The Grice Club: IMPLICATVRA -- in 16 volumes, vol. 6

cyrenaic implicaturum -- Cyrenaics, a classical Grecian philosophical school that began shortly after Socrates and lasted for several centuries, noted especially for hedonism. Ancient writers trace the Cyrenaics back to Aristippus of Cyrene fifth-fourth century B.C., an associate of Socrates. Aristippus came to Athens because of Socrates’ fame and later greatly enjoyed the luxury of court life in Sicily. Some people ascribe the founding of the school to his grandchild Aristippus, because of an ancient report that the elder Aristippus said nothing clear about the human end. The Cyrenaics include Aristippus’s child Arete, her child Aristippus taught by Arete, Hegesius, Anniceris, and Theodorus. The school seems to have been superseded by the Epicureans. No Cyrenaic writings survive, and the reports we do have are sketchy. The Cyrenaics avoid mathematics and natural philosophy, preferring ethics because of its utility. According to them, not only will studying nature not make us virtuous, it also won’t make us stronger or richer. Some reports claim that they also avoid logic and epistemology. But this is not true of all the Cyrenaics: according to other reports, they think logic and epistemology are useful, consider arguments and also causes as topics to be covered in ethics, and have an epistemology. Their epistemology is skeptical. We can know only how we are affected; we can know, e.g., that we are whitening, but not that whatever is causing this sensation is itself white. This differs from Protagoras’s theory; unlike Protagoras the Cyrenaics draw no inferences about the things that affect us, claiming only that external things have a nature that we cannot know. But, like Protagoras, the Cyrenaics base their theory on the problem of conflicting appearances. Given their epistemology, if humans ought to aim at something that is not a way of being affected i.e., something that is immediately perceived according to them, we can never know anything about it. Unsurprisingly, then, they claim that the end is a way of being affected; in particular, they are hedonists. The end of good actions is particular pleasures smooth changes, and the end of bad actions is particular pains rough changes. There is also an intermediate class, which aims at neither pleasure nor pain. Mere absence of pain is in this intermediate class, since the absence of pain may be merely a static state. Pleasure for Aristippus seems to be the sensation of pleasure, not including related psychic states. We should aim at pleasure although not everyone does, as is clear from our naturally seeking it as children, before we consciously choose to. Happiness, which is the sum of the particular pleasures someone experiences, is choiceworthy only for the particular pleasures that constitute it, while particular pleasures are choiceworthy for themselves. Cyrenaics, then, are not concerned with maximizing total pleasure over a lifetime, but only with particular pleasures, and so they should not choose to give up particular pleasures on the chance of increasing the total. Later Cyrenaics diverge in important respects from the original Cyrenaic hedonism, perhaps in response to the development of Epicurus’s views. Hegesias claims that happiness is impossible because of the pains associated with the body, and so thinks of happiness as total pleasure minus total pain. He emphasizes that wise people act for themselves, and denies that people actually act for someone else. Anniceris, on the other hand, claims that wise people are happy even if they have few pleasures, and so seems to think of happiness as the sum of pleasures, and not as the excess of pleasures over pains. Anniceris also begins considering psychic pleasures: he insists that friends should be valued not only for their utility, but also for our feelings toward them. We should even accept losing pleasure because of a friend, even though pleasure is the end. Theodorus goes a step beyond Anniceris. He claims that the end of good actions is joy and that of bad actions is grief. Surprisingly, he denies that friendship is reasonable, since fools have friends only for utility and wise people need no friends. He even regards pleasure as intermediate between practical wisdom and its opposite. This seems to involve regarding happiness as the end, not particular pleasures, and may involve losing particular pleasures for long-term happiness.

D: SUBJECT INDEX: DEMONSTRATUM
D: NAME INDEX – ITALIAN

D: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: DUMMETT

Experitum -- Empiricism – “with a capital E, of course.” – Grice. Czolbe, H., philosopher. He was born in Danzig and trained in theology and medicine. His main works are Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus “New Exposition of Sensualism,” 1855, Entstehung des Selbstbewusstseins “Origin of Self-Consciousness,” 1856, Die Grenzen und der Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntnis “The Limits and Origin of Human Knowledge,” 1865, and a posthumously published study, Grundzüge der extensionalen Erkenntnistheorie 1875. Czolbe proposed a sensualistic theory of knowledge: knowledge is a copy of the actual, and spatial extension is ascribed even to ideas. Space is the support of all attributes. His later work defended a non-reductive materialism. Czolbe made the rejection of the supersensuous a central principle and defended a radical “senCzolbe, Heinrich Czolbe, Heinrich 201 201 sationalism.” Despite this, he did not present a dogmatic materialism, but cast his philosophy in hypothetical form. In his study of the origin of self-consciousness Czolbe held that dissatisfaction with the actual world generates supersensuous ideas and branded this attitude as “immoral.” He excluded supernatural phenomena on the basis not of physiological or scientific studies but of a “moral feeling of duty towards the natural world-order and contentment with it.” The same valuation led him to postulate the eternality of terrestrial life. Nietzsche was familiar with Czolbe’s works and incorporated some of his themes into his philosophy.

englishry: Grice was first an Englishman, and then an Oxonian – and then a philosopher – and then a genius! Englishness – Englishry, -- St. George for England. A critique of racism, hostility, contempt, condescension, or prejudice, on the basis of social practices of racial classification, and the wider phenomena of social, economic, and political mistreatment that often accompany such classification. The most salient instances of racism include the Nazi ideology of the “Aryan master race,” chattel slavery, South African apartheid in the late twentieth century, and the “Jim Crow” laws and traditions of segregation that subjugated African descendants in the Southern United States during the century after the Civil War. Social theorists dispute whether, in its essence, racism is a belief or an ideology of racial inferiority, a system of social oppression on the basis of race, a form of discourse, discriminatory conduct, or an attitude of contempt or heartlessness and its expression in individual or collective behavior. The case for any of these as the essence of racism has its drawbacks, and a proponent must show how the others can also come to be racist in virtue of that essence. Some deny that racism has any nature or essence, insisting it is nothing more than changing historical realities. However, these thinkers must explain what makes each reality an instance of racism. Theorists differ over who and what can be racist and under what circumstances, some restricting racism to the powerful, others finding it also in some reactions by the oppressed. Here, the former owe an explanation of why power is necessary for racism, what sort economic or political? general or contextual?, and in whom or what racist individuals? their racial groups?. Although virtually everyone thinks racism objectionable, people disagree over whether its central defect is cognitive irrationality, prejudice, economic/prudential inefficiency, or moral unnecessary suffering, unequal treatment. Finally, racism’s connection with the ambiguous and controversial concept of race itself is complex. Plainly, racism presupposes the legitimacy of racial classifications, and perhaps the metaphysical reality of races. Nevertheless, some hold that racism is also prior to race, with racial classifications invented chiefly to explain and help justify the oppression of some peoples by others. The term originated to designate the pseudoscientific theories of racial essence and inferiority that arose in Europe in the nineteenth century and were endorsed by G.y’s Third Reich. Since the civil rights movement in the United States after World War II, the term has come to cover a much broader range of beliefs, attitudes, institutions, and practices. Today one hears charges of unconscious, covert, institutional, paternalistic, benign, anti-racist, liberal, and even reverse racism. Racism is widely regarded as involving ignorance, irrationality, unreasonableness, injustice, and other intellectual and moral vices, to such an extent that today virtually no one is willing to accept the classification of oneself, one’s beliefs, and so on, as racist, except in contexts of self-reproach. As a result, classifying anything as racist, beyond the most egregious cases, is a serious charge and is often hotly disputed.

rational Griceian deconstruction of communication -- a demonstration of the incompleteness or incoherence of a philosophical position using concepts and principles of argument whose meaning and use is legitimated only by that philosophical position. A deconstruction is thus a kind of internal conceptual critique in which the critic implicitly and provisionally adheres to the position criticized. The early work of Derrida is the source of the term and provides paradigm cases of its referent. That deconstruction remains within the position being discussed follows from a fundamental deconstructive argument about the nature of language and thought. Derrida’s earliest deconstructions argue against the possibility of an interior “language” of thought and intention such that the senses and referents of terms are determined by their very nature. Such terms are “meanings” or logoi. Derrida calls accounts that presuppose such magical thought-terms “logocentric.” He claims, following Heidegger, that the conception of such logoi is basic to the concepts of Western metaphysics, and that Western metaphysics is fundamental to our cultural practices and languages. Thus there is no “ordinary language” uncontaminated by philosophy. Logoi ground all our accounts of intention, meaning, truth, and logical connection. Versions of logoi in the history of philosophy range from Plato’s Forms through the self-interpreting ideas of the empiricists to Husserl’s intentional entities. Thus Derrida’s fullest deconstructions are of texts that give explicit accounts of logoi, especially his discussion of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena. There, Derrida argues that meanings that are fully present to consciousness are in decision tree deconstruction 209 209 principle impossible. The idea of a meaning is the idea of a repeatable ideality. But “repeatability” is not a feature that can be present. So meanings, as such, cannot be fully before the mind. Selfinterpreting logoi are an incoherent supposition. Without logoi, thought and intention are merely wordlike and have no intrinsic connection to a sense or a referent. Thus “meaning” rests on connections of all kinds among pieces of language and among our linguistic interactions with the world. Without logoi, no special class of connections is specifically “logical.” Roughly speaking, Derrida agrees with Quine both on the nature of meaning and on the related view that “our theory” cannot be abandoned all at once. Thus a philosopher must by and large think about a logocentric philosophical theory that has shaped our language in the very logocentric terms that that theory has shaped. Thus deconstruction is not an excision of criticized doctrines, but a much more complicated, self-referential relationship. Deconstructive arguments work out the consequences of there being nothing helpfully better than words, i.e., of thoroughgoing nominalism. According to Derrida, without logoi fundamental philosophical contrasts lose their principled foundations, since such contrasts implicitly posit one term as a logos relative to which the other side is defective. Without logos, many contrasts cannot be made to function as principles of the sort of theory philosophy has sought. Thus the contrasts between metaphorical and literal, rhetoric and logic, and other central notions of philosophy are shown not to have the foundation that their use presupposes.

deductum – also demonstratum, argumentum -- deduction, a finite sequence of sentences whose last sentence is a conclusion of the sequence the one said to be deduced and which is such that each sentence in the sequence is an axiom or a premise or follows from preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. A synonym is ‘derivation’. Deduction is a system-relative concept. It makes sense to say something is a deduction only relative to a particular system of axioms and rules of inference. The very same sequence of sentences might be a deduction relative to one such system but not relative to another. The concept of deduction is a generalization of the concept of proof. A proof is a finite sequence of sentences each of which is an axiom or follows from preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. The last sentence in the sequence is a theorem. Given that the system of axioms and rules of inference are effectively specifiable, there is an effective procedure for determining, whenever a finite sequence of sentences is given, whether it is a proof relative to that system. The notion of theorem is not in general effective decidable. For there may be no method by which we can always find a proof of a given sentence or determine that none exists. The concepts of deduction and consequence are distinct. The first is a syntactical; the second is semantical. It was a discovery that, relative to the axioms and rules of inference of classical logic, a sentence S is deducible from a set of sentences K provided that S is a consequence of K. Compactness is an important consequence of this discovery. It is trivial that sentence S is deducible from K just in case S is deducible from Dedekind cut deductíon 211 211 some finite subset of K. It is not trivial that S is a consequence of K just in case S is a consequence of some finite subset of K. This compactness property had to be shown. A system of natural deduction is axiomless. Proofs of theorems within a system are generally easier with natural deduction. Proofs of theorems about a system, such as the results mentioned in the previous paragraph, are generally easier if the system has axioms. In a secondary sense, ‘deduction’ refers to an inference in which a speaker claims the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. -- deduction theorem, a result about certain systems of formal logic relating derivability and the conditional. It states that if a formula B is derivable from A and possibly other assumptions, then the formula APB is derivable without the assumption of A: in symbols, if G 4 {A} Y B then GYAPB. The thought is that, for example, if Socrates is mortal is derivable from the assumptions All men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then If Socrates is a man he is mortal is derivable from All men are mortal. Likewise, If all men are mortal then Socrates is mortal is derivable from Socrates is a man. In general, the deduction theorem is a significant result only for axiomatic or Hilbert-style formulations of logic. In most natural deduction formulations a rule of conditional proof explicitly licenses derivations of APB from G4{A}, and so there is nothing to prove.

Dis-factum – dis-faccere -- defeasibility. Strawson Wiggins ‘somehwere in the kitchen,’ ‘in one of the dining-room cupboards’ unless some feature of the context defeats the implication, there is an implicaturum to the effect that the emissor cannot make a ‘stronger’ move by Grice’s principle of conversational fortitude (“Be ‘a fortiori’”). Cf. G. P. Baker on H. L. A. Hart. All very Oxonian. Cf. R. Hall, Oxonian, on ‘Excluders.’ For Strawson and Wiggins that a principle holds ‘generally, ceteris paribus, is a condition for the existence of conversation, or of a good conversation. Defeasibility is a sign of the freedom of the will. The communicators can always opt out. Not a salivating dog. Note that defeasibility does not apply just to the implicaturum. Since probabilistic demonstrate are uncertain, there is an element of defeasibility in the EXplicatum of a probabilistic utterance. Levinson’s quote, “Probability, Defeasibility, and Mode Operators.” Defeasibility -- Grice: “So far as generalizations of these kinds are concerned, it seems to me that one needs to be able to mark five features: (1) conditionality; (2) generality; (3) type of generality (absolute, ceteris paribus, etc., thereby, ipso facto, discriminating with respect to defeasibility or indefeasibility).” -- Baker, “Meaning and defeasibility” – defeater – in Aspects of reason -- defeasibility, a property that rules, principles, arguments, or bits of reasoning have when they might be defeated by some competitor. For example, the epistemic principle ‘Objects normally have the properties they appear to have’ or the normative principle ‘One should not lie’ are defeated, respectively, when perception occurs under unusual circumstances e.g., under colored lights or when there is some overriding moral consideration e.g., to prevent murder. Apparently declarative sentences such as ‘Birds typically fly’ can be taken in part as expressing defeasible rules: take something’s being a bird as evidence that it flies. Defeasible arguments and reasoning inherit their defeasibility from the use of defeasible rules or principles. Recent analyses of defeasibility include circumscription and default logic, which belong to the broader category of non-monotonic logic. The rules in several of these formal systems contain special antecedent conditions and are not truly defeasible since they apply whenever their conditions are satisfied. Rules and arguments in other non-monotonic systems justify their conclusions only when they are not defeated by some other fact, rule, or argument. John Pollock distinguishes between rebutting and undercutting defeaters. ‘Snow is not normally red’ rebuts in appropriate circumstances the principle ‘Things that look red normally are red’, while ‘If the available light is red, do not use the principle that things that look red normally are red’ only undercuts the embedded rule. Pollock has influenced most other work on formal systems for defeasible reasoning.

defensible – H. P. Grice, “Conceptual analysis and the defensible province of philosophy.” Grice uses the ‘territorial’ province, and the further implicaturum is that conceptual analysis as the province of philosophy is a defensible one. Grice thinks it is.

definitum: Grice: There is the definitum and what Kant called the infinitum --. Grice lists ‘the’ in his list of communicative devices. He was interested in the iota operator. After Sluga, he knew there were problems here. He proposed a quantificational approach alla Whitehead and Russell, indeed a Whitehead and Russellian expansion in three clauses, with identity, involved. Why wasn’t Russell not involved with the ‘indefinite’. One would think because that’s rendered already by (Ex), ‘some (at least one)’. Russell’s interest in definitum is not philosophical. His background was mathematics, rather --. Grice was obsessed with ‘aspects’ in verbs. There’s the ‘imperfect’ and the ‘perfect.’ These translate Aristotle’s ‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos.’ But why the change from “factum” to “fectum”? So it’s better to turn to ‘definitum,’ and ‘indefinitum, as better paraphrases of Aristotle’s jargon – keeping in mind we are talking of his ‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos. Aristotle and telos. In the Met. Y.1048b1835, Aristotle discusses the definition of an action πϱᾶξις. He distinguishes two kinds of activities: kinêseis ϰινήσεις and energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι: Only that movement in which the end is present is an action. E.g., at the same time we are v.ing and have v.n ὁϱᾷ ἅμα, are understanding and have understood φϱονεῖ, are thinking and have thought noei kai nenoêken νοεῖ ϰαὶ νενόηϰεν when it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt ou manthanei kai memathêken οὐ μανθάνει ϰαὶ μεμάθηϰεν, or are being cured and have been cured oud’ hugiazetai kai hugiastai οὐδ᾿ ὑγιάζεται ϰαὶ ὑγίασται. At the same time we are living well and have lived well εὖ ζῇ ϰαὶ εὖ ἔζηϰεν ἅμα, and are happy and have been happy εὐδαιμονεῖ ϰαὶ εὐδαιμόνηϰεν. Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements ϰινήσεις, and the other actualities energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι. We v. that the distinctive properties of these two categories of verbs are provided by relations of inference and semantic compatibility between the form of the present and the form of the perfect. In the case of energeiai, there is a relation of inference between the present and the perfect, in the sense that when someone says I v. we can infer I have v.n. There is also a relation of semantic compatibility since one can very well say I have v.n and continue to v.. Thus the two forms—the present and the perfect— are verifiable at the same time ἅμα, simultaneously. On the other hand, in the case of kinêseis, the present and the perfect are not verifiable at the same time. In fact, when someone says I am building a house, we cannot infer I have built a house, at least in the sense in which the house is finished. In addition, once the house is finished, one is no longer constructing it, which means that there is a semantic incompatibility between the present and the perfect. τέλος, which means both complete action, that is, end, and limit in competition with πέϱας, plays a crucial role in this opposition. In the category of energeiai, we have actions proper, that is, activities that are complete τέλεια because they have an immanent finality ἐνυπάϱχει τὸ τέλος. In the category of kinêseis, we have imperfect activities ἀτελείς that do not carry their own end within themselves but are transitive and aim at realizing something. Thus activities having an external goal that is at the same time a limit peras do not carry their own goal telos within themselves; they are directed toward a goal but this goal is not attained during the activity, but is realized at the end of the activity. And history repeated itself, in the same terms, regarding Slavic languages, with on the one hand the words perfective and imperfective, modeled on the Roman opposition and imported to describe an opposition in which lexicon and grammar are truly interwoven since it is a question of categories of verbs, which determine the whole organization of conjugation, and on the other hand the Russian words that are used to characterize the same categories of verbs, and that signify the accomplished and the unaccomplished. In the terminological imbroglio, we can once again v. the effects of a confusion connected with the inability to acknowledge the autonomy of lexical aspect, or, in the particular case of Slavic languages, the difficulty of isoRomang the aspectual dimension in the general system of the language. Nevertheless, the same questions, that of the telos and that of accomplishment, are at the foundation of the two aspectual dimensions. They are even so prominent that, alongside the heterogeneous inventory from which we began, we also find, and almost simultaneously in the aspectual tradition, a leveling of all differences in favor of two categories that are supposed to be the categories par excellence of grammatical aspect: the perfective on the one hand, and the imperfective on the other. However, there is also the continuing competition of the perfect, another tr. of the same word, perfectum, designating a category that is not exactly the same as that of the perfective, and which is, for its part, always a grammatical category, never a lexical category: one speaks of perfect to designate compound tenses in G. ic languages, e. g. , of the type I have received as opposed to I received, which corresponds to the idea that the telos is not only achieved, but transcended in the constitution of a fixed state, given as the result of the completion of the process. Two, or three, grammatical categories that are the same and not the same as the two, three, or four lexical categories. It is in the name of these categories, and literally behind their name, that the aspectual descriptions succeeded in being applicable to all languages, confRomang all the imperfects of all languages and also the Eng. progressive and the Russian imperfective, all the aorists in all languages, and aligning perfects, perfectives, the Eng. perfect, the G. Perfekt, the Roman perfectum and the Grecian perfect. The facts are different, but the words, and the recurrence of a problematics that v.ms invariable, are too strong. Although it is a matter of conjugations, the lexicon and the relation to ontological questions are too influential. The word imperfectum was invented, we v. a hesitation that is precisely the one that causes a problem here, between imperfectum and infectum a nonachieved finality, an absence of finality. The important point is that the whole history of aspectual terminology is constituted by such exchanges. The invention of the words perfectum and imperfectum itself proceeds from an enterprise of tr., in which it is a question of taking as a model, or rephrasing, the Grecian grammarians’ opposition between suntelikos συντελιϰός and non-suntelikos. However, the difference between the two terminologies is noticeable. A supine past participle, -fectum, has replaced telikos, and hence telos, thereby reintroducing, if not tense was tense really involved in that past participle?, at least the achievement of an act, and consequently merges with the question of the accomplished. In this operation, the Stoics’ opposition between suntelikos which would thus designate the choice of perfects or imperfects and παϱατατιϰός the extensive, in which the question of the telos is not involved was made symmetrical, introducing into aspectual terminology a binariness from which we have never recovered. And this symmetricalization, which sought to describe the organization of a conjugation, was then modeled on the distinction introduced by Aristotle between tτέλειος and aἀτελής, which was not grammatical but lexical. This resulted in a new confusion that is not without foundation because it was already implicit in the montage constructed by the Grecian philosophers, with on the one hand the telos used by Aristotle to differentiate types of process, and on the other the same telos used by the Stoics to structure conjugation. exist in G. , is said to be primarily a matter of discursive construction with the imparfait forming the background of a narration, and the past tenses forming the foreground of what develops and occurs. More recently, this area has been dominated by theories that situate aspect in a theory of discursive representations cf. Kamp’s discourse representation theory, and try to reduce it to a matter of discursive organization: thus the models currently most discussed make the imparfait an anaphoric mark that repeats an element of the context instead of constructing an independent referent. Once again the relations are inextricably confused: the types of discourse clearly have particular aspectual properties we have already v.n this in connection with aoristic utterances that structure both aspect and tense differently, and yet all or almost all aspectual forms can appear anywhere, in all or almost all types of discursive contexts. Thus we have foregrounded imparfaits, which have been recorded and are sometimes called narrative imparfaits— e. g. , in an utterance like Trois jours après, il mourait Three days later, he was dying, where it is a question of narrating a prominent event, and where the distinction between imparfait and passé simple becomes more difficult to evaluate. We also find passé composés in narratives, where they compete with the passé simple: that is why many analysts of the language consider the passé simple an archaic form that is being abandoned in favor of the passé composé. The difficulty is clear: it is hard to attach a given formal procedure to a given enunciative structuration, not only because enunciative structures are supposed to be compatible with several aspectual values, but first of all because the formal procedures themselves are all, more or less broadly, polysemous, their value depending precisely on the context and thus on the enunciative structure in which they are situated. Here again, this is commonplace: polysemy is everywhere in languages. But in this case it affects aspect: it consists precisely in running through aspectual oppositions, the very ones that are also supposed to be associated with some aspectual marker. The case of narrative uses of the imparfait v.ms to indicate that the imparfait can have different aspectual values, of which some are more or less apparently perfective. The narrative passé composés for instance, Il s’est levé et il est sorti He got up and went out describe the process in its advent and thus do not have the same aspectual properties as those that appear in utterances describing the state resulting from the process e.g., Désolé, en ce moment il est sorti Sorry, he left just now. Not to mention the presents, which are highly polysemous in many languages and which, depending on the language, therefore occupy a more or less extensive aspectual terrain. We are obliged to note that aspect is at least partially independent of formal procedures, that it also plays a role elsewhere, in particular, in the enunciative configuration. teleology: the objectivum. Grice speaks of the objective as a maxim. This is very Latinate. So if the maxim is an objective, the goal is the objective, or objectivum. Meaning "goal, aim" (1881) is from military term objective point (1852), reflecting a sense evolution in French. This is an expansion on the desideratum. Cf. ‘desirable,’ and ‘desirability,’ and ‘end.’ Grice feels like introducing goal-oriented conceptual machinery. In a later stage of his career he ensured that this machinery be seen as NOT mechanistically derivable. Which is odd seeing that in the ‘progression’ of the ‘soul,’ he allows for talk of adaptiveness and survival which suggest a mechanist explanation. If an agent has a desideratum that means that, to echo Bennett, A displays a goal-oriented behaviour, where the goal is the ‘telos.’ Smoke cannot ‘mean’ fire, because smoke doesn’t really behave in a goal-oriented matter. Grice does play with the idea of finality in nature, because that would allow him to justify the objectivity of his system. how does soul originate from matter? Does the vegetal soul have a telos. Purposive-behaviour is obvious in plants (phototropism). If it is present in the vegetal soul, it is present in the animal soul. If it is present in the animal soul, it is present in the rational soul. With each stage, alla Hartmann, there are distinctions in the specification of the telos. Grice could be more continental than Scheler! Grices métier. Unity of science was a very New-World expression that Grice did not quite buy. Grice was brought up in a world, the Old World, indeed, as he calls it in his Proem to the Locke lectures, of Snows two cultures. At the time of Grices philosophising, philosophers such as Winch (who indeed quotes fro Grice) were contesting the idea that science is unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a philosophical approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including conversational behaviour (to account for the conversational implicatura) is his priority, Grice needs to distinguish himself from those who propose a unified science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist. Grice is ambivalent about science and also playful (philosophia regina scientiarum). Grice seems to presuppose, or implicate, that, since there is the devil of scientism, science cannot get at teleology. The devil is in the physiological details, which are irrelevant. The language Grice uses to describe his Ps as goal-oriented, aimed at survival and reproduction, seems teleological and somewhat scientific, though. But he means that ironically! As the scholastics use it, teleology is a science, the science of telos, or finality (cf. Aristotle on telos aitia, causa finalis. The unity of science is threatened by teleology, and vice versa. Unified science seeks for a mechanistically derivable teleology. But Grices sympathies lie for detached finality. Grice is obsessed with the Greek idea of a telos, as slightly overused by Aristotle. Grice thinks that some actions are for their own sake. What is the telos of Oscar Wilde? Can we speak of Oscar Wilde’s métier? If a tiger is to tigerise, a human is to humanise, and a person is to personise. Grice thought that teleology is a key philosophical way to contest mechanism, so popular in The New World. Strictly, and Grice knew this, teleology is constituted as a discipline. One term that Cicero was unable to translate! For the philosopher, teleology is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the telos. Informally, teleological is opposed to mechanistic. Grice is interested in the mechanism/teleology debate, indeed jumps into it, with a goal in mind! Grice finds some New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with the more two-culture atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford! Code is the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of causa finalis. For Grice only detached finality poses a threat to Mechanism, as it should! Axiological objectivity is possible only given finality or purpose in Nature, the admissibility of a final cause. Grice’s “Definition” of Meaning – and Communicatum – Oddly, in “Utterer’s meaning and intentions,” Grice keeps calling his analyses ‘definition,’ and ‘re-definition.’ He is well aware of the trick introduced by Robinson on this. definiendum plural: definienda, the expression that is defined in a definition. The expression that gives the definition is the definiens plural: definientia. In the definition father, male parent, ‘father’ is the definiendum and ‘male parent’ is the definiens. In the definition ‘A human being is a rational animal’, ‘human being’ is the definiendum and ‘rational animal’ is the definiens. Similar terms are used in the case of conceptual analyses, whether they are meant to provide synonyms or not; ‘definiendum’ for ‘analysandum’ and ‘definiens’ for ‘analysans’. In ‘x knows that p if and only if it is true that p, x believes that p, and x’s belief that p is properly justified’, ‘x knows that p’ is the analysandum and ‘it is true that p, x believes that p, and x’s belief that p is properly justified’ is the analysans. definist, someone who holds that moral terms, such as ‘right’, and evaluative terms, such as ‘good’ in short, normative terms are definable in non-moral, non-evaluative i.e., non-normative terms. William Frankena offers a broader account of a definist as one who holds that ethical terms are definable in non-ethical terms. This would allow that they are definable in nonethical but evaluative terms say, ‘right’ in terms of what is non-morally intrinsically good. Definists who are also naturalists hold that moral terms can be defined by terms that denote natural properties, i.e., properties whose presence or absence can be determined by observational means. They might define ‘good’ as ‘what conduces to pleasure’. Definists who are not naturalists will hold that the terms that do the defining do not denote natural properties, e.g., that ‘right’ means ‘what is commanded by God’. definition, specification of the meaning or, alternatively, conceptual content, of an expression. For example, ‘period of fourteen days’ is a definition of ‘fortnight’. Definitions have traditionally been judged by rules like the following: 1 A definition should not be too narrow. ‘Unmarried adult male psychiatrist’ is too narrow a definition for ‘bachelor’, for some bachelors are not psychiatrists. ‘Having vertebrae and a liver’ is too narrow for ‘vertebrate’, for, even though all actual vertebrate things have vertebrae and a liver, it is possible for a vertebrate thing to lack a liver. 2 A definition should not be too broad. ‘Unmarried adult’ is too broad a definition for ‘bachelor’, for not all unmarried adults are bachelors. ‘Featherless biped’ is too broad for ‘human being’, for even though all actual featherless bipeds are human beings, it is possible for a featherless biped to be non-human. 3 The defining expression in a definition should ideally exactly match the degree of vagueness of the expression being defined except in a precising definition. ‘Adult female’ for ‘woman’ does not violate this rule, but ‘female at least eighteen years old’ for ‘woman’ does. 4 A definition should not be circular. If ‘desirable’ defines ‘good’ and ‘good’ defines ‘desirable’, these definitions are circular. Definitions fall into at least the following kinds: analytical definition: definition whose corresponding biconditional is analytic or gives an analysis of the definiendum: e.g., ‘female fox’ for ‘vixen’, where the corresponding biconditional ‘For any x, x is a vixen if and only if x is a female fox’ is analytic; ‘true in all possible worlds’ for ‘necessarily true’, where the corresponding biconditional ‘For any P, P is necessarily true if and only if P is true in all possible worlds’ gives an analysis of the definiendum. contextual definition: definition of an expression as it occurs in a larger expression: e.g., ‘If it is not the case that Q, then P’ contextually defines ‘unless’ as it occurs in ‘P unless Q’; ‘There is at least one entity that is F and is identical with any entity that is F’ contextually defines ‘exactly one’ as it occurs in ‘There is exactly one F’. Recursive definitions see below are an important variety of contextual definition. Another important application of contextual definition is Russell’s theory of descriptions, which defines ‘the’ as it occurs in contexts of the form ‘The so-and-so is such-and-such’. coordinative definition: definition of a theoretical term by non-theoretical terms: e.g., ‘the forty-millionth part of the circumference of the earth’ for ‘meter’. definition by genus and species: When an expression is said to be applicable to some but not all entities of a certain type and inapplicable to all entities not of that type, the type in question is the genus, and the subtype of all and only those entities to which the expression is applicable is the species: e.g., in the definition ‘rational animal’ for ‘human’, the type animal is the genus and the subtype human is the species. Each species is distinguished from any other of the same genus by a property called the differentia. definition in use: specification of how an expression is used or what it is used to express: e.g., ‘uttered to express astonishment’ for ‘my goodness’. Vitters emphasized the importance of definition in use in his use theory of meaning. definition per genus et differentiam: definition by genus and difference; same as definition by genus and species. explicit definition: definition that makes it clear that it is a definition and identifies the expression being defined as such: e.g., ‘Father’ means ‘male parent’; ‘For any x, x is a father by definition if and only if x is a male parent’. implicit definition: definition that is not an explicit definition. lexical definition: definition of the kind commonly thought appropriate for dictionary definitions of natural language terms, namely, a specification of their conventional meaning. nominal definition: definition of a noun usually a common noun, giving its linguistic meaning. Typically it is in terms of macrosensible characteristics: e.g., ‘yellow malleable metal’ for ‘gold’. Locke spoke of nominal essence and contrasted it with real essence. ostensive definition: definition by an example in which the referent is specified by pointing or showing in some way: e.g., “ ‘Red’ is that color,” where the word ‘that’ is accompanied with a gesture pointing to a patch of colored cloth; “ ‘Pain’ means this,” where ‘this’ is accompanied with an insertion of a pin through the hearer’s skin; “ ‘Kangaroo’ applies to all and only animals like that,” where ‘that’ is accompanied by pointing to a particular kangaroo. persuasive definition: definition designed to affect or appeal to the psychological states of the party to whom the definition is given, so that a claim will appear more plausible to the party than it is: e.g., ‘self-serving manipulator’ for ‘politician’, where the claim in question is that all politicians are immoral. precising definition: definition of a vague expression intended to reduce its vagueness: e.g., ‘snake longer than half a meter and shorter than two meters’ for ‘snake of average length’; ‘having assets ten thousand times the median figure’ for ‘wealthy’. prescriptive definition: stipulative definition that, in a recommendatory way, gives a new meaning to an expression with a previously established meaning: e.g., ‘male whose primary sexual preference is for other males’ for ‘gay’. real definition: specification of the metaphysically necessary and sufficient condition for being the kind of thing a noun usually a common noun designates: e.g., ‘element with atomic number 79’ for ‘gold’. Locke spoke of real essence and contrasted it with nominal essence. recursive definition also called inductive definition and definition by recursion: definition in three clauses in which 1 the expression defined is applied to certain particular items the base clause; 2 a rule is given for reaching further items to which the expression applies the recursive, or inductive, clause; and 3 it is stated that the expression applies to nothing else the closure clause. E.g., ‘John’s parents are John’s ancestors; any parent of John’s ancestor is John’s ancestor; nothing else is John’s ancestor’. By the base clause, John’s mother and father are John’s ancestors. Then by the recursive clause, John’s mother’s parents and John’s father’s parents are John’s ancestors; so are their parents, and so on. Finally, by the last closure clause, these people exhaust John’s ancestors. The following defines multiplication in terms of definition definition 214 214 addition: ‘0 $ n % 0. m ! 1 $ n % m $ n ! n. Nothing else is the result of multiplying integers’. The base clause tells us, e.g., that 0 $ 4 % 0. The recursive clause tells us, e.g., that 0 ! 1 $ 4 % 0 $ 4 ! 4. We then know that 1 $ 4 % 0 ! 4 % 4. Likewise, e.g., 2 $ 4 % 1 ! 1 $ 4 % 1 $ 4 ! 4 % 4 ! 4 % 8. stipulative definition: definition regardless of the ordinary or usual conceptual content of the expression defined. It postulates a content, rather than aiming to capture the content already associated with the expression. Any explicit definition that introduces a new expression into the language is a stipulative definition: e.g., “For the purpose of our discussion ‘existent’ means ‘perceivable’ “; “By ‘zoobeedoobah’ we shall mean ‘vain millionaire who is addicted to alcohol’.” synonymous definition: definition of a word or other linguistic expression by another word synonymous with it: e.g., ‘buy’ for ‘purchase’; ‘madness’ for ‘insanity’. Refs.: There are specific essays on ‘teleology,’ ‘final cause,’ and ‘finality,’ the The Grice Papers. Some of the material published in “Reply to Richards” (repr. in “Conception”) and “Actions and events,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

datum: in epistemology, the “brute fact” element to be found or postulated as a component of perceptual experience. Some theorists who endorse the existence of a given element in experience think that we can find this element by careful introspection of what we experience Moore, H. H. Price. Such theorists generally distinguish between those components of ordinary perceptual awareness that constitute what we believe or know about the objects we perceive and those components that we strictly perceive. For example, if we analyze introspectively what we are aware of when we see an apple we find that what we believe of the apple is that it is a three-dimensional object with a soft, white interior; what we see of it, strictly speaking, is just a red-shaped expanse of one of its facing sides. This latter is what is “given” in the intended sense. Other theorists treat the given as postulated rather than introspectively found. For example, some theorists treat cognition as an activity imposing form on some material given in conscious experience. On this view, often attributed to Kant, the given and the conceptual are interdefined and logically inseparable. Sometimes this interdependence is seen as rendering a description of the given as impossible; in this case the given is said to be ineffable C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order. On some theories of knowledge foundationalism the first variant of the given that which is “found” rather than “postulated” provides the empirical foundations of what we might know or justifiably believe. Thus, if I believe on good evidence that there is a red apple in front of me, the evidence is the non-cognitive part of my perceptual awareness of the red appleshaped expanse. Epistemologies postulating the first kind of givenness thus require a single entity-type to explain the sensorial nature of perception and to provide immediate epistemic foundations for empirical knowledge. This requirement is now widely regarded as impossible to satisfy; hence Wilfred Sellars describes the discredited view as the myth of the given.

Degradatum -- degree: Grice on the flat/variable distinction – Grice considers that ‘ought’ is weaker than ‘must’ – ‘ought’ displays ‘degree-acceptability.’ Grice loved a degree – he uses “d” in aspects of reason -- degree, also called arity, adicity, in formal languages, a property of predicate and function expressions that determines the number of terms with which the expression is correctly combined to yield a well-formed expression. If an expression combines with a single term to form a wellformed expression, it is of degree one monadic, singulary. Expressions that combine with two terms are of degree two dyadic, binary, and so on. Expressions of degree greater than or equal to two are polyadic. The formation rules of a formalized language must effectively specify the degrees of its primitive expressions as part of the effective determination of the class of wellformed formulas. Degree is commonly indicated by an attached superscript consisting of an Arabic numeral. Formalized languages have been studied that contain expressions having variable degree or variable adicity and that can thus combine with any finite number of terms. An abstract relation that would be appropriate as extension of a predicate expression is subject to the same terminology, and likewise for function expressions and their associated functions. -- degree of unsolvability, a maximal set of equally complex sets of natural numbers, with comparative complexity of sets of natural numbers construed as recursion-theoretic reducibility ordering. Recursion theorists investigate various notions of reducibility between sets of natural numbers, i.e., various ways of filling in the following schematic definition. For sets A and B of natural numbers: A is reducible to B iff if and only if there is an algorithm whereby each membership question about A e.g., ‘17 1 A?’ could be answered allowing consultation of an definition, contextual degree of unsolvability 215 215 “oracle” that would correctly answer each membership question about B. This does not presuppose that there is a “real” oracle for B; the motivating idea is counterfactual: A is reducible to B iff: if membership questions about B were decidable then membership questions about A would also be decidable. On the other hand, the mathematical definitions of notions of reducibility involve no subjunctive conditionals or other intensional constructions. The notion of reducibility is determined by constraints on how the algorithm could use the oracle. Imposing no constraints yields T-reducibility ‘T’ for Turing, the most important and most studied notion of reducibility. Fixing a notion r of reducibility: A is r-equivalent to B iff A is r-reducible to B and B is rreducible to A. If r-reducibility is transitive, r-equivalence is an equivalence relation on the class of sets of natural numbers, one reflecting a notion of equal complexity for sets of natural numbers. A degree of unsolvability relative to r an r-degree is an equivalence class under that equivalence relation, i.e., a maximal class of sets of natural numbers any two members of which are r-equivalent, i.e., a maximal class of equally complex in the sense of r-reducibility sets of natural numbers. The r-reducibility-ordering of sets of natural numbers transfers to the rdegrees: for d and dH r-degrees, let d m, dH iff for some A 1 d and B 1 dH A is r-reducible to B. The study of r-degrees is the study of them under this ordering. The degrees generated by T-reducibility are the Turing degrees. Without qualification, ‘degree of unsolvability’ means ‘Turing degree’. The least Tdegree is the set of all recursive i.e., using Church’s thesis, solvable sets of natural numbers. So the phrase ‘degree of unsolvability’ is slightly misleading: the least such degree is “solvability.” By effectively coding functions from natural numbers to natural numbers as sets of natural numbers, we may think of such a function as belonging to a degree: that of its coding set. Recursion theorists have extended the notions of reducibility and degree of unsolvability to other domains, e.g. transfinite ordinals and higher types taken over the natural numbers.

demonstratum: Cf. illatum – In act of communication, Grice’s focus is on the reasoning on the emissor’s part. This is end-means. The conversational moves is the most effectively designed move. The potential uptake by the emissee is also taken into the consideration by the emissor. And actual uptake is not of philosophical importance. hen Grice tried to conceptualise what ‘communicating’ and ‘smoke means fire’ have in common he came with the idea of ‘consequentia,’ as a dyadic relation that, eventually, will become triadic, with the missor and the missee brought into the bargain. “Look that smoke, there must be fire somewhere’ – “By that handwave, he meant that he was about to leave me.” In any case, Grice’s arriving at ‘consequentia’ is exactly Hobbes’s idea in “Computatio.’ And ‘con-sequentia’ involves a bit of ‘demonstratio.’ One thing follows the other. One thing YIELDS the other. The link may be causal (smoke means fire) or ‘communicative’). ‘Rationality’ is one of those words Austin forbids to use. Grice would venture with ‘reason,’ and better, ‘reasons’ to make it countable, and good for botanising. Only in the New World, and when he started to get input from non-philosophers, did Grice explore ‘rationality’ itself. Oxonians philosophers take it for granted, and do not have to philosophise about it. Especially those who belong to Grice’s play group of ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers! Oxonian philosophers will quote from the Locke version! Obviously, while each of the four lectures credits their own entry below, it may do to reflect on Grices overall aim. Grice structures the lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The first lecture is intended to provide a bit of linguistic botanising for reasonable, and rational. In later lectures, Grice tackles reason qua noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls the Aequi-vocality thesis: must has only one Fregeian that crosses what he calls the buletic-doxastic divide. He is especially concerned ‒ this being the Kant lectures ‒ with Kants attempt to reduce the categorical imperative to a counsel of prudence (Ratschlag der Klugheit), where Kants prudence is Klugheit, versus skill, as in rule of skill, and even if Kant defines Klugheit as a skill to attain what is good for oneself ‒ itself divided into privatKlugheit and Weltklugheit. Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia. While a further lecture on happiness as the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT strictly part of the either the Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaemonia may be regarded as the goal involved in the relevant imperative. “Aspects”, Clarendon, Stanford, The Kant memorial Lectures, “Aspects,” Clarendon, Some aspects of reason, Stanford; reason, reasoning, reasons. The lectures were also delivered as the Locke lectures. Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. His main thesis he calls the æqui-vocality thesis: must has one unique or singular sense, that crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide. “Aspects,” Clarendon, Grice, “Aspects, Clarendon, Locke lecture notes: reason. On “Aspects”. Including extensive language botany on rational, reasonable, and indeed reason (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed). At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is indispensable towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory theory. It is an exploration of a range of uses of reason that leads him to his Aequi-vocality thesis that must has only one sense; also ‘Aspects of reason and reasoning,’ in Grice, “Aspects,” Clarendon, the Locke lectures, the Kant lectures, Stanford, reason, happiness. While Locke hardly mentions reason, his friend Burthogge does, and profusely! It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford. He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford. While Grice was a fellow of St. Johns, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy. He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his proemium, Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Lockes ægis now! When preparing for his second lecture, he had occasion to revise some earlier drafts dated pretty early, on reasons, Grice, “Aspects,” Clarendon, reason, reasons. Linguistic analysis on justificatory, explanatory and mixed uses of reason. While Grice knows that the basic use of reason is qua verb (reasoner reasons from premise p to conclusion c), he spends some time in exploring reason as noun. Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to approach rationality. However, his distinction between justificatory and explanatory reason is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of reason qua noun. Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than justificatory reason. Explanatory reason explains the behaviour of a rational agent. Grice is aware of Freud and his rationalizations. An agent may invoke some reason for his acting which is not legitimate. An agent may convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather; when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and join the yacht club there. Grice loved an enthymeme. Grices enthymeme. Grice, the implicit reasoner! As the title of the lecture implies, Grice takes the verb, to reason, as conceptually prior. A reasoner reasons, briefly, from a premise to a conclusion. There are types of reason: flat reason and gradual reason. He famously reports Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie, and his proof on the immortality of the human soul. Grice makes some remarks on akrasia as key, too. The first lecture is then dedicated to an elucidation, and indeed attempt at a conceptual analysis in terms of intentions and doxastic conditions reasoner R intends that premise P yields conclusion C and believes his intention will cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his entertaining the premise. One example of particular interest for a study of the use of conversational reason in Grice is that of the connection between implicaturum and reasoning. Grice entitles the sub-section of the lecture as Too good to be reasoning, which is of course a joke. Cf. too much love will kill you, and Theres no such thing as too much of a good thing (Shakespeare, As you like it). Grice notes: I have so far been considering difficulties which may arise from the attempt to find, for all cases of actual reasoning, reconstructions of sequences of utterances or explicit thoughts which the reasoner might plausibly be supposed to think of as conforming to some set of canonical patterns of inference. Grice then turns to a different class of examples, with regard to which the problem is not that it is difficult to know how to connect them with canonical patterns, but rather that it is only too easy (or shall I say trivial) to make the connection. Like some children (not many), some cases of reasoning are too well behaved for their own good. Suppose someone says to Grice, and It is very interesting that Grice gives conversational examples. Jack has arrived, Grice replies, I conclude from that that Jack has arrived. Or he says Jack has arrived AND Jill has *also* arrived, And Grice replies, I conclude that Jill has arrived.(via Gentzens conjunction-elimination). Or he says, My wife is at home. And Grice replies, I reason from that that someone (viz. your wife) is at home. Is there not something very strange about the presence in my three replies of the verb conclude (in example I and II) and the verb reason (in the third example)? misleading, but doxastically fine, professor! It is true, of course, that if instead of my first reply I had said (vii) vii. So Jack has arrived, has he? the strangeness would have been removed. But here so serves not to indicate that an inference is being made, but rather as part of a not that otiose way of expressing surprise. One might just as well have said (viii). viii. Well, fancy that! Now, having spent a sizeable part of his life exploiting it, Grice is not unaware of the truly fine distinction between a statements being false (or axiologically satisfactory), and its being true (or axiologically satisfactory) but otherwise conversationally or pragmatically misleading or inappropriate or pointless, and, on that account and by such a fine distinction, a statement, or an utterance, or conversational move which it would be improper (in terms of the reasonable/rational principle of conversational helfpulness) in one way or another, to make. It is worth considering Grices reaction to his own distinction. Entailment is in sight! But Grice does not find himself lured by the idea of using that distinction here! Because Moores entailment, rather than Grices implicaturum is entailed. Or because explicatu, rather than implicaturum is involved. Suppose, again, that I were to break off the chapter at this point, and switch suddenly to this argument. ix. I have two hands (here is one hand and here is another). If had three more hands, I would have five. If I were to have double that number I would have ten, and if four of them were removed six would remain. So I would have four more hands than I have now. Is one happy to describe this performance as reasoning? Depends whos one and whats happy!? There is, however, little doubt that I have produced a canonically acceptable chain of statements. So surely that is reasoning, if only conversationally misleadingly called so. Or suppose that, instead of writing in my customary free and easy style, I had framed my remarks (or at least the argumentative portions of my remarks) as a verbal realization, so to speak, of sequences of steps in strict conformity with the rules of a natural-deduction system of first-order predicate logic. I give, that is to say, an updated analogue of a medieval disputation. Implicaturum. Gentzen is Ockham. Would those brave souls who continued to read be likely to think of my performance as the production of reasoning, or would they rather think of it as a crazy formalisation of reasoning conducted at some previous time? Depends on crazy or formalisation. One is reminded of Grice telling Strawson, If you cannot formalise, dont say it; Strawson: Oh, no! If I can formalise it, I shant say it! The points suggested by this stream of rhetorical questions may be summarized as follows. Whether the samples presented FAIL to achieve the title of reasoning, and thus be deemed reasoning, or whether the samples achieve the title, as we may figuratively put it, by the skin of their teeth, perhaps does not very greatly matter. For whichever way it is, the samples seem to offend against something (different things in different cases, Im sure) very central to our conception of reasoning. So central that Moore would call it entailment! A mechanical application of a ground rule of inference, or a concatenation thereof, is reluctantly (if at all) called reasoning. Such a mechanical application may perhaps legitimately enter into (i.e. form individual steps in) authentic reasonings, but they are not themselves reasonings, nor is a string of them. There is a demand that a reasoner should be, to a greater or lesser degree, the author of his reasonings. Parroted sequences are not reasonings when parroted, though the very same sequences might be reasoning if not parroted. Ped sequences are another matter. Some of the examples Grice gives are deficient because they are aimless or pointless. Reasoning is characteristically addressed to this or that problem: a small problem, a large problem, a problem within a problem, a clear problem, a hazy problem, a practical problem, an intellectual problem; but a problem! A mere flow of ideas minimally qualifies (or can be deemed) as reasoning, even if it happens to be logically respectable. But if it is directed, or even monitored (with intervention should it go astray, not only into fallacy or mistake, but also into such things as conversational irrelevance or otiosity!), that is another matter! Finicky over-elaboration of intervening steps is frowned upon, and in extreme cases runs the risk of forfeiting the title of reasoning. In conversation, such over-elaboration will offend against this or that conversational maxim, against (presumably) some suitably formulated maxim conjoining informativeness. As Grice noted with regard to ‘That pillar box seems red to me.’ That would be baffling if the addressee fails to detect the communication-point. An utterance is supposed to inform, and what is the above meant to inform its addressee? In thought, it will be branded as pedantry or neurotic caution. If a distinction between brooding and conversing is to be made! At first sight, perhaps, one would have been inclined to say that greater rather than lesser explicitnessness is a merit. Not that inexplicitness, or implicaturum-status, as it were ‒ is bad, but that, other things being equal, the more explicitness the better. But now it looks as if proper explicitness (or explicatum-status) is an Aristotelian mean, or mesotes, and it would be good some time to enquire what determines where that mean lies. The burden of the foregoing observations seems to me to be that the provisional account of reasoning, which has been before us, leaves out something which is crucially important. What it leaves out is the conception of reasoning, as I like to see conversation, as a purposive activity, as something with goals and purposes. The account or picture leaves out, in short, the connection of reasoning with the will! Moreover, once we avail ourselves of the great family of additional ideas which the importation of this conception would give us, we shall be able to deal with the quandary which I laid before you a few minutes ago. For we could say e.g. that R reasons (informally) from p to c just in case R thinks that p and intends that, in thinking c, he should be thinking something which would be the conclusion of a formally valid argument the premisses of which are a supplementation of p. This will differ from merely thinking that there exists some formally valid supplementation of a transition from p to c, which I felt inclined NOT to count as (or deem) reasoning. I have some hopes that this appeal to the purposiveness or goal-oriented character of authentic reasoning or good reasoning might be sufficient to dispose of the quandary on which I have directed it. But I am by no means entirely confident that this is the case, and so I offer a second possible method of handling the quandary, one to which I shall return later when I shall attempt to place it in a larger context. We have available to us (let us suppose) what I might call a hard way of making inferential moves. We in fact employ this laborious, step-by-step procedure at least when we are in difficulties, when the course is not clear, when we have an awkward (or philosophical) audience, and so forth. An inferential judgement, however, is a normally desirable undertaking for us only because of its actual or hoped for destinations, and is therefore not desirable for its own sake (a respect in which, possibly, it may differ from an inferential capacity). Following the hard way consumes time and energy. These are in limited supply and it would, therefore, be desirable if occasions for employing the hard way were minimized. A substitute for the hard way, the quick way, which is made possible by habituation and intention, is available to us, and the capacity for it (which is sometimes called intelligence, and is known to be variable in degree) is a desirable quality. The possibility of making a good inferential step (there being one to be made), together with such items as a particular inferers reputation for inferential ability, may determine whether on a particular occasion we suppose a particular transition to be inferential (and so to be a case of reasoning) or not. On this account, it is not essential that there should be a single supplementation of an informal reasoning which is supposed to be what is overtly in the inferers mind, though quite often there may be special reasons for supposing this to be the case. So Botvinnik is properly credited with a case of reasoning, while Shropshire is not. Drawing from his recollections of an earlier linguistic botany on reason. Grice distinguishes between justificatory reason and explanatory reason. There is a special case of mixed reason, explanatory-cum-justificatory. The lecture can be seen as the way an exercise that Austin took as taxonomic can lead to explanatory adequacy, too! Bennett is an excellent correspondent. He holds a very interesting philosophical correspondence with Hare. This is just one f. with Grices correspondence with Bennett. Oxford don, Christchurh, NZ-born Bennett, of Magdalen, B. Phil. Oxon. Bennett has an essay on the interpretation of a formal system under Austin. It is interesting that Bennett was led to consider the interpretation of a formal system under Austins Play Group. Bennett attends Grices seminars. He is my favourite philosopher. Bennett quotes Grice in his Linguistic behaviour. In return, Grice quotes Bennett in the Preface toWOW. Bennett has an earlier essay on rationality, which evidences that the topic is key at Grices Oxford. Bennett has studied better than anyone the way Locke is Griceian. A word or expression does not just stand for idea, but for the intention of the utterer to stand for it! Grice also enjoyed construal by Bennett of Grice as a nominalist. Bennett makes a narrow use of the epithet. Since Grice does distinguish between an utterance-token (x) and an utterance-type, and considers that the attribution of meaning from token to type is metabolic, this makes Grice a nominalist. Bennett is one of the few to follow Kantotle and make him popular on the pages of the Times Literary Supplement, of all places. Refs.: The locus classicus is “Aspects,” Clarendon. But there are allusions on ‘reason’ and ‘rationality, in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

denotatum -- denotation, the thing or things that an expression applies to; extension. The term is used in contrast with ‘meaning’ and ‘connotation’. A pair of expressions may apply to the same things, i.e., have the same denotation, yet differ in meaning: ‘triangle’, ‘trilateral’; ‘creature with a heart’, ‘creature with a kidney’; ‘bird’, ‘feathered earthling’; ‘present capital of France’, ‘City of Light’. If a term does not apply to anything, some will call it denotationless, while others would say that it denotes the empty set. Such terms may differ in meaning: ‘unicorn’, ‘centaur’, ‘square root of pi’. Expressions may apply to the same things, yet bring to mind different associations, i.e., have different connotations: ‘persistent’, ‘stubborn’, ‘pigheaded’; ‘white-collar employee’, ‘office worker’, ‘professional paper-pusher’; ‘Lewis Carroll’, ‘Reverend Dodgson’. There can be confusion about the denotation-connotation terminology, because this pair is used to make other contrasts. Sometimes the term ‘connotation’ is used more broadly, so that any difference of either meaning or association is considered a difference of connotation. Then ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a liver’ might be said to denote the same individuals or sets but to connote different properties. In a second use, denotation is the semantic value of an expression. Sometimes the denotation of a general term is said to be a property, rather than the things having the property. This occurs when the denotation-connotation terminology is used to contrast the property expressed with the connotation. Thus ‘persistent’ and ‘pig-headed’ might be said to denote the same property but differ in connotation.

