Q
Q: SUBJECT INDEX: QUIDDITAS
Q: NAME INDEX: ITALIAN
Q: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: QUINTON (Grice’s collaborator)
quale: a property of a mental state or event, in
particular of a sensation and a perceptual state, which determine “what it is
like” to have them. Sometimes ‘phenomenal properties’ and ‘qualitative
features’ are used with the same meaning. The felt difference between pains and
itches is said to reside in differences in their “qualitative character,” i.e.,
their qualia. For those who accept an “actobject” conception of perceptual
experience, qualia may include such properties as “phenomenal redness” and
“phenomenal roundness,” thought of as properties of sense-data, “phenomenal
objects,” or portions of the visual field. But those who reject this conception
do not thereby reject qualia; a proponent of the adverbial analysis of
perceptual experience can hold that an experience of “sensing redly” is so in
virtue of, in part, what qualia it has, while denying that there is any sense
in which the experience itself is red. Qualia are thought of as
non-intentional, i.e., non-representational, features of the states that have
them. So in a case of “spectrum inversion,” where one person’s experiences of
green are “qualitatively” just like another person’s experiences of red, and
vice versa, the visual experiences the two have when viewing a ripe tomato
would be alike in their intentional features both would be of a red, round,
bulgy surface, but would have different qualia. Critics of physicalist and
functionalist accounts of mind have argued from the possibility of spectrum
inversion and other kinds of “qualia inversion,” and from such facts as that no
physical or functional description will tell one “what it is like” to smell
coffee, that such accounts cannot accommodate qualia. Defenders of such
accounts are divided between those who claim that their accounts can
accommodate qualia and those who claim that qualia are a philosophical myth and
thus that there are none to accommodate.
qualitative predicate, a kind of predicate postulated in some attempts
to solve the grue paradox. 1 On the syntactic view, a qualitative predicate is
a syntactically more or less simple predicate. Such simplicity, however, is
relative to the choice of primitives in a language. In English, ‘green’ and
‘blue’ are primitive, while ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ must be introduced by
definitions ‘green and first examined before T, or blue otherwise’, ‘blue and
first examined before T, or green otherwise’, respectively. In other languages,
‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ may be primitive and hence “simple,” while ‘green’ and
‘blue’ must be introduced by definitions ‘grue and first examined before T, or
bleen otherwise’, ‘bleen and first examined before T, or grue otherwise’,
respectively. 2 On the semantic view, a qualitative predicate is a predicate to
which there corresponds a property that is “natural” to us or of easy semantic
access. The quality of greenness is easy and natural; the quality of grueness
is strained. 3 On the ontological view, a qualitative predicate is a predicate
to which there corresponds a property that is woven into the causal or modal
structure of reality in a way that gruesome properties are not. qualities, properties or characteristics.
There are three specific philosophical senses. 1 Qualities are physical
properties, logical constructions of physical properties, or dispositions.
Physical properties, such as mass, shape, and electrical charge, are properties
in virtue of which objects can enter into causal relations. Logical
constructions of physical properties include conjunctions and disjunctions of
them; being 10 # .02 cm long is a disjunctive property. A disposition of an
object is a potential for the object to enter into a causal interaction of some
specific kind under some specific condition; e.g., an object is soluble in
water if and only if it would dissolve were it in enough pure water. Locke held
a very complex theory of powers. On Locke’s theory, the dispositions of objects
are a kind of power and the human will is a kind of power. However, the human
will is not part of the modern notion of disposition. So, predicating a
disposition of an object implies a subjunctive conditional of the form: if
such-and-such were to happen to the object, then so-and-so would happen to it;
that my vase is fragile implies that if my vase were to be hit sufficiently
hard then it would break. Whether physical properties are distinct from
dispositions is disputed. Three sorts of qualities are often distinguished.
Primary qualities are physical properties or logical constructions from
physical properties. Secondary qualities are dispositions to produce sensory
experiences of certain phenomenal sorts under appropriate conditions. The
predication of a secondary quality, Q, to an object implies that if the object
were to be perceived under normal conditions then the object would appear to be
Q to the perceivers: if redness is a secondary quality, then that your coat is
red implies that if your coat were to be seen under normal conditions, it would
look red. Locke held that the following are secondary qualities: colors,
tastes, smells, sounds, and warmth or cold. Tertiary qualities are dispositions
that are not secondary qualities, e.g. fragility. Contrary to Locke, the color
realist holds that colors are either primary or tertiary qualities; so that x
is yellow is logically independent of the fact that x looks yellow under normal
conditions. Since different spectral reflectances appear to be the same shade
of yellow, some color realists hold that any shade of yellow is a disjunctive
property whose components are spectral reflectances. 2 Assuming a
representative theory of perception, as Locke did, qualities have two
characteristics: qualities are powers or dispositions of objects to produce
sensory experiences sensedata on some theories in humans; and, in sensory
experience, qualities are represented as intrinsic properties of objects.
Instrinsic properties of objects are properties that objects have independently
of their environment. Hence an exact duplicate of an object has all the
intrinsic properties of the original, and an intrinsic property of x never has
the form, x-stands-in-suchand-such-a-relation-to-y. Locke held that the primary
qualities are extension size, figure shape, motion or rest, solidity
impenetrability, and number; the primary qualities are correctly represented in
perception as intrinsic features of objects, and the secondary qualities listed
in 1 are incorrectly represented in perception as intrinsic features of
objects. Locke seems to have been mistaken in holding that number is a quality
of objects. Positional qualities are qualities defined in terms of the relative
positions of points in objects and their surrounding: shape, size, and motion
and rest. Since most of Locke’s primary qualities are positional, some
non-positional quality is needed to occupy positions. On Locke’s account,
solidity fulfills this role, although some have argued Hume that solidity is
not a primary quality. 3 Primary qualities are properties common to and
inseparable from all matter; secondary qualities are not really qualities in
objects, but only powers of objects to produce sensory effects in us by means
of their primary qualities. This is another use of ‘quality’ by Locke, where
‘primary’ functions much like ‘real’ and real properties are given by the
metaphysical assumptions of the science of Locke’s time. Qualities are distinct
from representations of them in predications. Sometimes the same quality is
represented in different ways by different predications: ‘That is water’ and
‘That is H2O’. The distinction between qualities and the way they are
represented in predications opens up the Lockean possibility that some
qualities are incorrectly represented in some predications. Features of
predications are sometimes used to define a quality; dispositions are sometimes
defined in terms of subjunctive conditionals see definition of ‘secondary
qualities’ in 1, and disjunctive properties are defined in terms of disjunctive
predications. Features of predications are also used in the following
definition of ‘independent qualities’: two qualities, P and Q, are independent
if and only if, for any object x, the predication of P and of Q to x are
logically independent i.e., that x is P and that x is Q are logically
independent; circularity and redness are independent, circularity and
triangularity are dependent. If two determinate qualities, e.g., circularity
and triangularity, belong to the same determinable, say shape, then they are
dependent, but if two determinate qualities, e.g., squareness and redness,
belong to different determinables, say shape and color, they are independent.
quantum: Quantification:
H. P. Grice, “Every nice girl loves a sailor.” -- the application of one or
more quantifiers e.g., ‘for all x’, ‘for some y’ to an open formula. A
quantification or quantified sentence results from first forming an open
formula from a sentence by replacing expressions belonging to a certain class
of expressions in the sentences by variables whose substituends are the
expressions of that class and then prefixing the formula with quantifiers using
those variables. For example, from ‘Bill hates Mary’ we form ‘x hates y’, to
which we prefix the quantifiers ‘for all x’ and ‘for some y’, getting the
quantification sentence ‘for all x, for some y, x hates y’ ‘Everyone hates
someone’. In referential quantification only terms of reference may be replaced
by variables. The replaceable terms of reference are the substituends of the
variables. The values of the variables are all those objects to which reference
could be made by a term of reference of the type that the variables may
replace. Thus the previous example ‘for all x, for some y, x hates y’ is a
referential quantification. Terms standing for people ‘Bill’, ‘Mary’, e.g. are
the substituends of the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’. And people are the values of the
variables. In substitutional quantification any type of term may be replaced by
variables. A variable replacing a term has as its substituends all terms of the
type of the replaced term. For example, from ‘Bill married Mary’ we may form
‘Bill R Mary’, to which we prefix the quantifier ‘for some R’, getting the
substitutional quantification ‘for some R, Bill R Mary’. This is not a
referential quantification, since the substituends of ‘R’ are binary predicates
such as ‘marries’, which are not terms of reference. Referential quantification
is a species of objectual quantification. The truth conditions of
quantification sentences objectually construed are understood in terms of the
values of the variable bound by the quantifier. Thus, ‘for all v, fv’ is true
provided ‘fv’ is true for all values of the variable ‘v’; ‘for some v, fv’ is
true provided ‘fv’ is true for some value of the variable ‘v’. The truth or
falsity of a substitutional quantification turns instead on the truth or
falsity of the sentences that result from the quantified formula by replacing
variables by their substituends. For example, ‘for some R, Bill R Mary’ is true
provided some sentence of the form ‘Bill R Mary’ is true. In classical logic
the universal quantifier ‘for all’ is definable in terms of negation and the
existential quantifier ‘for some’: ‘for all x’ is short for ‘not for some x
not’. The existential quantifier is similarly definable in terms of negation
and the universal quantifier. In intuitionistic logic, this does not hold. Both
quantifiers are regarded as primitive. Then there’s quantifying in, use of a
quantifier outside of an opaque construction to attempt to bind a variable
within it, a procedure whose legitimacy was first questioned by Quine. An
opaque construction is one that resists substitutivity of identity. Among others,
the constructions of quotation, the verbs of propositional attitude, and the
logical modalities can give rise to opacity. For example, the position of ‘six’
in: 1 ‘six’ contains exactly three letters is opaque, since the substitution
for ‘six’ by its codesignate ‘immediate successor of five’ renders a truth into
a falsehood: 1H ‘the immediate successor of five’ contains exactly three
letters. Similarly, the position of ‘the earth’ in: 2 Tom believes that the
earth is habitable is opaque, if the substitution of ‘the earth’ by its
codesignate ‘the third planet from the sun’ renders a sentence that Tom would
affirm into one that he would deny: 2H Tom believes that the third planet from
the sun is habitable. Finally, the position of ‘9’ and of ‘7’ in: 3 Necessarily
9 7 is opaque, since the substitution of
‘the number of major planets’ for its codesignate ‘9’ renders a truth into a
falsehood: 3H Necessarily the number of major planets 7. Quine argues that since the positions
within opaque constructions resist substitutivity of identity, they cannot
meaningfully be quantified. Accordingly, the following three quantified
sentences are meaningless: 1I Ex ‘x’ 7,
2I Ex Tom believes that x is habitable, 3I Ex necessarily x 7. 1I, 2I, and 3I are meaningless, since the
second occurrence of ‘x’ in each of them does not function as a variable in the
ordinary nonessentialist quantificational way. The second occurrence of ‘x’ in
1I functions as a name that names the twenty-fourth letter of the alphabet. The
second occurrences of ‘x’ in 2I and in 3I do not function as variables, since
they do not allow all codesignative terms as substituends without change of
truth-value. Thus, they may take objects as values but only objects designated
in certain ways, e.g., in terms of their intensional or essential properties.
So, short of acquiescing in an intensionalist or essentialist metaphysics,
Quine argues, we cannot in general quantify into opaque contexts. Quantum: one of Aristotle’s categories.
Cicero’s translation of Aristotle -- quantum logic, the logic of which the
models are certain non-Boolean algebras derived from the mathematical
representation of quantum mechanical systems. The models of classical logic
are, formally, Boolean algebras. This is the central notion of quantum logic in
the literature, although the term covers a variety of modal logics, dialogics,
and operational logics proposed to elucidate the structure of quantum mechanics
and its relation to classical mechanics. The dynamical quantities of a classical
mechanical system position, momentum, energy, etc. form a commutative algebra,
and the dynamical properties of the system e.g., the property that the position
lies in a specified range, or the property that the momentum is greater than
zero, etc. form a Boolean algebra. The transition from classical to quantum
mechanics involves the transition from a commutative algebra of dynamical
quantities to a noncommutative algebra of so-called observables. One way of
understanding the conceptual revolution from classical to quantum mechanics is
in terms of a shift from the class of Boolean algebras to a class of
non-Boolean algebras as the appropriate relational structures for the dynamical
properties of mechanical systems, hence from a Boolean classical logic to a non-Boolean
quantum logic as the logic applicable to the fundamental physical processes of
our universe. This conception of quantum logic was developed formally in a
classic 6 paper by G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann although von Neumann first
proposed the idea in 7. The features that distinguish quantum logic from
classical logic vary with the formulation. In the Birkhoffvon Neumann logic,
the distributive law of classical logic fails, but this is by no means a
feature of all versions of quantum logic. It follows from Gleason’s theorem 7
that the non-Boolean models do not admit two-valued homomorphisms in the
general case, i.e., there is no partition of the dynamical properties of a
quantum mechanical system into those possessed by the system and those not possessed
by the system that preserves algebraic structure, and equivalently no
assignment of values to the observables of the system that preserves algebraic
structure. This result was proved independently for finite sets of observables
by S. Kochen and E. P. Specker 7. It follows that the probabilities specified
by the Born interpretation of the state function of a quantum mechanical system
for the results of measurements of observables cannot be derived from a
probability distribution over the different possible sets of dynamical
properties of the system, or the different possible sets of values assignable
to the observables of which one set is presumed to be actual, determined by
hidden variables in addition to the state function, if these sets of properties
or values are required to preserve algebraic structure. While Bell’s theorem 4
excludes hidden variables satisfying a certain locality condition, the
Kochen-Specker theorem relates the non-Booleanity of quantum logic to the
impossibility of hidden variable extensions of quantum mechanics, in which
value assignments to the observables satisfy constraints imposed by the
algebraic structure of the observables. Then there’s quantum mechanics, also
called quantum theory, the science governing objects of atomic and subatomic
dimensions. Developed independently by Werner Heisenberg as matrix mechanics, 5
and Erwin Schrödinger as wave mechanics, 6, quantum mechanics breaks with
classical treatments of the motions and interactions of bodies by introducing
probability and acts of measurement in seemingly irreducible ways. In the
widely used Schrödinger version, quantum mechanics associates with each
physical system a time-dependent function, called the state function
alternatively, the state vector or Y function. The evolution of the system is
represented by the temporal transformation of the state function in accord with
a master equation, known as the Schrödinger equation. Also associated with a
system are “observables”: in principle measurable quantities, such as position,
momentum, and energy, including some with no good classical analogue, such as
spin. According to the Born interpretation 6, the state function is understood
instrumentally: it enables one to calculate, for any possible value of an
observable, the probability that a measurement of that observable would find
that particular value. The formal properties of observables and state functions
imply that certain pairs of observables such as linear momentum in a given
direction, and position in the same direction are incompatible in the sense
that no state function assigns probability 1 to the simultaneous determination
of exact values for both observables. This is a qualitative statement of the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle alternatively, the indeterminacy principle, or
just the uncertainty principle. Quantitatively, that principle places a precise
limit on the accuracy with which one may simultaneously measure a pair of
incompatible observables. There is no corresponding limit, however, on the
accuracy with which a single observable say, position alone, or momentum alone
may be measured. The uncertainty principle is sometimes understood in terms of
complementarity, a general perspective proposed by Niels Bohr according to
which the connection between quantum phenomena and observation forces our
classical concepts to split into mutually exclusive packages, both of which are
required for a complete understanding but only one of which is applicable under
any particular experimental conditions. Some take this to imply an ontology in
which quantum objects do not actually possess simultaneous values for
incompatible observables; e.g., do not have simultaneous position and momentum.
Others would hold, e.g., that measuring the position of an object causes an uncontrollable
change in its momentum, in accord with the limits on simultaneous accuracy
built into the uncertainty principle. These ways of treating the principle are
not uncontroversial. Philosophical interest arises in part from where the
quantum theory breaks with classical physics: namely, from the apparent
breakdown of determinism or causality that seems to result from the irreducibly
statistical nature of the theory, and from the apparent breakdown of
observer-independence or realism that seems to result from the fundamental role
of measurement in the theory. Both features relate to the interpretation of the
state function as providing only a summary of the probabilities for various
measurement outcomes. Einstein, in particular, criticized the theory on these
grounds, and in 5 suggested a striking thought experiment to show that,
assuming no action-at-a-distance, one would have to consider the state function
as an incomplete description of the real physical state for an individual
system, and therefore quantum mechanics as merely a provisional theory.
Einstein’s example involved a pair of systems that interact briefly and then
separate, but in such a way that the outcomes of various measurements performed
on each system, separately, show an uncanny correlation. In 1 the physicist
David Bohm simplified Einstein’s example, and later 7 indicated that it may be
realizable experimentally. The physicist John S. Bell then formulated a
locality assumption 4, similar to Einstein’s, that constrains factors which might
be used in describing the state of an individual system, so-called hidden
variables. Locality requires that in the EinsteinBohm experiment hidden
variables not allow the measurement performed on one system in a correlated
pair immediately to influence the outcome obtained in measuring the other,
spatially separated system. Bell demonstrated that locality in conjunction with
other assumptions about hidden variables restricts the probabilities for
measurement outcomes according to a system of inequalities known as the Bell
inequalities, and that the probabilities of certain quantum systems violate
these inequalities. This is Bell’s theorem. Subsequently several experiments of
the Einstein-Bohm type have been performed to test the Bell inequalities.
Although the results have not been univocal, the consensus is that the
experimental data support the quantum theory and violate the inequalities.
Current research is trying to evaluate the implications of these results,
including the extent to which they rule out local hidden variables. See J.
Cushing and E. McMullin, eds., Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory, 9.
The descriptive incompleteness with which Einstein charged the theory suggests
other problems. A particularly dramatic one arose in correspondence between
Schrödinger and Einstein; namely, the “gruesome” Schrödinger cat paradox. Here
a cat is confined in a closed chamber containing a radioactive atom with a
fifty-fifty chance of decaying in the next hour. If the atom decays it triggers
a relay that causes a hammer to fall and smash a glass vial holding a quantity
of 766 prussic acid sufficient to kill
the cat. According to the Schrödinger equation, after an hour the state
function for the entire atom ! relay ! hammer ! glass vial ! cat system is such
that if we observe the cat the probability for finding it alive dead is 50
percent. However, this evolved state function is one for which there is no
definite result; according to it, the cat is neither alive nor dead. How then
does any definite fact of the matter arise, and when? Is the act of observation
itself instrumental in bringing about the observed result, does that result
come about by virtue of some special random process, or is there some other
account compatible with definite results of measurements? This is the so-called
quantum measurement problem and it too is an active area of research.
quasi-demonstratum: The use of ‘quasi-‘ is implicatural. Grice is
implicating this is NOT a demonstratum. By a demonstratum he is having in mind
a Kaplanian ‘dthis’ or ‘dthat.’ Grice was obsessed with this or that. An
abstractum (such as “philosopher”) needs to be attached in a communicatum by
what Grice calls a ‘quasi-demonstrative,’ and for which he uses “φ.” Consider,
Grice says, an utterance, out of the blue, such as ‘The philosopher in the
garden seems bored,’ involving two iota-operators. As there may be more that a
philosopher in a garden in the great big world, the utterer intends his
addressee to treat the utterance as expandable into ‘The A which is φ is
B,’ where “φ” is a quasi-demonstrative epithet to be identified in a particular
context of utterance. The utterer intends that, to identify the denotatum
of “φ” for a particular utterance of ‘The philosopher in the garden seems
bored,’ the addressee wil proceed via the identification of a particular
philosopher, say Grice, as being a good candidate for being the philosopher
meant. The addressee is also intended to identify the candidate for a denotatum
of φ by finding in the candidate a feature, e. g., that of being the garden at
St. John’s, which is intended to be used to yield a composite epithet
(‘philosopher in St. John’s garden’), which in turn fills the bill of being the
epithet which the utterer believes is being uniquely satisfied by the philosopher
selected as the candidate. Determining the denotatum of “φ” standardly involve
determining what feature the utterer believes is uniquely instantiated by the
predicate “philosopher.” This in turn involves satisfying oneself that some
particular feature is in fact uniquely satisfied by a particular actual item,
viz. a particular philosopher such as Grice seeming bored in the garden of St.
John’s.
Quinton -- A.M.
Quinton’s Gedanke Experiment: from
“Spaces and Times,” Philosophy.“hardly Thought Out” – Is this apriori or a
posteriori? H. P. Grice. Space is ordinarily
seen to be a unique individual. All real things are contained in one and the
same space, and all spaces are part of the one space. In principle, every place
can be reached from every other place by traveling through intermediate places.
The spatial relation is symmetrical. Grice’s friend, A. M. Quinton devised a
thought experiment to challenge this picture. Suppose that we have richly
coherent and connected experience in our dreams just as we have in waking life,
so that it becomes arbitrary to claim that our dream experience is not of an
objectively existing world like the world of our waking experience. If the
space of my waking world and my dream world are not mutually accessible, it is unlikely
that we are justified in claiming to be living in a single spatially isolated
world. Hence, space is not essentially singular. In assessing this account, we
might distinguish between systematic and public physical space and fragmentary
and private experiential space. The two-space myth raises questions about how
we can justify moving from experiential space to objective space in the world
as it is. “We can at least conceive circumstances in which we should have good
reason to say that we know of real things located in two distinct spaces.”
Quinton, “Spaces and Times,” Philosophy 37.
quod: quid – quiddity. A term used by Grice when
talking to his wife. “What quiddity did you buy?”
qv-quæstio --
x-question: Grice borrowed the
erotetic from Cook Wilson, who in fact was influenced by Stout and will also
influence Collingwood. While Grice starts by considering the pseudo-distinction
between x-questions and yes/no questions, he soon finds out that they all
reduce to the x-question, since a yes/no question obviously asks for a variable
(the truth value of the whole proposition) to be filled. Grice sometimes
follows Ryle who had quoted Carnap on the ‘w
frage.’ Grice is aware of the ‘wh’ rune in Anglo-Saxon, but was confused
by ‘how.’ “For fun, I will spell ‘how,’ ‘whow.’” Although a Midlander Grice
preferred the northern English pronunciation of aspirating the ‘wh-‘ and was
irritated that only ‘who’ and ‘whose’ keep the aspiration. Note that “Where is
your wife?” is a qu-quaestio, but “(a) in the kitchen, (b) in the bedroom”
provides a ‘p v q’ as an answer – “Disjunctive answers to intrusive questions.”
Cf. “Iffy answers to intrusive questions.” “The lady doth protest too much:
ampliative conjunctive answers to intrusive questions.”
R
R: SUBJECT INDEX: ratio
R: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: RIMINI – ROSMINI
– ROSSELLI – ROTA -- ROVERE
R: NAME INDEX: ENGLISH: RYLE
Radix -- Radix -- Grice often talked about logical atomism and
molecular propositions – and radix – which is an atomic metaphor -- Democritus,
Grecian preSocratic philosopher. He was born at Abdera, in Thrace. Building on
Leucippus and his atomism, he developed the atomic theory in The Little
World-system and numerous other writings. In response to the Eleatics’ argument
that the impossibility of not-being entailed that there is no change, the
atomists posited the existence of a plurality of tiny indivisible beings the atoms
and not-being the void, or empty
space. Atoms do not come into being or perish, but they do move in the void,
making possible the existence of a world, and indeed of many worlds. For the
void is infinite in extent, and filled with an infinite number of atoms that
move and collide with one another. Under the right conditions a concentration
of atoms can begin a vortex motion that draws in other atoms and forms a
spherical heaven enclosing a world. In our world there is a flat earth
surrounded by heavenly bodies carried by a vortex motion. Other worlds like
ours are born, flourish, and die, but their astronomical configurations may be
different from ours and they need not have living creatures in them. The atoms
are solid bodies with countless shapes and sizes, apparently having weight or
mass, and capable of motion. All other properties are in some way derivative of
these basic properties. The cosmic vortex motion causes a sifting that tends to
separate similar atoms as the sea arranges pebbles on the shore. For instance
heavier atoms sink to the center of the vortex, and lighter atoms such as those
of fire rise upward. Compound bodies can grow by the aggregations of atoms that
become entangled with one another. Living things, including humans, originally
emerged out of slime. Life is caused by fine, spherical soul atoms, and living
things die when these atoms are lost. Human culture gradually evolved through
chance discoveries and imitations of nature. Because the atoms are invisible
and the only real properties are properties of atoms, we cannot have direct
knowledge of anything. Tastes, temperatures, and colors we know only “by
convention.” In general the senses cannot give us anything but “bastard”
knowledge; but there is a “legitimate” knowledge based on reason, which takes
over where the senses leave off
presumably demonstrating that there are atoms that the senses cannot
testify of. Democritus offers a causal theory of perception sometimes called the theory of effluxes accounting for tastes in terms of certain
shapes of atoms and for sight in terms of “effluences” or moving films of atoms
that impinge on the eye. Drawing on both atomic theory and conventional wisdom,
Democritus develops an ethics of moderation. The aim of life is equanimity euthumiê,
a state of balance achieved by moderation and proportionate pleasures. Envy and
ambition are incompatible with the good life. Although Democritus was one of
the most prolific writers of antiquity, his works were all lost. Yet we can
still identify his atomic theory as the most fully worked out of pre-Socratic
philosophies. His theory of matter influenced Plato’s Timaeus, and his
naturalist anthropology became the prototype for liberal social theories.
Democritus had no immediate successors, but a century later Epicurus
transformed his ethics into a philosophy of consolation founded on atomism.
Epicureanism thus became the vehicle through which atomic theory was
transmitted to the early modern period.
ramseyified
description. Grice enjoyed Ramsey’s
Engish humour: if you can say it, you can’t whistle it either. Applied by Grice
in “Method.”Agent A is in a D state just in case there is a predicate
“D” introduced via implicit definition
by nomological generalisation L within theory θ, such L obtains, A
instantiates D. Grice distinguishes the ‘descriptor’ from a more primitive
‘name.’ The reference is to Ramsey. The issue is technical and relates to the
introduction of a predicate constant – something he would never have dared to
at Oxford with Gilbert Ryle and D. F. Pears next to him! But in the New World,
they loved a formalism! And of course Ramsey would not have anything to do with
it! Ramsey: p. r. – cited by Grice, “The Ramseyfied description. Frank Plumpton
330, influential 769 R 769 British
philosopher of logic and mathematics. His primary interests were in logic and
philosophy, but decades after his untimely death two of his publications
sparked new branches of economics, and in pure mathematics his combinatorial
theorems gave rise to “Ramsey theory” Economic Journal 7, 8; Proc. London Math.
Soc., 8. During his lifetime Ramsey’s philosophical reputation outside
Cambridge was based largely on his architectural reparation of Whitehead and
Russell’s Principia Mathematica, strengthening its claim to reduce mathematics
to the new logic formulated in Volume 1
a reduction rounded out by Vitters’s assessment of logical truths as
tautologous. Ramsey clarified this logicist picture of mathematics by radically
simplifying Russell’s ramified theory of types, eliminating the need for the
unarguable axiom of reducibility Proc. London Math. Soc., 5. His philosophical
work was published mostly after his death. The canon, established by Richard
Braithwaite The Foundations of Mathematics . . . , 1, remains generally intact
in D. H. Mellor’s edition Philosophical Papers, 0. Further writings of varying
importance appear in his Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics M. C.
Galavotti, ed., 1 and On Truth Nicholas Rescher and Ulrich Majer, eds., 1. As
an undergraduate Ramsey observed that the redundancy account of truth “enables
us to rule out at once some theories of truth such as that ‘to be true’ means
‘to work’ or ‘to cohere’ since clearly ‘p works’ and ‘p coheres’ are not
equivalent to ‘p’.” Later, in the canonical “Truth and Probability” 6, he
readdressed to knowledge and belief the main questions ordinarily associated
with truth, analyzing probability as a mode of judgment in the framework of a
theory of choice under uncertainty. Reinvented and acknowledged by L. J. Savage
Foundations of Statistics, 4, this forms the theoretical basis of the currently
dominant “Bayesian” view of rational decision making. Ramsey cut his
philosophical teeth on Vitters’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus. His translation
appeared in 2; a long critical notice of the work 3 was his first substantial
philosophical publication. His later role in Vitters’s rejection of the
Tractatus is acknowledged in the foreword to Philosophical Investigations 3.
The posthumous canon has been a gold mine. An example: “Propositions” 9,
reading the theoretical terms T, U, etc. of an axiomatized scientific theory as
variables, sees the theory’s content as conveyed by a “Ramsey sentence” saying
that for some T, U, etc., the theory’s axioms are true, a sentence in which all
extralogical terms are observational. Another example: “General Propositions
and Causality” 9, offering in a footnote the “Ramsey test” for acceptability of
conditionals, i.e., add the if-clause to your ambient beliefs minimally
modified to make the enlarged set self-consistent, and accept the conditional
if the then-clause follows. Refs:
“Philosophical psychology,” in BANC. ‘
Ramée, philosopher who questioned the authority of
Aristotle and influenced the methods of f semantics. He published his “Dialecticae
institutiones libri XV,” reworked as “Dialectique,” the first philosophical work in what Grice
(‘Gris’) calls ‘the vernacular.’ “Not much different, I should say – cf.
Redecraft translating Logic!” Ramée is appointed
by François I as the first Regius Professor in Paris, where he teaches until he
is killed in the St. Bartholomew’s Day
Massacre. Ramée doubted that we can apodictically intuit the major premises
required for Aristotle’s rational syllogism. Turning instead to Plato, Ramée proposed
that a “Socratizing” of logic would produce a more workable and fruitful result.
As had Agricola and Sturm, Ramée reworks the rhetorical and liberal arts
traditions’ concepts of “invention, judgment, and practice,” placing “method”
in the center of judgment. Proceeding in these stages, we can “read” nature’s
“arguments,” because they are modeled on natural reasoning, which in turn can
emulate the reasoning by which God creates. Often Ramée’s results are depicted
graphically in tables as in chapter IX of Hobbes’s Leviathan. When carefully
done they would show both what is known and where gaps require further
investigation; the process from invention to judgment is continuous. Ramée’s works saw some 750 editions in one
century, fostering the “Ramist” movement in emerging Protestant universities
and the colonies. He influenced Bacon, Hobbes, Milton, Methodism, Cambridge
Platonism, and Alsted. Inconsistencies make him less than a major figure in the
history of logic, but his many works and their rapid popularity led to
philosophical and educational efforts to bring the world of learning to the
“plain man” by using the vernacular, and by more closely correlating the rigor
of philosophy with the memorable and persuasive powers of rhetoric; he saw this
goal as Socratic.
Rashdall: English historian, theologian, and personal
idealist. While acknowledging that Berkeley needed to be corrected by Kant,
Rashdall defended Berkeley’s thesis that objects only exist for minds. From
this he concluded that there is a divine mind that guarantees the existence of
nature and the objectivity of morality. In his most important philosophical
work, The Theory of Good and Evil 7, Rashdall argued that actions are right or
wrong according to whether they produce well-being, in which pleasure as well
as a virtuous disposition are constituents. Rashdall coined the name ‘ideal
utilitarianism’ for this view.
Illatum: rational
choice: as oppose to irrational
choice. V. choose. Grice, “Impicatures of ‘choosing’” “Hobson’s choice, or
Hobson’s ‘choice’?” Pears on conversational implicaturum and choosing. That includes
choosing in its meaning, and then it is easy to ac- cept the
suggestion that choosing might be an S-factor, and that the hypothetical might
be a Willkür: one of
Grice’s favourite words from Kant – “It’s so Kantish!” I told Pears about this,
and having found it’s cognate with English ‘choose,’ he immediately set to
write an essay on the topic!” f., ‘option, discretion, caprice,’ from
MidHG. willekür, f., ‘free
choice, free will’; gee kiesen and Kur-.kiesen, verb, ‘to select,’ from Middle
High German kiesen, Old
High German chiosan, ‘to
test, try, taste for the purpose of testing, test by tasting, select after
strict examination.’ Gothic kiusan,
Anglo-Saxon ceósan,
English to choose.
Teutonic root kus (with
the change of s into r, kur in the participle erkoren, see also Kur,
‘choice’), from pre-Teutonic gus,
in Latin gus-tus, gus-tare, Greek γεύω for γεύσω, Indian root juš, ‘to select, be fond of.’
Teutonic kausjun passed
as kusiti into
Slavonic. Insofar as a philosopher explains and predicts the actum as
consequences of a choice, which are themselves explained in terms of alleged
reasons, it must depict agents as to some extent rational. Rationality, like
reasons, involves evaluation, and just as one can assess the rationality of
individual choices, so one can assess the rationality of social choices and
examine how they are and ought to be related to the preferences and judgments
of the actor. In addition, there are intricate questions concerning rationality
in ‘strategic’ situations in which outcomes depend on the choices of multiple
individuals. Since rationality is a central concept in branches of philosophy
such as Grice’s pragmatics, action theory, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy
of mind, studies of rationality frequently cross the boundaries various
branches of philosophy. The barebones theory of rationality takes an
agent’s preferences,
i. e. his rankings of states of affairs, to be rational if they are complete
and transitive, and it takes the agent’s choice to be rational if the agent
does not prefer any feasible alternative to the one he chooses. Such a theory
of rationality is clearly too weak. It says nothing about belief or what
rationality implies when the agent does not know (with certainty) everything
relevant to his choice. It may also be too strong, since there is nothing
irrational about having incomplete preferences in situations involving
uncertainty. Sometimes it is rational to suspend judgment and to refuse to rank
alternatives that are not well understood. On the other hand, transitivity is a
plausible condition, and the so-called “money pump” argument demonstrates that
if one’s preferences are intransitive and one is willing to make exchanges,
then one can be exploited. Suppose an agent A prefers X to Y, Y to Z and Z to X,
and that A will pay some small amount of money $P to
exchange Y for X, Z for Y,
and X for Z. That means that, starting
with Z, A will pay $P for Y,
then $P again for X, then $P again
for Z and so on. An agent need not be this stupid. He will
instead refuse to trade or adjust his preferences to eliminate the
intransitivity. On the other hand, there is evidence that an agent’s
preferences are not in fact transitive. Such evidence does not establish that
transitivity is not a requirement of rationality. It may show instead that an
agent may sometimes not be rational. In, e. g. the case of preference
reversals,” it seems plausible that the agent in fact makes the ‘irrational
choice.’ Evidence of persistent violations of transitivity is disquieting,
since standards of rationality should not be impossibly high. A further difficulty with the barebones theory
of rationality concerns the individuation of the objects of preference or
choice. Consider e. g. data from a multi-stage ultimatum game. Suppose A can
propose any division of $10 between A and B. B can
accept or reject A’s proposal. If B rejects
the proposal, the amount of money drops to $5, and B gets to
offer a division of the $5 which A can accept or reject.
If A rejects B’s offer, both players get
nothing. Suppose that A proposes to divide the money with $7
for A and $3 for B. B declines
and offers to split the $5 evenly, with $2.50 for each. Behaviour such as this
is, in fact, common. Assuming that B prefers more money to
less, these choices appear to be a violation of transitivity. B prefers
$3 to $2.50, yet declines $3 for certain for $2.50 (with some slight chance
of A declining and B getting nothing).
But the objects of choice are not just quantities of money. B is
turning down $3 as part of “a raw deal” in favour of $2.50 as part of a fair arrangement.
If the objects of choice are defined in this way, there is no failure of
transitivity. This plausible observation
gives rise to a serious conceptual problem that Grice thinks he can solve. Unless
there are constraints on how the objects of choice are individuated, conditions
of rationality such as transitivity are empty. A’s choice
of X over Y, Y over Z and Z over X does
not violate transitivity if “X when the alternative is Y”
is not the same object of choice as “X when the alternative
is Z”. A further substantive principle of rationality isrequired
to limit how alternatives are individuated or to require that agents be
indifferent between alternatives such as “X when the alternative
is Y” and “X when the alternative is Z.”
To extend the theory of rationality to circumstances involving risk (where
the objects of choice are lotteries with known probabilities) and uncertainty
(where agents do not know the probabilities or even all the possible outcomes
of their choices) requires a further principle of rationality, as well as a
controversial technical simplification. Subjective Bayesians suppose that the
agent in circumstances of uncertainty has well-defined subjective probabilities
(degrees of belief) over all the payoffs and thus that the objects of choice
can be modeled as lotteries, just as in circumstances involving risk, though
with subjective probabilities in place of objective probabilities. The most
important of the axioms needed for the theory of rational choice under
conditions of risk and uncertainty is the independence condition. The
preferences of a rational agent between two lotteries that differ in only one
outcome should match his preferences between the differing outcomes. A considerable
part of Grice’s rational choice theory is concerned with formalizations of
conditions of rationality and investigation of their implications. When they are
complete and transitive and satisfy a further continuity condition, the agent’s
preferences can be represented by an ordinal utility function, i. e. it is then
possible to define a function that represents an agent’s preferences so
that U(X) > U(Y) iff if the
agent prefers X to Y, and U(X)
= U(Y) iff if the agent is indifferent between X and Y.
This function represents the preference ranking, and contains no information
beyond the ranking. When in addition they satisfy the independence condition,
the agent’s preferences can be represented by an expected utility function
(Ramsey 1926). Such a function has two important properties. First, the
expected utility of a lottery is equal to the sum of the expected utilities of
its prizes weighted by their probabilities. Second, expected utility functions
are unique up to a positive affine transformation. If U and V are
both expected utility functions representing the preferences of an agent, for
all objects of preference, X, V(X) must be
equal to aU(X) + b, where a and b are
real numbers and a is positive. The axioms of rationality
imply that the agent’s degrees of belief will satisfy the axioms of the
probability calculus. A great deal of controversy surrounds Grice’s theory of
rationality, and there have been many formal investigations into amendeding it.
Although a conversational pair is very different from this agent and this other
agent, the pair has a mechanism to evaluate alternatives and make a choice. The
evaluation and the choice may be rational or irrational. Pace Grice’s fruitful
seminars on rational helpfulness in cooperation, t is not, however, obvious,
what principles of rationality should govern the choices and evaluations of the
conversational dyad. Transitivity is one plausible condition. It seems that a
conversational dyad that chooses X when faced with the
alternatives X or Y, Y when
faced with the alternatives Y or Z and Z when
faced with the alternatives X or Z, the
conversational dyad has had “a change of hearts” or is choosing ‘irrationally.’
Yet, purported irrationalities such as these can easily arise from a standard
mechanism that aims to link a ‘conversational choice’ and individual
preferences. Suppose there are two conversationalists in the dyad. Individual
One ranks the alternatives X, Y, Z.
Individual Two ranks them Y, Z, X. (An
Individual Three if he comes by, may ranks them Z, X, Y).
If decisions are made by pairwise majority voting, X will be
chosen from the pair (X, Y), Y will
be chosen from (Y, Z), and Z will be
chosen from (X, Z). Clearly this is unsettling. But is a
possible cycle in a ‘conversational choice’ “irrational”? Similar
problems affect what one might call the logical coherence of a conversational
judgment Suppose the dyad consists of two individuals who make the following
judgments concerning the truth or falsity of the propositions P and Q and
that “conversational” judgment follows the majority. P if P, Q Q
Conversationalist A true true true Conversationalist B false true false
(Conversationalist C, if he passes by) true false false “Conversation” as an
Institution: true true false. The judgment of each conversationalist is
consistent with the principles of logic, while the “conversational
co-operative” judgment violates the principles of logic. The “cooperative
conversational,” “altruistic,” “joint judgment” need not be consistent with the
principles of egoist logic. Although conversational choice theory bears on
questions of conversational rationality, most work in conversational choice
theory explores the consequences of principles of rationality coupled with this
or that explicitly practical, or meta-ethical constraint. Grice
does not use ‘moral,’ since he distinguishes what he calls a ‘conversational
maxim’ from a ‘moral maxim’ of the type Kant universalizes. Arrow’s impossibility
theorem assumes that an individual preference and a concerted, joint preference
are complete and transitive and that the method of forming a conversational,
concerted, joint preference (or making a conversational, concerted, choice)
issues in some joint preference ranking or joint choice for any possible profile
(or dossier, as Grice prefers) of each individual preference. Arrow’s
impossibility theorem imposes a weak UNANIMITY (one-soul) condition. If A and B
prefers X to Y, Y must not
jointly preferred. Arrow’s impossibility theorem requires that there be no boss
(call him Immanuel, the Genitor) whose preference determines a joint preference
or choice irrespective of the preferences of anybody else. Arrow’s
impossibility theorem imposes the condition that the joint concerted
conversational preference between X and Y should
depend on how A and B rank X and Y and on
nothing else. Arrow’s impossibility theorem proves that no method of co-relating
or linking conversational and a monogogic preference can satisfy all these
conditions. If an monopreference and a mono-evaluations both satisfy the axioms
of expected utility theory (with shared or objective probabilities) and that a
duo-preference conform to the unanimous mono-preference, a duo- evaluation is
determined by a weighted sum of individual utilities. A form of weighted futilitarianism,
which prioritizes the interests of the recipient, rather than the emissor,
uniquely satisfies a longer list of rational and practical constraints. When
there are instead disagreements in probability assignments, there is an impossibility
result. The unanimity (‘one-soul’) condition implies that for some profiles of
individual preferences, a joint or duo-evaluation will not satisfy the axioms
of expected utility theory. When outcomes depend on what at least two
autonomous free agents do, one agent’s best choice may depend on what the other
agent chooses. Although the principles of rationality governing mono-choice
still apply, there is a further principle of conversational rationality
governing the ‘expectation’ (to use Grice’s favourite term) of the action (or
conversational move) of one’s co-conversationalist (and obviously, via the
mutuality requirement of applicational universalizability) of the
co-conversationalist’s ‘expectation’ concerning the conversationalist’s action
and expectation, and so forth. Grice’s Conversational Game Theory plays a
protagonist role within philosophy, and it is relevant to inquiries concerning conversational
rationality and inquiries concerning conversational ethics. Rational choice --
Probability -- Dutch book, a bet or combination of bets whereby the bettor is
bound to suffer a net loss regardless of the outcome. A simple example would be
a bet on a proposition p at odds of 3 : 2 combined with a bet on not-p at the
same odds, the total amount of money at stake in each bet being five dollars.
Under this arrangement, if p turned out to be true one would win two dollars by
the first bet but lose three dollars by the second, and if p turned out to be
false one would win two dollars by the second bet but lose three dollars by the
first. Hence, whatever happened, one would lose a dollar. Dutch book argument, the argument that a
rational person’s degrees of belief must conform to the axioms of the
probability calculus, since otherwise, by the Dutch book theorem, he would be
vulnerable to a Dutch book. R.Ke. Dutch book theorem, the proposition that
anyone who a counts a bet on a proposition p as fair if the odds correspond to
his degree of belief that p is true and who b is willing to make any combination
of bets he would regard individually as fair will be vulnerable to a Dutch book
provided his degrees of belief do not conform to the axioms of the probability
calculus. Thus, anyone of whom a and b are true and whose degree of belief in a
disjunction of two incompatible propositions is not equal to the sum of his
degrees of belief in the two propositions taken individually would be
vulnerable to a Dutch book. Illatum: rational
decision theory -- decidability, as a property of sets, the existence of an
effective procedure a “decision procedure” which, when applied to any object,
determines whether or not the object belongs to the set. A theory or logic is
decidable if and only if the set of its theorems is. Decidability is proved by
describing a decision procedure and showing that it works. The truth table
method, for example, establishes that classical propositional logic is
decidable. To prove that something is not decidable requires a more precise
characterization of the notion of effective procedure. Using one such
characterization for which there is ample evidence, Church proved that
classical predicate logic is not decidable. decision theory, the theory of
rational decision, often called “rational choice theory” in political science
and other social sciences. The basic idea probably Pascal’s was published at
the end of Arnaud’s Port-Royal Logic 1662: “To judge what one must do to obtain
a good or avoid an evil one must consider not only the good and the evil in
itself but also the probability of its happening or not happening, and view
geometrically the proportion that all these things have together.” Where goods
and evils are monetary, Daniel Bernoulli 1738 spelled the idea out in terms of
expected utilities as figures of merit for actions, holding that “in the
absence of the unusual, the utility resulting from a fixed small increase in
wealth will be inversely proportional to the quantity of goods previously
possessed.” This was meant to solve the St. Petersburg paradox: Peter tosses a
coin . . . until it should land “heads” [on toss n]. . . . He agrees to give
Paul one ducat if he gets “heads” on the very first throw [and] with each
additional throw the number of ducats he must pay is doubled. . . . Although
the standard calculation shows that the value of Paul’s expectation [of gain]
is infinitely great [i.e., the sum of all possible gains $ probabilities, 2n/2
$ ½n], it has . . . to be admitted that any fairly reasonable man would sell
his chance, with great pleasure, for twenty ducats. In this case Paul’s
expectation of utility is indeed finite on Bernoulli’s assumption of inverse
proportionality; but as Karl Menger observed 4, Bernoulli’s solution fails if
payoffs are so large that utilities are inversely proportional to
probabilities; then only boundedness of utility scales resolves the paradox.
