IMPLICATVRA, in 18 volumes -- vol. 18

V

V SUBJECT INDEX: VAGUM
NAME INDEX ITALIAN V: VAILATI -- VALENTINO – VALLA – VANINI – VARRONE – VARZI – VASTO – VATTIMO – VERRI -- VICO – VIO

NAME INDEX ENGLISH: VESEY

vagum: oddly, A. C. Ewing has a very early thing on ‘vagueness.’ Grice liked Ewing. There is an essay on “Clarity” which relates. Cf. Price, “Clarity is not enough” Which implicates it IS a necessity, though. Cf. “Clarity – who cares?” Some days, Grice did not feel ‘Grecian,’ and would use very vernacular expressions. He thought that what Cicero calls ‘vagum’ is best rendered in Oxfordshire dialect as ‘fuzzy.’ It is not clear which of Grice’s maxim controls this. The opposite of ‘vague’ is ‘specific.’ Grice was more concerned about this in the earlier lectures where he has under the desideratum of conversational candour and the principle of conversational benevolence, and the desideratum of conversational clarity that one should be explicit, and make one’s point explicit. But under the submaxims of the conversational category of modus (‘be perspicuous [sic]), none seem to prohibit ‘vagueness’ as such: Avoid obscurity of expression.Avoid ambiguity.Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).Be orderly The one he later calls a ‘tailoring principle’ ‘frame your contribution in way that facilitates a reply’, the ‘vagueness’ avoidance seems implicit. Cf. fuzzy. The indeterminacy of the field of application of an expression, in contrast to precision. For instance, the expression “young man” is vague since the point at which its appropriate application to a person begins and ends cannot be precisely defined. Vagueness should be distinguished from ambiguity, by which a term has more than one meaning. The vagueness of an expression is due to a semantic feature of the term itself, rather than to the subjective condition of its user. Vagueness gives rise to borderline cases, and propositions with vague terms lack a definite truth-value. For this reason, Frege rejected the possibility of vague concepts, although they are tolerated in recent work in vague or fuzzy logic. Various paradoxes arise due to the vagueness of words, including the ancient sorites paradox. It is because of its intrinsic vagueness that some philosophers seek to replace ordinary language with an ideal language. But ordinary language philosophers hold that this proposal creates a false promise of eliminating vagueness. Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance in part is a model of meaning that tolerates vagueness. As a property of expressions, vagueness extends to all sorts of cognitive representations. Some philosophers hold that there can be vagueness in things as well as in the representation of things. “A representation is vague when the relation of the representing system to the represented system is not one–one, but one–many.” Russell, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. IX. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Fuzzy impicatures, and how to unfuzz them;” H. P. Grice, “The conversational maxim of vagueness avoidance.” Oddly, Grice does not have a conversational, ‘be precise,’; but he did. In his earlier desideratum of conversational clarity, the point was to make your point precise – rather than fuzzy -- vagueness, a property of an expression in virtue of which it can give rise to a “borderline case.” A borderline case is a situation in which the application of a particular expression to a name of a particular object does not generate an expression with a definite truth-value; i.e., the piece of language in question neither unequivocally applies to the object nor fails to apply. Although such a formulation leaves it open what the pieces of language might be whole sentences, individual words, names or singular terms, predicates or general terms, most discussions have focused on vague general terms and have considered other types of terms to be nonvague. Exceptions to this have called attention to the possibility of vague objects, thereby rendering vague the designation relation for singular terms. The formulation also leaves open the possible causes for the expression’s lacking a definite truth-value. If this indeterminacy is due to there being insufficient information available to determine applicability or non-applicability of the term i.e., we are convinced the term either does or does not apply, but we just do not have enough information to determine which, then this is sometimes called epistemic vagueness. It is somewhat misleading to call this vagueness, for unlike true vagueness, this epistemic vagueness disappears if more information is brought into the situation. ‘There are between 1.89 $ 106 and 1.9 $ 106 stars in the sky’ is epistemically vague but is not vague in the generally accepted sense of the term. ’Vagueness’ may also be used to characterize non-linguistic items such as concepts, memories, and objects, as well as such semilinguistic items as statements and propositions. Many of the issues involved in discussing the topic of vagueness impinge upon other philosophical topics, such as the existence of truth-value gaps  declarative sentences that are neither true nor false  and the plausibility of many-valued logic. There are other related issues such as the nature of propositions and whether they must be either true or false. We focus here on linguistic vagueness, as it manifests itself with general terms; for it is this sort of indeterminacy that defines what most researchers call vagueness, and which has led the push in some schools of thought to “eliminate vagueness” or to construct languages that do not manifest vagueness. Linguistic vagueness is sometimes confused with other linguistic phenomena: generality, ambiguity, and open texture. Statements can be general ‘Some wheelbarrows are red’, ‘All insects have antennae’ and if there is no other vagueness infecting them, they are true or false  and not borderline or vague. Terms can be general ‘person’, ‘dog’ without being vague. Those general terms apply to many different objects but are not therefore vague; and furthermore, the fact that they apply to different kinds of objects ‘person’ applies to both men and women also does not show them to be vague or ambiguous. A vague term admits of borderline cases  a completely determinate situation in which there just is no correct answer as to whether the term applies to a certain object or not  and this is not the case with generality. Ambiguous linguistic items, including structurally ambiguous sentences, also do not have this feature unless they also contain vague terms. Rather, an ambiguous sentence allows there to be a completely determinate situation in which one can simultaneously correctly affirm the sentence and also deny the sentence, depending on which of the claims allowed by the ambiguities is being affirmed or denied. Terms are considered open-textured if they are precise along some dimensions of their meaning but where other possible dimensions simply have not been considered. It would therefore not be clear what the applicability of the term would be were objects to vary along these other dimensions. Although related to vagueness, open texture is a different notion. Friedrich Waismann, who coined the term, put it this way: “Open texture . . . is something like the possibility of vagueness.” Vagueness has long been an irritant to philosophers of logic and language. Among the oldest of the puzzles associated with vagueness is the sorites ‘heap’ paradox reported by Cicero Academica 93: One grain of sand does not make a heap, and adding a grain of sand to something that is not a heap will not create a heap; there945 V   945 fore there are no heaps. This type of paradox is traditionally attributed to Zeno of Elea, who said that a single millet seed makes no sound when it falls, so a basket of millet seeds cannot make a sound when it is dumped. The term ‘sorites’ is also applied to the entire series of paradoxes that have this form, such as the falakros ‘bald man’, Diogenes Laertius, Grammatica II, 1, 45: A man with no hairs is bald, and adding one hair to a bald man results in a bald man; therefore all men are bald. The original version of these sorites paradoxes is attributed to Eubulides Diogenes Laertius II, 108: “Isn’t it true that two are few? and also three, and also four, and so on until ten? But since two are few, ten are also few.” The linchpin in all these paradoxes is the analysis of vagueness in terms of some underlying continuum along which an imperceptible or unimportant change occurs. Almost all modern accounts of the logic of vagueness have assumed this to be the correct analysis of vagueness, and have geared their logics to deal with such vagueness. But we will see below that there are other kinds of vagueness too. The search for a solution to the sorites-type paradoxes has been the stimulus for much research into alternative semantics. Some philosophers, e.g. Frege, view vagueness as a pervasive defect of natural language and urge the adoption of an artificial language in which each predicate is completely precise, without borderline cases. Russell too thought vagueness thoroughly infected natural language, but thought it unavoidable  and indeed beneficial  for ordinary usage and discourse. Despite the occasional argument that vagueness is pragmatic rather than a semantic phenomenon, the attitude that vagueness is inextricably bound to natural language together with the philosophical logician’s self-ascribed task of formalizing natural language semantics has led modern writers to the exploration of alternative logics that might adequately characterize vagueness  i.e., that would account for our pretheoretic beliefs concerning truth, falsity, necessary truth, validity, etc., of sentences containing vague predicates. Some recent writers have also argued that vague language undermines realism, and that it shows our concepts to be “incoherent.” Long ago it was seen that the attempt to introduce a third truth-value, indeterminate, solved nothing  replacing, as it were, the sharp cutoff between a predicate’s applying and not applying with two sharp cutoffs. Similar remarks could be made against the adoption of any finitely manyvalued logic as a characterization of vagueness. In the late 0s and early 0s, fuzzy logic was introduced into the philosophic world. Actually a restatement of the Tarski-Lukasiewicz infinitevalued logics of the 0s, one of the side benefits of fuzzy logics was claimed to be an adequate logic for vagueness. In contrast to classical logic, in which there are two truth-values true and false, in fuzzy logic a sentence is allowed to take any real number between 0 and 1 as a truthvalue. Intuitively, the closer to 1 the value is, the “more true” the sentence is. The value of a negated sentence is 1 minus the value of the unnegated sentence; conjuction is viewed as a minimum function and disjunction as a maximum function. Thus, a conjunction takes the value of the “least true” conjunct, while a disjunction takes the value of the “most true” disjunct. Since vague sentences are maximally neither true nor false, they will be valued at approximately 0.5. It follows that if F is maximally vague, so is the negation -F; and so are the conjunction F & -F and the disjunction ~F 7 -F. Some theorists object to these results, but defenders of fuzzy logic have argued in favor of them. Other theorists have attempted to capture the elusive logic of vagueness by employing modal logic, having the operators AF meaning ‘F is definite’ and B F meaning ‘F is vague’. The logic generated in this way is peculiar in that A F & YPAF & AY is not a theorem. E.g., p & -p is definitely false, hence definite; hence A p & -p. Yet neither p nor -p need be definite. Technically, it is a non-Kripke-normal modal logic. Some other peculiarities are that AF Q A -F is a theorem, and that AFPBF is not. There are also puzzles about whether B FP ABF should be a theorem, and about iterated modalities in general. Modal logic treatments of vagueness have not attracted many advocates, except as a portion of a general epistemic logic i.e., modal logics might be seen as an account of so-called epistemic vagueness. A third direction that has been advocated as a logical account of vagueness has been the method of supervaluations sometimes called “supertruth”. The underlying idea here is to allow the vague predicate in a sentence to be “precisified” in an arbitrary manner. Thus, for the sentence ‘Friar Tuck is bald’, we arbitrarily choose a precise number of hairs on the head that will demarcate the bald/not-bald border. In this valuation Friar Tuck is either definitely bald or definitely not bald, and the sentence either is true or is false. Next, we alter the valuation so that there is some other bald/not-bald bordervagueness vagueness 946   946 line, etc. A sentence true in all such valuations is deemed “really true” or “supertrue”; one false in all such valuations is “really false” or “superfalse.” All others are vague. Note that, in this conception of vagueness, if F is vague, so is -F. However, unlike fuzzy logic ‘F & -F’ is not evaluated as vague  it is false in every valuation and hence is superfalse. And ‘F 7 -F’ is supertrue. These are seen by some as positive features of the method of supervaluations, and as an argument against the whole fuzzy logic enterprise. In fact there seem to be at least two distinct types of linguistic vagueness, and it is not at all clear that any of the previously mentioned logic approaches can deal with both. Without going into the details, we can just point out that the “sorites vagueness” discussed above presumes an ordering on a continuous underlying scale; and it is the indistinguishability of adjacent points on this scale that gives rise to borderline cases. But there are examples of vague terms for which there is no such scale. A classic example is ‘religion’: there are a number of factors relevant to determining whether a social practice is a religion. Having none of these properties guarantees failing to be a religion, and having all of them guarantees being one. However, there is no continuum of the sorites variety here; for example, it is easy to distinguish possessing four from possessing five of the properties, unlike the sorites case where such a change is imperceptible. In the present type of vagueness, although we can tell these different cases apart, we just do not know whether to call the practice a religion or not. Furthermore, some of the properties or combinations of properties are more important or salient in determining whether the practice is a religion than are other properties or combinations. We might call this family resemblance vagueness: there are a number of clearly distinguishable conditions of varying degrees of importance, and family resemblance vagueness is attributed to there being no definite answer to the question, How many of which conditions are necessary for the term to apply? Other examples of family resemblance vagueness are ‘schizophrenia sufferer’, ‘sexual perversion’, and the venerable ‘game’. A special subclass of family resemblance vagueness occurs when there are pairs of underlying properties that normally co-occur, but occasionally apply to different objects. Consider, e.g., ‘tributary’. When two rivers meet, one is usually considered a tributary of the other. Among the properties relevant to being a tributary rather than the main river are: relative volume of water and relative length. Normally, the shorter of the two rivers has a lesser volume, and in that case it is the tributary of the other. But occasionally the two properties do not co-occur and then there is a conflict, giving rise to a kind of vagueness we might call conflict vagueness. The term ‘tributary’ is vague because its background conditions admit of such conflicts: there are borderline cases when these two properties apply to different objects. To conclude: the fundamental philosophical problems involving vagueness are 1 to give an adequate characterization of what the phenomenon is, and 2 to characterize our ability to reason with these terms. These were the problems for the ancient philosophers, and they remain the problems for modern philosophers. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The conversational maxim for vagueness avoidance.”

vaihinger: Grice once gave a seminar on Vaihinger – “but thinking it would not attract that many, I titled it ‘As if.’” – H. P. Grice. philosopher best known for Die Philosophie des Als Ob; tr. by C. K. Ogden as The Philosophy of “As If” in 4. A neo-Kantian, he was also influenced by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. His commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 2 vols., 1 is still a standard work. Vaihinger was a cofounder of both the Kant Society and Kant-Studien. The “philosophy of the as if” involves the claim that values and ideals amount only to “fictions” that serve “life” even if they are irrational. We must act “as if” they were true because they have biological utility.

vailati: an important figure in the history of formal semantics, influenced by Peano, who in turn influenced Whitehead and Russell, and thus Grice. Giovanni Vailati (n. Crema, 2) è stato un filosofo. Vailati si laureò a Torino. Qui insegnò, dopo aver lavorato come assistente di Giuseppe Peano e Vito Volterra. Egli lasciò il suo posto universitario nel 1899 e così poté proseguire i suoi studi in modo indipendente, e si guadagnò da vivere insegnando matematica nelle scuole superiori. Durante la sua vita fu conosciuto a livello internazionale, i suoi scritti sono stati tradotti in inglese, francese, e polacco, sebbene fu in gran parte dimenticato dopo la sua morte a Roma. Non pubblicò nessun libro completo, ma lasciò circa 200 saggi e recensioni che toccano un'ampia gamma di discipline. L'opinione di Vailati nei confronti della filosofia era che essa fornisse una preparazione e gli strumenti per il lavoro scientifico. Per questa ragione, e perché la filosofia dovrebbe essere neutrale fra opposte convinzioni, concezioni, strutture teoriche, ecc., il filosofo dovrebbe evitare l'uso di un linguaggio tecnico specialistico, ma dovrebbe usare il linguaggio che la filosofia adotta in quelle aree in cui è interessata. Ciò non vuol dire che il filosofo debba soltanto accettare qualunque cosa egli trovi; un termine del linguaggio ordinario potrebbe essere problematico, ma le sue carenze dovrebbero essere corrette piuttosto che sostituite con qualche nuovo termine tecnico.  Il suo pensiero sulla verità e sul significato fu influenzato da filosofi come Peirce e Mach. Egli con cautela distinse fra significato e verità: "La questione di determinare che cosa vogliamo dire quando enunciamo una data proposizione, non solo è una questione affatto distinta da quella di decidere se essa sia vera o falsa (Scritti, p. 187). Tuttavia, dopo aver deciso cosa si vuole dire, l'azione di decidere se ciò è vero o falso è cruciale. Vailati ebbe un pensiero positivista moderato, sia nella scienza che nella filosofia:  "La tattica adottata dai pragmatisti in questa loro guerra contro l'abuso delle astrazioni e delle unificazioni consiste, come è noto, nel proporre che, anche nelle questioni filosofiche, come si fa sempre in quelle scientifiche, si esiga, da chiunque avanzi una tesi, che egli sia in grado di indicare quali siano i fatti che, nel caso che essa fosse vera, dovrebbero, secondo lui, succedere (o esser successi), e in che cosa essi differiscano dagli altri fatti che, secondo lui, dovrebbero succedere (o essere successi) nel caso che la tesi non fosse vera." (Scritti, p. 166)  Le influenze e i contatti di Vailati furono molti e vari, e spesso fu etichettato come "l'italiano pragmatista". Egli deve molto a Peirce e William James (fu uno dei primi a distinguere i loro pensieri), ma egli subì anche l'influenza di Platone e George Berkeley (che egli vide come precursori importanti del pragmatismo), Gottfried Leibniz, Victoria Welby-Gregory, George Edward Moore, Bertrand Russell, Giuseppe Peano e Franz Brentano. Vailati corrispose con molti dei suoi contemporanei.  La prima parte della sua opera comprende scritti sulla Logica matematica; in essi focalizza l'attenzione sul suo ruolo in filosofia e distinguendo fra logica, psicologia ed epistemologia; la dottrina recente pone Vailati e il suo allievo Mario Calderoni nella categoria storiografica del «pragmatismo analitico» italiano[1].  Storia della Scienza I principali interessi storici di Vailati riguardarono la meccanica, la logica e la geometria; egli diede un importante contributo in molti campi, compreso lo studio della meccanica post-aristotelica greca, dei predecessori di Galileo, della nozione di definizione e del suo ruolo nell'opera di Platone e Euclide, delle influenze matematiche sulla logica e sull'epistemologia, e sulla geometria non-euclidea di Gerolamo Saccheri. Vailati fu particolarmente interessato ai modi in cui quelli che potrebbero essere visti come gli stessi problemi sono inquadrati e trattati in periodi differenti. Il suo lavoro di storico della scienza fu strettamente connesso con quello filosofico: per le due attività, infatti, utilizzò gli stessi pensieri e metodologie di fondo. Vailati vedeva lo studio storico e lo studio filosofico come differenti nell'approccio ma non nell'argomento; credeva, inoltre, che dovesse esserci cooperazione fra filosofi e scienziati nell'approfondimento degli studi storici. Egli riteneva anche che una storia completa richiedesse che si tenesse in conto anche il background sociale pertinente. Il superamento delle teorie scientifiche, grazie a nuovi risultati, non comporta la loro distruzione, perché la loro importanza aumenta proprio per il fatto di essere superate: "Ogni errore ci indica uno scoglio da evitare mentre non ogni scoperta ci indica una via da seguire." (Scritti, p. 4).  La posizione di Giovanni Vailati sulla storia della scienza ricalca quella di una serrata critica al positivismo, in un contesto teorico dove il pragmatismo ammette nuovi strumenti di comprensione e anche di valutazione della scienza, come mostrano anche le vicende di Mario Calderoni (Ivan Pozzoni, Il pragmatismo analitico italiano di Mario Calderoni, Roma, IF Press, 2009, p.19 e sg. ISBN 978-88-95565-18-7) e del matematico Giuseppe Peano, il quale vanta certe affinità con il pensiero filosofico del periodo (Guglielmo Rinzivillo, Giovanni Vailati, Storia e metodologia delle scienze in Una epistemologia senza storia, Roma, Nuova Cultura, 2013, p. 65 e sg. e Giuseppe Peano, Giovanni Vailati. Contributi invisibili in Una epistemologia senza storia, Op. cit., p. 165 e sg. ISBN 978-88-6812-222-5).  Note ^ Ivan Pozzoni, Il pragmatismo analitico italiano di Giovanni Vailati, Villasanta, Liminamentis Editore, 2015. Bibliografia Ivor Grattan-Guinness (2000): The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870–1940. Princeton University Press Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1967): "Giovanni Vailati", in Paul Edwards editor The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Collier Macmillan Giuseppe Peano (1909): In Memoriam di Giovanni Vailati, Boll. di matematica 8 pp. 206–7 Ivan Pozzoni (a cura di), Cent'anni di Giovanni Vailati, Liminamentis Editore, Villasanta, 2009 Mauro De Zan, La formazione di Giovanni Vailati, Congedo Editore, Galatina (Lecce) 2009 Logic and Pragmatism. Selected Essays by Giovanni Vailati edited by C. Arrighi, P. Cantù, M. De Zan and P. Suppes, CSLI, Stanford, California, 2010. Gabriella Sava, La psicologia tra Vailati e Brentano, in "Il Veltro", Roma, a. LIV, n. 1-2, gennaio-aprile 2010, pp. 41–59. Giuseppe Giordano, Giovanni Vailati filosofo della scienza, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2014, ISBN 978-88-6087-832-8. Ivan Pozzoni, Il pragmatismo analitico italiano di Giovanni Vailati, Liminamentis Editore, Villasanta, 2015 Lucia Ronchetti (a cura di), L'archivio Giovanni Vailati (PDF), in Quaderni di Acme, 34, Bologna, Cisalpino, 1998, ISBN 8832345722. URL consultato il 3 giugno 2020. Giovanni Vailati Scritti filosofici, 1972 Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Giovanni Vailati Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Giovanni Vailati Collegamenti esterni Giovanni Vailati, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Giovanni Vailati, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Giovanni Vailati, su siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo Unificato per le Soprintendenze Archivistiche. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Giovanni Vailati, su MacTutor, University of St Andrews, Scotland. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Giovanni Vailati, su Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Giovanni Vailati, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Giovanni Vailati, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Centro Studi Giovanni Vailati, su giovanni-vailati.net. URL consultato il 28 aprile 2006 (archiviato dall'url originale il 24 aprile 2006). Fondo archivistico e librario di Giovanni Vailati conservato presso la Biblioteca di Filosofia Università degli Studi di Milano Massimo Mugnai, Vailati, Giovanni, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2012. Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 7468169 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2119 4295 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\039741 · LCCN (EN) n81056688 · GND (DE) 119331594 · BNF (FR) cb12367790m (data) · BAV (EN) 495/111331 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n81056688 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Matematica Portale Matematica Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XIX secoloMatematici italiani del XIX secoloStorici italiani del XIX secoloNati nel 1863Morti nel 1909Nati il 24 aprileMorti il 14 maggioNati a CremaMorti a RomaStorici della scienza italiani[altre]Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Vailati: la semantica filosofica," The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

VIDERE – how to divide the indivisible. Grice, “How to divide the indivisible.” dis- "apart" (see dis-) + -videre "to separate," which, according to de Vaan, is from PIE *(d)uid- "to separate, distinguish" (source also of Sanskrit avidhat "allotted," Old Avestan vida- "to devote oneself to"). He writes: "The original PIE verb ... (which became thematic in Latin) meant 'to divide in two, separate'. It lost initial *d- through dissimilation in front of the next dental stop, and was reinforced by dis- in Latin ...." Also compare devise. dividuum-individuum distinction, the: individuum: versus the dividuum – or divisum. Cicero’s attempt to translate ‘a-tomon.’ In metaphysics, a process whereby a universal, e.g., cat, becomes instantiated in an individual – also called a particular e.g., Minina; (2) in epistemology, a process whereby a knower discerns an individual, e.g., someone discerns Minina. The double understanding of individuation raises two distinct problems: identifying the causes of metaphysical individuation, and of epistemological individuation. In both cases the causes are referred to as the principle of individuation. Attempts to settle the metaphysical and epistemological problems of individuation presuppose an understanding of the nature of individuality. Individuality has been variously interpreted as involving one or more of the following: indivisibility, difference, division within a species, identity through time, impredicability, and non-instantiability. In general, theories of individuation try to account variously for one or more of these. Individuation may apply to both substances (e.g., Minina) and their features (e.g., Minina’s fur color), generating two different sorts of theories. The theories of the metaphysical individuation of substances most often proposed identify six types of principles: a bundle of features (Russell); space and/or time (Boethius); matter (Aristotle); form (Averroes); a decharacterized, sui generis component called bare particular (Bergmann) or haecceity (Duns Scotus); and existence (Avicenna). Sometimes several principles are combined. For example, for Aquinas the principle of individuation is matter under dimensions (materia signata). Two sorts of objections are often brought against these views of the metaphysical individuation of substances. One points out that some of these theories violate the principle of acquaintance,since they identify as individuators entities for which there is no empirical evidence. The second argues that some of these theories explain the individuation of substances in terms of accidents, thus contradicting the ontological precedence of substance over accident. The two most common theories of the epistemological individuation of substances identify spatiotemporal location and/or the features of substances as their individuators; we know a thing as an individual by its location in space and time or by its features. The objections that are brought to bear against these theories are generally based on the ineffectiveness of those principles in all situations to account for the discernment of all types of individuals. The theories of the metaphysical individuation of the features of substances fall into two groups. Some identify the substance itself as the principle of individuation; others identify some feature(s) of the substance as individuator(s). Most accounts of the epistemological individuation of the features of substances are similar to these views. The most common objections to the metaphysical theories of the individuation of features attempt to show that these theories are either incomplete or circular. It is argued, e.g., that an account of the individuation of features in terms of substance is incomplete because the individuation of the substance must also be accounted for: How would one know what tree one sees, apart from its features? However, if the substance is individuated by its features, one falls into a vicious circle. Similar points are made with respect to the epistemological theories of the individuation of features. Apart from the views mentioned, some philosophers hold that individuals are individual essentially (per se), and therefore that they do not undergo individuation. Under those conditions either there is no need for a metaphysical principle of individuation (Ockham), or else the principle of individuation is identified as the individual entity itself (Suárez).

VISUM – Grice: “The Grecian root ‘id-,’ as in Plato’s infamous ideas, is cognate with Latin, ‘visum,’ -- ideatum. Quite used by Grice. Cf. Conceptum. Sub-perceptual. Cognate with ‘eidos,’ that Grice translates as ‘forma.’ Why is an ‘eidos’ an ‘idea’ and in what sense is an idea a ‘form’? These are deep questions! idem: a key philosophical notion that encompasses linguistic, logic, and metaphysical issues, and also epistemology. Possibly the central question in philosophy. Vide the principle of ‘identity.’ amicus est tamquam alter idem,” a second self, Identicum. Grecian ‘tautotes.’ late L. identitās (Martianus Capella, c425), peculiarly formed from ident(i)-, for L. idem ‘same’ + -tās, -tātem: see -ty.  Various suggestions have been offered as to the formation. Need was evidently felt of a noun of condition or quality from idem to express the notion of ‘sameness’, side by side with those of ‘likeness’ and ‘oneness’ expressed by similitās and ūnitās: hence the form of the suffix.  But idem had no combining stem.  Some have thought that ident(i)- was taken from the L. adv. "identidem" ‘over and over again, repeatedly’, connexion with which appears to be suggested by Du Cange's explanation of identitās as ‘quævis actio repetita’. Meyer-Lübke suggests that in the formation there was present some association between idem and id ens ‘that being’, whence "identitās" like "entitās." But assimilation to "entitās" may have been merely to avoid the solecism of *idemitās or *idemtās. sameness. However originated, "ident(i)-" (either from adverb "identidem" or an assimilation of "id ens," "id ens," that being, "id entitas" "that entity") became the combining stem of idem, and the series ūnitās, ūnicus, ūnificus, ūnificāre, was paralleled by identitās, identicus, identificus, identificāre: see identic, identific, identify above.] to  OED 3rd: identity, n. Pronunciation:  Brit./ʌɪˈdɛntᵻti/ , U.S. /aɪˈdɛn(t)ədi/ Forms:  15 idemptitie, 15 ydemptyte, 15–16 identitie, 15– identity, 16 idemptity.  Etymology: < Middle French identité, ydemtité, ydemptité, ydentité (French identité) quality or condition of being the same (a1310; 1756 in sense ‘individuality, personality’, 1801 in sense ‘distinct impression of a single person or thing presented to or perceived by others’) and its etymon post-classical Latin identitat-, identitas quality of being the same (4th cent.), condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else (8th cent. in a British source), fact of being the same (from 12th cent. in British sources), continual sameness, lack of variety, monotony (from 12th cent. in British sources; 14th cent. in a continental source) < classical Latin idem same (see idem n.) + -tās (see -ty suffix1) [sameness], after post-classical Latin essentitas ‘being’ (4th cent.).The Latin word was formed to provide a translation equivalent for ancient Greek ταὐτότης (tautotes) identity. identity: identity was a key concept for Grice. Under identity, he views both identity simpliciter and personal identity. Grice advocates psychological or soul criterianism. Psychological or soul criterianism has been advocated, in one form or another, by philosophers such as Locke, Butler, Duncan-Jones, Berkeley, Gallie, Grice, Flew, Haugeland, Jones, Perry, Shoemaker and Parfit, and Quinton. What all of these theories have in common is the idea that, even if it is the case that some kind of physical states are necessary for being a person, it is the unity of consciousness which is of decisive importance for personal identity over time. In this sense, person is a term which picks out a psychological, or mental, "thing". In claiming this, all Psychological Criterianists entail the view that personal identity consists in the continuity of psychological features. It is interesting that Flew has an earlier "Selves," earlier than his essay on Locke on personal identity. The first, for Mind, criticising Jones, "The self in sensory cognition"; the second for Philosophy. Surely under the tutelage of Grice. Cf. Jones, Selves: A reply to Flew, Philosophy.  The stronger thesis asserts that there is no conceivable situation in which bodily identity would be necessary, some other conditions being always both necessary and sufficient. Grice takes it that Locke’s theory (II, 27) is an example of this latter type. To say "Grice remembers that he heard a noise", without irony or inverted commas, is to imply that Grice did hear a noise. In this respect remember is like, know, a factive. It does not follow from this, nor is it true, that each claim to remember, any more than each claim to know, is alethic or veridical; or, not everything one seems to remember is something one really remembers. So much is obvious, although Locke -- although admittedly referring only to the memory of actions, section 13 -- is forced to invoke the providence of God to deny the latter. These points have been emphasised by Flew in his discussion of Locke’s views on personal identity. In formulating Locke’ thesis, however, Flew makes a mistake; for he offers Lockes thesis in the form if Grice can remember Hardies doing such-and-such, Grice and Hardie are the same person. But this obviously will not do, even for Locke, for we constantly say things like I remember my brother Derek joining the army without implying that I and my brother are the same person. So if we are to formulate such a criterion, it looks as though we have to say something like the following. If Derek Grice remembers joining my, he is the person who did that thing. But since remembers doing means remembers himself doing, this is trivially tautologous, and moreover lends colour to Butlers famous objection that memory, so far from constituting personal identity, presupposes it.  As Butler puts it, one should really think it self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. Butler then asserts that Locke’s misstep stems from his methodology. This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. One of the points that Locke emphasizes—that persistence conditions are determined via defining kind terms—is what, according to Butler, leads Locke astray.  Butler additionally makes the point that memory is not required for personal persistence. But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings. This is a point that others develop when they assert that Lockes view results in contradiction. Hence the criterion should rather run as follows. If Derek Grice claims to remember joining the army. We must then ask how such a criterion might be used.  Grices example is: I remember I smelled a smell. He needs two experiences to use same. I heard a noise and I smelled a smell.The singular defines the hearing of a noise is the object of some consciousness. The pair defines, "The hearing of a noise and the smelling of a smell are objects of the same -- cognate with self as in I hurt me self, -- consciousness. The standard form of an identity question is Is this x the same x as that x which E and in the simpler situation we are at least presented with just the materials for constructing such a question; but in the more complicated situation we are baffled even in asking the question, since both the transformed persons are equally good candidates for being its Subjects, and the question Are these two xs the same (x?) as the x which E is not a recognizable form of identity question. Thus, it might be argued, the fact that we could not speak of identity in the latter situation is no kind of proof that we could not do so in the former. Certainly it is not a proof, as Strawson points out to Grice. This is not to say that they are identical at all. The only case in which identity and exact similarity could be distinguished, as we have just seen, is that of the body, same body and exactly similar body really do mark a difference. Thus one may claim that the omission of the body takes away all content from the idea of personal identity, as Pears pointed out to Grice. Leaving aside memory, which only partially applies to the case, character and attainments are quite clearly general things. Joness character is, in a sense, a particular; just because Jones’s character refers to the instantiation of certain properties by a particular (and bodily) man, as Strawson points out to Grice (Particular and general). If in ‘Negation and privation,’ Grice tackles Aristotle, he now tackles Locke. Indeed, seeing that Grice went years later to the topic as motivated by, of all people, Haugeland, rather than perhaps the more academic milieu that Perry offers, Grice became obsessed with Hume’s sceptical doubts! Hume writes in the Appendix that when he turns his reflection on himself, Hume never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions. Nor can Hume ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. It is the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self, Hume thinks. Hume grants that one can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose, says Hume, the mind to be reduced even below the life of an oyster. Suppose the oyster to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider the oyster in that situation. Does the oyster conceive any thing but merely that perception? Has the oyster any notion of, to use Gallies pretentious Aristotelian jargon, self or substance? If not, the addition of this or other perception can never give the oyster that notion. The annihilation, which this or that philosopher, including Grices first post-war tutee, Flew, supposes to  follow upon death, and which entirely destroys  the oysters self, is nothing but an extinction  of all particular perceptions; love and hatred,  pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other. Is self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? For his part, Hume claims, he has a notion of neither, when conceived distinct from this or that particular perception. However extraordinary Hume’s conclusion may seem,   it need not surprise us. Most philosophers, such as Locke, seems inclined to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness. But consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception, Hume suggests. This is Grices quandary about personal identity and its implicatura. Some philosophers have taken Grice as trying to provide an exegesis of Locke. However, their approaches surely differ. What works for Grice may not work for Locke. For Grice it is analytically true that it is not the case that Person₁ and Person may have the same experience. Grice explicitly states that he thinks that his logical-construction theory is a modification of Locke’s theory. Grice does not seem terribly interested to find why it may not, even if the York-based Locke Society might! Rather than introjecting into Lockes shoes, Grices strategy seems to dismiss Locke, shoes and all. Specifically, it not clear to Grice what Lockes answer in the Essay would be to Grices question about this or that I utterance that he sets his analysis with. Admittedly, Grice does quote, albeit briefly, directly from Lockes Essay. As far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action, Locke claims, so far the being is the same personal self. Grice tackles Lockes claim with four objections. These are important to consider since Grice sees as improving on Locke. A first objection concerns icircularity, with which Grice easily disposes by following Hume and appealing to the experience of memory or introspection. A second objection is Reid’s alleged counterexample about the long-term memory of the admiral who cannot remember that he was flogged as a boy. Grice dismisses this as involving too long-term of a memory. A third objection concerns Locke’s vagueness about the aboutness of consciousness, a point made by Hume in the Appendix. A fourth objection concerns again circularity, this time in Locke’s use of same in the definiens ‒ cf. Wiggins, Sameness and substance. It’s extraordinary that Wiggins is philosophising on anything Griceian. Grice is concerned with the implicaturum involved in the use of the first person singular. I will be fighting soon. Grice means in body and soul. The utterance also indicates that this is Grices pre-war days at Oxford. No wonder his choice of an example. What else could he have in his soul? The topic of personal identity, which label Hume and Austin found pretentious, and preferred to talk about the illocutionary force of I, has a special Oxonian pedigree, perhaps as motivated by Humes challenge, that Grice has occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum. with Locke’s Essay as mandatory reading. Locke, a philosopher with whom Oxford identifies most, infamously defends this memory-based account of I. Up in Scotland, Reid reads it and concocts this alleged counter-example. Hume, or Home, if you must, enjoys it. In fact, while in the Mind essay he is not too specific about Hume, Grice will, due mainly to his joint investigations with Haugeland, approach, introjecting into the shoes of Hume ‒ who is idolised in The New World ‒ in ways he does not introject into Lockes. But Grices quandary is Hume’s quandary, too. In his own approach to I, the Cartesian ego, made transcendental and apperceptive by Kant, Grice updates the time-honoured empiricist mnemonic analysis by Locke. The first update is in style. Grice embraces, as he does with negation, a logical construction, alla Russell, via Broad, of this or that “I” (first-person) utterance, ending up with an analysis of a “someone,” third-person, less informative, utterance. Grices immediate source is Gallie’s essay on self and substance in Mind. Mind is still a review of psychology and philosophy, so poor Grice has not much choice. In fact, Grice is being heterodoxical or heretic enough to use Broad’s taxonomy, straight from the other place of I utterances. The logical-construction theory is a third proposal, next to the Bradleyian idealist pure-ego theory and the misleading covert-description theory. Grice deals with the Reids alleged counterexample of the brave officer. Suppose, Reid says, and Grice quotes verbatim, a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life. Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he₂ took the standard, he₂ was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he₃ was conscious of his₂ taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his1 flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, from Lockes doctrine, that he1 who is flogged at school is the same person as him₂ who later takes the standard, and that he₂ who later takes the standard is the same person as him₃ who is still later made a general. When it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him₁ who is flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does emphatically not reach so far back as his1 flogging. Therefore, according to Locke’s doctrine, he₃ is emphatically not the same person as him1 who is flogged. Therefore, we can say about the general that he₃ is, and at the same time, that he₃ is not the same person as him₁ who was flogged at school. Grice, wholl later add a temporal suffix to =t yielding, by transitivity. The flogged boy =_t1 the brave officer. And the brave officer =_t2 the admiral. But the admiral ≠_t3 the flogged boy. In Mind, Grice tackles the basic analysans, and comes up with a rather elaborate analysans for a simple I or Someone statement. Grice just turns to a generic affirmative variant of the utterance he had used in Negation. It is now someone, viz. I, who hears that the bell tolls. It is the affirmative counterpart of the focus of his earlier essay on negation, I do not hear that the bell tolls. Grice dismisses what, in the other place, was referred to as privileged-access, and the indexicality of I, an approach that will be made popular by Perry, who however reprints Grices essay in his influential collection for the University of California Press. By allowing for someone, viz. I, Grice seems to be relying on a piece of reasoning which hell later, in his first Locke lecture, refer to as too good. I hear that the bell tolls; therefore, someone hears that the bell tolls. Grice attempts to reduce this or that I utterance (Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls) is in terms of a chain or sequence of mnemonic states. It poses a few quandaries itself. While quoting from this or that recent philosopher such as Gallie and Broad, it is a good thing that Grice has occasion to go back to, or revisit, Locke and contest this or that infamous and alleged counterexample presented by Reid and Hume. Grice adds a methodological note to his proposed logical-construction theory of personal identity. There is some intricacy of his reductive analysis, indeed logical construction, for an apparently simple and harmless utterance (cf. his earlier essay on I do not hear that the bell tolls). But this intricacy does not prove the analysis wrong. Only that Grice is too subtle. If the reductive analysis of not is in terms of each state which I am experiencing is incompatible with phi), that should not be a minus, or drawback, but a plus, and an advantage in terms of philosophical progress. The same holds here in terms of the concept of a temporary state. Much later, Grice reconsiders, or revisits, indeed, Broads remark and re-titles his approach as the (or a) logical-construction theory of personal identity. And, with Haugeland, Grice re-considers Humes own vagaries, or quandary, with personal identity. Unlike the more conservative Locke that Grice favours in the pages of Mind, eliminationist Hume sees ‘I’ as a conceptual muddle, indeed a metaphysical chimæra. Hume presses the point for an empiricist verificationist account of I. For, as Russell would rhetorically ask, ‘What can be more direct that the experience of myself?’ The Hume Society should take notice of Grices simplification of Hume’s implicaturum on I, if The Locke Society won’t. As a matter of fact, Grice calls one of his metaphysical construction routines the Humeian projection, so it is not too adventurous to think that Grice considers I  as an intuitive concept that needs to be metaphysically re-constructed and be given a legitimate Fregeian sense. Why that label for a construction routine? Grice calls this metaphysical construction routine Humeian projection, since the mind (or soul) as it were, spreads over its objects. But, by mind, Hume does not necessarily mean the I. Cf. The minds I. Grice is especially concerned with the poverty and weaknesses of Humes criticism to Lockes account of personal identity. Grice opts to revisit the Lockeian memory-based of this or that someone, viz. I utterance that Hume rather regards as vague, and confusing. Unlike Humes, neither Lockes nor Grices reductive analysis of personal identity is reductionist and eliminationist. The reductive-reductionist distinction Grice draws in Retrospective epilogue as he responds to Rountree-Jack on this or that alleged wrong on meaning that. It is only natural that Grice would be sympathetic to Locke. Grice explores these issues with Haugeland mainly at seminars. One may wonder why Grice spends so much time in a philosopher such as Hume, with whom he agreed almost on nothing! The answer is Humes influence in the Third World that forced Grice to focus on this or that philosopher. Surely Locke is less popular in the New World than Hume is. One supposes Grice is trying to save Hume at the implicaturum level, at least. The phrase or term of art, logical construction is Russells and Broads, but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar. Grice prefers Russells and Broads more conservative label. This is more than a terminological point. If Hume is right and there is NO intuitive concept behind I, one cannot strictly re-construct it, only construct it. Ultimately, Grice shows that, if only at the implicaturum level, we are able to provide an analysandum for this or that someone, viz. I utterance without using I, by implicating only this or that mnemonic concept, which belongs, naturally, as his theory of negation does, in a theory of philosophical psychology, and again a lower branch of it, dealing with memory. The topic of personal identity unites various interests of Grice. The first is identity “=” simpliciter. Instead of talking of the meaning of I, as, say, Anscombe would, Grice sticks to the traditional category, or keyword, for this, i. e. the theory-laden, personal identity, or even personal sameness. Personal identity is a type of identity, but personal adds something to it. Surely Hume was stretching person a bit when using the example of a soul with a life lower than an oyster. Since Grice follows Aristotles De Anima, he enjoys Hume’s choice, though. It may be argued that personal adds Locke’s consciousness, and rational agency. Grice plays with the body-soul distinction. I, viz someone or somebody, fell from the stairs, perhaps differs from I will be fighting soon. This or that someone, viz. I utterance may be purely bodily. Grice would think that the idea that his soul fell from the stairs sounds, as it would to Berkeley, harsh. But then theres this or that one may be mixed utterance. Someone, viz. I, plays cricket, where surely your bodily mechanisms require some sort of control by the soul. Finally, this or that may be purely souly ‒ the one Grice ends up analysing, Someone, viz. I, hear that the bell tolls. At the time of his Mind essay, Grice may have been unaware of the complications that the concept of a person may bring as attached in adjective form to identity. Ayer did, and Strawson and Wiggins will, and Grice learns much from Strawson. Since Parfit, this has become a common-place topic for analysis at Oxford. A person as a complexum of a body-soul spatio-temporal continuant substance. Ultimately, Grice finds a theoretical counterpart here. A P may become a human, which Grice understands physiologically. That is not enough. A P must aspire, via meteousis, to become a person. Thus, person becomes a technical term in Grices grand metaphysical scheme of things. Someone, viz. I, hear that the bell is tolls is analysed as  ≡df, or if and only if, a hearing that the bell tolls is a part of a total temporary t_n souly state S₁ which is one in a s. such that any state S_n,  given this or that condition, contains as a part a memory M_n of the experience of hearing that the bell tolls, which is a component in some pre-sequent t₁n item, or contains an experience of hearing that the bell tolls a memory M of which would, given this or that condition, occur as a component in some sub-sequent t₂>t_n item, there being no sub-set of items which is independent of the rest. Grice simplifies the reductive analysans. Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls iff a hearing that the bell tolls is a component in an item of an interlocking s. with emphasis on lock, s. of this or that memorable and memorative total temporary t_n state S₁. Is Grice’s Personal identity ever referred to in the Oxonian philosophical literature? Indeeed. Parfit mentions, which makes it especially memorable and memorative. P. Edwards includes a reference to Grices Mind essay in the entry for Personal identity, as a reference to Grice et al on Met. , is referenced in Edwardss encyclopædia entry for metaphysics. Grice does not attribute privileged access or incorrigibility to I or the first person. He always hastens to add that I can always be substituted, salva veritate (if baffling your addressee A) by someone or other, if not some-body or other, a colloquialism Grice especially detested. Grices agency-based approach requires that. I am rational provided thou art, too. If, by explicitly saying he is a Lockeian, Grice surely does not wish us to see him as trying to be original, or the first to consider this or that problem about I; i.e. someone. Still, Grice is the philosopher who explores most deeply the reductive analysis of I, i.e. someone. Grice needs the reductive analysis because human agency (philosophically, rather than psychologically interpreted) is key for his approach to things. By uttering The bell tolls, U means that someone, viz. himself, hears that the bell tolls, or even, by uttering I, hear, viz. someone hears, that the bell tolls, U means that the experience of a hearing that the bell tolls is a component in a total temporary state which is a member of a s. such that each member would, given certain conditions, contain as an component one memory of an experience which is a component in a pre-sequent member, or contains as a component some experience a memory of which would, given certain conditions, occur as a component in a post-sequent member; there being no sub-set of members which is independent of the rest. Thanks, the addressee might reply. I didnt know that! The reductive bit to Grices analysis needs to be emphasised. For Grice, a person, and consequently, a someone, viz. I utterance, is, simpliciter, a logical construction out of this or that Humeian experience. Whereas in Russell, as Broad notes, a logical construction of this or that philosophical concept, in this case personal identity, or cf. Grices earlier reductive analysis of not, is thought of as an improved, rationally reconstructed conception. Neither Russell nor Broad need maintain that the logical construction preserves the original meaning of the analysandum someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls, or I do not hear that the bell tolls ‒ hence their paradox of reductionist analysis. This change of Subjects does not apply to Grice. Grice emphatically intends to be make explicit, if rationally reconstructed (if that is not an improvement) through reductive (if not reductionist) analysis, the concept Grice already claims to have. One particular development to consider is within Grices play group, that of Quinton. Grice and Quinton seem to have been the only two philosophers in Austins play group who showed any interest on someone, viz. I. Or not. The fact that Quinton entitles his thing “The soul” did not help. Note that Woozley was at the time editing Reid on “Identity,” Cf. Duncan-Jones on mans mortality. Note that Quintons immediate trigger is Shoemaker. Grice writes that he is not “merely a series of perceptions,” for he is “conscious of a permanent self, an I who experiences these perceptions and who is now identical with the I who experienced perceptions yesterday.” So, leaving aside that he is using I with the third person verb, but surely this is no use-mention fallacy, it is this puzzle that provoked his thoughts on temporal-relative “=” later on. As Grice notes, Butler argued that consciousness of experience can contribute to identity but not define it. Grice will use Butler in his elaboration of conversational benevolence versus conversational self-interest. Better than Quinton, it is better to consider Flew in Philosophy, 96, on Locke and the problem of personal identity, obviously suggested as a term paper by Grice! Wiggins cites Flew. Flew actually notes that Berkeley saw Lockes problem earlier than Reid, which concerns the transitiveness of =. Recall that Wigginss tutor at Oxford was a tutee by Grice, Ackrill. identity, the relation each thing bears just to itself. Formally, a % b Q EF(Fa P Fb); informally, the identity of a and b implies and is implied by their sharing of all their properties. Read from left to right, this biconditional asserts the indiscernibility of identicals; from right to left, the identity of indiscernibles. The indiscernibility of identicals is not to be confused with a metalinguistic principle to the effect that if a and b are names of the same object, then each may be substituted for the other in a sentence without change of truth-value: that may be false, depending on the semantics of the language under discussion. Similarly, the identity of indiscernibles is not the claim that if a and b can be exchanged in all sentential contexts without affecting truth-value, then they name the same object. For such intersubstitutability may arise when the language in question simply lacks predicates that could discriminate between the referents of a and b. In short, the identity of things is not a relation among names. Identity proper is numerical identity, to be distinguished from exact similarity (qualitative identity). Intuitively, two exactly similar objects are “copies” of each other; still they are two, hence not identical. One way to express this is via the notions of extrinsic and intrinsic properties: exactly similar objects differ in respect of the former only. But we can best explain ‘instrinsic property’ by saying that a thing’s intrinsic properties are those it shares with its copies. These notions appear virtually interdefinable. (Note that the concept of an extrinsic property must be relativized to a class or kind of things. Not being in San Francisco is an extrinsic property of persons but arguably an intrinsic property of cities.) While qualitative identity is a familiar notion, its theoretical utility is unclear. The absolute notion of qualitative identity should, however, be distinguished from an unproblematic relative notion: if some list of salient properties is fixed in a given context (say, in mechanics or normative ethics), then the exactly similar things, relative to that context, are those that agree on the properties listed. Both the identity of indiscernibles and (less frequently) the indiscernibility of identicals are sometimes called Leibniz’s law. Neither attribution is apt. Although Leibniz would have accepted the former principle, his distinctive claim was the impossibility of exactly similar objects: numerically distinct individuals cannot even share all intrinsic properties. Moreover, this was not, for him, simply a law of identity but rather an application of his principle of sufficient reason. And the indiscernibility of identicals is part of a universal understanding of identity. What distinguishes Leibniz is the prominence of identity statements in his metaphysics and logical theory. Although identity remains a clear and basic logical notion, identity questions about problematic kinds of objects raise difficulties. One example is the identification of properties, particularly in contexts involving reduction. Although we know what identity is, the notion of a property is unclear enough to pose systematic obstacles to the evaluation of theoretically significant identity statements involving properties. Other difficulties involve personal identity or the possible identification of numbers and sets in the foundations of mathematics. In these cases, the identity questions simply inherit – and provide vivid ways of formulating – the difficulties pertaining to such concepts as person, property, or number; no rethinking of the identity concept itself is indicated. But puzzles about the relation of an ordinary material body to its constituent matter may suggest that the logician’s analysis of identity does not cleanly capture our everyday notion(s). Consider a bronze statue. Although the statue may seem to be nothing besides its matter, reflection on change over time suggests a distinction. The statue may be melted down, hence destroyed, while the bronze persists, perhaps simply as a mass or perhaps as a new statue formed from the same bronze. Alternatively, the statue may persist even as some of its bronze is dissolved in acid. So the statue seems to be one thing and the bronze another. Yet what is the bronze besides a statue? Surely we do not have two statues (or statuelike objects) in one place? Some authors feel that variants of the identity relation may permit a perspicuous description of the relation of statue and bronze: (1) tensed identity: Assume a class of timebound properties – roughly, properties an object can have at a time regardless of what properties it has at other times. (E.g., a statue’s shape, location, or elegance.) Then a % t b provided a and b share all timebound properties at time t. Thus, the statue and the bronze may be identical at time t 1 but not at t 2. (2) relative identity: a and b may be identical relative to one concept (or predicate) but not to another. Thus, the statue may be held to be the same lump of matter as the bronze but not the same object of art. identity identity 415 4065h-l.qxd 08/02/1999 7:39 AM Page 415 In each case, only detailed study will show whether the variant notion can at once offer a natural description of change and qualify as a viable identity concept. (Strong doubts arise about (2).) But it seems likely that our everyday talk of identity has a richness and ambiguity that escapes formal characterization.  identity, ‘is’ of. See IS. identity, psychophysical. See PHYSICALISM. identity, theoretical. See PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. identity of indiscernibles, any of a family of principles, important members of which include the following: (1) If objects a and b have all properties in common, then a and b are identical. (2) If objects a and b have all their qualitative properties in common, then a and b are identical. (3) If objects a and b have all their non-relational qualitative properties in common, then a and b are identical. Two questions regarding these principles are raised: Which, if any, are true? If any are true, are they necessarily true? Discussions of the identity of indiscernibles typically restrict the scope of the principle to concrete objects. Although the notions of qualitative and non-relational properties play a prominent role in these discussions, they are notoriously difficult to define. Intuitively, a qualitative property is one that can be instantiated by more than one object and does not involve being related to another particular object. It does not follow that all qualitative properties are non-relational, since some relational properties, such as being on top of a brown desk, do not involve being related to some particular object. (1) is generally regarded as necessarily true but trivial, since if a and b have all properties in common then a has the property of being identical with b and b has the property of being identical with a. Hence, most discussions focus on (2) and (3). (3) is generally regarded as, at best, a contingent truth since it appears possible to conceive of two distinct red balls of the same size, shade of color, and composition. Some have argued that elementary scientific particles, such as electrons, are counterexamples to even the contingent truth of (3). (2) appears defensible as a contingent truth since, in the actual world, objects such as the red balls and the electrons differ in their relational qualitative properties. It has been argued, however, that (2) is not a necessary truth since it is possible to conceive of a world consisting of only the two red balls. In such a world, any qualitative relational property possessed by one ball is also possessed by the other. Defenders of the necessary truth of (2) have argued that a careful examination of such counterexamples reveals hidden qualitative properties that differentiate the objects. Grice learned about idem, ipsum and simile via his High Church maternal grandfather. “What an iota can do!” -- Refs.: The main references covering identity simpliciter are in “Vacuous Names,” and his joint work on metaphysics with G. Myro. The main references relating to the second group, of personal identity, are his “Mind” essay, an essay on ‘the logical-construction theory of personal identity,’ and a second set of essays on Hume’s quandary, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