Grice’s deontic operator – “The deon is like the Roman ‘necesse,’ Grice was aware of Bentham’s play on words with deontology -- as a Kantian, Griceian is a deontologist. However, he refers to the ‘sorry story of deontic logic,’ because of von Wright (from whom he borrowed but to whom he never returned ‘alethic’) deontic logic, the logic of obligation and permission. There are three principal types of formal deontic systems. 1 Standard deontic logic, or SDL, results from adding a pair of monadic deontic operators O and P, read as “it ought to be that” and “it is permissible that,” respectively, to the classical propositional calculus. SDL contains the following axioms: tautologies of propositional logic, OA S - P - A, OA / - O - A, OA / B / OA / OB, and OT, where T stands for any tautology. Rules of inference are modus ponens and substitution. See the survey of SDL by Dagfinn Follesdal and Risto Hilpinin in R. Hilpinin, ed., Deontic Logic, 1. 2 Dyadic deontic logic is obtained by adding a pair of dyadic deontic operators O / and P / , to be read as “it ought to be that . . . , given that . . .” and “it is permissible that . . . , given that . . . ,” respectively. The SDL monadic operator O is defined as OA S OA/T; i.e., a statement of absolute obligation OA becomes an obligation conditional on tautologous conditions. A statement of conditional obligation OA/B is true provided that some value realized at some B-world where A holds is better than any value realized at any B-world where A does not hold. This axiological construal of obligation is typically accompanied by these axioms and rules of inference: tautologies of propositional logic, modus ponens, and substitution, PA/C S - O-A/C, OA & B/C S [OA/C & OB/C], OA/C / PA/C, OT/C / OC/C, OT/C / OT/B 7 C, [OA/B & OA/C] / OA/B 7 C, [PB/B 7 C & OA/B 7 C] / OA/B, and [P< is the negation of any tautology. See the comparison of alternative dyadic systems in Lennart Aqvist, Introduction to Deontic Logic and the Theory of Normative Systems, 7. 3 Two-sorted deontic logic, due to Castañeda Thinking and Doing, 5, pivotally distinguishes between propositions, the bearers of truth-values, and practitions, the contents of commands, imperatives, requests, and such. Deontic operators apply to practitions, yielding propositions. The deontic operators Oi, Pi, Wi, and li are read as “it is obligatory i that,” “it is permissible i that,” “it is wrong i that,” and “it is optional i denotation deontic logic 219 219 that,” respectively, where i stands for any of the various types of obligation, permission, and so on. Let p stand for indicatives, where these express propositions; let A and B stand for practitives, understood to express practitions; and allow p* to stand for both indicatives and practitives. For deontic definition there are PiA S - Oi - A, WiA S Oi - A, and LiA S - OiA & - Oi - A. Axioms and rules of inference include p*, if p* has the form of a truth-table tautology, OiA / - Oi - A, O1A / A, where O1 represents overriding obligation, modus ponens for both indicatives and practitives, and the rule that if p & A1 & . . . & An / B is a theorem, so too is p & OiA1 & . . . & OiAn / OiB. -- deontic paradoxes, the paradoxes of deontic logic, which typically arise as follows: a certain set of English sentences about obligation or permission appears logically consistent, but when these same sentences are represented in a proposed system of deontic logic the result is a formally inconsistent set. To illustrate, a formulation is provided below of how two of these paradoxes beset standard deontic logic. The contrary-to-duty imperative paradox, made famous by Chisholm Analysis, 3, arises from juxtaposing two apparent truths: first, some of us sometimes do what we should not do; and second, when such wrongful doings occur it is obligatory that the best or a better be made of an unfortunate situation. Consider this scenario. Art and Bill share an apartment. For no good reason Art develops a strong animosity toward Bill. One evening Art’s animosity takes over, and he steals Bill’s valuable lithographs. Art is later found out, apprehended, and brought before Sue, the duly elected local punishment-and-awards official. An inquiry reveals that Art is a habitual thief with a history of unremitting parole violation. In this situation, it seems that 14 are all true and hence mutually consistent: 1 Art steals from Bill. 2 If Art steals from Bill, Sue ought to punish Art for stealing from Bill. 3 It is obligatory that if Art does not steal from Bill, Sue does not punish him for stealing from Bill. 4 Art ought not to steal from Bill. Turning to standard deontic logic, or SDL, let sstand for ‘Art steals from Bill’ and let p stand for ‘Sue punishes Art for stealing from Bill’. Then 14 are most naturally represented in SDL as follows: 1a s. 2a s / Op. 3a O- s / - p. 4a O - s. Of these, 1a and 2a entail Op by propositional logic; next, given the SDL axiom OA / B / OA / OB, 3a implies O - s / O - p; but the latter, taken in conjunction with 4a, entails O - p by propositional logic. In the combination of Op, O - p, and the axiom OA / - O - A, of course, we have a formally inconsistent set. The paradox of the knower, first presented by Lennart Bqvist Noûs, 7, is generated by these apparent truths: first, some of us sometimes do what we should not do; and second, there are those who are obligated to know that such wrongful doings occur. Consider the following scenario. Jones works as a security guard at a local store. One evening, while Jones is on duty, Smith, a disgruntled former employee out for revenge, sets the store on fire just a few yards away from Jones’s work station. Here it seems that 13 are all true and thus jointly consistent: 1 Smith set the store on fire while Jones was on duty. 2 If Smith set the store on fire while Jones was on duty, it is obligatory that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire. 3 Smith ought not set the store on fire. Independently, as a consequence of the concept of knowledge, there is the epistemic theorem that 4 The statement that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire entails the statement that Smith set the store on fire. Next, within SDL 1 and 2 surely appear to imply: 5 It is obligatory that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire. But 4 and 5 together yield 6 Smith ought to set the store on fire, given the SDL theorem that if A / B is a theorem, so is OA / OB. And therein resides the paradox: not only does 6 appear false, the conjunction of 6 and 3 is formally inconsistent with the SDL axiom OA / - O - A. The overwhelming verdict among deontic logicians is that SDL genuinely succumbs to the deontic operator deontic paradoxes 220 220 deontic paradoxes. But it is controversial what other approach is best followed to resolve these puzzles. Two of the most attractive proposals are Castañeda’s two-sorted system Thinking and Doing, 5, and the agent-and-time relativized approach of Fred Feldman Philosophical Perspectives, 0.

Grice on types of priority -- Grice often uses ‘depend’ – but not clearly in what sense – there’s ontological dependence, the basic one. dependence, in philosophy, a relation of one of three main types: epistemic dependence, or dependence in the order of knowing; conceptual dependence, or dependence in the order of understanding; and ontological dependence, or dependence in the order of being. When a relation of dependence runs in one direction only, we have a relation of priority. For example, if wholes are ontologically dependent on their parts, but the latter in turn are not ontologically dependent on the former, one may say that parts are ontologically prior to wholes. The phrase ‘logical priority’ usually refers to priority of one of the three varieties to be discussed here. Epistemic dependence. To say that the facts in some class B are epistemically dependent on the facts in some other class A is to say this: one cannot know any fact in B unless one knows some fact in A that serves as one’s evidence for the fact in B. For example, it might be held that to know any fact about one’s physical environment e.g., that there is a fire in the stove, one must know as evidence some facts about the character of one’s own sensory experience e.g., that one is feeling warm and seeing flames. This would be to maintain that facts about the physical world are epistemically dependent on facts about sensory experience. If one held in addition that the dependence is not reciprocal that one can know facts about one’s sensory experience without knowing as evidence any facts about the physical world one would be maintaining that the former facts are epistemically prior to the latter facts. Other plausible though sometimes disputed examples of epistemic priority are the following: facts about the behavior of others are epistemically prior to facts about their mental states; facts about observable objects are epistemically prior to facts about the invisible particles postulated by physics; and singular facts e.g., this crow is black are epistemically prior to general facts e.g., all crows are black. Is there a class of facts on which all others epistemically depend and that depend on no further facts in turn a bottom story in the edifice of knowledge? Some foundationalists say yes, positing a level of basic or foundational facts that are epistemically prior to all others. Empiricists are usually foundationalists who maintain that the basic level consists of facts about immediate sensory experience. Coherentists deny the need for a privileged stratum of facts to ground the knowledge of all others; in effect, they deny that any facts are epistemically prior to any others. Instead, all facts are on a par, and each is known in virtue of the way in which it fits in with all the rest. Sometimes it appears that two propositions or classes of them each epistemically depend on the other in a vicious way to know A, you must first know B, and to know B, you must first know A. Whenever this is genuinely the case, we are in a skeptical predicament and cannot know either proposition. For example, Descartes believed that he could not be assured of the reliability of his own cognitions until he knew that God exists and is not a deceiver; yet how could he ever come to know anything about God except by relying on his own cognitions? This is the famous problem of the Cartesian circle. Another example is the problem of induction as set forth by Hume: to know that induction is a legitimate mode of inference, one would first have to know that the future will resemble the past; but since the latter fact is establishable only by induction, one could know it only if one already knew that induction is legitimate. Solutions to these problems must show that contrary to first appearances, there is a way of knowing one of the problematic propositions independently of the other. Conceptual dependence. To say that B’s are conceptually dependent on A’s means that to understand what a B is, you must understand what an A is, or that the concept of a B can be explained or understood only through the concept of an A. For example, it could plausibly be claimed that the concept uncle can be understood only in terms of the concept male. Empiricists typically maintain that we understand what an external thing like a tree or a table is only by knowing what experiences it would induce in us, so that the concepts we apply to physical things depend on the concepts we apply to our experideontological ethics dependence 221 221 ences. They typically also maintain that this dependence is not reciprocal, so that experiential concepts are conceptually prior to physical concepts. Some empiricists argue from the thesis of conceptual priority just cited to the corresponding thesis of epistemic priority that facts about experiences are epistemically prior to facts about external objects. Turning the tables, some foes of empiricism maintain that the conceptual priority is the other way about: that we can describe and understand what kind of experience we are undergoing only by specifying what kind of object typically causes it “it’s a smell like that of pine mulch”. Sometimes they offer this as a reason for denying that facts about experiences are epistemically prior to facts about physical objects. Both sides in this dispute assume that a relation of conceptual priority in one direction excludes a relation of epistemic priority in the opposite direction. But why couldn’t it be the case both that facts about experiences are epistemically prior to facts about physical objects and that concepts of physical objects are conceptually prior to concepts of experiences? How the various kinds of priority and dependence are connected e.g., whether conceptual priority implies epistemic priority is a matter in need of further study. Ontological dependence. To say that entities of one sort the B’s are ontologically dependent on entities of another sort the A’s means this: no B can exist unless some A exists; i.e., it is logically or metaphysically necessary that if any B exists, some A also exists. Ontological dependence may be either specific the existence of any B depending on the existence of a particular A or generic the existence of any B depending merely on the existence of some A or other. If B’s are ontologically dependent on A’s, but not conversely, we may say that A’s are ontologically prior to B’s. The traditional notion of substance is often defined in terms of ontological priority substances can exist without other things, as Aristotle said, but the others cannot exist without them. Leibniz believed that composite entities are ontologically dependent on simple i.e., partless entities that any composite object exists only because it has certain simple elements that are arranged in a certain way. Berkeley, J. S. Mill, and other phenomenalists have believed that physical objects are ontologically dependent on sensory experiences that the existence of a table or a tree consists in the occurrence of sensory experiences in certain orderly patterns. Spinoza believed that all finite beings are ontologically dependent on God and that God is ontologically dependent on nothing further; thus God, being ontologically prior to everything else, is in Spinoza’s view the only substance. Sometimes there are disputes about the direction in which a relationship of ontological priority runs. Some philosophers hold that extensionless points are prior to extended solids, others that solids are prior to points; some say that things are prior to events, others that events are prior to things. In the face of such disagreement, still other philosophers such as Goodman have suggested that nothing is inherently or absolutely prior to anything else: A’s may be prior to B’s in one conceptual scheme, B’s to A’s in another, and there may be no saying which scheme is correct. Whether relationships of priority hold absolutely or only relative to conceptual schemes is one issue dividing realists and anti-realists.

de re: as opposed to de dicto, of what is said or of the proposition, as opposed to de re, of the thing. Many philosophers believe the following ambiguous, depending on whether they are interpreted de dicto or de re: 1 It is possible that the number of U.S. states is even. 2 Galileo believes that the earth moves. Assume for illustrative purposes that there are propositions and properties. If 1 is interpreted as de dicto, it asserts that the proposition that the number of U.S. states is even is a possible truth something true, since there are in fact fifty states. If 1 is interpreted as de re, it asserts that the actual number of states fifty has the property of being possibly even something essentialism takes to be true. Similarly for 2; it may mean that Galileo’s belief has a certain content that the earth moves or that Galileo believes, of the earth, that it moves. More recently, largely due to Castañeda and John Perry, many philosophers have come to believe in de se “of oneself” ascriptions, distinct from de dicto and de re. Suppose, while drinking with others, I notice that someone is spilling beer. Later I come to realize that it is I. I believed at the outset that someone was spilling beer, but didn’t believe that I was. Once I did, I straightened my glass. The distinction between de se and de dicto attributions is supposed to be supported by the fact that while de dicto propositions must be either true or false, there is no true proposition embeddable within ‘I believe that . . .’ that correctly ascribes to me the belief that I myself am spilling beer. The sentence ‘I am spilling beer’ will not do, because it employs an “essential” indexical, ‘I’. Were I, e.g., to designate myself other than by using ‘I’ in attributing the relevant belief to myself, there would be no explanation of my straightening my glass. Even if I believed de re that LePore is spilling beer, this still does not account for why I lift my glass. For I might not know I am LePore. On the basis of such data, some philosophers infer that de se attributions are irreducible to de re or de dicto attributions. Internal-external distinction – de re -- externalism, the view that there are objective reasons for action that are not dependent on the agent’s desires, and in that sense external to the agent. Internalism about reasons is the view that reasons for action must be internal in the sense that they are grounded in motivational facts about the agent, e.g. her desires and goals. Classic internalists such as Hume deny that there are objective reasons for action. For instance, whether the fact that an action would promote health is a reason to do it depends on whether one has a desire to be healthy. It may be a reason for some and not for others. The doctrine is hence a version of relativism; a fact is a reason only insofar as it is so connected to an agent’s psychological states that it can motivate the agent. By contrast, externalists hold that not all reasons depend on the internal states of particular agents. Thus an externalist could hold that promoting health is objectively good and that the fact that an action would promote one’s health is a reason to perform it regardless of whether one desires health. This dispute is closely tied to the debate over motivational internalism, which may be conceived as the view that moral beliefs for instance are, by virtue of entailing motivation, internal reasons for action. Those who reject motivational internalism must either deny that expressive completeness externalism 300 300 sound moral beliefs always provide reasons for action or hold that they provide external reasons.

DE-VOLVTVM -- In-volutum, ex-volutum – de-volutum -- The involutum/evolutum distinction, the: evolutum: evolutionary Grice -- Darwinism, the view that biological species evolve primarily by means of chance variation and natural selection. Although several important scientists prior to Charles Darwin 180982 had suggested that species evolve and had provided mechanisms for that evolution, Darwin was the first to set out his mechanism in sufficient detail and provide adequate empirical grounding. Even though Darwin preferred to talk about descent with modification, the term that rapidly came to characterize his theory was evolution. According to Darwin, organisms vary with respect to their characteristics. In a litter of puppies, some will be bigger, some will have longer hair, some will be more resistant to disease, etc. Darwin termed these variations chance, not because he thought that they were in any sense “uncaused,” but to reject any general correlation between the variations that an organism might need and those it gets, as Lamarck had proposed. Instead, successive generations of organisms become adapted to their environments in a more roundabout way. Variations occur in all directions. The organisms that happen to possess the characteristics necessary to survive and reproduce proliferate. Those that do not either die or leave fewer offspring. Before Darwin, an adaptation was any trait that fits an organism to its environment. After Darwin, the term came to be limited to just those useful traits that arose through natural selection. For example, the sutures in the skulls of mammals make parturition easier, but they are not adaptations in an evolutionary sense because Danto, Arthur Coleman Darwinism 204 204 they arose in ancestors that did not give birth to live young, as is indicated by these same sutures appearing in the skulls of egg-laying birds. Because organisms are integrated systems, Darwin thought that adaptations had to arise through the accumulation of numerous, small variations. As a result, evolution is gradual. Darwin himself was unsure about how progressive biological evolution is. Organisms certainly become better adapted to their environments through successive generations, but as fast as organisms adapt to their environments, their environments are likely to change. Thus, Darwinian evolution may be goal-directed, but different species pursue different goals, and these goals keep changing. Because heredity was so important to his theory of evolution, Darwin supplemented it with a theory of heredity pangenesis. According to this theory, the cells throughout the body of an organism produce numerous tiny gemmules that find their way to the reproductive organs of the organism to be transmitted in reproduction. An offspring receives variable numbers of gemmules from each of its parents for each of its characteristics. For instance, the male parent might contribute 214 gemmules for length of hair to one offspring, 121 to another, etc., while the female parent might contribute 54 gemmules for length of hair to the first offspring and 89 to the second. As a result, characters tend to blend. Darwin even thought that gemmules themselves might merge, but he did not think that the merging of gemmules was an important factor in the blending of characters. Numerous objections were raised to Darwin’s theory in his day, and one of the most telling stemmed from his adopting a blending theory of inheritance. As fast as natural selection biases evolution in a particular direction, blending inheritance neutralizes its effects. Darwin’s opponents argued that each species had its own range of variation. Natural selection might bias the organisms belonging to a species in a particular direction, but as a species approached its limits of variation, additional change would become more difficult. Some special mechanism was needed to leap over the deep, though possibly narrow, chasms that separate species. Because a belief in biological evolution became widespread within a decade or so after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859, the tendency is to think that it was Darwin’s view of evolution that became popular. Nothing could be further from the truth. Darwin’s contemporaries found his theory too materialistic and haphazard because no supernatural or teleological force influenced evolutionary development. Darwin’s contemporaries were willing to accept evolution, but not the sort advocated by Darwin. Although Darwin viewed the evolution of species on the model of individual development, he did not think that it was directed by some internal force or induced in a Lamarckian fashion by the environment. Most Darwinians adopted just such a position. They also argued that species arise in the space of a single generation so that the boundaries between species remained as discrete as the creationists had maintained. Ideal morphologists even eliminated any genuine temporal dimension to evolution. Instead they viewed the evolution of species in the same atemporal way that mathematicians view the transformation of an ellipse into a circle. The revolution that Darwin instigated was in most respects non-Darwinian. By the turn of the century, Darwinism had gone into a decided eclipse. Darwin himself remained fairly open with respect to the mechanisms of evolution. For example, he was willing to accept a minor role for Lamarckian forms of inheritance, and he acknowledged that on occasion a new species might arise quite rapidly on the model of the Ancon sheep. Several of his followers were less flexible, rejecting all forms of Lamarckian inheritance and insisting that evolutionary change is always gradual. Eventually Darwinism became identified with the views of these neo-Darwinians. Thus, when Mendelian genetics burst on the scene at the turn of the century, opponents of Darwinism interpreted this new particulate theory of inheritance as being incompatible with Darwin’s blending theory. The difference between Darwin’s theory of pangenesis and Mendelian genetics, however, did not concern the existence of hereditary particles. Gemmules were as particulate as genes. The difference lay in numbers. According to early Mendelians, each character is controlled by a single pair of genes. Instead of receiving a variable number of gemmules from each parent for each character, each offspring gets a single gene from each parent, and these genes do not in any sense blend with each other. Blue eyes remain as blue as ever from generation to generation, even when the gene for blue eyes resides opposite the gene for brown eyes. As the nature of heredity was gradually worked out, biologists began to realize that a Darwinian view of evolution could be combined with Mendelian genetics. Initially, the founders of this later stage in the development of neoDarwinism exhibited considerable variation in Darwinism Darwinism 205 205 their beliefs about the evolutionary process, but as they strove to produce a single, synthetic theory, they tended to become more Darwinian than Darwin had been. Although they acknowledged that other factors, such as the effects of small numbers, might influence evolution, they emphasized that natural selection is the sole directive force in evolution. It alone could explain the complex adaptations exhibited by organisms. New species might arise through the isolation of a few founder organisms, but from a populational perspective, evolution was still gradual. New species do not arise in the space of a single generation by means of “hopeful monsters” or any other developmental means. Nor was evolution in any sense directional or progressive. Certain lineages might become more complex for a while, but at this same time, others would become simpler. Because biological evolution is so opportunistic, the tree of life is highly irregular. But the united front presented by the neo-Darwinians was in part an illusion. Differences of opinion persisted, for instance over how heterogeneous species should be. No sooner did neo-Darwinism become the dominant view among evolutionary biologists than voices of dissent were raised. Currently, almost every aspect of the neo-Darwinian paradigm is being challenged. No one proposes to reject naturalism, but those who view themselves as opponents of neo-Darwinism urge more important roles for factors treated as only minor by the neo-Darwinians. For example, neoDarwinians view selection as being extremely sharp-sighted. Any inferior organism, no matter how slightly inferior, is sure to be eliminated. Nearly all variations are deleterious. Currently evolutionists, even those who consider themselves Darwinians, acknowledge that a high percentage of changes at the molecular level may be neutral with respect to survival or reproduction. On current estimates, over 95 percent of an organism’s genes may have no function at all. Disagreement also exists about the level of organization at which selection can operate. Some evolutionary biologists insist that selection occurs primarily at the level of single genes, while others think that it can have effects at higher levels of organization, certainly at the organismic level, possibly at the level of entire species. Some biologists emphasize the effects of developmental constraints on the evolutionary process, while others have discovered unexpected mechanisms such as molecular drive. How much of this conceptual variation will become incorporated into Darwinism remains to be seen. Evolutionary griceianism -- evolutionary epistemology, a theory of knowledge inspired by and derived from the fact and processes of organic evolution the term was coined by the social psychologist Donald Campbell. Most evolutionary epistemologists subscribe to the theory of evolution through natural selection, as presented by Darwin in the Origin of Species 1859. However, one does find variants, especially one based on some kind of neoLamarckism, where the inheritance of acquired characters is central Spencer endorsed this view and another based on some kind of jerky or “saltationary” evolutionism Thomas Kuhn, at the end of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, accepts this idea. There are two approaches to evolutionary epistemology. First, one can think of the transformation of organisms and the processes driving such change as an analogy for the growth of knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. “Darwin’s bulldog,” T. H. Huxley, was one of the first to propose this idea. He argued that just as between organisms we have a struggle for existence, leading to the selection of the fittest, so between scientific ideas we have a struggle leading to a selection of the fittest. Notable exponents of this view today include Stephen Toulmin, who has worked through the analogy in some detail, and David Hull, who brings a sensitive sociological perspective to bear on the position. Karl Popper identifies with this form of evolutionary epistemology, arguing that the selection of ideas is his view of science as bold conjecture and rigorous attempt at refutation by another name. The problem with this analogical type of evolutionary epistemology lies in the disanalogy between the raw variants of biology mutations, which are random, and the raw variants of science new hypotheses, which are very rarely random. This difference probably accounts for the fact that whereas Darwinian evolution is not genuinely progressive, science is or seems to be the paradigm of a progressive enterprise. Because of this problem, a second set of epistemologists inspired by evolution insist that one must take the biology literally. This evidence of the senses evolutionary epistemology 294 294 group, which includes Darwin, who speculated in this way even in his earliest notebooks, claims that evolution predisposes us to think in certain fixed adaptive patterns. The laws of logic, e.g., as well as mathematics and the methodological dictates of science, have their foundations in the fact that those of our would-be ancestors who took them seriously survived and reproduced, and those that did not did not. No one claims that we have innate knowledge of the kind demolished by Locke. Rather, our thinking is channeled in certain directions by our biology. In an update of the biogenetic law, therefore, one might say that whereas a claim like 5 ! 7 % 12 is phylogenetically a posteriori, it is ontogenetically a priori. A major division in this school is between the continental evolutionists, most notably the late Konrad Lorenz, and the Anglo-Saxon supporters, e.g. Michael Ruse. The former think that their evolutionary epistemology simply updates the critical philosophy of Kant, and that biology both explains the necessity of the synthetic a priori and makes reasonable belief in the thing-in-itself. The latter deny that one can ever get that necessity, certainly not from biology, or that evolution makes reasonable a belief in an objectively real world, independent of our knowing. Historically, these epistemologists look to Hume and in some respects to the pragmatists, especially William James. Today, they acknowledge a strong family resemblance to such naturalized epistemologists as Quine, who has endorsed a kind of evolutionary epistemology. Critics of this position, e.g. Philip Kitcher, usually strike at what they see as the soft scientific underbelly. They argue that the belief that the mind is constructed according to various innate adaptive channels is without warrant. It is but one more manifestation of today’s Darwinians illicitly seeing adaptation everywhere. It is better and more reasonable to think knowledge is rooted in culture, if it is person-dependent at all. A mark of a good philosophy, like a good science, is that it opens up new avenues for research. Although evolutionary epistemology is not favored by conventional philosophers, who sneer at the crudities of its frequently nonphilosophically trained proselytizers, its supporters feel convinced that they are contributing to a forward-moving philosophical research program. As evolutionists, they are used to things taking time to succeed. -- evolutionary psychology, the subfield of psychology that explains human behavior and cultural arrangements by employing evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology to discover, catalog, and analyze psychological mechanisms. Human minds allegedly possess many innate, special-purpose, domain-specific psychological mechanisms modules whose development requires minimal input and whose operations are context-sensitive, mostly automatic, and independent of one another and of general intelligence. Disagreements persist about the functional isolation and innateness of these modules. Some evolutionary psychologists compare the mind with its specialized modules to a Swiss army knife. Different modules substantially constrain behavior and cognition associated with language, sociality, face recognition, and so on. Evolutionary psychologists emphasize that psychological phenomena reflect the influence of biological evolution. These modules and associated behavior patterns assumed their forms during the Pleistocene. An evolutionary perspective identifies adaptive problems and features of the Pleistocene environment that constrained possible solutions. Adaptive problems often have cognitive dimensions. For example, an evolutionary imperative to aid kin presumes the ability to detect kin. Evolutionary psychologists propose models to meet the requisite cognitive demands. Plausible models should produce adaptive behaviors and avoid maladaptive ones e.g., generating too many false positives when identifying kin. Experimental psychological evidence and social scientific field observations aid assessment of these proposals. These modules have changed little. Modern humans manage with primitive hunter-gatherers’ cognitive equipment amid the rapid cultural change that equipment produces. The pace of that change outstrips the ability of biological evolution to keep up. Evolutionary psychologists hold, consequently, that: 1 contrary to sociobiology, which appeals to biological evolution directly, exclusively evolutionary explanations of human behavior will not suffice; 2 contrary to theories of cultural evolution, which appeal to biological evolution analogically, it is at least possible that no cultural arrangement has ever been adaptive; and 3 contrary to social scientists, who appeal to some general conception of learning or socialization to explain cultural transmission, specialized psychological evolutionary ethics evolutionary psychology 295 295 mechanisms contribute substantially to that process.

descriptum: Grice: “The root script provides many niceties in Roman: inscriptum, descriptum, prescriptum, subscriptum, … -- descriptivism, the thesis that the meaning of any evaluative statement is purely descriptive or factual, i.e., determined, apart from its syntactical features, entirely by its truth conditions. Nondescriptivism of which emotivism and prescriptivism are the main varieties is the view that the meaning of full-blooded evaluative statements is such that they necessarily express the speaker’s sentiments or commitments. Nonnaturalism, naturalism, and supernaturalism are descriptivist views about the nature of the properties to which the meaning rules refer. Descriptivism is related to cognitivism and moral realism. Discussed at large by Grice just because his tutee, P. F. Strawson, showed an interst in it. theory of descriptions, an analysis, initially developed by Peano, and borrowed from (but never returned to) Peano by Russell, of sentences containing descriptions. In Peano’s view, it’s about the ‘article,’ definite (‘the’) and ‘indefinite’ (‘some (at least one).’ Descriptions include indefinite descriptions such as ‘an elephant’ and definite descriptions such as ‘the positive square root of four’. On Russell’s analysis, descriptions are “incomplete symbols” that are meaningful only in the context of other symbols, i.e., only in the context of the sentences containing them. Although the words ‘the first president of the United States’ appear to constitute a singular term that picks out a particular individual, much as the name ‘George Washington’ does, Russell held that descriptions are not referring expressions, and that they are “analyzed out” in a proper specification of the logical form of the sentences in which they occur. The grammatical form of ‘The first president of the United States is tall’ is simply misleading as to its logical form. According to Russell’s analysis of indefinite descriptions, the sentence ‘I saw a man’ asserts that there is at least one thing that is a man, and I saw that thing symbolically, Ex Mx & Sx. The role of the apparent singular term ‘a man’ is taken over by the existential quantifier ‘Ex’ and the variables it binds, and the apparent singular term disappears on analysis. A sentence containing a definite description, such as ‘The present king of France is bald’, is taken to make three claims: that at least one thing is a present king of France, that at most one thing is a present king of France, and that that thing is bald symbolically, Ex {[Fx & y Fy / y % x] & Bx}. Again, the apparent referring expression ‘the present king of France’ is analyzed away, with its role carried out by the quantifiers and variables in the symbolic representation of the logical form of the sentence in which it occurs. No element in that representation is a singular referring expression. Russell held that this analysis solves at least three difficult puzzles posed by descriptions. The first is how it could be true that George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly, but false that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Since Scott is the author of Waverly, we should apparently be able to substitute ‘Scott’ for ‘the author of Waverly’ and infer the second sentence from the first, but we cannot. On Russell’s analysis, ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly’ does not, when properly understood, contain an expression ‘the author of Waverly’ for which the name ‘Scott’ can be substituted. The second puzzle concerns the law of excluded middle, which rules that either ‘The present king of France is bald’ or ‘The present king of France is not bald’ must be true; the problem is that neither the list of bald men nor that of non-bald men contains an entry for the present king of France. Russell’s solution is that ‘The present king of France is not bald’ is indeed true if it is understood as ‘It is not the case that there is exactly one thing that is now King of France and is bald’, i.e., as -Ex {Fx & y {[Fy / y % x] & Bx}. The final puzzle is how ‘There is no present king of France’ or ‘The present king of France does not exist’ can be true if ‘the present king of France’ is a referring expression that picks out something, how can we truly deny that that thing exists? Since descriptions are not referring expressions on Russell’s theory, it is easy for him to show that the negation of the claim that there is at least and at most i.e., exactly one present king of France, -Ex [Fx & y Fy / y % x], is true. Strawson offered the first real challenge to Russell’s theory, arguing that ‘The present king of France is bald’ does not entail but instead presupposes ‘There is a present king of France’, so that the former is not falsified by the falsity of the latter, but is instead deprived of a truth-value. Strawson argued for the natural view that definite descriptions are indeed referring expressions, used to single something out for predication. More recently, Keith Donnellan argued that both Russell and Strawson ignored the fact that definite descriptions have two uses. Used attributively, a definite description is intended to say something about whatever it is true of, and when a sentence is so used it conforms to Russell’s analysis. Used referentially, a definite description is intended to single something out, but may not correctly describe it. For example, seeing an inebriated man in a policeman’s uniform, one might say, “The cop on the corner is drunk!” Donnellan would say that even if the person were a drunken actor dressed as a policeman, the speaker would have referred to him and truly said of him that he was drunk. If it is for some reason crucial that the description be correct, as it might be if one said, “The cop on the corner has the authority to issue speeding tickets,” the use is attributive; and because ‘the cop on the corner’ does not describe anyone correctly, no one has been said to have the authority to issue speeding tickets. Donnellan criticized Russell for overlooking referential uses of theory of descriptions theory of descriptions 914 914 descriptions, and Strawson for both failing to acknowledge attributive uses and maintaining that with referential uses one can refer to something with a definite description only if the description is true of it. Discussion of Strawson’s and Donnellan’s criticisms is ongoing, and has provoked very useful work in both semantics and speech act theory, and on the distinctions between semantics and pragmatics and between semantic reference and speaker’s reference, among others. .

de sensu implicaturum: vide casus obliquus. The casus rectus/casus obliquus distinction. Peter Abelard, Kneale, Grice, Aristotle. Aquinas. de sensu implicaturum. Ariskantian quessertions on de sensu implicate. “My sometimes mischievous friend Richard Grandy once said, in connection with some other occasion on which I was talking, that to represent my remarks, it would be necessary to introduce a new form of speech act, or a new operator, which was to be called the operator of quessertion. It is to be read as “It is perhaps possible that someone might assert that . . .” and is to be symbolized “?├”; possibly it might even be iterable […]. Everything I shall suggest here is highly quessertable.” Grice 1989:297. If Grice had one thing, he had linguistic creativity. Witness his ‘implicaturum,’ and his ‘implicaturum,’ not to mention his ‘pirotologia.’Sometime, somewhere, in the history of philosophy, a need was felt by some Griceian philosopher, surely, for numbering intentions. The verb, denoting the activity, out of which this ‘intention’ sprang was Latin ‘intendere,’ and somewhere, sometime, the need was felt to keep the Latinate /t/ sound, and sometimes to make it sibilate, /s/. The source of it all seems to be Aristotle in Soph. Elen., 166a24–166a30, which was rendered twice om Grecian to Latin. In the second Latinisation, ‘de sensu’ comes into view. Abelard proposes to use ‘de rebus,’ or ‘de re,’ for what the previous translation had as ‘per divisionem.’ To make the distinction, he also proposes to use ‘de sensu’ for what the previous translation has as ‘per compositionem,’ and ‘per conjunctionem.’ But what did either mean? It was a subtle question, indeed. And trust Nicolai Hartmann, in his mediaevalist revival, to add numbers and a further distinction, now the ‘recte/’oblique’ distinction, and ‘intentio’ being ‘prima,’ ‘seconda,’ ‘tertia,’ and so on, ad infinitum. The proposal is clear. We need a way to conceptualise first-order propositions. But we also need to conceptualise ‘that’-clauses. The ‘that’-clause subordination is indeed open-ended. ‘mean.’ Grice’s motivation in the presentation at the Oxford Philosophical Society is to offer, as he calls it, a ‘proposal.’ In his words, notice the emphasis on the Latinate ‘intend,’ – where it occurs, as applied to an emissor, and as having as content, following that ‘that’-clause, an ‘intensional’ verb like ‘believe,’ which again, involves an ‘intentio tertia,’ now referring to a state back in the emissor expressed by yet another intensional verb – all long for, ‘you communicate that p if you want your addressee to realise that you hold this or that propositional attitude with content p.’ "A meantNN something by x" is (roughly) equivalent to "A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention"; and we may add that to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect (though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a "that" clause, for example, "a belief that . . ."). (Grice 1989: 220). Grice’s motivation is to ‘reduce’ “mean” to what has come to be known in the Griceian [sic] literature as a ‘Griceian’ [sic] ‘reflexive’ intention – he prefers M-intention -- which we will read as involving an intentio seconda, and indeed intentio tertia, and beyond, which makes its appearance explicitly in the second clause -- or ‘prong,’ as he’d prefer -- of his ‘reductive’ analysis. Prong 1 then corresponds to the intention prima or intention recta: Utterer U intends₁ that Addressee A believes that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with content “p.” Prong 2 corresponds to the intentio seconda or intentio obliqua: Utterer U intends₂ that Addressee A believes (i) on the ‘rational,’ and not just ‘causal,’ basis of (ii), i.e. of the addressee A’s recognition of the utterer U’s intentio seconda or intentio obliqua i₂, that Addressee A comes to believe that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with content “p.” In Grice’s wording, “i₂” acts as a ‘reason,’ and not merely a ‘cause’ for Addressee A’s coming to believe that U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with content “p”. Kemmerling has used “↝” to represent this ‘reason’ (i₁ ↝ i₂, Kemmerling in Grandy/Warner, 1986, cf. Petrus in Petrus 2010). Prong 3 is a closure prong, now involving a self-reflective third-order intention, there is no ‘covert’ higher-order intention involved in (i)-(iii). Meaning-constitutive intentions in utterer u’s meaning that p should be out there ‘in the open,’ or ‘above board,’ to count as having been ‘communicated.Grice quotes only one author in ‘Meaning’: C. L. Stevenson, who started his career with a degree in English from Yale. Willing to allow a ‘metabolical’ use of ‘mean’ he recognises, he scare quotes it: “There is a sense, to be sure, in which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced temperature may at times ”mean” convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). This remark will have Grice later attempting an ‘evolutionary’ model of how an ‘x’ causing ‘y’ may proceed from ‘natural’ to less natural ones. Consider ‘is in pain.’ A creature is physically hurt, and the expression of pain comes up naturally as an effect. But if the creature attains rational control over his expressive behaviour, and the creature is in pain (or expects his addressee A to think that he is in pain), U can now imitate or replicate, in a something like a Peirceian iconic mode, the natural behaviour manifested by a spontaneous response to a hurtful stimulus. The ‘simulated’ pain will be an ‘icon’ of the natural pain. Grice is getting Peirceian by the day, and he is not telling us! There are, Grice says, as if to simplify Peirce the most he can, two modes of representation. The primary one is now the explicitly Peirceian iconic one. The ‘risus naturaliter significat interiorem laetitiam’ of Occam. And then, there’s the derivative *non*-iconic representation, in that order. The first is, shall we say, ‘natural,’ and beyond the utterer U’s voluntary control (cf. Darwin on the expression of emotions in man and animals); the second is not. Grice is allowing for smoke representing fire, or if one must, alla Stevenson, ‘representing’ it. In Grice’s motivation to along the right lines, his psychologist austere views of his 1948 ‘Meaning,’ when he rather artificially disjoins a ‘natural’ “mean” and an ‘artificial’ “mean,” when merely different ‘uses’ stand for what he then thought were senses, he wants now to re-introduce into philosophical discourse the iconic natural representation or meaning that he had left aside.If this is part of what he calls a ‘myth,’ even if an evolutionary one, to account for the emergence of ‘systems of communication,’ it does starts with an utterer U expressing (very much alla Croce or Marty) a psychological state or attitude ψ by displaying some behavioural pattern in an unintentional way. Grice is being Wittgensteinian here, and quotes almost verbatim from Anscombe’s rendition, “No psychological concept except when backed in behaviour that manifests it.” If Ockham notes that “Risus naturaliter significat interiorem laetitiam,” Grice shows this will allow to avoid, also alla Ockham, a polysemy to ‘mean.’In Grice’s three clauses in his 1948 conceptual analysis of ‘meaning’ – the first clause of exhibitiveness, the second clause of intentio seconda or reflexivity, and the third clause of communicative overtness, voluntary control on the part of the utterer U is already in order. Since the utterer’s addressee A is intended to recognise this, no longer is it required any prior ‘iconic’ association between a simulated behaviour and the behaviour naturally displayed as a response to a stimulus. This amounts, for Grice to deeming the system of expression as having become a full system now of intention-based ‘communication.’‘know’’ Intentio seconda or intentio obliqua comes up nicely when Grice delivers the third William James Lecture, later reprinted as “Further notes on logic and conversation.” There, Grice targets one type of anti-Gettier scenario for the use of a factive psychological state or attitude expressed by a verb like “know,” again followed by a “that”-clause. Grice is criticisign Austin’s hasty attempt to analyse ‘know’ in terms of the ‘performatory’ ‘guarantee.’ As Grice puts it in “Prolegomena,” “to say ‘I know’ is to give a guarantee.” (Grice 1989:9) which can be traced back to Austin, although since, as Grice witnessed it, Austin ‘all too frequently ignored’ the real of emissor’s communicatum, one is never sure. In any case, Grice wants to overcome this ‘performatory’ fallacy, and he expands on the ‘suspect’ example of the Prolegomena in the Third lecture. Grice’s troubles with ‘know’ were long-dated. In Causal Theory he lists as the third philosophical mistake, “What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case.” (1989: 237). Uncredited, but he may be having in mind Ryle’s odd characterisations with terms such as ‘occurrence,’ ‘episode,’ and so on. In the section on ‘stress,’ Grice asks us to assume that Grice knows that p. The question is whether this claim commits the philosopher to the further clause, ‘Grice knows that Grice knows that p, and so on, … to use the scholastic term we started this with, ad infinitum. It is not that Grice is adverse to a regressive analysis per se. This is, in effect, with what the third clause or prong in his analysis of ‘meaning’ does – ‘let all meaning-constitutive intentions be overt, including this one. Indeed, when it comes to meaning or knowing, we are talking optimal, we are talking ‘virtue.’ Both ‘meaning,’ ‘communicating, ‘and ‘knowing,’ represent an ‘ideal,’ value-paradeigmatic concept – where value, a favourite with Hartmann, appears under the guise of a noumenon in the topos ouranos that only realises imperfectly in the sub-lunary world. In the third William James lecture Grice cursorily dismisses these demanding or restrictive anti-Gettier scenarios as too stipulatory for the colloquial, ordinary, use – and thus ‘sense’ -- of ‘know.’ The approach Gettier is cricising ends up being too convoluted, seeing that conversationalists tend to make a rather loose use of the verb. Grice’s example illustrates linguistic botanising. So we have Grice bringing the examinee who does know that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815, with hardly conclusive evidence, or any ‘de sensu’ knowledge that the evidence (which he does not have) is conclusive. Grice grants that, in a specially emphatic utterance of ‘know,’ there might be a cancellable implicaturum to the effect that the knower does have conclusive evidence for what he alleges to know. Grice’s explicit reference to this ‘regressive nature’ (p. 59) touches on the topic of intention de sensu. Grice is contesting the strong view, as represented, according to Gettier, by philosophers ranging from Plato’s Thaetetus to Ayer’s Problem of Empirical Knowledge (indeed the only two loci Gettier cares to cite in his short essay) that a claim, “Grice knows that p” entails a claim to the effect that there is conclusive evidence for p, and which gives Grice a feeling of subjective certainty, and that Grice knows that there is such conclusive evidence, and so on, ad infinitum. Grice casts doubts on the intentio de sensu as applied to the colloquial or ‘ordinary’ uses of ‘know’. If I know that p, must I know that I know that p? Having just introduced his “Modified Occam’s Razor” – ‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’ --, Grice doesn’t think so. At this point, however, he adds a characteristic bracket: “(cf. causal theory).” With that bracket, Grice is allowing that the denotatum of “p,” qua content of U’s psychological state or attitude of ‘knowing,’ the state-of-affairs itself, as we may put it, should play something like a causal role in U’s knowing that p. Grice is open-minded as to what type of link or connection that is. It need not be strictly causal. He is merely suggesting the open-endness of ‘know in terms of these “further conditions” as to how Grice ‘comes’ to know that p, and refers to the ‘causal theory,’ as later developed by philosophers like E. F. Dretske and others. As a linguistic botanist, Grice is well aware that ‘know,’ like ‘see,’ is what the Kiparskys (whom Grice refers to) call a ‘factive.’An ascription of “Grice knows that p,” or, indeed, “Grice sees that p,” (unless Grice hallucinates) entails “p.” The defeating ‘hallucination’ scenario is key. It involves what Grice calls a dis-implicaturum. The utterer is using ‘know’ or‘see’ in a loose way (and meaning less, rather than more than he explicitly conveys. Note incidentally, as Grice later noted in later seminars, how his analysis proves the philosopher’s adage wrong. Surely what is known by me to be the case is believed by me to be the case. Any divergence to the contrary is a matter of ‘implicatural’ stress – by which he means supra-segmentation.‘want’Soon after his delivering the William James lectures, Grice got involved in a project concerning an evaluation of Quine’s programme, where again he touches on issues of intentio seconda or intentio obliqua, and brings us back to Russell and ‘the author of Waverley.’ Grice’s presentation comes out in Words and Objections, edited by Davidson and Hintikka, a pun on Quine’s Word and Object. Grice’s contribution, ‘Vacuous Names,’ (later reprinted in part in Ostertag’s volume on Definite descriptions) concludes with an exploration of “the” phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude. Grice’s choice of an ascription now notably involves an ‘opaque’ (rather than ‘factive,’ like ‘know’) psychological state or attitude: ‘wanting,’ which he symbolizes as “W.” Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him. Grice notes that “there are clearly at least *two* possible readings” of an utterance like our (i): a first reading “in which,” as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii).” A second reading is one “in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv).” Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order predicate calculus. ‘Ja wants that p’ becomes ‘W^jap,’ where ‘ja’ stands for the individual constant “Jack” as a super-script attached to the predicate standing for Jack’s psychological state or attitude. Grice writes: “Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent,” respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as ‘(Ǝx)W^jaFxja’ and ‘W^ja(Ǝx)Fxja.’ Grice then goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an ‘intentio seconda.’ Grice notes: “But suppose that Jack wants a specific individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been “*deceived* into thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though in fact Joe is an only child.” (The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent). Let us recall that Grice’s main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, ‘emptiness’! In these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading (vii),” where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the psychological-state or -attitude verb, “but we cannot now represent (ii) or (iii), with ‘Jill’ being vacuous, by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the psychological-attitude verb, want, “since [well,] Jill does not really exist,” except as a figment of Jack’s imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as ‘purely intentionalist,’ and thus favouring by far Suppes’s over Chomsky’s characterisation of Grice as a mere ‘behaviourist,’ Grice hopes that “we should be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings” of, now: Jack wants Jill to marry him; Jack wants ‘Jill’ to marry him. It is at this point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for the predicate calculus in question. Only the first notation yields the internal de sensu reading (where ‘ji’ stands for ‘Jill’): ‘W₂^ja4F₁ji₃ja₄’ and ‘W₃^ja4F₂ji₁ja₄.’ Note that in the alternative external notation, the individual constant for “Jill,” ‘ji,’ is introduced prior to ‘want,’ – ‘ji’’s sub-script is 1, while ‘W’’s sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. If Russell could have avowed of this he would have had that the Prince Regents, by issuing the invitation, wants to confirm that ‘the author of Waverley’ isN Scott, already having confirmed that the author of Waverley =M the author of Waverley. Grice warns Quine. Given that Jill does not exist, only the internal reading “can be true,” or alethically satisfactory. Similarly, we might imagine an alternative scenario where the butler informs the Prince: ‘We are sorry to inform Your Majesty that your invitation was returned: apparently the author of Waverley does not SEEM to exist.’ Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like that expressed by ‘wanting’ with one observation that further marks him as an intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. If he justified a loose use of ‘know,’ he is now is ready to allow for ‘existential’ phrases in cases of ‘vacuous’ designata, which however baffling, should not lead a philosopher to the wrong characterisation of the linguistic phenomena (as it led Austin with ‘know’). Provided such a descriptors occur within an opaque, intensional, de sensu, psychological-state or attitude verbs, Grice captures the nuances of ‘ordinary’ discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, we should also have available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs),” as a philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a generality! “Jill” now becomes “x”: ‘W₄^ja5Ǝx₃F₁x₂ja₅,’ ‘Ǝx₅W₂^ja5F₁x₄ja₃’, and ‘Ǝx₅W₃^ja4F₁x₂ja₄ .’ Since in (xii) the individual variable ‘x’ (ranging over ‘Jill’) “does not dominate the segment following the ‘(Ǝx)’ quantifier, the formulation does not display any ‘existential’ or de re, ‘force,’ and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii) or (iii), “if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.” At least Grice does not write, “really,” for he knew that Austin detested a ‘trouser word.’ Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) are derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will be “derivable only” from (ix).‘intend’By this time, Grice had been made a Fellow of the British Academy and it was about time for the delivery of the philosophical lecture that goes with it. It only took him six five years. Grice choses “Intention and uncertainty” as its topic. He was provoked by two members of his ‘playgroup’ at Oxford, Hart and Hampshire, who in an essay published in Mind, what Grice finds, again, as he did with the anti-Gettier cases of ‘know,’ as rather a too strong analysis of ‘intending.’ In his British-Academy lecture, Grice plays now with the psychological state or attitude, realised by the verbal form, ‘intend,’ when specifically followed by a ‘that’-clause, “intends that…,” as an echo of his dealing with “meaning to” as merely ‘natural.’ He calls himself a neo-Prichardian, reviving this ‘willing that’ which Urmson had popularised at Oxford, bringing to publication Prichard’s exploration of William James and his “I will that the distant chair slides over the floor towards me. It does not.”Grice’s ‘intending that…’ is notably a practical, boulemaic, or buletic, or desiderative, rather than alethic or doxastic, psychological state or attitude. It involves not just an itentum, but an intentum that involves both a desideratum AND a factum – for the ‘future indicative’ is conceptually involved. Grice claims that, if the conceptual analysis of “intending that…” is to represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, shows that it contains, as one of its prongs, in the final ‘neo-Prichardian’ version that Grice gives, also a ‘doxastic’ (rather than ‘factive’ and ‘epistemic’) psychological state or attitude, notably a belief on the part of the ‘intender’ that his willing that p has a probability greater than 0.5 to the effect that p be realised. Contra Hart and Hampshire, Grice acknowledges the investigations by the playgroup member Pears on this topic. Interestingly, a polemic arose elsewhere with Davidson, who trying to be more Griceian thatn Grice, sees this doxastic constraint as a mere cancellable implicaturum. Grice grants it may be a dis-implicaturum at most, as in loose cases of ‘know,’ or ‘see.’ Grice is adamant in regarding the doxastic component as a conceptual ‘entailment’ in the ‘ordinary’ use of ‘intend,’ unless the verb is used in a merely ‘disimplicatural,’ loose fashion. Grice’s example, ‘Jill intends to climb Everest next week,’ when the prohibitive conditions are all to evident to anyone concerned with such an utterance of (xv), perhaps Jill included, and ‘intends’ has to be read only ‘internally’ and hyperbolically. At this point, if in “Vacuous Names, he fights with Meinong while enjoying engaging in emptiness, it should be stressed that Grice gives as an illustration of a ‘disimplicaturum,’ along with a use of ‘see’ in a Shakespeareian context. ‘See,’ like ‘know,’ or ‘mean,’ exhibit what Grice calls diaphaneity. So it’s only natural Grice turns his attention to ‘see.’ Grice’s examples are ‘Macbeth saw Banquo’ and ‘Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore,’ and both involve hallucination! It is worth comparing the fortune of ‘disimplicaturum’ with that of ‘implicaturum.’ Grice coins ‘to dis-implicate’ as an active verb, for a case where the utterer does NOT, as in the case of implicaturum, mean MORE than he says, but LESS. Grice’s point is a subtle one. It involves his concession on something like an explicatum, but alsoo on something like Moore’s entailment. If the ‘doxastic condition’ is entailed by “intending that…,’ an utterer U may STILL use, in an ‘ordinary’ fashion, a strong ‘intending that…’ in a scenario where it is common ground between the utterer U and his addressee A that the probability of ‘p’ being realised is lower than 0.5. The expression of the psychological state or attitude is loose, since the utterer is, as it were, dropping an ‘entailment’ that applies in a use of ‘intending that’ where that ‘common-ground’ assumption is absent. One reason may be echoic. Jill may think that she can succeed in climbing Mt. Everest; she herself has used ‘intend.’ When that information is transmitted, the strong psychological verb is kept when the doxastic constraint is no longer shared by the utterer U and his addressee A (Like an implicaturum, a disimplicaturum has to be recognised as such to count as one. No such thing as an ‘unwanted’ disimplicaturum.‘motivate’Sometimes, it would seem that, for Grice, the English philosopher of English ‘ordinary-language’ philosophy, English is not enough! Grice would amuse at Berkeley seminars, with things like, ‘A pirot potches o as fang, or potches o and o’ as F-id,’ just to attract his addressee’s attention. The full passage, in what Grice calls, after Carnap, pirotese, reads: “A pirot can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng; also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o’ as being fid to one another.” Grice’s deciphering, with ‘pirot,” a tribute to Carnap – and Locke -- as any agent, and an ‘obble’ as an object. Grice borrows, but does not return, the ‘pirot’ from Carnap (for whom pirots karulise elatically – Carnap’s example of a syntactically well-formed formula in Introduction to Semantics). Grice uses ‘pirotese’ ‘to potch’ as a correlate for ‘perceive,’ such as the factive ‘see’ and ‘to cotch’ as a correlate for the similarly factive ‘know.’While ‘perceive’ strictly allows for a ‘that’-clause (as in Grice analysis of “I perceive that the pillar box is red” in “The causal theory of perception”), for simplificatory purposes, Grice is using ‘to potch’ as applying directly to an object, which Grice rephrases as an ‘obble.’ Since some perceptual feature or other is required in a predication of ‘perceiving’ and ‘potching,’ ‘feng’ is introduced as a perceptual predicate. And since pirots should also be allowed to perceive an ‘obble’ o in some relation with another ‘obble’ o2, Grice introduces the dyadic ‘relational’ feature ‘fid.’ Grice’s exegesis reads: “‘To potch’ is something like ‘to perceive,’ whereas ‘to cotch’ is something like ‘to think.’ ‘Feng’ and ‘fang’ are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives; ‘fid’ is a possible relation between ‘obbles.’”). At this point, Grice has been made, trans-territorially, the President of the American Philosophical Association, and is ready to give his Presidential Address (now reprinted in his Conception of Value, for Clarendon. He chooses ‘philosophical psychology’ It’s when Grice goes on to play now with the neo-Wittgensteinian issues of incorrigibility and privileged access, that issues of intentio seconda become prominent. For any psychological attitude ψ₁, if U holds it, U holds, as a matter of what Grice calls ‘genitorial construction,’ a meta-psychological attitude, ψ₂, a seconda intentio if ever there was one, -- Grice even uses the numeral ‘2’ -- that has, as its content followed the second ‘that’-clause, the very first psychological attitude ψ₁. The general schema being given below, with an instance of specification: ‘ψ^up ⊃ ψ^uψ^up,’ and ‘if U wills that p, U wills that U wills that p.’ The interesting bit, from the perspective of our exploration of ‘intentio seconda,’ is that, if, alla Peano, we apply this to itself, as in the anti-Gettier cases Grice discussed earlier, we end with an ad-infinitum clause. It was Judith Baker, who earned her doctorate under Grice at Berkeley who sees this clearlier than everyone (She was a regular contributor to the Kant Society in Germany). Baker’s publications are, like those of her tutor, scarce. But in a delightful contribution to the Grice festschrift, “Do one’s motives have to be pure?” (in Grandy/Warner 1986), Baker explores the crucial importance of that ad-infinitum chain of intentiones secondæ as it applies to questions of not alethic but practical value or satisfactoriness. Consider ‘ought’. Grice would say that ‘must’ is aequi-vocal, i.e. it is not that ‘must’ has an alethic ‘sense’ and a practical ‘sense.’ Only “one” must, if one must! (As Grice jokes, “Who needs ichthyological necessity?”). Baker notes that the ad-infinitum chain may explain how ‘duty’ ‘cashes out’ in ‘interest.’ Both Grice and Baker are avowed Kantotelians. By allowing ‘duty’ to cash out in interest they are merging Aristotle’s utilitarian teleology with Kant’s deontology, and succeeding! It is possible to symbolize Grice’s and Baker’s proposal. If there is a “p” SUCH AS, at some point in the iteration of willing and intentiones secondæ, the agent is not willing to accept it, this blocks the potential Kantian universalizability of the content of a teleological attitude “p,” stripping “p” of any absolute value status that it may otherwise attain.In Grice’s reductive analysis of ‘mean,’ ‘know,’ ‘want,’ ‘intend,’ and ‘motivate,’ we witness the subtlety of his approach that is only made possible from the recognition of Aristotle’s insight back in “De Sophisticis Elenchis” to Kant’s explorations on the purity of motives. It should not surprise us. It’s Grice’s nod, no doubt, to an unjustly neglected philosopher, who should be neglected no more.ReferencesBlackburn, S. W. 1984. Spreading the words: groundings in the philosophy of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Darwin, Charles. 1872. The expression of emotions in man and animals. London: Murray. Grandy, R. E. and R. O. Warner 1986. Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grice, H. P. 1948. Meaning, The Oxford Philosophical Society. Repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1961. The causal theory of perception, The Aristotelian Society. Repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1967. Logic and Conversation, The William James lectures. Repr. in a revised 1987 form in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1969. Vacuous Names, in Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. Grice, H. P. 1971. Intention and uncertainty, The British Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grice, H. P. 1975. How pirots karulise elatically: some simpler ways, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Grice, H. P. 1982. Meaning Revisited, in N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge. London: Croom Helm, repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H.P. 1987. Retrospective epilogue, in Studies in the Way of Words. Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the way of words. London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hart, H. L. A. and S. N. Hampshire 1958. Intention, decision, and certainty, Mind, 67:1-12.Kemmerling, A. M. 1986. Utterer’s meaning revisited, in Grandy/Warner 1986. Kneale, W. C. and M. Kneale. 1966. The development of logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Pecocke, C. A. B. 1989. Transcendental Arguments in the Theory of Content: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford on 16 May 1989. Oxford University Press. Prichard, H. A. 1968. Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest. Essays and Lectures, edited by W. D. Ross and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University. Stevenson, C. L. 1944. Ethics and language. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Strawson, P. F. 1964 Intention and convention in speech acts, The Philosophical Review, repr. in Logico-Linguistic Papers, London, Methuen, 1971, pp. 149-169 as Blackburn puts it in his discussion of Grice in the intention-based chapter of his “Spreading the word: groundings in the philosophy of language.” Intentio seconda or obliqua bears heavily on Grice’s presentation for the Oxford Philosophical Society. The motivation behind Grice’s analysis pertains to philosophical methodology. Grice is legitimizing an ascription of ‘mean’ to a rational agent, such as … a philosopher. This very ascription Grice finds to be ‘seemingly denied by Wittgenstein’ (Grice 1986). As an exponent of what he would later and in jest dub “The Post-War Oxonian School of ‘Ordinary-Language’ Philosophy,” Grice engages in a bit of language botany, and dealing with the intricacies of ‘communicative’ uses of “mean.” Interestingly, and publicly – although a provision is in order here – Grice acknowledges emotivist Stevenson, who apparently taught Grice about ‘metabolic’ uses of “mean.” Stevenson, who read English as a minor at Yale, would not venture to apply ‘mean’ to moans! Realising it as a colloquial extension, he is allowed to use ‘mean,’ but in scare quotes only! (“Smith’s reduced temperature ‘means’ that he is is convalescent.” “There is a sense, to be sure, in which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced temperature may at times ”mean” convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). Close enough but no cigar. Stevenson has ‘groan,’ which at least rhymes with ‘moan.’ (As for the proviso, Grice never ‘meant’ to ‘publish’ his talk on ‘Meaning,’ but one of his tutees submitted for publication, and on acceptance, Grice allowed the publication). In “Meaning” Grice does not provide a conceptual analysis for, ‘by moaning, U means [simpliciter] that p.’ He will in his “Meaning Revisited” – the metabolical scare quotes are justified on two counts: ‘By moaning U means that p’ is legitimized on the basis of the generic ‘x ‘means’ y iff x is a consequence of y.’ But it is also justified on the basis that there is a continuum between U’s involuntarily moaning thereby meaning that he is in pain, and U’s voluntarily moaning, thereby ‘communicating’ that he is in pain. However, and more importantly for our exploration of the ‘intentum,’ Grice hastens to add that he does not agree with Stevenson’s purely ‘causal’ account. The main reason is not ‘anti-naturalistic.’ It is just that Grice sees Stevenson’s proposal as as involving a vicious circle. Typically, Grice extrapolates the relevant quote from Stevenson, slightly out of context. Grice refers to Stevenson’s appeal to "an elaborate process of conditioning attending … communication."Grice: “If we have to take seriously the second part of the qualifying phrase ("attending … communication"), Stevenson’s account of meaning is obviously circular. We might just as well say, "U means” if “U communicates,” which, though true, is not helpful. It MIGHT be helpful for Cicero translating from Grecian to Roman: ‘com-municatio’ indeed translates a Grecian turn of phrase involving ‘what is common.’ f. “con-” and root “mu-,” to bind; cf.: immunis, munus, moenia.’And the suggestion would be helpful if we say that to ‘communicate,’ or ‘mean,’ is just to bring some intentum to be allotted ‘common ground,’ because of the psi-transmission it is shared between the emissor and his intended addressee. This one hopes is both true AND ‘helpful.’ In any case, Grice’s tutee Strawson later found Grice’s elucidation of utterer’s meaning to be ‘objection-proof’ (Starwson and Wiggins, 2001) in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, of an utterer or emissor E meaning that p, by uttering ‘x,’ and appealing to primary and secondary intentionality. But is Grice’s intentionalism a sort of behaviourism? Grice denies that in “Method” calling ‘behaviourism’ ‘silly. Grice further explores intentio obliqua as it pertains to his remarks towards a general theory of “re-presentation.” The place where this excursus takes place is crucial. It is his Valediction to his compilation of essays, Studies in the Way of Words, posthumously published. At this stage, he must have felt that, what he once regarded krypto-technic in Peirce, is no more! Grice has already identified in that ‘Valediction’ many strands of his philosophical thought, and concludes his re-assessment of his ‘philosophy of language’ and semiotics with an attempt to provide some general remarks about ‘to represent’ in general, perhaps to counter the allegations of vicious circularity which his approach had received, seeing that “p” features, as a ‘gap-sign,’ as the content of both an ‘expression’ and a ‘psychological’ attitude. In trying to reconcile his austere views on “Meaning,” back in that evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, where he distinguished two senses of ‘mean’ (“Smoke ‘means’ fire,” and ““Smoke” means ‘smoke’”). By focusing on the most general of verbs for a psychological state or attitude, ‘to represent,’ that even allows for a non-psychological reading, Grice wants to be seen as answering the challenge of an alleged vicious circle with which his intention-based approach is usually associated. The secondary-intentional non-iconic mode of representation rests on a prior iconic mode and can be understood as ‘pre-conventional,’ without any explicit recourse to the features we associate with a developed system of communication. Grice needs no ‘language of thought’ or sermo mentalis alla Ockham there. Grice allows that one can communicate fully without the need to use what more conventional philosophers call ‘a language.’ Artists do it all the time! The passage from intentio prima to full intentio seconda is, for Grice, gradual and complex. Grice means to adhere with ‘ordinary’ discourse, in its implicatura and dis-implicaata. The passage also adhering to a functionalist approach qua ‘method in philosophical psychology,’ as he’d prefer, that needs not to postulate a full-blown ‘linguistic entity’ as the object of intentional thought. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the work of C. A. B. Peacocke, who knew Grice from his Oxford days and later joined his seminars at Berkeley, and who has developed this line of thought in a better fashion than less careful philosophers. Grice’s programme has occasionally, and justly, been compared with phenomenological approaches to expression and communication, such as Marty’s. It is hoped that the previous notes have shed some light on those aspects where this interface can further be elaborated. Even as we leave an intentio seconda to resume the discussion for a longer day. In his explorations on the embedding of intensional concepts, Grice should be inspirational to philosophers in more than one way, but especially in the one that he favoured most: the problematicity of it all. As he put it in another context, when defending absolute value. “Such a defence of absolute value is of course, bristling with unsolved or incompletely solved problems. I do not find this thought daunting. If philosophy generated no new problems it would be dead, because it would be finished; and if it recurrently regenerated the same old problems it would not be alive because it could never begin. So those who still look to philosophy for their bread-and-butter should pray that the supply of new problems never dries up.” (Grice 1991). In the Graeco-Roman tradition, philosophers started to use ‘intentio prima,’ ‘intentio secunda,’ ‘intentio tertia,’ and “… ad infinitum,” as they would put it. In post-war Oxford, English philosopher H. P. Grice felt the need. The formalist he was, he found subscribing numbers to embedded intentions has a strong appeal for him. Grice’s main motivation is in the philosophy of language, but as ancillary towards solving this or that problem concerning the ‘linguistic’ methodology of his day. To appreciate Grice’s contribution one need to abstract a little from his own historical circumstances, or rather, place them in the proper context, and connect it with the general history of philosophy. As a matter of history, ‘intentio prima,’ or ‘recta,’ as opposed to ‘obliqua,’ is part of Nicolai Hartmann’s ‘mediaeval revival,’ as a reaction to mediaevalism having made scorn by the likes of Rabelais that amused D. P. Henry. For the mediaeval philosopher, to use Grice’s symbolism, was concerned with whether a chimaera could eat ‘I₂,’ a second intention. The mediaeval philosopher’s implicaturum seems to be that a chimaera can easily eat ‘I₁.’ Such a ‘quaestio subtilissima,’ Rabelais jokes. If ‘I₁,’ or, better, for simplificatory purposes, ‘I_R’ is a specific state, stance, or attitude of the ‘soul,’ ‘ψ₁’ or ‘ψ_R’ directed towards its ‘de re’ ‘intentum,’ or ‘prae-sentatum,’ of the noumenon, ‘I_O,’ ‘intentio obliqua,’ is a state, stance, or attitude of the ‘soul,’ of the same genus, ‘ψ₂,’ or ‘ψ_S’ directed towards ‘ψ_R,’ its ‘de sensu’ ‘intentum’ now ‘re-prae-sentatum’ of the phainomenon or ob-jectum (Abelard translates Aristotle’s ‘per divisionem’ as ‘de re’ and ‘per compositionem’ and ‘per conjunctionem’ by ‘de sensu,’ and ‘per Soph. Elen., Kneale and Kneale, 1966). Grice’s intentionalism has been widely discussed, but the defense he himself makes of intensionalism (versus extensionalism) has proved inspiring, as when he assumes as an attending commentary to his reductive analysis of the state of affairs by which the emissor communicates that p, that he is putting forward “the legitimacy of [the] application of [existential generalization] to a statement the expression of which contains such [an] "intensional" verb[…] as "intend" (Grice 1989: 116 ). The expression ‘de sensu’ is due to Abelard, but Russell likes it. While serving as Prince Regent of England in 1815, George IV casually remarks his wish to meet ‘the author of Waverley’ in the flesh. The Prince was being funny, you see. The prince would not know this, but when his press becomes embroiled in pecuniary difficulties, Scotts set out to write a cash-cow. The result is Waverley, a novel which did not name its author. It is a tale of the last Jacobite rebellion in England, the “Forty-Five.” The novel meets with considerable success. The next year, Scott. There follows a sequel, the same general vein. Mindful of his reputation, Scotts maintains the anonymous habit he displays with Waverley, and publishes the sequel under “the Author of Waverley.” The identity “Author of Waverley” = “Scott” is widely rumoured, and Scott is given the honour of dining with George, Prince Regent, who had wished to meet “Author of Waverley” in the flesh for a ‘snug little dinner’ at Carleton, on hearing ‘the author of Waverley’ was in town. The use of a descriptor may lead to the implicaturum that His Majesty is p’rhaps not sure that ‘the author of Waverley’ has a name, and is_R Scott. Lack of certainty is one thing, yet, to quote from Russell, “an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe.” Grice admired Russell profusely and one of his essays is wittily entitled, “Definite descriptions in Russell and in the Vernacular,” so his explorations of ‘intentio’ ‘de sensu’ have an intrinsic interest. Keywords: H. Paul Grice, intentio seconda, implicaturum, intentionalism, intentum, intentum de sensu, ‘that’-clause, the recte-oblique distinction. Grice explored issues of intentum de sensu in various areas. First, ‘meaning.’ Second, ‘knowing.’ Third, ‘wanting.’ Fourth, ‘intending,’ Fifth, pirots, with incorrigibility and privileged access. Sixth, morality and the regressus. Seventh, the continuum and the unity. With Grice, it all starts, roughly, when Grice comes up with a topic for a talk at The Oxford Philosophical Society.The Society is holding one of those meetings, and Grice thinks of presenting a few conclusions he had reached at his seminars on C. S. Peirce.What’s the good of an Oxford don of keeping tidy lecture notes if you will not be able to lecture to a philosophical addressee? Peirce is the philosopher on whom Grice choses to lecture. In part, for “not being particularly popular on these shores,” and in part because Grice noted the ‘heretic’ in Peirce with which he could identify.Granted, at this stage, Grice disliked the un-Englishness of some of Peirce’s over-Latinate jargon, what Grice finds the ‘krypto-technic.’ ‘Sign,’ ‘symbol,’ ‘icon,’ and the rest of them!Instead, Grice thinks, initially for the sake of his tutees and students – he was university lecturer -- sticking with the simpler, ‘ordinary’, short English lexeme ‘mean.’A. M. Kemmerling, of all people, who wrote the obituary for Grice for Synthese, has precisely cast doubts on the ‘universal’ validity of Grice’s proposed conceptual reductive analysis, notably in his Ph.D dissertation on ‘Meinen.’ Note the irony in Kemmerling’s title: Was Grice mit "Meinen" meint - Eine Rekonstruktion der Griceschen Analyse rationaler Kommunikation.” Nothing jocular in the subtitle, for this indeed is a reconstruction of ‘rational’ communication. The funny bit is in “Was mit “Meinen” Grice meint”! In that very phrase, which is rhetorical, and allows for an answer, because ‘meinen’ is both mentioned and used, Kemmerling allows that he is ‘buying’ Grice’s idea that his reductive analysis of ‘mean’ applies to German ‘meinen.’ Kemmerling is also pointing to the ‘primacy’ (to use Suppes’s phrase) of ‘utterer’s’ or ‘emissor’s “communicatum” or ‘Meinung.” Kemmerling advertises his interest in exploring on what _Grice_ means – by uttering ‘meinen,’ almost! As Kemmerling notes, German ‘meinen,’ cognate via common Germanic with English ‘mean,’ (cf. Frisian ‘mein,’ – and Hazzlitt, “Bread, butter, and green cheese, very good English, very good cheese”) is none other than ‘mean’ that Grice means. And ‘Grice means’ is the only literal, i. e. non-metabolic use of the verb Grice allows – as applied to a rational agent, which features in the subtitle to Kemmerling’s dissertation. Thus one reads in Kluge, “Etymologische Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 1881, of “meinen,” rendered by J. F. Davis as ‘to think, opine, mean,’ from a MHG used to indicate, in Davis’s rendition, ‘to direct one's thoughts to, have in view, aim at, be affected towards a person, love,’ OHG meinen, meinan, ‘to mean, think, say, declare.’ = OS mênian, Du. meenen, OE mœ̂nan, E mean (to this Anglo-Saxon mœ̂nan, cf. prob. moan – I know your meaning from your moaning), all from WGmc. meinen, mainjan, ‘mênjan,’ and cognate with ‘man,’ ‘to think’ (cf. ‘mahnen,’ ‘Mann,’ and ‘Minne’). Kemmerling is very apropos, because Grice engaged in philosophical discussion with him, as testified by his perceptive contribution to P. G. R. I. C. E. (Kemmerling, 1986). On top, in his presentation for the Oxford Philosophical Society, Grice wants to restrict the philosophical interest to ‘de sensu,’ the ‘that’-clause (cf. the recte-oblique distinction), viz. not just ‘what Grice means,’ if this is going to be expaned as ‘something wonderful.’ Not enough for Grice. It has to be expanded, for the thing to have philosophical interest into a ‘propositional clause,’, an ‘intensional’ context, i. e., ‘Grice means that…’ Grice cavalierly dismisses other use of ‘mean,’ – notably the ubiquitous, ‘mean to…’ – He will later explain his reason for this. It was after William James provoked Prichard. For William James uttered: “I will that the distant table slides on the floor toward me. It doesn’t’. Prichard turns this into the conceptual priority of ‘will that…’ for which Grice gives him the credit he deserved at a later lecture now on his being appointed a Fellow of The British Academy (Grice, 1971). Strictly, what Grice does in the Oxford Philosophical Socieety presentation is to distinguish between various ‘mean’ and end up focusing on ‘mean’ as followed by a ‘that’-clause. In the typical Oxonian fashion, that Grice borrows (but never returns) from J. C. Wilson, Grice has the I_O as ‘meaning that so-and-so’ (Grice, 1989: 217). Grice explicitly displays the primacy of a reductive analysis of the conceptual circumstances involving an emissor (Anglo-Saxon ‘utterer’) who ‘means’ that p. It will be a longer ‘shaggy-dog’ story Grice tells when he crosses the divide from ‘propositional’ (p) to ‘predicative’ ascriptions (“By uttering ‘Fido is shaggy,’ Grice means that the dog is hairy-coated (Grice 1989). Grice notes that ‘metabolically,’ “mean,” at least in English, can be applied to various other things, sometimes even involving a ‘that’-clause. “By delivering his budget, the major means that we will have a hard year.’ Grice finds that ‘but we won’t’ turns him into a self-contradicter. In Grice’s usage, ‘x ‘means’ y’ iff ‘y is a consequence [consequentia] of x’ --. Quite a departure from Old Frisian. If Hume’s objection to the use of the verb ‘cause,’ is that it covers animistic beliefs (“Charles I’s decapitation willed his death”), English allows for disimplicated or loose ‘metabolic’ uses of ‘will’ (“It ‘will’ rain”) and ‘mean’ (Grice’s moaning means that he is in pain).