Bernoulli’s idea of diminishing marginal utility of wealth survived in the
neoclassical texts of W. S. Jevons 1871, Alfred Marshall 0, and A. C. Pigou 0,
where personal utility judgment was understood to cause preference. But in the
0s, operationalistic arguments of John Hicks and R. G. D. Allen persuaded
economists that on the contrary, 1 utility is no cause but a description, in
which 2 the numbers indicate preference order but not intensity. In their
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 6, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
undid 2 by pushing 1 further: ordinal preferences among risky prospects were
now seen to be describable on “interval” scales of subjective utility like the
Fahrenheit and Celsius scales for temperature, so that once utilities, e.g., 0
and 1, are assigned to any prospect and any preferred one, utilities of all
prospects are determined by overall preferences among gambles, i.e.,
probability distributions over prospects. Thus, the utility midpoint between
two prospects is marked by the distribution assigning probability ½ to each. In
fact, Ramsey had done that and more in a little-noticed essay “Truth and
Probability,” 1 teasing subjective probabilities as well as utilities out of
ordinal preferences among gambles. In a form independently invented by L. J.
Savage Foundations of Statistics, 4, this approach is now widely accepted as a
basis for rational decision analysis. The 8 book of that title by Howard Raiffa
became a theoretical centerpiece of M.B.A. curricula, whose graduates diffused
it through industry, government, and the military in a simplified format for
defensible decision making, namely, “costbenefit analyses,” substituting
expected numbers of dollars, deaths, etc., for preference-based expected
utilities. Social choice and group decision form the native ground of
interpersonal comparison of personal utilities. Thus, John C. Harsanyi 5 proved
that if 1 individual and social preferences all satisfy the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, and 2 society is indifferent between two prospects
whenever all individuals are, and 3 society prefers one prospect to another
whenever someone does and nobody has the opposite preference, then social
utilities are expressible as sums of individual utilities on interval scales
obtained by stretching or compressing the individual scales by amounts
determined by the social preferences. Arguably, the theorem shows how to derive
interpersonal comparisons of individual preference intensities from social preference
orderings that are thought to treat individual preferences on a par. Somewhat
earlier, Kenneth Arrow had written that “interpersonal comparison of utilities
has no meaning and, in fact, there is no meaning relevant to welfare economics
in the measurability of individual utility” Social Choice and Individual
Values, 1 a position later abandoned P.
Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 7. Arrow’s
“impossibility theorem” is illustrated by cyclic preferences observed by Condorcet
in 1785 among candidates A, B, C of voters 1, 2, 3, who rank them ABC, BCA,
CAB, respectively, in decreasing order of preference, so that majority rule
yields intransitive preferences for the group of three, of whom two 1, 3 prefer
A to B and two 1, 2 prefer B to C but two 2, 3 prefer C to A. In general, the
theorem denies existence of technically democratic schemes for forming social
preferences from citizens’ preferences. A clause tendentiously called
“independence of irrelevant alternatives” in the definition of ‘democratic’
rules out appeal to preferences among non-candidates as a way to form social
preferences among candidates, thus ruling out the preferences among gambles
used in Harsanyi’s theorem. See John Broome, Weighing Goods, 1, for further information
and references. Savage derived the agent’s probabilities for states as well as
utilities for consequences from preferences among abstract acts, represented by
deterministic assignments of consequences to states. An act’s place in the
preference ordering is then reflected by its expected utility, a
probability-weighted average of the utilities of its consequences in the
various states. Savage’s states and consequences formed distinct sets, with
every assignment of consequences to states constituting an act. While Ramsey
had also taken acts to be functions from states to consequences, he took
consequences to be propositions sets of states, and assigned utilities to
states, not consequences. A further step in that direction represents acts,
too, by propositions see Ethan Bolker, Functions Resembling Quotients of
Measures, Microfilms, 5; and Richard
Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision, 5, 0. Bolker’s representation theorem states
conditions under which preferences between truth of propositions determine probabilities
and utilities nearly enough to make the position of a proposition in one’s
preference ranking reflect its “desirability,” i.e., one’s expectation of
utility conditionally on it. decision theory decision theory 208 208 Alongside such basic properties as
transitivity and connexity, a workhorse among Savage’s assumptions was the
“sure-thing principle”: Preferences among acts having the same consequences in
certain states are unaffected by arbitrary changes in those consequences. This
implies that agents see states as probabilistically independent of acts, and
therefore implies that an act cannot be preferred to one that dominates it in
the sense that the dominant act’s consequences in each state have utilities at
least as great as the other’s. Unlike the sure thing principle, the principle
‘Choose so as to maximize CEU conditional expectation of utility’ rationalizes
action aiming to enhance probabilities of preferred states of nature, as in
quitting cigarettes to increase life expectancy. But as Nozick pointed out in
9, there are problems in which choiceworthiness goes by dominance rather than
CEU, as when the smoker like R. A. Fisher in 9 believes that the statistical
association between smoking and lung cancer is due to a genetic allele, possessors
of which are more likely than others to smoke and to contract lung cancer,
although among them smokers are not especially likely to contract lung cancer.
In such “Newcomb” problems choices are ineffectual signs of conditions that
agents would promote or prevent if they could. Causal decision theories modify
the CEU formula to obtain figures of merit distinguishing causal efficacy from
evidentiary significance e.g., replacing
conditional probabilities by probabilities of counterfactual conditionals; or forming
a weighted average of CEU’s under all hypotheses about causes, with agents’
unconditional probabilities of hypotheses as weights; etc. Mathematical
statisticians leery of subjective probability have cultivated Abraham Wald’s
Theory of Statistical Decision Functions 0, treating statistical estimation,
experimental design, and hypothesis testing as zero-sum “games against nature.”
For an account of the opposite assimilation, of game theory to probabilistic
decision theory, see Skyrms, Dynamics of Rational Deliberation 0. The
“preference logics” of Sören Halldén, The Logic of ‘Better’ 7, and G. H. von
Wright, The Logic of Preference 3, sidestep probability. Thus, Halldén holds
that when truth of p is preferred to truth of q, falsity of q must be preferred
to falsity of p, and von Wright with Aristotle holds that “this is more
choiceworthy than that if this is choiceworthy without that, but that is not
choiceworthy without this” Topics III, 118a. Both principles fail in the
absence of special probabilistic assumptions, e.g., equiprobability of p with
q. Received wisdom counts decision theory clearly false as a description of
human behavior, seeing its proper status as normative. But some, notably
Davidson, see the theory as constitutive of the very concept of preference, so
that, e.g., preferences can no more be intransitive than propositions can be at
once true and false. Rational decision:
envelope paradox, an apparent paradox in decision theory that runs as follows.
You are shown two envelopes, M and N, and are reliably informed that each
contains some finite positive amount of money, that the amount in one
unspecified envelope is twice the amount in the unspecified other, and that you
may choose only one. Call the amount in M ‘m’ and that in N ‘n’. It might seem
that: there is a half chance that m % 2n and a half chance that m = n/2, so
that the “expected value” of m is ½2n ! ½n/2 % 1.25n, so that you should prefer
envelope M. But by similar reasoning it might seem that the expected value of n
is 1.25m, so that you should prefer envelope N.
illatum. rationality – while Grice never used to employ ‘rationality’ he
learned to! In “Retrospective epilogue” in fact he refers to the principle of
conversational helpfulness as ‘promoting conversational rationality.’
Rationality as a faculty psychology, the view that the mind is a collection of
departments responsible for distinct psychological functions. Related to
faculty psychology is the doctrine of localization of function, wherein each
faculty has a specific brain location. Faculty psychologies oppose theories of
mind as a unity with one function e.g., those of Descartes and associationism
or as a unity with various capabilities e.g., that of Ockham, and oppose the
related holistic distributionist or mass-action theory of the brain. Faculty
psychology began with Aristotle, who divided the human soul into five special
senses, three inner senses common sense, imagination, memory and active and
passive mind. In the Middle Ages e.g., Aquinas Aristotle’s three inner senses
were subdivied, creating more elaborate lists of five to seven inward wits.
Islamic physicianphilosophers such as Avicenna integrated Aristotelian faculty
psychology with Galenic medicine by proposing brain locations for the
faculties. Two important developments in faculty psychology occurred during the
eighteenth century. First, Scottish philosophers led by Reid developed a
version of faculty psychology opposed to the empiricist and associationist
psychologies of Locke and Hume. The Scots proposed that humans were endowed by
God with a set of faculties permitting knowledge of the world and morality. The
Scottish system exerted considerable influence in the United States, where it
was widely taught as a moral, character-building discipline, and in the
nineteenth century this “Old Psychology” opposed the experimental “New
Psychology.” Second, despite then being called a charlatan, Franz Joseph Gall
17581828 laid the foundation for modern neuropsychology in his work on
localization of function. Gall rejected existing faculty psychologies as
philosophical, unbiological, and incapable of accounting for everyday behavior.
Gall proposed an innovative behavioral and biological list of faculties and
brain localizations based on comparative anatomy, behavior study, and
measurements of the human skull. Today, faculty psychology survives in trait
and instinct theories of personality, Fodor’s theory that mental functions are
implemented by neurologically “encapsulated” organs, and localizationist
theories of the brain. rationalism, the position that reason has precedence
over other ways of acquiring knowledge, or, more strongly, that it is the
unique path to knowledge. It is most often encountered as a view in
epistemology, where it is traditionally contrasted with empiricism, the view
that the senses are primary with respect to knowledge. It is important here to
distinguish empiricism with respect to knowledge from empiricism with respect
to ideas or concepts; whereas the former is opposed to rationalism, the latter
is opposed to the doctrine of innate ideas. The term is also encountered in the
philosophy of religion, where it may designate those who oppose the view that
revelation is central to religious knowledge; and in ethics, where it may
designate those who oppose the view that ethical principles are grounded in or
derive from emotion, empathy, or some other non-rational foundation. The term
‘rationalism’ does not generally designate a single precise philosophical
position; there are several ways in which reason can have precedence, and
several accounts of knowledge to which it may be opposed. Furthermore, the very
term ‘reason’ is not altogether clear. Often it designates a faculty of the
soul, distinct from sensation, imagination, and memory, which is the ground of
a priori knowledge. But there are other conceptions of reason, such as the
narrower conception in which Pascal opposes reason to “knowledge of the heart”
Pensées, section 110, or the computational conception of reason Hobbes advances
in Leviathan I.5. The term might thus be applied to a number of philosophical
positions from the ancients down to the present. Among the ancients,
‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’ especially denote two schools of medicine, the
former relying primarily on a theoretical knowledge of the hidden workings of
the human body, the latter relying on direct clinical experience. The term
might also be used to characterize the views of Plato and later Neoplatonists,
who argued that we have pure intellectual access to the Forms and general
principles that govern reality, and rejected sensory knowledge of the imperfect
realization of those Forms in the material world. In recent philosophical
writing, the term ‘rationalism’ is most closely associated with the positions
of a group of seventeenth-century philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz,
and sometimes Malebranche. These thinkers are often referred to collectively as
the Continental rationalists, and are generally opposed to the socalled British
empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. All of the former share the view that
we have a non-empirical and rational access to the truth about the way the
world is, and all privilege reason over knowledge derived from the senses.
These philosophers are also attracted to mathematics as a model for knowledge
in general. But these common views are developed in quite different ways.
Descartes claims to take his inspiration from mathematics not mathematics as commonly understood, but
the analysis of the ancients. According to Descartes, we start from first
principles known directly by reason the cogito ergo sum of the Meditations,
what he calls intuition in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind; all other
knowledge is deduced from there. A central aim of his Meditations is to show
that this faculty of reason is trustworthy. The senses, on the other hand, are
generally deceptive, leading us to mistake sensory qualities for real qualities
of extended bodies, and leading us to the false philosophy of Aristotle and to
Scholasticism. Descartes does not reject the senses altogether; in Meditation
VI he argues that the senses are most often correct in circumstances concerning
the preservation of life. Perhaps paradoxically, experiment is important to
Descartes’s scientific work. However, his primary interest is in the
theoretical account of the phenomena experiment reveals, and while his position
is unclear, he may have considered experiment as an auxiliary to intuition and
deduction, or as a second-best method that can be used with problems too
complex for pure reason. Malebranche, following Descartes, takes similar views
in his Search after Truth, though unlike Descartes, he emphasizes original sin
as the cause of our tendency to trust the senses. Spinoza’s model for knowledge
is Euclidean geometry, as realized in the geometrical form of the Ethics.
Spinoza explicitly argues that we cannot have adequate ideas of the world
through sensation Ethics II, propositions 1631. In the Ethics he does see a
role for the senses in what he calls knowledge of the first and knowledge of
the second kinds, and in the earlier Emendation of the Intellect, he suggests
that the senses may be auxiliary aids to genuine knowledge. But the senses are
imperfect and far less valuable, according to Spinoza, than intuition, i.e.,
knowledge of the third kind, from which sensory experience is excluded.
Spinoza’s rationalism is implicit in a central proposition of the Ethics, in
accordance with which “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the
order and connection of things” Ethics II, proposition 7, allowing one to infer
causal connections between bodies and states of the material world directly
from the logical connections between ideas. Leibniz, too, emphasizes reason
over the senses in a number of ways. In his youth he believed that it would be
possible to calculate the truth-value of every sentence by constructing a
logical language whose structure mirrors the structure of relations between
concepts in the world. This view is reflected in his mature thought in the
doctrine that in every truth, the concept of the predicate is contained in the
concept of the subject, so that if one could take the God’s-eye view which, he
concedes, we cannot, one could determine the truth or falsity of any
proposition without appeal to experience Discourse on Metaphysics, section 8.
Leibniz also argues that all truths are based on two basic principles, the law
of non-contradiction for necessary truths, and the principle of sufficient
reason for contingent truths Monadology, section 31, both of which can be known
a priori. And so, at least in principle, the truth-values of all propositions
can be determined a priori. This reflects his practice in physics, where he
derives a number of laws of motion from the principle of the equality of cause
and effect, which can be known a priori on the basis of the principle of
sufficient reason. But, at the same time, referring to the empirical school of
ancient medicine, Leibniz concedes that “we are all mere Empirics in three
fourths of our actions” Monadology, section 28. Each of the so-called
Continental rationalists does, in his own way, privilege reason over the
senses. But the common designation ‘Continental rationalism’ arose only much
later, probably in the nineteenth century. For their contemporaries, more impressed
with their differences than their common doctrines, the Continental
rationalists did not form a single homogeneous school of thought. Illatum: rationality.
In its primary sense, rationality is a normative concept that philosophers have
generally tried to characterize in such a way that, for any action, belief, or
desire, if it is rational we ought to choose it. No such positive
characterization has achieved anything close to universal assent because,
often, several competing actions, beliefs, or desires count as rational.
Equating what is rational with what is rationally required eliminates the
category of what is rationally allowed. Irrationality seems to be the more
fundamental normative category; for although there are conflicting substantive
accounts of irrationality, all agree that to say of an action, belief, or
desire that it is irrational is to claim that it should always be avoided.
Rationality is also a descriptive concept that refers to those intellectual
capacities, usually involving the ability to use language, that distinguish
persons from plants and most other animals. There is some dispute about whether
some non-human animals, e.g., dolphins and chimpanzees, are rational in this
sense. Theoretical rationality applies to beliefs. An irrational belief is one
that obviously conflicts with what one should know. This characterization of an
irrational belief is identical with the psychiatric characterization of a
delusion. It is a personrelative concept, because what obviously conflicts with
what should be known by one person need not obviously conflict with what should
be known by another. On this account, any belief that is not irrational counts
as rational. Many positive characterizations of rational beliefs have been
proposed, e.g., 1 beliefs that are either self-evident or derived from
self-evident beliefs by a reliable procedure and 2 beliefs that are consistent
with the overwhelming majority of one’s beliefs; but all of these positive
characterizations have encountered serious objections. Practical rationality
applies to actions. For some philosophers it is identical to instrumental
rationality. On this view, commonly called instrumentalism, acting rationally
simply means acting in a way that is maximally efficient in achieving one’s
goals. However, most philosophers realize that achieving one goal may conflict
with achieving another, and therefore require that a rational action be one
that best achieves one’s goals only when these goals are considered as forming
a system. Others have added that all of these goals must be ones that would be
chosen given complete knowledge and understanding of what it would be like to
achieve these goals. On the latter account of rational action, the system of
goals is chosen by all persons for themselves, and apart from consistency there
is no external standpoint from which to evaluate rationally any such system.
Thus, for a person with a certain system of goals it will be irrational to act
morally. Another account of rational action is not at all person-relative. On
this account, to act rationally is to act on universalizable principles, so
that what is a reason for one person must be a reason for everyone. One point
of such an account is to make it rationally required to act morally, thus
making all immoral action irrational. However, if to call an action irrational
is to claim that everyone would hold that it is always to be avoided, then it
is neither irrational to act immorally in order to benefit oneself or one’s
friends, nor irrational to act morally even when that goes against one’s system
of goals. Only a negative characterization of what is rational as what is not
irrational, which makes it rationally permissible to act either morally or in
accordance with one’s own system of goals, as long as these goals meet some
minimal objective standard, seems likely to be adequate. Illatum:
rationalization, 1 an apparent explanation of a person’s action or attitude by
appeal to reasons that would justify or exculpate the person for it if, contrary to fact, those reasons were to
explain it; 2 an explanation or interpretation made from a rational
perspective. In sense 1, rationalizations are pseudo-explanations, often
motivated by a desire to exhibit an item in a favorable light. Such
rationalizations sometimes involve self-deception. Depending on one’s view of
justification, a rationalization might justify an action by adducing excellent reasons for its
performance even if the agent, not
having acted for those reasons, deserves no credit for so acting. In sense 2 a
sense popularized in philosophy by Donald Davidson, rationalizations of
intentional actions are genuine explanations in terms of agents’ reasons. In
this sense, we provide a rationalization for
or “rationalize” Robert’s
shopping at Zed’s by identifying the reasons for which he does so: e.g., he
wants to buy an excellent kitchen knife and believes that Zed’s sells the best
cutlery in town. Also, the reasons for which an agent acts may themselves be
said to rationalize the action. Beliefs, desires, and intentions may be
similarly rationalized. In each case, a rationalization exhibits the
rationalized item as, to some degree, rational from the standpoint of the
person to whom it is attributed. rational psychology, the a priori study of the
mind. This was a large component of eighteenthand nineteenth-century
psychology, and was contrasted by its exponents with empirical psychology,
which is rooted in contingent experience. The term ‘rational psychology’ may
also designate a mind, or form of mind, having the property of rationality.
Current philosophy of mind includes much discussion of rational psychologies,
but the notion is apparently ambiguous. On one hand, there is rationality as
intelligibility. This is a minimal coherence, say of desires or inferences, that
a mind must possess to be a mind. For instance, Donald Davidson, many
functionalists, and some decision theorists believe there are principles of
rationality of this sort that constrain the appropriate attribution of beliefs
and desires to a person, so that a mind must meet such constraints if it is to
have beliefs and desires. On another pole, there is rationality as
justification. For someone’s psychology to have this property is for that
psychology to be as reason requires it to be, say for that person’s inferences
and desires to be supported by proper reasons given their proper weight, and
hence to be justified. Rationality as justification is a normative property,
which it would seem some minds lack. But despite the apparent differences
between these two sorts of rationality, some important work in philosophy of
mind implies either that these two senses in fact collapse, or at least that
there are intervening and significant senses, so that things at least a lot
like normative principles constrain what our psychologies are. rational reconstruction, also called logical
reconstruction, translation of a discourse of a certain conceptual type into a
discourse of another conceptual type with the aim of making it possible to say
everything or everything important that is expressible in the former more
clearly or perspicuously in the latter. The best-known example is one in
Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Carnap attempted to translate discourse
concerning physical objects e.g., ‘There is a round brown table’ into discourse
concerning immediate objects of sense experience ‘Color patches of
such-and-such chromatic characteristics and shape appear in such-and-such a
way’. He was motivated by the empiricist doctrine that immediate sense
experience is conceptually prior to everything else, including our notion of a
physical object. In addition to talk of immediate sense experience, Carnap
relied on logic and set theory. Since their use is difficult to reconcile with
strict empiricism, his translation would not have fully vindicated empiricism
even if it had succeeded. Illatum: rationality
-- reasons for action, considerations that call for or justify action. They may
be subjective or objective. A subjective reason is a consideration an agent
understands to support a course of action, whether or not it actually does. An
objective reason is one that does support a course of action, regardless of
whether the agent realizes it. What are cited as reasons may be matters either
of fact or of value, but when facts are cited values are also relevant. Thus
the fact that cigarette smoke contains nicotine is a reason for not smoking
only because nicotine has undesirable effects. The most important evaluative
reasons are normative reasons i.e.,
considerations having e.g. ethical force. Facts become obligating reasons when,
in conjunction with normative considerations, they give rise to an obligation.
Thus in view of the obligation to help the needy, the fact that others are
hungry is an obligating reason to see they are fed. Reasons for action enter
practical thinking as the contents of beliefs, desires, and other mental
states. But not all the reasons one has need motivate the corresponding
behavior. Thus I may recognize an obligation to pay taxes, yet do so only for
fear of punishment. If so, then only my fear is an explaining reason for my
action. An overriding reason is one that takes precedence over all others. It
is often claimed that moral reasons override all others objectively, and should
do so subjectively as well. Finally, one may speak of an all-things-considered
reason one that after due consideration
is taken as finally determinative of what shall be done. reasons for belief, roughly, bases of
belief. The word ‘belief’ is commonly used to designate both a particular sort
of psychological state, a state of believing, and a particular intentional
content or proposition believed. Reasons for belief exhibit an analogous
duality. A proposition, p, might be said to provide a normative reason to
believe a proposition, q, for instance, when p bears some appropriate
warranting relation to q. And p might afford a perfectly good reason to believe
q, even though no one, as a matter of fact, believes either p or q. In
contrast, p is a reason that I have for believing q, if I believe p and p
counts as a reason in the sense above to believe q. Undoubtedly, I have reason
to believe countless propositions that I shall never, as it happens, come to
believe. Suppose, however, that p is a reason for which I believe q. In that case,
I must believe both p and q, and p must be a reason to believe q or, at any rate, I must regard it as such. It
may be that I must, in addition, believe q at least in part because I believe
p. Reasons in these senses are inevitably epistemic; they turn on
considerations of evidence, truth-conduciveness, and the like. But not all
reasons for belief are of this sort. An explanatory reason, a reason why I
believe p, may simply be an explanation for my having or coming to have this
belief. Perhaps I believe p because I was brainwashed, or struck on the head,
or because I have strong non-epistemic motives for this belief. I might, of
course, hold the belief on the basis of unexceptionable epistemic grounds. When
this is so, my believing p may both warrant and explain my believing q.
Reflections of this sort can lead to questions concerning the overall or
“all-things-considered” reasonableness of a given belief. Some philosophers
e.g., Clifford argue that a belief’s reasonableness depends exclusively on its
epistemic standing: my believing p is reasonable for me provided it is
epistemically reasonable for me; where belief is concerned, epistemic reasons
are overriding. Others, siding with James, have focused on the role of belief
in our psychological economy, arguing that the reasonableness of my holding a
given belief can be affected by a variety of non-epistemic considerations.
Suppose I have some evidence that p is false, but that I stand to benefit in a
significant way from coming to believe p. If that is so, and if the practical
advantages of my holding p considerably outweigh the practical disadvantages,
it might seem obvious that my holding p is reasonable for me in some
all-embracing sense.
Ray, J. English naturalist whose work on the structure
and habits of plants and animals led to important conclusions on the
methodology of classification and gave a strong impetus to the design argument
in natural theology. In an early paper he argued that the determining
characteristics of a species are those transmitted by seed, since color, scent,
size, etc., vary with climate and nutriment. Parallels from the animal kingdom
suggested the correct basis for classification would be structural. But we have
no knowledge of real essences. Our experience of nature is of a continuum, and
for practical purposes kinships are best identified by a plurality of criteria.
His mature theory is set out in Dissertatio Brevis 1696 and Methodus Emendata
1703. The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation 1691 and three
revisions was a best-selling compendium of Ray’s own scientific learning and
was imitated and quarried by many later exponents of the design argument.
Philosophically, he relied on others, from Cicero to Cudworth, and was
superseded by Paley.
Res: “Possibly the most important word in philosophy.”
Grice -- Realism – causal realism -- direct realism, the theory that perceiving
is epistemically direct, unmediated by conscious or unconscious inference.
Direct realism is distinguished, on the one hand, from indirect, or
representative, realism, the view that perceptual awareness of material objects
is mediated by an awareness of sensory representations, and, on the other hand,
from forms of phenomenalism that identify material objects with states of mind.
It might be thought that direct realism is incompatible with causal theories of
perception. Such theories invoke causal chains leading from objects perceived
causes to perceptual states of perceivers effects. Since effects must be
distinct from causes, the relation between an instance of perceiving and an
object perceived, it would seem, cannot be direct. This, however, confuses
epistemic directness with causal directness. A direct realist need only be
committed to the former. In perceiving a tomato to be red, the content of my
perceptual awareness is the tomato’s being red. I enter this state as a result
of a complex causal process, perhaps. But my perception may be direct in the
sense that it is unmediated by an awareness of a representational sensory state
from which I am led to an awareness of the tomato. Perceptual error, and more
particularly, hallucinations and illusions, are usually thought to pose special
difficulties for direct realists. My hallucinating a red tomato, for instance,
is not my being directly aware of a red tomato, since I may hallucinate the
tomato even when none is present. Perhaps, then, my hallucinating a red tomato
is partly a matter of my being directly aware of a round, red sensory
representation. And if my awareness in this case is indistinguishable from my
perception of an actual red tomato, why not suppose that I am aware of a
sensory representation in the veridical case as well? A direct realist may
respond by denying that hallucinations are in fact indistinguishable from
veridical perceivings or by calling into question the claim that, if sensory
representations are required to explain hallucinations, they need be postulated
in the veridical case. reality, in
standard philosophical usage, how things actually are, in contrast with their
mere appearance. Appearance has to do with how things seem to a particular
perceiver or group of perceivers. Reality is sometimes said to be
twoway-independent of appearance. This means that appearance does not determine
reality. First, no matter how much agreement there is, based on appearance,
about the nature of reality, it is always conceivable that reality differs from
appearance. Secondly, appearances are in no way required for reality: reality
can outstrip the range of all investigations that we are in a position to make.
It may be that reality always brings with it the possibility of appearances, in
the counterfactual sense that if there were observers suitably situated, then
if conditions were not conducive to error, they would have experiences of such-and-such
a kind. But the truth of such a counterfactual seems to be grounded in the
facts of reality. Phenomenalism holds, to the contrary, that the facts of
reality can be explained by such counterfactuals, but phenomenalists have
failed to produce adequate non-circular analyses. The concept of reality on
which it is two-wayindependent of experience is sometimes called objective
reality. However, Descartes used this phrase differently, to effect a contrast
with formal or actual reality. He held that there must be at least as much
reality in the efficient and total cause of an effect as in the effect itself,
and applied this principle as follows: “There must be at least as much actual
or formal reality in the efficient and total cause of an idea as objective
reality in the idea itself.” The objective reality of an idea seems to have to
do with its having representational content, while actual or formal reality has
to do with existence independent of the mind. Thus the quoted principle relates
features of the cause of an idea to the representational content of the idea.
Descartes’s main intended applications were to God and material objects.
recursum: Grice, ‘anti-sneak.” The third clause (III) in
Grice’s final analysis of utterer’s meaning is self-referential and recursive,
in a good way, in that (III) itself counts as one of the ‘inference elements’
(that Grice symbolises as “E”) that (III) specifies. Grice loved the heraldy
metaphor of the escrutcheon – and the Droste effect. Cf. ‘speculative,’ --. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice’s
mise-en-abyme,” per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa
Grice, Liguria, Italia. Then there is the recursive function theory, an area of
formal semantics that takes as its point of departure the study of an extremely
limited class of functions, the recursive functions. Recursive function theory
is a branch of higher arithmetic number theory, or the theory of natural
numbers whose universe of discourse is restricted to the non-negative integers:
0, 1, 2, etc. However, the techniques and results of recursive function theory
do not resemble those traditionally associated with number theory. The class of
recursive functions is defined in a way that makes evident that every recursive
function can be computed or calculated. The hypothesis that every calculable
function is recursive, which is known as Church’s thesis, is often taken as a
kind of axiom in recursive function theory. This theory has played an important
role in philosophy of mathematics, especially when epistemological issues are
studied, since as Grice knows, super-knowing may be hard, but not impossible!
Redintegratum: a psychological process, similar to or
involving classical conditioning, in which one feature of a situation causes a
person to recall, visualize, or recompose an entire original situation. On
opening a pack of cigarettes, a person may visualize the entire process,
including striking the match, lighting the cigarette, and puffing.
Redintegration is used as a technique in behavior therapy, e.g. when someone
trying to refrain from smoking is exposed to unpleasant odors and vivid
pictures of lungs caked with cancer, and then permitted to smoke. If the
unpleasantness of the odors and visualization outweighs the reinforcement of
smoking, the person may resist smoking. Philosophically, for Grice, so-called
barbarically “redintegratum” is of interest for two reasons. First, the process
may be critical in prudence. By bringing long-range consequences of behavior
into focus in present deliberation, redintegration may help to protect
long-range interests. Second, redintegration offers a role for visual images in
producing behavior. Images figure in paradigmatic cases of redintegration. In
recollecting pictures of cancerous lungs, the person may refrain from smoking.
Pears: “Oddly, it didn’t work with Grice who remained a bit of a chain-smoker – but of Navy’s Cut only,
except for the very last. He never smelt the odour in a bad way.”
reduction, the replacement of one expression by a
second expression that differs from the first in prima facie reference.
So-called reductions have been meant in the sense of uniformly applicable
explicit definitions, contextual definitions, or replacements suitable only in
a limited range of contexts. Thus, authors have spoken of reductive conceptual
analyses, especially in the early days of analytic philosophy. In particular,
in the sensedatum theory talk of physical objects was supposed to be reduced to
talk of sense-data by explicit definitions or other forms of conceptual
analysis. Logical positivists talked of the reduction of theoretical vocabulary
to an observational vocabulary, first by explicit definitions, and later by
other devices, such as Carnap’s reduction sentences. These appealed to a test
condition predicate, T e.g., ‘is placed in water’, and a display predicate, D
e.g., ‘dissolves’, to introduce a dispositional or other “non-observational”
term, S e.g., ‘is water-soluble’: Ex [Tx / Dx / Sx], with ‘/’ representing the
material conditional. Negative reduction sentences for non-occurrence of S took
the form Ex [NTx / NDx / - Sx]. For coinciding predicate pairs T and TD and -D
and ND Carnap referred to bilateral reduction sentences: Ex [Tx / Dx S Sx].
Like so many other attempted reductions, reduction sentences did not achieve
replacement of the “reduced” term, S, since they do not fix application of S
when the test condition, T, fails to apply. In the philosophy of mathematics,
logicism claimed that all of mathematics could be reduced to logic, i.e., all
mathematical terms could be defined with the vocabulary of logic and all
theorems of mathematics could be derived from the laws of logic supplemented by
these definitions. Russell’s Principia Mathematica carried out much of such a
program with a reductive base of something much more like what we now call set
theory rather than logic, strictly conceived. Many now accept the reducibility
of mathematics to set theory, but only in a sense in which reductions are not
unique. For example, the natural numbers can equally well be modeled as classes
of equinumerous sets or as von Neumann ordinals. This non-uniqueness creates
serious difficulties, with suggestions that set-theoretic reductions can throw
light on what numbers and other mathematical objects “really are.” In contrast,
we take scientific theories to tell us, unequivocally, that water is H20 and
that temperature is mean translational kinetic energy. Accounts of theory
reduction in science attempt to analyze the circumstance in which a “reducing
theory” appears to tell us the composition of objects or properties described
by a “reduced theory.” The simplest accounts follow the general pattern of
reduction: one provides “identity statements” or “bridge laws,” with at least
the form of explicit definitions, for all terms in the reduced theory not
already appearing in the reducing theory; and then one argues that the reduced
theory can be deduced from the reducing theory augmented by the definitions. For
example, the laws of thermodynamics are said to be deducible from those of
statistical mechanics, together with statements such as ‘temperature is mean
translational kinetic energy’ and ‘pressure is mean momentum transfer’. How
should the identity statements or bridge laws be understood? It takes empirical
investigation to confirm statements such as that temperature is mean
translational kinetic energy. Consequently, some have argued, such statements
at best constitute contingent correlations rather than strict identities. On
the other hand, if the relevant terms and their extensions are not mediated by
analytic definitions, the identity statements may be analogized to identities
involving two names, such as ‘Cicero is Tully’, where it takes empirical investigation
to establish that the two names happen to have the same referent. One can
generalize the idea of theory reduction in a variety of ways. One may require
the bridge laws to suffice for the deduction of the reduced from the reducing
theory without requiring that the bridge laws take the form of explicit
identity statements or biconditional correlations. Some authors have also
focused on the fact that in practice a reducing theory T2 corrects or refines
the reduced theory T1, so that it is really only a correction or refinement,
T1*, that is deducible from T2 and the bridge laws. Some have consequently
applied the term ‘reduction’ to any pair of theories where the second corrects
and extends the first in ways that explain both why the first theory was as
accurate as it was and why it made the errors that it did. In this extended
sense, relativity is said to reduce Newtonian mechanics. Do the social
sciences, especially psychology, in principle reduce to physics? This prospect
would support the so-called identity theory of mind and body, in particular
resolving important problems in the philosophy of mind, such as the mindbody
problem and the problem of other minds. Many though by no means all are now
skeptical about the prospects for identifying mental properties, and the
properties of other special sciences, with complex physical properties. To
illustrate with an example from economics adapted from Fodor, in the right
circumstances just about any physical object could count as a piece of money.
Thus prospects seem dim for finding a closed and finite statement of the form
‘being a piece of money is . . .’, with only predicates from physics appearing
on the right though some would want to admit infinite definitions in providing
reductions. Similarly, one suspects that attributes, such as pain, are at best
functional properties with indefinitely many possible physical realizations.
Believing that reductions by finitely stable definitions are thus out of reach,
many authors have tried to express the view that mental properties are still
somehow physical by saying that they nonetheless supervene on the physical
properties of the organisms that have them. In fact, these same difficulties
that affect mental properties affect the paradigm case of temperature, and probably
all putative examples of theoretical reduction. Temperature is mean
translational temperature only in gases, and only idealized ones at that. In
other substances, quite different physical mechanisms realize temperature.
Temperature is more accurately described as a functional property, having to do
with the mechanism of heat transfer between bodies, where, in principle, the
required mechanism could be physically realized in indefinitely many ways. In
most and quite possibly all cases of putative theory reduction by strict
identities, we have instead a relation of physical realization, constitution,
or instantiation, nicely illustrated by the property of being a calculator
example taken from Cummins. The property of being a calculator can be physically
realized by an abacus, by devices with gears and levers, by ones with vacuum
tubes or silicon chips, and, in the right circumstances, by indefinitely many
other physical arrangements. Perhaps many who have used ‘reduction’,
particularly in the sciences, have intended the term in this sense of physical
realization rather than one of strict identity. Let us restrict attention to
properties that reduce in the sense of having a physical realization, as in the
cases of being a calculator, having a certain temperature, and being a piece of
money. Whether or not an object counts as having properties such as these will
depend, not only on the physical properties of that object, but on various
circumstances of the context. Intensions of relevant language users constitute
a plausible candidate for relevant circumstances. In at least many cases,
dependence on context arises because the property constitutes a functional
property, where the relevant functional system calculational practices, heat
transfer, monetary systems are much larger than the propertybearing object in
question. These examples raise the question of whether many and perhaps all
mental properties depend ineliminably on relations to things outside the
organisms that have the mental properties.
Then there is the reduction sentence, for a given predicate Q3 of
space-time points in a first-order language, any universal sentence S1 of the
form: x [Q1x / Q2x / Q3 x], provided that the predicates Q1 and Q2 are
consistently applicable to the same space-time points. If S1 has the form given
above and S2 is of the form x [Q4x / Q5 / - Q6] and either S1 is a reduction
sentence for Q3 or S2 is a reduction sentence for -Q3, the pair {S1, S2} is a
reduction pair for Q3. If Q1 % Q4 and Q2 % - Q5, the conjunction of S1 and S2
is equivalent to a bilateral reduction sentence for Q3 of the form x [Q1 / Q3 S
Q2]. These concepts were introduced by Carnap in “Testability and Meaning,”
Philosophy of Science 637, to modify the verifiability criterion of meaning to
a confirmability condition where terms can be introduced into meaningful
scientific discourse by chains of reduction pairs rather than by definitions.
The incentive for this modification seems to have been to accommodate the use
of disposition predicates in scientific discourse. Carnap proposed explicating
a disposition predicate Q3 by bilateral reduction sentences for Q3. An
important but controversial feature of Carnap’s approach is that it avoids
appeal to nonextensional conditionals in explicating disposition predicates. Then there is the reductio ad absurdum,
“Tertullian’s favourite proof,” – Grice. 1 The principles A / - A / -A and -A /
A / A. 2 The argument forms ‘If A then B and not-B; therefore, not-A’ and ‘If
not-A then B and not-B; therefore, A’ and arguments of these forms. Reasoning
via such arguments is known as the method of indirect proof. 3 The rules of
inference that permit i inferring not-A having derived a contradiction from A
and ii inferring A having derived a contradiction from not-A. Both rules hold
in classical logic and come to the same thing in any logic with the law of
double negation. In intuitionist logic, however, i holds but ii does not. reductionism: The issue of reductionism
is very much twentieth-century. There was Wisdom’s boring contribtions to Mind
on ‘logical construction,’ Grice read the summary from Broad. One of the twelve
–isms that Grice finds on his ascent to the City of Eternal Truth. He makes the
reductive-reductionist distinction. Against J. M. Rountree. So, for Grice, the bad
heathen vicious Reductionism can be defeated by the good Christian virtuous.
Reductivism. A reductivist tries to define, say, what an emissor communicates
(that p) in terms of the content of that proposition that he intends to
transmit to his recipient. Following Aristotle, Grice reduces the effect to a
‘pathemata psucheos,’ i. e. a passio of the anima, as Boethius translates. This
can be desiderative (“Thou shalt not kill”) or creditativa (“The grass is
green.”)
mise-en-abyme-- reflection principles, two varieties of
internal statements related to correctness in formal axiomatic systems. 1
Proof-theoretic reflection principles are formulated for effectively presented
systems S that contain a modicum of elementary number theory sufficient to
arithmetize their own syntactic notions, as done by Kurt Gödel in his 1 work on
incompleteness. Let ProvS x express that x is the Gödel number of a statement
provable in S, and let nA be the number of A, for any statement A of S. The
weakest reflection principle considered for S is the collection RfnS of all
statements of the form ProvS nA P A, which express that if A is provable from S
then A is true. The proposition ConS expressing the consistency of S is a
consequence of RfnS obtained by taking A to be a disprovable statement. Thus,
by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, RfnS is stronger than S if S is
consistent. Reflection principles are used in the construction of ordinal
logics as a systematic means of overcoming incompleteness. 2 Set-theoretic
reflection principles are formulated for systems S of axiomatic set theory,
such as ZF Zermelo-Fraenkel. In the simplest form they express that any
property A in the language of S that holds of the universe of “all” sets,
already holds of a portion of that universe coextensive with some set x. This
takes the form A P DxAx where in Ax all quantifiers of A are relativized to x.
In contrast to proof-theoretic reflection principles, these may be established
as theorems of ZF.
Reflectum -- reflective equilibrium, as usually
conceived, a coherence method for justifying evaluative principles and
theories. The method was first described by Goodman, who proposed it be used to
justify deductive and inductive principles. According to Goodman Fact, Fiction
and Forecast, 5, a particular deductive inference is justified by its
conforming with deductive principles, but these principles are justified in
their turn by conforming with accepted deductive practice. The idea, then, is
that justified inferences and principles are those that emerge from a process
of mutual adjustment, with principles being revised when they sanction
inferences we cannot bring ourselves to accept, and particular inferences being
rejected when they conflict with rules we are unwilling to revise. Thus,
neither principles nor particular inferences are epistemically privileged. At
least in principle, everything is liable to revision. Rawls further articulated
the method of reflective equilibrium and applied it in ethics. According to
Rawls A Theory of Justice, 1, inquiry begins with considered moral judgments,
i.e., judgments about which we are confident and which are free from common
sources of error, e.g., ignorance of facts, insufficient reflection, or
emotional agitation. According to narrow reflective equilibrium, ethical
principles are justified by bringing them into coherence with our considered
moral judgments through a process of mutual adjustment. Rawls, however, pursues
a wide reflective equilibrium. Wide equilibrium is attained by proceeding to
consider alternatives to the moral conception accepted in narrow equilibrium,
along with philosophical arguments that might decide among these conceptions.
The principles and considered judgments accepted in narrow equilibrium are then
adjusted as seems appropriate. One way to conceive of wide reflective
equilibrium is as an effort to construct a coherent system of belief by a
process of mutual adjustment to considered moral judgments and moral principles
as in narrow equilibrium along with the background philosophical, social
scientific, and any other relevant beliefs that might figure in the arguments
for and against alternative moral conceptions, e.g., metaphysical views
regarding the nature of persons. As in Goodman’s original proposal, none of the
judgments, principles, or theories involved is privileged: all are open to
revision.
regressus
vitiosum -- viscious regress – Grice
preferred ‘vicious circle’ versus ‘virtuous circle’ – “Whether virtuous regress
sounds oxymoronic” -- regress that is in some way unacceptable, where a regress
is an infinite series of items each of which is in some sense dependent on a
prior item of a similar sort, e.g. an infinite series of events each of which
is caused by the next prior event in the series. Reasons for holding a regress
to be vicious might be that it is either impossible or that its existence is
inconsistent with things known to be true. The claim that something would lead
to a vicious regress is often made as part of a reductio ad absurdum argument
strategy. An example of this can be found in Aquinas’s argument for the
existence of an uncaused cause on the ground that an infinite regress of causes
is vicious. Those responding to the argument have sometimes contended that this
regress is not in fact vicious and hence that the argument fails. A more
convincing example of a regress is generated by the principle that one’s coming
to know the meaning of a word must always be based on a prior understanding of
other words. If this principle is correct, then one can know the meaning of a
word w1 only on the basis of previously understanding the meanings of other
words w2 and w3. But a further application of the principle yields the result
that one can understand these words w2 and w3 only on the basis of
understanding still other words. This leads to an infinite regress. Since no
one understands any words at birth, the regress implies that no one ever comes
to understand any words. But this is clearly false. Since the existence of this
regress is inconsistent with an obvious truth, we may conclude that the regress
is vicious and consequently that the principle that generates it is false.