valentino: -- or as Strawson would have it, ‘valentinus,’ gnostic teacher, b. in Alexandria, where he teaches until he moved to Rome. A dualist, he constructed an elaborate cosmology in which God the Father Bythos, or Deep Unknown unites the the feminine Silence Sige and in the overflow of love produces thirty successive divine emanations or aeons constituting the Pleroma fullness of the Godhead. Each emanation is arranged hierarchically with a graded existence, becoming progressively further removed from the Father and hence less divine. The lowest emanation, Sophia wisdom, yields to passion and seeks to reach, beyond her ability, to the Father, which causes her fall. In the process, she causes the creation of the material universe wherein resides evil and the loss of divine sparks from the Pleroma. The divine elements are embodied in those humans who are the elect. Jesus Christ is an aeon close to the Father and is sent to retrieve the souls into the heavenly Pleroma. Valentinus wrote a gospel. The sect of Valentino stood out in the early church for ordaining women priests and prophetesses. Grice: “Since he lived in Rome, he was almost a Roman.” –Valentino (floruit 135-165; Phrebonis, ... – ...) è stato un filosofo di scuola cristiano-gnostica. I seguaci della sua scuola vengono detti Valentiniani.    Valentino nacque a Phrebonis sul delta del Nilo (secondo altre fonti a Cartagine) e si trasferì in giovane età ad Alessandria d'Egitto, allora importante centro cristiano dove circolavano anche idee neoplatoniche ed allegoriche come quelle di Filone di Alessandria. Qui studiò presso un certo Teudas, che si proclamava diretto discepolo di Paolo di Tarso e che pretendeva di aver appreso da Paolo le rivelazioni segrete fatte all'apostolo direttamente dal Cristo. Questi insegnamenti esoterici sembrano essere stati poi riportati nel Vangelo secondo Filippo ed in altri scritti gnostici.  Valentino dapprima insegnò ad Alessandria d'Egitto, poi tra il 140 e il 160 circa soggiornò a Roma, dove operò come diacono sotto papa Igino, e vi rimase fino al pontificato di papa Aniceto. Secondo Tertulliano la mancata elezione a vescovo di Roma lo fece, in seguito, allontanare dalla Chiesa e intraprendere con decisione la strada gnostica che lo portò a una prima scomunica, nel 143, da parte di papa Pio I, seguita poi da molte altre. Tertulliano ne cita addirittura una post mortem fatta attorno al 175. Trascorse gli ultimi anni della sua vita a Cipro dove fece molti proseliti e dove probabilmente morì attorno al 165. I suoi seguaci furono chiamati valentiniani.  Dottrina Gli gnostici valentiniani cercarono di risolvere l'eterno dilemma che si presenta a chi pensa a un mondo creato: se il mondo è stato creato da un Dio, da dove viene il male? Se Egli non ha creato il male come lo si può considerare unico Creatore delle cose?  Da quanto tramandatoci dai primi eresiologi cristiani si può ricostruire solo in parte la dottrina del maestro gnostico e della sua scuola, basata su una fusione sincretica di elementi neoplatonici, giudaizzanti, cristiani e gnostici di derivazione sethiana ed encratita. I frammenti di cui siamo in possesso parlano soprattutto della Redenzione operata dal Cristo e del destino privilegiato dei cosiddetti uomini spirituali, ossia tutti quelli che conservavano nel loro corpo il seme divino. Dai pochi brandelli di cui siamo in possesso è impossibile stabilire dei confini netti tra la dottrina propriamente di Valentino e quella elaborata dalla sua scuola, sicuramente molto più complessa. Le fonti dalle quali si può ricavare la dottrina della scuola valentiniana sono:  la cosiddetta Lettera dogmatica dei Valentiniani[1] riportata da Epifanio in Panarion 31, 5-6; la Piccola notizia, riportata nell'opera di Ireneo Adversus Haereses, I 8; la Grande notizia, sempre nell'opera di Ireneo, Adversus Haereses , I I-8; una sintesi dottrinale scritta da Ippolito, Philosophumena, VI 29-36. La struttura della cosmogonia valentiniana può essere ricavata dalla Grande notizia, secondo la quale all'inizio di tutte le cose esisteva l'Essere Primo, Bythos, che dopo ere di silenzio e di contemplazione, tramite un processo di emanazione, diede vita al Pleroma (mondo divino), formato da 30 Eoni raggruppati in coppie (sizigie) maschili e femminili, in cui la parte femminile ha funzione delimitativa e formativa. Al vertice di questi Eoni si pone la coppia Abisso[2] e Silenzio[3] (quest'ultimo elemento femminile), coppia da cui nacquero per emanazione Intelletto[4] e Verità[5]. Da essi nacquero Logos e Vita, e da questi ultimi Uomo e Chiesa[6]. Questi otto formano la cosiddetta Ogdoade[7]. poi Logos e Vita emanarono una Decade[8] di Eoni: Profondo e Mescolanza; Sempre giovane e Unione, Autogenerato e Piacere, Immobile e Mistione, Unigenito e Beata. Quindi la coppia Uomo e Chiesa emanò dodici Eoni (Dodecade[9]): Paracleto e Fede, Paterno e Speranza, Materno e Carità, Sempre pensante e Intelligenza, Ecclesiastico e Beatitudine, Desiderio e Sophia. Tutti costoro concorrevano a formare il Pleroma.  L'origine del peccato e del decadimento del divino nel mondo materiale è attribuito dalla gnosi valentiniana proprio all'ultimo Eone femminile, Sophia, poiché le varie emanazioni comportarono una degradazione progressiva. Scriveva Ireneo: «Ma si fece avanti l'ultimo e più recente Eone della Dodecade emessa da Uomo e Chiesa, cioè Sophia, e subì la passione senza l'unione col suo compagno di sizigia Desiderio» (Adversus Haereses, I, II 2). La passione di cui si parla è desiderio di Sophia di conoscere e ascendere al Primo Essere, per sua natura inconoscibile[10]. Al peccato di Sophia, che voleva spingersi fino al Primo Essere, si oppose però Limite[11]; questi venne generato da Bythos privo della controparte femminile poiché era destinato a delimitare e a consolidare il mondo divino e non a generare per emanazione altri Eoni.  Sophia fu trattenuta e consolidata da questo: così, tornata a stento in sé e convinta che il Padre è incomprensibile, depose la sua intenzione insieme con la passione sopraggiunta a causa dello stupore e della meraviglia. (Ireneo, Adversus Haereses, I, II 2). Una volta che Limite ebbe reintegrato il mondo divino ed espulso la passione peccaminosa di Sophia dal Pleroma, l'Eone Abisso, insieme all'Eone Intelletto, emise un'altra coppia: Cristo e Spirito Santo[12], per portare a perfezione finale il mondo divino. Cristo fece conoscere agli altri Eoni la loro vera nascita, occorsa per successive emanazioni, principalmente ad opera di Intelletto e dell'essenza del Primo Essere; mentre Spirito Santo rivelò agli Eoni la loro sostanziale uguaglianza con quelli che compongono l'Ogdoade e così «tutti gli Eoni sono stati resi uguali per forma e volere e sono diventati tutti Intelletto, tutti Logoi, tutti Uom e tutti Cristo, e similmente gli elementi femminili tutte Verità, tutte Vita, tutte Spirito e Chiesa»[13]. A questo punto tutto il Pleroma emanò l'Eone Gesù[14], frutto perfetto generato da tutti gli Eoni; mentre come scorta dell'Eone furono emanati gli angeli, destinati a far coppia con gli uomini spirituali.  Al di fuori del mondo divino, però, Sophia detta Achamoth[15], la passione dell'Eone Sophia, vagava nei «luoghi dell'ombra e del vuoto» e solo l'intervento della coppia Cristo/Spirito Santo, le dette forma ma non la dotò della stessa conoscenza che aveva elargito agli altri Eoni[16]. Questa, ormai formata, decise di ascendere al mondo divino ma poiché era ancora sporca della passione, fu fermata da Limite. Essa cadde preda del dolore, del timore e del disagio, tutte passioni generate dall'ignoranza della sua vera essenza, parte sostanza materiale (la passione dell'Eone Sophia destinata a rimanere fuori dal Pleroma), parte «aroma d'immortalità» trasmessole da Cristo/Spirito Santo. Da questi sentimenti nacque la materia, da cui si generò il mondo materiale; però:  Le sopravvenne anche un'altra disposizione, quella della conversione verso colui che l'aveva vivificata. (Ireneo, Adversus Haereses) E proprio per questo sincero sentimento di conversione l'Eone Cristo/Spirito Santo mandò l'Eone Gesù ed i suoi angeli a far conoscere a Sophia Achamoth la sua vera essenza guarendola dalle passioni (elevandola cioè ad uno stadio di conoscenza superiore)[17]. L'Eone Gesù, inoltre, prese le passioni di cui era schiava Sophia Achamoth e le trasformò in sostanza, dividendola in una parte cattiva e una in parte buona, anche se essa stessa soggetta alle passioni; questa parte nacque dal sincero sentimento di conversione di Sophia Achamot e si qualificherà come sostanza psichica. A questo punto Sophia Achamoth generò dei semi spirituali, immagine imperfetta degli angeli dell'Eone Gesù, destinati a rimanere nel mondo materiale finché non matureranno e potranno ricongiungersi, come elemento femminile, agli stessi angeli; poi Sophia Achamoth decise di dare forma alla sostanza che l'Eone Gesù aveva ricavato dal suo sentimento di conversione, e prima di tutto dette forma al Demiurgo[18]:  Dicono che il Demiurgo è diventato padre e dio degli esseri esterni al Pleroma, essendo creatore di tutti gli esseri psichici e ilici. [...] Così fece sette cieli[19], al di sopra dei quali egli risiede. [...] i sette cieli sono intelligibili, e suppongono che siano angeli: anche il Demiurgo è un angelo, ma simile a Dio. Analogamente affermano che anche il paradiso, che è sopra il terzo cielo, è per potenza il quarto angelo e che da lui ha preso qualcosa Adamo, che è stato in esso. (Ireneo, Adversus Haereses) E ancora:  Il Demiurgo credeva di creare da sé tutte queste cose, mentre, invece, le faceva per impulso di Achamoth: così egli fece il cielo non conoscendo il cielo, plasmò l'uomo ignorando l'uomo, fece apparire la terra ignorando la terra. (Ireneo, Adversus Haereses) Infatti, il Demiurgo, spinto a sua insaputa da Sophia Achamoth crea solo l'aspetto materiale delle cose e questa, a sua volta, è spinta nella creazione dall'Eone Gesù. Dal Demiurgo nacquero anche il diavolo (detto Kosmokrator[20]) e la sua corte di angeli malvagi.  Dopo la creazione del mondo materiale il Demiurgo creò l'uomo. Secondo il mito gnostico gli uomini creati si dividevano in tre generi, con differenti caratteristiche e differenti destini:  ilici (da Hyle) o terreni, nati dalla materia cattiva creata dalla passione di Sophia Achamoth e destinati per questo a scomparire; psichici, fatti a somiglianza del Demiurgo, ossia della stessa buona materia nata dal sentimento di conversione di Sophia Achamoth, quindi possessori dell'anima ma destinati ad una redenzione incompleta, ovvero ad ascendere insieme al Demiurgo al regno di Sophia Achamoth[21], solo però quando essa sarà condotta al mondo divino e si unirà in sizigia con l'Eone perfetto Gesù; sono gli unici uomini dotati di libero arbitrio e, in virtù delle loro scelte, possono o salvarsi o dissolversi come gli ilici. pneumatici o spirituali, uomini nei quali vennero nascosti, all'insaputa del Demiurgo, i semi spirituali partoriti da Sophia Achamoth ad immagine e somiglianza degli angeli del corteo dell'Eone Gesù. Questi uomini, dotati della scintilla divina (pneuma), erano perciò destinati a ricongiungersi con il mondo divino indipendentemente dalle loro azioni[22]. Da questa distinzione si può dedurre che il Demiurgo aveva insufflato l'anima solo in alcuni ilici ed allo stesso modo Sophia Achamoth aveva inserito il seme spirituale solo in alcuni psichici. In tal modo ogni uomo spirituale aveva un involucro psichico e uno materiale, mentre ogni psichico solo un involucro materiale. Secondo i valentiniani gli gnostici erano spirituali, i cristiani in generale erano psichici ed i pagani erano ilici.  La Redenzione, però, sarebbe giunta solo grazie a Gesù, inviato per portare la gnosi e la salvezza agli spirituali. Secondo i valentiniani il Demiurgo generò un Cristo di pura natura psichica non corrotto dalla materia, infatti: «È questo che è passato attraverso Maria come l'acqua passa attraverso un tubo»; allo stesso tempo Sophia Achamoth inserì in lui il seme spirituale, mentre l'Eone Gesù discese su di lui sotto forma di colomba quando ricevette il Battesimo nel Giordano[23]. L'Eone Gesù e il seme spirituale impiantato da Sophia Achamoth, avrebbero però abbandonato il corpo del Cristo al momento della crocifissione. Secondo questa dottrina, Cristo non sarebbe veramente morto sulla croce, ma il tutto sarebbe stato un gioco di apparenze. (docetismo, dal greco dokéin (apparire) valentiniano).  Opere Delle sue opere rimangono solo pochi frammenti ricavati dagli scritti degli eresiologi cristiani: Clemente Alessandrino, Stromata, II 36; II 114; III 59; IV 89; IV 89-90; VI 52; Ippolito di Roma, Confutazioni VI 42; VI 37; Antimo, Sulla santa Chiesa, che riportano brani di lettere, omelie e poesie; sono invece attribuiti al maestro gnostico alcuni testi ritrovati a Nag Hammadi nel 1945:[24]  Vangelo della Verità, Preghiera dell'apostolo Paolo, Trattato sulla resurrezione, Trattato tripartito, Vangelo secondo Filippo, Interpretazione della conoscenza, Esposizione valentiniana. La scuola I seguaci di Valentino studiavano i metodi per liberare il proprio pneuma. Ciò poteva avvenire sia attraverso lo studio dei testi sacri che attraverso varie cerimonie, quali la camera nuziale o la redenzione. Tra i discepoli di Valentino sono da ricordare i due alessandrini, Eracleone e Tolomeo, che Ippolito indica come rappresentanti di una scuola italica; mentre nella scuola orientale, da Ippolito contrapposta a quella italica, sono da ricordare Assionico e Ardesiane, forse corrispondente a Bardesane. A questa scuola va ricollegato anche Teodoto di Bisanzio. Ireneo racconta che nella valle del Rodano era attivo Marco, da Ireneo detto dispregiativamente "il Mago".  Anche il filosofo e teologo Origene fu molto influenzato da questa scuola. Secondo Agostino si rifacevano alla scuola valentiniana anche i Secondiniani, che "aggiungevano alle loro dottrine la pratica di azioni turpi", ed i Colorbasi, che affermavano che la vita degli uomini dipendeva da sette costellazioni. Le scuole valentiniane, comunque, si estinsero entro la fine del III secolo, assorbite o dalla chiesa o dalle scuole manichee.  Note ^ Nella Lettera dogmatica dei Valentiniani, un documento sicuramente molto antico e destinato solamente agli iniziati, sono citati i 30 Eoni che, salvo qualche piccola differenza, ritroviamo nelle opere di Ireneo e Ippolito. ^ Il primo Principio maschile è chiamato con diversi nomi: Abisso (Βυθός), per definirne l'assoluta trascendenza rispetto agli altri Eoni e Autoprodotto (Αὐτοπάτωρ), ovvero che non è stato originato da nessun altro Eone. Troviamo anche il nome Padre, appellativo di solito riferito all'Eone Intelletto, per questo il primo Eone è chiamato Pre-Padre; per estensione, infine, troviamo anche il nome Pre-Principio. ^ Il nome Silenzio (Σιγὴν) definisce la sua trascendenza, mentre altri nomi del principio femminile sono Pensiero (Ἒννοιαν), che esprime la qualità dell'Eone di riflessione interna e Grazia (Χάριν), ossia l'impulso che le fa generare altri Eoni. ^ L'Intelletto (Νοῦς), è chiamato anche Padre (Πατήρ), ma anche Uomo (Ἄνθρωπον), per sottolineare il carattere di esemplare celeste dell'uomo spirituale; ma quest'ultima variante è più frequentemente riferita al quarto Eone. ^ Ἀλήθεια. ^ Chiesa (Ἐκκλησίαν) intesa nel senso della chiesa valentiniana, formata dagli uomini spirituali. ^ L'Ogdoade, formata da quattro coppie di Eoni, in genere viene suddivisa in due Tetradi, composte dai primi quattro Eoni (Abisso/Silenzia e Intelletto/Verità) e dagli altri quattro (Logos/Vita e Uomo/Chiesa) (4 e 8 erano considerati numeri perfetti dai Pitagorici). Nella cosiddetta Lettera dogmatica dei Valentiniani, riportata da Epifanio, l'Ogdoade al contrario è così composta: Abisso/Silenzio, Padre/Verità; Uomo/Chiesa; Logos/Vita. ^ I nomi che compongono questa Decade, nella Lettera dogmatica dei Valentiniani riportata da Epifanio, generati al contrario da Logos/Vita e detti Profondo/Mescolanza, Sempre giovane/Unione, Autogenerato/Mistione, Unigenito/Unità, Immobile/Piacere, sottolineano la perfezione del mondo angelico. ^ Questa serie di Eoni, nella Lettera dogmatica dei Valentiniani, riportata da Epifanio, generati al contrario da Uomo/Chiesa e così detti: Paracleto/Fede, Paterno/Speranza, Materno/Carità, Sempre pensante/Intelligenza, Desiderato/Beata, Ecclesiastico/Sophia; servono, eccettuato Sophia, più che altro a formare il numero complessivo di trenta, sottolineando con i loro nomi però l'imperfezione iniziale della Chiesa degli eletti. ^ Ippolito riferisce che il peccato di Sophia consisté nel voler generare da sola, come l'Essere Primevo, Bythos. ^ Il Limite (Ὄρον), si frapponeva tra il mondo divino e quello materiale. Ireneo (Adversus Haereses I II, I), però, parlava di due Limiti: uno fra il primo Essere e gli altri Eoni, e uno fra il mondo spirituale e quello materiale. In altre fonti valentiniane è denominato Horos (Ὁροθές), ovvero Limitatore; ma anche Λυτρωτής = Redentore, in quanto purifica gli Eoni; Σταυρός = Croce, intesa come croce cosmica, concetto in parte ripreso dal Timeo di Platone, che ha la funzione di separare e segnare i confini del mondo divino; Χαριστήριος = che rende grazie; Ἄφετος = che rimette i peccati degli Eoni; Μεταγωγεύς = Guida, che rimuove la passione dal Pleroma; Καρπιστής = Emancipatore dalla passione. ^ Qui è elemento femminile, poiché ruah = spirito, in ebraico è di genere femminile. ^ Questa conoscenza, detta illuminazione (=perfezionamento), consiste in una seconda formazione degli Eoni, dapprima formati solo secondo la sostanza, ovvero emanati, mentre ora sono formati secondo la gnosi, ossia la conoscenza, apprendendo la loro vera natura diventando così sostanzialmente uguali all'Eone Intelletto e raggiungendo la perfezione. ^ L'Eone è detto anche Salvatore (Σωτῆρα), Cristo (Χριστός), Logos (Λόγον) e Tutto (Πάντα), poiché deriva da tutti gli Eoni. ^ Il nome Achamoth (in ebraico sapienza), viene utilizzato per distinguere l'Eone Sophia, ormai nel Pleroma, dalla passione della stessa Sophia, rimasta esclusa dal mondo divino. Altro nome che si ritrova nei testi è quello di Madre (Μητέρα), nel senso di madre di tutti gli uomini spirituali. Da alcuni passi di Ireneo si può ricavare che lo sdoppiamento di Sophia in due unità, una superiore e l'altra inferiore, è probabilmente da attribuire alla scuola di Valentino, e non al maestro gnostico che probabilmente aveva immaginato una sola Sophia prima nel Pleroma poi espulsa fuori. ^ Questo processo di formazione materiale, in parte è speculare allo stesso compiuto prima dall'Eone Cristo/Spirito Santo nei confronti degli altri Eoni; ma se il secondo processo comportava la conoscenza, qui si tratta solo di formazione, ovvero di dare a Sophia Achamoth una forma precisa. Proprio questo processo di formazione, prima secondo la sostanza poi secondo la conoscenza, com'era già intervenuto a beneficio degli Eoni del Pleroma, occorse anche per Sophia Achamoth, e infine si ripeterà nel mondo materiale quando gli uomini spirituali verranno formati anche secondo la conoscenza, ovvero scopriranno la loro essenza e potranno assurgere al mondo divino. ^ Qui si conclude l'opera di formazione (illuminazione), se l'Eone Cristo/Spirito Santo aveva formato Sophia Achamoth secondo la sostanza, ora l'Eone Gesù la forma secondo la gnosi (conoscenza). ^ Il sentimento di conversione, da cui nacque il Demiurgo, rispetto agli altri sentimenti si qualifica come disposizione positiva, quindi il Demiurgo, ovvero il Dio del Vecchio Testamento, in un certo senso ha carattere positivo anche se imperfetto. Il Demiurgo è chiamato anche Padre, Madre-Padre, poiché genera da solo senza elemento femminile, ma anche Senza-Padre, perché a crearlo è stata Sophia Achamoth. Nel Trattato Tripartito troviamo i nomi: Padre, Dio, Demiurgo, Re, Giudice, Luogo, Dimora, Legge. ^ Questi cieli sono detti Ebdomade. ^ questo concetto, per cui il diavolo è a conoscenza di Sophia Achamot mentre il Demiurgo ne è all'oscuro; probabilmente è da spiegare in riferimento all'opera di opposizione svolta dal demonio all'opera del Demiurgo, che sembra implicare una consapevole conoscenza del mondo divino. ^ Questo regno era l'ottavo cielo, sito tra il limite del mondo divino e il settimo cielo abitato dal Demiurgo, per questo detto Ogdade. ^ Per questa salvezza per natura, molti polemisti cristiani attribuirono agli gnostici comportamenti libertini e in aperto contrasto con la legge cristiana; ma nei testi di Nag Hammadi si parla quasi sempre di atteggiamenti ascetici e non libertini, forse in questo caso i polemisti hanno calcato un po' la mano, attribuendo un atteggiamento libertino che forse apparteneva solo ad una parte minoritaria degli gnostici. ^ Raffrontando questo passo con Excerpta ex Theodoto, la dottrina valentiniana fa presumere che già alla nascita l'Eone Gesù fosse presente nel Cristo, mentre la colomba indicherebbe solamente la perfetta formazione dell'Eone divino, presente fin dalla nascita ma ancora imperfetto. In questo modo ancora una volta è ripetuta la duplice formazione (=illuminazione), prima sostanziale, quando Maria partorisce il Cristo, e poi gnoseologica (=secondo la conoscenza), quando il Cristo riceve il Battesimo. ^ Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism?, Harvard University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-674-01762-5, p. 154. Bibliografia A. Hilgenfeld, Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums, Leipzig 1884, pp. 283 sgg.; 345 sgg.; 461 sgg. A.E. Brooke, The Fragments of Heracleon, Cambridge 1891. C. Barth, Die Interpretation des Neuen Testaments in der valentinianischer Gnosis, Leipzig 1911. W. Foerster, Von Valentin zsu Haerakleon, Giessen 1928. A. Orbe, En los albores de la exegésis iohannea, in «Analecta Gregoriana» LXV, Roma 1955. A. Orbe, Los primeros herejes ante la persecución, in «Analecta Gregoriana» LXXXIII, Roma 1956. A. Orbe, Hacia la prima teologia de la processión del Verbo, in «Analecta Gregoriana» XCIX-C, Roma 1958. A. Orbe, La unción del Verbo, in «Analecta Gregoriana» CXIII, Roma 1961. A. Orbe, La teologia del Espiritu santo, in «Analecta Gregoriana» CLVIII, Roma 1966. H. Langerbeck, «La théologie de l'histoire dans la gnose valentinienne», in Le origini dello gnosticismo, a cura di U. Bianchi, Leiden 1967, p. 215 sgg. E. Muhlenberg, Wieviel Erlosungen kennt der Gnostiker Haeracleon?, in «Zeitschrift fur die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft», LXVI 1975, p. 170. D. Devoti, Antropologia e storia della salvezza in Eracleone, in «Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino», serie V 2, Torino 1978. The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, a cura di B. Layton, Leiden 1980-1, vol. I. M-J. Edwards, Gnostic and Valentinians in the Church Fathers, in «Journal of Theological Studies», XL 1989, p. 26 segg. Testi gnostici in lingua greca e latina, a cura di Manlio Simonetti, Milano 1993, p. 199 sgg. Voci correlate Eresie dei primi secoli Gnosticismo Letteratura cristiana Letteratura gnostica Scuole gnostiche Storia del cristianesimo Vangeli gnostici Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Valentino Collegamenti esterni (EN) Valentino, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Valentino, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. Modifica su Wikidata Dizionario delle eresie: Valentino, su eresie.com. (EN) Tertullian Adversus Valentinianos, su tertullian.org. (EN) Valentinus, su Early Christian Writings. (EN) Valentinus - A Gnostic for All Seasons]autore=Stephan Hoeller, su gnosis.org. Opinioni favorevoli, da un punto di vista gnostico. (EN) Valentinus and the Valentinian Tradition, su gnosis.org. (EN) Clyde Curry Smith, Valentinus, su dacb.org. Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 42228523 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0004 4887 0849 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\166409 · LCCN (EN) n85197536 · GND (DE) 118803751 · BNF (FR) cb12214625z (data) · BNE (ES) XX1145308 (data) · CERL cnp00400780 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n85197536 Biografie Portale Biografie Cristianesimo Portale Cristianesimo Storia Portale Storia Categorie: Teologi egizianiFilosofi egizianiPredicatori egizianiGnosticismo[altre]. valentinianism: Grice: “I will only explore the actdivities of the so-called “Valentinians” in Rome.” -- a form of Christian gnosticism of Alexandrian origin, founded by Valentinus in the second century and propagated by Theodotus in Eastern, and Heracleon in Western, Christianity. To every gnostic, pagan or Christian, knowledge leads to salvation from the perishable, material world. Valentinianism therefore prompted famous refutations by Tertullian Adversus Valentinianos and Irenaeus Adversus haereses. The latter accused the Valentinians of maintaining “creatio ex nihilo.” Valentinus is believed to have authored the Peri trion phuseon, the Evangelium veritatis, and the Treatise on the Resurrection. Since only a few fragments of these remain, his Neoplatonic cosmogony is accessible mainly through his opponents and critics Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria and in the Nag Hammadi codices. To explain the origins of creation and of evil, Valentinus separated God primal Father from the Creator Demiurge and attributed the cruVaihinger, Hans Valentinianism 947   947 cial role in the processes of emanation and redemption to Sophia. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Valentinus e Grice,” Villa Grice.

ideo-motor action – the idea of ‘ideo-‘ is cognate with Latin ‘visum’” – Grice.  a theory of the will according to which “every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object” (William James). Proposed by physiologist W. B. Carpenter, and taught by Lotze and Renouvier, ideo-motor action was developed by James. He rejected the regnant analysis of voluntary behavior, which held that will operates by reinstating “feelings of innervation” (Wundt) in the efferent nerves. Deploying introspection and physiology, James showed that feelings of innervation do not exist. James advanced ideo-motor action as the psychological basis of volition: actions tend to occur automatically when thought, unless inhibited by a contrary idea. Will consists in fixing attention on a desired idea until it dominates consciousness, the execution of movement following automatically. James also rejected Bain’s associationist thesis that pleasure or pain is the necessary spring of action, since according to ideo-motor theory thought of an action by itself produces it. James’s analysis became dogma, but was effectively attacked by psychologist E. L. Thorndike (1874– 1949), who proposed in its place the behavioristic doctrine that ideas have no power to cause behavior, and argued that belief in ideo-motor action amounted to belief in sympathetic magic. Thus did will leave the vocabulary of psychology

valla: Rome-born philosopher, teaches rhetoric in Pav a and is later secretary of Alfonso I di Naoli, and apostolic secretary in Rome under papa Nichola V. In his dialogue On Pleasure or On the True Good, Stoic and Epicurean interlocutors present their ethical views, which Valla proceeds to criticize. This dialogue is often regarded as a defense of Epicurean hedonism, because Valla equates the good with pleasure; but he claims that Italians can find pleasure only in heaven. Valla’s description of pleasure reflects the contemporary Renaissance attitude toward the joys of life and might have contributed to Valla’s reputation for hedonism. In another work, On Free Will between, Valla discusses the conflict between divine foreknowledge and human freedom and rejects Boezio’’s then predominantly accepted solution. Valla distinguishes between God’s knowledge and God’s will – as in Grice’s phrase, “God willing,” “Deo volente,” -- but denies that there is a rational solution of the apparent conflict between God’s will and human freedom. As a historian, he is famous for The Donation of Constantine 1440, which denounces as spurious the famous document on which medieval jurists and theologians based the papal rights to secular power. Lorenzo Valla (n. Roma) è stato un filosofo. Si presentava anche con il nome latino Laurentius Vallensis.  Nato a Roma da genitori di origini piacentine (il padre era l'avvocato Luca della Valle), ricevette la sua prima educazione a Roma e forse a Firenze, imparando il greco da Giovanni Aurispa e da Rinuccio Aretino. Lo guidava lo zio materno Melchiorre Scribani, un giurista funzionario in Curia.  La sua prima opera, oggi perduta, fu il De comparatione Ciceronis Quintilianique ("Confronto fra Cicerone e Quintiliano"), in cui elogiò il latino di Quintiliano a scapito di quello di Cicerone, andando contro all'idea corrente e mostrando già in questo primo scritto il suo gusto per la provocazione. Quando morì lo zio, Lorenzo sperava di ottenere un impiego nella Curia pontificia; ma i due autorevoli segretari Antonio Loschi e Poggio Bracciolini, ferventi ammiratori di Cicerone, si opposero all'assunzione, con la scusa che era troppo giovane.  Grazie all'aiuto di Antonio Beccadelli, detto il Panormita, fu chiamato ad insegnare retorica a Pavia, succedendo al maestro bergamasco Gasparino Barzizza, da poco defunto. Questi anni furono fondamentali per lo sviluppo del suo pensiero; la città era infatti un vivo centro culturale e Valla poté approfondire le sue conoscenze giuridiche, osservando inoltre l'efficacia del procedimento di analisi critica dei testi, che lo Studio pavese applicava con rigore.  A Pavia Valla acquisì una grande reputazione con il dialogo De Voluptate ("Il piacere"), nel quale si oppone fermamente alla morale stoica e all'ascetismo medievale, sostenendo la possibilità di conciliare il Cristianesimo, ricondotto alla sua originarietà, con l'edonismo, recuperando così il senso del pensiero di Epicuro e Lucrezio, che avevano sottolineato come tutta la vita dell'uomo sia fondamentalmente volta al piacere, inteso non come istintività, ma come calcolo dei vantaggi e svantaggi conseguenti ad ogni azione. A conclusione del dialogo, Valla sottolinea, però, come per l'uomo la suprema voluttà siano la ricerca spirituale e la fede in Dio. Si tratta di uno scritto considerevole, poiché, per la prima volta, una tendenza filosofica che era rimasta confinata nell'ambito del paganesimo trovava espressione in un'opera di livello universitario e di valore filosofico, venendo rivalutata alla luce del pensiero cristiano; le polemiche che seguirono alla pubblicazione del testo, costrinsero Valla a lasciare Pavia.  Da allora egli passò da un'università all'altra, accettando brevi incarichi e tenendo lezioni in diverse città. Durante questo periodo fece la conoscenza del re Alfonso V d'Aragona, al cui servizio entrò. Alfonso ne fece il suo segretario, lo difese dagli attacchi dei suoi nemici e lo incoraggiò ad aprire una scuola a Napoli.  Durante il pontificato di Eugenio IV, scrisse un breve testo, pubblicato solo nel 1517 e intitolato La falsa Donazione di Costantino (De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione). In esso Valla, con argomentazioni storiche e filologiche, dimostrò la falsità della Donazione di Costantino, documento apocrifo in base al quale la Chiesa giustificava la propria aspirazione al potere temporale: secondo questo documento, infatti, sarebbe stato lo stesso imperatore Costantino, trasferendo la sede dell'impero a Costantinopoli, a lasciare alla Chiesa il restante territorio dell'Impero romano (oggi la dimostrazione del Valla è universalmente accettata e lo scritto è datato all'VIII secolo o IX secolo).  (LA) «Quid, quod multo est absurdius, capit ne rerum natura, ut quis de Constantinopoli loqueretur tanquam una patriarchalium sedium, que nondum esset, nec patriarchalis nec sedes, nec urbs christiana nec sic nominata, nec condita nec ad condendum destinata? Quippe privilegium concessum est triduo, quam Constantinus esset effectus christianus, cum Byzantium adhuc erat, non Constantinopolis.»  (IT) «E, ciò che è molto più assurdo e non rientra nella realtà dei fatti, come si può parlare di Costantinopoli come di una delle sedi patriarcali, quando ancora non era né patriarcale né una sede né una città cristiana né si chiamava così, né era stata fondata, né la sua fondazione era stata decisa? Infatti il privilegio fu concesso tre giorni dopo che Costantino si fece cristiano, quando Bisanzio esisteva ancora e non Costantinopoli.»  (Lorenzo Valla, La falsa Donazione di Costantino, 1440) Egli dimostrò che anche la lettera ad Abgar V attribuita a Gesù era un falso e, sollevando dubbi sull'autenticità di altri documenti spuri e ponendo in discussione l'utilità della vita monastica e mettendone in luce anche l'ipocrisia nel De professione religiosorum ("La professione dei religiosi"), egli suscitò l'ira delle alte gerarchie ecclesiastiche. Fu obbligato, pertanto, a comparire davanti al tribunale dell'Inquisizione, alle cui accuse riuscì a sottrarsi soltanto grazie all'intervento del re Alfonso.  Visitò nuovamente Roma, dove i suoi avversari erano ancora molti e potenti. Riuscì a salvarsi da morte certa travestendosi e fuggendo a Barcellona, da dove fece poi ritorno a Napoli. Vengono divulgati gli Elegantiarum libri sex (i sei libri sull'"eleganza" della lingua latina), pubblicati però postumi nel 1471. L'opera raccoglie una serie straordinaria di passi desunti dai più celebri scrittori latini (Publio Virgilio Marone, Cicerone, Livio), dallo studio dei quali, sostiene Valla, occorre codificare i canoni linguistici, stilistici e retorici della lingua latina. Il testo costituì la base scientifica del movimento umanista impegnato a riformare il latino cristiano sullo stile ciceroniano.  Scrisse le "Emendationes sex librorum Titi Livii" in cui discute, col suo modo di scrivere brillante e caustico, correzioni ai libri 21-26 di Tito Livio in opposizione ad altri due intellettuali della corte napoletana il Panormita ed il Facio che non avevano il suo stesso spessore filologico.  L'ultima fase Nel febbraio 1447, con la morte di papa Eugenio IV, la sua fortuna iniziò a volgere in meglio. Recatosi nuovamente a Roma, fu ricevuto dal nuovo pontefice Niccolò V; a partire dal 1450 assunse il ruolo a lui più consono di professore di retorica, ma non perse nemmeno il suo spirito caustico e iniziò a criticare nel 1449 il latino della Vulgata, facendo confronti con l'originale greco sminuendo il ruolo di traduttore di San Girolamo e giudicò spuria la corrispondenza tra Seneca e San Paolo.  Sotto papa Callisto III Valla raggiunse il culmine della carriera, divenendo segretario apostolico. Morì a Roma. Un frammento della sua tomba, contenente un ritratto dello stesso, è ora murato nel chiostro della Basilica Lateranense dove era originariamente sepolto.  È quasi impossibile farsi un'idea precisa della vita privata e del carattere di Valla, essendo i documenti nei quali vi si fa riferimento sorti in contesti polemici e, pertanto, fonte più di esagerazioni e calunnie che di testimonianze attendibili. Egli appare comunque come persona orgogliosa, invidiosa e irascibile, caratteristiche cui però si affiancano le qualità di elegante umanista, critico acuto e scrittore pungente nella sua continua e violenta polemica sul potere temporale della Chiesa di Roma. Lorenzo Valla è un personaggio di eccezionale importanza non solo per la cultura italiana, ma soprattutto quale rappresentante del più puro umanesimo europeo. Con le sue spietate critiche alla Chiesa cattolica dell'epoca fu un precursore di Lutero, ma fu anche il promotore di molte revisioni di testi cattolici.  La sua opera si basa su una profonda padronanza della lingua latina e sulla convinzione che fosse stata proprio un'insufficiente conoscenza del latino la vera causa del linguaggio ambiguo di molti filosofi. Valla era convinto che lo studio accurato e l'uso corretto della lingua fosse l'unico mezzo di acculturazione feconda e comunicazione efficace: la grammatica e un appropriato modo di esprimersi erano a suo modo di pensare alla base di ogni enunciato e, prima ancora, della stessa formulazione intellettuale. Da questo punto di vista i suoi scritti sono tematicamente coerenti, in quanto ciascuno di essi si sofferma innanzitutto sulla lingua, sul suo impiego rigoroso e sull'individuazione delle applicazioni erronee della grammatica latina.  Oggi, il profondo distacco storico ci permette di distinguere le opere di Lorenzo Valla essenzialmente in due filoni, quello critico e quello filologico. Sebbene avesse saputo mostrare eccezionali doti di storico negli scritti critici, questa capacità non è però riscontrabile nell'unico lavoro definito storico, cioè nella biografia di Ferdinando d'Aragona, tutto sommato un modesto elenco di aneddoti.  Nel III secolo l'Impero romano iniziava a tramontare, il che si palesava non solo nell'indebolimento delle forze politiche e militari, ma anche nello sfaldamento dell'ordinamento interno e soprattutto nell'imbarbarimento della cultura. La crisi generale e l'accettazione di molte genti non italiche tra i cittadini romani provocarono un lento ma significativo allontanarsi dalla lingua latina ufficiale verso forme dialettali e meno eleganti. Si evidenziò la necessità di uno "sviluppo" della lingua che presupponeva la canonizzazione della parlata popolare e della sua semplice grammatica. Erano i primi sintomi della nascita di una nuova lingua, quella italiana, che avrebbe necessitato di un millennio per svilupparsi pienamente. Durante questa lunghissima transizione, in tutta la penisola ci fu un'enorme incertezza linguistica. Il latino classico cedeva lentamente il posto ad una mescolanza di nuovi idiomi che combattevano per la supremazia.  Gli effetti di questo periodo di passaggio sono ben visibili soprattutto nelle traduzioni che via via nascevano dal latino verso l'italiano, poché la linea di demarcazione tra le due lingue era fluttuante e nessuno dei traduttori poteva dirsi un vero esperto in materia. Valla fu il primo a stabilire un limite alla modernizzazione della lingua latina, decidendo che i cambiamenti oltre tale limite facessero già parte del processo di sviluppo della lingua italiana. In questo modo riuscì non solo a salvaguardare la purezza del latino, ma pose anche le basi per lo studio e la comprensione dell'italiano.  Lorenzo Valla si pone tra i maggiori esponenti del Quattrocento italiano e dell'umanesimo europeo, non solo per il suo costante apporto di punti di vista umanistici, bensì anche per la sua annosa avversione alla cultura scolastica.  È indicativa ad esempio la sua tesi (in De Voluptate) sugli errori dello stoicismo praticato dagli asceti cristiani che non avrebbero preso in debita considerazione le leggi naturali, dunque divine; la morale consiglierebbe infatti, a suo avviso, un'esistenza allegra e godereccia che non precluderebbe in alcun modo l'aspirazione alle gioie del paradiso. Analogamente, nelle Dialecticae Disputationes Valla confuta il dogmatismo di Aristotele e la sua arida logica che non offre insegnamenti o consigli, bensì discute solo di parole senza raffrontarle con il loro significato nella vita reale. Altrettanto critico si dimostra (nelle Adnotationes in Novum Testamentum) quando usa la sua profonda padronanza del latino per provare che sono state le traduzioni maldestre di alcuni passi del Nuovo Testamento a causare incomprensioni ed eresie.  È a lui dedicata la Fondazione Lorenzo Valla, che in collaborazione con la casa editrice Mondadori, pubblica la collana Scrittori greci e latini in cui vengono proposte edizioni critiche di testi classici.  Edizioni delle opere L'arte della grammatica, a cura di Paola Casciano, Milano, Mondadori (Fondazione Lorenzo Valla), (terza edizione rinnovata) La falsa Donazione di Costantino, a cura di Gabriele Pepe, Firenze, Ponte alle Grazie, Scritti filosofici e religiosi, a cura di Giorgio Radetti, Firenze, Sansoni, (ristampa: Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2009) Repastinatio dialectice et philosophie, testo latino edito da Gianni Zippel, Padova, Antenore, (due volumi) Dialectical Disputations, testo latino e traduzione inglese della Repastinatio a cura di B. P. Copenhaver and L. Nauta (I Tatti Renaissance Library), Harvard University Press, 2012 (due volumi). Note ^ http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/lorenzo-valla_(Il-Contributo-italiano-alla-storia-del-Pensiero:-Filosofia)/ ^ https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lorenzo-Valla ^ E. Garin, "La letteratura degli umanisti", in E. Cecchi-N. Sapegno (edd.) Letteratura italiana, III, Il Quattrocento e l'Ariosto, Milano, Garzanti, 1965, pp. 198-203). ^ Basilica Papale - SAN GIOVANNI IN LATERANO, su www.vatican.va. URL consultato il 22 marzo 2017. ^ Lodi Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla's Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy, Harvard University Press, 2009 ISBN 9780674032699. ^ Pubblicate per la prima volta nel 1505 da Erasmo da Rotterdam. Bibliografia Giovanni Antonazzi, Lorenzo Valla e la polemica sulla donazione di Costantino, Roma 1985. Salvatore Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia, Firenze, Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, 1972. Maristella de Panizza Lorch, A defense of life: Lorenzo Valla's theory of pleasure, Humanistische Bibliothek 1/36, Monaco, Wilhelm Fink, 1985. Marco Laffranchi, Dialettica e filosofia in Lorenzo Valla, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1999. Peter Mack, Renaissance argument. Valla and Agricola in the tradition of rhetoric and dialectic, Leiden, Brill, 1993. Girolamo Mancini, Vita di Lorenzo Valla, Firenze, G. C. Sansoni Editore, 1891 Lodi Nauta, In defense of common sense: Lorenzo Valla's Humanist critique of Scholastic philosophy, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2009. Mariangela Regoliosi (a cura di), Lorenzo Valla. La riforma della lingua e della logica (Atti del convegno del Comitato Nazionale VII centenario della nascita di Lorenzo Valla, Prato, 4-7 giugno 2008) Firenze, Edizioni Polistampa, 2010, 2 tomi. Voci correlate Donazione di Costantino Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Lorenzo Valla Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Lorenzo Valla Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Lorenzo Valla Collegamenti esterni Lorenzo Valla, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Lorenzo Valla, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Lorenzo Valla, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Lorenzo Valla, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (FR) Bibliografia su Lorenzo Valla, su Les Archives de littérature du Moyen Âge. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Lorenzo Valla, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. Modifica su Wikidata Delio Cantimori, «VALLA, Lorenzo», in Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1937. Rita Pagnoni Sturlese, VALLA, Lorenzo, su treccani.it. in Il contributo italiano alla storia del pensiero – Filosofia, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2012. La falsa donazione di Costantino, su classicitaliani.it. La tomba di Lorenzo Valla, su penelope.uchicago.edu. (EN) Lodi Nauta, Lorenzo Valla, in Edward N. Zalta (a cura di), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Università di Stanford. V · D · M Filologia Controllo di autorità      VIAF (EN) 29541502 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2125 8391 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\042795 · LCCN (EN) n79043871 · GND (DE) 118626000 · BNF (FR) cb11927487z (data) · BNE (ES) XX874162 (data) · NLA (EN) 35575211 · BAV (EN) 495/21449 · CERL cnp01259527 · NDL (EN, JA) 001169220 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n79043871 Biografie Portale Biografie Cattolicesimo Portale Cattolicesimo Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Umanisti italianiFilologi italianiScrittori italiani del XV secoloNati nel 1407Morti nel 1457Morti il 1º agostoNati a RomaMorti a RomaPersonaggi della corte aragonese di NapoliEpicureiAccademici italiani del XV secoloProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di PaviaAllievi di Vittorino da Feltre[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Valla e Grice,”per la Fondazione Lorenzo Valla, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

