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Wednesday, July 29, 2020

IMPLICATVRA -- in 16 volumes, vol. 8


gramsci: a. political leader whose imprisonment by the Fascists for his involvement with the Communist Party had the ironical result of sparing him from Stalinism and enabling him to better articulate his distinctive political philosophy. Gramsci welcomes the Bolshevik Revolution as a “revolution against Capital” rather than against capitalism: as a revolution refuting the deterministic Marxism according to which socialism could arise only by the gradual evolution of capitalism, and confirming the possibility of the radical transformation of social institutions. In 1 he supported creation of the  Communist Party; as its general secretary from 4, he tried to reorganize it along more democratic lines. In 6 the Fascists outlawed all opposition parties. Gramsci spent the rest of his life in various prisons, where he wrote more than a thousand s of notes ranging from a few lines to chapterlength essays. These Prison Notebooks pose a major interpretive challenge, but they reveal a keen, insightful, and open mind grappling with important social and political problems. The most common interpretation stems from Palmiro Togliatti, Gramsci’s successor as leader of  the  Communists. After the fall of Fascism and the end of World War II, Togliatti read into Gramsci the so-called  road to socialism: a strategy for attaining the traditional Marxist goals of the classless society and the nationalization of the means of production by cultural means, such as education and persuasion. In contrast to Bolshevism, one had to first conquer social institutions, and then their control would yield the desired economic and political changes. This democratic theory of Marxist revolution was long regarded by many as especially relevant to Western industrial societies, and so for this and other reasons Gramsci is a key figure of Western Marxism. The same theory is often called Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, referring to a relationship between two political units where one dominates the other with the consent of that other. This interpretation was a political reconstruction, based primarily on Gramsci’s Communist involvement and on highly selective passages from the Notebooks. It was also based on exaggerating the influence on Gramsci of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Gentile, and minimizing influences like Croce, Mosca, Machiavelli, and Hegel. No new consensus has emerged yet; it would have to be based on analytical and historical spadework barely begun. One main interpretive issue is whether Gramsci, besides questioning the means, was also led to question the ends of traditional Marxism. In one view, his commitment to rational persuasion, political realism, methodological fallibilism, democracy, and pluralism is much deeper than his inclinations toward the classless society, the abolition of private property, the bureaucratically centralized party, and the like; in particular, his pluralism is an aspect of his commitment to the dialectic as a way of thinking, a concept he adapted from Hegel through Croce.  Antonio Gramsci, nome completo, così come registrato nell'atto di battesimo, Antonio Sebastiano Francesco Gramsci[1] (Ales, 22 gennaio 1891 – Roma, 27 aprile 1937), è stato un politico, filosofo, politologo, giornalista, linguista e critico letterario italiano. Nel 1921 fu tra i fondatori del Partito Comunista d'Italia, divenendone esponente di primo piano e segretario dal 1924 al 1927, ma nel 1926 venne ristretto dal regime fascista nel carcere di Turi. Nel 1934, in seguito al grave deterioramento delle sue condizioni di salute, ottenne la libertà condizionata e fu ricoverato in clinica, dove trascorse gli ultimi anni di vita.  Considerato uno dei più importanti pensatori del XX secolo, nei suoi scritti, tra i più originali della tradizione filosofica marxista, Gramsci analizzò la struttura culturale e politica della società. Elaborò in particolare il concetto di egemonia, secondo il quale le classi dominanti impongono i propri valori politici, intellettuali e morali a tutta la società, con l'obiettivo di saldare e gestire il potere intorno a un senso comune condiviso da tutte le classi sociali, comprese quelle subalterne. Gli antenati paterni di Antonio Gramsci erano originari della città di Gramshi in Albania, e potrebbero essere giunti in Italia fin dal XVI secolo, durante la diaspora albanese causata dall'invasione turca. Documenti d'archivio attestano che nel Settecento il trisavolo Gennaro Gramsci, sposato con Domenica Blajotta, possedeva a Plataci, comunità ‘’arbëreshë’’ del distretto di Castrovillari, delle terre poi ereditate da Nicola Gramsci (1769-1824). Questi sposò Maria Francesca Fabbricatore, e dal loro matrimonio nacque a Plataci Gennaro Gramsci (1812-1873), che intraprese la carriera militare nella gendarmeria del Regno di Napoli e, quando era di stanza a Gaeta, sposò Teresa Gonzales, figlia di un avvocato napoletano di origini spagnole. Il loro secondo figlio fu Francesco (1860-1937), il padre di Antonio Gramsci.[2][3]  Le origini albanesi erano conosciute dallo stesso Antonio Gramsci, che tuttavia le immaginava più recenti, come scriverà alla cognata Tatiana Schucht dal carcere di Turi, il 12 ottobre del 1931:  «[...] io stesso non ho alcuna razza; mio padre è di origine albanese (la famiglia scappò dall'Epiro durante la guerra del 1821, ma si italianizzò rapidamente). Tuttavia la mia cultura è italiana, fondamentalmente questo è il mio mondo; non mi sono mai accorto di essere dilaniato tra due mondi. L'essere io oriundo albanese non fu messo in giuoco perché anche Crispi era albanese, educato in un collegio albanese.»   Ghilarza: casa museo Antonio Gramsci Francesco era studente in legge quando morì il padre; dovendo trovare subito un lavoro, nel 1881 partì per la Sardegna per impiegarsi nell'Ufficio del registro di Ghilarza. In questo paese, che allora contava circa 2.200 abitanti, conobbe Giuseppina Marcias (1861-1932), figlia di un esattore delle imposte e proprietario di alcune terre. La sposò nel 1883, malgrado l'opposizione dei familiari, rimasti in Campania, che consideravano i Marcias una famiglia di rango inferiore alla propria dal punto di vista sociale e culturale: Giuseppina aveva studiato fino alla terza elementare. Dal matrimonio nascerà Gennaro (1884-1965) e, dopo che Francesco Gramsci fu trasferito da Ghilarza ad Ales, Grazietta (1887-1962), Emma (1889-1920).[1] Antonio Gramsci nasce ad Ales secondo il registro delle nascite dello stato civile del comune il 22 gennaio 1891 e registrato con i nomi di Antonio, Francesco; secondo il registro dei battesimi della parrocchia di San Pietro e Paolo nasce il giorno dopo, il 23 gennaio 1891, e viene registrato con i nomi di Antonio, Sebastiano, Francesco.[4]  Sette mesi dopo la nascita di Antonio, Francesco Gramsci fu trasferito, come gerente dell'Ufficio del Registro, a Sorgono e qui nacquero gli altri figli, Mario (1893-1945), Teresina (1895-1976) e Carlo (1897-1968).[5] Antonio a due anni si ammalò del morbo di Pott, una tubercolosi ossea che in pochi anni gli deformò la colonna vertebrale e gli impedì una normale crescita: adulto, Gramsci non supererà il metro e mezzo di altezza; i genitori pensavano che la sua deformità fosse la conseguenza di una caduta e anche Antonio rimase convinto di quella spiegazione. Ebbe sempre una salute delicata: a quattro anni, soffrendo di emorragie e convulsioni, fu dato per spacciato dai medici, tanto che la madre comprò la bara e il vestito per la sepoltura.[6]  Il padre Francesco fu arrestato il 9 agosto 1898, con l'accusa di peculato, concussione e falsità in atti, e il 27 ottobre 1900 venne condannato al minimo della pena con l'attenuante del «lieve valore»: 5 anni, 8 mesi e 22 giorni di carcere, da scontare a Gaeta; priva del sostegno dello stipendio del padre, la famiglia Gramsci trascorse anni di estrema miseria, che la madre affrontò vendendo la sua parte di eredità, tenendo a pensione il veterinario del paese e guadagnando qualche soldo cucendo camicie.[7] Proprio per le sue delicate condizioni di salute Antonio cominciò a frequentare la scuola elementare soltanto a sette anni: la concluse nel 1903 con il massimo dei voti, ma la situazione familiare non gli permise di iscriversi al ginnasio. Già dall'estate precedente aveva iniziato a dare il suo contributo all'economia domestica lavorando 10 ore al giorno nell'Ufficio del catasto di Ghilarza per 9 lire al mese - l'equivalente di un chilo di pane al giorno - smuovendo «registri che pesavano più di me e molte notti piangevo di nascosto perché mi doleva tutto il corpo».[8]   Antonio Gramsci nel 1906 Il 31 gennaio 1904 Francesco Gramsci, grazie a un'amnistia, anticipò di tre mesi la fine della sua pena: inizialmente guadagnò qualcosa come segretario in un'assicurazione agricola, poi, riabilitato, fece il patrocinante in conciliatura e infine fu riassunto come scrivano nel vecchio Ufficio del catasto, dove lavorò per il resto della sua vita. Così, pur affrontando gli abituali sacrifici, i genitori poterono iscrivere il quindicenne Antonio nel Ginnasio comunale di Santu Lussurgiu, a 18 chilometri da Ghilarza, «un piccolo ginnasio in cui tre sedicenti professori sbrigavano, con molta faccia tosta, tutto l'insegnamento delle cinque classi».[9]  Con tale preparazione un poco avventurosa, riuscì tuttavia a prendere la licenza ginnasiale a Oristano nell'estate del 1908 e a iscriversi al Liceo classico Giovanni Maria Dettori di Cagliari, stando a pensione, prima in un appartamento in via Principe Amedeo 24, poi, l'anno dopo, in corso Vittorio Emanuele 149, insieme con il fratello Gennaro, il quale, terminato il servizio di leva a Torino, lavorava per cento lire al mese in una fabbrica di ghiaccio del capoluogo sardo.  La modesta preparazione ricevuta nel ginnasio si fece sentire, perché inizialmente Gramsci nelle diverse materie ottenne appena la sufficienza, ma riuscì a recuperare in fretta: del resto, leggere e studiare erano i suoi impegni costanti. Non si concedeva distrazioni, non soltanto perché avrebbe potuto permettersele solo con grandi sacrifici, ma anche perché l'unico vestito che possedeva, per lo più liso, non lo incoraggiava a frequentare né gli amici, né i locali pubblici.[10] A scuola, mostrò uno spiccato interesse per le discipline umanistiche e per lo studio della storia, anche perché il cattivo insegnamento ricevuto in matematica gli fece perdere l'interesse per la materia[11].  Nel frattempo, il giovane Gramsci, iniziò a seguire le vicende politiche. Il fratello Gennaro, che era tornato in Sardegna militante socialista, ai primi del 1911 divenne cassiere della Camera del lavoro e segretario della sezione socialista di Cagliari: «Una grande quantità di materiale propagandistico, libri, giornali, opuscoli, finiva a casa. Nino, che il più delle volte passava le sere chiuso in casa senza neanche un'uscita di pochi momenti, ci metteva poco a leggere quei libri e quei giornali».[12] Leggeva anche i romanzi popolari di Carolina Invernizio, di Anton Giulio Barrili e quelli di Grazia Deledda, ma questi ultimi non li apprezzava, considerando folkloristica la visione che della Sardegna aveva la scrittrice sarda; leggeva Il Marzocco e La Voce di Giuseppe Prezzolini, Papini, Emilio Cecchi «ma in cima alle sue raccomandazioni, quando mi chiedeva di ritagliare gli articoli e di custodirli nella cartella, stavano sempre Croce e Salvemini».[13]  Alla fine della seconda classe liceale, alla cattedra di lettere italiane del Liceo salì il professor Raffa Garzia, radicale e anticlericale, direttore de L'Unione Sarda, quotidiano legato alle istanze sarde, rappresentate, in Parlamento da Francesco Cocco-Ortu, allora impegnato in una dura opposizione al ministero di Luigi Luzzatti.[14] Gramsci instaurò con il Garzia un buon rapporto, che andava oltre il naturale discepolato: invitato ogni tanto a visitare la redazione del giornale, ricevette nell'estate del 1910 la tessera di giornalista, con l'invito a «inviare tutte le notizie di pubblico interesse»: e il 25 luglio Gramsci ebbe la soddisfazione di vedersi stampato il suo primo scritto pubblico, venticinque righe di cronaca ironica su un fatto avvenuto nel paese di Aidomaggiore.[15]  In un tema dell'ultimo anno di liceo, che ci è conservato, Gramsci scriveva, tra l'altro, che «Le guerre sono fatte per il commercio, non per la civiltà [...] la Rivoluzione francese ha abbattuto molti privilegi, ha sollevato molti oppressi; ma non ha fatto che sostituire una classe all'altra nel dominio. Però ha lasciato un grande ammaestramento: che i privilegi e le differenze sociali, essendo prodotto della società e non della natura, possono essere sorpassate».[16] La sua concezione socialista, qui chiaramente espressa, va unita, in questo periodo, all'adesione all'indipendentismo sardo[17], nel quale egli esprimeva, insieme con la denuncia delle condizioni di arretratezza dell'isola e delle disuguaglianze sociali, l'ostilità verso le classi privilegiate del continente, fra le quali venivano compresi, secondo una polemica mentalità di origine contadina, gli stessi operai, concepiti come una corporazione elitaria fra i lavoratori salariati.[18][19]  Poco dopo Gramsci conoscerà da vicino la realtà operaia di una grande città del Nord: nell'estate del 1911, il conseguimento della licenza liceale con una buona votazione - tutti otto e un nove in italiano - gli prospetta la possibilità di continuare gli studi all'Università. Nell'autunno del 1911, il Collegio Carlo Alberto di Torino bandì un concorso, riservato a tutti gli studenti poveri licenziati dai Licei del Regno, offrendo 39 borse di studio, ciascuna equivalente a 70 lire al mese per 10 mesi, per poter frequentare l'Università di Torino: Gramsci fu uno dei due studenti di Cagliari ammessi a sostenere gli esami a Torino. «Partii per Torino come se fossi in stato di sonnambulismo. Avevo 55 lire in tasca; avevo speso 45 lire per il viaggio in terza classe delle 100 avute da casa». Il 27 ottobre 1911 conclude gli esami: li supera classificandosi nono; al secondo posto è uno studente genovese venuto da Sassari, Palmiro Togliatti.  Si iscrive alla Facoltà di Lettere, ma le settanta lire al mese non bastano nemmeno per le spese di prima necessità: oltre alle tasse universitarie, deve pagare venticinque lire al mese per l'affitto della stanza di Lungo Dora Firenze 57, nel popolare quartiere di Porta Palazzo, e il costo della luce, della pulizia della biancheria, della carta e dell'inchiostro, e ci sono i pasti - «non meno di due lire alla più modesta trattoria» - e la legna e il carbone per il riscaldamento: privo anche di un cappotto, «la preoccupazione del freddo non mi permette di studiare, perché o passeggio nella camera per scaldarmi i piedi oppure devo stare imbacuccato perché non riesco a sostenere la prima gelata».[20] Sono frequenti le richieste di denaro alla famiglia che però, da parte sua, non se la passava di certo molto meglio.  L'Università degli Studi di Torino vantava professori di alto livello e di diversa formazione: Luigi Einaudi, Francesco Ruffini, Vincenzo Manzini, Pietro Toesca, Achille Loria, Gioele Solari e poi il giovane linguista Matteo Bartoli,[21] che si legò di amicizia con Gramsci, come fece anche l'incaricato di letteratura italiana Umberto Cosmo, contro il quale, nel 1920, indirizzò però un articolo violentemente polemico. Anni dopo, durante la dura esperienza in carcere, continuò comunque a ricordarlo con simpatia - «serbo del Cosmo un ricordo pieno di affetto e direi di venerazione [...] era e credo sia tuttora di una grande sincerità e dirittura morale con molte striature di quella ingenuità nativa che è propria dei grandi eruditi e studiosi»[22] - ricordando anche che, con questi e con molti altri intellettuali dei primi quindici anni del secolo, malgrado divergenze di varia natura, egli avesse questo in comune: «partecipavamo in tutto o in parte al movimento di riforma morale e intellettuale promosso in Italia da Benedetto Croce, il cui primo punto era questo, che l'uomo moderno può e deve vivere senza religione rivelata o positiva o mitologica o come altro si vuol dire. Questo punto anche oggi mi pare il maggior contributo alla cultura mondiale che abbiano dato gli intellettuali moderni italiani».[23]   Angelo Tasca Gramsci si ritrovò a casa per le elezioni politiche del 26 ottobre 1913, dopo la fine della guerra italo-turca contro l'Impero ottomano per la conquista della Libia; votavano per la prima volta anche gli analfabeti, ma la corruzione e le intimidazioni erano le stesse delle elezioni precedenti. In Sardegna, il timore che l'allargamento della base elettorale favorisse i socialisti portò al blocco delle candidature di tutte le forze politiche contro i candidati socialisti, indicati come il comune nemico da battere. In quest'obiettivo, "sardisti" e "non-sardisti" si trovarono d'accordo e deposero le vecchie polemiche. Gramsci scrisse di quest'esperienza elettorale al compagno di studi Angelo Tasca, giovane dirigente socialista torinese, il quale affermò che Gramsci «era stato molto colpito dalla trasformazione prodotta in quell'ambiente dalla partecipazione delle masse contadine alle elezioni, benché non sapessero e non potessero ancora servirsi per conto loro della nuova arma. Fu questo spettacolo, e la meditazione su di esso, che fece definitivamente di Gramsci un socialista».[24]  Tornò a Torino ai primi di novembre del 1913, andando ad affittare una stanza all'ultimo piano del palazzo di via San Massimo 14, oggi Monumento nazionale; dovrebbe datarsi a questo periodo la sua iscrizione al Partito socialista. Si trovò in ritardo con gli esami, con il rischio di perdere il contributo della borsa di studio, a causa di «una forma di anemia cerebrale che mi toglie la memoria, che mi devasta il cervello, che mi fa impazzire ora per ora, senza che mi riesca di trovare requie né passeggiando, né disteso sul letto, né disteso per terra a rotolarmi in certi momenti come un furibondo». Riconosciuto «afflitto da grave nevrosi» gli fu concesso di recuperare gli esami nella sessione di primavera.[25]  Prese anche lezioni private di filosofia dal professore Annibale Pastore, il quale scrisse poi che «il suo orientamento era originalmente crociano ma già mordeva il freno e non sapeva ancora come e perché staccarsi [...] voleva rendersi conto del processo formativo della cultura agli scopi della rivoluzione [...] come fa il pensare a far agire [...] come le idee diventano forze pratiche». Gramsci stesso scriverà di aver sentito anche la necessità di «superare un modo di vivere e di pensare arretrato, come quello che era proprio di un sardo del principio del secolo, per appropriarsi un modo di vivere e di pensare non più regionale e da villaggio, ma nazionale» ma anche «di provocare nella classe operaia il superamento di quel provincialismo alla rovescia della palla di piombo [come il Sud Italia era generalmente considerato nel Nord] che aveva le sue profonde radici nella tradizione riformistica e corporativa del movimento socialista».[26]  L'iscrizione al partito gli permise di superare in parte un lungo periodo di solitudine: ora frequentava i giovani compagni di partito, fra i quali erano Tasca, Togliatti, Terracini: «uscivamo spesso dalle riunioni di partito [...] mentre gli ultimi nottambuli si fermavano a sogguardarci [...] continuavamo le nostre discussioni, intramezzandole di propositi feroci, di scroscianti risate, di galoppate nel regno dell'impossibile e del sogno».[27]  Nell'Italia che ha dichiarato la propria neutralità nella Prima guerra mondiale in corso - neutralità affermata anche dal Partito socialista - scrive per la prima volta sul settimanale socialista torinese Il Grido del Popolo, il 31 ottobre 1914, l'articolo Neutralità attiva e operante in risposta a quello apparso il 18 ottobre sull'Avanti! di Mussolini Dalla neutralità assoluta alla neutralità attiva e operante,[28] senza però poter comprendere quale svolta politica stesse preparando l'allora importante e popolare esponente socialista.  Sostenne il 13 aprile 1915 quello che sarà, senza che lo sapesse ancora, il suo ultimo esame all'Università; il suo impegno politico si fece crescente con l'entrata in guerra dell'Italia e con il suo ingresso nella redazione torinese dell'Avanti!. Dal 1916 Gramsci trascorse gran parte delle sue giornate all'ultimo piano nel palazzo dell'Alleanza Cooperativa Torinese al numero 12 di corso Siccardi (oggi Galileo Ferraris), dove, in tre stanze, erano situate la sezione giovanile del partito socialista e le redazioni de Il Grido del Popolo e del foglio piemontese dell'Avanti!, che comprendeva la rubrica della cronaca torinese, Sotto la Mole; in entrambi i giornali Gramsci pubblicava di tutto, dai commenti sulla situazione interna ed estera agli interventi sulla vita di partito, dagli articoli di polemica politica alle note di costume, dalle recensioni dei libri alla critica teatrale.[29] Dirà più tardi di aver scritto in dieci anni di giornalismo «tante righe da poter costituire quindici o venti volumi di quattrocento pagine, ma esse erano scritte alla giornata e dovevano morire dopo la giornata»[30] e di aver contribuito «molto prima di Adriano Tilgher» a rendere popolare il teatro di Pirandello: «ho scritto sul Pirandello, dal 1915 al 1920, tanto da mettere insieme un volumetto di duecento pagine e allora le mie affermazioni erano originali e senza esempio: il Pirandello era o sopportato amabilmente o apertamente deriso».[31]  Della commedia di Pirandello Pensaci, Giacomino! scrisse che «è tutto uno sfogo di virtuosismo, di abilità letteraria, di luccichii discorsivi.[32] I tre atti corrono su un solo binario. I personaggi sono oggetto di fotografia piuttosto che di approfondimento psicologico: sono ritratti nella loro esteriorità più che in una intima ricreazione del loro essere morale. È questa del resto la caratteristica dell'arte di Luigi Pirandello, che coglie della vita la smorfia, più che il sorriso, il ridicolo, più che il comico: che osserva la vita con l'occhio fisico del letterato, più che con l'occhio simpatico dell'uomo artista e la deforma per un'abitudine ironica che è l'abitudine professionale più che visione sincera e spontanea», mentre considerò Liolà[33] «il prodotto migliore dell'energia letteraria di Luigi Pirandello. In esso il Pirandello è riuscito a spogliarsi delle sue abitudini retoriche. Il Pirandello è un umorista per partito preso [...] troppo spesso la prima intuizione dei suoi lavori viene a sommergersi in una palude retorica di una moralità inconsciamente predicatoria, e di molta verbosità inutile».  Il fu Mattia Pascal, secondo Gramsci, è una sorta di prima stesura del Liolà che, liberato dalla zavorra moralistica della vita, si è rinnovato diventando una pura rappresentazione, «una farsa che si riattacca ai drammi satireschi della Grecia antica, e che ha il suo corrispondente pittorico nell'arte figurativa vascolare [...] è una vita ingenua, rudemente sincera [...] una efflorescenza di paganesimo naturalistico, per il quale la vita, tutta la vita è bella, il lavoro è un'opera lieta, e la fecondità irresistibile prorompe da tutta la materia organica».  Severo fu invece il giudizio sul Così è (se vi pare):[34] dalla tesi - pseudologistica - che la verità in sé non esista, Pirandello «non ha saputo trarre dramma [...] e neppure motivo a rappresentazione viva e artistica di caratteri, di persone vive che abbiano un significato fantastico, se non logico. I tre atti di Pirandello sono un semplice fatto di letteratura [...] puro e semplice aggregato di parole che non creano né una verità né un'immagine [...] il vero dramma l'autore l'ha solo adombrato, l'ha accennato: è nei due pseudopazzi che non rappresentano però la loro vera vita, l'intima necessità dei loro atteggiamenti esteriori, ma sono presentati come pedine della dimostrazione logica». Rivolgendosi ai giovani, scrisse da solo il numero unico del giornale dei giovani socialisti La Città futura, uscito l'11 febbraio 1917. Qui mostra la sua intransigenza politica, la sua ironia, anche contro i socialisti riformisti, il fastidio verso ogni espressione retorica ma anche la sua formazione idealistica, i suoi debiti culturali nei confronti di Croce, superiori perfino a quelli dovuti a Marx: «in quel tempo» - scriverà - «il concetto di unità di teoria e pratica, di filosofia e politica, non era chiaro in me e io ero tendenzialmente crociano».[35]  Nel marzo 1917 lo zar di Russia Nicola II è facilmente rovesciato da pochi giorni di manifestazioni popolari, per lo più spontanee, che chiedono pane e la fine dell'autocrazia: viene instaurato un moderato governo liberale e, insieme, si ricostituiscono i Soviet, forme di rappresentanza su base popolare già creati nella precedente Rivoluzione russa del 1905; le notizie giungono in Italia parziali e confuse: i quotidiani «borghesi» sostengono che si tratta dell'avviamento di un processo di democratizzazione in Russia, sull'esempio della grande Rivoluzione francese, mentre Gramsci è convinto che «la rivoluzione russa è [...] un atto proletario ed essa naturalmente deve sfociare nel regime socialista [...] i rivoluzionari socialisti non possono essere giacobini: essi in Russia hanno solo attualmente il compito di controllare che gli organismi borghesi [...] non facciano essi del giacobinismo».[36]  Con il ritorno in Russia di Lenin, che pone subito il problema della pace immediata e della consegna del potere ai Soviet, la lotta politica si radicalizza. Gramsci è convinto che Lenin abbia «suscitato energie che più non morranno. Egli e i suoi compagni bolscevichi sono persuasi che sia possibile in ogni momento realizzare il socialismo». Gramsci nega esplicitamente la necessità dell'esistenza di condizioni obiettive affinché una rivoluzione trionfi, quando scrive che i bolscevichi «sono nutriti di pensiero marxista. Sono rivoluzionari, non evoluzionisti. E il pensiero rivoluzionario nega il tempo come fattore di progresso. Nega che tutte le esperienze intermedie tra la concezione del socialismo e la sua realizzazione debbano avere nel tempo e nello spazio una riprova assoluta e integrale».[37] È l'anticipazione dell'articolo, più famoso, che scriverà subito dopo la notizia del successo della Rivoluzione d'ottobre.  Anche in Italia la guerra interminabile, costata già centinaia di migliaia di morti e di mutilati, la penuria dei generi alimentari, la sconfitta di Caporetto e la stessa eco provocata dalla rivoluzione russa portarono a insofferenze che a Torino sfociarono, il 23 agosto 1917, in un'autentica sommossa spontanea duramente repressa dal governo: oltre 50 morti, più di duecento feriti, la città dichiarata zona di guerra con la conseguente applicazione della legge marziale, arresti a catena che colpirono non solo i diretti responsabili ma, indiscriminatamente, anche gli elementi politici d'opposizione e segnatamente l'intero nucleo della sezione socialista, con l'accusa di istigazione alla rivoluzione. In conseguenza dell'emergenza venutasi a creare, la direzione della Sezione socialista torinese venne assunta da un comitato di dodici persone, del quale fece parte anche Gramsci, il quale rimane l'unico redattore de Il Grido del Popolo che cesserà le pubblicazioni il 19 ottobre 1918.   Gramsci nel 1922 I bolscevichi avevano preso il potere in Russia il 7 novembre 1917, ma per settimane in Europa giunsero solo notizie deformate, confuse e censurate, finché il 24 novembre l'edizione nazionale dell'Avanti! uscì con un editoriale dal titolo La rivoluzione contro il Capitale, firmato da Gramsci:[38]  «La rivoluzione dei bolscevichi è materiata di ideologia più che di fatti [...] essa è la rivoluzione contro il Capitale di Carlo Marx. Il Capitale di Marx era, in Russia, il libro dei borghesi, più che dei proletari. Era la dimostrazione critica della fatale necessità che in Russia si formasse una borghesia, si iniziasse un'era capitalistica, si instaurasse una civiltà di tipo occidentale prima che il proletariato potesse neppure pensare alla sua riscossa, alle sue rivendicazioni di classe, alla sua rivoluzione. I fatti hanno superato le ideologie. I fatti hanno fatto scoppiare gli schemi critici entro i quali la storia della Russia avrebbe dovuto svolgersi secondo i canoni del materialismo storico [...] se i bolscevichi rinnegano alcune affermazioni del Capitale, non ne rinnegano il pensiero immanente, vivificatore. Essi non sono «marxisti», ecco tutto; non hanno compilato sulle opere del Maestro una dottrina esteriore di affermazioni dogmatiche e indiscutibili. Vivono il pensiero marxista, quello che non muore mai, che è la continuazione del pensiero idealistico italiano e tedesco, che in Marx si era contaminato di incrostazioni positivistiche e naturalistiche».[39]  In realtà Marx, almeno negli ultimi anni, non aveva escluso che un Paese arretrato potesse giungere al socialismo saltando fasi di sviluppo capitalistico:[40] ma qui interessa rilevare tanto la visione di Gramsci ancora idealistica, volontaristica, dell'azione politica, quanto la critica che di fatto Gramsci rivolgeva ai dirigenti socialisti europei, e italiani in particolare, di concepire lo sviluppo storico in modo meccanicistico.  Finita la guerra e usciti dal carcere i dirigenti torinesi del partito, dal 5 dicembre 1918 Gramsci lavorò unicamente all'edizione piemontese dell'Avanti!, che allora si stampava in via Arcivescovado 3, insieme con alcuni giovani colleghi: Giuseppe Amoretti, Alfonso Leonetti, Mario Montagnana, Felice Platone; ma egli e altri giovani socialisti torinesi, come Tasca, Togliatti e Terracini, intendevano ormai esprimere, dopo l'esperienza della rivoluzione russa, esigenze nuove nell'attività politica, che non sentivano rappresentate dalla Direzione nazionale del partito: «L'unico sentimento che ci unisse, in quelle nostre riunioni, era quello suscitato da una vaga passione di una vaga cultura proletaria; volevamo fare, fare, fare; ci sentivamo angustiati, senza un orientamento, tuffati nell'ardente vita di quei mesi dopo l'armistizio, quando pareva immediato il cataclisma della società italiana».[41] Il 1º maggio 1919 uscì il primo numero dell'Ordine nuovo con Gramsci segretario di redazione e animatore della rivista. La rivista ebbe un avvio incerto: all'inizio «il programma fu l'assenza di un programma concreto, per una vana e vaga aspirazione ai problemi concreti [...] nessuna idea centrale, nessuna organizzazione intima del materiale letterario pubblicato» Tasca intendeva farne una pubblicazione culturale: «per "cultura" intendeva "ricordare", non intendeva "pensare", e intendeva "ricordare" cose fruste, cose logore, la paccottiglia del pensiero operaio [...] fu una rassegna di cultura astratta, di informazione astratta, con la tendenza a pubblicare novelline orripilanti e xilografie bene intenzionate; ecco cosa fu l'Ordine nuovo nei suoi primi numeri [...]».[42]  Gramsci intendeva invece definirlo su posizioni nettamente operaistiche, ponendo all'ordine del giorno la necessità d'introdurre nelle fabbriche italiane nuove forme di potere operaio, i consigli di fabbrica, sull'esempio dei Soviet russi: «Ordimmo, io e Togliatti, un colpo di Stato redazionale; il problema delle commissioni interne fu impostato esplicitamente nel n. 7 della rassegna [...] il problema dello sviluppo della commissione interna divenne problema centrale, divenne l'idea dell'Ordine nuovo; era esso posto come problema fondamentale della rivoluzione operaia, era il problema della "libertà" proletaria. L'Ordine nuovo divenne, per noi e per quanti ci seguivano, "il giornale dei Consigli di fabbrica"; gli operai amarono l'Ordine nuovo [...] perché negli articoli del giornale ritrovavano una parte di se stessi, la parte migliore di se stessi; perché sentivano gli articoli dell'Ordine nuovo pervasi dallo stesso loro spirito di ricerca interiore: "Come possiamo diventar liberi? Come possiamo diventare noi stessi?". Perché gli articoli dell'Ordine nuovo non erano fredde architetture intellettuali, ma sgorgavano dalla discussione nostra con gli operai migliori, elaboravano sentimenti, volontà, passioni reali».[42]  Diversamente dalle Commissioni interne, già esistenti all'interno dalle fabbriche, che venivano elette soltanto dagli operai iscritti ai diversi sindacati, i Consigli dovevano essere eletti indistintamente da tutti gli operai e avrebbero dovuto, nel progetto degli ordinovisti, non tanto occuparsi dei consueti problemi sindacali, ma porsi problemi politici, fino al problema della stessa organizzazione, della gestione operaia della fabbrica, sostituendosi al capitalista: nel settembre 1919, alla FIAT furono eletti i primi Consigli.  La Confindustria, nella sua Conferenza nazionale del marzo 1920, espresse chiaramente «la necessità che la borghesia del lavoro attinga in se stessa [...] il mezzo per un'energica azione contro deviazioni e illusioni»[43] e il 20 marzo i tre maggiori industriali torinesi, Olivetti, De Benedetti e Agnelli fecero presente al prefetto Taddei la loro volontà di ricorrere all'arma della serrata delle fabbriche contro «l'indisciplina e le continue esorbitanti pretese degli operai».[44]  Così quando in occasione di una controversia sindacale nelle Industrie Metallurgiche tre membri delle commissioni interne furono licenziati e gli operai protestarono con lo sciopero, l'Associazione degli industriali metalmeccanici rispose il 29 marzo con la serrata di tutte le fabbriche torinesi. La lotta si estese fino allo sciopero generale proclamato a Torino il 15 aprile e in alcune province piemontesi, mentre il governo presidiava il capoluogo con migliaia di soldati. I tentativi degli ordinovisti di allargare la protesta, se non in tutta l'Italia, almeno nei maggiori centri industriali del paese, fallì e alla fine d'aprile gli operai furono costretti a riprendere il lavoro senza avere ottenuto nulla.  Lo sciopero fallì per la resistenza degli industriali ma anche per l'isolamento in cui la Camera del Lavoro, controllata dai socialisti riformisti, contrari alla costituzione dei Consigli operai, e lo stesso Partito socialista lasciarono i lavoratori torinesi; l'8 maggio Gramsci pubblicò sull'Ordine Nuovo una sua relazione,[45] approvata dalla Federazione torinese, che denunciava l'inefficienza e l'inerzia del Partito. Dopo aver sostenuto che era matura la trasformazione dell'«ordine attuale di produzione e di distribuzione» in un nuovo ordine che desse «alla classe degli operai industriali e agricoli il potere di iniziativa nella produzione», alla quale si opponevano gli industriali e i proprietari terrieri, appoggiati dallo Stato, Gramsci rilevava che «le forze operaie e contadine mancano di coordinamento e di concentrazione rivoluzionaria perché gli organismi direttivi del Partito socialista hanno rivelato di non comprendere assolutamente nulla della fase di sviluppo che la storia nazionale e internazionale attraversa nell'attuale periodo [...] il Partito socialista assiste da spettatore allo svolgersi degli eventi, non ha mai un'opinione sua da esprimere [...] non lancia parole d'ordine che possano essere raccolte dalle masse, dare un indirizzo generale, unificare e concentrare l'azione rivoluzionaria [...] il Partito socialista è rimasto, anche dopo il Congresso di Bologna,[46] un mero partito parlamentare, che si mantiene immobile entro i limiti angusti della democrazia borghese [...]».   Il numero dell'11 dicembre 1920 Rilevò la mancanza di omogeneità nella composizione del partito, in cui continuavano a essere presenti riformisti e «opportunisti», contrari agli indirizzi della III Internazionale. Non solo: «mentre la maggioranza rivoluzionaria del partito non ha avuto una espressione del suo pensiero e un esecutore della sua volontà nella direzione e nel giornale, gli elementi opportunisti invece si sono fortemente organizzati e hanno sfruttato il prestigio e l'autorità del Partito per consolidare le loro posizioni parlamentari e sindacali [...] se il Partito non realizza l'unità e la simultaneità degli sforzi, se il Partito si rivela un mero organismo burocratico, senza anima e senza volontà, la classe operaia istintivamente tende a costituirsi un altro partito e si sposta verso tendenze anarchiche [...]».  Il Partito socialista non svolge alcuna funzione di educazione e di spiegazione di quanto sta avvenendo nella scena internazionale, dalla quale esso è assente, non partecipando nemmeno alle riunioni dell'Internazionale comunista, le cui tesi non sono riportate nell'Avanti!. Analogamente, le edizioni socialiste non stampano le pubblicazioni comuniste: «valga per tutte il volume di Lenin Stato e rivoluzione». Occorre pertanto, secondo Gramsci, che il Partito socialista acquisti «una sua figura precisa e distinta: da partito parlamentare piccolo borghese deve diventare il partito del proletariato rivoluzionario che lotta per l'avvenire della società comunista [...] i non comunisti rivoluzionari devono essere eliminati dal Partito [...] ogni avvenimento della vita proletaria nazionale e internazionale deve essere immediatamente commentata [...] per trarne argomenti di propaganda comunista e di educazione delle coscienze rivoluzionarie [...] le sezioni devono promuovere in tutte le fabbriche, nei sindacati, nelle cooperative, nelle caserme la costituzione di gruppi comunisti [...] l'esistenza di un Partito comunista coeso e fortemente disciplinato [...] è la condizione fondamentale e indispensabile per tentare qualsiasi esperimento di Soviet [...] il Partito deve lanciare un manifesto nel quale la conquista rivoluzionaria del potere politico sia posta in modo esplicito [...]».[47] La risoluzione dell'Internazionale comunista che chiedeva ai partiti socialisti l'allontanamento dei riformisti, venne disattesa dal Partito Socialista Italiano. Infatti, a dispetto dell'approvazione e dell'avallo ottenuto dagli ordinovisti da parte di Lenin nel corso del II Congresso dell'Internazionale,[48] alla quale il PSI aveva aderito con il congresso di Bologna tenuto nell'ottobre del 1919, i vecchi dirigenti del partito erano riluttanti di fronte alla svolta politica e sociale realizzatasi nel dopoguerra.  In Italia, le rivendicazioni salariali, rese necessarie dall'elevato indice d'inflazione, non trovavano accoglienza presso gli industriali. Il 30 agosto 1920, a Milano, a seguito della serrata dell'Alfa Romeo, 300 fabbriche furono occupate dagli operai: la FIOM appoggiò l'iniziativa, ordinando l'occupazione di tutte le fabbriche metalmeccaniche d'Italia, con la speranza che una tale, estrema iniziativa provocasse l'intervento del governo a favore di una soluzione delle trattative. All'inizio di settembre tutte le maggiori fabbriche d'Italia erano occupate da mezzo milione di operai, parte dei quali armati, sia pure in modo rudimentale; alla FIAT di Torino, tuttavia, ci fu una novità: dell'ufficio di Giovanni Agnelli prese possesso l'operaio comunista Giovanni Parodi e i Consigli di fabbrica decisero di continuare la produzione, per dimostrare che una grande fabbrica poteva funzionare anche in assenza del proprietario.   Giovanni Giolitti Di fronte alla neutralità del governo Giolitti e alla decisione della Confindustria di non cedere, il 10 settembre, nell'assemblea milanese che vide riuniti i dirigenti del Partito socialista e della Camera del Lavoro, questi ultimi si dimisero lasciando la gestione della difficile situazione al Partito, che tuttavia non aveva alcuna intenzione di prolungare l'agitazione: la proposta estrema dell'allargamento delle occupazioni a tutte le fabbriche del paese e alle campagne fu respinta dalla maggioranza dei rappresentanti. Un accordo salariale raggiunto con la mediazione di Giolitti pose termine, alla fine di settembre, alle occupazioni delle fabbriche.  Quell'esperienza dimostrò tanto la mancanza di una strategia dei dirigenti socialisti quanto l'impreparazione degli stessi operai a iniziative rivoluzionarie, per le quali occorrevano organizzazione e disciplina. In previsione del prossimo XVII Congresso del Partito socialista, Gramsci scrisse[49] che «la costituzione del Partito comunista crea le condizioni per intensificare e approfondire l'opera nostra: liberati dal peso morto degli scettici, dei chiacchieroni, degli irresponsabili, liberati dall'assillo di dover continuamente, nel seno del Partito, lottare contro i riformisti e gli opportunisti, di dover sventare le loro insidie, di dover analizzare e criticare i loro atteggiamenti equivoci e la loro fraseologia pseudo-rivoluzionaria, noi potremo dedicarci interamente al lavoro positivo, all'espansione del nostro programma di rinnovamento, di organizzazione, di risveglio delle coscienze e delle volontà».  Nell'ottobre 1920 si riunì a Milano il gruppo favorevole alla costituzione di un partito comunista e Amadeo Bordiga, Luigi Repossi, Bruno Fortichiari, Gramsci, Nicola Bombacci, Francesco Misiano e Umberto Terracini costituirono il Comitato provvisorio della frazione comunista del Partito Socialista.  La fondazione del Partito comunista  Il congresso di Livorno La scissione si realizzò il 21 gennaio 1921, nel Teatro San Marco di Livorno, con la nascita del «Partito Comunista d'Italia, sezione italiana dell'Internazionale». Il comitato centrale fu composto dagli astensionisti (Amadeo Bordiga, Ruggero Grieco, Giovanni Parodi, Cesare Sessa, Ludovico Tarsia e Bruno Fortichiari), dagli ex-massimalisti (Nicola Bombacci, Ambrogio Belloni, Egidio Gennari, Francesco Misiano, Anselmo Marabini, Luigi Repossi e Luigi Polano) e dagli ordinovisti Gramsci e Terracini.  Dal 1º gennaio 1921 Gramsci diresse l'Ordine nuovo, divenuto ora uno dei quotidiani comunisti insieme con Il Lavoratore di Trieste e Il Comunista di Roma, quest'ultimo diretto da Togliatti. Non venne eletto deputato alle elezioni del 15 maggio: Gramsci non ha capacità oratorie, è ancora giovane e anche la sua conformazione fisica non lo agevola nell'apprezzamento di molti elettori.  Alla fine di maggio partì per Mosca, designato a rappresentare il Partito italiano nell'esecutivo dell'Internazionale comunista. Vi arrivò già malato e nell'estate fu ricoverato in un sanatorio per malattie nervose di Mosca. Qui conobbe una degente russa, Eugenia Schucht, membro del Partito, figlia di Apollon Schucht, dirigente del Pcus e amico personale di Lenin,[50] che aveva vissuto alcuni anni in Italia e, attraverso di lei, la sorella Giulia (Julka) (1896-1980) che, violinista, aveva abitato diversi anni a Roma diplomandosi al Conservatorio Santa Cecilia.  Giulia, ventiseienne, è bella, alta, ha un aspetto romantico; Gramsci ne è conquistato: ricorderà «il primo giorno che [...] non osavo entrare nella tua stanza perché mi avevi intimidito [...] al giorno che sei partita a piedi e io ti ho accompagnato fino alla grande strada attraverso la foresta e sono rimasto tanto tempo fermo per vederti allontanare tutta sola, col tuo carico da viandante, per la grande strada, verso il mondo grande e terribile [...] ho molto pensato a te, che sei entrata nella mia vita e mi hai dato l'amore e mi hai dato ciò che mi era sempre mancato e mi faceva spesso cattivo e torbido».[51] E quell'immagine di lei, viandante in un mondo grande e terribile, con il suo senso doloroso di distacco, ritornerà ancora dal carcere: «Ricordi quando sei ripartita dal bosco d'argento [...] ti ho accompagnata fino all'orlo della strada maestra e sono rimasto a lungo a vederti allontanare [...] così ti vedo sempre mentre ti allontani a passi brevi, col violino in una mano e nell'altra la tua borsa da viaggio, così pittoresca».[52] Si sposano nel 1923 e avranno due figli, Delio, nato il 10 agosto 1924, e Giuliano, nato il 30 agosto 1926. Il figlio di quest'ultimo (nato nel 1965), porta il nome del nonno, vive a Mosca e pratica la musica medievale.[53] Giulia diverrà nel 1924 membro della OGPU, il servizio di Sicurezza sovietico.[54]   La moglie di Gramsci e i figli Delio e Giuliano A differenza di Bordiga, tutto inteso a salvaguardare la «purezza» programmatica del partito, e perciò contrario a qualunque iniziativa al di fuori della dittatura del proletariato, Gramsci guardava anche a obiettivi democratici, intermedi, raggiungibili utilizzando le contraddizioni presenti negli strati sociali e le forze che potevano rappresentare elementi di rottura, come il movimento sindacale cattolico di Guido Miglioli e l'intellettualità progressista liberale di cui Piero Gobetti è allora tra i maggiori rappresentanti.[55] Tuttavia nei suoi scritti fino al 1926 ribadisce che l'obiettivo finale era la eliminazione dello stato borghese e la dittatura del proletariato e anche nei suoi scritti successivi non si riscontrano critiche al regime sovietico.  Nel III Congresso dell'Internazionale comunista, di fronte al riflusso dell'ondata rivoluzionaria rappresentata dalle sconfitte delle esperienze comuniste in Germania e in Ungheria, si decise la tattica del fronte unito con la socialdemocrazia. Bordiga e la maggioranza dei dirigenti comunisti italiani si oppose, elaborando le Tesi di Roma, base programmatica del II Congresso del Partito, tenuto a Roma nel marzo del 1922. Gramsci vi aderì ma scrisse di aver «accettato le tesi di Amadeo perché esse erano presentate come una opinione per il Quarto Congresso [dell'Internazionale comunista] e non come un indirizzo di azione. Ritenevamo di mantenere così unito il partito attorno al suo nucleo fondamentale, pensavamo che si potesse fare ad Amadeo questa concessione [...] senza nuove crisi e nuove minacce di scissione nel seno del nostro movimento».[56]  Nel IV Congresso dell'Internazionale, tenutosi dal 5 novembre al 5 dicembre 1922, di fronte all'avvento al potere di Mussolini, ai delegati comunisti italiani fu posta con ancora maggior forza la necessità di fondersi con corrente socialista degli internazionalisti, capeggiata da Giacinto Menotti Serrati, e di costituire un nuovo Esecutivo, mettendo in minoranza Bordiga, sempre contrario a ogni accordo. Lo stesso Bordiga fu arrestato al suo rientro in Italia nel febbraio 1923 e, in settembre, a Milano, furono incarcerati anche i rappresentanti del nuovo Esecutivo: Gramsci restò così il massimo dirigente del Partito e nel novembre del 1923 si trasferì a Vienna per seguire più da vicino la situazione italiana. Fu allora che egli ritenne necessario rompere con la politica di Bordiga: «Il suo stesso carattere inflessibile e tenace fino all'assurdo ci obbliga [...] a prospettarci il problema di costruire il partito ed il centro di esso anche senza di lui e contro di lui. Penso che sulle quistioni di principio non dobbiamo più fare compromessi come nel passato: vale meglio la polemica chiara, leale, fino in fondo, che giova al partito e lo prepara ad ogni evenienza».[57]  Il 12 febbraio 1924 uscì a Milano il primo numero del nuovo quotidiano comunista l'Unità e dal primo marzo la nuova serie del quindicinale l'Ordine nuovo. Il titolo del giornale, da lui scelto, venne giustificato dalla necessità dell'«unità di tutta la classe operaia intorno al partito, unità degli operai e dei contadini, unità del Nord e del Mezzogiorno, unità di tutto il popolo italiano nella lotta contro il fascismo».Alle elezioni del 6 aprile venne eletto deputato al parlamento, potendo così rientrare a Roma, protetto dall'immunità parlamentare, il 12 maggio 1924. Quello stesso mese, nei dintorni di Como, si tenne un convegno illegale dei dirigenti delle Federazioni comuniste italiane: pubblicamente, si fingevano dipendenti di un'azienda milanese in gita turistica, con tanto di pubblici discorsi fascisti e inni a Mussolini,[58] mentre, a parte, discutevano dei problemi del partito.  Nel convegno si affrontò il «caso Bordiga», il quale aveva rifiutato la candidatura al Parlamento, era in rotta con la maggioranza dell'Internazionale e rifiutava ogni azione politica comune con le altre forze politiche di sinistra. Delle tre mozioni presentate, che rispecchiavano le tre correnti in seno al Partito, la corrente di destra di Tasca, di centro di Gramsci e Togliatti, e di sinistra di Bordiga, questa raccolse l'adesione della grande maggioranza dei delegati, confermando la notevole importanza di cui il rivoluzionario napoletano godeva nel Partito.  Il 10 giugno un gruppo di fascisti rapì e uccise il deputato socialista Giacomo Matteotti; sembrò allora che il fascismo stesse per crollare per l'indignazione morale che in quei giorni percorse il Paese, ma non fu così; l'opposizione parlamentare scelse la linea sterile di abbandonare il Parlamento, dando luogo alla cosiddetta Secessione dell'Aventino: i liberali speravano in un appoggio della Monarchia, che non venne, i cattolici erano ostili tanto ai fascisti che ai socialisti e questi ultimi erano ostili a tutti, comunisti compresi. Gramsci avanzò al «Comitato dei sedici» - il nucleo dirigente dei gruppi aventiniani - la proposta di proclamare lo sciopero generale che però fu respinta; i comunisti uscirono allora dal «Comitato delle opposizioni» aventiniane il quale, secondo Gramsci, non aveva alcuna volontà di agire: ha una «paura incredibile che noi prendessimo la mano e quindi manovra per costringerci ad abbandonare la riunione».[59]   Giacomo Matteotti Malgrado le divisioni dell'opposizione antifascista, Gramsci credeva che la caduta del regime fosse imminente: «Il regime fascista muore perché non solo non è riuscito ad arrestare, ma anzi ha contribuito ad accelerare la crisi delle classi medie iniziatasi dopo la guerra. L'aspetto economico di questa crisi consiste nella rovina della piccola e media azienda [...] il monopolio del credito, il regime fiscale, la legislazione sugli affitti hanno stritolato la piccola impresa commerciale e industriale: un vero e proprio passaggio di ricchezza si è verificato dalla piccola e media alla grande borghesia [...] L'apparato industriale ristretto ha potuto salvarsi dal completo sfacelo solo per un abbassamento del livello di vita della classe operaia premuta dalla diminuzione dei salari, dall'aumento della giornata di lavoro [...] La disgregazione sociale e politica del regime fascista ha avuto la sua piena manifestazione di massa nelle elezioni del 6 aprile. Il fascismo è stato messo nettamente in minoranza nella zona industriale [...] Le elezioni del 6 aprile [...] segnarono l'inizio di quella ondata democratica che culminò nei giorni immediatamente successivi all'assassinio dell'on. Matteotti [...] le opposizioni avevano acquistato dopo le elezioni un'importanza politica enorme; l'agitazione da esse condotta nei giornali e nel Parlamento per discutere e negare la legittimità del governo fascista [...] si ripercuoteva nel seno dello stesso Partito nazionale fascista, incrinava la maggioranza parlamentare. Di qui l'inaudita campagna di minacce contro le opposizioni e l'assassinio del deputato unitario [...]» «Il delitto Matteotti dette la prova provata che il Partito fascista non riuscirà mai a diventare un normale partito di governo, che Mussolini non possiede dello statista e del dittatore altro che alcune pittoresche pose esteriori; egli non è un elemento della vita nazionale, è un fenomeno di folklore paesano, destinato a passare alla storia nell'ordine delle diverse maschere provinciali italiane, più che nell'ordine dei Cromwell, dei Bolívar, dei Garibaldi».[60]  S'ingannava, perché l'inerzia dell'opposizione non riuscì a dare alternative del blocco sociale in cui la piccola borghesia teme il «salto nel buio» della caduta del regime e i fascisti riprendono coraggio e ricominciano le violenze squadriste: in una delle tante viene aggredito anche Gobetti. E dopo il 12 settembre, quando il militante comunista Giovanni Corvi uccide in un tram il deputato fascista Armando Casalini, per vendicare la morte di Matteotti, la repressione s'inasprisce. Il 20 ottobre Gramsci propose vanamente che l'opposizione aventiniana si costituisca in «Antiparlamento», in modo da segnare nettamente la distanza e svuotare di significato un Parlamento di soli fascisti; il 26 partì per la Sardegna, per intervenire al Congresso regionale del partito e per rivedere i famigliari. Il 6 novembre si congedò dalla madre, che non avrebbe più rivisto.   Benito Mussolini Il 12 novembre 1924 il deputato comunista Luigi Repossi rientrò in Parlamento, dove sedevano solo i deputati fascisti e i loro alleati, per commemorare Matteotti a nome di tutto il suo partito; il 26 vi rientrò anche tutto il gruppo parlamentare comunista, a segnare l'inutilità dell'esperienza aventiniana. Il 27 dicembre 1924 il quotidiano di Giovanni Amendola Il Mondo pubblicò le dichiarazioni di Cesare Rossi, già capo ufficio stampa di Mussolini, a proposito del delitto Matteotti: «Tutto quanto è successo è avvenuto sempre per la volontà diretta o per l'approvazione o per la complicità del duce» e il 3 gennaio 1925 Mussolini, in un discorso rimasto famoso, a confermare quella testimonianza, dichiara alla Camera dei deputati di assumersi «la responsabilità politica, morale, storica di tutto quanto è avvenuto», dando il via a una nuova azione repressiva.  In febbraio Gramsci andò a Mosca, per stare con la moglie e conoscere finalmente il figlio Delio. Tornato in Italia a maggio, il 16 tenne il suo primo - e unico - discorso in Parlamento[61], davanti all'ex compagno di partito Mussolini, ora Primo ministro, che aveva descritto l'anno prima come un capo che «è divinizzato, è dichiarato infallibile, è preconizzato organizzatore e ispiratore di un rinato Sacro Romano Impero [...] Conosciamo quel viso: conosciamo quel roteare degli occhi nelle orbite che nel passato dovevano, con la loro ferocia meccanica, far venire i vermi alla borghesia e oggi al proletariato. Conosciamo quel pugno sempre chiuso alla minaccia [...] Mussolini [...] è il tipo concentrato del piccolo-borghese italiano, rabbioso, feroce impasto di tutti i detriti lasciati sul suolo nazionale da vari secoli di dominazione degli stranieri e dei preti: non poteva essere il capo del proletariato; divenne il dittatore della borghesia, che ama le facce feroci quando ridiventa borbonica».[62][63]  Con il pretesto di colpire la Massoneria, il governo aveva predisposto un disegno di legge per disciplinare l'attività di associazioni, enti e istituti: continuamente interrotto, Gramsci respinse il pretesto che il governo si era dato, «perché la Massoneria passerà in massa al Partito fascista e ne costituirà una tendenza, è chiaro che con questa legge voi sperate di impedire lo sviluppo di grandi organizzazioni operaie e contadine».  E ironizzando: «Qualche fascista ricorda ancora nebulosamente gli insegnamenti dei suoi vecchi maestri, di quando era rivoluzionario e socialista, e crede che una classe non possa rimanere tale permanentemente e svilupparsi fino alla conquista del potere, senza che essa abbia un partito e un'organizzazione che ne riassuma la parte migliore e più cosciente. C'è qualcosa di vero, in questa torbida perversione degli insegnamenti marxisti».  Concluse: «Voi potete conquistare lo Stato, potete modificare i codici, potete cercar di impedire alle organizzazioni di esistere nella forma in cui sono esistite fino adesso ma non potete prevalere sulle condizioni obbiettive in cui siete costretti a muovervi. Voi non farete che costringere il proletariato a ricercare un indirizzo diverso da quello fin oggi più diffuso nel campo dell'organizzazione di massa. Ciò noi vogliamo dire al proletariato e alle masse contadine italiane, da questa tribuna: che le forze rivoluzionarie italiane non si lasceranno schiantare, il vostro torbido sogno non riuscirà a realizzarsi». Dal 20 al 26 gennaio 1926 si svolse clandestinamente a Lione il III Congresso del Partito.