Griceian renaissance – (“rinascimento”) after J. L.
Austin’s death -- Erasmus, D., philosopher who played an important role in
Renaissance humanism. Like his
forerunners Petrarch, Coluccio Salutati, Lorenzo Valla, Leonardo Bruni,
and others, Erasmus stressed within philosophy and theology the function of
philological precision, grammatical correctness, and rhetorical elegance. But
for Erasmus the virtues of bonae literarae which are cultivated by the study of
authors of Latin and Grecian antiquity must be decisively linked with Christian
spirituality. Erasmus has been called by Huizinga the first modern intellectual
because he tried to influence and reform the mentality of society by working
within the shadow of ecclesiastical and political leaders. He epistemology,
evolutionary Erasmus, Desiderius 278
278 became one of the first humanists to make efficient use of the then
new medium of printing. His writings embrace various forms, including diatribe,
oration, locution, comment, dialogue, and letter. After studying in Christian
schools and living for a time in the monastery of Steyn near Gouda in the
Netherlands, Erasmus worked for different patrons. He gained a post as
secretary to the bishop of Kamerijk, during which time he wrote his first
published book, the Adagia first edition 1500, a collection of annotated Latin
adages. Erasmus was an adviser to the Emperor Charles V, to whom he dedicated
his Institutio principii christiani 1516. After studies at the of Paris, where he attended lectures by the
humanist Faber Stapulensis, Erasmus was put in touch by his patron Lord
Mountjoy with the British humanists John Colet and Thomas More. Erasmus led a
restless life, residing in several European cities including London, Louvain,
Basel, Freiburg, Bologna, Turin where he was awarded a doctorate of theology in
1506, and Rome. By using the means of modern philology, which led to the ideal
of the bonae literarae, Erasmus tried to reform the Christian-influenced
mentality of his times. Inspired by Valla’s Annotationes to the New Testament,
he completed a new Latin translation of the New Testament, edited the writings
of the early church fathers, especially St. Hieronymus, and wrote several
commentaries on psalms. He tried to regenerate the spirit of early Christianity
by laying bare its original sense against the background of scholastic
interpretation. In his view, the rituals of the existing church blocked the
development of an authentic Christian spirituality. Though Erasmus shared with
Luther a critical approach toward the existing church, he did not side with the
Reformation. His Diatribe de libero arbitrio 1524, in which he pleaded for the
free will of man, was answered by Luther’s De servo arbitrio. The historically
most influential books of Erasmus were Enchirion militis christiani 1503, in
which he attacked hirelings and soldiers; the Encomium moriae id est Laus
stultitiae 1511, a satire on modern life and the ecclesiastical pillars of
society; and the sketches of human life, the Colloquia first published in 1518,
often enlarged until 1553. In the small book Querela pacis 1517, he rejected
the ideology of justified wars propounded by Augustine and Aquinas. Against the
madness of war Erasmus appealed to the virtues of tolerance, friendliness, and
gentleness. All these virtues were for him the essence of Christianity.
Regressus: regression analysis, a part of statistical
theory concerned with the analysis of data with the aim of inferring a linear
functional relationship between assumed independent “regressor” variables and a
dependent “response” variable. A typical example involves the dependence of
crop yield on the application of fertilizer. For the most part, higher amounts
of fertilizer are associated with higher yields. But typically, if crop yield
is plotted vertically on a graph with the horizontal axis representing amount
of fertilizer applied, the resulting points will not fall in a straight line.
This can be due either to random “stochastic” fluctuations involving
measurement errors, irreproducible conditions, or physical indeterminism or to
failure to take into account other relevant independent variables such as
amount of rainfall. In any case, from any resulting “scatter diagram,” it is
possible mathematically to infer a “best-fitting” line. One method is, roughly,
to find the line that minimizes the average absolute distance between a line
and the data points collected. More commonly, the average of the squares of
these distances is minimized this is the “least squares” method. If more than
one independent variable is suspected, the theory of multiple regression, which
takes into account multiple regressors, can be applied: this can help to
minimize an “error term” involved in regression. Computers must be used for the
complex computations typically encountered. Care must be taken in connection
with the possibility that a lawlike, causal dependence is not really linear
even approximately over all ranges of the regressor variables e.g., in certain
ranges of amounts of application, more fertilizer is good for a plant, but too
much is bad.
reichenbach, “’philosopher,’ as we might say,” -- Grice
of science and a major leader of the movement known as logical empiricism. Born
in Hamburg, Reichenbach studies engineering (“if that’s something you study
than learn” – Grice) for a brief time, then turned to mathematics, philosophy,
and physics, which he pursued at Berlin, Munich, and Göttingen (“He kept moving
in the area.”) He takes his doctorate in philosophy at Erlangen with a
dissertation on conceptual aspects of probability, and a degree in mathematics
and physics by state examination at Göttingen – “just in case,” he said. With
Hitler’s rise to power, Reichenbach flees to Istanbul, then to “Los Angeles,” a
town on the western coast of America -- where he remained until his death, “if
not after” (Grice). Prior to his departure from G.y he is professor of philosophy of science at the of Berlin, leader of the Berlin Group of
logical empiricists, and a close associate of Einstein. With Carnap Reichenbach
founds “Erkenntnis,” the major journal of scientific philosophy before World
War II. After a short period early in his career as a follower of Kant,
Reichenbach rejects, “slightly out of the blue” (Grice), the synthetic a priori, chiefly because of
considerations arising out of Einstein’s general theory of relativity.
Reichenbach remains thereafter champion
of empiricism, adhering to a probabilistic version of the verifiability theory
of cognitive (“if not emotive”) meaning. Never, however, did he embrace the
logical positivism of what he pompously called the “Wiener Kraus.” Ideed, he
explicitly described his principal epistemological work, Experience and
Prediction 8, as his refutation of logical positivism. In particular, his
logical empiricism consisted in rejecting phenomenalism in favor of physicalism;
he rejected phenomenalism both in embracing scientific realism and in insisting
on a thoroughgoing probabilistic analysis of scientific meaning and scientific
knowledge. His main works span a wide range. In Probability and Induction he
advocated the frequency interpretation of probability and offered a pragmatic
justification of induction. In his philosophy of space and time he defended
conventionality of geometry and of simultaneity. In foundations of quantum
mechanics he adopted a three-valued logic to deal with causal anomalies. He
wrote major works on epistemology, logic, laws of nature, counterfactuals, and
modalities. At the time of his death he had almost completed The Direction of
Time, which was published posthumously. Grice cites him profusely in “Actions
and events.” Refs.: Section on Reichenbach in Grice, “Actions and events.”
Roman
Roamn – “Hellenism is what happened
to the Grecians after they became a Roman province.” -- hellenistic
philosophy: “Once the Romans defeated Greece, at Oxford we stop talking of
‘Greek’ philosophy, but ‘Hellenistic’ philosophy instead – since most Greeks
were brought to Rome as slaves to teach philosophy to their children” – Grice.
Vide “Roman philosophy” – “Not everybody knows all these Roman philosophers, so
that’s a good thing.” – H. P. Grice. Hellenistic philosophy is the
philosophical systems of the Hellenistic age 32330 B.C., although 31187 B.C.
better defines it as a philosophical era, notably Epicureanism, Stoicism, and
Skepticism. These all emerged in the generation after Aristotle’s death 322
B.C., and dominated philosophical debate until the first century B.C., during
which there were revivals of traditional Platonism and of Aristotelianism. The
age was one in which much of the eastern Mediterranean world absorbed Grecian
culture was “Hellenized,” hence “Hellenistic”, and recruits to philosophy
flocked from this region to Athens, which remained the center of philosophical
activity until 87 B.C. Then the Roman sack of Athens drove many philosophers
into exile, and neither the schools nor the styles of philosophy that had grown
up there ever fully recovered. Very few philosophical writings survive intact
from the period. Our knowledge of Hellenistic philosophers depends mainly on
later doxography, on the Roman writers Lucretius and Cicero both mid-first
century B.C., and on what we learn from the schools’ critics in later
centuries, e.g. Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch. ’Skeptic’, a term not actually
current before the very end of the Hellenistic age, serves as a convenient
label to characterize two philosophical movements. The first is the New
Academy: the school founded by Plato, the Academy, became in this period a
largely dialectical one, conducting searching critiques of other schools’
doctrines without declaring any of its own, beyond perhaps the assertion
however guarded that nothing could be known and the accompanying recommendation
of “suspension of judgment” epoche. The nature and vivacity of Stoicism owed
much to its prolonged debates with the New Academy. The founder of this
Academic phase was Arcesilaus school head c.268 c.241; its most revered and
influential protagonist was Carneades school head in the mid-second century;
and its most prestigious voice was that of Cicero 10643 B.C., whose highly influential
philosophical works were written mainly from a New Academic stance. But by the
early first century B.C. the Academy was drifting back to a more doctrinal
stance, and in the later part of the century it was largely eclipsed by a
second “skeptic” movement, Pyrrhonism. This was founded by Aenesidemus, a
pioneering skeptic despite his claim to be merely reviving the philosophy of
Pyrrho, a philosophical guru of the early Hellenistic period. His
neo-Pyrrhonism survives today mainly through the writings of Sextus Empiricus
second century A.D., an adherent of the school who, strictly speaking,
represents its post-Hellenistic phase. The Peripatos, Aristotle’s school,
officially survived throughout the era, but it is not regarded as a
distinctively “Hellenistic” movement. Despite the eminence of Aristotle’s first
successor, Theophrastus school head 322287, it thereafter fell from prominence,
its fortunes only reviving around the mid-first century B.C. It is disputed how
far the other Hellenistic philosophers were even aware of Aristotle’s
treatises, which should not in any case be regarded as a primary influence on
them. Each school had a location in Athens to which it could draw pupils. The
Epicurean school was a relatively private institution, its “Garden” outside the
city walls housing a close-knit philosophical community. The Stoics took their
name from the Stoa Poikile, the “Painted Colonnade” in central Athens where
they gathered. The Academics were based in the Academy, a public grove just
outside the city. Philosophers were public figures, a familiar sight around
town. Each school’s philosophical identity was further clarified by its
absolute loyalty to the name of its founder
respectively Epicurus, Zeno of Citium, and Plato and by the polarities that developed in
interschool debates. Epicureanism is diametrically opposed on most issues to
Stoicism. Academic Skepticism provides another antithesis to Stoicism, not
through any positions of its own it had none, but through its unflagging
critical campaign against every Stoic thesis. It is often said that in this age
the old Grecian political institution of the city-state had broken down, and
that the Hellenistic philosophies were an answer to the resulting crisis of
values. Whether or not there is any truth in this, it remains clear that moral
concerns were now much less confined to the individual city-state than
previously, and that at an extreme the boundaries had been pushed back to
include all mankind within the scope of an individual’s moral obligations. Our
“affinity” oikeiosis to all mankind is an originally Stoic doctrine that
acquired increasing currency with other schools. This attitude partly reflects
the weakening of national and cultural boundaries in the Hellenistic period, as
also in the Roman imperial period that followed it. The three recognized
divisions of philosophy were ethics, logic, and physics. In ethics, the central
objective was to state and defend an account of the “end” telos, the moral goal
to which all activity was subordinated: the Epicureans named pleasure, the
Stoics conformity with nature. Much debate centered on the semimythical figure
of the wise man, whose conduct in every conceivable circumstance was debated by
all schools. Logic in its modern sense was primarily a Stoic concern, rejected
as irrelevant by the Epicureans. But Hellenistic logic included epistemology,
where the primary focus of interest was the “criterion of truth,” the ultimate
yardstick against which all judgments could be reliably tested. Empiricism was
a surprisingly uncontroversial feature of Hellenistic theories: there was
little interest in the Platonic-Aristotelian idea that knowledge in the strict
sense is non-sensory, and the debate between dogmatists and Skeptics was more
concerned with the question whether any proposed sensory criterion was
adequate. Both Stoics and Epicureans attached especial importance to prolepsis,
the generic notion of a thing, held to be either innate or naturally acquired
in a way that gave it a guaranteed veridical status. Physics saw an opposition
between Epicurean atomism, with its denial of divine providence, and the Stoic
world-continuum, imbued with divine rationality. The issue of determinism was
also placed on the philosophical map: Epicurean morality depends on the denial
of both physical and logical determinism, whereas Stoic morality is compatible
with, indeed actually requires, the deterministic causal nexus through which
providence operates.
reid: Scots philosopher, beloved by Woozley, Grice’s
friend at Oxford in the late 1930s. Adefender of common sense and critic of the
theory of impressions and ideas articulated by Hume. Reid was born exactly one
year before Hume, in Strachan, Scotland. A bright lad, he went to
Marischal in Aberdeen at the age of
twelve, studying there with Thomas Blackwell and George Turnbull. The latter
apparently had great influence on Reid. Turnbull contended that knowledge of
the facts of sense and introspection may not be overturned by reasoning and
that volition is the only active power known from experience. Turnbull defended
common sense under the cloak of Berkeley. Reid threw off that cloak with
considerable panache, but he took over the defense of common sense from
Turnbull. Reid moved to a position of regent and lecturer at King’s in Aberdeen in 1751. There he formed, with
John Gregory, the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, which met fortnightly, often
to discuss Hume. Reid published his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the
Principles of Common Sense in 1764, and, in the same year, succeeded Adam Smith
in the chair of moral philosophy at Old
in Glasgow. After 1780 he no longer lectured but devoted himself to his
later works, Essays on the Intellectual Powers 1785 and Essays on the Active
Powers 1788. He was highly influential in Scotland and on the Continent in the
eighteenth century and, from time to time, in England and the United States
thereafter. Reid thought that one of his major contributions was the refutation
of Hume’s theory of impressions and ideas. Reid probably was convinced in his
teens of the truth of Berkeley’s doctrine that what the mind is immediately
aware of is always some idea, but his later study of Hume’s Treatise convinced
him that, contrary to Berkeley, it was impossible to reconcile this doctrine,
the theory of ideas, with common sense. Hume had rigorously developed the
theory, Reid said, and drew forth the conclusions. These, Reid averred, were
absurd. They included the denial of our knowledge of body and mind, and, even
more strikingly, of our conceptions of these things. The reason Reid thought
that Hume’s theory of ideas led to these conclusions was that for Hume, ideas
were faded impressions of sense, hence, sensations. No sensation is like a
quality of a material thing, let alone like the object that has the quality.
Consider movement. Movement is a quality of an object wherein the object
changes from one place to another, but the visual sensation that arises in us
is not the change of place of an object, it is an activity of mind. No two
things could, in fact, be more unalike. If what is before the mind is always
some sensation, whether vivacious or faded, we should never obtain the
conception of something other than a sensation. Hence, we could never even
conceive of material objects and their qualities. Even worse, we could not
conceive of our own minds, for they are not sensations either, and only
sensations are immediately before the mind, according to the theory of ideas.
Finally, and even more absurdly, we could not conceive of past sensations or
anything that does not now exist. For all that is immediately before the mind
is sensations that exist presently. Thus, we could not even conceive of
qualities, bodies, minds, and things that do not now exist. But this is absurd,
since it is obvious that we do think of all these things and even of things
that have never existed. The solution, Reid suggested, is to abandon the theory
of ideas and seek a better one. Many have thought Reid was unfair to Hume and
misinterpreted him. Reid’s Inquiry was presented to Hume by Dr. Blair in
manuscript form, however, and in reply Hume does not at all suggest that he has
been misinterpreted or handled unfairly. Whatever the merits of Reid’s
criticism of Hume, it was the study of the consequences of Hume’s philosophy
that accounts for Reid’s central doctrine of the human faculties and their
first principles. Faculties are innate powers, among them the powers of
conception and conviction. Reid’s strategy in reply to Hume is to build a
nativist theory of conception on the failure of Hume’s theory of ideas. Where
the theory of ideas, the doctrine of impressions and ideas, fails to account
for our conception of something, of qualities, bodies, minds, past things,
nonexistent things, Reid hypothesizes that our conceptions originate from a
faculty of the mind, i.e., from an innate power of conception. This line of
argument reflects Reid’s respect for Hume, whom he calls the greatest
metaphysician of the age, because Hume drew forth the consequences of a theory
of conception, which we might call associationism, according to which all our
conceptions result from associating sensations. Where the associationism of
Hume failed, Reid hypothesized that conceptions arise from innate powers of
conception that manifest themselves in accordance with original first
principles of the mind. The resulting hypotheses were not treated as a priori
necessities but as empirical hypotheses. Reid notes, therefore, that there are
marks by which we can discern the operation of an innate first principle, which
include the early appearance of the operation, its universality in mankind, and
its irresistibility. The operations of the mind that yield our conceptions of
qualities, bodies, and minds all bear these marks, Reid contends, and that
warrants the conclusion that they manifest first principles. It should be noted
that Reid conjectured that nature would be frugal in the implantation of innate
powers, supplying us with no more than necessary to produce the conceptions we
manifest. Reid is, consequently, a parsimonious empiricist in the development
of his nativist psychology. Reid developed his theory of perception in great
detail and his development led, surprisingly, to his articulation of
non-Euclidean geometry. Indeed, while Kant was erroneously postulating the a
priori necessity of Euclidean space, Reid was developing non-Euclidean geometry
to account for the empirical features of visual space. Reid’s theory of
perception is an example of his empiricism. In the Inquiry, he says that
sensations, which are operations of the mind, and impressions on the organs of
sense, which are material, produce our conceptions of primary and secondary
qualities. Sensations produce our original conceptions of secondary qualities
as the causes of those sensations. They are signs that suggest the existence of
the qualities. A sensation of smell suggests the existence of a quality in the
object that causes the sensation, though the character of the cause is
otherwise unknown. Thus, our original conception of secondary qualities is a relative
conception of some unknown cause of a sensation. Our conception of primary
qualities differs not, as Locke suggested, because of some resemblance between
the sensation and the quality for, as Berkeley noted, there is no resemblance
between a sensation and quality, but because our original conceptions of
primary qualities are clear and distinct. The sensation is a sign that suggests
a definite conception of the primary quality, e.g. a definite conception of the
movement of the object, rather than a mere conception of something, we know not
what, that gives rise to the sensation. These conceptions of qualities
signified by sensations result from the operations of principles of our natural
constitution. These signs, which suggest the conception of qualities, also
suggest a conception of some object that has them. This conception of the
object is also relative, in that it is simply a conception of a subject of the
qualities. In the case of physical qualities, the conception of the object is a
conception of a material object. Though sensations, which are activities of the
mind, suggest the existence of qualities, they are not the only signs of sense
perception. Some impressions on the organs of sense, the latter being material,
also give rise to conceptions of qualities, especially to our conception of
visual figure, the seen shape of the object. But Reid can discern no sensation
of shape. There are, of course, sensations of color, but he is convinced from
the experience of those who have cataracts and see color but not shape that the
sensations of color are insufficient to suggest our conceptions of visual
figure. His detailed account of vision and especially of the seeing of visual
figure leads him to one of his most brilliant moments. He asks what sort of data
do we receive upon the eye and answers that the data must be received at the
round surface of the eyeball and processed within. Thus, visual space is a
projection in three dimensions of the information received on the round surface
of the eye, and the geometry of this space is a non-Euclidean geometry of
curved space. Reid goes on to derive the properties of the space quite
correctly, e.g., in concluding that the angles of a triangle will sum to a
figure greater than 180 degrees and thereby violate the parallels postulate.
Thus Reid discovered that a non-Euclidean geometry was satisfiable and, indeed,
insisted that it accurately described the space of vision not, however, the
space of touch, which he thought was Euclidean. From the standpoint of his theory
of perceptual signs, the example of visual figure helps to clarify his doctrine
of the signs of perception. We do not perceive signs and infer what they
signify. This inference, Reid was convinced by Hume, would lack the support of
reasoning, and Reid concluded that reasoning was, in this case, superfluous.
The information received on the surface of the eye produces our conceptions of
visual figure immediately. Indeed, these signs pass unnoticed as they give rise
to the conception of visual figure in the mind. The relation of sensory signs
to the external things they signify originally is effected by a first principle
of the mind without the use of reason. The first principles that yield our
conceptions of qualities and objects yield convictions of the existence of
these things at the same time. A question naturally arises as to the evidence
of these convictions. First principles yield the convictions along with the
conceptions, but do we have evidence of the existence of the qualities and
objects we are convinced exist? We have the evidence of our senses, of our
natural faculties, and that is all the evidence possible here. Reid’s point is
that the convictions in questions resulting from the original principles of our
faculties are immediately justified. Our faculties are, however, all fallible,
so the justification that our original convictions possess may be refuted. We
can now better understand Reid’s reply to Hume. To account for our convictions
of the existence of body, we must abandon Hume’s theory of ideas, which cannot
supply even the conception of body. We must discover both the original first
principles that yield the conception and conviction of objects and their
qualities, and first principles to account for our convictions of the past, of
other thinking beings, and of morals. Just as there are first principles of
perception that yield convictions of the existence of presently existing
objects, so there are first principles of memory that yield the convictions of
the existence of past things, principles of testimony that yield the
convictions of the thoughts of others, and principles of morals that yield
convictions of our obligations. Reid’s defense of a moral faculty alongside the
faculties of perception and memory is striking. The moral faculty yields
conceptions of the justice and injustice of an action in response to our
conception of that action. Reid shrewdly notes that different people may
conceive of the same action in different ways. I may conceive of giving some
money as an action of gratitude, while you may consider it squandering money.
How we conceive of an action depends on our moral education, but the response
of our moral faculty to an action conceived in a specific way is original and
the same in all who have the faculty. Hence differences in moral judgment are
due, not to principles of the moral faculty, but to differences in how we
conceive of our actions. This doctrine of a moral faculty again provides a
counterpoint to the moral philosophy of Hume, for, according Reid, Thomas Reid,
Thomas 785 785 to Reid, judgments of
justice and injustice pertaining to all matters, including promises, contracts,
and property, arise from our natural faculties and do not depend on anything
artificial. Reid’s strategy for defending common sense is clear enough. He
thinks that Hume showed that we cannot arrive at our convictions of external
objects, of past events, of the thoughts of others, of morals, or, for that
matter, of our own minds, from reasoning about impressions and ideas. Since
those convictions are a fact, philosophy must account for them in the only way
that remains, by the hypothesis of innate faculties that yield them. But do we
have any evidence for these convictions? Evidence, Reid says, is the ground of
belief, and our evidence is that of our faculties. Might our faculties deceive
us? Reid answers that it is a first principle of our faculties that they are
not fallacious. Why should we assume that our faculties are not fallacious?
First, the belief is irresistible. However we wage war with first principles,
the principles of common sense, they prevail in daily life. There we trust our
faculties whether we choose to or not. Second, all philosophy depends on the
assumption that our faculties are not fallacious. Here Reid employs an ad
hominem argument against Hume, but one with philosophical force. Reid says
that, in response to a total skeptic who decides to trust none of his
faculties, he puts his hand over his mouth in silence. But Hume trusted reason
and consciousness, and therefore is guilty of pragmatic inconsistency in
calling the other faculties into doubt. They come from the same shop, Reid
says, and he who calls one into doubt has no right to trust the others. All our
faculties are fallible, and, therefore, we must, to avoid arbitrary favoritism,
trust them all at the outset or trust none. The first principles of our
faculties are trustworthy. They not only account for our convictions, but are
the ground and evidence of those convictions. This nativism is the original
engine of justification. Reid’s theory of original perceptions is supplemented
by a theory of acquired perceptions, those which incorporate the effects of
habit and association, such as the perception of a passing coach. He
distinguishes acquired perceptions from effects of reasoning. The most
important way our original perceptions must be supplemented is by general
conceptions. These result from a process whereby our attention is directed to
some individual quality, e.g., the whiteness of a piece of paper, which he
calls abstraction, and a further process of generalizing from the individual
quality to the general conception of the universal whiteness shared by many
individuals. Reid is a sophisticated nominalist; he says that the only things
that exist are individual, but he includes individual qualities as well as
individual objects. The reason is that individual qualities obviously exist and
are needed as the basis of generalization. To generalize from an individual we
must have some conception of what it is like, and this conception cannot be
general, on pain of circularity or regress, but must be a conception of an
individual quality, e.g., the whiteness of this paper, which it uniquely
possesses. Universals, though predicated of objects to articulate our knowledge,
do not exist. We can think of universals, just as we can think of centaurs, but
though they are the objects of thought and predicated of individuals that
exist, they do not themselves exist. Generalization is not driven by ontology
but by utility. It is we and not nature that sort things into kinds in ways
that are useful to us. This leads to a division-of-labor theory of meaning
because general conceptions are the meanings of general words. Thus, in those
domains in which there are experts, in science or the law, we defer to the
experts concerning the general conceptions that are the most useful in the area
in question. Reid’s theory of the intellectual powers, summarized briefly
above, is supplemented by his theory of our active powers, those that lead to
actions. His theory of the active powers includes a theory of the principles of
actions. These include animal principles that operate without understanding,
but the most salient and philosophically important part of Reid’s theory of the
active powers is his theory of the rational principles of action, which involve
understanding and the will. These rational principles are those in which we
have a conception of the action to be performed and will its performance.
Action thus involves an act of will or volition, but volitions as Reid
conceived of them are not the esoteric inventions of philosophy but, instead,
the commonplace activities of deciding and resolving to act. Reid is a
libertarian and maintains that our liberty or freedom refutes the principle of
necessity or determinism. Freedom requires the power to will the action and
also the power not to will it. The principle of necessity tells us that our
action was necessitated and, therefore, that it was not in our power not to
have willed as we did. It is not sufficient for freedom, as Hume suggested,
that we act as we will. We must also have the Reid, Thomas Reid, Thomas
786 786 power to determine what we
will. The reason is that willing is the means to the end of action, and he who
lacks power over the means lacks power over the end. This doctrine of the
active power over the determinations of our will is founded on the central
principle of Reid’s theory of the active powers, the principle of agent
causation. The doctrine of acts of the will or volitions does not lead to a
regress, as critics allege, because my act of will is an exercise of the most
basic kind of causality, the efficient causality of an agent. I am the
efficient cause of my acts of will. My act of will need not be caused by an
antecedent act of will because my act of will is the result of my exercise of
my causal power. This fact also refutes an objection to the doctrine of
liberty that if my action is not
necessitated, then it is fortuitous. My free actions are caused, not
fortuitous, though they are not necessitated, because they are caused by me.
How, one might inquire, do we know that we are free? The doubt that we are free
is like other skeptical doubts, and receives a similar reply, namely, that the
conviction of our freedom is a natural and original conviction arising from our
faculties. It occurs prior to instruction and it is irresistible in practical
life. Any person with two identical coins usable to pay for some item must be
convinced that she can pay with the one or the other; and, unlike the ass of
Buridan, she readily exercises her power to will the one or the other. The
conviction of freedom is an original one, not the invention of philosophy, and
it arises from the first principles of our natural faculties, which are trustworthy
and not fallacious. The first principles of our faculties hang together like
links in a chain, and one must either raise up the whole or the links prove
useless. Together, they are the foundation of true philosophy, science, and
practical life, and without them we shall lead ourselves into the coalpit of
skepticism and despair.
reimarus: G. philosopher, born in Hamburg and educated in
philosophy at Jena. For most of his life he taught foreignl languages at a high
school in Hamburg (“anything but Deutsche!”). The most important writings he
published were a treatise on natural religion, Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten
Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, a textbook
on semantics, which he pretentiously called “Vernunftlehre,” and an interesting work on instincts in
animals, “Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Tiere,” “which Strawson
thought was about deer!” – Grice.
However, Reimarus is best known
for his Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes.” In
it, Reimarus reverses his stance on natural theology and openly advocates a
deism in the British tradition. The controversy created by its publication had
a profound impact on the further development of G. theology. Though Reimarus
always remained basically a follower of Wolff, he is often quite critical of
Wolffian rationalism in his discussion of semantics and philosophical
psychology.
Reinhold, Karl Leonhard 17431819, Austrian philosopher
who was both a popularizer and a critic of Kant. He was the first occupant of
the chair of critical philosophy established at the of Jena in 1787. His Briefe über die
Kantische Philosophie 1786/87 helped to popularize Kantianism. Reinhold also
proclaimed the need for a more “scientific” presentation of the critical
philosophy, in the form of a rigorously deductive system in which everything is
derivable from a single first principle “the principle of consciousness”. He
tried to satisfy this need with Elementarphilosophie “Elementary Philosophy” or
“Philosophy of the Elements”, expounded in his Versuch einer neuen Theorie des
menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens “Attempt at a New Theory of the Human
Faculty of Representation,” 1789, Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger
Missverständnisse der Philosophen I “Contributions to the Correction of the
Prevailing Misunderstandings of Philosophers,” 1790, and Ueber das Fundament
des philosophischen Wissens “On the Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,”
1791. His criticism of the duality of Kant’s starting point and of the ad hoc
character of his deductions contributed to the demand for a more coherent
exposition of transcendental idealism, while his strategy for accomplishing
this task stimulated others above all,
Fichte to seek an even more “fundamental” first
principle for philosophy. Reinhold later became an enthusiastic adherent, first
of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and then of Bardili’s “rational realism,” before
finally adopting a novel “linguistic” approach to philosophical problems.
res: “No doubt the most important expression in the
philosophical vocabulary – nobody knows what it means!” – Grice. reism, also
called concretism, the theory that the basic entities are concrete objects.
Reism differs from nominalism in that the problem of universals is not its only
motivation and often not the principal motivation for the theory. Three types
of reism can be distinguished. 1 Brentano held that every object is a concrete
or individual thing. He said that substances, aggregates of substances, parts
of substances, and individual properties of substances are the only things that
exist. There is no such thing as the existence or being of an object; and there
are no non-existent objects. One consequence of this doctrine is that the
object of thought what the thought is about is always an individual object and
not a proposition. For example, the thought that this paper is white is about
this paper and not about the proposition that this paper is white. Meinong
attacked Brentano’s concretism and argued that thoughts are about “objectives,”
not objects. 2 Kotarbigski, who coined the term ‘reism’, holds as a basic
principle that only concrete objects exist. Although things may be hard or
soft, red or blue, there is no such thing as hardness, softness, redness, or
blueness. Sentences that contain abstract words are either strictly meaningless
or can be paraphrased into sentences that do not contain any abstract words.
Kotarbinski is both a nominalist and a materialist. Brentano was a nominalist
and a dualist. 3 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk’s concretism is quite different from
the first two. For him, concretism is the theory that all of a person’s
cognitive faculties participate in every instance of knowing: reason, senses,
emotion, and will.
relatum – Grice: “One should carefully distinguish
between the prior ‘relatum’ and its formative, ‘relatIVUM.’” -- RELATUM --
referentially transparent. An occurrence of a singular term t in a sentence ‘.
. . t . . .’ is referentially transparent or purely referential if and only if
the truth-value of ‘. . . t . . .’ depends on whether the referent of t
satisfies the open sentence ‘. . . x . . .’; the satisfaction of ‘. . . x . .
.’ by the referent of t would guarantee the truth of ‘. . . t . . .’, and
failure of this individual to satisfy ‘. . . x . . .’ would guarantee that ‘. .
. t . . .’ was not true. ‘Boston is a city’ is true if and only if the referent
of ‘Boston’ satisfies the open sentence ‘x is a city’, so the occurrence of
‘Boston’ is referentially transparent. But in ‘The expression “Boston” has six
letters’, the length of the word within the quotes, not the features of the
city Boston, determines the truth-value of the sentence, so the occurrence is
not referentially transparent. According to a Fregean theory of meaning, the
reference of any complex expression that is a meaningful unit is a function of
the referents of its parts. Within this context, an occurrence of a referential
term t in a meaningful expression ‘. . . t . . .’ is referentially transparent
or purely referential if and only if t contributes its referent to the
reference of ‘. . . t . . .’. The expression ‘the area around Boston’ refers to
the particular area it does because of the referent of ‘Boston’ and the reference
or extension of the function expressed by ‘the area around x’. An occurrence of
a referential term t in a meaningful expression ‘. . . t . . .’ is
referentially opaque if and only if it is not referentially transparent. Thus,
if t has a referentially opaque occurrence in a sentence ‘. . . t . . .’, then
the truth-value of ‘. . . t . . .’ depends on something reduction,
phenomenological referentially transparent 780 780 other than whether the referent of t
satisfies ‘. . . x . . .’. Although these definitions apply to occurrences of
referential terms, the terms ‘referentially opaque’ and ‘referentially
transparent’ are used primarily to classify linguistic contexts for terms as
referentially opaque contexts. If t occurs purely referentially in S but not in
CS, then C is a referentially opaque
context. But we must qualify this: C is
a referentially opaque context for that occurrence of t in S. It would not
follow without further argument that C
is a referentially opaque context for other occurrences of terms in
sentences that could be placed into C . Contexts of quotation, propositional
attitude, and modality have been widely noted for their potential to produce
referential opacity. Consider: 1 John believes that the number of planets is
less than eight. 2 John believes that nine is less than eight. If 1 is true but
2 is not, then either ‘the number of planets’ or ‘nine’ has an occurrence that
is not purely referential, because the sentences would differ in truth-value
even though the expressions are co-referential. But within the sentences: 3 The
number of planets is less than eight. 4 Nine is less than eight. the
expressions appear to have purely referential occurrence. In 3 and 4, the
truth-value of the sentence as a whole depends on whether the referent of ‘The
number of planets’ and ‘Nine’ satisfies ‘x is less than eight’. Because the
occurrences in 3 and 4 are purely referential but those in 1 and 2 are not, the
context ‘John believes that ’ is a
referentially opaque context for the relevant occurrence of at least one of the
two singular terms. Some argue that the occurrence of ‘nine’ in 2 is purely
referential because the truth-value of the sentence as a whole depends on
whether the referent, nine, satisfies the open sentence ‘John believes that x is
less than eight’. Saying so requires that we make sense of the concept of
satisfaction for such sentences belief sentences and others and that we show
that the concept of satisfaction applies in this way in the case at hand
sentence 2. There is controversy about whether these things can be done. In 1,
on the other hand, the truth-value is not determined by whether nine the
referent of ‘the number of planets’ satisfies the open sentence, so that
occurrence is not purely referential. Modal contexts raise similar questions. 5
Necessarily, nine is odd. 6 Necessarily, the number of planets is odd. If 5 is
true but 6 is not, then at least one of the expressions does not have a purely
referential occurrence, even though both appear to be purely referential in the
non-modal sentence that appears in the context ‘Necessarily, ———’. Thus the
context is referentially opaque for the occurrence of at least one of these
terms. On an alternative approach, genuinely singular terms always occur
referentially, and ‘the number of planets’ is not a genuinely singular term.
Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, e.g., provides an alternative
semantic analysis for sentences involving definite descriptions. This would
enable us to say that even simple sentences like 3 and 4 differ considerably in
syntactic and semantic structure, so that the similarity that suggests the
problem, the seemingly similar occurrences of co-referential terms, is merely
apparent. “A formation out of referro,” -- a two-or-more-place property e.g.,
loves or between, or the extension of such a property. In set theory, a
relation is any set of ordered pairs or triplets, etc., but these are reducible
to pairs. For simplicity, the formal exposition here uses the language of set
theory, although an intensional property-theoretic view is later assumed. The
terms of a relation R are the members of the pairs constituting R, the items
that R relates. The collection D of all first terms of pairs in R is the domain
of R; any collection with D as a subcollection may also be so called.
Similarly, the second terms of these pairs make up or are a subcollection of
the range counterdomain or converse domain of R. One usually works within a set
U such that R is a subset of the Cartesian product U$U the set of all ordered pairs
on U. Relations can be: 1 reflexive or exhibit reflexivity: for all a, aRa.
That is, a reflexive relation is one that, like identity, each thing bears to
itself. Examples: a weighs as much as b; or the universal relation, i.e., the
relation R such that for all a and b, aRb. 2 symmetrical or exhibit symmetry:
for all a and b, aRb P bRa. In a symmetrical relation, the order of the terms
is reversible. Examples: a is a sibling of b; a and b have a common divisor.
Also symmetrical is the null relation, under which no object is related to
anything. 3 transitive or exhibit transitivity: for all a, b, and c, aRb &
bRc P aRc. Transitive relations carry across a middle term. Examples: a is less
than b; a is an ancestor of b. Thus, if a is less than b and b is less than c,
a is less than c: less than has carried across the middle term, b. 4
antisymmetrical: for all a and b, aRb & bRa P a % b. 5 trichotomous,
connected, or total trichotomy: for all a and b, aRb 7 bRa 7 a % b. 6
asymmetrical: aRb & bRa holds for no a and b. 7 functional: for all a, b,
and c, aRb & aRc P b % c. In a functional relation which may also be called
a function, each first term uniquely determines a second term. R is
non-reflexive if it is not reflexive, i.e., if the condition 1 fails for at least
one object a. R is non-symmetric if 2 fails for at least one pair of objects a,
b. Analogously for non-transitive. R is irreflexive aliorelative if 1 holds for
no object a and intransitive if 3 holds for no objects a, b, and c. Thus
understands is non-reflexive since some things do not understand themselves,
but not irreflexive, since some things do; loves is nonsymmetric but not
asymmetrical; and being a cousin of is non-transitive but not intransitive, as
being mother of is. 13 define an equivalence relation e.g., the identity
relation among numbers or the relation of being the same age as among people. A
class of objects bearing an equivalence relation R to each other is an
equivalence class under R. 1, 3, and 4 define a partial order; 3, 5, and 6 a
linear order. Similar properties define other important classifications, such
as lattice and Boolean algebra. The converse of a relation R is the set of all
pairs b, a such that aRb; the comreism relation 788 788 plement of R is the set of all pairs a,
b such that aRb i.e. aRb does not hold. A more complex example will show the
power of a relational vocabulary. The ancestral of R is the set of all a, b
such that either aRb or there are finitely many cI , c2, c3, . . . , cn such
that aRcI and c1Rc2 and c2Rc3 and . . . and cnRb. Frege introduced the
ancestral in his theory of number: the natural numbers are exactly those
objects bearing the ancestral of the successor-of relation to zero.
Equivalently, they are the intersection of all sets that contain zero and are
closed under the successor relation. This is formalizable in second-order
logic. Frege’s idea has many applications. E.g., assume a set U, relation R on
U, and property F. An element a of U is hereditarily F with respect to R if a
is F and any object b which bears the ancestral of R to a is also F. Hence F is
here said to be a hereditary property, and the set a is hereditarily finite
with respect to the membership relation if a is finite, its members are, as are
the members of its members, etc. The hereditarily finite sets or the sets
hereditarily of cardinality ‹ k for any inaccessible k are an important
subuniverse of the universe of sets. Philosophical discussions of relations
typically involve relations as special cases of properties or sets. Thus
nominalists and Platonists disagree over the reality of relations, since they
disagree about properties in general. Similarly, one important connection is to
formal semantics, where relations are customarily taken as the denotations of
relational predicates. Disputes about the notion of essence are also pertinent.
One says that a bears an internal relation, R, to b provided a’s standing in R
to b is an essential property of a; otherwise a bears an external relation to
b. If the essentialaccidental distinction is accepted, then a thing’s essential
properties will seem to include certain of its relations to other things, so
that we must admit internal relations. Consider a point in space, which has no
identity apart from its place in a certain system. Similarly for a number. Or
consider my hand, which would perhaps not be the same object if it had not
developed as part of my body. If it is true that I could not have had other
parents that possible persons similar to
me but with distinct parents would not really be me then I, too, am internally related to other
things, namely my parents. Similar arguments would generate numerous internal
relations for organisms, artifacts, and natural objects in general. Internal
relations will also seem to exist among properties and relations themselves.
Roundness is essentially a kind of shape, and the relation larger than is
essentially the converse of the relation smaller than. In like usage, a
relation between a and b is intrinsic if it depends just on how a and b are; extrinsic
if they have it in virtue of their relation to other things. Thus, higher-than
intrinsically relates the Alps to the Appalachians. That I prefer viewing the
former to the latter establishes an extrinsic relation between the mountain
ranges. Note that this distinction is obscure as is internal-external. One
could argue that the Alps are higher than the Appalachians only in virtue of
the relation of each to something further, such as space, light rays, or
measuring rods. Another issue specific to the theory of relations is whether
relations are real, given that properties do exist. That is, someone might
reject nominalism only to the extent of admitting one-place properties.
Although such doctrines have some historical importance in, e.g., Plato and Bradley,
they have disappeared. Since relations are indispensable to modern logic and
semantics, their inferiority to one-place properties can no longer be seriously
entertained. Hence relations now have little independent significance in
philosophy.
Analysandum/analysans, definiens/definiendum,
implicans/implicaturum
relational logic, the formal study of the properties of
and operations on binary relations that was initiated by Peirce between 1870
and 2. Thus, in relational logic, one might examine the formal properties of
special kinds of relations, such as transitive relations, or asymmetrical ones,
or orderings of certain types. Or the focus might be on various operations,
such as that of forming the converse or relative product. Formal deductive
systems used in such studies are generally known as calculi of relations.
relativum-absolutum distinction, the: “No, we don’t
mean Whorft, less so Sapir!” – Grice. relativism, the denial that there are
certain kinds of universal truths. There are two main types, cognitive and
ethical. Cognitive relativism holds that there are no universal truths about
the world: the world has no intrinsic characteristics, there are just different
ways of interpreting it. The Grecian Sophist Protagoras, the first person on
record to hold such a view, said, “Man is the measure of all things; of things
that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not.” Goodman,
Putnam, and Rorty are contemporary philosophers who have held versions of
relativism. Rorty says, e.g., that “ ‘objective truth’ is no more and no less
than the best idea we currently have about how to explain what is going on.”
Critics of cognitive relativism contend that it is self-referentially
incoherent, since it presents its statements as universally true, rather than
simply relatively so. Ethical relativism is the theory that there are no
universally valid moral principles: all moral principles are valid relative to
culture or individual choice. There are two subtypes: conventionalism, which
holds that moral principles are valid relative to the conventions of a given
culture or society; and subjectivism, which maintains that individual choices
are what determine the validity of a moral principle. Its motto is, Morality
lies in the eyes of the beholder. As Ernest Hemingway wrote, “So far, about
morals, I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is
immoral is what you feel bad after.” Conventionalist ethical relativism
consists of two theses: a diversity thesis, which specifies that what is
considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, so that
there are no moral principles accepted by all societies; and a dependency
thesis, which specifies that all moral principles derive their validity from
cultural acceptance. From these two ideas relativists conclude that there are
no universally valid moral principles applying everywhere and at all times. The
first thesis, the diversity thesis, or what may simply be called cultural
relativism, is anthropological; it registers the fact that moral rules differ
from society to society. Although both ethical relativists and non-relativists
typically accept cultural relativism, it is often confused with the normative
thesis of ethical relativism. The opposite of ethical relativism is ethical
objectivism, which asserts that although cultures may differ in their moral
principles, some moral principles have universal validity. Even if, e.g., a
culture does not recognize a duty to refrain from gratuitous harm, that
principle is valid and the culture should adhere to it. There are two types of
ethical objectivism, strong and weak. Strong objectivism, sometimes called
absolutism, holds that there is one true moral system with specific moral
rules. The ethics of ancient Israel in the Old Testament with its hundreds of
laws exemplifies absolutism. Weak objectivism holds that there is a core
morality, a determinate set of principles that are universally valid usually
including prohibitions against killing the innocent, stealing, breaking of
promises, and lying. But weak objectivism accepts an indeterminate area where
relativism is legitimate, e.g., rules regarding sexual mores and regulations of
property. Both types of objectivism recognize what might be called application
relativism, the endeavor to apply moral rules where there is a conflict between
rules or where rules can be applied in different ways. For example, the ancient
Callactians ate their deceased parents but eschewed the impersonal practice of
burying them as disrespectful, whereas contemporary society has the opposite
attitudes about the care of dead relatives; but both practices exemplify the
same principle of the respect for the dead. According to objectivism, cultures
or forms of life can fail to exemplify an adequate moral community in at least
three ways: 1 the people are insufficiently intelligent to put constitutive
principles in order; 2 they are under considerable stress so that it becomes
too burdensome to live by moral principles; and 3 a combination of 1 and 2.