valitum: Oddly Vitters has a couple of lectures on ‘value,’ that Grice ‘ignored.’ Valitum should be contrasted from‘validum.’ ‘Valid,’ which is cognate with ‘value,’ a noun Grice loved, is used by logicians. In Grice’s generalised alethic-cum-deontic logic, ‘valid’ applies, too. ‘Valid’ is contrasted to the ‘satisfactoriness’ value that attaches directly to the utterance. ‘Valid’ applies to the reasoning, i.e. the sequence of psychological states from the premise to the conclusion. How common and insidious was the talk of a realm of ‘values’ at Oxford in the early 1930s to have Barnes attack it, and Grice defend it? ‘The realm of values’ sounds like an ordinary man’s expression, and surely Oxford never had a Wilson Chair of Metaphysical Axiology.  validum is the correct form out of Roman ‘valeor.’ Grice finds the need for the English equivalent, and plays with constructing the ‘concept’ “to be of value”! There’s also the axiologicum. The root for ‘value’ as ‘axis’ is found in Grice’s favourite book of the Republic, the First! Grice sometimes enjoys sounding pretentious and uses the definite article ‘the’ indiscriminately, just to tease Flew, his tutee, who said that talking of ‘the self’ is just ‘rubbish’. It is different with Grice’s ‘the good’ (to agathon), ‘the rational,’ (to logikon), ‘the valuable’ (valitum), and ‘the axiological’. Of course, whilesticking with ‘value,’ Grice plays with Grecian “τιμή.” Lewis and Short have ‘vălor,’ f. ‘valeo,’ which they render as ‘value,’ adding that it is supposed to translate in Gloss. Lab, Grecian ‘τιμή.’ ‘valor, τιμή, Gloss. Lab.’ ‘Valere,’ which of course algo gives English ‘valid,’ that Grice overuses, is said by Lewis and Short to be cognate with “vis,” “robur,” “fortissimus,” cf. debilis” and they render as “to be strong.” So one has to be careful here. “Axiology” is a German thing, and not used at Clifton or Oxford, where they stick with ‘virtus’ or ‘arete.’ This or that Graeco-Roman philosopher may have explored a generic approach to ‘value.’ Grice somewhat dismisses Hare who in Language of Morals very clearly distinguishes between deontic ‘ought’ and teleological, value-judgemental ‘good.’ For ‘good’ may have an aesthetic use: ‘that painting is good,’ the food is good). The sexist ‘virtus’ of the Romans perhaps did a disservice to Grecian ‘arete,’ but Grice hardly uses ‘arete,’ himself. It is etymologically unrelated to ‘agathon,’ yet rumour has it that ‘arete,’ qua ‘excellence,’ is ‘aristos,’ the superlative of ‘agathon.’ Since Aristotle is into the ‘mesotes,’ Grice worries not. Liddell and Scott have “ἀρετή” and render it simpliciter as “goodness, excellence, of any kind,” adding that “in Hom. esp. of manly qualities”: “ποδῶν ἀρετὴν ἀναφαίνων;” “ἀμείνων παντοίας ἀρετὰς ἠμὲν πόδας ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι καὶ νόον;” so of the gods, “τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀ. τιμή τε βίη τε;” also of women, “ἀ. εἵνεκα for valour,” “ἀ. ἀπεδείκνυντο,” “displayed brave deeds.”  But when Liddell and Scott give the philosophical references (Plathegel and Ariskant), they do render “ἀρετή,” as ‘value,’ generally, excellence, “ἡ ἀ. τελείωσίς τις” Arist. Met. 1021b20, cf. EN1106a15, etc.; of persons, “ἄνδρα πὺξ ἀρετὰν εὑρόντα,” “τὸ φρονεῖν ἀ. μεγίστη,” “forms of excellence, “μυρίαι ἀνδρῶν ἀ.;” “δικαστοῦ αὕτη ἀ.;” esp. moral virtue, opp. “κακία,” good nature, kindness, etc. We should not be so concerned about this, were not for the fact that Grice explored Foot, not just on meta-ethics as a ‘suppositional’ imperratives, but  on ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ by Foot, who had edited a reader in meta-ethics for the series of Grice’s friend, Warnock. Grice knows that when he hears the phrases value system, or belief system, he is conversing with a relativist. So he plays jocular here. If a value is not a concept, a value system at least is not what Davidson calls a conceptual scheme. However, in “The conception of value” (henceforth, “Conception”) Grice does argue that value IS a concept, and thus part of the conceptual scheme by Quine. Hilary Putnam congratulates Grice on this in “Fact and value,” crediting Baker – i. e. Judy – into the bargain. While utilitarianism, as exemplified by Bentham, denies that a moral intuition need be taken literally, Bentham assumes the axiological conceptual scheme of hedonistic eudaemonism, with eudaemonia as the maximal value (summum bonum) understood as hedone. The idea of a system of values (cf. system of ends) is meant to unify the goals of the agent in terms of the pursuit of eudæmonia. Grice wants to disgress from naturalism, and the distinction between a description and anything else. Consider the use of ‘rational’ as applied to ‘value.’ A naturalist holds that ‘rational’ can be legitimately apply to the ‘doxastic’ realm, not to the ‘buletic’ realm. A desire (or a ‘value’) a naturalist would say is not something of which ‘rational’ is predicable. Suppose, Grice says, I meet a philosopher who is in the habit of pushing pins into other philosophers. Grice asks the philosopher why he does this. The philosopher says that it gives him pleasure. Grice asks him whether it is the fact that he causes pain that gives him pleasure. The philosopher replies that he does not mind whether he causes pain. What gives him pleasure is the physical sensation of driving a pin into a philosopher’s body. Grice asks him whether he is aware that his actions cause pain. The philosopher says that he is. Grice asks him whether he would not feel pain if others did this to him. The philosopher agrees that he would. I ask him whether he would allow this to happen. He says that he guesses he would seek to prevent it. Grice asks him whether he does not think that others must feel pain when he drives pins into them, and whether he should not do to others what he would try to prevent them from doing to him. The philosopher says that pins driven into him cause him pain and he wishes to prevent this. Pins driven by him into others do not cause him pain, but pleasure, and he therefore wishes to do it. Grice asks him whether the fact that he causes pain to other philosophers does not seem to him to be relevant to the issue of whether it is rationally undesirable to drive pins into people. He says that he does not see what possible difference can pain caused to others, or the absence of it, make to the desirability of deriving pleasure in the way that he does. Grice asks him what it is that gives him pleasure in this particular activity. The philosopher replies that he likes driving pins into a philosopher’s resilient body. Grice asks whether he would derive equal pleasure from driving pins into a tennis ball. The philosopher says that he would derive equal pleasure, that into what he drives his pins, a philosopher or a tennis ball, makes no difference to him – the pleasure is similar, and he is quite prepared to have a tennis ball substituted, but what possible difference can it make whether his pins perforate living men or tennis balls? At this point, Grice begins to suspect that the philosopher is evil. Grice does not feel like agreeing with a naturalist, who reasons that the pin-pushing philosopher is a philosopher with a very different scale of moral values from Grice, that a value not being susceptible to argument, Grice may disagree but not reason with the pin-pushing philosopher. Grice rather sees the pin-pushing philosopher beyond the reach of communication from the world occupied by him. Communication is as unattainable as it is with a philosopher who that he is a doorknob, as in the story by Hoffman. A value enters into the essence of what constitutes a person. The pursuit of a rational end is part of the essence of a person. Grice does not claim any originality for his position (which much to Ariskant), only validity. The implicaturum by Grice is that rationalism and axiology are incompatible, and he wants to cancel that. So the keyword here is rationalistic axiology, in the neo-Kantian continental vein, with a vengeance. Grice arrives at value (validitum, optimum, deeming) via Peirce on meaning. And then there is the truth “value,” a German loan-translation (as value judgment, Werturteil). The sorry story of deontic logic, Grice says, faces Jørgensens dilemma. The dilemma by Jørgensens is best seen as a trilemma, Grice says; viz. Reasoning requires that premise and conclusion have what Boole, Peirce, and Frege call a “truth” value. An imperative dos not have a “truth” value. There may be a reasoning with an imperative as premise or conclusion. A philosopher can reject the first horn and provide an inference mechanism on elements – the input of the premise and the output of the conclusion -- which are not presupposed to have a “truth” value. A philosopher can reject the second horn and restrict ‘satisfactory’ value to a doxastic embedding a buletic (“He judges he wills…”). A philosopher can reject the third horn, and refuse to explore the desideratum. Grice generalizes over value as the mode-neutral ‘satisfactory.’ Both ‘p’ and “!p” may be satisfactory. ‘.p’ has doxastic value (0/1); ‘!p’ has buletic value  (0/1). The mode marker of the utterance guides the addresse you as to how to read ‘satisfactory.’ Grice’s ‘satisfactory’ is a variation on a theme by Hofstadter and McKinsey, who elaborate a syntax for the imperative mode, using satisfaction. They refer to what they call the ‘satisfaction-function’ of a fiat. A fiat is ‘satisfied’ (as The door is closed may also be said to be satisfied iff the door is closed) iff what is commanded is the case. The fiat ‘Let the door be closed’ is satisfied if the door is closed. An unary or dyadic operator becomes a satisfaction-functor. As Grice puts it, an inferential rule, which flat rationality is the capacity to apply, is not arbitrary. The inferential rule picks out a transition of acceptance in which transmission of ‘satisfactory’ is guaranteed or expected. As Grice notes, since mode marker indicate the species ‘satisfactory’ does. He imports into the object-language ‘It is satisfactory-d/p that’ just in case psi-d/b-p is satisfactory. Alla Tarski, Grice introduces ‘It is acceptable that’: It is acceptable that psi-d/b-p is satisfactory-b/d just in case ‘psi-d/b-p is satisfactory-d/b’ is satisfactory-b/d. Grice goes on to provide a generic value-assignment for satisfactoriness-functors. For coordinators: “φ Λ ψ” is 1-b/d just in case φ is 1-b/d and ψ is 1-b/d. “φ ν ψ”  is 1-b/d just in case one of the pair, φ and ψ, is 1-b/d. For subordinator: “φ⊃ψ” is 1-b/d just in case either φ is 0-b/d or ψ is 0-b/d. There are, however, a number of points to be made. It is not fully clear to Grice just how strong the motivation is for assigning a value to a mode-neutral, generic functor. Also he is assuming symmetry, leaving room for a functor is introduced if a restriction is imposed. Consider a bi-modal utterance. “The beast is filthy and do not touch it” and “The beast is filthy and I shall not touch it” seem all right. The commutated “Do not touch the beast and it is filthy” is dubious. “Touch the beast and it will bite you,” while idiomatic is hardly an imperative, since ‘and’ is hardly a conjunction. “Smith is taking a bath or leave the bath-room door open” is intelligible. The commutated “Leave the bath-room door open or Smith is taking a bath” is less so. In a bi-modal utterance, Grice makes a case for the buletic to be dominant over the doxastic. The crunch comes, however, with one of the four possible unary satisfactoriness-functors, especially with regard to the equivalence of  “~psi-b/d-p” and “psi-b/d-~p). Consider “Let it be that I now put my hand on my head” or  “Let it be that my bicycle faces north” in which neither seems to be either satisfactory or unsatisfactory. And it is a trick to assign a satisfactory value to “~psi-b/d-p” and “~psi-b/d~p.” Do we proscribe this or that form altogether, for every cases? But that would seem to be a pity, since ~!~p seems to be quite promising as a representation for you may (permissive) do alpha that satisfies p; i.e., the utterer explicitly conveys his refusal to prohibit his addressee A doing alpha. Do we disallow embedding of (or iterating) this or that form? But that (again if we use ~!p and ~!~p  to represent may) seems too restrictive. Again, if !p is neither buletically satisfactory nor buletically unsatisfactory (U could care less) do we assign a value other than 1 or 0 to !p (desideratively neuter, 0.5). Or do we say, echoing Quine, that we have a buletically satisfactoriness value gap? These and other such problems would require careful consideration. Yet Grice cannot see that those problems would prove insoluble, any more than this or that analogous problem connected with Strawsons presupposition (Dont arrest the intruder!) are insoluble. In Strawsons case, the difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present themselves. Grice takes up the topic of a calculus in connection with the introduction rule and the elimination rule of a modal such as must. We might hope to find, for each member of a certain family of modalities, an introduction rule and an elimination rule which would be analogous to the rules available for classical logical constants. Suggestions are not hard to come by. Let us suppose that we are seeking to provide such a pair of rules for the particular modality of necessity □. For (□,+) Grice considers the following (Grice thinks equivalent) forms: if φ is demonstrable, □φ is demonstrable. Provided φ is dependent on no assumptions, derive φ from □φ. For  (□,-), Grice considers From □φ derive φ. It is to be understood, of course, that the values of the syntactical variable φ would contain either a buletic or a doxastic mode markers. Both !p and .p would be proper substitutes for φ but p would not. Grice wonders: [W]hat should be said of Takeuti’s conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in P’s personalised system that φ, it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ is doxastically satisfactory/establishable. The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ, one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble. For such a rule is not acceptable. φ will be a buletic expression such as Let it be that Smith eats his hat. And my commitment to the idea that Smiths system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting volitively Let Smith eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary, with respect to X, that let X eat his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier. For this person-relativised version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope.  Grice, following Mackie, uses absolutism, as opposed to relativism, which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions (but cf. Hare on Subjectsivism). Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough discussion of value by English philosophers, other than Hare (and he is only responding to Mackie!). Continental philosophers, by comparison, have a special discipline, axiology, for it! Similarly, a continental-oriented tradition Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a pragmatist bent, such as Carus. Grice wants to say that rationality is a value, because it is a faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and survive to his changing environments. The implicaturum of the title is that values have been considered in the English philosophical tradition, almost alla Nietzsche, to belong to the realm irrational. Grice grants that axiological implicaturum rests on a PRE-rational propension. While Grice could play with “the good” in the New World, as a Lit. Hum. he knew he had to be slightly more serious. The good is one of the values, but what is valuing? Would the New Worlders understand valuing unattached to the pragmatism that defines them? Grice starts by invoking Hume on his bright side: the concept of value, versus the conception of value. Or rather, how the concept of value derives from the conception of value. A distinction that would even please Aquinas (conceptum/conceptio), and the Humeian routine. Some background for his third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately Subjectsive. What about inter-Subjectsive, and constructively objective? Grice constructs absolute value out of relative value. But once a rational pirot P (henceforth, P – Grice liked how it sounded like Locke’s parrot) constructs value, the P assigns absolute status to rationality qua value. The P cannot then choose not to be rational at the risk of ceasing to exist (qua person, or essentially rationally human agent). A human, as opposed to a person, assigns relative value to his rationality. A human is accidentally rational. A person is necessarily so. A distinction seldom made by Aristotle and some of his dumbest followers obsessed with the modal-free adage, Homo rationale animal. Short and Lewis have “hūmānus” (old form: hemona humana et hemonem hominem dicebant, Paul. ex Fest. p. 100 Müll.; cf. homo I.init.), adj., f. “homo,” and which they render as “of or belonging to man, human.” Grice also considers the etymology of ‘person.’ Lewis and Short have ‘persōna,’  according to Gabius Bassus ap. Gell. 5, 7, 1 sq., f. ‘persŏno,’ “to sound through, with the second syllable lengthened.’ Falsa est (finitio), si dicas, Equus est animal rationale: nam est equus animal, sed irrationale, Quint.7,3,24:homo est animal rationale; “nec si mutis finis voluptas, rationalibus quoque: quin immo ex contrario, quia mutis, ideo non rationalibus;” “a rationali ad rationale;” “τὸ λογικόν ζῷον,” ChrysiStoic.3.95; ἀρεταὶ λ., = διανοητικαί, oἠθικαί, Arist. EN1108b9; “λογικός, ή, όν, (λόγος), ζῶον λόγον ἔχον NE, 1098a3-5. λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων, man alone of all animals possesses speech, from the Politics. Grice takes the stratification of values by Hartmann much more seriously than Barnes. Grice plays with rational motivation. He means it seriously. The motivation is the psychological bite, but since it is qualified by rational, it corresponds to the higher more powerful bit of the soul, the rational soul. There are, for Grice, the Grecians, Kantotle and Plathegel, three souls: the vegetal, the animal, and the rational. As a matter of history, Grice reaches value (in its guises of optimum and deeming) via his analysis of meaning by Peirce. Many notions are value-paradeigmatic. The most important of all philosophical notions that of rationality, presupposes objective value as one of its motivations. For Grice, ratio can be understood cognoscendi but also essendi, indeed volendi and fiendi, too. Rational motivation involves a ratio cognoscendi and a ratio volendi; objective, “objectum,” and “objectus,” ūs, m. f. “obicio,” rendered as “a casting before, a putting against, in the way, or opposite, an opposing; or, neutr., a lying before or opposite (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose): dare objectum parmaï, the opposing of the shield” “vestis;” “insula portum efficit objectu laterum,” “by the opposition,” “cum terga flumine, latera objectu paludis tegerentur;” “molis;” “regiones, quæ Tauri montis objectu separantur;” “solem interventu lunæ occultari, lunamque terræ objectu, the interposition,” “eademque terra objectu suo umbram noctemque efficiat;” “al. objecta soli: hi molium objectus (i. e. moles objectas) scandere, the projection,” transf., that which presents itself to the sight, an object, appearance, sight, spectacle;” al. objecto;  and if not categoric. This is analogous to the overuse by Grice of psychoLOGICAL when he just means souly. It is perhaps his use of psychological for souly that leads to take any souly concept as a theoretical concept within a folksy psychoLOGICAL theory. Grice considered the stratification of values, alla Hartmann, unlike Barnes, who dismissed him in five minutes. “Some like Philippa Foot, but Hare is MY man,” Grice would say. “Virtue” ethics was becoming all the fashion, especially around Somerville. Hare was getting irritated by the worse offender, his Anglo-Welsh tutee, originally with a degree from the other place, Williams. Enough for Grice to want to lecture on value, and using Carus as an excuse! Mackie was what Oxonians called a colonial, and a clever one! In fact, Grice quotes from Hares contribution to a volume on Mackie. Hares and Mackies backgrounds could not be more different. Like Grice, Hare was a Lit. Hum., and like Grice, Hare loves the Grundlegung. But unlike Grice and Barnes, Hare would have nothing to say about Stevenson. Philosophers in the play group of Grice never took the critique by Ayer of emotivism seriously. Stevenson is the thing. V. Urmson on the emotive theory of ethics, tracing it to English philosphers like Ogden, Barnes, and Duncan-Jones. Barnes was opposing both Prichard (who was the Whites professor of moral philosophy – and more of an interest than Moore is, seeing that Prichard is Barness tutor at Corpus) and Hartmann. Ryle would have nothing to do with Hartmann, but these were the days before Ryle took over Oxford, and forbade any reference to a continental philosopher, even worse if a “Hun.” Grice reaches the notion of value through that of meaning. If Peirce is simplistic, Grice is not. But his ultra-sophisticated analysis ends up being deemed to hold in this or that utterer. And deeming is valuing, as is optimum. While Grice rarely used axiology, he should! A set of three lectures, which are individually identified below. I love Carus! Grice was undecided as to what his Carus lectures were be on. Grice explores meaning under its value optimality guise in Meaning revisited. Grice thinks that a value-paradeigmatic notion allows him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible vicious circle in his approach to semantic and psychological notions. The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the construction, alla Hume, of a value-paradeigmatic notion in general, and value itself. Grice starts by quoting Austin, Hare, and Mackie, of Oxford. The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a philosophical general audience. Most of the second lecture is a subtle exploration by Grice of the categorical imperative of Kant, with which he had struggled in the last Locke lecture in “Aspects,” notably the reduction of the categorical imperative to this or that counsel of prudence with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at eudæmonia. The Carus Lectures are three: on objectivity and value, on relative and absolute value, and on metaphysics and value. The first lecture, on objectivity and value, is a review Inventing right and wrong by Mackie, quoting Hare’s antipathy for a value being ‘objective’. The second lecture, on relative and absolute value, is an exploration on the categorical imperative, and its connection with a prior hypothetical or suppositional imperative. The third lecture, on metaphycis and value, is an eschatological defence of absolute value. The collective citation should be identified by each lecture separately. This is a metaphysical defence by Grice of absolute value. The topic fascinates Grice, and he invents a few routines to cope with it. Humeian projection rationally reconstructs the intuitive concept being of value. Category shift allows to put a value such as the disinterestedness by Smith in grammatical subject position, thus avoiding to answer that the disinterestedness of Smith is in the next room, since it is not the spatio-temporal continuan prote ousia that Smith is. But the most important routine is that of trans-substantatio, or metousiosis. A human reconstructs as a rational personal being, and alla Kantotle, whatever he judges is therefore of absolute value. The issue involves for Grice the introduction of a telos qua aition, causa finalis (final cause), role, or métier. The final cause of a tiger is to tigerise, the final cause of a reasoner is to reason, the final cause of a person is to personise. And this entails absolute value, now metaphysically defended. The justification involves the ideas of end-setting, unweighed rationality, autonomy, and freedom. In something like a shopping list that Grice provides for issues on free. Attention to freedom calls for formidably difficult undertakings including the search for a justification for the adoption or abandonment of an ultimate end. The point is to secure that freedom does not dissolve into compulsion or chance. Grice proposes four items for this shopping list. A first point is that full action calls for strong freedom. Here one has to be careful that since Grice abides by what he calls the Modified Occams Razor in the third James lecture on Some remarks about logic and conversation, he would not like to think of this two (strong freedom and weak freedom) as being different senses of free. Again, his calls for is best understood as presupposes. It may connect with, say, Kanes full-blown examples of decisions in practical settings that call for or presuppose libertarianism. A second point is that the buletic-doxastic justification of action has to accomodate for the fact that we need freedom which is strong. Strong or serious autonomy or freedom ensures that this or that action is represented as directed to this or that end E which are is not merely the agents, but which is also freely or autonomously adopted or pursued by the agent. Grice discusses the case of the gym instructor commanding, Raise your left arm! The serious point then involves this free adoption or free pursuit. Note Grices use of this or that personal-identity pronoun: not merely mine, i.e. not merely the agents, but in privileged-access position. This connects with what Aristotle says of action as being up to me, and Kant’s idea of the transcendental ego. An end is the agents in that the agent adopts it with liberum arbitrium. This or that ground-level desire may be circumstantial. A weak autonomy or freedom satisfactorily accounts for this or that action as directed to an end which is mine. However, a strong autonomy or freedom, and a strong autonomy or freedom only, accounts for this or that action as directed to an end which is mine, but, unlike, say, some ground-level circumstantial desire which may have sprung out of some circumstantial adaptability to a given scenario, is, first, autonomously or freely adopted by the agent, and, second, autonomously or freely pursued by the agent. The use of the disjunctive particle or in the above is of some interest. An agent may autonomously or freely adopt an end, yet not care to pursue it autonomously or freely, even in this strong connotation that autonomous or free sometimes has. A further point relates to causal indeterminacy. Any attempt to remedy this situation by resorting to causal indeterminacy or chance will only infuriate the scientist without aiding the philosopher. This remark by Grice has to be understood casually. For, as it can be shown, this or that scientist may well have resorted to precisely that introduction and in any case have not self-infuriated. The professional tag that is connoted by philosopher should also be seen as best implicated than entailed. A scientist who does resort to the introduction of causal indeterminacy may be eo ipso be putting forward a serious consideration regarding ethics or meta-ethics. In other words, a cursory examination of the views of a scientist like Eddington, beloved by Grice, or this or that moral philosopher like Kane should be born in mind when considering this third point by Grice. The reference by Grice to chance, random, and causal indeterminacy, should best be understood vis-à-vis Aristotles emphasis on tykhe, fatum, to the effect that this or that event may just happen just by accident, which may well open a can of worms for the naive Griceian, but surely not the sophisticated one (cf. his remarks on accidentally, in Prolegomena). A further item in Grices shopping list involves the idea of autonomous or free as a value, or optimum. The specific character of what Grice has as  strong autonomy or freedom may well turn out to consist, Grice hopes, in the idea of this or that action as the outcome of a certain kind of strong valuation  ‒ where this would include the rational selection, as per e.g. rational-decision theory, of this or that ultimate end. What Grice elsewhere calls out-weighed or extrinsically weighed rationality, where rational includes the buletic, of the end and not the means to it. This or that full human action calls for the presence of this or that reason, which require that this or that full human action for which this or that reason accounts should be the outcome of a strong rational valuation. Like a more constructivist approach, this line suggests that this or that action may require, besides strong autonomy or freedom, now also strong valuation. Grice sets to consider how to adapt the buletic-doxastic soul progression to reach these goals. In the case of this or that ultimate end E, justification should be thought of as lying, directly, at least, in this or that outcome, not on the actual phenomenal fulfilment of this or that end, but rather of the, perhaps noumenal, presence qua end. Grice relates to Kants views on the benevolentia or goodwill and malevolentia, or evil will, or illwill. Considers Smiths action of giving Jones a job. Smith may be deemed to have given Jones a job, whether or not Jones actually gets the job. It is Smiths benevolentia, or goodwill, not his beneficentia, that matters. Hence in Short and Lewis, we have “bĕnĕfĭcentĭa,” f. “beneficus,” like “magnificentia” f. magnificus, and “munificentia” f. munificus; Cicero, Off. 1, 7, 20, and which they thus render as “the quality of beneficus, kindness, beneficence, an honorable and kind treatment of others” (omaleficentia, Lact. Ira Dei, 1, 1; several times in the philos. writings of Cicero. Elsewhere rare: quid praestantius bonitate et beneficentiā?” “beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet,” “comitas ac beneficentia,” “uti beneficentiā adversus supplices,”“beneficentia augebat ornabatque subjectsos.” In a more general fashion then, it is the mere presence of an end qua end of a given action that provides the justification of the end, and not its phenomenal satisfaction or fulfilment. Furthermore, the agents having such and such an end, E1, or such and such a combination of ends, E1 and E2, would be justified by showing that the agents having this end exhibits some desirable feature, such as this or that combo being harmonious. For how can one combine ones desire to smoke with ones desire to lead a healthy life? Harmony is one of the six requirements by Grice for an application of happy to the life of Smith. The buletic-doxastic souly ascription is back in business at a higher level. The suggestion would involve an appeal, in the justification of this or that end, to this or that higher-order end which would be realised by having this or that lower, or first-order end of a certain sort. Such valuation of this or that lower-order end lies within reach of a buletic-doxastic souly ascription. Grice has an important caveat at this point. This or that higher-order end involved in the defense would itself stand in need of justification, and the regress might well turn out to be vicious. One is reminded of Watson’s requirement for a thing like freedom or personal identity to overcome this or that alleged counterexample to freewill provided by H. Frankfurt. It is after the laying of a shopping list, as it were, and considerations such as those above that Grice concludes his reflection with a defense of a noumenon, complete with the inner conflict that it brings. Attention to the idea of autonomous and free leads the philosopher to the need to resolve if not dissolve the most important unsolved problem of philosophy, viz. how an agent can be, at the same time, a member of both the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, or, to settle the internal conflict between one part of our rational nature, the doxastic, even scientific, part which seems to call for the universal reign of a deterministic law and the other buletic part which insists that not merely moral responsibility but every variety of rational belief demands exemption from just such a reign. In this lecture, Grice explores freedom and value from a privileged-access incorrigible perspective rather than the creature construction genitorial justification. Axiology – v. axiological.  Valitum -- Fact-value distinction, the apparently fundamental difference between how things are and how they should be. That people obey the law or act honestly or desire money is one thing; that they should is quite another. The first is a matter of fact, the second a matter of value. Hume is usually credited with drawing the distinction when he noticed that one cannot uncontroversially infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ the isought gap. From the fact, say, that an action would maximize overall happiness, we cannot legitimately infer that it ought to be done  without the introduction of some so far suppressed evaluative premise. We could secure the inference by assuming that one ought always to do what maximizes overall happiness. But that assumption is evidently evaluative. And any other premise that might link the non-evaluative premises to an evaluative conclusion would look equally evaluative. No matter how detailed and extensive the non-evaluative premises, it seems no evaluative conclusion follows directly and as a matter of logic. Some have replied that at least a few non-evaluative claims do entail evaluative ones. To take one popular example, from the fact that some promise was made, we might it appears legitimately infer that it ought to be kept, other things equal  and this without the introduction of an evaluative premise. Yet many argue that the inference fails, or that the premise is actually evaluative, or that the conclusion is not. Hume himself was both bold and brief about the gap’s significance, claiming simply that paying attention to it “wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason” Treatise of Human Nature. Others have been more expansive. Moore, for instance, in effect relied upon the gap to establish via the open question argument that any attempt to define evaluative terms using non-evaluative ones would commit the naturalistic fallacy. Moore’s main target was the suggestion that ‘good’ means “pleasant” and the fallacy, in this context, is supposed to be misidentifying an evaluative property, being good, with a natural property, being pleasant. Assuming that evaluative terms have meaning, Moore held that some could be defined using others he thought, e.g., that ‘right’ could be defined as “productive of the greatest possible good” and that the rest, though meaningful, must be indefinable terms denoting simple, non-natural, properties. Accepting Moore’s use of the open question argument but rejecting both his non-naturalism and his assumption that evaluative terms must have descriptive meaning, emotivists and prescriptivists e.g. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, and Hare argued that evaluative terms have a role in language other than to denote properties. According to them, the primary role of evaluative language is not to describe, but to prescribe. The logical gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, they argue, establishes both the difference between fact and value and the difference between describing how things are and recommending how they might be. Some naturalists, though, acknowledge the gap and yet maintain that the evaluative claims nonetheless do refer to natural properties. In the process they deny the ontological force of the open question argument and 302 F   302 treat evaluative claims as describing a special class of facts.  Refs.: The main source is The construction of value, the Carus lectures, Clarendon. But there are scattered essays on value and valuing in the Grice Papers. H. P. Grice, “Objectivity and value,” s. V, c. 8-f. 18, “The rational motivation for objective value,” s. V, c. 8-f. 19, “Value,” s. V, c. 9-f. 20; “Value, metaphysics, and teleology,” s. V, c. 9-f. 23, “Values, morals, absolutes, and the metaphysical,” s. V., c. 9-f.  24; “Value sub-systems and the Kantian problem,” s. V. c. 9-ff. 25-27; “Values and rationalism,” s. V, c. 9-f. 28; while the Carus are in the second series, in five folders, s. II, c-2, ff. 12-16, the H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. value, the worth of something. Philosophers have discerned these main forms: intrinsic, instrumental, inherent, and relational value. Intrinsic value may be taken as basic and many of the others defined in terms of it. Among the many attempts to explicate the concept of intrinsic value, some deal primarily with the source of value, while others employ the concept of the “fittingness” or “appropriateness” to it of certain kinds of emotions and desires. The first is favored by Moore and the second by Brentano. Proponents of the first view hold that the intrinsic value of X is the value that X has solely in virtue of its intrinsic nature. Thus, the state of affairs, Smith’s experiencing pleasure, has intrinsic value provided it has value solely in virtue of its intrinsic nature. Followers of the second approach explicate intrinsic value in terms of the sorts of emotions and desires appropriate to a thing “in and for itself” or “for its own sake”. Thus, one might say X has intrinsic value or is intrinsically good if and only if X is worthy of desire in and for itself, or, alternatively, it is fitting or appropriate for anyone to favor X in and for itself. Thus, the state of affairs of Smith’s experiencing pleasure is intrinsically valuable provided that state of affairs is worthy of desire for its own sake, or it is fitting for anyone to favor that state of affairs in and for itself. Concerning the other forms of value, we may say that X has instrumental value if and only if it is a means to, or causally contributes to, something that is intrinsically valuable. If Smith’s experiencing pleasure is intrinsically valuable and his taking a warm bath is a means to, or Valentinus value 948   948 causally contributes to, his being pleased, then his taking a warm bath is instrumentally valuable or “valuable as a means.” Similarly, if health is intrinsically valuable and exercise is a means to health, then exercise is instrumentally valuable. X has inherent value if and only if the experience, awareness, or contemplation of X is intrinsically valuable. If the experience of a beautiful sunset is intrinsically valuable, then the beautiful sunset has inherent value. X has contributory value if and only if X contributes to the value of some whole, W, of which it is a part. If W is a whole that consists of the facts that Smith is pleased and Brown is pleased, then the fact that Smith is pleased contributes to the value of W, and Smith’s being pleased has contributory value. Our example illustrates that something can have contributory value without having instrumental value, for the fact that Smith is pleased is not a means to W and, strictly speaking, it does not bring about or causally contribute to W. Given the distinction between instrumental and contributory value, we may say that certain sorts of experiences and activities can have contributory value if they are part of an intrinsically valuable life and contribute to its value, even though they are not means to it. Finally, we may say that X has relational value if and only if X has value in virtue of bearing some relation to something else. Instrumental, inherent, and contributory value may be construed as forms of relational value. But there are other forms of relational value one might accept, e.g. one might hold that X is valuable for S in virtue of being desired by S or being such that S would desire X were S “fully informed” and “rational.” Some philosophers defend the organicity of intrinsic value. Moore, for example, held that the intrinsic value of a whole is not necessarily equal to the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. According to this view, the presence of an intrinsically good part might lower the intrinsic value of a whole of which it is a part and the presence of an intrinsically bad part might raise the intrinsic value of a whole to which it belongs. Defenders of organicity sometimes point to examples of Mitfreude taking joy or pleasure in another’s joy and Schadenfreude taking joy or pleasure in another’s suffering to illustrate their view. Suppose Jones believes incorrectly that Smith is happy and Brown believes incorrectly that Gray is suffering, but Jones is pleased that Smith is happy and Brown is pleased that Gray is suffering. The former instance of Mitfreude seems intrinsically better than the latter instance of Schadenfreude even though they are both instances of pleasure and neither whole has an intrinsically bad part. The value of each whole is not a “mere sum” of the values of its parts.  Valitum -- axiology: value theory, also called axiology, the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of value and with what kinds of things have value. Construed very broadly, value theory is concerned with all forms of value, such as the aesthetic values of beauty and ugliness, the ethical values of right, wrong, obligation, virtue, and vice, and the epistemic values of justification and lack of justification. Understood more narrowly, value theory is concerned with what is intrinsically valuable or ultimately worthwhile and desirable for its own sake and with the related concepts of instrumental, inherent, and contributive value. When construed very broadly, the study of ethics may be taken as a branch of value theory, but understood more narrowly value theory may be taken as a branch of ethics. In its more narrow form, one of the chief questions of the theory of value is, What is desirable for its own sake? One traditional sort of answer is hedonism. Hedonism is roughly the view that i the only intrinsically good experiences or states of affairs are those containing pleasure, and the only instrinsically bad experiences or states of affairs are those containing pain; ii all experiences or states of affairs that contain more pleasure than pain are intrinsically good and all experiences or states of affairs that contain more pain than pleasure are intrinsically bad; and iii any experience or state of affairs that is intrinsically good is so in virtue of being pleasant or containing pleasure and any experience or state of affairs that is intrinsically bad is so in virtue of being painful or involving pain. Hedonism has been defended by philosophers such as Epicurus, Bentham, Sidgwick, and, with significant qualifications, J. S. Mill. Other philosophers, such as C. I. Lewis, and, perhaps, Brand Blanshard, have held that what is intrinsically or ultimately desirable are experiences that exhibit “satisfactoriness,” where being pleasant is but one form of being satisfying. Other philosophers have recognized a plurality of things other than pleasure or satisfaction as having intrinsic value. Among the value pluralists are Moore, Rashdall, Ross, Brentano, Hartmann, and Scheler. In addition to certain kinds of pleasures, these thinkers count some or all of the following as intrinsically good: consciousness and the flourishing of life, knowledge and insight, moral virtue and virtuous actions, friendship and mutual affection, beauty and aesthetic experience, a just distribution of goods, and self-expression. Many, if not all, of the philosophers mentioned above distinguish between what has value or is desirable for its own sake and what is instrumentally valuable. Furthermore, they hold that what is desirable for its own sake or intrinsically good has a value not dependent on anyone’s having an interest in it. Both of these claims have been challenged by other value theorists. Dewey, for example, criticizes any sharp distinction between what is intrinsically good or good as an end and what is good as a means on the ground that we adopt and abandon ends to the extent that they serve as means to the resolution of conflicting impulses and desires. Perry denies that anything can have value without being an object of interest. Indeed, Perry claims that ‘X is valuable’ means ‘Interest is taken in X’ and that it is a subject’s interest in a thing that confers value on it. Insofar as he holds that the value of a thing is dependent upon a subject’s interest in that thing, Perry’s value theory is a subjective theory and contrasts sharply with objective theories holding that some things have value not dependent on a subject’s interests or attitudes. Some philosophers, dissatisfied with the view that value depends on a subject’s actual interests and theories, have proposed various alternatives, including theories holding that the value of a thing depends on what a subject would desire or have an interest in if he were fully rational or if desires were based on full information. Such theories may be called “counterfactual” desire theories since they take value to be dependent, not upon a subject’s actual interests, but upon what a subject would desire if certain conditions, which do not obtain, were to obtain. Value theory is also concerned with the nature of value. Some philosophers have denied that sentences of the forms ‘X is good’ or ‘X is intrinsically good’ are, strictly speaking, either true or false. As with other forms of ethical discourse, they claim that anyone who utters these sentences is either expressing his emotional attitudes or else prescribing or commending something. Other philosophers hold that such sentences can express what is true or false, but disagree about the nature of value and the meaning of value terms like ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘better’. Some philosophers, such as Moore, hold that in a truth of the form ‘X is intrinsically good’, ‘good’ refers to a simple, unanalyzable, non-natural property, a property not identical with or analyzable by any “natural” property such as being pleasant or being desired. Moore’s view is one form of non-naturalism. Other philosophers, such as Brentano, hold that ‘good’ is a syncategorematic expression; as such it does not refer to a property or relation at all, though it contributes to the meaning of the sentence. Still other philosophers have held that ‘X is good’ and ‘X is intrinsically good’ can be analyzed in natural or non-ethical terms. This sort of naturalism about value is illustrated by Perry, who holds that ‘X is valuable’ means ‘X is an object of interest’. The history of value theory is full of other attempted naturalistic analyses, some of which identify or analyze ‘good’ in terms of pleasure or being the object of rational desire. Many philosophers argue that naturalism is preferable on epistemic grounds. If, e.g., ‘X is valuable’ just means ‘X is an object of interest’, then in order to know whether something is valuable, one need only know whether it is the object of someone’s interest. Our knowledge of value is fundamentally no different in kind from our knowledge of any other empirical fact. This argument, however, is not decisive against non-naturalism, since it is not obvious that there is no synthetic a priori knowledge of the sort Moore takes as the fundamental value cognition. Furthermore, it is not clear that one cannot combine non-naturalism about value with a broadly empirical epistemology, one that takes certain kinds of experience as epistemic grounds for beliefs about value.  Valitum -- valid, having the property that a well-formed formula, argument, argument form, or rule of inference has when it is logically correct in a certain respect. A well-formed formula is valid if it is true under every admissible reinterpretation of its non-logical symbols. If truth-value gaps or multiple truth-values are allowed, ‘true’ here might be replaced by ‘non-false’ or takes a “designated” truth-value. An argument is valid if it is impossible for the premises all to be true and, at the same time, the conclusion false. An argument form schema is valid if every argument of that form is valid. A rule of inference is valid if it cannot lead from all true premises to a false conclusion. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The conception of value,” The Paul Carus Lectures for the American Philosophical Association, published by Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.

