S
S: SUBJECT INDEX
S: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: SANCTIS – SARPI -- SCUPOLI – SENOFANE -- SENONE – SGALAMBRO – SOZZINI – SOTIONE – SPERANZA-GHERSI -- SPERANZA – SRAFFA – STROZZI
S: NAME INDEX ITALIAN: SANCTIS – SARPI -- SCUPOLI – SENOFANE -- SENONE – SGALAMBRO – SOZZINI – SOTIONE – SPERANZA-GHERSI -- SPERANZA – SRAFFA – STROZZI
S: NAME INDEX ENGLISH: SIBLEY -- STRAWSON --
Saint Petersburg paradox, or the return/utility
distinction: a puzzle about gambling that motivated the distinction between
expected return and expected utility. Bernoulli published it in a St.
Petersburg journal in 1738. It concerns a gamble like this: it pays $2 if heads
appears on the first toss of a coin, $4 if heads does not appear until the
second toss, $8 if heads does not appear until the third toss, and so on. The
expected return from the gamble is ½2 ! ¼4 ! 1 /88 ! . . . , or 1 ! 1 ! 1 !
..., i.e., it is infinite. But no one would pay much for the gamble. So it
seems that expected returns do not govern rational preferences. Bernoulli
argued that expected utilities govern rational preferences. He also held that
the utility of wealth is proportional to the log of the amount of wealth. Given
his assumptions, the gamble has finite 808 S
808 expected utility, and should not be preferred to large sums of
money. However, a twentieth-century version of the paradox, attributed to Karl
Menger, reconstructs the gamble, putting utility payoffs in place of monetary
payoffs, so that the new gamble has infinite expected utility. Since no one
would trade much utility for the new gamble, it also seems that expected
utilities do not govern rational preferences. The resolution of the paradox is
under debate.
idem, ipse, sui, de se -- Same -- Sameness -- Griceian
– One of Grice’s favourite essays ever was Wiggins’s “Sameness and substance” --
Griceian différance, a coinage deployed
by Derrida in De la Grammatologie 7, where he defines it as “an economic
concept designating the production of differing/deferring.” Différance is
polysemic, but its key function is to name the prime condition for the
functioning of all language and thought: differing, the differentiation of
signs from each other that allows us to differentiate things from each other.
Deferring is the process by which signs refer to each other, thus constituting
the self-reference essential to language, without ever capturing the being or
presence that is the transcendent entity toward which it is aimed. Without the
concepts or idealities generated by the iteration of signs, we could never
identify a dog as a dog, could not perceive a dog or any other thing as such.
Perception presupposes language, which, in turn, presupposes the ideality
generated by the repetition of signs. Thus there can be no perceptual origin
for language; language depends upon an “original repetition,” a deliberate
oxymoron that Derrida employs to signal the impossibility of conceiving an
origin of language from within the linguistic framework in which we find
ourselves. Différance is the condition for language, and language is the
condition for experience: whatever meaning we may find in the world is
attributed to the differing/ deferring play of signifiers. The notion of
différance and the correlative thesis that meaning is language-dependent have
been appropriated by radical thinkers in the attempt to demonstrate that
political inequalities are grounded in nothing other than the conventions of
sign systems governing differing cultures.
sanction, anything whose function is to penalize or
reward. It is useful to distinguish between social sanctions, legal sanctions,
internal sanctions, and religious sanctions. Social sanctions are extralegal
pressures exerted upon the agent by others. For example, others might distrust
us, ostracize us, or even physically attack us, if we behave in certain ways.
Legal sanctions include corporal punishment, imprisonment, fines, withdrawal of
the legal rights to run a business or to leave the area, and other penalties.
Internal sanctions may include not only guilt feelings but also the sympathetic
pleasures of helping others or the gratified conscience of doing right. Divine
sanctions, if there are any, are rewards or punishments given to us by a god
while we are alive or after we die. There are important philosophical questions
concerning sanctions. Should law be defined as the rules the breaking of which
elicits punishment by the state? Could there be a moral duty to behave in a
given way if there were no social sanctions concerning such behavior? If not,
then a conventionalist account of moral duty seems unavoidable. And, to what
extent does the combined effect of external and internal sanctions make
rational egoism or prudence or self-interest coincide with morality?
sanctis: essential
philosopher. He considers philosophy as a branch of the belles lettres – and
his field of expertise is when stylists stopped using an artificial Roman, and
turned to ‘Italian.’ Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e de Sanctis," per
Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia..
sarpi: very important
Italian philosopher. Paolo Sarpi (n. Venezia, 14 agosto 1552 – Venezia, 15 gennaio
1623) è stato un religioso, teologo, storico e scienziato italiano cittadino
della Repubblica di Venezia, appartenente all'Ordine dei Servi di Maria.
Teologo, astronomo, matematico, fisico, anatomista, letterato e storico, fu
tanto versato in molteplici campi dello scibile umano da essere definito da
Girolamo Fabrici d'Acquapendente «Oracolo del secolo».[1] Autore della celebre
Istoria del Concilio tridentino, subito messa all'Indice, fu fermo oppositore
del centralismo monarchico della Chiesa cattolica, difendendo le prerogative
della Repubblica veneziana, colpita dall'interdetto emanato da Paolo V. Rifiutò
di presentarsi di fronte all'Inquisizione romana che intendeva processarlo e
subì un grave attentato che si sospettò essere stato organizzato dalla Curia
romana, "agnosco stilum Curiae romanae", che negò tuttavia ogni
responsabilità. Indice 1 Biografia 1.1 L'infanzia 1.2 A Mantova 1.3
Il ritorno a Venezia 1.4 Seconda denuncia all'Inquisizione 1.5 L'interdetto del
papa contro Venezia 1.6 Gli attentati 1.7 La corrispondenza europea e la morte
2 Sarpi nella storia della letteratura e della scienza 3 Sarpi e la Chiesa 4
Opere 4.1 Edizioni 4.2 Manoscritti 5 Note 6 Bibliografia 7 Voci correlate 8
Altri progetti 9 Collegamenti esterni Biografia L'infanzia «[ ... ] era una
ritiratezza in sé medesimo, un sembiante sempre penseroso, e più tosto
malinconico che serio, un silenzio quasi continuato anco co' coetanei, una
quiete totale, senza alcun di quei giuochi, a' quali pare che la natura stessa
ineschi i fanciulli, acciò che col moto corroborino la complessione: cosa
notabile che mai fosse veduto in alcuno. Poi, così servò in tutta la sua vita,
et all'occasioni diceva non poter capir il gusto e trattenimento di chi giuoca,
se non fosse affetto d'avarizia. Un'alienazione da ogni gusto, nissuna avidità
de' cibi, de' quali si nutriva così poco, che restava meraviglia come stasse
vivo» (F. Micanzio, Vita di padre Paolo) Istoria del Concilio
tridentino, 1935 Nell'anno in cui proseguivano le sedute del Concilio di
Trento, Carlo V era in guerra con i prìncipi protestanti tedeschi e il
Parlamento inglese adottava un Libro di preghiere d'ispirazione luterana,
Pietro, questo il nome secolare del Sarpi, nacque a Venezia da Francesco di
Pietro Sarpi, di famiglia di lontane origini friulane (precisamente di San Vito
al Tagliamento[2]) e mercante a Venezia eppure, scrive il biografo Micanzio,
per la sua indole violenta «più dedito all'armi ch'alla mercatura»;[3] la
madre, veneziana, «d'aspetto umile e mite»,[4] si chiamava Isabella Morelli.
Rimasta vedova, fu accolta con Pietro e l'altra figlia Elisabetta nella casa
del fratello Ambrosio Morelli, prete della collegiata di Sant'Ermagora.
Con lo zio, «uomo d'antica severità di costumi, molto erudito nelle lettere
d'umanità [...] addottrinando nella grammatica e retorica molti fanciulli della
nobiltà»,[4] fece i primi studi, imparando presto e con facilità. A dodici
anni, nel 1564, anno dell'istituzione, dopo la chiusura del Concilio,
dell'Indice dei libri proibiti - tra i tanti, vi finirono il Talmud e il
Corano, il De Monarchia di Dante e le opere di Rabelais, Folengo, Telesio,
Machiavelli ed Erasmo - passò alla scuola del padre Giovanni Maria Capella,
teologo cremonese dell'Ordine dei Servi di Maria, seguace delle dottrine di
Giovanni Duns Scoto, il quale gli insegnò logica, filosofia e teologia, finché
il ragazzo fece così rapidi progressi che «il maestro istesso confessava non
aver più che insegnargli».[5] Con altri maestri veneziani apprese la
matematica, la lingua greca e l'ebraica. «Con la familiarità e co' studii
entrò Pietro anco in desiderio di ricevere l'abito de' servi, o perché gli
paresse vita conforme alla sua inclinazione ritirata e contemplativa, o perché
vi fosse allettato dal suo maestro»,[6] malgrado l'opposizione della madre e
dello zio Ambrogio che lo voleva prete nella sua chiesa, il 24 novembre 1566
entrò nel monastero veneziano dei servi di Maria. A Mantova Qui continuò
ancora a studiare con il Capella, rimanendo alieno dalle distrazioni proprie
della sua età finché nel 1567, in occasione della riunione a Mantova del capitolo
generale dell'Ordine servita, fu mandato in quella città «ad onorar il
congresso e far vedere che gl'ordini non sono oziosi, ma spendono il tempo in
sante e lodevoli operazioni», difendendo «318 delle più difficili proposizioni
della sacra teologia e della filosofia naturale. Il qual carico con che
felicità lo sostenesse e con che giubilo e stupore di quella venerabile corona,
si può dall'evento argomentare».[7] Convento e chiesa di San
Barnaba a Mantova Essersi così distinto a soli quindici anni gli valse la
nomina a teologo da parte del duca di Mantova Guglielmo Gonzaga - «prencipe di
grandissimo ingegno, così profondamente erudito nello scienze, che
difficilmente si discerneva qual fosse maggiore, o la prudenza di governare, o
l'erudizione di tutte le scienze et arti, sino nella musica» -[8] mentre il
vescovo Gregorio Boldrino gli affidò la cattedra di «teologia positiva di casi
di coscienza e delli sacri canoni».[9] Stabilito nel convento di San Barnaba,
perfezionò la conoscenza della lingua ebraica e iniziò, col puntiglio consueto,
ad applicarsi agli studi storici. Fu certo a motivo di quest'interesse
che a Mantova frequentò Camillo Olivo, già segretario di Ercole Gonzaga,
cardinale e legato pontificio nelle ultime sessioni del concilio di Trento, la
cui caduta in disgrazia presso Pio IV coinvolse anche l'Olivo che fu dagli
«inquisitori molto travagliato, col tenerlo longamente in carcere dopo la morte
del cardinale suo signore»,[10] ma che ora, dopo la morte del pontefice,
«viveva privatamente in Mantova. Il gusto principale che riceveva fra Paolo in
conversare con lui era perché lo trovava d'una moderazione singolare, erudito,
e che, per esser stato col cardinale a Trento, aveva avuto gran maneggio in
quelle azioni e sapeva tutte le particolarità de' negozii più secreti, et aveva
anco molte memorie, nell'intendere le quali fra Paolo riceveva molto
piacere».[8] Erano gli anni in cui in Italia continuava con vigore la
repressione inquisitoriale di Pio V: Pietro Carnesecchi venne decapitato nel 1567,
nel 1569 gli ebrei furono espulsi dallo Stato pontificio - tranne che da Roma e
da Ancona, nei ghetti delle quali vennero costretti a risiedere - e nel 1570 fu
impiccato l'umanista Aonio Paleario; il papa scomunicò Elisabetta d'Inghilterra
nel 1570, organizzò la Lega contro i turchi nel 1571, ottenendo la vittoria
navale di Lepanto e a Parigi, la notte del 23 agosto 1572 migliaia di ugonotti
furono massacrati: in quest'anno Sarpi fece la sua professione, entrando
ufficialmente nell'Ordine servita. Anche di lui l'Inquisizione si occupò per la
prima volta nel 1573, a seguito della denuncia di un confratello, un tale
Claudio, che lo accusò di sostenere che dal primo capitolo del Genesi non si
può ricavare l'articolo di fede della Trinità: ma, poiché effettivamente di
Trinità divina non vi è traccia nel Vecchio Testamento, l'Inquisizione gli
diede ragione, archiviando il caso. Il ritorno a Venezia Dopo aver
ricevuto nel convento mantovano il titolo di baccelliere, nel 1574 fu invitato
a Milano da Carlo Borromeo il quale, dopo aver ottenuto dalle autorità
spagnole, contro la volontà del Senato, il riconoscimento del tribunale e della
polizia diocesana, aveva avviato un processo di riforma del clero. L'anno
successivo ottenne di essere trasferito nel convento dell'Ordine servita di
Venezia, dove fu incaricato dell'insegnamento della filosofia e continuò i suoi
studi scientifici. Nella grande epidemia di peste, che imperversò a Venezia dal
1575 al 1577, facendo 50.000 vittime - tra le quali Tiziano - fra' Paolo rimase
immune dal contagio, ma perdette la madre. Nel 1578, dopo essersi
addottorato in teologia nell'Università di Padova, venne nominato reggente del
convento di Venezia e, l'anno dopo, priore della provincia veneta. Quello
stesso anno, durante il Capitolo generale tenutosi a Parma, nel quale venne
rieletto priore generale Giacomo Tavanti, tenne una dissertazione di fronte ai
cardinali protettori dell'Ordine, Alessandro Farnese e Giulio Antonio Santori.
Sarpi fu uno dei tre «saggi», insieme con Cirillo Franco e Alessandro Giani,
incaricati di preparare una riforma della regola: «il carico suo speziale fu
d'accommodare quella parte che toccava i sacri canoni, le riforme del concilio
di Trento, allora nuove, e la forma de' giudizii [...] quella parte tutta ove si
tratta de' giudizii accommodatamente allo stato claustrale [...] Lasciò in
questo carico in Roma fama di gran sapere e di molta prudenza, non solo nelle
corti de' due cardinali suddetti, co' quali, per ordine contenuto in un breve
apostolico di Gregorio XIII, conveniva conferire tutte le leggi che si
facevano, ma anco fu necessario molte volte trattar col pontefice medesimo.
Sbrigato da quale peso ritornò al suo governo».[11] Nel giugno del 1585
si tenne a Bologna il nuovo Capitolo dell'Ordine servita e Sarpi viene eletto
procuratore generale, «la suprema dignità di quell'ordine dopo il generale
[...] il carico porta seco di difender in Roma tutte le liti e controversie che
vengono promosse in tutta la religione»[12] Dovette pertanto trasferirsi a Roma
dove conobbe e «prese strettissima familiarità col padre Bellarmino [...] poi
cardinale, e durò l'amicizia sin al fine della vita», grazie al quale forse
poté prendere visione di diversa documentazione relativa alle istruzioni date
ai legati pontifici durante il Concilio di Trento. Conobbe anche il dottor
Navarro, teologo spagnolo difensore dell'arcivescovo di Toledo, Bartolomé
Carranza, accusato di eresia, il gesuita Nicolás Alfonso de Bobadilla e il
cardinale Castagna, che fu poi papa Urbano VII. Ebbe occasione di passare a
Napoli per presiedere Capitoli e «conversare con quel famoso ingegno Giovanni
Battista della Porta, il quale, anco nelle sue opere mandate in luce, fa
onorata menzione del padre Paolo come di non ordinario personaggio».[13]
Scaduto il periodo di carica a procuratore generale dell'Ordine servita, Sarpi
ritornò a Venezia nel 1589, frequentandovi i circoli intellettuali che si
riunivano nella bottega di Bernardo Sechini e nella casa del nobile veneziano
Andrea Morosini, dove conobbe anche Giordano Bruno, mentre a Padova frequentava
la casa di Gian Vincenzo Pinelli, «il ricetto delle muse e l'academia di tutte
le virtù in quei tempi»,[14] dove poté incontrare Galileo e forse ancora il
Bruno, il quale s'intrattenne a Padova più di tre mesi, poco prima di essere
arrestato a Venezia nel maggio del 1592. Seconda denuncia
all'Inquisizione Ottavio Leoni (?): papa Paolo V Nel 1594 si dovette
scegliere il nuovo generale dell'Ordine servita, e fra i due principali
candidati, Lelio Baglioni e Gabriele Dardano, Sarpi si espresse a favore del
primo. Il rancore spinse il Dardano a denunciare Paolo Sarpi al Sant'Uffizio,
accusandolo di negare efficacia allo Spirito Santo, di avere rapporti sospetti
con ebrei veneziani e allegando una lettera che fra' Paolo gli scrisse anni
prima da Roma, nella quale erano contenute «alcune parole in discredito della
corte, come che in quella si venisse alle dignità con male arti, e di tenerne
esso poco conto, anzi abominarla».[15] Sarpi, senza nemmeno essere
chiamato a Roma per discolparsi, fu subito prosciolto da ogni accusa ma il
cardinale di Santa Severina, Giulio Antonio Santori, protettore dell'Ordine e
capo del Sant'Uffizio, «mostrò però implacabile indignazione al padre»
utilizzando tutta la sua autorità per escludere gli amici del frate «dalli
gradi et onori [...] con maniere così strane e fini così bassi, ch'io non
ardisco poner i casi che mi sono stati dati in nota, perché troppo gran
scandalo arrecherebbono al mondo».[16] Sarpi continuò i suoi studi mentre
non cessavano le rivalità nell'Ordine servita, del quale venne eletto priore,
il 1º giugno 1597, Angelo Montorsoli, che morì tre anni dopo, succedendogli
così, nel 1601, Gabriele Dardano, accanito avversario del Sarpi. Questi, deciso
a uscire dall'Ordine per sottrarsi all'inimicizia dalla quale si sentiva
circondato, cercò invano di ottenere un vescovato, prima a Caorle e poi a Nona,
in Dalmazia, che però gli vennero rifiutati a causa delle negative informazioni
che di lui il Dardano e Ludovico Gagliardi, preposito della casa veneziana dei
gesuiti, diedero al papa: essi avrebbero «sentito mormorare alle volte che egli
con alcuni facci una scoletta piena d'errori».[17] Non solo: nel Capitolo, il
Dardano accusò padre Paolo di portare «una berretta in capo contra una forma
che sino sotto Gregorio XIV disse esser proscritta; che portasse le pianelle
incavate alla francese, allegando falsamente esserci decreto contrario, con
privazioni divote; che nel fine della messa non recitasse lo Salve Regina».[18]
Ma Sarpi fu assolto anche da queste accuse. L'interdetto del papa contro
Venezia Rivendicazioni sulla non validità dell'Interdetto, Venezia, 1606
La Repubblica veneziana, stretta a nord dall'Impero, in Italia dalla prevalenza
spagnola e papale, in Oriente dalla potenza turca, era ormai avviata a quel
lungo declino politico ed economico che avrà la sua sanzione alla fine del
Settecento. Alla prudente politica dei vecchi patrizi, rassegnati alla
compromissione con l'Impero e il papato, si sostituì quella degli innovatori, i
cosiddetti «Giovani», decisi a sottrarre la Serenissima all'invadenza
ecclesiastica nell'interno e a rilanciarne le fortune commerciali
nell'Adriatico, compromesse dal controllo dei porti esercitato dallo Stato
pontificio e dalle azioni degli Uscocchi, i pirati cristiani croati appoggiati
dall'Impero. Il 10 gennaio 1604 il Senato veneziano proibì la fondazione
di ospedali gestiti da ecclesiastici, di monasteri, chiese e altri luoghi di
culto senza autorizzazione preventiva della Signoria; il 26 marzo 1605 un'altra
legge proibiva l'alienazione di beni immobili dai laici agli ecclesiastici, già
proprietari, pur essendo solo un centesimo della popolazione, di quasi la metà
dei beni fondiari della Repubblica, e limitava le competenze del foro
ecclesiastico, prevedendo il deferimento ai tribunali civili degli
ecclesiastici responsabili di reati di particolare gravità. Avvenne che il
canonico vicentino Scipione Saraceno, colpevole di molestie a una nobile
parente, e l'aristocratico abate di Nervesa, Marcantonio Brandolini, reo di
omicidi e di stupri, fossero incarcerati. Il 10 dicembre 1605 il papa Paolo V
emanò due brevi richiedenti l'abrogazione delle due leggi e la consegna al
nunzio pontificio dei due ecclesiastici, affinché secondo il diritto canonico
fossero giudicati da un tribunale ecclesiastico. Il nuovo doge Leonardo
Donà fece esaminare il 14 gennaio 1606 i due brevi da giuristi e teologi, fra i
quali il Sarpi, affinché trovassero modo di controbattere alle richieste della
Santa Sede. Il 28 gennaio venne nominato teologo canonista proprio il Sarpi e
lo stesso giorno il suo scritto: Consiglio in difesa di due ordinazioni della
Serenissima Repubblica, venne inviato al Papa. Il Sarpi difese le ragioni della
Repubblica con numerosi scritti: sono di questi mesi la Scrittura sopra la
forza e validità delle scomuniche, il Consiglio sul giudicar le colpe di
persone ecclesiastiche, la Scrittura intorno all'appellazione al concilio, la
Scrittura sull'alienazione dei beni laici agli ecclesiastici e altri ancora,
poi raccolti nella sua successiva Istoria dell'interdetto. In quell'opera è
contenuta anche la traduzione in italiano, fatta dal Sarpi stesso, del trattato
di Jean Gerson sulla validità della scomunica, che fu attaccato dal cardinale
Bellarmino, al quale fra' Paolo rispose allora con l'Apologia per le
opposizioni del cardinale Bellarmino. Mentre il frate servita Fulgenzio
Micanzio - suo futuro biografo - iniziava a collaborare con Paolo Sarpi, il 6
maggio, dopo che il 17 aprile Paolo V aveva scomunicato il Consiglio veneziano
e fulminato con l'interdetto lo Stato veneto, Venezia pubblicò il Protesto del
monitorio del pontefice, scritto ancora da Sarpi, nel quale il breve papale
Superioribus mensibus è definito «nullo e di nessun valore», mentre impedì la
pubblicazione della bolla pontificia. Rubens; il cardinale Joyeuse
incorona Maria de' Medici. Obbedendo alle disposizioni del papa, il 9 maggio i
gesuiti rifiutarono di celebrare le messe a Venezia e la Repubblica reagì
espellendoli insieme con cappuccini e teatini: «partirono la sera alle doi di
notte, ciascuno con un Cristo al collo, per mostrare che Cristo partiva con
loro. Concorse moltitudine di populo [...] e quando il preposto, che ultimo
entrò in barca, dimandò la benedizione al vicario patriarcale [...] si levò una
voce in tutto il populo, che in lingua veneziana gridò loro dicendo "Andé
in malora!" [...]».[19] A Roma si sperava che l'interdetto provocasse una
sollevazione contro i governanti veneziani ma «li gesuiti scacciati, li
cappuccini e teatini licenziati, nissun altro ordine partì, li divini uffizi
erano celebrati secondo il consueto [...] il senato era unitissimo nelle
deliberazioni e le città e populi si conservarono quietissimi
nell'obbedienza»[20] Venezia era alleata, in funzione anti-spagnola, con
la Francia, ed era in buoni rapporti con l'Inghilterra e con la Turchia.
Fingendosi veneziani, il 10 agosto soldati spagnoli, per provocare la rottura
delle relazioni turco-veneziane, sbarcarono a Durazzo, saccheggiandola, ma la
provocazione fu facilmente scoperta e i turchi offrirono a Venezia l'appoggio
della loro flotta contro il papa e la Spagna. Il 30 ottobre l'Inquisizione
intimò a Sarpi di presentarsi a Roma per giustificare le molte cose «temerarie,
calunniose, scandalose, sediziose, scismatiche, erronee ed eretiche» contenute
nei suoi scritti ma il frate naturalmente si rifiutò. Invano il papa - che il 5
gennaio 1607 aveva scomunicato Sarpi e Micanzio - si dichiarava favorevole a
portare guerra a Venezia: la sua unica alleata, la Spagna, minacciata da
Francia, Inghilterra e Turchia, non poteva sostenerla in quest'impresa e si
giunse così alle trattative diplomatiche, favorite dalla mediazione del
cardinale francese François de Joyeuse. Il 21 aprile Venezia rilasciò i due
ecclesiastici incarcerati e ritirò il suo Protesto al papa in cambio della
revoca dell'interdetto, mentre le leggi promulgate dal Senato veneziano
restarono in vigore e i gesuiti non poterono rientrare nella Repubblica.
Gli attentati In quel tempo Sarpi ricevette la visita dell'ex-luterano ed
erudito tedesco Kaspar Schoppe, molto intimo dei segreti affari della Curia
romana, il quale gli confidò che «il papa, come gran prencipe, ha longhe le
mani, e che per tenersi da lui gravemente offeso non poteva succedergli se non
male, e che se sino a quell'ora avesse voluto farlo ammazzare, non gli
mancavano mezzi. Ma che il pensiero del papa era averlo vivo nelle mani e farlo
levare sin a Venezia e condurlo a Roma, offerendosi egli, quando volesse, di
trattare la sua riconciliazione, e con qual onore avesse saputo desiderare;
asserendo d'aver in carico anco molte trattazioni co' prencipi alemanni
protestanti e la loro conversione».[21] Monumento a Sarpi a
Venezia, in Campo Santa Fosca, presso il luogo dell'attentato Lo Schoppe,
ambiguo provocatore, intendeva convincere il frate a mettersi nelle mani
dell'Inquisizione come miglior partito che il Sarpi potesse prendere, tanto
«parvero strane le due proposte di far ammazzare o prender vivo il padre»,[22]
ma i disegni omicidi erano reali: il 5 ottobre 1607, «circa le 23 ore,
ritornando il padre al suo convento di San Marco a Santa Fosca, nel calare la
parte del ponte verso le fondamenta, fu assaltato da cinque assassini, parte
facendo scorta e parte l'essecuzione, e restò l'innocente padre ferito di tre
stilettate, due nel collo et una nella faccia, ch'entrava all'orecchia destra
et usciva per apunto a quella vallicella ch'è tra il naso e la destra guancia,
non avendo potuto l'assassino cavar fuori lo stillo per aver passato l'osso, il
quale restò piantato e molto storto».[23] I sicari, fuggendo, trovarono
rifugio nella casa del nunzio pontificio e la sera s'imbarcarono per Ravenna,
da dove proseguirono per Ancona e di qui raggiunsero Roma. Si conoscono i loro
nomi: l'esecutore materiale dell'attentato fu Rodolfo Poma, già mercante
veneziano, poi trasferitosi a Napoli e di qui a Roma, dove divenne intimo del
cardinale segretario di Stato Scipione Caffarelli-Borghese e dello stesso Paolo
V. Fu coadiuvato da tre uomini d'arme, tali Alessandro Parrasio, Giovanni da
Firenze e Pasquale da Bitonto, mentre «la spia, o guida, fu un prete, Michiel
Viti bergamasco, solito offiziare in Santa Trinità di Venezia, che non lasciò
dubitare quanti mesi precedessero questo bel effetto prima che fosse mandato
alla luce; poi che questo prete la quadragesima antecedente, sotto specie
d'aver gusto delle predicazioni del padre maestro Fulgenzio, andava ogni
mattina in convento de' servi alla porta del pulpito, che risponde alla parte
di dentro, e cortesemente trattava con lui, ricercandolo anco di qualche dubbio
di coscienza. E continuò di poi sempre a salutarlo et anco andar in convento a
visitarlo, parlandogli sempre di cose spettanti all'anima».[24] Il
pugnale non aveva tuttavia leso organi vitali e il Sarpi riuscì a sopravvivere;
il noto chirurgo Girolamo Fabrici d'Acquapendente, che l'operò, disse di non
aver mai medicato una ferita più strana, rispondendo allora Sarpi con la famosa
espressione: «eppure il mondo vuole che sia data stilo Romanae Curiae».[25] Le
conseguenze furono la rottura della mascella e vistose cicatrici nel volto. Il
27 ottobre 1607 il Senato, dichiarando il Sarpi «persona di prestante dottrina,
di gran valore e virtù», gli concede una casa in piazza San Marco ove possa
risiedere con il Micanzio e altri frati, e una sovvenzione affinché possa
acquistare una barca e provvedere alla sua sicurezza personale. Sarpi rifiutò
la casa ma si servì da allora di una barca che gli evitasse i pericolosi
tragitti a piedi per le calli veneziane. Poco più di un anno dopo, nel
gennaio del 1609, fu sventato un secondo attentato, ordito, sembra su mandato
del cardinale Lanfranco Margotti, da due frati serviti, Giovanni Francesco da
Perugia e Antonio da Viterbo, i quali, fatta una copia della chiave della
camera di Sarpi, «volevano secretamente introdurre nel monasterio due o più
sicarii e la notte trucidare l'innocente padre».[26] La corrispondenza
europea e la morte Sarpi inizia a corrispondere con personalità soprattutto di
fede calvinista o gallicana: fra questi ultimi, Jacques Leschassier e Jacques
Gillot, che pubblicò nel 1607 gli Actes du concile de Trente en l'an 1562 e
1563, dimostrando le pressioni papali sui vescovi riuniti a concilio, e fra gli
altri l'italiano Francesco Castrino, i francesi Jean Hotman de Villiers, Isaac
Casaubon, Jacques-Auguste de Thou, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, i tedeschi
Achatius e Christoph von Dohna. Attraverso il dialogo diretto con gli
intellettuali europei, Sarpi acquisì «quella straordinaria ampiezza di
orizzonti e di interessi, quella solida conoscenza dei problemi dello stato
moderno», che gli permise di «arricchire la sua cultura storica, giuridica e
scientifica» e lo condusse «a incidere sulla sua posizione religiosa, ad
approfondirne la crisi, risolvendola poi con l'accoglimento di nuove
prospettive e di nuove idealità; spalancandogli un mondo nuovo, che gli faceva
sentire più soffocante, più viziata, la vita italiana».[27] Incontrò a
Venezia nel 1607 l'inglese William Bedell, che riferì di lui e del Micanzio
come essi fossero «completamente dalla nostra parte nella sostanza della
religione» e, nel 1608, Cristoph von Dohna, inviato dal principe tedesco
Cristiano I di Anhalt-Bernburg, e il pastore ginevrino Giovanni Diodati, per
valutare la possibilità di introdurre a Venezia la Riforma. La traduzione in
lingua italiana, fatta da quest'ultimo, del Nuovo Testamento, viene diffusa a
Venezia proprio in questo periodo. Altre polemiche suscitano, nel marzo
del 1609, le prediche quaresimali di Fulgenzio Micanzio che vengono interpretate
a Roma come un attacco alla fede cattolica. Sarpi è anche preoccupato per la
tregua stipulata tra la Spagna e i Paesi Bassi, perché vede in essa un
indebolimento di questi ultimi «che, o prima o dopo, resteranno sopraffatti
dalle arti spagnole», mentre gli spagnoli ne potrebbero trarre beneficio anche
in vista del loro dominio in Italia.[28] Sarpi sperava in un'alleanza generale
di Francia, Inghilterra, principi protestanti, Paesi Bassi, Savoia e Venezia
che portasse alla guerra contro l'Impero cattolico ispano-tedesco e cancellasse
il dominio papale e spagnolo in Italia: «Se sarà guerra in Italia, va bene per
la religione; e questo Roma teme; l'Inquisizione cesserà e l'Evangelio avrà
corso».[29] E andrà bene anche per le libertà civili di Venezia: qui, anche se
«il giogo ecclesiastico è assai più mite che nel rimanente d'Italia, in quella
parte nondimeno che tocca la stampa è l'istesso appunto che negli altri luoghi.
Nessuna cosa si può stampare se non veduta e approvata dall'Inquisizione [...]
Dove si ragiona di alcun papa, non permettono che si dica alcuna di disonore,
se bene vera e notoria. Non permettono che alcuno separato dalla Chiesa romana
sia lodato di qualsivoglia virtù, né nominato se non con vituperio».[30]
Ai primi giorni del 1623 si ammalò gravemente, e morì il 15 gennaio. Secondo la
versione ufficiale l'8 gennaio, sebbene sfinito, volle alzarsi per il
mattutino, come al solito, e celebrare la Messa. La mattina del 12 gennaio,
fatto chiamare il priore del convento, lo pregò che lo raccomandasse alle
preghiere dei confratelli e che gli portasse il Viatico. Gli consegnò tutte le
cose concesse a suo uso. Si fece vestire, si confessò e passò il resto del
mattino facendosi leggere da fra Fulgenzio e da Fra Marco i Salmi e la Passione
di Cristo narrata dagli Evangelisti. Gli fu quindi amministrato dal priore,
alla presenza della Comunità, il Viatico. Il 14 mattina fu visitato dal medico
che gli disse che aveva poche ore di vita. Egli, sorridendo, rispose: Sia
benedetto Dio! A me piace ciò che a Lui piace. Col suo aiuto faremo bene anche
quest'ultima azione (quella di morire). Fu udito ripetere più volte, con
soddisfazione: Orsù, andiamo dove Dio ci chiama!. Secondo alcuni le sue ultime
parole sarebbero state: Esto perpetua, riferendosi a Venezia (v.
Bianchi-Giovini, 846, p. 340-344). Esistono tuttavia altre versioni della sua
morte che lo fanno apparire più vicino al culto protestante. Sarpi
nella storia della letteratura e della scienza Figura assai complessa di
pensatore, Sarpi occupa indubbiamente un posto di primo piano nella storia
della letteratura e della scienza. Fu uno dei più grandi scrittori del suo
secolo. «La sua prosa (è) una delle più maschie ed efficaci di tutta la
letteratura nostra, che non conosce lenocini né fronzoli, che scolpisce le
figure con raro risalto, che ha un magnifico potere rievocatore allorché
descrive dispute e contrasti, ch'è impareggiabile nel sarcasmo, tutto contenuto
in un'unica espressione, tre o quattro parole» (Arturo Carlo Jemolo.)
Giovanni Papini, parlando della Istoria del Concilio di Trento, l'ha
definita: «un modello di lucidità narrativa... e di prosa semplice,
esatta e rapida (Scritti filosofici inediti, p. 3)» Nel campo delle
scienze poi ha lasciato orme indelebili in vari campi: nella filosofia, nella
matematica, nell'ottica, nell'astronomia, nella medicina ecc. Galileo Galilei
fu suo grande amico, e non disdegnò di appellarlo: Mio Maestro. Dinanzi al
primo avvertimento a Galilei nel 1616, Sarpi (che non visse abbastanza a lungo
per assistere alla condanna del 1633) scrisse: «Verrà il giorno, e ne
sono quasi certo, che gli uomini, da studi resi migliori, deploreranno la
disgrazia di Galileo e l'ingiustizia resa a sì grande uomo.» Sarpi
scoperse, per primo, la dilatabilità della pupilla sotto l'azione della luce e
le valvole delle vene (Enciclopedia Treccani, vol. XXX, p. 879). I suoi
biografi parlano anche di scoperte nel campo dell'anatomia, dell'ottica, ecc.
L'invenzione del telescopio - dice Bianchi-Giovini - il Galilei la dovette per
certo ai lumi somministratigli dal Sarpi, se pure questi non ne fu il primo
inventore, come pensano alcuni (v. p. 74). Sopra la sua sapienza matematica si
citava l'autorevole giudizio di Galileo Galilei (Papini, p. 4). Robertson non
ha stentato ad appellare Sarpi il più grande dei veneziani. Daniel Georg Morhof
ha appellato Sarpi la Fenice del suo tempo. Galileo Galilei non esitò a
dire: Paolo de' Servi... del quale posso senza iperbole alcuna affermare che
niuno l'avanza in Europa in cognizione di queste scienze (matematiche) (contro
alle calunnie ed imposture di B. Capra, in ediz. naz., Firenze, 1932, II, 549).
La teoria di Galileo delle maree, successivamente dimostratasi erronea,
riprende idee di Sarpi, esposte nei Pensieri naturali, metafisici e matematici
(in particolare nei pensieri 569 e 571). Giovanni Battista Della Porta,
dopo aver dichiarato di avere appreso alcune cose da Fra Paolo, lo proclamò
splendore ed ornamento non solo della città di Venezia e dell'Italia, ma di
tutto il mondo. (Magia naturalis, L. VII, p. 127). Il cardinale Domenico
Passionei definì il Sarpi dottissimo oltre ogni espressione (cfr. Opuscoli, I,
p. 331-334). Un busto regalato alla città di Udine nel 1912 dai
Mazziniani italiani emigrati in Argentina. In uno studio il cui intento era
quello di misurare il Q.I. di 300 personaggi famosi vissuti tra il 1450 e il
1850, Sarpi si posizionò al quinto posto, al pari del più noto matematico
Pascal (cit. "The Early Mental Traits of Three Hundred Geniuses" di
Catharine M. Cox, in "Genetic Studies of Genius" di Lewis M. Terman.
Copyright 1926, Stanford University Press). Sarpi e la Chiesa Il Sarpi
alla grande intelligenza unì anche - come riconosciutagli da tutti -
un'esemplare integrità di vita. Arturo Carlo Jemolo, dopo essersi rivolto varie
domande intorno alla sua ortodossia, ha dato questa risposta: «Gli
elementi ci mancano per una risposta perentoria: noi non possiamo dissipare
l'alone di mistero che circonda Fra Paolo. - Questo non c'impedisce di ammirare
l'uomo e l'opera...» (Arturo Carlo Jemolo, p. (10).) Fondamentalmente lo
scontro di Paolo Sarpi con la Curia romana fu legato ad un progetto politico
volto a contenere il potere della Chiesa in ambito esclusivamente spirituale e
a promuovere un'alleanza tra Venezia e la Francia in un'ottica antimperiale e
fortemente antispagnola. Per questo intrattenne contatti con i riformati
(Lettere ai protestanti). Inoltre la sua visione della Chiesa era un vago
ritorno verso la chiesa primitiva: egli quindi era indotto a condannare il
potere temporale, il processo di mondanizzazione del clero, la superiorità del
papa sul Concilio. Nel 1616 il Sarpi strinse amicizia con Marcantonio de
Dominis, arcivescovo di Spalato, che tendeva all'apostasia. Quest'ultimo nel
1619 pubblicò a Londra, senza il consenso dell'autore, la sua Istoria del
Concilio Tridentino, che costituisce il suo capolavoro storico ed offre la
prima imponente ricostruzione del Concilio di Trento. Il 22 novembre 1619
l'opera fu condannata dalla Congregazione dell'Indice e quindi posta all'Indice
dei libri proibiti. Nel 1611 furono intercettate dal nunzio pontificio a
Parigi mons. Roberto Ubaldini «compromettenti carteggi di Sarpi con
l'ambasciatore veneziano Antonio Foscarini e con l'ugonotto Francesco Castrino;
carteggi ben presto inviati a Roma per essere messi a disposizione del
Sant'Uffizio, ma anche da utilizzare per far ammettere una buona volta al
governo veneziano quanto da tempo da Roma si veniva denunciando, che quel
frate, che si proclamava più cattolico del Papa e come tale difeso ufficialmente
dai responsabili politici veneziani, altri non era che un protestante, al
servizio delle forze ereticali europee: dunque infedele e ipocrita. Una taccia
di ipocrisia che non darà tregua alla figura sarpiana lungo i secoli, come
stanno a provare innumerevoli esempi, dal dotto curiale Girolamo Aleandro, che
ricevuta da Nicolas de Peiresc nel 1624 la sarpiana Istoria dell'Interdetto
appena edita rispondeva all'illustre erudito francese con fare perentorio
che quel fra Paolo servita [...] era nero ministro del Diavolo che si
dice esser padre delle menzogna, se ben egli veramente non credeva né nel
Diavolo né in Dio[31], al prelato friulano Giusto Fontanini con la sua
velenosa Storia arcana della vita di Fra Paolo Sarpi servita, al celebre cardinal
Domenico Passionei, che credeva di avere le carte per dimostrare che l'idea del
frate furfante era di introdurre il calvinismo in Venezia, come ancora
ricordava nel secolo scorso il dotto cardinale Angelo Mercati.»[32] Un
parere analogo si trova anche nella recente Storia della Chiesa di Ludwig
Hertling e Angiolino Bulla, dove Sarpi viene definito: «un ipocrita che fino
all'ultimo fece la parte del religioso, sebbene nel suo intimo si fosse da
tempo allontanato dalla Chiesa.»[33] Opere Trattato dell'interdetto di
Paolo V nel quale si dimostra che non è legittimamente pubblicato, 1606.
Apologia per le opposizioni fatte dal cardinale Bellarmino ai trattati et
risolutioni di G. Gersone sopra la validità delle scomuniche, 1606.
Considerationi sopra le censure della santità del papa Paolo V contra la
Serenissima Repubblica di Venezia, 1606. Istoria del Concilio Tridentino, 1619.
Il trattato dell'immunità delle chiese (De iure asylorum), 1622. Discorso
dell'origine, forma, leggi ed uso dell'Uffizio dell'Inquisizione nella città e
dominio di Venezia, 1638. Trattato delle materie beneficiarie, 1676. Opinione
del Padre Paolo Servita, come debba governarsi la Repubblica Veneziana per
havere il perpetuo dominio, Venezia, 1681. La storiografia recente attribuisce
lo scritto al patriziato veneziano medesimo[34] Edizioni Scritti
giurisdizionalistici, 1958 Istoria del Concilio Tridentino, 1619. Istoria del
Concilio tridentino, In Geneua, Pierre Aubert, 1629. Istoria del Concilio
Tridentino, 3 voll., Franco Pagnoni Editore, Milano, 1895. Giovanni Gambarin (a
cura di), Istoria del Concilio tridentino, Scrittori d'Italia 151, vol. 1,
Bari, Laterza, 1935. Giovanni Gambarin (a cura di), Istoria del Concilio
tridentino, Scrittori d'Italia 152, vol. 2, Bari, Laterza, 1935. Giovanni
Gambarin (a cura di), Istoria del Concilio tridentino, Scrittori d'Italia 153,
vol. 3, Bari, Laterza, 1935. Istoria del Concilio Tridentino, 2 voll., testo
critico di Giovanni Gambarin, introduzione di Renzo Pecchioli, Collana
Biblioteca, Sansoni, Firenze, 1966, pp. 1086; II ed. 1982. Lettere inedite di
Fra Paolo Sarpi a Simone Contarini ambasciatore veneto in Roma, 1615,
pubblicate dagli autografi, Monumenti storici pubblicati dalla R. Deputazione
veneta di storia patria. Serie 4, Miscellanea 12, Venezia, Fratelli Visentini,
1892. Pagine scelte, a cura di Arturo Carlo Jemolo, Vallecchi, Firenze, 1924,
pp.71. Lettere ai protestanti, Scrittori d'Italia 136, vol. 1, Bari, Laterza,
1931. Lettere ai protestanti, Scrittori d'Italia 137, vol. 2, Bari, Laterza,
1931. Antologia degli scritti politici e storici. A cura di Francesco T.
Roffarè, CEDAM, Padova, 1937, pp. 118. Istoria dell'Interdetto e altri scritti
editi e inediti, Bari, Laterza, 1940. Istoria dell'interdetto, Scrittori
d'Italia 179, vol. 1, Bari, Laterza, 1940. Istoria dell'interdetto, Scrittori
d'Italia 180, vol. 2, Bari, Laterza, 1940. Istoria dell'interdetto, Scrittori
d'Italia 181, vol. 3, Bari, Laterza, 1940. Romano Amerio (a cura di), Scritti
filosofici e teologici, Scrittori d'Italia 202, Bari, Laterza, 1951. Pensieri
naturali, metafisici e matematici. Manoscritto dell'iride e del calore - Arte
di ben pensare - Pensieri medico-morali - Pensieri sulla religione - Fabulae -
Massime e altri scritti. Edizione integrale commentata a cura di Luisa Cozzi e
Libero Sosio, Ricciardi, Milano-Napoli, 1951-1956-1996, ISBN 978-88-78-17504-4,
pp. XCIV-902. Scritti giurisdizionalistici, Scrittori d'Italia 216, Bari,
Laterza, 1958. Lettere ai Gallicani, a cura di Boris Ulianich, Wiesbaden, F.
Steiner, 1961. La Repubblica di Venezia la casa d'Austria e gli Uscocchi, Bari,
Laterza, 1965. Scritti scelti: Istoria dell'Interdetto, Consulti, Lettere, a
cura di Giovanni Da Pozzo, Collezione di Classici Italiani n.14, UTET, Torino,
I ed. 1968- 1974-1982, ISBN 978-88-02-01847-8, pp. 708. Storici, Politici, e
Moralisti del Seicento, a cura di Luisa e Gaetano Cozzi, Collana La Letteratura
Italiana. Storia e Testi vol.35, Milano-Napoli, Ricciardi, 1969-1997. Istoria
del Concilio Tridentino. Seguita dalla «Vita del padre Paolo» di Fulgenzio
Micanzio. A cura di Corrado Vivanti, 2 voll., Collana NUE n.156, Einaudi,
Torino, 1974, pp. CLX-XV-1472; Collana Piccola Biblioteca. Nuova Serie,
Einaudi, Torino, 2011, ISBN 978-88-06-20875-2. Pensieri. A cura di Gaetano e
Luisa Cozzi, Collana Classici Ricciardi, Torino, 1976, ISBN 978-88-06-45039-7,
pp. CXLVI-74. Considerazioni sopra le censure di papa Paolo V contro la
Repubblica di Venezia e altri scritti sull'Interdetto, a cura di Gaetano e
Luisa Cozzi, Collana Classici Ricciardi, Einaudi, Torino, 1977, ISBN
978-88-06-48223-7, pp. XIII-91. Lettere a Gallicani e Protestanti, Relazione
dello Stato della Relazione, Trattato delle Materie Beneficiarie. A cura di
Gaetano e Luisa Cozzi, Collana Classici Ricciardi, Einaudi, Torino, 1978, ISBN
978-88-06-10900-4, pp. 217. Gli ultimi consulti. 1612-1623. A cura di Gaetano e
Luisa Cozzi, Collana Classici Ricciardi n.100, Einaudi, Torino, 1979, ISBN
978-88-06-24976-2, pp. 122. Dai «Consulti», il carteggio con l'ambasciatore
inglese sir Dudley Carleston. A cura di Gaetano e Luisa Cozzi, Collana Classici
Ricciardi, Einaudi, Torino, 1979, ISBN 978-88-06-12971-2, pp. XIV-253. Dal
«Trattato di pace et accomodamento» e altri scritti sulla pace d'Italia.
1617-1620. A cura di Gaetano e Luisa Cozzi, Collana Classici Ricciardi,
Einaudi, Torino, 1979, pp. XII-138. Consulti, 2 voll., a cura di Corrado Pin,
Pisa-Roma, Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 2001. Letteratura
e vita civile. Paolo Sarpi, Collana I Classici del Pensiero Italiano n. 23,
Edizione speciale per Il Sole 24 Ore, Milano, 2006, pp. XIII-562. Della potestà
de' prencipi, a cura di Nina Cannizzaro, Collana I Giorni, Marsilio, Venezia,
2007. Scritti filosofici inediti. Tratti da un manoscritto della Marciana a
cura di G. Papini, Collana Cultura dell'anima, Rocco Carabba, Editore Lanciano,
2008 (ristampa anastatica del 1910), ISBN 978-88-63-44004-1, pp. 126.
Manoscritti Consulti: incipit - vol. III, p. 17, XVII secolo, Milano,
Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense, Fondo manoscritti, AG.X.3/11.1. Consulti: vol.
III, p. 18 - vol. VI, p. 99, XVII secolo, Milano, Biblioteca Nazionale
Braidense, Fondo manoscritti, AG.X.3/11.2. Consulti: vol. VI, p. 100 -
explicit, XVII secolo, Milano, Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense, Fondo
manoscritti, AG.X.3/11.3. Note ^ O. Ceretti, Cinque pugnali non bastarono a
troncare la sua parola, in «Historia», 264, febbraio 1980 ^ Touring club
italiano, Touring Editore, 1982 pp 450 ^ F. Micanzio, Vita del padre Paolo, in
«Istoria del Concilio tridentino», Torino 1974, p. 1275 F. Micanzio,
cit., p. 1276 ^ F. Micanzio, cit., p. 1278 ^ F. Micanzio, cit., pp. 1277-78 ^
F. Micanzio, cit., p. 1279 Ibidem ^ F. Micanzio, cit., p. 1280 ^ F.
Micanzio, cit., p. 1281 ^ F. Micanzio, cit., p. 1290 ^ F. Micanzio, cit., p.
1295 ^ F. Micanzio, cit., p. 1296 ^ F. Micanzio, cit., p. 1308 ^ F. Micanzio,
cit., p. 1296. Scriveva tra l'altro Sarpi nella lettera: «E che volete ch'io
speri in Roma, ove li soli ruffiani, cenedi et altri ministri di piaceri o di
guadagni hanno ventura?». I cenedi sono i giovani che si prostituiscono ^ F.
Micanzio, cit., p. 1298 ^ G, Cozzi, in Paolo Sarpi, Opere, 1969, p. 28 ^ F.
Micanzio, cit., p. 1328 ^ P. Sarpi, Istoria dell'interdetto e altri scritti
editi e inediti, 1940, p. 51 ^ Ivi, p. 52 ^ F. Micanzio, cit., p. 1346 ^ Ivi,
p. 1347 ^ Ivi, p. 1348 ^ Ivi, p. 1350 ^ Ivi, p. 1351, dove stilo può
significare sia stile che stiletto ^ Ivi, p. 1364 ^ G. Cozzi, cit., p. 227 ^
Lettere a Groslot de l'Isle, in «Lettere ai protestanti», I, pp. 18 e 78 ^ Ivi,
p. 120 ^ Lettera a Francesco Castrino, 18 agosto 1609, in «Lettere ai
protestanti», II, pp. 46-47 ^ Citato in C. Rizza, Peiresc e l'Italia, Torino,
Giappichelli, 1965, p. 74. ^ Corrado Pin, Paolo Sarpi senza maschera: l'avvio
della lotta politica dopo l'Interdetto del 1606, in Marie Viallon (a cura di),
Paolo Sarpi. Politique et religion en Europe, Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2010,
pp. 65-66, ISBN 9782812401244. ^ Ludwig Hertling e Angiolino Bulla, Storia
della Chiesa. La penetrazione dello spazio umano ad opera del cristianesimo,
Città Nuova, 2001, p. 391, ISBN 9788831192583. ^ Borgna Romain, Faggion Lucien
(dir.), Le Prince de Fra' Paolo. Pratiques politiques et forma mentis du
patriciat à Venise au XVII° Siécle, Aix-en-Provence, Université de Provence,
2011 Bibliografia Fulgenzio Micanzio, Vita del padre Paolo, dell'ordine de'
Servi e theologo della serenissima republ. di Venetia, Leida, 1646. Ed. moderna
in P. Sarpi, Istoria del Concilio tridentino, Torino, Einaudi, 1974 F.
Griselini, Memorie anedote spettanti alla vita ed agli studj del sommo filosofo
e giureconsulto f. Paolo Servita, Losanna, presso M. Mic. Bousquet e Comp.,
1760; F. Griselini, Del genio di f. Paolo Sarpi in ogni facolta scientifica e
nelle dottrine ortodosse tendenti alla difesa dell'originario diritto de' sovrani
né loro rispettivi dominj ad intento che colle leggi dell'ordine vi rifiorisca
la pubblica prosperita, Venezia, Basaglia, 1785 P. Zerletti, Storia arcana
della vita di Fra Paolo Sarpi servita scritta da Monsignor Giusto Fontanini,
arcivescovo d'Ancira in partibus e documenti relativi, Venezia, 1803 P.
Cassani, Paolo Sarpi e le scienze matematiche naturali, Venezia, 1822 A.
Bianchi-Giovini, Biografia di Fra Paolo Sarpi, Basilea, 1847 - Disponibile
on-line R. Morghen, Paolo Sarpi, in «Enciclopedia Treccani», vol. XXX, p. 879
G. Getto, Paolo Sarpi, Firenze, Olschki 1967 Mario Gliozzi Relazioni
scientifiche fra Paolo Sarpi e Giovan Battista Porta Archives Internationales
d'Histoire des Sciences 3, pp. 395–433, 1948 Gaetano Cozzi, Paolo Sarpi tra
Venezia e l'Europa, Collana Piccola Biblioteca, Torino, Einaudi, 1978. D.
Wootton, Paolo Sarpi between Renaissance and Enlightenment, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1983 V. Frajese, Sarpi scettico. Stato e Chiesa a
Venezia tra Cinque e Seicento, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1994 I. Cacciavillani, I
consulti di Paolo Sarpi sulla Vangadizza, Padova, CEDAM, 1994 ISBN
88-13-18963-X I. Cacciavillani, Paolo Sarpi, Venezia, Fiore, 1997 ISBN
88-7086-080-9 I. Cacciavillani, Paolo Sarpi. La guerre delle scritture del 1606
e la nascita della nuova Europa, Venezia, Fiore, 2005 ISBN 88-7086-123-6 I.
Cacciavillani, Sarpi giurista, Padova, CEDAM, 2002 ISBN 88-13-24252-2 C. Pin,
Ripensando Paolo Sarpi, Venezia, Ateneo veneto, 2006 Voci correlate Concilio di
Trento Fulgenzio Micanzio Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource
contiene una pagina dedicata a Paolo Sarpi Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote
contiene citazioni di o su Paolo Sarpi Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia
Commons contiene immagini o altri file su Paolo Sarpi Collegamenti esterni
Paolo Sarpi, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Paolo Sarpi, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Paolo Sarpi, in Dizionario di
storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2010. Modifica su Wikidata (EN)
Paolo Sarpi, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica
su Wikidata Paolo Sarpi, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Paolo Sarpi, su BeWeb,
Conferenza Episcopale Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Paolo Sarpi, su
Liber Liber. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Paolo Sarpi, su Open Library,
Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Paolo Sarpi, in Catholic
Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. Modifica su Wikidata Opere integrali in
più volumi dalla collana digitalizzata "Scrittori d'Italia" Laterza
Per l'epistolario di Paolo Sarpi, consultare il portale: correspondance-sarpi.univ-st-etienne.fr
(Marie Viallon, dir.) Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 76363633 · ISNI (EN) 0000
0001 1557 1576 · SBN IT\ICCU\RAVV\043315 · LCCN (EN) n79124620 · GND (DE)
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35476266 · BAV (EN) 495/38224 · CERL cnp00883241 · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n79124620 Biografie Portale Biografie Cattolicesimo Portale Cattolicesimo
Storia Portale Storia Categorie: Religiosi italianiTeologi italianiStorici
italiani del XVI secoloStorici italiani del XVII secoloNati nel 1552Morti nel
1623Nati il 14 agostoMorti il 15 gennaioNati a VeneziaMorti a VeneziaScienziati
italianiServitiStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di PadovaCanonisti
italianiSepolti nel Cimitero di San Michele di Venezia[altre]. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Sarpi," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
satisfactoriness-condition: a state of affairs or “way things are,” most commonly
referred to in relation to something that implies or is implied by it. Let p,
q, and r be schematic letters for declarative sentences; and let P, Q, and R be
corresponding nominalizations; e.g., if p is ‘snow is white’, then P would be
‘snow’s being white’. P can be a necessary or sufficient condition of Q in any
of several senses. In the weakest sense P is a sufficient condition of Q iff if
and only if: if p then q or if P is actual then Q is actual where the conditional is to be read as
“material,” as amounting merely to not-p & not-q. At the same time Q is a
necessary condition of P iff: if not-q then not-p. It follows that P is a
sufficient condition of Q iff Q is a necessary condition of P. Stronger senses
of sufficiency and of necessity are definable, in terms of this basic sense, as
follows: P is nomologically sufficient necessary for Q iff it follows from the
laws of nature, but not without them, that if p then q that if q then p. P is
alethically or metaphysically sufficient necessary for Q iff it is alethically
or metaphysically necessary that if p then q that if q then p. However, it is
perhaps most common of all to interpret conditions in terms of subjunctive
conditionals, in such a way that P is a sufficient condition of Q iff P would
not occur unless Q occurred, or: if P should occur, Q would; and P is a
necessary condition of Q iff Q would not occur unless P occurred, or: if Q
should occur, P would. -- satisfaction,
an auxiliary semantic notion introduced by Tarski in order to give a recursive
definition of truth for languages containing quantifiers. Intuitively, the
satisfaction relation holds between formulas containing free variables such as
‘Buildingx & Tallx’ and objects or sequences of objects such as the Empire
State Building if and only if the formula “holds of” or “applies to” the objects.
Thus, ‘Buildingx & Tallx’, is satisfied by all and only tall buildings, and
‘-Tallx1 & Tallerx1, x2’ is satisfied by any pair of objects in which the
first object corresponding to ‘x1’ is not tall, but nonetheless taller than the
second corresponding to ‘x2’. Satisfaction is needed when defining truth for
languages with sentences built from formulas containing free variables, because
the notions of truth and falsity do not apply to these “open” formulas. Thus,
we cannot characterize the truth of the sentences ‘Dx Buildingx & Tallx’
‘Some building is tall’ in terms of the truth or falsity of the open formula
‘Buildingx & Tallx’, since the latter is neither true nor false. But note
that the sentence is true if and only if the formula is satisfied by some
object. Since we can give a recursive definition of the notion of satisfaction
for possibly open formulas, this enables us to use this auxiliary notion in
defining truth. -- satisfiable, having a
common model, a structure in which all the sentences in the set are true; said
of a set of sentences. In modern logic, satisfiability is the semantic analogue
of the syntactic, proof-theoretic notion of consistency, the unprovability of
any explicit contradiction. The completeness theorem for first-order logic,
that all valid sentences are provable, can be formulated in terms of
satisfiability: syntactic consistency implies satisfiability. This theorem does
not necessarily hold for extensions of first-order logic. For any sound proof
system for secondorder logic there will be an unsatisfiable set of sentences
without there being a formal derivation of a contradiction from the set. This
follows from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. One of the central results of
model theory for first-order logic concerns satisfiability: the compactness
theorem, due to Gödel in 6, says that if every finite subset of a set of
sentences is satisfiable the set itself is satisfiable. It follows immediately
from his completeness theorem for first-order logic, and gives a powerful
method to prove the consistency of a set of sentences.
satisfice: to choose or do the good enough rather than the most
or the best. ‘Satisfice’, an obsolete variant of ‘satisfy’ (“much as
‘implicate’ is an explicated form of ‘imply’” – Grice) has been adopted by Simon
and others to designate nonoptimizing choice or action. According to some
economists, limitations of time or information may make it impossible or
inadvisable for an individual, firm, or state body to attempt to maximize
pleasure, profits, market share, revenues, or some other desired result, and
satisficing with respect to such results is then said to be rational, albeit
less than ideally rational. Although many orthodox economists think that choice
can and always should be conceived in maximizing or optimizing terms,
satisficing models have been proposed in economics, evolutionary biology, and
philosophy. Biologists have sometimes conceived evolutionary change as largely
consisting of “good enough” or satisficing adaptations to environmental
pressures rather than as proceeding through optimal adjustments to such
pressures, but in philosophy, the most frequent recent use of the idea of
satisficing has been in ethics and rational choice theory. Economists typically
regard satisficing as acceptable only where there are unwanted constraints on
decision making; but it is also possible to see satisficing as entirely
acceptable in itself, and in the field of ethics, it has recently been argued
that there may be nothing remiss about moral satisficing, e.g., giving a good
amount to charity, but less than one could give. It is possible to formulate
satisficing forms of utilitarianism on which actions are morally right even if
they contribute merely positively and/or in some large way, rather than
maximally, to overall net human happiness. Bentham’s original formulation of
the principle of utility and Popper’s negative utilitarianism are both examples
of satisficing utilitarianism in this sense
and it should be noted that satisficing utilitarianism has the putative
advantage over optimizing forms of allowing for supererogatory degrees of moral
excellence. Moreover, any moral view that treats moral satisficing as
permissible makes room for moral supererogation in cases where one optimally
goes beyond the merely acceptable. But since moral satisficing is less than
optimal moral behavior, but may be more meritorious than certain behavior that
in the same circumstances would be merely permissible, some moral satisficing
may actually count as supererogatory. In recent work on rational individual
choice, some philosophers have argued that satisficing may often be acceptable
in itself, rather than merely second-best. Even Simon allows that an
entrepreneur may simply seek a satisfactory return on investment or share of
the market, rather than a maximum under one of these headings. But a number of
philosophers have made the further claim that we may sometimes, without
irrationality, turn down the readily available better in the light of the
goodness and sufficiency of what we already have or are enjoying. Independently
of the costs of taking a second dessert, a person may be entirely satisfied
with what she has eaten and, though willing to admit she would enjoy that extra
dessert, turn it down, saying “I’m just fine as I am.” Whether such examples
really involve an acceptable rejection of the momentarily better for the good
enough has been disputed. However, some philosophers have gone on to say, even
more strongly, that satisficing can sometimes be rationally required and
optimizing rationally unacceptable. To keep on seeking pleasure from food or
sex without ever being thoroughly satisfied with what one has enjoyed can seem
compulsive and as such less than rational. If one is truly rational about such
goods, one isn’t insatiable: at some point one has had enough and doesn’t want
more, even though one could obtain further pleasure. The idea that satisficing
is sometimes a requirement of practical reason is reminiscent of Aristotle’s
view that moderation is inherently reasonable
rather than just a necessary means to later enjoyments and the avoidance
of later pain or illness, which is the way the Epicureans conceived moderation.
But perhaps the greatest advocate of satisficing is Plato, who argues in the
Philebus that there must be measure or limit to our desire for pleasure in
order for pleasure to count as a good thing for us. Insatiably to seek and
obtain pleasure from a given source is to gain nothing good from it. And
according to such a view, satisficing moderation is a necessary precondition of
human good and flourishing, rather than merely being a rational restraint on
the accumulation of independently conceived personal good or well-being.
Satisgrice: to satisfice in a Griceian fashion – after
C. E. L., of the Grice Club.
sceptis: Cicero translated as ‘dubitatio.’ For some
reason, Grice was irritated by Wood’s sobriquet of Russell as a “passionate
sceptic”: ‘an oxymoron.” The most specific essay by Grice on this is an essay
he kept after many years, that he delivered back in the day at Oxford,
entitled, “Scepticism and common sense.” Both were traditional topics at Oxford
at the time. Typically, as in the Oxonian manner, he chose two authors,
New-World’s Malcolm’s treatment of Old-World Moore, and brings in Austin’s
‘ordinary-language’ into the bargain. He also brings in his own obsession with
what an emissor communicates. In this case, the “p” is the philosopher’s
sceptical proposition, such as “That pillar box is red.” Grice thinks
‘dogmatic’ is the opposite of ‘sceptic,’ and he is right! Liddell and Scott
have “δόγμα,” from “δοκέω,” and which they render as “that which seems to one,
opinion or belief;” Pl.R.538c; “δ. πόλεως κοινόν;” esp. of philosophical
doctrines, Epicur.Nat.14.7; “notion,” Pl.Tht.158d; “decision, judgement,” Pl. Lg.926d; (pl.); public decree,
ordinance, esp. of Roman
Senatus-consulta, “δ. συγκλήτου” “δ. τῆς
βουλῆς” So note that there is nothing ‘dogmatic’ about ‘dogma,’ as it derives
from ‘dokeo,’ and is rendered as ‘that which seems to one.’ So the keyword
should be later Grecian, and in the adjectival ‘dogmatic.’ Liddell and Scott
have “δογματικός,” which they render as “of or for doctrines, didactic,
[διάλογοι] Quint.Inst.2.15.26, and “of persons, δ. ἰατροί,” “physicians who go
by general principles,” opp. “ἐμπειρικοί and μεθοδικοί,” Dsc.Ther.Praef.,
Gal.1.65; in Philosophy, S.E.M.7.1, D.L.9.70, etc.; “δ. ὑπολήψεις” Id.9.83; “δ.
φιλοσοφία” S.E. P.1.4. Adv. “-κῶς” D.L.9.74, S.E.P.1.197: Comp. “-κώτερον”
Id.M. 6.4. Why is Grice interested in scepticism. His initial concern, the one
that Austin would authorize, relates to ‘ordinary language.’ What if ‘ordinary
language’ embraces scepticism? What if it doesn’t? Strawso notes that the world
of ordinary language is a world of things, causes, and stuff. None of the good
stuff for the sceptic. what is Grice’s answer to the sceptic’s implicaturum?
