sIMPLICATVRA
acri: acri,
Italian philosopher, author of an essay on Plato’s and Vico’s theory of ideas.
“Abbozzo” essential Italian philosopher. Grice:
“I love Acri’s rendition of the Cratilo into the vernacular!” Francesco Acri (n. Catanzaro), filosofo. Opere
Del sistema in genere -- Alcune prose giovanili -- Abbozzo d'una teorica delle
idee / scritto da Francesco Acri, Palermo : Stab. tip. Lao, -- In memoria di
Alfonso della Valle di Casanova -- Su la natura della storia della
filosofia : discorso letto all'Università di Bologna / di Francesco Acri,
Bologna : presso Nicola Zanichelli successore alli Mrsigli e Rocchi, --
Critone 1 di Platone (IV secolo a.C.), traduzione dal greco -- Timeo
75%.svg di Platone (IV secolo a.C.), traduzione dal greco (XIX secolo) --
L'apologia di Socrate 75%.svg di Platone (IV secolo a.C.), traduzione dal
greco (XIX secolo) Scarica in formato ePub Eutifrone 75%.svg di Platone
(IV secolo a.C.), traduzione dal greco (XIX secolo) Categorie: Nati a
CatanzaroMorti a BolognaNati secoloAutori del XX secoloAutori italiani
del XIX secoloAutori italiani del XX secoloFilosofiFilosofi del XIX
secoloFilosofi del XX secoloAutori italianiFilosofi italianiAutori citati in
opere pubblicateAutori presenti sul Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. IL CRATILO. Due solenni questioni intorno
all'origine della lingua toglie ad esaminare Platone in questo dialogo; se cioè
i vocaboli o i nomi abbiano in sè da natura lor propria ragione, o vera mente
se retto sia il nome che da chiunque a cosa qualunque vien posto. Cratilo segue
la prima sentenza: Ermogene la seconda. Platone ammette alcun che di vero in
amendue, sebben apertamente nol dica e le confuti anzi tuttadue. Pertanto
facendo capo dalla seconda, in per sona di Socrate, così contro di Ermogene la
argomenta. Il nome parte è del discorso. Or potendosi tenere discorso vero e
falso, chiaro è che sia possibil dir anco un nome vero ed un falso. Se dunque
la sentenza di Ermogene stesse vera, che ogni nome da chiunque posto Due
solenni questioni intorno all'origine della lingua toglie ad esaminare Platone
in questo dialogo; se cioè i vocaboli o i nomi abbiano in sè da natura lor
propria ragione, o vera mente se retto sia il nome che da chiunque a cosa
qualunque vien posto. Cratilo segue la prima sentenza: Ermogene la seconda.
Platone ammette alcun che di vero in amendue, sebben apertamente nol dica e le
confuti anzi tuttadue. Pertanto facendo capo dalla seconda, in per sona di
Socrate, così contro di Ermogene la argomenta. Il nome parte è del discorso. Or
potendosi tenere discorso vero e falso, chiaro è che sia possibil dir anco un
nome vero ed un falso. Se dunque la sentenza di Ermogene stesse vera, che ogni
nome da chiunque posto a qualunque cosa sia retto, deriverebbe che tutti i
nomi, sì veri che falsi, sarebbono del pari retti, e che la cosa medesima
potrebbe aver nomi altrettanti, quanti individualmente dagli uomini le fossimo
posti, e che tosto anzi gli avesse, che quel sopressa li pronunciassero.
Inoltre, se le cose non han già sol esse una stabilità lor propria da natura
(contro il dir di Protagora, esser elle a mo' ch'a noi paiono; giacchè se così
fosse, non potrebb'esser uno più sapiente di un altro); ma stabilità pari ad
esse han pure le azioni loro, per modo che, se uno p. e ha da tagliare una
cosa, per ret tamente ciò fare, ei non la dee tagliare a ca priccio suo, ma nel
modo che la natura della medesima richiede di tagliarla e che taglisi e con
quello con che debbe tagliarsi; così pur segue che il nominare le cose,
send'un'azione, noi non le dobbiamo nominare a libito nostro, ma nel modo che
la lor natura richiede di nominarle e che nomininosi e con che deb bonsi
nominare. Arroge, che se il giudicare poi di quello con che fassi una cosa,
cioè del suo stromento, se sia ben fatto, non pertiene al l'artefice che lo fa,
ma a colui che ne usa a modo (giacchè il giudicar di un pettine se sia ben
fatto e acconcio al tessere, non per tiene a falegname, ma a tessitore, e il
giu dicar di una nave, di una cetra, se sian ben ſatte, non pertiene ai loro
fabbricatori, ma a piloto e a citarista); così pur segue, che il giudicare del
nome di cosa qualunque, se sia ben fatto, cioè se la indichi ed insegni vera
mente, non pertenga a chiunque nè a chi lo pone, ma a colui che a modo ne usa,
al dia lettico; e per conseguenza rimane chiaro che il porlo non è opra di
chiunque, ma di solo colui, che ragguardando al nome che in ispezie a ciascuna
cosa da natura conviene, colle let tere e colle sillabe è in grado di render
l'idea del medesimo. A questo discorso non sapendo Ermogene che rispondere,
prega Socrate, che voglia spie gargli e fargli conoscere cotesta ragione, che
il nome ha in sè da propria natura; e quindi soggiugnendogli ch'ei non
ammettendo la sen tenza di Protagora, esser le cose come paiono a ciascuno, non
poteva tener vero quello che in virtù di tal opinione Protagora affermava dei
nomi, Socrate allora il conforta a ricorrere ad Omero, il quale distingue nelle
cose stesse i nomi ad esse dati dagli Dei da quelli dati dagli uomini;
avvegnachè gli Dei chiamino le cose con nomi, che ad esse rettamente
convengono. E così movendosi a spiegare Socrate, secondo Omero, come ad
Astianatte, Ettore, Oreste, Agamemnone, Atreo, Pelope e Tantalo bene stieno que
nomi ch'hanno, dalla menzione di quest'ultimo naturalmente viene condotto a
spiegar la ragione del nome pur del suo padre, cioè di Giove, e quindi sale a
quello di Saturno e di Urano. Intanto rispetto ai nomi che sono posti agli
uomini ed agli eroi, egli avverte di non doversene troppo fidare, perchè molti
di essi, dicegli, sono stati presi da que de pro pri progenitori, o sono stati
posti secondo gli auspici e voti per loro, come Eutichide, for tunato, Sosia,
salvato, ecc., e per ciò dando l'addio a tali nomi, passa a spiegare quelli delle
cose che sono sempre nello stesso modo ed immutabili, vale a dire ai nomi Dii,
demoni, eroi, uomini, ed al nome corpo ed anima, dai quali l'uomo è composto.
Ma desideroso Ermogene, nel modo che aveva inteso la ra gione del nome di
Giove, di saper anche quella del nome degli altri Dei, Socrate, dopo aver
formalmente protestato, che per riguardo agli Dei, affatto nulla di loro ei
sapeva nè con quai nomi tra loro si chiamassero, nondimeno dice, che si
accingeva a dar la spiegazione di tai nomi, secondo l'opinione ch'ei credeva
avere avuto gli uomini nel porre i nomi ai medesimi; e così fra questi pel
primo comincia da quello di Vesta. - Il nome per esser retto, come si disse, bi
sogna ch'esso abbia una certa natural conve nevolezza con quello ch'ei nomina;
per dunque conoscere se un nome sia retto e stia bene colla cosa da esso
nominata, bisogna pur conoscere l'essere della cosa medesima. Or intorno all'es
tempi di Socrate e di Platone; l'una degli Eraclitiani, che credevano le cose
esser sempre in moto; l'altra degli Eleatici, i quali opinavano, che fossero
sempre in riposo. Secondo il proprio sistema ciascuno spiegava pure i nomi;
onde Socrate, nel dar l'etimologia del nome Vesta, riferisce anche la sentenza
di queste due scuole filosofiche dicendo, che gli Eleatici il nome di Vesta,
Eatix (Hestia), perchè, second'essi, in antico in vece di obaix (ousia),
essenza, en tezza, si diceva anche aix, esia, il derivavano da siva (einai),
essere, mentre gli Eraclitiani, prendendolo per sinonimo di oaix, osia, il de
rivavano da 33siv (othein), cacciare, spingere. Dopo questo passa ai nomi degli
altri Dei, e quindi a quello del sole, della luna, delle stelle, della terra,
dell'aria, delle stagioni e dell'anno; e quantunque la maggior parte di questi
paia spiegarli secondo il sistema di Eraclito; tuttavia havvene alcuno, la cui
spiegazione può anche convenire al sistema degli Eleatici; finchè ve nendo ai
nomi della prudenza, scienza, sa pienza, giustizia, fortezza, virtù, vizio,
ecc., e a quelli della tristezza, del diletto e a tanti altri, quasi tutti ei
li spiega un po' lepidamente ed ironicamente, ridendosi degli Eraclitiani, col
riferire tutto al loro modo, come se le cose fossero sempre in moto. Ma questo
modo di dichiarar la ragione del nomi, come facevano gli Eraclitiani, semplice
mente per mezzo di una superficiale e succes siva decomposizione del medesimi
in altri nomi, non appagava intieramente Socrate. Impercioc chè, dice egli, se
uno interroga intorno alle parole, da cui è composto un nome, e poi di nuovo intorno
a quelle, da cui sono composte queste medesime, e così continua sempre oltre ad
interrogare, è necessario venire alla fine ad una parola, la quale non si può
più decom porre, e di cui nulla più sappia quegli che ha a rispondere. D'altra
parte però se uno non sa dar la ragione dei primi nomi, non sa certo darla del
derivati, che si debbono spiegare per mezzo del primi. Per la qual cosa a
rintracciar la ragione del primi nomi ei si fa nel seguente modo. I nomi tutti,
sì primi che derivati, deb bon dichiarare come veramente ciascuna cosa è. Ora
se noi non avessimo nè voce nè lingua, e dovessimo indicare le cose, certo,
come i muti, colle mani e col capo e con tutto l'altro del corpo noi tenteremmo
di significarle, elevando le mani verso del cielo per indicar quel che è alto e
leggiero, e per l'opposito abbassandole verso terra per indicar quel che è
basso e grave. Dal che rettamente ei conchiude che il nome per esser retto,
cioè per poter indicare come vera mente una cosa è, dee pur anco essere un'imi
tazione, che la voce fa di quella cosa, ch'uno per mezzo della voce toglie ad
imitare onde fi gura e il color delle cose, la musica il loro suono, così
l'arte del nominare imita la loro es senza per mezzo di sillabe e lettere. E
per di mostrare poi come per mezzo di sillabe e let tere uno possa ciò fare,
oltre al distinguere egli le lettere in consonanti e vocali e semi vocali ecc.,
ei fa pur osservare in molte di esse un valor loro proprio, facendo avvertire
nel l'elemento r il valore d'indicare il moto e ciò che è aspro e duro,
nell'elemento l quello d'in dicar ciò ch'è liscio e molle, e così un proprio
valore dà egli a molte altre lettere. E di que sta cognizione pertanto intorno
al valor delle lettere, come anche della cognizione della na tura delle cose fornito
lo istitutore dei nomi, afferma Socrate, che in quel modo, che i pit tori per
render l'immagine che vogliono effi giare, or adoprano un colore or un altro ed
or ne mescolano molti insieme, così egli nel far ciascun nome per ciascuna
cosa, adope rando l'elemento or di una lettera or di un'al tra ed or
mescolandone più insieme, secondo che l'immagine della cosa ch'ei voleva
nominare pareva richiedere, abbia formato i primi nomi; e quindi da questi
primi, sempre coll'imita zione per mezzo di sillabe e lettere, abbia pur
composti tutti gli altri, e che questa sia la vera ragion de nomi. Secondo un
tale ragionamento pare che Socrate, che è quanto dir Platone, propenda per la
sentenza di Cratilo, il quale affermava, avere gli esseri in sè da natura la
ragion del loro nome. Nondimeno non esser tutti i nomi retta mente posti
conforme alla natura delle cose, che nominano, il dimostra poi nel seguente
modo. Il nome, dice egli, è uno stromento, il qual si fa per indicar e insegnar
le cose come veracemente sono. Or ogni stromento sup pone un artefice; e buono
essendo quello che è fatto da un buon artefice, e cattivo quel che è fatto da
un cattivo, ne segue che anche i nomi saranno altri bene, altri mal fatti.
Cratilo pretende che tutti i nomi, come tali, cioè in quanto son nomi, son
tutti ben fatti e retti; per modo che se uno dà a qualcuno il nome che non gli
conviene, costui parrà sì ben averlo, ma esso appartiene propriamente a colui,
la cui natura viene dichiarata dal nome. Dun que se tutti i nomi sono retti,
ripiglia Socrate, non più anco si potrà dire il falso. No, non si può dire il
falso, soggiugne Cratilo, perchè dire il falso è dir quel che non è; or quel
che non è, non si può pensare nè dire. E che dunque, replica Socrate, fa colui
che ti chia masse o ti salutasse col nome di Ermogene, mentre che tu sei
Cratilo? costui non chiame rebbe, non saluterebbe te, ma un altro? di rebbe
egli qualche cosa o direbbe nulla? Costui, risponde Cratilo, non farebbe altro,
ch'un van un'altra prova. Il nome, dice egli, secondo quel che da noi si è
ammesso, è una imitazione, la quale si fa per mezzo delle lettere e delle
sillabe, come la pittura imita coi colori; e per ciò in quel modo che la
pittura, se, nello effigiare le cose, vi adatta i convenienti colori, effettua
bene e belle le loro immagini; così pure l'arte del nominare, se per mezzo
delle lettere e delle sillabe imitando l'essenza delle cose, saprà ad esse
adattare tutto quello che conviene e che loro è simile, bella ne effettuerà
l'immagine; che se no, effettuerà sì bene un'immagine, ma non già bella, per
conseguenza i nomi ch'essa fa, gli uni saranno ben fatti, e gli altri no.
Cratilo a questo energicamente si oppone, di cendo che se in un nome si muta,
si traspone, o si toglie o si aggiugne una lettera, non so lamente non
iscriviam bene tal nome, ma non lo scriviamo affatto, anzi esso diventa subito
un'altra cosa che il nome. Socrate concede ciò aver luogo ne numeri, a quali se
uno toglie od aggiugne un'unità, subito diventan essi un altro numero da quel
che eran prima, ma non già nelle qualità e nelle immagini delle cose; poichè se
le immagini dovesser aver tutto quello che ha la cosa di cui son immagini, non
sa rebbero più immagini, ma rimarrebbero la cosa stessa di cui elle appunto
sono le immagini; e per ciò neanco i nomi debbono aver tutto quel che ha la
cosa di cui sono nomi, nè es serle in tutto e per tutto simili; perchè, se così
fosse, ne avverrebbe, che gli esseri sarebbero tutti doppi, e non si saprebbe
più dire qual fosse proprio la cosa e qual solo il nome. Per la qual cosa a
giudicare se un nome sia ben fatto, basta che in esso si trovi il tipo della
cosa di cui esso è nome; e quantunque si debba concedere, che più retti e belli
sian que nomi, che per la gran parte son composti di lettere convenienti; tuttavia
non si può sostenere, che un nome, il quale non abbia le lettere simili alla
cosa che nomina, non possa indicare la medesima. Ed in conferma di questo
Socrate adduce il nome azXood:ng (sclerotes), durezza, nella cui composizione
in vece di entrarvi il p. r, il cui valore è appunto d'indicare ciò che è duro
e aspro, v'entra anzi il X, l, che indica tutto il contrario, ciò che è molle e
liscio; nondimeno quand'uno il pronuncia, tutti sanno quello ch'ei vuole dire e
quello ch'egli ha in mente; così che fa pur d'uopo conchiudere, che le cose
s'indicano non solo per mezzo dell'imi tazione delle medesime, che si fa colle
lettere e colle sillabe, ma ancora per mezzo dell'uso e della convenzione. Che
se dunque tutti i nomi non son posti convenientemente secondo la natura della
cosa che nominano, ei si vede quanto senza fonda somi glianza tra essi e
quelle, che chi conosce i nomi conosce anche le cose. Del resto, anche dato,
continua Socrate, che per mezzo del nomi si possano conoscere le cose; tuttavia
essendo essi, anche quelli che rettamente conforme la natura delle cose sono
posti, solamente imma gini delle medesime, il miglior modo di cono scerle sarà
investigarle per esse, una per l'altra a vicenda, se a sorte cognate sono, e
ciasche duna per sè, e così venirle a contemplare nella verità loro, e non solo
nelle loro immagini. Intanto come questa verità, questa cognizione si possa
conseguire lasciando ad investigare un'altra volta, pel presente ei si contenta
di far vedere, che qualcosa di stabile e fermo è nelle cose, e che oltre ad
esservi p. e un viso bello, ei v'ha poi un bello in sè, che non è passeggiero
nè soggetto a movimento o flusso, ma immu tabile e sempre lo stesso; pel che
rettamente conchiude dicendo, che non retta gli pareva la sentenza di Eraclito,
il quale voleva che tutto fosse in centinuo flusso. Cratilo però alle ra gioni
di lui non si acqueta, onde Socrate il prega, che più attentamente volesse
ancora esaminare la cosa, e, quando gli venisse fatto di trovare la verità, si
piacesse di fargliene partecipe. - Così termina il dialogo, dal quale si vede,
come già in principio di questo argomento dicevamo, che Socrate, e nella sua
persona Pla tone, quantunque confuti la sentenza di Ermo gene e quella di
Cratilo, nondimeno, ancorchè espressamente nol dica, molto di vero ei rico
nosce in amendue, anzi le rettifica. In fatti, se concede a Ermogene esser
lecito agli uomini porre nomi alle cose; non gli concede però ciò essere lecito
a tutti, com'ei pretendeva, ed afº ferma non potersi porre a capriccio, se
hanno ad essere ben posti, ma richiedersi un'arte, e per ciò esser opra di solo
colui, che è in istato di rendere per mezzo del nome l'idea della cosa che vuol
nominare; come dall'altra parte, se ammette con Cratilo avere i nomi da natura
lor ragione, non conviene però che tutti sieno rettamente posti e stieno a
capello; e se pur gli concede migliori essere i nomi che per mezzo di lettere e
di sillabe esprimono la na tura delle cose che nominano; tuttavia non gli
consente, che assolutamente non abbiansi a chiamare nomi quelli che non sono
così for mati; giacchè l'esperienza ci dimostra esservi nomi, i quali, senza
che abbiano alcuna lettera simile o corrispondente alla natura della cosa da
lor nominata, per via del solo uso noi ve niamo posti in grado di ottimamente
intenderli e riferirli a cose, che non hanno punto di si mile col medesimi. Chi
è versato nella lettura delle opere di Pla tone facilmente si persuaderà, che
questo divino oltre all'addurre le prove dell'immortalità dell'anima umana,
scopo suo fu pur anco di rappresen tarci il quadro del filosofo morente; nel
Gorgia, oltre lo scopo di far vedere i difetti dell'oratoria politica e
sofistica, ebbe pur anco quello di far la difesa di se stesso, perchè non si
fosse dato alla vita pubblica; noi dunque ora nel Cratilo dobbiamo pure
investigare, se egli oltre al di mostrare, che la vera origine e ragion de nomi
non si dee derivare nè dalla stessa natura sola nè dal solo arbitrio umano,
abbia pur avuto intenzione di dimostrare ancora qualch'altra cosa pratica.
Erano ai tempi di Platone intorno allo essere delle cose, come abbiam già
detto, due sentenze, l'una degli Eraclitiani, i quai credevano ch'esse fossero
in un continuo flusso o moto; e l'altra degli Eleatici, i quali opina vano, che
fossero sempre in riposo. Ciascuna di queste due scuole (come tutti in ogni
tempo, e come anche vediamo aver fatto il nostro Vico), per confermare le loro
dottrine, i loro sistemi, ricorrevano all'etimologie delle parole, credendo in
queste trovare la ragione di quelli. Ma, quantunque lo studio delle etimologie
talora conduca alla cognizione delle cose, Platone tut tavia non vi aveva molta
fede, sì perchè ne nomi stabiliti a sorte dall'uso e dalla consue tudine, di
rado e forse quasi mai è possibile trovar la loro ragione e la verità di quello
che nominano; sì perchè nemmanco sulla strada più vera e più sicura ci mettono
quelli, che dall'in gegno e dalla potenza umana fur posti. Imper ciocchè chi
pose i primi nomi alle cose, com'egli dice, li pose, quali credeva che queste fossero;
or sei non aveva una retta opinione delle cose, e ad esse pose i nomi secondo
l'opinione ch'ei n'aveva, noi rimarremo ingannati, se il se guiremo. Per far
vedere adunque in che vano e fragile fondamento si appoggiassero le scuole
filosofiche che così facevano, e metter in chiaro l'insufficienza di questo
loro metodo per venire alla cognizione delle cose, Platone in questo dialogo
facendo una lunga esposizione di etimologie, sebben acute ma strane, di cui
molte forse raccolse da vari libri, mise in ridi colo l'abuso di tale studio,
validamente dimo strando, che le cose debbonsi piuttosto cono scere per mezzo
d'esse medesime, che per mezzo de' nomi, che sono soltanto una loro adombra
zione; e così, come metodo a ciò acconcio ed efficace, colloca poi egli alla
fine del dialogo, come opposta diametralmente alle opinioni degli
l'iraclitiani, la sua dottrina delle idee. Che se a questo avessero badato
certi eru diti (!), non mai avrebbero creduto che Platone (1) Proclo
spezialmente fra gli antichi, e fra i moderni il Menagio, ad Diogen. Laert.,
pag. 149, e il Tiedemann, Argum. dialogg. Plat., pag. 84 e seguente.
etimologie, che espone in questo dialogo. E nel vero, an corchè sia difficile
il distinguere dappertutto quello ch'ei dice per gioco e quello che dice da
senno; tuttavia al veder, che nello spiegar la ragione de nomi di Teti, di
Poseidone (Nettuno), di Demetra (Cerere) e d'altri, ei lascia le etimologie
prossime e ovvie, e in vece ne arreca delle rimote, anzi talvolta ne inventa
delle strane e bizzarre, spezialmente quando adduce quella oltremodo ridicola
di Dioniso (Bacco), niun certo può disconoscere ch'ei non ischerzi. Arroge, che
il protestaregli, per bocca di Socrate, che quello che per riguardo all'eti
mologia de nomi dichiarava, il diceva non come cosa sua propria e che sapesse,
ma come cosa che teneva per ispirazione della musa di Euti frone, ognuno
avrebbe dovuto accorgersi o al men sospettare, che Platone non poteva far buono
tutto quello che per ispirazione della musa di questo sciocco e superstizioso
fanatico ei diceva. Per la qual cosa lo Schleiermacher è di parere che Platone
avesse in mira di bef farsi in questo dialogo di Antistene; ma, oltre che molte
cose in esso occorrono che mala mente si potrebbero attribuire a questo
filosofo Socratico, come rettamente osserva lo Stallbaum, ei si dee ancora
avvertire che gli studi di An tistene erano piuttosto dialettici e retorici,
che grammatici, e non si trova documento veruno, il qual ne accerti ch'ei si
occupasse anche della ragione de nomi. E se poi non si può assolu tamente
negare, che nelle sue giocose etimologie abbia pur egli avuto in mira Prodico,
perchè questi nel dar la ragione della differenza de nomi, di necessità spesso
doveva anche spie garne le etimologie; scopo suo però fu piut tosto di beffarsi
di tutti quel filosofi, che, come abbiam detto, nelle etimologie de nomi cre
devan trovar confermati i loro sistemi, e spe zialmente di mettere in canzone i
sofisti, che in coteste arguzie ponevano molto studio e tanto si dilettavano, i
quali appunto egli dileggia, quando ironicamente spiegando il loro nome,
afferma che significa eroi. E in fatti che Protagora molto attendesse anche
all'interpretazione degli scrit tori spezialmente poeti, abbiam già veduto nel
dialogo del Protagora, intitolato dal suo nome, nel quale insieme con Prodico
ed Ippia ed altri espone a Socrate il suo sentimento intorno ad un passo oscuro
d una canzone di Simonide. E che, oltre all'aver lasciato precetti intorno alla
retorica, come ci attesta Cicerone nel Bruto. i 2: « scriptae fuerunt et
paratae a Protagora rerum illustrium disputationes, quae nunc com munes
appellantur loci, º molto pure si occu passe intorno alla proprietà dei nomi e
della collocazione delle parole per rendere bella l'elo cuzione, lo aſſerma lo
stesso Platone nel Fedro, pag. 267, C, ed Aristotele nclla Retorica, lib, ini,
ori gine e ragione de nomi abbia pure disputato. Questo pare chiaramente
indicato nel Cratilo, alla pag. 295 (Stef 391. C), anzi da quel, che ivi dice
Ermogene, sembra che tal questione facesse parte del suo libro della Verità,
reo A), 3sizg, come vedremo. I seguaci di cotesto sofista adunque sono quelli,
contro dei quali è diretta spezialmente l'ironia e lo scherzo di que sto
dialogo, poichè cotesti sono quelli, che, come il loro maestro Protagora,
approvando la sentenza di Eraclito, il quale stabiliva, che tutte le cose
perpetuamente scorressero, come un fiume, avevano ad essa accoppiata la loro,
cioè che l'uomo fosse la misura di tutto e che le cose fossero come a lui
appariscono; e per ciò credendo che tutto continuamente fluisse e che i nostri
sensi a questa mutazione delle cose si accomodassero in guisa, che sempre esse
fos sero come a loro apparivano, venivano pur a credere tali essere i nomi
delle cose, quali dal senso e dall'intelligenza di ciascheduno venivano
percepiti, cioè naturali. Da questo si vede che in cotesti
Eraclitiani-Protagoristi non si deb bono comprendere, gli antichi e veri
seguaci di Eraclito, ma solo i posteriori, che, material mente intendendo
Eraclito, facevano una cattiva e falsa applicazione dei suoi principii. E se
dum que di tutte le sette filosofiche, come sappiamo, era anticamente costume
di riferire i loro sistemi ai sapienti più antichi e spezialmente ad Omero, non
dee dunque far maraviglia, se i detti nuovi Eraclitiani-Protagoristi, chiamati
appunto Omeriani da Platone nel Teeteto (pag. 179. E), tentassero pur di
derivare le loro spie gazioni e interpretazioni de nomi da Omero ed anche da
Esiodo, e se in questo dialogo conforti poi Socrate Ermogene, se non ammet teva
la verità di Protagora, a ricorrere ad Omero, e se quindi egli pure, secondo
questo poeta, gli faccia parecchie spiegazioni del nomi. Il Cratilo,
interlocutore di questo dialogo e da cui anzi lo stesso dialogo s'intitola,
Aristotele (Metaph. 1, 6), Apuleio (de dogm. Plat., p. 2), e Diogene Laerzio
(III, 6), narrano essere stato, prima di Socrate, maestro di Platone, e che gli
abbia insegnato le opinioni e dottrine di Eraclito. L'Ast però (Platons Leben
und Schri ſten, pag. 19) opina, che il Cratilo interlocu tore del presente
dialogo sia diverso dal Cratilo che fu maestro di Platone, affermando non altro
potersi raccogliere dallo stesso dialogo, se non che il Cratilo, ivi
interlocutore, era se guace di Eraclito, e non già che sia stato mae stro di
filosofia e che abbia avuto Platone per discepolo; e per ciò pretende non esser
pro babile, se così fosse, che Platone l'avesse messo così in canzone senza
riguardo veruno. Questa sentenza a noi non pare di gran momento; poichè hoi non
abbiamo sufficienti argomenti Cratili, amendue filosofi e della scuola di
Eraclito, onde poter dubitare qual di loro sia stato maestro di Platone.
D'altra parte, Aristotele, Apuleio e Diogene Laerzio avevan certo notizia e del
Cratilo maestro di Platone, e del Cratilo inter locutore di questo dialogo; non
avendogli essi di stinti, rimane chiaro che sì quello che questo sono il
medesimo Cratilo. Per riguardo poi a quello, ch'ei dice non esser probabile,
che Platone abbia messo in canzone così ingratamente il suo maestro, noi
facciamo osservare, che Pla tone non gli fa dire da Socrate alcuna cosa dura,
anzi l'ironia, che regna nella esposizione delle etimologie, è pur così
coperta, che può anche sfuggire a non mediocri ingegni. Volendo Platone render
conto, perchè si fosse scostato dalle opinioni eraclitiane del suo primo mae
stro Cratilo, ed avesse poi seguito quelle di Socrate, ei non poteva più
giurare in verbo del suo primo maestro Cratilo, nè rappresen tarcelo superiore
a Socrate nelle ricerche e di scussioni didattiche, ma sì bene rappresentar
celo, come veramente egli era, e cercar, per quanto poteva, di farci conoscere
il modo di verso dell'esposizione scientifica d'amendue, come anche
intieramente il loro carattere. Per questo appunto Platone non si contenta già
di far abbattere da Socrate in questo dialogo le opinioni, che Cratilo aveva
intorno alla ragion de nomi, ma il fa udire ancora una lunga ſi lastrocca di
spinose etimologie, che Socrate espone ad Ermogene, la quale se par essere un
dileggio verso coloro a cui viene fatta, non è però fuor di proposito, perchè
Cratilo era così dato alle dottrine di Eraclito, che tutto contento ed
incantato beccava qualunque cosa gli fosse detta in confermazione di quelle, e
tanta era la sua ostinatezza in quel che soste neva, che dicendogli Socrate
alla fine del dia logo migliore essere il metodo di conoscere le cose per mezzo
di esse stesse nella verità loro, che solamente per mezzo delle loro immagini,
cioè per mezzo dei loro nomi, a tal patente ragione ei non si arrende ancora.
L'altro interlocutore del dialogo, anzi il primo che entra in discorso con
Socrate, è Ermogene, figliuolo d'Ipponico e fratello di Callia. Anche questo
afferma Diogene Laerzio (nel luogo ci tato) essere stato maestro di Platone
nelle dot trine della scuola di Elea. Ma questa asser zione viene rigettata
dall'Ast (nell'opera citata, pag. 2o), e dal Groen Van Prinsterer (Pro
sopographia Platonica, pag. 225), il qual ul timo crede, e con lui concorda lo
Stallbaum, che il testo di Diogene Laerzio sia stato cor rotto da un ignorante,
il quale abbia intruso il nome di Ermogene dopo quello di Cratilo, nell'opinione,
che siccome dei due rappresen Platone, così il fosse anche stato quello
dell'Eleatica, Ermogene. A questo aggiungasi ancora, che Aristotele ed Apuleio,
i quali affermano essere stato Cratilo istitutor di Platone, ciò non di cono
più di Ermogene. Altro è che questi fosse seguace delle dottrine degli
Eleatici, altro è che in esse abbia pure istruito Platone; giacchè trattandosi
di un fatto, sì per istabilire la sua verità, come per abbatterla, è del tutto
neces saria una prova positiva, la quale, quando manca, è nullo tutto ciò, che
pro o contrada qualunque si dice. Per la qual cosa, se l'unica e dubbia
autorità di Diogene Laerzio non si dee tenere da tanto per farci credere vero
tal fatto, neanco per negarlo pare a noi esser suf ficiente la prova negativa
dello Stallbaum e del Groen Van Prinsterer, i quai dicono, il poco ingegno e la
poca dottrina di Ermogene essere un argomento bastante a far sì, che niuno il
possa creder essere stato maestro di Platone. Imperciocchè come veramente
stesse di dottrina Ermogene, non è poi cosa facile a dichiarare, stante che il
merito scientifico degl'interlocu tori, che Platone mette ne suoi dialoghi in
iscena, non si dee giudicare dal grado, in cui egli ce li rappresenta e ce li
fa parlare; giac chè quando si tratta di coloro ch'ei vuol con futare, ei fa da
loro anche dire cose strane ed assurde, le quali essi mai non sognarono, ma ch'egli
però dalle loro dottrine deduce, per sempre far maggiormente spiccare il
contrasto della verità, ch'ei difende. D'altra parte poi, se si dovesse
giudicare da questo dialogo, pare che per niuna parte Ermogene la ceda a Cra
tilo. E nel vero, per non dire che la discus sione, fatta in principio tra
Ermogene e So crate, è sottile anzi che no, e suppone in Ermogene un non
mediocre ingegno, bisogna avvertire che la lunga esposizione delle etimo logie
secondo il sistema di Eraclito, è diretta a mettere in canzone non altri, che
coloro che tal sistema seguivano; e per ciò pare anzi che d'in gegno un po'
tardo ben si potrebbe tacciare Cratilo, che non mai in udirle di tal
corbelleria s'accorga, ma non Ermogene, il quale, udendole, scorgendo per mezzo
di esse beffarsi Socrate dei seguaci delle dottrine di Eraclito, veniva sempre
più confermato in quelle contrarie degli Eleatici, ch'ei sosteneva. Del resto
ch'Ermogene non pigliasse tutte per vere le etimologie di Socrate, non solo si
vede da quello, che in udirle non mai egli fa alcun segno d'ammira zione o di
contentezza, come se fosse giunto alla cognizione di qualcosa grande e nuova,
ma nemmanco di piena approvazione; giacchè, appena che ha udito l'etimologia di
un nome, senza più, quasi sempre passa subito a inter rogar Socrate di quella
di un altro, e se talor mostra d'averne per buona alcuna, la sua con a Socrate,
Pare che un po' ci tocchi o ci cogli ecc., daivet, xtvòvvsústg o doxsig rt
Xéyetv. Ma, che ancora? Che Ermogene più per curiosità e diletto che per altro,
se ne stesse ad ascoltar l'espo sizione delle etimologie di Socrate, argomento
certo n'è, ch'ei pure celia collo stesso Socrate, come (per non citar altri
luoghi) quando udita l'etimologia del nome ivtavróg, anno, ironica mente gli
dice, che aveva già fatto molti passi nella sapienza, e spezialmente quando
Socrate, nello spiegare il vocabolo 3) aſºspdv (blaberon), nocevole, dicendogli
che propriamente si do vrebbe chiamare 3ov) arrrepoijv, boulapteroun, ei gli
soggiugne che all'udirlo pronunziar così bel nome, gli pareva veramente che
zufolasse il preludio dell'aria di Minerva. Il timore e la superstizione, che
dà a dive dere Socrate in questo dialogo, nel protestare che per riguardo agli
Dei e ai loro nomi, ei punto non ne sapeva, ma che solo diceva quello che
ebbero in opinione gli uomini in porre loro i nomi, indicano manifestamente,
che l'Euti frone, per ispirazione della cui musa, ei dice tenere le
spiegazioni, che dà dei nomi, è quello, da cui è pure intitolato un dialogo di
Platone. Così appunto opinano l'Ast e lo Stallbaum. Quest'uomo è il tipo della
leggerezza e della superstizione; ei si vantava di saper meglio che alcun altro
le cose divine, e tanto era il suo entusiasmo, come dice egli stesso (!),
quando di esse parlava e mandava fuori i suoi oracoli, che eccitava il riso e
pareva maniaco. Verisimil mente dunque nell'interpretare la mitologia degli
antichi poeti e spezialmente di Omero, e nel cercar la ragion de nomi degli Dei
e nel darne la spiegazione, vi poneva molto studio e vi met teva pur lo stesso
entusiasmo e furore, come nel mandar fuori gli oracoli. Forse sarà anche stato
della scuola di Eraclito. Onde piacevole e grazioso pare lo scherzo di Platone,
in far per bocca di Socrate dar l'etimologia de nomi a Cratilo, il qual non era
men entusiasta e maniaco in beccar ciò, che parevagli confer mare le sue
dottrine eraclitiane (giacchè, quanto a Ermogene, egli stava, come abbiam
veduto, a udirle più per curiosità e diletto, che per altro); mentre così
facendo Platone, a chi era di perspicace ingegno dava, per mezzo dell'ironia, a
divedere, che a lui non andava a grado, anzi disapprovava il poco ragionevol
modo degli Eraclitiani, nello spiegare i nomi e nel pretendere di trovare quasi
in ciascun verso di Omero qualche cosa di oscuro e mi sterioso, togliendovi
quel suo proprio colore, semplice e naturale. In qual tempo sia stato composto
questo dia logo da Platone, e qual loco gli si debba as ri mane ancora a
vedere. Lo Schleiermacher il pone dopo il Teeteto, il Menone e l'Eutidemo, e
pretende che debba servire di compimento a quel primo; ma ognun vede che
l'argomento della scienza, che trattasi nel Teeteto, non viene ampliato nè
discusso nel Cratilo; anzi tutto il contrario, quel che affatto alla fine del
Cra tilo è appena indicato, viene poi diffusamente discusso nel Teeteto; chiaro
dunque egli è, che questo il dee seguire e non precedere. L'Ast il colloca non
solo dopo il Teeteto, ma anche dopo il Sofista, il Politico e il Parmenide;
anzi crede che il Cratilo faccia parte ed appartenga ad una trilogia o
tetralogia, che non fu da Platone compiuta; e per prova ne adduce le prime
parole del dialogo: Brami tu dunque che in cotesta questione anche qui Socrate
c'entri' le quali ei dice essere del tutto nude, secche e immotivate. Inoltre
che quest'opera non sia un lavoro compiuto, seguita egli, si vede da quello,
che nell'ultima sua parte i passaggi da una cosa all'altra sono scuciti e duri,
e molto, che non ista in immediata relazione con quel che precede, vien posto
senza alcuno appa recchio e introduzione, mentre le ricerche, che si connettono
coll'argomento principale e che eccitano un grande interesse, vengono al
l'improvviso abbandonate. Ma checchè ne voglia dire l'Ast, quantunque le prime
parole del dialogo indichino a precedente discussione tra Er mogene e Cratilo,
tuttavia di questa trilogia o tetralogia incompiuta, ch'ei pretende, non s'in
contra indizio veruno nelle opere di Platone, nè si trova che l'argomento del
Cratilo venga da lui trattato in qualche altro suo dialogo. Questo scritto può
stare da sè, ed io non veggo la ragione, perchè l'Ast il voglia far seguire al
Sofista, al Politico e al Parmenide, e non anzi a tutti questi precedere. E nel
vero, per non dire, che l'irrisione, che domina nell'espo sizione delle
etimologie nel Cratilo, non troppo acconciamente può stare vicina alle gravità
e serietà, con cui sono trattati il Sofista, il Po litico e il Parmenide, l'argomento
del Cratilo non ha che fare con quello di questi; nè si ravvisano ancor in esso
vestigia della scuola pitagorica, come nel Parmenide, ma appena si fa menzione
in un suo luogo dell'armonia de corpi celesti; nè appare ch'ei segua il me todo
dell'investigazione tenuto dai filosofi Me garici, i quali erano versatissimi
in trattare le quistioni di questo genere, come lo segue nel Sofista, nel
Politico e nel Parmenide; nè fi nalmente si vede ch'egli molto insista sulla
sua dottrina delle idee, ma appena ne fa cenno alla fine del dialogo, e la dà
soltanto ancora come un suo sogno. Per l'opposito, niuno può disconoscere, che
tra il Protagora, l'Eu tidemo e il Cratilo vi regni un'affinità quasi irri
sione drammaticamente ci rappresenta Platone il vano fasto di Protagora e di
tutti que sofisti che si millantavano essere maestri di virtù, e se
nell'Eutidemo poi egli si beffa delle meschi nità delle arguzie e de lacciuoli
dialettici pur de' seguaci di Protagora, anche nel Cratilo, come abbiam veduto,
con ischerzo e con ironia viene egli a dimostrare l'inutile sforzo de' Pro
tagoristi-Eraclitiani, che per mezzo dell'inter pretazione del vocaboli
tentavano di venire alla cognizione delle cose e di stabilire i loro sistemi.
Per la qual cosa, sebben l'autore in quest'opera sia lungi dal comico che
domina nel Protagora e nell'Ippia Maggiore, l'andamento però e la condotta
della medesima, come anche la molti plicità degli esempi e le minutezze, con
cui, secondo il metodo di Socrate, procede Platone in principio di essa, e
finalmente ancora lo scherzo e l'ironia che si scorge nell'esposizione delle
etimologie, danno a bastanza a divedere, ch'ella moltissimo si approssima ai
dialoghi po polari Socratici, ch'egli scrisse i primi, e che da lui sia stata
composta in una età, in cui egli non era ancora del tutto scevro da pro tervia
e petulanza giovanile. Non pertanto, quan tunque da solo quello, che si fa
menzione in questo dialogo delle vocali a ed o, le quali furono introdotte in
Atene, sotto l'arcontato di Euclide (l'anno 2 della 94 olimpiade, 4o3 prima
dell'era volgare, e 26 dell'età di Platone), non si possa di certo conchiudere,
che dopo tal anno sia stato questo scritto composto, per la ra gione, come
ottimamente osserva lo Stallbaum, che queste vocali potevano già essere in
vigore in uso privato, prima che pubblicamente fos sero sancite e passate ne'
monumenti pubblici (ved. il Matthiae Gramm. Ampl., tom. 1, pag. 22, annot.);
tuttavia non si può dubitare, che questo dialogo da Platone sia stato disteso
in quel tempo, in cui egli aveva già concepito i principii della sua dottrina
delle idee e deter minato con essa di confutare i Protagorei e gli Eraclitiani.
Or tanto le cognizioni richiedentisi per poter ciò ben fare, quanto le sottili
inve stigazioni circa la ragion de nomi, che in que st'opera si ravvisano,
paiono indicare esserelle un lavoro di Platone non così giovane, ma sì bene di
lui d'alquanto già più maturo. Che se poi tra il Protagora e il Cratilo, che
hanno tra di loro un'affinità che non si può disconoscere, noi abbiamo inserito
l'Ippia Mag giore ed il Gorgia, non è già che crediamo il Gorgia essere
anteriore al Cratilo (anzi la di fesa che nel Gorgia fa Platone di se stesso,
perchè non si fosse dato alla vita pubblica, ma alla filosofica, indica
chiaramente che tale scritto è un lavoro di un uomo più che maturo), ma non per
altro così ci parve di fare, se non perchè abbiam voluto far seguire l'un dopo
celebri sofisti della Grecia, Protagora, Ippia e Gorgia, ne quali Platone
graziosamente smaschera il loro vano sapere ed acremente li frusta. Però se uno
bada, che i Protagoristi-Eraclitiani, che Platone dileggia in questo dialogo
canzonando le loro etimologie, questi medesimi poi con con cludenti ragioni
validamente egli confuta nel Teeteto, facilmente ei si persuaderà, che il
Cratilo a questo dee stare unito e precederlo, anzi che susseguirlo; e per
conseguenza che noi, nell'assegnargli il posto che gli assegniamo, nel suo vero
l'abbiam collocato. Resf.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Acri," per Il
Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
ACTVM
-- or
ACTVM, as Grice would spell it. Grice’s
theory is action-oriented. He often used ‘pragmatic’ to that effect. This is
most evident in his account of meaning. In the phrastic, “The door is closed,
please,” the ultimate intention is that the recipient performs the action of
closing the door. Grice saw action theory as the study of the ontological
structure of human action, the process by which it originates, and the ways in
which it is explained. Most human actions are acts of commission: they
constitute a class of events in which a subject the agent brings about some
change or changes. Thus, in moving one’s finger, one brings it about that one’s
finger moves. When the change brought about is an ongoing process e.g., the
continuing appearance of words on a , the behavior is called an activity
writing. An action of omission occurs when an agent refrains from performing an
action of commission. Since actions of commission are events, the question of
their ontology is in part a matter of the general ontology of change. An
important issue here is whether what occurs when an action is performed should
be viewed as abstract or concrete. On the first approach, actions are
understood either as proposition-like entities e.g., Booth’s moving a finger,
or as a species of universal namely, an
act-type moving a finger. What “occurred” when Booth moved his finger in Ford’sTheater
on April 14, 1865, is held to be the abstract entity in question, and the
entity is viewed as repeatable: that is, precisely the same entity is held to
have occurred on every other occasion of Booth’s moving his finger. When
actions are viewed as concrete, on the other hand, Booth’s moving his finger in
Ford’s Theater is understood to be a non-repeatable particular, accidental
property action theory 6 4065A- 6 and
the movement of the finger counts as an acttoken, which instantiates the
corresponding acttype. Concrete actions are time-bound: each belongs to a
single behavioral episode, and other instantiations of the same act-type count
as distinct events. A second important ontological issue concerns the fact that
by moving his finger, Booth also fired a gun, and killed Lincoln. It is common
for more than one thing to be accomplished in a single exercise of agency, and
how such doings are related is a matter of debate. If actions are understood as
abstract entities, the answer is essentially foregone: there must be as many
different actions on Booth’s part as there are types exemplified. But if
actions are viewed as particulars the same token can count as an instance of
more than one type, and identity claims become possible. Here there is
disagreement. Fine-grained theories of act individuation tend to confine
identity claims to actions that differ only in ways describable through
different modifications of the same main verb
e.g., where Placido both sings and sings loudly. Otherwise, different
types are held to require different tokens: Booth’s action of moving his finger
is held to have generated or given rise to distinct actions of firing the gun
and killing Lincoln, by virtue of having had as causal consequences the gun’s
discharge and Lincoln’s death. The opposite, coarse-grained theory, however,
views these causal relations as grounds for claiming Booth’s acts were
precisely identical. On this view, for Booth to kill Lincoln was simply for him
to do something that caused Lincoln’s death
which was in fact nothing more than to move his finger and similarly for his firing the gun. There
is also a compromise account, on which Booth’s actions are related as part to
whole, each consisting in a longer segment of the causal chain that terminates
with Lincoln’s death. The action of killing Lincoln consisted, on this view, in
the entire sequence; but that of firing the gun terminated with the gun’s
discharge, and that of moving the finger with the finger’s motion. When, as in
Booth’s case, more than one thing is accomplished in a single exercise of
agency, some are done by doing others. But if all actions were performed by
performing others, an infinite regress would result. There must, then, be a
class of basic actions i.e., actions
fundamental to the performance of all others, but not themselves done by doing
something else. There is disagreement, however, on which actions are basic.