desideratum: Qua volition, a mental event involved with the initiation of action. ‘To will’ is sometimes taken to be the corresponding verb form of ‘volition’. The concept of volition is rooted in modern philosophy; contemporary philosophers have transformed it by identifying volitions with ordinary mental events, such as intentions, or beliefs plus desires. Volitions, especially in contemporary guises, are often taken to be complex mental events consisting of cognitive, affective, and conative elements. The conative element is the impetus – the underlying motivation – for the action. A velleity is a conative element insufficient by itself to initiate action. The will is a faculty, or set of abilities, that yields the mental events involved in initiating action. There are three primary theories about the role of volitions in action. The first is a reductive account in which action is identified with the entire causal sequence of the mental event (the volition) causing the bodily behavior. J. S. Mill, for example, says: “Now what is action? Not one thing, but a series of two things: the state of mind called a volition, followed by an effect. . . . [T]he two together constitute the action” (Logic). Mary’s raising her arm is Mary’s mental state causing her arm to rise. Neither Mary’s volitional state nor her arm’s rising are themselves actions; rather, the entire causal sequence (the “causing”) is the action. The primary difficulty for this account is maintaining its reductive status. There is no way to delineate volition and the resultant bodily behavior without referring to action. There are two non-reductive accounts, one that identifies the action with the initiating volition and another that identifies the action with the effect of the volition. In the former, a volition is the action, and bodily movements are mere causal consequences. Berkeley advocates this view: “The Mind . . . is to be accounted active in . . . so far forth as volition is included. . . . In plucking this flower I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition” (Three Dialogues). In this century, Prichard is associated with this theory: “to act is really to will something” (Moral Obligation, 1949), where willing is sui generis (though at other places Prichard equates willing with the action of mentally setting oneself to do something). In this sense, a volition is an act of will. This account has come under attack by Ryle (Concept of Mind, 1949). Ryle argues that it leads to a vicious regress, in that to will to do something, one must will to will to do it, and so on. It has been countered that the regress collapses; there is nothing beyond willing that one must do in order to will. Another criticism of Ryle’s, which is more telling, is that ‘volition’ is an obscurantic term of art; “[volition] is an artificial concept. We have to study certain specialist theories in order to find out how it is to be manipulated. . . . [It is like] ‘phlogiston’ and ‘animal spirits’ . . . [which] have now no utility” (Concept of Mind). Another approach, the causal theory of action, identifies an action with the causal consequences of volition. Locke, e.g., says: “Volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. . . . [V]olition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby . . . the mind endeavors to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power” (Essay concerning Human Understanding). This is a functional account, since an event is an action in virtue of its causal role. Mary’s arm rising is Mary’s action of raising her arm in virtue of being caused by her willing to raise it. If her arm’s rising had been caused by a nervous twitch, it would not be action, even if the bodily movements were photographically the same. In response to Ryle’s charge of obscurantism, contemporary causal theorists tend to identify volitions with ordinary mental events. For example, Davidson takes the cause of actions to be beliefs plus desires and Wilfrid Sellars takes volitions to be intentions to do something here and now. Despite its plausibility, however, the causal theory faces two difficult problems: the first is purported counterexamples based on wayward causal chains connecting the antecedent mental event and the bodily movements; the second is provision of an enlightening account of these mental events, e.g. intending, that does justice to the conative element. See also ACTION THEORY, FREE WILL PROBLEM, PRACTICAL REASONING, WAYWARD CAUSAL CHAIN. M.B. volition volition. Grice makes a double use of this. It should be thus two entries. There’s the conversational desideratum, where a desideratum is like a maxim or an imperative – and then there are two specific desiderata: the desideratum of conversational clarity, and the desideratum of conversational candour. Grice was never sure what adjective to use for the ‘desiderative.’ He liked buletic. He liked desideratum because it has the co-relate ‘consideratum,’ for belief. He uses ‘deriderative’ and a few more! Of course what he means is a sub-psychological modality, or rather a ‘soul.’ So he would apply it ‘primarily’ to the soul, as Plato and Aristotle does. The ‘psyche’, or ‘anima’ is what is ‘desiderativa.’ The Grecians are pretty confused about this (but ‘boulemaic’ and ‘buletic’ are used), and the Romans didn’t help. Grice is concerned with a rational-desiderative, that takes a “that”-clause (or oratio obliqua), and qua constructivist, he is also concerned with a pre-rational desiderative (he has an essay on “Needs and Wants,” and his detailed example in “Method” is a squarrel (sic) who needs a nut. On top, while Grice suggest s that it goes both ways: the doxastic can be given a reductive analaysis in terms of the buletic, and the buletic in terms of the doxastic, he only cares to provide the former. Basically, an agent judges that p, if his willing that p correlates to a state of affairs that satisfies his desires. Since he does not provide a reductive analysis for Prichard’s willing-that, one is left wondering. Grice’s position is that ‘willing that…’ attains its ‘sense’ via the specification, as a theoretical concept, in some law in the folk-science that agents use to explain their behaviour. Grice gets subtler when he deals with mode-markers for the desiderative: for these are either utterer-oriented, or addressee-oriented, and they may involve a buletic attitude itself, or a doxastic attitude. When utterer-addressed, utterer wills that utterer wills that p. There is no closure here, and indeed, a regressus ad infinitum is what Grice wants, since this regressus allows him to get univeersabilisability, in terms of conceptual, formal, and applicational kinds of generality. In this he is being Kantian, and Hareian. While Grice praises Kantotle, Aristotle here would stay unashamedly ‘teleological,’ and giving priority to a will that may not be universalisable, since it’s the communitarian ‘good’ that matters. what does Grice have to say about our conversational practice? L and S have “πρᾶξις,” from “πράσσω,” and which they render as ‘moral action,’ oποίησις, τέχνη;” “oποιότης,” “ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ π.,” “oοἱ πολιτικοὶ λόγοι;” “ἔργῳ καὶ πράξεσιν, οὐχὶ λόγοις” Id.6.3; ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, “exhibited in actual life,” action in drama, “oλόγος; “μία π. ὅλη καὶ τελεία.” With practical Grice means buletic. Praxis involves acting, and surely Grice presupposes acting. By uttering, i. e. by the act of uttering, expression x, U m-intends that p. Grice occasionally refers to action and behaviour as the thing which an ascription of a psychological state explains. Grice prefers the idiom of soul. Theres the ratiocinative soul. Within the ratiocinative, theres the executive soul and the merely administrative soul. Cicero had to translate Aristotle into prudentia, every time Aristotle talked of phronesis. Grice was aware that the terminology by Kant can be confusing. Kant used ‘pure’ reason for reason in the doxastic realm. The critique by Kant of practical reason is hardly symmetrical to his critique of doxastic reason. Grice, with his æqui-vocality thesis of must (must crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide), Grice is being more of a symmetricalist. The buletic, boulomaic, or volitive, is a part of the soul, as is the doxatic or judicative. And judicative is a trick because there is such a thing as a value judgement, or an evaluative judgement, which is hardly doxastic. Grice plays with two co-relative operators: desirability versus probability. Grice invokes the exhibitive/protreptic distinction he had introduced in the fifth James lecture, now applied to psychological attitudes themselves. This Grice’s attempt is to tackle the Kantian problem in the Grundlegung: how to derive the categorical imperative from a counsel of prudence. Under the assumption that the protasis is Let the agent be happy, Grice does not find it obtuse at all to construct a universalisable imperative out of a mere motive-based counsel of prudence. Grice has an earlier paper on pleasure which relates. The derivation involves seven steps. Grice proposes seven steps in the derivation. 1. It is a fundamental law of psychology that, ceteris paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R wills P Λ judges if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 2. Place this law within the scope of a "willing" operator: R wills for any P Λ Q, if R wills P Λ judges that if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 3. wills turns to should. If rational, R will have to block unsatisfactory (literally) attitudes. R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory to will that P Λ it is satisfactory to judge that if P, P as a result of Q, it is sastisfactory to will that Q. 4. Marking the mode: R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that !P Λ that if it .P, .P only as a result of Q, it is satisfactory that !Q. 5. via (p & q -> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)): R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that if .P, .P only because Q, i is satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 6. R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if P, P only because p yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 7. For any P Λ Q if P, P only because Q yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. Grice was well aware that a philosopher, at Oxford, needs to be a philosophical psychologist. So, wanting and needing have to be related to willing. A plant needs water. A floor needs sweeping. So need is too broad. So is want, a non-Anglo-Saxon root for God knows what. With willing things get closer to the rational soul. There is willing in the animal soul. But when it comes to rational willing, there must be, to echo Pritchard, a conjecture, some doxastic element. You cannot will to fly, or will that the distant chair slides over the floor toward you. So not all wants and needs are rational willings, but then nobody said they would. Grice is interested in emotion in his power structure of the soul. A need and a want may count as an emotion. Grice was never too interested in needing and wanting because they do not take a that-clause. He congratulates Urmson for having introduced him to the brilliant willing that … by Prichard. Why is it, Grice wonders, that many ascriptions of buletic states take to-clause, rather than a that-clause? Even mean, as ‘intend.’ In this Grice is quite different from Austin, who avoids the that-clause. The explanation by Austin is very obscure, like those of all grammars on the that’-clause, the ‘that’ of ‘oratio obliqua’ is not in every way similar to the ‘that’-clause in an explicit performative formula. Here the utterer is not reporting his own ‘oratio’ in the first person singular present indicative active. Incidentally, of course, it is not in the least necessary that an explicit performative verb should be followed by a ‘that’-clause. In important classes of cases it is followed by ‘to . . .,’ or by or nothing, e. g. ‘I apologize for…,’ ‘I salute you.’ Now many of these verbs appear to be quite satisfactory pure performatives. Irritating though it is to have them as such, linked with clauses that look like statements, true or false, e. g., when I say ‘I prophesy that …,’ ‘I concede that …’, ‘I postulate that …,’ the clause following normally looks just like a statement, but the verb itself seems to be pure performatives. One may distinguish the performative opening part, ‘I state that …,’ which makes clear how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement, as distinct from a prediction, etc.), from the bit in the that-clause which is required to be true or false. However, there are many cases which, as language stands at present, we are not able to split into two parts in this way, even though the utterance seems to have a sort of explicit performative in it. Thus, ‘I liken x to y,’ or ‘I analyse x as y.’ Here we both do the likening and assert that there is a likeness by means of one compendious phrase of at least a quasi-performative character. Just to spur us on our way, we may also mention ‘I know that …’, ‘I believe that …’, etc. How complicated are these examples? We cannot assume that they are purely descriptive, which has Grice talking of the pseudo-descriptive. Want etymologically means absence; need should be preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby needs intake of nuts, and youll soon see gobbling them! There is not much philosophical bibliography on these two psychological states Grice is analysing. Their logic is interesting. Smith wants to play cricket. Smith needs to play cricket. Grice is concerned with the propositional content attached to the want and need predicate. Wants that sounds harsh; so does need that. Still, there are propositional attached to the pair above. Smith plays cricket. Grice took a very cavalier attitude to what linguists spend their lives analysing. He thought it was surely not the job of the philosopher, especially from a prestigious university such as Oxford, to deal with the arbitrariness of grammatical knots attached to this or that English verb. He rarely used English, but stuck with ordinary language. Surely, he saw himself in the tradition of Kantotle, and so, aiming at grand philosophical truths: not conventions of usage, even his own! 1. Squarrel Toby has a nut, N, in front of him. 2. Toby is short on squarrel food (observed or assumed), so, 3. Toby wills squarrel food (by postulate of Folk Pyschological Theory θ connecting willing with intake of N). 4. Toby prehends a nut as in front (from (1) by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ, if it is assumed that nut and in front are familiar to Toby). 5. Toby joins squarrel food with gobbling, nut, and in front (i.e. Toby judges gobbling, on nut in front, for squarrel food (by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ with the aid of prior observation. So, from 3, 4 and 5, 6. Tobby gobbles; and since a nut is in front of him, gobbles the nut in front of him. The system of values of the society to which the agent belongs forms the external standard for judging the relative importance of the commitments by the agent. There are three dimensions of value: universally human, cultural that vary with societies and times; and personal that vary with individuals. Each dimension has a standard for judging the adequacy of the relevant values. Human values are adequate if they satisfy basic needs; cultural values are adequate if they provide a system of values that sustains the allegiance of the inhabitants of a society; and personal values are adequate if the conceptions of well‐being formed out of them enable individuals to live satisfying lives. These values conflict and our well‐being requires some way of settling their conflicts, but there is no universal principle for settling the conflicts; it can only be done by attending to the concrete features of particular conflicts. These features vary with circumstances and values. Grice reads Porter.The idea of the value chain is based on the process view of organizations, the idea of seeing a manufacturing (or service) organization as a system, made up of subsystems each with inputs, transformation processes and outputs. Inputs, transformation processes, and outputs involve the acquisition and consumption of resources – money, labour, materials, equipment, buildings, land, administration and management. How value chain activities are carried out determines costs and affects profits.In his choice of value system and value sub-system, Grice is defending objectivity, since it is usually the axiological relativist who uses such a pretentious phrasing! More than a value may co-ordinate in a system. One such is eudæmonia (cf. system of ends). The problem for Kant is the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. For Kant, a value tends towards the Subjectsive. Grice, rather, wants to offer a metaphysical defence of objective value. Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational Immanuel. The keyword to search the H. P. Grice is ‘will,’ and ‘volitional,’ even ‘ill-will,’ (“Metaphysics and ill-will,” s. V, c. 7-f. 28) and ‘benevolence’ (vide below under ‘conversational benevolence”). Also ‘desirability’: “Modality, desirability, and probability,” s. V, c. 8-ff. 14-15, and the conference lecture in a different series, “Probability, desirability, and mood operators,” s. II, c. 2-f.11). Grice makes systematic use of ‘practical’ to contrast with the ‘alethic,’ too (“Practical reason,” s. V, c. 9-f.1), The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

desideratum of conversational candour: The key for philosophical attention here is ‘candour’ but the collocation is delightfully Griceian, “the desideratum of conversational candour” where only ‘candour,’ and just about, should be taken seriously. The term ‘desideratum’ has to be taken seriously. It involves freedom. This includes the maximin. It should be noted that candour is DESIRABLE. There is a desirability for candour. Candour is not a given. Ditto for clarity. See conversational desideratum, simpliciter. A rational desideratum is a desideratum by a rational agent and which he expects from another rational agent. One should make the strongest move, and on the other hand try not to mislead.Grice's Oxford "Conversation" Lectures, 1966Grice: Between Self-Love and Benevolence As I was saying (somewhere), Grice uses "self-love", charmingly qualified with capitals, as "Conversational Self-Love", and, less charmingly, "Conversational Benevolence", in lectures advertised at Oxford, as "Logic and Conversation" that he gave at Oxford in 1964 as "University Lecturer in Philosophy". He also gave seminars on "Conversational helpfulness." A number of the lectures by Grice include discussion of thetypes of behaviour people in general exhibit, and thereforethe types of expectations[cfr. owings]they might bring to a venture such as a conversation.Grice suggests that people in general both exhibitand EXPECT a certain degree of helpfulness [-- alla Rosenschein, epistemic/boulemaic:If A cognizes that B wills p, then A wills p.] "from OTHERS" [-- reciprocal vs. reflexive, etc.] usually on the understanding that such helpfulness does NOT get in the way of particular goals and does not involve undue effort cf. least effort? - cfr. Hobbes on self-love. It two people, even complete strangers,are going through a gate, the expectation isthat the FIRST ONE through will hold thegate open, or at least leave it open, for thesecond. The expectation is such that todo OTHERWISE without particular reasonwould be interpreted as RUDE. The type of helpfulness exhibited andexpected in conversation is more specificbecause of a particular, although not a unique feature of conversation.It is a COLLABORATIVE venture betweenthe participants.There is a SHARED aimGrice wonders. His words, Does "helpfulness in something WE ARE DOING TOGETHER” equate to 'cooperation'?He seems to have decided that it does. By the later lectures in the series, 'the principle of conversational helpfulness'has been rebranded the expectation of 'cooperation.' During the Oxford lectures, Grice develops his account of the precise nature of this cooperation. It can be seen as governed by certain regularities, or principles, detailing expected behaviour. The expression'maxim' to describe these regularities appears relatively late in the lectures.Grice's INITIAL choices of terms are 'objectives' and 'desiderata'.He was particularly fond of the latter. He was interested in detailing the desirable forms of behaviour for the purpose of achieving a joint goal of the conversation. Initially, Grice posits TWO such desiderata. Those relating to candour on the one hand and clarity on the other. The desideratum of candour contains his general PRINCIPLE of making the strongest (MAX) possible statement and, as a LIMITING (MAX) factor on this, the suggestion that speakers should try not to mislead. (Do not mislead). cfr. our"We are brothers"-- but not mutual."We are married to each other". "You _are_ a boor".----The desideratum of conversational clarity concerns the manner of expression. [His later reference to Modus or Mode as used by Kant as one of the four categories] for any conversational contribution. It includes the IMPORTANT expectations of relevance to understanding and also insists that the main import of an utterance be clear and explicit. (“Explicate!”) These two factors are constantly to be WEIGHED against two FUNDAMENTAL and SOMETIMES COMPETING DEMANDS. Contributions to a conversation are aimed towards the agreed current purposes by the PRINCIPLE of Conversational Benevolence. The principle of CONVERSATIONAL SELF-LOVE ensures the assumption on the part of both participants that neither will go to unnecessary trouble [LEAST EFFORT] in framing their contribution. This has been a topic of interest to Noh end. In "Conversational Immanuel" Grice tries different ways of making sense -- it is very easy to do so -- of Grice's distinctions that go over the head of some linguists I know! Reasonable versus rational for example. A Rawlsian distinction of sorts. Rational is too weak. We need 'reasonable'. So, what sort of reasonableness is that which results from this harmonious, we hope, clash of self-love and benevolence? Grice tried, wittily, to extend the purposes of conversation to involve MUTUALLY INFLUENCING EACH OTHER -- a reciprocal. (WoW, ii). And there's a mythical reconstruction of this in his "Meaning Revisited" which he contributed to this symposium organised by N. Smith on Mutua knowledge. But issues remains, we hope. The concept of ‘candour’is especially basic for Grice since it is constitutive of what it means to identify the ‘significatum.’ As he notes, ‘false’ information is no information. This is serious, because it has to do with the acceptum. A contribution which is not trustworthy is not deemed a contribution. It is conceptually impossible to intend to PROVIDE information if you are aware that you are not being trustworthy and not conveying it. As for the degree of explicitness, as Grice puts it. Since in communication in a certain fashion all must be public, if an idea or thesis is heavily obscured, it can no longer be regarded as having been propounded. This gives acceptum justification to the correlative desideratum of conversational clarity. On top, if there is a level of obscurity, the thing is not deemed to have been a communicatum or significatum. It is all about confidence, you know. U expects A will find him confident. Thus we find in Short and Lewis, “confīdo,” wich they render as “to trust confidently in something,” and also, “confide in, rely firmly upon, to believe, be assured of,” as an enhancing of “sperare,” in Cicero’s Att. 6, 9, 1. Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. Urmson develops this. They phrase in Urmson is "implied claim." Whenever U makes a conversational contribution in a standard context, there is an implied claim to U being trustworthy and reasonable. What do Grice and Urmson mean by an "implied claim"? It is obvious enough, but they both love to expand. Whenever U utters an expression which can be used to convey truth or falsehood there is an implied claim to trustworthiness by U, unless the situation shows that this is not so. U may be acting or reciting or incredulously echoing the remark of another, or flouting the expectation. This, Grice and Urmson think, may need an explanation. Suppose that U utters, in an ordinary circumstance, ‘It will rain tomorrow,’ or ‘It rained yesterday,’ or ‘It is raining.’ This act carries with it the claim that U should be trusted and licenses A to believe that it will rain tomorrow. By this is meant that just as it is understood that no U will give an order unless he is entitled to give orders, so it is understood that no U will utter a sentence of a kind which can be used to make a statement unless U is willing to claim that that statement is true, and hence one would be acting in a misleading manner if one uttered the sentence if he was not willing to make that claim. Here, the predicate “implies that …,” Grice, Grant, Moore, Nowell-Smith, and Urmson hasten to add, is being used in such a way that, if there is a an expectation that a thing is done in Circumstance C, U implies that C holds if he does the thing. The point is often made if not always in the terms Grice uses, and it is, Urmson and Grice believe, in substance uncontroversial. Grice and Urmson wish to make the point that, when an utterer U deploys a hedge with an indicative sentence, there is not merely an implied claim that the whole statement is true but also that is true. The implied or expressed claim by the utterer to trustworthiness need not be very strong. The whole point of a hedge is to modify or weaken (if not, as Grice would have it, flout) the claim by U to full trustworthiness which would be implied by the unhedged assertion. But even if U utters “He is, I suppose, at home;” or “I guess that the penny will come down heads," U expresses, or for Urmson plainly implies, with however little reason, that this is what U accepts as worth the trust by A. Now Grice and Urmson meet an objection which is made by some philosophers to this comparison. Grice and Urmson intend to meet the objection by a fairly detailed examination of the example which they themselves would most likely choose. In doing this Grice and Urmson further explain the use of a parenthetical verb. The adverb is "probably" and the verb is “I believe.” To say, that something is probable, the imaginary objector will say, is to imply that it is reasonable to believe, that the evidence justifies a guarded claim for the trust or trustworthiness of U and the truth of the statement. But to say that someone else, a third person, believes something does not imply that it is reasonable for U or A to believe it, nor that the evidence justifies the guarded or implied claim to factivity or truth which U makes. Therefore, the objector continues, the difference between the use of “I believe” and “probably” is not, as Grice and Urmson suggest, merely one of nuance and degree of impersonality. In one case, “probably,” reasonableness is implied; in the other, “believe,” it is not. This objection is met by Grice and Urmson. They do so by making a general point. To use the rational-reasonable distinction in “Conversational implicaturum” and “Aspects,” there is an implied claim by U to reasonableness. Further to an implied claim to trust whenever a sentence is uttered in a standard context, now Grice and Urmson add, to meet the sceptical objection about the contrast between “probably” and “I believe” that, whenever U makes a statement in a standard context there is an implied claim to reasonableness. This contention must be explained alla Kant. Cf. Strawson on the presumption of conversational relevance, and Austin, Moore, Nowell-Smith, Grant, and Warnock. To use Hart’s defeasibility, and Hall’s excluder, unless U is acting or story-telling, or preface his remarks with some such phrase as “I know Im being silly, but …” or, “I admit it is unreasonable, but …” it is, Grice and Urmson think, a presupposition or expectation of communication or conversation that a communicator will not make a statement, thereby implying this trust, unless he has some ground, however tenuous, for the statement. To utter “The King is visiting Oxford tomorrow,” or “The President of the BA has a corkscrew in his pocket,” and then, when asked why the utterer is uttering that, to answer “Oh, for no reason at all,” would be to sin, theologically, against the basic conventions governing the use of discourse. Grice goes on to provide a Kantian justification for that, hence his amusing talk of maxims and stuff. Therefore, Urmson and Grice think there is an implied or expressed claim to reasonableness which goes with all our statements, i.e. there is a mutual expectation that a communicator will not make a statement unless he is prepared to claim and defend its reasonablenesss. Cf. Grice’s desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly conversational benevolence-cum-self-love). Grice thinks that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-love. The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness. Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by. Grice follows some observations by Warnock. The logical grammar of “trust,” “candour,” “charity,” “sincerity,” “decency,” “honesty,” is subtle, especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation: giving and receiving information/influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is paramount. The explorations of trust has become an Oxonian hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but Williams, and others. Grice’s essay is entitled, “Trust, metaphysics, value.” Trust as a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness. In a given conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is operating, U is assumed by A to be trustworthy and candid. There are two modes of trust, which relate to the buletic sub-goal and the doxastic sub-goal which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures: giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is key. In the doxastic realm, trust has to do, not so much or only, with truth (with which the expression is cognate), or satisfactoriness-value, but evidence and probability. In the buletic realm, there are the dimensions of satisfactoriness-value (‘good’ versus ‘true’), and ‘ground’ versus evidence, which becomes less crucial. But note that one is trustworthy regarding BOTH the buletic attitude and the doxastic attitude. Grice mentions this or that buletic attitudes which is not usually judged in terms of evidential support (“I vow to thee my country.”) However, in the buletic realm, U is be assumed as trustworthy if U has the buletic attitude he is expressing. The cheater, the insincere, the dishonest, the untrustworthy, for Grice is not irrational, just repugnant. How immoral is the idea that honesty is the best policy? Is Kant right in thinking there is no right to refrain from trust? Surely it is indecent. For Kant, there is no motivation or ‘motive,’ pure or impure, behind telling the truth – it’s just a right, and an obligation – an imperative. Being trustworthy for Kant is associated with a pure motive. Grice agrees. Decency comes into the picture. An indecent agent may still be rational, but in such a case, conversation may still be seen as rational (if not reasonable) and surely not be seen as rational helpfulness or co-operation, but rational adversarial competition, rather, a zero-sum game. Grice found the etymology of ‘decent’ too obscure. Short and Lewis have “dĕcet,” which they deem cognate with Sanscrit “dacas,” ‘fame,’ and Grecian “δοκέω,‘to seem,’ ‘to think,’ and with Latin ‘decus,’ ‘dingus.’ As an impersonal verb, Short and Lewis render it as ‘it is seemly, comely, becoming,; it beseems, behooves, is fitting, suitable, proper (for syn. v. debeo init.): decere quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae, Cic. Or. 22, 74; cf. also nunc quid aptum sit, hoc est, quid maxime deceat in oratione videamus, id. de Or. 3, 55, 210 (very freq. and class.; not in Caesar). Grice’s idea of decency is connected to his explorations on rational and reasonable. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational. It is just repulsive. Indecent, in other words. In all this, Grice is concerned with ordinary language, and treasures Austin questioning Warnock, when Warnock was pursuing a fellowship at Magdalen. “What would you say the difference is between ‘Smith plays cricket rather properly’ and ‘Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly’?” They spent the whole dinner over the subtlety. By desserts, Warnock was in love with Austin. Cf. Grice on his prim and proper Aunt Matilda. The exploration by Grice on trust is Warnockian in character, or vice versa. In “Object of morality,” Warnock has trust as key, as indeed, the very object of morality. Grice starts to focus on trust in an Oxford seminars on the implicaturum. If there is a desideratum of conversational candour, and the goal of the principle of conversational helpfulness is that of giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others, ‘false’ ‘information’ is just no information – Since exhibiteness trumps protrepsis, this applies to the buletic, too. Grice loved that Latin dictum, “tuus candor.” He makes an early defence of this in his fatal objection to Malcolm. A philosopher cannot intentionally instill a falsehood in his tutee, such as “Decapitation willed the death of Charles I” (the alleged paraphrase of the paradoxical philosopher saying that ‘causing’ is ‘willing’ and rephrasing “Decapitation was the cause of the death of Charles I.” There is, for both Grice and Apel, a transcendental (if weak) justification, not just utilitarian (honesty as the best policy), as Stalnaker notes in his contribution to the Grice symposium for APA. Unlike Apel, the transcendental argument is a weak one in that Grice aims to show that conversation that did not abide by trust would be unreasonable, but surely still ‘possible.’ It is not a transcendental justification for the ‘existence’ of conversation simpliciter, but for the existence of ‘reasonable,’ decent conversation. If we approach charity in the first person, we trust ourselves that some of our beliefs have to be true, and that some of our desires have to be satisfactory valid, and we are equally trusted by our conversational partners. This is Grice’s conversational golden rule. What would otherwise be the point of holding that conversation is rational co-operation? What would be the point of conversation simpliciter? Urmson follows Austin, so Austin’s considerations on this, notably in “Other minds,” deserve careful examination. Urmson was of course a member of Grice’s play group, and these are the philosophers that we consider top priority. Another one was P. H. Nowell-Smith. At least two of his three rules deserve careful examination. Nowell-Smith notes that this or that ‘rule’ of contextual implication is not meant to be taken as a ‘rigid rule’. Unlike this or that rule of entailment, a conversational rule can be broken without the utterer being involved in self-contradiction or absurdity. When U uses an expression to make a statement, it is contextually implied that he believes it to be true. Similarly, when he uses it to perform any of the other jobs for which sentences are used, it is contextually implied that he is using it for one of the jobs that it normally does. This rule is often in fact broken. Anti-Kantian lying, Bernhard-type play-acting, Andersen-type story-telling, and Wildeian irony is each a case in which U breaks the rule, or flouts the expectation, either overtly or covertly. But each of these four cases is a secondary use, i.e. a use to which an expression cannot logically or conceptually be put unless, as Hart would have it, it has a primary use. There is no limit to the possible uses to which an expression may be put. In many cases a man makes his point by deliberately using an expression in a queer way or even using it in the ‘sense’ opposite to its unique normal one, as in irony (“He is a fine friend,” implying that he is a scoundrel). The distinction between a primary and a secondary use is important because many an argument used by a philosopher consists in pointing out some typical example of the way in which some expression E is used. Such an argument is always illegitimate if the example employed is an example of a secondary use, however common such a use may be. U contextually implies that he has what he himself believes to be good reasons for his statement. Once again, we often break this rule and we have special devices for indicating when we are breaking it. Phrases such as ‘speaking offhand …,’ 'I do not really know but …,’ and ‘I should be inclined to say that …,’ are used by scrupulous persons to warn his addressee that U has not got what seem to him good reasons for his statement. But unless one of these guarding phrases is used we are entitled to believe that U believes himself to have good reasons for his statement and we soon learn to *mistrust* people who habitually infringe this rule. It is, of course, a mistake to infer from what someone says categorically that he has in fact good reasons for what he says. If I tell you, or ‘inform’ to you, that the duck-billed platypus is a bird (because I ' remember ' reading this in a book) I am unreliable; but I am not using language improperly. But if I tell you this without using one of the guarding phrases and without having what I think good reasons, I am. What U says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his addressee. This is the most important of the three rules; unfortunately it is also the most frequently broken. Bores are more common than liars or careless talkers. This rule is particularly obvious in the case of answers to questions, since it is assumed that the answer is an answer. Not all statements are answers to questions; information may be volunteered. Nevertheless the publication of a text-book on trigonometry implies that the author believes that there are people who want to learn about trigonometry, and to give advice implies a belief that the advice is relevant to one’s addressee's problem. This rule is of the greatest importance for ethics. For the major problem of ethics is that of bridging the gap between a decisions, an ought-sentence, an injunction, and a sentence used to give advice on the one hand and the statements of *fact*, sometime regarding the U’s soul, that constitute the reasons for these on the other. It is in order to bridge these gaps that insight into necessary synthetic connexions is invoked. This rule of contextual implication may help us to show that there is no gap to be bridged because the reason-giving sentence must turn out to be also *practical* from the start and not a statement of *fact*, even concerning the state of the U’s soul, from which a practical sentence can somehow be deduced. This rule is, therefore, more than a rule of good manners; or rather it shows how, in matters of ordinary language, rules of good manners shade into logical rules. Unless we assume that it is being observed we cannot understand the connexions between decisions, advice, and appraisals and the reasons given in support of them. Refs.: The main reference is in the first set of ‘Logic and conversation.’ Many keywords are useful, not just ‘candour,’ but notably ‘trust.’ (“Rationality and trust,” c. 9-f. 5, “Trust, metaphysics, and value,” c. 9-f. 20, and “Aristotle and friendship, rationality, trust, and decency,” c. 6-f. 18), BANC.

desideratum of conversational clarity. There is some overlap here with Grice’s category of conversational manner – of Grice’s maxim of conversational perspicuity [sic] – and at least one of the maxims proper, ‘obscuirty avoidance,’ or maxim of conversational obscurity avoidance. But at Oxford he defined the philosopher as the one whose profession it is to makes clear things obscure. The word desideratum has to be taken seriously. It involves freedom. In what way is “The pillar box seems red to me” less perspicuous than “The pillar box is red”? In all! If mutual expectation not to mislead and produce the stronger contribution are characteristics of candour, expectation of mutual relevance to interests, and being explicit and clear in your point are two characteristics of this desideratum. “Candour” and “clarity’ are somewhat co-relative for Grice. He is interested in identifying this or that desideratum. By having two of them, he can play. So, how UNCLEAR can a conversationalist be provided he WANTS to be candid? Candour trumps clarity. But too much ‘unperspicuity’ may lead to something not being deemed an ‘implicaturum’ at all. Grice is especially concerned with philosopher’s paradoxes. Why would Strawson say that the usage of ‘not,’ ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘if,’ ‘if and only if,’ ‘all,’ ‘some (at least one), ‘the,’ do not correspond to the logician’s use? Questions of candour and clarity interact. Grice’s first application, which he grants is not original, relates to “The pillar box seems red” versus “The pillar box is red.” “I would not like to give the false impression that the pillar box is not red” seems less clear than “The pillar box is red” – Yet the unperspicuous contributin is still ‘candid,’ in the sense that it expresses a truth. So one has to be careful. On top, philosophers like Lewis were using ‘clarity is not enough’ as a battle cry! Grice’s favourite formulations of the imperatives here are ‘self-contradictory,’ and for which he uses ‘[sic]’, notably: “Be perspicuous [sic]’ and “Be brief. Avoid unnecessary prolixity [sic].’ Desirabile, neuter, out of ‘desideratum’ – so by using ‘desirability,’ Grice is getting into the modals -- desirability: Correlative: credibility. For Grice, credibility reduces to desirability (He suggests that the reverse may also be possible but does not give a proposal). This Grice calls the Jeffrey operator. If Urmson likes ‘probably,’ Grice likes ‘desirably.’ This theorem is a corollary of the desirability axiom by Jeffrey, which is: "If prob XY = 0, for a prima facie PF(A V B) A (x E w)] = PFA A (x E w)] + PfB A (x El+ w)]. This is the account by Grice of the adaptability of a pirot to its changeable environs. Grice borrows the notion of probability (henceforth, “pr”) from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the notion. Grice abbreviates probability by Pr. and compares it to a buletic operator ‘pf,’ ‘for prima facie,’ attached to ‘De’ for desirability. A rational agent must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his action. For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial. Grice symbolises this by d: probability in degree d; probability in degree d. The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction (Pology.): life as continued operancy. Grice was fascinated with life (Aristotle, bios) because bios is what provides for Aristotle the definition (not by genus) of psyche. The steps are as follows. Pf(p ⊃!q)/Pr(p ⊃ q); pf((p1 ^ p2) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^ p2 ⊃q); pf((p1 ^ p2 ^ p3) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^ p2 ^ p3 ^ p4 ⊃q); pf (all things before me ⊃!q)/pr (all things before me ⊃ q); pf (all things considered ⊃ !q)/pr(all things considered ⊃ q); !q/|- q; G wills !q/G judges q. Strictly, Grice avoids using the noun probability (other than for the title of this or that lecture). One has to use the sentence-modifier ‘probably,’ and ‘desirably.’ So the specific correlative to the buletic prima facie ‘desirably’ is the doxastic ‘probably.’ Grice liked the Roman sound to ‘prima facie,’ ‘at first sight’: “exceptio, quae prima facie justa videatur.” Refs.: The two main sources are “Probability, desirability, and mood operators,” c. 2-f. 11, and “Modality, desirability and probability,” c. 8-ff. 14-15. But most of the material is collected in “Aspects,” especially in the third and fourth lectures. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