[64] Vi parteciparono 70 delegati, con tutti i maggiori responsabili, Bordiga, Gramsci, Tasca, Togliatti, Grieco, Leonetti, Scoccimarro: vi era anche Serrati, che aveva lasciato da poco il Partito socialista di cui era stato a lungo dirigente di primo piano. Assisteva, a nome dell'Internazionale, Jules Humbert-Droz.[65] Gramsci presentò le Tesi congressuali elaborate insieme con Togliatti.[66]  Con un capitalismo debole e l'agricoltura base dell'economia nazionale, in Italia si assiste al compromesso fra industriali del Nord e proprietari fondiari del Sud, ai danni degli interessi generali della maggioranza della popolazione. Il proletariato, in quanto forza sociale omogenea e organizzata rispetto alla piccola borghesia urbana e rurale, che ha interessi differenziati, viene visto, nelle Tesi, «come l'unico elemento che per la sua natura ha una funzione unificatrice e coordinatrice di tutta la società.»[67]  Secondo Gramsci il fascismo non è, come invece ritiene Bordiga, l'espressione di tutta la classe dominante, ma è il frutto politico della piccola borghesia urbana e della reazione degli agrari che ha consegnato il potere alla grande borghesia, e la sua tendenza imperialistica è l'espressione della necessità, da parte delle classi industriali e agrarie, «di trovare fuori del campo nazionale gli elementi per la risoluzione della crisi della società italiana» che tuttavia permette, per la sua natura oppressiva e reazionaria, una soluzione rivoluzionaria delle contraddizioni sociali e politiche; le due forze sociali idonee a dar luogo a questa soluzione sono il proletariato del Nord e i contadini del Mezzogiorno.[68] A questo scopo, il Partito andrà bolscevizzato, ossia organizzato per cellule di fabbrica caratterizzate da una "disciplina di ferro" negando al suo interno la possibilità dell'esistenza delle frazioni.  Il Congresso approvò le Tesi a grande maggioranza (oltre il 90%) ed elesse il Comitato centrale con Gramsci segretario del Partito.[69] Da allora, la sinistra comunista di Bordiga non ebbe più un ruolo influente nel Partito. Le Tesi di Lione, realizzate da Gramsci, ribadirono con una certa durezza le posizioni del Pcd’I «la socialdemocrazia sebbene abbia ancora la sua base sociale, per gran parte, nel proletariato per quanto riguarda la sua ideologia e la sua funzione politica cui adempie, deve essere considerata non come un'ala destra del movimento operaio, ma come un'ala sinistra della borghesia e come tale deve essere smascherata». In questa relazione venne sviluppata la cosiddetta bolscevizzazione del partito: «spetti al partito russo una funzione predominante e direttiva nella costruzione di una Internazionale comunista… La organizzazione di un partito bolscevico deve essere, in ogni momento della vita del partito, una organizzazione centralizzata, diretta dal Comitato centrale non solo a parole, ma nei fatti. Una disciplina proletaria di ferro deve regnare nelle sue file… La centralizzazione e la compattezza del partito esigono che non esistano nel suo seno gruppi organizzati i quali assumano carattere di frazione. Un partito bolscevico si differenzia per questo profondamente dai partiti socialdemocratici».[70] Tornato a Roma - da via Vesalio si era trasferito in via Morgagni - ebbe il tempo di passare alcuni mesi con la famiglia - la moglie Giulia e il piccolo Delio, oltre alle cognate Eugenia e Tatiana - che abitano tuttavia in un altro appartamento, in via Trapani: le squadre fasciste, superato da tempo lo smarrimento provocato dal delitto Matteotti, avevano piena libertà d'azione e non era prudente coinvolgere i familiari in loro possibili aggressioni; il 4 ottobre, a Firenze, era stato ucciso l'ex-deputato socialista Gaetano Pilati, la stessa casa di Gramsci era stata messa a soqquadro dalla polizia il 20 ottobre. Mentre gli esponenti dell'opposizione antifascista prendevano la via dell'emigrazione - Gobetti, che muore il 6 febbraio 1926, venticinquenne, a Parigi, in conseguenza delle bastonate squadriste, Amendola, Salvemini - un processo farsa condannava a una pena simbolica gli assassini di Matteotti, difesi dal capo-squadrista Roberto Farinacci.  La moglie Giulia, che aspettava il secondo figlio Giuliano, lasciò l'Italia il 7 agosto e il mese dopo fu la volta della cognata Eugenia a tornare a Mosca con il figlio Delio: Gramsci non l'avrebbe più rivisto.   Giustino Fortunato Elaborando temi già affrontati nelle Tesi di Lione, in settembre Gramsci iniziò a scrivere un saggio sulla questione meridionale, intitolato Alcuni temi sulla quistione meridionale, in cui analizzò il periodo dello sviluppo politico italiano dal 1894, anno dei moti dei contadini siciliani, seguito nel 1898 dall'insurrezione di Milano repressa a cannonate dal governo Di Rudinì. Secondo Gramsci, la borghesia italiana, impersonata politicamente da Giovanni Giolitti, di fronte all'insofferenza delle classi emarginate dei contadini meridionali e degli operai del Nord, piuttosto che allearsi con le forze agrarie, cosa che avrebbe dovuto comportare una politica di libero scambio e di bassi prezzi industriali, scelse di favorire il blocco industriale-operaio, con la conseguente scelta del protezionismo doganale, unita a concessione di libertà sindacali.  Di fronte alla persistenza dell'opposizione operaia, manifestatasi anche contro i dirigenti socialisti riformisti, Giolitti cercò un accordo con i contadini cattolici del Centro-Nord. Il problema è allora, per Gramsci, di perseguire una politica di opposizione che rompa l'alleanza borghesia-contadini, facendo convergere questi ultimi in un'alleanza con la classe operaia.  La società meridionale, secondo Gramsci, è costituita da tre classi fondamentali: braccianti e contadini poveri, politicamente inconsapevoli; piccoli e medi contadini, che non lavorano la terra ma dalla quale ricavano un reddito che permette loro di vivere in città, spesso come impiegati statali: costoro disprezzano e temono il lavoratore della terra, e fanno da intermediari al consenso fra i contadini poveri e la terza classe, costituita dai grandi proprietari terrieri, i quali a loro volta contribuiscono alla formazione dell'intellettualità nazionale, con personalità del valore di Benedetto Croce e di Giustino Fortunato e sono, con quelli, i principali e più raffinati sostenitori della conservazione di questo blocco agrario. Croce e Fortunato sono, per Gramsci, «i reazionari più operosi della penisola»,[71] «le chiavi di volta del sistema meridionale e, in un certo senso, sono le due più grandi figure della reazione italiana».[72]  Per poter spezzare questo blocco occorrerebbe la formazione di un ceto di intellettuali medi che interrompa il flusso del consenso fra le due classi estreme, favorendo così l'alleanza dei contadini poveri con il proletariato urbano. Tuttavia Gramsci non aveva un'opinione positiva sui contadini, nel 1926 scrisse: «Il solo organizzatore possibile della massa contadina meridionale è l'operaio industriale, rappresentato dal nostro partito»[73] «Non ho mai voluto mutare le mie opinioni, per le quali sarei disposto a dare la vita e non solo a stare in prigione [...] vorrei consolarti di questo dispiacere che ti ho dato: ma non potevo fare diversamente. La vita è così, molto dura, e i figli qualche volta devono dare dei grandi dolori alle loro mamme, se vogliono conservare il loro onore e la loro dignità di uomini»  (Antonio Gramsci, Lettera alla madre, 10 maggio 1928) In Unione Sovietica è in corso la lotta fra la maggioranza di Stalin e Bucharin e la minoranza di sinistra del Partito comunista, guidata da Trotskij, Zinov'ev e Kamenev, che critica la politica della NEP, la quale favorisce i contadini ricchi a svantaggio degli operai, e la rinuncia alla rivoluzione socialista mondiale attraverso la costruzione del «socialismo in un solo paese» che porterebbe all'involuzione del movimento rivoluzionario.[74] Il dissidio, che porta all'esclusione di Zinov'ev dall'Ufficio politico del Partito sovietico, si era fatto sempre più aspro con la costituzione in frazione della minoranza[75] e si era esteso anche all'interno del Partito comunista tedesco, provocando una scissione. [senza fonte] Il 18 ottobre 1926 il New York Times, forse su ispirazione di Lev Trotsky, pubblicava il testamento di Lenin, con i suoi noti rilievi sul carattere di Stalin e sul pericolo rappresentato dal troppo potere che la carica di segretario del Partito gli concedeva.[76]  Su incarico dell'Ufficio politico, Gramsci scrisse a metà ottobre una lettera al Comitato centrale del Partito sovietico.[77] Egli si mostra preoccupato per «l'acutezza delle polemiche» che potrebbero portare a una scissione che «può avere le più gravi ripercussioni, non solo se la minoranza di opposizione non accetta con la massima lealtà i principi fondamentali della disciplina rivoluzionaria di Partito, ma anche se essa, nel condurre la sua lotta, oltrepassa certi limiti che sono superiori a tutte le democrazie formali». Riconosciuto ai dirigenti sovietici il merito di essere stati «l'elemento organizzatore e propulsore delle forze rivoluzionarie di tutti i paesi», li rimprovera di star «distruggendo l'opera vostra, voi degradate e correte il rischio di annullare la funzione dirigente che il partito comunista dell'URSS aveva conquistato per l'impulso di Lenin: ci pare che la passione violenta delle quistioni russe vi faccia perdere di vista gli aspetti internazionali delle quistioni russe stesse, vi faccia dimenticare che i vostri doveri di militanti russi possono e debbono essere adempiuti solo nel quadro degli interessi del proletariato internazionale».   Palmiro Togliatti Nel merito del fondamento del contrasto - la contraddizione di un proletariato formalmente «dominante» in URSS, ma in condizioni economiche molto inferiori alla classe «dominata» - Gramsci appoggia la posizione della maggioranza, rilevando che «è facile fare della demagogia su questo terreno ed è difficile non farla quando la quistione è stata messa nei termini dello spirito corporativo e non in quelli del leninismo, della dottrina dell'egemonia del proletariato [...] è in questo elemento la radice degli errori del blocco delle opposizioni e l'origine dei pericoli latenti che nella sua attività sono contenuti. Nella ideologia e nella pratica del blocco delle opposizioni rinasce in pieno tutta la tradizione della socialdemocrazia e del sindacalismo che ha impedito finora al proletariato occidentale di organizzarsi in classe dirigente».  Gramsci concludeva esortando all'unità: «I compagni Zinov'ev, Trockij, Kamenev hanno contribuito potentemente a educarci per la rivoluzione [...] sono stati tra i nostri maestri. A loro specialmente ci rivolgiamo come ai maggiori responsabili dell'attuale situazione perché vogliamo essere sicuri che la maggioranza del comitato centrale del partito comunista dell'URSS non intenda stravincere nella lotta e sia disposta a evitare le misure eccessive. L'untà del nostro partito fratello di Russia è necessaria per lo sviluppo e il trionfo delle forze rivoluzionarie mondiali; a questa necessità ogni comunista e internazionalista deve essere disposto a fare maggiori sacrifizi. I danni di un errore compiuto dal partito unito sono facilmente superabili; i danni di una scissione o di una prolungata condizione di scissione latente possono essere irreparabili e mortali».[78]  Togliatti, allora a Mosca quale rappresentante italiano all'Internazionale, criticò le ultime considerazioni che ripartivano, seppure in modo diseguale, le responsabilità delle due fazioni, credendo ancora nella illusoria possibilità di una compattezza del gruppo dirigente sovietico: a suo avviso, invece, «d'ora in poi l'unità della vecchia guardia leninista non sarà più o sarà assai difficilmente realizzata in modo continuo».[79]  Non ci sarà tempo e occasione per approfondire la questione: lo stesso giorno in cui il Comitato centrale comunista doveva riunirsi clandestinamente a Genova, il 31 ottobre 1926, Mussolini subì a Bologna un attentato senza conseguenze personali, che provoca una tale pressione poliziesca da far fallire il convegno. L'attentato Zamboni costituì il pretesto per l'eliminazione degli ultimi, minimi residui di democrazia: il 5 novembre il governo sciolse i partiti politici di opposizione e soppresse la libertà di stampa. L'8 novembre, in violazione dell'immunità parlamentare, Gramsci venne arrestato nella sua casa e rinchiuso nel carcere di Regina Coeli.[80] Il giorno successivo fu dichiarato decaduto, insieme agli altri deputati aventiniani.[81]  Dopo un periodo di confino a Ustica, dove ritrovò, tra gli altri, Bordiga, il 7 febbraio 1927 fu detenuto nel carcere milanese di San Vittore. Qui ricevette, in agosto, la visita del fratello Mario, le cui scelte politiche erano state opposte alle sue - già federale di Varese, ora si occupava di commercio - e, soprattutto, quella della cognata Tatiana, la persona che si manterrà sempre, per quanto possibile, in contatto con lui. L'istruttoria andò per le lunghe, perché vi erano difficoltà a montare su di lui accuse credibili: fu anche fatto avvicinare da due agenti provocatori - prima un tale Dante Romani e poi un certo Corrado Melani - ma senza successo.[82]  Il processo a ventidue imputati comunisti, fra i quali Umberto Terracini, Mauro Scoccimarro e Giovanni Roveda, iniziò finalmente a Roma il 28 maggio 1928; Mussolini aveva istituito il 1º febbraio 1927 il Tribunale Speciale Fascista. Presidente è un generale, Alessandro Saporiti, giurati sono cinque consoli della milizia fascista, relatore l'avvocato Giacomo Buccafurri e accusatore l'avvocato Michele Isgrò, tutti in uniforme; intorno all'aula, «un doppio cordone di militi in elmetto nero, il pugnale sul fianco ed i moschetti con la baionetta in canna»[83] Gramsci è accusato di attività cospirativa, istigazione alla guerra civile, apologia di reato e incitamento all'odio di classe.[84] Il pubblico ministero Isgrò concluse la sua requisitoria con una frase rimasta famosa: «Bisogna impedire a questo cervello di funzionare per venti anni»;[85] e infatti Gramsci, il 4 giugno, venne condannato a venti anni, quattro mesi e cinque giorni di reclusione;[86] il 19 luglio raggiunse il carcere di Turi, in provincia di Bari. Fin da quando si trovava in carcere a Milano, Gramsci era intenzionato a occuparsi «intensamente e sistematicamente di qualche soggetto» che lo «assorbisse e centralizzasse la sua vita interiore».[87] L'8 febbraio 1929, nel carcere di Turi, il detenuto 7.047 ottenne finalmente l'occorrente per scrivere e iniziò la stesura dei suoi Quaderni del carcere. Il primo quaderno si apre proprio con una bozza di 16 argomenti, alcuni dei quali saranno abbandonati, altri inseriti e altri ancora svolti solo in parte. Caratteristico era il suo modo di lavorare: quasi tutti i giorni, per alcune ore, camminando all'interno della cella, rifletteva sulle frasi da scrivere e poi si chinava sul tavolino, scrivendo senza sedersi, un ginocchio appoggiato sullo sgabello, per riprendere a camminare e a pensare.[88] A fare da tramite tra Gramsci e il mondo esterno, e in particolare con Piero Sraffa e tramite questi col Pcus e il PCd'I, fu la cognata Tatiana Schucht, essendo la moglie di Gramsci tornata in Unione Sovietica.  Intanto, il VI Congresso dell'Internazionale comunista, tenutosi a Mosca dal luglio al settembre 1928, aveva stabilito l'impossibilità di accordi con la socialdemocrazia, che veniva anzi assimilata allo stesso fascismo.[89] Era la tesi di Stalin il quale, liquidata l'opposizione di Trockij, eliminava anche l'influenza di Bucharin che, già suo alleato contro la sinistra di Trockij, era rimasto il suo principale oppositore da destra.[90] Al nuovo orientamento dell'Internazionale, riaffermato nel X Plenum del Comitato esecutivo nel luglio 1929, dovevano adeguarsi i Partiti nazionali, espellendo, se necessario, i dissidenti.[89] Il Partito comunista d'Italia si adeguò alle scelte dell'Internazionale, espellendo Angelo Tasca in settembre e in successione, ma con l'accusa di trotskismo, prima, il 30 marzo del 1930, Bordiga,[91] poi, il 9 giugno, fu la volta di Alfonso Leonetti, Pietro Tresso e Paolo Ravazzoli.[92]  Gramsci teneva, durante l'ora d'aria, dei "colloqui-lezioni" con i compagni di partito: non esistono dirette testimonianze delle opinioni espresse da Gramsci riguardo alla «svolta» politica del movimento comunista, ma può costituire un indiretto riferimento un rapporto che un suo compagno di carcere, Athos Lisa, amnistiato nel 1933, inviò subito al Centro estero comunista.[93] Secondo quella relazione, Gramsci riferì la teoria della necessità dell'alleanza fra operai del Nord e contadini meridionali che già stava elaborando nei suoi Quaderni: «L'azione per la conquista degli alleati diviene per il proletariato cosa estremamente delicata e difficile. D'altra parte, senza la conquista di questi alleati, è precluso al proletariato ogni serio movimento rivoluzionario». Qui s'intende che il proletariato - la classe operaia - debba allearsi con i contadini e la piccola borghesia: «Se si tiene conto delle particolari condizioni nei limiti delle quali va visto il grado di sviluppo politico degli strati contadini e piccoli borghesi in Italia, è facile comprendere come la conquista di questi strati sociali comporti per il partito una particolare azione [...]»   Foto segnaletica di Gramsci del 1933 «La lotta per la conquista diretta del potere è un passo al quale questi strati sociali potranno solo accedere per gradi [...] il primo passo attraverso il quale bisogna condurre questi strati sociali è quello che li porti a pronunciarsi sul problema istituzionale e costituzionale. L'inutilità della Monarchia è ormai compresa da tutti i lavoratori [...] a questo obiettivo deve improntarsi la tattica del partito senza tema di apparire poco rivoluzionario. Deve fare sua prima degli altri partiti in lotta contro il fascismo la parola d'ordine della Costituente». Ma l'azione del partito «deve essere intesa a svalutare tutti i programmi di riforma pacifica dimostrando alla classe lavoratrice come la sola soluzione possibile in Italia risieda nella rivoluzione proletaria».  La richiesta di una Costituente, e dunque di un'iniziativa politica che si ponesse obiettivi intermedi, avrebbe comportato necessariamente una convergenza, per quanto temporanea, con altre forze antifasciste, e se è difficile considerare tale linea politica come «socialdemocratica», durante le discussioni nel cortile del carcere qualche suo compagno arrivò a sostenere che egli era ormai fuori del Partito comunista: probabilmente le reazioni di alcuni «erano esasperate dal clima di detenzione» ma certo le posizioni di Gramsci dovevano apparire «in contrasto con la linea politica indicata in quegli anni dal Partito comunista».[94]  È in questo periodo che Gramsci venne a contatto con Sandro Pertini, esponente del PSI e detenuto anch'egli alla Casa Penale di Turi. I due, nonostante i pensieri politici differenti, divennero grandi amici e Pertini, anche dopo la scarcerazione, ricordò spesso nei suoi discorsi il compagno di prigionia e le tristi condizioni di salute che lo stroncavano[95]. Dal 1931 Gramsci, oltre al morbo di Pott di cui soffriva fin dall'infanzia, fu colpito da arteriosclerosi e poté così ottenere una cella individuale; cercò di reagire alla detenzione studiando ed elaborando le proprie riflessioni politiche, filosofiche e storiche, tuttavia le condizioni di salute continuarono a peggiorare e in agosto ebbe un'improvvisa e grave emorragia.   La tomba di Gramsci nel Cimitero acattolico di Roma Anche la moglie Giulia, in Russia, era sofferente di una seria forma di depressione e rare erano le sue lettere al marito che, all'oscuro dei motivi dei suoi lunghi silenzi, sentiva crescere intorno a sé il senso di un opprimente isolamento. Scriveva alla cognata: «Non credere che il sentimento di essere personalmente isolato mi getti nella disperazione [...] io non ho mai sentito il bisogno di un apporto esteriore di forze morali per vivere fortemente la mia vita [...] tanto meno oggi, quando sento che le mie forze volitive hanno acquistato un più alto grado di concretezza e di validità. Ma mentre nel passato mi sentivo quasi orgoglioso di sentirmi isolato, ora invece sento tutta la meschinità, l'aridità, la grettezza di una vita che sia esclusivamente volontà».[96]  Quando la madre morì, il 30 dicembre 1932, i familiari preferirono non informarlo; il 7 marzo 1933 ebbe una seconda grave crisi, con allucinazioni e deliri. Si riprese a fatica, senza farsi illusioni sul suo immediato futuro: «Fino a qualche tempo fa io ero, per così dire, pessimista con l'intelligenza e ottimista con la volontà [...] Oggi non penso più così. Ciò non vuol dire che abbia deciso di arrendermi, per così dire. Ma significa che non vedo più nessuna uscita concreta e non posso più contare su nessuna riserva di forze».[97]  Eppure lo stesso codice penale dell'epoca, all'art. 176, prevedeva la concessione della libertà condizionata ai carcerati in gravi condizioni di salute. A Parigi si costituì un comitato, di cui fecero parte, fra gli altri, Romain Rolland e Henri Barbusse, per ottenere la liberazione sua e di altri detenuti politici, ma solo il 19 novembre Gramsci venne trasferito nell'infermeria del carcere di Civitavecchia e poi, il 7 dicembre, nella clinica del dottor Cusumano a Formia, sorvegliato in camera e all'esterno. Il 25 ottobre 1934 Mussolini accolse finalmente la richiesta di libertà condizionata, ma Gramsci non rimase libero nei suoi movimenti, tanto che gli fu impedito di andare a curarsi altrove, perché il governo temeva una sua fuga all'estero; solo il 24 agosto 1935 poté essere trasferito nella clinica "Quisisana" di Roma, dove giunse in gravi condizioni, poiché oltre al morbo di Pott e all'arteriosclerosi soffriva di ipertensione e di gotta.  Il 21 aprile 1937 Gramsci passò dalla libertà condizionata alla piena libertà, ma era ormai in gravissime condizioni: morì all'alba del 27 aprile, a quarantasei anni, di emorragia cerebrale, nella stessa clinica Quisisana.[98] Il giorno seguente la cremazione si svolsero i funerali, cui parteciparono soltanto il fratello Carlo e la cognata Tatiana: le ceneri, inumate nel cimitero del Verano, furono trasferite l'anno seguente nel Cimitero acattolico di Roma, nel Campo Cestio. I 33 Quaderni del carcere, non destinati da Gramsci alla pubblicazione, contengono riflessioni e appunti elaborati durante la reclusione; iniziati l'8 febbraio 1929, furono definitivamente interrotti nell'agosto 1935 a causa della gravità delle sue condizioni di salute. Furono numerati, senza tener conto della loro cronologia, dalla cognata Tatiana Schucht, che li affidò all'Ambasciata sovietica a Roma da dove furono inviati a Mosca e, successivamente, consegnati a Palmiro Togliatti.[99]  Dopo la fine della guerra i Quaderni, curati dal dirigente comunista Felice Platone sotto la supervisione di Palmiro Togliatti, furono pubblicati dall'editore Einaudi – unitamente alle sue Lettere dal carcere indirizzate ai familiari – in sei volumi, ordinati per argomenti omogenei, con i titoli:  Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce, nel 1948 Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura, nel 1949 Il Risorgimento, nel 1949 Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politica e sullo Stato moderno, nel 1949 Letteratura e vita nazionale, nel 1950 Passato e presente, nel 1951 Nel 1975 i Quaderni furono pubblicati a cura di Valentino Gerratana secondo l'ordine cronologico della loro elaborazione. Sono stati raccolti in volume anche tutti gli articoli scritti da Gramsci nell'Avanti!, ne Il Grido del Popolo e ne L'Ordine Nuovo.  Il pensiero di Gramsci L'egemonia Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Egemonia culturale. Conquistare la maggioranza politica di un Paese vuol dire che le forze sociali, che di tale maggioranza sono espressione, dirigono la politica di quel determinato paese e dominano le forze sociali che a tale politica si oppongono: significa ottenere l'egemonia.  Vi è distinzione fra direzione – egemonia intellettuale e morale – e dominio – esercizio della forza repressiva: «Un gruppo sociale è dominante dei gruppi avversari che tende a liquidare o a sottomettere anche con la forza armata, ed è dirigente dei gruppi affini e alleati. Un gruppo sociale può e anzi deve essere dirigente già prima di conquistare il potere governativo (è questa una delle condizioni principali per la stessa conquista del potere); dopo, quando esercita il potere ed anche se lo tiene fortemente in pugno, diventa dominante ma deve continuare ad essere anche dirigente».[100]  La crisi dell'egemonia si manifesta quando, anche mantenendo il proprio dominio, le classi sociali politicamente dominanti non riescono più a essere dirigenti di tutte le classi sociali, non riuscendo più a risolvere i problemi di tutta la collettività e a imporre la propria concezione del mondo. A quel punto, la classe sociale subalterna, se riesce a indicare concrete soluzioni ai problemi lasciati irrisolti dalla classe dominante, può diventare dirigente e, allargando la propria concezione del mondo anche ad altri strati sociali, può creare un nuovo «blocco sociale», cioè una nuova alleanza di forze sociali, divenendo egemone. Il cambiamento dell'esercizio dell'egemonia è un momento rivoluzionario che inizialmente avviene a livello della sovrastruttura – in senso marxiano, ossia politico, culturale, ideale, morale –, ma poi trapassa nella società nel suo complesso investendo anche la struttura economica, e dunque tutto il «blocco storico», termine che in Gramsci indica l'insieme della struttura e della sovrastruttura, ossia i rapporti sociali di produzione e i loro riflessi ideologici. Analizzando la storia italiana e il Risorgimento in particolare, Gramsci rileva che la classe popolare non trovò un proprio spazio politico e una propria identità, poiché la politica dei liberali di Cavour concepì «l'unità nazionale come allargamento dello Stato piemontese e del patrimonio della dinastia, non come movimento nazionale dal basso, ma come conquista regia».[101] Gramsci ritiene che l'azione della borghesia avrebbe potuto assumere un carattere rivoluzionario se avesse acquisito l'appoggio di vaste masse popolari, in particolare dei contadini, che costituivano la maggioranza della popolazione. Il limite della rivoluzione borghese in Italia consistette nel non essere capeggiata da un partito giacobino, come in Francia, dove le campagne, appoggiando la Rivoluzione, furono decisive per la sconfitta delle forze della reazione aristocratica.   Cavour Il partito politico italiano allora più avanzato fu il Partito d'Azione di Mazzini e Garibaldi, che non seppe impostare il problema dell'alleanza delle forze borghesi progressive con la classe contadina: Garibaldi in Sicilia distribuì le terre demaniali ai contadini, ma gli stessi garibaldini repressero le rivolte contadine contro i baroni latifondisti. Per conquistare l'egemonia contro i moderati guidati da Cavour, il Partito d'Azione avrebbe dovuto «legarsi alle masse rurali, specialmente meridionali, essere giacobino [...] specialmente per il contenuto economico-sociale: il collegamento delle diverse classi rurali che si realizzava in un blocco reazionario attraverso i diversi ceti intellettuali legittimisti-clericali poteva essere dissolto per addivenire ad una nuova formazione liberale-nazionale solo se si faceva forza in due direzioni: sui contadini di base, accettandone le rivendicazione di base [...] e sugli intellettuali degli strati medi e inferiori».[102]  Al contrario, i cavourriani seppero mettersi alla testa della rivoluzione borghese, assorbendo tanto i radicali che una parte dei loro stessi avversari. Questo avvenne perché i moderati cavourriani ebbero un rapporto organico con i loro intellettuali che erano proprietari terrieri e dirigenti industriali come i politici che essi rappresentavano. Le masse popolari restarono passive nel raggiunto compromesso fra i capitalisti del Nord e i latifondisti del Sud.  Il Piemonte assunse la funzione di classe dirigente, anche se esistevano altri nuclei di classe dirigente favorevoli all'unificazione: ma «questi nuclei non volevano dirigere nessuno, cioè non volevano accordare i loro interessi e aspirazioni con gli interessi e aspirazioni di altri gruppi. Volevano dominare, non dirigere e ancora: volevano che dominassero i loro interessi, non le loro persone, cioè volevano che una forza nuova, indipendente da ogni compromesso e condizione, divenisse arbitra della Nazione: questa forza fu il Piemonte», che ebbe una funzione paragonabile a quella di un partito.  «Questo fatto è della massima importanza per il concetto di rivoluzione passiva, che cioè non un gruppo sociale sia il dirigente di altri gruppi, ma che uno Stato, sia pure limitato come potenza, sia il dirigente del gruppo che di esso dovrebbe essere dirigente e possa porre a disposizione di questo un esercito e una forza politica-diplomatica». Che uno Stato si sostituisca ai gruppi sociali locali nel dirigere la lotta di rinnovamento «è uno dei casi in cui si ha la funzione di dominio e non di dirigenza di questi gruppi: dittatura senza egemonia».[103] E dunque per Gramsci il concetto di egemonia si distingue da quello di dittatura: questa è solo dominio, quella è capacità di direzione. Nei suoi scritti tuttavia Gramsci non prese mai posizione contro la dittatura del proletariato né espresse critiche significative al regime sovietico in Russia.  Le classi subalterne  Gustave Courbet, Lo spaccapietre Le classi subalterne - sottoproletariato, proletariato urbano, rurale e anche parte della piccola borghesia - non sono unificate e la loro unificazione avviene solo quando giungono a dirigere lo Stato, altrimenti svolgono una funzione discontinua e disgregata nella storia della società civile dei singoli Stati, subendo l'iniziativa dei gruppi dominanti anche quando ad essi si ribellano.  Il "blocco sociale", l'alleanza politica di classi sociali diverse, formato, in Italia, da industriali, proprietari terrieri, classi medie, parte della piccola borghesia, non è omogeneo, essendo attraversato da interessi divergenti, ma una politica opportuna, una cultura e un'ideologia o un sistema di ideologie impediscono che quei contrasti di interessi, permanenti anche quando siano latenti, esplodano provocando la crisi dell'ideologia dominante e la conseguente crisi politica dell'intero sistema di potere.  In Italia, l'esercizio dell'egemonia delle classi dominanti è ed è stata parziale: tra le forze che contribuiscono alla conservazione di tale blocco sociale è la Chiesa cattolica, che si batte per mantenere l'unione dottrinale tra fedeli colti e incolti, tra intellettuali e semplici, tra dominanti e dominati, in modo da evitare fratture irrimediabili che tuttavia esistono e che essa non è in realtà in grado di sanare, ma solo di controllare: «la Chiesa romana è sempre stata la più tenace nella lotta per impedire che ufficialmente si formino due religioni, quella degli intellettuali e quella delle anime semplici », una lotta che ha fatto risaltare «la capacità organizzatrice nella sfera della cultura del clero» che ha dato «certe soddisfazioni alle esigenze della scienza e della filosofia, ma con un ritmo così lento e metodico che le mutazioni non sono percepite dalla massa dei semplici, sebbene esse appaiano "rivoluzionarie" e demagogiche agli "integralisti" ».[104]  Anche la dominante cultura d'impronta idealistica, esercitata dalle scuole filosofiche crociane e gentiliane, non ha «saputo creare una unità ideologica tra il basso e l'alto, tra i semplici e gli intellettuali», tanto che essa, anche se ha sempre considerato la religione una mitologia, non ha nemmeno «tentato di costruire una concezione che potesse sostituire la religione nell'educazione infantile», e questi pedagogisti, pur essendo non religiosi, non confessionali e atei, «concedono l'insegnamento della religione perché la religione è la filosofia dell'infanzia dell'umanità, che si rinnova in ogni infanzia non metaforica».[105] La cultura laica dominante utilizza la religione proprio perché non si pone il problema di elevare le classi popolari al livello di quelle dominanti ma, al contrario, intende mantenerle in una posizione di subalternità.  Le classi dominanti hanno derubricato a folklore la cultura delle classi subalterne. Gramsci annota l'8 febbraio 1929, nel I Quaderno, che il folklore «non deve essere concepito come una bizzarria, una stranezza, una cosa ridicola, una cosa tutt'al più pittoresca; ma deve essere concepito come una cosa molto seria e da prendere sul serio», e va studiato in quanto «concezione del mondo e della vita [...] di certi strati della società [...] determinati nel tempo e nello spazio», cioè del popolo inteso come «l'insieme delle classi strumentali e subalterne di ogni forma di società finora esistita». È dunque necessario «mutare lo spirito delle ricerche folkloriche, oltre che approfondirle ed estenderle».[106][107]  La coscienza di classe  Karl Marx La frattura tra gli intellettuali e i semplici può essere sanata da quella politica che «non tende a mantenere i semplici nella loro filosofia primitiva del senso comune, ma invece a condurli a una concezione superiore della vita». L'azione politica realizzata dalla «filosofia della prassi» - così Gramsci chiama il marxismo, non solo per l'esigenza di celare quanto scrive alla repressiva censura carceraria - opponendosi alle culture dominanti della Chiesa e dell'idealismo, può condurre i subalterni a una «superiore concezione della vita. Se afferma l'esigenza del contatto tra intellettuali e semplici non è per limitare l'attività scientifica e per mantenere una unità al basso livello delle masse, ma appunto per costruire un blocco intellettuale-morale che renda politicamente possibile un progresso intellettuale di massa e non solo di scarsi gruppi intellettuali».[108] La via che conduce all'egemonia del proletariato passa dunque per una riforma culturale e morale della società.  Tuttavia l'uomo attivo di massa - cioè la classe operaia, - non è, in generale, consapevole né della funzione che può svolgere né della sua condizione reale di subordinazione, Il proletariato, scrive Gramsci, «non ha una chiara coscienza teorica di questo suo operare che pure è un conoscere il mondo in quanto lo trasforma. La sua coscienza teorica anzi può essere in contrasto col suo operare»; esso opera praticamente e nello stesso tempo ha una coscienza teorica ereditata dal passato, accolta per lo più in modo acritico. La reale comprensione critica di sé avviene «attraverso una lotta di egemonie politiche, di direzioni contrastanti, prima nel campo dell'etica, poi della politica per giungere a una elaborazione superiore della propria concezione del reale». La coscienza politica, cioè l'essere parte di una determinata forza egemonica, «è la prima fase per una ulteriore e progressiva autocoscienza dove teoria e pratica finalmente si unificano».[108]  Ma autocoscienza critica significa creazione di un gruppo di intellettuali, organici alla classe, perché per distinguersi e rendersi indipendenti occorre organizzarsi, e non esiste organizzazione senza intellettuali, «uno strato di persone specializzate nell'elaborazione concettuale e filosofica».[109]  Già Machiavelli indicava nei moderni Stati unitari europei l'esperienza che l'Italia avrebbe dovuto far propria per superare la drammatica crisi emersa nelle guerre che devastarono la penisola dalla fine del Quattrocento. Il Principe di Machiavelli «non esisteva nella realtà storica, non si presentava al popolo italiano con caratteri di immediatezza obiettiva, ma era una pura astrazione dottrinaria, il simbolo del capo, del condottiero ideale; ma gli elementi passionali, mitici [...] si riassumono e diventano vivi nella conclusione, nell'invocazione di un principe realmente esistente».[110]   Niccolò Machiavelli In Italia non si ebbe una monarchia assoluta che unificasse la nazione perché dalla dissoluzione della borghesia comunale si creò una situazione interna economico-corporativa, politicamente «la peggiore delle forme di società feudale, la forma meno progressiva e più stagnante: mancò sempre, e non poteva costituirsi, una forza giacobina efficiente, la forza appunto che nelle altre nazioni ha suscitato e organizzato la volontà collettiva nazional-popolare e ha fondato gli Stati moderni».[111]  A questa forza progressiva si oppose in Italia la «borghesia rurale, eredità di parassitismo lasciata ai tempi moderni dallo sfacelo, come classe, della borghesia comunale». Forze progressive sono i gruppi sociali urbani con un determinato livello di cultura politica, ma non sarà possibile la formazione di una volontà collettiva nazionale-popolare, «se le grandi masse dei contadini lavoratori non irrompono simultaneamente nella vita politica. Ciò intendeva il Machiavelli attraverso la riforma della milizia, ciò fecero i giacobini nella Rivoluzione francese; in questa comprensione è da identificare un giacobinismo precoce del Machiavelli, il germe, più o meno fecondo, della sua concezione della rivoluzione nazionale».[111]  Modernamente, il Principe invocato dal Machiavelli non può essere un individuo reale, concreto, ma un organismo e «questo organismo è già dato dallo sviluppo storico ed è il partito politico: la prima cellula in cui si riassumono dei germi di volontà collettiva che tendono a divenire universali e totali»; il partito è l'organizzatore di una riforma intellettuale e morale, che concretamente si manifesta con un programma di riforma economica, divenendo così «la base di un laicismo moderno e di una completa laicizzazione di tutta la vita e di tutti i rapporti di costume».[105]  Perché un partito esista, e diventi storicamente necessario, devono confluire in esso tre elementi fondamentali:  «Un elemento diffuso, di uomini comuni, medi, la cui partecipazione è offerta dalla disciplina e dalla fedeltà, non dallo spirito creativo ed altamente organizzativo [...] essi sono una forza in quanto c'è chi li centralizza, organizza, disciplina, ma in assenza di questa forza coesiva si sparpaglierebbero e si annullerebbero in un pulviscolo impotente» «L'elemento coesivo principale [...] dotato di forza altamente coesiva, centralizzatrice e disciplinatrice e anche, anzi forse per questo, inventiva [...] da solo questo elemento non formerebbe un partito, tuttavia lo formerebbe più che il primo elemento considerato. Si parla di capitani senza esercito, ma in realtà è più facile formare un esercito che formare dei capitani» «Un elemento medio, che articoli il primo col secondo elemento, che li metta a contatto, non solo fisico, ma morale e intellettuale».[112] Gramsci negli scritti compresi fra il 1919 e il 1926 ribadì i principi espressi dalla Terza Internazionale, insistendo sulla "disciplina ferrea" del partito e contestando qualsiasi forma di "frazionismo". Socialisti e sindacalisti venivano pesantemente criticati e messi sullo stesso piano del regime fascista. Per Gramsci, tutti gli uomini sono intellettuali, dal momento che «non c'è attività umana da cui si possa escludere ogni intervento intellettuale, non si può separare l'homo faber dall'homo sapiens»,[113] in quanto, indipendentemente della sua professione specifica, ognuno è a suo modo «un filosofo, un artista, un uomo di gusto, partecipa di una concezione del mondo, ha una consapevole linea di condotta morale», ma non tutti gli uomini hanno nella società la funzione di intellettuali.  Storicamente si formano particolari categorie di intellettuali, «specialmente in connessione coi gruppi sociali più importanti e subiscono elaborazioni più estese e complesse in connessione col gruppo sociale dominante». Un gruppo sociale che tende all'egemonia lotta «per l'assimilazione e la conquista ideologica degli intellettuali tradizionali [...] tanto più rapida ed efficace quanto più il gruppo dato elabora simultaneamente i propri intellettuali organici».[111]  L'intellettuale tradizionale è il letterato, il filosofo, l'artista e perciò, nota Gramsci, «i giornalisti, che ritengono di essere letterati, filosofi, artisti, ritengono anche di essere i veri intellettuali», mentre modernamente è la formazione tecnica a formare la base del nuovo tipo di intellettuale, un costruttore, organizzatore, persuasore - ma non assolutamente il vecchio oratore, formatosi sullo studio dell'eloquenza «motrice esteriore e momentanea degli affetti e delle passioni» - il quale deve giungere «dalla tecnica-lavoro alla tecnica-scienza e alla concezione umanistica storica, senza la quale si rimane specialista e non si diventa dirigente».[114]  Il gruppo sociale emergente, che lotta per conquistare l'egemonia politica, tende a conquistare alla propria ideologia l'intellettuale tradizionale mentre, nello stesso tempo, forma i propri intellettuali organici. L'organicità degli intellettuali si misura con la maggiore o minore connessione con il gruppo sociale cui essi fanno riferimento: essi operano tanto nella società civile - l'insieme degli organismi privati in cui si dibattono e si diffondono le ideologie necessarie all'acquisizione del consenso, apparentemente dato spontaneamente dalle grandi masse della popolazione alle scelte del gruppo sociale dominante - quanto nella società politica, dove si esercita il «dominio diretto o di comando che si esprime nello Stato e nel governo giuridico». Gli intellettuali sono così «i commessi del gruppo dominante per l'esercizio delle funzioni subalterne dell'egemonia sociale e del governo politico, cioè: 1) del consenso spontaneo dato dalle grandi masse della popolazione all'indirizzo impresso alla vita sociale dal gruppo fondamentale dominante [...] 2) dell'apparato di coercizione statale che assicura legalmente la disciplina di quei gruppi che non consentono».[115]  Come lo Stato, nella società politica, tende a unificare gli intellettuali tradizionali con quelli organici, così nella società civile il partito politico, ancor più compiutamente e organicamente dello Stato, elabora «i propri componenti, elementi di un gruppo sociale nato e sviluppatosi come economico, fino a farli diventare intellettuali politici qualificati, dirigenti, organizzatori di tutte le attività e le funzioni inerenti all'organico sviluppo di una società integrale, civile e politica».[109] Il compito della “riforma intellettuale e morale” non potrà che essere ancora degli intellettuali organici, non cristallizzati, che la determineranno e organizzeranno, adeguando la cultura anche alle sue funzioni pratiche, addivenendo a una nuova organizzazione della cultura. Il partito comunista si pone, per Gramsci, come sintesi attiva di questo processo: intellettuale collettivo di avanguardia, la direzione politica di classe lotterà per l'egemonia. Il partito comunista, per Gramsci, è intellettuale collettivo; e l'intellettuale comunista è organico alla classe e dunque a questo collettivo perché fa parte del blocco storico-sociale che deve costruire il nuovo mondo. Pur essendo sempre stati legati alle classi dominanti, ottenendone spesso onori e prestigio, gli intellettuali italiani non si sono mai sentiti organici, hanno sempre rifiutato, in nome di un loro astratto cosmopolitismo, ogni legame con il popolo, del quale non hanno mai voluto riconoscere le esigenze né interpretare i bisogni culturali.  In molte lingue - in russo, in tedesco, in francese - il significato dei termini «nazionale» e «popolare» coincidono: «in Italia, il termine nazionale ha un significato molto ristretto ideologicamente e in ogni caso non coincide con popolare, perché in Italia gli intellettuali sono lontani dal popolo, cioè dalla nazione e sono invece legati a una tradizione di casta, che non è mai stata rotta da un forte movimento popolare o nazionale dal basso: la tradizione è libresca e astratta e l'intellettuale tipico moderno si sente più legato ad Annibal Caro o a Ippolito Pindemonte che a un contadino pugliese o siciliano».[116]  Dall'Ottocento, in Europa, si è assistito a un fiorire della letteratura popolare, dai romanzi di appendice del Sue o di Ponson du Terrail, ad Alexandre Dumas, ai racconti polizieschi inglesi e americani; con maggior dignità artistica, alle opere del Chesterton e di Dickens, a quelle di Victor Hugo, di Émile Zola e di Honoré de Balzac, fino ai capolavori di Fëdor Michajlovič Dostoevskij e di Lev Tolstoj. Nulla di tutto questo in Italia: qui la letteratura non si è diffusa e non è stata popolare, per la mancanza di un blocco nazionale intellettuale e morale tanto che l'elemento intellettuale italiano è avvertito come più straniero degli stranieri stessi. Fa eccezione, per Gramsci, il melodramma, che ha tenuto in qualche modo in Italia il ruolo nazionale-popolare sostenuto altrove dalla letteratura.   Alessandro Manzoni ritratto da Francesco Hayez Il pubblico italiano cerca la sua letteratura all'estero perché la sente più sua di quella nazionale: è questa la dimostrazione del distacco, in Italia, fra pubblico e scrittori: «Ogni popolo ha la sua letteratura, ma essa può venirgli da un altro popolo [...] può essere subordinato all'egemonia intellettuale e morale di altri popoli. È questo spesso il paradosso più stridente per molte tendenze monopolistiche di carattere nazionalistico e repressivo: che mentre si costruiscono piani grandiosi di egemonia, non ci si accorge di essere oggetto di egemonie straniere; così come, mentre si fanno piani imperialistici, in realtà si è oggetto di altri imperialismi». Hanno fallito nel compito di elaborare la coscienza morale del popolo, non diffondendo in esso un moderno umanesimo, tanto gli intellettuali laici quanto i cattolici: la loro insufficienza è «uno degli indizi più espressivi dell'intima rottura che esiste tra la religione e il popolo: questo si trova in uno stato miserrimo di indifferentismo e di assenza di una vivace vita spirituale; la religione è rimasta allo stato di superstizione [...] l'Italia popolare è ancora nelle condizioni create immediatamente dalla Controriforma: la religione, tutt'al più, si è combinata col folclore pagano ed è rimasta in questo stadio».[117]  Sono rimaste famose le note di Gramsci sul Manzoni: lo scrittore più autorevole, più studiato nelle scuole e probabilmente il più popolare, è una dimostrazione del carattere non nazionale-popolare della letteratura italiana; ecco le parole dai Quaderni del carcere, confrontandolo con Tolstoj: «Il carattere aristocratico del cattolicismo manzoniano appare dal compatimento scherzoso verso le figure di uomini del popolo (ciò che non appare in Tolstoj), come fra Galdino (in confronto di frate Cristoforo), il sarto, Renzo, Agnese, Perpetua, la stessa Lucia [...] i popolani, per il Manzoni, non hanno vita interiore, non hanno personalità morale profonda; essi sono animali e il Manzoni è benevolo verso di loro proprio della benevolenza di una cattolica società di protezione di animali [...] niente dello spirito popolare di Tolstoi, cioè dello spirito evangelico del cristianesimo primitivo. L'atteggiamento del Manzoni verso i suoi popolani è l'atteggiamento della Chiesa Cattolica verso il popolo: di condiscendente benevolenza, non di immediatezza umana [...] vede con occhio severo tutto il popolo, mentre vede con occhio severo i più di coloro che non sono popolo; egli trova magnanimità, alti pensieri, grandi sentimenti, solo in alcuni della classe alta, in nessuno del popolo [...] non c'è popolano che non venga preso in giro e canzonato [...] Vita interiore hanno solo i signori: fra Cristoforo, il Borromeo, l'Innominato, lo stesso don Rodrigo [...] il suo atteggiamento verso il popolo non è popolare-nazionale ma aristocratico».[118]  Una classe che muova alla conquista dell'egemonia non può non creare una nuova cultura, che è essa stessa espressione di una nuova vita morale, un nuovo modo di vedere e rappresentare la realtà; naturalmente, non si possono creare artificialmente artisti che interpretino questo nuovo mondo culturale, ma «un nuovo gruppo sociale che entra nella vita storica con atteggiamento egemonico, con una sicurezza di sé che prima non aveva, non può non suscitare dal suo seno personalità che prima non avrebbero trovato una forza sufficiente per esprimersi compiutamente». Intanto, nella creazione di una nuova cultura, è parte la critica della civiltà letteraria presente, e Gramsci vede nella critica svolta da Francesco De Sanctis un esempio privilegiato:   Francesco De Sanctis ritratto da Saverio Altamura «La critica del De Sanctis è militante, non frigidamente estetica, è la critica di un periodo di lotte culturali, di contrasti tra concezioni della vita antagonistiche. Le analisi del contenuto, la critica della struttura delle opere, cioè della coerenza logica e storica-attuale delle masse di sentimenti rappresentati artisticamente, sono legate a questa lotta culturale: proprio in ciò pare consista la profonda umanità e l'umanesimo del De Sanctis [...] Piace sentire in lui il fervore appassionato dell'uomo di parte che ha saldi convincimenti morali e politici e non li nasconde». Il De Sanctis opera nel periodo risorgimentale, in cui si lotta per creare una nuova cultura: di qui la differenza con il Croce, che vive sì gli stessi motivi culturali, ma nel periodo della loro affermazione, per cui «la passione e il fervore romantico si sono composti nella serenità superiore e nell'indulgenza piena di bonomia». Quando poi quei valori culturali, così affermatisi, sono messi in discussione, allora in Croce «subentra una fase in cui la serenità e l'indulgenza s'incrinano e affiora l'acrimonia e la collera a stento repressa: fase difensiva non aggressiva e fervida, e pertanto non confrontabile con quella del De Sanctis».[119]  Per Gramsci, una critica letteraria marxistica può avere nel critico campano un esempio, dal momento che essa deve fondere, come De Sanctis fece, la critica estetica con la lotta per una cultura nuova, criticando il costume, i sentimenti e le ideologie espresse nella storia della letteratura, individuandone le radici nella società in cui quegli scrittori si trovavano a operare.  Non a caso, Gramsci progettava nei suoi Quaderni un saggio che intendeva intitolare «I nipotini di padre Bresciani», dal nome del gesuita Antonio Bresciani (1798-1862), tra i fondatori e direttore della rivista La Civiltà Cattolica e scrittore di romanzi popolari d'impronta reazionaria; uno di essi, L'ebreo di Verona, fu stroncato in un famoso saggio del De Sanctis. I nipotini di padre Bresciani sono, per Gramsci, gli intellettuali e i letterati contemporanei portatori di una ideologia reazionaria, sia essa cattolica che laica, con un «carattere tendenzioso e propagandistico apertamente confessato».[120]  Fra i «nipotini» Gramsci individua, oltre a molti scrittori ormai dimenticati, Antonio Beltramelli, Ugo Ojetti - «la codardia intellettuale dell'uomo supera ogni misura normale» - Alfredo Panzini, Goffredo Bellonci, Massimo Bontempelli, Umberto Fracchia, Adelchi Baratono - «l'agnosticismo del Baratono non è altro che vigliaccheria morale e civile [...] Baratono teorizza solo la propria impotenza estetica e filosofica e la propria coniglieria» - Riccardo Bacchelli - «nel Bacchelli c'è molto brescianesimo, non solo politico-sociale, ma anche letterario: la Ronda fu una manifestazione di gesuitismo artistico» - Salvator Gotta, «di Salvator Gotta si può dire ciò che il Carducci scrisse del Rapisardi: Oremus sull'altare e flatulenze in sagrestia; tutta la sua produzione letteraria è brescianesca», Giuseppe Ungaretti.  Secondo Gramsci «la vecchia generazione degli intellettuali è fallita (Papini, Prezzolini, Soffici, ecc.) ma ha avuto una giovinezza. La generazione attuale non ha neanche questa età delle brillanti promesse, Titta Rosa, Angioletti, Malaparte, ecc.). Asini brutti anche da piccoletti».[121] Benedetto Croce, il più autorevole intellettuale dell'epoca, secondo Gramsci aveva dato alla borghesia italiana gli strumenti culturali più raffinati per delimitare i confini fra gli intellettuali e la cultura italiana, da una parte, e il movimento operaio e socialista dall'altra; è allora necessario mostrare e combattere la sua funzione di maggior rappresentante dell'egemonia culturale che il blocco sociale dominante esercita nei confronti del movimento operaio italiano. Come tale, il Croce combatte il marxismo, cercando di negarne validità nell'elemento che egli individua come decisivo: quello dell'economia; Il Capitale di Marx sarebbe per lui un'opera di morale e non di scienza, un tentativo di dimostrare che la società capitalistica è immorale, diversamente dalla comunista, in cui si realizzerebbe la piena moralità umana e sociale. La non scientificità dell'opera maggiore di Marx sarebbe dimostrata dal concetto del plusvalore: per Croce, solo da un punto di vista morale si può parlare di plusvalore, rispetto al valore, legittimo concetto economico.   Benedetto Croce Questa critica del Croce è in realtà un semplice sofisma: il plusvalore è esso stesso valore, è la differenza tra il valore delle merci prodotte dal lavoratore e il valore della forza-lavoro del lavoratore stesso. Del resto, la teoria del valore di Marx deriva direttamente da quella dell'economista liberale inglese David Ricardo la cui teoria del valore-lavoro «non sollevò nessuno scandalo quando fu espressa, perché allora non rappresentava nessun pericolo, appariva solo, come era, una constatazione puramente oggettiva e scientifica. Il valore polemico e di educazione morale e politica, pur senza perdere la sua oggettività, doveva acquistarla solo con la Economia critica [Il Capitale di Marx]».[122]  La filosofia crociana si qualifica come storicismo, ossia, seguendo il Vico, la realtà è storia e tutto ciò che esiste è necessariamente storico ma, conformemente alla natura idealistica della sua filosofia, la storia è storia dello Spirito, dunque storia speculativa, di astrazioni - storia della libertà, della cultura, del progresso - non è la storia concreta delle nazioni e delle classi: «La storia speculativa può essere considerata come un ritorno, in forme letterarie rese più scaltre e meno ingenue dallo sviluppo della capacità critica, a modi di storia già caduti in discredito come vuoti e retorici e registrati in diversi libri dello stesso Croce. La storia etico-politica, in quanto prescinde dal concetto di blocco storico, in cui contenuto economico-sociale e forma etico-politica si identificano concretamente nella ricostruzione dei vari periodi storici, è niente altro che una presentazione polemica di filosofemi più o meno interessanti, ma non è storia [...] la storia del Croce rappresenta figure disossate, senza scheletro, dalle carni flaccide e cascanti anche sotto il belletto delle veneri letterarie dello scrittore».[123]  L'operazione conservatrice del Croce storico fa il paio con quella del Croce filosofo: se la dialettica dell'idealista Hegel era una dialettica dei contrari - uno svolgimento della storia che procede per contraddizioni - la dialettica crociana è una dialettica dei distinti: commutare la contraddizione in distinzione significa operare un'attenuazione, se non un annullamento dei contrasti che nella storia, e dunque nelle società, si presentano. Tale operazione si manifesta nelle opere storiche del Croce: la sua Storia d'Europa, iniziando dal 1815 e tagliando fuori il periodo della Rivoluzione francese e quello napoleonico, «non è altro che un frammento di storia, l'aspetto passivo della grande rivoluzione che si iniziò in Francia nel 1789, traboccò nel resto d'Europa con le armate repubblicane e napoleoniche, dando una potente spallata ai vecchi regimi e determinandone non il crollo immediato come in Francia, ma la corrosione riformistica che durò fino al 1870».