is
the one we find in rebel without a cause, cause-to, rather than cause-because.
The two-movement nature of causing is reproduced in the conversational
exchange: a material thing causes a sense datum which causes an expression
which gets communicated, thus causing a psychological state which will cause a
behaviour. This causation is almost representational. A material thing or a situation
cannot govern our actions and behaviours, but a re-præsentatum of it might.
Govern our actions and behaviour is Grices correlate of what a team of
North-Oxfordshire cricketers can do for North-Oxfordshire: what North
Oxfordshire cannot do for herself, Namesly, engage in a game of cricket! In
Retrospective epilogue he casts doubts on the point of his causal approach. It
is a short paragraph that merits much exploration. Basically, Grice is saying
his causalist approach is hardly an established thesis. He also proposes a
similar serious objection to his view in Some remarks about the senses, the
other essay in the philosophy of perception in Studies. As he notes, both
engage with some fundamental questions in the philosophy of perception, which
is hardly the same thing as saying that they provide an answer to each
question! Grice: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be
thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are
several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined
in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis
which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general
kind. Examples which occur to me are the following six. You cannot see a knife
‘as’ a knife, though you may see what is not a knife ‘as’ a knife (keyword:
‘seeing as’). When he said he ‘knew’ that the objects before him were human
hands, Moore was guilty of misusing ‘know.’ For an occurrence to be properly
said to have a ‘cause,’ it must be something abnormal or unusual (keyword:
‘cause’). For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is
‘responsible,’ it must be the sort of action for which people are condemned
(keyword: responsibility). What is actual is not also possible (keyword:
actual). What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be
the case (keyword: ‘know’ – cf. Urmson on ‘scalar set’). And cf. with the extra
examples he presents in “Prolegomena.” I have no doubt that there will be other
candidates besides the six which I have mentioned. I must emphasize that I am
not saying that all these examples are importantly similar to the thesis which
I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, they may be. To put the
matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to
involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one
contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of
manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is
to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the
linguistic nuances which we have detectcd, we should make sure that we are
reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. “Causal theory”, knowledge and
belief, knowledge, belief, philosophical psychology. Grice: the doxastic implicaturum.
I know only implicates I do not believe. The following is a mistake by a
philosopher. What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to
be the case. The topic had attracted the attention of some Oxonian philosophers
such as Urmson in Parenthetical verbs. Urmson speaks of a scale: I know can be
used parenthetically, as I believe can. For Grice, to utter I believe is
obviously to make a weaker conversational move than you would if you utter
I know. And in this case, an approach to informativeness in terms of entailment
is in order, seeing that I know entails I believe. A is thus allowed to infer
that the utterer is not in a position to make the stronger claim. The mechanism
is explained via his principle of conversational helpfulness. Philosophers tend
two over-use these two basic psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice
is concerned with Gettier-type cases, and also the factivity of know versus the
non-factivity of believe. Grice follows the lexicological innovations by
Hintikka: the logic of belief is doxastic; the logic of knowledge is epistemic.
The last thesis that Grice lists in Causal theory that he thinks rests on a big
mistake he formulates as: What is known by me to be the case is NOT also
believed by me to be the case. What are his attending remarks? Grice writes:
The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine
point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical
theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether
or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been
discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An example which
occurs to me is the following: What is known by me to be the case is not also
believed by me to be the case. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this
example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticising,
only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the
position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre
which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I
am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark
on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush
ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make
sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they are! The ætiological
implicaturum. Grice. For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it
must be something abnormal or unusual. This is an example Grice lists in Causal
theory but not in Prolegomena. But cf. ‘responsible’ – and Hart and Honoré on
accusation -- accusare
"call to account, make complaint against," from ad causa, from “ad,”
with regard to, as in ‘ad-’) + causa, a cause; a lawsuit,’ v. cause. For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it
must be something abnormal or unusual. Similar commentary to his example on
responsible/condemnable apply. The objector may stick with the fact that he is
only concerned with proper utterances. Surely Grice wants to go to a
pre-Humeian account of causation, possible Aristotelian, aetiologia. Where
everything has a cause, except, for Aristotle, God! What are his attending
remarks? Grice writes: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be
thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are
several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined
in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis
which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general
kind. An example which occurs to me is the following: What is known by me to be
the case is not also believed by me to be the case. I must emphasise that I am
not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have
been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more
generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of
manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of
philosophising. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely
suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with
the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have
detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances
they are! Causal theory, cause, causality, causation, conference, colloquium,
Stanford, cause, metaphysics, the abnormal/unusual implicaturum, ætiology,
ætiological implicaturum. Grice: the ætiological implicaturum. Grices
explorations on cause are very rich. He is concerned with some alleged misuse
of cause in ordinary language. If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one
would say that the decapitation of Charles I wills his death, which sounds
harsh, if not ungrammatical, too. Grice later relates cause to the Greek aitia,
as he should. He notes collocations like rebel without a cause. For the Greeks,
or Grecians, as he called them, and the Griceians, it is a cause to which one
should be involved in elucidating. A ‘cause to’ connects with the idea of
freedom. Grice was constantly aware of the threat of mechanism, and his idea
was to provide philosophical room for the idea of finality, which is not
mechanistically derivable. This leads him to discussion of overlap and priority
of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus a psychological theory explaining
this or that piece of rational behaviour. Grice can be Wittgensteinian when
citing Anscombes translation: No psychological concept without the behaviour
the concept is brought to explain. It is best to place his later
treatment of cause with his earlier one in Causal theory. It is surprising
Grice does not apply his example of a mistake by a philosopher to the causal
bit of his causal theory. Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows:
For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something
abnormal or unusual. This is an example Grice lists in Causal theory but not in
Prolegomena. For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be
something abnormal or unusual. A similar commentary to his example on
responsible/condemnable applies: The objector may stick with the fact that he
is only concerned with PROPER utterances. Surely Grice wants to embrace a
pre-Humeian account of causation, possible Aristotelian. Keyword: Aitiologia,
where everything has a cause, except, for Aristotle, God! What are his
attending remarks? Grice writes: The issue with which I have been mainly
concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an
isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would Grice
thinks need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently
parallel to the thesis which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to
treatment of the same general kind. One example which occurs to Grice is the
following: For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be
something abnormal or unusual. Grice feels he must emphasise that he is not
saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been
criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more
generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of
manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of
philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely
suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with
the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have
detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances
they are! Re: responsibility/condemnation. Cf. Mabbott, Flew on punishment,
Philosophy. And also Hart. At Corpus, Grice enjoys his tutor Hardies
resourcefulness in the defence of what may be a difficult position, a
characteristic illustrated by an incident which Hardie himself once told Grice
about himself. Hardie had parked his car and gone to a cinema. Unfortunately,
Hardie had parked his car on top of one of the strips on the street by means of
which traffic-lights were, at the time, controlled by the passing traffic. As a
result, the lights are jammed, and it requires four policemen to lift Hardies
car off the strip. The police decides to prosecute. Grice indicated to Hardie
that this hardly surprised him and asked him how he fared. Oh, Hardie says, I
got off. Then Grice asks Hardie how on earth he managed that! Quite simply,
Hardie answers. I just invoked Mills method of difference. The police charged
me with causing an obstruction at 4 p.m. I told the police that, since my car
was parked at 2 p.m., it could not have been my car which caused the
obstruction at 4 p.m. This relates to an example in Causal theory that he Grice
does not discuss in Prolegomena, but which may relate to Hart, and closer to
Grice, to Mabbotts essay on Flew on punishment, in Philosophy. Grice states the
philosophical mistake as follows: For an action to be properly described as one
for which the agent is responsible, it must be thc sort of action for which
people are condemned. As applied to Hardie. Is Hardie irresponsible? In any
case, while condemnable, he was not! Grice writes: The issue with which I have
been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly
not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which
would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are
sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable
to treatment of the same general kind. An example which occurs to me is the
following: For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is
responsible, it must be the sort of action for which people are condemned. I
must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to
the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be.
To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to
me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one
contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of
manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is
to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the
linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are
reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. The modal example, what is
actual is not also possible, should discussed under Indicative conditonals,
Grice on Macbeth’s implicaturum: seeing a dagger as a dagger. Grice elaborates
on this in Prolegomena, but the austerity of Causal theory is charming, since
he does not give a quote or source. Obviously, Witters. Grice writes: Witters
might say that one cannot see a knife as a knife, though one may see what is
not a knife as a knife. The issue, Grice notes, with which I have been mainly
concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an
isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I
think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently
parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment
of the same general kind. An example which occurs to Grice is the following:
You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a
knife. Grice feels that he must emphasise that he is not saying that this example
is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that,
for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position
adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is
characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not
condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it
without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead
to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure
that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are! Is this a dagger
which I see before me, the handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee. I
have thee not, and yet I see thee still. Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
to feeling as to sight? or art thou but A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain? I see thee yet, in form as palpable
as this which now I draw. Thou marshallst me the way that I was going; and such
an instrument I was to use. Mine eyes are made the fools o the other senses, Or
else worth all the rest; I see thee still, and on thy blade and dudgeon gouts
of blood, which was not so before. Theres no such thing: It is the bloody
business which informs Thus to mine eyes. Now oer the one halfworld Nature
seems dead, and wicked dreams abuse The curtaind sleep; witchcraft celebrates
Pale Hecates offerings, and witherd murder, Alarumd by his sentinel, the wolf,
Whose howls his watch, thus with his stealthy pace. With Tarquins
ravishing strides, towards his design Moves like a ghost. Thou sure and
firm-set earth, Hear not my steps, which way they walk, for fear Thy very
stones prate of my whereabout, And take the present horror from the time, Which
now suits with it. Whiles I threat, he lives: Words to the heat of deeds too
cold breath gives. I go, and it is done; the bell invites me. Hear it not,
Duncan; for it is a knell that summons thee to heaven or to hell. The Moore
example is used both in “Causal theory” and “Prolegomena.” But the use in
“Causal Theory” is more austere: Philosophers mistake: Malcolm: When Moore said
he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing
the word know. Grice writes: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned
may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one.
There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be
examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the
thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same
general kind. An example which occurs to me is the following: When Moore said
he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing
the word know. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is
importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for
all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted
by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is
characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not
condemning this kind of manoeuvre. Grice is merely suggesting that to embark on
it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush
ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make
sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are! So surely
Grice is meaning: I know that the objects before me are human hands as uttered
by Moore is possibly true. Grice was amused by the fact that while at Madison,
Wisc., Moore gave the example: I know that behind those curtains there is a
window. Actually he was wrong, as he soon realised when the educated
Madisonians corrected him with a roar of unanimous laughter. You see, the
lecture hall of the University of Wisconsin at Madison is a rather, shall we
say, striking space. The architect designed the lecture hall with a parapet
running around the wall just below the ceiling, cleverly rigged with indirect
lighting to create the illusion that sun light is pouring in through windows
from outside. So, Moore comes to give a lecture one sunny day. Attracted as he
was to this eccentric architectural detail, Moore gives an illustration of
certainty as attached to common sense. Pointing to the space below the ceiling,
Moore utters. We know more things than we think we know. I know, for example,
that the sunlight shining in from outside proves At which point he was somewhat startled (in
his reserved Irish-English sort of way) when his audience burst out laughing!
Is that a proof of anything? Grice is especially concerned with I seem He needs
a paradeigmatic sense-datum utterance, and intentionalist as he was, he finds
it in I seem to see a red pillar box before me. He is relying on Paul. Grice
would generalise a sense datum by φ I seem to perceive that the alpha is phi.
He agrees that while cause may be too much, any sentence using because will do:
At a circus: You seem to be seeing that an elephant is coming down the street
because an elephant is coming down the street. Grice found the causalist theory
of perception particularly attractive since its objection commits one same
mistake twice: he mischaracterises the cancellable implicaturum of both seem
and cause! While Grice is approaching the philosophical item in the
philosophical lexicon, perceptio, he is at this stage more interested in
vernacular that- clauses such as sensing that, or even more vernacular ones
like seeming that, if not seeing that! This is of course philosophical (cf. aesthetikos
vs. noetikos). L and S have “perceptĭo,” f. perceptio, as used by Cicero (Ac.
2, 7, 22) translating catalepsis, and which they render as “a taking,
receiving; a gathering in, collecting;’ frugum fruetuumque reliquorum, Cic.
Off. 2, 3, 12: fructuum;’ also as perception, comprehension, cf.: notio,
cognition; animi perceptiones, notions, ideas; cognitio aut perceptio, aut si
verbum e verbo volumus comprehensio, quam κατάληψιν illi vocant; in philosophy,
direct apprehension of an object by the mind, Zeno Stoic.1.20, Luc. Par. 4,
al.; τῶν μετεώρων;” ἀκριβὴς κ. Certainty; pl., perceptions, Stoic.2.30, Luc.
Herm.81, etc.; introduced into Latin by Cicero, Plu. Cic. 40. As for “causa”
Grice is even more sure he was exploring a time-honoured philosophical topic.
The entry in L and S is “causa,’ perh. root “cav-“ of “caveo,” prop. that which
is defended or protected; cf. “cura,” and that they render as, unhelpfully, as
“cause,” “that by, on account of, or through which any thing takes place or is
done;” “a cause, reason, motive, inducement;” also, in gen., an occasion,
opportunity; oeffectis; factis, syn.
with ratio, principium, fons, origo, caput; excusatio, defensio; judicium,
controversia, lis; partes, actio; condicio, negotium, commodum, al.);
correlated to aition, or aitia, cause, δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν,” cf. Pl. Ti.
68e, Phd. 97a sq.; on the four causes of Arist. v. Ph. 194b16, Metaph. 983a26:
αἰ. τοῦ γενέσθαι or γεγονέναι Pl. Phd. 97a; τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία
ἡ κοινωνία Id. R. 464b: αἰτίᾳ for the sake of, κοινοῦ τινος ἀγαθοῦ.” Then there
is “αἴτιον” (cf. ‘αἴτιος’) is used like “αἰτία” in the sense of cause, not in
that of ‘accusation.’ Grice goes back to perception at a later stage,
reminiscing on his joint endeavours with akin Warnock, Ps karulise elatically,
potching and cotching obbles, Pirotese, Pirotese, creature construction,
philosophical psychology. Grice was fascinated by Carnaps Ps which
karulise elatically. Grice adds potching for something like perceiving and
cotching for something like cognising. With his essay Some remarks about
the senses, Grice introduces the question by which criterion we
distinguish our five senses into the contemporary philosophy of perception. The
literature concerning this question is not very numerous but the discussion is
still alive and was lately inspired by the volume The Senses2. There are four
acknowledged possible answers to the question how we distinguish the senses,
all of them already stated by Grice. First, the senses are distinguished by the
properties we perceive by them. Second, the senses are distinguished by the
phenomenal qualities of the perception itself or as Grice puts it “by the
special introspectible character of the experiences” Third, the senses are
distinguished by the physical stimuli that are responsible for the relevant
perceptions. Fourth, The senses are distinguished by the sense-organs that are
(causally) involved in the production of the relevant perceptions. Most
contributions discussing this issue reject the third and fourth answers in a
very short argumentation. Nearly all philosophers writing on the topic vote
either for the first or the second answer. Accordingly, most part of the debate
regarding the initial question takes the form of a dispute between these two
positions. Or” was a big thing in Oxford philosophy. The only known
published work of Wood, our philosophy tutor at Christ Church, was an essay in
Mind, the philosophers journal, entitled “Alternative Uses of “Or” ”, a work
which was every bit as indeterminate as its title. Several years later he
published another paper, this time for the Aristotelian Society, entitled On
being forced to a conclusion. Cf. Grice and Wood on the demands of
conversational reason. Wood, The force of linguistic rules. Wood, on the implicaturum
of or in review in Mind of Connor, Logic. The five senses, as Urmson notes, are
to see that the sun is shining, to hear that the car collided, to feel that her
pulse is beating, to smell that something has been smoking and to taste that.