Ethical relativism is sometimes confused with ethical skepticism, the view that
we cannot know whether there are any valid moral principles. Ethical nihilism
holds that there are no valid moral principles. J. L. Mackie’s error theory is
a version of this view. Mackie held that while we all believe some moral
principles to be true, there are compelling arguments to the contrary. Ethical
objectivism must be distinguished from moral realism, the view that valid moral
principles are true, independently of human choice. Objectivism may be a form
of ethical constructivism, typified by Rawls, whereby objective principles are
simply those that impartial human beings would choose behind the veil of
ignorance. That is, the principles are not truly independent of hypothetical
human choices, but are constructs from those choices. relativum-absolutum
distinction, the: relativity, a term applied to Einstein’s theories of
electrodynamics special relativity, 5 and gravitation general relativity, 6
because both hold that certain physical quantities, formerly considered
objective, are actually “relative to” the state of motion of the observer. They
are called “special” and “general” because, in special relativity,
electrodynamical laws determine a restricted class of kinematical reference
frames, the “inertial frames”; in general relativity, the very distinction
between inertial frames and others becomes a relative distinction. Special
relativity. Classical mechanics makes no distinction between uniform motion and
rest: not velocity, but acceleration is physically detectable, and so different
states of uniform motion are physically equivalent. But classical
electrodynamics describes light as wave motion with a constant velocity through
a medium, the “ether.” It follows that the measured velocity of light should
depend on the motion of the observer relative to the medium. When
interferometer experiments suggested that the velocity of light is independent
of the motion of the source, H. A. Lorentz proposed that objects in motion
contract in the direction of motion through the ether while their local time
“dilates”, and that this effect masks the difference in the velocity of light.
Einstein, however, associated the interferometry results with many other
indications that the theoretical distinction between uniform motion and rest in
the ether lacks empirical content. He therefore postulated that, in
electrodynamics as in mechanics, all states of uniform motion are equivalent.
To explain the apparent paradox that observers with different velocities can
agree on the velocity of light, he criticized the idea of an “absolute” or
frame-independent measure of simultaneity: simultaneity of distant events can
only be established by some kind of signaling, but experiment suggested that
light is the only signal with an invariant velocity, and observers in relative
motion who determine simultaneity with light signals obtain different results.
Furthermore, since objective measurement of time and length presupposes
absolute simultaneity, observers in relative motion will also disagree on time
and length. So Lorentz’s contraction and dilatation are not physical effects,
but consequences of the relativity of simultaneity, length, and time, to the
motion of the observer. But this relativity follows from the invariance of the
laws of electrodynamics, and the invariant content of the theory is expressed
geometrically in Minkowski spacetime. Logical empiricists took the theory as an
illustration of how epistemological analysis of a concept time could eliminate
empirically superfluous notions absolute simultaneity. General relativity.
Special relativity made the velocity of light a limit for all causal processes
and required revision of Newton’s theory of gravity as an instantaneous action
at a distance. General relativity incorporates gravity into the geometry of
space-time: instead of acting directly on one another, masses induce curvature
in space-time. Thus the paths of falling bodies represent not forced deviations
from the straight paths of a flat space-time, but “straightest” paths in a
curved space-time. While space-time is “locally” Minkowskian, its global
structure depends on mass-energy distribution. The insight behind this theory
is the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass: since a given
gravitational field affects all bodies equally, weight is indistinguishable
from the inertial force of acceleration; freefall motion is indistinguishable
from inertial motion. This suggests that the Newtonian decomposition of free
fall into inertial and accelerated components is arbitrary, and that the
freefall path itself is the invariant basis for the structure of space-time. A
philosophical motive for the general theory was to extend the relativity of
motion. Einstein saw special relativity’s restricted class of equivalent
reference frames as an “epistemological defect,” and he sought laws that would
apply to any frame. His inspiration was Mach’s criticism of the Newtonian
distinction between “absolute” rotation and rotation relative to observable
bodies like the “fixed stars.” Einstein formulated Mach’s criticism as a fundamental
principle: since only relative motions are observable, local inertial effects
should be explained by the cosmic distribution of masses and by motion relative
to them. Thus not only velocity and rest, but motion in general would be
relative. Einstein hoped to effect this generalization by eliminating the
distinction between inertial frames and freely falling frames. Because free
fall remains a privileged state of motion, however, non-gravitational
acceleration remains detectable, and absolute rotation remains distinct from
relative rotation. Einstein also thought that relativity of motion would result
from the general covariance coordinate-independence of his theory i.e., that general equivalence of coordinate
systems meant general equivalence of states of motion. It is now clear,
however, that general covariance is a mathematical property of physical
theories without direct implications about motion. So general relativity does
not “generalize” the relativity of motion as Einstein intended. Its great accomplishments
are the unification of gravity and geometry and the generalization of special
relativity to space-times of arbitrary curvature, which has made possible the
modern investigation of cosmological structure. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “G. R.
Grice, M. Hollis, and Norfolkian relativism.”
relevans: “Hardly in the vocabulary of Cartesio!” –
Grice. relevance logic, any of a range of logics and philosophies of logic
united by their insistence that the premises of a valid inference must be
relevant to the conclusion. Standard, or classical, logic contains inferences
that break this requirement, e.g., the spread law, that from a contradiction
any proposition whatsoever follows. Relevance logic had its genesis in a system
of strenge Implikation published by Wilhelm Ackermann in 6. Ackermann’s idea
for rejecting irrelevance was taken up and developed by Alan Anderson and Nuel
Belnap in a series of papers between 9 and Anderson’s death in 4. The first
main summaries of these researches appeared under their names, and those of
many collaborators, in Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity vol. 1,
5; vol. 2, 2. By the time of Anderson’s death, a substantial research effort
into relevance logic was under way, and it has continued. Besides the rather
vague unity of the idea of relevance between premises and conclusion, there is
a technical criterion often used to mark out relevance logic, introduced by
Belnap in 0, and applicable really only to propositional logics the main focus
of concern to date: a necessary condition of relevance is that premises and
conclusion should share a propositional variable. Early attention was focused
on systems E of entailment and T of ticket entailment. Both are subsystems of
C. I. Lewis’s system S4 of strict implication and of classical truth-functional
logic i.e., consequences in E and T in ‘P’ are consequences in S4 in ‘ ’ and in
classical logic in ‘/’. Besides rejection of the spread law, probably the most
notorious inference that is rejected is disjunctive syllogism DS for extensional
disjunction which is equivalent to detachment for material implication: A 7
B,ÝA , B. The reason is immediate, given acceptance of Simplification and
Addition: Simplification takes us from A & ÝA to each conjunct, and
Addition turns the first conjunct into A 7 B. Unless DS were rejected, the
spread law would follow. Since the late 0s, attention has shifted to the system
R of relevant implication, which adds permutation to E, to mingle systems which
extend E and R by the mingle law A P A P A, and to contraction-free logics,
which additionally reject contraction, in one form reading A P A P B P A P B. R
minus contraction RW differs from linear logic, much studied recently in
computer science, only by accepting the distribution of ‘&’ over ‘7’, which
the latter rejects. Like linear logic, relevance logic contains both
truth-functional and non-truth-functional connectives. Unlike linear logic,
however, R, E, and T are undecidable unusual among propositional logics. This
result was obtained only in 4. In the early 0s, relevance logics were given
possible-worlds semantics by several authors working independently. They also
have axiomatic, natural deduction, and sequent or consecution formulations. One
technical result that has attracted attention has been the demonstration that,
although relevance logics reject DS, they all accept Ackermann’s rule Gamma:
that if A 7 B and ÝA are theses, so is B. A recent result occasioning much
surprise was that relevant arithmetic consisting of Peano’s postulates on the base
of quantified R does not admit Gamma. Refs.: “’Be relevant’—as a conversational
maxim under the category of relation.” Grice, “Strawson’s Principle of
Relevance – where did he take it from?”, H. P. Grice, “Nowell-Smith on
conversational relevance, and why he left Oxford.” Luigi Rossi, PhD
dissertataion on P. H. Nowell-Smith’s conversational relevance. P. H.
Nowell-Smith, “Grice et moi.” --. H. P. Grice, “Strawson’s relevance, Urmson’s
appositeness, and my helpfulness! Post-war Oxford pragmatics!”
reliabile, the, n. neuter. -- reliabilism, a type of
theory in epistemology that holds that what qualifies a belief as knowledge or
as epistemically justified is its *reliable* linkage to the truth. Philosophers
usually motivate reliabilism with an analogy between a thermometer that
reliably indicates the temperature and a belief that reliably indicates the
truth. A belief qualifies as knowledge, if there is a lawlike connection in nature
that guarantees that the belief is true. A cousin of the nomic sufficiency
account is the counterfactual approach, proposed by Dretske, Goldman, and
Nozick. A typical formulation of this approach says that a belief qualifies
relativity, general reliabilism 792
792 as knowledge if the belief is true and the cognizer has reasons for
believing it that would not obtain unless it were true. For example, someone
knows that the telephone is ringing if he believes this, it is true, and he has
a specific auditory experience that would not occur unless the telephone were
ringing. In a slightly different formulation, someone knows a proposition if he
believes it, it is true, and if it were not true he would not believe it. In
the example, if the telephone were not ringing, he would not believe that it
is, because he would not have the same auditory experience. These accounts are
guided by the idea that to know a proposition it is not sufficient that the
belief be “accidentally” true. Rather, the belief, or its mode of acquisition,
must “track,” “hook up with,” or “indicate” the truth. Unlike knowledge,
justified belief need not guarantee or be “hooked up” with the truth, for a
justified belief need not itself be true. Nonetheless, reliabilists insist that
the concept of justified belief also has a connection with truth acquisition.
According to the reliable process account, a belief’s justificational status
depends on the psychological processes that produce or sustain it. Justified
beliefs are produced by appropriate psychological processes, unjustified
beliefs by inappropriate processes. For example, beliefs produced or preserved
by perception, memory, introspection, and “good” reasoning are justified,
whereas beliefs produced by hunch, wishful thinking, or “bad” reasoning are
unjustified. Why are the first group of processes appropriate and the second
inappropriate? The difference appears to lie in their reliability. Among the
beliefs produced by perception, introspection, or “good” reasoning, a high
proportion are true; but only a low proportion of beliefs produced by hunch,
wishful thinking, or “bad” reasoning are true. Thus, what qualifies a belief as
justified is its being the outcome of a sequence of reliable belief-forming
processes. Reliabilism is a species of epistemological externalism, because it
makes knowledge or justification depend on factors such as truth connections or
truth ratios that are outside the cognizer’s mind and not necessarily
accessible to him. Yet reliabilism typically emphasizes internal factors as
well, e.g., the cognitive processes responsible for a belief. Process
reliabilism is a form of naturalistic epistemology because it centers on
cognitive operations and thereby paves the way for cognitive psychology to play
a role in epistemology. Grice: “I expect that my co-conversationalist shall be
realiable, as I assume he expects I will, too – or is it I assume he expects I
*shall*?” Grice: “Covnersational reliability.”
renouvier: philosopher influenced by Kant and Comte, the latter natural,
Comte being one of his teachers – “and brainwashing so endemic in academia it
hurts! I’m lucky Hardie wasn’t worth my mimesis!” – Grice. Renouvier rejected many of the views of both
these philosophers, however, charting his own course. He emphasized the
irreducible plurality and individuality of all things against the contemporary
tendencies toward absolute idealism. Human individuality he associated with
indeterminism and freedom. To the extent that agents are undetermined by other
things and self-determining, they are unique individuals. Indeterminism also
extends to the physical world and to knowledge. He rejected absolute certitude,
but defended the universality of the laws of logic and mathematics. In politics
and religion, he emphasized individual freedom and freedom of conscience. His
emphasis on plurality, indeterminism, freedom, novelty, and process influenced
James and, through James, pragmatism.
re-praesentatum: Grice plays with this as a philosophical semanticist,
rather than a philosophical psychologist. But the re-praesentatum depends on
the ‘praesentatum,’ which corresponds to Grice’s sub-perceptum (not the
‘conceptus’). cf. Grice on Peirce’s representamen (“You don’t want to go
there,” – Grice to his tutees). It seems that in the one-off predicament,
iconicy plays a role: the drawing of a skull to indicate danger, the drawing of
an arrow at the fork of a road to indicate which way the emissor’s flowers, who
were left behind, are supposed to take (Carruthers). Suppose Grice joins the
Oxfordshire cricket club. He will represent Oxfordshire. He will do for Oxfordshire
what Oxfordshire cannot do for herself. Similarly, by uttering “Smoke!,” the
utterer means that there is fire somewhere. “Smoke!” is a communication-device
if it does for smoke what smoke cannot do for itself, influence thoughts and
behaviour. Or does it?! It MWheIGHT. But suppose that the fire is some distant
from the addresse. And the utterer HAS LEARNED That there is fire in the
distance. So he utters ‘Smoke!’ Where? Oh, you won’t see it. But I was told
there is smoke on the outskirts. Thanks for warning me! rĕ-praesento , āvi,
ātum, 1, v. a. I. To bring before one, to bring back; to show, exhibit,
display, manifest, represent (class.): “per quas (visiones) imagines rerum
absentium ita repraesentantur animo, ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere
videamur,” Quint. 6, 2, 29: “memoriae vis repraesentat aliquid,” id. 11, 2, 1;
cf. Plin. Ep. 9, 28, 3: “quod templum repraesentabat memoriam consulatūs mei,”
Cic. Sest. 11, 26: si quis vultu torvo ferus simulet Catonem, Virtutemne
repraesentet moresque Catonis? * Hor. Ep. 1, 19, 14: “imbecillitatem ingenii
mei,” Val. Max. 2, 7, 6: “movendi ratio aut in repraesentandis est aut
imitandis adfectibus,” Quint. 11, 3, 156: “urbis species repraesentabatur
animis,” Curt. 3, 10, 7; cf.: “affectum patris amissi,” Plin. Ep. 4, 19, 1:
“nam et vera esse et apte ad repraesentandam iram deūm ficta possunt,” Liv. 8,
6, 3 Weissenb. ad loc.: “volumina,” to recite, repeat, Plin. 7, 24, 24, § 89:
“viridem saporem olivarum etiam post annum,” Col. 12, 47, 8: “faciem veri maris,”
id. 8, 17, 6: “colorem constantius,” to show, exhibit, Plin. 37, 8, 33, § 112:
“vicem olei,” i. e. to supply the place of, id. 28, 10, 45, § 160; cf. id. 18,
14, 36, § 134.— B. Of painters, sculptors, etc., to represent, portray, etc.
(post-Aug. for adumbro): “Niceratus repraesentavit Alcibiadem,” Plin. 34, 8,
19, § 88.—With se, to present one's self, be present, Col. 1, 8, 11; 11, 1, 26;
Dig. 48, 5, 15, § 3.— II. In partic., mercant. t. t., to pay immediately or on
the spot; to pay in ready money: reliquae pecuniae vel usuram Silio pendemus,
dum a Faberio vel ab aliquo qui Faberio debet, repraesentabimus, shall be
enabled to pay immediately, Cic. Att. 12, 25, 1; 12, 29, 2: “summam,” Suet.
Aug. 101: “legata,” id. Calig. 16: “mercedem,” id. Claud. 18; id. Oth. 5;
Front. Strat. 1, 11, 2 Oud. N. cr.: “dies promissorum adest: quem etiam
repraesentabo, si adveneris,” shall even anticipate, Cic. Fam. 16, 14, 2; cf.
fideicommissum, to discharge immediately or in advance, Dig. 35, 1, 36.— B.
Transf., in gen., to do, perform, or execute any act immediately, without
delay, forthwith; hence, not to defer or put off; to hasten (good prose): se,
quod in longiorem diem collaturus esset, repraesentaturum et proximā nocte
castra moturum, * Caes. B. G. 1, 40: “festinasse se repraesentare consilium,”
Curt. 6, 11, 33: “petis a me, ut id quod in diem suum dixeram debere differri,
repraesentem,” Sen. Ep. 95, 1; and Front. Aquaed. 119 fin.: “neque exspectare
temporis medicinam, quam repraesentare ratione possimus,” to apply it immediately,
Cic. Fam. 5, 16, 6; so, “improbitatem suam,” to hurry on, id. Att. 16, 2, 3:
“spectaculum,” Suet. Calig. 58: “tormenta poenasque,” id. Claud. 34: “poenam,”
Phaedr. 3, 10, 32; Val. Max. 6, 5, ext. 4: “verbera et plagas,” Suet. Vit. 10:
“vocem,” to sing immediately, id. Ner. 21 et saep.: “si repraesentari morte meā
libertas civitatis potest,” can be immediately recovered, Cic. Phil. 2, 46,
118: “minas irasque caelestes,” to fulfil immediately, Liv. 2, 36, 6 Weissenb.
ad loc.; cf. Suet. Claud. 38: “judicia repraesentata,” held on the spot,
without preparation, Quint. 10, 7, 2.— C. To represent, stand in the place of
(late Lat.): nostra per eum repraesentetur auctoritas, Greg. M. Ep. 1, 1.
res publica --: republicanism: cf. Cato -- Grice was a British
subject and found classical republicanism false -- also known as civic
humanism, a political outlook developed by Machiavelli in Renaissance Italy and
by James Harrington in England, modified by eighteenth-century British and
Continental writers and important for the thought of the founding fathers. Drawing on Roman
historians, Machiavelli argued that a state could hope for security from the
blows of fortune only if its male citizens were devoted to its well-being. They
should take turns ruling and being ruled, be always prepared to fight for the
republic, and limit their private possessions. Such men would possess a wholly
secular virtù appropriate to political beings. Corruption, in the form of
excessive attachment to private interest, would then be the most serious threat
to the republic. Harrington’s utopian Oceana 1656 portrayed England governed
under such a system. Opposing the authoritarian views of Hobbes, it described a
system in which the well-to-do male citizens would elect some of their number
to govern for limited terms. Those governing would propose state policies; the
others would vote on the acceptability of the proposals. Agriculture was the
basis of economics, civil rights classical republicanism 145 145 but the size of estates was to be
strictly controlled. Harringtonianism helped form the views of the political
party opposing the dominance of the king and court. Montesquieu in France drew
on classical sources in discussing the importance of civic virtue and devotion
to the republic. All these views were well known to Jefferson, Adams, and
other colonial and revolutionary
thinkers; and some contemporary communitarian critics of culture return to classical republican
ideas.
stimulus/response
distinction, the: Grice’s motto: “No
stimulus, no response.” “The black box is meant to EXPLAIN (make plain) the
link between the stimulus and the response – and no item in the black box
should be postulated that it lacks this explanatory adequacy. “As Witters says,
“No mental concept without the behaviour the mental concept is brought to
explain.” Chomsky hated it. Grice changed it to ‘effect.’ Or not. “Stimulus and
response,” Skinner's behavioral theory was largely
set forth in his first book, Behavior of Organisms (1938).[9] Here, he gives a
systematic description of the manner in which environmental variables control
behavior. He distinguished two sorts of behavior which are controlled in
different ways: Respondent behaviors are elicited by stimuli, and may be
modified through respondent conditioning, often called classical (or pavlovian)
conditioning, in which a neutral stimulus is paired with an eliciting stimulus.
Such behaviors may be measured by their latency or strength. Operant behaviors
are 'emitted,' meaning that initially they are not induced by any particular
stimulus. They are strengthened through operant conditioning (aka instrumental
conditioning), in which the occurrence of a response yields a reinforcer. Such
behaviors may be measured by their rate. Both of these sorts of behavior had
already been studied experimentally, most notably: respondents, by Ivan
Pavlov;[25] and operants, by Edward Thorndike.[26] Skinner's account differed
in some ways from earlier ones,[27] and was one of the first accounts to bring
them under one roof.
rerum natura: Latin, ‘the nature of things’, or ‘reality,’ to use
the root of ‘res,’ cognate with ‘ratio,’ – (as ‘ding’ is connected with
‘denken,’ and ‘logos’ with ‘legein’ -- metaphysics. The phrase can also be used
more narrowly to mean the nature of physical reality, and often it presupposes
a naturalistic view of all reality. Lucretius’s epic poem “De rerum natura,” is
an Epicurean physics, designed to underpin the Epicurean morality. Seneca told
Lucrezio, “You could have looked for a catchier title if you want it a
best-seller.”
responsabile, the responsabile: responsibility – cited
by H. P. Grice in “The causal theory of perception” -- a condition that relates
an agent to actions of, and consequences connected to, that agent, and is
always necessary and sometimes sufficient for the appropriateness of certain
kinds of appraisals of that agent. Responsibility has no single definition, but
is several closely connected specific concepts. Role responsibility. Agents are
identified by social roles that they occupy, say parent or professor. Typically
duties are associated with such roles to
care for the needs of their children, to attend classes and publish research
papers. A person in a social role is “responsible for” the execution of those
duties. One who carries out such duties is “a responsible person” or “is
behaving responsibly.” Causal responsibility. Events, including but not limited
to human actions, cause other events. The cause is “responsible” for the
effect. Causal responsibility does not imply consciousness; objects and natural
phenomena may have causal responsibility. Liability responsibility. Practices
of praise and blame include constraints on the mental stance that an agent must
have toward an action or a consequence of action, in order for praise or blame
to be appropriate. To meet such constraints is to meet a fundamental necessary
condition for liability for praise or blame
hence the expression ‘liability responsibility’. These constraints
include such factors as intention, knowledge, recklessness toward consequences,
absence of mistake, accident, inevitability of choice. An agent with the
capability for liability responsibility may lack it on some occasion when mistaken, for example. Capacity
responsibility. Practices of praise and blame assume a level of intellectual
and emotional capability. The severely mentally disadvantaged or the very
young, for example, do not have the capacity to meet the conditions for
liability responsibility. They are not “responsible” in that they lack capacity
responsibility. Both morality and law embody and respect these distinctions,
though law institutionalizes and formalizes them. Final or “bottom-line”
assignment of responsibility equivalent to indeed deserving praise or blame
standardly requires each of the latter three specific kinds of responsibility.
The first kind supplies some normative standards for praise or blame.
resultus: or resultance, a relation according to which one
property the resultant property, sometimes called the consequential property is
possessed by some object or event in virtue of and hence as a result of that
object or event possessing some other property or set of properties. The idea
is that properties of things can be ordered into connected levels, some being
more basic than and giving rise to others, the latter resulting from the
former. For instance, a figure possesses the property of being a triangle in
virtue of its possessing a collection of properties, including being a plane
figure, having three sides, and so on; the former resulting from the latter. An
object is brittle has the property of being brittle in virtue of having a
certain molecular structure. It is often claimed that moral properties like
rightness and goodness are resultant properties: an action is right in virtue
of its possessing other properties. These examples make it clear that the
nature of the necessary connection holding between a resultant property and
those base properties that ground it may differ from case to case. In the
geometrical example, the very concept of being a triangle grounds the
resultance relation in question, and while brittleness is nomologically related
to the base properties from which it results, in the moral case, the resultance
relation is arguably neither conceptual nor causal.
cornwall – “He hardly spoke English – and Grosseteste
hardly spoke Cornish – yet they became best friends at Oxford – Fishacre
helped. “But they communicated mainly in the lingua franca, that is Roman!” --
Rrichard Rufus, also called Richard of Cornwall English philosopher who wrote
some of the earliest commentaries on Aristotle in the Latin West. Cornwall’s
commentaries are not cursory summaries; they include sustained philosophical
discussions. “Cornwall,” as he was called (cf. Grice’s “Shropshire,” – all I
remember about him is that his name was that of a shire”) was a master of arts
at Paris, where he studied with Hales. And they would joke, “I was called after
a shire, but you after a town, ain’t that unfair?” – Cornwall is also deeply
influenced by Grosseteste – “he of the great head” – or “balls” (testis,
testiculus). Cornwall leaves Paris and joins the Franciscan order. He was
ordained in England. In 1256, he became regent master of the Franciscan studium
at Oxford (“of course,” Grice); according to Bacon, Cornwall is the most influential
philosopher at Oxford In addition to his
Aristotle commentaries, Cornwall writes two commentaries on Peter Lombard’s
Sentences. In the first of these he borrows
freely from Grosseteste, Hales, and Fishacre (“if you’ve heard of him” –
Grice). The second commentary is a critical condensation of the lectures of
Fidanza, presented in Paris. Cornwall is a proponent of the theory of impetus. His views
on projectile motion are cited by Meyronnes.
Cornwall also advocates other arguments first presented by Philoponus. Against
the eternity of the world, he argued that past time is necessarily finite, since
it has been traversed, and, on top, the world is hardly eternal, since “if the
world has no beginning, no more time transpires before tomorrow than it
transpires before today – but it does so transpire.” Cornwall also argues that
if the world had not been created ex nihilo, the first cause would be mutable. Grosseteste
cited one of Cornwalls arguments against the eternity of the world in his notes
on Aristotle’s Physics. Cornwall denies the validity of Anselm’s ontological
argument, but, anticipating Duns Scotus, Cornwall argues that the existence of
an independent being could be inferred from its possibility. Like Duns Scotus,
Cornwall employs the formal distinction as an explanatory tool; in presenting
his own views, Duns Scotus cites Cornwall’s’s definition of the “formal
distinction” versus the “material distinction.” Richard states his
philosophical views briefly, even cryptically; his Latin prose style is
sometimes eccentric (even Griceian), characterized by rather abrupt
extemporaneous interjections in which he apparently means to addresses this or
that question to God, to himself, or to his intended recipient. Cornwall is
hesitant about the value of systematic theology for the theologian, deferring
to biblical exposition as the primary forum for theological discussion. In
systematic theology, he emphasized Aristotelian semanticsc. He was a well-known
semanticist. Some scholars (Kneale, Grice, and Speranza included) believe
Cornwall is the famous logician known as the “Magister Abstractionum.” Though
Cornwall borrowed freely from his contemporaries, he was a profoundly original
philosopher.
ricoeur: hermeneuticist and phenomenologist who has been a
professor at several universities as
well as the of Naples, Yale , and
the of Chicago. He has received major
prizes from France, G.y, and Italy. He is the author of twenty-some volumes tr.
in a variety of languages. Among his best-known books are Freedom and Nature:
The Voluntary and the Involuntary; Freud and Philosophy: An Essay of
Interpretation; The Conflict of Interpretations: Essay in Hermeneutics; The
Role of the Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in
Language, Time and Narrative; and Oneself as Another. His early studies with
the existentialist Marcel resulted in a
book-length study of Marcel’s work and later a series of published dialogues
with him. Ricoeur’s philosophical enterprise is colored by a continuing tension
between faith and reason. His long-standing commitments to both the
significance of the individual and the Christian faith are reflected in his
hermeneutical voyage, his commitment to the Esprit movement, and his interest
in the writings of Emmanuel Mounier. This latter point is also seen in his
claim of the inseparability of action and discourse in our quest for meaning.
In our comprehension of both history and fiction one must turn to the text to
understand its plot as guideline if we are to comprehend experience of any
reflective sort. In the end there are no metaphysical or epistemological
grounds by which meaning can be verified, and yet our nature is such that
possibility must be present before us. Ricoeur attempts his explanation through
a hermeneutic phenomenology. The very hermeneutics of existence that follows is
itself limited by reason’s questioning of experience and its attempts to
transcend the limit through the language of symbols and metaphors. Freedom and
meaning come to be realized in the actualization of an ethics that arises out
of the very act of existing and thus transcends the mere natural voluntary
distinction of a formal ethic. It is clear from his later work that he rejects
any form of foundationalism including phenomenology as well as nihilism and
easy skepticism. Through a sort of interdependent dialectic that goes beyond
the more mechanical models of Hegelianism or Marxism, the self understands
itself and is understood by the other in terms of its suffering and its moral
actions. Refs.: J. O. Urmson, “La
pragmatique,” H. P. Grice, “The conflict of interpretations between me and
Ricoeur, and vice versa.”
directus -- right: an advantageous position conferred
on some possessor by law, morals, rule, or other norm. There is no agreement on
the way in which a ‘right’ is an advantage. Will theories hold that rights
favor the will of the possessor over the conflicting will of some other party;
interest theories maintain that rights serve to protect or promote the
interests of the right-holder. Hohfeld identified four legal advantages: liberties,
claims, powers, and immunitiesThe concept of a right arose in Roman
jurisprudence and was extended to ethics via natural law theory. Just as
positive law, the law posited by human lawmakers, confers legal rights, so the
natural law confers natural rights. Rights are classified by their specific
sources in different sorts of rules. Legal rights are advantageous positions
under the law of a society. Other species of institutional rights are conferred
by the rules of private organizations, of the moral code of a society, or even
of some game. Those who identify natural law with the moral law often identify
natural rights with moral rights, but some limit natural rights to our most
fundamental rights and contrast them with ordinary moral rights. Others deny
that moral rights are natural because they believe that they are conferred by
the mores or positive morality of one’s society. One always possesses any
specific right by virtue of possessing some status. Thus, rights are also
classified by status. Civil rights are those one possesses as a citizen; human
rights are possessed by virtue of being human. Presumably women’s rights,
children’s rights, patients’ rights, and the rights of blacks as such are
analogous. Human rights play very much the same role in ethics once played by
natural rights. This is partly because ontological doubts about the existence
of God undermine the acceptance of any natural law taken to consist in divine
commands, and epistemological doubts about self-evident moral truths lead many
to reject any natural law conceived of as the dictates of reason. Although the
Thomistic view that natural rights are grounded on the nature of man is often
advocated, most moral philosophers reject its teleological conception of human
nature defined by essential human purposes. It seems simpler to appeal instead
to fundamental rights that must be universal among human beings because they
are possessed merely by virtue of one’s status as a human being. Human rights
are still thought of as natural in the very broad sense of existing
independently of any human action or institution. This explains how they can be
used as an independent standard in terms of which to criticize the laws and
policies of governments and other organizations. Since human rights are
classified by status rather than source, there is another species of human
rights that are institutional rather than natural. These are the human rights
that have been incorporated into legal systems by international agreements such
as the European Convention on Human Rights. It is sometimes said that while
natural rights were conceived as purely negative rights, such as the right not
to be arbitrarily imprisoned, human rights are conceived more broadly to
include positive social and economic rights, such as the right to social
security or to an adequate standard of living. But this is surely not true by
definition. Traditional natural law theorists such as Grotius and Locke spoke
of natural rights as powers and associated them with liberties, rather than
with claims against interference. And while modern declarations of human rights
typically include social and economic rights, they assume that these are rights
in the same sense that traditional political rights are. Rights are often
classified by their formal properties. For example, the right not to be
battered is a negative right because it imposes a negative duty not to batter,
while the creditor’s right to be repaid is a positive right because it imposes
a positive duty to repay. The right to be repaid is also a passive right
because its content is properly formulated in the passive voice, while the
right to defend oneself is an active right because its content is best stated
in the active voice. Again, a right in rem is a right that holds against all second
parties; a right in personam is a right that holds against one or a few others.
This is not quite Hart’s distinction between general and special rights, rights
of everyone against everyone, such as the right to free speech, and rights
arising from special relations, such as that between creditor and debtor or
husband and wife. Rights are conceptually contrasted with duties because rights
are advantages while duties are disadvantages. Still, many jurists and
philosophers have held that rights and duties are logical correlatives. This
does seem to be true of claim rights; thus, the creditor’s right to be repaid
implies the debtor’s duty to repay and vice versa. But the logical correlative
of a liberty right, such as one’s right to park in front of one’s house, is the
absence of any duty for one not to do so. This contrast is indicated by D. D.
Raphael’s distinction between rights of recipience and rights of action.
Sometimes to say that one has a right to do something is to say merely that it
is not wrong for one to act in this way. This has been called the weak sense of
‘a right’. More often to assert that one has a right to do something does not
imply that exercising this right is right. Thus, I might have a right to refuse
to do a favor for a friend even though it would be wrong for me to do so.
Finally, many philosophers distinguish between absolute and prima facie rights.
An absolute right always holds, i.e., disadvantages some second party, within
its scope; a prima facie right is one that holds unless the ground of the right
is outweighed by some stronger contrary reason. Refs. H. P. Grice, “On the
conceptual priority of the moral right over the legal right, and vice versa.”
rigorism, the view that morality consists in that
single set of simple or unqualified moral rules, discoverable by reason, which
applies to all human beings at all times. It is often said that Kant’s doctrine
of the categorical imperative is rigoristic. Two main objections to rigorism
are 1 some moral rules do not apply universally
e.g., ‘Promises should be kept’ applies only where there is an
institution of promising; and 2 some rules that could be universally kept are
absurd e.g., that everyone should stand
on one leg while the sun rises. Recent interpreters of Kant defend him against
these objections by arguing, e.g., that the “rules” he had in mind are general
guidelines for living well, which are in fact universal and practically
relevant, or that he was not a rigorist at all, seeing moral worth as issuing
primarily from the agent’s character rather than adherence to rules.
rimini: gregorio di,
philosopher, he studied in Italy, England, and France, and taught at the
universities of Bologna, Padua, Perugia, and Paris before becoming prior
general of the Hermits of St. Augustine in his native city of Rimini, about
eighteen months before he died. Gregory earned the honorific title “the
Authentic Doctor” because he was considered by many of his contemporaries to be
a faithful interpreter of Augustine, and thus a defender of tradition, in the
midst of the scepticism of Occam and his disciples regarding what could be
known in natural philosophy and theology. Thus, in his commentary on Books I
and II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Gregory rejected the view that because of
God’s omnipotence he can do anything and is therefore unknowable in his nature
and his ways. Gregory also maintained that after Adam’s fall from
righteousness, men need, in conjunction with their free will, God’s help grace
to perform morally good actions. In non-religious matters Gregory is usually
associated with the theory of the complexe significabile, according to which
the object of knowledge acquired by scientific proof is neither an object
existing outside the mind, nor a word simplex or a proposition complexum, but
rather the complexe significabile, that which is totally and adequately
signified by the proposition expressed in the conclusion of the proof in
question.
ring of Gyges, a ring that gives its wearer
invisibility, discussed in Plato’s Republic II, 359b 360d. Glaucon tells the
story of a man who discovered the ring and used it to usurp the throne to
defend the claim that those who behave justly do so only because they lack the
power to act unjustly. If they could avoid paying the penalty of injustice,
Glaucon argues, everyone would be unjust.
romagnosi: important
Italian philosopher. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Romagnosi," per
il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia.
filosofia
romana: Grice: “There is a continuity
between the philosophy wrote in Ancient Rome and that done in Italy – as every
British soldier who fought in the second world war should know!” -- Grice loved
it. Enesidemo, academic philosopher, founder of a
Pyrrhonist revival in Rome. Vide “Enesidemo. Anassagora, pre-Socratic enquirer into the origin of the cosmos – andronico, peripatetic; editor of
Aristotle’s works. – antioco, cademic who reverted to Plato’s dogmatism – Antipater, Stoic, tutor to
Cato Uticensis. – apollonide, toic, adviser to Cato Uticensis – apollonio, eo-pythagorean.
– apuleio, Platonic, author of the “Isagoge” adored
by Boezio, and the "Metamorphoses". – arcelisao, academic sceptic, head of the New Academy --- aristippo, member
of Socrates’s circle – aristone, peripatetic and head of the Lyceum –
aristotele founder of the Peripatetic
school – aristo, head of the Academy and
teacher of Brutus – ario, adviser to Augustus – artemidoro, stoic, friend of
Pliny the Younger and son-in-law of Musonius – atenodoro, Stoic and
adviser to Cato Uticensis, in whose
house he lived –atenodoro, Stoic and friend of Cicero – attalo, toic, teacher of Seneca –augustino, neo-platonist –
bione, ynic, popular teacher – boezio, philosopher with Stoic and Neoplatonist views,
author of "The Consolation of
Philosophy" – carneade, head of the New Academy, Sceptic and star of the Athenian embassy to Rome in
155 – cheremone, toic, tutor to Nero – crisippo, head of the
Stoic school from 232 – cicerone, leading transmitter of Hellenistic philosophy to Rome and
Renaissance Europe, follower of the New
Academy and pupil of Philo of Larissa – cleante, Zeno’s successor as head of the Stoic school from
262 – clitomaco, ceptic and pupil of Carneades, head of the New Academy from 127 – cornuto, toic,
teacher and friend of Persius and Lucan
– crantore, Academic, the first
commentator on Plato – crate, ynic, follower of Diogenes of Sinope and teacher of Zeno of Citium –
cratippo, eripatetic, friend of Cicero and Nigidius and teacher of Cicero’s
son. – critolao, head of the Peripatetic
school and member of the Athenian
embassy to Rome in 155 – Demetrio, friend of Seneca – Demetrio, adviser of
Cato Uticensis – democrito,
pre-Socratic, founder of atomism –
dicherco, Peripatetic, pupil of
Aristotle – diodoto, toic, teacher and friend of Cicero, in whose house he lived – diogene
laerzio, author of "The Lives of the Philosophers" – diogene
d’apollonia 2nd half of 5th. cent., pre-Socratic philosopher and enquirer into the natural world; a source for Seneca’s
"Naturates Quaestiones" – diogene da babilonia, head of the Stoic
school and member of the Athenian
embassy to Rome in 155, tutor to Panaetius – diogene d’enoanda, Epicurean and
part-author of the inscription on the
stoa which he caused to be set up in Oenoanda -- diogene da sinope. mid-4th.cent., founder of Cynicism -- epitteto, Stoic, pupil of Musonius – epicuro -- principal
source for Lucretius’s poem – eufrate, Stoic,
student of Musonius and friend of Pliny
the Younger – favorino, philosopher of
the Second Sophistic, friend of Plutarch and teacher of Fronto – galeno,
physician to Marcus Aurelius, Platonist – ecato, early 1st. cent., Stoic, pupil
of Panaetius and member of circle of Posidonius – ermarco, pupil of Epicurus and his successor as head of the Epicurean
school from 271, with Epicurus,
Metrodorus and Polyaenus, one of “The Four Men”, founders of the
Epicurean school – ierocle, Stoic
-- lelio, consul in 140, friend of
Scipio Aemilianus and Panaetius and called by
Cicero "the first Roman philosopher." – leucippo, co-founder with Democritus of atomism – lucrezio,
Epicurean, author of "De Rerum Natura" – manilio -- Stoic author of
"Astronomica" – marc’aurelio, emperor, and Stoic, author of "To
Himself", a private diary –
menippo, first half of 3rd. cent., Cynic and
satirical author in prose and verse on philosophical subjects –
metrodoro, friend of Epicurus and one “The Four Men”, founders of Epicureanism – moderato, neo-pythagorean –
musonio, Roman of Etruscan descent,
Stoic, teacher of Epictetus – nigidio, eo-pythagorean – panezio, Stoic, head of
the Stoic school from 129, influential
at Rome, friend of Scipio Aemilianus and major
source for Cicero’s "De Officiis" – parmenide, pre-Socratic,
pioneer enquirer into the nature of
“what is” – patrone, friend of Cicero
and successor of Phaedrus as head of the Epicurean school – fedro, Epicurean, admired by Cicero.
head of the Epicurean school in the last years of his life – filone
d’alessandria, philosopher, sympathetic to Stoic ethics and influential in the later development of
Neo-platonism – filone da larissa, head of the New Academy, 110–88, the most
influential of Cicero’s tutors –
filodemo, Epicurean philosopher, protegé of Piso Caesoninus and an influence on
Virgil and Horace, many of his fragmentary
writings are preserved in the Herculaneum papyri – platone -- founder of
the Academy and disciple and interpreter of Socrates – plotino -- eo-platonist,
resident in Rome and Campania – Plutarco,
Platonist – polemo, Platonist and
head of the Academy -- poliaeno, friend of Epicurus and one of “The Four Men,”
founders of Epicureanism – posidonio, Stoic, student of Panaetius and head of
his own school in Rhodes, where Cicero
heard him. The dominant figure in middle Stoicism, whose works encompassed the whole range of
intellectual enquiry.—pirrone, the founder of
Scepticism, whose doctrines were revived in Rome by Enesidemo. – pitagora di samo -- head of a
community at Croton in S. Italy,
emphasized the importance of number and proportion, his doctrines included vegetarianism and the
transmigration of souls, influenced
Plato, his philosophy was revived at Rome by Nigidius and the Sextii.
–rustico: consul, Stoic, friend and teacher of
marc’aurelio. – Seneca, stoic, tutor, adviser and victim of Nero, author of philosophical treatises,
including "Dialogi" and "Epistulae Morales" – severo: consul, Stoic friend
and teacher of marc’aurelio, whose son married his daughter. – sestio -- Neo-pythagorean, founder of the only genuinely
Roman school of philosophy; admired by
Seneca for his disciplined Roman ethos – sesto empirico --sceptic, author of
philosophical works and critic of
Stoicism, principal source for Pyrrhonism – siro, 1st. cent., Epicurean, teacher in Campania of Virgil –
socrate -- iconic Athenian philosopher
and one of the most influential figures in Graeco-roman philosophy; he wrote
nothing but is the central figure in Plato’s dialogues, admired by non-Academics, including the Stoic
Marc’ Aureliio nearly six hundred years
after his death – sotione: Neopythagorean, teacher of Seneca – speusippo, , Plato’s successor as
head of the Academy – tele, cynic,
author of diatribes on ethical subjects – teofrasto, peripatetic, successor to Aristotle
as head of the Lyceum– Varrone – – Senocrate,. head of the Academy. Senone da
Citio -- founder of Stoicism, originally a
follower of the Cynic Crates, taught at Athens in the Stoa Poikile,
which gave its name to his school.
Senone da Sidone, head of the Epicurean school (or Garden) at Athens, where he
taught Philodemus and was heard by Cicero. Refs.: Marc’aurelio on Platone.
roscelin de Compiègne: He made fun of Abelard having
been ‘castrated’ for his philosophical dogmas on the universals. -- philosopher
and logician who became embroiled in theological controversy when he applied
his logical teachings to the doctrine of the Trinity. Since almost nothing
survives of his written work, we must rely on hostile accounts of his views by
Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard, both of whom openly opposed his
positions. Perhaps the most notorious view Roscelin is said to have held is
that universals are merely the puffs of air produced when a word is pronounced.