Some theories treat bodily movements, such as Booth’s moving his finger, as
basic. Others point out that it is possible to engage in action but to
accomplish less than a bodily movement, as when one tries to move a limb that
is restrained or paralyzed, and fails. According to these accounts, bodily
actions arise out of a still more basic mental activity, usually called
volition or willing, which is held to constitute the standard means for
performing all overt actions. The question of how bodily actions originate is
closely associated with that of what distinguishes them from involuntary and
reflex bodily events, as well as from events in the inanimate world. There is
general agreement that the crucial difference concerns the mental states that
attend action, and in particular the fact that voluntary actions typically
arise out of states of intending on the part of the agent. But the nature of
the relation is difficult, and there is the complicating factor that intention
is sometimes held to reduce to other mental states, such as the agent’s desires
and beliefs. That issue aside, it would appear that unintentional actions arise
out of more basic actions that are intentional, as when one unintentionally
breaks a shoelace by intentionally tugging on it. But how intention is first
tr. into action is much more problematic, especially when bodily movements are
viewed as basic actions. One cannot, e.g., count Booth’s moving his finger as
an intentional action simply because he intended to do so, or even on the
ground if it is true that his intention caused his finger to move. The latter
might have occurred through a strictly autonomic response had Booth been
nervous enough, and then the moving of the finger would not have counted as an
action at all, much less as intentional. Avoiding such “wayward causal chains”
requires accounting for the agent’s voluntary control over what occurs in
genuinely intentional action a difficult
task when bodily actions are held to be basic. Volitional accounts have greater
success here, since they can hold that movements are intentional only when the
agent’s intention is executed through volitional activity. But they must
sidestep another threatened regress: if we call for an activity of willing to
explain why Booth’s moving his finger counts as intentional action, we cannot
do the same for willing itself. Yet on most accounts volition does have the
characteristics of intentional behavior. Volitional theories of action must,
then, provide an alternative account of how mental activity can be intentional.
Actions are explained by invoking the agent’s reasons for performing them.
Characteristically, a reason may be understood to consist in a positive
attitude of the agent toward one or another action theory action theory 7
4065A- 7 outcome, and a belief to the
effect that the outcome may be achieved by performing the action in question.
Thus Emily might spend the summer in France out of a desire to learn , and a
belief that spending time in France is the best way to do so. Disputed
questions about reasons include how confident the agent must be that the action
selected will in fact lead to the envisioned outcome, and whether obligation
represents a source of motivation that can operate independently of the agent’s
desires. Frequently, more than one course of action is available to an agent.
Deliberation is the process of searching out and weighing the reasons for and
against such alternatives. When successfully concluded, deliberation usually
issues in a decision, by which an intention to undertake one of the
contemplated actions is formed. The intention is then carried out when the time
for action comes. Much debate has centered on the question of how reasons are
related to decisions and actions. As with intention, an agent’s simply having a
reason is not enough for the reason to explain her behavior: her desire to
learn notwithstanding, Emily might have
gone to France simply because she was transferred there. Only when an agent
does something for a reason does the reason explain what is done. It is
frequently claimed that this bespeaks a causal relation between the agent’s
strongest reason and her decision or action. This, however, suggests a
determinist stance on the free will problem, leading some philosophers to balk.
An alternative is to treat reason explanations as teleological explanations,
wherein an action is held to be reasonable or justified in virtue of the goals
toward which it was directed. But positions that treat reason explanations as non-causal
require an alternative account of what it is to decide or act for one reason
rather than another. Grice would often
wonder about the pervasiveness of the intentiona idiom in the description of
action. He would use the phrase ‘action verb,’ i. e. a verb applied to an agent
and describing an activity, an action, or an attempt at or a culmination of an
action. Verbs applying to agents may be distinguished in two basic ways: by
whether they can take the progressive continuous form and by whether or not
there is a specific moment of occurrence/completion of the action named by the
verb. An activity verb is one describing something that goes on for a time but
with no inherent endpoint, such as ‘drive’, ‘laugh’, or ‘meditate’. One can
stop doing such a thing but one cannot complete doing it. Indeed, one can be
said to have done it as soon as one has begun doing it. An accomplishment verb
is one describing something that goes on for a time toward an inherent
endpoint, such as ‘paint’ a fence, ‘solve’ a problem, or ‘climb’ a mountain.
Such a thing takes a certain time to do, and one cannot be said to have done it
until it has been completed. An achievement verb is one describing either the
culmination of an activity, such as ‘finish’ a job or ‘reach’ a goal; the
effecting of a change, such as ‘fire’ an employee or ‘drop’ an egg; or
undergoing a change, such as ‘hear’ an explosion or ‘forget’ a name. An
achievement does not go on for a period of time but may be the culmination of
something that does. Ryle singled out achievement verbs and state verbs see
below partly in order to disabuse philosophers of the idea that what
psychological verbs name must invariably be inner acts or activities modeled on
bodily actions or activities. A task verb is an activity verb that implies
attempting to do something named by an achievement verb. For example, to seek
is to attempt to find, to sniff is to attempt to smell, and to treat is to
attempt to cure. A state verb is a verb not an action verb describing a
condition, disposition, or habit rather than something that goes on or takes
place. Examples include ‘own’, ‘weigh’, ‘want’, ‘hate’, ‘frequent’, and
‘teetotal’. These differences were articulated by Zeno Vendler in Linguistics
and Philosophy 7. Taking them into account, linguists have classified verbs and
verb phrases into four main aspectual classes, which they distinguish in
respect to the availability and interpretation of the simple present tense, of
the perfect tenses, of the progressive construction, and of various temporal
adverbials, such as adverbs like ‘yesterday’, ‘finally’, and ‘often’, and
prepositional phrases like ‘for a long time’ and ‘in a while’. Many verbs
belong to more than one category by virtue of having several related uses. For
example, ‘run’ is both an activity and an accomplishment verb, and ‘weigh’ is
both a state and an accomplishment verb. Linguists single out a class of
causative verbs, such as ‘force’, ‘inspire’, and ‘persuade’, some of which are
achievement and some accomplishment verbs. Such causative verbs as ‘break’,
‘burn’, and ‘improve’ have a correlative intransitive use, so that, e.g., to
break something is to cause it to break. Grice denies the idea of an ‘act’ of
the soul. In this way, it is interesting to contrast his views to those philosophers,
even at Oxford, like Occam or Geach, who speak of an act of the soul. And then
there’s act-content-object psychology, or ‘act-object psychology,’ for short, a
philosophical theory that identifies in every psychological state a mental act,
a lived-through phenomenological content, such as a mental image or description
of properties, and an intended object that the mental act is about or toward
which it is directed by virtue of its content. The distinction between the act,
content, and object of thought originated with Alois Höfler’s Logik 0, written
in collaboration with Meinong. But the theory is historically most often
associated with its development in Kazimierz Twardowski’s Zur Lehre vom Inhalt
und Gegenstand der Vorstellung “On the Content and Object of Presentations,” 4,
despite Twardowski’s acknowledgment of his debt to Höfler. Act-object
psychology arose as a reaction to Franz Brentano’s immanent intentionality
thesis in his influential Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt “Psychology from
an Empirical Standpoint,” 1874, in which Brentano maintains that intentionality
is “the mark of the mental,” by contrast with purely physical phenomena.
Brentano requires that intended objects belong immanently to the mental acts
that intend them a philosophical
commitment that laid Brentano open to charges of epistemological idealism and
psychologism. Yet Brentano’s followers, who accepted the intentionality of
thought but resisted what they came to see as its detachable idealism and
psychologism, responded by distinguishing the act-immanent phenomenological
content of a psychological state from its act-transcendent intended object,
arguing that Brentano had wrongly and unnecessarily conflated mental content
with the external objects of thought. Twardowski goes so far as to claim that
content and object can never be identical, an exclusion in turn that is
vigorously challenged by Husserl in his Logische Untersuchungen “Logical
Investigations,” 3, 2, and by others in the phenomenological tradition who acknowledge
the possibility that a self-reflexive thought can sometimes be about its own
content as intended object, in which content and object are indistinguishable.
Act-object psychology continues to be of interest to contemporary philosophy
because of its relation to ongoing projects in phenomenology, and as a result
of a resurgence of study of the concept of intentionality and qualia in
philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and Gegenstandstheorie, or existent
and non-existent intended object theory, in philosophical logic and
semantics. Grice was fascinated by the
metaphysically wrong theory of agent-causation. He would make fun of it. His
example, “The cause of the death of Charles I is decapitation; therefore,
decapitation willed the death of Charles I. Grice would refer to transeunt
causation in “Actions and events.” In Grice’s terms, agent causation is the
convoluted idea that the primary cause of an event is a substance; more
specifically, causation by a substance, as opposed to an event. Thus a brick a
substance may be said to be the cause of the breaking of the glass. The
expression is also used more narrowly by Reid and others for the view that an
action or event is caused by an exertion of power by some agent endowed with
will and understanding. Thus, a person may be said to be the cause of her
action of opening the door. In this restricted sense Reid called it “the strict
and proper sense”, an agent-cause must have the power to cause the action or
event and the power not to cause it. Moreover, it must be “up to” the agent
whether to cause the event or not to cause it. It is not “up to” the brick
whether to cause or not to cause the breaking of the glass. The restricted
sense of agent causation developed by Reid is closely tied to the view that the
agent possesses free will. Medieval philosophers distinguished the internal
activity of the agent from the external event produced by that activity. The
former was called “immanent causation” and the latter “transeunt causation.”
These terms have been adapted by Chisholm and others to mark the difference
between agent causation and event causation. The idea is that the internal
activity is agentcaused by the person whose activity it is; whereas the
external event is event-caused by the internal activity of the agent. His “Death of Charles I” example is meant as
a reductio ad sbsurdum of ‘agent causation.’ The philosopher cannot possibly be
meaning to communicate such absurdity. The ‘actus’ is less obviously related to
the actum, but it should. When Grice says, “What is actual is not also
possible” as a mistake – he is not thinking of HUMAN rational agency – but some
kind of agency, though. It may be thought that ‘actum’ is still phrased after a
‘that’-clause, even if what is reported is something that is actual, e. g. It
is actually raining (versus It is possibly raining in Cambridge). – potentia --
energeia, Grecian term coined by Aristotle and often tr. as ‘activity’,
‘actuality’, and even ‘act’, but more literally rendered ‘a state of
functioning’. Since for Aristotle the function of an object is its telos or
aim, energeia can also be described as an entelecheia or realization another
coined term he uses interchangeably with energeia. So understood, it can denote
either a something’s being functional, though not in use at the moment, and b
something’s actually functioning, which Aristotle describes as a “first
realization” and “second realization” respectively On the Soul II.5. In
general, every energeia is correlative to some dunamis, a capability or power
to function in a certain way, and in the central books of the Metaphysics
Aristotle uses the linkage between these two concepts to explain the relation
of form to matter. He also distinguishes between energeia and kinesis change or
motion Metaphysics IX.6; Nicomachean Ethics X.4. A kinesis is defined by
reference to its terminus e.g., learning how to multiply and is thus incomplete
at any point before reaching its conclusion. An energeia, in contrast, is a
state complete in itself e.g., seeing. Thus, Aristotle says that at any time
that I am seeing, it is also true that I have seen; but it is not true that at
any time I am learning that I have learned. In Grecian, this difference is not
so much one of tense as of encrateia energeia 264 264 aspect: the perfect tense marks a
“perfect” or complete state, and not necessarily prior activity. energeticism, also called energetism or
energism, the doctrine that energy is the fundamental substance underlying all
change. Its most prominent champion was the physical chemist Wilhelm Ostwald. In
his address “Die Überwindung des wissenschaftlichen Materialismus” “The
Conquest of Scientific Materialism”, delivered at Lübeck in 5, Ostwald
chastised the atomic-kinetic theory as lacking progress and claimed that a
unified science, energetics, could be based solely on the concept of energy.
Many of Ostwald’s criticisms of materialism and mechanistic reductionism
derived from Mach. Ostwald’s attempts to deduce the fundamental equations of
thermodynamics and mechanics from the principles of energy conservation and
transformation were indebted to the writings of Georg Helm 18749, especially
Die Lehre von Energie “The Laws of Energy,” 7 and Die Energetik “Energetics,”
8. Ostwald defended Helm’s factorization thesis that all changes in energy can
be analyzed as a product of intensity and capacity factors. The factorization
thesis and the attempt to derive mechanics and thermodynamics from the
principles of energetics were subjected to devastating criticisms by Boltzmann
and Max Planck. Boltzmann also criticized the dogmatism of Ostwald’s rejection
of the atomickinetic theory. Ostwald’s program to unify the sciences under the
banner of energetics withered in the
face of these criticisms.” actum: -- behaviourism. Grice
was amused that what Ryle thought was behaviouristic was already pervaded wiith
mentalistic talk! Referred to by H. P. Grice in his criticism of Gilbert Ryle.
Ironically, Chomsky misjudged Grice as a behaviourist, but Chomsky’s critique
was demolished by P. Suppes, broadly, the view that behavior is fundamental in
understanding mental phenomena. The term applies both to a scientific research
Beauvoir, Simone de behaviorism 76 76
program in psychology and to a philosophical doctrine. Accordingly, we
distinguish between scientific psychological, methodological behaviorism and
philosophical logical, analytical behaviorism. Scientific behaviorism. First
propounded by the psychologist J. B.
Watson who introduced the term in 3 and further developed especially by C. L.
Hull, E. C. Tolman, and B. F. Skinner, it departed from the introspectionist
tradition by redefining the proper task of psychology as the explanation and
prediction of behavior where to explain
behavior is to provide a “functional analysis” of it, i.e., to specify the
independent variables stimuli of which the behavior response is lawfully a
function. It insisted that all variables
including behavior as the dependent variable must be specifiable by the experimental
procedures of the natural sciences: merely introspectible, internal states of
consciousness are thus excluded from the proper domain of psychology. Although
some behaviorists were prepared to admit internal neurophysiological conditions
among the variables “intervening variables”, others of more radical bent e.g.
Skinner insisted on environmental variables alone, arguing that any relevant
variations in the hypothetical inner states would themselves in general be a
function of variations in past and present environmental conditions as, e.g.,
thirst is a function of water deprivation. Although some basic responses are
inherited reflexes, most are learned and integrated into complex patterns by a
process of conditioning. In classical respondent conditioning, a response
already under the control of a given stimulus will be elicited by new stimuli
if these are repeatedly paired with the old stimulus: this is how we learn to
respond to new situations. In operant conditioning, a response that has
repeatedly been followed by a reinforcing stimulus reward will occur with
greater frequency and will thus be “selected” over other possible responses:
this is how we learn new responses. Conditioned responses can also be unlearned
or “extinguished” by prolonged dissociation from the old eliciting stimuli or
by repeated withholding of the reinforcing stimuli. To show how all human
behavior, including “cognitive” or intelligent behavior, can be “shaped” by
such processes of selective reinforcement and extinction of responses was the
ultimate objective of scientific behaviorism. Grave difficulties in the way of
the realization of this objective led to increasingly radical liberalization of
the distinctive features of behaviorist methodology and eventually to its
displacement by more cognitively oriented approaches e.g. those inspired by
information theory and by Chomsky’s work in linguistics. Philosophical
behaviorism. A semantic thesis about the meaning of mentalistic expressions, it
received its most sanguine formulation by the logical positivists particularly
Carnap, Hempel, and Ayer, who asserted that statements containing mentalistic
expressions have the same meaning as, and are thus translatable into, some set
of publicly verifiable confirmable, testable statements describing behavioral
and bodily processes and dispositions including verbalbehavioral dispositions.
Because of the reductivist concerns expressed by the logical positivist thesis
of physicalism and the unity of science, logical behaviorism as some
positivists preferred to call it was a corollary of the thesis that psychology
is ultimately via a behavioristic analysis reducible to physics, and that all
of its statements, like those of physics, are expressible in a strictly
extensional language. Another influential formulation of philosophical
behaviorism is due to Ryle The Concept of Mind, 9, whose classic critique of
Cartesian dualism rests on the view that mental predicates are often used to
ascribe dispositions to behave in characteristic ways: but such ascriptions,
for Ryle, have the form of conditional, lawlike statements whose function is
not to report the occurrence of inner states, physical or non-physical, of
which behavior is the causal manifestation, but to license inferences about how
the agent would behave if certain conditions obtained. To suppose that all
declarative uses of mental language have a fact-stating or -reporting role at
all is, for Ryle, to make a series of “category mistakes” of which both Descartes and the logical
positivists were equally guilty. Unlike the behaviorism of the positivists,
Ryle’s behaviorism required no physicalistic reduction of mental language, and
relied instead on ordinary language descriptions of human behavior. A further
version of philosophical behaviorism can be traced to Vitters Philosophical
Investigations, 3, who argues that the epistemic criteria for the applicability
of mentalistic terms cannot be private, introspectively accessible inner states
but must instead be intersubjectively observable behavior. Unlike the
previously mentioned versions of philosophical behaviorism, Vitters’s
behaviorism seems to be consistent with metaphysical mindbody dualism, and is
thus also non-reductivist. behaviorism behaviorism 77 77 Philosophical behaviorism underwent
severe criticism in the 0s and 0s, especially by Chisholm, Charles Taylor,
Putnam, and Fodor. Nonetheless it still lives on in more or less attenuated
forms in the work of such diverse philosophers as Quine, Dennett, Armstrong,
David Lewis, U. T. Place, and Dummett. Though current “functionalism” is often
referred to as the natural heir to behaviorism, functionalism especially of the
Armstrong-Lewis variety crucially differs from behaviorism in insisting that
mental predicates, while definable in terms of behavior and behavioral
dispositions, nonetheless designate inner causal states states that are apt to cause certain
characteristic behaviors. -- behavior
therapy, a spectrum of behavior modification techniques applied as therapy, such
as aversion therapy, extinction, modeling, redintegration, operant conditioning,
and desensitization. Unlike psychotherapy, which probes a client’s recollected
history, behavior therapy focuses on immediate behavior, and aims to eliminate
undesired behavior and produce desired behavior through methods derived from
the experimental analysis of behavior and from reinforcement theory. A chronic
problem with psychotherapy is that the client’s past is filtered through
limited and biased recollection. Behavior therapy is more mechanical, creating
systems of reinforcement and conditioning that may work independently of the
client’s long-term memory. Collectively, behavior-therapeutic techniques
compose a motley set. Some behavior therapists adapt techniques from
psychotherapy, as in covert desensitization, where verbally induced mental images
are employed as reinforcers. A persistent problem with behavior therapy is that
it may require repeated application. Consider aversion therapy. It consists of
pairing painful or punishing stimuli with unwelcome behavior. In the absence,
after therapy, of the painful stimulus, the behavior may recur because
association between behavior and punishment is broken. Critics charge that
behavior therapy deals with immediate disturbances and overt behavior, to the
neglect of underlying problems and irrationalities. Behaviourism. Chomsky, a. n. – cites H. P.
Grice as “A. P. Grice” -- preeminent
philosopher, and political activist who has spent his professional
career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Chomsky’s best-known
scientific achievement is the establishment of a rigorous and philosophically
compelling foundation for the scientific study of the grammar of natural
language. With the use of tools from the study of formal languages, he gave a
far more precise and explanatory account of natural language grammar than had
previously been given Syntactic Structures, 7. He has since developed a number
of highly influential frameworks for the study of natural language grammar
e.g., Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 5; Lectures on Government and Binding,
1; The Minimalist Program, 5. Though there are significant differences in
detail, there are also common themes that underlie these approaches. Perhaps
the most central is that there is an innate set of linguistic principles shared
by all humans, and the purpose of linguistic inquiry is to describe the initial
state of the language learner, and account for linguistic variation via the
most general possible mechanisms. On Chomsky’s conception of linguistics,
languages are structures in the brains of individual speakers, described at a
certain level of abstraction within the theory. These structures occur within
the language faculty, a hypothesized module of the human brain. Universal
Grammar is the set of principles hard-wired into the language faculty that determine
the class of possible human languages. This conception of linguistics involves
several influential and controversial theses. First, the hypothesis of a
Universal Grammar entails the existence of innate linguistic principles.
Secondly, the hypothesis of a language faculty entails that our linguistic
abilities, at least so far as grammar is concerned, are not a product of
general reasoning processes. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, since
having one of these structures is an intrinsic property of a speaker,
properties of languages so conceived are determined solely by states of the
speaker. On this individualistic conception of language, there is no room in
scientific linguistics for the social entities determined by linguistic
communities that are languages according to previous anthropological
conceptions of the discipline. Many of Chomsky’s most significant contributions
to philosophy, such as his influential rejection of behaviorism “Review of
Skinner’s Verbal Behavior,” Language, 9, stem from his elaborations and
defenses of the above consequences cf. also Cartesian Linguistics, 6;
Reflections on Language, 5; Rules and Representations, 0; Knowledge of
Language, 6. Chomsky’s philosophical writings are characterized by an adherence
to methodological naturalism, the view that the mind should be studied like any
other natural phenomenon. In recent years, he has also argued that reference,
in the sense in which it is used in the philosophy of language, plays no role
in a scientific theory of language “Language and Nature,” Mind, 5.
Ad-biter
– Grice: “How can a choice not be free?” -- liberum arbitrium – Grice: “I would
place the traditional proble of the freedom of the will within the philosophy
of action, of the type I engaged in only with two Englishmen, both students at
Christ Church, or ‘The House,’: J. F. Thomson, and D. F. Pears. free: “ “Free” is one of the trickiest
adjectives in English. My favourite is ‘alcohol-free’. And then there’s ‘free
logic.”” Free logic, a system of quantification theory, with or without
identity, that allows for non-denoting singular terms. In classical
quantification theory, all singular terms free variables and individual
constants are assigned a denotation in all models. But this condition appears
counterintuitive when such systems are applied to natural language, where many
singular terms seem to be non-denoting ‘Pegasus’, ‘Sherlock Holmes’, and the
like. Various solutions of this problem have been proposed, ranging from
Frege’s chosen object theory assign an arbitrary denotation to each
non-denoting singular term to Russell’s description theory deny singular term
status to most expressions used as such in natural language, and eliminate them
from the “logical form” of that language to a weakening of the quantifiers’
“existential import,” which allows for denotations to be possible, but not
necessarily actual, objects. All these solutions preserve the structure of
classical quantification theory and make adjustments at the level of
application. Free logic is a more radical solution: it allows for legitimate
singular terms to be denotationless, maintains the quantifiers’ existential
import, but modifies both the proof theory and the semantics of first-order
logic. Within proof theory, the main modification consists of eliminating the
rule of existential generalization, which allows one to infer ‘There exists a
flying horse’ from ‘Pegasus is a flying horse’. Within semantics, the main
problem is giving truth conditions for sentences containing non-denoting singular
terms, and there are various ways of accomplishing this. Conventional semantics
assigns truth-values to atomic sentences containing non-denoting singular terms
by convention, and then determines the truth-values of complex sentences as
usual. Outer domain semantics divides the domain of interpretation into an
inner and an outer part, using the inner part as the range of quantifiers and
the outer part to provide for “denotations” for non-denoting singular terms
which are then not literally denotationless, but rather left without an
existing denotation. Supervaluational semantics, when considering a sentence A,
assigns all possible combinations of truth-values to the atomic components of A
containing non-denoting singular terms, evaluates A on the basis of each of
those combinations, and then assigns to A the logical product of all such
evaluations. Thus both ‘Pegasus flies’ and ‘Pegasus does not fly’ turn out
truth-valueless, but ‘Pegasus flies or Pegasus does not fly’ turns out true
since whatever truth-value is assigned to its atomic component ‘Pegasus flies’
the truth-value for the whole sentence is true. A free logic is inclusive if it
allows for the possibility that the range of quantifiers be empty that there
exists nothing at all; it is exclusive otherwise. Then there’s the free rider, a person who
benefits from a social arrangement without bearing an appropriate share of the
burdens of maintaining that arrangement, e.g. one who benefits from government
services without paying one’s taxes that support them. The arrangements from
which a free rider benefits may be either formal or informal. Cooperative
arrangements that permit free riders are likely to be unstable; parties to the
arrangement are unlikely to continue to bear the burdens of maintaining it if
others are able to benefit without doing their part. As a result, it is common
for cooperative arrangements to include mechanisms to discourage free riders,
e.g. legal punishment, or in cases of informal conventions the mere disapproval
of one’s peers. It is a matter of some controversy as to whether it is always
morally wrong to benefit from an arrangement without contributing to its
maintenance. Then there’s the free will problem, the problem of the nature of
free agency and its relation to the origins and conditions of responsible
behavior. For those who contrast ‘free’ with ‘determined’, a central question
is whether humans are free in what they do or determined by external events
beyond their control. A related concern is whether an agent’s responsibility
for an action requires that the agent, the act, or the relevant decision be
free. This, in turn, directs attention to action, motivation, deliberation,
choice, and intention, and to the exact sense, if any, in which our actions are
under our control. Use of ‘free will’ is a matter of traditional nomenclature;
it is debated whether freedom is properly ascribed to the will or the agent, or
to actions, choices, deliberations, etc. Controversy over conditions of
responsible behavior forms the predominant historical and conceptual background
of the free will problem. Most who ascribe moral responsibility acknowledge
some sense in which agents must be free in acting as they do; we are not
responsible for what we were forced to do or were unable to avoid no matter how
hard we tried. But there are differing accounts of moral responsibility and
disagreements about the nature and extent of such practical freedom a notion
also important in Kant. Accordingly, the free will problem centers on these
questions: Does moral responsibility require any sort of practical freedom? If
so, what sort? Are people practically free? Is practical freedom consistent
with the antecedent determination of actions, thoughts, and character? There is
vivid debate about this last question. Consider a woman deliberating about whom
to vote for. From her first-person perspective, she feels free to vote for any
candidate and is convinced that the selection is up to her regardless of prior
influences. But viewing her eventual behavior as a segment of larger natural
and historical processes, many would argue that there are underlying causes
determining her choice. With this contrast of intuitions, any attempt to decide
whether the voter is free depends on the precise meanings associated with terms
like ‘free’, ‘determine’, and ‘up to her’. One thing event, situation
determines another if the latter is a consequence of it, or necessitated by it,
e.g., the voter’s hand movements by her intention. As usually understood,
determinism holds that whatever happens is determined by antecedent conditions,
where determination is standardly conceived as causation by antecedent events
and circumstances. So construed, determinism implies that at any time the
future is already fixed and unique, with no possibility of alternative
development. Logical versions of determinism declare each future event to be
determined by what is already true, specifically, by the truth that it will
occur then. Typical theological variants accept the predestination of all
circumstances and events inasmuch as a divine being knows in advance or even
from eternity that they will obtain. Two elements are common to most
interpretations of ‘free’. First, freedom requires an absence of determination
or certain sorts of determination, and second, one acts and chooses freely only
if these endeavors are, properly speaking, one’s own. From here, accounts
diverge. Some take freedom liberty of indifference or the contingency of
alternative courses of action to be critical. Thus, for the woman deliberating
about which candidate to select, each choice is an open alternative inasmuch as
it is possible but not yet necessitated. Indifference is also construed as
motivational equilibrium, a condition some find essential to the idea that a
free choice must be rational. Others focus on freedom liberty of spontaneity,
where the voter is free if she votes as she chooses or desires, a reading that
reflects the popular equation of freedom with “doing what you want.” Associated
with both analyses is a third by which the woman acts freely if she exercises
her control, implying responsiveness to free rider free will problem 326 326 intent as well as both abilities to
perform an act and to refrain. A fourth view identifies freedom with autonomy,
the voter being autonomous to the extent that her selection is self-determined,
e.g., by her character, deeper self, higher values, or informed reason. Though
distinct, these conceptions are not incompatible, and many accounts of
practical freedom include elements of each. Determinism poses problems if
practical freedom requires contingency alternate possibilities of action.
Incompatibilism maintains that determinism precludes freedom, though
incompatibilists differ whether everything is determined. Those who accept
determinism thereby endorse hard determinism associated with eighteenthcentury
thinkers like d’Holbach and, recently, certain behaviorists, according to which
freedom is an illusion since behavior is brought about by environmental and
genetic factors. Some hard determinists also deny the existence of moral
responsibility. At the opposite extreme, metaphysical libertarianism asserts
that people are free and responsible and, a fortiori, that the past does not
determine a unique future a position
some find enhanced by developments in quantum physics. Among adherents of this
sort of incompatibilism are those who advocate a freedom of indifference by
describing responsible choices as those that are undetermined by antecedent
circumstances Epicureans. To rebut the charge that choices, so construed, are
random and not really one’s “own,” it has been suggested that several elements,
including an agent’s reasons, delimit the range of possibilities and influence
choices without necessitating them a view held by Leibniz and, recently, by
Robert Kane. Libertarians who espouse agency causation, on the other hand,
blend contingency with autonomy in characterizing a free choice as one that is
determined by the agent who, in turn, is not caused to make it a view found in
Carneades and Reid. Unwilling to abandon practical freedom yet unable to
understand how a lack of determination could be either necessary or desirable
for responsibility, many philosophers take practical freedom and responsibility
to be consistent with determinism, thereby endorsing compatibilism. Those who
also accept determinism advocate what James called soft determinism. Its
supporters include some who identify freedom with autonomy the Stoics, Spinoza
and others who champion freedom of spontaneity Hobbes, Locke, Hume. The latter
speak of liberty as the power of doing or refraining from an action according
to what one wills, so that by choosing otherwise one would have done otherwise.
An agent fails to have liberty when constrained, that is, when either prevented
from acting as one chooses or compelled to act in a manner contrary to what one
wills. Extending this model, liberty is also diminished when one is caused to
act in a way one would not otherwise prefer, either to avoid a greater danger
coercion or because there is deliberate interference with the envisioning of
alternatives manipulation. Compatibilists have shown considerable ingenuity in
responding to criticisms that they have ignored freedom of choice or the need
for open alternatives. Some apply the spontaneity, control, or autonomy models
to decisions, so that the voter chooses freely if her decision accords with her
desires, is under her control, or conforms to her higher values, deeper
character, or informed reason. Others challenge the idea that responsibility
requires alternative possibilities of action. The so-called Frankfurt-style
cases developed by Harry G. Frankfurt are situations where an agent acts in
accord with his desires and choices, but because of the presence of a
counterfactual intervener a mechanism
that would have prevented the agent from doing any alternative action had he
shown signs of acting differently the
agent could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt’s intuition is that the agent is
as responsible as he would have been if there were no intervener, and thus that
responsible action does not require alternative possibilities. Critics have
challenged the details of the Frankfurt-style cases in attempting to undermine
the appeal of the intuition. A different compatibilist tactic recognizes the
need for open alternatives and employs versions of the indifference model in
describing practical freedom. Choices are free if they are contingent relative
to certain subsets of circumstances, e.g. those the agent is or claims to be
cognizant of, with the openness of alternatives grounded in what one can choose
“for all one knows.” Opponents of compatibilism charge that since these
refinements leave agents subject to external determination, even by hidden
controllers, compatibilism continues to face an insurmountable challenge. Their
objections are sometimes summarized by the consequence argument so called by
Peter van Inwagen, who has prominently defended it: if everything were
determined by factors beyond one’s control, then one’s acts, choices, and
character would also be beyond one’s control, and consequently, agents would
never be free and there would be nothing free will problem free will problem
327 327 for which they are responsible.
Such reasoning usually employs principles asserting the closure of the
practical modalities ability, control, avoidability, inevitability, etc. under
consequence relations. However, there is a reason to suppose that the sort of
ability and control required by responsibility involve the agent’s sense of
what can be accomplished. Since cognitive states are typically not closed under
consequence, the closure principles underlying the consequence argument are
disputable. From liber (‘eleutheros) is also liberatum: liberum arbitrium – vide ‘arbitrium’ How can arbitrium
not be free? Oddly this concerns rationality. For Grice, as for almost
everyone, a rational agent is an autonomous agent. Freewill is proved
grammatically. The Romans had a ‘modus deliberativus’, and even a ‘modus
optativus’ (ortike ktesis) “in imitationem Graecis.”If you utter “Close the
door!” you rely on free will. It would be otiose for a language or system of
communication to have as its goal to inform/get informed, and influence/being
influenced if determinism and fatalism were true. freedom: Like identity, crucial in philosophy
in covering everything. E cannot communicate that p, unless E is FREE. An
amoeba cannot communicate thatp. End setting, unweighed rationality,
rationality about the ends, autonomy. Grice was especially concerned with Kants
having brought back the old Greek idea of eleutheria for philosophical
discussion. Refs.: the obvious keywords are “freedom” and “free,” but most of
the material is in “Actions and events,” in PPQ, and below under ‘kantianism’ –
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.Bratman, of Stanford, much influenced by Grice (at
Berkeley then) thanks to their Hands-Across-the-Bay programme, helps us to
understand this Pological progression towards the idea of strong autonomy or
freedom. Recall that Grices Ps combine Lockes very intelligent parrots with
Russells and Carnaps nonsensical Ps of which nothing we are told other than
they karulise elatically. Grices purpose is to give a little thought to a
question. What are the general principles exemplified, in creature-construction,
in progressing from one type of P to a higher type? What kinds of steps are
being made? The kinds of step with which Grice deals are those which culminate
in a licence to include, within the specification of the content of the
psychological state of this or that type of P, a range of expressions which
would be inappropriate with respect to this lower-type P. Such expressions
include this or that connective, this or that quantifier, this or that temporal
modifier, this or that mode indicator, this or that modal operator, and
(importantly) this or that expression to refer to this or that souly state
like … judges that … and … will that …
This or that expression, that is, the availability of which leads to the
structural enrichment of the specification of content. In general, these steps
will be ones by which this or that item or idea which has, initially, a
legitimate place outside the scope of this or that souly instantiable (or, if
you will, the expressions for which occur legitimately outside the scope of this
or that souly predicate) come to have a legitimate place within the scope of
such an instantiable, a step by which, one might say, this or that item or
ideas comes to be internalised. Grice is disposed to regard as prototypical the
sort of natural disposition or propension which Hume attributes to a person,
and which is very important to Hume, viz. the tendency of the soul to spread
itself upon objects, i.e. to project into the world items which, properly or
primitively considered, is a feature of this or that souly state. Grice sets
out in stages the application of aspects of the genitorial programme. We then
start with a zero-order, with a P equipped to satisfy unnested, or logically
amorphous, judging and willing, i.e. whose contents do not involve judging or
willing. We soon reach our first P, G1. It would be advantageous to
a P0 if it could have this or that judging and this or that
willing, which relate to its own judging or willing. Such G1 could
be equipped to control or regulate its own judgings and willings. It will
presumably be already constituted so as to conform to the law that, cæteris
paribus, if it wills that p and judge that ~p, if it can, it makes it the case
that p in its soul To give it some control over its judgings and willings, we need
only extend the application of this law to the Ps judging and willing. We equip
the P so that, cæteris paribus, if it wills that it is not the case that it
wills that p and it judges that they do will that p, if it can, it makes it the
case that it does not will that p. And we somehow ensure that sometimes it can
do this. It may be that the installation of this kind of control would go hand
in had with the installation of the capacity for evaluation. Now, unlike it is
the case with a G1, a G2s intentional effort depends on the motivational
strength of its considered desire at the time of action. There is a process by
which this or that conflicting considered desire motivates action as a broadly
causal process, a process that reveals motivational strength. But a G2 might
itself try to weigh considerations provided by such a conflicting desire B1 and
B2 in deliberation about this or that pro and this or that con of various
alternatives. In the simplest case, such weighing treats each of the things
desired as a prima facie justifying end. In the face of conflict, it weighs
this and that desired end, where the weights correspond to the motivational
strength of the associated considered desire. The outcome of such deliberation,
Aristotle’s prohairesis, matches the outcome of the causal motivational process
envisioned in the description of G2. But, since the weights it
invokes in such deliberation correspond to the motivational strength of this or
that relevant considered desire (though perhaps not to the motivational
strength of this or that relevant considered desire), the resultant activitiy
matches those of a corresponding G2 (each of whose desires, we
are assuming, are considered). To be more realistic, we might limit ourselves
to saying that a P2 has the capacity to make the transition
from this or that unconsidered desire to this or that considered desire, but
does not always do this. But it will keep the discussion more manageable to
simplify and to suppose that each desire is considered. We shall not want this
G2 to depend, in each will and act in ways that reveal the motivational
strength of this or that considered desire at the time of action, but for a G3 it
will also be the case that in this or that, though not each) case, it acts on
the basis of how it weights this or that end favoured by this or that
conflicting considered desire. This or that considered desire will concern
matters that cannot be achieved simply by action at a single time. E. g. G3 may
want to nurture a vegetable garden, or build a house. Such matters will require
organized and coordinated action that extends over time. What the G3 does now
will depend not only on what it now desires but also on what it now expects it
will do later given what it does now. It needs a way of settling now what it
will do later given what it does now. The point is even clearer when we remind
ourselves that G3 is not alone. It is, we may assume, one of some number of G3;
and in many cases it needs to coordinate what it does with what other G3 do so
as to achieve ends desired by all participants, itself included. These
costs are magnified for G4 whose various plans are interwoven so that a change
in one element can have significant ripple effects that will need to be
considered. Let us suppose that the general strategies G4 has for responding to
new information about its circumstances are sensitive to these kinds of costs.
Promoting in the long run the satisfaction of its considered desires and
preferences. G4 is a somewhat sophisticated planning agent but
it has a problem. It can expect that its desires and preferences may well
change over time and undermine its efforts at organizing and coordinating its
activities over time. Perhaps in many cases this is due to the kind of temporal
discounting. So for example G4 may have a plan to exercise every day but may
tend to prefer a sequence of not exercising on the present day but exercising
all days in the future, to a uniform sequence the present day included. At the
end of the day it returns to its earlier considered preference in favour of
exercising on each and every day. Though G4, unlike G3, has the
capacity to settle on prior plans or plaices concerning exercise, this capacity
does not yet help in such a case. A creature whose plans were stable in ways in
part shaped by such a no-regret principle would be more likely than G4 to
resist temporary temptations. So let us build such a principle into the
stability of the plans of a G5, whose plans and policies are not derived solely
from facts about its limits of time, attention, and the like. It is also
grounded in the central concerns of a planning agent with its own future,
concerns that lend special significance to anticipated future regret. So let us
add to G5 the capacity and disposition to arrive at such hierarchies of
higher-order desires concerning its will. This gives us creature G6. There
is a problem with G6, one that has been much discussed. It is not clear why a
higher-order desire ‒ even a higher-order desire that a certain
desire be ones will ‒ is not simply one more desire in the pool of
desires (Berkeley Gods will problem). Why does it have the authority to
constitute or ensure the agents (i. e. the creatures) endorsement or rejection
of a first-order desire? Applied to G6 this is the question of whether, by
virtue solely of its hierarchies of desires, it really does succeed in taking
its own stand of endorsement or rejection of various first-order desires. Since
it was the ability to take its own stand that we are trying to provide in the
move to P6, we need some response to this challenge. The basic point
is that G6 is not merely a time-slice agent. It is, rather, and
understands itself to be, a temporally persisting planning agent, one who
begins, and continues, and completes temporally extended projects. On a broadly
Lockean view, its persistence over time consists in relevant psychological continuities
(e.g., the persistence of attitudes of belief and intention) and connections
(e.g., memory of a past event, or the later intentional execution of an
intention formed earlier). Certain attitudes have as a primary role the
constitution and support of such Lockean continuities and connections. In
particular, policies that favour or reject various desires have it as their
role to constitute and support various continuities both of ordinary desires
and of the politicos themselves. For this reason such policies are not merely
additional wiggles in the psychic stew. Instead, these policies have a claim to
help determine where the agent ‒ i.e., the temporally persisting agent ‒
stands with respect to its desires, or so it seems to me reasonable to say. The
psychology of G7 continues to have the hierarchical structure of pro-attitudes
introduced with G6. The difference is that the higher-order pro-attitudes of G6
were simply characterized as desires in a broad, generic sense, and no appeal
was made to the distinctive species of pro-attitude constituted by plan-like
attitudes. That is the sense in which the psychology of G7 is an extension of
the psychology of G6. Let us then give G7 such higher-order policies with the
capacity to take a stand with respect to its desires by arriving at relevant
higher-order policies concerning the functioning of those desires over time. G7 exhibits
a merger of hierarchical and planning structures. Appealing to planning theory
and ground in connection to the temporally extended structure of agency to be
ones will. G7 has higher-order policies that favour or challenge motivational
roles of its considered desires. When G7 engages in deliberative weighing of
conflicting, desired ends it seems that the assigned weights should reflect the
policies that determine where it stands with respect to relevant desires. But
the policies we have so far appealed to ‒ policies concerning what desires are
to be ones will ‒ do not quite address this concern. The problem is that one
can in certain cases have policies concerning which desires are to motivate and
yet these not be policies that accord what those desires are for a
corresponding justifying role in deliberation. G8. A solution is to give our
creature, G8, the capacity to arrive at policies that express
its commitment to be motivated by a desire by way of its treatment of that
desire as providing, in deliberation, a justifying end for action. G8 has
policies for treating (or not treating) certain desires as providing justifying
ends, as, in this way, reason-providing, in motivationally effective
deliberation. Let us call such policies self-governing policies. We will
suppose that these policies are mutually compatible and do not challenge each
other. In this way G8 involves an extension of structures already present in
G7. The grounds on which G8 arrives at (and on occasion revises) such
self-governing policies will be many and varied. We can see these policies as
crystallizing complex pressures and concerns, some of which are grounded in other
policies or desires. These self-governing policies may be tentative and will
normally not be immune to change. If we ask what G8 values in this case, the
answer seems to be: what it values is constituted in part by its higher-order
self-governing policies. In particular, it values exercise over nonexercise
even right now, and even given that it has a considered, though temporary,
preference to the contrary. Unlike lower Ps, what P8 now values
is not simply a matter of its present, considered desires and preferences. Now
this model of P8 seems in relevant aspects to be a partial) model of us, in our
better moments, of course. So we arrive at the conjecture that one important
kind of valuing of which we are capable involves, in the cited ways, both our
first-order desires and our higher order self-governing policies. In an
important sub-class of cases our valuing involves reflexive polices that are
both first-order policies of action and higher-order policies to treat the
first-order policy as reason providing in motivationally effective
deliberation. This may seem odd. Valuing seems normally to be a first-order
attitude. One values honesty, say. The proposal is that an important kind of
valuing involves higher-order policies. Does this mean that, strictly speaking,
what one values (in this sense) is itself a desire ‒ not honesty, say, but a
desire for honesty? No, it does not. What I value in the present case is
honesty; but, on the theory, my valuing honesty in art consists in certain
higher-order self-governing policies. An agents reflective valuing involves a
kind of higher-order willing. Freud challenged the power structure of the soul
in Plato: it is the libido that takes control, not the logos. Grice takes up
this polemic. Aristotle takes up Platos challenge, each type of soul is united
to the next by the idea of life. The animal soul, between the vegetative and
the rational, is not detachable.
ADDITVM
-- additum:
or, ADDITVM, as Grice would spell it -- f. addo ,
dĭdi, dĭtum, 3, v. a. 2. do (addues for addideris, Paul. ex Fest. p. 27 Müll.),addition.
Strawson Wiggins p. 520. The utterer implies something more or different from
what he explicitly conveys. Cfr. Disimplicaturum, ‘less’ under ‘different from’
How seriously are we taking the ‘more.’ Not used by Grice. They seem
cross-categorial. If emissor draws a skull and then a cross he means that there
is danger and death in the offing. He crosses the cross, so it means death is
avoidable. Urmson says that Warnock went to bed and took off his boots. He
implicates in that order. So he means MORE than the ‘ampersand.” The “and” is
expanded into “and then.” But in not every case things are so easy that it’s a
matter of adding stuff. Cf. summatum, conjunctum. And then there’s the
‘additive implicaturum.’ By uttering
‘and,’ Russell means the Boolean adition. Whitehead means ‘and then’.
Whithead’s implicaturum is ADDITIVE, as opposed to diaphoron. Grice considers
the conceptual possibilities here: One may explicitly convey that p, and
implicitly convey q, where q ADDS to p (e. g. ‘and’ implicates ‘and then’).
Sometimes it does not, “He is a fine fine,” (or a ‘nice fellow,’ Lecture IV)
implying, “He is a scoundrel.” Sometimes it has nothing to do with it, “The
weather has been nice” implying, “you committed a gaffe.” With disimplicaturum,
you implicate LESS than you explicitly convey. When did you last see your
father? “Yesterday night, in my drams.” Grice sums this up with the phrase,
“more or other.” By explicitly conveying that p, the emissor implicates MORE OR
OTHER than he explicitly conveys.