vanini: philosopher, a Renaissance Aristotelian who studied law and theology. He became a monk and traveled all over Europe. After abjuring, he taught and practiced medicine. He was burned at the stake by the Inquisition. His major work is four volumes of dialogues, De admirandis naturae reginae deaeque mortalium arcanis “On the Secrets of Nature, Queen and Goddess of Mortal Beings,” 1616. He was influenced by Averroes and Pietro Pomponazzi, whom he regarded as his teacher. Vanini rejects revealed religion and claims that God is immanent in nature. The world is ruled by a necessary natural order and is eternal. Like Averroes, he denies the immortality and the immateriality of the human soul. Like Pomponazzi, he denies the existence of miracles and claims that all apparently extraordinary phenomena can be shown to have natural causes and to be predetermined. Despite the absence of any original contribution, from the second half of the seventeenth century Vanini was popular as a symbol of free and atheist thought. Giulio Cesare Vanini Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search  Medaglione di Vanini al monumento a Giordano Bruno in Campo de' Fiori. Sotto il mento, una piccola effigie di Martin Lutero[1]. Giulio Cesare Vanini (Taurisano, 19 gennaio 1585 – Tolosa, 9 febbraio 1619) è stato un filosofo, medico, naturalista e libero pensatore italiano, fra i primi esponenti di rilievo del libertinismo erudito.   Indice 1 Biografia 1.1 La fuga in Inghilterra 1.2 La fuga da Londra 1.3 In Francia 1.4 A Tolosa 2 Opera 3 Pensiero 4 La fortuna filosofica di Vanini 5 Opere letterarie 6 Note 7 Bibliografia 7.1 Vanini in Inghilterra 7.1.1 Documenti 7.1.2 Documenti inclusi nell'opera di Namer 7.2 Vanini e l'Inquisizione di Roma 8 Altri progetti 9 Collegamenti esterni Biografia Giulio Cesare Vanini nasce nella notte tra il 19 e il 20 gennaio 1585[2] a Taurisano, casale di Terra d'Otranto, nella famiglia che il padre Giovan Battista, uomo d'affari originario di Tresana in Toscana, ha costituito sposando una Lopez de Noguera, appartenente a una famiglia spagnola appaltatrice delle regie dogane della Terra di Bari, della Terra d'Otranto, della Capitanata e della Basilicata. Anche un successivo documento dell'agosto del 1612, scoperto nell'Archivio segreto vaticano, lo qualifica "pugliese", confermando il luogo di nascita ch'egli si attribuisce nelle sue opere.  Nel censimento ufficiale della popolazione del casale di Taurisano, nel 1596, figurano solo i nomi di Giovan Battista Vanini, del figlio legittimo Alessandro, nato nel 1582, e del figlio naturale Giovan Francesco. Nessun cenno della moglie e dell'altro figlio legittimo Giulio Cesare. Nel 1603 Giovan Battista Vanini viene segnalato per l'ultima volta a Taurisano: si ha motivo di ritenere che dopo questa data sia rientrato a Napoli.   Paolo Sarpi Sistemata ogni pendenza economica, nel 1603[3] entra nell'ordine carmelitano assumendo il nome di fra' Gabriele e si trasferisce a Padova per intraprendere gli studi di teologia presso quell'università. Giunge nelle terre della Repubblica di Venezia quando le polemiche provocate due anni prima dall'interdetto del papa Paolo V sono ancora vivacissime. Durante il soggiorno padovano entra in contatto con il gruppo capeggiato da Paolo Sarpi che, con l'appoggio dell'ambasciata inglese a Venezia, alimenta la polemica antipapale.  Giulio Cesare consegue a Napoli il titolo di dottore in utroque iure, superando nel giugno 1606 l'esame che gli consentiva di esercitare la professione di dottore nella legge civile e canonica. Come verrà descritto in documenti posteriori, egli ha assimilato una grande cultura, «parla assai bene il latino e con una grande facilità, è alto di taglia e un po' magro, ha i capelli castani, il naso aquilino, gli occhi vivi e fisionomia gradevole ed ingegnosa».  Nel 1606 probabilmente il padre del filosofo muore a Napoli. Giulio Cesare Vanini, divenuto maggiorenne, si fa riconoscere da un tribunale della capitale erede di Giovan Battista e tutore del fratello Alessandro. Con una serie di rogiti e procure notarili redatte a Napoli, Giulio Cesare inizia a sistemare ogni pendenza economica conseguente alla morte del padre: vende una casa di sua proprietà sita in Ugento, a pochi chilometri dal suo paese d'origine; nel 1607 dà mandato a uno zio materno di assolvere incarichi dello stesso tipo, incarica nel 1608 l'amico Scarciglia di recuperagli una somma e gli vende alcuni beni rimasti a Taurisano e tenuti in custodia dai due fratelli.  Nel 1611 partecipa alle prediche quaresimali, attirandosi i sospetti delle autorità religiose.  La fuga in Inghilterra Nel gennaio 1612, in conseguenza dei suoi atteggiamenti antipapali, viene allontanato dal convento di Padova e rinviato, in attesa di ulteriori sanzioni disciplinari, al Provinciale di Terra di Lavoro con sentenza del generale dell'Ordine Carmelitano, Enrico Silvio, ma l'anno dopo fugge in Inghilterra, insieme con il confratello genovese Bonaventura Genocchi. Nel viaggio, toccano Bologna, Milano, i Grigioni svizzeri e discendono il corso del Reno sino alla costa del Mare del Nord, attraversando la Germania, i Paesi Bassi, il canale della Manica e giungendo infine a Londra e a Lambeth, sede arcivescovile del Primate d'Inghilterra. Qui i due frati rimarranno per quasi due anni, nascondendo la loro reale identità perfino ai loro ospiti inglesi, poiché è provato che lo stesso arcivescovo di Canterbury, George Abbot, li conosceva sotto un nome diverso da quello reale.   Francesco Bacone Nel luglio 1612, nella Chiesa londinese detta "dei Merciai" o "degli Italiani", alla presenza di un folto auditorio e del filosofo Francesco Bacone, Vanini e il suo compagno fanno una pubblica sconfessione della loro fede cattolica, abbracciando la religione anglicana. In realtà i due frati non hanno tagliato i ponti con i loro ambienti di provenienza: infatti nel 1613 Genocchi viene raggiunto da una lettera molto amichevole di un amico e confratello genovese, Gregorio Spinola.  A loro volta, le autorità cattoliche vengono subito informate di questo caso. All'inizio di agosto è il nunzio a Parigi ad avvertire la Segreteria di Stato vaticana che due frati veneziani non meglio identificati sono fuggiti in Inghilterra «e si sono fatti ugonotti», che un vescovo italiano sta per seguirli e che lo stesso Paolo Sarpi, morto il doge e privato della sua protezione, per non cadere in mano dei suoi nemici, è sul punto di fuggire in Palatinato tra i protestanti; analoga notizia, arricchita di altri particolari, viene inoltrata dal nunzio in Fiandra al cardinale Borghese a Roma, che risponde mostrandosi già al corrente dei fatti e dell'esatta identità dei due frati; sa che la fuga di Vanini, di Genocchi, di Paolo Sarpi e di un non ancora identificato vescovo italiano potrebbe portare alla ricostituzione in terra protestante del gruppo di opposizione al Papato già operante nella Repubblica veneta al tempo dell'interdetto.  Nei mesi seguenti il nunzio Ubaldini da Parigi continua a inviare a Roma dettagli sulla condotta dei due frati rifugiati in Inghilterra, sulle loro predicazioni, su come sono stati accolti a corte e dalle autorità religiose, su come si continui a parlare dell'arrivo del vescovo italiano. La Segreteria di Stato vaticana esorta il nunzio in Francia ad attivare i suoi confidenti in Inghilterra al fine di scoprire l'identità del vescovo intenzionato a rifugiarvisi; in ottobre il cardinale Ubaldini da Parigi assicura alla Segreteria di Stato tutto il suo impegno in merito all'argomento dei due frati. Nello stesso dispaccio afferma che non mancherà di informare di ogni dettaglio anche il cardinale Arrigoni, che gli ha scritto in merito per conto del Papa e della Congregazione del Sant'Uffizio. Evidentemente a quella data la condotta veneziana e la successiva fuga dei due frati era già diventata argomento di discussione dell'Inquisizione Romana.  Un'altra lettera del cardinale Borghese invita il nunzio in Francia ad essere vigile sulla faccenda della fuga del vescovo in Inghilterra e, nel caso egli passi per il suolo francese, a far di tutto per «farlo ritenere», come suggerisce il Papa e «come sarebbe molto a proposito». In dicembre il Nunzio Ubaldini invia da Parigi al cardinale Borghese notizie dettagliate e di tenore molto diverso rispetto alle precedenti sui due frati, attestando la buona reputazione di cui essi godono in Inghilterra e la fiducia che possano presto essere recuperati alla Chiesa di Roma. Questa lettera viene poi trasmessa al tribunale dell'Inquisizione romana che nei primi giorni del gennaio successivo inizia di fatto a istruire il processo contro Vanini.   Il Museo di Storia Naturale dell'Università di Oxford Nei mesi successivi si hanno varie notizie di un gran traffico di suppliche e lettere dei due frati a Roma, specialmente tramite l'ambasciatore spagnolo a Londra, per ottenere il perdono del papa e il rientro nel Cattolicesimo. Le autorità religiose inglesi ne vengono segretamente informate e dispongono un'attenta sorveglianza nei confronti dei due frati.  Tra la fine del 1613 e l'inizio del 1614 Vanini si reca in visita all'Università di Cambridge e poi ad Oxford; qui confida ad alcuni conoscenti la sua ormai imminente fuga dall'Inghilterra, cosicché in gennaio i due frati vengono arrestati dalla guardie dell'arcivescovo dopo una funzione religiosa nella chiesa "degli Italiani" e rinchiusi in case di alcuni servi dell'arcivescovo. Scoppia un grande scandalo e dell'episodio vengono informati il re e le massime autorità dello Stato, in quanto nelle operazioni di recupero appaiono chiaramente coinvolti agenti di nazioni straniere accreditati nelle ambasciate a Londra. Altissime personalità cattoliche da Roma seguono la vicenda e la favoriscono con grande calore.  In febbraio Genocchi, eludendo la sorveglianza e con l'aiuto di agenti stranieri, fugge dalla prigione e dall'Inghilterra; in conseguenza di ciò, Vanini viene trasferito in luogo più sicuro e rinchiuso nella Carzel publica, ovvero nella Gatehouse adiacente all'Abbazia di Westminster. Dilaga lo scandalo; volano le accuse di leggerezza nei confronti dei fautori della fuga dei due frati dall'Italia, mentre cominciano a circolare apertamente i nomi del cappellano dell'ambasciatore veneto a Londra, Girolamo Moravo, e dell'ambasciatore spagnolo quali autori del clamoroso "recupero". Dalla Curia romana si continua a seguire la vicenda e a favorirla in ogni modo.  A Londra viene intanto istruito il processo a Vanini: il frate rischia una severa punizione, non il rogo come i martiri della fede (come il carmelitano scriverà con enfasi poi nelle sue opere), ma una lunga deportazione in desolate colonie lontane, come l'arcivescovo Abbot suggerisce al re.  La fuga da Londra Tra il 10 e il 16 marzo 1614 anche Vanini riesce a evadere di prigione e a fuggire dall'Inghilterra, sempre grazie all'aiuto degli agenti dell'ambasciatore spagnolo a Londra, incoraggiato da alte personalità romane e del cappellano dell'ambasciata della Repubblica Veneta, che si avvale anche dell'opera di alcuni servi dell'ambasciatore stesso, ma all'insaputa di questi.  Due anni dopo, durante il processo della Repubblica Veneta contro l'ambasciatore Foscarini per spionaggio e per aver consentito ad Abbot di sottoporre ad interrogatorio il personale dell'ambasciata, vengono alla luce anche dettagli sulla complicità della fuga di Vanini da Londra.  In aprile Vanini e Genocchi arrivano a Bruxelles e si presentano al Nunzio di Fiandra, Guido Bentivoglio, che li attende da tempo. Vengono iniziate le prime pratiche per la concessione del perdono per la fuga in Inghilterra e per l'apostasia e viene loro accordato di tornare in Italia e di vivervi in abito di prete secolare, senza più indossare l'abito religioso, ma con il vincolo dell'obbedienza al loro superiore. Forti di tali concessioni, alla fine di maggio i due frati vengono posti sulla via per Parigi, dove devono presentarsi al Nunzio di quella città, Roberto Ubaldini.  All'incirca nello stesso periodo giunge a Parigi anche l'ultimo frate "recuperato" dall'Inghilterra, fra' Nicolò da Ferrara, al secolo Camillo Marchetti. Altri due frati, invece, non ottengono il perdono dalle autorità cattoliche.   Lione, la città vecchia A Parigi, nell'estate del 1614, durante la permanenza presso la sede del Nunzio Ubaldini, Vanini si inserisce nella polemica relativa all'accettazione dei principi del Concilio di Trento in Francia, che tardava ad arrivare a causa del rifiuto di parte del clero gallicano; per orientare gli animi nella direzione voluta dalla Santa Sede, scrive i Commentari in difesa del Concilio di Trento, di cui egli poi intende avvalersi, come scrive Ubaldini ai suoi superiori in Roma, per dimostrare la sincerità del suo ritorno nella fede cattolica.  Riprende quindi la strada per l'Italia, dirigendosi a Roma, dove deve affrontare le difficili fasi finali del processo presso il tribunale dell'Inquisizione. Dimora per qualche mese a Genova, dove ritrova l'amico Genocchi e si guadagna da vivere insegnando filosofia ai figli di Scipione Doria.  Nonostante le assicurazioni ricevute, il ritorno dei frati non è del tutto tranquillo: nel gennaio 1615 Genocchi viene inaspettatamente arrestato dall'Inquisitore di Genova; a Ferrara accade lo stesso all'altro frate "recuperato", Camillo Marchetti. Vanini teme che gli accada la stessa sorte, fugge nuovamente in Francia e si dirige a Lione. Gli esiti finali delle esperienze capitate al frate genovese e a quello ferrarese - che vennero rilasciati dopo un breve periodo di detenzione e restituiti alla normale vita religiosa - sembrano indicare che forse Vanini esagerò il pericolo insito in queste operazioni di polizia dell'Inquisizione.  In Francia' A Lione, nel giugno 1615, Vanini pubblica l'Amphitheatrum, che egli intende esibire in sua difesa alle autorità romane, come si legge in un dispaccio di Ubaldini alle autorità romane. Esso è dedicato a Francesco de Castro, ambasciatore spagnolo presso la Santa Sede, già collegato con la famiglia Vanini, da cui il frate fuggiasco s'aspetta un aiuto nell'operazione della concessione del perdono da parte delle autorità romane.   La Sorbona Poco tempo dopo, grazie anche agli appoggi acquisiti presso certi ambienti cattolici con la pubblicazione della sua opera, Vanini ritorna a Parigi e si ripresenta al Nunzio Ubaldini, chiedendogli di intervenire in suo favore presso le autorità di Roma. In agosto il prelato scrive al cardinale Borghese, chiedendo chiare indicazioni sulla sorte dell'ex-carmelitano. Non si conosce la risposta del Segretario di Stato; Vanini, comunque, non ritorna più in Italia e riesce invece a trovare la strada e i mezzi per entrare in ambienti molto prestigiosi della nobiltà francese.  Nel 1616, in pochi mesi, Vanini completa un'altra sua opera, il De Admirandis Naturae Reginae Deaeque Mortalium Arcanis, ed il 20 maggio l'affida a due teologi della Sorbona perché ne autorizzino la pubblicazione, secondo le norme del tempo vigenti in Francia; l'opera è pubblicata in settembre a Parigi. Essa è dedicata a François de Bassompierre, uomo potente alla corte di Maria de' Medici, ma è stampata da Adrien Perier, tipografo notoriamente protestante. Il lavoro vede la luce in un ambiente ricco di pubblicazioni che vengono guardate con sospetto dai rappresentanti cattolici e che provocano pesanti condanne, fino al rogo. L'opera del Vanini ottiene un immediato successo presso certi ambienti della nobiltà, popolati di giovani spiriti che guardano con interesse alle innovazioni culturali e scientifiche che vengono dall'Italia. In questo senso il De Admirandis costituisce una summa, esposta in modo vivace e brillante, del nuovo sapere; dà una risposta alle esigenze del momento di questo settore della nobiltà francese; diviene una specie di "manifesto" culturale di questi esprits forts e rappresenta per Vanini una possibilità di stabile permanenza negli ambienti vicini alla corte di Parigi.[senza fonte]  Tuttavia, pochi giorni dopo la pubblicazione dell'opera, i due teologi della Sorbona che avevano espresso la loro approvazione alla pubblicazione si presentano ai membri della Facoltà di Teologia in seduta ufficiale e li informano di aver letto, a loro tempo, certi dialoghi scritti da Vanini; di non avervi trovato allora niente che contrastasse con la fede cattolica; di averli restituiti muniti della loro approvazione alla stampa e con la condizione che il manoscritto da essi controfirmato fosse depositato presso di essi a pubblicazione avvenuta, a testimonianza della fedeltà del testo pubblicato a quello da loro approvato; che ciò non era avvenuto e che circolava invece un testo dell'opera diverso da quello approvato e contenente «alcuni errori contro la comune fede di tutti», per cui i due dottori avanzano la supplica che l'opera non circoli più con la loro approvazione e che tale richiesta venga trascritta nel libro delle Conclusioni della Facoltà stessa. La Sorbona accoglie tale richiesta che costituì di fatto un divieto di circolazione del testo.   Marco Antonio de Dominis La Facoltà di Teologia della Sorbona, però, sembra non occuparsi più dell'opera di Vanini, non prenderne più in esame l'opera, non elencarne o denunciarne, come da prassi, gli errori da emendare, né mai condanna il suo contenuto o il suo autore. Comunque, una condanna espressa dal vicario episcopale di Tolosa, Jean de Rudèle, fu sottoscritta anche dall'inquisitore Claude Billy. Inoltre anche la Congregazione dell'Indice pronuncia una condanna il 3 luglio 1620, con la quale il De admirandis fu condannato con la formula del donec corrigatur, in base alla quale il Sotomaior collocò il Vanini nella prima classe degli autori proibiti nel suo indice del 1640. La Collectio Judiciorum de novis erroribus qui ab initio duodecimi seculi post Incarnationem Verbi, usque ad annum 1632, in Ecclesia proscripti sunt et notati, di Charles du Plessis d'Argentré, dottore della Sorbona e vescovo, edita a Parigi nel 1728, esamina le censure e le "conclusioni" espresse dalla Facoltà sino al 1632 - che aveva condannato l'Amphitheatrum Aeternae Sapientiae di Heinrich Khunrath e la De Republica Ecclesiastica di Marco Antonio de Dominis) - non menziona invece provvedimenti contro Vanini.  Tutto questo porterebbe a ritenere che non vi siano stati atti ufficiali specifici di persecuzione contro Vanini da parte delle autorità parigine, né religiose né civili, né in questo periodo né negli anni seguenti, ma solo proteste e minacce nei suoi confronti da parte di alcuni settori cattolici. Una condanna dell'opera di Vanini non avrebbe trovato fondate giustificazioni, né sul piano giuridico né su quello culturale, in quanto gran parte delle teorie esposte da Vanini non costituivano una novità per la cultura francese.  Fuggito da pochi mesi dall'Inghilterra, impossibilitato a rientrare in Italia, minacciato da alcuni settori cattolici francesi, Vanini vede restringersi intorno gli spazi di movimento e ridursi le possibilità di trovare stabile sistemazione nella società francese. Ha paura che venga aperto un processo contro di lui anche a Parigi, per cui fugge dalla capitale e si nasconde in Bretagna, in una delle cui abbazie, quella di Redon, è Abate Commendatario il suo amico e protettore, Arthur d'Espinay Saint-Luc. Ma intervengono anche altri fattori di preoccupazione: nell'aprile 1617 viene ucciso a Parigi Concino Concini, favorito di Maria de Medici, uomo potentissimo e molto odiato in Francia. L'episodio, seguito poco dopo dall'allontanamento della regina dalla capitale con il suo odiato seguito di italiani, crea notevole turbolenza politica e suscita un vasto movimento di ostilità nei confronti degli italiani residenti a corte.  A Tolosa Nei mesi seguenti, altre cronache del tempo segnalano la presenza di un misterioso italiano, con un nome strano, in possesso di una grande cultura ma dall'incerto passato, ancora più a sud, in alcune città della Guienna e poi della Linguadoca ed infine a Tolosa. Nella particolare suddivisione politica della Francia del XVII secolo, Enrico, duca di Montmorency, protettore degli esprits forts del tempo, sposato con la duchessa italiana Maria Felice Orsini, è governatore di questa regione e sembra poter accordare protezione al fuggiasco, che continua comunque a tenersi prudentemente nascosto. La presenza a Tolosa di questo misterioso personaggio, di cui si ignora la provenienza e la formazione culturale, ma che fa mostra di grande sapienza, di grande vivacità dialettica specialmente tra i giovani e di affermazioni non sempre allineate con la morale del tempo, non passa inosservata ed attira i sospetti delle autorità, che cominciano a sorvegliarlo.  Dopo averlo ricercato per un mese, il 2 agosto 1618 le autorità tolosane lo fanno arrestare e chiudere in prigione. Lo sottopongono ad interrogatorio, cercano di scoprire chi egli sia, quali siano le sue idee in materia di religione e di morale, perché fosse arrivato fin in quel lontano angolo della Francia meridionale. Vengono convocati testimoni contro di lui, ma non riescono ad accertare nulla, né a farlo tradire.   Il convento degli Agostiniani a Tolosa Il 9 febbraio 1619 il misterioso personaggio viene improvvisamente riconosciuto colpevole e condannato al rogo. Ormai isolato, braccato, impossibilitato a chiamare a sua difesa un passato travagliatissimo e ricco di nodi mai sciolti, abbandonato dai pochi amici rimastigli fedeli perché impotenti ad organizzare una chiara strategia in sua difesa, Vanini muore di morte atroce. Il Parlamento di Tolosa lo riconosce colpevole del reato di ateismo e di bestemmie contro il nome di Dio, condannandolo, sulla base della normativa del tempo prevista per i bestemmiatori, alla stessa pena cui erano andati incontro, in luoghi diversi ma in circostanze analoghe, certi Gilles Fremond e Jean Fontanier: gli viene tagliata la lingua, poi è strangolato e infine arso.  Subito dopo l'esecuzione – rispettivamente nel maggio e nel giugno 1619 - furono pubblicati due anonimi che facevano esplicitamente il nome del Vanini e quindi nel misterioso italiano giustiziato viene riconosciuto Giulio Cesare Vanini, l'autore del De Admirandis, che aveva suscitato i sospetti di alcuni settori cattolici parigini nel 1616. Nello stesso 1619 comparvero le Histoires memorables di Rosset, che, con la quinta Histoire, divulgava con poche modifiche il secondo dei due citati canards. Nel luglio 1620 Joannes de Rudele, teologo e vicario generale dell'arcivescovado di Tolosa, avverte pubblicamente di aver esaminato le due opere di Vanini insieme con il padre Claudio Billy e di averle trovate «contrarie al culto e all'accettazione del vero Dio e assertrici dell'ateismo», emettendo ufficiale ordinanza di condanna e proibendone la stampa e la vendita nella diocesi di Tolosa, territorio posto sotto la sua giurisdizione. In precedenza, la Facoltà teologica della Sorbona non aveva comunicato di aver adottato analogo provvedimento.   Omaggio a Giulio Cesare Vanini nel luogo della sua morte. Opera Amphitheatrum Æternæ Providentiæ divino-magicum, christiano-physicum, necnon astrologo-catholicum adversus veteres philosophos, atheos, epicureos, peripateticos et stoicos, pubblicato a Lione nel 1615. L'opera si compone di 50 esercitazioni, che mirano a dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio, a definirne l'essenza, a descriverne la provvidenza, a vagliare o confutare le opinioni di Pitagora, di Protagora, di Cicerone, di Boezio, di Tommaso d'Aquino, degli Epicurei, di Aristotele, di Averroè, di Cardano, dei Peripatetici, degli Stoici, ecc., su questo argomento.  De Admirandis Naturæ Reginæ Deæque Mortalium Arcanis libri quattuor, stampato a Parigi nel 1616 presso l'editore Adriano Périer. Si divide in quattro libri:  un Liber Primus de Cœlo et Aëre; un Liber Secundus de Aqua et Terra; un Liber Tertius de Animalia Generatione et Affectibus Quibusdam; un Liber Quartus de Religione Ethnicorum; per un totale di 60 dialoghi (ma in realtà solo 59, in quanto il XXXV è perduto o mai redatto), che avvengono tra lui, nelle vesti di divulgatore del sapere, e un immaginario Alessandro, che si presta ad un gioco sottile e divertente nel corso del quale, con un atteggiamento compiacente e un po' complice, tra espressioni di meraviglia e ammirazione per la vastità del sapere di cui l'amico fa mostra, sollecita il suo interlocutore ad elencare e spiegare gli arcani della natura regina e dea che esistono intorno e all'interno dell'uomo.  Così, in un misto di rilettura in nuova chiave critica del pensiero degli antichi e di divulgazione di nuove teorie scientifiche e religiose, il protagonista del lavoro discetta sulla materia, figura, colore, forma, motore ed eternità del cielo; sul moto, centro e poli dei cieli; sul sole, sulla luna, sugli astri; sul fuoco; sulla cometa e sull'arcobaleno; sulla folgore, la neve e la pioggia; sul moto e la quiete dei proiettili nell'aria; sull'impulsione delle bombarde e delle balestre; sull'aria soffiata e ventilata; sull'aria corrotta; sull'elemento dell'acqua; sulla nascita dei fiumi; sull'incremento del Nilo; sull'eternità e la salsedine del mare; sul fragore e sul moto delle acque; sul moto dei proiettili; sulla generazione delle isole e dei monti, nonché della causa dei terremoti; sulla genesi, radice e colore delle gemme, nonché delle macchie delle pietre; sulla vita, l'alimento e la morte delle pietre; sulla forza del magnete di attrarre il ferro e sulla sua direzione verso i poli terrestri; sulle piante; sulla spiegazione da dare ad alcuni fenomeni della vita di tutti i giorni; sul seme genitale; sulla generazione, la natura, la respirazione e la nutrizione dei pesci; sulla generazione degli uccelli; sulla generazione delle api; sulla prima generazione dell'uomo; sulle macchie contratte dai bambini nell'utero; sulla generazione del maschio e della femmina; sui parti di mostri; sulla faccia dei bambini coperta da una larva; sulla crescita dell'uomo; sulla lunghezza della vita umana; sulla vista; sull'udito; sull'odorato; sul gusto; sul tatto e solletico; sugli affetti dell'uomo; su Dio; sulle apparizioni nell'aria; sugli oracoli; sulle sibille; sugli indemoniati; sulle sacre immagini dei pagani; sugli àuguri; sulla guarigione delle malattie capitata miracolosamente ad alcuni al tempo della religione pagana; sulla resurrezione dei morti; sulla stregoneria; sui sogni.  Pensiero  Girolamo Cardano «Empio osarono dirti e d'anatemi oppressero il tuo cuore e ti legarono e alle fiamme ti diedero. O uomo sacro! perché non discendesti in fiamme dal cielo, il capo a colpire ai blasfemi e la tempesta tu non invocasti che spazzasse le ceneri dei barbari dalla patria lontano e dalla terra! Ma pur colei che tu già vivo amasti, sacra Natura te morente accolse, del loro agire dimentica i nemici con te raccolse nell'antica pace.»  (Friedrich Hölderlin, Vanini, 1798) L'interpretazione naturalistica dei fenomeni soprannaturali che Pietro Pomponazzi – chiamato dal Vanini magister meus, divinus praeceptor meus, nostri speculi Philosophorum princeps - aveva dato nel De incantationibus, “aureum opusculum”, è ripresa nel De admirandis naturae, dove, con una prosa semplice ed elegante, Vanini fa riferimento anche al Cardano, a Giulio Cesare Scaligero e ad altri cinquecentisti.  «Dio agisce sugli esseri sublunari (cioè sugli esseri umani) servendosi dei cieli come strumento»; di qui l'origine naturale e la spiegazione razionale dei pretesi fenomeni soprannaturali, dal momento che anche l'astrologia è considerata una scienza; «l'Essere Supremo, quando incombono pericoli, dà avvertimenti agli uomini e specialmente ai sovrani, agli esempi dei quali il mondo si conforma» (De admirandis, IV, 52). Ma i reali fondamenti dei presunti fenomeni sovrannaturali sono per Vanini soprattutto la fantasia umana, capace a volte di modificare l'apparenza della realtà esterna, i fondatori delle religioni rivelate, Mosè, Gesù, Maometto e gli ecclesiastici impostori che impongono false credenze per ottenere ricchezze e potere, e i regnanti, interessati al mantenimento di credenze religiose per meglio dominare la plebe, come insegnava già Machiavelli, il «principe degli atei» per il quale, secondo Vanini, «tutte le cose religiose sono false e sono finte dai principi per istruire l'ingenua plebe affinché, dove non può giungere la ragione, almeno conduca la religione».  Seguendo ancora il Pomponazzi e il Porzio nella loro interpretazione dei testi aristotelici, mutuata dai commenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia, nega l'immortalità dell'anima. Anche il cosmo aristotelico-scolastico subisce l'attacco distruttivo del Vanini: egli, analogamente a Bruno, nega la differenza peripatetica tra un mondo sublunare e un mondo celeste, affermando che entrambi sono composti della stessa materia corruttibile; scardina nell'ambito fisico e biologico il finalismo e la dottrina ilemorfica aristotelica, e, ricollegandosi all'epicureismo lucreziano, elabora una nuova descrizione dell'universo d'impianto meccanicistico-materialistico (gli organismi sono paragonati a orologi), e concepisce una prima forma di trasformismo universale delle specie viventi; concorda con gli aristotelici sull'eternità del mondo (considerando in particolare l'aspetto temporale), ma, contro di essi, afferma il moto di rotazione terrestre e appare respingere la tesi tolemaica in favore di quella eliocentrica/copernicana.  Se il primo curatore delle sue opere, Luigi Corvaglia e lo storico Guido De Ruggiero, ingiustamente, considerarono i suoi scritti semplicemente «un centone privo di originalità e di serietà scientifica», il padre gesuita François Garasse, ben più preoccupato delle conseguenze della diffusione dei suoi scritti, li giudicò «l'opera più perniciosa che in fatto di ateismo fosse mai uscita negli ultimi cento anni». La figura e l'opera del Vanini sono state ampiamente riconsiderate e rivalutate dalla critica contemporanea, mettendo in mostra l'originalità e le intuizioni (metafisiche, fisiche, biologiche), talvolta precorritrici nei tempi, dei suoi scritti.  Visto che il Vanini nelle sue opere nasconde le sue idee, secondo un tipico espediente della cultura del suo tempo (per evitare seri conflitti con le autorità religiose e politiche costituite, conflitti che, come paradossalmente e sfortunatamente avvenne, nonostante le cautele, lo condussero infine alla morte), l'interpretazione del suo pensiero si offre a diversi piani di lettura. Tuttavia, nella storia della filosofia, resta di lui acquisita un'immagine di miscredente e persino di ateo (il che non era). E questo perché avversario di ogni superstizione e di fede costituita(meglio un proto-agnostico), tanto da essere considerato uno dei padri del libertinismo, malgrado avesse scritto persino un'apologia del Concilio di Trento, andata perduta.  Per una sintesi sul pensiero di Vanini si deve guardare da un lato al retroterra culturale, che è quello abbastanza tipico del Rinascimento, con prevalenza di elementi dell'aristotelismo averroistico ma con forti elementi di misticismo platonico e neoplatonico. Dall'altro lato egli trae dal Cusano dei tipici elementi panteistici, simili a quelli che si ritrovano anche in Giordano Bruno, ma più materialistici. La sua visione del mondo si basa sull'eternità della materia, sulla omogeneità sostanziale cosmica, su un Dio dentro la natura come "forza" che la forma, la ordina e la dirige. Tutte le forme del vivente hanno avuto origine spontanea dalla terra stessa come loro creatrice.  Considerato ateo, Vanini nel titolo della sua prima opera pubblicata a Lione nel 1615 Amphitheatrum aeternae providentiae divino-magicum, christiano-physicum, nec non astrologo-catholicum adversus veteres philosophos, Atheos, Epicureos, Peripateticos et Stoicos dimostra di non esserlo. Come precursore del libertinismo vi sono invece molti elementi che lo avvicinano al pensiero dell'ignoto autore del Trattato dei tre impostori anch'egli panteista. Vanini pensa infatti che i creatori delle tre religioni monoteiste, Mosè, Gesù e Maometto, non siano altro che degli impostori.  In De admirandis Naturae Reginae Deaeque mortalium arcanis libri quatuor stampato a Parigi nel 1616 vengono riprese le tesi dell'Amphiteatrum, con precisazioni e sviluppi che ne fanno il suo capolavoro e la sintesi della sua filosofia. Viene negata la creazione dal nulla e l'immortalità dell'anima, Dio è nella natura come sua forza propulsiva e vitale, entrambi sono eterni. Gli astri del cielo sono una specie di intermediari tra Dio e la Natura che sta nel mondo sublunare e di cui noi facciamo parte. La religione vera è perciò una "religione della natura" che non nega Dio ma lo considera un suo spirito-forza.  Il pensiero di Vanini è abbastanza frammentario e riflette anche la complessità della sua formazione, perché era un religioso, un naturalista, ma anche un medico e un po' un mago. Ciò che ne caratterizza la prosa è la veemenza anticlericale. Tra le cose originali del suo pensiero c'è una specie di anticipazione del darwinismo, perché, dopo un primo tempo in cui sostiene che le specie animali nascano per generazione spontanea dalla terra, in un secondo tempo (lo aveva già pensato anche Cardano) pare convinto che esse possano trasformarsi le une nelle altre e che l'uomo derivi da "animali affini all'uomo come le bertucce, i macachi e le scimmie in genere".[senza fonte]  La fortuna filosofica di Vanini Nel 1623 appaiono due opere che consacrano il mito del Vanini ateo: La doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps..., del gesuita François Garasse e le Quaestiones celeberrimae in Genesim cum accurata explicatione..., del padre Marin Mersenne. Le due opere, però, anziché spegnere la voce del filosofo, la amplificano in un ambiente che evidentemente era pronto a ricevere, discutere e riconoscerne la validità delle affermazioni.  In quello stesso anno il nome di Vanini viene nuovamente proiettato all'attenzione della cultura francese in occasione del clamoroso processo che viene celebrato contro il poeta Théophile de Viau: il progetto di interrogatorio che il procuratore generale del Re, Mathieu Molé, predispone con ben articolati capi d'accusa su cui interrogare il poeta, contiene impressionanti analogie con il pensiero vaniniano, cui vien fatto esplicito riferimento mentre, nel 1624, il frate Marin Mersenne torna a martellare sulla figura e sul pensiero di Vanini, analizzandone alcune affermazioni nel capitolo X del suo L'Impiétè des Déistes, Athées et Libertins de ce temps, combatuë, et renversee de point en point par raisons tirées de la Philosophie, et de la Theologie, "nel quale il teologo porta il suo giudizio concernente le opere di Girolamo Cardano, e di Giordano Bruno".  Anche Leibniz, oppositore al pari di Mersenne del libertinismo, si esprime duramente contro Vanini, considerandolo un empio, un pazzo e un ciarlatano.  (FR) «Je n'ai pas encore vu l'apologie de Vanini, je ne pense pas qu'elle mérite fort d'être lue. Les écrits de ce personnage sont bien peu de chose. Mais un imbécille comme lui, ou pour mieux dire, un fou ne méritoit pas d'être brûlé; on étoit seulement en droit de l'enfermer, afin qu'il ne séduisît personne.»  (IT) «Non ho ancora visto l'apologia di Vanini, e non penso che meriti d'essere minimamente letta. Gli scritti di questo personaggio sono di ben poco valore. Ma un imbecille come lui, o per meglio dire, un pazzo, non meritava d'essere bruciato; occorreva solo rinchiuderlo, perché non traviasse nessuno.»  (Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Epist. 22, ad Kortholtum in Opera omnia, Genève 1768, tomo V, p. 321)  La Biblioteca dell'Università di Amburgo Ancora nel Settecento la leggenda nera creata intorno alla figura di Vanini sopravvive al passare del tempo, si espande in altri paesi europei ed affascina molti studiosi, che si avvicinano alle sue opere e ne tentano dei profili biografici. Così anche la cultura inglese mostra interesse per la figura ed il pensiero del filosofo di Taurisano ed è soprattutto con l'opera di Charles Blount che il pensiero di Vanini entra nella cultura inglese ed acquista una dimensione europea che non abbandonerà mai più, quando diviene un elemento cardine del libertinismo e deismo nel Seicento inglese.  Un manoscritto inedito della Biblioteca Municipale di Avignone custodisce delle Observations sur Lucilio Vanini redatte da Joseph Louis Dominique de Cambis, Marquis de Velleron, ma fornisce solo delle incerte notizie sul filosofo, in gran parte rettificate dagli ultimi studi. In questo stesso periodo viene effettuata una copia manoscritta dell'Amphitheatrum, ad opera o su commissione di Joseph Uriot, il quale la trasferisce poi nella Biblioteca Ducale del duca di Württemberg; attualmente essa si trova nella Württembergische Landesbibliothek di Stoccarda.  Un'altra copia manoscritta della stessa opera si trova nella Staats und Universitätbibliothek di Amburgo, a testimonianza del perdurante interesse della cultura tedesca per il pensiero di Vanini.  Nel 1730 viene data alle stampe a Londra una biografia vaniniana con un estratto delle sue opere, dal titolo The life of Lucilio (alias Julius Caesar) Vanini, burnt for atheism at Toulouse. With an abstract of his writings. L'opera, pur ricollegandosi alla consueta storiografia vaniniana francese e quindi con i soliti errori d'origine, sottopone ad un dibattito ponderato la figura ed il pensiero del filosofo, a cui riconosce qualche merito. Ma la strada per una collocazione europea di Vanini e del suo pensiero è ormai aperta. Opere letterarie Amphitheatrum aeternae providentiae divino-magicum, christiano-physicum, nec non astrologo-catholicum adversus veteres philosophos, Atheos, Epicureos, Peripateticos et Stoicos, Auctore Iulio Caesare Vanino, Philosopho, Theologo et Iuris utriusque Doctore, Lugduni, Apud Viduam Antonii de Harsy, ad insigne Scuti Coloniensis, 1615, (rist. fotom., Galatina, 1979). Iulii Caesaris Vanini, Neapoletani Theologi, Philosophi et Iuris utriusque Doctoris, De admirandis Naturae Reginae Deaeque mortalium arcanis libri quatuor, Lutetiae, Apud Adrianum Perier, via Iacobaea, 1616, (rist. fotom., Galatina, 1985). Luigi Corvaglia, Le opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini e le loro fonti, Milano, 1933-1934, (rist. anast., Galatina, 1990). Le opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini tradotte per la prima volta in italiano, a cura di G. Porzio, Lecce, 1912. Anfiteatro dell'eterna Provvidenza, Galatina, 1981. I meravigliosi segreti della natura, regina e dea dei mortali, Galatina, 1990. Opere, Galatina, 1990. Confutazione delle religioni (traduzione del IV libro del "De Admirandis"), a cura di Anna Vasta, Catania, De Martinis & C., 1993. Tutte le Opere (testo originale latino a fronte), a cura di Francesco Paolo Raimondi e Mario Carparelli, Collana Il pensiero occidentale, Milano, Bompiani, 2010. Note ^ Massimo Bucciantini, Lutero in Campo dei Fiori, in Il Sole 24 ORE, 12 febbraio 2017. URL consultato il 12 settembre 2017 (archiviato dall'url originale il 13 settembre 2017). ^ Terzapagina. Filosofia ed ecologia per il "compleanno" di Giulio Cesare Vanini, 19 gennaio 2014 ^ Una lettera dell'ambasciatore inglese a Venezia, Dudley Carleton, datata 7 [ma 17], febbraio 1611 [ma 1612], fa risalire l'episodio a nove anni prima, ovvero al 1603. Bibliografia F. P. Raimondi (a cura di), Giulio Cesare Vanini e il libertinismo, Atti del Convegno di Studi, Taurisano, 28 - 30 ottobre 1999, Galatina, 2000 F. P. Raimondi (a cura di), Giulio Cesare Vanini: dal tardo Rinascimento al Libertinisme érudit, Atti del Convegno di Studi, Lecce-Taurisano 24 - 26 ottobre 1985, Galatina, 2002 G. Spini, Vaniniana, in «Rinascimento», I, 1950 F. De Paola, Vanini e il primo ‘600 anglo-veneto, Cutrofiano, 1979 F. De Paola, Giulio Cesare Vanini da Taurisano filosofo Europeo, Fasano, 1998 F. De Paola, Nuovi documenti per una rilettura di Giulio Cesare Vanini, in «Bruniana & Campanelliana», V, 1999 D. Foucault, Un philosophe libertin dans l'Europe baroque: Giulio Cesare Vanini (1585 – 1619), Paris, 2003 F. P. Raimondi, Documenti vaniniani nell'Archivio Segreto Vaticano, in «Bollettino di Storia della Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Lecce», VIII (1980 - 1985), ma 1987 F. P. Raimondi, Il soggiorno vaniniano in Inghilterra alla luce di nuovi documenti spagnoli e londinesi, in «Bollettino di Storia della Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Lecce», XII, 1996 - 2002 F. P. Raimondi, Giulio Cesare Vanini e la Santa Inquisizione, Taurisano, 2005 F. P. Raimondi, Giulio Cesare Vanini nell'Europa del Seicento. con una appendice documentaria, Pisa - Roma, 2005 (L'appendice contiene la più completa documentazione sulla biografia vaniniana: 192 documenti dalla nascita al rogo). M. Leopizzi, Les Sources Documentaires du Courant Libertin Français Giulio Cesare Vanini, Fasano, 2004 D. M. Fazio, Giulio Cesare Vanini nella cultura filosofica tedesca del Sette e Ottocento. Da Brucker a Schopehnauer, Galatina, 1995 M. T. Marcialis, Natura e uomo in Giulio Cesare Vanini, in «Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana», LXXI, 1992 M. T. Marcialis, Giulio Cesare Vanini nell'Europa del Seicento, in "Rivista di Storia della Filosofia", LXI (2006), pp. 954-72. G. Paganini, Le Theophrastus redivivus et Vanini, in «Kairos», 12, 1998 G. Papuli, Le interpretazioni di G. C. Vanini, Galatina, 1975 A. Perrino, "Giulio Cesare Vanini nel Theophrastus redivivus", in «Bollettino di Storia della Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Lecce», 10, 1990-1992, pp. 199-212 F. P. Raimondi, Vanini e il "De tribus impostoribus", in «Ethos e Cultura», Padova, 1991 G. Spini, Ricerca dei libertini. La teoria dell'impostura delle religioni nel Seicento italiano, Roma, 1950 (nuova edizione riveduta e ampliata, Firenze, 1983) Cesare Teofilato Giulio Cesare Vanini nel III Centenario del suo Martirio, Milano 1921, Tip. Ed. La Stampa d'Avanguardia. Cesare Teofilato Giulio Cesare Vanini, in The Connecticut Magazine, articles in English and Italian, New Britain, Conn, may 1923, pag. 13 (I, 7). Cesare Teofilato Vaniniana, in La puglia letteraria, mensile di storia, Roma 31 gen 1932, pag. 1, (II, 1). Cesare Vasoli, Riflessioni sul problema Vanini, in S. Bertelli, Il libertinismo in Europa, Milano-Napoli, 1980 Cesare Vasoli, Vanini e il suo processo per ateismo, in F. Niewohner e O. Pluta, Atheismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance, Wiesbaden, 1999 Vanini in Inghilterra La seguente è una lista di alcuni documenti in cui è possibile trovare riferimenti alla presenza del frate Carmelitano a Lambeth Palace a Londra (1612 - 1614).  Trascrizioni complete, riassunti e contesto di questi documenti sono disponibili per studenti e ricercatori "Vanini e il primo Seicento anglo-veneto" e in "Giulio Cesare Vanini da Taurisano filosofo europeo", Schena Editore, Fasano Brindisi, 1998.  Documenti London - Public Record Office - State Papers -Venice 1607-1610, vol. XI, pag. XVIII-XIX. Notizie sulla Mercers' Chapel a Londra, dove Vanini sconfesso la sua fede cattolica e tenne vari sermoni. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 99 Bundle 9, c.(arta) 297. Petizione di due Carmelitani (Vanini e Genocchi) a Carleton, ambasciatore Inglese a Venezia, per essere accettati in Inghilterra. Venezia, inizi del 1612. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 99 Bundle 9, c.(arta) 57. Lettera di Sir Dudley Carleton a Lord Salisbury. Da Venezia, il 7 febbraio 1612. Carleton informa Lord Salisbury che due frati gli hanno chiesto permesso di rifugiarsi in Inghilterra per evitare persecuzioni dai loro superiori. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 79 Bundle 3, c.(arta) 199 (10). Giulio Cesare Vanini a Carleton. Da Lambeth il 24 febbraio 1612. Vanini manda a Lord Carleton informazioni riguardanti alla sua ricezione a Palazzo Lambeth e la buona stima di cui gode lì. London - Historical Manuscripts Commission - De L'Isle and Dudley Manuscripts, vol. V - 1611-1626. Sir John Throckmorton al visconte Lisle. Flushing. 15 giugno 1612 Corrispondenza tra i due statisti riguardo ad una missione segreta di John Florio, che forse accompagnò Vanini e il suo compagno a Londra. London - Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park - Berk. Papers of William Trumbull the elder - 1613-1614. Thomas Albery a William Trumbull. Londra, il 16 luglio 1612. Albery, un mercante Inglese e corrispondente di Trumbull, agente Inglese a Bruxelles, manda informazioni sull'arrivo di Vanini e le sue esperienze a Venezia. London - Historical Manuscripts Commission - Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire,vol.3, Trumbull Papers 1611-1612. Thomas Albery a William Trumbull. Londra, il 16 luglio 1612. Una copia della lettera da una fonte diversa. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 79 Bundle 1, c.(arta) 387. Da Gregorio Spinola a Maria Ginocchio. Genova, il 13 giugno 1612. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 99 Bundle 11, c.(arta) 125 . Isaac Wake a Sir Dudley Carleton. Londra 5 dicembre 1612, st.° novo. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 99 Bundle 12, c.(arta) 48 . Isaac Wake a Sir Dudley Carleton. Londra 1º febbraio 1612, st.° no(vo). London - Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthamstead Park - Berk. Papers of William Trumbull the Elder - 1613-1614. Alfonse de S. Victors a William Trumbull Da Middolborg (Middelburg) il 3 agosto 1613. London - Historical Manuscripts Commission - Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire, vol. 4, Trumbull Papers 1613-1614. Alfonse de St. Victor a William Trumbull. Middelborg. il 3 agosto 1613. London - Public Record Office - State Papers Domestic Series Jac. I, LXXVI, 20. John Chamberlain a Sir Dudley Carleton. Londra, 10 febbraio, 1614. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 99 Bundle 15, c.(arta) 101 recto e verso. Sir Dudley Carleton a Sir Thomas Lake. Da Venezia il 18 febbraio 1614. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - Domestic Series 1611-1618 - vol. 68-76, n. 35. Giovan Francesco Biondi a Carleton. Da Londra, il 18 febbraio 1614. London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 99 Bundle 15, c. 127. Sir Dudley Carleton a Chamberlain. Da Venezia il 25 febbraio 1613, st.° vet. London - Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park - Berks. Papers of William Trumbull the Elder - 1613-1614. George Abbot a William Trumbull. Da Lambeth il 10 marzo, 1613 (1614). London - Historical Manuscripts Commission - Report of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire, vol. IV, Trumbull Papers 1613 -1614. George Abbot, Arcivescovo di Canterbury, a William Trumbull. Lambeth il 10 marzo, 1613 (1614). London - Public Record Office - State Papers - 99 Bundle 15, c. 164. Sir Dudley Carleton a Chamberlain. Venezia, 11 marzo 1613 st.° vet. London - Public Record Office - State Papers 99 Bundle 9, c. 152. Sir Dudley Carleton a Giovan Francesco Biondi. Venezia, 14 marzo 1614. London - Public Record Office - State Papers Domestic Series 1611-1618, vol. 72, n.211. Abbot a Carleton. Lambeth, 30 marzo 1613 (1614). London - Public Record Office - State Papers 99 Bundle 19, c. 233. Paolo Sarpi a Sir Dudley Carleton. Venezia 30 aprile 1614. London - Record Office - State Papers 99 Bundle 19, c. 154. Paolo Sarpi a Sir Dudley Carleton. Venezia, 1º maggio 1614. London - Public Record Office - State Papers 99 Bundle 19, c. 234. Paolo Sarpi a Sir Dudley Carleton. Venezia, giugno 1614. London - Historical Manuscripts Commission - Report 78 Hastings, vol. IV, chapter XVII. Notes of speeches and proceedings in the House of Lords. :A.(nno) 1610 - 1621. Lunedì 16 maggio 1614. London - Historical Manuscripts Commission - Report 78 Hastings, vol. IV, chapter XVII. Notes of speeches and proceedings in the House of Lords. A.(nno) 1610 - 1621. Giovedì 19 maggio (1614). London - Public Record Office - State Papers 99 Bundle 16, c. 86. Dudley Carleton a Sua Signoria l'Arcivescovo di Canterbury. Venezia 3/13 giugno 1614. London - Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park - Berks. Papers of William Trumbull the Elder - 1613-1614. George Abbot a William Trumbull. Lambeth, 17 giugno 1614. London - Historical Manuscripts Commission - Report of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire, vol. IV, Trumbull Papers 1613-1614. George Abbot, Arcivescovo di Canterbury, a William Trumbull. Lambeth, 17 giugno 1614. Archivio di Stato di Venezia - Inquisitori di Stato, busta 155. Istruzioni degli Inquisitori di Stato all'ambasciatore in Inghilterra. London - Calendar of State Papers on English Affairs in the Archives of Venice and other Libraries of North Italy -1615/1617. Inquisitori di Stato, busta 155. Venetian Archives. 905. Gli Inquisitori di Stato a Gregorio Barbarigo, 22 gennaio 1616. London - Calendar of State Papers on English Affairs in the Archives of Venice and other Libraries of North Italy -1615/1617. Inquisitori di Stato, busta 155. Venetian Archives. 912. Examinations for Antonio Foscarini. 22 febbraio 1616. Archivio di Stato di Venezia - Inquisitori di Stato, busta 155, carte 84 r., 84 v., 85 r. Londra, 23 febbraio 1616. Interrogatorio di Lunardo Michelini sulle modalità della fuga di Vanini da Lambeth. Archivio di Stato di Venezia - Inquisitori di Stato, busta 155, carte 101 v. e 102 r. 25 marzo 1616. Interrogatorio di Alessandro di Giulio Forti da Volterra sulle modalità della fuga di Vanini da Lambeth. Archivio General de Simancas - fondo Inglaterra - Legajo 7025 - Libro 368 (anni 1613 - 1615); foglio privo di indicazioni. Bentivoglio a Sarmiento. Bruxelles 15 aprile 1614. Il nunzio apostolico a Bruxelles informa l'abasciatore di Spagna che Vanini e il suo compare sono arrivati sani e salvi dopo la loro fuga da Londra. Archivio General de Simancas - fondo Inglaterra - Legajo 7025 - Libro 368 (anni 1613 - 1615); foglio 47. Bentivoglio a Sarmiento. Bruxelles, 27 maggio 1614. Il nunzio apostolico a Bruxelles informa l'abasciatore di Spagna che Vanini e il suo compare sono partiti verso l'Italia, come era stato concordato a Roma. Documenti inclusi nell'opera di Namer La seguente è la lista dei documenti inglesi inclusi nel lavoro Documents sur la vie de Jules-César Vanini de Taurisano di Ėmile Namer, che può essere considerato come un utile punto di partenza per la delineazione di una biografia di Giulio Cesare Vanini, e di cui la nuova documentazione deve essere considerata un completamento:  London - Foreign State Papers. Venice. Bundle 9. Carleton all'Arcivescovo Abbot. 7 febbraio, 1611-12. London - Foreign State Papers. Venice. Bundle 9. l'Arcivescovo Abbot a Carleton. 8 marzo, 1611-12. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 68 Fol. 103. Dudley Carleton a John Chamberlain. Venezia, 29 aprile 1612. London - Foreign State Papers. Venice. Bundle 9. Sir D. Carleton all'Arcivescovo di Canterbury. 15 maggio, 1612. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 69. Fol. 71. John Chamberlain a Lord Dudley Carleton. Londra, 17 giugno 1612. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 70 Fol. 1. Chamberlain a Carleton. 2 luglio, 1612. London - Foreign State Papers. Venice. Bundle 10. Abbot a Carleton. 20 luglio, 1612. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 70 Fol. 12. Carleton a Chamberlain. 23 luglio. 1612. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 70 Fol. 16. l'Arcivescovo di York al conte di Suffolk. 29 luglio. 1612. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 71 Fol. 13. Giulio Cesare Vanini a Dudley Carleton. Da Lambeth, il 9 ottobre 1612. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 71 Fol. 14. Giulio Cesare Vanini a Sir Isaac Wake. Da Lambeth il 9 ottobre 1612. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 72 Fol. 13. John Chamberlain a Dudley Carleton. 14 gennaio 1612/13 da Londra. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 72 Fol. 39. l'Arcivescovo Abbot a Carleton. Lambeth 24 febbraio, 1612 - 13. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 72 Fol. 74. John Chamberlain a Dudley Carleton. Da Londra l'11 marzo, 1612 - 13. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 72 Fol. 80. Giovanni Biondi a Dudley Carleton. Da Londra il 17 marzo 1613. London - Foreign State Papers. Venice. Bundle 13. Carleton a Abbot. 3 settembre, 1613. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 75 Fol. 28. John Chamberlain a Dudley Carleton. Da Londra il 25 novembre 1613. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 76 Fol. 9. 2. l'Arcivescovo Abbot al vescovo di Bath. Gennaio 1613 - 14. Da Lambeth (?). London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 76 Fol. 9. Sir Tho. Lake a Dudley Carleton. Dalla corte a Royston, 27 gennaio 1613 - 14. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 76 Fol. 18 v. John Chamberlain a Sir Dudley Carleton. Da Londra il 3 febbraio 1613 - 14. London - Foreign State Papers. Venice. Bundle 15. Carleton a Abbot. 18 - 28 febbraio, 1614. London - Foreign State Papers. Venice. Bundle 15. Carleton a Sir Thomas Lake. 4 marzo, 1613 - 14. London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 76 Fol. 48. l'Arcivescovo Abbot di Canterbury a Sir Dudley Carleton a Venezia. Lambeth, 16 marzo, 1613 (i. e. 14). London - State Papers Domestic. James I. Vol. 76 Fol. 49. John Chamberlain a Dudley Carleton. Londra, 17 marzo, 1613 (1614). London - Foreign State Papers. Venice. Bundle 15. Carleton a Abbot. 22 aprile, 1614. Archivio de Simancas, Estado, vol. 368. Cardinale Millino a Alonso de Velasco, ambasciatore spagnolo a Londra. Roma, 10 settembre, 1613. Archivio de Simancas, Estado, vol. 368. Cardinal Millino a Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, ambasciatore spagnolo a Londra. Roma, 22 marzo, 1614. Archivio de Simancas, Estado, vol. 368. Cardinal Bentivoglio a Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, ambasciatore spagnolo a Londra. Bruxelles, 15 aprile, 1614. Archivio de Simancas, Estado, vol. 368. Cardinal Bentivoglio a Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, ambasciatore spagnolo a Londra. Bruxelles, 27 maggio, 1614.Vanini e l'Inquisizione di Roma Elenco di alcuni documenti presenti nella corrispondenza tra alcuni Nunzi apostolici in Europa e le autorità vaticane, dove è possibile trovare informazioni relative alla fuga, permanenza e rientro segreto dall'Inghilterra del frate carmelitano (1612 - 1615).  Le trascrizioni complete, i sommari e le contestualizzazioni di questi documenti sono disponibili per studiosi e lettori in Giulio Cesare Vanini da Taurisano filosofo europeo, Schena Editore, Fasano (Brindisi), 1998.  Il pontefice Paolo V e l'Inquisizione in Roma furono informati continuamente della vicenda di Vanini con dispacci dei Nunzi apostolici in Venezia, Francia e Fiandra e con missive dell'ambasciatore di Spagna a Londra, a cominciare dalla sua fuga da Venezia nel 1612 sino al suo desiderio di rientrare nel mondo cattolico.  Roma - Archivio Segreto Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia, vol. 55, foglio 194 r. e 194 v. Ubaldini, Nunzio papale in Francia, all'Ill.mo sig.re Card.le Borghese (Segretario di Stato di Papa Paolo V) de 2 di agosto 1612 di Parigi.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziature diverse, Fiandra, vol. 207, il Nuntio alla Segreteria, 1608 - 1615, foglio 439 r. e v. Bentivoglio, Nunzio papale in Fiandra, al Card. Borghese. (Bruxelles) 4 agosto 1612.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziature diverse, Francia, vol. 293A, lettere scritte al Nuntio in Francia 1609-1612, foglio 432 v. Card. Borghese a Ubaldini. Di Roma li 28 di agosto 1612.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia, vol. 55, foglio 207 v. e 208 r. Ubaldini (da Parigi) al med.(esim)o (cardinale Borghese) de 30 di agosto 1612.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziature diverse, Francia, vol. 293A, lettere scritte al Nuntio in Francia 1609 - 1612, foglio 451 v. e 452 . Il card. Borghese a Ubaldini. Di Roma li 26 di Sett.(em)bre 1612.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia, vol. 55, foglio 259. Ubaldini al medesimo sig.re Card.le (Borghese) de 25 d'ottobre 1612.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziature diverse, Francia, vol. 293A, lettere scritte al Nuntio in Francia 1609-1612, foglio 479 r. e 479 v . Il card. Borghese a Ubaldini. Di Roma li 24 di novembre 1612.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia - Registro 55 - pag. 296 recto e 297. Ubaldini all'Ill.mo sig. Card.(ina)le Borghese de 20 di Dixbre 1612 .  Londra, British Museum, Lettere del Card. Ubaldini, nella sua Nunziatura di Francia,1610 - 1616; Add. 8726, f. 305 v. Card. Ubaldini al Card. Borghese, 20 Dec. 1612.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia, vol. 55, foglio 297 r. e v. Ubaldini al S.(igno)re Card.(ina)le Mellini (membro del Sant'Uffizio, il Tribunale dell'Inquisizione di Roma) di 20 di Xbre 1612.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziature diverse, Francia, vol. 71, lettere scritte al Nuntio in Francia dal Card. Borghese, 1613-1614, foglio 17 r. e v . Il card. Borghese a Ubaldini. Di Roma 21 gennaio 1613  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia, vol. 295A, Registro di Lettere della Segreteria di Stato di Paolo V al Vescovo di Montepulciano Nuntio in Francia l'anno 1613-1614, foglio 21 v. e 22 r. Il Segretario Porfirio Feliciani vescovo di Foligno al Nuntio in Francia. Roma 21 Genn.° 1613.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia, vol. 55, foglio 343 v. Ubaldini al S.(igno)re Card.(ina)le Mellini De 26 di Febraro 1613.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia, vol. 55, foglio 375 v. e 376 . Ubaldini al med.(esim)o S.(igno)re Card.(ina)le Mellini De 23 d'aprile 1613.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia - Registro 55 - pag. 466 r. Ubaldini al Sig.re Card.(ina)le Borghese. Di Parigi li 8 d'ottobre 1613.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia - Registro 56 - pag. 38 recto e 39. Ubaldini al med.(esim)o sig. Card.(ina)le Millini de 25 di febbraio 1614.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziature diverse, Francia, vol. 71, lettere scritte al Nuntio in Francia dal Card. Borghese, 1613-1614, foglio 215 v. e 216 r. Il card. Borghese a Ubaldini. Di Roma li 24. Maggio 1614.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia - Registro 56 - pag. 95 recto e 96. Ubaldini al sig.re Card.(ina)le Borghese degli 31 di luglio 1614. Di Parigi.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia - Registro 56 - pag. 118 . Ubaldini al sig. Card.(ina)le Millini de 14 di o.(tto)bre 1614.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziatura di Francia - Registro 56, foglio 246 - 246 retro - 247 . Ubaldini al med.(esi)mo s.(ignor) Card.(ina)le (50) de 27 agosto 1615.  Londra, British Museum, Lettere del Card. Ubaldini, nella sua nunziatura di Francia,1610 - 1616; Add. 8727, ff.123 v. -125. Card. Ubaldini al Card. Borghese, 27 Aug. 1615.  Parigi, Bibliothèque nationale de France - Departement des Manuscrits, Italien 866, Registro di Lettere della Nunziatura di Francia di Monsignor Ubaldini dell'anno 1615 e 1616, lettera 127. Ubaldini al S.(ignor) C.(ardinale) B.(orghese) P.(arigi) li 27 agosto 1615.  Roma - A. S. Vaticano - Segreteria di Stato - Nunziature diverse, Francia, vol. 41, Lettere del Sir. Card.le Ubaldini nella sua Nunciatura di Francia dell'anno 1615 e 1616 (Tomo VI), foglio 189 r. e v. -190 r. e v. Ubaldini al Sig.re Card.(ina)l Borghese li 27 Ag.(ost)o 1615.  Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Giulio Cesare Vanini Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Giulio Cesare Vanini Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Giulio Cesare Vanini Collegamenti esterni Giulio Cesare Vanini, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Delio Cantimori, Giulio Cesare Vanini, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Giulio Cesare Vanini, su sapere.it, De Agostini. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Giulio Cesare Vanini, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata L'Archivio GCV (Giulio Cesare Vanini, 1585-1619) compresi i testi online dell'Amphitheatrum e De admiandis. Francesco Paolo Raimondi, Giulio Cesare Vanini, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero: Filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2012. Controllo di autoritàVIAF (EN) 36967006 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 7973 5245 · SBN IT\ICCU\CUBV\171992 · LCCN (EN) n85231891 · GND (DE) 119373211 · BNF (FR) cb122115776 (data) · BNE (ES) XX4789511 (data) · CERL cnp00554171 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n85231891 Areligiosità Portale Areligiosità Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Medicina Portale Medicina Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XVII secoloMedici italianiNaturalisti italianiNati nel 1585Morti nel 1619Nati il 19 gennaioMorti il 9 febbraioNati a TaurisanoMorti a TolosaFilosofi giustiziatiMaterialistiFilosofi ateiPersone giustiziate per eresiaPersone giustiziate sul rogo[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Vanini e Grice,” Villa Grice, Luigi Speranza, “La statua all’aperto di Vanini,” Luigi Speranza, “Il medaglione di Vanini a Roma.”