On this point he opposed views current among many theologians that a universal
has an existence independent of language, and somehow is what many different
particulars are. Roscelin’s aversion to any proposal that different things can
be some one thing is probably what led him in his thinking about the three
persons of God to a position that sounded suspiciously like the heresy of
tritheism. Roscelin also evidently held that the qualities of things are not
entities distinct from the subjects that possess them. This indicates that
Roscelin probably denied that terms in the Aristotelian categories other than
substance signified anything distinct from substances. Abelard, the foremost
logician of the twelfth century, studied under Roscelin around 1095 and was
undoubtedly influenced by him on the question of universals. Roscelin’s view
that universals are linguistic entities remained an important option in
medieval thought. Otherwise his positions do not appear to have had much
currency in the ensuing decades. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The universal – and what
to do with it.”
rosmini: important Italian philosopher,
Catholic priest, counselor to Pope Pius IX, and supporter of the supremacy of
the church over civil government Neo-Guelphism. Rosmini had two major concerns:
the objectivity of human knowledge and the synthesis of philosophical thought
within the tradition of Catholic thought. In his Nuovo saggio sull’origine
delle idee “New Essay on the Origin of Ideas,” 1830, he identifies the
universal a priori intuitive component of all human knowledge with the idea of
being that gives us the notion of a possible or ideal being. Everything in the
world is known by intellectual perception, which is the synthesis of sensation
and the idea of being. Except for the idea of being, which is directly given by
God, all ideas derive from abstraction. The objectivity of human knowledge
rests on its universal origin in the idea of being. The harmony between
philosophy and religion comes from the fact that all human knowledge is the
result of divine revelation. Rosmini’s thought was influenced by Augustine and
Aquinas, and stimulated by the attempt to find a solution to the contrasting
needs of rationalism and empiricism. Antonio Rosmini Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to
navigationJump to search Nota disambigua.svg Disambiguazione – Se stai cercando
l'omonimo criminale appartenente alla 'ndrangheta, vedi Antonio Rosmini
(criminale). Nota disambigua.svg Disambiguazione – "Rosmini" rimanda
qui. Se stai cercando la 'ndrina, vedi Rosmini ('ndrina). Beato Antonio Rosmini
Francesco Hayez (1791-1882) Ritratto di Antonio Rosmini (1853-1856) Galleria
d'Arte Moderna di Milano.jpg Antonio Rosmini ritratto da Francesco Hayez, 1853-1856
Nascita 24 marzo 1797 Morte 1º luglio 1855 Venerato da Chiesa cattolica
Beatificazione 18 novembre 2007 Ricorrenza 1º luglio Manuale Antonio Francesco
Davide Ambrogio Rosmini Serbati (Rovereto, 24 marzo 1797 – Stresa, 1º luglio
1855) è stato un filosofo, teologo e presbitero italiano. La chiesa cattolica
lo venera come beato dal 18 novembre 2007. Indice 1 Biografia 2
Pensiero 2.1 Filosofia 2.2 Politica 3 Da Pio VIII a Benedetto XVI: il giudizio
dei papi su Rosmini 3.1 La condanna del Sant'Uffizio 3.2 La riabilitazione a
seguito del Concilio Vaticano II 4 La beatificazione 4.1 Cronologia della causa
di beatificazione 4.2 La cerimonia di beatificazione 5 Opere 5.1 Massime di
perfezione cristiana 6 Rosmini e il Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II 6.1 Tematiche
affrontate nell'opera Delle Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa 7 Scuole 8 Note 9
Bibliografia 10 Voci correlate 11 Altri progetti 12 Collegamenti esterni
Biografia Casa natale di Antonio Rosmini, in corso Rosmini, a Rovereto Fu
secondogenito di Pier Modesto e di Giovanna dei Conti Formenti di Biacesa in
Valle di Ledro, nipote di Ambrogio Rosmini Serbati, e al momento della sua
nascita avvenuta il 24 marzo 1797, Rovereto faceva parte del dominio delle
forze napoleoniche, che l'avevano strappato all'Impero asburgico. In quegli
anni il Trentino fu terra di confine ora Tirolese (Tirolo italiano) ora
appartenente al regno d'Italia, con capitale Milano.[1] Della sua
nascita, Rosmini renderà sempre grazie a Dio poiché «Egli la fece coincidere
con la vigilia della Beata Maria Vergine Annunziata». Viveva con sua sorella
maggiore Margherita, entrata nelle Suore di Canossa, e con suo fratello più
piccolo, Giuseppe. Rosmini, terminato l'Imperial Regio Ginnasio di Rovereto, al
tempo città della Contea del Tirolo, compì gli studi giuridici e teologici
presso l'Università di Padova e manifestò il desiderio di diventare sacerdote.
A questo proposito i famigliari raccontavano come, fin dalla più tenera età,
Rosmini leggesse alla luce della sua aureola.[2] Fu nel giugno 1820, in
occasione della venuta a Rovereto del Vescovo di Chioggia Giuseppe Manfrin
Provedi per consacrare le chiese di Santa Maria del Carmine e di Santa Croce,
appartenente all'omonimo Monastero, che Antonio Rosmini, prendendo parte alla
cerimonia, ottenne da Monsignor Manfrin il diaconato ed in seguito, a Chioggia,
il 21 aprile 1821 ricevette l'ordinazione sacerdotale.[3] Intanto iniziò a
mostrare una profonda inclinazione per gli studi filosofici, incoraggiato in
tal senso da papa Pio VII. Dal 1826 si trasferì a Milano dove strinse un
profondo rapporto d'amicizia con Alessandro Manzoni che di lui ebbe a dire: «è
una delle sei o sette intelligenze che più onorano l'umanità». Manzoni
assistette Rosmini sul letto di morte, da cui trasse il testamento spirituale
"Adorare, Tacere, Gioire". Gli scritti di Antonio Rosmini destarono
l'ammirazione, tra gli altri, anche di Giovanni Stefani, Niccolò Tommaseo e
Vincenzo Gioberti dei quali pure divenne amico. Nel 1828, dopo aver
dovuto lasciare il Trentino, per motivi di forte ostilità per le sue posizioni
incontrati da parte del vescovo di Trento, il beato Giovanni Nepomuceno de
Tschiderer, fondò al Sacro Monte Calvario di Domodossola la congregazione
religiosa dell'Istituto della Carità, detta dei "Rosminiani". Le
Costituzioni della nuova famiglia religiosa, contenute in un libro che curò per
tutta la vita, furono approvate da papa Gregorio XVI nel 1839. A
Borgomanero svolge la sua attività di insegnamento e di guida spirituale in un
collegio rosminiano, il "Collegio Rosmini", regolato dalla
Congregazione delle Suore della Provvidenza Rosminiane. Nel 1848 svolse
una missione diplomatica per conto del Re di Sardegna Carlo Alberto presso la
Santa Sede. Il filosofo fu presidente dell'Accademia Roveretana degli
Agiati ed il suo posto, anni dopo la sua morte, dal 1872 al 1888, fu assunto da
don Francesco Paoli, suo segretario ed esecutore delle volontà, già direttore
di Casa Rosmini.[4] Tra le volontà del filosofo vi fu anche quella di donare
alla città di Rovereto un terreno nell'attuale zona di Santa Maria per
costruirvi l'ospedale cittadino, e don Paoli onorò tale decisione.
Rosmini è sepolto all'interno del Santuario del SS. Crocifisso di Stresa. Nella
stessa chiesa si trovano le spoglie di Clemente Rebora. Pensiero Filosofia
Rosmini portò avanti tesi filosofiche tese a contrastare sia l'illuminismo che
il sensismo. Sottolineando l'inalienabilità dei diritti naturali della persona,
fra i quali quello della proprietà privata, entrò in polemica con il socialismo
e il comunismo[5], postulando uno Stato il cui intervento fosse ridotto ai
minimi termini. Nelle sue teorie il filosofo seguì le concezioni di
Sant'Agostino e di San Tommaso, rifacendosi anche a Platone. Gli esordi
filosofici di Antonio Rosmini si ricollegano a Pasquale Galluppi, sia pure
polemicamente, in quanto Rosmini avverte con ogni chiarezza come risulti
insostenibile una posizione di integrale sensismo gnoseologico. La
necessità di concepire una funzione ordinatrice dell'esperienza, e a questa
precedente, porta Rosmini a guardare con interesse la filosofia di Kant.
Tuttavia non è soddisfatto di ciò che lui chiama l'innatismo kantiano, legato
ad una pluralità imbarazzante e precaria di categorie. Le quali, d'altra parte,
gli sembrano fallire lo scopo di far conoscere il reale quale esso è, per la
necessaria introduzione di modifiche soggettive nell'atto stesso del
conoscere. Contrada della Terra, a Rovereto. Memoria storica della
presenza di Antonio Rosmini. Il problema filosofico di Rosmini si configurava
perciò come quello di garantire oggettività alla conoscenza. La soluzione non
potrà essere trovata, stante il rifiuto della trascendentalità kantiana e dei
connessi sviluppi, se non in una ricerca ontologica, in un principio oggettivo
di verità, che riesca ad illuminare l'intelligenza in quanto le si proponga con
immediata evidenza, universalità e immutabilità. Questo principio è per
Rosmini l'idea dell'essere possibile, che da indeterminato contenuto
dell'intelligenza, quale originariamente è, si fa determinato allorché viene
applicato ai dati forniti dal senso. Essa precede e informa di sé tutti i
giudizi con cui affermiamo che qualche cosa particolare esiste. L'idea
dell'essere, dunque, costituisce l'unico contenuto della mente che non abbia
origine dai sensi, ed è perciò innata (Nuovo saggio sull'origine delle idee,
del 1830).[6] Ma qui i problemi del kantismo, che sembrano superati o
almeno messi da parte, si riaffacciano con urgenza: di fronte al mero ricevere
dati, di cui parlava il sensismo, Rosmini ha chiarito che la mente umana nel
suo uso conoscitivo formula giudizi, in cui l'idea dell'essere ha funzione di
predicato, cioè di categoria, e la sensazione è il soggetto, di cui si predica
qualche cosa. Nel giudizio, inoltre, il predicato si determina e la sensazione
si certifica: se questa è la funzione propria del giudicare, ogni concetto non
può sussistere che come predicato di un giudizio; né a questa necessità sembra
potersi sottrarre il concetto di essere, che è dato solo nell'attività
giudicante, come forma del giudizio. Tuttavia Rosmini non accetta tale
riduzione, ed esclude proprio il predicato di esistenza della funzione del
giudizio, continuando ad attribuirgli una natura oggettiva e trascendente. È
l'essere trascendente che si rivela all'uomo, lo illumina e gli permette di
pensare. Chi lo nega come il nichilismo cade in una vuota posizione
nullista. Accanto a questa ontologia l'etica di Rosmini si sviluppa come
etica caritativa (Principio della scienza morale, 1831). Monumento
sepolcrale di Antonio Rosmini, Vincenzo Vela, Stresa Politica Rosmini dedicò
alla politica una breve ma intensa fase della sua vita. Seguì papa Pio IX
riparato a Gaeta dopo la proclamazione della Repubblica Romana, ma la sua
formazione attestatasi su ferme posizioni di cattolicesimo liberale era tale
per cui fu costretto a ritirarsi sul Lago Maggiore, a Stresa. Tuttavia, quando
Pio IX volle istituire dopo il 1849 una commissione incaricata della
preparazione del testo per la definizione del dogma dell'Immacolata Concezione,
nonostante ben due sue opere (Le cinque piaghe della Chiesa e La costituzione
secondo la giustizia sociale) fossero all'Indice, Rosmini fu chiamato a
prendere parte a tale commissione. In generale, Rosmini era favorevole
allo Stato liberale (vagheggiando la monarchia costituzionale), al
costituzionalismo e anche alla separazione tra Stato e Chiesa (sebbene non
"assoluta": Rosmini criticherà lo Statuto Albertino proprio per il
suo porre ancora il cattolicesimo come religione di Stato, elogiandone comunque
il tentativo distensivo nei confronti della Santa Sede, ma criticherà le leggi
laiciste ed anticlericali emanate successivamente). In gioventù ammiratore di
François-René de Chateaubriand e di Joseph de Maistre (per cui avrà comunque
parole di elogio ancora nel 1839), si convincerà in seguito della sostanziale
bontà della maggior parte delle conquiste dell'età moderna, criticandone solo
le modalità: in tale ottica, Rosmini criticava sia la rivoluzione francese che
l'Ancient Regime, riconoscendo invece la sostanziale bontà dei princìpi sanciti
nel 1789 (distinguendoli dalle successive degenerazioni rivoluzionarie), in
polemica con chi, da una parte e dall'altra, sosteneva una società da lui
definita "perfettista". Continuò a vivere a Stresa, fecondo nel
perseguire il perfezionamento del suo sistema di pensiero con opere come Logica
(1853) e Psicologia (1855), sino alla morte, avvenuta a 58 anni il 1º luglio
1855. Il suo corpo è oggi inumato in un sarcofago presso il Santuario SS.
Sacramento a Stresa. Da Pio VIII a Benedetto XVI: il giudizio dei papi su
Rosmini Ratzinger su Rosmini Il cardinale Joseph Ratzinger, il 18 maggio 1985
(quando la questione rosminiana era ancora ben accesa), nell'ambito di una
serata organizzata dal Centro Culturale di Lugano, disse: Nel confronto
con le parole classiche della fede che sembrano così lontane da noi, anche il
presente diventa più ricco di quanto sarebbe se rimanesse chiuso solo in se
stesso. Vi sono naturalmente anche tra i teologi ortodossi molti spiriti poco
illuminati e molti ripetitori di ciò che è già stato detto. Ma ciò succede
ovunque; del resto la letteratura dozzinale è cresciuta in modo particolarmente
rapido proprio là dove si è inneggiato più forte alla cosiddetta creatività. Io
stesso per lungo tempo avevo l'impressione che i cosiddetti eretici fossero per
una lettura più interessante dei teologi della chiesa, almeno nell'epoca
moderna. Ma se io ora guardo i grandi e fedeli maestri, da Mohler a
Newman a Scheeben, da Rosmini a Guardini, o nel nostro tempo de Lubac, Congar,
Balthasar - quanto più attuale è la loro parola rispetto a quella di coloro in
cui è scomparso il soggetto comunitario della Chiesa. In loro diventa
chiaro anche qualcos'altro: il pluralismo non nasce dal fatto che uno lo cerca,
ma proprio dal fatto che uno, con le sue forze e nel suo tempo, non vuole
nient'altro che la verità. Per volerla davvero, si esige tuttavia anche che uno
non faccia di se stesso il criterio, ma accetti il giudizio più grande, che è
dato nella fede della Chiesa, come voce e via della verità. Del resto io
penso che vale la stessa regola anche per le nuove grandi correnti della
teologia, che oggi sono ricercate: teologa africana, latinoamericana, asiatica,
ecc. La grande teologia francese non è nata per il fatto che si voleva fare
qualcosa di francese, ma perché non si presumeva di cercare nient'altro che la
verità e di esprimerla più adeguatamente possibile. E così questa
teologia è diventata anche tanto francese quanto universale. La stessa cosa
vale per la grande teologia italiana, tedesca, spagnola. Ciò vale sempre. Solo
l'assenza di questa intenzione esplicita è fruttuosa. E di fatto non abbiamo
davvero raggiunto la cosa più importante se noi ci siamo convalidati da soli,
ci siamo accreditati da soli e ci siamo costruiti un monumento per noi
stessi. Abbiamo veramente raggiunto la meta più importante se siamo
giunti più vicino alla verità. Essa non è mai noiosa, mai uniforme, perché il
nostro spirito non la contempla che in rifrazioni parziali; tuttavia essa è nello
stesso tempo la forza che ci unisce. E solo il pluralismo, che è rivolto
all'unità, è veramente grande.» Monumento ad Antonio Rosmini, in
Corso Rosmini, a Rovereto Papa Pio VIII disse a Rosmini, in udienza il 15
maggio 1829: «È volontà di Dio che voi vi occupiate nello scrivere libri:
tale è la vostra vocazione. Ella maneggia assai bene la logica, e la Chiesa al
presente ha gran bisogno di scrittori: dico, di scrittori solidi, di cui
abbiamo somma scarsezza. Per influire utilmente sugli uomini, non rimane oggidì
altro mezzo che quello di prenderli colla ragione, e per mezzo di questa
condurli alla religione. Tenetevi certo, che voi potrete recare un vantaggio
assai maggiore al prossimo occupandovi nello scrivere, che non esercitando
qualunque altra opera del Sacro Ministero.» Gregorio XVI, successore di
Pio VIII, in risposta alla lettera che Antonio Rosmini gli aveva indirizzato il
10 gennaio 1832, il 27 marzo dello stesso anno gli scrisse: «Diletto
Figlio, a te il nostro saluto e la nostra Apostolica Benedizione. Abbiamo
volentieri e con animo lieto ricevuto la tua lettera con i sensi della tua
devota sommissione a Noi e alla Sede Apostolica che ci hai mandato il 10
gennaio, in cui ci parli della pia Società, chiamata Istituto della Carità e
che con le tue fatiche è stata fondata nel territorio della diocesi di Novara
con l'approvazione del Vescovo. E soprattutto ci hai anche informato che il
medesimo Istituto è stato da poco chiamato anche dal Vescovo di Trento nella
sua diocesi e che qui molti ecclesiastici, di provate virtù, vi hanno aderito.
Per questi fatti davvero rendiamo il nostro umile grazie a Dio autore di ogni
bene. E quantunque questo Istituto non sia stato ancora confermato
dall'autorità di questa Santa Sede, tuttavia speriamo in bene di esso e ci
allietiamo che lo stesso si dilati con il consenso dei nostri Venerabili
Fratelli nell'Episcopato. Quindi, per quanto riguarda le Sante Indulgenze
connesse a questo istituto, che domandi siano concesse, ricevi diletto figlio
il nostro Rescritto unito a questa lettera, da cui sicuramente comprenderai che
rispondiamo positivamente alla tua richiesta. Ti assicuriamo anche che ci è
pervenuto il libro sopra i Principi della Dottrina Morale da te edito e
mandatoci in omaggio e ti dichiariamo il grazie del nostro animo per il dono.
Tuttavia per la tensione nelle gravissime fatiche del Governo Apostolico non
abbiamo ancora letto lo stesso libro, ma siamo certamente persuasi che esso sia
in tutto conforme alla più sana dottrina e utilissimo alla sua difesa. Continua
dunque, diletto figlio, lo studio e prosegui a spendere le tue fatiche ad onore
di Dio per l'utilità della Chiesa; in Cielo sarà copiosa la ricompensa per la
tua opera. Frattanto la paterna carità con cui ti abbracciamo nell'umanità di
Cristo sia pegno dell'apostolica benedizione, che sgorgante dall'intimo del
cuore ti impartiamo.» (Da Breve pontificio di Gregorio P.P.XVI, del 27
marzo 1832) Pio IX rivolgendosi al Vescovo di Cremona, nel 1854 dopo il decreto
Dimittantur opera omnia parlando di Rosmini disse[7]: «Non solo è un buon
cattolico, ma santo: Iddio si serve dei santi per far trionfare la
verità» Il papa Leone XIII, al tempo delle aspre e dolorose lotte che si
svolgevano intorno al pensiero rosminiano sul finire del diciannovesimo secolo,
in una lettera indirizzata agli arcivescovi di Milano, Torino e Vercelli, del
25 gennaio 1882, fra l'altro scrisse: «Ma non vogliamo che con questo
abbia a patir detrimento il religioso Sodalizio della Carità; il quale come per
lo innanzi spese utilmente le sue fatiche a beneficio del prossimo, secondo lo
spirito dell'Istituto, così è desiderabile che fiorisca in avvenire e prosegua
a rendere ognora più abbondanti frutti» Rosmini Rovereto 02.jpg La
condanna del Sant'Uffizio Col decreto del Sant'Uffizio "Post Obitum"
del 1887, firmato da Leone XIII, vennero condannate, in quanto "non
conformi alla verità cattolica", 40 proposizioni contenute nelle opere del
Rosmini, le quali la Sacra Congregazione romana "giudicò doversi
riprovare, condannare e proscrivere, nel proprio senso dell’autore",
chiarendo inoltre che non era lecito "a chicchessia di inferire, che le
altre dottrine del medesimo Autore, che non vengono condannate per questo
decreto, siano per veruna guisa approvate"[8]. La riabilitazione a
seguito del Concilio Vaticano II Giovanni XXIII, negli ultimi anni della sua
vita, meditò in ritiro spirituale le rosminiane "Massime di Perfezione
Cristiana", assumendole come propria regola di condotta. Anche Paolo VI
prestò interesse nel Rosmini: in occasione del 150º anniversario di fondazione
dell'Istituto della Carità inviò un messaggio all'allora padre generale, in cui
elogiava l'intuizione del Rosmini nel dare un grande peso alla missione
caritativa già nel nome del nativo istituto religioso, appunto l'Istituto della
Carità. Pubblicamente Paolo VI citò Rosmini durante il discorso tenuto alla
Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana del 2 settembre 1963 riguardante
la cultura cattolica e l'Europa. Inoltre sotto il suo pontificato venne tolto
il divieto di pubblicazione dell'opera Dalle Cinque Piaghe della Santa
Chiesa. Alla morte di Paolo VI venne eletto papa Giovanni Paolo I, che si
era laureato in sacra teologia alla Pontificia Università Gregoriana di Roma
con una tesi su L'origine dell'anima umana secondo Antonio Rosmini. È bene
precisare che Luciani era fortemente critico nei riguardi del pensiero
rosminiano, solo successivamente cambiò opinione, rivolgendo nei riguardi di
Rosmini parole di ammirazione e stima. Tuttavia fu con il pontificato di
Giovanni Paolo II che il pensiero rosminiano ha potuto liberarsi delle aspre
critiche e delle condanne che accompagnavano l'Istituto della Carità fin dai
tempi della sua fondazione. Nella Lettera Enciclica Fides et ratio, Giovanni
Paolo II ha annoverato Rosmini «tra i pensatori più recenti nei quali si
realizza un fecondo incontro tra sapere filosofico e Parola di Dio». Ne ha
inoltre concesso l'introduzione della causa di beatificazione, conclusasi nella
sua fase diocesana novarese il 21 marzo 1998. Nel 2001, Joseph Ratzinger
da prefetto della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede emanò nel 2001 il
famoso documento Nota ai Decreti dottrinali sul Rev.do sac. Antonio Rosmini
Serbati. La nota si concludeva confermando la validità del decreto Post obitum
sulle quaranta proposizioni, e allo stesso tempo con la riabilitazione di
Rosmini: «Il Decreto dottrinale Post obitum non si riferisce al giudizio
sulla negazione formale di verità di fede da parte dell'Autore, ma piuttosto al
fatto che il sistema filosofico-teologico del Rosmini era ritenuto
insufficiente e inadeguato a custodire ed esporre alcune verità della dottrina
cattolica, pur riconosciute e confessate dall'Autore stesso.[...] Si possono
attualmente considerare ormai superati i motivi di preoccupazione e di
difficoltà dottrinali e prudenziali, che hanno determinato la promulgazione del
Decreto Post obitum di condanna delle "Quaranta Proposizioni" tratte
dalle opere di Antonio Rosmini. E ciò a motivo del fatto che il senso delle
proposizioni, così inteso e condannato dal medesimo Decreto, non appartiene in
realtà all'autentica posizione di Rosmini, ma a possibili conclusioni della
lettura delle sue opere. Resta tuttavia affidata al dibattito teoretico la
questione della plausibilità o meno del sistema rosminiano stesso, della sua
consistenza speculativa e delle teorie o ipotesi filosofiche e teologiche in
esso espresse. Nello stesso tempo rimane la validità oggettiva del Decreto Post
obitum in rapporto al dettato delle proposizioni condannate, per chi le legge,
al di fuori del contesto di pensiero rosminiano, in un'ottica idealista,
ontologista e con un significato contrario alla fede e alla dottrina
cattolica.» (Nota ai Decreti dottrinali sul Rev.do sac. Antonio Rosmini
Serbati[9]) Il documento ribadisce la diversità di linguaggio e apparato
concettuale del sistema rosminiano rispetto al tomismo, l'assenza di apparato
critico nelle opere postume e la permanente "difficoltà oggettiva di
interpretarne le categorie, soprattutto se lette nella prospettiva neotomista".
Il 1º giugno 2007, papa Benedetto XVI ha autorizzato la Congregazione delle
Cause dei Santi a promulgare il Decreto sul miracolo della guarigione di Suor
Ludovica Noè, attribuito all'intercessione di Antonio Rosmini. Tra quelli
portati dalla postulazione dei padri rosminiani, si è scelto di dare maggiore
impulso a quello della guarigione della suora sopracitata, poiché il medico che
la curò si convertì in seguito all'accaduto. Il cardinale Angelo
Bagnasco, presidente della CEI, a margine del Convegno sulla sfida educativa
tenuto a Milano il 18 marzo 2010, ha tenuto un intervento intitolato
"Istanze educative e questione antropologica" in cui ha riconosciuto
le istanze pedagogiche del Beato Antonio Rosmini. Il 1º luglio 2010, il card.
Angelo Bagnasco ha presieduto a Stresa la celebrazione eucaristica per il Dies
Natalis di Antonio Rosmini. Nel corso dell'Angelus domenicale fu
ricordato per la sola "carità intellettuale" e perché
"testimoniò la virtù della carità in tutte le sue dimensioni e ad alto livello"[10].
Avversario del sensismo e dell'illuminismo settecenteschi, fu mentore e maestro
intellettuale di quattro Pontefici eletti consecutivamente: Giovanni XXIII,
Paolo VI, Giovanni Paolo I e II[11]. La beatificazione Cronologia della
causa di beatificazione 19 febbraio 1994. Nulla osta della Congregazione per la
Dottrina della Fede che consente l'inizio della causa di beatificazione. 1º
luglio 1997. Apertura del processo informativo diocesano dopo la nomina dei
Censori teologi e delle commissioni storiche in Novara. 15 agosto 1997. Don
Claudio Massimiliano Papa, I.C., diventa postulatore della Causa succedendo a
padre Remo Bessero Belti, storico dell'Istituto e già Direttore del Centro
Internazionale di Studi Rosminiani di Stresa. 21 marzo 1998. Chiusura del
Processo informativo Diocesano. 26 marzo 1998. Consegna del Trasunto alla
Congregazione per le cause dei Santi. 6 giugno 1998. Apertura del Trasunto. 15
gennaio 1999. Decreto di Validità del processo diocesano. 3 marzo 1999. Schema
per la stesura della Positio. 2 dicembre 1999. Consegna del lavoro sul Post
obitum curato dal Postulatore. 16 dicembre 1999. Il Relatore generale approva
il lavoro sul Post obitum e il lumen oculorum tuorum 20 dicembre 1999. Consegna
del lavoro sul Post obitum alla Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede. 1º
luglio 2001. Il giorno dell'anniversario della morte di Rosmini viene
pubblicata sull'Osservatore Romano la Nota della Congregazione per la dottrina
della fede sul valore dei decreti dottrinali concernenti il pensiero e le opere
del Rev.do sacerdote Antonio Rosmini Serbati, a firma del cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger e di mons. Tarcisio Bertone. 3 luglio 2001. Rilascio del Nihil
obstare per la Causa di Beatificazione. 1º luglio 2002. Il Relatore approva e
firma la Positio. 23 gennaio 2003. Conclusione della stampa e consegna alla
Congregazione per le cause dei santi della Positio (4.693 pagine). 26 maggio
2004. Consegna del Trasunto super miro alla Congregazione per le cause dei
santi. 29 maggio 2004. Validità dell'inquisizione diocesana sul processo super
miro. 28 giugno 2004. Presentazione fattispecie super miro. 12 ottobre 2004.
Revisa della fattispecie con firma del sotto-segretario. 28 ottobre 2004.
Relatio et vota del Congresso Storico (con esito positivo). 3 febbraio 2005.
Relatio et vota del Congresso teologico super virtutibus (con esito positivo).
6 giugno 2006. Ordinaria della Congregazione per le cause dei santi: esito
affermativo. Ponente della Causa Mons. Rino Fisichella. 26 giugno 2006. Papa
Benedetto XVI autorizza la Congregazione per le Cause dei Santi a promulgare il
decreto di esercizio eroico delle virtù. 12 ottobre 2006. La Consulta medica
della Congregazione per le Cause dai Santi, si esprime con esito affermativo
(all'unanimità 5 su 5) circa l'inspiegabilità scientifica dell'evento di
guarigione avvenuto a Sr. Ludovica Noè. Il presunto evento miracoloso è
avvenuto il 6 gennaio 1927. 19 dicembre 2006. Al termine del dibattito, i
Consultori si sono unanimemente espressi con voto affermativo (7 su 7),
ravvisando nella guarigione in esame un miracolo operato da Dio per
intercessione del Ven. Antonio Rosmini. 1º giugno 2007. Papa Benedetto XVI
autorizza la pubblicazione da parte della Congregazione per le Cause dei Santi
del riconoscimento delle virtù eroiche di Rosmini. 18 novembre 2007. Nella
diocesi di Novara si celebra la cerimonia di Beatificazione dando lettura del
decreto di Benedetto XVI che iscrive Rosmini tra i Beati. La cerimonia di
beatificazione La cerimonia di beatificazione è avvenuta il 18 novembre 2007
nella città di Novara: appositamente è stato fatto allestire il Palasport della
città, unico luogo capace di raccogliere un numero di fedeli così
significativo. Con il pontificato di Benedetto XVI le beatificazioni
vengono preferibilmente celebrate dai cardinali, per rendere ancora più piena
la comunione tra loro e il successore di Pietro, e viene privilegiato il luogo
in cui il candidato agli onori degli altari ha vissuto. Così, in qualità di
delegato pontificio, la celebrazione è stata officiata dal cardinale José
Saraiva Martins, allora prefetto della congregazione per le Cause dei Santi. A
fianco dell'altare erano disposti gli spalti da cui hanno concelebrato circa
400 sacerdoti, non soltanto rosminiani. A prendere parte alla processione
e celebrare sull'altare, insieme al preposito generale James Flynn c'era il
segretario generale dell'Istituto p. Domenico Mariani con gli allora componenti
della Curia Generalizia dell'Istituto della Carità, il Vicario per la Carità
Spirituale p. Crish Fuse, il Vicario per la Carità Intellettuale p. Giancarlo
Taverna Patron, il Vicario per la Carità Temporale p. David Tobin, l'allora
preposito della Provincia Italiana don Umberto Muratore (profondo conoscitore
del pensiero di Rosmini) e il padre postulatore della Causa di Beatificazione,
don Claudio Massimiliano Papa. Hanno partecipato alla celebrazione anche
il cardinale ex prefetto della Sacra Congregazione per i vescovi Giovanni
Battista Re, il cardinale arcivescovo di Torino Severino Poletto, il vescovo di
Novara, mons. Renato Corti, l'arcivescovo di Trento, mons. Luigi Bressan, il
vescovo rosminiano mons. Antonio Riboldi e fra gli altri anche mons. Germano
Zaccheo (che sarebbe improvvisamente scomparso due giorni dopo), vescovo della
Diocesi di Casale Monferrato, mons. Luigi Bettazzi, vescovo emerito di Ivrea
(che durante la III sessione del Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II fece per primo
il nome di Rosmini), l'allora segretario generale della Conferenza Episcopale
Italiana Giuseppe Betori, mons. Giovanni Lajolo, presidente del Governatorato
della Città del Vaticano, l'allora rettore della Pontificia Università
Lateranense, mons. Rino Fisichella, il Vicario Episcopale per la Vita
Consacrata dell'arcidiocesi di Milano monsignor Ambrogio Piantanida e il
preposito generale dei barnabiti, padre Giovanni Maria Villa. Tra i
numerosissimi fedeli (più di diecimila) accorsi da diverse parti del mondo per
presenziare alla celebrazione, hanno preso parte anche personalità
politiche. Tra queste il senatore a vita Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, l'allora
presidente del Senato, Franco Marini, e Arturo Parisi, al tempo Ministro della
Difesa. Rosmini è il primo beato della Provincia del Verbano Cusio
Ossola. In occasione della beatificazione sono stati moltissimi i
quotidiani e periodici italiani e esteri che hanno dedicato articoli, pagine e
interi numeri alla figura di Rosmini. Opere Frontespizio dell'opera
Delle cinque piaghe della santa chiesa edizione di Bruxelles (1848)
Monumento a Rosmini a Milano (1896) Sono numerosissimi gli scritti del Beato
Antonio Rosmini, certamente il più importante a livello ascetico e spirituale
sono le Massime di Perfezione Cristiana, su cui anche papa Giovanni XXIII fece
delle riflessioni prima di morire. Gli costarono la messa all'Indice dei libri
proibiti le opere "Delle Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa" e
"Dalla Costituzione secondo la giustizia sociale". In ambito
filosofico meritano di essere ricordati: Nuovo saggio sull'origine delle
idee, 1830 Principii della scienza morale, 1831 Filosofia della morale, 1837
Antropologia in servigio della scienza morale, 1838 Filosofia della politica,
1839 Trattato della coscienza morale, 1839 Filosofia del diritto, 1841-1845
Teodicea, 1845 Sull'unità d'Italia, 1848 Il comunismo e il socialismo, 1849
Massime di perfezione cristiana Le Massime di perfezione cristiana furono
scritte da Rosmini per definire il fondamento spirituale sul quale tutti i
cristiani potessero avere un cammino nella perfezione. Nel Vangelo stesso
è scritto: "Siate perfetti come è perfetto il vostro Padre celeste"
(Mt 5,48) 1ª Massima: Desiderare unicamente ed infinitamente di piacere a
Dio, cioè di essere giusto. 2ª Massima: Orientare tutti i propri pensieri
e le azioni all'incremento e alla gloria della Chiesa di Cristo. 3ª
Massima: Rimanere in perfetta tranquillità circa tutto ciò che avviene per
disposizione di Dio riguardo alla Chiesa di Cristo, lavorando per essa secondo
la chiamata di Dio. 4ª Massima: Abbandonare se stesso nella Provvidenza
di Dio. 5ª Massima: Riconoscere intimamente il proprio nulla. 6ª
Massima: Disporre tutte le occupazioni della propria vita con uno spirito di
intelligenza Rosmini e il Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II Di particolare
interesse fu la sua opera "Le cinque piaghe della santa Chiesa",
scritta nel 1832 e pubblicata nel 1848. L'autore mostrò di discostarsi
dall'ortodossia dell'epoca. Per tale ragione l'opera fu messa all'Indice sin
dal 1849 e ne scaturì una polemica nota col nome di "questione
rosminiana". L'opera fu riscoperta al Concilio Vaticano II. Il primo a
parlare al Concilio di Rosmini fu il vescovo mons. Luigi Bettazzi, presente
durante alcune sessioni in rappresentanza del cardinal Giacomo Lercaro di cui
era Vicario generale. Di Rosmini, Bettazzi disse, il 4 ottobre 1965
durante la Congregazione 141/1 periodo IV: «...Mi sia consentito
ricordare ancora in quest'aula l'esempio di Rosmini, molto legato a Tommaso, ma
anche studioso e amante del suo tempo, e che certamente guadagnò a Cristo non
pochi uomini contemporanei e posteriori. Tutto questo mi sembra si accordi con
le cose che sono state già dette da non pochi Padri su questo schema in
generale, che cioè gli uomini non si aspettano dalla Chiesa soluzioni
particolari, ma piuttosto la presentazione di valori che li aiutino a
trascorrere questa vita umana più nobilmente e con maggiore sicurezza. Parlando
della libertà abbiamo dovuto esaltare i valori dell'umiltà; parlando del
matrimonio, il ruolo della fortezza; parlando dei problemi economici e di molti
altri problemi, l'efficacia di un certo disprezzo delle cose: occorre dunque
mettere in luce la necessità dell'ubbidienza, della castità, della povertà, non
solo nella vita e nell'esempio (e nella Bozza di Documento!) dei religiosi,
aiuto agli uomini di questo tempo, perché possano vivere la loro vita umana nel
modo migliore e più efficace; il primo e principale compito dunque per i
cristiani che coltivano la sapienza dev'essere, alla luce del Magistero,
l'amore delle Scritture e l'amore di questo mondo in un colloquio franco e
aperto...» Papa Paolo VI, in un'udienza concessa alle suore rosminiane
disse a proposito di Rosmini: «...i suoi libri sono pieni di pensiero, un
pensiero profondo, originale che spazia in tutti i campi: quello filosofico,
morale, politico, sociale, soprannaturale, religioso, ascetico; libri degni di
essere conosciuti e divulgati... È stato anche un profeta: Le Cinque piaghe
della Chiesa (una volta la chiesa non aveva piacere che si mettessero in luce
le sue mancanze, le sue debolezze). Lui, per esempio, previde la partecipazione
liturgica del popolo...Tutti i suoi pensieri indicano uno spirito degno di
essere conosciuto, imitato e forse invocato anche come protettore dal Cielo. Ve
lo auguriamo di cuore...» Tematiche affrontate nell'opera Delle Cinque
Piaghe della Santa Chiesa L'opera è suddivisa in cinque capitoli
(corrispondenti ciascuna ad una piaga, paragonata alle piaghe di Cristo). In
ogni capitolo la struttura è la medesima: un quadro ottimistico della
Chiesa antica segue un fatto nuovo che cambia la situazione generale (invasioni
barbariche, nascita di una società cristiana, ingresso dei vescovi nella
politica) la piaga i rimedi. Prima piaga. È la divisione del popolo dal clero
nel culto pubblico. Nell'antichità il culto era un mezzo di catechesi e
formazione e il popolo partecipava al culto. Poi, le invasioni barbariche, la
scomparsa del latino, la scarsa istruzione del popolo, la tendenza del clero a
formare una casta hanno eretto un muro di divisione tra il popolo e i ministri
di Dio. Rimedi proposti: insegnamento del latino, spiegazione delle cerimonie
liturgiche, uso di messalini in lingua volgare. Seconda piaga.
Insufficiente educazione del clero. Se un tempo i preti erano educati dai
vescovi, ora ci sono i seminari con "piccoli libri" e "piccoli maestri":
dura critica alla scolastica, ma soprattutto ai catechismi. Rimedio: necessità
di unire scienza e pietà. Terza piaga. Disunione tra i vescovi. Critica
serrata ai vescovi dell'ancien régime: occupazioni politiche estranee al
ministero sacerdotale, ambizione, servilismo verso il governo, preoccupazione
di difendere ad ogni costo i beni ecclesiastici, "schiavi di uomini
mollemente vestiti anziché apostoli liberi di un Cristo ignudo". Rimedi:
riserve sulla difesa del patrimonio ecclesiastico, accenni espliciti di
consenso alle tesi dell'Avenir sulla rinunzia alle ricchezze e allo stipendio
statale per riavere la libertà. Quarta piaga. La nomina dei vescovi
lasciata al potere temporale. Rosmini compie un'approfondita analisi storica
sull'evoluzione del problema e critica i concordati moderni con cui la S. Sede
ha ceduto la nomina al potere statale (e, accenna prudentemente, per avere
compensi economici). Rimedi: propone un ritorno all'elezione dei vescovi da
parte dei fedeli. Quinta piaga. La servitù dei beni ecclesiastici.
Rosmini sostiene la necessità di offerte libere, non imposte d'autorità con
l'appoggio dello Stato, rileva i danni del sistema beneficiale, propone la
rinuncia ai privilegi e la pubblicazione dei bilanci. Scuole A lui sono
intolati vari istituti scolasti in città italiane. Rovereto, sua città
natale, gli ha dedicato il liceo Antonio Rosmini che frequentò quando ancora si
chiamava Imperiale e Regio Ginnasio. Borgomanero ospita l'Istituto Antonio
Rosmini dal 1857.[12] Domodossola ospita il liceo delle Scienze Umane
"Antonio Rosmini (istituto parificato).[13] Roma ospita la sede
dell'Istituto Comprensivo Antonio Rosmini.[14] Torino ospita la biblioteca
Antonio Rosmini del polo biomedico universitario che in passato fu un istituto
scolastico attivo fino alla fine del XX secolo.[15] Trento, dove si trova il
liceo "A. Rosmini".[16] Note ^ M. Farina, pp. 15-47. ^ I.
Prosser, p. 154. ^ I. Prosser, p. 129. ^ Marcello Bonazza, L'Accademia
Roveretana degli Agiati (PDF), su agiati.it, Accademia Roveretana degli Agiati,
1998. URL consultato il 6 aprile 2018 (archiviato dall'url originale il 7
aprile 2018). «Don Francesco Paoli (1808-1891)... artefice della
rinascita dell'Accademia nel 1872 e suo presidente fino al 1888». ^ Antonio
Rosmini, Ragionamento sul comunismo e socialismo, Giovanni Grondona, Genova
1849 ^ Questa tesi fu messa in discussione da Giacomo Andrea Abbà a cui Rosmini
controbatté nel Diario filosofico di Adolfo, VII, G.A.A.(pubblicato in Riv.
rosminiana, III [1908], pp. 1-8). ^ PAGANI-ROSSI, Vita di Antonio Rosmini,
Vol.II, p.680 ^
http://www.rosmini.it/Resource/Causa/05%20Decreto%20Post%20Obitum%201887.pdf ^
Nota sul valore dei Decreti dottrinali concernenti il pensiero e le opere del
Rev.do Sac. Antonio Rosmini Serbati, su vatican.va, 1º luglio 2001 (archiviato
il 7 agosto 2001). ^ Angelus: Rosmini, esempio per la Chiesa, su agensir.it, 18
novembre 2007. ^ Biografia di Antonio Rosmini, su vatican.va. ^ Istituto
Antonio Rosmini, su rosmini-borgomanero.it. URL consultato il 9 maggio 2020. ^
Liceo delle Scienze Umane "Antonio Rosmini", su
cercalatuascuola.istruzione.it. URL consultato il 9 maggio 2020. ^ Istituto
Comprensivo Antonio Rosmini, su ic-rosmini.edu.it. URL consultato il 9 maggio
2020. ^ Biblioteca Rosmini, su biomedico.campusnet.unito.it. URL consultato il
9 maggio 2020. ^ LICEO "A. Rosmini" - TRENTO, su vivoscuola.it. URL
consultato il 9 maggio 2020. Bibliografia Fonti Marcello Farina, Antonio
Rosmini e l'Accademia degli Agiati, Brescia, Morcelliana Edizioni, 2000, ISBN
88-372-1805-2. Italo Prosser, El pra' de le Móneghe: cronistoria del monastero
di Santa Croce nell'antico comune di Lizzana, Rovereto (Trento), Stella, 2003,
SBN IT\ICCU\TO0\1613699. Approfondimenti Michele Federico Sciacca, La filosofia
morale di Antonio Rosmini, Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1955. Giovanni Pusineri,
Rosmini (Edizione riveduta e aggiornata da Remo Bessero Belti), Stresa (VB),
Edizioni Rosminiane Sodalitas, 1989. Michele Dossi, Profilo filosofico di
Antonio Rosmini, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1998, ISBN 88-372-1687-4. Alfeo Valle,
Antonio Rosmini. Il carisma del fondatore, Rovereto (TN), Longo Editore, 1991.
Paolo Marangon, Il Risorgimento della Chiesa. Genesi e ricezione delle
"Cinque piaghe" di A. Rosmini, collana Italia Sacra, Roma, Casa
Editrice Herder, 2000. Antonio Rosmini, Frammenti di una storia della empietà,
a c. di Alfredo Cattabiani con una nota filologica di M. Albertazzi, Trento, La
Finestra, 2003. Fulvio De Giorgi, Rosmini e il suo tempo. L'educazione
dell'uomo moderno tra riforma della filosofia e rinnovamento della Chiesa
(1797-1833), Brescia, Morcelliana, 2003. Michele Dossi, Il Santo Probito, La
vita e il pensiero di Antonio Rosmini, Trento, Il Margine, 2007, ISBN
978-88-6089-021-4. Paolo Gomarasca, Rosmini e la forma morale dell'essere. La
"poiesi" del bene come destino della metafisica, Milano,
FrancoAngeli, 1998. Francesco Paoli, Antonio Rosmini, Virtù quotidiane, Verona,
Edizioni Fede & Cultura, 2007. ISBN 978-88-89913-27-7 Maurizio De Paoli,
Antonio Rosmini. Maestro e profeta, Milano, Edizioni San Paolo, 2007. Piero
Sapienza, Eclissi Dell'educazione? La sfida educativa nel pensiero di Rosmini,
Roma, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008. Giuseppe Goisis, Il pensiero politico
di Antonio Rosmini e altri saggi fra critica ed Evangelo, S. Pietro in Cariano
(VR), Gabrielli Editori, 2009. Comunità di San Leolino (a cura di), Una
profezia per la Chiesa. Antonio Rosmini verso il Vaticano II, Panzano in
Chianti (FI), Edizioni Feeria-Comunità di San Leolino, 2009. Umberto Muratore,
Rosmini per il Risorgimento. Tra unità e federalismo, Stresa (VB), Edizioni
Rosmininane Sodalitas, 2010. Cirillo Bergamaschi, Antonio Rosmini. La
perfezione della vita cristiana, Stresa (VB), Edizioni Rosminiane Sodalitas,
2010. Luciano Malusa, Antonio Rosmini per l'unità d'Italia. Tra aspirazione nazionale
e fede cristiana, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2011. Domenico Fisichella, Il caso
Rosmini. Cattolicesimo, nazione, federalismo, Roma, Carocci editore, 2011.