AD-PARITVM -- adparitum: or ADPARTIVUM, as
Grice would spell it -- apparitio –
Latin for ‘appear’ – ADPARITUM -- theory of appearing, the theory that to
perceive an object is simply for that object to appear present itself to one as
being a certain way, e.g., looking round or like a rock, smelling vinegary,
sounding raucous, or tasting bitter. Nearly everyone would accept this
formulation on some interpretation. But the theory takes this to be a
rock-bottom characterization of perception, and not further analyzable. It
takes “appearing to subject S as so-and-so” as a basic, irreducible relation,
one readily identifiable in experience but not subject to definition in other
terms. The theory preserves the idea that in normal perception we are directly
aware of objects in the physical environment, not aware of them through
non-physical sense-data, sensory impressions, or other intermediaries. When a
tree looks to me a certain way, it is the tree and nothing else of which I am
directly aware. That involves “having” a sensory experience, but that experience
just consists of the tree’s looking a certain way to me. After enjoying a
certain currency early in this century the theory was largely abandoned under
the impact of criticisms by Price, Broad, and Chisholm. The most widely
advertised difficulty theoretical underdetermination is this. What is it that
appears to the subject in completely hallucinatory experience? Perhaps the
greatest strength of the theory is its fidelity to what perceptual experience
seems to be. ap-pārĕo (adp- , Ritschl, Fleck., B. and K.; app- , Lachm., Merk.,
Weissenb., Halm, Rib.), ui, itum, 2, v. n.,
I.to come in sight, to appear, become visible, make one's appearance
(class. in prose and poetry). I. A.. Lit.: “ego adparebo domi,” Plaut. Capt. 2,
3, 97: “ille bonus vir nusquam adparet,” Ter. Eun. 4, 3, 18; Lucr. 3, 25; so
id. 3, 989: “rem contra speculum ponas, apparet imago,” id. 4, 157: unde tandem
adpares, Cic. Fragm. ap. Prisc. p. 706 P.; id. Fl. 12 fin.: “equus mecum una
demersus rursus adparuit,” id. Div. 2, 68; so id. Sull. 2, 5: “cum lux
appareret (Dinter, adpeteret),” Caes. B. G. 7, 82: “de sulcis acies apparuit
hastae,” Ov. M. 3, 107: “apparent rari nantes,” Verg. A. 1, 118, Hor. C. S. 59
al.—With dat.: “anguis ille, qui Sullae adparuit immolanti,” Cic. Div. 2, 30
fin.; id. Clu. 53: “Quís numquam candente dies adparuit ortu,” Tib. 4, 1,
65.—Once in Varro with ad: quod adparet ad agricolas, R. R. 1, 40.— B. In gen.,
to be seen, to show one's self, be in public, appear: “pro pretio facio, ut
opera adpareat Mea,” Plaut. Ps. 3, 2, 60: “fac sis nunc promissa adpareant,”
Ter. Eun. 2, 3, 20; cf. id. Ad. 5, 9, 7: “illud apparere unum,” that this only
is apparent, Lucr. 1, 877; Cato, R. R. 2, 2: “ubi merces apparet? i. e. illud
quod pro tantā mercede didiceris,” Cic. Phil. 2, 34: “quo studiosius opprimitur
et absconditur, eo magis eminet et apparet,” id. Rosc. Am. 41 fin.: “Galbae
orationes evanuerunt, vix jam ut appareant,” id. Brut. 21, 82: “apparet adhuc
vetus mde cicatrix,” Ov. M. 12, 444; 2, 734: “rebus angustis animosus atque
fortis appare,” Hor. C. 2, 10, 22: “cum lamentamur, non apparere labores
Nostros,” are not noticed, considered, id. Ep. 2, 1, 224, so id. ib. 2, 1, 250
al.; Plaut. Men. 2, 1, 14; cf. id. Am. 2, 2, 161 and 162.—Hence, apparens (opp.
latens), visible, evident: “tympana non apparentia Obstrepuere,” Ov. M. 4, 391:
“apparentia vitia curanda sunt,” Quint. 12, 8, 10; so id. 9, 2, 46.— II. Trop.:
res apparet, and far more freq. impers. apparet with acc. and inf. or
rel.-clause, the thing (or it) is evident, clear, manifest, certain, δῆλόν ἐστι,
φαίνεται (objective certainty, while videtur. δοκεῖ, designates subjective
belief, Web. Uebungssch. 258): “ratio adparet,” Plaut. Trin. 2, 4, 17: “res
adparet, Ter Ad. 5, 9, 7: apparet id etiam caeco, Liv 32, 34. cui non id
apparere, id actum esse. etc.,” id. 22, 34; 2, 31 fin.: “ex quo adparet
antiquior origo,” Plin. 36, 26, 67, § 197 al.: “adparet servom nunc esse domini
pauperis,” Ter. Eun. 3, 2, 33: “non dissimulat, apparet esse commotum,” Cic.
Phil. 2, 34: apparet atque exstat, utrum simus earum (artium) rudes, id. de Or.
1, 16, 72: “quid rectum sit, adparet,” id. Fam. 5, 19; 4, 7: “sive confictum
est, ut apparet, sive, etc.,” id. Fl. 16 fin.; Nep. Att. 4, 1; Liv. 42, 43:
“quo adparet antiquiorem hanc fuisse scientiam,” Plin. 35, 12, 44, § 153 al.—Also
with dat. pers.: “quas impendere jam apparebat omnibus,” Nep. Eum. 10, 3; and,
by attraction, with nom. and inf., as in Gr. δῆλός ἐστι, Varr. R. R. 1, 6, 2:
“membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse
adpareant,” Cic. Fin. 3, 7, 23, ubi v. Otto: “apparet ita degenerāsse Nero,”
Suet. Ner. 1; or without the inf., with an adj. as predicate: “apparebat atrox
cum plebe certamen (sc. fore, imminere, etc.),” Liv. 2, 28; Suet. Rhet. 1.—
III. To appear as servant or aid (a lictor, scribe, etc.), to attend, wait
upon, serve; cf. apparitor (rare): “sacerdotes diis adparento,” Cic. Leg. 2, 8,
21: “cum septem annos Philippo apparuisset,” Nep. Eum. 13, 1: “cum appareret
aedilibus,” Liv. 9, 46 Drak.: “lictores apparent consulibus,” id. 2, 55: “collegis
accensi,” id. 3, 33: tibi appareo atque aeditumor in templo tuo, Pompon. ap.
Gell. 12, 10: “Jovis ad solium Apparent,” Verg. A. 12, 850 (= praestant ad
obsequium, Serv.). Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bradley and the misuses of
‘appearance.’”
Ælfric: important English
philosopher, like Grice. Cf. Alcuinus. --.
æqui-pollens: -- from
‘aequipollentia,’ a term used by Grice, après Sextus Empiricus, to express the
view that there are arguments of equal strength on all sides of any question
and that therefore we should suspend judgment on every question that can be
raised.
æqui-probabile: a neuter – as
used by Grice, having the same probability. Sometimes used in the same way as
‘equipossible’, the term is associated with Laplace’s the “classical”
interpretation of probability, where the probability of an event is the ratio
of the number of equipossibilities favorable to the event to the total number
of equipossibilities. For example, the probability of rolling an even number
with a “fair” six-sided die is ½ there
being three equipossibilities 2, 4, 6 favorable to even, and six
equipossibilities 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 in all and 3 /6 % ½. The concept is now
generally thought not to be widely applicable to the interpretation of
probability, since natural equipossibilities are not always at hand as in
assessing the probability of a thermonuclear war tomorrow.
æqui-valens: -- from
aequi-valentia – i. ee. mutual inferability. The following are main kinds: two
statements are materially equivalent provided they have the same truthvalue,
and logically equivalent provided each can be deduced from the other; two
sentences or words are equivalent in meaning provided they can be substituted
for each other in any context without altering the meaning of that context. In
truth-functional logic, two statements are logically equivalent if they can
never have truthvalues different from each other. In this sense of ‘logically
equivalent’ all tautologies are equivalent to each other and all contradictions
are equivalent to each other. Similarly, in extensional set theory, two classes
are equivalent provided they have the same numbers, so that all empty classes
are regarded as equivalent. In a non-extensional set theory, classes would be
equivalent only if their conditions of membership were logically equivalent or
equivalent in meaning.
æqui-vocale: A neuter form -- Grice preferred Cicero’s rendition
of ‘synonymia’ (cf. paronymia, and homonympia) --. Grice’s æqui-vocality thesis
-- aequivocation, the use of an expression in two or more different senses in a
single context. For example, in ‘The end of anything is its perfection. But the
end of life is death; so death is the perfection of life’, the expression ‘end’
is first used in the sense of ‘goal or purpose,’ but in its second occurrence
‘end’ means ‘termination.’ The use of the two senses in this context is an
equivocation. Where the context in which the expression used is an argument,
the fallacy of equivocation may be committed.
ÆSTHETICVM: or AESTHETICVM,
as Grice would spell it – “A hybrid,” – Grice is aware that the old Roman form
is ‘sensus’ – which Cicero uses to translate the rather convoluted Grecian idea
of the ‘aesthesis’ – or ‘aesthetikos’ versus ‘noetikos.’ -- Grice is well aware
that ‘aesthetica,’ qua discipline, was meant to refer to the ‘sensibile,’ as
opposed to the ‘intellectus.’ With F. N. Sibley (who credits Grice profusely),
Grice explored the ‘second-order’ quality of the so-called ‘aesthetic
properties.’ It influenced Scruton. The aesthetic attitude is the appropriate
attitude or frame of mind for approaching art or nature or other objects or
events so that one might both appreciate its intrinsic perceptual qualities,
and as a result have an aesthetic experience. The aesthetic attitude has been
construed in many ways: 1 as disinterested, so that one’s experience of the
work is not affected by any interest in its possible practical uses, 2 as a
“distancing” of oneself from one’s own personal concerns, 3 as the
contemplation of an object, purely as an object of sensation, as it is in
itself, for its own sake, in a way unaffected by any cognition or knowledge one
may have of it. These different notions of aesthetic attitude have at times
been combined within a single theory. There is considerable doubt about whether
there is such a thing as an aesthetic attitude. There is neither any special
kind of action nor any special way of performing an ordinary action that
ensures that we see a work as it “really is,” and that results in our having an
aesthetic experience. Furthermore, there are no purely sensory experiences,
divorced from any cognitive content whatsoever. Criticisms of the notion of
aesthetic attitude have reinforced attacks on aesthetics as a separate field of
study within philosophy. On the other hand, there’s aesthetic formalism,
non-iconic, the view that in our interactions with works of art, form should be
given primacy. Rather than taking ‘formalism’ as the name of one specific
theory in the arts, it is better and more typical to take it to name that type
of theory which emphasizes the form of the artwork. Or, since emphasis on form
is something that comes in degrees, it is best to think of theories of art as
ranged on a continuum of more formalist and less formalist. It should be added
that theories of art are typically complex, including definitions of art,
recommendations concerning what we should attend to in art, analyses of the
nature of the aesthetic, recommendations concerning the making of aesthetic
evaluations, etc.; and each of these components may be more formalist or less
so. Those who use the concept of form mainly wish to contrast the artifact
itself with its relations to entities outside itself with its representing various things, its
symbolizing various things, its being expressive of various things, its being
the product of various intentions of the artist, its evoking various states in
beholders, its standing in various relations of influence and similarity to
preceding, succeeding, and contemporary works, etc. There have been some, however,
who in emphasizing form have meant to emphasize not just the artifact but the
perceptible form or design of the artifact. Kant, e.g., in his theory of
aesthetic excellence, not only insisted that the only thing relevant to
determining the beauty of an object is its appearance, but within the
appearance, the form, the design: in visual art, not the colors but the design
that the colors compose; in music, not the timbre of the individual sounds but
the formal relationships among them. It comes as no surprise that theories of
music have tended to be much more formalist than theories of literature and
drama, with theories of the visual arts located in between. While Austin’s
favourite aesthetic property is ‘dumpty,’ Grice is more open minded, and allows
for more of a property or quality such as being dainty, garish, graceful,
balanced, charming, majestic, trite, elegant, lifeless, ugly, or beautiful. By
contrast, non-aesthetic properties are properties that require no special
sensitivity or perceptiveness to perceive
such as a painting’s being predominantly blue, its having a small red
square in a corner or a kneeling figure in the foreground, or that the music
becomes louder at a given point. Sometimes it is argued that a special
perceptiveness or taste is needed to perceive a work’s aesthetic qualities, and
that this is a defining feature of a property’s being aesthetic. A corollary of
this view is that aesthetic qualities cannot be defined in terms of
non-aesthetic qualities, though some have held that aesthetic qualities supervene
on non-aesthetic qualities. As a systematic philosopher, Grice goes back to the
etymological root of the aesthetic as the philosophy of the sensible. He would
make fun of the specialization. “If at the philosophy department I am introduced
to Mr. Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental aesthetics, I can
grasp he is either underdescribed or not good at nineteenth-century continental
aesthetics!’ The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of art and the
character of our adventitious ideas and experience of art and of the natural
environment. It emerged as a separate field of philosophical inquiry during the
eighteenth century in England and on the Continent. Recognition of aesthetics
as a separate branch of philosophy coincided with the development of theories
of art that grouped together painting, poetry, sculpture, music, and dance and
often landscape gardening as the same kind of thing, les beaux arts, or the
fine arts. Baumgarten coined the term ‘aesthetics’ in his Reflections on Poetry
1735 as the name for one of the two branches of the study of knowledge, i.e.,
for the study of sensory experience coupled with feeling, which he argued
provided a different type of knowledge from the distinct, abstract ideas studied
by “logic.” He derived it from the ancient Grecian aisthanomai ‘to perceive’,
and “the aesthetic” has always been intimately connected with sensory
experience and the kinds of feelings it arouses. Questions specific to the
field of aesthetics are: Is there a special attitude, the aesthetic attitude,
which we should take toward works of art and the natural environment, and what
is it like? Is there a distinctive type of experience, an aesthetic experience,
and what is it? Is there a special object of attention that we can call the
aesthetic object? Finally, is there a distinctive value, aesthetic value,
comparable with moral, epistemic, and religious values? Some questions overlap
with those in the philosophy of art, such as those concerning the nature of beauty,
and whether there is a faculty of taste that is exercised in judging the
aesthetic character and value of natural objects or works of art. Aesthetics
also encompasses the philosophy of art. The most central issue in the
philosophy of art has been how to define ‘art’. Not all cultures have, or have
had, a concept of art that coincides with the one that emerged in Western
Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What justifies our
applying our concept to the things people in these other cultures have
produced? There are also many pictures including paintings, songs, buildings,
and bits of writing, that are not art. What distinguishes those pictures,
musical works, etc., that are art from those that are not? Various answers have
been proposed that identify the distinguishing features of art in terms of
form, expressiveness, intentions of the maker, and social roles or uses of the
object. Since the eighteenth century there have been debates about what kinds
of things count as “art.” Some have argued that architecture and ceramics are
not art because their functions are primarily utilitarian, and novels were for
a long time not listed among the “fine arts” because they are not embodied in a
sensuous medium. Debates continue to arise over new media and what may be new
art forms, such as film, video, photography, performance art, found art,
furniture, posters, earthworks, and computer and electronic art. Sculptures
these days may be made out of dirt, feces, or various discarded and
mass-produced objects, rather than marble or bronze. There is often an explicit
rejection of craft and technique by twentieth-century artists, and the subject
matter has expanded to include the banal and everyday, and not merely
mythological, historical, and religious subjects as in years past. All of these
developments raise questions about the relevance of the category of “fine” or
“high” art. Another set of issues in philosophy of art concerns how artworks
are to be interpreted, appreciated, and understood. Some views emphasize that
artworks are products of individual efforts, so that a work should be
understood in light of the producer’s knowledge, skill, and intentions. Others
see the meaning of a work as established by social conventions and practices of
the artist’s own time, but which may not be known or understood by the
producer. Still others see meaning as established by the practices of the
users, even if they were not in effect when the work was produced. Are there
objective criteria or standards for evaluating individual artworks? There has
been much disagreement over whether value judgments have universal validity, or
whether there can be no disputing about taste, if value judgments are relative
to the tastes and interests of each individual or to some group of individuals
who share the same tastes and interests. A judgment such as “This is good”
certainly seems to make a claim about the work itself, though such a claim is
often based on the sort of feeling, understanding, or experience a person has
obtained from the work. A work’s aesthetic or artistic value is generally
distinguished from simply liking it. But is it possible to establish what sorts
of knowledge or experiences any given work should provide to any suitably
prepared perceiver, and what would it be to be suitably prepared? It is a
matter of contention whether a work’s aesthetic and artistic values are
independent of its moral, political, or epistemic stance or impact. Philosophy
of art has also dealt with the nature of taste, beauty, imagination, creativity,
repreaesthetics aesthetics 12 4065A- 12
sentation, expression, and expressiveness; style; whether artworks convey
knowledge or truth; the nature of narrative and metaphor; the importance of
genre; the ontological status of artworks; and the character of our emotional
responses to art. Work in the field has always been influenced by philosophical
theories of language or meaning, and theories of knowledge and perception, and
continues to be heavily influenced by psychological and cultural theory,
including versions of semiotics, psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology,
feminism, and Marxism. Some theorists in the late twentieth century have denied
that the aesthetic and the “fine arts” can legitimately be separated out and
understood as separate, autonomous human phenomena; they argue instead that
these conceptual categories themselves manifest and reinforce certain kinds of
cultural attitudes and power relationships. These theorists urge that
aesthetics can and should be eliminated as a separate field of study, and that
“the aesthetic” should not be conceived as a special kind of value. They favor
instead a critique of the roles that images not only painting, but film,
photography, and advertising, sounds, narrative, and three-dimensional
constructions have in expressing and shaping human attitudes and
experiences.
agape: Grice would often
contrast ‘self-love’ with ‘agape’ and ‘benevolence.’ Strictly, agape, “a lovely
Grecian word,” is best rendered as the unselfish love for all persons. An
ethical theory according to which such love is the chief virtue, and actions
are good to the extent that they express it, is sometimes called agapism. Agape
is the Grecian word most often used for love in the New Testament, and is often
used in modern languages to signify whatever sort of love the writer takes to
be idealized there. In New Testament Grecian, however, it was probably a quite
general word for love, so that any ethical ideal must be found in the text’s
substantive claims, rather than in the linguistic meaning of the word. R.M.A.
agathon, Grecian word meaning ‘a good’ or ‘the good’. From Socrates onward,
agathon was taken to be a central object of philosophical inquiry; it has
frequently been assumed to be the goal of all rational action. Plato in the simile
of the sun in the Republic identified it with the Form of the Good, the source
of reality, truth, and intelligibility. Aristotle saw it as eudaimonia,
intellectual or practical virtue, a view that found its way, via Stoicism and
Neoplatonism, into Christianity. Modern theories of utility can be seen as
concerned with essentially the same Socratic question.
AGITATVM -- agitation: or AGITATUM, as
Grice would spell it -- a Byzantine
feeling is a Ryleian agitation. If Grice
were to advance the not wholly plausible thesis that ‘to feel Byzantine’ is
just to have a an anti-rylean agitation which is caused by the thought that
Grice is or might *be* Byzantine, it would surely be ridiculous to criticise
Grice on the grounds that Grice saddles himself with an ontological commitment
to feelings, or to modes of feeling. And why? Well, because, alla Parsons, if a
quantifier is covertly involved at all, it will only be a universal quantifier
which in such a case as this is more than adequately handled by a substitutional
account of quantification. Grice’s situation vis-a-vis the ‘proposition’ is in
no way different. In
the idiolect of Ryle, “a serious student of Grecian philosophy,” as Grice puts
it, ‘emotion’ designates at least three or four different kinds of things,
which Ryle calls an ‘inclination, or ‘motive,’ a ‘mood’, an ‘agitation,’ or a ‘commotion,’
and a ‘feeling.’ An inclination or a mood, including an agitation, is not
occurrences and doest not therefore take place either publicly or privately. It
is a propensity, not an act or state. An inclination is, however, a propensity
of this or that kind, and the kind is important. A feeling, on the other hand,
IS an occurrence, but the place that mention of it should take in a description
of human behaviour is very different from that which the standard theories
accord to it. A susceptibility to a specific agitation is on the same general
footing with an inclination, viz. that each is a general propensity and not an
occurrence. An agitation is not a motive. But an agitation does presuppose a
motive, or rather an agitataion presupposes a behaviour trend of which a motive
is for us the most interesting sort.
There
is however a matter of expression which is the source of some confusion, even
among Oxonian Wilde readers, and that did confuse philosophical psychologists
of the ability of G. F. Stout. An expression may signify both an inclination
and an agitation. But an expression may signify anything but an agitations.
Again, some other expression may signify anything but an inclination. An
expression like ‘uneasy’, ‘anxious’, ‘distressed’, ‘excited’, ‘startled’ always
signifies an agitations. An expression like ‘fond of fishing’, ‘keen on
gardening’, ‘bent on becoming a bishop’ never signifies an agitation. But an
expression like ‘love’, ‘want’, ‘desire’, ‘proud’, ‘eager,’ or many others, stands
sometimes for a simple inclination and sometimes for an agitations which is
resultant upon the inclinations and interferences with the exercise of it. Thus
‘hungry’ for ‘having a good appetite’ means roughly ‘is eating or would eat
heartily and without sauces, etc..’ This is different from ‘hungry’ in which a
person might be said to be ‘too hungry to concentrate on his work’. Hunger in
this second expression is a distress, and requires for its existence the
conjunction of an appetite with the inability to eat. Similarly the way in
which a boy is proud of his school is different from the way in which he is
speechless with pride on being unexpectedly given a place in a school team. To
remove a possible misapprehension, it must be pointed out that an agitation may
be quite agreeable. A man may voluntarily subject himself to suspense, fatigue,
uncertainty, perplexity, fear and surprise in such practices as angling,
rowing, travelling, crossword puzzles, rock-climbing and joking. That a thing
like a thrill, a rapture, a surprise, an amusement and an relief is an
agitation is shown by the fact that we can say that someone is too much
thrilled, amused or relieved to act, think or talk coherently. It
is helpful to notice that, anyhow commonly, the expression which completes ‘pang of . . .’ or ‘chill of . . .’ denotes an
agitation. A feeling, such as a man feeling Byzantine, is intrinsically
connected with an agitation. But a feeling, e. g. of a man who is feeling
Byzantine, is not intrinsically connected with an inclination, save in so far
as the inclination is a factor in the agitation. This is no novel psychological
hypothesis; It is part of the logic of our descriptions of a feeling that a
feeling (such as a man feeling Byzantine) is a sign of an agitation and is not
an exercise of an inclination. A feeling, such as a man feeling Byzantine, in
other words, is not a thing of which it makes sense to ask from what motive it
issues. The same is true, for the same reasons, of any sign of any agitation. This
point shows why we were right to suggest above that a feeling (like a man
feeling Byzantine) does not belong directly to a simple inclination. An
inclination is a certain sort of proneness or readiness to do certain sorts of
things on purpose. These things are therefore describable as being done from
that motive. They are the exercises of the disposition that we call ‘a motive’.
A feeling (such as a man feeling Byzantine) is not from a motive and is
therefore not among the possible exercise of such a propensiy. The widespread
theory that a motive such as vanity, or affection, is in the first instance a
disposition to experience certain specific feeling is therefore absurd. There
may be, of course, a tendency to have a feeling, such as feeling Byzantine;
being vertiginous and rheumatic are such tendencies. But we do not try to
modify a tendency of these kinds by a sermon. What a feeling, such as being
Byzantine, does causally belong to is the agitation. A feeling (such as feeling
Byzantine) is a sign of an agitation in the same sort of way as a stomach-ache
is a sign of indigestion. Roughly, we do not, as the prevalent theory holds,
act purposively because we experience a feeling (such as feeling Byzantine); we
experience a feeling (such as feeling Byzantine), as we wince and shudder,
because we are inhibited from acting purposively.
A
sentimentalist is a man who indulges in this or that induced feeling (such as
feeling Byzantine) without acknowledging the fictitiousness of his agitation.
It seems to be generally supposed that ‘pleasure’ or ‘desire’ is always used to
signify a feeling. And there certainly are feelings which can be described as a
feeling of pleasure or desire. Some thrills, shocks, glows and ticklings are
feelings of delight, surprise, relief and amusement; and things like a
hankering, an itche, a gnawing and a yearning is a sign that something is both
wanted and missed. But the transports, surprises, reliefs and distresses of
which such a feeling is diagnosed, or mis-diagnosed, as a sign is not itself a
feeling. It is an agitation or a mood, just as are the transports and
distresses which a child betrays by his skips and his whimpers. Nostalgia is an
agitation and one which can be called a ‘desire’; but it is not merely a
feeling or series of feelings. There is the sense of ‘pleasure’ in which it is
commonly replaced by such expressions as ‘delight’, ‘transport’, ‘rapture’,
‘exultation’ and ‘joy’. These are expressions of this or that mood signifying this
or that agitation. There are two quite different usages of ‘emotion’, in which
we explain people’s behaviour by reference to emotions. In the first usage of
‘emotion,’ we are referring to the motives or inclinations from which more or less
intelligent actions are done. In a second usage we are referring to a mood,
including the agitation or perturbation of which some aimless movement may be a
sign. In neither of these usages are we asserting or implicating that the overt
behaviour is the effect of a felt turbulence in the agent’s stream of
consciousness. In a third usage of ‘emotion’, pangs and twinges are feelings or
emotions, but they are not, save per accidens, things by reference to which we
explain behaviour. They are things for which diagnoses are required, not things
required for the diagnoses of behaviour. Since a convulsion of merriment is not
the state of mind of the sober experimentalist, the enjoyment of a joke is also
not an introspectible happening. States of mind such as these more or less
violent agitations can be examined only in retrospect. Yet nothing disastrous
follows from this restriction. We are not shorter of information about panic or
amusement than about other states of mind. If retrospection can give us the data
we need for our knowledge of some states of mind, there is no reason why it
should not do so for all. And this is just what seems to be suggested by the
popular phrase ‘to catch oneself doing so and so’. We catch, as we pursue and
overtake, what is already running away from us. I catch myself daydreaming
about a mountain walk after, perhaps very shortly after, I have begun the
daydream; or I catch myself humming a particular air only when the first few
notes have already been hummed. Retrospection, prompt or delayed, is a genuine
process and one which is exempt from the troubles ensuing from the assumption
of multiply divided attention; it is also exempt from the troubles ensuing from
the assumption that violent agitations could be the objects of cool, contemporary
scrutiny. One may be aware that he is whistling ‘Tipperary’ and not know that
he is whistling it in order to give tte appearance of a sang-froid which he
does not feel. Or, again, he may be aware that he is shamming sang-froid
without knowing that the tremors which he is trying to hide derive from the
agitation of a guilty conscience.
agnoiologicum: Grice loved a
negative prefix. He was proud that he was never vulgar in publishing, like some
of his tutees – and that the number of his unpublications by far exceed the
number of his publications. To refute Hampshire with this intention and
certainty, he regaled the British Academy with the annual philosophical lecture
on intention and Uncertainty. While Grice thought that ‘knowledge’ was
overreated at Oxford (“Surely an examinee can be said to know that date of the
battle of Waterloo”) he could be agnoiological at times. From Grecian agnoia,
‘ignorance’, the study of ignorance, its quality, and its conditions. And then
there’s ‘agnosticism,’ from Grecian a-, ‘not’, and gnastos, ‘known’, term
invented by Thomas Henry Huxley in 1869 to denote the philosophical and
religious attitude of those who claim that metaphysical ideas can be neither
proved nor disproved. Huxley wrote, “I neither affirm nor deny the immortality
of man. I see no reason for believing it, but on the other hand, I have no
means of disproving it. I have no a priori objection to the doctrine.”
Agnosticism is a form of skepticism applied to metaphysics, especially theism.
The position is sometimes attributed to Kant, who held that we cannot have
knowledge of God or immortality but must be content with faith. Agnosticism
should not be confused with atheism, the belief that no god exists.
alberti: alberti – Italian
philosopher, on ‘aesthetics.’ Cf. Grice on sensation. Grice: “No one can fail to be enchanted by Lusini’s great likeness of
Alberti at the loggiato of the uffizi! Ah, if we had the same at Oxford!” -- Genova-born
essential Italian philosopher – Grice, “I love his “De statua” – it’s more
philosophical anthropology than aesthetics!” «Ci
è un uomo che per la sua universalità parrebbe volesse abbracciarlo tutto, dico
Leon Battista Alberti, pittore, architetto, poeta, erudito, filosofo e
letterato» (Francesco de Sanctis, Storia della letteratura
italiana) Leon Battista Alberti Leon Battista Alberti (Genova, 14
febbraio 1404 – Roma, 25 aprile 1472) è stato un architetto, scrittore,
matematico, umanista, crittografo, linguista, filosofo, musicista e archeologo
italiano; fu una delle figure artistiche più poliedriche del Rinascimento. Il
suo primo nome si trova spesso, soprattutto in testi stranieri, come
Leone. Alberti fa parte della seconda generazione di umanisti (quella
successiva a Vergerio, Bruni, Bracciolini, Francesco Barbaro), di cui fu una
figura emblematica per il suo interesse nelle più varie discipline. Un
suo costante interesse era la ricerca delle regole, teoriche o pratiche, in
grado di guidare il lavoro degli artisti. Nelle sue opere menzionò alcuni
canoni, ad esempio: nel "De statua" espose le proporzioni del corpo
umano, nel "De pictura" fornì la prima definizione della prospettiva
scientifica e infine nel "De re aedificatoria" (opera cui lavorò fino
alla morte, nel 1472), descrisse tutta la casistica relativa all'architettura
moderna, sottolineando l'importanza del progetto e le diverse tipologie di
edifici a seconda della loro funzione. Tale opera lo renderà immortale nei
secoli e motivo di studio a livello internazionale da artisti come Eugène
Viollet-le-Duc e John Ruskin. Come architetto, Alberti viene considerato,
accanto a Brunelleschi, il fondatore dell'architettura rinascimentale.
L'aspetto innovativo delle sue proposte, soprattutto sia in ambito
architettonico che umanistico, consisteva nella rielaborazione moderna
dell'antico, cercato come modello da emulare e non semplicemente da
replicare. La classe sociale a cui Alberti faceva riferimento è comunque
un'aristocrazia e alta "borghesia" illuminata. Egli lavorò per
committenti quali i Gonzaga a Mantova e (per la tribuna della SS. Annunziata) a
Firenze, i Malatesta a Rimini, i Rucellai a Firenze. Indice 1
Biografia 1.1 La formazione umanistica 1.2 A Roma 1.3 Le prime opere letterarie
1.4 A Firenze 1.5 De pictura 1.6 La questione del volgare 1.7 Ritorno a Roma
1.8 Il De re aedificatoria 1.9 L'attività come architetto a Firenze 1.9.1
Palazzo Rucellai 1.9.2 Facciata di Santa Maria Novella 1.9.3 Altre opere 1.10
Ferrara 1.11 Rimini 1.12 Mantova 1.12.1 San Sebastiano 1.12.2 Sant'Andrea 1.13
I caratteri dell'architettura albertiana 1.14 Il De statua 1.15 Il Crittografo
1.16 De iciarchia 2 Opere 2.1 Scritti 2.2 Opere architettoniche 2.3 Manoscritti
3 Note 4 Bibliografia 5 Voci correlate 6 Altri progetti 7 Collegamenti esterni
Biografia La formazione umanistica Presunto autoritratto su placchetta,
(Parigi, Cabinet des Medailles). Leon Battista nacque a Genova, figlio di
Lorenzo Alberti, di una ricca famiglia di mercanti e banchieri fiorentini
banditi dalla città toscana a partire dal 1388 per motivi politici, e da Bianca
Fieschi, appartenente ad una delle più nobili casate genovesi. I primi
studi furono di tipo letterario, dapprima a Venezia e poi a Padova, alla scuola
dell'umanista Gasparino Barzizza, dove apprese il latino e forse anche il
greco.[1] Si trasferì poi a Bologna dove studiò diritto, coltivando
parallelamente il suo amore per molte altre discipline artistiche quali la
musica, la pittura, la scultura, la matematica, la grammatica e la letteratura
in generale. Si dedicò all'attività letteraria sin da giovane: a Bologna,
infatti, già intorno ai vent'anni scrisse una commedia autobiografica in
latino, la Philodoxeos fabula. Compose in latino il Momus, un originalissimo e
avvincente romanzo mitologico, e le Intercoenales; in volgare, compose
un'importante serie di dialoghi (De familia, Theogenius, Profugiorum ab ærumna
libri, Cena familiaris, De iciarchia, dai titoli rigorosamente in latino) e
alcuni scritti amatori, tra cui la Deiphira, ove raccoglie i precetti utili a
fuggire da un amore mal iniziato. Dopo la morte del padre, avvenuta nel
1421, l'Alberti trascorse alcuni anni di difficoltà, entrando in forte
contrasto con i parenti che non volevano riconoscere i suoi diritti ereditari
né favorire i suoi studi. In questi anni coltivò soprattutto gli studi
scientifici, astronomici e matematici.[1] Sembra si sia tuttavia concretamente
laureato in diritto nel 1428 a Bologna, o forse a Ferrara, nonostante le
difficoltà economiche e di salute. Tra Padova e Bologna intrecciò amicizie con
molti importanti intellettuali, come Paolo Dal Pozzo Toscanelli, Tommaso
Parentuccelli, futuro papa Nicolò V e probabilmente Niccolò Cusano. Per
gli anni 1428-1431 poco si sa, benché debba escludersi che si sia recato a
Firenze dopo il ritiro del bandi contro gli Alberti, nel 1428, e sia del pari
assai poco probabile che al seguito del cardinal Albergati abbia viaggiato in
Francia e nel Nord Europa.[1] A Roma Nel 1431 diventò segretario del
patriarca di Grado e, trasferitosi a Roma con questi, nel 1432 fu nominato
abbreviatore apostolico (il cui ruolo consisteva per l'appunto nel redigere i
brevi apostolici). Così entrò nel prestigioso ambiente umanistico della curia
di papa Eugenio IV, che lo nominò (1432) titolare della pieve di San Martino a
Gangalandi a Lastra a Signa, nei pressi di Firenze, beneficio di cui godette
fino alla morte.[1] Vivendo prevalentemente a Roma ma spostandosi per
periodi anche lunghi e per varie incombenze a Ferrara, Bologna, Venezia,
Firenze, Mantova, Rimini e Napoli. Le prime opere letterarie Tra il 1433
e il 1434, scrisse in pochi mesi i primi tre libri de Familia, un dialogo in
volgare completato con un quarto libro nel 1437. Il dialogo è ambientato a
Padova, nel 1421; vi partecipano vari componenti della famiglia Alberti,
personaggi realmente esistiti, scontrandosi su due visioni diverse: da un lato
c'è la mentalità moderna e borghese e dall'altro la tradizione, aristocratica e
legata al passato. L'analisi che il libro offre è una visione dei principali
aspetti e istituzioni della vita sociale dell'epoca, quali il matrimonio, la
famiglia, l'educazione, la gestione economica, l'amicizia e in genere i
rapporti sociali: l'Alberti esprime qui un punto di vista
"filosofico" pienamente umanistico, che ricorre in tutte le sue opere
di carattere morale e che consiste nella convinzione che gli uomini siano
responsabili della propria sorte e che la virtù sia insita nell'uomo e debba
essere realizzata attraverso l'operosità, la volontà e la ragione.[1] A
Firenze Statua di Leon Battista Alberti, piazza degli Uffizi a Firenze.
Tra il 1434 e il 1443 l'Alberti visse prevalentemente a Firenze e Ferrara, al
seguito della curia papale che fra l'altro partecipò al Concilio, ossia alle
sedute ferrarese e fiorentina del concilio ecumenico (1438-39) che dovevano
riappacificare la chiesa latina e le chiese cristiano-orientali, in particolare
quella greca. In questo periodo l'Alberti assimila parte della cultura
fiorentina, cercando (invero con moderato successo) d'inserirsi nell'ambiente
intellettuale e artistico della città; sono verosimilmente gli anni in cui
nascono i suoi interessi artistici, che si traducono da subito nella duplice
redazione (latina e volgare) del De pictura (1435-36). Nel prologo della
versione in volgare, dedica l'opera a Brunelleschi e menziona anche i grandi innovatori
delle arti del tempo: Donatello, Masaccio (morto già nel 1428) e i Della
Robbia. Intorno al 1443, al seguito del pontefice Eugenio IV lasciò
Firenze, ma con la città continuò ad avere intensi rapporti legati anche ai
cantieri dei suoi progetti. De pictura Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg Lo
stesso argomento in dettaglio: De pictura. Del 1435-1436 è il De pictura,
scritto verosimilmente dapprima in latino e tradotto poi in volgare; se la
redazione latina, senza ombra di dubbio la più importante e ricca, sarà
dedicata al Gonzaga marchese di Mantova, per quella volgare l'Alberti redasse
una dedica al Brunelleschi che, trasmessa da un solo codice strettamente legato
al laboratorio personale dell'Alberti, forse non fu mai inviata. Il De pictura
rappresenta la prima trattazione di una disciplina artistica non intesa solo
come tecnica manuale, ma anche come ricerca intellettuale e culturale, e
sarebbe difficile immaginarla fuori dallo straordinario contesto fiorentino e
scritta da un autore diverso dall'Alberti, grande intellettuale umanista e
artista egli stesso, anche se la sua attività nel campo delle arti
figurative—attestata (benché in modi non lusinghieri) già dal Vasari—dovette
essere ridotta. Il trattato è organizzato in tre "libri".[1][2] Il
primo contiene la più antica trattazione della prospettiva. Nel secondo libro
l'Alberti tratta di “circoscrizione, composizione, e ricezione dei lumi”, cioè
dei tre principi che regolano l'arte pittorica: la circumscriptio
consiste nel tracciare il contorno dei corpi; la compositio è il disegno delle
linee che uniscono i contorni dei corpi e perciò la disposizione narrativa
della scena pittorica, la cui importanza è qui espressa per la prima volta con
piena lucidità intellettuale; la receptio luminum tratta dei colori e della
luce. Il terzo libro è relativo alla figura del pittore di cui si rivendica il
ruolo di vero artista e non, semplicemente, di artigiano. Con questo trattato
Alberti influenzerà non solo il Rinascimento ma tutto quanto si sarebbe detto
sulla pittura sino ai nostri giorni. La questione del volgare Pur
scrivendo numerosi testi in latino, lingua alla quale riconosceva il valore
culturale e le specifiche qualità espressive, l'Alberti fu un fervente
sostenitore del volgare. La duplice redazione in latino e in volgare del De
pictura manifesta il suo interesse per il dibattito allora in corso tra gli
umanisti sulla possibilità di usare il volgare nella trattazione di ogni
materia. In un dibattito avvenuto a Firenze tra gli umanisti della curia, Flavio
Biondo aveva affermato la diretta discendenza del volgare dal latino e
l'Alberti, ne dimostra genialmente la tesi componendo la prima grammatica del
volgare (1437-41), e ne riprende gli argomenti difendendo l'uso del volgare
nella dedicatoria del libro III de Familia a Francesco d'Altobianco Alberti
(1435-39 circa).[1] Da qui deriva la significativa esperienza del Certame
coronario, una gara di poesia sul tema dell'amicizia, organizzata a Firenze
nell'ottobre 1441 dall'Alberti con il più o meno tacito concorso di Piero de'
Medici, una gara che doveva servire all'affermazione del volgare, soprattutto
in poesia, e alla quale va associata la composizione dei sedici Esametri
sull'amicizia da parte dell'Alberti – Esametri ora pubblicati fra le sue Rime,
innovative tanto nello stile quanto nella metrica, che costituiscono uno dei
primissimi tentativi di adattare i metri greco-latini alla poesia volgare
(metrica «barbara»).[1] Nonostante ciò, l'Alberti continuò a scrivere
naturalmente in latino, come fece per gli Apologi centum, una sorta di
breviario della sua filosofia di vita, composti intorno al 1437. Ritorno
a Roma Chiusosi il concilio a Firenze, nel 1443, l'Alberti ritornò con la curia
papale a Roma. continuando a ricoprire il ruolo di abbreviatore apostolico per
ben 34 anni, fino al 1464, quando il collegio degli abbreviatori fu soppresso.
Durante la permanenza a Roma ebbe modo di coltivare i propri interessi
propriamente architettonici, che lo indussero a proseguire lo studio delle
rovine della Roma classica, come dimostra la stessa Descriptio urbis Romae,
risalente al 1450 circa, in cui l'Alberti tentò con successo, per la prima
volta nella storia, una ricostruzione della topografia di Roma antica, mediante
un sistema di coordinate polari e radiali che permettono di ricostruire il
disegno da lui tracciato. I suoi interessi archeologici lo portarono anche a
tentare il recupero delle navi romane affondate nel lago di Nemi. Questi
interessi per l'architettura che diventeranno prevalenti negli ultimi due
decenni della sua vita, non impedirono una ricchissima produzione letteraria.
Tra il 1443 e la morte compone una delle sue opere più interessanti, il Momus,
un romanzo satirico in lingua latina, che tratta in maniera abbastanza amara e
disincantata della società umana e degli stessi esseri umani. Dopo
l'elezione di Niccolò V, l'Alberti, come antico conoscente, entrò nella cerchia
ristretta del papa, dal quale ricevette anche la carica di priore di Borgo San
Lorenzo. Tuttavia i rapporti con il papa sono considerati piuttosto controversi
dagli storici, sia per quel che riguarda gli aspetti politici che per
l'adesione o la collaborazione dell'Alberti al vasto programma di rinnovamento
urbano voluto da Niccolò V. Forse venne impiegato durante il restauro del
palazzo papale e dell'acquedotto romano e della fontana dell'Acqua Vergine,
disegnata in maniera semplice e lineare, creando la base sulla quale, in età
Barocca, sarebbe stata costruita la Fontana di Trevi. Intorno al 1450
Alberti cominciò ad occuparsi più attivamente di architettura con numerosi
progetti da eseguire fuori Roma, a Firenze, Rimini e Mantova, città in cui si
recò varie volte durante gli ultimi decenni della sua vita. In tal modo
dopo la metà del secolo l'Alberti fu la figura-guida dell'architettura. Questo
riconosciuto primato rende anche difficile distinguere, nella sua opera,
l'attività di progettazione dalle tante consulenze e dall'influenza più o meno
diretta che dovette avere, per esempio, sulle opere promosse a Roma, sotto
Niccolò V, come il restauro di Santa Maria Maggiore e Santo Stefano Rotondo o
come la costruzione di Palazzo Venezia, il rinnovamento della basilica di San
Pietro, del Borgo e del Campidoglio. Potrebbe forse essere stato il consulente
che indica alcune linee-guida o, ma ben più difficilmente, aver avuto un ruolo
anche meno indiretto. Sicuramente il prestigio della sua opera e del suo
pensiero teorico condizionarono direttamente l'opera di progettisti come
Francesco del Borgo e Bernardo Rossellino, influenzando anche Giuliano da
Sangallo.[3] Morì a Roma, all'età di 68 anni. Il De re
aedificatoria Frontespizio Matteo de' Pasti, Medaglia di Leon
Battista Alberti (1446-1450 circa). Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg Lo stesso
argomento in dettaglio: De re aedificatoria. Le sue riflessioni teoriche
trovarono espressione nel De re aedificatoria, un trattato di architettura in
latino, scritto prevalentemente a Roma, cui l'Alberti lavorò fino alla morte e
che è rivolto anche al pubblico colto di educazione umanistica. Il trattato fu
concepito sul modello del De architectura di Vitruvio. L'opera, considerata il
trattato architettonico più significativo della cultura umanistica, è divisa
anch'essa in dieci libri: nei primi tre si parla della scelta del terreno, dei
materiali da utilizzare e delle fondazioni (potrebbero corrispondere alla
categoria vitruviana della firmitas); i libri IV e V si soffermano sui vari
tipi di edifici in relazione alla loro funzione (utilitas); il libro VI tratta
la bellezza architettonica (venustas), intesa come un'armonia esprimibile
matematicamente grazie alla scienza delle proporzioni, con l'aggiunta di una
trattazione sulle macchine per costruire; i libri VII, VIII e IX parlano della
costruzione dei fabbricati, suddividendoli in chiese, edifici pubblici ed edifici
privati; il libro X tratta dell'idraulica. Nel trattato si trova anche
uno studio basato sulle misurazioni dei monumenti antichi per proporre nuovi
tipi di edifici moderni ispirati all'antico, fra i quali le prigioni, che cercò
di rendere più umane, gli ospedali e altri luoghi di pubblica utilità. Il
trattato fu stampato a Firenze nel 1485, con una prefazione del Poliziano a
Lorenzo il Magnifico, e poi a Parigi (1512) e a Strasburgo (1541); venne in
seguito tradotto in varie lingue e diventò ben presto imprescindibile nella
cultura architettonica moderna e contemporanea. Nel De re aedificatoria,
l'Alberti affronta anche il tema delle architetture difensive e intuisce come
le armi da fuoco rivoluzioneranno l'aspetto delle fortificazioni. Per aumentare
l'efficacia difensiva indica che le difese dovrebbero essere "costruite
lungo linee irregolari, come i denti di una sega" anticipando così i
principi della fortificazione alla moderna. L'attività come architetto a
Firenze A Firenze lavorò come architetto soprattutto per Giovanni Rucellai,
ricchissimo mercante e mecenate,[4] intimo amico suo e della sua famiglia. Le
opere fiorentine saranno le sole dell'Alberti a essere compiute prima della sua
morte. Palazzo Rucellai Facciata di palazzo Rucellai. Forse sin dal
1439-1442 gli venne commissionata la costruzione del palazzo della famiglia
Rucellai, da ricavarsi da una serie di case-torri acquistate da Giovanni
Rucellai in via della Vigna Nuova. Il suo intervento si concentrò sulla
facciata, posta su un basamento che imita l'opus reticulatum romano, realizzata
tra il 1450 e il 1460. È formata da tre piani sovrapposti, separati
orizzontalmente da cornici marcapiano e ritmati verticalmente da lesene di
ordine diverso; la sovrapposizione degli ordini è di origine classica come nel
Colosseo o nel Teatro di Marcello, ed è quella teorizzata da Vitruvio:[5] al
piano terreno lesene doriche, ioniche al piano nobile e corinzie al secondo.
Esse inquadrano porzioni di muro bugnato a conci levigati, in cui si aprono
finestre in forma di bifora nel piano nobile e nel secondo piano. Le lesene
decrescono progressivamente verso i piani superiori, in modo da creare
nell'osservatore l'illusione che il palazzo sia più alto di quanto non sia in
realtà. Al di sopra di un forte cornicione aggettante si trova un attico,
caratteristicamente arretrato rispetto al piano della facciata. Il palazzo creò
un modello per tutte le successive dimore signorili del Rinascimento, venendo
addirittura citato pedissequamente da Bernardo Rossellino, suo collaboratore,
per il suo palazzo Piccolomini a Pienza (post 1459). Attribuita
all'Alberti è anche l'antistante Loggia Rucellai, o per lo meno il suo disegno.