variable: in semantics, a symbol interpreted so as to be associated with a range of values, a set of entities any one of which may be temporarily assigned as a value of the variable. Grice uses more specifically for a variable for a ‘grice,’ a type of extinct pig that existed (‘in the past’) in Northern England – “There is a variable number of grices in the backyard, Paul.” An occurrence of a variable in a mathematical or logical expression is a free occurrence if assigning a value is necessary in order for the containing expression to acquire a semantic value  a denotation, truth-value, or other meaning. Suppose a semantic value is assigned to a variable and the same value is attached to a constant as meaning of the same kind; if an expression contains free occurrences of just that variable, the value of the expression for that assignment of value to the variable is standardly taken to be the same as the value of the expression obtained by substituting the constant for all the free occurrences of the variable. A bound occurrence of a variable is one that is not free. Grice: “Strictly, a variable is the opposite of a constant, but a constant varies – ain’t that paradoxical?” -- H. P. Grice, “The variable and the constant;” H. P. Grice, “Variable and meta-variable,” “Order and variable.”

varrone: Grice: “I know his Loeb edition by heart!” -- Academic,  Roman polymath, author of works on language, agriculture, history and  philosophy, as well as satires, and principal speaker in the later version of  Cicero’s "Academica" Marco Terenzio Varrone Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Marco Terenzio Varrone Project Rome logo Clear.png Questore della Repubblica romana Varrocoin.jpg Nome originale Marcus Terentius Varro Nascita 116 a.C. Rieti Morte 27 a.C. Roma Gens Terentia Questura 78 a.C. in Illyricum Propretura 49 a.C. in Spagna Marco Terenzio Varrone (in latino: Marcus Terentius Varro; Rieti, 116 a.C. – Roma, 27 a.C.) è stato un letterato, grammatico, militare e agronomo romano.  «Tu ci hai fatto luce su ogni epoca della patria, sulle fasi della sua cronologia, sulle norme dei suoi rituali, sulle sue cariche sacerdotali, sugli istituti civili e militari, sulla dislocazione dei suoi quartieri e vari punti, su nomi, generi, su doveri e cause dei nostri affari, sia divini che umani.»  (Marco Tullio Cicerone, Academica Posteriora, I 9 - trad. A. D'Andria)  Statua di Varrone a Rieti Marco Terenzio Varrone nacque a Rieti (o in alta Sabina) nel 116 a.C.: per tale motivo è detto Reatino (attributo che lo distingue da Varrone Atacino, vissuto nello stesso periodo)[1].   Nato da una famiglia di nobili origini, aveva rilevanti proprietà terriere in Sabina[2] - dove fu educato con disciplina e severità dai familiari -, integrate dall'acquisto di lussuose ville a Baia e fondi terrieri a Tusculum e Cassino.  A Roma compì studi avanzati presso i migliori maestri del tempo: tra gli altri, studi di grammatica presso Lucio Elio Stilone Preconino, che lo fece appassionare anche agli studi etimologici e retorici[3] e di linguistica e filologia con Lucio Accio, a cui dedicò la sua prima opera grammaticale De antiquitate litterarum.  Come molti giovani romani, compì un viaggio in Grecia fra l'84 a.C. e l'82 a.C., dove ascoltò filosofi accademici come Filone di Larissa e Antioco di Ascalona, da cui dedusse una posizione filosofica di tipo eclettico[4].  A differenza di molti altri eruditi del tempo, Varrone non si ritirò dalla vita politica ma, anzi, vi prese parte attivamente accostandosi agli optimates, forse anche influenzato dall'estrazione sociale. Dopo aver, infatti, percorso le prime tappe del cursus honorum (triumviro capitale nel 97 a.C., questore lo stesso anno, legato in Illiria nel 78 a.C.) fu vicino a Pompeo, per il quale ricoprì incarichi di grande importanza: fu legato e proquestore in Spagna fra il 76 a.C. e il 72 a.C. e combatté nella guerra contro i pirati difendendo la zona navale tra la Sicilia e Delo.[5]  Allo scoppio della guerra civile nel 49 a.C. fu propretore in Spagna: in una guerra che vedeva i romani contro i romani, tentò un'incerta difesa del suo territorio che si concluse in una resa che Gaio Giulio Cesare, nei Commentarii de bello civili, definì poco gloriosa[6].  Dopo la disfatta dei pompeiani, si avvicinò, comunque, a Cesare, che apprezzò il Reatino soprattutto sul piano culturale, affidandogli la costituzione di due biblioteche, una di testi latini l'altra di testi greci, ma che, dopo le idi di Marzo, furono sospese[7].  Dopo la morte del dittatore, anzi, fu inserito nelle liste di proscrizione sia di Antonio che di Ottaviano (interessati più alle sue ricchezze che a punire i congiuranti), da cui si salvò grazie all'intervento di Fufio Caleno per poi avvicinarsi a Ottaviano a cui dedicò il De vita populi Romani volto alla divinizzazione della figura di Giulio Cesare.[8].  Morì quasi novantenne nel 27 a.C. dopo aver scritto una produzione di oltre 620 libri, suddivisi in circa settanta opere[9].  Opere Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg         Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: De re rustica (Varrone) e De lingua Latina.  Marco Terenzio Varrone Produzione e trasmissione La vasta produzione di Varrone fu suddivisa da Girolamo in un catalogo (incompleto, poiché sono elencati circa la metà degli scritti del reatino)[10]: in totale, le opere varroniane sono verosimilmente 74, suddivise in 620 volumi, sebbene Varrone stesso, a 77 anni, abbia riferito di aver scritto 490 libri[11].  Le opere varroniane, secondo l'argomento, possono essere suddivise in vari gruppi, dalle opere di erudizione, filologia e storia a quelle giuridiche e burocratiche, dalle opere di filosofia e agricoltura alle opere di poesia, di linguistica e letteratura; di retorica e diritto, con ben 15 libri De iure civili; di filosofia.  Di questa enorme produzione è pervenuta (quasi integra) solo un'opera, il De re rustica, mentre del De lingua Latina sono pervenuti solo 6 libri su 25. Probabilmente, causa del quasi completo naufragio della immane bibliografia varroniana è che, avendo compulsato tanta parte della cultura grecoromana precedente, divenne la fonte indispensabile per gli autori successivi, perdendosi, per così dire, per assimilazione.  Il filologo ed erudito Dell'attività filologica varroniana fa testimonianza il cosiddetto "canone varroniano", elaborato a partire da due opere, le Quaestiones Plautinae e il De comoediis Plautinis, in cui Varrone ripartì il corpus plautino, che includeva 130 fabulae: di queste, 21 vengono definite autentiche, 19 di origine incerta, dette "pseudo-varroniane" e le restanti spurie[12].  Si occupò soprattutto di antiquaria, con i 41 libri di Antiquitates, il suo capolavoro, divisi in 25 di res humanae e 16 di res divinae[13], fonte precipua di Agostino nel De civitate Dei: proprio da Agostino si evidenzia l'attenzione di Varrone sulla religione "civile", con una compiuta disamina su culti e tradizioni, pur con acute critiche alla teologia mitica dei poeti in nome di una theologia naturalis. A questo gruppo appartiene anche l'opera, non pervenuta, De bibliothecis, presumibilmente legata alle incombenze come bibliotecario affidategli da Cesare.  La produzione a sfondo filosofico Nell'ambito filosofico, notevoli dovevano essere i Logistorici (dal greco “discorsi di storia”)[14] un'opera in 76 libri, composta in forma di dialogo in prosa, di argomento morale e antiquario, in cui ogni libro prendeva il nome di un personaggio storico e un tema di cui il personaggio costituiva un modello, come il Marius, de fortuna o il Catus, de liberis educandis[15]: probabilmente questi dialoghi storico-filosofici furono tra i modelli espositivi del Laelius de amicitia e del Cato Maior de senectute di Cicerone[16].  All'interesse filosofico e divulgativo di Varrone, probabilmente scritte lungo tutto il corso della sua parabola culturale, riconducevano le Saturae Menippeae[17], che prendevano come modello Menippo di Gadara, esponente della filosofia cinica (da cui il nome). Esse, scritte tra l'80 a.C. e il 46 a.C., si componevano di 150 libri, in prosa e in versi, di cui però ci rimangono circa 600 frammenti e novanta titoli, di argomento soprattutto filosofico, ma anche di critica dei costumi, morale, con rimpianti sui tempi antichi in contrasto con la corruzione del presente. Ciascuna satira recava un titolo, desunto da proverbi (Cave canem con allusione alla mordacità dei filosofi cinici) o dalla mitologia (Eumenides contro la tesi stoico-cinica per cui gli uomini sono folli, Trikàranos, il mostro a tre teste, con un mordace riferimento al primo triumvirato) ed era caratterizzata da lessico popolaresco, polimetria e, come in Menippo, uno stile tragicomico[18].  Note ^ Valerio Massimo, VII 3. ^ Aulo Gellio, III 10, 7. ^ Ce ne parla Varrone stesso in De lingua latina, VII 12. ^ Cicerone, Academica posteriora, I 7, 12. ^ Appiano, Guerre civili, IV 47; Varrone, De re rustica, II 10, 8 e III 12, 7. ^ II 17. ^ Svetonio, Cesare, 44, 2. ^ Appiano, IV 47. ^ Ausonio, Commemoratio professorum Burdigalensium, XX, 10. ^ Chronicon, ann. 1901 e 1989. ^ Aulo Gellio, II 10, 17. ^ Gellio, III 3, 9. ^ I cui frammenti sono editi nella fondamentale edizione in due volumi di B. Cardauns: Antiquitates rerum divinarum, Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1976. ^ Cfr. B. Zucchelli, Varro logistoricus. Studio letterario e prosopografico, Parma, Universita degli studi di Parma, 1981. ^ Cfr., ad esempio, il Fr. XIX Riese: "Da ragazzo, avevo solo una tunica modesta e una toga, calzature senza fascette, un cavallo non sellato; bagno giornaliero, niente e, davvero di rado, una tinozza". ^ N. Horsfall, Varrone, in Letteratura Latina Cambridge, vol. 1, Milano, Mondadori, 2007, pp. 474-475. ^ Cfr. M. Salanitro, Le Menippee di Varrone. Contributi esegetici e linguistici, Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1990. ^ Sulla satira varroniana, cfr. L. Alfonsi, Le Menippee di Varrone, in "ANRW", I (1973), n. 3, pp. 26-59. Bibliografia (Per la bibliografia specifica sul De re rustica e sul De lingua Latina si rimanda alle rispettive voci)  Atti del Congresso internazionale di studi varroniani. Rieti settembre 1974, 2 voll., Rieti, Centro di studi varroniani, 1976. B. Cardauns, Marcus Terentius Varro. Einführung in sein Werk, Heidelberg, Winter, 2001. A. Cenderelli, Varroniana. Istituti e terminologia giuridica nelle opere di M. Terenzio Varrone, Milano, A. Giuffrè, 1973. H. Dahlmann, Varrone e la teoria ellenistica della lingua, Traduzione italiana di Pasqualina Vozza, Napoli, Loffredo, 1997. F. Della Corte, Varrone, il terzo gran lume romano, Genova, Istituto universitario di Magistero, 1954 (rist. Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1970). G.A. Nelsestuen, Varro the agronomist. Political philosophy, satire and agriculture in the late Republic, Columbus, Ohio State University press, 2015. A. Pittà, M. Terenzio Varrone. De vita populi Romani. Introduzione e commento, Pisa, Pisa University Press, 2015. B. Riposati, M. Terenti Varronis De vita populi Romani. Fonti, esegesi, edizione critica dei frammenti, Milano, Vita e pensiero, 1939. B. Riposati, M. Terenzio Varrone. L'uomo e lo scrittore, Roma Istituto di studi romani, 1975. A. Traglia, Introduzione a: M.T. Varrone, Opere, Torino, UTET, 1974, pp. 9-47. B. Zucchelli, Varro logistoricus. Studio letterario e prosopografico, Parma, Universita degli studi di Parma, Istituto di lingua e letteratura latina, 1981. Voci correlate Satira menippea Biblioteche romane Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Marco Terenzio Varrone Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina in lingua latina dedicata a Marco Terenzio Varrone Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Marco Terenzio Varrone Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Marco Terenzio Varrone Collegamenti esterni Marco Terenzio Varrone, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Marco Terenzio Varrone, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Marco Terenzio Varrone, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Marco Terenzio Varrone, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata (LA) Opere di Marco Terenzio Varrone, su Musisque Deoque. Modifica su Wikidata (LA) Opere di Marco Terenzio Varrone, su PHI Latin Texts, Packard Humanities Institute. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Marco Terenzio Varrone, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Marco Terenzio Varrone, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Marco Terenzio Varrone, su Progetto Gutenberg. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Audiolibri di Marco Terenzio Varrone, su LibriVox. Modifica su Wikidata (FR) Pubblicazioni di Marco Terenzio Varrone, su Persée, Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation. Modifica su Wikidata M. Ter. Varronis De lingua Latina libri qui supersunt: cum fragmentis ejusdem, Biponti, ex typographia societatis, 1788. (LA, IT) Biblioteca degli scrittori latini con traduzione e note: Terentii Varronis quae supersunt opera, Venetiis, excudit Joseph Antonelli, 1846. (LA, FR) Les agronomes latins, Caton, Varron, Columelle, Palladius, avec la traduction en français, a cura di M. Nisard, Paris, Firmin Didot Fréres, 1856, pp. 53 ss. Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta, a cura di Gino Funaioli, Lipsiae, in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1907, vol. 1, pp. 179 ss. M. Terenti Varronis saturarum menippearum reliquiae, cur. Alexander Riese, Lipsiae, in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1865. V · D · M Opere di Marco Terenzio Varrone Grammatici romani V · D · M Guerra civile romana (49-45 a.C.) Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 100219311 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2145 2047 · LCCN (EN) n79060808 · GND (DE) 118626183 · BNF (FR) cb119277168 (data) · BNE (ES) XX958574 (data) · NLA (EN) 35578074 · BAV (EN) 495/44942 · CERL cnp00396771 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n79060808 Agricoltura Portale Agricoltura Antica Roma Portale Antica Roma Biografie Portale Biografie Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Letterati romaniGrammatici romaniMilitari romaniNati nel 116 a.C.Morti nel 27 a.C.Nati a RietiAgronomi romaniApicoltoriEnciclopedisti romaniScrittori romaniStoria dell'agricolturaUomini universali[altre]

varzi: essential Italian philosopher. Some Italians do not consider Varzi an “Italian” philosopher in that his maximal degree was earned elsewhere! If philosophy is a branch of the belles lettres, part of Varzi’s essays belong in English literature --. He was written on ‘universal semantics.’ Achille Varzi all'Università di Trento. Achille C. Varzi (n. Galliate) è un filosofo.  Esponente della filosofia analitica, in Italia è noto principalmente per le sue ricerche di logica e per il suo contributo alla rinascita degli studi in ambito di metafisica e ontologia.   Laureatosi all'Università degli Studi di Trento con una tesi sulle logiche libere, ha conseguito il Ph.D. in filosofia presso la University of Toronto (Canada) con una dissertazione sulla semantica universale. Insegna Logica e Metafisica a Columbia, ove è stato direttore del Dipartimento di Filosofia. È nel direttivo del Journal of Philosophy e nell'esecutivo della Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.-- è stato insignito della Targa Giuseppe Piazzi per la ricerca scientifica e del Premio Paolo Bozzi per l'Ontologia.  Dopo un periodo dedicato soprattutto allo studio dell'immagine del mondo propria del senso comune, il suo pensiero si è indirizzato progressivamente verso posizioni di stampo nominalista e convenzionalista, nella convinzione che "buona parte della struttura che siamo soliti attribuire alla realtà esterna risieda a ben vedere nella nostra testa, nelle nostre pratiche organizzatrici, nel complesso sistema di concetti e categorie che sottendono alla nostra rappresentazione dell'esperienza e al nostro bisogno di rappresentarla in quel modo".Autore di oltre un centinaio di pubblicazioni su volumi e riviste specializzate, in Italia Varzi è noto anche per la sua attività divulgativa (spesso in collaborazione con Roberto Casati), ispirata al principio secondo cui "la filosofia è una sfida in cui il pensiero parte dalla semplicità delle cose quotidiane e ne mostra la meravigliosa complessità". Opere principali: Semplicemente diaboliche. 100 nuove storie filosofiche (con Roberto Casati), Laterza, 2017. I modi dell'amicizia (con Maurizio Ferraris), Orthotes, 2016. I colori del bene, Orthotes, 2015. L'incertezza elettorale (con Roberto Casati), Aracne, 2014. Le tribolazioni del filosofare. Comedia Metaphysica ne la quale si tratta de li errori & de le pene de l’Infero (con Claudio Calosi), Laterza, 2014. Il mondo messo a fuoco, Laterza, 2010. Il pianeta dove scomparivano le cose. Esercizi di immaginazione filosofica (con Roberto Casati), Einaudi, 2006. Ontologia, Laterza, 2005. Semplicità insormontabili - 39 storie filosofiche (con Roberto Casati), Laterza, 2004; ed. inglese: 2006.[4] Parole, oggetti, eventi e altri argomenti di metafisica, Carocci. An Essay in Universal Semantics, Kluwer, 1999. Parts and Places. The Structures of Spatial Representation (con Roberto Casati), MIT Press.Theory and Problems of Logic (con John Nolt e Dennis Rohatyn), McGraw-Hill, 1998; trad. it. Logica, McGraw-Hill Italia, 2003, 2007. Holes and Other Superficialities (con Roberto Casati), MIT Press, 1994; trad. it. Buchi e altre superficialità, Garzanti, 1996. Studi: Elena Casetta e Valeria Giardino (a cura di), Mettere a fuoco il mondo. Conversazioni sulla filosofia di Achille C. Varzi, numero speciale di Isonomia – Epistemologica, Vol. 4, 2014. Francesco Calemi, Achille Varzi. Logica, semantica, metafisica, AlboVersorio, Milano 2015. Note ^ Elena Casetta e Valeria Giardino, 2014, p. 159. Il mondo messo a fuoco, Laterza, 2010, p. 4. Dal risvolto di copertina di Semplicità insormontabili, Laterza, 2004. Altre edizioni in francese, spagnolo, portoghese, greco, cinese, giapponese, coreano, polacco, finlandese. Da questo libro è stato tratto lo spettacolo teatrale Insurmountable Simplicities, per la regia di Natalie Glick, presentato dall'All Gone Theatre Company all'edizione 2010 del New York International Fringe Festival. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Achille Varzi Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Achille Varzi Collegamenti esterni (EN) Sito di Varzi presso la Columbia University, su columbia.edu. (EN) Bibliografia completa di Varzi, su columbia.edu. (EN) Biografia "negativa" di Varzi, su columbia.edu. Intervista ad Achille Varzi di Leonardo Caffo, Rivista italiana di filosofia analitica. Controllo di autorità                                        VIAF (EN) 69104236 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2027 9350 · LCCN (EN) n93057819 · GND (DE) 154577324 · BNF (FR) cb13609893t (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n93057819 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1958Nati l'8 maggioNati a GalliateProfessori della Columbia University[altre] Refs.:  Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Varzi: semantica filosofia," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia

vattimo: Italian philosopher – (n. Torino) Gianni Vattimo (n. Torino) è un filosofo -- not one that provinicial Beaney would include in his handbooks and dictionaries – Vattimo’s philosophy shares quite a bit with Grice’s programme, as anyone familiar with both Vattimo and Grice may testify. Vattimo has philosophised on Heidegger and Nietzsche, and one of his essays is on the subject and the mask – another on reality – There is a volume in his honour. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Vattimo," The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

vauvenargues: luc de Clapiers de, army officer and secular moralist. Discovering Plutarch at an early age, he critically adopted Stoic idealism. Poverty-stricken, obscure, and solitary, he was ambitious for glory. Though eventful, his military career brought little reward. In poor health, he resigned in 1744 to write. In 1747, he published Introduction to the Knowledge of the Human Mind, followed by Reflections and Maxims. Voltaire and Mirabeau praised his vigorous and eclectic thought, which aimed at teaching people how to live. Vauvenargues was a deist and an optimist who equally rejected Bossuet’s Christian pessimism and La Rochefoucauld’s secular pessimism. He asserted human freedom and natural goodness, but denied social and political equality. A lover of martial virtues and noble passions, Vauvenargues crafted memorable maxims and excelled in character depiction. His complete works were published in 1862. 

velia -- Velia -- Grice as Eleatic -- School, strictly, two fifth-century B.C. Grecian philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno of Elea. The Ionian Grecian colony of Elea or Hyele in southern Italy became Velia in Roman times and retains that name today. A playful remark by Plato in Sophist 242d gave rise to the notion that Xenophanes of Colophon, who was active in southern Italy and Sicily, was Parmenides’ teacher, had anticipated Parmenides’ views, and founded the Eleatic School. Moreover, Melissus of Samos and according to some ancient sources even the atomist philosopher Leucippus of Abdera came to be regarded as “Eleatics,” in the sense of sharing fundamental views with Parmenides and Zeno. In the broad and traditional use of the term, the Eleatic School characteristically holds that “all is one” and that change and plurality are unreal. So stated, the School’s position is represented best by Melissus. Grice: “Crotone and Velia are the origins of western philosophy, since Greece is eastern!” – Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice a Velia,” Villa Grice.

venn diagram, a logic diagram invented by the English philosopher J. Venn in which standard form statements the four kinds listed below are represented by two appropriately marked overlapping circles, as follows: Syllogisms are represented by three overlapping circles, as in the examples below. If a few simple rules are followed, e.g. “diagram universal premises first,” then in a valid syllogism diagramming the premises automatically gives a diagram in which the conclusion is represented. In an invalid syllogism diagramming the premises does not automatically give a diagram in which the conclusion is represented, as below. Venn diagrams are less perspicuous for the beginner than Euler diagrams. Grice: “I tried to teach Strawson some Euler first; but English as he is, he said, ‘Stick with Venn.’” – Refs.: H. P. Grice, “From Euler to Strawson via Venn: diagramme and impicaturum.”

verificatum: Grice: “Strictly, what is ‘verified’ is therefore ‘made true,’ analytically.” -- see ayerism. Grice would possibly NOT be interested in verificationism had not been for Ayer ‘breaking tradition’ “and other things” with it --. Oppoiste Christian virtuous –ism: falsificationism. Verificationism is one of the twelve temptations Grice finds on his way to the City of Eternal Truth. (Each one has its own entry). Oddly, Boethius was the first verificationist. He use ‘verifico’ performatively. “When I say, ‘verifico’, I verify that what I say is true.” He didn’t mean it as a sophisma (or Griceisma, but it was (mis-)understood as such! “When I was listing the temptations, I thought of calling this ‘Ayerism,’ but then I changed my mind. verification theory of meaning The theory of meaning advocated by the logical positivists and associated with the criterion of verifiability. The latter provides a criterion of meaningfulness for sentences, while the verification theory of meaning specifies the nature of meaning. According to the criterion, a sentence is cognitively meaningful if and only if it is logically possible for it to be verified. The meaning of a sentence is its method of verification, that is, the way in which it can be verified or falsified, particularly by experience. The theory has been challenged because the best formulations still exclude meaningful sentences and allow meaningless sentences. Critics also claim that the theory is a test for meaningfulness rather than a theory of meaning proper. Further, they claim that it fails to recognize that the interconnectedness of language might allow a sentence that cannot itself be verified to be meaningful. “The verification theory of meaning, which dominated the Vienna Circle, was concerned with the meaning and meaningfulness of sentences rather than words.” Quine, Theories and Things verificationism Philosophical method, philosophy of science, philosophy of language A position fundamental to logical positivism, claiming that the meaning of a statement is its method of verification. Accordingly, apparent statements lacking a method of verification, such as those of religion and metaphysics, are meaningless. Theoretical expressions can be defined in terms of the experiences by means of which assertions employing them can be verified. In the philosophy of mind, behaviorism, which tries to reduce unobserved inner states to patterns of behavior, turns out to be a version of verificationism. Some philosophers require conclusive verification for a statement to be meaningful, while others allow any positive evidence to confer meaning. There are disputes whether every statement must be verified separately or theories can be verified as a whole even if some of their statements cannot be individually verified. Attempts to offer a rigorous account of verification have run into difficulties because statements that should be excluded as meaningless nevertheless pass the test of verification and statements that should be allowed as meaningful are excluded. “For over a hundred years, one of the dominant tendencies in the philosophy of science has been verificationism, that is, the doctrine that to know the meaning of a scientific proposition . . . is to know what would be evidence for that proposition.” Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality verisimilitude Philosophy of science [from Latin verisimilar, like the truth] The degree of approximation or closeness to truth of a statement or a theory. Popper defined it in terms of the difference resulting from truth-content minus falsity-content. The truthcontent of a statement is all of its true consequences, while the falsity-content of a statement is all of its false consequences. The aim of science is to find better verisimilitude. One theory has a better verisimilitude than competing theories if it can explain the success of competing theories and can also explain cases where the other theories fail. Popper emphasized that verisimilitude is different from probability. Probability is the degree of logical certainty abstracted from content, while verisimilitude is degree of likeness to truth and combines truth and content. “This suggests that we combine here the ideas of truth and content into one – the idea of a degree of better (or worse) correspondence to truth or of greater (or less) likeness or similarity to truth; or to use a term already mentioned above (in contradistinction to probability) the idea of (degrees of ) verisimilitude.” Popper, Conjectures and Refutations.