The sceptic’s implicaturum is a topic that always fascinated Girce. While Grice
groups two essays as dealing with one single theme, strictly, only this or that
philosopher’s paradox (not all) may count as sceptical. This or that
philosopher’s paradox may well not be sceptical at all but rather dogmatic. In
fact, Grice defines philosophers paradox as anything repugnant to common sense,
shocking, or extravagant ‒ to Malcolms ears, that is! While it is, strictly,
slightly odd to quote this as a given date just because, by a stroke of the
pen, Grice writes that date in the Harvard volume, we will follow his
charming practice. This is vintage Grice. Grice always takes the
sceptics challenge seriously, as any serious philosopher should. Grices
takes both the sceptics explicatum and the scepticss implicaturum as
self-defeating, as a very affront to our idea of rationality, conversational or
other. V: Conversations with a sceptic: Can he be slightly more conversational
helpful? Hume’ sceptical attack is partial, and targeted only towards
practical reason, though. Yet, for Grice, reason is one. You cannot
really attack practical or buletic reason without attacking theoretical or
doxastic reason. There is such thing as a general rational acceptance, to use
Grice’s term, that the sceptic is getting at. Grice likes to play with the idea
that ultimately every syllogism is buletic or practical. If, say, a syllogism
by Eddington looks doxastic, that is because Eddington cares to omit the
practical tail, as Grice puts it. And Eddington is not even a philosopher, they
say. Grice is here concerned with a Cantabrigian topic popularised by
Moore. As Grice recollects, Some like Witters, but
Moore’s my man. Unlike Cambridge analysts such as Moore, Grice sees
himself as a linguistic-turn Oxonian analyst. So it is only natural that Grice
would connect time-honoured scepticism of Pyrrhos vintage, and common sense
with ordinary language, so mis-called, the elephant in Grices room. Lewis
and Short have “σκέψις,” f. σκέπτομαι, which they render as “viewing,
perception by the senses, ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ςκέψις, Pl. Phd. 83a;
observation of auguries; also as examination, speculation, consideration, τὸ
εὕρημα πολλῆς σκέψιος; βραχείας ςκέψις; ϝέμειν ςκέψις take thought of a
thing; ἐνθεὶς τῇ τέχνῃ ςκέψις; ςκέψις ποιεῖσθαι; ςκέψις προβέβληκας;
ςκέψις λόγων; ςκέψις περί τινος inquiry into, speculation on a thing;
περί τι Id. Lg. 636d;ἐπὶ σκέψιν τινὸς ἐλθεῖν; speculation, inquiry,ταῦτα
ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως; ἔξω τῆς νῦν ςκέψεως; οὐκ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης
ςκέψις; also hesitation, doubt, esp. of the Sceptic or Pyrthonic philosophers,
AP 7. 576 (Jul.); the Sceptic philosophy, S. E. P. 1.5; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
ςκέψεως, the Sceptics, ib. 229. in politics, resolution, decree, συνεδρίον
Hdn. 4.3.9, cf. Poll. 6.178. If scepticism attacks common sense and fails,
Grice seems to be implicating, that ordinary language philosophy is a good
antidote to scepticism. Since what language other than ordinary language does common
sense speak? Well, strictly, common sense doesnt speak. The man in the street
does. Grice addresses this topic in a Mooreian way in a later essay, also repr.
in Studies, Moore and philosophers paradoxes, repr. in Studies. As with
his earlier Common sense and scepticism, Grice tackles Moores and Malcolms
claim that ordinary language, so-called, solves a few of philosophers
paradoxes. Philosopher is Grices witty way to generalise over your
common-or-garden, any, philosopher, especially of the type he found eccentric,
the sceptic included. Grice finds this or that problem in this overarching
Cantabrigian manoeuvre, as over-simplifying a pretty convoluted
terrain. While he cherishes Austins Some like Witters, but Moores MY man!
Grice finds Moore too Cantabrigian to his taste. While an Oxonian thoroughbred,
Grice is a bit like Austin, Some like Witters, but Moores my man, with this or
that caveat. Again, as with his treatment of Descartes or Locke, Grice is
hardly interested in finding out what Moore really means. He is a philosopher,
not a historian of philosophy, and he knows it. While Grice agrees with Austins
implicaturum that Moore goes well above Witters, if that is the expression
(even if some like him), we should find the Oxonian equivalent to Moore. Grice
would not Names Ryle, since he sees him, and his followers, almost every day.
There is something apostolic about Moore that Grice enjoys, which is just as
well, seeing that Moore is one of the twelve. Grice found it amusing that
the members of The Conversazione Society would still be nickNamesd apostles
when their number exceeded the initial 12. Grice spends some time exploring
what Malcolm, a follower of Witters, which does not help, as it were, has to
say about Moore in connection with that particularly Oxonian turn of phrase,
such as ordinary language is. For Malcolms Moore, a paradox by philosopher
[sic], including the sceptic, arises when philosopher [sic], including the
sceptic, fails to abide by the dictates of ordinary language. It might merit some
exploration if Moore’s defence of common sense is against: the sceptic may be
one, but also the idealist. Moore the realist, armed with ordinary language
attacks the idealists claim. The idealist is sceptical of the realists claim.
But empiricist idealism (Bradley) has at Oxford as good pedigree as empiricist
realism (Cook Wilson). Malcolm’s simplifications infuriate Grice, and ordinary
language has little to offer in the defense of common sense realism against
sceptical empiricist idealism. Surely the ordinary man says ridiculous, or
silly, as Russell prefers, things, such as Smith is lucky, Departed spirits
walk along this road on their way to Paradise, I know there are infinite stars,
and I wish I were Napoleon, or I wish that I had been Napoleon, which
does not mean that the utterer wishes that he
were like Napoleon, but that he wishes that he had lived
not in the his century but in the XVIIIth century. Grice is being specific
about this. It is true that an ordinary use of language, as Malcolm suggests,
cannot be self-contradictory unless the ordinary use of language is defined by
stipulation as not self-contradictory, in which case an appeal to ordinary
language becomes useless against this or that paradox by Philosopher. I wish
that I had been Napoleon seems to involve nothing but an ordinary use of
language by any standard but that of freedom from absurdity. I wish
that I had been Napoleon is not, as far as Grice can see, philosophical, but
something which may have been said and meant by numbers of ordinary
people. Yet, I wish that I had been Napoleon is open to the suspicion of
self-contradictoriness, absurdity, or some other kind of
meaninglessness. And in this context suspicion is all Grice needs. By
uttering I wish that I had been Napoleon U hardly means the same as he
would if he uttered I wish I were like Napoleon. I wish that I had been
Napoleon is suspiciously self-contradictory, absurd, or meaningless, if, as
uttered by an utterer in a century other than the XVIIIth century, say, the
utterer is understood as expressing the proposition that the utterer wishes
that he had lived in the XVIIIth century, and not in his century, in which case
he-1 wishes that he had not been him-1? But blame it on the
buletic. That Moore himself is not too happy with Malcolms criticism can
be witnessed by a cursory glimpse at hi reply to Malcolm. Grice is totally
against this view that Malcolm ascribes to Moore as a view that is too broad to
even claim to be true. Grices implicaturum is that Malcolm is appealing to Oxonian
turns of phrase, such as ordinary language, but not taking proper Oxonian care
in clarifying the nuances and stuff in dealing with, admittedly, a non-Oxonian
philosopher such as Moore. When dealing with Moore, Grice is not necessarily
concerned with scepticism. Time is unreal, e.g. is hardly a sceptic utterance.
Yet Grice lists it as one of Philosophers paradoxes. So, there are various to
consider here. Grice would start with common sense. That is what he does when
he reprints this essay in WOW, with his attending note in both the preface and
the Retrospective epilogue on how he organizes the themes and strands. Common
sense is one keyword there, with its attending realism. Scepticism is another,
with its attending empiricist idealism. It is intriguing that in the first two
essays opening Grices explorations in semantics and metaphysics it seems its
Malcolm, rather than the dryer Moore, who interests Grice most. While he would
provide exegeses of this or that dictum by Moore, and indeed, Moore’s response
to Malcolm, Grice seems to be more concerned with applications of his own
views. Notably in Philosophers paradoxes. The fatal objection Grice finds for
the paradox propounder (not necessarily a sceptic, although a sceptic may be
one of the paradox propounders) significantly rests on Grices reductive
analysis of meaning that as ascribed to
this or that utterer U. Grice elaborates on circumstances that hell later take
up in the Retrospective epilogue. I find myself not understanding what I mean
is dubiously acceptable. If meaning, Grice claims, is about an utterer U
intending to get his addressee A to believe that U ψ-s that p, U must think
there is a good chance that A will recognise what he is supposed to believe,
by, perhaps, being aware of the Us practice or by a supplementary explanation
which might come from U. In which case, U should not be meaning what Malcolm
claims U might mean. No utterer should intend his addressee to believe what is
conceptually impossible, or incoherent, or blatantly false (Charles Is
decapitation willed Charles Is death.), unless you are Queen in Through the
Looking Glass. I believe five impossible things before breakfast, and I hope
youll soon get the proper training to follow suit. Cf. Tertulian, Credo, quia
absurdum est. Admittedly, Grice edits the Philosophers paradoxes essay. It is
only Grices final objection which is repr. in WOW, even if he provides a good
detailed summary of the previous sections. Grice appeals to Moore on later
occasions. In Causal theory, Grice lists, as a third philosophical
mistake, the opinion by Malcolm that Moore did not know how to use knowin a
sentence. Grice brings up the same example again in Prolegomena. The use of
factive know of Moore may well be a misuse. While at Madison, Wisconsin, Moore
lectures at a hall eccentrically-built with indirect lighting simulating sun
rays, Moore infamously utters, I know that there is a window behind that
curtain, when there is not. But it is not the factiveness Grice is aiming at,
but the otiosity Malcolm misdescribes in the true, if baffling, I know that I
have two hands. In Retrospective epilogue, Grice uses M to abbreviate Moore’s
fairy godmother – along with G (Grice), A (Austin), R (Ryle) and Q (Quine)! One
simple way to approach Grices quandary with Malcolm’s quandary with Moore is
then to focus on know. How can Malcolm claim that Moore is guilty of misusing
know? The most extensive exploration by Grice on know is in Grices third James
lecture (but cf. his seminar on Knowledge and belief, and his remarks on some
of our beliefs needing to be true, in Meaning revisited. The examinee
knows that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815. Nothing odd about that,
nor about Moores uttering I know that these are my hands. Grice is perhaps the
only one of the Oxonian philosophers of Austins play group who took common
sense realsim so seriously, if only to crticise Malcoms zeal with it. For
Grice, common-sense realism = ordinary language, whereas for the typical
Austinian, ordinary language = the language of the man in the street. Back at
Oxford, Grice uses Malcolm to contest the usual criticism that Oxford
ordinary-language philosophers defend common-sense realist assumptions just
because the way non-common-sense realist philosopher’s talk is not ordinary
language, and even at Oxford. Cf. Flews reference to Joness philosophical
verbal rubbish in using self as a noun. Grice is infuriated by all this unclear
chatter, and chooses Malcolms mistreatment of Moore as an example. Grice is
possibly fearful to consider Austins claims directly! In later essays, such as
‘the learned’ and ‘the lay,’ Grice goes back to the topic criticising now the
scientists jargon as an affront to the ordinary language of the layman that
Grice qua philosopher defends. scepticism, in the most common sense, the
refusal to grant that there is any knowledge or justification. Skepticism can
be either partial or total, either practical or theoretical, and, if
theoretical, either moderate or radical, and either of knowledge or of
justification. Skepticism is partial iff if and only if it is restricted to
particular fields of beliefs or propositions, and total iff not thus
restricted. And if partial, it may be highly restricted, as is the skepticism
for which religion is only opium, or much more general, as when not only is
religion called opium, but also history bunk and metaphysics meaningless.
Skepticism is practical iff it is an attitude of deliberately withholding both
belief and disbelief, accompanied perhaps but not necessarily by commitment to
a recommendation for people generally, that they do likewise. Practical
skepticism can of course be either total or partial, and if partial it can be
more or less general. Skepticism is theoretical iff it is a commitment to the
belief that there is no knowledge justified belief of a certain kind or of
certain kinds. Such theoretical skepticism comes in several varieties. It is
moderate and total iff it holds that there is no certain superknowledge
superjustified belief whatsoever, not even in logic or mathematics, nor through
introspection of one’s present experience. It is radical and total iff it holds
that there isn’t even any ordinary knowledge justified belief at all. It is
moderate and partial, on the other hand, iff it holds that there is no certain
superknowledge superjustified belief of a certain specific kind K or of certain
specific kinds K1, . . . , Kn less than the totality of such kinds. It is
radical and partial, finally, iff it holds that there isn’t even any ordinary
knowledge justified belief at all of that kind K or of those kinds K1, . . . ,
Kn. Grecian skepticism can be traced back to Socrates’ epistemic modesty.
Suppressed by the prolific theoretical virtuosity of Plato and Aristotle, such
modesty reasserted itself in the skepticism of the Academy led by Arcesilaus
and later by Carneades. In this period began a long controversy pitting
Academic Skeptics against the Stoics Zeno and later Chrysippus, and their
followers. Prolonged controversy, sometimes heated, softened the competing
views, but before agreement congealed Anesidemus broke with the Academy and
reclaimed the arguments and tradition of Pyrrho, who wrote nothing, but whose
Skeptic teachings had been preserved by a student, Timon in the third century
B.C.. After enduring more than two centuries, neoPyrrhonism was summarized,
c.200 A.D., by Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Adversus
mathematicos. Skepticism thus ended as a school, but as a philosophical
tradition it has been influential long after that, and is so even now. It has
influenced strongly not only Cicero Academica and De natura deorum, St.
Augustine Contra academicos, and Montaigne “Apology for Raimund Sebond”, but
also the great historical philosophers of the Western tradition, from Descartes
through Hegel. Both on the Continent and in the Anglophone sphere a new wave of
skepticism has built for decades, with logical positivism, deconstructionism,
historicism, neopragmatism, and relativism, and the writings of Foucault
knowledge as a mask of power, Derrida deconstruction, Quine indeterminacy and
eliminativism, Kuhn incommensurability, and Rorty solidarity over objectivity,
edification over inquiry. At the same time a rising tide of books and articles
continues other philosophical traditions in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics,
etc. It is interesting to compare the cognitive disengagement recommended by
practical skepticism with the affective disengagement dear to stoicism
especially in light of the epistemological controversies that long divided
Academic Skepticism from the Stoa, giving rise to a rivalry dominant in
Hellenistic philosophy. If believing and favoring are positive, with
disbelieving and disfavoring their respective negative counterparts, then the
magnitude of our happiness positive or unhappiness negative over a given matter
is determined by the product of our belief/disbelief and our
favoring/disfavoring with regard to that same matter. The fear of unhappiness
may lead one stoically to disengage from affective engagement, on either side
of any matter that escapes one’s total control. And this is a kind of practical
affective “skepticism.” Similarly, if believing and truth are positive, with
disbelieving and falsity their respective negative counterparts, then the
magnitude of our correctness positive or error negative over a given matter is
determined by the product of our belief/disbelief and the truth/falsity with
regard to that same matter where the positive or negative magnitude of the
truth or falsity at issue may be determined by some measure of “theoretical
importance,” though alternatively one could just assign all truths a value of
!1 and all falsehoods a value of †1. The fear of error may lead one skeptically
to disengage from cognitive engagement, on either side of any matter that
involves risk of error. And this is “practical cognitive skepticism.” We wish
to attain happiness and avoid unhappiness. This leads to the disengagement of
the stoic. We wish to attain the truth and avoid error. This leads to the
disengagement of the skeptic, the practical skeptic. Each opts for a
conservative policy, but one that is surely optional, given just the reasoning
indicated. For in avoiding unhappiness the stoic also forfeits a corresponding
possibility of happiness. And in avoiding error the skeptic also forfeits a
corresponding possibility to grasp a truth. These twin policies appeal to
conservatism in our nature, and will reasonably prevail in the lives of those
committed to avoiding risk as a paramount objective. For this very desire must
then be given its due, if we judge it rational. Skepticism is instrumental in
the birth of modern epistemology, and modern philosophy, at the hands of
Descartes, whose skepticism is methodological but sophisticated and well
informed by that of the ancients. Skepticism is also a main force, perhaps the
main force, in the broad sweep of Western philosophy from Descartes through
Hegel. Though preeminent in the history of our subject, skepticism since then
has suffered decades of neglect, and only in recent years has reclaimed much attention
and even applause. Some recent influential discussions go so far as to grant
that we do not know we are not dreaming. But they also insist one can still
know when there is a fire before one. The key is to analyze knowledge as a kind
of appropriate responsiveness to its object truth: what is required is that the
subject “track” through his belief the truth of what he believes. S tracks the
truth of P iff: S would not believe P if P were false. Such an analysis of
tracking, when conjoined with the view of knowledge as tracking, enables one to
explain how one can know about the fire even if for all one knows it is just a
dream. The crucial fact here is that even if P logically entails Q, one may
still be able to track the truth of P though unable to track the truth of Q.
Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 1. Many problems arise in the literature on
this approach. One that seems especially troubling is that though it enables us
to understand how contingent knowledge of our surroundings is possible, the
tracking account falls short of enabling an explanation of how such knowledge
on our part is actual. To explain how one knows that there is a fire before one
F, according to the tracking account one presumably would invoke one’s tracking
the truth of F. But this leads deductively almost immediately to the claim that
one is not dreaming: Not D. And this is not something one can know, according
to the tracking account. So how is one to explain one’s justification for
making that claim? Most troubling of all here is the fact that one is now
cornered by the tracking account into making combinations of claims of the
following form: I am quite sure that p, but I have no knowledge at all as to
whether p. And this seems incoherent. A Cartesian dream argument that has had
much play in recent discussions of skepticism is made explicit by Barry Stroud,
The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, 4 as follows. One knows that if
one knows F then one is not dreaming, in which case if one really knows F then
one must know one is not dreaming. However, one does not know one is not
dreaming. So one does not know F. Q.E.D. And why does one fail to know one is
not dreaming? Because in order to know it one would need to know that one has
passed some test, some empirical procedure to determine whether one is
dreaming. But any such supposed test
say, pinching oneself could just
be part of a dream, and dreaming one passes the test would not suffice to show
one was not dreaming. However, might one not actually be witnessing the fire,
and passing the test and be doing this
in wakeful life, not in a dream and
would that not be compatible with one’s knowing of the fire and of one’s
wakefulness? Not so, according to the argument, since in order to know of the
fire one needs prior knowledge of one’s wakefulness. But in order to know of
one’s wakefulness one needs prior knowledge of the results of the test
procedure. But this in turn requires prior knowledge that one is awake and not
dreaming. And we have a vicious circle. We might well hold that it is possible
to know one is not dreaming even in the absence of any positive test result, or
at most in conjunction with coordinate not prior knowledge of such a positive
indication. How in that case would one know of one’s wakefulness? Perhaps one
would know it by believing it through the exercise of a reliable faculty.
Perhaps one would know it through its coherence with the rest of one’s
comprehensive and coherent body of beliefs. Perhaps both. But, it may be urged,
if these are the ways one might know of one’s wakefulness, does not this answer
commit us to a theory of the form of A below? A The proposition that p is
something one knows believes justifiably if and only if one satisfies
conditions C with respect to it. And if so, are we not caught in a vicious
circle by the question as to how we know
what justifies us in believing A
itself? This is far from obvious, since the requirement that we must submit to
some test procedure for wakefulness and know ourselves to test positively,
before we can know ourselves to be awake, is itself a requirement that seems to
lead equally to a principle such as A. At least it is not evident why the
proposal of the externalist or of the coherentist as to how we know we are
awake should be any more closely related to a general principle like A than is
the foundationalist? notion that in order to know we are awake we need
epistemically prior knowledge that we test positive in a way that does not
presuppose already acquired knowledge of the external world. The problem of how
to justify the likes of A is a descendant of the infamous “problem of the
criterion,” reclaimed in the sixteenth century and again in this century by
Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 6, 7, and 8 but much used already by the
Skeptics of antiquity under the title of the diallelus. About explanations of
our knowledge or justification in general of the form indicated by A, we are
told that they are inadequate in a way revealed by examples like the following.
Suppose we want to know how we know anything at all about the external world,
and part of the answer is that we know the location of our neighbor by knowing
the location of her car in her driveway. Surely this would be at best the
beginning of an answer that might be satisfactory in the end if recursive,
e.g., but as it stands it cannot be satisfactory without supplementation. The
objection here is based on a comparison between two appeals: the appeal of a
theorist of knowledge to a principle like A in the course of explaining our
knowledge or justification in general, on one side; and the appeal to the car’s
location in explaining our knowledge of facts about the external world, on the
other side. This comparison is said to be fatal to the ambition to explain our
knowledge or justification in general. But are the appeals relevantly
analogous? One important difference is this. In the example of the car, we
explain the presence, in some subject S, of a piece of knowledge of a certain
kind of the external world by appeal to the presence in S of some other piece
of knowledge of the very same kind. So there is an immediate problem if it is
our aim to explain how any knowledge of the sort in question ever comes to be
unless the explication is just beginning, and is to turn recursive in due
course. Now of course A is theoretically ambitious, and in that respect the
theorist who gives an answer of the form of A is doing something similar to
what must be done by the protagonist in our car example, someone who is
attempting to provide a general explanation of how any knowledge of a certain
kind comes about. Nevertheless, there is also an important difference, namely
that the theorist whose aim it is to give a general account of the form of A
need not attribute any knowledge whatsoever to a subject S in explaining how
that subject comes to have a piece of knowledge or justified belief. For there
is no need to require that the conditions C appealed to by principle A must be
conditions that include attribution of any knowledge at all to the subject in
question. It is true that in claiming that A itself meets conditions C, and
that it is this which explains how one knows A, we do perhaps take ourselves to
know A or at least to be justified in believing it. But if so, this is the
inevitable lot of anyone who seriously puts forward any explanation of
anything. And it is quite different from a proposal that part of what explains
how something is known or justifiably believed includes a claim to knowledge or
justified belief of the very same sort. In sum, as in the case of one’s belief
that one is awake, the belief in something of the form of A may be said to be
known, and in so saying one does not commit oneself to adducing an ulterior
reason in favor of A, or even to having such a reason in reserve. One is of
course committed to being justified in believing A, perhaps even to having
knowledge that A. But it is not at all clear that the only way to be justified
in believing A is by way of adduced reasons in favor of A, or that one knows A
only if one adduces strong enough reasons in its favor. For we often know
things in the absence of such adduced reasons. Thus consider one’s knowledge
through memory of which door one used to come into a room that has more than
one open door. Returning finally to A, in its case the explanation of how one
knows it may, once again, take the form of an appeal to the justifying power of
intellectual virtues or of coherence or
both. Recent accounts of the nature of thought and representation undermine a tradition
of wholesale doubt about nature, whose momentum is hard to stop, and threatens
to leave the subject alone and restricted to a solipsism of the present moment.
But there may be a way to stop skepticism early
by questioning the possibility of its being sensibly held, given what is
required for meaningful language and thought. Consider our grasp of observable
shape and color properties that objects around us might have. Such grasp seems
partly constituted by our discriminatory abilities. When we discern a shape or
a color we do so presumably in terms of a distinctive impact that such a shape
or color has on us. We are put systematically into a certain distinctive state
X when we are appropriately related, in good light, with our eyes open, etc.,
to the presence in our environment of that shape or color. What makes one’s
distinctive state one of thinking of sphericity rather than something else, is
said to be that it is a state tied by systematic causal relations to skepticism
skepticism 849 849 the presence of
sphericity in one’s normal environment. A light now flickers at the end of the
skeptic’s tunnel. In doubt now is the coherence of traditional skeptical
reflection. Indeed, our predecessors in earlier centuries may have moved in the
wrong direction when they attempted a reduction of nature to the mind. For
there is no way to make sense of one’s mind without its contents, and there is
no way to make sense of how one’s mind can have such contents except by appeal
to how one is causally related to one’s environment. If the very existence of
that environment is put in doubt, that cuts the ground from under one’s ability
reasonably to characterize one’s own mind, or to feel any confidence about its
contents. Perhaps, then, one could not be a “brain in a vat.” Much contemporary
thought about language and the requirements for meaningful language thus
suggests that a lot of knowledge must already be in place for us to be able to
think meaningfully about a surrounding reality, so as to be able to question
its very existence. If so, then radical skepticism answers itself. For if we
can so much as understand a radical skepticism about the existence of our
surrounding reality, then we must already know a great deal about that
reality. Sceptics, those ancient thinkers
who developed sets of arguments to show either that no knowledge is possible
Academic Skepticism or that there is not sufficient or adequate evidence to
tell if any knowledge is possible. If the latter is the case then these
thinkers advocated suspending judgment on all question concerning knowledge
Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Academic Skepticism gets its name from the fact that it
was formulated in Plato’s Academy in the third century B.C., starting from
Socrates’ statement, “All I know is that I know nothing.” It was developed by
Arcesilaus c.268241 and Carneades c.213129, into a series of arguments,
directed principally against the Stoics, purporting to show that nothing can be
known. The Academics posed a series of problems to show that what we think we
know by our senses may be unreliable, and that we cannot be sure about the
reliability of our reasoning. We do not possess a guaranteed standard or
criterion for ascertaining which of our judgments is true or false. Any
purported knowledge claim contains some element that goes beyond immediate
experience. If this claim constituted knowledge we would have to know something
that could not possibly be false. The evidence for the claim would have to be
based on our senses and our reason, both of which are to some degree
unreliable. So the knowledge claim may be false or doubtful, and hence cannot
constitute genuine knowledge. So, the Academics said that nothing is certain.
The best we can attain is probable information. Carneades is supposed to have
developed a form of verification theory and a kind of probabilism, similar in
some ways to that of modern pragmatists and positivists. Academic Skepticism
dominated the philosophizing of Plato’s Academy until the first century B.C.
While Cicero was a student there, the Academy turned from Skepticism to a kind
of eclectic philosophy. Its Skeptical arguments have been preserved in Cicero’s
works, Academia and De natura deorum, in Augustine’s refutation in his Contra
academicos, as well as in the summary presented by Diogenes Laertius in his
lives of the Grecian philosophers. Skeptical thinking found another home in the
school of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, probably connected with the Methodic school
of medicine in Alexandria. The Pyrrhonian movement traces its origins to Pyrrho
of Elis c.360275 B.C. and his student Timon c.315225 B.C.. The stories about
Pyrrho indicate that he was not a theoretician but a practical doubter who
would not make any judgments that went beyond immediate experience. He is
supposed to have refused to judge if what appeared to be chariots might strike
him, and he was often rescued by his students because he would not make any
commitments. His concerns were apparently ethical. He sought to avoid
unhappiness that might result from accepting any value theory. If the theory
was at all doubtful, accepting it might lead to mental anguish. The theoretical
formulation of Pyrrhonian Skepticism is attributed to Aenesidemus c.100 40
B.C.. Pyrrhonists regarded dogmatic philosophers and Academic Skeptics as
asserting too much, the former saying that something can be known and the
latter that nothing can be known. The Pyrrhonists suspended judgments on all
questions on which there was any conflicting evidence, including whether or not
anything could be known. The Pyrrhonists used some of the same kinds of
arguments developed by Arcesilaus and Carneades. Aenesidemus and those who
followed after him organized the arguments into sets of “tropes” or ways of
leading to suspense of judgment on various questions. Sets of ten, eight, five,
and two tropes appear in the only surviving writing of the Pyrrhonists, the
works of Sextus Empiricus, a third-century A.D. teacher of Pyrrhonism. Each set
of tropes offers suggestions for suspending judgment about any knowledge claims
that go beyond appearances. The tropes seek to show that for any claim,
evidence for and evidence against it can be offered. The disagreements among
human beings, the variety of human experiences, the fluctuation of human
judgments under differing conditions, illness, drunkenness, etc., all point to
the opposition of evidence for and against each knowledge claim. Any criterion
we employ to sift and weigh the evidence can also be opposed by
countercriterion claims. Given this situation, the Pyrrhonian Skeptics sought
to avoid committing themselves concerning any kind of question. They would not
even commit themselves as to whether the arguments they put forth were sound or
not. For them Skepticism was not a statable theory, but rather an ability or
mental attitude for opposing evidence for and against any knowledge claim that
went beyond what was apparent, that dealt with the non-evident. This opposing
produced an equipollence, a balancing of the opposing evidences, that would
lead to suspending judgment on any question. Suspending judgment led to a state
of mind called “ataraxia,” quietude, peace of mind, or unperturbedness. In such
a state the Skeptic was no longer concerned or worried or disturbed about
matters beyond appearances. The Pyrrhonians averred that Skepticism was a cure
for a disease called “dogmatism” or rashness. The dogmatists made assertions
about the non-evident, and then became disturbed about whether these assertions
were true. The disturbance became a mental disease or disorder. The
Pyrrhonians, who apparently were medical doctors, offered relief by showing the
patient how and why he should suspend judgment instead of dogmatizing. Then the
disease would disappear and the patient would be in a state of tranquillity,
the peace of mind sought by Hellenistic dogmatic philosophers. The Pyrrhonists,
unlike the Academic Skeptics, were not negative dogmatists. The Pyrrhonists
said neither that knowledge is possible nor that it is impossible. They
remained seekers, while allowing the Skeptical arguments and the equipollence
of evidences to act as a purge of dogmatic assertions. The purge eliminates all
dogmas as well as itself. After this the Pyrrhonist lives undogmatically,
following natural inclinations, immediate experience, and the laws and customs
of his society, without ever judging or committing himself to any view about
them. In this state the Pyrrhonist would have no worries, and yet be able to
function naturally and according to law and custom. The Pyrrhonian movement
disappeared during the third century A.D., possibly because it was not
considered an alternative to the powerful religious movements of the time. Only
scant traces of it appear before the Renaissance, when the texts of Sextus and
Cicero were rediscovered and used to formulate a modern skeptical view by such
thinkers as Montaigne and Charron. Refs.:
The obvious source is the essay on scepticism in WoW, but there are allusions
in “Prejudices and predilections, and elsewhere, in The H. P. Grice Papers,
BANC
otium -- schole – “The Grecian term for ‘otium.’” “Not
to be confused with ‘studium’ as in ‘studium generale.’ Scholasticism, a set of
scholarly and instructional techniques developed in Western European schools of
the late medieval period, including the use of commentary and disputed
question. ‘Scholasticism’ is derived from Latin scholasticus, which in the twelfth
century meant the master of a school. The Scholastic method is usually
presented as beginning in the law schools
notably at Bologna and as being
then transported into theology and philosophy by a series of masters including
Abelard and Peter Lombard. Within the new universities of the thirteenth
century the standardization of the curriculum and the enormous prestige of
Aristotle’s work despite the suspicion with which it was initially greeted
contributed to the entrenchment of the method and it was not until the
educational reforms of the beginning of the sixteenth century that it ceased to
be dominant. There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as Scholasticism. As
the term was originally used it presupposed that a single philosophy was taught
in the universities of late medieval Europe, but there was no such philosophy.
The philosophical movements working outside the universities in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the “neo-Scholastics” of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries all found such a presupposition
useful, and their influence led scholars to assume it. At first this generated
efforts to find a common core in the philosophies taught in the late medieval
schools. More recently it has led to efforts to find methods characteristic of
their teaching, and to an extension of the term to the schools of late
antiquity and of Byzantium. Both among the opponents of the schools in the
seventeenth century and among the “neoScholastics,” ‘Scholasticism’ was
supposed to designate a doctrine whose core was the doctrine of substance and
accidents. As portrayed by Descartes and Locke, the Scholastics accepted the
view that among the components of a thing were a substantial form and a number
of real accidental forms, many of which corresponded to perceptible properties
of the thing its color, shape,
temperature. They were also supposed to have accepted a sharp distinction
between natural and unnatural motion.
scire – sapio
-- sapientia: wisdom, an understanding
of the highest principles of things that functions as a guide for living a
truly exemplary human life. From the preSocratics through Plato this was a
unified notion. But Aristotle introduced a distinction between theoretical
wisdom sophia and practical wisdom phronesis, the former being the intellectual
virtue that disposed one to grasp the nature of reality in terms of its
ultimate causes metaphysics, the latter being the ultimate practical virtue
that disposed one to make sound judgments bearing on the conduct of life. The
former invoked a contrast between deep understanding versus wide information,
whereas the latter invoked a contrast between sound judgment and mere technical
facility. This distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom persisted
through the Middle Ages and continues to our own day, as is evident in our use
of the term ‘wisdom’ to designate both knowledge of the highest kind and the
capacity for sound judgment in matters of conduct. Grice: “The etymology of
‘sapientia’ is excellent – it’s like taste!” –
săpĭo , īvi or ĭi (sapui, Aug. Civ. Dei, 1,
10; id. Ep. 102, 10; but sapivi, Nov. ap. Prisc. p. 879 P.; id. ap. Non. 508,
21: I.“saPisti,” Mart. 9, 6, 7: “sapisset,” Plaut. Rud. 4, 1, 8), 3, v. n. and
a. [kindr. with ὀπός, σαφής, and σοφός], to taste, savor; to taste, smack, or
savor of, to have a taste or flavor of a thing (cf. gusto). I. Lit. (so only in
a few examples). 1. Of things eaten or drunk: “oleum male sapiet,” Cato, R. R.
66, 1: “occisam saepe sapere plus multo suem,” Plaut. Mil. 2, 6, 104: “quin
caseus jucundissime sapiat,” Col. 7, 8, 2: “nil rhombus nil dama sapit,” Juv.
11, 121.—With an acc. of that of or like which a thing tastes: “quis (piscis)
saperet ipsum mare,” Sen. Q. N. 3, 18, 2: “cum in Hispaniā multa mella herbam
eam sapiunt,” Plin. 11, 8, 8, § 18: “ipsum aprum (ursina),” Petr. 66, 6.—Poet.:
anas plebeium sapit, has a vulgar taste, Petr. poët. 93, 2: “quaesivit quidnam
saperet simius,” Phaedr. 3, 4, 3.—* 2. Of that which tastes, to have a taste or
a sense of taste (perh. so used for the sake of the play upon signif. II.):
“nec sequitur, ut, cui cor sapiat, ei non sapiat palatus,” Cic. Fin. 2, 8, 24.—
3. Transf., of smell, to smell of or like a thing (syn.: oleo, redoleo; very
rare): Cicero, Meliora, inquit, unguenta sunt, quae terram quam crocum sapiunt.
Hoc enim maluit dixisse quam redolent. Ita est profecto; “illa erit optima,
quae unguenta sapiat,” Plin. 17, 5, 3, § 38: “invenitur unguenta gratiosiora
esse, quae terram, quam quae crocum sapiunt,” id. 13, 3, 4, § 21.—In a lusus verbb.
with signif. II.: istic servus quid sapit? Ch. Hircum ab alis, Plaut. Ps. 2, 4,
47.— II. Trop. 1. To taste or smell of, savor of, i. e., a. To resemble (late
Lat.): “patruos,” Pers. 1, 11.— b. To suggest, be inspired by: “quia non sapis
ea quae Dei sunt,” Vulg. Matt. 16, 23; id. Marc. 8, 33.— c. Altum or alta
sapere, to be high-minded or proud: “noli altum sapere,” Vulg. Rom. 11, 20:
“non alta sapientes,” id. ib. 12, 16.— 2. To have good taste, i.e. to have
sense or discernment; to be sensible, discreet, prudent, wise, etc. (the
predominant signif. in prose and poetry; most freq. in the P. a.). (α). Neutr.,
Plaut. Ps. 2, 3, 14: “si aequum siet Me plus sapere quam vos, dederim vobis
consilium catum, etc.,” id. Ep. 2, 2, 73 sq.: “jam diu edepol sapientiam tuam
abusa est haec quidem. Nunc hinc sapit, hinc sentit,” id. Poen. 5, 4, 30; cf.:
“populus est moderatior, quoad sentit et sapit tuerique vult per se constitutam
rem publicam,” Cic. Rep. 1, 42, 65; “so (with sentire),” Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 292;
id. Bacch. 4, 7, 19; id. Merc. 2, 2, 24; id. Trin. 3, 2, 10 sq.; cf.: “qui
sapere et fari possit quae sentiat,” Hor. Ep. 1, 4, 9; Plaut. Bacch. 1, 2, 14:
“magna est admiratio copiose sapienterque dicentis, quem qui audiunt
intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam ceteros arbitrantur,” Cic. Off. 2, 14,
48: “veluti mater Plus quam se sapere Vult (filium),” Hor. Ep. 1, 18, 27: “qui
(puer) cum primum sapere coepit,” Cic. Fam. 14, 1, 1; Poët. ap. Cic. Fam. 7,
16, 1: “malo, si sapis, cavebis,” if you are prudent, wise, Plaut. Cas. 4, 4,
17; so, “si sapis,” id. Eun. 1, 1, 31; id. Men. 1, 2, 13; id. Am. 1, 1, 155;
id. Aul. 2, 9, 5; id. Curc. 1, 1, 28 et saep.; Ter. Eun. 4, 4, 53; id. Heaut.
2, 3, 138: “si sapias,” Plaut. Merc. 2, 3, 39; 4, 4, 61; id. Poen. 1, 2, 138;
Ter. Heaut. 3, 3, 33; Ov. H. 5, 99; 20, 174: “si sapies,” Plaut. Bacch. 4, 9,
78; id. Rud. 5, 3, 35; Ter. Heaut. 4, 4, 26; Ov. M. 14, 675: “si sapiam,”
Plaut. Men. 4, 2, 38; id. Rud. 1, 2, 8: “si sapiet,” id. Bacch. 4, 9, 74: “si
saperet,” Cic. Quint. 4, 16: hi sapient, * Caes. B. G. 5, 30: Ph. Ibo. Pl.
Sapis, you show your good sense, Plaut. Mil. 4, 8, 9; id. Merc. 5, 2, 40: “hic
homo sapienter sapit,” id. Poen. 3, 2, 26: “quae (meretrix) sapit in vino ad
rem suam,” id. Truc. 4, 4, 1; cf. id. Pers. 1, 3, 28: “ad omnia alia aetate
sapimus rectius,” Ter. Ad. 5, 3, 46: “haud stulte sapis,” id. Heaut. 2, 3, 82:
“te aliis consilium dare, Foris sapere,” id. ib. 5, 1, 50: “pectus quoi sapit,”
Plaut. Bacch. 4, 4, 12; id. Mil. 3, 1, 191; id. Trin. 1, 2, 53; cf.: “cui cor
sapiat,” Cic. Fin. 2, 8, 24: “id (sc. animus mensque) sibi solum per se sapit,
id sibi gaudet,” Lucr. 3, 145.— (β). Act., to know, understand a thing (in good
prose usually only with general objects): “recte ego rem meam sapio,” Plaut.
Ps. 1, 5, 81: “nullam rem,” id. Most. 5, 1, 45: qui sibi semitam non sapiunt,
alteri monstrant viam, Poët. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 58, 132; Cic. Att. 14, 5, 1;
Plaut. Mil. 2, 3, 65; cf.: “quamquam quis, qui aliquid sapiat, nunc esse beatus
potest?” Cic. Fam. 7, 28, 1: “quantum ego sapio,” Plin. Ep. 3, 6, 1: “jam nihil
sapit nec sentit,” Plaut. Bacch. 4, 7, 22: “nihil,” Cic. Tusc. 2, 19, 45:
“plane nihil,” id. Div. in Caecil. 17, 55: nihil parvum, i. e. to occupy one's
mind with nothing trivial (with sublimia cures), Hor. Ep. 1, 12, 15; cf.: cum
sapimus patruos, i.e. resemble them, imitate them in severity, Pers. 1, 11. —
3. Prov.: sero sapiunt Phryges, are wise behind the time; or, as the Engl.
saying is, are troubled with afterwit: “sero sapiunt Phryges proverbium est
natum a Trojanis, qui decimo denique anno velle coeperant Helenam quaeque cum
eā erant rapta reddere Achivis,” Fest. p. 343 Müll.: “in Equo Trojano (a
tragedy of Livius Andronicus or of Naevius) scis esse in extremo, Sero sapiunt.
Tu tamen, mi vetule, non sero,” Cic. Fam. 7, 16, 1.—Hence, să-pĭens , entis
(abl. sing. sapiente, Ov. M. 10, 622; gen. plur. sapientum, Lucr. 2, 8; Hor. S.
2, 3, 296; “but sapientium,” id. C. 3, 21, 14), P. a. (acc. to II.), wise,
knowing, sensible, well-advised, discreet, judicious (cf. prudens). A. In gen.:
“ut quisque maxime perspicit, quid in re quāque verissimum sit, quique
acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et explicare rationem, is
prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet,” Cic. Off. 1, 5, 16; cf.:
“sapientissimum esse dicunt eum, cui quod opus sit ipsi veniat in mentem:
proxume acceder illum, qui alterius bene inventis obtemperet,” id. Clu. 31, 84:
“M. Bucculeius, homo neque meo judicio stultus et suo valde sapiens,” id. de
Or. 1, 39, 179: “rex aequus ac sapiens,” id. Rep. 1, 26, 42; cf.: “Cyrus
justissimus sapientissimusque rex,” id. ib. 1, 27, 43: “bonus et sapiens et
peritus utilitatis civilis,” id. ib. 2, 29, 52: “o, Neptune lepide, salve,
Neque te aleator ullus est sapientior,” Plaut. Rud. 2, 3, 29: “quae tibi mulier
videtur multo sapientissima?” id. Stich. 1, 2, 66: “(Aurora) ibat ad hunc
(Cephalum) sapiens a sene diva viro,” wise, discreet, Ov. H. 4, 96 Ruhnk.; so,
“puella,” id. M. 10, 622: “mus pusillus quam sit sapiens bestia,” Plaut. Truc.
4, 4, 15; id. As. 3, 3, 114 et saep.—With gen. (analogous to gnarus, peritus,
etc.): “qui sapiens rerum esse humanarum velit,” Gell. 13, 8, 2.—Subst.:
săpĭens , entis, m., a sensible, shrewd, knowing, discreet, or judicious
person: “semper cavere hoc sapientes aequissimumst,” Plaut. Rud. 4, 7, 20; cf.:
“omnes sapientes suom officium aequom est colere et facere,” id. Stich. 1, 1,
38; id. Trin. 2, 2, 84: “dictum sapienti sat est,” id. Pers. 4, 7, 19; Ter.
Phorm. 3, 3, 8; Plaut. Rud. 2, 4, 15 sq.: “insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus
iniqui,” Hor. Ep. 1, 6, 15: “sapiens causas reddet,” id. S. 1, 4, 115: “quali
victu sapiens utetur,” id. ib. 2, 2, 63; 1, 3, 132.—In a lusus verbb. with the
signif. of sapio, I., a person of nice taste: “qui utuntur vino vetere
sapientes puto Et qui libenter veteres spectant fabulas,” good judges,
connoisseurs, Plaut. Cas. prol. 5: fecundae leporis sapiens sectabitur armos,
Hor. S. 2, 4, 44.—As a surname of the jurists Atilius, C. Fabricius, M'.
Curius, Ti. Coruncanius, Cato al., v. under B. fin.— b. Of abstract things:
“opera,” Plaut. Pers. 4, 5, 2: “excusatio,” Cic. Att. 8, 12, 2: “modica et
sapiens temperatio,” id. Leg. 3, 7, 17: “mores,” Plaut. Rud. 4, 7, 25: “verba,”
Ter. Ad. 5, 1, 7: “consilium,” Ov. M. 13, 433: “Ulixes, vir sapienti facundiā
praeditus,” Gell. 1, 15, 3: “morus, quae novissima urbanarum germinat, nec nisi
exacto frigore, ob id dicta sapientissima arborum,” Plin. 16, 25, 41, § 102.—
B. After the predominance of Grecian civilization and literature, particularly
of the Grecian philosophy, like σοφός, well acquainted with the true value of
things, wise; and subst., a wise man, a sage (in Cic. saepiss.): ergo hic,
quisquis est, qui moderatione et constantiā quietus animo est sibique ipse
placatus ut nec tabescat molestiis nec frangatur timore nec sitienter quid
expetens ardeat desiderio nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat; “is est
sapiens quem quaerimus, is est beatus,” Cic. Tusc. 4, 17, 37: “sapientium
praecepta,” id. Rep. 3, 4, 7: “si quod raro fit, id portentum putandum est:
sapientem esse portentum est. Saepius enim mulam peperisse arbitror, quam
sapientem fuisse,” id. Div. 2, 28, 61: “statuere quid sit sapiens, vel maxime
videtur esse sapientis,” id. Ac. 2, 3, 9; cf. id. Rep. 1, 29, 45.—So esp. of
the seven wise men of Greece: “ut ad Graecos referam orationem ... septem
fuisse dicuntur uno tempore, qui sapientes et haberentur et vocarentur,” Cic.
de Or. 3, 34, 137: “eos vero septem quos Graeci sapientes nominaverunt,” id.
Rep. 1, 7, 12: “sapienti assentiri ... se sapientem profiteri,” id. Fin. 2,3,
7.—Ironically: “sapientum octavus,” Hor. S. 2, 3, 296.—With the Romans, an
appellation of Lœlius: te, Laeli, sapientem et appellant et existimant.
Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni: scimus L. Atilium apud patres nostros
appellatum esse sapientem, sed uterque alio quodam modo: Atilius, qui prudens
esse in jure civili putabatur; “Cato quia multarum rerum usum habebat ...
propterea quasi cognomen jam habebat in senectute sapientis ... Athenis unum
accepimus et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum judicatum,” Cic.
Lael. 2, 6; cf.: “numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium,
quos sapientes nostri majores judicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes,”
id. ib. 5, 18: “ii, qui sapientes sunt habiti, M. Cato et C. Laelius,” id. Off.
3, 4, 16; Val. Max. 4, 1, ext. 7; Lact. 4, 1.—Hence, adv.: săpĭen-ter ,
sensibly, discreetly, prudently, judiciously, wisely: “recte et sapienter
facere,” Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 133; id. Mil. 3, 3, 34: “consulere,” id. ib. 3, 1,
90: “insipienter factum sapienter ferre,” id. Truc. 4, 3, 33: “factum,” id.
Aul. 3, 5, 3: “dicta,” id. Rud. 4, 7, 24: “quam sapienter jam reges hoc nostri
viderint,” Cic. Rep. 2, 17, 31: “provisa,” id. ib. 4, 3, 3: “a majoribus
prodita fama,” id. ib. 2, 2, 4: “considerate etiam sapienterque fecerunt,” id.
Phil. 4, 2, 6; 13, 6, 13: “vives sapienter,” Hor. Ep. 1, 10, 44: “agendum,” Ov.
M. 13, 377: “temporibus uti,” Nep. Epam. 3, 1; Hor. C. 4, 9, 48.—Comp.: “facis
sapientius Quam pars latronum, etc.,” Plaut. Curc. 4, 3, 15; id. Poen. prol. 7:
“nemo est, qui tibi sapientius suadere possit te ipso,” Cic. Fam. 2, 7, 1:
“sapientius fecisse,” id. Brut. 42, 155.—Sup.: “quod majores nostros et
probavisse maxime et retinuisse sapientissime judico,” Cic. Rep. 2, 37, 63.
Vide H. P. Grice, “Philosophy: love of wisdom, love of taste,” BANC.
res: reale: Grice: “Possibly the philosophically most
important Roman neuter expression,” -- is res!
"Unfortunately, the etymology is dubious." "Perhaps
"res" comes from a root ra- of reor, ratus."- to reckon,
calculate, believe, think, suppose, imagine, judge, deem, as in English
'ratify,' and 'reason.' "I am
reminded of German "ding;" English "thing," from
"denken," to think; prop., that which is thought of." "I am
also reminded of "λόγος," Lid. and Scott, 9, a thing, object, being;
a matter, affair, event, fact, circumstance, occurrence, deed, condition, case,
etc.; and sometimes merely = something (cf.: causa, ratio, negotium)."
realism, the view that the subject matter of common sense or scientific
research and scientific theories exists independently of our knowledge of it,
and that the goal of science is the description and explanation of both
observable and unobservable aspects of the world. Scientific realism is
contrasted with logical empiricism and social constructivism. Early arguments
for scientific realism simply stated that, in light of the impressive products
and methods of science, realism is the only philosophy that does not make the
success of science a miracle. Formulations of scientific realism focus on the
objects of theoretical knowledge: theories, laws, and entities. One especially
robust argument for scientific realism due to Putnam and Richard Boyd is that
the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology in the mature sciences
such as physics, chemistry, and some areas of biology can be explained
adequately only if we suppose that theories in the mature sciences are at least
approximately true and their central theoretical terms are at least partially
referential Putnam no longer holds this view. More timid versions of scientific
realism do not infer approximate truth of mature theories. For example, Ian
Hacking’s “entity realism” 3 asserts that the instrumental manipulation of
postulated entities to produce further effects gives us legitimate grounds for
ontological commitment to theoretical entities, but not to laws or theories.
Paul Humphreys’s “austere realism” 9 states that only theoretical commitment to
unobserved structures or dispositions could explain the stability of observed outcomes
of scientific inquiry. Distinctive versions of scientific realism can be found
in works by Richard Boyd 3, Philip Kitcher 3, Richard Miller 7, William
Newton-Smith 1, and J. D. Trout 8. Despite their differences, all of these
versions of realism are distinguished
against logical empiricism by
their commitment that knowledge of unobservable phenomena is not only possible
but actual. As well, all of the arguments for scientific realism are abductive;
they argue that either the approximate truth of background theories or the
existence of theoretical entities and laws provides the best explanation for
some significant fact about the scientific theory or practice. Scientific
realists address the difference between real entities and merely useful constructs,
arguing that realism offers a better explanation for the success of science. In
addition, scientific realism recruits evidence from the history and practice of
science, and offers explanations for the success of science that are designed
to honor the dynamic and uneven character of that evidence. Most arguments for
scientific realism cohabit with versions of naturalism. Anti-realist opponents
argue that the realist move from instrumental reliability to truth is
question-begging. However, realists reply that such formal criticisms are
irrelevant; the structure of explanationist arguments is inductive and their
principles are a posteriori.
applicatum, extensum -- extensio: scope, the “part” of
the sentence or proposition to which a given term “applies” under a given
interpretation of the sentence. If the sentence ‘Abe does not believe Ben died’
is interpreted as expressing the proposition that Abe believes that it is not
the case that Ben died, the scope of ‘not’ is ‘Ben died’; interpreted as “It is
not the case that Abe believes that Ben died,” the scope is the rest of the
sentence, i.e., ‘Abe believes Ben died’. In the first case we have narrow
scope, in the second wide scope. If ‘Every number is not even’ is interpreted
with narrow scope, it expresses the false proposition that every number is
non-even, which is logically equivalent to the proposition that no number is
even. Taken with wide scope it expresses the truth that not every number is
even, which is equivalent to the truth that some number is non-even. Under
normal interpretations of the sentences, ‘hardened’ has narrow scope in ‘Carl
is a hardened recidivist’, whereas ‘alleged’ has wide scope in ‘Dan is an
alleged criminal’. Accordingly, ‘Carl is a hardened recidivist’ logically
implies ‘Carl is a recidivist’, whereas ‘Dan is an alleged criminal’, being
equivalent to ‘Allegedly, Dan is a criminal’, does not imply ‘Dan is a
criminal’. Scope considerations are useful in analyzing structural ambiguity
and in understanding the difference between the grammatical form of a sentence
and the logical form of a proposition it expresses. In a logically perfect
language grammatical form mirrors logical form, there is no scope ambiguity,
and the scope of a given term is uniquely determined by its context.
scupoli: very important Italian philosopher.
Lorenzo Scupoli Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to
navigationJump to search Lorenzo Scupoli (Laurentius Scupulus) Lorenzo
Scupoli (Otranto, 1530 circa – Napoli, 28 novembre 1610) è stato un presbitero,
religioso e scrittore italiano, appartenente all'ordine dei Chierici Regolari
Teatini, e autore de Il combattimento spirituale, uno dei classici della
spiritualità cattolica. Indice Biografia 2Il combattimento
spirituale 3Voci correlate 4Altri progetti 5 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Il combattimento spirituale Nato a Otranto verso il
1530, lo Scupoli ricevette come nome di battesimo Francesco. Entrò nell'ordine
dei teatini quasi quarantenne, nel 1569, per ricevere gli ordini sacri in soli
otto anni. Fu discepolo di sant'Andrea Avellino, appartenente al suo stesso
ordine. Al 1585 risale l'accusa di violazione della regola, per cui fu
arrestato per un anno e sospeso a divinis. Per la sua assoluzione dovette
attendere quasi la morte; intanto, sopportò l'ingiusta accusa e la pena
conseguente con umiltà e umanità. Il combattimento spirituale Abbozzo
cattolicesimo Questa sezione sull'argomento cattolicesimo è solo un abbozzo.
Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di Wikipedia. Segui i suggerimenti
del progetto di riferimento. «"Con l’orazione porrai la spada in mano a
Dio, perché combatta e vinca per te." La preghiera è dunque l’arma di
tutte le vittorie. Essa è la debolezza di Dio e la forza dell’uomo perché il
cuore del Padre non sa negare nulla di buono ai suoi figli.» (Padre Lino
Pedron) Il combattimento spirituale, come afferma V. Gambi nell'introduzione
all'opera delle ed. Paoline del 1960, è un trattato di strategia spirituale che
come altre opere e vicino alla spiritualità ignaziana conduce l'anima a una
perfezione tutta interiore. L'opera indica cinque mezzi per raggiungere la
perfezione spirituale: 1. Sfiducia in sé 2. pienissima confidenza in Dio 3.
combattimento e uso metodico delle facoltà per correggere i propri difetti,
quindi per trionfare del demonio e per conquistare le virtù 4. preghiera e
meditazione 5. comunione. Voci correlate Spiritualità Imitazione di
Cristo Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o
su Lorenzo Scupoli Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Lorenzo Scupoli Collegamenti esterni Testo del
Combattimento spirituale, su monasterovirtuale.it. URL consultato il 6 gennaio
2019 (archiviato dall'url originale il 6 gennaio 2019). Controllo di autoritàVIAF
(EN) 19719383 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1022 1323 · SBN IT\ICCU\CUBV\144230 · LCCN
(EN) n85115812 · GND (DE) 123377145 · BNF (FR) cb121719343 (data) · BNE (ES)
XX1185313 (data) · CERL cnp00467393 · NDL (EN, JA) 00552028 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n85115812 Biografie Portale Biografie Cattolicesimo
Portale Cattolicesimo Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Presbiteri
italianiReligiosi italianiScrittori italiani del XVI secoloMorti nel 1610Morti
il 28 novembreNati a OtrantoMorti a Napoli[alter].
Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Scupoli," per il Club Anglo-Italiano,
The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
first-order
predicate calculus with time-relative identity: - second-order logic, the logic of languages that
contain, in addition to variables ranging over objects, variables ranging over
properties, relations, functions, or classes of those objects. A model, or
interpretation, of a formal language usually contains a domain of discourse.
This domain is what the language is about, in the model in question. Variables
that range over this domain are called first-order variables. If the language
contains only first-order variables, it is called a first-order language, and
it is within the purview of first-order logic. Some languages also contain
variables that range over properties, relations, functions, or classes of
members of the domain of discourse. These are second-order variables. A
language that contains first-order and second-order variables, and no others,
is a secondorder language. The sentence ‘There is a property shared by all and
only prime numbers’ is straightforwardly rendered in a second-order language,
because of the bound variable ranging over properties. There are also
properties of properties, relations of properties, and the like. Consider,
e.g., the property of properties expressed by ‘P has an infinite extension’ or
the relation expressed by ‘P has a smaller extension than Q’. A language with
variables ranging over such items is called thirdorder. This construction can
be continued, producing fourth-order languages, etc. A language is called
higher-order if it is at least second-order. Deductive systems for second-order
languages are obtained from those for first-order languages by adding
straightforward extensions of the axioms and rules concerning quantifiers that
bind first-order variables. There may also be an axiom scheme of comprehension:
DPExPx S Fx, one instance for each formula F that does not contain P free. The
scheme “asserts” that every formula determines the extension of a property. If
the language has variables ranging over functions, there may also be a version
of the axiom of choice: ERExDyRxy P DfExRxfx. In standard semantics for
second-order logic, a model of a given language is the same as a model for the
corresponding first-order language. The relation variables range over every
relation over the domain-of-discourse, the function variables range over every
function from the domain to the domain, etc. In non-standard, or Henkin
semantics, each model consists of a domain-ofdiscourse and a specified
collection of relations, functions, etc., on the domain. The latter may not
include every relation or function. The specified collections are the range of
the second-order variables in the model in question. In effect, Henkin
semantics regards second-order languages as multi-sorted, first-order
languages.
secundum quid: in a certain respect, or with a qualification.
Fallacies can arise from confusing what is true only secundum quid with what is
true simpliciter ‘without qualification’, ‘absolutely’, ‘on the whole’, or
conversely. Thus a strawberry is red simpliciter on the whole. But it is black,
not red, with respect to its seeds, secundum quid. By ignoring the distinction,
one might mistakenly infer that the strawberry is both red and not red. Again,
a certain thief is a good cook, secundum quid; but it does not follow that he
is good simpliciter without qualification. Aristotle was the first to recognize
the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter explicitly, in his Sophistical
Refutations. On the basis of some exceptionally enigmatic remarks in the same
work, the liar paradox was often regarded in the Middle Ages as an instance of
this fallacy.
deceptum sui: Auto-deception – D. F. Pears -- self-deception, 1
purposeful action to avoid unpleasant truths and painful topics about oneself
or the world; 2 unintentional processes of denial, avoidance, or biased
perception; 3 mental states resulting from such action or processes, such as
ignorance, false belief, wishful thinking, unjustified opinions, or lack of
clear awareness. Thus, parents tend to exaggerate the virtues of their
children; lovers disregard clear signs of unreciprocated affection; overeaters
rationalize away the need to diet; patients dying of cancer pretend to
themselves that their health is improving. In some contexts ‘self-deception’ is
neutral and implies no criticism. Deceiving oneself can even be desirable,
generating a vital lie that promotes happiness or the ability to cope with
difficulties. In other contexts ‘self-deception’ has negative connotations,
suggesting bad faith, false consciousness, or what Joseph Butler called “inner
hypocrisy” the refusal to acknowledge
our wrongdoing, character flaws, or onerous responsibilities. Existentialist
philosophers, like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and most notably Sartre Being and
Nothingness, 3, denounced self-deception as an inauthentic dishonest, cowardly
refusal to confront painful though significant truths, especially about
freedom, responsibility, and death. Herbert Fingarette, however, argued that
self-deception is morally ambiguous
neither clearly blameworthy nor clearly faultless because of how it erodes capacities for
acting rationally Self-Deception, 9. The idea of intentionally deceiving
oneself seems paradoxical. In deceiving other people I usually know a truth
that guides me as I state the opposite falsehood, intending thereby to mislead
them into believing the falsehood. Five difficulties seem to prevent me from
doing anything like that to myself. 1 With interpersonal deception, one person
knows something that another person does not. Yet self-deceivers know the truth
all along, and so it seems they cannot use it to make themselves ignorant. One
solution is that self-deception occurs over time, with the initial knowledge
becoming gradually eroded. Or perhaps selfdeceivers only suspect rather than
know the truth, and then disregard relevant evidence. 2 If consciousness
implies awareness of one’s own conscious acts, then a conscious intention to
deceive myself would be self-defeating, for I would remain conscious of the
truth I wish to flee. Sartre’s solution was to view self-deception as
spontaneous and not explicitly reflected upon. Freud’s solution was to conceive
of self-deception as unconscious repression. 3 It seems that self-deceivers
believe a truth that they simultaneously get themselves not to believe, but how
is that possible? Perhaps they keep one of two conflicting beliefs unconscious
or not fully conscious. 4 Self-deception suggests willfully creating beliefs,
but that seems impossible since beliefs cannot voluntarily be chosen. Perhaps
beliefs can be indirectly manipulated by selectively ignoring and attending to
evidence. 5 It seems that one part of a person the deceiver manipulates another
part the victim, but such extreme splits suggest multiple personality disorders
rather than self-deception. Perhaps we are composed of “subselves” relatively unified clusters of elements in
the personality. Or perhaps at this point we should jettison interpersonal
deception as a model for understanding self-deception. .
determinatum
sui: auto-determination -- self-determination,
the autonomy possessed by a community when it is politically independent; in a
strict sense, territorial sovereignty. Within international law, the principle
of self-determination appears to grant every people a right to be self-determining,
but there is controversy over its interpretation. Applied to established
states, the principle calls for recognition of state sovereignty and
non-intervention in internal affairs. By providing for the self-determination
of subordinate communities, however, it can generate demands for secession that
conflict with existing claims of sovereignty. Also, what non-self-governing
groups qualify as beneficiaries? The national interpretation of the principle
treats cultural or national units as the proper claimants, whereas the regional
interpretation confers the right of self-determination upon the populations of
well-defined regions regardless of cultural or national affiliations. This
difference reflects the roots of the principle in the doctrines of nationalism
and popular sovereignty, respectively, but complicates its application.
evidens sui: (after ‘causa sui’), self-evidence, the property of
being self-evident. Only true propositions or truths are self-evident, though
false propositions can appear to be self-evident. It is widely held that a true
proposition is self-evident if and only if one would be justified in believing
it if one adequately understood it. Some would also require that self-evident
propositions are known if believed on the basis of such an understanding. Some
self-evident propositions are obvious, such as the proposition that all stags
are male, but others are not, since it may take considerable reflection to
achieve an adequate understanding of them. That slavery is wrong and that there
is no knowledge of falsehoods are perhaps examples of the latter. Not all
obvious propositions are self-evident, e.g., it is obvious that a stone will
fall if dropped, but adequate understanding of that claim does not by itself
justify one in believing it. An obvious proposition is one that immediately
seems true for anyone who adequately understands it, but its obviousness may
rest on wellknown and commonly accepted empirical facts, not on understanding.
All analytic propositions are self-evident but not all self-evident
propositions are analytic. The propositions that if A is older than B, then B
is younger than A, and that no object can be red and green all over at the same
time and in the same respects, are arguably self-evident but not analytic. All
self-evident propositions are necessary, for one could not be justified in
believing a contingent proposition simply in virtue of understanding it.
However, not all necessary propositions are self-evident, e.g., that water is
H2O and that temperature is the measure of the molecular activity in substances
are necessary but not self-evident. A proposition can appear to be selfevident
even though it is not. For instance, the proposition that all unmarried adult
males are bachelors will appear self-evident to many until they consider that
the pope is such a male. A proposition may appear self-evident to some but not
to others, even though it must either have or lack the property of being
self-evident. Self-evident propositions are knowable non-empirically, or a
priori, but some propositions knowable a priori are not self-evident, e.g.,
certain conclusions of long and difficult chains of mathematical
reasoning.
auto-present: self-presenting, in the philosophy of
Meinong, having the ability common to
all mental states to be immediately
present to our thought. “Meinong was too German to be English – take
‘wahrnehmen,’ to perceive, to take notice, to ‘verum’-sit.!”
Warhnehmungvorstellung is perceptual representation – Chisholm, alas, never
gives, typically in a second-tier varsity, to give the correct citation, when
he claims, to impress, that he is ‘borrowing’ from Meinong, never to return!
(“also typical of a second-tier!” -- Grice). In Meinong’s view, no mental state
can be presented to our thought in any other way e.g., indirectly, via a Lockean “idea of
reflection.” The only way to apprehend a mental state is to experience or “live
through” it. The experience involved in the apprehension of an external object
has thus a double presentational function: 1 via its “content” it presents the
object to our thought; 2 as its own “quasi-content” it presents itself
immediately to our thought. In the contemporary era, Roderick Chisholm has
based his account of empirical knowledge in part on a related concept of the
self-presenting. In Chisholm’s sense the
definition of which we omit here all
self-presenting states are mental, but not conversely; for instance, being
depressed because of the death of one’s spouse would not be self-presenting. In
Chisholm’s epistemology, self-presenting states are a source of certainty in
the following way: if F is a self-presenting state, then to be certain that one
is in state F it is sufficient that one is, and believes oneself to be in state
F. Cf. untranslatable, ‘sui,’ ‘ipse,’ ‘idem’. Presentatum de se.
self-reproducing automaton: a formal model of
self-reproduction of a kind introduced by von Neumann. He worked with an
intuitive robot model and then with a well-defined cellular automaton model.