[124] Analoga è l'operazione operata dal Croce nella sua Storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915 la quale affronta unicamente il periodo del consolidamento del regime dell'Italia unita e si «prescinde dal momento della lotta, dal momento in cui si elaborano e radunano e schierano le forze in contrasto [...] in cui un sistema etico-politico si dissolve e un altro si elabora [...] in cui un sistema di rapporti sociali si sconnette e decade e un altro sistema sorge e si afferma, e invece [Croce] assume placidamente come storia il momento dell'espansione culturale o etico-politico» Gramsci, fin dagli anni universitari, fu un deciso oppositore di quella concezione fatalistica e positivistica del marxismo, presente nel vecchio partito socialista, per la quale il capitalismo necessariamente era destinato a crollare da sé, facendo posto a una società socialista. Questa concezione mascherava l'impotenza politica del partito della classe subalterna, incapace di prendere l'iniziativa per la conquista dell'egemonia.  Anche il manuale del bolscevico russo Nikolaj Bucharin, edito nel 1921, La teoria del materialismo storico manuale popolare di sociologia, si colloca nel filone positivistico: «la sociologia è stata un tentativo di creare un metodo della scienza storico-politica, in dipendenza di un sistema filosofico già elaborato, il positivismo evoluzionistico [...] è diventata la filosofia dei non filosofi, un tentativo di descrivere e classificare schematicamente i fatti storici, secondo criteri costruiti sul modello delle scienze naturali. La sociologia è dunque un tentativo di ricavare sperimentalmente le leggi di evoluzione della società umana in modo da prevedere l'avvenire con la stessa certezza con cui si prevede che da una ghianda si svilupperà una quercia. L'evoluzionismo volgare è alla base della sociologia che non può conoscere il principio dialettico col passaggio dalla quantità alla qualità, passaggio che turba ogni evoluzione e ogni legge di uniformità intesa in senso volgarmente evoluzionistico».[125]  La comprensione della realtà come sviluppo della storia umana è solo possibile utilizzando la dialettica marxiana - della quale non vi è traccia nel Manuale del Bucharin - perché essa coglie tanto il senso delle vicende umane quanto la loro provvisorietà, la loro storicità determinata dalla prassi, dall'azione politica che trasforma le società.  Le società non si trasformano da sé: già Marx aveva rilevato come nessuna società si ponga compiti per la cui soluzione non esistano già le condizioni almeno in via di apparizione né essa si dissolve, se prima non ha svolto tutte le forme di vita che le sono implicite. Il rivoluzionario si pone il problema di individuare esattamente i rapporti tra struttura e sovrastruttura per giungere a una corretta analisi delle forze che operano nella storia di un determinato periodo. L'azione politica rivoluzionaria, la prassi, per Gramsci è anche catarsi che segna «il passaggio dal momento meramente economico (o egoistico-passionale) al momento etico-politico cioè l'elaborazione superiore della struttura in superstruttura nella coscienza degli uomini. Ciò significa anche il passaggio dall'oggettivo al soggettivo e dalla necessità alla libertà. La struttura, da forza esteriore che schiaccia l'uomo, lo assimila a sé, lo rende passivo, si trasforma in mezzo di libertà, in strumento per creare una nuova forma etico-politica, in origine di nuove iniziative. La fissazione del momento catartico diventa così, mi pare, il punto di partenza di tutta la filosofia della prassi; il processo catartico coincide con la catena di sintesi che sono risultate dallo svolgimento dialettico».   Friedrich Engels La dialettica è dunque strumento di indagine storica, che supera la visione naturalistica e meccanicistica della realtà, è unione di teoria e prassi, di conoscenza e azione. La dialettica è «dottrina della conoscenza e sostanza midollare della storiografia e della scienza della politica» e può essere compresa solo concependo il marxismo «come una filosofia integrale e originale che inizia una nuova fase nella storia e nello sviluppo mondiale in quanto supera (e superando ne include in sé gli elementi vitali) sia l'idealismo che il materialismo tradizionali espressione delle vecchie società. Se la filosofia della prassi [il marxismo] non è pensata che subordinatamente a un'altra filosofia, non si può concepire la nuova dialettica, nella quale appunto quel superamento si effettua e si esprime».[126]  Il vecchio materialismo è metafisica; per il senso comune la realtà oggettiva, esistente indipendentemente dall'uomo, è un ovvio assioma, confortato dall'affermazione della religione per la quale il mondo, creato da Dio, si trova già dato di fronte a noi. Ma per Gramsci va rifiutata «la concezione della realtà oggettiva del mondo esterno nella sua forma più triviale e acritica» dal momento che «a questa può essere mossa l'obbiezione di misticismo».[127] Se noi conosciamo la realtà in quanto uomini, ed essendo noi stessi un divenire storico, anche la conoscenza e la realtà stessa sono un divenire.  Come potrebbe esistere un'oggettività extrastorica ed extraumana e chi giudicherà di tale oggettività? «La formulazione di Engels che l'unità del mondo consiste nella sua materialità dimostrata dal lungo e laborioso sviluppo della filosofia e delle scienze naturali contiene appunto il germe della concezione giusta, perché si ricorre alla storia e all'uomo per dimostrare la realtà oggettiva. Oggettivo significa sempre umanamente oggettivo, ciò che può corrispondere esattamente a storicamente soggettivo [...] . L'uomo conosce oggettivamente in quanto la conoscenza è reale per tutto il genere umano storicamente unificato in un sistema culturale unitario; ma questo processo di unificazione storica avviene con la sparizione delle contraddizioni interne che dilaniano la società umana, contraddizioni che sono la condizione della formazione dei gruppi e della nascita delle ideologie [...]. C'è dunque una lotta per l'oggettività (per liberarsi dalle ideologie parziali e fallaci) e questa lotta è la stessa lotta per l'unificazione culturale del genere umano. Ciò che gli idealisti chiamano spirito non è un punto di partenza ma di arrivo, l'insieme delle soprastrutture in divenire verso l'unificazione concreta e oggettivamente universale e non già un presupposto unitario».[128] La formazione linguistica di Antonio Gramsci inizia durante gli anni universitari a Torino con la frequentazione delle lezioni di linguistica generale del prof. Matteo Bartoli. Dal Bartoli Gramsci apprende che la lingua è un "prodotto sociale" e che non può essere studiata senza tenere conto della storia generale: ciò vuol dire che non è possibile comprendere i mutamenti di una data lingua senza riflettere sui mutamenti sociali, culturali e politici del popolo che la parla.[129] È stato notato che Gramsci fece aderire le teorie apprese dal Bartoli alle letture filosofiche che lo formarono politicamente; in primo luogo all'Ideologia Tedesca di Karl Marx, dove il filosofo affermava che la lingua, come la coscienza, appartiene alla sfera degli istituti sovrastrutturali, cioè al mondo dell'organizzazione politica e giuridica della società.[129]  Le più interessanti riflessioni linguistiche gramsciane sono contenute nei Quaderni del carcere e riguardano da una parte la questione della lingua in Italia, ovvero lo studio delle ragioni che hanno reso difficile la diffusione di una lingua nazionale italiana, dall'altra il tema dell'insegnamento linguistico nelle scuole primarie. Soprattutto il secondo tema è di fondamentale importanza per Gramsci, perché riguarda direttamente il riscatto culturale delle grandi masse popolari e la creazione di uno spirito nazionale in grado di superare ogni forma di particolarismo regionale.  L'indagine storica I Quaderni del carcere sono costellati in maniera asistematica di molte note dedicate a problemi di caratteri linguistico; queste note tracciano una vera e propria storia della lingua italiana e racchiudono le riflessioni di Gramsci in merito alla cosiddetta questione della lingua in Italia. Questo tipo di argomento si riallaccia a un altro importante tema dei Quaderni ovvero lo studio delle responsabilità degli intellettuali italiani per la formazione di uno spirito nazionale unitario. A tal proposito Gramsci scrive: «mi pare che, intesa la lingua come elemento della cultura e quindi della storia generale e come manifestazione precipua della nazionalità e popolarità degli intellettuali, questo studio non sia ozioso e puramente erudito».[130]  Nell'affrontare una ricostruzione storica delle vicende linguistiche italiane Gramsci cerca dei termini di confronto con altri paesi europei come la Francia: mentre in Francia il volgare viene usato per la prima volta nella storia per redigere un documento ufficiale di carattere politico-istituzionale, in Italia il volgare appare per la registrazione di documenti privati legati al commercio o a questioni giuridiche:  «l'origine della differenziazione storica tra Italia e Francia si può trovare testimoniata nel giuramento di Strasburgo (verso l'841), cioè nel fatto che il popolo partecipa attivamente alla storia (il popolo-esercito) diventando il garante dell'osservanza dei trattati tra i discendenti di Carlo Magno; il popolo-esercito garantisce giurando in volgare, cioè introduce nella storia nazionale la sua lingua, assumendo una funzione politica di primo piano, presentandosi come volontà collettiva, come elemento di una democrazia nazionale. Questo fatto demagogico dei Carolingi di appellarsi al popolo nella loro politica estera è molto significativo per comprendere lo sviluppo della storia francese e la funzione che vi ebbe la monarchia come fattore nazionale. In Italia i primi documenti di volgare sono dei giuramenti individuali per fissare la proprietà su certe terre dei conventi, o hanno un carattere antipopolare («Traite, traite, fili de le putte»).»  (A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 646.) In Francia i gruppi dirigenti si rendono conto dell'importanza del popolo negli affari di Stato: la demagogia di cui parla Gramsci è da intendere, oltre che come strumento di propaganda, anche come un nuovo atteggiamento politico in grado di crearsi «una propria civiltà statale integrale»,[131] in cui si stabilisce un rapporto diretto tra governati e governanti: il popolo diventa testimone di un fatto storico legittimato dal suo giuramento.  Gramsci ricorda nei suoi appunti come in Italia l'uso del volgare si diffonda con l'avvento dell'età comunale, non solo per la redazione di documenti privati, tipo atti notarili o giuramenti, ma anche per la creazione di opere letterarie: in particolare, il volgare toscano, lingua della borghesia, ottiene un certo successo anche nelle altre regioni. Gramsci scrive: «fino al Cinquecento Firenze esercita una egemonia culturale, connessa alla sua egemonia commerciale e finanziaria (papa Bonifazio VIII diceva che i fiorentini erano il quinto elemento del mondo) e c'è uno sviluppo linguistico unitario dal basso, dal popolo alle persone colte, rinforzato dai grandi scrittori fiorentini e toscani. Dopo la decadenza di Firenze, l'italiano diventa sempre più la lingua di una casta chiusa, senza contatto vivo con una parlata storica».[132]  Da questo momento si verifica una cristallizzazione della lingua. I promotori del nuovo volgare, provenienti dalla borghesia, non scrivono più nella lingua della loro classe d'origine perché con essa non intrattengono più nessun rapporto, nella visione di Gramsci essi «vengono assorbiti dalle classi reazionarie, dalle corti, non sono letterati borghesi, ma aulici».[133] In questo senso, Gramsci vede sciupata l'occasione di una diffusione graduale del volgare toscano su scala nazionale, occasione compromessa soprattutto dalla frammentazione politica della penisola e dal carattere elitario dei ceti intellettuali italiani.  Gramsci affronta con maggior vigore la questione della lingua italiana in relazione al periodo post-unitario; nella seconda metà dell'Ottocento il nuovo Stato Italiano era per gran parte dialettofono, mentre l'italiano veniva usato solo a livello letterario e come lingua delle istituzioni. La scarsa diffusione di una lingua nazionale testimoniava la frammentazione politica e culturale del popolo italiano; questo fenomeno veniva avvertito come un problema politico, soprattutto da molti intellettuali di tendenze democratiche come Alessandro Manzoni.  Nella sua ricostruzione storica Gramsci scrive che «anche la questione della lingua posta dal Manzoni riflette questo problema, il problema della unità intellettuale e morale della nazione e dello Stato, ricercato nell'unità della lingua»;[134] eppure, sebbene Gramsci riconosca al Manzoni di aver compreso la questione linguistica italiana come una questione politica e sociale, si distingue dall'autore lombardo nel modo di interpretare la risoluzione del problema.   Graziadio Isaia Ascoli Durante il suo apprendistato glottologico presso il professor Bartoli a Torino Gramsci aveva avuto modo di confrontare le posizioni del Manzoni con quelle di Graziadio Isaia Ascoli, autore del Proemio al primo numero dell'Archivio Glottologico italiano del 1873. Mentre Manzoni prevedeva la diffusione di una lingua nazionale sul modello fiorentino imposta per decreto statale e per mezzo di maestri di scuola di origine toscana, Ascoli concepiva la nascita di una lingua nazionale come il frutto di un'unificazione culturale prima ancora che linguistica.  Secondo Ascoli l'unità culturale e linguistica, prima di tutto, deve avere un centro irradiante, cioè un determinato 'municipio' in cui si concentrano e da cui provengono gli elementi essenziali della vita nazionale: beni di consumo, stimoli culturali, mode, ritrovati della tecnica, istituti statali e giuridici, ecc. Se quel dato municipio riuscirà a stabilire un primato politico, economico e culturale su tutta la nazione, riuscirà anche a diffondere, per conseguenza, il suo particolare idioma. Per Ascoli «una lingua nazionale altro non può e non deve essere, se non l'idioma vivo di una data città; deve cioè per ogni parte coincidere con l'idioma spontaneamente parlato dagli abitatori contemporanei di quel dato municipio, che per questo capo viene a farsi principe, o quasi stromento livellatore, dell'intiera nazione».[135] Ascoli, nel suo Proemio, prende la Francia come esempio per avvalorare la sua tesi; infatti l'unità linguistica francese corrisponde all'egemonia politico-culturale della città di Parigi:  «La Francia attinge da Parigi la unità della sua favella, perché Parigi è il gran crogiuolo in cui si è fusa e si fonde l'intelligenza della Francia intera. Dal vertiginoso movimento del municipio parigino parte ogni impulso dell'universa civiltà francese; [...] viene da Parigi il nome, perché da Parigi vien la cosa. E la Francia avendo in questo municipio l'unità assorbente del suo pensiero, vi ha naturalmente pur quella dell'animo suo; e non solo studia e lavora, ma si commuove, e in pianto e in riso, così come la metropoli vuole; e quindi è necessariamente dell'intiera Francia l'intiera favella di Parigi».»  (G. I. Ascoli, Proemio, AGI, n. I, 1873, p. X) Gramsci ricalca la lezione ascoliana nei suoi Quaderni, dove scrive: «poiché il processo di formazione, di diffusione, e di sviluppo di una lingua nazionale unitaria avviene attraverso tutto un complesso di processi molecolari, è utile avere consapevolezza di tutto il processo nel suo complesso, per essere in grado di intervenire attivamente in esso col massimo di risultato. Questo intervento non bisogna considerarlo come decisivo e immaginare che i fini proposti saranno tutti raggiunti nei loro particolari, che cioè si otterrà una determinata lingua unitaria: si otterrà una lingua unitaria, se essa è una necessità e l'intervento organizzato accelererà i tempi del processo già esistente; quale sia per essere questa lingua non si può prevedere e stabilire [...]».[136]  L'insegnamento linguistico Gramsci, nel Quaderno 29 alla nota Focolai di irradiazione linguistiche nella tradizione e di un conformismo nazionale linguistico nelle grandi masse compila un elenco di tutti gli strumenti utili alla diffusione di una lingua unitaria: «1) La scuola; 2) i giornali; 3) gli scrittori d'arte e quelli popolari; 4) il teatro e il cinematografo sonoro; 5) la radio; 6) le riunioni pubbliche di ogni genere, comprese quelle religiose; 7) i rapporti di conversazione tra i vari strati della popolazione più colti e meno colti [...] ; 8) i dialetti locali, intesi in sensi diversi (dai dialetti più localizzati a quelli che abbracciano complessi regionali più o meno vasti: così il napoletano per l'Italia meridionale, il palermitano o il catanese per la Sicilia ecc.)».[137]  Al primo posto di questo elenco troviamo la scuola; per tradizione, a scuola, gli insegnanti introducono gli alunni allo studio di una lingua attraverso la grammatica normativa. Gramsci definisce la grammatica normativa come una «fase esemplare, come la sola degna di diventare, organicamente e totalitarmente, la lingua comune di una nazione, in lotta e in concorrenza con le altre fasi e tipi o schemi che esistono già [...]».[138]  Le riflessioni gramsciane in materia di grammatica si pongono in netto contrasto con la riforma della scuola realizzata da Giovanni Gentile nel 1923. La riforma, in linea con l'impianto filosofico idealista gentiliano, prevedeva che l'apprendimento della lingua nazionale nelle classi elementari si basasse sull'espressione viva o parlata e non sulla grammatica, considerata questa come una disciplina astratta e meccanica. Nell'ottica gramsciana questo metodo apparentemente liberale racchiude uno spiccato carattere classista, in quanto gli scolari appartenenti alle classi sociali più alte sono avvantaggiati dal fatto che apprendono l'italiano in famiglia, mentre gli scolari del basso popolo possono contare su una comunicazione familiare realizzata esclusivamente in dialetto. In questo senso lo studio della grammatica si presenta come uno strumento in grado di livellare le differenze sociali degli scolari permettendo a tutti la conoscenza della lingua nazionale.  Secondo Gramsci la conoscenza della lingua nazionale presso le classi subalterne è fondamentale per la loro organizzazione politica. Un proletariato dialettofono non può partecipare alla vita politica di una nazione e non può sperare di crearsi un ceto intellettuale in grado di competere con i ceti intellettuali tradizionali. I dialetti non devono sparire, ma restare funzionali a un tipo di comunicazione familiare che non può garantire, per cause interne al suo sistema, «la comunicazione di contenuti culturali universali, caratteristici della nuova cultura esercitata dal proletariato»[139]  Gramsci prestò attenzione anche alle lingue morte. Da giovane espresse in più occasioni l'idea che lo studio del latino e del greco fosse particolarmente utile nella formazione scolastica degli individui, in quanto esse potevano abituare gli alunni allo studio rigoroso ed educarli a pensare storicamente. Inoltre, contestò il nazionalismo degli studi e criticò ripetutamente gli intellettuali che, durante la prima guerra mondiale, chiedevano che fossero messe al bando le edizioni dei testi antichi e le grammatiche greche e latine compilate da autori tedeschi[140].  Anche nei Quaderni del carcere si soffermò sulla questione e ribadì l'utilità intrinseca del latino e del greco, osservando che erano strumenti importanti nella fase della formazione scolastica nella quale è necessario un insegnamento "disinteressato", cioè non legato a questioni pratiche. Gramsci, però, sottolineò anche che in futuro lo studio delle lingue morte avrebbe dovuto essere sostituito da altre materie: era un cambiamento difficile, ma necessario, per promuovere la formazione di un nuovo tipo di intellettuale.[141] Scrisse nel Quaderno 12:  Bisognerà sostituire il latino e il greco come fulcro della scuola formativa e lo si sostituirà, ma non sarà agevole disporre la nuova materia o la nuova serie di materie in un ordine didattico che dia risultati equivalenti di educazione e formazione generale della personalità, partendo dal fanciullo fino alla soglia della scelta professionale. In questo periodo infatti lo studio o la parte maggio re dello studio deve essere (e apparire ai discenti) disinteressato, non avere cioè scopi pratici immediati o troppo immediati, deve essere formativo, anche se «istruttivo», cioè ricco di nozioni concrete.  (A. Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, a cura di V. Gerratana, Einaudi, Torino 1975, p. 1546)Influenze sul pensiero di Gramsci  Fiabe intrecciate, 2007, Omaggio a Antonio Gramsci, di Maria Lai, Piazzale del Museo Stazione dell'arte Niccolò Machiavelli — influenzò fortemente la teoria dello Stato di Gramsci. Karl Marx — filosofo, storico, critico dell'economia politica e fondatore del materialismo storico Friedrich Engels Lenin Antonio Labriola — primo notevole teorico marxista italiano, riteneva che la principale caratteristica del marxismo fosse quella di aver creato uno stretto nesso fra la storia e la filosofia Georges Sorel — sindacalista francese e scrittore che ha respinto il principio dell'inevitabilità del progresso storico. Vilfredo Pareto — economista e sociologo italiano, noto per la sua teoria sull'interazione fra masse ed élite. Benedetto Croce — liberale italiano, filosofo anti-marxista e idealista il cui pensiero fu sottoposto da Gramsci a critica attenta e approfondita. Pensatori influenzati da Gramsci Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Gramscianesimo. Zackie Achmat · Eqbal Ahmad · Jalal Al-e-Ahmad · Louis Althusser · Perry Anderson · Giulio Angioni · Michael Apple · Giovanni Arrighi · Zygmunt Bauman · Homi K. Bhabha · Gordon Brown · Alberto Burgio · Judith Butler · Alex Callinicos · Partha Chatterjee · Marilena Chauí · Noam Chomsky · Alberto Mario Cirese · Hugo Costa · Robert W. Cox · Alain de Benoist · Biagio de Giovanni · Ernesto de Martino · Umberto Eco · John Fiske · Michel Foucault · Paulo Freire · Eugenio Garin · Eugene D. Genovese · Stephen Gill · Paul Gottfried · Stuart Hall · Michael Hardt · Chris Harman · David Harvey · Hamish Henderson · Eric Hobsbawm · Samuel P. Huntington · Alfredo Jaar · Bob Jessop · Ernesto Laclau · Subcomandante Marcos · José Carlos Mariátegui · Chantal Mouffe · Antonio Negri · Luigi Nono · Michael Omi · Pier Paolo Pasolini · Antonio Pigliaru · Michelangelo Pira · Juan Carlos Portantiero · Nicos Poulantzas · Gyan Prakash · William I. Robinson · Edward Saïd · Ato Sekyi-Otu · Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak · Piero Sraffa · Edward Palmer Thompson · Giuseppe Vacca · Paolo Virno · Cornel West · Raymond Williams · Howard Winant · Ludwig Wittgenstein · Eric Wolf · Howard Zinn Gramsci al cinema e in televisione Il delitto Matteotti, regia di Florestano Vancini, (1973) Antonio Gramsci - I giorni del carcere, regia di Lino Del Fra, (1977) Vita di Antonio Gramsci, regia di Raffaele Maiello - serie TV (1981) Gramsci, film in forma di rosa, regia di Gabriele Morleo - cortometraggio (2005) Gramsci 44, regia di Emiliano Barbucci (2016) Nel mondo grande e terribile, regia di Daniele Maggioni, Maria Grazia Perria e Laura Perini (2017) Gramsci nel teatro Compagno Gramsci, di Maricla Boggio e Franco Cuomo, regia di Maricla Boggio, (1971-72) Gramsci nella musica Quello lì (compagno Gramsci), canzone di Claudio Lolli contenuta nell'album Un uomo in crisi. Canzoni di morte. Canzoni di vita (1973) Piazza Fontana, canzone dei Yu Kung contenuta nell'album Pietre della mia gente (1975) Nino, canzone dei Gang contenuta nell'album Sangue e Cenere (2015) Gramsci, il teatro e la musica È nota la passione di Gramsci per il teatro e per la musica, che si può leggere nelle lettere scritte a Tania[142]. Egli ha scritto circa il melodrama “verdiano” che per lui segnava l’apertura dei teatri al pubblico, svolgendo una funzione conoscitiva, pedagogica e politica in senso generale. Per Gramsci l’opera diviene l’arte più popolare e i teatri aperti i luoghi dove si esercitava parte del conflitto politico.  Una frase quasi ironica di Gramsci da citare, per quanto riguarda l’importanza dell’opera per l’Italia: “siccome il popolo non è letterato e di letteratura conosce solo il libretto d'opera ottocentesco, avviene che gli uomini del popolo melodrammatizzino”[143].  Nelle sue lettere si può leggere anche riguardo alla moda europea del jazz; egli sostiene che questa musica aveva conquistato uno strato dell’Europa colta e aveva creato un vero fanatismo[144].Opere Alcuni temi della questione meridionale, in Lo Stato Operaio, a. IV, n. 1, gennaio 1930, ma ottobre 1926. Opere di Antonio Gramsci (12 voll.) Lettere dal carcere, Torino, Einaudi, 1947; premio Viareggio[145], con centodiciannove lettere inedite, 1965. I quaderni dal carcere Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce, Torino, Einaudi, 1948. Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura, Torino, Einaudi, 1948. Il Risorgimento, Torino, Einaudi, 1949. Note sul Machiavelli sulla politica e sullo stato moderno, Torino, Einaudi, 1949. Letteratura e vita nazionale, Torino, Einaudi, 1950. Passato e presente, Torino, Einaudi, 1951. L'Ordine Nuovo. 1919-1920, Torino, Einaudi, 1954. Scritti giovanili. 1914-1918, Torino, Einaudi, 1958. Sotto la mole. 1916-1920, Torino, Einaudi, 1960. Socialismo e fascismo. L'Ordine Nuovo 1921-1922, Torino, Einaudi, 1966. La costruzione del Partito comunista. 1923-1926, Torino, Einaudi, 1971. L'albero del riccio, Milano, Milano-sera, 1948. Americanismo e fordismo, Milano, Ed. cooperativa Libro popolare, 1949. Ultimo discorso alla Camera. 16 maggio 1925, Padova, R. Guerrini, 1958. Antologia popolare degli scritti e delle lettere di Antonio Gramsci, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1957. Il Vaticano e l'Italia, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1961. Note sulla situazione italiana 1922-1924, Milano, Rivista storica del socialismo, 1962. 2000 pagine di Gramsci Nel tempo della lotta. 1914-1926, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1964. Lettere edite e inedite. 1912-1937, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1964. Elementi di politica, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1964. La formazione dell'uomo. Scritti di pedagogia, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1967. Scritti politici La guerra, la rivoluzione russa e i nuovi problemi del socialismo italiano, 1916-1919, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1967. Il Biennio rosso, la crisi del socialismo e la nascita del Partito comunista, 1919-1921, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1967. Il nuovo partito della classe operaia e il suo programma. La lotta contro il fascismo, 1921-1926, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1973. Scritti 1915-1921, Milano, I quaderni de Il corpo, 1968. Dibattito sui Consigli di fabbrica, Roma, La nuova sinistra, 1971. Paolo Spriano (a cura di), Scritti politici, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1971. L'alternativa pedagogica, Firenze, La nuova Italia, 1972. I consigli e la critica operaia alla produzione, Milano, Servire il popolo, 1972. La lotta per l'edificazione del Partito comunista, Milano, Servire il popolo, 1972. Il pensiero di Gramsci, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1972. Il pensiero filosofico e storiografico di Antonio Gramsci, Palermo, Palumbo, 1972. Resoconto dei lavori del III congresso del P.C.D.I. (Lione, 26 gennaio 1926), Milano, Cooperativa editrice distributrice proletaria, 1972. Scritti sul sindacato, Milano, Sapere, 1972. Sul fascismo, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1973. Quaderni del carcere Quaderni 1-5. (1929-1932), Torino, Einaudi, 1975. Quaderni 6-11. (1930-1933), Torino, Einaudi, 1975. Quaderni 12-29. (1932-1935), Torino, Einaudi, 1975. Apparato critico, Torino, Einaudi, 1975. La rivoluzione italiana, Roma, Newton Compton, 1976. Arte e folclore, Roma, Newton Compton, 1976. Scritti 1915-1921. Inediti da Il Grido del Popolo e dall'Avanti. Con una antologia da Il Grido del Popolo, Milano, Moizzi, 1976. Ricordi politici e civili, Pavia 1977. Scritti nella lotta. Dai consigli di fabbrica, alla fondazione del partito, al Congresso di Lione, Livorno, Edizioni Gramsci, 1977. Scritti sul sindacato, Roma, Nuove edizioni operaie, 1977. A Delio e Giuliano, Milano, N. Milano, 1978. I consigli di fabbrica, Milano, Amici della casa Gramsci di Ghilarza, Centro milanese, 1978. Favole di libertà, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1980. Scritti 1913-1926 Cronache torinesi. 1913-1917, Torino, Einaudi, 1980. La città futura. 1917-1918, Torino, Einaudi, 1982. Il nostro Marx. 1918-1919, Torino, Einaudi, 1984. L'Ordine nuovo, 1919-1920, Torino, Einaudi, 1987. Nuove lettere di Antonio Gramsci. Con altre lettere di Piero Sraffa, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1986. Forse rimarrai lontana.... Lettere a Iulca, 1922-1937, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1987. Gramsci al confino di Ustica. Nelle lettere di Gramsci, di Berti e di Bordiga, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1987. Le sue idee nel nostro tempo, Milano, l'Unità, 1987. Lettere dal carcere, con nuove lettere in parte inedite, 2 voll., Roma, l'Unità, 1988. Il rivoluzionario qualificato. Scritti 1916-1925, Roma, Delotti, 1988. Il giornalismo, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1991. Lettere, 1908-1926, Torino, Einaudi, 1992. Per una preparazione ideologica di massa: introduzione al primo corso della scuola interna di partito, aprile-maggio 1925, Napoli, Laboratorio politico, 1994. Scritti di economia politica, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 1994. Vita attraverso le lettere, 1908-1937, Torino, Einaudi, 1994. Disgregazione sociale e rivoluzione. Scritti sul Mezzogiorno, Napoli, Liguori, 1996. Piove, Governo ladro. Satire e polemiche sul costume degli italiani, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1996. Contro la legge sulle associazioni segrete, Roma, Manifestolibri, 1997. Lettere, 1926-1935, Torino, Einaudi, 1997. Le opere, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1997. Critica letteraria e linguistica, Roma, Lithos, 1998. Il lettore in catene. La critica letteraria nei Quaderni, Roma, Carocci, 2004. La nostra città futura. Scritti torinesi, 1911-1922, Roma, Carocci, 2004. Pensare l'Italia, Roma, Nuova iniziativa editoriale, 2004. Scritti sulla Sardegna. La memoria familiare, l'analisi della questione sarda, Nuoro, Ilisso, 2008. Scritti rivoluzionari. Dal biennio rosso al Congresso di Lione (1919-1926), a cura di Orlando Micucci, Camerano, Gwynplaine, 2008. Quaderni del carcere. Edizione anastatica dei manoscritti, 18 voll., Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana-Cagliari-L'Unione Sarda, 2009. Epistolario 1906-1922, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2009. Epistolario gennaio-novembre 1923, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2011. Antologia, a cura di Antonio A. Santucci, prefazione di Guido Liguori, Roma, Editori Riuniti university press, 2012. Il teatro lancia bombe nei cervelli. Articoli, critiche, recensioni 1915-1920, a cura di Fabio Francione, Mimesis Edizioni 2017. La taglia della storia. Idea e prassi della rivoluzione, NovaEuropa Edizioni, 2018.Note  Luigi Manias, Antonio Sebastiano Francesco Gramsci, Marmilla Cultura, 28 gennaio 2018. URL consultato il 17 aprile 2019. ^ International Gramsci Society, su internationalgramscisociety.org. ^ Genealogia dei Gramsci (JPG), su albanianews.it. ^ Luigi Manias, Ma quando è nato Antonio Gramsci?, Marmilla Cultura, 21 gennaio 2018. URL consultato il 17 aprile 2019. ^ Luigi Manias, Ales. La sua storia. I suoi problemi, Marmilla Cultura, 14 marzo 2018. URL consultato il 17 aprile 2019. ^ Così Gramsci ricordava con ironia l'episodio, nella lettera dal carcere alla cognata Tatiana, il 7 settembre 1931, aggiungendo che «una zia sosteneva che ero risuscitato quando lei mi unse i piedini con l'olio di una lampada dedicata a una Madonna e perciò, quando mi rifiutavo di compiere gli atti religiosi, mi rimproverava aspramente, ricordando che alla Madonna dovevo la vita» ^ «Noi eravamo tutti molto piccoli. Lei dunque doveva anche accudire alla casa. Trovava il tempo per i lavori di cucito rinunziando al sonno». Così ricordava quegli anni la sorella Teresina Gramsci, in Fiori, 1995, p. 18 ^ Lettera a Tatiana Schucht, 3 ottobre 1932: così Gramsci scriveva per invitare la cognata a non eccedere nelle sue preoccupazioni sulla sua vita di carcerato. La lettera prosegue infatti: «Ho conosciuto quasi sempre solo l'aspetto più brutale della vita e me la sono sempre cavata, bene o male» ^ Lettera a Tatiana Schucht, 12 settembre 1932 ^ Numerose sono le richieste di denaro al padre: il 10 febbraio 1910 gli scrive di essere «proprio indecente con questa giacca che ha già due anni ed è spelacchiata e lucida [...] oggi non sono andato a scuola perché mi son dovuto risuolare le scarpe» e, il 16 febbraio, che «per non farvi vergognare non sono uscito di casa per dieci giorni interi» ^ Fonzo, pp. 15-22. ^ Testimonianza in Fiori, 1995, p. 65 ^ Testimonianza della sorella Teresina in Fiori, 1995, p. 66 ^ Fiori, 1995, p. 66. ^ L'articolo è riportato in Fiori, 1995, p. 69. ^ Riportato in A. Gramsci, Scritti politici, p. 53-55. ^ Antonio Gramsci, Dizionario di Storia, Treccani ^ [...] «io pensavo allora che bisognava lottare per l'indipendenza nazionale della regione: "Al mare i continentali". Poi ho conosciuto la classe operaia di una città industriale e ho capito ciò che realmente significavano le cose di Marx che avevo letto prima per curiosità intellettuale». Cfr. A. Gramsci, lettera a Giulia Schucht, 6 marzo 1924, in A. Gramsci, Lettere 1908-1926, 1992, pp. 271-273. ^ Gramsci e l'isola laboratorio, La Nuova Sardegna ^ A. Gramsci. Lettere. 1908-1926, p. 55 ^ Progettando, in carcere, uno studio di linguistica comparata, mai realizzato, in una lettera dal carcere del 19 marzo 1927 alla cognata Tatiana, ricorda come «uno dei maggiori "rimorsi" intellettuali della mia vita è il dolore profondo che ho procurato al mio buon professor Bartoli dell'Università di Torino, il quale era persuaso essere io l'arcangelo destinato a profligare definitivamente i "neogrammatici"» della linguistica. Tuttavia già nel 2003 l'economista Amartya Sen aveva avanzato l'ipotesi che il passaggio ai giochi linguistici di Ludwig Wittgenstein nelle Ricerche filosofiche fosse stato ispirato dai Quaderni dal carcere. Nel suo recente studio Gramsci and Wittgenstein: an intriguing connection, Franco Lo Pipero ha aggiunto nuovi elementi che dimostrano il collegamento fra Gramsci e Wittgenstein tramite Piero Sraffa. Infatti il filosofo viennese venne a conoscenza del Quaderno 29 nel 1935, grazie proprio al suo amico Sraffa che aveva conosciuto a Cambridge nel 1929 ^ Lettera dal carcere del 23 febbraio 1931: in essa Gramsci ricorda ancora un simpatico e patetico episodio. Dopo la rottura avvenuta ala fine del 1920, a causa di quell'articolo che fece «piangere come un bambino e stette chiuso in casa [il Cosmo] per alcuni giorni», essi s'incontrarono nel 1922 nell'Ambasciata d'Italia a Berlino, dove il professore era segretario: «il Cosmo mi si precipitò addosso, inondandomi di lacrime e di barba e dicendo a ogni momento: Tu capisci perché! Tu capisci perché! Era in preda a una commozione che mi sbalordì, ma mi fece capire quanto dolore gli avessi procurato nel 1920 e come egli intendesse l'amicizia per i suoi allievi di scuola» ^ Lettera dal carcere a Tatiana Schucht del 17 agosto 1931 ^ In Fiori, 1995, p. 103 ^ In Fiori, 1995, p. 105 ^ In Fiori, 1995, pp. 108-9 ^ In Fiori, 1995, p. 112 ^ In A. Gramsci, Scritti politici, I, p. 56-59 ^ Davico, p. 12. ^ Lettera dal carcere a Tatiana Schucht del 7 settembre 1931 ^ Lettera dal carcere a Tatiana Schucht del 19 marzo 1927 ^ Recensione del 24 marzo 1917 ^ Recensione del 4 aprile 1917 ^ Recensione del 5 ottobre 1917 ^ Spriano, 1972, pp. 373. ^ Note sulla rivoluzione russa, ne Il Grido del Popolo, 29 aprile 1917, in Gramsci, 1971, pp. 59-60 ^ I massimalisti russi, ne Il Grido del Popolo, 28 luglio 1917, in Gramsci, 1971, p. 66 ^ Spriano, 1972, p. 260. ^ La rivoluzione contro il «Capitale», nell'Avanti!, 24 novembre 1918, in Gramsci, 1971, pp. 80-1 ^ Nella lettera dell'8 marzo 1881 Marx scriveva a Vera Zasulič che la tipica proprietà comune agricola russa poteva essere salvata dalla distruzione minacciata dallo sviluppo dei rapporti capitalistici: «Per salvare la comune russa, occorre una rivoluzione russa. Se la rivoluzione scoppierà a tempo opportuno, se l'intelligencija concentrerà tutte le forze «vive del paese» nell'assicurare alla comune agricola un libero spiegamento, allora la comune ben presto evolverà come elemento di rigenerazione della società russa e, insieme, di superiorità sui paesi ancora asserviti dal regime capitalistico». Inoltre, nella prefazione all'edizione russa del Manifesto del 1882, Marx ed Engels avevano scritto che «l'odierna proprietà comune potrà servire di partenza per una evoluzione comunista». È anche vero, tuttavia, almeno nel caso della lettera alla Zasulič, che Gramsci all'epoca non poteva conoscerne il contenuto, perché il documento sarebbe stato reso pubblico solo nel 1924. (Cfr. Ettore Cinella, L'altro Marx, Della Porta Editori, Pisa-Genova, 2014, pp.142-143). ^ A. Gramsci, Ordine Nuovo, 14 agosto 1920  A. Gramsci, ibidem ^ Corriere della Sera, 9 marzo 1920 ^ Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Min. Int., Dir. Gen. PS, 1920, C 2, b 50 ^ Ordine Nuovo, 8 maggio 1920, in Scritti politici, II, pp. 102-108 ^ Concluso l'8 ottobre 1919 con un ordine del giorno che prospettava la conquista violenta del potere e la dittatura del proletariato ^ Per un rinnovamento del Partito socialista, ne L’ordine Nuovo, 8 maggio 1920, in Gramsci, 1971, pp. 315-21 ^ Il 30 luglio Lenin, nel suo discorso all'Internazionale Comunista, invitando a espellere dal partito socialista l'ala destra riformista, disse che «all'indirizzo dell'Internazionale Comunista corrisponde l'indirizzo dei militanti dell'Ordine Nuovo e non l'indirizzo dell'attuale maggioranza dei dirigenti del partito socialista e del loro gruppo parlamentare». Lenin, Opere, XXV, p.355 ^ Ordine Nuovo, 4 dicembre 1920, in Scritti politici, II, p. 172 ^ GRAMSCI La sposa mandata da Lenin ^ Lettera del 30 giugno 1924, in A. Gramsci, Lettere 1908-1926 ^ Lettera dal carcere del 18 aprile 1927 ^ Un profilo di Antonio Gramsci junior, su channelingstudio.ru. ^ Su alcune note di uno sconosciuto bolscevico Vladimir Diogot - che sosteneva, fra l'altro, di essere a conoscenza di un tentativo di rovesciamento della monarchia italiana da parte di Nitti in accordo con i socialisti - lo storico Jaroslav Leontiev ha sostenuto nel 1999 che la conoscenza tra Gramsci e la Schucht sia stata "pilotata" da Lenin in persona: cfr. Link archivio del Corriere ^ Amendola, pp. 13 e 97. ^ In Togliatti, 1974, pp. 272-3 ^ In Togliatti, 1974, p. 255 ^ Lettera di Gramsci a Giulia Schucht, 21 luglio 1924 ^ Lettera a Giulia Schucht, 22 giugno 1924 ^ La crisi italiana, ne L’Ordine Nuovo, 1º settembre 1924, in Gramsci, 1971, pp. 577-9 ^ Camera dei Deputati, XXVII legislatura del Regno d'Italia, Tornata di sabato 16 maggio 1925 (PDF). ^ "Capo" (PDF), in L'Ordine Nuovo, 1º marzo 1924; pubblicato successivamente col titolo di Lenin capo rivoluzionario, in l'Unità, 6 novembre 1924. ^ «Capo», ne L’ordine Nuovo, 1º marzo 1924, in Gramsci, 1971, pp. 540-3 ^ Anche alle autorità francesi fu nascosto lo svolgimento del Congresso. Sul III Congresso, P. Spriano, Storia del Partito comunista italiano, I, capp. 29-30 ^ Spriano, 1976(1), pp. 498-500. ^ Spriano, 1976(1), p. 490. ^ Spriano, 1976(1), pp. 491-2. ^ Spriano, 1976(1), pp. 492-4. ^ Spriano, 1976(1), p. 511. ^ Antonio Gramsci, Tesi di Lione, Lione, 1925. ^ Antonio Gramsci, La questione meridionale, Editori Riuniti, 2005, p.184 ^ «Alcuni temi della quistione meridionale». Stato operaio, gennaio 1930. Citato in Rosario Villari, Il Sud nella Storia d'Italia. Antologia della Questione meridionale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1981, p. 480 ^ Antonio Gramsci, Cinque anni di vita del partito, L'Unità, 1926. ^ Fiori, 1995, p. 247. ^ Spriano, 1976(2), pp. 43-5. ^ Aurelio Lepre, Il prigioniero. Vita di Antonio Gramsci, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1998, p. 84. ^ La lettera, non datata, si ritiene scritta il 14 ottobre: fu pubblicata per la prima volta in Francia da Tasca nel 1938. Su tutta la questione della lotta interna nel partito comunista sovietico di questo periodo, P. Spriano, cit., II, capp. 3 e 5 ^ A. Gramsci, Lettere 1908-1926, cit., pp. 455-462. ^ Lettera di Togliatti a Gramsci, 18 ottobre 1926 ^ Commissione di assegnazione al confino di Roma, ordinanza del 18.11.1926 contro Antonio Gramsci (“Dirigenti e deputati del PCd'I dichiarati decaduti il 2 novembre 1926”). In: Adriano Dal Pont, Simonetta Carolini, L'Italia al confino 1926-1943. Le ordinanze di assegnazione al confino emesse dalle Commissioni provinciali dal novembre 1926 al luglio 1943, Milano 1983 (ANPPIA/La Pietra), vol. IV, p. 1312 ^ Tornata di martedì 9 novembre 1926 (PDF), Camera dei deputati, p. 6389-6394. URL consultato il 23 marzo 2015. ^ Fiori, 1995, cap. 23. ^ In Fiori, 1995, cap. 24 ^ Sentenza n. 58 del 20.2.1928 contro Antonio Gramsci e altri (“Ricostituzione di partito disciolto, propaganda, cospirazione, istigazione alla lotta armata ecc.”). In: Adriano Dal Pont, Simonetta Carolini, L'Italia dissidente e antifascista. Le ordinanze, le Sentenze istruttorie e le Sentenze in Camera di consiglio emesse dal Tribunale speciale fascista contro gli imputati di antifascismo dall'anno 1927 al 1943, Milano 1980 (ANPPIA/La Pietra), vol. I, p. 260-261 ^ Amendola, p. 142. ^ Spriano, 1977, p. 41. ^ Lettera a Tatiana Schucht del 19 marzo 1927 ^ Fiori, 1995, cap. 26.  Fiori, 1995, p. 289. ^ Fiori, 1995, p. 288. ^ Risoluzione per l'espulsione di Amedeo Bordiga ^ Fiori, 1995, p. 291. ^ Pubblicato in «Rinascita», 12 dicembre 1964 ^ In «Rinascita», cit. ^ Dalla biografia di Pertini pubblicata nel sito web del Circolo Sandro Pertini di Genova: «Chiesi al maresciallo dei carabinieri che comandava la scorta se poteva dirmi dove mi portavano. Quando questi fece il nome di Turi me ne rallegrai. Ero contento perché sapevo che là avrei incontrato Antonio Gramsci, un uomo che avevo sempre ammirato per il suo coraggio». «A Turi incontrai Gramsci in un angolo del cortile dove coltivava un'aiuola di fiori; era piccolo di statura e con due gobbe: una davanti ed una di dietro. Mi avvicinai a lui, mi presentai, gli affermai che venivo da Santo Stefano e che ero onorato di fare la sua conoscenza. Gli davo del lei e lo chiamavo Onorevole Gramsci. Lui si mise a ridere, dicendomi: "Perché mi dai del lei? Siamo antifascisti, vittime del Tribunale speciale tutti e due", "Io gli ricordai che per loro, i comunisti, noi eravamo dei social-traditori". Gramsci disse di lasciar stare quella polemica penosa. Ci vedemmo dopo qualche giorno e Gramsci parlò di Turati e Treves in maniera che mi sembrò offensiva ed io risposi con durezza. Il giorno dopo Gramsci si scusò, dicendo che il suo era un giudizio politico, non aveva avuto intenzione di offendere le persone, e capiva la mia reazione in favore di due compagni che si trovavano in Francia. Da allora diventammo buoni amici. Parlavamo a lungo insieme anche perché era stato isolato dai suoi. Per certi versi costoro lo consideravano un traditore e chiedevano la sua espulsione dal partito, come poi fecero anche con Camilla Ravera. In cella Gramsci era perseguitato dai carcerieri: credo che l'ordine di non lasciarlo dormire arrivasse direttamente da Roma. Io andai dal direttore del carcere a protestare perché i carcerieri, ogni volta che Gramsci si addormentava, lo svegliavano facendo scorrere sulle sbarre della finestra dei bastoni, con la scusa di controllare che le sbarre non fossero state segate per un'evasione. Dissi al direttore che se la situazione non fosse cambiata, avrei scritto una lettera al ministero. Il risultato fu che Gramsci, già gravemente malato di tubercolosi poté dormire tranquillo. Le mie proteste costrinsero il direttore del carcere di Turi a concedere a Gramsci anche alcuni quaderni, delle matite, un tavolino ed una sedia. Così poterono nascere i quaderni dal carcere. La mia amicizia con Gramsci mi mise in contrasto con il direttore del carcere e forse non fu estraneo al mio trasferimento a Pianosa, all'inizio del 1932». ^ Lettera a Tatiana Schucht, 3 agosto 1931 ^ Lettera a Tatiana Schucht, 29 maggio 1933 ^ Alla fine degli anni settanta cominciò a circolare la voce secondo la quale Gramsci in punto di morte si sarebbe convertito alla fede cattolica. Tale affermazione venne però ritrattata dallo stesso religioso che l’aveva inavvertitamente messa in circolazione, chiamando a supporto della smentita l’allora cappellano della clinica Quisisana. Nonostante le chiare argomentazioni della rettifica, trent’anni dopo la medesima tesi fu riproposta da un altro sacerdote. Essendo priva di riscontri documentali e di prove testimoniali, la teoria della conversione di Gramsci non è mai stata avvalorata dagli storici. Cfr. S.Fio., Antonio Gramsci e il sacerdote pentito, La Repubblica, 27 novembre 2008. URL consultato il 17 giugno 2019. e Il Vaticano: «Gramsci trovò la fede», Il Corriere della Sera, 25 novembre 2008. URL consultato il 17 giugno 2019. ^ C. Daniele (a cura di), Togliatti editore di Gramsci, Carocci, 2005, pp. 14-29 ^ Quaderni del carcere, Il Risorgimento, p. 70 ^ Antonio Gramsci, Il Risorgimento, Einaudi, Torino, 1949, p. 46. ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 81 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., pp. 106-107 ^ Quaderni del carcere, Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce, p. 7-8  Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 8 ^ Quaderni del carcere, ed. Gerratana, 89, pp. 2311-2317. ^ Cirese, 1976, p. 65 e ss.; Baratta, 2007; Giulio Angioni, Gramsci e il folklore come cosa seria, in Fare, dire, sentire. L'identico e il diverso nelle culture, Il Maestrale, 2011, pp. 206-221.  Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 11  Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 12 ^ Quaderni del carcere, Note sul Machiavelli, pp. 3-4  Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 7 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., pp. 23-24 ^ Quaderni del carcere, Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura, p.6 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p.7 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 9 ^ Quaderni del carcere, Letteratura e vita nazionale, p. 127 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 131 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 86 e segg. ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., pp. 5-6 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 179 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 185 ^ Quaderni del carcere, Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce, p. 210 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 204 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 192-193 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 125 ^ Quaderno del carcere, cit., p. 132 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., pp. 141-142 ^ Quaderni del carcere, cit., p. 142  L. Rosiello, Problemi e orientamenti linguistici negli scritti di Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni dell'Istituto di glottologia di Bologna, 1957, p. 39 ^ A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 355. ^ A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 646. ^ A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 2237. ^ A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 789. ^ A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 2188. ^ G. I. Ascoli, Proemio, AGI, n. I, 1873, p. IX ^ A. Gramsci, 'Quaderni del carcere', a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 2345. ^ A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 2345. ^ A. Gramsci, 'Quaderni del carcere', a cura di V. Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi, 1975, p. 2343. ^ L. Rosiello, Lingua nazione egemonia, Rinascita - Il Contemporaneo, 51-2, p. 24 ^ Rapone, Leonardo, 1952-, Cinque anni che paiono secoli : Antonio Gramsci dal socialismo al comunismo (1914- 1919), 1a ed, Carocci, 2011, ISBN 9788843060900, OCLC 760053895. URL consultato il 17 marzo 2019. ^ Fonzo, pp. 33-49. ^ Maria Luisa Bosi, Antonio Gramsci, su www.scuolalodivecchio.it. URL consultato il 25 aprile 2017. ^ giovannicarpinelli, Gramsci e la musica, su Palomar, 18 aprile 2017. URL consultato il 25 aprile 2017. ^ La passione sconosciuta di Gramsci per la musica, in L’Huffington Post. URL consultato il 25 aprile 2017. ^ Premio letterario Viareggio-Rèpaci, su premioletterarioviareggiorepaci.it. URL consultato il 9 agosto 2019.Bibliografia Giorgio Amendola, Storia del Partito comunista italiano 1921-1943, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1978. Perry Anderson, Ambiguità di Gramsci, Bari, Laterza, 1978. Giulio Angioni, Gramsci e il folklore come cosa seria, in Fare, dire, sentire. L'identico e il diverso nelle culture, Il Maestrale, 2011. ISBN 978-88-6429-020-1 Francesco Aqueci, Il Gramsci di un nuovo inizio, Quaderno 12, Supplemento al n. 19 (settembre-dicembre 2018) di «AGON», Rivista Internazionale di Studi Culturali, Linguistici e Letterari, pp. 223. Francesco Aqueci, Ancora Gramsci, Roma, Aracne, 2020. Nicola Auciello, Socialismo ed egemonia in Gramsci e Togliatti, Bari, De Donato, 1974. Nicola Badaloni e altri, Attualità di Gramsci, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1977. Giorgio Baratta, Antonio Gramsci in contrappunto. Dialoghi col presente, Roma, Carocci, 2008. ISBN 88-430-4384-6 Norberto Bobbio, Saggi su Gramsci, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1990. ISBN 978-88-07-10135-9 Franco Calamandrei e Guido Calogero, La conoscenza di Gramsci in Inghilterra. Una lettera di Guido Calogero e una nota di Franco Calamandrei, in «L'Unità» [ed. romana], XXX, n. 21, 24 gennaio 1953. Mauro Canali, Il tradimento. Gramsci, Togliatti e la verità negata, Venezia, Marsilio, 2013. 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Voci correlate Casa museo Antonio Gramsci Comunismo Gramscianesimo Benedetto Croce Francesco De Sanctis Egemonia culturale Friedrich Engels Antonio Labriola Lenin Karl Marx Marxismo Marxismo occidentale Partito Comunista Italiano Quaderni del carcere Risorgimento Tesi di Lione Palmiro Togliatti Unione Sovietica L'Unità Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Antonio Gramsci Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Antonio Gramsci Collabora a Wikibooks Wikibooks contiene testi o manuali su Antonio Gramsci Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Antonio Gramsci Collegamenti esterni Antonio Gramsci, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Gramsci / Antonio Gramsci (altra versione), in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Gramsci, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Antonio Gramsci, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Gramsci, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Gramsci, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Antonio Gramsci, su Find a Grave. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Antonio Gramsci, su Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Antonio Gramsci, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Antonio Gramsci, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (FR) Pubblicazioni di Antonio Gramsci, su Persée, Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere riguardanti Antonio Gramsci, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Antonio Gramsci, su Goodreads. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Gramsci, su storia.camera.it, Camera dei deputati. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Antonio Gramsci, su Internet Movie Database, IMDb.com. Modifica su Wikidata Casa museo Antonio Gramsci a Ghilarza, su casamuseogramsci.it. Antonio Gramsci: un intellettuale fra due totalitarismi, su lastoriasiamonoi.rai.it. URL consultato il 16 ottobre 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 21 dicembre 2012). Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, su fondazionegramsci.org. Opere di Gramsci, su marxists.org. L. Canfora, La lezione di libertà di Antonio Gramsci, su letteratura.rai.it. "I Quaderni del carcere" con link intertestuali ai nomi, agli eventi, ai movimenti culturali e politici e note di lettura a cura di Luigi Anepeta M. Vincenzi, Gramsci a New York, su repubblica.it. Gramsci, La questione meridionale, su archive.org. Antonio Gramsci, il grande intellettuale dimenticato, in Il fascino degli intellettuali, 31 luglio 2016. URL consultato il 01-10-2016 Gramsci, pagina web di note e articoli di argomento gramsciano a cura di Francesco Aqueci Predecessore                                         Segretario del Partito Comunista d'Italia                                    Successore Amadeo Bordiga                                     1924 - 1927                                        Palmiro Togliatti V · D · M Segretari del Partito Comunista V · D · M Antifascismo (1919-1943) V · D · M Flag of Italian Committee of National Liberation.svg Resistenza italiana Flag of Italian Committee of National Liberation.svg V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Viareggio per la narrativa Controllo di autorità                                           VIAF (EN) 44299576 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2279 0742 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\008358 · Europeana agent/base/145395 · LCCN (EN) n78095485 · GND (DE) 118541463 · BNF (FR) cb119056581 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1163536 (data) · NLA (EN) 35139573 · BAV (EN) 495/77237 · NDL (EN, JA) 00441497 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n78095485 Biografie Portale Biografie Comunismo Portale Comunismo Editoria Portale Editoria Filosofia Portale Filosofia Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Deputati della XXVII legislatura del Regno d'ItaliaPolitici italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XX secoloPolitologi italianiNati nel 1891Morti nel 1937Nati il 22 gennaioMorti il 27 aprileNati ad AlesMorti a RomaAntonio GramsciGiornalisti italiani del XX secoloLinguisti italianiCritici letterari italiani del XX secoloSepolti nel cimitero acattolico di RomaArbëreshëAntifascisti italianiComunisti in ItaliaSchedati al Casellario Politico CentraleConfinati politiciFilosofi della politicaL'Unità (quotidiano)MarxistiPolitici del Partito Socialista ItalianoPolitici del Partito Comunista d'ItaliaFondatori di quotidianiFondatori di riviste italianeDirettori di periodici italianiVittime di dittature nazifascisteFilosofi ateiMeridionalismoVincitori del Premio Viareggio per la narrativaMembri del Comitato esecutivo del CominternStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di TorinoSecession isti dell'Aventino[altre]