verisimile -- verisimilitude -- truthlikeness, a term introduced by Karl Popper to explicate the idea that one theory may have a better correspondence with reality, or be closer to the truth, or have more verisimilitude, than another theory. Truthlikeness, which combines truth with information content, has to be distinguished from probability, which increases with lack of content. Let T and F be the classes of all true and false sentences, respectively, and A and B deductively closed sets of sentences. According to Popper’s qualitative definition, A is more truthlike than B if and only if B 3 T 0 A 3 T and A 3 F 0 B 3 F, where one of these setinclusions is strict. In particular, when A and B are non-equivalent and both true, A is more truthlike than B if and only if A logically entails B. David Miller and Pavel Tichý proved in 4 that Popper’s definition is not applicable to the comparison of false theories: if A is more truthlike than B, then A must be true. Since the mid-0s, a new approach to truthlikeness has been based upon the concept of similarity: the degree of truthlikeness of a statement A depends on the distances from the states of affairs allowed by A to the true state. In Graham Oddie’s Likeness to Truth 6, this dependence is expressed by the average function; in Ilkka Niiniluoto’s Truthlikeness 7, by the weighted average of the minimum distance and the sum of all distances. The concept of verisimilitude is also used in the epistemic sense to express a rational evaluation of how close to the truth a theory appears to be on available evidence.

verri: essential Italian philosopher. Like Grice, he wrote on ‘happiness.’ Like Grice, he wrote on ‘pleasure.’ Like Grice, he was a very clubbable man. Pietro Verri. Pietro Verri-Visconti Pietro Verri ritratto tagliato.jpg Barone di Rho Stemma In carica 1782 – 1797 Predecessore Gabriele Verri Trattamento Sua Eccellenza Heraldic Crown of Spanish Count.svg Nascita Cinisello, 12 dicembre 1728 Morte Lambrate, 28 giugno 1797 Dinastia Verri Visconti Padre Gabriele Verri Madre Barbara Dati della Somaglia Consorte Marietta Castiglioni Vincenza Melzi d'Eril Figli Teresa, Alessandro (da Marietta Castiglioni) Religione cattolicesimo. Il conte Pietro Verri (n. Milano) è stato un filosofo; considerato tra i massimi esponenti dell'illuminismo italiano, è altresì ritenuto il fondatore della scuola illuministica milanese. Pietro Verri nacque a Milano (allora appartenente all'impero asburgico) dal conte Gabriele, magistrato e politico conservatore e da Barbara Dati della Somaglia, membri della nobiltà milanese. Ha tre fratelli: Alessandro, Carlo e Giovanni.  Avviati gli studi nel Collegio dei gesuiti di Brera, frequenta negli anni '50 l'Accademia dei Trasformati, dove conosce tra gli altri Giuseppe Parini. Si arruola nell'esercito imperiale e prende parte brevemente alla Guerra dei Sette Anni. Fermatosi a Vienna, intraprende la redazione delle Considerazioni sul commercio nello Stato di Milano, pubblicate poi nel 1763, che gli varranno il primo incarico di funzionario governativo; lo stesso anno pubblica anche le Meditazioni sulla felicità. Rientrato frattanto a Milano, vi fonda, insieme al fratello Alessandro Verri e agli amici Cesare Beccaria, Alfonso Longo, Pietro Secchi, Giambattista Biffi e Luigi Porro Lambertenghi, la cosiddetta Accademia dei Pugni, iniziale nucleo redazionale del foglio periodico Il Caffè, destinato a diventare il punto di riferimento del riformismo illuministico italiano. Il Caffè inizia le sue pubblicazioni nel giugno 1764 ed esce ogni dieci giorni, fino al maggio 1766, quando viene raccolto in due volumi. Tra gli articoli più importanti di Pietro Verri per Il Caffè vanno ricordati almeno gli Elementi del commercio (volume I, foglio 3), La commedia (I, 4-5), La medicina (I, 18), Su i parolai (II, 6). Gli illuministi milanesi, e tra loro Verri, hanno rapporti epistolari anche con gli enciclopedisti francesi, tra cui Diderot, Voltaire e d'Holbach, mentre d'Alembert verrà anche a Milano per incontrare il circolo del Caffè. Parallelamente all'impresa editoriale, Verri intraprende, con alcuni dei suoi sodali, la scalata politico-amministrativa del governo viennese di Milano, allo scopo di mettere in opera le riforme propugnate nella rivista. Nel gennaio 1764 è fatto membro della Giunta per la revisione della "ferma" (appalto delle imposte ai privati) e nel 1765 del Supremo Consiglio dell'Economia. Quest'ultimo, presieduto da Gian Rinaldo Carli, altro collaboratore del Caffè, assegna a Cesare Beccaria la cattedra di Economia pubblica e ad Alfonso Longo quella di Diritto pubblico ecclesiastico nelle Scuole Palatine. Verri, Beccaria, Frisi e Secchi danno luogo alla Società patriottica milanese.   Sull'indole del piacere e del dolore, 1781 Risalgono a questi anni le Meditazioni sull'economia politica, il Discorso sull'indole del piacere e del dolore, che affronta temi che avranno grande importanza per Giacomo Leopardi, i Ricordi a mia figlia e le Osservazioni sulla tortura. Il suo è uno stile asciutto e libero, pieno di trattenuto vigore.   Il monumento a Pietro Verri nel Cortile del Palazzo di Brera a Milano Con la successione di Giuseppe II al trono d'Austria (1780), gli spazi per i riformisti milanesi si riducono, e a partire dal 1786 Verri lascia ogni incarico pubblico, assumendo un atteggiamento sempre più critico nei confronti del figlio di Maria Teresa. Pubblica frattanto la Storia di Milano (1783).  All'arrivo di Napoleone (1796), Verri sessantottenne prende parte, con Alfonso Longo e Luigi Lambertenghi, alla fondazione della Repubblica Cisalpina, culla del tricolore italiano. Muore durante una seduta notturna della Municipalità milanese, della quale era membro assieme a personalità come Giuseppe Parini. Le sue spoglie sono conservate nella cappella di famiglia, visibile al pubblico, che si trova a latere del Santuario della Beata Vergine del Lazzaretto, nel comune di Ornago (MB).  Il fratello minore Giovanni, secondo alcuni sarebbe il padre naturale di Alessandro Manzoni, figlio di Giulia Beccaria e nipote di Cesare.  Meriti e pensiero filosofico ed economico di Pietro Verri  Medaglione col ritratto di Pietro Verri sulla casa di Cesare Beccaria a Milano. Grazie alla sua opera come autore e come organizzatore Milano divenne il più importante centro dell'Illuminismo italiano. L'ipotesi di civiltà che scaturiva dalla figura intellettuale di Pietro Verri era forse troppo avanzata per poter essere adeguatamente raccolta dalla nostra cultura; e comunque lo colloca a pieno titolo tra le espressioni più alte dell'Illuminismo italiano. Il grande merito storico di Verri consiste nel fatto di aver creato in Lombardia un grande centro di aggregazione illuminista, la rivista Il Caffè. Ciò che desta curiosità rimane il titolo con cui Pietro Verri scelse di intitolare la sua testata, dovuta al rilevante fenomeno della diffusione di caffè (bar), come luoghi dove poter intraprendere un libero e attuale dibattito culturale, politico e sociale. Con i suoi scritti sul dolore e il piacere, Verri sottoscrisse le teorie di Helvétius, nonché il sensismo di Condillac, fondando sulla ricerca della felicità e del piacere l'attività dell'uomo. L'uomo, per Verri, tendeva a sé stesso, al piacere, quindi secondo Verri l'uomo è pervaso dall'idea del dolore, e il suo piacere non è altro che una momentanea interruzione di questo dolore; questa tesi è riscontrabile anche in Schopenhauer e in Leopardi e quest'ultimo potrebbe averla derivata da quella del Verri, essendo ispirato spesso dalla filosofia sensistica settecentesca. Per Verri quindi, la vera felicità dell'uomo non è quella personale, ma è quella a cui partecipa il collettivo, quasi fosse eutimia o atarassia. Anche Kant e Nietzsche apprezzeranno questa tesi. Antonio Perego, L'Accademia dei Pugni. Da sinistra a destra: Alfonso Longo (di spalle), Alessandro Verri, Giambattista Biffi, Cesare Beccaria, Luigi Lambertenghi, Pietro Verri, Giuseppe Visconti di Saliceto Per quanto riguarda la politica e l'economia, il pensiero di Pietro Verri è controverso. Per quanto riguarda l'ambito economico, negli Elementi del Commercio e nella sua più grande opera economica Meditazioni sull'economia politica, enunciò (anche, per primo, in forma matematica) le leggi di domanda e offerta, spiegò il ruolo della moneta come "merce universale", appoggiò il libero scambio e sostenne che l'equilibrio nella bilancia dei pagamenti è assicurato da aggiustamenti del prodotto interno lordo (quantità) e non del tasso di cambio (prezzo)[6]. Di conseguenza, può essere visto come precursore di Adam Smith, del marginalismo e persino di John Maynard Keynes; altri però notano come assuma atteggiamenti di difesa del concetto di proprietà privata e del mercantilismo. Egli ritiene che solo la libera concorrenza tra eguali possa distribuire la proprietà privata: tuttavia pare favorevole principalmente alla piccola proprietà, per evitare il risorgere delle disuguaglianze. Verri con le Osservazioni sulla tortura esprime la sua contrarietà all'uso della tortura, definendo ingiusto e antistorico un modello così efferato di giurisprudenza e auspicando l'abolizione di questi metodi. Verri cominciò la stesura dell'opuscolo già nel 1760, ma non lo pubblicò per non inimicarsi, con le pesanti critiche alla magistratura in esso contenute, il senato di Milano (tribunale) presso cui si stava decidendo dell'eredità del padre.  La grande opera del collega Beccaria Dei delitti e delle pene, terminata nel 1764, prende in gran parte le mosse proprio dalle bozze delle Osservazioni sulla tortura, oltre che dagli articoli de Il Caffè. Sarà proprio a causa di questo furto di idee che i due scrittori e amici arriveranno al più acceso scontro.   Ritratto del Verri Nella versione definitiva e aggiornata delle Osservazioni, che sono in conclusione un invito ai magistrati a seguire le idee illuministe invece di irrigidirsi sulle posizioni conservatrici, la dialettica di Verri è cruda e basilare: la tortura è una crudeltà, perché se la vittima è innocente, subisce sofferenze non necessarie, mentre se colpisce un colpevole presumibile rischia di martoriare il corpo di un possibile innocente. Inoltre gli accusati rinunciano nella tortura alla loro difesa naturale istintiva, e ciò viola la legge di natura.  Verri apre la sua opera con la ricostruzione del processo agli "untori" del 1630, presentandolo sia come documento dell'ignoranza di un secolo non guidato dai "Lumi", sia come emblema del modo in cui leggi sbagliate portano a evidenti ingiustizie. Questa ricostruzione fornirà la base[8] per la Storia della colonna infame di Alessandro Manzoni, che però la presenterà come testimonianza di ciò che accade quando uomini ingiusti detengono un grande potere, come all'epoca era quello del senato milanese. L'opera di Verri non arriverà mai ad avere il successo che invece ebbe Dei delitti e delle pene, vuoi perché la maggior parte delle osservazioni in essa sviluppate erano già contenute nell'opera di Beccaria, vuoi per via dello stile di Verri, dotto e di difficile comprensione, che rendeva di per sé ardua la diffusione del testo, che pure conteneva molti ulteriori spunti rispetto all'opera del collega.  Opere, scritti e discorsi. Le principali opere di Verri sono, in ordine cronologico: La Borlanda impasticciata con la concia, e trappola de sorci composta per estro, e dedicata per bizzaria alla nobile curiosita di teste salate dall'incognito d'Eritrea Pedsol riconosciuto, Festosamente raccolta, e fatta dare in luce dall'abitatore disabitato accademico bontempista, Adorna di varj poetici encomj, ed accresciuta di opportune annotazioni per opera di varj suoi coaccademici amici. Il Gran Zoroastro ossia Astrologiche Predizioni per l'Anno 1758, Il Mal di Milza, Diario military, Elementi del commercio, Sul tributo del sale nello Stato di Milano, Sulla grandezza e decadenza del commercio di Milano, Dialogo tra Fronimo e Simplicio (detto anche Dialogo sul disordine delle monete nello Stato di Milano, Considerazioni sul commercio nello Stato di Milano, Orazione panegirica sula giurisprudenza Milanese, Meditazioni sulla felicità – cf. Grice, Notes on happiness -- Bilancio del commercio dello stato di Milano, Il Caffè, Sull’innesto del vajuolo, Memorie storiche sulla economia pubblica dello Stato di Milano, Riflessioni sulle leggi vincolanti il commercio dei grani, Meditazioni sulla economia politica con annotazioni, Consulta su la riforma delle monete dello Stato di Milano, Osservazioni sulla tortura, Ricordi a mia figlia, Considerazioni sul commercio nello Stato di Milano Sull'indole del piacere e del dolore, Manoscritto da leggersi dalla mia cara figlia Teresa Verri per cui sola lo scrissi, Storia di Milano, Piano di organizzazione del Consiglio governativo ed istruzioni per il medesimo, Precetti di Caligola e Claudio, Memoria cronologica dei cambiamenti pubblici dello Stato di Milano, Delle nozioni tendenti alla pubblica felicità, Pensieri di un buon vecchio che non è letterato, Carteggio di Pietro e di Alessandro Verri. L'Edizione Nazionale, Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali ha deciso di avallare un'Edizione nazionale delle opere di Pietro Verri. Attualmente il comitato, finanziato pubblicamente, dalla Fondazione Cariplo e da Banca Intesa Sanpaolo, è presieduto da Carlo Capra e composto da una ventina di studiosi e si basa, per la stesura delle opere, sull'Archivio Verri, donato dalla Contessa Luisa Sormani Andreani Verri alla "Fondazione Raffaele Mattioli per la storia del pensiero economico.” Note: Angolani Bartolo, Gli Scritti di argomento familiare e autobiografico di Pietro Verri, Rivista di storia della filosofia. Fascicolo 3 (Firenze : [poi] Milano : La Nuova Italia ; Franco Angeli). Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri ^ Cfr. Ricuperati, Giuseppe, Pietro Verri e il genere della biografia, Società e storia. Fascicolo 10, 2002 (Milano : Franco Angeli, 2002). ^ Pietro Verri, "Il Caffè", Introduzione, I, 1 ^ Giordanetti, Piero, a cura di, Sul piacere e sul dolore. Immanuel Kant discute Pietro Verri, Milano, Unicopli, 1998; Giordanetti, Piero: Kant, Verri e le arti belle. Sulla fortuna di Verri in Germania, in Pietro Verri e il suo tempo, a cura di C. Capra, 2 voll., Bologna, Cisalpino, 1999, pp. 429-446; Meld Shell, Susan. Kant's 'true economy of human nature': Rousseau, Count Verri, and the problem of happiness, Essays on Kant's anthropology, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Pezzei, Ivana, Kant, Verri, Nietzsche e la questione del piacere e del dolore, in Annali di Ca' Foscari ^ Parisi, D., Pre-classical economic thought: profitable commerce and formal constraints in the economic studies of the young Pietro Verri, Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali, CVII.4 (Oct 1999): 455-480. ^ Porta, Pier Luigi; Scazzieri, Roberto, Pietro Verri's political economy: commercial society, civil society, and the science of the legislator, History of political economy, 34.1 (Apr 2002): 83-110. ^ Renzo Villata, Maria Gigliola, Il processo agli untori di manzioniana memoria e la testimonianza (ovvero... due volti dell'umana giustizia), Acta Histriae 19.3 (2011): 419-452. ^ Storia di Milano ::: Cronologia della vita di Pietro Verri, su www.storiadimilano.it. URL consultato il 25 marzo 2018. ^ Vèrri, Pietro nell'Enciclopedia Treccani, su www.treccani.it. URL consultato il 25 marzo 2018. ^ Pietro Verri Ricordi a mia figlia, su www.classicitaliani.it. URL consultato il 25 marzo 2018. ^ Catalogo - Sellerio, su Sellerio.^ SALERNO EDITRICE. Scheda del libro: VERRI PIETRO - DELLE NOZIONI TENDENTI ALLA PUBBLICA FELICITÀ, su www.salernoeditrice.it. URL consultato il 25 marzo 2018 (archiviato dall'url originale il 26 marzo 2018). ^ Pietro Verri Pensieri di un buon vecchio che non è letterato, su www.classicitaliani.it. URL consultato il 25 marzo 2018. ^ Per la data vedere qui Archiviato il 14 luglio 2014 in Internet Archive.. ^ Carlo Capra, L'Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Pietro Verri. Risultati e prospettive, in Rivista di storia della filosofia, n. 3, 2007, pp. 533-539. URL consultato il 2 luglio 2014. Bibliografia Edizione nazionale delle opere di Pietro Verri: Vol. 2 tomo 1: Scritti di economia, finanza e amministrazione, a cura di Giuseppe Bognetti, Angelo Moioli, Pierluigi Porta, Giovanna Tonelli, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2006, XXV + 831 pagg., ISBN 978-88-8498-351-0. Vol. 2 tomo 2: Scritti di economia, finanza e amministrazione, a cura di Giuseppe Bognetti, Angelo Moioli, Pierluigi Porta, Giovanna Tonelli, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2007, XV + 688 pagg., ISBN 978-88-8498-500-2. Vol. 3: I Discorsi e altri scritti degli anni Settanta, a cura di Giorgio Panizza, con la collaborazione di Silvia Contarini, Gianni Francioni, Sara Rosini, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2004, XVII + 692 pagg., ISBN 978-88-8498-219-3. Vol. 4: Storia di Milano, a cura di Renato Pasta, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2009, LII + 872 pagg., ISBN 978-88-6372-168-3. Vol. 5: Scritti di argomento familiare e autobiografico, a cura di Gennaro Barbarisi, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2003, XXI + 838 pagg., ISBN 978-88-8498-158-5. Vol. 6: Scritti politici della maturità, a cura di Carlo Capra, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2010, XXVII + 888 pagg., ISBN 978-88-6372-303-8. Vol. 7: Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri. 18 settembre 1782-16 maggio 1792, a cura di Gigliola Di Renzo Villata, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2012, XXXVI + 510 pagg., ISBN 978-88-6372-454-7. Vol. 8 tomo 1: Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri. 19 maggio 1792-31 marzo 1794, a cura di Sara Rosini, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2008, XXIX + 658 pagg. Vol. 8 tomo 2: Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri. 2 aprile 1794-8 luglio 1797, a cura di Sara Rosini, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2008, pagg. 662-1421, ISBN 978-88-6372-094-5. Pietro Verri, Caffè. 1, In Venezia, Pietro Pizzolato, 1766. URL consultato il 22 giugno 2015. Pietro Verri, Caffè. 2, In Venezia, Pietro Pizzolato, 1766. URL consultato il 22 giugno 2015. Pietro Verri, Meditazioni sulla economia politica con annotazioni, Venezia, Giovanni Battista Pasquali, 1771. URL consultato il 22 giugno 2015. Pietro Verri, Meditazioni sulla economia politica, Livorno, Stamperia dell'Enciclopedia Livorno, 1772. URL consultato il 22 giugno 2015. Pietro Verri, Sull'indole del piacere e del dolore, In Milano, Giuseppe Marelli, 1781. URL consultato il 22 giugno 2015. Pietro Verri, Storia di Milano. 1, Milano, Società tipografica de' classici italiani, 1834. URL consultato il 22 giugno 2015. Pietro Verri, Storia di Milano. 2, Milano, Società tipografica de' classici italiani, 1835. URL consultato il 22 giugno 2015. Riedizioni Pietro Verri, Alessandro Verri, Carteggio di Pietro e di Alessandro Verri, a cura di F. Novati, A. Giulini, E. Greppi, G. Seregni, vol. 12, Milano, L. F. Cogliati, Milesi & figli, Giuffrè, 1910-1942. Pietro Verri, Alessandro Verri, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra (1766-1767) - Carteggio di Pietro ed Alessandro Verri, a cura di Gianmarco Gaspari, Milano, Adelphi,  Pietro Verri, Appunti di diritto bellico, a cura di Paolo Benvenuti, riedizione aggiornata, Roma, 1990. Arnaldo Di Benedetto, Pietro Verri repubblicano: gli ultimi articoli, Tra Sette e Ottocento. Poesia, letteratura e politica, Alessandria, Edizioni dell'Orso, 1991, pp. 75-95. Adriano Cavanna, Da Maria Teresa a Bonaparte: il lungo viaggio di Pietro Verri, 1999. Carlo Capra, I progressi della ragione: vita di Pietro Verri, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002. Pietro Verri, Meditazioni sulla felicità, Pavia-Como, Ibis. Pietro Verri, Discorso sull'indole del piacere e del dolore, a cura di Gianfranco Spada, Londra, Traettiana, 2010. Pietro Verri, Diario Militar, Milano, M&B Publishing, 1996. Voci correlate Verri (famiglia) Alessandro Verri Carlo Verri Giovanni Verri Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Pietro Verri Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Pietro Verri Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Pietro Verri Collegamenti esterni Pietro Verri, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Pietro Verri, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Pietro Verri, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Pietro Verri, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Pietro Verri, su Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Pietro Verri, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Pietro Verri, su Open Library, Internet Archive. (EN) Opere di Pietro Verri, su Progetto Gutenberg. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Pietro Verri, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. Modifica su Wikidata Pietro Verri. Biografia e pensiero a cura di Diego Fusaro e Nicoletta Cieri, sito Filosofico.net. URL visitato il 17 febbraio 2012. Cronologia della vita di Pietro Verri, Maria Castiglioni e Teresa Verri di Paolo Colussi, sito Storia di Milano. URL visitato il 17 febbraio 2012. V · D · M Illuministi italiani Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 34473689 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2100 5327 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\035822 · LCCN (EN) n82138205 · GND (DE) 118804278 · BNF (FR) cb120377209 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1479709 (data) · NLA (EN) 36414819 · BAV (EN) 495/88410 · CERL cnp01260077 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n82138205 Biografie Portale Biografie Diritto Portale Diritto Economia Portale Economia Filosofia Portale Filosofia Letteratura Portale Letteratura Storia Portale Storia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XVIII secoloEconomisti italianiStorici italiani del XVIII secoloNati nel 1728 Morti nel 1797 Nati il 12 dicembreMorti il 28 giugnoNati a MilanoMorti a MilanoIlluministiFilosofi del dirittoScrittori italiani del XVIII secoloSalottieri[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Verri," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

verum – verum – Grice: “Cognate with German ‘wahr’” -- there’s the ‘truth table’ and the ‘truth’ -- truth table, a tabular display of one or more truth-functions, truth-functional operators, or representatives of truth-functions or truth-functional operators such as well-formed formulas of propositional logic. In the tabular display, each row displays a possible assignment of truthvalues to the arguments of the truth-functions or truth-functional operators. Thus, the collection of all rows in the table displays all possible assignments of truth-values to these arguments. The following simple truth table represents the truth-functional operators negation and conjunction: truth, coherence theory of truth table 931   931 Because a truth table displays all possible assignments of truth-values to the arguments of a truth-function, truth tables are useful devices for quickly ascertaining logical properties of propositions. If, e.g., all entries in the column of a truth table representing a proposition are T, then the proposition is true for all possible assignments of truth-values to its ultimate constituent propositions; in this sort of case, the proposition is said to be logically or tautologically true: a tautology. If all entries in the column of a truth table representing a proposition are F, then the proposition is false for all possible assignments of truth-values to its ultimate constituent propositions, and the proposition is said to be logically or tautologically false: a contradiction. If a proposition is neither a tautology nor a contradiction, then it is said to be a contingency. The truth table above shows that both Not-P and Pand-Q are contingencies. For the same reason that truth tables are useful devices for ascertaining the logical qualities of single propositions, truth tables are also useful for ascertaining whether arguments are valid or invalid. A valid argument is one such that there is no possibility no row in the relevant truth table in which all its premises are true and its conclusion false. Thus the above truth table shows that the argument ‘P-and-Q; therefore, P’ is valid.  Verum -- truth-value, most narrowly, one of the values T for ‘true’ or F for ‘false’ that a proposition may be considered to have or take on when it is regarded as true or false, respectively. More broadly, a truth-value is any one of a range of values that a proposition may be considered to have when taken to have one of a range of different cognitive or epistemic statuses. For example, some philosophers speak of the truth-value I for ‘indeterminate’ and regard a proposition as having the value I when it is indeterminate whether the proposition is true or false. Logical systems employing a specific number n of truthvalues are said to be n-valued logical systems; the simplest sort of useful logical system has two truth-values, T and F, and accordingly is said to be two-valued. Truth-functions are functions that take truth-values as arguments and that yield truth-values as resultant values. The truthtable method in propositional logic exploits the idea of truth-functions by using tabular displays. Verum -- truth-value semantics, interpretations of formal systems in which the truth-value of a formula rests ultimately only on truth-values that are assigned to its atomic subformulas where ‘subformula’ is suitably defined. The label is due to Hugues Leblanc. On a truth-value interpretation for first-order predicate logic, for example, the formula atomic ExFx is true in a model if and only if all its instances Fm, Fn, . . . are true, where the truth-value of these formulas is simply assigned by the model. On the standard Tarskian or objectual interpretation, by contrast, ExFx is true in a model if and only if every object in the domain of the model is an element of the set that interprets F in the model. Thus a truth-value semantics for predicate logic comprises a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers and a “non-denotational” interpretation of terms and predicates. If t 1, t 2, . . . are all the terms of some first-order language, then there are objectual models that satisfy the set {Dx-Fx, Ft1, Ft2 . . . .}, but no truth-value interpretations that do. One can ensure that truth-value semantics delivers the standard logic, however, by suitable modifications in the definitions of consistency and consequence. A set G of formulas of language L is said to be consistent, for example, if there is some G' obtained from G by relettering terms such that G' is satisfied by some truth-value assignment, or, alternatively, if there is some language L+ obtained by adding terms to L such that G is satisfied by some truth-value assignment to the atoms of L+. Truth-value semantics is of both technical and philosophical interest. Technically, it allows the completeness of first-order predicate logic and a variety of other formal systems to be obtained in a natural way from that of propositional logic. Philosophically, it dramatizes the fact that the formulas in one’s theories about the world do not, in themselves, determine one’s ontological commitments. It is at least possible to interpret first-order formulas without reference to special truth-table method truth-value semantics 932   932 domains of objects, and higher-order formulas without reference to special domains of relations and properties. The idea of truth-value semantics dates at least to the writings of E. W. Beth on first-order predicate logic in 9 and of K. Schütte on simple type theory in 0. In more recent years similar semantics have been suggested for secondorder logics, modal and tense logics, intuitionistic logic, and set theory. Truth, the quality of those propositions that accord with reality, specifying what is in fact the case. Whereas the aim of a science is to discover which of the propositions in its domain are true i.e., which propositions possess the property of Trinity truth 929   929 truth  the central philosophical concern with truth is to discover the nature of that property. Thus the philosophical question is not What is true? but rather, What is truth?  What is one saying about a proposition in saying that it is true? The importance of this question stems from the variety and depth of the principles in which the concept of truth is deployed. We are tempted to think, e.g., that truth is the proper aim and natural result of scientific inquiry, that true beliefs are useful, that the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions that would render it true, and that valid reasoning preserves truth. Therefore insofar as we wish to understand, assess, and refine these epistemological, ethical, semantic, and logical views, some account of the nature of truth would seem to be required. Such a thing, however, has been notoriously elusive. The belief that snow is white owes its truth to a certain feature of the external world: the fact that snow is white. Similarly, the belief that dogs bark is true because of the fact that dogs bark. Such trivial observations lead to what is perhaps the most natural and widely held account of truth, the correspondence theory, according to which a belief statement, sentence, proposition, etc. is true provided there exists a fact corresponding to it. This Aristotelian thesis is unexceptionable in itself. However, if it is to provide a complete theory of truth  and if it is to be more than merely a picturesque way of asserting all instances of ‘the belief that p is true if and only if p’  then it must be supplemented with accounts of what facts are, and what it is for a belief to correspond to a fact; and these are the problems on which the correspondence theory of truth has foundered. A popular alternative to the correspondence theory has been to identify truth with verifiability. This idea can take on various forms. One version involves the further assumption that verification is holistic  i.e., that a belief is verified when it is part of an entire system of beliefs that is consistent and “harmonious.” This is known as the coherence theory of truth and was developed by Bradley and Brand Blanchard. Another version, due to Dummett and Putnam, involves the assumption that there is, for each proposition, some specific procedure for finding out whether one should believe it or not. On this account, to say that a proposition is true is to say that it would be verified by the appropriate procedure. In mathematics this amounts to the identification of truth with provability and is sometimes referred to as intuitionistic truth. Such theories aim to avoid obscure metaphysical notions and explain the close relation between knowability and truth. They appear, however, to overstate the intimacy of that link: for we can easily imagine a statement that, though true, is beyond our power to establish as true. A third major account of truth is James’s pragmatic theory. As we have just seen, the verificationist selects a prominent property of truth and considers it to be the essence of truth. Similarly the pragmatist focuses on another important characteristic  namely, that true beliefs are a good basis for action  and takes this to be the very nature of truth. True assumptions are said to be, by definition, those that provoke actions with desirable results. Again we have an account with a single attractive explanatory feature. But again the central objection is that the relationship it postulates between truth and its alleged analysans  in this case, utility  is implausibly close. Granted, true beliefs tend to foster success. But often actions based on true beliefs lead to disaster, while false assumptions, by pure chance, produce wonderful results. One of the few fairly uncontroversial facts about truth is that the proposition that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white, the proposition that lying is wrong is true if and only if lying is wrong, and so on. Traditional theories of truth acknowledge this fact but regard it as insufficient and, as we have seen, inflate it with some further principle of the form ‘X is true if and only if X has property P’ such as corresponding to reality, verifiability, or being suitable as a basis for action, which is supposed to specify what truth is. A collection of radical alternatives to the traditional theories results from denying the need for any such further specification. For example, one might suppose with Ramsey, Ayer, and Strawson that the basic theory of truth contains nothing more than equivalences of the form, ‘The proposition that p is true if and only if p’ excluding instantiation by sentences such as ‘This proposition is not true’ that generate contradiction. This so-called deflationary theory is best presented following Quine in conjunction with an account of the raison d’être of our notion of truth: namely, that its function is not to describe propositions, as one might naively infer from its syntactic form, but rather to enable us to construct a certain type of generalization. For example, ‘What Einstein said is true’ is intuitively equivalent to the infinite conjunction ‘If Einstein said that nothing goes faster than light, then nothing goes faster than light; and if Einstein said truth truth 930   930 that nuclear weapons should never be built, then nuclear weapons should never be built; . . . and so on.’ But without a truth predicate we could not capture this statement. The deflationist argues, moreover, that all legitimate uses of the truth predicate  including those in science, logic, semantics, and metaphysics  are simply displays of this generalizing function, and that the equivalence schema is just what is needed to explain that function. Within the deflationary camp there are various competing proposals. According to Frege’s socalled redundancy theory, corresponding instances of ‘It is true that p’ and ‘p’ have exactly the same meaning, whereas the minimalist theory assumes merely that such propositions are necessarily equivalent. Other deflationists are skeptical about the existence of propositions and therefore take sentences to be the basic vehicles of truth. Thus the disquotation theory supposes that truth is captured by the disquotation principle, ‘p’ is true if and only if p’. More ambitiously, Tarski does not regard the disquotation principle, also known as Tarski’s T schema, as an adequate theory in itself, but as a specification of what any adequate definition must imply. His own account shows how to give an explicit definition of truth for all the sentences of certain formal languages in terms of the referents of their primitive names and predicates. This is known as the semantic theory of truth. Grice: “From ‘verum’ we have to ‘make’ true, as the Romans put it, ‘verificare’ -- verificatum -- verificationism, a metaphysical theory about what determines meaning: the meaning of a statement consists in its methods of verification. Verificationism thus differs radically from the account that identifies meaning with truth conditions, as is implicit in Frege’s work and explicit in Vitters’s Tractatus and throughout the writings of Davidson. On Davidson’s theory, e.g., the crucial notions for a theory of meaning are truth and falsity. Contemporary verificationists, under the influence of the Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett, propose what they see as a constraint on the concept of truth rather than a criterion of meaningfulness. No foundational place is generally assigned in modern verificationist semantics to corroboration by observation statements; and modern verificationism is not reductionist. Thus, many philosophers read Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” as rejecting verificationism. This is because they fail to notice an important distinction. What Quine rejects is not verificationism but “reductionism,” namely, the theory that there is, for each statement, a corresponding range of verifying conditions determinable a priori. Reductionism is inherently localist with regard to verification; whereas verificationism, as such, is neutral on whether verification is holistic. And, lastly, modern verificationism is, veil of ignorance verificationism 953   953 whereas traditional verificationism never was, connected with revisionism in the philosophy of logic and mathematics e.g., rejecting the principle of bivalence. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The taming of the true.” Porphyry called the verum one of the four transcendental, along with unum, pulchrum and bonum – Grice agreed. Grice’s concern with the ‘verum’ is serious. If Quine is right, and logical truth should go, so truth should go. Grice needs ‘true’ to correct a few philosophical mistakes. It is true that Grice sees a horse as a horse, for example. The nuances of the implicaturum are of a lesser concern for Grice than the taming of the true.  The root of Latin ‘vero’ is cognate with an idea Grice loved: that of ‘sincerity.’ The point is more obviously realised lexically in the negative: the fallax versus the mendax. But ‘verum’ had to do with candidum – and thus very much cognate with the English that Grice avoided, ‘truth,’ cognate with ‘trust.’ quod non possit ab honestate sejungi The true and simple Good which cannot be separated from honesty, Cicero, Academica, I, 2, but also for the ontological which one can find in Cicero’s tr. Topica, 35 of etumologia ἐτυμολογία by veriloquium. Most contemporary hypotheses propose that verus —and the words signifying true, vrai, vérité, G. wahr, G. Wahrheit — derive from an Indo-European root, *wer, which would retain meanings of to please, pleasing, manifesting benevolence, gifts, services rendered, fidelity, pact. Chantraine Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque links it to the Homeric expression êra pherein ἦϱα φέϱειν, to please, as well as to ἐπίηϱα, ἐπίηϱος, and ἐπιήϱανος, agreeable Odyssey, 19, 343, just like the Roman verus cf. se-vere, without benevolence, the G.  war, and the Russian vera, faith, or verit’ верить, to believe. Pokorny adds to this same theme the Grecian ἑοϱτή, religious feast, cult. And from the same basis have come terms signifying guarantee, protect: Fr.  garir and later garant, G.  Gewähren, Eng. warrant, to grant. According to Chantraine, this root *wer should be distinguished from another root ver-, whence eirô εἴϱω in Grecian , verbum in Roman word in English, etc., and words from the family of vereor, revereor, to fear, to respect, verecundia respectful fear. According to Chantraine, this root *wer should be distinguished from another root ver-, whence eirô εἴϱω in Grecian , verbum in Roman word in English, etc., and words from the family of vereor, revereor, to fear, to respect, verecundia respectful fear. Alfred Ernout does not support this separation. We should recall that plays on the words verum and verbum were common, as Augustine mentions verbum = verum boare, proclaiming the truth, Dialectics 1. P. Florensky, following G. Curtius, “Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie,” also claims a single root for the ensemble of these derivations, including the Sanskrit vratum, sacred act, vow, promise, the Grecian bretas βϱέτας, cult object, wooden idol Aeschylus, Eumenides, v. 258, and the Roman “ver-bum.” The signification of verus must be considered as belonging first to the field of religious ritual and subsequently of juridical formulas: strictly speaking, verus means protected or grounded in the sense of that which is the object of a taboo or consecration Pillar and Ground. Then there’s from the juridical to the philosophical. “Verum” implies a rectification of an adversarial allegation considered to be fraudulent, as is indicated by the original opposition verax/fallax-mendax. It thus signifies the properly founded in fact or in the rules of law: crimen verissimum a well-founded accusation Cicero, In Verrem, 5, 15. In texts of grammar and rhetoric, but also in juridical texts as well, verus and veritas signify the veracity of the rule, inasmuch as it can be distinguished from usage. “Quid verum sit intellego; sed alias ita loquor ut concessum est I know what is correct, but sometimes I avail myself of the variation in usage, Cicero, De oratore, Loeb Classical Library; Consule veritatem: reprehendet; refer ad auris: probabunt If you consult the strict rule of analogy, it will say this practice is wrong, but if you consult the ear, it will approve 1586. The juridical connotation of the word verus and thus of veritas is retained and subsequently reinforced. In the glosses of the Middle Ages, verus signifies legitimate and the Roman sense of the word, legal and authentic or conforming to existing law. One normally finds “verum est” in legal texts to certify that a new rule conforms to preexisting ones Digest, 8, 4, 1. It is this juridical dimension that produces the meaning of verus as authenticated, authentic in contrast to false, imitative, deceiving and thus real as in real cream or a genuine Rolex watch.  The juridical here provides a foundation not only for the moral Verum et simplex bonum. The paradigm of “verum” is not easy to separate from any epistemological dimensions, as is evident in the varied fates of the Indo-European root *wer, from which derives, in addition to vera in Russian, belief, the old Fr.  garir, in the sense of certifying as true, designating as true, whence the participle garant. The evolution of these derived words inscribes G. “wahr,” and “Wahrheit” in a semantic network from which emerge two directions, belief and salvation. Belief. “Wahr” is often linked back, in composite words, to the idea of belief, in the sense of true belief, to take as true. “Wahrsagen,” to predict, “wahr haben,” to admit, agree upon, “für wahr halten,” to hold as true, to believe. This is the term that Kant employs in the Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental theory of method, ch.2, 3 On Opinion, Science, and Belief: “das Fürwahrhalten” is a belief, as a modality of subjectivity, that can be divided into conviction Überzeugung or persuasion Überredung and that is capable of three degrees: opinion Meinung, belief Glaube, and science Wissenschaft. Safeguarding, conservation. Similarly “wahren,” “bewahren” in the sense of to guard, to conserve is linked to “Wahrung” in the sense of defending one’s interests or safeguarding. One might refer to Heidegger’s use of this etymological and semantic relation in reference to Nietzsche. It remains to be said that many common or colloquial expressions, in Fr.  as well as in English, play on the semantic slippages of vrai and real, between the ontological sense and linguistic meanings. Thus in Fr. , c’est pas vrai! does not mean it is false, but rather that it is not reality. In English, the opposite is the case: get real! means come back down to earth, accept the truth. Grice’s main manoeuvre may be seen as intended to crack the crib of reality. For he wants to say some philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis are misled if they think an inappropriate usage reveals a truth-condition. By coining ‘implicaturum,’ his point is to give room for “Emissor E communicates that p,” as opposed to ‘emissum x ‘means’ ‘p.’ Therefore, Grice can claim that an utterance may very well totally baffling and misleading YET TRUE (or otherwise ‘good’), and that in no way that reveals anything about the emissum itself. This is due to the fact that ‘Emissor E communicates that p’ is diaphanous. And one can conjoin what the emissor E communicates to what he explicitly conveys and NOT HAVE the emissor contradicting himself or uttering a falsehood. And that is what in philosophy should count. H. P. Grice was always happy with a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth. It was what Aristotle thought. So why change? The fact that Austin agreed helped. The fact that Strawson applied Austin’s shining new tool of the performatory had him fashion a new shining skid, and that helped, because, once Grice has identified a philosophical mistake, that justifies his role as methodologist in trying to ‘correct’ the mistake. The Old Romans did not have an article. For them it is the unum, the verum, the bonum, and the pulchrum. They were trying to translate the very articled Grecian ‘to alethes,’ ‘to agathon,’ and ‘to kallon.’ Grecian Grice is able to restore the articles. He would use ‘the alethic’ for the ‘verum,’ after von Wright. But occasionally uses the ‘verum’ root. E. g. when his account of ‘personal identity’ was seen to fail to distinguish between a ‘veridical’ memory and a non-veridical one. If it had not been for Strawson’s ‘ditto’ theory to the ‘verum,’ Grice would not have minded much. Like Austin, his inclination was for a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth alla Aristotle and Tarski, applied to the utterance, or ‘expressum.’ So, while we cannot say that an utterer is TRUE, we can say that he is TRUTHFUL, and trustworthy (Anglo-Saxon ‘trust,’ being cognate with ‘true,’ and covering both the credibility and desirability realms. Grice approaches the ‘verum’ in terms of predicate calculus. So we need at least an utterance of the form, ‘the dog is shaggy.’ An utterance of ‘The dog is shaggy’ is true iff the denotatum of ‘the dog’ is a member of the class ‘shaggy.’ So, when it comes to ‘verum,’ Grice feels like ‘solving’ a problem rather than looking for new ones. He thought that Strawson’s controversial ‘ditto’ was enough of a problem ‘to get rid of.’ VERUM. Along with verum, comes the falsum. fallibilism, the doctrine, relative to some significant class of beliefs or propositions, that they are inherently uncertain and possibly mistaken. The most extreme form of the doctrine attributes uncertainty to every belief; more restricted forms attribute it to all empirical beliefs or to beliefs concerning the past, the future, other minds, or the external world. Most contemporary philosophers reject the doctrine in its extreme form, holding that beliefs about such things as elementary logical principles and the character of one’s current feelings cannot possibly be mistaken. Philosophers who reject fallibilism in some form generally insist that certain beliefs are analytically true, self-evident, or intuitively obvious. These means of supporting the infallibility of faculty psychology fallibilism 303   303 some beliefs are now generally discredited. W. V. Quine has cast serious doubt on the very notion of analytic truth, and the appeal to self-evidence or intuitive obviousness is open to the charge that those who officially accept it do not always agree on what is thus evident or obvious there is no objective way of identifying it, and that beliefs said to be self-evident have sometimes been proved false, the causal principle and the axiom of abstraction in set theory being striking examples. In addition to emphasizing the evolution of logical and mathematical principles, fallibilists have supported their position mainly by arguing that the existence and nature of mind-independent objects can legitimately be ascertained only be experimental methods and that such methods can yield conclusions that are, at best, probable rather than certain. false consciousness, 1 lack of clear awareness of the source and significance of one’s beliefs and attitudes concerning society, religion, or values; 2 objectionable forms of ignorance and false belief; 3 dishonest forms of self-deception. Marxists if not Marx use the expression to explain and condemn illusions generated by unfair economic relationships. Thus, workers who are unaware of their alienation, and “happy homemakers” who only dimly sense their dependency and quiet desperation, are molded in their attitudes by economic power relationships that make the status quo seem natural, thereby eclipsing their long-term best interests. Again, religion is construed as an economically driven ideology that functions as an “opiate” blocking clear awareness of human needs. Collingwood interprets false consciousness as self-corrupting untruthfulness in disowning one’s emotions and ideas The Principles of Art, 8.  . false pleasure, pleasure taken in something false. If it is false that Jones is honest, but Smith believes Jones is honest and is pleased that Jones is honest, then Smith’s pleasure is false. If pleasure is construed as an intentional attitude, then the truth or falsity of a pleasure is a function of whether its intentional object obtains. On this view, S’s being pleased that p is a true pleasure if an only if S is pleased that p and p is true. S’s being pleased that p is a false pleasure if and only if S is pleased that p and p is false. Alternatively, Plato uses the expression ‘false pleasure’ to refer to things such as the cessation of pain or neutral states that are neither pleasant nor painful that a subject confuses with genuine or true pleasures. Thus, being released from tight shackles might mistakenly be thought pleasant when it is merely the cessation of a pain. Refs: Grice, “Rationality and Trust,” Grice, “The alethic.” “P. F. Strawson and the performatory account of ‘true’”, The Grice Papers.