An interesting piece in that it was commissioned by Butler, who knew Grice from
his Oxford days. Grice cites Wood and Albritton. Grice is concerned with a
special topic in the philosophy of perception, notably the identification of
the traditional five senses: vision, audition, taste, smell, and tact. He
introduces what is regarded in the philosophical literature as the first
thought-experiment, in terms of the senses that Martians may have. They have
two pairs of eyes: are we going to allow that they see with both pairs? Grice
introduces a sub-division of seeing: a Martian x-s an object with his upper
pair of eyes, but he y-s an object with the lower pair of eyes. In his
exploration, he takes a realist stance, which respects the ordinary discursive
ways to approach issues of perception. A second interesting point is that in
allowing this to be repr. in Butlers Analytic philosophy, Grice is
demonstrating that analytic philosophers should NOT be obsessed with ordinary
language. Butlers compilation, a rather dry one, is meant as a response to the
more linguistic oriented ones by Flew (Grices first tutee at St. Johns, as it
happens), also published by Blackwell, and containing pieces by Austin, and
company. One philosopher who took Grice very seriously on this was Coady, in
his The senses of the Martians. Grice provides a serious objection to his own
essay in Retrospective epilogue We see with our eyes. I.e. eye is
teleologically defined. He notes that his way of distinguishing the senses is
hardly an established thesis. Grice actually advances this topic in his earlier
Causal theory. Grice sees nothing absurd in the idea that a non-specialist
concept should contain, so to speak, a blank space to be filled in by the
specialist; that this is so, e.g., in the case of the concept of seeing is
perhaps indicated by the consideration that if we were in doubt about the
correctness of speaking of a certain creature with peculiar sense-organs as
seeing objects, we might well wish to hear from a specialist a comparative
account of the human eye and the relevant sense-organs of the creature in
question. He returns to the point in Retrospective epilogue with a bit of
doxastic humility, We see with our eyes is analytic ‒ but
philosophers should take that more seriously. Grice tested the playmates
of his children, aged 7 and 9, with Nothing can be green and red all
over. Instead, Morley Bunker preferred
philosophy undergrads. Aint that boring? To give examples:
Summer follows Spring was judged analytic by Morley-Bunkers informants, as
cited by Sampson, in Making sense (Clarendon) by highly significant majorities
in each group of Subjectss, while We see with our eyes was given near-even
split votes by each group. Over all, the philosophers were somewhat more
consistent with each other than the non-philosophers. But that global finding
conceals results for individual sentences that sometimes manifested the
opposed tendency. Thus, Thunderstorms are electrical disturbances in the
atmosphere is judged analytic by a highly significant majority of the
non-philosophers, while a non-significant majority of the philosophers deemed
it non-analytic or synthetic. In this case, it seems, philosophical training,
surely not brain-washing, induces the realisation that well-established results
of contemporary science are not necessary truths. In other cases, conversely,
cliches of current philosophical education impose their own mental blinkers on
those who undergo it: Nothing can be completely red and green all over is
judged analytic by a significant majority of philosophers but only by a
non-significant majority of non-philosophers. All in all, the results argue
strongly against the notion that our inability to decide consistently whether
or not some statement is a necessary truth derives from lack of skill in
articulating our underlying knowledge of the rules of our language. Rather, the
inability comes from the fact that the question as posed is unreal. We choose
to treat a given statement as open to question or as unchallengeable in the
light of the overall structure of beliefs which we have individually
evolved in order to make sense of our individual experience. Even the cases
which seem clearly analytic or synthetic are cases which individuals judge
alike because the relevant experiences are shared by the whole community, but
even for such cases one can invent hypothetical or suppositional future
experiences which, if they should be realised, would cause us to revise our
judgements. This is not intended to call into question the special status of
the truths of logic, such as either Either it is raining or it is not. He
is of course inclined to accept the traditional view according to which logical
particles such as not and or are distinct from the bulk of the vocabulary in
that the former really are governed by clear-cut inference rules. Grice
does expand on the point. Refs.: Under sense-datum, there are groups of essays.
The obvious ones are the two essays on the philosophy of perception in WOW. A
second group relates to his research with G. J. Warnock, where the keywords are
‘vision,’ ‘taste,’ and ‘perception,’ in general. There is a more recent group
with this research with R. Warner. ‘Visum’ and ‘visa’ are good keywords, and
cf. the use of ‘senses’ in “Some remarks about the senses,” in BANC.Philo: Grice’s
favourite philosopher, after Ariskant. The [Greek: protos logos anapodeiktos]
of the Stoic logic ran thus [Greek: ei hemera esti, phos estin ... alla men
hemera estin phos ara estin] (Sext. _P.H._ II. 157, and other passages qu.
Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and isnot so utterly tautological as Cic.'s translation, which
merges [Greek: phos] and [Greek: hemera] into one word, or that of Zeller (114,
note). Si
dies est lucet: a better trans of
Greek: ei phos estin, hemera estin] than was given in 96, where see n. _Aliter
Philoni_: not Philo of Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus the
Megarian, mentioned also in 75. The dispute between Diodorus and Philo is
mentioned in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 115--117 with the same purpose as here, see
also Zeller 39. Conexi = Gr. “synemmenon,” cf. Zeller 109. This was the proper
term for the hypothetical judgment. _Superius_: the Greek: synemmenon consists
of two parts, the hypothetical part and the affirmative--called in Greek
[Greek: hegoumenon] and [Greek: legon]; if one is admitted the other follows of
course.Philo's criterion for the truth of “if p, q” is truth-functional. Philo’s
truth-functional criterion is generally accepted as a minimal condition.Philo
maintains that “If Smith is in London, he, viz. Smith, is attending the meeting
there, viz. in London” is true (i) when the antecedens (“Smith is in London”)
is true and the consequens (“Smith is in London at a meeting”) is true (row 1)
and (ii) when the antecedent is false (rows 3 and 4); false only when the antecedens
(“Smith is in London”) is true and the consequens (“Smith is in London, at a
meeting”) is false. (Sext. Emp., A.
M., 2.113-114). Philo’s “if p, q” is what Whitehead and Russell call,
misleadingly, ‘material’ implication, for it’s neither an implication, nor
materia.In “The Influence of Grice on Philo,” Shropshire puts forward the
thesis that Philo was aware of Griceian ideas on relative identity,
particularly time-relative identity. Accordingly, Philo uses subscript for temporal
indexes. Once famous discussion took place one long winter night.“If it is day,
it is night.”“False!” Diodorus screamed.“True,” his tutee Philo courteously
responded. “But true at night only.”Philo's suggestion is remarkable – although
not that remarkable if we assume he read the now lost Griceian tract.Philo’s
“if,” like Grice’s “if,” – on a bad day -- deviates noticeably from what Austin
(and indeed, Austen) used to refer to as ‘ordinary’ language.As Philo rotundly
says: “The Griceian ‘if’ requires abstraction on the basis of a concept of
truth-functionality – and not all tutees will succeed in GETTING that.” The
hint was on Strawson.Philo's ‘if’ has been criticised on two counts. First, as with
Whitehead’s and Russell’s equally odd ‘if,’ – which they symbolise with an
‘inverted’ C, to irritate Johnson, -- “They think ‘c’ stands for either
‘consequentia’ or ‘contentum’ -- in the case of material implication, for the
truth of the conditional no connection (or better, Kant’s relation) of content
between antecedent and consequent is required. Uttered or emitted during the
day, e. g. ‘If virtue benefits, it is
day’ is Philonianly true. This introduces a variant of the so-called
‘paradoxes’ of material implication (Relevance
Logic, Conditionals 2.3;
also, English Oxonian philosopher Lemmon 59-60, 82). This or that ancient
philosopher was aware of what he thought was a ‘problem’ for Philo’s ‘if.’
Vide: SE, ibid. 113-117). On
a second count, due to the time-dependency or relativity of the ‘Hellenistic’ ‘proposition,’
Philo's truth-functional criterion implies that ‘if p, q’ changes its truth-value
over time, which amuses Grice, but makes Strawson sick. In Philo’s infamous
metalinguistic disquotational version that Grice finds genial:‘If it is day, it
is night’ is true if it is night, but false if it is day. This is
counter-intuitive in Strawson’s “London,” urban, idiolect (Grice is from the
Heart of England) as regards an utterance in ‘ordinary-language’ involving
‘if.’“We are not THAT otiose at busy London!On a third count, as the concept of
“if” (‘doubt’ in Frisian) also meant to provide for consequentia between from a
premise to a conclusio, this leads to the “rather” problematic result –
Aquinas, S. T. ix. 34) that an ‘argumentum,’ as Boethius calls it, can in
principle change from being valid to being invalid and vice versa, which did
not please the Saint Thomas (Aquinas), “or God, matter of fact.”From Sextus: A.
M., 2.113ffA non-simple proposition is such composed of a duplicated
proposition or of this or that differing proposition. A complex proposition is
controlled by this or that conjunction. 109. Of
these let us take the hypo-thetical proposition, so-called. This, then, is
composed of a duplicated proposition or of differing propositions, by means of
the conjunction “if” (Gr. ‘ei,’ L. ‘si’, German ‘ob’). Thus, e. g. from a
duplicated proposition and the conjunction “if” (Gr. ‘ei,’ L. ‘si,’ G.
‘ob’) there is composed such a hypothetical proposition as this. “If it is day,
it is day’ (110) and from differing
propositions, and by means of the conjunction “if” , one in this
form, “If it is day, it is light.” “Si dies est, lucet.” And of the two propositions
contained in the hypo-thetical proposition, or subordinating clause that which
is placed immediately AFTER the conjunction or subordinating particle “if”
is called “ante-cedent,” or “first;” and ‘if’ being ‘noncommutative,’ and
the other one “consequent” or “second,” EVEN if the whole proposition
is reversed IN ORDER OF EXPRESSION – this is a conceptual issue, not a
grammatical one! -- as thus — “It is light, if it is day.” For in this,
too, the proposition, “It is light,” (lucet) is called consequent although
it is UTTERED first, and ‘It is day’ antecedent, although it is UTTERED second,
owing to the fact that it is placed after the conjunction or subordinating
particle “if.” 111. Such
then is the construction of the hypothetical proposition, and a proposition of
this kind seems to “promise” (or suggest, or implicate) that the ‘consequent’
(or super-ordinated or main proposition) logically follows the ‘antecedens,’ or
sub-ordinated proposition. If the antecedens is true, the consequens is true.
Hence, if this sort of “promise,” suggestio, implicaturum, or what have you, is
fulfilled and the consequens follows the antecedent, the hypothetical
proposition is true. If the promise is not fulfilled, it is false (This is
something Strawson grants as a complication in the sentence exactly after the
passage that Grice extracts – Let’s revise Strawson’s exact wording. Strawson
writes:“There is much more to be noted about ‘if.’ In particular, about whether
the antecedens has to be a ‘GOOD’ antecedens, i. e. a ‘good’ ground – not
inadmissible evidence, say -- or good reason for accepting the consequens, and
whether THIS is a necessary condition for the whole ‘if’ utterance to be TRUE.’
Surely not for Philo. Philo’s criterion is that an ‘if’ utterance is true iff it
is NOT the case that the antecedens is true and it is not the case that the
consequens is true. 112. Accordingly,
let us begin at once with this problem, and consider whether any hypothetical
proposition can be found which is true and which fulfills the promise or
suggestio or implicaturum described. Now all philosophers agree that a hypothetical
proposition is true when the consequent follows the antecedent. As to when the
consequens follows from the antecedens philosophers such as Grice and his tutee
Strawson disagree with one another and propound conflicting criteria. 113. Philo and Grice
declares that the ‘if’ utterance is true whenever it is not the case that
the antecedens (“Smith is in London”) is true and it is not the case that the
consequens (“Smith is in London attending a meeting”) is true. So that, according
to Grice and Philo (vide, “The influence of Grice on Philo”), the hypothetical
is true in three ways or rows (row 1, row 3, and row 4) and false in one way or
row (second row, antecedens T and consequence F). For the first row, whenever
the ‘if’ utterance begins with truth and ends in truth it is true. E. g. “If it
is day, it is light.” “Si dies est, lux est.”For row 4: the ‘if’ utterance is
also true whenever the antecedens is false and the consequens is false. E. g. “If
the earth flies, the earth has wings.” ει πέταται ή γή, πτέρυγας έχει ή γή (“ei petatai he ge, pteguras ekhei he ge”) (Si terra volat,
habet alas.”)114. Likewise also that
which begins with what is false and ends with what is true is true, as thus
— If the earth flies, the earth exists. “Si terra volat, est terra”. dialecticis, in
quibus ſubtilitatem nimiam laudando, niſi fallimur, tradu xit Callimachus. 2
Cujus I. ſpecimen nobis fervavit se XTVS EMPI . RIC V S , a qui de Diodori,
Philonis & Chryſippi diſſenſu circa propofi tiones connexas prolixe
diſſerit. Id quod paucis ita comprehendit ci . CERO : 6 In hoc ipfo , quod in
elementis dialectici docent, quomodo judi care oporteat, verum falſumne fit ,
fi quid ita connexum eſt , ut hoc: fi dies eft, lucet, quanta contentio eft,
aliter Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chry fappo aliter placet. Quæ ut clarius
intelligantur, obſervandum eſt, Dia lecticos in propofitionum conditionatarum ,
quas connexas vocabant, explicatione in eo convenisse, verum esse consequens,
si id vera consequentia deducatur ex antecedente; falsum, si non ſequatur; in
criterio vero , ex quo dijudicanda est consequentiæ veritas, definiendo inter
se diſſenſiſſe. Et Philo quidem veram esse propoſitionem connexam putabat, fi
& antecedens & consequens verum esset , & ſi antecedens atque
conſequens falsum eſſet, & fi a falſo incipiens in verum defineret, cujus
primi exemplum eſt : “Si dies est, lux est,” secondi. “Si terra volat, habet
alas.” Tertii. “Si terra volat, est terra.” Solum vero falsum , quando incipiens
a vero defineret in falſum . Diodorus autem hoc falſum interdum eſſe, quod
contingere pof ſet, afferens, omne quod contigit , ex confequentiæ complexu
removit , ficque, quod juxta Philonem verum eft, fi dies eſt, ego diſſero,
falſum eſſe pronunciavit, quoniam contingere poffit, ut quis, ſi dies fit, non
differat, ſed fileat. Ex qua Dialecticorum diſceptatione Sextus infert,
incertum eſſe criterium propoſitionum hypotheticarum . Ex quibus parca , ut de
bet, manu prolatis, judicium fieri poteſt , quam miſeranda facies fuerit shia
lecticæ eriſticæ , quæ ad materiam magis argumentorum , quam ad formam - &
ad verba magis, quam ideas, quæ ratiocinia conſtituunt refpiciens, non potuit
non innumeras ſine modo & ratione technias & difficultates ftruere,
facile fumi inſtar diſſipandas, fi ad ipſam ratiocinandi & ideas inter ſe
con ferendi & ex tertia judicandi formam attendatur. Quod fi enim inter ve
ritate conſequentiæ & confequentis, ( liceat pauliſper cum ſcholaſticis
barbare loqui diſtinxiffent, inanis diſputatio in pulverem abiiffet, & eva
nuiſſet; nam de prima Diodorus, de altera Philo , & hic quidem inepte &
minus accurate loquebatur. Sed hæc ws šv zapóów . Ceterum II. in fo phiſma t)
Coutra Gramm . S.309.Log. I. II.S. 115.Seqq. ) Catalogum Diodororum ſatis longum
exhi # Nominateas CLEM . ALE X. Strom . I. IV . ber FABRIC. Bibl.Gr. vol. II. p
. 775. pag. 522. % ) Cujusverſus vide apud LAERT. & SEXT. * Contra Iovinian
. I. I. conf. MENAG. ad l. c. H . cc. Laërt . & Hiſt. phil. mal. Ø . 60 .