Loggia e palazzo andavano così costituendo una sorta di piazzetta celebrante la
casata, che viene riconosciuta come uno dei primi interventi urbanistici
rinascimentali. Facciata di Santa Maria Novella Facciata di Santa
Maria Novella, Firenze. Su commissione del Rucellai, progettò anche il
completamento della facciata della basilica di Santa Maria Novella, rimasta
incompiuta nel 1365 al primo ordine di arcatelle, caratterizzate
dall'alternarsi di fasce di marmo bianco e di marmo verde, secondo la secolare
tradizione fiorentina. I lavori iniziarono intorno al 1457. Si presentava il
problema di integrare, in un disegno generale e classicheggiante, i nuovi
interventi con gli elementi esistenti di epoca precedente: in basso vi erano
gli avelli inquadrati da archi a sesto acuto e i portali laterali, sempre a
sesto acuto, mentre nella parte superiore era già aperto il rosone, seppur
spoglio di ogni decorazione. Alberti inserì al centro della facciata inferiore
un portale di proporzioni classiche, inquadrato da semicolonne, in cui inserì
incrostazioni in marmo rosso per rompere la bicromia. Per terminare la fascia
inferiore pose una serie di archetti a tutto sesto a conclusione delle lesene.
Poiché la parte superiore della facciata risultava arretrata rispetto al
basamento (un tema molto comune nell'architettura albertiana, derivata dai
monumenti della romanità) inserì una fascia di separazione a tarsie marmoree
che recano una teoria di vele gonfie al vento, l'insegna personale di Giovanni
Rucellai; il livello superiore, scandito da un secondo ordine di lesene che non
hanno corrispondenza in quella inferiore, sorregge un timpano triangolare. Ai
lati, due doppie volute raccordano l'ordine inferiore, più largo, all'ordine
superiore più alto e stretto, conferendo alla facciata un moto ascendente
conforme alle proporzioni; non mascherano come spesso si è detto erroneamente
gli spioventi laterali che risultano più bassi, come si evince osservando la
facciata dal lato posteriore. La composizione con incrostazioni a tarsia
marmorea ispirate al romanico fiorentino, necessaria in questo caso per
armonizzare le nuove parti al già costruito, rimase una costante nelle opere
fiorentine dell'Alberti. Secondo Rudolf Wittkower: "L'intero
edificio sta rispetto alle sue parti principali nel rapporto di uno a due, vale
a dire nella relazione musicale dell'ottava, e questa proporzione si ripete nel
rapporto tra la larghezza del piano superiore e quella dell'inferiore". La
facciata si inscrive infatti in un quadrato avente per lato la base della
facciata stessa. Dividendo in quattro tale quadrato, si ottengono quattro
quadrati minori; la zona inferiore ha una superficie equivalente a due
quadrati, quella superiore a un quadrato. Altri rapporti si possono trovare
nella facciata tanto da realizzare una perfetta proporzione. Secondo Franco
Borsi: "L'esigenza teorica dell'Alberti di mantenere in tutto l'edificio
la medesima proporzione è qui stata osservata ed è appunto la stretta
applicazione di una serie continua di rapporti che denuncia il carattere non
medievale di questa facciata pseudo-protorinascimentale e ne fa il primo grande
esempio di eurythmia classica del Rinascimento". Altre opere
Il tempietto del Santo Sepolcro. Attribuito all'Alberti è il progetto
dell'abside della pieve di San Martino a Gangalandi presso Lastra a Signa.
L'Alberti fu rettore di San Martino dal 1432 fino alla sua morte. La chiesa, di
origine medievale, ha il suo punto focale nell'abside, chiusa in alto da un
arco a tutto sesto con decorazione a motivi di candelabro e con lesene in
pietra serena sorreggenti un architrave che reca un'iscrizione a lettere capitali
dorate, ornata alle due estremità dalle arme degli Alberti. L'abside è
ricordata incepta et quasi perfecta nel testamento di Leon Battista Alberti, e
fu infatti terminata dopo la sua morte, tra il 1472 e il 1478.[1] Del
1467 è un'altra opera per i Rucellai, il tempietto del Santo Sepolcro nella
chiesa di San Pancrazio a Firenze, costruito secondo un parallelepipedo
spartito da paraste corinzie. La decorazione è a tarsie marmoree, con figure
geometriche in rapporto aureo; le decorazioni geometriche, come per la facciata
di Santa Maria Novella, secondo l'Alberti inducono a meditare sui misteri della
fede. Ferrara Il campanile del duomo di Ferrara. L'Alberti fu a
Ferrara a varie riprese, e sicuramente tra il 1438 e il 1439, stringendo
amicizie alla corte estense. Vi ritorna nel 1441 e forse nel 1443, chiamato a
giudicare la gara per un monumento equestre a Niccolò III d'Este.[6] In tale
occasione forse dette indicazioni per il rinnovo della facciata del Palazzo
Municipale, allora residenza degli Estensi. A lui è stato attribuito da
insigni storici dell'arte, ma esclusivamente su basi stilistiche, anche
l'incompleto campanile del duomo, dai volumi nitidi e dalla bicromia di marmi
rosa e bianchi. Rimini Tempio Malatestiano, Rimini. Nel 1450 l'Alberti
venne chiamato a Rimini da Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta per trasformare la
chiesa di San Francesco in un tempio in onore e gloria sua e della sua
famiglia. Alla morte del signore (1468) il tempio fu lasciato incompiuto
mancando della parte superiore della facciata, della fiancata sinistra e della
tribuna. Conosciamo il progetto albertiano attraverso una medaglia incisa da
Matteo de' Pasti, l'architetto a cui erano stati affidati gli ampliamenti
interni della chiesa e in generale tutto il cantiere. Tempio malatestiano
sulla medaglia di Matteo de' Pasti. L'Alberti ideò un involucro marmoreo che
lasciasse intatto l'edificio preesistente. L'opera prevedeva in facciata una
tripartizione con archi scanditi da semicolonne corinzie, mentre nella parte
superiore era previsto una specie di frontone con arco al centro affiancato da
paraste e forse due volute curve. Punto focale era il portale centrale, con
timpano triangolare e riccamente ornato da lastre marmoree policrome nello
stile della Roma imperiale. Ai lati due archi minori avrebbero dovuto
inquadrare i sepolcri di Sigismondo e della moglie Isotta, ma furono poi
tamponati. Le fiancate invece sono composte da una sequenza di archi su
pilastri, ispirati alla serialità degli acquedotti romani, destinati ad accogliere
i sarcofagi dei più alti dignitari di corte. Fianchi e facciata sono unificati
da un alto zoccolo che isola la costruzione dallo spazio circostante. Ricorre
la ghirlanda circolare, emblema dei Malatesta, qui usata come oculo.
Interessante è notare come Alberti traesse spunto dall'architettura classica,
ma affidandosi a spunti locali, come l'arco di Augusto, il cui modulo è
triplicato in facciata.[7] Una particolarità di questo intervento è che il
rivestimento non tiene conto delle precedenti aperture gotiche: infatti,
il passo delle arcate laterali non è lo stesso delle finestre ogivali, che
risultano posizionate in maniera sempre diversa. Del resto Alberti scrive a
Matteo de' Pasti che «queste larghezze et altezze delle Chappelle mi
perturbano». Per l'abside era prevista una grande rotonda coperta da
cupola emisferica simile a quella del Pantheon. Se completata, la navata
avrebbe allora assunto un ruolo di semplice accesso al maestoso edificio
circolare e sarebbe stata molto più evidente la funzione celebrativa
dell'edificio, anche in rapporto allo skyline cittadino.[7] Mantova
Chiesa di San Sebastiano, Mantova. Basilica di Sant'Andrea, Mantova. Nel
1459 Alberti fu chiamato a Mantova da Ludovico III Gonzaga, nell'ambito dei
progetti di abbellimento cittadino per il Concilio di Mantova. San
Sebastiano Il primo intervento mantovano riguardò la chiesa di San Sebastiano,
cappella privata dei Gonzaga, iniziata nel 1460. L'edificio fece da fondamento
per le riflessioni rinascimentali sugli edifici a croce greca: è infatti diviso
in due piani, uno dei quali interrato, con tre bracci absidati attorno ad un
corpo cubico con volta a crociera; il braccio anteriore è preceduto da un
portico, oggi con cinque aperture.[8] La parte superiore della facciata,
spartita da lesene di ordine gigante, è originale del progetto albertiano e
ricorda un'elaborazione del tempio classico, con architrave spezzata, timpano e
un arco siriaco, a testimonianza dell'estrema libertà con cui l'architetto
disponeva gli elementi. Forse l'ispirazione fu un'opera tardo-antica, come
l'arco di Orange.[8] I due scaloni di collegamento che permettono l'accesso al
portico non fanno parte del progetto originario, ma furono aggiunte
posteriori. Sant'Andrea Il secondo intervento, sempre su commissione dei
Gonzaga, fu la basilica di Sant'Andrea, eretta in sostituzione di un precedente
sacrario in cui si venerava una reliquia del sangue di Cristo. L'Alberti creò
il suo progetto «... più capace più eterno più degno più lieto ...» ispirandosi
al modello del tempio etrusco ripreso da Vitruvio e contrapponendosi al
precedente progetto di Antonio Manetti. Innanzitutto mutò l'orientamento della
chiesa allineandola all'asse viario che collegava Palazzo Ducale al
Tè.[8] La chiesa a croce latina, iniziata nel 1472, è a navata unica
coperta a botte con lacunari, con cappelle laterali a base rettangolare con la
funzione di reggere e scaricare le spinte della volta, inquadrate negli
ingressi da un arco a tutto sesto, inquadrato da un lesene architravate. Il
tema è ripreso dall'arco trionfale classico ad un solo fornice come l'arco di
Traiano ad Ancona. La grande volta della navata e quelle del transetto e degli
atri d'ingresso si ispiravano a modelli romani, come la Basilica di
Massenzio. Per caratterizzare l'importante posizione urbana, venne data
particolare importanza alla facciata, dove ritorna il tema dell'arco: l'alta
apertura centrale è affiancata da setti murari, con archetti sovrapposti tra
lesene corinzie sopra i due portali laterali. Il tutto, coronato da un timpano
triangolare a cui si sovrappone, per non lasciare scoperta l'altezza della
volta, un nuovo arco. Questa soluzione, che enfatizza la solennità dell'arco di
trionfo e il suo moto ascensionale, permetteva anche l'illuminazione della
navata. Sotto l'arco venne a formarsi uno spesso atrio, diventato il punto di
filtraggio tra interno ed esterno.[8] La facciata è inscrivibile in un
quadrato e tutte le misure della navata, sia in pianta che in alzato, si
conformano ad un preciso modulo metrico. La tribuna e la cupola (comunque
prevista da Alberti) vennero completate nei secoli successivi, secondo un
disegno estraneo all'Alberti. I caratteri dell'architettura albertiana Le
opere più mature di Alberti evidenziano una forte evoluzione verso un classicismo
consapevole e maturo in cui, dallo studio dei monumenti antichi romani,
l'Alberti ricavò un senso delle masse murarie ben diverso dalla semplicità
dello stile brunelleschiano. I modi originali albertiani precorsero l'arte del
Bramante. I caratteri innovativi di Alberti furono: La colonna deve sostenere
la trabeazione e deve essere usata come ornamento per le fabbriche; l'arco deve
essere costruito sopra i pilastri. Il De statua Il trattato, scritto in
latino, è relativo alla teoria della scultura e risale al1450 circa. Nel De
statua, l'Alberti rielaborò profondamente le concezioni e le teorie relative
alla scultura tenendo conto delle innovazioni artistiche del Rinascimento,
attingendo anche ad una rilettura critica delle fonti classiche e riconoscendo,
tra i primi dignità intellettuale alla scultura, prima di allora sempre
condizionata dal pregiudizio verso un'attività tanto manuale. Nel
trattato che si compone di 19 capitoli, l'Alberti parte, sulla scorta di
Plinio, dalla definizione dell'arte plastica tridimensionale distinguendo la
scultura o per via di porre o per via di levare, dividendola secondo la tecnica
utilizzata: togliere e aggiungere: sculture con materie molli, terra e
cera eseguita dai "modellatori" levare: scultura in pietra, eseguita
dagli "scultori" Tale distinzione fu determinante nella concezione
artistica di molti scultori come Michelangelo e non era mai stata espressa con
tanta chiarezza.[9] Il definitor, lo strumento inventato da Leon
Battista Alberti. Relativamente al metodo da utilizzare per raggiungere il fine
ultimo della scultura che è l'imitazione della natura, l'Alberti
distingue: la dimensio (misura) che definisce le proporzioni generali
dell'oggetto rappresentato mediante l’exempeda, una riga diritta modulare atta
a rilevare le lunghezze e squadre mobili a forma di compassi (normae), con cui
misurare spessori, distanze e diametri.[10] la finitio, definizione individuale
dei particolari e dei movimenti dell'oggetto rappresentato, per la quale
Alberti suggerisce uno strumento da lui ideato: il definitor o finitorium, un
disco circolare cui è fissata un'asta graduata rotante, da cui pende un filo a
piombo. Con esso si può determinare qualsiasi punto sul modello mediante una
combinazione di coordinate polari e assiali, rendendo possibile un
trasferimento meccanico dal modello alla scultura.[9] Alberti sembra anticipare
i temi relativi alla raffigurazione 'scientifica' della figura umana che è uno
dei temi che percorre la cultura figurativa rinascimentale.[11] e addirittura
aspetti dell'industrializzazione e addirittura della digitalizzazione, visto
che il definitor trasformava i punti rilevati sul modello in dati
alfanumerici.[12] L'opera fu tradotta in volgare nel 1568 da Cosimo
Bartoli. Il testo latino originale fu stampato solo alla fine del XIX secolo,
mentre solo recentemente sono state pubblicate traduzioni moderne.[11] I
sistemi di definizione meccanica dei volumi proposti dall'Alberti,
appassionarono Leonardo che approntò, come si può rilevare dai suoi disegni,
dei sistemi alternativi, sviluppati a partire dal trattato albertiano[9] e
utilizzò le "Tabulae dimensionum hominis" del "De statua"
per realizzare il celeberrimo "Uomo vitruviano". Il Crittografo
Alberti fu inoltre un geniale crittografo e inventò un metodo per generare
messaggi criptati con l'aiuto di un apparecchio, il disco cifrante. Sua fu
infatti l'idea di passare da una crittografia con tecnica
"monoalfabetica" (Cifrario di Cesare) ad una con tecnica
"polialfabetica", codificata teoricamente parecchi anni dopo da
Blaise de Vigenère.[13] In The Codebreakers. The Story of Secret Writing[14],
lo storico della crittologia David Kahn attribuisce all'Alberti il titolo di
Father of Western Cryptology (Padre della crittologia occidentale). Kahn
ribadisce questa definizione, sottolineando le ragioni che la giustificano,
nella prefazione all'edizione italiana del testo albertiano: «Questo volume
elegante e sottile riproduce il testo più importante di tutta la storia della
crittologia; un primato che il De cifris di Leon Battista Alberti ben si merita
per i tre temi cruciali che tratta: l'invenzione della sostituzione
polialfabetica, l'uso della crittanalisi, la descrizione di un codice
sopracifrato.» Tra le altre attività di Alberti ci fu anche la musica,
per la quale fu considerato uno dei primi organisti della sua epoca. Disegnò
anche delle mappe e collaborò con il grande cartografo Paolo Toscanelli.
De iciarchia Iciarco e Iciarchia sono due termini usati dall'Alberti nel
dialogo De iciarchia composto nel 1470 circa, pochi anni prima della sua morte
(avvenuta nel 1472) e ambientato nella Firenze medicea di quegli anni. Le due
parole sono di origine greca ("Pogniàngli nome tolto da' Greci, iciarco:
vuol dire supremo omo e primario principe della famiglia sua", libro III),
e sono formate da oîkos o oikía "casa, famiglia" e arkhós "capo
supremo, principe, principio". Il nome stesso di iciarco vuole
esprimere quello che secondo il parere dell'autore è il governante ideale:
colui che sia come un padre di famiglia nei confronti dello Stato. Secondo le
parole dell'Alberti, "il suo compito sarà (...) provedere alla salute,
quiete, e onestamento di tutta la famiglia, (...) fare sì che amando e
benificando è suoi, tutti amino lui, e tutti lo reputino e osservino come padre"
(ivi). Questo ruolo di "padre di famiglia" del governante
ideale era finalizzato, nella sua visione politica, ad una stabilità, in
definitiva "conservatrice", che permetterebbe di governare senza
discordie che, dilaniando lo Stato, nuocerebbero a tutto il corpo sociale
("Inoltre la prima cura sua sarà che la famiglia sia senza niuna discordia
unitissima. Non esser unita la famiglia circa le cose (...) che giovano, nuoce
sopra modo molto., ivi). Il termine iciarco, nato coll'Alberti e
strettamente legato alla sua visione "paternalistica" del governo
dello Stato, non ebbe comunque alcun seguito e non risulta che sia mai più
stato impiegato nel lessico politico. Opere Scritti Apologi centum Cena
familiaris De amore De equo animante (Il cavallo vivo) De Iciarchia De componendis
cifris Deiphira De pictura Porcaria coniuratio De re aedificatoria De statua
Descriptio urbis Romae Ecatomphile Elementa picturae Epistola consolatoria
Grammatica della lingua toscana (meglio nota come Grammatichetta vaticana[15])
Intercoenales De familia libri IV Ex ludis rerum mathematicorum Momus
Philodoxeos fabula Profugiorum ab ærumna libri III Sentenze pitagoriche
Sophrona Theogenius Villa Opere architettoniche Palazzo Rucellai, 1446-1451,
Firenze, Via della Vigna Nuova Loggia Rucellai, 145?-1460, Firenze, Via della
Vigna Nuova Facciata di Santa Maria Novella, 1458-1478, Firenze, Santa Maria
Novella Abside di San Martino, 1472-1478, Lastra a Signa, Pieve di San Martino
a Gangalandi Tempietto del Santo Sepolcro, 1457-1467, Firenze, Chiesa di San
Pancrazio Tempio Malatestiano (incompiuto), iniziato nel 1450 circa, Rimini,
Tempio Malatestiano Chiesa di San Sebastiano, 1460 circa, Mantova, Chiesa di
San Sebastiano Basilica di Sant'Andrea, 1472-1732, Mantova, Basilica di
Sant'Andrea (Mantova) Palazzo Romei, Vibo Valentia[16] Manoscritti Liber de
iure, scriptus Bononiae anno 1437, XV secolo, Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana,
Fondo manoscritti, ms. I 193 inf., ff. 1v-13r. Trivia senatoria, XV secolo,
Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Fondo manoscritti, ms. I 193 inf., ff. 13v-19v.
Note Cecil Grayson, Studi su Leon Battista Alberti, Firenze, Olschki,
1998, pag.419-433 ^ L.B. Alberti, De pictura, a cura di C. Grayson, Laterza,
1980: versione on line Copia archiviata, su liberliber.it. URL consultato il 27
novembre 2010 (archiviato dall'url originale il 16 novembre 2010). ^ Christoph
L. Frommel, Architettura e committenza da Alberti a Bramante, Olschki, 2006,
ISBN 978-88-222-5582-2 ^ Bernardo Rucellai, De bello italico, a cura di
Donatella Coppini, Firenze University Press, 2011, ISBN 88-6453-224-2. ^ De re
Aedificatoria ^ In tale occasione manifestò il suo interesse per la morfologia
e l'allevamento dei cavalli con il breve trattato De equo animante dedicato a
Leonello d'Este. De Vecchi-Cerchiari, cit., p. 95. De
Vecchi-Cerchiari, cit., p. 104 Rudolf Wittkower, op. cit. 1993 ^ Rudolf
Wittkower,op. cit. 1993 Leon Battista Alberti, De statua, a cura di M.
Collareta, 1998 ^ Mario Carpo, L'architettura dell'età della stampa: oralità,
scrittura, libro stampato e riproduzione meccanica dell'immagine nella storia
delle teorie architettoniche, 1998. ^ Simon Singh, Codici e Segreti, p. 45 ^
(EN) David Kahn, The Codebreakers, Scribner, 1996. ^ Il nome deriva dal fatto
che il libello, di appena 16 carte, è conservato in una copia del 1508 in un
codice in ottavo della Biblioteca vaticana. Lo scritto non ha epigrafe,
pertanto il titolo è stato assegnato in seguito: fu riscoperto infatti nel 1850
e dato alle stampe solo nel 1908. ^ viviamolacalabria.blogspot.com, https://viviamolacalabria.blogspot.com/2017/09/esempio-tangibile-di-palazzo-nobiliare.html?m=1.
Bibliografia (LA) Leon Battista Alberti, De re aedificatoria, Argentorati,
excudebat M. Iacobus Cammerlander Moguntinus, 1541. (LA) Leon Battista Alberti,
De re aedificatoria, Florentiae, accuratissime impressum opera magistri Nicolai
Laurentii Alamani. Leon Battista Alberti, Opere volgari. 1, Firenze, Tipografia
Galileiana, 1843. Leon Battista Alberti, Opere volgari. 2, Firenze, Tipografia
Galileiana, 1844. Leon Battista Alberti, Opere volgari. 4, Firenze, Tipografia
Galileiana, 1847. Leon Battista Alberti, Opere volgari. 5, Firenze, Tipografia
Galileiana, 1849. Leon Battista Alberti, Opere, Florentiae, J. C. Sansoni,
1890. Leon Battista Alberti, Trattati d'arte, Bari, Laterza, 1973. Leon
Battista Alberti, Ippolito e Leonora, Firenze, Bartolomeo de' Libri, prima del
1495. Leon Battista Alberti, Ecatonfilea, Stampata in Venesia, per Bernardino
da Cremona, 1491. Leon Battista Alberti, Deifira, Padova, Lorenzo Canozio, 1471.
Leon Battista Alberti, Teogenio, Milano, Leonard Pachel, circa 1492. Leon
Battista Alberti, Libri della famiglia, Bari, G. Laterza, 1960. Leon Battista
Alberti, Rime e trattati morali, Bari, Laterza, 1966. Albertiana, Rivista della
Société Intérnationale Leon Battista Alberti, Firenze, Olschki, 1998 sgg.
Franco Borsi, Leon Battista Alberti: Opera completa, Electa, Milano, 1973;
Giovanni Ponte, Leon Battista Alberti: Umanista e scrittore, Tilgher, Genova,
1981; Paolo Marolda, Crisi e conflitto in Leon Battista Alberti , Bonacci,
Roma, 1988; Roberto Cardini, Mosaici: Il nemico dell'Alberti, Bulzoni, Roma
1990; Rosario Contarino, Leon Battista Alberti moralista, presentazione di
Francesco Tateo, S. Sciascia, Caltanissetta 1991; Pierluigi Panza, Leon
Battista Alberti: Filosofia e teoria dell'arte, introduzione di Dino Formaggio,
Guerini, Milano 1994; Pierluigi Panza, introduzione a "De Amore" di
Leon Battista Alberti, in Estetica. Le scritture dell’eros, annuario a cura di
S. Zecchi, Il Mulino, Bologna. ISBN 88-15-04790-5. Pierluigi Panza, "Lui
geometra, lui musico, lui astronomo”. Leon Battista Alberti e le discipline
liberali", in Le arti e le scienze. Annuario di Estetica, a cura di
S. Zecchi, Bologna ISBN 88-15-05268-2. Cecil Grayson, Studi su Leon Battista Alberti,
a cura di Paola Claut, Olschki, Firenze 1998; Stefano Borsi, Momus, o Del
principe: Leon Battista Alberti, i papi, il giubileo, Polistampa, Firenze 1999;
Luca Boschetto, Leon Battista Alberti e Firenze: Biografia, storia,
letteratura, Olschki, Firenze 2000; Alberto G. Cassani, La fatica del
costruire: Tempo e materia nel pensiero di Leon Battista Alberti, Unicopli,
Milano 2000; Pierluigi Panza, “Alberti e il mondo naturale”, in AA.VV., Lettere
e arti nel Rinascimento, Atti del X Convegno internazionale
Chianciano-Pienza, 20-23 luglio 1998, a cura di Luisa Secchi Tarugi, Franco
Cesati editore, Firenze, vol. 1, pp.167-180, ISBN 88-7667-096-3 Elisabetta Di
Stefano, L'altro sapere: Bello, arte, immagine in Leon Battista Alberti, Centro
internazionale studi di estetica, Palermo 2000; Rinaldo Rinaldi, Melancholia
Christiana. Studi sulle fonti di Leon Battista Alberti, Firenze, Olschki, 2002;
Francesco Furlan, Studia albertiana: Lectures et lecteurs de L.B. Alberti, N.
Aragno-J. Vrin, Torino-Parigi 2003; Anthony Grafton, Leon Battista Alberti: Un
genio universale, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2003; D. Mazzini, S. Martini. Villa Medici
a Fiesole. Leon Battista Alberti e il prototipo di villa rinascimentale, Centro
Di, Firenze 2004; Michel Paoli, Leon Battista Alberti 1404-1472, Parigi,
Editions de l'Imprimeur, 2004, ISBN 2-910735-88-5, ora tradotto in italiano:
Michel Paoli, Leon Battista Alberti, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 2007, 124 p. +
40 ill., ISBN 978-88-339-1755-9. Anna Siekiera, Bibliografia linguistica albertiana,
Firenze, Edizioni Polistampa, 2004 (Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Leon
Battista Alberti, Serie «Strumenti», 2); Francesco P. Fiore: La Roma di Leon
Battista Alberti. Umanisti, architetti e artisti alla scoperta dell'antico
nella città del Quattrocento, Skira, Milano 2005, ISBN 88-7624-394-1; Leon
Battista Alberti architetto, a cura di Giorgio Grassi e Luciano Patetta, testi
di Giorgio Grassi et alii, Banca CR, Firenze 2005; Restaurare Leon Battista
Alberti: il caso di Palazzo Rucellai, a cura di Simonetta Bracciali,
presentazione di Antonio Paolucci, Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, Firenze 2006,
ISBN 88-89264-81-0; Stefano Borsi, Leon Battista Alberti e Napoli, Polistampa,
Firenze 2006; ISBN 88-88967-58-3 Gabriele Morolli, Leon Battista Alberti. Firenze
e la Toscana, Maschietto Editore, Firenze, 2006. F. Canali, "Leon Battista
Alberti "Camaleonta" e l'idea del Tempio Malatestiano dalla
Storiografia al Restauro, in Il Tempio della Meraviglia, a cura di F. Canali,
C. Muscolino, Firenze, 2007. F. Canali, La facciata del Tempio Malatestiano, in
Il Tempio della Meraviglia, a cura di F. Canali, C. Muscolino, Firenze, 2007.
V. C. Galati, "Ossa" e "illigamenta" nel De Re
aedificatoria. Caratteri costruttivi e ipotesi strutturali nella lettura della
tecnologia antiquaria del cantiere del Tempio Malatestiano, in Il Tempio della
Meraviglia, a cura di F. Canali, C. Muscolino, Firenze, 2007 “Il mito
dell’Egitto in Alberti”, in AA.VV., Leon Battista Alberti teorico delle arti e
gli impegni civili del “De re aedificatoria”, Atti dei Convegni internazionali
di studi del Comitato Nazionale per le celebrazioni albertiane, Mantova,
17-19/10/2002-23-25/10/2003, a cura di Arturo Calzona, Francesco Paolo Fiore,
Alberto Tenenti, Cesare Vasoli, Firenze, Olschki, 2007, Isbn: 978-88-222-5605-8.
Alberti e la cultura del Quattrocento, Atti del Convegno internazionale di
Studi, (Firenze, Palazzo Vecchio, Salone dei Dugento, 16-17-18 dicembre 2004),
a cura di R. Cardini e M. Regoliosi, Firenze, Edizioni Polistampa, 2007. AA.VV,
Brunelleschi, Alberti e oltre, a cura di F. Canali, «Bollettino della Società
di Studi Fiorentini», 16-17, 2008. F. Canali, R Tracce albertiane nella Romagna
umanistica tra Rimini e Faenza, in Brunelleschi, Alberti e oltre, a cura di F.
Canali, «Bollettino della Società di Studi Fiorentini», 16-17, 2008. V. C.
Galati, Riflessioni sulla Reggia di Castelnuovo a Napoli: morfologie
architettoniche e tecniche costruttive. Un univoco cantiere antiquario tra
Donatello e Leon Battista Alberti?, in Brunelleschi, Alberti e oltre, a cura di
F. Canali, «Bollettino della Società di Studi Fiorentini», 16-17, 2008. F.
Canali, V. C. Galati, Leon Battista Alberti, gli 'Albertiani' e la Puglia
umanistica, in Brunelleschi, Alberti e oltre, a cura di F. Canali, «Bollettino
della Società di Studi Fiorentini», 16-17, 2008. G. Morolli, Alberti: la
triiplice luce della pulcritudo, in Brunelleschi, Alberti e oltre, a cura di F.
Canali, «Bollettino della Società di Studi Fiorentini», 16-17, 2008. G.
Morolli, Pienza e Alberti, in Brunelleschi, Alberti e oltre, a cura di F.
Canali, «Bollettino della Società di Studi Fiorentini», 16-17, 2008. Christoph
Luitpold Frommel, Alberti e la porta trionfale di Castel Nuovo a Napoli, in
«Annali di architettura» n° 20, Vicenza 2008 leggere l'articolo; Massimo
Bulgarelli, Leon Battista Alberti, 1404-1472: Architettura e storia, Electa,
Milano 2008; Caterina Marrone, I segni dell'inganno. Semiotica della
crittografia, Stampa Alternativa&Graffiti, Viterbo 2010; Pierluigi
Panza, “Animalia: La zoologia nel De Re Aedificatoria", Convegno 29-30
marzo 2008 Facoltà di Architettura Civile, Milano, in Albertiana, vol.13,
pp.87-100, Issn 1126-9588 S. Borsi, Leon Battista Alberti e Napoli, Firenze,
2011. V. Galati, Il Torrione quattrocentesco di Bitonto dalla committenza di
Giovanni Ventimiglia e Marino Curiale; dagli adeguamenti ai dettami del De Re
aedificatoria di Leon Battista Alberti alle proposte di Francesco di Giorgio
Martini (1450-1495), in Defensive Architecture of the Mediterranean XV to XVIII
centuries, a cura di G. Verdiani,, Firenze, 2016, vol.III. V. Galati, Tipologie
di Saloni per le udienze nel Quattrocento tra Ferrara e Mantova. Oeci,
Basiliche, Curie e "Logge all'antica" tra Vitruvio e Leon Battista
Alberti nel "Salone dei Mesi di Schifanoia a Ferrara e nella "Camera
Picta" di Palazzo Ducale a Mantova, in Per amor di Classicismo, a cura di
F. Canali «Bollettino della Società di Studi Fiorentini», 24-25, 2016. S.
Borsi, Leon Battista, Firenze, 2018. Roberto Rossellini gli ha dedicato un film-
documentario per la TV nel 1973, intitolato "L'età di Cosimo dei
Medici" (88'). Voci correlate Architettura rinascimentale
Rinascimento fiorentino Rinascimento riminese Rinascimento mantovano Medaglia
di Leon Battista Alberti Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource
contiene una pagina dedicata a Leon Battista Alberti Collabora a Wikisource
Wikisource contiene una pagina in lingua latina dedicata a Leon Battista
Alberti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di Leon Battista
Alberti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Leon Battista Alberti Collegamenti esterni Leon Battista Alberti,
su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata Leon Battista Alberti, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Leon Battista Alberti, su
Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata
Leon Battista Alberti, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Leon Battista Alberti, su
MacTutor, University of St Andrews, Scotland. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di
Leon Battista Alberti, su Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Leon
Battista Alberti, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata
(EN) Opere di Leon Battista Alberti, su Open Library, Internet Archive.
Modifica su Wikidata (FR) Bibliografia su Leon Battista Alberti, su Les
Archives de littérature du Moyen Âge. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Leon Battista
Alberti, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. Modifica su
Wikidata La bibliografia aggiornata degli studi albertiani dal 1995 in poi, e
le informazioni più recenti sulla ricerca albertiana, su alberti.wordpress.com.
Il sito della Société Internationale Leon Battista Alberti, su silba-online.eu.
Biografia breve, su imss.fi.it. Fondazione Centro Studi Leon Battista Alberti -
Mantova, su fondazioneleonbattistaalberti.it. Momus, (testo in latino, Roma
1520), facsimile, progetto CAMENA Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 29559625 ·
ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2095 8329 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\042377 · Europeana
agent/base/60136 · LCCN (EN) n79005570 · GND (DE) 11850147X · BNF (FR)
cb12083793k (data) · BNE (ES) XX1108703 (data) · ULAN (EN) 500002025 · NLA (EN)
35002626 · BAV 495/19463 · CERL cnp01302039 · NDL (EN, JA) 00431158 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n79005570 Architettura Portale Architettura Biografie
Portale Biografie Crittografia Portale Crittografia Letteratura Portale
Letteratura Matematica Portale Matematica Categorie: Architetti italiani del XV
secoloScrittori italiani del XV secoloMatematici italiani del XV secoloNati nel
1404Morti nel 1472Nati il 14 febbraioMorti il 25 aprileNati a GenovaMorti a
RomaPersonalità commemorate nella Basilica di Santa CroceLeon Battista
AlbertiAlberti (famiglia)Personaggi della Camera degli SposiUomini
universaliArchitetti alla corte dei GonzagaArchitetti alla corte degli
EstensiArchitetti rinascimentaliTeorici dell'architettura italianiTeorici dell'arteArtisti
di scuola fiorentinaCrittografi italianiTeorici della musica italianiUmanisti
italianiStudenti dell'Università di BolognaDrammaturghi italianiMembri
dell'Accademia neoplatonica[altre]. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Alberti," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
alethic: Grice could not
find a good word for ‘verum,’ and so he borrowed ‘alethic’ from, but never
returned it to, von Wright. Under the alethic modalities, Grice, as
historically, included the four central ways or modes in which a given
proposition might be true or false: necessity, contingency, possibility, and
impossibility. The term ‘alethic’ derives from Grecian aletheia, ‘truth’. These
modalities, and their logical interconnectedness, can be characterized as
follows. A proposition that is true but possibly false is contingently true
e.g., that Aristotle taught Alexander; one that is true and not-possibly i.e.,
“impossibly” false is necessarily true e.g., that red things are colored.
Likewise, a proposition that is false but possibly true is contingently false
e.g., that there are no tigers; and one that is false and not-possibly true is
necessarily false e.g., that seven and five are fourteen. Though any one of the
four modalities can be defined in terms of any other, necessity and possibility
are generally taken to be the more fundamental notions, and most systems of
alethic modal logic take one or the other as basic. Distinct modal systems
differ chiefly in regard to their treatment of iterated modalities, as in the
proposition It is necessarily true that it is possibly true that it is possibly
true that there are no tigers. In the weakest of the most common systems,
usually called T, every iterated modality is distinct from every other. In the
stronger system S4, iterations of any given modality are redundant. So, e.g.,
the above proposition is equivalent to It is necessarily true that it is
possibly true that there are no tigers. In the strongest and most widely
accepted system S5, all iteration is redundant. Thus, the two propositions
above are both equivalent simply to It is possibly true that there are no
tigers.
alexanderian: s.– what Grice
called “A Balliol hegelian,” philosopher, tuteed at Balliol by A. C. Bradley,
Oxford, and taught for most of his career at the of Manchester. His aim, which he most fully
realized in Space, Time, and Deity 0, was to provide a realistic account of the
place of mind in nature. He described nature as a series of levels of existence
where irreducible higher-level qualities emerge inexplicably when lower levels
become sufficiently complex. At its lowest level reality consists of
space-time, a process wherein points of space are redistributed at instants of
time and which might also be called pure motion. From complexities in
space-time matter arises, followed by secondary qualities, life, and mind.
Alexander thought that the still-higher quality of deity, which characterizes
the whole universe while satisfying religious sentiments, is now in the process
of emerging from mind.
alexanderian: related to
Alexander de Aphrodisias: ““Alexander of Aphrodisias” should not be confused
with Samuel Alexander, a fellow of Bradley, even if they are next in your
philosophical dictionary!” – Grice. Grecian philosopher, one of the foremost
commentators on Aristotle in late antiquity. He exercised considerable
influence on later Grecian and Roman philosophy through to the Renaissance. On
the problem of universals, Alexander endorses a brand of conceptualism: although
several particulars may share a single, common nature, this nature does not
exist as a universal except while abstracted in thought from the circumstances
that accompany its particular instantiations. Regarding Aristotle’s notorious
distinction between the “agent” and “patient” intellects in On the Soul III.5,
Alexander identifies the agent intellect with God, who, as the most
intelligible entity, makes everything else intelligible. As its own
self-subsistent object, this intellect alone is imperishable; the human
intellect, in contrast, perishes at death. Of Alexander’s many commentaries,
only those on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Ad, Prior Analytics I, Topics, On the
Senses, and Meterologics are extant. We also have two polemical treatises, On
Fate and On Mixture, directed against the Stoics; a psychological treatise, the
De anima based on Aristotle’s; as well as an assortment of essays including the
De intellectu and his Problems and Solutions. Nothing is known of Alexander’s
life apart from his appointment by the emperor Severus to a chair in
Aristotelian philosophy between and
209.
algarotti: Grice:
“Nobody can fail to be enchanted by the drawing by Richardson of Algarotti!” --
essential Italian philosopher. Grice: “I don’t have a monicker, but Algarotti
had two: il cigno di Padova and il Socrate veneziano. Il conte Francesco Algarotti
(n. Venezia) è stato un filosofo, poeta. Spirito illuminista, erudito dotato di
conoscenze che spaziavano dal newtonianismo all'architettura, alla musica, era
amico delle personalità più grandi dell'epoca: Voltaire, Jean-Baptiste Boyer
d'Argens, Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Julien Offray de La Mettrie. Tra i
suoi corrispondenti vi erano Lord Chesterfield, Thomas Gray, George Lyttelton,
Thomas Hollis, Metastasio, Benedetto XIV, Heinrich von Brühl, Federico II di
Prussia. Saggi, 1963 (testo completo) Nacque a Venezia, da una
famiglia di commercianti. Dopo un primo periodo di studio a Roma, dove poté
studiare sotto la guida del Lodoli, continuò gli studi a Bologna, dove affrontò
le diverse discipline scientifiche nella loro vastità, soprattutto l'astronomia
sotto la guida di Eustachio Manfredi e di Francesco Maria Zanotti. Si trasferì
a Firenze per completare la propria preparazione letteraria. Iniziò a
viaggiare per l'Europa, raggiungendo Parigi, città nella quale ebbe modo di
conoscere diverse autorevoli personalità. Ad esse poté presentare il
proprio Newtonianismo per le dame, piccola opera di divulgazione scientifica
brillante ispirata al lavoro dello scrittore francese Bernard le Bovier de
Fontenelle. L'opera fu prima apprezzata, e poi denigrata da Voltaire, che dal
lavoro del suo Caro cigno di Padova — come era solito appellarlo — trasse
alcuni temi dei suoi Elementi della filosofia di Newton. Voltaire e Algarotti
si erano conosciuti personalmente a Cirey nello stesso periodo in cui
l'italiano preparava il saggio Dopo il periodo trascorso in Francia,
Algarotti si recò in Inghilterra, per soggiornare per qualche tempo a Londra,
dove fu accolto nella Royal Society, prestigiosa accademia scientifica. Tornato
in Italia si poté dedicare alla pubblicazione del Newtonianesimo e subito dopo
partì. Dopo un breve ritorno a Londra, andò a visitare alcune zone della Russia
(fermandosi in particolare a San Pietroburgo) e della Prussia. Dice il De
Tipaldo, nelle sue biografie degli italiani illustri: "Quando Federico si
recò a Königsberg a incoronarsi, l'Algarotti si trovò in mezzo gli applausi e
il giubilo di quella potente e valorosa nazione misto e confuso coi principi
della famiglia reale, e stette nel palco col re, spargendo al popolo sottoposto
le monete con l'immagine di Federico. Fu in tale congiuntura che questi conferì
a lui, quanto al fratello Bonomo e ai discendenti della famiglia Algarotti, il
titolo di conte, meno vano quando è premio del sapere, e dal 1747 lo fece suo
ciambellano e cavaliere dell'ordine del merito, mentr'era alla corte di Dresda
col titolo di consigliere intimo di guerra. Dal momento che Algarotti conobbe
Federico sino alla sua morte, cioè pel corso di venticinque anni, né
l'amicizia, né la stima del re, né la gratitudine, la devozione e il sincero
affetto del cortigiano vennero meno, né soffersero mai alcuna
alterazione." Secondo il De Tipaldo, l'amicizia fra i due era estesa anche
alla sfera più intima; dice infatti: "…lo volle non solo a compagno degli
studi e dei viaggi, ma altresì dei suoi più segreti piaceri, essendoché della
corte di Potsdam, ora egli faceva un Peripato, ed ora la convertiva in un
tempio di Gnido" - il che significa: in un tempio di Venere.
Trascorse alla corte del re oltre un decennio, per fare ritorno nel paese
natale. Utilizzò la propria influenza anche a favore degli
"oppositori" filosofici come Gregorio Bressani Il resto della vita lo
trascorse tra Venezia e Bologna per fermarsi a Pisa, dove morì all'età di
cinquantatré anni mentre preparava la pubblicazione di tutte le sue opere, fra
cui Lettere sulla Russia e Il Congresso di Citera, un romanzo dedicato ai
costumi galanti e amorosi rivisitati secondo quanto osservato nelle diverse
nazioni in cui aveva soggiornato. Malato di tubercolosi, a Pisa col
diletto amico Mauro Antonio Tesi, chiamato "Maurino", si preparò alla
morte; come epitaffio, volle Algarottus, sed non omnis. Malignamente, l'abate
Galiani notò che questo era epitaffio più di evirato cantore che di
dotto. Fu sepolto nel camposanto di Pisa, in un monumento disegnato
dall'illustre architetto Carlo Bianconi e dallo stesso "Maurino" Tesi
in uno stile archeologizzante, tradotto in marmo dall'allora celebre abate Giovanni
Antonio Cybei di Carrara. L'epitaffio è quello che per lui dettò il re di
Prussia: "Algarotto Ovidii aemulo, Neutoni discipulo, Federicus rex",
tranne che gli eredi cambiarono quel rex in magnus. Commenta il De Tipaldo:
"Egli medesimo si era preparato, in compagnia del Maurino, il disegno del
sepolcro e l'epitafio, non già per orgoglio, ma spinto dal sacro amore delle
arti belle, che anche in faccia alla morte non poteva intiepidirsi nel suo
petto." Personalità e influenza culturale Domenico Michelessi,
Memorie intorno alla vita e agli scritti del conte Francesco Algarotti, 1770
Aperto al progresso e alla conoscenza razionale, esperto di arti (si prodigò
come fautore di Palladio), fu - rispetto alla scienza - un grande assertore
delle teorie di Isaac Newton (sul conto del quale scrisse uno dei suoi più noti
saggi, Il newtonianesimo per le dame). Viene considerato una sorta di
Socrate veneziano e per comprendere la sua statura di insigne studioso con
un'infinita sete di sapere e divulgare è sufficiente porsi davanti al suo
innumerevole campo di interessi. Al di là del suo ruolo di spicco
nell'illuminismo letterario, fu anche un diplomatico e un procacciatore d'arte.
In particolare viaggiò cercando opere d'arte per conto di Augusto III di
Sassonia. È noto che fu Algarotti a comprare a Venezia il capolavoro di
Liotard, il pastello de La cioccolataia, che poi divenne una delle perle della
Galleria di Dresda. Uomo di bell'aspetto, dotato di un aristocratico naso
aquilino (esiste al Rijksmuseum di Amsterdam uno suo ritratto a pastello,
sempre di Liotard, che è riprodotto nell’incipit della presente voce),
l'Algarotti nel Saggio sopra Orazio non perdeva occasione di far notare come
questi fosse ambidestro, e tanto lodava i vantaggi di questa disposizione, che
c'è chi suppone che egli la condividesse col poeta. Ebbe a scrivere
praticamente su tutto, affrontando - con l'acuta attenzione dello scienziato -
pressoché ogni aspetto dello scibile umano. Basti ricordare i saggi che scrisse
a proposito della pittura (Sopra la pittura), dell'architettura (Sopra
l'architettura), dell'opera lirica (Sopra l'opera in musica), del commercio
(Sopra il commercio). La tomba di Algarotti al Camposanto di
Pisa.Opera di Giovanni Antonio Cybei Opere Francesco Algarotti, Saggi, Scrittori
d'Italia 226, Bari, Laterza, 1963. URL consultato il 29 giugno 2015. Saggi, a
cura di Giovanni da Pozzo, Ediz.Laterza (1963), testo integrale dalla collana
digitalizzata "Scrittori d'Italia" F.Algarotti e S.Bettinelli "
Opere " a cura di Ettore Bonora, Milano-Napoli Ricciardi, 1969 Il
newtonianismo per le dame, 1737. The International Centre for the History of
Universities and Science (CIS), Università di Bologna, su 137.204.24.205. URL
consultato il 13 ottobre 2010 (archiviato dall'url originale il 13 giugno
2011). Il Congresso di Citera, Parigi 1768., su archive.org. Il Congresso di
Citera, note, bibliografia e commento a cura di Daniela Mangione, Bologna,
Millennium, 2003 Viaggi di Russia, Milano, Garzanti, 2006 Poesie, Torino, Nino
Aragno editore, 2010 Saggi su Francesco Algarotti: Daniela Mangione, Il
demone ben temperato. Francesco Algarotti tra scienza e letteratura, Italia ed
Europa, Sinestesie, 2018 Note ^ Umberto Renda e Piero Operti, Dizionario
storico della letteratura italiana, Torino, Paravia, 1952, p. 26. ^ Ugo
Baldini, BRESSANI, Gregorio, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol. 14,
Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1972. Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Francesco Algarotti Collabora
a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Francesco Algarotti Collabora
a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file su
Francesco Algarotti Collegamenti esterni Francesco Algarotti, su Treccani.it –
Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata
Francesco Algarotti, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Francesco Algarotti, su Enciclopedia
Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata Francesco
Algarotti, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Francesco Algarotti, su Find a Grave.
Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Francesco Algarotti, su Liber Liber. Modifica su
Wikidata Opere di Francesco Algarotti / Francesco Algarotti (altra versione),
su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di
Francesco Algarotti, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata
(EN) Spartiti o libretti di Francesco Algarotti, su International Music Score
Library Project, Project Petrucci LLC. Modifica su Wikidata Progetto per
ridurre a compimento il Regio Museo di Dresda (1742), su horti-hesperidum.com.
Sito Algarotti dell'Università di Treviri, su algarotti.uni-trier.de. La casa
di Francesco Algarotti è aperta da settembre 2011 come alloggio turistico.
Algarotti e Palladio (PDF), su cisapalladio.org. Il newtonianismo per le dame,
su google.com. Opere del conte Algarotti, su google.com. Corrispondenza con Federico
II di Prussia (testo francese e tedesco) V · D · M Illuministi italiani
Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 68955699 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2138 0493 · SBN
IT\ICCU\CFIV\057168 · LCCN (EN) n82110127 · GND (DE) 119086395 · BNF (FR)
cb12090007q (data) · ULAN (EN) 500021142 · NLA (EN) 36040192 · BAV 495/86206 ·
CERL cnp00403740 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n82110127 Arte Portale Arte
Biografie Portale Biografie LGBT Portale LGBT Letteratura Portale Letteratura
Teatro Portale Teatro Categorie: Scrittori italiani del XVIII secoloSaggisti
italiani del XVIII secoloCollezionisti d'arte italianiNati nel 1712Morti nel
1764Nati l'11 dicembreMorti il 3 maggioNati a VeneziaMorti a PisaTeorici del
restauroIlluministiScrittori trattanti tematiche LGBTMembri della Royal
SocietyViaggiatori italianiMercanti d'arte italiani[altre]. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Algarotti," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
algorithm: Grice’s term for
‘decision procedure,’ a clerical or effective procedure that can be applied to
any of a class of certain symbolic inputs and that will in a finite time and
number of steps eventuate in a result in a corresponding symbolic output. A
function for which an algorithm sometimes more than one can be given is an
algorithmic function. The following are common examples: a given n, finding the
nth prime number; b differentiating a polynomial; c finding the greatest common
divisor of x and y the Euclidean algorithm; and d given two numbers x, y, deciding
whether x is a multiple of y. When an algorithm is used to calculate values of
a numerical function, as in a, b, and c, the function can also be described as
algorithmically computable, effectively computable, or just computable.
Algorithms are generally agreed to have the following properties which made them essential to the theory of
computation and the development of the Church-Turing thesis i an algorithm can be given by a finite
string of instructions, ii a computation device or agent can carry out or
compute in accordance with the instructions, iii there will be provisions for
computing, storing, and recalling steps in a computation, iv computations can
be carried out in a discrete and stepwise fashion in, say, a digital computer,
and v computations can be carried out in a deterministic fashion in, say, a
deterministic version of a Turing machine.
alighieri,
dante. “The Commedia and philosophy.” Refs.: “Philosophical references in
Dante’s Commedia.”
allais’s paradox: a puzzle about
rationality, discussed by H. P. Grice, “Aspects of reason,” devised by Maurice
Allais b. 1. Leonard Savage advanced the
sure-thing principle, which states that a rational agent’s ranking of a pair of
gambles having the same consequence in a state S agrees with her ranking of any
other pair of gambles the same as the first pair except for having some other
common consequence in S. Allais devised an apparent counterexample with four
gambles involving a 100-ticket lottery. The table lists prizes in units of
$100,000. Ticket Numbers Gambles 1 2 11
12 100 A 5 5 5 B 0 25 5 C 5 5 0 D 0 25 0
Changing A’s and B’s common consequence for tickets 12100 from 5 to 0 yields C
and D respectively. Hence the sure-thing principle prohibits simultaneously
preferring A to B, and D to C. Yet most people have these preferences, which
seem coherent. This conflict generates the paradox. Savage presented the
sure-thing principle in The Foundations of Statistics 4. Responding to
preliminary drafts of that work, Allais formulated his counterexample in “The
Foundations of a Positive Theory of Choice Involving Risk and a Criticism of
the Postulates and Axioms of the School”
2.
allegedly
‘wayward’ causal chain: Grice: “What
is the antonym of ‘wayward’?’ A causal chain, referred to in a proposed causal
analysis of a key concept, that goes awry. Causal analyses have been proposed
for key concepts e.g., reference,
action, explanation, knowledge, artwork. There are two main cases of wayward or
deviant causal chains that defeat a causal analysis: 1 those in which the
prescribed causal route is followed, but the expected event does not occur; and
2 those in which the expected event occurs, but the prescribed causal route is
not followed. Consider action. One proposed analysis is that a person’s doing something
is an action if and only if what he does is caused by his beliefs and desires.
The possibility of wayward causal chains defeats this analysis. For case 1,
suppose, while climbing, John finds he is supporting another man on a rope.
John wants to rid himself of this danger, and he believes that he can do so by
loosening his grip. His belief and desire unnerve him, causing him to loosen
his hold. The prescribed causal route was followed, but the ensuing event, his
grip loosening, is not an action. For case 2, suppose Harry wants to kill his
rich uncle, and he believes that he can find him at home. His beliefs and
desires so agitate him that he drives recklessly. He hits and kills a
pedestrian, who, by chance, is his uncle. The killing occurs, but without
following the prescribed causal route; the killing was an accidental
consequence of what Harry did. Refs.: H.
P. Grice, “Aetiologica: from Roman ‘causa’ to Anglo-Saxon ‘for’”, Woodfield,
“Be-*cause* he thought she had insulted him,” H. P. Grice, “A philosophical
mistake: ‘cause’ is called for for unusual events only.” Grice: “What is the
antonym of ‘wayward’?” -- a causal chain, referred to in a proposed causal
analysis of a key concept, that goes awry. Causal analyses have been proposed
for key concepts – e.g., reference, action, explanation, knowledge, artwork.
There are two main cases of wayward (or deviant) causal chains that defeat a
causal analysis: (1) those in which the prescribed causal route is followed,
but the expected event does not occur; and (2) those in which the expected
event occurs, but the prescribed causal route is not followed. Consider action.
One proposed analysis is that a person’s doing something is an action if and
only if what he does is caused by his beliefs and desires. The possibility of
wayward causal chains defeats this analysis. For case (1), suppose, while
climbing, John finds he is supporting another man on a rope. John wants to rid
himself of this danger, and he believes that he can do so by loosening his
grip. His belief and desire unnerve him, causing him to loosen his hold. The
prescribed causal route was followed, but the ensuing event, his grip
loosening, is not an action. For case (2), suppose Harry wants to kill his rich
uncle, and he believes that he can find him at home. His beliefs and desires so
agitate him that he drives recklessly. He hits and kills a pedestrian, who, by
chance, is his uncle. The killing occurs, but without following the prescribed
causal route; the killing was an accidental consequence of what Harry did.
Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Aetiologica: from Roman ‘cause’ to Anglo-Saxon ‘for’” –
Woodfield, “Be-*cause* she thought he had insulted him.’”
alnwick: English
Franciscan theologian. William studied under Duns Scotus at Paris, and wrote
the Reportatio Parisiensia, a central source for Duns Scotus’s teaching. In his
own works, William opposed Scotus on the univocity of being and haecceitas.
Some of his views were attacked by Ockham. English Franciscan theologian from
Northumbria -- William studied under Duns Scotus at Paris, and wrote the
Reportatio Parisiensia, a central source for Duns Scotus’s teaching. In his own
works, William opposed Scotus on the univocity of being and haecceitas. Some of
his views were attacked by Ockham.
altogether nice girl: Or Grice’s
altogether nice girl. Grice quotes from the music-hall ditty, “Every [sic] nice
girl loves a sailor” (WoW:33). He uses this for his account of multiple
quantification. There is a reading where the emissor may implicate that every
nice girl is such that he loves one sailor, viz. Grice. But if the existential
quantifier is not made dominant, the uniqueness is disimplicated. Grice admits
that not every nominalist will be contented with the ‘metaphysical’ status of
‘the altogether nice girl.’ The ‘one-at-a-time sailor’ is her counterpart. And
they inhabit the class of LOVE.
AMBROGIO -- ambrosius: saint. Grice: I
prefer the spelling “Ambrogio,” or if not “Aurelio Ambrosius” – To call him
Ambrosisus is like calling me Gree.” Grice: “Not to be confused with Ambrose
and his orchestra – sweet!” – on altruism. known as Ambrose of Milan. Roman
church leader and theologian. While bishop of Milan, he not only led the
struggle against the Arian heresy and its political manifestations, but offered
new models for preaching, for Scriptural exegesis, and for hymnody. His works
also contributed to medieval Latin philosophy. Ambrose’s appropriation of
Neoplatonic doctrines was noteworthy in itself, and it worked powerfully on and
through Augustine. Ambrose’s commentary on the account of creation in Genesis,
his Hexaemeron, preserved for medieval readers many pieces of ancient natural
history and even some elements of physical explanation. Perhaps most
importantly, Ambrose engaged ancient philosophical ethics in the search for
moral lessons that marks his exegesis of Scripture; he also reworked Cicero’s
De officiis as a treatise on the virtues and duties of Christian living.
amicus: philia and eros –
Grice on Aristotle’s aporia of friendship -- Eros, the Grecian god of erotic
love. Eros came to be symbolic of various aspects of love, first appearing in
Hesiod in opposition to reason. In general, however, Eros was seen by Grecians
e.g., Parmenides as a unifying force. In Empedocles, it is one of two external
forces explaining the history of the cosmos, the other being Strife. These
forces resemble the “hidden harmony” of Heraclitus. The Symposium of Plato is
the best-known ancient discussion of Eros, containing speeches from various
standpoints mythical, sophistic, etc.
Socrates says he has learned from the priestess Diotima of a nobler form of
Eros in which sexual desire can be developed into the pursuit of understanding
the Form of beauty. The contrast between agape and Eros is found first in
Democritus. This became important in Christian accounts of love. In
Neoplatonism, Eros referred to the mystical union with Being sought by
philosophers. Eros has become important recently in the work of Continental
writers.
ammonio: Or as Strawson
preferred, “Ammonius.” Ssaccas early third century A.D., Platonist philosopher.
He apparently served early in the century as the teacher of the philosopher
Origen. He attracted the attention of Plotinus, who came to the city in 232 in
search of philosophical enlightenment Porphyry, Life of Plotinus 3. Ammonius
the epithet ‘Saccas’ seems to mean ‘the bagman’ was undoubtedly a charismatic
figure, but it is not at all clear what, if any, were his distinctive
doctrines, though he seems to have been influenced by Numenius. He wrote nothing,
and may be thought of, in E. R. Dodds’s words, as the Socrates of Neoplatonism.
There is a good edition in Bibliotheca Scriptores Graeci e Romani.
ANA-LYTICVM -- : Grice:
Etyologically, a compound – ana-lusis --. Cf. catalysis --. Porphyry couldn’t find
a Latinate for ‘analyticum’ – ‘analyisis’ is like ‘se-paratio.’ But even in
Grecian, ‘analysis’ and synthesis are not real opposite – since ‘synthesis’
neatly comes as ‘compositio’ -- analysis, the process of breaking up a concept,
proposition, linguistic complex, or fact into its simple or ultimate
constituents. That on which the analysis is done is called the analysandum, and
that which does the analysis is called the analysans. A number of the most
important philosophers of the twentieth century, including Russell, Moore, and
the early Vitters, have argued that philosophical analysis is the proper method
of philosophy. But the practitioners of analytic philosophy have disagreed
about what kind of thing is to be analyzed. For example, Moore tried to analyze
sense-data into their constituent parts. Here the analysandum is a complex
psychological fact, the having of a sense-datum. More commonly, analytic
philosophers have tried to analyze concepts or propositions. This is conceptual
analysis. Still others have seen it as their task to give an analysis of
various kinds of sentences e.g., those
involving proper names or definite descriptions. This is linguistic analysis.
Each of these kinds of analysis faces a version of a puzzle that has come to be
called the paradox of analysis. For linguistic analyses, the paradox can be
expressed as follows: for an analysis to be adequate, the analysans must be
synonymous with the analysandum; e.g., if ‘male sibling’ is to analyze
‘brother’, they must mean the same; but if they are synonymous, then ‘a brother
is a male sibling’ is synonymous with ‘a brother is a brother’; but the two
sentences do not seem synonymous. Expressed as a dilemma, the paradox is that
any proposed analysis would seem to be either inadequate because the analysans
and the analysandum are not synonymous or uninformative because they are
synonymous. Analytic philosophy is an
umbrella term currently used to cover a diverse assortment of philosophical
techniques and tendencies. As in the case of chicken-sexing, it is relatively
easy to identify analytic philosophy and philosophers, though difficult to say
with any precision what the criteria are. Analytic philosophy is sometimes
called Oxford philosophy or linguistic philosophy, but these labels are, at
least, misleading. Whatever else it is, analytic philosophy is manifestly not a
school, doctrine, or body of accepted propositions. At Cambridge, analytic
philosophers are the intellectual heirs of Russell, Moore, and Vitters,
philosophers who self-consciously pursued “philosophical analysis” in the early
part of the twentieth century. Analysis, as practiced by Russell and Moore,
concerned not language per se, but concepts and propositions. In their eyes,
while it did not exhaust the domain of philosophy, analysis provided a vital
tool for laying bare the logical form of reality. Vitters, in the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, contended, though obliquely, that the structure of
language reveals the structure of the world; every meaningful sentence is analyzable
into atomic constituents that designate the finegrained constituents of
reality. This “Tractarian” view was one Vitters was to renounce in his later
work, but it had considerable influence within the Vienna Circle in the 0s, and
in the subsequent development of logical positivism in the 0s and 0s. Carnap
and Ayer, both exponents of positivism, held that the task of philosophy was
not to uncover elusive metaphysical truths, but to provide analyses of
scientific sentences. Other sentences, those in ethics, for instance, were
thought to lack “cognitive significance.” Their model was Russell’s theory of
descriptions, which provided a technique for analyzing away apparent
commitments to suspicious entities. Meanwhile, a number of former proponents of
analysis, influenced by Vitters, had taken up what came to be called ordinary
language philosophy. Philosophers of this persuasion focused on the role of
words in the lives of ordinary speakers, hoping thereby to escape long-standing
philosophical muddles. These muddles resulted, they thought, from a natural
tendency, when pursuing philosophical theses, to be misled by the grammatical
form of sentences in which those questions were posed. A classic illustration
might be Heidegger’s supposition that ‘nothing’ must designate something,
though a very peculiar something. Today, it is difficult to find much unanimity
in the ranks of analytic philosophers. There is, perhaps, an implicit respect
for argument and clarity, an evolving though informal agreement as to what problems
are and are not tractable, and a conviction that philosophy is in some sense
continuous with science. The practice of analytic philosophers to address one
another rather than the broader public has led some to decry philosophy’s
“professionalization” and to call for a return to a pluralistic,
community-oriented style of philosophizing. Analytic philosophers respond by
pointing out that analytic techniques and standards have been well represented
in the history of philosophy. Analyticity. H. P. Grice, “In defence of a
dogma,” in Studies in the way of words. the analyticsynthetic distinction, the
distinction, made famous by Kant, according to which an affirmative
subject-predicate statement proposition, judgment is called analytic if the
predicate concept is contained in the subject concept, and synthetic otherwise.
The statement ‘All red roses are red’ is analytic, since the concept ‘red’ is
contained in the concept ‘red roses’. ‘All roses are red’ is synthetic, since
the concept ‘red’ is not contained in the concept ‘roses’. The denial of an
affirmative subject-predicate statement entails a contradiction if it is
analytic. E.g., ‘Not all red roses are red’ entails ‘Some roses are both red
and not red’. One concept may be contained in another, in Kant’s sense, even
though the terms used to express them are not related as part to whole. Since
‘biped’ means ‘two-footed animal’, the concept ‘two-footed’ is contained in the
concept ‘biped’. It is accordingly analytic that all bipeds are two-footed. The
same analytic statement is expressed by the synonymous sentences ‘All bipeds
are two-footed’ and ‘All two-footed animals are two-footed’. Unlike statements,
sentences cannot be classified as analytic or synthetic except relative to an
interpretation. analytical jurisprudence analyticsynthetic distinction 26
4065A- 26 Witness ‘All Russian teachers
are Russian’, which in one sense expresses the analytic statement ‘All teachers
that are Russian are Russian’, and in another the synthetic statement ‘All
teachers of Russian are Russian’. Kant’s innovation over Leibniz and Hume lay
in separating the logicosemantic analyticsynthetic distinction from the
epistemological a prioria posteriori distinction and from the modalmetaphysical
necessarycontingent distinction. It seems evident that any analytic statement
is a priori knowable without empirical evidence and necessary something that
could not be false. The converse is highly controversial. Kant and his
rationalist followers maintain that some a priori and necessary statements are
synthetic, citing examples from logic ‘Contradictions are impossible’, ‘The
identity relation is transitive’, mathematics ‘The sum of 7 and 5 is 12’, ‘The
straight line between two points is the shortest’, and metaphysics ‘Every event
is caused’. Empiricists like J. S. Mill, Carnap, Ayer, and C. I. Lewis argue
that such examples are either synthetic a posteriori or analytic a priori.
Philosophers since Kant have tried to clarify the analyticsynthetic
distinction, and generalize it to all statements. On one definition, a sentence
is analytic on a given interpretation provided it is “true solely in virtue of
the meaning or definition of its terms.” The truth of any sentence depends in
part on the meanings of its terms. `All emeralds are green’ would be false,
e.g., if ‘emerald’ meant ‘ruby’. What makes the sentence synthetic, it is
claimed, is that its truth also depends on the properties of emeralds, namely,
their being green. But the same holds for analytic sentences: the truth of ‘All
red roses are red’ depends on the properties of red roses, namely, their being
red. Neither is true solely in virtue of meaning. A more adequate
generalization defines an analytic statement as a formal logical truth: one
“true in virtue of its logical form,” so that all statements with the same form
are true. In terms of sentences under an interpretation, an analytic truth is
an explicit logical truth one whose surface structure represents its logical
form or one that becomes an explicit logical truth when synonyms are substituted.
The negative statement that tomorrow is not both Sunday and not Sunday is
analytic by this definition, because all statements of the form : p & - p
are true. Kant’s definition is obtained as a special case by stipulating that
the predicate of an affirmative subjectpredicate statement is contained in the
subject provided the statement is logically true. On a third generalization,
‘analytic’ denotes any statement whose denial entails a contradiction. Subject
S contains predicate P provided being S entails being P. Whether this is
broader or narrower than the second generalization depends on how ‘entailment’,
‘logical form’, and ‘contradiction’ are defined. On some construals, ‘Red is a
color’ counts as analytic on the third generalization its denial entails
‘Something is and is not a color’ but not on the second ‘red’ and ‘colored’ are
logically unstructured, while the rulings are reversed for a counterfactual
conditional like ‘If this were a red rose it would be red’. Following Quine,
many have denied any distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.
Some arguments presume the problematic “true by meaning” definition. Others are
that: 1 the distinction cannot be defined without using related notions like
‘meaning’, ‘concept’, and ‘statement’, which are neither extensional nor
definable in terms of behavior; 2 some statements like ‘All cats are animals’
are hard to classify as analytic or synthetic; and 3 no statement allegedly is
immune from rejection in the face of new empirical evidence. If these arguments
were sound, however, the distinction between logical truths and others would
seem equally dubious, a conclusion seldom embraced. Some describe a priori
truths, both synthetic and analytic, as conceptual truths, on the theory that
they are all true in virtue of the nature of the concepts they contain.
Conceptual truths are said to have no “factual content” because they are about
concepts rather than things in the actual world. While it is natural to
classify a priori truths together, the proffered theory is questionable. As
indicated above, all truths hold in part because of the identity of their
concepts, and in part because of the nature of the objects they are about. It
is a fact that all emeralds are emeralds, and this proposition is about
emeralds, not concepts. analyticum-a-priori: For Grice, an oxymoron, since surely
‘analyticum-a-posteriori’ is an oxymoron. R. A. Wollheim. London-born
philosopher, BPhil Oxon, Balliol (under D. Marcus) and All Souls. Examined by H. P. Grice. “What’s two times
two?” Wollheim treasured that examination. It was in the context of a
discussion of J. S. Mill and I. Kant, for whom addition and multiplication are
‘synthetic’ – a priori for Kant, a posteriori for Mill. Grice was trying to
provide a counterexample to Mill’s thesis that all comes via deduction or
induction.
anaxagoras: Grecian and
pre-Griceian philosopher who was the first of the pre-Socratics to teach in
Athens, where he influenced leading intellectuals such as Pericles and
Euripides. He left Athens when he was prosecuted for impiety. Writing in
response to Parmenides, he elaborated a theory of matter according to which
nothing comes into being or perishes. The ultimate realities are stuffs such as
water and earth, flesh and bone, but so are contraries such as hot and cold,
likewise treated as stuffs. Every phenomenal substance has a portion of every
elemental stuff, and there are no minimal parts of anything, but matter takes
on the phenomenal properties of whatever predominates in the mixture.
Anaxagoras posits an indefinite number of elemental stuffs, in contrast to his
contemporary Empedocles, who requires only four elements; but Anaxagoras
follows Parmenides more rigorously, allowing no properties or substances to
emerge that were not already present in the cosmos as its constituents. Thus
there is no ultimate gap between appearance and reality: everything we perceive
is real. In Anaxagoras’s cosmogony, an initial chaos of complete mixture gives
way to an ordered world when noûs mind begins a vortex motion that separates
cosmic masses of ether the bright upper air, air, water, and earth. Mind is
finer than the stuffs and is found in living things, but it does not mix with
stuffs. Anaxagoras’s theory of mind provides the first hint of a mindmatter
dualism. Plato and Aristotle thought his assigning a cosmic role to mind made
him sound like “a sober man” among his contemporaries, but they were
disappointed that he did not exploit his idea to provide teleological explanations
of natural phenomena.
anaximander:: Grecian and
pre-Griceian philosopher and cosmologist, reputedly the student and successor
of Thales in the Milesian school. He described the cosmos as originating from
apeiron the boundless by a process of separating off; a disk-shaped earth was
formed, surrounded by concentric heavenly rings of fire enclosed in air. At
“breathing holes” in the air we see jets of fire, which are the stars, moon,
and sun. The earth stays in place because there is no reason for it to tend one
way or another. The seasons arise from alternating periods where hot and dry or
wet and anaphor Anaximander 28 4065A-
28 cold powers predominate, governed by a temporal process figuratively
portrayed as the judgment of Time. Anaximander drew a map of the world and explained
winds, rain, and lightning by naturalistic hypotheses. He also described the
emergence of life in a way that prefigures the theory of evolution.
Anaximander’s interest in cosmology and cosmogony and his brilliant conjectures
set the major questions for later preSocratics.
anaximenes: of Miletus:
Grecian and pre-Griceian philosopher, a
pre-Socratic who, following in the tradition of the Milesians Thales and
Anaximander, speculated about cosmology and meteorology. The source arche of
the cosmos is air aer, originally mist, which by a process of rarefaction
becomes fire, and by a process of condensation becomes wind, clouds, water,
earth, and stones. Air is divine and causes life. The earth is flat and rides
on a cushion of air, while a heavenly firmament revolves about it like a felt
cap. Anaximenes also explained meteorological phenomena and earthquakes.
Although less innovative than his predecessor Anaximander, he made progress in
naturalistic explanations by appealing to a quantitative process of rarefaction
and condensation rather than to mythical processes involving quasi-personal
agents.
ancestry: Studied by H. P.
Grice. Of a given relation R, the relation also called the transitive closure
of R that relates one given individual to a second if and only if the first can
be “reached” from the second by repeated “applications” of the given relation
R. The “ancestor” relation is the ancestral of the parent relation since one
person is an ancestor of a second if the first is a parent of the second or the
first is a parent of a parent of the second or the first is a parent of a
parent of a parent of the second, and so on. Frege discovered a simple method
of giving a materially adequate and formally correct definition of the
ancestral of a given relation in terms of the relation itself plus logical
concepts. This method is informally illustrated as follows. In order for one
person A to be an ancestor of a second person B it is necessary and sufficient
for A to have every property that belongs to every parent of B and that belongs
to every parent of any person to whom it belongs. This and other similar
methods made possible the reduction of all numerical concepts to those of zero
and successor, which Frege then attempted to reduce to concepts of pure logic.
Frege’s definition of the ancestral has become a paradigm in modern analytic
philosophy as well as a historical benchmark of the watershed between
traditional logic and modern logic. It demonstrates the exactness of modern
logical analysis and, in comparison, the narrowness of traditional logic.
andronicus: Grecian
philosopher, a leading member of the Lyceum who was largely responsible for
establishing the canon of Aristotle’s works still read today. He also edited
the works of Theophrastus. At the time, Aristotle was known primarily for his
philosophical dialogues, only fragments of which now survive; his more
methodical treatises had stopped circulating soon after his death. By producing
the first systematic edition of Aristotle’s corpus, Andronicus revived study of
the treatises, and the resulting critical debates dramatically affected the
course of philosophy. Little is recorded about Andronicus’s labors; but besides
editing the texts and discussing titles, arrangement, and authenticity, he
sought to explicate and assess Aristotle’s thought. In so doing, he and his
colleagues initiated the exegetical tradition of Aristotelian commentaries.
Nothing he wrote survives; a summary account of emotions formerly ascribed to
him is spurious.
angst: Grice discusses
this as an ‘implicatural emotion.’ G. term for a special form of anxiety, an
emotion seen by existentialists as both constituting and revealing the human
condition. Angst plays a key role in the writings of Heidegger, whose concept
is closely related to Kierkegaard’s angest and Sartre’s angoisse. The concept
is first treated in this distinctive way in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of
Anxiety 1844, where anxiety is described as “the dizziness of freedom.” Anxiety
here represents freedom’s self-awareness; it is the psychological precondition
for the individual’s attempt to become autonomous, a possibility that is seen
as both alluring and disturbing.
ANIMA, ANIMATVM -- animatum
-- animal:
pirotese. Durrell’s Family Conversations. Durrelly’s
family conversation.
When H. P. Grice was presented with
an ‘overview’ of his oeuvre for PGRICE (Grandy and Warner, 1986), he soon found
out. “There’s something missing.” Indeed, there is a very infamous objection,
Grice thought, which is not mentioned by ‘Richards,’ as he abbreviates Richard
Grandy and Richard Warner’s majestically plural ‘overview,’ which seems to
Grice to be one to which Grice must respond. And he shall! The objection Grice
states as follows. One of the leading strands in Grice’s reductive analysis of
the circumstances or scenario in which an emissor (E) communicates that p is
that the scenario, call it “C,” is not to be regarded exclusively, “or even
primarily,” as a ‘feature’ of an E that is using what philosophers of language (since
Plato’s “Cratylus”) have been calling ‘language’ (glossa, la lingua latina, la
lingua italiana, la langue française, the English tongue, de nederlands taal,
die Deutsche Sprache, etc.). The emissum (e) may be an ‘utterance’ which is not
‘linguistic.’ Grice finds the issue crucial after discussing the topic with his
colleague at Berkeley, Davidson. For Davidson reminds Grice: “[t]here is no such
thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers […]
have supposed” (Davidson, 1986: 174). “I’m happy you say ‘many,’ Davidson,”
Grice commented. Grice continues formulating what he
obviously found to be an insidious, fastidious, objection. There are many
instances of “NOTABLY NON-‘linguistic’” vehicles or devices of communication,
within a communication-system, even a one-off system, which fulfil this or that
communication-function. I am using ‘communication-function’ alla Grice (1961:138,
repr. 1989:235).
These vehicles or devices are mostly
syntactically un-structured or amorphous – Grice’s favourite example being a
‘sort of hand-wave’ meaning that it is not the case that the emissor knows the
route or that the emissor is about to leave his addressee (1967:VI, repr. 1989:126).
Sometimes,
a device may exhibit at least “some rudimentary syntactic” structure – as Grice
puts it, giving a nod to Morris’s tripartite semiotics -- in that we may perhaps
distinguish and identify a ‘totum’ or complexum (say, Plato’s ‘logos’) from a
pars or simplex (say, Plato’s ‘onoma’ and ‘rhema’). Grice’s intention-based reductive
analysis of a communicatum, based on Aristotle, Locke, and Peirce, is designed,
indeed its very raison d'être being, to allow for the possibility that a non-“linguistic,” and,
further, indeed a non-“conventional” 'utterance,’ perhaps unrepeatable token,
not even manifesting any degree of syntactic structure, but a block of an
amorphous signal, be within the ‘repertoire’ of ‘procedures,’ perhaps
unrepeatable ones, of this or that organism, or creature, or agent, even if not
relying on any apparatus for communication of the kind that that we may label
‘linguistic’ or otherwise ‘conventional,’ will count as an emissor E ‘doing’
this or that ‘thing,’ thereby ‘communicating’ that p. To provide for this
conceptual scenario, it is plainly necessary, Grice grants, that the key
ingredient in any representation or conceptualization, or reductive analysis of
‘communicating,’ viz. intending that p, for Grice, should be a ‘state’ of the
emissor’s “soul” (Grice is translating Grecian ψυχή the capacity for which does not require what we may label
the ‘possession’ of, shall we say, ‘faculty,’ of what philosophers since
Cratylus have been calling ‘γλῶσσα Ἑλληνίδα,’
‘lingua latina,’ ‘lingua italiana,’ ‘langue française,’ ‘English tongue,’
‘Nederlands taal,’ ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’ (Grice
always congratulated Kant for never distinguishing between ‘die Deutsche
Sprache’ and ‘Sprache’ as ‘eine Fakultät.’). Now
a philosopher, relying on this or that neo-Prichardian reductive analysis of
‘intending that p,’ (Oxonian Grice will quote Oxonian if he can) may not be
willing to allow the possibility of such, shall we grant, pre-linguistic
intending that p, or non-linguistic intending that p. Surely, if the emissor E
realizes that his addressee or recipient R does not ‘share’ say, what the
Germans call ‘die Deutsche Sprache,” E may still communicate, by doing
so-and-so, that such-and-such, viz. p. E may make this sort of hand wave
communicating that E knows the route or that E is about to leave R. Against
that objection, Grice surely wins the day. There’s nothing in Prichard account
of ‘willing that p,’ itself a borrowing from William James (“I will that the
distant table slides over the floor toward me. It does not.”) which is about
‘die Deutsche Sprache.’
But Grice hastens to declare that
winning ‘the’ day may not be winning ‘all’ day. And
that is because of Oxonian philosophy being what it is. Because, as far as
Grice’s Oxonian explorations on communication go, in a succession of
increasingly elaborate moves – ending with a a clause which closes the succession
o-- designed to thwart this or that scenario, later deemed illegitimate,
involving two rational agents where the emissor E relies on an
‘inference-element’ that it is not the case that E intends his recipient R will
recogise – Grice is led to narrow the ‘intending’ the reductive analysis of ‘Emissor
E communicates that p’ to C-intending. Grice expects that whatever may be the case in general with
regard to ‘intending,’ C-intending seems for some reason to Grice to be unsophisticatedly,
viz. plainly, too sophisticated a ‘state’ of a soul (or ψυχή) to be found in an organism, ‘pirot,’ creature, that we may
not want to deem ‘rational,’ or as the Germans would say, a creature that is plainly
destitute of “Die Deutsche Sprache.” We seem to be needing a pirot to be “very
intelligent, indeed rational.” (Who other than Grice would genially combine
Locke with Carnap?). Some may regret, Grice admits, that his unavoidable rear-guard
action just undermines the raison d'etre of his campaign. However, Grice goes on to provide an admittedly brief reply
which will have to suffice under the circumstances. There is SOME limit for
Oxonian debate! A full treatment that would satisfy Grice requires delving deep
into crucial problems about the boundary between vicious and virtuous conceptual
circularity.
Which is promising. It is not something
UNATTAINABLE a priori – and there is nothing wrong with leaving it for the
morrow. It reduces to the philosopher trying to show himself virtuously
circular, if not, like Lear, spherical. But why need the circle be virtuous.
Well, as August would put it, unless a ‘circulus’ is not ‘virtuosus,’ one would
hardly deem it a ‘circulus’ in the first place. A circle is virtuous if it is not a
bad circle. One may even say, with The Carpenter, that, like a cabbage or a
king, if a circle is not virtuous is not even a circle! (Grice 2001:35). In
this case, to borrow from former Oxonian student S. R. Schiffer, we need the
‘virtuous circle’ because we are dealing with ‘a loop’ (Schiffer, 1988:v) -- a
‘conceptual loop,’ that is. Schiffer is not interested in ‘communicating;’ only
‘meaning,’ but his point can be easily transliterated. Schiffer is saying that
‘U,’ or utterer, our ‘E,’ means that p’ surely relies on ‘U intends that p,’
but mind the loop: ‘U intends that p’ may rely on ‘U means that p.’In Grice’s
most generic, third-person terms, we have a creature, call it a pirot, P1,
that, by doing thing D1, communicates that p. We are talking of Grice qua
ethologist, who OBSERVES the scenario. As it happens, Grice’s favourite pirot
is the parrot, and call Grice a snob, but his favourite parrot was Prince
Maurice’s Parrot. Prince Maurice’s Parrot. Grice reads Locke, and adapts it
slightly. “Since I think I may be confident, that, whoever should see a
CREATURE of his own shape or make, though it had no more reason all its life
than a PARROT, would call him still A MAN; or whoever should hear a parrot discourse,
reason, and philosophise, would call or think it nothing but a PARROT; and say,
the one was A DULL IRRATIONAL MAN, and the other A VERY INTELLIGENT RATIONAL
PARROT. “A relation we have in an author of great note, is sufficient to
countenance the supposition of A RATIONAL PARROT. “The author’s words are as
follows.”““I had a mind to know, from Prince Maurice's own mouth, the account
of a common, but much credited story, that I had heard so often from many
others, of a parrot he has, that speaks, and asks, and answers common questions,
like A REASONABLE CREATURE.””““So that those of his train there generally
conclude it to be witchery or possession; and one of his chaplains, would never
from that time endure A PARROT, but says all PARROTS have a devil in them.””““I
had heard many particulars of this story, and as severed by people hard to be
discredited, which made me ask Prince Maurice what there is of it.””““Prince
Maurice says, with his usual plainness and dryness in talk, there is something
true, but a great deal false of what is reported.””““I desired to know of him
what there was of the first. Prince Maurice tells me short and coldly, that he
had HEARD of such A PARROT; and though he believes nothing of it, and it was a
good way off, yet he had so much curiosity as to send for the parrot: that it
was a very great parrot; and when the parrot comes first into the room where
Prince Maurice is, with a great many men about him, the parrot says presently, ‘What
a nice company is here.’”” ““ One of the men asks the parrot, ‘What thinkest
thou that man is?,’ ostending his finger, and pointing to Prince Maurice.”“The
parrot answers, ‘Some general -- or other.’ When the man brings the parrot
close to Prince Maurice, Prince Maurice asks the parrot, ‘D'ou venez-vous?’”““The
parrot answers, ‘De Marinnan.’ Then Prince Maurice goes on, and poses a second
question to the parrot.””““‘A qui estes-vous?’ The Parrot answers: ‘A un
Portugais.’”““Prince Maurice then asks a third question: ‘Que fais-tu la?’““The
parrot answers: “Je garde les poulles.’ Prince Maurice smiles, which pleases
the Parrot.”““Prince Maurice, violating a Griceian maxim, and being just
informed that p, asks whether p. This is incidentally the Prince’s fourth
question to the parrot – the first idiotic one. ‘Vous gardez les poulles?’”” ““The Parrot answers, ‘Oui, moi; et je scai bien faire.’
Then the parrott appeals to Peirce’s iconic system and makes the chuck four or
five times that a man uses to make to chickens when a man calls them. I set
down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said
them to me. I ask Prince Maurice in what ‘tongue’ the parrot speaks.””““Prince
Maurice says that the parrot speaks in the Brazilian tongue.””““ I ask Prince
William whether he understands the Brazilian tongue.”” ““Prince Maurice says:
No, but he has taken care to have TWO interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman
that spoke the Brazilian tongue, and the other a Brazilian that spoke the Dutch
tongue; that Prince Maurice asked them separately and privately, and both of
them AGREED in telling Prince Maurice just the same thing that the parrot had
said.””““I could not but tell this ODD story, because it is so much out of the
way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say
Prince Maurice at least believed himself in all he told me, having ever passed
for a very honest and pious man.””““I leave it to naturalists to reason, and to
other men to believe, as they please upon it. However, it is not, perhaps,
amiss to relieve or enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digressions,
whether to the purpose or no.””Locke takes care “that the reader should have
the story at large in the author's own words, because he seems to me not to
have thought it incredible.”“For it cannot be imagined that so able a man as
he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of
himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to
pin so close, not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince
in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety, a story which, if he
himself thought incredible, he could not but also think RIDICULOUS.”“Prince
Maurice, it is plain, who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it
from him, both of them call this talker A PARROT.”Locke asks “any one else who
thinks such a story fit to be told, whether, if this PARROT, and all of its
kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it this one did,-
whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of RATIONAL ANIMALS; but
yet, whether, for all that, they would have been allowed to be MEN, and not
PARROTS?”“For I presume it is not the idea of A THINKING OR RATIONAL BEING
alone that makes the idea of A MAN in most people's sense: but of A BODY, so
and so shaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a MAN, the same
successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as THE SAME IMMATERIAL
SPIRIT, go to the making of the same MAN.”So
back to Grice’s pirotology, or Pirotologia. But first a precis Grice needs a
dossier with a précis, so that he can insert the parrot’s conversational implicatura
– and Prince Maurice’s. PARROT: What a nice company is here.MAN (pointing to
Prince Maurice): What thinkest thou that man is?PARROT: Some general -- or
other. Grice’s gloss: The he parrot displays what Grice calls ‘up-take.’ The
parrot recognizes the man’s c-intention. So far is ability to display uptake.PRINCE
MAURICE: D'ou venez-vous?PARROT: De Marinnan.PRINCE MAURICE: A qui
estes-vous?PARROT: A un Portugais.PRINCE MAURICE: Que fais-tu la?PARROT: Je
garde les poulles.PRINCE MAURICE SMILES and flouts a Griceian maxim: Vous
gardez les poulles?PARROT (losing patience, and grasping the Prince’s implicaturum
that he doubts it): Oui, moi. Et je scai bien faire.Grice’s gloss: The Parrott appeals
to Peirce’s iconic system and makes the chuck five times that a man uses to
make to chickens when a man calls them.According to his “most recent speculations”
about communication, Grice goes on in his ‘Reply to Richards,’ one should
distinguish, as he engages in a bit of legalese, between two sides of the scenario
under conceptual reduction, E communicates that p. One side is the ‘de facto’
side, a side which, as in name implies, in fact contains any
communication-relevant feature which obtains or is present in the
circumstances. But then there is a ‘de jure’ side to the scenario, viz. the
nested C-intending which is only deemed to be present, as a vicious circle with
good intentions may become a virtuous one. By the ‘nesting,’ Grice means the
three sub-intentions, involved in a scenario where Emissor E communicates that
(psi*) p, reducible to the Emissor E c-intending that A recognises that E psi-s
that p.First, there is the ‘exhibitive’ intention, C1. Emissor E intends A to
recognise that A psi-s that p.Second, there is the ‘reflexive’ intention, C2.Emissor
intends that A recognise C1 by A recognising C2Third, there is the ‘openness’
intention, C3. There is no inference-element which is C-constitutive such that
Emissor relies on it and yet does not intend A to recognise.The “de jure” side
to the state of affairs involves self-reference But since this self-referential
circle, a mere ‘loop,’ is meant to BLOCK an utterly vicious circle of a
regressus ad infinitum (or ‘ho eis apeiron ekballon,’ if you must), the
self-referential circle may well be deemed virtuous. The ‘de jure’ side to the
scenario is trying to save state of affairs which in, in Grice’s words,
“infinitely complex,” and such that no reasonable philosopher should expect to
be realised ‘de facto.’ “In which case,” Grice remarks, “it seems to serve
little, if any, purpose” to assume that this very INCONCEIVABLE ‘de facto’
instantiation of a ‘de jure’ ascription of an emissor communicating that p
would only be detectable, as it isn’t, by appeal to something like ‘die
Deutsche Sprache’!“At its most meagre,” to use Grice’s idiom, the ‘de facto’
side should consist, merely, in any pre-rational ‘counterpart’ to the state of
affairs describable by having an Emissor E communicating that p,This might
amount to no more than making a certain sort of utterance – our doing D1 -- in
order thereby to get some recipient creature R, our second pirot, P2, to think
or want some particular thing, our p. This meagre condition hardly involves
reference to anything like ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’Let’s reformulate the
condition.It’s just a pirot, at a ‘pre-rational’ level. The pirot does a thing
T IN ORDER THEREBY to get some other pirot to think or do some particular
thing. To echo Hare,Die Tur ist geschlossen, ja.Die Tur ist geschlossen,
bitte.Grice continues as a corollary: “Maybe in a less straightforward instance
of “Emissor E communicates that p” there is actually present the C-intention
whose feasibility as an ‘intention’ suggests some ability to use ‘die Deutsche
Sprache.’And if it does, Grice adds, it looks like anything like ‘die Deutsche
Sprache’ ends up being an aid to the conceptualizing about communication, not
communication itself! ReferencesDavidson, Donald
1986. A nice derangement of epitaphs, in Grandy and Warner, pp. 157-74.Durrell,
My family and other animals. Grandy, R. E. and R. O. Warner. 1986.
Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. Oxford, at
the Clarendon Press. Grice, H. P. 1986. Reply to Richards, in Grandy and
Warner, pp. 45-106Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. London and
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Grice, H. P. 2001. Aspects of
reason. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. Locke, J. 1690. An essay concerning
humane [sic] understanding. Oxford: The Bodleian. Schiffer, S. R. 1988.
Meaning. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. animatum:
Grice thinks of communication as what he calls ‘soul-to-soul transfer.’ Very
Aristotelian. Grice was interested in
what he called the ‘rational soul’ (psyche logike). In an act of communication,
Emissor communicates that p, there is a psi involved, therefore a soul,
therefore what the Romans called an ‘anima,’ and the Greeks called the
‘psyche.’ For surely there can be no psi-transmission without a psi. Grice
loved to abbreviate this as the psi, since Lady Asquith, who was a soul, would
not have desired any less from Grice. Grice, like Plato and Aristotle, holds a
tripartite theory of the soul. Where, ‘part’ (Aristotelian ‘meros’) is taken
very seriously. Anything thought. From ‘psyche,’ anima. Grice uses the symbol
of the letter psi here which he renders as ‘animatum.’ Why Grice prefers ‘soul’
to mind. The immortality of a the chicken soul. By Shropshire. Shropshire claims that the immortality of the soul is proved by
the fact that, if you cut off a chicken's head, the chicken will run round the
yard for a quarter of an hour before dropping. Grice has an an 'expansion' of
Shropshire's ingenious argument.If the soul is not dependent on the body, it is
immortal. If the soul is dependent on the body, it is dependent on that part of
the body in which it is located. If the soul is located in the body, it is
located in the head. If the chicken's soul were located in its head, the
chicken's soul would be destroyed if the head were rendered inoperative by
removal from the body. The chicken runs round the yard after head-removal. It
could do this only if animated, and controlled by its soul. So the chicken's
soul is not located in, and not dependent on, the chicken's head. So the
chicken's soul is not dependent on the chicken's body. So the chicken's soul is
immortal. end p.11 If the chicken's soul is immortal, a fortiori the human soul
is immortal. So the soul is immortal. The question I now ask myself is this:
why is it that I should be quite prepared to believe that the Harvard students
ascribed their expansion of Botvinnik's proof, or at least some part of it, to
Botvinnik (as what he had in mind), whereas I have no inclination at all to
ascribe any part of my expansion to Shropshire? Considerations which at once
strike me as being likely to be relevant are: (1) that Botvinnik's proof
without doubt contained more steps than Shropshire's claim; (2) that the
expansion of Botvinnik's proof probably imported, as extra premisses, only
propositions which are true, and indeed certain; whereas my expansion imports
premisses which are false or dubious; (3) that Botvinnik was highly intelligent
and an accomplished logician; whereas Shropshire was neither very intelligent
nor very accomplished as a philosopher. No doubt these considerations are
relevant, though one wonders whether one would be much readier to accord
Shropshire's production the title of 'reasoning' if it had contained some
further striking 'deductions', such as that since the soul is immortal moral
principles have absolute validity; and one might also ask whether the effect of
(3) does not nullify that of (2), since, if Shropshire was stupid, why should
not one ascribe to him a reconstructed argument containing plainly unacceptable
premisses? But, mainly, I would like some further light on the following
question: if such considerations as those which I have just mentioned are
relevant, why are they relevant? I should say a word about avowals. The
following contention might be advanced. If you want to know whether someone R,
who has produced what may be an incomplete piece of reasoning, has a particular
completion in mind, the direct way to find out is to ask him. That would settle
the matter. If, however, you are unable to ask him, then indirect methods will
have to be used, which may well be indecisive. Indeterminacy springs merely
from having to rely on indirect methods. I have two comments to make. First: it
end p.12 is far from clear to what extent avowals do settle the matter. Anyone
who has taught philosophy is familiar with the situation in which, under
pressure to expand an argument they have advanced, students, particularly
beginners, make statements which, one is inclined to say, misrepresent their
position. This phenomenon is perhaps accounted for by my much more important
second point: that avowals in this kind of context generally do not have the
character which one might without reflection suppose them to have; they are not
so much reportive as constructive. If I ask someone if he thinks that so-and-so
is a consequence of such-and-such, what I shall receive will be primarily a
defence of this supposition, not a report on what, historically, he had in mind
in making it. We are in general much more interested in whether an inferential
step is a good one to make than we are in what a particular person had in mind
at the actual moment at which he made the step. One might perhaps see an
analogy between avowals in this area and the specification of plans. If someone
has propounded a plan for achieving a certain objective, and I ask him what he
proposes to do in such-and-such a contingency, I expect him to do the best he
can to specify for me a way of meeting that contingency, rather than to give a
historically correct account of what thoughts he had been entertaining. This
feature of what I might call inferential avowals is one for which we shall have
to account.Let us take stock. The thesis which we proposed for examination has
needed emendation twice, once in the face of the possibility of bad reasoning,
and once to allow for informal and incomplete reasoning. The reformulation
needed to accommodate the latter is proving difficult to reach. Let us take s
and s′ to be sequences consisting of a set of premisses and a conclusion (or,
perhaps it would be better to say, a set of propositions and a further
proposition), or a sequence (sorites) of such sequences. (This is not fully
accurate, but will serve.) Let us suppose that x has produced s (in speech or
in thought). Let "formally cogent" mean "having true premisses,
and being such that steps from premisses to conclusions are formally valid".