Imagine a class of robotic automata made of robot parts and operating in an
environment of such parts. There are computer parts switches, memory elements,
wires, input-output parts sensing elements, display elements, action parts
grasping and moving elements, joining and cutting elements, and straight bars
to maintain structure and to employ in a storage tape. There are also energy
sources that enable the robots to operate and move around. These five
categories of parts are sufficient for the construction of robots that can make
objects of various kinds, including other robots. These parts also clearly
suffice for making a robot version of any finite automaton. Sensing and acting
parts can then be added to this robot so that it can make an indefinitely
expandable storage tape from straight bars. A “blank tape” consists of bars
joined in sequence, and the robot stores information on this tape by attaching
bars or not at the junctions. If its finite automaton part can execute programs
and is sufficiently powerful, such a robot is a universal computing robot cf. a
universal Turing machine. A universal computing robot can be augmented to form
a universal constructing robot a robot
that can construct any robot, given its description. Let r be any robot with an
indefinitely expandable tape, let Fr be the description of its finite part, and
let Tr be the information on its tape. Now take a universal computing robot and
augment it with sensing and acting devices and with programs so that when Fr
followed by Tr is written on its tape, this augmented universal computer
performs as follows. First, it reads the description Fr, finds the needed
parts, and constructs the finite part of r. Second, it makes a blank tape,
attaches it to the finite part of r, and then copies the information Tr from
its own tape onto the new tape. This augmentation of a universal computing
robot is a universal constructor. For when it starts with the information Fr,Tr
written on its tape, it will construct a copy of r with Tr on its tape. Robot
self-reproduction results from applying the universal constructor to itself.
Modify the universal constructor slightly so that when only a description Fr is
written on its tape, it constructs the finite part of r and then attaches a
tape with Fr written on it. Call this version of the universal constructor Cu.
Now place Cu’s description FCu on its own tape and start it up. Cu first reads
this description and constructs a copy of the finite part of itself in an empty
region of the cellular space. Then it adds a blank tape to the new construction
and copies FCu onto it. Hence Cu with FCu on its tape has produced another copy
of Cu with FCu on its tape. This is automaton self-reproduction. This robot
model of self-reproduction is very general. To develop the logic of
self-reproduction further, von Neumann first extended the concept of a finite
automaton to that of an infinite cellular automaton consisting of an array or
“space” of cells, each cell containing the same finite automaton. He chose an
infinite checkerboard array for modeling self-reproduction, and he specified a
particular twenty-nine-state automaton for each square cell. Each automaton is
connected directly to its four contiguous neighbors, and communication between
neighbors takes one or two time-steps. The twenty-nine states of a cell fall
into three categories. There is a blank state to represent the passivity of an
empty area. There are twelve states for switching, storage, and communication,
from which any finite automaton can be constructed in a sufficiently large
region of cells. And there are sixteen states for simulating the activities of
construction and destruction. Von Neumann chose these twenty-nine states in
such a way that an area of non-blank cells could compute and grow, i.e.,
activate a path of cells out to a blank region and convert the cells of that
region into a cellular automaton. A specific cellular automaton is embedded in
this space by the selection of the initial states of a finite area of cells,
all other cells being left blank. A universal computer consists of a
sufficiently powerful finite automaton with a tape. The tape is an indefinitely
long row of cells in which bits are represented by two different cell states.
The finite automaton accesses these cells by means of a construction arm that
it extends back and forth in rows of cells contiguous to the tape. When
activated, this finite automaton will execute programs stored on its tape. A
universal constructor results from augmenting the universal computer cf. the
robot model. Another construction arm is added, together with a finite
automaton controller to operate it. The controller sends signals into the arm
to extend it out to a blank region of the cellular space, to move around that
region, and to change the states of cells in that region. After the universal
constructor has converted the region into a cellular automaton, it directs the
construction arm to activate the new automaton and then withdraw from it.
Cellular automaton selfreproduction results from applying the universal
constructor to itself, as in the robot model. Cellular automata are now studied
extensively by humans working interactively with computers as abstract models
of both physical and organic systems. See Arthur W. Burks, “Von Neumann’s
Self-Reproducing Automata,” in Papers of John von Neumann on Computers and
Computer Theory, edited by William Aspray and Arthur Burks, 7. The study of
artificial life is an outgrowth of computer simulations of cellular automata
and related automata. Cellular automata organizations are sometimes used in highly
parallel computers.
semantic: semantic
– Grice saw ‘semantics’ (he detested the pretentious ‘pragmatics’) as a branch
of philosophy. “Surely we cannot expect someone whose training includes
phonetics, a totally physical science, to have any saying on the nuances of the
communicatum, which is all semantics is about!” -- H. P. Grice, “Logic and
conversation” – “Meaning,” in P. F. Strawson, “Philosophical Logic,” Oxford --
the arena of philosophy devoted to examining the scope and nature of logic.
Aristotle considered logic an organon, or foundation, of knowledge. Certainly,
inference is the source of much human knowledge. Logic judges inferences good
or bad and tries to justify those that are good. One need not agree with
Aristotle, therefore, to see logic as essential to epistemology. Philosophers
such as Vitters, additionally, have held that the structure of language
reflects the structure of the world. Because inferences have elements that are
themselves linguistic or are at least expressible in language, logic reveals
general features of the structure of language. This makes it essential to
linguistics, and, on a Vittersian view, to metaphysics. Moreover, many
philosophical battles have been fought with logical weaponry. For all these
reasons, philosophers have tried to understand what logic is, what justifies
it, and what it tells us about reason, language, and the world. The nature of
logic. Logic might be defined as the science of inference; inference, in turn,
as the drawing of a conclusion from premises. A simple argument is a sequence,
one element of which, the conclusion, the others are thought to support. A
complex argument is a series of simple arguments. Logic, then, is primarily
concerned with arguments. Already, however, several questions arise. 1 Who
thinks that the premises support the conclusion? The speaker? The audience? Any
competent speaker of the language? 2 What are the elements of arguments?
Thoughts? Propositions? Philosophers following Quine have found these answers
unappealing for lack of clear identity criteria. Sentences are more concrete
and more sharply individuated. But should we consider sentence tokens or
sentence types? Context often affects interpretation, so it appears that we
must consider tokens or types-in-context. Moreover, many sentences, even with
contextual information supplied, are ambiguous. Is a sequence with an ambiguous
sentence one argument which may be good on some readings and bad on others or
several? For reasons that will become clear, the elements of arguments should
be the primary bearers of truth and falsehood in one’s general theory of
language. 3 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what does ‘support’ mean?
Logic evaluates inferences by distinguishing good from bad arguments. This
raises issues about the status of logic, for many of its pronouncements are
explicitly normative. The philosophy of logic thus includes problems of the
nature and justification of norms akin to those arising in metaethics. The
solutions, moreover, may vary with the logical system at hand. Some logicians
attempt to characterize reasoning in natural language; others try to
systematize reasoning in mathematics or other sciences. Still others try to
devise an ideal system of reasoning that does not fully correspond to any of these.
Logicians concerned with inference in natural, mathematical, or scientific
languages tend to justify their norms by describing inferential practices in
that language as actually used by those competent in it. These descriptions
justify norms partly because the practices they describe include evaluations of
inferences as well as inferences themselves. The scope of logic. Logical
systems meant to account for natural language inference raise issues of the
scope of logic. How does logic differ from semantics, the science of meaning in
general? Logicians have often treated only inferences turning on certain
commonly used words, such as ‘not’, ‘if’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘all’, and ‘some’,
taking them, or items in a symbolic language that correspond to them, as logical
constants. They have neglected inferences that do not turn on them, such as My
brother is married. Therefore, I have a sister-in-law. Increasingly, however,
semanticists have used ‘logic’ more broadly, speaking of the logic of belief,
perception, abstraction, or even kinship.
Such uses seem to treat logic and semantics as coextensive. Philosophers
who have sought to maintain a distinction between the semantics and logic of
natural language have tried to develop non-arbitrary criteria of logical
constancy. An argument is valid provided the truth of its premises guarantees
the truth of its conclusion. This definition relies on the notion of truth,
which raises philosophical puzzles of its own. Furthermore, it is natural to
ask what kind of connection must hold between the premises and conclusion. One
answer specifies that an argument is valid provided replacing its simple
constituents with items of similar categories while leaving logical constants
intact could never produce true premises and a false conclusion. On this view,
validity is a matter of form: an argument is valid if it instantiates a valid
form. Logic thus becomes the theory of logical form. On another view, an
argument is valid if its conclusion is true in every possible world or model in
which its premises are true. This conception need not rely on the notion of a
logical constant and so is compatible with the view that logic and semantics
are coextensive. Many issues in the philosophy of logic arise from the plethora
of systems logicians have devised. Some of these are deviant logics, i.e.,
logics that differ from classical or standard logic while seeming to treat the
same subject matter. Intuitionistic logic, for example, which interprets the
connectives and quantifiers non-classically, rejecting the law of excluded
middle and the interdefinability of the quantifiers, has been supported with
both semantic and ontological arguments. Brouwer, Heyting, and others have
defended it as the proper logic of the infinite; Dummett has defended it as the
correct logic of natural language. Free logic allows non-denoting referring
expressions but interprets the quantifiers as ranging only over existing
objects. Many-valued logics use at least three truthvalues, rejecting the
classical assumption of bivalence that
every formula is either true or false. Many logical systems attempt to extend
classical logic to incorporate tense, modality, abstraction, higher-order
quantification, propositional quantification, complement constructions, or the
truth predicate. These projects raise important philosophical questions. Modal
and tense logics. Tense is a pervasive feature of natural language, and has
become important to computer scientists interested in concurrent programs.
Modalities of several sorts alethic
possibility, necessity and deontic obligation, permission, for example appear in natural language in various
grammatical guises. Provability, treated as a modality, allows for revealing
formalizations of metamathematics. Logicians have usually treated modalities and
tenses as sentential operators. C. I. Lewis and Langford pioneered such
approaches for alethic modalities; von Wright, for deontic modalities; and
Prior, for tense. In each area, many competing systems developed; by the late
0s, there were over two hundred axiom systems in the literature for
propositional alethic modal logic alone. How might competing systems be
evaluated? Kripke’s semantics for modal logic has proved very helpful. Kripke
semantics in effect treats modal operators as quantifiers over possible worlds.
Necessarily A, e.g., is true at a world if and only if A is true in all worlds
accessible from that world. Kripke showed that certain popular axiom systems
result from imposing simple conditions on the accessibility relation. His work
spawned a field, known as correspondence theory, devoted to studying the
relations between modal axioms and conditions on models. It has helped
philosophers and logicians to understand the issues at stake in choosing a
modal logic and has raised the question of whether there is one true modal
logic. Modal idioms may be ambiguous or indeterminate with respect to some
properties of the accessibility relation. Possible worlds raise additional
ontological and epistemological questions. Modalities and tenses seem to be
linked in natural language, but attempts to bring tense and modal logic
together remain young. The sensitivity of tense to intra- and extralinguistic
context has cast doubt on the project of using operators to represent tenses.
Kamp, e.g., has represented tense and aspect in terms of event structure,
building on earlier work by Reichenbach. Truth. Tarski’s theory of truth shows
that it is possible to define truth recursively for certain languages.
Languages that can refer to their own sentences, however, permit no such
definition given Tarski’s assumptions
for they allow the formulation of the liar and similar paradoxes. Tarski
concluded that, in giving the semantics for such a language, we must ascend to
a more powerful metalanguage. Kripke and others, however, have shown that it is
possible for a language permitting self-reference to contain its own truth 680 predicate by surrendering bivalence or
taking the truth predicate indexically. Higher-order logic. First-order
predicate logic allows quantification only over individuals. Higher-order
logics also permit quantification over predicate positions. Natural language
seems to permit such quantification: ‘Mary has every quality that John
admires’. Mathematics, moreover, may be expressed elegantly in higher-order
logic. Peano arithmetic and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, e.g., require infinite
axiom sets in firstorder logic but are finitely axiomatizable and categorical, determining their models up
to isomorphism in second-order logic.
Because they quantify over properties and relations, higher-order logics seem
committed to Platonism. Mathematics reduces to higher-order logic; Quine
concludes that the latter is not logic. Its most natural semantics seems to
presuppose a prior understanding of properties and relations. Also, on this
semantics, it differs greatly from first-order logic. Like set theory, it is
incomplete; it is not compact. This raises questions about the boundaries of
logic. Must logic be axiomatizable? Must it be possible, i.e., to develop a logical
system powerful enough to prove every valid argument valid? Could there be
valid arguments with infinitely many premises, any finite fragment of which
would be invalid? With an operator for forming abstract terms from predicates,
higher-order logics easily allow the formulation of paradoxes. Russell and
Whitehead for this reason adopted type theory, which, like Tarski’s theory of
truth, uses an infinite hierarchy and corresponding syntactic restrictions to
avoid paradox. Type-free theories avoid both the restrictions and the
paradoxes, as with truth, by rejecting bivalence or by understanding
abstraction indexically. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Why I don’t use ‘logic,’ but I
use ‘semantic.’”Grice was careful with what he felt was an abuse of ‘semantic’
– v. Evans: “Meaning and truth: essayis in semantics.” “Well, that’s what
‘meaning’ means, right?” The semantics is more reated to the signatum than to
the significatum. The Grecians did not have anything remotely similar to the
significatum, which is all about the making (facere) of a sign (as in Grice’s
example of the handwave). This is the meaning Grice gives to ‘semantics.’ There
is no need for the handwave to be part of a system of communication, or have
syntactic structure, or be ‘arbitrary.’ Still, one thing is communicated from
the emissor to his recipient, and that is all count. “I know the route” is the
message, or “I will leave you soon.” The handwave may be ambiguous. Grice is
aware that formalists like Hilbert and Gentzen think that they can do without
semantics – but as long as there is something ‘transmitted,’ or ‘messaged,’ it
cannot. In the one-off predicament, Emissor E emits x and communicates that p.
Since an intention with a content involving a psychological state is involved
and attached, even in a one-off, to ‘x,’ we can legitimately say the scenario
may be said to describe a ‘semantic’ phenomenon. Grice would freely use
‘semantic,’ and the root for ‘semantics,’ that Grice does use, involves the
richest root of all Grecian roots: the ‘semion.’ Liddell and Scott have “τό
σημεῖον,” Ion. σημήϊον , Dor. σα_μήϊον IG12(3).452 (Thera, iv B.C.), σα_μεῖον
IPE12.352.25 (Chersonesus, ii B.C.), IG5(1).1390.16 (Andania, i B.C.), σα_μᾶον
CIG5168 (Cyrene); = σῆμα in all senses, and more common in Prose, but never in
Hom. or Hes.; and which they render as “mark by which a thing is known,”
Hdt.2.38;” they also have “τό σῆμα,” Dor. σᾶμα Berl.Sitzb.1927.161 (Cyrene),
etc.; which they render as “sign, mark, token,” “ Il.10.466, 23.326, Od.19.250,
etc.” Grice lectured not only on Cat. But the next, De Int. As Arsitotle puts
it, an expression is a symbol (symbolon) or sign (semeion) of an affections or
impression (pathematon) of the soul (psyche). An affection of the soul, of
which a word is primarily a sign, are
the same for the whole of mankind, as is also objects (pragmaton) of which the
affections is a representation or likenes, image, or copiy (homoiomaton). [De Int., 1.16a4] while Grice is NOT concerned about the
semantics of utterers meaning (how could he, when he analyses means
in terms of intends , he is about
the semantics of expression-meaning. Grices
second stage (expression meaing) of his programme about meaning begins with
specifications of means as applied to x, a token of X. He is having Tarski and
Davidson in their elaborations of schemata like ‘p’ ‘means’ that p. ‘Snow
is white’ ‘means’ that snow is white, and stuff! Grice was especially concerned
with combinatories, for both unary and dyadic operators, and with multiple
quantifications within a first-order predicate calculus with identity. Since in
Grice’s initial elaboration on meaning he relies on Stevenson, it is worth
exploring how ‘semantics’ and ‘semiotics’ were interpreted by Peirce and the
emotivists. Stevenson’s main source is however in the other place, though,
under Stevenson. Semantics – communication – H. P. Grice, “Implicaturum and
Explicature: The basis of communication” – “Communication and Intention” --
philosophy of language, the philosophical study of natural language and its
workings, particularly of linguistic meaning and the use of language. A natural
language is any one of the thousands of various tongues that have developed
historically among populations of human beings and have been used for everyday
purposes including English, , Swahili,
and Latin as opposed to the formal and
other artificial “languages” invented by mathematicians, logicians, and
computer scientists, such as arithmetic, the predicate calculus, and LISP or
COBOL. There are intermediate cases, e.g., Esperanto, Pig Latin, and the sort
of “philosophese” that mixes English words with logical symbols. Contemporary
philosophy of language centers on the theory of meaning, but also includes the
theory of reference, the theory of truth, philosophical pragmatics, and the
philosophy of linguistics. The main question addressed by the theory of meaning
is: In virtue of what are certain physical marks or noises meaningful
linguistic expressions, and in virtue of what does any particular set of marks
or noises have the distinctive meaning it does? A theory of meaning should also
give a comprehensive account of the “meaning phenomena,” or general semantic
properties of sentences: synonymy, ambiguity, entailment, and the like. Some
theorists have thought to express these questions and issues in terms of
languageneutral items called propositions: ‘In virtue of what does a particular
set of marks or noises express the proposition it does?’; cf. ‘ “La neige est
blanche” expresses the proposition that snow is white’, and ‘Synonymous
sentences express the same proposition’. On this view, to understand a sentence
is to “grasp” the proposition expressed by that sentence. But the explanatory
role and even the existence of such entities are disputed. It has often been
maintained that certain special sentences are true solely in virtue of their
meanings and/or the meanings of their component expressions, without regard to
what the nonlinguistic world is like ‘No bachelor is married’; ‘If a thing is
blue it is colored’. Such vacuously true sentences are called analytic.
However, Quine and others have disputed whether there really is such a thing as
analyticity. Philosophers have offered a number of sharply competing hypotheses
as to the nature of meaning, including: 1 the referential view that words mean
by standing for things, and that a sentence means what it does because its
parts correspond referentially to the elements of an actual or possible state
of affairs in the world; 2 ideational or mentalist theories, according to which
meanings are ideas or other psychological phenomena in people’s minds; 3 “use”
theories, inspired by Vitters and to a lesser extent by J. L. Austin: a
linguistic expression’s “meaning” is its conventionally assigned role as a
game-piece-like token used in one or more existing social practices; 4 H. P.
Grice’s hypothesis that a sentence’s or word’s meaning is a function of what
audience response a typical utterer would intend to elicit in uttering it. 5
inferential role theories, as developed by Wilfrid Sellars out of Carnap’s and
Vitters’s views: a sentence’s meaning is specified by the set of sentences from
which it can correctly be inferred and the set of those which can be inferred
from it Sellars himself provided for “language-entry” and “language-exit” moves
as partly constitutive of meaning, in addition to inferences; 6
verificationism, the view that a sentence’s meaning is the set of possible
experiences that would confirm it or provide evidence for its truth; 7 the
truth-conditional theory: a sentence’s meaning is the distinctive condition
under which it is true, the situation or state of affairs that, if it obtained,
would make the sentence true; 8 the null hypothesis, or eliminativist view,
that “meaning” is a myth and there is no such thing a radical claim that can stem either from
Quine’s doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation or from eliminative
materialism in the philosophy of mind. Following the original work of Carnap,
Alonzo Church, Hintikka, and Richard Montague in the 0s, the theory of meaning
has made increasing use of “possible worlds”based intensional logic as an
analytical apparatus. Propositions sentence meanings considered as entities,
and truth conditions as in 7 above, are now commonly taken to be structured
sets of possible worlds e.g., the set of
worlds in which Aristotle’s maternal grandmother hates broccoli. And the
structure imposed on such a set, corresponding to the intuitive constituent
structure of a proposition as the concepts ‘grandmother’ and ‘hate’ are
constituents of the foregoing proposition, accounts for the meaning-properties
of sentences that express the proposition. Theories of meaning can also be
called semantics, as in “Gricean semantics” or “Verificationist semantics,”
though the term is sometimes restricted to referential and/or truth-conditional
theories, which posit meaning-constitutive relations between words and the
nonlinguistic world. Semantics is often contrasted with syntax, the structure
of grammatically permissible ordering relations between words and other words
in well-formed sentences, and with pragmatics, the rules governing the use of
meaningful expressions in particular speech contexts; but linguists have found
that semantic phenomena cannot be kept purely separate either from syntactic or
from pragmatic phenomena. In a still more specialized usage, linguistic
semantics is the detailed study typically within the truth-conditional format
of particular types of construction in particular natural languages, e.g.,
belief-clauses in English or adverbial phrases in Kwakiutl. Linguistic
semantics in that sense is practiced by some philosophers of language, by some
linguists, and occasionally by both working together. Montague grammar and
situation semantics are common formats for such work, both based on intensional
logic. The theory of referenceis pursued whether or not one accepts either the
referential or the truthconditional theory of meaning. Its main question is: In
virtue of what does a linguistic expression designate one or more things in the
world? Prior to theorizing and defining of technical uses, ‘designate’,
‘denote’, and ‘refer’ are used interchangeably. Denoting expressions are
divided into singular terms, which purport to designate particular individual
things, and general terms, which can apply to more than one thing at once.
Singular terms include proper names ‘Cindy’, ‘Bangladesh’, definite
descriptions ‘my brother’, ‘the first baby born in the New World’, and singular
pronouns of various types ‘this’, ‘you’, ‘she’. General terms include common
nouns ‘horse’, ‘trash can’, mass terms ‘water’, ‘graphite’, and plural pronouns
‘they’, ‘those’. The twentieth century’s dominant theory of reference has been
the description theory, the view that linguistic terms refer by expressing
descriptive features or properties, the referent being the item or items that
in fact possess those properties. For example, a definite description does that
directly: ‘My brother’ denotes whatever person does have the property of being
my brother. According to the description theory of proper names, defended most
articulately by Russell, such names express identifying properties indirectly
by abbreviating definite descriptions. A general term such as ‘horse’ was
thought of as expressing a cluster of properties distinctive of horses; and so
forth. But the description theory came under heavy attack in the late 0s, from
Keith Donnellan, Kripke, and Putnam, and was generally abandoned on each of
several grounds, in favor of the causal-historical theory of reference. The
causal-historical idea is that a particular use of a linguistic expression
denotes by being etiologically grounded in the thing or group that is its
referent; a historical causal chain of a certain shape leads backward in time
from the act of referring to the referents. More recently, problems with the
causal-historical theory as originally formulated have led researchers to
backpedal somewhat and incorporate some features of the description theory.
Other views of reference have been advocated as well, particularly analogues of
some of the theories of meaning listed above
chiefly 26 and 8. Modal and propositional-attitude contexts create
special problems in the theory of reference, for referring expressions seem to
alter their normal semantic behavior when they occur within such contexts. Much
ink has been spilled over the question of why and how the substitution of a
term for another term having exactly the same referent can change the
truth-value of a containing modal or propositional-attitude sentence.
Interestingly, the theory of truth historically predates articulate study of
meaning or of reference, for philosophers have always sought the nature of
truth. It has often been thought that a sentence is true in virtue of
expressing a true belief, truth being primarily a property of beliefs rather
than of linguistic entities; but the main theories of truth have also been
applied to sentences directly. The correspondence theory maintains that a
sentence is true in virtue of its elements’ mirroring a fact or actual state of
affairs. The coherence theory instead identifies truth as a relation of the
true sentence to other sentences, usually an epistemic relation. Pragmatic
theories have it that truth is a matter either of practical utility or of
idealized epistemic warrant. Deflationary views, such as the traditional
redundancy theory and D. Grover, J. Camp, and N. D. Belnap’s prosentential
theory, deny that truth comes to anything more important or substantive than
what is already codified in a recursive Tarskian truth-definition for a
language. Pragmatics studies the use of language in context, and the
context-dependence of various aspects of linguistic interpretation. First, one
and the same sentence can express different meanings or propositions from
context to context, owing to ambiguity or to indexicality or both. An ambiguous
sentence has more than one meaning, either because one of its component words
has more than one meaning as ‘bank’ has or because the sentence admits of more
than one possible syntactic analysis ‘Visiting doctors can be tedious’, ‘The
mouse tore up the street’. An indexical sentence can change in truth-value from
context to context owing to the presence of an element whose reference
fluctuates, such as a demonstrative pronoun ‘She told him off yesterday’, ‘It’s
time for that meeting now’. One branch of pragmatics investigates how context
determines a single propositional meaning for a sentence on a particular
occasion of that sentence’s use. Speech act theory is a second branch of
pragmatics that presumes the propositional or “locutionary” meanings of
utterances and studies what J. L. Austin called the illocutionary forces of
those utterances, the distinctive types of linguistic act that are performed by
the speaker in making them. E.g., in uttering ‘I will be there tonight’, a
speaker might be issuing a warning, uttering a threat, making a promise, or
merely offering a prediction, depending on conventional and other social
features of the situation. A crude test of illocutionary force is the “hereby”
criterion: one’s utterance has the force of, say, a warning, if it could fairly
have been paraphrased by the corresponding “explicitly performative” sentence
beginning ‘I hereby warn you that . . .’..Speech act theory interacts to some
extent with semantics, especially in the case of explicit performatives, and it
has some fairly dramatic syntactic effects as well. A third branch of
pragmatics not altogether separate from the second is the theory of
conversation or theory of implicaturum, founded by H. P. Grice. Grice notes
that sentences, when uttered in particular contexts, often generate
“implications” that are not logical consequences of those sentences ‘Is Jones a
good philosopher?’ ’He has very neat
handwriting’. Such implications can usually be identified as what the speaker
meant in uttering her sentence; thus for that reason and others, what Grice
calls utterer’s meaning can diverge sharply from sentence-meaning or “timeless”
meaning. To explain those non-logical implications, Grice offered a now widely
accepted theory of conversational implicaturum. Conversational implicaturums
arise from the interaction of the sentence uttered with mutually shared
background assumptions and certain principles of efficient and cooperative
conversation. The philosophy of linguistics studies the academic discipline of
linguistics, particularly theoretical linguistics considered as a science or
purported science; it examines methodology and fundamental assumptions, and
also tries to incorporate linguists’ findings into the rest of philosophy of
language. Theoretical linguistics concentrates on syntax, and took its contemporary
form in the 0s under Zellig Harris and Chomsky: it seeks to describe each
natural language in terms of a generative grammar for that language, i.e., a
set of recursive rules for combining words that will generate all and only the
“well-formed strings” or grammatical sentences of that language. The set must
be finite and the rules recursive because, while our informationprocessing
resources for recognizing grammatical strings as such are necessarily finite
being subagencies of our brains, there is no limit in any natural language
either to the length of a single grammatical sentence or to the number of
grammatical sentences; a small device must have infinite generative and parsing
capacity. Many grammars work by generating simple “deep structures” a kind of
tree diagram, and then producing multiple “surface structures” as variants of
those deep structures, by means of rules that rearrange their parts. The
surface structures are syntactic parsings of natural-language sentences, and
the deep structures from which they derive encode both basic grammatical
relations between the sentences’ major constituents and, on some theories, the
sentences’ main semantic properties as well; thus, sentences that share a deep
structure will share some fundamental grammatical properties and all or most of
their semantics. As Paul Ziff and Davidson saw in the 0s, the foregoing
syntactic problem and its solution had semantic analogues. From small
resources, human speakers understand
compute the meanings of
arbitrarily long and novel sentences without limit, and almost
instantaneously. This ability seems to require semantic compositionality, the
thesis that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meanings of its
semantic primitives or smallest meaningful parts, built up by way of syntactic
compounding. Compositionality also seems to be required by learnability, since
a normal child can learn an infinitely complex dialect in at most two years,
but must learn semantic primitives one at a time. A grammar for a natural language
is commonly taken to be a piece of psychology, part of an explanation of
speakers’ verbal abilities and behavior. As such, however, it is a considerable
idealization: it is a theory of speakers’ linguistic “competence” rather than
of their actual verbal performance. The latter distinction is required by the
fact that speakers’ considered, reflective judgments of grammatical correctness
do not line up very well with the class of expressions that actually are
uttered and understood unreflectively by those same speakers. Some grammatical
sentences are too hard for speakers to parse quickly; some are too long to
finish parsing at all; speakers commonly utter what they know to be formally
ungrammatical strings; and real speech is usually fragmentary, interspersed
with vocalizations, false starts, and the like. Actual departures from formal
grammaticality are ascribed by linguists to “performance limitations,” i.e.,
psychological factors such as memory failure, weak computational capacity, or
heedlessness; thus, actual verbal behavior is to be explained as resulting from
the perturbation of competence by performance limitations. Refs.: The main sources are his lectures on
language and reality – part of them repr. in WOW. The keywords under ‘communication,’
and ‘signification,’ that Grice occasionally uses ‘the total signification’ of
a remark, above, BANC. -- semantic holism, a metaphysical thesis about the
nature of representation on which the meaning of a symbol is relative to the
entire system of representations containing it. Thus, a linguistic expression
can have meaning only in the context of a language; a hypothesis can have
significance only in the context of a theory; a concept can have intentionality
only in the context of the belief system. Holism about content has profoundly
influenced virtually every aspect of contemporary theorizing about language and
mind, not only in philosophy, but in linguistics, literary theory, artificial
intelligence, psychology, and cognitive science. Contemporary semantic holists
include Davidson, Quine, Gilbert Harman, Hartry Field, and Searle. Because
semantic holism is a metaphysical and not a semantic thesis, two theorists
might agree about the semantic facts but disagree about semantic holism. So,
e.g., nothing in Tarski’s writings determines whether the semantic facts
expressed by the theorems of an absolute truth semantic atomism semantic holism
829 829 theory are holistic or not.
Yet Davidson, a semantic holist, argued that the correct form for a semantic
theory for a natural language L is an absolute truth theory for L. Semantic
theories, like other theories, need not wear their metaphysical commitments on
their sleeves. Holism has some startling consequences. Consider this. Franklin
D. Roosevelt who died when the United States still had just forty-eight states
did not believe there were fifty states, but I do; semantic holism says that
what ‘state’ means in our mouths depends on the totality of our beliefs about
states, including, therefore, our beliefs about how many states there are. It
seems to follow that he and I must mean different things by ‘state’; hence, if
he says “Alaska is not a state” and I say “Alaska is a state” we are not
disagreeing. This line of argument leads to such surprising declarations as
that natural langauges are not, in general, intertranslatable Quine, Saussure;
that there may be no fact of the matter about the meanings of texts Putnam,
Derrida; and that scientific theories that differ in their basic postulates are
“empirically incommensurable” Paul Feyerabend, Kuhn. For those who find these
consequences of semantic holism unpalatable, there are three mutually exclusive
responses: semantic atomism, semantic molecularism, or semantic nihilism.
Semantic atomists hold that the meaning of any representation linguistic,
mental, or otherwise is not determined by the meaning of any other
representation. Historically, Anglo- philosophers in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries thought that an idea of an X was about X’s in virtue of
this idea’s physically resembling X’s. Resemblance theories are no longer
thought viable, but a number of contemporary semantic atomists still believe
that the basic semantic relation is between a concept and the things to which
it applies, and not one among concepts themselves. These philosophers include
Dretske, Dennis Stampe, Fodor, and Ruth Millikan. Semantic molecularism, like
semantic holism, holds that the meaning of a representation in a language L is
determined by its relationships to the meanings of other expressions in L, but,
unlike holism, not by its relationships to every other expression in L.
Semantic molecularists are committed to the view, contrary to Quine, that for
any expression e in a language L there is an in-principle way of distinguishing
between those representations in L the meanings of which determine the meaning
of e and those representations in L the meanings of which do not determine the
meaning of e. Traditionally, this inprinciple delimitation is supported by an
analytic/synthetic distinction. Those representations in L that are
meaning-constituting of e are analytically connected to e and those that are
not meaning-constituting are synthetically connected to e. Meaning molecularism
seems to be the most common position among those philosophers who reject
holism. Contemporary meaning molecularists include Michael Devitt, Dummett, Ned
Block, and John Perry. Semantic nihilism is perhaps the most radical response
to the consequences of holism. It is the view that, strictly speaking, there are
no semantic properties. Strictly speaking, there are no mental states; words
lack meanings. At least for scientific purposes and perhaps for other purposes
as well we must abandon the notion that people are moral or rational agents and
that they act out of their beliefs and desires. Semantic nihilists include
among their ranks Patricia and Paul Churchland, Stephen Stich, Dennett, and,
sometimes, Quine. -- semantic paradoxes,
a collection of paradoxes involving the semantic notions of truth, predication,
and definability. The liar paradox is the oldest and most widely known of
these, having been formulated by Eubulides as an objection to Aristotle’s
correspondence theory of truth. In its simplest form, the liar paradox arises
when we try to assess the truth of a sentence or proposition that asserts its
own falsity, e.g.: A Sentence A is not true. It would seem that sentence A
cannot be true, since it can be true only if what it says is the case, i.e., if
it is not true. Thus sentence A is not true. But then, since this is precisely
what it claims, it would seem to be true. Several alternative forms of the liar
paradox have been given their own names. The postcard paradox, also known as a
liar cycle, envisions a postcard with sentence B on one side and sentence C on
the other: B The sentence on the other side of this card is true. semantic
molecularism semantic paradoxes 830
830 C The sentence on the other side of this card is false. Here, no
consistent assignment of truth-values to the pair of sentences is possible. In
the preface paradox, it is imagined that a book begins with the claim that at
least one sentence in the book is false. This claim is unproblematically true
if some later sentence is false, but if the remainder of the book contains only
truths, the initial sentence appears to be true if and only if false. The
preface paradox is one of many examples of contingent liars, claims that can
either have an unproblematic truth-value or be paradoxical, depending on the
truth-values of various other claims in this case, the remaining sentences in
the book. Related to the preface paradox is Epimenedes’ paradox: Epimenedes,
himself from Crete, is said to have claimed that all Cretans are liars. This
claim is paradoxical if interpreted to mean that Cretans always lie, or if
interpreted to mean they sometimes lie and if no other claim made by Epimenedes
was a lie. On the former interpretation, this is a simple variation of the liar
paradox; on the latter, it is a form of contingent liar. Other semantic paradoxes
include Berry’s paradox, Richard’s paradox, and Grelling’s paradox. The first
two involve the notion of definability of numbers. Berry’s paradox begins by
noting that names or descriptions of integers consist of finite sequences of
syllables. Thus the three-syllable sequence ‘twenty-five’ names 25, and the
seven-syllable sequence ‘the sum of three and seven’ names ten. Now consider
the collection of all sequences of English syllables that are less than
nineteen syllables long. Of these, many are nonsensical ‘bababa’ and some make
sense but do not name integers ‘artichoke’, but some do ‘the sum of three and
seven’. Since there are only finitely many English syllables, there are only
finitely many of these sequences, and only finitely many integers named by them.
Berry’s paradox arises when we consider the eighteen-syllable sequence ‘the
smallest integer not nameable in less than nineteen syllables’. This phrase
appears to be a perfectly well-defined description of an integer. But if the
phrase names an integer n, then n is nameable in less than nineteen syllables,
and hence is not described by the phrase. Richard’s paradox constructs a
similarly paradoxical description using what is known as a diagonal
construction. Imagine a list of all finite sequences of letters of the alphabet
plus spaces and punctuation, ordered as in a dictionary. Prune this list so
that it contains only English definitions of real numbers between 0 and 1. Then
consider the definition: “Let r be the real number between 0 and 1 whose kth decimal
place is if the kth decimal place of the
number named by the kth member of this list is 1, and 0 otherwise’. This
description seems to define a real number that must be different from any
number defined on the list. For example, r cannot be defined by the 237th
member of the list, because r will differ from that number in at least its
237th decimal place. But if it indeed defines a real number between 0 and 1,
then this description should itself be on the list. Yet clearly, it cannot
define a number different from the number defined by itself. Apparently, the
definition defines a real number between 0 and 1 if and only if it does not
appear on the list of such definitions. Grelling’s paradox, also known as the
paradox of heterologicality, involves two predicates defined as follows. Say
that a predicate is “autological” if it applies to itself. Thus ‘polysyllabic’
and ‘short’ are autological, since ‘polysyllabic’ is polysyllabic, and ‘short’
is short. In contrast, a predicate is “heterological” if and only if it is not
autological. The question is whether the predicate ‘heterological’ is
heterological. If our answer is yes, then ‘heterological’ applies to
itself and so is autological, not
heterological. But if our answer is no, then it does not apply to itself and so is heterological, once again
contradicting our answer. The semantic paradoxes have led to important work in
both logic and the philosophy of language, most notably by Russell and Tarski.
Russell developed the ramified theory of types as a unified treatment of all
the semantic paradoxes. Russell’s theory of types avoids the paradoxes by
introducing complex syntactic conditions on formulas and on the definition of
new predicates. In the resulting language, definitions like those used in formulating
Berry’s and Richard’s paradoxes turn out to be ill-formed, since they quantify
over collections of expressions that include themselves, violating what Russell
called the vicious circle principle. The theory of types also rules out, on
syntactic grounds, predicates that apply to themselves, or to larger
expressions containing those very same predicates. In this way, the liar
paradox and Grelling’s paradox cannot be constructed within a language
conforming to the theory of types. Tarski’s attention to the liar paradox made
two fundamental contributions to logic: his development of semantic techniques
for defining the truth predicate for formalized languages and his proof of
Tarski’s theorem. Tarskian semantics avoids the liar paradox by starting with a
formal language, call it L, in which no semantic notions are expressible, and
hence in which the liar paradox cannot be formulated. Then using another
language, known as the metalanguage, Tarski applies recursive techniques to
define the predicate true-in-L, which applies to exactly the true sentences of
the original language L. The liar paradox does not arise in the metalanguage,
because the sentence D Sentence D is not true-in-L. is, if expressible in the
metalanguage, simply true. It is true because D is not a sentence of L, and so
a fortiori not a true sentence of L. A truth predicate for the metalanguage can
then be defined in yet another language, the metametalanguage, and so forth,
resulting in a sequence of consistent truth predicates. Tarski’s theorem uses
the liar paradox to prove a significant result in logic. The theorem states
that the truth predicate for the first-order language of arithmetic is not
definable in arithmetic. That is, if we devise a systematic way of representing
sentences of arithmetic by numbers, then it is impossible to define an
arithmetical predicate that applies to all and only those numbers that
represent true sentences of arithmetic. The theorem is proven by showing that
if such a predicate were definable, we could construct a sentence of arithmetic
that is true if and only if it is not true: an arithmetical version of sentence
A, the liar paradox. Both Russell’s and Tarski’s solutions to the semantic
paradoxes have left many philosophers dissatisfied, since the solutions are
basically prescriptions for constructing languages in which the paradoxes do
not arise. But the fact that paradoxes can be avoided in artificially
constructed languages does not itself give a satisfying explanation of what is
going wrong when the paradoxes are encountered in natural language, or in an
artificial language in which they can be formulated. Most recent work on the
liar paradox, following Kripke’s “Outline of a Theory of Truth” 5, looks at
languages in which the paradox can be formulated, and tries to provide a
consistent account of truth that preserves as much as possible of the intuitive
notion.
semeiotics: semiological: or is it semiotics? Cf. semiological,
semotic. Since Grice uses ‘philosophical psychology’ and ‘philosopical
biology,’ it may do to use ‘semiology,’ indeed ‘philosophical semiology,’ here.
Oxonian semiotics is unique. Holloway
published his “Language and Intelligence” and everyone was excited. It is best
to see this as Grices psychologism. Grice would rarely use ‘intelligent,’ less
so the more pretentious, ‘intelligence,’ as a keyword. If he is doing it, it is
because what he saw as the misuse of it by Ryle and Holloway. Holloway, a PPE,
is a tutorial fellow in philosophy at All Souls. He acknowledges Ryle as his
mentor. (Holloway also quotes from Austin). Grice was amused that J. N.
Findlay, in his review of Holloway’s essay in “Mind,” compares Holloway to C.
W. Morris, and cares to cite the two relevant essay by Morris: The Foundation
in the theory of signs, and Signs, Language, and Behaviour. Enough for Grice to
feel warmly justified in having chosen another New-World author, Peirce, for
his earlier Oxford seminar. Morris studied under G. H. Mead. But is
‘intelligence’ part of The Griceian Lexicon?Well, Lewis and Short have
‘interlegere,’ to chose between. Lewis and Short have ‘interlĕgo , lēgi, lectum,
3, v. a., I’.which they render it as “to cull or pluck off here and there
(poet. and postclass.).in tmesi) uncis Carpendae manibus frondes, interque
legendae, Verg. G. 2, 366: “poma,” Pall. Febr. 25, 16; id. Jun. 5, 1.intellĕgo
(less correctly intellĭgo), exi, ectum (intellexti for intellexisti, Ter. Eun.
4, 6, 30; Cic. Att. 13, 32, 3: I.“intellexes for intellexisses,” Plaut. Cist.
2, 3, 81; subj. perf.: “intellegerint,” Sall. H. Fragm. 1, 41, 23 Dietsch);
“inter-lego,” “to see into, perceive, understand.” I. Lit. A. Lewis and Short
render as “to perceive, understand, comprehend.” Cf. Grice on his handwriting
being legible to few. And The child is an adult as being UNintelligible until
the creature is produced. In “Aspects,” he mentions flat rationality, and
certain other talents that are more difficult for the philosopher to
conceptualise, such as nose (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and
such. Grices approach is Pological. If Locke had used intelligent to refer
to Prince Maurices parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for intelligent as
applied to his favourite type of P, rather (intelligent, indeed rational.). semiosis
from Grecian semeiosis, ‘observation of signs’, the relation of signification
involving the three relata of sign, object, and mind. Semiotic is the science
or study of semiosis. The semiotic of John of Saint Thomas and of Peirce includes
two distinct components: the relation of signification and the classification
of signs. The relation of signification is genuinely triadic and cannot be
reduced to the sum of its three subordinate dyads: sign-object, sign-mind,
object-mind. A sign represents an object to a mind just as A gives a gift to B.
Semiosis is not, as it is often taken to be, a mere compound of a sign-object
dyad and a sign-mind dyad because these dyads lack the essential intentionality
that unites mind with object; similarly, the gift relation involves not just A
giving and B receiving but, crucially, the intention uniting A and B. In the
Scholastic logic of John of Saint Thomas, the sign-object dyad is a categorial
relation secundum esse, that is, an essential relation, falling in Aristotle’s
category of relation, while the sign-mind dyad is a transcendental relation
secundum dici, that is, a relation only in an analogical sense, in a manner of
speaking; thus the formal rationale of semiosis is constituted by the
sign-object dyad. By contrast, in Peirce’s logic, the sign-object dyad and the
sign-mind dyad are each only potential semiosis: thus, the hieroglyphs of
ancient Egypt were merely potential signs until the discovery of the Rosetta
Stone, just as a road-marking was a merely potential sign to the driver who
overlooked it. Classifications of signs typically follow from the logic of
semiosis. Thus John of Saint Thomas divides signs according to their relations
to their objects into natural signs smoke as a sign of fire, customary signs
napkins on the table as a sign that dinner is imminent, and stipulated signs as
when a neologism is coined; he also divides signs according to their relations
to a mind. An instrumental sign must first be cognized as an object before it
can signify e.g., a written word or a symptom; a formal sign, by contrast,
directs the mind to its object without having first been cognized e.g.,
percepts and concepts. Formal signs are not that which we cognize but that by
which we cognize. All instrumental signs presuppose the action of formal signs
in the semiosis of cognition. Peirce similarly classified signs into three
trichotomies according to their relations with 1 themselves, 2 their objects,
and 3 their interpretants usually minds; and Charles Morris, who followed
Peirce closely, called the relationship of signs to one another the syntactical
dimension of semiosis, the relationship of signs to their objects the
semantical dimension of semiosis, and the relationship of signs to their
interpreters the pragmatic dimension of semiosis. Refs.: The most specific essay is his lecture
on Peirce, listed under ‘communication, above. A reference to ‘criteria of
intelligence relates. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
sender: Grice:
“Surely, if there is a ‘recipient,’ there must be a ‘sender.’” Grice: “I prefer
‘sender’ as correlative for ‘recipient,’ since there is an embedded
intentionality about it.” Cf. Sting, “Message in a bottle – sending out an S.
O. S.” – Grice: “Addresser and addressee sound otiose.” – Grice: “Then there’s
this jargon of the ‘target’ addressee’ – while we are in the metaphorical
mode!” -- emissor: utterer: cf.
emissum, emissor. Usually Homo sapiens sapiens – and usually Oxonian, the Homo
sapiens sapiens Grice interactes with. Sometimes tutees, sometimes tutor. There
is something dualistic about the ‘utterer.’ It is a vernacularism from English
‘out.’ So the French impressionists were into IM-pressing, out to in; the
German expressionists were into EX-pressing, in to out. Or ‘man’. The important
thing is for Grice to avoid ‘speaker.’ He notes that ‘utterance’ has a nice
fuzziness about it. He still notes that he is using ‘utter’ in a ‘perhaps
artificial’ way. He was already wedded to ‘utter’ in his talk for the Oxford Philosopical Society.
Grice does not elaborate much on general gestures or signals. His main example
is a sort of handwave by which the emissor communicates that either he knows
the route or that he is about to leave the addressee. Even this is complex.
Let’s try to apply his final version of communication to the hand-wave. The
question of “Homo sapiens sapiens” is an interesting one. Grice is all for
ascribing predicates regarding the soul to what he calls the ‘lower animals’.
He is not ready to ascribe emissor’s meaning to them. Why? Because of Schiffer!
I mean, when it comes to the conditions of necessity of the reductive analysis,
he seems okay. When it comes to the sufficiency, there are two types of
objection. One by Urmson, easily dismissed. The second, first by Stampe and
Strawson, not so easily. But Grice agrees to add a clause limiting intentions
to be ‘in the open.’ Those who do not have a philosophical background usually
wonder about this. So for their sake, it may be worth considering Grice’s
synthetic a posteriori argument to refuse an emissor other than a Homo sapiens
sapiens to be able to ‘mean,’ if not ‘communicate,’ or ‘signify.’ There is an objection which is not mentioned by his
editors, which seems to Grice to be one to which Grice must respond. The
objection may be stated thus. One of the leading strands in Grice’s reductive
analysis of an emissor communicating that p is that communication is not to be
regarded exclusively, or even primarily, as a ‘feature’ of emissors who use
what philosophers of language call ‘language’ (Sprache, Taal, Langage,
Linguaggio – to restrict to the philosophical lexicon, cf. Plato’s Cratylus),
and a fortiori of an emissor who emits this or that “linguistic” ‘utterance.’
There are many instances of NOTABLY NON-“linguistic” vehicles or devices of
communication, within a communication-system, which fulfil this or that
communication-function; these vehicles or devices are mostly syntactically
un-structured or amorphous. Sometimes, a device may exhibit at least some
rudimentary syntactic structure, in that we may distinguish a totum from a pars
and identify a ‘simplex’ within a ‘complexum.’ Grice’s intention-based
reductive analysis of a communicatum, based on Aristotle, Locke, and Peirce, is
designed to allow for the possibility that a non-“linguistic,” and, further,
indeed a non-“conventional” 'utterance' token, perhaps even manifesting some
degree of syntactic structure, and not just a block of an amorphous signal, may
be within the ‘repertoire’ of ‘procedures’ of this or that organism, or creature,
or agent, which, even if not relying on any apparatus for communication of the
kind that that we may label ‘linguistic’ or otherwise ‘conventional,’ ‘do’ this or that ‘thing’ thereby
‘communicating’ that p, or q. To provide for this possibility, it is plainly
necessary that the key ingredient in any representation of ‘communicating,’
viz. intending that p, should be a ‘state’ of the emissor’s soul the capacity
for which does not require what we may label the ‘possession’ of, shall we say,
a ‘faculty,’ of what philosophers call ‘a’ ‘language’ (Sprache, Taal, langue,
lingua – note that in German we do not distinguish between ‘die Deutsche
Sprache’ and ‘Sprache’ as ‘ein Facultat.’). Now a philosopher, relying on this
or that neo-Prichardian reductive analysis of ‘intending that p,’ may not be
willing to allow the possibility of such, shall we call it, pre-linguistic
intending that p, or non-linguistic intending that p. Surely if the emissor
realizes that his addressee does not share what the Germans call ‘die Deutsche
Sprache,” the emissor may still communicate with his addresse this or that by
doing this or that. E. g. he may simulate that he wants to smoke a cigarette
and wonders if his addressee has one to spare. Against that objection, Grice
surely wins the day. But Grice grants that winning the day on THAT front may
not be enough. And that is because, as far as Grice’s Oxonian explorations on
communication go, in a succession of increasingly elaborate moves – ending with
a ‘closure’ clause which cut this succession of increasingly elaborate moves --
designed to thwart this or that scenario, later deemed illegitimate, involving
two rational agents where the emissor relies on an ‘inference-element’ that it
is not the case that he intends his addressee will recogise – Grice is led to
restrict the ‘intending’ which is to constitute a case of an emissor
communicating that p to C-intending. Grice suspects that whatever may be the
case in general with regard to ‘intending,’ C-intending seems for some reason to
Grice to be unsophisticatedly, viz. plainly, too sophisticated a ‘state’ of a
soul to be found in an organism, ‘pirot,’ creature, that we may not want to
deem ‘rational,’ or as the Germans would say, a creature that is destitute of
“Die Deutsche Sprache.” We need the pirot to be “very intelligent, indeed
rational.”Grice regrets that some may think that what he thought were
unavoidable rear-guard actions (ending with a complex reductive analysis of
C-intending) seem to have undermined the raison d'etre of the Griciean
campaign.”Unfortunately, Grice provides what he admittedly labels “a brief
reply” which “will have to suffice.” Why? Because “a full treatment would
require delving deep into crucial problems concerning the boundaries between
vicious and virtuous circularity.” Which is promising. It is not something
totally UNATTAINABLE. It reduces to the philosopher being virtuously circular,
only! Why is the ‘virtuous circle’ so crucial – vide ‘circulus virtuosus.’ virtŭōsus , a, um, adj. virtus, I.virtuous, good (late Lat.), Aug. c. Sec.
Man. 10. A circle is virtuous if it is not that bad. In this case, we need the
‘virtuous circle’ because we are dealing with ‘a loop.’ This is exactly
Schiffer’s way of putting it in his ‘Introduction’ to Meaning (second edition).
There is a ‘conceptual loop.’ Schiffer is not interested in ‘communicating;’
only ‘meaning.’ But his point can be transferred. He is saying that ‘U means
that p,’ may rely on ‘U intends that p,’ where ‘U intends that p’ relies on ‘U
means that p.’ There is a loop. In more generic terms:We have a creature, call
it a pirot P1 that, by doing thing T, communicates that p. Are we talking of
the OBSERVER? I hope so, because Grice’s favourite pirot is the parrot. So we
have Prince Maurice’s Parrot. Locke: Since I think I may be confident, that,
whoever should see a CREATURE of his own shape or make, though it had no more
reason all its life than a cat or a PARROT, would call him still A MAN; or
whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize,
would call or think it nothing but a cat or a PARROT; and say, the one was A
DULL IRRATIONAL MAN, and the other A VERY INTELLIGENT RATIONAL PARROT. A
relation we have in an author of great note, is sufficient to countenance the
supposition of A RATIONAL PARROT. The author’s words are: I had a mind to know,
from Prince Maurice's own mouth, the account of a common, but much credited
story, that I had heard so often from many others, of an old parrot he has,
that speaks, and asks, and answers common questions, like A REASONABLE
CREATURE. So that those of his train there generally conclude it to be witchery
or possession; and one of his chaplains, would never from that time endure A
PARROT, but says all PARROTS have a devil in them. I had heard many particulars
of this story, and as severed by people hard to be discredited, which made me
ask Prince Maurice what there is of it. Prince Maurice says, with his usual
plainness and dryness in talk, there is something true, but a great deal false
of what is reported. I desired to know of him what there was of the first.
Prince Maurice tells me short and coldly, that he had HEARD of such A PARROT;
and though he believes nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he had so
much curiosity as to send for the parrot: that it was a very great parrot; and
when the parrot comes first into the room where Prince Maurice is, with a great
many men about him, the parrot says presently, What a nice company is here. One
of the men asks the parrot, ‘What thinkest thou that man is?,’ ostending his
finger, and pointing to Prince Maurice. The parrot answers, ‘Some general -- or
other.’ When the man brings the parrot close to Prince Maurice, Prince Maurice
asks the parrot., “D'ou venez-vous?” The parrot answers, “De Marinnan.” Then
Prince Maurice goes on, and poses a second question to the parrot. “A qui
estes-vous?” The Parrot answers: “A un Portugais.” Prince Maurice asks a third
question. “Que fais-tu la?” The parrot answers: “Je garde les poulles.”Prince
Maurice smiles, which pleases the Parrot. Prince Maurice, violating a Griceian
maxim, and being just informed that p, asks whether p. This is his fourth question.
“Vous gardez les poulles?” The Parrot answers, “Oui, moi; et je scai bien
faire.” The Parrott appeals to Peirce’s iconic system and makes the chuck four
or five times that a man uses to make to chickens when a man calls them. I set
down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said
them to me. I ask Prince Maurice in what ‘language’ the parrot speaks. Prince
Maurice says that the parrot speaks in Brazilian. I ask Prince William whether
he understands the Brazilian language. Prince Maurice says: No, but he has
taken care to have TWO interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that spoke
Brazilian, and the other a Brazilian that spoke Dutch; that Prince Maurice
asked them separatelyand privately, and both of them AGREED in telling Prince
Maurice just the same thing that the parrot had said. I could not but tell this
ODD story, because it is so much out of the way, and from the first hand, and
what may pass for a good one; for I dare say Prince Maurice at least believed
himself in all he told me, having ever passed for a very honest and pious man.
I leave it to naturalists to reason, and to other men to believe, as they
please upon it. However, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve or enliven a busy
scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the purpose or no.Locke takes
care that the reader should have the story at large in the author's own words,
because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible.For it cannot be
imagined that so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all
the testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place
where it had nothing to do, to pin so close, not only on a man whom he mentions
as his friend, but on a prince in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and
piety, a story which, if he himself thought incredible, he could not but also
think RIDICULOUS. Prince Maurice, it is plain, who vouches this story, and our
author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker A PARROT. And
Locke asks any one else who thinks such a story fit to be told, whether, if
this PARROT, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word
for it this one did,- whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of
RATIONAL ANIMALS; but yet, whether, for all that, they would have been allowed
to be MEN, and not PARROTS? For I presume it is not the idea of A THINKING OR
RATIONAL BEING alone that makes the idea of A MAN in most people's sense: but
of A BODY, so and so shaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a MAN,
the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as THE SAME
IMMATERIAL SPIRIT, go to the making of the same MAN. So back to Grice’s pirotology.But first a precis of the
conversation, or languaging:PARROT: What a nice company is here.MAN (pointing
to Prince Maurice): What thinkest thou that man is?PARROT: Some general -- or
other. (i. e. the parrot displays what Grice calls ‘up-take.’ The parrot
recognizes the man’s c-intention. So far is ability to display uptake.PRINCE
MAURICE: D'ou venez-vous?PARROT: De Marinnan.PRINCE MAURICE: A qui
estes-vous?PARROT: A un Portugais.PRINCE MAURICE: Que fais-tu la?PARROT: Je
garde les poulles.PRINCE MAURICE SMILES and flouts a Griceian maxim: Vous
gardez les poulles?PARROT (losing patience, and grasping the Prince’s
implicaturum that he doubts it): Oui, moi. Et je scai bien faire.(The Parrott
then appeals to Peirce’s iconic system and makes the chuck five times that a
man uses to make to chickens when a man calls them.)So back to Grice:“According
to my most recent speculations about communication, one should distinguish
between what I call the ‘factual’ or ‘de facto’ character of behind the state
of affairs that one might describe as ‘rational agent A communicates that p,’
for those communication-relevant features which obtain or are present in the
circumstances) the ‘titular’ or ‘de jure’ character, viz. the nested
C-intending which is only deemed to be present. And the reason Grice calls it
‘nested’ is that it involves three sub-intentions:(C) Emissor E communicates
that (psi*) p iff Emissor E c-intends that A recognises that E psi-s that p
iffC1: Emissor E intends A to recognise that A psi-s that p.C2: Emissor intends
that A recognise C1 by A recognising C2C3: There is no inference-element which
is C-constitutive such that Emissor relies on it and yet does not intend A to
recognise.Grice:“The titular or de jure character of the state of affairs that
is described as “Emissor communicates that p,” involves self-reference in the
closure clause regarding the third intention, C3, may be thought as being
‘regressive,’ or involving what mathematicians mean when they use “, …;” and
the translators of Aristotle, ‘eis apeiron,’ translated as ‘ad infinitum.’There
may be ways of UNDEEMING this, i. e. of stating that self-reference and closure
are meant to BLOCK an infinite regress. Hence the circle, if there is one – one
feature of a virtuous circle is that it doesn’t look like a circle simpliciter
-- would be virtuous. The ‘de jure’
character stands for a situation which, in Grice’s words, is “infinitely
complex,” and so cannot be actually present in toto – only DEEMED to be.”“In
which case,” Grice concludes pointing to the otiosity or rendering inoperative,
“to point out that THE INCONCEIVABLE actual presence of the ‘de jure’ character
of ‘Emissor communicates that p’ WOULD, still, be possible, or would be
detectable, only via the ‘use’ of something like ‘die Deutsche Sprache’ seem to
serve little, if any, purpose.”“At its most meagre, the factual or ‘de facto’ character
consists merely in the pre-rational ‘counterpart’ of the state of affairs
describable by “Emissor E communicates that p,” which might amount to no more
than making a certain sort of utterance in order thereby to get some creature
to think or want some particular thing.This meagre condition does not involve a
reference to any expertise regarding anything like ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’Let’s
reformulate the condition.It’s just a pirot, at a ‘pre-rational’ level. The
pirot does a thing T IN ORDER THEREBY to get some other pirot to think or do
some particular thing. To echo Hare,Die Tur ist geschlossen, ja.Die Tur ist
geschlossen, bitte.Grice continues as a corollary: “Maybe in a less
straightforward instance of “Emissor E communicates that p” there is actually
present the C-intention whose feasibility as an ‘intention’ suggests some
ability to use ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’But vide “non-verbal communication,”
pre-verbal communication, languaging, pre-conventional communication, gestural
communication – as in What Grice has as “a gesture (a signal).” Not necessary
‘conventional,’ and MAYBE ‘established’ – is one-off sufficient for
‘established’? I think so. By waving his hand in a particular way (“a
particular sort of hand wave”), the emissor communicates that he knows the
route (or is about to leave the addressee).
Grice concludes about the less straightforward instances, that there can
be no advance guarantee when this will be so, i. e. that there is actually
present the C-intention whose feasibility as an intention points to some
capacity to use ‘die Deutsche Sprache.’Grice adds: “It is in any case arguable
that the use of ‘die Deutsche Sprache’ would here be an indispensable aid to
philosophising about communication, rather than it being an element in the PHILOSOPHISING
about communication! Philosophers of Grice’s generation use ‘man’ on
purpose to mean ‘mankind’. What a man means. What a man utters. The utterer is
the man. In semiotics one can use something more Latinate, like gesturer, or
emitter – or profferer. The distinction is between what an utterer means and
what the logical and necessary implication. He doesn’t need to say this since
‘imply’ in the logical usage does not take utterer as subject. It’s what the
utterer SAYS that implies this or that. (Strawson and Wiggins, p. 519). The
utterer is possibly the ‘expresser.’ sender and sendee: Emissee: this is crucial. There’s loads of
references on this. Apparently, some philosopher cannot think of communication
without the emissee. But surely Grice loved Virginia Woolf. “And when she was
writing ‘The Hours,’ I’m pretty sure she cared a damn whether the rest of the
world existed!” Let's explore the issue of the
UTTERER'S OCCASION-MEANING IN THE ABSENCE OF A (so-called) AUDIENCE -- or sender
without sendee, as it were. There are various scenarios of utterances by which the
utterer or sender is correctly said to have communicated that so-and-so, such
that there is no actual person or set of persons (or sentient beings) whom the
utterer or sender is addressing and in whom the sender intends to induce a
response. The range of these scenarios includes, or might be thought to
include, such items as -- the posting of a notice, like "Keep
out" or "This bridge is dangerous," -- an entry in a
diary, -- the writing of a note to clarify one's thoughts when working on
some problem, -- soliloquizing, -- rehearsing a part in a projected
conversation, and -- silent thinking. At least some of these
scenarios are unprovided for in the reductive analysis so far
proposed. The examples which Grice's account should cover fall into three
groups: (a) Utterances for which the utterer or sender thinks there may
(now or later) be an audience or sendee (as when Grice's son sent a letter to
Santa). U may think that some particular person, e. g. himself at a future
date in the case of a diary entry, may (but also may not) encounter U's
utterance.Or U may think that there may or may not be some person or other who
is or will be an auditor or sendee or recipient of his utterance. (b) An
utterances which the utterer knows that it is not to be addressed to any actual
sendee, but which the utterer PRETENDS to address or send to some particular
person or type of person, OR which he thinks of as being addressed (or sent) to
some imagined sendee or type of sendee (as in the rehearsal of a speech or of
his part in a projected conversation, or Demosthenes or Noel Coward talking to
the gulls.(c) An utterances (including what Occam calls an "internal"
utterance) with respect to which the utterer NEITHER thinks it possible that
there may be an actual sendee nor imagines himself as addressing sending
so-and-so to a sendee, but nevertheless intends his utterance to be such that
it would induce a certain sort of response in a certain perhaps fairly
indefinite kind of sendee were it the case that such a sendee *were* present.In
the case of silent thinking the idea of the presence of a sendee will have to
be interpreted 'liberally,' as being the idea of there being a sendee for a
public counter-part of the utterer's internal, private speech, if there is
one. Austin refused to discuss Vitters's private-language argument.In this
connection it is perhaps worth noting that some cases of verbal thinking
(especially the type that Vitters engages in) do fall outside the scope of
Grice's account. When a verbal though merely passes through
Vitters's head (or brain) as distinct from being "framed" by Vitters,
it is utterly inappropriate (even in Viennese) to talk of Vitters as having
communicated so-and-so by "the very thought of you," to echo Noble. Vitters is,
perhaps, in such a case, more like a sendee than a sender -- and wondering who
such an intelligent sender might (or then might not) be. In any case, to
calm the neo-Wittgensteinians, Grice propose a reductive analysis which surely
accounts for the examples which need to be accounted for, and which will allow
as SPECIAL (if paradigmatic) cases (now) the range of examples in which there
is, and it is known by the utterer that there is, an actual sendee. A
soul-to-soul transfer. This redefinition is relatively informal. Surely Grice could
present a more formal version which would gain in precision at the cost of ease
of comprehension. Let "p" (and k') range over properties of
persons (possible sendees); appropriate substituends for "O" (and i')
will include such diverse expressions as "is a passer-by,"
"is a passer-by who sees this notice," "understands the
Viennese cant," "is identical with Vitters." As will
be seen, for Grice to communicate that so-and-so it will have to be possible to
identify the value of "/" (which may be fairly indeterminate) which U
has in mind; but we do not have to determine the range from which U makes a
selection. "U means by uttering x that *iP" is true iff (30) (3f
(3c): I. U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has q
would think that (i) x has f (2) f is correlated in way c with M-ing
that p (3) (3 0'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has b' would
think, via thinking (i) and (2), that U4's that p (4) in view of (3), U O's
that p; and II. (operative only for certain substituends for
"*4") U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone
who has 0, he would via thinking (4), himself a that p; ' and III. It is
not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that
anyone who has 0 will both (i') rely on E in coming to O+ that p and (2') think
that (3k'): Uintends x to be such that anyone who has O' will come to /+ that p
without relying on E. Notes: (1) "i+" is to be read as
"p" if Clause II is operative, and as "think that UO's" if
Clause II is non-operative. (2) We need to use both "i" and
"i'," since we do not wish to require that U should intend his
possible audience to think of U's possible audience under the same description
as U does himself. Explanatory comments: (i) It is essential that the
intention which is specified in Clause II should be specified as U's intention
"that should there be anyone who has 0, he would (will) . . ." rather
than, analogously with Clauses I and II, as U's intention "that x should
be such that, should anyone be 0, he would ... ." If we adopt the latter
specification, we shall be open to an objection, as can be shown with the aid
of an example.Suppose that, Vitters is married, and further, suppose he married
an Englishwoman. Infuriated by an afternoon with his mother-in-law, when he is
alone after her departure, Vitters relieves his feelings by saying, aloud and
passionately, in German:"Do not ye ever comest near me again!"It will
no doubt be essential to Vitters's momentary well-being that Vitters should
speak with the intention that his remark be such that were his mother-in-law
present, assuming as we say, that he married and does have one who, being an
Englishwoman, will most likely not catch the Viennese cant that Vitters is
purposively using, she should however, in a very Griceian sort of way, form the
intention not to come near Vitters again. It would, however, be pretty
unacceptable if it were represented as following from Vitters's having THIS
intention (that his remark be such that, were his mother-in-law be present, she
should form the intnetion to to come near Vitters again) that what Vitters is
communicating (who knows to who) that the denotatum of 'Sie' is never to come
near Vitters again.For it is false that, in the circumstances, Vitters is
communicating that by his remark. Grice's reductive analysis is formulated
to avoid that difficulty. (2) Suppose that in accordance with the
definiens o U intends x to be such that anyone who is f will think ...