Umberto Muratore, Apologia della fedeltà. In difesa dei valori etici e
spirituali, Stresa (VB), Edizioni Rosminiane Sodalitas, 2011. Luciano Malusa,
Stefania Zanardi, Le lettere di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, un
"cantiere" per lo studioso. Introduzione all'epistolario rosminiano,
Venezia, Marsilio Editore, 2013. Stefania Zanardi, La filosofia di Antonio
Rosmini di fronte alla Congregazione dell'Indice (1850-1854), con Prefazione di
Fulvio De Giorgi, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2018. Voci correlate
Restaurazione Antonio Fogazzaro Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource
Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Antonio Rosmini Collabora a Wikiquote
Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Antonio Rosmini Collabora a Wikimedia
Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Antonio Rosmini
Collegamenti esterni Sito ufficiale, su rosmini.it. Modifica su Wikidata
Antonio Rosmini, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Rosmini, in
Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su
Wikidata Antonio Rosmini, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Antonio Rosmini, su Enciclopedia
Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Rosmini,
in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Rosmini, su accademicidellacrusca.org, Accademia
della Crusca. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Rosmini, su BeWeb, Conferenza
Episcopale Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (DE) Antonio Rosmini (XML), in
Dizionario biografico austriaco 1815-1950. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Antonio
Rosmini, su Find a Grave. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Antonio Rosmini, su
Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Antonio Rosmini, su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Antonio Rosmini /
Antonio Rosmini (altra versione), su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica
su Wikidata (EN) Antonio Rosmini, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton
Company. Modifica su Wikidata Antonio Rosmini, su Santi, beati e testimoni, santiebeati.it.
Modifica su Wikidata Sito ufficiale degli scritti di Antonio Rosmini, su
rosminionline.it. Un esteso saggio inedito su Antonio Rosmini si puà trovare
sul Blog di Carlo Ellena (EN) Edward N. Zalta (a cura di), Antonio Rosmini, in
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center for the Study of Language and
Information (CSLI), Università di Stanford. Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 49636 · ISNI
(EN) 0000 0001 2117 2715 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\005649 · LCCN (EN) n79065278 · GND
(DE) 118602888 · BNF (FR) cb121577279 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1164389 (data) · NLA
(EN) 36549484 · BAV (EN) 495/21332 · CERL cnp00905104 · WorldCat Identities
(EN) lccn-n79065278 Biografie Portale Biografie Cattolicesimo Portale
Cattolicesimo Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XIX
secoloTeologi italianiPresbiteri italianiNati nel 1797Morti nel 1855Nati il 24
marzoMorti il 1º luglioNati a RoveretoMorti a StresaBeati italiani del XIX
secoloBeati proclamati da Benedetto XVIFondatori di società e istituti cattoliciPersonalità
del cattolicesimoMembri dell'Accademia delle Scienze di TorinoFederalistiUomini
universaliPersone legate all'Accademia Roveretana degli AgiatiFilosofi
cattoliciRosminiani[altre].
Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Rosmini e Grice,” per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia.
rosselli: important Italian philosopher –
There is a Rosselli Circle in Rome – Carlo Rosselli Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Carlo Rosselli
Carlo Alberto[1] Rosselli (Roma, 16 novembre 1899 – Bagnoles-de-l'Orne, 9
giugno 1937) è stato un attivista, giornalista, filosofo, storico ed
antifascista italiano. Fu il teorico del "socialismo liberale",
un socialismo riformista non marxista direttamente ispirato dal laburismo
britannico e dalla tradizione storico-politica, italiana e non, del radicalismo
liberale e libertario. Nel 1925 fondò a Firenze il foglio clandestino Non
Mollare e nel 1926, insieme al socialista Pietro Nenni, la rivista milanese Il
Quarto Stato. Fondò nel 1929 a Parigi il movimento antifascista Giustizia e
Libertà, che nel 1936 combatté per la Repubblica nella Guerra civile spagnola,
all'interno della Colonna Italiana Rosselli, costituita assieme agli anarchici.
Nel 1937 fu ucciso in Francia insieme con il fratello Nello da assassini legati
al regime fascista. Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svgLo stesso argomento in
dettaglio: Fratelli Rosselli. Nello Rosselli Indice 1Biografia
1.1La nascita, la guerra e gli studi 1.2 L'avvento
del fascismo e l'inizio della lotta 1.3Il confino e la fuga da Lipari
1.4L'esilio a Parigi. La nascita di "Giustizia e Libertà"
1.5L'impegno nella guerra civile spagnola 1.6L'assassinio 2Il pensiero 3Note
4Bibliografia 4.1Opere di Carlo Rosselli 4.2Opere su Carlo Rosselli 5Altri
progetti 6Collegamenti esterni Biografia La nascita, la guerra e gli
studi Amelia Pincherle, madre di Carlo. Rosselli nacque a
Roma il 16 novembre del 1899 da un'agiata famiglia ebraica,
secondogenito dei tre figli del livornese Giuseppe Emanuele "Joe"
Rosselli (10 agosto 1867 - Firenze, 9 settembre 1911) e della veneziana Amelia
Pincherle (16 gennaio 1870 - Firenze, 26 dicembre 1954), sorella di Carlo
Pincherle, architetto e pittore, oltreché padre dello scrittore Alberto Moravia.
Sia la famiglia paterna che quella materna, fermamente legate agli ideali
repubblicani e mazziniani, erano state politicamente attive, avendo partecipato
alle vicende del Risorgimento italiano: Pellegrino Rosselli, tra l'altro zio
della futura moglie di Ernesto Nathan (Sindaco di Roma dal novembre del 1907 al
dicembre del 1913), fu un seguace e stretto collaboratore di Giuseppe Mazzini
nei suoi ultimi anni di vita (morì difatti in clandestinità nella sua casa
pisana) ed un Pincherle fu nominato ministro durante la breve esperienza della
Repubblica di San Marco, instauratasi nel Triveneto a seguito d'una massiccia
insurrezione anti-asburgica guidata da Daniele Manin e Niccolò Tommaseo.
I Rosselli avevano abitato per un considerevole periodo a Vienna, dove Giuseppe
Emanuele aveva studiato composizione musicale e dove, nel 1895, era nato il
primogenito Aldo Sabatino. In seguito, si trasferirono a Roma, dove il padre,
rinunciando alle sue aspirazioni artistiche, si dedicò alla vita mondana,
mentre la madre ottenne dei discreti successi come autrice di drammi teatrali.
Qui, dopo la propria nascita, venne alla luce, l'anno seguente, il terzogenito
Sabatino Enrico "Nello". Nel 1903, i due coniugi si separarono:
le condizioni economiche della famiglia avevano subito un grave tracollo a
causa della leggerezza del padre. Amelia si trasferì con i suoi tre figli a
Firenze, dove frequentarono le scuole: Carlo mostrò in quel periodo poco
interesse per gli studi e la madre lo ritirò dal ginnasio, facendogli
frequentare le scuole tecniche. Nel 1911 morì il padre. L'entrata in
guerra dell'Italia, nel 1915, fu accolta con entusiasmo dalla famiglia
Rosselli, decisamente interventista. Il fratello Aldo fu arruolato come
ufficiale di fanteria e morì in combattimento nel 1916, ricevendo una medaglia
d'argento alla memoria. Carlo, ancora studente, collaborava dal 1917 al foglio
di propaganda «Noi giovani», fondato dal fratello Nello, anche se l'editoriale
Il nostro programma, che aprì in gennaio il primo numero del giornale, fu
redatto con buone probabilità assieme a Carlo. Il manifesto, che
l'ingenuità di due ragazzi indirizzava verso una fiduciosa speranza in un mondo
migliore, proponeva sin da allora alcuni tratti fondamentali della personalità
di Carlo, ossia un amore incondizionato per l'umanità e la spinta all'azione
nel solco dello spirito mazziniano, che lo inserisce nel filone
dell'interventismo democratico. Per «Noi giovani», licenziò i primi articoli,
uno in aprile sulla rivoluzione russa di febbraio, il secondo nel mese successivo
vertente sull'entrata in guerra degli Stati Uniti. Il primo testo, Libera
Russia, esalta il risveglio del paese di Gorkij, Tolstoj e Dostoevskij, supremi
interpreti di un rinnovamento in atto già dal secolo precedente, per cui la
rivoluzione di febbraio non era che il punto culminante di una lunga
preparazione all'avvento di una società più giusta. Vi «era tutta una massa che
saliva lentamente, inesorabilmente. La marcia si poteva ritardare ma non
impedire». Dei recentissimi eventi, inoltre, viene esaltata la componente
"pacifica", la loro attuazione relativamente non violenta.
L'articolo Wilson mostra tutta la fiducia nutrita per l'uomo che definì il
conflitto come «a war to end wars» (una guerra per porre fine alle guerre), uno
slogan che rappresentava bene le speranze di Carlo e di tutta la famiglia
Rosselli.[2] In giugno fu chiamato alle armi: frequentò a Caserta il
corso allievi ufficiali e venne assegnato nell'aprile del 1918 a un battaglione
di alpini in Valtellina. La guerra finì senza che egli avesse dovuto
sottomettersi al battesimo del fuoco e venne congedato col grado di tenente nel
febbraio 1920. Il contatto con i giovani militari appartenenti ai ceti
più popolari fu molto importante per Rosselli e per altri studenti come lui:
«apprezzarono la massa [...] furon posti in grado di comprendere tante cose che
sarebbero loro certamente sfuggite nel loro isolamento di classe o di
professione». Gaetano Salvemini Diplomatosi all'Istituto tecnico,
si iscrisse a Firenze al corso di Scienze sociali, laureandosi a pieni voti il
4 luglio 1921 con una tesi sul sindacalismo e si preparò a sostenere anche gli
esami di maturità classica per ottenere il diritto di frequentare altri corsi
universitari. Tramite il fratello Nello aveva conosciuto Gaetano Salvemini,
professore dell'Università fiorentina, che sarà da allora un costante punto di
riferimento per entrambi i fratelli. Gli fece rivedere la sua tesi, che
Salvemini giudicò «non un'opera critica, equilibrata, sostanziosa», ma in essa
«era incapsulata un'idea fondamentale: la ricerca di un socialismo che facesse
sua la dottrina liberale e non la ripudiasse». In questo periodo si
avvicinò al Partito Socialista Italiano, simpatizzando, in contrapposizione
all'allora maggioritaria corrente massimalista di Giacinto Menotti Serrati, per
quella riformista di Filippo Turati, che egli ebbe poi modo di conoscere
personalmente a Livorno nel 1921, durante lo svolgimento del Congresso
nazionale del Partito, che sancì la definitiva scissione dell'ala di sinistra
interna filo-bolscevica del Partito, che prenderà il nome di Partito Comunista
d'Italia, e scrisse svariati articoli per la sua rivista Critica Sociale.
L'avvento del fascismo e l'inizio della lotta Nell'ottobre del 1922 Mussolini
salì al potere; i riformisti di Turati vennero espulsi dal PSI. In
dicembre Carlo Rosselli si trasferì a Torino, dove frequentò il gruppo della
rivista gobettiana «La Rivoluzione liberale», in quel momento fortemente
impegnata in senso antifascista, e con la quale, dall'aprile 1923, incominciò a
collaborare. Conobbe Giacomo Matteotti, segretario dell'appena fondato Partito
Socialista Unitario, nel quale erano confluiti Piero Gobetti e la componente
riformista espulsa dal PSI. Ernesto Rossi Nel febbraio del 1923, a
Firenze, il gruppo dei socialisti liberali che si raccoglieva intorno alla
figura carismatica di Salvemini inaugurò il «Circolo di Cultura». Oltre ai
Rosselli vi erano: Piero Calamandrei, Enrico Finzi, Gino Frontali, Piero
Jahier, Ludovico Limentani, Alfredo Niccoli ed Ernesto Rossi. Gli
ex-combattenti del circolo, nel 1923, aderirono all'associazione antifascista
Italia libera. Qualche mese dopo, il 9 luglio, Carlo si laureò in
giurisprudenza all'università di Siena, con la tesi Prime linee di una teoria
economica dei sindacati operai e partì per Londra, stimolato dal desiderio di
conoscere la capitale del laburismo, di seguire i seminari della Fabian Society
e di assistere, a Plymouth, al congresso delle Trade Unions. A Londra vi era
anche Salvemini, che teneva un corso sulla storia della politica estera
italiana al King's College. Tornato in Italia in ottobre, grazie anche ai
buoni uffici di Salvemini, si impiegò come assistente volontario nella Facoltà
di economia dell'Università Bocconi a Milano, dove trasferì il suo domicilio.
Proseguì la sua collaborazione alla «Critica Sociale» di Turati: in novembre vi
pubblicò un articolo, invitando il Partito socialista a rompere con il
marxismo, che egli giudicava espressione di «cieco e tortuoso dogmatismo», per
mettersi piuttosto sulla linea di un «sano empirismo all'inglese». Nel
febbraio del 1924, inaugurò la sua collaborazione con la rivista della
Federazione giovanile del PSU, «Libertà», scrivendo proprio un articolo sul
movimento laburista inglese. Pochi mesi dopo il delitto Matteotti s'iscrisse al
P.S.U.. Rosselli sperava invano che in Italia si costituisse una seria
opposizione antifascista moderata in grado di offrire un'alternativa politica
alla borghesia che guarda con simpatia al fascismo: una di queste avrebbe potuto
essere l'Unione democratica nazionale di Giovanni Amendola, alla quale aderì il
fratello Nello. In settembre Carlo era in Inghilterra, da dove inviava al
giornale del PSU, la «Giustizia», le corrispondenze sull'evolversi della
situazione politica inglese, successiva alla vittoria elettorale dei
conservatori e alla rottura dell'alleanza tra laburisti e liberali.
Piero Calamandrei Era pessimista sulle condizioni politiche dell'Italia:
la secessione aventiniana non produceva effetti, con i suoi sterili tentativi
di accordo con il re, con i generali e i fascisti dissidenti. Del resto i
fascisti stavano reagendo e lo dimostrarono anche devastando, il 31 dicembre
1924, il «Circolo di Cultura» di Salvemini che, come non bastasse, venne chiuso
dal prefetto con una singolare motivazione: «la sua attività provoca il giusto
risentimento del partito dominante»[3]. Lasciato l'incarico alla Bocconi,
Rosselli passò a insegnare Istituzioni di economia politica a Genova. Scrisse a
Salvemini: «forse non avrà apparentemente alcuna positiva efficacia, ma io
sento che abbiamo da assolvere una grande funzione, dando esempi di carattere e
di forza morale alla generazione che viene dopo di noi». Appare così, nel
gennaio 1925, con la collaborazione di Ernesto Rossi, Gaetano Salvemini, Piero
Calamandrei, Nello Traquandi, Dino Vannucci e di Nello Rosselli, che ne ha
proposto il nome, il foglio clandestino Non Mollare. Alcuni
redattori della rivista Non Mollare nel 1925: Nello Traquandi, Tommaso
Ramorino, Carlo Rosselli, Ernesto Rossi, Luigi Emery, Nello Rosselli. In
maggio la denuncia di un tipografo provocò la repressione e la
dispersione di alcuni tra i redattori del foglio: Ernesto Rossi riuscì a
fuggire a Parigi, il Vannucci in Brasile, Salvemini fu arrestato l'8 giugno a
Roma e denunciato per «vilipendio del governo». In attesa del processo, messo
in libertà provvisoria, a causa delle minacce dei fascisti, a luglio passò la
notte a Firenze, in casa dei Rosselli, che non erano ancora fra i sospettati:
gli squadristi però, venuti a conoscenza del fatto, devastarono l'abitazione il
giorno dopo. Scrisse Rosselli a Giovanni Ansaldo: «Io sono di ottimo umore e
l'altra sera ho financo bevuto alla distruzione compiuta! Se i signori fascisti
non hanno altri moccoli, possono andare a dormire: aspetteranno a lungo la mia
rinuncia alla lotta». Ormai preso di mira dai fascisti, Rosselli fu
aggredito a Genova mentre si recava all'Università e poi disturbato durante la
sua lezione, con la richiesta del suo allontanamento. Nel luglio del 1926 si attivò
infine lo stesso Ministro dell'economia, Giuseppe Belluzzo, che chiese il suo
licenziamento. A questo punto, preferì dimettersi. Pochi giorni dopo, il
25 aprile, a Firenze, sposò con rito civile Marion Catherine Cave, una giovane
laburista inglese che era venuta nel 1919 a Firenze a insegnare lingua inglese
nel British Institute, conosciuta da Rosselli nel 1923 al Circolo della Cultura
salveminiano. Milano - Lapide commemorativa: «In via Ancona 2 visse
nel 1926 il martire antifascista Carlo Rosselli e qui ebbe sede la redazione
del Quarto Stato rivista socialista a difesa della libertà e della democrazia».
I due sposi vissero a Milano, dove Carlo aveva fondato insieme con Pietro Nenni
la rivista «Il Quarto Stato», il cui primo numero uscì il 27 marzo 1926. La
rivista avrà vita breve, venendo chiusa a novembre con l'entrata in vigore
della legge sui «provvedimenti per la difesa dello Stato». Scopo della
pubblicazione era il tentativo di rappresentare un punto d'incontro di tutte le
forze socialiste e di sviluppare temi di politica culturale al cui centro fosse
«il perfezionamento della personalità umana» e l'elevamento della «vita
spirituale e materiale» dei cittadini. Il 26 novembre 1925 Rosselli, con
Claudio Treves e Giuseppe Saragat costituì un triumvirato che, il 29 novembre
successivo, costituì clandestinamente il Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori
Italiani (PSLI), che prese il posto del P.S.U., sciolto d'imperio dal regime
fascista, il 14 novembre, a causa del fallito attentato a Mussolini da parte
del suo iscritto Tito Zaniboni, avvenuto il 4 novembre precedente. Il
confino e la fuga da Lipari 12 dicembre 1926 - Lorenzo De Bova, Filippo
Turati, Carlo Rosselli, Sandro Pertini e Ferruccio Parri a Calvi in Corsica
dopo la fuga in motoscafo da Savona. Filippo Turati Alla fine del 1926
organizzò con Italo Oxilia[4], Sandro Pertini e Ferruccio Parri l'espatrio di
Filippo Turati a Calvi in Corsica, con un motoscafo partito da Savona. Mentre
Turati, Pertini e Oxilia proseguirono per Nizza, Parri e Rosselli, ritornati
con il motoscafo a Marina di Carrara, furono arrestati, nonostante tentassero
di sostenere di essere reduci da una gita di piacere. Rosselli fu
accusato anche di aver favorito la fuga in Svizzera di Giovanni Ansaldo, di
Claudio Silvestri, di Claudio Treves e di Giuseppe Saragat. Venne
detenuto nelle carceri di Como fino al maggio del 1927 e poi inviato al
confino[5] di Lipari in attesa del processo. L'8 giugno nacque suo figlio
Giovanni Andrea "John". Quando Carlo fu ricondotto da Lipari a Savona
per essere processato, nell'isola siciliana giungeva il fratello Nello,
condannato a 5 anni di confino.[6] Al processo, che si aprì il 9
settembre, Rosselli si difese attaccando il regime: «il responsabile primo e
unico, che la coscienza degli uomini liberi incrimina è il fascismo [...] che
con la legge del bastone, strumento della sua potenza e della sua Nemesi, ha
inchiodato in servitù milioni di cittadini, gettandoli nella tragica
alternativa della supina acquiescenza o della fame o dell'esilio». La
sentenza, rispetto alle previsioni, fu mite: dieci mesi di reclusione e,
avendone già scontati otto, Rosselli avrebbe potuto essere presto libero, ma le
nuove leggi speciali permisero alla polizia di infliggergli altri 3 anni di
confino da scontare a Lipari. Emilio Lussu Lì venne raggiunto dalla
moglie e dal figlio: la vita al confino trascorreva con le letture di Croce, di
Mondolfo, dell'epistolario di Marx ed Engels e di Kant. Intanto, si
preparava la fuga, che venne organizzata da Parigi dall'amico di Salvemini
Alberto Tarchiani. Il 27 luglio 1929 Rosselli evase dall'isola, insieme
con Francesco Fausto Nitti ed Emilio Lussu, con un motoscafo guidato dall'amico
Italo Oxilia diretto in Tunisia, da cui poi i fuggiaschi raggiunsero la Francia.[7]
Francesco Fausto Nitti Nitti narrerà l'avventurosa evasione nel libro Le
nostre prigioni e la nostra evasione, pubblicato quello stesso anno in inglese
col titolo di Escape e in edizione italiana nel 1946, mentre Rosselli
racconterà le vicende del confino e dell'evasione in Fuga in quattro
tempi. La moglie Marion, che aspettava la seconda figlia, Amelia
"Melina", nata il successivo 28 marzo, venne in un primo tempo
arrestata per complicità, ma presto fu rilasciata. L'esilio a Parigi. La
nascita di "Giustizia e Libertà" Carlo Rosselli (in piedi) con
Claudio Treves e Filippo Turati in esilio a Parigi nel 1932. Nel 1929 a Parigi,
con Lussu, Nitti, e un gruppo di fuoriusciti organizzati da Salvemini, fu fra i
fondatori del movimento antifascista "Giustizia e Libertà". GL
pubblicò diversi numeri della rivista e dei quaderni omonimi (con cadenza
settimanale e mensile) e fu attiva nell'organizzazione di diverse azioni
dimostrative, tra cui il volo sopra Milano di Bassanesi nel 1930. Nello
stesso anno pubblicò, in francese, Socialisme liberal. Il libro è una
critica appassionata del marxismo ortodosso, colonna portante della stragrande
maggioranza dei vari schieramenti politici socialisti dell'epoca. Il
"socialismo liberale" propugnato da Rosselli si caratterizza quale
una creativa sintesi della tradizione del marxismo revisionista, democratico e
riformista (quello, tra gli altri, di Eduard Bernstein, Werner Sombart, Turati
e Treves), ed il socialismo non marxista, libertario e decentralista (come
quello di Francesco Merlino, Salvemini, G. D. H. Cole, R. H. Tawney e Oszkár
Jászi); il testo, però, contiene anche un attacco dirompente contro lo
stalinismo della Terza Internazionale che, con la formula del
"socialfascismo", accomunava socialdemocrazia, liberalismo "borghese"
e fascismo. Non stupisce perciò che uno fra i più importanti stalinisti,
Palmiro Togliatti, abbia definito "Socialismo liberale" un
"magro libello antisocialista" e Rosselli "un ideologo
reazionario che nessuna cosa lega alla classe operaia". Il logo
di Giustizia e Libertà Nell'ottobre del 1931 Giustizia e Libertà aderì alla
Concentrazione Antifascista, unione di tutte le forze antifasciste non
comuniste (repubblicani, socialisti, CGL) che intendeva promuovere e coordinare
dall'estero ogni possibile azione di lotta al fascismo in Italia; si iniziarono
a pubblicare i "Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà". Dopo
l'avvento del nazismo in Germania nel 1933, GL sostenne la necessità di una
rivoluzione preventiva per rovesciare i regimi fascista e nazista prima che
questi portassero a una nuova tragica guerra, che a GL sembrava l'inevitabile
destino dei due regimi. L'impegno nella guerra civile spagnola
Bandiera della Colonna Italiana, nota anche come Centuria Giustizia e Libertà,
che sostenne i repubblicani nella guerra civile spagnola. Nel 1936 scoppiò in
Spagna la guerra civile tra i rivoltosi dell'esercito filo-monarchico, che
effettuarono un colpo di Stato, e il legittimo governo repubblicano del Fronte
Popolare di ispirazione marxista. Rosselli fu subito attivo nel sostegno alle
forze repubblicane, criticando l'immobilismo di Francia e Inghilterra, mentre
fascisti e nazisti aiutavano Francisco Franco con uomini e armi agli
insorti. Nell'agosto combatté la sua prima battaglia in Spagna, nei dintorni
di Huesca sul fronte di Aragona; cercò poi di costituire un vero e proprio
battaglione (intitolato a Giacomo Matteotti). La prima formazione
italiana, che prenderà poi, dopo l'uccisione dei due fratelli, il nome di
Colonna Italiana Rosselli, annoverava tra i 50 e i 150 uomini, reclutati fra
gli esuli italiani in Francia dal movimento Giustizia e Libertà e dal Comitato
Anarchico Italiano Pro Spagna; tra questi c'erano anche gli anarchici Umberto
Marzocchi e Camillo Berneri. Umberto Marzocchi scrisse un libro sulla comune
esperienza antifascista di anarchici e di militanti di Giustizia e Libertà,
"Carlo Rosselli e gli anarchici". In un discorso a Radio
Barcellona il 13 novembre 1936[8], Rosselli pronuncia la frase che poi diverrà
il motto degli antifascisti italiani: "Oggi qui, domani in
Italia": «È con questa speranza segreta che siamo accorsi in
Ispagna. Oggi qui, domani in Italia. Fratelli, compagni italiani, ascoltate. È
un volontario italiano che vi parla dalla Radio di Barcellona. Non prestate
fede alle notizie bugiarde della stampa fascista, che dipinge i rivoluzionari
spagnuoli come orde di pazzi sanguinari alla vigilia della sconfitta.»
Nel dicembre 1936 in seguito a contrasti con gli anarchici si dimette da
comandante della Colonna e nel gennaio 1937 fonda il battaglione
Matteotti. L'assassinio Nel giugno 1937 soggiornò a Bagnoles-de-l'Orne
per delle cure termali, località dove fu raggiunto dal fratello Nello. Il
9 giugno i due furono uccisi da una squadra di "cagoulards", miliziani
della "Cagoule", formazione eversiva di destra francese, su mandato,
forse, dei servizi segreti fascisti e di Galeazzo Ciano; con un pretesto
vennero fatti scendere dall'automobile, poi colpiti da raffiche di pistola:
Carlo morì sul colpo, Nello (colpito per primo) venne finito con un'arma da
taglio.[9][10]. I corpi vennero trovati due giorni dopo; i colpevoli, dopo
numerosi processi, riusciranno quasi tutti a essere prosciolti. I
fratelli Rosselli furono sepolti nel cimitero monumentale parigino del Père
Lachaise, ma nel 1951 i familiari ne traslarono le salme in Italia, nel
Cimitero Monumentale di Trespiano, nel piccolo borgo omonimo, comune di
Firenze, sulla via Bolognese. L'anziano Salvemini tenne il discorso
commemorativo funebre, alla presenza del presidente della Repubblica Luigi
Einaudi. La tomba dei due eroi dell'antifascismo si trova nel riquadro subito a
destra dell'ingresso. Nello stesso cimitero sono sepolti anche Gaetano
Salvemini, Ernesto Rossi, Piero Calamandrei e Spartaco Lavagnini. La
tomba riporta il simbolo della "spada di fiamma", emblema di GL, e
l'epitaffio scritto da Calamandrei: «GIUSTIZIA E LIBERTA' PER QUESTO
MORIRONO PER QUESTO VIVONO» Il pensiero Giuseppe Mazzini
L'unico suo libro pubblicato mentre era in vita è "Socialismo
liberale", scritto durante il confino a Lipari, in una situazione di
semi-prigionia. Questa opera si pone in una posizione eretica rispetto ai
partiti della sinistra italiana del suo tempo (per i quali Il Capitale di Marx,
variamente interpretato, era ancora considerato come la Bibbia).
Indubbiamente è presente l'influsso del laburismo inglese, da lui ben
conosciuto. In seguito ai successi elettorali del partito laburista, Rosselli
era infatti convinto che l'insieme delle regole della democrazia liberale
fossero essenziali non solo per raggiungere il socialismo, ma anche per la sua
concreta realizzazione (mentre nella tattica leninista queste regole, una volta
preso il potere, debbono essere accantonate): pertanto, la sintesi del pensiero
rosselliano è: "il liberalismo come metodo, il socialismo come
fine". Carlo Pisacane L'idea di rivoluzione propria della
dottrina marxista era fondata sulla concezione della dittatura del proletariato
(che, in realtà, già ai tempi di Rosselli si sta traducendo, in Unione Sovietica,
nella dittatura del vertice di un solo partito). Essa viene respinta da
Rosselli, a favore di una rivoluzione che, come si nota nel programma di GL, è
un sistema coerente di riforme strutturali mirate alla costruzione di un
sistema socialista che non rinnega, ma anzi esalta, la libertà individuale e
associativa. Nella riflessione degli ultimi anni, Rosselli, alla luce
dell'esperienza spagnola (difesa dell'organizzazione sociale di Barcellona
compiuta dagli anarchici durante la guerra civile) e dell'avanzata del nazismo,
radicalizza le sue posizioni libertarie. Rosselli, influenzato dalle idee
di Mazzini e di Carlo Pisacane, propugna il socialismo liberale: il fine è il
socialismo, il metodo il liberalismo, un metodo che garantisce la democrazia e
l'autogoverno dei cittadini. Il liberalismo deve svolgere una funzione
democratica, il "metodo liberale" è il complesso di regole del gioco
che tutte le parti in lotta si impegnano a rispettare, regole dirette ad
assicurare la pacifica convivenza dei cittadini, delle classi, degli Stati, a
contenere le lotte (peraltro desiderabili se limitate). La violenza è
giustificabile come risposta ad altra violenza (per questo era giusta la lotta
contro il franchismo e sarebbe stata auspicabile in Italia una rivoluzione
violenta in risposta al fascismo); il socialismo è una logica conclusione del
liberalismo: socialismo significa libertà per tutti. Rosselli ha fiducia che la
classe del futuro sarà la classe proletaria, la borghesia deve fare da guida al
proletariato: il fine è la libertà per tutte le classi. Note ^ Archivio
Rosselli - Bio, su archiviorosselli.it. URL consultato il 4 luglio 2019
(archiviato dall'url originale il 27 maggio 2016). ^ N. Tranfaglia, Carlo
Rosselli dall'interventismo a Giustizia e Libertà, Bari, Laterza, 1968, pp.
18-20 ^ Il Circolo di Cultura fu rifondato nel settembre 1944, a liberazione di
Firenze appena avvenuta, per iniziativa del Partito d'Azione e dei soci
superstiti e intitolato ai Fratelli Rosselli. Assunse così il nome di Circolo
di Cultura Politica Fratelli Rosselli. La sua prima manifestazione fu
presieduta da Piero Calamandrei. Con questo nome è tuttora operante a Firenze.
Nel 1990 con decreto del Presidente della Repubblica è stata costituita ed
eretta in Ente Morale la Fondazione Circolo Rosselli per sostenerne l'attività.
^ Antonio Martino: Fuorusciti e confinati dopo l'espatrio clandestino di
Filippo Turati nelle carte della R. Questura di Savona in Atti e Memorie della
Società Savonese di Storia Patria, n.s., vol. XLIII, Savona 2007, pp. 453-516.
e Pertini e altri socialisti savonesi nelle carte della R.Questura, Gruppo
editoriale L'espresso, Roma, 2009. ^ Cfr. Commissione di Milano, ordinanza del
15.12.1926 contro Carlo Rosselli (“Intensa attività antifascista; tra gli
ideatori del giornale clandestino Non Mollare uscito a Firenze nel 1925;
favoreggiamento nell'espatrio di Turati e Pertini”). In: Adriano Dal Pont,
Simonetta Carolini, L'Italia al confino 1926-1943. Le ordinanze di assegnazione
al confino emesse dalle Commissioni provinciali dal novembre 1926 al luglio
1943, Milano 1983 (ANPPIA/La Pietra), vol. III, p. 238 ^ Cfr. Commissione di
Firenze, ordinanza del 3.6.1927 contro Nello Rosselli (“Attività
antifascista”). In: Adriano Dal Pont, Simonetta Carolini, L'Italia al confino
1926-1943. Le ordinanze di assegnazione al confino emesse dalle Commissioni
provinciali dal novembre 1926 al luglio 1943, Milano 1983 (ANPPIA/La Pietra),
vol. III, p. 1051 ^ Cfr. La storia sotto inchiesta: Fuga da Lipari, un esilio
per la liberta trasmesso da Rai Storia il 3 gennaio 2012. ^ Il discorso di
Rosselli su Romacivica.net Archiviato il 29 settembre 2007 in Internet Archive.
^ Giuseppe Fiori, Casa Rosselli, Einaudi, 1999, pp. 202 e segg. ^ Mimmo
Franzinelli, Il delitto Rosselli. 9 giugno 1937. Anatomia di un omicidio
politico, Mondadori, Milano 2007. Bibliografia Opere di Carlo Rosselli Oggi in
Spagna, domani in Italia, prefazione di Gaetano Salvemini, Edizioni di
«Giustizia e libertà», Parigi, 1938; seconda edizione, introduzione di Aldo
Garosci, Einaudi, Torino, 1967. Scritti politici e autobiografici, prefazione
di Gaetano Salvemini, Polis editrice, Napoli, 1944; seconda edizione a cura di
Zeffiro Ciuffoletti e Vincenzo Caciulli, Lacaita, Manduria 1992. Lettere di
Carlo e Nello Rosselli a Gaetano Salvemini (1925), a cura di Nicola Tranfaglia,
«Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi», I (1967), Torino. Carlo Rosselli,
Socialismo liberale, Einaudi, 1973. «Il Quarto Stato» di Pietro Nenni e
Rosselli, a cura di Domenico Zucàro, SugarCo, Milano, 1977. Epistolario familiare.(1914-1937),
introduzione di Leo Valiani, prefazione di Zeffiro Ciuffoletti, SugarCo,
Milano, 1979. Socialismo liberale, a cura di John Rosselli, introduzione di
Norberto Bobbio, Einaudi, Torino, 1979. Socialismo liberale, a cura di John
Rosselli, introduzione e commento di Norberto Bobbio, «Attualità del socialismo
liberale» e «Tradizione ed eredità del liberalsocialismo», seconda edizione
Einaudi Tascabili. Saggi, 1997, pp. 164. Scritti dell'esilio. I. «Giustizia e
libertà» e la concentrazione antifascista (1929-1934), a cura di Costanzo
Casucci, Collana Opere scelte di Carlo Rosselli, Einaudi, Torino, 1988
(contiene una cronologia della vita e la bibliografia di C. Rosselli dal 1929
al 1934). Scritti politici, a cura di Zeffiro Ciuffoletti e Paolo Bagnoli,
Guida, Napoli, 1988,[1] una grossa anteprima del libri consultabile in rete.
Scritti dell'esilio II. Dallo scioglimento della concentrazione antifascista
alla guerra di Spagna (1934-1937), a cura di Costanzo Casucci, Einaudi, Torino,
1992, (è riportata la cronologia della vita e una bibliografia di Carlo
Rosselli dal 1934 al 1937). Liberalismo socialista e socialismo liberale, a
cura di Nicola Terraciano, Galzerano Editore, Casalvelino Scalo (Salerno),
1992. Carlo e Nello Rosselli, Giustizia e libertà, a cura di Giuliana Limiti e
Mario di Napoli, prefazione di Pietro Larizza, Roma, 1993, con la tesi di
laurea di Carlo Rosselli sul «sindacalismo» (Firenze, 1921). Liberalsocialism,
edited by Nadia Urbinati, translated by Williams McCuaig, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1994, introduzione di Nadia Urbinati. Scritti scelti, a cura
di Gian Biagio Furiozzi, “Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli”, n. 4/2000, Alinea
Editrice, Firenze. Opere su Carlo Rosselli Gaetano Salvemini, "Carlo e
Nello Rosselli", Edizioni di «Giustizia e libertà», Parigi, 1938; ora in
"Scritti Vari", a cura di Giorgio Agosti e Alessandro Galante
Garrone, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1978 («Opere scelte di Gaetano Salvemini», volume
VIII, pp. 673–718). Cultura e società nella formazione di Gaetano Salvemini,
buona anteprima del pensiero di Salvemini con i rapporti con Carlo Rosselli e
la grangia politica correlata Roberto Gremmo "Rosselli alla Cagoule"
Silenzi e segreti d'un oscuro delitto politico. Edizioni Storia Ribelle, Biella
2018. Aldo Garosci, "Vita di Carlo Rosselli", Edizioni U,
Roma-Firenze-Milano s.d., 1945, 2 voll., pp. 274 e 298 («Collezione Giustizia e
Libertà»); nuova edizione Vallecchi, Firenze, 1973. Alessandro Levi,
"Ricordi dei fratelli Rosselli", La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1947
(«Quaderni del Ponte», 2). Stefano Merli, "Il dibattito socialista sotto
il fascismo. Lettere di Rodolfo Morandi e Carlo Rosselli (1928-1931)",
«Rivista storica del socialismo», a. VI, n. 19. Maggio-Agosto 1963.
Parzialmente ricompreso in Id., "Fronte antifascista e politica di classe.
Socialisti e comunisti in Italia 1923-1929", De Donato, Bari, 1975
(«Movimento operaio», 28). Nicola Tranfaglia, "Carlo Rosselli
dall'interventismo all'antifascismo", «Dialoghi del XX», a. I, n. 2,
giugno 1967. Cfr. il n. 8. informazioni su volume "Rosselli e l'Aventino:
l'eredità di Giacomo Matteotti", «Il movimento di liberazione in Italia»,
a. XX, n. 92, luglio-Settembre 1968, pp. 3–34. Cfr. il n.8. stralcio di
"Carlo Rosselli e l'Aventino"[collegamento interrotto] «L'opposizione
diventava per la prima volta opposizione, minoranza; come minoranza, avrebbe
potuto darsi una psicologia virile, d'attacco. Ma aveva troppi ex nelle sue
file, era troppo appesantita da uomini che avevano gustato le gioie del potere
e della popolarità.» «Fu questo il miracolismo dell'Aventino. Credere di
poter vincere con le armi legali l'avversario che ha già vinto sul terreno
della forza. Pregustare le gioie del trionfo mentre si riceve la botta più
dura. Evitare tutti i problemi (Piero Gobetti diceva: "l'Aventino ha un
mito, il mito della cautela"), sperando che la borghesia dimentichi il
'19.» «Quanto alle masse popolari, che si mostravano nei primi giorni in
stato di effervescenza, guai a chi avesse tentato metterle in movimento! Solo i
comunisti e le minoranze giovani chiesero lo sciopero generale. Ma le
opposizioni non vollero, per non spaventare la borghesia e il
sovrano.» "Carlo Rosselli dall'interventismo a «Giustizia e
Libertà»", Laterza, Bari, 1968, («Biblioteca di cultura moderna»); in
appendice: scritti di Carlo Rosselli (1919-1926) e Lettera di Carlo Rosselli a
Pietro Nenni. Cfr. i nn. 6 e 7. "Carlo Rosselli dal processo di Savona
alla fondazione di GL (1927-1929). Le fonti di «Socialismo liberale»", «Il
movimento di liberazione in Italia», a. XXIV, n. 106, gennaio-Marzo 1972.
Mirella Larizza Lolli, "Alcuni appunti per una lettura del «Socialismo
liberale» di Rosselli", «Il pensiero politico», a. VII, n. 2, 1974, pp.
283–92. Santi Fedele, "Lo «Schema di programma» di «Giustizia e Libertà»,
del 1932", «Belfagor», a. XXIX, n. 4, 31 luglio 1974, pp. 437–54 Paolo
Bagnoli, "L'esperienza liberale di Carlo Rosselli (1919-1924)",
«Italia Contemporanea», * XXVIII, n. 125, ottobre-Dicembre 1976, pp. 29–42. Poi
compreso in n. 36, pp. 37–61. "L'antifascismo rivoluzionario dei «Quaderni
di Giustizia e Libertà»", «Ricerche Storiche», a. VI, n. 1 (Nuova serie),
gennaio-Giugno 1976, pp. 167–89. Poi compreso in n. 36, pp. 143–69. Santi
Fedele, "Storia della concentrazione antifascista 1927/1934", prefazione
di Nicola Tranfaglia, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976. Maria Garbari, "I «vinti»
della Resistenza. Nel quarantesimo del sacrificio di Carlo e Nello
Rosselli", «Studi Trentini di Scienze Storiche», a. LVI, n. 3, 1977, pp.
281–94. "«Quarto Stato» di Pietro Nenni e Rosselli", Tavola rotonda
fra Riccardo Bauer, Ugoberto Alfassio Grimaldi, Giovanni Spadolini, Domenico
Zucàro, «Critica Sociale», a. LXIX, n. 8, 22 luglio 1977, pp. 44–48. Leo
Valiani, "Il pensiero e l'azione di Carlo e Nello Rosselli", «Nuova
Antologia», anno 112°, Vol. 530°, Fasc. 2118-2120, giugno-Luglio-Agosto 1977,
pp. 24–40. Poi compreso in n. 22, pp. 3–22. Nicola Tranfaglia, "Carlo
Rosselli e l'antifascismo", «Mondo Operaio», a. XXX, nn. 7-8,
luglio/Agosto 1977, pp. 71–81. Poi compreso in n. 22, pp. 181–204 e in n. 34,
pag. 186-211. Roberto Vivarelli, "Carlo Rosselli e Gaetano
Salvemini", «Il pensiero politico», a. X, n. 2, 1977, pp. 225–52. Poi
compreso in n. 22, pp. 69–97. Giovanni Spadolini, "Carlo Rosselli nella
lotta per la libertà", con lettere tra Egidio Reale e Carlo Rosselli,
«Nuova Antologia», anno 112°, Vol. 532°, Fasc. 2121-2124,
settembre-Ottobre-Novembre-Dicembre 1977, pp. 3–16. Arturo Colombo, "Carlo
Rosselli e il «Quarto Stato»", «Nord e Sud», a. XXIV, Terza serie, nn.
34-35, novembre-Dicembre 1977, pp. 108–120. Cfr. n. 29, pp. 55–66.
"Giustizia e Libertà nella lotta antifascista e nella storia
d'Italia", Atti del convegno internazionale organizzato a Firenze il 10-12
giugno 1977 dall'Istituto storico della Resistenza in Toscana, dalla Giunta
regionale toscana, dal Comune di Firenze, dalla Provincia di Firenze, La Nuova
Italia, Firenze, 1978. Riccardo Bauer, "Carlo Rosselli e la nascita di GL
in Italia". Jan Petersen, "Giustizia e Libertà in Germania".
Pierre Guillen, "La risonanza in Francia dell'azione di GL e
dell'assassinio dei fratelli Rosselli". Frank Rosengarten, "Carlo
Rosselli e Silvio Trentin, teorici della rivoluzione italiana". Max
Salvadori, "Giellisti e loro amici degli Stati Uniti durante la seconda
guerra mondiale". Santi Fedele, "Giellisti e socialisti dalla
fondazione di GL (1929) alla politica dei fronti popolari". Pier Giorgio
Zunino, "Giustizia e Libertà e i cattolici". Aldo Garosci, "Le
diverse fasi dell'intervento di Giustizia e Libertà nella guerra civile di Spagna.