green: t. h., Grice: “The rather idiotic German philosopher at Oxford, Schiller, thought that Dodgson meant Green when he said that the snark may be served with greens.” --  absolute idealist and social philosopher. The son of a clergyman, Green studied and taught at Oxford. His central concern was to resolve what he saw as the spiritual crisis of his age by analyzing knowledge and morality in ways inspired by Kant and Hegel. In his lengthy introduction to Hume’s Treatise, he argued that Hume had shown knowledge and morality to be impossible on empiricist principles. In his major work, “Prolegomena to Ethics,” Green contended that thought imposed relations on sensory feelings and impulses whose source was an eternal consciousness to constitute objects of knowledge and of desire. Furthermore, in acting on desires, rational agents seek the satisfaction of a self that is realized through their own actions. This requires rational agents to live in harmony among themselves and hence to act morally. In Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation Green transformed classical liberalism by arguing that even though the state has no intrinsic value, its intervention in society is necessary to provide the conditions that enable rational beings to achieve self-satisfaction. 

gregorio magno: Grice: “Poor Gregorio Magno had to fight with the Lonbards, and the sad thing is he lost!” --  I, Saint, called Gregory the Great,  a pope and Roman political leader. Born a patrician, he was educated for public office and became prefect of Rome in 570. In 579, he was appointed papal representative in Constantinople, returning to Rome as counselor to Pope Pelagius II in 586. He was elected Pope Gregory I in 590. When the Lombards attacked Rome in 594, Gregory bought them off. Constantinople would neither cede nor defend Italy, and Gregory stepped in as secular ruler of what became the Papal States. He asserted the universal jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome, and claimed patriarchy of the West. His writings include important letters; the Moralia, an exposition of the Book of Job summarizing Christian theology; Pastoral Care, which defined the duties of the clergy for the Middle Ages; and Dialogues, which deals chiefly with the immortality of the soul, holding it could enter heaven immediately without awaiting the Last Judgment. His thought, largely Augustinian, is unoriginal, but was much quoted in the Middle Ages. Grice takes inspiration on Shropshire’s argument for the immortality of the soul from Gregorio Magno (Dialogo, IV).

gregory of Nyssa, Saint, Grecian theologian and mystic who tried to reconcile Platonism with Christianity. As bishop of Cappadocia in eastern Asia Minor, he championed orthodoxy and was prominent at the First Council of Constantinople. He related the doctrine of the Trinity to Plato’s ideas of the One and the Many. He followed Origen in believing that man’s material great chain of being Gregory of Nyssa 354   354 nature was due to the fall and in believing in the Apocatastasis, the universal restoration of all souls, including Satan’s, in the kingdom of God. 

wodeham, adam. Obviously born at Wodeham, or Woodham as the current spelling goes (“But I prefer the old, vide Occam” – Grice). Like Gregorio da Rimini, obsessed with the complexe significabile, “which has obvious connections with what I call the propositional complexus.”

grice: as a count noun – “Lots of grice in the fields.” – One Scots to another -- count noun, a noun that can occur syntactically a with quantifiers ‘each’, ‘every’, ‘many’, ‘few’, ‘several’, and numerals; b with the indefinite article, ‘an’; and c in the plural form. The following are examples of count nouns CNs, paired with semantically similar mass nouns MNs: ‘each dollar / silver’, ‘one composition / music’, ‘a bed / furniture’, ‘instructions / advice’. MNs but not CNs can occur with the quantifiers ‘much’ and ‘little’: ‘much poetry / poems’, ‘little bread / loaf’. Both CNs and MNs may occur with ‘all’, ‘most’, and ‘some’. Semantically, CNs but not MNs refer distributively, providing a counting criterion. It makes sense to ask how many CNs?: ‘How many coins / gold?’ MNs but not CNs refer collectively. It makes sense to ask how much MN?: ‘How much gold / coins?’ One problem is that these syntactic and semantic criteria yield different classifications; another problem is to provide logical forms and truth conditions for sentences containing mass nouns.

grice: English philosopher, born in Harborne, “in the middle of nowhere,” as Strawson put it – (“He was from London, Strawson was”) -- whose work concerns perception and philosophy of language, and whose most influential contribution is the concept of a conversational implicaturum and the associated theoretical machinery of conversational ‘postulates.’ The concept of a conversational implicaturum is first used in his ‘presentation’ on the causal theory of perception and reference. Grice distinguishes between the ‘meaning’ of the words used in a sentence and what is implied by the utterer’s choice of words. If someone says “It looks as if there is a red pillar box in front of me,” the choice of words implies that there is some doubt about the pillar box being red. But, Grice argues, that is a matter of word choice and the sentence itself does not ‘impl’  that there is doubt. The term ‘conversational implicaturum’ was introduced in Grice’s William James lectures published in 8 and used to defend the use of the material implication as a logical translation of ‘if’. With Strawson “In Defence of Dogma”, Grice gives a spirited defense of the analyticsynthetic distinction against Quine’s criticisms. In subsequent systematic papers Grice attempts, among other things, to give a theoretical grounding of the distinction. Grice’s oeuvre is part of the Oxford ordinary language tradition, if formal and theoretical. He also explores metaphysics, especially the concept of absolute value. There is the H. P. Grice Society – Other organisations Grice-related are “The Grice Club,” “The Grice Circle,” and “H. P. Grice’s Playgroup.”

grice’s complexe significabile, plural: -- Grice used to say jocularly that he wasn’t commited to propositions; only to propositional complexes -- complexe significabilia, also called complexum significabile, in medieval philosophy, what is signified only by a complexum a statement or declarative sentence, by a that-clause, or by a dictum an accusative ! infinitive construction, as in: ‘I want him to go’. It is analogous to the modern proposition. The doctrine seems to have originated with Adam de Wodeham in the early fourteenth century, but is usually associated with Gregory of Rimini slightly later. Complexe significabilia do not fall under any of the Aristotelian categories, and so do not “exist” in the ordinary way. Still, they are somehow real. For before creation nothing existed except God, but even then God knew that the world was going to exist. The object of this knowledge cannot have been God himself since God is necessary, but the world’s existence is contingent, and yet did not “exist” before creation. Nevertheless, it was real enough to be an object of knowledge. Some authors who maintained such a view held that these entities were not only signifiable in a complex way by a statement, but were themselves complex in their inner structure; the term ‘complexum significabile’ is unique to their theories. The theory of complexe significabilia was vehemently criticized by late medieval nominalists.  Refs.: The main reference is in ‘Reply to Richards.’ But there is “Sentence semantics and propositional complexes,” c. 9-f. 12, BANC.

grice’s combinatory logic, a branch of logic that deals with formal systems designed for the study of certain basic operations for constructing and manipulating functions as rules, i.e. as rules of calculation expressed by definitions. The notion of a function was fundamental in the development of modern formal or mathematical logic that was initiated by Frege, Peano, Russell, Hilbert, and others. Frege was the first to introduce a generalization of the mathematical notion of a function to include propositional functions, and he used the general notion for formally representing logical notions such as those of a concept, object, relation, generality, and judgment. Frege’s proposal to replace the traditional logical notions of subject and predicate by argument and function, and thus to conceive predication as functional application, marks a turning point in the history of formal logic. In most modern logical systems, the notation used to express functions, including propositional functions, is essentially that used in ordinary mathematics. As in ordinary mathematics, certain basic notions are taken for granted, such as the use of variables to indicate processes of substitution. Like the original systems for modern formal logic, the systems of combinatory logic were designed to give a foundation for mathematics. But combinatory logic arose as an effort to carry the foundational aims further and deeper. It undertook an analysis of notions taken for granted in the original systems, in particular of the notions of substitution and of the use of variables. In this respect combinatory logic was conceived by one of its founders, H. B. Curry, to be concerned with the ultimate foundations and with notions that constitute a “prelogic.” It was hoped that an analysis of this prelogic would disclose the true source of the difficulties connected with the logical paradoxes. The operation of applying a function to one of its arguments, called application, is a primitive operation in all systems of combinatory logic. If f is a function and x a possible argument, then the result of the application operation is denoted fx. In mathematics this is usually written fx, but the notation fx is more convenient in combinatory logic. The G. logician M. Schönfinkel, who started combinatory logic in 4, observed that it is not necessary to introduce color realism combinatory logic functions of more than one variable, provided that the idea of a function is enlarged so that functions can be arguments as well as values of other functions. A function Fx,y is represented with the function f, which when applied to the argument x has, as a value, the function fx, which, when applied to y, yields Fx,y, i.e. fxy % Fx,y. It is therefore convenient to omit parentheses with association to the left so that fx1 . . . xn is used for  . . . fx1 . . . xn. Schönfinkel’s main result was to show how to make the class of functions studied closed under explicit definition by introducing two specific primitive functions, the combinators S and K, with the rules Kxy % x, and Sxyz % xzyz. To illustrate the effect of S in ordinary mathematical notation, let f and g be functions of two and one arguments, respectively; then Sfg is the function such that Sfgx % fx,gx. Generally, if ax1, . . . ,xn is an expression built up from constants and the variables shown by means of the application operation, then there is a function F constructed out of constants including the combinators S and K, such that Fx1 . . . xn % ax1, . . . , xn. This is essentially the meaning of the combinatory completeness of the theory of combinators in the terminology of H. B. Curry and R. Feys, Combinatory Logic 8; and H. B. Curry, J. R. Hindley, and J. P. Seldin, Combinatory Logic, vol. II 2. The system of combinatory logic with S and K as the only primitive functions is the simplest equation calculus that is essentially undecidable. It is a type-free theory that allows the formation of the term ff, i.e. self-application, which has given rise to problems of interpretation. There are also type theories based on combinatory logic. The systems obtained by extending the theory of combinators with functions representing more familiar logical notions such as negation, implication, and generality, or by adding a device for expressing inclusion in logical categories, are studied in illative combinatory logic. The theory of combinators exists in another, equivalent form, namely as the type-free l-calculus created by Church in 2. Like the theory of combinators, it was designed as a formalism for representing functions as rules of calculation, and it was originally part of a more general system of functions intended as a foundation for mathematics. The l-calculus has application as a primitive operation, but instead of building up new functions from some primitive ones by application, new functions are here obtained by functional abstraction. If ax is an expression built up by means of application from constants and the variable x, then ax is considered to define a function denoted lx.a x, whose value for the argument b is ab, i.e. lx.a xb % ab. The function lx.ax is obtained from ax by functional abstraction. The property of combinatory completeness or closure under explicit definition is postulated in the form of functional abstraction. The combinators can be defined using functional abstraction i.e., K % lx.ly.x and S % lx.ly.lz.xzyz, and conversely, in the theory of combinators, functional abstraction can be defined. A detailed presentation of the l-calculus is found in H. Barendregt, The Lambda Calculus, Its Syntax and Semantics 1. It is possible to represent the series of natural numbers by a sequence of closed terms in the lcalculus. Certain expressions in the l-calculus will then represent functions on the natural numbers, and these l-definable functions are exactly the general recursive functions or the Turing computable functions. The equivalence of l-definability and general recursiveness was one of the arguments used by Church for what is known as Church’s thesis, i.e., the identification of the effectively computable functions and the recursive functions. The first problem about recursive undecidability was expressed by Church as a problem about expressions in the l calculus. The l-calculus thus played a historically important role in the original development of recursion theory. Due to the emphasis in combinatory logic on the computational aspect of functions, it is natural that its method has been found useful in proof theory and in the development of systems of constructive mathematics. For the same reason it has found several applications in computer science in the construction and analysis of programming languages. The techniques of combinatory logic have also been applied in theoretical linguistics, e.g. in so-called Montague grammar. In recent decades combinatory logic, like other domains of mathematical logic, has developed into a specialized branch of mathematics, in which the original philosophical and foundational aims and motives are of little and often no importance. One reason for this is the discovery of the new technical applications, which were not intended originally, and which have turned the interest toward several new mathematical problems. Thus, the original motives are often felt to be less urgent and only of historical significance. Another reason for the decline of the original philosophical and foundational aims may be a growing awareness in the philosophy of mathematics of the limitations of formal and mathematical methods as tools for conceptual combinatory logic combinatory logic clarification, as tools for reaching “ultimate foundations.” 

grice’s “The Three-Year-Old’s Guide to Russell’s Theory of Types,” with an advice to parents by P. F. Starwson -- type theory, broadly, any theory according to which the things that exist fall into natural, perhaps mutually exclusive, categories or types. In most modern discussions, ‘type theory’ refers to the theory of logical types first sketched by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics 3. It is a theory of logical types insofar as it purports only to classify things into the most general categories that must be presupposed by an adequate logical theory. Russell proposed his theory in response to his discovery of the now-famous paradox that bears his name. The paradox is this. Common sense suggests that some classes are members of themselves e.g., the class of all classes, while others are not e.g., the class of philosophers. Let R be the class whose membership consists of exactly those classes of the latter sort, i.e., those that are not members of themselves. Is R a member of itself? If so, then it is a member of the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, and hence is not a member of itself. If, on the other hand, it is not a member of itself, then it satisfies its own membership conditions, and hence is a member of itself after all. Either way there is a contradiction. The source of the paradox, Russell suggested, is the assumption that classes and their members form a single, homogeneous logical type. To the contrary, he proposed that the logical universe is stratified into a regimented hierarchy of types. Individuals constitute the lowest type in the hierarchy, type 0. For purposes of exposition, individuals can be taken to be ordinary objects like chairs and persons. Type 1 consists of classes of individuals, type 2 of classes of classes of individuals, type 3 classes of classes of classes of individuals, and so on. Unlike the homogeneous universe, then, in the type hierarchy the members of a given class must all be drawn from a single logical type n, and the class itself must reside in the next higher type n ! 1. Russell’s sketch in the Principles differs from this account in certain details. Russell’s paradox cannot arise in this conception of the universe of classes. Because the members of a class must all be of the same logical type, there is no such class as R, whose definition cuts across all types. Rather, there is only, for each type n, the class Rn of all non-self-membered classes of that type. Since Rn itself is of type n ! 1, the paradox breaks down: from the assumption that Rn is not a member of itself as in fact it is not in the type hierarchy, it no longer follows that it satisfies its own membership conditions, since those conditions apply only to objects of type n. Most formal type theories, including Russell’s own, enforce the class membership restrictions of simple type theory syntactically such that a can be asserted to be a member of b only if b is of the next higher type than a. In such theories, the definition of R, hence the paradox itself, cannot even be expressed. Numerous paradoxes remain unscathed by the simple type hierarchy. Of these, the most prominent are the semantic paradoxes, so called because they explicitly involve semantic notions like truth, as in the following version of the liar paradox. Suppose Epimenides asserts that all the propositions he asserts today are false; suppose also that that is the only proposition he asserts today. It follows immediately that, under those conditions, the proposition he asserts is true if and only if it is false. To address such paradoxes, Russell was led to the more refined and substantially more complicated system known as ramified type theory, developed in detail in his 8 paper “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.” In the ramified theory, propositions and properties or propositional functions, in Russell’s jargon come to play the central roles in the type-theoretic universe. Propositions are best construed as the metaphysical and semantical counterparts of sentences  what sentences express  and properties as the counterparts of “open sentences” like ‘x is a philosopher’ that contain a variable ‘x’ in place of a noun phrase. To distinguish linguistic expressions from their semantic counterparts, the property expressed by, say, ‘x is a philosopher’, will be denoted by ‘x ^ is a philosopher’, and the proposition expressed by ‘Aristotle is a philosopher’ will be denoted by ‘Aristotle is a philosopher’. A property . . .x ^ . . . is said to be true of an individual a if . . . a . . . is a true proposition, and false of a if . . . a . . . is a false proposition where ‘. . . a . . .’ is the result of replacing ‘x ^ ’ with ‘a’ in ‘. . . x ^ . . .’. So, e.g., x ^ is a philosopher is true of Aristotle. The range of significance of a property P is the collection of objects of which P is true or false. a is a possible argument for P if it is in P’s range of significance. In the ramified theory, the hierarchy of classes is supplanted by a hierarchy of properties: first, properties of individuals i.e., properties whose range of significance is restricted to individuals, then properties of properties of individuals, and so on. Parallel to the simple theory, then, the type of a property must exceed the type of its possible arguments by one. Thus, Russell’s paradox with R now in the guise of the property x ^ is a property that is not true of itself  is avoided along analogous lines. Following the  mathematician Henri Poincaré, Russell traced the type theory type theory 935   935 source of the semantic paradoxes to a kind of illicit self-reference. So, for example, in the liar paradox, Epimenides ostensibly asserts a proposition p about all propositions, p itself among them, namely that they are false if asserted by him today. p thus refers to itself in the sense that it  or more exactly, the sentence that expresses it  quantifies over i.e., refers generally to all or some of the elements of a collection of entities among which p itself is included. The source of semantic paradox thus isolated, Russell formulated the vicious circle principle VCP, which proscribes all such self-reference in properties and propositions generally. The liar proposition p and its ilk were thus effectively banished from the realm of legitimate propositions and so the semantic paradoxes could not arise. Wedded to the restrictions of simple type theory, the VCP generates a ramified hierarchy based on a more complicated form of typing. The key notion is that of an object’s order. The order of an individual, like its type, is 0. However, the order of a property must exceed the order not only of its possible arguments, as in simple type theory, but also the orders of the things it quantifies over. Thus, type 1 properties like x ^ is a philosopher and x ^ is as wise as all other philosophers are first-order properties, since they are true of and, in the second instance, quantify over, individuals only. Properties like these whose order exceeds the order of their possible arguments by one are called predicative, and are of the lowest possible order relative to their range of significance. Consider, by contrast, the property call it Q x ^ has all the first-order properties of a great philosopher. Like those above, Q also is a property of individuals. However, since Q quantifies over first-order properties, by the VDP, it cannot be counted among them. Accordingly, in the ramified hierarchy, Q is a second-order property of individuals, and hence non-predicative or impredicative. Like Q, the property x ^ is a first-order property of all great philosophers is also second-order, since its range of significance consists of objects of order 1 and it quantifies only over objects of order 0; but since it is a property of first-order properties, it is predicative. In like manner it is possible to define third-order properties of individuals, third-order properties of first-order properties, third-order properties of second-order properties of individuals, third-order properties of secondorder properties of first-order properties, and then, in the same fashion, fourth-order properties, fifth-order properties, and so on ad infinitum. A serious shortcoming of ramified type theory, from Russell’s perspective, is that it is an inadequate foundation for classical mathematics. The most prominent difficulty is that many classical theorems appeal to definitions that, though consistent, violate the VCP. For instance, a wellknown theorem of real analysis asserts that every bounded set of real numbers has a least upper bound. In the ramified theory, real numbers are identified with certain predicative properties of rationals. Under such an identification, the usual procedure is to define the least upper bound of a bounded set S of reals to be the property call it b some real number in S is true of x ^ , and then prove that this property is itself a real number with the requisite characteristics. However, b quantifies over the real numbers. Hence, by the VCP, b cannot itself be taken to be a real number: although of the same type as the reals, and although true of the right things, b must be assigned a higher order than the reals. So, contrary to the classical theorem, S fails to have a least upper bound. Russell introduced a special axiom to obviate this difficulty: the axiom of reducibility. Reducibility says, in effect, that for any property P, there is a predicative property Q that is true of exactly the same things as P. Reducibility thus assures that there is a predicative property bH true of the same rational numbers as b. Since the reals are predicative, hence of the same order as bH, it turns out that bH is a real number, and hence that S has a least upper bound after all, as required by the classical theorem. The general role of reducibility is thus to undo the draconian mathematical effects of ramification without undermining its capacity to fend off the semantic paradoxes. 

grice’s play group -- H. P. Grice’s playgroup: after the death of J. L. Austin, Grice kept the routine of the Saturday morning with a few new rules. 1. Freedom. 2. Freedom, and 3. Freedom.

grice’s theory-theory: Grice’s word for ‘first philosophy.’ – ‘striking originality, eh?’

grice’s personalism: Grice: “I finished the thing and did not know what to title – my mother said, “Try ‘personal identity.’ She was a personal trinitarian.” -- a version of personal idealism that flourished in the United States principally at Boston  from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. Its principal proponents were Borden Parker Bowne 1847 0 and three of his students: Albert Knudson 18733; Ralph Flewelling 18710, who founded The Personalist; and, most importantly, Edgar Sheffield Brightman 43. Their personalism was both idealistic and theistic and was influential in philosophy and in theology. Personalism traced its philosophical lineage to Berkeley and Leibniz, and had as its foundational insight the view that all reality is ultimately personal. God is the transcendent person and the ground or creator of all other persons; nature is a system of objects either for or in the minds of persons. Both Bowne and Brightman considered themselves empiricists in the tradition of Berkeley. Immediate experience is the starting point, but this experience involves a fundamental knowledge of the self as a personal being with changing states. Given this pluralism, the coherence, order, and intelligibility of the universe are seen to derive from God, the uncreated person. Bowne’s God is the eternal and omnipotent being of classical theism, but Brightman argued that if God is a real person he must be construed as both temporal and finite. Given the fact of evil, God is seen as gradually gaining control over his created world, with regard to which his will is intrinsically limited. Another version of personalism developed in France out of the neo-Scholastic tradition. E. Mounier 550, Maritain, and Gilson identified themselves as personalists, inasmuch as they viewed the infinite person God and finite persons as the source and locus of intrinsic value. They did not, however, view the natural order as intrinsically personal.

grice’s personhood: Grice: “I finished the thing and did not know how to title. My mother, a confessed personal trinitarian, suggested, ‘personal identity.’’ -- the condition or property of being a person, especially when this is considered to entail moral and/or metaphysical importance. Personhood has been thought to involve various traits, including moral agency; reason or rationality; language, or the cognitive skills language may support such as intentionality and self-consciousness; and ability to enter into suitable relations with other persons viewed as members of a self-defining group. Buber emphasized the difference between the I-It relationship holding between oneself and an object, and the IThou relationship, which holds between oneself and another person who can be addressed. Dennett has construed persons in terms of the “intentional stance,” which involves explaining another’s behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Questions about when personhood begins and when it ends have been central to debates about abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia, since personhood has often been viewed as the mark, if not the basis, of a being’s possession of special moral status. 

griceian. Grice disliked the spelling “Gricean” that some people in the New World use. “Surely my grandmother was right when she said she had become a Griceian by marrying a Grice!”

brown, S. author of the Dictionary of British Philosophers (“I first thought of writing a dictionary of English philosophers, but then I thought that Russell would be out – he was born in Wales!.”

grice: g. r. – Welsh philosopher who taught at Norwich. Since H. P. Grice and G. R. Grice both wrote on the contract and morality, one has to be careful.

Griceian elenchus: a cross-examination or refutation. Typically in Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates has a conversation with someone who claims to have some sort of knowledge, and Socrates refutes this claim by showing the interlocutor that what he thinks he knows is inconsistent with his other opinions. This refutation Grice calls a ‘conversational elenchus.’ “It is not entirely negative, for awareness of his own ignorance is supposed to spur one’s conversational interlocutor to further inquiry, and the concepts and assumptions employed in the refutations serve as the basis for positive Griceian, and implicatural, treatments of the same topic.” “Now, in contrast, I’ll grant you that a type of “sophistic elenchi” that one sometimes sees at Oxford, usually displayed  by Rhode scholars from the New World or the Colonies, under the tutelage of me or others in my group, may be merely eristic.” “They aim simply at the refutation of an opponent by any means.” “That is why, incidentally, why Aristotle calls a fallacy that only *appear* to be a refutation a “sophistici elenchi.”  Cf. ‘eristic.’ And Grice on the epagoge/diagoge distinction. 

Grice’s “sc.”: as the elliptical disimplicaturum -- ellipsis as implicaturum: an expression from which a ‘part’ has been deleted.. “I distinguish between the expression-whole and the expression-part.” The term Grice uses for ‘part’ is ‘incomplete’ versus ‘complete,’ and it’s always for metabolical ascriptions primarily. Thus Grice has "x (utterance-type) means '. . .' " which is a specification of timeless meaning for an utterance-type ad which can be either (i a) “complete” or (i b) non-complete (partial) or incomplete]. He also has "x (utterance-type) meant here '...'", which is a specification of applied timeless meaning for an utterance-type which again can be either (2a) complete or (2b) partial, non-complete, or incomplete. So ellipsis can now be redefined in terms of the complete-incomplete distinction. “Smith is” is incomplete. “Smith is clever” is complete.  “Uusually for conciseness.” As Grice notes, “an elliptical or incomplete sentence is often used to answer a questions without repeating material occurring in the question; e. g.  ‘Grice’ may be the answer to the question of the authorship of “The grounds of morality” or to the question of the authorship of “Studies in the Way of Words.” ‘Grice’ can be seen as an ‘elliptical’ name when used as an ellipsis of ‘G. R. Grice’ or “H. P. Grice” and “Grice” can be seen as an elliptical *sentence* when used as an ellipsis for ‘G. R. Grice is the author of ‘The Grounds of Morality”” or “H. P. Grice is the author of Studies in the Way of Words.’Other typical elliptical sentences are: ‘Grice is a father of two [+> children]’, ‘Grice, or Godot, arrived for the tutorial past twelve [+> midnight]’. A typical ellipsis that occurs in discussion of ellipses involves citing the elliptical sentences with the deleted material added in brackets often with ‘sc.’ or ‘scilicet’ – “Grice is a father of two (sc. Children),” Grice, or Godot, as we tutees call him, arrived for the tutorial past twelve (sc. midnight)” -- instead of also presenting the complete sentence. As Grice notes, ellipsis can also occurs above the sentential level, e.g. where well-known premises are omitted in the course of argumentation, as in “Grice is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.” ‘Enthymeme,’ literally, ‘in-the-breast,’ designates an elliptical argument expression from which one or more premise-expressions have been deleted, “or merely implicated.” -- ‘elliptic ambiguity’ designates ambiguity arising from ellipsis, as does ‘elliptic implicaturum.’ “Sc.” Grice calls “elliptical disimplicaturum.”


Grice’s ego: “Oddly, while I and we, and thou and you are persons, ‘it’ is not – the “THIRD” person is a joke!” -- “I follow Buber in distinguishing ‘ego’ from ‘tu.’ With conversation, there’s the ‘we,’ too.”  “If you were the only girl in the world, there would not be a need for the personal pronoun ‘ego’” – Grice to his wife, on the day of their engagement. “I went to Oxford. You went to Cambridge. He went to the London School of Economics.” egocentric particular, a word whose denotation is determined by identity of the speaker and/or the time, place, and audience of his utterance. Examples are generally thought to include ‘I,’ ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘now’, ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’. The term ‘egocentric particular’ was introduced by Russell in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth 0. In an earlier work, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” Monist, 819, Russell called such words “emphatic particulars.” Some important questions arise regarding egocentric particulars. Are some egocentric particulars more basic than others so that the rest can be correctly defined in terms of them but they cannot be correctly defined in terms of the rest? Russell thought all egocentric particulars can be defined by ‘this’; ‘I’, for example, has the same meaning as ‘the biography to which this belongs’, where ‘this’ denotes a sense-datum experienced by the speaker. Yet, at the same time, ‘this’ can be defined by the combination ‘what I-now notice’. Must we use at least some egocentric particulars to give a complete description of the world? Our ability to describe the world from a speaker-neutral perspective, so that the denotations of the terms in our description are independent of when, where, and by whom they are used, depends on our ability to describe the world without using egocentric particulars. Russell held that egocentric particulars are not needed in any part of the description of the world.  -- egocentric predicament, each person’s apparently problematic position as an experiencing subject, assuming that all our experiences are private in that no one else can have them. Two problems concern our ability to gain empirical knowledge. First, it is hard to see how we gain empirical knowledge of what others experience, if all experience is private. We cannot have their experience to see what it is like, for any experience we have is our experience and so not theirs. Second, it is hard to see how we gain empirical knowledge of how the external world is, independently of our experience. All our empirically justified beliefs seem to rest ultimately on what is given in experience, and if the empirically given is private, it seems it can only support justified beliefs about the world as we experience it. A third major problem concerns our ability to communicate with others. It is hard to see how we describe the world in a language others understand. We give meaning to some of our words by defining them by other words that already have meaning, and this process of definition appears to end with words we define ostensively; i.e., we use them to name something given in experience. If experiences are private, no one else can grasp the meaning of our ostensively defined words or any words we use them to define. No one else can understand our attempts to describe the world.  Egoism: cf. H. P. Grice, “The principle of conversational self-love and the principle of conversational benevolence,” any view that, in a certain way, makes the self central. There are several different versions of egoism, all of which have to do with how actions relate to the self. Ethical egoism is the view that people ought to do what is in their own selfinterest. Psychological egoism is a view about people’s motives, inclinations, or dispositions. One statement of psychological egoism says that, as a matter of fact, people always do what they believe is in their self-interest and, human nature being what it is, they cannot do otherwise. Another says that people never desire anything for its own sake except what they believe is in their own self-interest. Altruism is the opposite of egoism. Any ethical view that implies that people sometimes ought to do what is in the interest of others and not in their self-interest can be considered a form of ethical altruism. The view that, human nature being what it is, people can do what they do not believe to be in their self-interest might be called psychological altruism. Different species of ethical and psychological egoism result from different interpretations of self-interest and of acting from self-interest, respectively. Some people have a broad conception of acting from self-interest such that people acting from a desire to help others can be said to be acting out of self-interest, provided they think doing so will not, on balance, take away from their own good. Others have a narrower conception of acting from selfinterest such that one acts from self-interest only if one acts from the desire to further one’s own happiness or good. Butler identified self-love with the desire to further one’s own happiness or good and self-interested action with action performed from that desire alone. Since we obviously have other particular desires, such as the desires for honor, for power, for revenge, and to promote the good of others, he concluded that psychological egoism was false. People with a broader conception of acting from self-interest would ask whether anyone with those particular desires would act on them if they believed that, on balance, acting on them would result in a loss of happiness or good for themselves. If some would, then psychological egoism is false, but if, given human nature as it is, no one would, it is true even if self-love is not the only source of motivation in human beings. Just as there are broader and narrower conceptions of acting from self-interest, there are broader and narrower conceptions of self-interest itself, as well as subjective and objective conceptions of self-interest. Subjective conceptions relate a person’s self-interest solely to the satisfaction of his desires or to what that person believes will make his life go best for him. Objective conceptions see self-interest, at least in part, as independent of the person’s desires and beliefs. Some conceptions of self-interest are narrower than others, allowing that the satisfaction of only certain desires is in a person’s self-interest, e.g., desires whose satisfaction makes that person’s life go better for her. And some conceptions of self-interest count only the satisfaction of idealized desires, ones that someone would have after reflection about the nature of those desires and what they typically lead to, as furthering a person’s self-interest.  See index to all Grice’s books with index – the first three of them.

Grice’s genitorial programme – A type of ideal observer theory -- demiurge from Grecian demiourgos, ‘artisan’, ‘craftsman’, a deity who shapes the material world from the preexisting chaos. Plato introduces the demiurge in his Timaeus. Because he is perfectly good, the demiurge wishes to communicate his own goodness. Using the Forms as a model, he shapes the initial chaos into the best possible image of these eternal and immutable archetypes. The visible world is the result. Although the demiurge is the highest god and the best of causes, he should not be identified with the God of theism. His ontological and axiological status is lower than that of the Forms, especially the Form of the Good. He is also limited. The material he employs is not created by him. Furthermore, it is disorderly and indeterminate, and thus partially resists his rational ordering. In gnosticism, the demiurge is the ignorant, weak, and evil or else morally limited cause of the cosmos. In the modern era the term has occasionally been used for a deity who is limited in power or knowledge. Its first occurrence in this sense appears to be in J. S. Mill’s Theism 1874. 