(1) We cannot define "s is a piece of reasoning by x" as "x
thinks s to be formally cogent", because if s is an incomplete piece of
reasoning s is not, and could not reasonably be thought by x to be, formally
cogent. end p.13 (2) We cannot define "s is a piece of reasoning by
x" as "(∃s′)
(s′ is an expansion of s and s′ is formally cogent)" because (a) it does
not get in the idea that x thinks s′ formally cogent and (b) it would exclude
bad reasoning. (3) We cannot define "s is a piece of reasoning by x"
as "x thinks that (∃s′)
(s′ is an expansion of s and s′ is formally cogent)", for this is too
weak, and would allow as reasoning any case in which x believed (for whatever
reason, or lack of reason) that an informal sequence had some formally cogent
expansion or other. (Compare perhaps Shropshire.).” In Latin indeed, ‘animus’
and ‘anima’ make a world of a difference, as Shropshire well knows. Psyche
transliterates as ‘anima’ only; ‘animus’ the Greeks never felt the need for. Of
course a chicken is an animal, as in man. “Homo animalis rationalis.” Grice
prefers ‘human,’ but sometimes he uses ‘animal,’ as opposed to ‘vegetal,
sometimes, when considering stages of freedom. A stone (mineral) displays a
‘free’ fall, which is metabolical. And then, a vegetable is less free than an
animal, which can move, and a non-human animal (that Grice calls ‘a beast’) is
less free than man, who is a rational animal. Grice notes that back in the day,
when the prince came from a hunt, “I brought some animals,” since these were
‘deer,’ ‘deer’ was taken as meaning ‘animal,’ when the implicaturum was very
much cancellable. The Anglo-Saxons soon dropped the ‘deer’ and adopted the
Latinate ‘animal.’ They narrowed the use of ‘deer’ for the ‘cervus cervus.’ But
not across the North Sea where the zoo is still called a ‘deer-garden.’ When
Aelfric studied philosophy he once thought man was a rational deer. animatum – vide: H. P. Grice, “Psychology, folk
psychology, etc.” -- philosophy of psychology, the philosophical study of
psychology. Psychology began to separate from philosophy with the work of the
nineteenth-century G. experimentalists, especially Fechner 180187, Helmholtz
1821 94, and Wundt 18320. In the first half of the twentieth century, the
separation was completed in this country insofar as separate psychology
departments were set up in most universities, psychologists established their
own journals and professional associations, and experimental methods were
widely employed, although not in every area of psychology the first
experimental study of the effectiveness of a psychological therapy did not
occur until 3. Despite this achievement of autonomy, however, issues have
remained about the nature of the connections, if any, that should continue
between psychology and philosophy. One radical view, that virtually all such
connections should be severed, was defended by the behaviorist John Watson in
his seminal 3 paper “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.” Watson criticizes
psychologists, even the experimentalists, for relying on introspective methods
and for making consciousness the subject matter of their discipline. He
recommends that psychology be a purely objective experimental branch of natural
science, that its theoretical goal be to predict and control behavior, and that
it discard all reference to consciousness. In making behavior the sole subject
of psychological inquiry, we avoid taking sides on “those time-honored relics
of philosophical speculation,” namely competing theories about the mindbody
problem, such as interactionism and parallelism. In a later work, published in
5, Watson claimed that the success of behaviorism threatened the very existence
of philosophy: “With the behavioristic point of view now becoming dominant, it
is hard to find a place for what has been called philosophy. Philosophy is
passing has all but passed, and unless
new issues arise which will give a foundation for a new philosophy, the world
has seen its last great philosopher.” One new issue was the credibility of
behaviorism. Watson gave no argument for his view that prediction and control
of behavior should be the only theoretical goals of psychology. If the attempt
to explain behavior is also legitimate, as some anti-behaviorists argue, then
it would seem to be an empirical question whether that goal can be met without
appealing to mentalistic causes. Watson and his successors, such as B. F.
Skinner, cited no credible empirical evidence that it could, but instead relied
primarily on philosophical arguments for banning postulation of mentalistic
causes. As a consequence, behaviorists virtually guaranteed that philosophers
of psychology would have at least one additional task beyond wrestling with
traditional mind body issues: the analysis and criticism of behaviorism itself.
Although behaviorism and the mindbody problem were never the sole subjects of
philosophy of psychology, a much richer set of topics developed after 0 when
the so-called cognitive revolution occurred in
psychology. These topics include innate knowledge and the acquisition of
transformational grammars, intentionality, the nature of mental representation,
functionalism, mental imagery, the language of thought, and, more recently,
connectionism. Such topics are of interest to many cognitive psychologists and
those in other disciplines, such as linguistics and artificial intelligence,
who contributed to the emerging discipline known as cognitive science. Thus,
after the decline of various forms of behaviorism and the consequent rise of
cognitivism, many philosophers of psychology collaborated more closely with
psychologists. This increased cooperation was probably due not only to a
broadening of the issues, but also to a methodological change in philosophy. In
the period roughly between 5 and 5, conceptual analysis dominated both and English philosophy of psychology and the
closely related discipline, the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers took the
position that philosophy was essentially an a priori discipline. These
philosophers rarely cited the empirical studies of psychologists. In recent decades,
however, philosophy of psychology has become more empirical, at least in the
sense that more attention is being paid to the details of the empirical studies
of psychologists. The result is more interchanges between philosophers and
psychologists. Although interest in cognitive psychology appears to predominate
in recent philosophy of psychology, the
new emphasis on empirical studies is also reflected in philosophic work on
topics not directly related to cognitive psychology. For example, philosophers
of psychology have written books in recent years on the clinical foundations of
psychoanalysis, the foundations of behavior therapy and behavior modification,
and self-deception. The emphasis on empirical data has been taken one step
further by naturalists, who argue that in epistemology, at least, and perhaps
in all areas of philosophy, philosophical questions should either be replaced
by questions from empirical psychology or be answered by appeal to empirical
studies in psychology and related disciplines. It is philosophy of psychology
philosophy of psychology 695 695 still
too early to predict the fruitfulness of the naturalist approach, but this new
trend might well have pleased Watson. Taken to an extreme, naturalism would
make philosophy dependent on psychology instead of the reverse and thus would
further enhance the autonomy of psychology that Watson desired. animatum --
philosophical psychology, -- vide H. P. Grice: “Method in philosophical
psychology: from the banal to the bizarre” – in “Conception of Value,” Oxford,
Clarendon Press. -- philosophy of mind, the branch of philosophy that includes
the philosophy of psychology, philosophical psychology, and the area of
metaphysics concerned with the nature of mental phenomena and how they fit into
the causal structure of reality. Philosophy of psychology, a branch of the
philosophy of science, examines what psychology says about the nature of
psychological phenomena; examines aspects of psychological theorizing such as
the models used, explanations offered, and laws invoked; and examines how
psychology fits with the social sciences and natural sciences. Philosophical
psychology investigates folk psychology, a body of commonsensical,
protoscientific views about mental phenomena. Such investigations attempt to
articulate and refine views found in folk psychology about conceptualization,
memory, perception, sensation, consciousness, belief, desire, intention,
reasoning, action, and so on. The mindbody problem, a central metaphysical one
in the philosophy of mind, is the problem of whether mental phenomena are
physical and, if not, how they are related to physical phenomena. Other
metaphysical problems in the philosophy of mind include the free will problem,
the problem of personal identity, and the problem of how, if at all, irrational
phenomena such as akrasia and self-deception are possible. Mindbody dualism
Cartesian dualism. The doctrine that the soul is distinct from the body is
found in Plato and discussed throughout the history of philosophy, but Descartes
is considered the father of the modern mindbody problem. He maintained that the
essence of the physical is extension in space. Minds are unextended substances
and thus are distinct from any physical substances. The essence of a mental
substance is to think. This twofold view is called Cartesian dualism. Descartes
was well aware of an intimate relationship between mind and the brain. There is
no a priori reason to think that the mind is intimately related to the brain;
Aristotle, e.g., did not associate them. Descartes mistakenly thought the seat
of the relationship was in the pineal gland. He maintained, however, that our
minds are not our brains, lack spatial location, and can continue to exist
after the death and destruction of our bodies. Cartesian dualism invites the
question: What connects the mind and brain? Causation is Descartes’s answer:
states of our minds causally interact with states of our brains. When bodily
sensations such as aches, pains, itches, and tickles cause us to moan, wince, scratch,
or laugh, they do so by causing brain states events, processes, which in turn
cause bodily movements. In deliberate action, we act on our desires, motives,
and intentions to carry out our purposes; and acting on these mental states
involves their causing brain states, which in turn cause our bodies to move,
thereby causally influencing the physical world. The physical world, in turn,
influences our minds through its influence on our brains. Perception of the
physical world with five senses sight, hearing,
smell, taste, and touch involves causal
transactions from the physical to the mental: what we perceive i.e., see, hear,
etc. causes a sense experience i.e., a visual experience, aural experience,
etc.. Thus, Descartes held that there is two-way psychophysical causal
interaction: from the mental to the physical as in action and from the physical
to the mental as in perception. The conjunction of Cartesian dualism and the
doctrine of two-way psychophysical causal interaction is called Cartesian interactionism.
Perhaps the most widely discussed difficulty for this view is how states of a
non-spatial substance a mind can causally interact with states of a substance
that is in space a brain. Such interactions have seemed utterly mysterious to
many philosophers. Mystery would remain even if an unextended mind is locatable
at a point in space say, the center of the pineal gland. For Cartesian
interactionism would still have to maintain that causal transactions between
mental states and brain states are fundamental, i.e., unmediated by any
underlying mechanism. Brain states causally interact with mental states, but
there is no answer to the question of how they do so. The interactions are
brute facts. Many philosophers, including many of Descartes’s contemporaries,
have found that difficult to accept. Parallelism. Malebranche and Leibniz,
among others, rejected the possibility of psychophysical causal interaction.
They espoused versions of parallelism: the view that the mental and physical
realms run in parallel, in that types of mental phenomena co-occur with certain
types of physical phenomena, but these co-occurrences never involve causal
interactions. On all extant versions, the parallels hold because of God’s
creation. Leibniz’s parallelism is preestablished harmony: the explanation of
why mental types and certain physical types co-occur is that in the possible
world God actualized i.e., this world they co-occur. In discussing the relation
between the mental and physical realms, Leibniz used the analogy of two
synchronized but unconnected clocks. The analogy is, however, somewhat
misleading; suggesting causal mechanisms internal to each clock and intramental
and intraphysical causal transactions. But Leibniz’s monadology doctrine
excludes the possibility of such transactions: mental and physical phenomena
have no effects even within their own realms. Malebranche is associated with
occasionalism, according to which only God, through his continuous activities,
causes things to happen: non-divine phenomena never cause anything.
Occasionalism differs from preestablished harmony in holding that God is
continually engaged in acts of creation; each moment creating the world anew,
in such a way that the correlations hold. Both brands of parallelism face
formidable difficulties. First, both rest on highly contentious, obscure
theological hypotheses. The contention that God exists and the creation stories
in question require extensive defense and explanation. God’s relationship to
the world can seem at least as mysterious as the relationship Descartes posits
between minds and brains. Second, since parallelism denies the possibility of
psychophysical interaction, its proponents must offer alternatives to the
causal theory of perception and the causal theory of action or else deny that
we can perceive and that we can act intentionally. Third, since parallelism
rejects intramental causation, it must either deny that reasoning is possible
or explain how it is possible without causal connections between thoughts.
Fourth, since parallelism rejects physical transactions, it is hard to see how
it can allow, e.g., that one physical thing ever moves another; for that would
require causing a change in location. Perhaps none of these weighty
difficulties is ultimately insuperable; in any case, parallelism has been
abandoned. Epiphenomenalism. Empirical research gives every indication that the
occurrence of any brain state can, in principle, be causally explained by
appeal solely to other physical states. To accommodate this, some philosophers
espoused epiphenomenalism, the doctrine that physical states cause mental
states, but mental states do not cause anything. This thesis was discussed
under the name ‘conscious automatism’ by Huxley and Hogeson in the late
nineteenth century. William James was the first to use the term ‘epiphenomena’
to mean phenomena that lack causal efficacy. And James Ward coined the term
‘epiphenomenalism’ in 3. Epiphenomenalism implies that there is only one-way
psychophysical action from the physical
to the mental. Since epiphenomenalism allows such causal action, it can embrace
the causal theory of perception. However, when combined with Cartesian dualism,
epiphenomenalism, like Cartesian interactionism, implies the problematic thesis
that states of an extended substance can affect states of an unextended
substance. An epiphenomenalist can avoid this problem by rejecting the view
that the mind is an unextended substance while maintaining that mental states
and events are nonetheless distinct from physical states and events. Still,
formidable problems would remain. It is hard to see how epiphenomenalism can
allow that we are ever intentional agents. For intentional agency requires
acting on reasons, which, according to the causal theory of action, requires a
causal connection between reasons and actions. Since epiphenomenalism denies
that such causal connections are possible, it must either maintain that our
sense of agency is illusory or offer an alternative to the causal theory of
action. Similarly, it must explain how thinking is possible given that there
are no causal connections between thoughts. Monism The dual-aspect theory. Many
philosophers reject Descartes’s bifurcation of reality into mental and physical
substances. Spinoza held a dualattribute theory
also called the dual-aspect theory
according to which the mental and the physical are distinct modes of a
single substance, God. The mental and the physical are only two of infinitely
many modes of this one substance. Many philosophers opted for a thoroughgoing
monism, according to which all of reality is really of one kind. Materialism,
idealism, and neutral monism are three brands of monism. Hobbes, a contemporary
of Descartes, espoused materialism, the brand of monism according to which
everything is material or physical. Berkeley is associated with idealism, the
brand of monism according to which everything is mental. He held that both
mental and physical phenomena are perceptions in the mind of God. For Hegel’s
idealism, everything is part of the World Spirit. The early twentieth-century
British philosophers Bradley and McTaggart also held a version of idealism.
Neutral monism is the doctrine that all of reality is ultimately of one kind,
which is neither mental nor physical. Hume was a neutral monist, maintaining
that mental and physical substances are really just bundles of the neutral
entities. Versions of neutral monism were later held by Mach and, for a short
time, Russell. Russell called his neutral entities sensibilia and claimed that
minds and physical objects are logical constructions out of them.
Phenomenalism. This view, espoused in the twentieth century by, among others,
Ayer, argues that all empirical statements are synonymous with statements
solely about phenomenal appearances. While the doctrine is about statements,
phenomenalism is either a neutral monism or an idealism, depending on whether
phenomenal appearances are claimed to be neither mental nor physical or,
instead, mental. The required translations of physical statements into phenomenal
ones proved not to be forthcoming, however. Chisholm offered a reason why they
would not be: what appearances a physical state of affairs e.g., objects
arrayed in a room has depends both on physical conditions of observation e.g.,
lighting and physical conditions of the perceiver e.g., of the nervous system.
At best, a statement solely about phenomenal appearances is equivalent to one
about a physical state of affairs, only when certain physical conditions of
observation and certain physical conditions of the perceiver obtain.
Materialism. Two problems face any monism: it must characterize the phenomena
it takes as basic, and it must explain how the fundamental phenomena make up
non-basic phenomena. The idealist and neutral monist theories proposed thus far
have faltered on one or both counts. Largely because of scientific successes of
the twentieth century, such as the rebirth of the atomic theory of matter, and
the successes of quantum mechanics in explaining chemistry and of chemistry in
turn in explaining much of biology, many philosophers today hold that
materialism will ultimately succeed where idealism and neutral monism
apparently failed. Materialism, however, comes in many different varieties and
each faces formidable difficulties. Logical behaviorism. Ryle ridiculed
Cartesianism as the view that there is a ghost in the machine the body. He
claimed that the view that the mind is a substance rests on a category mistake:
‘mind’ is a noun, but does not name an object. Cartesianism confuses the logic
of discourse about minds with the logic of discourse about bodies. To have a
mind is not to possess a special sort of entity; it is simply to have certain
capacities and dispositions. Compare the thesis that to be alive is to possess
not a certain entity, an entelechy or élan vital, but rather certain capacities
and dispositions. Ryle maintained, moreover, that it was a mistake to regard
mental states such as belief, desire, and intention as internal causes of
behavior. These states, he claimed, are dispositions to behave in overt ways.
In part in response to the dualist point that one can understand our ordinary
psychological vocabulary ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘pain’, etc. and know nothing
about the physical states and events in the brain, logical behaviorism has been
proposed as a materialist doctrine that explains this fact. On this view, talk
of mental phenomena is shorthand for talk of actual and potential overt bodily
behavior i.e., dispositions to overt bodily behavior. Logical behaviorism was
much discussed from roughly the 0s until the early 0s. While Ryle is sometimes
counted as a logical behaviorist, he was not committed to the thesis that all
mental talk can be tr. into behavioral talk. The translations promised by
logical behaviorism appear unachievable. As Putnam and others pointed out, one
can fake being in pain and one can be in pain and yet not behave or be disposed
to behave as if one were in pain e.g., one might be paralyzed or might be a
“super-spartan”. Logical behaviorism faces similar difficulties in translating
sentences about what Russell called propositional attitudes i.e., beliefs that
p, desires that p, hopes that p, intentions that p, and the like. Consider the
following sample proposal similar to one offered by Carnap: one believes that the
cat is on the mat if and only if one is disposed to assent to ‘The cat is on
the mat’. First, the proposed translation meets the condition of being purely
behavioral only if assenting is understandable in purely behavioral terms. That
is doubtful. The proposal also fails to provide a sufficient or a necessary
condition: someone may assent to ‘The cat is on the mat’ and yet not believe
the cat is on the mat for the person may be trying to deceive; and a belief
that the cat is on the mat will dispose one to assent to ‘The cat is on the
mat’ only if one understands what is being asked, wants to indicate that one
believes the cat is on the mat, and so on. But none of these conditions is
required for believing that the cat is on the mat. Moreover, to invoke any of
these mentalistic conditions defeats the attempt to provide a purely behavioral
translation of the belief sentence. Although the project of translation has
been abandoned, in recent years Dennett has defended a view in the spirit of
logical behaviorism, intentional systems theory: belief-desire talk functions
to characterize overall patterns of dispositions to overt behavior in an
environmental context for the purposes of predicting overt behavior. The theory
is sometimes characterized as supervenient behaviorism since it implies that
whether an individual has beliefs, desires, intentions and the like supervenes
on his dispositions to overt behavior: if two individuals are exactly alike in
respect of their dispositions to overt behavior, the one has intentional states
if and only if the other does. This view allows, however, that the contents of
an individual’s intentional states what
the individual believes, desires, etc.
may depend on environmental factors. So it is not committed to the
supervenience of the contents of intentional states on dispositions to overt
behavior.the discussion of content externalism below. One objection to this
view, due to Ned Block, is that it would mistakenly count as an intentional
agent a giant look-up table “a
Blockhead” that has the same
dispositions to peripheral behavior as a genuine intentional agent. A look-up
table is a simple mechanical device that looks up preprogrammed responses.
Identity theories. In the early 0s, Herbert Feigl claimed that mental states
are brain states. He pointed out that if mental properties or state types are
merely nomologically correlated with physical properties or state types, the
connecting laws would be “nomological danglers”: irreducible to physical laws,
and thus additional fundamental laws. According to the identity theory, the
connecting laws are not fundamental laws and so not nomological danglers since
they can be explained by identifying the mental and physical properties in
question. In the late 0s and the early 0s, the philosopher Smart and the
psychologist U. T. Place defended the materialist view that sensations are
identical with brain processes. Smart claimed that while mental terms differ in
meaning from physical terms, scientific investigation reveals that they have
the same referents as certain physical terms. Compare the fact that while ‘the
Morning Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’ differ in meaning empirical investigation
reveals the same referent: Venus. Smart and Place claimed that feeling pain,
e.g., is some brain process, exactly which one to be determined by scientific
investigation. Smart claimed that sensation talk is paraphraseable in
topic-neutral terms; i.e., in terms that leave open whether sensational
properties are mental or physical. ‘I have an orange afterimage’ is
paraphraseable roughly as: ‘There is something going on like what is going on
when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good
light in front of me, i.e., when I really see an orange’. The description is
topic-neutral since it leaves open whether what is going on is mental or
physical. Smart maintained that scientific investigation reveals that what in
fact meets the topic-neutral description is a brain process. He held that
psychophysical identity statements such as ‘Pain is C-fiber firing’ are
contingent, likening these to, e.g., ‘Lightning is electrical discharge’, which
is contingent and knowable only through empirical investigation. Central state
materialism. This brand of materialism was defended in the late 0s and the
early 0s by Armstrong and others. On this view, mental states are states that
are apt to produce a certain range of behavior. Central state materialists
maintain that scientific investigation reveals that such states are states of
the central nervous system, and thus that mental states are contingently
identical with states of the central nervous system. Unlike logical
behaviorism, central state materialism does not imply that mental sentences can
be tr. into physical sentences. Unlike both logical behaviorism and philosophy
of mind philosophy of mind 687 687
intentional systems theory, central state materialism implies that mental
states are actual internal states with causal effects. And unlike Cartesian
interactionism, it holds that psychophysical interaction is just physical
causal interaction. Some central state materialists held in addition that the
mind is the brain. However, if the mind were the brain, every change in the
brain would be a change in the mind; and that seems false: not every little
brain change amounts to a change of mind. Indeed, the mind ceases to exist when
brain death occurs, while the brain continues to exist. The moral that most
materialists nowadays draw from such considerations is that the mind is not any
physical substance, since it is not a substance of any sort. To have a mind is
not to possess a special substance, but rather to have certain capacities to think, feel, etc. To that extent, Ryle was
right. However, central state materialists insist that the properly functioning
brain is the material seat of mental capacities, that the exercise of mental
capacities consists of brain processes, and that mental states are brain states
that can produce behavior. Epistemological objections have been raised to
identity theories. As self-conscious beings, we have a kind of privileged
access to our own mental states. The exact avenue of privileged access, whether
it is introspection or not, is controversial. But it has seemed to many
philosophers that our access to our own mental states is privileged in being
open only to us, whereas we lack any privileged access to the states of our
central nervous systems. We come to know about central nervous system states in
the same way we come to know about the central nervous system states of others.
So, against central state materialism and the identity theory, it is claimed
that mental states cannot be states of our central nervous systems. Taking
privileged access to imply that we have incorrigible knowledge of our conscious
mental states, and despairing of squaring privileged access so understood with
materialism, Rorty advocated eliminative materialism, the thesis that there
actually are no mental phenomena. A more common materialist response, however,
is to deny that privileged access entails incorrigibility and to maintain that
privileged access is compatible with materialism. Some materialists maintain
that while certain types of mental states e.g., sensations are types of
neurological states, it will be knowable only by empirical investigation that
they are. Suppose pain is a neural state N. It will be only a posteriori
knowable that pain is N. Via the avenue of privileged access, one comes to
believe that one is in a pain state, but not that one is in an N-state. One can
believe one is in a pain state without believing that one is in an N-state
because the concept of pain is different from the concept of N. Nevertheless,
pain is N. Compare the fact that while water is H2O, the concept of water is
different from that of H2O. Thus, while water is H2O, one can believe there is
water in the glass without believing that there is H2O in it. The avenue of
privileged access presents N conceptualized as pain, but never as neurological
state N. The avenue of privileged access involves the exercise of mental, but
not neurophysiological, concepts. However, our mental concepts answer to apply in virtue of the same properties state types as do certain
of our neurophysiological concepts. The identity theory and central state
materialism both hold that there are contingent psychophysical property and
type identities. Some theorists in this tradition tried to distinguish a notion
of theoretical identity from the notion of strict identity. They held that
mental states are theoretically, but not strictly, identical with brain states.
Against any such distinction, Kripke argued that identities are metaphysically
necessary, i.e., hold in every possible world. If A % B, then necessarily A %
B. Kripke acknowledged that there can be contingent statements of identity. But
such statements, he argued, will employ at least one term that is not a rigid
designator, i.e., a term that designates the same thing in every world in which
it designates anything. Thus, since ‘the inventor of bifocals’ is a non-rigid
designator, ‘Benjamin Franklin is the inventor of bifocals’ is contingent.
While Franklin is the inventor of bifocals, he might not have been. However,
statements of identity in which the identity sign is flanked by rigid
designators are, if true, metaphysically necessary. Kripke held that proper
names are rigid designators, and hence, the true identity statement ‘Cicero is
Tully’ is metaphysically necessary. Nonetheless, a metaphysically necessary
identity statement can be knowable only a posteriori. Indeed, ‘Cicero is Tully’
is knowable only a posteriori. Both ‘water’ and ‘H2O’, he maintained, are rigid
designators: each designates the same kind of stuff in every possible world.
And he thus maintained that it is metaphysically necessary that water is H2O,
despite its not being a priori knowable that water is H2O. On Kripke’s view,
any psychophysical identity statement that employs mental terms and physical
terms that are rigid designators will also be metaphysically necessary, if
true. Central state materialists maintain that mental concepts are equivalent
to concepts whose descriptive content is the state that is apt to produce
such-and-such behavior in such-and-such circumstances. These defining
descriptions for mental concepts are intended to be meaning-giving, not contingent
reference-fixing descriptions; they are, moreover, not rigid designators. Thus,
the central state materialists can concede that all identities are necessary,
but maintain that psychophysical claims of identity are contingent claims of
identity since the mental terms that figure in those statements are not rigid
designators. However, Kripke maintained that our concepts of sensations and
other qualitative states are not equivalent to the sorts of descriptions in
question. The term ‘pain’, he maintained, is a rigid designator. This position
might be refuted by a successful functional analysis of the concept of pain in
physical and/or topic-neutral terms. However, no successful analysis of this
sort has yet been produced. See the section on consciousness below. A
materialist can grant Kripke that ‘pain’ is a rigid designator and claim that a
statement such as ‘Pain is C-fiber firing’ will be metaphysically necessary if
true, but only a posteriori knowable. However, Kripke raised a formidable
problem for this materialism. He pointed out that if a statement is
metaphysically necessary but only a posteriori knowable, its appearance of
contingency calls for explanation. Despite being metaphysically necessary,
‘Water is H2O’ appears contingent. According to Kripke, we explain this
appearance by noting that one can coherently imagine a world in which something
has all the phenomenal properties of water, and so is an “epistemic
counterpart” of it, yet is not H2O. The fact that we can coherently imagine
such epistemic counterparts explains why ‘Water is H2O’ appears contingent. But
no such explanation is available for e.g. ‘Pain is C-fiber firing’. For an
epistemic counterpart of pain, something with the phenomenal properties of pain the feel of pain is pain. Something can look, smell, taste,
and feel like water yet not be water. But whatever feels like pain is pain:
pain is a feeling. In contrast, we can explain the apparent contingency of
claims like ‘Water is H2O’ because water is not constituted by its phenomenal
properties; our concept of water allows that it may have a “hidden essence,”
i.e., an essential microstructure. If Kripke is right, then anyone who
maintains that a statement of identity concerning a type of bodily sensation
and a type of physical state is metaphysically necessary yet a posteriori, must
explain the appearance of contingency in a way that differs from the way Kripke
explains the appearance of contingency of ‘Water is H2O’. This is a formidable
challenge. The final section, on consciousness, sketches some materialist
responses to it. The general issue of property and state type identity is
controversial. The claim that water is H2O despite the fact that the concept of
water is distinct from the concept of H2O seems plausible. However, property or
state type identity is more controversial than the identity of types of
substances. For properties or state types, there are no generally accepted
“non-duplication principles” to use a
phrase of David Lewis’s. A nonduplication principle for A’s will say that no
two A’s can be exactly alike in a certain respect; e.g., no two sets can have
exactly the same members. It is widely denied, for instance, that no two
properties can be possessed by exactly the same things. Two properties, it is
claimed, can be possessed by the same things; likewise, two state types can
occur in the same space-time regions. Even assuming that mental concepts are
distinct from physical concepts, the issue of whether mental state types are
physical state types raises the controversial issue of the non-duplication
principle for state types. Token and type physicalisms. Token physicalism is
the thesis that every particular is physical. Type physicalism is the thesis
that every type or kind of entity is physical; thus, the identity thesis and
central state materialism are type physicalist theses since they imply that
types of mental states are types of physical states. Type physicalism implies
token physicalism: given the former, every token falls under some physical
type, and therefore is token-token identical with some token of a physical
type. But token physicalism does not imply type physicalism; the former leaves
open whether physical tokens fall under non-physical types. Some doctrines
billed as materialist or physicalist embrace token epiphenomenalism, but reject
type physicalism. Non-reductive materialism. This form of materialism implies
token physicalism, but denies type physicalism and, as well, that mental types
properties, etc. are reducible to physical types. This doctrine has been
discussed since at least the late nineteenth century and was widely discussed
in the first third of the twentieth century. The British philosophers George
Henry Lewes, Samuel Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, and C. D. Broad all held or
thought plausible a certain version of non-reductive materialism. They held or
sympathized with the view that every substance philosophy of mind philosophy of
mind 689 689 either is or is wholly
made up of physical particles, that the well-functioning brain is the material
seat of mental capacities, and that token mental states events, processes, etc.
are token neurophysiological states events, processes, etc.. However, they
either held or thought plausible the view that mental capacities, properties,
etc., emerge from, and thus do not reduce to, physical capacities, properties,
etc. Lewes coined the term ‘emergence’; and Broad later labeled the doctrine
emergent materialism. Emergent materialists maintain that laws correlating
mental and physical properties are irreducible. These laws would be what Feigl
called nomological danglers. Emergentists maintain that, despite their
untidiness, such laws must be accepted with natural piety. Davidson’s doctrine
of anomalous monism is a current brand of non-reductive materialism. He
explicitly formulates this materialist thesis for events; and his
irreducibility thesis is restricted to intentional mental types e.g., believings, desirings, and intendings.
Anomalous monism says that every event token is physical, but that intentional
mental predicates and concepts ones expressing propositional attitudes do not
reduce, by law or definition, to physical predicates or concepts. Davidson
offers an original argument for this irreducibility thesis. Mental predicates
and concepts are, he claims, governed by constitutive principles of
rationality, but physical predicates and concepts are not. This difference, he
contends, excludes the possibility of reduction of mental predicates and
concepts to physical ones. Davidson denies, moreover, that there are strict
psychological or psychophysical laws. He calls the conjunction of this thesis
and his irreducibility thesis the principle of the anomalism of the mental. His
argument for token physicalism for events appeals to the principle of the anomalism
of the mental and to the principle of the nomological character of causality:
when two events are causally related, they are subsumed by a strict law. He
maintains that all strict laws are physical. Given that claim, and given the
principle of the nomological character of causality, it follows that every
event that is a cause or effect is a physical event. On this view,
psychophysical causation is just causation between physical events. Stephen
Schiffer has also maintained a non-reductive materialism, one he calls
ontological physicalism and sentential dualism: every particular is physical,
but mental truths are irreducible to physical truths. Non-reductive materialism
presupposes that mental state event tokens can fall under physical state types
and, thereby, count as physical state tokens. This presupposition is
controversial; no uncontroversial non-duplication principle for state tokens
settles the issue. Suppose, however, that mental state tokens are physical
state tokens, despite mental state types not being physical state types. The
issue of how mental state types and physical state types are related remains.
Suppose that some physical token x is of a mental type M say, a belief that the
cat is on the mat and some other physical token y is not of type M. There must,
it seems, be some difference between x and y in virtue of which x is, and y is
not, of type M. Otherwise, it is simply a brute fact that x is and y is not of
type M. That, however, seems implausible. The claim that certain physical state
tokens fall under mental state types simply as a matter of brute fact would
leave the difference in question utterly mysterious. But if it is not a brute
fact, then there is some explanation of why a certain physical state is a
mental state of a certain sort. The non-reductive materialist owes us an
explanation that does not imply psychophysical reduction. Moreover, even though
the non-reductive materialist can claim that mental states are causes because
they are physical states with physical effects, there is some question whether
mental state types are relevant to causal relations. Suppose every state is a
physical state. Given that physical states causally interact in virtue of
falling under physical types, it follows that whenever states causally interact
they do so in virtue of falling under physical types. That raises the issue of
whether states are ever causes in virtue of falling under mental types. Type
epiphenomenalism is the thesis that no state can cause anything in virtue of
falling under a mental type. Token epiphenomenalism, the thesis that no mental
state can cause anything, implies type epiphenomenalism, but not conversely.
Nonreductive materialists are not committed to token physicalism. However,
token epiphenomenalism may be false but type epiphenomenalism true since mental
states may be causes only in virtue of falling under physical types, never in
virtue of falling under mental types. Broad raised the issue of type
epiphenomenalism and discussed whether emergent materialism is committed to it.
Ted Honderich, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, and others have in recent years raised
the issue of whether non-reductive materialism is committed to type
epiphenomenalism. Brian McLaughlin has argued that the claim that an event acts
as a cause in virtue of falling under a certain physical type is consistent
with the claim that it also acts as a cause in virtue of falling under a
certain mental type, even when the mental type is not identical with the
physical type. But even if this is so, the relationship between mental types
and physical types must be addressed. Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer, Frank
Jackson and Philip Pettit, Stephen Yablo, and others have attempted to
characterize a relation between mental types and physical types that allows for
the causal relevance of mental types. But whether there is a relation between
mental and physical properties that is both adequate to secure the causal
relevance of mental properties and available to non-reductive materialists
remains an open question. Davidson’s anomalous monism may appear to be a kind
of dual-aspect theory: there are events and they can have two sorts of
autonomous aspects, mental and physical. However, while Davidson holds that
mental properties or types do not reduce to physical ones, he also holds that
the mental properties of an event depend on its physical properties in that the
former supervene on the latter in this sense: no two events can be exactly
alike in every physical respect and yet differ in some mental respect. This
proposal introduced the notion of supervenience into contem- porary philosophy
of mind. Often nonreductive materialists argue that mental properties types
supervene on physical properties types. Kim, however, has distinguished various
supervenience relations, and argues that some are too weak to count as versions
of materialism as opposed to, say, dual-aspect theory, while other
supervenience relations are too strong to use to formulate non-reductive
materialism since they imply reducibility. According to Kim, non-reductive materialism
is an unstable position. Materialism as a supervenience thesis. Several
philosophers have in recent years attempted to define the thesis of materialism
using a global supervenience thesis. Their aim is not to formulate a brand of
non-reductive materialism; they maintain that their supervenience thesis may
well imply reducibility. Their aim is, rather, to formulate a thesis to which
anyone who counts as a genuine materialist must subscribe. David Lewis has
maintained that materialism is true if and only if any non-alien possible
worlds that are physically indiscernible are mentally indiscernible as well.
Non-alien possible worlds are worlds that have exactly the same perfectly
natural properties as the actual world. Frank Jackson has offered this proposal:
materialism is true if and only if any minimal physical duplicate of the actual
world is a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. A world is a physical
duplicate of the actual world if and only if it is exactly like the actual
world in every physical respect physical particular for physical particular,
physical property for physical property, physical relation for physical
relation, etc.; and a world is a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world if
and only if it is exactly like the actual world in every respect. A minimal
physical duplicate of the actual world is a physical duplicate that contains
nothing else by way of particulars, kinds, properties, etc. than it must in
order to be a physical duplicate of the actual world. Two questions arise for
any formulation of the thesis of materialism. Is it adequate to materialism?
And, if it is, is it true? Functionalism. The nineteenth-century British
philosopher George Henry Lewes maintained that while not every neurological
event is mental, every mental event is neurological. He claimed that what makes
certain neurological events mental events is their causal role in the organism.
This is a very early version of functionalism, nowadays a leading approach to
the mindbody problem. Functionalism implies an answer to the question of what
makes a state token a mental state of a certain kind M: namely, that it is an
instance of some functional state type identical with M. There are two versions
of this proposal. On one, a mental state type M of a system will be identical
with the state type that plays a certain causal role R in the system. The
description ‘the state type that plays R in the system’ will be a nonrigid
designator; moreover, different state types may play R in different organisms,
in which case the mental state is multiply realizable. On the second version, a
mental state type M is identical with a second-order state type, the state of
being in some first-order state that plays causal role R. More than one
first-order state may play role R, and thus M may be multiply realizable. On
either version, if the relevant causal roles are specifiable in physical or
topic-neutral terms, then the functional definitions of mental state types will
be, in principle, physically reductive. Since the roles would be specified
partly in topic-neutral terms, there may well be possible worlds in which the
mental states are realized by non-physical states; thus, functionalism does not
imply token physicalism. However, functionalists typically maintain that, on
the empirical evidence, mental states are realized in our world only by
physical states. Functionalism comes in many varieties. philosophy of mind
philosophy of mind 691 691 Smart’s
topic-neutral analysis of our talk of sensations is in the spirit of functionalism.
And Armstrong’s central state materialism counts as a kind of functionalism
since it maintains that mental states are states apt to produce a certain range
of behavior, and thus identifies states as mental states by their performing
this causal role. However, functionalists today typically hold that the
defining causal roles include causal roles vis-à-vis input state types, as well
as output state types, and also vis-à-vis other internal state types of the
system in question. In the 0s David Lewis proposed a functionalist theory,
analytical functionalism, according to which definitions of mental predicates
such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, and the like though not predicates such as
‘believes that p’ or ‘desires that q’ can be obtained by conjoining the platitudes
of commonsense psychology and formulating the Ramsey sentence for the
conjunction. The relevant Ramsey sentence is a second-order quantificational
sentence that quantifies over the mental predicates in the conjunction of
commonsense psychological platitudes, and from it one can derive definitions of
the mental predicates. On this view, it will be analytic that a certain mental
state e.g., belief is the state that plays a certain causal role vis-à-vis
other states; and it is a matter of empirical investigation what state plays
the role. Lewis claimed that such investigation reveals that the state types
that play the roles in question are physical states. In the early 0s, Putnam
proposed a version of scientific functionalism, machine state functionalism:
according to this view, mental states are types of Turing machine table states.
Turing machines are mechanical devices consisting of a tape with squares on it
that either are blank or contain symbols, and an executive that can move one
square to the left, or one square to the right, or stay where it is. And it can
either write a symbol on a square, erase a symbol on a square, or leave the
square as it is. According to the Church-Turing thesis, every computable
function can be computed by a Turing machine. Now there are two functions
specifying such a machine: one from input states to output states, the other
from input states to input states. And these functions are expressible by
counterfactuals e.g., ‘If the machine is in state s 1 and receives input I, it
will emit output O and enter state s2’. Machine tables are specified by the
counterfactuals that express the functions in question. So the main idea of
machine state functionalism is that any given mental type is definable as the
state type that participates in certain counterfactual relationships specified
in terms of purely formal, and so not semantically interpreted, state types.
Any system whose inputs, outputs, and internal states are counterfactually
related in the way characterized by a machine table is a realization of that
table. This version of machine state functionalism has been abandoned: no one
maintains that the mind has the architecture of a Turing machine. However,
computational psychology, a branch of cognitive psychology, presupposes a scientific
functionalist view of cognitive states: it takes the mind to have a
computational architecture. See the section on cognitive psychology below.
Functionalism the view that what makes a
state a realization of a mental state is its playing a certain causal role remains a leading theory of mind. But
functionalism faces formidable difficulties. Block has pinpointed one. On the
one hand, if the input and output states that figure in the causal role alleged
to define a certain mental state are specified in insufficient detail, the
functional definition will be too liberal: it will mistakenly classify certain
states as of that mental type. On the other hand, if the input and output
states are specified in too much detail, the functional definition will be
chauvinistic: it will fail to count certain states as instances of the mental
state that are in fact such instances. Moreover, it has also been argued that
functionalism cannot capture conscious states since types of conscious states
do not admit of functional definitions. Cognitive psychology, content, and
consciousness Cognitive psychology. Many claim that one aim of cognitive
psychology is to provide explanations of intentional capacities, capacities to
be in intentional states e.g., believing and to engage in intentional
activities e.g., reasoning. Fodor has argued that classical cognitive
psychology postulates a cognitive architecture that includes a language of
thought: a system of mental representation with a combinatorial syntax and
semantics, and computational processes defined over these mental
representations in virtue of their syntactic structures. On this view,
cognition is rule-governed symbol manipulation. Mental symbols have meanings,
but they participate in computational processes solely in virtue of their
syntactic or formal properties. The mind is, so to speak, a syntactic engine.
The view implies a kind of content parallelism: syntaxsensitive causal
transitions between symbols will preserve semantic coherence. Fodor has
mainphilosophy of mind philosophy of mind 692
692 tained that, on this language-of-thought view of cognition the
classical view, being in a beliefthat-p state can be understood as consisting
in bearing a computational relation one that is constitutive of belief to a sentence
in the language of thought that means that p; and similarly for desire,
intention, and the like. The explanation of intentional capacities will be
provided by a computational theory for mental sentences in conjunction with a
psychosemantic theory, a theory of meaning for mental sentences. A research
program in cognitive science called connectionism postulates networks of
neuron-like units. The units can be either on or off, or can have continuous
levels of activation. Units are connected, the connections have various degrees
of strength, and the connections can be either inhibitory or excitatory.
Connectionism has provided fruitful models for studying how neural networks
compute information. Moreover, connectionists have had much success in modeling
pattern recognition tasks e.g., facial recognition and tasks consisting of
learning categories from examples. Some connectionists maintain that
connectionism will yield an alternative to the classical language-of-thought
account of intentional states and capacities. However, some favor a
mixed-models approach to cognition: some cognitive capacities are symbolic,
some connectionist. And some hold that connectionism will yield an
implementational architecture for a symbolic cognitive architecture, one that
will help explain how a symbolic cognitive architecture is realized in the
nervous system. Content externalism. Many today hold that Twin-Earth thought
experiments by Putnam and Tyler Burge show that the contents of a subject’s
mental states do not supervene on intrinsic properties of the subject: two
individuals can be exactly alike in every intrinsic respect, yet be in mental
states with different contents. In response to Twin-Earth thought experiments,
some philosophers have, however, attempted to characterize a notion of narrow
content, a kind of content that supervenes on intrinsic properties of thinkers.
Content, externalists claim, depends on extrinsic-contextual factors. If
externalism is correct, then a psychosemantic theory must examine the relation between
mental symbols and the extrinsic, contextual factors that determine contents.
Stephen Stich has argued that psychology should eschew psychosemantics and
concern itself only with the syntactic properties of mental sentences. Such a
psychology could not explain intentional capacities. But Stich urges that
computational psychology also eschew that explanatory goal. If, however,
psychology is to explain intentional capacities, a psychosemantic theory is
needed. Dretske, Fodor, Ruth Millikan, and David Papineau have each
independently attempted to provide, in physicalistically respectable terms,
foundations for a naturalized externalist theory of the content of mental
sentences or internal physical states. Perhaps the leading problem for these
theories of content is to explain how the physical and functional facts about a
state determine a unique content for it. Appealing to work by Quine and by
Kripke, some philosophers argue that such facts will not determine unique
contents. Both causal and epistemic concerns have been raised about externalist
theories of content. Such theories invite the question whether the property of
having a certain content is ever causally relevant. If content is a contextual
property of a state that has it, can states have effects in virtue of their
having a certain content? This is an important issue because intentional states
figure in explanations not only in virtue of their intentional mode whether
they are beliefs, or desires, etc. but also in virtue of their contents.