vico: He is so beloved by the Italians “that they made a stamp of him.” – Grice. cited by H. P. Grice, “Vico and the origin of language.” Philosopher who founded modern philosophy of history, philosophy of culture, and philosophy of mythology. He was born and lived all his life in or near Naples, where he taught eloquence. The Inquisition was a force in Naples throughout Vico’s lifetime. A turning point in his career was his loss of the concourse for a chair of civil law 1723. Although a disappointment and an injustice, it enabled him to produce his major philosophical work. He was appointed royal historiographer by Charles of Bourbon. Vico’s major work is “La scienza nuova”  completely revised in a second, definitive version in 1730. In the 1720s, he published three connected works in Latin on jurisprudence, under the title Universal Law; one contains a sketch of his conception of a “new science” of the historical life of nations. Vico’s principal works preceding this are On the Study Methods of Our Time 1709, comparing the ancients with the moderns regarding human education, and On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the s 1710, attacking the Cartesian conception of metaphysics. His Autobiography inaugurates the conception of modern intellectual autobiography. Basic to Vico’s philosophy is his principle that “the true is the made” “verum ipsum factum”, that what is true is convertible with what is made. This principle is central in his conception of “science” scientia, scienza. A science is possible only for those subjects in which such a conversion is possible. There can be a science of mathematics, since mathematical truths are such because we make them. Analogously, there can be a science of the civil world of the historical life of nations. Since we make the things of the civil world, it is possible for us to have a science of them. As the makers of our own world, like God as the maker who makes by knowing and knows by making, we can have knowledge per caussas through causes, from within. In the natural sciences we can have only conscientia a kind of “consciousness”, not scientia, because things in nature are not made by the knower. Vico’s “new science” is a science of the principles whereby “men make history”; it is also a demonstration of “what providence has wrought in history.” All nations rise and fall in cycles within history corsi e ricorsi in a pattern governed by providence. The world of nations or, in the Augustinian phrase Vico uses, “the great city of the human race,” exhibits a pattern of three ages of “ideal eternal history” storia ideale eterna. Every nation passes through an age of gods when people think in terms of gods, an age of heroes when all virtues and institutions are formed through the personalities of heroes, and an age of humans when all sense of the divine is lost, life becomes luxurious and false, and thought becomes abstract and ineffective; then the cycle must begin again. In the first two ages all life and thought are governed by the primordial power of “imagination” fantasia and the world is ordered through the power of humans to form experience in terms of “imaginative universals” universali fantastici. These two ages are governed by “poetic wisdom” sapienza poetica. At the basis of Vico’s conception of history, society, and knowledge is a conception of mythical thought as the origin of the human world. Fantasia is the original power of the human mind through which the true and the made are converted to create the myths and gods that are at the basis of any cycle of history. Michelet was the primary supporter of Vico’s ideas in the nineteenth century; he made them the basis of his own philosophy of history. Coleridge is the principal disseminator of Vico’s views in England. James Joyce used the New Science as a substructure for Finnegans Wake, making plays on Vico’s name, beginning with one in Latin in the first sentence: “by a commodius vicus of recirculation.” Croce revives Vico’s philosophical thought, wishing to conceive Vico as the  Hegel. Vico’s ideas have been the subject of analysis by such prominent philosophical thinkers as Horkheimer and Berlin, by anthropologists such as Edmund Leach, and by literary critics such as René Wellek and Herbert Read. Refs.: S. N. Hampshire, “Vico,” in The New Yorker. Luigi Speranza, “Vico alla Villa Grice.” H. P. Grice, “Vico and language.” vico --  Danesi, Marcel. Vico, Metaphor, and the Origin of Language. Bloomington: Indiana. Serious scholars of Vico as well as glottogeneticists will find much of value in this excellent monograph. Vico Studies. A provocative, well-researched argument which might find reapplication in philosophy." —Theological Book Review. Danesi returns to Vico to create a persuasive, original account of the evolution and development of language, one of the deep mysteries of human existence. The Vico’s reconstruction of the origin of language is described at length, then evaluated in light of Grice’s philosophical conversational pragmatics. Glottogenesis Vico’s Reconstruction. The New Science Basic Notions. Language and the Imagination: Vito’s Glottogenetic Scenario Vico’s Approach Reconstructing the Primal Scene After the Primal Scence. The Dawn of Communication: Iconicity and Mimesis Hypotheses The Nature of Iconicity. Imagery, Iconicity, and Gesture. Iconic Representation. Osmosis Hypothesis Ontogenesis From Percepts to Concepts The Metaphoricity Metaphor Metaphor and Concept-Formation Mentation, Narrativity, and Myth  The Sociobiological-Computationist Viewpoint:A Vichian Critique The Vichian Scenario Revisited Revisting the Genetic Perspective computationism. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Vico e Grice,” Villa Grice.

villa grice: -- Kept by Luigi Speranza -- Grice kept a nice garden in his cottage on Banbury Road, not far from St. John’s. It was more of a villa than his town house at Harborne. While Grice loved Academia, he also loved non-Academia. He would socialize at the Flag and Lamb, at the Bird and Baby, and the cricket club, at the bridge club, etc. In this way, he goes back to Plato’s idea of an ‘academy,’ established by Plato at his villa outside Athens near the public park and gymnasium known by that name. Although it may not have maintained a continuous tradition, the many and varied philosophers of the Academy all considered themselves Plato’s successors, and all of them celebrated and studied his work. The school survived in some form until A.D. 529, when it was dissolved, along with the other pagan schools, by the Eastern Roman emperor Justinian I. The history of the Academy is divided by some authorities into that of the Old Academy Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and their followers and the New Academy the Skeptical Academy of the third and second centuries B.C.. Others speak of five phases in its history: Old as before, Middle Arcesilaus, New Carneades, Fourth Philo of Larisa, and Fifth Antiochus of Ascalon. For most of its history the Academy was devoted to elucidating doctrines associated with Plato that were not entirely explicit in the dialogues. These “unwritten doctrines” were apparently passed down to his immediate successors and are known to us mainly through the work of Aristotle: there are two opposed first principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad Great and Small; these generate Forms or Ideas which may be identified with numbers, from which in turn come intermediate mathematicals and, at the lowest level, perceptible things Aristotle, Metaphysics I.6. After Plato’s death, the Academy passed to his nephew Speusippus, who led the school until his death. Although his written works have perished, his views on certain main points, along with some quotations, were recorded by surviving authors. Under the influence of late Pythagoreans, Speusippus anticipated Plotinus by holding that the One transcends being, goodness, and even Intellect, and that the Dyad which he identifies with matter is the cause of all beings. To explain the gradations of beings, he posited gradations of matter, and this gave rise to Aristotle’s charge that Speusippus saw the universe as a series of disjointed episodes. Speusippus abandoned the theory of Forms as ideal numbers, and gave heavier emphasis than other Platonists to the mathematicals. Xenocrates who once went with Plato to Sicily, succeeded Speusippus and led the Academy till his own death. Although he was a prolific author, Xenocrates’ works have not survived, and he is known only through the work of other authors. He was induced by Aristotle’s objections to reject Speusippus’s views on some points, and he developed theories that were a major influence on Middle Platonism, as well as on Stoicism. In Xenocrates’ theory the One is Intellect, and the Forms are ideas in the mind of this divine principle; the One is not transcendent, but it resides in an intellectual space above the heavens. While the One is good, the Dyad is evil, and the sublunary world is identified with Hades. Having taken Forms to be mathematical entities, he had no use for intermediate mathematicals. Forms he defined further as paradigmatic causes of regular natural phenomena, and soul as self-moving number. Polemon led the Academy, and was chiefly known for his fine character, which set an example of self-control for his students. The Stoics probably derived their concept of oikeiosis an accommodation to nature from his teaching. After Polemon’s death, his colleague Crates led the Academy until the accession of Arcesilaus. The New Academy arose when Arcesilaus became the leader of the school and turned the dialectical tradition of Plato to the Skeptical aim of suspending belief. The debate between the New Academy and Stoicism dominated philosophical discussion for the next century and a half. On the Academic side the most prominent spokesman was Carneades. In the early years of the first century B.C., Philo of Larisa attempted to reconcile the Old and the New Academy. His pupil, the former Skeptic Antiochus of Ascalon, was enraged by this and broke away to refound the Old Academy. This was the beginning of Middle Platonism. Antiochus’s school was eclectic in combining elements of Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelian philosophy, and is known to us mainly through Cicero’s Academica. Middle Platonism revived the main themes of Speusippus and Xenocrates, but often used Stoic or neo-Pythagorean concepts to explain them. The influence of the Stoic Posidonius was strongly felt on the Academy in this period, and Platonism flourished at centers other than the Academy in Athens, most notably in Alexandria, with Eudorus and Philo of Alexandria. After the death of Philo, the center of interest returned to Athens, where Plutarch of Chaeronia studied with Ammonius at the Academy, although Plutarch spent most of his career at his home in nearby Boeotia. His many philosophical treatises, which are rich sources for the history of philosophy, are gathered under the title Moralia; his interest in ethics and moral education led him to write the Parallel Lives paired biographies of famous Romans and Athenians, for which he is best known. After this period, the Academy ceased to be the name for a species of Platonic philosophy, although the school remained a center for Platonism, and was especially prominent under the leadership of the Neoplatonist Proclus. 

villa speranza: the grander sourroundings where the Casino Grice belongs – Grice used to call it ‘Villa Grice.’ Villa Speranza counts with an excellent host in the charming A. M. G. -- . Villa Speranza holds a grand swimming pool where Grice would keep his Loeb collection (“Loeb is all you need”) – It became known in the neighbourhood as The Swimming-Pool Library.

vio: essential Italian philosopher. Grice was irritated that when ‘vio’ became a saint, the Italians list them under ‘c’. He wrote extensively on freewill, and had a colourful dispute with, of all people, Calvin – well represented in a painting Grice adored. Vio – tomasso di vio -- cajetan, original name, -- H. P. Grice thinks that Shropshire borrowed his proof for the immortality of the soul from Cajetan -- Tommaso de Vio, prelate and theologian. Born in Gaeta from which he took his name, he entered the Dominican order in 1484 and studied philosophy and theology at Naples, Bologna, and Padua. He became a cardinal in 1517; during the following two years he traveled to G.y, where he engaged in a theological controversy with Luther. His major work is a Commentary on St. Thomas’ Summa of Theology 1508, which promoted a renewal of interest in Scholastic and Thomistic philosophy during the sixteenth century. In agreement with Aquinas, Cajetan places the origin of human knowledge in sense perception. In contrast with Aquinas, he denies that the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as our creator can be proved. Cajetan’s work in logic was based on traditional Aristotelian syllogistic logic but is original in its discussion of the notion of analogy. Cajetan distinguishes three types: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, and analogy of proportion. Whereas he rejected the first two types as improper, he regarded the last as the basic type of analogy and appealed to it in explaining how humans come to know God and how analogical reasoning applied to God and God’s creatures avoids being equivocal. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e de Vio.” The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

violence: Grice: “I would define ‘violence’ as the use of force to cause physical harm, death, or destruction physical violence;  the causing of severe mental or emotional harm, as through humiliation, deprivation, or brainwashing, whether using force or not psychological violence; more broadly, profaning, desecrating, defiling, or showing disrespect for i.e., “doing violence” to something valued, sacred, or cherished; extreme physical force in the natural world, as in tornados, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Physical violence may be directed against persons, animals, or property.” Grice goes on: “In the first two cases, harm, pain, suffering, and death figure prominently; in the third, illegality or illegitimacy the forceful destruction of property is typically considered violence when it lacks authorization. Psychological violence applies principally to persons. It may be understood as the violation of beings worthy of respect. But it can apply to higher animals as well as in the damaging mental effects of some experimentation, e.g., involving isolation and deprivation. Environmentalists sometimes speak of violence against the environment, implying both destruction and disrespect for the natural world. Sometimes the concept of violence is used to characterize acts or practices of which one morally disapproves. To this extent it has a normative force. But this prejudges whether violence is wrong. One may, on the other hand, regard inflicting harm or death as only prima facie wrong i.e., wrong all other things being equal. This gives violence a normative character, establishing its prima facie wrongness. But it leaves open the ultimate moral justifiability of its use. Established practices of physical or psychological violence  e.g., war, capital punishment  constitute institutionalized violence. So do illegal or extralegal practices like vigilantism, torture, and state terrorism e.g., death squads. Anarchists sometimes regard the courts, prisons, and police essential to maintaining the state as violence. Racism and sexism may be considered institutional violence owing to their associated psychological as well as physical violence. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Causes and reasons.” 

virtuosum – Grice: “The etymology of ‘virtue’ is fantastic: it is strictly a bit like ‘manliness,’ only the Romans were never sure who was ‘vir’ and who wasn’t!” -- “virtue is entire” – “Do not multiply virtues beyond necessity” -- virtue ethics, also called virtue-based ethics and agent-based ethics, conceptions or theories of morality in which virtues play a central or independent role. Thus, it is more than simply the account of the virtues offered by a given theory. Some take the principal claim of virtue ethics to be about the moral subject  that, in living her life, she should focus her attention on the cultivation of her or others’ virtues. Others take the principal claim to be about the moral theorist  that, in mapping the structure of our moral thought, she should concentrate on the virtues. This latter view can be construed weakly as holding that the moral virtues are no less basic than other moral concepts. In this type of virtue ethics, virtues are independent of other moral concepts in that claims about morally virtuous character or action are, in the main, neither reducible to nor justified on the basis of underlying claims about moral duty or rights, or about what is impersonally valuable. It can also be construed strongly as holding that the moral virtues are more basic than other moral concepts. In such a virtue ethics, virtues are fundamental, i.e., claims about other moral concepts are either reducible to underlying claims about moral virtues or justified on their basis. Forms of virtue ethics predominated in Western philosophy before the Renaissance, most notably in Aristotle, but also in Plato and Aquinas. Several ancient and medieval philosophers endorsed strong versions of virtue ethics. These views focused on character rather than on discrete behavior, identifying illicit behavior with vicious behavior, i.e., conduct that would be seriously out of character for a virtuous person. A virtuous person, in turn, was defined as one with dispositions relevantly linked to human flourishing. On these views, while a person of good character, or someone who carefully observes her, may be able to articulate certain principles or rules by which she guides her conduct or to which, at least, it outwardly conforms, the principles are not an ultimate source of moral justification. On the contrary, they are justified only insofar as the conduct they endorse would be in character for a virtuous person. For Aristotle, the connection between flourishing and virtue seems conceptual. He conceived moral virtues as dispositions to choose under the proper guidance of reason, and defined a flourishing life as one lived in accordance with these virtues. While most accounts of the virtues link them to the flourishing of the virtuous person, there are other possibilities. In principle, the flourishing to which virtue is tied whether causally or conceptually may be either that of the virtuous subject herself, or that of some patient who is a recipient of her virtuous behavior, or that of some larger affected group  the agent’s community, perhaps, or all humanity, or even sentient life in general. For the philosophers of ancient Greece, it was human nature, usually conceived teleologically, that fixed the content of this flourishing. Medieval Christian writers reinterpreted this, stipulating both that the flourishing life to which the virtues lead extends past death, and that human flourishing is not merely the fulfillment of capacities and tendencies inherent in human nature, but is the realization of a divine plan. In late twentieth-century versions of virtue ethics, some theorists have suggested that it is neither to a teleology inherent in human nature nor to the divine will that we should look in determining the content of that flourishing to which the virtues lead. They understand flourishing more as a matter of a person’s living a life that meets the standards of her cultural, historical tradition. In his most general characterization, Aristotle called a thing’s virtues those features of it that made it and its operation good. The moral virtues were what made people live well. This use of ‘making’ is ambiguous. Where he and other premodern thinkers thought the connection between virtues and living well to be conceptual, moral theorists of the modernist era have usually virtue ethics virtue ethics understood it causally. They commonly maintain that a virtue is a character trait that disposes a person to do what can be independently identified as morally required or to effect what is best best for herself, according to some theories; best for others, according to different ones. Benjamin Franklin, e.g., deemed it virtuous for a person to be frugal, because he thought frugality was likely to result in her having a less troubled life. On views of this sort, a lively concern for the welfare of others has moral importance only inasmuch as it tends to motivate people actually to perform helpful actions. In short, benevolence is a virtue because it conduces to beneficent conduct; veracity, because it conduces to truth telling; fidelity, because it conduces to promise keeping; and so on. Reacting to this aspect of modernist philosophy, recent proponents of virtue ethics deny that moral virtues derive from prior determinations of what actions are right or of what states of affairs are best. Some, especially certain theorists of liberalism, assign virtues to what they see as one compartment of moral thought and duties to a separate, and only loosely connected compartment. For them, the life and theory of virtue is autonomous. They hold that virtues and duties have independent sources of justification, with virtues chiefly concerned with the individual’s personal “ideals,” self-image, or conception of her life goals, while duties and rights are thought to derive from social rules regulating interpersonal dealings. Proponents of virtue ethics maintain that it has certain advantages over more modern alternatives. They argue that virtue ethics is properly concrete, because it grounds morality in facts about human nature or about the concrete development of particular cultural traditions, in contrast with modernist attempts to ground morality in subjective preference or in abstract principles of reason. They also claim that virtue ethics is truer to human psychology in concentrating on the less conscious aspects of motivation  on relatively stable dispositions, habits, and long-term goals, for example  where modern ethics focuses on decision making directed by principles and rules. Virtue ethics, some say, offers a more unified and comprehensive conception of moral life, one that extends beyond actions to comprise wants, goals, likes and dislikes, and, in general, what sort of person one is and aims to be. Proponents of virtue ethics also contend that, without the sensitivity and appreciation of their situation and its opportunities that only virtues consistently make available, agents cannot properly apply the rules that modernist ethical theories offer to guide their actions. Nor, in their view, will the agent follow those rules unless her virtues offer her sufficient clarity of purpose and perseverance against temptation. Several objections have been raised against virtue ethics in its most recent forms. Critics contend that it is antiquarian, because it relies on conceptions of human nature whose teleology renders them obsolete; circular, because it allegedly defines right action in terms of virtues while defining virtues in terms of right action; arbitrary and irrelevant to modern society, since there is today no accepted standard either of what constitutes human flourishing or of which dispositions lead to it; of no practical use, because it offers no guidance when virtues seem to conflict; egoistic, in that it ultimately directs the subject’s moral attention to herself rather than to others; and fatalistic, in allowing the morality of one’s behavior to hinge finally on luck in one’s constitution, upbringing, and opportunities. There may be versions of virtue ethics that escape the force of all or most of the objections, but not every form of virtue ethics can claim for itself all the advantages mentioned above.  virtue epistemology, the subfield of epistemology that takes epistemic virtue to be central to understanding justification or knowledge or both. An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable goal. Following Aristotle, we should distinguish these virtues from such qualities as wisdom or good judgment, which are the intellectual basis of practical  but not necessarily intellectual  success. The importance, and to an extent, the very definition, of this notion depends, however, on larger issues of epistemology. For those who favor a naturalist conception of knowledge say, as belief formed in a “reliable” way, there is reason to call any truth-conducive quality or properly working cognitive mechanism an epistemic virtue. There is no particular reason to limit the epistemic virtues to recognizable personal qualities: a high mathematical aptitude may count as an epistemic virtue. For those who favor a more “normative” conception of knowledge, the corresponding notion of an epistemic virtue or vice will be narrower: it will be tied to personal qualities like impartiality or carelessness whose exercise one would associate with an ethics of belief. H. P. Grice, “Philosophy, like virtue, is entire;” H. P. Grice, “Virtutes non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem,” H. P. Grice, “Aristotle’s mesotes – where virtue lies.”

vis: When in a Latinate mood, Grice would refer to a ‘vis’ of an expression. Apparently, ‘vis’ is cognate with ‘validum,’ transf., of abstr. things, force, notion, meaning, sense, import, nature, essence (cf. significatio): “id, in quo est omnis vis amicitiae,” Cic. Lael. 4, 15: “eloquentiae vis et natura,” id. Or. 31, 112: “vis honesti (with natura),” id. Off. 1, 6, 18; cf. id. Fin. 1, 16, 50: “virtutis,” id. Fam. 9, 16, 5: “quae est alia vis legis?” id. Dom. 20, 53: “vis, natura, genera verborum et simplicium et copulatorum,” i.e. the sense, signification, id. Or. 32, 115: “vis verbi,” id. Inv. 1, 13, 17; id. Balb. 8, 21: “quae vis insit in his paucis verbis, si attendes, si attendes, intelleges,” id. Fam. 6, 2, 3: “quae vis subjecta sit vocibus,” id. Fin. 2, 2, 6: “nominis,” id. Top. 8, 35: μετωνυμία, cujus vis est, pro eo, quod dicitur, causam, propter quam dicitur, ponere, Quint. 8, 6, 23.

vital lie: Grice: “I would define a vital life as an instance of self-deception or lying to oneself when it fosters hope, confidence, self-esteem, mental health, or creativity; or any false belief or unjustified attitude that helps people cope with difficulties; or  a lie to other people designed to promote their wellbeing; e.. g.: self-deceiving optimism about one’s prospects for success in work or personal relationships may generate hope, mobilize energy, enrich life’s meaning, and increase chances for success. Grice considers the optimism law as basic in folk-psychology. Ibsen dramatises “life-lies” as essential for happiness The Wild Duck, and O’Neill portrays “pipe dreams” as necessary crutches The Iceman Cometh. Nietzsche endorsed “pious illusions” or “holy fictions” about the past that liberate individuals and societies from shame and guilt On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. In Problems of belief, Schiller praised normal degrees of vanity and self-conceit because they support selfesteem. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “Optimism,” in “Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.”

volition: cf. desideratum. a mental event involved with the initiation of action. ‘To will’ is sometimes taken to be the corresponding verb form of ‘volition’. The concept of volition is rooted in modern philosophy; contemporary philosophers have transformed it by identifying volitions with ordinary mental events, such as intentions, or beliefs plus desires. Volitions, especially in contemporary guises, are often taken to be complex mental events consisting of cognitive, affective, and conative elements. The conative element is the impetus  the underlying motivation  for the action. A velleity is a conative element insufficient by itself to initiate action. The will is a faculty, or set of abilities, that yields the mental events involved in initiating action. There are three primary theories about the role of volitions in action. The first is a reductive account in which action is identified with the entire causal sequence of the mental event the volition causing the bodily behavior. J. S. Mill, for example, says: “Now what is action? Not one thing, but a series of two things: the state of mind called a volition, followed by an effect. . . . [T]he two together constitute the action” Logic. Mary’s raising her arm is Mary’s mental state causing her arm to rise. Neither Mary’s volitional state nor her arm’s rising are themselves actions; rather, the entire causal sequence the “causing” is the action. The primary difficulty for this account is maintaining its reductive status. There is no way to delineate volition and the resultant bodily behavior without referring to action. There are two non-reductive accounts, one that identifies the action with the initiating volition and another that identifies the action with the effect of the volition. In the former, a volition is the action, and bodily movements are mere causal consequences. Berkeley advocates this view: “The Mind . . . is to be accounted active in . . . so far forth as volition is included. . . . In plucking this flower I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition” Three Dialogues. In this century, Prichard is associated with this theory: “to act is really to will something” Moral Obligation, 9, where willing is sui generis though at other places Prichard equates willing with the action of mentally setting oneself to do something. In this sense, a volition is an act of will. This account has come under attack by Ryle Concept of Mind. Ryle argues that it leads to a vicious regress, in that to will to do something, one must will to will to do it, and so on. It has been countered that the regress collapses; there is nothing beyond willing that one must do in order to will. Another criticism of Ryle’s, which is more telling, is that ‘volition’ is an obscurantic term of art; “[volition] is an artificial concept. We have to study certain specialist theories in order to find out how it is to be manipulated. . . . [It is like] ‘phlogiston’ and ‘animal spirits’ . . . [which] have now no utility” Concept of Mind. Another approach, the causal theory of action, identifies an action with the causal consequences of volition. Locke, e.g., says: “Volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. . . . [V]olition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby . . . the mind endeavors to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power” Essay concerning Human Understanding. This is a functional account, since an event is an action in virtue of its causal role. Mary’s arm rising is Mary’s action of raising her arm in virtue of being caused by her willing to raise it. If her arm’s rising had been caused by a nervous twitch, it would not be action, even if the bodily movements were photographically the same. In response to Ryle’s charge of obscurantism, contemporary causal theorists tend to identify volitions with ordinary mental events. For example, Davidson takes the cause of actions to be beliefs plus desires and Wilfrid Sellars takes volitions to be intentions to do something here and now. Despite its plausibility, however, the causal theory faces two difficult problems: the first is purported counterexamples based on wayward causal chains connecting the antecedent mental event and the bodily movements; the second is provision of an enlightening account of these mental events, e.g. intending, that does justice to the conative element. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “A. J. P. Kenny on voliting.”

voluntarism: -- W. James: “I will that the chair slides over the floor toward me. It doesn’t.” cf. Grice on the volitive – desiderative -- any philosophical view that makes our ability to control the phenomena in question an essential part of the correct understanding of those phenomena. Thus, ethical voluntarism is the doctrine that the standards that define right and wrong conduct are in some sense chosen by us. Doxastic voluntarism is the doctrine that we have extensive control over what we believe; we choose what to believe. A special case of doxastic voluntarism is theological voluntarism, which implies that religious belief requires a substantial element of choice; the evidence alone cannot decide the issue. This is a view that is closely associated with Pascal, Kierkegaard, and James. Historical voluntarism is the doctrine that the human will is a major factor in history. Such views contrast with Marxist views of history. Metaphysical voluntarism is the doctrine, linked with Schopenhauer, that the fundamental organizing principle of the world is not the incarnation of a rational or a moral order but rather the will, which for Schopenhauer is an ultimately meaningless striving for survival, to be found in all of nature.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The will”

voting paradox: the possibility that if there are three candidates, A, B, and C, for democratic choice, with at least three choosers, and the choosers are asked to make sequential choices among pairs of candidates, A could defeat B by a majority vote, B could defeat C, and C could defeat A. This would be the outcome if the choosers’ preferences were ABC, BCA, and CAB. Hence, although each individual voter may have a clear preference ordering over the candidates, the collective may have cyclic preferences, so that individual and majoritarian collective preference orderings are not analogous. While this fact is not a logical paradox, it is perplexing to many analysts of social choice. It may also be morally perplexing in that it suggests majority rule can be quite capricious. For example, suppose we vote sequentially over various pairs of candidates, with the winner at each step facing a new candidate. If the candidates are favored by cyclic majorities, the last candidate to enter the fray will win the final vote. Hence, control over the sequence of votes may determine the outcome. It is easy to find cyclic preferences over such candidates as movies and other matters of taste. Hence, the problem of the voting paradox is clearly real and not merely a logical contrivance. But is it important? Institutions may block the generation of evidence for cyclic majorities by making choices pairwise and sequentially, as above. And some issues over which we vote provoke preference patterns that cannot produce cycles. For example, if our issue is one of unidimensional liberalism versus conservatism on some major political issue such as welfare programs, there may be no one who would prefer to spend both more and less money than what is spent in the status quo. Hence, everyone may display single-peaked preferences with preferences falling as we move in either direction toward more money or toward less from the peak. If all important issues and combinations of issues had this preference structure, the voting paradox would be unimportant. It is widely supposed by many public choice scholars that collective preferences are not single-peaked for many issues or, therefore, for combinations of issues. Hence, collective choices may be quite chaotic. What order they display may result from institutional manipulation. If this is correct, we may wonder whether democracy in the sense of the sovereignty of the electorate is a coherent notion. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Grice’s Book of Paradoxes – with pictures and illustrations.”

vyse: an unfortunate example by Grice. He wants to give an ambiguous sentence, “Strawson is caught in the grip of a vice.” Oddly, in The New World, Webster noticed this, and favoured the spelling ‘vyse.’ “But what Webster fails,” Grice adds, “to note, is that ‘vice’ and ‘vyse’ ARE cognate, hence no need for double talk!” “They both can be traced to ‘violence.’” Sir Cecil Vyse happens to be a character in Forster’s “A room with a view,” which gives a triple ambiguity, to “Strawson was caught in the grip of a Vyse.” Vyse was wonderfully played by Daniel Day Lewis in the film. “What is your profession, Mister Vyse?” Vyse: “Must one have a profeesion?” – Vyse’s favourite motto applies to Grice, “Ingelese italianato, diavolo incarnate.” – Grice: “Stupidly, when this is reversed the implicature is lost.

W

W: SUBJECT INDEX:

W: DON’T EXPECT AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER WITH THIS BARBARIC LETTER

W: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: WARNOCK (Grice’s collaborator) – WILSON --

ward: j. English philosopher and psychologist. Influenced by Lotze, Herbart, and Brentano, Ward sharply criticized Bain’s associationism and its allied nineteenth-century reductive naturalism. His psychology rejected the associationists’ sensationism, which regarded mind as passive, capable only of sensory receptivity and composed solely of cognitive presentations. Ward emphasized the mind’s inherent activity, asserting, like Kant, the prior existence of an inferred but necessarily existing ego or subject capable of feeling and, most importantly, of conation, shaping both experience and behavior by the willful exercise of attention. Ward’s psychology stresses attention and will. In his metaphysics, Ward resisted the naturalists’ mechanistic materialism, proposing instead a teleological spiritualistic monism. While his criticisms of associationism and naturalism were telling, Ward was a transitional figure whose positive influence is limited, if we except H. P. Grice who follows him to a T. Although sympathetic to scientific psychology – he founded scientific psychology in Britain by establishing a psychology laboratory  – he, with his student Stout, represented the beginning of armchair psychology at Oxford, which Grice adored. Through Stout he influenced the hormic psychology of McDougall, and Grice who calls himself a Stoutian (“until Prichard converted me”). Ward’s major work is “Psychology” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., 1886), reworked as Psychological Principles (1918). “one of the most philosophical psychologists England (if not Oxford) ever produced!” – H. P. Grice -- cited by H. P. Grice. -- English philosopher. Influenced by Lotze, Herbart, and Brentano, Ward sharply criticized Bain’s associationism and its allied nineteenth-century reductive naturalism. His psychology rejected the associationists’ sensationism, which regarded mind as passive, capable only of sensory receptivity and composed solely of cognitive presentations. Ward emphasized the mind’s inherent activity, asserting, like Kant, the prior existence of an inferred but necessarily existing ego or subject capable of feeling and, most importantly, of conation, shaping both experience and behavior by the willful exercise of attention. Ward’s psychology stresses attention and will. In his metaphysics, Ward resisted the naturalists’ mechanistic materialism, proposing instead a teleological spiritualistic monism. While his criticisms of associationism and naturalism were telling, Ward was a transitional figure whose positive influence is limited, if we except H. P. Grice who follows him to a T. Although sympathetic to scientific psychology  he founded scientific psychology in Britain by establishing a psychology laboratory   he, with his student Stout, represented the beginning of armchair psychology at Oxford, which Grice adored. Through Stout he influenced the hormic psychology of McDougall, and Grice who calls himself a Stoutian “until Prichard converted me”. Ward’s major work is “Psychology” Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., 6, reworked as Psychological Principles 8. 

warnock:  Irish philosopher, born in the north of England (“He was so Irish, I could sing ‘Danny Boy’ to him all day long – Dame Mary Warnock). “One of my most intelligent collaborators.” Unlike any other of the collaborators, Warnock had what Grice calls “the gift for botanising.” They would spend hours on the philosophy of perception. His other English collaborators were, in alphabetic order: Pears, Strawson, and Thomson. And you can see the difference. Thomson was pretty obscure. Pears was a closet Vittersian. And Strawson was ‘to the point.’ With Warnock, Grice could ramble at ease. Warnock became the custodian of Austin’s heritage which somehow annoyed Grice. But the Warnock that Grice enjoyed most was the Warnock-while-the-SchoolMaster-Austin-was-around. Because they could play. And NOT in the play group, which was “anything but.” But Grice would philosophise on ‘perception,’ and especially ‘see’ – with Warnock. Their idiolects differed. Warnock, being Irish, was more creative, and less conservative. So it was good for Warnock to have Grice to harness him! Through Warnock, Grice got to discuss a few things with Urmson, the co-custodian of Austin’s legacy. But again, most of the discussions with Urmson were before Austin’s demise. Urmson and Warnock are the co-editors of Austin’s “Philosophical Papers.” Would Austin have accepted? Who knows. The essays were more or less easily available. Still. warnockianism: Grice: “I told Warnock, ‘How clever language is!” “He agreed, for we realised that language makes all the distinctions you need, and when you feel there is one missing, language allows you to introduce it!” --. Refs.: H. P. Grice and G. J. Warnock, The philosophy of perception – Folder – BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

weapon: Grice’s shining new tool. The funny thing is that his tutee Strawson didn’t allow him to play with it ONCE! Or weapon. Grice refers to the implicaturum as a philosopher’s tool, and that the fun comes in the application. Strawson and Wiggins p. 522, reminds us of Austin. Austin used to say that when a philosopher “forges a new weapon, he is also fshioning new skids to put under his feet.” It is perhaps inappropriate that a memorial should mention this, but here they were, the memorialists. They were suggesting that Grice forged a shining new tool, the implicaturum, or implicaturum – rather, he proposed a rational explanation for the distinction between what an emissor means (e. g., that p) and what anything else may be said, ‘metabolically,’ to “mean.” Suggesting an analogy with J. L. Austin and his infelicitious notion of infelicity, which found him fashioning a shining new skid, the memorialists suggest the same for Grice – but of course the analogy does not apply.

well-formed formula (Villa Grice: formula).  For Grice, an otiosity – surely an ill-formed formula is an oxymoron -- a grammatically wellformed sentence or structured predicate of an artificial language of the sort studied by logicians. A well-formed formula is sometimes known as a wff pronounced ‘woof’ or simply a formula. Delineating the formulas of a language involves providing it with a syntax or grammar, composed of both a vocabulary a specification of the symbols from which the language is to be built, sorted into grammatical categories and formation rules a purely formal or syntactical specification of which strings of symbols are grammatically well-formed and which are not. Formulas are classified as either open or closed, depending on whether or not they contain free variables variables not bound by quantifiers. Closed formulas, such as x Fx / Gx, are sentences, the potential bearers of truth-values. Open formulas, such as Fx / Gx, are handled in any of three ways. On some accounts, these formulas are on a par with closed ones, the free variables being treated as names. On others, open formulas are structured predicates, the free variables being treated as place holders for terms. And on still other accounts, the free variables are regarded as implicitly bound by universal quantifiers, again making open formulas sentences. 

“what-is-hinted” -- hint hinting. Don’t expect Cicero used this. It’s Germanic and related to ‘hunt,’ to ‘seize.’ As if you throw something in the air, and expect your recipient will seize it. Grice spends quite a long section in “Retrospective epilogue” to elucidate “Emissor E communicates that p via a hint,” versus “Emissor E communicates that p via a suggestion.” Some level of explicitness (vide candour) is necessary. If it is too obscure it cannot be held to have been ‘communicated’ in the first place! Cf. Holdcroft, “Some forms of indirect communication” for the Journal of Rhetoric. Grice had to do a bit of linguistic botany for his “E implicates that p”: To do duty for ‘imply,’ suggest, indicate, hint, mean, -- “etc.” indirectly or implicitly convey.

what the eye no longer sees the heart no longer grieves for. Grice. Vide sytactics. Grice played with ‘elimination rules’ for his scope device. Once applied, Grice said: “What the eye no longer sees the heart no longer grieves for.” “As they say,” he added.

whewell: English philosopher of science. He was a master of Trinity , Cambridge. Francis Bacon’s early work on induction was furthered by Whewell, J. F. W. Herschel, and J. S. Mill, who attempted to create a logic of welfare economics Whewell, William 970   970 induction, a methodology that can both discover generalizations about experience and prove them to be necessary. Whewell’s theory of scientific method is based on his reading of the history of the inductive sciences. He thought that induction began with a non-inferential act, the superimposition of an idea on data, a “colligation,” a way of seeing facts in a “new light.” Colligations generalize over data, and must satisfy three “tests of truth.” First, colligations must be empirically adequate; they must account for the given data. Any number of ideas may be adequate to explain given data, so a more severe test is required. Second, because colligations introduce generalizations, they must apply to events or properties of objects not yet given: they must provide successful predictions, thereby enlarging the evidence in favor of the colligation. Third, the best inductions are those where evidence for various hypotheses originally thought to cover unrelated kinds of data “jumps together,” providing a consilience of inductions. Consilience characterizes those theories achieving large measures of simplicity, generality, unification, and deductive strength. Furthermore, consilience is a test of the necessary truth of theories, which implies that what many regard as merely pragmatic virtues of theories like simplicity and unifying force have an epistemic status. Whewell thus provides a strong argument for scientific realism. Whewell’s examples of consilient theories are Newton’s theory of universal gravitation, which covers phenomena as seemingly diverse as the motions of the heavenly bodies and the motions of the tides, and the undulatory theory of light, which explains both the polarization of light by crystals and the colors of fringes. There is evidence that Whewell’s methodology was employed by Maxwell, who designed the influential Cavendish Laboratories at Cambridge. Peirce and Mach favored Whewell’s account of method over Mill’s empiricist theory of induction. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “From induction to deduction, via abduction.”

whistle. If you can’t say it you can’t whistle it either – But you can implicate it. “To say” takes a ‘that’-clause. “To implicate” takes a ‘that’-clause. Grice: “ ‘To whisle’ takes a ‘that’-clause, “By whistling, E communicates that he intends his emissee to be there.” “Whistle and I’ll be there” – Houseman to a Shropshire farmer.

whitehead: cited by H. P. Grice, a. n., philosopher of science, educated first at the Sherborne School in Dorsetshire and then at Trinity , Cambridge, Whitehead emerged as a first-class mathematician with a rich general background. In 5 he became a fellow of Trinity  and remained there in a teaching role until 0. In the early 0s Bertrand Russell entered Trinity  as a student in mathematics; by the beginning of the new century Russell had become not only a student and friend but a colleague of Whitehead’s at Trinity . Each had written a first book on algebra Whitehead’s A Treatise on Universal Algebra won him election to the Royal Society in 3. When they discovered that their projected second books largely overlapped, they undertook a collaboration on a volume that they estimated would take about a year to write; in fact, it was a decade later that the three volumes of their ground-breaking Principia Mathematica appeared, launching symbolic logic in its modern form. In the second decade of this century Whitehead and Russell drifted apart; their responses to World War I differed radically, and their intellectual interests and orientations diverged. Whitehead’s London period 024 is often viewed as the second phase of a three-phase career. His association with the  of London involved him in practical issues affecting the character of working-class education. For a decade Whitehead held a professorship at the Imperial  of Science and Technology and also served as dean of the Faculty of Science in the , chair of the Academic Council which managed educational affairs in London, and chair of the council that managed Goldsmith’s . His book The Aims of Education 8 is a collection of essays largely growing out of reflections on the experiences of these years. Intellectually, Whitehead’s interests were moving toward issues in the philosophy of science. In the years 922 he published An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, The Concept of Nature, and The Principle of Relativity  the third led to his later 1 election as a fellow of the British Academy. In 4, at the age of sixty-three, Whitehead made a dramatic move, both geographically and intellectually, to launch phase three of his career: never having formally studied philosophy in his life, he agreed to become professor of philosophy at Harvard , a position he held until retirement in 7. The accompanying intellectual shift was a move from philosophy of science to metaphysics. The earlier investigations had assumed the self-containedness of nature: “nature is closed to mind.” The philosophy of nature examined nature at the level of abstraction entailed by this assumption. Whitehead had come to regard philosophy as “the critic of abstractions,” a notion introduced in Science and the Modern World 5. This book traced the intertwined emergence of Newtonian science and its philosophical presuppositions. It noted that with the development of the theory of relativity in the twentieth century, scientific understanding had left behind the Newtonian conceptuality that had generated the still-dominant philosophical assumptions, and that those philosophical assumptions considered in themselves had become inadequate to explicate our full concrete experience. Philosophy as the critic of abstractions must recognize the limitations of a stance that assumes that nature is closed to mind, and must push deeper, beyond such an abstraction, to create a scheme of ideas more in harmony with scientific developments and able to do justice to human beings as part of nature. Science and the Modern World merely outlines what such a philosophy might be; in 9 Whitehead published his magnum opus, titled Process and Reality. In this volume, subtitled “An Essay in Cosmology,” his metaphysical understanding is given its final form. It is customary to regard this book as the central document of what has become known as process philosophy, though Whitehead himself frequently spoke of his system of ideas as the philosophy of organism. Process and Reality begins with a sentence that sheds a great deal of light upon Whitehead’s metaphysical orientation: “These lectures are based upon a recurrence to that phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume.” Descartes, adapting the classical notion of substance to his own purposes, begins a “phase of philosophic thought” by assuming there are two distinct, utterly different kinds of substance, mind and matter, each requiring nothing but itself in order to exist. This assumption launches the reign of epistemology within philosophy: if knowing begins with the experiencing of a mental substance capable of existing by itself and cut off from everything external to it, then the philosophical challenge is to try to justify the claim to establish contact with a reality external to it. The phrase “and ended with Hume” expresses Whitehead’s conviction that Hume and more elegantly, he notes, Santayana showed that if one begins with Descartes’s metaphysical assumptions, skepticism is inevitable. Contemporary philosophers have talked about the end of philosophy. From Whitehead’s perspective such talk presupposes a far too narrow view of the nature of philosophy. It is true that a phase of philosophy has ended, a phase dominated by epistemology. Whitehead’s response is to offer the dictum that all epistemological difficulties are at bottom only camouflaged metaphysical difficulties. One must return to that moment of Cartesian beginning and replace the substance metaphysics with an orientation that avoids the epistemological trap, meshes harmoniously with the scientific understandings that have displaced the much simpler physics of Descartes’s day, and is consonant with the facts of evolution. These are the considerations that generate Whitehead’s fundamental metaphysical category, the category of an actual occasion. An actual occasion is not an enduring, substantial entity. Rather, it is a process of becoming, a process of weaving together the “prehensions” a primitive form of ‘apprehension’ meant to indicate a “taking account of,” or “feeling,” devoid of conscious awareness of the actual occasions that are in the immediate past. Whitehead calls this process of weaving together the inheritances of the past “concrescence.” An actual entity is its process of concrescence, its process of growing together into a unified perspective on its immediate past. The seeds of Whitehead’s epistemological realism are planted in these fundamental first moves: “The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant’s philosophy. . . . For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world.” It is customary to compare an actual occasion with a Leibnizian monad, with the caveat that whereas a monad is windowless, an actual occasion is “all window.” It is as though one were to take Aristotle’s system of categories and ask what would result if the category of substance were displaced from its position of preeminence by the category of relation  the result would, mutatis mutandis, be an understanding of being somewhat on the model of a Whiteheadian actual occasion. In moving from Descartes’s dualism of mental substance and material substance to his own notion of an actual entity, Whitehead has been doing philosophy conceived of as the critique of abstractions. He holds that both mind and matter are abstractions from the concretely real. They are important abstractions, necessary for everyday thought and, of supreme importance, absolutely essential in enabling the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries to accomplish their magnificent advances in scientific thinking. Indeed, Whitehead, in his philosophy of science phase, by proceeding as though “nature is closed to mind,” was operating with those selfsame abstractions. He came to see that while these abstractions were indispensable for certain kinds of investigations, they were, at the philosophical level, as Hume had demonstrated, a disaster. In considering mind and matter to be ontological ultimates, Descartes had committed what Whitehead termed the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The category of an actual occasion designates the fully real, the fully concrete. The challenge for such an orientation, the challenge that Process and Reality is designed to meet, is so to describe actual occasions that it is intelligible how collections of actual occasions, termed “nexus” or societies, emerge, exhibiting the characteristics we find associated with “minds” and “material structures.” Perhaps most significantly, if this challenge is met successfully, biology will be placed, in the eyes of philosophy, on an even footing with physics; metaphysics will do justice both to human beings and to human beings as a part of nature; and such vexing contemporary problem areas as animal rights and environmental ethics will appear in a new light. Whitehead’s last two books, Adventures of Ideas 3 and Modes of Thought 8, are less technical and more lyrical than is Process and Reality. Adventures of Ideas is clearly the more significant of these two. It presents a philosophical study of the notion of civilization. It holds that the social changes in a civilization are driven by two sorts of forces: brute, senseless agencies of compulsion on the one hand, and formulated aspirations and articulated beliefs on the other. These two sorts of forces are epitomized by barbarians and Christianity in the ancient Roman world and by steam and democracy in the world of the industrial revolution. Whitehead’s focal point in Adventures of Ideas is aspirations, beliefs, and ideals as instruments of change. In particular, he is concerned to articulate the ideals and aspirations appropriate to our own era. The character of such ideals and aspirations at any moment is limited by the philosophical understandings available at that moment, because in their struggle for release and efficacy such ideals and aspirations can appear only in the forms permitted by the available philosophical discourse. In the final section of Adventures of Ideas Whitehead presents a statement of ideals and aspirations fit for our era as his own philosophy of organism allows them to take shape and be articulated. The notions of beauty, truth, adventure, zest, Eros, and peace are given a content drawn from the technical understandings elaborated in Process and Reality. But in Adventures of Ideas a less technical language is used, a language reminiscent of the poetic imagery found in the style of Plato’s Republic, a language making the ideas accessible to readers who have not mastered Process and Reality, but at the same time far richer and more meaningful to those who have. Whitehead notes in Adventures of Ideas that Plato’s later thought “circles round the interweaving of seven main notions, namely, The Ideas, The Physical Elements, The Psyche, The Eros, The Harmony, The Mathematical Relations, The Receptacle. These notions are as important for us now, as they were then at the dawn of the modern world, when civilizations of the old type were dying.” Whitehead uses these notions in quite novel and modern ways; one who is unfamiliar with his metaphysics can get something of what he means as he speaks of the Eros of the Universe, but if one is familiar from Process and Reality with the notions of the Primordial Nature of God and the Consequent Nature of God then one sees much deeper into the meanings present in Adventures of Ideas. Whitehead was not religious in any narrow, doctrinal, sectarian sense. He explicitly likened his stance to that of Aristotle, dispassionately considering the requirements of his metaphysical system as they refer to the question of the existence and nature of God. Whitehead’s thoughts on these matters are most fully developed in Chapter 11 of Science and the Modern World, in the final chapter of Process and Reality, and in Religion in the Making 6. These thoughts are expressed at a high level of generality. Perhaps because of this, a large part of the interest generated by Whitehead’s thought has been within the community of theologians. His ideas fairly beg for elaboration and development in the context of particular modes of religious understanding. It is as though many modern theologians, recalling the relation between the theology of Aquinas and the metaphysics of Aristotle, cannot resist the temptation to play Aquinas to Whitehead’s Aristotle. Process theology, or Neo-Classical Theology as it is referred to by Hartshorne, one of its leading practitioners, has been the arena within which a great deal of clarification and development of Whitehead’s ideas has occurred. Whitehead was a gentle man, soft-spoken, never overbearing or threatening. He constantly encouraged students to step out on their own, to develop their creative capacities. His concern not to inhibit students made him a notoriously easy grader; it was said that an A-minus in one of his courses was equivalent to failure. Lucien Price’s Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead chronicles many evenings of discussion in the Whitehead household. He there described Whitehead as follows: his face, serene, luminous, often smiling, the complexion pink and white, the eyes brilliant blue, clear and candid as a child’s yet with the depth of the sage, often laughing or twinkling with humour. And there was his figure, slender, frail, and bent with its lifetime of a scholar’s toil. Always benign, there was not a grain of ill will anywhere in him; for all his formidable armament, never a wounding word.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Definite descriptions in Whitehead and Russell and in the vernacular,” “Definite descriptions in Whitethead’s and Russell’s formalese and in Strawson’s vernacular” -- BANC.