gricese: While Grice presented Gricese as refutation of Vitters’s idea of a private language “I soon found out that my wife and my two children were speaking Gricese, as was my brother Derek!” -- english, being English or the genius of the ordinary. H. P. Grice refers to “The English tongue.” A refusal to rise above the facts of ordinary life is characteristic of classical Eng. Phil.  from Ireland-born Berkeley to Scotland-born Hume, Scotland-born Reid, and very English Jeremy Bentham and New-World Phil. , whether in transcendentalism Emerson, Thoreau or in pragmatism from James to Rorty. But this orientation did not become truly explicit until after the linguistic turn carried out by Vienna-born Witters, translated by C. K. Ogden, very English Brighton-born Ryle, and especially J. L. Austin and his best companion at the Play Group, H. P. Grice, when it was radicalized and systematized under the name of a phrase Grice lauged at: “‘ordinary’-language philosophy.” This preponderant recourse to the ordinary seems inseparable from certain peculiar characteristics of the English Midlanders such as H. P. Grice, such as the gerund that often make it difficult if not impossible to translate. It is all the more important to emphasize this paradox because English Midlander philosopher, such as H. P. Grice, claims to be as simple as it is universal, and it established itself as an important philosophical language in the second half of the twentieth century, due mainly to the efforts of H. P. Grice. English, but especially Oxonian Phil.  has a specific relationship to ‘ordinary’ language (even though for Grice, “Greek and Latin were always more ordinary to me – and people who came to read Eng. at Oxford were laughed at!”), as well as to the requirements of everyday life, that is not limited to the theories of the Phil.  of language, in which an Eng. philosopher such as H. P. Grice appears as a pioneer. It rejects the artificial linguistic constructions of philosophical speculation that is, Met. and always prefers to return to its original home, as Witters puts it: the natural environment of everyday words Philosophical Investigations. Thus we can discern a continuity between the recourse to the ordinary in Scots Hume, Irish Berkeley, Scots Reid, and very English Jeremy Bentham and what will become in Irish London-born G. E. Moore and Witters after he started using English, at least orally and then J. L. Austin’s and H. P. Grice’s ‘ordinary’-language philosophy. This continuity can be seen in several areas. First, in the exploitation of all the resources of the language, which is considered as a source of information and is valid in itself. Second, in the attention given to the specificities—and even the defects, or ‘implicatura,’ as Grice calls them —of the vernacular --  which become so many philosophical characteristics from which one can learn. Finally, in the affirmation of the naturalness of the distinctions made in and by ordinary language, seeking to challenge the superiority of the technical language of Philosophy —the former being the object of an agreement deeper than the latter. Then there’s The Variety of Modes of Action. The passive. There are several modes of agency, and these constitute both part of the genius of the language and a main source of its problems in tr.. Agency is a strange intersection of points of view that makes it possible to designate the person who is acting while at the same time concealing the actor behind the act—and thus locating agency in the passive subject itself v. AGENCY. A classic difficulty is illustrated by the following sentence from J. Stuart Mill’s To gauge the naturalness of the passive construction in English, it suffices to examine a couple of newspaper headlines. “Killer’s Car Found” On a retrouvé la voiture du tueur, “Kennedy Jr. Feared Dead.” On craint la mort du fils Kennedy; or the titles of a philosophical essay, “Epistemology Naturalized,” L’Épistémologie naturalisée; Tr.  J. Largeault as L’Épistémologie devenue naturelle; a famous article by Quine that was the origin of the naturalistic turn in American Phil.  and “Consciousness Explained” La conscience expliquée by Daniel Dennett. We might then better understand why this PASSIVE VOICE kind of construction—which seems so awkward in Fr.  compared with the active voice— is perceived by its Eng. users as a more direct and effective way of speaking. More generally, the ellipsis of the agent seems to be a tendency of Eng. so profound that one can maintain that the phenomenon Lucien Tesnière called diathèse récessive the loss of the agent has become a characteristic of the Eng. language itself, and not only of the passive. Thus, e. g. , a Fr.  reader irresistibly gains the impression that a reflexive pronoun is lacking in the following expressions. “This book reads well.” ce livre se lit agréablement. “His poems do not translate well.” ses poèmes se traduisent difficilement. “The door opens.” la porte s’ouvre. “The man will hang.” l’homme sera pendu. In reality, here again, Eng. simply does not need to mark by means of the reflexive pronoun se the presence of an active agent. Do, make, have Eng. has several terms to translate the single Fr.  word faire, which it can render by to do, to make, or to have, depending on the type of agency required by the context. Because of its attenuation of the meaning of action, its value as emphasis and repetition, the verb “to do” has become omnipresent in English, and it plays a particularly important role in philosophical texts. We can find a couple of examples of tr. problems in the Oxonian seminars by J. L. Austin. In Sense and Considerations on Representative Government: “I must not be understood to say that” p. To translate such a passive construction, Fr.  is forced to resort to the impersonal pronoun on and to put it in the position of an observer of the “I” je as if it were considered from the outside: On ne doit pas comprendre que je dis que p. But at the same time, the network of relations internal to the sentence is modified, and the meaning transformed. Necessity is no longer associated with the subject of the sentence and the author; it is made impersonal. Philosophical language also makes frequent use of the diverse characteristics of the passive. Here we can mention the crucial turning point in the history of linguistics represented by Chomsky’s discovery Syntactic Structures,  of the paradigm of the active/ passive relation, which proves the necessity of the transformational component in grammar. A passive utterance is not always a reversal of the active and only rarely describes an undergoing, as is shown by the example She was offered a bunch of flowers. In particular, language makes use of the fact that this kind of construction authorizes the ellipsis of the agent as is shown by the common expression Eng. spoken. For a philosopher, the passive is thus the privileged form of an action when its agent is unknown, indeterminate, unimportant, or, inversely, too obvious. Thus without making his prose too turgid, in Sense and Sensibilia Austin can use five passives in less than a page, and these can be translated in Fr.  only by on, an indeterminate subject defined as differentiated from moi. “It is clearly implied, that “Now this, at least if it is taken to mean The expression is here put forward We are given, as examples, familiar objects The expression is not further defined On sous-entend clairement que Quant à cela, du moins si on l’entend au sens de On avance ici l’expression On nous donne, comme exemples, des objets familiers On n’approfondit pas la définition de l’expression . . . 1 Langage, langue, parole: A virtual distinction. Contrary to what is too often believed, the Eng. language does not conflate under the term language what Fr.  distinguishes following Saussure with the terms langage, langue, and parole. In reality, Eng. also has a series of three terms whose semantic distribution makes possible exactly the same trichotomy as Fr. : First there’s Grice’s “tongue,”which serves to designate a specific language by opposition to another; speech, which refers more specifically to parole but which is often translated in Fr.  by discours; and language in the sense of faculté de langage. Nonetheless, Fr. ’s set of systematic distinctions can only remain fundamentally virtual in English, notably because the latter refuses to radically detach langue from parole. Thus in Chrestomathia, Bentham uses “tongue” (Bentham’s tongue – in Chrestomathia) and language interchangeably and sometimes uses language in the sense of langue: “Of all known languages the Grecian [Griceian] is assuredly, in its structure, the most plastic and most manageable. Bentham even uses speech and language as equivalents, since he speaks of parts of speech. But on the contrary, he sometimes emphasizes differences that he ignores here. And he proceeds exactly like Hume in his essay Of the Standard of Taste, where we find, e. g. , But it must also be allowed, that some part of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of language. The word, virtue, with its equivalent in every tongue, implies praise; as that of vice does blame. REFS.: Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd.  by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, . Hume, D. . Of the Standard of Taste. In Four Dissertations. London: Thoemmes Continuum, . First published in 175 Saussure, F. de. Course in General Linguistics. Ed.  by Bally and Sechehaye. Tr.  R. Harris. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, . First published in circulation among these forms. This formal continuity promotes a great methodological inventiveness through the interplay among the various grammatical entities that it enables.  The gerund: The form of -ing that is the most difficult to translate Eng. is a nominalizing language. Any verb can be nominalized, and this ability gives the Eng. philosophical language great creative power. “Nominalization,” as Grice calls it, is in fact a substantivization without substantivization: the verb is not substantivized in order to refer to action, to make it an object of discourse which is possible in any language, notably in philosophical Fr.  and G. , but rather to nominalize the verb while at the same time preserving its quality as a verb, and even to nominalize whole clauses. Fr.  can, of course, nominalize faire, toucher, and sentir le faire, le toucher, even le sentir, and one can do the same, in a still more systematic manner, in G. . However, these forms will not have the naturalness of the Eng. expressions: the making and unmaking the doing and undoing, the feeling, the feeling Byzantine, the meaning. Above all, in these languages it is hard to construct expressions parallel to, e. g. , the making of, the making use of, my doing wrongly, “my meaning this,” (SIGNIFICATUM, COMMUNICATUM), his feeling pain, etc., that is, mixtures of noun and verb having—and this is the grammatical characteristic of the gerund — the external distribution of a nominal expression and the internal distribution of a verbal expression. These forms are so common that they characterize, in addition to a large proportion of book titles e. g. , The Making of the Eng. Working Class, by E. P. Thomson; or, in Phil. , The Taming of Chance, or The taming of the true, by I. Hacking, the language of classical Eng. Phil. . The gerund functions as a sort of general equivalent or exchanger between grammatical forms. In that way, it not only makes the language dynamic by introducing into it a permanent temporal flux, but also helps create, in the language itself, a kind of indeterminacy in the way it is parsed, which the translator finds awkward when he understands the message without being able to retain its lightness. Thus, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume speaks, regarding the idea, of the manner of its being conceived, which a Fr.  translator might render as sa façon d’être conçue or perhaps, la façon dont il lui appartient d’être conçue, which is not quite the same thing. And we v. agency and the gerund connected in a language like that of Bentham, who minimizes the gaps between subject and object, verb and noun: much regret has been suggested at the thoughts of its never having yet been brought within the reach of the Eng. reader ChrestomathiTranslators often feel obliged to render the act expressed by a gerund by the expression le fait de, but this has a meaning almost contrary to the English. With its gerund, Eng. avoids the discourse of fact by retaining only the event and arguing only on that basis. The inevitable confusion suggested by Fr.  when it translates the Eng. gerund is all the more unfortunate in this case because it becomes impossible to distinguish when Eng. uses the fact or the case from when it uses the gerund. The importance of the event, along with the distinction between trial, case, and event, on the one hand and happening on the other, is Sensibilia, he has criticized the claim that we never perceive objects directly and is preparing to criticize its negation as well: I am not going to maintain that we ought to embrace the doctrine that we do perceive material things. Je ne vais pas soutenir que nous devons embrasser la doctrine selon laquelle nous percevons vraiment les choses matérielles. Finally, let us recall Austin’s first example of the performative, which plays simultaneously on the anaphoric value of do and on its sense of action, a duality that v.ms to be at the origin of the theory of the performative, I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife—as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony Oui à savoir: je prends cette femme pour épouse’énoncé lors d’une cérémonie de mariage; How to Do Things with Words. On the other hand, whereas faire is colored by a causative sense, Eng. uses to make and to have—He made Mary open her bags il lui fit ouvrir sa valise; He had Mary pour him a drink il se fit verser un verre—with this difference: that make can indicate, as we v., coercion, whereas have presupposes that there is no resistance, a difference that Fr.  can only leave implicit or explain by awkward periphrases. Twentieth-century Eng. philosophers from Austin to Geach and Anscombe have examined these differences and their philosophical implications very closely. Thus, in A Plea for Excuses, Austin emphasizes the elusive meaning of the expression doing something, and the correlative difficulty of determining the limits of the concept of action—Is to sneeze to do an action? There is indeed a vague and comforting idea that doing an action must come down to the making of physical movements. Further, we need to ask what is the detail of the complicated internal machinery we use in acting. Philosophical Papers No matter how partial they may be, these opening remarks show that there is a specific, intimate relation between ordinary language and philosophical language in English language Phil. . This enables us to better understand why the most Oxonian philosophers are so comfortable resorting to idiomatic expressions cf. H. Putnam and even to clearly popular usage: “Meanings ain’t in the head.” It ain’t necessarily so.As for the title of Manx-ancestry Quine’s famous book From a Logical Point of View, which at first seems austere, it is taken from a calypso song: “From a logical point of view, Always marry women uglier than you. The Operator -ing: Properties and Antimetaphysical Consequences -ing: A multifunctional operator Although grammarians think it important to distinguish among the forms of -ing—present participles, adjectives, the progressive, and the gerund—what strikes the reader of scientific and philosophical texts is first of all the free in Phil. , You are v.ing something Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, regarding a stick in water; I really am perceiving the familiar objects Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. The passage to the form be + verb + -ing indicates, then, not the progressiveness of the action but rather the transition into the metalanguage peculiar to the philosophical description of phenomena of perception. The sole exception is, curiously, to know, which is practically never used in the progressive: even if we explore the philosophical and epistemological literature, we do not find “I am knowing” or he was knowing, as if knowledge could not be conceived as a process. In English, there is a great variety of what are customarily called aspects, through which the status of the action is marked and differentiated in a more systematic way than in Fr.  or G. , once again because of the -ing ending: he is working / he works / he worked / he has been working. Unlike what happens in Slavic languages, aspect is marked at the outset not by a duality of verbal forms but instead by the use of the verb to be with a verb ending in -ing imperfect or progressive, by opposition to the simple present or past perfect. Moreover, Grice mixes several aspects in a single expression: iterativity, progressivity, completion, as in it cannot fail to have been noticed Austin, How to Do Things. These are nuances, or implicate, as Labov and then Pinker recently observed, that are not peculiar to classical or written Eng. but also exist in certain vernaculars that appear to be familiar or allegedly ungrammatical. The vernacular seems particularly sophisticated on this point, distinguishing “he be working” from “he working” —that is, between having a regular job and being engaged in working at a particular moment, standard usage being limited to “he is working” Pinker, Language Instinct. Whether or not the notion of aspect is used, it seems clear that in Eng. there is a particularly subtle distinction between the different degrees of completion, of the iterativity or development of an action, that leads Oxonian philosophers to pay more attention to these questions and even to surprising inventions, such as that of ‘implicaturum,’ or ‘visum,’ or ‘disimplicaturum.’ The linguistic dissolution of the idea of substance  Fictive entities Thus the verb + -ing operation simply gives the verb the temporary status of a noun while at the same time preserving some of its syntactic and semantic properties as a verb, that is, by avoiding substantivization. It is no accident that the substantiality of the I think asserted by Descartes was opposed by virtually all the Eng. philosophers of the seventeenth century. If a personal identity can be constituted by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, it does not require positing a substance: the substantivization of making and giving meets the need. We can also consider the way in which Russell Analysis of Matter, ch.27 makes his reader understand far more easily than does Bachelard, and without having to resort to the category of an epistemological obstacle, that one can perfectly well posit an atom as a series of events without according it the status of a substance. crucial in discussions of probability. The very definition of probability with which Bayes operates in An Essay towards Solving a Problem, the first great treatise on subjective probability, is based on this status of the happening, the event conceived not in terms of its realization or accomplishment but in terms of its expectation: The probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing expected upon its happening.  The progressive: Tense and aspect If we now pass from the gerund to the progressive, another construction that uses -ing, a new kind of problem appears: that of the aspect and temporality of actions. An interesting case of tr. difficulty is, e. g. , the one posed by Austin precisely when he attempts, in his presentation of performatives, to distinguish between the sentence and the act of saying it, between statement and utterance: there are utterances, such as the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action How to Do Things. The tr. difficulty here is caused by the combination in the construction in -ing of the syntactical flexibility of the gerund and a progressive meaning. Does the -ing construction indicate the act, or the progressiveness of the act? Similarly, it is hard to choose to translate “On Referring” P. F. Strawson as De la référence rather than as De l’action de référer. Should one translate On Denoting Russell as De la dénotation the usual tr. or as Du dénoter? The progressive in the strict sense—be + verb + -ing— indicates an action at a specific moment, when it has already begun but is not yet finished. A little farther on, Austin allows us to gauge the ease of Eng. in the whole of these operations. “To utter the sentence is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing. The Fr.  tr. gives, correctly: Énoncer la phrase, ce n’est pas décrire ce qu’il faut bien reconnaître que je suis en train de faire en parlant ainsi, but this remains unsatisfying at best, because of the awkwardness of en train de. Moreover, in many cases, en train de is simply not suitable insofar as the -ing does not indicate duration: e. g. , in At last I am v.ing . It is interesting to examine from this point of view the famous category of verbs of perception, verbum percipiendi. It is remarkable that these verbs v., hear can be in some cases used with the construction be + verb + -ing, since it is generally said even in grammar books that they can be used only in the present or simple past and not in the progressive. This rule probably is thought to be connected with something like the immediacy of perception, and it can be compared with the fact that the verbs to know and to understand are also almost always in the present or the simple past, as if the operations of the understanding could not be presented in the progressive form and were by definition instantaneous; or as if, on the contrary, they transcended the course of time. In reality, there are counterexamples. “I don’t know if I’m understanding you correctly”; You are hearing voices; and often Oxonian Phil. , which makes their tr. particularly indigestible, especially in Fr. , where -ismes gives a very Scholastic feel to the classifications translated. In addition to the famous term realism, which has been the object of so many contradictory definitions and so many debates over past decades that it has been almost emptied of meaning, we may mention some common but particularly obscure for anyone not familiar with the theoretical context terms: “cognitivism,” noncognitivism, coherentism, eliminativism, consequentialism, connectionism, etSuch terms in which moral Phil.  is particularly fertile are in general transposed into Fr.  without change in a sort of new, international philosophical language that has almost forgone tr.. More generally, in Eng. as in G. , words can be composed by joining two other words far more easily than in Fr. —without specifying the logical connections between the terms: toothbrush, pickpocket, lowlife, knownothing; or, for more philosophical terms: aspect-blind, language-dependent, rule-following, meaning-holism, observer-relative, which are translatable, of course, but not without considerable awkwardness.  Oxonian philosophese.  Oxonian Phil.  seems to establish a language that is stylistically neutral and appears to be transparently translatable. Certain specific problems—the tr. of compound words and constructions that are more flexible in Eng. and omnipresent in current philosophical discourse, such as the thesis that la thèse selon laquelle, the question whether la question de savoir si, and my saying that le fait que je dise que—make Fr.  tr.s of contemporary Eng. philosophical texts very awkward, even when the author writes in a neutral, commonplace style. Instead, these difficulties, along with the ease of construction peculiar to English, tend to encourage non-Oxonian analytical philosophers to write directly in Gricese, following the example of many of their European colleagues, or else to make use of a technical vernacular we have noted the -isms and compounds that is frequently heavy going and not very inventive when transRomang terms which are usually transliterated. This situation is certainly attributable to the paradoxical character of Gricese, which established itself as a philosophical language in the second half of the twentieth century: it is a language that is apparently simple and accessible and that thus claims a kind of universality but that is structured, both linguistically and philosophically, around major stumbling blocks to do, -ing, etthat often make it untranslatable. It is paradoxically this untranslatability, and not its pseudo-transparency, that plays a crucial role in the process of universalization. . IThe Austinian Paradigm: Ordinary Language and Phil.  The proximity of ordinary language and philosophical language, which is rooted in classical English-language Phil. , was theorized in the twentieth century by Austin and can be summed up in the expression “‘ordinary’-language philosophy”. Ordinary language Phil.  is interested This sort of overall preeminence in Eng. of the verbal and the subjective over the nominal and the objective is clear in the difference in the logic that governs the discourse of affectivity in Fr.  and in English. How would something that one is correspond to something that one has, as in the case of fear in Fr.  avoir peur? It follows that a Fr. man—who takes it for granted that fear is something that one feels or senses—cannot feel at home with the difference that Eng. naturally makes between something that has no objective correlative because it concerns only feeling like fear; and what is available to sensation, implying that what is felt through it has the status of an object. Thus in Eng. something is immediately grasped that in Fr.  v.ms a strange paradox, viz. that passion, as Bentham notes in Deontology, is a fictive entity. Thus what sounds in Fr.  like a nominalist provocation is implicated in the folds of the Eng. language. A symbolic theory of affectivity is thus more easily undertaken in Eng. than in Fr. , and if an ontological conception of affectivity had to be formulated in English, symmetrical difficulties would be encountered.  Reversible derivations Another particularity of English, which is not without consequences in Phil. , is that its poverty from the point of view of inflectional morphology is compensated for by the freedom and facility it offers for the construction of all sorts of derivatives. Nominal derivatives based on adjectives and using suffixes such as -ity, -hood, -ness, -y. The resulting compounds are very difficult to differentiate in Fr.  and to translate in general, which has led, in contemporary Fr.  tr.s, to various incoherent makeshifts. To list the most common stumbling blocks: privacy privé-ité, innerness intériorité, not in the same sense as interiority, vagueness caractère vague, goodness bonté, in the sense of caractère bon, rightness  justesse, “sameness,” similarité, in the sense of mêmeté, ordinariness, “appropriateness,” caractère ordinaire, approprié, unaccountability caractère de ce dont il est impossible de rendre compte. Adjectival derivatives based on nouns, using numerous suffixes: -ful, -ous, -y, -ic, -ish, -al e.g., meaningful, realistic, holistic, attitudinal, behavioral. Verbal derivatives based on nouns or adjectives, with the suffixes -ize, -ify, -ate naturalize, mentalize, falsify, and even without suffixes when possible e.g., the title of an article “How Not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau,” i.e., how not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau. d. Polycategorial derivatives based on verbs, using suffixes such as -able, -er, -age, -ismrefutable, truthmaker. The reversibility of these nominalizations and verbalizations has the essential result of preventing the reification of qualities or acts. The latter is more difficult to avoid in Fr.  and G. , where nominalization hardens and freezes notions compare intériorité and innerness, which designates more a quality, or even, paradoxically, an effect, than an entity or a domain. But this kind of ease in making compounds has its flip side: the proliferation of -isms in liberties with the natural uses of the language. The philosophers ask, e. g. , how they can know that there is a real object there, but the question How do I know? can be asked in ordinary language only in certain contexts, that is, where it is always possible, at least in theory, to eliminate doubt. The doubt or question But is it a real one? has always must have a special basis, there must be some reason for suggesting that it isn’t real, in the sense of some specific way in which it is suggested that this experience or item may be phoney. The wile of the metaphysician consists in asking Is it a real table? a kind of object which has no obvious way of being phoney and not specifying or limiting what may be wrong with it, so that I feel at a loss how to prove it is a real one. It is the use of the word real in this manner that leads us on to the supposition that real has a single meaning the real world, material objects, and that a highly profound and puzzling one. Austin, Philosophical Papers This analysis of real is taken up again in Sense and Sensibilia, where Austin criticizes the notion of a sense datum and also a certain way of raising problems supposedly on the basis of common opinion e. g. , the common opinion that we really perceive things—but in reality on the basis of a pure construction. To state the case in this way, Austin says, is simply to soften up the plain man’s alleged views for the subsequent treatment; it is preparing the way for, by practically attributing to him, the so-called philosophers’ view. Phil. ’s frequent recourse to the ordinary is characterized by a certain condescension toward the common man. The error or deception consists in arguing the philosopher’s position against the ordinary position, because if the in what we should say when. It is, in other words, a Phil.  of language, but on the condition that we never forget that we are looking not merely at words or ‘meanings,’ whatever they may be but also at the realities we use the words to talk about, as Austin emphasizes A Plea for Excuses, in Philosophical Papers. During the twentieth century or more precisely, between the 1940s and the s, there was a division of the paradigms of the Phil.  of language between the logical clarification of ordinary language, on the one hand, and the immanent examination of ordinary language, on the other. The question of ordinary language and the type of treatment that it should be given—a normative clarification or an internal examination—is present in and even constitutive of the legacy of logical positivism. Wittgenstein’s work testifies to this through the movement that it manifests and performs, from the first task of the Phil.  of language the creation of an ideal or formal language to clarify everyday language to the second the concern to examine the multiplicity of ordinary language’s uses. The break thus accomplished is such that one can only agree with Rorty’s statement in his preface to The Linguistic Turn that the only difference between Ideal Language Philosophers and Ordinary Language Philosophers is a disagreement about which language is ideal. In the renunciation of the idea of an ideal language, or a norm outside language, there is a radical change in perspective that consists in abandoning the idea of something beyond language: an idea that is omnipresent in the whole philosophical tradition, and even in current analytical Phil. . Critique of language and Phil.  More generally, Austin criticizes traditional Phil.  for its perverse use of ordinary language. He constantly denounces Phil. ’s abuse of ordinary language—not so much that it forgets it, but rather that it exploits it by taking 2 A defect in the Eng. language? Between according to Bentham Eng. philosophers are not very inclined toward etymology—no doubt because it is often less traceable than it is in G.  or even in Fr.  and discourages a certain kind of commentary. There are, however, certain exceptions, like Jeremy Bentham’s analysis of the words “in,” “or,” “between,” “and,” etc., -- cf. Grice on “to” and “or” – “Does it make sense to speak of the ‘sense’ of ‘to’?” -- through which Eng. constructs the kinds of space that belong to a very specific topiLet us take the case of between, which Fr.  can render only by the word entre. Both the semantics and the etymology of entre imply the number three in Fr. , since what is entre intervenes as a third term between two others which it separates or brings closer in Lat., in-ter; in Fr., en tiers; as a third. This is not the case in English, which constructs between in accord with the number two in conformity with the etymology of this word, by tween, in pairs, to the point that it can imagine an ordering, even when it involves three or more classes, only in the binary mode: comon between three? relation between three?—the hue of selfcontradictoriness presents itself on the very face of the phrase. By one of the words in it, the number of objects is asserted to be three: by another, it is asserted to be no more than two. To the use thus exclusively made of the word between, what could have given rise, but a sort of general, howsoever indistinct, perception, that it is only one to one that objects can, in any continued manner, be commodiously and effectually compared. The Eng. language labours under a defect, which, when it is compared in this particular with other European langues, may perhaps be found peculiar to it. By the derivation, and thence by the inexcludible import, of the word between i.e., by twain, the number of the objects, to which this operation is represented as capable of being applied, is confined to two. By the Roman inter—by its Fr.  derivation entre—no such limitation v.ms to be expressed. Chrestomathia REFS.: Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd.  by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, To my mind, experience proves amply that we do come to an agreement on what we should say when such and such a thing, though I grant you it is often long and difficult. I should add that too often this is what is missing in Phil. : a preliminary datum on which one might agree at the outset. We do not claim in this way to discover all the truth that exists regarding everything. We discover simply the facts that those who have been using our language for centuries have taken the trouble to notice. Performatif-Constatif Austinian agreement is possible for two reasons:  Ordinary language cannot claim to have the last word. Only remember, it is the first word Philosophical Papers. The exploration of language is also an exploration of the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men ibid..  Ordinary language is a rich treasury of differences and embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations. These are certainly more subtle and solid than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon ibid.. It is this ability to indicate differences that makes language a common instrument adequate for speaking things in the world. Who is we? Cavell’s question It is clear that analytical Phil. , especially as it has developed in the United States since the 1940s, has moved away from the Austinian paradigm and has at the same time abandoned a certain kind of philosophical writing and linguistic subtlety. But that only makes all the more powerful and surprising the return to Austin advocated by Stanley Cavell and the new sense of ordinary language Phil.  that is emerging in his work and in contemporary American Phil. . What right do we have to refer to our uses? And who is this we so crucial for Austin that it constantly recurs in his work? All we have, as we have said, is what we say and our linguistic agreements. We determine the meaning of a given word by its uses, and for Austin, it is nonsensical to ask the question of meaning for instance, in a general way or looking for an entity; v. NONSENSE. The quest for agreement is founded on something quite different from signification or the determination of the common meaning. The agreement Austin is talking about has nothing to do with an intersubjective consensus; it is not founded on a convention or on actual agreements. It is an agreement that is as objective as possible and that bears as much on language as on reality. But what is the precise nature of this agreement? Where does it come from, and why should so much importance be accorded to it? That is the question Cavell asks, first in Must We Mean What We Say? and then in The Claim of Reason: what is it that allows Austin and Witters to say what they say about what we say? A claim is certainly involved here. That is what Witters means by our agreement in judgments, and in language it is based only on itself, on the latter exists, it is not on the same level. The philosopher introduces into the opinion of the common man particular entities, in order then to reject, amend, or explain it. The method of ordinary language: Be your size. Small Men. Austin’s immanent method comes down to examining our ordinary use of ordinary words that have been confiscated by Phil. , such as ‘true’ and ‘real,’ in order to raise the question of truth: Fact that is a phrase designed for use in situations where the distinction between a true statement and the state of affairs about which it is a truth is neglected; as it often is with advantage in ordinary life, though seldom in Phil. . So speaking about the fact that is a compendious way of speaking about a situation involving both words and world. Philosophical Papers We can, of course, maintain along with a whole trend in analytical Phil.  from Frege to Quine that these are considerations too small and too trivial from which to draw any conclusions at all. But it is this notion of fact that Austin relies on to determine the nature of truth and thus to indicate the pertinence of ordinary language as a relationship to the world. This is the nature of Austin’s approach: the foot of the letter is the foot of the ladder ibid.. For Austin, ordinary words are part of the world: we use words, and what makes words useful objects is their complexity, their refinement as tools ibid.: We use words to inform ourselves about the things we talk about when we use these words. Or, if that v.ms too naïve: we use words as a way of better understanding the situation in which we find ourselves led to make use of words. What makes this claim possible is the proximity of dimension, of size, between words and ordinary objects. Thus philosophers should, instead of asking whether truth is a substance, a quality, or a relation, take something more nearly their own size to strain at ibid.. The Fr.  translators render size by mesure, which v.ms excessively theoretical; the reference is to size in the material, ordinary sense. One cannot know everything, so why not try something else? Advantages of slowness and cooperation. Be your size. Small Men. Conversation cited by Urmson in A Symposium Austin emphasizes that this technique of examining words which he ended up calling linguistic phenomenology (and Grice linguistic botany) is not new and that it has existed since Socrates, producing its slow successes. But Grice is the first to make a systematic application of such a method, which is based, on the one hand, on the manageability and familiarity of the objects concerned and, on the other hand, on the common agreement at which it arrives in each of its stages. The problem is how to agree on a starting point, that is, on a given. This given or datum, for Grice, is Gricese, not as a corpus consisting of utterances or words, but as the site of agreement about what we should say when. Austin regards language as an empirical datum or experimental dat -- Bayes, T. . An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, with Richard Price’s Foreword and Discussion. In Facsimiles of Two Papers by Bayes. : Hafner, . First published in 176 Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd.  by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Deontology. Ed.  by Goldworth. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Essay on Language. In The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed.  by J. Bowring. Edinburgh: W. Tait, 18384 Berkeley, George. Of Infinities. In vol. 2 of The Works, ed.  by Luce and T. E. Jessop, 4081 London: Nelson, 19485 Reprint, : Kraus, . . A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Ed.  by J. Dancy. Oxford: Oxford , . Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason. : Oxford , . . In Quest of the Ordinary. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . . Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge: Cambridge , . . This New Yet Unapproachable AmericAlbuquerque: Living Batch Press, . Chomsky, Noam. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, . Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays, First and Second Series. : Library of America, . Hacking, Jan. Why Does Language Matter to Phil. ? Cambridge: Cambridge , . Hume, D. . Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Ed.  by D. Coleman. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Essays, Moral, Political and Literary Ed.  by E. F. Miller. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, . . A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed.  by L. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford . 197 Laugier, SandrDu réel à l’ordinaire. : Vrin, . . Recommencer la philosophie. : Presses Universitaires de France, . Locke, J.. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford , . Mill, J. Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. In Essays on Pol. and Society, vol. 19 of Collected Works, ed.  by J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . . Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society. Vol. 10 of Collected Works, ed.  by J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . . A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . Nedeljkovic, Maryvonne. D.  Hume, approche phénoménologique de l’action et théorie linguistique. : Presses Universitaires de France, . Pinker, Steven. The Language Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind. London: Penguin, . Putnam, Hilary. Mind, Language and Reality. Vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Realism with a Human Face. Ed.  by J. Conant.  , . Quine, Willard V. From a Logical Point of View.  , 195 . Word and Object. , . Ricœur, Paul. Memory, History, Forgetting. Tr.  K. Blamey and D. Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . Rorty, Richard, ed. The Linguistic Turn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . First published . Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Matter. London: Allen and Unwin, 195 . An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. : Routledge, . First published in 1950. Tesnière, Lucien. Éléments de syntaxe structural. : Klincksieck, . Urmson, J. O., W.V.O. Quine, and S. Hampshire. A Symposium on Austin’s Method. In Symposium on J. L. Austin, ed.  by K. T. Fann. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and the Brown Books. Ed.  by R. Rhees. Oxford: Blackwell, . First published in 195 . Philosophical Investigations. Tr.  G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 195 we, as Cavell says in a passage that illustrates many of the difficulties of tr. we have discussed up to this point: We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing ensures that this projection will take place in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules, just as nothing ensures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That we do, on the whole, is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and ‑of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism Witterscalls forms of life. Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as it is and because it is  terrifying. Must We Mean What We Say? The fact that our ordinary language is based only on itself is not only a reason for concern regarding the validity of what we do and say, but also the revelation of a truth about ourselves that we do not always want to recognize: the fact that I am the only possible source of such a validity. That is a new understanding of the fact that language is our form of life, precisely its ordinary form. Cavell’s originality lies in his reinvention of the nature of ordinary language in American thought and in the connection he establishes—notably through his reference to Emerson and Thoreau, American thinkers of the ordinary—between this nature of language and human nature, finitude. It is also in this sense that the question of linguistic agreements reformulates that of the ordinary human condition and that the acceptance of the latter goes hand in hand with the recognition of the former. In Cavell’s Americanization of ordinary language Phil.  there thus emerges a radical form of the return to the ordinary. But isn’t this ordinary, e. g. , that of Emerson in his Essays, precisely the one that the whole of Eng. Phil.  has been trying to find, or rather to feel or taste, since its origins? Thus we can compare the writing of Emerson or James, in texts like Experience or Essays in Radical Empiricism, with that of the British empiricists when they discuss experience, the given, and the sensible. This is no doubt one of the principal dimensions of philosophical writing in English: always to make the meaning more available to the senses. J.-Pierre Cléro Sandra Laugier REFS.: Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Performatif-Constatif. In La philosophie analytique, ed.  by J. Wahl and L. Beck. : Editions du Minuit, . Tr. in Performative-Constative. In Phil.  and Ordinary Language, ed.  by E. Caton. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, . . Philosophical Papers. Ed.  by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Sense and SensibiliOxford: Clarendon, . Ayer, J. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan, 1940. ENTREPRENEUR 265 form the basis of the kingdom by means of calculated plans; to the legal domain: someone who contravenes the hierarchical order of the professions and subverts their rules; finally, to the economic domain: someone who agrees, on the basis of a prior contract an established price to execute a project collection of taxes, supply of an army, a merchant expedition, construction, production, transaction, assuming the hazards related to exchange and time. This last usage corresponds to practices that became more and more socially prominent starting in the sixteenth century. Let us focus on the term in economics. The engagement of the entrepreneur in his project may be understood in various ways, and the noun entrepreneur translated in various ways into English: by contractor if the stress is placed on the engagement with regard to the client to execute the task according to conditions negotiated in advance a certain time, a fixed price, firm price, tenant farming; by undertaker now rare in this sense when we focus on the engagement in the activity, taking charge of the project, its practical realization, the setting in motion of the transaction; and by adventurer, enterpriser, and projector, to emphasize the risks related to speculation. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Fr.  word entreprise acquired the new meaning of an industrial establishment. Entrepreneur accordingly acquired the sense of the head or direction of a business of production superintendent, employer, manager. In France, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the noun entrepreneur had strong political connotations, in particular in the abundant pamphlets containing mazarinades denouncing the entrepreneurs of tax farming. The economist Pierre de Boisguilbert wrote the Factum de la France, the largest trial ever conducted by pen against the big financiers, entrepreneurs of the wealth of the kingdom, who take advantage of its good administration its political economy in the name of the entrepreneurs of commerce and industry, who contribute to the increase in its wealth. Boisguilbert failed in his project of reforming the tax farm, or tax business, and it was left to a clever financier, Richard Cantillon, to create the economic concept of the entrepreneur. Chance in Business: Risk and Uncertainty There is no trace of Boisguilbert’s moral indignation in Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature du commerce en générale Essay on the nature of commerce in general. Having shown that all the classes and all the men of a State live or acquire wealth at the expense of the owners of the land bk. 1, ch.12, he suggests that the circulation and barter of goods and merchandise, like their production, are conducted in Europe by entrepreneurs and haphazardly bk. 1, of ch.1 He then describes in detail what composes the uncertain aspect of the action of an entrepreneur, in which he acts according to his ideas and without being able to predict, in which he conceives and executes his plans surrounded by the hazard of events. The uncertainty related to business profits turns especially on the fact that it is dependent on the forms of consumption of the owners, the only members of society who are independent—naturally independent, Cantillon specified. Entrepreneurs are those who are capable of breaking ÉNONCÉ Énoncé, from the Roman enuntiare to express, divulge; from ex out and nuntiare to make known; a nuntius is a messenger, a nuncio, ranges over the same type of entity as do proposition and phrase: it is a basic unit of syntax, the relevant question being whether or not it is the bearer of truth values. An examination of the differences among these entities, and the networks they constitute in different languages especially in English: sentence, statement, utterance, appears under PROPOSITION. V. also DICTUM and LOGOS, both of which may be acceptably Tr.  énoncé. Cf. PRINCIPLE, SACHVERHALT, TRUTH, WORD especially WORD, Box  The essential feature of an énoncé is that it is considered to be a singular occurrence and thus is paired with its énonciation: v. SPEECH ACT; cf. ENGLISH, LANGUAGE, SENSE, SIGN, SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED, WITTICISM. v.  DISCOURSE ENTREPRENEUR FR.  ENG. adventurer, contractor, employer, enterpriser, entrepreneur, manager, projector, undertaker, superintendent v.  ACT, AGENCY, BERUF, ECONOMY, LIBERAL, OIKONOMIA, PRAXIS, UTILITY. Refs.: G. J. Warnock, “English philosophy,” H. P. Grice, “Gricese,” BANC.

griceian casuistry: the case-analysis approach to the interpretation of general moral rules. Casuistry starts with paradigm cases of how and when a given general moral rule should be applied, and then reasons by analogy to cases in which the proper application of the rule is less obvious  e.g., a case in which lying is the only way for a priest not to betray a secret revealed in confession. The point of considering the series of cases is to ascertain the morally relevant similarities and differences between cases. Casuistry’s heyday was the first half of the seventeenth century. Reacting against casuistry’s popularity with the Jesuits and against its tendency to qualify general moral rules, Pascal penned a polemic against casuistry from which the term never recovered see his Provincial Letters, 1656. But the kind of reasoning to which the term refers is flourishing in contemporary practical ethics.

grice’s handwave. A sort of handwave can mean in a one-off act of communication something. It’s the example he uses. By a sort of handwave, the emissor communicates either that he knows the route or that he is about to leave the addressee. Handwave signals. Code. Cfr. the Beatles’s HELP. Explicatum: We need some body – Implicaturum: Not just Any Body. Why does this matter to the philosopher? The thing is as follows. Grice was provoked by Austin. To defeat Austin, Grice needs a ‘theory of communication.’ This theory applies his early reflections on the intentional side to an act of communication. This allows him to explain the explicatum versus the implicaturum. By analysing each, Grice notes that there is no need to refer to linguistic entities. So, the centrality of the handwave is an offshoot of his theory designed to defeat Austin. Gice: “Blame Paget for my obsession with the hand.” – Refs.: Paget, “Ta-ta: when the hands are full, use your mouth.” – H. P. Grice, The utterer’s hand-wave.”

grice’s creatures: the pirots. The programme  he calls ‘creature construction.’ “I could have used the ‘grice,’ which was extinct by the time I was born.”

grice’s myth. Or Griceian myths – The Handbook of Griceian mythology. At one point Grice suggests that his ‘genitorial programme’ a kind of ideal-observer theory is meant as ‘didactic,’ and for expository purposes. It seems easier, as , as Grice and Plato would agree, to answer a question about the genitorial programme rather than use a first-person approach and appeal to introspection. Grice refers to the social contract as a ‘myth,’ which may still explain, as ‘meaning’ does. G. R. Grice built his career on this myth. This is G. R. Grice, of the social-contract fame. Cf. Strawson and Wiggins comparing Grice’s myth with Plato’s, and they know what they are talking about.

grice’s martian chronicle -- Twin-Earth – as opposed to Mars -- a fictitious planet first visited by Hilary Putnam in a thought experiment inspired by H. P. Grice in “Some remarks about the senses” -- designed to show, among other things, that “ ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head” “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” 5. Twin-Earth is exactly like Earth with one notable exception: ponds, rivers, and ice trays on Twin-Earth contain, not H2O, but XYZ, a liquid superficially indistinguishable from water but with a different chemical constitution. According to Putnam, although some inhabitants of Twin-Earth closely resemble inhabitants of Earth, ‘water’, when uttered by a Twin-Earthling, does not mean water. Water is H2O, and, on Twin-Earth, the word ‘water’ designates a different substance, XYZ, Twin-water. The moral drawn by Putnam is that the meanings of at least some of our words, and the significance of some of our thoughts, depend, in part, on how things stand outside our heads. Two “molecular duplicates,” two agents with qualitatively similar mental lives, might mean very different things by their utterances and think very different thoughts. Although Twin-Earth has become a popular stopping-off place for philosophers en route to theories of meaning and mental content, others regard Twin-Earth as hopelessly remote, doubting that useful conclusions can be drawn about our Earthly circumstances from research conducted there.  Suppose that long-awaited invasion of the Martians takes place, that they turn out to be friendly creatures and teach us their language. We get on all right, except that we find no verb in their language which unquestionably corresponds to our verb “see.” Instead we find two verbs which we decide to render as “x” and “y”: we find that (in their tongue) they speak of themselves as x-ing, and also as y-ing, things to be of this and that color, size, and shape. Further, in physical appearance they are more or less like ourselves, except that in their heads they have, one above the other, two pairs of organs, not perhaps exactly like one another, but each pair more or less like our eyes: each pair of organs is found to be sensitive to light waves. It turns out that for them x-ing is dependent on the operation of the upper organs, and y-ing on that of the lower organs. The question which it seems natural to ask is this: Are x-ing and y-ing both cases of seeing, the difference between them being that x-ing is seeing with the upper organs, and y-ing is seeing with the lower organs? Or alternatively, do one or both of these accomplishments constitute the exercise of a new sense, other than that of sight? If we adopt, to distinguish the senses, a combination of suggestion (I) with one or both of suggestions (III) or (IV), the answer seems clear: both x-ing and y-ing are seeing, with different pairs of organs. But is the question really to be settled so easily? Would we not in fact want to ask whether x-ing something to be round was like y-ing it to be round, or whether when something x-ed blue to them this was like or unlike its y-ing blue to them? If in answer to such questions as these they said, “Oh no, there’s all the difference in the world!” then I think we should be inclined to say that either x-ing or y-ing (if not both) must be something other than seeing: we might of course be quite unable to decide which (if either) was seeing. (I am aware that here those whose approach is more Wittgensteinian than my own might complain that unless something more can be said about how the difference between x-ing and y-ing might “come out” or show itself in publicly observable phenomena, then the claim by the supposed Martians that x-ing and y-ing are different would be one of which nothing could be made, which would leave one at a loss how to understand it. First, I am not convinced of the need for “introspectible” differences to show themselves in the way this approach demands (I shall not discuss this point further); second, I think that if I have to meet this demand, I can. One can suppose that one or more of these Martians acquired the use of the lower y-ing organs at some comparatively late date in their careers, and that at the same time (perhaps for experimental purposes) the operation of the upper x-ing organs was inhibited. One might now be ready to allow that a difference between Some Remarks about the Senses 47 x-ing and y-ing would have shown itself if in such a situation the creatures using their y-ing organs for the first time were unable straightaway, without any learning process, to use their “color”-words fluently and correctly to describe what they detected through the use of those organs.) It might be argued at this point that we have not yet disposed of the idea that the senses can be distinguished by an amalgam of suggestions (I), (III), and (IV); for it is not clear that in the example of the Martians the condition imposed by suggestion (I) is fulfilled. The thesis, it might be said, is only upset if x-ing and y-ing are accepted as being the exercise of different senses; and if they are, then the Martians’ color-words could be said to have a concealed ambiguity. Much as “sweet” in English may mean “sweet-smelling” or “sweet-tasting,” so “blue” in Martian may mean “blue-x-ing” or “blue-y-ing.” But if this is so, then the Martians after all do not detect by x-ing just those properties of things which they detect by y-ing. To this line of argument there are two replies: (1) The defender of the thesis is in no position to use this argument; for he cannot start by making the question whether x-ing and y-ing are exercises of the same sense turn on the question (inter alia) whether or not a single group of characteristics is detected by both, and then make the question of individuation of the group turn on the question whether putative members of the group are detected by one, or by more than one, sense. He would be saying in effect, “Whether, in x-ing and y-ing, different senses are exercised depends (inter alia) on whether the same properties are detected by x-ing as by y-ing; but whether a certain x-ed property is the same as a certain y-ed property depends on whether x-ing and y-ing are or are not the exercise of a single sense.” This reply seems fatal. For the circularity could only be avoided by making the question whether “blue” in Martian names a single property depend either on whether the kinds of experience involved in x-ing and y-ing are different, which would be to reintroduce suggestion (II), or on whether the mechanisms involved in x-ing and y-ing are different (in this case whether the upper organs are importantly unlike the lower organs): and to adopt this alternative would, I think, lead to treating the differentiation of the senses as being solely a matter of their mechanisms, thereby making suggestion (I) otiose. (2) Independently of its legitimacy or illegitimacy in the present context, we must reject the idea that if it is accepted that in x-ing and y-ing different senses are being exercised, then Martian color-words will be ambiguous. For ex hypothesi there will be a very close correlation between things x-ing blue and their y-ing blue, far closer 48 H. P. Grice than that between things smelling sweet and their tasting sweet. This being so, it is only to be expected that x-ing and y-ing should share the position of arbiters concerning the color of things: that is, “blue” would be the name of a single property, determinable equally by x-ing and y-ing. After all, is this not just like the actual position with regard to shape, which is doubly determinable, by sight and by touch? While I would not wish to quarrel with the main terms of this second reply, I should like briefly to indicate why I think that this final quite natural comparison with the case of shape will not do. It is quite conceivable that the correlation between x-ing and y-ing , in the case supposed, might be close enough to ensure that Martian color-words designated doubly determinable properties, and yet that this correlation should break down in a limited class of cases: for instance, owing to some differences between the two pairs of organs, objects which transmitted light of a particular wavelength might (in standard conditions) x blue but y black. I suggest, then, that given the existence of an object which, for the Martians, standardly x-ed blue but y-ed black (its real color being undecidable), no conclusion could be drawn to the effect that other objects do, or could as a matter of practiSome Remarks about the Senses 51 cal possibility be made to, x one way and y another way either in respect of color or in respect of some other feature within the joint province of x-ing and y-ing. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Some remarks about the senses,” in WoW --. Coady, “The senses of the Martians.”

Grice’s folksy psychology: Grice loved Ramsey, “But Ramsey was born before folk-psychology, so his ‘Theories’ is very dense.”” one sense, a putative network of principles constituting a commonsense theory that allegedly underlies everyday explanations of human behavior; the theory assigns a central role to mental states like belief, desire, and intention. Consider an example of an everyday commonsense psychological explanation: Jane went to the refrigerator because she wanted a beer and she believed there was beer in the refrigerator. Like many such explanations, this adverts to a so-called propositional attitude  a mental state, expressed by a verb ‘believe’ plus a that-clause, whose intentional content is propositional. It also adverts to a mental state, expressed by a verb ‘want’ plus a direct-object phrase, whose intentional content appears not to be propositional. In another, related sense, folk psychology is a network of social practices that includes ascribing such mental states to ourselves and others, and proffering explanations of human behavior that advert to these states. The two senses need distinguishing because some philosophers who acknowledge the existence of folk psychology in the second sense hold that commonsense psychological explanations do not employ empirical generalizations, and hence that there is no such theory as folk psychology. Henceforth, ‘FP’ will abbreviate ‘folk psychology’ in the first sense; the unabbreviated phrase will be used in the second sense. Eliminativism in philosophy of mind asserts that FP is an empirical theory; that FP is therefore subject to potential scientific falsification; and that mature science very probably will establish that FP is so radically false that humans simply do not undergo mental states like beliefs, desires, and intentions. One kind of eliminativist argument first sets forth certain methodological strictures about how FP would have to integrate with mature science in order to be true e.g., being smoothly reducible to neuroscience, or being absorbed into mature cognitive science, and then contends that these strictures are unlikely to be met. Another kind of argument first claims that FP embodies certain strong empirical commitments e.g., to mental representations with languagelike syntactic structure, and then contends that such empirical presuppositions are likely to turn out false. One influential version of folk psychological realism largely agrees with eliminativism about what is required to vindicate folk psychology, but also holds that mature science is likely to provide such vindication. Realists of this persuasion typically argue, for instance, that mature cognitive science will very likely incorporate FP, and also will very likely treat beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes as states with languagelike syntactic structure. Other versions of folkpsychological realism take issue, in one way or another, with either i the eliminativists’ claims about FP’s empirical commitments, or ii the eliminativists’ strictures about how FP must mesh with mature science in order to be true, or both. Concerning i, for instance, some philosophers maintain that FP per se is not committed to the existence of languagelike mental representations. If mature cognitive science turns out not to posit a “language of thought,” they contend, this would not necessarily show that FP is radically false; instead it might only show that propositional attitudes are subserved in some other way than via languagelike representational structures. Concerning ii, some philosophers hold that FP can be true without being as tightly connected to mature scientific theories as the eliminativists require. For instance, the demand that the special sciences be smoothly reducible to the fundamental natural sciences is widely considered an excessively stringent criterion of intertheoretic compatibility; so perhaps FP could be true without being smoothly reducible to neuroscience. Similarly, the demand that FP be directly absorbable into empirical cognitive science is sometimes considered too stringent as a criterion either of FP’s truth, or of the soundness of its ontology of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes, or of the legitimacy of FP-based explanations of behavior. Perhaps FP is a true theory, and explanatorily legitimate, even if it is not destined to become a part of science. Even if FP’s ontological categories are not scientific natural kinds, perhaps its generalizations are like generalizations about clothing: true, explanatorily usable, and ontologically sound. No one doubts the existence of hats, coats, or scarves. No one doubts the truth or explanatory utility of generalizations like ‘Coats made of heavy material tend to keep the body warm in cold weather’, even though these generalizations are not laws of any science. Yet another approach to folk psychology, often wedded to realism about beliefs and desires although sometimes wedded to instrumentalism, maintains that folk psychology does not employ empirical generalizations, and hence is not a theory at all. One variant denies that folk psychology employs any generalizations, empirical or otherwise. Another variant concedes that there are folk-psychological generalizations, but denies that they are empirical; instead they are held to be analytic truths, or norms of rationality, or both at once. Advocates of non-theory views typically regard folk psychology as a hermeneutic, or interpretive, enterprise. They often claim too that the attribution of propositional attitudes, and also the proffering and grasping of folk-psychological explanations, is a matter of imaginatively projecting oneself into another person’s situation, and then experiencing a kind of empathic understanding, or Verstehen, of the person’s actions and the motives behind them. A more recent, hi-tech, formulation of this idea is that the interpreter “runs a cognitive simulation” of the person whose actions are to be explained. Philosophers who defend folk-psychological realism, in one or another of the ways just canvassed, also sometimes employ arguments based on the allegedly self-stultifying nature of eliminativism. One such argument begins from the premise that the notion of action is folk-psychological  that a behavioral event counts as an action only if it is caused by propositional attitudes that rationalize it under some suitable actdescription. If so, and if humans never really undergo propositional attitudes, then they never really act either. In particular, they never really assert anything, or argue for anything since asserting and arguing are species of action. So if eliminativism is true, the argument concludes, then eliminativists can neither assert it nor argue for it  an allegedly intolerable pragmatic paradox. Eliminativists generally react to such arguments with breathtaking equanimity. A typical reply is that although our present concept of action might well be folk-psychological, this does not preclude the possibility of a future successor concept, purged of any commitment to beliefs and desires, that could inherit much of the role of our current, folk-psychologically tainted, concept of action. 



grice’s computatio sive logica -- computability, roughly, the possibility of computation on a Turing machine. The first convincing general definition, A. N. Turing’s 6, has been proved equivalent to the known plausible alternatives, so that the concept of computability is generally recognized as an absolute one. Turing’s definition referred to computations by imaginary tape-processing machines that we now know to be capable of computing the same functions whether simple sums and products or highly complex, esoteric functions that modern digital computing machines could compute if provided with sufficient storage capacity. In the form ‘Any function that is computable at all is computable on a Turing machine’, this absoluteness claim is called Turing’s thesis. A comparable claim for Alonzo Church’s 5 concept of lcomputability is called Church’s thesis. Similar theses are enunciated for Markov algorithms, for S. C. Kleene’s notion of general recursiveness, etc. It has been proved that the same functions are computable in all of these ways. There is no hope of proving any of those theses, for such a proof would require a definition of ‘computable’  a definition that would simply be a further item in the list, the subject of a further thesis. But since computations of new kinds might be recognizable as genuine in particular cases, Turing’s thesis and its equivalents, if false, might be decisively refuted by discovery of a particular function, a way of computing it, and a proof that no Turing machine can compute it. The halting problem for say Turing machines is the problem of devising a Turing machine that computes the function hm, n % 1 or 0 depending on whether or not Turing machine number m ever halts, once started with the number n on its tape. This problem is unsolvable, for a machine that computed h could be modified to compute a function gn, which is undefined the machine goes into an endless loop when hn, n % 1, and otherwise agrees with hn, n. But this modified machine  Turing machine number k, say  would have contradictory properties: started with k on its tape, it would eventually halt if and only if it does not. Turing proved unsolvability of the decision problem for logic the problem of devising a Turing machine that, applied to argument number n in logical notation, correctly classifies it as valid or invalid by reducing the halting problem to the decision problem, i.e., showing how any solution to the latter could be used to solve the former problem, which we know to be unsolvable.  computer theory, the theory of the design, uses, powers, and limits of modern electronic digital computers. It has important bearings on philosophy, as may be seen from the many philosophical references herein. Modern computers are a radically new kind of machine, for they are active physical realizations of formal languages of logic and arithmetic. Computers employ sophisticated languages, and they have reasoning powers many orders of magnitude greater than those of any prior machines. Because they are far superior to humans in many important tasks, they have produced a revolution in society that is as profound as the industrial revolution and is advancing much more rapidly. Furthermore, computers themselves are evolving rapidly. When a computer is augmented with devices for sensing and acting, it becomes a powerful control system, or a robot. To understand the implications of computers for philosophy, one should imagine a robot that has basic goals and volitions built into it, including conflicting goals and competing desires. This concept first appeared in Karel C v apek’s play Rossum’s Universal Robots 0, where the word ‘robot’ originated. A computer has two aspects, hardware and programming languages. The theory of each is relevant to philosophy. The software and hardware aspects of a computer are somewhat analogous to the human mind and body. This analogy is especially strong if we follow Peirce and consider all information processing in nature and in human organisms, not just the conscious use of language. Evolution has produced a succession of levels of sign usage and information processing: self-copying chemicals, self-reproducing cells, genetic programs directing the production of organic forms, chemical and neuronal signals in organisms, unconscious human information processing, ordinary languages, and technical languages. But each level evolved gradually from its predecessors, so that the line between body and mind is vague. The hardware of a computer is typically organized into three general blocks: memory, processor arithmetic unit and control, and various inputoutput devices for communication between machine and environment. The memory stores the data to be processed as well as the program that directs the processing. The processor has an arithmetic-logic unit for transforming data, and a control for executing the program. Memory, processor, and input-output communicate to each other through a fast switching system. The memory and processor are constructed from registers, adders, switches, cables, and various other building blocks. These in turn are composed of electronic components: transistors, resistors, and wires. The input and output devices employ mechanical and electromechanical technologies as well as electronics. Some input-output devices also serve as auxiliary memories; floppy disks and magnetic tapes are examples. For theoretical purposes it is useful to imagine that the computer has an indefinitely expandable storage tape. So imagined, a computer is a physical realization of a Turing machine. The idea of an indefinitely expandable memory is similar to the logician’s concept of an axiomatic formal language that has an unlimited number of proofs and theorems. The software of a modern electronic computer is written in a hierarchy of programming languages. The higher-level languages are designed for use by human programmers, operators, and maintenance personnel. The “machine language” is the basic hardware language, interpreted and executed by the control. Its words are sequences of binary digits or bits. Programs written in intermediate-level languages are used by the computer to translate the languages employed by human users into the machine language for execution. A programming language has instructional means for carrying out three kinds of operations: data operations and transfers, transfers of control from one part of the program to the other, and program self-modification. Von Neumann designed the first modern programming language. A programming language is general purpose, and an electronic computer that executes it can in principle carry out any algorithm or effective procedure, including the simulation of any other computer. Thus the modern electronic computer is a practical realization of the abstract concept of a universal Turing machine. What can actually be computed in practice depends, of course, on the state of computer technology and its resources. It is common for computers at many different spatial locations to be interconnected into complex networks by telephone, radio, and satellite communication systems. Insofar as users in one part of the network can control other parts, either legitimately or illegitimately e.g., by means of a “computer virus”, a global network of computers is really a global computer. Such vast computers greatly increase societal interdependence, a fact of importance for social philosophy. The theory of computers has two branches, corresponding to the hardware and software aspects of computers. The fundamental concept of hardware theory is that of a finite automaton, which may be expressed either as an idealized logical network of simple computer primitives, or as the corresponding temporal system of input, output, and internal states. A finite automaton may be specified as a logical net of truth-functional switches and simple memory elements, connected to one another by computer theory computer theory idealized wires. These elements function synchronously, each wire being in a binary state 0 or 1 at each moment of time t % 0, 1, 2, . . . . Each switching element or “gate” executes a simple truth-functional operation not, or, and, nor, not-and, etc. and is imagined to operate instantaneously compare the notions of sentential connective and truth table. A memory element flip-flop, binary counter, unit delay line preserves its input bit for one or more time-steps. A well-formed net of switches and memory elements may not have cycles through switches only, but it typically has feedback cycles through memory elements. The wires of a logical net are of three kinds: input, internal, and output. Correspondingly, at each moment of time a logical net has an input state, an internal state, and an output state. A logical net or automaton need not have any input wires, in which case it is a closed system. The complete history of a logical net is described by a deterministic law: at each moment of time t, the input and internal states of the net determine its output state and its next internal state. This leads to the second definition of ‘finite automaton’: it is a deterministic finite-state system characterized by two tables. The transition table gives the next internal state produced by each pair of input and internal states. The output table gives the output state produced by each input state and internal state. The state analysis approach to computer hardware is of practical value only for systems with a few elements e.g., a binary-coded decimal counter, because the number of states increases as a power of the number of elements. Such a rapid rate of increase of complexity with size is called the combinatorial explosion, and it applies to many discrete systems. However, the state approach to finite automata does yield abstract models of law-governed systems that are of interest to logic and philosophy. A correctly operating digital computer is a finite automaton. Alan Turing defined the finite part of what we now call a Turing machine in terms of states. It seems doubtful that a human organism has more computing power than a finite automaton. A closed finite automaton illustrates Nietzsche’s law of eternal return. Since a finite automaton has a finite number of internal states, at least one of its internal states must occur infinitely many times in any infinite state history. And since a closed finite automaton is deterministic and has no inputs, a repeated state must be followed by the same sequence of states each time it occurs. Hence the history of a closed finite automaton is periodic, as in the law of eternal return. Idealized neurons are sometimes used as the primitive elements of logical nets, and it is plausible that for any brain and central nervous system there is a logical network that behaves the same and performs the same functions. This shows the close relation of finite automata to the brain and central nervous system. The switches and memory elements of a finite automaton may be made probabilistic, yielding a probabilistic automaton. These automata are models of indeterministic systems. Von Neumann showed how to extend deterministic logical nets to systems that contain selfreproducing automata. This is a very basic logical design relevant to the nature of life. The part of computer programming theory most relevant to philosophy contains the answer to Leibniz’s conjecture concerning his characteristica universalis and calculus ratiocinator. He held that “all our reasoning is nothing but the joining and substitution of characters, whether these characters be words or symbols or pictures.” He thought therefore that one could construct a universal, arithmetic language with two properties of great philosophical importance. First, every atomic concept would be represented by a prime number. Second, the truth-value of any logically true-or-false statement expressed in the characteristica universalis could be calculated arithmetically, and so any rational dispute could be resolved by calculation. Leibniz expected to do the computation by hand with the help of a calculating machine; today we would do it on an electronic computer. However, we know now that Leibniz’s proposed language cannot exist, for no computer or computer program can calculate the truth-value of every logically true-orfalse statement given to it. This fact follows from a logical theorem about the limits of what computer programs can do. Let E be a modern electronic computer with an indefinitely expandable memory, so that E has the power of a universal Turing machine. And let L be any formal language in which every arithmetic statement can be expressed, and which is consistent. Leibniz’s proposed characteristica universalis would be such a language. Now a computer that is operating correctly is an active formal language, carrying out the instructions of its program deductively. Accordingly, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for formal arithmetic apply to computer E. It follows from these theorems that no program can enable computer E to decide of an arbitrary statecomputer theory computer theory 166   166 ment of L whether or not that statement is true. More strongly, there cannot even be a program that will enable E to enumerate the truths of language L one after another. Therefore Leibniz’s characteristica universalis cannot exist. Electronic computers are the first active or “live” mathematical systems. They are the latest addition to a long historical series of mathematical tools for inquiry: geometry, algebra, calculus and differential equations, probability and statistics, and modern mathematics. The most effective use of computer programs is to instruct computers in tasks for which they are superior to humans. Computers are being designed and programmed to cooperate with humans so that the calculation, storage, and judgment capabilities of the two are synthesized. The powers of such humancomputer combines will increase at an exponential rate as computers continue to become faster, more powerful, and easier to use, while at the same time becoming smaller and cheaper. The social implications of this are very important. The modern electronic computer is a new tool for the logic of discovery Peirce’s abduction. An inquirer or inquirers operating a computer interactively can use it as a universal simulator, dynamically modeling systems that are too complex to study by traditional mathematical methods, including non-linear systems. Simulation is used to explain known empirical results, and also to develop new hypotheses to be tested by observation. Computer models and simulations are unique in several ways: complexity, dynamism, controllability, and visual presentability. These properties make them important new tools for modeling and thereby relevant to some important philosophical problems. A humancomputer combine is especially suited for the study of complex holistic and hierarchical systems with feedback cf. cybernetics, including adaptive goal-directed systems. A hierarchical-feedback system is a dynamic structure organized into several levels, with the compounds of one level being the atoms or building blocks of the next higher level, and with cyclic paths of influence operating both on and between levels. For example, a complex human institution has several levels, and the people in it are themselves hierarchical organizations of selfcopying chemicals, cells, organs, and such systems as the pulmonary and the central nervous system. The behaviors of these systems are in general much more complex than, e.g., the behaviors of traditional systems of mechanics. Contrast an organism, society, or ecology with our planetary system as characterized by Kepler and Newton. Simple formulas ellipses describe the orbits of the planets. More basically, the planetary system is stable in the sense that a small perturbation of it produces a relatively small variation in its subsequent history. In contrast, a small change in the state of a holistic hierarchical feedback system often amplifies into a very large difference in behavior, a concern of chaos theory. For this reason it is helpful to model such systems on a computer and run sample histories. The operator searches for representative cases, interesting phenomena, and general principles of operation. The humancomputer method of inquiry should be a useful tool for the study of biological evolution, the actual historical development of complex adaptive goal-directed systems. Evolution is a logical and communication process as well as a physical and chemical process. But evolution is statistical rather than deterministic, because a single temporal state of the system results in a probabilistic distribution of histories, rather than in a single history. The genetic operators of mutation and crossover, e.g., are probabilistic operators. But though it is stochastic, evolution cannot be understood in terms of limiting relative frequencies, for the important developments are the repeated emergence of new phenomena, and there may be no evolutionary convergence toward a final state or limit. Rather, to understand evolution the investigator must simulate the statistical spectra of histories covering critical stages of the process. Many important evolutionary phenomena should be studied by using simulation along with observation and experiment. Evolution has produced a succession of levels of organization: selfcopying chemicals, self-reproducing cells, communities of cells, simple organisms, haploid sexual reproduction, diploid sexuality with genetic dominance and recessiveness, organisms composed of organs, societies of organisms, humans, and societies of humans. Most of these systems are complex hierarchical feedback systems, and it is of interest to understand how they emerged from earlier systems. Also, the interaction of competition and cooperation at all stages of evolution is an important subject, of relevance to social philosophy and ethics. Some basic epistemological and metaphysical concepts enter into computer modeling. A model is a well-developed concept of its object, representing characteristics like structure and funccomputer theory computer theory 167   167 tion. A model is similar to its object in important respects, but simpler; in mathematical terminology, a model is homomorphic to its object but not isomorphic to it. However, it is often useful to think of a model as isomorphic to an embedded subsystem of the system it models. For example, a gas is a complicated system of microstates of particles, but these microstates can be grouped into macrostates, each with a pressure, volume, and temperature satisfying the gas law PV % kT. The derivation of this law from the detailed mechanics of the gas is a reduction of the embedded subsystem to the underlying system. In many cases it is adequate to work with the simpler embedded subsystem, but in other cases one must work with the more complex but complete underlying system. The law of an embedded subsystem may be different in kind from the law of the underlying system. Consider, e.g., a machine tossing a coin randomly. The sequence of tosses obeys a simple probability law, while the complex underlying mechanical system is deterministic. The random sequence of tosses is a probabilistic system embedded in a deterministic system, and a mathematical account of this embedding relation constitutes a reduction of the probabilistic system to a deterministic system. Compare the compatibilist’s claim that free choice can be embedded in a deterministic system. Compare also a pseudorandom sequence, which is a deterministic sequence with adequate randomness for a given finite simulation. Note finally that the probabilistic system of quantum mechanics underlies the deterministic system of mechanics. The ways in which models are used by goaldirected systems to solve problems and adapt to their environments are currently being modeled by humancomputer combines. Since computer software can be converted into hardware, successful simulations of adaptive uses of models could be incorporated into the design of a robot. Human intentionality involves the use of a model of oneself in relation to others and the environment. A problem-solving robot using such a model would constitute an important step toward a robot with full human powers. These considerations lead to the central thesis of the philosophy of logical mechanism: a finite deterministic automaton can perform all human functions. This seems plausible in principle and is treated in detail in Merrilee Salmon, ed., The Philosophy of Logical Mechanism: Essays in Honor of Arthur W. Burks,0. A digital computer has reasoning and memory powers. Robots have sensory inputs for collecting information from the environment, and they have moving and acting devices. To obtain a robot with human powers, one would need to put these abilities under the direction of a system of desires, purposes, and goals. Logical mechanism is a form of mechanism or materialism, but differs from traditional forms of these doctrines in its reliance on the logical powers of computers and the logical nature of evolution and its products. The modern computer is a kind of complex hierarchical physical system, a system with memory, processor, and control that employs a hierarchy of programming languages. Humans are complex hierarchical systems designed by evolution  with structural levels of chemicals, cells, organs, and systems e.g., circulatory, neural, immune and linguistic levels of genes, enzymes, neural signals, and immune recognition. Traditional materialists did not have this model of a computer nor the contemporary understanding of evolution, and never gave an adequate account of logic and reasoning and such phenomena as goaldirectedness and self-modeling. 