Non-detachability. A rather abstract notion. One thinks of ‘detach’ in physical terms (‘semi-detached house’). Grice means it in an abstract way. To detach – what is it that we detach? We detach an implicaturum. Grice is not so much concerned with how to DETACH an implicaturum, but how sometimes you cannot. It’s NON-detachability that is the criterion. And this should be a matter of a prioricity. However, since style gets in the picture, he has to allow for exceptions to this criterion. A conversational, even philosophically interesting one, generated by the conversational category of modus (as the maxim of orderliness: “he went to bed and took off his boots”) is detachable. How to interpret this in an one-off predicament. Cf. non-detachability. And the other features or tests or catalysts that Grice uses. In Causal Theory of Perception, the ideas are FOUR, which he nicely summarises in WoW on the occasion of eliminating the excursus. And then he expands on Essay II, as an update. His tutees at Oxford are aware of the changes. Few care, though. Even his colleagues don’t, they are into their own things. So let’s compare the two versions of the catalysts in Causal and Essay II. Version of the four catalysts up to the first two examples in “Causal”: The first cxample is a stock case of what is sometimes called " prcsupposition " and it is often held that here 1he truth of what is irnplicd is a necessary condition of the original statement's beirrg cither true or false. This might be disputed, but it is at lcast arguable that it is so, and its being arguable might be enough to distinguish-this type of case from others. I shall however for convenience assume that the common view mentioned is correct. This consideration clearly distinguishes (1) from (2); even if the implied proposition were false, i.e. if there were no reason in the world to contrast poverty with honesty either in general or in her case, the original statement could still be false; it would be false if for example she were rich and dishonest. One might perhaps be less comfortable about assenting to its truth if the implied contrast did not in fact obtain; but the possibility of falsity is enough for the immediate purpose. My next experiment on these examples is to ask what it is in each case which could properly be said to be the vehicle of implication (to do the implying). There are at least four candidates, not necessarily mutually exclusive. Supposing someone to have uttered one or other of my sample sentences, we may ask whether the vehicle of implication would be (a) what the speaker said (or asserted), or (b) the speaker (" did he imply that . . . .':) or (c) the words the speaker used, or (d) his saying that (or again his saying that in that way); or possibly some plurality of these items. As regards (a) I think (1) and (2) differ; I think it would be correct to say in the case of (l) that what he speaker said (or asserted) implied that Smith had been beating this wife, and incorrect to say in the case of (2) that what te said (or asserted) implied that there was a contrast between e.g., honesty and poverty. A test on which I would rely is the following : if accepting that the implication holds involves one in r27 128 H. P. GRICE accepting an hypothetical' if p then q ' where 'p ' represents the original statement and ' q' represents what is implied, then what the speaker said (or asserted) is a vehicle of implication, otherwise not. To apply this rule to the given examples, if I accepted the implication alleged to hold in the case of (1), I should feel compelled to accept the hypothetical " If Smith has left off beating his wife, then he has been beating her "; whereas if I accepted the alleged implication in the case of (2), I should not feel compelled to accept the hypothetical " If she was poor but honest, then there is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty." The other candidates can be dealt with more cursorily; I should be inclined to say with regard to both (l) and (2) that the speaker could be said to have implied whatever it is that is irnplied; that in the case of (2) it seems fairly clear that the speaker's words could be said to imply a contrast, whereas it is much less clear whether in the case of (1) the speaker's words could be said to imply that Smith had been beating his wife; and that in neither case would it be evidently appropriate to speak of his saying that, or of his saying that in that way, as implying what is implied. The third idea with which I wish to assail my two examples is really a twin idea, that of the detachability or cancellability of the implication. (These terms will be explained.) Consider example (1): one cannot fi.nd a form of words which could be used to state or assert just what the sentence " Smith has left off beating his wife " might be used to assert such that when it is used the implication that Smith has been beating his wife is just absent. Any way of asserting what is asserted in (1) involves the irnplication in question. I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (l) the implication is not detqchable from what is asserted (or simpliciter, is not detachable). Furthermore, one cannot take a form of words for which both what is asserted and what is implied is the same as for (l), and then add a further clause withholding commitment from what would otherwise be implied, with the idea of annulling the implication without annulling the assertion. One cannot intelligibly say " Smith has left off beating his wife but I do not mean to imply that he has been beating her." I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (1) the implication is not cancellable (without THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION r29 cancelling the assertion). If we turn to (2) we find, I think, that there is quite a strong case for saying that here the implication ls detachable. Thcrc sccms quitc a good case for maintaining that if, instead of sayirrg " She is poor but shc is honcst " I were to say " She is poor and slre is honcst", I would assert just what I would havc asscrtcct ii I had used thc original senterrce; but there would now be no irnplication of a contrast between e.g', povery and honesty. But the question whether, in tl-re case of (2), thc inrplication is cancellable, is slightly more cornplex. Thcrc is a sonse in which we may say that it is non-cancellable; if sorncone were to say " She is poor but she is honest, though of course I do not mean to imply that there is any contrast between poverty and honesty ", this would seem a puzzling and eccentric thing to have said; but though we should wish to quarrel with the speaker, I do not think we should go so far as to say that his utterance was unintelligible; we should suppose that he had adopted a most peculiar way of conveying the the news that she was poor and honesl. The fourth and last test that I wish to impose on my exarnples is to ask whether we would be inclined to regard the fact that the appropriate implication is present as being a matter of the meaning of some particular word or phrase occurring in the sentences in question. I am aware that this may not be always a very clear or easy question to answer; nevertheless Iwill risk the assertion that we would be fairly happy to say that, as regards (2), the factthat the implication obtains is a matter of the meaning of the word ' but '; whereas so far as (l) is concerned we should have at least some inclination to say that the presence of the implication was a matter of the meaning of some of the words in the sentence, but we should be in some difficulty when it came to specifying precisely which this word, or words are, of which this is true. After third example introduced:It is plain that there is no case at all for regarding the truth of what is implied here as a pre-condition of the truth or falsity cf 130 H. P. GRICB what I have asserted; a denial of the truth of what is implied would have no bearing at all on whether what I have asserted is true or false. So (3) is much closer to (2) than (1) in this respect. Next, I (the speaker) could certainly be said to have implied that Jones is hopeless (provided that this is what I intended to get across) and my saying that (at any rate my saying /s/ that and no more) is also certainly a vehicle of implication. On the other hand my words and what I say (assert) are, I think, not here vehicles of implication. (3) thus differs from both (1) and (2). The implication is cancellable but not detachable; if I add o'I do not of course mean to imply that he is no good at philosophy " my whole utterance is intelligible and linguistically impeccable, even though it may be extraordinary tutorial behaviour; and I can no longer be said to have implied that he was no good, even though perhaps that is what my colleagues might conclude to be the case if I had nothing else to say. The implication is not however, detachable; any other way of making, in the same context of utterance, just the assertion I have made would involve the same implication. Finally, the fact that the implication holds is not a matter of any particular word or phrase within the sentence which I have uttered; so in this respect (3) is certainly different from (2) and, possibly different from (1). One obvious fact should be mentioned before I pass to the last example. This case of implication is unlike the others in that the utterance of the sentence " Jones has beautiful handwriting etc." does not standardly involve the implication here attributed to it; it requires a special context (that it should be uttered at Collections) to attach the implication to its uttgrance. After fourth and last example is introduced: in the case of (a) I can produce a strong argument in favour of holding that the fulfllment of the THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION implication of the speaker's ignorance is not a precaution of the truth or falsity of the disjunctive statement. Suppose (c) that the speaker knows that his wife is in the kitchen, (b) that the house has only two rooms (and no passages etc.) Even though (a) is the casc, thc spcaker can certainly say truly " My wife is in the housc "; he is merely not being as informative as he could bc if nccd arose. But the true proposition that his wife is in thc housc together with the true proposition that the house consists entirely of a kitchen and a bedroom, entail the proposition that his wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom. But il to cxpress the proposition p in certain circumstances would bc to spcak truly, and p, togelher with another true proposition, crrtails q, then surely to express 4 in the same circvmstances must be to speak truly. So I shall take it that the disjunctive statement in (4) does not fail to be true or false if the implied ignorance is in fact not realized. Secondly, I think it is fairly clear that in this case, as in the case of (3), we could say that the speaker had irnplied that he did not know, and also that his saying that (or his saying that rather than something else, v2., in which room she was) implied that he did not know. Thirdly, the irnplication is in a sense non-detachable, in that if in a given context the utterance of the disjunctive sentence would involve the implication that the speaker did not know in which room his his wife was, this implication would also be involved in the utterance of any other form of words which would make the same assertion(e.g., "The alternatives are (1) .(2) " or " One of the following things is the case: (a) (r) "). ln another possible sense, however, the implication could perhaps bc said to be detachable: for there will be some contexls of ruttcrance in Which the normal implication will not hold; e.g., thc spokesman who announces, " The next conference will be cither in Geneva or in New York " perhaps does not imply that lrc does not know which; for he may well be just not saying which. This points to the fact that the implication is cancellablg; :r nrarl could say, " My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bctlroorn " in circumstances in which the implication would rrornrally be present, and then go on, " Mind you, I'm not saying tlrrrt I don't know which"; this might be unfriendly (and grcr'lrrps ungrammatical) but would be perfectly intelligible, I2 131 132 H. P. GRICB Finally, the fact that the utterance of the disjunctive sentence normally involves the implication of the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts is, I should like to say, to be explained by reference to a general principle governing the use of language. Exactly what this principle is I am uncertain, but L first sftol would be the following: "One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing." This is certainly not an adequate formulation but will perhaps be good enough for my present purpose. On the assumption that such a principle as this is of general application, one can draw the conclusion that the utterance of a disjunctive sentence would imply the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts, given that (a) the obvious reason for not making a statemcnt which there is some call on one to make is that one is not in a position to make it, and given (6) the logical fact that each disjunct entails the disjunctive, but not vice versa; which being so, the disjuncts are stronger than the disjunctive. lf the outline just given js on the right lines, then I would wish to say, we have a reason for refusing in the case of (4) to regard the implication of the speaker's ignorance as being part of the meaning of the word'or'; someone who knows about the logical relation between a disjunction and its disjuncts, and who also knew about the alleged general principle governing discourse, could work out for hirnself that disjunctive utterances would involve the implication which they do in fact involve. I must insist, however, that my aim in discussing this last point has been merelyto indicate the position I would wish to take up, and not to argue scriously in favour of it. My main purpose in this sub-section has been to introduce four ideas of which l intend to make some use; and to provide some conception of tlre ways in which they apply or fail to apply to various types of implication. By the numbering of it, it seems he has added an extra. It’s FIVE catalysts now. He’ll go back to them in Essay IV, and in Presupposition and Conversational Impicature. He needs those catalysts. Why? It seems like he is always thinking that someone will challenge him! This is Grice: “We can now show that, it having been stipulated as being what it is, a conversational implicaturum must possess certain features. Or rather here are some catalyst ideas which will help us to determine or individuate. Four tests for implicaturum as it were. First, CANCELLABILITY – as noted in “Causal Theory” – for two of the examples (‘beautiful handwriting’ and ‘kitchen or bedroom’ and NEGATIVE version of “You don’t cease to eat iron”) and the one of the pillar box -- Since, to assume the presence of a conversational implicum, we have to assume that the principle of conversational co-operation is being observed, and since it is possible to opt out of the observation of this principle, it follows that an implicaturum can be canceled in a particular case. It may be explicitly canceled, if need there be, by the addition of a clause by which the utterer states or implies that he has opted out (e. g. “The pillar box seems red but it is.”). Then again it may be contextually (or implicitly) canceled (e. g. to a very honest person, who knows I disbelieve the examiner exists, “The loyalty examiner won’t be summoning you at any rate”). The utterance that usually would carry an implicaturum is used on an occasion that makes it clear or obvious that the utterer IS opting out without having to bore his addressee by making this obviousness explicit. There is a second litmus test or catalyst idea. nsofar as the calculation that a implicaturum is present requires, besides contextual and background information only a knowledge or understanding or processing of what has been said or explicitly conveyed (‘are you playing squash? B shows bandaged leg) (or the ‘conventional’ ‘commitment’ of the utterance), and insofar as the manner or style, of FORM, rather than MATTER, of expression plays no role in the calculation, it will NOT be possible to find another way of explicitly conveying or putting forward the same thing, the same so-and-so (say that q follows from p) which simply ‘lacks’ the unnecessary implicaturum in question -- except [will his excluders never end?] where some special feature of the substituted version [this other way which he says is not conceivable] is itself relevant to the determination of the implicaturum (in virtue of this or that conversational maxims pertaining to the category of conversational mode. If we call this feature, as Grice does in “Causal Theory,” ‘non-detachability’ – in that the implicaturum cannot be detached from any alternative expression that makes the same point -- one may expect the implicaturum carried by this or that locution to have a high degree of non-detachability. ALTERNATIVES FOR “NOT” Not, it is not the case, it is false that. There’s nothing unique about ‘not’.ALTERNATIVES FOR “AND” and, nothing, furthermore, but. There isnothing unique about ‘and’ALTERNATIVES FOR “OR”: One of the following is true. There is nothing unique about ‘or’ALTERNATIVES FOR “IF” Provided. ‘There is nothing unique about ‘if’ALTERNATIVES FOR “THE” – There is at least one and at most one. And it exists. (existence and uniqueness). There is nothing unique about ‘the’.THIS COVERS STRAWSON’S first problem.What about the other English philosophers?AUSTIN – on ‘voluntarily’ ALTERNATIVES to ‘voluntarily,’ with the will, willingly, intentionally. Nothing unique about ‘voluntarily.’STRAWSON on ‘true’ – it is the case, redundance theory, nothing. Nothing unique about ‘true’HART ON good. To say that ‘x is commendable’ is to recommend x. Nothing unique about ‘good.’HART on ‘carefully.’ Da Vinci painted Mona Lisa carefully, with caution, with precaution. Nothing unique about ‘carefully.’THIRD LITMUS TEST or idea. To speak approximately, since the calculation of the presence of an implicaturum presupposes an initial knowledge, or grasping, or understanding, or taking into account of the ‘conventional’ force (not in Austin’s sense, but translating Latin ‘vis’) of the expression the utterance of which carries the implicaturum, a conversational implicaturum will be a condition that is NOT, be definition, on risk of circularity of otiosity, included in the original specification of the expression's conventional force. If I’m saying that ‘seems’ INVOLVES, as per conventional force, ‘doubt or denial,’what’s my point? If Strawson is right that ‘if’ has the conventional force of conventionally committing the utterer with the belief that q follows from p, why bother? And if that were so, how come the implicaturum is still cancellable?Though it may not be impossible for what starts life, so to speak, as a conversational implicaturum to become conventionalized, to suppose that this is so in a given case would require special justification. (Asking Lewis). So, initially at least, a conversational implicaturum is, by definition and stipulation, not part of the sense, truth-condition, conventional force, or part of what is explicitly conveyed or put forward, or ‘meaning’ of the expression to the employment of which the impicatum attaches. FOURTH LITMUS TEST or catalyst idea.Mentioned in “Causal theory” The alethic value – conjoined with the test about the VEHICLE --. He has these as two different tests in “Causal”. Since the truth of a conversational implicaturum is not required by (is not a condition for) the truth of what is said or explicitly conveyed (what is said or explicated – the explicatum or explcitum, or what is explicitly conveyed or communicated) may be true -- what is implicated may be false – that he has beautiful handwriting, that q follows from p, that the utterer is ENDORSING what someone else said, that the utterer is recommending x, that the person who is said to act carefully has taken precaution), the implicaturum is NOT carried by what is said or the EXPLICATUM or EXPLICITUM, or is explicitly conveyed, but only by the ‘saying’ or EXPLICATING or EXPLICITING of what is said or of the explicatum or explicitum, or by 'putting it that way.’.The fifth and last litmus test or catalyst idea. Since, to calculate a conversational implicaturum is to calculate what has to be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the utterer is a rational, benevolent, altruist agent, and that the principle of conversational cooperation is being observed, and since there may be various possible specific explanations or alternatives that fill the gap here – as to what is the content of the psychological attitude to be ascribed to the utterer, a list of which may be open, or open-ended, the conversational implicaturum in such cases will technically be an open-ended disjunction of all such specific explanations, which may well be infinitely non-numerable. Since the list of these IS open, the implicaturum will have just the kind of INDETERMINACY or lack of determinacy that an implicaturum appears in most cases to possess.

determinatum: determinable, a general characteristic or property analogous to a genus except that while a property independent of a genus differentiates a species that falls under the genus, no such independent property differentiates a determinate that falls under the determinable. The color blue, e.g., is a determinate with respect of the determinable color: there is no property F independent of color such that a color is blue if and only if it is F. In contrast, there is a property, having equal sides, such that a rectangle is a square if and only if it has this property. Square is a properly differentiated species of the genus rectangle. W. E. Johnson introduces the terms ‘determinate’ and ‘determinable’ in his Logic, Part I, Chapter 11. His account of this distinction does not closely resemble the current understanding sketched above. Johnson wants to explain the differences between the superficially similar ‘Red is a color’ and ‘Plato is a man’. He concludes that the latter really predicates something, humanity, of Plato; while the former does not really predicate anything of red. Color is not really a property or adjective, as Johnson puts it. The determinates red, blue, and yellow are grouped together not because of a property they have in common but because of the ways they differ from each other. Determinates under the same determinable are related to each other and are thus comparable in ways in which they are not related to determinates under other determinables. Determinates belonging to different determinables, such as color and shape, are incomparable. ’More determinate’ is often used interchangeably with ‘more specific’. Many philosophers, including Johnson, hold that the characters of things are absolutely determinate or specific. Spelling out what this claim means leads to another problem in analyzing the relation between determinate and determinable. By what principle can we exclude red and round as a determinate of red and red as a determinate of red or round? determinism, the view that every event or state of affairs is brought about by antecedent events or states of affairs in accordance with universal causal laws that govern the world. Thus, the state of the world at any instant determines a unique future, and that knowledge of all the positions of things and the prevailing natural forces would permit an intelligence to predict the future state of the world with absolute precision. This view was advanced by Laplace in the early nineteenth century; he was inspired by Newton’s success at integrating our physical knowledge of the world. Contemporary determinists do not believe that Newtonian physics is the supreme theory. Some do not even believe that all theories will someday be integrated into a unified theory. They do believe that, for each event, no matter how precisely described, there is some theory or system of laws such that the occurrence of that event under that description is derivable from those laws together with information about the prior state of the system. Some determinists formulate the doctrine somewhat differently: a every event has a sufficient cause; b at any given time, given the past, only one future is possible; c given knowledge of all antecedent conditions and all laws of nature, an agent could predict at any given time the precise subsequent history of the universe. Thus, determinists deny the existence of chance, although they concede that our ignorance of the laws or all relevant antecedent conditions makes certain events unexpected and, therefore, apparently happen “by chance.” The term ‘determinism’ is also used in a more general way as the name for any metaphysical doctrine implying that there is only one possible history of the world. The doctrine described above is really scientific or causal determinism, for it grounds this implication on a general fact about the natural order, namely, its governance by universal causal law. But there is also theological determinism, which holds that God determines everything that happens or that, since God has perfect knowledge about the universe, only the course of events that he knows will happen can happen. And there is logical determinism, which grounds the necessity of the historical order on the logical truth that all propositions, including ones about the future, are either true or false. Fatalism, the view that there are forces e.g., the stars or the fates that determine all outcomes independently of human efforts or wishes, is claimed by some to be a version of determinism. But others deny this on the ground that determinists do not reject the efficacy of human effort or desire; they simply believe that efforts and desires, which are sometimes effective, are themselves determined by antecedent factors as in a causal chain of events. Since determinism is a universal doctrine, it embraces human actions and choices. But if actions and choices are determined, then some conclude that free will is an illusion. For the action or choice is an inevitable product of antecedent factors that rendered alternatives impossible, even if the agent had deliberated about options. An omniscient agent could have predicted the action or choice beforehand. This conflict generates the problem of free will and determinism.

deutero-esperanto: Also Gricese – Pirotese. “Gricese” is best. Arbitrariness need not be a two-party thing. E communicates to himself that there is danger by drawing a skull. Grice genially opposed to the idea of a convention. He hated a convention. A language is not conventional. Meaning is not conventional. Communication is not conventional. He was even unhappy with the account of convention by Lewis in terms of an arbitrary co-ordination. While the co-ordination bit passes rational muster, the arbitrary element is deemed a necessary condition, and Grice hated that. For Grice there is natural, and iconic. When a representation ceases to be iconic and becomes, for lack of a better expression, non-iconic, things get, we may assume conventional. One form of correlation in his last definition of meaing allows for a conventional correlation. “Pain!,” the P cries. There is nothing in /pein/ that minimally resembles the pain the P is suffering. So from his involuntary “Ouch” to his simulated “Ouch,” he thinks he can say “Pain.” Bennett explored the stages after that. The dog is shaggy is Grices example. All sorts of resultant procedures are needed for reference and predication, which may be deemed conventional. One may refer nonconventionally, by ostension. It seems more difficult to predicate non-conventionally. But there may be iconic predication. Urquhart promises twelve parts of speech: each declinable in eleven cases, four numbers, eleven genders (including god, goddess, man, woman, animal, etc.); and conjugable in eleven tenses, seven moods, and four voices. The language will translate any idiom in any other language, without any alteration of the literal sense, but fully representing the intention. Later, one day, while lying in his bath, Grice designed deutero-esperanto. The obble is fang may be current only for Griceian members of the class of utterers. It is only this or that philosophers practice to utter The obble is fang in such-and-such circumstances. In this case, the utterer U does have a readiness to utter The obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances. There is also the scenario in which The obble is fang is may be conceived by the philosopher not to be deemed current at all, but the utterance of The obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances is part of some system of communication which the utterer U (Lockwith,, Urquart, Wilkins, Edmonds, Grice) has devised but which has never been put into operation, like the highway code which Grice invent another day again while lying in his bath. In that case, U does this or that basic or resultant procedure for the obble is feng in an attenuated but philosophically legitimate fashion. U has envisaged a possible system of practices which involve a readiness to utter Example by Grice that does NOT involve a convention in this usage. Surely Grice can as he indeed did, invent a language, call it Deutero-Esperanto, Griceish, or Pirotese, which nobody at Oxford ever uses to communicat. That makes Grice the authority - cf. arkhe, authority, government (in plural), "authorities" - and Grice can lay down, while lying in the tub, no doubt - what is proper. A P can be said to potch of some obble o as fang or as feng. Also to cotch of some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o as being fid to one another.” In symbols: (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ potch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ potch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Ox ^ cotch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oz ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, fid(y,z)). Let’s say that Ps (as Russell and Carnap conceived them) inhabit a world of obbles, material objects, or things. To potch is something like to perceive; to cotch something like to think. Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives. Fid is a possible relation between obbles. Grice provides a symbolisation for content internalisation. The perceiver or cognitive Subjects perceives or cognises two objects, x, y, as holding a relation of some type. There is a higher level that Ps can reach when the object of their potchings and cotchings is not so much objects but states of affairs. Its then that the truth-functional operators will be brought to existence “^”: cotch(p ^ q) “V”: cotch(p v q) “)”: )-cotch(p ) q) A P will be able to reject a content, refuse-thinking: ~. Cotch(~p). When P1 perceives P2, the reciprocals get more complicated. P2 cotches that P1!-judges that p. Grice uses ψ1 for potching and ψ2 for cotching. If P2 is co-operative, and abides by "The Ps Immanuel," P2 will honour, in a Kantian benevolent way, his partners goal by adopting temporarily his partners goal potch(x (portch(y, !p)) ⊃ potch(x, !p). But by then, its hardly simpler ways. Especially when the Ps outdo their progenitor Carnap as metaphysicians. The details are under “eschatology,” but the expressions are here “α izzes α.” This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. P1 applies it war, and utters War is war which yields a most peculiar implicaturum. “if α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ, α izz γ.” This is transitivity, which is crucial for Ps to overcome Berkeley’s counterexample to Locke, and define their identity over time. “if α hazzes β, α izzes β.” Or, what is accidental is not essential. A P may allow that what is essential is accidental while misleading, is boringly true. “α hazzes β iff α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β.” “If β is a katholou or universalium, β is an eidos or forma.” For surely Ps need not be stupid to fail to see squarrelhood. “if α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular, γ≠α ∧ α izz β.” “α izzes predicable of β iff ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). “α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). α = β iff α izzes β ∧ β izzes α. “α izzes an atomon, or individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β). “α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)). α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α). α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum. α izzes an eidos or forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium); α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). “ α izzes essentially predicable of α α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β. ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β. α izzes an kathekaston or particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum; α izz a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α). ~(∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma) ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α). x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izzes β); α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazzes α); α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazzes A); (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α). (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing). (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing). α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α). (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. Grice is following a Leibnizian tradition. A philosophical language is any constructed language that is constructed from first principles or certain ideologies. It is considered a type of engineered language. Philosophical languages were popular in Early Modern times, partly motivated by the goal of recovering the lost Adamic or Divine language. The term “ideal language” is sometimes used near-synonymously, though more modern philosophical languages such as “Toki Pona” are less likely to involve such an exalted claim of perfection. It may be known as a language of pure ideology. The axioms and grammars of the languages together differ from commonly spoken languages today. In most older philosophical languages, and some newer ones, words are constructed from a limited set of morphemes that are treated as "elemental" or fundamental. "Philosophical language" is sometimes used synonymously with "taxonomic language", though more recently there have been several conlangs constructed on philosophical principles which are not taxonomic. Vocabularies of oligo-synthetic communication-systems are made of compound expressions, which are coined from a small (theoretically minimal) set of morphemes; oligo-isolating communication-systems, such as Toki Pona, similarly use a limited set of root words but produce phrases which remain s. of distinct words. Toki Pona is based on minimalistic simplicity, incorporating elements of Taoism. Láadan is designed to lexicalize and grammaticalise the concepts and distinctions important to women, based on muted group theory. A priori languages are constructed languages where the vocabulary is invented directly, rather than being derived from other existing languages (as with Esperanto, or Grices Deutero-Esperanto, or Pirotese or Ido). It all starts when Carnap claims to know that pritos karulise elatically. Grice as engineer. Pirotese is the philosophers engaging in Pology. Actually, Pirotese is the lingo the Ps parrot. Ps karulise elatically. But not all of them. Grice finds that the Pological talk allows to start from zero. He is constructing a language, (basic) Pirotese, and the philosophical psychology and world that that language is supposed to represent or denote. An obble is a Ps object. Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch, in Pirotese, is what a P does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is Pirotese for what a P can further do with an obble: know or cognise it. Cotching, unlike potching, is factive. Pirotese would not be the first language invented by a philosopher. Deutero-Esperanto -- Couturat, L., philosopher and logician who wrote on the history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of mathematics, and the possibility of a universal language. Couturat refuted Renouvier’s finitism and advocated an actual infinite in The Mathematical Infinite 6. He argued that the assumption of infinite numbers was indispensable to maintain the continuity of magnitudes. He saw a precursor of modern logistic in Leibniz, basing his interpretation of Leibniz on the Discourse on Metaphysics and Leibniz’s correspondence with Arnauld. His epoch-making Leibniz’s Logic 1 describes Leibniz’s metaphysics as panlogism. Couturat published a study on Kant’s mathematical philosophy Revue de Métaphysique, 4, and defended Peano’s logic, Whitehead’s algebra, and Russell’s logistic in The Algebra of Logic 5. He also contributed to André Lalande’s Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie 6. Refs.: While the reference to “Deutero-Esperanto’ comes from “Meaning revisited,” other keywords are useful, notably “Pirotese” and “Symbolo.” Also keywords like “obble,” and “pirot.” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

diagoge: Grice makes a triad here: apagoge, diagoge, and epagoge. Cf. Grice’s emphasis on the ‘argument’ involved in the conversational implciatum, though. To work out an impilcatum is to reach it ‘by argument.’ No argument, no conversational implicaturum. But cf. argument in Emissor draws skull and communicates that there is danger. ARGUMENT involved in that Emissor intends his addressee WILL REASON. Can the lady communicate to the pigeons that she is selling ‘twopence a bag’ for their pleasure? Grice contrasted epagoge with diagoge. Cooperation with competition. Cooperative game with competitive game. But epagoge is induction, so here we’ll consider his views on probability and how it contrastds with diagoge. The diagoge is easy to identity: Grice is a social animal, with the BA, Philosophy, conferences, discussion, The American Philosophical Association, transcripts by Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes contained in c. 10 within the same s. IV miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts and audio-cassettes, s. IV, c. 6-f. 8, and f. 10, and s. V, c. 8-f. 4-8 Unfortunately, Parker typed carulise for karulise, or not. Re: probability, Grice loves to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mills principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play, Grice would speak of not bringing more Grice to your Mill. Mills System of Logic was part of the reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his Life and opinions he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was interested in Kneales secondary induction, since Grice saw this as an application of a construction routine. He was also interested in Keyness notion of a generator property, which he found metaphysically intriguing. Induction. Induction ‒ Mill’s Induction, induction, deduction, abduction, Mill. More Grice to the Mill. Grice loved Hardies playing with Mill’s method of difference with an Oxford copper. He also quotes Kneale and Keynes on induction. Note that his seven-step derivation of akrasia relies on an inductive step! Grice was fortunate to associate with Davidson, whose initial work is on porbability. Grice borrows from Davidson the idea that inductive probability, or probable, attaches to the doxastic, while prima facie attaches to desirably, or desirability. Jeffreys notion of desirability is partition-invariant in that if a proposition, A, can be expressed as the disjoint disjunction of both {B1, B2, B3} and {C1, C2, C3}, ∑ Bi ∈ AProb (Bi ∣∣ A). Des (Bi) = ∑Ci ∈ A Prob (Ci ∣∣ A). Des (Ci). It follows that applying the rule of desirability maximization will always lead to the same recommendation, irrespective of how the decision problem is framed, while an alternative theory may recommend different courses of action, depending on how the decision problem is formulated. Here, then, is the analogue of Jeffreys desirability axiom (D), applied to sentences rather than propositions: (D) (prob(s and t) = 0 and prob(s or t) "# 0, ⊃ d ( ) prob(s)des(s)+ prob(t)des(t) es s or t =-"---- prob( s) + prob(t ) (Grice writes prob(s) for the Subjectsive probability of sand des(s) for the desirability or utility of s.) B. Jeffrey admits that "desirability" (his terms for evidential value) does not directly correspond to any single pre-theoretical notion of desire. Instead, it provides the best systematic explication of the decision theoretic idea, which is itself our best effort to make precise the intuitive idea of weighing options. As Jeffrey remarks, it is entirely possibly to desire someone’s love when you already have it. Therefore, as Grice would follow, Jeffrey has the desirability operator fall under the scope of the probability operator. The agents desire that p provided he judges that p does not obtain. Diagoge/epagoge, Grices audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various lectures and conferences, some seminars with Warner and J. Baker, audio files of various lectures and conferences. Subjects: epagoge, diagoge. A previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts. These are the audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folder. The kind of metaphysical argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to exemplify a dia-gogic or trans-ductive as opposed to epa-gogic or in-ductive approach to philosophical argumentation. Hence Short and Lewis have, for ‘diagoge,’ the cognates of ‘trādūco,’ f. transduco. Now, the more emphasis is placed on justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to refutation, whether of theses or of people. And perhaps a greater emphasis on a diagogic procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable, would have an eirenic effect. Cf. Aristotle on diagoge, schole, otium. Liddell and Scott have “διαγωγή,” which they render as “literally carrying across,” -- “τριήρων” Polyaen.5.2.6, also as “carrying through,” and “hence fig.” “ἡ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν δ., “taking a person through a subject by instruction, Pl. Ep.343; so, course of instruction, lectures, ἐν τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ δ. prob. in Phld. Piet.25; also passing of life, way or course of life, “δ. βίου” Pl. R.344e: abs., Id. Tht.177a, etc., way of passing time, amusement, “δ. μετὰ παιδιᾶς” Arist. EN 1127b34, cf. 1177a27; “δ. ἐλευθέριος” Id. Pol.1339b5; διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν public pastimes, ib.1280b37, cf. Plu.126b (pl.). also delay, D.C. 57.3. management, τῶν πραγμάτων δ. dispatch of business, Id.48.5. IV. station for ships, f. l. in Hdn.4.2.8. And there are other entries to consider: διαγωγάν: διαίρεσιν, διανομήν, διέλευσιν. Grice knew what he was talking about! Refs.: The main sources listed under ‘desirability,’ above. There is a specific essay on ‘probability and life.’ Good keywords, too, are epagoge and induction The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

dialogos – the ‘dia’ means ‘trans-‘, not ‘two.’ Deuterologos δευτερο-λόγος , ὁ, A.second speaker (though, not really conversationalist – cf. conversari) Teles p.5 H. -- is the exact opposite of monologos, cf. Aeschylus when he called on an Athenian to play the second ‘fighter’ “deuteron-agonistes.” -- dialogical implicaturum – Grice seldom uses ‘dialogue.’ It’s always conversational with him. He must have thought that ‘dialogue’ was too Buberian. In Roman, ‘she had a conversation with him’ means ‘she had sex with him.’ “She had a dialogue with him” does not. Classicists are obsessed with the beginning of Greek theatre: it all started with ‘dialogue.’ It wasn’t like Aeschylus needed a partner. He wrote the parts for BOTH. Was he reconstructing naturally-occurring Athenian dialogue? Who knows! The *two*-actor rule, which was indeed preceded by a convention in which only a single actor would appear on stage, along with the chorus. It was in 471 B. C. that Aeschylus introduces a second actor, called Cleander. You see, Aeschylus always cast himself as protagonist in his own plays. For the season of 471 B. C., the Athenians were surprised when Aeschylus introduced Cleander as his deuteragonist. “I can now conversationally implicate!” he said to a cheering crowd! Dialogism -- Bakhtin: m. m., philosopher of dialogism -- and cultural theorist whose influence is pervasive in a wide range of academic disciplines from literary hermeneutics to the epistemology of the human sciences, and cultural theory. He may legitimately be called a philosophical anthropologist in the venerable Continental tradition. Because of his seminal work on Rabelais and Dostoevsky’s poetics, Baden School Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich 70 70 his influence has been greatest in literary hermeneutics. Without question dialogism, or the construal of dialogue, is the hallmark of Bakhtin’s thought. Dialogue marks the existential condition of humanity in which the self and the other are asymmetrical but double-binding. In his words, to exist means to communicate dialogically, and when the dialogue ends, everything else ends. Unlike Hegelian and Marxian dialectics but like the Chin. correlative logic of yin and yang, Bakhtin’s dialogism is infinitely polyphonic, open-ended, and indeterminate, i.e., “unfinalizable” to use his term. Dialogue means that there are neither first nor last words. The past and the future are interlocked and revolve around the axis of the present. Bakhtin’s dialogism is paradigmatic in a threefold sense. First, dialogue is never abstract but embodied. The lived body is the material condition of social existence as ongoing dialogue. Not only does the word become enfleshed, but dialogue is also the incorporation of the self and the other. Appropriately, therefore, Bakhtin’s body politics may be called a Slavic version of Tantrism. Second, the Rabelaisian carnivalesque that Bakhtin’s dialogism incorporates points to the “jesterly” politics of resistance and protest against the “priestly” establishment of officialdom. Third, the most distinguishing characteristic of Bakhtin’s dialogism is the primacy of the other over the self, with a twofold consequence: one concerns ethics and the other epistemology. In modern philosophy, the discovery of “Thou” or the primacy of the other over the self in asymmetrical reciprocity is credited to Feuerbach. It is hailed as the “Copernican revolution” of mind, ethics, and social thought. Ethically, Bakhtin’s dialogism, based on heteronomy, signals the birth of a new philosophy of responsibility that challenges and transgresses the Anglo- tradition of “rights talk.” Epistemologically, it lends our welcoming ears to the credence that the other may be right the attitude that Gadamer calls the soul of dialogical hermeneutics.

diaphaneity: Grice unique in his subtlety. Strawson and Wiggins. 'the quality of being freely pervious to light; transparency', OED. This is a crucial concept for Grice. He applies it ‘see,’ which which, after joint endeavours with G. J. Warnock, he was obsessed! Grice considers the ascription, “Warnock sees that it is raining.” And then he adds, “And it is true, I see that it is raining, too.” What’s the diference. Then comes Strawson. “Strawson, you see that it is raining, right?” So we have an ascription in the first, second, and third persons. When it comes to the identification of a sense (like vision) via experience or qualia, we are at a problem, because ‘see,’ allowing for what Ryle calls a ‘conversational avowal,’ that nobody has an authority to distrust, is what Grice calls a ‘diaphanous’ predicate. More formally. That means that “Grice sees that it is raining,” in terms of experience, cannot really be expanded except by expanding into WHAT IS that Grice sees, viz. that it is raining. The same with “communicating that p,” and “meaning that p.”

dictum: Grice was fascinated with these multiple vowel roots: dictum, deictis. Cf. dictor, and dictivenss. Not necessarily involved with ‘say,’ but with ‘deixis,’ So a dictum is involved in Emissor E drawing a skull, communicating that there is danger. It is Hare who introduced ‘dictum’ in the Oxonian philosophical literature in his T. H. Green Essay. Hare distinguishes between the ‘dictum,’ that the cat is on the mat, from the ‘dictor,’ ‘I state that the cat is on the mat, yes.’ ‘Cat, on the mat, please.’ Grice often refers to Hare’s play with words, which he obviously enjoys. In “Epilogue,” Grice elaborates on the ‘dictum,’ and turns it into ‘dictivitas.’ How does he coin that word? He starts with Cicero, who has ‘dictivm,’ and creates an abstract noun to match. Grice needs a concept of a ‘dictum’ ambiguous as it is. Grice distinguishes between what an Utterer explicitly conveys, e. g. that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Then there’s what Grice implicitly conveys, to wit: that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed – in that order. Surely Grice has STATED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Grice has ASSERTED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. But if Grice were to order Strawson: “Put on your parachute and jump!” the implicatura may differ. By uttering that utterance, Grice has not asserted or stated anything. So Grice needs a dummy that will do for indicatives and imperatives. ‘Convey’ usually does – especially in the modality ‘explicitly’ convey. Because by uttering that utterance Grice has explicitly conveyed that Strawson is to put on his parachute and jump. Grice has implicitly conveyd that Strawson is to put on his parachute and THEN jump, surely.

Griceian dignitas: a moral worth or status usually attributed to human persons. Persons are said to have dignity as well as to express it. Persons are typically thought to have 1 “human dignity” an dichotomy paradox dignity 234 234 intrinsic moral worth, a basic moral status, or both, which is had equally by all persons; and 2 a “sense of dignity” an awareness of one’s dignity inclining toward the expression of one’s dignity and the avoidance of humiliation. Persons can lack a sense of dignity without consequent loss of their human dignity. In Kant’s influential account of the equal dignity of all persons, human dignity is grounded in the capacity for practical rationality, especially the capacity for autonomous self-legislation under the categorical imperative. Kant holds that dignity contrasts with price and that there is nothing not pleasure nor communal welfare nor other good consequences for which it is morally acceptable to sacrifice human dignity. Kant’s categorical rejection of the use of persons as mere means suggests a now-common link between the possession of human dignity and human rights see, e.g., the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One now widespread discussion of dignity concerns “dying with dignity” and the right to conditions conducive thereto.

Griceian dilemma, a trilemma, tetralemma, monolemma, lemma – Grice thought that Ryle’s dilemmas were overrated. Strictly, a ‘dilemma’ is a piece of reasoning or argument or argument form in which one of the premises is a disjunction, featuring “or.” Constructive dilemmas take the form ‘If A and B, if C, D, A or C; therefore, B or D’ and are instances of modus ponendo ponens in the special case where A is C and B is D; A so-called ‘destructive’ dilemma is of the form ‘If A, B, if C, D, not-B or not-D; therefore, not-A or not-C’ and it is likewise an instance of modus tollendo tollens in that special case. A dilemma in which the disjunctive premise is false is commonly known as a “false” dilemma, which is one of Ryle’s dilemmas: “a category mistake!”

diminutive: diminished capacity: explored by Grice in his analysis of legal versus moral right -- a legal defense to criminal liability that exists in two distinct forms: 1 the mens rea variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to cast doubt on the prosecution’s assertion that, at the time of the crime, the defendant possessed the mental state criteria, the mens rea, required by the legal definition of the offense charged; and 2 the partial responsibility variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to support a claim that, even if the defendant’s mental state satisfied the mens rea criteria for the offense, the defendant’s responsibility for the crime is diminished and thus the defendant should be convicted of a lesser crime and/or a lesser sentence should be imposed. The mental abnormality may be produced by mental disorder, intoxication, trauma, or other causes. The mens rea variant is not a distinct excuse: a defendant is simply arguing that the prosecution cannot prove the definitional, mental state criteria for the crime. Partial responsibility is an excuse, but unlike the similar, complete excuse of legal insanity, partial responsibility does not produce total acquittal; rather, a defendant’s claim is for reduced punishment. A defendant may raise either or both variants of diminished capacity and the insanity defense in the same case. For example, a common definition of firstdegree murder requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant intended to kill and did so after premeditation. A defendant charged with this crime might raise both variants as follows. To deny the allegation of premeditation, a defendant might claim that the killing occurred instantaneously in response to a “command hallucination.” If believed, a defendant cannot be convicted of premeditated homicide, but can be convicted of the lesser crime of second-degree murder, which typically requires only intent. And even a defendant who killed intentionally and premeditatedly might claim partial responsibility because the psychotic mental state rendered the agent’s reasons for action nonculpably irrational. In this case, either the degree of crime might be reduced by operation of the partial excuse, rather than by negation of definitional mens rea, or a defendant might be convicted of first-degree murder but given a lesser penalty. In the United States the mens rea variant exists in about half the jurisdictions, although its scope is usually limited in various ways, primarily to avoid a defendant’s being acquitted and freed if mental abnormality negated all the definitional mental state criteria of the crime charged. In English law, the mens rea variant exists but is limited by the type of evidence usable to support it. No jurisdiction has adopted a distinct, straightforward partial responsibility variant, but various analogous doctrines and procedures are widely accepted. For example, partial responsibility grounds both the doctrine that intentional killing should be reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter if a defendant acted “in the heat of passion” upon legally adequate provocation, and the sentencing judge’s discretion to award a decreased sentence based on a defendant’s mental abnormality. In addition to such partial responsibility analogues, England, Wales, and Scotland have directly adopted the partial responsibility variant, termed “diminished responsibility,” but it applies only to prosecutions for murder. “Diminished responsibility” reduces a conviction to a lesser crime, such as manslaughter or culpable homicide, for behavior that would otherwise constitute murder.

direction of fit – referred to by Grice in “Intention and uncertainty,” and symbolized by an upward arrow and a downward arrow – there are only TWO directions (or senses) of fit: expressum to ‘re’ and ‘re’ to expressum. The first is indicativus modus; the second is imperativus modus -- according to his thesis of aequivocality – the direction of fit is overrated -- a metaphor that derives from a story in Anscombe’s Intention 7 about a detective who follows a shopper around town making a list of the things that the shopper buys. As Anscombe notes, whereas the detective’s list has to match the way the world is each of the things the shopper buys must be on the detective’s list, the shopper’s list is such that the world has to fit with it each of the things on the list are things that he must buy. The metaphor is now standardly used to describe the difference between kinds of speech act assertions versus commands and mental states beliefs versus desires. For example, beliefs are said to have the world-to-mind direction of fit because it is in the nature of beliefs that their contents are supposed to match the world: false beliefs are to be abandoned. Desires are said to have the opposite mind-to-world direction of fit because it is in the nature of desires that the world is supposed to match their contents. This is so at least to the extent that the role of an unsatisfied desire that the world be a certain way is to prompt behavior aimed at making the world that way.

disgrice: In PGRICE, Kemmerling speaks of disgricing as the opposite of gricing. The first way to disgrice Kemmerling calls ‘strawsonising.’For Strawson, even the resemblance (for Grice, equivalence in terms of 'iff' -- cf. his account of what an syntactically structured non-complete expression) between (G) There is not a single volume in my uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’and the negatively existential form (LFG) ~ (Ex)(Ax . ~ Bx)’ is deceptive, ‘It is not the case that there exists an x such that x is a book in Grice’s uncle’s library and x is written by an Englishman. FIRST, 'There is not a single volume in uncle’s library which is not by an English author' -- as normally used, carries the presupposition -- or entails, for Grice -- (G2) Some (at least one) book is in Grice’s uncle’s library. SECOND, 'There is not a single volume in Grice’s uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’ is far from being 'entailed' by (G3e) It is not the case that there is some (at least one) book in my room. If we give ‘There not a single book in my room which is not by an English author’ the modernist logical form ‘~ (Ex)(Ax .~ Bx),’ we see that this is ENTAILED by the briefer, and indeed logicall stronger (in terms of entailments) ~ (Ex)Ax. So when Grice, with a solemn face, utters, ‘There is not a single foreign volume in my uncle’s library, to reveal later that the library is empty, Grice should expect his addressee to get some odd feeling. Surely not the feeling of having been lied to -- or been confronted with an initial false utterance --, because we have not. Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage." "What you say is outrageous!" This sounds stronger than it is. An outrage is believed to be an evil deed, offense, crime; affront, indignity, act not within established or reasonable limits," of food, drink, dress, speech, etc., from Old French outrage "harm, damage; insult; criminal behavior; presumption, insolence, overweening" (12c.), earlier oltrage (11c.), From Vulgar Latin ‘ultraticum,’ excess," from Latin ultra, beyond" (from suffixed form of PIE root *al- "beyond"). Etymologically, "the passing beyond reasonable bounds" in any sense. The meaning narrowed in English toward violent excesses because of folk etymology from out + rage. Of injuries to feelings, principles, etc., from outrage, v. outragen, "to go to excess, act immoderately," from outrage (n.) or from Old French oultrager. From 1580s with meaning "do violence to, attack, maltreat." Related: Outraged; outraging. But Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage.” When Grice was only trying to tutor him in The Organon. Of course it is not the case that Grice is explicitly conveying or expressing that there there is some (at least one) book in his uncle's room. Grice has not said anything false. Or rather, it is not the case that Grice utters an utterance which is not alethically or doxastically satisfactory. Yet what Grice gives Strawson the defeasible, cancellable, license to to assume that Grice thinks there is at least one book. Unless he goes on to cancel the implicaturum, Grice may be deemed to be misleading Strawson. What Grice explicitly conveys to be true (or false) it is necessary (though not sufficient) that there should at least one volume in his uncle’s library -- It is not the case that my uncle has a library and in that library all the books are autochthonous to England, i.e. it is not the case that Grice’s uncle has a library; for starters, it is not the case that Grice has a literate uncle. Of this SUBTLE, nuantic, or cloudy or foggy, "slight or delicate degree of difference in expression, feeling, opinion, etc.," from Fr. nuance "slight difference, shade of colour,” from nuer "to shade," from nue "cloud," from Gallo-Roman nuba, from Latin nubes "a cloud, mist, vapour," sneudh- "fog," source also of Avestan snaoda "clouds," Latin obnubere "to veil," Welsh nudd "fog," Greek nython, in Hesychius "dark, dusky") According to Klein, the French usage is a reference to "the different colours of the clouds,” in reference to color or tone, "a slight variation in shade; of music, as a French term in English -- 'sort' is the relation between ‘There is not a volume in my uncle's library which is not by an English author,’ and ‘My uncle's library is not empty. RE-ENTER GRICE. Grice suggested that Strawson see such a fine point such as that, which Grice had the kindness to call an 'implicaturum', the result of an act of an ‘implicatura’ (they were both attending Kneale’s seminar on the growth and ungrowth of logic) is irrelevant to the issue of ‘entailment’. It is a 'merely pragmatic’ implicaturum, Grice would say, bringing forward a couple of distinctions: logical/pragmatic point; logical/pragmatic inference; entailment/implicaturum; conveying explicitly/conveying implicitly; stating/implicating; asserting/implying; what an utterer means/what the expression 'means' -- but cf. Nowell-Smith, who left Oxford after being overwhelmed by Grice, "this is how the rules of etiquette inform the rules of logic -- on the 'rule' of relevance in "Ethics," 1955. If to call such a point, as Grice does, as "irrelevant to logic" is vacuous in that it may be interpreted as saying that that such a fine foggy point is not considered in a modernist formal system of first-order predicate calculus with identity, this Strawson wishes not to dispute, but to emphasise. Call it his battle cry! But to 'logic' as concerned with this or that relation between this or that general class of statement occurring in ordinary use, and the attending general condition under which this or that statement is correctly called 'true' or 'false,' this fine foggy nice point would hardly be irrelevant. GRICE'S FORMALIST (MODERNIST) INTERPRETATION. Some 'pragmatic' consideration, or assumption, or expectation, a desideratum of conversational conduct obviously underlies and in fact 'explains' the implicaturum, without having to change the ‘sense’ of Aristotle’s syllogistics in terms of the logical forms of A, E, I, and O. If we abide by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally giving and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by others in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the effect, ‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou canst truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’ Assume the form ‘There is not a single … which is not . . .,’ or ‘It is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that ... is not ... is introduced in ‘ordinary’ language with the same SENSE as the expression in the ‘ideal’ language, ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx). Then prohibition inhibits the utterance of the form where the utterer can truly and truthfully simply convey explicitly ‘There is not a single ..., i. e. ~(Ex)(Fx). It is defeasible prohibition which tends to confer on the overprolixic form ('it is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that is not ...') just that kind of an implicaturum which Strawson identifies. But having detected a nuance in a conversational phenomenon is not the same thing as rushing ahead to try to explain it BEFORE exploring in some detail what kind of a nuance it is. The mistake is often commited by Austin, too (in "Other Minds," and "A Plea for Excuses"), and by Hart (on 'carefully'), and by Hare (on "good"), and by Strawson on 'true,' (Analysis), ‘the,’ and 'if -- just to restrict to the play group. Grice tries to respond to anti-sense-datum in "That pillar box seems red to me,” but Strawson was not listening. The overprolixic form in the ‘ordinary’ language, ‘It is not the case that there is some (at least one x) such that ... x is not ...’ would tend, if it does not remain otiose, to develop or generate just that baffling effect in one's addressee ('outrage!') that Strawson identifies, as opposed to the formal-device in the ‘ideal’ language with which the the ‘ordinary’ language counterpart is co-related. What weakens our resistance to the negatively existential analysis in this case more than in the case of the corresponding "All '-sentence is the powerful attraction of the negative opening phrase There is not …'. To avoid misunderstanding one may add a point about the neo-traditionalist interpretation of the forms of the traditional Aristotelian system. Strawson is not claiming that it faithfully represents this or that intention of the principal exponent of the Square of Opposition. Appuleius, who knows, was perhaps, more interested in formulating this or that theorem governing this or that logical relation of this or that more imposing general statement than this or that everyday general statement that Strawson considers. Appuleius, who knows, might have been interested, e. g., in the logical powers of this or that generalisation, or this or that sentence which approximates more closely to the desired conditions that if its utterance by anyone, at any time, at any place, results in a true statement, so does its utterance by anyone else, at any other time, at any other place. How far the account by the neo-traditionalist of this or that general sentence of 'ordinary' langauge is adequate for every generalization may well be under debate. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “In defence of Appuleius,” BANC.