weiner kraus -- Vienna Circle  vide ayerism -- a group of philosophers and scientists who met periodically for discussions in Vienna from 2 to 8 and who proposed a self-consciously revolutionary conception of scientific knowledge. The Circle was initiated by the mathematician Hans Hahn to continue a prewar forum with the physicist Philip Frank and the social scientist Otto Neurath after the arrival in Vienna of Moritz Schlick, a philosopher who had studied with Max Planck. Carnap joined in 6 from 1 in Prague; other members included Herbert Feigl from 0 in Iowa, Friedrich Waismann, Bergmann, Viktor Kraft, and Bela von Juhos. Viennese associates of the Circle included Kurt Gödel, Karl Menger, Felix Kaufmann, and Edgar Zilsel. Popper was not a member or associate. During its formative period the Circle’s activities were confined to discussion meetings many on Vitters’s Tractatus. In 9 the Circle entered its public period with the formation of the Verein Ernst Mach, the publication of its manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis by Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath tr. in Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology, 3, and the first of a series of philosophical monographs edited by Frank and Schlick. It also began collaboration with the independent but broadly like-minded Berlin “Society of Empirical Philosophy,” including Reichenbach, Kurt Grelling, Kurt Lewin, Friedrich Kraus, Walter Dubislav, Hempel, and Richard von Mises: the groups together organized their first public conferences in Prague and Königsberg, acquired editorship of a philosophical journal renamed Erkenntnis, and later organized the international Unity of Science congresses. The death and dispersion of key members from 4 onward Hahn died in 4, Neurath left for Holland in 4, Carnap left for the United States in 5, Schlick died in 6 did not mean the extinction of Vienna Circle philosophy. Through the subsequent work of earlier visitors Ayer, Ernest Nagel, Quine and members and collaborators who emigrated to the United States Carnap, Feigl, Frank, Hempel, and Reichenbach, the logical positivism of the Circle Reichenbach and Neurath independently preferred “logical empiricism” strongly influenced the development of analytic philosophy. The Circle’s discussions concerned the philosophy of formal and physical science, and even though their individual publications ranged much wider, it is the attitude toward science that defines the Circle within the philosophical movements of central Europe at the time. The Circle rejected the need for a specifically philosophical epistemology that bestowed justification on knowledge claims from beyond science itself. In this, the Circle may also have drawn on a distinct Austrian tradition a thesis of its historian Neurath: in most of G.y, science and philosophy had parted ways during the nineteenth century. Starting with Helmholtz, of course, there also arose a movement that sought to distinguish the scientific respectability of the Kantian tradition from the speculations of G. idealism, yet after 0 neo-Kantians insisted on the autonomy of epistemology, disparaging earlier fellow travelers as “positivist.” Yet the program of reducing the knowledge claim of science and providing legitimations to what’s left found wide favor with the more empirical-minded like Mach. Comprehensive description, not explanation, of natural phenomena became the task for theorists who no longer looked to philosophy for foundations, but found them in the utility of their preferred empirical procedures. Along with the positivists, the Vienna Circle thought uneconomical the Kantian answer to the question of the possibility of objectivity, the synthetic a priori. Moreover, the Vienna Circle and its conventionalist precursors Poincaré and Duhem saw them contradicted by the results of formal science. Riemann’s geometries showed that questions about the geometry of physical space were open to more than one answer: Was physical space Euclidean or non-Euclidean? It fell to Einstein and the pre-Circle Schlick Space and Time in Contemporary Physics, 7 to argue that relativity theory showed the untenability of Kant’s conception of space and time as forever fixed synthetic a priori forms of intuition. Yet Frege’s anti-psychologistic critique had also shown empiricism unable to account for knowledge of arithmetic and the conventionalists had ended the positivist dream of a theory of experiential elements that bridged the gap between descriptions of fact and general principles of science. How, then, could the Vienna Circle defend the claim  under attack as just one worldview among others  that science provides knowledge? The Circle confronted the problem of constitutive conventions. As befitted their self-image beyond Kant and Mach, they found their paradigmatic answer in the theory of relativity: they thought that irreducible conventions of measurement with wide-ranging implications were sharply separable from pure facts like point coincidences. Empirical theories were viewed as logical structures of statements freely created, yet accountable to experiential input via their predictive consequences identifiable by observation. The Vienna Circle defended empiricism by the reconceptualization of the relation between a priori and a posteriori inquiries. First, in a manner sympathetic to Frege’s and Russell’s doctrine of logicism and guided by Vitters’s notion of tautology, arithmetic was considered a part of logic and treated as entirely analytical, without any empirical content; its truth was held to be exhausted by what is provable from the premises and rules of a formal symbolic system. Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language, 4, assimilated Gödel’s incompleteness result by claiming that not every such proof could be demonstrated in those systems themselves which are powerful enough to represent classical arithmetic. The synthetic a priori was not needed for formal science because all of its results were non-synthetic. Second, the Circle adopted verificationism: supposedly empirical concepts whose applicability was indiscernible were excluded from science. The terms for unobservables were to be reconstructed by logical operations from the observational terms. Only if such reconstructions were provided did the more theoretical parts of science retain their empirical character. Just what kind of reduction was aimed for was not always clear and earlier radical positions were gradually weakened; Reichenbach instead considered the relation between observational and theoretical statements to be probabilistic. Empirical science needed no synthetic a priori either; all of its statements were a posteriori. Combined with the view that the analysis of the logical form of expressions allowed for the exact determination of their combinatorial value, verificationism was to exhibit the knowledge claims of science and eliminate metaphysics. Whatever meaning did not survive identification with the scientific was deemed irrelevant to knowledge claims Reichenbach did not share this view either. Since the Circle also observed the then long-discussed ban on issuing unconditional value statements in science, its metaethical positions may be broadly characterized as endorsing noncognitivism. Its members were not simply emotivists, however, holding that value judgments were mere expressions of feeling, but sought to distinguish the factual and evaluative contents of value judgments. Those who, like Schlick Questions of Ethics, 0, engaged in metaethics, distinguished the expressive component x desires y of value judgments from their implied descriptive component doing zfurthers aim y and held that the demand inherent in moral principles possessed validity if the implied description was true and the expressed desire was endorsed. This analysis of normative concepts did not render them meaningless but allowed for psychological and sociological studies of ethical systems; Menger’s formal variant Morality, Decision and Social Organization, 4 proved influential for decision theory. The semiotic view that knowledge required structured representations was developed in close contact with foundational research in mathematics and depended on the “new” logic of Frege, Russell, and Vitters, out of which quantification theory was emerging. Major new results were quickly integrated albeit controversially and Carnap’s works reflect the development of the conception of logic itself. In his Logical Syntax he adopted the “Principle of Tolerance” vis-à-vis the question of the foundation of the formal sciences: the choice of logics and languages was conventional and constrained, apart from the demand for consistency, only by pragmatic considerations. The proposed language form and its difference from alternatives simply had to be stated as exactly as possible: whether a logico-linguistic framework as a whole correctly represented reality was a cognitively meaningless question. Yet what was the status of the verifiability principle? Carnap’s suggestion that it represents not a discovery but a proposal for future scientific language use deserves to be taken seriously, for it not only characterizes his own conventionalism, but also amplifies the Circle’s linguistic turn, according to which all philosophy concerned ways of representing, rather than the nature of the represented. What the Vienna Circle “discovered” was how much of science was conventional: its verificationism was a proposal for accommodating the creativity of scientific theorizing without accommodating idealism. Whether an empirical claim in order to be meaningful needed to be actually verified or only potentially verifiable, or fallible or only potentially testable, and whether so by current or only by future means, became matters of discussion during the 0s. Equally important for the question whether the Circle’s conventionalism avoided idealism and metaphysics were the issues of the status of theoretical discourse about unobservables and the nature of science’s empirical foundation. The view suggested in Schlick’s early General Theory of Knowledge 8, 2d. ed. 5 and Frank’s The Causal Law and its Limitations 2 and elaborated in Carnap’s “Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science” in Foundations of the Unity of Science I.1, 8 characterized the theoretical language as an uninterpreted calculus that is related to the fully interpreted observational language only by partial definitions. Did such an instrumentalism require for its empirical anchor the sharp separation of observational from theoretical terms? Could such a separation even be maintained? Consider the unity of science thesis. According to the methodological version, endorsed by all members, all of science abides by the same criteria: no basic methodological differences separate the natural from the social or cultural sciences Geisteswissenschaften as claimed by those who distinguish between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’. According to the metalinguistic version, all objects of scientific knowledge could in principle be comprehended by the same “universal” language. Physicalism asserts that this is the language that speaks of physical objects. While everybody in the Circle endorsed physicalism in this sense, the understanding of its importance varied, as became clear in the socalled protocol sentence debate. The nomological version of the unity thesis was only later clearly distinguished: whether all scientific laws could be reduced to those of physics was another matter on which Neurath came to differ. Ostensively, this debate concerned the question of the form, content, and epistemological status of scientific evidence statements. Schlick’s unrevisable “affirmations” talked about phenomenal states in statements not themselves part of the language of science “The Foundation of Knowledge,” 4, tr. in Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism. Carnap’s preference changed from unrevisable statements in a primitive methodologically solipsistic protocol language that were fallibly translatable into the physicalistic system language 1; see Unity of Science, 4, via arbitrary revisable statements of that system language that are taken as temporary resting points in testing 2, to revisable statements in the scientific observation language 5; see “Testability and Meaning,” Philosophy of Science, 637. These changes were partly prompted by Neurath, whose own revisable “protocol statements” spoke, amongst other matters, of the relation between observers and the observed in a “universal slang” that mixed expressions of the physicalistically cleansed colloquial and the high scientific languages “Protocol Statements,”  tr. in Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism. Ultimately, these proposals answered to different projects. Since all agreed that all statements of science were hypothetical, the questions of their “foundation” concerned rather the very nature of Vienna Circle philosophy. For Schlick philosophy became the activity of meaning determination inspired by Vitters; Carnap pursued it as the rational reconstruction of knowledge claims concerned only with what Reichenbach called the “context of justification” its logical aspects, not the “context of discovery”; and Neurath replaced philosophy altogether with a naturalistic, interdisciplinary, empirical inquiry into science as a distinctive discursive practice, precluding the orthodox conception of the unity of science. The Vienna Circle was neither a monolithic nor a necessarily reductionist philosophical movement, and quick assimilation to the tradition of British empiricism mistakes its struggles with the formcontent dichotomy for foundationalism, when instead sophisticated responses to the question of the presuppositions of their own theories of knowledge were being developed. In its time and place, the Circle was a minority voice; the sociopolitical dimension of its theories  stressed more by some Neurath than others Schlick  as a renewal of Enlightenment thought, ultimately against the rising tide of Blutund-Boden metaphysics, is gaining recognition. After the celebrated “death” of reductionist logical positivism in the 0s the historical Vienna Circle is reemerging as a multifaceted object of the history of analytical philosophy itself, revealing in nuce different strands of reasoning still significant for postpositivist theory of science. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “What Freddie brought us from Vienna.”

williams: “There are many Williams in Oxford, but only one “B. A. O., “ as he pretentiously went by!” – H. P. Grice. B. A. O. London-born Welsh philosopher who has made major contributions to many fields but is primarily known as a moral philosopher. His approach to ethics, set out in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 5, is characterized by a wide-ranging skepticism, directed mainly at the capacity of academic moral philosophy to further the aim of reflectively living an ethical life. One line of skeptical argument attacks the very idea of practical reason. Attributions of practical reasons to a particular agent must, in Williams’s view, be attributions of states that can potentially explain the agent’s action. Therefore such reasons must be either within the agent’s existing set of motivations or within the revised set of motivations that the agent would acquire upon sound reasoning. Williams argues from these minimal assumptions that this view of reasons as internal reasons undermines the idea of reason itself being a source of authority over practice. Williams’s connected skepticism about the claims of moral realism is based both on his general stance toward realism and on his view of the nature of modern societies. In opposition to internal realism, Williams has consistently argued that reflection on our conception of the world allows one to develop a conception of the world maximally independent of our peculiar ways of conceptualizing reality  an absolute conception of the world. Such absoluteness is, he argues, an inappropriate aspiration for ethical thought. Our ethical thinking is better viewed as one way of structuring a form of ethical life than as the ethical truth about how life is best lived. The pervasive reflectiveness and radical pluralism of modern societies makes them inhospitable contexts for viewing ethical concepts as making knowledge available to groups of concept users. Modernity has produced at the level of theory a distortion of our ethical practice, namely a conception of the morality system. This view is reductionist, is focused centrally on obligations, and rests on various fictions about responsibility and blame that Williams challenges in such works as Shame and Necessity 3. Much academic moral philosophy, in his view, is shaped by the covert influence of the morality system, and such distinctively modern outlooks as Kantianism and utilitarianism monopolize the terms of contemporary debate with insufficient attention to their origin in a distorted view of the ethical. Williams’s views are not skeptical through and through; he retains a commitment to the values of truth, truthfulness in a life, and individualism. His most recent work, which thematizes the long-implicit influence of Nietzsche on his ethical philosophy, explicitly offers a vindicatory “genealogical” narrative for these ideals.

willkür, v.  Hobson’s choice. Grice: “‘will-kuer’ is a fascinating German expression, literally will-care’.”

wilson’s ultimate counterexample to Grice -- Grice’s counterexample – “the ultimate counter-example” -- counterinstance, also called counterexample. 1 A particular instance of an argument form that has all true premises but a false conclusion, thereby showing that the form is not universally valid. The argument form ‘p 7 q, - p / , ~q’, for example, is shown to be invalid by the counterinstance ‘Grass is either red or green; Grass is not red; Therefore, grass is not green’. 2 A particular false instance of a statement form, which demonstrates that the form is not a logical truth. A counterinstance to the form ‘p 7 q / p’, for example, would be the statement ‘If grass is either red or green, then grass is red’. 3 A particular example that demonstrates that a universal generalization is false. The universal statement ‘All large cities in the United States are east of the Mississippi’ is shown to be false by the counterinstance of San Francisco, which is a large city in the United States that is not east of the Mississippi. V.K. counterpart theory, a theory that analyzes statements about what is possible and impossible for individuals statements of de re modality in terms of what holds of counterparts of those individuals in other possible worlds, a thing’s counterparts being individuals that resemble it without being identical with it. The name ‘counterpart theory’ was coined by David Lewis, the theory’s principal exponent. Whereas some theories analyze ‘Mrs. Simpson might have been queen of England’ as ‘In some possible world, Mrs. Simpson is queen of England’, counterpart theory analyzes it as ‘In some possible world, a counterpart of Mrs. Simpson is queen of a counterpart of England’. The chief motivation for counterpart theory is a combination of two views: a de re modality should be given a possible worlds analysis, and b each actual individual exists only in the actual world, and hence cannot exist with different properties in other possible worlds. Counterpart theory provides an analysis that allows ‘Mrs. Simpson might have been queen’ to be true compatibly with a and b. For Mrs. Simpson’s counterparts in other possible worlds, in those worlds where she herself does not exist, may have regal properties that the actual Mrs. Simpson lacks. Counterpart theory is perhaps prefigured in Leibniz’s theory of possibility. 

wilson: this is the way to quote J. C. Wilson. Grice loved him, and thanked Farquarhson for editing his papers. A favourite with Grice and Collingwood. In the chapter on “Language” in “The idea of art,” Collingwood refers to the infamous, “That building is the Bodelian.” – which may repreeent two propositions: one as an answer to what building is that? The other as an answer to Which building is the Bodleian? Grice would consider that the distinction is impilcatural, and that stress is merely implicatural – and only one proposition is at stake – do not multiply propositions beyond necessity. not to be confused with wilson, author of “Grice: The ultimate counterexample” -- Oxonian philosopher, like Grice. Cook Wilson studied with T. H. Green before becoming Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford and leading the Oxford reaction against the then entrenched absolute idealism. More influential as a tutor than as a writer, his major oeuvre, Statement and Inference, was posthumously reconstructed from drafts of papers, philosophical correspondence, and an extensive set of often inconsistent lectures for his logic courses. A staunch critic of Whitehead’s mathematical logic, Wilson conceived of logic as the study of thinking, an activity unified by the fact that thinking either is knowledge or depends on knowledge “What we know we kow”. Wilson claims that knowledge involves apprehending an object that in most cases is independent of the act of apprehension and that knowledge is indefinable without circularity, views he defended by appealing to common usage. Many of Wilson’s ideas are disseminated by H. W. B. Joseph, especially in his “Logic.” Rejecting “symbolic logic,” Joseph attempts to reinvigorate traditional logic conceived along Wilsonian lines. To do so Joseph combined a careful exposition of Aristotle with insights drawn from idealistic logicians. Besides Joseph, Wilson decisively influenced a generation of Oxford philosophers including Prichard and Ross, and Grice who explores the ‘interrogative subordination’ in the account of ‘if.’ “Who killed Cock Robin”.

winchism: After P. Winch, P. London-born philosopher. He quotes  Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of one’s remarks – Grice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t hesitate to say that it seems red to me” – Surely pointless, but an incredible truth meant to refute G. A. Paul!” Winch translated Vitters’s “little essay on value” which Grice “did not use for [his] essay on the conception of value.” (“Kultur und Wert.”). Grice: “Not contented with natural science, Winch wants a social one!”

wodeham: “If Adam of Wodeham was called Wodeham, I should, by the same token, be called “Harborne”” – H. P. Grice. Oxonian philosopher, like Grice. Adam de English Franciscan philosopher-theologian who lectured on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at London, Norwich, and Oxford. His published works include the Tractatus de indivisibilibus; his Lectura secunda Norwich lectures; and an abbreviation of his Oxford lectures by Henry Totting of Oyta, published by John Major. Wodeham’s main work, the Oxford lectures, themselves remain unpublished. A brilliant interpreter of Duns Scotus, whose original manuscripts he consulted, Wodeham deemed Duns Scotus the greatest Franciscan doctor. William Ockham, Wodeham’s teacher, was the other great influence on Wodeham’s philosophical theology. Wodeham defended Ockham’s views against attacks mounted by Walter Chatton; he also wrote the prologue to Ockham’s Summa logicae. Wodeham’s own influence rivaled that of Ockham. Among the authors he strongly influenced are Gregory of Rimini, John of Mirecourt, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Pierre d’Ailly, Peter Ceffons, Alfonso Vargas, Peter of Candia Alexander V, Henry Totting of Oyta, and John Major. Wodeham’s theological works were written for an audience with a very sophisticated understanding of current issues in semantics, logic, and medieval mathematical physics. Contrary to Duns Scotus and Ockham, Wodeham argued that the sensitive and intellective souls were not distinct. He further develops the theory of intuitive cognition, distinguishing intellectual intuition of our own acts of intellect, will, and memory from sensory intuition of external objects. Scientific knowledge based on experience can be based on intuition, according to Wodeham. He distinguishes different grades of evidence, and allows that sensory perceptions may be mistaken. Nonetheless, they can form the basis for scientific knowledge, since they are reliable; mistakes can be corrected by reason and experience. In semantic theory, Wodeham defends the view that the immediate object of scientific knowledge is the complexe significabile, that which the conclusion is designed to signify. Oxonian philosopher, like Grice. Adam de (c. 1295–1358), English Franciscan philosopher- who lectured on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at Oxford. His oeuvre includes a “Tractatus de indivisibilibus, divisum in cinque partibus”; his “Lectura secunda”  and “Lecturae Oxonienses” as transcribed by Henry Totting of Oyta, and published by John Major. Wodeham’s main work, like Grice’s, the Oxford lectures, themselves remain only partially published. A brilliant interpreter of Duns Scotus, whose original manuscripts he consulted in his main unpublication, Wodeham deems Duns Scotus the greatest Franciscan doctor. Occam, Wodeham’s teacher, is the other great influence on Wodeham (“I treasure the razor he gave me for my birthday.”) Wodeham defends his tutor Ockham’s views against attacks mounted by Walter Chatton. Grice was familiar with Wodeham (“from Wodeham, as it happens”) because he wrote the prologue to Ockham’s Summa logicae. Wodeham’s own influence rivals that of Ockham. Among the authors he strongly influenced are Gregory of Rimini, John of Mirecourt, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Pierre d’Ailly, Peter Ceffons, Alfonso Vargas, Peter of Candia (Alexander V), Henry Totting of Oyta, John Major, and lastly, but certainly not leastly, H. P. Grice. Wodeham’s lectures were composed for tutees with a very sophisticated understanding of current issues in semantics, logic, and mathematical physics. Contrary to Duns Scotus and Occam, Wodeham argues – and this is borrowed by Grice -- that the sensitive and intellective souls are not distinct (vide Grice, “The power structure of the soul”). Wodeham further develops the theory of intuitive cognition, distinguishing intellectual intuition of our own acts of intellect, will, and memory from sensory intuition of external objects. This is developed by Grice in his contrast of “I am not hearing a noise,” and “That is not blue.” Thus, knowledge based on experience can be based on intuition, according to Wodeham. Wodeham goes on to distinguishs different grades (or degrees, as Grice prefers, which Grice symbolises as ‘d’) of evidence (for credibility and desirability) and allows that this or that sensory perception may be mistaken (“but if all were, we are in trouble’). Nonetheless, they can form the basis for knowledge, since they are, caeteris paribus, reliable. “A mistake can always be corrected by reason and experience. In semantic and pragmatic theories, Wodeham defends the view that the immediate object of knowledge is what he calls the “complexum significabile,” that which the conclusion is designed to signify. wodeham, adam. Obviously born at Wodeham, or Woodham as the current spelling goes (“But I prefer the old, vide Occam” – Grice). Like Gregorio da Rimini, obsessed with the complexe significabile, “which has obvious connections with what I call the propositional complexus.”

wollaston: when Grice is in a humorous mood, or mode, as he prefers, he cites Wollaston at large! Wollaston is notorious for arguing that the immorality of this or that action lies in an utterer who describes it implicating a false proposition. Wollaston maintains that there is harmony between reason (or truth) and happiness. Therefore, any ction that contradict truth through misrepresentation thereby frustrates human happiness and is thus “plain evil.” Wollaston gives the example of Willard [Quine] who, to pay Paul [Grice], robs Peter [Strawspm] stealing his watch.  Grice comments: “In falsely epresenting Strawson’s watch as his own, Willard makes the act wrong, even if he did it to pay me what he owed me.” Wollaston’s views, particularly his taking morality to consist in universal and necessary truths, were influenced by the rationalists Ralph Cudworth and Clarke. Among his many critics the most famous is, as Grice would expect, Hume, who contends that Wollaston’s theory implies an absurdity (“unless you disimplicate it in the bud.”). For Hume, any action concealed from public view (e.g., adultery) conveys (or ‘explicates’) no false proposition and therefore is not immoral, since one can annul it, to use Grice’s jargon. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Wollaston and the longitudinal unity of philosophy.” cited by H. P. Grice. English moralist notorious for arguing that the immorality of actions lies in their implying false propositions. An assistant headmaster who later took priestly orders, Wollaston maintains in his one published work, The Religion of Nature Delineated 1722, that the foundations of religion and morality are mutually dependent. God has preestablished a harmony between reason or truth and happiness, so that actions that contradict truth through misrepresentation thereby frustrate human happiness and are thus evil. For instance, if a person steals another’s watch, her falsely representing the watch as her own makes the act wrong. Wollaston’s views, particularly his taking morality to consist in universal and necessary truths, were influenced by the rationalists Ralph Cudworth and Clarke. Among his many critics the most famous was Hume, who contends that Wollaston’s theory implies an absurdity: any action concealed from public view e.g., adultery conveys no false proposition and therefore is not immoral. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Why bother with Wollaston?” BANC.

wollheim: R. A. London-born philosopher of Eastern-European ancestry, BPhil Oxon, Balliol (under D. Marcus) and All Souls.  Examined by H. P. Grice. “What’s two times two?” Wollheim treasured that examination. It was in the context of a discussion of J. S. Mill and I. Kant, for whom addition and multiplication are ‘synthetic’ – a priori for Kant, a posteriori for Mill. Grice was trying to provide a counterexample to Mill’s thesis that all comes via deduction or induction. Refs.: I. C. Dengler and Luigi Speranza, “Wollheilm and Grice,” for the Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

woodianism: Roy Hudd: “Not to be confused with the woodianisms of Victoria Wood.” -- Grice loved O. P. Wood, as anyone at Oxford did – even those who disliked Ryle! Refs.: H. P. Grice, “O. P. Wood and some remarks about the senses,” --  O. P. Wood, “Implicatura in Hereford,” for The Swimming-Pool Library, custodian: Luigi Speranza – Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

woozleyianism: R. M. Harnish discussed H. P. Grice’s implicaturum with A. D. Woozley. Woozley would know because he had been in contact with Grice since for ever. Woozley had a closer contact with Austin, since, unlike Grice, ‘being from the right side of the tracks,’ he socialized with Austin in what Berlin pretentiously calls the ‘early beginnings of Oxford philosophy,’ as if the Middle Ages never happened. Woozley edited Reid, that Grice read, or reed. Since the first way to approach Grice’s philosophy is with his colleagues at his Play Group, Woozley plays a crucial role. Grice: “While Woozley would attend Austin’s Sat. morns., he wouldn’t say much – in fact, he seldom said much.” Refs.: R. M. Harnish and A. D. Woozley, “Implicatura,” for The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

wyclif: “It never ceased to amaze me how Wyclif was able to find Anglo-Saxon terms for all the “Biblia Vulgata”!” – H. P. Grice. English Griceian philosophical theologian and religious reformer. He worked for most of his life in Oxford as a secular clerk, teaching philosophy and writing extensively in the field. The mode of thought expressed in his surviving works is one of extreme realism, and in this his thought fostered the split of Bohemian, later Hussite, philosophy from that of the G. masters teaching in Prague. His worldline philosophical summa was most influential for his teaching on universals, but also dealt extensively with the question of determinism; these issues underlay his later handling of the questions of the Eucharist and of the identity of the church respectively. His influence on English philosophy was severely curtailed by the growing hostility of the church to his ideas, the condemnation of many of his tenets, the persecution of his followers, and the destruction of his writings. Refs.: H. P. Grice: “The problem of universals: from Bologna to Oxford,” Villa Grice.

X

X: SUBJECT INDEX:

X: NAME INDEX: XENOPHANES -- XENOPHON

xenophon: Grice: “You have to be carefully when researching for this philosopher in Italy – They spell it ‘Senofonte’ Grecian soldier and historian, author of several Socratic dialogues, along with important works on history, education, political theory, and other topics. He was interested in philosophy, and he was a penetrating and intelligent “social thinker” whose views on morality and society have been influential over many centuries. His perspective on Socrates’ character and moral significance provides a valuable supplement and corrective to the better-known views of Plato. Xenophon’s Socratic dialogues, the only ones besides Plato’s to survive intact, help us obtain a broader picture of the Socratic dialogue as a literary genre. They also provide precious evidence concerning the thoughts and personalities of other followers of Socrates, such as Antisthenes and Alcibiades. Xenophon’s longest and richest Socratic work is the Memorabilia, or “Memoirs of Socrates,” which stresses Socrates’ self-sufficiency and his beneficial effect on his companions. Xenophon’s Apology of Socrates and his Symposium were probably intended as responses to Plato’s Apology and Symposium. Xenophon’s Socratic dialogue on estate management, the Oeconomicus, is valuable for its underlying social theory and its evidence concerning the role and status of women in classical Athens. Refs.: Speranza, “All you need is Loeb,” Villa Grice.

Y

Y: SUBJECT INDEX: YOG-AND-ZOG

yog and zog: Grice: “This is my paradox on ‘si’ – ‘if’ – All philosophers have a paradox named after them, and I thought it was high time to name a paradox after me.” --. “My inspiration was Carroll’s “What the tortoise said to Achilles.” Trust me to go to the defense of the underdog, or undertortoise!” “Achilles had enough praise by the Romans!” -- “If” (Cicero’s ‘si’) is a problem for Grice. “Especially in it being the only subordinate particle I have seriously explored.” According to Strawson and Wiggins, this was Grice having forged his shining new tool – the distinction between ‘By emitting x, An emissor coomunicates that p” and “The emissum x ‘means’ ‘p.’ Apply that to ‘if.’ In Strawson and Wiggins’s precis, for Grice, ‘p yields q’ is part of the conversational implicaturum – for Strawson and Wiggins it is part of the conventional implicaturum. They agree on ‘p  horseshoe q’ being the explicit emissum or explicatum in “Emissor explicitly conveys and communicates that p horseshoe q.” For Grice, the implicaturum, which, being conversational is cancellable, is calculated on the assumption that the addressee can work out that the emissor has non-truth-functional grounds for the making of any stronger claim. For Strawson, that non-truth-functional reason is precisely ‘p yields q,’ which leads Strawson to think that the thing is not cancellable and conventionally implicated. If Strawson were right that this is Grice forging a new shining tool to crack the crib of reality and fashioning thereby a new shining skid under his metaphysical feet, it would be almost the second use of the tool!  This is an expansion by Grice on the implicaturum of a ‘propositio conditionalis.’ Grice, feeling paradoxical, invites us to suppose a scenario involving ‘if.’ He takes it as a proof that his account of the conversational implicaturum of ‘if’ is, as Strawson did not agree, correct, and that what an utterer explicitly conveys by ‘if p, q’ is ‘p > q.’  that two chess players, Yog and Zog, play 100 games under the following conditions. Yog is white nine of ten times. There are no draws.  And the results are:  Yog, when white, won 80 of 90 games. Yog, when black, won zero of ten games.  This implies that:  8/9 times, if Yog was white, Yog won. 1/2 of the time, if Yog lost, Yog was black.  9/10 that either Yog wasnt white or he won.  From these statements, it might appear one could make these deductions by contraposition and conditional disjunction: If Yog was white, then 1/2 of the time Yog won. 9/10 times, if Yog was white, then he won.  But both propositions are untrue. They contradict the assumption. In fact, they do not provide enough information to use Bayesian reasoning to reach those conclusions. That might be clearer if the propositions had instead been stated differently. When Yog was white, Yog won 8/9 times. No information is given about when Yog was black. When Yog lost, Yog was black 1/2 the time. No information is given about when Yog won. (9/10 times, either Yog was black and won, Yog was black and lost, or Yog was white and won. No information is provided on how the 9/10 is divided among those three situations. The paradox by Grice shows that the exact meaning of statements involving conditionals and probabilities is more complicated than may be obvious on casual examination. Refs.: Grice’s interest with ‘if’ surely started after he carefully read the section on ‘if’ and the horseshoe in Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory. He was later to review his attack on Strawson in view of Strawson’s defense in ‘If and the horseshoe.’ The polemic was pretty much solved as a matter of different intuitions: what Grice sees as a conversational implicaturum, Strawson does see as an ‘implicaturum,’ but a non-defeasible one – what Grice would qualify as ‘conventional.’ Grice leaves room for an implicaturum to be nonconversational and yet nonconventional, but it is not worth trying to fit Strawson’s suggestion in this slot, since Strawson, unlike Grice, has nothing against a convention. Grice was motivated to formulate his ‘paradox,’ seeing that Strawson was saying that the so-called ‘paradoxes’ of ‘entailment’ and ‘implication’ are a misnomer. “They are not paradoxical; they are false!” Grice has specific essays on both the paradoxes of entailment and the paradoxes of implication-. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The University of California, Berkeley.

Z

Z: SUBJECT INDEX: ZEIGARNICK -- ZETTEL -- ZWECKRATIONALITÄT

Z: NAME INDEX:

ITALIAN: ZABARELLA

ENGLISH

OTHER: ZOROASTRO

zabarella: Grice: “Zabarella is what I would call a proto-Griceain.” In fact, at Villa Grice, Grice was often called the English Zabarella, after philosopher Jacopo Zabarella, of Padova. Zabarella produces extensive commentaries on Grice’s favourite tract by Aristotle, “De Anima,” and Physica and also discussed some Aristotelian interpreters. However, Zabarella’s most original contribution is his work in semantics, “Opera logica.” Zabarella regards semantics as a preliminary study that provides the tools necessary for philosophical analysis. Two such tools are what Zabarella calls “order” (cf. Grice, ‘be orderly’). Another tool is what Zabarella calls “ method.” Order teaches us how to organize the content of a discipline to apprehend it more easily. Method teaches us how to draw a syllogistic inference. Zabarella reduces the varieties of orders and methods classified by other interpreters to compositive order, and resolutive order, and composite method and and resolutive method. The compositive order from a principle to this or that corollary applies to this or that speculative, alethic or theoretical discipline. The ‘resolutive’ order, from a desired end to the means appropriate to its achievement applies to this or that practical discipline, such as ‘pragmatics’ understood as a manual of rules of etiquette. This much is already in Aristotle. However, Zabarella offers an original analysis of ‘method.’ The compositive method infers a particular consequence or corollary from a ‘generic’ principle. The ‘resolutive’ method INFERS an originating gneric principle from this or that particular consequence, corollary, or instantiantion, as in inductive reasoning or in reasoning from effect to cause. Zabarella’s terminology influenced Galileo’s mechanics, and has been applied to Grice’s inference of the principle of conversational co-operation out from the only evidence which Grice has, which is this or that ‘dyadic’ exchange, as he calls it. In Grice’s case, his corpus is intentionally limited to conversations between two philosophers: A: What’s that? B: A pillar box? A: What colour is it? B: Seems red to me. From such an exchange, Grice infers the principle of conversational co-operation. It clashes when a cancellation (or as Grice prefers, an annulation) is on sight: “I surely don’t mean to imply that it MIGHT actually be red.” “Then why be so guarded? I thought you were cooperating.”H. P. Grice. “We can regard Jacopo as an Aristotelian philosopher who taught at the  of Padua. He wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and On the Soul and also discussed other interpreters such as Averroes. However, his most original contribution was his work in logic, Opera logica 1578. Zabarella regards logic as a preliminary study that provides the tools necessary for philosophical analysis. Two such tools are order and method: order teaches us how to organize the content of a discipline to apprehend it more easily; method teaches us how to draw syllogistic inferences. Zabarella reduces the varieties of orders and methods classified by other interpreters to compositive and resolutive orders and methods. The compositive order from first principles to their consequences applies to theoretical disciplines. The resolutive order from a desired end to means appropriate to its achievement applies to practical disciplines. This much was already in Aristotle. Zabarella offers an original analysis of method. The compositive method infers particular consequences from general principles. The resolutive method infers originating principles from particular consequences, as in inductive reasoning or in reasoning from effect to cause. It has been suggested that Zabarella’s terminology might have influenced Galileo’s mechanics. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, Notes on I Tatti’s edition of Zabarella, “On methods,” -- H. P. Grice, “Zabarella,” Speranza, “Grice and Zabarella,” Villa Grice.

zeigarnik effect: ‘Conversation as a compete task and the Zeigmaik effect’ -- H. P. Grice. the selective recall of uncompleted tasks in comparison to completed tasks. The effect was named for Zeigarnik, a student of K. Lewin, who discovered it and described it in the Psychologische Forschung. Subjects received an array of short tasks, such as counting backward and stringing beads, for rapid completion. Performance on half of these was interrupted. Subsequent recall for the tasks favored the interrupted tasks. Zeigarnik concluded that recall is influenced by motivation and not merely associational strength. The effect was thought relevant to Freud’s claim that unfulfilled wishes are persistent. Lewin attempted to derive the effect from field theory, suggesting that an attempt to reach a goal creates a tension released only when that goal is reached; interruption of the attempt produces a tension favoring recall. Conditions affecting the Zeigarnik effect are incompletely understood, as is its significance. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Conversation as a complete task and the Zeigmarnik effect.” BANC

zettel: Grice entitled his further notes on logic and conversation, “zettel” – “What’s good enough for Vitters is good enough for me.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Conversation: Zettel,” BANC.

zoroastro: the founder of so-called ‘zoroastrianism.’ H. P. Grice wrote, “Thus Implicated Zarahustra,” the national religion of ancient Iran. Zoroastrianism suffered a steep decline after the seventh century A.D. because of conversion to Islam. Of a remnant of roughly 100,000 adherents today, three-fourths are Parsis “Persians” in or from western India; the others are Iranian Zoroastrians. The tradition is identified with its prophet; his name in Persian, Zarathushtra, is preserved in G. and Griceian, but the ancient Grecian rendering of that name, Zoroaster, is the form used in most other modern European languages. Zoroaster’s hymns to Ahura Mazda “the Wise Lord”, called the Gathas, are interspersed among ritual hymns to other divine powers in the collection known as the Avesta. In them, Zoroaster seeks reassurance that good will ultimately triumph over evil and that Ahura Mazda will be a protector to him in his prophetic mission. The Gathas expect that humans, by aligning themselves with the force of righteousness and against evil, will receive bliss and benefit in the next existence. The dating of the texts and of the prophet himself is an elusive matter for scholars, but it is clear that Zoroaster lived somewhere in Iran sometime prior to the emergence of the Achaemenid empire in the sixth century B.C. His own faith in Ahura Mazda, reflected in the Gathas, came to be integrated with other strains of old Indo-Iranian religion. We see these in the Avesta’s hymns and the religion’s ritual practices. They venerate an array of Iranian divine powers that resemble in function the deities found in the Vedas of India. A common Indo-Iranian heritage is indicated conclusively by similarities of language and of content between the Avesta and the Vedas. Classical Zoroastrian orthodoxy does not replace the Indo-Iranian divinities with Ahura Mazda, but instead incorporates them into its thinking more or less as Ahura Mazda’s agents. The Achaemenid kings from the sixth through the fourth centuries B.C. mention Ahura Mazda in their inscriptions, but not Zoroaster. The Parthians, from the third century B.C. to the third century A.D., highlighted Mithra among the Indo-Iranian pantheon. But it was under the Sasanians, who ruled Iran from the third to the seventh centuries, that Zoroastrianism became the established religion. A salient doctrine is the teaching concerning the struggle between good and evil. The time frame from the world’s creation to the final resolution or judgment finds the Wise Lord, Ahura Mazda or Ohrmazd, in the Pahlavi language of Sasanian times, locked in a struggle with the evil spirit, Angra Mainyu in Pahlavi, Ahriman. The teaching expands on an implication in the text of the Gathas, particularly Yasna 30, that the good and evil spirits, coming together in the beginning and establishing the living and inanimate realms, determined that at the end benefit would accrue to the righteous but not the wicked. In Sasanian times, there was speculative concern to assert Ahura Mazda’s infinity, omnipotence, and omniscience, qualities that may indicate an impact of Mediterranean philosophy. For example, the Bundahishn, a Pahlavi cosmological and eschatological narrative, portrays Ahura Mazda as infinite in all four compass directions but the evil spirit as limited in one and therefore doomed to ultimate defeat. Such doctrine has been termed by some dualistic, in that it has at least in Sasanian times seen the power of God rivaled by that of an evil spirit. Zoroastrians today assert that they are monotheists, and do not worship the evil spirit. But to the extent that the characterization may hold historically, Zoroastrianism has manifested an “ethical” dualism, of good and evil forces. Although capable of ritual pollution through waste products and decay, the physical world, God’s creation, remains potentially morally good. Contrast “ontological” dualism, as in gnostic and Manichaean teaching, where the physical world itself is the result of the fall or entrapment of spirit in matter. In the nineteenth century, Zoroastrian texts newly accessible to Europe produced an awareness of the prophet’s concern for ethical matters. Nietzsche’s values in his work Thus Spake Zarathustra, however, are his own, not those of the ancient prophet. The title is arresting, but the connection of Nietzsche with historical Zoroastrianism is a connection in theme only, in that the work advances ideas about good and evil in an oracular style. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Nietzsche’s implicatura,” BANC.

zweckrationalität: “I chose this to be one of the last entries in my dictionary!” -- Grice: “What I like about Weber’s ‘zweckrationalitaet’ is that it’s one of the latter items in my dictionary!” -- Grice: “I’m slightly confused by Weber, who was hardly a philosopher, and his use of ‘zweck,’ – which Kant would have disliked. H. P. Grice used the vernacular here, since he found it tricky to look for the Oxonian for ‘Zweck.’ As he was reading Weber, Grice realises that one of the main theoretical goals of Weber’s work is to understand how a social process (such as a conversation, seen as a two-player game) become “rationalized,” taking up certain themes of philosophy of history since Hegel as part of social theory. Conversation, as part of culture, e.g., becomes ‘rationalised’ in the process of the “disenchantment of a world views” in the West, a process that Weber thinks has “universal significance.” But because of his goal-oriented theory of action and his non-cognitivism in ethics, Weber sees rationalization, like Grice, and unlike, say, Habermas, exclusively in terms of the spread of purposive, or MEANS–ends rationality (“Zweckrationalität”). Rational action means choosing the most effective MEANS of achieving one’s goals and implies judging the consequences of one’s actions and choices. In contrast, value rationality (“Wertrationalität,” that Grice translates as ‘worth-rationality’) consists of any action oriented to this or that ultimate END, where considerations of consequences are irrelevant. Although such action is rational insofar as it directs and organises human conduct, the choice of this or that end, or this or that value itself cannot be, for Weber, unlike Grice, a matter for rational or scientific judgment. Indeed, for Weber this means that politics is the sphere for the struggle between at least two of this or that irreducibly competing ultimate end, where “gods and demons fight it out” and charismatic leaders invent new gods and values. Grice tries to look for a way to give a criterion of rationality other than the ‘common-or-garden’ means-end variety. When it comes to conversation, see, Speranza, “The feast of [conversational] reason – Grice’s Conversational immanuel – three steps towards a critique of conversational reason.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Conversational rationality,” in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

References: Following the tradition of H. P. Grice’s Playgroup, only Oxonian English-born male philosophers of Grice’s generation listed)

Abbagnano, N. Dizionario di filosofia.

Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia.

Austin, J. L. Philosophical papers, edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Austin, J. L. Sense and sensibilia, reconstructed from manuscript notes by G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Austin, J. L. How to do things with words, ed. by J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Blackburn, S. W. Spreading the word. Oxford.

Bostock, D. Logic.

Croce, B.  Estetica

Flew, A. G. N. Logic and language. Oxford: Blackwell.

Galileo, Scienza

Gentile, Storia della filosofia

Grice, H. P. Studies in the Way of Words

Grice, H. P. Negation and privation

Grice, H. P. The conception of value. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.

Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.

Grice, H. P., D. F. Pears, and P. F. Strawson, ‘Metaphysics,’ in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics. London: Macmillan.

Hampshire, S. N. Thought and action. London: Chatto and Windus.

Hampshire, S. N. and H. L. A. Hart, Intention, decision, and certainty. Mind.

Hare, R. M. The language of morals. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.

Hart, H. L. A. Review of Holloway, The Philosophical Quarterly’

Leonardi, Filosofia

Machiavelli, Il principe

Mondolfo, Storia della filosofia

Nowell-Smith, P. H. Ethics. Middlesex: Penguin

Pears, D. F. Philosophical psychology. London: Duckworth.

Pears, D. F. Motivated irrationality.

Pears, D. F. and H. P. Grice, The philosophy of action.

Speranza, Minutes of H. P. Grice’s Play-Group – The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

Strawson, P. F. Introduction to Logical Theory.

Strawson, P. F. Logico-Linguistic Papers.

Strawson, P. F. and H. P. Grice, In defense of a dogma.

Strawson, P. F. and H. P. Grice, Categories

Strawson, P. F. and H. P. Grice, Meaning.

Thomson, J. F. and H. P. Grice, The philosophy of action.

Urmson, J. O. Philosophical Analysis: its development between the two wars.

Vico, Scienza nuova

Warnock, G. J. The object of morality

Warnock, G. J. Language and Morals

Woozley, A. D. On H. P. Grice. – A. M. G. is Anna Maria Ghersi – Ghersi instilled and keeps instilling – never ceases to instill -- in Luigi Speranza a love for philosophy.