conatum: Aristotle distinguishes three types of living beings: vegetables, φυτά, which possess only the ability to nourish themselves τὸ θϱεπτιϰόν; animals, ζαῷ, which possess the faculty of sensing τὸ αἰσθητιϰόν, which opens onto that of desiring, τὸ ὀϱεϰτιϰόν, to orektikon, (desdideratum); and man and — he says—any other similar or superior being, who possess in addition the ability to think, “τὸ διανοητιϰόν τε ϰαὶ νοῦς.” -- De An., 414a 29-b.orme,  the technical Stoic definition of πάθος, viz. as a particular kind of conation, or impulse (ορμή). ... 4 ' This definition (amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae faeiendae ex ... emotion and moral self-management in Galen's philosophical psychology', ..cōnātum , i, usu. in plur.: cōnāta , ōrum, n., v. conor.. The term is used by an the Wilde Reader at Oxford, that Grice once followed – until he became a neo-Prichardian instead.(philosophy) The power or act which directs or impels to effort of any kind, whether muscular or psychical. quotations 1899, George Frederick Stout, A Manual of Psychology, page 234:Any pleasing sense-experience, when it has once taken place, will, on subsequent occasions, give rise to a conation, when its conditions are only partially repeated...

grice’s four conversational categories – the category of conversational mode: Only Kant would call it function. While Grice could be jocular, in an English way, about the number of maxims within each category – he surely would not like to joke as far as to be cavalier about the NUMBER of categories: Four was the number of functions from which the twelve categories rramify, Kant, or “Ariskant,” but Grice takes the function for the category -- four is for Ariskantian Grice. This is Aristotle’s hexis. This category posed a special conceptual problem to Grice. Recall that his categories are invoked only by their power to generate conversational implciata. But a conversational implicaturum is non-detachable. That is, being based on universalistic principles of general rationality, it cannot attach to an EXPRESSION, less so to the ‘meaning’ of an EXPRESSION: “if” and “provided” are REALISATIONS of the concept of the conditionality. Now, the conversational supra-maxim, ‘be perspicuous’ [sic], is supposed to apply NOT to the content, or matter, but to the FORM. (Strictly, quantitas and qualitas applies to matter, RELATIO applies to the link between at least two matters). Grice tweaks things in such a way that he is happy, and so am I. This is a pun on Aristkant’s Kategorie (Ammonius, tropos, Boëthius, modus, Kant Modalitat). Gesichtspuncte der Modalität in assertorische, apodiktische und problematische hat sich aus der Aristotelischen Eintheilung hervorgebildet (Anal. Dr. 1, 2): 7@ợc gócois atv n 100 incozy h kỹ kvayxns Úndozav û toù {VJÉZEo fai Úndozev: Doch geht diese Aristotelische Stelle vielmehr auf die analogen objectiven Verhältnisse, als auf den subjectiven Gewissheitsgrad. Der Zusatz Svvatóv, įvsezóuevov, és åviyans, jedoch auch eine adverbiale Bestimmung wie taméws in dem Satze ý σελήνη ταχέως αποκαθίσταται, heisst bei Ammonius τρόπος (zu περί ερμ. Cap. 12) und bei Boëthius modus. Kant (Kritik der r. Vern. § 9-11; Prolegom. $ 21, Log. § 30) gründet die Eintheilung nach der Modalität auf die modalen Kategorien: Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit, Dasein und Nichtsein, Nothwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit, wobei jedoch die Zusammenstellung der Unmöglichkeit, die eine negative Nothwendigkeit ist, mit der Möglichkeit, und ebenso der Zufälligkeit, die das nicht als nothwendig erkannte Dasein bezeichnet, mit der Nothwendigkeit eine Ungenauigkeit enthält: die Erkenntniss der Unmöglichkeit ist nicht ein problematisches, sondern ein (negativ-) apodiktisches Urtheil (was Kant in der Anwendung selbst anerkennt, indem er z. B. Krit. der r. V. S. 191 die Formel: es ist unmöglich etc. als Ausdruck einer apodiktischen Gewissheit betrachtet), und die Erkenntniss des Zufälligen ist nicht ein apodiktisches, sondern ein assertorisches Urtheil. Ausserdem aber hat Kant das subjective und objective Element in den Kategorien der Qualität und Modalität nicht bestimmt genug unterschieden.

grice’s four conversational categories – the category of conversational quality: Only Kant would call it ‘function.’ While Grice could be cavalier about the number of maxims falling under the category of conversational quality, he surely would not be cavalier about the number of categories themselves. Four were the functions from which the twelve categories ramify for Ariskant, and four were for Grice: he takes the function from Kant, but the spirit from Aristotle.  This is Aristotle’s universal, poiotes. This was originally the desideratum of conversational candour. At that point, there was no Kantian scheme of categories in the horizon. Candour Grice arbitrarily contrasts with clarity – and so the desideratum of conversational candour sometimes clashes with the desideratum of conversational clarity. One may not be able to provide a less convoluted utterance (“It is raining”) but use the less clear, but more candid, “It might be raining, for all I know.” A pun on Aristkan’s Kategorie, poiotes, qualitas, Qualitat.  Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'.

grice’s four conversational categories – the category of conversational quantity: Only Kant would call it function. While Grice could be cavalier about the number of maxims falling under quantity, he was not about the number of categories itself. Four was the number of functions out of which the twelve categories spring for Ariskant, and four was for Grice. He takes the function (the letter) from Kant, but the spirit from Aristotle. This is Aristotle’s universal, posotes. Grice would often use ‘a fortiori,’ and then it dawned on him. “All I need is a principle of conversational fortitude. This will give the Oxonians the Graeco-Roman pedigree they deserve.’  a pun on Ariskant’s Kategorie, posotes, quantitas, Quantitat. Grice expands this as ‘quantity of information,’ or ‘informative content’ – which then as he recognises overlaps with the category of conversational quality, because ‘false information’ is a misnomer. Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long'

grice’s four conversational categories – the category of conversational relation: Only Kant would call it function. While Grice could be cavalier about the number of maxims under the category of relation, he was not about the number of categories: four were the number of functions out of which the twelve categories spring for Ariskant and four were for Grice: he takes the letter (function) from Kant, and the spirit from Aristotle. This is Aristotle’s ‘pros ti.’ f there are categories of being, and categories of thought, and categories of expression, surely there is room for the ‘conversational category.’ A pun on Ariskant’s Kategorie (pros ti, ad aliquid, Relation). Surely a move has to relate to the previous move, and should include a tag as to what move will relate. Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation.

grice’s predicament.  S draws a pic- "one-off predicament"). ... Clarendon, 1976); and Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) ... But there is an obvious way of emending the account. Grice points out. ... Blackburn helpfully suggests that we can cut through much of this complexity by ... The above account is intended to capture the notion of one-off meaning. Walking in a forest, having gone some way ahead of the rest of the party, I draw an arrow at a fork of a path, meaning that those who are following me should go straight on. Gricean considerations may be safely ignored. Only when trying to communicate by nonconventional means ("one-off predicament," Blackburn, 1984, chap. Blackburn's mission is to promote the philosophy of language as a pivotal enquiry ... and dismissed; the Gricean model might be suitable to explain one-off acts. The Gricean mechanism with its complex communicative intentions has a clear point in what Blackburn calls “a one-off predicament” - a situation in which an ...

grice’s shaggy-dog story: While Grice would like to say that it should be in the range of a rational creature to refer and to predicate, what about the hand wave? By his handwave, the emissor means that _HE_ (subject) is a knower of the road (or roate), the predicate after the copula or that he, the emissor, subject, is (the copula) about to leave his emissee – but there is nothing IN THE MATTER (the handwave) that can be ‘de-composed’ like that. The FORM attaches to the communicatum directly. This is strange, but not impossible, and shows Grice’s programme. Because his idea is that a communicatum need not a vehicile which is syntactically structured (as “Fido is shaggy”). This is the story that Grice tells in his lecture. He uses a ‘shaggy-dog’ story to explain TWO main notions: that of ‘reference’ or denotatio, and that of predicatio. He had explored that earlier when discussing, giving an illustration “Smith is happy”, the idea of ‘value,’ as correspondence, where he adds the terms for ‘denote’ and ‘predicatio,’ or actually, ‘designatio’ and ‘indicatio’, need to be “explained within the theory.” In the utterance ‘Smith is happy,’ the utterer DESIGNATES an item, Smith. The utterer also INDICATES some class, ‘being happy.’ Grice introduces a shorthand, ‘assign’, or ‘assignatio,’ previous to the value-satisfaction, to involve both the ‘designatio’ and the ‘indicatio’. U assigns the item Smith to the class ‘being happy.’ U’s intention involves A’s belief that U believes that “the item belongs to the class, or that he ASSIGNS the item to the class. A predicate, such as 'shaggy,' in my shaggy-dog story, is a part of a bottom-up, or top-bottom, as I prefer, analysis of this or that sentences, and a predicate, such as 'shaggy,' is the only indispensable 'part,' or 'element,' as I prefer, since a predicate is the only 'pars orationis,' to use the old phrase, that must appear in every sentence. In a later lecture he ventures with ‘reference.’ Lewis and Short have “rĕferre,” rendered as “to bear, carry, bring, draw, or give back,” in a “transf.” usage, they render as “to make a reference, to refer (class.),” asa in “de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Apollinem censeo referendum; “ad quem etiam Athenienses publice de majoribus rebus semper rettulerunt,” Cic. Div. 1, 54, 122.” While Grice uses ‘Fido,’ he could have used ‘Pegasus’ (Martin’s cat, as it happens) and apply Quine’s adage: we could have appealed to the ex hypothesi unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of being Pegasus, adopting, for its expression, the verb 'is-Pegasus', or 'pegasizes'. And Grice could have played with ‘predicatio’ and ‘subjectio.’ Grice on subject.  Lewis and Short have “sūbĭcĭo,” (less correctly subjĭcĭo ; post-Aug. sometimes sŭb- ), jēci, jectum, 3, v. a. sub-jacio.  which they render as “to throw, lay, place, or bring under or near (cf. subdo),” and in philosophy, “subjectum , i, n. (sc. verbum), as “that which is spoken of, the foundation or subject of a proposition;”  “omne quicquid dicimus aut subjectum est aut de subjecto aut in subjecto est. Subjectum est prima substantia, quod ipsum nulli accidit alii inseparabiliter, etc.,” Mart. Cap. 4, § 361; App. Dogm. Plat. 3, p. 34, 4 et saep.—.” Note that for Mart. Cap. the ‘subject,’ unlike the ‘predicate’ is not a ‘syntactical category.’ “Subjectum est prima substantia,” The subject is a prote ousia. As for correlation, Grice ends up with a reductive analysis. By uttering utterance-token V, the utterer U correlates predicate P1 with (and only with) each member of P2 (R)(R') (1) U effects that (x)(R P1x x P1) and (2) U intends (1), and (3) U intends that (y)(R' P1y y P1), where R' P1 is an expression-type such that utterance-token V is a sequence consisting of an expression-token p1 of expression-type P1 and an expression-token p2  of expression-type P2, the R-co-relatum of which is a set of which y is a member. And he is back with ‘denotare. Lewis and Short have “dēnŏtare,” which they render as “to mark, set a mark on, with chalk, color, etc.: “pedes venalium creta,”  It is interesting to trace Grice’s earliest investigations on this. Grice and Strawson stage a number of joint seminars on topics related to the notions of meaning, categories, and logical form. Grice and Strawson engage in systematic and unsystematic philosophical exploration. From these discussions springs work on predication and categories, one or two reflections of which are acknowledge at two places (re: the reductive analysis of a ‘particular,’ “the tallest man that did, does, or will exist” --) in Strawson’s “Particular and general” for The Aristotelian Society – and “visible” as Grice puts it, but not acknowledged, in Strawson’s “Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics.””

grice’s theory-theory: “I am perhaps not too happy with the word ‘theory,’ as applied to this, but that’s Ramsey for you” (WoW: 285). Grice’s theory-theory: A theory of mind concerning how we come to know about the propositional attitudes of others. It tries to explain the nature of ascribing certain thoughts, beliefs, or intentions to other persons in order to explain their actions. The theory-theory holds that in ascribing beliefs to others we are tacitly (check) applying a theory that enables us to make inferences about the beliefs behind the actions of others. The theory that is applied is a set of rules embedded in folk psychology. Hence, to anticipate and predict the behavior of others, one engages in an intellectual process moving by inference from one set of beliefs to another. This position contrasts with another theory of mind, the simulation theory, which holds that we need to make use of our own motivational and emotional resources and capacities for practical reasoning in explaining actions of others. “So called ‘theory-theorists’ maintain that the ability to explain and predict behaviour is underpinned by a folk-psychological theory of the structure and functioning of the mind – where the theory in question may be innate and modularised, learned individually, or acquired through a process of enculturation.” Carruthers and Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Grice needs a theory. For those into implicatura and conversation as rational cooperation, when introducing the implicaturum he mentions ‘pre-theoretical adequacy’ of the model. So he is thinking of the conversational theory as a theory in the strict sense, with ‘explanatory’ and not merely taxonomical power. So one task is to examine in which way the conversational theory is a theory that explains, rather than merely ad hoc ex post facto commentary.  Not so much for his approach to mean. He polemises with Rountree, of Somerville, that you dont need a thory to analyse mean. Indeed, you cannot have a theory to analyse mean, because mean is a matter of intuition, not a theoretical concept. But Grice appeals to theory, when dealing with willing. He knows what willing means because he relies on a concept of folk-science. In this folk-science, willing is a theoretical concept. Grice arrived at this conclusion by avoiding the adjective souly, and seeing that there is no word to describe willing other than by saying it is a psychoLOGICAL concept, i.e. part of a law within that theory of folk-science. That law will include, by way of ramsified naming or describing willing as a predicate-constant. Now, this is related to metaphysics. His liberal or ecunmenical metaphysics is best developed in terms of his ontological marxism presented just after he has expanded on this idea of willing as a theoretical concept, within a law involving willing (say, Grices Optimism-cum-Pesimism law), within the folk-science of psychology that explains his behaviour. For Aristotle, a theoria, was quite a different animal, but it had to do with contemplatio, hence the theoretical (vita contemplativa) versus the practical (vita activa). Grices sticking to Aristotle’srare use of theory inspires him to develop his fascinating theory of the theory-theory.  Grice realised that there is no way to refer to things like intending except with psychological, which he takes to mean, belonging to a pscyhological theory. Grice was keen to theorise on theorising. He thought that Aristotle’s first philosophy (prote philosophia) is best rendered as Theory-theory. Grice kept using Oxonian English spelling, theorising, except when he did not! Grice calls himself folksy: his theories, even if Subjects to various types of Ramseyfication, are popular in kind! And ceteris paribus! Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for! The way Grice conceives of his theory-theory is interesting to revisit. A route by which Grice hopes to show the centrality of metaphysics (as prote philosophia) involves taking seriously a few ideas. If any region of enquiry is to be successful as a rational enterprise, its deliverance must be expressable in the shape of one or another of the possibly different types of theory. A characterisation of the nature and range of a possible kind of theory θ is needed. Such a body of characterisation must itself be the outcome of rational enquiry, and so must itself exemplify whatever requirement it lays down for any theory θ in general. The characterisation must itself be expressible as a theory θ, to be called, if you like, Grice politely puts it, theory-theory, or meta-theory, θ2. Now, the specification and justification of the ideas and material presupposed by any theory θ, whether such account falls within the bounds of Theory-theory, θ2 would be properly called prote philosophia (first philosophy) and may turn out to relate to what is generally accepted as belonging to the Subjects matter of metaphysics. It might, for example, turn out to be establishable that any theory θ has to relate to a certain range of this or that Subjects item, has to attribute to each item this or that predicate or attribute, which in turn has to fall within one or another of the range of types or categories. In this way, the enquiry might lead to recognised metaphysical topics, such as the nature of being, its range of application, the nature of predication and a systematic account of categories. Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos Republic, Thrasymachus, social justice, Socrates, along with notes on Zeno, and topics for pursuit, repr.in Part II, Explorations in semantics and  metaphysics to WOW , metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, Platos Republic, Socrates, Thrasymachus, justice, moral right, legal right, Athenian dialectic. Philosophical eschatology is a sub-discipline of metaphysics concerned with what Grice calls a category shift. Grice, having applied such a technique to Aristotle’s aporia on philos (friend) as alter ego, uses it now to tackle Socratess view, against Thrasymachus, that right applies primarily to morality, and secondarily to legality. Grice has a specific reason to include this in his WOW Grices exegesis of Plato on justice displays Grices take on the fact that metaphysics needs to be subdivided into ontology proper and what he calls philosophical eschatology, for the study of things like category shift and other construction routines. The exploration of Platos Politeia thus becomes an application of Grices philosophically eschatological approach to the item just, as used by Socrates (morally just) and Thrasymachus (legally just). Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle in PPQ. So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too! Grices focus is on Plato’s exploration of dike. Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of moral justice as conceptually (or axiologically) prior to legal justice. In the proceeding, he creates philosophical eschatology as the other branch to metaphysics, along with good ol ontology. To say that just crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to make a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement. The Grice Papers locate the Plato essay in s.  II, the Socrates essay in s.  III, and the Thrasymachus essay, under social justice, in s. V. Grice is well aware that in his account of fairness, Rawls makes use of his ideas on personal identity. The philosophical elucidation of fairness is of great concern for Grice. He had been in touch with such explorations as Nozicks and Nagels along anti-Rawlsian lines. Grices ideas on rationality guide his exploration of social justice. Grice keeps revising the Socrates notes. The Plato essay he actually dates. As it happens, Grices most extensive published account of Socrates is in this commentary on Platos Republic: an eschatological commentary, as he puts it. In an entertaining fashion, Grice has Socrates, and neo-Socrates, exploring the logic and grammar of just against the attack by Thrasymachus and neo-Thrasymachus. Grices point is that, while the legal just may be conceptually prior to the moral just, the moral just is evaluationally or axiologically prior. Refs.: There is a specific essay on ‘theorising’ in the Grice Papers, but there are scattered sources elsewhere, such as “Method” (repr. in “Conception”), BANC.

grice’s three-year-old’s guide to Russell’s theory of types, with an advice to parents by Strawson: Grice put forward the empirical hypothesis that a three-year old CAN understand Russell’s theory of types. “In more than one way.” This brought confusion in the household, with some members saying they could not – “And I trust few of your tutees do!” Russell’s influential solution to the problem of logical paradoxes. The theory was developed in particular to overcome Russell’s paradox, which seemed to destroy the possibility of Frege’s logicist program of deriving mathematics from logic. Suppose we ask whether the set of all sets which are not members of themselves is a member of itself. If it is, then it is not, but if it is not, then it is. The theory of types suggests classifying objects, properties, relations, and sets into a hierarchy of types. For example, a class of type 0 has members that are ordinary objects; type 1 has members that are properties of objects of type 0; type 2 has members that are properties of the properties in type 1; and so on. What can be true or false of items of one type can not significantly be said about those of another type and is simply nonsense. If we observe the prohibitions against classes containing members of different types, Russell’s paradox and similar paradoxes can be avoided. The theory of types has two variants. The simple theory of types classifies different objects and properties, while the ramified theory of types further sorts types into levels and adds a hierarchy of levels to that of types. By restricting predicates to those that relate to items of lower types or lower levels within their own type, predicates giving rise to paradox are excluded. The simple theory of types is sufficient for solving logical paradoxes, while the ramified theory of type is introduced to solve semantic paradoxes, that is, paradoxes depending on notions such as reference and truth. “Any expression containing an apparent variable is of higher type than that variable. This is the fundamental principles of the doctrines of types.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge. Grice’s commentary in “In defense of a dogma,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

grice’s complementary class: the class of all things not in a given class. For example, if C is the class of all red things, then its complementary class is the class containing everything that is not red. This latter class includes even non-colored things, like numbers and the class C itself. Often, the context will determine a less inclusive complementary class. If B 0 A, then the complement of B with respect to A is A  B. For example, if A is the class of physical objects, and B is the class of red physical objects, then the complement of B with respect to A is the class of non-red physical objects. 

griceism. Gricese. At Oxford, it was usual to refer to Austin’s idiolect as Austinese. In analogy with Grecism, we have a Gricism, a Griceian cliché. Cf. a ‘grice’ and ‘griceful’ in ‘philosopher’s lexicon.’ Gricese is a Latinism, from -ese, word-forming element, from Old French -eis (Modern French -ois-ais), from Vulgar Latin, from Latin -ensem-ensis "belonging to" or "originating in."

grecianism: why was Grice obsessed with Socrates’s convesations? He does not say. But he implicates it. For the Athenian dialecticians, it is all a matter of ta legomena. Ditto for the Oxonian dialecticians. Ta legomena becomes ordinary language. And the task of the philosopher is to provide reductive analysis of this or that concept in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Cf. Hospers. Grices review of the history of philosophy (Philosophy is but footnotes to Zeno.). Grice enjoyed Zenos answer, What is a friend? Alter ego, Allego. ("Only it was the other Zeno." Grice tried to apply the Socratic method during his tutorials. "Nothing like a heartfelt dedication to the Socratic art of mid-wifery, seeking to bring forth error and to strangle it at birth.” μαιεύομαι (A.“μαῖα”), ‘to serve as a midwife, act a; “ἡ Ἄρτεμις μ.” Luc. D Deor.26.2. 2. cause delivery to take place, “ἱκανὴ ἔκπληξις μαιεύσασθαι πρὸ τῆς ὥρας” Philostr. VA1.5. 3. c. acc., bring to the birth, Marin.Procl.6; ὄρνιθας μ. hatch chickens, Anon. ap. Suid.; αἰετὸν κάνθαρος μαιεύσομαι, prov. of taking vengeance on a powerful enemy, Ar. Lys.695 (cf. Sch.). 4. deliver a woman, esp. metaph. in Pl. of the Socratic method, Tht. 149b. II. Act., Poll. 4.208, Sch. OH.4.506. Pass., τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα brought into the world by me, Pl. Tht. 150e, cf. Philostr.VA5.13. Refs.: the obvious references are Grice’s allusions to Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Zeno, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

grosseteste: Grice was a member of the Grosseteste Society. Like Grice’s friend, G. J. Warnock, Grosseteste was chancellor of Oxford. Only that by the time of Warnock, the monarch is the chancellor by default, so “Warnock had to allow to be called ‘vice-chancelor’ to Elizabeth II.” “I would never have read Aristotle had it not been by this great head that grosseteste (“Greathead” is a common surname in Suffolk).” – H. P. Grice. English philosopher who began life on the bottom rung of feudal society in Suffolk and became one of the most influential figures in pre-Reformation England. He studied at Oxford, obtaining an “M. A.,” like Grice. Sometime after this period he joined the household of William de Vere, of Hereford. Grosseteste associated with the elite at Hereford, several of whose members were part of an advanced philosophical tradition. It was a centre for the study of liberal arts. This explains his interest in dialectics. After a sojourn in Paris, he becomes the first chancellor of Oxford. He was a secular lecturer in theology to the recently established Franciscan order at Oxford. It was during his tenure with the Franciscans that he studied Grecian  an unusual endeavour for an Oxonian schoolman then. He later moved to Lincoln. As a  scholar, Grosseteste is an original thinker who used Aristotelian and Augustinian theses as points of departure. Grosseteste (or “Greathead,” as he was called by the town – if not the gown) believes, with Aristotle, that sense is the basis of all knowledge, and that the basis for sense is our discovery of the cause of what is experienced or revealed by experiment. He also believes, with Augustine, that light plays an important role in creation. Thus he maintained that God produced the world by first creating prime matter (“materia prima”) from which issued a point of light lux, the first corporeal form or power, one of whose manifestations is visible light. The diffusion of this light resulted in extension or tri-dimensionality in the form of the nine concentric celestial spheres and the four terrestrial spheres of fire, air, water, and earth. According to Grosseteste, the diffusion of light takes place in accordance with laws of mathematical proportionality geometry. Everything, therefore, is a manifestation of light, and mathematics is consequently indispensable to science and knowledge generally. The principles Grosseteste employs to support his views are presented in, e.g., his commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, the De luce, and the De lineis, angulis et figuris. He worked in areas as seemingly disparate as optics and angelology. Grosseteste is one of the first to take an interest in and introduce into the Oxford curriculum newly recovered Aristotelian texts, along with commentaries on them. His work and interest in natural philosophy, mathematics, the Bible, and languages profoundly influenced Roger Bacon, and the educational goals of the Franciscan order. It also helped to stimulate work in these areas.

Grice’s grue and grellow, -- and bleen: H. P. Grice was fascinated by Goodman’s ‘grue’ paradox and kept looking for the crucial implicaturum. “The paradox is believed to be mainly as arising within the theory of induction, but I’ve seen Strawson struggling with gruesome consequences in his theory of deduction, too.” According to Nelson Goodman, “a philosopher from the New World,” every intuitively acceptable inductive argument, call it A, may be mimicked by indefinitely many other inductive arguments  each seemingly quite analogous to A and therefore seemingly as acceptable, yet each nonetheless intuitively *unacceptable*, and each yielding a conclusion contradictory to that of A, given the assumption that sufficiently many and varied of the sort of things induced upon exist as yet unexamined which is the only circumstance in which A is of interest. “Goodman then asks us to suppose an intuitively acceptable inductive argument.”A1 every hitherto observed EMERALD is GREEN; therefore, every emerald is green. Now introduce the totally unnatural colour predicate ‘grue’ – a portmanteau of blue and green – as in Welsh ‘glas’ -- where for some given, as yet wholly future, temporal interval T an object is ‘grue’ provided it has the property of being green and first examined before T OR  blue and NOT first examined before T. Then consider the following inductive argument: A2 every hitherto observed EMERALD is GRUE; therefore, every emerald is grue. The premise is true, and A2 is formally analogous to A1. But A2 is intuitively unacceptable. If there is an emerald UNexamined before T, he conclusion of A2 says that this emerald is blue, whereas the conclusion of A1 says that every emerald is green! Granted, other counter-intuitive competing arguments could be given, e.g.: A3. Every hitherto observed emerald is grellow; therefore, every emeralds is grellow. where an object is ‘grellow’ provided it is green and located on the earth or yellow otherwise. It would seem, therefore, that some restriction on induction is required. “Goodman’s alleged of induction offers two challenges. First, state the restriction  i.e., demarcate the intuitively acceptable inductions from the unacceptable ones, in some general way, without constant appeal to intuition.”“Second, justify our preference for the one group of inductions over the other.”“These two parts of the paradox are, alas, often conflated.”But it is at least conceivable that one might solve the analytical, demarcative part without solving the justificatory part, and, perhaps, vice versa. It will not do to rule out, a priori gruesome” variances in nature. H2O varies in its physical state along the parameter of temperature. If so, why might not one emerald vary in colour along the parameter of time of first examination? One approach to the problem of restriction is to focus on the conclusions of inductive arguments e.g., every emerald is green, every emerald is grue and to distinguish those which may legitimately so serve called “projectible hypotheses” from those which may not. The question then arises whether only non-gruesome hypotheses those which do not contain gruesome predicates are projectible. Aside from the task of defining ‘gruesome predicate’ which could be done structurally relative to a preferred language, the answer is no. Consider the predicate ‘x is solid and less than 0; C, or liquid and more than 0; C but less than 100; C, or gaseous and more than 100; C.’This is gruesome on any plausible structural account of gruesomeness. Note the similarity to the ‘grue’ equivalent: green and first examined before T, or blue and not first examined before T. Nevertheless, where nontransitional water is pure H2O at one atmosphere of pressure save that which is in a transitional state, i.e., melting/freezing or boiling/condensing, i.e., at 0°C or 100; C, we happily project the hypothesis that all non-transitional water falls under the above gruesome predicate. Perhaps this is because, if we rewrite the projection about non-transitional water as a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses  i water at less than 0; C is solid, ii water at more than 0; C but less than 100; C is liquid, and iii water at more than 100; C is gaseous  we note that iiii are all supported there are known positive instances; whereas if we rewrite the gruesome projection about the emerald as a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses  i* every emerald first examined before T is green, and ii* every emerald NOT first examined before T is blue  we note that ii* is as yet unsupported. It would seem that, whereas a non-gruesome hypothesis is projectible provided it is unviolated and supported, a gruesome hypothesis is projectible provided it is unviolated and equivalent to a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses, each of which is supported.

grundnorm: Grice knows about the ground and the common ground – and then there’s the ground norm -- also called basic norm, in a legal system, the norm that determines the legal validity of all other norms. The content of such an ultimate norm may provide, e.g., that norms created by a legislature or by a court are legally valid. The validity of such an ultimate norm cannot be established as a matter of social fact such as the social fact that the norm is accepted by some group within a society. Rather, the validity of the basic norm for any given legal system must be presupposed by the validity of the norms that it legitimates as laws. The idea of a basic norm is associated with the legal philosopher Hans Kelsen. 

H

H: SUBJECT INDEX

H: NAME INDEX – ITALIAN
DON’T EXPECT AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER HERE.

H: NAME INDEX – ENGLISHMEN (Oxonian philosophy dons)
HAMPSHIRE
HARE
HART




bradley’s thatness: :The investing of the content, which is in Bradleian language a `what', with self-existent reality or ‘that-ness'." Athenaeum 24 Dec. 1904’ If thought asserted the existence of any content which was not an actual or possible object of thought—certainly that assertion in my judgment would contradict itself. But the Other which I maintain, is not any such content, nor is it another separated “ what,” nor in any case do I suggest that it lies outside intelligence. Everything, all will and feeling, is an object for thought, and must be called intelligible. This is certain; but, if so, what becomes of the Other? If we fall back on the mere “ that,” thatness itself seems a distinction made by thought. And we have to face this difficulty: If the Other exists, it must be something; and if it is nothing, it certainly does not exist. There is only one way to get rid of contradiction, and that way is by dissolution. Instead of one subject distracted, we get a larger subject with distinctions, and so the tension is removed. We have at first A, which possesses the qualities c and b, inconsistent adjectives which collide; and we go on to produce harmony by making a distinction within this subject. That was really not mere A, but either a complex within A, or (rather here) a wider whole in which A is included. The real subject is A + D; and this subject contains the contradiction made harmless by division, since A is c and D is b. This is the general principle, and I will attempt here to apply it in particular. Let us suppose the reality to be X (abcdefg . . .), and that we are able only to get partial views of this reality. Let us first take such a view as “ X (ab) is b.” This (rightly or wrongly) we should probably call a true view. For the content b does plainly belong to the subject; and, further, the appearance also—in other words, the separation of b in the predicate—can partly be explained. For, answering to this separation, we postulate now another adjective in the subject: let us call it *. The “ thatness,” the psychical existence of the predicate, which at first was neglected, has now also itself been included in the subject. We may hence write the subject as X (ab*); and in this way we seem to avoid contradiction. Let us go further on the same line, and, having dealt with a truth, pass next to an error. Take the subject once more as X (abcde . . .), and let us now say “ X (ab) is d.” To be different from another is to have already transcended one’s own being; and all finite existence is thus incurably relative and ideal. Its quality falls, more or less, outside its particular “ thatness”; and, whether as the same or again as diverse, it is equally made what it is by community with others.

hic, the hæc, and the hoc, the – “Scotus was being clever. Since he wanted an abstract noun, and abstract nouns are feminine in both Greek and Latin (‘ippotes, eqquitas’), he chose the feminine ‘haec,’ to turn into a ‘thisness.’ But we should expand his rather sexist view to apply to ‘hic’ and ‘hoc,’ too. In Anglo-Saxon, there is only ‘this,’ with ‘thisness’ first used by Pope George. The OED first registers ‘thisness’ in 1643.” – cf. OED: "It is at its such-&-suchness, at its character -- in other words, at the _universal_ in it -- that we have to look. the first cite in the OED for 'thisness' also features 'thatness': "thisness,” from "this" + "-ness": rendering ‘haecceitas,’ the quality of being 'this' (as distinct from anything else): = haecceity. First cite: "It is evident that [...] THISness, and THATness belong[...] not to matter by itself, but onely as [matter] is distinguished & individuated by the form." The two further quotes for 'thisness' being: 1837 Whewell Hist Induct Sc 1857 I 244: "Which his school called ‘HAECcceity’ – from the feminine form of the demonstrative masculine ‘hic,’ in Roman, neutre ‘hoc’ (Scotus uses the femine because ‘-ity- is a feminine ending) -- or ‘thisness.’", and 1895 Rashdall Universities II 532: "An individuating form called by the later Scotists its ‘haecceitas’ or its `thisness'").  "The investing of the content, which is in Bradleian language a `what', with self-existent reality or ‘that-ness'." Athenaeum 24 Dec. 1904 868/2. -- OED, 'thatness'. Trudgill writes in _The Dialects of England_ (Oxford: Blackwell), that Grice would often consult (he was from Harborne and had a special interest in this – “I seem to have lost my dialect when I moved to Corpus.” The 'this'-'that' demonstrative system is a two-way system which distinguishes between things which are distant and things which are near. Interestingly, however, a number of traditional dialects in England (if not Oxford) differ from this system in having what Grice called a Griceian _three_-way distinction. The Yorkshire dialect, for example, has ‘this’ (sing., near), ‘thir’ (pl. near), ‘that’ (sing. Medial) ‘tho’ (plural, medial), thon (sing. distal) and ‘thon’ (pl., distal). The Mercian Anglian dialect has ‘these’ (sing. near), ‘theys’ (plural, near), ‘that’ (sing. medial), ‘they’ (pl., medial), ‘thik’ (sing./pl., distal). “The northern dialect is better in that it distinguishes between the singular and the plural form for the distal, unlike the southern dialect which has ‘thik’ for either.” Grice. Still, Grice likes the sound of ‘thik’ and quotes from his friend M. Wakelin, _The Southwest of England_. "When I awoke one May day morn/I found an urge within me born/To see the beauteous countryside/That's all round wher'I do bide./So I set out wi' dog & stick,/ My head were just a trifle thick./But good ole' fresh air had his say/& blowed thik trouble clean away." -- B. Green, in _The Dorset Year Book_. Dorset: Society of Dorset Men. “Some like Russell, but Bradley’s MY man.” – H. P. Grice: Grice: "Russell is pretentious; Bradley, an English angel, is not!" "Bradley can use 'thatness' freely; Russell uses it after Bradley and artificially." all the rest of the watery bulk : but return back those few  drops from whence they were taken, and the glass-full that  even now had an individuation by itself, loseth that, and  groweth one and the same with the other main stock : yet if  you fill your glass again, wheresoever you take it up, so it be  of the same uniform bulk of water you had before, it is the  same glassfuU of water that you had. But as I said before,  this example fitteth entirely no more than the other did. In  such abstracted speculations, where we must consider matter  without form, (which hath no actual being,) we must not expect  adequated examples in nature. But enough is said to make  a speculative man see, that if God should join the soul of a  lately dead man, (even whilst his dead corpse should lie en-  tire in his windingsheet here,) unto a body made of earth,  taken from some mountain in America; it were most true  and certain, that the body he should then live by, were the  same identical body he lived with before his death, and late  resurrection. It is evident, that sameness, thisness, and that-  ness, belongeth not to matter by itself, (for a general indiffer-  ence runneth through it all,) but only as it is distinguished and  individuated by the form. Which in our case, whensoever  the same soul doth, it must be understood always to be the  same matter and body.” (Browne, 1643).  Grice. Corbin says that English is such a plastic language, “unlike Roman,” but then there’s haec, and hæcceitas -- Duns Scotus, J., Scottish Franciscan metaphysician and philosophical theologian. He lectured at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, where he died and his remains are still venerated. Modifying Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics as the science of being qua being, but univocally conceived, Duns Scotus showed its goal was to demonstrate God as the Infinite Being revealed to Moses as the “I am who am”, whose creative will is the source of the world’s contingency. Out of love God fashioned each creature with a unique “haecceity” or particularity formally distinct from its individualized nature. Descriptively identical with others of its kind, this nature, conceived in abstraction from haecceity, is both objectively real and potentially universal, and provides the basis for scientific knowledge that Peirce calls “Scotistic realism.” Duns Scotus brought many of Augustine’s insights, treasured by his Franciscan predecessors, into the mainstream of the Aristotelianism of his day. Their notion of the will’s “supersufficient potentiality” for self-determination he showed can be reconciled with Aristotle’s notion of an “active potency,” if one rejects the controDuhem thesis Duns Scotus, John 247   247 versial principle that “whatever is moved is moved by another.” Paradoxically, Aristotle’s criteria for rational and non-rational potencies prove the rationality of the will, not the intellect, for he claimed that only rational faculties are able to act in opposite ways and are thus the source of creativity in the arts. If so, then intellect, with but one mode of acting determined by objective evidence, is non-rational, and so is classed with active potencies called collectively “nature.” Only the will, acting “with reason,” is free to will or nill this or that. Thus “nature” and “will” represent Duns Scotus’s primary division of active potencies, corresponding roughly to Aristotle’s dichotomy of non-rational and rational. Original too is his development of Anselm’s distinction of the will’s twofold inclination or “affection”: one for the advantageous, the other for justice. The first endows the will with an “intellectual appetite” for happiness and actualization of self or species; the second supplies the will’s specific difference from other natural appetites, giving it an innate desire to love goods objectively according to their intrinsic worth. Guided by right reason, this “affection for justice” inclines the will to act ethically, giving it a congenital freedom from the need always to seek the advantageous. Both natural affections can be supernaturalized, the “affection for justice” by charity, inclining us to love God above all and for his own sake; the affection for the advantageous by the virtue of hope, inclining us to love God as our ultimate good and future source of beatitude. Another influential psychological theory is that of intuitive intellectual cognition, or the simple, non-judgmental awareness of a hereand-now existential situation. First developed as a necessary theological condition for the face-toface vision of God in the next life, intellectual intuition is needed to explain our certainty of primary contingent truths, such as “I think,” “I choose,” etc., and our awareness of existence. Unlike Ockham, Duns Scotus never made intellectual intuition the basis for his epistemology, nor believed it puts one in direct contact with any extramental substance material or spiritual, for in this life, at least, our intellect works through the sensory imagination. Intellectual intuition seems to be that indistinct peripheral aura associated with each direct sensory-intellectual cognition. We know of it explicitly only in retrospect when we consider the necessary conditions for intellectual memory. It continued to be a topic of discussion and dispute down to the time of Calvin, who, influenced by the Scotist John Major, used an auditory rather than a visual sense model of intellectual intuition to explain our “experience of God.”  haecceity from Latin haec, ‘this’, 1 loosely, thisness; more specifically, an irreducible category of being, the fundamental actuality of an existent entity; or 2 an individual essence, a property an object has necessarily, without which it would not be or would cease to exist as the individual it is, and which, necessarily, no other object has. There are in the history of philosophy two distinct concepts of haecceity. The idea originated with the work of the thirteenthcentury philosopher Duns Scotus, and was discussed in the same period by Aquinas, as a positive perfection that serves as a primitive existence and individuation principle for concrete existents. In the seventeenth century Leibniz transformed the concept of haecceity, which Duns Scotus had explicitly denied to be a form or universal, into the notion of an individual essence, a distinctive nature or set of necessary characteristics uniquely identifying it under the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Duns Scotus’s haecceitas applies only to the being of contingently existent entities in the actual world, but Leibniz extends the principle to individuate particular things not only through the changes they may undergo in the actual world, but in any alternative logically possible world. Leibniz admitted as a consequence the controversial thesis that every object by virtue of its haecceity has each of its properties essentially or necessarily, so that only the counterparts of individuals can inhabit distinct logically possible worlds. A further corollary  since the possession of particular parts in a particular arrangement is also a property and hence involved in the individual essence of any complex object  is the doctrine of mereological essentialism: every composite is necessarily constituted by a particular configuration of particular proper parts, and loses its self-identity if any parts are removed or replaced. Grice was more familiar with the thatness than the thisness (“Having had to read Bradley for my metaphysics paper!”).

hales: from Alexander of Halesowen, Salop (on the border with Worcs.).. Grice called William of Occam “Occam,” William of Sherwood, “Shyrewood,” and Alexander of Hales “Hales,” – why, I wish people would call me “Harborne,” and not Grice!” – Grice. English Franciscan theologian, known as the Doctor Irrefragabilis. The first to teach theology by lecturing on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Alexander’s emphasis on speculative theology initiated the golden age of Scholasticism. Alexander wrote commentaries on the Psalms and the Gospels; his chief works include his Glossa in quattuor libros sententiarum, Quaestiones disputatatae antequam esset frater, and Quaestiones quodlibetales. Alexander did not complete the Summa fratris Alexandri; Pope Alexander IV ordered the Franciscans to complete the Summa Halesiana in 1255. Master of theology in 1222, Alexander played an important role in the history of Paris, writing parts of Gregory IX’s Parens scientiarum 1231. He also helped negotiate the peace between England and France. He gave up his position as canon of Lichfield and archdeacon of Coventry to become a Franciscan, the first Franciscan master of theology; his was the original Franciscan chair of theology at Paris. Among the Franciscans, his most prominent disciples include St. Bonaventure, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, and John of La Rochelle, to whom he resigned his chair in theology near the end of his life. Hales wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s metaphysics, on the multiplicity of being, that Grice found fascinating. Vide “Summa halensis.”


hampshireism: His second wife was from the New World. His first wife wasn’t. He married Renée Orde-Lees, the daughter of the very English Thomas Orde-Lees, in 1961, and had two children, a son, Julian, and a daughter. To add to the philosophers’ mistakes. There’s Austin (in “Plea for Excuses” and “Other Minds”), Strawson (in “Truth” and “Introduction to Logical Theory,” and “On referring”), Hart (in conversation, on ‘carefully,”), Hare (“To say ‘x is good’ is to recommend x”) and Hampshire (“Intention and certainty”). For Grice, the certainty is merely implicated and on occasion, only.  Cited by Grice as a member of the play group. Hampshire would dine once a week with Grice. He would discuss and find very amusing to discuss with Grice on post-war Oxford philosophy. Unlike Grice, Hampshire attended Austin’s Thursday evening meetings at All Souls. Grice wrote “Intention and uncertainty” in part as a response to Hampshire and Hart, Intention and certainty. But Grice brought the issue back to an earlier generation, to a polemic between Stout (who held a certainty-based view) and Prichard.

hare: r. m. cited by H. P. Grice, “Hare’s neustrics”. b.9, English philosopher who is one of the most influential moral philosophers of the twentieth century and the developer of prescriptivism in metaethics. Hare was educated at Rugby and Oxford, then served in the British army during World War II and spent years as a prisoner of war in Burma. In 7 he took a position at Balliol  and was appointed White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the  of Oxford in 6. On retirement from Oxford, he became Graduate Research Professor at the  of Florida 393. His major books are Language of Morals 3, Freedom and Reason 3, Moral Thinking 1, and Sorting Out Ethics 7. Many collections of his essays have also appeared, and a collection of other leading philosophers’ articles on his work was published in 8 Hare and Critics, eds. Seanor and Fotion. According to Hare, a careful exploration of the nature of our moral concepts reveals that nonironic judgments about what one morally ought to do are expressions of the will, or commitments to act, that are subject to certain logical constraints. Because moral judgments are prescriptive, we cannot sincerely subscribe to them while refusing to comply with them in the relevant circumstances. Because moral judgments are universal prescriptions, we cannot sincerely subscribe to them unless we are willing for them to be followed were we in other people’s positions with their preferences. Hare later contended that vividly to imagine ourselves completely in other people’s positions involves our acquiring preferences about what should happen to us in those positions that mirror exactly what those people now want for themselves. So, ideally, we decide on a universal prescription on the basis of not only our existing preferences about the actual situation but also the new preferences we would have if we were wholly in other people’s positions. What we can prescribe universally is what maximizes net satisfaction of this amalgamated set of preferences. Hence, Hare concluded that his theory of moral judgment leads to preference-satisfaction act utilitarianism. However, like most other utilitarians, he argued that the best way to maximize utility is to have, and generally to act on, certain not directly utilitarian dispositions  such as dispositions not to hurt others or steal, to keep promises and tell the truth, to take special responsibility for one’s own family, and so on.  Then there’s Hare’s phrastic: It is convenient to take Grice mocking Hare in Prolegomena. “To say ‘x is good’ is to recommend x.’ An implicaturum: annullable:  “x is good but I don’t recommend it.” Hare was well aware of the implicaturum. Loving Grice’s account of ‘or,’ Hare gives the example: “Post the letter: therefore; post the letter or burn it.” Grice mainly quotes Hare’s duet, the phrastic and the neustic, and spends some time exploring what the phrastic actually is. He seems to prefer ‘radix.’ But then Hare also has then the ‘neustic,’ that Grice is not so concerned with since he has his own terminology for it. And for Urmson’s festschrift, Hare comes up with the tropic and the clistic. So each has a Griceian correlate.  Then there’s Hareian supervenience: a dependence relation between properties or facts of one type, and properties or facts of another type. In the other place, G. E. Moore, for instance, holds that the property intrinsic value is dependent in the relevant way on certain non-moral properties. Moore did not employ the expression ‘supervenience’. As Moore puts it, “if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree,  not only must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree” (Philosophical Studies, 2). The concept of supervenience, as a relation between properties, is essentially this: A poperties of type A is supervenient (or better, as Grice prefesrs, supervenes) on a property of type B if and only if two objects cannot differ with respect to their A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. Properties that allegedly are supervenient on others are often called consequential properties, especially in ethics; the idea is that if something instantiates a moral property, then it does so in virtue of, i.e., as a non-causal consequence of, instantiating some lower-level property on which the moral property supervenes. In another, related sense, supervenience is a feature of discourse of one type, vis-à-vis discourse of another type. ‘Supervenience’ is so used by Hare. “First, let us take that characteristic of “good” which has been called its ‘supervenience.’” Grice: “Hare has a good ear for the neologism: he loved my ‘implicature,’ and used in an essay he submitted to “Mind,” way before I ventured to publish the thing!” – “Suppose that we say, “St. Francis is a good man.” It is logically impossible to say this and to maintain at the same time that there might have been another man placed exactly in the same circumstances as St. Francis, and who behaved in exactly the same way, but who differed from St. Francis in this respect only, that it is NOT the case that this man is a good man.” (“The Language of Morals”). Here the idea is that it would be a misuse of moral language, a violation of the “logic of moral discourse,” to apply ‘good’ to one thing but not to something else exactly similar in all pertinent non-moral respects. Hare is a meta-ethical irrealist. He denies that there are moral properties or facts. So for him, supervenience is a ‘category of expression,’ a feature of discourse and judgment, not a relation between properties or facts of two types. The notion of supervenience has come to be used quite widely in metaphysics and philosophical philosophy, usually in the way explained above. This use is heralded by Davidson in articulating a position about the relation between a physical property and a property of the ‘soul,’ or statet-ypes, that eschews the reducibility of mental properties to physical ones. “Although the position I describe denies there are psycho-physical laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, or plainly supervene on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some physical respects. Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail reducibility through law or definition. “Mental Events.” A variety of supervenience theses have been propounded in metaphysics and philosophical psychology, usually although not always in conjunction with attempts to formulate metaphysical positions that are naturalistic, in some way, without being strongly reductionistic, if reductive. E. g. it is often asserted that mental properties and facts are supervenient on neurobiological properties, and/or on physicochemical properties and facts. And it is often claimed, more generally, that all properties and facts are supervenient on the properties and facts of the kind described by physics. Much attention has been directed at how to formulate the desired supervenience theses, and thus how to characterize supervenience itself. A distinction has been drawn between weak supervenience, asserting that in any single possible world w, any two individuals in w that differ in their A-properties also differ in their B-properties; and strong supervenience, asserting that for any two individuals i and j, either within a single possible world or in two distinct ones, if i and j differ in A-properties then they also differ in Bproperties. It is sometimes alleged that traditional formulations of supervenience, like Moore’s or Hare’s, articulate only weak supervenience, whereas strong supervenience is needed to express the relevant kind of determination or dependence. It is sometimes replied, however, that the traditional natural-language formulations do in fact express strong supervenience  and that formalizations expressing mere weak supervenience are mistranslations. Questions about how best to formulate supervenience theses also arise in connection with intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties. For instance, the property being a bank, instantiated by the brick building on Main Street, is not supervenient on intrinsic physical properties of the building itself; rather, the building’s having this social-institutional property depends on a considerably broader range of facts and features, some of which are involved in subserving the social practice of banking. The term ‘supervenience base’ is frequently used to denote the range of entities and happenings whose lowerlevel properties and relations jointly underlie the instantiation of some higher-level property like being a bank by some individual like the brick building on Main Street. Supervenience theses are sometimes formulated so as to smoothly accommodate properties and facts with broad supervenience bases. For instance, the idea that the physical facts determine all the facts is sometimes expressed as global supervenience, which asserts that any two physically possible worlds differing in some respect also differ in some physical respect. Or, sometimes this idea is expressed as the stronger thesis of regional supervenience, which asserts that for any two spatiotemporal regions r and s, either within a single physically possible world or in two distinct ones, if r and s differ in some intrinsic respect then they also differ in some intrinsic physical respect. H. P. Grice, “Hare on supervenience.” H. P. Grice, “Supervenience in my method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.” H. P. Grice, “Supervenience and the devil of scientism.”

harris: philosopher of language – classical. Grice adored him, and he was quite happy that few knew about Harris! Cf. Tooke. Cf. Priestley and Hartley – all pre-Griceian philosohers of language that are somehow outside the canon, when they shouldn’t. They are very Old World, and it’s the influence of the New World that has made them sort of disappear! That’s what Grice said!

hart: h. l. a. – cited by Grice, “Hare on ‘carefully.’ Philosopher of European ancestry born in Yorkshire, principally responsible for the revival of legal and political philosophy after World War II. After wartime work with military intelligence, Hart gave up a flourishing law practice to join the Oxford faculty, where he was a brilliant lecturer, a sympathetic and insightful critic, and a generous mentor to many scholars. Like the earlier “legal positivists” Bentham and John Austin, Hart accepted the “separation of law and morals”: moral standards can deliberately be incorporated in law, but there is no automatic or necessary connection between law and sound moral principles. In The Concept of Law 1 he critiqued the Bentham-Austin notion that laws are orders backed by threats from a political community’s “sovereign”  some person or persons who enjoy habitual obedience and are habitually obedient to no other human  and developed the more complex idea that law is a “union of primary and secondary rules.” Hart agreed that a legal system must contain some “obligation-imposing” “primary” rules, restricting freedom. But he showed that law also includes independent “power-conferring” rules that facilitate choice, and he demonstrated that a legal system requires “secondary” rules that create public offices and authorize official action, such as legislation and adjudication, as well as “rules of recognition” that determine which other rules are valid in the system. Hart held that rules of law are “open-textured,” with a core of determinate meaning and a fringe of indeterminate meaning, and thus capable of answering some but not all legal questions that can arise. He doubted courts’ claims to discover law’s meaning when reasonable competing interpretations are available, and held that courts decide such “hard cases” by first performing the important “legislative” function of filling gaps in the law. Hart’s first book was an influential study with A. M. Honoré of Causation in the Law 9. His inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence, “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” 3, initiated a career-long study of rights, reflected also in Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 2 and in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 3. He defended liberal public policies. In Law, Liberty and Morality 3 he refuted Lord Devlin’s contention that a society justifiably enforces the code of its moral majority, whatever it might be. In The Morality of the Criminal Law 5 and in Punishment and Responsibility 8, Hart contributed substantially to both analytic and normative theories of crime and punishment.