The explicaturum/implicaturum/disimplicaturum triad: Grice: “Strictly, it’s a dyad, since disimplicatum is a derivative of one member of the dyad, the implicatum – so that the opposition is binary (ex/in) with ‘dis-‘ as applied to the im-, cf. disexplicaturum – (the annulation of an explicaturum). “We should not conclude from this that an implication of the existence of thing said to be seen is NOT part of the conventional meaning of ‘see’ nor even (as some philosophers have done) that there is one sense of ‘see’ which lacks this implication!” (WoW:44). If Oxonians are obsessed with ‘implication,’ do they NEED ‘disimplicaturum’? Grice doesn’t think so! But sometimes you have to use it to correct a mistake. Grice does not give names, but he says he has heard a philosopher claim that there are two SENSES of ‘see,’ one which what one sees exists, and one in which it doesn’t! It would be good to trace that! It relates, in any case to ‘remembers,’but not quite, and to ‘know.’ But not quite. The issue of ‘see’ is not that central, since Grice realizes that it is just a modality of perception, even if crucial. He coined ‘visum’ with Warnock to play with the idea of ‘what is seen’ NOT being existent. On another occasion, when he cannot name a ridiculous philosopher, he invents him: “A philosopher will not be given much credit if he comes with an account of the indefinite ‘one’ as having three senses: one proximate to the emissor (“I broke a finger”), one distant (“He’s meeting a woman”) and one where the link is not specified (“A flower”). he target is of course Davidson having the cheek to quote Grice’s Henriette Herz Trust lecture for the BA! Lewis and Short have ‘intendere’ under ‘in-tendo,’ which they render as ‘to stretch out or forth, extend, also to turn ones attention to, exert one’s self for, to purpose, endeavour,” and finaly as “intend”! “pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4, 27 Grices tends towards claiming that you cannot extend what you dont intend. In the James lectures, Grice mentions the use of is to mean seem (The tie is red in this light), and see to mean hallucinate. Denying Existence: The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of ...books.google.com › books ... then it seems unidiomatic if not ungrammatical to speak of hallucinations as ... that fighting people and 156 APPEARING UNREALS 4 Two Senses of "See"? A. Chakrabarti - 1997 - ‎Language Arts & Disciplines The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and ...books.google.com › books sight, say sense-data; others will then say that there are two senses of 'see'. ... wrong because I am dreaming or hallucinating them, which of course could ... Stanley Cavell - 1999 - ‎Philosophy Wittgenstein and Perception - Page 37 - Google Books Resultbooks.google.com › books For example, Gilbert Harman characterises the two senses of see as follows: see† = 'the ... which is common to genuine cases of seeing and to hallucinations. Michael Campbell, ‎Michael O'Sullivan - 2015 - ‎Philosophy The Alleged Ambiguity of'See'www.jstor.org › stable including dreams, hallucinations and the perception of physical objects. ... existence of at least two senses of ' see' were his adherence to the doctrine that 'see' ... by AR White - ‎1963 - ‎Cited by 3 - ‎Related articles Seeing and Naming - jstorwww.jstor.org › stable there are or aren't two senses of 'see'. If there are, I'm speaking of ... The third kind of case is illustrated by Macbeth's dagger hallucination, at least if we assume ... by RJ Hall - ‎1977 - ‎Cited by 3 - ‎Related articles Philosophy at LaGuardia Community Collegewww.laguardia.edu › Philosophy › GADFLY-2011 PDF Lastly, I will critically discuss Ayer's two senses of 'see', ... (e.g., hallucinations); it thus seems correct to say that ... Hallucinations are hallucinations. There are. Talking about seeing: An examination of some aspects of the ...etd.ohiolink.edu › ... I propose a distinction between delusions and hallucinations,'and argue ... say that there are two senses of .'see* in ordinary language or not, he does, as I will ... by KA Emmett - ‎1974 - ‎Related articles Wittgenstein and Perceptionciteseerx.ist.psu.edu › viewdoc › download PDF 2 Two senses of 'see'. 33 ... may see things that are not there, for example in hallucinations. ... And so, hallucinations are not genuine perceptual experiences. by Y Arahata - ‎Related articles Allen Blur - University of Yorkwww-users.york.ac.uk › Publications_files PDF of subjectively indistinguishable hallucination (e.g. Crane 2006). ... and material objects of sight, and correlatively for a distinction between two senses of 'see',. by K Allen - ‎Related articles Austin and sense-data - UBC Library Open Collectionsopen.library.ubc.ca › ... › UBC Theses and Dissertations Sep 15, 2011 - (5) Illusions and Hallucinations It is not enough to reject Austin's way of ... I will not deal with Austin and Ayer on "two senses of 'see'" because I ... by DD Todd - ‎1967 - ‎Cited by 1 - ‎Related articles. Godfrey Vesey (1965, p. 73) deposes, "if a person sees something at all it must look like something to him, even if it only looks like 'somebody doing something.' With Davidson, Grice was more cavalier, because he could blame it on a different ‘New-World’ dialect or idiolect, about ‘intend.’ When Grice uses ‘disimplicaturum’ to apply to ‘cream in coffee’ that is a bit tangential – and refers more generally to his theory of communication. What would the rationale of disimplicaturum be? In this case, if the emissee realizes the obvious category mistake (“She’s not the cream in your coffee”) there may be a need to disimplicate explicitly. To consider. There is an example that he gives that compares with ‘see’ and it is even more philosophical but he doesn’t give examples: to use ‘is’ when one means ‘seem’ (the tie example). The reductive analyses of being and seeing hold. We have here two cases of loose use (or disimplicaturum). Same now with his example in “Intention and Uncertainty” (henceforth, “Uncertainty”): Smith intends to climb Mt. Everest + [common-ground status: this is difficult]. Grices response to Davidsons pretty unfair use of Grices notion of conversational implicaturum in Davidsons analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. Pears loved Grices reply. Implicaturum here is out of the question ‒ disimplicaturum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is too social to be true when applied to intending. The doxastic condition is one of the entailments in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicaturum can. If it can be cancelled, it is best seen as a disimplicaturum, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants. Grice and Davidson were members of The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society. Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grices polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears hold a minimalist approach to intending. On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as the same mistake again of building certainty into the concept. Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational implicaturum at this point is too social to be true. Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational disimplicaturum: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a loose use of intends. The certainty on the agents part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt. Davidson was claiming that the agents belief in the probability of the object of the agents intention was a mere conversational implicaturum on the utterers part. Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an entailment of a strict use of intend, even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational disimplicaturum, it can be dropped. The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending, disimplicaturum, disimplicaturum. Strictly, a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grices claim to fame is implicaturum, he finds disimplicaturum an intriguing notion to capture those occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of intending (without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of see in Shakespeareian contexts (Macbeth saw Banquo, Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore) and the use of is to mean seems (That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise, when both conversants know that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with Youre the cream in my coffee being an utterance where the disimplicaturum (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. Disimplicaturum does not appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes, an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as the wanting family. This wanting family includes expressions like want, desire, would like to, is eager to, is anxious to, would mind not…, the idea of appeals to me, is thinking of, etc. As Grice remarks, The likeness and differences within this wanting family demand careful attention. In commenting on Davidsons treatment of wanting in Intending, Grice notes: It seems to Grice that the picture of the soul suggested by Davidsons treatment of wanting is remarkably tranquil and, one might almost say, computerized. It is the picture of an ideally decorous board meeting, at which the various heads of sections advance, from the standpoint of their particular provinces, the case for or against some proposed course of action. In the end the chairman passes judgement, effective for action; normally judiciously, though sometimes he is for one reason or another over-impressed with the presentation made by some particular member. Grices soul doesnt seem to him, a lot of the time, to be like that at all. It is more like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in which some members shout, wont listen, and suborn other members to lie on their behalf; while the chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of cheating, endeavours to impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect, since sometimes the meeting breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears to end comfortably, in reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and sometimes, whatever the outcome of the meeting, individual members go off and do things unilaterally. Could it be that Davidson, of the New World, and Grice, of the Old World, have different idiolects regarding intend? Could well be! It is said that the New World is prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in Grices more cautious use, intend is restricted to the conditions HE wants it to restrict it too! Odd that for all the generosity he displays in Post-war Oxford philosophy (Surely I can help you analyse you concept of this or that, even if my use of the corresponding expression does not agree with yours), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for trying to be nice and apply the conversational implicaturum to intend! Genial Grice! It is natural Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to see intending as merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong psychological state as belief. And its natural that Grice hated that! Refs.: The source is Grice’s comment on Davidson on intending. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

disjunctum: Strangely enough Ariskant thought disjunctum, but not conjunctum a categorial related to the category of ‘community’!Aulus Gellius (The Attic Nights, XVI, 8) tells us about this disjunction: “There also is ■ another type of a^twpa which the Greeks call and we call disjunctum, disjunctive sentence. Gellius notes that ‘or’ is by default ‘inclusive’: where one or several propositions may be simultaneously true, without ex- cluding one another, although they may also all be false. Gellius expands on the non-default reading of exclusive disjunction: pleasure is either good or bad or it is neither good nor bad (“Aut malum est voluplas, aut bonum, aul neque bonum, neque malum est”). All the elements of the exclusive disjunctive exclude one another, and their contradictory elements, Gr. avTtxs'-p.sva, are incompatible with one another”. “Ex omnibus quae disjunguntiir, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera.”Grice lists ‘or’ as the second binary functor in his response to Strawson. But both Grice and Strawson agreed that the Oxonian expert on ‘or’ is Wood. Mitchell is good, too, though. The relations between “v” and “or” (or “either ... or …”) are, on the whole, less intimate than those between “.” and “and,” but less distant than those between “D” and “if.” Let us speak of a statement made by coupling two clauses by “or” as an alternative statement ; and let us speak of the first and second alternatesof such a statement, on analogy with our talk of the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement. At a bus-stop, someone might say: “Either we catch this bus or we shall have to walk all the way home.” He might equally well have said “If we don't catch this bus, we shall have to walk all the way home.” It will be seen that the antecedent of the hypothetical statement he might have made is the negation of the first alternate of the alternative statement he did make. Obviously, we should not regard our catching the bus as a sufficient condition of the 'truth' of either statement; if it turns out that the bus we caught was not the last one, we should say that the man who had made the statement had been wrong. The truth of one of the alternates is no more a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement than the falsity of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of the truth of the hypothetical statement. And since 'p"Dpyq' (and, equally, * q"3p v q ') is a law of the truth-functional system, this fact sufficiently shows a difference between at least one standard use of “or” and the meaning given to “v.” Now in all, or almost all, the cases where we are prepared to say something of the form “p or q,” we are also prepared to say something of the form 4 if not-p, then q \ And this fact may us to exaggerate the difference between “v” and “or” to think that, since in some cases, the fulfilment of one alternate is not a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement of which It is an alternate, the fulfilment of one alternate is a sufficient condition of the truth of an alternative statement. And this is certainly an exaggeration. If someone says ; “Either it was John or it was Robert but I couldn't tell which,” we are satisfied of the truth of the alternative statement if either of the alternates turns out to be true; and we say that the speaker was wrong only if neither turns out to be true. Here we seem to have a puzzle ; for we seem to be saying that * Either it was John or it was Robert ' entails 4 If it wasn't John, it was Robert * and, at the same time, that ‘It was John’ entails the former, but not the latter. What we are suffering from here is perhaps a crudity in our notion of entailraent, a difficulty In applying this too undifferentiated concept to the facts of speech ; or, if we prefer it, an ambiguity in the notion of a sufficient condition. The statement that it was John entails the statement that it was either John or Robert in the sense thai it confirms it; when It turns out to have been John, the man who said that either It was John or it was Robert is shown to have been right. But the first statement does not entail the second in the sense that the step ‘It was John, so it was either John or Robert’ is a logically proper step, unless the person saying this means by it simply that the alternative statement made previously was correct, i.e., 'it was one of the two '. For the alternative statement carries the implication of the speaker's uncertainty as to which of the two it was, and this implication is inconsistent with the assertion that it was John. So in this sense of * sufficient condition ', the statement that it was John is no more a sufficient condition of (no more entails) the statement that it was either John or Robert than it is a sufficient condition of (entails) the statement that if it wasn't John, it was Robert. The further resemblance, which we have already noticed, between the alternative statement and the hypothetical statement, is that whatever knowledge or experience renders it reasonable to assert the alternative statement, also renders it reasonable to make the statement that (under the condition that it wasn't John) it was Robert. But we are less happy about saying that the hypothetical statement is confirmed by the discovery that it was John, than we are about saying that the alternative statement is confirmed by this discovery. For we are inclined to say that the question of confirmation of the hypothetical statement (as opposed to the question of its reasonableness or acceptability) arises only if the condition (that it wasn't John) turns out to be fulfilled. This shows an asymmetry, as regards confirmation, though not as regards acceptability, between 4 if not p, then q ' and * if not qy then p ' which is not mirrored in the forms ‘either p or q’ and ‘either q or p.’ This asymmetry is ignored in the rule that * if not p, then q ' and ‘if not q, then p’ are logically equivalent, for this rule regards acceptability rather than confirmation. And rightly. For we may often discuss the l truth ' of a subjunctive conditional, where the possibility of confirmation is suggested by the form of words employed to be not envisaged. It is a not unrelated difference between * if ' sentences and ‘or’ sentences that whereas, whenever we use one of the latter, we should also be prepared to use one of the former, the converse does not hold. The cases in which it does not generally hold are those of subjunctive conditionals. There is no ‘or’ sentence which would serve as a paraphrase of ‘If the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war’ as this sentence would most commonly be used. And this is connected with the fact that c either . . . or . . .' is associated with situations involving choice or decision. 4 Either of these roads leads to Oxford ' does not mean the same as ' Either this road leads to Oxford or that road does’ ; but both confront us with the necessity of making a choice. This brings us to a feature of * or ' which, unlike those so far discussed, is commonly mentioned in discussion of its relation to * v ' ; the fact, namely, that in certain verbal contexts, ‘either … or …’ plainly carries the implication ‘and not both . . . and . . .', whereas in other contexts, it does not. These are sometimes spoken of as, respectively, the exclusive and inclusive senses of ‘or;’ and, plainly, if we are to identify 4 v’ with either, it must be the latter. The reason why, unlike others, this feature of the ordinary use of “or” is commonly mentioned, is that the difference can readily be accommodated (1 Cf. footnote to p. 86.In the symbolism of the truth-functional system: It is the difference between “(p y q) .~ (p . q)” (exclusive sense) and “p v q” (inclusive sense). “Or,” like “and,” is commonly used to join words and phrases as well as clauses. The 4 mutuality difficulties attending the general expansion of 4 x and y are/ 5 into * x is /and y is/' do not attend the expansion of 4 x or y isf into c r Is/or y is/ ? (This is not to say that the expansion can always correctly be made. We may call “v” the disjunctive sign and, being warned against taking the reading too seriously, may read it as ‘or.' While he never approached the topic separately, it’s easy to find remarks about disjunction in his oeuvre. A veritable genealogy of disjunction can be traced along Griceian lines. DISJUNCTUM -- disjunction elimination. 1 The argument form ‘A or B, if A then C, if B then C; therefore, C’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer C from a disjunction together with derivations of C from each of the disjuncts separately. This is also known as the rule of disjunctive elimination or V-elimination. disjunction introduction. 1 The argument form ‘A or B; therefore, A or B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer a disjunction from either of its disjuncts. This is also known as the rule of addition or Vintroduction. . disjunctive proposition, a proposition whose main propositional operator main connective is the disjunction operator, i.e., the logical operator that represents ‘and/or’. Thus, ‘P-and/orQ-and-R’ is not a disjunctive proposition because its main connective is the conjunction operation, but ‘P-and/or-Q-and-R’ is disjunctive. Refs.: Grice uses an illustration involving ‘or’ in the ‘implication’ excursus in “Causal Theory.” But the systematic account comes from WoW, especially essay 4.

dispositum. Grice: “The –positum is a very formative Roman expression: there’s the suppositum, the praepositum, and the dispositum. All very apposite!” -- H. P. Grice, “Disposition and intention” – Grice inspired D. F. Pears on this, as they tried to refute Austin’s rather dogmatic views in ‘ifs’ and ‘cans’ – where the ‘can’ relates to the disposition, and the ‘if’ to the conditional analysis for it. Grice’s phrase is “if I can”. “I intend to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees,” Marmaduke Bloggs says, “if a can.” A disposition, more generally is, any tendency of an object or system to act or react in characteristic ways in certain situations. Fragility, solubility, and radioactivity, and intentionality, are typical dispositions. And so are generosity and irritability. For Ryle’s brand of analytic behaviorism, functionalism, and some forms of materialism, an event of the soul, such as the occurrence of an idea, and states such as a belief, a will, or an intention, is also a disposition. A hypothetical or conditional statement is alleged to be ‘implicated’ by dispositional claims. What’s worse, this conditional is alleged to capture the basic meaning of the ascription of a state of the soul. The glass would shatter if suitably struck. Left undisturbed, a radium atom will probably decay in a certain time. An ascription of a disposition is taken as subjunctive rather than material conditionals to avoid problems like having to count as soluble anything not immersed in water. The characteristic mode of action or reaction shattering, decaying, etc. is termed the disposition’s manifestation or display. But it need not be observable. Fragility is a regular or universal disposition. A suitably struck glass invariably shatters. Radio-activity on the other hand is alleged to be a variable or probabilistic disposition. Radium may (but then again may not) decay in a certain situation. A dispositions may be what Grice calls “multi-track,” i. e. multiply manifested, rather than “single-track,” or singly manifested. Hardness or elasticity may have different manifestations in different situations. In his very controversial (and only famous essay), “The Concept of Mind,” Ryle, who held, no less, the chair of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, argues – just to provoke -- that there is nothing more to a dispositional claim than its associated conditional. A dispositional property is not an occurrent property. To possess a dispositional property is not to undergo any episode or occurrence, or to be in a particular state. Grice surely refuted this when he claims that the soul is in this or that a state. Consider reasoning. The soul is in state premise; then the soul is in state conclusion. The episode or occurrence is an event, when the state of the premise causes the state of the conclusion. Coupled with a ‘positivist’ (or ultra-physicalist, ultra-empiricist, and ultra-naturalist) rejection of any unobservable, and a conception of an alleged episode or state of the soul as a dispositios, this supports the view of behaviorism that such alleged episode or state is nothing but a disposition TO observable behaviour – if Grice intends to climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees if he can, there is no ascription without the behaviour that manifests it – the ascription is meant to EXPLAIN (or explicate, or provide the cause) for the behaviour. Grice reached this ‘functionalist’ approach later in his career, and presented it with full fanfare in “Method in philosophoical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.” By contrast, realism holds that dispositional talk is also about an actual or occurrent property or a state, possibly unknown or unobservable – the ‘black box’ of the functionalist, a function from sensory input to behavioural output. In particular, it is about the bases of dispositions in intrinsic properties or states. Thus, fragility is based in molecular structure, radioactivity in nuclear structure. A disposition’s basis is viewed as at least partly the cause of its manifestation in behaviour. Some philosophers, for fear of an infinite regress, hold that the basis is categorical, not dispositional D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, 8. Others, notably Popper, Madden, and Harre (Causal powers) hold that every property is dispositional. Grice’s essay has now historical interest – but showed the relevance of these topics among two tightly closed groups in post-war Oxford: the dispositionalists led by Ryle, and the anti-dispositionalists, a one-member group led by Grice. Refs.: Grice, “Intention and dispositions.”

distributum: distributio -- undistributed middle: a logical fallacy in traditional syllogistic logic, resulting from the violation of the rule that the middle term (the term that appears twice in premises) must be distributed at least once in the premises. Any syllogism that commits this error is invalid. Consider “All philosophers are persons,” and “Some persons are bad.” No conclusion follows from these two premises because “persons” in the first premise is the predicate of an affirmative proposition, and in the second is the subject of a particular proposition. Neither of them is distributed. “If in a syllogism the middle term is distributed in neither premise, we are said to have a fallacy of undistributed middle.” Keynes, Formal Logic. DISTRIBUTUM -- distribution, the property of standing for every individual designated by a term. The Latin term distributio originated in the twelfth century; it was applied to terms as part of a theory of reference, and it may have simply indicated the property of a term prefixed by a universal quantifier. The term ‘dog’ in ‘Every dog has his day’ is distributed, because it supposedly refers to every dog. In contrast, the same term in ‘A dog bit the mailman’ is not distributed because it refers to only one dog. In time, the idea of distribution came to be used only as a heuristic device for determining the validity of categorical syllogisms: 1 every term that is distributed in a premise must be distributed in the conclusion; 2 the middle term must be distributed at least once. Most explanations of distribution in logic textbooks are perfunctory; and it is stipulated that the subject terms of universal propositions and the predicate terms of negative propositions are distributed. This is intuitive for A-propositions, e.g., ‘All humans are mortal’; the property of being mortal is distributed over each human. The idea of distribution is not intuitive for, say, the predicate term of O-propositions. According to the doctrine, the sentence ‘Some humans are not selfish’ says in effect that if all the selfish things are compared with some select human one that is not selfish, the relation of identity does not hold between that human and any of the selfish things. Notice that the idea of distribution is not mentioned in this explanation. The idea of distribution is currently disreputable, mostly because of the criticisms of Geach in Reference and Generality 8 and its irrelevance to standard semantic theories. The related term ‘distributively’ means ‘in a manner designating every item in a group individually’, and is used in contrast with ‘collectively’. The sentence ‘The rocks weighed 100 pounds’ is ambiguous. If ‘rocks’ is taken distributively, then the sentence means that each rock weighed 100 pounds. If ‘rocks’ is taken collectively, then the sentence means that the total weight of the rocks was 100 pounds. distributive laws, the logical principles A 8 B 7 C S A 8 B 7 A 7 C and A 7 B 8 C S A 7 B 8 A 7 C. Conjunction is thus said to distribute over disjunction and disjunction over conjunction.

ditto: Or Strawson’s big mistake. Strawson quite didn’t understand what “Analysis” was for, and submits this essay on the perlocutionary effects of ‘true.’ Grice comes to the resuce of veritable analysis. cf. verum. Grice disliked Strawson’s ditto theory in Analysis of ‘true’ as admittive performatory. 1620s, "in the month of the same name," Tuscan dialectal ditto "(in) the said (month or year)," literary Italian detto, past participle of dire "to say," from Latin dicere "speak, tell, say" (from PIE root *deik- "to show," also "pronounce solemnly"). Italian used the word to avoid repetition of month names in a series of dates, and in this sense it was picked up in English. Its generalized meaning of "the aforesaid, the same thing, same as above" is attested in English by 1670s. In early 19c. a suit of men's clothes of the same color and material through was ditto or dittoes (1755). Dittohead, self-description of followers of U.S. radio personality Rush Limbaugh, attested by 1995. dittoship is from 1869.

dodgson: c. l. – Grice quotes Carroll often. Cabbages and kings – Achilles and the Tortoise – Humpty Dumpty and his Deutero-Esperanto -- Carroll, Lewis, pen name of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson 183298, English writer and mathematician. The eldest son of a large clerical family, he was educated at Rugby and Christ Church, Oxford, where he remained for the rest of his uneventful life, as mathematical lecturer until 1 and curator of the senior commonroom. His mathematical writings under his own name are more numerous than important. He was, however, the only Oxonian of his day to contribute to symbolic logic, and is remembered for his syllogistic diagrams, for his methods for constructing and solving elaborate sorites problems, for his early interest in logical paradoxes, and for the many amusing examples that continue to reappear in modern textbooks. Fame descended upon him almost by accident, as the author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 1865, Through the Looking Glass 1872, The Hunting of the Snark 1876, and Sylvie and Bruno 9 93; saving the last, the only children’s books to bring no blush of embarrassment to an adult reader’s cheek. Dodgson took deacon’s orders in 1861, and though pastorally inactive, was in many ways an archetype of the prim Victorian clergyman. His religious opinions were carefully thought out, but not of great philosophic interest. The Oxford movement passed him by; he worried about sin though rejecting the doctrine of eternal punishment, abhorred profanity, and fussed over Sunday observance, but was oddly tolerant of theatergoing, a lifelong habit of his own. Apart from the sentimental messages later inserted in them, the Alice books and Snark are blessedly devoid of religious or moral concern. Full of rudeness, aggression, and quarrelsome, if fallacious, argument, they have, on the other hand, a natural attraction for philosophers, who pillage Carneades Carroll, Lewis 119 119 them freely for illustrations. Humpty-Dumpty, the various Kings and Queens, the Mad Hatter, the Caterpillar, the White Rabbit, the Cheshire Cat, the Unicorn, the Tweedle brothers, the Bellman, the Baker, and the Snark make fleeting appearances in the s of Russell, Moore, Broad, Quine, Nagel, Austin, Ayer, Ryle, Blanshard, and even Vitters an unlikely admirer of the Mock Turtle. The first such allusion to the March Hare is in Venn’s Symbolic Logic 1. The usual reasons for quotation are to make some point about meaning, stipulative definition, the logic of negation, time reversal, dream consciousness, the reification of fictions and nonentities, or the absurdities that arise from taking “ordinary language” too literally. For exponents of word processing, the effect of running Jabberwocky through a spell-checker is to extinguish all hope for the future of Artificial Intelligence. Though himself no philosopher, Carroll’s unique sense of philosophic humor keeps him and his illustrator, Sir John Tenniel effortlessly alive in the modern age. Alice has been tr. into seventy-five languages; new editions and critical studies appear every year; imitations, parodies, cartoons, quotations, and ephemera proliferate beyond number; and Carroll societies flourish in several countries, notably Britain and the United States. Refs.: Sutherland, “Grice, Dodgson, and Carroll. The Carrolian, the journal of the Lewis Carroll Society – Jabberwocky: the newsletter of the Lewis Carroll Society. A. M. Ghersi, “Turtles and mock-turtles,” from “Correspondence with Derek Foster.” Alice’s adventures in Griceland.

dominium -- domain – used by Grice in his treatment of Extensionalism -- of a science, the class of individuals that constitute its subject matter. Zoology, number theory, and plane geometry have as their respective domains the class of animals, the class of natural numbers, and the class of plane figures. In Posterior Analytics 76b10, Aristotle observes that each science presupposes its domain, its basic concepts, and its basic principles. In modern formalizations of a science using a standard firstorder formal language, the domain of the science is often, but not always, taken as the universe of the intended interpretation or intended model, i.e. as the range of values of the individual variables.

donkey – quantification – considered by Grice -- sentences, sentences exemplified by ‘Every man who owns a donkey beats it’, ‘If a man owns a donkey, he beats it’, and similar forms (“Every nice girl loves a sailor”), which have posed logical puzzles since medieval times but were noted more recently by Geach. At issue is the logical form of such sentences specifically, the correct construal of the pronoun ‘it’ and the indefinite noun phrase ‘a donkey’. Translations into predicate logic by the usual strategy of rendering the indefinite as existential quantification and the pronoun as a bound variable cf. ‘John owns a donkey and beats it’ P Dx x is a donkey & John owns x & John beats x are either ill-formed or have the wrong truth conditions. With a universal quantifier, the logical form carries the controversial implication that every donkey-owning man beats every donkey he owns. Efforts to resolve these issues have spawned much significant research in logic and linguistic semantics.

dossier: Grice is not clear about the status of this – but some philosophers have been too mentalistic. How would a genitorial programme proceed. Is there a dossier in a handwave by which the emissor communicates that he knows the route or that he is about to leave his emissee. It does not seem so, because the handwave is unstructured. Unlike “Fido is shaggy.” In the case of “Fido is shaggy,” there must be some OVERLAP between the emissor’s soul and the emissee’s soul – in terms of dossier. So perhaps there is overlap in the handwave. There must be an overlap as to WHICH route he means. By making the handwave the emissor communicates that HE, the emissor, subject IS (copula) followed by predicate “knower of the route.” So here we have a definite ‘the route.’ Which route? To heaven, to hell. Cf. The scots ‘high road,’ ‘low road.’ To Loch Lomond. If there is not this minimal common ground nothing can be communicated. In the alternative meaning, “I (subject) am (copula) about to leave you – where again there must be an overlap in the identification of the denotata of the pronouns. In the case of Blackburn’s skull or the arrow at the fork of a road, the common ground is instituted in situu in the one-off predicament, and there still must be some overlap of dossier. In its most technical usage, Grice wants to demystify Donnellan’s identificatory versus non-identificatory uses of ‘the,’ as unnecessary implications to Russell’s otherwise neat account. The topic interested Strawson (“Principle of assumption of ignorance, knowledge and relevance”) and Urmson’s principle of aptitude. Grice’s favourite vacuous name is ‘Bellerophon.’ ‘Vacuous names’ is an essay commissioned by Davison and Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine (henceforth, W and O) for Reidel, Dordrecht. “W and O” had appeared (without Grices contribution) as a special issue of Synthese. Grices contribution, along with Quines Reply to Grice, appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians ‒ this was the time when logic was starting to be taught outside philosophy departments, or sub-faculties), such as Mitchell, Myro, Mates, Donnellan, Strawson, Grice was particularly proud to be able to quote Mates by mouth or book. Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicatura to be given maximal scope. The device in Vacuous Namess is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation. Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special existential kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer. Someone isnt attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society. That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees. But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside Newsletter, “W and O,” vacuous name, identificatory use, non-identificatory use, subscript device. Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the New-World impact of the Old-World ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grices and Strawsons sophisticated version of the paradigm-case argument in Word and Object. Davidson and Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to which Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue into a separate volume, that they would approach the other infamous member of the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Davidson and Hintikka for “W and O.” Grice introduces a subscript device to account for implicatura of utterances like Marmaduke Bloggs won’t be attending the party; he was invented by the journalists. In the later section, he explores identificatory and non identificatory uses of the without involving himself in the problems Donnellan did! Some philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section on Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. The essay is structured very systematically with an initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen, followed by implicatura of vacuous Namess such as Marmaduke Bloggs, to end with definite descriptions, repr. in Ostertag, and psychological predicates. It is best to focus on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on Marmaduke Bloggs, brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his Presupposition and conversational implicaturum. There is a quantifier phrase, the, and two uses of it: one is an identificatory use (the haberdasher is clumsy, or THE haberdasher is clumsy, as Grice prefers) and then theres a derived, non-identificatory use: the haberdasher (whoever she was! to use Grices and Mitchells addendum) shows her clumsiness. The use of the numeric subscripts were complicated enough to delay the publication of this. The whole thing was a special issue of a journal. Grices contribution came when Reidel turned that into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric subscript device by square brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle enough, though. Grices contribution, Vacuous Namess, later repr. in part “Definite descriptions,” ed. Ostertag, concludes with an exploration of the phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude. Grices choice of an ascription now notably involves an opaque (rather than factive, like know) psychological state or attitude: wanting, which he symbolizes as W. At least Grice does not write, really, for he knew that Austin detested a trouser word! Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) will be derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will be derivable only from (ix).Grice had been Strawsons logic tutor at St. Johns (Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!) and it shows! One topic that especially concerned Grice relates to the introduction and elimination rules, as he later searches for generic satisfactoriness. Grice wonders [W]hat should be said of Takeutis conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in Xs personalized system that φ, then it is necessary with respect to X that φ is true (establishable). The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary with respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ will be a volitive expression such as let it be that X eats his hat; and my commitment to the idea that Xs system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting (buletically) let X eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. A very interesting concept Grice introduces in the definite-descriptor section of Vacuous Namess is that of a conversational dossier, for which he uses δ for a definite descriptor. The key concept is that of conversational dossier overlap, common ground, or conversational pool. Let us say that an utterer U has a dossier for a definite description δ if there is a set of definite descriptions which include δ, all the members of which the utterer supposes to be satisfied by one and the same item and the utterer U intends his addressee A to think (via the recognition that A is so intended) that the utterer U has a dossier for the definite description δ which the utterer uses, and that the utterer U has specifically selected (or chosen, or picked) this specific δ from this dossier at least partly in the hope that his addressee A has his own dossier for δ which overlaps the utterers dossier for δ, viz. shares a substantial, or in some way specially favoured, su-bset with the utterers dossier. Its unfortunate that the idea of a dossier is not better known amog Oxonian philosophers. Unlike approaches to the phenomenon by other Oxonian philosophers like Grices tutee Strawson and his three principles (conversational relevance, presumption of conversational knowledge, and presumption of conversational ignorance) or Urmson and his, apter than Strawsons, principle of conversational appositeness (Mrs.Smiths husband just delivered a letter, You mean the postman!?), only Grice took to task the idea of formalising this in terms of set-theory and philosophical psychology ‒ note his charming reference to the utterers hope (never mind intention) that his choice of d from his dossier will overlap with some d in the dossier of his his addressee. The point of adding whoever he may be for the non-identificatory is made by Mitchell, of Worcester, in his Griceian textbook for Hutchinson. Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s “Vacuous names,” in “W and O” and its attending notes, BANC.

doxastic – discussed by J. L. Austin in the myth of the cave. Plato is doing some form of linguistic botany when he distinguishes between the doxa and the episteme – Stich made it worse with his ‘sub-doxastic’! from Grecian doxa, ‘belief’, of or pertaining to belief. A doxastic mental state, for instance, is or incorporates a belief. Doxastic states of mind are to be distinguished, on the one hand, from such non-doxastic states as desires, sensations, and emotions, and, on the other hand, from subdoxastic states. By extension, a doxastic principle is a principle governing belief. A doxastic principle might set out conditions under which an agent’s forming or abandoning a belief is justified epistemically or otherwise.

doxographia griceiana -- Griceian doxographers. A Griceian doxographer is a a compiler of andcommentators on the opinions of Grice. “I am my first doxographer,” Grice said. Grice enjoyed the term coined by H. Diels for the title of his work “Doxographi Graeci,” which Grice typed “Doxographi Gricei”. In his “Doxographi,” Diels assembles a series of Grecian texts in which the views of Grecian philosophers from the archaic to the Hellenistic era are set out in a relatively schematic way. In the introduction, Diels reconstructs the history of the writing of these opinions, viz. the doxography strictly – the ‘writing’ (graphein) of the ‘opinion’ (“doxa”) – cfr. the unwritten opinions; Diels’s ‘Doxographi’ is now a standard part of the historiography of philosophy. Doxography is important both as a source of information about a philosopher, and also because a later philosopher (later than Grice, that is), ancient, medieval, and modern, should rely on it besides what Diels calls the ‘primary’ material – “what Grice actually philosophised on.” The crucial text for Diels’s reconstruction is the book Physical Opinions of the Philosophers Placita Philosophorum, traditionally ascribed to Plutarch but no longer thought to be by him. “Placita philosophorum” lists the views of various philosophers and schools under subject headings such as “What Is Nature?” and “On the Rainbow.” Out of this oeuvre and others Diels reconstructs a Collection of Opinions that he ascribes to Aetius, a philosopher mentioned by Theodoret as its author. Diels takes Aetius’s ultimate source to be Theophrastus, who wrote a more discursive Physical Opinions. Because Aetius mentions the views of Hellenistic philosophers writing after Theophrastus, Diels postulates an intermediate source, which he calls the “Vetusta Placita.” The most accessible doxographical material for Grice is in “The Life of Opinions of the Eminent Philosopher H. P. Grice,” “Vita et sententiae H. P. Griceiani quo in philosophia probatus fuit.” by H. P. Grice, après “Vitae et sententiae eorum qui in philosophia probati fuerunt,” by Diogenes Laertius, who is, however, mainly interested in gossip. Laertius arranges philosophers by schools and treats each school chronologically.

dummett – Dummett on ‘implicaturum’ in “Truth and other enigmas” – Note the animosity by Dummett against Grice’s playgroup for Grice never inviting him to a Saturday morning! “I will say this: conversational implicaturum, or as he fastidiously would prefer, the ‘implicaturum,’ was, yes, ‘invented,’ by H. P. Grice, of St. John’s, but University Lecturer, to boot, to replace an abstract semantic concept such as Frege’s ‘Sinn,’ expelled in Grice’s original Playgroup’s determination to pay attention, in the typical Oxonian manner, to nothing but what an *emisor* (never mind his emission!) ‘communicates’ in a ‘particularised’ context — so that was a good thing -- for Grice!” “Truth and other enigmas.” Cited by Grice in Way of Words -- dummett, m. a. e. – cited by H. P. Grice. philosopher of language, logic, and mathematics, noted for his sympathy for metaphysical antirealism and for his exposition of the philosophy of Frege. Dummett regards allegiance to the principle of bivalence as the hallmark of a realist attitude toward any field of discourse. This is the principle that any meaningful assertoric sentence must be determinately either true or else false, independently of anyone’s ability to ascertain its truth-value by recourse to appropriate empirical evidence or methods of proof. According to Dummett, the sentences of any learnable language cannot have verification-transcendent truth conditions and consequently we should query the intelligibility of certain statements that realists regard as meaningful. On these grounds, he calls into question realism about the past and realism in the philosophy of mathematics in several of the papers in two collections of his essays, Truth and Other Enigmas 8 and The Seas of Language 3. In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics 1, Dummett makes clear his view that the fundamental questions of metaphysics have to be approached through the philosophy of language, and more specifically through the theory of meaning. Here his philosophical debts to Frege and Vitters are manifest. Dummett has been the world’s foremost expositor and champion of Frege’s philosophy, above all in two highly influential books, Frege: Philosophy of Language 3 and Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics 1. This is despite the fact that Frege himself advocated a form of Platonism in semantics and the philosophy of mathematics that is quite at odds with Dummett’s own anti-realist inclinations. It would appear, however, from what Dummett says in Origins of Analytical Philosophy 3, that he regards Frege’s great achievement as that of having presaged the “linguistic turn” in philosophy that was to see its most valuable fruit in the later work of Vitters. Vitters’s principle that grasp of the meaning of a linguistic expression must be exhaustively manifested by the use of that expression is one that underlies Dummett’s own approach to meaning and his anti-realist leanings. In logic and the philosophy of mathematics this is shown in Dummett’s sympathy for the intuitionistic approach of Brouwer and Heyting, which involves a repudiation of the law of excluded middle, as set forth in Dummett’s own book on the subject, Elements of Intuitionism 7.

dyad -- co-agency: social action: Grice: “My principle of co-operation you can call the ‘conversational contract.’ In this respect, I agree with Grice: Grice: “When I speak of conversation, I mean of a social action – where one agent’s expectations influence his co-agent’s” -- a subclass of human action involving the interaction among agents and their mutual orientation, or the action of groups. While all intelligible actions are in some sense social, social actions must be directed to others. Talcott Parsons 279 captured what is distinctive about social action in his concept of “double contingency,” and similar concepts have been developed by other philosophers and sociologists, including Weber, Mead, and Vitters. Whereas in monological action the agents’ fulfilling their purposes depends only on contingent facts about the world, the success of social action is also contingent on how other agents react to what the agent does and how that agent reacts to other agents, and so on. An agent successfully communicates, e.g., not merely by finding some appropriate expression in an existing symbol system, but also by understanding how other agents will understand him. Game theory describes and explains another type of double contingency in its analysis of the interdependency of choices and strategies among rational agents. Games are also significant in two other respects. First, they exemplify the cognitive requirements for social interaction, as in Mead’s analysis of agents’ perspective taking: as a subject “I”, I am an object for others “me”, and can take a third-person perspective along with others on the interaction itself “the generalized other”. Second, games are regulated by shared rules and mediated through symbolic meanings; Vitters’s private language argument establishes that rules cannot be followed “privately.” Some philosophers, such as Peter Winch, conclude from this argument that rule-following is a basic feature of distinctively social action. Some actions are social in the sense that they can only be done in groups. Individualists such as Weber, Jon Elster, and Raimo Tuomela believe that these can be analyzed as the sum of the actions of each individual. But holists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Margaret Gilbert reject this reduction and argue that in social actions agents must see themselves as members of a collective agent. Holism has stronger or weaker versions: strong holists, such as Durkheim and Hegel, see the collective subject as singular, the collective consciousness of a society. Weak holists, such as Gilbert and Habermas, believe that social actions have plural, rather than singular, collective subjects. Holists generally establish the plausibility of their view by referring to larger contexts and sequences of action, such as shared symbol systems or social institutions. Explanations of social actions thus refer not only to the mutual expectations of agents, but also to these larger causal contexts, shared meanings, and mechanisms of coordination. Theories of social action must then explain the emergence of social order, and proposals range from Hobbes’s coercive authority to Talcott Parsons’s value consensus about shared goals among the members of groups. -- social biology, the understanding of social behavior, especially human social behavior, from a biological perspective; often connected with the political philosophy of social Darwinism. Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species highlighted the significance of social behavior in organic evolution, and in the Descent of Man, he showed how significant such behavior is for humans. He argued that it is a product of natural selection; but it was not until 4 that the English biologist William Hamilton showed precisely how such behavior could evolve, namely through “kin selection” as an aid to the biological wellbeing of close relatives. Since then, other models of explanation have been proposed, extending the theory to non-relatives. Best known is the self-describing “reciprocal altruism.” Social biology became notorious in 5 when Edward O. Wilson published a major treatise on the subject: Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Accusations of sexism and racism were leveled because Wilson suggested that Western social systems are biologically innate, and that in some respects males are stronger, more aggressive, more naturally promiscuous than females. Critics argued that all social biology is in fact a manifestation of social Darwinism, a nineteenthcentury philosophy owing more to Herbert Spencer than to Charles Darwin, supposedly legitimating extreme laissez-faire economics and an unbridled societal struggle for existence. Such a charge is extremely serious, for as Moore pointed out in his Principia Ethica 3, Spencer surely commits the naturalistic fallacy, inasmuch as he is attempting to derive the way that the world ought to be from the way that it is. Naturally enough, defenders of social biology, or “sociobiology” as it is now better known, denied vehemently that their science is mere right-wing ideology by another name. They pointed to many who have drawn very different social conclusions on the basis of biology. Best known is the Russian anarchist Kropotkin, who argued that societies are properly based on a biological propensity to mutual aid. With respect to contemporary debate, it is perhaps fairest to say that sociobiology, particularly that pertaining to humans, did not always show sufficient sensitivity toward all societal groups although certainly there was never the crude racism of the fascist regimes of the 0s. However, recent work is far more careful in these respects. Now, indeed, the study of social behavior from a biological perspective is one of the most exciting and forward-moving branches of the life sciences. -- social choice theory, the theory of the rational action of a group of agents. Important social choices are typically made over alternative means of collectively providing goods. These might be goods for individual members of the group, or more characteristically, public goods, goods such that no one can be excluded from enjoying their benefits once they are available. Perhaps the most central aspect of social choice theory concerns rational individual choice in a social context. Since what is rational for one agent to do will often depend on what is rational for another to do and vice versa, these choices take on a strategic dimension. The prisoner’s dilemma illustrates how it can be very difficult to reconcile individual and collectively rational decisions, especially in non-dynamic contexts. There are many situations, particularly in the provision of public goods, however, where simple prisoner’s dilemmas can be avoided and more manageable coordination problems remain. In these cases, individuals may find it rational to contractually or conventionally bind themselves to courses of action that lead to the greater good of all even though they are not straightforwardly utility-maximizing for particular individuals. Establishing the rationality of these contracts or conventions is one of the leading problems of social choice theory, because coordination can collapse if a rational agent first agrees to cooperate and then reneges and becomes a free rider on the collective efforts of others. Other forms of uncooperative behaviors such as violating rules established by society or being deceptive about one’s preferences pose similar difficulties. Hobbes attempted to solve these problems by proposing that people would agree to submit to the authority of a sovereign whose punitive powers would make uncooperative behavior an unattractive option. It has also been argued that cooperation is rational if the concept of rationality is extended beyond utility-maximizing in the right way. Other arguments stress benefits beyond selfinterest that accrue to cooperators. Another major aspect of social choice theory concerns the rational action of a powerful central authority, or social planner, whose mission is to optimize the social good. Although the central planner may be instituted by rational individual choice, this part of the theory simply assumes the institution. The planner’s task of making a onetime allocation of resources to the production of various commodities is tractable if social good or social utility is known as a function of various commodities. When the planner must take into account dynamical considerations, the technical problems are more difficult. This economic growth theory raises important ethical questions about intergenerational conflict. The assumption of a social analogue of the individual utility functions is particularly worrisome. It can be shown formally that taking the results of majority votes can lead to intransitive social orderings of possible choices and it is, therefore, a generally unsuitable procedure for the planner to follow. Moreover, under very general conditions there is no way of aggregating individual preferences into a consistent social choice function of the kind needed by the planner. -- social constructivism, also called social constructionism, any of a variety of views which claim that knowledge in some area is the product of our social practices and institutions, or of the interactions and negotiations between relevant social groups. Mild versions hold that social factors shape interpretations of the world. Stronger versions maintain that the world, or some significant portion of it, is somehow constituted by theories, practices, and institutions. Defenders often move from mild to stronger versions by insisting that the world is accessible to us only through our interpretations, and that the idea of an independent reality is at best an irrelevant abstraction and at worst incoherent. This philosophical position is distinct from, though distantly related to, a view of the same name in social and developmental psychology, associated with such figures as Piaget and Lev Vygotsky, which sees learning as a process in which subjects actively construct knowledge. Social constructivism has roots in Kant’s idealism, which claims that we cannot know things in themselves and that knowledge of the world is possible only by imposing pre-given categories of thought on otherwise inchoate experience. But where Kant believed that the categories with which we interpret and thus construct the world are given a priori, contemporary constructivists believe that the relevant concepts and associated practices vary from one group or historical period to another. Since there are no independent standards for evaluating conceptual schemes, social constructivism leads naturally to relativism. These views are generally thought to be present in Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which argues that observation and methods in science are deeply theory-dependent and that scientists with fundamentally different assumptions or paradigms effectively live in different worlds. Kuhn thus offers a view of science in opposition to both scientific realism which holds that theory-dependent methods can give us knowledge of a theory-independent world and empiricism which draws a sharp line between theory and observation. Kuhn was reluctant to accept the apparently radical consequences of his views, but his work has influenced recent social studies of science, whose proponents frequently embrace both relativism and strong constructivism. Another influence is the principle of symmetry advocated by David Bloor and Barry Barnes, which holds that sociologists should explain the acceptance of scientific views in the same way whether they believe those views to be true or to be false. This approach is elaborated in the work of Harry Collins, Steve Woolgar, and others. Constructivist themes are also prominent in the work of feminist critics of science such as Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway, and in the complex views of Bruno Latour. Critics, such as Richard Boyd and Philip Kitcher, while applauding the detailed case studies produced by constructivists, claim that the positive arguments for constructivism are fallacious, that it fails to account satisfactorily for actual scientific practice, and that like other versions of idealism and relativism it is only dubiously coherent. Then there’s the idea of a ‘contract,’ or social contract, an agreement either between the people and their ruler, or among the people in a community. The idea of a social contract has been used in arguments that differ in what they aim to justify or explain e.g., the state, conceptions of justice, morality, what they take the problem of justification to be, and whether or not they presuppose a moral theory or purport to be a moral theory. Traditionally the term has been used in arguments that attempt to explain the nature of political obligation and/or the kind of responsibility that rulers have to their subjects. Philosophers such as Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant argue that human beings would find life in a prepolitical “state of nature” a state that some argue is also presocietal so difficult that they would agree either with one another or with a prospective ruler to the creation of political institutions that each believes would improve his or her lot. Note that because the argument explains political or social cohesion as the product of an agreement among individuals, it makes these individuals conceptually prior to political or social units. Marx and other socialist and communitarian thinkers have argued against conceptualizing an individual’s relationship to her political and social community in this way. Have social contracts in political societies actually taken place? Hume ridicules the idea that they are real, and questions what value makebelieve agreements can have as explanations of actual political obligations. Although many social contract theorists admit that there is almost never an explicit act of agreement in a community, nonetheless they maintain that such an agreement is implicitly made when members of the society engage in certain acts through which they give their tacit consent to the ruling regime. It is controversial what actions constitute giving tacit consent: Plato and Locke maintain that the acceptance of benefits is sufficient to give such consent, but some have argued that it is wrong to feel obliged to those who foist upon us benefits for which we have not asked. It is also unclear how much of an obligation a person can be under if he gives only tacit consent to a regime. How are we to understand the terms of a social contract establishing a state? When the people agree to obey the ruler, do they surrender their own power to him, as Hobbes tried to argue? Or do they merely lend him that power, reserving the right to take it from him if and when they see fit, as Locke maintained? If power is merely on loan to the ruler, rebellion against him could be condoned if he violates the conditions of that loan. But if the people’s grant of power is a surrender, there are no such conditions, and the people could never be justified in taking back that power via revolution. Despite controversies surrounding their interpretation, social contract arguments have been important to the development of modern democratic states: the idea of the government as the creation of the people, which they can and should judge and which they have the right to overthrow if they find it wanting, contributed to the development of democratic forms of polity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. and revolutionaries explicitly acknowledged their debts to social contract theorists such as Locke and Rousseau. In the twentieth century, the social contract idea has been used as a device for defining various moral conceptions e.g. theories of justice by those who find its focus on individuals useful in the development of theories that argue against views e.g. utilitarianism that allow individuals to be sacrificed for the benefit of the group -- social epistemology, the study of the social dimensions or determinants of knowledge, or the ways in which social factors promote or perturb the quest for knowledge. Some writers use the term ‘knowledge’ loosely, as designating mere belief. On their view social epistemology should simply describe how social factors influence beliefs, without concern for the rationality or truth of these beliefs. Many historians and sociologists of science, e.g., study scientific practices in the same spirit that anthropologists study native cultures, remaining neutral about the referential status of scientists’ constructs or the truth-values of their beliefs. Others try to show that social factors like political or professional interests are causally operative, and take such findings to debunk any objectivist pretensions of science. Still other writers retain a normative, critical dimension in social epistemology, but do not presume that social practices necessarily undermine objectivity. Even if knowledge is construed as true or rational belief, social practices might enhance knowledge acquisition. One social practice is trusting the opinions of authorities, a practice that can produce truth if the trusted authorities are genuinely authoritative. Such trust may also be perfectly rational in a complex world, where division of epistemic labor is required. Even a scientist’s pursuit of extra-epistemic interests such as professional rewards may not be antithetical to truth in favorable circumstances. Institutional provisions, e.g., judicial rules of evidence, provide another example of social factors. Exclusionary rules might actually serve the cause of truth or accuracy in judgment if the excluded evidence would tend to mislead or prejudice jurors. -- social philosophy, broadly the philosophy of socisocial Darwinism social philosophy 856 856 ety, including the philosophy of social science and many of its components, e.g., economics and history, political philosophy, most of what we now think of as ethics, and philosophy of law. But we may distinguish two narrower senses. In one, it is the conceptual theory of society, including the theory of the study of society the common part of all the philosophical studies mentioned. In the other, it is a normative study, the part of moral philosophy that concerns social action and individual involvement with society in general. The central job of social philosophy in the first of these narrower senses is to articulate the correct notion or concept of society. This would include formulating a suitable definition of ‘society’; the question is then which concepts are better for which purposes, and how they are related. Thus we may distinguish “thin” and “thick” conceptions of society. The former would identify the least that can be said before we cease talking about society at all say, a number of people who interact, whose actions affect the behavior of their fellows. Thicker conceptions would then add such things as community rules, goals, customs, and ideals. An important empirical question is whether any interacting groups ever do lack such things and what if anything is common to the rules, etc., that actual societies have. Descriptive social philosophy will obviously border on, if not merge into, social science itself, e.g. into sociology, social psychology, or economics. And some outlooks in social philosophy will tend to ally with one social science as more distinctively typical than others e.g., the individualist view looks to economics, the holist to sociology. A major methodological controversy concerns holism versus individualism. Holism maintains that at least some social groups must be studied as units, irreducible to their members: we cannot understand a society merely by understanding the actions and motivations of its members. Individualism denies that societies are “organisms,” and holds that we can understand society only in that way. Classic G. sociologists e.g., Weber distinguished between Gesellschaft, whose paradigm is the voluntary association, such as a chess club, whose activities are the coordinated actions of a number of people who intentionally join that group in order to pursue the purposes that identify it; and Gemeinschaft, whose members find their identities in that group. Thus, the are not a group whose members teamed up with like-minded people to form society. They were before they had separate individual purposes. The holist views society as essentially a Gemeinschaft. Individualists agree that there are such groupings but deny that they require a separate kind of irreducibly collective explanation: to understand the we must understand how typical individuals behave compared, say, with the G.s, and so on. The methods of Western economics typify the analytical tendencies of methodological individualism, showing how we can understand large-scale economic phenomena in terms of the rational actions of particular economic agents. Cf. Adam Smith’s invisible hand thesis: each economic agent seeks only his own good, yet the result is the macrophenomenal good of the whole. Another pervasive issue concerns the role of intentional characterizations and explanations in these fields. Ordinary people explain behavior by reference to its purposes, and they formulate these in terms that rely on public rules of language and doubtless many other rules. To understand society, we must hook onto the selfunderstanding of the people in that society this view is termed Verstehen. Recent work in philosophy of science raises the question whether intentional concepts can really be fundamental in explaining anything, and whether we must ultimately conceive people as in some sense material systems, e.g. as computer-like. Major questions for the program of replicating human intelligence in data-processing terms cf. artificial intelligence are raised by the symbolic aspects of interaction. Additionally, we should note the emergence of sociobiology as a potent source of explanations of social phenomena. Normative social philosophy, in turn, tends inevitably to merge into either politics or ethics, especially the part of ethics dealing with how people ought to treat others, especially in large groups, in relation to social institutions or social structures. This contrasts with ethics in the sense concerned with how individual people may attain the good life for themselves. All such theories allot major importance to social relations; but if one’s theory leaves the individual wide freedom of choice, then a theory of individually chosen goods will still have a distinctive subject matter. The normative involvements of social philosophy have paralleled the foregoing in important ways. Individualists have held that the good of a society must be analyzed in terms of the goods of its individual members. Of special importance has been the view that society must respect indisocial philosophy social philosophy 857 857 vidual rights, blocking certain actions alleged to promote social good as a whole. Organicist philosophers such as Hegel hold that it is the other way around: the state or nation is higher than the individual, who is rightly subordinated to it, and individuals have fundamental duties toward the groups of which they are members. Outrightly fascist versions of such views are unpopular today, but more benign versions continue in modified form, notably by communitarians. Socialism and especially communism, though focused originally on economic aspects of society, have characteristically been identified with the organicist outlook. Their extreme opposite is to be found in the libertarians, who hold that the right to individual liberty is fundamental in society, and that no institutions may override that right. Libertarians hold that society ought to be treated strictly as an association, a Gesellschaft, even though they might not deny that it is ontogenetically Gemeinschaft. They might agree that religious groups, e.g., cannot be wholly understood as separate individuals. Nevertheless, the libertarian holds that religious and cultural practices may not be interfered with or even supported by society. Libertarians are strong supporters of free-market economic methods, and opponents of any sort of state intervention into the affairs of individuals. Social Darwinism, advocating the “survival of the socially fittest,” has sometimes been associated with the libertarian view. Insofar as there is any kind of standard view on these matters, it combines elements of both individualism and holism. Typical social philosophers today accept that society has duties, not voluntary for individual members, to support education, health, and some degree of welfare for all. But they also agree that individual rights are to be respected, especially civil rights, such as freedom of speech and religion. How to combine these two apparently disparate sets of ideas into a coherent whole is the problem. John Rawls’s celebrated Theory of Justice, 1, is a contemporary classic that attempts to do just that. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Grice and Grice on the conversational contract.”

E: SUBJECT INDEX: EXPLICATVM

E: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN:

ECO

ENESIDEMO

EMPEDOCLE

EPITTETO

EVOLA

E: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH.

e: the ‘universalis abdicative.’ Cf. Grice on the Square of Opposition, or figura quadrata -- Grice, “Circling the square of Opposition.” Grice: “There is an asymmetry here. It’s supposed to be from Affirmo/Nego, but Affirmo has THREE vowels, and Nego, two; therefore, the o in affirmo is otiose.”