ubi tamen quatuor A ) Adv. Logic. I. c . noininat, cum quinque fuerint. b )
Acad. 29. I. IV . 6. 47. DE SECTAM E GARICA phiſinatibus ftruendis Diodorum
excelluiffe, non id folum argumentum eft, nuod is quibusdam auctor argumenti,
quod velatum dicitur , fuifle aflera tur, fed & quod argumentum dominans
invexerit, de quo, ne his nugis lectori moleſti fimus, Epictetum apud ARRIANVM
conſuli velimus. Er ad hæc quoque Dialecticæ peritiæ acumina referendum eſt
argumentum , quo nihilmoveri probabat. Quod ita sexTvs enarrat: Si quid move
tur, aut in eo , in quo eft , loco movetur, aut in eo , in quo non eſt. At
neque in quo eſt movetur, manet enim in eo , fi in eo eft ; nec vero , in quo
non eſt,movetur; ubi enim aliquid non eſt, ibi neque agere quidquam ne que pati
poteft. Non ergo movetur quicquam . Quo argumento non ideo ufus eſt Diodorus,
quod putat Sextus, ut more Eleaticorum probaret : non darimotum in rerum
natura, & nec interire quicquam nec oriri ; fed ut ſubtilitatem ingenii
dialecticam oftenderet, verbisque circumveniret. Qua ratione Diodorum mire
depexum dedit Herophilusmedicus. Cum enim luxato humero ad eum veniffet
Diodorus, ut ipſum curaret , facete eum irriſit, eodem argumento probando
humerum non excidiffe : adeo ut precaretur fophifta , omiffis iis
cavillationibus adhiberet ei congruens ex artemedica remedium . f . . Tandem
& III . inter atomiſticæ p hiloſophiæ ſectatores numerari folet Diodorus,
eo quod énocy iso xei dueen CÁMata minima & indiviſibilia cor pora
Itatuerit,numero infinita , magnitudine finita , ut ex veteribus afferunt
præter SEXTVM , & EVSEBIVŠ, \ CHALCIDIVS, ISTOBAEVS k alii , quibus ex
recentioribus concinunt cvDWORTHVS 1 & FABRICIV'S. * Quia vero veteres non
addunt, an indiviſibilia & minima ifta corpuſcula , omnibus qualitatibus
præter figuram & fitum fpoliata poſuerit, fine formi dine oppoſiti inter
ſyſtematis atomiſtici fectatores numerari non poteſt. Nam alii quoque
philoſophi ejusmodi infecabilia corpuſcula admiſerunt ; nec tamen atomos
Democriticos ſtatuerunt. "Id quod acute monuit cel. MOSHEMIV S . n . irAnd it is false only in this one way, when it begins with
truth and ends in what is false, as in a proposition of this kind. “If it is
day, it is night.” “Si dies est, nox est”. (Cf. Cole Porter, “Night and day, day and
night!”.For if it IS day, the clause ‘It is day’ is true, and this is
the antecedent, but the clause ‘It is night,’ which is the consequens, is
false. But when uttered at night, it is true. 115. —
But Diodorus asserts that the hypothetical proposition is true which
neither admitted nor admits of beginning with truth and ending in
falsehood. And this is in conflict with the statement of Philo. For a
hypothetical of this kind — If it is day, I am conversing, when at
the present moment it is day and I am conversing, is true according to Philo
since it begins with the true clause It is day and ends with the
true I am conversing; but according to Diodorus it is false, for it admits
of beginning with a clause that is, at one time, true and ending in the false
clause I am conversing, when I have ceased speaking; also it admitted
of beginning with truth and ending with the falsehood I am
conversing, 116. for before I began to
converse it began with the truth It is day and ended in the
falsehood I am conversing. Again, a proposition in this form
— If it is night, I am conversing, when it is day and I am silent, is
likewise true according to Philo, for it begins with what is false and ends in
what is false; but according to Diodorus it is false, for it admits of
beginning with truth and ending in falsehood, after night has come on, and when
I, again, am not conversing but keeping silence. 117. Moreover,
the proposition If it is night, it is day, when it is day, is true
according to Philo for the reason that it begins with the false It is
night and ends in the true It is day; but according to Diodorus it is
false for the reason that it admits of beginning, when night comes on, with the
truth It is night and ending in the falsehood It is day.Philo is
sometimes called ‘Philo of Megara,’ where ‘of’ is used alla Nancy Mitford, of
Chatworth. Although no essay by Philo is preserved (if he wrote it), there are
a number of reports of his doctrine, not all positive!Some think Philo made a
groundbreaking contribution to the development of semantics (influencing
Peirce, but then Peirce was influenced by the World in its totality), in
particular to the philosophy of “as if” (als ob), or “if.”A conditional (sunêmmenon), as Philo calls it, is a
non-simple, i. e. molecular, non atomic, proposition composed of two propositions,
a main, or better super-ordinated proposition, or consequens, and a
sub-ordinated proposition, the antecedens, and the subordinator ‘if’. Philo
invented (possibly influenced by Frege) what he (Frege, not Philo) calls
truth-functionality.Philo puts forward a criterion of truth as he called what
Witters will have as a ‘truth table’ for ‘if’ (or ‘ob,’ cognate with Frisian
gif, doubt).A conditional is is true in three truth-value combinations, and
false when and only when its antecedent is true and
its consequent is false.The Philonian ‘if’ Whitehead and Russell re-labelled
‘material’ implication – irritating Johnson who published a letter in The
Times, “… and dealing with the paradox of implication.”For Philo, like Grice, a
proposition is a function of time that can have different truth-values at
different times—it may change its truth-value over time. In Philo’s
disquotational formula for ‘if’:“If it is day, ‘if it is day, it is night’ is
false; if it is night, ‘if it is day, it is night’ is true.”(Tarski translated
to Polish, in which language Grice read it).Philo’s ramblings on ‘if’ lead to
foreshadows of Whitehead’s and Russell’s ‘paradox of implication’ that
infuriated Johnson – In Russell’s response in the Times, he makes it plain:
“Johnson shouldn’t be using ‘paradox’ in the singular. Yours, etc. Baron
Russell, Belgravia.”Sextus Empiricus [S. E.] M. 8.109–117, gives a precis of Johnson’s paradox of
implication, without crediting Johnson. Philo and Diodorus each considered the
four modalities possibility, impossibility, necessity and non-necessity. These
were conceived of as modal properties or modal values of propositions, not as
modal operators. Philo defined them as follows: ‘Possible is that which is
capable of being true by the proposition’s own nature … necessary is that which
is true, and which, as far as it is in itself, is not capable of being false.
Non-necessary is that which as far as it is in itself, is capable of being
false, and impossible is that which by its own nature is not capable of being
true.’ Boethius fell in love with Philo, and he SAID it! (In Arist. De Int., sec. ed., 234–235
Meiser).Cf. (Epict. Diss.
II.19). Aristotle’s De
Interpretatione 9 (Aulus
Gellius 11.12.2–3). Grice: “Vision was always held by philosophers to be the
superior sense.” Grice:
“Perception is, strictly, the extraction and use of information about one’s
environment exteroception and one’s own body interoception. “ he various
external senses sight, hearing, touch,
smell, and taste though they overlap to
some extent, are distinguished by the kind of information e.g., about light,
sound, temperature, pressure they deliver. Proprioception, perception of the
self, concerns stimuli arising within, and carrying information about, one’s
own body e.g., acceleration, position,
and orientation of the limbs. There are distinguishable stages in the
extraction and use of sensory information, one an earlier stage corresponding
to our perception of objects and events, the other, a later stage, to the
perception of facts about these objects. We see, e.g., both the cat on the sofa
an object and that the cat is on the sofa a fact. Seeing an object or
event a cat on the sofa, a person on the
street, or a vehicle’s movement does not
require that the object event be identified or recognized in any particular way
perhaps, though this is controversial, in any way whatsoever. One can, e.g.,
see a cat on the sofa and mistake it for a rumpled sweater. Airplane lights are
often misidentified as stars, and one can see the movement of an object either
as the movement of oneself or under some viewing conditions as expansion or
contraction. Seeing objects and events is, in this sense, non-epistemic: one
can see O without knowing or believing that it is O that one is seeing. Seeing
facts, on the other hand, is epistemic; one cannot see that there is a cat on
the sofa without, thereby, coming to know that there is a cat on the sofa.
Seeing a fact is coming to know the fact in some visual way. One can see
objects the fly in one’s soup, e.g., without realizing that there is a fly in
one’s soup thinking, perhaps, it is a bean or a crouton; but to see a fact, the
fact that there is a fly in one’s soup is, necessarily, to know it is a fly.
This distinction applies to the other sense modalities as well. One can hear
the telephone ringing without realizing that it is the telephone perhaps it’s
the TV or the doorbell, but to hear a fact, that it is the telephone that is
ringing, is, of necessity, to know that it is the telephone that is ringing.
The other ways we have of describing what we perceive are primarily variations
on these two fundamental themes. In seeing where he went, when he left, who
went with him, and how he was dressed, e.g., we are describing the perception
of some fact of a certain sort without revealing exactly which fact it is. If
Martha saw where he went, then Martha saw hence, came to know some fact having
to do with where he went, some fact of the form ‘he went there’. In speaking of
states and conditions the condition of his room, her injury, and properties the
color of his tie, the height of the building, we sometimes, as in the case of
objects, mean to be describing a non-epistemic perceptual act, one that carries
no implications for what if anything is known. In other cases, as with facts,
we mean to be describing the acquisition of some piece of knowledge. One can
see or hear a word without recognizing it as a word it might be in a foreign
language, but can one see a misprint and not know it is a misprint? It
obviously depends on what one uses ‘misprint’ to refer to: an object a word
that is misprinted or a fact the fact that it is misprinted. In examining and
evaluating theories whether philosophical or psychological of perception it is
essential to distinguish fact perception from object perception. For a theory
might be a plausible theory about the perception of objects e.g., psychological
theories of “early vision” but not at all plausible about our perception of
facts. Fact perception, involving, as it does, knowledge and, hence, belief
brings into play the entire cognitive system memory, concepts, etc. in a way
the former does not. Perceptual relativity
e.g., the idea that what we perceive is relative to our language, our
conceptual scheme, or the scientific theories we have available to “interpret”
phenomena is quite implausible as a
theory about our perception of objects. A person lacking a word for, say,
kumquats, lacking this concept, lacking a scientific way of classifying these
objects are they a fruit? a vegetable? an animal?, can still see, touch, smell,
and taste kumquats. Perception of objects does not depend on, and is therefore
not relative to, the observer’s linguistic, conceptual, cognitive, and
scientific assets or shortcomings. Fact perception, however, is another matter.
Clearly one cannot see that there are kumquats in the basket as opposed to
seeing the objects, the kumquats, in the basket if one has no idea of, no
concept of, what a kumquat is. Seeing facts is much more sensitive and, hence,
relative to the conceptual resources, the background knowledge and scientific
theories, of the observer, and this difference must be kept in mind in
evaluating claims about perceptual relativity. Though it does not make objects
invisible, ignorance does tend to make facts perceptually inaccessible. There
are characteristic experiences associated with the different senses. Tasting a
kumquat is not at all like seeing a kumquat although the same object is
perceived indeed, the same fact that it
is a kumquat may be perceived. The
difference, of course, is in the subjective experience one has in perceiving
the kumquat. A causal theory of perception of objects holds that the perceptual
object, what it is we see, taste, smell, or whatever, is that object that
causes us to have this subjective experience. Perceiving an object is that
object’s causing in the right way one to have an experience of the appropriate
sort. I see a bean in my soup if it is, in fact whether I know it or not is
irrelevant, a bean in my soup that is causing me to have this visual
experience. I taste a bean if, in point of fact, it is a bean that is causing
me to have the kind of taste experience I am now having. If it is unknown to me
a bug, not a bean, that is causing these experiences, then I am unwittingly
seeing and tasting a bug perhaps a bug
that looks and tastes like a bean. What object we see taste, smell, etc. is
determined by the causal facts in question. What we know and believe, how we
interpret the experience, is irrelevant, although it will, of course, determine
what we say we see and taste. The same is to be said, with appropriate changes,
for our perception of facts the most significant change being the replacement
of belief for experience. I see that there is a bug in my soup if the fact that
there is a bug in my soup causes me to perception perception 655 655 believe that there is a bug in my soup.
I can taste that there is a bug in my soup when this fact causes me to have
this belief via some taste sensation. A causal theory of perception is more
than the claim that the physical objects we perceive cause us to have
experiences and beliefs. This much is fairly obvious. It is the claim that this
causal relation is constitutive of perception, that necessarily, if S sees O,
then O causes a certain sort of experience in S. It is, according to this
theory, impossible, on conceptual grounds, to perceive something with which one
has no causal contact. If, e.g., future events do not cause present events, if
there is no backward causation, then we cannot perceive future events and
objects. Whether or not future facts can be perceived or known depends on how
liberally the causal condition on knowledge is interpreted. Though conceding
that there is a world of mind-independent objects trees, stars, people that
cause us to have experiences, some philosophers
traditionally called representative realists argue that we nonetheless do not directly
perceive these external objects. What we directly perceive are the effects
these objects have on us an internal
image, idea, or impression, a more or less depending on conditions of
observation accurate representation of the external reality that helps produce
it. This subjective, directly apprehended object has been called by various
names: a sensation, percept, sensedatum, sensum, and sometimes, to emphasize
its representational aspect, Vorstellung G., ‘representation’. Just as the
images appearing on a television screen represent their remote causes the
events occurring at some distant concert hall or playing field, the images
visual, auditory, etc. that occur in the mind, the sensedata of which we are
directly aware in normal perception, represent or sometimes, when things are
not working right, misrepresent their external physical causes. The representative
realist typically invokes arguments from illusion, facts about hallucination,
and temporal considerations to support his view. Hallucinations are supposed to
illustrate the way we can have the same kind of experience we have when as we
commonly say we see a real bug without there being a real bug in our soup or
anywhere else causing us to have the experience. When we hallucinate, the bug
we “see” is, in fact, a figment of our own imagination, an image i.e.,
sense-datum in the mind that, because it shares some of the properties of a
real bug shape, color, etc., we might mistake for a real bug. Since the
subjective experiences can be indistinguishable from that which we have when as
we commonly say we really see a bug, it is reasonable to infer the representative
realist argues that in normal perception, when we take ourselves to be seeing a
real bug, we are also directly aware of a buglike image in the mind. A
hallucination differs from a normal perception, not in what we are aware of in
both cases it is a sense-datum but in the cause of these experiences. In normal
perception it is an actual bug; in hallucination it is, say, drugs in the
bloodstream. In both cases, though, we are caused to have the same thing: an
awareness of a buglike sense-datum, an object that, in normal perception, we
naively take to be a real bug thus saying, and encouraging our children to say,
that we see a bug. The argument from illusion points to the fact that our
experience of an object changes even when the object that we perceive or say we
perceive remains unchanged. Though the physical object the bug or whatever
remains the same color, size, and shape, what we experience according to this
argument changes color, shape, and size as we change the lighting, our viewing
angle, and distance. Hence, it is concluded, what we experience cannot really
be the physical object itself. Since it varies with changes in both object and
viewing conditions, what we experience must be a causal result, an effect, of
both the object we commonly say we see the bug and the conditions in which we
view it. This internal effect, it is concluded, is a sense-datum.
Representative realists have also appealed to the fact that perceiving a
physical object is a causal process that takes time. This temporal lag is most
dramatic in the case of distant objects e.g., stars, but it exists for every
physical object it takes time for a neural signal to be transmitted from
receptor surfaces to the brain. Consequently, at the moment a short time after
light leaves the object’s surface we see a physical object, the object could no
longer exist. It could have ceased to exist during the time light was being
transmitted to the eye or during the time it takes the eye to communicate with
the brain. Yet, even if the object ceases to exist before we become aware of
anything before a visual experience occurs, we are, or so it seems, aware of
something when the causal process reaches its climax in the brain. This
something of which we are aware, since it cannot be the physical object it no
longer exists, must be a sense-datum. The representationalist concludes in this
“time-lag argument,” therefore, that even when the physperception perception
656 656 ical object does not cease to
exist this, of course, is the normal situation, we are directly aware, not of
it, but of its slightly later-occurring representation. Representative realists
differ among themselves about the question of how much if at all the sense-data
of which we are aware resemble the external objects of which we are not aware.
Some take the external cause to have some of the properties the so-called
primary properties of the datum e.g., extension and not others the so-called
secondary properties e.g., color. Direct
or naive realism shares with representative realism a commitment to a world of
independently existing objects. Both theories are forms of perceptual realism.
It differs, however, in its view of how we are related to these objects in
ordinary perception. Direct realists deny that we are aware of mental intermediaries
sensedata when, as we ordinarily say, we see a tree or hear the telephone ring.
Though direct realists differ in their degree of naïveté about how and in what
respect perception is supposed to be direct, they need not be so naive as
sometimes depicted as to deny the scientific facts about the causal processes
underlying perception. Direct realists can easily admit, e.g., that physical
objects cause us to have experiences of a particular kind, and that these
experiences are private, subjective, or mental. They can even admit that it is
this causal relationship between object and experience that constitutes our
seeing and hearing physical objects. They need not, in other words, deny a
causal theory of perception. What they must deny, if they are to remain direct
realists, however, is an analysis of the subjective experience that objects
cause us to have into an awareness of some object. For to understand this
experience as an awareness of some object is, given the wholly subjective
mental character of the experience itself, to interpose a mental entity what
the experience is an awareness of between the perceiver and the physical object
that causes him to have this experience, the physical object that is supposed
to be directly perceived. Direct realists, therefore, avoid analyzing a
perceptual experience into an act sensing, being aware of, being acquainted
with and an object the sensum, sense-datum, sensation, mental representation.