, and suppose that the value of "O" which U has in mind is the
property of being identical with a particular person A. Then it will
follow that U intends A to think . . . ; and given the further condition,
fulfilled in any normal (paradigmatic, standard, typical, default) case, that U
intends the sendee to think that the sendee is the intended sendee, we are
assured of the truth of a statement from which the definiens is inferrible by
the rule of existential generalisation (assuming the legitimacy of this application
of existential generalisation to a statement the expression of which contains
such "intensional" verbs as "intend" and
"think"). It can also be shown that, for any case in which there
is an actual sendee who knows that he is the intended sendee, if the definiens
in the standard version is true then the definiens in the adapted version will
be true. If that is so, given the definition is correct, for any normal
case in which there IS an actual sendee the fulfillment of the definiens will
constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for U's having communicated
that *1p. sendeeless:
‘audienceless’ “One good example of a sendeeless implicaturum is Sting’s
“Message in a bottle.” – Grice. Grice: “When Sting says, “I’m sending out an
‘s.o.s’ he is being Peirceian.” Latin sensus
"perception, feeling, undertaking, meaning," from sentire
"perceive, feel, know," probably a figurative use of a literally
meaning "to find one's way," or "to go mentally," from PIE
root *sent- "to go" (source also of Old High German sinnan "to
go, travel, strive after, have in mind, perceive," German Sinn
"sense, mind," Old English sið "way, journey." Refs.: Grice, “The utterer as the sender.”
senone: (or as Strawson
would prefer, Zeno). "Senone *loved* his
native Velia. Vivid evidence of the
cultural impact of Senone's arguments in Italia is to be found in the interior
of a red-figure drinking cup (Roma, Villa Giulia, inv. 3591) discovered in the
Etrurian city of Falerii. It depicts a heroic figure racing nimbly ahead
of a large tortoise and has every appearance of being the first known
‘response’ to the Achilles (or Mercurio, Ermete) paradox. “Was ‘Senone’ BORN
in Velia?” – that is the question!” – Grice. Italian philosopher, as as such, or as Grice prefers, ‘senone’ --
Zenos paradoxes. “Since Elea is in Italy, we can say Zeno is Italian.” – H. P.
Grice. “Linguistic puzzles, in nature.”
H. P. Grice. four paradoxes relating to space and motion attributed to
Zeno of Elea fifth century B.C.: the racetrack, Achilles and the tortoise, the
stadium, and the arrow. Zeno’s work is known to us through secondary sources,
in particular Aristotle. The racetrack paradox. If a runner is to reach the end
of the track, he must first complete an infinite number of different journeys:
getting to the midpoint, then to the point midway between the midpoint and the
end, then to the point midway between this one and the end, and so on. But it
is logically impossible for someone to complete an infinite series of journeys.
Therefore the runner cannot reach the end of the track. Since it is irrelevant
to the argument how far the end of the track is
it could be a foot or an inch or a micron away this argument, if sound, shows that all
motion is impossible. Moving to any point will involve an infinite number of
journeys, and an infinite number of journeys cannot be completed. The paradox
of Achilles and the tortoise. Achilles can run much faster than the tortoise,
so when a race is arranged between them the tortoise is given a lead. Zeno
argued that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise no matter how fast he
runs and no matter how long the race goes on. For the first thing Achilles has
to do is to get to the place from which the tortoise started. But the tortoise,
though slow, is unflagging: while Achilles was occupied in making up his
handicap, the tortoise has advanced a little farther. So the next thing
Achilles has to do is to get to the new place the tortoise occupies. While he
is doing this, the tortoise will have gone a little farther still. However
small the gap that remains, it will take Achilles some time to cross it, and in
that time the tortoise will have created another gap. So however fast Achilles
runs, all that the tortoise has to do, in order not to be beaten, is not to
stop. The stadium paradox. Imagine three equal cubes, A, B, and C, with sides
all of length l, arranged in a line stretching away from one. A is moved
perpendicularly out of line to the right by a distance equal to l. At the same
time, and at the same rate, C is moved perpendicularly out of line to the left
by a distance equal to l. The time it takes A to travel l/2 relative to B
equals the time it takes A to travel to l relative to C. So, in Aristotle’s
words, “it follows, Zeno thinks, that half the time equals its double” Physics
259b35. The arrow paradox. At any instant of time, the flying arrow “occupies a
space equal to itself.” That is, the arrow at an instant cannot be moving, for
motion takes a period of time, and a temporal instant is conceived as a point,
not itself having duration. It follows that the arrow is at rest at every
instant, and so does not move. What goes for arrows goes for everything:
nothing moves. Scholars disagree about what Zeno himself took his paradoxes to
show. There is no evidence that he offered any “solutions” to them. One view is
that they were part of a program to establish that multiplicity is an illusion,
and that reality is a seamless whole. The argument could be reconstructed like
this: if you allow that reality can be successively divided into parts, you
find yourself with these insupportable paradoxes; so you must think of reality
as a single indivisible One. Refs.: H.
P. Grice, “Zeno’s sophisma;” Luigi Speranza,
"Senone e Grice," The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia.
sensus: sensationalism, the belief that all mental
states particularly cognitive
states are derived, by composition or
association, from sensation. It is often joined to the view that sensations
provide the only evidence for our beliefs, or more rarely to the view that
statements about the world can be reduced, without loss, to statements about
sensation. Hobbes was the first important sensationalist in modern times.
“There is no conception in man’s mind,” he wrote, “which hath not at first,
totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are
derived from that original.” But the belief gained prominence in the eighteenth
century, due largely to the influence of Locke. Locke himself was not a
sensationalist, because he took the mind’s reflection on its own operations to
be an independent source of ideas. But his distinction between simple and
complex ideas was used by eighteenthcentury sensationalists such as Condillac
and Hartley to explain how conceptions that seem distant from sense might
nonetheless be derived from it. And to account for the particular ways in which
simple ideas are in fact combined, Condillac and Hartley appealed to a second
device described by Locke: the association of ideas. “Elementary”
sensations the building blocks of our
mental life were held by the
sensationalists to be non-voluntary, independent of judgment, free of
interpretation, discrete or atomic, and infallibly known. Nineteenth-century
sensationalists tried to account for perception in terms of such building
blocks; they struggled particularly with the perception of space and time. Late
nineteenth-century critics such as Ward and James advanced powerful arguments
against the reduction of perception to sensation. Perception, they claimed,
involves more than the passive reception or recombination and association of
discrete pellets of incorrigible information. They urged a change in
perspective to a functionalist viewpoint
more closely allied with prevailing trends in biology from which sensationalism never fully
recovered. sensibile: Austin, “Sense and
sensibile,” as used by Russell, those entities that no one is at the moment
perceptually aware of, but that are, in every other respect, just like the
objects of perceptual awareness. If one is a direct realist and believes that
the objects one is aware of in sense perception are ordinary physical objects,
then sensibilia are, of course, just physical objects of which no one is at the
moment aware. Assuming with common sense that ordinary objects continue to
exist when no one is aware of them, it follows that sensibilia exist. If,
however, one believes as Russell did that what one is aware of in ordinary
sense perception is some kind of idea in the mind, a so-called sense-datum,
then sensibilia have a problematic status. A sensibile then turns out to be an
unsensed sense-datum. On some the usual conceptions of sense-data, this is like
an unfelt pain, since a sense-datum’s existence not as a sense-datum, but as
anything at all depends on our someone’s perception of it. To exist for such
things is to be perceived see Berkeley’s “esse est percipii“. If, however, one
extends the notion of sense-datum as Moore was inclined to do to whatever it is
of which one is directly aware in sense perception, then sensibilia may or may
not exist. It depends on what physical
objects or ideas in the mind we are
directly aware of in sense perception and, of course, on the empirical facts
about whether objects continue to exist when they are not being perceived. If
direct realists are right, horses and trees, when unobserved, are sensibilia.
So are the front surfaces of horses and trees things Moore once considered to
be sensedata. If the direct realists are wrong, and what we are perceptually
aware of are “ideas in the mind,” then whether or not sensibilia exist depends
on whether or not such ideas can exist apart from any mind. sensorium, the seat and cause of sensation in
the brain of humans and other animals. The term is not part of contemporary
psychological parlance; it belongs to prebehavioral, prescientific psychology,
especially of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only creatures
possessed of a sensorium were thought capable of bodily and perceptual
sensations. Some thinkers believed that the sensorium, when excited, also
produced muscular activity and motion. sensus communis, a cognitive faculty to
which the five senses report. It was first argued for in Aristotle’s On the
Soul II.12, though the term ‘common sense’ was first introduced in Scholastic
thought. Aristotle refers to properties such as magnitude that are perceived by
more than one sense as common sensibles. To recognize common sensibles, he
claims, we must possess a single cognitive power to compare such qualities,
received from the different senses, to one another. Augustine says the “inner
sense” judges whether the senses are working properly, and perceives whether
the animal perceives De libero arbitrio II.35. Aquinas In De anima II, 13.370
held that it is also by the common sense that we perceive we live. He says the
common sense uses the external senses to know sensible forms, preparing the
sensible species it receives for the operation of the cognitive power, which
recognizes the real thing causing the sensible species. sentential connective, also called sentential
operator, propositional connective, propositional operator, a word or phrase,
such as ‘and’, ‘or’, or ‘if . . . then’, that is used to construct compound
sentences from atomic i.e.,
non-compound sentences. A sentential
connective can be defined formally as an expression containing blanks, such
that when the blanks are replaced with sentences the result is a compound
sentence. Thus, ‘if ——— then ———’ and ‘——— or ———’ are sentential connectives,
since we can replace the blanks with sentences to get the compound sentences
‘If the sky is clear then we can go swimming’ and ‘We can go swimming or we can
stay home’. Classical logic makes use of truth-functional connectives only, for
which the truth-value of the compound sentence can be determined uniquely by
the truth-value of the sentences that replace the blanks. The standard
truth-functional sensibilia sentential connective 834 834 connectives are ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if
. . . then’, and ‘if and only if’. There are many non-truth-functional
connectives as well, such as ‘it is possible that ———’ and ‘——— because
———’. sentimentalism, the theory,
prominent in the eighteenth century, that epistemological or moral relations
are derived from feelings. Although sentimentalism and sensationalism are both
empiricist positions, the latter view has all knowledge built up from
sensations, experiences impinging on the senses. Sentimentalists may allow that
ideas derive from sensations, but hold that some relations between them are
derived internally, that is, from sentiments arising upon reflection. Moral
sentimentalists, such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, argued that the
virtue or vice of a character trait is established by approving or disapproving
sentiments. Hume, the most thoroughgoing sentimentalist, also argued that all
beliefs about the world depend on sentiments. On his analysis, when we form a
belief, we rely on the mind’s causally connecting two experiences, e.g., fire
and heat. But, he notes, such causal connections depend on the notion of
necessity that the two perceptions will
always be so conjoined and there is
nothing in the perceptions themselves that supplies that notion. The idea of
necessary connection is instead derived from a sentiment: our feeling of
expectation of the one experience upon the other. Likewise, our notions of
substance the unity of experiences in an object and of self the unity of
experiences in a subject are sentimentbased. But whereas moral sentiments do
not purport to represent the external world, these metaphysical notions of
necessity, substance, and self are “fictions,” creations of the imagination
purporting to represent something in the outside world. -- sententia: For some reason, perhaps of his eccentricity, J. L.
Austin was in love with Chomsky. He would read “Syntactic Structures” aloud to
the Play Group. And Grice was listening. This stuck with Grice, who started to
use ‘sentence,’ even in Polish, when translating Tarski. Hardie had taught him
that ‘sententia’ was a Roman transliteration of ‘dia-noia,’ which helped. Since
“Not when the the of dog” is NOT a sentence, not even an ‘ill-formed sentence,’
Grice concludes that like ‘reason,’ and ‘cabbage,’ sentence is a value-paradeigmatic
concept. His favourite sentence was “Fido is shaggy,” uttered to communicate
that Smith’s dog is hairy coated. One of Grice’s favourite sentences was
Carnap’s “Pirots karulise elatically,” which Carnap borrowed from (but never
returned to) Baron Russell. (“I later found out a ‘pirot’ is an extinct fish,
which destroyed my whole implicaturum – talk of ichthyological necessity!” (Carnap
contrasted, “Pirots karulise elatically,” with “The not not if not the dog
the.”
shaggy-dog story, v. Grice’s shaggy-dog story.
shared experience: WoW: 286. Grice was fascinated by the
etymology of ‘share,’ – “which is so difficult to translate to Grecian!” –
“Co-operation can be regarded as a shared experience. You cooperate not just
when you help, but, as the name indicates, when you operate along with another
– when you SHARE some task – in this case influencing the other in the dyad,
and being influenced by him.”
set: “Is the idea of a one-member set implicatural?” –
Grice. “I distinguish between a class and a set, but Strawson does not.” –
Grice -- the study of collections,
ranging from familiar examples like a set of encyclopedias or a deck of cards
to mathematical examples like the set of natural numbers or the set of points
on a line or the set of functions from a set A to another set B. Sets can be
specified in two basic ways: by a list e.g., {0, 2, 4, 6, 8} and as the
extension of a property e.g., {x _ x is an even natural number less than 10},
where this is read ‘the set of all x such that x is an even natural number less
than 10’. The most fundamental relation in set theory is membership, as in ‘2
is a member of the set of even natural numbers’ in symbols: 2 1 {x _ x is an
even natural number}. Membership is determinate, i.e., any candidate for membership
in a given set is either in the set or not in the set, with no room for
vagueness or ambiguity. A set’s identity is completely determined by its
members or elements i.e., sets are extensional rather than intensional. Thus {x
_ x is human} is the same set as {x _ x is a featherless biped} because they
have the same members. The smallest set possible is the empty or null set, the
set with no members. There cannot be more than one empty set, by
extensionality. It can be specified, e.g., as {x _ x & x}, but it is most
often symbolized as / or { }. A set A is called a subset of a set B and B a
superset of A if every member of A is also a member of B; in symbols, A 0 B.
So, the set of even natural numbers is a subset of the set of all natural
numbers, and any set is a superset of the empty set. The union of two sets A
and B is the set whose members are the members of A and the members of B in symbols, A 4 B % {x _ x 1 A or x 1 B} so the union of the set of even natural
numbers and the set of odd natural numbers is the set of all natural numbers.
The intersection of two sets A and B is the set whose members are common to
both A and B in symbols, A 3 B % {x _ x
1 A and x 1 B} so the intersection of
the set of even natural numbers and the set of prime natural numbers is the
singleton set {2}, whose only member is the number 2. Two sets whose
intersection is empty are called disjoint, e.g., the set of even natural
numbers and the set of odd natural numbers. Finally, the difference between a
set A and a set B is the set whose members are members of A but not members of
B in symbols, A B % {x _ x 1 A and x 2 B} so the set of odd numbers between 5 and 20
minus the set of prime natural numbers is {9, 15}. By extensionality, the order
in which the members of a set are listed is unimportant, i.e., {1, 2, 3} % {2,
3, 1}. To introduce the concept of ordering, we need the notion of the ordered
pair of a and b in symbols, a, b or .
All that is essential to ordered pairs is that two of them are equal only when
their first entries are equal and their second entries are equal. Various sets
can be used to simulate this behavior, but the version most commonly used is
the Kuratowski ordered pair: a, b is defined to be {{a}, {a, b}}. On this
definition, it can indeed be proved that a, b % c, d if and only if a % c and b
% d. The Cartesian product of two sets A and B is the set of all ordered pairs
whose first entry is in A and whose second entry is B in symbols, A $ B % {x _ x % a, b for some a
1 A and some b 1 B}. This set-theoretic reflection principles set theory
836 836 same technique can be used to
form ordered triples a, b, c % a, b, c;
ordered fourtuples a, b, c, d % a, b, c,
d; and by extension, ordered n-tuples for all finite n. Using only these simple
building blocks, substitutes for all the objects of classical mathematics can
be constructed inside set theory. For example, a relation is defined as a set
of ordered pairs so the successor
relation among natural numbers becomes {0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3 . . . } and a function is a relation containing no
distinct ordered pairs of the form a, b and a, c so the successor relation is a function. The
natural numbers themselves can be identified with various sequences of sets,
the most common of which are finite von Neumann ordinal numbers: /, {/}, {/,
{/}, {/}, {/}, {/, {/}}}, . . . . On this definition, 0 % /, 1 % {/}, 2 % {/,
{/}}, etc., each number n has n members, the successor of n is n 4 {n}, and n ‹
m if and only if n 1 m. Addition and multiplication can be defined for these
numbers, and the Peano axioms proved from the axioms of set theory; see below.
Negative, rational, real, and complex numbers, geometric spaces, and more
esoteric mathematical objects can all be identified with sets, and the standard
theorems about them proved. In this sense, set theory provides a foundation for
mathematics. Historically, the theory of sets arose in the late nineteenth
century. In his work on the foundations of arithmetic, Frege identified the
natural numbers with the extensions of certain concepts; e.g., the number two
is the set of all concepts C under which two things fall in symbols, 2 % {x _ x is a concept, and
there are distinct things a and b which fall under x, and anything that falls
under x is either a or b}. Cantor was led to consider complex sets of points in
the pursuit of a question in the theory of trigonometric series. To describe
the properties of these sets, Cantor introduced infinite ordinal numbers after
the finite ordinals described above. The first of these, w, is {0, 1, 2, . .
.}, now understood in von Neumann’s terms as the set of all finite ordinals.
After w, the successor function yields w ! 1 % w 4 {w} % {0, 1, 2, . . . n, n +
1, . . . , w}, then w ! 2 % w ! 1 ! 1 % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w , w ! 1}, w ! 3 % w
! 2 ! 1 % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w, w ! 1, w ! 2}, and so on; after all these comes
w ! w % {0, 1, 2, . . . , w, w ! 1, w ! 2, . . . , w ! n, w ! n ! 1, . . .},
and the process begins again. The ordinal numbers are designed to label the
positions in an ordering. Consider, e.g., a reordering of the natural numbers
in which the odd numbers are placed after the evens: 0, 2, 4, 6, . . . 1, 3, 5,
7, . . . . The number 4 is in the third position of this sequence, and the
number 5 is in the w + 2nd. But finite numbers also perform a cardinal
function; they tell us how many so-andso’s there are. Here the infinite
ordinals are less effective. The natural numbers in their usual order have the
same structure as w, but when they are ordered as above, with the evens before
the odds, they take on the structure of a much larger ordinal, w ! w. But the
answer to the question, How many natural numbers are there? should be the same
no matter how they are arranged. Thus, the transfinite ordinals do not provide
a stable measure of the size of an infinite set. When are two infinite sets of
the same size? On the one hand, the infinite set of even natural numbers seems
clearly smaller than the set of all natural numbers; on the other hand, these
two sets can be brought into one-to-one correspondence via the mapping that
matches 0 to 0, 1 to 2, 2 to 4, 3 to 6, and in general, n to 2n. This puzzle
had troubled mathematicians as far back as Galileo, but Cantor took the
existence of a oneto-one correspondence between two sets A and B as the
definition of ‘A is the same size as B’. This coincides with our usual
understanding for finite sets, and it implies that the set of even natural
numbers and the set of all natural numbers and w ! 1 and w! 2 and w ! w and w !
w and many more all have the same size. Such infinite sets are called
countable, and the number of their elements, the first infinite cardinal
number, is F0. Cantor also showed that the set of all subsets of a set A has a
size larger than A itself, so there are infinite cardinals greater than F0,
namely F1, F2, and so on. Unfortunately, the early set theories were prone to
paradoxes. The most famous of these, Russell’s paradox, arises from
consideration of the set R of all sets that are not members of themselves: is R
1 R? If it is, it isn’t, and if it isn’t, it is. The Burali-Forti paradox
involves the set W of all ordinals: W itself qualifies as an ordinal, so W 1 W,
i.e., W ‹ W. Similar difficulties surface with the set of all cardinal numbers
and the set of all sets. At fault in all these cases is a seemingly innocuous
principle of unlimited comprehension: for any property P, there is a set {x _ x
has P}. Just after the turn of the century, Zermelo undertook to systematize
set theory by codifying its practice in a series of axioms from which the known
derivations of the paradoxes could not be carried out. He proposed the axioms
of extensionality two sets with the same members are the same; pairing for any
a and b, there is a set {a, b}; separation for any set A and property P, there
is a set {x _ x 1 A and x has P}; power set for any set A, there is a set {x _
x0 A}; union for any set of sets F, there is a set {x _ x 1 A for some A 1
F} this yields A 4 B, when F % {A, B}
and {A, B} comes from A and B by pairing; infinity w exists; and choice for any
set of non-empty sets, there is a set that contains exactly one member from
each. The axiom of choice has a vast number of equivalents, including the
well-ordering theorem every set can be
well-ordered and Zorn’s lemma if every chain in a partially ordered set has
an upper bound, then the set has a maximal element. The axiom of separation
limits that of unlimited comprehension by requiring a previously given set A
from which members are separated by the property P; thus troublesome sets like
Russell’s that attempt to collect absolutely all things with P cannot be
formed. The most controversial of Zermelo’s axioms at the time was that of
choice, because it posits the existence of a choice set a set that “chooses” one from each of
possibly infinitely many non-empty sets
without giving any rule for making the choices. For various
philosophical and practical reasons, it is now accepted without much debate.
Fraenkel and Skolem later formalized the axiom of replacement if A is a set,
and every member a of A is replaced by some b, then there is a set containing
all the b’s, and Skolem made both replacement and separation more precise by
expressing them as schemata of first-order logic. The final axiom of the
contemporary theory is foundation, which guarantees that sets are formed in a
series of stages called the iterative hierarchy begin with some non-sets, then
form all possible sets of these, then form all possible sets of the things
formed so far, then form all possible sets of these, and so on. This iterative
picture of sets built up in stages contrasts with the older notion of the
extension of a concept; these are sometimes called the mathematical and the
logical notions of collection, respectively. The early controversy over the
paradoxes and the axiom of choice can be traced to the lack of a clear
distinction between these at the time. Zermelo’s first five axioms all but
choice plus foundation form a system usually called Z; ZC is Z with choice
added. Z plus replacement is ZF, for Zermelo-Fraenkel, and adding choice makes
ZFC, the theory of sets in most widespread use today. The consistency of ZFC
cannot be proved by standard mathematical means, but decades of experience with
the system and the strong intuitive picture provided by the iterative conception
suggest that it is. Though ZFC is strong enough for all standard mathematics,
it is not enough to answer some natural set-theoretic questions e.g., the
continuum problem. This has led to a search for new axioms, such as large
cardinal assumptions, but no consensus on these additional principles has yet
been reached. Then there are the set-theoretica paradoxes, a collection of
paradoxes that reveal difficulties in certain central notions of set theory.
The best-known of these are Russell’s paradox, Burali-Forti’s paradox, and
Cantor’s paradox. Russell’s paradox, discovered in 1 by Bertrand Russell, is
the simplest and so most problematic of the set-theoretic paradoxes. Using it,
we can derive a contradiction directly from Cantor’s unrestricted comprehension
schema. This schema asserts that for any formula Px containing x as a free
variable, there is a set {x _ Px} whose members are exactly those objects that
satisfy Px. To derive the contradiction, take Px to be the formula x 1 x, and
let z be the set {x _ x 2 x} whose existence is guaranteed by the comprehension
schema. Thus z is the set whose members are exactly those objects that are not
members of themselves. We now ask whether z is, itself, a member of z. If the
answer is yes, then we can conclude that z must satisfy the criterion of
membership in z, i.e., z must not be a member of z. But if the answer is no,
then since z is not a member of itself, it satisfies the criterion for
membership in z, and so z is a member of z. All modern axiomatizations of set
theory avoid Russell’s paradox by restricting the principles that assert the
existence of sets. The simplest restriction replaces unrestricted comprehension
with the separation schema. Separation asserts that, given any set A and
formula Px, there is a set {x 1 A _ Px}, whose members are exactly those
members of A that satisfy Px. If we now take Px to be the formula x 2 x, then
separation guarantees the existence of a set zA % {x 1 A _ x 2 x}. We can then
use Russell’s reasoning to prove the result that zA cannot be a member of the
original set A. If it were a member of A, then we could prove that it is a
member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself. Hence it is not a
member of A. But this result is not problematic, and so the paradox is avoided.
The Burali-Forte paradox and Cantor’s paradox are sometimes known as paradoxes
of size, since they show that some collections are too large to be considered
sets. The Burali-Forte paradox, discovered by Cesare Burali-Forte, is concerned
with the set of all ordinal numbers. In Cantor’s set theory, an ordinal number
can be assigned to any well-ordered set. A set is wellordered if every subset
of the set has a least element. But Cantor’s set theory also guarantees the
existence of the set of all ordinals, again due to the unrestricted
comprehension schema. This set of ordinals is well-ordered, and so can be
associated with an ordinal number. But it can be shown that the associated
ordinal is greater than any ordinal in the set, hence greater than any ordinal
number. Cantor’s paradox involves the cardinality of the set of all sets.
Cardinality is another notion of size used in set theory: a set A is said to
have greater cardinality than a set B if and only if B can be mapped one-to-one
onto a subset of A but A cannot be so mapped onto B or any of its subsets. One
of Cantor’s fundamental results was that the set of all subsets of a set A
known as the power set of A has greater cardinality than the set A. Applying
this result to the set V of all sets, we can conclude that the power set of V
has greater cardinality than V. But every set in the power set of V is also in
V since V contains all sets, and so the power set of V cannot have greater
cardinality than V. We thus have a contradiction. Like Russell’s paradox, both
of these paradoxes result from the unrestricted comprehension schema, and are
avoided by replacing it with weaker set-existence principles. Various
principles stronger than the separation schema are needed to get a reasonable
set theory, and many alternative axiomatizations have been proposed. But the
lesson of these paradoxes is that no setexistence principle can entail the
existence of the Russell set, the set of all ordinals, or the set of all sets,
on pain of contradiction.
sextus empiricus: the sixth son of Empiricus the Elder – “My five
brothers were not philosophers” -- Grecian Skeptic philosopher whose writings
are the chief source of our knowledge about the extreme Skeptic view,
Pyrrhonism. Practically nothing is known about him as a person. He was
apparently a medical doctor and a teacher in a Skeptical school, probably in
Alexandria. What has survived are his Hypotoposes, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and
a series of Skeptical critiques, Against the Dogmatists, questioning the
premises and conclusions in many disciplines, such as physics, mathematics,
rhetoric, and ethics. In these works, Sextus summarized and organized the views
of Skeptical arguers before him. The Outlines starts with an attempt to
indicate what Skepticism is, to explain the terminology employed by the
Skeptics, how Pyrrhonian Skepticism differs from other so-called Skeptical
views, and how the usual answers to Skepticism are rebutted. Sextus points out
that the main Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Academic
Skepticism which is presented as a negative dogmatism, claimed that they would
bring the adherent peace of mind, ataraxia. Unfortunately the dogmatic adherent
would only become more perturbed by seeing the Skeptical objections that could
be brought against his or her view. Then, by suspending judgment, epoche, one
would find the tranquillity being sought. Pyrrhonian Skepticism is a kind of
mental hygiene or therapy that cures one of dogmatism or rashness. It is like a
purge that cleans out foul matter as well as itself. To bring about this state
of affairs there are sets of Skeptical arguments that should bring one to
suspense of judgment. The first set are the ten tropes of the earlier Skeptic,
Anesidemus. The next are the five tropes about causality. And lastly are the
tropes about the criterion of knowledge. The ten tropes stress the variability
of sense experience among men and animals, among men, and within one
individual. The varying and conflicting experiences present conflicts about
what the perceived object is like. Any attempt to judge beyond appearances, to
ascertain that which is non-evident, requires some way of choosing what data to
accept. This requires a criterion. Since there is disagreement about what
criterion to employ, we need a criterion of a criterion, and so on. Either we
accept an arbitrary criterion or we get into an infinite regress. Similarly if
we try to prove anything, we need a criterion of what constitutes a proof. If
we offer a proof of a theory of proof, this will be circular reasoning, or end
up in another infinite regress. Sextus devotes most of his discussion to
challenging Stoic logic, which claimed that evident signs could reveal what is
non-evident. There might be signs that suggested what is temporarily
non-evident, such as smoke indicating that there is a fire, but any supposed
linkage between evident signs and what is non-evident can be challenged and
questioned. Sextus then applies the groups of Skeptical arguments to various
specific subjects physics, mathematics,
music, grammar, ethics showing that one
should suspend judgment on any knowledge claims in these areas. Sextus denies
that he is saying any of this dogmatically: he is just stating how he feels at
given moments. He hopes that dogmatists sick with a disease, rashness, will be
cured and led to tranquillity no matter how good or bad the Skeptical arguments
might be.
sgalambro: important Italian philosopher – Manlio
Sgalambro Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search
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Wikidata · Manuale Manlio Sgalambro (Lentini, 9 dicembre 1924 – Catania, 6
marzo 2014) è stato un filosofo, scrittore, poeta, aforista, paroliere e
cantautore italiano. La sua opera filosofica è stata definita di
orientamento nichilista[1][2], definizione spesso respinta da Sgalambro stesso[3][4],
ma talvolta anche accettata[5], e si può piuttosto definire un'originale
sintesi tra la filosofia della vita di Arthur Schopenhauer[6] e il materialismo
e pessimismo di Giuseppe Rensi[7], con le influenze dell'esistenzialismo sui
generis di Emil Cioran[8], di alcuni temi della scolastica e della
"teologia empia" e naturalistica di Vanini e Mauthner[9].
Sgalambro è noto anche per la collaborazione con il cantautore Franco Battiato,
delle cui canzoni fu autore dei testi tra il 1995 e il 2012. Indice
1 Biografia 1.1 La produzione filosofica 1.2 Le collaborazioni con Franco
Battiato ed altri 2 Partecipazioni dirette alle opere di Battiato 2.1 Canzoni 3
Opere 3.1 Libri 3.2 Saggi 3.3 Album 3.4 Singoli 4 Collaborazioni 4.1 Album 4.2
Singoli 4.3 Opere teatrali 4.4 Film 4.5 Documentari 4.6 Videoclip 4.7 Programmi
televisivi 5 Bibliografia 5.1 Libri 5.2 Saggi 5.3 Articoli 5.4 Tesi di laurea 6
Filmografia 7 Note 8 Altri progetti 9 Collegamenti esterni Biografia Manlio
Sgalambro nacque a Lentini nel 1924, da una famiglia benestante (il padre era
un farmacista). Ha sempre osservato un riserbo quasi
"conventuale"[10] nella sua vita privata, fornendo tuttavia alcuni
elementi biografici nelle sue interviste o presentazioni. Dopo l'infanzia
trascorsa a Lentini, si trasferisce a Catania, dove rimane per tutta la vita.
Nel 1947 si iscrive all'Università degli studi di Catania:
«All'università decisi di non iscrivermi in Filosofia perché la coltivavo già
autonomamente. Mi piaceva il diritto penale e per questo scelsi la facoltà di
Giurisprudenza.[11]» (Manlio Sgalambro) Inoltre non si trovava d'accordo
con la cultura filosofica dominante allora nelle accademie, troppo legata
all'idealismo di Croce e Gentile: «Erano loro che occupavano tutto lo
spazio culturale, ma io non mi ritrovavo affatto in quei sistemi complessi e
completi, dove ogni cosa era già stata incasellata. Per me pensare era una
destructio piuttosto che una costructio: ero uno che notava le rovine,
piuttosto che la bellezza. Questo era un po' scomodo, e non certamente
accademico.[5]» Nel 1963, a 39 anni, si sposa, e dal matrimonio nascono
cinque figli (Elena, Simona, Riccardo, Irene, Elisa). Il reddito che proveniva
da un agrumeto (lasciatogli in eredità dal padre) non basta più, così sceglie di
integrarlo compilando tesi di laurea e facendo supplenze nelle scuole:
«Il matrimonio è un momento, come dice Hegel, in cui «la realtà determinata
entra in un individuo». Dunque il matrimonio non coincide semplicemente con
l'amore per una persona, ma con la durata: ecco dove sta l'essenza, quasi
teologica, del matrimonio.[11]» (Manlio Sgalambro) Muore il 6 marzo 2014
a Catania, all'età di 89 anni.[12] Sgalambro era dichiaratamente ateo anche se
credeva nella reincarnazione, come ricordato anche dall'amico Battiato[13], e
ha avuto un funerale religioso.[14] Da molti anni viveva da solo nella sua casa
catanese.[5] La produzione filosofica «Che non ci sia niente di peggiore
del mondo, non si deve dimostrare.» (La conoscenza del peggio) Sgalambro
ripeteva spesso che non possedeva titoli né lauree «per i biglietti da visita»
e quindi come sia riuscito a diventare uno scrittore di filosofia – i cui libri
sono tradotti in francese, tedesco e spagnolo – era «un mistero» che egli
stesso stentava a spiegarsi. Il suo primo contatto con un'opera
filosofica avviene nel periodo dell'adolescenza, quando legge La formazione
naturale nel fatto del sistema solare di Roberto Ardigò nella biblioteca di un
parente[15]. Seguono i Principi di psicologia di William James, le Ricerche
logiche di Husserl (un'opera che ritornerà più volte nella sua
riflessione[16]), e, soprattutto, Il mondo come volontà e rappresentazione di
Schopenhauer[17]. L'incontro con il pensatore tedesco spinge Sgalambro ad un
interesse sempre crescente per la cultura nordeuropea, che sfocerà poi nella
scoperta di Kant, Hegel[18], Friedrich Nietzsche[15], e Kierkegaard, a cui
dedica i suoi primi saggi. Nel 1945 inizia a collaborare alla rivista
catanese Prisma (diretta da Leonardo Grassi): il primo scritto è Paralipomeni
all'irrazionalismo, dove, influenzato da Rensi, sviluppa un attacco
all'idealismo crociano allora in piena egemonia.[19] Egli si ispira anche
all'ironia di Karl Kraus di cui ama lo stile aforistico ("Se Karl Kraus
avesse scritto Il Capitale lo avrebbe fatto in tre righe"). Dal
1959, assieme a Sebastiano Addamo, scrive per il periodico Incidenze (fondato
da Antonio Corsano): il primo articolo è Crepuscolo e notte (che viene
ristampato nel 2011), un breve saggio di "esistenzialismo negativo",
ispirato ad Heidegger e Céline.[5] Frattanto inizia a scrivere anche per la
rivista Tempo presente (diretta da Nicola Chiaromonte ed Ignazio
Silone).[5] Alla fine degli anni settanta decide di organizzare il suo
pensiero in un'opera sistematica: a 55 anni Sgalambro manda il suo primo libro,
La morte del sole, con un biglietto di due righe alla casa editrice Adelphi; al
proposito dirà: «E lì è rimasto due anni. Ma siccome io sono fatto in
questo modo, non ho chiesto niente. Poi è arrivata una telefonata a mia moglie.
Mi chiedevano di andare a Milano, per prendere contatto con l'editore. Roberto
Calasso mi disse che quel libro non era maturo, era marcio: ed era esattamente
così”.[20]» (Manlio Sgalambro) Negli anni seguenti, con lo stesso
editore, pubblica anche: Trattato dell'empietà (1987), Anatol (1990), Del
pensare breve (1991), Dialogo teologico (1993), Dell'indifferenza in materia di
società (1994), La consolazione (1995), Trattato dell'età (1999), De mundo
pessimo (2004), La conoscenza del peggio (2007), Del delitto (2009) e Della
misantropia (2012).[5] Spesso viene avvicinato alla corrente nichilista;
talvolta ha respinto la definizione, mentre altre volte l'ha accettata, nel
senso di un nichilismo attivo e demolitore, non passivo e chiuso: «Indubbiamente
questa visione è nell'intimo di me stesso. Per un nichilista le cose – il Papa,
Mussolini, un vaso di terracotta – si equivalgono. Questo non significa che non
si ha il senso di ciò che vale: significa piuttosto che si prova a romperlo
come si può, per esempio con il martello del pensare.[5]» Intanto,
all'inizio degli anni novanta, con alcuni amici avvia una piccola attività
editoriale a Catania: nasce così la De Martinis. All'interno di questa casa
editrice, Sgalambro si occupa di saggistica, pubblicando un paio di propri
testi (Dialogo sul comunismo e Contro la musica) e ristampando alcune opere di
Giulio Cesare Vanini e di Julien Benda. Nel 2005 suscita polemiche una
sua intervista a Francesco Battistini sulla mafia, dove critica anche Leonardo
Sciascia e il mito dell'antimafia "militante" (che tra l'altro fu
criticata da Sciascia stesso negli ultimi anni di vita): «L'immagine della
Sicilia… C'è, come no? Ma cercarla in faccende di Cuffaro e di Gabanelli è come
cercare un tesoro fra le spine dei fichi d'India. Cercare che cosa, poi? La
griglia mafiosa è una gabbia. È chiaro che ha ragione la Gabanelli e che
Cuffaro vuole cancellare a suo modo la mafia, con un tratto di parole. Ma
contesto che la mafiosità sia una chiave di conoscenza... Non cambio idea. La
mafia è un concetto astratto. E gli astratti si distruggono con la logica, non
con la polizia... La polizia può arrestare la mafia. Eliminarla, mai. Quello
che importa è la Mafia maiuscola, concetto generale e perciò indistruttibile...
La mafia in sé non mi fa venire in mente nulla. Come la patria, i morti di
Solferino. Cose vetuste. Leonardo Sciascia era lo scrittore sociale, un maestro
di scuola che voleva insegnarci le buone maniere sociali. Ma rivisitarlo oggi è
come rileggere Silvio Pellico. La sua funzione si è esaurita... La mafia è
l'unica economia reale di quest'isola... Ci sono fenomeni della storia,
ricchezze che non si possono fare con le mani pulite. Qui la ricchezza è sempre
stata fondiaria, senza investimenti... La ricchezza è per sua natura sporca...
Basta col gioco della spartizione: è mafioso o no? Domande da periodo di lotte
religiose: è luterano o cattolico? In Sicilia sono arrivati anche i laici, per
fortuna.[21]» Definisce poi Claudio Fava "quel piagnone",
affermando che "i famosi Cavalieri", soprannome dato dal padre di
Fava a quattro imprenditori catanesi considerati collusi con Cosa nostra,
«erano l'unica economia possibile» per la città.[21] Nel 2014 è tornato in
maniera sarcastica sull'argomento: «Considero la Sicilia come un fenomeno
estetico e non ne cambierei nulla. In questo senso potrei dire che mi considero
un mafioso…».[5] Già nel 1995 era stato attaccato dal sociologo Franco
Ferrarotti che lo definì "un neo-reazionario" e di "intolleranza
aristocratica e silenzio sulla mafia".[22] Alla sua isola ha
dedicato l'opera Teoria della Sicilia: «Là dove domina l'elemento
insulare è impossibile salvarsi. Ogni isola attende impaziente di inabissarsi.
Una teoria dell'isola è segnata da questa certezza. Un'isola può sempre
sparire. Entità talattica, essa si sorregge sui flutti, sull'instabile. Per
ogni isola vale la metafora della nave: vi incombe il naufragio.» Oltre
ai saggi per Adelphi, ha pubblicato per Bompiani Teoria della canzone (1997),
Variazioni e capricci morali (2013) e due raccolte di poesie, Nietzsche
(frammenti di una biografia per versi e voce) (1998) e Marcisce anche il
pensiero (frammenti di un poema) (2011), dedicato all'ultima mezz'ora di vita
di Immanuel Kant, nonché L'impiegato di Filosofia (2010), nel quale ironicamente
afferma di aver rinunciato alla filosofia ritrovandosi più filosofo che mai,
curioso libretto stampato in un museo della stampa con caratteri mobili, edito
da La Pietra Infinita. Infine, ha pubblicato con Il Girasole: Del metodo
ipocondriaco (1989), Quaternario (racconto parigino) (2006), la raccolta di
poesie Nell'anno della pecora di ferro (2011), la pièce teatrale L'illusion
comique (2013) e Dal ciclo della vita (2014, postumo). Le collaborazioni
con Franco Battiato ed altri «La matematica è il tribunale del mondo. Il numero
è ordine e disciplina. Ciò con cui si indica lo scopo della scienza, tradisce
col termine la cosa. L'ordine, già il termine ha qualcosa di bieco, che sa di
polizia, adombra negli adepti le forze dell'ordine cosmico, i riti cosmici.
L'autentico sentimento scientifico è impotente davanti all'universo.
L'inflazione che caccia nelle mani dell'individuo, in un gesto solo, miliardi
di marchi, lasciandolo più miserabile di prima, dimostra punto per punto che il
denaro è un'allucinazione collettiva» (M. Sgalambro, La morte del sole,
frasi recitate da Franco Battiato in 23 coppie di cromosomi) Nel 1993 avviene
l'incontro con Franco Battiato, del tutto casualmente, perché presentavano
insieme un volume di poesie dell'amico comune Angelo Scandurra. Dopo pochi
giorni da quell'incontro, Battiato gli chiede un appuntamento per proporgli di
scrivere il libretto dell'opera Il cavaliere dell'intelletto: «Un anno fa
non ci conoscevamo neppure. Da allora non abbiamo fatto altro che lavorare insieme.
Lui sarà anche un filosofo, ma per me è un talento che mi stimola e
arricchisce. Mi sembra impossibile, oggi, tornare a scrivere i testi delle mie
cose.[23]» (Franco Battiato) «In mezzo a tutto questo, mi capitò tra i
piedi Franco Battiato. Per un certo verso direi che è stato uno di quegli
incontri che ti portano fuori strada, ma questa è una percezione che ho avuto
molto tardi. A volte trovo che è come se tutto quel tempo io lo abbia perduto:
la questione starebbe nel vedere se sia possibile recuperarlo…[5]»
Sgalambro a Conegliano nel 2007 Sgalambro accetta e risponde ironicamente
all'invito di Battiato chiedendogli di scrivere insieme un disco di musica
pop[10]. Tra Sgalambro e Battiato si sviluppa un sodalizio artistico e umano,
anche se non sempre facile: «Anche perché io non sono un grande seguace
dell'amicizia. Con Battiato abbiamo avuto lunghe liti, che duravano parecchio.
Poi uno dei due, in genere lui, telefonava e il rapporto riprendeva. Tutti i
litigi erano per un rigo da cambiare in una canzone: io non accettavo le
esigenze della musica e per lui questo era costoso. Il suo impegno in politica?
Non ho mai capito come si sia potuto lasciare tentare, tutti i giorni ho
cercato di convincerlo a levarsi, solo ora per fortuna sta tornando in se stesso.[5]»
A partire dal 1994 collabora a quasi tutti i progetti di Franco Battiato, per
cui scrive: i libretti delle opere Il cavaliere dell'intelletto (su
Federico II di Svevia), Socrate impazzito, Gli Schopenhauer e Telesio (su
Bernardino Telesio), e del balletto Campi magnetici; i testi di svariati album
musicali (L'ombrello e la macchina da cucire, L'imboscata, Gommalacca, Ferro
battuto, Dieci stratagemmi, Il vuoto, Apriti sesamo) e vari inediti, presenti
ad esempio nell'album Fleurs; le sceneggiature dei film Perduto amor,
Musikanten (sugli ultimi anni della vita di Beethoven) e Niente è come sembra,
del programma televisivo Bitte, keine Réclame e del documentario Auguri don
Gesualdo (su Gesualdo Bufalino). Benché affermasse che la canzone era per lui
"una distrazione"[5], dal 1998 scrive testi di canzoni anche per
Patty Pravo (Emma), Alice (Come un sigillo, Eri con me), Fiorella Mannoia (Il
movimento del dare), Carmen Consoli (Marie ti amiamo), Milva (Non conosco
nessun Patrizio), Adriano Celentano (Facciamo finta che sia vero) e Ornella
Vanoni (Aurora). Dopo essere intervenuto anche ai concerti di Battiato,
nel 2000 si cimenta lui stesso con la musica e pubblica il singolo La mer,
contenente la cover del celebre brano di Charles Trenet. In una rappresentazione
de L'histoire du soldat di Igor' Stravinskij (2000) interpretò la voce
narrante, con Franco Battiato nella parte del soldato e Giovanni Lindo Ferretti
in quella del Diavolo. Nel 2001 pubblica l'album Fun club, prodotto da
Franco Battiato e Saro Cosentino, che contiene «evergreen» del calibro di La
vie en rose (di Édith Piaf) e Moon river (di Henry Mancini), ma anche l'ironica
Me gustas tú (di Manu Chao): «Un alleggerimento che considero doveroso.
Dobbiamo sgravare la gente dal peso del vivere, invece che dare pane e
brioches. Questa volta, mi sono sgravato anch'io. E poi, la musica leggera ha
questo di bello, che in tre minuti si può dire quanto in un libro di 400 pagine
o in un'opera completa a teatro.[24]» (Manlio Sgalambro) Nel 2007 dà la voce
all'aereo DC-9 Itavia nell'opera Ultimo volo di Pippo Pollina sulla strage di
Ustica. Nel 2009 pubblica il singolo La canzone della galassia,
contenente la cover di The galaxy song (tratto da Il senso della vita dei Monty
Python), cantata assieme al gruppo sardo-inglese Mab. Nel 2009 torna dopo
40 anni ad esibirsi in un pub di Catania, assieme al filosofo Salvatore Massimo
Fazio e il curatore del suo sito Alessio Cantarella. Finita l'esibizione alla
presenza di Pippo Russo e Franco Battiato, seguì il concerto delle Lilies on
Mars, band formata da due ex componenti del gruppo MAB (Lisa Masia e Marina
Cristofalo), band che si era esibita con Battiato nella canzone Il vuoto, su
testo di Sgalambro. Partecipazioni dirette alle opere di Battiato Canzoni
In Di passaggio (da L'imboscata) recita in greco antico: (EL) «Ταὐτὸ τενὶ ζῶν
καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν' τάδε γὰρ
μεταπεσόντα ἐκεινά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν ταῦτα.» (IT) «La stessa cosa sono
il vivente e il morto, lo sveglio e il dormiente, il giovane e il vecchio:
questi infatti mutando son quelli e quelli mutando son questi.»
(Eraclito, Frammenti, 88) Interviene recitando in Shakleton, dall'album
Gommalacca (1998) In Invito al viaggio (da Fleurs) recita: «Ti invito al viaggio
in quel paese che ti somiglia tanto. I soli languidi dei suoi cieli annebbiati
hanno per il mio spirito l'incanto dei tuoi occhi quando brillano offuscati.
Laggiù, tutto è ordine e bellezza, calma e voluttà; il mondo s'addormenta in
una calda luce di giacinto e d'oro; dormono pigramente i vascelli vagabondi,
arrivati da ogni confine per soddisfare i tuoi desideri.» (Charles
Baudelaire, I fiori del male) In Corpi in movimento (da Campi magnetici)
recita: «Se io, come miei punti, penso quali si vogliano sistemi di cose, per
esempio, il sistema: amore, legge, spazzacamino… e poi non faccio altro che
assumere tutti i miei assiomi come relazioni tra tali cose, allora le mie
proposizioni, per esempio, il teorema di Pitagora, valgono anche per queste
cose.» (David Hilbert, Lettera a Frege del 29 dicembre 1899) Dal 1996
partecipa a quasi tutti i tour di Franco Battiato: Nel tour del '97
recita versi in latino sul brano di Battiato Areknames (da Pollution),
ribattezzato per l'occasione Canzone chimica: «Bacterium flourescens
liquefaciens, Bacterium histolyticum, Bacterium mesentericum, Bacterium
sporagenes, Bacterium putrificus…» (Manlio Sgalambro, Canzone chimica)
Nel tour del 2002 esegue una nuova versione – con il testo riadattato in chiave
filosofica – di Accetta il consiglio (tratto da The Big Kahuna), che viene
pubblicato l'anno dopo nell'album live Last Summer Dance. Nel 2004 canta due
brevi strofe dei suoi versi nella canzone La porta dello spavento supremo,
dall'album Dieci stratagemmi di Battiato: «Quello che c'è / ciò che verrà / ciò
che siamo stati / e comunque andrà /tutto si dissolverà (...) Sulle scogliere
fissavo il mare / che biancheggiava nell'oscurità / tutto si dissolverà.»
(La porta dello spavento supremo/Il sogno, testo di Manlio Sgalambro e Carlotta
Wieck) Opere Libri Manlio Sgalambro, La morte del sole, Milano, Adelphi, 1982
Manlio Sgalambro, Trattato dell'empietà, Milano, Adelphi, 1987 Manlio
Sgalambro, Vom Tod der Sonne (edizione tedesca de La morte del sole),
traduzione di Dora Winkler, Monaco (Germania), Hanser, 1988 Manlio Sgalambro,
Del metodo ipocondriaco, Valverde (CT), Il Girasole, 1989 Manlio Sgalambro,
Anatol, Milano, Adelphi, 1990 Manlio Sgalambro, Anatol (edizione francese),
traduzione di Dominique Bouveret, Saulxures (Francia), Circé, 1991 Manlio
Sgalambro, Del pensare breve, Milano, Adelphi, 1991 Manlio Sgalambro, Dialogo
teologico, Milano, Adelphi, 1993 Manlio Sgalambro, Contro la musica.
(Sull'ethos dell'ascolto), Catania, De Martinis, 1994 Manlio Sgalambro,
Dell'indifferenza in materia di società, Milano, Adelphi, 1994 Manlio
Sgalambro, De la pensée brève (edizione francese di Del pensare breve),
traduzione di Carole Walter, Saulxures (Francia), Circé, 1995 Manlio Sgalambro,
Dialogo sul comunismo, Catania, De Martinis, 1995 Manlio Sgalambro, La
consolazione, Milano, Adelphi, 1995 Manlio Sgalambro, La morte del sole
(seconda edizione), Milano, Adelphi, 1996 Manlio Sgalambro, Teoria della
canzone, Milano, Bompiani, 1997 Manlio Sgalambro-Jacques Robaud, Deux dialogues
philosophiques (contiene l'edizione francese di Dialogo teologico), traduzione
di Carole Walter, Saulxures (Francia), Circé, 1993 Manlio Sgalambro, Nietzsche.
(Frammenti di una biografia per versi e voce), Bompiani, Milano, 1998 Manlio
Sgalambro, Poesie (edizione a tiratura limitata di 72 esemplari numerati), a
cura di Antonio Contiero, Reggio Emilia, La Pietra Infinita, 1999 Manlio
Sgalambro, Trattato dell'età. Una lezione di metafisica, Milano, Adelphi, 1999
Manlio Sgalambro-Davide Benati, Segrete (edizione a tiratura limitata di 30
esemplari numerati), a cura di Antonio Contiero, Reggio Emilia, La Pietra
Infinita, 2001 Manlio Sgalambro, Traité de l'âge. Une leçon de métaphysique
(edizione francese di Trattato dell'età), traduzione di Dominique Férault,
Parigi (Francia), Payot, 2001 Manlio Sgalambro, Opus postumissimum. (Frammento
di un poema), a cura di Silvia Batisti - Rossella Lisi, Firenze, Giubbe Rosse,
2002 Manlio Sgalambro, Dolore e poesia (edizione a tiratura limitata di 32
esemplari numerati), a cura di Antonio Contiero, Reggio Emilia, La Pietra
Infinita, 2003 Manlio Sgalambro, De mundo pessimo (contiene Contro la musica.
(Sull'ethos dell'ascolto) e Dialogo sul comunismo), Milano, Adelphi, 2004
Manlio Sgalambro, Trattato dell'empietà (seconda edizione), Milano, Adelphi,
2005 Manlio Sgalambro, Quaternario. Racconto parigino, Valverde (CT), Il
Girasole, 2006 Manlio Sgalambro, Nietzsche. Frammenti di una biografia per
versi e voce (seconda edizione), Milano, Bompiani, 2006 Manlio Sgalambro, La
conoscenza del peggio, Milano, Adelphi, 2007 Manlio Sgalambro, Del delitto,
Milano, Adelphi, 2009 Manlio Sgalambro, La consolación (edizione spagnola de La
consolazione), traduzione di Martín López-Vega, Valencia (Spagna), Pre-Textos,
2009 Manlio Sgalambro, L'impiegato di filosofia (edizione a tiratura limitata
di 100 esemplari numerati), Reggio Emilia, La Pietra Infinita, 2010 Manlio
Sgalambro, Crepuscolo e notte, Messina, Mesogea, 2011 Manlio Sgalambro,
Nell'anno della pecora di ferro, Valverde (CT), Il Girasole, 2011 Manlio Sgalambro,
Marcisce anche il pensiero. Frammenti di un poema (seconda edizione di Opus
postumissimum. (Frammento di un poema)), Milano, Bompiani, 2011 Manlio
Sgalambro, Della misantropia, Milano, Adelphi, 2012 Manlio Sgalambro, Teoria
della canzone (seconda edizione con una nuova introduzione dell'autore),
Milano, Bompiani, 2012 Manlio Sgalambro, L'illusion comique, Valverde (CT), Il
Girasole, 2013 Manlio Sgalambro, Variazioni e capricci morali, Milano,
Bompiani, 2013 Manlio Sgalambro, Dal ciclo della vita, Valverde (CT), Il
Girasole, 2014 (postumo) Saggi Manlio Sgalambro, Devozione allo spazio in
Giuseppe Raciti, Dello spazio, Catania, CUECM, 1990, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro,
Sciascia e le aporie del fare in Sciascia. Scrittura e verità, Palermo,
Flaccovio, 1991, pp. 33–36 Manlio Sgalambro, Carpe veritatem in Arthur
Schopenhauer, La filosofia delle università, Milano, Adelphi, 1992, pp. 121–141
Manlio Sgalambro, Empedocle o della fine del ciclo cosmico in Antonio Di Grado,
Grandi siciliani. Tre millenni di civiltà, v. 1, Catania, Maimone, pp. 29–31
Manlio Sgalambro, Gentile o del pensare in Antonio Di Grado, Grandi siciliani.
Tre millenni di civiltà, v. 2, Catania, Maimone, pp. 415–418 Manlio Sgalambro,
Post scriptum in Pietro Barcellona, Lo spazio della politica. Tecnica e
democrazia, Roma, Riuniti, 1993, pp. 161–171 Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione in
Julien Benda, Saggio di un discorso coerente sui rapporti tra Dio e il mondo,
Catania, De Martinis, 1993, pp. 185–190 Manlio Sgalambro, Rensi in Giuseppe
Rensi, La filosofia dell'autorità, Catania, De Martinis, 1993, quarta di
copertina Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Angelo Scandurra, Trigonometria di
ragni, Milano, All'Insegna del Pesce d'Oro, 1993, pp. 7–8 Manlio Sgalambro, La
malattia dello spazio in Insulæ. L'arte dell'esilio, Genova, Costa &
Nolan, 1993, pp. 51–53 Manlio Sgalambro, Vanini e l'empietà in Giulio Cesare
Vanini, Confutazione delle religioni, Catania, De Martinis, 1993, pp. I-VI
Manlio Sgalambro, Breve introduzione in Giuseppe Tornatore, Una pura formalità,
Catania, De Martinis, 1994, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Piccola glossa al
“Trattato della concupiscenza” in Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, Trattato della
concupiscenza, Catania, De Martinis, 1994, pp. 7–10 Manlio Sgalambro,
postfazione in Ernst Jünger - Klaus Ulrich Leistikov, Mantrana. Un gioco,
Catania, De Martinis, 1995, quarta di copertina Manlio Sgalambro, Gentile e il
tedio del pensare in Giovanni Gentile, L'atto del pensare come atto puro,
Catania, De Martinis, 1995, pp. 7–13 Manlio Sgalambro, Il bene non può fondarsi
su un Dio omicida in Carlo Maria Martini - Umberto Eco, In cosa crede chi non
crede?, Roma, Liberal, 1996, pp. 95–98 Manlio Sgalambro, Sciascia e le aporie
del fare in Leonardo Sciascia. La memoria, il futuro, a cura di Matteo Collura,
Milano, Bompiani, 1998, pp. 69–72 Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Tommaso
Ottonieri, Elegia sanremese, Milano, Bompiani, 1998, p. V Manlio Sgalambro, La
morale di un cavallo in Ottavio Cappellani, La morale del cavallo, Scordia
(CT), Nadir, 1998, p. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Prefazione in Maurizio Cosentino, I
sistemi morali, Catania, Boemi, 1998, p. 7 Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione in
Domenico Trischitta, Daniela Rocca. Il miraggio in celluloide, Catania, Boemi,
1999, p. 71 Manlio Sgalambro, Piccole note in margine a Salvo Basso in Salvo
Basso, Dui, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 1999, p. 5 Manlio Sgalambro, Il
fabbricante di chiavi in Mariacatena De Leo - Luigi Ingaliso, Nell'antro del
filosofo. Dialogo con Manlio Sgalambro, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 2002, pp. 87–94
Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione in Alessandro Pumo, Il destino del corpo. L'uomo
e le nuove frontiere della scienza medica, Palermo, Nuova Ipsa, 2002, pp. ???
Manlio Sgalambro, Sodalizio in Franco Battiato. L'alba dentro l'imbrunire
(allegato a Franco Battiato. Parole e canzoni), a cura di Vincenzo Mollica,
Torino, Einaudi, 2004, p. V Manlio Sgalambro, Del vecchio in Riccardo Mondo -
Luigi Turinese, Caro Hillman… Venticinque scambi epistolari con James Hillman,
Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2004, pp. 227–228 Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in
Anna Vasta, I malnati, Porretta Terme (BO), I Quaderni del Battello Ebbro,
2004, seconda di copertina Manlio Sgalambro, Lettera a un giovane poeta in Luca
Farruggio, Bugie estatiche, Roma, Il Filo, 2006, p. 5 Manlio Sgalambro,
prefazione in Toni Contiero, Galleria Buenos Aires, Reggio Emilia, Aliberti,
2006, p. 7 Manlio Sgalambro, Teoria della Sicilia in Guido Guidi Guerrera,
Battiato. Another link, Baiso (RE), Verdechiaro, 2006, p. 117 Manlio Sgalambro,
Nota introduttiva in Michele Falzone, Franco Battiato. La Sicilia che profuma
d'oriente, Palermo, Flaccovio, 2007, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Una nota in
Franco Battiato, In fondo sono contento di aver fatto la mia conoscenza
(allegato a Niente è come sembra), Milano, Bompiani, 2007, pp. 87–90 Manlio
Sgalambro, Nadia Boulanger e l'ethos della musica in Bruno Monsaingeon,
Incontro con Nadia Boulanger, Palermo, rueBallu, 2007, pp. ??? Manlio
Sgalambro, prefazione in Arnold de Vos, Il giardino persiano, Fanna (PN),
Samuele, 2009, p. 7 Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Angelo Scandurra, Quadreria
dei poeti passanti, Milano, Bompiani, 2009, seconda di copertina Manlio
Sgalambro, Sull'idea di nazione in Catania. Non vi sarà facile, si può fare, lo
facciamo. La città, le regole, la cultura, Catania, ANCE, 2010, pp. 49–50
Manlio Sgalambro, Dicerie in Franco Battiato, Don Gesualdo (allegato a Auguri
don Gesualdo), Milano, Bompiani, 2010, pp. 7–10 Manlio Sgalambro, postfazione
in Carlo Guarrera, Occhi aperti spalancati, Messina, Mesogea, 2011, pp. 101–105
Manlio Sgalambro, Nota critica in Anna Vasta, Di un fantasma e di mari,
Catania, Prova d'Autore, 2011, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Nota in Georges
Bataille, W.C., a cura di Antonio Contiero, Massa, Transeuropa, Massa, 2011,
pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Giampaolo Bellucci, Un grappolo di rose
appese al sole, Villafranca Lunigiana (MS), Cicorivolta, 2011, pp. ??? Manlio
Sgalambro, prefazione in Selenia Bellavia, Pourparler, Catania, Prova d'Autore,
2012, p. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Apologia del teologo in Fabio Presutti, Deleuze
e Sgalambro: dell'espressione avversa, Catania, Prova d'Autore, 2012, pp. ???
Manlio Sgalambro, Breve riflessione in Massimiliano Scuriatti, Mico è tornato
coi baffi, Milano, Bietti, 2012, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Presentazione in
Armando Rotoletti, Circoli di conversazione a Biancavilla, Modugno (BA), Arti
Grafiche Favia, 2013, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Il senso della bellezza in
Franco Battiato, Jonia me genuit. Discografia leggera, discografia classica,
filmografia, pittura, Firenze, Della Bezuga, 2013, p. 168 Manlio Sgalambro,
Moralità plutarchee in Domenico Trischitta, 1999, Catania, Il Garufi, 2013, p.