Ǝ: Ǝx. From EX-SISTENS -- Grice: “The inverted E is supposed to stand for ‘exist,’ which is a Ciceronianism – I mean, The Romans thought that you could sist, insist, or exist!” -- The existential quantifier. When Gentzen used /\ and \/ for ‘all’ and ‘some’ he is being logical, since ‘all’ and ‘some’ behave like ‘and’ and ‘or.’ This is not transparently shown at all by the use of the inverted A and the inverted E. This Grice called Grice’s Proportion: “and:or::every:some”. Grice: “Surely there is a relation of ‘every’ to ‘and’ and ‘some’ to ‘or.’” “Given a finite domain of discourse D = {a1, ... an} “every” is equivalent to an “and” propositions “Pai /\, … Pan.””“Analogously, “some (at least one”) is equivalent to an “or” proposition having the same structure as before:“Pai V, … Pan.”“For an infinite domain of discourse the equivalences are pretty similar, and I shouldn’t bother you with it for two long. But consider the statement, “1 + 1, and 2 + 2, 3 + 3, ..., and 100 + 100, and ..., etc.” This is an infinite “and” proposition. From the point of view of a system like System G, this may seem a problem. Syntax rules are expected to generate finite formulae. But my example above is fortunate in that there is a procedure to generate every conjunct. Now, as Austin once suggested to me, having translated Frege, an assertion were to be made about every *irrational* number, it would seem that is no (Fregeian) way to enumerate every conjunct, since irrational numbers cannot be enumerated. However, a succinct equivalent formulation which avoids this problem with the ‘irrational’ number uses “every” quantification. For each natural number n, n · 2 = n + n. An analogous analysis applies to the “or” proposition: “1 is equal to 5 + 5, 2\/ is equal to 5 + 5, \/ 3 is equal to 5 + 5, ... , \/ 100 is equal to 5 + 5, or ..., etc.” This is easily rephrasable using “some (at least one)” quantification: “For SOME natural number n, n is equal to 5+5. Aristotelian predicate calculus rescued from undue existential import As ... universal quantifier and conjunction and, on the other, between the existential quantifier and disjunction. This analogy has not passed unnoticed in logical circles. ... existential quantifiers correspond to the conjunction and disjunction operators, ...analogous analysis applies to propositional logic. ... symbol 'V' for the existential quantifier in the 'Californian' notation’ (so-called by H. P. Grice when briefly visiting Berkeley) which was ... In Grice’s system G, the quantifiers are symbolized with larger versions of the symbols used for conjunction and disjunction. Although quantified expressions cannot be translated into expressions without quantifiers, there is a conceptual connection between the universal quantifier and conjunction and between the existential quantifier and disjunction. Consider the sentence ∃xPxxPx, for example. It means that either the first member of the UD is a PP, or the second one is, or the third one is, . . . . Such a system uses the symbol ‘⋁’ instead of ‘∃.’ Grice’s manoeuver to think of the quantifier versions of De Morgan's laws is an interesting one. The statement ∀xP(x)∀xP(x) is very much like a big conjunction. If the universe of discourse is the positive integers, for example, then it is equivalent to the statement that “P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯” or, more concisely, we might write “⋀x∈UP(x),⋀x∈UP(x),” using notation similar to "sigma notation'' for sums. Of course, this is not really a "statement'' in our official mathematical logic, because we don't allow infinitely long formulas. In the same way, ∃xP(x)∃xP(x) can be thought of as “⋁x∈UP(x).⋁x∈UP(x). Now the first quantifier law can be written “¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),” which looks very much like the law “¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),” but with an infinite conjunction and disjunction. Note that we can also rewrite De Morgan's laws for ∧∧ and ∨∨ as “¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).” As Grice says, “this may look initially cumbersome, but it reflects the close relationship with the quantifier forms of De Morgan's laws.” Cited by Grice as translatable by “some (at least one)”. Noting the divergence that Strawson identified but fails to identify as a conversational implicaturum. It relates in the case of the square of opposition to the ‘particularis’ but taking into account or NOT taking into account the ‘unnecessary implication,’ as Russell calls it. “Take ‘every man is mortal.’ Surely we don’t need the unnecessary implication that there is a man!”

eco: Eco philosophised at the oldest varsity, Bologna – Grice: “Of course, ‘varsity’ is over-rated, as I’m sure Cicero would agree!” -- Grice: “I would not call Eco a philosopher, since his dissertation is on aesthetics in Aquinas! Plus, he wrote a novel!” -- scuola bolognese-- possibly, after Speranza, one of the most Griceian of Italian philosophers (Only Speranza calls himself an Oxonian, rather! – “Surely alma mater trumps all!”). Umberto Eco (Alessandria, 5 gennaio 1932 – Milano, 19 febbraio 2016[1][2]) è stato un semiologo, filosofo, scrittore, traduttore, accademico, bibliofilo e medievista italiano. Autografo di Eco apposto all'edizione tedesca di Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale. Saggista e intellettuale di fama mondiale, ha scritto numerosi saggi di semiotica, estetica medievale, linguistica e filosofia, oltre a romanzi di successo. Nel 1971 è stato tra gli ispiratori del primo corso del DAMS all'Università di Bologna[3][4]. Sempre nello stesso ateneo, negli anni Ottanta ha promosso l'attivazione del corso di laurea in Scienze della comunicazione[5], già attivo in altre sedi. Nel 1988 ha fondato il Dipartimento della Comunicazione dell'Università di San Marino. Dal 2008 era professore emerito e presidente della Scuola Superiore di Studi Umanistici dell'Università di Bologna.[6] Dal 12 novembre 2010 Umberto Eco era socio dell'Accademia dei Lincei, per la classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filosofiche.[7] Tra i suoi romanzi più famosi figura Il nome della rosa, tradotto in più di 40 lingue, che è divenuto un bestseller internazionale avendo venduto oltre 50 milioni di copie in tutto il mondo; da quest'opera sono stati tratti un film ed una serie televisiva.[8] Figlio di Rita Bisio e di Giulio Eco, un impiegato nelle Ferrovie, conseguì la maturità al liceo classico Giovanni Plana di Alessandria,[9] sua città natale. Tra i suoi compagni di classe, vi era il fisarmonicista Gianni Coscia, con il quale scrisse spettacoli di rivista.[10] In gioventù fu impegnato nella GIAC (l'allora ramo giovanile dell'Azione Cattolica) e nei primi anni cinquanta fu chiamato tra i responsabili nazionali del movimento studentesco dell'AC (progenitore dell'attuale MSAC). Nel 1954 abbandonò l'incarico (così come avevano fatto Carlo Carretto e Mario Rossi) in polemica con Luigi Gedda. Durante i suoi studi universitari su Tommaso d'Aquino, smise di credere in Dio e lasciò definitivamente la Chiesa cattolica;[11] in una nota ironica, in seguito commentò: «si può dire che lui Tommaso d'Aquino mi abbia miracolosamente curato dalla fede».[12][13] Laureatosi in filosofia nel 1954 all'Università di Torino (agli esami riportò sempre 30/30, anche con lode, tranne quattro casi: filosofia teoretica e letteratura latina, in cui ottenne 29/30, e storia della letteratura italiana e pedagogia, entrambi superati con 27/30) [14] con relatore Luigi Pareyson e tesi sull'estetica di San Tommaso d'Aquino (controrelatore Augusto Guzzo), cominciò a interessarsi di filosofia e cultura medievale, campo d'indagine mai più abbandonato (vedi il volume Dall'albero al labirinto), anche se successivamente si dedicò allo studio semiotico della cultura popolare contemporanea e all'indagine critica sullo sperimentalismo letterario e artistico. Nel 1956 pubblicò il suo primo libro, un'estensione della sua tesi di laurea dal titolo Il problema estetico in San Tommaso. Nel 1954 partecipò e vinse un concorso della Rai per l'assunzione di telecronisti e nuovi funzionari; con Eco vi entrarono anche Furio Colombo e Gianni Vattimo. Tutti e tre abbandonarono l'ente televisivo entro la fine degli anni cinquanta. Nel concorso successivo entrarono Emmanuele Milano, Fabiano Fabiani, Angelo Guglielmi, e molti altri. I vincitori dei primi concorsi furono in seguito etichettati come i "corsari" perché seguirono un corso di formazione diretto da Pier Emilio Gennarini e avrebbero dovuto, secondo le intenzioni del dirigente Filiberto Guala, "svecchiare" i programmi. Con altri ingressi successivi, come quelli di Gianni Serra, Emilio Garroni e Luigi Silori, questi giovani intellettuali innovarono davvero l'ambiente culturale della televisione, ancora molto legato a personalità provenienti dall'EIAR, venendo in seguito considerati come i veri promotori della centralità della RAI nel sistema culturale italiano.[15] Dall'esperienza lavorativa in RAI, incluse amicizie con membri del Gruppo 63, Eco trasse spunto per molti scritti, tra cui il celebre articolo del 1961 Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno. Dal 1959 al 1975 fu codirettore editoriale della casa editrice Bompiani. Nel 1962 pubblicò il saggio Opera aperta che, con sorpresa dello stesso autore, ebbe notevole risonanza a livello internazionale e diede le basi teoriche al Gruppo 63, movimento d'avanguardia letterario e artistico italiano che suscitò interesse negli ambienti critico-letterari anche per le polemiche che destò criticando fortemente autori all'epoca già "consacrati" dalla fama come Carlo Cassola, Giorgio Bassani e Vasco Pratolini, ironicamente definiti "Liale", con riferimento a Liala, autrice di romanzi rosa.[16] Nel 1961 ebbe inizio anche la sua carriera universitaria che lo portò a tenere corsi, in qualità di professore incaricato, in diverse università italiane: Torino, Milano, Firenze e, infine, Bologna dove ha ottenuto la cattedra di Semiotica nel 1975, diventando professore ordinario.[16] All'Università di Bologna è stato fra i fondatori del primo corso di laurea in DAMS (era il 1971), poi è stato direttore dell'Istituto di Comunicazione e spettacolo del DAMS, e in seguito ha dato inizio al corso di laurea in Scienze della comunicazione. Infine è divenuto Presidente della Scuola Superiore di Studi Umanistici, fondata nel 2000, che coordina l'attività dei dottorati bolognesi del settore umanistico, e dove nel 2001 ha ideato il Master in Editoria Cartacea e Digitale.[17] Nel corso degli anni ha insegnato come professore invitato alla New York University, Northwestern University, Columbia University, Yale University, Harvard University, University of California-San Diego, Cambridge University, Oxford University, Università di São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro, La Plata e Buenos Aires, Collège de France, École normale supérieure (Parigi). Nell'ottobre 2007 si è ritirato dall'insegnamento per limiti di età. Dalla fine degli anni cinquanta, Eco cominciò a interessarsi all'influenza dei mass media nella cultura di massa, su cui pubblicò articoli in diversi giornali e riviste, poi in gran parte confluiti in Diario minimo (1963) e Apocalittici e integrati (1964).[18] Apocalittici e integrati (che ebbe una nuova edizione nel 1977) analizzò con taglio sociologico le comunicazioni di massa. Il tema era già stato affrontato in Diario minimo, che includeva tra gli altri il breve articolo del 1961 Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno. Sullo stesso tema, nel 1967 svolse a New York il seminario Per una guerriglia semiologica, in seguito pubblicato ne Il costume di casa (1973) e frequentemente citato nelle discussioni sulla controcultura e la resistenza al potere dei mass media[19]. Significativa fu anche la sua attenzione per le correlazioni tra dittatura e cultura di massa ne Il fascismo eterno, capitolo del saggio Cinque scritti morali,[20] dove individuava le caratteristiche, ricorrenti nel tempo, del cosiddetto "fascismo eterno", o "Ur-fascismo": il culto della tradizione, il rifiuto del modernismo, il culto dell'azione per l'azione, il disaccordo come tradimento, la paura delle differenze, l'appello alle classi medie frustrate, l'ossessione del complotto, il machismo, il "populismo qualitativo Tv e Internet" e altre ancora; da esse e dalle loro combinazioni, secondo Eco, è possibile anche "smascherare" le forme di fascismo che si riproducono da sempre "in ogni parte del mondo". In un'intervista del 24 aprile 2010 mise in evidenza la sua visione rispetto a Wikipedia, della quale Eco si definiva un "utente compulsivo", e al mondo dell'open source.[21] Nel 1968 pubblicò il suo primo libro di teoria semiotica, La struttura assente,[19] cui seguirono il fondamentale Trattato di semiotica generale (1975) e gli articoli per l'Enciclopedia Einaudi poi riuniti in Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio (1984). Nel 1971 fondò Versus - Quaderni di studi semiotici, una delle maggiori riviste internazionali di semiotica, rimanendone direttore responsabile e membro del comitato scientifico fino alla morte. È anche stato segretario, vicepresidente e dal 1994 presidente onorario della IASS/AIS ("International Association for Semiotic Studies"). È stato invitato a tenere le prestigiose conferenze Tanner (Università di Cambridge, 1990), Norton (Università di Harvard, 1993), Goggio (Università di Toronto, 1998), Weidenfeld (Università di Oxford, 2002) e Richard Ellmann (Università Emory, 2008). Collaborò sin dalla sua fondazione, nel 1955, al settimanale L'Espresso, sul quale dal 1985 al 2016 tenne in ultima pagina la rubrica La bustina di minerva (nella quale, tra l'altro, dichiarò di aver contribuito personalmente alla propria voce su Wikipedia[22]), ai giornali Il Giorno, La Stampa, Corriere della Sera, la Repubblica, il manifesto[23] e a innumerevoli riviste internazionali specializzate, tra cui Semiotica (fondata nel 1969 da Thomas Albert Sebeok), Poetics Today, Degrès, Structuralist Review, Text, Communications (rivista parigina del EHESS), Problemi dell'informazione, Word & Images, o riviste letterarie e di dibattito culturale quali Quindici, Il Verri (fondata da Luciano Anceschi), Alfabeta, Il cavallo di Troia, ecc. Collaborò alla collana "Fare l'Europa" diretta da Jacques Le Goff con lo studio La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea (1993), in cui si espresse a favore dell'utilizzo dell'esperanto. Tradusse gli Esercizi di stile di Raymond Queneau (nel 1983) e Sylvie di Gérard de Nerval (nel 1999 entrambi presso Einaudi) e introdusse opere di numerosi scrittori e di artisti. Ha anche collaborato con i musicisti Luciano Berio e Sylvano Bussotti. I suoi dibattiti, spesso dal tono divertito, con Luciano Nanni, Omar Calabrese, Paolo Fabbri, Ugo Volli, Francesco Leonetti, Nanni Balestrini, Guido Almansi, Achille Bonito Oliva o Maria Corti, tanto per nominarne alcuni, hanno aggiunto contributi non scritti alla storia degli intellettuali italiani, soprattutto quando sfioravano argomenti non consueti (o almeno non ritenuti tali prima dell'intervento di Eco), come la figura di James Bond, l'enigmistica, la fisiognomica, la serialità televisiva, il romanzo d'appendice, il fumetto, il labirinto, la menzogna, le società segrete o più seriamente gli annosi concetti di abduzione, di canone e di classico.[senza fonte] Grande appassionato del fumetto Dylan Dog,[24] a Eco è stato fatto tributo sul numero 136 attraverso il personaggio Humbert Coe, che ha affiancato l'indagatore dell'incubo in un'indagine sull'origine delle lingue del mondo. È stato inoltre amico del pittore e autore di fumetti Andrea Pazienza[25] che fu suo allievo al DAMS di Bologna, e ha scritto la prefazione a libri di Hugo Pratt, Charles Monroe Schulz, Jules Feiffer e Raymond Peynet. Scrisse la presentazione di "Cuore" a fumetti, di F. Bonzi e Alain Denis, pubblicata su "Linus" nel 1975. Nel 1980 Eco esordì nella narrativa. Il suo primo romanzo, Il nome della rosa, riscontrò un grande successo sia presso la critica sia presso il pubblico, tanto da divenire un best seller internazionale tradotto in 47 lingue e venduto in trenta milioni di copie. Il nome della rosa è stato anche tra i finalisti del prestigioso Edgar Award nel 1984 e ha vinto il Premio Strega.[26] Dal lavoro fu tratto anche un celebre film con Sean Connery. Nel 1988 pubblicò il suo secondo romanzo, Il pendolo di Foucault, satira dell'interpretazione paranoica dei fatti veri o leggendari della storia e delle sindromi del complotto. Questa critica dell'interpretazione incontrollata viene ripresa in opere teoriche sulla ricezione (cfr. I limiti dell'interpretazione). Romanzi successivi sono L'isola del giorno prima (1994), Baudolino (2000), La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana (2004), Il cimitero di Praga (2010) e Numero zero (2015), tutti editi in italiano da Bompiani. Nel 2012 è stata pubblicata una versione "riveduta e corretta" del suo primo romanzo Il nome della rosa, con una nota finale dello stesso Eco che, mantenendo stile e struttura narrativa, è intervenuto a eliminare ripetizioni ed errori, a modificare l'impianto delle citazioni latine e la descrizione della faccia del bibliotecario per togliere un riferimento neogotico. Molte opere furono dedicate alle teorie della narrazione e della letteratura: Il superuomo di massa (1976), Lector in fabula (1979), Sei passeggiate nei boschi narrativi (1994), Sulla letteratura (2002), Dire quasi la stessa cosa (2003, sulla traduzione). È stato inoltre precursore e divulgatore dell'applicazione della tecnologia alla scrittura. In contemporanea alla nomina di "guest curator" (curatore ospite) del Louvre, dove nel mese di novembre 2009 organizzò una serie di eventi e manifestazioni culturali[27], uscì per Bompiani Vertigine della lista, pubblicato in quattordici paesi del mondo. Nel 2011 Bompiani pubblicò una raccolta dal titolo Costruire il nemico e altri scritti occasionali, che raccoglie saggi occasionali che spaziano nei vari interessi dell'autore, come quello per la narratologia e il feuilleton ottocentesco. Il primo saggio riprende temi già presenti ne Il cimitero di Praga. Muore nella sua casa di Milano il 19 febbraio 2016 alle ore 22:30,[1][2] a causa di un tumore del pancreas che lo aveva colpito due anni prima.[28] I funerali laici si sono svolti il 23 febbraio 2016 nel Castello Sforzesco di Milano, dove migliaia di persone si sono recate per l'ultimo saluto.[29] Sono state eseguite due composizioni alla viola da gamba e al clavicembalo: Couplets de folies (Les folies d'Espagne) dalla Suite n. 1 in re maggiore dai Pièces de viole, Livre II (1701) di Marin Marais e La Folia dalla Sonata per violino e basso continuo in re minore, op. 5 n. 12 (1700) di Arcangelo Corelli.[30] Nel proprio testamento Eco ha chiesto ai suoi familiari di non autorizzare né promuovere, per i dieci anni successivi alla sua morte (quindi sino al 2026), alcun seminario o conferenza su di lui.[31] Il corpo di Eco è stato infine cremato. La moglie, Renate Eco-Ramge, rifiutando la proposta di tumularne le ceneri nel Civico Mausoleo Garbin, ex edicola privata del Cimitero Monumentale di Milano ora provvista di piccole cellette destinate a ceneri o resti ossei di personalità artistiche illustri, ne ha preferito la conservazione privata, con il progetto di costruire un'edicola di famiglia nel medesimo cimitero.[32] Nei suoi romanzi, Eco racconta storie realmente accadute o leggende che hanno come protagonisti personaggi storici o inventati. Inserisce nelle sue opere accesi dibattiti filosofici sull'esistenza del vuoto, di Dio o sulla natura dell'universo. Attratto da temi piuttosto misteriosi e oscuri (i cavalieri Templari, il sacro Graal, la sacra Sindone ecc.), nei suoi romanzi gli scienziati e gli uomini che hanno fatto la storia sono spesso trattati con indifferenza dai contemporanei. L'umorismo è l'arma letteraria preferita dallo scrittore di Alessandria, che inserisce innumerevoli citazioni e collegamenti a opere di vario genere, conosciute quasi esclusivamente da filologi e bibliofili. Ciò rende romanzi come Il nome della rosa o L'isola del giorno prima un turbinio variopinto di nozioni di carattere storico, filosofico, artistico e matematico. Centrale ne Il nome della rosa è la questione del riso, post-modernisticamente declinata. Ne Il pendolo di Foucault Eco affronta temi come la ricerca del sacro Graal e la storia dei cavalieri Templari, facendo numerosi cenni ai misteri dell'età antica e moderna, rivisitati in chiave parodistica. Ne L'isola del giorno prima l'umanità intera è simboleggiata dal naufrago Roberto de la Grive, che cerca un'isola al di fuori del tempo e dello spazio. In Baudolino dà vita ad un picaresco personaggio medioevale tutto dedito alla ricerca di un paradiso terrestre (il regno leggendario di Prete Giovanni). Ne La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana riflette sulla forza e sull'essenza stessa del ricordo, rivolto, in questo caso, ad episodi del XX secolo. Il cimitero di Praga è incentrato sulla natura del complotto e, in particolar modo, sulla storia 'europea' del popolo ebraico. Il suo ultimo romanzo, Numero zero, riprendendo temi da sempre cari all'autore (il falso, la costruzione del complotto e delle notizie) si sofferma sulla storia italiana recente, narrando fatti realmente accaduti, ma riletti attraverso una chiave complottistica. Nel 1971 fu tra i 757 firmatari della lettera aperta a L'Espresso sul caso Pinelli e successivamente della autodenuncia di solidarietà a Lotta Continua, in cui una cinquantina di firmatari esprimevano solidarietà verso alcuni militanti e direttori responsabili del giornale, inquisiti per istigazione a delinquere.[33] I firmatari si autodenunciavano alla magistratura dicendo di condividere il contenuto dell'articolo. Peraltro le severe critiche di Eco al terrorismo e ai vari progetti di lotta armata[34] sono contenute in una serie di articoli scritti sul settimanale L'Espresso e su Repubblica, specie ai tempi del caso Moro (articoli poi ripubblicati nel volume Sette anni di desiderio). In effetti l'arma che ha caratterizzato l'impegno politico di Eco è diventata l'analisi critica dei discorsi politici e delle comunicazioni di massa. Questo impegno è sintetizzato nella metafora della guerriglia semiologica dove si sostiene che non è tanto importante cambiare il contenuto dei messaggi alla fonte ma cercare di animare la loro analisi là dove essi arrivano (la formula era: non serve occupare la televisione, bisogna occupare una sedia davanti a ogni televisore). In questo senso la guerriglia semiologica è una forma di critica sociale attraverso l'educazione alla ricezione.[35] Dal 2002 partecipa alle attività dell'associazione Libertà e Giustizia, di cui è uno dei fondatori e garanti più noti, partecipando attivamente tramite le sue iniziative al dibattito politico-culturale italiano. Il suo libro A passo di gambero (2006) contiene le critiche a quello che lui definisce populismo berlusconiano, alla politica di Bush, al cosiddetto scontro tra etnie e religioni. Nel 2011, nelle settimane delle rivolte arabe, durante una conferenza stampa registrata alla Fiera del libro di Gerusalemme, scatena una polemica politica la sua risposta a un giornalista italiano che gli domanda se condivida il paragone fra Berlusconi e Mubarak, avanzato da alcuni: "Il paragone potrebbe essere fatto con Hitler: anche lui giunse al potere con libere elezioni";[36] lo stesso Eco, dalle colonne de l'Espresso, smentirà tale dichiarazione chiarendo le circostanze della sua risposta.[37] Eco faceva parte dell'associazione Aspen Institute Italia.[38] Onorificenze italiane Cavaliere di gran croce dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiana - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCavaliere di gran croce dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica italiana — Roma, 9 gennaio 1996[39] Medaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della cultura e dell'arte - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaMedaglia d'oro ai benemeriti della cultura e dell'arte — Roma, 13 gennaio 1997[40] Onorificenze straniere Commendatore dell'Ordine delle Arti e delle Lettere (Francia) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine delle Arti e delle Lettere (Francia) — 1985 Cavaliere dell'Ordine pour le Mérite für Wissenschaften und Künste (Repubblica Federale di Germania) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCavaliere dell'Ordine pour le Mérite für Wissenschaften und Künste (Repubblica Federale di Germania) — 1998 Premio Principe delle Asturie per la comunicazione e l'umanistica (Spagna) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaPremio Principe delle Asturie per la comunicazione e l'umanistica (Spagna) — 2000 Ufficiale dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaUfficiale dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) — 2003 Gran croce al merito con placca dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica Federale di Germania - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaGran croce al merito con placca dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica Federale di Germania — 2009 Commendatore dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) - nastrino per uniforme ordinariaCommendatore dell'Ordine della Legion d'Onore (Francia) — Parigi, 13 gennaio 2012[41] Cittadinanze onorarie Monte Cerignone, 1981. Nizza Monferrato, 6 novembre 2010. San Leo, 11 giugno 2011. Torre Pellice, 2013. Lauree Eco ha ricevuto 40 lauree honoris causa da prestigiose università europee e americane,[42] come quella del 2014, che gli è stata conferita dall'Università federale del Rio Grande do Sul, di Porto Alegre, in Brasile.[43] Nel giugno 2015 in occasione della laurea in comunicazione conferita dall'Università di Torino, Umberto Eco ha rilasciato severi giudizi sui social del Web che, a suo dire, possono essere utilizzati da «legioni di imbecilli» per porsi sullo stesso piano di un vincitore di un Premio Nobel.[44] Le affermazioni di Eco hanno suscitato approvazioni ma anche vivaci discussioni.[45][46] Affiliazioni e sodalizi accademici Umberto Eco è stato membro onorario (Honorary Trustee) della James Joyce Association, dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Bologna, dell'Academia Europea de Yuste, dell'American Academy of Arts and Letters, dell'Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, della Polska Akademia Umiejętności ("Accademia polacca della Arti"), "Fellow" del St Anne's College di Oxford e socio dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei.[47] Eco è stato inoltre membro onorario del CICAP. Altro Gli è stato dedicato l'asteroide 13069 Umbertoeco, scoperto nel 1991 dall'astronomo belga Eric Walter Elst. Il 12 aprile 2008 è stato nominato Duca dell'Isola del Giorno Prima del regno di Redonda dal re Xavier. Nel 2016 il comune di Milano ha deciso che il suo nome venga iscritto nel Pantheon di Milano, all'interno del cimitero monumentale.[48] Saggistica Eco ha anche scritto numerosi saggi di filosofia, semiotica, linguistica, estetica: Il problema estetico in San Tommaso, Torino, Edizioni di Filosofia, 1956; poi Il problema estetico in Tommaso d'Aquino, 2ª ed., Milano, Bompiani, 1970. Filosofi in libertà, come Dedalus, Torino, Taylor, 1958, poi in Il secondo diario minimo. Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale, in Momenti e problemi di storia dell'estetica, I, Dall'antichità classica al Barocco, Milano, Marzorati, 1959. Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale, Milano, Bompiani, 1987. Storia figurata delle invenzioni. Dalla selce scheggiata al volo spaziale, a cura di e con G. B. Zorzoli, Milano, Bompiani, 1961. Opera aperta. Forma e indeterminazione nelle poetiche contemporanee, Milano, Bompiani, 1962; 1967 sulla base dell'ed. francese 1965; 1971; 1976. Diario minimo, Milano, A. Mondadori, 1963; 1975. (include i saggi Fenomenologia di Mike Bongiorno e Elogio di Franti) Apocalittici e integrati, Milano, Bompiani, 1964; 1977. Il caso Bond. [Le origini, la natura, gli effetti del fenomeno 007], a cura di e con Oreste del Buono, Milano, Bompiani, 1965. Le poetiche di Joyce. Dalla "Summa" al "Finnegans Wake", Milano, Bompiani, 1966. (ed. modificata sulla base della seconda parte di Opera aperta, 1962) Appunti per una semiologia delle comunicazioni visive, Milano, Bompiani, 1967. (poi in La struttura assente) L'Italie par elle-meme. A portrait of Italy. Autoritratto dell'Italia, a cura di e con Giulio Carlo Argan, Guido Piovene, Luigi Chiarini, Vittorio Gregotti e altri, Milano, Bompiani, 1967. La struttura assente, Milano, Bompiani, 1968; 1980. La definizione dell'arte, Milano, Mursia, 1968. L'arte come mestiere, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. I sistemi di segni e lo strutturalismo sovietico, a cura di e con Remo Faccani, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. L'industria della cultura, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1969. Le forme del contenuto, Milano, Bompiani, 1971. I fumetti di Mao, a cura di e con Jean Chesneaux e Gino Nebiolo, Bari, Laterza, 1971. Cent'anni dopo. Il ritorno dell'intreccio, a cura di e con Cesare Sughi, Milano, Bompiani, 1971. Documenti su il nuovo Medioevo, con Francesco Alberoni, Furio Colombo e Giuseppe Sacco, Milano, Bompiani, 1972. Estetica e teoria dell'informazione, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 1972. I pampini bugiardi. Indagine sui libri al di sopra di ogni sospetto: i testi delle scuole elementari, a cura di e con Marisa Bonazzi, Rimini, Guaraldi, 1972. Il segno, Milano, Isedi, 1973; Milano, A. Mondadori, 1980. Il costume di casa. Evidenze e misteri dell'ideologia italiana, Milano, Bompiani, 1973. Beato di Liébana. Miniature del Beato de Fernando I y Sancha. Codice B.N. Madrid Vit. 14-2, testo e commenti alle tavole di, Milano, Franco Maria Ricci, 1973. Eugenio Carmi. Una pittura di paesaggio?, Milano, Prearo, 1973. Trattato di semiotica generale, Milano, Bompiani, 1975. (EN) A Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1976. (e London, Macmillan, 1977) [versione inglese originale del Trattato di semiotica generale] Il superuomo di massa. Studi sul romanzo popolare, Roma, Cooperativa Scrittori, 1976; Milano, Bompiani, 1978. Stelle & stellette. La via lattea mormorò, illustrazioni di Philippe Druillet, Conegliano Treviso, Quadragono Libri, 1976. Storia di una rivoluzione mai esistita. L'esperimento Vaduz. Appunti del Servizio opinioni, n.292, settembre 1976, Roma, Rai, Servizio Opinioni, 1976. Dalla periferia dell'impero, Milano, Bompiani, 1977. Come si fa una tesi di laurea, Milano, Bompiani, 1977. Carolina Invernizio, Matilde Serao, Liala, con altri, Firenze, La nuova Italia, 1979. (EN) The Role of the Reader, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979. (contiene saggi tratti da Opera aperta, Apocalittici e integrati, Forme del contenuto, Lector in Fabula e Il superuomo di massa) (EN, FR) A semiotic Landscape. Panorama sémiotique. Proceedings of the Ist Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Den Haag, Paris, New York, Mouton (Approaches to Semiotics, 29) (a cura di, con Seymour Chatman e Jean-Marie Klinkenberg). Lector in fabula, Milano, Bompiani, 1979. (EN) Function and sign, the semiotics of architecture; A componential analysis of the architectural sign /column/, in Geoffrey Broadbent, Richard Bunt, Charles Jencks (a cura di), Signs, symbols and architecture, Chichester-New York, Wiley, 1980. (EL) E semeiologia sten kathemerine zoe, Thessaloniki, Malliares, 1980. (antologia di saggi). De bibliotheca, Milano, Comune di Milano, 1981. Postille al nome della rosa, Milano, Bompiani, 1983. The Sign of Three. Peirce, Holmes, Dupin (a cura di, con Thomas A. Sebeok), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983 (trad. Il segno dei tre, Milano, Bompiani) Sette anni di desiderio. [Cronache, 1977-1983], Milano, Bompiani, 1983. Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, Torino, Einaudi, 1984, ISBN 88-06-05690-5. (PT) Conceito de texto, São Paulo, Queiroz, 1984. Sugli specchi e altri saggi, Milano, Bompiani, 1985. (DE) Streit der Interpretationen, Konstanz, Universitätverlag Konstanz GMBH, 1987. (FR) Notes sur la sémiotique de la réception, in "Actes sémiotiques. Documents", IX, 81, 1987. (ZH) Jie gou zhu yi he fu hao xue. Dian ying wen ji, San lien shu dian chu ban fa xing, Np, 1987. (edizione cinese di articoli vari originariamente pubblicati in inglese e francese) (EN) Meaning and mental representations (a cura di, con M. Santambrogio e Patrizia Violi), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988. (DE) Im Labyrinth der Vernunft. Texte über Kunst und Zeichen, Leipzig, Reclam, 1989. (antologia di saggi) Lo strano caso della Hanau 1609, Milano, Bompiani, 1989. Saggio in Leggere i Promessi sposi. Analisi semiotiche, a cura di Giovanni Manetti, Milano, Gruppo editoriale Fabbri-Bompiani-Sonzogno-ETAS, 1989, ISBN 88-452-1466-4. (DE) Auf dem Wege zu einem Neuen Mittelalter, München, DTV Grossdruck, 1990. (antologia di saggi). I limiti dell'interpretazione, Milano, Bompiani, 1990, ISBN 88-452-1657-8. Vocali, con Soluzioni felici di Paolo Domenico Malvinni, Napoli, Collana "Clessidra" di Alfredo Guida Ed., 1991, ISBN 88-7188-024-2. Il secondo diario minimo, Milano, Bompiani, 1992, ISBN 88-452-1833-3. (EN) Interpretation and Overinterpretation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. La memoria vegetale, Milano, Rovello, 1992. La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1993, ISBN 88-420-4287-0. (EL) Ton augousto den Uparchoun eideseis, Thessaloniki, Parateretés, 1993. (antologia di saggi). (EN) Apocalypse Postponed, Bloomington, Indiana U.P, 1994. (saggi tratti da Apocalittici e integrati scelti e curati da Robert Lumley) (EN) Six Walks in the Fictional Woods, Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1994. (tradotto come Sei passeggiate nei boschi narrativi, Milano, Bompiani) Povero Pinocchio. Giochi linguistici di studenti del Corso di Comunicazione, a cura di, Modena, Comix, 1995, ISBN 88-7686-601-9. In cosa crede chi non crede?, con Carlo Maria Martini, Roma, Liberal, 1996, ISBN 88-86838-03-4. (DE) Neue Streichholzbriefe, München, DTV, 1997. Kant e l'ornitorinco, Milano, Bompiani, 1997, ISBN 88-452-2868-1. Cinque scritti morali, Milano, Bompiani, 1997, ISBN 88-452-3124-0. (EN) Talking of Joyce, con Liberato Santoro-Brienza, Dublin, University College Dublin Press, 1998. (DE) Gesammelte Streichholzbriefe, München, Hanser, 1998. (EN) Serendipities. Language and Lunacy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. Tra menzogna e ironia, Milano, Bompiani, 1998, ISBN 88-452-3829-6. La bustina di minerva, Milano, Bompiani, 1999, ISBN 88-452-4383-4. (NO) Den nye Middelalderen og andre essays, Oslo, Tiden Norske, 2000. (antologia di saggi) (DE) Mein verrücktes Italien, Berlin, Wagenbach, 2000. (antologia di saggi) (CS) Mysl a smysl, Praha, Moravia press, 2000. (antologia di saggi) (EN) Experiences in translation, Toronto, Toronto U.P., 2000. Riflessioni sulla bibliofilia, Milano, Rovello, 2001. (DE) Sämtliche Glossen und Parodien, München, Hanser, 2001. (raccolta completa da Diario minimo, Secondo diario minimo, Bustina di minerva e altre parodie da raccolte in tedesco) Sulla letteratura, Milano, Bompiani, 2002, ISBN 88-452-5069-5. Guerre sante, passione e ragione. Pensieri sparsi sulla superiorità culturale; Scenari di una guerra globale, in Islam e Occidente. Riflessioni per la convivenza, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002, ISBN 88-420-6784-9. Bellezza. Storia di un'idea dell'Occidente, CD-ROM a cura di, Milano, Motta On Line, 2002. Dire quasi la stessa cosa. Esperienze di traduzione, Milano, Bompiani, 2003, ISBN 88-452-5397-X. (EN) Mouse or Rat?, Translation as Negociation, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003. (Experiences in translation e saggi selezionati da Dire quasi la stessa cosa) Storia della bellezza, a cura di, testi di Umberto Eco e Girolamo de Michele, Milano, Bompiani, 2004, ISBN 88-452-3249-2. Il linguaggio della Terra Australe, Milano, Bompiani, 2004. (non in commercio) Il codice Temesvar, Milano, Rovello, 2005. Nel segno della parola, con Daniele Del Giudice e Gianfranco Ravasi, a cura e con un saggio di Ivano Dionigi, Milano, BUR, 2005, ISBN 88-17-00632-7. A passo di gambero. Guerre calde e populismo mediatico, Collana Overlook, Milano, Bompiani, 2006, ISBN 88-452-5620-0. La memoria vegetale e altri scritti di bibliofilia, Milano, Rovello, 2006, ISBN 88-452-5785-1. Sator Arepo eccetera, Roma, Nottetempo, 2006, ISBN 88-7452-085-9. Storia della bruttezza, a cura di, Milano, Bompiani, 2007, ISBN 978-88-452-5965-4. 11/9 La cospirazione impossibile, con Piergiorgio Odifreddi, Michael Shermer, James Randi, Paolo Attivissimo, Lorenzo Montali, Francesco Grassi, Andrea Ferrero e Stefano Bagnasco, a cura di Massimo Polidoro, Casale Monferrato, Piemme, 2007, ISBN 978-88-384-6847-6. Dall'albero al labirinto. Studi storici sul segno e l'interpretazione, Milano, Bompiani, 2007, ISBN 978-88-452-5902-9. Historia. La grande storia della civiltà europea, a cura di e con altri, 9 voll., Milano, Motta, 2007. Storia della civiltà europea, a cura di e con altri, 18 voll., Milano, Corriere della Sera, 2007-2008. Nebbia, a cura di e con Remo Ceserani, con la collaborazione di Francesco Ghelli e un saggio di Antonio Costa, Torino, Einaudi, 2009. ISBN 978-88-06-18724-8. (antologia letteraria di racconti a tema) Non sperate di liberarvi dei libri, con Jean-Claude Carrière, Milano, Bompiani, 2009. ISBN 978-88-452-6215-9. Vertigine della lista, Milano, Bompiani, 2009. ISBN 978-88-452-6345-3. Il Medioevo, a cura di, 4 voll., Milano, Encyclomedia, 2010-2011. ISBN 978-88-905082-0-2, ISBN 978-88-905082-1-9, ISBN 978-88-905082-5-7, ISBN 978-88-905082-9-5. La grande Storia, a cura di, 28 voll., Milano, Corriere della Sera, 2011. Costruire il nemico e altri scritti occasionali, Milano, Bompiani, 2011. ISBN 978-88-452-6585-3. Scritti sul pensiero medievale, Collana Il pensiero occidentale, Milano, Bompiani, 2012, ISBN 978-88-452-7156-4. L'età moderna e contemporanea, a cura di, 22 voll., Roma, Gruppo editoriale L'Espresso, 2012-2013. Storia delle terre e dei luoghi leggendari, Milano, Bompiani, 2013. ISBN 978-88-452-7392-6. Da dove si comincia?, con Stefano Bartezzaghi, Roma, La Repubblica, 2013. Riflessioni sul dolore, Bologna, ASMEPA, 2014. ISBN 978-88-97620-73-0. La filosofia e le sue storie, a cura di e con Riccardo Fedriga, 3 voll., Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2014-2015. ISBN 978-88-581-1406-3, ISBN 978-88-581-1742-2, ISBN 978-88-581-1741-5. Pape Satàn Aleppe. Cronache di una società liquida, Milano, La nave di Teseo, 2016, ISBN 978-88-9344-021-9. Come viaggiare con un salmone, Milano, La nave di Teseo, 2016, ISBN 978-88-9344-023-3. Sulle spalle dei giganti, Collana I fari, Milano, La nave di Teseo, 2017, ISBN 978-88-934-4271-8. Il fascismo eterno, Collana Le onde, Milano, La nave di Teseo, 2018, ISBN 978-88-934-4241-1. [già pubblicato in Cinque scritti morali, Bompiani, 1997] Sulla televisione. Scritti 1956-2015, A cura di Gianfranco Marrone, Collana I fari, Milano, La Nave di Teseo, 2018, ISBN 978-88-934-4456-9. Narrativa Il nome della rosa, Milano, Bompiani, 1980. Il pendolo di Foucault, Milano, Bompiani, 1988, ISBN 88-452-0408-1 L'isola del giorno prima, Milano, Bompiani, 1994, ISBN 88-452-2318-3 Baudolino, Milano, Bompiani, 2000, ISBN 88-452-4736-8 La misteriosa fiamma della regina Loana. Romanzo illustrato, Milano, Bompiani, 2004, ISBN 88-452-1425-7 Il cimitero di Praga, Milano, Bompiani, 2010, ISBN 978-88-452-6622-5 Numero zero, Milano, Bompiani, 2015, ISBN 978-88-452-7851-8 Narrativa per l'infanzia La bomba e il generale, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1966. I tre cosmonauti, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1966. Ammazza l'uccellino, come Dedalus, illustrazioni di Monica Sangberg, Milano, Bompiani, 1973. Gli gnomi di Gnu, illustrazioni di Eugenio Carmi, Milano, Bompiani, 1992, ISBN 88-452-1885-6. Tre racconti, Milano, Fabbri, 2004, ISBN 88-451-0300-5. (raccolta dei tre precedenti) La storia de "I promessi sposi", raccontata da, Torino-Roma, Scuola Holden-La biblioteca di Repubblica-L'Espresso, 2010, ISBN 978-88-8371-311-8. Traduzioni Raymond Queneau, Esercizi di stile, Torino, Einaudi, 1983. Note Claudio Gerino, Morto lo scrittore Umberto Eco. Ci mancherà il suo sguardo nel mondo, in la Repubblica, 20 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 22 febbraio 2016. Massimo Delfino e Emma Camagna, Alessandria piange Umberto Eco, in La Stampa, 20 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 22 febbraio 2016. ^ [1] ^ Cosimo Di Bari, "A passo di critica: il modello di media education nell'opera di Umberto Eco", Firenze University Press 2009 ^ [2] ^ Èco, Umberto, in Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. ^ LINCEI, ENRICO MENESTO' E UMBERTO ECO NUOVI SOCI DELL'ACCADEMIA, su tuttoggi.info. URL consultato il 30 ottobre 2017. ^ 'Il nome della rosa' debutta su Rai1 e conquista gli ascolti della prima serata, su la Repubblica, 5 marzo 2019. URL consultato il 30 gennaio 2020. ^ quotidiano la Stampa del 22/11/2000, p. 25. ^ Gianni Coscia: «quando suono col mio amico Umberto Eco», su genova.mentelocale.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016 (archiviato dall'url originale il 12 ottobre 2014). ^ «È il lato dolente e angoscioso di un uomo che è cresciuto nell'Azione Cattolica, che l'ha lasciata in polemica con il grande Gedda; un uomo, Eco, che ha studiato – dicono - Tommaso d'Aquino, e che un giorno se n'è uscito dalla Chiesa proclamandosi orgogliosamente ateo, o se si preferisce, agnostico.» (In Rassegna stampa cattolica: Mario Palmaro, Eco è solo un refuso, 21 settembre 2011 ^ (EN) «His new book touches on politics, but also on faith. Raised Catholic, Eco has long since left the church. "Even though I'm still in love with that world, I stopped believing in God in my 20s after my doctoral studies on St. Thomas Aquinas. You could say he miraculously cured me of my faith..."» (IT) «Il suo nuovo libro tratta di politica, ma anche di fede. Cresciuto nel cattolicesimo, Eco ha lasciato da tempo la Chiesa. "Anche se io sono ancora innamorato di quel mondo, ho smesso di credere in Dio durante i miei anni 20, dopo i miei studi universitari su Tommaso d'Aquino. Potete dire che egli mi ha miracolosamente curato dalla mia fede..."» (Articolo in Time, 13 giugno 2005) ^ Liukkonen, Petri (2003) Umberto Eco (1932–) – Pseudonym: Dedalus Archiviato il 4 agosto 2006 in Internet Archive. ^ Eco, quando l'Università di Torino gli consegnò il libretto con 27 in letteratura italiana, su la Repubblica, 20 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 17 febbraio 2020. ^ Antonio Galdo, Saranno potenti? Storia, declino e nuovi protagonisti della classe dirigente italiana, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano Giuseppe Antonio Camerino, ECO, Umberto, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. ^ "Riparte il Master in Editoria, ideato da Umberto Eco" ^ Capozzi (2008) Bondanella (2005) pp.53 ^ Umberto Eco, Cinque scritti morali, Bompiani 1997, pp. 25-48 ^ Intervista a Umberto Eco - Wikinotizie, su it.wikinews.org. ^ Umberto Eco, Ho sposato Wikipedia?, «l'Espresso», 4 settembre 2009. ^ Con lo pseudonimo di Dedalus: Dedalus e il manifesto, su ilmanifesto.it, 20 Febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 13 febbraio 2019 (archiviato il 13 febbraio 2019). ^ Ostini (1998) ^ Sclavi (1998) p. 94, citazione: "Sto leggendo un libro [In cosa crede chi non crede, N.d.R.] di Umberto Eco che mi è arrivato dall'Italia. Curioso no? Ha il mio stesso nome e il cognome è l'anagramma del mio..." ^ 1981, Umberto Eco, su premiostrega.it. URL consultato il 16 aprile 2019. ^ Italian Writer Umberto Eco is the Louvre's New Guest Curator ^ Emma Camagna, La morte di Eco, il ricordo di Gianni Coscia, in La Stampa, 20 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 22 febbraio 2016. ^ L'ultimo saluto a Umberto Eco: "Grazie maestro", in La Stampa, 23 febbraio 2016. URL consultato il 23 febbraio 2016. ^ Marco Del Corona, «Follie di Spagna»: ecco che cos'è la musica suonata per Umberto Eco, su Corriere della Sera. URL consultato il 23 febbraio 2016. ^ Umberto Eco, la richiesta nel testamento: "Non autorizzate convegni su di me per i prossimi 10 anni", su Il Fatto Quotidiano. URL consultato il 23 marzo 2016. ^ La lettera della vedova Eco al Comune, in Corriere della Sera. URL consultato il 30 marzo 2017. ^ Pinelli, Calabresi e l'eskimo in redazione Archiviato il 19 gennaio 2012 in Internet Archive., opinione.it, 30 gennaio 1997 ^ Bruno Pischedda, Come leggere Il nome della rosa di Umberto Eco, Mursia, 1994 p.99 ^ La struttura assente, 1968, pp. 413-18. ^ "Eco a Gerusalemme attacca il Cavaliere. È polemica", di Francesco Battistini (dal Corriere della Sera, 24 febbraio 2011) Corriere della Sera ^ Berlusconi, Hitler e io, su l'Espresso. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Comitato Esecutivo | Aspen Institute Italia, su www.aspeninstitute.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato. ^ Sito web del Quirinale: dettaglio decorato. ^ Umberto Eco all'Eliseo onorato da Sarkozy con Legion D'Honneur, su liberoquotidiano.it. URL consultato il 14 gennaio 2012 (archiviato dall'url originale il 29 ottobre 2013). ^ Curriculum Vitae, su umbertoeco.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Unibo e Brasile: Laurea ad honorem a Umberto Eco, su magazine.unibo.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Umberto Eco contro i social: "Hanno dato diritto di parola a legioni di imbecilli", su Il Fatto Quotidiano. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Il problema di Umberto Eco con internet, su Il Post. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Imbecilli e non, tutto il mondo è social, su LaStampa.it. URL consultato il 20 febbraio 2016. ^ Serena Vitale e Umberto Eco entrano nell'Accademia dei Lincei, 12 novembre 2010, Il Giornale. ^ Decise all'unanimità le 15 personalità illustri da iscrivere nel Pantheon di Milano, su comune.milano.it, 20 settembre 2016. URL consultato il 28 settembre 2017. Riferimenti Opere: Bondanella, Peter (2005) Umberto Eco and the Open Text: Semiotics, Fiction, Popular Culture Capozzi, Rocco (2008) Eco's Prophetic Vision of Mass Culture in McLuhan Studies: Premier Issue, Antonio Galdo (2003) Saranno potenti? Storia, declino e nuovi protagonisti della classe dirigente italiana, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano ISBN 88-200-3501-4 Alberto Ostini (a cura di), Umberto Eco e Tiziano Sclavi. Un dialogo, in Dylan Dog, indocili sentimenti, arcane paure, Milano, Euresis, 1998. Tiziano Sclavi, Bruno Brindisi, Lassù qualcuno ci chiama, Dylan Dog n. 136, Milano, Sergio Bonelli Editore, gennaio 1998, p. 94. Film Walt Disney e l'Italia - Una storia d'amore (2014): viene mostrata un'intervista durante lo "speciale Walt Disney" (1965) con Ettore Della Giovanna e Gianni Rodari Bibliografia Luigi Bauco, Francesco Millocca, Dizionario del «Pendolo di Foucault», Milano, Corbo, 1989. Manlio Talamo, I segreti del Pendolo, Napoli, Simone, 1989. Francesco Pansa, Anna Vinci, Effetto Eco, Roma, Nuova Edizione del Gallo, 1990. Marco Testi, "Il romanzo al passato": medioevo e invenzione in tre autori contemporanei in Analisi letteraria, 27, Roma, Bulzoni, 1992. Walter Pedullà, «L'utilitaria di Eco» in Le caramelle di Musil, Milano, Rizzoli, 1992, pp. 236-243. Salman Rushdie, «Umberto Eco» in Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991, Londra, Penguin, 1992. Bruno Pischedda, Come leggere «Il nome della rosa» di Umberto Eco, Milano, Mursia, 1994. Jean Petitot, Paolo Fabbri (a cura di), Nel nome del senso. Intorno all'opera di Umberto Eco, Milano, Sansoni, 2001. Antonio Sorella (a cura di), Umberto Eco. Sponde remote e nuovi orizzonti, Pescara, Tracce, 2002. Roberto Rampi, L'ornitorinco. Umberto Eco, Peirce e la conoscenza congetturale, M & B Publishing, Milano 2005, ISBN 88-7451-065-9 Marco Sonzogni, Echi di Eco, Balerna, Edizione Ulivo, 2007. Cinzia Bianchi, Clare Vassallo, “Umberto Eco's interpretative semiotics: Interpretation, encyclopedia, translation”, in Semiotica. Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter), 2015, vol. 206, issue 1/4, pp. 1-218. Peter Bondanella, Umberto Eco and the open text. Semiotics, fiction, popular culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Peter Bondanella (a cura di), New Essays on Umberto Eco, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. Jean-Jacques Brochier (a cura di), Umberto Eco. Du semiologue au romancier, in Le Nouveau Magazine Littéraire [inserto speciale], n. 262, febbraio 1989. Michael Caesar, Umberto Eco. Philosophy, Semiotics and the Work of Fiction, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999. Rocco Capozzi (a cura di), Reading Eco. An Anthology, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997. Michele Castelnovi, La mappa della biblioteca: geografia reale ed immaginaria secondo Umberto Eco, in Miscellanea di Storia delle esplorazioni n. LX, Genova, 2015, pp. 195-253. Remo Ceserani, Eco e il postmoderno consapevole in Raccontare il postmoderno, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, pp. 180-200. Michele Cogo, Fenomenologia di Umberto Eco. Indagine sulle origini di un mito intellettuale contemporaneo. Introduzione di Paolo Fabbri. Bologna, Baskerville, 2010, ISBN 978-88-8000-310-6 Furio Colombo, «L'isola del giorno prima», in La rivista dei libri, IV, n. 10, ottobre 1994, pp. 4-8. Roberto Cotroneo, La diffidenza come sistema. Saggio sulla narrativa di Umberto Eco, Milano, Anabasi, 1995. Roberto Cotroneo, Eco: due o tre cose che so di lui, Milano, Bompiani, 2001. Teresa de Lauretis, Umberto Eco, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1981. Nunzio Dell'Erba, Alla ricerca delle fonti del romanzo "Il Cimitero di Praga" , in Id., L'eco della storia. Saggi di critica storica: massoneria, anarchia, fascismo e comunismo, Universitas Studiorum, Mantova 2013, ISBN 978-88-97683-30-8 Cosimo Di Bari, A passo di critica. Il modello di Media Education nell'opera di Umberto Eco, Firenze, Firenze University Press, 2009, ISBN 978-88-8453-928-1. Richard Ellmann, Murder in the Monastery?, in The New York Review of Books, n. 12, luglio 1983. Lorenzo Flabbi, La disposizione del sapere di Umberto Eco, in Atlante dei movimenti culturali. 1968-2007, a cura di C. Cretella e P. Pieri, Clueb, Bologna 2007, ISBN 978-8849128994. Cristina Farronato, Eco's Chaosmos, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003. Franco Forchetti, Il segno e la rosa. I segreti della narrativa di Umberto Eco, Roma, Castelvecchi, 2005. Grit Fröhlich, Umberto Eco. Philosophie – Ästhetik – Semiotik, Paderborn, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009, ISBN 978-3-7705-4880-4. Margherita Ganeri, Il «caso» Eco, Palermo, Palumbo, 1991. Alfredo Giuliani, «Scherzare col fuoco» in Autunno del novecento, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1984. Renato Giovannoli (a cura di), Saggi su «Il Nome della Rosa», Milano, Bompiani, 1985. Fabio Izzo, Eco a perdere, Associazione Culturale Il Foglio, 2005. Paolo Jachia, Umberto Eco. Arte semiotica letteratura, San Cesario, Manni, 2006. Anna Maria Lorusso, Umberto Eco. Temi, problemi e percorsi semiotici, Roma, Carocci, 2008. Patrizia Magli et. al. (a cura di), Semiotica: Storia Teoria Interpretazione. Saggi intorno a Umberto Eco, Milano, Bompiani, 1992, ISBN 978-88-452-1835-4. Sandro Montalto (a cura di), Umberto Eco: l'uomo che sapeva troppo, Pisa, ETS, 2007. Franco Musarra et al., Eco in fabula. Umberto Eco in the Humanities. Umberto Eco dans les sciences humaines. Umberto Eco nelle scienze umane, Proceedings of the International Conference, Leuven, 24-27 febbraio 1999, Leuven, Leuven U.P. e Firenze, Franco Cesati Editore, 2002. Claudio Paolucci, Umberto Eco. Tra ordine e avventura, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2017. Voci correlate Semiotica Monte Cerignone, luogo di residenza Struttura (semiotica) Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Umberto Eco Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Umberto Eco Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Umberto Eco Collegamenti esterni Sito ufficiale, su umbertoeco.it. Modifica su Wikidata Umberto Eco, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Umberto Eco, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco, su The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction. Modifica su Wikidata Umberto Eco, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Umberto Eco, su Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Umberto Eco, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Umberto Eco, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (FR) Pubblicazioni di Umberto Eco, su Persée, Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Bibliografia di Umberto Eco, su Internet Speculative Fiction Database, Al von Ruff. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco (autore), su Goodreads. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco (personaggio), su Goodreads. Modifica su Wikidata Bibliografia italiana di Umberto Eco, su Catalogo Vegetti della letteratura fantastica, Fantascienza.com. Modifica su Wikidata Registrazioni di Umberto Eco, su RadioRadicale.it, Radio Radicale. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco, su Internet Movie Database, IMDb.com. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Umberto Eco, su AllMovie, All Media Network. Modifica su Wikidata (DE, EN) Umberto Eco, su filmportal.de. Modifica su Wikidata Eco, Umberto, in Lessico del XXI secolo, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2012-2013. "La bustina di minerva": la rubrica periodica di Eco su L'Espresso, L'Espresso. URL consultato il 10 gennaio 2012. www.signosemio.com - Signo - Biografia di Umberto Eco e la presentazione della sua teoria semiotica, su signosemio.com. URL consultato il 19 giugno 2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 4 giugno 2009). Approfondimento, su italialibri.net. Curiosità (anche la "cacopedia" - in PDF) (PDF), su bibliotecheoggi.it. Opere in TecaLibri/1, su tecalibri.info. Opere in TecaLibri/2, su tecalibri.info. Considerazioni su: "Non sperate di liberarvi dei libri", su antonietta.philo.unibo.it (archiviato dall'url originale il 18 gennaio 2012). Golem L'indispensabile (il sito della rivista) - rivista online diretta da Umberto Eco, Renato Mannheimer, Carlo Bertelli, Danco Singer Un articolo di Eco su Wikipedia, su espresso.repubblica.it. www.encyclomedia.it, su encyclomedia.it. Il «questionario Proust» a Umberto Eco, su elapsus.it. URL consultato il 22 maggio 2016. (DE) Umberto Eco, in Perlentaucher, Perlentaucher Medien GmbH. Opere di Umberto Eco V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Strega V · D · M Vincitori internazionali del Prix Médicis V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Bancarella V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Cesare Pavese V · D · M Vincitori del Premio di Stato austriaco per la letteratura europea V · D · M Vincitori del Premio Mediterraneo per stranieri Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 108299403 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2283 9390 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\006213 · Europeana agent/base/145365 · LCCN (EN) n79021285 · GND (DE) 11852884X · BNF (FR) cb11901536g (data) · BNE (ES) XX1044144 (data) · ULAN (EN) 500075019 · NLA (EN) 35607219 · BAV (EN) 495/158121 · NDL (EN, JA) 00438594 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n79021285 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Giallo Portale Giallo Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Semiologi italianiFilosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloScrittori italiani del XX secoloScrittori italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1932Morti nel 2016Nati il 5 gennaioMorti il 19 febbraioNati ad AlessandriaMorti a MilanoUmberto EcoScrittori per ragazziFondatori di riviste italianeVincitori del Premio BancarellaVincitori del Premio StregaCavalieri di gran croce OMRIBenemeriti della cultura e dell'arteDecorati con la Legion d'onoreAutori del Gruppo 63Accademici dei LinceiPersone legate all'Università di HarvardProfessori dell'Università di BolognaProfessori della Columbia UniversityPatafisicaTraduttori italianiAccademici italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti italiani del XXI secoloUomini universaliStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di TorinoTraduttori dal franceseTraduttori all'italianoMedievisti italianiBibliofiliDirettori di periodici italianiCritici e teorici dei nuovi media[altre]. Econ provides a bridge between Graeco-Roman philosophy and Grice! Eco is one of the few philosophers who considers the very origins of philosophy in Bologna – and straight from Rome – On top, Eco is one of the first to generalise most of Grice’s topics under ‘communication,’ rather than using the Anglo-Saxon ‘mean’ that does not really belong in the Graeco-Roman tradition. Eco cites H. P. Grice in “Cognitive constraints of communication.” Umberto b.2, philosopher, intellectual historian, and novelist. A leading figure in the field of semiotics, the general theory of signs. Eco has devoted most of his vast production to the notion of interpretation and its role in communication. In the 0s, building on the idea that an active process of interpretation is required to take any sign as a sign, he pioneered reader-oriented criticism The Open Work, 2, 6; The Role of the Reader, 9 and championed a holistic view of meaning, holding that all of the interpreter’s beliefs, i.e., his encyclopedia, are potentially relevant to word meaning. In the 0s, equally influenced by Peirce and the structuralists, he offered a unified theory of signs A Theory of Semiotics, 6, aiming at grounding the study of communication in general. He opposed the idea of communication as a natural process, steering a middle way between realism and idealism, particularly of the Sapir-Whorf variety. The issue of realism looms large also in his recent work. In The Limits of Interpretation 0 and Interpretation and Overinterpretation 2, he attacks deconstructionism. Kant and the Platypus 7 defends a “contractarian” form of realism, holding that the reader’s interpretation, driven by the Peircean regulative idea of objectivity and collaborating with the speaker’s underdetermined intentions, is needed to fix reference. In his historical essays, ranging from medieval aesthetics The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, 6 to the attempts at constructing artificial and “perfect” languages The Search for the Perfect Language, 3 to medieval semiotics, he traces the origins of some central notions in contemporary philosophy of language e.g., meaning, symbol, denotation and such recent concerns as the language of mind and translation, to larger issues in the history of philosophy. All his novels are pervaded by philosophical queries, such as Is the world an ordered whole? The Name of the Rose, 0, and How much interpretation can one tolerate without falling prey to some conspiracy syndrome? Foucault’s Pendulum, 8. Everywhere, he engages the reader in the game of controlled interpretations. “Il nome della rosa” is about the dark ages in Northern Italy, where the monks were the only to find a slight interest in philosophy, unlike the barbaric Lombards!” -- Refs.: Umberto Econ on H. P. Grice in “Cognitive constraints on communication,” Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Eco: semantica filosofica," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