Hartley, British philosopher. Although the notion of association of ideas is ancient, he is generally regarded as the founder of associationism as a self-sufficient psychology. Despite similarities between his association psychology and Hume’s, Hartley developed his system independently, acknowledging only the writings of clergyman John Gay 1699 1745. Hartley was one of many Enlightenment thinkers aspiring to be “Newtons of the mind,” in Peter Gay’s phrase. In Hartley, this took the form of uniting association philosophy with physiology, a project later brought to fruition by Bain. His major work, Observations on Man 1749, pictured mental events and neural events as operating on parallel tracks in which neural events cause mental events. On the mental side, Hartley distinguished like Hume between sensation and idea. On the physiological side, Hartley adopted Newton’s conception of nervous transmission by vibrations of a fine granular substance within nerve-tubes. Vibrations within sensory nerves peripheral to the brain corresponded to the sensations they caused, while small vibrations in the brain, vibratiuncles, corresponded to ideas. Hartley proposed a single law of association, contiguity modified by frequency, which took two forms, one for the mental side and one for the neural: ideas, or vibratiuncles, occurring together regularly become associated. Hartley distinguished between simultaneous association, the link between ideas that occur at the same harmony, preestablished Hartley, David 362    AM  362 moment, and successive association, between ideas that closely succeed one another. Successive associations occur only in a forward direction; there are no backward associations, a thesis generating much controversy in the later experimental study of memory.

Hartley, Joseph – philosopher. Hartmann: philosopher who sought to synthesize the thought of Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The most important of his essays is “Philosophie des Unbewussten.” For Hartmann both will and idea are interrelated and are expressions of an absolute “thing-in-itself,” the unconscious. The unconscious is the active essence in natural and psychic processes and is the teleological dynamic in organic life. Paradoxically, he claimed that the teleology immanent in the world order and the life process leads to insight into the irrationality of the “will-to-live.” The maturation of rational consciousness would, he held, lead to the negation of the total volitional process and the entire world process would cease. Ideas indicate the “what” of existence and constitute, along with will and the unconscious, the three modes of being. Despite its pessimism, this work enjoyed considerable popularity. Hartmann was an unusual combination of speculative idealist and philosopher of science defending vitalism and attacking mechanistic materialism; his pessimistic ethics was part of a cosmic drama of redemption. Some of his later works dealt with a critical form of Darwinism that led him to adopt a positive evolutionary stance that undermined his earlier pessimism. His general philosophical position was selfdescribed as “transcendental realism.” His Philosophy of the Unconscious was tr. into English by W. C. Coupland in three volumes in 4. There is little doubt that his metaphysics of the unconscious prepared the way for Freud’s later theory of the unconscious mind. 

hazzing: under conjunctum, we see that the terminology is varied. There is the copulatum. But Grice prefers to restrict to use of the copulatum to izzing and hazzing. Oddly Grice sees hazzing as a predicate which he formalizes as Hxy. To be read x hazzes y, although sometimes he uses ‘x hazz y.’ Vide ‘accidentia.’ For Grice the role of métier is basic since it shows finality in nature. Homo sapiens, qua pirot, is to be rational.

Plactivm -- hedonism, the view that pleasure including the absence of pain is the sole intrinsic good in life. The hedonist may hold that, questions of morality aside, persons inevitably do seek pleasure psychological hedonism; that, questions of psychology aside, morally we should seek pleasure ethical hedonism; or that we inevitably do, and ought to, seek pleasure ethical and psychological hedonism combined. Psychological hedonism itself admits of a variety of possible forms. One may hold, e.g., that all motivation is based on the prospect of present or future pleasure. More plausibly, some philosophers have held that all choices of future actions are based on one’s presently taking greater pleasure in the thought of doing one act rather than another. Still a third type of hedonism  with roots in empirical psychology  is that the attainment of pleasure is the primary drive of a wide range of organisms including human beings and is responsible, through some form of conditioning, for all acquired motivations. Ethical hedonists may, but need not, appeal to some form of psychological hedonism to buttress their case. For, at worst, the truth of some form of psychological hedonism makes ethical hedonism empty or inescapable  but not false. As a value theory a theory of what is ultimately good, ethical hedonism has typically led to one or the other of two conceptions of morally correct action. Both of these are expressions of moral consequentialism in that they judge actions strictly by their consequences. On standard formulations of utilitarianism, actions are judged by the amount of pleasure they produce for all sentient beings; on some formulations of egoist views, actions are judged by their consequences for one’s own pleasure. Neither egoism nor utilitarianism, however, must be wedded to a hedonistic value theory. A hedonistic value theory admits of a variety of claims about the characteristic sources and types of pleasure. One contentious issue has been what activities yield the greatest quantity of pleasure  with prominent candidates including philosophical and other forms of intellectual discourse, the contemplation of beauty, and activities productive of “the pleasures of the senses.” Most philosophical hedonists, despite the popular associations of the word, have not espoused sensual pleasure. Another issue, famously raised by J. S. Mill, is whether such different varieties of pleasure admit of differences of quality as well as quantity. Even supposing them to be equal in quantity, can we say, e.g., that the pleasures of intellectual activity are superior in quality to those of watching sports on television? And if we do say such things, are we departing from strict hedonism by introducing a value distinction not really based on pleasure at all? Most philosophers have found hedonism  both psychological and ethical  exaggerated in its claims. One difficulty for both sorts of hedonism is the hedonistic paradox, which may be put as follows. Many of the deepest and best pleasures of life of love, of child rearing, of work seem to come most often to those who are engaging in an activity for reasons other than pleasure seeking. Hence, not only is it dubious that we always in fact seek or value only pleasure, but also dubious that the best way to achieve pleasure is to seek it. Another area of difficulty concerns happiness  and its relation to pleasure. In the tradition of Aristotle, happiness is broadly understood as something like well-being and has been viewed, not implausibly, as a kind of natural end of all human activities. But ‘happiness’ in this sense is broader than ‘pleasure’, insofar as the latter designates a particular kind of feeling, whereas ‘well-being’ does not. Attributions of happiness, moreover, appear to be normative in a way in which attributions of pleasure are not. It is thought that a truly happy person has achieved, is achieving, or stands to achieve, certain things respecting the “truly important” concerns of human life. Of course, such achievements will characteristically produce pleasant feelings; but, just as characteristically, they will involve states of active enjoyment of activities  where, as Aristotle first pointed out, there are no distinctive feelings of pleasure apart from the doing of the activity itself. In short, the Aristotelian thesis that happiness is the natural end of all human activities, even if it is true, does not seem to lend much support to hedonism  psychological or ethical.

plathegel and ariskant – Hegel, “one of the most influential and systematic of the idealists” (Grice), also well known for his philosophy of history and philosophy of religion. Life and works. Hegel, the eldest of three children, was born in Stuttgart, the son of a minor financial official in the court of the Duchy of Württemberg. His mother died when he was eleven. At eighteen, he began attending the theology seminary or Stift attached to the  at Tübingen; he studied theology and classical languages and literature and became friendly with his future colleague and adversary, Schelling, as well as the great genius of G. Romantic poetry, Hölderlin. In 1793, upon graduation, he accepted a job as a tutor for a family in Bern, and moved to Frankfurt in 1797 for a similar post. In 1799 his father bequeathed him a modest income and the freedom to resign his tutoring job, pursue his own work, and attempt to establish himself in a  position. In 1801, with the help of Schelling, he moved to the  town of Jena, already widely known as the home of Schiller, Fichte, and the Schlegel brothers. After lecturing for a few years, he became a professor in 1805. Prior to the move to Jena, Hegel’s essays had been chiefly concerned with problems in morality, the theory of culture, and the philosophy of religion. Hegel shared with Rousseau and the G. Romantics many doubts about the political and moral implications of the European Enlightenment and modern philosophy in general, even while he still enthusiastically championed what he termed the principle of modernity, “absolute freedom.” Like many, he feared that the modern attack on feudal political and religious authority would merely issue in the reformulation of new internalized and still repressive forms of authority. And he was among that legion of G. intellectuals infatuated with ancient Greece and the superiority of their supposedly harmonious social life, compared with the authoritarian and legalistic character of the Jewish and later Christian religions. At Jena, however, he coedited a journal with Schelling, The Critical Journal of Philosophy, and came to work much more on the philosophic issues created by the critical philosophy or “transcendental idealism” of Kant, and its legacy in the work of Rheinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. His written work became much more influenced by these theoretical projects and their attempt to extend Kant’s search for the basic categories necessary for experience to be discriminated and evaluated, and for a theory of the subject that, in some non-empirical way, was responsible for such categories. Problems concerning the completeness, interrelation, and ontological status of such a categorial structure were quite prominent, along with a continuing interest in the relation between a free, self-determining agent and the supposed constraints of moral principles and other agents. In his early years at Jena especially before Schelling left in 1803, he was particularly preoccupied with this problem of a systematic philosophy, a way of accounting for the basic categories of the natural world and for human practical activity that would ground all such categories on commonly presupposed and logically interrelated, even interdeducible, principles. In Hegel’s terms, this was the problem of the relation between a “Logic” and a “Philosophy of Nature” and “Philosophy of Spirit.” After 1803, however, while he was preparing his own systematic philosophy for publication, what had been planned as a short introduction to this system took on a life of its own and grew into one of Hegel’s most provocative and influential books. Working at a furious pace, he finished hedonistic paradox Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 365    AM  365 what would be eventually called The Phenomenology of Spirit in a period of great personal and political turmoil. During the final writing of the book, he had learned that Christina Burkhard would give birth to his illegitimate son. Ludwig was born in February 1807. And he is supposed to have completed the text on October 13, 1807, the day Napoleon’s armies captured Jena. It was certainly an unprecedented work. In conception, it is about the human race itself as a developing, progressively more self-conscious subject, but its content seems to take in a vast, heterogeneous range of topics, from technical issues in empiricist epistemology to the significance of burial rituals. Its range is so heterogeneous that there is controversy to this day about whether it has any overall unity, or whether it was pieced together at the last minute. Adding to the interpretive problem, Hegel often invented his own striking language of “inverted worlds,” “struggles to the death for recognition,” “unhappy consciousness,” “spiritual animal kingdoms,” and “beautiful souls.” Continuing his  career at Jena in those times looked out of the question, so Hegel accepted a job at Bamberg editing a newspaper, and in the following year began an eight-year stint 180816 as headmaster and philosophy teacher at a Gymnasium or secondary school at Nürnberg. During this period, at forty-one, he married the twenty-year-old Marie von Tucher. He also wrote what is easily his most difficult work, and the one he often referred to as his most important, a magisterial two-volume Science of Logic, which attempts to be a philosophical account of the concepts necessary in all possible kinds of account-givings. Finally, in 1816, Hegel was offered a chair in philosophy at the  of Heidelberg, where he published the first of several versions of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, his own systematic account of the relation between the “logic” of human thought and the “real” expression of such interrelated categories in our understanding of the natural world and in our understanding and evaluation of our own activities. In 1818, he accepted the much more prestigious post in philosophy at Berlin, where he remained until his death in 1831. Soon after his arrival in Berlin, he began to exert a powerful influence over G. letters and intellectual life. In 1821, in the midst of a growing political and nationalist crisis in Prussia, he published his controversial book on political philosophy, The Philosophy of Right. His lectures at the  were later published as his philosophy of history, of aesthetics, and of religion, and as his history of philosophy. Philosophy. Hegel’s most important ideas were formed gradually, in response to a number of issues in philosophy and often in response to historical events. Moreover, his language and approach were so heterodox that he has inspired as much controversy about the meaning of his position as about its adequacy. Hence any summary will be as much a summary of the controversies as of the basic position. His dissatisfactions with the absence of a public realm, or any forms of genuine social solidarity in the G. states and in modernity generally, and his distaste with what he called the “positivity” of the orthodox religions of the day their reliance on law, scripture, and abstract claims to authority, led him to various attempts to make use of the Grecian polis and classical art, as well as the early Christian understanding of love and a renewed “folk religion,” as critical foils to such tendencies. For some time, he also regarded much traditional and modern philosophy as itself a kind of lifeless classifying that only contributed to contemporary fragmentation, myopia, and confusion. These concerns remained with him throughout his life, and he is thus rightly known as one of the first modern thinkers to argue that what had come to be accepted as the central problem of modern social and political life, the legitimacy of state power, had been too narrowly conceived. There are now all sorts of circumstances, he argued, in which people might satisfy the modern criterion of legitimacy and “consent” to the use of some power, but not fully understand the terms within which such issues are posed, or assent in an attenuated, resentful, manipulated, or confused way. In such cases they would experience no connection between their individual will and the actual content of the institutions they are supposed to have sanctioned. The modern problem is as much alienation Entfremdung as sovereignty, an exercise of will in which the product of one’s will appears “strange” or “alien,” “other,” and which results in much of modern life, however chosen or willed, being fundamentally unsatisfying. However, during the Jena years, his views on this issue changed. Most importantly, philosophical issues moved closer to center stage in the Hegelian drama. He no longer regarded philosophy as some sort of self-undermining activity that merely prepared one for some leap into genuine “speculation” roughly Schelling’s position and began to champion a unique kind of comprehensive, very determinate reflection on the interrelations among all the various classical alternatives in philosophy. Much more controversially, he also attempted to understand the way in which such relations and transitions were also reflected in the history of the art, politics, and religions of various historical communities. He thus came to think that philosophy should be some sort of recollection of its past history, a realization of the mere partiality, rather than falsity, of its past attempts at a comprehensive teaching, and an account of the centrality of these continuously developing attempts in the development of other human practices.Through understanding the “logic” of such a development, a reconciliation of sorts with the implications of such a rational process in contemporary life, or at least with the potentialities inherent in contemporary life, would be possible. In all such influences and developments, one revolutionary aspect of Hegel’s position became clearer. For while Hegel still frequently argued that the subject matter of philosophy was “reason,” or “the Absolute,” the unconditioned presupposition of all human account-giving and evaluation, and thereby an understanding of the “whole” within which the natural world and human deeds were “parts,” he also always construed this claim to mean that the subject matter of philosophy was the history of human experience itself. Philosophy was about the real world of human change and development, understood by Hegel to be the collective self-education of the human species about itself. It could be this, and satisfy the more traditional ideals because, in one of his most famous phrases, “what is actual is rational,” or because some full account could be given of the logic or teleological order, even the necessity, for the great conceptual and political changes in human history. We could thereby finally reassure ourselves that the way our species had come to conceptualize and evaluate is not finite or contingent, but is “identical” with “what there is, in truth.” This identity theory or Absolute Knowledgemeans that we will then be able to be “at home” in the world and so will have understood what philosophers have always tried to understand, “how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” The way it all hangs together is, finally, “due to us,” in some collective and historical and “logical” sense. In a much disputed passage in his Philosophy of Religion lectures, Hegel even suggested that with such an understanding, history itself would be over. Several elements in this general position have inspired a good deal of excitement and controversy. To advance claims such as these Hegel had to argue against a powerful, deeply influential assumption in modern thought: the priority of the individual, self-conscious subject. Such an assumption means, for example, that almost all social relations, almost all our bonds to other human beings, exist because and only because they are made, willed into existence by individuals otherwise naturally unattached to each other. With respect to knowledge claims, while there may be many beliefs in a common tradition that we unreflectively share with others, such shared beliefs are also taken primarily to be the result of individuals continuously affirming such beliefs, however implicitly or unreflectively. Their being shared is simply a consequence of their being simultaneously affirmed or assented to by individuals. Hegel’s account requires a different picture, an insistence on the priority of some kind of collective subject, which he called human “spirit” or Geist. His general theory of conceptual and historical change requires the assumption of such a collective subject, one that even can be said to be “coming to self-consciousness” about itself, and this required that he argue against the view that so much could be understood as the result of individual will and reflection. Rather, he tried in many different ways to show that the formation of what might appear to an individual to be his or her own particular intention or desire or belief already reflected a complex social inheritance that could itself be said to be evolving, even evolving progressively, with a “logic” of its own. The completion of such collective attempts at self-knowledge resulted in what Hegel called the realization of Absolute Spirit, by which he either meant the absolute completion of the human attempt to know itself, or the realization in human affairs of some sort of extrahuman transcendence, or full expression of an infinite God. Hegel tried to advance all such claims about social subjectivity without in some way hypostatizing or reifying such a subject, as if it existed independently of the actions and thoughts of individuals. This claim about the deep dependence of individuals on one another even for their very identity, even while they maintain their independence, is one of the best-known examples of Hegel’s attempt at a dialectical resolution of many of the traditional oppositions and antinomies of past thought. Hegel often argued that what appeared to be contraries in philosophy, such as mind/body, freedom/determinism, idealism/materialism, universal/particular, the state/the individual, or even God/man, appeared such incompatible alternatives only because of the undeveloped and so incomplete perspective within which the oppositions were formulated. So, in one of his more famous attacks on such dualisms, human freedom according to Hegel could not be understood coherently as some purely rational self-determination, independent of heteronomous impulses, nor the human being as a perpetual opposition between reason and sensibility. In his moral theory, Kant had argued for the latter view and Hegel regularly returned to such Kantian claims about the opposition of duty and inclination as deeply typical of modern dualism. Hegel claimed that Kant’s version of a rational principle, the “categorical imperative,” was so formal and devoid of content as not to be action-guiding it could not coherently rule in or rule out the appropriate actions, and that the “moral point of view” rigoristically demanded a pure or dutiful motivation to which no human agent could conform. By contrast, Hegel claimed that the dualisms of morality could be overcome in ethical life Sittlichkeit, those modern social institutions which, it was claimed, provided the content or true “objects” of a rational will. These institutions, the family, civil society, and the state, did not require duties in potential conflict with our own substantive ends, but were rather experienced as the “realization” of our individual free will. It has remained controversial what for Hegel a truly free, rational self-determination, continuous with, rather than constraining, our desire for happiness and self-actualization, amounted to. Many commentators have noted that, among modern philosophers, only Spinoza, whom Hegel greatly admired, was as insistent on such a thoroughgoing compatibilism, and on a refusal to adopt the Christian view of human beings as permanently divided against themselves. In his most ambitious analysis of such oppositions Hegel went so far as to claim that, not only could alternatives be shown to be ultimately compatible when thought together within some higher-order “Notion” Begriff that resolved or “sublated” the opposition, but that one term in such opposition could actually be said to imply or require its contrary, that a “positing” of such a notion would, to maintain consistency, require its own “negating,” and that it was this sort of dialectical opposition that could be shown to require a sublation, or Aufhebung a term of art in Hegel that simultaneously means in G. ‘to cancel’, ‘to preserve’, and ‘to raise up’. This claim for a dialectical development of our fundamental notions has been the most severely criticized in Hegel’s philosophy. Many critics have doubted that so much basic conceptual change can be accounted for by an internal critique, one that merely develops the presuppositions inherent in the affirmation of some notion or position or related practice. This issue has especially attracted critics of Hegel’s Science of Logic, where he tries first to show that the attempt to categorize anything that is, simply and immediately, as “Being,” is an attempt that both “negates itself,” or ends up categorizing everything as “Nothing,” and then that this self-negation requires a resolution in the higher-order category of “Becoming.” This analysis continues into an extended argument that purports to show that any attempt to categorize anything at all must ultimately make use of the distinctions of “essence” and “appearance,” and elements of syllogistic and finally Hegel’s own dialectical logic, and both the details and the grand design of that project have been the subject of a good deal of controversy. Unfortunately, much of this controversy has been greatly confused by the popular association of the terms “thesis,” “antithesis,” and “synthesis” with Hegel’s theory of dialectic. These crude, mechanical notions were invented in 1837 by a less-than-sensitive Hegel expositor, Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, and were never used as terms of art by Hegel. Others have argued that the tensions Hegel does identify in various positions and practices require a much broader analysis of the historical, especially economic, context within which positions are formulated and become important, or some more detailed attention to the empirical discoveries or paradoxes that, at the very least, contribute to basic conceptual change. Those worried about the latter problem have also raised questions about the logical relation between universal and particular implied in Hegel’s account. Hegel, following Fichte, radicalizes a Kantian claim about the inaccessibility of pure particularity in sensations Kant had written that “intuitions without concepts are blind”. Hegel charges that Kant did not draw sufficiently radical conclusions from such an antiempiricist claim, that he should have completely rethought the traditional distinction between “what was given to the mind” and “what the mind did with the given.” By contrast Hegel is confident that he has a theory of a “concrete universal,” concepts that cannot be understood as pale generalizations or abstract representations of given particulars, because they are required for particulars to Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 368    AM  368 be apprehended in the first place. They are not originally dependent on an immediate acquaintance with particulars; there is no such acquaintance. Critics wonder if Hegel has much of a theory of particularity left, if he does not claim rather that particulars, or whatever now corresponds to them, are only interrelations of concepts, and in which the actual details of the organization of the natural world and human history are deduced as conceptual necessities in Hegel’s Encyclopedia. This interpretation of Hegel, that he believes all entities are really the thoughts, expressions, or modes of a single underlying mental substance, and that this mind develops and posits itself with some sort of conceptual necessity, has been termed a panlogicism, a term of art coined by Hermann Glockner, a Hegel commentator in the first half of the twentieth century. It is a much-disputed reading. Such critics are especially concerned with the implications of this issue in Hegel’s political theory, where the great modern opposition between the state and the individual seems subjected to this same logic, and the individual’s true individuality is said to reside in and only in the political universal, the State. Thus, on the one hand, Hegel’s political philosophy is often praised for its early identification and analysis of a fundamental, new aspect of contemporary life  the categorically distinct realm of political life in modernity, or the independence of the “State” from the social world of private individuals engaged in competition and private association “civil society”. But, on the other hand, his attempt to argue for a completion of these domains in the State, or that individuals could only be said to be free in allegiance to a State, has been, at least since Marx, one of the most criticized aspects of his philosophy. Finally, criticisms also frequently target the underlying intention behind such claims: Hegel’s career-long insistence on finding some basic unity among the many fragmented spheres of modern thought and existence, and his demand that this unity be articulated in a discursive account, that it not be merely felt, or gestured at, or celebrated in edifying speculation. PostHegelian thinkers have tended to be suspicious of any such intimations of a whole for modern experience, and have argued that, with the destruction of the premodern world, we simply have to content ourselves with the disconnected, autonomous spheres of modern interests. In his lecture courses these basic themes are treated in wide-ranging accounts of the basic institutions of cultural history. History itself is treated as fundamentally political history, and, in typically Hegelian fashion, the major epochs of political history are claimed to be as they were because of the internal inadequacies of past epochs, all until some final political semiconsciousness is achieved and realized. Art is treated equally developmentally, evolving from symbolic, through “classical,” to the most intensely self-conscious form of aesthetic subjectivity, romantic art. The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion embody these themes in some of the most controversial ways, since Hegel often treats religion and its development as a kind of picture or accessible “representation” of his own views about the relation of thought to being, the proper understanding of human finitude and “infinity,” and the essentially social or communal nature of religious life. This has inspired a characteristic debate among Hegel scholars, with some arguing that Hegel’s appropriation of religion shows that his own themes are essentially religious if an odd, pantheistic version of Christianity, while others argue that he has so Hegelianized religious issues that there is little distinctively religious left. Influence. This last debate is typical of that prominent in the post-Hegelian tradition. Although, in the decades following his death, there was a great deal of work by self-described Hegelians on the history of law, on political philosophy, and on aesthetics, most of the prominent academic defenders of Hegel were interested in theology, and many of these were interested in defending an interpretation of Hegel consistent with traditional Christian views of a personal God and personal immortality. This began to change with the work of “young Hegelians” such as D. F. Strauss 180874, Feuerbach 180472, Bruno Bauer 180982, and Arnold Ruge 180380, who emphasized the humanistic and historical dimensions of Hegel’s account of religion, rejected the Old Hegelian tendencies toward a reconciliation with contemporary political life, and began to reinterpret and expand Hegel’s account of the productive activity of human spirit eventually focusing on labor rather than intellectual and cultural life. Strauss himself characterized the fight as between “left,” “center,” and “right” Hegelians, depending on whether one was critical or conservative politically, or had a theistic or a humanistic view of Hegelian Geist. The most famous young or left Hegelian was Marx, especially during his days in Paris as coeditor, with Ruge, of the Deutsch-französischen Jahrbücher 1844. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 369    AM  369 In Great Britain, with its long skeptical, empiricist, and utilitarian tradition, Hegel’s work had little influence until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when philosophers such as Green and Caird took up some of the holistic themes in Hegel and developed a neo-Hegelian reading of issues in politics and religion that began to have influence in the academy. The most prominent of the British neo-Hegelians of the next generation were Bosanquet, McTaggart, and especially Bradley, all of whom were interested in many of the metaphysical implications of Hegel’s idealism, what they took to be a Hegelian claim for the “internally related” interconnection of all particulars within one single, ideal or mental, substance. Moore and Russell waged a hugely successful counterattack in the name of traditional empiricism and what would be called “analytic philosophy” against such an enterprise and in this tradition largely finished off the influence of Hegel or what was left of the historical Hegel in these neo-Hegelian versions. In G.y, Hegel has continued to influence a number of different schools of neo-Marxism, sometimes itself simply called “Hegelian Marxism,” especially the Frankfurt School, or “critical theory” group especially Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse. And he has been extremely influential in France, particularly thanks to the lectures of a brilliant if idiosyncratic Russian émigré, Alexander Kojève, who taught Hegel in the 0s at the École Pratique des Hautes Études to the likes of Merleau-Ponty and Lacan. Kojève was as much influenced by Marx and Heidegger as Hegel, but his lectures inspired many thinkers to turn again to Hegel’s account of human selfdefinition in time and to the historicity of all institutions and practices and so forged an unusual link between Hegel and postwar existentialism. Hegelian themes continue to resurface in contemporary hermeneutics, in “communitarianism” in ethics, and in the increasing attention given to conceptual change and history in the philosophy of science. This has meant for many that Hegel should now be regarded not only as the origin of a distinctive tradition in European philosophy that emphasizes the historical and social nature of human existence, but as a potential contributor to many new and often interdisciplinary approaches to philosophy.

Heno-theism, allegiance to one supreme deity while conceding existence to others; also described as monolatry, incipient monotheism, or practical monotheism. It occupies a middle ground between polytheism and radical monotheism, which denies reality to all gods save one. It has been claimed that early Judaism passed through a henotheistic phase, acknowledging other Middle Eastern deities albeit condemning their worship, en route to exclusive recognition of Yahweh. But the concept of progress from polytheism through henotheism to monotheism is a rationalizing construct, and cannot be supposed to capture the complex development of any historical religion, including that of ancient Israel.

heraclitus fl. c.500 B.C., Grice on Heraclitus: They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,/They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remembered how often you and I/Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. Grecian philosopher. A transition figure between the Milesian philosophers and the later pluralists, Heraclitus stressed unity in the world of change. He follows the Milesians in positing a series of cyclical transformations of basic stuffs of the world; for instance, he holds that fire changes to water and earth in turn. Moreover, he seems to endorse a single source or arche of natural substances, namely fire. But he also observes that natural transformations necessarily involve contraries such as hot and cold, wet and dry. Indeed, without the one contrary the other would not exist, and without contraries the cosmos would not exist. Hence strife is justice, and war is the father and king of all. In the conflict of opposites there is a hidden harmony that sustains the world, symbolized by the tension of a bow or the attunement of a lyre. Scholars disagree about whether Heraclitus’s chief view is that there is a one in the many or that process is reality. Clearly the underlying unity of phenomena is important for him. But he also stresses the transience of physical substances and the importance of processes and qualities. Moreover, his underlying source of unity seems to be a law of process and opposition; thus he seems to affirm both the unity of phenomena and the reality of process. Criticizing his predecessors such as Pythagoras and Xenophanes for doing research without insight, Heraclitus claims that we should listen to the logos, which teaches that all things are one. The logos, a principle of order and knowledge, is common to all, but the many remain ignorant of it, like sleepwalkers unaware of the reality around them. All things come to pass according to the logos; hence it is the law of change, or at least its expression. Heraclitus wrote a single book, perhaps organized into sections on cosmology, politics and ethics, and theology. Apparently, however, he did not provide a continuous argument but a series of epigrammatic remarks meant to reveal the nature of reality through oracular and riddling language. Although he seems to have been a recluse without immediate disciples, he may have stirred Parmenides to his reaction against contraries. In the late fifth century B.C. Cratylus of Athens preached a radical Heraclitean doctrine according to which everything is in flux and there is accordingly no knowledge of the world. This version of Heracliteanism influenced Plato’s view of the sensible world and caused Plato and Aristotle to attribute a radical doctrine of flux to Heraclitus. Democritus imitated Heraclitus’s ethical sayings, and in Hellenistic times the Stoics appealed to him for their basic principles. 

interpretatum: h “While ‘heremneia’ sounds poetic and sweet, ‘interpretatio’ sounds thomistic and rough!” – H. P. Grice. “Plus ‘hermeneia is metaphorical.’ hermeneia: hermeneutics, the art or theory of interpretation, as well as a type of philosophy that starts with questions of interpretation. Originally concerned more narrowly with interpreting sacred texts, the term acquired a much broader significance in its historical development and finally became a philosophical position in twentieth-century G. philosophy. There are two competing positions in hermeneutics: whereas the first follows Dilthey and sees interpretation or Verstehen as a method for the historical and human sciences, the second follows Heidegger and sees it as an “ontological event,” an interaction between interpreter and text that is part of the history of what is understood. Providing rules or criteria for understanding what an author or native “really” meant is a typical problem for the first approach. The interpretation of the law provides an example for the second view, since the process of applying the law inevitably transforms it. In general, hermeneutics is the analysis of this process and its conditions of possibility. It has typically focused on the interpretation of ancient texts and distant peoples, cases where the unproblematic everyday understanding and communication cannot be assumed. Schleiermacher’s analysis of understanding and expression related to texts and speech marks the beginning of hermeneutics in the modern sense of a scientific methodology. This emphasis on methodology continues in nineteenth-century historicism and culminates in Dilthey’s attempt to ground the human sciences in a theory of interpretation, understood as the imaginative but publicly verifiable reenactment of the subjective experiences of others. Such a method of interpretation reveals the possibility of an objective knowledge of human beings not accessible to empiricist inquiry and thus of a distinct methodology for the human sciences. One result of the analysis of interpretation in the nineteenth century was the recognition of “the hermeneutic circle,” first developed by Schleiermacher. The circularity of interpretation concerns the relation of parts to the whole: the interpretation of each part is dependent on the interpretation of the whole. But interpretation is circular in a stronger sense: if every interpretation is itself based on interpretation, then the circle of interpretation, even if it is not vicious, cannot be escaped. Twentieth-century hermeneutics advanced by Heidegger and Gadamer radicalize this notion of the hermeneutic circle, seeing it as a feature of all knowledge and activity. Hermeneutics is then no longer the method of the human sciences but “universal,” and interpretation is part of the finite and situated character of all human knowing. “Philosophical hermeneutics” therefore criticizes Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology and Enlightenment universalism in ethics, seeing science as a cultural practice and prejudices or prejudgments as ineliminable in all judgments. Positively, it emphasizes understanding as continuing a historical tradition, as well as dialogical openness, in which prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened. 

hermetism, also hermeticism, a philosophical theology whose basic impulse was the gnostic conviction that human salvation depends on revealed knowledge gnosis of God and of the human and natural creations. Texts ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus, a Greco-Egyptian version of the Egyptian god Thoth, may have appeared as early as the fourth century B.C., but the surviving Corpus Hermeticum in Grecian and Latin is a product of the second and third centuries A.D. Fragments of the same literature exist in Grecian, Armenian, and Coptic as well; the Coptic versions are part of a discovery made at Nag Hammadi after World War II. All these Hermetica record hermetism as just described. Other Hermetica traceable to the same period but surviving in later Arabic or Latin versions deal with astrology, alchemy, magic, and other kinds of occultism. Lactantius, Augustine, and other early Christians cited Hermes but disagreed on his value; before Iamblichus, pagan philosophers showed little interest. Muslims connected Hermes with a Koranic figure, Idris, and thereby enlarged the medieval hermetic tradition, which had its first large effects in the Latin West among the twelfth-century Platonists of Chartres. The only ancient hermetic text then available in the West was the Latin Asclepius, but in 1463 Ficino interrupted his epochal translation of Plato to Latinize fourteen of the seventeen Grecian discourses in the main body of the Corpus Hermeticum as distinct from the many Grecian fragments preserved by Stobaeus but unknown to Ficino. Ficino was willing to move so quickly to Hermes because he believed that this Egyptian deity stood at the head of the “ancient theology” prisca theologia, a tradition of pagan revelation that ran parallel to Christian scripture, culminated with Plato, and continued through Plotinus and the later Neoplatonists. Ficino’s Hermes translation, which he called the Pimander, shows no interest in the magic and astrology about which he theorized later in his career. Trinitarian theology was his original motivation. The Pimander was enormously influential in the later Renaissance, when Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Lodovico Lazzarelli, Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples, Symphorien Champier, Francesco Giorgi, Agostino Steuco, Francesco Patrizi, and others enriched Western appreciation of Hermes. The first printed Grecian Hermetica was the 1554 edition of Adrien Turnebus. The last before the nineteenth century appeared in 1630, a textual hiatus that reflected a decline in the reputation of Hermes after Isaac Casaubon proved philologically in 1614 that the Grecian Hermetica had to be post-Christian, not the remains of primeval Egyptian wisdom. After Casaubon, hermetic ideas fell out of fashion with most Western philosophers of the current canon, but the historiography of the ancient theology remained influential for Newton and for lesser figures even later. The content of the Hermetica was out of tune with the new science, so Casaubon’s redating left Hermes to the theosophical heirs of Robert Fludd, whose opponents Kepler, Mersenne, Gassendi turned away from the Hermetica and similar fascinations of Renaissance humanist culture. By the nineteenth century, only theosophists took Hermes seriously as a prophet of pagan wisdom, but he was then rediscovered by G. students of Christianity and Hellenistic religions, especially Richard Reitzenstein, who published his Poimandres in 4. The ancient Hermetica are now read in the 654 edition of A. D. Nock and A. J. Festugière. 

heuristics, a rule or solution adopted to reduce the complexity of computational tasks, thereby reducing demands on resources such as time, memory, and attention. If an algorithm is a procedure yielding a correct solution to a problem, then a heuristic procedure may not reach a solution even if there is one, or may provide an incorrect answer. The reliability of heuristics varies between domains; the resulting biases are predictable, and provide information about system design. Chess, for example, is a finite game with a finite number of possible positions, but there is no known algorithm for finding the optimal move. Computers and humans both employ heuristics in evaluating intermediate moves, relying on a few significant cues to game quality, such as safety of the king, material balance, and center control. The use of these criteria simplifies the problem, making it computationally tractable. They are heuristic guides, reliable but limited in success. There is no guarantee that the result will be the best move or even good. They are nonetheless satisfactory for competent chess. Work on human judgment indicates a similar moral. Examples of judgmental infelicities support the view that human reasoning systematically violates standards for statistical reasoning, ignoring base rates, sample size, and correlations. Experimental results suggest that humans utilize judgmental heuristics in gauging probabilities, such as representativeness, or the degree to which an individual or event resembles a prototypical member of a category. Such heuristics produce reasonable judgments in many cases, but are of limited validity when measured by a Bayesian standard. Judgmental heuristics are biased and subject to systemic errors. Experimental support for the importance of these heuristics depends on cases in which subjects deviate from the normative standard. 

habitus: hexis Grecian, from hexo, ‘to have’, ‘to be disposed’, a good or bad condition, disposition, or state. The traditional rendering, ‘habit’ Latin habitus, is misleading, for it tends to suggest the idea of an involuntary and merely repetitious pattern of behavior. A hexis is rather a state of character or of mind that disposes us to deliberately choose to act or to think in a certain way. The term acquired a quasi-technical status after Aristotle advanced the view that hexis is the genus of virtue, both moral and intellectual. In the Nicomachean Ethics he distinguishes hexeis from passions pathe and faculties dunamis of the soul. If a man fighting in the front ranks feels afraid when he sees the enemy approaching, he is undergoing an involuntary passion. His capacity to be affected by fear on this or other occasions is part of his makeup, one of his faculties. If he chooses to stay where his commanders placed him, this is due to the hexis or state of character we call courage. Likewise, one who is consistently good at identifying what is best for oneself can be said to possess a hexis called prudence. Not all states and dispositions are commendable. Cowardice and stupidity are also hexeis. Both in the sense of ‘state’ and of ‘possession’ hexis plays a role in Aristotle’s Categories. 

Bradwardine, fellow of Merton.

tisberi -- Heytesbury: w. also called Hentisberus, Hentisberi, Tisberi before, English philosopher and chancellor of Oxford . He wrote Sophismata “Sophisms”, Regulae solvendi sophismata “Rules for Solving Sophisms”, and De sensu composito et diviso “On the Composite and Divided Sense”. Other works are doubtfully attributed to him. Heytesbury belonged to the generation immediately after Thomas Bradwardine and Kilvington, and was among the most significant members of the Oxford Calculators, important in the early developemnt of physics. Unlike Kilvington but like Bradwardine, he appealed to mathematical calculations in addition to logical and conceptual analysis in the treatment of change, motion, acceleration, and other physical notions. His Regulae includes perhaps the most influential treatment of the liar paradox in the Middle Ages. Heytesbury’s work makes widespread use of “imaginary” thought experiments assuming physical impossibilities that are yet logically consistent. His influence was especially strong in Italy in the fifteenth century, where his works were studied widely and commented on many times. 

hierarchy, a division of mathematical objects into subclasses in accordance with an ordering that reflects their complexity. Around the turn of the century, analysts interested in the “descriptive set theory” of the real numbers defined and studied two systems of classification for sets of reals, the Borel (due to Emil Borel) and the G hierarchies. In the 1940s, logicians interested in recursion and definability (most importantly, Stephen Kleene) introduced and studied other hierarchies (the arithmetic, the hyperarithmetic, and the analytical hierarchies) of reals (identified with sets of natural numbers) and of sets of reals; the relations between this work and the earlier work were made explicit in the 1950s by J. Addison. Other sorts of hierarchies have been introduced in other corners of logic. All these so-called hierarchies have at least this in common: they divide a class of mathematical objects into subclasses subject to a natural well-founded ordering (e.g., by subsethood) that reflects the complexity (in a sense specific to the hierarchy under consideration) of the objects they contain. What follows describes several hierarchies from the study of definability. (For more historical and mathematical information see Descriptive Set Theory by Y. Moschovakis, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1980.) (1) Hierarchies of formulas. Consider a formal language L with quantifiers ‘E’ and ‘D’. Given a set B of formulas in L, we inductively define a hierarchy that treats the members of B as “basic.” Set P0 % S0 % B. Suppose sets Pn and Sn of formulas have been defined. Let Pn!1 % the set of all formulas of the form Q1u1 . . . Qmumw when u1, . . . , um are distinct variables, Q1, . . . , Qm are all ‘E’, m M 1, and w 1 Sn. Let Sn+1 % the set of all formulas of that form for Q1, . . . , Qm all ‘D’, and w 1 Pn. Here are two such hierarchies for languages of arithmetic. Take the logical constants to be truthfunctions, ‘E’ and ‘D’. (i) Let L0 % the first-order language of arithmetic, based on ‘%’, a two-place predicate-constant ‘‹’, an individual-constant for 0, functionconstants for successor, addition, and multiplication; ‘first-order’ means that bound variables are all first-order (ranging over individuals); we’ll allow free second-order variables (ranging over properties or sets of individuals). Let B % the set of bounded formulas, i.e. those formed from atomic formulas using connectives and bounded quantification: if w is bounded so are Eu(u ‹ t / w) and Du(u ‹ t & w). (ii) Let L1 % the second-order language of arithmetic (formed from L0 by allowing bound second-order variables); let B % the set of formulas in which no second-order variable is bound, and take all u1, . . . , um as above to be second-order variables. (2) Hierarchies of definable sets. (i) The Arithmetic Hierarchy. For a set of natural numbers (call such a thing ‘a real’) A : A 1 P0 n [ or S0 n ] if and only if A is defined over the standard model of arithmetic (i.e., with the constant for 0 assigned to 0, etc., and with the first-order variables ranging over the natural numbers) by a formula of L0 in Pn [respectively Sn] as described in (1.i). Set D0 n % P0 n Thus: In fact, all these inclusions are proper. This hierarchy classifies the reals simple enough to be defined by arithmetic formulas. Example: ‘Dy x % y ! y’ defines the set even of even natural numbers; the formula 1 S1, so even 1 S0 1; even is also defined by a formula in P1; so even 1 P0 1, giving even 1 D0 1. In fact, S0 1 % the class of recursively enumerable reals, and D0 1 % the class of recursive reals. The classification of reals under the arithmetic hierarchy reflects complexity of defining formulas; it differs from classification in terms of a notion of degree of unsolvability, that reflecting a notion of comparative computational complexity; but there are connections between these classifications. The Arithmetic Hierarchy extends to sets of reals (using a free second-order variable in defining sentences). Example: ‘Dx (Xx & Dy y % x ! x)’ 1 S1 and defines the set of those reals with an even number; so that set 1 S0 1.The Analytical Hierarchy. Given a real A : A 1 P1 n [S1 1] if and only if A is defined (over the standard model of arithmetic with second-order variables ranging over all sets of natural numbers) by a formula of L1 in Pn (respectively Sn) as described in (1.ii); D1 n % P1 n 3 S1 n. Similarly for a set of reals. The inclusions pictured above carry over, replacing superscripted 0’s by 1’s. This classifies all reals and sets of reals simple enough to have analytical (i.e., second-order arithmetic) definitions.The subscripted ‘n’ in ‘P0 n’, etc., ranged over natural numbers. But the Arithmetic Hierarchy is extended “upward” into the transfinite by the ramified-analytical hierarchy. Let R0 % the class of all arithmetical reals. For an ordinal a let Ra!1 % the class of all sets of reals definable by formulas of L1 in which second-order variables range only over reals in Ra – this constraint imposes ramification. For a limit-ordinal l, let Rl % UaThe above hierarchies arise in arithmetic. Similar hierarchies arise in pure set theory; e.g. by transferring the “process” that produced the ramified analytical hierarchy to pure set theory we obtain the constructible hierarchy, defined by Gödel in his 1939 monograph on the continuum hypothesis.

Grice’s formalists: Hilbert, D. – G. mathematician and philosopher of mathematics. Born in Königsberg, he also studied and served on the faculty there, accepting Weber’s chair in mathematics at Göttingen in 1895. He made important contributions to many different areas of mathematics and was renowned for his grasp of the entire discipline. His more philosophical work was divided into two parts. The focus of the first, which occupied approximately ten years beginning in the early 1890s, was the foundations of geometry and culminated in his celebrated Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899). This is a rich and complex work that pursues a variety of different projects simultaneously. Prominent among these is one whose aim is to determine the role played in geometrical reasoning by principles of continuity. Hilbert’s interest in this project was rooted in Kantian concerns, as is confirmed by the inscription, in the Grundlagen, of Kant’s synopsis of his critical philosophy: “Thus all human knowledge begins with intuition, goes from there to concepts and ends with ideas.” Kant believed that the continuous could not be represented in intuition and must therefore be regarded as an idea of pure reason – i.e., as a device playing a purely regulative role in the development of our geometrical knowledge (i.e., our knowledge of the spatial manifold of sensory experience). Hilbert was deeply influenced by this view of Kant’s and his work in the foundations of geometry can be seen, in large part, as an attempt to test it by determining whether (or to what extent) pure geometry can be developed without appeal to principles concerning the nature of the continuous. To a considerable extent, Hilbert’s work confirmed Kant’s view – showing, in a manner more precise than any Kant had managed, that appeals to the continuous can indeed be eliminated from much of our geometrical reasoning. The same basic Kantian orientation also governed the second phase of Hilbert’s foundational work, where the focus was changed from geometry to arithmetic and analysis. This is the phase during which Hilbert’s Program was developed. This project began to take shape in the 1917 essay “Axiomatisches Denken.” (The 1904 paper “Über die Grundlagen der Logik und Arithmetik,” which turned away from geometry and toward arithmetic, does not yet contain more than a glimmer of the ideas that would later become central to Hilbert’s proof theory.) It reached its philosophically most mature form in the 1925 essay “Über das Unendliche,” the 1926 address “Die Grundlagen der Mathematik,” and the somewhat more popular 1930 paper “Naturerkennen und Logik.” (From a technical as opposed to a philosophical vantage, the classical statement is probably the 1922 essay “Neubegründung der Mathematik. Erste Mitteilung.”) The key elements of the program are (i) a distinction between real and ideal propositions and methods of proof or derivation; (ii) the idea that the so-called ideal methods, though, again, playing the role of Kantian regulative devices (as Hilbert explicitly and emphatically declared in the 1925 paper), are nonetheless indispensable for a reasonably efficient development of our mathematical knowledge; and (iii) the demand that the reliability of the ideal methods be established by real (or finitary) means. As is well known, Hilbert’s Program soon came under heavy attack from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (especially the second), which have commonly been regarded as showing that the third element of Hilbert’s Program (i.e., the one calling for a finitary proof of the reliability of the ideal systems of classical mathematics) cannot be carried out. Hilbert’s Program, a proposal in the foundations of mathematics, named for its developer, the German mathematician-philosopher David Hilbert, who first formulated it fully in the 1920s. Its aim was to justify classical mathematics (in particular, classical analysis and set theory), though only as a Kantian regulative device and not as descriptive science. The justification thus presupposed a division of classical mathematics into two parts: the part (termed real mathematics by Hilbert) to be regulated, and the part (termed ideal mathematics by Hilbert) serving as regulator. Real mathematics was taken to consist of the meaningful, true propositions of mathematics and their justifying proofs. These proofs – commonly known as finitary proofs – were taken to be of an especially elementary epistemic character, reducing, ultimately, to quasi-perceptual intuitions concerning finite assemblages of perceptually intuitable signs regarded from the point of view of their shapes and sequential arrangement. Ideal mathematics, on the other hand, was taken to consist of sentences that do not express genuine propositions and derivations that do not constitute genuine proofs or justifications. The epistemic utility of ideal sentences (typically referred to as ideal propositions, though, as noted above, they do not express genuine propositions at all) and proofs was taken to derive not from their meaning and/or evidentness, but rather from the role they play in some formal algebraic or calculary scheme intended to identify or locate the real truths. It is thus a metatheoretic function of the formal or algebraic properties induced on those propositions and proofs by their positions in a larger derivational scheme. Hilbert’s ideal mathematics was thus intended to bear the same relation to his real mathematics as Kant’s faculty of pure reason was intended to bear to his faculty of understanding. It was to be a regulative device whose proper function is to guide and facilitate the development of our system of real judgments. Indeed, in his 1925 essay “Über das Unendliche,” Hilbert made just this point, noting that ideal elements do not correspond to anything in reality but serve only as ideas “if, following Kant’s terminology, one understands as an idea a concept of reason which transcends all experience and by means of which the concrete is to be completed into a totality.” The structure of Hilbert’s scheme, however, involves more than just the division of classical mathematics into real and ideal propositions and proofs. It uses, in addition, a subdivision of the real propositions into the problematic and the unproblematic. Indeed, it is this subdivision of the reals that is at bottom responsible for the introduction of the ideals. Unproblematic real propositions, described by Hilbert as the basic equalities and inequalities of arithmetic (e.g., ‘3 ( 2’, ‘2 ‹ 3’, ‘2 ! 3 % 3 ! 2’) together with their sentential (and certain of their bounded quantificational) compounds, are the evidentially most basic judgments of mathematics. They are immediately intelligible and decidable by finitary intuition. More importantly, they can be logically manipulated in all the ways that classical logic allows without leading outside the class of real propositions. The characteristic feature of the problematic reals, on the other hand, is that they cannot be so manipulated. Hilbert gave two kinds of examples of problematic real propositions. One consisted of universal generalizations like ‘for any non-negative integer a, a ! 1 % 1 ! a’, which Hilbert termed hypothetical judgments. Such propositions are problematic because their denials do not bound the search for counterexamples. Hence, the instance of the (classical) law of excluded middle that is obtained by disjoining it with its denial is not itself a real proposition. Consequently, it cannot be manipulated in all the ways permitted by classical logic without going outside the class of real propositions. Similarly for the other kind of problematic real discussed by Hilbert, which was a bounded existential quantification. Every such sentence has as one of its classical consequents an unbounded existential quantification of the same matrix. Hence, since the latter is not a real proposition, the former is not a real proposition that can be fully manipulated by classical logical means without going outside the class of real propositions. It is therefore “problematic.” The question why full classical logical manipulability should be given such weight points up an important element in Hilbert’s thinking: namely, that classical logic is regarded as the preferred logic of human thinking – the logic of the optimally functioning human epistemic engine, the logic according to which the human mind most naturally and efficiently conducts its inferential affairs. It therefore has a special psychological status and it is because of this that the right to its continued use must be preserved. As just indicated, however, preservation of this right requires addition of ideal propositions and proofs to their real counterparts, since applying classical logic to the truths of real mathematics leads to a system that contains ideal as well as real elements. Hilbert believed that to justify such an addition, all that was necessary was to show it to be consistent with real mathematics (i.e., to show that it proves no real proposition that is itself refutable by real means). Moreover, Hilbert believed that this must be done by finitary means. The proof of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem in 1931 brought considerable pressure to bear on this part of Hilbert’s Program even though it may not have demonstrated its unattainability.

“what-is-hinted” -- hint hinting. Don’t expect Cicero used this. It’s Germanic and related to ‘hunt,’ to ‘seize.’ As if you throw something in the air, and expect your recipient will seize it. Grice spends quite a long section in “Retrospective epilogue” to elucidate “Emissor E communicates that p via a hint,” versus “Emissor E communicates that p via a suggestion.” Some level of explicitness (vide candour) is necessary. If it is too obscure it cannot be held to have been ‘communicated’ in the first place! Cf. Holdcroft, “Some forms of indirect communication” for the Journal of Rhetoric. Grice had to do a bit of linguistic botany for his “E implicates that p”: To do duty for ‘imply,’ suggest, indicate, hint, mean, -- “etc.” indirectly or implicitly convey.

hippocrates, philosopher from Cos. Some sixty treatises survive under his name, but it is doubtful whether he was the author of any of them. The Hippocratic corpus contains material from a wide variety of standpoints, ranging from an extreme empiricism that rejected all grand theory (On Ancient Medicine) to highly speculative theoretical physiology (On the Nature of Man, On Regimen). Many treatises were concerned with the accurate observation and classification of diseases (Epidemics) rather than treatment. Some texts (On the Art) defended the claims of medicine to scientific status against those who pointed to its inaccuracies and conjectural status; others (Oath, On Decorum) sketch a code of professional ethics. Almost all his treatises were notable for their materialism and rejection of supernatural “explanations”; their emphasis on observation; and their concern with the isolation of causal factors. A large number of texts are devoted to gynecology. The Hippocratic corpus became the standard against which later doctors measured themselves; and, via Galen’s rehabilitation and extension of Hippocratic method, it became the basis for Western medicine for two millennia.