The experience we are caused to have when we perceive a physical object or
event is, instead, to be understood in some other way. The adverbial theory is
one such possibility. As the name suggests, this theory takes its cue from the
way nouns and adjectives can sometimes be converted into adverbs without loss
of descriptive content. So, for instance, it comes to pretty much the same
thing whether we describe a conversation as animated adjective or say that we
conversed animatedly an adverb. So, also, according to an adverbialist, when,
as we commonly say, we see a red ball, the red ball causes in us a moment later
an experience, yes, but not as the representative realist says an awareness
mental act of a sense-datum mental object that is red and circular adjectives.
The experience is better understood as one in which there is no object at all,
as sensing redly and circularly adverbs. The adverbial theorist insists that
one can experience circularly and redly without there being, in the mind or
anywhere else, red circles this, in fact, is what the adverbialist thinks
occurs in dreams and hallucinations of red circles. To experience redly is not
to have a red experience; nor is it to experience redness in the mind. It is,
says the adverbialist, a way or a manner of perceiving ordinary objects
especially red ones seen in normal light. Just as dancing gracefully is not a
thing we dance, so perceiving redly is not a thing and certainly not a red thing in the
mind that we experience. The adverbial
theory is only one option the direct realist has of acknowledging the causal
basis of perception while, at the same time, maintaining the directness of our
perceptual relation with independently existing objects. What is important is
not that the experience be construed adverbially, but that it not be
interpreted, as representative realists interpret it, as awareness of some
internal object. For a direct realist, the appearances, though they are
subjective mind-dependent are not objects that interpose themselves between the
conscious mind and the external world. As classically understood, both naive
and representative realism are theories about object perception. They differ
about whether it is the external object or an internal object an idea in the
mind that we most directly apprehend in ordinary sense perception. But they
need not although they usually do differ in their analysis of our knowledge of
the world around us, in their account of fact perception. A direct realist
about object perception may, e.g., be an indirect realist about the facts that
we know about these objects. To see, not only a red ball in front of one, but
that there is a red ball in front of one, it may be necessary, even on a direct
theory of object perception, to infer or in some way derive this fact from
facts that are known more directly perception perception about one’s
experiences of the ball. Since, e.g., a direct theorist may be a causal
theorist, may think that seeing a red ball is in part constituted by the having
of certain sorts of experience, she may insist that knowledge of the cause of
these experiences must be derived from knowledge of the experience itself. If
one is an adverbialist, e.g., one might insist that knowledge of physical
objects is derived from knowledge of how redly? bluely? circularly? squarely?
one experiences these objects. By the same token, a representative realist
could adopt a direct theory of fact perception. Though the objects we directly
see are mental, the facts we come to know by experiencing these subjective
entities are facts about ordinary physical objects. We do not infer at least at
no conscious level that there is a bug in our soup from facts known more
directly about our own conscious experiences from facts about the sensations
the bug causes in us. Rather, our sensations cause us, directly, to have
beliefs about our soup. There is no intermediate belief; hence, there is no
intermediate knowledge; hence, no intermediate fact perception. Fact perception
is, in this sense, direct. Or so a representative realist can maintain even
though committed to the indirect perception of the objects bug and soup
involved in this fact. This merely illustrates, once again, the necessity of
distinguishing object perception from fact perception. Refs.: H. P. Grice and
A. R. White, “The causal theory of perception,” a symposium for the
Aristotelian Socieety, in G. J. Warnock, “The philosophy of perception,” Oxford
readings in philosophy.
Percival: English physician and author of
Medical Ethics. He was central in bringing the Western traditions of medical
ethics from prayers and oaths e.g., the Hippocratic oath toward more detailed,
modern codes of proper professional conduct. His writing on the normative
aspects of medical practice was part ethics, part prudential advice, part
professional etiquette, and part jurisprudence. Medical Ethics treated standards
for the professional conduct of physicians relative to surgeons and
apothecaries pharmacists and general practitioners, as well as hospitals,
private practice, and the law. The issues Percival addressed include privacy,
truth telling, rules for professional consultation, human experimentation,
public and private trust, compassion, sanity, suicide, abortion, capital
punishment, and environmental nuisances. Percival had his greatest influence in
England and America. At its founding in 1847, the Medical Association used Medical Ethics to
guide its own first code of medical ethics.
perdurance, endurance, continuance -- in one common philosophical use, the property
of being temporally continuous and having temporal parts. There are at least
two conflicting theories about temporally continuous substances. According to
the first, temporally continuous substances have temporal parts they perdure,
while according to the second, they do not. In one ordinary philosophical use,
endurance is the property of being temporally continuous and not having
temporal parts. There are modal versions of the aforementioned two theories:
for example, one version of the first theory is that necessarily, temporally
continuous substances have temporal parts, while another version implies that
possibly, they do not. Some versions of the first theory hold that a temporally
continuous substance is composed of instantaneous temporal parts or
“object-stages,” while on other versions these object-stages are not parts but
boundaries.
perfect competition: perfect co-operation:
the state of an ideal market under the following conditions: a every consumer
in the market is a perfectly rational maximizer of utility; every producer is a
perfect maximizer of profit; there is a very large ideally infinite number of
producers of the good in question, which ensures that no producer can set the
price for its output otherwise, an imperfect competitive state of oligopoly or
monopoly obtains; and every producer provides a product perfectly indistinguishable
from that of other producers if consumers could distinguish products to the
point that there was no longer a very large number of producers for each
distinguishable good, competition would again be imperfect. Under these
conditions, the market price is equal to the marginal cost of producing the
last unit. This in turn determines the market supply of the good, since each
producer will gain by increasing production when price exceeds marginal cost
and will generally cut losses by decreasing production when marginal cost
exceeds price. Perfect competition is sometimes thought to have normative
implications for political philosophy, since it results in Pareto optimality.
The concept of perfect competition becomes extremely complicated when a
market’s evolution is considered. Producers who cannot equate marginal cost
with the market price will have negative profit and must drop out of the
market. If this happens very often, then the number of producers will no longer
be large enough to sustain perfect competition, so new producers will need to
enter the market.
perfectus – finitum – complete -- perfectionism,
an ethical view according to which individuals and their actions are judged by
a maximal standard of achievement
specifically, the degree to which they approach ideals of aesthetic,
intellectual, emotional, or physical “perfection.” Perfectionism, then, may
depart from, or even dispense with, standards of conventional morality in favor
of standards based on what appear to be non-moral values. These standards
reflect an admiration for certain very rare levels of human achievement.
Perhaps the most characteristic of these standards are artistic and other forms
of creativity; but they prominently include a variety of other activities and
emotional states deemed “noble” e.g.,
heroic endurance in the face of great suffering. The perfectionist, then, would
also tend toward a rather non-egalitarian
even aristocratic view of
humankind. The rare genius, the inspired few, the suffering but courageous artist these examples of human perfection are
genuinely worthy of our estimation, according to this view. Although no fully
worked-out system of “perfectionist philosophy” has been attempted, aspects of
all of these doctrines may be found in such philosophers as Nietzsche.
Aristotle, as well, appears to endorse a perfectionist idea in his
characterization of the human good. Just as the good lyre player not only
exhibits the characteristic activities of this profession but achieves
standards of excellence with respect to these, the good human being, for
Aristotle, must achieve standards of excellence with respect to the virtue or
virtues distinctive of human life in general.
peripatos at the lycaeum – Grice: “This is
a common word, and while it does mean that, being a covered pathway, you are
meant to walk about, it did not apply as per my type of identificatory
reference, to Aristotle. It was that bit of the gym created by Pericle and
iproved by Lycurgus in the ‘middle of nowhere’ mount of Licabetto. Aristotle
may have chosen the site because Socrate, his tutor’s tutor, used to walk all
the way form downtown to corrupt the athletes!” -- peripatetic – lycaeum -- School,
also called Peripatos, the philosophical playgroup founded by Aristotle at the
Lycaeum gymnasium in Athens. The derivation of ‘Peripatetic’ from the alleged
Aristotelian custom of “walking about, “peripatein,” is, while colourful,
wrong. ‘Peripatos’ is in Griceian a “covered walking hall” – which is among the
facilities, “as the excavations show,” as Grice notes. A scholarch or head-master
presided over roughly two classes of members. One is the “presbyteroi” or
seniors, who have this or that teaching dutu, and the “neaniskoi” or juniors. Grice:
“When Austin instituted the playgroup he saw himself as *the* presbyteros,
while I, like the others, was a ‘neaniskos.”” No females were allowed, to avoid
disruption. During Aristotle’s lifetime his own lectures, whether for the inner
circle of the school (what Aristotle calls ‘the gown’) or for Athens (‘the
town’) at large, are probably the key attraction and core activity. Given
Aristotle’s celebrated knack for organizing group research projects, we may
assume that Peripatetics spent much of their time working on their own specific
assignments either at the swimming-pool library, or at some kind of repository
for specimens used in zoological and botanical investigations. As a foreigner,
Aristotle cannot possibly own any property in Athens. When he left Athens (pretty much as when Austin died) Theophrastus
of Eresus (pretty much like Grice did) succeeded him as scholarch. Theophrastus
is s an able Aristotelian (whereas Grice started to criticise Austin) who wrote
extensively on metaphysics, psychology, physiology, botany, ethics, politics,
and the history of philosophy. With the help of the Peripatetic dictator
Demetrius of Phaleron, Theophrastus was able to secure property rights over the
physical facilities of the school. Under Theophrastus, the Peripatos continued
to flourish and is said to have had 2,000 students. Theophrastus’s successor,
Strato of Lampsakos, has much narrower interests and abandoned key Aristotelian
tenets (such as the syllogism – “I won’t force Aristotle to teach me how to
reason with a middle term in the middle!” – Diog. Laert. v. 673b-c. With
Strato, a progressive decline set in, to which the moving of Aristotle’s swimming-pool
library out of Athens (minus the swimming-pool) by Neleus of Skepsis, certainly
contributed. By the first century B.C. the Peripatos had ceased to exist. “Philosophers
of later periods sympathetic to Aristotle’s views have also been called
Peripatetics; I fact, *I* have, by A. D. Code, of all people!” – Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “How to become a Peripatetic – and not die in the attempt.”
Perone: important Italian
philosopher – Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Perone," per il Club
Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
idem: Grice: “A very,
untranslatable Roman notion – no translation – but cf. ‘ipse,’ ‘same,’ self’,
and ‘sameself,’ and Peano’s = may do.” personal identity: explored by H. P.
Grice in “Personal Identity,” Mind – and H. P. Grice, “The logical construction
theory of personal identity,” and “David Hume on the vagaries of personal
identity.” -- the numerical identity over time of persons. The question of what
personal identity consists in is the question of what it is what the necessary
and sufficient conditions are for a person existing at one time and a person
existing at another time to be one and the same person. Here there is no
question of there being any entity that is the “identity” of a person; to say
that a person’s identity consists in such and such is just shorthand for saying
that facts about personal identity, i.e., facts to the effect that someone
existing at one time is the same as someone existing at another time, consist
in such and such. This should not be confused with the usage, common in
ordinary speech and in psychology, in which persons are said to have identities,
and, sometimes, to seek, lose, or regain their identities, where one’s
“identity” intimately involves a set of values and goals that structure one’s
life. The words ‘identical’ and ‘same’ mean nothing different in judgments
about persons than in judgments about other things. The problem of personal
identity is therefore not one of defining a special sense of ‘identical,’ and
it is at least misleading to characterize it as defining a particular kind of
identity. Applying Quine’s slogan “no entity without identity,” one might say
that characterizing any sort of entity involves indicating what the identity
conditions for entities of that sort are so, e.g., part of the explanation of
the concept of a set is that sets having the same members are identical, and
that asking what the identity of persons consists in is just a way of asking
what sorts of things persons are. But the main focus in traditional discussions
of the topic has been on one kind of identity judgment about persons, namely
those asserting “identity over time”; the question has been about what the
persistence of persons over time consists in. What has made the identity
persistence of persons of special philosophical interest is partly its
epistemology and partly its connections with moral and evaluative matters. The
crucial epistemological fact is that persons have, in memory, an access to
their own past histories that is unlike the access they have to the histories
of other things including other persons; when one remembers doing or experiencing
something, one normally has no need to employ any criterion of identity in
order to know that the subject of the remembered action or experience is i.e.,
is identical with oneself. The moral and evaluative matters include moral
responsibility someone can be held responsible for a past action only if he or
she is identical to the person who did it and our concern for our own survival
and future well-being since it seems, although this has been questioned, that
what one wants in wanting to survive is that there should exist in the future
someone who is identical to oneself. The modern history of the topic of
personal identity begins with Locke, who held that the identity of a person
consists neither in the identity of an immaterial substance as dualists might
be expected to hold nor in the identity of a material substance or “animal
body” as materialists might be expected to hold, and that it consists instead
in “same consciousness.” His view appears to have been that the persistence of
a person through time consists in the fact that certain actions, thoughts,
experiences, etc., occurring at different times, are somehow united in memory.
Modern theories descended from Locke’s take memory continuity to be a special
case of something more general, psychological continuity, and hold that
personal identity consists in this. This is sometimes put in terms of the
notion of a “person-stage,” i.e., a momentary “time slice” of the history of a
person. A series of person-stages will be psychologically continuous if the
psychological states including memories occurring in later members of the
series grow out of, in certain characteristic ways, those occurring in earlier
members of it; and according to the psychological continuity view of personal
identity, person-stages occurring at different times are stages of the same
person provided they belong to a single, non-branching, psychologically
continuous series of person-stages. Opponents of the Lockean and neo-Lockean
psychological continuity view tend to fall into two camps. Some, following
Butler and Reid, hold that personal identity is indefinable, and that nothing
informative can be said about what it consists in. Others hold that the
identity of a person consists in some sort of physical continuity perhaps the identity of a living human
organism, or the identity of a human brain. In the actual cases we know about
putting aside issues about non-bodily survival of death, psychological
continuity and physical continuity go together. Much of the debate between
psychological continuity theories and physical continuity theories has centered
on the interpretation of thought experiments involving brain transplants,
brain-state transfers, etc., in which these come apart. Such examples make
vivid the question of whether our fundamental criteria of personal identity are
psychological, physical, or both. Recently philosophical attention has shifted
somewhat from the question of what personal identity consists in to questions
about its importance. The consideration of hypothetical cases of “fission” in
which two persons at a later time are psychologically continuous with one
person at an earlier time has suggested to some that we can have survival or at any rate what matters in survival without personal identity, and that our self-interested
concern for the future is really a concern for whatever future persons are
psychologically continuous with us.
phantasia: Grice: “
“Phantasia,” as any Clifton schoolboy knows, is cognate with ‘phainomenon,’ as
Cant forgot!” -- Grecian, ‘appearance’, ‘imagination’, 1 the state we are in
when something appears to us to be the case; 2 the capacity in virtue of which
things appear to us. Although frequently used of conscious and imagistic
experiences, ‘phantasia’ is not limited to such states; in particular, it can
be applied to any propositional attitude where something is taken to be the
case. But just as the English ‘appears’ connotes that one has epistemic
reservations about what is actually the case, so ‘phantasia’ suggests the
possibility of being misled by appearances and is thus often a subject of
criticism. According to Plato, phantasia is a “mixture” of sensation and
belief; in Aristotle, it is a distinct faculty that makes truth and falsehood
possible. The Stoics take a phantasia to constitute one of the most basic
mental states, in terms of which other mental states are to be explained, and
in rational animals it bears the propositional content expressed in language.