eddington: “Some like Einstein, but Eddington’s MY man.” – H. P. Grice. Einstein – discussed by Grice in “Eddington’s Two Tables” -- Albert 18795, G.-born physicist, founder of the special and general theories of relativity and a fundamental contributor to several branches of physics and to the philosophical analysis and critique of modern physics, notably of relativity and the quantum theory. Einstein was awarded the Nobel Prize for physics in 2, “especially for his discovery of the law of the photoelectric effect.” Born in Ulm in the G. state of Württemberg, Einstein studied physics at the Polytechnic in Zürich, Switzerland. He was called to Berlin as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics 4 at the peak of the G. ultranationalism that surrounded World War I. His reaction was to circulate an internationalist “Manifesto to Europeans” and to pursue Zionist and pacifist programs. Following the dramatic confirmation of the general theory of relativity 9 Einstein became an international celebrity. This fame also made him the frequent target of G. anti-Semites, who, during one notable episode, described the theory of relativity as “a Jewish fraud.” In 3 Einstein left G.y for the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Although his life was always centered on science, he was also engaged in the politics and culture of his times. He carried on an extensive correspondence whose publication will run to over forty volumes with both famous and ordinary people, including significant philosophical correspondence with Cassirer, Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, and others. Despite reservations over logical positivism, he was something of a patron of the movement, helping to secure academic positions for several of its leading figures. In 9 Einstein signed a letter drafted by the nuclear physicist Leo Szilard informing President Roosevelt about the prospects for harnessing atomic energy and warning of the G. efforts to make a bomb. Einstein did not further participate in the development of atomic weapons, and later was influential in the movement against them. In 2 he was offered, and declined, the presidency of Israel. He died still working on a unified field theory, and just as the founders of the Pugwash movement for nuclear disarmament adopted a manifesto he had cosigned with Russell. Einstein’s philosophical thinking was influenced by early exposure to Kant and later study of Hume and Mach, whose impact shows in the operationalism used to treat time in his famous 5 paper on special relativity. That work also displays a passion for unity in science characteristic of nearly all his physical thinking, and that may relate to the monism of Spinoza, a philosopher whom he read and reread. Einstein’s own understanding of relativity stressed the invariance of the space-time interval and promoted realism with regard to the structure of spacetime. Realism also shows up in Einstein’s work on Brownian motion 5, which was explicitly motivated by his long-standing interest in demonstrating the reality of molecules and atoms, and in the realist treatment of light quanta in his analysis 5 of the photoelectric effect. While he pioneered the development of statistical physics, especially in his seminal investigations of quantum phenomena 525, he never broke with his belief in determinism as the only truly fundamental approach to physical processes. Here again one sees an affinity with Spinoza. Realism and determinism brought Einstein into conflict with the new quantum theory 526, whose observer dependence and “flight into statistics” convinced him that it could not constitute genuinely fundamental physics. Although influential in its development, he became the theory’s foremost critic, never contributing to its refinement but turning instead to the program of unifying the electromagnetic and gravitational fields into one grand, deterministic synthesis that would somehow make room for quantum effects as limiting or singular cases. It is generally agreed that his unified field program was not successful, although his vision continues to inspire other unification programs, and his critical assessments of quantum mechanics still challenge the instrumentalism associated with the theory. Einstein’s philosophical reflections constitute an important chapter in twentieth-century thought. He understood realism as less a metaphysical doctrine than a motivational program, and he argued that determinism was a feature of theories rather than an aspect of the world Einstein, Albert Einstein, Albert 256 256 directly. Along with the unity of science, other central themes in his thinking include his rejection of inductivism and his espousal of holism and constructivism or conventionalism, emphasizing that meanings, concepts, and theories are free creations, not logically derivable from experience but subject rather to overall criteria of comprehensibility, empirical adequacy, and logical simplicity. Holism is also apparent in his acute analysis of the testability of geometry and his rejection of Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism.

einheit – Grice: “I will use the Germanism for two reasons: it’s pompous, and no Englishman would use ‘unity’ (literally ‘onehood’) like that!” -- H. P. Grice, “Unity of science and teleology.” unity of science, a situation in which all branches of empirical science form a coherent system called unified science. Unified science is sometimes extended to include formal sciences e.g., branches of logic and mathematics. ‘Unity of science’ is also used to refer to a research program aimed at unified science. Interest in the unity of science has a long history with many roots, including ancient atomism and the work of the Encyclopedists. In the twentieth century this interest was prominent in logical empiricism see Otto Neurath et al., International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. I, 8. Logical empiricists originally conceived of unified science in terms of a unified language of science, in particular, a universal observation language. All laws and theoretical statements in any branch of science were to be translatable into such an observation language, or else be appropriately related to sentences of this language. In unified science unity of science 939 939 addition to encountering technical difficulties with the observationaltheoretical distinction, this conception of unified science also leaves open the possibility that phenomena of one branch may require special concepts and hypotheses that are explanatorily independent of other branches. Another concept of unity of science requires that all branches of science be combined by the intertheoretic reduction of the theories of all non-basic branches to one basic theory usually assumed to be some future physics. These reductions may proceed stepwise; an oversimplified example would be reduction of psychology to biology, together with reductions of biology to chemistry and chemistry to physics. The conditions for reducing theory T2 to theory T1 are complex, but include identification of the ontology of T2 with that of T1, along with explanation of the laws of T2 by laws of T1 together with appropriate connecting sentences. These conditions for reduction can be supplemented with conditions for the unity of the basic theory, to produce a general research program for the unification of science see Robert L. Causey, Unity of Science, 7. Adopting this research program does not commit one to the proposition that complete unification will ever be achieved; the latter is primarily an empirical proposition. This program has been criticized, and some have argued that reductions are impossible for particular pairs of theories, or that some branches of science are autonomous. For example, some writers have defended a view of autonomous biology, according to which biological science is not reducible to the physical sciences. Vitalism postulated non-physical attributes or vital forces that were supposed to be present in living organisms. More recent neovitalistic positions avoid these postulates, but attempt to give empirical reasons against the feasibility of reducing biology. Other, sometimes a priori, arguments have been given against the reducibility of psychology to physiology and of the social sciences to psychology. These disputes indicate the continuing intellectual significance of the idea of unity of science and the broad range of issues it encompasses. Einheitswissenschaft: Used by Grice ironically. While he was totally ANTI-Einheitwisseschaft, he was ALL for einheitsphilosophie! The phrase is used by Grice in a more causal way. He uses the expression ‘unity of science’ vis-à-vis the topic of teleology. Note that ‘einheitswissenschaft,’ literally translates as unity-science – there is nothing about ‘making’ if one, which is what –fied implies. The reason why ‘einheitswissenschaft’ was transliterated as ‘unified science’ was that Neurath thought that ‘unity-science’ would be a yes-yes in New England, most New Englanders being Unitarians, but they would like to include Theology there, ‘into the bargain.’ “Die Einheit von Wissenschaft.” Die Einheit der Wissenschaft und die neopositivistische Theorie der „Einheitswissenschaft”. O. Neurath, „Einheit der Wissenschaft als Aufgabe“,Einheitswissenschaft oder Einheit der Wissenschaft? | Frank F Vierter Internationaler Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft, Cambridge 1938 ... Einheitswissenschaft als Basis der Wissenschaftsgeschichte (pp. positivists held that no essential differences in aim and method exist between the various branches of science. The scientists of all disciplines should collaborate closely with each other and should unify the vocabulary of sciences by logical analysis. According to this view, there is no sharp demarcation between natural sciences and social sciences. In particular, to establish universal laws in the social sciences may be difficult in practice, but it is not impossible in principle. Through Otto Neurath, this ideal of scientific unity became a program for logical positivists, who published a series of books in Vienna under the heading Unified Science. After the dissolution of the Vienna Circle, Neurath renamed the official journal Erkenntnis as The Journal of Unified Science, and planned to continue publication of a series of works in the United States under the general title The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. He thought that the work would be similar in historical importance to the eighteenth-century French Encyclopédie under the direction of Diderot. Unfortunately, this work was never completed, although Carnap and Morris published some volumes originally prepared for it under the title Foundations of the Unity of Science. “We have repeatedly pointed out that the formation of the constructional system as a whole is the task of unified science.” Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World.

empedocle: one of the most important Italian philosophers. Grecian preSocratic philosopher who created a physical theory in response to Parmenides while incorporating Pythagorean ideas of the soul into his philosophy. Following Parmenides in his rejection of coming-to-be and perishing, he accounted for phenomenal change by positing four elements his “roots,” rizomata, earth, water, air, and fire. When they mix together in set proportions they create compound substances such as blood and bone. Two forces act on the elements, Love and Strife, the former joining the different elements, the latter separating them. In his cyclical cosmogony the four elements combine to form the Sphere, a completely homogeneous spherical body permeated by Love, which, shattered by Strife, grows into a cosmos with the elements forming distinct cosmic masses of earth, water the seas, air, and fire. There is controversy over whether Empedocles posits one or two periods when living things exist in the cycle. On one view there are two periods, between which intervenes a stage of complete separation of the elements. Empedocles accepts the Pythagorean view of reincarnation of souls, seeing life as punishment for an original sin and requiring the expiation of a pious and philosophical life. Thus the exile and return of the individual soul reflects in the microcosm the cosmic movement from harmony to division to harmony. Empedocles’ four elements became standard in natural philosophy down to the early modern era, and Aristotle recognized his Love and Strife as an early expression of the efficient cause. Vide “Italic Griceians” – While in the New World, ‘Grecian philosophy’ is believed to have happened ‘in Greece,’ Grice was amused that ‘most happened in Italy!’ Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Empedocle," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

enantiamorphs: “When Moore said that he knew he had two hands, he implicated, ‘I have two enantiamorphic hands,’ before they were able to cancel his talk and his implicaturum.” from Grecian enantios, ‘opposite’, and morphe, ‘form’, objects whose shapes differ as do those of a right and left hand. One of a pair of enantiamorphs can be made to look identical in shape to the other by viewing it in a mirror but not merely by changing its spatial orientation. Enantiamorphs figure prominently in the work of Kant, who argued that the existence of enantiamorphic pairs entailed that Leibnizian relational theories of space were to be rejected in favor of Newtonian absolutist theories, that some facts about space could be apprehended empiricism, constructive enantiamorphs 263 263 only by “pure intuition,” and that space was mind-dependent.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA: he way Grice is known in Italy, due to the efforts of Luigi Speranza, of the Grice Club. Speranza saw that Grice connected, somehow, with philosophy in general, and tried to pursue a way to make him accessible to anti-Oxonians. The encyclopædia Griceiana. Grice went to Paris and became enamoured with encyclopedia, or “encyclopédie,” “or a Descriptive Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Trades,” launched by the Parisian publisher Le Breton, who had secured d’Alembert’s and Diderot’s editorship, the Encyclopedia was gradually released despite a temporary revocation of its royal privilege. Comprising seventeen folio volumes of 17,818 articles and eleven folio volumes of 2,885 plates, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA required a staff of 272 Griceian engravers. “But the good thing,” Grice says, “is that it incorporates the accumulated knowledge and rationalist, secularist views of the Enlightenment and prescribed economic, social, and political reforms.” Strawson adds: “Enormously successful at Oxford, ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA was reprinted with revisions five times before Grice died.” “Contributions were made by anyone we could bribe!” – As in the old encycloopaedia, the philosophes Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, d’Holbach, Naigeon, and Saint-Lambert; the writers Duclos and Marmontel; the theologians Morellet and Malet; enlightened clerics, e.g. Raynal; explorers, e.g. La Condamine; natural scientists, e.g. Daubenton; physicians, e.g. Bouillet; the economists Turgot and Quesnay; engineers, e.g. Perronet; horologists, e.g. Berthoud; and scores of other experts. “The purpose of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA,” writes Grice in the “Foreword”, “is to collect this or that bit of Griceian knowledge dispersed on the surface of the earth, and to unfold its general system.” “The Encyclopedia,” Strawson adds, “offers the educated Oxonian a comprehensive, systematic, and descriptive repository of contemporary liberal and mechanical arts, with an appendix on implicaturum by Grice hisself.” D’Alembert and Diderot developed a sensationalist epistemology, “but I don’t.” “Preliminary Discourse” under the influence of Locke and Condillac. Grice and Strawson (with the occasional help from Austin, Warnock, Pears and Thomson) compiled and rationally classified existing knowledge according to the noetic process memory, imagination, and reason. Based on the assumption of the unity of theory and praxis, the approach of the ENCYCLOOPÆDIA GRICEIANA is positivistic and ‘futilitarian.’ The ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA vindicates experimental reason and the rule of nature, fostered the practice of criticism, and stimulated the development of both old and new sciences. In religious matters, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA cultivates ambiguity and implicaturum to escape censorship by Queen Elizabeth II, an avid reader of the supplements. Whereas most contributors held either conciliatory or orthodox positions, J. F. Thomson barely concealed his naturalistic and atheistic opinions. Thomson’s radicalism was pervasive. Supernaturalism, obscurantism, and fanaticism, and Heideggerianism are among the Encyclopedists’ favorite targets. The Griceian Encyclopaedists identify Roman Catholicism (of the type Dummett practiced) with superstition and theology with occult magic; assert the superiority of natural morality over theological ethics; demand religious toleration; and champion human rights and conventional implicaturum alike. They innovatively retrace the historical conditions of the development of Oxford (“and a little Cambridge”) philosophy. They furthermore pioneer ideas on trade and industry and anticipate the relevance of historiography, sociology, economics, and ‘conversational pragmatics.’ As the most ambitious and expansive reference work Oxford ever saw, the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA crystallizes the confidence of England’s midlands bourgeoisie in the capacity of reason to dispel the shadows of ignorance and improve society – “at least Oxonian society, if I can.”

enesidemo: or ‘aenesidemus,’ as Strawson would prefer. Although Grecian, he is listed in the name glossay to the essay on “Roman philosophers,” and that is because he influenced some Roman-born philosophers and nnobles. “Nothing beats a Grecian don,” as Cicero remarked. Academic philosopher, founder of a Pyrrhonist revival in Rome. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Scetticismo romano.”

English futilitarians, The: Bergmann’s pun on H. P. Grice and J. L. Austin. from futile. Cf. conversational futilitarianism. Can there be a futilitarian theory of communication? Grice’s! The issue is a complex one. Some may interpret Grice’s theory as resting “on Kantian grounds.” Not everybody was present at Grice’s seminars at Oxford on helpfulness, where he discusses the kind of reasoning that a participant to a conversation will display in assuming that his co-conversationalist is being conversationally helpful, conversationally benevolent, conversationally ‘altruist,’ almost, and conversationally, well, co-operative. So, as to the basis for this. We can simplify the scenario by using the plural. A conversationalist assumes that his co-conversationalist is being co-operative on Kantian grounds. What are the alternatives, if any? One can re-describe “Kantian grounds” as “moral grounds.” Conversationalists abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness on Kantian, moral grounds. Kant wrote the “Critique of practical reason,” so Kant would allow for a rephrase of this as follows. Conversationalists abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness on practical, indeed moral, grounds – which is the topic of Grice’s last Kant lecture at Stanford. How to turn a ‘counsel of prudence,’ which is ‘practical’ into something that covers Kant’s “Kategorische Imperativ.” And then there’s the utilitarian. Utilitarianism IS a moral theory, or a meta-ethical theory. So one would have to allow for the possibility that conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on “utilitarian grounds,” which would be “practical grounds,” AND “moral grounds,” if not Kantian grounds. In any case, the topic WAS raised, and indeed, for someone like Grice who wrote on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘happiness,’ it does not seem futilitarian to see him as a futilitarian. Unfortunately, you need a serious philosophical background to appreciate all this, since it touches on the very serious, or ‘deep,’ as Grice would say, “and fascinating,” suburbia or practicality. But surely the keyword ‘utilitarian’ as per “conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on utilitarian grounds” is a possibility. Cf. Grice’s reference to the ‘least effort,’ and in the Oxford lectures on helpfulness to a conversationalist not getting involved in “undue effort,” or getting into “unnecessary trouble.” “Undue effort” is ‘forbidden’ by the desideratum of conversational candour; the ‘unnecessary trouble’ is balanced by the ‘principle of conversational self-love.’ And I don’t think Kant would ever considered loving himself! Grice being keen on neuter adjectives, he saw the ‘utile’ at the root of utilitarianism. There is much ‘of value’ in the old Roman concept of ‘utile.’ Lewis and Short have it as Neutr. absol.: ūtĭle , is, n., what is useful, the useful: omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci, Hor. A. P. 343: “bonus atque fidus Judex honestum praetulit utili,” id. C. 4, 9, 41: “utilium tardus provisor,” id. A. P. 164: “sententiae de utilibus honestisque,” Quint. 3, 8, 13; cf. id. 1, 2, 29. —Ultimately, Grice’s meta-ethics, like Hare’s, Nowell-Smith’s, Austin’s, Hampshire’s, and Warnock’s derives into a qualified utilitarianism, with notions of agreeableness and eudaemonia being crucial. Grice well knows that for Aristotle pleasure is just one out of the three sources for phulia; the others being profit, and virtue. As an English utilitarian, or English futilitarian, Grice plays with Griceian pleasures. Democritus, as Grice remarks, seems to be the earliest philosopher to have categorically embraced a hedonistic philosophy. Democritus claims that the supreme goal of life is contentment or cheerfulness, stating that joy and sorrow are the distinguishing mark of things beneficial and harmful. The Cyrenaics are an ultra-hedonist Grecoam school of philosophy founded by Aristippus. Many of the principles of the school were set by his grandson, Aristippus the Younger, and Theodorus. The Cyrenaic school is one of the earliest Socratic schools. The Cyrenaics teach that the only intrinsic ‘agathon’ is pleasure ‘hedone,’ which means not just the absence of pain, but a positively enjoyable momentary sensation. A physical pleasure is stronger than a pleasure of anticipation or memory. The Cyrenaics do, however, recognize the value of social obligation, and that pleasure may be gained from altruism. The Cyrenaic school dies out within a century, and is replaced by Epicureanism. The Cyrenaics are known for their sceptical epistemology. The Cyrenaics reduce logic to a basic doctrine concerning the criterion of truth. The Cyrenaics think that one can only know with certainty his immediate sense-experience, e. g., that he is having a sweet sensation. But one can know nothing about the nature of the object that causes this sensation, e.g., that honey is sweet. The Cyrenaics also deny that we can have knowledge of what the experience of others are like. All knowledge is immediate sensation. Sensation is a motion which is purely subjective, and is painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as it is violent, tranquil or gentle. Further, sensation is entirely individual and can in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only possible criterion of knowledge and of conduct. The way of being affected is alone knowable. Thus the sole aim for everyone should be pleasure. Cyrenaicism deduces a single, universal aim for all which is pleasure. Furthermore, feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows that past and future pleasure have no real existence for us, and that in present pleasure there is no distinction of kind. Socrates speaks of the higher pleasure of the intellect. The Cyrenaics denies the validity of this distinction and say that bodily pleasure (hedone somatike), being more simple and more intense, is preferable. Momentary pleasure, preferably of a physical kind, is the only good for a human. However, an action which gives immediate pleasure can create more than their equivalent of pain. The wise person should be in control (egcrateia) of pleasure rather than be enslaved to it, otherwise pain results, and this requires judgement to evaluate this or that pleasure of life. Regard should be paid to law and custom, because even though neither law nor custom have an intrinsic value on its own, violating law or custom leads to an unpleasant penalty being imposed by others. Likewise, friendship and justice are useful because of the pleasure they provide. Thus the Cyrenaics believe in the hedonistic value of social obligation and altruistic behaviour. Epicureanism is a system of philosophy based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an atomic materialist, following in the steps of Democritus and Leucippus. Epicurus’s materialism leads him to a general stance against superstition or the idea of divine intervention. Following Aristippus, Epicurus believes that the greatest good is to seek modest, sustainable pleasure in the form of a state of tranquility and freedom from fear (ataraxia) and absence of bodily pain (aponia) through knowledge of the workings of the world and the limits of desire. The combination of these two states, ataraxia and aponia, is supposed to constitute happiness in its highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism, insofar as it declares pleasure as the sole intrinsic good, its conception of absence of pain as the greatest pleasure and its advocacy of a simple life make it different from hedonism as it is commonly understood. In the Epicurean view, the highest pleasure (tranquility and freedom from fear) is obtained by knowledge, friendship and living a virtuous and temperate life. Epicurus lauds the enjoyment of a simple pleasure, by which he means abstaining from the bodily desire, such as sex and the appetite, verging on asceticism. Epicurus argues that when eating, one should not eat too richly, for it could lead to dissatisfaction later, such as the grim realization that one could not afford such delicacies in the future. Likewise, sex could lead to increased lust and dissatisfaction with the sexual partner. Epicurus does not articulate a broad system of social ethics that has survived but had a unique version of the golden rule. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, agreeing neither to harm nor be harmed, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life. Epicureanism is originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the main opponent of Stoicism. Epicurus and his followers shun politics. After the death of Epicurus, his school is headed by Hermarchus. Later many Epicurean societies flourish in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era, such as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes and Ercolano. The poet Lucretius is its most known Roman proponent. By the end of the Roman Empire, having undergone attack and repression, Epicureanism has all but died out, and would be resurrected in the seventeenth century by the atomist Pierre Gassendi. Some writings by Epicurus have survived. Some scholars consider the epic poem “De natura rerum” by Lucretius to present in one unified work the core arguments and theories of Epicureanism. Many of the papyrus scrolls unearthed at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum are Epicurean texts. At least some are thought to have belonged to the Epicurean Philodemus. Cf. Barnes on epicures and connoiseurs. Many a controversy arising out of this or that value judgement is settled by saying, ‘I like it and you don’t, and that s the end of the matter.’ I am content to adopt this solution of the difficulty on matters such as food and drink. Even here, though, we admit the existence of epicures and connoisseurs.Why are we not content to accept the same solution on every matter where value is concerned? The reason I am not so content lies in the fact that the action of one man dictated by his approval of something is frequently incompatible with the action of another man dictated by his approval of something. This is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian hedonistic Epicureians made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Oxford. L and S have "ἡδονή,” also “ἁδονά,” or in a chorus in tragedy, “ἡδονά,” ultimately from "ἥδομαι,” which they render it as “enjoyment, pleasure,” “prop. of sensual pleasure.” αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡ. Plato, Republic, 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Plato, Republic, 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R. 582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ.; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to pleasure; Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or so as to humour you? εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ, “one feels pleasure at the thought that …” ; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied with; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple; δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν; ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ.; πρὸς ἡ. Λέγειν, “to speak so as to please another”; δημηγορεῖν; οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα; πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας; later πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι; καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν κλύειν; καθ᾽ ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν; καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, it is a pleasure or delight to another; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς, to take pleasure in them; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, oοἱ λυπηροί; μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ; ἡδονᾷ with pleasure; a pleasure; ἡδοναὶ τραγημάτων sweetmeats; plural., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts. In Ionic philosophers, taste, flavour, usually joined with χροιή. Note that Aristotle uses somatike hedone. As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of hedone in Aristotles system. Pleasure is sometimes rendered “placitum,” as in “ad placitum,” in scholastic philosophy, but that is because scholastic philosophy is not as Hellenic as it should be. Actually, Grice prefers “agreeable.” One of Grices requisites for an ascription of eudaemonia (to have a fairy godmother) precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an agreeable one. One form or mode of agreeableness, Grice notes, is, unless counteracted, automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of ends to another. However, some other mode of agreeableness, such as e. g. being a source of delight, which is not routinely associated with the fulfilment of this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of other features relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and another. Further, a system of ends the operation of which is especially agreeable is stable not only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the somewhat weakening effect of ‘egcrateia,’ incontinence, or akrasia, if you mustn’t. A disturbing influence, as Aristotle knows from experience, is more surely met by a principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the principle alone. Grices favourite hedonistic implicaturum was “please,” as in “please, please me,” by The Beatles. While Grice claims to love Kantotle, he cannot hide his greater reverence for Aristotle, instilled early on at Corpus. An Oxonian need not recite Kant in what during the Second World War was referred to as the Hun, and while Aristotle was a no-no at Clifton (koine!), Hardie makes Grice love him. With eudaemonia, Grice finds a perfect synthetic futilitarian concept to balance his innate analytic tendencies. There is Grecian eudaemonism and there is Griceian eudaemonism. L and S are not too helpful. They have “εὐδαιμονία” (Ion. –ιη), which they render not as happiness, but as “prosperity, good fortune, opulence;” “χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐ.;” of countries; “μοῖρ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας.” In a second use, the expression is indeed rendered as “true, full happiness;” “εὐ. οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐν χρυσῷ; εὐ. ψυχῆς, oκακοδαιμονίη, cf. Pl. Def. 412d, Arist. EN 1095a18, sometimes personified as a divinity. There is eudaemonia and there is kakodaemonia. Of course, Grice’s locus classicus is EN 1095a18, which is Grice’s fairy godmother, almost. Cf. Austin on agathon and eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics, unearthed by Urmson and Warnock, a response to an essay by Prichard in “Philosophy” on the meaning of agathon in Aristotle’s ethics. Pritchard argues that Aristotle regards “agathon” to mean conducive to “eudaemonia,” and, consequently, that Aristotle maintains that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire for eudaemonia. Austin finds fault with this. First, agathon in Aristotle does not have a single usage, and a fortiori not the one Pritchard suggests. Second, if one has to summarise the usage of “agathon” in one phrase, “being desired” cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides “τό άγαθόν,” even if Davidson would disagree. Prichard endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, “agathon” seems to mean simply that being desired or an ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim of a person. In other contexts, “αγαθον” takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as “a good.” Prichard argues that by "αγαθον" Aristotle actually means, except in the Nicomachean Ethics, conducive to eudaemonia, and holds that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to attain eudaemonia. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of man’s ultimate aim. Grice takes life seriously: philosophical biology. He even writes an essay entitled “Philosophy of life,” listed is in PGRICE. Grice bases his thought on his tutee Ackrill’s Dawes Hicks essay for the BA, who quotes extensively from Hardie. Grice also reviews that “serious student of Greek philosophy,” Austin, in his response to Prichard, Grice’s fairy godmother. Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Grecian eudaimonia means is that eudaemonia is to be understood as the name for that state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for one. One’s good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to one, solely by concern for one’s eudaemonia, well-being or happiness. To change the idiom, eudæmonia is the general characterisation of what a full-time and unhampered fairy godmother would secure for one. Grice is concerned with the specific system of ends that eudaemonia consists for Ariskant. Grice borrows, but never returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. Johns, Ackrill. Ackrills point is about the etymological basis for eudaemonia, from eudaemon, the good dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken literally. Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of eudaemonia to the agent. For Grice, as for Kantotle, telos and eudaemonia are related in subtle ways. For eudaemonia we cannot deal with just one end, but a system of ends, although such a system may be a singleton. Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising end so that a particular ascription of an end may entail an ascription of eudaemonia. Grice follows the textual criticism of his tutee Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that eudaemonia is literally related to the eudaemon. In PGRICE Warner explores Grice’s concept of eudaemonia. Warner is especially helpful with the third difficult Carus lecture by Grice, a metaphysical defence of absolute value. Warner connects with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception seen in an evolutionary light and the Kantotelian idea of eudaemonia. In response to Warner’s overview of the oeuvre of Grice for the festschrift that Warner co-edited with Grandy, Grice refers to the editors collectively as Richards. While he feels he has to use “happiness,” Grice is always having Aristotle’s eudaemonia in mind. The implicaturum of Smith is ‘happy’ is more complex than Kantotle thinks. Austen knew. For Emma, you decide if youre happy. Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life. Grice took life seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes essay in WOW, where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is no Cartesian scholar – what Oxonian would? It concerns certainty. And certainty is originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer says that to know is to assure that one is certain or sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is authoritative. And Grice plays with meaning, too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know? Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian and otiose. Tutees. Grice loved to place himself in the role of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutees inabilities, a whole week long – until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning. Now, the logical form of certain is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as numbering of operators. If G ψs p, G ψs ψs p, and G ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesnt think so. Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver his BA lecture he chooses ‘intention and uncertainty’ as its topic, just to provoke. Not surprisingly, the “Uncertainty” piece opens with the sceptics challenge. And he will not conclude that the intender is certain. Only that theres some good chance (p ˃0.5) that what he intends will get through! When there is a will, there is a way, when there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing! Perhaps by know Moore means certain. Grice was amused by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasnt. He uses Moores misuse of know – according to Malcolm – both in Causal theory and Prolegomena. And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptics implicaturum, above, with the two essays Scepticism and Common sense and Moore and Philosophers Paradoxes repr. partially in WOW. With regard to certainty, it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still, may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and desires are incorrigible? One of Grices problems is, as he puts it, how to accommodate privileged access and, maybe, incorrigibility. This or that a second-order state may be, in some fashion, incorrigible. On the contrary, for Grice, this or that lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged access. Note that while he is happy to allow privileged access to lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or second-order may, in some fashion, be said to count as an incorrigible avowal. It rains. P judges it rains (privileged access). P judges that P judges that it rains (incorrigible). The justification is conversational. It rains says the P, or expresses the P. Grice wants to be able to say that if a P expresses that p, the P judges₂ that p. If the P expresses that it rains, the P judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order, higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick with judging here. Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones. If P expresses !p, P ψ-s₂ that !p. His second-order, higher-order buletic state is incorrigible (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a matter only of privileged access. For a study of conversation as rational co-operation this utilitarian revival modifies the standard exegesis of Grice as purely Kantian, and has him more in agreement with the general Oxonian meta-ethical scene. Refs.: Under ‘futilitarianism,’ we cover Grice’s views on ‘pleasure’ (he has an essay on “Pleasure,”) and “eudaemonia” (He has an essay on ‘happiness’); other leads are given under ‘grecianism,’ since this is the Grecian side to Grice’s Ariskant; for specific essays on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘eudaimonia,’ the keywords ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ are useful. A good source is the essay on happiness in “Aspects,” which combines ‘eudaemonia’ and ‘agreebleness,’ his futilitarianism turned Kantotelian. BANC. English futilitarians: utilitarianism, the moral theory that an action is morally right if and only if it produces at least as much good utility for all people affected by the action as any alternative action the person could do instead. Its best-known proponent is J. S. Mill, who formulated the greatest happiness principle also called the principle of utility: always act so as to produce the greatest happiness. Two kinds of issues have been central in debates about whether utilitarianism is an adequate or true moral theory: first, whether and how utilitarianism can be clearly and precisely formulated and applied; second, whether the moral implications of utilitarianism in particular cases are acceptable, or instead constitute objections to it. Issues of formulation. A central issue of formulation is how utility is to be defined and whether it can be measured in the way utilitarianism requires. Early utilitarians often held some form of hedonism, according to which only pleasure and the absence of pain have utility or intrinsic value. For something to have intrinsic value is for it to be valuable for its own sake and apart from its consequences or its relations to other things. Something has instrumental value, on the other hand, provided it brings about what has intrinsic value. Most utilitarians have held that hedonism is too narrow an account of utility because there are many things that people value intrinsically besides pleasure. Some nonhedonists define utility as happiness, and among them there is considerable debate about the proper account of happiness. Happiness has also been criticized as too narrow to exhaust utility or intrinsic value; e.g., many people value accomplishments, not just the happiness that may accompany them. Sometimes utilitarianism is understood as the view that either pleasure or happiness has utility, while consequentialism is understood as the broader view that morally right action is action that maximizes the good, however the good is understood. Here, we take utilitarianism in this broader interpretation that some philosophers reserve for consequentialism. Most utilitarians who believe hedonism gives too narrow an account of utility have held that utility is the satisfaction of people’s informed preferences or desires. This view is neutral about what people desire, and so can account for the full variety of things and experiences that different people in fact desire or value. Finally, ideal utilitarians have held that some things or experiences, e.g. knowledge or being autonomous, are intrinsically valuable or good whether or not people value or prefer them or are happier with them. Whatever account of utility a utilitarian adopts, it must be possible to quantify or measure the good effects or consequences of actions in order to apply the utilitarian standard of moral rightness. Happiness utilitarianism, e.g., must calculate whether a particular action, or instead some possible alternative, would produce more happiness for a given person; this is called the intrapersonal utility comparison. The method of measurement may allow cardinal utility measurements, in which numerical units of happiness may be assigned to different actions e.g., 30 units for Jones expected from action a, 25 units for Jones from alternative action b, or only ordinal utility measurements may be possible, in which actions are ranked only as producing more or less happiness than alternative actions. Since nearly all interesting and difficult moral problems involve the happiness of more than one person, utilitarianism requires calculating which among alternative actions produces the greatest happiness for all people affected; this is called the interpersonal utility comparison. Many ordinary judgments about personal action or public policy implicitly rely on interpersonal utility comparisons; e.g., would a family whose members disagree be happiest overall taking its vacation at the seashore or in the mountains? Some critics of utilitarianism doubt that it is possible to make interpersonal utility comparisons. Another issue of formulation is whether the utilitarian principle should be applied to individual actions or to some form of moral rule. According to act utilitarianism, each action’s rightness or wrongness depends on the utility it produces in comparison with possible alternatives. Even act utilitarians agree, however, that rules of thumb like ‘keep your promises’ can be used for the most part in practice because following them tends to maximize utility. According to rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, individual actions are evaluated, in theory not just in practice, by whether they conform to a justified moral rule, and the utilitarian standard is applied only to general rules. Some rule utilitarians hold that actions are right provided they are permitted by rules the general acceptance of which would maximize utility in the agent’s society, and wrong only if they would be prohibited by such rules. There are a number of forms of rule utilitarianism, and utilitarians disagree about whether act or rule utilitarianism is correct. Moral implications. Most debate about utilitarianism has focused on its moral implications. Critics have argued that its implications sharply conflict with most people’s considered moral judgments, and that this is a strong reason to reject utilitarianism. Proponents have argued both that many of these conflicts disappear on a proper understanding of utilitarianism and that the remaining conflicts should throw the particular judgments, not utilitarianism, into doubt. One important controversy concerns utilitarianism’s implications for distributive justice. Utilitarianism requires, in individual actions and in public policy, maximizing utility without regard to its distribution between different persons. Thus, it seems to ignore individual rights, whether specific individuals morally deserve particular benefits or burdens, and potentially to endorse great inequalities between persons; e.g., some critics have charged that according to utilitarianism slavery would be morally justified if its benefits to the slaveowners sufficiently outweighed the burdens to the slaves and if it produced more overall utility than alternative practices possible in that society. Defenders of utilitarianism typically argue that in the real world there is virtually always a better alternative than the action or practice that the critic charges utilitarianism wrongly supports; e.g., no system of slavery that has ever existed is plausibly thought to have maximized utility for the society in question. Defenders of utilitarianism also typically try to show that it does take account of the moral consideration the critic claims it wrongly ignores; for instance, utilitarians commonly appeal to the declining marginal utility of money equal marginal increments of money tend to produce less utility e.g. happiness for persons, the more money they already utilitarianism utilitarianism have as giving some support to equality in income distribution. Another source of controversy concerns whether moral principles should be agent-neutral or, in at least some cases, agent-relative. Utilitarianism is agent-neutral in that it gives all people the same moral aim act so as to maximize utility for everyone whereas agent-relative principles give different moral aims to different individuals. Defenders of agent-relative principles note that a commonly accepted moral rule like the prohibition of killing the innocent is understood as telling each agent that he or she must not kill, even if doing so is the only way to prevent a still greater number of killings by others. In this way, a non-utilitarian, agent-relative prohibition reflects the common moral view that each person bears special moral responsibility for what he or she does, which is greater than his or her responsibility to prevent similar wrong actions by others. Common moral beliefs also permit people to give special weight to their own projects and commitments and, e.g., to favor to some extent their own children at the expense of other children in greater need; agent-relative responsibilities to one’s own family reflect these moral views in a way that agent-neutral utilitarian responsibilities apparently do not. The debate over neutrality and relativity is related to a final area of controversy about utilitarianism. Critics charge that utilitarianism makes morality far too demanding by requiring that one always act to maximize utility. If, e.g., one reads a book or goes to a movie, one could nearly always be using one’s time and resources to do more good by aiding famine relief. The critics believe that this wrongly makes morally required what should be only supererogatory action that is good, but goes beyond “the call of duty” and is not morally required. Here, utilitarians have often argued that ordinary moral views are seriously mistaken and that morality can demand greater sacrifices of one’s own interests for the benefit of others than is commonly believed. There is little doubt that here, and in many other cases, utilitarianism’s moral implications significantly conflict with commonsense moral beliefs the dispute is whether this should count against commonsense moral beliefs or against utilitarianism. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bergmann on Stephen and the English utilitarians.”

entelecheia -- used by Grice in his philosophical psychology -- from Grecian entelecheia, energeia, actuality. Aristotle, who coins both terms, entelecheia and energeia, treats entelecheia as a near synonym of Energeia (“which makes me often wonder why he felt the need to coin TWICE” – H. P. Grice.). Entelecheia figures in Aristotle’s definition of the soul (psyche) as the first actuality of the natural body (De Anima, II.1). This is explained by analogy with knowledge: first actuality is to knowledge as second actuality is to the active use of knowledge. ’Entelechia’ is also a technical term, but in German, in Leibniz for the primitive active force in every monad, which is combined with primary matter, and from which the active force, vis viva, is somehow derived (“But I rather use ‘entelecheia’ in the original Grecian.” – Grice). “The vitalist philosopher Hans Driesch used the Aristotelian term in his account of biology, and I feel vitalistic on occasion.” “Life, Driesch holds, is not a bowl of cherries, but an entelechy; and an entelechy is a substantial entity, rather like a mind, that controls organic processes.” “To me, life is rather a bowl of cherries, don’t make it serious! It’s just mysterious!”

enthymeme: an incompletely stated syllogism, with one premise, or even the conclusion, omitted. The term sometimes designates incompletely stated arguments of other kinds. We are expected to supply the missing premise or draw the conclusion if it is not stated. The result is supposed to be a syllogistic inference. For example: ‘He will eventually get caught, for he is a thief’; or ‘He will eventually be caught, for all habitual thieves get caught’. This notion of enthymeme as an incompletely stated syllogism has a long tradition and does not seem inconsistent with Aristotle’s own characterization of it. Thus, Peter of Spain openly declares that an enthymeme is an argument with a single premise that needs to be reduced to syllogism. But Peter also points out that Aristotle spoke of enthymeme as “being of ycos and signum,” and he explains that ycos here means ‘probable proposition’ while signum expresses the necessity of inference. ‘P, therefore Q’ is an ycos in the sense of a proposition that appears to be true to all or to many; but insofar as P has virtually a double power, that of itself and of the proposition understood along with it, it is both probable and demonstrative, albeit from a different point of view.