Consider an everyday belief-desire explanation. The fact that the subject’s
belief was that there was milk in the refrigerator and the fact that the
subject’s desire was for milk are both essential to the belief and desire
explaining why the subject went to the refrigerator. Dretske, who maintains
that content depends on a causal-historical context, has attempted to explain
how the property of having a certain content can be causally relevant even
though the possession of the property depends on causal-historical factors. And
various other philosophers have attempted to explain how the causal relevance
of content can be squared with the fact that it fails to supervene on intrinsic
properties of the subject. A further controversial question is whether
externalism is consistent with our having privileged access to what we are
thinking. Consciousness. Conscious states such as pain states, visual
experiences, and so on, are such that it is “like” something for the subject of
the state to be in them. Such states have a qualitative aspect, a
phenomenological character. The what-it-is-like aspects of experiences are
called qualia. Qualia pose a serious difficulty for physicalism. Broad argued
that one can know all the physical properties of a chemical and how it causally
interacts with other physical phenomena and yet not know what it is like to
smell it. He concluded that the smell of the chemical is philosophy of mind
philosophy of mind 693 693 not itself
a physical property, but rather an irreducible emergent property. Frank Jackson
has recently defended a version of the argument, which has been dubbed the
knowledge argument. Jackson argues that a super-scientist, Mary, who knows all
the physical and functional facts about color vision, light, and matter, but
has never experienced redness since she has spent her entire life in a black
and white room, would not know what it is like to visually experience red. He
concludes that the physical and functional topic-neutral facts do not entail
all the facts, and thus materialism is false. In response, Lawrence Nemirow,
David Lewis, and others have argued that knowing what it is like to be in a
certain conscious state is, in part, a matter of know-how e.g., to be able to
imagine oneself in the state rather than factual knowledge, and that the
failure of knowledge of the physical and functional facts to yield such
know-how does not imply the falsity of materialism. Functionalism seems unable
to solve the problem of qualia since qualia seem not to be functionally
definable. In the 0s, Fodor and Ned Block argued that two states can have the
same causal role, thereby realizing the same functional state, yet the qualia
associated with each can be inverted. This is called the problem of inverted
qualia. The color spectrum, e.g., might be inverted for two individuals a
possibility raised by Locke, despite their being in the same functional states.
They further argued that two states might realize the same functional state,
yet the one might have qualia associated with it and the other not. This is
called the problem of absent qualia. Sydney Shoemaker has argued that the
possibility of absent qualia can be ruled out on functionalist grounds.
However, he has also refined the inverted qualia scenario and further
articulated the problem it poses for functionalism. Whether functionalism or
physicalism can avoid the problems of absent and inverted qualia remains an
open question. Thomas Nagel claims that conscious states are subjective: to
fully understand them, one must understand what it is like to be in them, but
one can do that only by taking up the experiential point of view of a subject
in them. Physical states, in contrast, are objective. Physical science attempts
to characterize the world in abstraction from the experiential point of view of
any subject. According to Nagel, whether phenomenal mental states reduce to
physical states turns on whether subjective states reduce to objective states;
and, at present, he claims, we have no understanding of how they could. Nagel
has suggested that consciousness may be explainable only by appeal to as yet
undiscovered basic nonmental, non-physical properties “proto-mental properties” the idea being that experiential points of
view might be constituted by protomental properties together with physical properties.
He thus claims that panphysicism is worthy of serious consideration. Frank
Jackson, James Van Cleve, and David Chalmers have argued that conscious
properties are emergent, i.e., fundamental, irreducible macro-properties; and
Chalmers sympathizes with a brand of panphysicism. Colin McGinn claims that
while conscious properties are likely reductively explainable by brain
properties, our minds seem conceptually closed to the explaining properties: we
are unable to conceptualize them, just as a cat is unable to conceptualize a
square root. Dennett attempts to explain consciousness in supervenient
behaviorist terms. David Rosenthal argues that consciousness is a special case
of intentionality more specifically, that
conscious states are just states we can come in a certain direct way to believe
we are in. Dretske, William Lycan, and Michael Tye argue that conscious
properties are intentional properties and physicalistically reducible. Patricia
Churchland argues that conscious phenomena are reducible to neurological
phenomena. Brian Loar contends that qualia are identical with either functional
or neurological states of the brain; and Christopher Hill argues specifically
that qualia are identical with neurological states. Loar and Hill attempt to
explain away the appearance of contingency of psychophysical identity claims,
but in a way different from the way Kripke attempts to explain the appearance
of contingency of ‘Water is H2O’, since they concede that that mode of
explanation is unavailable. They appeal to differences in the conceptual roles
of neurological and functional concepts by contrast with phenomenal concepts.
They argue that while such concepts are different, they answer to the same
properties. The nature of consciousness thus remains a matter of dispute. Animatum
-- philosophical psychology – Grice: “Someone at Oxford had the bad idea of
calling the Wilde lecturer the Wilde lecturer in mental philosophy – and the
sad thing is that Ryle did nothing to stop it!” -- Eckhart, Johannes, called
Meister Eckhart c.12601328, G. mystic, theologian, and preacher. Eckhart
entered the Dominican order early and began an academic circuit that took him
several times to Paris as a student and master of theology and that initiated
him into ways of thinking much influenced by Albertus Magnus and Thomas
Aquinas. At Paris, Eckhart wrote the required commentary on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard and finished for publication at least three formal disputations.
But he had already held office within the Dominicans, and he continued to
alternate work as administrator and as teacher. Eckhart preached throughout
these years, and he continued to write spiritual treatises in the vernacular,
of which the most important is the Book of Divine Consolation. Only about a
third of Eckhart’s main project in Latin, the Opus tripartitum, seems ever to
have been completed. Beginning in the early 1320s, questions were raised about
Eckhart’s orthodoxy. The questions centered on what was characteristic of his
teaching, namely the emphasis on the soul’s attaining “emptiness” so as to
“give birth to God.” The soul is ennobled by its emptying, and it can begin to
“labor” with God to deliver a spark that enacts the miraculous
union-and-difference of their love. After being acquitted of heresy once,
Eckhart was condemned on 108 propositions drawn from his writings by a
commission at Cologne. The condemnation was appealed to the Holy See, but in
1329 Eckhart was there judged “probably heretical” on 17 of 28 propositions
drawn from both his academic and popular works. The condemnation clearly
limited Eckhart’s explicit influence in theology, though he was deeply
appropriated not only by mystics such as Johannes Tauler and Henry Suso, but by
church figures such as Nicholas of Cusa and Martin Luther. He has since been
taken up by thinkers as different as Hegel, Fichte, and Heidegger.
Philosophical psychology – “soul-to-soul transfer” – the problem of other
minds, the question of what rational basis a person can have for the belief
that other persons are similarly conscious and have minds. Every person, by
virtue of being conscious, is aware of her own state of consciousness and thus
knows she has a mind; but the mental states of others are not similarly
apparent to her. An influential attempt to solve this problem was made by
philosophical behaviorists. According to Ryle in “The Concept of Mind,”(first
draft entitled, “The concept of psyche,” second draft, “The concept of the
soul” -- a mind (Ryle means ‘soul’) is not a ghost in the physical machine but roughly
speaking an aggregate of dispositions to behave intelligently and to respond
overtly to sensory stimulation. Since the behavior distinctive of these
mentalistic dispositions is readily observable in other human beings, the
so-called problem of other minds is easily solved: it arose from mere confusion
about the concept of mind. Ryle’s opponents were generally willing to concede
that such dispositions provide proof that another person has a “mind” or is a
sentient being, but they were not willing to admit that those dispositions
provide proof that other people actually have feelings, thoughts, and sensory
experiences. Their convictions on this last matter generated a revised version
of the otherminds problem; it might be called the problem of other-person
experiences. Early efforts to solve the problem of other minds can be viewed as
attempts to solve the problem of other-person experiences. According to J. S.
Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, one can defend one’s conviction that others
have feelings and other subjective experiences by employing an argument from
analogy. To develop that analogy one first attends to how one’s own experiences
are related to overt or publicly observable phenomena. One might observe that
one feels pain when pricked by a pin and that one responds to the pain by
wincing and saying “ouch.” The next step is to attend to the behavior and
circumstances of others. Since other people are physically very similar to
oneself, it is reasonable to conclude that if they are pricked by a pin and
respond by wincing and saying “ouch,” they too have felt pain. Analogous
inferences involving other sorts of mental states and other sorts of behavior
and circumstances add strong support, Mill said, to one’s belief in other-person
experiences. Although arguments from analogy are generally conceded to provide
rationally acceptable evidence for unobserved phenomena, the analogical
argument for other-person experiences was vigorously attacked in the 0s by
philosophers influenced by Vitters’s Philosophical Investigations 3. Their
central contention was that anyone employing the argument must assume that,
solely from her own case, she knows what feelings and thoughts are. This
assumption was refuted, they thought, by Vitters’s private language argument,
which proved that we learn what feelings and thoughts are only in the process
of learning a publicly understandable language containing an appropriate
psychological vocabulary. To understand this latter vocabulary, these critics
said, one must be able to use its ingredient words correctly in relation to
others as well as to oneself; and this can be ascertained only because words
like ‘pain’ and ‘depression’ are associated with behavioral criteria. When such
criteria are satisfied by the behavior of others, one knows that the words are
correctly applied to them and that one is justified in believing that they have
the experiences in question. The supposed problem of other-person experiences
is thus “dissolved” by a just appreciation of the preconditions for coherent
thought about psychological states. Vitters’s claim that, to be conceivable,
“an inner process stands in need of external criteria,” lost its hold on
philosophers during the 0s. An important consideration was this: if a feeling
of pain is a genuine reality different from the behavior that typically
accompanies it, then so-called pain behavior cannot be shown to provide
adequate evidence for the presence of pain by a purely linguistic argument;
some empirical inductive evidence is needed. Since, contrary to Vitters, one
knows what the feeling of pain is like only by having that feeling, one’s
belief that other people occasionally have feelings that are significantly like
the pain one feels oneself apparently must be supported by an argument in which
analogy plays a central role. No other strategy seems possible. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Method in philosophical
psychology: from the bizarre to the banal,” repr. in “The Conception of Value,”
Oxford, Clarendon Press. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Method in philosophical
psychology: from the banal to the bizarre,” in The Conception of Value, Oxford,
Clarendon.
annullatum
–Grice: Etymologically, ‘ad-nullatum.’ -- annullability: a synonym for ‘cancellability,’
used in “Causal.” Perhaps clear than ‘cancel.’ The etymology seems clear,
because it involves the negative – “Cancel” seems like a soft sophisticated way
of annulling, render something nix. Short and Lewis has ‘nullus’ as ne-ullus, not any, none, no. which is indeed a diminutive
for ‘unus,’ [for unulus, dim. of unus], any, any one (usu.
in neg. sentences; corresp. with aliquis in affirmations).
anniceris: Grecian and
pre-Griceian philosopher, vide. H. P. Grice, “Pleasure.” A pupil of Antipater,
he established a separate branch of the Cyrenaic school known as the
Anniceraioi. He subscribed to typical Cyrenaic hedonism, arguing that the end
of each action should be one’s own pleasure, since we can know nothing of
others’ experiences. He tempered the implications of hedonism with the claim
that a wise man attaches weight to respect for parents, patriotism, gratitude,
and friendship, perhaps influencing Epicurus in this regard. Anniceris also
played down the Cyrenaic stress on the intellect’s role in hedonistic practical
rationality, taking the Aristotelian view that cultivation of the right habits
is indispensable.
AOSTA – ANSELMO
D’AOSTA -- anselmus:
“I would call him ‘Canterbury,’ only he
was an Italian!” – H. P. Grice. Saint, called Anselm of Canterbury, philosopher
theologian. A Benedictine monk and the second Norman archbishop of Canterbury,
he is best known for his distinctive method
fides quaerens intellectum; his “ontological” argument for the existence
of God in his treatise Proslogion; and his classic formulation of the
satisfaction theory of the Atonement in the Cur Deus homo. Like Augustine
before him, Anselm is a Christian Platonist in metaphysics. He argues that the
most accessible proofs of the existence of God are through value theory: in his
treatise Monologion, he deploys a cosmological argument, showing the existence
of a source of all goods, which is the Good per se and hence supremely good;
that same thing exists per se and is the Supreme Being. In the Proslogion,
Anselm begins with his conception of a being a greater than which cannot be
conceived, and mounts his ontological argument that a being a greater than
which cannot be conceived exists in the intellect, because even the fool
understands the phrase when he hears it; but if it existed in the intellect
alone, a greater could be conceived that existed in reality. This supremely
valuable object is essentially whatever it is
other things being equal that is
better to be than not to be, and hence living, wise, powerful, true, just,
blessed, immaterial, immutable, and eternal per se; even the paradigm of
sensory goods Beauty, Harmony,
Sweetness, and Pleasant Texture, in its own ineffable manner. Nevertheless, God
is supremely simple, not compounded of a plurality of excellences, but “omne et
unum, totum et solum bonum,” a being a more delectable than which cannot be
conceived. Everything other than God has its being and its well-being through
God as efficient cause. Moreover, God is the paradigm of all created natures,
the latter ranking as better to the extent that they more perfectly resemble
God. Thus, it is better to be human than to be horse, to be horse than to be
wood, even though in comparison with God everything else is “almost nothing.”
For every created nature, there is a that-for-which-it-ismade ad quod factum
est. On the one hand, Anselm thinks of such teleology as part of the internal
structure of the natures themselves: a creature of type F is a true F only
insofar as it is/does/exemplifies that for which F’s were made; a defective F,
to the extent that it does not. On the other hand, for Anselm, the telos of a
created nature is that-for-which-God-made-it. Because God is personal and acts
through reason and will, Anselm infers that prior in the order of explanation
to creation, there was, in the reason of the maker, an exemplar, form,
likeness, or rule of what he was going to make. In De veritate Anselm maintains
that such teleology gives rise to obligation: since creatures owe their being
and well-being to God as their cause, so they owe their being and well-being to
God in the sense of having an obligation to praise him by being the best beings
they can. Since every creature is of some nature or other, each can be its best
by being that-for-which-God-made-it. Abstracting from impediments, non-rational
natures fulfill this obligation and “act rightly” by natural necessity;
rational creatures, when they exercise their powers of reason and will to
fulfill God’s purpose in creating them. Thus, the goodness of a creature how
good a being it is is a function of twin factors: its natural telos i.e., what
sort of imitation of divine nature it aims for, and its rightness in exercising
its natural powers to fulfill its telos. By contrast, God as absolutely
independent owes no one anything and so has no obligations to creatures. In De
casu diaboli, Anselm underlines the optimism of his ontology, reasoning that
since the Supreme Good and the Supreme Being are identical, every being is good
and every good a being. Two further conclusions follow. First, evil is a
privation of being, the absence of good in something that properly ought to
have it e.g., blindness in normally sighted animals, injustice in humans or
angels. Second, since all genuine powers are given to enable a being to fulfill
its natural telos and so to be the best being it can, all genuine
metaphysically basic powers are optimific and essentially aim at goods, so that
evils are merely incidental side effects of their operation, involving some
lack of coordination among powers or between their exercise and the surrounding
context. Thus, divine omnipotence does not, properly speaking, include
corruptibility, passibility, or the ability to lie, because the latter are
defects and/or powers in other things whose exercise obstructs the flourishing
of the corruptible, passible, or potential liar. Anselm’s distinctive action
theory begins teleologically with the observation that humans and angels were
made for a happy immortality enjoying God, and to that end were given the
powers of reason to make accurate value assessments and will to love
accordingly. Anselm regards freedom and imputability of choice as essential and
permanent features of all rational beings. But freedom cannot be defined as a
power for opposites the power to sin and the power not to sin, both because
neither God nor the good angels have any power to sin, and because sin is an
evil at which no metaphysically basic power can aim. Rather, freedom is the
power to preserve justice for its own sake. Choices and actions are imputable
to an agent only if they are spontaneous, from the agent itself. Creatures
cannot act spontaneously by the necessity of their natures, because they do not
have their natures from themselves but receive them from God. To give them the
opportunity to become just of themselves, God furnishes them with two
motivaAnselm Anselm 31 31 tional drives
toward the good: an affection for the advantageous affectio commodi or a
tendency to will things for the sake of their benefit to the agent itself; and
an affection for justice affectio justitiae or a tendency to will things
because of their own intrinsic value. Creatures are able to align these drives
by letting the latter temper the former or not. The good angels, who preserved
justice by not willing some advantage possible for them but forbidden by God
for that time, can no longer will more advantage than God wills for them,
because he wills their maximum as a reward. By contrast, creatures, who sin by
refusing to delay gratification in accordance with God’s will, lose both
uprightness of will and their affection for justice, and hence the ability to
temper their pursuit of advantage or to will the best goods. Justice will never
be restored to angels who desert it. But if animality makes human nature
weaker, it also opens the possibility of redemption. Anselm’s argument for the
necessity of the Incarnation plays out the dialectic of justice and mercy so
characteristic of his prayers. He begins with the demands of justice: humans
owe it to God to make all of their choices and actions conform to his will;
failure to render what was owed insults God’s honor and makes the offender
liable to make satisfaction; because it is worse to dishonor God than for
countless worlds to be destroyed, the satisfaction owed for any small sin is
incommensurate with any created good; it would be maximally indecent for God to
overlook such a great offense. Such calculations threaten certain ruin for the
sinner, because God alone can do/be immeasurably deserving, and depriving the
creature of its honor through the eternal frustration of its telos seems the
only way to balance the scales. Yet, justice also forbids that God’s purposes
be thwarted through created resistance, and it was divine mercy that made
humans for a beatific immortality with him. Likewise, humans come in families
by virtue of their biological nature which angels do not share, and justice
allows an offense by one family member to be compensated by another. Assuming
that all actual humans are descended from common first parents, Anselm claims
that the human race can make satisfaction for sin, if God becomes human and
renders to God what Adam’s family owes. When Anselm insists that humans were
made for beatific intimacy with God and therefore are obliged to strive into
God with all of their powers, he emphatically includes reason or intellect
along with emotion and will. God, the controlling subject matter, is in part
permanently inaccessible to us because of the ontological incommensuration
between God and creatures and our progress is further hampered by the consequences
of sin. Our powers will function best, and hence we have a duty to follow right
order in their use: by submitting first to the holistic discipline of faith,
which will focus our souls and point us in the right direction. Yet it is also
a duty not to remain passive in our appreciation of authority, but rather for
faith to seek to understand what it has believed. Anselm’s works display a
dialectical structure, full of questions, objections, and contrasting opinions,
designed to stir up the mind. His quartet of teaching dialogues De grammatico, De veritate, De libertate
arbitrii, and De casu diaboli as well as his last philosophical treatise, De
concordia, anticipate the genre of the Scholastic question quaestio so dominant
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. His discussions are likewise
remarkable for their attention to modalities and proper-versus-improper
linguistic usage. Refs.: Grice,
“Anselmo’s “De grammatico” and paronymy.” Speranza, “Grice and Anselm on
paronymy: a ‘quaestio subtilissima.’”
ANTI-LOGISMVS -- antilogismus: A compound.
“Although pro-logismus sounds otiose.” Grice: “Not to be confused with the mere
implicatural ‘para-logism.’ -- an inconsistent triad of propositions, two of
which are the premises of a valid categorical syllogism and the third of which
is the contradictory of the conclusion of this valid categorical syllogism. An
antilogism is a special form of antilogy or self-contradiction.
ANTI-NOMINANISM -- antinomianism: “A compound,
although pro-nomy sounds otiose.” Grice. as a Kantian, Grice overused the idea
of a nomos or law, and then there’s antinominaism, the view that one is not
bound by moral law; specifically, the view that Christians are by grace set
free from the need to observe moral laws. During the Reformation, antinomianism
was believed by some but not Martin Luther to follow from the Lutheran doctrine
of justification by faith alone.
antiochus: Grecian
philosopher and the last prominent member of the New Academy. He played the
major role in ending its two centuries of Skepticism and helped revive interest
in doctrines from the Old Academy, as he called Plato, Aristotle, and their
associates. The impulse for this decisive shift came in epistemology, where the
Skeptical Academy had long agreed with Stoicism that knowledge requires an
infallible “criterion of truth” but disputed the Stoic claim to find this
criterion in “cognitive perception.” Antiochus’s teacher, Philo of Larissa,
broke with this tradition and proposed that perception need not be cognitive to
qualify as knowledge. Rejecting this concession, Antiochus offered new
arguments for the Stoic claim that some perception is cognitive, and hence
knowledge. He also proposed a similar accommodation in ethics, where he agreed
with the Stoics that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness but insisted with
Aristotle that virtue is not the only good. These and similar attempts to
mediate fundamental disputes have led some to label Antiochus an eclectic or
syncretist; but some of his proposals, especially his appeal to the Old
Academy, set the stage for Middle Platonism, which also sought to reconcile
Plato and Aristotle. No works by Antiochus survive, but his students included
many eminent Romans, most notably Cicero, who summarizes Antiochus’s epistemology
in the Academica, his critique of Stoic ethics in De finibus IV, and his
purportedly Aristotelian ethics in De finibus V.
anti-realism: Grice: “Sometimes
I use contra-, sometimes I use anti-.” If Grice was a realist, he hated
anti-realism, the rejection, in one or another form or area of inquiry, of
realism, the view that there are knowable mind-independent facts, objects, or
properties. Metaphysical realists make the general claim that there is a world
of mind-independent objects. Realists in particular areas make more specific or
limited claims. Thus moral realists hold that there are mind-independent moral
properties, mathematical realists that there are mind-independent mathematical
facts, scientific realists that scientific inquiry reveals the existence of
previously unknown and unobservable mind-independent entities and properties.
Antirealists deny either that facts of the relevant sort are mind-independent
or that knowledge of such facts is possible. Berkeley’s subjective idealism,
which claims that the world consists only of minds and their contents, is a
metaphysical anti-realism. Constructivist anti-realists, on the other hand,
deny that the world consists only of mental phenomena, but claim that it is
constituted by, or constructed from, our evidence or beliefs. Many philosophers
find constructivism implausible or even incoherent as a metaphysical doctrine,
but much more plausible when restricted to a particular domain, such as ethics
or mathematics. Debates between realists and anti-realists have been
particularly intense in philosophy of science. Scientific realism has been
rejected both by constructivists such as Kuhn, who hold that scientific facts
are constructed by the scientific community, and by empiricists who hold that
knowledge is limited to what can be observed. A sophisticated version of the
latter doctrine is Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, which allows
scientists free rein in constructing scientific models, but claims that
evidence for such models confirms only their observable implications.
A-PAGOGE
– vs. E-PAGOGE, and DIA-GOGE. apagoge: distinguished by
Grice from both ‘epagoge,’ and his favoured ‘diagoge.’ A shifting of the
basis of argument: hence of argument based on a probable or agreed assumption,
Arist.APr.69a20, cf. Anon.in SE65.35; reduction, “ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀ.”
reductio per impossibile, APr. 29b6; “ἡ ἀ. μετάβασίς ἐστιν ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου
προβλήματος ἢ θεωρήματος ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο, οὗ γνωσθέντος ἢ πορισθέντος καὶ τὸ
προκείμενον ἔσται καταφανές” Procl. in Euc.p.212F.; τῶν ἀπορουμένων
διαγραμμάτων τὴν ἀ. ποιήσασθαι ib. p.213F. b. reduction of a disputant (cf. ἀπάγω
v. 1c), “ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀ.” S.E.P.2.234.
APO-CATASTASIS -- apocatastasis: a branch of
Grice’s eschatology -- from Grecian, ‘reestablishment’, the restoration of all
souls, including Satan’s and his minions’, in the kingdom of God. God’s
goodness will triumph over evil, and through a process of spiritual education
souls will be brought to repentance and made fit for divine life. The theory
originates with Origen but was also held by Gregory of Nyssa. In modern times
F. D. Maurice 180572 and Karl Barth 6 8 held this position.
A-PORIA -- aporia: cf. aporetic, cognate
with porosity. No porosity, and you get an impasse. While aware of Baker’s and
Deutsch’s treatment of the ‘aporia’ in Aristotle’s account of ‘philos,’ Grice
explores ‘aporia’ in Plato in the Thrasymachus on ‘legal justice’ prior to
‘moral justice’ in Republic. in Dialectic, question for discussion, difficulty,
puzzle, “ἀπορίᾳ σχόμενος” Pl.Prt.321c; ἀ. ἣν ἀπορεῖς ib.324d; “ἡ ἀ. ἰσότης ἐναντίων
λογισμῶν” Arist. Top.145b1, al.; “ἔχει ἀπορίαν περί τινος” Id.Pol.1285b28; “αἱ
μὲν οὖν ἀ. τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν” Id.EN1146b6; “οὐδεμίαν ποιήσει ἀ.”
Id.Metaph.1085a27; ἀ. λύειν, διαλύειν, Id.MM 1201b1, Metaph.1062b31; “ἀπορίᾳ ἀπορίαν
λύειν” D.S.1.37.Discussion with the
Sophist Thrasymachus can
only lead to aporia.
And the more I trust you, the more I sink into an aporia of
sorts. —Aha! roared Thrasymachus to everyone's surprise. There it is!
Socratic aporia is
back! Charge! neither Socrates' company nor Socrates himself gives any
convincing answer. So, he says, finding himself in a real aporia, he
visits Thrasymachus as
well, and ... I argue that a combination of these means in form
that I call “provocative-aporetic” better accounts for the means that Plato
uses to exert a protreptic effect on readers. Aporia is a simultaneously
intellectual and affective experience, and the way that readers choose to
respond to aporia has a greater protreptic effect than either affective or
intellectual means alone. When Socrates says he can 'transfer' the use of
"just" to things related to the 'soul,' what kind of conversational
game is that? Grice took Socrates's manoeuvre very
seriously.Socrates relies on the tripartite theory of the soul. Plato, actually -- since Socrates is a drammatis persona! In "Philosophical Eschatology, Metaphysics, and Plato's
Republic," H. P. Grice's purpose is to carry out a provocative-aporetic
reading Book I Grice argues that it is a dispute between two ways of
understanding 'just' which causes the aporia when Socrates tries to analyse
'just.' Although Socrates will not argue for the complexity and
tripartition of the soul until Bk. IV, we can at least note the contrast with
Thrasymachus' “idealize user” theory.For Socrates, agents are complex, and
justice coordinates the parts of the agent.For Thrasymachus, agents are simple
“users,” and justice is a tool for use. (2 - 3) Justice makes its
possessor happy; the function (telos, metier) argument. To make the
argument that justice is an excellence (virtus, arete) of soul (psyche) that
makes its possessor happy, Socrates relies on a method for discovering the
function (ἔργον, ergon, 352e1, cf. telos, metier, causa finalis) of any object
whatsoever. Socrates begins by differentiating between an exclusive
functions and an optimal function, so that we may discover the functions in
different types of objects, i.e., natural and artificial objects. We can
say an object performs some function (ergon) if one of the following conditions
holds.If the object is the only one that can do the work in
question, or If it is the object that does that work best.Socrates
then provides examples from different part-whole complexes to make his
point. The eye's exclusive function is to see, because no other organ is
specialized so as to perform just that function. A horse's work is to
carry riders into battle. Even though this might not be a horse's
EXCLUSIVE function, it may be its “optimal” function in that the horse is best
suited or designed by God to the task. Finally, the pruning knife is best
for tending to vines, not because it cannot cut anything else, but because it
is optimally suited for that task. Socrates' use of the pruning knife of
as an example of a thing's function resembles a return to the technē model,
since a craftsman must make the knife for a gardener to Socrates asks,
“Would you define this as the function of a horse and of anything else, as that
which someone does either through that thing alone, or best?” (...τοῦτο ἄν
θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὅ ἄν ἤ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἤ ἄριστα;
352e1-2) Thrasymachus agrees to this definition of function. 91 use.But his use
of the eye — a bodily organ — should dissuade us from this view. One may
use these examples to argue that Socrates is in fact offering a new method to
investigate the nature of justice: 1) Find out what the functions of such
objects are2) determine (by observation, experiment, or even thought
experiment) cases where objects of such a kind perform their functions well and
cases where they perform them poorly; and 3) finally find out the
qualities that enable them to perform such functions well (and in the absence
of which they perform poorly), and these are their virtues.A crucial difference
between this method and technē model of justice lies in the interpretation that
each assigns to the realm of human artifacts. Polemarchus and Thrasymachus
both assume that the technē is unique as a form of knowledge for the power and
control that it offers users. In Polemarchus' case, the technē of justice,
“helping friends and harming enemies,” may be interpreted as a description of a
method for gaining political power within a traditional framework of communal
life, which assumes the oikos as the basic unit of power. Those families
that help their friends and harm their enemies thrive. Thrasymachus, on
the other hand, emphasizes the ways that technai grant users the power to
exploit nature to further their own, distinctively individual ends. Thus,
the shepherd exploits the sheep to make a livelihood for himself. Socrates'
approach differs from these by re-casting “mastery” over nature as submission
to norms that structure the natural world. For example, many factors contribute
to making This points to a distinction Socrates draws in Book X between
producers and users of artifacts. He uses the example of the blacksmith
who makes a bridle and the horseman who uses the bridle to argue that
production and use correspond to two gradations of knowledge (601c). The ultimate
purpose of the example is to provide a metaphor — using the craft analogy — for
identifying gradations of knowledge on a copy-original paradigm of the
form-participant relation. the pruning knife the optimal tool for cutting
vines: the shape of the human hand, the thickness and shape of the vines, and
the metal of the blade. Likewise, in order for horses to optimally perform
their “work,” they must be "healthy" and strong. The conditions
that bring about their "health" and strength are not up to us,
however."Control” only comes about through the recognition of natural
norms. Thus technē is a type of knowledge that coordinates structures in
nature.It is not an unlimited source of power. Socrates' inclusion of the
human soul (psyche) among those things that have a function is the more
controversial aspect of function argument.Socrates says that the functions
(erga) of the soul (psyche) are “to engage in care-taking, ruling, and
deliberation” and, later, simply that the ergon (or function) of the
soul (or psyche) is “to live” (τὸ ζῆν, "to zen," 353d6). But the
difficulty seems to be this: the functions of pruning knives, horses, and
bodily organs are determined with respect to a limited and fairly unambiguous
context that is already defined for them. But what is this context with
respect to the soul (psyche) of a human individual? One answer might be
that the social world — politics — provides the context that defines the soul's
function, just as the needs of the human organism define the context in which
the eye can perform a function. But here a challenger might reply that in
aristocracies, oligarchies, and democracies, “care-taking, ruling, and
deliberation” are utilized for different ends.In these contexts, individual
souls might have different functions, according to the “needs” that these
different regimes have. Alternatively, one might deny altogether that the
human soul has a function: the distinctive feature of human beings might be
their position “outside” of nature. Thus, even if Socrates' description of
the soul's function is accurate, it is too general to be really
informative.Socrates must offer more details for the function argument to be
convincing. Nonetheless, the idea that justice is a condition that lets
the soul perform its functions is a significant departure from the technē
model of justice, and one that will remain throughout the argument of the
Republic. […] τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι (353d3). As
far as Bk. I is concerned, “justice” functions as a place-holder for that
condition of the soul which permits the soul to perform its functions
well. What that condition is, however, remains unknown.For this reason,
Plato has Socrates concludes Bk. I by likening himself to a “glutton” (ὥσπερ οἱ
λίχνοι, 354b1), who takes another dish before “moderately enjoying the
previous” serving (πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαύσαι, 354b2-3). For
Socrates wants to know what effects the optimal condition of soul brings about
before knowing what the condition itself is. Thus Bk. I concludes in "aporia,"
but not in a way that betrays the dialogue's lack of unity.The “separatist”
thesis concerning Bk. I goes back to Hermann in "Geschichte und System der
Platonischen Philosophie." One can argue on behalf of the “separatist”
view as well. One can argue against the separatist thesis, even granting
some evidence in favour of the separatist thesis. To the contrary, the
"aporia" clearly foreshadows the argument that Socrates makes about
the soul in Bk. IV, viz. that the soul (psyche) is a complex whole of parts --
an implicaturum in the “justice is stronger” argument -- and that 'just' is the
condition that allows this complex whole be integrated to an optimal
degree. Thus, Bk. I does not conclude negatively, but rather provides the
resources for going beyond the "technē" model of justice, which is
the primary cause of Polemarchus's and Thrasymachus's encounter with
"aporia" in Bk. I. Throughout conversation of "The
Republic," Socrates does not really alter the argument he gives for
justice in Bk. I, but rather states the same argument in a different
way. My gratitude to P. N. Moore. Refs: Wise guys and smart
alecks in Republic 1 and 2; Proleptic composition in the Republic, or why Bk. 1
was never a separate dialogue, The Classical Quarterly; "Socrates: ironist
and moral philosopher." Strictly an ‘aporia’ in Griceian, is a ‘puzzle’, ‘question
for discussion’, ‘state of perplexity’. The aporetic method the raising of puzzles without offering
solutions is typical of the elenchus in
the early Socratic dialogues of Plato. These consist in the testing of
definitions and often end with an aporia, e.g., that piety is both what is and
what is not loved by the gods. Compare the paradoxes of Zeno, e.g., that motion
is both possible and impossible. In Aristotle’s dialectic, the resolution of
aporiai discovered in the views on a subject is an important source of
philosophical understanding. The beliefs that one should love oneself most of
all and that self-love is shameful, e.g., can be resolved with the right understanding
of ‘self’. The possibility of argument for two inconsistent positions was an
important factor in the development of Skepticism. In modern philosophy, the
antinomies that Kant claimed reason would arrive at in attempting to prove the
existence of objects corresponding to transcendental ideas may be seen as
aporiai.
AD-PLICATVM -- applicatum.
Grice: “Etymologically, ad-plicatum. So we have im-plicatum, ex-plicatum,
dis-im-plicatum, and ad-plicatum. While we have implicatum and implicitum, we
also have adplicatum and adplicitum. While Bennett uses the rather ‘abusive’
“nominalist” to refer to Grice, Grice isn’t. It’s all about the ‘applied.’
Grice thinks a rational creature – not a parrot, but a rational intelligent
pirot – can have an abstract idea. So there is this “Communication Device,”
with capital C and capital D. The emissor APPLIES it to a given occasion. Cf.
complete and incomplete. What’s the antonym of applied? Plato’s idea! applied – grice
used ‘applied’ for ‘meaning’ – but ‘applied’ can be used in other contxts too.
In ethics, the domain of ethics that includes professional ethics, such as
business ethics, engineering ethics, and medical ethics, as well as practical
ethics such as environmental ethics, which is applied, and thus practical as
opposed to theoretical, but not focused on any one discipline. One of the major
disputes among those who work in applied ethics is whether or not there is a
general and universal account of morality applicable both to the ethical issues
in the professions and to various practical problems. Some philosophers believe
that each of the professions or each field of activity develops an ethical code
for itself and that there need be no apellatio applied ethics 34 34 close relationship between e.g. business
ethics, medical ethics, and environmental ethics. Others hold that the same
moral system applies to all professions and fields. They claim that the
appearance of different moral systems is simply due to certain problems being
more salient for some professions and fields than for others. The former
position accepts the consequence that the ethical codes of different
professions might conflict with one another, so that a physician in business
might find that business ethics would require one action but medical ethics
another. Engineers who have been promoted to management positions sometimes
express concern over the tension between what they perceive to be their
responsibility as engineers and their responsibility as managers in a business.
Many lawyers seem to hold that there is similar tension between what common
morality requires and what they must do as lawyers. Those who accept a
universal morality hold that these tensions are all resolvable because there is
only one common morality. Underlying both positions is the pervasive but false
view of common morality as providing a unique right answer to every moral
problem. Those who hold that each profession or field has its own moral code do
not realize that common morality allows for conflicts of duties. Most of those
who put forward moral theories, e.g., utilitarians, Kantians, and
contractarians, attempt to generate a universal moral system that solves all
moral problems. This creates a situation that leads many in applied ethics to
dismiss theoretical ethics as irrelevant to their concerns. An alternative view
of a moral theory is to think of it on the model of a scientific theory,
primarily concerned to describe common morality rather than generate a new
improved version. On this model, it is clear that although morality rules out
many alternatives as unacceptable, it does not provide unique right answers to
every controversial moral question. On this model, different fields and
different professions may interpret the common moral system in somewhat
different ways. For example, although deception is always immoral if not
justified, what counts as deception is not the same in all professions. Not
informing a patient of an alternative treatment counts as deceptive for a
physician, but not telling a customer of an alternative to what she is about to
buy does not count as deceptive for a salesperson. The professions also have
considerable input into what special duties are incurred by becoming a member
of their profession. Applied ethics is thus not the mechanical application of a
common morality to a particular profession or field, but an independent
discipline that clarifies and analyzes the practices in a field or profession
so that common morality can be applied.
a priori: Obviously
contrasted to ‘a posteriori,’ but not necessarily in termporal terms -- Grice
was fascinated by the apriori, both analytic but more so the synthetic. He
would question his children’s playmates with things like, “Can a sweater be
green and red all over? No striped allowed.” a priori, prior to or independent
of experience; contrasted with ‘a posteriori’ empirical. These two terms are
primarily used to mark a distinction between 1 two modes of epistemic
justification, together with derivative distinctions between 2 kinds of
propositions, 3 kinds of knowledge, and 4 kinds of argument. They are also used
to indicate a distinction between 5 two ways in which a concept or idea may be
acquired. 1 A belief or claim is said to be justified a priori if its epistemic
justification, the reason or warrant for thinking it to be true, does not
depend at all on sensory or introspective or other sorts of experience; whereas
if its justification does depend at least in part on such experience, it is
said to be justified a posteriori or empirically. This specific distinction has
to do only with the justification of the belief, and not at all with how the
constituent concepts are acquired; thus it is no objection to a claim of a
priori justificatory status for a particular belief that experience is required
for the acquisition of some of the constituent concepts. It is clear that the
relevant notion of experience includes sensory and introspective experience, as
well as such things as kinesthetic experience. Equally clearly, to construe
experience in the broadest possible sense of, roughly, a conscious undergoing
of any sort would be to destroy the point of the distinction, since even a
priori justification presumably involves some sort of conscious process of
awareness. The construal that is perhaps most faithful to the traditional usage
is that which construes experience as any sort of cognitive input that derives,
presumably causally, from features of the actual world that may not hold in
other possible worlds. Thus, e.g., such things as clairvoyance or telepathy, if
they were to exist, would count as forms of experience and any knowledge
resulting therefrom as a posteriori; but the intuitive apprehension of
properties or numbers or other sorts of abstract entities that are the same in
all possible worlds, would not. Understood in this way, the concept of a priori
justification is an essentially negative concept, specifying as it does what
the justification of the belief does not depend on, but saying nothing a priori
a priori 35 35 about what it does
depend on. Historically, the main positive conception was that offered by
proponents of rationalism such as Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz,
according to which a priori justification derives from the intuitive
apprehension of necessary facts pertaining to universals and other abstract
entities. Although Kant is often regarded as a rationalist, his restriction of
substantive a priori knowledge to the world of appearances represents a major
departure from the main rationalist tradition. In contrast, proponents of
traditional empiricism, if they do not repudiate the concept of a priori
justification altogether as does Quine, typically attempt to account for such
justification by appeal to linguistic or conceptual conventions. The most
standard formulation of this empiricist view a development of the view of Hume
that all a priori knowledge pertains to “relations of ideas” is the claim
typical of logical positivism that all a priori knowable claims or propositions
are analytic. A rationalist would claim in opposition that at least some a
priori claims or propositions are synthetic. 2 A proposition that is the
content of an a priori justified belief is often referred to as an a priori
proposition or an a priori truth. This usage is also often extended to include
any proposition that is capable of being the content of such a belief, whether
it actually has this status or not. 3 If, in addition to being justified a
priori or a posteriori, a belief is also true and satisfies whatever further
conditions may be required for it to constitute knowledge, that knowledge is
derivatively characterized as a priori or a posteriori empirical, respectively.
Though a priori justification is often regarded as by itself guaranteeing
truth, this should be regarded as a further substantive thesis, not as part of
the very concept of a priori justification. Examples of knowledge that have
been classically regarded as a priori in this sense are mathematical knowledge,
knowledge of logical truths, and knowledge of necessary entailments and exclusions
of commonsense concepts ‘Nothing can be red and green all over at the same
time’, ‘If A is later than B and B is later than C, then A is later than C’;
but many claims of metaphysics, ethics, and even theology have also been
claimed to have this status. 4 A deductively valid argument that also satisfies
the further condition that each of the premises or sometimes one or more
particularly central premises are justified a priori is referred to as an a
priori argument. This label is also sometimes applied to arguments that are
claimed to have this status, even if the correctness of this claim is in
question. 5 In addition to the uses just catalogued that derive from the
distinction between modes of justification, the terms ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’
are also employed to distinguish two ways in which a concept or idea might be
acquired by an individual person. An a posteriori or empirical concept or idea
is one that is derived from experience, via a process of abstraction or
ostensive definition. In contrast, an a priori concept or idea is one that is
not derived from experience in this way and thus presumably does not require
any particular experience to be realized though the explicit realization of
such a concept might still require experience as a “trigger”. The main
historical account of such concepts, again held mainly by rationalists,
construes them as innate, either implanted in the mind by God or, in the more
contemporary version of the claim held by Chomsky, Fodor, and others, resulting
from evolutionary development. Concepts typically regarded as having this sort
of status include the concepts of substance, causation, God, necessity,
infinity, and many others. Empiricists, in contrast, typically hold that all
concepts are derived from experience. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The synthetic a
priori.”
AQUINO -- aquino:
“Perhaps the Italian most studied at Oxford!” – Grice. Aquino and
intentionality – Clark – Armini -- aquino – keyword: “medieval pragmatics”!
-- thomism, the theology and philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The term is applied
broadly to various thinkers from different periods who were heavily influenced
by Aquinas’s thought in their own philosophizing and theologizing. Here three
different eras and three different groups of thinkers will be distinguished:
those who supported Aquinas’s thought in the fifty years or so following his
death in 1274; certain highly skilled interpreters and commentators who
flourished during the period of “Second Thomism” sixteenthseventeenth
centuries; and various late nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers who have
been deeply influenced in their own work by Aquinas. Thirteenth- and
fourteenth-century Thomism. Although Aquinas’s genius was recognized by many
during his own lifetime, a number of his views were immediately contested by
other Scholastic thinkers. Controversies ranged, e.g., over his defense of only
one substantial form in human beings; his claim that prime matter is purely
potential and cannot, therefore, be kept in existence without some substantial
form, even by divine power; his emphasis on the role of the human intellect in
the act of choice; his espousal of a real distinction betweeen the soul and its
powers; and his defense of some kind of objective or “real” rather than a
merely mind-dependent composition of essence and act of existing esse in
creatures. Some of Aquinas’s positions were included directly or indirectly in
the 219 propositions condemned by Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris in 1277, and
his defense of one single substantial form in man was condemned by Archbishop
Robert Kilwardby at Oxford in 1277, with renewed prohibitions by his successor
as archbishop of Canterbury, John Peckham, in 1284 and 1286. Only after
Aquinas’s canonization in 1323 were the Paris prohibitions revoked insofar as
they touched on his teaching in 1325. Even within his own Dominican order,
disagreement about some of his views developed within the first decades after
his death, notwithstanding the order’s highly sympathetic espousal of his
cause. Early English Dominican defenders of his general views included William
Hothum d.1298, Richard Knapwell d.c.1288, Robert Orford b. after 1250,
fl.129095, Thomas Sutton d. c.1315?, and William Macclesfield d.1303. Dominican Thomists included Bernard of Trilia
d.1292, Giles of Lessines in present-day Belgium d.c.1304?, John Quidort of
Paris d. 1306, Bernard of Auvergne d. after 1307, Hervé Nédélec d.1323, Armand
of Bellevue fl. 131634, and William Peter Godin d.1336. The secular master at
Paris, Peter of Auvergne d. 1304, while remaining very independent in his own
views, knew Aquinas’s thought well and completed some of his commentaries on
Aristotle. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Thomism. Sometimes known as the
period of Second Thomism, this revival gained impetus from the early
fifteenth-century writer John Capreolus 13801444 in his Defenses of Thomas’s
Theology Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae, a commentary on the Sentences. A
number of fifteenth-century Dominican and secular teachers in G. universities
also contributed: Kaspar Grunwald Freiburg; Cornelius Sneek and John Stoppe in
Rostock; Leonard of Brixental Vienna; Gerard of Heerenberg, Lambert of
Heerenberg, and John Versor all at Cologne; Gerhard of Elten; and in Belgium
Denis the Carthusian. Outstanding among various sixteenth-century commentators
on Thomas were Tommaso de Vio Cardinal Cajetan, Francis Sylvester of Ferrara,
Francisco de Vitoria Salamanca, and Francisco’s disciples Domingo de Soto and
Melchior Cano. Most important among early seventeenth-century Thomists was John
of St. Thomas, who lectured at Piacenza, Madrid, and Alcalá, and is best known
for his Cursus philosophicus and his Cursus theologicus. Theravada Buddhism
Thomism 916 916 The nineteenth- and
twentieth-century revival. By the early to mid-nineteenth century the study of
Aquinas had been largely abandoned outside Dominican circles, and in most Roman
Catholic s and seminaries a kind of Cartesian and Suarezian Scholasticism was
taught. Long before he became Pope Leo XIII, Joachim Pecci and his brother
Joseph had taken steps to introduce the teaching of Thomistic philosophy at the
diocesan seminary at Perugia in 1846. Earlier efforts in this direction had
been made by Vincenzo Buzzetti, by Buzzetti’s students Serafino and Domenico
Sordi, and by Taparelli d’Aglezio, who became director of the Collegio Romano
Gregorian in 1824. Leo’s encyclical
Aeterni Patris1879 marked an official effort on the part of the Roman Catholic
church to foster the study of the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas.
The intent was to draw upon Aquinas’s original writings in order to prepare
students of philosophy and theology to deal with problems raised by
contemporary thought. The Leonine Commission was established to publish a
critical edition of all of Aquinas’s writings; this effort continues today.
Important centers of Thomistic studies developed, such as the Higher Institute
of Philosophy at Louvain founded by Cardinal Mercier, the Dominican School of
Saulchoir in France, and the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in
Toronto. Different groups of Roman, Belgian, and Jesuits acknowledged a deep indebtedness to
Aquinas for their personal philosophical reflections. There was also a
concentration of effort in the United States at universities such as The Catholic of America, St. Louis , Notre Dame, Fordham,
Marquette, and Boston , to mention but a few, and by the Dominicans at River
Forest. A great weakness of many of the nineteenthand twentieth-century Latin
manuals produced during this effort was a lack of historical sensitivity and
expertise, which resulted in an unreal and highly abstract presentation of an
“Aristotelian-Thomistic” philosophy. This weakness was largely offset by the
development of solid historical research both in the thought of Aquinas and in
medieval philosophy and theology in general, championed by scholars such as H.