This last use becomes prominent in ancient literary and rhetorical theory to
designate the ability of language to move us and convey subjects vividly as
well as to range beyond the bounds of our immediate experience. Here lie the
origins of the modern concept of imagination although not the Romantic
distinction between fancy and imagination. Later Neoplatonists, such as
Proclus, take phantasia to be necessary for abstract studies such as geometry,
by enabling us to envision spatial relations.
phenomenalism: one of the twelve
labours of H. P. Grice – very fashionable at Oxford – “until Austin demolished
it with his puritanical “Sense and sensibilia,” – Grice: “Strictly, it should
be ‘sense and sensibile,’ since ‘sensibilia’ is plural – which invokes Ryle’s
paradox of the speckled hen!” -- the view that propositions asserting the
existence of physical objects are equivalent in meaning to propositions
asserting that subjects would have certain sequences of sensations were they to
have certain others. The basic idea behind phenomenalism is compatible with a
number of different analyses of the self or conscious subject. A phenomenalist
might understand the self as a substance, a particular, or a construct out of
actual and possible experience. The view also is compatible with any number of
different analyses of the visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and
kinesthetic sensations described in the antecedents and consequents of the
subjunctive conditionals that the phenomenalist uses to analyze physical object
propositions as illustrated in the last paragraph. Probably the most common
analysis of sensations adopted by traditional phenomenalists is a sense-datum
theory, with the sense-data construed as mind-dependent entities. But there is
nothing to prevent a phenomenalist from accepting an adverbial theory or theory
of appearing instead. The origins of phenomenalism are difficult to trace, in
part because early statements of the view were usually not careful. In his
Dialogues, Berkeley hinted at phenomenalism when he had Philonous explain how
he could reconcile an ontology containing only minds and ideas with the story
of a creation that took place before the existence of people. Philonous
imagines that if he had been present at the creation he should have seen
things, i.e., had sensations, in the order described in the Bible. It can also
be argued, however, that J. S. Mill in An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s
Philosophy was the first to put forth a clearly phenomenalistic analysis when
he identified matter with the “permanent possibility of sensation.” When Mill explained
what these permanent possibilities are, he typically used conditionals that
describe the sensations one would have if one were placed in certain
conditions. The attraction of classical phenomenalism grew with the rise of
logical positivism and its acceptance of the verifiability criterion of
meaning. Phenomenalists were usually foundationalists who were convinced that
justified belief in the physical world rested ultimately on our
noninferentially justified beliefs about our sensations. Implicitly committed
to the view that only deductive and inductive inferences are legitimate, and
further assuming that to be justified in believing one proposition P on the
basis of another E, one must be justified in believing both E and that E makes
P probable, the phenomenalist saw an insuperable difficulty in justifying
belief in ordinary statements about the physical world given prevalent
conceptions of physical petitio principii phenomenalism 663 663 objects. If all we ultimately have as
our evidence for believing in physical objects is what we know about the
occurrence of sensation, how can we establish sensation as evidence for the
existence of physical objects? We obviously cannot deduce the existence of
physical objects from any finite sequence of sensations. The sensations could,
e.g., be hallucinatory. Nor, it seems, can we observe a correlation between
sensation and something else in order to generate the premises of an inductive
argument for the conclusion that sensations are reliable indicators of physical
objects. The key to solving this problem, the phenomenalist argues, is to
reduce assertions about the physical world to complicated assertions about the
sequences of sensations a subject would have were he to have certain others.
The truth of such conditionals, e.g., that if I have the clear visual
impression of a cat, then there is one before me, might be mind-independent in
the way in which one wants the truth of assertions about the physical world to
be mind-independent. And to the phenomenalist’s great relief, it would seem
that we could justify our belief in such conditional statements without having
to correlate anything but sensations. Many philosophers today reject some of
the epistemological, ontological, and metaphilosophical presuppositions with
which phenomenalists approached the problem of understanding our relation to
the physical world through sensation. But the argument that was historically
most decisive in convincing many philosophers to abandon phenomenalism was the
argument from perceptual relativity first advanced by Chisholm in “The Problem
of Perception.” Chisholm offers a strategy for attacking any phenomenalistic
analysis. The first move is to force the phenomenalist to state a conditional
describing only sensations that is an alleged consequence of a physical object
proposition. C. I. Lewis, e.g., in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation,
claims that the assertion P that there is a doorknob before me and to the left
entails C that if I were to seem to see a doorknob and seem to reach out and
touch it then I would seem to feel it. Chisholm argues that if P really did
entail C then there could be no assertion R that when conjoined with P did not
entail C. There is, however, such an assertion: I am unable to move my limbs
and my hands but am subject to delusions such that I think I am moving them; I
often seem to be initiating a grasping motion but with no feeling of contacting
anything. Chisholm argues, in effect, that what sensations one would have if
one were to have certain others always depends in part on the internal and
external physical conditions of perception and that this fact dooms any attempt
to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of a physical object
proposition couched in terms that describe only connections between
sensations.
phenomenology – Grice:
“Strictly, my area – the science of appearances!” -- referred ironically by J.
L. Austin as “linguistic phenomenology,”—Austin only accepted public-school
(“i. e. private-school) educated males at his Saturday mornings – “They share
my dialect, unlike others.” -- in the
twentieth century, the philosophy developed by Husserl and some of his
followers. The term has been used since the mideighteenth century and received
a carefully defined technical meaning in the works of both Kant and Hegel, but
it is not now used to refer to a homogeneous and systematically developed
philosophical position. The question of what phenomenology is may suggest that
phenomenology is one among the many contemporary philosophical conceptions that
have a clearly delineated body of doctrines and whose essential characteristics
can be expressed by a set of wellchosen statements. This notion is not correct,
however. In contemporary philosophy there is no system or school called “phenomenology,”
characterized by a clearly defined body of teachings. Phenomenology is neither
a school nor a trend in contemporary philosophy. It is rather a movement whose
proponents, for various reasons, have propelled it in many distinct directions,
with the result that today it means different things to different people. While
within the phenomenological movement as a whole there are several related
currents, they, too, are by no means homogeneous. Though these currents have a
common point of departure, they do not project toward the same destination. The
thinking of most phenomenologists has changed so greatly that their respective
views can be presented adequately only by showing them in their gradual
development. This is true not only for Husserl, founder of the phenomenological
movement, but also for such later phenomenologists as Scheler, N. Hartmann,
Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. To anyone who studies the
phenomenological movement without prejudice the differences among its many
currents are obvious. It has been phenomenal property phenomenology 664 664 said that phenomenology consists in an
analysis and description of consciousness; it has been claimed also that
phenomenology simply blends with existentialism. Phenomenology is indeed the study
of essences, but it also attempts to place essences back into existence. It is
a transcendental philosophy interested only in what is “left behind” after the
phenomenological reduction is performed, but it also considers the world to be
already there before reflection begins. For some philosophers phenomenology is
speculation on transcendental subjectivity, whereas for others it is a method
for approaching concrete existence. Some use phenomenology as a search for a
philosophy that accounts for space, time, and the world, just as we experience
and “live” them. Finally, it has been said that phenomenology is an attempt to
give a direct description of our experience as it is in itself without taking
into account its psychological origin and its causal explanation; but Husserl
speaks of a “genetic” as well as a “constitutive” phenomenology. To some
people, finding such an abundance of ideas about one and the same subject
constitutes a strange situation; for others it is annoying to contemplate the
“confusion”; and there will be those who conclude that a philosophy that cannot
define its own scope does not deserve the discussion that has been carried on
in its regard. In the opinion of many, not only is this latter attitude not
justified, but precisely the opposite view defended by Thevenaz should be
adopted. As the term ‘phenomenology’ signifies first and foremost a methodical
conception, Thevenaz argues that because this method, originally developed for
a very particular and limited end, has been able to branch out in so many
varying forms, it manifests a latent truth and power of renewal that implies an
exceptional fecundity. Speaking of the great variety of conceptions within the
phenomenological movement, Merleau-Ponty remarked that the responsible philosopher
must recognize that phenomenology may be practiced and identified as a manner
or a style of thinking, and that it existed as a movement before arriving at a
complete awareness of itself as a philosophy. Rather than force a living
movement into a system, then, it seems more in keeping with the ideal of the
historian as well as the philosopher to follow the movement in its development,
and attempt to describe and evaluate the many branches in and through which it
has unfolded itself. In reality the picture is not as dark as it may seem at
first sight. Notwithstanding the obvious differences, most phenomenologists
share certain insights that are very important for their mutual philosophical
conception as a whole. In this connection the following must be mentioned: 1
Most phenomenologists admit a radical difference between the “natural” and the
“philosophical” attitude. This leads necessarily to an equally radical
difference between philosophy and science. In characterizing this difference
some phenomenologists, in agreement with Husserl, stress only epistemological
issues, whereas others, in agreement with Heidegger, focus their attention
exclusively on ontological topics. 2 Notwithstanding this radical difference,
there is a complicated set of relationships between philosophy and science.
Within the context of these relationships philosophy has in some sense a
foundational task with respect to the sciences, whereas science offers to
philosophy at least a substantial part of its philosophical problematic. 3 To
achieve its task philosophy must perform a certain reduction, or epoche, a
radical change of attitude by which the philosopher turns from things to their
meanings, from the ontic to the ontological, from the realm of the objectified
meaning as found in the sciences to the realm of meaning as immediately
experienced in the “life-world.” In other words, although it remains true that
the various phenomenologists differ in characterizing the reduction, no one
seriously doubts its necessity. 4 All phenomenologists subscribe to the
doctrine of intentionality, though most elaborate this doctrine in their own
way. For Husserl intentionality is a characteristic of conscious phenomena or
acts; in a deeper sense, it is the characteristic of a finite consciousness that
originally finds itself without a world. For Heidegger and most existentialists
it is the human reality itself that is intentional; as Being-in-the-world its
essence consists in its ek-sistence, i.e., in its standing out toward the
world. 5 All phenomenologists agree on the fundamental idea that the basic
concern of philosophy is to answer the question concerning the “meaning and
Being” of beings. All agree in addition that in trying to materialize this goal
the philosopher should be primarily interested not in the ultimate cause of all
finite beings, but in how the Being of beings and the Being of the world are to
be constituted. Finally, all agree that in answering the question concerning
the meaning of Being a privileged position is to be attributed to subjectivity,
i.e., to that being which questions the Being of beings. Phenomenologists
differ, however, the moment they have to specify what is meant by subjectivity.
As noted above, whereas Husserl conceives it as a worldless monad, Heidegger
and most later phenomenologists conceive it as being-in-the-world. Referring to
Heidegger’s reinterpretation of his phenomenology, Husserl writes: one
misinterprets my phenomenology backwards from a level which it was its very
purpose to overcome, in other words, one has failed to understand the
fundamental novelty of the phenomenological reduction and hence the progress
from mundane subjectivity i.e., man to transcendental subjectivity;
consequently one has remained stuck in an anthropology . . . which according to
my doctrine has not yet reached the genuine philosophical level, and whose
interpretation as philosophy means a lapse into “transcendental
anthropologism,” that is, “psychologism.” 6 All phenomenologists defend a
certain form of intuitionism and subscribe to what Husserl calls the “principle
of all principles”: “whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form
as it were in its bodily reality, is simply to be accepted as it gives itself
out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself.”
Here again, however, each phenomenologist interprets this principle in keeping
with his general conception of phenomenology as a whole. Thus, while
phenomenologists do share certain insights, the development of the movement has
nevertheless been such that it is not possible to give a simple definition of
what phenomenology is. The fact remains that there are many phenomenologists
and many phenomenologies. Therefore, one can only faithfully report what one
has experienced of phenomenology by reading the phenomenologists. Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “J. L. Austin’s linguistic phenomenology – and conversational
implicatura,” “Conversational phenomenology.”
Philo Judaeus, philosopher who composed
the bulk of his work in the form of commentaries and discourses on Scripture.
He made the first known sustained attempt to synthesize its revealed teachings
with the doctrines of classical philosophy. Although he was not the first to
apply the methods of allegorical interpretation to Scripture, the number and
variety of his interpretations make Philo unique. With this interpretive tool,
he transformed biblical narratives into Platonic accounts of the soul’s quest
for God and its struggle against passion, and the Mosaic commandments into
specific manifestations of general laws of nature. Philo’s most influential
idea was his conception of God, which combines the personal, ethical deity of
the Bible with the abstract, transcendentalist theology of Platonism and
Pythagoreanism. The Philonic deity is both the loving, just God of the Hebrew
Patriarchs and the eternal One whose essence is absolutely unknowable and who
creates the material world by will from primordial matter which He creates ex
nihilo. Besides the intelligible realm of ideas, which Philo is the earliest known
philosopher to identify as God’s thoughts, he posited an intermediate divine
being which he called, adopting scriptural language, the logos. Although the
exact nature of the logos is hard to pin down
Philo variously and, without any concern for consistency, called it the
“first-begotten Son of the uncreated Father,” “Second God,” “idea of ideas,”
“archetype of human reason,” and “pattern of creation” its main functions are clear: to bridge the
huge gulf between the transcendent deity and the lower world and to serve as
the unifying law of the universe, the ground of its order and rationality. A
philosophical eclectic, Philo was unknown to medieval Jewish philosophers but,
beyond his anticipations of Neoplatonism, he had a lasting impact on
Christianity through Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Ambrose.
Filolao, pre-Socratic Grecian philosopher
from Crotone in southern Italy, the first Pythagorean to write a book. The
surviving fragments of it are the earliest primary texts for Pythagoreanism,
but numerous spurious fragments have also been preserved. Philolaus’s book
begins with a cosmogony and includes astronomical, medical, and psychological
doctrines. His major innovation was to argue that the cosmos and everything in
it is a combination not just of unlimiteds what is structured and ordered, e.g.
material elements but also of limiters structural and ordering elements, e.g.
shapes. These elements are held together in a harmonia fitting together, which
comes to be in accord with perspicuous mathematical relationships, such as the
whole number ratios that correspond to the harmonic intervals e.g. octave %
phenotext Philolaus 1 : 2. He argued that secure knowledge is possible insofar
as we grasp the number in accordance with which things are put together. His
astronomical system is famous as the first to make the earth a planet. Along
with the sun, moon, fixed stars, five planets, and counter-earth thus making
the perfect number ten, the earth circles the central fire a combination of the
limiter “center” and the unlimited “fire”. Philolaus’s influence is seen in
Plato’s Philebus; he is the primary source for Aristotle’s account of
Pythagoreanism. H. P. Grice,
“Pythagoras: the written and the unwritten doctrines,” Luigi Speranza, “Grice a
Crotone, ovvero, Filolao,” per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool
Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
vita – vitalism philosophical biology: Grice,
“What is ‘life’?” “How come the Grecians had two expressions for this: ‘zoon’
and ‘bios’?” “Why could the Romans just do with ‘vivere’?’ -- Grice liked to
regard himself as a philosophical biologist, and indeed philosophical
physiologist. bioethics, the subfield of ethics that concerns the ethical
issues arising in medicine and from advances in biological science. One central
area of bioethics is the ethical issues that arise in relations between health
care professionals and patients. A second area focuses on broader issues of
social justice in health care. A third area concerns the ethical issues raised
by new biological knowledge or technology. In relations between health care
professionals and patients, a fundamental issue is the appropriate role of each
in decision making about patient care. More traditional views assigning
principal decision-making authority to physicians have largely been replaced
with ideals of shared decision making that assign a more active role to patients.
Shared decision making is thought to reflect better the importance of patients’
self-determination in controlling their care. This increased role for patients
is reflected in the ethical and legal doctrine of informed consent, which
requires that health care not be rendered without the informed and voluntary
consent of a competent patient. The requirement that consent be informed places
a positive responsibility on health care professionals to provide their
patients with the information they need to make informed decisions about care.
The requirement that consent be voluntary requires that treatment not be
forced, nor that patients’ decisions be coerced or manipulated. If patients
lack the capacity to make competent health care decisions, e.g. young children
or cognitively impaired adults, a surrogate, typically a parent in the case of
children or a close family member in the case of adults, must decide for them.
Surrogates’ decisions should follow the patient’s advance directive if one
exists, be the decision the patient would have made in the circumstances if
competent, or follow the patient’s best interests if the patient has never been
competent or his or her wishes are not known. A major focus in bioethics
generally, and treatment decision making in particular, is care at or near the
end of life. It is now widely agreed that patients are entitled to decide about
and to refuse, according to their own values, any lifesustaining treatment.
They are also entitled to have desired treatments that may shorten their lives,
such as high doses of pain medications necessary to relieve severe pain from
cancer, although in practice pain treatment remains inadequate for many
patients. Much more controversial is whether more active means to end life such
as physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia are morally permissible
in indibhavanga bioethics 88 88 vidual
cases or justified as public policy; both remain illegal except in a very few
jurisdictions. Several other moral principles have been central to defining
professionalpatient relationships in health care. A principle of truth telling
requires that professionals not lie to patients. Whereas in the past it was
common, especially with patients with terminal cancers, not to inform patients
fully about their diagnosis and prognosis, studies have shown that practice has
changed substantially and that fully informing patients does not have the bad
effects for patients that had been feared in the past. Principles of privacy
and confidentiality require that information gathered in the
professionalpatient relationship not be disclosed to third parties without
patients’ consent. Especially with highly personal information in mental health
care, or information that may lead to discrimination, such as a diagnosis of
AIDS, assurance of confidentiality is fundamental to the trust necessary to a
wellfunctioning professionalpatient relationship. Nevertheless, exceptions to
confidentiality to prevent imminent and serious harm to others are well
recognized ethically and legally. More recently, work in bioethics has focused
on justice in the allocation of health care. Whereas nearly all developed
countries treat health care as a moral and legal right, and ensure it to all
their citizens through some form of national health care system, in the United
States about 15 percent of the population remains without any form of health
insurance. This has fed debates about whether health care is a right or
privilege, a public or individual responsibility. Most bioethicists have supported
a right to health care because of health care’s fundamental impact on people’s
well-being, opportunity, ability to plan their lives, and even lives
themselves. Even if there is a moral right to health care, however, few defend
an unlimited right to all beneficial health care, no matter how small the
benefit and how high the cost. Consequently, it is necessary to prioritize or
ration health care services to reflect limited budgets for health care, and
both the standards and procedures for doing so are ethically controversial.