EPI-STEMIC – Grice: “Philosophers hardly realise how artificial the idea of a Grecian epi-steme is! from epi "over, near" (see epi-) + histasthai "to stand," from PIE root *sta- "to stand, make or be firm." epistemic deontologism, a duty-based view of the nature of epistemic justification. A central concern of epistemology is to account for the distinction between justified and unjustified beliefs. According to epistemic deontologism, the concept of justification may be analyzed by using, in a specific sense relevant to the pursuit of knowledge, terms such as ‘ought’, ‘obligatory’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’. A subject S is justified in believing that p provided S does not violate any epistemic obligations those that arise from the goal of believing what is true and not believing what is false. Equivalently, S is justified in believing that p provided believing p is from the point of view taken in the pursuit of truth permissible for S. Among contemporary epistemologists, this view is held by Chisholm, Laurence BonJour, and Carl Ginet. Its significance is twofold. If justification is a function of meeting obligations, then it is, contrary to some versions of naturalistic epistemology, normative. Second, if the normativity of justification is deontological, the factors that determine whether a belief is justified must be internal to the subject’s mind. Critics of epistemic deontologism, most conspicuously Alston, contend that belief is involuntary and thus cannot be a proper object of obligations. If, e.g., one is looking out the window and notices that it is raining, one is psychologically forced to believe that it is raining. Deontologists can reply to this objection by rejecting its underlying premise: epistemic obligations require that belief be voluntary. Alternatively, they may insist that belief is voluntary after all, and thus subject to epistemic obligations, for there is a means by which one can avoid believing what one ought not to believe: weighing the evidence, or deliberation. -- epistemic logic, the logical investigation of epistemic concepts and statements. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, evidence, certainty, and related notions. Epistemic logic is usually taken to include the logic of belief or doxastic logic. Much of the recent work on epistemic logic is based on the view that it is a branch of modal logic. In the early 0s von Wright observed that the epistemic notions verified known to be true, undecided, and falsified are related to each other in the same way as the alethic modalities necessary, contingent, and impossible, and behave logically in analogous ways. This analogy is not surprising in view of the fact that the meaning of modal concepts is often explained epistemically. For example, in the 0s Peirce defined informational possibility as that “which in a given state of information is not perfectly known not to be true,” and called informationally necessary “that which is perfectly known to be true.” The modal logic of epistemic and doxastic concepts was studied systematically by Hintikka in his pioneering Knowledge and Belief2, which applied to the concepts of knowledge and belief the semantical method the method of modal sets that he had used earlier for the investigation of modal logic. In this approach, the truth of the proposition that a knows that p briefly Kap in a possible world or situation u is taken to mean that p holds in all epistemic alternatives of u; these are understood as worlds compatible with what a knows at u. If the relation of epistemic alternativeness is reflexive, the principle ‘KapPp’ only what is the case can be known is valid, and the assumption that the alternativeness relation is transitive validates the so-called KK-thesis, ‘Kap P Ka Ka p’ if a knows that p, a knows that a knows that p; these two assumptions together make the logic of knowledge similar to an S4-type modal logic. If the knowledge operator Ka and the corresponding epistemic possibility operator Pa are added to quantification theory with identity, it becomes possible to study the interplay between quantifiers and epistemic operators and the behavior of individual terms in epistemic contexts, and analyze such locutions as ‘a knows who what b some F is’. The problems of epistemic logic in this area are part of the general problem of giving a coherent semantical account of propositional attitudes. If a proposition p is true in all epistemic alternatives of a given world, so are all logical consequences of p; thus the possible-worlds semantics of epistemic concepts outlined above leads to the result that a person knows all logical consequences of what he knows. This is a paradoxical conclusion; it is called the problem of logical omniscience. The solution of this problem requires a distinction between different levels of knowledge for example, between tacit and explicit knowledge. A more realistic model of knowledge can be obtained by supplementing the basic possible-worlds account by an analysis of the processes by which the implicit knowledge can be activated and made explicit. Modal epistemic logics have found fruitful applications in the recent work on knowledge representation and in the logic and semantics of questions and answers in which questions are interpreted as requests for knowledge or “epistemic imperatives.” -- epistemic principle, a principle of rationality applicable to such concepts as knowledge, justification, and reasonable belief. Epistemic principles include the principles of epistemic logic and principles that relate different epistemic concepts to one another, or epistemic concepts to nonepistemic ones e.g., semantic concepts. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, epistemic probability, and other concepts that are used for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of beliefs and knowledge claims. Epistemic principles can be formulated as principles concerning belief systems or information systems, i.e., systems that characterize a person’s possible doxastic state at a given time; a belief system may be construed as a set of accepted propositions or as a system of degrees of belief. It is possible to distinguish two kinds of epistemic principles: a principles concerning the rationality of a single belief system, and b principles concerning the rational changes of belief. The former include the requirements of coherence and consistency for beliefs and for probabilities; such principles may be said to concern the statics of belief systems. The latter principles include various principles of belief revision and adjustment, i.e., principles concerning the dynamics of belief systems. -- epistemic privacy, the relation a person has to a proposition when only that person can have direct or non-inferential knowledge of the proposition. It is widely thought that people have epistemic privacy with respect to propositions about certain of their own mental states. According to this view, a person can know directly that he has certain thoughts or feelings or sensory experiences. Perhaps others can also know that the person has these thoughts, feelings, or experiences, but if they can it is only as a result of inference from propositions about the person’s behavior or physical condition. -- epistemic regress argument, an argument, originating in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, aiming to show that knowledge and epistemic justification have a two-tier structure as described by epistemic foundationalism. It lends itself to the following outline regarding justification. If you have any justified belief, this belief occurs in an evidential chain including at least two links: the supporting link i.e., the evidence and the supported link i.e., the justified belief. This does not mean, however, that all evidence consists of beliefs. Evidential chains might come in any of four kinds: circular chains, endless chains, chains ending in unjustified beliefs, and chains anchored in foundational beliefs that do not derive their justification from other beliefs. Only the fourth, foundationalist kind is defensible as grounding knowledge and epistemic justification. Could all justification be inferential? A belief, B1, is inferentially justified when it owes its justification, at least in part, to some other belief, B2. Whence the justification for B2? If B2 owes its justification to B1, we have a troublesome circle. How can B2 yield justification or evidence for B1, if B2 owes its evidential status to B1? On the other hand, if B2 owes its justification to another belief, B3, and B3 owes its justification to yet another belief, B4, and so on ad infinitum, we have a troublesome endless regress of justification. Such a regress seems to deliver not actual justification, but at best merely potential justification, for the belief at its head. Actual finite humans, furthermore, seem not to be able to comprehend, or to possess, all the steps of an infinite regress of justification. Finally, if B2 is itself unjustified, it evidently will be unable to provide justification for B1. It seems, then, that the structure of inferential justification does not consist of either circular justification, endless regresses of justification, or unjustified starter-beliefs. We have foundationalism, then, as the most viable account of evidential chains, so long as we understand it as the structural view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially i.e., without deriving justification from other beliefs, but can nonetheless provide justification for other beliefs. More precisely, if we have any justified beliefs, we have some foundational, non-inferentially justified beliefs. This regress argument needs some refinement before its full force can be appreciated. With suitable refinement, however, it can seriously challenge such alternatives to foundationalism as coherentism and contextualism. The regress argument has been a key motivation for foundationalism in the history of epistemology. -- epistemology from Grecian episteme, ‘knowledge’, and logos, ‘explanation’, the study of the nature of knowledge and justification; specifically, the study of a the defining features, b the substantive conditions or sources, and c the limits of knowledge and justification. The latter three categories are represented by traditional philosophical controversy over the analysis of knowledge and justification, the sources of knowledge and justification e.g., rationalism versus empiricism, and the viability of skepticism about knowledge and justification. Kinds of knowledge. Knowledge can be either explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge is self-conscious in that the knower is aware of the relevant state of knowledge, whereas tacit knowledge is implicit, hidden from self-consciousness. Much of our knowledge is tacit: it is genuine but we are unaware of the relevant states of knowledge, even if we can achieve awareness upon suitable reflection. In this regard, knowledge resembles many of our psychological states. The existence of a psychological state in a person does not require the person’s awareness of that state, although it may require the person’s awareness of an object of that state such as what is sensed or perceived. Philosophers have identified various species of knowledge: for example, propositional knowledge that something is so, non-propositional knowledge of something e.g., knowledge by acquaintance, or by direct awareness, empirical a posteriori propositional knowledge, nonempirical a priori propositional knowledge, and knowledge of how to do something. Philosophical controversy has arisen over distinctions between such species, for example, over i the relations between some of these species e.g., does knowing-how reduce to knowledge-that?, and ii the viability of some of these species e.g., is there really such a thing as, or even a coherent notion of, a priori knowledge?. A primary concern of classical modern philosophy, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the extent of our a priori knowledge relative to the extent of our a posteriori knowledge. Such rationalists as Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza contended that all genuine knowledge of the real world is a priori, whereas such empiricists as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume argued that all such knowledge is a posteriori. In his Critique of Pure Reason 1781, Kant sought a grand reconciliation, aiming to preserve the key lessons of both rationalism and empiricism. Since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a posteriori knowledge has been widely regarded as knowledge that depends for its supporting ground on some specific sensory or perceptual experience; and a priori knowledge has been widely regarded as knowledge that does not depend for its supporting ground on such experience. Kant and others have held that the supporting ground for a priori knowledge comes solely from purely intellectual processes called “pure reason” or “pure understanding.” Knowledge of logical and mathematical truths typically serves as a standard case of a priori knowledge, whereas knowledge of the existence or presence of physical objects typically serves as a standard case of a posteriori knowledge. A major task for an account of a priori knowledge is the explanation of what the relevant purely intellectual processes are, and of how they contribute to non-empirical knowledge. An analogous task for an account of a posteriori knowledge is the explanation of what sensory or perceptual experience is and how it contributes to empirical knowledge. More fundamentally, epistemologists have sought an account of propositional knowledge in general, i.e., an account of what is common to a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Ever since Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus c.400 B.C., epistemologists have tried to identify the essential, defining components of knowledge. Identifying these components will yield an analysis of knowledge. A prominent traditional view, suggested by Plato and Kant among others, is that propositional knowledge that something is so has three individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This is the tripartite definition that has come to be called the standard analysis. We can clarify it by attending briefly to each of its three conditions. The belief condition. This requires that anyone who knows that p where ‘p’ stands for any proposition or statement must believe that p. If, therefore, you do not believe that minds are brains say, because you have not considered the matter at all, then you do not know that minds are brains. A knower must be psychologically related somehow to a proposition that is an object of knowledge for that knower. Proponents of the standard analysis hold that only belief can provide the needed psychological relation. Philosophers do not share a uniform account of belief, but some considerations supply common ground. Beliefs are not actions of assenting to a proposition; they rather are dispositional psychological states that can exist even when unmanifested. You do not cease believing that 2 ! 2 % 4, for example, whenever your attention leaves arithmetic. Our believing that p seems to require that we have a tendency to assent to p in certain situations, but it seems also to be more than just such a tendency. What else believing requires remains highly controversial among philosophers. Some philosophers have opposed the belief condition of the standard analysis on the ground that we can accept, or assent to, a known proposition without actually believing it. They contend that we can accept a proposition even if we fail to acquire a tendency, required by believing, to accept that proposition in certain situations. On this view, acceptance is a psychological act that does not entail any dispositional psychological state, and such acceptance is sufficient to relate a knower psychologically to a known proposition. However this view fares, one underlying assumption of the standard analysis seems correct: our concept of knowledge requires that a knower be psychologically related somehow to a known proposition. Barring that requirement, we shall be hard put to explain how knowers psychologically possess their knowledge of known propositions. Even if knowledge requires belief, belief that p does not require knowledge that p, since belief can typically be false. This observation, familiar from Plato’s Theaetetus, assumes that knowledge has a truth condition. On the standard analysis, if you know that p, then it is true that p. If, therefore, it is false that minds are brains, then you do not know that minds are brains. It is thus misleading to say, e.g., that astronomers before Copernicus knew that the earth is flat; at best, they justifiably believed that they knew this. The truth condition. This condition of the standard analysis has not attracted any serious challenge. Controversy over it has focused instead on Pilate’s vexing question: What is truth? This question concerns what truth consists in, not our ways of finding out what is true. Influential answers come from at least three approaches: truth as correspondence i.e., agreement, of some specified sort, between a proposition and an actual situation; truth as coherence i.e., interconnectedness of a proposition with a specified system of propositions; and truth as pragmatic cognitive value i.e., usefulness of a proposition in achieving certain intellectual goals. Without assessing these prominent approaches, we should recognize, in accord with the standard analysis, that our concept of knowledge seems to have a factual requirement: we epistemology epistemology 274 274 genuinely know that p only if it is the case that p. The pertinent notion of “its being the case” seems equivalent to the notion of “how reality is” or “how things really are.” The latter notion seems essential to our notion of knowledge, but is open to controversy over its explication. The justification condition. Knowledge is not simply true belief. Some true beliefs are supported only by lucky guesswork and hence do not qualify as knowledge. Knowledge requires that the satisfaction of its belief condition be “appropriately related” to the satisfaction of its truth condition. This is one broad way of understanding the justification condition of the standard analysis. More specifically, we might say that a knower must have adequate indication that a known proposition is true. If we understand such adequate indication as a sort of evidence indicating that a proposition is true, we have reached the traditional general view of the justification condition: justification as evidence. Questions about justification attract the lion’s share of attention in contemporary epistemology. Controversy focuses on the meaning of ‘justification’ as well as on the substantive conditions for a belief’s being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge. Current debates about the meaning of ‘justification’ revolve around the question whether, and if so how, the concept of epistemic knowledge-relevant justification is normative. Since the 0s Chisholm has defended the following deontological obligation-oriented notion of justification: the claim that a proposition, p, is epistemically justified for you means that it is false that you ought to refrain from accepting p. In other terms, to say that p is epistemically justified is to say that accepting p is epistemically permissible at least in the sense that accepting p is consistent with a certain set of epistemic rules. This deontological construal enjoys wide representation in contemporary epistemology. A normative construal of justification need not be deontological; it need not use the notions of obligation and permission. Alston, for instance, has introduced a non-deontological normative concept of justification that relies mainly on the notion of what is epistemically good from the viewpoint of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity. Alston links epistemic goodness to a belief’s being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reasons to the contrary. Some epistemologists shun normative construals of justification as superfluous. One noteworthy view is that ‘epistemic justification’ means simply ‘evidential support’ of a certain sort. To say that p is epistemically justifiable to some extent for you is, on this view, just to say that p is supportable to some extent by your overall evidential reasons. This construal will be non-normative so long as the notions of supportability and an evidential reason are nonnormative. Some philosophers have tried to explicate the latter notions without relying on talk of epistemic permissibility or epistemic goodness. We can understand the relevant notion of “support” in terms of non-normative notions of entailment and explanation or, answering why-questions. We can understand the notion of an “evidential reason” via the notion of a psychological state that can stand in a certain truth-indicating support relation to propositions. For instance, we might regard nondoxastic states of “seeming to perceive” something e.g., seeming to see a dictionary here as foundational truth indicators for certain physical-object propositions e.g., the proposition that there is a dictionary here, in virtue of those states being best explained by those propositions. If anything resembling this approach succeeds, we can get by without the aforementioned normative notions of epistemic justification. Foundationalism versus coherentism. Talk of foundational truth indicators brings us to a key controversy over justification: Does epistemic justification, and thus knowledge, have foundations, and if so, in what sense? This question can be clarified as the issue whether some beliefs can not only a have their epistemic justification non-inferentially i.e., apart from evidential support from any other beliefs, but also b provide epistemic justification for all justified beliefs that lack such non-inferential justification. Foundationalism gives an affirmative answer to this issue, and is represented in varying ways by, e.g., Aristotle, Descartes, Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Chisholm. Foundationalists do not share a uniform account of non-inferential justification. Some construe non-inferential justification as self-justification. Others reject literal self-justification for beliefs, and argue that foundational beliefs have their non-inferential justification in virtue of evidential support from the deliverances of non-belief psychological states, e.g., perception “seem-ing-to-perceive” states, sensation “seeming-to-sense” states, or memory “seeming-toremember” states. Still others understand noninferential justification in terms of a belief’s being “reliably produced,” i.e., caused and sustained by some non-belief belief-producing process or source e.g., perception, memory, introspection that tends to produce true rather than false beliefs. This last view takes the causal source of a belief to be crucial to its justification. Unlike Descartes, contemporary foundationalists clearly separate claims to non-inferential, foundational justification from claims to certainty. They typically settle for a modest foundationalism implying that foundational beliefs need not be indubitable or infallible. This contrasts with the radical foundationalism of Descartes. The traditional competitor to foundationalism is the coherence theory of justification, i.e., epistemic coherentism. This is not the coherence definition of truth; it rather is the view that the justification of any belief depends on that belief’s having evidential support from some other belief via coherence relations such as entailment or explanatory relations. Notable proponents include Hegel, Bosanquet, and Sellars. A prominent contemporary version of epistemic coherentism states that evidential coherence relations among beliefs are typically explanatory relations. The rough idea is that a belief is justified for you so long as it either best explains, or is best explained by, some member of the system of beliefs that has maximal explanatory power for you. Contemporary coherentism is uniformly systemic or holistic; it finds the ultimate source of justification in a system of interconnected beliefs or potential beliefs. One problem has troubled all versions of coherentism that aim to explain empirical justification: the isolation argument. According to this argument, coherentism entails that you can be epistemically justified in accepting an empirical proposition that is incompatible with, or at least improbable given, your total empirical evidence. The key assumption of this argument is that your total empirical evidence includes non-belief sensory and perceptual awareness-states, such as your feeling pain or your seeming to see something. These are not belief-states. Epistemic coherentism, by definition, makes justification a function solely of coherence relations between propositions, such as propositions one believes or accepts. Thus, such coherentism seems to isolate justification from the evidential import of non-belief awareness-states. Coherentists have tried to handle this problem, but no resolution enjoys wide acceptance. Causal and contextualist theories. Some contemporary epistemologists endorse contextualism regarding epistemic justification, a view suggested by Dewey, Vitters, and Kuhn, among others. On this view, all justified beliefs depend for their evidential support on some unjustified beliefs that need no justification. In any context of inquiry, people simply assume the acceptability of some propositions as starting points for inquiry, and these “contextually basic” propositions, though lacking evidential support, can serve as evidential support for other propositions. Contextualists stress that contextually basic propositions can vary from context to context e.g., from theological inquiry to biological inquiry and from social group to social group. The main problem for contextualists comes from their view that unjustified assumptions can provide epistemic justification for other propositions. We need a precise explanation of how an unjustified assumption can yield evidential support, how a non-probable belief can make another belief probable. Contextualists have not given a uniform explanation here. Recently some epistemologists have recommended that we give up the traditional evidence condition for knowledge. They recommend that we construe the justification condition as a causal condition. Roughly, the idea is that you know that p if and only if a you believe that p, b p is true, and c your believing that p is causally produced and sustained by the fact that makes p true. This is the basis of the causal theory of knowing, which comes with varying details. Any such causal theory faces serious problems from our knowledge of universal propositions. Evidently, we know, for instance, that all dictionaries are produced by people, but our believing that this is so seems not to be causally supported by the fact that all dictionaries are humanly produced. It is not clear that the latter fact causally produces any beliefs. Another problem is that causal theories typically neglect what seems to be crucial to any account of the justification condition: the requirement that justificational support for a belief be accessible, in some sense, to the believer. The rough idea is that one must be able to access, or bring to awareness, the justification underlying one’s beliefs. The causal origins of a belief are, of course, often very complex and inaccessible to a believer. Causal theories thus face problems from an accessibility requirement on justification. Internalism regarding justification preserves an accessibility requirement on what confers justification, whereas epistemic externalism rejects this requirement. Debates over internalism and externalism abound in current epistemology, but internalists do not yet share a uniform detailed account of accessibility. The Gettier problem. The standard analysis of knowledge, however elaborated, faces a devastating challenge that initially gave rise to causal theories of knowledge: the Gettier problem. In 3 Edmund Gettier published a highly influential challenge to the view that if you have a justified true belief that p, then you know that p. Here is one of Gettier’s counterexamples to this view: Smith is justified in believing the false proposition that i Jones owns a Ford. On the basis of i, Smith infers, and thus is justified in believing, that ii either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. As it happens, Brown is in Barcelona, and so ii is true. So, although Smith is justified in believing the true proposition ii, Smith does not know ii. Gettier-style counterexamples are cases where a person has justified true belief that p but lacks knowledge that p. The Gettier problem is the problem of finding a modification of, or an alternative to, the standard analysis that avoids difficulties from Gettier-style counterexamples. The controversy over the Gettier problem is highly complex and still unsettled. Many epistemologists take the lesson of Gettier-style counterexamples to be that propositional knowledge requires a fourth condition, beyond the justification, truth, and belief conditions. No specific fourth condition has received overwhelming acceptance, but some proposals have become prominent. The so-called defeasibility condition, e.g., requires that the justification appropriate to knowledge be “undefeated” in the general sense that some appropriate subjunctive conditional concerning defeaters of justification be true of that justification. For instance, one simple defeasibility fourth condition requires of Smith’s knowing that p that there be no true proposition, q, such that if q became justified for Smith, p would no longer be justified for Smith. So if Smith knows, on the basis of his visual perception, that Mary removed books from the library, then Smith’s coming to believe the true proposition that Mary’s identical twin removed books from the library would not undermine the justification for Smith’s belief concerning Mary herself. A different approach shuns subjunctive conditionals of that sort, and contends that propositional knowledge requires justified true belief that is sustained by the collective totality of actual truths. This approach requires a detailed account of when justification is undermined and restored. The Gettier problem is epistemologically important. One branch of epistemology seeks a precise understanding of the nature e.g., the essential components of propositional knowledge. Our having a precise understanding of propositional knowledge requires our having a Gettier-proof analysis of such knowledge. Epistemologists thus need a defensible solution to the Gettier problem, however complex that solution is. Skepticism. Epistemologists debate the limits, or scope, of knowledge. The more restricted we take the limits of knowledge to be, the more skeptical we are. Two influential types of skepticism are knowledge skepticism and justification skepticism. Unrestricted knowledge skepticism implies that no one knows anything, whereas unrestricted justification skepticism implies the more extreme view that no one is even justified in believing anything. Some forms of skepticism are stronger than others. Knowledge skepticism in its strongest form implies that it is impossible for anyone to know anything. A weaker form would deny the actuality of our having knowledge, but leave open its possibility. Many skeptics have restricted their skepticism to a particular domain of supposed knowledge: e.g., knowledge of the external world, knowledge of other minds, knowledge of the past or the future, or knowledge of unperceived items. Such limited skepticism is more common than unrestricted skepticism in the history of epistemology. Arguments supporting skepticism come in many forms. One of the most difficult is the problem of the criterion, a version of which has been stated by the sixteenth-century skeptic Montaigne: “To adjudicate [between the true and the false] among the appearances of things, we need to have a distinguishing method; to validate this method, we need to have a justifying argument; but to validate this justifying argument, we need the very method at issue. And there we are, going round on the wheel.” This line of skeptical argument originated in ancient Greece, with epistemology itself. It forces us to face this question: How can we specify what we know without having specified how we know, and how can we specify how we know without having specified what we know? Is there any reasonable way out of this threatening circle? This is one of the most difficult epistemological problems, and a cogent epistemology must offer a defensible solution to epistemology epistemology 277 277 it. Contemporary epistemology still lacks a widely accepted reply to this urgent problem

erfahrung: Grice used the German, ‘since I find it difficult to translate.” G. term tr. into English, especially since Kant, as ‘experience’. Kant does not use it as a technical term; rather, it indicates that which requires explanation through more precisely drawn technical distinctions such as those among ‘sensibility’, ‘understanding’, and ‘reason’. In the early twentieth century, Husserl sometimes distinguishes between Erfahrung and Erlebnis, the former indicating experience as capable of being thematized and methodically described or analyzed, the latter experience as “lived through” and never fully available to analysis. Such a distinction occasionally reappears in later texts of phenomenology and existentialism.

eristic, the art of controversy, often involving fallacious but persuasive reasoning. The ancient Sophists brought this art to a high level to achieve their personal goal. They may have found their material in the “encounters” in the law courts as well as in daily life. To enhance persuasion they endorsed the use of unsound principles such as hasty generalizations, faulty analogies, illegitimate appeal to authority, the post hoc ergo propter hoc i.e., “after this, therefore because of this” and other presumed principles. Aristotle exposed eristic argumentation in his Sophistical Refutations, which itself draws examples from Plato’s Euthydemus. From this latter work comes the famous example: ‘That dog is a father and that dog is his, therefore that dog is his father’. What is perhaps worse than its obvious invalidity is that the argument is superficially similar to a sound argument such as ‘This is a table and this is brown, therefore this is a brown table’. In the Sophistical Refutations Aristotle undertakes to find procedures for detection of bad arguments and to propose rules for constructing sound arguments.

erlebnis: G. Grice used the German term, “since I find it difficult to translate it” -- term for experience used in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century G. philosophy. Erlebnis denotes experience in all its direct immediacy and lived fullness. It contrasts with the more typical G. word Erfahrung, denoting ordinary experience as mediated through intellectual and constructive elements. As immediate, Erlebnis eludes conceptualization, in both the lived present and the interiority of experience. As direct, Erlebnis is also disclosive and extraordinary: it reveals something real that otherwise escapes thinking. Typical examples include art, religion, and love, all of which also show the anti-rationalist and polemical uses of the concept. It is especially popular among the Romantic mystics like Novalis and the anti-rationalists Nietzsche and Bergson, as well as in phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie, and existentialism. As used in post-Hegelian G. philosophy, the term describes two aspects of subjectivity. The first concerns the epistemology of the human sciences and of phenomenology. Against naturalism and objectivism, philosophers appeal to the ineliminable, subjective qualities of experience to argue that interpreters must understand “what it is like to be” some experiencing subject, from the inside. The second use of the term is to denote extraordinary and interior experiences like art, religion, freedom, and vital energy. In both cases, it is unclear how such experience could be identified or known in its immediacy, and much recent G. thought, such as Heidegger and hermeneutics, rejects the concept.

erotetic: in the strict sense, pertaining to questions. Erotetic logic is the logic of questions. Different conceptions of questions yield different kinds of erotetic logic. A Platonistic approach holds that questions exist independently of interrogatives. For P. Tichý, a question is a function on possible worlds, the right answer being the value of the function at the actual world. Erotetic logic is the logic of such functions. In the epistemic-imperative approach of L. Bqvist, Hintikka, et al., one begins with a system for epistemic sentences and embeds this in a system for imperative sentences, thus obtaining sentences of the form ‘make it the case that I know . . .’ and complex compounds of such sentences. Certain ones of these are defined to be interrogatives. Then erotetic logic is the logic of epistemic imperatives and the conditions for satisfaction of these imperatives. In the abstract interrogative approach of N. Belnap, T. Kubigski, and many others, one chooses certain types of expression to serve as interrogatives, and, for each type, specifies what expressions count as answers of various kinds direct, partial, . . .. On this approach we may say that interrogatives express questions, or we may identify questions with interrogatives, in which case the only meaning that an interrogative has is that it has the answers that it does. Either way, the emphasis is on interrogatives, and erotetic logic is the logic of systems that provide interrogatives and specify answers to them. In the broad sense, ‘erotetic’ designates what pertains to utterance-and-response. In this sense erotetic logic is the logic of the relations between 1 sentences of many kinds and 2 the expressions that count as appropriate replies to them. This includes not only the relations between question and answer but also, e.g., between assertion and agreement or denial, command and report of compliance or refusal, and for many types of sentence S between S and various corrective replies to S e.g., denial of the presupposition of S. Erotetic logics may differ in the class of sentences treated, the types of response counted as appropriate, the assignment of other content presupposition, projection, etc., and other details.

eschatologicum: Possibly related to Latin ‘summum, ‘as in ‘summum genus,’ and ‘summun bonum. From Greek, 5. in the Logic of Arist., τὰ ἔ. are the last or lowest species, Metaph.1059b26, or individuals, ib.998b16, cf. AP0.96b12, al.; “τὸ ἔ. ἄτομον” Metaph.1058b10. b. ὁ ἔ. ὅρος the minor term of a syllogism, EN1147b14. c. last step in geom. analysis or ultimate condition of action, “τὸ ἔ. ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως” de An.433a16. II. Adv. -τως to the uttermost, exceedingly, “πῦρ ἐ. καίει” Hp.de Arte8; “ἐ. διαμάχεσθαι” Arist.HA613a11 ; “ἐ. φιλοπόλεμος” X.An.2.6.1 ; “φοβοῦμαί σ᾽ ἐ.” Men.912, cf. Epicur.Ep. 1p.31U. b. -τως διακεῖσθαι to be at the last extremity, Plb.1.24.2, D.S.18.48 ; “ἔχειν” Ev.Marc.5.23 ; “ἀπορεῖν” Phld.Oec.p.72J. 2. so ἐς τὸ ἔ.,=ἐσχάτως, Hdt.7.229; “εἰς τὰ ἔ.” X.HG5.4.33 ; “εἰς τὰ ἔ. μάλα” Id.Lac.1.2 ; “τὸ ἔ.” finally, in the end, Pl.Grg.473c ; but, τὸ ἔ. what is worst of all, ib.508d. Why ontology is not enough. The philosopher needs to PLAY with cross-categorial barriers. He is an eschatologist. Socrates was. being and good, for Aristotle and Grice cover all. Good was a favourite of Moore and Hare, as Barnes was well aware! Like Barnes, Grice dislikes Prichards analysis of good. He leans towards the emotion-based approach by Ogden. If Grice, like Humpty Dumpty, opposes the Establishment with his meaning liberalism (what a word means is what I mean by uttering it), he certainly should be concerned with category shifts. Plus, Grice was a closet Platonist. As Plato once remarked, having the ability to see horses but not horsehood (ἱππότης) is a mark of stupidity – rendered by Liddell and Scott as “horse-nature, the concept of horse” (Antisth. et Pl. ap. Simp.in Cat.208.30,32, Sch.AristId.p.167F). Grice would endure the flinty experience of giving joint seminars at Oxford with Austin on the first two books of Aristotles Organon, Categoriae, and De Int. Grice finds the use of a category, κατηγορία, by Aristotle a bit of a geniality. Aristotle is using legalese, from kata, against, on, and agoreuô [ἀγορεύω], speak in public), and uses it to designate both the prosecution in a trial and the attribution in a logical proposition, i. e., the questions that must be asked with regard to a Subjects, and the answers that can be given. As a representative of the linguistic turn in philosophy, Grice is attracted to the idea that a category can thus be understood variously, as applying to the realm of reality (ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of expression) and to philosophical psychology (category of representation). Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate, shall we say, categories: his explorations with Austin (very serious), and those with Strawson (more congenial). Where is Smiths altruism? Nowhere to be seen. Should we say it is idle (otiose) to speak of altruism? No, it is just an attribute, which, via category shift, can be made the Subjects of your sentence, Strawson. It is not spatio-temporal, though, right. Not really. ‒ I do not particularly like your trouser words. The essay is easy to date since Grice notes that Strawson reproduced some of the details in his Individuals, which we can very well date. Grice thought Aristotle was the best! Or at any rate almost as good as Kantotle! Aristotle saw Categoriæ, along with De Int. as part of his Organon. However, philosophers of language tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts of the Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics ‒ the boring bits! The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian category (as Austin and Strawson equally were) is that category allows for a linguistic-turn reading. Plus, its a nice, pretentious (in the Oxonian way) piece of philosophical jargon! Aristotle couldnt find category in the koine, so he had to coin it. While meant by Aristotle in a primarily ontological way, Oxonian philosophers hasten to add that a category of expression, as Grice puts it, is just as valid a topic for philosophical exploration. His tutee Strawson will actually publish a book on Subjects and predicate in grammar! (Trivial, Strawson!). Grice will later add an intermediary category, which is the Subjects of his philosophical psychology. As such, a category can be construed ontologically, or representationally: the latter involving philosophical psychological concepts, and expressions themselves. For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford (Only the poor learn at Oxford ‒ Arnold), there are (at least ‒ at most?) ten categories. Grice doesnt (really) care about the number. But the first are important. Actually the very first: theres substantia prima, such as Grice. And then theres substantia secunda, such as Grices rationality. The essentia. Then there are various types of attributes. But, as Grice sharply notes, even substantia secunda may be regarded as an attribute. Grices favourite game with Strawson was indeed Category Shift, or Subjects-ification, as Strawson preferred. Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute. We would have substantia prima AND attribute, which in turn gets divided into essential, the izzing, and non-essential, the hazzing. While Austin is not so fun to play with, Strawson is. Smith is a very altruist person. Where is his altruism? Nowhere to be seen, really. Yet we may sensically speak of Smiths altruism. It is just a matter of a category shift. Grice scores. Grice is slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understands, that Strawson, who footnotes Grice as the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic in Introduction to logical lheory, fails to acknowledge that most of the research in Strawsons Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations at joint seminars with Grice. Grice later elaborates on this with Code, who is keen on Grices other game, the hazz and the hazz not, the izz. But then tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics sounds slightlier clumsier, as far as the implicaturum goes. Categories, the Grice-Myro theory of identity, Relative identity, Grice on =, identity, notes, with Myro, metaphysics, philosophy, with Code, Grice izz Grice – or izz he? The idea that = is unqualified requires qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didnt. Grice wants to allow for It is the case that a = b /t1 and it is not the case that a = b /t2. The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a Leibnizian bent are too accustomed to deal with = as an absolute. Grice applies this to human vs. person. A human may be identical to a person, but cease to be so. Indeed, Grices earlier attempt to produce a reductive analsysis of I may be seen as remedying a circularity he detected in Locke about same. Cf. Wiggins, Sameness and substance. Grice makes Peano feel deeply Griceian, as Grice lists his = postulates, here for consideration. And if you wondered why Grice prefers Latinate individuum to the Grecian. The Grecian is “ἄτομον,” in logic, rendered by L and S as ‘individual, of terms,’ Pl. Sph. 229d; of the εἶδος or forma, Arist. Metaph.1034a8, de An. 414b27.2. individual, Id. APo. 96b11, al.: as a subst., τό ἄτομον, Id. Cat. 1b6, 3a38, Metaph.1058a18 (pl.), Plot. 6.2.2, al. subst.; latinised from Grecian. Lewis and Short have “indīvĭdŭum,” an atom, indivisible particle: ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni affirmat, Cic. Ac. 2, 17 fin.: ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit, id. N. D. 3, 12, 29. Note the use of individuum in alethic modalities for necessity and possibility, starting with (11). ⊢ (α izzes α). This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. Grice applies it to war: War is war, as yielding a most peculiar implicaturum. (α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ) ⊃ α izzes γ. This above is transitivity, which is crucial for Grices tackling of Reids counterexample to Locke (and which according to Flew in Locke on personal identity was predated by Berkeley. α hazzes β ⊃ ~(α izzes β). Or, what is accidental is not essential. Grice allows that what is essential is accidental is, while misleading, true. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β) ⊢ (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes a forma). This above defines a universalium as a forma, or eidos. (α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular) ⊃ (∃γ).(γ≠α ∧ α izzes β) ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α ⊢ α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) α = β ⊃⊂ α izzes β ∧ β izzes α ⊢ α izzes an individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β) ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)); α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α) ⊢ α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum. ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium) 16. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of α ⊢ α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β; ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β 20. α izzes a particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) 22. ⊢~ (∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma) α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izz β) ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazz α); α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazz A) ⊢ (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α) ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing); (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing) ⊢ α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α); (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β)⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. The use of this or that doxastic modality, necessity and possibility, starting above, make this a good place to consider one philosophical mistake Grice mentions in “Causal theory.” What is actual is not also possible. Cf. What is essential is also accidental. He is criticising a contemporary, if possible considered dated in the New World, form of ordinary-language philosophy, where the philosopher detects a nuance, and embarks risking colliding with the facts, rushing ahead to exploit it before he can clarify it! Grice liked to see his explorations on = as belonging to metaphysics, as the s. on his Doctrines at the Grice Collection testifies. While Grice presupposes the use of = in his treatment of the king of France, he also explores a relativisation of =. His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against Strawsons criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the substantia prima. Grice wants to apply = to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that a=b in scenario S, but that it may not be the case that a = b in a second scenario S. Myro had an occasion to expand on Grices views in his contribution on the topic for PGRICE. Myro mentions his System Ghp, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grices System Q, in gratitude to to Grice. Grice explored also the logic of izzing and hazzing with Code. Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of qualified identity. The formal aspects were developed by Myro, and also by Code. Grice discussed Wigginss Sameness and substance, rather than Geach. Cf. Wiggins and Strawson on Grice for the BA. At Oxford, Grice was more or less given free rein to teach what he wanted. He found the New World slightly disconcerting at first. At Oxford, he expected his tutees to be willing to read the classics in the vernacular Greek. His approach to teaching was diagogic, as Socratess! Even in his details of izzing and hazzing. Greek enough to me!, as a student recalled! correspondence with Code, Grice sees in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotles underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as izzing and hazing, izzing and hazzing, Code on the significance of the middle book in Aristotles Met. , Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book. Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this! The organisation of Aristotle’s metaphysics was a topic of much concern for Grice. With Code, Grice coined izzing and hazzing to refer to essential and non-essential attribution. Izzing and hazzing, “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being” (henceforth, “Aristotle”) PPQ, Aristotle on multiplicity, “The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly” (henceforth, “PPQ,” posthumously ed. by Loar, Aristotle, multiplicity, izzing, hazzing, being, good, Code. Grice offers a thorough discussion of Owens treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the snares of ontology. Grice distinguishes between izzing and hazzing, which he thinks help in clarifying, more axiomatico, what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on essential versus non-essential predication. Surely, for Grice, being, nor indeed good, should not be multiplied beyond necessity, but izzing and hazzing are already multiplied. The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication by Loar in memoriam Grice. Note that the Grice Papers contains a typically Griceian un-publication, entitled Aristotle and multiplicity simpliciter. Rather than Aristotle on, as the title for the PPQ piece goes. Note also that, since its multiplicity simpliciter, it refers to Aristotle on two key ideas: being and the good. As Code notes in his contribution to PGRICE, Grice first presents his thoughts on izzing and hazzing publicly at Vancouver. Jones has developed the axiomatic treatment favoured by Grice. For Grice there is multiplicity in both being and good (ton agathon), both accountable in terms of conversational implicatura, of course. If in Prolegomena, Grice was interested in criticising himself, in essays of historical nature like these, Grice is seeing Aristotles Athenian dialectic as a foreshadow of the Oxonian dialectic, and treating him as an equal. Grice is yielding his razor: senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. But then Aristotle is talking about the multiplicity of is and is good. Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be! There is a further item in the Grice collection that combines Aristotle on being with Aristotle on good, which is relevant in connection with this. Aristotle on being and good (ἀγαθόν). Aristotle, being, good (agathon), ἀγαθός. As from this f., the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with Aristotle, Grice will explore Aristotle on being or is and good (ἀγαθός) in explorations with Code. Grice comes up with izzing and hazzing as the two counterparts to Aristotles views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication. Grices views on Aristotle on the good (strictly, there is no need to restrict Arisstotles use to the neuter form, since he employs ἀγαθός) connect with Grices Aristotelian idea of eudaemonia, that he explores elsewhere. Strictly: Aristotle on being and the good. If that had been Grices case, he would have used the definite article. Otherwise, good may well translate as masculine, ἀγαθός ‒the agathetic implicaturum. He plays with Dodgson, cabbages and kings. For what is a good cabbage as opposed to a cabbage? It does not require very sharp eyes, but only our willingness to use the eyes one has, to see that speech is permeated with the notion of purpose. To say what a certain kind of thing is is only too frequently partly to say that it is for. This feature applies to talk of, e. g., ships, shoes, sailing wax, and kings; and, possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it extends even to cabbages! Although Grice suspects Urmson might disagree. v. Grice on Urmsons apples. Grice at his jocular best. If he is going to be a Kantian, he will. He uses Kantian jargon to present his theory of conversation. This he does only at Harvard. The implicaturum being that talking of vaguer assumptions of helpfulness would not sound too convincing. So he has the maxim, the super-maxim, and the sub-maxim. A principle and a maxim is Kantian enough. But when he actually echoes Kant, is when he introduces what he later calls the conversational categories – the keyword here is conversational category, as categoria is used by Aristotle and Kant ‒ or Kantotle. Grice surely knew that, say, his Category of Conversational Modality had nothing to do with the Kantian Category of Modality. Still, he stuck with the idea of four categories (versus Aristotles ten, eight or seven, as the text you consult may tell you): category of conversational quantity (which at Oxford he had formulated in much vaguer terms like strength and informativeness and entailment), the category of conversational quality (keyword: principle of conversational trust), and the category of conversational relation, where again Kants relation has nothing to do with the maxim Grice associates with this category. In any case, his Kantian joke may be helpful when considering the centrality of the concept category simpliciter that Grice had to fight with with his pupils at Oxford – he was lucky to have Austin and Strawson as co-lecturers! Grice was irritated by L and S defining kategoria as category. I guess I knew that. He agreed with their second shot, predicable. Ultimately, Grices concern with category is his concern with person, or prote ousia, as used by Aristotle, and as giving a rationale to Grices agency-based approach to the philosophical enterprise. Aristotle used kategorein in the sense of to predicate, assert something of something, and kategoria. The prote ousia is exemplified by o tis anthropos. It is obvious that Grice wants to approach Aristotles semantics and Aristotles metaphysics at one fell swoop. Grice reads Aristotles Met. , and finds it understandable. Consider the adjective French (which Aristotle does NOT consider) ‒ as it occurs in phrases such as Michel Foucault is a French citizen. Grice is not a French citizen. Michel Foucault once wrote a nice French poem. Urmson once wrote a nice French essay on pragmatics. Michel Foucault was a French professor. Michel Foucault is a French professor. Michel Foucault is a French professor of philosophy. The following features are perhaps significant. The appearance of the adjective French, or Byzantine, as the case might be ‒ cf. I’m feeling French tonight. In these phrases is what Grice has as adjunctive rather than conjunctive, or attributive. A French poem is not necessarily something which combines the separate features of being a poem and being French, as a tall philosopher would simply combine the features of being tall and of being a philosopher. French in French poem, occurs adverbially. French citizen standardly means citizen of France. French poem standardly means poem in French. But it is a mistake to suppose that this fact implies that there is this or that meaning, or, worse, this or that Fregeian sense, of the expression French. In any case, only metaphorically or metabolically can we say that French means this or that or has sense. An utterer means. An utterer makes sense. Cf. R. Pauls doubts about capitalizing major. French means, and figuratively at that, only one thing, viz. of or pertaining to France. And English only means of or pertaining to England. French may be what Grice (unfollowing his remarks on The general theory of context) call context-sensitive. One might indeed say, if you like, that while French means ‒ or means only this or that, or that its only sense is this or that, French still means, again figuratively, a variety of things. French means-in-context of or pertaining to France. Symbolise that as expression E means-in-context that p. Expression E means-in-context C₂ that p₂. Relative to Context C₁ French means of France; as in the phrase French citizen. Relative to context C₂, French means in the French language, as in the phrase, French poem ‒ whereas history does not behave, like this. Whether the focal item is a universal or a particular is, contra Aristotle, quite irrelevant to the question of what this or that related adjective means, or what its sense is. The medical art is no more what an utterer means when he utters the adjective medical, as is France what an utterer means by the adjective French. While the attachment of this or that context may suggest an interpretation in context of this or that expression as uttered by the utterer U, it need not be the case that such a suggestion is indefeasible. It might be e.g. that French poem would have to mean, poem composed in French, unless there were counter indications, that brings the utterer and the addressee to a different context C₃. In which case, perhaps what the utterer means by French poem is poem composed by a French competitor in this or that competition. For French professor there would be two obvious things an utterer might mean. Disambiguation will depend on the wider expression-context or in the situational context attaching to the this or that circumstance of utterance. Eschatology. Some like Hegel, but Collingwoods *my* man! ‒ Grice. Grice participated in two consecutive evenings of the s. of programmes on metaphysics organised by Pears. Actually, charming Pears felt pretentious enough to label the meetings to be about the nature of metaphysics! Grice ends up discussing, as he should, Collingwood on presupposition. Met. remained a favourite topic for Grices philosophical explorations, as it is evident from his essay on Met. , Philosophical Eschatology, and Platos Republic, repr. in his WOW . Possibly Hardie is to blame, since he hardly tutored Grice on metaphysics! Grices two BBC lectures are typically dated in tone. It was the (good ole) days when philosophers thought they could educate the non-elite by dropping Namess like Collingwood and stuff! The Third Programme was extremely popular, especially among the uneducated ones at London, as Pears almost put it, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know what is going on down at Oxford, the only place an uneducated (or educated, for that matter) Londoner at the time was interested in displaying some interest about! I mean, Johnson is right: if a man is tired of the nature of metaphysics, he is tired of life! Since the authorship is Grice, Strawson, and Pears, Met. , in Pears, The Nature of Met., The BBC Third Programme, it is somewhat difficult to identify what paragraphs were actually read by Grice (and which ones by Pears and which ones by Strawson). But trust the sharp Griceian to detect the correct implicaturum! There are many (too many) other items covered by these two lectures: Kant, Aristotle, in no particular order. And in The Grice Collection, for that matter, that cover the field of metaphysics. In the New World, as a sort of tutor in the graduate programme, Grice was expected to cover the discipline at various seminars. Only I dislike discipline! Perhaps his clearest exposition is in the opening section of his Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos Republic, repr. in his WOW , where he states, bluntly that all you need is metaphysics! metaphysics, Miscellaneous, metaphysics notes, Grice would possible see metaphysics as a class – category figuring large. He was concerned with the methodological aspects of the metaphysical enterprise, since he was enough of a relativist to allow for one metaphysical scheme to apply to one area of discourse (one of Eddingtons tables) and another metaphysical scheme to apply to another (Eddingtons other table). In the third programme for the BBC Grice especially enjoyed criticising John Wisdoms innovative look at metaphysics as a bunch of self-evident falsehoods (Were all alone). Grice focuses on Wisdom on the knowledge of other minds. He also discusses Collingwoods presuppositions, and Bradley on the reality-appearance distinction. Grices reference to Wisdom was due to Ewings treatment of Wisdom on metaphysics. Grices main motivation here is defending metaphysics against Ayer. Ayer thought to win more Oxonian philosophers than he did at Oxford, but he was soon back in London. Post-war Oxford had become conservative and would not stand to the nonsense of Ayers claiming that metaphysics is nonsense, especially, as Ayers implicaturum also was, that philosophy is nonsense! Perhaps the best summary of Griceian metaphysics is his From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics. It’s an ontological answer that one must give to Grices metabolic operation from utterers meaning to expression meaning, Grice had been interested in the methodology of metaphysics since his Oxford days. He counts as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for the BBC Third Programme on The nature of metaphysics with the organiser, Pears, and his former tutee, Strawson on the panel. Grice was particularly keen on Collingwoods views on metaphysical presuppositions, both absolute and relative! Grice also considers John Wisdoms view of the metaphysical proposition as a blatant falsehood. Grice considers Bradleys Hegelian metaphysics of the absolute, in Appearance and reality. Refs.: While Grice’s choice was ‘eschatology,’ as per WoW, Essay, other keywords are useful, notably “metaphysics,” “ontology,” “theorizing,” and “theory-theory,” in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

ESSE: Grice: “Surely the most important verb, philosophically speaking. It was good of Boezio to turn Aristotle’s troublesome ‘belonging’ into a simple ‘est’.” ens a se: Grice defines an ‘ens a se’ as a being that is completely independent and self-sufficient. Since every creature depends at least upon God for its existence, only God could be ens a se. In fact, only God is, and he must be. For if God depended on any other being, he would be dependent and hence not self-sufficient. To the extent that the ontological argument is plausible, it depends on conceiving of God as ens a se. In other words, God as ens a se is the greatest conceivable being. The idea of ens a se is very important in the Monologion and Proslogion of Anselm, in various works of Duns Scotus, and later Scholastic thought. Ens a se should be distinguished from ens ex se, according to Anselm in Monologion. Ens a se is from itself and not “out of itself.” In other words, ens a se does not depend upon itself for its own existence, because it is supposed to be dependent on absolutely nothing. Further, if ens a se depended upon itself, it would cause itself to exist, and that is impossible, according to medieval and Scholastic philosophers, who took causality to be irreflexive. It is also transitive and asymmetric. Hence, the medieval idea of ens a se should not be confused with Spinoza’s idea of causa sui. Later Scholastics often coined abstract terms to designate the property or entity that makes something to be what it is, in analogy with forming, say, ‘rigidity’ from ‘rigid’. The Latin term ‘aseitas’ is formed from the prepositional phrase in ‘ens a se’ in this way; ‘aseitas’ is tr. into English as ‘aseity’. A better-known example of forming an abstract noun from a concrete word is ‘haecceitas’ thisness from ‘haec’ this. -- ens rationis Latin, ‘a being of reason’, a thing dependent for its existence upon reason or thought; sometimes known as an intentional being. Ens rationis is the contrasting term for a real being res or ens in re extra animam, such as an individual animal. Real beings exist independently of thought and are the foundation for truth. A being of reason depends upon thought or reason for its existence and is an invention of Enlightenment ens rationis 266 266 the mind, even if it has a foundation in some real being. This conception requires the idea that there are degrees of being. Two kinds of entia rationis are distinguished: those with a foundation in reality and those without one. The objects of logic, which include genera and species, e.g., animal and human, respectively, are entia rationis that have a foundation in reality, but are abstracted from it. In contrast, mythic and fictional objects, such as a chimera or Pegasus, have no foundation in reality. Blindness and deafness are also sometimes called entia rationis. -- ens realissimum: used by Grice. Latin, ‘most real being’, an informal term for God that occurs rarely in Scholastic philosophers. Within Kant’s philosophy, it has a technical sense. It is an extension of Baumgarten’s idea of ens perfectissimum most perfect being, a being that has the greatest number of possible perfections to the greatest degree. Since ens perfectissimum refers to God as the sum of all possibilities and since actuality is greater than possibility, according to Kant, the idea of God as the sum of all actualities, that is, ens realissimum, is a preferable term for God. Kant thinks that human knowledge is “constrained” to posit the idea of a necessary being. The necessary being that has the best claim to necessity is one that is completely unconditioned, that is, dependent on nothing; this is ens realissimum. He sometimes explicates it in three ways: as the substratum of all realities, as the ground of all realities, and as the sum of all realities. Ens realissimum is nonetheless empirically invalid, since it cannot be experienced by humans. It is something ideal for reason, not real in experience. According to Kant, the ontological argument begins with the concept of ens realissimum and concludes that an existing object falls under that concept Critique of Pure Reason, Book II, chapter 3. esse, essentia: Grice: “Perhaps the most important verb, philosophical speaking.” Grice: “It was Boezio who had the witty occurrence of translating the Aristotelian ‘belong’ by the much simpler ‘est’ – “S est P.” -- Explored byy Grice in “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”. To avoid equivocation, Grice distinguishes between the ‘izz’ of essentia, and the ‘hazz’ of accidentia. ssentialism, a metaphysical theory that objects have essences and that there is a distinction between essential and non-essential or accidental predications. Different issues have, however, been central in debates about essences and essential predication in different periods in the history of philosophy. In our own day, it is commitment to the notion of de re modality that is generally taken to render a theory essentialist; but in the essentialist tradition stemming from Aristotle, discussions of essence and essential predication focus on the distinction between what an object is and how it is. According to Aristotle, the universals that an ordinary object instantiates include some that mark it out as what it is and others that characterize it in some way but do not figure in an account of what it is. In the Categories, he tells us that while the former are said of the object, the latter are merely present in it; and in other writings, he distinguishes between what he calls kath hauto or per se predications where these include the predication of what-universals and kata sumbebekos or per accidens predications where these include the predication of how-universals. He concedes that universals predicated of an object kath hauto are necessary to that object; but he construes the necessity here as derivative. It is because a universal marks out an entity, x, as what x is and hence underlies its being the thing that it is that the universal is necessarily predicated of x. The concept of definition is critically involved in Aristotle’s essentialism. First, it is the kind infima species under which an object falls or one of the items genus or differentia included in the definition of that kind that is predicated of the object kath hauto. But, second, Aristotle’s notion of an essence just is the notion of the ontological correlate of a definition. The term in his writings we translate as ‘essence’ is the expression to ti ein einai the what it is to be. Typically, the expression is followed by a substantival expression in the dative case, so that the expressions denoting essences are phrases like ‘the what it is to be for a horse’ and ‘the what it is to be for an oak tree’; and Aristotle tells us that, for any kind, K, the what it is to be for a K just is that which we identify when we provide a complete and accurate definition of K. Now, Aristotle holds that there is definition only of universals; and this commits him to the view that there are no individual essences. Although he concedes that we can provide definitions of universals from any of his list of ten categories, he gives pride of place to the essences of universals from the category of substance. Substance-universals can be identified without reference to essences from other categories, but the essences of qualities, quantities, and other non-substances can be defined only by reference to the essences of substances. In his early writings, Aristotle took the familiar particulars of common sense things like the individual man and horse of Categories V to be the primary substances; and in these writings it is the essences we isolate by defining the kinds or species under which familiar particulars fall that are construed as the basic or paradigmatic essences. However, in later writings, where ordinary particulars are taken to be complexes of matter and form, it is the substantial forms of familiar particulars that are the primary substances, so their essences are the primary or basic essences; and a central theme in Aristotle’s most mature writings is the idea that the primary substances and their essences are necessarily one and the same in number. error theory essentialism 281 281 The conception of essence as the ontological correlate of a definition often called quiddity persists throughout the medieval tradition; and in early modern philosophy, the idea that the identity of an object is constituted by what it is plays an important role in Continental rationalist thinkers. Indeed, in the writings of Leibniz, we find the most extreme version of traditional essentialism. Whereas Aristotle had held that essences are invariably general, Leibniz insisted that each individual has an essence peculiar to it. He called the essence associated with an entity its complete individual concept; and he maintained that the individual concept somehow entails all the properties exemplified by the relevant individual. Accordingly, Leibniz believed that an omniscient being could, for each possible world and each possible individual, infer from the individual concept of that individual the whole range of properties exemplified by that individual in that possible world. But, then, from the perspective of an omniscient being, all of the propositions identifying the properties the individual actually exhibits would express what Aristotle called kath hauto predications. Leibniz, of course, denied that our perspective is that of an omniscient being; we fail to grasp individual essences in their fullness, so from our perspective, the distinction between essential and accidental predications holds. While classical rationalists espoused a thoroughgoing essentialism, the Aristotlelian conceptions of essence and definition were the repeated targets of attacks by classical British empiricists. Hobbes, e.g., found the notion of essence philosophically useless and insisted that definition merely displays the meanings conventionally associated with linguistic expressions. Locke, on the other hand, continued to speak of essences; but he distinguished between real and nominal essences. As he saw it, the familiar objects of common sense are collections of copresent sensible ideas to which we attach a single name like ‘man’ or ‘horse’. Identifying the ideas constitutive of the relevant collection gives us the nominal essence of a man or a horse. Locke did not deny that real essences might underlie such collections, but he insisted that it is nominal rather than real essences to which we have epistemic access. Hume, in turn, endorsed the idea that familiar objects are collections of sensible ideas, but rejected the idea of some underlying real essence to which we have no access; and he implicitly reinforced the Hobbesian critique of Aristotelian essences with his attack on the idea of de re necessities. So definition merely expresses the meanings we conventionally associate with words, and the only necessity associated with definition is linguistic or verbal necessity. From its origins, the twentieth-century analytic tradition endorsed the classical empiricist critique of essences and the Humean view that necessity is merely linguistic. Indeed, even the Humean concession that there is a special class of statements true in virtue of their meanings came into question in the forties and fifties, when philosophers like Quine argued that it is impossible to provide a noncircular criterion for distinguishing analytic and synthetic statements. So by the late 0s, it had become the conventional wisdom of philosophers in the Anglo- tradition that both the notion of a real essence and the derivative idea that some among the properties true of an object are essential to that object are philosophical dead ends. But over the past three decades, developments in the semantics of modal logic have called into question traditional empiricist skepticism about essence and modality and have given rise to a rebirth of essentialism. In the late fifties and early sixties, logicians like Kripke, Hintikka, and Richard Montague showed how formal techniques that have as their intuitive core the Leibnizian idea that necessity is truth in all possible worlds enable us to provide completeness proofs for a whole range of nonequivalent modal logics. Metaphysicians seized on the intuitions underlying these formal methods. They proposed that we take the picture of alternative possible worlds seriously and claimed that attributions of de dicto modality necessity and possibility as they apply to propositions can be understood to involve quantification over possible worlds. Thus, to say that a proposition, p, is necessary is to say that for every possible world, W, p is true in W; and to say that p is possible is to say that there is at least one possible world, W, such that p is true in W. These metaphysicians went on to claim that the framework of possible worlds enables us to make sense of de re modality. Whereas de dicto modality attaches to propositions taken as a whole, an ascription of de re modality identifies the modal status of an object’s exemplification of an attribute. Thus, we speak of Socrates as being necessarily or essentially rational, but only contingently snub-nosed. Intuitively, the essential properties of an object are those it could not have lacked; whereas its contingent properties are properties it exemplifies but could have failed to exemplify. The “friends of possible worlds” insisted that we can make perfectly good sense of this intuitive distinction if we say that an object, x, exhibits a property, P, essentially just in case x exhibits P in the actual world and in every possible world in which x exists and that x exhibits P merely contingently just in case x exhibits P in the actual world, but there is at least one possible world, W, such that x exists in W and fails to exhibit P in W. Not only have these neo-essentialists invoked the Leibnizian conception of alternative possible worlds in characterizing the de re modalities, many have endorsed Leibniz’s idea that each object has an individual essence or what is sometimes called a haecceity. As we have seen, the intuitive idea of an individual essence is the idea of a property an object exhibits essentially and that no other object could possibly exhibit; and contemporary essentialists have fleshed out this intuitive notion by saying that a property, P, is the haecceity or individual essence of an object, x, just in case 1 x exhibits P in the actual world and in all worlds in which x exists and 2 there is no possible world where an object distinct from x exhibits P. And some defenders of individual essences like Plantinga have followed Leibniz in holding that the haecceity of an object provides a complete concept of that object, a property such that it entails, for every possible world, W, and every property, P, either the proposition that the object in question has P in W or the proposition that it fails to have P in W. Accordingly, they agree that an omniscient being could infer from the individual essence of an object a complete account of the history of that object in each possible world in which it exists.

eudaemonia: from Grecian eudaimonia, and then there’s eudaemonism --‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’, the ethical doctrine that happiness is the ultimate justification for morality. The ancient Grecian philosophers typically begin their ethical treatises with an account of happiness, and then argue that the best way to achieve a happy life is through the cultivation and exercise of virtue. Most of them make virtue or virtuous activity a constituent of the happy life; the Epicureans, however, construe happiness in terms of pleasure, and treat virtue as a means to the end of pleasant living. Ethical eudaimonism is sometimes combined with psychological eudaimonism i.e., the view that all free, intentional action is aimed ultimately at the agent’s happiness. A common feature of ancient discussions of ethics, and one distinguishing them from most modern discussions, is the view that an agent would not be rationally justified in a course of action that promised less happiness than some alternative open to him. Hence it seems that most of the ancient theories are forms of egosim. But the ancient theories differ from modern versions of egoism since, according to the ancients, at least some of the virtues are dispositions to act from primarily other-regarding motives: although the agent’s happiness is the ultimate justification of virtuous action, it is not necessarily what motivates such action. Since happiness is regarded by most of the ancients as the ultimate end that justifies our actions, their ethical theories seem teleological; i.e., right or virtuous action is construed as action that contributes to or maximizes the good. But appearances are again misleading, for the ancients typically regard virtuous action as also valuable for its own sake and hence constitutive of the agent’s happiness.

event: used by Grice in “Actions and Events,” -- anything that happens; an occurrence. Two fundamental questions about events, which philosophers have usually treated together, are: 1 Are there events?, and 2 If so, what is their nature? Some philosophers simply assume that there are events. Others argue for that, typically through finding semantic theories for ordinary claims that apparently concern the fact that some agent has done something or that some thing has changed. Most philosophers presume that the events whose existence is proved by such arguments are abstract particulars, “particulars” in the sense that they are non-repeatable and spatially locatable, “abstract” in the sense that more than one event can occur simultaneously in the same place. The theories of events espoused by Davidson in his causal view, Kim though his view may be unstable in this respect, Jonathan Bennett, and Lawrence Lombard take them to be abstract particulars. However, Chisholm takes Euler diagram event 292 292 events to be abstract universals; and Quine and Davidson in his later view take them to be concrete particulars. Some philosophers who think of events as abstract particulars tend to associate the concept of an event with the concept of change; an event is a change in some object or other though some philosophers have doubts about this and others have denied it outright. The time at which an event, construed as a particular, occurs can be associated with the shortest time at which the object, which is the subject of that event, changes from the having of one property to the having of another, contrary property. Events inherit whatever spatial locations they have from the spatial locations, if any, of the things that those events are changes in. Thus, an event that is a change in an object, x, from being F to being G, is located wherever x is at the time it changes from being F to being G. Some events are those of which another event is composed e.g., the sinking of a ship seems composed of the sinkings of its parts. However, it also seems clear that not every group of events comprises another; there just is no event composed of a certain explosion on Venus and my birth. Any adequate theory about the nature of events must address the question of what properties, if any, such things have essentially. One issue is whether the causes or effects of events are essential to those events. A second is whether it is essential to each event that it be a change in the entity it is in fact a change in. A third is whether it is essential to each event that it occur at the time at which it in fact occurs. A chief component of a theory of events is a criterion of identity, a principle giving conditions necessary and sufficient for an event e and an event eH to be one and the same event. Quine holds that events may be identified with the temporal parts of physical objects, and that events and physical objects would thus share the same condition of identity: sameness of spatiotemporal location. Davidson once proposed that events are identical provided they have the same causes and effects. More recently, Davidson abandoned this position in favor of Quine’s. Kim takes an event to be the exemplification of a property or relation by an object or objects at a time. This idea has led to his view that an event e is the same as an event eH if and only if e and eH are the exemplifications of the same property by the same objects at the same time. Lombard’s view is a variation on this account, and is derived from the idea of events as the changes that physical objects undergo when they alter.

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IMPLICATVRA -- in 16 volumes, vol. 6

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