Denifle, M. De Wulf, M. Grabmann, P. Mandonnet, F. Van Steenberghen, E. Gilson
and many of his students at Toronto, and by a host of more recent and
contemporary scholars. Much of this historical work continues today both within
and without Catholic scholarly circles. At the same time, remarkable diversity
in interpreting Aquinas’s thought has emerged on the part of many
twentieth-century scholars. Witness, e.g., the heavy influence of Cajetan and
John of St. Thomas on the Thomism of Maritain; the much more historically
grounded approaches developed in quite different ways by Gilson and F. Van
Steenberghen; the emphasis on the metaphysics of participation in Aquinas in the
very different presentations by L. Geiger and C. Fabro; the emphasis on
existence esse promoted by Gilson and many others but resisted by still other
interpreters; the movement known as Transcendental Thomism, originally inspired
by P. Rousselot and by J. Marechal in dialogue with Kant; and the long
controversy about the appropriateness of describing Thomas’s philosophy and
that of other medievals as a Christian philosophy. An increasing number of
non-Catholic thinkers are currently directing considerable attention to
Aquinas, and the varying backgrounds they bring to his texts will undoubtedly
result in still other interesting interpretations and applications of his
thought to contemporary concerns. :
--a strange genitive for “Aquino,” the little village where the saint was born.
while Grice, being C. of E., would avoid Aquinas like the rats, he was aware of
Aquinas’s clever ‘intention-based semantics’ in his commentary of Aristotle’s
De Interpretatione. Saint Thomas 122574,
philosopher-theologian, the most influential thinker of the medieval
period. He produced a powerful philosophical synthesis that combined
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements within a Christian context in an original
and ingenious way. Life and works. Thomas was born at Aquino castle in
Roccasecca, Italy, and took early schooling at the Benedictine Abbey of Monte
Cassino. He then studied liberal arts and philosophy at the of Naples 123944 and joined the Dominican
order. While going to Paris for further studies as a Dominican, he was detained
by his family for about a year. Upon being released, he studied with the
Dominicans at Paris, perhaps privately, until 1248, when he journeyed to a
priori argument Aquinas, Saint Thomas 36
36 Cologne to work under Albertus Magnus. Thomas’s own report reportatio
of Albertus’s lectures on the Divine Names of Dionysius and his notes on
Albertus’s lectures on Aristotle’s Ethics date from this period. In 1252 Thomas
returned to Paris to lecture there as a bachelor in theology. His resulting
commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard dates from this period, as do two
philosophical treatises, On Being and Essence De ente et essentia and On the
Principles of Nature De principiis naturae. In 1256 he began lecturing as
master of theology at Paris. From this period 125659 date a series of
scriptural commentaries, the disputations On Truth De veritate, Quodlibetal
Questions VIIXI, and earlier parts of the Summa against the Gentiles Summa
contra gentiles; hereafter SCG. At different locations in Italy from 1259 to
1269, Thomas continued to write prodigiously, including, among other works, the
completion of the SCG; a commentary on the Divine Names; disputations On the
Power of God De potentia Dei and On Evil De malo; and Summa of Theology Summa
theologiae; hereafter ST, Part I. In January 1269, he resumed teaching in Paris
as regent master and wrote extensively until returning to Italy in 1272. From
this second Parisian regency date the disputations On the Soul De anima and On
Virtues De virtutibus; continuation of ST; Quodlibets IVI and XII; On the Unity
of the Intellect against the Averroists De unitate intellectus contra
Averroistas; most if not all of his commentaries on Aristotle; a commentary on
the Book of Causes Liber de causis; and On the Eternity of the World De
aeternitate mundi. In 1272 Thomas returned to Italy where he lectured on
theology at Naples and continued to write until December 6, 1273, when his
scholarly work ceased. He died three months later en route to the Second
Council of Lyons. Doctrine. Aquinas was both a philosopher and a theologian.
The greater part of his writings are theological, but there are many strictly
philosophical works within his corpus, such as On Being and Essence, On the
Principles of Nature, On the Eternity of the World, and the commentaries on
Aristotle and on the Book of Causes. Also important are large sections of
strictly philosophical writing incorporated into theological works such as the
SCG, ST, and various disputations. Aquinas clearly distinguishes between strictly
philosophical investigation and theological investigation. If philosophy is
based on the light of natural reason, theology sacra doctrina presupposes faith
in divine revelation. While the natural light of reason is insufficient to
discover things that can be made known to human beings only through revelation,
e.g., belief in the Trinity, Thomas holds that it is impossible for those
things revealed to us by God through faith to be opposed to those we can
discover by using human reason. For then one or the other would have to be
false; and since both come to us from God, God himself would be the author of
falsity, something Thomas rejects as abhorrent. Hence it is appropriate for the
theologian to use philosophical reasoning in theologizing. Aquinas also distinguishes
between the orders to be followed by the theologian and by the philosopher. In
theology one reasons from belief in God and his revelation to the implications
of this for created reality. In philosophy one begins with an investigation of
created reality insofar as this can be understood by human reason and then
seeks to arrive at some knowledge of divine reality viewed as the cause of
created reality and the end or goal of one’s philosophical inquiry SCG II, c.
4. This means that the order Aquinas follows in his theological Summae SCG and
ST is not the same as that which he prescribes for the philosopher cf.
Prooemium to Commentary on the Metaphysics. Also underlying much of Aquinas’s
thought is his acceptance of the difference between theoretical or speculative
philosophy including natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics and
practical philosophy. Being and analogy. For Aquinas the highest part of
philosophy is metaphysics, the science of being as being. The subject of this
science is not God, but being, viewed without restriction to any given kind of
being, or simply as being Prooemium to Commentary on Metaphysics; In de
trinitate, qu. 5, a. 4. The metaphysician does not enjoy a direct vision of God
in this life, but can reason to knowledge of him by moving from created effects
to awareness of him as their uncreated cause. God is therefore not the subject
of metaphysics, nor is he included in its subject. God can be studied by the
metaphysician only indirectly, as the cause of the finite beings that fall
under being as being, the subject of the science. In order to account for the
human intellect’s discovery of being as being, in contrast with being as mobile
studied by natural philosophy or being as quantified studied by mathematics, Thomas
appeals to a special kind of intellectual operation, a negative judgment,
technically named by him “separation.” Through this operation one discovers
that being, in order to be realized as such, need not be material and
changAquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas 37 37 ing. Only as a result of this judgment is
one justified in studying being as being. Following Aristotle and Averroes,
Thomas is convinced that the term ‘being’ is used in various ways and with
different meanings. Yet these different usages are not unrelated and do enjoy
an underlying unity sufficient for being as being to be the subject of a single
science. On the level of finite being Thomas adopts and adapts Aristotle’s
theory of unity by reference to a first order of being. For Thomas as for
Aristotle this unity is guaranteed by the primary referent in our predication
of being substance. Other things are
named being only because they are in some way ordered to and dependent on
substance, the primary instance of being. Hence being is analogous. Since
Thomas’s application of analogy to the divine names presupposes the existence
of God, we shall first examine his discussion of that issue. The existence of
God and the “five ways.” Thomas holds that unaided human reason, i.e., philosophical
reason, can demonstrate that God exists, that he is one, etc., by reasoning
from effect to cause De trinitate, qu. 2, a. 3; SCG I, c. 4. Best-known among
his many presentations of argumentation for God’s existence are the “five
ways.” Perhaps even more interesting for today’s student of his metaphysics is
a brief argument developed in one of his first writings, On Being and Essence
c.4. There he wishes to determine how essence is realized in what he terms
“separate substances,” i.e., the soul, intelligences angels of the Christian
tradition, and the first cause God. After criticizing the view that created
separate substances are composed of matter and form, Aquinas counters that they
are not entirely free from composition. They are composed of a form or essence
and an act of existing esse. He immediately develops a complex argument: 1 We
can think of an essence or quiddity without knowing whether or not it actually
exists. Therefore in such entities essence and act of existing differ unless 2
there is a thing whose quiddity and act of existing are identical. At best
there can be only one such being, he continues, by eliminating multiplication
of such an entity either through the addition of some difference or through the
reception of its form in different instances of matter. Hence, any such being
can only be separate and unreceived esse, whereas esse in all else is received
in something else, i.e., essence. 3 Since esse in all other entities is
therefore distinct from essence or quiddity, existence is communicated to such
beings by something else, i.e., they are caused. Since that which exists
through something else must be traced back to that which exists of itself,
there must be some thing that causes the existence of everything else and that
is identical with its act of existing. Otherwise one would regress to infinity
in caused causes of existence, which Thomas here dismisses as unacceptable. In
qu. 2, a. 1 of ST I Thomas rejects the claim that God’s existence is
self-evident to us in this life, and in a. 2 maintains that God’s existence can
be demonstrated by reasoning from knowledge of an existing effect to knowledge
of God as the cause required for that effect to exist. The first way or
argument art. 3 rests upon the fact that various things in our world of sense
experience are moved. But whatever is moved is moved by something else. To
justify this, Thomas reasons that to be moved is to be reduced from
potentiality to actuality, and that nothing can reduce itself from potency to
act; for it would then have to be in potency if it is to be moved and in act at
the same time and in the same respect. This does not mean that a mover must
formally possess the act it is to communicate to something else if it is to
move the latter; it must at least possess it virtually, i.e., have the power to
communicate it. Whatever is moved, therefore, must be moved by something else.
One cannot regress to infinity with moved movers, for then there would be no
first mover and, consequently, no other mover; for second movers do not move
unless they are moved by a first mover. One must, therefore, conclude to the
existence of a first mover which is moved by nothing else, and this “everyone
understands to be God.” The second way takes as its point of departure an
ordering of efficient causes as indicated to us by our investigation of
sensible things. By this Thomas means that we perceive in the world of sensible
things that certain efficient causes cannot exercise their causal activity
unless they are also caused by something else. But nothing can be the efficient
cause of itself, since it would then have to be prior to itself. One cannot
regress to infinity in ordered efficient causes. In ordered efficient causes,
the first is the cause of the intermediary, and the intermediary is the cause
of the last whether the intermediary is one or many. Hence if there were no
first efficient cause, there would be no intermediary and no last cause. Thomas
concludes from this that one must acknowledge the existence of a first
efficient cause, “which everyone names God.” The third way consists of two
major parts. Some Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas 38 38 textual variants have complicated the
proper interpretation of the first part. In brief, Aquinas appeals to the fact
that certain things are subject to generation and corruption to show that they
are “possible,” i.e., capable of existing and not existing. Not all things can
be of this kind revised text, for that which has the possibility of not
existing at some time does not exist. If, therefore, all things are capable of
not existing, at some time there was nothing whatsoever. If that were so, even
now there would be nothing, since what does not exist can only begin to exist
through something else that exists. Therefore not all beings are capable of
existing and not existing. There must be some necessary being. Since such a
necessary, i.e., incorruptible, being might still be caused by something else,
Thomas adds a second part to the argument. Every necessary being either depends
on something else for its necessity or it does not. One cannot regress to
infinity in necessary beings that depend on something else for their necessity.
Therefore there must be some being that is necessary of itself and that does
not depend on another cause for its necessity, i.e., God. The statement in the
first part to the effect that what has the possibility of not existing at some
point does not exist has been subject to considerable dispute among
commentators. Moreover, even if one grants this and supposes that every
individual being is a “possible” and therefore has not existed at some point in
the past, it does not easily follow from this that the totality of existing
things will also have been nonexistent at some point in the past. Given this,
some interpreters prefer to substitute for the third way the more satisfactory
versions found in SCG I ch. 15 and SCG II ch. 15. Thomas’s fourth way is based
on the varying degrees of perfection we discover among the beings we
experience. Some are more or less good, more or less true, more or less noble,
etc., than others. But the more and less are said of different things insofar
as they approach in varying degrees something that is such to a maximum degree.
Therefore there is something that is truest and best and noblest and hence that
is also being to the maximum degree. To support this Thomas comments that those
things that are true to the maximum degree also enjoy being to the maximum
degree; in other words he appeals to the convertibility between being and truth
of being. In the second part of this argument Thomas argues that what is
supremely such in a given genus is the cause of all other things in that genus.
Therefore there is something that is the cause of being, goodness, etc., for
all other beings, and this we call God. Much discussion has centered on
Thomas’s claim that the more and less are said of different things insofar as
they approach something that is such to the maximum degree. Some find this
insufficient to justify the conclusion that a maximum must exist, and would
here insert an appeal to efficient causality and his theory of participation.
If certan entities share or participate in such a perfection only to a limited
degree, they must receive that perfection from something else. While more satisfactory
from a philosophical perspective, such an insertion seems to change the
argument of the fourth way significantly. The fifth way is based on the way
things in the universe are governed. Thomas observes that certain things that
lack the ability to know, i.e., natural bodies, act for an end. This follows
from the fact that they always or at least usually act in the same way to
attain that which is best. For Thomas this indicates that they reach their ends
by “intention” and not merely from chance. And this in turn implies that they
are directed to their ends by some knowing and intelligent being. Hence some
intelligent being exists that orders natural things to their ends. This
argument rests on final causality and should not be confused with any based on
order and design. Aquinas’s frequently repeated denial that in this life we can
know what God is should here be recalled. If we can know that God exists and
what he is not, we cannot know what he is see, e.g., SCG I, c. 30. Even when we
apply the names of pure perfections to God, we first discover such perfections
in limited fashion in creatures. What the names of such perfections are
intended to signify may indeed be free from all imperfection, but every such
name carries with it some deficiency in the way in which it signifies. When a
name such as ‘goodness’, for instance, is signified abstractly e.g., ‘God is
goodness’, this abstract way of signifying suggests that goodness does not
subsist in itself. When such a name is signified concretely e.g., ‘God is
good’, this concrete way of signifying implies some kind of composition between
God and his goodness. Hence while such names are to be affirmed of God as
regards that which they signify, the way in which they signify is to be denied
of him. This final point sets the stage for Thomas to apply his theory of
analogy to the divine names. Names of pure perfections such as ‘good’, ‘true’,
‘being’, etc., cannot be applied to God with Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas,
Saint Thomas 39 39 exactly the same
meaning they have when affirmed of creatures univocally, nor with entirely
different meanings equivocally. Hence they are affirmed of God and of creatures
by an analogy based on the relationship that obtains between a creature viewed
as an effect and God its uncaused cause. Because some minimum degree of
similarity must obtain between any effect and its cause, Thomas is convinced
that in some way a caused perfection imitates and participates in God, its
uncaused and unparticipated source. Because no caused effect can ever be equal
to its uncreated cause, every perfection that we affirm of God is realized in
him in a way different from the way we discover it in creatures. This
dissimilarity is so great that we can never have quidditative knowledge of God
in this life know what God is. But the similarity is sufficient for us to
conclude that what we understand by a perfection such as goodness in creatures
is present in God in unrestricted fashion. Even though Thomas’s identification
of the kind of analogy to be used in predicating divine names underwent some
development, in mature works such as On the Power of God qu. 7, a. 7, SCG I
c.34, and ST I qu. 13, a. 5, he identifies this as the analogy of “one to
another,” rather than as the analogy of “many to one.” In none of these works
does he propose using the analogy of “proportionality” that he had previously
defended in On Truth qu. 2, a. 11. Theological virtues. While Aquinas is
convinced that human reason can arrive at knowledge that God exists and at
meaningful predication of the divine names, he does not think the majority of
human beings will actually succeed in such an effort SCG I, c. 4; ST IIIIae,
qu. 2, a. 4. Hence he concludes that it was fitting for God to reveal such
truths to mankind along with others that purely philosophical inquiry could
never discover even in principle. Acceptance of the truth of divine revelation
presupposes the gift of the theological virtue of faith in the believer. Faith
is an infused virtue by reason of which we accept on God’s authority what he
has revealed to us. To believe is an act of the intellect that assents to
divine truth as a result of a command on the part of the human will, a will
that itself is moved by God through grace ST II IIae, qu. 2, a. 9. For Thomas
the theological virtues, having God the ultimate end as their object, are prior
to all other virtues whether natural or infused. Because the ultimate end must
be present in the intellect before it is present to the will, and because the
ultimate end is present in the will by reason of hope and charity the other two
theological virtues, in this respect faith is prior to hope and charity. Hope
is the theological virtue through which we trust that with divine assistance we
will attain the infinite good eternal
enjoyment of God ST IIIIae, qu. 17, aa. 12. In the order of generation, hope is
prior to charity; but in the order of perfection charity is prior both to hope
and faith. While neither faith nor hope will remain in those who reach the
eternal vision of God in the life to come, charity will endure in the blessed.
It is a virtue or habitual form that is infused into the soul by God and that
inclines us to love him for his own sake. If charity is more excellent than
faith or hope ST II IIae, qu. 23, a. 6, through charity the acts of all other
virtues are ordered to God, their ultimate end qu. 23, a. 8. Refs.: Grice, “Intentionality in Aquino,”
Speranza, “Grice and Aquino on the taxonomy of intentions.”
ars: as in ars liberalis, the seven liberal arts –
philosophy is NOT one of them, but the trivium and quadrivium are – So, while
logic or dialectica or witcraft is an art, or technique, philosophy is free
from those constraints. The philosopher is insulted if considered a
craftman! techne Grecian, ‘art’, ‘craft’, a human skill
based on general principles and capable of being taught. In this sense, a
manual craft such as carpentry is a techne, but so are sciences such as
medicine and arithmetic. According to Plato Gorgias 501a, a genuine techne
understands its subject matter and can give a rational account of its activity.
Aristotle Metaphysics I.1 distinguishes technefrom experience on the grounds
that techne involves knowledge of universals and causes, and can be taught.
Sometimes ‘techne’ is restricted to the productive as opposed to theoretical
and practical arts, as at Nicomachean Ethics VI.4. Techne and its products are
often contrasted with physis, nature Physics II.1.
arbitrium: Grice: “One
problem Lewis has with his analysis of ‘arbitrariness’ is that neither he nor I
know what it means – and neither did Plautus.” from
ad "to" (see ad-) + baetere "to come, go," a word of
unknown etymology. Grice: “However, Lewis and Short are helpful. They say
‘beto’ is kindred with ‘vado’ and ‘baino,’ and means ‘go.’ bēto (baeto ; in
Plaut. bīto ), ĕre, v. n. kindr. with vado and βαίνω, I.to go (with its
derivatives, abito, adbito, ebito, interbito, perbito, praeterbito, rebito,
bitienses, only ante-class.): in pugnam baetite, Pac. ap. Non. p. 77, 21 (Trag.
Rel. v. 255 Rib.): “si ire conor, prohibet betere,” id. ib.; “Varr. ib.: ad
aliquem,” Plaut. Curc. 1, 2, 52: “ad portum ne bitas,” id. Merc. 2, 3, 127.
cfr. choose. arminius, Jacobus 15601609, Dutch theologian who, as a Dutch
Reformed pastor and later professor at the
of Leiden, challenged Calvinist orthodoxy on predestination and free
will. After his death, followers codified Arminius’s views in a document
asserting that God’s grace is necessary for salvation, but not irresistible:
the divine decree depends on human free choice. This became the basis for
Arminianism, which was condemned by the Dutch ReAristotle, commentaries on
Arminius, Jacobus 51 51 formed synod
but vigorously debated for centuries among Protestant theologians of different
denominations. The term ‘Arminian’ is still occasionally applied to theologians
who defend a free human response to divine grace against predestinationism. Grice:
“We should place due relevance to ‘arbitrium’ because it’s out way to
‘freedom/’.”
arcesilas: Or as Strawson
would prefer, arcelisaus -- Grecian, pre-Griceian, sceptic philosopher, founder
of the Middle Academy. Influenced by Socratic elenchus, he claimed that, unlike
Socrates, he was not even certain that he was certain of nothing. He shows the
influence of Pyrrho in attacking the Stoic doctrine that the subjective
certainty of the wise is the criterion of truth. At the theoretical level he
advocated epoche, suspension of rational judgment; at the practical, he argued
that eulogon, probability, can justify action
an early version of coherentism. His ethical views were not extreme; he
held, e.g., that one should attend to one’s own life rather than external
objects. Though he wrote nothing except verse, he led the Academy into two hundred
years of Skepticism.
archytas: Grecian, pre-Griceian,
Pythagorean philosopher from Tarentum in southern Italy. He was elected general
seven times and sent a ship to rescue Plato from Dionysius II of Syracuse in
361. He is famous for solutions to specific mathematical problems, such as the
doubling of the cube, but little is known about his general philosophical
principles. His proof that the numbers in a superparticular ratio have no mean
proportional has relevance to music theory, as does his work with the
arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic means. He gave mathematical accounts of the
diatonic, enharmonic, and chromatic scales and developed a theory of acoustics.
Fragments 1 and 2 and perhaps 3 are authentic, but most material preserved in
his name is spurious.
aretaic: sometimes
used by Grice for ‘virtuosum’. arete, ancient Grecian term meaning ‘virtue’ or
‘excellence’. In philosophical contexts, the term was used mainly of virtues of
human character; in broader contexts, arete was applicable to many different
sorts of excellence. The cardinal virtues in the classical period were courage,
wisdom, temperance sophrosune, piety, and justice. Sophists such as Protagoras
claimed to teach such virtues, and Socrates challenged their credentials for
doing so. Several early Platonic dialogues show Socrates asking after
definitions of virtues, and Socrates investigates arete in other dialogues as
well. Conventional views allowed that a person can have one virtue such as
courage but lack another such as wisdom, but Plato’s Protagoras shows Socrates
defending his thesis of the unity of arete, which implies that a person who has
one arete has them all. Platonic accounts of the cardinal virtues with the
exception of piety are given in Book IV of the Republic. Substantial parts of
the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle are given over to discussions of arete,
which he divides into virtues of character and virtues of intellect. This
discussion is the ancestor of most modern theories of virtue ethics.
argumentum:
Grice; “We should start with an etymology.” “To argue means, arguably, to make
clear, which clarifies things.” arguere "make clear, make known,
prove, declare, demonstrate," from PIE *argu-yo-, suffixed form of root
*arg- "to shine; white." The transmission to French might be via
arguere in a Medieval Latin sense of "to argue," or from Latin
argutare "to prattle, prate," frequentative of arguere. De Vaan
says arguere is probably "a denominative verb 'to make bright, enlighten'
to an adj. *argu- 'bright' as continued in argutus and outside Italic." He
cites a closely similar formation in Hittite arkuuae- "to make a
plea." Dodgson: “I thought I saw an
argument.” cited
by Grice in “Aspects of reason.” Grice was Strawson’s tutor for the Logic
Paper, and he had to go with him over the ‘boring theory of the syllogism –
Barbara, Celarent, and the reset of them!” -- syllogism, in Aristotle’s words,
“a discourse in which, a certain thing being stated, something other than what
is stated follows of necessity from being so” Prior Analytics, 24b 18. Three
types of syllogism were usually distinguished: categorical, hypothetical, and
disjunctive. Each will be treated in that order. The categorical syllogism.
This is an argument consisting of three categorical propositions, two serving
as premises and one serving as conclusion. E.g., ‘Some students are happy; all students are high school graduates;
therefore, some high school graduates are happy’. If a syllogism is valid, the
premises must be so related to the conclusion that it is impossible for both
premises to be true and the conclusion false. There are four types of
categorical propositions: universal affirmative or A-propositions ‘All S are P’, or ‘SaP’; universal negative
or E-propositions ‘No S are P’, or
‘SeP’; particular affirmative or I-propositions
‘Some S are P’, or ‘SiP’; and particular negative or O-propositions:
‘Some S are not P’, or ‘SoP’. The mediate basic components of categorical
syllogism are terms serving as subjects or predicates in the premises and the
conclusion. There must be three and only three terms in any categorical
syllogism, the major term, the minor term, and the middle term. Violation of
this basic rule of structure is called the fallacy of four terms quaternio
terminorum; e.g., ‘Whatever is right is useful; only one of my hands is right;
therefore only one of my hands is useful’. Here ‘right’ does not have the same
meaning in its two occurrences; we therefore have more than three terms and
hence no genuine categorical syllogism. The syllogistic terms are identifiable
and definable with reference to the position they have in a given syllogism.
The predicate of the conclusion is the major term; the subject of the
conclusion is the minor term; the term that appears once in each premise but
not in the conclusion is the middle term. As it is used in various types of
categorical propositions, a term is either distributed stands for each and
every member of its extension or undistributed. There is a simple rule
regarding the distribution: universal propositions SaP and SeP distribute their
subject terms; negative propositions SeP and SoP distribute their predicate
terms. No terms are distributed in an I-proposition. Various sets of rules
governing validity of categorical syllogisms have been offered. The following
is a “traditional” set from the popular Port-Royal Logic 1662. R1: The middle
term must be distributed at least once. Violation: ‘All cats are animals; some
animals do not eat liver; therefore some cats do not eat liver’. The middle
term ‘animals’ is not distributed either in the first or minor premise, being
the predicate of an affirmative proposition, nor in the second or major
premise, being the subject of a particular proposition; hence, the fallacy of
undistributed middle. R2: A term cannot be distributed in the conclusion if it
is undistributed in the premises. Violation: ‘All dogs are carnivorous; no
flowers are dogs; therefore, no flowers are carnivorous’. Here the major,
‘carnivorous’, is distributed in the conclusion, being the predicate of a
negative proposition, but not in the premise, serving there as predicate of an
affirmative proposition; hence, the fallacy of illicit major term. Another
violation of R2: ‘All students are happy individuals; no criminals are
students; therefore, no happy individuals are criminals’. Here the minor, ‘happy
individuals’, is distributed in the conclusion, but not distributed in the
minor premise; hence the fallacy of illicit minor term. R3: No conclusion may
be drawn from two negative premises. Violation: ‘No dogs are cats; some dogs do
not like liver; therefore, some cats do not like liver’. Here R1 is satisfied,
since the middle term ‘dogs’ is distributed in the minor premise; R2 is
satisfied, since both the minor term ‘cats’ as well as the major term ‘things
that like liver’ are distributed in the premises and thus no violation of
distribution of terms occurs. It is only by virtue of R3 that we can proclaim
this syllogism to be invalid. R4: A negative conclusion cannot be drawn where
both premises are affirmative. Violation: ‘All educated people take good care
of their children; all syllogism syllogism 894
894 who take good care of their children are poor; therefore, some poor
people are not educated’. Here, it is only by virtue of the rule of quality,
R4, that we can proclaim this syllogism invalid. R5: The conclusion must follow
the weaker premise; i.e., if one of the premises is negative, the conclusion
must be negative, and if one of them is particular, the conclusion must be
particular. R6: From two particular premises nothing follows. Let us offer an
indirect proof for this rule. If both particular premises are affirmative, no
term is distributed and therefore the fallacy of undistributed middle is
inevitable. To avoid it, we have to make one of the premises negative, which
will result in a distributed predicate as middle term. But by R5, the
conclusion must then be negative; thus, the major term will be distributed in
the conclusion. To avoid violating R2, we must distribute that term in the
major premise. It could not be in the position of subject term, since only
universal propositions distribute their subject term and, by hypothesis, both
premises are particular. But we could not use the same negative premise used to
distribute the middle term; we must make the other particular premise negative.
But then we violate R3. Thus, any attempt to make a syllogism with two
particular premises valid will violate one or more basic rules of syllogism.
This set of rules assumes that A- and Epropositions have existential import and
hence that an I- or an O-proposition may legitimately be drawn from a set of
exclusively universal premises. Categorical syllogisms are classified according
to figure and mood. The figure of a categorical syllogism refers to the schema
determined by the possible position of the middle term in relation to the major
and minor terms. In “modern logic,” four syllogistic figures are recognized.
Using ‘M’ for middle term, ‘P’ for major term, and ‘S’ for minor term, they can
be depicted as follows: Aristotle recognized only three syllogistic figures. He
seems to have taken into account just the two premises and the extension of the
three terms occurring in them, and then asked what conclusion, if any, can be
derived from those premises. It turns out, then, that his procedure leaves room
for three figures only: one in which the M term is the subject of one and
predicate of the other premise; another in which the M term is predicated in
both premises; and a third one in which the M term is the subject in both
premises. Medievals followed him, although all considered the so-called
inverted first i.e., moods of the first figure with their conclusion converted
either simply or per accidens to be legitimate also. Some medievals e.g.,
Albalag and most moderns since Leibniz recognize a fourth figure as a distinct
figure, considering syllogistic terms on the basis not of their extension but
of their position in the conclusion, the S term of the conclusion being defined
as the minor term and the P term being defined as the major term. The mood of a
categorical syllogism refers to the configuration of types of categorical
propositions determined on the basis of the quality and quantity of the
propositions serving as premises and conclusion of any given syllogism; e.g.,
‘No animals are plants; all cats are animals; therefore no cats are plants’,
‘MeP, SaM /, SeP’, is a syllogism in the mood EAE in the first figure. ‘All
metals conduct electricity; no stones conduct electricity; therefore no stones
are metals’, ‘PaM, SeM /, SeP’, is the mood AEE in the second figure. In the
four syllogistic figures there are 256 possible moods, but only 24 are valid
only 19 in modern logic, on the ground of a non-existential treatment of A- and
E-propositions. As a mnemonic device and to facilitate reference, names have
been assigned to the valid moods, with each vowel representing the type of
categorical proposition. William Sherwood and Peter of Spain offered the famous
list designed to help students to remember which moods in any given figure are
valid and how the “inevident” moods in the second and third figures are
provable by reduction to those in the first figure: barbara, celarent, darii,
ferio direct Fig. 1; baralipton, celantes, dabitis, fapesmo, frisesomorum
indirect Fig. 1; cesare, camestres, festino, baroco Fig. 2; darapti, felapton,
disamis, datisi, bocardo, ferison Fig. 3. The hypothetical syllogism. The pure
hypothetical syllogism is an argument in which both the premises and the
conclusion are hypothetical, i.e. conditional, propositions; e.g., ‘If the sun
is shining, it is warm; if it is warm, the plants will grow; therefore if the
sun is shining, the plants will grow’. Symbolically, this argument form can be
represented by ‘A P B, B P C /, A P C’. It was not recognized as such by
Aristotle, but Aristotle’s pupil Theophrastus foreshadowed it, even syllogism
syllogism 895 895 though it is not
clear from his example of it ‘If man is,
animal is; if animal is, then substance is; if therefore man is, substance
is’ whether this was seen to be a
principle of term logic or a principle of propositional logic. It was the
MegaricStoic philosophers and Boethius who fully recognized hypothetical
propositions and syllogisms as principles of the most general theory of
deduction. Mixed hypothetical syllogisms are arguments consisting of a
hypothetical premise and a categorical premise, and inferring a categorical
proposition; e.g., ‘If the sun is shining, the plants will grow; the sun is
shining; therefore the plants will grow’. Symbolically, this is represented by
‘P P Q, P /, Q’. This argument form was explicitly formulated in ancient times
by the Stoics as one of the “indemonstrables” and is now known as modus ponens.
Another equally basic form of mixed hypothetical syllogism is ‘P P Q, -Q /,
~P’, known as modus tollens. The disjunctive syllogism. This is an argument in
which the leading premise is a disjunction, the other premise being a denial of
one of the alternatives, concluding to the remaining alternative; e.g., ‘It is
raining or I will go for a walk; but it is not raining; therefore I will go for
a walk’. It is not always clear whether the ‘or’ of the disjunctive premise is
inclusive or exclusive. Symbolic logic removes the ambiguity by using two
different symbols and thus clearly distinguishes between inclusive or weak
disjunction, ‘P 7 Q’, which is true provided not both alternatives are false,
and exclusive or strong disjunction, ‘P W Q’, which is true provided exactly
one alternative is true and exactly one false. The definition of ‘disjunctive
syllogism’ presupposes that the lead premise is an inclusive or weak
disjunction, on the basis of which two forms are valid: ‘P 7 Q, -P /, Q’ and ‘P
7 Q, -Q /, P’. If the disjunctive premise is exclusive, we have four valid
argument forms, and we should speak here of an exclusive disjunctive syllogism.
This is defined as an argument in which either from an exclusive disjunction
and the denial of one of its disjuncts we infer the remaining disjunct ’P W Q, -P /,Q’, and ‘P W Q, -Q /, P’ modus
tollendo ponens; or else, from an exclusive disjunction and one of its
disjuncts we infer the denial of the remaining disjunct ’P W Q, P /, -Q’, and ‘P W Q, Q /,-P’ modus
ponendo tollens. “Strictly, ‘argumetum’
is ‘what is argued,’ the passive perfect participle – arguens is the present
active participle, ‘argumentatio’ the feminine abstract noun, and
‘argumentarus,’ and ‘argumentarum’ the neuter active future participle. – there
is the argumenttaturum, too.”“I thought I saw an argument, it turned to be some
soap” (Dodgson). Term that Grice borrows from (but “never returned” to)
Boethius, the Roman philosopher. Strictly, Grice is interested in the ‘arguer.’
Say Blackburn goes to Grice and, not knowing Grice speaks English, writes a
skull. Blackburn intends Grice to think that there is danger, somewhere, even
deadly danger. So there is arguing on Blackburn’s part. And there is INTENDED
arguing on Blackburn’s recipient, Grice, as it happens. For Grice, the
truth-value of “Blackburn communicates (to Grice) that there is danger” does
not REQUIRE the uptake.” “Why, one must just as well require that Jones GETS
his job to deem Smith having GIVEN it to him if that’s what he’s promised. The
arguer is invoked in a self-psi-transmission. For he must think P, and he must
think C, and he must think that P yields C. And this thought that C must be
CAUSED by the fact that he thinks that P yields C. -- f. argŭo , ŭi, ūtum
(ŭĭtum, hence arguiturus, Sall. Fragm. ap. Prisc. p. 882 P.), 3, v. a. cf. ἀργής,
white; ἀργός, bright; Sanscr. árgunas, bright; ragatas, white; and rag, to
shine (v. argentum and argilla); after the same analogy we have clarus, bright;
and claro, to make bright, to make evident; and the Engl. clear, adj., and to
clear = to make clear; v. Georg Curtius p. 171. I. A.. In gen., to make clear,
to show, prove, make known, declare, assert, μηνύειν: “arguo Eam me vidisse
intus,” Plaut. Mil. 2, 3, 66: “non ex auditu arguo,” id. Bacch. 3, 3, 65: “M.
Valerius Laevinus ... speculatores, non legatos, venisse arguebat,” Liv. 30,
23: “degeneres animos timor arguit,” Verg. A. 4, 13: “amantem et languor et
silentium Arguit,” Hor. Epod. 11, 9; id. C. 1, 13, 7.—Pass., in a mid. signif.:
“apparet virtus arguiturque malis,” makes itself known, Ov. Tr. 4, 3, 80:
“laudibus arguitur vini vinosus Homerus,” betrays himself, Hor. Ep. 1, 19, 6.—
B. Esp. a. With aliquem, to attempt to show something, in one's case, against
him, to accuse, reprove, censure, charge with: Indicāsse est detulisse;
“arguisse accusāsse et convicisse,” Dig. 50, 16, 197 (cf. Fest. p. 22: Argutum iri
in discrimen vocari): tu delinquis, ego arguar pro malefactis? Enn. (as transl.
of Eurip. Iphig. Aul. 384: Εἶτ̓ ἐγὼ δίκην δῶ σῶν κακῶν ὁ μὴ σφαλείς) ap. Rufin.
§ “37: servos ipsos neque accuso neque arguo neque purgo,” Cic. Rosc. Am. 41,
120: “Pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4, 27; 2, 2,
32: “hae tabellae te arguunt,” id. Bacch. 4, 6, 10: “an hunc porro tactum sapor
arguet oris?” Lucr. 4, 487: “quod adjeci, non ut arguerem, sed ne arguerer,”
Vell. 2, 53, 4: “coram aliquem arguere,” Liv. 43, 5: “apud praefectum,” Tac. A.
14, 41: “(Deus) arguit te heri,” Vulg. Gen. 31, 42; ib. Lev. 19, 17; ib. 2 Tim.
4, 2; ib. Apoc. 3, 19 al.— b. With the cause of complaint in the gen.; abl.
with or without de; with in with abl.; with acc.; with a clause as object; or
with ut (cf. Ramsh. p. 326; Zumpt, § 446). (α). With gen.: “malorum facinorum,”
Plaut. Ps. 2, 4, 56 (cf. infra, argutus, B. 2.): “aliquem probri, Stupri,
dedecoris,” id. Am. 3, 2, 2: “viros mortuos summi sceleris,” Cic. Rab. Perd. 9,
26: “aliquem tanti facinoris,” id. Cael. 1: “criminis,” Tac. H. 1, 48: “furti
me arguent,” Vulg. Gen. 30, 33; ib. Eccl. 11, 8: “repetundarum,” Tac. A. 3, 33:
“occupandae rei publicae,” id. ib. 6, 10: “neglegentiae,” Suet. Caes. 53:
“noxae,” id. Aug. 67: “veneni in se comparati,” id. Tib. 49: “socordiae,” id.
Claud. 3: “mendacii,” id. Oth. 10: “timoris,” Verg. A. 11, 384: “sceleris
arguemur,” Vulg. 4 Reg. 7, 9; ib. Act. 19, 40 al.— (β). With abl.: “te hoc
crimine non arguo,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 18; Nep. Paus. 3 fin.— (γ). With de: “de
eo crimine, quo de arguatur,” Cic. Inv 2, 11, 37: “de quibus quoniam verbo
arguit, etc.,” id. Rosc. Am. 29 fin.: “Quis arguet me de peccato?” Vulg. Joan.
8, 46; 16, 8.— (δ). With in with abl. (eccl. Lat.): “non in sacrificiis tuis arguam
te,” Vulg. Psa. 49, 8.—（ε) With acc.: quid undas Arguit et
liquidam molem camposque natantīs? of what does he impeach the waves? etc.,
quid being here equivalent to cujus or de quo, Lucr. 6, 405 Munro.—（ζ) With an
inf.-clause as object: “quae (mulier) me arguit Hanc domo ab se subripuisse,”
Plaut. Men. 5, 2, 62; id. Mil. 2, 4, 36: “occidisse patrem Sex. Roscius
arguitur,” Cic. Rosc. Am. 13, 37: “auctor illius injuriae fuisse arguebatur?”
Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 33: “qui sibimet vim ferro intulisse arguebatur,” Suet. Claud.
16; id. Ner. 33; id. Galb. 7: “me Arguit incepto rerum accessisse labori,” Ov.
M. 13, 297; 15, 504.—（η) With ut, as in Gr. ὡς (post-Aug. and
rare), Suet. Ner. 7: “hunc ut dominum et tyrannum, illum ut proditorem
arguentes,” as being master and tyrant, Just. 22, 3.— II. Transf. to the thing.
1. To accuse, censure, blame: “ea culpa, quam arguo,” Liv. 1, 28: “peccata
coram omnibus argue,” Vulg. 1 Tim. 5, 20: “tribuni plebis dum arguunt in C.
Caesare regni voluntatem,” Vell. 2, 68; Suet. Tit. 5 fin.: “taciturnitatem
pudoremque quorumdam pro tristitiā et malignitate arguens,” id. Ner. 23; id.
Caes. 75: “arguebat et perperam editos census,” he accused of giving a false
statement of property, census, id. Calig. 38: “primusque animalia mensis Arguit
imponi,” censured, taught that it was wrong, Ov. M. 15, 73: “ut non arguantur
opera ejus,” Vulg. Joan. 3, 20.— 2. Trop., to denounce as false: “quod et ipsum
Fenestella arguit,” Suet. Vit. Ter. p. 292 Roth.—With reference to the person,
to refute, confute: “aliquem,” Suet. Calig. 8.—Hence, argūtus , a, um, P. a. A.
Of physical objects, clear. 1. To the sight, bright, glancing, lively: “manus
autem minus arguta, digitis subsequens verba, non exprimens,” not too much in
motion, Cic. de Or. 3, 59, 220 (cf. id. Or. 18, 59: nullae argutiae digitorum,
and Quint. 11, 3, 119-123): “manus inter agendum argutae admodum et gestuosae,”
Gell. 1, 5, 2: “et oculi nimis arguti, quem ad modum animo affecti sumus,
loquuntur,” Cic. Leg. 1, 9, 27: “ocelli,” Ov. Am. 3, 3, 9; 3, 2, 83: “argutum
caput,” a head graceful in motion, Verg. G. 3, 80 (breve, Servius, but this
idea is too prosaic): aures breves et argutae, ears that move quickly (not
stiff, rigid), Pall. 4, 13, 2: “argutā in soleā,” in the neat sandal, Cat. 68,
72.— 2. a.. To the hearing, clear, penetrating, piercing, both of pleasant and
disagreeable sounds, clear-sounding, sharp, noisy, rustling, whizzing,
rattling, clashing, etc. (mostly poet.): linguae, Naev. ap. Non. p. 9, 24:
“aves,” Prop. 1, 18, 30: “hirundo,” chirping, Verg. G. 1, 377: “olores,”
tuneful, id. E. 9, 36: ilex, murmuring, rustling (as moved by the wind), id.
ib. 7, 1: “nemus,” id. ib. 8, 22 al.—Hence, a poet. epithet of the musician and
poet, clear-sounding, melodious: “Neaera,” Hor. C. 3, 14, 21: “poëtae,” id. Ep.
2, 2, 90: “fama est arguti Nemesis formosa Tibullus,” Mart. 8, 73, 7: forum,
full of bustle or din, noisy, Ov. A.A. 1, 80: “serra,” grating, Verg. G. 1,
143: “pecten,” rattling, id. ib. 1, 294; id. A. 7, 14 (cf. in Gr. κερκὶς ἀοιδός,
Aristoph. Ranae, v. 1316) al.—Hence, of rattling, prating, verbose discourse:
“sine virtute argutum civem mihi habeam pro preaeficā, etc.,” Plaut. Truc. 2,
6, 14: “[Neque mendaciloquom neque adeo argutum magis],” id. Trin. 1, 2, 163
Ritschl.— b. Trop., of written communications, rattling, wordy, verbose:
“obviam mihi litteras quam argutissimas de omnibus rebus crebro mittas,” Cic.
Att. 6, 5: vereor, ne tibi nimium arguta haec sedulitas videatur, Cael. ap. Cic.
Fam. 8, 1. —Transf. to omens, clear, distinct, conclusive, clearly indicative,
etc.: “sunt qui vel argutissima haec exta esse dicant,” Cic. Div. 2, 12 fin.:
“non tibi candidus argutum sternuit omen Amor?” Prop. 2, 3, 24.— 3. To the
smell; sharp, pungent: “odor argutior,” Plin. 15, 3, 4, § 18.— 4. To the taste;
sharp, keen, pungent: “sapor,” Pall. 3, 25, 4; 4, 10, 26.— B. Of mental
qualities. 1. In a good sense, bright, acute, sagacious, witty: “quis illo (sc.
Catone) acerbior in vituperando? in sententiis argutior?” Cic. Brut. 17, 65:
“orator,” id. ib. 70, 247: “poëma facit ita festivum, ita concinnum, ita
elegans, nihil ut fieri possit argutius,” id. Pis. 29; so, “dicta argutissima,”
id. de Or. 2, 61, 250: “sententiae,” id. Opt. Gen. 2: “acumen,” Hor. A. P. 364:
“arguto ficta dolore queri,” dexterously-feigned pain, Prop. 1, 18, 26 al.— 2.
In a bad sense, sly, artful, cunning: “meretrix,” Hor. S. 1, 10, 40: calo. id.
Ep. 1, 14, 42: “milites,” Veg. Mil. 3, 6.—As a pun: ecquid argutus est? is he
cunning? Ch. Malorum facinorum saepissime (i.e. has been accused of), Plaut.
Ps. 2, 4, 56 (v. supra, I. B. a.).—Hence, adv.: argūtē (only in the signif. of
B.). a. Subtly, acutely: “respondere,” Cic. Cael. 8: “conicere,” id. Brut. 14,
53: “dicere,” id. Or. 28, 98.—Comp.: “dicere,” Cic. Brut. 11, 42.— Sup.: “de re
argutissime disputare,” Cic. de Or. 2, 4, 18.— b. Craftily: “obrepere,” Plaut. Trin.
4, 2, 132; Arn. 5, p. 181. For Grice, an argumentum is a sequence of statements
such that some of them the premises purport to give reason to accept another of
them, the conclusion. Since we speak of bad arguments and weak arguments, the
premises of an argument need not really support the conclusion, but they must
give some appearance of doing so or the term ‘argument’ is misapplied. Logic is
mainly concerned with the question of validity: whether if the premises are
true we would have reason to accept the conclusion. A valid argument with true
premises is called sound. A valid deductive argument is one such that if we
accept the premises we are logically bound to accept the conclusion and if we
reject the conclusion we are logically bound to reject one or more of the
premises. Alternatively, the premises logically entail the conclusion. A good
inductive argument some would reserve
‘valid’ for deductive arguments is one
such that if we accept the premises we are logically bound to regard the
conclusion as probable, and, in addition, as more probable than it would be if
the premises should be false. A few arguments have only one premise and/or more
than one conclusion. Then there’s the argumentum a
fortiori: According
to Grice, an argument that moves from the premises that everything which
possesses a certain characteristics will possess some further characteristics
and that certain things possess the relevant characteristics to an eminent
degree to the conclusion that a fortiori even more so these things will possess
the further characteristics. The second premise is often left implicit – or
implicated, as Grice prefers, so a fortiori arguments are often enthymemes. A
favourite illustration by Grice of an a fortiori argument can be found in
Plato’s Crito. We owe gratitude and respect to our parents and so should do
nothing to harm them. However, athenians owe even greater gratitude and respect
to the laws of Athens. Therefore, a fortiori, Athenians should do nothing to
harm those laws.
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