109 Manlio Sgalambro, La città dei morti in Luigi Spina, Monumentale. Un
viaggio fotografico all'interno del gran camposanto di Messina, Milano, Electa,
2013, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, prefazione in Ghesia Bellavia, Fermo immagine,
Catania, Il Garufi, 2014, pp. ??? Manlio Sgalambro, Sulla mia morte in Franco
Battiato, Attraversando il bardo. Sguardi sull'aldilà, Milano, Bompiani, 2014,
pp. 44–45 Album Manlio Sgalambro, Fun club, Milano, Sony, 2001 Singoli Manlio
Sgalambro, La mer, Milano, Sony, 2000 Manlio Sgalambro, Me gustas tú, Milano,
Sony, 2001 Manlio Sgalambro feat. Mab, La canzone della galassia, Milano, Sony,
2009 Collaborazioni Album testi (L'ombrello e la macchina da cucire, Breve
invito a rinviare il suicidio, Piccolo pub, Fornicazione, Gesualdo da Venosa,
Moto browniano, Tao, Un vecchio cameriere, L'esistenza di Dio) in Franco
Battiato, L'ombrello e la macchina da cucire, Milano, EMI, 1995 testi (Di
passaggio, Strani giorni, La cura, Ein Tag aus dem Leben des kleinen Johannes,
Amata solitudine, Splendide previsioni, Ecco com'è che va il mondo,
Segunda-feira, Memorie di Giulia, Serial killer) e voce (Di passaggio) in
Franco Battiato, L'imboscata, Milano, Polygram, 1996 voce (Canzone chimica) in
Franco Battiato, L'imboscata live tour (registrazione video di un concerto),
Milano, Polygram, 1997 testo (Emma Bovary) in Patty Pravo, Notti, guai e
libertà, Milano, Sony, 1998 testi (Shock in my town, Auto da fé, Casta diva, Il
ballo del potere, La preda, Il mantello e la spiga, È stato molto bello, Quello
che fu, Vite parallele, Shackleton) e voce (Shackleton) in Franco Battiato,
Gommalacca, Milano, Polygram, 1998 testi (Medievale, Invito al viaggio) e voce
(Invito al viaggio) in Franco Battiato, Fleurs. Esempi affini di scritture e
simili, Milano, Universal, 1999 testi (Running against the grain, Bist du bei
mir, La quiete dopo un addio, Personalità empirica, Il cammino interminabile,
Lontananze d'azzurro, Sarcofagia, Scherzo in minore, Il potere del canto) e
voce (Personalità empirica) in Franco Battiato, Ferro battuto, Milano, Sony,
2001 testo (Invasione di campo) in AA.VV., Invasioni, ???, New Scientist, 2001
testo (Come un sigillo) in Franco Battiato, Fleurs 3 (album), Milano, Sony,
2002 voce (Non dimenticar le mie parole) in Franco Battiato, Colonna sonora di
Perduto amor (colonna sonora del film), Milano, Sony, 2003 voce (Shackleton,
Accetta il consiglio) in Franco Battiato, Last summer dance (registrazione
audio di un concerto), Milano, Sony, 2003 testi (Tra sesso e castità, Le aquile
non volano a stormi, Ermeneutica, Fortezza Bastiani, Odore di polvere da sparo,
I'm that, Conforto alla vita, 23 coppie di cromosomi, Apparenza e realtà, La
porta dello spavento supremo) e voce (La porta dello spavento supremo) in
Franco Battiato, Dieci stratagemmi. Attraversare il mare per ingannare il
cielo, Milano, Sony, 2004 voce (La porta dello spavento supremo) in Franco Battiato,
Un soffio al cuore di natura elettrica (registrazione audio e video di un
concerto), Milano, Sony, 2005 testi (Il vuoto, I giorni della monotonia,
Aspettando l'estate, Niente è come sembra, Tiepido aprile, The game is over, Io
chi sono?, Stati di gioia) e dell'adattamento in italiano di Era l'inizio della
primavera (da Aleksej Nikolaevič Tolstoj, It was in the early days of spring)
in Franco Battiato, Il vuoto, Milano, Universal, 2007 testo (Maori legend) in
Lilies on Mars, Lilies on Mars, 2008 testo (Il movimento del dare) in Fiorella
Mannoia, Il movimento del dare, Milano, Sony, 2008 testi (Tutto l'universo
obbedisce all'amore, Tibet) e dell'adattamento in italiano di Del suo veloce
volo (da Antony Hegarthy, Frankenstein) in Franco Battiato, Fleurs 2,
Universal, 2008 testo (Marie ti amiamo) in Carmen Consoli, Elettra, Milano,
Universal, 2009 testi (Inneres Auge, 'U cuntu) e voce ('U cuntu) in Franco
Battiato, Inneres Auge. Il tutto è più della somma delle sue parti, Milano,
Universal, 2009 testo (Non conosco nessun Patrizio!) in Milva, Non conosco
nessun Patrizio!, Milano, Universal, 2010 testo (Facciamo finta che sia vero)
in Adriano Celentano, Facciamo finta che sia vero, Milano, Universal, 2011
testo (Eri con me) in Alice, Samsara, ???, Arecibo, 2012 testi (Un
irresistibile richiamo, Testamento, Quand'ero giovane, Eri con me, Passacaglia,
La polvere del branco, Caliti junku, Aurora, Il serpente, Apriti sesamo) in
Franco Battiato, Apriti sesamo, Milano, Universal, 2012 Singoli testi (Strani
giorni, Decline and fall of the Roman empire) in Franco Battiato, Strani
giorni, Milano, Polygram, 1996 testo in Patty Pravo, Emma Bovary, Milano, Sony,
1998 testi (Shock in my town, Stage door) in Franco Battiato, Shock in my town,
Milano, Polygram, 1998 testi (Il ballo del potere, Stage door, Emma,
L'incantesimo) in Franco Battiato, Il ballo del potere, Milano, Polygram, 1998
testi (Running against the grain, Sarcofagia, In trance) in Franco Battiato,
Running against the grain, Milano, Sony, 2001 testo in Franco Battiato, Il
vuoto, Milano, Universal, 2007 testo in Franco Battiato feat. Carmen Consoli,
Tutto l'universo obbedisce all'amore, Milano, Universal, 2008 testo in Franco
Battiato, Inneres Auge, Milano, Universal, 2009 testo in Franco Battiato,
Passacaglia, Milano, Universal, 2012 Opere teatrali testi in Franco Battiato,
Il cavaliere dell'intelletto, inedito (prima rappresentazione: Palermo, 20
settembre 1994) testi e attore in Martin Kleist, Socrate impazzito, inedito
(prima rappresentazione: Catania, 30 luglio 1995) testi e attore in Franco
Battiato, Gli Schopenhauer, inedito (prima rappresentazione: Fano (PU), 8
agosto 1998) attore in Igor' Fëdorovič Stravinskij, L'histoire du soldat,
inedito, 1999 (prima rappresentazione: Roma, 4 febbraio 2000) libretto e voce
(Corpi in movimento, La mer) in Franco Battiato, Campi magnetici. I numeri non
si possono amare, Milano, Sony, 2000 (prima rappresentazione: Firenze, 13
giugno 2000) voce (Volare è un'arte, Negli abissi, Pratica di mare, A tu per tu
con il Mig, Verso Bologna, Simulacro) in Pippo Pollina, Ultimo volo. Orazione
civile per Ustica, Bologna, Storie di Note, 2007 (prima rappresentazione:
Bologna, 27 giugno 2007) attore in Manlio Sgalambro - Rosalba Bentivoglio -
Carlo Guarrera, Frammenti per versi e voce, inedito (prima rappresentazione:
Catania, 7 maggio 2009) testi in Franco Battiato, Telesio. Opera in due atti e
un epilogo, Milano, Sony, 2011 (prima rappresentazione: Cosenza, 7 maggio 2011)
Film sceneggiatura e attore (Martino Alliata) in Franco Battiato, Perduto amor,
Giarre (CT), L'Ottava, 2003 sceneggiatura e attore (nobile senese) in Franco
Battiato, Musikanten, Giarre (CT), L'Ottava, 2005 sceneggiatura in Franco
Battiato, Niente è come sembra, Milano, Bompiani, 2007 Documentari intervento
in Daniele Consoli, La verità sul caso del signor Ciprì e Maresco, Zelig, 2004
intervento in Franco Battiato, Auguri don Gesualdo, Milano, Bompiani, 2010
intervento in Massimiliano Perrotta, Sicilia di sabbia, Movie Factory, 2011
intervento in Franco Battiato, Attraversando il bardo. Sguardi sull'aldilà,
Milano, Bompiani, 2014 Videoclip attore in Franco Battiato, L'ombrello e la
macchina da cucire, 1995 attore in Franco Battiato, Di passaggio, 1996 attore
in Franco Battiato, Strani giorni, 1996 attore in Franco Battiato, Shock in my
town, 1998 attore in Franco Battiato, Running against the grain, 2001 attore in
Franco Battiato, Bist du bei mir, 2001 attore in Franco Battiato, Ermeneutica,
2004 attore in Franco Battiato, La porta dello spavento supremo, 2004 attore in
Franco Battiato, Il vuoto, 2007 attore in Franco Battiato, Inneres Auge, 2009
Programmi televisivi Franco Battiato, Bitte, keine Réclame, 2004 Bibliografia
Libri Francesco Saverio Niso, Comunità dello sguardo. Halbwachs, Sgalambro,
Cordero, Torino, Giappichelli, 2001 Mariacatena De Leo - Luigi Ingaliso,
Nell'antro del filosofo. Dialogo con Manlio Sgalambro, Catania, Prova d'Autore,
2002 Lina Passione, La notte e il tempo. Divagazioni su Franco Battiato, Manlio
Sgalambro e… altro, Catania, CUECM, 2009 Alessandro Max Cantello, Sgalambro
speaks. Uno scherzo mimetico che possa introdurre ad una filosofia, ???, Mas
Club, 2014 Manlio Sgalambro. L'ultimo chierico, a cura di Rita Fulco, Messina,
Mesogea, 2015 Caro misantropo. Saggi e testimonianze per Manlio Sgalambro, a
cura di Antonio Carulli - Francesco Iannello, Napoli, La Scuola di Pitagora,
2015 Salvatore Massimo Fazio, Regressione suicida. Dell'abbandono disperato di
Emil Cioran e Manlio Sgalambro, Barrafranca (EN), Bonfirraro, 2016 Manlio
Sgalambro. Breve invito all'opera, a cura di Davide Miccione, Caltagirone (CT),
Lettere da Qalat, 2017 Antonio Carulli, Introduzione a Sgalambro, Genova, Il
Melangolo, 2017 Patrizia Trovato - Antonio Carulli - Piercarlo Necchi - Manuel
Pérez Cornejo, La piccola verità. Quattro saggi su Manlio Sgalambro, Milano,
Mimesis, 2019 Saggi Sergio Zavoli, Le ombre della sera in Di questo passo.
Cinquecento domande per capire dove andiamo, Torino, Nuova ERI, 1993, pp.
377–389 Calogero Rizzo, De consolatione theologie in Massimo Iiritano, Sergio
Quinzio. Profezie di un'esistenza, Soveria Mannelli (CZ), Rubettino, 2000, pp.
105–126 Armando Matteo, Manlio Sgalambro: il dovere dell'empietà in Della fede
dei laici. Il cristianesimo di fronte alla mentalità postmoderna, Soveria
Mannelli (CZ), Rubettino, 2001, pp. 27–34 Stefano Lanuzza, Il filosofo insulare
in Erranze in Sicilia, Napoli, Guida, 2003, pp. 43–55 Leonor Sáez Méndez,
Zwischen der kritischen Bedingung der praktischen Erfahrung und der Doktrin:
Dechiffrierung der Perversion (Zwei Beispiele) in Kant ein illusionist? Das
retorsive und kompositive Verfahren der kantischen Urteilskraft nach dem
philosophischen Empirismus, Murcia (Spagna), Universidad de Murcia, 2010, pp.
201–204 Pino Aprile, La morte del sole in Giù al sud. Perché i terroni salveranno
l'Italia, Segrate (MI), Piemme, 2011, pp. 331–338 Marco Risadelli, Note su
“Dell'indifferenza in materia di società” di Manlio Sgalambro in Alessandra
Mallamo - Angelo Nizza, Polisofia, Roma, Nuova Cultura, 2012, pp. 17–31
Giuseppe Raciti, Until the end of the world. Sgalambro lettore di Spengler in
Per la critica della notte. Saggio sul “Tramonto dell’Occidente” di Oswald
Spengler, Milano, Mimesis, 2014, pp. 131–135 Articoli Enrico Arosio, Ora
Sgalambro il mondo in L'Espresso, n. 7, 21 febbraio 1988, pp. 141–145 Stefano
Lanuzza, Il pensiero ipocondriaco in Il Ponte, IVL, n. 2, febbraio 1990, pp.
146–148 Gerd Bergfleth, Finis mundi. Manlio Sgalambro und der Weltuntergang in
Der Pfahl. Jahrbuch aus dem Niemandsland zwischen Kunst und Wissenschaft, n. 5,
1991, pp. 20–56 Alberto Corda, Profilo di Manlio Sgalambro, filosofo
“irregolare” in Arenaria, VIII, n. 22, gennaio-aprile 1992, pp. 81–82 Giuseppe
Raciti, Sgalambro maestro “cattivo” per elezione in Ideazione, IV, n. 6, 1997,
pp. 215–216 Ferdinando Raffaele, Intorno alla creatività filosofica. A
colloquio con il filosofo Manlio Sgalambro in Parolalibera, n. 8, 1998, pp.
17–19 Francesco Saverio Nisio, Sgalambro, l'unico che canta. Mille sguardi, II
in Democrazia e diritto. Guerra e individuo, n. 1, 1999, pp. 190–202 Marcello
Faletra, Dialogo con Manlio Sgalambro, Cyberzone n° 20, 2006. Fabio Presutti,
Manlio Sgalambro, Giorgio Agamben: on metaphysical suspension of language and
the destiny of its inorganic re-absorption in Italica, v. 85, nn. 2-3, 2008, pp.
243–272 Concetta Bonini, Manlio Sgalambro. Il cavaliere dell'intelletto in
Freetime. Sicilia, febbraio-marzo 2014, pp. 88–91 Marcello Faletra, La pistola
di Sgalambro, 2014 in http://www.peppinoimpastato.com/visualizza.asp?val=2115
Marcello Faletra, L'azzardo del pensiero o il filosofo della crudeltà: Manlio
Sgalambro. Cyberzone n° 20 2006. Marcello Faletra, In ricordo di Manlio
Sgalambro, Artribune, 07/03/ 2017. Manuel Pérez Cornejo, En la estela de
Schopenhauer y Mainländer: la filosofía «peorista» de Manlio Sgalambro in
Schopenhaueriana. Revista española de estudios sobre Schopenhauer, n. 3, 2018,
pp. 9–31 Tesi di laurea Salvatore Massimo Fazio, Cioran e Sgalambro: un
confronto, Università degli Studi di Catania, a.a. ??? Fatima Scaglione,
Battiato - Sgalambro. Tra musica e filosofia, Università degli Studi di
Palermo, a.a. 2006-2007 Cecilia Comparoni, L'impossibilità di essere consolati.
L'itinerario tragico di Manlio Sgalambro, Università degli Studi di Genova,
a.a. 2014-2015 Filmografia Guido Cionini, Manlio Sgalambro. Il consolatore,
inedito (2006) Guido Cionini, Another side of Sgalambro, inedito (2008)
Marcello Faletra, Mario Bellone, Manlio Sgalambro. Del pensare breve, inedito
(2015) Note ^ Franco Battiato su Storia della musica.it ^ Articolo su Repubblica,
Manlio Sgalambro: adesso il filosofo diventa crooner ^ Intervista a Battiato e
Sgalambro - YouTube ^ Intervista a Manlio Sgalambro: Il filosofo rock che dà
del “lei” a Battiato www.livesicilia.it | elena giordano Manlio
Sgalambro, l'ultima intervista ^ "Teoria della canzone", pag.60,
Bompiani, e la prefazione a "La filosofia delle università", Adelphi
^ Sgalambro, il ricordo commosso di Cacciari: “Con lui incontro straordinario”
– Video Il Fatto Quotidiano TV, su tv.ilfattoquotidiano.it. URL consultato il
30 maggio 2014 (archiviato dall'url originale il 31 maggio 2014). ^ “A un
tratto ci si accorge di quella cosa che chiamiamo pensare”: Addio a Sgalambro.
La sua ultima intervista. URL consultato il 22 novembre 2014. ^ cfr. "De
mundo pessimo", "Frammenti di storia dell'empietismo",
"Trattato dell'empietà" Adelphi GAP Speciali. Manlio Sgalambro
- Un viaggio oltre il luogo comune - Rai Scuola Mariacatena De Leo
& Luigi Ingaliso, Nell'antro del filosofo: dialogo con Manlio Sgalambro
(Prova d'autore, 2002). ^ È morto Manlio Sgalambro, il filosofo di Franco
Battiato, radiomusik.it, 6 marzo 2014. ^ Franco Battiato choc a Napoli: «Sento
la fine vicina, meglio cogliere il giorno». URL consultato il 22 novembre 2014.
^ Sgalambro, il filosofo che cantò il nichilismo Giovanni Tesio, "In
ginocchio davanti a Nietzsche", TuttoLibri, 2/6/2012 ^ "La conoscenza
del peggio", pag.58, Adelphi ^ La scrittura aforistica di Manlio Sgalambro
| ^ Intervista a Manlio Sgalambro:: LaRecherche.it ^ Paralipomeni all'irrazionalismo
Archiviato il 7 marzo 2014 in Internet Archive. ^ Giorgio Calcagno, Sgalambro:
il filosofo è uno spione (da La Stampa del 28 agosto 1996). Francesco
Battistini, Sgalambro: Sciascia addio, non servi più, Corriere della Sera, 11
febbraio 2005. ^ Carlo Formenti, Ferrarotti accusa: «Sgalambro neoreazionario»,
in “Corriere della Sera”, 20 dicembre 1995 ^ Liliana Madeo, Battiato: note per
un filosofo (da La Stampa del 19 settembre 1994). ^ Marinella Venegoni, Così
Sgalambro canta la sua filosofia (da La Stampa del 20 ottobre 2001) Altri
progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Manlio
Sgalambro Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o
altri file su Manlio Sgalambro Collegamenti esterni Sito ufficiale, su
sgalambro.altervista.org. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Manlio Sgalambro, su
AllMusic, All Media Network. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Manlio Sgalambro, su
Discogs, Zink Media. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Manlio Sgalambro, su
MusicBrainz, MetaBrainz Foundation. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Manlio Sgalambro,
su Internet Movie Database, IMDb.com. Modifica su Wikidata Manlio Sgalambro. Il
filosofo cantante maestro dell'ironia: "Sono un uomo felice di stare su
quest'Isola", in la Repubblica, 20 febbraio 2011. Incontro con Sgalambro
(PDF), in Le conversazioni di Perelandra, n. 3-4, gennaio-agosto 2002.
Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 79045628 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 8158 7237 · SBN
IT\ICCU\CFIV\057374 · LCCN (EN) n82105664 · GND (DE) 111680166 · BNF (FR)
cb120279706 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1626691 (data) · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n82105664 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Letteratura Portale Letteratura Musica Portale Musica Sicilia Portale Sicilia
Categorie: Cantautori popFilosofi italiani del XX secoloFilosofi italiani del
XXI secoloScrittori italiani del XX secoloScrittori italiani del XXI
secoloPoeti italiani del XX secoloPoeti italiani del XXI secoloNati nel
1924Morti nel 2014Nati il 9 dicembreMorti il 6 marzoNati a LentiniMorti a
CataniaParolieri italianiCantautori italiani del XX secoloAforisti
italianiPersone legate all'Università di CataniaEditori italianiInsegnanti
italiani del XX secoloAttori italiani del XXI secoloLibrettisti
italianiSceneggiatori italianiPoeti in lingua sicilianaStudenti dell'Università
di Catania[altre] Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Sgalamabro," per
il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria,
Italia.
shaftesbury, Lord, in full, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, title of Anthony
Ashley Cooper, English philosopher and politician who originated the moral
sense theory. He was born at Wimborne St. Giles, Dorsetshire. As a Country Whig
he served in the House of Commons for three years and later, as earl, monitored
meetings of the House of Lords. Shaftesbury introduced into British moral
philosophy the notion of a moral sense, a mental faculty unique to human
beings, involving reflection and feeling and constituting their ability to
discern right and wrong. He sometimes represents the moral sense as analogous
to a purported aesthetic sense, a special capacity by which we perceive,
through our emotions, the proportions and harmonies of which, on his Platonic
view, beauty is composed. For Shaftesbury, every creature has a “private good
or interest,” an end to which it is naturally disposed by its constitution. But
there are other goods as well notably,
the public good and the good without qualification of a sentient being. An
individual creature’s goodness is defined by the tendency of its “natural
affections” to contribute to the “universal system” of nature of which it is a
part i.e., their tendency to promote the
public good. Because human beings can reflect on actions and affections,
including their own and others’, they experience emotional responses not only
to physical stimuli but to these mental objects as well e.g., to the thought of
one’s compassion or kindness. Thus, they are capable of perceiving and acquiring through their actions a particular species of goodness, namely,
virtue. In the virtuous person, the person of integrity, natural appetites and
affections are in harmony with each other wherein lies her private good and in
harmony with the public interest. Shaftesbury’s attempted reconciliation of
selflove and benevolence is in part a response to the egoism of Hobbes, who
argued that everyone is in fact motivated by self-interest. His defining
morality in terms of psychological and public harmony is also a reaction to the
divine voluntarism of his former tutor, Locke, who held that the laws of nature
and morality issue from the will of God. On Shaftesbury’s view, morality exists
independently of religion, but belief in God serves to produce the highest
degree of virtue by nurturing a love for the universal system. Shaftesbury’s
theory led to a general refinement of eighteenth-century ideas about moral
feelings; a theory of the moral sense emerged, whereby sentiments are under certain conditions perceptions of, or constitutive of, right and
wrong. In addition to several essays collected in three volumes under the title
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times second edition, 1714,
Shaftesbury also wrote stoical moral and religious meditations reminiscent of
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. His ideas on moral sentiments exercised considerable
influence on the ethical theories of Hutcheson and Hume, who later worked out
in detail their own accounts of the moral sense. H. P. Grice, “My favourite Cooper.”
shyreswood: “I prefer the spelling shyreswood, since it SAYS what
‘sherwood’ merely implicates.” -- Sherwood, William, also called William
Shyreswood, English logician who taught logic at Oxford and at Paris between
1235 and 1250. He was the earliest of the three great “summulist” writers, the
other two whom he influenced strongly being Peter of Spain and Lambert of
Auxerre. His main works are “Introductiones in Logicam,” “Syncategoremata,” “De
insolubilibus,” and “Obligationes.” Some serious doubts have recently arisen
about the authorship of the latter work. Since M. Grabmann published Sherwood’s
Introductiones, philosophers have paid considerable attention to this seminal
Griceian. While the first part of Introductiones offer the basic ideas of
Aristotle’s Organon, and the latter part neatly lays out the Sophistical
Refutations, the final tract expounds the doctrine of the four properties of a
term. First, signification. Second, supposition. Third, conjunction, Fourth, appellation
-- hence the label ‘terminist’ for this sort of logic. These logico-semantic
discussions, together with the discussions of syncategorematic words,
constitute the “logica moderna,” (Grice’s ‘mdoernism’) as opposed to the more
strictly Aristotelian contents of the earlier logica vetus (Grice’s
neo-traditionalism) and logica nova (“It took me quite a while to explain to
Strawson the distinction between ‘logica nova’ and ‘logica moderna,’ only to
have him tell me, “worry not, Grice – I’ll be into ‘logica vetus’ anyways!””. The
doctrine of properties of terms and the analysis of syncategorematic terms,
especially those of ‘all’ (or every) ‘no’ (or not or it is not the case) and
‘nothing’, ‘only’, ‘not’, ‘begins’ and ‘ceases (to eat iron) ‘necessarily’,
‘if’ (Latin ‘si,’ Grecian ‘ei’), ‘and’ (Latin ‘et’, Grecian ‘kai’) and ‘or’
(Latin ‘vel’) may be said to constitute
Sherwood’s or Shyrewood’s philosophy of logic. Shyrewood not only distinguishes
categorematic descriptive and syncategorematic logical words but also shows how
some terms are used categorematically in some contexts and syncategorematically
in others – “he doesn’t explain which, and that’s one big map in his opus.”–
Grice. He recognizes the importance of the order of words (hence Grice, ‘be
orderly’) and of the scope of logical functors; he also anticipates the variety
of composite and divided senses of propositions. Obligationes, if indeed his,
attempts to state conditions under which a formal disputation may take place.
De Insolubilibus deals with paradoxes of self-reference and with ways of
solving them. Understanding Sherwood’s logic is important for understanding the
later medieval developments of logica moderna down to Occam whom Grice laughed
at (“modified Occam’s razor.”). Refs.: Grice, “Shyreswood at Oxford.”
All figures of rhetoric
All fallacies – argumentum ad:
ship of
Theseus: the ship of the Grecian hero
Theseus, which, according to Plutarch “Life of Theseus,” 23, the Athenians
preserved by gradually replacing its timbers. A classic debate ensued
concerning identity over time. Suppose a ship’s timbers are replaced one by one
over a period of time; at what point, if any, does it cease to be the same
ship? What if the ship’s timbers, on removal, are used to build a new ship,
identical in structure with the first: which ship has the best claim to be the
original ship?
shpet: phenomenologist and highly regarded friend of
Husserl. Shpet plays a major role in the development of phenomenology. Graduating
from Kiev in 6, Shpet accompanied his mentor
Chelpanov to Moscow, ommencing graduate studies at Moscow M.A., 0; Ph.D., 6. He attends Husserl’s
seminars at Göttingen during 213, out of which developed a continuing
friendship between the two, recorded in correspondence extending through 8. In
4 Shpet published a meditation, “Iavlenie i smysl,” nspired by Husserl’s
Logical Investigations and, especially, Ideas I, which had appeared in 3.
Between 4 and 7 he published six additional books on such disparate topics as
the concept of history, Herzen, philosophy, aesthetics, ethnic psychology, and
language. He founds and edited the philosophical yearbook Mysl’ i slovo Thought
and Word between 8 and 1, publishing an important article on skepticism in it.
He was arrested and sentenced to internal exile. Under these conditions he made
a running commentary of Hegel’s Phenomenology. He was executed.
sidgwick: English
philosopher. Best known for “The Methods of Ethics,” he also wrote “Outlines of
the History of Ethics.” In the “Methods,” Sidgwick tries to assess the
rationality of the main ways in which ordinary people go about making this or
that moral decision. Sidgwick thinks that our common “methods of ethics” fall
into three main patterns. The first pattern is articulated by the philosophical
theory known as intuitionism. This is the view that we can just see straight
off either what particular act is right or what binding rule or general principle
we ought to follow. A second pattern is spelled out by what self-love or egoism,
the view that we ought in each act to get as much good as we can for ourselves.
– vide: H. P. Grice, “The principle of conversational self-love and the
principle of conversational benevolence,” H. P.
Grice, “Conversational benevolence, not conversational self-love.” The
third widely used method is represented by utilitarianism, the view that we
ought in each case to bring about as much good as possible for everyone
affected. Can any or all of the methods prescribed by these views be rationally
defended? And how are they related to one another? By framing his philosophical
questions in these terms, Sidgwick makes it centrally important to examine the
chief philosophical theories of morality in the light of the common-sense
morals of his time. Sidgwick thinks that no theory wildly at odds with common-sense
morality would be acceptable. Intuitionism, a theory originating with Butler
(of ‘self-love and benevolence’ fame), transmitted by Reid, and most
systematically expounded during the Victorian era by Whewell, is widely held to
be the best available defense of Christian morals. Egoism (Self-love) was
thought by many to be the clearest pattern of practical (or means-end)
rationality and is frequently said to be compatible with Christianity. And J.
S. Mill had argues that utilitarianism is both rational and in accord with
common sense. But whatever their relation to ordinary morality, the three
methods or patterns seem to be seriously at odds with one another. Examining
all the chief commonsense precepts and rules of morality, such as that promises
ought to be kept, Sidgwick argues that none is truly self-evident or intuitively
certain. Each fails to guide us at certain points where we expect it to answer
our practical questions. Utilitarianism, he found, could provide a complicated
method for filling these gaps. But what ultimately justifies utilitarianism is
certain very general axioms seen intuitively to be true. Among them are the
principles that what is right in one case must be right in any similar case,
and that we ought to aim at good generally, not just at some particular part of
it. Thus intuitionism and utilitarianism can be reconciled. When taken together
they yield a complete and justifiable method of ethics that is in accord with
common sense. What then of egoism and self-love? Self love and egoirm can
provide as complete a method as utilitarianism, and it also involves a
self-evident axiom. But the results of
egoism and self-love often contradict those of utilitarianism. Hence there is a
serious problem. The method that instructs us to act always for the good
generally and the method that tells one to act solely for one’s own good are
equally rational. Since the two methods give contradictory directions, while
each method rests on self-evident axioms, it seems that practical reason is
fundamentally incoherent. Sidgwick could see no way to solve the problem. Sidgwick’s
bleak conclusion is not generally accepted (especially at Oxford), but his
Methods is widely viewed as one of the best works of moral philosophy ever
written in what Grice calls ‘insular’ philosophy (as opposed to mainland
philosophy). Sidgwick’s account of
classical utilitarianism is unsurpassed. Sidwick’s discussions of the general
status of morality and of particular moral concepts are enduring models of
clarity and acumen. His insights about the relations between egoism (self-love)
and utilitarianism have stimulated much valuable research. And his way of
framing moral problems, by asking about the relations between commonsense
beliefs and the best available theories, has set much of the agenda for
ethics.
sì/no -- “sic” et “ne” – modus interrogativus. Grice: “Oddly that the Italians call
themselves as speaking the ‘lingua del si,’ contra the Gallics, who speak the
‘lingua del’oc,” or worse, the ‘lingua d’oil”!! -- Grice: Or yes/no question.
“Cicero has this as ‘sic’ and ‘non.’ For Grice, tertium non datur. Grice’s
example is “Have you stopped beating
your wife, Smith?” “Smith is tricked into having to say ‘yes,’ which
makes him a criminal, or “no,” which doesn’t but *implicates* him in a crime.”
“The explicit cancellation would be, “No, because I never started it.” – “But
usually Smith is never so intelligently Griceian like *that*! Vide: modus
interrogatives. Grice finds the
formalisation of a yes-no question more complicated than that of an x-question.
Like Carnap, he concludes that the distinction is otiose, because a yes/no
question also is after a variable to be filled by a definite value, regarding
the truth-value of the proposition as a whole rather than a part thereof.
Grice: “While I’ll casually use ‘yes,’ I’m well aware that the ‘s,’ as every
German schoolboy knows, is otiose – it’s ‘yeah’ which is the correct form!” --
Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Cicero on ‘sic’ and ‘ne’.” BANC, Speranza, “First time in
Corpus?”
signum – Grice: “I prefer token, so Anglo-Saxon! Plus I’m a
‘teacher’ – “to teach philosophy” --” whose explorations on the Nicomachean
Ethics, in one of their earlier incarnations, as a set of lecture notes, sees
me through terms of teaching Aristotle's moral theory.” “My own philosophical
life in this period involves two especially important aspects.” ROBBING PETER
TO PAY PAUL.. “The first is my prolonged collaboration with my tutee at St.
John’s, P. F. Strawson.”“Strawson’s and my efforts are partly directed towards
the giving of joint seminars.”“Strawson and I stage a number of joint seminars
on topics related to the notions of meaning, categories, and logical form.”
“But my association with P. F. Strawson is much more than an alliance for the
purpose of teaching.” -- theory of signs, the philosophical and scientific
theory of information-carrying entities, communication, and information
transmission. The term ‘semiotic’ was introduced by Locke for the science of
signs and signification. The term became more widely used as a result of the
influential work of Peirce and Charles Morris. With regard to linguistic signs,
three areas of semiotic were distinguished: pragmatics the study of the way people, animals, or machines
such as computers use signs; semantics
the study of the relations between signs and their meanings, abstracting
from their use; and syntax the study of
the relations among signs themselves, abstracting both from use and from
meaning. In Europe, the near-equivalent term ‘semiology’ was introduced by
Ferdinand de Saussure, the Swiss linguist. Broadly, a sign is any
information-carrying entity, including linguistic and animal signaling tokens,
maps, road signs, diagrams, pictures, models, etc. Examples include smoke as a
sign of fire, and a red light at a highway intersection as a sign to stop.
Linguistically, vocal aspects of speech such as prosodic features intonation,
stress and paralinguistic features loudness and tone, gestures, facial
expressions, etc., as well as words and sentences, are signs in the most
general sense. Peirce defined a sign as “something that stands for something in
some respect or capacity.” Among signs, he distinguished symbols, icons, and
indices. A symbol, or conventional sign, is a sign, typical of natural language
forms, that lacks any significant relevant physical correspondence with or
resemblance to the entities to which the form refers manifested by the fact
that quite different forms may refer to the same class of objects, and for
which there is no correlation between the occurrence of the sign and its
referent. An index, or natural sign, is a sign whose occurrence is causally or
statistically correlated with occurrences of its referent, and whose production
is not intentional. Thus, yawning is a natural sign of sleepiness; a bird call
may be a natural sign of alarm. Linguistically, loudness with a rising pitch is
a sign of anger. An icon is a sign whose form corresponds to or resembles its
referent or a characteristic of its referent. For instance, a tailor’s swatch
is an icon by being a sign that resembles a fabric in color, pattern, and
texture. A linguistic example is onomatopoeia
as with ‘buzz’. In general, there are conventional and cultural aspects
to a sign being an icon. signatum: Cf. “to sign” as a verb –
from French. Grice uses designatum, too – but more specifically within the
‘propositio’ as a compound of a subjectum and a predicatum. The subject-item
indicates a thing; and the predicate-item designates a property. As Grice
notes, there is a distinction between Aristotle’s use, in De Int., of
‘sumbolon,’ for which Aristotle sometimes means ‘semeion,’ and their Roman
counterparts, ‘signum’ sounds otiose enough. But ‘significo’ does not. There is
this –fico thing that sounds obtrusive. The Romans, however, were able to
distinguish between ‘make a sign,’ and just ‘signal.’ The point is important
when Grice tries to apply the Graeco-Roman philosophical terminology to a
lexeme which does not belong in there: “mean.” His example is someone in pain,
uttering “Oh.” If he later gains voluntary control, by uttering “Oh” he means
that he is in pain, and even at a later stage, provided he learns ‘lupe,’ he
may utter the expression which is somewhat correlated in a non-iconic fashion
with something which iconically is a vehicle for U to mean that he is in pain.
In this way, in a communication-system, a communication-device, such as “Oh”
does for the state of affairs something that the state of affairs cannot do for
itself, govern the addresee’s thoughts and behaviour (very much as the
Oxfordshire cricket team does for Oxfordshire what Oxfordshire cannot do for
herself, viz. to engage in a game of cricket. There’s rae-presentatum, for you!
Short and Lewis have ‘signare,’ from ‘signum,’ and which they render as ‘to set
a mark upon, to mark, mark out, designate (syn.: noto, designo),’ Lit. A. In
gen. (mostly poet. and in post-Aug. prose): discrimen non facit neque signat
linea alba, Lucil. ap. Non. 405, 17: “signata sanguine pluma est,” Ov. M. 6,
670: “ne signare quidem aut partiri limite campum Fas erat,” Verg. G. 1, 126:
“humum limite mensor,” Ov. M. 1, 136; id. Am. 3, 8, 42: “moenia aratro,” id. F.
4, 819: “pede certo humum,” to print, press, Hor. A. P. 159; cf.: “vestigia
summo pulvere,” to mark, imprint, Verg. G. 3, 171: auratā cyclade humum, Prop.
4 (5), 7, 40. “haec nostro signabitur area curru,” Ov. A. A. 1, 39: “locum, ubi
ea (cistella) excidit,” Plaut. Cist. 4, 2, 28: “caeli regionem in cortice
signant,” mark, cut, Verg. G. 2, 269: “nomina saxo,” Ov. M. 8, 539: “rem
stilo,” Vell. 1, 16, 1: “rem carmine,” Verg. A. 3, 287; “for which: carmine
saxum,” Ov. M. 2, 326: “cubitum longis litteris,” Plaut. Rud. 5, 2, 7: “ceram
figuris,” to imprint, Ov. M. 15, 169: “cruor signaverat herbam,” had stained,
id. ib. 10, 210; cf. id. ib. 12, 125: “signatum sanguine pectus,” id. A. A. 2,
384: “dubiā lanugine malas,” id. M. 13, 754: “signata in stirpe cicatrix,”
Verg. G. 2, 379: “manibus Procne pectus signata cruentis,” id. ib. 4, 15:
“vocis infinitios sonos paucis notis,” Cic. Rep. 3, 2, 3: “visum objectum
imprimet et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem,” id. Fat. 19, 43.— B. In
partic. 1. To mark with a seal; to seal, seal up, affix a seal to a thing
(usually obsignare): “accepi a te signatum libellum,” Cic. Att. 11, 1, 1: “volumina,”
Hor. Ep. 1, 13, 2: locellum tibi signatum remisi, Caes. ap. Charis. p. 60 P.:
“epistula,” Nep. Pel. 3, 2: “arcanas tabellas,” Ov. Am. 2, 15, 15: “signatis
quicquam mandare tabellis,” Tib. 4, 7, 7: “lagenam (anulus),” Mart. 9, 88, 7:
“testamentum,” Plin. Ep. 2, 20, 8 sq.; cf. Mart. 5, 39, 2: “nec nisi signata
venumdabatur (terra),” Plin. 35, 4, 14, § 33.—Absol., Mart. 10, 70, 7; Quint.
5, 7, 32; Suet. Ner. 17.— 2. To mark with a stamp; hence, a. Of money, to
stamp, to coin: “aes argentum aurumve publice signanto,” Cic. Leg. 3, 3, 6;
cf.: “qui primus ex auro denarium signavit ... Servius rex primus signavit aes
... Signatum est nota pecudum, unde et pecunia appellata ... Argentum signatum
est anno, etc.,” Plin. 33, 3, 13, § 44: “argentum signatum,” Cic. Verr. 2, 5,
25, § 63; Quint. 5, 10, 62; 5, 14, 26: “pecunia signata Illyriorum signo,” Liv.
44, 27, 9: “denarius signatus Victoriā,” Plin. 33, 3, 13, § 46: “sed cur
navalis in aere Altera signata est,” Ov. F. 1, 230: “milia talentūm argenti non
signati formā, sed rudi pondere,” Curt. 5, 2, 11.— Hence, b. Poet.: “signatum
memori pectore nomen habe,” imprinted, impressed, Ov. H. 13, 66: “(filia) quae
patriā signatur imagine vultus,” i. e. closely resembles her father, Mart. 6,
27, 3.— c. To stamp, i. e. to license, invest with official authority (late
Lat.): “quidam per ampla spatia urbis ... equos velut publicos signatis, quod
dicitur, calceis agitant,” Amm. 14, 6, 16.— 3. Pregn., to distinguish, adorn,
decorate (poet.): “pater ipse suo superūm jam signat honore,” Verg. A. 6, 781
Heyne: caelum corona, Claud. Nupt. Hon. et Mar. 273. to point out, signify,
indicate, designate, express (rare; more usually significo, designo; in Cic.
only Or. 19, 64, where dignata is given by Non. 281, 10; “v. Meyer ad loc.): translatio
plerumque signandis rebus ac sub oculos subiciendis reperta est,” Quint. 8, 6,
19: “quotiens suis verbis signare nostra voluerunt (Graeci),” id. 2, 14, 1;
cf.: “appellatione signare,” id. 4, 1, 2: “utrius differentiam,” id. 6, 2, 20;
cf. id. 9, 1, 4; 12, 10, 16: “nomen (Caieta) ossa signat,” Verg. A. 7, 4: “fama
signata loco est,” Ov. M. 14, 433: “miratrixque sui signavit nomine terras,”
designated, Luc. 4, 655; cf.: “(Earinus) Nomine qui signat tempora verna suo,”
Mart. 9, 17, 4: “Turnus ut videt ... So signari oculis,” singled out, looked
to, Verg. A. 12, 3: signare responsum, to give a definite or distinct answer,
Sen. Ben. 7, 16, 1.—With rel.-clause: “memoria signat in quā regione quali
adjutore legatoque fratre meo usus sit,” Vell. 2, 115.— B. To distinguish,
recognize: “primi clipeos mentitaque tela Adgnoscunt, atque ora sono discordia
signant,” Verg. A. 2, 423; cf.: “sonis homines dignoscere,” Quint. 11, 3, 31:
“animo signa quodcumque in corpore mendum est,” Ov. R. Am. 417.— C. To seal,
settle, establish, confirm, prescribe (mostly poet.): “signanda sunt jura,”
Prop. 3 (4), 20, 15. “signata jura,” Luc. 3, 302: jura Suevis, Claud. ap. Eutr.
1, 380; cf.: “precati deos ut velint ea (vota) semper solvi semperque signari,”
Plin. Ep. 10, 35 (44). To close, end: “qui prima novo signat quinquennia
lustro,” Mart. 4, 45, 3.—Hence, A. signan-ter , adv. (acc. to II. A.),
expressly, clearly, distinctly (late Lat. for the class. significanter):
“signanter et breviter omnia indicare,” Aus. Grat. Act. 4: “signanter et
proprie dixerat,” Hier. adv. Jovin. 1, 13 fin. signātus, a, um, P. a. 1. (Acc.
to I. B. 1. sealed; hence) Shut up, guarded, preserved (mostly ante- and
post-class.): signata sacra, Varr. ap. Non. 397, 32: limina. Prop. 4 (5), 1,
145. Chrysidem negat signatam reddere, i. e. unharmed, intact, pure, Lucil. ap.
Non. 171, 6; cf.: “assume de viduis fide pulchram, aetate signatam,” Tert.
Exhort. 12.— 2. (Acc. to II. A.) Plain, clear, manifest (post-class. for
“significans” – a back formation!): “quid expressius atque signatius in hanc
causam?” Tert. Res. Carn.Adv.: signātē , clearly, distinctly (post-class.):
“qui (veteres) proprie atque signate locuti sunt,” Gell. 2, 6, 6; Macr. S. 6, 7
Comp.: “signatius explicare aliquid,” Amm. 23, 6, 1. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Sign
and sign-making – the Roman signi-ficare, and beyond.” significatum: or better ‘signatum.’ Grice knew that in old Roman,
signatum was intransitive, as originally ‘significatum’ was – “He is
signifying,” i. e. making signs. In the Middle Ages it was applied to ‘utens’
of this or that expression, as was an actum, ‘agitur,’ Thus an expression was
not said to ‘signify’ in the same way. Grice plays with the
expression-communication distinction. When dealing with a lexeme that does NOT
belong in the Graeco-Roman tradition, that of “mean,” he is never sure. His
doubts were hightlighted in essays on “Grice without an audience.” While Grice
explicitly says that a ‘word’ is not a sign, he would use ‘signify’ at a later
stage, including the implicaturum as part of the significatum. There is indeed
an entry for signĭfĭcātĭo, f. significare. L and S render it, unhelpfully,
as “a pointing out, indicating, denoting, signifying; an
expression, indication, mark, sign, token, = indicium,
signum, ἐπισημασία, etc., freq. and class. As with Stevenson’s ‘communico,’
Grice goes sraight to ‘signĭfĭco,’ also dep. “signĭfĭcor,” f.
‘significare,’ from signum-facere, to make sign, signum-facio, I make sign,
which L and S render as to signify, which is perhaps not too helpful. Grice, if
not the Grecians, knew that. Strictly, L and S render significare as to show by
signs; to show, point out, express, publish, make known, indicate; to intimate,
notify, signify, etc. Note that the cognate signify almost comes last, but not
least, if not first. Enough to want to coin a word to do duty for them all.
Which is what Grice (and the Grecians) can, but the old Romans cannot, with
mean. If that above were not enough, L and S go on, also, to betoken,
prognosticate, foreshow, portend, mean (syn. praedico), as in to betoken a
change of weather (post-Aug.): “ventus Africus tempestatem significat,
etc.,”cf. Grice on those dark clouds mean a storm is coming. Short
and Lewis go on, to say that significare may be rendered as to call, name; to
mean, import, signify. Hence, ‘signĭfĭcans,’ in rhet. lang., of
speech, full of meaning, expressive, significant; graphic, distinct,
clear: adv.: signĭfĭcanter, clearly, distinctly, expressly, significantly,
graphically: “breviter ac significanter ordinem rei protulisse;” “rem indicare
(with proprie),” “dicere (with
ornate),” “apertius, significantius
dignitatem alicujus defendere,” “narrare,”“disponere,” “appellare aliquid (with
consignatius);” “dicere (with probabilius).” -- signifier, a vocal sound or a
written symbol. The concept owes its modern formulation to the Swiss linguist
Saussure. Rather than using the older conception of sign and referent, he
divided the sign itself into two interrelated parts, a signifier and a
signified. The signified is the concept and the signifier is either a vocal
sound or writing. The relation between the two, according to Saussure, is
entirely arbitrary, in that signifiers tend to vary with different languages.
We can utter or write ‘vache’, ‘cow’, or ‘vaca’, depending on our native
language, and still come up with the same signified i.e., concept. H. P. Grice,
“Significatum and English ‘meaning.’”
simplicius: Grecian Neoplatonist philosopher. His surviving works
are extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, Physics, and
Categories, and on the Encheiridion of Epictetus. The authenticity of the commentary
on Aristotle’s “De anima” attributed to
Simplicius has been disputed. He studied with Ammonius in Alexandria, and with
Damascius, the last known head of the Platonist school in Athens. Justinian
closed the school in 529. Two or three years later a group of philosophers,
including Damascius and Simplicius, visited the court of the Sassanian king
Khosrow I Chosroes but soon returned to the Byzantine Empire under a guarantee
of their right to maintain their own beliefs. It is generally agreed that most,
if not all, of Simplicius’s extant works date from the period after his stay
with Khosrow. But there is no consensus about where Simplicius spent his last
years both Athens and Harran have been proposed recently, or whether he resumed
teaching philosophy; his commentaries, unlike most of the others that survive
from that period, are scholarly treatises rather than classroom expositions.
Simplicius’s Aristotle commentaries are the most valuable extant works in the
genre. He is our source for many of the fragments of the preSocratic
philosophers, and he frequently invokes material from now-lost commentaries and
philosophical works. He is a deeply committed Neoplatonist, convinced that
there is no serious conflict between the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.
The view of earlier scholars that his Encheiridion commentary embodies a more
moderate Platonism associated with Alexandria is now generally rejected.
Simplicius’s virulent defense of the eternity of the world in response to the
attack of the Christian John Philoponus illustrates the intellectual vitality
of paganism at a time when the Mediterranean world had been officially
Christian for about three centuries. H.
P. Grice, “Why we should study Simplicius;” Luigi Speranza, “The history of
philosophical psychology, from the Grecians to the Griceians,” J. O. Urmson,
“Grice and Simplicius on the soul,” for The Grice Club.
simulatum: Grice: “If x simulates y, x is not y – or is this an
implicature – if x is x, is x LIKE x?” -- simulation theory: Grice: “How does
one simulate an implicature? I challenge AI, so-called, to do it!” -- the view that one represents the mental
activities and processes of others by mentally simulating them, i.e.,
generating similar activities and processes in oneself. By simulating them, one
can anticipate their product or outcome; or, where this is already known, test
hypotheses about their starting point. For example, one anticipates the product
of another’s theoretical or practical inferences from given premises by making
inferences from the same premises oneself; or, knowing what the product is, one
retroduces the premises. In the case of practical reasoning, to reason from the
same premises would typically require indexical adjustments, such as shifts in
spatial, temporal, and personal “point of view,” to place oneself in the
other’s physical and epistemic situation insofar as it differs from one’s own.
One may also compensate for the other’s reasoning capacity and level of
expertise, if possible, or modify one’s character and outlook as an actor
might, to fit the other’s background. Such adjustments, even when insufficient
for making decisions in the role of the other, allow one to discriminate
between action options likely to be attractive or unattractive to the agent.
One would be prepared for the former actions and surprised by the latter. The
simulation theory is usually considered an alternative to an assumption
sometimes called the “theory theory” that underlies much recent philosophy of
mind: that our commonsense understanding of people rests on a speculative
theory, a “folk psychology” that posits mental states, events, and processes as
unobservables that explain behavior. Some hold that the simulation theory
undercuts the debate between philosophers who consider folk psychology a
respectable theory and those the eliminative materialists who reject it. Unlike
earlier writing on empathic understanding and historical reenactment, discussions
of the simulation theory often appeal to empirical findings, particularly
experimental results in developmental psychology. They also theorize about the
mechanism that would accomplish simulation: presumably one that calls up
computational resources ordinarily used for engagement with the world, but runs
them off-line, so that their output is not “endorsed” or acted upon and their
inputs are not limited to those that would regulate one’s own behavior.
Although simulation theorists agree that the ascription of mental states to
others relies chiefly on simulation, they differ on the nature of
selfascription. Some especially Robert Gordon and simple supposition simulation
theory 845 845 Jane Heal, who
independently proposed the theory give a non-introspectionist account, while
others especially Goldman lean toward a more traditional introspectionist
account. The simulation theory has affected developmental psychology as well as
branches of philosophy outside the philosophy of mind, especially aesthetics
and philosophy of the social sciences. Some philosophers believe it sheds light
on traditional topics such as the problem of other minds, referential opacity,
broad and narrow content, and the peculiarities of self-knowledge.
singulare: Grice: “I use ‘singular’ in triadic opposition to
plural and singular, and reject Urquart’s bi-dual -- singular term -- singŭlāris , e, adj. singuli. I. Lit. A. In gen., one by
one, one at a time, alone, single, solitary; alone of its kind, singular (class.;
“syn.: unus, unicus): non singulare nec solivagum genus (sc. homines),” i. e.
solitary, Cic. Rep. 1, 25, 39: “hostes ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi
egredientes conspexerant,” Caes. B. G. 4, 26: “homo,” id. ib. 7, 8, 3; so,
“homo (with privatus, and opp. isti conquisiti coloni),” Cic. Agr. 2, 35, 97:
“singularis mundus atque unigena,” id. Univ. 4 med.: “praeconium Dei singularis
facere,” Lact. 4, 4, 8; cf. Cic. Ac. 1, 7, 26: “natus,” Plin. 28, 10, 42, §
153: “herba (opp. fruticosa),” id. 27, 9, 55, § 78: singularis ferus, a wild
boar (hence, Fr. sanglier), Vulg. Psa. 79, 14: “hominem dominandi cupidum aut
imperii singularis,” sole command, exclusive dominion, Cic. Rep. 1, 33, 50; so,
“singulare imperium et potestas regia,” id. ib. 2, 9, 15: “sunt quaedam in te
singularia ... quaedam tibi cum multis communia,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 88, § 206:
“singulare beneficium (opp. commune officium civium),” id. Fam. 1, 9, 4: “odium
(opp. communis invidia),” id. Sull. 1, 1: “quam invisa sit singularis potentia
et miseranda vita,” Nep. Dion, 9, 5: “pugna,” Macr. S. 5, 2: “si quando quid
secreto agere proposuisset, erat illi locus in edito singularis,” particular,
separate, Suet. Aug. 72.— B. In partic. 1. In gram., of or belonging to unity,
singular: “singularis casus,” Varr. L. L. 7, § 33 Müll.; “10, § 54 ib.:
numerus,” Quint. 1, 5, 42; 1, 6, 25; 8, 3, 20; Gell. 19, 8, 13: “nominativus,”
Quint. 1, 6, 14: “genitivus,” id. 1, 6, 26 et saep. —Also absol., the singular
number: “alii dicunt in singulari hac ovi et avi, alii hac ove et ave,” Varr.
L. L. 8, § 66 Müll.; Quint. 8, 6, 28; 4, 5, 25 al.— 2. In milit lang., subst.:
singŭlāris , is, m. a. In gen., an orderly man (ordonance), assigned to
officers of all kinds and ranks for executing their orders (called apparitor, Lampr.
Alex. Sev. 52): “SINGVLARIS COS (consulis),” Inscr. Orell. 2003; cf. ib. 3529
sq.; 3591; 6771 al.— b. Esp., under the emperors, equites singulares Augusti,
or only equites singulares, a select horse body-guard (selected from barbarous
nations, as Bessi, Thraces, Bæti, etc.), Tac. H. 4, 70; Hyg. m. c. §§ 23 and
30; Inscr. Grut. 1041, 12 al.; cf. on the Singulares, Henzen, Sugli Equiti
Singolari, Roma, 1850; Becker, Antiq. tom. 3, pass. 2, p. 387 sq.— 3. In the
time of the later emperors, singulares, a kind of imperial clerks, sent into
the provinces, Cod. Just. 1, 27, 1, § 8; cf. Lyd. Meg. 3, 7.— II. Trop.,
singular, unique, matchless, unparalleled, extraordinary, remarkable (syn.:
unicus, eximius, praestans; “very freq. both in a good and in a bad sense):
Aristoteles meo judicio in philosophiā prope singularis,” Cic. Ac. 2, 43, 132:
“Cato, summus et singularis vir,” id. Brut. 85, 293: “vir ingenii naturā
praestans, singularis perfectusque undique,” Quint. 12, 1, 25; so, “homines
ingenio atque animo,” Cic. Div. 2, 47, 97: “adulescens,” Plin. Ep. 7, 24, 2.—Of
things: “Antonii incredibilis quaedam et prope singularis et divina vis ingenii
videtur,” Cic. de Or. 1, 38, 172: “singularis eximiaque virtus,” id. Imp. Pomp.
1, 3; so, “singularis et incredibilis virtus,” id. Att. 14, 15, 3; cf. id. Fam.
1, 9, 4: “integritas atque innocentia singularis,” id. Div. in Caecil. 9, 27:
“Treviri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio est singularis,” Caes. B. G. 2,
24: “Pompeius gratias tibi agit singulares,” Cic. Fam. 13, 41, 1; cf.: “mihi
gratias egistis singularibus verbis,” id. Cat. 4, 3: “fides,” Nep. Att. 4:
“singulare omnium saeculorum exemplum,” Just. 2, 4, 6.—In a bad sense:
“nequitia ac turpitudo singularis,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 44, § 106; so, “nequitia,”
id. ib. 2, 2, 54, § 134; id. Fin. 5, 20, 56: “impudentia,” Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 7,
§ 18: audacia (with scelus incredibile), id. Fragm. ap. Quint. 4, 2, 105:
“singularis et nefaria crudelitas,” Caes. B. G. 7, 77.— Hence, adv.:
singŭlārĭter (singlā-rĭter , Lucr. 6, 1067). 1. One by one, singly, separately.
a. In gen. (ante- and post-class.): “quae memorare queam inter se singlariter
apta, Lucr. l. l. Munro (Lachm. singillariter): a juventā singulariter sedens,”
apart, separately, Paul. Nol. Carm. 21, 727.— b. In partic. (acc. to I. B. 1.),
in the singular number: “quod pluralia singulariter et singularia pluraliter
efferuntur,” Quint. 1, 5, 16; 1, 7, 18; 9, 3, 20: “dici,” Gell. 19, 8, 12; Dig.
27, 6, 1 al.— 2. (Acc. to II.) Particularly, exceedingly: “aliquem diligere,”
Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 47, § 117: “et miror et diligo,” Plin. Ep. 1, 22, 1: “amo,”
id. ib. 4, 15, 1. Grice: “I would define a ‘singular implicaturum’ as
any vehicle of communicatum such as an expression, like ‘Zeus’, ‘Pegasus,’ ‘the
President’, ‘Strawson’s dog,’ ‘Fido,’ or ‘my favorite chair’, that can be the
grammatical subject of what is semantically a subject-predicate sentence.”
Grice: “By contrast, what one might call a ‘general,’ or ‘non-singular term,
such as ‘horse,’ ‘dog,’‘table’ or ‘swam’ is one that can serve in predicative
position.” It is also often said that a singular term (‘nomen singularis,’
‘expressio singularis’) is a word or phrase that could refer or ostensibly
refer, on a given occasion of use, only to a single (or ‘singular’) object –
unless you show me a ‘general’ object --, whereas a general term is predicable
of *more than one* singular object, if not a ‘general’ object, which does not
exist. A singular term is thus the expression that replace, or are replaced by,
an individual variable (x, y, z, …) in applications of such quantifier rules as
universal instantiation and existential generalization or flank ‘%’ in identity
statements.” H. P. Grice, “System G: the rudiments.”
situation
ethics: what Grice calls the ‘particularised’
– prior obviously to the ‘generalised.’ -- a kind of anti-theoretical, case-by-case
applied ethics in vogue largely in some European and religious circles for twenty years or so
following World War II. It is characterized by the insistence that each moral
choice must be determined by one’s particular context or situation i.e., by a consideration of the outcomes that
various possible courses of action might have, given one’s situation. To that
degree, situation ethics has affinities to both act utilitarianism and
traditional casuistry. But in contrast to utilitarianism, situation ethics
rejects the idea that there are universal or even fixed moral principles beyond
various indeterminate commitments or ideals e.g., to Christian love or
humanism. In contrast to traditional casuistry, it rejects the effort to
construct general guidelines from a case or to classify the salient features of
a case so that it can be used as a precedent. The anti-theoretical stance of
situation ethics is so thoroughgoing that writers identified with the position
have not carefully described its connections to consequentialism,
existentialism, intuitionism, personalism, pragmatism, relativism, or any other
developed philosophical view to which it appears to have some affinity.
st. john’s: st. john’s keeps a record of all of H. P. Grice’s
tutees. It is fascinating that Strawson’s closest collaboration, as Plato with
Socrates, and Aristotle with Plato, was with his tutee Strawson – whom Grice
calls a ‘pupil,’ finding ‘tutee’ too French to his taste. G. J. Warnock recalls
that, of all the venues that the play group held, their favourite one was the
room overlooking the garden at st. john’s. “It’s one of the best gardens in
England, you know. Very peripathetic.” In alphabetical order, some of his
English ‘gentlemanly’ tutees include: London-born J. L. Ackrill, London-born
David Bostock, London-born A. G. N. Flew, Leeds-born T. C. Potts, London-born
P. F. Strawson. They were happy to have Grice as a tutorial fellow, since he,
unlike Mabbot, was English, and did not instill on the tutees a vernacular
furrin to the area.
Grice, “philosophical semanticist.”
smart and
place: Cambridge-born Australian philosopher
whose name is associated with three very non-Oxonian doctrines in particular:
the mind-body identity theory, scientific realism, and utilitarianism. A
student of Ryle’s at Oxford, from the other place, he rejected logical
behaviorism in favor of what came to be known as Australian or ‘colonial’ or
“Dominion” materialism. This is the view that mental processes and, as, -- “the other colonial,” – Grice -- Armstrong
brought Smart to see, mental states
cannot be explained simply in terms of behavioristic dispositions. In
order to make good sense of how the ordinary person talks of them we have to
see them as brain processes and
states under other names. Smart
developed this identity theory of mind and brain, under the stimulus of his
colleague, Yorkshire-born, Rugby and Corpus-Christi (via Open Scholarship), tutee
of Ryle, U. T. Place, in “Sensations and Brain Processes” Philosophical Review.
It became a mainstay of twentieth-century philosophy. Smart endorsed the
materialist analysis of mind on the grounds that it gave a simple picture that
was consistent with the findings of science. He took a realist view of the
claims of science, rejecting phenomenalism, instrumentalism, and the like, and
he argued that commonsense beliefs should be maintained only so far as they are
plausible in the light of total science. Philosophy and Scientific Realism 3
gave forceful expression to this physicalist picture of the world, as did some
later works. He attracted attention in particular for his argument that if we
take science seriously then we have to endorse the four-dimensional picture of
the universe and recognize as an illusion the experience of the passing of
time. He published a number of defenses of utilitarianism, the best known being
his contribution to J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism, For
and Against 3. He gave new life to act utilitarianism at a time when
utilitarians were few and most were attached to rule utilitarianism or other
restricted forms of the doctrine. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Ryle and the devil of
scientism,” H. P. Grice, “What Smart learned from Ryle.”
smith: Scots philosopher, a founder of modern political
economy and a major contributor to ethics and the psychology of morals. His
first published work is “The Theory of Moral Sentiments.” This book immediately
made him famous, and earned the praise of thinkers of the stature of Hume,
Burke, and Kant. It sought to answer two questions: Wherein does virtue
consist, and by means of what psychological principles do we determine this or
that to be virtuous or the contrary? His answer to the first combined ancient
Stoic and Aristotelian views of virtue with modern views derived from Hutcheson
and others. His answer to the second built on Hume’s theory of sympathy our ability to put ourselves imaginatively in
the situation of another as well as on
the notion of the “impartial spectator.” Smith throughout is skeptical about
metaphysical and theological views of virtue and of the psychology of morals.
The self-understanding of reasonable moral actors ought to serve as the moral
philosopher’s guide. Smith’s discussion ranges from the motivation of wealth to
the psychological causes of religious and political fanaticism. Smith’s second
published work, the immensely influential An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations 1776, attempts to explain why free economic,
political, and religious markets are not only more efficient, when properly
regulated, but also more in keeping with nature, more likely to win the
approval of an impartial spectator, than monopolistic alternatives. Taken
together, Smith’s two books attempt to show how virtue and liberty can
complement each other. He shows full awareness of the potentially dehumanizing
force of what was later called “capitalism,” and sought remedies in schemes for
liberal education and properly organized religion. Smith did not live to
complete his system, which was to include an analysis of “natural
jurisprudence.” We possess student notes of his lectures on jurisprudence and
on rhetoric, as well as several impressive essays on the evolution of the
history of science and on the fine arts.
saggio: philosophical essay: ‘saggio filosofico.’ – a
subgenre of the prose genre of ‘essay.’ Grice seems to prefer ‘study’ (“Studies
in the way of words”) but surely each piece is an essay. Austin preferred
“papers” (vide his “Philosophical Papers.”). “The implicature,” Grice says,
“seems to be that an essay is too sketchy!” --. “Storia del saggio filosofico
in Italia” --. Grice: “It is strictly not true that a philosopher needs to
engage in the subgenre of the ‘philosophical essay;’ after all, at Oxford, we
always thought Jowett’s dialogues were the epitome of philosophy – and they
are!”
società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale: Grice:
“It always amazed me that the mediaevals at Bologna and Oxford ‘knew’ that they
were in the middle of it!” -- the title of this Society is telling. For the
Italians, they do not want to distinguish Politics, Economics, Theology, and
Philosophy – It is all covered under ‘thought,’ ‘pensiero.’ This is in
accordance with de Sanctis’s view of philosophy as one of the belles lettres
(“if perhaps less ‘belle’ than the rest). The subgenre of the essay –
‘philosophical essay.’ Grice: “While it is easy to take ‘mediaeval’ in a boring
chronological fashion, the mediaevals themselves saw themselves to be in the
‘middle’ of it, of the ‘aevus,’ that is.”
sozzini: -- Socinianism, NELLA PRIMA METÀ DEL SEDICESIMO SECOLO NACQUERO IN QUESTA CASA LELIO E
FAUSTO SOZZINI LETTERATI INSIGNI FILOSOFI SOMMI DELLA LIBERTÀ DI PENSIERO
STRENUI PROPUGNATORI ______ CONTRO IL SOPRANNATURALE VINDICI DELLA UMANA
RAGIONE FONDARONO LA CELEBRE SCUOLA SOCINIANA PRECORRENDO DI TRE SECOLI LE
DOTTRINE DEL MODERNO RAZIONALISMO ______
I LIBERALI SENESI AMMIRATORI REVERENTI QUESTA MEMORIA POSERO 1879
a movement originating in the sixteenth century from the work of reformer Laelius Socinus “Sozzini” and his
nephew Faustus Socinus. Born in Siena of
a patrician family, Sozzini is widely read. Influenced by the evangelical
movement, Sozzini makes contact with noted Protestant reformers, including
Calvin and Melanchthon, some of whom questioned his orthodoxy. In response,
Sozzini writes a confession of faith, one of a small number of his writings to
have survived. After his death, Sozzini’s oeuvre was carried on by his nephew,
Faustus, whose writings including “On the Authority of Scripture,” “On the
Savior Jesus Christ,” and “On
Predestination,” expressed heterodox views. Sozzini believed that Christ’s
nature is entirely human, that the souls does not possess immortality by nature
though there is selective resurrection for believers, that invocation of Christ
in prayer is permissible but not required, and he argues, like Grice, Pears,
and Thomson, against predestination. After publication of his writings, Sozzini is invited to Transylvania
and Poland to engage in a dispute within the Reformed churches there. He
decides to make his permanent residence in Poland, which, through his tireless
efforts, became the center of the Socinian movement. The most important
document of this movement was the Racovian Catechism, published shortly after
Faustus’s death. The Minor church of Poland, centered at Racov, became the
focal point of the movement. Its academy attracted hundreds of students and its
publishing house produced books in many languages defending Socinian ideas.
Socinianism, as represented by the Racovian Catechism and other writings
collected by Faustus’s disciples, involves the views of Laelius and especially
Faustus Socinus, aligned with the anti-Trinitarian views of the Polish Minor
church.. It accepts Christ’s message as the definitive revelation of God, but
regards Christ as human, not divine; rejects the natural immortality of the
soul, but argues for the selective resurrection of the faithful; rejects the
doctrine of the Trinity; emphasizes human free will against predestinationism;
defends pacifism and the separation of church and state; and argues that reason not creeds, dogmatic tradition, or church
authority must be the final interpreter
of Scripture. Its view of God is temporalistic: God’s eternity is existence at
all times, not timelessness, and God knows future free actions only when they
occur. In these respects, the Socinian view of God anticipates aspects of
modern process theology. Socinianism was suppressed in Poland in 1658, but it
had already spread to other European countries, including Holland where it
appealed to followers of Arminius and England, where it influenced the Cambridge
Platonists, Locke, and other philosophers, as well as scientists like Newton.
In England, it also influenced and was closely associated with the development
of Unitarianism. H. P. Grice, “Sozzini,
rationalism, and moi.”
solus ipse, solipsism: Grice: “If my theory of conversation has
any value, is the refutation of solipsism!” -- the doctrine that there exists a
firstperson perspective possessing privileged and irreducible characteristics,
in virtue of which we stand in various kinds of isolation from any other
persons or external things that may exist. This doctrine is associated with but
distinct from egocentricism. On one variant of solipsism Thomas Nagel’s we are
isolated from other sentient beings because we can never adequately understand
their experience empathic solipsism. Another variant depends on the thesis that
the meanings or referents of all words are mental entities uniquely accessible
only to the language user semantic solipsism. A restricted variant, due to
Vitters, asserts that first-person ascriptions of psychological states have a
meaning fundamentally different from that of second- or thirdperson ascriptions
psychological solipsism. In extreme forms semantic solipsism can lead to the
view that the only things that can be meaningfully said to exist are ourselves
or our mental states ontological solipsism. Skepticism about the existence of
the world external to our minds is sometimes considered a form of
epistemological solipsism, since it asserts that we stand in epistemological isolation
from that world, partly as a result of the epistemic priority possessed by
firstperson access to mental states. In addition to these substantive versions
of solipsism, several variants go under the rubric methodological solipsism.