Historia -- historicism, the doctrine that knowledge of human affairs has an irreducibly historical character and that there can be no ahistorical perspective for an understanding of human nature and society. What is needed instead is a philosophical explication of historical knowledge that will yield the rationale for all sound knowledge of human activities. So construed, historicism is a philosophical doctrine originating in the methodological and epistemological presuppositions of critical historiography. In the mid-nineteenth century certain German thinkers (Dilthey most centrally), reacting against positivist ideals of science and knowledge, rejected scientistic models of knowledge, replacing them with historical ones. They applied this not only to the discipline of history but to economics, law, political theory, and large areas of philosophy. Initially concerned with methodological issues in particular disciplines, historicism, as it developed, sought to work out a common philosophical doctrine that would inform all these disciplines. What is essential to achieve knowledge in the human sciences is to employ the ways of understanding used in historical studies. There should in the human sciences be no search for natural laws; knowledge there will be interpretive and rooted in concrete historical occurrences. As such it will be inescapably perspectival and contextual (contextualism). This raises the issue of whether historicism is a form of historical relativism. Historicism appears to be committed to the thesis that what for a given people is warrantedly assertible is determined by the distinctive historical perspective in which they view life and society. The stress on uniqueness and concrete specificity and the rejection of any appeal to universal laws of human development reinforce that. But the emphasis on cumulative development into larger contexts of our historical knowledge puts in doubt an identification of historicism and historical relativism. The above account of historicism is that of its main proponents: Meinecke, Croce, Collingwood, Ortega y Gasset, and Mannheim. But in the twentieth century, with Popper and Hayek, a very different conception of historicism gained some currency. For them, to be a historicist is to believe that there are “historical laws,” indeed even a “law of historical development,” such that history has a pattern and even an end, that it is the central task of social science to discover it, and that these laws should determine the direction of political action and social policy. They attributed (incorrectly) this doctrine to Marx but rightly denounced it as pseudo-science. However, some later Marxists (Lukács, Korsch, and Gramsci) were historicists in the original nonPopperian sense as was the critical theorist Adorno and hermeneuticists such as Gadamer.

heterological: Grice and Thomson go heterological. Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell’s remarks on heterological and its implicate. Grice is particularly interested in Russell’s philosophy because of the usual Oxonian antipathy towards his type of philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found in Russell a good point for dissent! If paradoxes were always sets of propositions or arguments or conclusions, they would always be meaningful. But some paradoxes are semantically flawed and some have answers that are backed by a pseudo-argument employing a defective lemma that lacks a truth-value. Grellings paradox, for instance, opens with a distinction between autological and heterological words. An autological word describes itself, e.g., polysyllabic is polysllabic, English is English, noun is a noun, etc. A heterological word does not describe itself, e.g., monosyllabic is not monosyllabic, Chinese is not Chinese, verb is not a verb, etc. Now for the riddle: Is heterological heterological or autological? If heterological is heterological, since it describes itself, it is autological. But if heterological is autological, since it is a word that does not describe itself, it is heterological. The common solution to this puzzle is that heterological, as defined by Grelling, is not what Grice a genuine predicate  ‒ Gricing is!In other words, Is heterological heterological? is without meaning. That does not mean that an utterer, such as Baron Russell, may implicate that he is being very witty by uttering the Grelling paradox! There can be no predicate that applies to all and only those predicates it does not apply to for the same reason that there can be no barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves. Grice seems to be relying on his friend at Christ Church, Thomson in On Some Paradoxes, in the same volume where Grice published his Remarks about the senses, Analytical Philosophy, Butler (ed.), Blackwell, Oxford, 104–119. Grice thought that Thomson was a genius, if ever there is one! Plus, Grice thought that, after St. Johns, Christ Church was the second most beautiful venue in the city of dreaming spires. On top, it is what makes Oxford a city, and not, as villagers call it, a town. Refs.: the main source is Grice’s essay on ‘heterologicality,’ but the keyword ‘paradox’ is useful, too, especially as applied to Grice’s own paradox and to what, after Moore, Grice refers to as the philosopher’s paradoxes. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

hobbesian implicatura -- hobbes: “Hobbes is a Griceian” – Grice. Grice was a member of the Hobbes Society -- Thomas. English philosopher whose writings, especially the English version of Leviathan (1651), strongly influenced all of subsequent English moral and political philosophy. He also wrote a trilogy comprising De Cive (1642; English version, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, 1651), De Corpore (On the Body, 1655), and De Homine (On Man, 1658). Together with Leviathan (the revised Latin version of which was published in 1668), these are his major philosophical works. However, an early draft of his thoughts, The Elements of Law, Natural and Political(also known as Human Nature and De Corpore Politico), was published without permission in 1650. Many of the misinterpretations of Hobbes’s views on human nature come from mistaking this early work as representing his mature views. Hobbes was influential not only in England, but also on the Continent. He is the author of the third set of objections to Descartes’s Meditations. Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-politicus was deeply influenced by Hobbes, not only in its political views but also in the way it dealt with Scripture. Hobbes was not merely a philosopher; he was mathematical tutor to Charles II and also a classical scholar. His first published work was a translation of Thucydides (1628), and among his latest, about a half-century later, were translations of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. Hobbes’s philosophical views have a remarkably contemporary sound. In metaphysics, he holds a strong materialist view, sometimes viewing mental phenomena as epiphenomenal, but later moving toward a reductive or eliminative view. In epistemology he held a sophisticated empiricism, which emphasized the importance of language for knowledge. If not the originator of the contemporary compatibilist view of the relationship between free will and determinism (see The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, 1656), he was one of the primary influences. He also was one of the most important philosophers of language, explicitly noting that language is used not only to describe the world but to express attitudes and, performatively, to make promises and contracts. One of Hobbes’s outstanding characteristics is his intellectual honesty. Though he may have been timid (he himself claims that he was, explaining that his mother gave birth to him because of fright over the coming of the Spanish Armada), his writing shows no trace of it. During more than half his long lifetime he engaged in many philosophical controversies, which required considerably more courage in Hobbes’s day than at present. Both the Roman Catholic church and Oxford University banned the reading of his books and there was talk not only of burning his books but of burning Hobbes himself. An adequate interpretation of Hobbes requires careful attention to his accounts of human nature, reason, morality, and law. Although he was not completely consistent, his moral and political philosophy is remarkably coherent. His political theory is often thought to require an egoistic psychology, whereas it actually requires only that most persons be concerned with their own self-interest, especially their own preservation. It does not require that most not be concerned with other persons as well. All that Hobbes denies is an undifferentiated natural benevolence: “For if by nature one man should love another (that is) as man, there could no reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man, as being equally man.” His argument is that limited benevolence is not an adequate foundation upon which to build a state. Hobbes’s political theory does not require the denial of limited benevolence, he indeed includes benevolence in his list of the passions in Leviathan: “Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.” Psychological egoism not only denies benevolent action, it also denies action done from a moral sense, i.e., action done because one believes it is the morally right thing to do. But Hobbes denies neither kind of action. But when the words [’just’ and ‘unjust’] are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavor in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. Hobbes’s pessimism about the number of just people is primarily due to his awareness of the strength of the passions and his conviction that most people have not been properly educated and disciplined. Hobbes is one of the few philosophers to realize that to talk of that part of human nature which involves the passions is to talk about human populations. He says, “though the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned.” Though we may be aware of small communities in which mutual trust and respect make law enforcement unnecessary, this is never the case when we are dealing with a large group of people. Hobbes’s point is that if a large group of people are to live together, there must be a common power set up to enforce the rules of the society. That there is not now, nor has there ever been, any large group of people living together without such a common power is sufficient to establish his point. Often overlooked is Hobbes’s distinction between people considered as if they were simply animals, not modified in any way by education or discipline, and civilized people. Though obviously an abstraction, people as animals are fairly well exemplified by children. “Unless you give children all they ask for, they are peevish, and cry, aye and strike their parents sometimes; and all this they have from nature.” In the state of nature, people have no education or training, so there is “continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” But real people have been brought up in families; they are, at least to some degree, civilized persons, and how they will behave depends on how they are brought up. Hobbes does not say that society is a collection of misfits and that this is why we have all the trouble that we do – a position congenial to the psychological egoist. But he does acknowledge that “many also (perhaps most men) either through defect of mind, or want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human nature; wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education.” Education and training may change people so that they act out of genuine moral motives. That is why it is one of the most important functions of the sovereign to provide for the proper training and education of the citizens. In the current debate between nature and nurture, on the question of behavior Hobbes would come down strongly on the side of nurture. Hobbes’s concept of reason has more in common with the classical philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle, where reason sets the ends of behavior, than with the modern tradition stemming from Hume where the only function of reason is to discover the best means to ends set by the passions. For Hobbes, reason is very complex; it has a goal, lasting selfpreservation, and it seeks the way to this goal. It also discovers the means to ends set by the passions, but it governs the passions, or tries to, so that its own goal is not threatened. Since its goal is the same in all people, it is the source of rules applying to all people. All of this is surprisingly close to the generally accepted account of rationality. We generally agree that those who follow their passions when they threaten their life are acting irrationally. We also believe that everyone always ought to act rationally, though we know that few always do so. Perhaps it was just the closeness of Hobbes’s account of reason to the ordinary view of the matter that has led to its being so completely overlooked. The failure to recognize that the avoidance of violent death is the primary goal of reason has distorted almost all accounts of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy, yet it is a point on which Hobbes is completely clear and consistent. He explicitly says that reason “teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution [mortem violentam] as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature.” He continually points out that it is a dictate of right reason to seek peace when possible because people cannot “expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war.” And he calls temperance and fortitude precepts of reason because they tend to one’s preservation. It has not generally been recognized that Hobbes regarded it as an end of reason to avoid violent death because he often talks of the avoidance of death in a way that makes it seem merely an object of a passion. But it is reason that dictates that one take all those measures necessary for one’s preservation; peace if possible, if not, defense. Reason’s dictates are categorical; it would be a travesty of Hobbes’s view to regard the dictates of reason as hypothetical judgments addressed to those whose desire for their own preservation happens to be greater than any conflicting desire. He explicitly deplores the power of the irrational appetites and expressly declares that it is a dictate of reason that one not scorn others because “most men would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander.” He does not say if you would rather die than suffer slander, it is rational to do so. Hobbes, following Aristotle, regards morality as concerned with character traits or habits. Since morality is objective, it is only those habits that are called good by reason that are moral virtues. “Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and therefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy (which we have demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or habits, that is, virtues.” Moral virtues are those habits of acting that the reason of all people must praise. It is interesting to note that it is only in De Homine that Hobbes explicitly acknowledges that on this account, prudence, temperance, and courage are not moral virtues. In De Cive he distinguishes temperance and fortitude from the other virtues and does not call them moral, but he does not explicitly deny that they are moral virtues. But in De Homine, he explicitly points out that one should not “demand that the courage and prudence of the private man, if useful only to himself, be praised or held as a virtue by states or by any other men whatsoever to whom these same are not useful.” That morality is determined by reason and that reason has as its goal self-preservation seems to lead to the conclusion that morality also has as its goal self-preservation. But it is not the selfpreservation of an individual person that is the goal of morality, but of people as citizens of a state. That is, moral virtues are those habits of persons that make it rational for all other people to praise them. These habits are not those that merely lead to an individual’s own preservation, but to the preservation of all; i.e., to peace and a stable society. Thus, “Good dispositions are those that are suitable for entering into civil society; and good manners (that is, moral virtues) are those whereby what was entered upon can be best preserved.” And in De Cive, when talking of morality, he says, “The goodness of actions consist[s] in this, that it [is] in order to peace, and the evil in this, that it [is] related to discord.” The nature of morality is a complex and vexing question. If, like Hobbes, we regard morality as applying primarily to those manners or habits that lead to peace, then his view seems satisfactory. It yields, as he notes, all of the moral virtues that are ordinarily considered such, and further, it allows one to distinguish courage, prudence, and temperance from the moral virtues. Perhaps most important, it provides, in almost self-evident fashion, the justification of morality. For what is it to justify morality but to show that reason favors it? Reason, seeking self-preservation, must favor morality, which seeks peace and a stable society. For reason knows that peace and a stable society are essential for lasting preservation. This simple and elegant justification of morality does not reduce morality to prudence; rather it is an attempt, in a great philosophical tradition stemming from Plato, to reconcile reason or rational self-interest and morality. In the state of nature every person is and ought to be governed only by their own reason. Reason dictates that they seek peace, which yields the laws of nature, but it also allows them to use any means they believe will best preserve themselves, which is what Hobbes calls The Right of Nature. Hobbes’s insight is to see that, except when one is in clear and present danger, in which case one has an inalienable right to defend oneself, the best way to guarantee one’s longterm preservation is to give up one’s right to act on one’s own decisions about what is the best way to guarantee one’s long-term preservation and agree to act on the decisions of that single person or group who is the sovereign. If all individuals and groups are allowed to act on the decisions they regard as best, not accepting the commands of the sovereign, i.e., the laws, as the overriding guide for their actions, the result is anarchy and civil war. Except in rare and unusual cases, uniformity of action following the decision of the sovereign is more likely to lead to long-term preservation than diverse actions following diverse decisions. And this is true even if each one of the diverse decisions, if accepted by the sovereign as its decision, would have been more likely to lead to long-term preservation than the actual decision that the sovereign made. This argument explains why Hobbes holds that sovereigns cannot commit injustice. Only injustice can properly be punished. Hobbes does not deny that sovereigns can be immoral, but he does deny that the immorality of sovereigns can properly be punished. This is important, for otherwise any immoral act by the sovereign would serve as a pretext for punishing the sovereign, i.e., for civil war. What is just and unjust is determined by the laws of the state, what is moral and immoral is not. Morality is a wider concept than that of justice and is determined by what leads to peace and stability. However, to let justice be determined by what the reason of the people takes to lead to peace and stability, rather than by what the reason of the sovereign decides, would be to invite discord and civil war, which is contrary to the goal of morality: a stable society and peace. One can create an air of paradox by saying that for Hobbes it is immoral to attempt to punish some immoral acts, namely, those of the sovereign. Hobbes is willing to accept this seeming paradox for he never loses sight of the goal of morality, which is peace. To summarize Hobbes’s system: people, insofar as they are rational, want to live out their natural lives in peace and security. To do this, they must come together into cities or states of sufficient size to deter attack by any group. But when people come together in such a large group there will always be some that cannot be trusted, and thus it is necessary to set up a government with the power to make and enforce laws. This government, which gets both its right to govern and its power to do so from the consent of the governed, has as its primary duty the people’s safety. As long as the government provides this safety the citizens are obliged to obey the laws of the state in all things. Thus, the rationality of seeking lasting preservation requires seeking peace; this in turn requires setting up a state with sufficient power to keep the peace. Anything that threatens the stability of the state is to be avoided. As a practical matter, Hobbes took God and religion very seriously, for he thought they provided some of the strongest motives for action. Half of Leviathan is devoted to trying to show that his moral and political views are supported by Scripture, and to discredit those religious views that may lead to civil strife. But accepting the sincerity of Hobbes’s religious views does not require holding that Hobbes regarded God as the foundation of morality. He explicitly denies that atheists and deists are subject to the commands of God, but he never denies that they are subject to the laws of nature or of the civil state. Once one recognizes that, for Hobbes, reason itself provides a guide to conduct to be followed by all people, there is absolutely no need to bring in God. For in his moral and political theory there is nothing that God can do that is not already done by reason. Grice read most of Hobbes, both in Latin (for his Lit. Hum.) and in English. When in “Meaning,” Grice says “this is what people are getting at with their natural versus artificial signs” – he means Hobbes.

Hobson’s choice:  willkür – Hobson’s choice. One of Grice’s favourite words from Kant – “It’s so Kantish!” I told Pears about this, and having found it’s cognate with English ‘choose,’ he immediately set to write an essay on the topic!” f., ‘option, discretion, caprice,’ from MidHG. willekür, f., ‘free choice, free will’; gee kiesen and Kur-kiesen, verb, ‘to select,’ from Middle High German kiesen, Old High German chiosan, ‘to test, try, taste for the purpose of testing, test by tasting, select after strict examination.’ Gothic kiusan, Anglo-Saxon ceósan, English to choose. Teutonic root kus (with the change of s into rkur in the participle erkoren, see also Kur, ‘choice’), from pre-Teutonic gus, in Latin gus-tusgus-tare, Greek γεύω for γεύσω, Indian root juš, ‘to select, be fond of.’ Teutonic kausjun passed as kusiti into Slavonic. There is an oil portrait of Thomas Hobson, in the National Portrait Gallery, London. He looks straight to the artist and is dressed in typical Tudor dress, with a heavy coat, a ruff, and tie tails Thomas Hobson, a portrait in the National Portrait Gallery, London. A Hobson's choice is a free choice in which only one thing is offered. Because a person may refuse to accept what is offered, the two options are taking it or taking nothing. In other words, one may "take it or leave it".  The phrase is said to have originated with Thomas Hobson (1544–1631), a livery stable owner in Cambridge, England, who offered customers the choice of either taking the horse in his stall nearest to the door or taking none at all. According to a plaque underneath a painting of Hobson donated to Cambridge Guildhall, Hobson had an extensive stable of some 40 horses. This gave the appearance to his customers that, upon entry, they would have their choice of mounts, when in fact there was only one: Hobson required his customers to choose the horse in the stall closest to the door. This was to prevent the best horses from always being chosen, which would have caused those horses to become overused.[1] Hobson's stable was located on land that is now owned by St Catharine's College, Cambridge.  Early appearances in writing According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first known written usage of this phrase is in The rustick's alarm to the Rabbies, written by Samuel Fisher in 1660:[3]  If in this Case there be no other (as the Proverb is) then Hobson's choice...which is, chuse whether you will have this or none.  It also appears in Joseph Addison's paper The Spectator (No. 509 of 14 October 1712); and in Thomas Ward's 1688 poem "England's Reformation", not published until after Ward's death. Ward wrote:  Where to elect there is but one, 'Tis Hobson's choice—take that, or none. The term "Hobson's choice" is often used to mean an illusion of choice, but it is not a choice between two equivalent options, which is a Morton's fork, nor is it a choice between two undesirable options, which is a dilemma. Hobson's choice is one between something or nothing.  John Stuart Mill, in his book Considerations on Representative Government, refers to Hobson's choice:  When the individuals composing the majority would no longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either voting for the person brought forward by their local leaders, or not voting at all. In another of his books, The Subjection of Women, Mill discusses marriage:  Those who attempt to force women into marriage by closing all other doors against them, lay themselves open to a similar retort. If they mean what they say, their opinion must evidently be, that men do not render the married condition so desirable to women, as to induce them to accept it for its own recommendations. It is not a sign of one's thinking the boon one offers very attractive, when one allows only Hobson's choice, 'that or none'.... And if men are determined that the law of marriage shall be a law of despotism, they are quite right in point of mere policy, in leaving to women only Hobson's choice. But, in that case, all that has been done in the modern world to relax the chain on the minds of women, has been a mistake. They should have never been allowed to receive a literary education.[7]  A Hobson's choice is different from:  Dilemma: a choice between two or more options, none of which is attractive. False dilemma: only certain choices are considered, when in fact there are others. Catch-22: a logical paradox arising from a situation in which an individual needs something that can only be acquired by not being in that very situation. Morton's fork, and a double bind: choices yield equivalent, and often undesirable, results. Blackmail and extortion: the choice between paying money (or some non-monetary good or deed) or risk suffering an unpleasant action. A common error is to use the phrase "Hobbesian choice" instead of "Hobson's choice", confusing the philosopher Thomas Hobbes with the relatively obscure Thomas Hobson  (It's possible they may be confusing "Hobson's choice" with "Hobbesian trap", which refers to the trap into which a state falls when it attacks another out of fear).[11] Notwithstanding that confused usage, the phrase "Hobbesian choice" is historically incorrect. Common law In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983), Justice Byron White dissented and classified the majority's decision to strike down the "one-house veto" as unconstitutional as leaving Congress with a Hobson's choice. Congress may choose between "refrain[ing] from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking function to the executive branch and independent agency".  In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978),[15] the majority opinion ruled that a New Jersey law which prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste from other states into New Jersey was unconstitutional based on the Commerce Clause. The majority reasoned that New Jersey cannot discriminate between the intrastate waste and the interstate waste with out due justification. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated:  [According to the Court,] New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leaving itself to cast about for a presently nonexistent solution to the serious problem of disposing of the waste generated within its own borders, or it must accept waste from every portion of the United States, thereby multiplying the health and safety problems which would result if it dealt only with such wastes generated within the State. Because past precedents establish that the Commerce Clause does not present appellees with such a Hobson's choice, I dissent.  In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)[16] the judgement of the court was that  [T]here was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman Amendment, by putting municipalities to the Hobson's choice of keeping the peace or paying civil damages, attempted to impose obligations to municipalities by indirection that could not be imposed directly, thereby threatening to "destroy the government of the states".  In the South African Constitutional Case MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v Pillay, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC)[17] Chief Justice Langa for the majority of the Court (in Paragraph 62 of the judgement) writes that:  The traditional basis for invalidating laws that prohibit the exercise of an obligatory religious practice is that it confronts the adherents with a Hobson's choice between observance of their faith and adherence to the law. There is however more to the protection of religious and cultural practices than saving believers from hard choices. As stated above, religious and cultural practices are protected because they are central to human identity and hence to human dignity which is in turn central to equality. Are voluntary practices any less a part of a person's identity or do they affect human dignity any less seriously because they are not mandatory?  In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and added in one of the footnotes that the petitioners "faced a Hobson’s choice: accept arbitration on their employer’s terms or give up their jobs".  In Trump et al v. Mazars USA, LLP, US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia No. 19-5142, 49 (D.C. Cir. 11 October 2019) ("[w]orse still, the dissent’s novel approach would now impose upon the courts the job of ordering the cessation of the legislative function and putting Congress to the Hobson’s Choice of impeachment or nothing.").  Popular culture Hobson's Choice is a full-length stage comedy written by Harold Brighouse in 1915. At the end of the play, the central character, Henry Horatio Hobson, formerly a wealthy, self-made businessman but now a sick and broken man, faces the unpalatable prospect of being looked after by his daughter Maggie and her husband Will Mossop, who used to be one of Hobson's underlings. His other daughters have refused to take him in, so he has no choice but to accept Maggie's offer which comes with the condition that he must surrender control of his entire business to her and her husband, Will.  The play was adapted for film several times, including versions from 1920 by Percy Nash, 1931 by Thomas Bentley, 1954 by David Lean and a 1983 TV movie.  Alfred Bester's 1952 short story Hobson's Choice describes a world in which time travel is possible, and the option is to travel or to stay in one's native time.  In the 1951 Robert Heinlein book Between Planets, the main character Don Harvey incorrectly mentions he has a Hobson's choice. While on a space station orbiting Earth, Don needs to get to Mars, where his parents are. The only rockets available are back to Earth (where he is not welcome) or on to Venus.  In The Grim Grotto by Lemony Snicket, the Baudelaire orphans and Fiona are said to be faced with a Hobson's Choice when they are trapped by the Medusoid Mycelium Mushrooms in the Gorgonian Grotto: "We can wait until the mushrooms disappear, or we can find ourselves poisoned".In Bram Stoker's short story "The Burial of Rats", the narrator advises he has a case of Hobson's Choice while being chased by villains. The story was written around 1874.  The Terminal Experiment, a 1995 science fiction novel by Robert J. Sawyer, was originally serialised under the title Hobson's Choice.  Half-Life, a video game created in 1998 by Valve includes a Hobson's Choice in the final chapter. A human-like entity, known only as the 'G-Man', offers the protagonist Gordon Freeman a job, working under his control. If Gordon were to refuse this offer, he would be killed in an unwinnable battle, thus creating the 'illusion of free choice'.  In Early Edition, the lead character Gary Hobson is named after the choices he regularly makes during his adventures.  In an episode of Inspector George Gently, a character claims her resignation was a Hobson's choice, prompting a debate among other police officers as to who Hobson is.  In "Cape May" (The Blacklist season 3, episode 19), Raymond Reddington describes having faced a Hobson's choice in the previous episode where he was faced with the choice of saving Elizabeth Keen's baby and losing Elizabeth Keen or losing them both.  In his 1984 novel Job: A Comedy of Justice, Robert A. Heinlein's protagonist is said to have Hobson's Choice when he has the options of boarding the wrong cruise ship or staying on the island.  Remarking about the 1909 Ford Model T, US industrialist Henry Ford is credited as saying “Any customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black”[19]  In 'The Jolly Boys' Outing', a 1989 Christmas Special episode of Only Fools and Horses, Alan states they are left with Hobson's Choice after their coach has blown up (due to a dodgy radio, supplied by Del). There's a rail strike, the last bus has gone, and their coach is out of action. They can't hitch-hike as there's 27 of them, and the replacement coach doesn't come till the next morning, thus their only choice is to stay in Margate for the night.  See also Buckley's Chance Buridan's ass Boulwarism Death and Taxes Locus of control Morton's fork No-win situation Standard form contract Sophie's Choice Zugzwang References  Barrett, Grant. "Hobson's Choice", A Way with Words  "Thomas Hobson: Hobson's Choice and Hobson's Conduit". Historyworks.  See Samuel Fisher. "Rusticus ad academicos in exercitationibus expostulatoriis, apologeticis quatuor the rustick's alarm to the rabbies or The country correcting the university and clergy, and ... contesting for the truth ... : in four apologeticall and expostulatory exercitations : wherein is contained, as well a general account to all enquirers, as a general answer to all opposers of the most truly catholike and most truly Christ-like Chistians called Quakers, and of the true divinity of their doctrine : by way of entire entercourse held in special with four of the clergies chieftanes, viz, John Owen ... Tho. Danson ... John Tombes ... Rich. Baxter ." Europeana. Retrieved 8 August 2014.  See The Spectator with Notes and General Index, the Twelve Volumes Comprised in Two. Philadelphia: J.J. Woodward. 1832. p. 272. Retrieved 4 August 2014. via Google Books  Ward, Thomas (1853). English Reformation, A Poem. New York: D.& J. Sadlier & Co. p. 373. Retrieved 8 August 2014. via Internet Archive  See Mill, John Stuart (1861). Considerations on Representative Government (1 ed.). London: Parker, Son, & Bourn. p. 145. Retrieved 23 June 2014. via Google Books  Mill, John Stuart (1869). The Subjection of Women (1869 first ed.). London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer. pp. 51–2. Retrieved 28 July 2014.  Hobbes, Thomas (1982) [1651]. Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. New York: Viking Press.  Martinich, A. P. (1999). Hobbes: A Biography. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-49583-7.  Martin, Gary. "Hobson's Choice". The Phrase Finder. Archived from the original on 6 March 2009. Retrieved 7 August 2010.  "The Hobbesian Trap" (PDF). 21 September 2010. Retrieved 8 April 2012.  "Sunday Lexico-Neuroticism". boaltalk.blogspot.com. 27 July 2008. Retrieved 7 August 2010.  Levy, Jacob (10 June 2003). "The Volokh Conspiracy". volokh.com. Retrieved 7 August 2010.  Oxford English Dictionary, Editor: "Amazingly, some writers have confused the obscure Thomas Hobson with his famous contemporary, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The resulting malapropism is beautifully grotesque". Garner, Bryan (1995). A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 404–405.  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/437/617/  "Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs. - 436 U.S. 658 (1978)". justicia.com. US Supreme Court. 6 June 1978. 436 U.S. 658. Retrieved 19 February 2014.  "MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay (CCT 51/06) [2007] ZACC 21; 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC); 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (5 October 2007)". www.saflii.org.  Snicket, Lemony (2004) The Grim Grotto, New York: HarperCollins Publishers p.145 - 147  Henry Ford in collaboration with Samuel Crowther in My Life and Work. 1922. Page 72 External links Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Hobson's Choice" . Encyclopædia Britannica. 13 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 553. Categories: English-language idiomsFree willMetaphors referring to peopleDilemmas. Refs.: H. P. Grice and D. F. Pears, The philosophy of action, Pears, Choosing and deciding. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

Totum – Those who are inclined to Grecianisms will use “holism,” but unlike ‘totum,’ ‘holos,’ being from EASTERN Europe, did not develop in Western Europe, whereas ‘totum’ gives us plenty of cognates in Grice’s vernacular, via Anglo-Norman, ‘totality,’ for example. From Grecian ‘holon,’ Latin ‘totum.’ “One of Quine’s dogma of empiricism – the one I and Sir Peter had not the slightest intereset in!” – Grice. Holism is one of a wide variety of theses that in one way or another affirm the equal or greater reality or the explanatory necessity of the whole of some system in relation to its parts. In philosophy, the issues of holism (the word is more reasonably, but less often, spelled ‘wholism’) have appeared Hohenheim, Theophrastus Bombastus von holism 390 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 390 traditionally in the philosophy of biology, of psychology, and especially of the human sciences. In the context of description, holism with respect to some system maintains that the whole has some properties that its parts lack. This doctrine will ordinarily be trivially true unless it is further held, in the thesis of descriptive emergentism, that these properties of the whole cannot be defined by properties of the parts. The view that all properties of the wholes in question can be so defined is descriptive individualism. In the context of explanation, holism with respect to some object or system maintains either (1) that the laws of the more complex cases in it are not deducible by way of any composition laws or laws of coexistence from the laws of the less complex cases (e.g., that the laws of the behavior of people in groups are not deducible by composition laws or laws of coexistence from the laws of solitary behavior), or (2) that all the variables that constitute the system interact with each other. This denial of deducibility is known also as metaphysical or methodological holism, whereas affirming the deducibility is methodological individualism. In a special case of explanatory holism that presupposes descriptive emergentism, holism is sometimes understood as the thesis that with respect to some system the whole has properties that interact “back” with the properties of its parts. In the philosophy of biology, any of these forms of holism may be known as vitalism, while in the philosophy of psychology they have been called Gestalt doctrine. In the philosophy of the social sciences, where ‘holism’ has had its most common use in philosophy, the many issues have often been reduced to that of metaphysical holism versus methodological individualism. This terminology reflected the positivists’ belief that holism was non-empirical in postulating social “wholes” or the reality of society beyond individual persons and their properties and relations (as in Durkheim and other, mostly Continental, thinkers), while individualism was non-metaphysical (i.e., empirical) in relying ultimately only on observable properties in describing and explaining social phenomena. More recently, ‘holism’ has acquired additional uses in philosophy, especially in epistemology and philosophy of language. Doxastic or epistemic holism are theses about the “web of belief,” usually something to the effect that a person’s beliefs are so connected that their change on any topic may affect their content on any other topic or, perhaps, that the beliefs of a rational person are so connected. Semantic or meaning holism have both been used to denote either the thesis that the meanings of all terms (or sentences) in a language are so connected that any change of meaning in one of them may change any other meaning, or the thesis that changes of belief entail changes of meaning. Cited by Grice, “In defense of a dogma” “My defense of the other dogma must be left for another longer day” Duhem, Pierre-Maurice-Marie, physicist who wrote extensively on the history and philosophy of science. Like Georg Helm, Wilhelm Ostwald, and others, he was an energeticist, believing generalized thermodynamics to be the foundation of all of physics and chemistry. Duhem spent his whole scientific life advancing energetics, from his failed dissertation in physics a version of which was accepted as a dissertation in mathematics, published as Le potentiel thermodynamique 6, to his mature treatise, Traité d’énergétique 1. His scientific legacy includes the Gibbs-Duhem and DuhemMargules equations. Possibly because his work was considered threatening by the Parisian scientific establishment or because of his right-wing politics and fervent Catholicism, he never obtained the position he merited in the intellectual world of Paris. He taught at the provincial universities of Lille, Rennes, and, finally, Bordeaux. Duhem’s work in the history and philosophy of science can be viewed as a defense of the aims and methods of energetics; whatever Duhem’s initial motivation, his historical and philosophical work took on a life of its own. Topics of interest to him included the relation between history of science and philosophy of science, the nature of conceptual change, the historical structure of scientific knowledge, and the relation between science and religion. Duhem was an anti-atomist or anti-Cartesian; in the contemporary debates about light and magnetism, Duhem’s anti-atomist stance was also directed against the work of Maxwell. According to Duhem, atomists resolve the bodies perceived by the senses into smaller, imperceptible bodies. The explanation of observable phenomena is then referred to these imperceptible bodies and their motions, suitably combined. Duhem’s rejection of atomism was based on his instrumentalism or fictionalism: physical theories are not explanations but representations; they do not reveal the true nature of matter, but give general rules of which laws are particular cases; theoretical propositions are not true or false, but convenient or inconvenient. An important reason for treating physics as nonexplanatory was Duhem’s claim that there is general consensus in physics and none in metaphysics  thus his insistence on the autonomy of physics from metaphysics. But he also thought that scientific representations become more complete over time until they gain the status of a natural classification. Accordingly, Duhem attacked the use of models by some scientists, e.g. Faraday and Maxwell. Duhem’s rejection of atomism was coupled with a rejection of inductivism, the doctrine that the only physical principles are general laws known through induction, based on observation of facts. Duhem’s rejection forms a series of theses collectively known as the Duhem thesis: experiments in physics are observations of phenomena accompanied by interpretations; physicists therefore do not submit single hypotheses, but whole groups of them, to the control of experiment; thus, experimental evidence alone cannot conclusively falsify hypotheses. For similar reasons, Duhem rejected the possibility of a crucial experiment. In his historical studies, Duhem argued that there were no abrupt discontinuities between medieval and early modern science  the so-called continuity thesis; that religion played a positive role in the development of science in the Latin West; and that the history of physics could be seen as a cumulative whole, defining the direction in which progress could be expected. Duhem’s philosophical works were discussed by the founders of twentieth-century philosophy of science, including Mach, Poincaré, the members of the Vienna Circle, and Popper. A revival of interest in Duhem’s philosophy began with Quine’s reference in 3 to the Duhem thesis also known as the Duhem-Quine thesis. As a result, Duhem’s philosophical works were tr. into English  as The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory 4 and To Save the Phenomena 9. By contrast, few of Duhem’s extensive historical works  Les origines de la statique 2 vols., 608, Études sur Léonard de Vinci 3 vols., 613, and Système du monde 10 vols., 359, e.g.  have been tr., with five volumes of the Système du monde actually remaining in manuscript form until 459. Unlike his philosophical work, Duhem’s historical work was not sympathetically received by his influential contemporaries, notably George Sarton. His supposed main conclusions were rejected by the next generation of historians of science, who presented modern science as discontinuous with that of the Middle Ages. This view was echoed by historically oriented philosophers of science who, from the early 0s, emphasized discontinuities as a recurrent feature of change in science  e.g. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2. 

hologram: the image of an object in three dimensions created and reproduced by the use of lasers. Holography is a method for recording and reproducing such images. Holograms are remarkable in that, unlike normal photographs, every part of them contains the complete image but in reduced detail. Thus a small square cut from a hologram can still be laser-illuminated to reveal the whole scene originally holographed, albeit with loss of resolution. This feature made the hologram attractive to proponents of the thesis of distribution of function in the brain, who argued that memories are like holograms, not being located in a single precise engram – as claimed by advocates of localization of function – but distributed across perhaps all of the cortex. Although intriguing, the holographic model of memory storage failed to gain acceptance. Current views favor D. O. Hebb’s “cell assembly” concept, in which memories are stored in the connections between a group of neurons.

HOMO-CLITIC -- The homoclitical/heteroclitical distinction, the: heteroclitical implicaturum:-- Greek κλιτικός (klitikós, “inflexional”, but transliterated as ‘heterocliticum’) -- signifying a stem which alternates between more than one form when declined for grammatical case. Examples of heteroclitic noun stems in Proto-Indo-European include *wod-r/n- "water" (nominoaccusative *wódr; genitive *udnés; locative *udén) and *yékw-r/n- "liver" (nominoaccusative *yékwr, genitive *ikwnés). In Proto-Indo-European, heteroclitic stems tend to be noun stems with grammatically inanimate gender. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The heteroclitical implicaturum: implicaturum, implicitum, explicatum, explicitum: what I learned at Clifton, and why.”


homœmerum: an adjective Grice adored, from Grecian homoiomeres, ‘of like parts’). Aristotle: “A lump of bronze differs from a statue in being homoeo-merous. The lump of bronze is divisible into at least two partial lumps of bronze, whereas the statue is not divisible into statues.” Having parts, no matter how small, that share the constitutive properties of the whole. The derivative abstract noun is ‘homœomeria’. The Grecian forms of the adjective and of its corresponding privative ‘anhomoeomerous’ are used by Aristotle to distinguish between (a) non-uniform parts of living things, e.g., limbs and organs, and (b) biological stuffs, e.g., blood, bone, sap. In spite of being composed of the four elements, each biological stuff, when taken individually and without admixtures, is through-and-through F, where F represents the cluster of the constitutive properties of that stuff. Thus, if a certain physical volume qualifies as blood, all its mathematically possible sub-volumes, regardless of size, also qualify as blood. Blood is thus homoeomerous. By contrast, a face or a stomach or a leaf are an-homoeomerous: the parts of a face are not a face, etc. In Aristotle’s system, the homœomeria of the biological stuff is tied to his doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter. The homœomerum-heterormerum distinction is prefigured in Plato (Protagoras 329d). ‘Homœomerous’ is narrow in its application than ‘homogeneous’ and ‘uniform’. We speak of a homogeneous entity even if the properties at issue are identically present only in samples that fall above a certain size. The colour of the sea can be homogeneously or uniformly blue; but it is heteromerously blue. “homoiomeres” and “homoiomereia” also occur –in the ancient sources for a pre-Aristotelian philosopher, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, with reference to the constituent things (“chremata”) involved in his scheme of universal mixture. Moreover, homœeomeria plays a significant role outside ancient Grecian (or Griceian) philosophy, notably in twentieth-century accounts of the contrast between mass terms and count terms or sortals, and the discussion was introduced by Grice. ANAXAGORAS' THEORY OF MATTER-I. 17 homoeomerous in Anaxagoras' system falls into one of these three class. (I. 834), for example, says: 'When he ... by FM Cornford - ‎1930. Refs. Grice, “Cornford on Anaxagoras.”

homomorphism: cf. isomorphism -- in Grice’s model theory of conversation, a structure-preserving mapping from one structure to another: thus the demonstratum is isomorph with the implicaturum, since every conversational implicaturum can be arrived via an argumentum. A structure consists of a domain of objects together with a function specifying interpretations, with respect to that domain, of the relation symbols, function symbols, and individual symbols of a given calculus. Relations, functions, and individuals in different structures for a system like System GHP correspond to one another if they are interpretations of the same symbol of GHP. To call a mapping “structure-preserving” is to say, first, that if objects in the first structure bear a certain relation to one another, then their images in the second structure (under the mapping) bear the corresponding relation to one another; second, that the value of a function for a given object (or ntuple of objects) in the first structure has as its image under the mapping the value of the corresponding function for the image of the object (or n-tuple of images) in the second structure; and third, that the image in the second structure of an object in the first is the corresponding object. An isomorphism is a homomorphism that is oneto-one and whose inverse is also a homomorphism.

co-substantia: homoousios. Athanasius -- early Christian father, bishop, and a leading protagonist in the disputes concerning Christ’s relationship to God. Through major works like On the Incarnation, Against the Arians, and Letters on the Holy Spirit, Athanasius contributed greatly to the classical doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity. Opposing all forms of Arianism, which denies Christ’s divinity and reduced him to what Grice would call a “creature,” Athanasius teaches, in the language of the Nicene Creed, that Christ the Son, and likewise the Holy Spirit, are of the same being as God the Father, cosubstantialis, “homoousios.” Thus with terminology and concepts drawn from Grecian and Graeco-Roman philosophy, Athanasius helps to forge the distinctly Christian and un-Hellenistic doctrine of the eternal tri-une God (“credo quia absurdum est”) who became enfleshed in time and matter and restored humanity to immortality, forfeited through sin, by involvement in its condition of corruption and decay. Homoousios (Greek, ‘of the same substance’), a concept central to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, enshrined in the Nicene Creed (Nicaea, “Holy, Holy, Holy”). It attests that God the Son (and by extension the Spirit) is of one and the same being or substance (ousia) as the Father. Reflecting the insistence of Athanasius against Arianism that Christ is God’s eternal, co-equal Son and not a “creature,” as Grice uses the term, the Nicene “homoousios” is also to be differentiated from a rival formula, “homoiousios” (Grecian, ‘of SIMILAR substance’), which affirms merely the Son’s LIKENESS in being to God. Though notoriously and superficially an argument over one Greek iota, the issue was philosophically profound and crucial whether or not Jesus of Nazareth incarnated God’s own being, revealed God’s own truth, and mediated God’s own salvation. If x=x, x is like x. A horse is like a horse. Grice on implicaturum. “There is only an implicaturum to the effect that if a horse is a horse a horse is not like a horse.” “Similarly for Christ and God.” Cicero saw this when he philosophised on ‘idem’ and ‘similis.’

homuncularism -- Grice on the ‘fallacia homunculi’ Grice borrows ‘homunculus’ from St. Augustine, for a miniature ‘homo’ held to inhabit the brain (or some other organ) who perceives all the inputs to the sense organs and initiates all the commands to the muscles. Any theory that posits such an internal agent risks an infinite regress (what Grice, after Augustine, calls the ‘fallacia homunculi’) since we can ask whether there is a little man in the little man’s head, responsible for his perception and action, and so on. Many familiar views of the mind and its activities seem to require a homunculus. E. g. models of visual perception that posit an inner picture as its product apparently require a homunculus to look at the picture, and models of action that treat intentions as commands to the muscles apparently require a homunculus to issue the commands. It is never an easy matter to determine whether a theory is committed to the existence of a homunculus that vitiates the theory, and in some circumstances, a homunculus can be legitimately posited at intermediate levels of theory. As Grice says, a homunculus is, shall we say, a bogey-man (to use a New-World expression) only if he duplicates entire the talents he is rung in to explain. If one can get a relatively ignorant, narrow-minded, blind homunculus to produce the intelligent behaviour of the whole, this is progress. Grice calls a theory (in philosophoical psychology) that posit such a homunculus “homuncular functionalism.” Paracelsus is credited with the first mention of the homunculus in De homunculis (c. 1529–1532), and De natura rerum (1537). Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Paracelsus.”

natura – natura humana -- human nature – Grice distinguishes very sharply between a human and a person – a human becomes a person via transubstantiation, a metaphysical routine – human nature is a quality or group of qualities, belonging to all and only humans, that explains the kind of being we are. We are all two-footed and featherless, but ‘featherless biped’ does not explain our socially significant characteristics. We are also all both animals and rational beings (at least potentially), and ‘rational animal’ might explain the special features we have that other kinds of beings, such as angels, do not. The belief that there is a human nature is part of the wider thesis that all natural kinds have essences. Acceptance of this position is compatible with many views about the specific qualities that constitute human nature. In addition to rationality and embodiment, philosophers have said that it is part of our nature to be wholly selfinterested, benevolent, envious, sociable, fearful of others, able to speak and to laugh, and desirous of immortality. Philosophers disagree about how we are to discover our nature. Some think metaphysical insight into eternal forms or truths is required, others that we can learn it from observation of biology or of behavior. Most have assumed that only males display human nature fully, and that females, even at their best, are imperfect or incomplete exemplars. Philosophers also disagree on whether human nature determines morality. Some think that by noting our distinctive features we can infer what God wills us to do. Others think that our nature shows at most the limits of what morality can require, since it would plainly be pointless to direct us to ways of living that our nature makes impossible. Some philosophers have argued that human nature is plastic and can be shaped in different ways. Others hold that it is not helpful to think in terms of human nature. They think that although we share features as members of a biological species, our other qualities are socially constructed. If the differences between male and female reflect cultural patterns of child rearing, work, and the distribution of power, our biologically common features do not explain our important characteristics and so do not constitute a nature.

Grice and the humboldts: Born in Potsdam, Wilhelm, with his brother Alexander, was educated by private tutors in the enlightened style thought suitable for a Prussian philosopher.This included Grice’s stuff: philosophy and the two classical languages, with a bit of ancient and modern history. After his university studies in law at Frankfurt an der Oder and Göttingen, Humboldt’s career was divided among assorted posts, philosophising on a broad range of topics, notably his first loves, like Grice’s: philosophy and the classical languages. Humboldt’s broad-ranging works reveal the important influences of Herder in his conception of history and culture, Kant and Fichte in philosophy, and the French “Ideologues” in semiotics. His most enduring work has proved to be the Introduction to his massive study of language. Humboldt maintains that language, as a vital and dynamic “organism,” is the key to understanding both the operations of the soul. A language such as Latin possesses a distinctive inner form that shapes, in a way reminiscent of Kant’s more general categories, the subjective experience, the world-view, and ultimately the institutions of Rome. While all philosophers are indebted to both his empirical studies and his theoretical insights on culture, such philosophers as Dilthey and Cassirer acknowledge him as establishing the Latin language as a central concern for the humanities. H. P. Grice, “Alexander and all the Humboldts.”


Materia-forma distinction, the: One of Grice’s twelve labours is against Materialism -- Cicero’s translation of hyle, ancient Greek term for matter. Aristotle brought the word into use in philosophy by contrast with the term for form, and as designating one of the four causes. By hyle Aristotle usually means ‘that out of which something has been made’, but he can also mean by it ‘that which has form’. In Aristotelian philosophy hyle is sometimes also identified with potentiality and with substrate. Neoplatonists identified hyle with the receptacle of Plato. Materia-forma distinction, the forma: Grice always found ‘logical form’ redundant (“Surely we are not into ‘matter’ – that would be cheap!”) – “‘materia-forma’ is the unity, as the Grecians well knew.”- hylomorphism, the doctrine, first taught by Aristotle, that concrete substance consists of form in matter (hyle). The details of this theory are explored in the central books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Zeta, Eta, and Theta).  Materia-forma distinction, the. Then there’s hylozoism: from Greek hyle, ‘matter’, and zoe, ‘life’), the doctrine that matter is intrinsically alive, or that all bodies, from the world as a whole down to the smallest corpuscle, have some degree or some kind of life. It differs from panpsychism though the distinction is sometimes blurred – in upholding the universal presence of life per se, rather than of soul or of psychic attributes. Inasmuch as it may also hold that there are no living entities not constituted of matter, hylozoism is often criticized by theistic philosophers as a form of atheism. The term was introduced polemically by Ralph Cudworth, the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist, to help define a position that is significantly in contrast to soul–body dualism (Pythagoras, Plato, Descartes), reductive materialism (Democritus, Hobbes), and Aristotelian hylomorphism. So understood, hylozoism had many advocates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, among both scientists and naturalistically minded philosophers. In the twentieth century, the term has come to be used, rather unhelpfully, to characterize the animistic and naive-vitalist views of the early Greek philosophers, especially Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and Empedocles – who could hardly count as hylozoists in Cudworth’s sophisticated sense.

substantia – hypostasis, the process of regarding a concept or abstraction as an independent or real entity. The verb forms ‘hypostatize’ and ‘reify’ designate the acts of positing objects of a certain sort for the purposes of one’s theory. It is sometimes implied that a fallacy is involved in so describing these processes or acts, as in ‘Plato was guilty of the reification of universals’. The issue turns largely on criteria of ontological commitment.  The exact Greek transliteration is “hypostasis” Arianism, diverse but related teachings in early Christianity that subordinated the Son to God the Father. In reaction the church developed its doctrine of the Trinity, whereby the Son and Holy Spirit, though distinct persons hypostases, share with the Father, as his ontological equals, the one being or substance ousia of God. Arius taught in Alexandria, where, on the hierarchical model of Middle Platonism, he sharply distinguished Scripture’s transcendent God from the Logos or Son incarnate in Jesus. The latter, subject to suffering and humanly obedient to God, is inferior to the immutable Creator, the object of that obedience. God alone is eternal and ungenerated; the Son, divine not by nature but by God’s choosing, is generated, with a beginning: the unique creature, through whom all else is made. The Council of Nicea, in 325, condemned Arius and favored his enemy Athanasius, affirming the Son’s creatorhood and full deity, having the same being or substance homoousios as the Father. Arianism still flourished, evolving into the extreme view that the Son’s being was neither the same as the Father’s nor like it homoiousios, but unlike it anomoios. This too was anathematized, by the Council of 381 at Constantinople, which, ratifying what is commonly called the Nicene Creed, sealed orthodox Trinitarianism and the equality of the three persons against Arian subordinationism. 

suppositum – Cicero for ‘hypothesis’, as in ‘hypothetico-deductive’ – a hypothetico-deductive method, a method of testing hypotheses. Thought to be preferable to the method of enumerative induction, whose limitations had been decisively demonstrated by Hume, the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method has been viewed by many as the ideal scientific method. It is applied by introducing an explanatory hypothesis resulting from earlier inductions, a guess, or an act of creative imagination. The hypothesis is logically conjoined with a statement of initial conditions. The purely deductive consequences of this conjunction are derived as predictions, and the statements asserting them are subjected to experimental or observational test. More formally, given (H • A) P O, H is the hypothesis, A a statement of initial conditions, and O one of the testable consequences of (H • A). If the hypothesis is ‘all lead is malleable’, and ‘this piece of lead is now being hammered’ states the initial conditions, it follows deductively that ‘this piece of lead will change shape’. In deductive logic the schema is formally invalid, committing the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. But repeated occurrences of O can be said to confirm the conjunction of H and A, or to render it more probable. On the other hand, the schema is deductively valid (the argument form modus tollens). For this reason, Karl Popper and his followers think that the H-D method is best employed in seeking falsifications of theoretical hypotheses. Criticisms of the method point out that infinitely many hypotheses can explain, in the H-D mode, a given body of data, so that successful predictions are not probative, and that (following Duhem) it is impossible to test isolated singular hypotheses because they are always contained in complex theories any one of whose parts is eliminable in the face of negative evidence.

campsall: a village in Yorkshire, Richard – of Balliol, semantics. Cf. Ricardus de Campsalle obtained a MA from Balliol and then became a Fellow of Merton.

Trutfetter

affirmo-nego distinction, the: Grice: “There is a delightful asymmetry in ‘affirmo’/’nego’ as yielding a square. For the –o in affirmo is immaterial, whereas the ‘o’ in nego is not! Who was the stupid monk who deviced this? Most importantly, ‘affirmo’ and ‘nego’ account for the QUALITY, not the quantity. Surely the ‘a’ and ‘i’, but not the ‘o’ of affirmo can stand for ‘affirmative’, and the ‘e’ and ‘o’ of nego can stand for negative. But surely there is no correspondence to a and e being universal and I and o being particular.  Barbara celarent darii ferio baralipton Celantes dabitis fapesmo frisesomorum; Cesare campestres festino baroco; darapti Felapton disamis datisi bocardo ferison.  Vowels & particular consonants have particular meaning.  A – universalis affirmativa (i.e. affirmo)  E– universalis negativa (i.e. nego) I – particularis affirmativa (i.e. affirmo) O – particularis negativa (i.e. nego) S is for simplex in – conversio simplex.P is ‘per accidens’ in  conversio per accidens. c – is contradiction in ‘reductio rad contradictionem  m is for metathesis–(, conversio per contrapositionem).  “b” is for ‘barbara’ in – reductio ad Modus Barbara.  C –is for celarent in  reductio ad Modus Celarent. D is for darii in – reductio ad Modus Darii. F is for ferio in – reductio ad Modus Ferio.I: particularis dedicativa.. See Grice, “Circling the Square of Opposition    Affirmo-nego distinction, the: Grice: “There is a delightful asymmetry in ‘affirmo’/’nego’ as yielding a square. For the –o in affirmo is immaterial, whereas the ‘o’ in nego is not! Who was the stupid monk who deviced this? Most importantly, ‘affirmo’ and ‘nego’ account for the QUALITY, not the quantity. Surely the ‘a’ and ‘i’, but not the ‘o’ of affirmo can stand for ‘affirmative’, and the ‘e’ and ‘o’ of nego can stand for negative. But surely there is no correspondence to a and e being universal and I and o being particular. -- Albert the Great, Liber I Priorum Analyticorum, inOpera omnia, A. Borgnet (ed.), vol. I, Paris: Vivés, 1890. Aristotle, Analytica Priora, in Aristoteles LatinusIII.1–4, L. Minio-Paluello (ed.), Bruges–Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962. Avicenna, Remarks and Admonitions. Part One: Logic, tr. S. Inati, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984. 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necesse – Grice: “The archaic Romans had ‘necessum,’ which they turned to ‘necessum.’ The etymology is not clear  [perh. Sanscr. naç, obtain; Gr. root ἐνεκ-; cf. ἀνάγκη; v. Georg Curtius Gr. Etym. 424]. ichthyological necessity: topic-neutral: Originally, Ryle’s term for logical constants, such as “of ” “not,” “every.” They are not endowed with special meanings, and are applicable to discourse about any subject-matter. They do not refer to any external object but function to organize meaningful discourse. J. J. C. Smart calls a term topic-neutral if it is noncommittal about designating something mental or something physical. Instead, it simply describes an event without judging the question of its intrinsic nature. In his central-state theory of mind, Smart develops a topic-neutral analysis of mental expressions and argues that it is possible to account for the situations described by mental concepts in purely physical and topic-neutral terms. “In this respect, statements like ‘I am thinking now’ are, as J. J. C. Smart puts it, topic-neutral. They say that something is going on within us, something apt for the causing of certain sorts of behaviour, but they say nothing of the nature of this process.” D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind

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