Utilitarians and defenders of cost-effectiveness analysis in health policy
support using limited resources to maximize aggregate health benefits for the
population. Their critics argue that this ignores concerns about equity, concerns
about how health care resources and health are distributed. For example, some
have argued that equity requires giving priority to treating the worst-off or
sickest, even at a sacrifice in aggregate health benefits; moreover, taking
account in prioritization of differences in costs of different treatments can
lead to ethically problematic results, such as giving higher priority to
providing very small benefits to many persons than very large but individually
more expensive benefits, including life-saving interventions, to a few persons,
as the state of Oregon found in its initial widely publicized prioritization
program. In the face of controversy over standards for rationing care, it is
natural to rely on fair procedures to make rationing decisions. Other bioethics
issues arise from dramatic advances in biological knowledge and technology.
Perhaps the most prominent example is new knowledge of human genetics,
propelled in substantial part by the worldwide Human Genome Project, which
seeks to map the entire human genome. This project and related research will
enable the prevention of genetically transmitted diseases, but already raises
questions about which conditions to prevent in offspring and which should be
accepted and lived with, particularly when the means of preventing the
condition is by abortion of the fetus with the condition. Looking further into
the future, new genetic knowledge and technology will likely enable us to
enhance normal capacities, not just prevent or cure disease, and to manipulate
the genes of future children, raising profoundly difficult questions about what
kinds of persons to create and the degree to which deliberate human design
should replace “nature” in the creation of our offspring. A dramatic example of
new abilities to create offspring, though now limited to the animal realm, was
the cloning in Scotland in 7 of a sheep from a single cell of an adult sheep;
this event raised the very controversial future prospect of cloning human
beings. Finally, new reproductive technologies, such as oocyte egg donation,
and practices such as surrogate motherhood, raise deep issues about the meaning
and nature of parenthood and families. Philosophical
biology -- euthanasia, broadly, the beneficent timing or negotiation of the
death of a sick person; more narrowly, the killing of a human being on the
grounds that he is better off dead. In an extended sense, the word ‘euthanasia’
is used to refer to the painless killing of non-human animals, in our interests
at least as much as in theirs. Active euthanasia is the taking of steps to end
a person’s especially a patient’s life. Passive euthanasia is the omission or
termination of means of prolonging life, on the grounds that the person is
better off without them. The distinction between active and passive euthanasia
is a rough guide for applying the more fundamental distinction between
intending the patient’s death and pursuing other goals, such as the relief of
her pain, with the expectation that she will die sooner rather than later as a
result. Voluntary euthanasia is euthanasia with the patient’s consent, or at
his request. Involuntary euthanasia is euthanasia over the patient’s
objections. Non-voluntary euthanasia is the killing of a person deemed
incompetent with the consent of someone
say a parent authorized to speak
on his behalf. Since candidates for euthanasia are frequently in no condition
to make major decisions, the question whether there is a difference between
involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia is of great importance. Few moralists
hold that life must be prolonged whatever the cost. Traditional morality
forbids directly intended euthanasia: human life belongs to God and may be
taken only by him. The most important arguments for euthanasia are the pain and
indignity suffered by those with incurable diseases, the burden imposed by
persons unable to take part in normal human activities, and the supposed right
of persons to dispose of their lives however they please. Non-theological
arguments against euthanasia include the danger of expanding the principle of
euthanasia to an everwidening range of persons and the opacity of death and its
consequent incommensurability with life, so that we cannot safely judge that a
person is better off dead. H. P. Grice, “The roman problem: ‘vita’ for ‘bios’
and ‘zoe.’”
philosophism: birrellism – general refelction on life. Grice defines a
philosopher as someone ‘addicted to general reflections on life,’ like Birrell
did. f. paraphilosophy – philosophical hacks. “Austin’s expressed view -- the
formulation of which no doubt involves some irony -- is that we ‘philosophical
hacks’ spend the week making, for the benefit of our tutees, direct attacks on
this or that philosophical issue, and that we need to be refreshed, at the
week-end, by some suitably chosen ‘para-philosophy’ in which some non-philosophical conception is to be
examined with the full rigour of the Austinian Code, with a view to an ultimate
analogical pay-off (liable never to be reached) in philosophical currency.” His feeling of superiority as a
philosopher is obvious in various fields. He certaintly would not get involved
in any ‘empirical’ survey (“We can trust this, qua philosophers, as given.”) Grice
held a MA (Lit. Hum.) – Literae Humaniores (Philosophy). So he knew what he was
talking about. The curriculum was an easy one. He plays with the fact that
empiricists don’t regard philosophy as a sovereign monarch: philosophia regina
scientiarum, provided it’s queen consort. In “Conceptual analysis and the
province of philosophy,” he plays with the idea that Philosophy is the Supreme
Science. Grice was somewhat obsessed as to what ‘philosohical’ stood for, which
amused the members of his play group! His play group once spends five weeks in
an effort to explain why, sometimes, ‘very’ allows, with little or no change of
meaning, the substitution of ‘highly’ (as in ‘very unusual’) and sometimes does
not (as in ‘very depressed’ or ‘very wicked’); and we reached no conclusion. This
episode was ridiculed by some as an ultimate embodiment of fruitless frivolity.
But that response is as out of place as a similar response to the medieval
question, ‘How many angels can dance on a needle’s point?’” A needless point?For
much as this medieval question is raised in order to display, in a vivid way, a
difficulty in the conception of an immaterial substance, so The Play Group
discussion is directed, in response to a worry from me, towards an examination,
in the first instance, of a conceptual question which is generally agreed among
us to be a strong candidate for being a question which had no philosophical
importance, with a view to using the results of this examination in finding a
distinction between philosophically important and philosophically unimportant
enquiries. Grice is fortunate that the Lit. Hum. programme does not have much
philosophy! He feels free! In fact, the lack of a philosophical background is
felt as a badge of honour. It is ‘too clever’ and un-English to ‘know’ things.
A pint of philosophy is all Grice wanted. Figurative. This is Harvardite Gordon’s
attempt to formulate a philosophy of the minimum fundamental ideas that all
people on the earth should come to know. Reviewed by A. M. Honoré: Short
measure. Gordon, a Stanley Plummer scholar, e: Bowdoin and Harvard, in The
Eastern Gazette. Grice would exclaim: I always loved Alfred Brooks Gordon!
Grice was slightly disapppointed that Gordon had not included the fundamental
idea of implicaturum in his pint. Short measure, indeed. Grice gives seminars
on Ariskant (“the first part of this individual interested some of my tutees;
the second, others.” Ariskant philosophised in Grecian, but also in the pure
Teutonic, and Grice collaborated with Baker in this area. Curiously, Baker majors
in French and philosophy and does research at the Sorbonne. Grice would
sometimes define ‘philoosphy.’ Oddly, Grice gives a nice example of
‘philosopher’ meaning ‘addicted to general, usually stoic, reflections about
life.’ In the context where it occurs, the implicaturum is Stevensonian. If
Stevenson says that an athlete is usually tall, a philosopher may occasionally
be inclined to reflect about life in general, as a birrelist would. Grice’s
gives an alternate meaning, intended to display circularity: ‘engaged in
philosophical studies.’ The idea of Grice of philosophy is the one the Lit.
Hum. instills. It is a unique
experience, unknown in the New World, our actually outside Oxford, or
post-Grice, where a classicist is not seen as a philosopher. Once a tutorial
fellow in philosophy (rather than classics) and later university lecturer in
philosophy (rather than classics) strengthens his attachment. Grice needs to
regarded by his tutee as a philosopher simpliciter, as oppoosed to a prof: the
Waynflete is a metaphysician; the White is a moralist, the Wykeham a logician,
and the Wilde a ‘mental’. For Grice’s “greatest living philosopher,” Heidegger,
‘philosophy’ is a misnomer. While philology merely discourses (logos) on love,
the philosopher claims to be a wizard (sophos) of love. Liddell and Scott have
“φιλοσοφία,” which they render as “love of knowledge, pursuit thereof,
speculation,” “ἡ φ. κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης.” Then there’s “ἡ πρώτη φ.,” with striking
originality, metaphysic, Arist. Metaph. 1026a24. Just one sense, but various
ambiguities remain in ‘philosopher,’ as per Grice’s two usages. As it happens, Grice is both addicted
to general, usually stoic, speculations about life, and he is a member of The
Oxford Philosophical Society.Refs.: The main sources in the Grice Papers are
under series III, of the doctrines. See also references under ‘lingusitic
botany,’ and Oxonianism. Grice liked to play with the adage of ‘philosophia’ as
‘regina scientiarum.’ A specific essay in his update of “post-war Oxford
philosophy,” in WoW on “Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy,”
BANC, H. P. Grice, “My friend Birrell.”
philosophia
perennis:
a supposed body of truths that appear in the writings of the great
philosophers, or the truths common to opposed philosophical viewpoints. The
term is derived from the title of a book De perenni philosophia published by
Agostino Steuco of Gubbio in 1540. It suggests that the differences between
philosophers are inessential and superficial and that the common essential
truth emerges, however partially, in the major philosophical schools. Aldous
Huxley employed it as a title. L. Lavelle, N. Hartmann, and K. Jaspers also
employ the phrase. M. De Wulf and many others use the phrase to characterize
Neo-Thomism as the chosen vehicle of essential philosophical truths. Refs.: H.
P. Grice, “All that remains is mutability.”
philosophical
anthropology:
Grice hardly used ‘man,’ but preferred ‘human,’ and person. ‘Man’ is very
English, and that may be the reason why latinate Grice avoided it! “Human”
Grice thought cognate with “homo,” which rendered Grecian ‘anthropoos.’ “The
Grecians and the Roamns distinguished between a generic ‘anthropoos,’ and the
masculine ‘aner,’ Roman ‘vir.’ -- “What is man?” Grice: “I would distinguish
between what is human, and what is person.” -- philosophical inquiry concerning
human nature, often starting with the question of what generally characterizes
human beings in contrast to other kinds of creatures and things. Thus broadly
conceived, it is a kind of inquiry as old as philosophy itself, occupying
philosophers from Socrates to Sartre; and it embraces philosophical psychology,
the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and existentialism. Such inquiry
presupposes no immutable “essence of man,” but only the meaningfulness of
distinguishing between what is “human” and what is not, and the possibility
that philosophy as well as other disciplines may contribute to our
self-comprehension. It leaves open the question of whether other kinds of
naturally occurring or artificially produced entity may possess the hallmarks
of our humanity, and countenances the possibility of the biologically evolved,
historically developed, and socially and individually variable character of
everything about our attained humanity. More narrowly conceived, philosophical
anthropology is a specific movement in recent European philosophy associated
initially with Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, and subsequently with such figures
as Arnold Gehlen, Cassirer, and the later Sartre. It initially emerged in
Germany simultaneously with the existential philosophy of Heidegger and the
critical social theory of the Frankfurt School, with which it competed as G.
philosophers turned their attention to the comprehension of human life. This
movement was distinguished from the outset by its attempt to integrate the
insights of phenomenological analysis with the perspectives attainable through
attention to human and comparative biology, and subsequently to social inquiry
as well. This turn to a more naturalistic approach to the understanding of
ourselves, as a particular kind of living creature among others, is reflected
in the titles of the two works published in 8 that inaugurated the movement:
Scheler’s Man’s Place in Nature and Plessner’s The Levels of the Organic and
Man. For both Scheler and Plessner, however, as for those who followed them,
our nature must be understood by taking further account of the social,
cultural, and intellectual dimensions of human life. Even those like Gehlen,
whose Der Mensch 0 exhibits a strongly biological orientation, devoted much
attention to these dimensions, which our biological nature both constrains and
makes possible. For all of them, the relation between the biological and the
social and cultural dimensions of human life is a central concern and a key to
comprehending our human nature. One of the common themes of the later
philosophical-anthropological literature
e.g., Cassirer’s An Essay on Man 5 and Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical
Reason 0 as well as Plessner’s Contitio Humana 5 and Gehlen’s Early Man and
Late Culture 3 is the plasticity of
human nature, made possible by our biological constitution, and the resulting
great differences in the ways human beings live. Yet this is not taken to
preclude saying anything meaningful about human nature generally; rather, it
merely requires attention to the kinds of general features involved and
reflected in human diversity and variability. Critics of the very idea and possibility
of a philosophical anthropology e.g., Althusser and Foucault typically either
deny that there are any such general features or maintain that there are none
outside the province of the biological sciences to which philosophy can
contribute nothing substantive. Both claims, however, are open to dispute; and
the enterprise of a philosophical anthropology remains a viable and potentially
significant one. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Gehlen and the idea that man is sick –
homo infirmus.”
vita – vitalism -- animatum – Grice: “The
Romans saw a living body as the ‘animatum,’ since it’s the soul that makes a
body a living thing --. So the idea of ‘vita’ is conceptually linked to that of
a ‘soul.’ Grice was logically more interested in the verb, ‘vivere.’ “Most of Malcolm’s
sophismata on ‘dreaming’ apply to ‘living,’ surely “I live” implicates that I
live. Grice was fascinated by the fact that English ‘quick’ was cognate with
Roman ‘vivere.’ “as it should,” because if it’s quick, it’s most certainly
alive!” Old English cwic
"living, alive, animate," and figuratively, of mental qualities,
"rapid, ready," from Proto-Germanic *kwikwaz (source also of Old
Saxon and Old Frisian quik, Old Norse kvikr "living, alive," Dutch
kwik "lively, bright, sprightly," Old High German quec
"lively," German keck "bold"), from PIE root *gwei-
"to live." Sense of "lively, swift" developed by late 12c.,
on notion of "full of life." NE swift or the now more common fast may
apply to rapid motion of any duration, while in quick (in accordance with its
original sense of 'live, lively') there is a notion of 'sudden' or 'soon over.'
We speak of a fast horse or runner in a race, a quick starter but not a quick
horse. A somewhat similar feeling may distinguish NHG schnell and rasch or it
may be more a matter of local preference. [Carl Darling Buck, "A
Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages,"
1949] v. n. Sanscr. giv-, givami, live; Gr. βίος, life; Goth. quius, living; Germ. quicken; Engl.
quick, to live, be alive, have life (syn.
spiro).
philosophical biology: v. H. P. Grice, “The roman problem: doing with ‘vivere’
for ‘zoe’ and bios’” -- vide: H. P. Grice, “Philosophical biology and
philosophical psychology” -- the philosophy of science applied to biology. On a
conservative view of the philosophy of science, the same principles apply
throughout science. Biology supplies additional examples but does not provide
any special problems or require new principles. For example, the reduction of
Mendelian genetics to molecular biology exemplifies the same sort of relation
as the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and the same
general analysis of reduction applies equally to both. More radical
philosophers argue that the subject matter of biology has certain unique
features; hence, the philosophy of biology is itself unique. The three features
of biology most often cited by those who maintain that philosophy of biology is
unique are functional organization, embryological development, and the nature
of selection. Organisms are functionally organized. They are capable of
maintaining their overall organization in the face of fairly extensive
variation in their envisonments. Organisms also undergo ontogenetic development
resulting from extremely complex interactions between the genetic makeup of the
organism and its successive environments. At each step, the course that an
organism takes is determined by an interplay between its genetic makeup, its
current state of development, and the environment it happens to confront. The
complexity of these interactions produces the naturenurture problem. Except for
human artifacts, similar organization does not occur in the non-living world.
The species problem is another classic issue in the philosophy of biology.
Biological species have been a paradigm example of natural kinds since Aristotle.