The idea is that when we seek to explain why sentient beings behave in certain
ways by looking to what they believe, desire, hope, and fear, we should
identify these psychological states only with events that occur inside the mind
or brain, not with external events, since the former alone are the proximate
and sufficient causal explanations of bodily behavior.
sophisma: Grice’s favourite for a time was “Have you stopped
beating your wife.” In “Presupposition and conversational implicature,” he does
admit that he has grown tired of it, what he calls his having had his eyes
glued to “the inquiry whether you have left off beating your wife” --. an
utterance illustrating a semantic or logical issue associated with the analysis
of a syncategorematic term, or a term lacking independent signification.
Typically a sophisma was used from the thirteenth century into the sixteenth
century to analyze relations holding between logic or semantics and broader
philosophical issues. For example, the syncategorematic term ‘besides’ praeter in
‘Socrates twice sees every man besides Plato’ is ambiguous, because it could
mean ‘On two occasions Socrates sees every-man-but-Plato’ and also ‘Except for
overlooking Plato once, on two occasions Socrates sees every man’. Roger Bacon
used this sophisma to discuss the ambiguity of distribution, in this case, of
the scope of the reference of ‘twice’ and ‘besides’. Sherwood used the sophisma
to illustrate the applicability of his rule of the distribution of ambiguous
syncategoremata, while Pseudo-Peter of Spain uses it to establish the truth of
the rule, ‘If a proposition is in part false, it can be made true by means of
an exception, but not if it is completely false’. In each case, the philosopher
uses the ambiguous signification of the syncategorematic term to analyze
broader logical problems. The sophisma ‘Every man is of necessity an animal’
has ambiguity through the syncategorematic ‘every’ that leads to broader
philosophical problems. In the 1270s, Boethius of Dacia analyzed this sophisma
in terms of its applicability when no man exists. Is the knowledge derived from
understanding the proposition destroyed when the object known is destroyed?
Does ‘man’ signify anything when there are no men? If we can correctly
predicate a genus of a species, is the nature of the genus in that species
something other than, or distinct from, what finally differentiates the
species? In this case, the sophisma proves a useful approach to addressing
metaphysical and epistemological problems central to Scholastic discourse. sophisma: Grice: “Literally, a
wisecrack.” “’Sophisma’ is a very Griceian and Grecian pun on ‘sophos,’ the
wise men of Gotham -- any of a number of ancient Grecians, roughly
contemporaneous with Socrates, who professed to teach, for a fee, rhetoric,
philosophy, and how to succeed in life. They typically were itinerants,
visiting much of the Grecian world, and gave public exhibitions at Olympia and
Delphi. They were part of the general expansion of Grecian learning and of the
changing culture in which the previous informal educational methods were
inadequate. For example, the growing litigiousness of Athenian society demanded
Solovyov, Vladimir Sophists 862 862
instruction in the art of speaking well, which the Sophists helped fulfill. The
Sophists have been portrayed as intellectual charlatans hence the pejorative
use of ‘sophism’, teaching their sophistical reasoning for money, and at the
other extreme as Victorian moralists and educators. The truth is more complex.
They were not a school, and shared no body of opinions. They were typically
concerned with ethics unlike many earlier philosophers, who emphasized physical
inquiries and about the relationship between laws and customs nomos and nature
phusis. Protagoras of Abdera c.490c.420 B.C. was the most famous and perhaps
the first Sophist. He visited Athens frequently, and became a friend of its
leader, Pericles; he therefore was invited to draw up a legal code for the
colony of Thurii 444. According to some late reports, he died in a shipwreck as
he was leaving Athens, having been tried for and found guilty of impiety. He
claimed that he knew nothing about the gods, because of human limitations and
the difficulty of the question. We have only a few short quotations from his
works. His “Truth” also known as the “Throws,” i.e., how to overthrow an
opponent’s arguments begins with his most famous claim: “Humans are the measure
of all things of things that are, that
they are, of things that are not, that they are not.” That is, there is no
objective truth; the world is for each person as it appears to that person. Of
what use, then, are skills? Skilled people can change others’ perceptions in
useful ways. For example, a doctor can change a sick person’s perceptions so
that she is healthy. Protagoras taught his students to “make the weaker
argument the stronger,” i.e., to alter people’s perceptions about the value of
arguments. Aristophanes satirizes Protagoras as one who would make unjust
arguments defeat just arguments. This is true for ethical judgments, too: laws
and customs are simply products of human agreement. But because laws and
customs result from experiences of what is most useful, they should be followed
rather than nature. No perception or judgment is more true than another, but
some are more useful, and those that are more useful should be followed.
Gorgias c.483376 was a student of Empedocles. His town, Leontini in Sicily,
sent him as an ambassador to Athens in 427; his visit was a great success, and
the Athenians were amazed at his rhetorical ability. Like other Sophists, he
charged for instruction and gave speeches at religious festivals. Gorgias
denied that he taught virtue; instead, he produced clever speakers. He insisted
that different people have different virtues: for example, women’s virtue differs
from men’s. Since there is no truth and if there were we couldn’t know it, we
must rely on opinion, and so speakers who can change people’s opinions have
great power greater than the power
produced by any other skill. In his “Encomium on Helen” he argues that if she
left Menelaus and went with Paris because she was convinced by speech, she
wasn’t responsible for her actions. Two paraphrases of Gorgias’s “About What
Doesn’t Exist” survive; in this he argues that nothing exists, that even if
something did, we couldn’t know it, and that even if we could know anything we
couldn’t explain it to anyone. We can’t know anything, because some things we
think of do not exist, and so we have no way of judging whether the things we
think of exist. And we can’t express any knowledge we may have, because no two
people can think of the same thing, since the same thing can’t be in two
places, and because we use words in speech, not colors or shapes or objects.
This may be merely a parody of Parmenides’ argument that only one thing exists.
Antiphon the Sophist fifth century is probably although not certainly to be
distinguished from Antiphon the orator d. 411, some of whose speeches we
possess. We know nothing about his life if he is distinct from the orator. In
addition to brief quotations in later authors, we have two papyrus fragments of
his “On Truth.” In these he argues that we should follow laws and customs only
if there are witnesses and so our action will affect our reputation; otherwise,
we should follow nature, which is often inconsistent with following custom.
Custom is established by human agreement, and so disobeying it is detrimental
only if others know it is disobeyed, whereas nature’s demands unlike those of
custom can’t be ignored with impunity. Antiphon assumes that rational actions
are selfinterested, and that justice demands actions contrary to
self-interest a position Plato attacks
in the Republic. Antiphon was also a materialist: the nature of a bed is wood,
since if a buried bed could grow it would grow wood, not a bed. His view is one
of Aristotle’s main concerns in the Physics, since Aristotle admits in the
Categories that persistence through change is the best test for substance, but
won’t admit that matter is substance. Hippias fifth century was from Elis, in
the Peloponnesus, which used him as an ambasSophists Sophists 863 863 sador. He competed at the festival of
Olympus with both prepared and extemporaneous speeches. He had a phenomenal
memory. Since Plato repeatedly makes fun of him in the two dialogues that bear
his name, he probably was selfimportant and serious. He was a polymath who
claimed he could do anything, including making speeches and clothes; he wrote a
work collecting what he regarded as the best things said by others. According
to one report, he made a mathematical discovery the quadratrix, the first curve
other than the circle known to the Grecians. In the Protagoras, Plato has
Hippias contrast nature and custom, which often does violence to nature.
Prodicus fifth century was from Ceos, in the Cyclades, which frequently
employed him on diplomatic missions. He apparently demanded high fees, but had
two versions of his lecture one cost
fifty drachmas, the other one drachma. Socrates jokes that if he could have
afforded the fifty-drachma lecture, he would have learned the truth about the
correctness of words, and Aristotle says that when Prodicus added something
exciting to keep his audience’s attention he called it “slipping in the
fifty-drachma lecture for them.” We have at least the content of one lecture of
his, the “Choice of Heracles,” which consists of banal moralizing. Prodicus was
praised by Socrates for his emphasis on the right use of words and on
distinguishing between synonyms. He also had a naturalistic view of the origin
of theology: useful things were regarded as gods.
sort: Grice, “One of the few technicisms introduced by an
English philosopher, in this case Locke.” – a sortal predicate, roughly, a
predicate whose application to an object says what kind of object it is and
implies conditions for objects of that kind to be identical. Person, green
apple, regular hexagon, and pile of coal would generally be regarded as sortal
predicates, whereas tall, green thing, and coal would generally be regarded as
non-sortal predicates. An explicit and precise definition of the distinction is
hard to come by. Sortal predicates are sometimes said to be distinguished by
the fact that they provide a criterion of counting or that they do not apply to
the parts of the objects to which they apply, but there are difficulties with
each of these characterizations. The notion figures in recent philosophical
discussions on various topics. Robert Ackermann and others have suggested that
any scientific law confirmable by observation might require the use of sortal
predicates. Thus ‘all non-black things are non-ravens’, while logically
equivalent to the putative scientific law ‘all ravens are black’, is not itself
confirmable by observation because ‘non-black’ is not a sortal predicate. David
Wiggins and others have discussed the sortal sortal predicate 865 865 idea that all identity claims are
sortal-relative in the sense that an appropriate response to the claim a % b is
always “the same what as b?” John Wallace has argued that there would be
advantages in relativizing the quantifiers of predicate logic to sortals. ‘All
humans are mortal’ would be rendered Ex[m]Dx, rather than ExMxPDx. Crispin
Wright has suggested that the view that natural number is a sortal concept is
central to Frege’s or any other number-theoretic platonism. The word ‘sortal’
as a technical term in philosophy apparently first occurs in Locke’s Essay
Concerning Human Understanding. Locke argues that the so-called essence of a
genus or sort unlike the real essence of a thing is merely the abstract idea
that the general or sortal name stands for. But ‘sortal’ has only one
occurrence in Locke’s Essay. Its currency in contemporary philosophical idiom
probably should be credited to P. F. Strawson’s Individuals. The general idea may
be traced at least to the notion of second substance in Aristotle’s Categories.
Sotione, teacher of Seneca. In glossary to Roman
philosophers, in “Roman philosophers.”
animatum - soul: -- cf. Grice on “soul-to-soul transfer” -- also
called spirit, an entity supposed to be present only in living things,
corresponding to the Grecian psyche and Latin anima. Since there seems to be no
material difference between an organism in the last moments of its life and the
organism’s newly dead body, many philosophers since the time of Plato have
claimed that the soul is an immaterial component of an organism. Because only
material things are observed to be subject to dissolution, Plato took the
soul’s immateriality as grounds for its immortality. Neither Plato nor
Aristotle thought that only persons had souls: Aristotle ascribed souls to
animals and plants since they all exhibited some living functions. Unlike
Plato, Aristotle denied the transmigration of souls from one species to another
or from one body to another after death; he was also more skeptical about the
soul’s capacity for disembodiment
roughly, survival and functioning without a body. Descartes argued that
only persons had souls and that the soul’s immaterial nature made freedom possible
even if the human body is subject to deterministic physical laws. As the
subject of thought, memory, emotion, desire, and action, the soul has been
supposed to be an entity that makes self-consciousness possible, that
differentiates simultaneous experiences into experiences either of the same
person or of different persons, and that accounts for personal identity or a
person’s continued identity through time. Dualists argue that soul and body
must be distinct in order to explain consciousness and the possibility of
immortality. Materialists argue that consciousness is entirely the result of
complex physical processes.
soundness: Grice: “The etymology if fascinating.” The English
Grice. "Most of the terms I use are
Latinate." "I implicate: a few are not." "I say that System
G should be sound." "free from special defect or injury," c.
1200, from Old English gesund "sound, safe, having the organs and
faculties complete and in perfect action," from Proto-Germanic *sunda-,
from Germanic root *swen-to- "healthy, strong" (source also of Old
Saxon gisund, Old Frisian sund, Dutch gezond, Old High German gisunt, German
gesund "healthy," as in the post-sneezing interjection gesundheit;
also Old English swið "strong," Gothic swinþs "strong,"
German geschwind "fast, quick"), with connections in Indo-Iranian and
Balto-Slavic. Meaning "right, correct, free from error" is from
mid-15c. Meaning "financially solid or safe" is attested from c.
1600; of sleep, "undisturbed," from 1540s. Sense of "holding
accepted opinions" is from 1520s Grice: “’sound’ is not polysemous,
but it has different usages: of an argument the property of being valid and
having all true premises; of a system, like Sytem G, the property of being not too strong in a
certain respect. A System G has weak
soundness provided every theorem of G is
valid. And G has strong soundness if for every set S of sentences, every
sentence deducible from S using system G is a logical consequence of S.
spatium: space, an extended manifold of several dimensions,
where the number of dimensions corresponds to the number of variable magnitudes
Soto, Domingo de space 866 866 needed
to specify a location in the manifold; in particular, the three-dimensional
manifold in which physical objects are situated and with respect to which their
mutual positions and distances are defined. Ancient Grecian atomism defined
space as the infinite void in which atoms move; but whether space is finite or
infinite, and whether void spaces exist, have remained in question. Aristotle described
the universe as a finite plenum and reduced space to the aggregate of all
places of physical things. His view was preeminent until Renaissance
Neoplatonism, the Copernican revolution, and the revival of atomism
reintroduced infinite, homogeneous space as a fundamental cosmological
assumption. Further controversy concerned whether the space assumed by early
modern astronomy should be thought of as an independently existing thing or as
an abstraction from the spatial relations of physical bodies. Interest in the
relativity of motion encouraged the latter view, but Newton pointed out that
mechanics presupposes absolute distinctions among motions, and he concluded
that absolute space must be postulated along with the basic laws of motion
Principia, 1687. Leibniz argued for the relational view from the identity of
indiscernibles: the parts of space are indistinguishable from one another and
therefore cannot be independently existing things. Relativistic physics has
defused the original controversy by revealing both space and spatial relations
as merely observer-dependent manifestations of the structure of spacetime.
Meanwhile, Kant shifted the metaphysical controversy to epistemological grounds
by claiming that space, with its Euclidean structure, is neither a
“thing-in-itself” nor a relation of thingsin-themselves, but the a priori form
of outer intuition. His view was challenged by the elaboration of non-Euclidean
geometries in the nineteenth century, by Helmholtz’s arguments that both
intuitive and physical space are known through empirical investigation, and
finally by the use of non-Euclidean geometry in the theory of relativity.
Precisely what geometrical presuppositions are inherent in human spatial
perception, and what must be learned from experience, remain subjects of
psychological investigation. -- space-time: a four-dimensional
continuum combining the three dimensions of space with time in order to
represent motion geometrically. Each point is the location of an event, all of
which together represent “the world” through time; paths in the continuum
worldlines represent the dynamical histories of moving particles, so that
straight worldlines correspond to uniform motions; three-dimensional sections
of constant time value “spacelike hypersurfaces” or “simultaneity slices”
represent all of space at a given time. The idea was foreshadowed when Kant
represented “the phenomenal world” as a plane defined by space and time as
perpendicular axes Inaugural Dissertation, 1770, and when Joseph Louis Lagrange
17361814 referred to mechanics as “the analytic geometry of four dimensions.”
But classical mechanics assumes a universal standard of simultaneity, and so it
can treat space and time separately. The concept of space-time was explicitly
developed only when Einstein criticized absolute simultaneity and made the
velocity of light a universal constant. The mathematician Hermann Minkowski
showed in 8 that the observer-independent structure of special relativity could
be represented by a metric space of four dimensions: observers in relative
motion would disagree on intervals of length and time, but agree on a
fourdimensional interval combining spatial and temporal measurements.
Minkowski’s model then made possible the general theory of relativity, which
describes gravity as a curvature of spacetime in the presence of mass and the
paths of falling bodies as the straightest worldlines in curved
space-time. -- spatio-temporal continuancy: or continunity, a property of the
careers, or space-time paths, of well-behaved objects. Let a space-time path be
a series of possible spatiotemporal positions, each represented in a selected
coordinate system by an ordered pair consisting of a time its temporal
component and a volume of space its spatial component. Such a path will be
spatiotemporally continuous provided it is such that, relative to any inertial
frame selected as coordinate system, space, absolute spatiotemporal continuity
867 867 1 for every segment of the
series, the temporal components of the members of that segment form a
continuous temporal interval; and 2 for any two members ‹ti, Vi and ‹tj, Vj of
the series that differ in their temporal components ti and tj, if Vi and Vj the
spatial components differ in either shape, size, or location, then between
these members of the series there will be a member whose spatial component is
more similar to Vi and Vj in these respects than these are to each other. This
notion is of philosophical interest partly because of its connections with the
notions of identity over time and causality. Putting aside such qualifications
as quantum considerations may require, material objects at least macroscopic
objects of familiar kinds apparently cannot undergo discontinuous change of
place, and cannot have temporal gaps in their histories, and therefore the path
through space-time traced by such an object must apparently be spatiotemporally
continuous. More controversial is the claim that spatiotemporal continuity,
together with some continuity with respect to other properties, is sufficient
as well as necessary for the identity of such objects e.g., that if a spatiotemporally continuous
path is such that the spatial component of each member of the series is
occupied by a table of a certain description at the time that is the temporal
component of that member, then there is a single table of that description that
traces that path. Those who deny this claim sometimes maintain that it is
further required for the identity of material objects that there be causal and
counterfactual dependence of later states on earlier ones ceteris paribus, if
the table had been different yesterday, it would be correspondingly different
now. Since it appears that chains of causality must trace spatiotemporally
continuous paths, it may be that insofar as spatiotemporal continuity is
required for transtemporal identity, this is because it is required for
transtemporal causality. Refs.: H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, “Categories,”
in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley.
specious
present: the supposed time between
past and future. The phrase was first offered by Clay in “The Alternative: A Study in
Psychology,” and is cited by James in his
Principles of Psychology Clay challenges
the assumption that the “present” as a “datum” is given as “present” to us in
our experience. “The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the *past*,
a recent past delusively given as benign
time that intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named ‘the
specious present,’ and let the past that is given as being the past be known as
‘the obvious past.’” For James, this position is supportive of his contention
that consciousness (conscientia) is a stream and can be divided into parts only
by conceptual addition, i.e., only by our ascribing past, present, and future
to what is, in our actual experience, a seamless flow. James holds that the
“practically cognized present is no knife-edge but a saddleback,” a sort of
“ducatum” which we experience as a whole, and only upon reflective attention do
we “distinguish its beginning from its end.” Whereas Clay refers to the datum
of the present as “delusive,” one might rather say that it is perpetually *elusive*,
for as we have our experience, now, it is always bathed retrospectively and
prospectively. Contrary to common wisdom, no single experience ever is had by
our consciousness utterly alone, single and without relations, fore and aft.
Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The logical-construction theory of personal identity.”
speculatum: Grice: “Philosophy may broadly be divided into
‘philosophia speculativa” and “philosophia practica.”” -- speculative
philosophy, a form of theorizing that goes beyond verifiable observation;
specifically, a philosophical approach informed by the impulse to construct a
grand narrative of a worldview that encompasses the whole of reality.
Speculative philosophy purports to bind together reflections on the existence
and nature of the cosmos, the psyche, and God. It sets for its goal a unifying
matrix and an overarching system whereswith to comprehend the considered
judgments of cosmology, psychology, and theology. Hegel’s absolute idealism,
particularly as developed in his later thought, paradigmatically illustrates
the requirements for speculative philosophizing. His system of idealism offered
a vision of the unity of the categories of human thought as they come to
realization in and through their opposition to each other. Speculative thought
tends to place a premium on universality, totality, and unity; and it tends to
marginalize the concrete particularities of the natural and social world. In
its aggressive use of the systematic principle, geared to a unification of
human experience, speculative philosophy aspires to a comprehensive understanding
and explanation of the structural interrelations of the culture spheres of
science, morality, art, and religion. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Practical and
doxastic attitudes: why I need exhibitive clauses.”
SISTENS
-- CUM-SISTENS -- consistens: “There’s
consistens, and there’s inconsistens.” – H. P. Grice. The inconsistent triad,
most generally, any three propositions such that it cannot be the case that all
three of them are true. More narrowly, any three categorical propositions such
that it cannot be the case that all three of them are true. A categorical
syllogism is valid provided the three propositions that are its two premises
and the negation (contradiction) of its conclusion are an inconsistent triad;
this fact underlies a test for the validity of categorical syllogisms, which
test are thus called by Grice the “method of” the inconsistent triad.
spencer: English philosopher, social reformer, and editor of
The Economist. In epistemology, Spencer adopted the ninespeculative reason
Spencer, Herbert 869 869 teenth-century
trend toward positivism: the only reliable knowledge of the universe is to be
found in the sciences. His ethics were utilitarian, following Bentham and J. S.
Mill: pleasure and pain are the criteria of value as signs of happiness or
unhappiness in the individual. His Synthetic Philosophy, expounded in books
written over many years, assumed both in biology and psychology the existence
of Lamarckian evolution: given a characteristic environment, every animal
possesses a disposition to make itself into what it will, failing maladaptive
interventions, eventually become. The dispositions gain expression as inherited
acquired habits. Spencer could not accept that species originate by chance
variations and natural selection alone: direct adaptation to environmental
constraints is mainly responsible for biological changes. Evolution also
includes the progression of societies in the direction of a dynamical
equilibrium of individuals: the human condition is perfectible because human
faculties are completely adapted to life in society, implying that evil and
immorality will eventually disappear. His ideas on evolution predated
publication of the major works of Darwin; A. R. Wallace was influenced by his
writings. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Evolutionary pirotology,” in “Method in
philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.”
speranza: luigi della --. Italian philosopher, attracted, for
some reason, to H. P. Grice. Speranza knows St. John’s very well. He is the
author of “Dorothea Oxoniensis.” He is a member of a number of cultivated Anglo-Italian
societies, like H. P. Grice’s Playgroup. He is the custodian of Villa Grice,
not far from Villa Speranza. He works at the Swimming-Pool Library. Cuisine is
one of his hobbies – grisottoa alla ligure, his specialty. He can be reached
via H. P. Grice. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Vita ed opinion di Luigi Speranza,”
par Luigi Speranza. A. M. Ghersi Speranza – vide Ghersi-Speranza. Ghersi is a
collaborator of Speranza. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Speranza, villa – The
Swimming-Pool Library – H. P. Grice’s Play Group, Liguria, Italia.
spinoza: Jewish metaphysician, born in the Netherlanads -- epistemologist,
psychologist, moral philosopher, political theorist, and philosopher of
religion, generally regarded as one of the most important figures of
seventeenth-century rationalism. Life and works. Born and educated in the
Jewish ‘community’ of Amsterdam, he forsook his given name ‘Baruch’ in favor of
the Latin ‘Benedict’ at the age of twenty-two. Between 1652 and 1656 he studied
the philosophy of Descartes in the school of Francis van den Enden. Having
developed unorthodox views of the divine nature and having ceased to be fully
observant of Jewish practice, he was excommunicated by the Jewish community in
1656. He spent his entire life in Holland; after leaving Amsterdam in 1660, he
resided successively in Rijnsburg, Voorburg, and the Hague. He supported
himself at least partly through grinding lenses, and his knowledge of optics
involved him in an area of inquiry of great importance to seventeenth-century
science. Acquainted with such leading intellectual figures as Leibniz, Huygens,
and Henry Oldenberg, he declined a professorship at the of Heidelberg partly on the grounds that it
might interfere with his intellectual freedom. His premature death at the age
of fortyfour was due to consumption. The only work published under Spinoza’s
name during his lifetime was his Principles of Descartes’s Philosophy Renati
Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae, Pars I et II, 1663, an attempt to recast
and present Parts I and II of Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy in the
manner that Spinoza called geometrical order or geometrical method. Modeled on
the Elements of Euclid and on what Descartes called the method of synthesis,
Spinoza’s “geometrical order” involves an initial set of definitions and
axioms, from which various propositions are demonstrated, with notes or scholia
attached where necessary. This work, which established his credentials as an
expositor of Cartesian philosophy, had its origins in his endeavor to teach
Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy to a private student. Spinoza’s
TheologicalPolitical Treatise Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was published
anonymously in 1670. After his death, his close circle of friends published his
Posthumous Works Opera Postuma, 1677, which included his masterpieces, Ethic,
Demonstrated in Geometrical Order Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. The
Posthumous Works also included his early unfinished Treatise on the Emendation
of the Intellect Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, his later unfinished
Political Treatise Tractatus Politicus, a Hebrew Grammar, and Correspondence.
An unpublished early work entitled Short Treatise on God, Man, and His
Well-Being Korte Vorhandelung van God, de Mensch en deszelvs Welstand, in many
ways a forerunner of the Ethics, was rediscovered in copied manuscript and
published in the nineteenth century. Spinoza’s authorship of two brief
scientific treatises, On the Rainbow and On the Calculation of Chances, is
still disputed. Metaphysics. Spinoza often uses the term ‘God, or Nature’
“Deus, sive Natura“, and this identification of God with Nature is at the heart
of his metaphysics. Because of this identification, his philosophy is often
regarded as a version of pantheism and/or naturalism. But although philosophy
begins with metaphysics for Spinoza, his metaphysics is ultimately in the service
of his ethics. Because his naturalized God has no desires or purposes, human
ethics cannot properly be derived from divine command. Rather, Spinozistic
ethics seeks to demonstrate, from an adequate understanding of the divine
nature and its expression in human nature, the way in which human beings can
maximize their advantage. Central to the successful pursuit of this advantage
is adequate knowledge, which leads to increasing control of the passions and to
cooperative action. Spinoza’s ontology, like that of Descartes, consists of
substances, their attributes which Descartes called principal attributes, and
their modes. In the Ethics, Spinoza defines ‘substance’ as what is “in itself,
and is conceived through itself”; ‘attribute’ as that which “the intellect
perceives of a substance as constituting its essence”; and ‘mode’ as “the
affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which also it is
conceived.” While Descartes had recognized a strict sense in which only God is
a substance, he also recognized a second sense in which there are two kinds of
created substances, each with its own principal attribute: extended substances,
whose only principal attribute is extension; and minds, whose only principal
attribute is thought. Spinoza, in contrast, consistently maintains that there
is only one substance. His metaphysics is thus a form of substantial monism.
This one substance is God, which Spinoza defines as “a being absolutely
infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which
each expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” Thus, whereas Descartes
limited each created substance to one principal attribute, Spinoza claims that
the one substance has infinite attributes, each expressing the divine nature
without limitation in its own way. Of these infinite attributes, however,
humans can comprehend only two: extension and thought. Within each attribute,
the modes of God are of two kinds: infinite modes, which are pervasive features
of each attribute, such as the laws of nature; and finite modes, which are
local and limited modifications of substance. There is an infinite sequence of
finite modes. Descartes regarded a human being as a substantial union of two
different substances, the thinking soul and the extended body, in causal
interaction with each other. Spinoza, in contrast, regards a human being as a
finite mode of God, existing simultaneously in God as a mode of thought and as
a mode of extension. He holds that every mode of extension is literally
identical with the mode of thought that is the “idea of” that mode of
extension. Since the human mind is the idea of the human body, it follows that
the human mind and the human body are literally the same thing, conceived under
two different attributes. Because they are actually identical, there is no
causal interaction between the mind and the body; but there is a complete
parallelism between what occurs in the mind and what occurs in the body. Since
every mode of extension has a corresponding and identical mode of thought however
rudimentary that might be, Spinoza allows that every mode of extension is
“animated to some degree”; his view is thus a form of panpsychism. Another
central feature of Spinoza’s metaphysics is his necessitarianism, expressed in
his claim that “things could have been produced . . . in no other way, and in
no other order” than that in which they have been produced. He derives this
necessitarianism from his doctrine that God exists necessarily for which he
offers several arguments, including a version of the ontological argument and
his doctrine that everything that can follow from the divine nature must
necessarily do so. Thus, although he does not use the term, he accepts a very
strong version of the principle of sufficient reason. At the outset of the Ethics,
he defines a thing as free when its actions are determined by its own nature
alone. Only God whose actions are
determined entirely by the necessity of his own nature, and for whom nothing is
external is completely free in this
sense. Nevertheless, human beings can achieve a relative freedom to the extent
that they live the kind of life described in the later parts of the Ethics.
Hence, Spinoza is a compatibilist concerning the relation between freedom and
determinism. “Freedom of the will” in any sense that implies a lack of causal
determination, however, is simply an illusion based on ignorance of the true
causes of a being’s actions. The recognition that all occurrences are causally
determined, Spinoza holds, has a positive consolatory power that aids one in
controlling the passions. Epistemology and psychology. Like other rationalists,
Spinoza distinguishes two representational faculties: the imagination and the
intellect. The imagination is a faculty of forming imagistic representations of
things, derived ultimately from the mechanisms of the senses; the intellect is
a faculty of forming adequate, nonimagistic conceptions of things. He also
distinguishes three “kinds of knowledge.” The first or lowest kind he calls
opinion or imagination opinio, imaginatio. It includes “random or indeterminate
experience” experientia vaga and also “hearsay, or knowledge from mere signs”;
it thus depends on the confused and mutilated deliverances of the senses, and
is inadequate. The second kind of knowledge he calls reason ratio; it depends
on common notions i.e., features of things that are “common to all, and equally
in the part and in the whole” or on adequate knowledge of the properties as
opposed to the essences of things. The third kind of knowledge he calls intuitive
knowledge scientia intuitiva; it proceeds from adequate knowledge of the
essence or attributes of God to knowledge of the essence of things, and hence
proceeds in the proper order, from causes to effects. Both the second and third
kinds of knowledge are adequate. The third kind is preferable, however, as
involving not only certain knowledge that something is so, but also knowledge
of how and why it is so. Because there is only one substance God
the individual things of the world are not distinguished from one
another by any difference of substance. Rather, among the internal qualitative
modifications and differentiations of each divine attribute, there are patterns
that have a tendency to endure; these constitute individual things. As they
occur within the attribute of extension, Spinoza calls these patterns fixed
proportions of motion and rest. Although these individual things are thus modes
of the one substance, rather than substances in their own right, each has a
nature or essence describable in terms of the thing’s particular pattern and
its mechanisms for the preservation of its own being. This tendency toward
self-preservation Spinoza calls conatus sometimes tr. as ‘endeavor’. Every
individual thing has some conatus. An individual thing acts, or is active, to
the extent that what occurs can be explained or understood through its own
nature i.e., its selfpreservatory mechanism alone; it is passive to the extent
that what happens must be explained through the nature of other forces
impinging on it. Thus, every thing, to whatever extent it can, actively strives
to persevere in its existence; and whatever aids this self-preservation
constitutes that individual’s advantage. Spinoza’s specifically human
psychology is an application of this more general doctrine of conatus. That
application is made through appeal to several specific characteristics of human
beings: they form imagistic representations of other individuals by means of
their senses; they are sufficiently complex to undergo increases and decreases
in their capacity for action; and they are capable of engaging in reason. The
fundamental concepts of his psychology are desire, which is conatus itself,
especially as one is conscious of it as directed toward attaining a particular
object; pleasure, which is an increase in capacity for action; and pain, which
is a decrease in capacity for action. He defines other emotions in terms of
these basic emotions, as they occur in particular combinations, in particular
kinds of circumstances, with particular kinds of causes, and/or with particular
kinds of objects. When a person is the adequate cause of his or her own
emotions, these emotions are active emotions; otherwise, they are passions.
Desire and pleasure can be either active emotions or passions, depending on the
circumstances; pain, however, can only be a passion. Spinoza does not deny the
phenomenon of altruism: one’s self-preservatory mechanism, and hence one’s
desire, can become focused on a wide variety of objects, including the
well-being of a loved person or object
even to one’s own detriment. However, because he reduces all human
motivation, including altruistic motivation, to permutations of the endeavor to
seek one’s own advantage, his theory is arguably a form of psychological
egoism. Ethics. Spinoza’s ethical theory does not take the form of a set of
moral commands. Rather, he seeks to demonstrate, by considering human actions
and appetites objectively “just as if it
were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies”
wherein a person’s true advantage lies. Readers who genuinely grasp the
demonstrated truths will, he holds, ipso facto be motivated, to at least some
extent, to live their lives accordingly. Thus, Spinozistic ethics seeks to show
how a person acts when “guided by reason“; to act in this way is at the same
time to act with virtue, or power. All actions that result from
understanding i.e., all virtuous
actions may be attributed to strength of
character fortitudo. Such virtuous actions may be further divided into two
classes: those due to tenacity animositas, or “the Desire by which each one
strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to preserve his being”; and those
due to nobility generositas, or “the Desire by which each one strives, solely
from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and join them to him in
friendship.” Thus, the virtuous person does not merely pursue private
advantage, but seeks to cooperate with others; returns love for hatred; always
acts honestly, not deceptively; and seeks to join himself with others in a political
state. Nevertheless, the ultimate reason for aiding others and joining them to
oneself in friendship is that “nothing is more useful to man than man” i.e., because doing so is conducive to one’s
own advantage, and particularly to one’s pursuit of knowledge, which is a good
that can be shared without loss. Although Spinoza holds that we generally use
the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ simply to report subjective appearances so that we call “good” whatever we desire,
and “evil” whatever we seek to avoid he
proposes that we define ‘good’ philosophically as ‘what we certainly know to be
useful to us’, and ‘evil’ as ‘what we certainly know prevents us from being
masters of some good’. Since God is perfect and has no needs, it follows that
nothing is either good or evil for God. Spinoza’s ultimate appeal to the
agent’s advantage arguably renders his ethical theory a form of ethical egoism,
even though he emphasizes the existence of common shareable goods and the
instrumental ethical importance of cooperation with others. However, it is not
a form of hedonism; for despite the prominence he gives to pleasure, the
ultimate aim of human action is a higher state of perfection or capacity for
action, of whose increasing attainment pleasure is only an indicator. A human
being whose self-preservatory mechanism is driven or distorted by external
forces is said to be in bondage to the passions; in contrast, one who
successfully pursues only what is truly advantageous, in consequence of genuine
understanding of where that advantage properly lies, is free. Accordingly,
Spinoza also expresses his conception of a virtuous life guided by reason in
terms of an ideal “free man.” Above all, the free man seeks understanding of
himself and of Nature. Adequate knowledge, and particularly knowledge of the
third kind, leads to blessedness, to peace of mind, and to the intellectual
love of God. Blessedness is not a reward for virtue, however, but rather an
integral aspect of the virtuous life. The human mind is itself a part of the infinite
intellect of God, and adequate knowledge is an eternal aspect of that infinite
intellect. Hence, as one gains knowledge, a greater part of one’s own mind
comes to be identified with something that is eternal, and one becomes less
dependent on and less disturbed by the local forces of one’s immediate
environment. Accordingly, the free man “thinks of nothing less than of death,
and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death.” Moreover, just as one’s
adequate knowledge is literally an eternal part of the infinite intellect of
God, the resulting blessedness, peace of mind, and intellectual love are
literally aspects of what might be considered God’s own eternal “emotional”
life. Although this endows the free man with a kind of blessed immortality, it
is not a personal immortality, since the sensation and memory that are
essential to personal individuality are not eternal. Rather, the free man
achieves during his lifetime an increasing participation in a body of adequate
knowledge that has itself always been eternal, so that, at death, a large part
of the free man’s mind has become identified with the eternal. It is thus a
kind of “immortality” in which one can participate while one lives, not merely
when one dies. Politics and philosophical theology. Spinoza’s political theory,
like that of Hobbes, treats rights and power as equivalent. Citizens give up
rights to the state for the sake of the protection that the state can provide.
Hobbes, however, regards this social contract as nearly absolute, one in which
citizens give up all of their rights except the right to resist death. Spinoza,
in contrast, emphasizes that citizens cannot give up the right to pursue their
own advantage as they see it, in its full generality; and hence that the power,
and right, of any actual state is always limited by the state’s practical
ability to enforce its dictates so as to alter the citizens’ continuing
perception of their own advantage. Furthermore, he has a more extensive
conception of the nature of an individual’s own advantage than Hobbes, since
for him one’s own true advantage lies not merely in fending off death and
pursuing pleasure, but in achieving the adequate knowledge that brings
blessedness and allows one to participate in that which is eternal. In
consequence, Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, recommends a limited, constitutional state
that encourages freedom of expression and religious toleration. Such a
state itself a kind of individual best preserves its own being, and provides
both the most stable and the most beneficial form of government for its
citizens. In his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza also takes up popular
religion, the interpretation of Scripture, and their bearing on the well-being
of the state. He characterizes the Old Testament prophets as individuals whose
vivid imaginations produced messages of political value for the ancient Hebrew
state. Using a naturalistic outlook and historical hermeneutic methods that
anticipate the later “higher criticism” of the Bible, he seeks to show that
Scriptural writers themselves consistently treat only justice and charity as
essential to salvation, and hence that dogmatic doxastic requirements are not
justified by Scripture. Popular religion should thus propound only these two
requirements, which it may imaginatively represent, to the minds of the many,
as the requirements for rewards granted by a divine Lawgiver. The few, who are
more philosophical, and who thus rely on intellect, will recognize that the
natural laws of human psychology require charity and justice as conditions of
happiness, and that what the vulgar construe as rewards granted by personal
divine intervention are in fact the natural consequences of a virtuous life.
Because of his identificaton of God with Nature and his treatment of popular religion,
Spinoza’s contemporaries often regarded his philosophy as a thinly disguised
atheism. Paradoxically, however, nineteenth-century Romanticism embraced him
for his pantheism; Novalis, e.g., famously characterized him as “the
God-intoxicated man.” In fact, Spinoza ascribes to Nature most of the
characteristics that Western theologians have ascribed to God: Spinozistic
Nature is infinite, eternal, necessarily existing, the object of an ontological
argument, the first cause of all things, all-knowing, and the being whose
contemplation produces blessedness, intellectual love, and participation in a
kind of immortality or eternal life. Spinoza’s claim to affirm the existence of
God is therefore no mere evasion. However, he emphatically denies that God is a
person or acts for purposes; that anything is good or evil from the divine
perspective; or that there is a personal immortality involving memory. In
addition to his influence on the history of biblical criticism and on
literature including not only Novalis but such writers as Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Heine, Shelley, George Eliot, George Sand, Somerset Maugham, Jorge
Luis Borges, and Bernard Malamud, Spinoza has affected the philosophical
outlooks of such diverse twentieth-century thinkers as Freud and Einstein.
Contemporary physicists have seen in his monistic metaphysics an anticipation
of twentieth-century field metaphysics. More generally, he is a leading
intellectual forebear of twentieth-century determinism and naturalism, and of
the mindbody identity theory. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Hampshire’s Spinoza.”
split-brain
effect: one of a wide array of
behavioral effects consequent upon the severing of the cerebral commisures, and
generally interpreted as indicating asymmetry in cerebral functions. The human
brain has considerable leftright functional differentiation, or asymmetry, that
affects behavior. The most obvious example is handedness. By the 1860s
Bouillaud, Dax, and Broca had observed that the effects of unilateral damage
indicated that the left hemisphere was preferentially involved in language.
Since the 0s, this commitment to functional asymmetry has been reinforced by
studies of patients in whom communication between the hemispheres has been
surgically disrupted. Split brain effects depend on severing the cerebral
commisures, and especially the corpus callosum, which are neural structures
mediating communication between the cerebral hemispheres. Commisurotomies have
been performed since the 0s to control severe epilepsy. This is intended to
leave both hemispheres intact and functioning independently. Beginning in the
0s, J. E. Bogen, M. S. Gazzaniga, and R. W. Sperry conducted an array of
psychological tests to evaluate the distinctive abilities of the different
hemispheres. Ascertaining the degree of cerebral asymmetry depends on a
carefully controlled experimental design in which access of the disassociated
hemispheres to peripheral cues is limited. The result has been a wide array of
striking results. For example, patients are unable to match an object such as a
key felt in one hand with a similar object felt in the other; patients are
unable to name an object Spir, Afrikan split brain effects 874 874 held in the left hand, though they can
name an object held in the right. Researchers have concluded that these results
confirm a clear lateralization of speech, writing, and calculation in the left
hemisphere for righthanded patients, leaving the right hemisphere largely
unable to respond in speech or writing, and typically unable to perform even
simple calculations. It is often concluded that the left hemisphere is
specialized for verbal and analytic modes of thinking, while the right
hemisphere is specialized for more spatial and synthetic modes of thinking. The
precise character and extent of these differences in normal subjects are less
clear.
sraffa: an Italian noble -- vitters, and Grice -- L. – cited by H. P. Grice, “Some like
Vitters, but Moore’s MY man.” Vienna-born philosopher trained as an enginner at
Manchester. Typically referred to Wittgenstein in the style of English
schoolboy slang of the time as, “Witters,” pronounced “Vitters.”“I heard Austin
said once: ‘Some like Witters, but Moore’s MY man.’ Austin would open the
“Philosophical Investigations,” and say, “Let’s see what Witters has to say
about this.” Everybody ended up loving Witters at the playgroup.” Witters’s
oeuvre was translated first into English by C. K. Ogden. There are interesting
twists. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Vitters.” Grice was sadly discomforted when one of
his best friends at Oxford, D. F. Pears, dedicated so much effort to the
unveiling of the mysteries of ‘Vitters.’ ‘Vitters’ was all in the air in
Grice’s inner circle. Strawson had written a review of Philosophical
Investigations. Austin was always mocking ‘Vitters,’ and there are other
connections. For Grice, the most important is that remark in “Philosohpical
Investigations,” which he never cared to check ‘in the Hun,’ about a horse not
being seen ‘as a horse.’ But in “Prolegomena” he mentions Vitters in other
contexts, too, and in “Causal Theory,” almost anonymously – but usually with
regard to the ‘seeing as’ puzzle. Grice would also rely on Witters’s now
knowing how to use ‘know’ or vice versa. In “Method” Grice quotes verbatim: ‘No
psyche without the manifestation the ascription of psyche is meant to explain,”
and also to the effect that most ‘-etic’ talk of behaviour is already ‘-emic,’
via internal perspective, or just pervaded with intentionalism. One of the most
original and challenging philosophical writers of the twentieth century. Born
in Vienna into an assimilated family of Jewish extraction, he went to England
as a student and eventually became a protégé of Russell’s at Cambridge. He
returned to Austria at the beginning of The Great War I, but went back to Cambridge
in 8 and taught there as a fellow and professor. Despite spending much of his
professional life in England, Vitters never lost contact with his Austrian
background, and his writings combine in a unique way ideas derived from both
the insular and the continental European tradition. His thought is strongly
marked by a deep skepticism about philosophy, but he retained the conviction
that there was something important to be rescued from the traditional
enterprise. In his Blue Book 8 he referred to his own work as “one of the heirs
of the subject that used to be called philosophy.” What strikes readers first
when they look at Vitters’s writings is the peculiar form of their composition.
They are generally made up of short individual notes that are most often numbered
in sequence and, in the more finished writings, evidently selected and arranged
with the greatest care. Those notes range from fairly technical discussions on
matters of logic, the mind, meaning, understanding, acting, seeing,
mathematics, and knowledge, to aphoristic observations about ethics, culture,
art, and the meaning of life. Because of their wide-ranging character, their
unusual perspective on things, and their often intriguing style, Vitters’s
writings have proved to appeal to both professional philosophers and those
interested in philosophy in a more general way. The writings as well as his
unusual life and personality have already produced a large body of interpretive
literature. But given his uncompromising stand, it is questionable whether his
thought will ever be fully integrated into academic philosophy. It is more
likely that, like Pascal and Nietzsche, he will remain an uneasy presence in
philosophy. From an early date onward Vitters was greatly influenced by the
idea that philosophical problems can be resolved by paying attention to the
working of language a thought he may
have gained from Fritz Mauthner’s Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache 102.
Vitters’s affinity to Mauthner is, indeed, evident in all phases of his
philosophical development, though it is particularly noticeable in his later
thinking.Until recently it has been common to divide Vitters’s work into two
sharply distinct phases, separated by a prolonged period of dormancy. According
to this schema the early “Tractarian” period is that of the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus 1, which Vitters wrote in the trenches of World War I, and
the later period that of the Philosophical Investigations 3, which he composed
between 6 and 8. But the division of his work into these two periods has proved
misleading. First, in spite of obvious changes in his thinking, Vitters
remained throughout skeptical toward traditional philosophy and persisted in
channeling philosophical questioning in a new direction. Second, the common
view fails to account for the fact that even between 0 and 8, when Vitters
abstained from actual work in philosophy, he read widely in philosophical and
semiphilosophical authors, and between 8 and 6 he renewed his interest in
philosophical work and wrote copiously on philosophical matters. The posthumous
publication of texts such as The Blue and Brown Books, Philosophical Grammar,
Philosophical Remarks, and Conversations with the Vienna Circle has led to
acknowledgment of a middle period in Vitters’s development, in which he
explored a large number of philosophical issues and viewpoints a period that served as a transition between
the early and the late work. Early period. As the son of a greatly successful
industrialist and engineer, Vitters first studied engineering in Berlin and
Manchester, and traces of that early training are evident throughout his
writing. But his interest shifted soon to pure mathematics and the foundations
of mathematics, and in pursuing questions about them he became acquainted with
Russell and Frege and their work. The two men had a profound and lasting effect
on Vitters even when he later came to criticize and reject their ideas. That
influence is particularly noticeable in the Tractatus, which can be read as an
attempt to reconcile Russell’s atomism with Frege’s apriorism. But the book is
at the same time moved by quite different and non-technical concerns. For even
before turning to systematic philosophy Vitters had been profoundly moved by
Schopenhauer’s thought as it is spelled out in The World as Will and
Representation, and while he was serving as a soldier in World War I, he
renewed his interest in Schopenhauer’s metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, and
mystical outlook. The resulting confluence of ideas is evident in the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus and gives the book its peculiar character. Composed in a
dauntingly severe and compressed style, the book attempts to show that
traditional philosophy rests entirely on a misunderstanding of “the logic of
our language.” Following in Frege’s and Russell’s footsteps, Vitters argued
that every meaningful sentence must have a precise logical structure. That
structure may, however, be hidden beneath the clothing of the grammatical
appearance of the sentence and may therefore require the most detailed analysis
in order to be made evident. Such analysis, Vitters was convinced, would
establish that every meaningful sentence is either a truth-functional composite
of another simpler sentence or an atomic sentence consisting of a concatenation
of simple names. He argued further that every atomic sentence is a logical
picture of a possible state of affairs, which must, as a result, have exactly
the same formal structure as the atomic sentence that depicts it. He employed
this “picture theory of meaning” as it is
usually called to derive conclusions
about the nature of the world from his observations about the structure of the
atomic sentences. He postulated, in particular, that the world must itself have
a precise logical structure, even though we may not be able to determine it
completely. He also held that the world consists primarily of facts,
corresponding to the true atomic sentences, rather than of things, and that
those facts, in turn, are concatenations of simple objects, corresponding to
the simple names of which the atomic sentences are composed. Because he derived
these metaphysical conclusions from his view of the nature of language, Vitters
did not consider it essential to describe what those simple objects, their
concatenations, and the facts consisting of them are actually like. As a
result, there has been a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement among
interpreters about their character. The propositions of the Tractatus are for
the most part concerned with spelling out Vitters’s account of the logical
structure of language and the world and these parts of the book have
understandably been of most interest to philosophers who are primarily
concerned with questions of symbolic logic and its applications. But for
Vitters himself the most important part of the book consisted of the negative
conclusions about philosophy that he reaches at the end of his text: in
particular, that all sentences that are not atomic pictures of concatenations
of objects or truth-functional composites of such are strictly speaking
meaningless. Among these he included all the propositions of ethics and
aesthetics, all propositions dealing with the meaning of life, all propositions
of logic, indeed all philosophical propositions, and finally all the
propositions of the Tractatus itself. These are all strictly meaningless; they
aim at saying something important, but what they try to express in words can
only show itself. As a result Vitters concluded that anyone who understood what
the Tractatus was saying would finally discard its propositions as senseless,
that she would throw away the ladder after climbing up on it. Someone who
reached such a state would have no more temptation to pronounce philosophical
propositions. She would see the world rightly and would then also recognize
that the only strictly meaningful propositions are those of natural science;
but those could never touch what was really important in human life, the
mystical. That would have to be contemplated in silence. For “whereof one
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent,” as the last proposition of the
Tractatus declared. Middle period. It was only natural that Vitters should not
embark on an academic career after he had completed that work. Instead he
trained to be a school teacher and taught primary school for a number of years
in the mountains of lower Austria. In the mid-0s he also built a house for his
sister; this can be seen as an attempt to give visual expression to the
logical, aesthetic, and ethical ideas of the Tractatus. In those years he
developed a number of interests seminal for his later development. His school
experience drew his attention to the way in which children learn language and
to the whole process of enculturation. He also developed an interest in
psychology and read Freud and others. Though he remained hostile to Freud’s
theoretical explanations of his psychoanalytic work, he was fascinated with the
analytic practice itself and later came to speak of his own work as therapeutic
in character. In this period of dormancy Vitters also became acquainted with
the members of the Vienna Circle, who had adopted his Tractatus as one of their
key texts. For a while he even accepted the positivist principle of meaning
advocated by the members of that Circle, according to which the meaning of a sentence
is the method of its verification. This he would later modify into the more
generous claim that the meaning of a sentence is its use. Vitters’s most
decisive step in his middle period was to abandon the belief of the Tractatus
that meaningful sentences must have a precise hidden logical structure and the
accompanying belief that this structure corresponds to the logical structure of
the facts depicted by those sentences. The Tractatus had, indeed, proceeded on
the assumption that all the different symbolic devices that can describe the
world must be constructed according to the same underlying logic. In a sense,
there was then only one meaningful language in the Tractatus, and from it one
was supposed to be able to read off the logical structure of the world. In the
middle period Vitters concluded that this doctrine constituted a piece of
unwarranted metaphysics and that the Tractatus was itself flawed by what it had
tried to combat, i.e., the misunderstanding of the logic of language. Where he
had previously held it possible to ground metaphysics on logic, he now argued
that metaphysics leads the philosopher into complete darkness. Turning his
attention back to language he concluded that almost everything he had said
about it in the Tractatus had been in error. There were, in fact, many
different languages with many different structures that could meet quite
different specific needs. Language was not strictly held together by logical
structure, but consisted, in fact, of a multiplicity of simpler substructures
or language games. Sentences could not be taken to be logical pictures of facts
and the simple components of sentences did not all function as names of simple
objects. These new reflections on language served Vitters, in the first place,
as an aid to thinking about the nature of the human mind, and specifically
about the relation between private experience and the physical world. Against
the existence of a Cartesian mental substance, he argued that the word ‘I’ did
not serve as a name of anything, but occurred in expressions meant to draw
attention to a particular body. For a while, at least, he also thought he could
explain the difference between private experience and the physical world in
terms of the existence of two languages, a primary language of experience and a
secondary language of physics. This duallanguage view, which is evident in both
the Philosophical Remarks and The Blue Book, Vitters was to give up later in
favor of the assumption that our grasp of inner phenomena is dependent on the existence
of outer criteria. From the mid-0s onward he also renewed his interest in the
philosophy of mathematics. In contrast to Frege and Russell, he argued
strenuously that no part of mathematics is reducible purely to logic. Instead
he set out to describe mathematics as part of our natural history and as
consisting of a number of diverse language games. He also insisted that the
meaning of those games depended on the uses to which the mathematical formulas
were put. Applying the principle of verification to mathematics, he held that
the meaning of a mathematical formula lies in its proof. These remarks on the
philosophy of mathematics have remained among Vitters’s most controversial and
least explored writings. Later period. Vitters’s middle period was characterized
by intensive philosophical work on a broad but quickly changing front. By 6,
however, his thinking was finally ready to settle down once again into a
steadier pattern, and he now began to elaborate the views for which he became
most famous. Where he had constructed his earlier work around the logic devised
by Frege and Russell, he now concerned himself mainly with the actual working
of ordinary language. This brought him close to the tradition of British common
sense philosophy that Moore had revived and made him one of the godfathers of
the ordinary language philosophy that was to flourish in Oxford in the 0s. In
the Philosophical Investigations Vitters emphasized that there are countless
different uses of what we call “symbols,” “words,” and “sentences.” The task of
philosophy is to gain a perspicuous view of those multiple uses and thereby to
dissolve philosophical and metaphysical puzzles. These puzzles were the result
of insufficient attention to the working of language and could be resolved only
by carefully retracing the linguistic steps by which they had been reached.
Vitters thus came to think of philosophy as a descriptive, analytic, and
ultimately therapeutic practice. In the Investigations he set out to show how
common philosophical views about meaning including the logical atomism of the
Tractatus, about the nature of concepts, about logical necessity, about
rule-following, and about the mindbody problem were all the product of an
insufficient grasp of how language works. In one of the most influential
passages of the book he argued that concept words do not denote sharply
circumscribed concepts, but are meant to mark family resemblances between the
things labeled with the concept. He also held that logical necessity results
from linguistic convention and that rules cannot determine their own
applications, that rule-following presupposes the existence of regular
practices. Furthermore, the words of our language have meaning only insofar as
there exist public criteria for their correct application. As a consequence, he
argued, there cannot be a completely private language, i.e., a language that in
principle can be used only to speak about one’s own inner experience. This
private language argument has caused much discussion. Interpreters have
disagreed not only over the structure of the argument and where it occurs in
Vitters’s text, but also over the question whether he meant to say that
language is necessarily social. Because he said that to speak of inner
experiences there must be external and publicly available criteria, he has
often been taken to be advocating a logical behaviorism, but nowhere does he,
in fact, deny the existence of inner states. What he says is merely that our
understanding of someone’s pain is connected to the existence of natural and
linguistic expressions of pain. In the Philosophical Investigations Vitters
repeatedly draws attention to the fact that language must be learned. This
learning, he says, is fundamentally a process of inculcation and drill. In
learning a language the child is initiated in a form of life. In Vitters’s
later work the notion of form of life serves to identify the whole complex of
natural and cultural circumstances presupposed by our language and by a
particular understanding of the world. He elaborated those ideas in notes on
which he worked between 8 and his death in 1 and which are now published under
the title On Certainty. He insisted in them that every belief is always part of
a system of beliefs that together constitute a worldview. All confirmation and
disconfirmation of a belief presuppose such a system and are internal to the
system. For all this he was not advocating a relativism, but a naturalism that
assumes that the world ultimately determines which language games can be
played. Vitters’s final notes vividly illustrate the continuity of his basic
concerns throughout all the changes his thinking went through. For they reveal
once more how he remained skeptical about all philosophical theories and how he
understood his own undertaking as the attempt to undermine the need for any
such theorizing. The considerations of On Certainty are evidently directed
against both philosophical skeptics and those philosophers who want to refute
skepticism. Against the philosophical skeptics Vitters insisted that there is
real knowledge, but this knowledge is always dispersed and not necessarily
reliable; it consists of things we have heard and read, of what has been
drilled into us, and of our modifications of this inheritance. We have no
general reason to doubt this inherited body of knowledge, we do not generally
doubt it, and we are, in fact, not in a position to do so. But On Certainty
also argues that it is impossible to refute skepticism by pointing to
propositions that are absolutely certain, as Descartes did when he declared ‘I
think, therefore I am’ indubitable, or as Moore did when he said, “I know for
certain that this is a hand here.” The fact that such propositions are
considered certain, Vitters argued, indicates only that they play an indispensable,
normative role in our language game; they are the riverbed through which the
thought of our language game flows. Such propositions cannot be taken to
express metaphysical truths. Here, too, the conclusion is that all
philosophical argumentation must come to an end, but that the end of such
argumentation is not an absolute, self-evident truth, but a certain kind of
natural human practice. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Il gesto della mano di Sraffa.”
Speranza, “Sraffa’s handwave, and his impicaturum.” Refs.: Luigi Speranza,
“L’implicatura di Sraffa,” per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool
Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
standard: Grice:
“People, philosophers included, misuse ‘standard’ – in Italian, it just means
‘flag’!” -- model, a term that, like ‘non-standard model’, is used with regard
to theories that systematize part of our knowledge of some mathematical
structure, for instance the structure of natural numbers with addition,
multiplication, and the successor function, or the structure of real numbers
with ordering, addition, and multiplication. Models isomorphic to this intended
mathematical structure are the “standard models” of the theory, while any
other, non-isomorphic, model of the theory is a ‘non-standard’ model. Since
Peano arithmetic is incomplete, it has consistent extensions that have no
standard model. But there are also non-standard, countable models of complete
number theory, the set of all true first-order sentences about natural numbers,
as was first shown by Skolem in 4. Categorical theories do not have a
non-standard model. It is less clear whether there is a standard model of set
theory, although a countable model would certainly count as non-standard. The
Skolem paradox is that any first-order formulation of set theory, like ZF, due
to Zermelo and Fraenkel, has a countable model, while it seems to assert the
existence of non-countable sets. Many other important mathematical structures
cannot be characterized by a categorical set of first-order axioms, and thus
allow non-standard models. The
philosopher Putnam has argued that this fact has important implications
for the debate about realism in the philosophy of language. If axioms cannot
capture the spontaneity, liberty of standard model 875 875 “intuitive” notion of a set, what could?
Some of his detractors have pointed out that within second-order logic
categorical characterizations are often possible. But Putnam has objected that
the intended interpretation of second-order logic itself is not fixed by the
use of the formalism of second-order logic, where “use” is determined by the
rules of inference for second-order logic we know about. Moreover, categorical
theories are sometimes uninformative.
stabilitatum – stabilire --
Establishment – Grice speaks of the Establishment twice. Once re: Gellner:
non-Establishment criticizing the English Establishment. Second: to refute
Lewis. Something can be ‘established’ and not be conventional. “Surely Lewis
should know the Graeco-Roman root of establish to figure that out!” stăbĭlĭo ,
īvi, ītum (sync. I.imperf. stabilibat, Enn. Ann. 44), 4, v. a. stabilis, to
make firm, steadfast, or stable; to fix, stay, establish (class.; esp. in the
trop. sense). I. Lit.: semita nulla pedem stabilibat, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 20,
40 (Ann. v. 44 Vahl.): “eo stabilita magis sunt,” Lucr. 3, 202; cf.:
confirmandi et stabiliendi causā singuli ab infimo solo pedes terrā
exculcabantur, * Caes. B. G. 7, 73: “vineas,” Col. 4, 33, 1: “loligini pedes
duo, quibus se velut ancoris stabiliunt,” Plin. 9, 28, 44, § 83.— II. Trop.:
regni stabilita scamna solumque, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 48 fin. (Ann. v. 99
Vahl.): “alicui regnum suom,” Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 39; cf.: libertatem civibus,
Att. ap. Cic. Sest. 58, 123: “rem publicam (opp. evertere),” Cic. Fin. 4, 24,
65; so, “rem publicam,” id. Sest. 68, 143: “leges,” id. Leg. 1, 23, 62: “nisi
haec urbs stabilita tuis consiliis erit,” id. Marcell. 9, 29: “matrimonia
firmiter,” id. Rep. 6, 2, 2: pacem, concordiam, Pseud.-Sall. Rep. Ordin. 1 fin.
(p. 267 Gerl.): “res Capuae stabilitas Romana disciplina,” Liv. 9, 20: “nomen
equestre in consulatu (Cicero),” Plin. 33, 2, 8, § 34: “(aegrum) ad retinendam
patientiam,” to strengthen, fortify him, Gell. 12, 5, 3. While Grice’s play
with ‘estaablished’ is in the second metabolical stage of his programme – where
‘means’ applies to things other than the emissor, surely metaphorically – he is
allowing that ‘estabalish’ may be used in the one-off predicament. By drawing a
skull, U is establishing a procedure. Grice notably wants to make ‘established’
a weaker variant of ‘conventional.’ So that x, whatever, may be ‘established’
but not ‘conventional.’ In fact, it can be argued that to establish you have to
do it at least once. Cfr. ‘settled. ‘Greenwich, Conn., settled in 1639.’
‘Established’ Surely it would be obtuse to say that Greenwich, Conn. Was
“conventionalized”.
state, Grice: “I will use the phrase ‘state of the soul’ –
This may sound pedantic, and it is!” – “I will use ‘psychological state,’ where
the more correct phrase would be ‘state’ of the ‘soul,’ since theory – as in
‘-logical,’ has nothing to do with it. Now you’ll wonder if the soul has
states. A state of the soul – or a ‘frame of mind,’ as Strawson wrongly puts it
– is a physical state on which a ‘state’ of the soul supervenes, alla
Funcionalism” – “Note that a ’state’ of the soul may be quite specific and
involving other states, like the belief that Strawson’s dog is shaggy.” – “A
state is anything that follows a ‘that’-clause; the way an object or system
basically is; the fundamental, intrinsic properties of an object or system, and
the basis of its other properties. An instantaneous state is a state at a given
time. State variables are constituents of a state whose values may vary with
time. In classical or Newtonian mechanics the instantaneous state of an
n-particle system consists of the positions and momenta masses multiplied by
velocities of the n particles at a given time. Other mechanical properties are
functions of those in states. Fundamental and derived properties are often,
though possibly misleadingly, called observables. The set of a system’s
possible states can be represented as an abstract phase space or state space,
with dimensions or coordinates for the components of each state variable. In
quantum theory, states do not fix the particular values of observables, only
the probabilities of observables assuming particular values in particular
measurement situations. For positivism or instrumentalism, specifying a quantum
state does nothing more than provide a means for calculating such
probabilities. For realism, it does more
e.g., it refers to the basis of a quantum system’s probabilistic
dispositions or propensities. Vectors in Hilbert spaces represent possible
states, and Hermitian operators on vectors represent observables. -- state
of affairs: Grice: “My poor friend D. F. Pears got himself into a lot of
trouble by offering to correct C. K. Ogden’s passe translation of Vitters’s
Tractatus!” a possibility, actuality, or impossibility of the kind expressed by
a nominalization of a declarative sentence. The declarative sentence ‘This die
comes up six’ can be nominalized either through the construction ‘that this die
comes up six’ or through the likes of ‘this die’s coming up six’. The resulting
nominalizations might be interpreted as naming corresponding propositions or
states of affairs. States of affairs come in several varieties. Some are
possible states of affairs, or possibilities. Consider the possibility of a certain
die coming up six when rolled next. This possibility is a state of affairs, as
is its “complement” the die’s not coming
up six when rolled next. There is in addition the state of affairs which
conjoins that die’s coming up six with its not coming up six. And this
contradictory state of affairs is of course not a possibility, not a possible
state of affairs. Moreover, for every actual state of affairs there is a
non-actual one, its complement. For every proposition there is hence a state of
affairs: possible or impossible, actual or not. Indeed some consider
propositions to be states of affairs. Some take facts to be actual states of
affairs, while others prefer to define them as true propositions. If
propositions are states of affairs, then facts are of course both actual states
of affairs and true propositions. In a very broad sense, events are just
possible states of affairs; in a narrower sense they are contingent states of
affairs; and in a still narrower sense they are contingent and particular states
of affairs, involving just the exemplification of an nadic property by a
sequence of individuals of length n. In a yet narrower sense events are only
those particular and contingent states of affairs that entail change. A
baseball’s remaining round throughout a certain period does not count as an
event in this narrower sense but only as a state of that baseball, unlike the
event of its being hit by a certain bat.
statistics: Grice: “I shall use the singular, ‘statistic’” -- statistical explanation. Grice: “Jill
says, “Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.” Is the validty of her
reasoning based on statistics?” -- an explanation expressed in an explanatory
argument containing premises and conclusions making claims about statistical
probabilities. These arguments include deductions of less general from more
general laws and differ from other such explanations only insofar as the
contents of the laws imply claims about statistical probability. Most
philosophical discussion in the latter half of the twentieth century has
focused on statistical explanation of events rather than laws. This type of
argument was discussed by Ernest Nagel The Structure of Science, 1 under the
rubric “probabilistic explanation,” and by Hempel Aspects of Scientific Explanation,
5 as “inductive statistical” explanation. The explanans contains a statement
asserting that a given system responds in one of several ways specified by a
sample space of possible outcomes on a trial or experiment of some type, and
that the statistical probability of an event represented by a set of points in
the sample space on the given kind of trial is also given for each such event.