Parte III- Oggi in Spagna, domani in Italia". Umberto Marzocchi,
"Carlo Rosselli e gli anarchici"; citazione sottostante da un
articolo di Ugo Finetti «Infatti Rosselli considerava una barbarie le stragi di
anarchici in Catalogna, tra cui l'uccisione di Camillo Berneri, l'anarchico che
lo affiancava nella guida della Prima colonna italiana formata da tremila
antifascisti, i primi accorsi in Spagna.» e si ricorda, nel prosieguo,
anche la ferma presa di posizione delle Brigate partigiane di Giustizia e
Libertà quando Emilio Canzi fu rimosso da comandante unico della XIII zona
operante nel piacentino e grazie a questa presa di posizione fu reintegrato
dopo un breve arresto. Le Brigate partigiane di Giustizia e Libertà erano in
gran parte influenzate dal pensiero di Rosselli. Umberto Tommasini,
"Testimonianza su Carlo Rosselli; Parte IV- L'eredità di Giustizia e
Libertà". Mario Delle Piane, "Rapporti tra socialismo liberale e
liberalsocialismo". Tristano Codignola, "GL e Partito d'azione".
Nicola Tranfaglia, "Carlo Rosselli", in "Il movimento operaio
italiano. Dizionario biografico - IV", a cura di Franco Andreucci e
Tommaso Detti, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1978, pp. 392–99. Arturo Colombo,
"Carlo Rosselli e il socialismo liberale", «Il Politico», a. XLIII, n.
4, dicembre 1978, pp. 628–48. Poi compreso in n. 37, pp. 249–73. Paolo Bagnoli,
"Di un dissidio in «Giustizia e Libertà». Lettere inedite di Mario Levi,
Renzo Giua, Nicola Chiaromonte, Carlo Rosselli, Aldo Garosci (1934-1935)",
«Mezzosecolo», n. 3, Centro studi Piero Gobetti, Istituto Storico della
Resistenza in Piemonte, Archivio Nazionale Cinematografico della Resistenza,
Annali 1978-1979, Torino, 1982, pp. 5–54. Luigi Cirillo, "Il socialismo di
Carlo Rosselli", Fasano, Cosenza, 1979. Emilio Lussu, "Lettere a
Carlo Rosselli e altri scritti di «Giustizia e Libertà»", a cura di Manlio
Brigaglia, Editrice Libreria Dessì, Sassari 1979, pp. 301.informazioni su
Storia della Sardegna di Manlio Brigaglia, son presenti correlazioni fra i
succitati personaggi. "Le componenti mazziniana e cattaneanea in Salvemini
e nei Rosselli. La figura e l'opera di Giulio Andrea Belloni", Atti del
Convegno di studi nel venticinquesimo anniversario della fondazione della Domus
Mazziniana tenutosi a Pisa il 4-6 novembre 1977, Arti Grafiche Pacini &
Mariotti, Pisa, 1979, pp. 257. Comprende: Arturo Colombo, "Carlo Rosselli
e il «Quarto Stato»", pp. 55–66 (cfr. il n. 21). Angelo Varni,
"Derivazioni mazziniane nella concezione sindacalista di Carlo
Rosselli", pp. 67–78. Lucio Ceva, "Aspetti politici dell'azione di
Carlo Rosselli in Spagna", pp. 109–26. Giuseppe Tramarollo, "Rosselli
e la gioventù del regime", pp. 127–130. Paolo Bagnoli, "Il
revisionismo rosselliano", in "Guida alla storia del PSI. La ripresa
del pensiero socialista tra eresia e tradizione", a cura di Francesca
Taddei e Marco Talluri, «Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli», a. I, n. 3,
luglio-Settembre 1981, pp. 95–108. Giuseppe Galasso, "La democrazia da
Cattaneo a Rosselli", Le Monnier, Firenze, 1982, pp. 331, («Quaderni di storia»,
LVII). Aldo Rosselli, "La famiglia Rosselli. Una tragedia italiana",
presentazione di Sandro Pertini, prefazione di Alberto Moravia, Bompiani,
Milano, 1983, pp. 184. Francesco Kostner, "Carlo Rosselli e il suo
socialismo liberale", Lalli, Poggibonsi, 1984, pp. 91 («Linee politiche»).
Paolo Bagnoli, "Carlo Rosselli tra pensiero politico e azione",
prefazione di Giovanni Spadolini, con uno scritto di Alessandro Galante
Garrone, Passigli, Firenze, 1985, pp. 190. Arturo Colombo, "Carlo Rosselli
e il socialismo liberale", in "Padri della patria. Protagonisti e
testimoni di un'altra Italia", FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1985, pp. 249–73
(«Ricerche storiche», 64). Franco Invernici, "L'alternativa di «Giustizia
e Libertà». Economia e politica nei progetti del gruppo di Carlo
Rosselli", presentazione di Arturo Colombo, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1987,
pp. 196 («Studi e ricerche storiche», 96). Leo Valiani, "Carlo e Nello
Rosselli da Mazzini alla lotta di liberazione", «Nuova Antologia», anno
122°, Vol. 558°, Fasc. 2163, luglio-Settembre 1987, pp. 45–59. Diego Scacchi,
Arturo Colombo, "Per Carlo e Nello Rosselli", presentazione di
Giovanni Spadolini, Casagrande, Lugano, 1988, pp. 71 («Quaderni europei», I).
Roberto Vivarelli, "Le ragioni di un comune impegno. Ricordando Gaetano
Salvemini, Carlo e Nello Rosselli, Ernesto Rossi", «Rivista Storica
Italiana», a. c, Fasc. III, dicembre 1988, pp. 669–78. Giovanni Spadolini,
"Carlo e Nello Rosselli. Le radici mazziniane del loro pensiero",
Passigli, Firenze, 1990, pp. 61 («Letture Rosselli», 2). Corrado Malandrino,
"Socialismo e libertà. Autonomie, federalismo, Europa da Rosselli a
Silone", FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1990, pp. 247 (Collana «Gioele Solari».
Dipartimento di Studi politici dell'Università di Torino, 6). Franco Bandini,
"Il cono d'ombra. Chi armò la mano degli assassini dei fratelli
Rosselli", SugarCo, Milano, 1990, pp. 527. Arturo Colombo, "I
Rosselli, due guardiani per l'albero della libertà", in Id., "Voci e
volti della democrazia. Cultura e impegno civile da Gobetti a Bauer", Le
Monnier, Firenze, 1990, pp. 115–145 («Quaderni di storia»). AA. VV., "Nel
nome dei Rosselli. 1920-1990", «Quaderni del Circolo Rosselli», a. XI, n.
1, 1991, FrancoAngeli, Milano, pp. 177. Con una bibliografia sui fratelli
Rosselli di Giuseppe Muzzi. "A più voci su Carlo Rosselli. Gaetano Arfé,
Costanzo Casucci, Aldo Garosci, Francesco Malgeri, Leonardo Rapone, Scritti
dell'esilio", «Il Ponte», a. XLVII, n. 6, giugno 1991, pp. 120–150.
"Il carteggio di Carlo e Nello Rosselli con Carlo Silvestri (1928-1934)",
a cura di Gloria Gabrielli, «Storia Contemporanea», a. XXII, n. 5, ottobre
1991, pp. 875–916. Santi Fedele, "E verrà un'altra Italia. Politica e
cultura nei «Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà»", FrancoAngeli, Milano,
1992, pp. 212 Collana di Fondazione di studi storici Filippo Turati», n °7.
Zeffiro Ciuffoletti, "Carlo Rosselli, il mito della rivoluzione russa e il
comunismo", in "Socialismo e Comunismo 1892-1992". Vol. I, «Il
Ponte», a. XLVIII, n. 5, maggio 1992, pp. 186–202. Paolo Bagnoli, "La
lezione rosselliana, La nuova storia. Politica e cultura alla ricerca del
socialismo liberale", prefazione di Renato Treves, Festina Lente, Firenze,
1992, pp. 107–34. Nicola Tranfaglia, "Sul socialismo liberale di Carlo
Rosselli", in I volume "Dilemmi del liberalsocialismo", a cura
di Michelangelo Bovero, Virgilio Mura, Franco Sbarberi, La Nuova Italia
Scientifica, Roma, 1994, pp. 88–104 («Studi Superiori NIS/201. Scienze
Sociali»). Atti del convegno "Liberalsocialismo: ossimoro o
sintesi?", organizzato ad Alghero il 25-27 aprile 1991, Dipartimento di
Economia istituzioni e società dell'Università Sassari. Il 1º gennaio del 1924
fu pubblicato il primo numero di “Libertà”, periodico legato all'ala socialista
del movimento antifascista, il sottotitolo fu la frase di Carlo Marx ed
Federico Engels: Alla società borghese, con le sue classi e con i suoi
antagonismi di classe, subentrerà un'associazione nella quale il libero
sviluppo di ciascuno sarà la condizione del libero sviluppo di tutti e, su
invito Claudio Treves, Rodolfo Mondolfo e Alessandro Levi, Rosselli scrisse un
articolo Il partito del lavoro in Inghilterra che fu pubblicato sul numero tre
del 1º febbraio 1924, in cui Rosselli riaffermò una parte del suo pensiero del
periodo: «Il Labour Party, in base agli elementi che lo compongono può
definirsi come una federazione di gruppi economici e di gruppi politici. In
realtà è l'organizzazione politica federativa ed associativa del movimento
operaio più vecchio e potente del mondo.» Silvio Suppa, "Note su
Carlo Rosselli: temi per due tradizioni", in I volume "dilemmi del
liberalsocialismo "cit., pp. 189-208. Del Puppo D., "«Il Quarto
Stato»", «Science and Society», a. 58, 1994, n. 2, pp. 136–162.
"L'attualità di Carlo Rosselli e del socialismo liberale. Dialoghi tra:
Giancarlo Bosetti, Vittorio Foa, Sebastiano Maffettone, Enzo Marzo, Nicola
Tranfaglia, Nadia Urbinati", Supplemento al n. I/1995 di «Croce Via»,
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli, 1995. Atti del dibattito svoltosi a
Napoli il 13 gennaio 1995 in occasione della presentazione italiana del volume
"Liberal socialism", lavoro di Nadia Urbinati, tradotto da William
McCuaig, Princeton University Press, Princenton 1994, pp. 138. Nadia Urbinati,
"Carlo Rosselli: la democrazia come fede comune", «il Vieusseux», a.
VII, n. 21, settembre-Dicembre 1994, pp. 25–42. Paolo Bagnoli, Rosselli,
"Piero Gobetti e la rivoluzione democratica. Uomini e idee tra liberalismo
e socialismo", La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1996, pp. 258 («Biblioteca di
Storia», 55). Costanzo Casucci, "La caratteristica di Carlo
Rosselli", con un vademecum, «Belfagor», a. LI, n. 2, 31 marzo 1996, pp.
243–248. Simone Visciola, Giuseppe Limone (a cura di), "I Rosselli. Eresia
creativa, eredità originale", Napoli, Guida, 2005 Piero Graglia,
"Unità europea e federalismo. Da «Giustizia e Libertà» ad Altiero
Spinelli", il Mulino, Bologna, 1996, pp. 296 («il Mulino-Ricerca»).
"Il dibattito europeista e federalista in «Giustizia e Libertà»",
«Storia Contemporanea», a. XXVII, n. 2, aprile 1996, pp. 327–56. Lisetto D.,
"Carlo Rosselli e le élites. Una teoria tra l'elitismo democratico e la
democrazia partecipativa", «Scienza & Politica», 16, 1997, pp. 69–86.
Carlo Rosselli, "Pagine scelte di economia", a cura di Simone
Visciola e Antonio De Ruggiero, Firenze, Le Monnier, 2010 Salvo Mastellone,
"Il partito politico nel socialismo liberale di Carlo Rosselli", «Il
pensiero politico», a. XXXI, n. 1, 1998, pag. 111-118. Gianbiagio Furlozzi,
"Carlo Rosselli e Georges Sorel", «Il pensiero politico», a. XXXII,
n. 2, 1999, pag. 262-270. Giovanna Angeli, "L'eredità democratica da
Bignami a Rosselli", Angeli, Milano, 1999. Salvo Mastellone, "Carlo
Rosselli e «La rivoluzione liberale del socialismo»". Con scritti e
documenti inediti. Olschki, 1999, pp. 266. Son riportati testi pubblicati da
Carlo Rosselli non inseriti nel Vol. I delle «Opere scelte». "Rosselli.
Dizionario delle idee", a cura di Sergio Bucchi, Editori Riuniti, gennaio
2000, pp. 169. Antonio Martino, Pertini e altri socialisti savonesi nelle carte
della R. Questura, Roma, Gruppo editoriale L'espresso, 2009. Mimmo Franzinelli,
"Il delitto Rosselli. 9 giugno 1937. Anatomia di un omicidio
politico", Mondadori, Milano 2007. Diego Dilettoso, "La Parigi e La
Francia di Carlo Rosselli. Sulle orme di un umanista in esilio", Biblion,
Milano 2013 .Paolo Bagnoli. Carlo Rosselli: Il socialismo delle libertà.
Polistampa, Milano, 2012 Paolo Bagnoli. Carlo Rosselli. Socialismo, giustizia e
libertà. Biblion, Milano, 2015 Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource
contiene una pagina dedicata a Carlo Rosselli Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote
contiene citazioni di o su Carlo Rosselli Collabora a Wikimedia Commons
Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Carlo Rosselli Collegamenti
esterni Carlo Rosselli, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Carlo Rosselli, in
Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su
Wikidata Carlo Rosselli, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata (IT, DE, FR) Carlo Rosselli, su
hls-dhs-dss.ch, Dizionario storico della Svizzera. Modifica su Wikidata Carlo
Rosselli, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Carlo Rosselli, su
siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it, Sistema Informativo Unificato per le
Soprintendenze Archivistiche. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Carlo Rosselli, su
Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Carlo Rosselli, su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Carlo Rosselli, su
Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Biografia di Rosselli, su
romacivica.net. URL consultato il 30 agosto 2006 (archiviato dall'url originale
il 30 agosto 2006). Carlo Rosselli e l'Aventino (DOC) [collegamento
interrotto], su geocities.com. Giancarlo Iacchini,*Rosselli: socialismo
liberale ma... vero!, dal sito del Movimento Radical Socialista 55esima brigata
Garibaldi Carlo Rosselli, su 55rosselli.it. Archivio della famiglia Rosselli [collegamento
interrotto], su archiviorosselli.it. I fratelli Rosselli, genesi di un delitto
impunito, su rifondazionepescara.org (archiviato dall'url originale l'8 aprile
2008). Camillo Berneri e Carlo Rosselli - Vite parallele di Massimo Ortalli (da
"Umanità Nova" n.08 del 4 marzo 2001) Fondazione Rosselli, Centro di
ricerca, su fondazionerosselli.it. URL consultato il 17 gennaio 2013
(archiviato dall'url originale il 1º settembre 2005). Fondazione Circolo
Rosselli - Firenze, su rosselli.org. "Gaetano Pecora" Carlo Rosselli,
socialista e liberale.Bilancio critico di un grande italiano, su
politicamagazine.it. Valdo Spini, "Perché i Rosselli parlano ancora a
questa Italia", sul sito repubblica.it del 7 giugno 2020. V · D · M
Antifascismo (1919-1943) Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 14809419 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1598 3394 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\090406 ·
Europeana agent/base/89804 · LCCN (EN) n79042225 · GND (DE) 119181347 · BNF
(FR) cb12159402m (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n79042225 Biografie
Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Politica Portale Politica
Socialismo Portale Socialismo Categorie: Attivisti italianiGiornalisti italiani
del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1899Morti nel 1937Nati il
16 novembreMorti il 9 giugnoNati a RomaAntifascisti italianiFondatori di
riviste italianeDirettori di periodici italianiGiornalisti assassinatiPersone
legate agli alpiniEbrei italianiBrigate Giustizia e
LibertàSocialistiMazzinianiPolitici assassinatiVittime di dittature
nazifascisteSchedati al Casellario Politico CentraleConfinati politiciPolitici
del Partito Socialista Unitario[altre]. Refs.: Luigi Speranza,
“Rosselli e Grice,” per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library,
Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
rota: Italian philosopher – Gian-Carlo Rota From
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search Not to be
confused with Carlo Rota. Gian-Carlo Rota Gian-Carlo Rota blackboard Nizza
1970.jpg Rota in 1970. Born April 27,
1932 Vigevano, Italy Died April 18, 1999 (aged 66) Cambridge, Massachusetts,
U.S. Alma mater Princeton University (A.B.) Yale University (Ph.D.) AwardsLeroy
P. Steele Prize (1988) Scientific career Fields Mathematics, philosophy
Institutions Massachusetts Institute of Technology Los Alamos National Laboratory
The Rockefeller University Doctoral advisor Jacob T. Schwartz Notable students
Thomas H. Brylawski William Y.C. Chen Daniel I. A. Cohen Henry Crapo
Peter Duren Richard Ehrenborg Mark Haiman Patrick O'Neil Richard P. Stanley
Walter Whiteley Catherine Yan Gian-Carlo Rota (April 27, 1932 – April 18, 1999)
was an Italian-American mathematician and philosopher. Contents 1
Early life and education 2 Career 3 Death 4 See also 5 Notes 6 External links
Early life and education Rota was born in Vigevano, Italy. His father,
Giovanni, a prominent antifascist, was the brother of the mathematician
Rosetta, who was the wife of the writer Ennio Flaiano.[1][2] Gian-Carlo's
family left Italy when he was 13 years old, initially going to
Switzerland. Rota attended the Colegio Americano de Quito in Ecuador, and
graduated with an A.B. in mathematics from Princeton University in 1953 after
completing a senior thesis, titled "On the solubility of linear equations
in topological vector spaces", under the supervision of William Feller. He
then pursued graduate studies at Yale University, where he received a Ph.D. in
mathematics in 1956 after completing a doctoral dissertation, titled
"Extension Theory Of Ordinary Linear Differential Operators", under
the supervision of Jacob T. Schwartz.[3][4] Career Much of Rota's career
was spent as a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
where he was and remains the only person ever to be appointed Professor of
Applied Mathematics and Philosophy. Rota was also the Norbert Wiener Professor
of Applied Mathematics. In addition to his professorships at MIT, Rota
held four honorary degrees, from the University of Strasbourg, France (1984);
the University of L'Aquila, Italy (1990); the University of Bologna, Italy (1996);
and Brooklyn Polytechnic University (1997). Beginning in 1966 he was a
consultant at Los Alamos National Laboratory, frequently visiting to lecture,
discuss, and collaborate, notably with his friend Stanisław Ulam. He was also a
consultant for the Rand Corporation (1966–71) and for the Brookhaven National
Laboratory (1969–1973). Rota was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in
1982, was vice president of the American Mathematical Society (AMS) from
1995–97, and was a member of numerous other mathematical and philosophical
organizations.[5] He taught a difficult but very popular course in
probability. He also taught Applications of Calculus, differential equations,
and Combinatorial Theory. His philosophy course in phenomenology was offered on
Friday nights to keep the enrollment manageable. Among his many eccentricities,
he would not teach without a can of Coca-Cola, and handed out prizes ranging
from Hershey bars to pocket knives to students who asked questions in class or
did well on tests.[6][7] Rota began his career as a functional analyst,
but switched to become a distinguished combinatorialist. His series of ten
papers on the "Foundations of Combinatorics" in the 1960s is credited
with making it a respectable branch of modern mathematics.[dubious – discuss]
He said that the one combinatorial idea he would like to be remembered for is
the correspondence between combinatorial problems and problems of the location
of the zeroes of polynomials.[8] He worked on the theory of incidence algebras
(which generalize the 19th-century theory of Möbius inversion) and popularized
their study among combinatorialists, set the umbral calculus on a rigorous
foundation, unified the theory of Sheffer sequences and polynomial sequences of
binomial type, and worked on fundamental problems in probability theory. His
philosophical work was largely in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.
Death Rota died of atherosclerotic cardiac disease on April 18, 1999,
apparently in his sleep at his home in Cambridge, Massachusetts. See also
Kallman–Rota inequality Rota's conjecture Rota's basis conjecture Rota–Baxter
algebra Joint spectral radius, introduced by Rota in the early 1960s Cyclotomic
identity Necklace ring Twelvefold way List of American philosophers Notes
O'Connor, John J.; Robertson, Edmund F., "Gian-Carlo Rota", MacTutor
History of Mathematics archive, University of St Andrews. Palombi,
Fabrizio (2011). The Star and the Whole: Gian-Carlo Rota on Mathematics and
Phenomenology. CRC Press. pp. 6–7. His aunt, Rosetta Rota (1911–2003), was a
mathematician associated with the renowned Rome university Institute of Physics
in Via Panispenra… "American Mathematical Society | Gian-Carlo Rota
(1932–1999)" (PDF). Rota, Gian Carlo (1956). Extension Theory Of
Ordinary Linear Differential Operators (Thesis). New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University. "MIT professor Gian-Carlo Rota, mathematician and
philosopher, is dead at 66". April 22, 1999. Wesley T. Chan
(December 5, 1997). "To Teach or Not To Teach: Professors Might Try a New
Approach to Classes – Caring about Teaching". The Tech. 117 (63).
Retrieved 2008-02-10. "Gian-Carlo Rota". The Tech. 119 (21).
April 23, 1999. Retrieved 2008-02-10. "Mathematics, Philosophy, and
Artificial Intelligence: a dialogue with Gian-Carlo Rota and David Sharp".
Archived from the original on August 11, 2007. Retrieved 2007-08-11. External
links Gian-Carlo Rota at the Mathematics Genealogy Project O'Connor, John J.;
Robertson, Edmund F., "Gian-Carlo Rota", MacTutor History of Mathematics
archive, University of St Andrews. Kung, Joseph; Rota, Gian-Carlo; Yan,
Catherine (2009). Combinatorics: The Rota Way. Cambridge Mathematical Library.
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-73794-4. Archived from the original
on 2016-03-03. Retrieved 2010-03-19. The Forbidden City of Gian-Carlo Rota (a
memorial site) at the Wayback Machine (archived June 30, 2007) This page at
www.rota.org was not originally intended to be a memorial web site, but was
created by Rota himself with the assistance of his friend Bill Chen in January
1999 while Rota was visiting Los Alamos National Laboratory. Mathematics,
Philosophy, and Artificial Intelligence: a dialogue with Gian-Carlo Rota and
David Sharp at the Wayback Machine (archived August 11, 2007) "Fine Hall
in its golden age: Remembrances of Princeton in the early fifties" by
Gian-Carlo Rota. Tribute page by Prof. Catherine Yan (Texas A&M
University), a former student of Rota Scanned copy of Gian-Carlo Rota's and
Kenneth Baclawski's Introduction to Probability and Random Processes manuscript
in its 1979 version. Gian-Carlo Rota (1996). Indiscrete Thoughts. Birkhäuser
Boston. ISBN 0-8176-3866-0., ISBN 0-8176-3866-0; review at MAA.org The Digital
Footprint of Gian-Carlo Rota: International Conference in memory of Gian-Carlo Rota,
organized by Ottavio D'Antona, Vincenzo Marra and Ernesto Damiani at the
University of Milan (Italy) Gian-Carlo Rota on Analysis and Probability, ISBN
978-0-8176-4275-4. Biographical Memoir of Gian-Carlo Rota, National Academy of
Science Authority control Edit this at Wikidata IBNF: cb12279061m (data)GND:
119286416ISNI: 0000 0001 0928 3340LCCN: n79018095MGP: 7721NKC: skuk0004876NLI:
000224293NTA: 068390920ICCU: IT\ICCU\CFIV\054252SELIBR: 396279SNAC:
w6gc4r4cSUDOC: 031608558VIAF: 98388126WorldCat Identities: lccn-n79018095
Categories: 1932 births1999 deathsPeople from Vigevano20th-century Italian
mathematiciansItalian mathematicians20th-century Italian
philosophers20th-century American mathematiciansAmerican
philosophersCombinatorialistsAmerican people of Italian descentPrinceton
University alumniYale University alumniMassachusetts Institute of Technology
facultyPhenomenologists. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Rota," per il
Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
rousseau: philosopher, best known for his theories on
social freedom and societal rights, education, and religion. Born in Geneva, he
was largely self-educated and moved to France as a teenager. Throughout much of
his life he moved between Paris and the provinces with several trips abroad
including a Scottish stay with Hume and a return visit to Geneva, where he
reconverted to Protestantism from his earlier conversion to Catholicism. For a
time he was a friend of Diderot and other philosophes and was asked to
contribute articles on music for the Encyclopedia. Rousseau’s work can be seen
from at least three perspectives. As social contract theorist, he attempts to
construct a hypothetical state of nature to explain the current human
situation. This evolves a form of philosophical anthropology that gives us both
a theory of human nature and a series of pragmatic claims concerning social
organization. As a social commentator, he speaks of both practical and ideal
forms of education and social organization. As a moralist, he continually
attempts to unite the individual and the citizen through some form of universal
political action or consent. In Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of
Inequality Among Mankind 1755, Rousseau presents us with an almost idyllic view
of humanity. In nature humans are first seen as little more than animals except
for their special species sympathy. Later, through an explanation of the
development of reason and language, he is able to suggest how humans, while
retaining this sympathy, can, by distancing themselves from nature, understand
their individual selves. This leads to natural community and the closest thing
to what Rousseau considers humanity’s perfect moment. Private property quickly
follows on the division of labor, and humans find themselves alienated from
each other by the class divisions engendered by private property. Thus man, who
was born in freedom, now finds himself in chains. The Social Contract or
Principles of Political Right 1762 has a more ambitious goal. With an account
of the practical role of the legislator and the introduction of the concept of
the general will, Rousseau attempts to give us a foundation for good government
by presenting a solution to the conflicts between the particular and the
universal, the individual and the citizen, and the actual and the moral.
Individuals, freely agreeing to a social pact and giving up their rights to the
community, are assured of the liberties and equality of political citizenship
found in the contract. It is only through being a citizen that the individual
can fully realize his freedom and exercise his moral rights and duties. While
the individual is naturally good, he must always guard against being dominated
or dominating. Rousseau finds a solution to the problems of individual freedoms
and interests in a superior form of moral/political action that he calls the
general will. The individual as citizen substitutes “I must” for “I will,”
which is also an “I shall” when it expresses assent to the general will. The
general will is a universal force or statement and thus is more noble than any
particular will. In willing his own interest, the citizen is at the same time
willing what is communally good. The particular and the universal are united.
The individual human participant realizes himself in realizing the good of all.
As a practical political commentator Rousseau knew that the universal and the
particular do not always coincide. For this he introduced the idea of the
legislator, which allows the individual citizen to realize his fulfillment as
social being and to exercise his individual rights through universal consent.
In moments of difference between the majority will and the general will the
legislator will instill the correct moral/political understanding. This will be
represented in the laws. While sovereignty rests with the citizens, Rousseau
does not require that political action be direct. Although all government
should be democratic, various forms of government from representative democracy
preferable in small societies to strong monarchies preferable in large
nation-states may be acceptable. To shore up the unity and stability of
individual societies, Rousseau suggests a sort of civic religion to which all
citizens subscribe and in which all members participate. His earlier writings
on education and his later practical treatises on the governments of Poland and
Corsica reflect related concerns with natural and moral development and with
historical and geographical considerations. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Rousseau
and Grice and Grice on the explanatory myth of the contract,” per Il Club
Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
rovere: essential Italian
philosopher – His family originates in Albalonga, Savona, Liguria. Terenzio Mamiani Da Wikiquote, aforismi e citazioni in
libertà. Jump to navigationJump to search Terenzio Mamiani Terenzio
Mamiani della Rovere (1799 – 1885), filosofo, politico e scrittore
italiano. Indice 1 Citazioni di Terenzio Mamiani 2 Antonio Oroboni
alla sua fidanzata 2.1 Incipit 2.2 Citazioni 3 D'un nuovo diritto europeo 3.1
Incipit 3.2 Citazioni 4 Dell'ottima congregazione umana 4.1 Incipit 4.2
Citazioni 5 Mario Pagano, ovvero, della immortalità 5.1 Incipit 5.2 Citazioni 6
Prose letterarie 6.1 Avvertenza 6.2 Prefazione alla scelta dei poeti italiani
dell'età media 7 Citazioni su Terenzio Mamiani 7.1 Candido Mamini 8
Bibliografia 9 Altri progetti Citazioni di Terenzio Mamiani [...] Testimonio
essendo il Pontefice [della insurrezione dell'Italia contro l'Austria] e
d'altra parte abborrendo egli, pel suo ministero santissimo, dalle guerre e dal
sangue ha pensato... d'interporsi fra i combattenti, e di fare intendere ai
nemici della nostra comune patria, quanto crudele ed inutile impresa riesca
ormai quella di contendere agli italiani le naturali frontiere... (9 giugno
1848; citato in Giuseppe Fumagalli, Chi l'ha detto?, Hoepli, 1921, p. 631)
Antonio Oroboni alla sua fidanzata Incipit Dallo Spielberg, ai 5 d'Aprile. Del
soave amor tuo, nobile spirto | Ed infelice, io vissi altera e santa: | Di quel
vivrò, giuro all'eterno Iddio, | Si che il dolor nol chiuda entro al sepolcro.
| Tai celesti parole in picciol foglio | Vergate, o cara, ebb'io da te quel
giorno | Che tramutai le dolci aure lombarde | Con queste ignote al Sol tombe
di vivi. Citazioni Io muojo, ed al suo fine affretta | questa lunga
agonia che chiaman vita | qui per istrazio. Quando suonarne il certo annunzio
udrai, | non pianger tu, non piangere, o diletto | spirto d'amor, ché del mio
ben migliore | Lacrimar ti disdice. [...] Il misero | che gemea quivi giù,
poiché il dolore | soverchiò troppo, disperatamente | diè del capo nel sasso e
del diffuso | Cerebro il tinse. [...] d'ogni affetto umano affinatrice | fiamma
è il dolore, e di virtù maestra | la morte. D'un nuovo diritto europeo Incipit
Il giure civile di ciascun popolo ha nel testo delle leggi positive e speciali
autorità sufficiente da soddisfare la giustizia ordinaria e da risolvere i
dubii e acquetare le controversie intorno agli interessi e agli ufficii d'ogni
privato cittadino. Di quindi nasce che possono alcuni curiali riuscire
segnalati e famosi al mondo con la sola abilità del pronto ricordare, dell'
acuto distinguere e dell'interpretare acconcio e discreto. Al giure delle genti
occorre, invece, assai di frequente la discussione delle verità astratte.
Perocché esso è indipendente e superiore all'autorità delle sopra citate leggi;
si connette immediatamente al giure naturale che è al tutto razionale e
speculativo; spesso gli è forza di riandar col pensiero sulle fondamenta
medesime dell'ordine sociale umano, e spesso altresì non rinviene modo migliore
per risolvere i dubii e acquetare le discrepanze tra popolo e popolo fuor che
indagare i grandi pronunziati della ragione perpetua del diritto, chiariti,
dedotti e applicati mercé della scienza. Citazioni Poco importa se i
metafisici e i letterati si bisticciano; ma non va senza danno del genere umano
il discordare e il traviare de' pubblicisti. E già si disse che il fine
criterio degli uomini illuminati coglie il certo e il sodo della scienza, ma
non la crea e non l'ordina. (p. 5) La demenza degli uonini fa talvolta
scandalosa la verità; laonde ella ebbe a pronunziare di se medesima: non venni
a recare la pace in mezzo di voi, sibbene la spada. (p. 11) Lo Stato essere
certa congregazione di famiglie la qual provvede con leggi e con tribunali al
bene proprio e alla propria tutela; tanto che sieno competentemente adempiuti i
fini generali della socialità e i particolari di essa congregazione. (p. 13) Lo
Stato non esiste per la contiguità sola delle terre e delle abitazioni, ma per
certo congiungimento e unità delle menti e degli animi. (p. 15) La libera città
di Amburgo è così autonoma come l'impero di Moscovia. Il che riconosciuto e
fermato, se ne ritrae ciò che pel diritto internazionale è primo principio ed
assioma, non potersi da niuno e sotto niuna ragione arrogare la facoltà di
offendere e menomare l'autonomia interna ed esterna di qualchesia Stato insino
a tanto che questo non provoca gli altri ad assalirlo con giusta guerra; ed
eziandio in tal caso è lecito di occupare temporalmente il suo territorio e
dominare il suo popolo nei limiti della difesa e dell'equo rifacimento dei
danni. (p. 20-21) Le varie provincie spagnuole o francesi e i tre regni britanni
congiunti ed unificati per la conquista o l'eredità palesarono in lungo volgere
d'anni la volontà loro ferma ed unanime di perseverare in quella identità e
unità di vita sociale e politica. Per lo contrario, l'incorporamento delle
provincie basche nell'unità politica degli Spagnuoli fu con violenza adempiuta
e poi mantenuta. Voleva ragione e giustizia che per l'azione lenta del tempo e
della civiltà riconoscessero quei popoli da se medesimi la utilità di vivere al
tutto vita comune coi popoli iberici. Similmente, era iniqua la condizione
degl'Irlandesi quando l'irosa Inghilterra per la diversità del culto li
segregava dal godimento dei diritti politici. (p. 22) L'uomo individuo può nel
servaggio e nelle catene serbare con isforzo la libertà dello spirito e
compiere in altro modo e sotto altre condizioni certa eroica purgazione e certo
mirabile perfezionamento della sua parte interiore e immortale. Ma ciò è
impossibile ad un popolo intero, il quale nel servaggio di necessità si
corrompe ed abbietta, e quindi Gian Vincenzo Gravina chiamò assai giustamente
la libertà delle nazioni sacrosanta cosa e di giure divino. (p. 25) L'anima non
è vendibile e non è nostra, dicevano i teologanti per dimostrare da più parti
la iniquità del contratto. E neppure la libertà è vendibile; e se l'usarla e
abusarla è nostro, non è tale la facoltà e il principio infuso da Dio con
l'alito suo divino e che al dire di Omero vale una mezza anima. (p. 30) Lo
Stato possiede onninamente se stesso; niuno fuori di lui può attribuirsene la padronanza.
Quindi i popoli o vivono in se od in altri; cioè a dire, o provedono ai propri
fini con leggi e ordini propri e componendo un individuo vero e perfetto della
universa famiglia umana; ovvero entrano a parte d'altra maggior comunanza con
ugualità di diritto e d'ufficio, come quelle riviere che ne' più larghi e reali
fiumi confondono le acque e perdono il nome. Questa è la generale e astratta
dottrina che danno la ragione e la scienza. (p. 32) Patria, impertanto,
significa quella determinata contrada e quella peculiare congregazione di
uomini a cui ciascuno degli abitanti e ciascuno dei congregati sentesi legato
per tutti i doveri, gl'istinti, i diritti, le speranze e gli affetti del vivere
comune. (p.) La patria considerata nella sua morale e profonda significazione è
il compiuto sodamento di ciascuno verso di tutti e di tutti verso ciascuno. (p.
36-37) Se la patria non ha debito né possibilità di nudrire del suo ogni giorno
tutti i suoi indigenti, spietata cosa sarebbe inibire a questi di procacciarsi
altrove la sussistenza. (p. 39) Prediletta opera delle mani di Dio sono le
nazioni. (p. 41) Qual nazione è pura, domandano essi, e tutta omogenea, e quale
Stato in Europa non è straniero a qualche porzione de' sudditi proprii?
L'Inghilterra pesa sul popolo Jonio, la Francia sull' Algerino, la Spagna sul
Basco. Non nacquero forse Italiani i Corsi e Tedeschi i popoli dell'Alsazia? I
Polacchi di Posen son forse Prussiani; e non è mezzo slava la Silesia?
Chiameremo Russi i Lituani o i Finlandesi o gli abitanti di Riga e della
Curlandia? E se tinti vediamo della medesima pece tutti i governi, se niuno, a
rispetto del puro principio di nazionalità, è incolpevole, qual profitto si può
dedurre d'una teorica non mai applicabile; ed anzi, come può essere teorica e
vera, se i fatti in ogni luogo e tempo la contradicono? (p. 45) Lo Stato
dipendente come si sia da un altro non è, a propriamente parlare, autonomo; e
perciò, a rigore di definizione, neppure la denominazione di Stato gli si
compete. (p. 61) I prìncipi non sono, del certo, scelti da Dio immediatamente,
ma sono da Dio immediatamente investiti di loro sovranità. Il popolo indica
l'uomo a cui vuole obbedire e in quell'uomo è subito la pienezza della
sovranità che da Dio gli proviene. Perocché come da Dio è istituito il fine
della socievole comunanza, così è istituito il mezzo nella autorità del
comando. (p. 71) È sicuro che nella lunghezza dei secoli le volontà e i giudizi
umani si accostano all'assoluto del bene sociale, quanto che la via che viene
trascorsa non procede diritta e spedita ma declina e torce continuo fra molti
errori e molte misere concussioni. (p. 75) La libertà, essendo naturale ed
essenziale agli uomini e necessaria concomitanza d'ogni bontà, è doveroso per
tutti il serbarla integra nella sostanza; e perciò, né il privato individuo si
può vendere ad altro privato, né tutto il corpo de' cittadini assoggettarsi
pienamente e perpetuamente al dominio d'alcuno, sia forestiere o nativo. (p.
80) Poco o nessun valore ha il dissentimento dei piccioli e deboli, quando
anche piglino ardire di esprimerlo; e chi investiga la Storia, ritrova che
delle proteste loro giacciono grandi fasci dimenticati negli archivi delle
Cancellerie. (p. 98) Dacché siete i più forti, correte poco rischio di vivere
ex lege alla maniera dei Ciclopi. Ma confessare il diritto e contro il diritto
procedere, non è conceduto a nessuno; e parlavano meglio quegli Ateniesi che
alle querele dei Milesi rispondevano senza sturbarsi : il diritto è cosa pei
deboli e non già pei forti e pei valorosi. (p. 113) Ogni popolo è autonomo; o
con altri vocaboli, ogni Stato vero è libero ed inviolabile inverso tutti i
popoli e tutti gli Stati. (p. 121) E patria nel significato morale e politico è
sinonimo di Stato, in quanto questo compone uno stretto e nativo consorzio in
cui ciascun cittadino ha debito e desiderio insieme di effettuare il grado
massimo di unimento sociale e civile. (p. 122) S'incominci dall'avvisare chi
sono costoro che si querelano dell'abusata libertà degli Stati e ne temono
danni così spaventevoli. Costoro sono i medesimi da cui si alzano lagni e
rimproveri cotidiani per qualunque libertà, eccetto la propria loro. Vogliono
limitare la stampa, limitare la libera concorrenza, limitare i Parlamenti e in
fine ogni cosa col pretesto volgare ed ovvio che i parlamenti, il commercio, la
stampa abusano di loro facoltà e trasvanno più d'una volta e in più cose. (p.
207) La volontà umana, dite, è corrotta e inchinevole al male. Può darsi; ma
privata di libertà so che depravasi molto di più e i padroni non meno che i
servi. (p. 208) Non è lecito agli uomini di esercitare nessun diritto qualora
difettino pienamente delle facoltà e dei mezzi correlativi. Perciò il
fanciullo, il mentecatto, l'idiota cade naturalmente sotto l'altrui tutela, e
per ciò medesimo la parte meno educata del volgo ed offesa di troppa ignoranza,
o posta in condizione troppo servile, non ha nel generale facoltà e mezzi
proporzionati ad esercitare diritti politici. (p. 219) Dell'ottima
congregazione umana Incipit Esaminato il fine del viver comune, fatta rassegna
d'alcuni principii direttivi, più bisognevoli al nostro intento e poco o nulla
noti agli antichi, segue senza più che noi trapassiamo a contemplare l'ottimo
ordinamento civile. Della qual materia stragrande fermammo in principio del
libro che sarebbero da noi segnate alquante linee soltanto, scegliendo quelle
che più hanno riferimento con l'indole speciale de' tempi nostri. E pur questi
pochi lineamenti noi cercheremo di descriverli, come suoi fare l'artista,
secondo il concetto d'una bellezza ideale ricavata e desunta con fedeltà
squisita dall'essere delle cose e figurandola in mente come e quale uscirebbe
dalle mani della natura, quando non la perturbassero gli scorretti accidenti.
Cosi noi delineeremo qnalche fattezza dell'incivilimento umano, contemplandolo
nella natura primitiva ed universale dei popoli, ed avvisandoci di non
iscambiare l'alterato e il mutabile col permanente ed inalterato; e per
converso, di non dar nome d'errore emendabile e di accidente transitorio a ciò
che appartiene alle condizioni salde e durevoli della comunanza civile. Chè nel
primo difetto cadono i troppo retrivi ed i pusillanimi; nel secondo, i novatori
audaci e leggeri. Citazioni Aristotile con molto senno incomincia
dall'insegnar quello che spetta al buono stato della famiglia, perché della
comunanza umana l'individuo compiuto non è lo scapolo, ma l'ammogliato con
prole o vogliam dire la famiglia, rimossa la quale, come fu scritto
nell'aforismo XIV, non rimane intermezzo alcuno che tempri l'amor proprio e la
fiera e violenta natura nostra. (p. 400, I) L'organizzazione tanto è più
eccellente quanto meno cede alle esterne azioni ed impressioni ed anzi modifica
con maggior efficacia ed appropria a sé quelle azioni. (p. 401, I) È da
confessare che un gran trovato fece lo spirito umano e giovevole soprammodo
alla prosperità del viver sociale, quando mise in atto quello che fu domandato
governo rappresentativo o parlamentare. (p. 404, I) Se dirai: carattere di
nazione è la continuità e circoscrizione del suolo, i Tedeschi di qua del Reno
sarebber Francesi, e non è Grecia l'Asia minore, e gli Ebrei non compongono
nazione, e malamente la compongono le genti slave. Se dirai la lingua; i Baschi
non sono spagnuoli, né francesi i Bretoni e quei dell' Alsazia, e non ha niente
di nazione la Svizzera né l'Ungheria dove più lingue sono parlate. Se la
religione; troppe smentite ci danno Germania, Inghilterra e gli Stati Uniti
americani; d'altra parte, sotto il rispetto dell'unità religiosa, farebber
nazione insieme Siciliani e Messicani, Irlandesi e Abissini. Se il governo; i
Lombardi sono austriaci, sono turchi i Greci, francesi gli Arabi e via
discorrendo. Se la letteratura e le arti ; non fanno nazione quei popoli a cui
mancano lettere e arti proprie e le accattano dai forestieri, come usavano poco
fa i Russi, i Boemi, gli Ungaresi ed altri, e tuttora non cessano. Se le
origini e la schiatta; le colonie sono tal membro e così vivace del corpo della
patria onde uscirono, da non potersene mai dispiccare, e la guerra americana fu
dalla banda dei sollevati iniqua e parricida. Gran questione poi insorge sulle
genti di confine, le quali compongonsi il più delle volte di schiatte anfibie,
a cosi chiamarle. Quindi noi vogliamo, per via d'esempio, i Nizzardi essere italiani
e i Francesi li fanno dei loro. Né minor controversia nasce circa cento
popolazioni per la terra disseminate, che è impossibile di ben definire a qual
generazione appartengano, né per sé bastano a far nazione, come Bosniaci,
Bulgari, Albanesi, Illirii, Maltesi e innumerevoli altri. (p. 429, V) La
compagnia civile comincia là solamente dove gli animi si accostano, e sorge
desiderio di regolato e comune operare. (p. 2, VI) La Giustizia, secondo Omero,
apre e chiude i congressi degli Dei, non quelli degli uomini. (p. 2, VI) La
voce nazione nel suo peculiare e pieno significato vuol dire unimento e società
d'uomini che la natura stessa con le sue mani à fatta e costituita mediante la
mescolanza del sangue e la singolarità delle condizioni interiori ed estrinseche;
per talché quella società distinguesi da tutte le altre per tutti gli
essenziali caratteri che possono diversificare le genti in fra loro, come la
schiatta, la lingua, la religione, l'indole, il territorio, le tradizioni, le
arti, i costumi. (p. 2, VI) Nazione vuol significare certo novero di genti per
comunanza di sangue, conformità di genio, medesimezza di linguaggio atte e
preordinate alla massima unione sociale. (p. 2, VI) Gli Svizzeri varii di
lingua, di schiatta, di religione e d'usanza sonosi costituiti artificialmente
e politicamente in nazione, mediante una grande e maravigliosa unità morale che
turbata e rotta alcune volte di dentro è sempre riuscita gagliarda di fuori a
fronte degli stranieri. (p. 5, VI) I Greci ed i Musulmani dell'Asia Minore o
d'altra contrada, i quali tuttoché nati e cresciuti nel suolo stesso, pur non
si chiamano concittadini, e vivono e sempre vivranno stranieri l'uno accanto
dell'altro. (p. 8, VII) Lo stipite umano è ordinato esso pure a spandere
discosto da sé le propagini e i semi; e ogni germe nuovo dee nudrirsi del
terreno ove cade, non del tronco da cui si origina. (p. 11, VII) Sieno rese
grazie publicamente da tutta l'Italia a voi, o Valdesi, che l'antica madre mai
non avete voluto e potuto odiare e sconoscere insino al giorno glorioso che fu
da Dio coronata la vostra costanza, e un patto comune di libertà vi
riconciliava con gli emendati persecutori. (p. 13, VII) S'io credessi quelle
armi che assiepano il Foro, dicea Cicerone, starsene qui a minacciare e non a proteggere,
cederei al tempo e mi terrei silenzioso. Ma il fatto fu che quelle armi nel
Foro inducevano per se sole una fiera minaccia, tanto ch'egli parlò poco e
male, e la paura ammazzò l'eloquenza. (p. 18, VIII) Dal riscontro, per tanto,
di tutte le storie, senza timore mai d'eccezione, e più ancora dalla ripugnanza
intima di certi termini, quali sono felicità a servitù, spontaneità e
costrizione, ricavasi questa assoluta sentenza che tra le nazioni civili il
governo straniero non può vantarsi mai né della legittimità che abbiamo
chiamata interiore, né della esteriore che emana dall'assentimento espresso o
tacito delle popolazioni. (p. 20-21, IX) Non può aver luogo prescrizione, dove
i diritti innati o fondamentali dell'uomo ricevono sostanziale ingiuria ed offesa;
e di si fatti è per appunto la indipendenza o dimezzata o distrutta. (p. 21,
IX) Ogni cosa nell'uomo è principiata dalla natura e poi dalla ragione e
dall'arte è compiuta. (p. 30, XI) Mario Pagano, ovvero, della immortalità
Incipit Francesco Pignatelli — Giuseppe Poerio Pignatelli: Voi stesso l'avete
udito? Poerio: E come nò, se rinchiuso era con lui in una prigione medesima?