According to nearly all pre-Darwinian philosophers, species are part of the
basic makeup of the universe, like gravity and gold. They were held to be as
eternal, immutable, and discrete as these other examples of natural kinds. If
Darwin was right, species are not eternal. They come and go, and once gone can
no more reemerge than Aristotle can once again walk the streets of Athens. Nor
are species immutable. A sample of lead can be transmuted into a sample of
gold, but these elements as elements remain immutable in the face of such
changes. However, Darwin insisted that species themselves, not merely their
instances, evolved. Finally, because Darwin thought that species evolved
gradually, the boundaries between species are not sharp, casting doubt on the
essentialist doctrines so common in his day. In short, if species evolve, they
have none of the traditional characteristics of species. Philosophers and
biologists to this day are working out the consequences of this radical change
in our worldview. The topic that has received the greatest attention by
philosophers of biology in the recent literature is the nature of evolutionary
theory, in particular selection, adaptation, fitness, and the population
structure of species. In order for selection to operate, variation is
necessary, successive generations must be organized genealogically, and
individuals must interact differentially with their environments. In the
simplest case, genes pass on their structure largely intact. In addition, they
provide the information necessary to produce organisms. Certain of these
organisms are better able to cope with their environments and reproduce than
are other organisms. As a result, genes are perpetuated differentially through
successive generations. Those characteristics that help an organism cope with
its environments are termed adaptations. In a more restricted sense, only those
characteristics that arose through past selective advantage count as
adaptations. Just as the notion of IQ was devised as a single measure for a
combination of the factors that influence our mental abilities, fitness is a
measure of relative reproductive success. Claims about the tautological
character of the principle philosophical behaviorism philosophy of biology of
the survival of the fittest stem from the blunt assertion that fitness just is
relative reproductive success, as if intelligence just is what IQ tests
measure. Philosophers of biology have collaborated with biologists to analyze
the notion of fitness. This literature has concentrated on the role that
causation plays in selection and, hence, must play in any adequate explication
of fitness. One important distinction that has emerged is between replication
and differential interaction with the environment. Selection is a function of
the interplay between these two processes. Because of the essential role of
variation in selection, all the organisms that belong to the same species
either at any one time or through time cannot possibly be essentially the same.
Nor can species be treated adequately in terms of the statistical covariance of
either characters or genes. The populational structure of species is crucial.
For example, species that form numerous, partially isolated demes are much more
likely to speciate than those that do not. One especially controversial
question is whether species themselves can function in the evolutionary process
rather than simply resulting from it. Although philosophers of biology have
played an increasingly important role in biology itself, they have also
addressed more traditional philosophical questions, especially in connection
with evolutionary epistemology and ethics. Advocates of evolutionary
epistemology argue that knowledge can be understood in terms of the adaptive
character of accurate knowledge. Those organisms that hold false beliefs about
their environment, including other organisms, are less likely to reproduce
themselves than those with more accurate beliefs. To the extent that this
argument has any force at all, it applies only to humansized entities and
events. One common response to evolutionary epistemology is that sometimes
people who hold manifestly false beliefs flourish at the expense of those who
hold more realistic views of the world in which we live. On another version of
evolutionary epistemology, knowledge acquisition is viewed as just one more
instance of a selection process. The issue is not to justify our beliefs but to
understand how they are generated and proliferated. Advocates of evolutionary
ethics attempt to justify certain ethical principles in terms of their survival
value. Any behavior that increases the likelihood of survival and reproduction
is “good,” and anything that detracts from these ends is “bad.” The main
objection to evolutionary ethics is that it violates the isought distinction.
According to most ethical systems, we are asked to sacrifice ourselves for the
good of others. If these others were limited to our biological relatives, then
the biological notion of inclusive fitness might be adequate to account for
such altruistic behavior, but the scope of ethical systems extends past one’s
biological relatives. Advocates of evolutionary ethics are hard pressed to
explain the full range of behavior that is traditionally considered as
virtuous. Either biological evolution cannot provide an adequate justification
for ethical behavior or else ethical systems must be drastically reduced in
their scope. Refs.: Grice, “Philosophical biology: are we all emergentists?”
philosophical oeconomica: Grice: “The
oikos is the house – and a house is not a home unless there’s a cat around.” --
the study of methodological issues facing positive economic theory and
normative problems on the intersection of welfare economics and political
philosophy. Methodological issues. Applying approaches and questions in the
philosophy of science specifically to economics, the philosophy of economics
explores epistemological and conceptual problems raised by the explanatory aims
and strategy of economic theory: Do its assumptions about individual choice
constitute laws, and do they explain its derived generalizations about markets
and economies? Are these generalizations laws, and if so, how are they tested
by observation of economic processes, and how are theories in the various
compartments of economics
microeconomics, macroeconomics
related to one another and to econometrics? How are the various
schools neoclassical, institutional,
Marxian, etc. related to one another,
and what sorts of tests might enable us to choose between their theories?
Historically, the chief issue of interest in the development of the philosophy
of economics has been the empirical adequacy of the assumptions of rational
“economic man”: that all agents have complete and transitive cardinal or
ordinal utility rankings or preference orders and that they always choose that
available option which maximizes their utility or preferences. Since the actual
behavior of agents appears to disconfirm these assumptions, the claim that they
constitute causal laws governing economic behavior is difficult to sustain. On
the other hand, the assumption of preference-maximizing behavior is
indispensable to twentieth-century economics. These two considerations jointly
undermine the claim that economic theory honors criteria on explanatory power
and evidential probity drawn philosophy of economics philosophy of economics
669 669 from physical science. Much
work by economists and philosophers has been devoted therefore to disputing the
claim that the assumptions of rational choice theory are false or to disputing
the inference from this claim to the conclusion that the cognitive status of
economic theory as empirical science is thereby undermined. Most frequently it
has been held that the assumptions of rational choice are as harmless and as
indispensable as idealizations are elsewhere in science. This view must deal
with the allegation that unlike theories embodying idealization elsewhere in
science, economic theory gains little more in predictive power from these
assumptions about agents’ calculations than it would secure without any
assumptions about individual choice. Normative issues. Both economists and
political philosophers are concerned with identifying principles that will
ensure just, fair, or equitable distributions of scarce goods. For this reason
neoclassical economic theory shares a history with utilitarianism in moral
philosophy. Contemporary welfare economics continues to explore the limits of
utilitarian prescriptions that optimal economic and political arrangements
should maximize and/or equalize utility, welfare, or some surrogate. It also
examines the adequacy of alternatives to such utilitarian principles. Thus,
economics shares an agenda of interests with political and moral philosophy.
Utilitarianism in economics and philosophy has been constrained by an early
realization that utilities are neither cardinally measurable nor
interpersonally comparable. Therefore the prescription to maximize and/or
equalize utility cannot be determinatively obeyed. Welfare theorists have nevertheless
attempted to establish principles that will enable us to determine the equity,
fairness, or justice of various economic arrangements, and that do not rely on
interpersonal comparisons required to measure whether a distribution is maximal
or equal in the utility it accords all agents. Inspired by philosophers who
have surrendered utilitarianism for other principles of equality, fairness, or
justice in distribution, welfare economists have explored Kantian, social
contractarian, and communitarian alternatives in a research program that cuts
clearly across both disciplines. Political philosophy has also profited as much
from innovations in economic theory as welfare economics has benefited from
moral philosophy. Theorems from welfare economics that establish the efficiency
of markets in securing distributions that meet minimal conditions of optimality
and fairness have led moral philosophers to reexamine the moral status of
free-market exchange. Moreover, philosophers have come to appreciate that coercive
social institutions are sometimes best understood as devices for securing
public goods goods like police
protection that cannot be provided to those who pay for them without also
providing them to free riders who decline to do so. The recognition that
everyone would be worse off, including free riders, were the coercion required
to pay for these goods not imposed, is due to welfare economics and has led to
a significant revival of interest in the work of Hobbes, who appears to have
prefigured such arguments.
philosophy of education: Grice: “To teach
is not the opposite of learn, even if The Wind in The Willows thus suggests. –
“ “To teach is etymologically, to ‘show, -- the ensign – To educate is of
course to guide, to lead, to conduce. Grice: “I taught Peters all he needed to
know about this!” -- a branch of philosophy concerned with virtually every
aspect of the educational enterprise. It significantly overlaps other, more
mainstream branches especially epistemology and ethics, but even logic and
metaphysics. The field might almost be construed as a “series of footnotes” to
Plato’s Meno, wherein are raised such fundamental issues as whether virtue can
be taught; what virtue is; what knowledge is; what the relation between
knowledge of virtue and being virtuous is; what the relation between knowledge
and teaching is; and how and whether teaching is possible. While few people
would subscribe to Plato’s doctrine or convenient fiction, perhaps in Meno that
learning by being taught is a process of recollection, the paradox of inquiry
that prompts this doctrine is at once the root text of the perennial debate
between rationalism and empiricism and a profoundly unsettling indication that
teaching passeth understanding. Mainstream philosophical topics considered
within an educational context tend to take on a decidedly genetic cast. So,
e.g., epistemology, which analytic philosophy has tended to view as a
justificatory enterprise, becomes concerned if not with the historical origins
of knowledge claims then with their genesis within the mental economy of
persons generally in consequence of
their educations. And even when philosophers of education come to endorse
something akin to Plato’s classic account of knowledge as justified true
belief, they are inclined to suggest, then, that the conveyance of knowledge
via instruction must somehow provide the student with the justification along
with the true philosophy of education philosophy of education 670 670 belief
thereby reintroducing a genetic dimension to a topic long lacking one.
Perhaps, indeed, analytic philosophy’s general though not universal neglect of
philosophy of education is traceable in some measure to the latter’s almost
inevitably genetic perspective, which the former tended to decry as armchair
science and as a threat to the autonomy and integrity of proper philosophical
inquiry. If this has been a basis for neglect, then philosophy’s more recent,
postanalytic turn toward naturalized inquiries that reject any dichotomy
between empirical and philosophical investigations may make philosophy of
education a more inviting area. Alfred North Whitehead, himself a leading light
in the philosophy of education, once remarked that we are living in the period
of educational thought subject to the influence of Dewey, and there is still no
denying the observation. Dewey’s instrumentalism, his special brand of
pragmatism, informs his extraordinarily comprehensive progressive philosophy of
education; and he once went so far as to define all of philosophy as the
general theory of education. He identifies the educative process with the
growth of experience, with growing as developing where experience is to be understood more in
active terms, as involving doing things that change one’s objective environment
and internal conditions, than in the passive terms, say, of Locke’s
“impression” model of experience. Even traditionalistic philosophers of
education, most notably Maritain, have acknowledged the wisdom of Deweyan
educational means, and have, in the face of Dewey’s commanding philosophical
presence, reframed the debate with progressivists as one about appropriate
educational ends thereby insufficiently
acknowledging Dewey’s trenchant critique of the meansend distinction. And even
some recent analytic philosophers of education, such as R. S. Peters, can be
read as if translating Deweyan insights e.g., about the aim of education into
an analytic idiom. Analytic philosophy of education, as charted by Oxford
philosopher R. S. Peters, Israel Scheffler, and others in the Anglo-
philosophical tradition, has used the tools of linguistic analysis on a wide
variety of educational concepts learning, teaching, training, conditioning,
indoctrinating, etc. and investigated their interconnections: Does teaching
entail learning? Does teaching inevitably involve indoctrinating? etc. This
careful, subtle, and philosophically sophisticated work has made possible a
much-needed conceptual precision in educational debates, though the debaters
who most influence public opinion and policy have rarely availed themselves of
that precisification. Recent work in philosophy of education, however, has
taken up some major educational objectives
moral and other values, critical and creative thinking in a way that promises to have an impact on
the actual conduct of education. Philosophy of education, long isolated in
schools of education from the rest of the academic philosophical community, has
also been somewhat estranged from the professional educational mainstream.
Dewey would surely have approved of a change in this status quo. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Peters and I.”
philosophical historian: philosophical
historian – Grice as – longitudinal unity -- Danto, A. C. philosopher of art
and art history who has also contributed to the philosophies of history,
action, knowledge, science, and metaphilosophy. Among his influential studies
in the history of philosophy are books on Nietzsche, Sartre, and thought. Danto arrives at his philosophy of
art through his “method of indiscernibles,” which has greatly influenced
contemporary philosophical aesthetics. According to his metaphilosophy, genuine
philosophical questions arise when there is a theoretical need to differentiate
two things that are perceptually indiscernible
such as prudential actions versus moral actions Kant, causal chains
versus constant conjunctions Hume, and perfect dreams versus reality Descartes.
Applying the method to the philosophy of art, Danto asks what distinguishes an
artwork, such as Warhol’s Brillo Box, from its perceptually indiscernible,
real-world counterparts, such as Brillo boxes by Proctor and Gamble. His
answer his partial definition of
art is that x is a work of art only if 1
x is about something and 2 x embodies its meaning i.e., discovers a mode of
presentation intended to be appropriate to whatever subject x is about. These
two necessary conditions, Danto claims, enable us to distinguish between
artworks and real things between
Warhol’s Brillo Box and Proctor and Gamble’s. However, critics have pointed out
that these conditions fail, since real Brillo boxes are about something Brillo
about which they embody or convey meanings through their mode of presentation
viz., that Brillo is clean, fresh, and dynamic. Moreover, this is not an
isolated example. Danto’s theory of art confronts systematic difficulties in
differentiating real cultural artifacts, such as industrial packages, from
artworks proper. In addition to his philosophy of art, Danto proposes a
philosophy of art history. Like Hegel, Danto maintains that art history as a developmental, progressive process has ended. Danto believes that modern art has
been primarily reflexive i.e., about itself; it has attempted to use its own
forms and strategies to disclose the essential nature of art. Cubism and
abstract expressionism, for example, exhibit saliently the two-dimensional
nature of painting. With each experiment, modern art has gotten closer to
disclosing its own essence. But, Danto argues, with works such as Warhol’s
Brillo Box, artists have taken the philosophical project of self-definition as
far as they can, since once an artist like Warhol has shown that artworks can
be perceptually indiscernible from “real things” and, therefore, can look like
anything, there is nothing further that the artist qua artist can show through
the medium of appearances about the nature of art. The task of defining art
must be reassigned to philosophers to be treated discursively, and art
history as the developmental,
progressive narrative of self-definition
ends. Since that turn of events was putatively precipitated by Warhol in
the 0s, Danto calls the present period of art making “post-historical.” As an
art critic for The Nation, he has been chronicling its vicissitudes for a
decade and a half. Some dissenters, nevertheless, have been unhappy with
Danto’s claim that art history has ended because, they maintain, he has failed
to demonstrate that the only prospects for a developmental, progressive history
of art reside in the project of the self-definition of art. “There are two concerns
by the philosopher with history – the history of philosophy as a philosophical
discipline – and the philosophy of history per se. In the latter, in what way
can we say that decapitation willed the death of Charles II?” – Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “Philosophy’s Two Co-Ordinate Unities: Lat. and Long.,” “Kantotle or
Ariskant? The Co-Ordinate Unity of Philosophy.” Grice is more interested in
philosophical historiography than history itself! He makes some hypotheses
about the movement he belonged to, and he hoped that what he had to say related
to what he called Athenian dialectic! In stressing the ‘continuity,’ or unity,
of philosophy both latitudinal and longidtudinal, Grice is inviting
historiography as more than ancilla philosophiae. This at a time when analyticd
philowophers, mainly in the New World, “where they really lack a history,” were
propagating the slogan that to philosophise is NOT do to history of
philosophy!” philosophy of history, the philosophical study of human history
and of attempts to record and interpret it. ‘History’ in English and its
equivalent in most modern European languages has two primary senses: 1 the
temporal progression of large-scale human events and actions, primarily but not
exclusively in the past; and 2 the discipline or inquiry in which knowledge of
the human past is acquired or sought. This has led to two senses of ‘philosophy
of history’, depending on which “history” has been the object of philosophers’
attentions. Philosophy of history in the first sense is often called substantive
or speculative, and placed under metaphysics. Philosophy of history in the
second sense is called critical or analytic and can be placed in epistemology.
Substantive philosophy of history. In the West, substantive philosophy of
history is thought to begin only in the Christian era. In the City of God,
Augustine wonders why Rome flourished while pagan, yet fell into disgrace after
its conversion to Christiantity. Divine reward and punishment should apply to
whole peoples, not just to individuals. The unfolding of events in history
should exhibit a plan that is intelligible rationally, morally, and for
Augustine theologically. As a believer Augustine is convinced that there is
such a plan, though it may not always be evident. In the modern period, philosophers
such as Vico and Herder also sought such intelligibility in history. They also
believed in a long-term direction or purpose of history that is often opposed
to and makes use of the purposes of individuals. The most elaborate and
best-known example of this approach is found in Hegel, who thought that the
gradual realization of human freedom could be discerned in history even if much
slavery, tyranny, and suffering are necessary in the process. Marx, too,
claimed to know the laws in his case
economic according to which history
unfolds. Similar searches for overall “meaning” in human history have been
undertaken in the twentieth century, notably by Arnold Toynbee 95, author of
the twelve-volume Study of History, and Oswald Spengler 06, author of Decline
of the West. But the whole enterprise was denounced by the positivists and
neo-Kantians of the late nineteenth century as irresponsible metaphysical
speculation. This attitude was shared by twentieth-century neopositivists and
some of their heirs in the analytic tradition. There is some irony in this,
since positivism, explicitly in thinkers like Comte and implicitly in others,
involves belief in progressively enlightened stages of human history crowned by
the modern age of science. Critical philosophy of history. The critical
philosophy of history, i.e., the epistemology of historical knowledge, can be
traced to the late nineteenth century and has been dominated by the paradigm of
the natural sciences. Those in the positivist, neopositivist, and postpositivist
tradition, in keeping with the idea of the unity of science, believe that to
know the historical past is to explain events causally, and all causal
explanation is ultimately of the same sort. To explain human events is to
derive them from laws, which may be social, psychological, and perhaps
ultimately biological and physical. Against this reductionism, the neo-Kantians
and Dilthey argued that history, like other humanistic disciplines
Geisteswissenschaften, follows irreducible rules of its own. It is concerned
with particular events or developments for their own sake, not as instances of
general laws, and its aim is to understand, rather than explain, human actions.
This debate was resurrected in the twentieth century in the English-speaking
world. Philosophers like Hempel and Morton White b.7 elaborated on the notion
of causal explanation in history, while Collingwood and William Dray b.1
described the “understanding” of historical agents as grasping the thought
behind an action or discovering its reasons rather than its causes. The
comparison with natural science, and the debate between reductionists and
antireductionists, dominated other questions as well: Can or should history be
objective and valuefree, as science purportedly is? What is the significance of
the fact that historians can never perceive the events that interest them,
since they are in the past? Are they not limited by their point of view, their
place in history, in a way scientists are not? Some positivists were inclined
to exclude history from science, rather than make it into one, relegating it to
“literature” because it could never meet the standards of objectivity and
genuine explanation; it was often the anti-positivists who defended the
cognitive legitimacy of our knowledge of the past. In the non-reductionist
tradition, philosophers have increasingly stressed the narrative character of
history: to understand human actions generally, and past actions in particular,
is to tell a coherent story about them. History, according to W. B. Gallie b.2,
is a species of the genus Story. History does not thereby become fiction:
narrative remains a “cognitive instrument” Louis Mink, 183 just as appropriate
to its domain as theory construction is to science. Nevertheless, concepts
previously associated with fictional narratives, such as plot structure and
beginning-middle-end, are seen as applying to historical narratives as well.
This tradition is carried further by Hayden White b.8, who analyzes classical
nineteenth-century histories and even substantive philosophies of history such
as Hegel’s as instances of romance, comedy, tragedy, and satire. In White’s
work this mode of analysis leads him to some skepticism about history’s
capacity to “represent” the reality of the past: narratives seem to be imposed
upon the data, often for ideological reasons, rather than drawn from them. To
some extent White’s view joins that of some positivists who believe that
history’s literary character excludes it from the realm of science. But for
White this is hardly a defect. Some philosophers have criticized the emphasis
on narrative in discussions of history, since it neglects search and discovery,
deciphering and evaluating sources, etc., which is more important to historians
than the way they “write up” their results. Furthermore, not all history is
presented in narrative form. The debate between pro- and anti-narrativists
among philosophers of history has its parallel in a similar debate among
historians themselves. Academic history in recent times has seen a strong turn
away from traditional political history toward social, cultural, and economic
analyses of the human past. Narrative is associated with the supposedly
outmoded focus on the doings of kings, popes, and generals. These are
considered e.g. by the historian Fernand
Braudel, 285 merely surface ripples compared to the deeper-lying and
slower-moving currents of social and economic change. It is the methods and
concepts of the social sciences, not the art of the storyteller, on which the
historian must draw. This debate has now lost some of its steam and narrative
history has made something of a comeback among historians. Among philosophers
Paul Ricoeur has tried to show that even ostensibly non-narrative history
retains narrative features. Historicity. Historicity or historicality:
Geschichtlichkeit is a term used in the phenomenological and hermeneutic
tradition from Dilthey and Husserl through Heidegger and Gadamer to indicate an
essential feature of human existence. Persons are not merely in history; their
past, including their social past, figures in their conception of themselves
and their future possibilities. Some awareness of the past is thus constitutive
of the self, prior to being formed into a cognitive discipine. Modernism and
the postmodern. It is possible to view some of the debates over the modern and
postmodern in recent Continental philosophy as a new kind of philosophy of
history. Philosophers like Lyotard and Foucault see the modern as the period
from the Enlightenment and Romanticism to the present, characterized chiefly by
belief in “grand narratives” of historical progress, whether capitalist,
Marxist, or positivist, with “man” as the triumphant hero of the story. Such
belief is now being or should be abandoned, bringing modernism to an end. In
one sense this is like earlier attacks on the substantive philosophy of
history, since it unmasks as unjustified moralizing certain beliefs about
large-scale patterns in history. It goes even further than the earlier attack,
since it finds these beliefs at work even where they are not explicitly
expressed. In another sense this is a continuation of the substantive
philosophy of history, since it makes its own grand claims about largescale
historical patterns. In this it joins hands with other philosophers of our day
in a general historicization of knowledge e.g., the philosophy of science
merges with the history of science and even of philosophy itself. Thus the
later Heidegger and more recently
Richard Rorty view philosophy itself as
a large-scale episode in Western history that is nearing or has reached its
end. Philosophy thus merges with the history of philosophy, but only thanks to
a philosophical reflection on this history as part of history as a whole.
jus: prudentia iuris,
iuris-prudentia, iurisprudentia -- Jurisprudence – Grice: “The root of ‘juris’
is an interesting one – before Hart and his legalese, it was all about ethics’!”
The Roman expression ‘jus,’ not to be confused with
‘jus,’ which meant ‘juice,’ as in ‘orange juice,’ is kindred with Sanscrit,
“yu,” to join; cf. ζεύγνυμι, and jungo,
qs. the binding, obliging; in this way, it compares with “lex,” which derives
from “ligo,” -- right, law, justice. The ‘jungo’ gives the family of
expressions like ‘con-junctum,’ joined. The idea is that if you are bound, you
are obliged. -- Hartian
jurisprudence – Grice on Hartian jurisprudence -- philosophy of law, also called
general jurisprudence, the study of conceptual and theoretical problems
concerning the nature of law as such, or common to any legal system. Problems
in the philosophy of law fall roughly into two groups. The first contains
problems internal to law and legal systems as such. These include a the nature
of legal rules; the conditions under which they can be said to exist and to
influence practice; their normative character, as mandatory or advisory; and
the indeterminacy of their language; b the structure and logical character of
legal norms; the analysis of legal principles as a class of legal norms; and
the relation between the normative force of law and coercion; c the identity
conditions for legal systems; when a legal system exists; and when one legal
system ends and another begins; d the nature of the reasoning used by courts in
adjudicating cases; e the justification of legal decisions; whether legal
justification is through a chain of inferences or by the coherence of norms and
decisions; and the relation between intralegal and extralegal justification; f
the nature of legal validity and of what makes a norm a valid law; the relation
between validity and efficacy, the fact that the norms of a legal system are
obeyed by the norm-subjects; g properties of legal systems, including
comprehensiveness the claim to regulate any behavior and completeness the
absence of gaps in the law; h legal rights; under what conditions citizens
possess them; and their analytical structure as protected normative positions;
i legal interpretation; whether it is a pervasive feature of law or is found
only in certain kinds of adjudication; its rationality or otherwise; and its
essentially ideological character or otherwise. The second group of problems
concerns the philosophy of law philosophy of law 676 676 relation between law as one particular
social institution in a society and the wider political and moral life of that
society: a the nature of legal obligation; whether there is an obligation,
prima facie or final, to obey the law as such; whether there is an obligation
to obey the law only when certain standards are met, and if so, what those
standards might be; b the authority of law; and the conditions under which a
legal system has political or moral authority or legitimacy; c the functions of
law; whether there are functions performed by a legal system in a society that
are internal to the design of law; and analyses from the perspective of
political morality of the functioning of legal systems; d the legal concept of
responsibility; its analysis and its relation to moral and political concepts
of responsibility; in particular, the place of mental elements and causal
elements in the assignment of responsibility, and the analysis of those
elements; e the analysis and justification of legal punishment; f legal
liberty, and the proper limits or otherwise of the intrusion of the legal
system into individual liberty; the plausibility of legal moralism; g the
relation between law and justice, and the role of a legal system in the
maintenance of social justice; h the relation between legal rights and
political or moral rights; i the status of legal reasoning as a species of
practical reasoning; and the relation between law and practical reason; j law
and economics; whether legal decision making in fact tracks, or otherwise ought
to track, economic efficiency; k legal systems as sources of and embodiments of
political power; and law as essentially gendered, or imbued with race or class
biases, or otherwise. Theoretical positions in the philosophy of law tend to
group into three large kinds legal
positivism, natural law, and legal realism. Legal positivism concentrates on
the first set of problems, and typically gives formal or content-independent
solutions to such problems. For example, legal positivism tends to regard legal
validity as a property of a legal rule that the rule derives merely from its
formal relation to other legal rules; a morally iniquitous law is still for
legal positivism a valid legal rule if it satisfies the required formal
existence conditions. Legal rights exist as normative consequences of valid
legal rules; no questions of the status of the right from the point of view of
political morality arise. Legal positivism does not deny the importance of the
second set of problems, but assigns the task of treating them to other
disciplines political philosophy, moral
philosophy, sociology, psychology, and so forth. Questions of how society
should design its legal institutions, for legal positivism, are not technically
speaking problems in the philosophy of law, although many legal positivists
have presented their theories about such questions. Natural law theory and
legal realism, by contrast, regard the sharp distinction between the two kinds
of problem as an artifact of legal positivism itself. Their answers to the
first set of problems tend to be substantive or content-dependent. Natural law
theory, for example, would regard the question of whether a law was consonant
with practical reason, or whether a legal system was morally and politically
legitimate, as in whole or in part determinative of the issue of legal
validity, or of whether a legal norm granted a legal right. The theory would
regard the relation between a legal system and liberty or justice as in whole
or in part determinative of the normative force and the justification for that
system and its laws. Legal realism, especially in its contemporary politicized
form, sees the claimed role of the law in legitimizing certain gender, race, or
class interests as the prime salient property of law for theoretical analysis,
and questions of the determinacy of legal rules or of legal interpretation or
legal right as of value only in the service of the project of explaining the
political power of law and legal systems. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Does Oxford need
a chair of jurisprudence” – symposium with H. L. A. Hart, conducted on the
Saturday morning following Hart’s appointment as chair of jurisprudence.”
Literae humaniores. Grice took
‘literature’ seriously. “After all, I am a Lit. Hum. master! And previously a
Lit. Hum. BACHELOR” – He made a strict distinction, seeing that at Oxford, a
master can do things a bachelor cannot – like marry! philosophy of literature:
Grice: “When I got my Masters in Literae Humaniores, the more human letters, my
mather said – which are the less human ones?” -- literary theory. However,
while the literary theorist, who is often a literary critic, is primarily
interested in the conceptual foundations of practical criticism, philosophy of
literature, usually done by philosophers, is more often concerned to place
literature in the context of a philosophical system. Plato’s dialogues have
much to say about poetry, mostly by way of aligning it with Plato’s
metaphysical, epistemological, and ethico-political views. Aristotle’s Poetics,
the earliest example of literary theory in the West, is also an attempt to
accommodate the practice of Grecian poets to Aristotle’s philosophical system
as a whole. Drawing on the thought of philosophers like Kant and Schelling,
Samuel Taylor Coleridge offers in his Biographia Literaria a philosophy of
literature that is to Romantic poetics what Aristotle’s treatise is to
classical poetics: a literary theory that is confirmed both by the poets whose
work it legitimates and by the metaphysics that recommends it. Many
philosophers, among them Hume, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, and Sartre, have tried
to make room for literature in their philosophical edifices. Some philosophers,
e.g., the G. Romantics, have made literature and the other arts the cornerstone
of philosophy itself. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The
Literary Absolute, 8. Sometimes ‘philosophy of literature’ is understood in a
second sense: philosophy and literature; i.e., philosophy and literature taken
to be distinct and essentially autonomous activities that may nonetheless
sustain determinate relations to each other. Philosophy of literature,
understood in this way, is the attempt to identify the differentiae that
distinguish philosophy from literature and to specify their relationships to
each other. Sometimes the two are distinguished by their subject matter e.g.,
philosophy deals with objective structures, literature with subjectivity,
sometimes by their methods philosophy is an act of reason, literature the
product of imagination, inspiration, or the unconscious, sometimes by their
effects philosophy produces knowledge, literature produces emotional
fulfillment or release, etc. Their relationships then tend to occupy the areas
in which they are not essentially distinct. If their subject matters are
distinct, their effects may be the same philosophy and literature both produce
understanding, the one of fact and the other of feeling; if their methods are
distinct, they may be approaching the same subject matter in different ways;
and so on. For Aquinas, e.g., philosophy and poetry may deal with the same
objects, the one communicating truth about the object in syllogistic form, the
other inspiring feelings about it through figurative language. For Heidegger,
the philosopher investigates the meaning of being while the poet names the
holy, but their preoccupations tend to converge at the deepest levels of
thinking. For Sartre, literature is philosophy engagé, existential-political
activity in the service of freedom. ’Philosophy of literature’ may also be
taken in a third sense: philosophy in literature, the attempt to discover
matters of philosophical interest and value in literary texts. The philosopher
may undertake to identify, examine, and evaluate the philosophical content of
literary texts that contain expressions of philosophical ideas and discussions
of philosophical problems e.g., the debates
on free will and theodicy in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. Many
if not most courses on philosophy of
literature are taught from this point of view. Much interesting and important
work has been done in this vein; e.g., Santayana’s Three Philosophical Poets 0,
Cavell’s essays on Emerson and Thoreau, and Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge 9. It
should be noted, however, that to approach the matter in this way presupposes
that literature and philosophy are simply different forms of the same content:
what philosophy expresses in the form of argument literature expresses in
lyric, dramatic, or narrative form. The philosopher’s treatment of literature
implies that he is uniquely positioned to explicate the subject matter treated
in both literary and philosophical texts, and that the language of philosophy
gives optimal expression to a content less adequately expressed in the language
of literature. The model for this approach may well be Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit, which treats art along with religion as imperfect adumbrations of a
truth that is fully and properly articulated only in the conceptual mode of
philosophical dialectic. Dissatisfaction with this presupposition and its
implicit privileging of philosophy over literature has led to a different view
of the relation between philosophy and literature and so to a different program
for philosophy of literature. The self-consciously literary form of
Kierkegaard’s writing is an integral part of his polemic against the
philosophical imperialism of the Hegelians. In this century, the work of
philosophers like Derrida and the philosophers and critics who follow his lead
suggests that it is mistaken to regard philosophy and literature as alternative
expressions of an identical content, and seriously mistaken to think of
philosophy as the master discourse, the “proper” expression of a content
“improperly” expressed in literature. All texts, on this view, have a
“literary” form, the texts of philosophers as well as the texts of novelists
and poets, and their content is internally determined by their “means of
expression.” There is just as much “literature in philosophy” as there is
“philosophy in literature.” Consequently, the philosopher of literature may no
longer be able simply to extract philosophical matter from literary form.
Rather, the modes of literary expression confront the philosopher with problems
that bear on the presuppositions of his own enterprise. E.g., fictional mimesis
especially in the works of postmodern writers raises questions about the
possibility and the prephilosophy of literature philosophy of literature
678 678 philosophy of logic philosophy
of logic 679 sumed normativeness of factual representation, and in so doing
tends to undermine the traditional hierarchy that elevates “fact” over
“fiction.” Philosophers’ perplexity over the truth-value of fictional
statements is an example of the kind of problems the study of literature can
create for the practice of philosophy see Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 2,
ch. 7. Or again, the self-reflexivity of contemporary literary texts can lead
philosophers to reflect critically on their own undertaking and may seriously
unsettle traditional notions of self-referentiality. When it is not regarded as
another, attractive but perhaps inferior source of philosophical ideas,
literature presents the philosopher with epistemological, metaphysical, and
methodological problems not encountered in the course of “normal”
philosophizing. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Why a philosopher is a literary soul at
Oxford: the etymological meaning of ‘literae humaniores.’”
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