Thus, the statement might assert that the statistical probability is near 1 of
the relative frequency r/n of heads in n tosses being close to the statistical
probability p of heads on a single toss, where the sample space consists of the
2n possible sequences of heads and tails in n tosses. Nagel and Hempel
understood such statistical probability statements to be covering laws, so that
inductive-statistical explanation and deductivenomological explanation of
events are two species of covering law explanation. The explanans also contains
a claim that an experiment of the kind mentioned in the statistical assumption
has taken place e.g., the coin has been tossed n times. The explanandum asserts
that an event of some kind has occurred e.g., the coin has landed heads
approximately r times in the n tosses. In many cases, the kind of experiment
can be described equivalently as an n-fold repetition of some other kind of
experiment as a thousandfold repetition of the tossing of a given coin or as
the implementation of the kind of trial thousand-fold tossing of the coin one
time. Hence, statistical explanation of events can always be construed as
deriving conclusions about “single cases” from assumptions about statistical
probabilities even when the concern is to explain mass phenomena. Yet, many
authors controversially contrast statistical explanation in quantum mechanics,
which is alleged to require a singlecase propensity interpretation of
statistical probability, with statistical explanation in statistical mechanics,
genetics, and the social sciences, which allegedly calls for a frequency
interpretation. The structure of the explanatory argument of such statistical
explanation has the form of a direct inference from assumptions about
statistical probabilities and the kind of experiment trial which has taken
place to the outcome. One controversial aspect of direct inference is the
problem of the reference class. Since the early nineteenth century, statistical
probability has been understood to be relative to the way the experiment or
trial is described. Authors like J. Venn, Peirce, R. A. Fisher, and
Reichenbach, among many others, have been concerned with how to decide on which
kind of trial to base a direct inference when the trial under investigation is
correctly describable in several ways and the statistical probabilities of
possible outcomes may differ relative to the different sorts of descriptions.
The most comprehensive discussion of this problem of the reference class is
found in the work of H. E. Kyburg e.g., Probability and the Logic of Rational
Belief, 1. Hempel acknowledged its importance as an “epistemic ambiguity” in inductive
statistical explanation. Controversy also arises concerning inductive
acceptance. May the conclusion of an explanatory direct inference be a judgment
as to the subjective probability that the outcome event occurred? May a
judgment that the outcome event occurred is inductively “accepted” be made? Is
some other mode of assessing the claim about the outcome appropriate? Hempel’s
discussion of the “nonconjunctiveness of inductivestatistical” explanation
derives from Kyburg’s earlier account of direct inference where high
probability is assumed to be sufficient for acceptance. Non-conjunctiveness has
been avoided by abandoning the sufficiency of high probability I. Levi,
Gambling with Truth, 7 or by denying that direct inference in
inductive-statistical explanation involves inductive acceptance at all R. C.
Jeffrey, “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference,” in Essays in
Honor of C. G. Hempel. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Jack and Jill.”
stillingfleet: English divine and controversialist who first made
his name with “Irenicum,” using natural-law doctrines to oppose religious
sectarianism. His “Origines Sacrae” ostensibly on the superiority of the
Scriptural record over other forms of ancient history, was for its day a
learned study in the moral certainty of historical evidence, the authority of
testimony, and the credibility of miracles. In drawing eclectically on
philosophy from antiquity to the Cambridge Platonists, he was much influenced
by the Cartesian theory of ideas, but later repudiated Cartesianism for its
mechanist tendency. For three decades he pamphleteered on behalf of the moral
certainty of orthodox Protestant belief against what he considered the beliefs
“contrary to reason” of Roman Catholicism. This led to controversy with
Unitarian and deist writers who argued that mysteries like the Trinity were
equally contrary to “clear and distinct” ideas. He was alarmed at the use made
of Locke’s “new,” i.e. nonCartesian, way of ideas by John Toland in Christianity
not Mysterious, and devoted his last years to challenging Locke to prove his
orthodoxy. The debate was largely over the concepts of substance, essence, and
person, and of faith and certainty. Locke gave no quarter in the public
controversy, but in the fourth edition of his Essay he silently amended some
passages that had provoked Stillingfleet.
sttochasis: stochastic process –“"pertaining
to conjecture," from Greek stokhastikos "able to guess,
conjecturing," from stokhazesthai "to guess, aim at,
conjecture," from stokhos "a guess, aim, fixed target, erected pillar
for archers to shoot at," perhaps from PIE *stogh-, variant of root
*stegh- "to stick, prick, sting." The sense of "randomly
determined" is from 1934, from German stochastik (1917). a process
that evolves, as time goes by, according to a probabilistic principle rather
than a deterministic principle. Such processes are also called random
processes, but ‘stochastic’ does not imply complete disorderliness. The
principle of evolution governing a stochastic or random process is precise,
though probabilistic, in form. For example, suppose some process unfolds in
discrete successive stages. And suppose that given any initial sequence of
stages, S1, S2, . . . , Sn, there is a precise probability that the next stage
Sn+1 will be state S, a precise probability that it will be SH, and so on for
all possible continuations of the sequence of states. These probabilities are
called transition probabilities. An evolving sequence of this kind is called a
discrete-time stochastic process, or discrete-time random process. A
theoretically important special case occurs when transition probabilities
depend only on the latest stage in the sequence of stages. When an evolving
process has this property it is called a discrete-time Markov process. A simple
example of a discrete-time Markov process is the behavior of a person who keeps
taking either a step forward or a step back according to whether a coin falls
heads or tails; the probabilistic principle of movement is always applied to the
person’s most recent position. The successive stages of a stochastic process
need not be discrete. If they are continuous, they constitute a
“continuous-time” stochastic or random process. The mathematical theory of
stochastic processes has many applications in science and technology. The
evolution of epidemics, the process of soil erosion, and the spread of cracks
in metals have all been given plausible models as stochastic processes, to
mention just a few areas of research. H.
P. Grice, “Stochastic implicatum.”
stoa – stoa --
Stoicus: stoicism -- Neo-stoicism -- du Vair, Guillaume, philosopher, bishop,
and political figure. Du Vair and Justus Lipsius were the two most influential
propagators of neo-Stoicism in early modern Europe. Du Vair’s Sainte
Philosophie “Holy Philosophy,” 1584 and his shorter Philosophie morale des
Stoïques “Moral Philosophy of the Stoics,” 1585, were tr. and frequently
reprinted. The latter presents Epictetus in a form usable by ordinary people in
troubled times. We are to follow nature and live according to reason; we are
not to be upset by what we cannot control; virtue is the good. Du Vair inserts,
moreover, a distinctly religious note. We must be pious, accept our lot as
God’s will, and consider morality obedience to his command. Du Vair thus Christianized
Stoicism, making it widely acceptable. By teaching that reason alone enables us
to know how we ought to live, he became a founder of modern rationalism in
ethics. Stōĭcus , a, um, adj., = Στωϊκός, I.of or
belonging to the Stoic philosophy or to the Stoics, Stoic: “schola,” Cic. Fam.
9, 22 fin.: “secta,” Sen. Ep. 123, 14: “sententia,” id. ib. 22, 7: “libelli,”
Hor. Epod. 8, 15: “turba,” Mart. 7, 69, 4: “dogmata,” Juv. 13, 121:
“disciplina,” Gell. 19, 1, 1: “Stoicum est,” it is a saying of the Stoics, Cic.
Ac. 2, 26, 85: “non loquor tecum Stoicā linguā, sed hac submissiore,” Sen. Ep.
13, 4: “est aliquid in illo Stoici dei: nec cor nec caput habet,” Sen. Apoc.
8.— Subst.: Stōĭcus , i, m., a Stoic philosopher, a Stoic, Cic. Par. praef. §
2; Hor. S. 2, 3, 160; 2, 3, 300; plur., Cic. Mur. 29, 61; and in philosophical
writings saepissime.— 2. Stōĭca , ōrum, n. plur., the Stoic philosophy, Cic. N.
D. 1, 6, 15.—Adv.: Stōĭcē , like a Stoic, Stoically: “agere austere et Stoice,”
Cic. Mur. 35, 74: dicere, id. Par. praef. § 3.H. P. Grice, “The Stoa:
from Athenian to Oxonian dialectic,” H. P. Grice, “The Stoa and Athenian
dialectic.” H. P. Grice: “The Stoa and
Athenian dialectic.” -- stoicism, one of the three leading movements
constituting Hellenistic philosophy. Its founder was Zeno of Citium, who was
succeeded as school head by Cleanthes. But the third head, Chrysippus, was its
greatest exponent and most voluminous writer. These three are the leading
representatives of Early Stoicism. No work by any early Stoic survives intact,
except Cleanthes’ short “Hymn to Zeus.” Otherwise we are dependent on
doxography, on isolated quotations, and on secondary sources, most of them
hostile. Nevertheless, a remarkably coherent account of the system can be
assembled. The Stoic world is an ideally good organism, all of whose parts
interact for the benefit of the whole. It is imbued with divine reason logos,
its entire development providentially ordained by fate and repeated identically
from one world phase to the next in a never-ending cycle, each phase ending
with a conflagration ekpyrosis. Only bodies strictly “exist” and can interact.
Body is infinitely divisible, and contains no void. At the lowest level, the
world is analyzed into an active principle, god, and a passive principle,
matter, both probably corporeal. Out of these are generated, at a higher level,
the four elements air, fire, earth, and water, whose own interaction is
analogous to that of god and matter: air and fire, severally or conjointly, are
an active rational force called breath Grecian pneuma, Latin spiritus, while
earth and water constitute the passive substrate on which these act, totally
interpenetrating each other thanks to the non-particulate structure of body and
its capacity to be mixed “through and through.” Most physical analysis is
conducted at this higher level, and pneuma becomes a key concept in physics and
biology. A thing’s qualities are constituted by its pneuma, which has the
additional role of giving it cohestochastic process Stoicism 879 879 sion and thus an essential identity. In
inanimate objects this unifying pneuma is called a hexis state; in plants it is
called physis nature; and in animals “soul.” Even qualities of soul, e.g.
justice, are portions of pneuma, and they too are therefore bodies: only thus
could they have their evident causal efficacy. Four incorporeals are admitted:
place, void which surrounds the world, time, and lekta see below; these do not
strictly “exist” they lack the corporeal
power of interaction but as items with
some objective standing in the world they are, at least, “somethings.”
Universals, identified with Plato’s Forms, are treated as concepts ennoemata,
convenient fictions that do not even earn the status of “somethings.” Stoic
ethics is founded on the principle that only virtue is good, only vice bad.
Other things conventionally assigned a value are “indifferent” adiaphora,
although some, e.g., health, wealth, and honor, are naturally “preferred”
proegmena, while their opposites are “dispreferred” apoproegmena. Even though
their possession is irrelevant to happiness, from birth these indifferents
serve as the appropriate subject matter of our choices, each correct choice
being a “proper function” kathekon not
yet a morally good act, but a step toward our eventual end telos of “living in
accordance with nature.” As we develop our rationality, the appropriate choices
become more complex, less intuitive. For example, it may sometimes be more in
accordance with nature’s plan to sacrifice your wealth or health, in which case
it becomes your “proper function” to do so. You have a specific role to play in
the world plan, and moral progress prokope consists in learning it. This
progress involves widening your natural “affinity” oikeiosis: an initial
concern for yourself and your parts is later extended to those close to you,
and eventually to all mankind. That is the Stoic route toward justice. However,
justice and the other virtues are actually found only in the sage, an idealized
perfectly rational person totally in tune with the divine cosmic plan. The
Stoics doubted whether any sages existed, although there was a tendency to
treat at least Socrates as having been one. The sage is totally good, everyone
else totally bad, on the paradoxical Stoic principle that all sins are equal.
The sage’s actions, however similar externally to mere “proper functions,” have
an entirely distinct character: they are renamed ‘right actions’ katorthomata.
Acting purely from “right reason,” he is distinguished by his “freedom from passion”
apatheia: morally wrong impulses, or passions, are at root intellectual errors
of mistaking what is indifferent for good or bad, whereas the sage’s
evaluations are always correct. The sage alone is happy and truly free, living
in perfect harmony with the divine plan. All human lives are predetermined by
the providentially designed, all-embracing causal nexus of fate; yet being the
principal causes of their actions, the good and the bad alike are responsible
for them: determinism and morality are fully compatible. Stoic epistemology
defends the existence of cognitive certainty against the attacks of the New
Academy. Belief is described as assent synkatathesis to an impression
phantasia, i.e. taking as true the propositional content of some perceptual or
reflective impression. Certainty comes through the “cognitive impression”
phantasia kataleptike, a self-certifying perceptual representation of external
fact, claimed to be commonplace. Out of sets of such impressions we acquire
generic conceptions prolepseis and become rational. The highest intellectual
state, knowledge episteme, in which all cognitions become mutually supporting
and hence “unshakable by reason,” is the prerogative of the wise. Everyone else
is in a state of mere opinion doxa or of ignorance. Nevertheless, the cognitive
impression serves as a “criterion of truth” for all. A further important
criterion is prolepseis, also called common conceptions and common notions
koinai ennoiai, often appealed to in philosophical argument. Although officially
dependent on experience, they often sound more like innate intuitions,
purportedly indubitable. Stoic logic is propositional, by contrast with
Aristotle’s logic of terms. The basic unit is the simple proposition axioma,
the primary bearer of truth and falsehood. Syllogistic also employs complex
propositions conditional, conjunctive,
and disjunctive and rests on five
“indemonstrable” inference schemata to which others can be reduced with the aid
of four rules called themata. All these items belong to the class of lekta “sayables” or “expressibles.” Words are
bodies vibrating portions of air, as are external objects, but predicates like
that expressed by ‘ . . . walks’, and the meanings of whole sentences, e.g.,
‘Socrates walks’, are incorporeal lekta. The structure and content of both
thoughts and sentences are analyzed by mapping them onto lekta, but the lekta
are themselves causally inert. Conventionally, a second phase of the school is
distinguished as Middle Stoicism. It developed largely at Rhodes under
Panaetius and Posidonius, both of whom influenced the presentation of Stoicism
in Cicero’s influential philosophical treatises mid-first century B.C..
Panaetius Stoicism Stoicism 880 880
c.185c.110 softened some classical Stoic positions, his ethics being more
pragmatic and less concerned with the idealized sage. Posidonius c.135c.50 made
Stoicism more open to Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, reviving Plato’s
inclusion of irrational components in the soul. A third phase, Roman Stoicism,
is the only Stoic era whose writings have survived in quantity. It is
represented especially by the younger Seneca A.D. c.165, Epictetus A.D.
c.55c.135, and Marcus Aurelius A.D. 12180. It continued the trend set by
Panaetius, with a strong primary focus on practical and personal ethics. Many
prominent Roman political figures were Stoics. After the second century A.D.
Stoicism as a system fell from prominence, but its terminology and concepts had
by then become an ineradicable part of ancient thought. Through the writings of
Cicero and Seneca, its impact on the moral and political thought of the
Renaissance was immense.
stoutianism: philosophical psychologist, astudent of Ward, he was
influenced by Herbart and especially Brentano. He influenced Grice to the point
that Grice called himself “a true Stoutian.” He was editor of Mind 20. He followed Ward in
rejecting associationism and sensationism, and proposing analysis of mind as
activity rather than passivity, consisting of acts of cognition, feeling, and
conation. Stout stressed attention as the essential function of mind, and
argued for the goal-directedness of all mental activity and behavior, greatly
influencing McDougall’s hormic psychology. He reinterpreted traditional
associationist ideas to emphasize primacy of mental activity; e.g., association
by contiguity a passive mechanical
process imposed on mind became
association by continuity of attentional interest. With Brentano, he argued
that mental representation involves “thought reference” to a real object known
through the representation that is itself the object of thought, like Locke’s
“idea.” In philosophy he was influenced by Moore and Russell. His major works
are Analytic Psychology 6 and Manual of Psychology 9.
strato: Grecian philosopher and polymath nicknamed “the
Physicist” for his innovative ideas in natural science. He succeeded
Theophrastus as head of the Lyceum. Earlier he served as royal tutor in
Alexandria, where his students included Aristarchus, who devised the first
heliocentric model. Of Strato’s many writings only fragments and summaries
survive. These show him criticizing the abstract conceptual analysis of earlier
theorists and paying closer attention to empirical evidence. Among his targets
were atomist arguments that motion is impossible unless there is void, and also
Aristotle’s thesis that matter is fully continuous. Strato argued that no large
void occurs in nature, but that matter is naturally porous, laced with tiny
pockets of void. His investigations of compression and suction were influential
in ancient physiology. In dynamics, he proposed that bodies have no property of
lightness but only more or less weight.
strawson: Grice’s tutee. b.9, London-born, Oxford-educated philosopher
who has made major contributions to logic, metaphysics, and the study of Kant.
His career has been mainly at Oxford (he spent a term in Wales and visited the
New World a lot), where he was the leading philosopher of his generation, due
to that famous tutor he had for his ‘logic paper’: H. P. Grice, at St. John’s. His
first important work, “On Referring” argues that Baron Russell’s theory of
descriptions fails to deal properly with the role of descriptions as “referring
expressions” because Russell assumed the “bogus trichotomy” that sentences are
true, false, or meaningless: for Strawson, sentences with empty descriptions
are meaningful but “neither true nor false” because the general presuppositions
governing the use of referring expressions are not fulfilled. One aspect of
this argument was Russell’s alleged insensitivity to the ordinary use of
definite descriptions. The contrast between the abstract schemata of formal
logic and the manifold richness of the inferences inherent in ordinary language
is the central theme of Strawson’s “ Introduction to Logical Theory,” where he
credits H. P. Grice for making him aware of ‘pragmatic rules’ of conversation –
Grice was amused that Baron Russell cared to respond to Strawson in “Mind” –
where Russell’s original “On denoting” had been published. Together, after a
joint seminar with Quine, Strawson submitted “In defense of a dogma,”
co-written with Grice – A year later Strawson submitted on Grice’s behalf
“Meaning” to the same journal – They participated with Pears in a Third
programme lecture, published by Pears in “The nature of metaphysics” (London,
Macmillan”). In Individuals, provocatively entitled “an essay in DESCRIPTIVE
(never revisionary) metaphysics,” Strawson, drawing “without crediting” on
joint seminars with Grice on Categories and De Interpretatione, Strawson reintroduced metaphysics as a respectable
philosophical discipline after decades of positivist rhetoric. But his project
is only “descriptive” metaphysics
elucidation of the basic features of our own conceptual scheme and his arguments are based on the philosophy
of language: “basic” particulars are those like “Grice” or his “cricket bat”,
which are basic objects of reference, and it is the spatiotemporal and sortal
conditions for their identification and reidentification by speakers that constitute
the basic categories. Three arguments are especially famous. First, even in a
purely auditory world objective reference on the basis of experience requires at
least an analogue of space. Second, because self-reference presupposes
reference to others, persons, conceived as bearers of both physical and
psychological properties, are a type of basic particular – cfr. Grice on
“Personal identity.” Third, “feature-placing” discourse, such as ‘it is snowing
here now’, is “the ultimate propositional level” through which reference to
particulars enters discourse. Strawson’s next book, The Bounds of Sense 6,
provides a critical reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. His aim is to
extricate what he sees as the profound truths concerning the presuppositions of
objective experience and judgment that Kant’s transcendental arguments
establish from the mysterious metaphysics of Kant’s transcendental idealism.
Strawson’s critics have argued, however, that the resulting position is
unstable: transcendental arguments can tell us only what we must suppose to be
the case. So if Kant’s idealism, which restricts such suppositions to things as
they appear to us, is abandoned, we can draw conclusions concerning the way the
world itself must be only if we add the verificationist thesis that ability to
make sense of such suppositions requires ability to verify them. In his next
book, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties 5, Strawson conceded this:
transcendental arguments belong within descriptive metaphysics and should not
be regarded as attempts to provide an external justification of our conceptual
scheme. In truth no such external justification is either possible or needed:
instead and here Strawson invokes Hume
rather than Kant our reasonings come to
an end in natural propensities for belief that are beyond question because they
alone make it possible to raise questions. In a famous earlier paper Strawson
had urged much the same point concerning the free will debate: defenders of our
ordinary attitudes of reproach and gratitude should not seek to ground them in
the “panicky metaphysics” of a supra-causal free will; instead they can and
need do no more than point to our unshakable commitment to these “reactive”
attitudes through which we manifest our attachment to that fundamental category
of our conceptual scheme persons. strawsonise:
verb invented by A. M. Kemmerling. To adopt Strawson’s manoever in the analysis
of ‘meaning.’ “A form of ‘disgricing,’” – Kemmerling adds. strawsonism – Grice’s favourite Strawsonisms
were too many to count. His first was Strawson on ‘true’ for ‘Analysis.’ Grice
was amazed by the rate of publishing in Strawson’s case. Strawson kept
publishing and Grice kept criticizing. In “Analysis,’ Strawson gives Grice his
first ‘strawsonism’ “To say ‘true’ is ditto.’ The second strawsonism is that
there is such a thing as ‘ordinary language’ which is not Russellian. As Grice
shows, ordinary language IS Russellian. Strawson said that composing “In
defence of a dogma” was torture and that it is up to Strawson to finish the
thing off. So there are a few
strawonisms there, too. Strawson had the courtesy never to reprint ‘In defence’
in any of his compilations, and of course to have Grice as fist author. There are
‘strawsonisms’ in Grice’s second collaboration with Strawson – that Grice
intentionally ignores in “Life and opinions.” This is a transcript of the talk
of the dynamic trio: Grice, Pears, and Strawson, published three years later by
Pears in “The nature of metaphysics.” Strawson collaborated with “If and the
horseshoe” to PGRICE, but did not really write it for the occasion. It was an
essay he had drafted ages ago, and now saw fit to publish. He expands on this
in his note on Grice for the British Academy, and in his review of Grice’s
compilation. Grice makes an explicit mention of Strawson in a footnote in
“Presupposition and conversational implicaturum,” the euphemism he uses is
‘tribute’: the refutation of Strawson’s truth-value gap as a metaphysical excrescence
and unnecessary is called a ‘tribute,’ coming from the tutor – “in this and
other fields,” implicating, “there may be mistakes all over the place.”
Kemmerling somewhat ignores Urmson when he says, “Don’t disgrice if you can
grice.” To strawsonise, for Kemmerling is to avoid Grice’s direct approach and
ask for a higher-level intention. To strawsonise is the first level of
disgrice. But Grice first quotes Urmson and refers to Stampe’s briddge example
before he does to Strawson’s rat-infested house example. strawson’s rat-infested house. Few in Grice’s playgroup had Grice’s
analytic skills. Only a few cared to join him in his analysis of ‘mean.’ The
first was Urmson with the ‘bribe.’ The second was Strawson, with his
rat-infested house. Grice re-writes Strawson’s alleged counterexample. To deal
with his own rat-infested house example, Strawson proposes that the analysans
of "U means that p" might be restricted by the addition of a further
condition, namely that the utterer U should utter x not only, as already
provided, with the intention that his addressee should think that U intends to
obtain a certain response from his addressee, but also with the intention that
his addressee should think (recognize) that U has the intention just
mentioned. In Strawson's example, in The Philosohical Review (that Grice
cites on WOW:x) repr. in his "Logico-Linguistic Papers," the
potential home buyer is intended to think that the realtor wants him to think
that the house is rat-infested. However, the potential house-buyer is not
intended by the realtor to think that he is intended to think that the realtor
wants him to think that the house is rat infested. The addressee is intended to
think that it is only as a result of being too clever for the
realtor that he has learned that the potential home buyer wants him
to think that the house is rat-infested; the potential home-buyer is to
think that he is supposed to take the artificially displayed dead
rat as a evidence that the house is rat infested. U wants to get A
to believe that the house A is thinking of buying is rat-infested. S decides
to· bring about this belief in A by taking into the house and letting loose a
big fat sewer rat. For S has the following scheme. He knows that A is
watching him and knows that A believes that S is unaware that he, A, is
watching him. It isS's intention that A should (wrongly) infer from the
fact that S let the rat loose that S did so with the intention that A should
arrive at the house, see the rat, and, taking the rat as "natural evidence",
infer therefrom that the house is rat-infested. S further intends A to realize
that given the nature of the rat's arrival, the existence of the rat cannot be
taken as genuine or natural evidence that the house is rat-infested; but S
kilows that A will believe that S would not so contrive to get A to believe the
house is rat-infested unless Shad very good reasons for thinking that it was,
and so S expects and intends A to infer that the house is rat-infested from the
fact that Sis letting the rat loose with the intention of getting A to believe
that the house is rat-infested. Thus S satisfies the conditions purported to be
necessary and sufficient for his meaning something by letting the rat loose: S
lets the rat loose intending (4) A to think that the house is rat-infested,
intending (1)-(3) A to infer from the fact that S let the rat loose that S did
so intending A to think that the house is rat-infested, and intending (5) A's
recognition of S's . intention (4) to function as his reason for thinking that
the house is rat-infested. But even though S's action meets these
conditions, Strawson feels that his scenario fits Grice's conditions in
Grice's reductive analysis and not yet Strawson's intuition about his own use
of 'communicate.' To minimise Strawson's discomfort, Grice brings an
anti-sneaky clause. ("Although I never shared Strawson's intuition about
his use of 'communicate;' in fact, I very rarely use 'communicate that...' To
exterminate the rats in Strawson's rat-infested house, Grice uses, as he should,
a general "anti-deception" clause. It may be that the use
of this exterminating procedure is possible. It may be that any
'backward-looking' clauses can be exterminated, and replaced by a general
prohibitive, or closure clause, forbidding an intention by the utterer to be
sneaky. It is a conceptual point that if you intend your addressee NOT TO
REALISE that p, you are not COMMUNICATING that p. (3A) (if) (3r)
(ic): (a) U utters x intending (I) A to think x possesses
f (2) A to thinkf correlated in way c with the type to which r
belongs (3) A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (I) and (3)
that U intends A to produce r (4) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to
produce r, and (b) There is no inference-element E such that U
intends both (I') A in his determination of r to rely on E (2') A to think Uto
intend (I') to be false. In the final version Grice reaches after considering
alleged counterexamples to the NECESSITY of some of the conditions in the
analysans, Grice reformulates. It is not the case that, for some inference
element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who
has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be
such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without
relying on E. Embedded in the general definition. By uttering x, U means that-ψb-dp ≡ (Ǝφ)(Ǝf)(Ǝc) U utters
x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ think
that x has f, f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, and (Ǝφ') U intends x to be such
that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has
f and that f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that
p, and in view of (Ǝφ') U intending x to be such
that anyone who has φ' think, via thinking that x has
f, and f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that
p, U ψ-s that p, and, for some
substituends of ψb-d, U utters x
intending that, should there actually be anyone who
has φ, he will, via thinking in view of (Ǝφ') U
intending x to be such that anyone who has φ' think, via
thinking that x has f, and f is correlated in way c
with ψ-ing that p, that U ψ-s that p, U ψ-s that
p himself ψ that p, and it is not
the case that, for some inference element E, U intends x to be such
that anyone who has φ both rely on E in coming to ψ, or think that U ψ-s, that p and think that (Ǝφ) U intends x to be
such that anyone who has φ come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that
p without relying on E,
stimulus-response -- poverty of the
stimulus, a psychological phenomenon exhibited when behavior is
stimulusunbound, and hence the immediate stimulus characterized in
straightforward physical terms does not completely control behavior. Human
beings sort stimuli in various ways and hosts of influences seem to affect
when, why, and how we respond our
background beliefs, facility with language, hypotheses about stimuli, etc.
Suppose a person visiting a museum notices a painting she has never before
seen. Pondering the unfamiliar painting, she says, “an ambitious visual
synthesis of the music of Mahler and the poetry of Keats.” If stimulus painting
controls response, then her utterance is a product of earlier responses to
similar stimuli. Given poverty of the stimulus, no such control is exerted by
the stimulus the painting. Of course, some influence of response must be
conceded to the painting, for without it there would be no utterance. However,
the utterance may well outstrip the visitor’s conditioning and learning
history. Perhaps she had never before talked of painting in terms of music and
poetry. The linguist Noam Chomsky made poverty of the stimulus central to his
criticism of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior 7. Chomsky argued that there is no
predicting, and certainly no critical stimulus control of, much human behavior.
strozzi: Important Italian
philosopher, especially influential at what Grice called Italy’s Oxford, i. e.
Firenze – “Palla Strozzi was more a mentor than a philosopher, but I would
consider him both a Grecian and Griceian in spirit.” -- Palla Strozzi Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia
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Palla e Lorenzo Strozzi, dettaglio dell'Adorazione dei Magi di Gentile
da Fabriano (1423) Palla di Onofrio Strozzi (o Palla di Noferi) (Firenze, 1372
– Padova, 18 maggio 1462) è stato un banchiere, politico, letterato, filosofo e
filologo italiano. Stemma degli
Strozzi Indice 1 Biografia 1.1
L'opposizione ai Medici 1.2 L'esilio 2 Matrimoni e discendenza 3 Onorificenze 4
Bibliografia 5 Altri progetti 6 Collegamenti esterni Biografia Grazie alla
ricchezza accumulata nelle ultime generazioni dalla sua famiglia degli Strozzi,
il padre poté far istruire il figlio da letterati ed umanisti, e grazie
all'interesse e all'intelligenza, Palla divenne di fatto uno dei più fini
uomini di cultura fiorentini del suo tempo.
Ricco e colto, commissionò numerose opere d'arte, tra le quali la
Cappella Strozzi (oggi Sagrestia) nella Basilica di Santa Trinita, opera di
Filippo Brunelleschi e Lorenzo Ghiberti (1419-1423). La cappella, progetto
irrealizzato del padre Noferi, venne fatta erigere in sua memoria da Palla dopo
la morte, e ne ospitò la sepoltura monumentale. Per questo ambiente commissionò
l'Adorazione dei Magi a Gentile da Fabriano e la Deposizione dalla Croce a
Lorenzo Monaco, terminata poi da Beato Angelico che ne fece uno dei suoi
capolavori. L'opposizione ai Medici
Collezionista di libri rari e conoscitore del greco e del latino, si trovò già
sessantenne invischiato nell'opposizione strenua contro Cosimo de' Medici. Cosimo il Vecchio infatti era l'uomo che per
la prima volta si era di fatto preso tutto il potere cittadino, grazie a un
sistema di clientelismo con uomini chiave alla guida degli uffici della
Repubblica fiorentina. Davanti a Cosimo solo due strade erano possibili:
l'alleanza accettando un ruolo subordinato o lo scontro frontale; e Palla,
forte della sua ricchezza e fiero della propria cultura, fu a capo della
fazione antimedicea assieme ad un altro oligarca indomabile, Rinaldo degli
Albizi. In un primo momento la fortuna
arrise alla sua fazione, riuscendo ad ottenere prima l'incarcerazione di
Cosimo, poi la dichiarazione del medesimo come magnate, cioè tiranno, ed il suo
conseguente esilio dalla città (1433). L'obiettivo dello Strozzi comunque non
era tanto l'eliminazione di un avversario, ma la restaurazione della libertas
fiorentina e in questo fu diverso dall'alleato Rinaldo degli Albizi. Intanto Cosimo mandava già segni di
prepararsi a un rientro, che avvenne puntuale al cambio di governo con il
veloce avvicendamento dei gonfalonieri, meno di un anno dopo la sua partenza da
Firenze. L'esilio Tra i primi
provvedimenti vi è proprio la vendetta sugli avversari, con l'esilio delle
famiglie degli Albizi e degli Strozzi, e in questo Cosimo fu favorito anche
dall'appoggio popolare che lui e la sua casata si erano saputi
conquistare. Nel 1434 quindi lo Strozzi
parte per Padova, dove si preparava per un rientro che non avvenne mai. La sua
casa di Padova, nella quale egli visse una seconda giovinezza, fu un ritrovo di
artisti e letterati, nel periodo d'oro quando la città veneta era uno dei
centri culturali più notevoli della penisola italiana, per certi risultati
artistici più importante della stessa Firenze (si pensi ai capolavori lasciati
proprio da due fiorentini come Giotto o Donatello). Lasciò la sua raccolta di libri rari,
arricchita ulteriormente durante il suo soggiorno padovano, al monastero di
Santa Giustina. Morì a Padova l'8 maggio 1462, nel suo palazzo verso il Prato
della Valle. Fu sepolto nella vicina chiesa di Santa Maria di Betlemme. Matrimoni e discendenza Dalla moglie Maria
Strozzi, sua lontana parente, ebbe undici figli: Lorenzo (1404-1452) Onofrio (1411-1452)
Nicola detto Tita (1412-?) Gianfrancesco (1418-1468 circa) Carlo Bartolomeo
Margherita Lena (morta nel 1449, moglie di Felice Brancacci) Ginevra Jacopa
(moglie di Giovanni di Paolo Rucellai) Tancia. In tarda età si sposò con una
figlia di Felice Brancacci, che lo seguì a Padova. I suoi discendenti si stabilirono in seguito
a Ferrara e diedero origine al ramo ferrarese degli Strozzi (quello di Tito
Vespasiano ed Ercole Strozzi).
Onorificenze Cavaliere dello Speron d'oro - nastrino per uniforme
ordinaria Cavaliere dello Speron d'oro Bibliografia Marcello Vannucci, Le
grandi famiglie di Firenze, Roma, Newton Compton Editori, 2006. ISBN
88-8289-531-9 Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons
contiene immagini o altri file su Palla Strozzi Collegamenti esterni G.
Reichenbach, «STROZZI, Palla», in Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1936. Roberto Palmarocchi, «La famiglia STROZZI»,
in Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1936.
Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 32432314 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 4346 1318 · LCCN
(EN) no91009565 · GND (DE) 104350172 · CERL cnp00369282 · WorldCat Identities
(EN) lccn-no91009565 Biografie Portale Biografie Storia Portale Storia
Categorie: Banchieri italianiPolitici italiani del XIV secoloPolitici italiani
del XV secoloLetterati italianiNati nel 1372Morti nel 1462Morti il 18
maggioNati a FirenzeMorti a PadovaUmanisti italianiCollezionisti d'arte
italianiStrozziCavalieri dello Speron d'oro[altre]. Refs.:Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Strozzi -- Grecian,
Griceian," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa
Grice, Liguria, Italia.
structuratum: mid-15c.,
"action or process of building or construction;" 1610s, "that
which is constructed, a building or edifice;" from Latin structura "a
fitting together, adjustment; a building, mode of building;" figuratively,
"arrangement, order," from structus, past participle of struere
"to pile, place together, heap up; build, assemble, arrange, make by
joining together," related to strues "heap," from PIE *streu-,
extended form of root *stere- "to spread.” structuralism, a
distinctive yet extremely wide range of productive research conducted in the
social and human sciences from the 0s through the 0s, principally in France. It
is difficult to describe structuralism as a movement, because of the
methodological constraints exercised by the various disciplines that came to be
influenced by structuralism e.g.,
anthropology, philosophy, literary theory, psychoanalysis, political theory,
even mathematics. Nonetheless, structuralism is generally held to derive its organizing
principles from the early twentieth-century work of Saussure, the founder of
structural linguistics. Arguing against the prevailing historicist and
philological approaches to linguistics, he proposed a “scientific” model of
language, one understood as a closed system of elements and rules that account
for the production and the social communication of meaning. Inspired by
Durkheim’s notion of a “social fact”
that domain of objectivity wherein the psychological and the social
orders converge Saussure viewed language
as the repository of discursive signs shared by a given linguistic community.
The particular sign is composed of two elements, a phonemic signifier, or
distinctive sound element, and a corresponding meaning, or signified element.
The defining relation between the sign’s sound and meaning components is held
to be arbitrary, i.e., based on conventional association, and not due to any
function of the speaking subject’s personal inclination, or to any external
consideration of reference. What lends specificity or identity to each
particular signifier is its differential relation to the other signifiers in
the greater set; hence, each basic unit of language is itself the product of
differences between other elements within the system. This principle of
differential and structural relation was extended by Troubetzkoy to the
order of phonemes, whereby a defining set of vocalic differences underlies the
constitution of all linguistic phonemes. Finally, for Saussure, the closed set
of signs is governed by a system of grammatical, phonemic, and syntactic rules.
Language thus derives its significance from its own autonomous organization,
and this serves to guarantee its communicative function. Since language is the
foremost instance of social sign systems in general, the structural account
might serve as an exemplary model for understanding the very intelligibility of
social systems as such hence, its
obvious relevance to the broader concerns of the social and human sciences.
This implication was raised by Saussure himself, in his Course on General
Linguistics6, but it was advanced dramatically by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss who is generally acknowledged to be the
founder of modern structuralism in his
extensive analyses in the area of social anthropology, beginning with his
Elementary Structures of Kinship 9. Lévi-Strauss argued that society is itself
organized according to one form or another of significant communication and
exchange whether this be of information,
knowledge, or myths, or even of its members themselves. The organization of
social phenomena could thus be clarified through a detailed elaboration of
their subtending structures, which, collectively, testify to a deeper and
all-inclusive, social rationality. As with the analysis of language, these
social structures would be disclosed, not by direct observation, but by
inference and deduction from the observed empirical data. Furthermore, since
these structures are models of specific relations, which in turn express the
differential properties of the component elements under investigation, the
structural analysis is both readily formalizable and susceptible to a broad
variety of applications. In Britain, e.g., Edmund Leach pursued these analyses
in the domain of social anthropology; in the United States, Chomsky applied
insights of structuralism to linguistic theory and philosophy of mind; in
Italy, Eco conducted extensive structuralist analyses in the fields of social
and literary semiotics. With its acknowledgment that language is a
rule-governed social system of signs, and that effective communication depends
on the resources available to the speaker from within the codes of language
itself, the structuralist approach tends to be less preoccupied with the more
traditional considerations of “subjectivity” and “history” in its treatment of
meaningful discourse. In the post-structuralism that grew out of this approach,
the philosopher Foucault, e.g., focused
on the generation of the “subject” by the various epistemic discourses of
imitation and representation, as well as on the institutional roles of
knowledge and power in producing and conserving particular “disciplines” in the
natural and social sciences. These disciplines, Foucault suggested, in turn
govern our theoretical and practical notions of madness, criminality,
punishment, sexuality, etc., notions that collectively serve to “normalize” the
individual subject to their determinations. Likewise, in the domain of
psychoanalysis, Lacan drew on the work of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss to
emphasize Freud’s concern with language and to argue that, as a set of
determining codes, language serves to structure the subject’s very unconscious.
Problematically, however, it is the very dynamism of language, including
metaphor, metonymy, condensation, displacement, etc., that introduces the
social symbolic into the constitution of the subject. Althusser applied the
principles of structuralist methodology to his analysis of Marxism, especially
the role played by contradiction in understanding infrastructural and
superstructural formation, i.e., for the constitution of the historical
dialectic. His account followed Marx’s rejection of Feuerbach, at once denying
the role of traditional subjectivity and humanism, and presenting a
“scientific” analysis of “historical materialism,” one that would be
anti-historicist in principle but attentive to the actual political state of
affairs. For Althusser, such a philosophical analysis helped provide an
“objective” discernment to the historical transformation of social reality. The
restraint the structuralists extended toward the traditional views of
subjectivity and history dramatically colored their treatment both of the
individuals who are agents of meaningful discourse and of the linguistically
articulable object field in general. This redirection of research interests
particularly in France, due to the influential work of Barthes and Michel
Serres in the fields of poetics, cultural semiotics, and communication theory
has resulted in a series of original analyses and also provoked lively debates
between the adherents of structuralist methodology and the more conventionally
oriented schools of thought e.g., phenomenology, existentialism, Marxism, and
empiricist and positivist philosophies of science. These debates served as an
agency to open up subsequent discussions on deconstruction and postmodernist
theory for the philosophical generation of the 0s and later. These
post-structuralist thinkers were perhaps less concerned with the organization
of social phenomena than with their initial constitution and subsequent
dynamics. Hence, the problematics of the subject and history or, in broader terms, temporality itself were again engaged. The new discussions were
abetted by a more critical appraisal of language and tended to be antiHegelian
in their rejection of the totalizing tendency of systematic metaphysics.
Heidegger’s critique of traditional metaphysics was one of the major influences
in the discussions following structuralism, as was the reexamination of
Nietzsche’s earlier accounts of “genealogy,” his antiessentialism, and his
teaching of a dynamic “will to power.” Additionally, many poststructuralist
philosophers stressed the Freudian notions of the libido and the unconscious as
determining factors in understanding not only the subject, but the deep
rhetorical and affective components of language use. An astonishing variety of
philosophers and critics engaged in the debates initially framed by the
structuralist thinkers of the period, and their extended responses and critical
reappraisals formed the vibrant, poststructuralist period of intellectual life. Such figures as Ricoeur,
Emmanuel Levinas, Kristeva, Maurice Blanchot, Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Félix
Guattari, Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Philippe LacoueLabarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy,
and Irigaray inaugurated a series of contemporary reflections that have become
international in scope. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The structure of structure.” .
subiectum: sub-iectum – sub-iectificatio -- subjectification: Grice
is right in distinguishing this from nominalization, because not all
nominalization takes the subject position. Grice plays with this. It is a
derivation of the ‘subjectum,’ which Grice knows it is Aristotelian. Liddell
and Scott have the verb first, and the neuter singular later. “τὸ ὑποκείμενον,”
Liddell and Scott note “has three main applications.” The first is “to the
matter (hyle) which underlies the form (eidos), as opp. To both “εἶδος” and
“ἐντελέχεια” Met. 983a30; second, to the substantia (hyle + morphe) which
underlies the accidents, and as opposed to “πάθη,” and “συμβεβηκότα,” as in
Cat. 1a20,27 and Met.1037b16, 983b16; third, and this is the use that
‘linguistic’ turn Grice and Strawson are interested in, “to the logical subject
to which attributes are ascribed,” and here opp. “τὸ κατηγορούμενον,” (which
would be the ‘praedicatum’), as per Cat.1b10,21, Ph.189a31. If Grice uses
Kiparsky’s factive, he is also using ‘nominalisation’ as grammarians use it.
Refs.: Grice, “Reply to Richards,” in PGRICE, also BANC. subjectivism: When
Grice speaks of the subjective condition on intention, he is using ‘subject,’
in a way a philosophical psychologist would. He does not mean Kant’s
transcendental subject or ego. Grice means the simpler empiricist subject,
personal identity, or self. The choice is unfelicitious in that ‘subject’
contrasts with ‘object.’ So when he speaks of a ‘subjective’ person he means an
‘ego-centric’ condition, or a self-oriented condition, or an agent-oriented
condition, or an ‘utterer-oriented’ or ‘utterer-relative’ condition. But this
is tricky. His example: “Nixon should get that chair of theology.” The utterer
may have to put into Nixon’s shoes. He has to perceive Nixon as a PERSON, a
rational agent, with views of his own. So, the philosophical psychologist that
Grice is has to think of a conception of the self by the self, and the
conception of the other by the self. Wisdom used to talk of ‘other minds;’
Grice might speak of other souls. Grice was concerned with intending folloed by
a that-clause. Jeffrey defines desirability as doxastically modified. It is
entirely possible for someone to desire the love that he already has. It is
what he thinks that matters. Cf. his dispositional account to intending. A
Subjectsive condition takes into account the intenders, rather than the
ascribers, point of view: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt. Everest on
hands and knees. Bloggs might reason: Given my present state, I should do
what is fun. Given my present state, the best thing for me to do would be
to do what is fun. For me in my present state it would make for my
well-being, to have fun. Having fun is good, or, a good. Climbing a
mountain would be fun. Climbing the Everest would be/make for climbing
fun. So, I shall climb the Everest. Even if a critic insisted that a
practical syllogism is the way to represent Bloggs finding something to be
appealing, and that it should be regarded as a respectable evaluation, the
assembled propositions dont do the work of a standard argument. The premises do
not support or yield the conclusion as in a standard argument. The premises may
be said to yield the conclusion, or directive, for the particular agent whose
reasoning process it is, only on the basis of a Subjectsive condition:
that the agent is in a certain Subjectsive state, e.g. feels like going out for
dinner-fun. Rational beings (the agent at some other time, or other
individuals) who do not have that feeling, will not accept the conclusion. They
may well accept as true. It is fun to climb Everest, but will not accept it as
a directive unless they feel like it now. Someone wondering what to do for the
summer might think that if he were to climb Everest he would find it fun or
pleasant, but right now she does not feel like it. That is in general the end
of the matter. The alleged argument lacks normativity. It is not authoritative
or directive unless there is a supportive argument that he needs/ought to do
something diverting/pleasant in the summer. A practical argument is different.
Even if an agent did not feel like going to the doctor, an agent would think I
ought to have a medical check up yearly, now is the time, so I should see my
doctor to be a directive with some force. It articulates a practical
argument. Perhaps the strongest attempt to reconstruct an (acceptable or
rational) thought transition as a standard arguments is to
treat the Subjectsive condition, I feel like having climbing fun in the
summer, as a premise, for then the premises would support the conclusion. But
the individual, whose thought transition we are examining, does not regard a
description of his psychological state as a consideration that supports the
conclusion. It will be useful to look more closely at a variant of the
example to note when it is appropriate to reconstruct thinking in the form of
argument. Bloggs, now hiking with a friend in the Everest, comes to a
difficult spot and says: I dont like the look of that, I am frightened. I am
going back. That is usually enough for Bloggs to return, and for the friend
to turn back with him. Bloggss action of turning back, admittedly motivated by
fear, is, while not acting on reasons, nonetheless rational unless we judge his
fear to be irrational. Bloggss Subjectsive condition can serve
as a premise, but only in a very different situation. Bloggs resorts to
reasons. Suppose that, while his friend does not think Bloggss fear irrational,
the friend still attempts to dissuade Bloggs from going back. After listening
and reflecting, Bloggs may say I am so frightened it is not worth it. I am not
enjoying this climbing anymore. Or I am too frightened to be able to safely go
on. Or I often climb the Everest and dont usually get frightened. The fact that
I am now is a good indication that this is a dangerous trail and I should turn
back. These are reasons, considerations implicitly backed by principles, and
they could be the initial motivations of someone. But in Bloggss case they
emerged when he was challenged by his friend. They do not express his initial
practical reasoning. Bloggs was frightened by the trail ahead, wanted to go
back, and didnt have any reason not to. Note that there is no general
rational requirement to always act on reasons, and no general truth that a
rational individual would be better off the more often he acted on
reasons. Faced with his friends objections, however, Bloggs needed
justification for acting on his fear. He reflected and found reason(s) to act
on his fear. Grice plays with Subjectsivity already in Prolegomena. Consider
the use of carefully. Surely we must include the agents own idea of this. Or
consider the use of phi and phi – surely we dont want the addressee to regard
himself under the same guise with which the utterer regards him. Or consider “Aspects”:
Nixon must be appointed professor of theology at Oxford. Does he feel the need?
Grice raises the topic of Subjectsivity again in the Kant lectures just after
his discussion of mode, in a sub-section entitled, Modalities: relative and
absolute. He finds the topic central for his æqui-vocality thesis: Subjectsive
conditions seem necessary to both practical and alethic considerations. Refs.:
The source is his essay on intentions and the subjective condition, The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC. The subject: hypokeimenon -- When Frege turned from ‘term logic’
to ‘predicate logic’ “he didn’t know what he was doing.” Cf. Oxonian
nominalization. Grice plays a lot on that. His presentation at the Oxford
Philosophical Society he entitled, in a very English way, as “Meaning” (echoing
Ogden and Richards). With his “Meaning, Revisited,” it seems more clearly that
he is nominalizing. Unless he means, “The essay “Meaning,” revisited,” – alla
Putnam making a bad joke on Ogden: “The meaning of ‘meaning’” – “ ‘Meaning,’
revisited” -- Grice is very familiar
with this since it’s the literal transliteration of Aristotle’s hypokeimenon,
opp. in a specific context, to the ‘prae-dicatum,’ or categoroumenon. And with
the same sort of ‘ambiguity,’ qua opposite a category of expression, thought,
or reality. In philosophical circles, one has to be especially aware of the
subject-object distinction (which belong in philosophical psychology) and the
thing which belongs in ontology. Of course there’s the substance (hypousia,
substantia), the essence, and the sumbebekon, accidens. So one has to be
careful. Grice expands on Strawson’s explorations here. Philosophy, to
underlie, as the foundation in which something else inheres, to be implied or
presupposed by something else, “ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων . . ὑ. τις ἴδιος οὐσία”
Pl.Prt.349b, cf. Cra.422d, R.581c, Ti.Locr.97e: τὸ ὑποκείμενον has three main
applications: (1) to the matter which underlies the form, opp. εἶδος,
ἐντελέχεια, Arist.Metaph.983a30; (2) to the substance (matter + form) which
underlies the accidents, opp. πάθη, συμβεβηκότα, Id.Cat.1a20,27,
Metaph.1037b16, 983b16; (3) to the logical subject to which attributes are
ascribed, opp. τὸ κατηγορούμενον, Id.Cat.1b10,21, Ph.189a31: applications (1)
and (2) are distinguished in Id.Metaph.1038b5, 1029a1-5, 1042a26-31: τὸ ὑ. is
occasionally used of what underlies or is presupposed in some other way, e. g.
of the positive termini presupposed by change, Id.Ph.225a3-7. b. exist, τὸ
ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον the external reality, Stoic.2.48, cf. Epicur.Ep.1pp.12,24 U.;
“φῶς εἶναι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖς ὑ. ἐπιπῖπτον” Aristarch. Sam. ap. Placit.1.15.5; “τὸ
κρῖνον τί τε φαίνεται μόνον καὶ τί σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔτι καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν
ὑπόκειται” S.E.M.7.143, cf. 83,90,91, 10.240; = ὑπάρχω, τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα
the existing state of affairs, Plb.11.28.2, cf. 11.29.1, 15.8.11,13, 3.31.6,
Eun.VSp.474 B.; “Τίτος ἐξ ὑποκειμένων ἐνίκα, χρώμενος ὁπλις μοῖς καὶ τάξεσιν
αἷς παρέλαβε” Plu.Comp.Phil.Flam.2; “τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ὑποκειμένης” Id.2.336b;
“ἐχομένου τοῦ προσιόντος λόγου ὡς πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον” A.D.Synt.122.17. c. ὁ
ὑ. ἐνιαυτός the year in question, D.S.11.75; οἱ ὑ. καιροί the time in question,
Id.16.40, Plb.2.63.6, cf. Plu.Comp.Sol.Publ.4; τοῦ ὑ. μηνός the current month,
PTeb.14.14 (ii B. C.), al.; ἐκ τοῦ ὑ. φόρου in return for a reduction from the
said rent, PCair.Zen.649.18 (iii B. C.); πρὸς τὸ ὑ. νόει according to the
context, Gp.6.11.7. Note that both Grice and Strawson oppose Quine’s Humeian
dogma that, since the subjectum is beyond comprehension, we can do with a
‘predicate’ calculus, only. Vide Strawson, “Subject and predicate in logic and
grammar.” Refs: H. P. Grice, Work on the categories with P. F. Strawson, The H.
P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c. subjectum – Grecian hypokeimenon – Grice’s
‘implying,’ qua nominalization, is a category shift, a subjectification, or
objectificiation. – We have ‘employ,’ ‘imply,’ and then ‘implication,’
‘implicature, and ‘implying’ Using the participles, we have the active voice
present implicans, the active voice future, implicaturum, and the passive
perfect ‘impicatum.’ subjectivism, any philosophical view that attempts to
understand in a subjective manner what at first glance would seem to be a class
of judgments that are objectively either true or false i.e., true or false independently of what we
believe, want, or hope. There are two ways of being a subjectivist. In the
first way, one can say that the judgments in question, despite first
appearances, are really judgments about our own attitudes, beliefs, emotions,
etc. In the second way, one can deny that the judgments are true or false at
all, arguing instead that they are disguised commands or expressions of
attitudes. In ethics, for example, a subjective view of the second sort is that
moral judgments are simply expressions of our positive and negative attitudes.
This is emotivism. Prescriptivism is also a subjective view of the second sort;
it is the view that moral judgments are really commands to say “X is good” is to say, details aside,
“Do X.” Views that make morality ultimately a matter of conventions or what we
or most people agree to can also be construed as subjective theories, albeit of
the first type. Subjectivism is not limited to ethics, however. According to a
subjective view of epistemic rationality, the standards of rational belief are
the standards that the individual or perhaps most members in the individual’s
community would approve of insofar as they are interested in believing those
propositions that are true and not believing those propositions that are false.
Similarly, phenomenalists can be regarded as proposing a subjective account of
material object statements, since according to them, such statements are best
understood as complex statements about the course of our experiences. -- -obiectum-abiectumm-exiectum
quartet, the: Grice: subject-object dichotomy, the distinction between
thinkers and what they think about. The distinction is not exclusive, since
subjects can also be objects, as in reflexive self-conscious thought, which
takes the subject as its intended object. The dichotomy also need not be an
exhaustive distinction in the strong sense that everything is either a subject
or an object, since in a logically possible world in which there are no
thinkers, there may yet be mind-independent things that are neither subjects
nor objects. Whether there are non-thinking things that are not objects of
thought in the actual world depends on whether or not it is sufficient in logic
to intend every individual thing by such thoughts and expressions as ‘We can
think of everything that exists’. The dichotomy is an interimplicative
distinction between thinkers and what they think about, in which each
presupposes the other. If there are no subjects, then neither are there objects
in the true sense, and conversely. A subjectobject dichotomy is acknowledged in
most Western philosophical traditions, but emphasized especially in Continental
philosophy, beginning with Kant, and carrying through idealist thought in
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. It is also prominent in intentionalist
philosophy, in the empirical psychology of Brentano, the object theory of
Meinong, Ernst Mally, and Twardowski, and the transcendental phenomenology of
Husserl. Subjectobject dichotomy is denied by certain mysticisms, renounced as
the philosophical fiction of duality, of which Cartesian mindbody dualism is a
particular instance, and criticized by mystics as a confusion that prevents
mind from recognizing its essential oneness with the world, thereby
contributing to unnecessary intellectual and moral dilemmas.
sub-ordination. Grice must be the only Oxonian
philosopher in postwar Oxford that realised the relevance of subordination.
Following J. C. Wilson, Grice notes that ‘if’ is a subordinating connective,
and the only one of the connectives which is not commutative. This gives Grice
the idea to consult Cook Wilson and develop his view of ‘interrogative
subordination.’ Who killed Cock Robin. If it was not the Hawk, it was the
Sparrow. It was not the Hawk. It was the Sparrow. What Grecian idiom is Romanesque
sub-ordinatio translating. The opposite is co-ordination. “And” and “or” are
coordinative particles. Interrogative coordination is provided by ‘or,’ but it
relates to yes/no questions. Interrogative subordination involves x-question.
WHO killed Cock Robin. The Grecians were syntactic and hypotactic. Varro uses
jungendi. is the same and wherefrom it is different, in relation to what
&c." It may well be doubted whether he has thus improved upon his
predecessors. Surely the discernment of sameness and difference is a function
necessarily belonging to soul and necessarily included in the catalogue of her
functions : yet Stallbaum's rendering excludes it from that catalogue. The fact
that we have ory hv $, not orcp ecri, does not really favour his view—"
with whatsoever a thing may be the same, she declares it the same.' I coincide
then with the other interpreters in regarding the whole sentence from orw t' hv
as indirect INTERROGATION SUBORDINATE interrogation subordinateto \iyeiThis
mistake in logic carries with it serious mistakes in trans lation. The clause
otw t av ti tovtov rj kcu otov hv erepov is made an indirect INTERROGATIVE
COORDINATE with itpbs o tC re pu£Aio-ra xai ottt? [ 39 ] k.t.\., which is
impossible. Stallbaum rightly makes the clause a substantive clause and subject
of elvai or £vp.f}aivei elvai. (3) eKao-ra is of course predicate with elvai to
this sthe question, ‘How many sugars would Tom like in his tea?’ is not
‘satisfied’ by the answer ‘Tom loves sugar’. It may well be true that Tom loves
sugar, but the question is not satisfied by that form of answer. Conversely the
answer ‘one spoonful’ satisfies the question, even though it might be the wrong
answer and leave the tea insufficiently sugary for the satisfaction of Tom’s
sweet tooth.
sub-perceptum: This relates to Stich and his sub-doxastic. For
Aristotle, “De An.,” the anima leads to the desideratum. Unlike in ‘phuta,’ or
vegetables, which are still ‘alive,’ (‘zoa’ – he had a problem with ‘sponges’
which were IN-animate, to him, most likely) In WoW:139, Grice refers to “the
pillar box seems red” as “SUB-PERCEPTUAL,” the first of a trio. The second is
the perceptual, “A perceives that the pillar box is red,” and the third, “The
pillar box is red.” He wishes to explore the truth-conditons of the
subperceptum, and although first in the list, is last in the analsysis. Grice
proposes: ‘The pillar box seems red” iff (1) the pillar box is red; (2) A
perceives that the pillar box is red; and (3) (1) causes (2). In this there is
a parallelism with his quasi-causal account of ‘know’ (and his caveat that
‘literally,’ we may just know that 2 + 2 = 4 (and such) (“Meaning Revisited). In
what he calls ‘accented sub-perceptum,’ the idea is that the U is choosing the
superceptum (“seems”) as opposed to his other obvious choices (“The pillar box
IS red,”) and the passive-voice version of the ‘perceptum’: “The pillar box IS
PERCEIVED red.” The ‘accent’ generates the D-or-D implicaturum: By uttering
“The pillar box seems red,” U IMPLICATES that it is denied that or doubted that
the pillar box is perceived red by U or that the pillar box is red. In this,
the accented version contrasts with the unaccented version where the implicaturum
is NOT generated, and the U remains uncommitted re: this doubt or denial implicaturum.
It is this uncommitment that will allow to disimplicate or cancel the implicaturum
should occasion arise. The reference Grice makes between the sub-perceptum and
the perceptum is grammatical, not psychological. Or else he may be meaning that
in uttering, “I perceive that the pillar box is red,” one needs to appeal to
Kant’s apperception of the ego. Refs.: Pecocke, Sense and content, Grice, BANC.
sub-perceptual -- subdoxastic, pertaining to states of mind postulated to
account for the production and character of certain apparently non-inferential
beliefs. These were first discussed by Stephen P. Stich in “Beliefs and
Subdoxastic States” 8. I may form the belief that you are depressed, e.g., on
the basis of subtle cues that I am unable to articulate. The psychological
mechanism responsible for this belief might be thought to harbor information
concerning these cues subdoxastically. Although subdoxastic states resemble
beliefs in certain respects they
incorporate intentional content, they guide behavior, they can bestow
justification on beliefs they differ
from fullyfledged doxastic states or beliefs in at least two respects. First,
as noted above, subdoxastic states may be largely inaccessible to
introspection; I may be unable to describe, even on reflection, the basis of my
belief that you are depressed. Second, subdoxastic states seem cut off
inferentially from an agent’s corpus of beliefs; my subdoxastic appreciation
that your forehead is creased may contribute to my believing that you are
depressed, but, unlike the belief that your forehead is creased, it need not,
in the presence of other beliefs, lead to further beliefs about your
visage.
subscriptum: Quine thought that Grice’s subscript device was
otiose, and that he would rather use brackets, or nothing, any day. Grice plays with various roots of ‘scriptum.’
He was bound to. Moore had showed that ‘good’ was not ‘descriptive.’ Grice
thinks it’s pseudo-descriptive. So here we have the first, ‘descriptum,’ where
what is meant is Griceian: By uttering the “The cat is on the mat” U means, by
his act of describing, that the cat is on the mat. Then there’s the
‘prae-scriptum.’ Oddly, Grice, when criticizing the ‘descriptive’ fallacy,
seldom mentions the co-relative ‘prescriptum.’ “Good” would be understood in
terms of a ‘prae-scriptum’ that appeals to his utterer’s intentions. Then
there’s the subscriptum. This may have various use, both in Grice. “I subscribe,”
and in the case of “Pegasus flies.” Where the utterer subscribes to his
ontological commitment. subscript device. Why does Grice think we NEED a
subscript device? Obviously, his wife would not use it. I mean, you cannot
pronounce a subscript device or a square-bracket device. So his point is
ironic. “Ordinary” language does not need it. But if Strawson and Quine are
going to be picky about stuff – ontological commitment, ‘existential
presupposition,’ let’s subscribe and bracket! Note that Quine’s response to
Grice is perfunctory: “Brackets would have done!” Grice considers a quartet of
utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack wants someone or
other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry him,
and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him.Grice notes that
there are clearly at least two possible readings of an utterance
like our (i): a first reading in which, as Grice puts it, (i) might be
paraphrased by (ii). A second reading is one in which it might be
paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv). Grice goes on to symbolize the
phenomenon in his own version of a first-order predicate calculus. Ja wants
that p becomes Wjap where ja stands for the individual constant Jack
as a super-script attached to the predicate standing for Jacks psychological
state or attitude. Grice writes: Using the apparatus of classical predicate
logic, we might hope to represent, respectively, the external reading and the
internal reading (involving an intentio secunda or intentio
obliqua) as (Ǝx)WjaFxja and Wja(Ǝx)Fxja. Grice then
goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this
second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an
intentio seconda.Grice notes: But suppose that Jack wants a specific
individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been deceived
into thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill,
though in fact Joe is an only child. The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill
with is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent. Let us
recall that Grices main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes,
emptiness! In these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i)
is true only on reading (vii), where the existential quantifier
occurs within the scope of the psychological-state or -attitude verb,
but we cannot now represent (ii) or (iii), with Jill being vacuous,
by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the
scope of the psychological-attitude verb, want, since [well,] Jill does
not really exist, except as a figment of Jacks imagination. In a manoeuver that
I interpret as purely intentionalist, and thus favouring by far Suppess over
Chomskys characterisation of Grice as a mere behaviourist, Grice hopes that
we should be provided with distinct representations
for two familiar readings of, now: Jack wants Jill to marry him and
Jack wants Jill to marry him. It is at this point that Grice applies a
syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted numerals, (ix) and (x), where
the numeric values merely indicate the order of introduction of the symbol to
which it is attached in a deductive schema for the predicate calculus in
question. Only the first formulation represents the internal reading (where ji
stands for Jill): W2ja4F1ji3ja4 and
W3ja4F2ji1ja4. Note
that in the second formulation, the individual constant for Jill, ji, is
introduced prior to want, – jis sub-script is 1, while Ws sub-script is the
higher numerical value 3. Grice notes: Given that Jill does not exist, only the
internal reading can be true, or alethically satisfactory. Grice sums up
his reflections on the representation of the opaqueness of a verb standing for
a psychological state or attitude like that expressed by wanting with one
observation that further marks him as an intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian
type. He is willing to allow for existential phrases in cases of vacuous
designata, provided they occur within opaque psychological-state or attitude
verbs, and he thinks that by doing this, he is being faithful to the richness
and exuberance of ordinary discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice
puts it, we should also have available to us also three neutral, yet distinct,
(Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs), as a philosopher
who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a generality!
Jill now becomes x. W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5, Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3, Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4. As Grice
notes, since in (xii) the individual variable x (ranging over Jill) does not
dominate the segment following the (Ǝx) quantifier, the formulation does not
display any existential or de re, force, and is suitable therefore for
representing the internal readings (ii) or (iii), if we have to allow, as we do
have, if we want to faithfully represent ordinary discourse, for the possibility
of expressing the fact that a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.
stupid. Grice loved Plato. They are considering
‘horseness.’ “I cannot see horeseness; I can see horses.” “You are the epitome
of stupidity.” “I cannot see stupidity. I see stupid.”
società
filosofia italiana
sub-gestum -- suggestio falsi – suggest. To suggest is
like to ‘insinuate,’ only different. The root involves a favourite with Grice,
‘a gesture.’ That gesture is very suggesture. Grice explores hint versus
suggest in Retrospective epilogue. Also cited by Strawson and Wiggins. The
emissor’s implication is exactly this suggestio, for which suggestum. To suggest, advise, prompt, offer, bring to mind: “quoties aequitas restitutionem suggerit,” Dig. 4,
6, 26 fin.; cf.: “quae (res) suggerit, ut Italicarum rerum esse credantur eae res,” reminds, admonishes, ib. 28, 5, 35 fin.: “quaedam de republicā,” Aur. Vict. Vir. Ill. 66, 2. — Absol.: “suggerente conjuge,” at the instigation of, Aur. Vict. Epit. 41, 11; cf.: “suggerente irā,” id. ib. 12, 10 suggestio falsi. Pl. suggestiones
falsi. [mod.L., = suggestion of what is false.] A misrepresentation
of the truth whereby something incorrect is implied to be true; an indirect
lie. Often in contexts with suppressio veri. QUOTES: 1815 H.
Maddock Princ. & Pract. Chancery I. 208 Whenever Suppressio veri or
Suggestio falsi occur..they afford a sufficient ground for setting aside any
Release or Conveyance. 1855 Newspaper & Gen. Reader's Pocket
Compan. i.4 He was bound to say that the suppressio veri on that occasion
approached very nearly to a positive suggestio falsi. 1898 Kipling
Stalky & Co. (1899) 36 It seems..that they had held back material
facts; that they were guilty both of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.
1907 W. de Morgan Alice-for-Short xxxvi. 389 That's suppressio veri
and suggestio falsi! Besides, it's fibs! 1962 J. Wilson Public
Schools & Private Practice i. 19 It is rare to find a positively
verifiable untruth in a school brochure: but it is equally rare not to find a
great many suggestiones falsi, particularly as regards the material comfort and
facilities available. 1980 D. Newsome On Edge of Paradise 7 There
are undoubted cases of suppressio veri; on the other hand, he appears to eschew
suggestio falsi. --- Fibs indeed. Suppress, suggest. Write:
"Griceland, Inc." "Yes, I agree to become a Doctor
in Gricean Studies" EXAM QUESTION: 1. Discuss suggestio
falsi in terms of detachability. 2. Compare suppresio veri and suggestion
falsi in connection with "The king of France is bald" uttered during
Napoleon's time. 3. Invent things for 'suppressio falsi' and 'suggestio
veri'. 4. No. You cannot go to the bathroom. -- sub-gestum -- suggestum: not necesarilyy ‘falsi.’ The verb is ‘to
suggest that…’ which is diaphanous. Note that the ‘su-‘ stands for ‘sub-‘ which
conveys the implicitness or covertness of the impicatum. Indirectness. It’s
‘under,’ not ‘above’ board.’ To suggest, advise, prompt, offer, bring to mind:
“quoties aequitas restitutionem suggerit,” Dig. 4, 6, 26 fin.; cf.: “quae (res)
suggerit, ut Italicarum rerum esse credantur eae res,” reminds, admonishes, ib.
28, 5, 35 fin.: “quaedam de republicā,” Aur. Vict. Vir. Ill. 66, 2. — Absol.:
“suggerente conjuge,” at the instigation of, Aur. Vict. Epit. 41, 11; cf.:
“suggerente irā,” id. ib. 12, 10.— The implicaturum is a suggestum – ALWAYS
cancellable. Or not? Sometimes not, if ‘reasonable,’ but not ‘rational.’ Jill
suggests that Jack is brave when she says, “He is an Englishman, he is;
therefore, brave.” The tommy suggests that her povery contrasts with her
honesty (“’Tis the same the whole world over.”) So the ‘suggestum’ is like the implicaturum.
A particular suggesta are ‘conversational suggestum.’ For Grice this is
philosophically important, because many philosophical adages cover ‘suggesta’
which are not part of the philosopher’s import! Vide Holdcroft, “Some forms of
indirect communication.”
substantia – hypostasis, the
process of regarding a concept or abstraction as an independent or real entity.
The verb forms ‘hypostatize’ and ‘reify’ designate the acts of positing objects
of a certain sort for the purposes of one’s theory. It is sometimes implied
that a fallacy is involved in so describing these processes or acts, as in
‘Plato was guilty of the reification of universals’. The issue turns largely on
criteria of ontological commitment. The exact Greek transliteration is “hypostasis” Arianism,
diverse but related teachings in early Christianity that subordinated the Son
to God the Father. In reaction the church developed its doctrine of the
Trinity, whereby the Son and Holy Spirit, though distinct persons hypostases,
share with the Father, as his ontological equals, the one being or substance
ousia of God. Arius taught in Alexandria, where, on the hierarchical model of
Middle Platonism, he sharply distinguished Scripture’s transcendent God from
the Logos or Son incarnate in Jesus. The latter, subject to suffering and
humanly obedient to God, is inferior to the immutable Creator, the object of
that obedience. God alone is eternal and ungenerated; the Son, divine not by
nature but by God’s choosing, is generated, with a beginning: the unique creature,
through whom all else is made. The Council of Nicea, in 325, condemned Arius
and favored his enemy Athanasius, affirming the Son’s creatorhood and full
deity, having the same being or substance homoousios as the Father. Arianism
still flourished, evolving into the extreme view that the Son’s being was
neither the same as the Father’s nor like it homoiousios, but unlike it
anomoios. This too was anathematized, by the Council of 381 at Constantinople,
which, ratifying what is commonly called the Nicene Creed, sealed orthodox
Trinitarianism and the equality of the three persons against Arian
subordinationism.
Sub-positum
-- suppositum
– Cicero for ‘hypothesis’, as in ‘hypothetico-deductive’ – a
hypothetico-deductive method, a method of testing hypotheses. Thought to be
preferable to the method of enumerative induction, whose limitations had been
decisively demonstrated by Hume, the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method has
been viewed by many as the ideal scientific method. It is applied by
introducing an explanatory hypothesis resulting from earlier inductions, a
guess, or an act of creative imagination. The hypothesis is logically conjoined
with a statement of initial conditions. The purely deductive consequences of
this conjunction are derived as predictions, and the statements asserting them
are subjected to experimental or observational test. More formally, given (H •
A) P O, H is the hypothesis, A a statement of initial conditions, and O one of
the testable consequences of (H • A). If the hypothesis is ‘all lead is
malleable’, and ‘this piece of lead is now being hammered’ states the initial
conditions, it follows deductively that ‘this piece of lead will change shape’.
In deductive logic the schema is formally invalid, committing the logical
fallacy of affirming the consequent. But repeated occurrences of O can be said
to confirm the conjunction of H and A, or to render it more probable. On the
other hand, the schema is deductively valid (the argument form modus tollens).
For this reason, Karl Popper and his followers think that the H-D method is
best employed in seeking falsifications of theoretical hypotheses. Criticisms
of the method point out that infinitely many hypotheses can explain, in the H-D
mode, a given body of data, so that successful predictions are not probative,
and that (following Duhem) it is impossible to test isolated singular
hypotheses because they are always contained in complex theories any one of
whose parts is eliminable in the face of negative evidence.
sub-pressum
-- suppresum veri: This is a bit like
an act of omission – about which Urmson once asked, “Is that ‘to do,’ Grice?” –
Strictly, it is implicatural. “Smith has a beautiful handwriting.” Grice’s
abductum: “He must be suppressing some ‘veri,’ but surely the ‘suggestio falsi’
is cancellable. On the other hand, my abent-minded uncle, who ‘suppresses,’ is
not ‘implicating.’ The ‘suppressio’ has to be ‘intentional,’ as an ‘omission’
is. Since for the Romans, the ‘verum’ applied to a unity (alethic/practical)
this was good. No multiplication, but unity – cf. untranslatable (think) –
modality ‘the ‘must’, neutral – desideratum-doxa – think – Yes, when
Untranslatable discuss ‘vero’ they do say it applies to ‘factual’ and
sincerity, I think. At Collections, the expectation is that Grice gives a
report on the philosopher’s ability – not on
his handwriting. It is different when Grice applied to St. John’s. “He
doesn’t return library books.” G. Richardson. Why did he use this on two
occasions? In “Prolegomena,” he uses it for his desideratum of conversational
fortitude (“make a strong conversational move”). To suppress. suggestio falsi. Pl.
suggestiones falsi. [mod.L., = suggestion of what is false.] A
misrepresentation of the truth whereby something incorrect is implied to be
true; an indirect lie. Often in contexts with suppressio veri.
QUOTES: 1815 H. Maddock Princ. & Pract. Chancery I. 208
Whenever Suppressio veri or Suggestio falsi occur..they afford a sufficient
ground for setting aside any Release or Conveyance. 1855 Newspaper
& Gen. Reader's Pocket Compan. i.4 He was bound to say that the
suppressio veri on that occasion approached very nearly to a positive suggestio
falsi. 1898 Kipling Stalky & Co. (1899) 36 It seems..that
they had held back material facts; that they were guilty both of suppressio
veri and suggestio falsi. 1907 W. de Morgan Alice-for-Short xxxvi.
389 That's suppressio veri and suggestio falsi! Besides, it's
fibs! 1962 J. Wilson Public Schools & Private Practice i.
19 It is rare to find a positively verifiable untruth in a school
brochure: but it is equally rare not to find a great many suggestiones falsi,
particularly as regards the material comfort and facilities available.
1980 D. Newsome On Edge of Paradise 7 There are undoubted cases of
suppressio veri; on the other hand, he appears to eschew suggestio falsi.
--- Fibs indeed. Suppress, suggest. Write: "Griceland,
Inc." "Yes, I agree to become a Doctor in Gricean
Studies" EXAM QUESTION: 1. Discuss suggestio falsi in
terms of detachability. 2. Compare suppresio veri and suggestion falsi in
connection with "The king of France is bald" uttered during
Napoleon's time. 3. Invent things for 'suppressio falsi' and 'suggestio
veri'. 4. No. You cannot go to the bathroom.
super-knowing. In WoW. A notion Grice detested. Grice,
“I detest superknowing.” “For that reason, I propose a closure clause – for a
communicatum to count as one, there should not be any sneaky intention.” The
use of ‘super’ is Plotinian. If God is super-good, he is not good. If someobody
superknows, he doesn’t know. This is an implicaturum. Surely it is cancellable:
“God is supergood; therefore, He is good.” “Smith superknows that p; therefore,
Smith, as per a semantic entailment, knows that p.” Grice: “The implicature
arise out of the postulate of conversational fortitude: why stop at knowing if
you can claim that Smith superknows? Why say that God is love, when He is
super-love?”
Si –
Grice: “If Quine likes ‘vel’ to represent ‘or,’ I shall use ‘si’ to represent
‘if.’ -- “if”
– (Italian: “si”, Roman, “si”). Unlike Austin, Grice never was stuck with an
English expression. Part of his rationalism is that for an expression E, if E
is to be implicaturum, i.e. the vehicle of an ‘implicatum,’ there must be an
expression E2 that does the trick. Implicatura are non-detachable. You cannot
detach it from one expression and using another. Grice: “Whitehead lists ‘and,’
‘or,’ and ‘if,’ but had he known some classical languages, he would have noted,
as J. C. Wilson does, that ‘if’ is totally subordinating, and thus totally
non-commutative!” -- German “ob,” Latin, “si,” Grecian, “ei” -- conditional, a
compound sentence, such as ‘if Abe calls, then Ben answers,’ in which one
sentence, the antecedent, is connected to a second, the consequent, by the
connective ‘if . . . then’. Propositions statements, etc. expressed by
conditionals are called conditional propositions statements, etc. and, by
ellipsis, simply conditionals. The ambiguity of the expression ‘if . . . then’
gives rise to a semantic classification of conditionals into material
conditionals, causal conditionals, counterfactual conditionals, and so on. In
traditional logic, conditionals are called hypotheticals, and in some areas of
mathematical logic conditionals are called implications. Faithful analysis of
the meanings of conditionals continues to be investigated and intensely
disputed. conditional proof. 1 The
argument form ‘B follows from A; therefore, if A then B’ and arguments of this
form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer a conditional given a
derivation of its consequent from its antecedent. This is also known as the
rule of conditional proof or /- introduction. conditioning, a form of
associative learning that occurs when changes in thought or behavior are produced
by temporal relations among events. It is common to distinguish between two
types of conditioning; one, classical or Pavlovian, in which behavior change
results from events that occur before behavior; the other, operant or
instrumental, in which behavior change occurs because of events after behavior.
Roughly, classically and operantly conditioned behavior correspond to the
everyday, folk-psychological distinction between involuntary and voluntary or
goaldirected behavior. In classical conditioning, stimuli or events elicit a
response e.g., salivation; neutral stimuli e.g., a dinner bell gain control
over behavior when paired with stimuli that already elicit behavior e.g., the
appearance of dinner. The behavior is involuntary. In operant conditioning, stimuli
or events reinforce behavior after behavior occurs; neutral stimuli gain power
to reinforce by being paired with actual reinforcers. Here, occasions in which
behavior is reinforced serve as discriminative stimuli-evoking behavior.
Operant behavior is goal-directed, if not consciously or deliberately, then
through the bond between behavior and reinforcement. Thus, the arrangement of
condiments at dinner may serve as the discriminative stimulus evoking the
request “Please pass the salt,” whereas saying “Thank you” may reinforce the
behavior of passing the salt. It is not easy to integrate conditioning
phenomena into a unified theory of conditioning. Some theorists contend that
operant conditioning is really classical conditioning veiled by subtle temporal
relations among events. Other theorists contend that operant conditioning
requires mental representations of reinforcers and discriminative stimuli. B.
F. Skinner 4 90 argued in Walden Two 8 that astute, benevolent behavioral
engineers can and should use conditioning to create a social utopia. conditio sine qua non Latin, ‘a condition
without which not’, a necessary condition; something without which something
else could not be or could not occur. For example, being a plane figure is a
conditio sine qua non for being a triangle. Sometimes the phrase is used
emphatically as a synonym for an unconditioned presupposition, be it for an
action to start or an argument to get going. I.Bo. Condorcet, Marquis de, title
of Marie-JeanAntoine-Nicolas de Caritat 174394,
philosopher and political theorist who contributed to the Encyclopedia
and pioneered the mathematical analysis of social institutions. Although
prominent in the Revolutionary government, he was denounced for his political
views and died in prison. Condorcet discovered the voting paradox, which shows
that majoritarian voting can produce cyclical group preferences. Suppose, for
instance, that voters A, B, and C rank proposals x, y, and z as follows: A:
xyz, B: yzx, and C: zxy. Then in majoritarian voting x beats y and y beats z,
but z in turn beats x. So the resulting group preferences are cyclical. The
discovery of this problem helped initiate social choice theory, which evaluates
voting systems. Condorcet argued that any satisfactory voting system must guarantee
selection of a proposal that beats all rivals in majoritarian competition. Such
a proposal is called a Condorcet winner. His jury theorem says that if voters
register their opinions about some matter, such as whether a defendant is
guilty, and the probabilities that individual voters are right are greater than
½, equal, and independent, then the majority vote is more likely to be correct
than any individual’s or minority’s vote. Condorcet’s main works are Essai sur
l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la
pluralité des voix Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of
Decisions Reached by a Majority of Votes, 1785; and a posthumous treatise on
social issues, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain
Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, 1795. “if” corresponding conditional of a given
argument, any conditional whose antecedent is a logical conjunction of all of
the premises of the argument and whose consequent is the conclusion. The two
conditionals, ‘if Abe is Ben and Ben is wise, then Abe is wise’ and ‘if Ben is
wise and Abe is Ben, then Abe is wise’, are the two corresponding conditionals
of the argument whose premises are ‘Abe is Ben’ and ‘Ben is wise’ and whose
conclusion is ‘Abe is wise’. For a one-premise argument, the corresponding
conditional is the conditional whose antecedent is the premise and whose
consequent is the conclusion. The limiting cases of the empty and infinite
premise sets are treated in different ways by different logicians; one simple
treatment considers such arguments as lacking corresponding conditionals. The
principle of corresponding conditionals is that in order for an argument to be
valid it is necessary and sufficient for all its corresponding conditionals to
be tautological. The commonly used expression ‘the corresponding conditional of
an argument’ is also used when two further stipulations are in force: first,
that an argument is construed as having an ordered sequence of premises rather
than an unordered set of premises; second, that conjunction is construed as a
polyadic operation that produces in a unique way a single premise from a
sequence of premises rather than as a dyadic operation that combines premises
two by two. Under these stipulations the principle of the corresponding
conditional is that in order for an argument to be valid it is necessary and
sufficient for its corresponding conditional to be valid. These principles are
closely related to modus ponens, to conditional proof, and to the so-called
deduction theorem. “if” counterfactuals,
also called contrary-to-fact conditionals, subjunctive conditionals that
presupcorner quotes counterfactuals pose the falsity of their antecedents, such
as ‘If Hitler had invaded England, G.y would have won’ and ‘If I were you, I’d
run’. Conditionals or hypothetical statements are compound statements of the
form ‘If p, then q’, or equivalently ‘q if p’. Component p is described as the
antecedent protasis and q as the consequent apodosis. A conditional like ‘If
Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did’ is called indicative,
because both the antecedent and consequent are in the indicative mood. One like
‘If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then someone else would have’ is subjunctive.
Many subjunctive and all indicative conditionals are open, presupposing nothing
about the antecedent. Unlike ‘If Bob had won, he’d be rich’, neither ‘If Bob
should have won, he would be rich’ nor ‘If Bob won, he is rich’ implies that
Bob did not win. Counterfactuals presuppose, rather than assert, the falsity of
their antecedents. ‘If Reagan had been president, he would have been famous’
seems inappropriate and out of place, but not false, given that Reagan was
president. The difference between counterfactual and open subjunctives is less
important logically than that between subjunctives and indicatives. Whereas the
indicative conditional about Kennedy is true, the subjunctive is probably
false. Replace ‘someone’ with ‘no one’ and the truth-values reverse. The most
interesting logical feature of counterfactuals is that they are not
truth-functional. A truth-functional compound is one whose truth-value is
completely determined in every possible case by the truth-values of its
components. For example, the falsity of ‘The President is a grandmother’ and
‘The President is childless’ logically entails the falsity of ‘The President is
a grandmother and childless’: all conjunctions with false conjuncts are false.
But whereas ‘If the President were a grandmother, the President would be
childless’ is false, other counterfactuals with equally false components are
true, such as ‘If the President were a grandmother, the President would be a
mother’. The truth-value of a counterfactual is determined in part by the
specific content of its components. This property is shared by indicative and
subjunctive conditionals generally, as can be seen by varying the wording of
the example. In marked contrast, the material conditional, p / q, of modern
logic, defined as meaning that either p is false or q is true, is completely
truth-functional. ‘The President is a grandmother / The President is childless’
is just as true as ‘The President is a grandmother / The President is a
mother’. While stronger than the material conditional, the counterfactual is
weaker than the strict conditional, p U q, of modern modal logic, which says
that p / q is necessarily true. ‘If the switch had been flipped, the light
would be on’ may in fact be true even though it is possible for the switch to have
been flipped without the light’s being on because the bulb could have burned
out. The fact that counterfactuals are neither strict nor material conditionals
generated the problem of counterfactual conditionals raised by Chisholm and
Goodman: What are the truth conditions of a counterfactual, and how are they
determined by its components? According to the “metalinguistic” approach, which
resembles the deductive-nomological model of explanation, a counterfactual is
true when its antecedent conjoined with laws of nature and statements of
background conditions logically entails its consequent. On this account, ‘If
the switch had been flipped the light would be on’ is true because the
statement that the switch was flipped, plus the laws of electricity and statements
describing the condition and arrangement of the circuitry, entail that the
light is on. The main problem is to specify which facts are “fixed” for any
given counterfactual and context. The background conditions cannot include the
denials of the antecedent or the consequent, even though they are true, nor
anything else that would not be true if the antecedent were. Counteridenticals,
whose antecedents assert identities, highlight the difficulty: the background
for ‘If I were you, I’d run’ must include facts about my character and your
situation, but not vice versa. Counterlegals like ‘Newton’s laws would fail if
planets had rectangular orbits’, whose antecedents deny laws of nature, show
that even the set of laws cannot be all-inclusive. Another leading approach
pioneered by Robert C. Stalnaker and David K. Lewis extends the possible worlds
semantics developed for modal logic, saying that a counterfactual is true when
its consequent is true in the nearest possible world in which the antecedent is
true. The counterfactual about the switch is true on this account provided a
world in which the switch was flipped and the light is on is closer to the
actual world than one in which the switch was flipped but the light is not on.
The main problem is to specify which world is nearest for any given
counterfactual and context. The difference between indicative and subjunctive
conditionals can be accounted for in terms of either a different set of
background conditions or a different measure of nearness. counterfactuals
counterfactuals Counterfactuals turn
up in a variety of philosophical contexts. To distinguish laws like ‘All copper
conducts’ from equally true generalizations like ‘Everything in my pocket
conducts’, some have observed that while anything would conduct if it were
copper, not everything would conduct if it were in my pocket. And to have a
disposition like solubility, it does not suffice to be either dissolving or not
in water: it must in addition be true that the object would dissolve if it were
in water. It has similarly been suggested that one event is the cause of
another only if the latter would not have occurred if the former had not; that
an action is free only if the agent could or would have done otherwise if he
had wanted to; that a person is in a particular mental state only if he would
behave in certain ways given certain stimuli; and that an action is right only
if a completely rational and fully informed agent would choose it. “If the cat
is on the mat, she is purring.” INDICATIVE PLUS INDICATIVE – “Subjective ‘if’
is a different animal as Julius Caesar well knew!” -- Refs: “If and Macaulay.”
iff: Grice: “a silly
abbreviation for ‘if and only if’” -- that is used as if it were a single
propositional operator (connective). Another synonym for ‘iff’ is ‘just in
case’. The justification for treating ‘iff’ as if it were a single
propositional connective is that ‘P if and only if Q’ is elliptical for ‘P if
Q, and P only if Q’, and this assertion is logically equivalent to ‘P
biconditional Q’.
sublime: sub-lime, neuter. sublīmie (collat.
form sublīmus , a, um: ex sublimo vertice, Cic. poët. Tusc. 2, 7, 19; Enn. ap.
Non. 169; Att. and Sall. ib. 489, 8 sq.; Lucr. 1, 340), adj. etym. dub.; perh.
sub-limen, up to the lintel; cf. sublimen (sublimem est in altitudinem elatum,
Fest. p. 306 Müll.), I.uplifted, high, lofty, exalted, elevated (mostly poet.
and in postAug. prose; not in Cic. or Cæs.; syn.: editus, arduus, celsus,
altus). I. Lit. A. In gen., high, lofty: “hic vertex nobis semper sublimis,”
Verg. G. 1, 242; cf. Hor. C. 1, 1, 36: “montis cacumen,” Ov. M. 1, 666:
“tectum,” id. ib. 14, 752: “columna,” id. ib. 2, 1: “atrium,” Hor. C. 3, 1, 46:
“arcus (Iridis),” Plin. 2, 59, 60, § 151: “portae,” Verg. A. 12, 133: “nemus,”
Luc. 3, 86 et saep.: os, directed upwards (opp. to pronus), Ov. M. 1, 85; cf.
id. ib. 15, 673; Hor. A. P. 457: “flagellum,” uplifted, id. C. 3, 26, 11:
“armenta,” Col. 3, 8: “currus,” Liv. 28, 9.—Comp.: “quanto sublimior Atlas
Omnibus in Libyā sit montibus,” Juv. 11, 24.—Sup.: “triumphans in illo
sublimissimo curru,” Tert. Apol. 33.— B. Esp., borne aloft, uplifted, elevated,
raised: “rapite sublimem foras,” Plaut. Mil. 5, 1: “sublimem aliquem rapere
(arripere, auferre, ferre),” id. As. 5, 2, 18; id. Men. 5, 7, 3; 5, 7, 6; 5, 7,
13; 5, 8, 3; Ter. And. 5, 2, 20; id. Ad. 3, 2, 18; Verg. A. 5, 255; 11, 722 (in
all these passages others read sublimen, q. v.); Ov. M 4, 363 al.: “campi armis
sublimibus ardent,” borne aloft, lofty, Verg. A. 11, 602: sublimes in equis
redeunt, id. ib. 7, 285: “apparet liquido sublimis in aëre Nisus,” id. G. 1,
404; cf.: “ipsa (Venus) Paphum sublimis abit,” on high through the air, id. A.
1, 415: “sublimis abit,” Liv. 1, 16; 1, 34: “vehitur,” Ov. M. 5, 648 al.— C. On
high, lofty, in a high position: “tenuem texens sublimis aranea telum,” Cat.
68, 49: “juvenem sublimem stramine ponunt,” Verg. A. 11, 67: “sedens solio
sublimis avito,” Ov. M. 6, 650: “Tyrio jaceat sublimis in ostro,” id. H. 12,
179.— D. Subst.: sublīme , is, n., height; sometimes to be rendered the air:
“piro per lusum in sublime jactato,” Suet. Claud. 27; so, in sublime, Auct. B.
Afr. 84, 1; Plin. 10, 38, 54, § 112; 31, 6, 31, § 57: “per sublime volantes
grues,” id. 18, 35, 87, § 362: “in sublimi posita facies Dianae,” id. 36, 5, 4,
§ 13: “ex sublimi devoluti,” id. 27, 12, 105, § 129.—Plur.: “antiquique memor
metuit sublimia casus,” Ov. M. 8, 259: “per maria ac terras sublimaque caeli,”
Lucr. 1, 340.— II. Trop., lofty, exalted, eminent, distinguished. A. In gen.:
“antiqui reges ac sublimes viri,” Varr. R. R. 2, 4, 9; cf. Luc. 10, 378:
“mens,” Ov. P. 3, 3, 103: “pectora,” id. F. 1, 301: “nomen,” id. Tr. 4, 10,
121: “sublimis, cupidusque et amata relinquere pernix,” aspiring, Hor. A. P.
165; cf.: “nil parvum sapias et adhuc sublimia cures,” id. Ep. 1, 12,
15.—Comp.: “quā claritate nihil in rebus humanis sublimius duco,” Plin. 22, 5,
5, § 10; Juv. 8, 232.—Sup.: “sancimus supponi duos sublimissimos judices,” Cod.
Just. 7, 62, 39.— B. In partic., of language, lofty, elevated, sublime (freq.
in Quint.): “sublimia carmina,” Juv. 7, 28: “verbum,” Quint. 8, 3, 18: “clara
et sublimia verba,” id. ib.: “oratio,” id. 8, 3, 74: “genus dicendi,” id. 11,
1, 3: “actio (opp. causae summissae),” id. 11, 3, 153: “si quis sublimia
humilibus misceat,” id. 8, 3, 60 et saep.—Transf., of orators, poets, etc.:
“natura sublimis et acer,” Hor. Ep. 2, 1, 165: “sublimis et gravis et
grandiloquus (Aeschylus),” Quint. 10, 1, 66: “Trachalus plerumque sublimis,”
id. 10, 1, 119.—Comp.: “sublimior gravitas Sophoclis,” Quint. 10, 1, 68:
“sublimius aliquid,” id. 8, 3, 14: “jam sublimius illud pro Archiā, Saxa atque
solitudines voci respondent,” id. 8, 3, 75.—Hence, advv. 1. Lit., aloft,
loftily, on high. (α). Form sub-līmĭter (rare ): “stare,” upright, Cato, R. R.
70, 2; so id. ib. 71: “volitare,” Col. 8, 11, 1: “munitur locus,” id. 8, 15,
1.— (β). Form sub-līme (class. ): “Theodori nihil interest, humine an sublime
putescat,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 43, 102; cf.: “scuta, quae fuerant sublime fixa, sunt
humi inventa,” id. Div. 2, 31, 67: “volare,” Lucr. 2, 206; 6, 97: “ferri,” Cic.
Tusc. 1, 17, 40; id. N. D. 2, 39, 101; 2, 56, 141 Orell. N. cr.: “elati,” Liv.
21, 30: “expulsa,” Verg. G. 1, 320 et saep.— b. Comp.: “sublimius altum
Attollit caput,” Ov. Hal. 69.— 2. Trop., of speech, in a lofty manner, loftily
(very rare): “alia sublimius, alia gravius esse dicenda,” Quint. 9, 4, 130.
Grice’s favoured translation of Grecian ‘hypsos’ -- a feeling brought about by
objects that are infinitely large or vast such as the heavens or the ocean or
overwhelmingly powerful such as a raging torrent, huge mountains, or
precipices. The former in Kant’s terminology is the mathematically sublime and
the latter the dynamically sublime. Though the experience of the sublime is to
an important extent unpleasant, it is also accompanied by a certain pleasure:
we enjoy the feeling of being overwhelmed. On Kant’s view, this pleasure
results from an awareness that we have powers of reason that are not dependent
on sensation, but that legislate over sense. The sublime thus displays both the
limitations of sense experience and hence our feeling of displeasure and the
power of our own mind and hence the feeling of pleasure. The sublime was an
especially important concept in the aesthetic theory of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Reflection on it was stimulated by the appearance of a
translation of Longinus’s Peri hypsous On the Sublime in 1674. The “postmodern
sublime” has in addition emerged in late twentieth century thought as a basis
for raising questions about art. Whereas beauty is associated with that whose
form can be apprehended, the sublime is associated with the formless, that
which is “unpresentable” in sensation. Thus, it is connected with critiques of
“the aesthetic” understood as that which
is sensuously present as a way of
understanding what is important about art. It has also been given a political
reading, where the sublime connects with resistance to rule, and beauty
connects with conservative acceptance of existing forms or structures of
society.
subsidiarium: sub-sidiarium -- subsidiarity, a basic principle of
social order and the common good governing the relations between the higher and
lower associations in a political community. Positively, the principle of
subsidiarity holds that the common good, i.e., the ensemble of social resources
and institutions that facilitate human self-realization, depends on fostering
the free, creative initiatives of individuals and of their voluntary
associations; thus, the state, in addition to its direct role in maintaining
public good which comprises justice, public peace, and public morality also has
an indirect role in promoting other aspects of the common good by rendering
assistance subsidium to those individuals and associations whose activities
facilitate cooperative human self-realization in work, play, the arts,
sciences, and religion. Negatively, the principle of subsidiarity holds that
higher-level i.e., more comprehensive associations while they must monitor, regulate, and
coordinate ought not to absorb, replace,
or undermine the free initiatives and activities of lower-level associations
and individuals insofar as these are not contrary to the common good. This
presumption favoring free individual and social initiative has been defended on
various grounds, such as the inefficiency of burdening the state with myriad
local concerns, as well as the corresponding efficiency of unleashing the free,
creative potential of subordinate groups and individuals who build up the
shared economic, scientific, and artistic resources of society. But the deeper
ground for this presumption is the view subjunctive conditional subsidiarity
886 886 that human flourishing depends
crucially on freedom for individual self-direction and for the self-government
of voluntary associations and that human beings flourish best through their own
personal and cooperative initiatives rather than as the passive consumers or
beneficiaries of the initiatives of others.
subsistum: sub-sistum -- subsistence translation of G. Bestand,
in current philosophy, especially Meinong’s system, the kind of being that
belongs to “ideal” objects such as mathematical objects, states of affairs, and
abstractions like similarity and difference. By contrast, the kind of being
that belongs to “real” wirklich objects, things of the sorts investigated by
the sciences other than psychology and pure mathematics, is called existence
Existenz. Existence and subsistence together exhaust the realm of being Sein.
So, e.g., the subsistent ideal figures whose properties are investigated by
geometers do not exist they are nowhere
to be found in the real world but it is
no less true of them that they have being than it is of an existent physical
object: there are such figures. Being does not, however, exhaust the realm of
objects or things. The psychological phenomenon of intentionality shows that
there are in some sense of ‘there are’ objects that neither exist nor subsist.
Every intentional state is directed toward an object. Although one may covet
the Hope Diamond or desire the unification of Europe, one may also covet a
non-existent material object or desire a non-subsistent state of affairs. If
one covets a non-existent diamond, there is in some sense of ‘there is’ something
that one covets one’s state of mind has
an object and it has certain properties:
it is, e.g., a diamond. It may therefore be said to inhabit the realm of Sosein
‘being thus’ or ‘predication’ or ‘having properties’, which is the category
comprising the totality of objects. Objects that do not have any sort of being,
either existence or subsistence, belong to non-being Nichtsein. In general, the
properties of an object do not determine whether it has being or non-being. But
there are special cases: the round square, by its very nature, cannot subsist.
Meinong thus maintains that objecthood is ausserseiend, i.e., independent of
both existence and subsistence.
substratum: sub-statum: hypoeinai, hypostasis, hypokemeinon -- substantia
– Grice: “The Romans never felt the need for the word ‘substantia’ but trust
Cicero to force them to use it!” -- Grice lectured on this with J. L. Austin
and P. F. Strawson. hypousia -- as defined by Aristotle in the Categories, that
which is neither predicable “sayable” of anything nor present in anything as an
aspect or property of it. The examples he gives are an individual man and an
individual horse. We can predicate being a horse of something but not a horse;
nor is a horse in something else. He also held that only substances can remain
self-identical through change. All other things are accidents of substances and
exist only as aspects, properties, or relations of substances, or kinds of
substances, which Aristotle called secondary substances. An example of an
accident would be the color of an individual man, and an example of a secondary
substance would be his being a man. For Locke, a substance is that part of an
individual thing in which its properties inhere. Since we can observe, indeed
know, only a thing’s properties, its substance is unknowable. Locke’s sense is
obviously rooted in Aristotle’s but the latter carries no skeptical
implications. In fact, Locke’s sense is closer in meaning to what Aristotle
calls matter, and would be better regarded as a synonym of ‘substratum’, as
indeed it is by Locke. Substance may also be conceived as that which is capable
of existing independently of anything else. This sense is also rooted in
Aristotle’s, but, understood quite strictly, leads to Spinoza’s view that there
can be only one substance, namely, the totality of reality or God. A fourth
sense of ‘substance’ is the common, ordinary sense, ‘what a thing is made of’.
This sense is related to Locke’s, but lacks the latter’s skeptical
implications. It also corresponds to what Aristotle meant by matter, at least
proximate matter, e.g., the bronze of a bronze statue Aristotle analyzes
individual things as composites of matter and form. This notion of matter, or
stuff, has great philosophical importance, because it expresses an idea crucial
to both our ordinary and our scientific understandings of the world.
Philosophers such as Hume who deny the existence of substances hold that
individual things are mere bundles of properties, namely, the properties
ordinarily attributed to them, and usually hold that they are incapable of
change; they are series of momentary events, rather than things enduring
through time.
substantialism, the view that the primary, most
fundamental entities are substances, everything else being dependent for its existence
on them, either as a property of them or a relation between them. Different
versions of the view would correspond to the different senses of the word
‘substance’.
salva-veritate/salva-congruitate distinction, the The phrase occurs in two fragments from Gottfried Leibniz's
General Science. Characteristics: In Chapter 19, Definition 1, Leibniz
writes: "Two terms are the same (eadem) if one can be substituted for the
other without altering the truth of any statement (salva veritate)." In
Chapter 20, Definition 1, Leibniz writes: "Terms which can be substituted
for one another wherever we please without altering the truth of any statement
(salva veritate), are the same (eadem) or coincident (coincidentia). For
example, 'triangle' and 'trilateral', for in every proposition demonstrated by
Euclid concerning 'triangle', 'trilateral' can be substituted without loss of
truth (salva veritate)." ubstitutivity salva veritate: Grice: “The
phrase ‘salva veritate’ has been used at Oxford for years, Kneale tells me!” --
a condition met by two expressions when one is substitutable for the other at a
certain occurrence in a sentence and the truth-value truth or falsity of the
sentence is necessarily unchanged when the substitution is made. In such a case
the two expressions are said to exhibit substitutivity or substitutability
salva veritate literally, ‘with truth saved’ with respect to one another in
that context. The expressions are also said to be interchangeable or
intersubstitutable salva veritate in that context. Where it is obvious from a
given discussion that it is the truth-value that is to be preserved, it may be
said that the one expression is substitutable for the other or exhibits
substitutability with respect to the other at that place. Leibniz proposed to
use the universal interchangeability salva veritate of two terms in every
“proposition” in which they occur as a necessary and sufficient condition for
identity presumably for the identity of
the things denoted by the terms. There are apparent exceptions to this
criterion, as Leibniz himself noted. If a sentence occurs in a context governed
by a psychological verb such as ‘believe’ or ‘desire’, by an expression
conveying modality e.g., ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, or by certain temporal
expressions such as ‘it will soon be the case that’, then two terms may denote
the same thing but not be interchangeable within such a sentence. Occurrences
of expressions within quotation marks or where the expressions are both
mentioned and used cf. Quine’s example, “Giorgione was so-called because of his
size” also exhibit failure of substitutivity. Frege urged that such failures
are to be explained by the fact that within such contexts an expression does
not have its ordinary denotation but denotes instead either its usual sense or
the expression itself. Salva congruitate From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to navigationJump to search Salva congruitate[1] is a Latin scholastic
term in logic, which means "without becoming ill-formed",[2] salva
meaning rescue, salvation, welfare and congruitate meaning combine, coincide,
agree. Salva Congruitate is used in logic to mean that two terms may be
substituted for each other while preserving grammaticality in all
contexts.[3][4] Contents 1 Remarks on
salva congruitate 1.1 Timothy C. Potts 1.2 Bob Hale 2See also 3References
Remarks on salva congruitate Timothy C. Potts Timothy C. Potts describes salva
congruitate as a form of replacement in the context of meaning. It is a
replacement which preserves semantic coherence and should be distinguished from
a replacement which preserves syntactic coherence but may yield an expression
to which no meaning has been given. This means that supposing an original
expression is meaningful, the new expression obtained by the replacement will
also be meaningful, though it will not necessarily have the same meaning as the
original one, nor, if the expression in question happens to be a proposition,
will the replacement necessarily preserve the truth value of the original.[5] Bob Hale Bob Hale explains salva congruitate,
as applied to singular terms, as substantival expressions in natural language,
which are able to replace singular terms without destructive effect on the
grammar of a sentence.[6] Thus the singular term 'Bob' may be replaced by the
definite description 'the first man to swim the English Channel' salva
congruitate. Such replacement may shift both meaning and reference, and so, if
made in the context of a sentence, may cause a change in truth-value. Thus
terms which may be interchanged salva congruitate may not be interchangeable
salva veritate (preserving truth). More generally, expressions of any type are
interchangeable salva congruitate if and only if they can replace one another
preserving grammaticality or well-formedness.
See also Salva veritate Reference principle Referential opacity Crispin
Wright Peter Geach References W.V.O.
Quine, Philosophy of logic Dr. Benjamin
Schnieder, Canonical Property Designators, P9
W.V.O. Quine, Quiddities, P204
W.V.O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, P18
Timothy C. Potts, Structures and categories for the representation of
meaning, p57 Bob Hale, Singular Terms,
P34 Categories: Concepts in logicPhilosophical logicPhilosophy of languageLatin
logical phrases. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Implicaturum salva veritate,” H. P.
Grice, “What I learned from T. C. Potts.” – T. C. Potts, “My tutorials with
Grice at St. John’s.”
summum bonum: Grice: “that in relation to which all other things
have at most instrumental value value only insofar as they are productive of
what is the highest good. Philosophical conceptions of the summum bonum have
for the most part been teleological in character. That is, they have identified
the highest good in terms of some goal or goals that human beings, it is
supposed, pursue by their very nature. These natural goals or ends have
differed considerably. For the theist, this end is God; for the rationalist, it
is the rational comprehension of what is real; for hedonism, it is pleasure;
etc. The highest good, however, need not be teleologically construed. It may
simply be posited, or supposed, that it is known, through some intuitive
process, that a certain type of thing is “intrinsically good.” On such a view,
the relevant contrast is not so much between what is good as an end and what is
good as a means to this end, as between what is good purely in itself and what
is good only in combination with certain other elements the “extrinsically
good”. Perhaps the best example of such a view of the highest good would be the
position of Moore. Must the summum bonum be just one thing, or one kind of
thing? Yes, to this extent: although one could certainly combine pluralism the
view that there are many, irreducibly different goods with an assertion that
the summum bonum is “complex,” the notion of the highest good has typically
been the province of monists believers in a single good, not pluralists.
summum genus. What adjective is the ‘sumum’ translating, Grice
wondered. And he soon found out. We know that the Romans were unoriginally
enough with their ‘genus’ (cf. ‘gens’) translating Grecian ‘genos.’ The highest
category in the ‘arbor griceiana’ -- The categories. There is infimum genus, or
sub-summum. Talk of categories becomes informal in Grice when he ‘echoes’ Kant
in the mention of four ‘functions’ that generate for Kant twelve categories.
Grice however uses the functions themselves, echoing Ariskant, rather, as
‘caegory’. We have then a category of conversational quantity (involved in a
principle of maximization of conversational informativeness). We have a
category of conversational quality (or a desideratum of conversational
candour). We have a category of conversational relation (cf. Strawson’s
principle of relevance along with Strawson’s principles of the presumption of
knowledge and the presumption of ignorance). Lastly, we have a category of
conversational mode. For some reason, Grice uses ‘manner’ sometimes in lieu of
Meiklejohn’s apt translation of Kant’s modality into the shorter ‘mode.’ The
four have Aristotelian pedigree, indeed Grecian and Graeco-Roman: The quantity
is Kant’s quantitat which is Aristotle’s posotes (sic abstract) rendered in
Roman as ‘quantitas.’ Of course, Aristotle derives ‘posotes,’ from ‘poson,’ the
quantum. No quantity without quantum. The quality is Kant’s qualitat, which
again has Grecian and Graeco-Roman pediegree. It is Aristotel’s poiotes (sic in
abstract), rendered in Roman as qualitas. Again, derived from the more basic
‘poion,’ or ‘quale.’ Aristotle was unable to find a ‘-tes’ ending form for what
Kant has as ‘relation.’ ‘pros it’ is used, and first translated into Roman as
‘relatio.’ We see here that we are talking of a ‘summum genus.’ For who other
but a philosopher is going to lecture on the ‘pros it’? What Aristotle means is
that Socrates is to the right of Plato. Finally, for Grice’s mode, there is
Kant’s wrong ‘modalitat,’ since this refers to Aristotle ‘te’ and translated in
Roman as ‘modus,’ which Meiklejohn, being a better classicist than Kant,
renders as ‘mode,’ and not the pretentious sounding ‘modality.’ Now for Kant,
12 categories are involved here. Why? Because he subdivides each summum genus
into three sub-summum or ‘inferiore’ genus. This is complex. Kant would
DISAGREE with Grice’s idea that a subject can JUDGE in generic terms, say, about
the quantum. The subject has THREE scenarios. It’s best to reverse the order,
for surely unity comes before totality. One scenario, he utters a SINGULAR or
individual utterance (Grice on ‘the’). The CATEGORY is the first category, THE
UNUM or UNITAS. The one. The unity. Second scenario, he utters a PARTICULAR
utterance (Grice’s “some (at least one). Here we encounter the SECOND category,
that of PLURALITAS, the plurum, plurality. It’s a good thing Kant forgot that
the Greeks had a dual number, and that Urquhart has fourth number, a re-dual. A
third scenario: the nirvana. He utters a UNIVERSAL (totum) utterance (Grice on
“all”). The category is that of TOTUM, TOTALITAS, totality. Kant does not deign
to specify if he means substitutional or non-substitutional. For the quale,
there are again three scenarios for Kant, and he would deny that the subject is
confronted with the FUNCTION quale and be able to formulate a judgement. The
first scenario involves the subject uttering a PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA (Grice elaborates
on this before introducing ‘not’ in “Indicative conditionals” – “Let’s start
with some unstructured amorophous proposition.” Here the category is NOT
AFFIRMATION, but the nirvana “REALITAS,” Reality, reale.Second scenario,
subject utters a PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA (Grice on ‘not’). While Kant does not
consider affirmatio a category (why should he?), he does consider NEGATIO a
category. Negation. See abdicatum. Third scenario, subject utters an PROPOSITIO
INFINITA. Here the category is that of LIMITATION, which is quite like NEGATIO
(cf. privatio, stelesis, versus habitus or hexis), but not quite. Possibly
LIMITATUM. Regarding the ‘pros ti.’ The first scenario involves a categorema,
PROPOSITIO CATEGORICA. Here Kant seems to think that there is ONE category
called “INHERENCE AND SUBSTISTENCE or substance and accident. There seem rather
two. He will go to this ‘pair’ formulation in one more case in the relation,
and for the three under modus. If we count the ‘categorical pairs’ as being two
categories. The total would not be 12 categories but 17, which is a rather ugly
number for a list of categories, unles it is not. Kant is being VERY serious
here, because if he has SUBSTISTENCE or SUBSTANCE as a category, this is
SECUNDA SUBSTANTIA or ‘deutero-ousia.’ It is a no-no to count the prote ousia
or PRIMA SUBSTANTIA as a category. It is defined as THE THING which cannot be
predicated of anything! “SUMBEBEKOS” is a trick of Kant, for surely EVERYTHING
BUT THE SUBSTANCE can be seen as an ‘accidens’ (In fact, those who deny
categories, reduce them to ‘attribute’, or ‘property.’ The second scenario
involves an ‘if’ Grice on ‘if’ – PROPOSITIO CONDITIONALIS – hypothetike
protasis -- this involves for the first time a MOLECULAR proposition. As in the
previous case, we have a ‘category pair’, which is formulated either as
CAUSALITY (CAUSALITAS) and DEPENDENCE (Dependentia), or “cause’ (CAUSA) and
‘effect’ (Effectum). Kant is having in mind Strawson’s account of ‘if’ (The
influence of P. F. Strawson on Kant). For since this is the hypothetical, Kant
is suggeseting that in ‘if p, q’ q depends on p, or q is an effect of its
cause, p. As in “If it rains, the boots are in the closet.” (J). The third scenario also involves a molectural
proposition, A DISJUNCTUM. PROPOSITIO DISJUNCTIVA. Note that in Kant, ‘if’
before ‘or’! His implicaturum: subordination before coordination, which makes
sense. Grice on ‘or.’ FOR SOME REASON, the category here for Kant is that of
COMMUNITAS (community) or RECIPROCITAS, reciprocity. He seems to be suggesting
that if you turn to the right or to the left, you are reciprocally forbidden to
keep on going straight. For the modus, similar. Here Kant is into modality.
Again, it is best to re-order the scenarios in terms of priority. Here it’s the
middle which is basic. The first scenario, subject utters an ASSERTORIC. The
category is a pair: EXISTENCE (how is this different from REALITY) and
NON-EXISTENCE (how is this different from negation?). He has in mind: ‘the cat
is in the room,’ ‘the room is empty.’ Second scenario, the subject doubts.
subject utters a problematical. (“The pillar box may be red”). Here we have a
category pair: POSSIBILITIAS (possibility) and, yes, IMPOSSIBILITAS –
IMPOSSIBILITY. This is odd, because ‘impossibility’ goes rather with the negation
of necessity. The third and last scenario, subject utters an APODEICTIC. Here
again there is a category pair – yielding 17 as the final number --:
NECESSITAS, necessity, and guess what, CONTINGENTIA, or contingency. Surely,
possibilitas and contingentia are almost the same thing. It may be what Grice
has in mind when he blames a philosopher to state that ‘what is actual is not
also possible.’ Or not. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of
Ariskant’s categories,” Ryle, “Categories.” “The nisnamed categories.” Ryle
notes that when it comes to ‘relatio,’ Kant just murders Aristotle’s idea of a
‘relation’ as in higher than, or smaller than. – “His idea of the molecular
propositions has nothing to do with Aristotle’s ‘relation’ or ‘pros ti.’”
sub-positum, suppositum – (literally, ‘sub-positum,’) -- cf.
presuppositum -- in the Middle Ages, reference. The theory of supposition, the
central notion in the theory of proprietates terminorum, was developed in the
twelfth century, and was refined and discussed into early modern times. It has
two parts their names are a modern convenience. 1 The theory of supposition
proper. This typically divided suppositio into “personal” reference to
individuals not necessarily to persons, despite the name, “simple” reference to
species or genera, and “material” reference to spoken or written expressions.
Thus ‘man’ in ‘Every man is an animal’ has personal supposition, in ‘Man is a
species’ simple supposition, and in ‘Man is a monosyllable’ material
supposition. The theory also included an account of how the range of a term’s
reference is affected by tense and by modal factors. 2 The theory of “modes” of
personal supposition. This part of supposition theory divided personal
supposition typically into “discrete” ‘Socrates’ in ‘Socrates is a man’,
“determinate” ‘man’ in ‘Some man is a Grecian’, “confused and distributive”
‘man’ in ‘Every man is an animal’, and “merely confused” ‘animal’ in ‘Every man
is an animal’. The purpose of this second part of the theory is a matter of
some dispute. By the late fourteenth century, it had in some authors become a
theory of quantification. The term ‘suppositio’ was also used in the Middle
Ages in the ordinary sense, to mean ‘assumption’, ‘hypothesis’. H. P. Grice,
“Implicaturum, implicatum, positum, subpositum;” H. P. Grice: “A
communicational analogy: explicatum/expositum:implicatum/impositum,” H. P.
Grice, “The positum: between the sub-positum and the supra-positum,” H. P.
Grice, “The implicaturum, the sous-entendu, and the sub-positum.”
survival: discussed by Grice in what he calls the ‘genoritorial
programme, where the philosopher posits himself as a creature-constructor. It’s
an expository device that allows to ask questions in the third person, “seeing
that we can thus avoid the so-called ‘first-person bias’” -- continued
existence after one’s biological death. So understood, survival can pertain
only to beings that are organisms at some time or other, not to beings that are
disembodied at all times as angels are said to be or to beings that are
embodied but never as organisms as might be said of computers. Theories that
maintain that one’s individual consciousness is absorbed into a universal
consciousness after death or that one continues to exist only through one’s
descendants, insofar as they deny one’s own continued existence as an
individual, are not theories of survival. Although survival does not entail
immortality or anything about reward or punishment in an afterlife, many
theories of survival incorporate these features. Theories about survival have
expressed differing attitudes about the importance of the body. supervenient
behaviorism survival 892 892 Some
philosophers have maintained that persons cannot survive without their own bodies,
typically espousing a doctrine of resurrection; such a view was held by
Aquinas. Others, including the Pythagoreans, have believed that one can survive
in other bodies, allowing for reincarnation into a body of the same species or
even for transmigration into a body of another species. Some, including Plato
and perhaps the Pythagoreans, have claimed that no body is necessary, and that
survival is fully achieved by one’s escaping embodiment. There is a similar
spectrum of opinion about the importance of one’s mental life. Some, such as
Locke, have supposed that survival of the same person would require memory of
one’s having experienced specific past events. Plato’s doctrine of
recollection, in contrast, supposes that one can survive without any
experiential memory; all that one typically is capable of recollecting are
impersonal necessary truths. Philosophers have tested the relative importance
of bodily versus mental factors by means of various thought experiments, of
which the following is typical. Suppose that a person’s whole mental life memories, skills, and character traits were somehow duplicated into a data bank and
erased from the person, leaving a living radical amnesiac. Suppose further that
the person’s mental life were transcribed into another radically amnesiac body.
Has the person survived, and if so, as whom?
swinburne: Grice: “Those Savoyards among us should never confuse
Swinburne, parodied in “Patience,” and the Oxonian theologian – hardly an
aesthete!” -- English philosopher of religion and of science. In philosophy of science,
he has contributed to confirmation theory and to the philosophy of space and
time. His work in philosophy of religion is the most ambitious project in
philosophical theology undertaken by a British philosopher in the twentieth
century. Its first part is a trilogy on the coherence and justification of
theistic belief and the rationality of living by that belief: TheCoherence of
Theism 7, The Existence of God 9, and Faith and Reason 1. Since 5, when
Swinburne became Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion
at the of Oxford, he has written a
tetralogy about some of the most central of the distinctively Christian
religious doctrines: Responsibility and Atonement 9, Revelation 2, The
Christian God 4, and Providence and the Problem of Evil 8. The most interesting
feature of the trilogy is its contribution to natural theology. Using Bayesian
reasoning, Swinburne builds a cumulative case for theism by arguing that its
probability is raised sustaining cause Swinburne, Richard 893 893 by such things as the existence of the
universe, its order, the existence of consciousness, human opportunities to do
good, the pattern of history, evidence of miracles, and religious experience.
The existence of evil does not count against the existence of God. On our total
evidence theism is more probable than not. In the tetralogy he explicates and
defends such Christian doctrines as original sin, the Atonement, Heaven, Hell,
the Trinity, the Incarnation, and Providence. He also analyzes the grounds for
supposing that some Christian doctrines are revealed truths, and argues for a
Christian theodicy in response to the problem of evil. Refs.: H. P. Grice,
“Swinburne et moi.”
synæsthesia: cum-perceptum: co-sensibile – cum-sensibile –
co-sensatio, co-sensation -- a conscious experience in which qualities normally
associated with one sensory modality are or seem to be sensed in another.
Examples include auditory and tactile visions such as “loud sunlight” and “soft
moonlight” as well as visual bodily sensations such as “dark thoughts” and
“bright smiles.” Two features of synaesthesia are of philosophic interest.
First, the experience may be used to judge the appropriateness of sensory
metaphors and similes, such as Baudelaire’s “sweet as oboes.” The metaphor is appropriate
just when oboes sound sweet. Second, synaesthesia challenges the manner in
which common sense distinguishes among the external senses. It is commonly
acknowledged that taste, e.g., is not only unlike hearing, smell, or any other
sense, but differs from them because taste involves gustatory rather than
auditory experiences. In synaesthesia, however, one might taste sounds
sweet-sounding oboes. G.A.G. syncategoremata, 1 in grammar, words that cannot
serve by themselves as subjects or predicates of categorical propositions. The
opposite is categoremata, words that can do this. For example, ‘and’, ‘if’,
‘every’, ‘because’, ‘insofar’, and ‘under’ are syncategorematic terms, whereas
‘dog’, ‘smooth’, and ‘sings’ are categorematic ones. This usage comes from the
fifth-century Latin grammarian Priscian. It seems to have been the original way
of drawing the distinction, and to have persisted through later periods along
syllogism, demonstrative syncategoremata 896
896 with other usages described below. 2 In medieval logic from the
twelfth century on, the distinction was drawn semantically. Categoremata are
words that have a definite independent signification. Syncategoremata do not
have any independent signification or, according to some authors, not a definite
one anyway, but acquire a signification only when used in a proposition
together with categoremata. The examples used above work here as well. 3
Medieval logic distinguished not only categorematic and syncategorematic words,
but also categorematic and syncategorematic uses of a single word. The most
important is the word ‘is’, which can be used both categorematically to make an
existence claim ‘Socrates is’ in the sense ‘Socrates exists’ or
syncategorematically as a copula ‘Socrates is a philosopher’. But other words
were treated this way too. Thus ‘whole’ was said to be used
syncategorematically as a kind of quantifier in ‘The whole surface is white’
from which it follows that each part of the surface is white, but
categorematically in ‘The whole surface is two square feet in area’ from which
it does not follow that each part of the surface is two square feet in area. 4
In medieval logic, again, syncategoremata were sometimes taken to include words
that can serve by themselves as subjects or predicates of categorical
propositions, but may interfere with standard logical inference patterns when
they do. The most notorious example is the word ‘nothing’. If nothing is better
than eternal bliss and tepid tea is better than nothing, still it does not
follow by the transitivity of ‘better than’ that tepid tea is better than
eternal bliss. Again, consider the verb ‘begins’. Everything red is colored,
but not everything that begins to be red begins to be colored it might have
been some other color earlier. Such words were classified as syncategorematic
because an analysis called an expositio of propositions containing them reveals
implicit syncategoremata in sense 1 or perhaps 2. Thus an analysis of ‘The
apple begins to be red’ would include the claim that it was not red earlier,
and ‘not’ is syncategorematic in both senses 1 and 2. 5 In modern logic, sense
2 is extended to apply to all logical symbols, not just to words in natural
languages. In this usage, categoremata are also called “proper symbols” or
“complete symbols,” while syncategoremata are called “improper symbols” or
“incomplete symbols.” In the terminology of modern formal semantics, the
meaning of categoremata is fixed by the models for the language, whereas the
meaning of syncategoremata is fixed by specifying truth conditions for the
various formulas of the language in terms of the models. H. P. Grice,
“Implicatures of synaesthesia,” “Some remarks about the senses.”
syneidesis,
conscientia -- synderesis: Grice
disliked the word as a ‘barbarism.’ Grice: “synderesis was by most of us at the Playgroup
reckoned to be a corruption of the Greician
“συνείδησις” shared knowledge, literally
‘co-ideatio,’ formed from ‘syn’ and ‘eidesis,’ ‘co-vision,’ or
conscience, the corruption appearing in the medieval manuscripts of what
Austin called ‘that ignorant saint,’ Jerome in his Commentary.” Douglas Kries in Traditio vol.
57: Origen, Plato, and Conscience (Synderesis) in Jerome's Ezekiel
Commentary, p. 67. συνείδησις , εως, ἡ, A.
Liddell and Scott render as “knowledge shared with another,” -- τῶν ἀλγημάτων
(in a midwife) Sor.1.4. 2. communication, information, εὑρήσεις ς. PPar. p.422
(ii A.D.); “ς. εἰσήνεγκαν τοῖς κολλήγαις αὐτῶν” POxy. 123.13 (iii/iv A.D.). 3.
knowledge, λῦε ταῦτα πάντα μὴ διαλείψας ἀγαθῇ ς. (v.l. ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ) Hp.Ep.1. 4.
consciousness, awareness, [τῆς αὑτοῦ συστάσεως] Chrysipp.Stoic.3.43, cf.
Phld.Rh.2.140 S., 2 Ep.Cor.4.2, 5.11, 1 Ep.Pet.2.19; “τῆς κακοπραγμοσύνης”
Democr.297, cf. D.S.4.65, Ep.Hebr.10.2; “κατὰ συνείδησιν ἀτάραχοι διαμενοῦσι” Hero
Bel.73; inner consciousness, “ἐν ς. σου βασιλέα μὴ καταράσῃ” LXX Ec. 10.20; in
1 Ep.Cor.8.7 συνειδήσει is f.l. for συνηθείᾳ. 5. consciousness of right or
wrong doing, conscience, Periander and Bias ap. Stob.3.24.11,12, Luc.Am.49; ἐὰν
ἐγκλήματός τινος ἔχῃ ς. Anon. Oxy.218 (a） ii 19; “βροτοῖς ἅπασιν ἡ ς. θεός” Men.Mon.654, cf. LXX
Wi.17.11, D.H.Th.8 (but perh. interpol.); “ς. ἀγαθή” Act.Ap.23.1; ἀπρόσκοπος
πρὸς τὸν θεόν ib.24.16; “καθαρά” 1 Ep.Ti.3.9, POsl.17.10 (ii A.D.);
“κολαζομένους κατὰ συνείδησιν” Vett.Val.210.1; “θλειβομένη τῇ ς. περὶ ὧν
ἐνοσφίσατο” PRyl.116.9 (ii A.D.); τὸν . . θεὸν κεχολωμένον ἔχοιτο καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν
ς. Ath.Mitt.24.237 (Thyatira); conscientiousness, Arch.Pap.3.418.13 (vi
A.D.).--Senses 4 and 5 sts. run one into the other, v. 1 Ep.Cor.8.7, 10.27 sq.
6. complicity, guilt, crime, “περὶ τοῦ πεφημίσθαι αὐτὴν ἐν ς. τοιαύτῃ”
Supp.Epigr.4.648.13 (Lydia, ii A.D.). Grice: “The rough Romans could not do
with the ‘cum-‘ of the ‘syn-‘ but few of us at Oxford think of Laurel and Hardy
or Grice and Strawson when they say ‘conscientia’!” con-scĭo , īre, v. a. * I.
To be conscious of wrong: nil sibi, * Hor. Ep. 1, 1, 61.— II. To know well
(late Lat.): “consciens Christus, quid esset,” Tert. Carn. Chr. 3. moral theology, conscience. Jerome used ‘synderesis.’
‘Synderesis’ becomes a fixture because of Peter Lombard’s inclusion of it in
his Sentences. Despite this origin, Grecian ‘synderesis’ is distinguished from Roman
‘conscience’ (from cum-scire) -- by
Aquinas. For Aquinas, Grecian ‘synderesis’ is the quasi-habitual grasp of the
most common principles of the moral order i.e., natural law, whereas ‘conscienntia’
is the *application* of such knowledge to fleeting and unrepeatable
circumstances. ’Conscientia,’ Aquinas misleadingly claims, is allegedly ambiguous
in the way in which ‘knowledge’ is. Knowledge (Scientia) can be the mental
state of the knower or what the knower knows (scitum, cognitum) – Grice: “In
fact, Roman has four participles, active present, sciens, passive perfect,
sctium, future active, sciendus, future passive, sciturus -- But ‘conscientia’ like ‘synderesis’, is typically used for the
state of the soul. Sometimes, however, conscientia is taken to include general
moral knowledge as well as its application here and now; but the content of
synderesis is the most general precepts, whereas the content of conscience, if
general knowledge, will be less general precepts. Since conscience can be
erroneous, the question arises as to whether synderesis and its object, natural
law precepts, can be obscured and forgotten because of bad behavior or
upbringing. Aquinas holds that while great attrition can take place, such
common moral knowledge cannot be wholly expunged from the soul. This is a
version of the Aristotelian doctrine that there are starting points of
knowledge so easily grasped that the grasping of them is a defining mark of the
human being. However perversely the human agent behaves there will remain not
only the comprehensive realization that good (bonum) is to be done and evil (malum)
avoided, but also the recognition of some substantive human goods. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice ad Aquino,” Villa Grice --. H. P. Grice, “Kenny on Aquinas,”
“Kenny uses barbaric Griceian and Grecian.”
synergism: in soteriology, the cooperation within human
consciousness of free will and divine grace in the processes of conversion and
regeneration. Synergism became an issue in sixteenth-century Lutheranism during
a controversy prompted by Philip Melanchthon 1497 syncategorematic synergism
897 897 1569. Under the influence of
Erasmus, Melanchthon mentioned, in the 1533 edition of his Common Places, three
causes of good actions: “the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will.” Advocated by
Pfeffinger, a Philipist, synergism was attacked by the orthodox, predestinarian,
and monergist party, Amsdorf and Flacius, who retorted with Gnesio-Lutheranism.
The ensuing Formula of Concord 1577 officialized monergism. Synergism occupies
a middle position between uncritical trust in human noetic and salvific
capacity Pelagianism and deism and exclusive trust in divine agency Calvinist
and Lutheran fideism. Catholicism, Arminianism, Anglicanism, Methodism, and
nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberal Protestantism have professed versions
of synergism.
systems
theory: the transdisciplinary study of
the abstract organization of phenomena, independent of their substance, type,
or spatial or temporal scale of existence. It investigates both the principles
common to all complex entities and the usually mathematical models that can be
used to describe them. Systems theory was proposed in the 0s by the biologist
Ludwig von Bertalanffy and furthered by Ross Ashby Introduction to Cybernetics,
6. Von Bertalanffy was both reacting against reductionism and attempting to
revive the unity of science. He emphasized that real systems are open to, and
interact with, their environments, and that they can acquire qualitatively new
properties through emergence, resulting in continual evolution. Rather than
reduce an entity e.g. the human body to the properties of its parts or elements
e.g. organs or cells, systems theory focuses on the arrangement of and
relations among the parts that connect them into a whole cf. holism. This
particular organization determines a system, which is independent of the
concrete substance of the elements e.g. particles, cells, transistors, people.
Thus, the same concepts and principles of organization underlie the different
disciplines physics, biology, technology, sociology, etc., providing a basis
for their unification. Systems concepts include: system environment boundary,
input, output, process, state, hierarchy, goal-directedness, and information.
The developments of systems theory are diverse Klir, Facets of Systems Science,
1, including conceptual foundations and philosophy e.g. the philosophies of
Bunge, Bahm, and Laszlo; mathematical modeling and information theory e.g. the
work of Mesarovic and Klir; and practical applications. Mathematical systems
theory arose from the development of isomorphies between the models of
electrical circuits and other systems. Applications include engineering,
computing, ecology, management, and family psychotherapy. Systems analysis,
developed independently of systems theory, applies systems principles to aid a
decision maker with problems of identifying, reconstructing, optimizing, and
controlling a system usually a socio-technical organization, while taking into
account multiple objectives, constraints, and resources. It aims to specify
possible courses of action, together with their risks, costs, and benefits.
Systems theory is closely connected to cybernetics, and also to system
dynamics, which models changes in a network of synergy systems theory 898 898 coupled variables e.g. the “world
dynamics” models of Jay Forrester and the Club of Rome. Related ideas are used
in the emerging “sciences of complexity,” studying self-organization and
heterogeneous networks of interacting actors, and associated domains such as
far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, chaotic dynamics, artificial life,
artificial intelligence, neural networks, and computer modeling and simulation.
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