Pignatelli: E fu la vigilia della sua morte? Poerio: Appunto fu la vigilia.
Sapete che valica la mezzanotte, una voce improvvisa e sepolcrale veramente
rompevane il sonno chiamando forte per nome alcuno di noi; e quella chiamata
voleva dire: vieni, ti aspetta il carnefice. La notte pertanto che seguitò quel
mirabil discorso di Mario Pagano gli sgherri gridarono il nome suo, e fu menato
al patibolo. Pignatelli: Stava per mezzo a voi quell'omerica figura del conte
di Ruvo? Poerio: Nò, ma in Castello dell'Uovo insieme con altri uffiziali e con
l'intrepido Mantonè. Nel Castel Nuovo e in quella carcere proprio dove era
Francesco Mario Pagano, stava il fratel vostro maggiore, principe di Strangoli,
stava io, il Conforti, Cirillo, Granali, Eusebio Palmieri, Vincenzo Russo e due
giovinetti amorevoli e cari, cioè l'ultimo figliuolo dello Spanò ed un marchese
di Genzano, bello come l'Appollino e di cui sentiva il Pagano particolare
compassione. Citazioni Poerio: V'à una cagione suprema di tutte le cose,
cagione assoluta e però insofferente di limiti e incapace d'aumento e di
defficienza. Ma se niun difetto può stare in lei, ella è il bene infinito e
comprende infinitamente ogni specie di bene. Ciò posto, la cagione suprema è
altresì infinita bontà che raggia il bene fuor di sé stessa e ne riempie la
creazione ed ogni ente se ne satura, a dir così, per quanto fu fatto capace.
Tale contenenza di bene è poi sempre difettiva perché sempre è finita. Di
quindi si origina il male. Non si chieda dunque perché Dio è permettitore del
male, ma chiedasi in quella vece perché piacque a Dio, oltre all'infinito, che
sussistesse pure il finito. (p. 16) Poerio: Se il vivere nostro presente fosse
condito di molto diletto e noi incapaci di conoscere e desiderare con ismania
istintiva l'eternità, forse potrebbesi giudicare senza paradosso aver noi
sortito quella porzioncella sola e frammento di beatitudine, brevissima ma
sincera e inconsapevole della propria caducità. (p. 17) Poerio: Col presupposto
della immortalità, bene avvertiva il Bruno, alcun desiderio naturale non è
indarno e alcuna lacrima non cade senza conforto. Con la immortalità non è
affetto generoso perduto, non ferita dell'animo a cui non si apparecchi altrove
copioso balsamo. Per entro il corso interminato e magnifico de'nostri destini,
ogni male vien riparato, ogni speranza risorge, ogni bellezza rifiorisce, ogni
felicità si rinnova e giganteggia ne'secoli. (p. 18) Poerio: Quando fosse
possibile strappare dal cuor dell'uomo il concetto e la speranza della
immortalità, il consorzio civile medesimo pericolerebbe di sciogliersi e i
piaceri e le utilità stesse della vita presente verrebbero gran parte impedite
o affatto levate di mezzo. (p. 18) Prose letterarie Avvertenza I dotti e i
legisti barbareggiavano sempre peggio, e pareva in loro una sorta di necessità
tramutata in diritto, e niun discepolo mai se ne querelava; e le lettere
cadevano in tale grettezza, che nelle prose del Giordani si appuntavano
parecchie mende di stile, ma nessuno accusava la tenuità dei concetti e la
critica angusta e slombata. Il Colletta era stimato dai più uno storico sovrano
e poco meno che un Tacito redivivo, ed altri istituivano paragone tra il
Guicciardini e il Botta, tra il Goldoni ed Alberto Nota. Tale il gusto e il
criterio comune. Pochi grandi intelletti non mancavano neppure a quei giorni.
Basti ricordare Bartolini nella scultura; Leopardi e Niccolini nella poetica; Rossini,
Bellini, Donizetti nella musica. In Italia scemando il sapere e la potenza
meditativa, crebbe l'amore spasimato ed irragionevole della bellezza dell'abito
esterno, lasciando a digiuno la mente e poco nudriti e mal governati gli
affetti. Letteratura vasta, soda e ben definita, e parimente larghe scuole e
ben tratteggiate e scolpite mancano alla patria nostra da quasi tre secoli e
piuttosto ne abbiamo avuto cenni e frammenti, e ogni cosa a pezzi, a sbalzi e a
modo d'assaggio. Miei degni signori, il cibo che v'apparecchio è scarso,
scondito e di povera mensa, ma è letteratura e non metafisica. Non appena
l'esilio mi astrinse a lasciare l'Italia e fui spettatore d'altro ordine di
civiltà e uditore d'altri maestri, subito mi si aprì dentro l'animo l'occhio
doloroso della coscienza, ed ebbi della mia ignoranza una paura ed una vergogna
da non credere. Per giudicare alla prima prima che tutto è vecchio e trito in
un libro convien sapere dell'autore se nel generale à l'abito di pensar di suo
capo. IX. — Ed egli evoca nuovi spiriti di più sublime natura, i quali entrano
a uno a uno dentro la torre. Spirito del mare. Che vuoi ? Barone. Sapere
l'essenza del bene e la fonte della felicità. Spirito del mare. Perché lo
chiedi al mare ? Barone. Perché tu sai o puoi sapere ogni cosa; tu nei silenzj
della notte tieni misteriosi colloquj con la luna e con le stelle che in te si
riflettono ; e tu pur ricevi nell ' ampio tuo seno i fiumi tutti del mondo, i
quali ti raccontano le geste antiche dei popoli e le più antiche vicende dei
continenti per mezzo a cui essi fluiscono senza posa. Spirito del mare. lo non
so nulla (sparisce). Barone. Che tu venga malmenato in eterno dallo spirito
delle procelle, e che i tuoi membri immortali sieno rotti e squarciati mai
sempre dalle taglienti creste degli ardui scogli. La coda del cavallo
bianco dell' Apocalisse. Che vuoi ? Barone. Sapere in che consiste il bene, e
dove è la fonte della felicità. La coda. Perché lo chiedi a me ? Barone. Tu sai
la fine ultima delle cose, e tu comparirai poco innanzi della consumazione del
secolo. La coda. Quando io comparirò, io ondeggerò nelle sfere, simile alla
caduta del Niagara e più tremenda della coda delle comete. Ogni mio crine
rinserra un destino ; e ogni mio moto è un cenno di oracolo ; ò trascorsi tutti
i cieli di Tolomeo e i cieli di Galileo e i cieli di Herschel; ò lambita con la
mia criniera la faccia delle stelle, e l'ò distesa sulle penne de' turbini;
molte cose ò conosciute, ma non quel che tu cerchi: io non so nulla (sparisce).
Prefazione alla scelta dei poeti italiani dell'età media Dagli Arabi si travasò
il mal gusto ne' Catalani e ne' Provenzali, e una vena non troppo scarsa ne fu
derivata ne' primi nostri verseggiatori. Dante egli pure non se ne astenne
affatto; e noi peniamo a credere che a quel genio sovrano venisse scritta la
canzone lambiccatissima della Pietra. (II) Sa ognuno che nel seicento, con lo
scadere dell' arte, ricomparvero quelle freddure e mattie, e ogni cosa fu piena
di acrostici, d'anagrammi, d'allitterazioni e altrettali sciempiezze. Ma per
buona ventura cotesta sorta vanissima di pedanteria non sembra ai moderni
pericolosa; e dico ai moderni italiani, perché appresso gli stranieri non ne
mancano esempj ; e molti anno letto in un vivente poeta francese di gran nomea certi
capricci di metri e di rime i quali dimostrano come in lui siensi venuti
rinnovando tutti gli umori e le vertigini dei seicentisti. E nemmanco ci pare
immune dalle stranezze di cui parliamo quel concepimento del Goethe di ordire
la tragedia del Fausto con questa singolar legge che ogni scena fosse dettata
in metro diverso ed una altresì in nuda prosa, onde potesse affermarsi che
niuna maniera del verseggiare ed anzi dello scrivere umano (per quanto ne è
capace il tedesco idioma) mancasse a quel dramma ; nuova maniera e poco assai
naturale e graziosa di porgere idea e figura del panteismo. (II) Non può né
deve il poeta scompagnarsi mai troppo dalle opinioni e dai sentimenti comuni
dell'età sua; chè da questi principalmente è suscitato l'estro di lui, con questi
accende e innamora le moltitudini. D'ogni altro pensiero ed affetto, ove li
possieda e li senta egli solo, avrà pochi intenditori, pochissimi lodatori ; e
la favella delle Muse langue e muor sulle labbra se non suona ad orecchie
benevole e a cuori profondamente commossi. (VI) In Inghilterra il Milton
fierissimo repubblicano e segretario eloquente del gran Cromvello, à quasi
sempre poetato di cose mistiche e teologiche e nulla v'à di politico, nulla
d'inglese e di patrio, né nel Paradiso perduto, né in altri suoi canti. (VI)
Riuscirà sempre a gloria grande e invidiata d'Italia che la Gerusalemme del
Tasso compaja tanto più bella e mirabile quanto più in lei si contempla e
considera intentivamente la perfezione del tutto. (VII) Certo, il Valvasone è meno
forbito ed armonioso del Tansillo, meno fluido del Tasso seniore, meno
corretto, proprio e limato de' più corretti e limati rimatori toscani; ma non
per ciò si capisce come questa minor perfezione di forma, abbia potuto oscurare
nel giudicio de' raccoglitori e de' critici il gran merito dell'invenzione. Che
il Milton siasi giovato dell' Angeleide non so, quantunque fra i due poemi si
vengan trovando molti e singolari riscontri che non è facile a credere casuali;
ma questo io so bene che a rispetto della guerra degli angeli episodicamente
introdotta nel Paradiso perduto, il Valvasone non perde nulla ad esser letto
dopo l'Inglese e con quello essere paragonato; il che non avviene del sicuro né
per l' Adamo dell'Andreini né per la Strage degl'Innocenti del cavaliere
Marino, due componimenti che dicesi aver suggerito a Milton parecchi pensieri e
l'ideal grandezza del suo Lucifero. (VIII) L'ingegno poetico, in versificare
ciascuno di quei subbietti, tende a spiegare una novità, un' altezza e una
leggiadria suprema di concetto, di sentimento, di fantasia e di stile. Dove
mancasse l'una di tali eccellenze, l'arte sarebbe difettosa e quindi
increscevole. (IX) Ci venne osservato (cosa che per addietro non ben sapevamo)
la critica letteraria incominciata in Italia con Dante essere morta col Tasso e
gli amici suoi; e come cadde con quel mirabile intelletto la nostra primazia
nel ministero delle Muse, così venne meno la filosofia estetica; e il nuovo
dell' arte non fu capito, l'antico fu dalla pedanteria svisato e agghiadato.
L'arte critica antica ebbe ultimi promulgatori due grandi ingegni, il Muratori
e il Gravina. Della critica nata dipoi con le nuove speculazioni e con le nuove
forme di poesia, non conosciamo in Italia alcun degno scrittore e
rappresentatore. (X) Dopo Omero nessun poeta, per mio giudicio, può alzarsi a
competere con l'Alighieri, salvo Guglielmo Shakspeare, gloria massima
dell'Inghilterra. E per fermo, ne' drammi di lui l'animo e la vita umana vengon
ritratti così al vero e scandagliati e disaminati così nel profondo, che mai
nol saranno di più. Ma le condizioni peculiari della drammatica e l'indole
propria degl' ingegni settentrionali impedirono a Shakspeare di raggiungere
quella perfetta unione sì delle diverse materie poetiche e sì di tutte l'eccellenze
e prerogative onde facciamo discorso. E veramente nelle composizioni sue la
religione si mostra sol di lontano e molto di rado; e tra le specie differenti
e delicatissime d'amore ivi entro significate, manca quella eccelsa e
spiritualissima di cui si scaldò l'amante di Beatrice. (XI) Il poeta è
dall'ispirazione allacciato e padroneggiato sì forte, da non saper bene
sottomettersi all'arte ed alla meditazione. (XII) Il troppo incivilirsi dei
popoli aumentando di soverchio l'osservazione e la critica e affinandovisi
l'arte ogni giorno di più per effetto medesimo dell' esercizio e dell'
esperienza e per desiderio di novità, mena il poeta a scordar forse troppo
l'aurea semplicità degli antichi, il sincero aspetto della natura e i veri e
spontanei moti dell'animo. (XII) Il compiuto e l'ottimo della poesia consiste
in racchiudere dentro ai poemi con vaga e proporzionata unità di composizione
tutto quanto il visibile ed il pensabile umano per ciò che in ambedue è più
bello e più commovente. Consiste inoltre nel figurare e ritrarre cotesto
subbietto amplissimo e universale con la maggior novità e la maggiore sublimità
e leggiadria di concepimento, di fantasia, d'affetto e d'elocuzione che sia
fattibile di conseguire. Laonde poi il concepimento, così nel complesso come
nelle sentenze particolari, dee riuscir succoso, vario ed inaspettato e pieno
di recondita dottrina e saggezza; l'affetto dee correre, quanto è possibile,
per tutti i gradi e le differenze, e toccare il sommo della tenerezza e
commiserazione e il sommo della terribilità. (XIII) Il Tasso, anima pia e
generosa, ma in cui (non so dir come) nulla v'era di popolare. Quindi egli
s'infervorò della maestà teocratica dei pontefici e aderì alla nuova cavalleria
cortigiana e feudale; quindi pure accettò con zelo e con osservanza scrupolosa
l' ortodossia cattolica, e nella vita intellettuale quanto nella civile, fu
dall' autorità dei metodi e degli esempj signoreggiato. Da ciò prese nudrimento
e moto il divino estro suo e uscirono le maraviglie della Gerusalemme (XIX) Nel
Tasso poi sono tutti i pregi e tutta quanta la luce e magnificenza della poesia
classica, e spiccano altresì in lui alcuni attributi speciali del genio
italiano in ordine al bello. In perpetuo si ammirerà nella Liberata ciò che
l'arte, i precetti, l'erudizione e la scienza possono fare, ajutati e avvivati
da una stupenda natura poetica. (XX) L'Ariosto significò la commedia umana
quale la veggiamo rappresentarsi nel mondo, laddove Dante fece primo subbietto
suo il soprammondano, e in esso figurò e simboleggiò le cose terrene. E come il
gran Fiorentino nelle fogge variatissime de' tormenti e delle espiazioni
dipinse i variatissimi aspetti delle indoli e delle passioni, il simile
adempiva l'Ariosto sotto il velo dei portenti magici e delle strane avventure.
Ma certo qual narrazione di fatti umani riuscirà più vasta, più immaginosa e
più moltiforme di quella dell' Orlando furioso? Quivi sono guerre tra più
nazioni, nascimenti e ruine di molti regni, conflitto sanguinoso di religione e
di culto, infinita diversità e singolarità di costumi, e tutto il Ponente e il
Levante offrono larga scena e strepitoso teatro a cotali imprese e catastrofi.
Quivi sono dipinte la vita privata e la pubblica, le corti e le capanne, i
castelli ed i romitaggi; quivi s'intrecciano gradevolmente la cronica, la
novella e la storia, e ciò che il dramma à di patetico, l'epopeia di maestoso,
il romanzo di fantastico. (XXI) Non credo che in veruna straniera letteratura
possa come nella nostra volgare annoverarsi una sequela così sterminata di
poemi eroici e di romanzeschi, parecchj de' quali brillerebbero di gran luce,
ove fossero soli e non li soverchiasse la troppa chiarezza di Dante,
dell'Ariosto e del Tasso. Né reputo presontuoso il dire che, per esempio, la
Croce racquistata del Bracciolini o il Conquisto di Granata di Girolamo
Graziane sostengono bene assai il paragone o con l'Araucana dell' Ercilla o coi
medesimi Lusiadi [di Luís Vaz de Camões] ai quali ànno accresciuta non poca
fama le sventure e le virtù del poeta ; e per simile, io giudico che l' Amadigi
del Tasso il vecchio o l'Orlando innamorato del Berni, non temono di gareggiare
con la Regina Fata di Spenser e con quanto di meglio in tal genere ànno
prodotto l'altre nazioni. Ma non è da tacere che in quasi tutti questi nostri poemi
riconoscesi agevolmente l'uno o l'altro dei tipi che nel Furioso e nella
Gerusalemme ricevettero perfezione, ed a cui poca giunta di novità e poche
profonde mutazioni si fecero dagl'ingegni posteriori; e ne' poemi eroici
singolarmente a niuno è riuscito di ben cantare i difetti del Tasso, molti in
quel cambio li esagerarono. (XXII) Scusabile mi si fa il Marino e scusabili
gl'Italiani, quand'io considero lo stato di lor nazione sotto il crudele
dominio degli Spagnuoli, e fieramente mi sdegno con questi medesimi che nella
patria loro ancor sì potente e sì fortunata, plaudivano a que' delirj e
incensavano il Gongora, meno ingegnoso assai del Marino e di lui più strano e
affettato. In fine, gioverà il ricordare che all'Italia serva, scaduta e
dilapidata, rimaneva pur tanto ancora di prevalenza intellettuale appresso
l'altre nazioni che de' trionfi più insigni e delle lodi più sperticate del
cavalier Marino furono autori i Francesi ; e per lungo tempo assai nessuno de'
lor poeti seppe al tutto purgarsi della letteraria corruzione venuta d'oltre
Alpe ; testimonio lo stesso Cornelio, alto e robustissimo ingegno, ma nel cui
stile nondimeno avria dovuto il Boileau ritrovare assai spesso di quel medesimo
talco del quale parevangli luccicare i versi del Tasso. (XXIII) Dal Marino
incominciò a propagarsi nel mondo una poesia fantastica e meramente
coloritrice, la quale cerca l'arte solo per l'arte, fassi specchio indifferente
al falso ed al vero, alle cose buone ed alle malvage, alle vane e giocose come
alle grandi e instruttive; sente tutti gli affetti e nessuno con profondità, e
nell'essere suo naturale od abituale, canta di Adone, come di Erode e così
delle favole greche come delle bibliche narrazioni. (XXIV) [Dal cinquecento al
secolo XVII] [...] Fiorirono in tale intervallo tre ingegni eminenti che forse
mantennero alla lirica nostra una spiccata maggioranza su quella d'altre
nazioni. Ognuno, io penso, à nominato ad una con me il Chiabrera, il Filicaja
ed il Guidi. (XXV) Dal solo Chiabrera fu l'Italia regalata di tre nuove corone
poetiche ; mercechè veramente nelle sue mani nacque e grandeggiò prima la
canzone pindarica, poi la canzone anacreontica e infine il sermone oraziano ;
né mal s' apporrebbe colui che attribuisse al Chiabrera eziandio la
rinnovazione del Ditirambo. (XXV) Il Filicaja venne a tempi ancora più
disavventurati, e quando più non era possibile discoprire ne' suoi Fiorentini
un segno e un vestigio pure dell'antica fierezza repubblicana. Ma il senso del
bene morale e la pietà religiosa fervevano così profondi nell'animo suo che
bastarono a farlo poeta. (XXVI) Mai né in questa nostra patria, né fuori sonosi
udite canzoni così ben temperate di splendore pindarico e di maestà scritturale
come quelle del Filicaja. (XXVI) Nel Guidi allato a concetti ed a sentimenti
spesso comuni e rettorici, splende una forma non superabile di novità, di
bellezza e magnificenza. (XXVI) Certo, se ad Alessandro Guidi fosse toccato di
vivere in seno di una nazione forte e gloriosa, non ostante la poca fecondità e
vastità di pensieri, io non so bene a qual grado di eccellenza non sarebbe
salita la lirica sua; perché costui propriamente sortì da natura Yos magna
sonaturum, e ce ne porge sicura caparra la sua canzone alla Fortuna. (XXVI) A
me sonerà sempre caro ed insigne il nome di Alfonso Varano, perché da lui
segnatamente, a quello che io giudico, s'iniziò il corso della poesia moderna
italiana ; e forse la patria non gli si mostra ricordevole e grata quanto
dovrebbe. (XXVIII) Chi trovasse non poca similitudine tra la mente del Varano e
quella del Young, credo che male non si apporrebbe. Anime pie e stoiche
ambidue, e dischiuse non pertanto agli affetti gentili, diffondono ne' lor
versi un religioso terrore e un' ascetica melanconia che nell'Inglese riescono
cupi, inconsolati e monotoni, e nell'Italiano s'allegrano spesso alla vista del
nostro bel sole, e dai pensieri del sepolcro volano con gran fede alla pace e
serenità della gloria immortale. (XXVIII) Varano poi insieme col Gozzi restituì
alla Divina Commedia il debito culto; il Gozzi con li scritti polemici, egli
con la virtù dell' esempio; ed ebbe arbitrio di dire a Dante ciò che questi a
Virgilio : Tu séi lo mio maestro e il mio autore. Se non che il cantore delle
Visioni chiuse e conchiuse l'intero universo nel sentimento della pietà e nei
misteri del dogma, e non ben seppe imitare del suo modello la nervosa brevità e
parsimonia, la varietà inesauribile e la peregrina eleganza.
(XXVIII) Citazioni su Terenzio Mamiani Se taluno dei suoi piuttosto
scarsi scolari volle talora celebrare nel conte Terenzio Mamiani della Rovere
(1799-1885) l'ultimo anello della catena che dal Galluppi si continuò in
Rosmini e Gioberti, unanime fu il consenso dei suoi maggiori contemporanei e
dei posteri nell'affermare il valore pressoché nullo della sua vasta produzione
filosofica. (Eugenio Garin) Candido Mamini La teoria del Rosmini fu più
scolastica, quella del Mamiani più civile; quella quasi sterile in politica,
questa molto feconda, risolvendo i problemi più ardui e interessanti della vita
sociale. Quella fu timida, questa coraggiosa; quella arrivò a rifiutare sul
terreno pratico le-conseguenze de' suoi principii per un pregiudizioso rispetto
di casta non evitando il disonore di una ritirata e la deformità del sofisma;
questa per lo contrario tutta intrepida si sostenne colla gloria di una
vittoria, colla dignità di una rigorosa coerenza, e colla bellezza di una vera
argomentazione. Rosmini in un bel momento di sua ragione scrive stupende pagine
sulla riforma del clero; poi ha la debolezza di ritirarle, impaurito dalle
minaccia dell'Indice; Mamiani è oggi quel che era ne' primi giorni della sua
vita pubblica, e non sa temere altro autorevole indice che quello del buon
senso. Nel suo ultimo libro, intitolalo Di un nuovo diritto europeo, si ammira
il coraggio della coscienza di un filosofo, e la prudenza d'un uomo di Stato.
Riguardo poi ai pregi della forma, Rosmini fu semplicemente filosofo, Mamiani
un filosofo-oratore; nel primo spicca la pura meditazione, nel secondo si
unisce il genio che feconda il deserto delle speculazioni metafisiche, delle
avanzate astrazioni. Nel primo vi ha una ricchezza povera, cioè una
stiracchiatura di poche idee in molte parole, quasi diffidi della memoria, e
dell'abilità del lettore; nel secondo vi ha una povertà ricca, cioè molte idee
in poche parole; il che appaga l'amor proprio del lettore, e ne fa liete tutte
le potenze della ritentiva e della ragione. Bibliografia Terenzio Mamiani,
Antonio Oroboni alla sua fidanzata, da un libro anonimo del 1929. Terenzio
Mamiani, D'un nuovo diritto europeo, Tipografia Scolastica, Torino, 1861.
Terenzio Mamiani, Dell'ottima congregazione umana e del principio di
nazionalità, Rivista contemporanea, vol. 2-3, Pelazza Tipografia Subalpina,
Torino, 1855. Terenzio Mamiani, Mario Pagano, ovvero, della immortalità, Dai
Torchi della Signora De Lacombe, Parigi, 1845. Terenzio Mamiani, Prose
letterarie, G. Barbera Editore, Firenze, 1867. Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikipedia Wikipedia contiene una voce riguardante Terenzio Mamiani Collabora a
Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Terenzio Mamiani Collabora
a Commons Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Terenzio Mamiani Categorie:
Filosofi italianiPatrioti italianiPoeti italianiPolitici italianiScrittori
italiani. Refs.: Luigi Speranza,
"Grice e della Rovere," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool
Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
rule of law, the largely formal or procedural
properties of a well-ordered legal system. Commonly, these properties are
thought to include: a prohibition of arbitrary power the lawgiver is also
subject to the laws; laws that are general, prospective, clear, and consistent
capable of guiding conduct; and tribunals courts that are reasonably accessible
and fairly structured to hear and determine legal claims. Contemporary
discussions of the rule of law focus on two major questions: 1 to what extent
is conformity to the rule of law essential to the very idea of a legal system;
and 2 what is the connection between the rule of law and the substantive moral
value of a legal system?
Russell: “not really a philosopher,” as Grice puts it,
by either education or practice, he was born of Celtic Highland stock into an
aristocratic family in Wales (then part of England), Russell always divided his
interests between politics, philosophy, and the ladies (he married six times). Orphaned
at four, he was brought up by his grandmother, who educated him at home with
the help of “rather dull” tutors. He studied mathematics at Cambridge and then,
as his grandmother says, ‘out of the blue,’ he turned to philosophy. At home he
had absorbed J. S. Mill’s liberalism, but not his empiricism. At Cambridge he
came under the influence of neo-Hegelianism, especially the idealism of
McTaggart, Ward his tutor, and Bradley. His earliest logical views were
influenced most by Bradley, especially Bradley’s rejection of psychologism.
But, like Ward and McTaggart, he rejected Bradley’s metaphysical monism in
favor of pluralism or monadism. Even as an idealist, he held that scientific
knowledge was the best available and that philosophy should be built around it.
Through many subsequent changes, this belief about science, his pluralism, and
his anti-psychologism remained constant. In 5, he conceived the idea of an
idealist encyclopedia of the sciences to be developed by the use of
transcendental arguments to establish the conditions under which the special
sciences are possible. Russell’s first philosophical book, An Essay on the
Foundations of Geometry 7, was part of this project, as were other mostly
unfinished and unpublished pieces on physics and arithmetic written at this
time see his Collected Papers, vols. 12. Russell claimed, in contrast to Kant,
to use transcendental arguments in a purely logical way compatible with his
anti-psychologism. In this case, however, it should be both possible and
preferable to replace them by purely deductive arguments. Another problem arose
in connection with asymmetrical relations, which led to contradictions if
treated as internal relations, but which were essential for any treatment of
mathematics. Russell resolved both problems in 8 by abandoning idealism
including internal relations and his Kantian methodology. He called this the
one real revolution in his philosophy. With his Cambridge contemporary Moore,
he adopted an extreme Platonic realism, fully stated in The Principles of
Mathematics 3 though anticipated in A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of
Leibniz 0. Russell’s work on the sciences was by then concentrated on pure
mathematics, but the new philosophy yielded little progress until, in 0, he
discovered Peano’s symbolic logic, which offered hope that pure mathematics
could be treated without Kantian intuitions or transcendental arguments. On
this basis Russell propounded logicism, the claim that the whole of pure
mathematics could be derived deductively from logical principles, a position he
came to independently of Frege, who held a similar but more restricted view but
whose work Russell discovered only later. Logicism was announced in The
Principles of Mathematics; its development occupied Russell, in collaboration
with Whitehead, for the next ten years. Their results were published in
Principia Mathematica 013, 3 vols., in which detailed derivations were given for
Cantor’s set theory, finite and transfinite arithmetic, and elementary parts of
measure theory. As a demonstration of Russell’s logicism, Principia depends
upon much prior arithmetization of mathematics, e.g. of analysis, which is not
explicitly treated. Even with these allowances much is still left out: e.g.,
abstract algebra and statistics. Russell’s unpublished papers Papers, vols. 45,
however, contain logical innovations not included in Principia, e.g.,
anticipations of Church’s lambda-calculus. On Russell’s extreme realism,
everything that can be referred to is a term that has being though not
necessarily existence. The combination of terms by means of a relation results
in a complex term, which is a proposition. Terms are neither linguistic nor psychological.
The first task of philosophy is the theoretical analysis of propositions into
their constituents. The propositions of logic are unique in that they remain
true when any of their terms apart from logical constants are replaced by any
other terms. In 1 Russell discovered that this position fell prey to
self-referential paradoxes. For example, if the combination of any number of
terms is a new term, the combination of all terms is a term distinct from any
term. The most famous such paradox is called Russell’s paradox. Russell’s
solution was the theory of types, which banned self-reference by stratifying
terms and expressions into complex hierarchies of disjoint subclasses. The
expression ‘all terms’, e.g., is then meaningless unless restricted to terms of
specified types, and the combination of terms of a given type is a term of
different type. A simple version of the theory appeared in Principles of
Mathematics appendix A, but did not eliminate all the paradoxes. Russell
developed a more elaborate version that did, in “Mathematical Logic as Based on
the Theory of Types” 8 and in Principia. From 3 to 8 Russell sought to preserve
his earlier account of logic by finding other ways to avoid the paradoxes including a well-developed substitutional
theory of classes and relations posthumously published in Essays in Analysis,
4, and Papers, vol. 5. Other costs of type theory for Russell’s logicism
included the vastly increased complexity of the resulting sysRussell, Bertrand
Arthur William Russell, Bertrand Arthur William 802 802 tem and the admission of the
problematic axiom of reducibility. Two other difficulties with Russell’s
extreme realism had important consequences: 1 ‘I met Quine’ and ‘I met a man’
are different propositions, even when Quine is the man I met. In the
Principles, the first proposition contains a man, while the second contains a
denoting concept that denotes the man. Denoting concepts are like Fregean
senses; they are meanings and have denotations. When one occurs in a
proposition the proposition is not about the concept but its denotation. This
theory requires that there be some way in which a denoting concept, rather than
its denotation, can be denoted. After much effort, Russell concluded in “On
Denoting” 5 that this was impossible and eliminated denoting concepts as
intermediaries between denoting phrases and their denotations by means of his
theory of descriptions. Using firstorder predicate logic, Russell showed in a
broad, though not comprehensive range of cases how denoting phrases could be
eliminated in favor of predicates and quantified variables, for which logically
proper names could be substituted. These were names of objects of
acquaintance represented in ordinary
language by ‘this’ and ‘that’. Most names, he thought, were disguised definite
descriptions. Similar techniques were applied elsewhere to other kinds of
expression e.g. class names resulting in the more general theory of incomplete
symbols. One important consequence of this was that the ontological commitments
of a theory could be reduced by reformulating the theory to remove expressions
that apparently denoted problematic entities. 2 The theory of incomplete
symbols also helped solve extreme realism’s epistemic problems, namely how to
account for knowledge of terms that do not exist, and for the distinction
between true and false propositions. First, the theory explained how knowledge
of a wide range of items could be achieved by knowledge by acquaintance of a
much narrower range. Second, propositional expressions were treated as
incomplete symbols and eliminated in favor of their constituents and a
propositional attitude by Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment. These
innovations marked the end of Russell’s extreme realism, though he remained a
Platonist in that he included universals among the objects of acquaintance.
Russell referred to all his philosophy after 8 as logical atomism, indicating
thereby that certain categories of items were taken as basic and items in other
categories were constructed from them by rigorous logical means. It depends
therefore upon reduction, which became a key concept in early analytic
philosophy. Logical atomism changed as Russell’s logic developed and as more
philosophical consequences were drawn from its application, but the label is
now most often applied to the modified realism Russell held from 5 to 9. Logic
was central to Russell’s philosophy from 0 onward, and much of his fertility
and importance as a philosopher came from his application of the new logic to
old problems. In 0 Russell became a lecturer at Cambridge. There his interests
turned to epistemology. In writing a popular book, Problems of Philosophy 2, he
first came to appreciate the work of the British empiricists, especially Hume
and Berkeley. He held that empirical knowledge is based on direct acquaintance
with sense-data, and that matter itself, of which we have only knowledge by
description, is postulated as the best explanation of sense-data. He soon
became dissatisfied with this idea and proposed instead that matter be
logically constructed out of sensedata and unsensed sensibilia, thereby
obviating dubious inferences to material objects as the causes of sensations.
This proposal was inspired by the successful constructions of mathematical
concepts in Principia. He planned a large work, “Theory of Knowledge,” which
was to use the multiple relation theory to extend his account from acquaintance
to belief and inference Papers, vol. 7. However, the project was abandoned as
incomplete in the face of Vitters’s attacks on the multiple relation theory,
and Russell published only those portions dealing with acquaintance. The
construction of matter, however, went ahead, at least in outline, in Our
Knowledge of the External World 4, though the only detailed constructions were
undertaken later by Carnap. On Russell’s account, material objects are those
series of sensibilia that obey the laws of physics. Sensibilia of which a mind
is aware sense-data provide the experiential basis for that mind’s knowledge of
the physical world. This theory is similar, though not identical, to
phenomenalism. Russell saw the theory as an application of Ockham’s razor, by
which postulated entities were replaced by logical constructions. He devoted
much time to understanding modern physics, including relativity and quantum
theory, and in The Analysis of Matter 7 he incorporated the fundamental ideas
of those theories into his construction of the physical world. In this book he
abandoned sensibilia as fundamental constituents of the world in favor Russell,
Bertrand Arthur William Russell, Bertrand Arthur William 803 803 of events, which were “neutral” because
intrinsically neither physical nor mental. In 6 Russell was dismissed from
Cambridge on political grounds and from that time on had to earn his living by
writing and public lecturing. His popular lectures, “The Philosophy of Logical
Atomism” 8, were a result of this. These lectures form an interim work, looking
back on the logical achievements of 510 and emphasizing their importance for philosophy,
while taking stock of the problems raised by Vitters’s criticisms of the
multiple relation theory. In 9 Russell’s philosophy of mind underwent
substantial changes, partly in response to those criticisms. The changes
appeared in “On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean” 9 and The
Analysis of Mind 1, where the influence of contemporary trends in psychology,
especially behaviorism, is evident. Russell gave up the view that minds are
among the fundamental constituents of the world, and adopted neutral monism,
already advocated by Mach, James, and the
New Realists. On Russell’s neutral monism, a mind is constituted by a
set of events related by subjective temporal relations simultaneity,
successiveness and by certain special “mnemic” causal laws. In this way he was
able to explain the apparent fact that “Hume’s inability to perceive himself
was not peculiar.” In place of the multiple relation theory Russell identified
the contents of beliefs with images “imagepropositions” and words “word-propositions”,
understood as certain sorts of events, and analyzed truth qua correspondence in
terms of resemblance and causal relations. From 8 to 4 Russell lived in the
United States, where he wrote An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth 0 and his
popular A History of Western Philosophy 5. His philosophical attention turned
from metaphysics to epistemology and he continued to work in this field after
he returned in 4 to Cambridge, where he completed his last major philosophical
work, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits 8. The framework of Russell’s early
epistemology consisted of an analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true
belief though it has been suggested that he unintentionally anticipated Edmund
Gettier’s objection to this analysis, and an analysis of epistemic
justification that combined fallibilism with a weak empiricism and with a
foundationalism that made room for coherence. This framework was retained in An
Inquiry and Human Knowledge, but there were two sorts of changes that
attenuated the foundationalist and empiricist elements and accentuated the
fallibilist element. First, the scope of human knowledge was reduced. Russell
had already replaced his earlier Moorean consequentialism about values with
subjectivism. Contrast “The Elements of Ethics,” 0, with, e.g., Religion and
Science, 5, or Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 4. Consequently, what had
been construed as self-evident judgments of intrinsic value came to be regarded
as non-cognitive expressions of desire. In addition, Russell now reversed his
earlier belief that deductive inference can yield new knowledge. Second, the
degree of justification attainable in human knowledge was reduced at all
levels. Regarding the foundation of perceptual beliefs, Russell came to admit
that the object-knowledge “acquaintance with a sensedatum” was replaced by
“noticing a perceptive occurrence” in An Inquiry that provides the
non-inferential justification for a perceptual belief is buried under layers of
“interpretation” and unconscious inference in even the earliest stages of
perceptual processes. Regarding the superstructure of inferentially justified
beliefs, Russell concluded in Human Knowledge that unrestricted induction is
not generally truthpreserving anticipating Goodman’s “new riddle of induction”.
Consideration of the work of Reichenbach and Keynes on probability led him to
the conclusion that certain “postulates” are needed “to provide the antecedent
probabilities required to justify inductions,” and that the only possible
justification for believing these postulates lies, not in their self-evidence,
but in the resultant increase in the overall coherence of one’s total belief
system. In the end, Russell’s desire for certainty went unsatisfied, as he felt
himself forced to the conclusion that “all human knowledge is uncertain,
inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation
whatever.” Russell’s strictly philosophical writings of 9 and later have
generally been less influential than his earlier writings. His influence was
eclipsed by that of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. He
approved of the logical positivists’ respect for logic and science, though he
disagreed with their metaphysical agnosticism. But his dislike of ordinary
language philosophy was visceral. In My Philosophical Development 9, he accused
its practitioners of abandoning the attempt to understand the world, “that
grave and important task which philosophy throughout the ages has hitherto
pursued.”
RECTVM
-- DE-RECTUM -- directum. “Searle thought he
was being witty when adapting my implicaturum to what he called an Indirect
Austinian thing. Holdcroft was less obvious!” – Grice. – indirectum -- indirect
discourse, also called oratio obliqua, the use of words to report what others
say, but without direct quotation. When one says “John said, ‘Not every doctor
is honest,’ “ one uses the words in one’s quotation directly – one uses direct
discourseto make an assertion about what John said. Accurate direct discourse
must get the exact words. But in indirect discourse one can use other words
than John does to report what he said, e.g., “John said that some physicians
are not honest.” The words quoted here capture the sense of John’s assertion
(the proposition he asserted). By extension, ‘indirect discourse’ designates
the use of words in reporting beliefs. One uses words to characterize the
proposition believed rather than to make a direct assertion. When Alice says,
“John believes that some doctors are not honest,” she uses the words ‘some
doctors are not honest’ to present the proposition that John believes. She does
not assert the proposition. By contrast, direct discourse, also called oratio
recta, is the ordinary use of words to make assertions. Grice struggled for
years as to what the ‘fundamentum distinctionis’ is between the central and the
peripheric communicatum. He played with first-ground versus second-ground. He
played with two different crtieria: formal/material, and dictive-non-dictive.
Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Holdcroft on direct and indirect communication.”
ryle: the waynflete professor of metaphysical philosophy,
known especially for his contributions to the philosophy of mind and his
attacks on Cartesianism. His best-known work is the masterpiece The Concept of
Mind 9, an attack on what he calls “Cartesian dualism” and a defense of a type
of logical behaviorism. This dualism he dubs “the dogma of the Ghost in the
Machine,” the Machine being the body, which is physical and publicly
observable, and the Ghost being the mind conceived as a private or secret arena
in which episodes of sense perception, consciousness, and inner perception take
place. A person, then, is a combination of such a mind and a body, with the
mind operating the body through exercises of will called “volitions.” Ryle’s attack
on this doctrine is both sharply focused and multifarious. He finds that it
rests on a category mistake, namely, assimilating statements about mental
processes to the same category as statements about physical processes. This is
a mistake in the logic of mental statements and mental concepts and leads to
the mistaken metaphysical theory that a person is composed of two separate and
distinct though somehow related entities, a mind and a body. It is true that
statements about the physical are statements about things and their changes.
But statements about the mental are not, and in particular are not about a
thing called “the mind.” These two types of statements do not belong to the
same category. To show this, Ryle deploys a variety of arguments, including
arguments alleging the impossibility of causal relations between mind and body
and arguments alleging vicious infinite regresses. To develop his positive view
on the nature of mind, Ryle studies the uses and hence the logic of mental
terms and finds that mental statements tell us that the person performs
observable actions in certain ways and has a disposition to perform other
observable actions in specifiable circumstances. For example, to do something
intelligently is to do something physical in a certain way and to adjust one’s
behavior to the circumstances, not, as the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine
would have it, to perform two actions, one of which is a mental action of
thinking that eventually causes a separate physical action. Ryle buttresses this
position with many acute and subtle analyses of the uses of mental terms. Much
of Ryle’s other work concerns philosophical methodology, sustaining the thesis
which is the backbone of The Concept of Mind that philosophical problems and
doctrines often arise from conceptual confusion, i.e., from mistakes about the
logic of language. Important writings in this vein include the influential
article “Systematically Misleading Expressions” and the book Dilemmas. Ryle was
also interested in Grecian philosophy throughout his life, and his last major
work, Plato’s Progress, puts forward novel hypotheses about changes in Plato’s
views, the role of the Academy, the purposes and uses of Plato’s dialogues, and
Plato’s relations with the rulers of Syracuse. Refs: H. P. Grice, “What neither
Ryle nor Austin ever taught me!” --. “What I mislearned from ‘The Concept of
Mind.’”
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment